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Psychopathic Characters on the Stage

Sigmund Freud

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PSYCHOPATHIC CHARACTERS ON THE STAGE

BY SIGMUND FREUD

If the function of the drama, as has been assumed since Aristotle, is to excite pity and fear, and thus bring about a 'catharsis of the emotions', we may describe this same purpose a little more fully if we say that the question is one of opening up sources of pleasure and enjoyment from within our affective life, just as wit and the comic do from within the sphere of the intellect, through the action of which many such sources had been made inaccessible. Certainly the release of the subject's own affects must here be given first place, and the enjoyment resulting therefrom corresponds on the one hand to the relief produced by their free discharge, and on the other, very likely, to the concomitant sexual stimulation which, one may suppose, occurs as a by-product of every emotional excitation and supplies the subject with that feeling of a heightening of his psychic level which he so greatly prizes. The sympathetic witnessing of a dramatic performance fulfils the same function for the adult as does play for the child, whose besetting hope of being able to do what the adult does, it gratifies. The spectator at the play experiences too little; he feels like a 'Misero, to whom nothing worth while can happen'; he has long since had to moderate, or better direct elsewhere, his ambition to occupy a central place in the stream of world events; he wants to feel, to act, to mold the world in the light of his desire—in short, to be a hero. And the playwright-actors make all this possible for him by giving him the opportunity to identify himself with a hero. But they thus spare him something also; for the spectator is well aware that taking over the hero's rôle in his own person would involve such griefs, such sufferings and such frightful terrors as would almost nullify the pleasure therein; and he knows too that he has but a single life to live, and might perhaps perish in a single one of the hero's many

battles with the Fates. Hence his enjoyment presupposes an illusion; it presupposes an attenuation of his suffering through the certainty that in the first place it is another than himself who acts and suffers upon the stage, and that in the second place it is only a play, whence no threat to his personal security can ever arise. It is under such circumstances that he may indulge in the luxury of being a hero; he may give way unashamedly to suppressed impulses such as the need for freedom in religious, political, social or sexual respects, and may let himself go in all directions in each and every grand scene of the life enacted upon the stage.

These are prerequisites for enjoyment, however, which are common to several forms of creative art. Epic poetry subserves above all the release of intense but simple feelings—as does, in its sphere, the dance; the epic poem may be said to make possible the enjoyment in particular of the great heroic personality in his triumphs; drama, however, is supposed to delve deeper into emotional possibilities, to manage to transform even the forebodings of doom into something enjoyable, and it therefore depicts the embattled hero rather with a masochistic satisfaction in succumbing. In fact, one might characterize drama by this very relation to suffering and misfortune, whether as in the play mere apprehension is aroused and then allayed, or as in tragedy actual suffering is brought into being. The origin of drama in sacrificial rites (goat and scapegoat) in the cult of the gods cannot be without appositeness to this meaning of drama; it assuages as it were the beginning revolt against the divine order which decreed the suffering. The hero is at first a rebel against God or the divine; and it is from the feeling of misery of the weaker creature pitted against the divine might that pleasure may be said to derive, through masochistic gratification and the direct enjoyment of the personage whose greatness nevertheless the drama emphasizes. This is the Prometheus attitude of man, who in a spirit of petty compliance would be soothed for the time being with a merely momentary gratification.

All varieties of suffering are therefore the theme of drama,

which promises to create out of them pleasure for the spectator; whence arises the first condition which this art form must fulfil, that it shall cause the spectator no suffering, and that it must know how to compensate by means of the gratifications which it makes possible for the pity which it arouses—a rule against which modern dramatists have particularly often been offenders. But this suffering is soon restricted to mental anguish only, for nobody wants to witness physical suffering who knows how soon the bodily sensations thus stimulated put an end to all mental enjoyment. He who is ill has but one desire: to get well, to get over his condition; the doctor must come with his medicine; the arresting of the play of fantasy must cease—that arrest which has spoiled us to the extent of letting us extract enjoyment even out of our suffering. When the spectator puts himself in the place of the sufferer from physical illness, he finds nothing within himself of enjoyment or of psychological give and take; and it is on this account that a person physically ill is possible on the stage only as a property, but not as the hero—excepting as some particular psychic aspect of illness is susceptible of psychic elaboration, as for example the abandoning of the sick Philoctetes, or the hopelessness of the sick in the plays of Strindberg.

Mental suffering we recognize, however, chiefly in relation to the circumstances out of which it has developed; hence drama requires an action from which this suffering derives, and begins by introducing to the audience this action. It is only an apparent exception that such plays as *Ajax* and *Philoctetes* present mental suffering as already in existence, for because of the familiarity of the matter to the audience the curtain always rises in the Greek drama in the middle of the play, as it were. Now, it is easy to define the conditions which this action must fulfil. There must be a play of contending forces; the action must contain within itself a striving of the will and some opposition thereto. The first and most grandiose fulfilling of these conditions was exemplified in the struggle against divinity. It has already been said that the essence of this tragedy is revolt, with dramatist and spectator taking sides with the rebel. The less

that is then ascribed to the divine, the more accrues to the human element, which, with ever increasing insight, is made responsible for suffering; and so the next struggle, that of the hero against the social community, becomes the social tragedy. Still another fulfilling of these conditions is seen in the struggle between men themselves, that is, the character drama, which contains within itself all the characteristics of the agon, and, enacted preferably between outstanding personalities freed from the restrictions of human institutions, must accordingly have more than one hero. Combinations of these two are of course perfectly permissible, in the form of a struggle on the part of the hero against institutions of which strong characters are the embodiment. The pure drama of character is lacking in the sources of enjoyment afforded by the theme of rebellion, which in social plays, such as those of Ibsen, is again as powerfully to the fore as in the historical plays of Greek classical times. If religious, character and social drama differ from one another chiefly with respect to the arena in which the action takes place from which the suffering has its origin, we may now follow the drama to still another arena, where it becomes the psychological drama. For it is within the soul of the hero himself that there takes place an anguished struggle between various impulses—a struggle which must end, not with the downfall of the hero, but with that of one of the contending impulses, in other words, with a renunciation. Every combination of this situation with that in the earlier type of drama, that is the social and the character drama, is of course possible in so far as social institutions evoke just such an inner conflict, and so on. It is here that the love drama belongs, in so far as the suppressing of love—whether on the score of the mores, the conventions or the conflict, familiar from opera, between 'love and duty'—forms the starting point for an almost endless variety of conflictual situations, as infinite in their variety as the erotic daydreams of mankind. The possibilities multiply still further, however, and the psychological drama becomes the psychopathological, when the source of the suffering which we are to share and from which we are to derive pleasure is no longer a conflict between

two almost equally conscious motivations, but one between conscious and repressed ones. Here the precondition for enjoyment is that the spectator shall also be neurotic. For it is only to him that the release and, to a certain extent, the conscious recognition of the repressed motivation can afford pleasure, instead of making merely for unacceptance. In the non-neurotic this will meet only with unacceptance, and will induce a readiness to repeat the act of repression, for in his case the latter has been successful. The repressed impulse is kept in complete counterbalance by the original force of repression. In the neurotic, on the other hand, repression is by way of failing; it is unstable, and requires ever renewed effort, an effort which is spared by recognition. It is only in the neurotic that such a struggle exists as can become the subject of drama; but in him also the dramatist will create not only the pleasure derived from release but resistance as well.

The foremost modern drama of this kind is *Hamlet,* which deals with the theme of a normal man who, because of the particular nature of the task enjoined upon him, becomes neurotic —a man in whom an impulse hitherto successfully repressed seeks to assert itself. *Hamlet* is distinguished by three characteristics which seem of importance to our discussion: 1) that the hero is not psychopathic, but becomes so only in the course of the action we are going to witness; 2) that the repressed desire is one of those that are similarly repressed in all of us, the repression of which belongs to an early stage of our individual development, while the situation arising in the play shatters precisely this repression. Because of these two features it is easy for us to recognize ourselves in the hero. For we are victims of the same conflict as is he; since 'he who doesn't lose his reason under certain provocations has no reason to lose'. 3) But it appears to be one of the prerequisites of this art form that the struggle of the repressed impulse to become conscious, recognizable though it is, is so little given a definite name that the process of reaching consciousness goes on in turn within the spectator while his attention is distracted and he is in the grip of his emotions, rather than capable of rational judgment. In

this way resistance is definitely reduced, in the manner seen in psychoanalytic treatment, when the derivatives of the repressed ideas and emotions come to consciousness as a result of a lessening of resistance in a manner denied to the repressed material itself. And indeed the conflict in *Hamlet* is so deeply hidden that at first I could only surmise it.

Possibly it is because of the disregarding of these three requisite conditions that so many other psychopathic characters become as useless for the stage as they are for life itself. For the sick neurotic is to us a man into whose conflict we can obtain no insight (empathy) when he presents it to us in the form of the finished product. Conversely, if we are familiar with this conflict, we forget that he is a sick man, just as when he becomes familiar with it he himself ceases to be sick. It is thus the task of the dramatist to transport us into the same illness—a thing best accomplished if we follow him through its development. This will be particularly needful when the repression is not already existent in ourselves and must therefore be effected *de novo*—which represents a step beyond *Hamlet* in the utilization of neurosis upon the stage. Where the full-blown and strange neurosis confronts us, in real life we call the physician and deem the person in question unsuitable as a stage figure.

In general, it may perhaps be said that the neurotic lability of the public, and the art of the dramatist in making use of resistances and supplying forepleasure, alone determine the limits of the utilization of abnormal characters upon the stage.

Translated by HENRY ALDEN BUNKER

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Reminiscences of Professor Sigmund Freud

Max Graf

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REMINISCENCES OF PROFESSOR SIGMUND FREUD

BY MAX GRAF

Freud's [1] article, Psychopathological Personages on the Stage, which I now make public and which is here printed for the first time, was written in 1904. Four years previously, Freud had published his Interpretation of Dreams in which he laid the foundation for his new psychoanalytic technique. He boldly descended into the obscure depths of the 'unconscious'. For the first time, he marched along on his own way, undaunted among affects, affective psychological stimuli, erotic drives. In a realm in which heretofore man had seen only arbitrariness, obscurity, and absence of laws, Freud discovered laws and well-balanced structure. The images of dreams were no longer the arbitrary play of an imagination which, once the lights were out, began to dream about things without inhibition. On the contrary, these images developed in accordance with definite laws; they had a meaning which could be definitely established by means of a scientific technique. *Acheronta movebo,* 'I shall move the nether world', wrote the keen investigator with pride and self-awareness. He chose this phrase as the motto of his book. And he did move this underworld—with a secure hand, without fear of conventions or painful results. The mechanisms of this underworld were described and explained scientifically.

From the very outset, Freud applied his method of investigating the unconscious to the various fields of psychic life.

[1] These are comments accompanying Freud's Psychopathic Characters on the Stage, published here at the wish of Dr. Graf to whom Freud donated the manuscript many years ago. Time does not seem to have dimmed the freshness of the affects which were aroused by Freud's steady scientific progress and his sequential adherence to his scientific method. Dr. Graf's remarks are therefore of historical interest. They are here published as they were submitted, without any deletions or corrections. The reference to the University of Toronto is an obvious lapse of memory; evidently, Clark University is meant, to the twentieth anniversary of which Freud was invited in 1909. Freud was of course eighty, not seventy, when Hitler ordered his books burned. [THE EDITORS]

First he studied wit; soon he turned his attention to the products of artistic imagination, and later to religions, myths, the development of human civilization, the microcosm and macrocosm, the world and the man. All were for Freud a unity. Everywhere he saw the regular organization of the unconscious and conscious, inhibition and repression, the affects and their influence from within, the transformation of instincts and passions into symptoms and images, the fundamental power of erotic drives in human life. The imagery of the dream, of the myth, the symbols of religion—all were interrelated. According to Freud, the ceremonies of divine service have the same content as the obsessional acts of neurotics and the seemingly meaningless and not very odd acts of the sane. There was meaning and sense in everything. The unconscious of man developed and functioned exactly in the same manner as the unconscious in the course of the development of humanity as a whole. It was a part of the past which the new gods had thrust into the depths and which through the movement of the surface of the earth, through earthquakes and volcanic eruptions, tried to free itself.

Freud was particularly anxious to subject Tragedy to psychoanalytic investigation. Freud's point of departure in the investigation of the psyche was Œdipus. The behavior of the Greek Œdipus, Freud considered typical for the functions of the unconscious. He analyzed love for the mother and hate for the father and considered them the primary drives in the sexual development of humanity. In his Interpretation of Dreams Freud moved from the analysis of Œdipus to that of Shakespeare's Hamlet. Here he discovered the same psychological motivations he had found in the tragedy of Sophocles. Here, too, love for the mother and hate for the father (the œdipus complex) were transformed into the complicated form of a neurosis by means of modern psychological inhibitions and resistances. There was but one short step left to make from the psychoanalytic interpretation of individual characters of the Drama to the psychoanalytic investigation of the Drama and the Tragedy. The profound article on psychopathological characters of the stage is logically connected with the studies

and ideas which Freud broadened in his Interpretation of Dreams.

I met Freud in the same year in which he published the Interpretation of Dreams (1900)—in other words, in the most important and decisive year of his life. Freud had at the time been treating a lady whom I knew. This lady would tell me after her sessions with Freud of the remarkable treatment by means of questions and answers. On the basis of her reports of these interviews, I became acquainted with the new mode of looking at psychological phenomena, with the artistic untangling of the fabric of the unconscious, and with the technique of dream analysis. These new ideas, which affected me in the manner of a psychological fermentation, aroused my interest in the new investigator. I wanted to know him personally. I was invited to visit him in his office.

Freud was then forty-four years old. The very black hair on his head and beard had begun to show traces of gray. The most striking thing about the man was his expression. His beautiful eyes were serious and seemed to look at man from the depths. There was then something distrustful in this look; later, there was to appear bitterness as well. Freud's head had something artistic about it; it was the head of a man of imagination. I no longer remember what it was we talked about at that first meeting. It was friendly and simple, as always. I suppose my interest in his theories was the reason for my being invited again, and soon I found myself in the circle of his first pupils, although I was not a physician but a writer, a music critic.

Freud's theories were then arousing their first severe opposition. The official science of the time wanted nothing of Freud. The leader of the Viennese physicians was Wagner-Jauregg, professor at the University, a man who constitutionally and in manner of thinking was unable to understand Freud's ideas. For Wagner-Jauregg psychological suffering meant only physical suffering, something to be treated by physical agencies. Freud, on the other hand, tried to find a way of treating neurotic states by means of a psychological approach. He taught the patient to analyze his own psychological life and to bring

together the confused threads. Wagner-Jauregg sought to improve the bodily functions in order to cure the patient.

I knew personally this great man who 'played against' Freud. He came from peasant stock—broad shouldered, slow, heavy, very strong, he was rather taciturn. When he was examining his patients, he was frequently rather rude and snappish. However, I also learned to know him as a kind man, although he would gladly conceal this side of his personality under a rude exterior. It is difficult to imagine a greater contrast than Freud and Wagner-Jauregg. Freud was a spiritual person of great imagination; he saw in the psyche of the sick man the same forces at work as those in a healthy person—not merely soul, psychic forces, and psychological mechanisms. Wagner-Jauregg was a physician to whom the body and the bodily occupied the major place, to whom the psychological was but an expression of the bodily. On the basis of this point of view, Wagner-Jauregg discovered the treatment of general paralysis with malaria, one of the greatest creative discoveries of modern medicine. He treated the general paralytic patients with artificially produced fever and thus cured the sick psyche. Freud did not want to hear of any physical treatment of a psychological illness. When the opinion was once expressed that the intimate relationship between body and soul would permit one theoretically to believe that mental diseases could be cured with medicaments, that is to say, by means of the bodily approach, Freud remarked that theoretically it was possible, but not practically—that there was no way of approaching the psyche via the body—that one should approach the psyche only psychologically.

Thus stood Freud and Wagner-Jauregg, each on his own spot on the globe, each producing great deeds. Much later, Wagner-Jauregg recognized that Freud's ideas contained, in part, something valuable. At the time when I met Freud, the two men were opponents, and Freud had to wait another twenty years before—world famous and sixty-four years old—he became professor at the University of Vienna, in which Wagner-Jauregg was the most outstanding man.

The neurologists were enemies of Freud. The Viennese

Society laughed at him. In those days when one mentioned Freud's name in a Viennese gathering, everyone would begin to laugh, as if someone had told a joke. Freud was the queer fellow who wrote a book about dreams and who imagined himself an interpreter of dreams. More than that, he was the man who saw sex in everything. It was considered bad taste to bring up Freud's name in the presence of ladies. They would blush when his name was mentioned. Those who were less sensitive spoke of Freud with a laugh, as if they were telling a dirty story. Freud was fully aware of this opposition on the part of the world. It was a part of the psychological picture as he saw it. It was the manifestations of the same force which drove so many psychological stimuli into the unconscious; consequently, it now arose against any attempt at their uncovering.

With conviction and certainty, Freud pursued his own way. He worked from morning till night; he gave his lectures at the University; he sat at his desk and wrote his books and let his patients tell him their stories. He smoked his cigars and listened to the free associations of his patients, to their dreams and fantasies. The unconscious psychological life presented to him as little mystery as the dark forest has for a good hunter; he knew every nook and corner. The amount of spiritual energy which Freud needed for his daily listening to the histories of his patients and for the interpretation of their psychological tension was immense.

Freud's life with his family and his congress with friends gave him the necessary rest. On Sunday afternoon he used to go to the house of *B'nai B'rith,* where he played with friends the Viennese card game *Tarock.* Here, at the gathering of *B'nai B'rith,* Freud presented his first lectures on the interpretation of dreams. Whether discoursing before experts or laity, Freud was a brilliant speaker. Words came to him readily, naturally, and with clarity. On the most difficult subjects he spoke as he wrote, with the imagination of an artist, using comparisons from the most varied fields of knowledge. His lectures were enlivened with quotations from the classics, especially from Goethe's Faust. Freud was particularly fond of telling various

episodes from his travels. His summers he spent regularly in Altaussee, in the midst of the Alps. His favorite occupations during these summer vacations was looking in the woods for mushrooms.

Gradually, Freud gathered around him a circle of interested and inspired pupils. One day he startled me by announcing that he would like to have a meeting in his house once a week; he wanted there not only a number of his pupils, but also some personalities from other fields of intellectual endeavor. He mentioned to me Hermann Bahr, the writer who was then the leader of modern artists in Vienna, who had a keen feeling for all new intellectual trends. Freud wanted to have his theories discussed from all possible points of view. He asked me whether I would be interested in such an undertaking. Thus, I was for several years a member of this group of friends which met every Wednesday in Freud's house. The majority of this group was naturally made up of physicians who were familiar with the new freudian psychology. There were a few writers, I who was a music critic, and Leher, the musical esthete from the Viennese State Academy of Music. I took over the task of investigating the psychology of great musicians and the process of composing music, utilizing psychoanalysis for this task.

We would gather in Freud's office every Wednesday evening. Freud sat at the head of a long table, listening, taking part in the discussion, smoking his cigar, and weighing every word with a serious, probing look. To his right sat Alfred Adler, whose talk carried conviction because of his poise, factual earnestness, and sobriety. To Freud's left sat Wilhelm Stekel, the man about whom Freud later published a sharp critique, but who was at that time active and rich in ideas. Of the physicians of Freud's circle, I met Paul Federn, one of the most loyal pupils of Freud, who successfully represents the orthodox trends of Freud's school.

The gatherings followed a definite ritual. First, one of the members would present a paper. Then, black coffee and cakes were served; cigars and cigarettes were on the table and were consumed in great quantitites. After a social quarter of an

hour, the discussion would begin. The last and the decisive word was always spoken by Freud himself. There was an atmosphere of the foundation of a religion in that room. Freud himself was its new prophet who made the theretofore prevailing methods of psychological investigation appear superficial. Freud's pupils—all inspired and convinced—were his apostles. Despite the fact that the contrast among the personalities of this circle of pupils was great, at that early period of freudian investigation all of them were united in their respect for and inspiration with Freud.

At those Wednesday gatherings I presented papers on the psychological processes of Beethoven and Richard Wagner in writing music. It is astonishing to what extent the new psychology of Freud proved useful in the analysis of artistic, creative work. The mechanisms of the dream and those of artistic fantasy were similar; the unconscious and the conscious acted togethere in accordance with the laws formulated by Freud; the play and counterplay of affects, inhibitions, transformations of affects—all became intelligible. One day I brought Freud an attempted analysis of Richard Wagner's The Flying Dutchman; in this the poetic imagery of Wagner was connected with his childhood impressions. Freud told me that he would not return this work to me (the first of its kind); he published it in his Writings on Applied Psychology (Vienna, by Deuticke). In another book, entitled The Inner Workshop of the Musician (published by Ferdinand Enke in Stuttgart), I made use of freudian theories for the interpretation of creative musical work.

I have compared the gatherings in Freud's home with the founding of a religion. However, after the first dreamy period and the unquestioning faith of the first group of apostles, the time came when the church was founded. Freud began to organize his church with great energy. He was serious and strict in the demands he made of his pupils; he permitted no deviations from his orthodox teaching. Subjectively, Freud was of course right, for that which he worked out with so much energy and sequence, and which was as yet to be

defended against the opposition of the world, could not be rendered inept by hesitations, weakening, and tasteless ornamentations. Good-hearted and considerate though he was in private life, Freud was hard and relentless in the presentation of his ideas. When the question of his science came up, he would break with his most intimate and reliable friends. If we do consider him as a founder of a religion, we may think of him as a Moses full of wrath and unmoved by prayers, a Moses like the one Michael Angelo brought to life out of stone—to be seen in the Church of San Pietro in Vincoli in Rome. After a trip to Italy, Freud never tired of talking to us about this statue; the memory of it he kept for his last book.

In the meantime, Freud's theories spread ever further all over the world. They were a real fermenting agent, not only in science but also in literature, in religious problems, in mythology. Everywhere one had to deal with strife and animosities, rejections of the sexual interpretation of affects, resistances against a theory which strove to uncover what was poorly repressed. On the other hand, new, inspired adherents appeared everywhere, new pupils, new apostles. One day Freud brought into our circle a tall, good-looking physician from Switzerland. Freud spoke of him with great warmth; it was Professor Jung from Zürich. Another time he introduced a gentleman from Budapest—Doctor Ferenczi. Branches of the freudian church were founded in all parts of the world. America showed a particularly great interest in this new psychology, and it was an especial honor when Freud was invited by the University of Toronto to give there several lectures. When Freud returned to Vienna, he presented to our Wednesday gathering a vivid description of America and of his experiences in the New World.

The original circle of the Viennese apostles began to lose its significance for Freud, particularly because his most gifted pupil turned away to follow a path of his own—Alfred Adler, who in a series of excellent discussions of his own views quietly and firmly defended the following point of view:

Freud had created a new technique, the product of a real genius; this technique was a new tool for investigative work, which every physician should use for independent research. He compared the freudian technique for exploring the unconscious with the technique of great artists, which pupils would take over but which they would have to adapt to their given personalities. Raphael used Perugino's technique, but he was not copying Perugino.

Freud would not listen. He insisted that there was but one theory, he insisted that if one followed Adler and dropped the sexual basis of psychic life, one was no more a freudian. In short, Freud—as the head of a church—banished Adler; he ejected him from the official church. Within the space of a few years, I lived through the whole development of a church history: from the first sermons to a small group of apostles to the strife between Arius and Athanasius.

I did not feel able to decide to take part in the strife between Freud and Adler's group. I admired Freud's genius. I loved his human simplicity, the absence of any vanity in his scientific personality. Moreover, a personal contact had developed between Freud and my family which made Freud's human warmth particularly valuable. On the occasion of some of his visits the conversation would touch upon the Jewish question. Freud was proud to belong to the Jewish people which gave the Bible to the world. When my son was born, I wondered whether I should not remove him from the prevailing antisemitic hatred, which at that time was preached in Vienna by a very popular man, Doctor Lueger. I was not certain whether it would not be better to have my son brought up in the Christian faith. Freud advised me not to do this. 'If you do not let your son grow up as a Jew', he said, 'you will deprive him of those sources of energy which cannot be replaced by anything else. He will have to struggle as a Jew, and you ought to develop in him all the energy he will need for that struggle. Do not deprive him of that advantage.'

When Gustav Mahler became director of the Viennese Opera, Freud was an admirer of the energy and greatness of the man.

Freud was a man of great artistic sensibilities, but to his great regret he was quite unmusical. It was the spiritual and personal energy of Gustav Mahler that he admired.

Freud took the warmest part in all family events in my house; this, despite the fact that I was still a young man and Freud was already aging and his marvelous black hair was beginning to gray. On the occasion of my son's third birthday, Freud brought him a rocking horse which he himself carried up the four flights of steps leading to my house. Freud knew how to live with people; he was a person with social feelings. It was his fundamental rule always to treat at least one patient without compensation. It was his way of doing welfare work.

Freud was one of the most cultivated persons I have ever known. He knew all the most important writings of poets. He knew the paintings of the great artists, which he studied in the museums and churches of Italy and Holland. Despite his artistic propensities and the romantic nature of his investigation of the unconscious, he was a true type of the exact scientist. His analysis of the unconscious was rationalistic. The bringing of the unconscious into consciousness, the method which he devised, the transformation of affects—he performed through reasoning and brought under control through reasoning. Freud wanted nothing of metaphysics. He had no feeling for philosophy. I frequently wondered with astonishment at how harshly he rejected any sort of metaphysics. He was an out and out positivist. He was much surprised when I pointed out to him passages in Kant's Anthropology and in the writings of Leibnitz in which the unconscious was discussed. Leibnitz was, strictly speaking, the discoverer of unconscious presentations.

Freud had a particular interest for the history of ancient peoples and ancient cultures. In his work room there stood a glass case full of Greek and Egyptian objects, some of which he had bought and some of which he had received as presents. He himself betrayed this interest in his excavations of his own psyche. His profession was excavating the past from the psyche of his patients. He brought to light many things when he studied human beings psychoanalytically, old things which

had remained undiscovered and hidden in the deepest layers of the psyche. He found the same symbols represented by the Egyptian scarab, or a phallus in bronze, which for this interpreter of erotic symbols had an especial interest.

One of the kindliest traits of Freud's personality was his love for jokes. He liked to enliven his conversation and even his lectures with various jokes and anecdotes. He valued particularly the jargon jokes of popular Jewish humor. These interested him not only because of the trenchancy of the dialect but for their inner earnestness and wisdom of life. As is known, following his discovery of the meaning of the seemingly meaningless imagery of dreams, Freud devoted a book to the analysis of the unconscious relationships of wit.

There was not a field of the human spirit and history which Freud did not approach with the keen eye of an investigator. There is none which he did not enrich with his new method of consideration. He was a born discoverer and investigator, and his imagination was that of an artist. Freud's best pupil cannot be compared to this creative imagination and real genius. Adler possessed clarity, poise, and a fine psychological feeling; he went along his path in slow steps, ever testing. He remained on the surface of the earth. Unlike Freud, he never rose into the air in a flight of imagination, nor did he ever dig deep shafts into the bowels of the earth. But I was unable and unwilling to submit to Freud's 'do' or 'don't'—with which he once confronted me—and nothing was left for me but to withdraw from his circle.

I did, of course, express my admiration for Freud later in an article on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. In that article, while the destroyers of German culture in Berlin burned many great books and among them also the writings of Freud, I tried to show how Freud's ideas were connected not only with those of Leibnitz but also with those of German romanticism, whose physicians and writers began first with somnambulism and hypnotism. Quite naturally, so great a house as that built by Freud has as great a foundation.

At that time I had a chance to speak once more with Freud,

and I found him distrustful, bitter, and angry. His teaching had spread all over the world; it had become an important component of modern psychological research everywhere. 'Conscious', 'unconscious', 'repression', 'inhibition' had become catchwords. Even moving pictures embroidered their trash with Freud's ideas, and one day we read in the papers that an American film company wanted to engage Freud's services; so great had his glory become that they wished to have the publicity value of his presence in Hollywood. A great deal of money was offered, but Freud refused. How changed was this world from the days when a small group of pupils would gather in Freud's house every Wednesday evening. The spiritual and scientific world belonged to Freud. Only Albert Einstein, as a scientist, exerted a similar influence.

As a memory of those days when I had the honor of accompanying the great scholar part of his way, I kept the manuscript which I now offer; Freud gave it to me and I now submit it to a world in which the ideas of Freud have become a part of the spiritual air we breathe. The original manuscript presents four pages of large size written in Freud's handwriting, which betrays energy, decisiveness, and artistic freedom. Evidently, the manuscript was written in one sitting. The thoughts flow freely from the pen and despite their keenness and development, there is not a sign of halting and there are almost no corrections. The article is written in the way Freud spoke, fluently, with great vividness, with the joy of improvising and of expressing ideas which were independent and keen.

Since Freud never returned to this subject, the article is of particular importance.

I have frequently stood in awe in the archeological museum in Athens and wondered how it was that even a fragment of the marble of a Greek statue could reflect the total greatness of Greek art. Similarly, one can see revealed in this obviously hastily sketched article—which undoubtedly represents but a first draft—the whole greatness of Freud.

Translated by GREGORY ZILBOORG

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Emotional Memories and Acting Out

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EMOTIONAL MEMORIES AND ACTING OUT

BY EDOARDO WEISS (CHICAGO)

I

From the beginning of his psychological inquiries, Freud stressed the importance of the dynamic factor for the resolution of the neurosis. If a patient recalls a trauma without reëxperiencing the related affects, these are not discharged and he fails to feel relieved from the neurotic libidinal tension. The related affects remain, as Freud said, 'pent up'. Also in the case of repressed drives it is not enough for the patient to gain only the intellectual conviction of having, unconsciously, this or that drive, in order to change the psychodynamics. The desired internal changes take place only by the actual experience of the emotions belonging to the repressed memories or drives. In this sense alone can it be said that the patient becomes conscious of what formerly was unconscious. He is confronted with internal forces which constantly try to prevent the reappearance in his consciousness of repressed memories, drives, and related affects. These opposing forces or resistances are organized in a countercathexis, typical for each neurosis.

One of the tasks of psychoanalytic treatment is precisely to help the patient overcome these psychic obstacles and so enable him to reëxperience the repressed affects and emotions as well as to become aware of their connections with other psychic phenomena. Thus the analysis of resistances, and the elaboration of technical procedure to surmount them, arose as one of the most important problems of such treatment.

A far more difficult task of psychoanalytic treatment is to induce or enable the patient to give up, successively, infantile reaction-patterns, habits, etc., of a certain kind. It is indeed much more difficult for an individual to accomplish in his later life what he did not succeed in accomplishing in his past

development. Fixations to infantile situations, attachments, reactions, etc., extend themselves more and more to multiple derivatives and equivalents and are responsible for inhibitions and distortions of ego development and its adjustment to the external world, thus influencing the fate of the individual.

II

The dynamic conception of the unconscious is not only the most important, but also the first that we owe to Freud. He taught that memories and drives are repressed because the ego rejects them, and that the analyst meets this attitude of the ego in the resistance it exerts whenever he tries to raise to the consciousness of the patient what has been repressed. The resistances themselves are mostly unconscious although they are considered to be manifestations of the ego. The analysis must enable the patient to become aware of his resistances before he becomes able to surmount them; hence Freud could no longer identify consciousness with an ego which revealed other unconscious activities too, such as for instance the secondary gain from illness. Freud compared consciousness to a 'sense' organ for the perception of psychic qualities. This organ belongs to the ego. Federn says about the relation of the ego to consciousness: 'Consciousness is one of the functions united within the ego by the ego. Accordingly, the ego is both the vehicle and object of consciousness. We speak of the ego, in its capacity as the vehicle of consciousness, as "I myself".'

The phenomenon of repression revealed itself as a complicated one after Freud distinguished primary repression from later repressions. These occur not only because of the rejection of related psychic contents by the ego, but also because of a process of attraction that already repressed material exerts on them. In later repressions, the id participates in the process.

The reappearance during analysis of repressed affects and emotions occurs in the different neuroses in different measure and with different facility. In hysteria it occurs more easily; in compulsive neurosis with greater difficulty; in the schizophrenias sometimes very vividly and spontaneously. But the

breaking through of repressed emotions in schizophrenia happens haphazardly because of the loss of coherence of the schizophrenic ego.

Verbalization is a determining factor for the reappearance in consciousness of memories. Experiences undergone in the period before the acquisition of language can be recalled with the greatest difficulty if at all. The different degrees of accessability to the hysteric and compulsive egos, of repressed affects and emotions, depend on both the particular phase of the libido fixation and regression, and the ego organization which is typical for each neurosis. According to Federn it is a question of different states and degrees of unity of the ego: whether the ego was more or less split, more or less compact and unified, whether the ego boundaries were more or less rigid when the neurosis began.

It is a great achievement of Federn to have given analytic consideration to different ego states and phases of ego development, and to have noted their importance for the mechanisms of the different neuroses. Federn's observations are original and represent effective progress in metapsychological conceptions.

III

Psychoanalysis considers the ego to be, so to speak, an 'organ' of the psychic apparatus. It has been defined by many analysts (Freud, Federn, Glover, Nunberg, Waelder and others), and there has been much discussion about its functions.

Freud calls the ego that part of the id which is detached and turned toward the external world. In conformation to the external world, an ego had to develop in order to adapt the organism to reality. The ego has to coördinate and resolve conflicting demands from the id, the superego and the external world. From birth, it has to relinquish progressively the pursuit of the primary pleasure principle in favor of the reality principle. Freud supposes that originally the ego gets hallucinatory satisfaction of its desires and needs. Only little by little does it learn to wait and renounce, in accordance with reality, in order to obtain in limited measure what it needs and desires.

Its thinking function is developed by trial activity, testing reality with minimal shifts of energy. Many functions of the ego are not yet satisfactorily explored and probably there are still ego functions to be discovered.

Federn's definitions of the ego are classified as follows:

> '(1) *Descriptive Definition.* The ego is the lasting or recurring psychical *continuity* of the body *and* mind of an individual in respect of space, time and causality.
>
> '(2) *Phenomenological (i.e. subjectively descriptive) Definition.* The ego is felt and known by the individual as a lasting or recurring *continuity* of the bodily and mental life in respect of time, space and causality, and is felt and apprehended by him as a unity.
>
> '(3) *Metapsychological Definition.* The basis of the ego is a state of psychical cathexis of certain interdependent bodily and mental functions and contents, the cathexes in question being simultaneous and interconnected, and also continuous. The nature of these functions and the centre around which they are grouped are familiar.'

While some analysts (Waelder, Nunberg) describe the ego as an 'organ' having the function of establishing harmonious unity, according to Federn it is a cathexis-unity which from birth to death changes with every change of exogenous stimulation and endogenous intention. The established, frequent, and habitual ego reactions are the well-known reaction-patterns of the individual. However, the normal ego consciously feels itself only somewhat, and frequently not at all, disharmonious. This is explained by the fact that only one ego state may function at any given moment thus excluding others, some only by displacement, some by repression.

Although the ego is a cathexis-unity, it includes, originally, contrasts which express themselves in emotions of different kinds (Federn). Freud speaks of a synthetic function of consciousness, to which e.g. the secondary elaboration in the dream work and the apparent logical aspect of paranoic delusions are due, whereas Nunberg in his interesting paper, The Synthetic Function of the Ego, assigned this function of establishing

harmony and unity to the ego. Self-preservation requires coherence in the reactions of the ego toward the external world; furthermore, as Freud stated, the ego ideal and superego, once established, claim a certain (moral) unity and harmony from the ego. Nevertheless the harmony of the ego is continuously threatened, and it defends itself by repression, and other mechanisms, in an effort to keep itself free from conflicts.

IV

Federn introduced the psychoanalytic investigation of the feeling of oneself, 'ego feeling'. He considered bodily as well as psychic ego feelings. Ego feeling must be distinguished from consciousness. In some cases of depersonalization the patient fails to feel the affected parts as belonging to his own ego although he is conscious of them. He may for instance have the feeling that his legs no longer belong to him, while still able to move them and to perceive every sensation in them exactly as before. The subjectively experienced fact is that the ego feeling of that person does not include his legs. Depressed patients often complain of inability to feel love, pity, and so forth, while their behavior and reactions reveal clearly the presence of such feelings. According to Federn, in these cases the ego feeling has been withdrawn from psychic contents which are conscious to the patient. Ego feeling is an additional feeling to consciousness and only those functions invested with this feeling are felt to be normally connected with the ego.

The experience of the ego feeling is tied to the primary or 'medial' (Federn) ego libido which forms a well-demarcated unity, and borders on the external world and that internal one which is not felt as ego. The ego boundaries are changeable but the ego cathexis remains a unity. It is precisely this cathexis which permits the ego to be experienced by the individual. This introspective perception of ego feeling is significant for the appearance and reappearance into consciousness of different psychic material.

Not every ego can experience every kind of emotion, affect or drive. Expressions like 'childish', 'mature', 'heterosexual',

'homosexual', 'narcissistic', 'hysteric', 'compulsive', 'schizophrenic', 'intelligent', 'inhibited', represent various ego dispositions. An infantile ego can experience emotions, impulses, etc., which a mature ego cannot. The description of a given ego includes the accepted drives, reaction-formations toward the repressed ones, reaction patterns, its relation to objects, the superego, etc.

V

The realization of connections between seemingly disconnected and senseless subjective or objective events is always accompanied by a feeling of relief. This is the most impressive experience for the patient in psychoanalysis. It is the process of making conscious what was unconscious before. In his New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Freud says, 'Where id was, there shall ego be. It is reclamation work, like the draining of the Zuyder Zee.' Whenever the id does not have control over drives, the ego takes over and puts them in its service.

Order and sense are of the greatest importance to ego feeling. Loss of unity and lack of a feeling of internal order—such as occurs in schizophrenia—is experienced as an annihilation of the ego, projected onto the world.

The psychic contents which in any given moment or period of life are cathected by ego feeling are due to many factors. They are determined by one's drives and the external situation in conformity to the particular type of ego and the degree of its development. The type of ego, in turn, is shaped both by internal (constitutional and other) factors and by its manifold experiences, remote and recent, and by environmental conditions which together determine the special reactions, repressions, identifications, and so forth.

VI

The reappearance of a drive, which has been repressed in early childhood as a defense against danger, mobilizes anxiety. However, reducing the resistance due to the past fear is insufficient

to cause the ego to reinclude the repressed drive. The ego, being in contact with reality, the exclusion or inclusion of any psychic material in its boundaries is dependent on the actual character of the ego. In addition to 'consciousness cathexis', an 'ego-feeling cathexis' is required if the ego is to feel the related content as belonging to it. This ego-feeling cathexis in turn depends on the compatibility of the single element with the whole ego unity. Important phenomena, as inclusion of certain drives and affects in the ego, acceptance of some orientations or moral demands, identifications, giving up of moral demands or principles, abandonment of identifications, etc., require more or less a rearrangement of the existing contents of the ego. If the ego is unable to accommodate such changes, it loses its coherence. The disappearance from consciousness of infantile memories and drives is due to the incompatibility of these elements with the mature ego.

Under hypnosis the ego feeling undergoes the most profound changes. Analysis also facilitates slight or intensive regressions to former ego states, although in lesser degree than in hypnosis. On arising from the analytic couch patients often feel dizzy for a few minutes. On the couch the patient was, in a certain measure, detached from current reality, a state conducive to reëxperiencing past experiences, with corresponding affects by virtue of withdrawal of ego cathexis from recent positions. The feeling of dizziness the patient experiences on getting up is due to the sudden reëstablishment in his ego of full contact with immediate reality.

Ferenczi in 1914 wrote on this subject as follows. 'Many patients have a sensation of giddiness on rising from the recumbent position at the end of the psychoanalytic session. The explanation—in itself rational—that this is the result of the sudden change of posture (cerebral anæmia) proves on analysis to be a successful rationalization; in reality the sensation on change of posture is only the means of expression of certain feelings and thoughts still under censorship. During the session the patient gave himself up wholly to free association and to its preliminary stipulation, transference to the doctor, and

lives in the fantasy that he will always enjoy such well-being. Suddenly this (unconscious) fantasy is destroyed by the doctor's warning that the session is ended; he suddenly becomes conscious of the actual facts; he is not "at home" here, but a patient like any other; it is the paid doctor and not the helpful father that stands before him. This sudden alteration of the psychic setting, the *disillusionment* (when one feels as *"though fallen from the clouds")* may call up the same subjective feeling as is experienced in sudden and unexpected change of posture when one is unable to adapt oneself suitably by compensation movements and by means of the sense organs—that is to say, to preserve one's "equilibrium"—which is the essence of giddiness. Naturally at the moment of this disillusionment, that part of the *belief in analysis* that did not as yet rest on honest conviction, but only on a filial trust, disappears very easily, and the patient is again suddenly more inclined to regard the analytic explanations as a "swindle" [1] which word association may also facilitate the appearance of the symptom. The problem, however, is not solved, but merely displaced by this discovery, for the question at once arises, why does one call the *deceiver a swindler,* that is, take him for a person who knows how to rouse feelings of giddiness in others? Probably just because he is able to waken *illusions* that at the moment of *disillusionment* will call up the feeling of giddiness (in the manner just described).'

Careful inquiry has revealed that some patients feel strange, rather than giddy, although they complained in almost all such cases of dizziness. The strangeness (depersonalization) is the reaction of the mature ego to the regression to an earlier stage of ego development just experienced on the couch. Often this feeling of depersonalization is accompanied by anxiety.

This phenomenon presents a number of problems of practical interest. Sometimes the emotions and emotional memories experienced on the analytic couch are afterwards not fully assimilated by the adult ego. On leaving a theatre, having

[1] German *'Schwindel'*—'giddiness' as well as 'swindle'. The interplay here of meaning and sound is untranslatable. [TR.]

been deeply engrossed in the performance, one also sometimes feels estranged from reality for a variable time. It is questionable whether psychotic patients whose grasp of reality is limited should be permitted to attend theatrical performances. Often in dreams, a theatre represents the analysis, or one's internal life in antithesis to external reality (Tausk).

VII

Some of the emotions experienced during analysis, although apparently connected with memories, belong to the recent ego of the patient and did not occur in the past about which the patient is talking. In these cases no dizziness or depersonalization occurs after the hour. Many times emotions are reactions of the present ego to the past. A girl, for instance, who was analyzed for depression, cried bitterly every time she remembered how kind some people were to her in her childhood. The emotion with which she reacted to these memories was not what she had experienced in childhood in response to the kindnesses recollected. The ego of this neurotic patient felt like an abandoned child. The memories simply touched her current neurotic emotional sensibilities. Such emotional discharge during analysis brings temporary relief but must be distinguished from becoming conscious of an affect which was repressed through which lasting changes in the psychic economy are achieved. It is in the latter instances that the patient feels dizzy or estranged for a few minutes when he arises at the end of the session.

Still another related phenomenon is sometimes observed. A patient dwells for weeks or even months on a special eventful and emotional period of his life, which may be puberty or a phase of his childhood, reëxperiencing more or less the emotions he felt at that time, not only during the analytic hour, but continuously. In such phases of analysis the patient does not feel strange after the hour because he does not pass suddenly from one ego state to another, but dwells in the reawakened one. However, this reawakened ego succeeds in establishing a compromise with current reality, and the patient

becomes for the time being susceptible to those emotions, expectations, affective attitudes, etc., which belonged to that past period of his life.

A twenty-two-year-old girl began to feel more vivacious especially at home during a phase of analysis in which she was recalling her emotional states during puberty. She became very attentive to her parents with whom she had lost all relationship, and on one occasion she caught up her mother and started dancing with her as she had seven or eight years prior.

Such sudden regressive hypomanic acting out naturally bewilders the patient's family and intimates. The acting out of the repressed ego of a patient is sometimes more conspicuous if he is analyzed away from home and returns after a few months to visit. During the period of analysis he is lacking in that continuous control he would have had by his permanent contact with his family; thus his ego could more freely regress in analysis. The sudden recovery of a repressed memory from earliest childhood is experienced by the patient in a hallucinatory way. Freud explained this observation of his by the statement that in infancy, psychic experiences have, in general, a hallucinatory character. If a patient succeeds, during an analytic hour, in recapturing a strongly emotional memory of childhood, he feels as a rule depersonalized; he loses for some minutes the feeling of external reality and becomes more or less anxious.

A patient in analysis was lying relaxed on a beach taking a sun bath, when he saw in the distance a lady in a bathing suit holding her little son of about two years by the hand. The baby was naked. As they approached, the patient suddenly saw with a shock of horror that the little boy's penis had been completely amputated. The next instant he realized that the child was a girl. For some minutes he felt dizzy (depersonalized) until he could dismiss the incident. It was precisely these emotions that he had experienced when he first discovered the difference between the sexes. Although this topic had appeared repeatedly in his analysis, he had not been able to believe he could have experienced such a shock in his

childhood. Reëxperiencing the emotion caused a momentary regression to the corresponding ego state of development which competed with his mature realistically oriented ego.

The subjective, sometimes terrifying, anxiety against which phobic patients defend themselves is usually difficult for patients to describe accurately. Almost all cases have in common the feeling of alienation both from the outer world and from the self. One says he is faint; another fears he will lose his memory or go mad; a third is dizzy, while others feel that they are dying. Some feel their knees becoming so relaxed that they are unable to stand; some state that they cannot feel their legs, or that they are confronted with an invisible barrier which does not allow them to proceed further; others complain of a sensation in stepping as if the ground were becoming unsteady or rising up, or as if they found themselves walking on the edge of a precipice. Unable to tell where he himself ends and the world begins, such a one finds himself lost in space, feeling powerless to cope with the outer world; or he relates that surrounding objects lose their outlines.

All these sensations are expressions of disturbances of ego feeling. The ego cathexis is disturbed in its coherent unity by repressed emotions (infantile anxiety states) which threaten to break through into consciousness. The feeling of estrangement from the external world is due to the withdrawal of ego cathexis from sense organs through which the external world is perceived. Sensory stimuli which are not cathected by ego feeling are perceived as unreal (Federn).

VIII

By 'acting out' is meant the behavior of a person who repeats without insight an unconscious psychic situation out of his past in terms of current reality. What characterizes the acting out is the fact that the repetition, occurring *under changed conditions, appears changed itself* and finds expression *in derivatives of the original situation.* A man, for instance, repeats intense feelings of hostility towards his brothers and sisters by quarreling with his fellow-workers. Often the repe-

tition occurs in symbolic form. The repetition is not so much to reëstablish the old situation as it is unconsciously to seek such gratification, or its equivalent, as existed at that former time if only in fantasy. Freud considered transference as a form of acting out.

If the tension of repressed drives inadmissible to the ego becomes sufficiently strong the compromise is a neurotic symptom, the kind depending on the ego structure and the libidinal organization. An ego overwhelmed by id cathexes takes refuge in a psychosis. The fear of becoming insane is the threat to the ego that impulses from the id may become uncontrollable.

One of the commonest escapes from ego-id tensions is provided by alcoholism and other addictions. Impending emotions and instinctual drives incompatible with the ego ideal can be temporarily forgotten or more easily acted out with the assistance of alcohol. The drunkard permits himself and, to a certain degree, is permitted to act 'crazy' while intoxicated. Drunkenness is a transitory psychosis. His subjective feeling is changed. As a consequence of the increased cathexis mobility he can become euphoric and boastful, sentimental, pitiful or tender, sad and tearful, etc., in manner and degree quite incompatible with his sober ego. Much more importantly, he can often actively consummate genital, or infantile, sexual impulses, or hostile and destructive strivings, giving full vent to the formerly repressed energic tensions before the reëstablished sober ego closes its door (consciousness) to them.

In every case in which the ego struggles against impulses alien to it, the individual feels depersonalized and unwell. A man who had been given some drinks, ignorant of the fact that the drinks contained alcohol, complained after a time that he felt uncomfortable and wished to withdraw from the company. Told that he had had alcoholic drinks, he felt immediately better, and soon quite 'comfortable'. This subjective improvement was due to his 'permitting' the mild inebriation. His ego had stopped resisting.

The precondition for every recovery from a neurosis is a permanent change in the structure of the ego which is also felt

subjectively. The changed ego must be compliant to some form of conscious expression of the pathogenic libidinal tensions. The ego cathexis, being a coherent unity, may be compatible with some emotional states and incompatible with others. If the repressed primitive and infantile strivings of early childhood are brought too suddenly into the consciousness of a weak or not very coherent ego, the awakened ego states do not disappear easily and coëxist with the mature ego and the resulting mental condition may resemble something like drunkenness mixed with depersonalization. This is an important problem in the analysis of schizophrenic or schizoid persons.

If, as has been surmised, shock treatments eliminate some memories through organic action on the cells of the cortex, it is quite possible that certain emotional factors which disrupted the unity and coherence of the ego are also destroyed. The recent ego is enabled to assert itself, competitive regressive ego states having been reduced to impotence. Federn states that it is postepileptic amnesia that causes the remissions following shock treatments. It is known that too strong and too many shocks can cause demonstrable changes in the ganglion cells of the brain with some permanent loss of memory.

IX

In my opinion, regression does not characterize the phenomenon of acting out. There is nevertheless the tendency to live out for a time 'pent up' emotions, or repressed impulses, once they are freed. This is only possible, in the case of memories, if the patient can dwell again in fantasy for a sufficient length of time in the corresponding former state of ego development. In the case of the girl who reënacted her puberty, the reëxperiencing of this earlier period of her life was not restricted to memories of adolescence with the related emotions, but was rather a total reversion to an earlier period of living. This is only similar to acting out.

Acting out proper is another kind of repetition of repressed psychic events. It is the repetition *in a new edition* of some

former behavior, the ego cathexis not regressing to the previous phase and with no recognition of any relationship between the present and the past behavior.

In discussing the repetition compulsion, Freud stated that the analyst would certainly prefer that the patient recall the memory of repressed traumatic experiences, instead of repeating them actively and without insight, but that he cannot prevent the patient's repeating the most salient episodes and situations of his past. These repetitions take place chiefly in the transference. However, since remembering is partially also a repetition, one wonders why the repetition is not confined to recalling memories.

According to Freud, one acts out instead of remembering. However, psychoanalytic experience teaches us that patients in analysis often act out emotional situations which they have already remembered. Freud's formulation can be modified by saying that one acts out instead of remembering *fully* with the appropriate attending emotions. It is because the ego cannot always regress to the corresponding state, or at least dwell long enough in it, that the repetition or the acting out occurs. *If the current conscious ego does not return to the past memory, then the past memory ascends to the recent ego.* This, in my opinion, is the psychological reason for acting out. I have called 'leveling', the phenomenon according to which emotion and ego state meet on the same level. The repetition then occurs in the form of derivatives of the former experience, compatible with the current conscious ego.

What to a child's mind is a crime may not be such in the feeling of an adult. Likewise, in acting out, the 'crime' of childhood will be represented by a deed which is felt to be an equivalent crime by the adult ego; moreover, what was experienced in early childhood only in fantasy, will be translated into activity in repetition on the level of the adult ego, because fantasy has for the ego organization of the child a much greater reality value than it has for an adult ego. This is what led Freud to warn patients not to make major decisions during analysis which greatly intensifies the tendency to act out which operates in everyone's life.

The more the emotional cathexes are discharged via recovery of emotionally charged memories or in acting out (especially transference), the more the neurotic symptoms subside. The infantile neurosis has been reduced to a character neurosis through which the individual passes toward recovery.

The occurrence of combinations of ego regression (or ego change) with acting out does not militate against our conceptions. While acting out is a substitute for recall, it does not have the therapeutic effect of the latter. The difference is that in the case of the memories the patient realizes the connection between the present and the past, while the patient who acts out has still to acknowledge that his present behavior is a reproduction of past experiences. Freud stated that the analyst's authoritative position enables him at the right moment to reveal to the patient the meaning of his acting out. Unfortunately this does not always succeed in circumventing the compulsive repetitive activity. I agree fully with Anna Freud who says that the patient who acts out exclusively cannot be analyzed.

X

In successful analysis, the patient gains conviction, through evidence, of the importance of remote emotional experiences in their various connections with his immediate problems. This evidence is bound to ego feeling which cathects the related emotions. But the repressed ego feelings are not easily and satisfactorily reached. This is the immediate reason why the patient finds it difficult emotionally to accept interpretations of remote experiences and their consequences. Some reject them, others accept them only intellectually. The working through of current derivatives and equivalents and the connections between them and one's early development are the most important work of every psychoanalysis.

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Defense Reactions in Anxiety States of Central Origin

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DEFENSE REACTIONS IN ANXIETY STATES OF CENTRAL ORIGIN

BY J. KASANIN (SAN FRANCISCO)

The central problem of any neurosis is the problem of anxiety. Symptoms are repressed and distorted vestiges of instincts seeking gratification. They are created to avoid an inner danger whose approach is signaled by the emergence of anxiety.

There is some ambiguity in Freud's *(1)* use of the terms 'symptom' and 'anxiety' because anxiety may be a symptom as well as the general manifestation of a neurosis. What he says about symptoms is true of neuroses in which anxiety is latent as is the case in the hysterias where the symptoms are a compromise between gratification and punishment. The adaptation of the ego to the symptoms is a secondary process, the primary one being the curbing of the forbidden instinctual impulses which is not always successful. In general, symptoms are formed in order to avoid anxiety. They bind mental energies which would otherwise be discharged as anxiety. Anxiety then is the central problem of the neurosis as well as its commonest outward manifestation.

In those neuroses where a successful repression or other defense measures prevent anxiety, any slight interference with the freedom of expression of symptoms mobilizes the anxiety. An agoraphobic patient left alone on the street immediately becomes anxious. If an obsessional neurotic is prevented from performing his ceremonial rituals, the anxiety becomes unbearable. Symptoms ward off anxiety.

Although Freud was not the first to perceive that anxiety is the chief factor in the neuroses, he was the first to define it clearly *(2)*. His greater contribution was in developing a method of studying and treating anxiety in its relationship to

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neuroses. Freud left many of his questions about neurosis unanswered: why it is that some people remain fixed in infantile behavior; why a neurosis of one phase does not disappear when the patient reaches the next phase in his development; why anxiety is so predominantly a reaction of choice, painful as it is to the individual. The answer to these questions must reside in the problem of anxiety itself.

The most conspicuous characteristic of anxiety is that it is an affective state which is decidedly unpleasant *(1)*. It is often accompanied by physical sensations most commonly referred to the respiratory and circulatory systems. Important elements of anxiety are (1) the quality of psychic discomfort (unpleasure); (2) physiological concomitants involving both the sympathetic and parasympathetic systems; (3) the psychic perception of these sensations.

Freud repeatedly expressed the opinion that certain fundamentals of anxiety are physiological rather than psychological in origin, and that to understand anxiety one must know more about its physiology. The work of Cannon in the study of such primary emotions as fear, rage, anxiety, etc., and the experimental production of anxiety states in animals and in human beings has added much to our knowledge.

An emotion like anxiety cannot be studied by its manifestations only. What we know about the id processes is gained by glimpses of its processes when the ego can be caught off guard. The same is true of the anxiety which one sees in the neuroses which is probably a secondary anxiety considerably modified by the ego. There must be a more primitive, 'primary' type of anxiety.

We know more about the way in which the organism defends itself against anxiety than we know about anxiety itself. All emotions result from action and interaction of the cortex and the thalamus *(3)*. Cortical processes may start thalamic processes and thus arouse an affective return from that portion of the brain. Although the sympathetic adrenal system becomes active in manifestations of all emotions, it was concluded by Cannon and his coworkers that the nervous organization for the display of emotions is located in the diencephalon, or more

specifically, in the optic thalamus. Bard *(4)* has demonstrated that fear is shown by cats after the neocortex, rhinencephalon and most of the striatum have been removed. The exact locus of the subcortical structure concerned in the production of fear response has not as yet been established.

Anxiety being a warning signal of danger, the ego initiates activity to protect itself by removing the source of danger. That great quantities of anxiety can be released in response to a minimal psychological stimulus is illustrated by the following patient.

A thirty-one-year-old woman entered the hospital complaining of nausea and vomiting associated with headaches of four years' duration. Very severe lately, it disabled her from work. The patient was a pleasant, cheerful, easy-going person with many friends. She always led an active life, being sociable, friendly, a hard worker, having assumed responsibilities from the age of fifteen. She had had two unsuccessful marriages because the husbands were both older than she was and extremely jealous. Symptoms had first appeared eight years prior with attacks of slight headache, some dizziness and nausea, loss of appetite and occasional vomiting. She was able to continue her work except when the symptoms continued a second day with more dizziness, severe headache and a feeling of depression, when she would have to go to bed. Often during the first day the patient had a peculiar sensation in her heart which throbbed and beat rapidly, making her very uncomfortable. She compared this sensation with the feeling of inward excitement one gets from a serious emotional situation except that these feelings were not provoked by any external stimulus. It was like an emotion without reason. Sometimes the spells would last three days, and on the third day the patient would remain in bed in a darkened room, refusing food, aware only of her wildly palpitating heart. During such spells the patient became dehydrated and lost from five to six pounds.

The patient was a very attractive, intelligent, coöperative, young woman who tried very earnestly, on psychiatric examination, to explain her sensations and feelings although she was

extremely uncomfortable and had to stop at times because of attacks of palpitation. After several interviews she talked quite frankly about her personal life, notably that following divorce from her second husband she had had several strong attachments to men with a good deal of sexual intimacy. Intercourse was always mildly and pleasantly exciting to her and culminated in an orgasm. Two years prior to examination the patient noticed that when a man began to make love to her, she suddenly started breathing heavily, her heart would palpitate, all conspiring to make her appear outwardly greatly aroused although really she felt very little. It embarrassed her greatly to appear so emotional in situations where everything was more or less casual. Alcohol had the effect of soothing her.

What the patient described were the visceral manifestations of strong emotions without comparable affect. She described the sensations as an 'inner thrill, inside excitement, like a fright or a shock'. This reaction so embarrassed her that she stopped seeing men.

It was my opinion that her emotional responses could not be accounted for on the basis of instinctual conflict alone but must have a definite visceral background. Because of this and the observation of a vague shadow in an intravenous pyelogram, the patient was operated on and a small tumor of the right adrenal gland was discovered and removed, the twenty-ninth case of its kind reported in the literature *(5)*.

After a long and stormy convalescence the patient made a complete recovery physically and mentally. Her reaction of anxiety completely disappeared. She resumed sexual relationships which now did not cause any undue amount of anxiety such as she used to experience during her illness. She became optimistic, cheerful, planned to resume her work and presented every appearance of her normal self.

A boy of eleven was admitted to a hospital because of vomiting and the loss of nine pounds weight in two weeks. He was the younger of two children of an apparently healthy

family. Birth and development had been entirely normal until six months previously. He seemed well adjusted in his home, in school and in his personal relationships. He was considerate, presented no problem to his parents, and was an honor student in school. He was prominent in athletics for which he had won a shield, was well liked by the boys, and was a leader in his group. The family had had some financial reverses, but lived comfortably and the father had had steady work. Both parents were intelligent. A sister aged fifteen was an honor student in high school.

Retrospectively the illness began during an automobile trip. He had stopped frequently to urinate and drank about a gallon of water. Nocturia developed and also an abnormal craving for candy and ice cream. In July he went to camp where polydipsia and especially polyuria became acute problems. He weighed 84 pounds. Upon returning home in August, he often napped after lunch, contrary to previous custom, and gradually he was sleeping all afternoon, returning to bed tired and drowsy after short periods of play. The mother noted that the boy seemed less alert, had no appetite, and was losing weight. However he attended school all fall, maintaining his high standard of scholarship. No concern was aroused until two weeks prior to admission when projectile vomiting began, usually following the evening meal, resulting in a loss of nine pounds weight. The family physician was consulted, and finding no organic basis for the vomiting, advised hospitalization. During the previous five months the boy's voice had become very deep and a moderate growth of pubic hair had appeared.

Physical examination on admission showed a tall well-developed and fairly well-nourished boy weighing 77 pounds, the average weight for his height and age being 95 pounds. His skin was uniformly dark. He appeared listless, answered questions in monosyllables with the voice of an adult male. A very slight bilateral exophthalmos and a suggestion of lid lag were noted. General muscle power was good and reflexes were normal. There was a moderate growth of pubic hair of

feminine distribution; the penis and testes were large for his age. Blood pressure was 90/50.

Repeated urinalyses, erythrocyte counts, leucocyte counts, hemoglobin estimations, and differential leucocyte counts showed no deviations from the normal range. Wassermann and Mantoux tests were negative. Blood calcium, phosphorus, nonprotein nitrogen, and total protein were similarly within normal limits. On one occasion uric acid was 9.4 and later 8.9 mg. per cent. Lumbar puncture shortly after admission yielded fluid of normal character. There was no increased pressure, cells were not increased; sugar was 34 mg. per cent, chlorides 673 mg. per cent, total protein 74 mg. per cent. There was no excess globulin, the Wassermann reaction was negative, and the colloidal gold curve flat. An x-ray of the skull and sella turcica gave no clues. The visual fields and fundi were normal.

I saw the patient about a month after his admission to the hospital, two days after he had been examined by a neurologist. The patient was apathetic, indifferent and spoke in a very low voice. In the course of conversation he became more spontaneous, and sat up in bed for the first time. It was noted that the patient was extremely dependent upon the nurses and doctors, asking help with simple tasks which he was quite able to perform. The main problem with this boy was his difficulty in eating. He knew that he should eat, stated that he was willing to eat, but refused to take more than a morsel of food when it was offered to him. He was fed through a nasal tube throughout most of his stay in the hospital. He expressed a marked fear of death which he connected with the fact that he was not eating. He was worried that his mother and sister, who were worried because he did not eat, would subsequently not eat and die too. He showed good intelligence, was completely oriented and was in good contact with his environment.

A few days later the patient was very depressed with marked psychomotor retardation and apathy. He was lying for hours as if asleep, yet completely aware of what was going on around him.

A month later he was stuporous. Asked how he felt, he

shrugged his shoulders without answering. He was still fearful that he would die with a peculiar fatalistic acceptance of whatever might come. He was quite disturbed over his inability to eat and because of a marked repugnance to tube feeding.

Two and a half months after admission to the hospital the patient first showed evidence of involvement of the higher cortical functions. A valentine to one of the doctors he stated was a birthday card from his sister. He was disoriented as to time, complained that there was a snake in his bed, and declared that he must chew his uncle's cigar before eating. His movements were clumsy and he had all the outward manifestations of a profound depression. From this point there was a rapid progression of symptoms with increasing confusion, coma, and death.

At autopsy there was found at the base of the third ventricle a firm, ovoid mass, measuring about 2 cm. pressing on the optic chiasm and the anterior border of the pons. The pineal body was completely destroyed by the tumor. This tumor mass had invaded the third ventricle which was dilated and pushed posteriorly and upward. It had also completely destroyed the corpus callosum, and extended into the lateral ventricle. In the anterior horn there was a large tumor measuring 5 by 4 cm. in its greatest diameters which extended through the ventricular wall and invaded the frontal lobe. The histological examination showed a teratoma with all the three germinal layers present. It was the eighteenth teratoma of the pineal body *(6)* reported in the literature.

From the psychiatric point of view, the case presented the clinical picture of a depression without the subjective perception of such an emotion. The boy looked depressed but did not express any marked depressive ideation. This is noteworthy in view of current neurological theories which postulate the basal ganglia and the hypothalamus as the seat of primitive emotions.

The emotional reactions in organic diseases of the brain have been studied in general paresis by Ferenczi *(7)* and in epidemic encephalitis by Jelliffe. According to Ferenczi, the melancholia

of the paretics is due to injury to the ego. As a result of the injury to the brain, chief organ of its functioning, the ego responds with grief, self-accusations and ideas of suicide.

As an ego defense, the boy resorted to denial of reality. The distortion of reality was, according to the pleasure principle, preferable to the overwhelming and unbearable anxiety of forthcoming death. An expression of this was seen in his statement that the valentine card was a birthday card from his sister. His birthday was not due until the summer. Birth is the opposite of death and he had lived until his next birthday.

Another defense which the boy made use of was a mixture of projection and identification. Mother and sister would also die because they did not eat. But he knew that they did eat, that they would not die, another denial of the threat of his impending death.

These two cases are reported to describe the reactions of the ego in diseases involving some of the organs which participate in the physiology of fear and anxiety—in these cases, the adrenal and the hypothalamus. Involvement of these organs evokes 'primary' or id anxiety which differs from ordinary anxiety in the character of the subjective content.

Note:

Dr. Lawrence Kubie, in discussing these cases, was of the opinion that the history of the patient with an adrenal tumor proved the inadequacy of an old theory. All of the visceral, somatic and peripheral autonomic changes occurred which, according to the old theory, should automatically have induced the central experience of anxiety. Instead, the patient had a perfectly clear subjective appreciation of the distinction between her experience as an affectless physiological state, and the experience of anxiety as an affect. This patient seemed to have been psychologically a rather normal person, including the universal experience of anxiety. She was able to make the distinction between her own conscious experience of anxiety and this purely physiological experience of states, which usually are part and parcel of the total anxiety experience, but which in her pathological state occurred as an isolated, affectless phenomena.

This clinical observation correlated with Kubie's own opinion that the core of the anxiety experience is central and not peripheral. He took issue, however, with the author's interpretation of the psychological work that the patient had to go through. He did not believe that such a patient has to erect ego defenses against anxiety. This occurs only where inner stimuli are building up to a point at which they are in danger of diffuse irradiation. If the central excitation threatens to irradiate diffusely in the Pavlovian sense, this is the moment at which anxiety threatens to break through. It is against this that a patient defends himself when we speak of ego defenses against anxiety. The adrenal patient was the passive recipient of certain peripheral sensations ordinarily linked to the experience of anxiety; nevertheless, they did not build up the type of central excitation which has to be warded off. He doubted, therefore, that one has to bring in a concept of psychological defenses as the barrier which prevented the patient from experiencing the total subjective experience of anxiety.

Kubie stated the same comment might be made about the author's psychological interpretation of the second case. The patient with teratoma of the pineal body sank into a state of apathy, looked depressed but did not feel depressed, and apparently spoke about apprehension without actually feeling anxiety. Here too it seems that simulation of emotions without the subjective experience of those emotions is demonstrated. The patient anticipated his own death, realized it intellectually, was somewhat unhappy, gloomy, brooding about it, but without that central experience of terror which we know as anxiety. This proves again the fact that anxiety is always a central structure which is built up by the individual and projected upon external reality.

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Freudian Mechanisms and Frustration Experiments

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FREUDIAN MECHANISMS AND FRUSTRATION EXPERIMENTS

BY DAVID RAPAPORT (TOPEKA)

The discussion of this topic will deal with three distinct problems: (a) the nature of frustration experiments; (b) the nature of the freudian mechanisms; (c) the relation of frustration experiments to the freudian mechanisms, namely, whether frustration experiments presuppose the freudian theory and whether they investigate phenomena pertaining to the freudian theory.

I

Frustration experiments bring about frustration in an experimental situation, controlling and varying the field conditions and observing the behavior of the human or animal subject which arises as a result of frustration. This type of experimentation is valuable, but it has three significant limitations:

First, it is concerned with the field conditions as they exist here and now, and it views the subject who is a product of his past experience, as a static part of the field conditions. The individual differences in quality and degree of reaction to frustration will lead necessarily to a more or less explicit typology, as there seems to be no direct path from the field structure investigation to the genetic understanding of individual differences.

Second, the reactions to frustration (established by observation of behavior, or reports of introspection) will necessarily be meaningful only in terms of the field conditions explaining the dynamics of the frustration situation and will say but little about the genesis of the psychic functions responsible for the reactions of frustration and the individual differences in respect to them.

From the Menninger Clinic, Topeka, Kansas.

Third, a limitation is imposed on the quality of frustration by the nature of the experimental situation. Since the frustrated wish or striving in these experiments represents only a sample of the strivings which are or can be subject to frustration in everyday life, the experimental findings will give only partial information on frustration. It seems also probable that the strivings frustrated in the experiments are usually not central strivings of the subject but rather some of the more peripheral ones.

Despite these limitations frustration experiments are of practical and theoretical significance. J. F. Brown in his experiments found that different groups of psychiatric patients react differently to frustration and that thus such experiments may be useful diagnostically. In my experience with the Vigodsky Test I have found definite differences in the reaction patterns of different psychiatric groups and character types to this usually frustrating test situation. There seems to be some basis in both J. F. Brown's and my material for hoping that a scale of frustration tolerance could be worked out. Thus, a static, typological, diagnostic, measure inferred from the subject's reactions to the frustrating field situation is one advantage offered by these frustration experiments. But why a hysteric or a paranoiac should react exactly as he does to frustration is apparently beyond the scope of these experiments as only the structure, but not the origin, of these reactions is investigated by them.

While the frustration experiments can be designated as striving to establish ahistorical laws, the freudian theory and the freudian mechanisms strive toward a historical, genetic understanding. The immediate reaction of the subject to a frustrating or any other situation is viewed in terms of his total personality—his organization of past experience on the basis of his instinctual needs. It is a genetic theory par excellence. In so far as it pays attention to existing field conditions at all, freudian theory emphasizes that a real understanding of the field conditions cannot be achieved unless we have sufficient knowledge of the individual's organization of past experience

in terms of the organization of his instinctual needs. Thus it is felt that the structure of the field is determined by this organization of the past experience of the subject.

II

The frustration experiments can be viewed in two different ways from the point of view of freudian theory. First, these experiments give a detailed analysis in dynamic terms of the subject's reaction to a frustrating situation such as is rarely obtained and little investigated by the psychoanalyst and thus a highly welcomed and interesting topic for him. He is interested in using it practically for clinical typology, for diagnostic, and eventually prognostic purposes. He is interested in it theoretically inasmuch as he hopes to be able to extend his genetic theory to the point of incorporating these very concrete *ad hoc* dynamics of behavior.

The immediate bearing, however, of the frustration experiments on the freudian mechanisms seems to be quite unclear. Let us consider for example the aggression arising as a result of frustration described by Dembo (1932). It is obvious for the analyst that the sequence 'frustration=aggressive behavior' may occur, and does occur frequently in actual life situations. If, however, aggression *per se* is understood to be a result of frustration, a conclusion drawn for instance by the Yale group,[1] the psychoanalyst will protest. For him 'aggression'

[1] *Frustration and Aggression.* By John Dollard, Leonard W. Doob, Neal E. Miller, O. H. Mowrer, Robert R. Sears, in collaboration with Clellan S. Ford, Carl Iver Hovland, Richard T. Sollenberger. (Institute of Human Relations, Yale University.) New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939.

'The basic hypothesis which has been presented is that aggression is always a consequence of frustration. It is clear from common observation and from a consideration of the examples of this relationship given in Chapter I, however, that aggressive behavior may take many forms. Sometimes aggression is directed at the frustrating agent; at other times it seems to be aimed at innocent bystanders. Some forms of aggression are vigorous and undisguised; others are weak or subtle and roundabout. While the simple statement that frustration produces aggression, therefore, may add something of value to the problem of predicting human behavior, other psychological factors besides frustration itself must be taken into consideration if a more adequate understanding of the

and aggressive behavior are not identifiable, the second being only a mobilization of the first by the field conditions, the first being an instinctual need not elicited by field conditions but rather an integral part of every field condition. In the psychoanalyst's experience aggression is as genuine a need as any; aggression is mobilized and becomes phenomenal in varying field conditions, not only in a frustration situation. Aggression as such is understood genetically by the analyst who would feel that the frustration experiments are only partial investigations, limited by their ahistorical approach.

Another example would be the phenomenon of 'going out of the field' described by Dembo.[2] Freudian theory discusses similar mechanisms. Escape reactions, such as avoidance of the feminine rôle by a woman or of the masculine rôle by a man, might be considered as steady repetitions of a 'going out of the field' of a frustrating situation. In this case, however, it is even more obvious than in the previous one that the rôle of the actual field conditions is relatively insignificant as compared to the rôle of the genetic historical factors operating. Regression could be another example. It is extremely interesting to know that the drawing of a child after frustration shows features which are on a relatively lower developmental level than the one shown by his drawings before the frustrating situation. The mechanism of regression as observed and described by the psychoanalyst is *quantitatively* more significant and covers a much greater portion of the life span, and interferes grossly

specific forms that aggression takes is to be gained. In this and the succeeding chapter a more systematic analysis of four groups of factors will be made:

'1. Those governing the strength of instigation to aggression; i.e., the amount of frustration.

'2. Those related to the inhibition of aggressive acts; i.e., the effects of punishment.

'3. Those determining the object toward which aggression is directed and the form this aggression takes; i.e., the displacement of aggression.

'4. Those related to the reduction of instigation to aggression; i.e., the catharsis of aggression.' (p. 27)

[2] Dembo, T.: *Der Ärger als dynamisches Problem.* Psychologische Forschung, XV, 1931, pp. 1–144.

with the whole of the individual's functioning. It appears to be *qualitatively* different as well, inasmuch as (in terms of frustration) it comes about as the result of a long series of frustrations and has at its core deeply rooted conflicts of instinctual origin.[3]

The similarity of the phenomena observed in the frustration experiments to the freudian mechanisms is obvious. The gravest danger in dealing with them lies in the possibility that one may lose sight of the fact that our knowledge about them has been gathered by a methodology basically different from that of the freudian mechanisms. The freudian mechanisms reflect vicissitudes of instinctual needs inferred from historical investigations. The reactions to frustration in the frustration experiments are ahistorically established dynamics of a field situation out of which no conclusion as to the genetic relation between frustration and it sequelæ should be drawn. In other words, it is interesting to know that a frustrating field situation may result in aggressive behavior, in anger and destructurization of the field by 'going out of the field', or in regression. No doubt these results give an adequate description of how frustration in the experimental situation resulted in aggression, repression, 'leaving the field', and 'destructurization of the

[3] Fromm-Reichmann, Frieda: *Transference Problems in Schizophrenics.* This QUARTERLY, VIII, 1939, p. 413. 'Traumatic experiences in this early period of life will damage a personality more seriously than those occurring in later childhood such as are found in the history of psychoneurotics. The infant's mind is more vulnerable the younger and less used it has been; further, the trauma is a blow to the infant's egocentricity. In addition early traumatic experience shortens the only period in life in which an individual ordinarily enjoys the most security, thus endangering the ability to store up as it were a reasonable supply of assurance and self-reliance for the individual's later struggle through life. Thus is such a child sensitized considerably more towards the frustrations of later life than by later traumatic experience. Hence many experiences in later life which would mean little to a "healthy" person and not much to a psychoneurotic, mean a great deal of pain and suffering to the schizophrenic. His resistance against frustration is easily exhausted.

'Once he reaches his limit of endurance, he escapes the unbearable reality of his present life by attempting to reëstablish the autistic, delusional world of the infant: but this is impossible because the content of his delusions and hallucinations are naturally colored by the experiences of his whole lifetime.'

field'. It cannot be claimed, however, that the experimental results are proof of the existence of a genetic one-to-one relationship between frustration and those phenomena which were found in the experimental situation to be its sequelæ.

III

The last question is of the relation of freudian mechanisms to frustration experiments. Historically, the freudian discoveries revealed the central problems and provided the incentive for such investigations. If this experimentation and its highly interesting results should become an integral part of a science of man's reaction, which will necessarily be an historical science and not a physical-ahistorical one, it will have to take into account freudian mechanisms and center its interest on producing more and more experimental similes to those mechanisms. Further experimentation will have to pay attention to freudian theory lest the concepts, 'aggression', 'repression', etc., express isolated observations without hope of incorporation into a theory of the genetic continuum of human reaction. Freudian theory was the cradle of these experiments and systematic exploration of the freudian mechanisms is their final goal. Although they are of value to the psychiatrist and psychoanalyst, it would be a grave error to assume that at present these experiments measure or even reproduce freudian mechanisms. A discussion of the memory-experimentation concerning 'repression' will elucidate this point. The concept of repression as well as that of frustration attracted the interest of experimental psychologists. For forty years unceasing experimentation has tried to prove or to disprove the freudian theory of repression; approximately one hundred and fifty different experiments were conducted toward this end. Scrutiny of this experimentation soon reveals that the freudian contention that 'we tend to forget the disagreeable' is isolated from the context of the freudian theory.

The experimentation which developed showed that there is a difference in remembering of words judged pleasant and

those judged unpleasant, between what is liked and what is disliked, between success and failure, between associations with pleasant and with unpleasant sensory stimuli, etc. These were interesting results worth while knowing. Their bearing on the concept of repression, however, appears to be quite unclear. Repression is the concept, derived from clinical observations, that the significant traumatic events underlying neuroses are usually forgotten and furthermore, that outstanding lapses of memory and parapraxes are due to the connection of this forgotten or distorted material with the originally repressed traumatic events. One might hypothesize that the difference in recall of pleasant and unpleasant, etc., material is a distant relative or some kind of a derivative of repressed material although this would be stretching the point. Another hypothesis seems more plausible: there exists an emotional stratification of memory in which judgmental pleasantness and unpleasantness are of a rather peripheral significance, success and failure perhaps somewhat more central, and at the core of this stratification are those instinctual strivings which are the main motives of human life, subject to the memory manifestations of repression phenomena.

In all of the general psychological experimentation on repression, perhaps only Kenneth Diven and A. A. Sharp have demonstrated phenomena related to repression. Experimental demonstration of repression and affective transformation of memory material is rather more demonstrable in clinical experimentation as in the work of Despert, the hypnotic work of Erickson, the investigations of Schilder on the psychology of paresis, and that of Betlheim and Hartman on the psychology of the Korsakow syndrome.[4]

In the field of frustration the result might be similar if the problem of frustration be investigated with an eye on the question: 'What is frustration?' The freudian definition of frus-

[4] *Cf.* Rapaport, D.: *Emotions and Memory.* Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1942.

tration refers to frustration of libidinous strivings.[5] One may investigate the effects of the frustration of less significant, less central, more peripheral strivings. These investigations will be of as great interest to us as the investigation of the special memory phenomena investigated in the wake of the freudian hypothesis of repression. These investigations might show usual developmental effects of frustration on different levels of the emotional hierarchy, similar to the findings in memory experimentation. Experimentation with memory as well as with frustration has already shown great individual differences, indicating that the 'objectively' identical frustrations may elicit frustrations on different levels in different individuals.[6] There is some hope that investigations of memory experiments with both repression and frustration will contribute to our knowledge of a hierarchy in which instincts, drives, needs, quasi needs, attitudes, sentiments, determining tendencies, interests, affects, preferences, pleasantness, unpleasantness, etc., may be some of the levels. Experiments with memory and repression seem to indicate that affective influences on the different levels of this hierarchy can elicit very different effects: reinforcement, weakening, obliteration, distortion, condensation, displacement, etc., of memories. It might be that in frustration experiments a regard for these hierarchic levels will make the differential reactions to frustration amenable to more concrete individual analysis.

Summary

The ahistorical nature of experimentally induced frustration is contrasted with the historical nature of freudian mechanisms. The similarity of experimentally elicited frustration mecha-

5 Freud: Coll. Papers, II. London: Hogarth Press, 1933, pp. 113–115. 'The most immediate, most easily discerned, and most comprehensible exciting cause of the onset of neurotic illness lies in that external factor which may generally be described as frustration. The person was healthy as long as his erotic need was satisfied by an actual object in the outer world; he becomes neurotic as soon as he is deprived of this object and no substitute is forthcoming.'

6 *Cf.* Freud's discussion of internal frustration. *Coll. Papers,* IV. London: Hogarth Press, 1933, pp. 325–326.

nisms to clinical psychoanalytic frustration mechanisms is described. The difference in the scope of both is stressed.

The typological and diagnostic usefulness of differentiating types of reaction to frustration is emphasized. The theoretical connection between the experience of frustration as clinically observed, and frustration as experimentally elicited, is problematic.

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The Amazons in Ancient Greece

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THE AMAZONS IN ANCIENT GREECE

BY BERNICE SCHULTZ ENGLE (OMAHA)

The ancient Greeks thought the Amazons were real people. From earliest times the best informed Greek writers firmly believed that the Amazons were a race of women who hated men and lived without them, who loved to fight battles and perform the deeds of men, who tolerated men during one brief period each year for the definite purpose of propagation. With one or two exceptions *(1)* this belief persisted well into the Christian era.

Tales of the Amazons are among the oldest legends, their portrayal one of the most favored in Greek art. No figures were more deeply imbedded in the national mind; none are more strange nor more difficult to explain. Yet Amazon legends alone have attracted comparatively little study *(2)*.

Several modern historians have attempted to identify the Amazons with various tribes or classes of people such as the Hittites or armed priestesses. Other writers believe that knowledge for positive conclusions is still lacking. A few dismiss the Amazons as mere fairy-tale creatures. But serious critics of Greek mythology like Bachofen, Weigert, and Turel have emphasized the psychological importance to classical Greek civilization of Amazonian legends whether Amazons actually existed or not.

To show that the Amazons were real people, although their exact race and civilization have not yet been determined, is one of the two purposes of this paper. Examination of cults and legends and archæological evidence indicate that Amazonian people came very likely from regions around the Black Sea as part of the first horse-riding invaders of Asia Minor and Greece during the time of change from the use of bronze to iron. Again and again one notes that horseback riding, the use

Read before a meeting of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, Feb. 1, 1941.

of the axe and other iron weapons are items that link the Amazons with their homeplace and times.

Because they once had known Amazonian battles at first hand, Greek men feared to permit women freedom or power, all the more for the reason that the earliest Greeks who entered the peninsula found a native folk living under complete matriarchal rule. Their early encounter with a highly civilized matriarchy, and fierce battles with Amazon tribes, gave the Greeks ample reason to exaggerate the hatred of women for men, and also to reënforce the dread and fear of men for women. Accounts of Amazons were first handed down by folk memory. Their popularity increased because they bolstered up the hostile attitude of Greek men toward the position of women and gave excuse for the extreme subordination of women which took place between prehistoric and classical times; also, the legends came to connect the Amazons with deities whose rôle stressed the powers of matriarchy or gynecocracy.

In reaction against this twofold danger, the Greeks struggled to form a religion in which gods were powerful and strong, while goddesses were but weaker, more abstract copies of men, and to conquer the warlike Amazonian women. As a result, Amazonian cults and legends were replete with the age-old conflict between the sexes. Greek men seemed constantly to fear that women would overpower them and take away their privileges. On their side, the women practiced great cruelty and sadism toward not only men but also children.

Amazonomachia had therefore deep psychological importance for the ancient Greeks.

THE LOCALE AND HABITS OF THE AMAZONS

Greek tradition assigned to the Amazons three main districts *(3)*: one in Pontus, south of the Black Sea, at Themiscyra on the banks of the Thermodon river and often including the Halys river; the second, farther west, a strip of land along the coast of the Ægean comprising mainly Lycia and Phrygia; a third section north of the Euxine, extending as far west as

Thrace, as far east as the Caspian Sea. The first two sections lie in modern Turkey, the third is contained in the Balkans and southern Russia. A district in Africa is mentioned by only one writer.

The Amazons were often connected with Ægean islands, notably Lesbos, Samos, Samothrace, Lemnos, Patmos. Above all, the legends show the Amazons at home in Asia, particularly in Asia Minor where they were said to have founded numerous cities, as Ephesus, Smyrna, Cyme, Myrine *(4)*. But in Greece they founded not one city; only graves and memorials to their defeat were in Greece. It is noteworthy that Amazonian habitats are connected with famous Asiatic grasslands which became permanent centers for horsebreeding and horsemanship such as Cappadocia and the Sarmatian flatlands *(5)*; likewise, the regions of Chalybes, Halizones, and the Halys and Alybe (all related in root) in which iron was first regularly produced, which lie near the Caucasus mountains *(6)*.

Daughters of Ares, their usual parentage, the Amazons were 'no gentle folk, cared not for justice, were intent on violence and the works of Ares' *(7)*. By wars they tried to extend their rule into Europe for they 'alone of people around were armed with iron, were the first of all to mount on horses, with which, owing to the inexperience of their foes, they surprised them and either caught those who fled or outstripped those who pursued them' *(8)*.

At home they cared nothing for womanly arts, spent ten months of the year in farming, pasturing cattle, and especially in training horses. The strongest spent much of their time practicing military exercises and hunting on horseback *(9)*. Husbands they had none. For two months in the spring they sought the men of neighboring tribes for the purpose of breeding. The men cohabited in the darkness with the first woman each one met. As soon they were pregnant the women returned home *(10)*.

Female children they reared, 'searing off the right breast so it might not stand out when the body matured, and be in the

way' of using the bow or throwing the javelin. This practice furnished the usual Grecian derivation of the word Amazon: *amazos,* without a breast *(11)*. Hippocrates describes *(12)* the copper instrument used by Scythian Amazons to burn off the right breast of the baby girls. Male children were a surplus commodity. Sometimes the women sent them back to the men who treated them as their own, distributing the infants by lot since they had no way of determining their paternity *(13)*. Other Amazonian mothers killed male babies at birth or maimed them by mutilating their arms and legs *(14)*. Although Hippocrates disclaims any personal knowledge of the practice, he confirms medically the effectiveness of dislocating knee and hip joints of boy children 'so that the males might become incapable of plotting against the females' and that they might serve as artisans in leather or copper and other sedentary work *(15)*.

Sometimes tradition represented them as originally having had husbands whom they had killed. A late writer has them go down periodically to the Halys river and buy men for purposes of procreation *(16)*. Another reports that the women occasionally arranged friendly alliances with men lest the race die out; but they protected themselves 'with scorn of men' and refused marriage 'calling it slavery' *(17)*. These women either killed or abandoned their male children. Girl babies they loved and took care of 'after the nature of mothers' except that in order to avoid having pendulous breasts they fed the infants horses' milk which, in addition, made the girls stronger and less effeminate. The same writer denies that Amazons amputated one breast. He derives the name from the meaning, 'unsuckled' *(18)*.

According to one account *(19)* the Amazons lived with men the year around but 'humiliated and enslaved' them compelling them 'like our married women' to spend their time in the house and carry out the orders of their wives. The men took no part in war, held no offices, had no freedom of speech, and were permitted no participation in the affairs of the com-

munity 'by means of which they might become presumptuous and rise up against women'. The women were conscripted to serve a period of training in the army during which they remained virgins. After military service they married and turned over the rearing of the children to the men who brought them up on milk and 'such cooked foods as are appropriate to the age of infants'. The breast of the girls was seared, the legs and arms of the boys were crippled to unfit them for war.

Many references show the Amazons' close connection with horseback riding. They specialized in horsemanship *(20)*. One Amazon queen favored cavalry above all instruments of war *(21)*. They were 'an equestrian folk' *(22)*; 'when they are not mounted on horseback they are just plain, ordinary women' *(23)*. Aristophanes refers *(24)* satirically to the numerous paintings of squadrons of Amazonian cavalry, ascribing the women's excellence in riding to the suitability for the gallop of their fine broad seats; indeed, nothing is more difficult than to dislodge a woman mounted on a horse *(25)*. The Amazons had noble steeds *(26)*.

The oldest reference in literature *(27)* to an individual Amazon is to Myrina (whose grave was in Troy) who is praised for her speed in driving the chariot. This, incidentally, is the only reference in literature to Amazons and chariots although Greek art so depicts them in various cases. Early examples of both Ionic and Attic art show the Amazons mounted, often in flight, shooting arrows backward as they flee. Frequently in friezes the Amazons fight on horseback, the Greeks on foot. In vase paintings an Amazon often has her horse kneel so that she can dismount *(28)*.

Amazonian costume in Greek art is varied *(29)*. A short tunic was girt up for action, usually exposing one breast; or a tight fitting, long sleeved and trousered Persian costume, much like an old fashioned suit of long knitted underwear, with peaked Phrygian cap and turned up, pointed shoes, betrayed the owner's mountainous origin. Sometimes on horseback they wore pants similar to modern shorts. In both

gave him his daughter for a wife and Bellerophon settled down in Lycia.

Although Bellerophon had won a mighty victory over Amazonian women, he allied himself by marriage with matrilinear customs. The Lycians, who claimed descent from ancient Crete and were certainly of the same Mediterranean stock, took the mother's name and reckoned maternal ancestry in the female line. An old law declared legitimate the children of a freeborn woman by a slave, those of a male citizen by a slave illegitimate *(108)*. Moreover, Bellerophon's kingdom, which had come to him through his wife, remained in the female line under Lycian laws of inheritance, and it passed to Sarpedon, his daughter's son, and not to Glaucus, his grandson in the direct line.

Old vase paintings also show him reconciled with the Amazons, who are aiding him in his war against the monstrous Chimera *(109)*.

Some said that Bellerophon's real name was Hipponous. This ancient name, his ownership of Pegasus, and his reputed descent from Poseidon attest his early and close connection with the miracles of the horse and horseback riding. Poseidon, in classical times god of the sea, was originally a horse god married to Demeter, a horse goddess and mother of his horse children *(110)*.

HERACLES

Of all Greek heroes, Heracles was most widely popular. His name is undoubtedly derived from Hera, wife of Zeus, who was indeed his stepmother. Her jealousy drove him to kill his own and his nephew's children and as part of his expiation to serve in an inferior capacity the Mycenæan king Eurystheus who withheld Heracles' rightful inheritance and further humiliated him by giving him orders through Copreus, the dung man *(111)*.

The ninth labor assigned by Eurystheus was to bring back the Amazon's girdle. It is significant that as his eighth labor Heracles had killed Diomedes, son of Ares, owner of the man-

eating horses, and had thrown the body to them, whereupon the horses became tame and Heracles brought them to Mycenæ. Now he was to attack the daughters of Ares.

Heracles captured or killed the queen and obtained the 'girdle' whose erotic symbolism was not missed by ancient commentators. He destroyed the dauntless Amazons driving them out of the entire land *(112)*. Then across the Black Sea he went to the Sea of Azov to capture the intrepid Hippolyte *(113)*. He and his comrade Telamon who had 'first brought light to men', were not affected by the fear 'that quelleth men' in facing these mighty women *(114)*. He ambushed Melanippe whom her sister Hippolyte ransomed with her girdle *(115)*; then he forced the whole race of Amazons to flee to the sanctuary of Artemis *(116)*. When in Pontus the Amazons paid no attention to his demand for the girdle, Heracles wiped out the race, killing such renowned maidens as Prothoe, seven times victor in combat with men, Eribœa, whose claim of 'manly bravery' was proved false once she had met 'her better', and Alcippe, whose vow of virginity long preserved 'could not save her life' *(117)*. Of the captives, he gave Antiope to Theseus, freeing only Queen Melanippe whose blood-stained girdle was carried back as a trophy to a Mycenæan shrine *(118)*. On an expedition to Africa, where he set up his famous pillars, he destroyed both Gorgons and Amazons because his resolve to become the benefactor of all mankind forbade letting 'any nation be under the rule of women' *(119)*. It is perhaps to his defeat of Hippolyte that he owed his immortality *(120)*.

Sometimes his victories do not sound very heroic. Once he besieged Themiscyra in vain until Antiope handed him the keys of the city because she had fallen in love with his comrade, Theseus *(121)*. Once Hippolyte and her women, 'who cultivate the manly virtues', promised to give the girdle freely. When her armed followers, egged on by Hera to suspect treachery, charged the ship on horseback, Heracles killed Hippolyte, stripped off her girdle, and sailed away *(122)*.

An adventure with an Amazon-like woman was the Omphale interlude *(123)*. Having in a fit of madness killed a friend,

Heracles sought relief in the temple of Delphi for an acute disease which followed. Refused a consultation, Heracles seized the omphalos from Apollo's shrine, declaring he would make his own oracular prescription. Zeus intervened between him and Apollo and meted to Heracles the punishment of three years servitude. Omphale, Lydian queen, bought him, the money was paid to the murdered man's heirs, and Heracles' disease vanished. The queen made fun of his strength, compelled him as proof of his love for her to put on women's clothes and spin wool while she donned his lion's skin and brandished his club or spanked him with her sandal if his handiwork did not suit her. He even gave her the axe he had taken from the defeated Hippolyte which from that time became the symbol of Lydian royalty. At the end of his indenture he married Deianeira and was able to live in peace with her for three years.

In this story several points are of interest. Omphalos and Omphale both mean navel. Originally the omphalos was a stone shaped like half an egg that marked at Delphi the center of the world, doubtless pre-Hellenic in origin. Deianeira is an epithet applied to Amazons meaning 'man-murdering'.

Accompanying Jason and the Argonauts on the early part of their voyage *(124)*, Heracles stopped at the island of Lemnos. Queen Hypsipyle invited them to visit her in the capital city of Myrina, a city of women who had murdered all their menfolk, because Lemnian husbands preferred Thracian slave women to their lawful wives whom they had come to loathe because for a long time the women had grudged due honors to Aphrodite. In punishment she had first afflicted *(125)* the women with a foul smell *(disomosmian)*. Heracles refused to go and with a few chosen comrades stayed on shipboard. Jason lived with the queen, his men paired off with her subjects. Finally Heracles, losing patience, called a mass meeting of the men, remonstrating acridly with them for such disgraceful dalliance. No fame he said was to be won from sojourning with strange women. Let Jason spend all day in Hypsipyle's arms until 'he peopled all Lemnos with male children and

obtained great fame'. The men, ashamed, sailed away to seek the Fleece.

Other accounts emphasize Heracles' misogyny, a trait first pointed out by Bachofen and later by Weigert. One Amazonian queen whom he seduced gave him her girdle voluntarily. When she tried to hold him by her beauty he deserted her 'for he could never be overcome by beauty and would never tarry far from his own possessions for a woman's sake' *(126)*. Women were in general excluded from the shrines of Heracles *(127)*. In a fit of anger he once wounded Hera in the breast *(128)*. He was sometimes addressed *Misogynos (129)* although priests of Heracles often dressed as women *(130)*. Returning from battle he once gave his wife to his best friend Iolaus and married another 'in order to have children without apprehension' *(131)*.

THESEUS

Theseus became the great national hero of Athens, then of all Greece, exceeding in the nobility of his exploits Heracles whom he had early taken as his model *(132)*. His connection with Cretan myths dates his legends back to late Minoan times.

On his return from a Cretan expedition Theseus 'forgot' in his joy to hoist as agreed a white sail, and his father Ægeus (Poseidon is sometimes his father) killed himself in despair. At once Theseus conceived and organized the Atheniam democracy. Having got the new state in running order, he set off for the Euxine (alone or with Heracles; Plutarch says alone because it was after the time of Heracles) and there he fought the Amazons. He then either received Antiope (also Hippolyte, Melanippe, or Glauce) as a reward for his valor or she fell in love with him and followed him back to Athens *(133)*; or he took her captive and made her his mistress; or he married her in honored wedlock. By her he had a son Hippolyte, a lover of horses and a devotee of Artemis, apparently according to his mother's tradition.

In reprisal the Amazons made war upon Athens crossing the Cimmerian Bosporus on the ice in the dead of winter. Theseus

found the defense of Athens 'no trivial or womanish enterprise'. Against the Amazons he waged war to preserve the freedom of the young law-abiding democracy. The women advanced into the heart of the city, fortified their citadel on Ares hill, held the Pnyx and the Museum. After a period of deadlock the Amazons sacrificed to Ares—white horses according to one account *(134)*—Theseus to Phobos (fear) son of Ares, and began battle. The women fought sturdily pushing the Athenians back as far as the shrine of the Eumenides where Theseus rallied his men and with fresh troops repelled them. Four months later he made a treaty of peace, celebrated by the Horcomosium and by an ancient sacrifice to the Amazons before the feast of Theseus. Molpadia, a sister Amazon, killed Antiope as she fought at Theseus' side, or Theseus or one of his men killed Antiope by mistake. Plutarch denies that Theseus divorced or enslaved Antiope in order to marry Phædra, thus earning the Amazons' revenge.

The remnants of the Amazons fled, leaving many dead and dying comrades in the city, burying others on their way back through Greece. Theseus pursued and conquered them again at Troezen where a temple of Ares marked both the birthplace of Theseus and his victory. According to one source, the Amazons came with a large number of cavalry and Scythian allies whose defection allowed Theseus to beat them *(135)*.

From the fifth century, literary men and the best painters and sculptors of Greece celebrated Theseus' victory over the Amazons. Isocrates, great Athenian historian and orator, proclaimed: 'The Scythians under the Amazons, trying to extend their rule as far as Europe, hating as they did the whole race of Hellenes, directed their efforts against us in particular, hoping thus to become masters of all Greece. In conflict with our ancestors alone they were destroyed as utterly as if they had fought the whole world. . . . Of the Amazons who came not one went back again and those left behind were driven from power on account of the disaster here' *(136)*. Only the superiority of Athenian men made their victory over the Amazons

possible *(137)*, a victory which ranks with that at Troy and at Marathon *(138)*.

A famous orator, Lysias *(139)*, wrote: 'They were accounted men for their high courage rather than as women for their sex, so much did they seem to excel men. . . . They had become the rulers of many nations and hearing of our country, how great it was, and moved by greed of glory they mustered the bravest nations and marched against us. Having met with valiant men they found their spirit was now like their sex; the repute they got was the reverse of the former. . . . They stood alone in failing to learn from their mistakes and so to be better advised in their future actions. They would not return home and report their own misfortunes and our ancestors' valor. So they perished on the spot, were punished for their folly and made our city's name imperishable for its valor. . . . So these women, in unjust greed for others' land, justly lost their own.'

All the chief buildings in Greece celebrated the victory of Theseus over the Amazons in painting or sculpture: the Parthenon, the Theseum, the Painted Portico, the Olympian temple of Zeus which was one of the seven wonders of the ancient world. Theseus became the great champion of honor and freedom. He rendered the first great service of Athens to the rest of Greece in his Amazonian victory *(140)*.

Yet Theseus, too, wore women's clothes. Once *(141)* as he entered the city his robe, his hair, his soft beauty excited workmen to jeer at him and ask why a marriageable girl like him was walking about unchaperoned. His answer was to hurl a team of oxen higher than the roof which the artisans were building. On his return from Crete he dedicated to Dionysus a festival in which two young men were carefully nurtured and trained to imitate gentle young girls *(142)*.

Like Heracles, Theseus had his most ideal relationship with a man, Pirithous. Theseus is also associated with horses, particularly through his defeat of the dreaded Centaurs, creatures half men, half horse. In fifth century art he is always shown with the double axe which he may have brought back from his Cretan expedition.

ACHILLES

Priam relates in the Iliad *(143)* that as a young man he aided the Phrygians on their noble steeds at the river Sangarius the day the Amazons, peers of men, came. But Trojans and Amazons were allied against the Greeks because Penthesilea, Thracian daughter of Ares, had come in the last year of the war to help the beleaguered city of Troy. She died at the hands of Achilles and the Trojans gave her splendid burial. Achilles also slew Thersites who impugned his respect for the dead Penthesilea. So runs an excerpt from the Æthiopis *(143a)*, ancient sequel to the Iliad.

Later writers embroidered the story. Penthesilea *(144)* while out hunting accidentally killed her sister Hippolyte and because of the sacrilege fled her native land. In return for Priam's purificatory rites she fought for Troy and killed many Greek heroes. Soon after her arrival she had dreamed that her father Ares urged her 'fearlessly to meet Achilles front to front'. She and twelve sister warriors were just ready to set fire to the Greek ships when Achilles and Ajax at last resumed fighting. After killing five Amazons, Achilles grappled with Penthesilea who was on horseback. Boasting of her valor and might she struck to no avail. Achilles scorned her folly in leaving women's work and stabbed her through the breast. As he drew out his spear and removed the Amazon's helmet he saw her 'lovely face, lovely in death as a child's, beneath dainty pencilled brows. His heart was wrung with love's remorse to have slain a thing so sweet, whom he might have borne home as his queenly bride . . . for she was flawless, a very daughter of the gods, divinely tall and fair.' His love and regret were deep as when his beloved Patroclus had died. Apelike Thersites, ugliest of the Greeks, began to jeer that Achilles should be ashamed to pity an Amazon as if she were a woman suitable to wed. The same madness and lust for women had ruined Troy; a woman's beauty made fools even of wise men. To emphasize his hatred, Thersites plunged his spear into the

dead queen's eye. Achilles, deeply angered, struck Thersites a blow that killed him.

Two late writers *(145)* call Penthesilea and her warriors mercenary troops. Another late account *(146)* rejects the story of Penthesilea's aid of Troy. The Amazons had set out against the island of Leuce to destroy Achilles. They made boats, practiced sailing, and sailed away on fifty ships. In a landing in which they attempted to steal and mount a herd of horses they were foiled by Achilles who frightened the horses already alarmed by the strange burden of their women riders. The horses reared, threw the riders, trampled and ate them. Then maddened by the taste of human flesh, they mistook the sea for a white plain, jumped in and were drowned.

In the temple of Olympian Zeus was a screen showing Achilles tenderly supporting the dying Penthesilea *(147)*. A painting *(148)* represents her wearing a leopard's skin and carrying a Scythian bow. She is looking disdainfully and contemptuously at Paris who seeks to attract her notice. Near them are two women, one very young, the other old, trying to carry water in broken pitchers . . . both among the 'number of the uninitiated'.

Penthesilea's broken life and the futility of her brash courage were the key note of late Greek literature and art.

Achilles, too, though he was mightiest of all the Greek warriors, had dressed in women's garb. Because it had been prophesied that his going to the aid of the Greeks against Troy, which could not be taken without him, would cost his life, his mother Thetis put him at the age of nine in the court of Lycomedes, king of Scyros. There he lived disguised as a girl under the name Pyrrha. Once at a feast in honor of Dionysus he seduced the king's daughter Deidameia. Their son was Pyrrhus *(149)*.

The connection of names in the Achilles stories deserves and his Amazon daughters. In the Iliad the king of Scyros is comment. Scyros was early connected with the cult of Ares Enyeus, a cult name of Ares *(150)*, as is also the name Thersites.

Deidameia is an Amazon name. Achilles was once engaged to marry Iphigenia who is associated with the cults of Artemis and Dionysus.

THE SARMATIANS AND THE SCYTHIANS

The story of the Sarmatians *(151)* is a sequel to one of the Grecian attacks upon the Amazons, whether of Heracles or Theseus is uncertain.

After their victory the Greeks sailed away, taking with them in three ships the Amazons captured alive. Out at sea the Amazons attacked and threw their captors overboard. But since the women knew 'nothing of ships nor how to use rudder, sail, or oar', they were carried by the winds to the Sea of Azov. Here they landed, found a herd of horses, and raided Scythia on horseback.

At first the Scythian army thought the Amazons were men. After discovering their mistake they arranged peace terms in order to have children by such valiant women. The two armies joined camps, 'each man having for his wife the woman with whom he had intercourse at first'.

Unlike Scythian women, who remained in wagons and did not go out to hunt but were engaged in women's employments, the Amazons had no skills except to 'shoot with the bow and throw the javelin and ride horseback'. The couples therefore moved to a new land north of the Sea of Azov. Such was the founding of Sarmatia with its mongrel Scythian tongue. The men could not learn the Amazons' language and the women always spoke the Scythian language incorrectly.

Sarmatian women continued to follow their ancestral Amazonian habits: 'they ride horseback and go hunting with their men or without them; they go to war, and wear the same dress as men'. Hippocrates *(152)* adds that the young women learned to throw the javelin from horseback and that as long as they were virgins they fought and had to kill three enemies before they could marry. In parts of these regions women still have great personal liberty *(153)*.

Both Scythian men and women, at least the richer ones, were

said to have had a sexual indifference amounting to impotence. The Enarees, according to Herodotus *(154)* were Scythian men afflicted with an ailment called the 'sacred disease'. Hippocrates *(155)* denies that it was the sacred disease, characterizing it 'from being jaded by exercise on horseback, the men become weak in their desires. . . . Whenever men ride much and very frequently on horseback, . . . they are inept at venery.' This diagnosis an English physician confirms *(156)*, calling the disease orchitis 'very likely to result, as Hippocrates suggests, from constant horseback riding'.

It is apparent that the nomadic Asiatic tribes had different customs, some allowing women great personal freedom, others secluding women and limiting their activity.

WHO WERE THE AMAZONS?—A THEORY

The cults and legends of the Amazons undoubtedly had a basis in fact. As in dream *(157)*, so in myth some reality must underlie the imaginative and distorted tale. Facts persist in folk memory, an essential truth which has been proved for all legends wherever research has been at all thorough.

The horse, the axe, and possibly the sword are the most pertinent clues as to the identity of the Amazons *(158)*. Homer, Hesiod, Æschylus, Herodotus, Euripides, Isocrates, Plato, and Apollodorus are representative writers who believed the Amazons existed. References of these and other ancient writers make constant mention of horse riding, the use of the axe and other iron weapons, and of districts about the Black Sea especially around the Caucasus mountains.

In these regions appear cults of Ares, Artemis, Dionysus, and Cybele, in which horses, horseback riding, and the use of the axe were noted. It is a historical fact that here originated the axe; that here iron objects were first made in large quantities.

In these districts heroes fought and conquered horse-riding women who used the axe and other iron weapons. Both Heracles and Achilles had cults here. All the heroes are connected with horses. Bellerophon, once called *Hipponous,* rode Pegasus to conquer the women; Heracles tamed the man-eating

horses of Diomedes before attacking Ares's daughters; Theseus conquered the Centaurs, had a son, the horse-loving *Hippolytus*; Achilles repelled by valor and guile the attack of the horse riding Amazons in the Chersonese.

Archæological research has also shown that during the period of about 1400–1000 B.C. there occurred widespread invasions of Indo-European peoples and troubled times. Crete fell in 1400, the Hittites about 1200, Troy a few years later. These were the times when heroes performed brave deeds, when legends originated.

Research has shown that early horse riding people, among them women, came originally from Northern Eurasian grasslands, later from those regions in which iron was first discovered. This fact bears out the legends that numerous cities in western Asia Minor were founded by Amazons who are thus identified as newcomers. Amazonian tribes would have found more welcome in the Anatolian lands already under the strong domination of women than in Greece recently taken over by patriarchal Indo-Europeans.

At any rate, there came into Greece in some numbers about 1400 B.C. a subbrachycephalic people, not Achæan, allied to western Caucasian stock. These invaders may have entered along the Northern route and the Danube valley *(159)*. Many Amazonian legends contain place names from this route. At least two Amazonian legends stress Amazonian inexperience with sailing: they drifted with the winds; they had to learn shipbuilding and sailing before starting a voyage; they crossed the Bosporus on the ice.

Hundreds of years afterward Athenian orators could still arouse terror and dread by recalling these nomadic invaders: 'In ancient times the Amazons . . . alone of all people around were armed with iron, were first of all to mount the horse.'

AN ATTEMPTED INTERPRETATION OF AMAZONIAN LEGENDS

Why, hundreds of years after all danger from these invasions had passed, did Amazonian tales continue their 'wonderful power to delight and charm', as a fourth century emperor

remarked *(160)*? Because stories about Amazons filled many psychological needs of classical Greece.

How difficult it was to superimpose upon matriarchal Cretan culture the rule of patriarchal Zeus has been surmised from examining the cults. The legends of the heroes mirror the same struggle to establish patriarchal marriage and the rights of fatherhood. Bachofen, who by interpretation of the legends anticipated the discovery of Cretan matriarchy, and recently Turel, a student of Bachofen and Freud, have emphasized the importance of the heroes' victories over the Amazons.

All the heroes rebelled against female domination. Bellerophon projected his incest wishes upon his overlord's wife and her unwelcome proposals *(161)*. Heracles deserted his wives, killed his children, had other children 'with apprehension', rebelled against Hypsipyle's use of men as studs, refused to let any nation remain under female rule. Theseus abandoned his Cretan wife. Achilles slew her who might have been his bride. All inflicted horrible slaughter upon Amazonian women.

The heroes 'brought light to men'. With the exception of Bellerophon, each hero bestowed his ideal love on a man: Hercules and Iolaus, Theseus and Pirithous, Achilles and Patroclus. None achieved a secure heterosexual union. They maintained fraternal, homosexual rather than marital and paternal relationships.

Yet all four in their efforts to conquer women succumbed at least temporarily to the charms of Amazons. Bellerophon married a Lycian wife and their children inherited through the female line. Heracles served one as a slave and was then able to live at peace with an Amazonian wife. Theseus married Hippolyte; Achilles seduced the Amazonian Deidameia.

Nor did the heroes escape fascination for the mother, the wish to be like her and to escape the danger of destruction (castration) by her. They too, like Dionysus, put on women's dress. Heracles donned Omphale's robe, submitted to women's work. Theseus and Achilles wore the dainty garb of young girls. The transvestite has strong castration fears *(162)* assert-

ing his belief in the phallic structure of women with whom he identifies himself. As a woman he wishes to be loved by a woman as he had been by his mother—as Omphale spanked Heracles with her slipper. Moreover, the transvestite *(163)* regresses to infancy seeking by his innocence and helplessness to recover his former dependent pregenital (masochistic to the adult ego) relationship to the mother and to deny any hint of incest. Three of the heroes assert their injured masculine self-esteem: Heracles kills the strangers who tried to sleep with Omphale; Theseus threw oxen at the jeering men on the roof; Achilles seized weapons smuggled into the women's quarters.

The deeds of Theseus are particularly significant in the development of Greek patriarchy. Amazons attacking Athens had seized the holiest places of the city including the shrine of the Eumenides. Here Apollo and Athena, 'she whom never a dark womb hid yet never did god procreate nobler child', successfully defended Orestes' right to avenge with matricide the murder of his father. Theseus by his victory helped the Erinyes to become Eumenides. By his marriage, more than Bellerophon, he established patriarchal rights, declared man's procreative power equal to woman's creative function. Athenian men could well name his victory the first brilliant service of Attica to all Greece *(164)*.

Amazonian women had a comparable psychological need to imitate men. What may have begun as dire necessity in their early mountain homes later became a repetitive compulsion to take over men's tasks of aggression and conquest. In this expansion the technique of horseback riding proved highly valuable. We know something of the ancient and extraordinarily rich symbolism of riding, its common use as a symbol for coitus, its equivalence in the unconscious of the rider with an object ridden *(165)*. It was easy for the Amazon to fantasy as part of herself the powerful new collaborator, the horse, which provided her with a substitute for the phallic power she envied, made her feel like a man. Certainly the women's physical and psychological superiority is emphasized. Without horses they were just plain, ordinary women; after marriage

they gave up horseback riding for all except general expeditions. The biting and trampling by the horses seems to have represented a fantasy of rape (return of the repressed).

Perhaps the women of these nomadic tribes were often forced to obtain sexual gratification in other than normal ways. Among both Scythian and Sarmatian men sexual indifference amounted to impotence. Constant horseback riding apparently gave them orchitis and aroused deep fears of impotency, so that often they adopted women's garb to show their loss of virility. For the women it seems possible that riding substituted masturbatory satisfaction.

The general content of the legends suggests that horses became love objects to the women. They sacrificed horses as their dearest possessions and were concerned about the fertility of their horses. Their sadism toward children may have been bound up with their love and fear of their powerful steeds. Well the heroes might wish to deprive Amazons of their horses.

Turel has shown *(166)* that by the time of Pericles and Phidias, Amazonian legends were used to excuse and justify the oriental seclusion of Greek women and their loss of almost all civil and social rights. 'See what the Amazons did to men', the paintings and sculpture proclaimed; and so the Amazon was shown as struck down, wounded, dying or submissively bearing, at last, the yoke of marriage. One or two writers have noted that the Roman matron's higher position and the lack of an antecedent matriarchy rendered both Amazon and hero legends unnecessary in Rome. In Greece as well, the relatively freer position of Laconian women gave Amazonian stories there a friendlier interpretation.

French offers a more dynamic explanation *(167)*, the truth of which may well be verified by future research since considerable evidence already exists. He feels that the struggle between the sexes which plays such a conspicuous rôle in all these legends is itself a reaction to the mixture of fascination and shocked fear of temptation which the orgiastic and seductive character of the Great Mother and the cults associated with her aroused in the more primitive and virile invaders. Woman as

Amazon was less to be feared than woman as seductress. The sex of the mother must at all cost be denied. The Greeks converted the alluring mother into the chaste huntress Artemis and into the wise and virginal Athena born parthenogenetically not from the mother but from the head of Zeus; and, as we have seen, those same Greeks were fascinated by stories of wild horsewomen who repudiated their sex and fought like men.

If, as we believe, there were real bands of Amazon women who rode to war like men, French thinks it is possible that a similar mechanism, a violent masculine protest against feminine sexuality, may have played a rôle in their warlike ardor. To be sure the original motive may have arisen from economic necessity when, as with Scyths and Sarmatians and other poor or weakened tribes, women were forced to fight against enemies; but the fact that Amazons were made to reject the breast and to kill or maim their male children suggests that there was an emotional need as well as an economic necessity underlying these stories.

In French's opinion the chaste goddesses of the Greeks and Amazon legends that arose among the nomadic tribes invading Asia Minor are parallel phenomena. Because the Hellenes were a highly intelligent, gifted people, they opposed the Cretan mother cult by idealizing goddesses and making them into cultivated, intellectual copies of men. But the more primitive Amazonian invaders of Asia Minor, faced by a similar mother cult, revived a more primitive type of masculine protest patterned on memories of an earlier day when the women found it necessary to fight beside their men against common enemies.

Historians celebrate the importance of Greek defeat of the Persians. No doubt much fear of the Persian threat went back to the old fear of Cretan and Amazonian domination. One important connection has not elsewhere been noted. Soon after the battle of Salamis, Athenian art and literature began to emphasize the victories of Theseus over the Amazons. Now it happened in that battle that one of Xerxes' allies was the

Carian queen Artemisia whose valiant deeds brought from Xerxes the remark that his women allies had acted like men, his men aids like women. Athenians after that battle offered the immense reward of 10,000 drachmas for the capture of Artemisia alive 'so great was the indignity that a woman should make war against Athens' *(168)*. The constant danger of such attacks in sections of Asia Minor where women were still powerful as late as the fourth century A.D. *(169)* must have made Amazonian legends a continued reassurance to Greek citizens. Artemisia, Tomyris and Semiramis were only *historical* Amazons.[1]

The Amazons were doubtless originally Eurasian people with large numbers of women in their bands who first developed the mobile economic use of horseback riding. Amazonian invasions inspired excessive fear in Hellenic hearts at a time when they were striving to conquer the dominant Mother in Mycenæan Greece. Amazonian gynecocracy was as distasteful as Cretan matriarchy. Reaction against both helped to bring about extreme subordination of women from early classical times. Later, when most fear of feminine hegemony had passed, Amazonian art and legend served conveniently to justify the subordination of women.

'If we give them the least rope, we'll see them building ships and fighting sea fights, like Artemisia; or if they want to mount the horse and ride as cavalry, we might as well get rid of our knights', the chorus of old men declare in Aristophanes' comedy, Lysistrata, feminist heroine.

(The author wishes to acknowledge the interest and suggestions of Dr. Thomas M. French, of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute; and of Professor Mary A. Grant, professor of Greek and Latin, University of Kansas.)

1 International News Service release, November 13, 1940: *Women of Crete Want to Organize Amazon Regiment.* Canea, Crete—'Greek women of the island of Crete today forwarded a message to King George II asking permission to form an "Amazonian" regiment to aid in the war against Italy. According to mythology, the original female warriors—the Amazons of Scythia—fought for many years on Greek battlefields.'

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Masochism in Modern Man. By Theodor Reik. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1941. 439 pp.

Hanns Sachs

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BOOK REVIEWS

MASOCHISM IN MODERN MAN. By Theodor Reik. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1941. 439 pp.

AUS LEIDEN FREUDEN. By Theodor Reik. London: Imago Publishing Company, Ltd., 1940. 404 pp.

The first of these books is not a mere translation of the German original but has been considerably enlarged by the author. The following review is concerned chiefly with the English version although the study of the original has been helpful towards a fuller understanding of the author's opinions and intentions.

Reik's book deserves the fullest attention of every psychoanalyst because it is—to this reviewer's knowledge, and leaving the problem of homosexuality aside—the first full and exhaustive study of a perversion from the psychoanalytic point of view. It treats masochism as a nosological entity on the basis of a rich and penetrating experience. It discusses its diverse forms, its unconscious sources and its genesis, the differentiation from other forms of perversion, the relation to moral—or as Reik calls it—'social' masochism and its transformation into some important social phenomena. All this would be valuable enough if done on a merely eclectic basis by collecting, coördinating, and clarifying what Freud, his followers and his critics among the psychoanalysts have said on the subject. But Reik's book is far from being eclectic. Although he builds throughout on the basis of Freud's libido theory, his work shows the highest form of originality—at least the highest form desirable in scientific thinking—the originality of observation.

Every analyst has now and then had the experience, first described by Freud, that an analysand, after the last resistance against a correct interpretation had been removed, remarked with some astonishment, 'But this I have known all the time', although he has hitherto given ample proof that he had no conscious possession of this knowledge. The first reaction of scientists, and especially of psychoanalysts, on learning of a new, correct and convincing discovery, made in their own field, is often the same.

One of those things that seem so simple and easy when they have been done, is the removal of obstacles—or perhaps better 'resistances'—which stand as a seemingly insurmountable barrier in

the way of scientific progress. An excellent example is furnished by Reik's insistence on the simple fact that the masochist does not desire pain and punishment as his real and final aim. He wants like everyone else to experience pleasure, and he gets all he wants, deeply and fully, when he achieves the end-pleasure or orgasm. Yet the way by which he arrives at the end-pleasure is peculiar and different from the normal proceeding. This becomes obvious to everyone who had any opportunity for close observation of masochistic individuals, but nobody has ever pronounced it fully and clearly and used it as the foundation on which all theories of masochism have to be built. The difference between masochism and normality (and all the other perversions too) lies in the fact that the same striving towards *Endlust* (end-pleasure) is not preceded by a gradual series of *Vorlust* (forepleasure), but has to be achieved by way of *Vor-Unlust,* that is by suffering pain, punishment, or humiliation. We will hear more about the mechanism of this deviation from forepleasure to foredispleasure in the discussion of the suspense factor.

Before we try to follow this new track to its end, the author introduces us first to the characteristic traits of masochism. The first of these characteristics is the special significance of fantasy (discussed in Part II, Chapter III and Part IV, Chapter XIII). This has nothing to do with the fact that in masochism, as in other perversions and in normal sexuality, fantasies are accepted as substitutes for reality and eventually may replace it altogether. The influence of fantasy goes so far that the reality situation is gratifying and pleasurable only because it is built up on fantasy material. The original fantasy was but a surrogate for the missing real gratification, but in the fully formed perversion their relation is reversed and the reality is sexually stimulating only so far as it is the reflection, the acting out of a fantasy.

'Let us assume that the specific conditions for excitement are that he [the masochist] receives a box on the ear from a Junonian woman and is abused by her. . . . The man in question walks peaceably out in the street, a huge woman comes up to him, showers him with words of abuse and gives him a mighty box on the ear (e.g. as a consequence of mistaken identity). . . . Will the masochist be sexually stimulated by this sudden attack? This is well-nigh impossible. Of course it is quite possible that the scene will subsequently be used in a fantasy to produce sexual stimula-

tion, but its immediate effect will not be of this kind even though it exactly reproduces a desired situation. Nothing but the preparatory fantasy is lacking.'

It would be a fatal mistake to let our attention be deflected by those impressive and startling acts—the whipping and binding and treading under feet—and to overlook the fantasies which are the source of masochistic pleasure. (Freud noted that most masochists seem to be satisfied with very little actual pain.) This characteristic groundwork of fantasy, although specially important in the problem of masochism, is present in most, if not all, other perversions. Reik thinks that it may be especially important where passive tendencies are preponderant. Anyway, once our eyes are opened we can see how often the fantasies directing the reality situation are the wirepullers of the libidinal excitement. The exhibitionists or scoptophilics could, for example, have the full satisfaction of their desires—to look at a nude body and its sex organs or to expose their own—for love or money, and for very little of both. Why do they not avail themselves of these easy possibilities rather than prefer situations where they risk social disgrace and punishment? Doubtlessly because the act itself does not mean much to them. They 'don't get a kick out of it' when its setting does not reproduce and stimulate certain fantasies to which their libido is fixated. The exhibitionist enjoys a situation in which he can expect to fill the mind of his victim with a mixture of terror and sexual excitement. The voyeur enjoys only the sight which is not freely conceded, and which he snatches in spite of obstacles, by stealth or surprise. In these perversions the infantile origin and character of the stimulating fantasies is manifest; in the case of masochism it works, as Reik has shown, in a more subtle and indirect way.

Reik's observations of the 'synchronization' of fantasy and act—mostly, of course, with the use of masturbation—are in this connection especially valuable.

The 'demonstrative feature' reveals the pride behind the apparent humility and the wish to attract universal attention. This wish gets satisfied by being the worst in every competition, nearly as much as by being the best.

The 'provocative factor' is provided by the urge to be naughty, to pile up bits of aggressive behavior in order to provoke an outburst which will be met with masochistic pleasure. The enjoyment

is enhanced by the suspense and by the fact that the suffering is unconsciously prearranged, the other person being only the unwitting executor of the masochistic wishes.

These two last characteristics are perhaps more prominent in the 'social' form of masochism than in the straightforward perversion. Maybe this preponderance is a factor helping towards the transformation from the one to the other.

A fundamental trait belonging to all forms of masochism, but especially revealing in its relation to the perversion, is the suspense factor.

We may resume here the discussion of the foredispleasure *(Vorunlust)*. As Freud demonstrated in the Three Contributions, every step upwards on the stairs of forepleasure creates a certain amount of tension. This constitutes the main difference between forepleasure and the end-pleasure where all tension is finally swept away. The tension inherent in forepleasure is of course unpleasant, so that foredispleasure is always present; but in the normal case it is not sought for, the next step being dictated by the desire to do away with it, which is not gratified till the end-pleasure is achieved. If we see normals linger on in stages of forepleasure, this happens because the tension is not yet strong enough to urge them on. Normal individuals, often enough, through motives of a social or intrapsychic order, endure amounts of tension which are decidedly unpleasant—eventually even to the extent of foregoing the end-pleasure altogether *(Zielgehemmte Strebungen)*.

All these well-known facts are still far removed from masochism, but they throw some light on it with the help of Reik's penetrating power of observation.

The masochist too has strong motives which keep him from end-pleasure and cause orgasm to appear as something extremely dangerous. In other words, anxiety as the angel with the flaming sword stands at the door of his paradise. But the masochist, in spite of all that, does *not* give up the orgasm—nothing will induce him to such a renunciation; he clings to it passionately, perhaps even more passionately than those who remain sexually normal. Instead of resigning he throws himself into the punishment, puts torture and humiliation in the place of forepleasure, 'makes them the center of his desires, in order to attain the pleasure more quickly'. This is then, as Reik calls it, 'the flight forward' as an

indicator of the impatient urge. 'The punishment lying as a threat behind the pleasure is met intentionally. . . .' The constant conflict between the anxiety and the 'flight forward' results in the phenomenon that Reik describes as the 'suspense factor'. To be suspended between more and more painful torture on the one hand and the sudden orgasm on the other is the true characteristic of masochistic fantasies.

The anxiety which necessitates this 'flight forward' can be recognized—but according to Reik not regularly or absolutely—as castration anxiety. He avoids any set formula and does not overlook the complexity of the phenomena with which he has to deal. In elucidating the characteristics of masochism, especially the suspense factor, he pays due attention to the origin of the perversion. To mention just a few of them: the erogeneity of certain parts of the body, certain infantile experiences, the œdipus and castration complexes, femininity and *Ur-Masochismus*—primitive masochism as expression of the death instinct.

Reik gives first place in his theory of the origin of masochism to sadism, or more accurately to sadistic fantasies, out of which by a process of reversal and identification the masochistic attitude is finally evolved. The masochist demonstrates what he had wanted to do to others in having it done to himself. Masochism 'is no original drive, but a secondary instinctual formation. It springs from the denial that meets the sadistic instinctual impulse and it develops from the sadistic aggressive or defiant fantasy which replaces reality.' Reik denounces the opinion which sees the masochist as an unaggressive weakling since it neglects the essential in favor of the superficial aspect.

The masochist is always ready to drown himself in a sea of pain, to abandon himself to all sorts of torture—in his fantasy life. His attitude when he experiences the realization of his perverted desires is a quite different one. He is eager to suffer more or less pain—mostly less—but there is little of abandonment in it. The torture scene has to be played strictly along the lines laid down by him before he assumed the part of the helpless victim and not too much leeway is given to any sadistic initiative of the executioner. He acts like the old man in the story who, when he was lying on his deathbed, said to the minister who rattled off the prayers: 'I am willing to die, but I won't be rushed'. Nor do the

masochists—speaking here, of course, of the sexual perverts, not of moral masochists—show in ordinary life character traits of unusual weakness, readiness to yield their place to others, or self-effacement.

The foregoing remarks do not represent an attempt to reproduce the main structure of Reik's book nor to give an extract of all its parts. The book is too rich in content and too variegated in its points of view to permit such abbreviation. The purpose is to emphasize those parts of the book which make it required reading for analysts. The strictly theoretical or speculative, and still more the controversial aspects have to be nearly entirely passed over. The reader will find there many excellent observations and highly valuable theories, but more important than all these is the dazzling new light thrown on old and seemingly well-known facts.

We will have to content ourselves with a more general survey of the second half of Reik's book (Part VII, Social Forms; Part VIII, Cultural Aspects, Chapters XX to XXX). Not that the work done there is negligible. The author who has achieved eminence by his studies of the cultural and social aspects of psychoanalysis shows his well-known qualities: profound penetration of the subject, the outlook on human affairs from an elevated point of view (the fairy godmother who bestowed this gift was Freud) and brilliant—perhaps now and then too brilliant—wit. This part of the book will be of special interest for students of the unconscious trends in social life, especially in history and sociology.

Reik starts by drawing the line of separation between the perversion and the 'social' form of masochism. We know a good many transitional forms which enable us to see the unconscious identity of both forms. The differentiation lies in the fact that social masochism knows neither an end-pleasure (orgasm) nor any individual partner from whom the infliction of pain is expected and desired. As Reik explains it, this different conscious attitude is achieved by what we could call in mathematical terms a 'projection into the infinite', the end-pleasure being placed after death, in the realm of eternity, the world in general becoming the torturer who executes the harsh decrees of the superego. None of the other characteristics of masochism are missing.

The 'projection into the infinite' gives special zest to the discussion of the question: martyr or masochist? We are reminded how essential for the final victory of any cause has been the fact

that its partisans were ready, willing and eager to become its martyrs. The final victory of Christianity is due to the martyrs of Diocletian's persecution who proved to the pagans how unshaken their trust in the promise of a reward after death remained in the face of torture and execution.

Reik's book gives many things to many scientific interests, but it is indispensable to the analyst.

HANNS SACHS (BOSTON)

EL PSICOANALISIS, PRESENTE Y PERSPECTIVAS. (Psychoanalysis in the Present and in Perspective.) By Angel Garma. Buenos Aires: Aniceto Lopez, 1942. 115 pp.

Dr. Garma continues to provide the Spanish speaking countries with psychoanalytic teachings. This is his third book and a fourth, on the neuroses, is in preparation. As the title indicates the volume now appearing is an account of present-day analysis and the perspectives offered by recent work. He brings up to date views on anxiety, libidinal types, the theory of instincts, and the question of the superego, using Freud's latest works as a basis, expressing some of his own views incidentally. Among special topics, he discusses infancy, with special reference to the work of Melanie Klein; the stages of libidinal development, following Abraham; female sexuality, referring not only to Freud but also to Brunswick, Lampl-de Groot, and Helene Deutsch; puberty; dreams, based on the chapter in the New Introductory Lectures; psychoses; organ neuroses and organic disease, with special reference to the work of Americans; therapy, with a discussion of Reich and Reik; applied analysis, chiefly in connection with belles lettres; the relation to biology; psychoanalysis and pavlovian neurology, in which he summarizes the views of Ischlondsky, French, Kubie and others. Finally in a chapter on the psychoanalytic movement, he tells of the work of the various psychoanalytic institutes, gives the Chicago statistics on treatment, and prints at length as an example of training schedules, the entire announcement of courses of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute for the season 1940–1941. For a rapid survey of present-day trends and issues in psychoanalysis, and the type of work being done, this book should be of great use to its readers.

B. D. L.

THE RELATIVITY OF REALITY. Reflections on the Limitations of Thought and the Genesis of the Need of Causality. By René Laforgue. Translated by Anne Jouard. New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs, 1940. 92 pp.

The translation by Anne Jouard of The Relativity of Reality [1] by René Laforgue, is an adequate presentation of the text. The painstaking effort to present an absolutely literal English rendering sometimes makes for somewhat tortuous, stilted sentence structure and not only detracts from the reader's enjoyment of the book, but often makes it difficult to grasp the meaning at a glance. This is unfortunate, since Laforgue's French is particularly free-flowing, alive, and expressive of exact shades of meaning. The translation is distinctly pedestrian, and stands in the same relationship to the original as does an excellent, unretouched photograph to the actual face of a man, with all its intrinsic capacity for subtle changes.

As The Relativity of Reality is a book which deserves to be widely read, this version will at least make the contents available to the English speaking public.

BETTINA WARBURG (NEW YORK)

SUPERSTITION AND SOCIETY. By Roger Money-Kyrle. London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1939. 163 pp.

This little book is the third psychoanalytic epitome. Supplied with a preface by Dr. John Rickman, it is an excellent survey of the most important contributions psychoanalysis has made to anthropology. The wealth of material is impressive, but still more so is the skill with which it is condensed into brief yet clear and comprehensive form, valuable for the psychoanalyst and layman alike.

In his introductory chapter, the author points to the inadequacies of the theories and methods which, having been confined to a psychology of the conscious only, were unable to explain irrational phenomena. For instance, mythology with its incestuous, parricidal and castrative elements, remained an obscure and impenetrable domain until psychoanalytical studies of dreams furnished some enlightenment.

[1] The original, *Relativité de la Realité*, was reviewed in this QUARTERLY, VIII, 1939, p. 244.

Through the clinical observations of neurotics, especially obsessional neurotics, the primitive is made more understandable to us. 'The savage is, indeed, an obsessional neurotic; but whereas his civilized brother has to invent symptoms for himself, the savage finds his symptoms ready made in the traditional system of taboos' (p. 71).

In fact, the author believes that the difference between men and animals is not so much the greater intelligence of man 'but the defects peculiar to his intelligence, almost one may say, his capacity for madness . . .'. Adopting the theory of Melanie Klein, the author continues, '. . . The psychotic fantasies of early infancy vary with differences in innate endowment and education; but their basic form is universal in and peculiar to the human species' (p. 114).

In the last chapter, Education and Culture, the author makes some interesting and timely suggestions on how to mold the character of future generations. 'If we wish to abolish war we should cease to put our faith too much in leagues and covenants and learn from the Arapesh how to run our nurseries' (p. 128). According to Money-Kyrle, however, the infantile experience alone determines only the temperament of an individual, whereas the group ideal is responsible for the actual character. The study of these two factors should be, says the author, divided between psychoanalysis and anthropology. 'Thus we may hope that one day the infant science of psychoanalytical anthropology will perform the Herculean task—which has so far defeated the philosophies and religions of the world—of giving *homo sapiens* the wisdom that his name implies. Once he acquires this, a rational society, in the political and economic sense, will come almost of its own accord' (p. 153).

If we could only define that intangible transition between the rational and irrational!

PAUL FRIEDMAN (NEW YORK)

THE TRAUMATIC NEUROSES OF WAR. By Abram Kardiner, M.D., Psychosomatic Medicine Monograph II-III. Published with the Sponsorship of the Committee on Problems of Neurotic Behavior, Division of Anthropology and Psychology, National Research Council, Washington, D. C., 1941. 258 pp.

Kardiner has wisely refrained in this volume from including 'war neuroses', thus permitting him to elaborate in great detail a very

specific and circumscribed clinical picture. This he has done in exemplary fashion.

The book includes a clinical, a theoretical, and a practical part. Symptomatology is presented by means of detailed case histories. The symptom is then analyzed, the traumatic situation explained, the repetitive features of traumatic neuroses stressed. The symptoms are further discussed from Kardiner's special methodological viewpoint—the point of view of adaptation.

Adaptation is the guiding concept throughout the second part of the book. Kardiner does not discard the libido theory; he criticizes it as being too atomistic, too much patterned after the sexual drive. This pattern does not fit the pattern of the other drives. He considers much more decisive what he calls the action syndrome. According to him, the newly born reacts to its environment not so much by reason of its instinctual structure, but because of its necessity to master its functions and its environment. This urge to master the environment is the specific motor which creates the ego. In the course of this process the individual learns that, while in the domain of psychology compromises are possible, reality offers only the choice between success or failure, and the consequence of failure is death.

Trauma represents a failure of mastery. Traumatic neurosis is explained partly as an attempt to regain mastery, partly as a means of maintaining such mastery as the subject has at his disposal, partly as repetitions of the failure in mastery.

Treatment is directed toward reassurance and toward enabling the patient to regain mastery over the traumatic events by abolishing the amnesia. Progressive mastery over his environment is sought by careful reëducation, paralleled by management of environmental factors.

The value of Kardiner's book lies in the rich case material, in introducing a set of new viewpoints, and in the avenue these new viewpoints open for a systematic therapy.

Kardiner's point of view, centering mainly around an approach to ego development on the basis of adaptation and mastery, is sound in itself, but breaks down when he makes it the sole and only explanation for human development and behavior. Although he makes a bow to the libido theory, he treats it as if it were completely irrelevant to the development of the ego. There is, on the contrary, the strongest interaction between the two. The

libidinal forces are the integrative power which welds the otherwise discrete action syndromes into the totality of personality. Action syndromes and their genesis cannot alone explain psychological phenomena, either in the normal person or in the neurotic.

This limitation has made Kardiner's explanation of the phenomena of traumatic neuroses and his suggestions for their treatment fall short of what one had looked to find in this otherwise interesting book.

R. A. SPITZ (NEW YORK)

LECTURES ON CONDITIONED REFLEXES. VOL. II: CONDITIONED REFLEXES AND PSYCHIATRY. By I. P. Pavlov. Translated and edited by W. Horsley Gantt. New York: International Publishers Co., Inc., 1941. 199 pp.

This volume consists of an edited translation of those of Pavlov's writings and scientific addresses which appeared between the year 1928 when he was seventy-five, and his death in 1936. It covers the period during which Pavlov was occupied with the application of the concept of the conditioned reflex to the problems of psychiatry. The speeches and papers are presented as sixteen chapters; some of them mere notes of two or three pages, others as long as twenty-nine pages. Although there is a certain chronological evolution of the ideational content, there is also much repetition and overlapping. Furthermore, most of the papers were addressed to an audience on whose previous knowledge of the subject Pavlov could not count, so that he felt it necessary to recapitulate basic principles in almost every paper. Consequently that which is novel in the content of these lectures could be condensed into a shorter, clearer exposition. In fact, the translator's thoughtful twenty-four page introduction contains most of the meat of the subsequent lectures, and makes one wish that instead of a reverential rendering of the lectures themselves he had organized the material in the form of a concise, and logical text. It is important, of course, that the full text of the protocols of original experiments should be available in English; but unfortunately these lectures, like so much of the available data on the work of Pavlov, are not protocols and are scarcely detailed enough for critical analysis, nor systematic enough to constitute a cogent presentation of the material in a running story.

Just as Anrep's book is a better basic text for the serious student

than is the first volume of this series, so is Frolov's [1] recent book, unsatisfactory though it is, really a better introduction to Pavlov's ideas on psychiatry than are these discontinuous lectures by Pavlov himself. A careful authoritative textbook is still needed to enable us to evaluate Pavlov's contributions. The very effort to organize such a textbook would highlight both the strengths and the weaknesses of Pavlov's theories.

Several unsolved problems hinder one's effort to understand Pavlov's concept of psychopathological processes and his attempt to apply his findings on dogs to human beings.

In the first place, in Pavlov's terminology, words sometimes change their connotations by infinitesimal steps. For instance, the important word 'stimulus' is not constant in its meaning. In certain connections it will mean a stimulus of a certain intensity. In another context it will mean a signal that is affectively charged. The word never indicates here, as it does in neurophysiology, the intensity of a stimulus to a single cell, but rather a complex situational demand upon the animal as a whole, a demand which always involves subcortical as well as cortical structures, since instinctual needs are always involved. This ambiguity makes difficult the interpretation of many experiments.

For years Pavlov has thought and written in terms of weak and strong cells, and of cells with varying thresholds, or with varying maximal tolerances. Yet this concept remained up to the end quite unanalyzed. As a deduction from the total activity of the animal, qualities are attributed to individual cells analogous to the variations observed in the animal's behavior. Thus he 'explains' the differences between different types of dogs entirely by these hypothetical differences in cortical cellular capacities, thresholds, or strengths. Actually the evidence can as well be used to defend a theory that the variations are due to differences in the relationship between subcortical and cortical structures. This aspect of Pavlov's theories could be made acceptable only by translating Pavlov's theory of varying cellular strengths, etc., into variations in the numbers of neurones involved.

In several places, Pavlov speaks of inhibitory functions as being absent from subcortical structures and as a process which is encountered only in the cortex. On page 64, he speaks of it as being something peculiar to dogs. These statements are hard to reconcile

[1] Frolov, Y. P.: *Pavlov and His School.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1937. Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, X, 1941, pp. 329–339.

with evidence from other fields of investigation. If taken at their face value, they would rule out entirely any effort to apply observations on dogs to psychopathological manifestations in any other species, especially in man.

Finally one cannot help regretting that Pavlov was in such a hurry. One may sympathize with the eagerness of his spirit, and with his sense that the problems were urgent and that he was old; but one must deplore the fact that this led him to loose analogies, and at times, to abandon his own self-critical standards. An example of this is found on page 151, where he argues seriously that if bromides dissipate an established conditioned reflex, this constitutes proof of its pathological nature. Certainly this was a hasty ad hoc argument, an attempt to prove his case in a field in which he felt insecure. To anyone who reveres the spirit of the earlier years of Pavlov's work it is painful to see this example of his older years uncritically perpetuated. Chapter LII (An Attempt to Understand the Symptoms of Hysteria Physiologically) is marred by many examples of Pavlov's confusion about psychiatry. It is ungrateful to criticize, but clinical entities must be clearly differentiated before experiments can be usefully applied. One cannot hit an unseen target even with a shotgun except by chance. Although this reviewer is used to the task of translating the idiom of one branch of psychological science into another, in this chapter he finds himself hopelessly bogged. However, there are other chapters not devoid of interesting and stimulating suggestions.

Pavlov's central idea is that the basic properties of the cortex consist of excitatory and inhibitory processes, both of which may be focussed or may irradiate, and both of which may be conditioned and reconditioned. The stimulus which evokes one can sometimes be reversed so as to evoke the opposite. Finally the two processes are themselves constantly involved in an intricate mosaic of alternation and collision. Out of these basic facts he builds his picture of psychopathology. He finds individual differences in individual animals, as a result of which they fall into four main types. These are in general excitable, lively, calm, and inhibitory, depending upon the relative strength and weakness of the excitatory and inhibitory processes of which the cortical cells are assumed to be capable, and upon the balance or lack of balance which can be established between them. These differences in types he believes to be due partly to inheritance and partly to experience.

In the interplay of these factors, Pavlov points out certain dis-

turbances which seem to him analogous to every symptom observable in the psychiatric clinic. He sees muscular rigidity, patterned stereotypes of behavior, perseveration, obsessional manifestations, depressive states, and a variety of hyperexcitable and paradoxical reactions.

Of central importance in the production of these pathological states is the condition which Pavlov believes to be analogous to, if not identical with, hypnosis. His concept of hypnotism permeates his whole conception of the dynamics of psychopathological states. Schizophrenic symptoms are to him 'the expression of a chronic hypnotic state' (p. 40). This hypnotic state seems to him to be something halfway between sleep and waking. There are no data to indicate that he ever compared it with or made comparable studies of the hypnoid state in man. One often feels that he is using the term hypnosis for something related to but hardly identical with hypnotism.

He is at times led to venture rash statements about human clinical states, statements made in an effort to emphasize their assumed identity with the conditions which he observes in experimental animals. An example would be the broad claim (on page 40) that unresponsive patients will not reply to emphatic approaches but will reply to questions which 'are put to them very softly in very quiet surroundings'. This is used as an argument to prove that their unresponsiveness is identical with the ultra-paradoxical inhibitory effect sometimes obtainable with strongly conditioned stimuli.

His theories concerning rigidity and the hypnotic state lead directly into his concept of stereotype. Here again one is impressed by the dangers of premature efforts to correlate a laboratory phenomenon with loosely defined and complex clinical states. At times Pavlov's unquestioning identification of muscular rigidity with the hypnoid state seems no more justified than it would have been for Sherrington to write of decerebrate hypnotization instead of decerebrate rigidity.

The concept of stereotyped activity is central in Pavlov's effort to explain paranoid or obsessional ideas. This stereotype is an expression of what Pavlov calls 'pathological inertia' and grows out of an observation described on page 150 et seq. Here Pavlov describes a fact which is of great importance and which is rarely emphasized in discussions of the conditioned reflex: in any well-

established conditioned reflex, a skeletal muscular reaction of the entire body, toward the direction from which the stimulus comes, precedes the vegetative reflex. This skeletal muscular component of the conditioned reflex, which occurs in the interval between the stimulus and the conditioned salivation, may persist long after the salivation has been subjected to inhibition.

This surprising fact that the motor component of the total conditioned constellation is so much less destructible than the vegetative component, led Pavlov to certain interesting speculations about obsessional processes, and to certain interesting experiments. For instance, he attempted to convert the stimulus for a positive conditioned reflex into a stimulus for its exact opposite, a negative reflex. In certain animals this could be done easily. In others not only was this impossible, but it became equally impossible to reverse the sign of any similar stimulus. For instance, if the original stimulus was a metronome with a certain beat, it would become impossible to change the sign of any rhythmical auditory stimulus. If the original stimulus had been excitatory, all rhythm would become excitatory and could not be made inhibitory.

This is reminiscent of the obsessional and compulsive problem as one meets it clinically. It brings to mind the strange and fateful manner in which the 'do's' and 'don'ts' of infancy and childhood become fixed and unalterable patterns operating throughout life below the surface of conscious thoughts and feelings. In their ultimate implications conditioned reflexes and the efforts to transform them into opposites would seem to be closely analogous to positive and negative commands.

This particular aspect of Pavlov's thinking fascinates the reviewer but leaves him frustrated for lack of sufficient data. For instance, the material presented deals only with auditory stimuli. There is no evidence as to whether visual or tactile stimuli show the same phenomena. It is described only in the dog in which, as we have already noted, Pavlov assumes that inhibitory processes play a special rôle. This is a critical point since he also assumes that in the process of 'pathological inertia' inhibitory processes play a special rôle. These and many other considerations make it difficult to apply this data with any sense of security.

Because in a recent review of Frovlov's book already referred to, this reviewer has already gone into many details concerning the possible applicability of Pavlov's work to problems of clinical

psychiatry, he will not repeat those considerations here. The present review, therefore, consists chiefly of criticisms and regrets at the absence of much more detailed and varied experimental protocols, with only a few considerations of further applications of Pavlov's work, and is in a sense unfair to the book and to its value in shaking the psychiatrist out of his accustomed ruts. Nevertheless, in welcoming the provocative dynamite of Pavlov's contributions, we must also be careful not to abandon the valid criteria of our own experience. When Pavlov tends to look upon the experimental animal as an emotionless automaton (as for instance when he fails to consider the influence of emotion in analyzing the effects of excessive stimuli in producing what he calls the paradoxical or ultra-paradoxical inhibition), and when he prefers to speak in terms of cellular fatigue because it sounds more scientific than to use the descriptive terminology of psychology, we must be careful not to follow him.

Typographical errors are scattered throughout the book: for instance, *Beziehungswohn* on page 159. Nor is the translation always beyond criticism. There are unnecessary punctuation, foreign word order and unidiomatic usage. Unnecessary qualifying phrases are found where simple adjectives would suffice. Verbs too often precede their subjects. Dependent clauses and phrases are detached from their points of reference. All of this tends at times to make the translation stiff and cumbersome, and to make certain sentences almost unintelligible. Undoubtedly, translations from the Russian present exceptional difficulties. It would seem, however, that greater care could be taken to achieve simplicity and clarity in a work of such basic importance as the rendering of Pavlov's ideas into English.

LAWRENCE S. KUBIE (NEW YORK)

PSYCHIATRY IN MEDICAL EDUCATION. By Franklin G. Ebaugh, M.D., and Charles A. Rymer, M.D. New York: The Commonwealth Fund; London: Humphrey Milford-Oxford Press, 1942. 619 pp.

This book brings up to date the 1932 survey of psychiatric teaching, made under the auspices of the Division of Psychiatric Education of the National Committee for Mental Hygiene of which the coauthor, Franklin G. Ebaugh, was an Associate Director. The 1932 survey has been followed up by questionnaires in 1934, 1937 and 1940. Additional data were obtained from many other sources,

and particularly from the reports on the conference on psychiatric education held in 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1936. In addition to presenting the curricula of preclinical, clinical, graduate and postgraduate psychiatric teaching in medical schools and of psychiatric training in hospitals, it quotes copiously the opinions of a large number of teachers of psychiatry on many relevant phases of medical and psychiatric education. What we have here, then, is an authoritative work which presents the large accomplishments, problems, and the prospects of psychiatric education in America. It is such a clear report on prevailing psychiatric thought in America in the last three decades, that it can be profitably read as a history of this phase of psychiatry.

The authors, both leaders in psychiatric teaching, are not content with the rôle of reporters, and the book obtains much of its readability from the fervor with which they set forth their definition of psychiatry, and their plea for its rightful place in medical education. It is their thesis that psychobiology, 'the American School of Psychiatry', encompasses the most mature thought in psychiatry. The ultimate program they propose is that medicine should be taught as psychobiology. Thus, the first year medical curriculum would be psychobiology taught from the viewpoint of the anatomist, the chemist, the psychobiologist, and the psychiatrist. This would also apply in the teaching of the pathological and clinical sciences. 'Man as an individual' would be studied 'in relation to these various aspects of life'. Psychiatry is conceived as having 'a vastly broader scope than mental disease', a concept which expresses the progress that has been made in psychiatric thought in this country.

This presentation of the broad issues of psychiatric education, presumably the purpose of this book, is weakened by making the special point of view of psychobiology, eclectic though it is, to appear synonymous with modern psychiatry and with its aims and goals in psychiatric education. Psychobiology is, after all, essentially a methodological approach, scientifically sound in that it stresses the concept of the total reaction of an organism to its environment, and in that it seeks to dissolve the mind-body pseudo problem. But the rather undiscriminating eclecticism of psychobiology largely neglects to acknowledge the debt that the 'genetic-dynamic' psychiatric approach owes to the contributions of psychoanalysis which have revolutionized psychiatric thought, and

which have in large measure rung in the new era of psychiatry. Psychobiological eclectism, misappropriating many psychoanalytic concepts obscures their significance or waters them down to ineffectuality in practice.

Self-knowledge is accepted as basic for effectiveness in diagnosis and therapy. In lieu of the preparatory analysis of the psychoanalytic curriculum (outlined in this volume) is offered the 'Personality Study' which the uninitiated freshman medical student is asked to carry out on himself. It confronts the unprepared student with a battery of questions including such naïve items as: 'Did you have a latency period?' Have you 'unconscious . . . motives in your makeup?'

Psychoanalysis, the leaven of modern psychiatry, has supplied most of its most dynamic concepts. It has dissolved the body-mind dualism, and has bridged the chasm between the crudely mechanistic concepts of nineteenth century medical pathology and psychology. But this volume brings home to the psychoanalyst that it is the Adolf Meyer school, in truth, that established modern psychiatry in the medical schools of America.

In 1909, psychiatry was rarely mentioned in medical curricula and a total of twelve hours was allotted to neurology and psychiatry in a model medical curriculum sponsored by the American Medical Association. In 1914, there were still a number of schools which taught no psychiatry and most of the others taught it in combination with neurology in the third or fourth year. By 1932, 43 per cent of the medical schools were giving preclinical instruction in psychiatry and the average total was seventy-seven hours of psychiatry, which rose to as high as two hundred forty-six hours in Tufts in 1940. Preclinical instruction was given in 88 per cent of the schools in 1940. 'In 1940, psychiatry is being recognized as a fundamental part of general medical training, and in the more progressive schools, important liaisons are made in teaching between the department of psychiatry and the clinical departments, such as pediatrics, medicine, obstetrics, and surgery.'

The authors state that premedical and medical education do not orient to psychiatry the student who is observed to be resistant to its content and methods. Current preclinical instruction in psychobiology, psychology and sociobiology, will hardly succeed in orienting the student who has been almost exclusively trained in the natural sciences to the neglect of the social sciences. In the present

medical tradition an improperly prepared medical student, or graduate, must go through the difficult experience of entering the strange and foreign field of psychiatry. Perhaps psychoanalytic education is the only one which can achieve this. It wrenches the medical man out of his habitual organic straightjacket and thrusts him into the world of psychological phenomena. Can this be done earlier in the medical school? Alexander is quoted as saying that it can and should be done.

SAMUEL ATKIN (NEW YORK)

HUMAN NATURE IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. By Kurt Goldstein. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940. 258 pp.

The invitation to deliver the William James Lectures in 1938–1939 at Harvard University prompted the author to survey anew the much scattered data upon the subject of the fundamentals of social relationships, which is the problem of human nature. In his previous book, The Organism, Goldstein endeavored to develop the basic methodolgy for studying organismic behavior, using facts drawn from his experience chiefly as illustrations of the method proposed. In this publication, however, Goldstein is striving for a systematic interpretation of all those facts with reference to a conception of the nature of man.

Starting with a review of William James' works, the holistic approach is described, illustrated by the concept of 'isolation' and the problem of cognition in biology. The chapters about 'the abstract attitude in patients with lesions of the brain cortex' and 'amnesicaphasia and the problem of the meaning of words' form the basis and the transition to more general remarks about ordered and catastrophic behavior. In protection against castastrophic situations, the world of the abnormal person begins to shrink.

The discussion of psychoanalysis is not very impressive and may be summarized in a quotation from page 164. The 'overestimation of the genetic factor, on the one hand, and the misinterpretation of the ideas presented in free association as being repressed conscious phenomena, on the other, have had a fateful consequence in both a theoretical and a practical respect . . . as a result many theoretical statements of psychoanalysis have arisen which lead only to the hopeless struggle of the neurotic patient with psychoanalytic terms, a situation that suggests the vain labor of Sisyphus.' The

existence of the unconscious is recognized. For psychotherapy, the author recommends more emphasis on 'the individual's coming to terms with his environment'. It is not easy to rediscover in these generalities the author of Psychological Analysis of Cases with Cerebral Lesions (with Gelb, Leipzig, 1920), which forms a landmark in neurology and in psychology.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (CHICAGO)

THE CARE OF THE PSYCHIATRIC PATIENT IN GENERAL HOSPITALS. By Franklin G. Ebaugh, M.D. Chicago: American Hospital Association, 1940. 79 pp.

This monograph was prepared for the Council on Professional Practice of the American Hospital Association. It presents a study of 'the history, present status, principles, treatment procedures, and other aspects of the management of the psychiatric patient in the general hospital'. The material is very well organized. There is no highly technical psychiatric jargon to baffle the hospital administrator to whom the book is particularly directed.

Dr. Ebaugh defines very clearly the type of psychiatric problem with which one must cope on the wards of general hospitals. He points out the great emphasis on organic disease which exists with the possible disregard of the total picture of the illness. A plea is made for the inclusion of psychiatry as a fundamental of general medical practice as well as for its ranking as a major clinical division of medicine. Statistical evidence is presented both for the frequency with which psychiatric problems occur in any general practice and for the inadequate facilities existent for the care, study and treatment of such problems in the great majority of general hospitals. 'Since cases that are wholly or partially psychiatric probably outnumber all others combined, the necessity for a psychiatric ward is obvious.' The Trend of Psychiatric Service in General Hospitals is given a chapter with discussion of the type of service that has been developed in the few hospitals where it is now available. It is estimated that in meeting the needs 'every general hospital of 150 or more beds, could support a psychiatric ward of at least fifteen beds'.

The author summarizes the advantages of such a service to the hospital, the community, the patient, the medical profession and to psychiatry; these would include better levels of medical practice, better community relationships, educational and economic gains

for the hospital, the physician, and the community; early and complete care for the patient without stigma, and a break in the isolation of psychiatry. The author counters satisfactorily such objections as the legal problem, and the costs of such wards, as well as the noisiness, destructiveness or dangers of the psychiatric patient. In organizing such a service, a separate department is preferable to a consultation service or the inclusion of psychiatric facilities under the medical department. The chapter on Organization Requirements should be particularly helpful. Methods of Psychiatric Study and the Management Principles in Psychiatric Disorders Commonly Seen in the General Hospital are the titles of the concluding chapters. This monograph contains a very good bibliography as well as references recommended for further reading on this subject.

WILLIAM H. DUNN (NEW YORK)

PSYCHIATRY FOR THE CURIOUS. By George H. Preston, M.D. New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940. 148 pp.

In offering this small volume to the public the author has condensed in a small space most of the essential concepts of modern psychiatry, and has presented them in a manner which is both original and entertaining.

In the first chapter, after exploding some old fallacies, he calls attention to the basic interest of psychiatry in the ancient laws of cause and effect, and so claims for it a scientific approach. He then goes on to sketch the biological concept of behavior.

In touching upon conversion symptoms he stresses the fact that a psychiatrist must first be a trained physician, and points out that symptoms may come from disturbed nervous transmission or from misinterpretation of the messages delivered. He pauses for a moment to pay tribute to the influence of physical illness or differences upon emotional development.

The second half of the book is devoted largely to the consideration of various disabilities, or symptoms, as examples of man's attempt to defend himself against his fellow man. In discussing projection he points out the narrow margin which separates certain 'normal' people from those with definitely paranoid ideas. Similarly, in speaking of the mechanism of retiring into oneself as a means of defense, he points out how closely related such a mechanism is to that seen in more pronounced form in true schizophrenia. These mechanisms he classifies as 'turtle defense'.

The cyclothymic defense he stigmatizes as a highly unsuccessful attempt to escape reality.

In the eleventh chapter he extends the idea of defense mechanisms to include symptoms occurring as the result of organic damage to the nervous system, which he dubs the 'gap-filling' mechanism.

The author's breadth of insight is well illustrated in his chapter on alcohol and drugs, which he describes as 'crutches' which people use to improve their interpersonal relations. Viewed from this angle they can be likened to 'such obviously unrelated factors as secret societies, patriotism, religion, and styles'.

He brings the book to a close with a brief explanation of what he considers 'the three major points of attack for psychiatric treatment: the patient's physical machinery, his situation, and what he thinks and feels about himself, and the people around him'.

After laying much needed stress on the still prevailing ignorance and prejudices regarding psychiatric treatment, he concludes his critique with a well-considered tribute to psychoanalysis: 'It is a long, and at times painful process. In the hands of a skilful physician, trained in the technique and himself a wise man, it offers certain patients their only chance for complete personality reorganization.'

The closing sentence of the volume is an appeal for the overcoming of prejudice and the seeking of psychiatric advice during the early stages of emotional disturbance: 'Treated early, the majority of psychiatric problems present a favorable outlook. Treated late, they are among medicine's most difficult problems.'

The author has written a sane, humorous, and readable account of the position and outlook of modern psychiatry. For this achievement his colleagues owe him a debt of appreciation, and the reading public should accord him an enthusiastic reception.

JOHN A. P. MILLET (NEW YORK)

THE ADOLESCENT PERSONALITY. By Peter Blos. New York and London: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1941. 517 pp.

This is the second book to come from the Adolescent Study by the Commission on Secondary School Curriculum, the first volume having been Caroline B. Zachry's Emotion and Conduct in Adolescence. The purpose of Peter Blos's book is to provide educators

with a sufficient basic understanding of adolescence to be helpful in any reconstruction of the secondary school program.

The Adolescent Study was carried on for five years under the auspices of the Progressive Education Association. In its plan of research it followed the case study method, collecting material which covered several consecutive years in the life of individual adolescents, in and out of school, and from different parts of the country. The setting of the Study as well as its explicit purpose of aiding education have determined the primary objective of this book: it is addressed principally to teachers, guidance workers, and psychologists interested in improving and contributing to education. It is also of value to anyone dealing with personality development.

Because of the primary objective of the book, its presentation of theory will not satisfy the psychoanalyst. Its treatment of case material, however, can leave no doubt that the book has been prepared by a person thoroughly familiar with psychoanalytic concepts.

Four cases, selected from those of about six hundred adolescents, are discussed in detail. In applying the case method to relatively normal adolescents the author attempts to throw light on each case by organizing the manifold factors given in the material and viewing these factors in their dynamic interaction.

Both cases in Part Two—the cases of 'Betty' and 'Paul'—include data on infancy and early childhood. They are documented with extensive material such as school reports from kindergarten to high school, creative writings and assigned themes, interviews, family history, and autobiography. Although each source receives a separate interpretation, it also contributes to a 'cumulative' analysis of the developmental history and personality structure.

The cases of 'Mary' and 'Joe' which comprise Part Four contain only interview material. They show in an impressive way how Mary and Joe passed through the upheaval of puberty to emerge as fairly well-adjusted people, without receiving active help from the outside. Throughout the interviews the worker made no attempt to deal directly with these two young people except by listening to them. Their developmental history is reconstructed solely on the basis of the interview material and the transference situation. The material demonstrates how the average worker, remaining within the limits of his competency, can guide and

clarify troubled adolescents simply by listening to them and making himself available to them. But it is deplorable that the worker's faulty handling of the interviews is not clarified by the author. A situation of negative countertransference is pointed out in the case of 'Joe'. But the author does not discuss this situation in any detail, nor does he criticize the interview handling in the case of 'Mary', and her worker's conspicuous blind spots, especially regarding sexual material. The author unfortunately misses an excellent opportunity in this section to educate the educator through a demonstration of the pitfalls which lie in the path of an unwary interviewer. Throughout the case discussion emphasis is placed upon the reactivation of infantile problems during adolescence, and the educator is made aware of the contributions he can make to help his adolescent students in the struggle of puberty.

The presentation of concrete case material with cumulative interpretations is particularly well suited for demonstrating the continuity of development and the symptomatic character of behavior. This unique way of formulating certain aspects of psychodynamics may provide educators with insights which could never have been conveyed as effectively through a purely theoretical discussion so long as there exists a lack of a common conceptual language between psychoanalysts and the bulk of workers in the present educational system.

As mentioned above, this adaptation to the conceptual language of educators, a far reaching compromise at the expense of psychoanalytic psychology, seems a compromise which may lead the psychoanalyst to criticize Part Three, A Theory of Adolescent Development. This section illustrates, however, the situation described by Caroline B. Zachry in a recent article, The Influence of Psychoanalysis in Education (This QUARTERLY, X, 1941, pp. 431–444). There she explains why psychoanalytic influence on education has been largely indirect and has never reached the state of an explicit demonstration of analytic concepts. In her view the discussion of educational problems in strictly psychoanalytic terminology is available and meaningful to only a small minority; but educational literature which—though guided by psychoanalytic insights—is expressed in the current jargon of the teaching profession, exerts a far wider influence upon educational theory and practice.

MARGARET MAHLER-SCHOENBERGER (NEW YORK)

FAMILY BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF HUMAN RELATIONS. By Bess V. Cunningham, Ph.D. Second revised edition. Philadelphia and London: W. B. Saunders Co., 1940. 527 pp.

The author, who is a Professor of Education in the University of Toledo, has written this book 'for the student of college age who is interested in obtaining an improved perspective on life in a family group'. She hopes the text will contribute to self-understanding and makes a point of stressing the mental hygiene aspects of family behavior. She has divided her material into four general headings: Orientation, which gives the historical background of the modern family and methods of studying this subject; The Social Setting, which deals with socio-economic questions; Old Problems in New Settings, which discusses work and income, the use of leisure, adaptations to community life and current influences; The Nurture of Personalities, which sets forth some of the fundamental concepts of mental hygiene, careers for parents, relationships to children, adolescent problems, and the need for a program of education for family life of tomorrow. The author does not attempt to describe the ideal family of tomorrow but rather encourages her readers to 'better the lives of families of the future by finding a workable philosophy in the suggested interpretations' throughout the text.

The book was first published in the spring of 1936, the current edition appearing in 1940. The author's purpose in revising the text is to separate for the reader those problems which are fairly constant from those which are particularly acute because of immediate social trends. One new chapter is added providing the historical background of the modern family and several new subjects are introduced. Reading references are given at the end of each chapter and the second edition brings some of these up to date. However, the section pertaining to mental health remains the same as given in the first edition. It does not include any references to the works of psychiatrists but is confined to books by sociologists and psychologists.

Family Behavior is written from a philosophical and sociological approach as is seen from an appendix with several statistical tables dealing with the correlation of intelligence quotients to parental occupation, racial and nationality groups and summaries of other sociological data. The author has presented her material clearly

and in easily readable form. Her book probably will encourage some students to continue further in this field of study.

ELISABETH BROCKETT BECH (CEDAR GROVE, NEW JERSEY)

SELF-ANALYSIS. By Karen Horney. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1942. 309 pp.

More than half of Horney's book has to be read before one discovers what self-analysis consists of. Until that point is reached, the reader is led to conjecture. Here are some of the clues: '. . . there is considerable danger that [the analyst] will misconstrue, mislead, perhaps even inflict positive injury—not through bad will but through carelessness, ignorance, or conceit' (p. 25). '. . . the gap between a trained and an untrained person is often regarded as wider than it is' (p. 24). '. . . [of the neurotic] the fact remains that it is his world, that all the knowledge about it is there somehow, that he need only observe and make use of his observations in order to gain access to it' (p. 26). '. . . [self analysis] might shorten the procedure considerably if in the intervals between analytical sessions, and also during the sessions, [patients] were inspired with the courage to do active and independent work on themselves' (p. 36). Whatever she is talking about so far, it is clear that Horney is unfriendly to psychoanalysis.

There is the usual stricture on the '. . . one-sided emphasis that Freud has given sexual factors' (p. 295). Then comes the expected rescue of the ego, from 'Freud's . . . postulate that the "ego" is a weak agency tossed about among the claims of instinctual drives, of the outside world and of a forbidding conscience' (p. 23).

Having rescued the ego from Freud, Dr. Horney then lays claim to it. Here is the argument: '[Freud] was primarily interested in the removal of neurotic symptoms; he cared about a change of personality only in so far as it would guarantee a permanent cure of symptoms. . . . Freud's goal is thus essentially to be defined in a negative manner: gaining "freedom from". . . . Other authors, however, including myself, would formulate the goal of analysis in a positive way: by rendering a person free from inner bondages make him free for the development of his best potentialities.' It is only in verbiage that this statement differs from Freud's formulation [1] that '. . . the patient should be educated to

[1] Freud: *Turnings in the Ways of Psycho-Analytic Therapy*. Coll. Papers, II, p. 399.

liberate and fulfil his own nature, and not to resemble ourselves'. Horney admits that her distinction is pretty thin. As Freud in 1914 said of Jung, Adler and Rank [2], 'These arguments . . . are not intended seriously; they are intended only for use against opponents; when confronted with his own theories they keep at a respectful distance'.

Horney then offers her contribution. 'My own answer', she writes on page 40, 'is that in the center of psychic disturbances are unconscious strivings developed in order to cope with life despite fears, helplessness, and isolation'. How this can serve to explain all psychological phenomena is a puzzle which Horney does not attempt to clarify. Her statement is not illustrated as a principle of selection in the ten types of neurotic trends (p. 54 et seq.); there is no exemplification of it in the case history which rambles through the book; and this is the sole mention of the unconscious in the book. 'Dread' which is common to all ten types of neurotic trends, is not anxiety but a differentiating 'dread of' something or other, like the old classification of phobias. Horney's manifest concern lies in describing the symptom. As Freud observed in another connection: 'Where it comes from, however, or how it happens that its manifestations are at the disposal of the patient in this way is not inquired into, being a point of no interest to the ego. The detailed mechanism of symptoms and the manifestations of disease, the foundations of the manifold variety of diseases and their forms of expression, are disregarded in toto . . . it has furnished not a single new observation. I imagine I have made it clear that it has nothing to do with psychoanalysis.' [3] Quite.

It is on the subject of dreams that Horney is farthest from psychoanalysis. Her inclusion of Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams in the list of recommended reading cannot be taken seriously; besides, it is easier to glean 'psychological treasures' (p. 39) from Balzac, Ibsen, and Charles Allen Smart, who are also recommended. The curiously wide variety in Horney's list of recommended reading is probably meant to indicate her culture. But there is no cultural point of view anywhere in her works. On the contrary, there is an insistence on current situation which, like neighborhood gossip, comes close to being cultural illiteracy.

[2] Freud: *On the History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement.* Coll. Papers, I, p. 349.

[3] Freud: *Ibid.*, p. 347.

Some 'culturalists' have taken up communism as a sort of *ex post facto* verification of their theories. Here was a real opportunity for psychological field work, except that none of them has undertaken it.

Self-analysis turns out on page 186 to be free associations which are preferably written down. 'Come, let yourself be taught something on this one point', says Freud [4], 'what is in your mind is not identical with what you are conscious of; whether something is going on in your mind and whether you hear of it, are two different things.' Horney might reasonably be expected at least to mention this statement, but she does not; nor does she quote what Freud said on the subject of self-analysis [5]. This is especially a pity because Freud in the same paragraph forewarned the self-styled 'analyst': 'He will easily yield to the temptation of projecting as a scientific theory of general applicability some of the peculiarities of his own personality which he has dimly perceived; he will bring the psychoanalytic method into discredit, and lead the inexperienced astray'.

Horney's farewell to Freud and psychoanalysis may be characterized as unfair. Philosophically, she has foundered on an error of seventeenth century thinking, the error of mistaking a concept for a thing. Paying no heed to Freud's gentle warning, 'This is our mythology', Horney has treated ego and libido as though they were material, and could be added to and subtracted from at will. This is what comes of mistaking functional abstractions for concrete realities. Consequently it is not surprising that an eighteenth century thinker should have pointed out the basic philosophical error in 'Self Analysis'. It was Bishop Berkeley who said: [6] 'But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it; but what is all this, I beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them?'

EDWARD E. HARKAVY (NEW YORK)

[4] Freud: *One of the Difficulties of Psycho-Analysis.* Coll. Papers, IV, p. 354.

[5] Freud: *Recommendations for Physicians on the Psycho-Analytic Method of Treatment.* Coll. Papers, II, p. 329 *et seq.*

[6] *Principles of Human Knowledge,* Section 23.

THE RORSCHACH TECHNIQUE. A Manual for a Projective Method of Personality Diagnosis. By Bruno Klopfer, Ph.D., and Douglas McGlashan Kelley, M.D. Introduction by Nolan D. C. Lewis. Yonkers, New York: World Book Co., 1942. 436 pp.

This book really consists of two works. The first (Parts One to Three, inclusive) is Dr. Bruno Klopfer's exposition of the Rorschach Test. The second (Part Four) is Dr. Douglas McG. Kelley's evaluation of progress with the test in the several clinical groups.

Klopfer's contribution, which forms the bulk of the book (308 pages), offers the latest and most complete description of the Rorschach test technique as he has been teaching it. The reader wishing to acquaint himself with the form that the test is taking under his molding can, therefore, do no better than read this book. From this point of view it is quite as authoritative as its advertisements announce it. However, this review is being written by a student trained in the Rorschach-Oberholzer discipline. Judged from that sphere of reference, Klopfer has superimposed on the Rorschach test so much that is strange to it as to make it, except for the broad outlines, essentially unrecognizable. With certain new emphases in interpretation, he has made of the test another instrument. Whether for better or for worse is another matter; the point is that it is something different.

The first and most obvious transformation is in respect to the multiplicity of symbols which Dr. Klopfer has introduced. In the 'detail' category, (responses to parts of the inkblot), Rorschach's two classifications, D, Dd, are expanded to six: D, d, dd, de, di, dr. This is not to mention such inventions as D→W; or DS (apparently not identical with Rorschach's Dzw, the usual white space response). The variation becomes even more astounding in respect to movement, color and shading responses. In these categories, Rorschach was able to handle the material of his test with the simple M, C, CF, FC, and F(C) (translating his German letters), five symbols. The Klopfer repertory with M, FM, m, mF, Fm, k, kF, Fk, K, KF, FK, Fc, c, cF, FC′, C′F, C′, F/C, C/F, C, Cn, Cdes, Csym, is bewildering. As one studies the responses for which these Klopfer symbols are shorthand, there is no disputing their occurrence. They have been observed by various workers and commented upon. As precisely identifiable refinements, they are, however, too rare to warrant separate classificatory rubrics. They are those qualitative

events which may overlay any Rorschach response record and help complete the diagnostic picture, the finer strokes that paint in the high-lights and the shadows once the structure itself has been established. The objection to designating them by special signs is that these symbols become part of the response summary which, in turn, becomes part of a formula; e.g., (p. 254) (Fm+m):(Fc+c+C′). Or, (p. 229), 'there are several ways of measuring the degree of outer control with the aid of the quantitative Rorschach results' and several ratios are offered as: FC to (CF+C); (FC+CF+C) to (Fc+c+C′), by which to gauge 'outer control', 'inner control', 'crude control', 'refined control', 'extreme constriction', 'modified constriction', and others. This gives an impression of a quantitative foundation which simply does not obtain for the psychologic events tested. The few formulas which Rorschach and his followers use are not intended as a representation of exactly measured events. They are symbols of directions of psychic trends, not measurements. They do not presume to go further in interpreting psychologic events than is possible by inference from regularly occurring Rorschach response categories in clinical pictures of known dynamics. Rorschach's own ten years of careful labor, his psychologic insight backed by an experimenter's temperament, and Oberholzer's long experience with the test, on the background of his thoroughgoing clinical knowledge, are the bases for the personality interpretations that have been made from the Rorschach test. To offer formulas is to go much further than is known experimentally concerning the symbols as referring to mental life. It is striking the pose of a quantitative method not warranted by the present state of knowledge.

Deriving from this, is a second more serious objection. The creation of many symbols and formulas steers the examiner into a search for them. It encourages that superficial amateur psychologism which has been so much the bane of psychometrics, happily less so today than twenty years ago. It takes the student away from psychological dynamics, and leads him to hunt for signs and the magic of numbers. To make symbols—used by Rorschach only as a convenience in recording—so large a portion of the test is to lay the emphasis on sign at the expense of substance.

This misplaced emphasis in turn leads to a third, and by far more fundamental, criticism. Klopfer informs us in his first sentence that the 'book grew out of seven years of "learning by

teaching" '. He makes no statement of having first set his own foundation in study with any of the men who developed the test from its inception. Oberholzer is of course the most important of these and Zürich is not far from Bavaria where Dr. Klopfer lived. Now that both are in New York the distance is much less. Klopfer started his Rorschach work without profiting from the experience of those who devised and developed the test, and the results show it. This accounts for his fundamental error in regard to the all-important M, or movement (Rorschach's B, or *Bewegung*) response, and particularly respecting movement in animal forms (pp. 114, ff). A single session with Oberholzer would have disabused Klopfer of the notion that 'the open mouth of a crocodile . . . devouring its victim' (pp. 115–116) has any M in the Rorschach sense; similarly with 'movement' in inanimate objects: 'something falling apart' (p. 117). The extreme to which this distortion of M may go is finding it in 'animal skin, nailed on a board . . . it is beginning to contract' (p. 119).

The M response in the Rorschach test is something the individual does; it is of deep significance to him; it is something other than what he states in the manifest content of the association, in other words, it is the latent dream in the literal freudian sense. To designate any Rorschach association that has a verb in it as M is to apply this symbol to words, and miss its value for identifying events in the unconscious living of the individual. Some M responses obtained with the test have been shown to communicate the innermost personal needs of the individual. This value of M is what makes it so important a discovery and Rorschach's great contribution to the problem of objective ingress into personality. Accuracy in identifying it, therefore, is of the greatest importance. It makes the difference between the psychologist trained to search for subsurface mental activity, and the 'sign psychologist'.

The merits of Klopfer's portion of the book are in the valuable suggestions for further exploration. One of his best is what he calls 'Testing the Limits'. In this he is making a regular rule of procedure of a practice that had formerly been employed only in those patients who had been extremely uncommunicative. Without doubt, this additional effort to elicit associations can also be used profitably in many instances where we now stop after obtaining that minimum set of responses considered essential for personality

delineation. In extremely productive patients, Klopfer acknowledges the probability of adding little by 'testing the limits' (p. 52).

The author devotes more space than have former publications—excepting, naturally, Binder's monograph—to the shading response. He makes some valuable suggestions as to possible significances of the different shading nuances. Especially important may be the lead that the 'surface' shading reaction (not the three dimensional, or vista percept) expresses a need for contact sensation.

Beginners will be grateful for the considerable more space devoted to administration and recording than have earlier publications. The scoring blank (Klopfer and Davidson), which is a formal element in Klopfer's method, is pasted into the book. This author closes (Appendix to Part Three) with one sample Rorschach record, scored and interpreted. In this reviewer's opinion, teaching is best done by an abundance of illustrative material.

The chapter on history includes some hitherto unpublished and valuable details. This reviewer regrets the omission of Campbell and Wells, in Boston, the American Orthopsychiatric Association, and Lawson Lowrey in New York. The first two were largely responsible for the early research with the test in this country. The Association was the forum before which the first reports were made, and Lowrey's persistent interest made possible many of the earlier American publications.

Dr. Douglas Kelley's contribution, the final eight chapters of the book, summarize and evaluate investigations with the test in the following clinical conditions: intracranial organic pathology, dementia præcox, mental deficiency, convulsive states, psychoneuroses, depressive states, and one chapter of miscellaneous clinical problems (excitements, alcohol, drugs, *inter alia*). The best of these chapters are the ones on brain pathology and schizophrenia, which is to be expected, these being the fields which have been most studied. The least satisfying is the one on psychoneuroses. The fault is due to the paucity of published reports on the Rorschach test in neurosis. It is indeed strange that this clinical group, which comprises so large a percentage of the population, should yield so few reports. Here is a big field, still to develop. The chapters by Kelley are much the most satisfying in the book. They reflect a caution born of clinical seasoning, and a balanced approach to Rorschach problems, unhappily missing in most of the rest.

The book has a good bibliography, 370 titles, covering the literature through January 1942. It is well indexed and paginated, an important feature in any instruction manual. The introduction is appropriately by Doctor Nolan D. C. Lewis, one of the men whose support, material and moral, has done much toward developing this test in America.

S. J. BECK (CHICAGO)

THE CLINICAL APPLICATION OF THE RORSCHACH TEST. By Ruth Bochner and Florence Halpern. Introduction by Karl M. Bowman, M.D. New York: Grune and Stratton, Inc., 1942. 216 pp.

Having decided that 'a certain aura has gathered about the test, making of it a cult in which only the initiated may serve' (p. ix), these authors are undertaking to make it 'available to all psychologists and psychiatrists'. They do so in chapters on How to Score a Record, What the Symbols in Column I Mean, and in a style reminiscent of the 'easy lessons' style of promotion. The bulk of the book consists of the twenty Rorschach records with evaluation of responses and interpretations selected from the following groups: normal adults, children, mental defectives, neurotics, schizophrenics, organic mental disorders.

To cite in full the numerous naïvetés committed in this small book would require far more space than is allotted this review.

'When the white space is used to indicate something missing, as a gap . . . in our experience this type of response is frequent in the records of children and adolescents from broken homes' (p. 30). Here the authors seem themselves to be doing some free associating of the *Klang* variety: 'broken blot', 'broken home'. Experience of other workers does not confirm this superficially simple working of the test.

'We feel that individuals of superior intelligence should not give an F— unless they are emotionally disturbed' (p. 38, n). Scientific method happens to be not a matter of feeling, but observation. The fact is that the healthy superiors always have some F—. They dare to make errors. That goes with superiority. With their highly endowed personalities they more than compensate for their errors as does also the rich Rorschach response pattern for the F—.

Referring to the D (major detail) response: 'The shape of these

details approximates reality more closely than does the shape of the whole blot' (p. 24). Here is a complete lack of understanding of the psychological processes in the Rorschach test factors. Reality in the test is totally independent of whole, detail, or rare detail. The 'butterfly' to Figure V (whole) is as real as 'muskrat' to the lateral red of Figure VIII. It is in F+, not D, that the individual reveals his loyalty to reality.

Percentages and formulas are offered as though they represent well-established, quantitative measures of psychological processes (e.g., pp. 36–37, 41, 60–61). There is a too frequent use of quotations without quotation marks. The description on page 20 of the whole response as related to intelligence will be found in the *Psychodiagnostik,* p. 63 ff., 1932 edition; and the 'good form' discussion (p. 36) is a fairly faithful paraphrasing of Rorschach, pp. 60–61 *ibid.* Numerous other instances can be cited. Klopfer appears to be the chief sufferer in this respect, as in regard to 'testing the limits' (p. 4). The possible rationalization of such a practice is that the hitherto published material in a scientific field is the public property of all workers in it. This may be so in respect to the foundations of such an ancient science as, say, chemistry. But in a field so new as the psychology of personality and so specialized as the Rorschach test, it is small compensation for each worker to ask that his contribution be credited.

The one merit of the book lies in the twenty complete Rorschach response records distributed in the several personality groups. It is the reviewer's teaching experience that the best way to get to know the test is to make comparative studies of the records of different clinical pictures. A valuable suggestion will be found on pages 34–35, regarding the *Suksezzionstypus* as spatially determined (not only according to whether W, D, Dr follow in that order). The bibliography looks good but the omission of Skalweit's important monograph on schizophrenia looks like evidence of haste in preparing the manuscript. The book has no index—an inconvenience in a discipline so dependent on symbols peculiar to it.

This work reflects no more than a shallow grasp by the authors of the psychological dynamics involved in the Rorschach experiment. It would have helped in judging their preparedness for writing such a book if they had informed us what is their background of direct experience with the test. A single, brief paper by one of the authors is their only other publication. Rorschach

labored ten years before he published anything. Most conscientious workers today consider about three years' work a necessary minimum to enable them to grasp it solidly, let alone write a book.

The introduction by Dr. Karl M. Bowman has a special interest in view of his own many years of association with the test. He not only has had the opportunity to observe it in use at Bellevue, but also in the Boston Psychopathic Hospital where he was chief medical officer in the years when it was receiving some of its early trials in the United States.

S. J. BECK (CHICAGO)

DYNAMICS IN PSYCHOLOGY. By Wolfgang Köhler. New York: Liveright Publishing Co., 1940. 158 pp.

For many years Köhler has been attempting to reconstruct upon the basis of experimentation in the psychological field, the physicochemical mechanisms in the central nervous system that are responsible for psychological phenomena. His method is a very straightforward one. He studies the dynamic properties of the psychological phenomena and assumes that the physicochemical processes underlying them must have similar dynamic properties. Making use of what is known about the physicochemical properties of central nervous tissues, he next searches about for a physicochemical system whose dynamic properties correspond to those suggested by the psychodynamic relationships. Such a system will undoubtedly possess also other dynamic properties. He then returns to psychological experimentation in order to determine whether the psychological relationships correspond to those of the hypothetical system. This method was already outlined by Köhler many years ago in a study entitled *Die physischen Gestalten in Ruhe und im stationären Zustand; eine naturphilosophische Untersuchung* (F. Vieweg & Sohn, Braunschweig, 1920) in which he pointed out in great detail the analogies between the field concept in physics and the new field or gestalt concept then being introduced into psychology. In the present work Köhler presents this thesis in English in a more or less popular form, drawing illustrations from experiments in the fields of visual perception and of retention and recall. He believes that the relations between figure and background that can be demonstrated by experiments on visual perception can be accounted for by the theory that an electrical current passes in one direction through the retinal areas corresponding to the figure

and back through the retinal areas corresponding to the background. The current through the area corresponding to the figure is more densely concentrated, whereas the current through the area corresponding to the background is more diffuse and therefore less intense. As a result of this difference in intensity of current in the two areas, he assumes, two contrasting chemical phases arise, differing in electrical potential and separated by the boundaries between figure and ground. The contrast between these two phases, he believes, gives rise to the psychological contrast between figure and background.

The presentation is lucid and the examples are well chosen to illustrate the author's thesis. This book and still more the wider researches of which it is a brief report, are exceedingly significant for anyone who is interested in establishing a sound theoretical basis for the understanding of psychodynamic relationships.

THOMAS M. FRENCH (CHICAGO)

INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT: A Psychological Interpretation. Edited by George W. Hartmann and George Newcomb. New York: The Dryden Press (A Cordon Publication), 1940. 583 pp.

This is the 1939 yearbook of The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues which is affiliated with the American Psychological Association. The articles, prepared by twenty-six collaborating authors, include contributions by economists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, educational philosophers, personnel managers, individuals connected with business enterprises and labor unions, as well as psychologists and psychiatrists. Naturally the authors differ in their general viewpoints and also in their social attitudes, which range from 'proletarian' to 'conservative'.

In the introduction the editors stress the importance of intellectual and emotional conflicts in connection with industrial problems. The spirit governing the book is described as 'scientific humanism' which repudiates the 'ivory tower' tradition, and includes the problems of values and ethical standards as an integral part of the real world. In considering the position of industrial management in relation to labor, the editors assume that 'only that type of administration can be labeled "enlightened" —i.e. attached to the principles of scientific method—which seeks to make the productive processes of industry contribute to the better satisfaction of human needs'.

Following a general introduction which clearly indicates the nature of the work, the book is divided into five parts: I. Orientation in Time and Space: Industrial Conflict and Community Organization. II. Personal Sources of Conflict: Individual Tensions, Needs and Satisfactions. III. Parties to the Struggle: Causes of Group Identification. IV. Objectives and Procedures: Efforts to Eliminate Conflicts—(a) Forces within Industry Itself; (b) Contributions of Public Opinion. V. Editorial Summary—Summary for Psychologists; Summary for Laymen. There is an appendix: Life Histories of Some Workers and Bosses.

The variety of contents and interpretations in this book precludes any possibility of evaluating it as a whole. However, as source material for the topics discussed, it unquestionably represents a highly significant contribution. In one respect, namely in regard to methodology, the book stands in a unique position. In place of a rigidly statistical approach to the dynamic problems of community life, a real attempt is made to come to grips not only with the facts of individual and group behavior, but also with attitudes present in the persons observed as well as in the observers. That scientists are members of a particular culture and hence conditioned by social forces, is fully acknowledged. Therefore emphasis is placed upon the need to strive for objectivity of method while acknowledging subjectivity of purpose. Personal motivation which is present at the beginning and end of any research project need not interfere with a neutral and detached attitude during the investigative process itself. From such an orientation the editors attempt to synthesize the data reported. They constantly are alert to the fact that industrial conflict must be considered in terms of individuals with personal urges and desires. Although the data presented clearly indicate the importance of individual frustrations in the problems of industrial adjustment, conclusions regarding the nature of the psychological conflicts are reached through inductive reasoning based largely upon tests, interviews and questionnaires used among employers and workers. These technics deal almost entirely with conscious or preconscious attitudes. However in the chapter by Dr. Temple Burling on Disruptive and Cohesive Forces in Job Situations, there are references to the repetition of emotional patterns based upon infantile fixations, particularly attachment to one of the parents and the affect transferred to the current relationships between

employer and employee. Examples are given especially of harmonious job adjustments which the author states were determined by such infantile emotional problems.

Although throughout the book emphasis is placed upon the importance of personal motives in regard to work satisfaction or dissatisfaction, the character of the motive present is not precisely delimited. For example in the article by Goodwin Watson on Work Satisfaction, it is clearly shown that workers are profoundly influenced by the need for approval, evidence of tangible achievement, congenial associates etc., but no mention is made of those unconscious aspects of ego development which have such a vital bearing upon the feeling of adequacy and which also determine, very largely, the scope and the flexibility of those personality qualities which the individual is able to mobilize. Conversely these studies do not touch upon the question of unconscious ego restriction with the characteristic rigidity in and narrowing of the personality found so frequently in those instances of work inhibition which are observed in daily psychoanalytic practice. Such inhibitions persist, of course, despite an environment which provides an abundance of approval and in some instances affords opportunity for specific forms of successful achievement. In fact, precisely because of successful achievement or the presence of imminent success some inhibitions become intensified. The well known example of the individual whose work begins to 'bog down' immediately after he has received a promotion, cannot be understood without insight into the dynamics of the unconscious.

On the other hand this book is replete with careful descriptive studies of one of the most important social problems of our era, and anyone who reads it will receive several new insights into the complex phenomenology of industrial strife.

EDWIN R. FISLER (CHICAGO)

ORGANIZING AND MEMORIZING. By George Katona. New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. 318 pp.

This study presents absorbing material for the educational psychologist and for the teacher. It calmly raises serious implicit challenge to much of our current theory, a large part of school practice. Educators, however, are not alone in their concern and curiosity as to how we learn, either sense or nonsense, how we understand and how we retain knowledge. Hence Dr. Katona's

research and conclusions should, and hopefully will be of interest to workers in numerous other fields.

Approaching the processes of learning from the gestaltist point of view, Dr. Katona, now at the New School for Social Research, developed his experiments to throw further light on forgetting, grouping, memory traces, the transfer of learning, retention of principles and of facts. The experimental situations are presented in detail, as is his own thinking about purpose, problem and results. Dr. Katona's frequent references to the work of Dr. Max Wertheimer, leader of the modern school of gestalt thought, are enough to make us wish that more of Dr. Wertheimer's work was available in English.

A report of more than three hundred pages can scarcely be summarized; only hints can be suggested: 'Knowledge is acquired by a process of learning by understanding . . . which is to be distinguished from a process of memorization . . . '. The essence of learning by understanding is organization or reorganization of the given material by the learner. . . . Meaningful organization is not restricted to immediate learning material; it often proceeds circuitously, utilizing various examples and cues; it results in integrated knowledge of principles rather than in the acquisition of specific information. . . . What has been learned by understanding can be applied under varied circumstances and to new as well as to practised situations . . . [and] is retained for longer periods of time without substantial deterioriation' than what has been learned by memorizing.

Dr. Katona's scholarship is impressive, his organization clear, his writing direct, unequivocal yet not dogmatic. From footnotes to detailed test results, from bibliography to chapter content, he states himself as a scientist who is not detached from the world as we too know it. Unlike minor investigators, he reports in such a way as to make it apparent that he has not exhausted his field, himself, or us.

ELIZABETH H. ROSS (PHILADELPHIA)

THE ORPHAN CHILD AMONG THE GUNANTUNA. By Joseph Meier. Washington, D. C.: Publications of the Catholic Anthropological Conference, Vol. II, 1939, pp. 63–128.

This publication of the well-known missionary and anthropologist contains an interesting and detailed description of the status of an

orphan among the Gunantuna and also of the emotional attitudes regarding orphans. The usual word for orphan means 'the bereft one', but another expression denotes the orphan as 'a child faulty, erring, or abnormal' (p. 68) or as 'a child that has come out of its mother's rectum' (p. 70).

GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

THE TORTURE OF CAPTIVES BY THE INDIANS OF EASTERN NORTH AMERICA. By Nathaniel Knowles. Philadelphia: Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 82, 1940, pp. 151–225.

From this monograph we learn that torture of captives in Eastern North America should be evaluated as part of the war trophy complex. Territorial aggrandizement was not the cause of war in this area (pp. 152, 153). According to one account the main objects of cruelty (among the Natchez) were the old men: 'they first tore from the latter their clothes and shot them to death with arrows which they generally aimed at the parts of the sex' (p. 159). Some of the descriptions are strongly suggestive of a body destruction fantasy carried out in reality (pp. 193, 215). According to Le Jeune, around the Gulf of Mexico, in the feast preparatory to war, a new born child was shot with arrows, burned, and the ashes consumed (p. 180).

GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

INGALIK MATERIAL CULTURE. By Cornelius Osgood. Yale University Publications in Anthropology No. 22. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940. 500 pp.

Psychoanalysts will usually look for anthropological data in books on the sexual, social and ceremonial life of primitive tribes, or in accounts of myths and beliefs, rather than in books dealing with material culture. Here and there in Osgood's book, however, one finds data of interest. The author discusses toys and games (pp. 389–403), puberty paraphernalia (pp. 405–408), funerary objects (pp. 409–416), and religious ceremonial objects (pp. 417–428). Men's urine is used for tanning, women's for washing purposes (p. 340).

The book is an excellent and painstaking contribution to Alaskan anthropology.

GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

GENERAL SEMANTICS. Papers from the First American Congress for General Semantics. With an introductory Outline of General Semantics by Alfred Korzybski, and other Related Contributions. New York: Arrow Editions, 1940. 111 pp.

This collection of papers includes a restatement of Count Korzybski's theory of general semantics, which was extensively expounded in his book, Science and Sanity (reviewed in this QUARTERLY, III, p. 641 by M. Reiner), and numerous essays intended to show how this theory has affected workers in the fields of mathematics, logic, psychology, linguistics, education, sociology, biology, psychiatry, business, journalism, etc.

The general idea of this school is well known: a denial of the aristotelian principle of identity, a practical technique for avoiding the error of using this principle in thinking, and the hope that through retraining and education this error will be eliminated and numerous beneficial consequences ensue. Among such consequences are the advancement of science and the relief of neurosis. The papers in this present volume leave the issue of therapy and the psychoses generally rather vague, as are some of the conclusions reached in the other practical fields heterogeneously brought together here. But this reviewer agrees with Reiner's first impression that Count Korzybski has raised several extremely interesting problems and made many interesting suggestions. For example, psychoanalysts will surely appreciate his feeling that our very best present logical theory and practice leaves much to be desired in the correct handling of the world, and his suggestion that ordinary thinking is 'unsane' and capable of replacement by better methods as they are invented, will find a willing ear. Interesting too is his idea that the three strictly human functions of the human brain, not to be found in animals, are the ability to 'scientize', to 'mathematize', and the capacity for insanity.

B. D. L.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF SEX. By Kenneth Walker. New York and Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1940. 212 pp.

It was apparently not easy for the author to overcome his resistance to adding one other book to the long list of books about sex. What we need, according to the author, is not more books on the subject, but more time in which to digest them. The author, however,

overcame his misgivings in order to point the way toward a new sexual ethics to take the place of what was destroyed in the fight for sexual freedom of the last fifty years. The need for such an ethic is so great because church and law are equally uncharitable in the harshness with which they punish any offender against their code of ethics. It is stated, however, that although the church's emphasis on sexual immorality as the 'one great sin' has aggravated our difficulties, it has not created them.

The spiritual godfathers of the book are Havelock Ellis, Wilhelm Stekel, H. G. Wells and Julian Huxley.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (CHICAGO)

AMERICAN DOCTORS OF DESTINY. By Frank J. Jirka, M.D. Chicago: Normandie House, 1940. 361 pp.

The former Director of the Illinois State Department of Public Health has written an earnest and pedestrian book, designed to acquaint the lay reader with the contributions of American physicians and surgeons to American history and to medicine. The scope and intent of the book are perhaps best indicated by Dr. Jirka's choice of subjects: the first doctors in America, the rôle of American doctors in the Revolution and in colonial times, Major-General Dearborn, Ephraim McDowell, Daniel Drake, W. T. G. Morton, Samuel A. Mudd, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Walter Reed, Major-General Gorgas, Silas Weir Mitchell, Charles Norris, General Wood, Franklin H. Martin, Leo J. Stanley, James Sonnett Greene, the Mayos, and Frederick Tice. The writing is marked by more sincerity than skill.

SIDNEY KAHR (NEW YORK)

WHY BE SHY? By Louis E. Bisch, A.B., M.D., Ph.D. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1941. 265 pp.

Another item in the 'self-analysis' series of the curbstone school of psychoanalysis. It is full of hearty advice about 'toughening up your ego', and admonitions to 'act as though the other person is shier than you'. The author refers to himself as a psychoanalyst.

R. G.

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Die lchspaltung im Abwehrvorgang. (The Splitting of the Ego in Defense Mechanisms.) Sigmund Freud. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 241–245.

Otto Fenichel

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ABSTRACTS

Die Ichspaltung im Abwehrvorgang. (The Splitting of the Ego in Defense Mechanisms.) Sigmund Freud. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 241–245.

This three-page manuscript of Freud is dated January 2, 1938. Freud writes here about a phenomenon which he first discussed in his papers, Neurosis and Psychosis, and Fetishism, and which seems to have interested him considerably in his latter years because the posthumous Outline of Psychoanalysis also gives a chapter to it. It is the defense mechanism of denial, the ability not to recognize or not fully to recognize certain data of reality. That such a denial is not limited to psychotics was demonstrated by Freud in the fetishist whose displacement is an attempt to deny the female lack of penis. Freud hastens to add that similar mechanisms occur in normal people. In normal people it presupposes the simultaneous effectiveness of another mechanism, a certain cleavage of the ego *(Ichspaltung)*. The fetishist knows consciously that women have no penis, but the unconscious part of his ego succeeds in not acknowledging just this knowledge. A part of his ego knows; another part of his ego does not know. A child whose experience creates the conception that a certain instinct satisfaction may be dangerous, may defend itself against this danger and simultaneously deny the existence of the danger altogether. A boy whose masturbation is threatened by castration 'continues his masturbation as if it were not endangering his penis at all; at the same time he develops a symptom—in full contradiction to his apparent bravery and indifference—a symptom which proves that he nevertheless realizes a danger'.

OTTO FENICHEL

Über die durch den Krieg verursachten Änderungen in unserer psychischen Ökonomie, I. (On the Changes in Our Psychic Economy Incident to War, I.) E. Glover. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 336–345.

Glover emphasizes that the war represents a unique opportunity for psychological research. His first impression of the effect of the war is that neurotic people act more normally and normal people more neurotically. The apparent normality of the neurotics is probably a distraction from neurotic anxieties by real dangers and is only temporary.

More important than the reactions of individuals is the psychology of groups. The most difficult task in the psychology of groups is the determination of what is normal and what is pathological. [The reviewer believes that the degree to which the data of the psychopathology of neuroses can be applied to group phenomena is debatable.] Glover believes certain parts of a group to be analogous to the differentiated layers of the individual mind. Ethical, religious, or pacifistic societies, for example, serve the functions of the superego; certain public institutions, like the food industry, and organized transportation, correspond to the reality function of the ego. He hopes that the study of such institutions or group phenomena will permit certain conclusions about the

effects of the war on the masses. For example, to what an extent do the difficulties which the war brings to all fields of everyday life cause regressions or lead to new adaptations. Are moral standards higher in war times? Is the pressure of the superego felt rather more intensely? Glover believes that observations of church attendances and the activities of 'superego organizations' could answer these questions. Does the war loosen sexual inhibitions? To what an extent do aggressions decrease within the national unit when war distracts the aggressions toward other nations?

To answer these questions, says Glover, one should study the war as an agent which puts the masses into motion, and reconstruct psychoanalytically the entire mental functioning of a national unit at war. [But are analytic methods suitable for solving problems of this kind?] Psychoanalysis doubtless has an important contribution to make to the problem, and Glover's interesting paper points the direction.

GEORGE GEROE

Über die durch den Krieg verursachten Änderungen in unserer psychischen Ökonomie, II. (On the Changes in Our Psychic Economy Incident to War, II.) K. Mannheim. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 346–355.

Mannheim warns against frequent errors in the psychological investigation of social phenomena. Either groups are considered as mythological beings, and theoretical constructions about the 'mass soul' are made, or (the viewpoint of many psychoanalysts) the psychology of the individual is applied directly to 'society'. Statistical studies assume that social phenomena are simply products of summation, ignoring the origin through processes of interrelation in society. In these processes not only a combination of individual experiences takes place, but a gradual change of form occurs through certain social mechanisms. The study of such social mechanisms is the task of sociology, as the study of psychological mechanisms is the task of psychoanalysis.

To study the psychological effects of the war, primarily typical conflicts between groups, conflicts which are set in motion by the war should be investigated first. Those group conflicts have the same significance for sociology as the study of the actual conflicts for the psychology of neuroses; in them the essential dynamic processes, which take place in society, can be demonstrated most clearly.

There are problems of research on which psychoanalysts and sociologists can profitably collaborate. A basic problem is the correlation of the mechanisms of the individual ego with the social mechanisms which it influences—not descriptively only, but dynamically in terms of the life processes of the groups. Mannheim recommends the collection of data from individuals about the effects of war fantasies and war neuroses. Psychologists and sociologists should note and analyze the most important collective emotions which can be observed as a reaction to war. The aim of the study of the psychological effects of war should be to create a more effective social welfare to remedy the social difficulties which result from war.

GEORGE GEROE

Zur Psychologie der Todfeindschaft. (The Psychology of Mortal Enmity.) Maria Weigl-Pisk. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. u. Imago, XXV, 1940, pp. 214–220.

The psychological significance of decapitating a foe, as practiced by the primitives of Indonesia and Further India, is the subject of this study. Anthropological material shows that the prize is appreciated as an exquisite masculine symbol which promotes the fertility of the fields and protects the proud owner against evil ghosts. In some tribes the head represents the spirit of the dead enemy, a fearful watchdog dangerous to everyone except its beloved master.

An intimate personal relationship exists between the conqueror and his victim (usually a male he had not known before the slaughter) which is evidenced by certain special rituals in the preservation of the trophy. Whereas some carry the heads in the fork of a branch, or store them in privies, in other tribes a man sleeps with a newly seized head for five days during which he must strictly avoid all contact with women.

The relation between the victor and the remains of his foe is extremely friendly, almost tender. This identification is a confirmation of Freud's conclusion in Totem and Taboo that the son of the primal horde identifies with the father after killing him. The significance of the head-trophy as a phallic symbol of power and honor (Marie Bonaparte) gives evidence that its powerful function is comparable to that of the superego (Fenichel). The author suggests that the unexpected affection for the killed victim is the psychodynamic counterpart of the mourning of a son for his beloved father.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

Some Remarks on the Formation of the Anal-Erotic Character. Karl Landauer. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 418–425.

Certain social conflicts with objects accompany the conflicts arising from the satisfaction or suppression of erotic, anal impulses. This was long ago emphasized by Freud in his conception of 'anal character'. The subsequent progress of ego psychology makes it possible to describe these facts in greater detail. Object relationships and their development have to be studied with the same intensity as the erotogenic zones. Landauer's basic thoughts are very convincing: but is he not going too far when he says 'that it is not the erotogenic zones, but the social demands' which are responsible for character formation; or when he says: 'The center of interest is now shifted from the sexual zone and aim to the factor of social demands and the reaction to these.' Psychoanalytic characterology, it seems to the reviewer, serves to clarify just this interoperation and the interrelationship between instinctive forces and social demands. Landauer's clinical examples are good illustrations of that interrelationship.

OTTO FENICHEL

Some Observations on Knowledge, Belief and the Impulse to Know. Bertram D. Lewin. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 426–431.

'In many persons a repression is perceived narcissistically as a blow to their omniscience, which they try to repair through real or magical means. It also happens that later any insult to narcissism, whether in the field of knowledge

or in other fields, evokes as a response an assertion of omniscience or a setting into play of the investigatory impulse in an attempt to recapture the sense of omniscient perfection. The magical methods used vary. . . .' This thesis is convincingly demonstrated in two case histories. The consequence is an irrational attitude toward knowledge because the omnipotence necessary for narcissistic stability might be endangered. There are certain phenomena within and without neuroses which show that belief is a partial omniscience.

Lewin has clarified a very common narcissistic attitude which is important for the understanding of certain neurotic patterns of behavior.

OTTO FENICHEL

Contribution to the Problem of Vaginal Orgasm. Sandor Lorand. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 432–438.

Lorand joins those who believe in a paramount importance of infantile vaginal sensations which later are repressed. These early vaginal sensations regularly have an oral character. If the sensations are analyzed in detail they are always connected with the prœdipal oral relationship to the mother. The anxieties which are responsible for the repression of these sensations are also rooted in the prœdipal relation to the mother. The material for the study of these phenomena is, according to Lorand, the analysis of more complicated frigidities which show that certain behavior patterns apparently expressing penis envy are rooted in deeper pregenital conflicts.

OTTO FENICHEL

An Anthropological Note on the Theory of Pre-Natal Instinctual Conflicts. Karl A. Menninger. Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 439–442.

Menninger tries to apply the thesis of eros and death instinct speculatively to the development of the fœtus in utero. He does so to show how similar the result of such a speculation is to certain beliefs of the Mohave Indians of Arizona concerning birth and shamanism.

OTTO FENICHEL

The Voice of the Intellect Is Soft. Franz Alexander. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, No. 1, 1941.

Alexander's study is a variation of a theme of Freud: 'The voice of the intellect is a soft one but it does not rest until it has gained a hearing'. According to Alexander, this sentence contains the essence of psychoanalytic therapy which is based on the victory of reasonable insight over old patterns of highly emotional significance. If the insight that these old patterns are unsuitable for the aims of the mature personality is gained, the cure will make progress. The force of infantile desires works as resistance against the voice of the intellect and therefore against the therapeutic process. The relative increase of reason during the successful analytic process can be demonstrated in dreams which become clearer, franker and express the content of the neurotic conflict with little disguise. The patient is, according to Alexander, not even in his dreams able to avoid the confrontation of his ego with his unconscious difficulties and

infantile desires. The patient slowly becomes able to consider his infantile patterns with a humorous superiority. A patient of Alexander felt in an advanced phase of treatment as if it were not he who behaved so normally. Alexander thinks that the dynamic background of this feeling is the opposite of depersonalization. Depersonalization occurs when deep unconscious tendencies break through. The feeling of strangeness by the favorable metamorphosis of the advanced cure is the effect of increased conscious control of the ego. This process of objectivation, in which the patient gets a greater distance from his infantile habits, is called by Alexander 'sequestration'.

Alexander believes that an interruption of analysis at the right time may have a favorable therapeutic effect. The patient is left with the new insight gained by analysis and has to prove his new orientation in life.

The characterization of the analytic treatment as a struggle between intellectual insight and habitual emotional patterns is doubtless correct but incomplete. What is missing is the consideration of the sexual structure. The case history of Alexander remains unsatisfactory, because the reader is told nothing about the sexual history of the patient; therefore it is difficult to judge the genesis and fixation of the infantile emotional attitudes of the patient.

GEORGE GEROE

Some Observations on the Psychological Factors in Urination and Genito-Urinary Afflictions. Karl A. Menninger. Psa. Rev., XXVIII, No. 1, 1941.

The function of micturition has erotic, aggressive, and in cases of pathological disturbance self-punitive significance. Urination, being the closest physiological approximation to genital activity, represents for the child expression and satisfaction of sexual excitement. In the neurotic, whose pleasure seeking regresses to an infantile level, urinary symptoms (polyuria, enuresis) often replace sexual activity. For one of the author's patients, who was in the habit of urinating ten to fifteen times a day, urination had the meaning of a permitted form of masturbation. Two other patients recalled that they had urinated as a direct reaction to the primal scene. Aggressive tendencies are recognizable in the enuresis of children and in cases of urinary frequency among adults. Vituperation is expressed in various ways in the sense of casting urine and fæces on the hated person. In numerous cases, the unconscious aggressive satisfaction inherent in urination is increased, requiring self-punitive measures with a secondary erotization of the function. A case report is quoted in which an apparent bladder disturbance (extreme frequency of urination) disappeared completely after an explanation of the psychological factors involved. In one of the author's cases a psychogenic polyuria had existed for so many years that a contraction of the bladder had developed which, in turn, caused the frequency anatomically. Jelliffe reported an instance in which the kidneys were damaged as the consequence of a psychogenic urinary disturbance of long duration. The author discusses the problem of pseudo-renal colic. The clinical symptoms are of nephrolithiasis. Repeated attacks of severe colic fail, by the most careful examination to reveal calculi. Two cases are reported in which the syndrome was definitely a neurotic conversion.

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

Alcoholism: Some Contemporary Opinions. Merrill Moore. A Report on the Symposium on Alcoholism of the Research Council on Problems of Alcohol, at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Philadelphia, Pa., December 27–29, 1940. Amer. J. of Psychiat., XCVII, 1941, pp. 1455–1469.

The symposium covering all aspects of the problem of alcoholism was divided into five sessions at which a total of forty-four papers were presented of which Dr. Moore has prepared an excellent summary.

Dr. Winfred Overholzer expressed the point of view of most of the participants in his opening address. He considers alcoholism as a disorder of conduct, a disease, which in some instances is amenable to treatment.

With the exception of large cities jails are usually the only institutions which give admission to acute alcoholics. Alcoholism is classed with tuberculosis, cancer and syphilis as a public health problem which requires a systematic attack.

The first nine papers deal with the physiological and chemical features of alcoholism, its stimulating effect upon the propulsive motility of the colon and upon the respiratory centre. Atypical carbohydrate metabolism which could be corrected by diet regulation was reported by Dr. H. D. Palmer. Dr. Harry Newman reported that tolerance to alcohol depends upon the tissue tolerance of the cells of the central nervous system to a given quantity of alcohol. Dr. Arthur Grollman showed that alcohol exerts only a minor effect on the circulation. The experimentally isolated heart is not affected by concentrations which might be encountered in a human subject. The circulatory system is only reflexly stimulated. Dr. Thorne Carpenter pointed out the need for clarification of many points regarding the metabolism of alcohol.

The second session was devoted to the discussion of the clinical aspects of alcoholism. The symptoms of alcoholism were discussed by Dr. P. Piker. The attempted correlations between alcoholic symptoms and blood alcohol levels should be regarded with scepticism in the light of Dr. Piker's findings with rabbits and human subjects. Dr. H. Houston Merritt stated that examination of the cerebrospinal fluid can be especially useful in the diagnosis of alcoholism. Dr. A. Wright pointed out that cirrhosis of the liver is the only pathological condition in which alcohol appears to play more than a minor part.

Dr. Norman Jolliffe suggested the term 'deficiency polyneuritis' instead of 'alcoholic polyneuritis', 'nicotinic acid deficiency encephalopathy' instead of 'wet brain', and 'pellagra' instead of 'alcoholic pseudopellagra'. Professor A. J. Carlson stressed that alcoholism is a disease which can be more readily prevented than cured.

In the third session devoted to neuropsychiatric features of alcoholism, Dr. Leo Alexander pointed out that the majority of pathological conditions in the central nervous system of chronic alcoholism are attributable to associated vitamin deficiencies.

Dr. Paul Schilder's contribution, read by Merrill Moore, goes directly to the basic psychological core of the problem: 'the chronic alcoholic has lived from earliest childhood in a state of insecurity, alcohol appears to reverse this situation . . . the attitudes of parents toward children which will promote

security and a normal amount of aggression and which will guarantee a reasonably free development of sexual adaptation will be powerful factors in the prevention of alcoholism'.

In the fourth session devoted to the treatment and prevention of alcoholism, Dr. Charles Duryee stated that there is no alcoholic type. Individuals drink for various reasons, and cure results in or follows a radical personality readjustment which does away with the need for alcohol.

This concept was reiterated by Mrs. Harriet R. Mowrer in the final session devoted to discussion of related social and legal problems. She stated that 'alcoholism is one of the many problems of personality adjustment which have their genesis in the complex of familial relationships out of which the patterns of personality are developed . . . most alcoholics appear near the oldest and youngest of the sibling group . . . marital discord is not the result of alcoholism but of the same etiological factors'.

Dr. Jeremiah P. Shalloo made the interesting observation that with so many forms of drinking culturally approved it is surprising that so few people become dependent upon alcohol; '. . . the teetotaler is equally as abnormal from the cultural standpoint as the habitual drinker'.

A. EISENDORFER

Factors in Psychotherapy: A Psychoanalytic Evaluation. M. Ralph Kaufman. The Psychiatric Quarterly, XV, 1941, pp. 117–143.

Various dynamic factors enter into different types of psychotherapy, as viewed from the perspective of psychoanalytic psychology. The psychiatrist should evaluate the procedure he employs and bear in mind the difference between therapies aimed at symptoms and therapies aimed at causes. If the treatment is a symptomatic one, he should know why and how a symptom has disappeared or is transformed into another dynamic expression of emotional forces.

Kaufman gives a brief, very clear and good review of the most important principles of psychoanalysis with particular emphasis on the transference and attempts to explain the dynamics of various psychotherapies from this point of view. Hospitalization may give excited or depressed patients immediate relief from symptoms. Removal from the demands of life relieve the patient of the psychic tensions thereof. Occupational therapy permits sublimated gratification of repressed impulses.

One set of psychotherapeutic techniques has the purpose of allaying anxiety. Hypnosis, reassurance, direct and indirect suggestion, removing environmental stresses and other forms of authoritative intervention, attempts to interest the patient in work and social activity and to distract him from his symptoms, fall into this category. The therapist assists the patient in repressing. A compliant transference enables the patient to accept reassurance partly because of the authority of the physician, partly because there is a decrease of guilt and anxiety.

The second category of therapeutic techniques is the one directed toward uncovering and removing causes and enables the patient to understand his unconscious conflicts and find new solutions, either by direct advice or by increasing his ability to tolerate conflict at a conscious level. Psychoses are

treatable in this way only to a limited extent on account of the inaccessibility of the patient and his distortion of reality. The applicability of uncovering procedures depends on the transference.

Hypnosis seems to be regaining favor as an insight therapy to revive memories. However the patient does not really accept and digest the traumatic experiences. He is enabled to tolerate them temporarily with the aid of transference.

Shock treatment contains important psychological factors. Some workers now believe that its fundamental therapeutic value lies in the increased rapport between the patient and the therapist immediately following the shock, and in the precipitation of immense quantities of anxiety. The shock may also represent a punishment which alleviates guilt feelings. Some patients show an intensification of their homosexual patterns, particularly in the period immediately following the convulsion, and are able to express their homosexual needs more freely. The fear of death connected with the shock plays a rôle in the disappearance of symptoms by 'bringing the patient back to reality'. All forms of shock treatment have equally a psychological content, particularly from the point of view of transference.

Cultural and religious patterns, various forms of communal activities, and work, serve as psychotherapeutic agents. Conflicts with the father, fear of death, and the need for a stronger discipline in relation to forbidden instinctual demands are projected into them. They are not only forbidding but also permissive, giving aggression, homosexual, and other libidinal trends, sublimated or socially approved outlets.

BERNHARD BERLINER

An Analyzed Case of Essential Hypertension. Louis Adrian Schwartz. Psychosomatic Med., II, No. 4, 1940.

In addition to hypertension, the patient suffered from ejaculatio præcox, anxiety, a cardiac neurosis with precordial distress, tachycardia, and extrasystoles. The conflict is a masochistic-submissive, orally dependent attitude toward a dominating mother, leading to a masochistic-submissive attitude to a rigid superego and a deep attachment to the father. There developed a chronic, unsuccessful, unsatisfied rebellion and hostility against this submission. The rebellion and hostility were conscious, or near to consciousness, but not expressed directly because of fear of loss of love. The masochistic homosexual submissiveness was not conscious and bitter hostility opposed making it conscious in the analysis. The hypertension seemed to be related to the hostile rebellion against the masochistic submissiveness with consequent anxiety.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Psychosomatic Correlations in Allergic Conditions. A Review of Problems and Literature. John H. Stokes and Herman Beerman. Psychosomatic Med., II, No. 4, 1940.

The authors give an extremely well-written, well-organized, comprehensive, and informative outline of the literature. They start with a description of the 'sceptical attitude toward psychogenic factors'. Case material is used as the

basis for discussion of pruritis, 'allergens', the 'allergic personality', the rôle of guilt, anxiety, anger, and sex.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

The Rôle of Women in This Culture. Clara Thompson. Psychiatry, IV, 1941, pp. 1–8.

When Freud wrote his Studies of Hysteria in 1893, he described a type of woman with prospects very different from those of the average psychoanalytic patient of today. In this country women occupy a unique position and are probably freer to live their own lives than in any patriarchal country of the world. Increasingly, a woman finds herself without an occupation and with an unsatisfactory emotional life. There is, however, an increasing tendency in and out of marriage to have a sexual life approximating in its freedom that enjoyed by the male. Three frequently encountered types of reaction to the current situation are described: women who marry and try to live according to the old pattern, but find themselves unemployed and often discontented; women who work and do not marry; and women who marry and engage in serious work outside the home. Some of the basic conflicts described by Freud are still encountered, although the emphasis is different. Then the girl who wished to be a boy had recourse only to symbolic expression in the form of hysterical fantasies. Today she may live out the fantasies, at least in part.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

The Concept of Time in Defense of Ego Integrity. Lucile Dooley. Psychiatry, IV, 1941, pp. 13–23.

In many neurotic patients any unperceived lapse of time is a signal for distressing anxiety. This neurotic attitude toward time is little discussed except in obsessional neurosis. The awareness of time develops as a part of the intellect. To lose the connecting link of time means that the sufferer has lost the object. To lose the object is to the neurotic to lose a part of the self. Activity helps to establish the perception of duration and succession; hence the anxious person must not be inactive, since inactivity results in the loss of time perception with consequent loss of object and of self. The recurrence of something familiar gives rise to the concept of past time which becomes memory. The formation and carrying out of a purpose gives the concept of future. The instincts know no time. The obsessional character leads all others in the use of time as a defense.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Short Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy: Its Possibilities and Its Limitations. Bernhard Berliner. Bulletin of The Menninger Clinic, V, 1941, p. 204.

Berliner points out that there is a great need for short psychotherapeutic treatments and that psychoanalytic knowledge may be utilized to good advantage in many cases. The analyst attempts to obtain as complete a picture of the dynamics as possible, as quickly as he can, and then proceeds actively to interpret. Judgment and experience guide the analyst particularly in avoiding

the interpretation of 'deep' material. He cites cases in which analysis was not feasible but in which analytic psychotherapy enabled patients to carry on. The author feels that especially in cases of mild masochistic and obsessional conditions, and in impotence, it is possible successfully to treat patients who for whatever reasons are not able to be analyzed.

CHARLES W. TIDD

[In discussions of 'short' or 'brief' psychoanalytic therapy is implicit the statement that the psychoanalyst operates on an all or none principle of psychoanalysis or nothing for his patients. If such exist, it is a short-sighted, self-imposed limitation, and rare. In the psychotherapy of patients who are not suitable for psychoanalysis, a psychoanalyst inevitably practices a psychotherapy which, not psychoanalysis, is nevertheless psychoanalytic. Ed.]

The Psychological Examination: An Outline of Procedure in the Determination of the Mental Status of the Psychiatric Patient. William C. Menninger, Karl A. Menninger, and Robert C. Knight. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, V, No. 4, 1941.

This outline is the procedure that is followed in psychiatric examinations at the Menninger Clinic. Its special importance lies in the fact that, unlike the usual mental status, it provides for estimation of psychodynamic factors.

CHARLES W. TIDD

Neurotic Camouflage and Thought Rehearsal. Theodor Reik. Amer. Imago, II, 1941, pp. 86–103.

In this article the clinical phenomenology of an inadequately 'understood and described' neurotic manifestation engages Reik's minute observational interest. Beginning with the premise that psychological differences in the neuroses are reflected in characteristic differences in social behavior, Reik describes the peculiarly open-yet-hidden way in which obsessional acts and ceremonials pervade the social behavior of the compulsive neurotic.

By clinical examples, Reik demonstrates the highly and ingeniously complicated way in which the obsessional patient weaves his ritual into the texture of reality situations. That this activity is in its surface manifestations conscious, does not lessen its complexity; as a matter of fact, the forces of intellect are enlisted to such an extent that one can not conceive of a dullard remotely achieving the adroit 'stage management' required for the camouflage. Such practiced perfection in making socially presentable the unpresentable neurotic act, is not easily accomplished. The preliminary stages are the 'thought rehearsals', indispensable to the smooth running off of the 'social' presentation. These 'trial performances', which Reik describes as a 'peculiar kind of protective measure', have the aim of eliminating anticipated disturbances in 'carrying out . . . obsessional acts and ceremonials'.

Disturbances are anticipated because the patient is aware of the lack of consonance between his compulsive acts and the realities of adult life. 'This breach between . . . the magical way of thinking dominating the obsessional neurosis, and the rationalistic way of thinking characteristic of our culture',

the compulsive neurotic attempts to close by 'social camouflage'. It is not the magical significance of the rehearsed thought or act in preventing a bad outcome that Reik emphasizes, so much as the conscious bringing-to-perfection of a performance geared to a keenly apprehended social reality. The author writes interestingly about the reaction of the analyst to the 'cleverness' of the patient's performance.

In following through the clinical manifestations of such behavior we are also made aware of stages in the genesis of the neurosis itself, and of the growing load of tension which arises from the 'imperious tendency' of the 'obsessional neurosis' to 'dominate the ego, tooth and nail', thus indicating the relationship of lessened efficiency in camouflage to the greater scope of the neurosis as it enlarges its hold over the ego and makes social conformity an ever more difficult task. In the abortive attempts and fiascos of camouflage which then result, the fundamental nature of the conflicting psychic and social tendencies involved becomes even more apparent. It is in the analysis of these tendencies as evidenced in the details of the neurotic camouflage and its failures, that the familiar analytic paradox of revelation in the very act of concealment is encountered.

Reik's article contains numerous thought provoking suggestions arising from minutiæ of clinical observation too often neglected in the search for more direct routes to the understanding of the unconscious. Brief references to social camouflage in 'normal' life situations further developed, could add much to our knowledge of human psychology and psychopathology.

MINA EMCH

Psychodynamic Factors in Illegitimacy. J. Kasanin and Sieglinde Handschin. Amer. J. of Orthopsychiat., XI, No. 1, 1941.

Psychiatric examination was made of sixteen unmarried mothers who were neither psychotic nor feeble minded and came from average American homes. Their relationship to the child, the child's father, and to the members of their families, showed various neurotic trends which the authors believe 'represent hysterical disassociation states in which the girls act out their incest fantasies as an expression of the œdipus situation'. Attitudes toward their fathers, and the history of promiscuity or illegitimacy in the mother's family played an important part in their psychological structure. [It is likely that pathological character traits are higher in percentage among persons who do not adjust themselves to established social institutions, and that this very question of adjustment or maladjustment gives many an opportunity for neurotic 'acting out'. Rev.]

OTTO FENICHEL

Freud's Metapsychology. A. A. Brill. Harofe Haivri, XIII, 1941, p. 6.

Freud's Contribution to Science. P. R. Lehrman. Ibid., p. 20.

The Hebrew Medical Journal, *Harofe Haivri*, dedicates its 13th anniversary number to the memory of Sigmund Freud. The article by Brill presents a brief summary of some of Freud's theoretical ideas. The paper outlines lucidly

some of the classical freudian concepts. Brill first explains the dynamic, topographic, and economic aspects of the psychic processes. He continues with a discussion of the id, ego and superego, and how conflicts among these psychic functions lead to mental disorder. The article concludes with some remarks on Freud's speculations on phylogenetic influences on our psychic life, his preoccupation with race and religion, and the possible effect of his Judaism on his work.

The article by Lehrman is largely a biographical sketch of Freud, illustrated by a number of excellent photographs. There is a long section on Freud's neurological career and contributions, followed by a clear exposition of his basic findings in the field of the neuroses, dreams, the psychopathology of everyday life. The author concludes with the statement that Freud was careful not to be pedantic, not to create a strictly defined system, warning that such an attempt might hamper the further development of the science of psychoanalysis. It is typical of Freud's restraint that when the Prussian Minister of Art, Science and Education greeted him with the words: 'I have have come to honor the discoverer of the Unconscious', Freud replied: 'The poets and philosophers before me have discovered the unconscious; I have discovered the scientific method with which the unconscious can be studied.'

CHARLES FISHER

Psicoanálise do Cafuné. (Psychoanalysis of the *Cafuné*.) Roger Bastide. São Paulo Revista do Arquivo, 1940.

'At noon the mistress of the house puts her head in her favorite girl-slave's lap; the slave strokes with her fingers her mistress's loosened hair, touches the hair-roots, fondles the scalp and creates a little cracking sound with the nails of the thumb and the third finger. This causes a pleasant sensation in the mistress's whole body which makes her swoon with delight comparable to an orgasm. . . .'

Bastide states that he was less interested in the description of this old Brazilian custom, described by two European travellers early in the nineteenth century, than in the emotional reaction of the two travellers. Both expressed strong aversion and disgust. Malinowski has described a similar custom among children and loving couples in Northwest Melanesia.

Bastide's interpretation starting with the symbolic equation, head=genitalia, mentions the infantile sexual significance of hair, and then asks how it can be that this behavior developed in Brazil to a socially accepted custom among adult women. It becomes understandable when one takes into consideration the life which the white woman lived in the colonial period in Brazil. The women married at the age of 12 or 13, were entirely left to their husbands' tyranny and were spied upon by husband, in-laws, and hundreds of native slaves. They were confined to their houses, their husbands made love to the young slave girls before their eyes, and a strict, religious up-bringing all combined to make sexual satisfaction nearly impossible for white women. The *Cafuné* probably developed as a substitutive sexual satisfaction which was tolerated because its sexual character was extragenital.

ADELHEID KOCH

The New Medical Attack on So-Called Mental Diseases. Foster Kennedy. New York State J. of Med., October 15, 1941.

This is another of Kennedy's attacks against the psychoanalyst who 'divorces soma and psyche and who seems to see like Polyphemus with but a single eye'. Neurology and internal medicine must be the basis of psychiatry, and a pathology of neuroses and psychoses must be developed through medicine. The author mentions various disorders which were in earlier days considered as neuroses, and whose organic etiology has been discovered later. 'We have', says Kennedy, 'in shock therapy an attack on mental illness which means to the treatment of disorders of the "mind" what the appearance of Lister's carbolic spray meant to surgery.'

JULIUS I. STEINFELD

Magic and Theft in European Folk-Lore. Géza Róheim. J. of Criminal Psychopathology, II, 1940, pp. 54–61.

The superstition that witches steal is universal. They are especially said to steal milk which has a magical significance representing 'luck' or 'mana'. Often it is believed that the witch leaves her excrement as an equivalent for what she has stolen. A 'thief's candle', made of human fat, renders the owner invisible and so able to steal whatever he desires without risk of punishment. Róheim gives psychoanalytic interpretations of these superstitions. 'The witches are the representatives of the "bad mother" image of the talic aspect of the child's body destruction fantasy'. '. . . the thief is really the infant who tears all the "good objects" which life has failed to give him out of his mother's body. . . .'

The universality of such oral-sadistic fantasies, and the direct applicability of individual psychopathology to mythology are debatable.

GEORGE GEROE

Dreams of a Somali Prostitute. Géza Róheim. J. of Criminal Psychopathology, II, 1940, pp. 162–170.

Róheim reports ten dreams of a Somali prostitute whom he had interviewed in Aden, and provides interpretations and comments. The prostitute had conflicts about her profession and especially concerning her relationship to her father. Her father's moral attitude was in conflict with an unconscious sexual love for him. The last dream transfers feelings from the father to the analyst. Some interpretations of details are unconvincing.

OTTO FENICHEL

Clinical Notes on a Case Diagnosed as Epilepsy. Charles Berg. Brit. J. Med. Psychol., XIX, 1941, pp. 9–18.

For eight years a patient suffered from seizures which developed without warning, resulted in total unconsciousness, and were followed by a dazed condition with memory defects. Other manifestations also were in accord with a diagnosis of epilepsy. The author summarizes the outcome of a prolonged analysis as

follows: 'By the technique of analysis unconscious sources of nervous tension are freed from repression. A drama of the most acute emotional intensity, with its origins in earliest childhood, is brought to consciousness. In the course of this process the fits also become conscious and subject to conscious control. In other words, they change their typical epileptic form, are replaced by typically hysteric fits and become, therefore, amenable to cure by psychotherapy.' In discussing the psychopathology, the author raises the question: 'How many cases of so called idiopathic epilepsy have a similar psychopathology, and are therefore similarly subject to amelioration by psychotherapy?'

MILTON H. ERICKSON

Sociology and Psychology in the Prediction of Behavior. Kenneth F. Walker. Psychol. Rev., XLVIII, 1941, pp. 443–449.

Noting a recent trend in psychology to replace chapters on the nervous system in textbooks of psychology with chapters on sociology, Walker examines critically this trend toward sociology. It can be considered an advance because it aims at greater predictability of behavior and hence greater control of it. But Walker cautions that this trend can be misused. The recognition of the relativity of psychological generalizations to particular sets of sociological conditions does not mean that psychological laws can be reduced to sociological ones. Walker feels that the observation of different sociological conditions in molding 'the basic motives' to action is often the only method the psychologist has to work with.

NORMAN REIDER

Our Inadequate Treatment of the Mentally Ill as Compared with Treatment of Other Sick People. Victor H. Vogel. Public Health Reports, Vol. LVI, No. 40, 1941.

While 58 per cent of all hospital beds in this country are occupied by mental cases, and in the estimation of the writer, 50 per cent of the patients of private physicians have emotional or mental disorders as an accompanying condition, only one or two per cent of all physicians in this country are psychiatric specialists. There is an almost total lack of efforts being made to prevent mental illnesses from occurring or developing to the point where hospitalization is necessary. The nation continues to spend $210,000,000 a year to maintain our mentally ill in hospitals, but only about $5,000,000 for the support of mental hygiene clinics. Although some psychoses are due to hereditary factors, infections, toxic agents and old age, most mental disturbances occur when persons are faced with what to them are intolerable situations. The proper treatment of the reactions to environmental stresses, particularly in childhood and adolescence, through mental hygiene clinics may prevent the development of a mental disorder. The unfortunate stigma attached to mental illness, and archaic persecutory commitment procedures should be corrected. The establishment of a neuropsychiatric research institute in connection with the Public Health Service is advocated.

BERNHARD BERLINER

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

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First Annual Report of the Melbourne Institute for Psychoanalysis for the Year 1941.

Dr. Clara Lazar-Geroe, Dr. P. G. Dane (Chairman) & Dr. R. S. Ellery (Hon. Secretary.)

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NOTES

At the last regular meeting of the CHICAGO PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY the following officers were unanimously elected:

Dr. Edwin R. Eisler, President
Dr. Margaret W. Gerard, Vice-President
Dr. George W. Wilson, Secretary-Treasurer
Dr. George Mohr, Executive Council
Dr. Thomas French, Council on Professional Training

President Dr. Edwin Eisler appointed the following committees:

TRAINING COMMITTEE

Dr. Thomas M. French, Chairman
Drs. Helen McLean, Lionel Blitzsten, Franz Alexander, and George Mohr

PROGRAM COMMITTEE

Dr. Martin Grotjahn, Chairman
Drs. Therese Benedek and Kurt Eissler

FINANCE COMMITTEE

Dr. George W. Wilson, Chairman
Drs. Lucia Tower and Rudolf Fuerst

As of September 1, 1942, the following members are on active duty with the Armed Forces:

Major Roy R. Grinker
Major Milton L. Miller
Lt. Commander Leon J. Saul

Other members have volunteered their services and are awaiting call to active duty.

The TOPEKA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY elected the following officers for the year 1942–43:

President: Dr. Ernst Lewy
Vice-President: Dr. G. Leonard Harrington
Secretary Treasurer: Dr. Sylvia Allen
Executive Councilor: Dr. Robert P. Knight

Appointments for the year 1942–43:

Representatives to Council on Professional Training:
Dr. Robert P. Knight—1 year
Dr. Karl Menninger—2 years
Dr. Ernst Lewy—3 years

Committee on Membership and Education:
Dr. Karl Menninger
Dr. Robert P. Knight
Dr. Ernst Lewy (ex officio)

Committee on Finance:
Dr. Sylvia Allen, Chairman

Dr. Robert P. Knight
Dr. Ernst Lewy (ex officio)

Committee on Program:
Dr. Mary O'Neil Hawkins, Chairman
Dr. Sylvia Allen
Dr. Ernst Lewy (ex officio)

Total membership for the year:

Active Members	19
Associate Members	3
Affiliate Members	2
Honorary Member	1

Newly elected members:

To Active Membership:

Dr. George Gerö, Tucson, Arizona (September 27, 1941) (by transfer from Danish Psychoanalytic Society)

Dr. Elisabeth R. Geleerd, Topeka, Kansas (March 28, 1942)

To Affiliate Membership:

Dr. J. F. Brown, Lawrence, Kansas
Dr. D. Rapaport, Topeka, Kansas } (December 6, 1941)

Dr. Carl Tillman, who had been an associate member under the old Constitution since 1939, was elected to the new constitutional category of associate membership on June 20, 1942.

Active Membership terminated by death:

Dr. Irene Haenel, Los Angeles, California (November 8, 1941)

Associate Membership discontinued (by resignation):

Dr. Coyne Campbell, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (September 27, 1941)

Report of Training Committee as of August 1, 1942:

(Training activities of the Topeka Society in Topeka, Los Angeles, and San Francisco have been under the auspices of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis.)

SEMINARS AND COURSES

Topeka		*Sessions*	*Attendance*
Dr. Ernst Lewy	Didactic Seminar: Freud's Writings	10	10
Dr. Karl A. Menninger	Didactic Seminar: Psychoanalytic Technique	11	13
Dr. Robert P. Knight and Dr. Ernst Lewy	Clinical Conferences	11	9
Dr. Robert P. Knight	Didactic Seminar: Theory of Dream Interpretation	6	7
Dr. Ernst Lewy and Dr. Mary O'Neil Hawkins	Didactic Seminar: Application of Psychoanalysis to Non-Medical Problems	12	8
Dr. Karl A. Menninger	Psychoanalytic Psychiatry	68	16

Los Angeles			
Dr. Otto Fenichel	Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses	17	Not reported
" " "	Seminar on Questions of Psychoanalytic Technique (based on Glover's 'An Investigation of the Technique of Psychoanalysis')	18	Not reported
" " "	Literature Seminar	11	Not reported
Dr. Ernst Simmel	Seminar on Freud's Clinical and Theoretical Papers on Neuroses and Psychoses	10	5
Dr. Ernst Simmel and assistants	Educational Seminars:		
	Introductory Lectures for Teachers	Not reported	
	Literature Seminar (Psychoanalysis Applied to Pedagogy)	Not reported	
	Case Seminar for Advanced Teachers	Not reported	
	These educational seminars were conducted by Dr. David Brunswick, Mrs. Marjorie Leonard, Mrs. Christina Olden and Mrs. Margaret Munk		
San Francisco			
Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld	Clinical Conferences	11	5
" " "	Freud Seminar	1	5
" " "	Literature Seminar on Freud's Writings	1	3

First Annual Report of THE MELBOURNE INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS for the Year 1941.

I have much pleasure in submitting the first annual report of the Institute for Psychoanalysis of Melbourne, Australia. It is a most comforting fact that at a time when so many of the psychoanalytic institutions in Europe have had to close, in Australia, psychoanalysis has found a new home.

The foundation of the Melbourne Institute for Psychoanalysis was made possible by the donation of Miss Lorna Traill, Melbourne. Its existence is no less due to Dr. Paul G. Dane, who has worked with indefatigable enthusiasm, and to Dr. R. Ellery, who has been a tremendous help, as have been Dr. N. A. Albiston, Dr. A. R. Phillips and Dr. P. G. Reynolds. The Institute has had, since the earliest stages of its planning, the full support of the British Psychoanalytic Society, London, and particularly that of Dr. Ernest Jones who honored the Institute by accepting a membership to its Board of Directors. I may

perhaps mention too, with ever so many thanks, the great trouble he took in helping analysts to come to Australia.

The Institute is incorporated and licensed as an Association under the Companies Act. It is administered and supervised by a Council of Directors, whose members are: Dr. P. G. Dane, Chairman; Dr. R. Ellery, Hon. Secretary; Dr. E. Jones, London, Dr. N. A. Albiston, Dr. A. R. Phillips, Dr. P. G. Reynolds, Dr. L. C. Winn, Sydney.

The Institute employs Dr. Clara Lazar-Geroe as psychoanalyst.

The Institute had its formal and official opening on the 11th of October, 1940, in the presence of about fifty invited guests, representatives of the medical, psychological and pedagogical circles of Melbourne. The Institute was opened by Judge Foster. Dr. Dane outlined its program, and Dr. Winn addressed the meeting in the name of the British Psychoanalytic Society.

It is the plan of the Institute to maintain a psychoanalytic clinic for adult patients and for children, acting also in an advisory capacity for teachers and parents; to give lectures and organize study groups; to build up a psychoanalytic library.

Clinical work started in January 1941. There are two work rooms, an office, a nurse's room, and one large waiting room which serves also as lecture room.

As the Clinic is so short of analytical workers, our scheme may appear rather ambitious, and of course we are able to carry it out only on a small scale.

Report of the First Year's Work

Clinic: Every patient who comes to our clinic, undergoes a physical examination by one of the members of our Board.

We have been consulted by 29 adult patients, classified as follows:

Hysteria	3
Perversions	6
Stealing	1
Compulsive neurosis	4
Various anxiety states	10
Agoraphobia	2
Depression	2
Character neurosis	1

Of these three are in regular analytic treatment, two have 5 hours weekly, and one 4 hours weekly.

Lacking the necessary time for regular analyses, we have taken six cases for one or two sessions weekly with the aim of resolving actual problems. Three of these cases improved and were discharged after 20, 10, and 6 sessions, respectively.

There are always people on our waiting list for regular analysis.

Children's Clinic: The Children's Clinic has been operating since May 1941 one afternoon weekly.

There are even greater difficulties to overcome in Australia in analytic work with children than with adults because of the complete novelty of such work here. People are hardly aware of children's problems or neurotic symptoms. Conditions here make it difficult to send them from the suburbs into the city

after school (4 P.M.), and mothers are unable to accompany them; so we have had no opportunity during the first year to start analysis with children.

We have had to adapt the work of the Children's Clinic in a way acceptable to the public. We have worked chiefly in an advisory capacity with teachers, social workers, nurses, probation officers of the Children's Court, etc., in many cases without seeing the child.

From May 1941 to January 1942, we had 37 consultations in 27 afternoons about the problems of 17 children. We hope that this coöperation with teachers and also our lectures will be followed by the increasing confidence of parents in our work.

Lectures: The Institute arranged the following courses: Introductory lectures on Psychoanalysis and Mental Disorders, Dr. Dane, 3 lectures; Technique of Psychoanalysis, Dr. Lazar-Geroe, 1 lecture. This course was held in April and May, 1941, for Medical Students; we planned to have more lectures, but they had to be discontinued because of the shortening of the curriculum at the University. Members attending: 5. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalytic Pedagogics, 8 lectures given by Dr. Lazar-Geroe, during the months of June–September 1941. Members attending: 18.

Psychoanalytic Lectures in Other Institutions: (1) Dr. Dane: Educational Problems, address given at the Girl's Grammar School, Fintona, for parents, July 1941. (2) Dr. Lazar-Geroe: Influences of the New Psychological Schools on Preschool Education, 4 lectures in August–September 1941. These lectures were arranged for third year students of the Teacher's Training College of the Free Kindergarten Union of Victoria, in their course in Mental Hygiene. (3) Psychoanalytic Approach to Juvenile Delinquency, 3 evenings with the study group of the Children's Court Probation Officers, conducted by Dr. Lazar-Geroe. Problems were discussed in cases presented by probation officers. Members attending: 12 to 15. (4) During the winter the Institute arranged some discussion evenings, inviting a group of psychiatrists: (a) Perversions. Dr. Ellery presented several case histories. We discussed Freud's interpretation of the perversions. (b) Juvenile Delinquency. Dr. A. Muhl presented a case and therapy of a delinquent boy. (c) Child Analysis. Dr. Lazar-Geroe demonstrated the technique of child analysis, presenting the analysis of a girl of six with compulsive symptoms. Members attending: 8–9.

Library: Dr. P. G. Dane presented the Institute with his collection of psychoanalytic works, thus laying the foundation of our library with about one hundred volumes. Since then there have been added about twenty-five volumes, donated by Mr. N. G. Jarvey. We bought three volumes.

DR. CLARA LAZAR-GEROE.

DR. P. G. DANE, *Chairman.*
DR. R. S. ELLERY, *Hon. Secretary.*

Arthur H. Ruggles, president of THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, has made (September 11, 1942) a report of the progress of a Special Committee on Psychiatry in the Armed Forces, appointed at the Boston meeting in May 1942. This Committee is composed of Dr. Arthur H. Ruggles, Chairman, Dr. Frederick

W. Parsons and Dr. Edward A. Strecker. The Surgeon General of the Army has long been interested in developing an efficient neuropsychiatric organization, and to that end has appointed Dr. Roy D. Halloran, Superintendent of the Metropolitan State Hospital, Waltham, Massachusetts, as Colonel in charge of Neuropsychiatry in the Office of The Surgeon General of the Army. Colonel Halloran has reported for the duty of organizing Army psychiatry.

Several commissioned members of the Association are on psychiatric duty in the Pacific area, several in Great Britain, and it is expected that psychiatric organization will soon be well advanced in our expeditionary forces.

It is proposed to appoint a chief psychiatrist to each Corps Area, now called Service Commands, of which there are nine in this country. Other important developments in psychiatric organization will soon be effected.

The Committee is aware that there are some well qualified psychiatrists in the service not yet being used for psychiatric duty, but it has been assured that as rapidly as possible, psychiatric personnel will be utilized as fully as possible for the type of work for which they are best qualified.

The Executive Committee of the American Psychiatric Association have decided to attempt the publication of the annual directory, even though it will be hard to determine the whereabouts of many members in the service. Members of the Association are asked to send to Mr. Austin M. Davies, Room 708, 9 Rockefeller Plaza, any change of address listed in the previous directory.

The SALMON COMMITTEE ON PSYCHIATRY AND MENTAL HYGIENE of the New York Academy of Medicine has named Dr. Emilio Mira, professor of psychiatry at the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and formerly full professor of psychiatry at the University of Barcelona, Spain, as the Salmon Lecturer for 1942. The lectures will be held on three successive Friday evenings November 6, November 13 and November 20, in the New York Academy of Medicine Building, 2 East 103rd Street, New York City. Members of the medical profession and their friends are invited to attend.

Dr. Mira, who was director of the Neuropsychiatric Services of the Loyalist Forces during the Spanish Civil War from 1936 to 1939 and has studied and taught in Germany, France, Switzerland and England, has entitled his lectures Psychiatry at War. In his first lecture on November 6 he will discuss the psychopathology of fear and anger reactions in wartime. In his second lecture on November 13, he will discuss the duties of the psychiatrist in wartime and his personal experiences in the Spanish War. In his third lecture on November 20 he will lecture on new techniques for detecting and controlling 'fighting power' in individuals and armies.

From his experience in wartime Germany Dr. Mira has gained a wide knowledge of the German Army's organization of psychological warfare and racial theories and the use of war psychiatry in Germany.

Dr. Mira is the author of numerous scientific works, including a comprehensive Manual of Psychiatry which was written in three months and is now used widely in Spain and in South America. He has edited several psychiatric journals, including Archives of Neurology of Buenos Aires and Pedagogical

Review. He is a frequent contributor to the psychiatric journals of three continents.

Dr. Mira was educated in Spain, receiving his license in medicine from the University of Barcelona and his medical degree from the Central University in Madrid. He held three full professorships at the University of Barcelona: on the faculty of philosophy, the faculty of economic and social sciences and the faculty of medicine. Dr. Mira was the founder of a vocational institute in Barcelona which guided into productive channels the skills of thousands of Spanish workers. He was the director of several mental institutions in Barcelona, where he introduced the application of modern psychiatric principles to the treatment of the mentally ill. He conducted special research in psychological tests at the Maudsley Hospital in London previous to assuming the professorship of psychiatry in Buenos Aires.

To fill appointments for rotating interneships and for psychiatric residents in St. Elizabeths Hospital, federal institution for the treatment of mental disorders in Washington, D. C., the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION will accept applications for Junior Medical Officers until the needs have been met. The positions pay $2,000 a year. The rotating interneship consists of one year of rotating service including medicine, surgery, psychiatry, laboratory, pediatrics (affiliation), and obstetrics (affiliation). Appointments are made on July 1 and January 1 of each year. Applicants must be fourth year students in a Class A medical school. A postgraduate interneship of one year in psychiatry (psychiatric residents) is offered to graduates in medicine who have already served or are now serving in an accredited rotating interneship. Proof of completion of the interneship must be shown before entrance on duty. No written test is required and there are no age limits. Revised requirements for nurses have also been issued by the Commission. Persons interested in any of these positions are urged to secure the desired announcements and proper application forms from the Commission's representatives at first- and second-class post offices.

ADDENDA. Vol. XI, No. 3, p. 456. In the note about the Boston Psychoanalytic Society, 'Training Analysts' should read 'Training and Supervising Analysts'. To the Teaching Faculty are added the names: Drs. Ives Hendrick, M. Ralph Kaufman, John M. Murray, Hanns Sachs.

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