The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Depersonalization and the Body Ego with Special Reference to the Genital Representation

Leo Berman

To cite this article: Leo Berman (1948) Depersonalization and the Body Ego with Special Reference to the Genital Representation, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 433-452, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11925734

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11925734

DEPERSONALIZATION AND THE BODY EGO WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE GENITAL REPRESENTATION

BY LEO BERMAN, M.D. (BOSTON)

Depersonalization is of both theoretical and practical interest. Review of the moderate amount of literature on depersonalization makes it evident that our knowledge of it is incomplete. It is of practical significance because of its widespread incidence. It occurs as a transient phenomenon at the onset or during periods of exacerbation of many psychoneuroses and in more chronic form in many borderline states and psychoses. A more thorough theoretical study of depersonalization would lead us to the still relatively obscure area of early development of the ego and its object relationships.

Depersonalization as a clinical symptom is a term that can be used in either a narrow or broad sense. In the narrow sense it refers to an altered awareness of one's thinking and feelings. These are experienced as strange, unreal and indefinably changed. When this altered state of awareness pertains to the patient's body or parts of it, it is sometimes called 'estrangement'. 'Derealization' refers to feelings of unreality about the world, or parts of it. Used broadly, depersonalization may refer to a disturbed and troubled awareness of the mental ego, the body ego, or the outside world, including altered perception of time and space. In this discussion, depersonalization is used in the broader sense.

GENERAL AND THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This paper is concerned with those cases of depersonalization, apparently psychogenic, with no impairment of consciousness or perception. There is little value in trying to differentiate, as some authors do, between 'genuine depersonalization', an al-

Based on a paper read before the Boston Psychoanalytic Society on November 20, 1946.

leged clinical entity, and symptomatic depersonalization. Those cases are considered here in which depersonalization symptoms are an important and persistent part of the total symptomatology and which are not frank psychoses. Typically, such cases are borderline, and some of them may later become psychotic. It is well known that patients complain more when depersonalization comes and goes than when it persists unaltered over a long period. Schilder *(26)* notes the appearance of depersonalization in organic diseases of the brain, especially before and after epileptic attacks. Depersonalization, especially as regards the body ego, was studied by Federn *(8)* in states of health, for example, in falling asleep and waking, in dreams, and in states of fatigue.

Freud *(14)*, in his only paper on depersonalization, used the term both as a mechanism of defense and as a symptom. He noted a relationship between depersonalization and conditions of *fausse reconnaissance, déjà vu,* and *déjà raconté.* In the former, an attempt is made to exclude something from the ego; in the latter conditions the attempt is to include something in the ego. Freud stated that extremes of depersonalization lead to double personality.

Fenichel *(12)* described as characteristic of depersonalization that the ego defends itself not against instinctual impulses, as in repression, but against specific affective and sensory internal perceptions. He stated that depersonalization differs from repression only as regards different data of internal perception which are 'put out of action'; however, he *(13)* also stated that certain types of depersonalization are examples of emotional blocking (repression). Sadger *(24)* stated that in depersonalization there is a removal of affects (*Affektentblössung*) with a retention of the original sexual object and sexual goal. It seems then that in depersonalization there is a defense against affects and sensations. The characteristic result of such defense is a loss in ego feeling. Feigenbaum *(11)* commented on how destructive of the ego such a method of defense is, and raised the question as to whether it acts as a preventive against suicide and psychosis.

What, then, is the rôle of the emotions in depersonalization? Reik *(22)* presupposed an unusual degree of affective development in depersonalization. With an intensification of ambivalence, there is a withdrawal of libido, resulting in a 'temporary anesthesia of psychic life'. Helene Deutsch *(7)*, in describing the 'as if' personality, stated that this type of ego disturbance is closely related to depersonalization but differs from it in that the patient does not perceive any disturbances. She then sharply differentiated the affective disturbance in the 'as if' personality from that in repressed emotional life, although they both superficially showed affective impoverishment. In the 'as if' personality, the affective disturbance represented 'no longer an act of repression but a real loss of object cathexis'. Object relationships were but the expressions of imitativeness and mimicry, the result of an early deficiency in affective development which led to an impoverishment of the total personality. In emotional repression, as for example in hysteria, there is, by contrast, identification with highly cathected objects. Fenichel *(13)* indicated that depersonalization is associated with narcissistic regression and loss of object cathexes. To summarize, symptomatic depersonalization may appear when there is a defense against affects, (a) through repression with retention of object cathexes; (b) through narcissistic regression with relative loss of object cathexes: usually depersonalization refers to those cases which show narcissistic regression. One may also note that there is some disagreement as to whether initially there is an under or over development of affects.

A difference of opinion as to the type of narcissistic disturbance in depersonalization leads us to the problem of early development of the ego. Fenichel *(12)*, in his discussion of hypochondriasis and depersonalization in schizophrenia, gave the more generally accepted view. With the relinquishment of object cathexes there is a narcissistic regression and an associated increase of narcissistic cathexis of the ego and its nucleus, the body ego. The resultant body sensations are not necessarily intense, as the increased libidinal charge of the body or part may be concealed by an intense countercathexis and thus give

rise to altered feelings characteristic of depersonalization. Schilder (*25*) and Oberndorf (*21*) believed there was a withdrawal of libido from the body as well as from the outside world. Federn (*9, 10*) sharply differentiated between a primary objectless narcissism with the ego as subject, and a libidinal investment of the ego as object. In depersonalization there is a reduction of primary narcissistic cathexis of the ego, specifically in the cathexis of the ego boundaries. This reduction results in an altered awareness of the affected body ego boundary and its associated perceptions of the outside world. Federn's conception of primary narcissism seems not to conform with the conception of primary narcissism as that earliest period of infancy when, according to the view more generally held, there is no ego and no object representation. It may be noted, however, that others [Schilder, Glover, Searl (*28*), M. Balint (*1*)] maintain that ego and object representations of a primitive kind are present in earliest infancy.

Freud (*15*) wrote in 1913 that '. . . a full understanding of any neurotic predisposition from the developmental point of view is never complete without taking into account not merely the stage of libido development at which fixation occurs but also the stage of ego development'. In 1923, Freud (*16*) emphasized that the ego is first and foremost a body ego. It is striking to note how relatively little has been written about the body ego, apart from the basic and extensive contribution of Schilder. Schilder (*25*) and Bernfeld (*4*) stressed the need for a better understanding of the ontogeny of the body ego. Somatic depersonalization offers a fruitful field for such a study if we can assume that these phenomena may represent earlier stages in the development of the body ego.

In connection with his study of ego development in borderline cases, Hendrick (*18, 19*) suggested that complete ego identifications with partial objects were indispensable steps in the development of such normal mental attributes as the capacity to express socially acceptable aggression and to reciprocate tender feelings. Clinically it seems that the physical attributes of the body ego are to an important degree dependent on iden-

tifications with partial objects. In other words, it is important to study in the framework of identification not only the nature of the mental ego (physiology), but also of the anatomical ego. In actual life it would have to be assumed that these processes occur simultaneously, as expressed in the familiar statement that an organ is a structuralized function.

ANALYZED CASES REPORTED IN THE LITERATURE

There is considerable agreement in the literature as regards certain clinical findings in cases with depersonalization. These findings, stressed to varying degrees by different authors, include sadomasochism, erotization of thought, voyeurism and exhibitionism with the constant findings of increased self-observation, ambivalence, strong fears of castration and of annihilation. Some authors note paranoid tendencies, and state that these are kept in check by depersonalization. Others stress the importance of anal tendencies, especially anal exhibitionism and anal voyeurism. Orality, especially oral sadism, is given strong emphasis by some, but Schilder (*27*) observed that oral trends are rare. An unconscious trend toward self-castration is noted by a number of authors. Strikingly frequent is the onset or intensification of depersonalization reported when the patients, either in fantasy or in reality, manifest heterosexual interests. In several cases, œdipal fixation with conscious sexual fantasies involving the parent is described. Homosexuality, usually repressed, is a frequent finding.

In view of the variety and complexity of the clinical data, it is not surprising to find that there are widely varying formulations by different authors of the unconscious motivations. To mention only a few which seem closest to the core of the problem of depersonalization, Federn notes the identification of the ego with the male genital; when there is a rejection of genitality, there is a loss of ego feeling for the male genital. Hendrick (*17*) and others stress the importance of self-castration. For one of his patients, a schizoid young woman, depersonalization served the fantasy of castrating the father. Because the patient

identified herself with the paternal phallus it was a self-castration. This patient had strong, aggressive, desexualized impulses toward her father, with associated fears of retaliation. Searl (*28*) described a sadistic looking at genitals coupled with the desire to bite. The world became one in which there was biting and the fear of being bitten. Depersonalization occurred in this setting, and both the patient and the feared person were then identified with nondangerous inanimate objects. Depersonalization to eliminate fierceness of feelings also occurred in connection with a 'wild beast' identification.

One or both parents of the patients showed gross evidences of psychopathology, including psychosis and overt sexual behavior toward the patients. Schilder (*27*) believes that the prevalence of primitive sexuality in depersonalization has two sources: (a) the patients felt neglected and mistreated by the parents, craved more love for their intellectual and physical qualities; (b) an excessive amount of admiration and erotic interest was focussed upon the patients which they expected would be continuous. Schilder also notes that depersonalization is the neurosis of the good-looking and intelligent who want too much admiration. Deutsch (*7*), in her discussion of etiology of the 'as if' personality disturbances, stresses that these patients were given either too much or too little tenderness in childhood. Several authors stress the etiological importance of infantile traumata and 'shocks', including the loss of an important libidinal object and observation of parental intercourse.

Direct observation re-emphasizes the fact that many disturbances are observable in earliest infancy (*3, 6, 29*). The defenses of the ego are relatively undifferentiated and tend, as in depersonalization, to be excessive. Ribble's (*23*) descriptions of those infants who do not receive enough handling and affection may well represent states closely related to depersonalization. The analyzed case reported below yielded little material regarding the first three years of his life. We are therefore including a somewhat detailed description of the patient's family, especially his mother, in an attempt partly to fill this gap.

CASE REPORT

A man, twenty-two years old, for many years had been solitary, introspective, and asocial. In preparatory school and in college he was given short periods of psychotherapy. His mother believed he was getting worse. She reported that he was writing an interminable book to be published after his death. Samples of these writings showed an obsessive preoccupation with feelings of inferiority and passivity, resentment at being dominated especially by his mother and brother, and the longing to be loved by them. He wanted 'love, attention, admiration, fame'. In preliminary interviews he revealed fears of bodily injury, death, and insanity. In the half year following his graduation from college, he had done little else than brood or engage in intermittent passionate quarrels with his mother.

A tall, well-built young man of average good looks, the patient appeared to be much younger than his age.[1] This appearance, it transpired, was one the patient had cultivated, together with an awkwardness and a childlike voice, to dissemble intense sexual and destructive tendencies.

The patient had a phimosis, the penis being otherwise normal. It had made a painful impression on him to observe that his brother was circumcized. This observation came to mean to him that he was not supposed to have a penis, and that it would be dangerous for him to try to have one.

FAMILY HISTORY

The paternal grandfather deserted when the father was quite young and the paternal grandmother committed suicide when the father was twelve years old. The father showed tendencies toward passivity. When the patient was twelve years old, his father was killed in an automobile accident at a time and under circumstances suggesting conscious or unconscious suicidal intent.

[1] In several cases reported in the literature, the youthful appearance of patients with depersonalization is commented upon.

The father's attitude toward his sons made the patient feel—with rare exceptions—that his father was a stranger and that he never had a father. At first, repression caused the father to be recalled as a kind of superman, always mild, correct, and kindly; later, in connection with certain experiences, the patient remembered him to have been an impassive, deadly, ruthless man of action; there were also a few memories of him as weak and unhappy. Subsequently his mother told the patient that his father had not wanted any children, that he had wanted her to have an abortion when she was pregnant with his brother, and that he had been waiting impatiently for the patient and his brother to grow up so that he could be alone with her again.

The brother, who was two years older, brutally beat the patient into cowering submission. For a couple of years, beginning about the age of seven, the brother seduced him into mutual fellatio and experiments at anal intercourse, during which the patient never recalled having an erection.

The patient was not breast fed. There is an amnesia for a maid to whom he was supposed to have been closely attached in his earliest years. The patient always felt that his mother treated him as if he were an inanimate object, 'like a cigarette stand'. From the mother's attitude and her derogatory references to his penis as a 'worm', he got the impression that 'a nice man should not have a penis'. When his mother gave him enemas he felt that he was losing his dirty penis, but was gaining food. The mother, without realizing it, behaved in a sexually provocative way, but withheld from him the more accepting attitude she showed toward his father and brother. She used to undress before the patient, and even when they had grown to manhood, the sons made no effort to conceal their genitals in her presence. The patient slept in her bed after his father's death, and a few months before the start of the analysis he was shocked but acquiescent when she had him share her bed, supposedly because there were no other facilities available. There were many memories of her belching and spitting freely in his presence, and he was particularly disturbed by her greediness in eating, the avidity with which she gnawed at bones when

they were alone at meals. She acknowledged to him when he was grown that she made herself attractive to gain her own ends, and he believed that she had tricked him in various ways.

The mother had been and was continuing intermittently in psychotherapy for a narcissistic neurosis with paranoid features. She would spend hours before a mirror practicing coquetry. She was very skilful in business affairs. Periodically she had to withdraw from all human relationships. She regarded her younger son almost as a girl. The elder, who resembled her in some ways and was capable only of limited object relationships, she viewed as manly.

EARLY TRAUMATA

At the age of three and a half, while crossing the street near his house, the patient was hit on the left side by a milk truck and knocked unconscious. He remembered being in the hospital with his leg in a cast, and having to learn to walk all over again as if he had never known how to walk before. He recalled that he had started to cross the street to join his brother and some friends in a game which consisted of putting a finger through the fly of one's pants as if it were a penis. Some time after the accident he heard the story that while lying on the street after being hit he was covered with a black cloth and his brother cried, 'He's dead, he's dead'. The patient had many pleasant memories of the nice treatment he received at the hospital and recalled his satisfaction when the milk truck driver visited him and gave him a fifty-cent piece. In later years he recalled this incident with much resentment. In analysis, when his murderous hatred toward men was emerging from repression, he said he would like to have a man die 'fifty times'. He had a dream in which he appeared with a depression on his forehead 'the size of a fifty-cent piece': 'Fifty cents could be the fee a prostitute gets'. He said resentfully that he felt he had been a slave for fifty years. The truck was associated with his father and he recalled that for years he was fascinated with cartoons showing the front end of a car as a face with the headlights as eyes.

Prior to recalling this accident, the patient had remarked that he thought his past was 'colorless'. On another occasion he said that after the accident he 'had to disown all his past life' up to and including the accident and start his life anew. Reluctant to talk about his past, he commented, 'There's no future in the past'. Later he described his past as a little projection sticking out like a penis from a sphere, the sphere being himself. This little projection annoyed him, made him feel unsafe and uneasy.

Throughout his life and most of the analysis, the patient believed the accident was 'predestined' and emphatically insisted that it could not have been otherwise. This belief proved to be a magic defense against the anxiety it had engendered and a denial that it could happen to him again. After this accident he lost his spontaneity and aggressiveness. He had to control his emotions to prevent becoming 'dynamite, a bombshell, a sex maniac'. By the time he was six or seven he felt completely defeated, 'held down by weights'. Not until he was eleven years old did he feel he had the right to some of his ideas, but only 'underground'.

The patient believes he distinctly recalls having thought that his father would crash just at the time, as it turned out, that his father was killed. Shortly before his death the patient, after many requests, had finally been given an air rifle by him. The patient does not remember what became of this air rifle; he believes he must have lost it.

The patient recalled his first erection as occurring at the age of fourteen years while in church. He soon started masturbating with masochistic heterosexual fantasies. He referred to the two year interval between his father's death and the beginning of his masturbation as a period of 'sexual mourning'.

The severe accident at the age of three and a half years had been experienced as a proof in reality of his father's retaliatory potential for the little boy's phallic aggressiveness and œdipal strivings. The patient felt that he had barely escaped complete castration and annihilation and established rigid, ego-crippling defenses against the possibility of such a thing happening again.

From this point on he felt that any manhood he still retained must be kept secret and be augmented secretly through the device of being 'cute', which also included being feminine. The ultimate goal remained to castrate and annihilate the would-be annihilator. The ego deformation resulted from a denial, to a great degree but not totally, of his past, his feelings and his ideas, all of which represented his penis. This denial of his penis, to be described shortly, was directly related to his depersonalization symptoms.

From dreams, associations and fantasies, the reconstructed primal scene was one of extreme violence and terror. It appeared as a 'catastrophe' and an 'earthquake' and was associated with feelings that the world was going too fast, that he was frozen, could not move, and if he did, it did not seem like himself. For years the patient felt his penis to be 'numb'. He once stated it was as if he were in 'perpetual fornication' with his mother and that he identified with his father's penis while his parents were having intercourse.

Toward the end of his analysis he was trying to fall asleep while his roommate was seducing a girl in another part of the room. He felt he had to pretend he was asleep; then cautiously he lit a cigarette which he smoked under the covers, and at one point carefully touched his penis, which he found in a semi-erect state, and quickly withdrew his hand.

SELF-CASTRATION

This patient had many symptoms of depersonalization: 'frozen' feelings; a need for 'double thinking'; he was 'nonexistent, a vacuum, a blind spot'; he was without a past, was like a 'light sheet of two-dimensional paper' or a fly; he felt like a balloon, had to maintain an internal pressure to escape being collapsed by the atmosphere; the world was like an inflated paper bag which would crumble if he let his weight on it; things went too fast or appeared very far away; he felt himself to be hanging on to the limb of a tree, which enabled him to have 'thirty-five percent manhood'. He feared that if he let go, as he felt was expected of him in the analysis, it would be a suicidal leap into

space. His penis felt numb or nonexistent or completely separated from his body; it had a brain and life of its own, beyond his control.

It became clear that a reciprocal relationship existed between the intensity of the symptoms of depersonalization and the distance in space the patient's anxiety dictated he had to maintain between himself and his penis—especially the farther off to his left in space (he had been struck on the left side by the truck).

As he improved, the 'double thinking' diminished and he felt he was 'becoming more one' with his penis; that his center of gravity was 'shifting from the left' to his own genitals and he had 'more substance' and was 'more full-fleshed'. He described feeling more complex, deep and human. He felt that letting go of the limb of the tree would be only a somersault on to the ground under his feet, which at different times he felt as only inches away from him. As he saw more chance of openly having his own penis, he reported an increased faith in mankind and his identification with the Nazis lessened. As his sexual strivings became more ego syntonic there were corresponding improvements in the sexual, social, and work spheres, and he became increasingly independent of and objective about his mother.

Periods of improvement alternated with weeks (later days) of relapse into hopelessness accompanied by increasing symptoms of depersonalization and greater or lesser degrees of masochism. For example, he came to the session one day dressed in dilapidated clothing, his pants belted with a rope crudely tied with a large knot, the ends prominently protruding. At first he asserted he was, in effect, completely castrated; he whined childishly that he could neither think nor remember anything that had transpired in the analysis. Casual questions elicited strong hostility with a paranoid trend toward the analyst. It became apparent that such states occurred whenever he felt the threat of his penis 'coming too close' to him. The anxiety was fended off by partial regression to a passive feminine identification which in turn evoked defensive hostility. The patient later described that on such occasions he secretly felt more manly,

and experienced strong feelings of defiance in regard to his would-be castrators and annihilators. Another type of defense to the same threat was a hypomanic flight into the fantasy or delusion that he was a sexless, Christlike superman, an intellectual and artistic giant, or—less frequently—that he was a sexual superman and other men were weak and castrated as he felt he was most of the time.

SELF-CASTRATION AND ORALITY

Resolution of the patient's self-castrative attitudes involved analytic working through of his oral sadistic impulses and fears of retaliation.

Early in analysis the patient complained frequently of the unpleasant sensation that he had something inside his chest he would like to cough up, which would get rid of his neurosis. It was 'like a mouse' which had to come out; also it was his mother in his chest, as if she were his heart and stomach. On the other hand, whenever he smelled a bad odor, he blew through his mouth to prevent dislodging this something in his chest. This he likened to pulling his foreskin forward to hide his (glans) penis. He had always resisted vomiting as 'giving up a part' of himself. He always had difficulty differentiating between what was his and not his, as for example when he saw some food on a table. After about four months symptoms in the chest disappeared and were succeeded by sensations referred to the stomach and penis which the patient described as 'feeling guilt' in those regions. Later, disturbing body sensations were confined to the head and mouth, the left side of his body and the genital region. At one point the patient reported that a numb feeling which had previously been present over his entire anterior body surface was now localized entirely around his genitals. There were frequent fears of something being forced into his rectum, and he characterized his feces as 'bad' and 'evil' and like his penis.

He felt that by remaining thirty-five percent a man, he could safely maintain himself within a self-imposed, self-regulated passive femininity. 'Life lines' extended from his left side to

his mother and different men, including the analyst, through which he obtained sustenance. Every fold and orifice in the skin of his body was like a 'womb' through which he got nourishment. He referred to this as 'living from without' instead of 'living from within' as he would have preferred doing. This activity of living from without took place secretly without the host's knowledge, but there was always the danger of discovery. He disclosed his 'secret' that he was 'born a woman', and emphatically asserted that he had no awareness of having a penis. Much later in the analysis he revealed that deeply buried in the recesses of his 'womb' was a small pebble, a bud, his insignificant penis. (His father's penis, which he had seen as a small boy, was a 'rock of Gibraltar'.) When his pebble or bud had grown sufficiently through nourishment, he would make the other's penis his own by a deft twist of his right hand which he compared to 'a quick bite'. He felt he could get into the necessary strategic position for such a quick twist by being 'cute and entertaining' with his left (feminine) hand. He was confused as to whether the penis he refused to acknowledge on the left was his own or that of another meaning to use the patient as a woman. The penis was like 'a hot potato' which he first tossed to his father and, upon his father's death, to his mother. The nourishment he drew from other people derived from his own penis in them. He could tolerate small amounts of his own penis without fear of revenge. His penis and testicles were 'embedded' in his mother, and it became clear it was this circumstance that made it impossible for him to feel free of her and feel that he was a self-sufficient individual. As a child his penis was 'never put well to him' and that had made it 'so easily detachable'. Ultimately he became aware that it was his own oral sadistic penis which he strained to disclaim from fear of retribution.

From being 'a wild boar in a jungle' which gored and devoured people, his penis became 'a bull in a china shop', destructive of things and not people. As his penis became further 'tamed' he could 'let it come closer'.

The analysis was discontinued after two and one half years. Although by no means cured, the patient showed considerable

improvement and was confident he could advance further by himself. He felt he was 'down to earth on his own feet' and 'in direct contact' with his penis. He added with a smile that it had to be 'a little weak penis' and thought that he would be able to make it stronger. He felt that he had previously 'tangled things up systematically' to 'interpose vagaries' between himself and his penis.

He returned about five months later in an acute psychotic episode, with fears of momentary 'extinction', which subsided after eight interviews. He had felt a 'great need for passivity' in the interval, and the psychotic interlude seemed to have begun gradually when he started to build a body for his jeep, and to have been precipitated when he attempted intercourse unsuccessfully. He was convinced that the acquiescent girl's 'bones were grown together' in a manner to account for his inability to make vaginal entry. Several days later, after masturbating on two successive nights, he developed various grandiose delusions —he was like his father, was Christlike, a superman, felt the whole world was his. These were gradually replaced by feelings of inferiority to God, and that God directed everything he did; supplanted in turn by feelings of impending death, suicidal impulses, and feelings of complete sexlessness.

Following the psychotic episode the patient worked as a reporter on a newspaper for five months. He was asked to resign because he had not shown sufficient improvement in his work. The patient was seen seven times during this period. He reiterated that he could not quite get his penis 'from the left to the center'. He experimented with looking at his penis. When he imagined it was not his but was something on the table, his penis became erect; when he then thought of it as his own, the erection subsided. He could not permit himself to read his own printed copy in the newspaper. He took the initiative in making appointments with the analyst from time to time, but objected to resuming the analysis from fears of being 'directed and influenced'. He repeatedly stressed that he felt he had to proceed at his own rate and in his own manner to gain more than a 'slim' idea of reality.

DISCUSSION

In patients with symptoms of depersonalization, studied in analysis, there are observed serious disturbances of ego development which include disturbances of the mental ego, body ego, and 'world image' (representations of the outside world).[2] Extensive clinical study is necessary to test the general validity of this observation.

Depersonalization has been compared to autotomy (*2*). Reik stated that an affective break with one's past is a favorable precondition for depersonalization. The self-castrative attitudes of the case reported represented an autotomy of his past and his feelings, as well as of his penis. The last was distinctly not a total autotomy but a means of preserving this organ until such time when he would feel safe in having it back again. The fantasy of saving the psychologically autotomized part for future use may not have received sufficient attention.

Bernfeld states that the body ego exists from birth because a number of organs respond to the needs of the body. The outer world is a part of the body ego, referred especially to the mother and some portions of the infant's habitual environment. The body ego develops simultaneously from two different mental processes: an oral incorporation of the world, and a delimitation of the body ego from the outside world. Delimitation begins with disappointment when an organ withholds gratification, as for example, the breast at weaning. At weaning, the mother is ejected from the body ego. E. Bibring (*5*) suggested that in infancy mental entities consisting of objects and erogenous zones are constructed on the basis of experience. Depending on whether these entities are experienced by the infantile ego as pleasurable or unpleasurable, they become more a part of the ego or the outer world, respectively. Evidences of such infantile entities persist into adult life.

Schilder (*25*), in speaking of the 'body image', referred to the comparative looseness with which the single parts of the body

[2] Oberndorf (*20*) called attention to the fact that during the course of analysis hidden areas of depersonalization may be uncovered.

are psychologically connected: psychological dismembering takes place rather easily. He stressed that the body image is acquired by directed and purposeful action in relation to the environment; hence the body image belongs more to the outside world. The feeling of an intact body is not a matter of course, but the effect of self-love. With destructive tendencies, the body is spread over the world. In what he called appersonation, the whole or parts of another's body or personality are incorporated into the body image to such an extent that one's own body image is not possible without the body image of others. The body image is labile but there is also a tendency toward relative stability. Protruding parts, especially male genitals, can gain relative independence and are often personified. Pregenital analogies to the castration complex are fears of losing inner parts of the body and a fear of general dismemberment. In the development of the body image, Schilder believed there is a maturation factor which is responsible for the primary outlines of the body. The development of these primary outlines varies with experience, activity and emotional attitudes toward objects. The undeveloped body image shows a greater tendency toward transformations. The earlier body images of the child are never completely lost.

On the basis of the case reported, it appears that in the development of the body ego, parts of the bodies of objects incorporated early must become a fixed and permanent part of the body ego in order for development to proceed normally. This would be analagous to Hendrick's opinion that the appearance of various mental attributes in the ego is dependent on different permanent incorporations of partial objects. The body ego of the case reported was highly unstable because of the exaggerated oral aggressiveness and fears of retaliation. This led to a regression to a very early stage of body ego development, with the need to eject from the body ego the penis, originally father's incorporated penis, which normally would have been permanently incorporated to play its rôle later in the development of the genital representation of the patient's body ego. The ejection or tossing away of the penis had symptomatic representa-

tion in numbness and functional inadequacy. The patient experienced what was left over of his penis as a pebble or, more significantly, a bud. This formulation would explain the point raised by Tausk (*30*) who felt that some sort of identification had to be postulated as a necessary first step to account for Natalija's capacity to project her own genitals.

There are cases of repressed and overt homosexuality in individuals with oral fixations which, in the course of psychoanalytic treatment, come to center around an oral sadistic, breastlike penis which is introjected and ejected and which seems to have an independent existence. In these cases depersonalization is not a conspicuous symptom. The history of these cases reveals a relatively good relationship between mother and child in infancy, in contrast to the history of cases with depersonalization. In terms of body ego theory, these cases of homosexuality have achieved and maintained a more advanced state of body ego development with only partial regression to an earlier body ego phase.

Federn's ideas pertaining to narcissistic disturbances in depersonalization are helpful. He suggested that there is a reduction of primary narcissistic cathexis of the ego and the ego boundaries resulting in an altered awareness of the self and outside world. Such formulation could be used to explain the self-castration in terms of the libido theory; also the patient's difficulties in differentiating between what was his and not his. It is difficult to agree with the idea that in depersonalization there is a loss of object cathexis with a narcissistic regression, unless it be meant that there is a relative loss of genital object cathexis. The patient showed an almost unceasing striving for objects, mostly as a means of gratifying his oral sadism, in abortive attempts to complete his body ego. In addition there was some evidence that he was not always completely devoid of object relationships and strivings on a genital level.

SUMMARY

The case reported demonstrates, to a greater or lesser degree, practically all the symptomatology reported in the literature of

depersonalization. Genetically and dynamically noteworthy are: 1, fixation at a pregenital (especially oral sadistic) phase of development; 2, relationships among the family (father, mother, brother) were overtly sadomasochistic; 3, a series of severe infantile and subsequent psychological traumata; 4, distorted (body) ego development. The case is discussed particularly from the point of view of body ego pathology. Body ego disturbances, especially of genital representations, may be of basic importance in the psychogenesis of depersonalization. A suggestion was made as to the possible normal mode of development of the body ego.

REFERENCES

1. BALINT, MICHAEL: *Frühe Entwicklungsstadien des Ichs. Primäre Objektliebe.* Imago, XXIII, 1937, pp. 285–286.
2. BERGLER, EDMUND AND EIDELBERG, LUDWIG: *Der Mechanismus der Depersonalisation.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXI, 1935, p. 283.
3. BERGMAN, PAUL: *Neurotic Anxieties in Children and Their Prevention.* The Nervous Child, V, 1946, p. 43.
4. BERNFELD, SIEGFRIED: *The Psychology of the Infant.* New York: Brentano, 1929, pp. 261–274.
5. BIBRING, EDWARD: *Klinische Beiträge zur Paranoiafrage. II, Ein Fall von Organprojection.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XV, 1929, pp. 61–62.
6. DESPERT, J. LOUISE: *Anxiety, Phobias, and Fears in Young Children.* The Nervous Child, V, 1946, p. 21.
7. DEUTSCH, HELENE: *Some Forms of Emotional Disturbance and their Relationship to Schizophrenia.* This QUARTERLY, XI, 1942, pp. 301–321.
8. FEDERN, PAUL: *Some Variations in Ego-Feeling.* Int. J. Psa., VII, 1926, pp. 434–444.
9. ———: *Narcissism in the Structure of the Ego.* Int. J. Psa., IX, 1928, pp. 401–419.
10. ———: *Das Ich als Subjekt und Objekt in Narzissmus.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XV, 1929, pp. 393–425.
11. FEIGENBAUM, DORIAN: *Depersonalization as a Defense Mechanism.* This QUARTERLY, VI, 1937, pp. 4–11.
12. FENICHEL, OTTO: *Über Organlibidinöse Begleiterscheinungen der Triebabwehr.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XIV, 1928, p. 61.
13. ———: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1945, pp. 161, 418.
14. FREUD: *Eine Erinnerungstörung auf der Akropolis.* Almanach der Psa., 1937, pp. 9–21.
15. ———: *The Predisposition to Obsessional Neurosis.* Coll. Papers, II, p. 131.

16. ———: *The Ego and the Id.* Trans. by Joan Rivière. London: Hogarth Press, 1927, p. 31.
17. HENDRICK, IVES: *Ego Defense and the Mechanism of Oral Ejection in Schizophrenia. The Psychoanalysis of a Prepsychotic Case.* Int. J. Psa., XII, 1931, pp. 313–314.
18. ———: *Ego Development and Certain Character Problems.* This QUARTERLY, V, 1936, pp. 320–346.
19. ———: *Identification in Infancy.* Read before the American Psychoanalytic Association in Detroit, 1943.
20. OBERNDORF, C. P.: *Depersonalization in Relation to Erotization of Thought.* Int. J. Psa., XV, 1934, pp. 271–295.
21. ———: *On Retaining the Sense of Reality in States of Depersonalization.* Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 137–138.
22. REIK, THEODOR: *Wie man Psychologe Wird.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1927, pp. 34–100.
23. RIBBLE, MARGARET A.: *The Rights of Infants.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1943.
24. SADGER, I.: *Über Depersonalisation.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XIV, 1928, p. 348.
25. SCHILDER, PAUL: *The Image and Appearance of the Human Body.* London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1935.
26. ———: *Treatment of Depersonalization.* Bulletin N. Y. Academy of Med., XV, 1939, pp. 258–272.
27. ———: *Goals and Desires of Man.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1942, p. 196.
28. SEARL, M. N.: *A Note on Depersonalization.* Int. J. Psa., XIII, 1932, pp. 329–347.
29. SILBERPFENNIG, JUDITH K.: *Early Fears and Early Defenses.* The Nervous Child, V, 1946, p. 69.
30. TAUSK, VICTOR: *On the Origin of the Influencing Machine in Schizophrenia.* This QUARTERLY, II, 1933, p. 542.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Equivalents of Matricide

Robert M. Lindner

To cite this article: Robert M. Lindner (1948) The Equivalents of Matricide, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 453-470, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11925735

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11925735

Published online: 07 Dec 2017.

THE EQUIVALENTS OF MATRICIDE

BY ROBERT M. LINDNER, PH.D. (BALTIMORE)

In the lengthy calendar of crimes, matricide is perhaps the rarest and most abhorred. The mother occupies an exalted position in the human psyche, every imaginable device being employed to defend her inviolability: the merest hint of attack upon her sacredness is met with unconstrained reprisals; ancient and modern religions elevated her to godhood; a day is set apart for honoring her, and words which declare or imply her derogation are the most violently reacted to of all in our vocabulary.[1] Equally as strong as the love for her is the fear the mother inspires, and the hostility she evokes; else why would she need so many safeguards?

Myth and legend, fairy tale and nursery rhyme, song and story all testify to men's fear of their mothers and to the deep-rootedness of their hostility toward them. So charged with guilt is acknowledgment of such fear and hostility that, to protect against their expression in behavior, reaction-formations and other defenses, all of them significantly overdetermined, are designed to bind the anxiety thereby aroused; indeed, when this anxiety is liberated explosively in an act of matricide, the effects upon the personality of the murderer are always cataclysmic. From the Greek legend of Orestes through Wertham's Gino [2], not one was able to retain even a relative integration of the personality under the stress of the act's genesis and fulfilment.

Presented before the Neuropsychiatric Section of the Baltimore Medical and Chirurgical Faculty on February 12, 1948.

[1] During my prison experience, I have more than once seen a man killed for calling another a 'mother fucker'. *Cf.* Lindner, Robert M.: *Rebel Without A Cause.* New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1944.

[2] Wertham, Frederic: *Dark Legend—A Study in Murder.* New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, Inc., 1941.

MATRICIDAL EQUIVALENTS IN MURDER

On an afternoon in July some years ago a young woman stood in the entrance hall of a small apartment building in an eastern city, apparently trying to decide which doorbell to push on the panel before her. In a package under one arm she was carrying religious books and pamphlets. As she lifted her free hand to ring the bell, a youth of about seventeen opened the door behind her. She smiled at him and asked, 'Is your mother at home?' He nodded and pointed up the stairs. 'My mother's up there', he said, 'Follow me'. On the second landing he opened a door. Facing them was a small kitchen. On the top of an icebox lay some tools. The boy pointed again, this time down a narrow hallway. 'Mom's in there', he said, 'in her bedroom'. As the girl crossed the threshold of the room, the youth struck her on the head with a hammer; then he stabbed her sixty-nine times with an ice pick, flung himself on the corpse and raped it.

This young man was analyzed during the first years of his imprisonment for life in a federal institution. Regrettably, the analysis was not completed, but enough about him and his crime was analyzed to determine that in murdering and raping the little Jehovah's Witness, he was unconsciously murdering and having sexual intercourse with his mother.[3]

Charles was the second son born to a totally incompatible couple whose marriage ended in divorce when he was three years old. The parents had been held together that long only by their inability to obtain a special religious dispensation which would permit their separation. When Charles was four, his mother placed him and his brother in an orphanage. He spent most of his life in one institution or another, leaving them only for short visits on holidays and birthdays.

[3] *Cf.* Lindner, Robert M.: *Stone Walls and Men.* New York: The Odyssey Press, 1946; and Lindner, Robert M.: An Evaluation of Hypnoanalysis. In, *Current Therapies of Personality Disorders.* Edited by Bernard Glueck. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1946, p. 206 ff.

After fifteen years of life without love or other security, he emerged cunning, shrewd, selfish, perverse and brutalized by his experiences. Once home, he worked spasmodically at whatever employment he could obtain. In less than a year he was back in an institution, this time for life.

Analysis revealed that, far from being an impulsive act, most of his life had been a preparation for his crime. Without a father and subjected to the forbidding coldness and harshness of the frustrated male institutional personnel, who might otherwise have substituted as father surrogates, Charles remained fixed in an infantile attachment to his mother. Her value to him was increased by the periodicity of the contact he had with her. 'She was like a fairy princess when she came to see us', he told me; 'she smelled so good and she always brought things for us'. His mother had, however, abandoned him, put him in orphanages and exposed him to the ministrations of cruel men and women. For this she was hated and feared, and, while sometimes idealized as a fairy princess, she was correspondingly as often hated as an evil witch.

Because of religious scruples about her divorce, Charles's mother had told her sons their father was dead. Charles unconsciously constructed a father for himself in fantasy (as is often the case with boys who are deprived of the male parent), and identified himself with his glorified creation. The turn this identification took was aided by the homosexuality rife in the environment in which Charles was kept. Charles's notions of sexuality were painfully distorted. As a helpless small boy in the orphanages he was the target for sexual assaults from older members. To these he responded by nurturing fantasies of gory revenge which later he acted out by bullying and attacking others when his physical maturity permitted. Sex and sadism became inextricably interwoven, homosexuality predominating.

Gradually there emerged from his unconscious the idea—born of defenses against the overwhelming love and hatred he had for her—that this woman who visited him was not really his mother. By thus denying reality, he was able to harbor dreams and hopeful fantasies of incestuous possession. Simi-

larly, though unconsciously, the identification with the missing male parent made such a notion both feasible and acceptable.

When Charles was twelve he made the shattering discovery, during a visit home, that his mother had a lover, which he regarded both as usurpation and betrayal. In analysis seven years later, he recalled his dreams and fantasies of that time, and it is clear that he was even then a matricide. Outwardly, too, he changed. No longer docile and adaptable in the orphanage, he ran away four times. Because each time he went to his mother's house, his teachers and keepers believed he was homesick for her.

During his visits, Charles had learned of a trunk beneath his mother's bed in which she stored her money and jewels. From his ninth year on, he stole small sums from this trunk by jimmying the lock; also, whenever he stole money, he always removed his mother's wedding ring, intending each time to pawn it but never quite 'having the guts to do it'. He would carry the ring in his pockets for days, carefully replacing it just before returning to the orphanage.

Some months before his final discharge from the orphanage, Charles ran away again. He arrived home in the afternoon while his mother was at work. Picking the lock on her trunk, he removed some money and the wedding ring, then hurried to the red-light district of the town. Shortly he was picked up by an elderly prostitute, and attempted his first heterosexual intercourse. He was totally impotent and was about to resign in disgust when he thought of the ring. He induced the prostitute to try it on. As if by magic, his potency was at once established and the act immediately consummated.

Some days before the crime, Charles had been fired from a job and was 'broke'. Just after noon on the day of the murder, he decided to break into his mother's trunk again. The lock was jammed, so he borrowed a hammer from the janitor. He did not use it immediately as he had slept very late, awakened feeling 'kind of fuzzy and heavy', and decided to prepare some breakfast for himself and then take a walk to 'clear my head'. As he descended to the street, he met his victim.

It can be argued that the act of violence in this case was precipitated as the culmination of what Wertham has described as a catathymic crisis; [4] also, because of Charles's physiological state as he himself describes it, a transient hypoglycemia cannot be excluded. In any event, its intention is clear. The blow, the stabbing and the raping were not intended for the girl but for Charles's mother. They expressed at once his deep hatred and his incestuous love. Why they required displacement is obvious.

IN SUICIDE

The psychoanalytic formula that equates suicide with murder is well established. In any given instance of self-destruction, however, it is sometimes difficult to traverse the maze of the unconscious and to identify with assurance the latent target and object of the misdirected aggression.

A forty-five-year-old alcoholic homosexual was the oldest and most favored of four children. His father was a teacher of music, his mother a teacher of singing. Kenneth, whose mother fondly hoped would become a priest, attended a parochial school and studied music with his father. The boy progressed amazingly and at fourteen decided to abandon the priesthood and to concentrate on music. At sixteen, when his father died, Kenneth took his place as church organist. He assumed financial responsibility for the entire family, sent a brother and two sisters through college and added one success to another in his artistic career. Between the ages of twenty-three and thirty-five he held one of the most coveted posts in his field, was creative in composition and interpretation and was financially secure. In the ten years that followed he served two terms in prison and ended his life on a kitchen floor, asphyxiated by gas.

[4] This is quite likely, since the course Wertham describes was followed in the events that led to the abrupt termination of the analysis. In the transference, when the analyst and mother-image merged, Charles tried to kill me and came very near succeeding. As a result, he was transferred to another institution. In the genesis and near realization of this second act of murder I was able to observe, as under a microscope, the unfolding of the pattern Wertham has so well described.

He was analyzed for about six months on returning to the penitentiary to serve out his sentence because of a violation of parole. His first conviction was for impersonation of an army officer. He was apprehended with a soldier he had picked up in a hotel. Released on parole, he was arrested again for drunkenness. He came to analysis because of strong impulses to kill himself which conflicted with his religious beliefs, and because of homosexuality and alcoholism. Another parole, obtained through the influence of well-meaning friends, brought the analysis to a premature termination. It was planned that he continue with another analyst in his home city, but his friends persuaded him that psychoanalysis was incompatible with his religious beliefs. Nevertheless, those six months sufficed to provide a clear conception of the dynamics of Kenneth's life and the significance of its miserable conclusion.

According to his mother, soon after his birth he was always hungry and cried continuously. A wet nurse was obtained, but he remained undernourished, unsatisfied and voracious. Finally, he was fed goat's milk from a bottle, and given a pacifier between feedings to keep him quiet. As a reward for good behavior, until the age of at least seven, his mother often gave him her breast to drift into his afternoon nap or fall asleep at night. She did this not only because it was the custom among the Irish peasants from whom she had sprung, but also because of his obvious jealousy of the brother and two sisters who followed him in quick succession, and who were nursed by the mother.

When Kenneth was five his mother induced him to throw his pacifier into the shrubbery behind their house as a 'gift to the bunnies'. He did this very reluctantly. In the same year he developed a balanitis and he was held by his mother and the wife of the physician who performed circumcision. During analysis his dreams disclosed the persistence into adult life of the unconscious hostility these events inspired. His mother, he believed, had not only robbed him of the breast but had assisted at his castration.

At eight, he was waylaid by two older boys and forced to perform fellatio on them. Although he resented this experience he found it curiously satisfying. Analysis of this and innumerable subsequent similar experiences revealed gratification of both the aggressive wish to recover a penis and the passive, receptive yearnings. He had an unconscious belief in the 'magical' properties of semen which he called 'the elixir of life'.

Kenneth's rivalry and identification with his father lacked the usual hostility of the œdipus because of the father's passive character which the patient later called his 'femininity'. Highly sensitive and interested almost exclusively in music, the father was shy and retiring. 'I could do everything he did', Kenneth said, 'and do it better', which indeed he did, following his father's death.

This patient's chief conflict was the struggle between his ambivalent feelings toward his mother. In each of his homosexual attachments he projected upon his partner qualities he himself possessed, transforming the sexual object into an image of himself and then, assuming the rôle of mother, loved the man as he wished his mother had loved him. In a repetitive compulsive manner he forced every lover, in one way or another, to reject or abandon him.

A basic feature of alcoholism is the wish fulfilling alcoholic fantasy.[5] It was this patient's fantasy that he was in a great cathedral, playing the organ brilliantly and flawlessly. The only other person present in the immense hall was his mother, who sat with eyes ecstatically closed. As a reward for his performance she offered him her breast, but as he approached it changed into a penis upon which he fell greedily and happily.

The suicide was precipitated by an unsuccessful love affair. Shortly before he died he wrote: 'My great struggle has been to keep from doing her [mother] harm. Last week she had a 'spell' in the bathtub and I had to go to her aid. When I lifted her poor shrunken body from the water I was seized with the tenderest feeling for her, but at the same time I actually had to

[5] Lindner, Robert M.: *Stone Walls and Men. Loc. cit.*, p. 214 ff.

fight against a desire to keep from pushing her under the water and drowning her. How could such great love and hate exist side by side? I wish I had the money to move away from her. I have to get away before one of us gets hurt.'

Kenneth's suicide prevented him from killing his mother; unconsciously, he murdered her introjected image in himself. It is a two-headed coin, with the breast-denying, penis-robbing mother graven on one side, and the longed for, incestuously desired mother on the other.

ACTING OUT

A woman of thirty-eight had had during the preceding twenty years nine major and many minor surgical operations including the loss of all her teeth, her tonsils and adenoids, her gall bladder, appendix and thyroid; also she had three hemorrhoidectomies, a hysterectomy and two plastic cosmetic alterations. In almost every case she had acted against the advice of her physician and had herself found a different surgeon for each operation. She believed that apart from her many operations and her chronically poor health she was a favorite child of a benign destiny. She loved her parents and they loved her; she had the most wonderful of all husbands who adored her; her daughter left nothing to be desired and worshipped her mother. In short, Susan loved everyone and everyone loved Susan.

About every third appointment she had one or another of her fingers bandaged. When this was called to her attention, she laughed and explained that for many years she had been in the practice of spending an entire day each week visiting with her mother and preparing dinner for the family. Her mother had an old fashioned kitchen and many outmoded utensils on which Susan invariably cut herself; it developed that her mother's house was the scene of numerous other 'accidents', and that when her mother visited Susan's home, she always 'brought a little bit of hard luck with her'. When the obvious interpretation was made of the hostile and expiatory unconscious motivations of such symptomatic behavior, including her predilection for surgery, her rejection of it was so violent that

she failed to keep the next two appointments. On the third day she appeared, and without preliminary said, 'You're right. I hate her. I hate her guts and I'd kill her if I could.'

The dynamics are too common to warrant detailed presentation here. The predominant defenses against aggressively hostile impulses toward the mother are reaction-formations and masochism. Introjection particularly accounts for the self-punishment, the target of which is the introjected image. Such patients are compulsive characters and ritualistic in behavior. Their passive compliance cloaks their essential hostility. Their martyrdom is an unconvincing mask. If they stop short of self-annihilation it is due to their discovery of defenses which release their tensions piecemeal, preventing accumulation to the danger point. A strong latent homosexuality is never absent.

Many analyses fail or are incomplete because the matricidal impulse is so overlain with defenses and disguises as to make its exposure difficult or impossible. Often the analysts are misled by the more frequently emphasized aspects of the œdipus, or they may themselves be scotomatized by the incompleteness of their own analyses of this area.

An erythrophobe had been in analysis for eleven years without relief from his symptoms. The tightly interlaced and intricately woven strands of self-reproach for masturbation, fantasied castration, oral aggression, feminine identifications and masochism had all been analyzed,[6] as had the œdipus. Treated by hypnoanalysis[7]—apart from the influences already mentioned—there was revealed a complicated preœdipal matricidal fantasy which the neurotic bashfulness and blushing both hid and betrayed. Scoptophilia, an important ingredient of this neurosis, had an aggressive meaning and was itself an unconscious instrument for destroying his mother. Habitual and apparently innocent and meaningless acts of the patient signified

[6] Fenichel, Otto: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neuroses.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945, p. 200 ff.; also Hitschmann, Edward: *Neurotic Bashfulness and Erythrophobia.* Psa. Rev. XXX, 1943, p. 438.

[7] Hypnoanalysis was the method chosen in this case because of the excessive dependency that had been established upon the previous analyst.

peeping, which for him was a possessive as well as a destructive activity according to the commonplace, 'If looks could kill!'. With the analysis and working through of all this, an otherwise unterminable analysis terminated.

DREAMS

Dreams provide the commonest medium of expression for the matricidal wish. As a rule such dreams are highly disguised and evoke great resistance to analysis. Matricidal dreams belong among those that are reported, 'Here is a dream I had last week I forgot to tell you about', and those that are given just previous to the end of the hour.

A young biologist, under analysis for impotence, dreamed:

> I am standing in a garden among beautiful flowers. Overhead I hear the drone of an airplane. I decide to pick some of the flowers, thinking they will make my laboratory brighter and will help me to work better. As I reach out to gather the first flower for the bouquet, it moves away from me. The same thing happens whenever I try to touch one of the flowers. Soon I notice the whole field is in motion. Every time I reach out, the flowers recoil. I become terrified and try to run but I cannot. I'm stuck. I awaken in terror, in a cold sweat.

By association, the field of flowers represents the patient's mother. He will never work better (achieve potency) until she is dead. The drone of the airplane overhead reminds him of snoring. He sleeps in a room next to his mother's and often, while reading in bed at night, he is disturbed by the noises she makes in her sleep. The wish in the dream is represented by the elusiveness of the flowers: he wants her to put herself out of reach of his murderous impulses. His association is to a fantastic science-fiction story he read, then to a man-eating plant he has heard about. His mother is the 'man-eater'. Unconsciously, he fantasied that his father, who died when the patient was a small boy, had been devoured by the mother.

A physician, analyzed because of anxiety neurosis and inability to compete professionally, dreamed:

I am riding in a street car in the city. Suddenly the car plunges into a tunnel and I have the feeling that it is going deeper and deeper into the earth. I plead with the conductor to stop the car. He assures me that everything will be all right, and that this short cut is the quickest way to our destination. I am relieved and go back to my seat. As soon as I sit down, an advertisement falls from the rack over my head. I read it with amazement. It is for a deodorant and gives the formula. I point this out to the conductor, who tells me I should take the matter up with the city council. The scene then changes abruptly and I am making rounds in an unfamiliar hospital. A woman whose face I cannot see calls to me in a strange language. I tell her that she will be transfused when it stops snowing.

The street car is the analysis and the conductor the analyst. The fear of descent is the attitude which made this patient avoid analytic therapy for many years. The immediate association to the formula in the advertisement is a deadly poison. The city council is the superego which will not allow the repressed wish to be recognized. The strange language spoken by the woman eventually evoked the association of the diminutive by which he was called in childhood.

A frigid young woman, recently married, dreamed:

I am climbing a hill to a house where I have been invited to dinner. As I reach the top I am breathless with excitement and anticipation. Just as I am about to open the door, I notice a dead cat lying on the threshold. I feel intense disgust. A man comes to the door and moves the cat away. I notice his hands are covered with blood after he finishes the loathsome task. I then go into the house but cannot find the hostess. However, the table is set and I enjoy a good meal.

Climbing the hill in excitement and anticipation represent the forepleasure of intercourse. At the door (intercourse) her path is blocked by a dead cat. To this she associates the vulgar idiom for the female genitalia and remarks that hers are indeed dead. The man who removes it is her husband, who in real life helps her to achieve orgasm manually. The fear of death, which is the

basic reason for her frigidity—resulting from the unconscious equation of orgasm with death—is represented by the bloody hands. The absence of the hostess, her mother, enables her to eat with relish. With her mother out of the way—dead in the prelogical language of the unconscious—she is free to enjoy intercourse.

An artist, unable to work, and in a state bordering on schizophrenia, dreamed:

> I am painting a self-portrait but as I apply the paint it seems to disappear into the canvas and in spite of all my efforts the canvas remains blank. I am suddenly aware that the police are after me and so I run down a dark alley toward the waterfront. I have the feeling I am being chased and I know that I have done something terrible but I can't figure out what it is. At the edge of the waterfront there is a hotel. An old man shows me to a room. I lie down on a bed and try to figure out why I am being pursued. I awaken with a feeling of perplexity.

The disappearance of the paint despite increasing effort represents his inhibition in work. That it is a self-portrait refers to his strong identification with his mother, whom he resembles physically to an amazing degree, and represents the displacement of his annihilative wishes. He is constantly haunted by the vague, gnawing 'feeling' that he has committed a horrible crime, and he has often considered suicide (expiation). This feeling pursues him in the dream. The hotel is the analysis, his last resort. Another version of this dream appeared later in the analysis. In another stage of transference it was the analyst whose portrait he was striving so unsuccessfully to paint.

DEFENSES AGAINST MATRICIDE

In considering the means by which murder of the mother is accomplished, even in the case of the murderer cited his unconscious aim was achieved without committing the actual act of matricide. The defenses, guardians of psychic integration, function by subversion of anxiety, by binding it whenever possible, by displacing the aggression in small quanta elsewhere, or by recanalizing it. The usual mechanisms of defense are, however, not all capable of protecting the ego against unconscious

matricidal impulses. For example, the defense by denial cannot be utilized since it is, by its very nature, a defense which disappears as the ego matures, unless psychosis supervenes. We find it among children and psychotics: the familiar, 'This woman they say is my mother' of the schizophrenic, while it symbolizes matricide, entails a withdrawal of ego under the awful impact of the wish and is no practical solution of the conflict. Reversal, undoing and regression are all likewise inadequate. Turning against the self weakens the ego by a continuum of damage, and its ultimate 'success' entails destruction of the individual.

Other defenses, however, permit matricidal equivalents by giving expression in a variety of ways to the repressed wish, allowing discharge of varying quantities of anxiety insufficient to overwhelm the ego, and preventing the fantasy from emerging undisguised.[8]

DISPLACEMENT

Of all the defenses, displacement is the most useful. It includes things, situations and people as objects.

An engineer under analysis had recently bought a new home for his mother and himself. In the yard was a shade tree over whose exposed roots he was always stumbling. One day, in a highly elated mood, he reported: 'I got rid of the damned thing at last; cut it down and tore up the roots with my own hands. No more tripping over it for me. It's out of my way at last.' Analysis revealed the act as a displacement of his repressed feelings toward his mother who had been a burden to him for many years and had prevented his marriage to the woman to whom he has been affianced for a decade.

REACTION-FORMATION

Reaction-formation is one of the most transparent disguises of the unconscious matricidal fantasy. The typical overevaluation

[8] For purposes of illustration the various defenses are presented separately. In practice, of course, they rarely appear alone. Defenses are always overdetermined.

by scrupulous devotion and care and by slavish adoration of the object it seeks to destroy, unconvincingly protests too much.

A matron in analysis glowingly described her devotion to her widowed mother, making it plain that she had sacrificed herself and spared no effort to make her mother's 'remaining years' as pleasant as possible. Each winter, at great expense, she sent her mother to Florida. She scrupulously observed birthdays, anniversaries and other occasions with appropriate sentiments and lavish gifts. She provided the old lady with a comfortable apartment, with clothes and a liberal allowance. She wrote a scathing letter indignantly protesting the publication of an essay which detailed the baleful influence of mothers on their children. She prided herself that she was so different from the usual run of neglectful children, and reiterated that the 'sunset years' of her parent's life would be made happy.

The reason for quartering her mother in an expensive apartment instead of in her own spacious and comfortable home she rationalized as her belief that 'parents and their grown children should never live under one roof'. And why had she used the phrase 'the last years of her life' many times when talking of her mother? Behind the façade of devotion lurked a grim wish for the mother's death which found confirmation in a dream when the mother was en route to Florida: the patient killed her in dreams of train wrecks, earthquakes and hurricanes.

PROJECTION

The mechanism of projection usually occurs as a product of a tyrannical superego. Especially when unconscious hostile aggression against the mother has been provoked to matricidal proportions does the severity of the superego tend to dominate all other psychic functions.

The analysis of a woman with a neurotic depression was for months utilized by her as a means of seeking sympathy by querulousness about the abuse she had suffered from the world. She monotonously described her own goodness and ascribed the basest of motives to everyone else. No one treated her as she

merited, particularly her mother whom she regarded as selfish, avaricious and sadistic.

She invented a memory of her eighth year when, as punishment for some childish prank, her mother led her to a window, lifted her to the sill, pointed to the street four stories below and said, 'Jump—and I hope you kill yourself'. When she finished this tale she burst into tears and sobbed, 'Now I know why I hate her so'. This substitution by the opposite contained the projection to her mother of the patient's wish to destroy her.

REPRESSION

Absolute repression is theoretically impossible except, possibly, in catatonia; however, whatever mechanism of defense is utilized, it is initiated primarily by repression.

So great is the anxiety accompanying the matricidal wish that the depth of its repression often obscures its detection and analysis.

A young industrial engineer came to analysis with the complaint, 'Nothing holds any interest for me. . . . My existence is lacklustrous and dull. I seem to be incapable of feeling any emotion. When I am with other people I close up like a clam. All I have is a sense of distance between myself and everyone else. I feel detached from everything and everybody. I'd like not to be this way.'

The progress of the analysis was exceedingly slow; resistance, expressed by inability to follow the analytic rule, was overwhelming. Hypnosis was tried but soon abandoned because the depth of trance could not be controlled and, interestingly enough, passed over into profound sleep which distressed both analyst and patient. In the course of an otherwise unproductive hour, the patient suddenly said casually, 'This is probably insignificant, but last night I dreamed a lot and all I can recall is that I wanted to do something and found my hands and feet were tied and there was a gag in my mouth'. To this he associated the helpless feeling he had in analysis, the persistence of this feeling throughout his life, and recognition that he was 'doing the tying'. 'I guess', he said, laughing nervously, 'if I

ever become untied I'll really be a hell-raiser'. Asked what he might do he replied, 'I don't know. I've often thought there's very little I'm not capable of doing. I guess no crime is too awful for me to commit. I might even murder my own mother.'

Subsequent analysis disclosed that he harbored this unconscious fantasy and that, moreover, the repression required to negate this wish involved an almost total repression of everything.

INTROJECTION AND IDENTIFICATION

These defenses have not been observed to function singly in matricidal conflicts; nor has the combination of identification with projection. Introjection and identification combined are frequent as defenses against matricidal aggression and the associated homosexuality and masochism. The organist's suicide was in large measure thus engendered (destructive aggression vented on the introjected mother), and Susan, with her penchant for polysurgery, similarly experienced on her own person what was actually intended for her mother.

A woman of forty-three was found, in a routine physical examination, to have grossly elevated blood pressure without the usual secondary signs of hypertension and subjective complaints. On initial consultation, she was found to be an attractive spinster who had sacrificed herself and her own interests to the care of her aged parents, having refused at least two offers of marriage in order to remain with them. Everything about this woman proclaimed her meticulousness and efficiency. In her opinion the whole clinical procedure was nonsense, and she stated she was satisfied with her life, saw nothing wrong in having dedicated herself to her parents and, indeed, expressed the belief that the world would be a better place if more people were 'conscious of their obligations'.

It was disclosed that she had had one sexual encounter 'in the dark' at the age of seventeen. Since she made a point of using the words 'in the dark', questioning revealed that during childhood her mother, while bathing her, had placed some water to heat over an alcohol lamp. There was an explosion and the

child barely escaped with her life. Her real reason for avoiding marriage was the disfigurement of her abdomen, genital region and buttocks and, although she denied it vehemently, she held her mother responsible. By a process of identification with the enemy she established a hostile identification with her mother and assumed a maternal rôle within the family. Compulsive behavior, discernible in meticulousness and efficiency, permitted the pent-up anxiety to escape in such limited amounts that a chronic state of tension could not be avoided.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MATRICIDE

Whether, as many anthropologists believe, human society was originally matriarchal, the assumption that the primary expression of human interdependence centers around the mother is unassailable. Freud, Reik, Money-Kryle and Roheim, among psychoanalysts, and the studies of Frazier, Malinowski, Westermarck, Bachofen and Briffault justify the acceptance of this view. By the best reckoning, the patriarchism of prehistory and its modified manifestations that characterize our own androcentric civilization is very likely no more than seven millenia old, which means that it has, biologically speaking, hardly had a chance to become incorporated into the historical and psychological heritage of man.

Wertham in this country and Onofrio Fabrizi in Italy have emphasized the need for a re-evaluation of the theory of the œdipus as a result of their studies of matricide.[9] The assumption that hostility against the mother is secondary and derives chiefly from the œdipus complex, has long since been discarded. Wertham introduced the term 'Orestes complex' to designate the preœdipal reactions to the complex of feelings centering around the parents. Contemporary psychoanalytic literature places increasing emphasis on the preœdipal centralization of conflict around the mother and its biphasic or ambivalent hostility and excessive attachment to her.[10]

[9] Dalma, G.: *'Via del Maltempo' di Onofrio Fabrizi.* Psicoanalisi, 1945, I, No. 1, p. 70.

[10] Wertham, Frederic: *Op. cit.*, p. 222 ff.

The scientific literature on literal matricide is exceedingly sparse, although legend, poetry and the drama abound in such themes.[11] In addition to Wertham's valuable work, more recently Bunker has demonstrated that matricide and mother-son incest are unconsciously identical or equivalent.[12] Anthropologists report symbolic equivalents of matricide in the obsessive acts of primitives as, for example, spitting on the mother before his marriage by the Fiji Islander. In their study of the case of Madame Lefebvre, Alexander and Staub show the displacement of a repressed matricidal wish.[13] Other references are slim, scattered and indirect.

Indeed it cannot be overlooked that the mother is the first identifiable object in the life of the child, and that there is a period when the child does not distinguish itself as separate. Recently Bergler has presented evidence that the nursing experience is subjectively perceived by the infant to be a maternal assault.[14] It cannot be doubted that the entire emotional gamut from passive-receptive to aggressive-hostile feelings are initially experienced in the relationship between mother and child. On the course and outcome of this most powerful of all human ties largely depends the ultimate degree of an individual's maturity and his adult mental health or pathology.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 24: 'I turned to the libraries, to do some research on the subject. But when I attempted to collect the literature on the subject of matricide, I discovered there was none to collect.'

[12] Bunker, H. Alden: *Mother-Murder in Myth and Legend.* This QUARTERLY, XIII, 1944, p. 198.

[13] Alexander, Franz and Staub, Hugo: *The Criminal, The Judge, and The Public.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931.

[14] Bergler, Edmund: *Three Tributaries to the Development of Ambivalence.* This QUARTERLY, 1948, XVII, p. 173.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Thread of Life

Géza Róheim

To cite this article: Géza Róheim (1948) The Thread of Life, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 471-486, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11925736

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11925736

THE THREAD OF LIFE

BY GÉZA RÓHEIM, PH.D (NEW YORK)

Antiquity believed that man's fate was determined at birth by a goddess or goddesses. These goddesses, the Parcae of the Romans, the Moirai of the Greeks, the Hathors of the Egyptians all have something to do with spinning or weaving a thread.[1]

The goddesses of Egypt who correspond to the Moirai of the Greeks are the Hathors. The Hathors appear as seven or more beautiful young girls foretelling the future of the newborn infant. They are represented attending the infant as midwives. Whenever a child is born the seven Hathors appear and proclaim the fate that has been allotted to the infant by its god. Death is called 'that which has been fated' (*das Verhängte*) in an official document.[2] Some of them attend the young mother to protect her with their incantations; others receive the newborn baby and pass it from one to the other.[3] The sun god Ra sends the goddesses Isis, Nephtys, Mashkonouit and Hiqit to act as midwives to Rouditdit, a mother pregnant with triplets. The first two goddesses are well known; the latter two may require introduction.

Maspero says Mashkonouit is the goddess Mashkonou, *'c'est à dire du berceau et en cette qualité elle assiste à l'accouchement: elle réunit en elle Shait et Raninit, c'est à dire la déesse qui règle la destinée et celle qui allaite l'enfant et lui donne son nom par suite sa personnalité'*.

Hiqit is the frog-headed goddess called *'l'un des premiers berceaux d'Abydos'*. The goddesses arrive and Isis gives the child its name of Ousirhaf (the one whose double is powerful). The goddesses wash the infant, cut its umbilical cord and put it on a bed. Similar proceedings follow with the other two infants of the triplets.[4]

[1] A revised and expanded version of one of the author's first psychoanalytic studies, this was originally published in Hungarian: *Az élet fonala (The Thread of Life)*. Ethnographia, 1916.

[2] Erman, A.: *Die ägyptische Religion*. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1909, pp. 95–96.

[3] Maspero, G.: *Les contes populaires de l'Égypte ancienne*. Third Edition. Paris: Guilmoto, pp. LI–LII.

[4] *Ibid.* pp. 36–39. *Cf.* also p. 12 and p. 169.

All Egyptian goddesses are in a sense mothers, midwives and fates (Hathors). Hathor, or House of Horus, is the divine representative of women, the goddess of love and pleasure. She is both the goddess of sunrise and sunset and, therefore, also of the hereafter.[5] In the late Egyptian period all dead women were called Hathors.[6] 'The goddess Hathor is one of the oldest known deities of Egypt and it is certain that in the form of a cow she was worshipped in the early part of the archaic period.'[7] She was also regarded as the great mother of the world, as the personification of the great power of nature which was perpetually conceiving, creating, rearing and maintaining all things great and small. She was the 'mother of her father' and 'the daughter of her son'.[8] 'It was Hathor, in the form of a cow, who received the dead when they entered the underworld; she gave them new life and celestial food wherewith to maintain it.'[9] In the person of Hathor we thus have the complete circle from the cradle to the grave; but she also represents an annually recurring periodicity for she is the star Sothis and is thereby connected with the rise of the Nile before the inundation. Sothis rose heliacally on the first day of the Egyptian New Year, and when the sun god Ra entered his boat, Hathor, the goddess of the star Sothis, went with him.[10]

Various peoples have held the belief that human life is determined (sometimes at birth) by maternal goddesses or supernatural beings, and that life ends when a cord, or thread, is severed. The Assyrian mother goddess Ishtar spins the thread of life and cuts it.[11] Alkinous promises Odysseus that he will

[5] Erman, A.: *Op. cit.* p. 15.

[6] *Ibid.* p. 252.

[7] Budge, E. A. Wallis: *The Gods of the Egyptians.* London: Methuen & Co., 1904, I, p. 428.

[8] *Ibid.* II, p. 431.

[9] *Ibid.* I, p. 437.

[10] *Ibid.* I, p. 435.

[11] Langdon, S.: *The Semitic Goddess of Fate.* J. Royal Asiatic Society, 1929–1930, p. 28. On Hebrew survivals of this idea *cf.* Scheftelowitz, J.: *Das Schlingen und Netzmotiv im Glauben und Brauch der Völker.* Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten, XII, 1912, pp. 57–58.

take care of him till he touches 'the soil of his beloved home' and he will have to face then 'whatever hard fate has in store for him and what the Moirai have spun on his thread of life when he was born'. [12] A thread has been spun at birth for each mortal by Moira or Aisa and the texture of this thread determines whatever will happen to him, both good and bad.[13] Moiragenes was anyone who might be regarded as favored by these goddesses; they would care for him like good mothers and spin all the luck they could into his thread. The Moirai are closely related to the Erinyes (Furies); their altar in Sikyon was in the forest devoted to the cult of these avenging representatives of the mother-imago. Clotho wound the flax round the distaff, ready for her sister Lachesis who span out the thread of life which Atropos with her scissors relentlessly snapped asunder.[14]

According to Plato the Moirai were the daughters of Ananke (necessity): they were Lachesis (who presides over destiny), Clotho (the spinner) and Atropos (the inflexible). As they spin they sing with the Sirens the music of the spheres; Lachesis, the past; Clotho, the present; Atropos, the future.[15] In modern Greek folklore the Moirai are old women who appear three days after the child is born and spin the thread. They carry a spindle and yarn wherewith is spun the infant's destiny. Of a lucky person it is said: 'The Fate who fated thee carried a silver spindle, and threads of gold wherewith she fated thee'.[16]

The Moirai in modern Greek folklore are the tutelary divinities of female sex life. Greek girls used to sacrifice honey cakes to them in their cave to induce Fate to bring them husbands. In Athens, young girls sacrificed honey, salt and bread to the Moirai on a plate, so that the Moirai should give them young and nice husbands. Women who desired to be pregnant, or

12 *Odyssey*, VII, 196–198.

13 *Iliad*, XX, 127–128; XXXV, 209–210.

14 Peter, R.: *Moiren*. Roscher's Lexikon, II, pp. 3084–3105.

15 Greene, W. Charles: *Moira*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944, p. 315 fn.

16 Abbott, G. F.: *Macedonian Folklore*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1903, p. 126.

pregnant women, would rub against a rock and invoke the Moirai. This rock near the Kallirhoe is situated near the erstwhile temple of Aphrodite who was here invoked as the eldest of the Moirai. Widows prayed to the goddess asking for a new husband.[17] At Arachoba the expressions 'his yarn has been torn' or 'the yarn has been wound up' [18] denote that the person has died.

At Zagori in Epirus the three Fates appear when a child is born. One determines the duration of the child's life by spinning the yarn; another, called Kaloumoira, gives happiness. The Moirai write their decisions on the child's nose in the form of pimples, or on the forehead in the form of mysterious spots.[19]

The often repeated folk tale is the scene of the three weird sisters who appear at midnight, the third night after the child's birth. The mother, awake in her bed, hears them. They sit at the table, eat the food and taste the wine that has been prepared for them. Then they talk and endow the child with all their gifts.[20]

In a modern folk story of Steiri, the Moirai appear as usual and the first one says: 'He will fall into the fire at the age of three and burn to death'. The second one says: 'No, when he is seven years old he will jump off a rock'. The third says: 'He won't burn, won't jump off a rock but at the age of twenty-two, when he is lying in bed beside his wife on the bridal night, a snake will bite him'.[21] The listener in this instance is a sister. The Moirai are a dream of her evil wishes which are the expression of sibling rivalry. In the typical folk tale of the mother who hears the Fates express their good and bad wishes, we may surmise that the mother's ambivalence is similarly expressed.

[17] Schmidt, B.: *Das Volksleben der Neugriechen.* Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1871, pp. 216–218.

[18] *Ibid.* p. 220.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 212.

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 313.

[21] Schmidt, B.: *Griechische Märchen, Sagen und Volkslieder.* Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1877, p. 69.

This mother and daughter situation as the explanation of the good and bad Moirai becomes quite obvious in a Greek version of Snowwhite. The governess induces Marigo to kill her mother and then when the king marries her she persuades the king to kill his daughter. Marigo escapes and at this moment the Moirai appear. 'What shall her fate be', they ask, 'good or evil?' [22]

The Bulgarians have their Orissnitzi (a word derived from *rissuwam*—to tear, to draw, to write) who appear at the birth of the infant and with an invisible pen write whatever is going to happen to the child on the child's forehead; but it is written in invisible letters. They live at the end of the world, near the sun, in a deep valley.[23]

In Aigina the eldest of the three sisters wields the scissors, one of the younger ones operates the spindle, the third holds the yarn. While they are spinning they discuss the child's future. Each turn of the yarn on the spindle means a year of life. When they have finished spinning, the chief or oldest Moira cuts the yarn. If the yarn should break before the Moirai have said what they were about to say, life will endure only as many years as the yarn had turned around the spindle. If everything goes well the chief of the three unwinds one coil at each birthday. When she has come to the end of the yarn, life is finished. In other versions, the yarn is cut at the moment when life ends, not at the beginning.[24] Germanic equivalents of these beliefs are not so well defined.[25]

Ostiaks and Voguls pray for children to Puges, daughter of the sky god, who lives in a golden house. Seven cradles hang from the roof. When she rocks one of these seven times a

[22] von Hahn, I. G.: *Griechische und albanesische Märchen.* Leipzig: Engelmann, 1864, II, pp. 134–137. *Cf.* also Sainenn, L.: *Basmele Romane.* (*Roumanian Folk Tales.*) Bucharest: Gobl, 1895, pp. 144, 783.

[23] Lübeck, K. L.: *Die Krankheitsdämonen der Balkanvölker.* Ztschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde, VIII, 1898, pp. 243–244.

[24] Thumb, R.: *Zur neugriechischen Volkskunde.* Ztschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde, II, 1892, pp. 123–134.

[25] Grimm, J.: *Deutsche Mythologie.* Gutersloh: Verlag von C. Bertelsmann, 1875, I, p. 338 and III, p. 118, fn.

'soul' is created but if the cradle overturns during this movement it will not live long. The road to this dwelling goes over seven seas to a mountain consisting of seven stories. Around Surgut this deity is also called Vagneg imi (*imi,* old woman), 'the mother of the seven sons of the heaven god'. In her hand she holds a wooden staff from which hang threads for each person born. When a child is born the goddess makes a knot in one of the threads, the distance between this and the staff indicating the length of the child's life.[26] The Koryak have a similar belief but it is displaced to a male, One on High, particularly concerned with birth, who sends the souls of the newly born into the wombs of their mothers. The souls are hung up in the house of this deity on posts and beams, and the duration of their earthly existence is measured by thongs tied to them, a long one indicating longevity, a short one, early death of the child to be born. After death the human soul returns to the One on High who, after some time, sends it to a relative of its former owner, to be reborn.[27] According to the Toradja in central Celebes, Ngai mantande sonka is the supreme ruler of life and death. The souls hang in his house on cords; whenever he cuts one somebody dies.[28] The Batak have similar myths but without the concept of the cord.[29] The Chinese have their 'old man in the moon' who links the fate of future consorts to each other with a red ribbon; no force can tear this ribbon.[30] According to another version the legs of children who are destined to marry are tied to each other with this ribbon.[31]

[26] Karjalainen, F.: *Iugrilaisen ustonko.* (*Beliefs of the Ugrians.*) Suomen Suvun Uskonnot, 1918, III, pp. 38, 249; quoted by Holmberg, U. in *Finno Ugric Mythology, The Mythology of All Races.* Boston: Marshall Jones Company, 1927, p. 260.

[27] Jochelson, W.: *The Koryak.* Jesup North Pacific Expedition, 1905, VI, p. 26.

[28] Juynboll: *Indonesien.* Arch. für Religionswissenschaft, 1904, VII, p. 509, quotes A. C. Kruyt: *Het Wezen van het Heidendom te Posso.* (*The Essence of Posso Paganism.*) Medizinische Nederlander Zend. Gen., 1903, XLVIII, pp. 21–35.

[29] Warneck, John: *Die Religion der Batak.* Leipzig: Dieterichs, 1909, pp. 49–50.

[30] de Groot, J. J. M.: *Les Fêtes-annuellement celébrées à Emoui.* Annales du Musée Guimet, 1886, II, p. 476.

[31] Grube, W.: *Religion und Kultus der Chinesen.* Leipzig: Verlag von Rudolf Haupt, 1910, p. 168.

We suspect that in all these fantasies the end of life is modeled on the beginning: the thread of life is the umbilical cord.

The Tena of Alaska tie around the wrist or waist of a young child a thread called 'by-which-he-is-tied', i.e., to life. These threads tie the child's life to the mother's so that the child cannot die unless the mother dies first.[32] Among the Jicarilla Apache when a couple know that the woman is pregnant they cease tying their moccasin laces, tucking them instead inside. Were they to tie them, the umbilical cord would be wound around the child's neck with the risk of choking it during delivery. As Opler observes, the moccasin string is the symbolic equivalent of the umbilical cord.[33]

In numerous instances the placenta or the cord is regarded as magically identical with the child. At Torda Aranyosszek the placenta is called the child's double.[34] In Bavaria they keep the placenta for three days in a parcel under the mother's bed and then they throw it into running water to prevent witches from getting hold of it and substituting a changeling for the child.[35] In eastern England the stump of the umbilical cord must not fall on the ground when it separates.[36] All over Europe the stump is preserved as an amulet and frequently buried with its original owner. In Saxonia, eating the placenta was regarded as a safeguard against epilepsy. In Russia (Orenburg) the placenta is buried with great reverence. If it is wished to prevent the mother from having more children, the placenta is dug out and reburied upside down. In the area of Obolensk the placenta is put on the head of the newborn

[32] Jette, J.: *On the Superstitions of the Tena Indians.* Anthropos, VI, 1911, p. 257.

[33] Opler, M. E.: *Childhood and Youth in Jicarilla Apache Society.* Los Angeles: Publications of the Frederics Webb Hodge Anniversary Publication Fund, 1945, p. 5.

[34] Janko, J.: *Torda, Aranyosszék Toroczkó magyar népe.* (*Hungarians of Torda Aranyosszék Toroczkó.*) Budapest: 1893, p. 249.

[35] Hovorka, O., and Kronfeld, A.: *Vergleichende Volksmedizin.* Stuttgart: Strecher & Schroeder, 1909, II, p. 635, quoting G. Lammert: *Volksmedizin und medizinischer Aberglaube in Bayern.* Wurtsberg: F. R. Julien, 1869.

[36] Newman: *Some Birth Customs in East Anglia.* Folklore, L, 1939, p. 185.

infant who is then washed in its mother's urine. This is to prevent it from being afflicted with chorea.[37]

In Hungary the umbilical cord is kept to fumigate the child when it gets sick. If witches get hold of the cord they can use it to suck milk out of cows from a great distance. In southern Hungary as soon as the child can walk a powder is made of the umbilical cord and mixed with the child's food to make it strong. The same remedy is used for stomach ache or sleeplessness.[38]

The Aranda 'cut the umbilical cord with a stone knife at a distance of some inches from the child's body. It is never bitten off, as is the custom in many primitive tribes. After a few days the remaining part of the cord is cut off by the mother who, by swathing it in strips of fur, makes it into a string which is kept by the father's mother for a few days and then wound around the child's neck. This necklace facilitates the growth of the child and keeps it quiet and contented. It averts illness and prevents the child from hearing the noise made by dogs in the camp.' [39]

From my own field notes I quote the following observations. The Mularatara cut a long umbilical cord and then let it break when it is dry. They tie it with a string and put it on the boy's neck to make him grow big and fat. It also prevents the child from crying. Among the tribes of the Nullarbor plains the string made from the umbilical cord and worn around the infant's neck is supposed to contain part of the child's spirit. When it withers and falls off, the baby has finally completed absorption of the spirit.[40] At Cape Bedford the cord is tied in a coil and hung around the child's neck. The child wears it for some time and it is finally presented to the father's father

[37] Ploss, H. and Bartels, M.: *Das Weib in der Natur und Völkerkunde.* Leipzig: Th. Grieben, 1908, II, p. 265.

[38] Wlislocki, F. Doerfler: *A gyermek a magyar nephitben.* (*The Child in Hungarian Folk Beliefs.*) Ethnographia, IV, 1893, p. 112.

[39] Spencer, B. and Gillen, F. T.: *The Arunta.* London: Macmillan Co., 1927, II, pp. 487–488.

[40] Bates, Daisy: *The Passing of the Aborigines.* London: John Murray, 1939, p. 235.

if the child is a boy and to the mother's father if a girl. On the Pennyfather River the placenta is buried at birth. It contains the vital principle. When the portion of cord falls off the infant, it is carried in the mother's dilly bag. The mother does not bury it before the little one begins to walk, because if she were to do so, the baby would die.[41]

It is quite clear from these and many other data [42] that the umbilical cord and the placenta are magical doubles of the child and that they symbolize the dual union of infant and mother, the tie that unites mother and child.[43]

Siberian customs are especially interesting. Among the Tungus and Jakut the father and his friends eat the placenta.[44] According to Pallas, the Ostiaks put the placenta in a little box, and after adding a piece of meat or fish to it they hang it on a tree.[45] The midwife is called 'navel mother' and the child 'navel son' or 'navel daughter'. In the Tremjugan district they pretend to see human features in the expelled placenta. They personify it and call it 'the child nourishing woman'; it is also the object of a cult. They make a little shirt, a belt and a shawl for it and put all this in the 'navel basket'. Before carrying the 'navel basket' into the forest they arrange a little festival called 'navel meal' and they place whatever food they have, and tea, on a plate for 'the child nourishing woman', the placenta. The 'navel mother', the midwife, tells the women to bow to this spirit and say: 'Child nourishing woman eat! Mother of the fire eat and drink! Then we shall have luck and blessing.' [46]

[41] Roth, W. E.: *Postures and Abnormalities.* North Queensland Ethnography Bulletin, XIV, p. 76.

[42] *Cf.* Frazer, J. G.: *The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings.* London: Macmillan Co., 1911, I, pp. 182–203. Ploss, H. and Renz, B.: *Das Kind, in Brauch und Sitte der Völker.* Leipzig: Th. Grieben, 1911, pp. 56–61. Ploss, H. and Bartels, M.: *op. cit.*, pp. 253–278.

[43] To be discussed in detail in my Psychology of Magic.

[44] Georgi, J. G.: *Beschreibung aller Nationen der russischen Reiches.* 1776, p. 79.

[45] Pallas, P. S.: *Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des russischen Reichs.* 1776, III, pp. 53–54.

[46] Karjalainen, K. F.: *Die Religion der Iugra-Völker.* Helsinki: F. F. Communications, No. 41, 1921, pp. 58–60.

Here we certainly have an incipient supernatural being and we should not forget that the same Ostiaks and Voguls also have a mother goddess in heaven who has allotted the life span of human beings on the threads that hang from her distaff. Moreover the expression for 'mortal' in the songs is frequently 'man whose navel has been cut'.[47]

In Europe the umbilical cord appears frequently in the life of a child. In Czechoslovakia the mother keeps the umbilical cord in a knot. Before the child begins going to school they give it to him; if he can untie the knot all will be well.[48] It is the Graeco-Walach custom to show the child the cord to bring him luck.[49] The Székelys in Transylvania make the child look through the umbilical cord to see his future.[50] Usually a boy gets the knotted umbilical cord at the age of seven; if he can untie it he will be a real man.[51]

At Szatmar thoughtful mothers keep the umbilical cord and tie on it a hundred knots. At the age of thirteen it is given to the child to undo; if it succeeds, it will be fortunate in life.[52] In Baden and Franconia the cord is kept six years, then it is chopped into scrambled eggs fed to the child. It is believed this will make him smart; or the cord is sewn into his clothes to prevent him from losing his mind (Hesse). In Bavaria it is burnt after seven years. In Oldenburg they form a circle out of the umbilical cord; if the child looks through it and sees the alphabet it will learn to read quickly.[53] The Graeco-

[47] *Cf.* Munkácsi, B., in the volumes of the Thesaurus of Vogul Folk Lore. (Hungarian Academy of Sciences.)

[48] John, A.: *Sitte, Brauch und Volksglaube im deutschen Westböhmen.* 1905, p. 104.

[49] Sajaktzis, G.: *Gräco-walachische Sitten und Gebrauche.* Ztschr. des Vereins für Volkskunde, 1894, p. 135.

[50] Róheim, Géza: *Az élet fonala.* (*The Thread of Life.*) In *Adalékok a magyar nephithez.* (*Contributions to Hungarian Folkbelief.*) Budapest: Hornyánsky, 1920, p. 287.

[51] Temesváry, R.: *Volksbrauche und Aberglauben bei der Geburtshilfe und Pflege der Neugeborenen in Ungarn.* Leipzig: 1900, p. 127.

[52] Luby, M.: *Treatment of Hungarian Peasant Children.* Folk Lore, LII, 1941, p. 105.

[53] Wuttke, A.: *Der deutsche Volksaberglaube.* Berlin: Wiegandt und Grieben, 1900, p. 380.

Walachs keep the cord (called *asalos,* the equivalent of the Greek *omphalos*) dry because if it gets wet the child feels pain in its body. When the child has grown a little they show him the umbilical cord to make him successful in everything. 'He has seen his *asalos*' means 'He is very successful'. The mother must never show a child's umbilical cord to other children.[54] Among the Masurs the cord is dried and put into the child's bosom when it first goes to school.[55] The Ona of Tierra del Fuego dry the umbilical cord and put it in a small pouch. When the child is able to walk alone the father catches a small bird and the child ties the pouch around the bird's neck. The father then puts the bird in the hands of the child who lets the bird loose to fly away. Every bird of this species will thereafter protect the child.[56]

The child who can undo the 'Gordian knot' is capable of loosening the tie to its mother and to the past. Progress in life then becomes possible. In many cases, however, as when the child keeps or eats the cord, this transition rite, instead of representing the trend 'away from the mother', denies it. The mother, represented by the umbilical cord, will still be with the child.

The thesis is by now sufficiently obvious: the thread of life is the umbilical cord and the final separation from the world is but a repetition of the first separation when the physical unity of mother and child is disrupted. That the 'thread' is the umbilical cord symbolism is unmistakable.

Hungarian witches put the cord of a stillborn infant into the cow's fodder. It remains intact in the cow's belly until midnight when it starts growing. It grows right out of the animal, right into the witch's hand, and through it she drains all the milk out of the cow.[57] In southern Hungary a fowl is

[54] Sajaktzis, G.: *op. cit.*, p. 135.

[55] Toeppen, M.: *Aberglauben aus Masuren.* Danzig: Verlag von Th. Bertling, 1867, p. 80.

[56] Gusinde, M.: *Die feuerland Indianer.* Mödling bei Wien: Anthropos Verlag, 1931, pp. 377–378.

[57] von Wlislocki, H.: *Volksglaube und religiöser Brauch der Magyaren.* Münster bei Wien: Aschendorff, 1893, pp. 155–156.

killed when a child is born. Great caution is exercised to remove the intestines of the fowl intact in the form of a single long cord. If breaks occur through which excrement escapes, each break indicates a misfortune that will befall the child. If the intestines are completely severed before removal, the length of the part that remains attached to the fowl indicates the length of the child's life. A tree is planted for the newly born and the entrails are buried under the tree. *'Hosszu belet húztak neki'*—'They have drawn him long guts'—means 'He is very old'.[58]

As the unconscious closely associates the womb and the stomach, the cord may represent the intestines. There is a German incantation used to cure pains in the uterus.

> Three women sat in the sand
> A mortal's intestines in their hand.
> The first one moves it,
> The second closes it,
> The third puts it back in its place.[59]

Although Mansikka has shown the Christian origin of these incantations, a psychological interpretation is not excluded. In the Caucasus, folklore that includes intestinal (anal) references reveals an ambivalent attitude toward the mother imago: 'A mother and a daughter sat on a river's bank, before them was a chest. In the chest were the son's intestines; the mother tied them into a knot, the daughter undid the knot; the undoer was stronger than the tier.' [60]

According to the Saxons in Transylvania, a pregnant woman must be careful not to get her neck entwined in anything or wear a string of pearls on her neck because the umbilical cord might get twisted around the child's neck when it is born.[61] The Wends say if a pregnant woman passes under a rope the

[58] *Ibid.*, pp. 68–69.

[59] Heim, R.: *Incantamenta magica Graeca Latina.* Jahrbücher für klassische Philologie, Suppl. XIX, 1892, p. 497.

[60] Mansikka, V. J.: *Über russische Zauberformeln.* Helsinki: Suomalais Tiedeakatemian Kustantama (Publications of the Finnish Scientific Academy), 1909, p. 195.

[61] von Wlislocki, H.: *Volksglaube und Volksbrauch der siebenbürger Sachsen.* Münster bei Wien: Aschendorff, 1893, p. 140.

cord will get twisted around the child's neck and kill it.[62] In Wales if a pregnant woman ties a cord around her waist the child will be unlucky. She must not spin because the flax or hemp will become a rope that will hang her child.[63]

Gypsies in Hungary resort to the following rite to exorcise the spirits of sickness from the child. The oldest man present, the sorceress and the child's mother throw the cord (which has been concealed up to that moment) into a brazier. When the smoke ascends all three say the following prayer:

Dear God give us luck
And protect us all the time.
Rescue us everywhere.
We give you the heavy chain
To chain the spirit of evil
And make it flee this place.

The chain is the umbilical cord, an amulet against all evil. They call it *devleskero lancos*—god's chain—or *devleshero shelo*—god's rope.[64]

Children's rhymes frequently include references to a thread or cord of gold.

O you golden thread
Take us through the whole land.
Take us from Dobsina to Kassa
And then again to Löcse.
Three women live there;
They punish and reward us.
One of them has a round apple in her mouth,
Another waves a long switch
To beat you if you don't obey,
And the third one weaves of silk
A nice new suit for you.
Boys ride and ride,
Hop, hop, hop, ride![65]

62 Schulenburg, W.: *Wendisches Volkstum.* Berlin: Stricker, 1882, p. 108.

63 Trevelyan, M.: *Folk-Lore and Folk Stories of Wales.* London: Elliot Stock, 1909, p. 266.

64 von Wlislocki, H.: *Volksglaube und religiöser Brauch der Zigeuner.* Münster bei Wien: Aschendorff, 1891, p. 72.

65 *Ibid.*, p. 135.

These rhymes are evidently sung to children who are 'riding' on the knee of an adult. They frequently contain references to the three women, or three Marys, and the golden yarn or thread.[66]

Another of these songs is a Rumanian song from Transylvania.

Hello you darlings,
We ride along,
We have a thread of gold in our hand.
Two women have made it,
All night they have spun it,
From the tiny navel cord
They have made this golden thread.
The third one will cut it,
Therefore we must ride and always ride.
For the third one from her thick foot
Must be delivered of many toads and snakes,
Thirty at every step.
Therefore we must ride and ride
Lest the toads and snakes
Come and catch the little boys.[67]

The Moirai represent the past, the present and the future. They represent a past that is always with us. They are the future formed out of the past. They are time,[68] experience the inevitable (Ananke), both transformed by wishful thinking into the all giving mother.[69] The first and the second metamorphoses are successful; the third fails. Death cannot be completely ignored.[70]

According to the Samojeds the delta of the Ob is the entrance to the netherworld. It is ruled by 'the old woman of seven

[66] *Cf.* Rochholtz, E. L.: *Alemannisches Kinderlied und Kinderspiel aus der* Schweiz. 1857, pp. 139–149; and Mansikka, V. J.: *op. cit.*, pp. 193–202.

[67] von Wlislocki, H.: *op. cit.* (footnote 61), pp. 132–133.

[68] The thirty in the Rumanian song may perhaps be the thirty days of the month.

[69] *Cf.* Bergler, Edmund and Róheim, Géza: *Psychology of Time Perception.* This QUARTERLY, XV, 1946, pp. 190–206.

[70] *Cf.* Freud: *Das Motiv der Kästchenwahl* In Ges. Schr., X, p. 243. (Imago, II, 1913.)

lands who cuts the umbilical cords'. She determines the moment when a human being should be born and when he or she should die.[71] But the last separation is modeled on what preceded; therefore, implicitly, it is not final; it will be followed by another life.

What is the meaning of the third woman with the swollen foot? Wlislocki thinks it is the *reine pédauque,* the third one with the goose foot.[72] It might therefore be the phallic woman; but the lines suggest another interpretation. The swollen foot is the pregnant body, the toads and snakes are the siblings who threaten the child with severance, with separation from the mother.

Among the Somali when a male child is born they take pains to cut the umbilical cord in such a way as to leave as much as possible and then they try to stretch it, for the longer it is, the longer will be the penis. They tie the part that has been cut off into a knot which the mother keeps in her bag. If a delivery is not going smoothly this piece of the cord is held over a fire and the woman sniffs the steam.[73] In France the umbilical cord is cut short for girls, but for boys *'selon la longeur au moment de la naissance, du petit membre viril';* also it is almost exclusively for the male sex that the cord is preserved.[74]

The cord of life is cut; castration looms at the end. Object loss and the loss of the genital organ merge into each other.

We revive the past and remember because we want to relive, to retrace our steps to the mothers.

> Ye Mothers, in your name, who set your throne
> In boundless space, eternally alone,
> And yet companioned! All the forms of Being,
> In movement, lifeless, ye are round you seeing.

[71] Trócsányi, Z.: *Sziberia szamojédjei koezoett.* (*Among the Samoyeds of Siberia.*) Ethnographia, 1916, p. 71.

[72] von Wlislocki, H.: *op. cit.* (footnote 64), p. 133.

[73] Róheim, Géza: *National Character of the Somali.* Int. J. of Psa., XIII, 1932, 219.

[74] van Gennep, Arnold: *Manuel de folklore français contemporain.* Paris: A. Picard, 1943, I, p. 143.

Whate'er once was, there burns and brightens free
In splendor—for 't would fain eternal be,
And ye allot it, with all potent might,
To Day's pavilions and the vaults of Night.[75]

It is the fond hope of man that the universe itself is subject to his own memory and to the omnipotent mothers of his childhood. This attempt to reanimate the past is undeniable, indeed, too obvious. The Polish custom of calling out to the man who cuts the last handful of corn, 'You have cut the umbilical cord' [76] is a conscious or allegorical representation of separation. The data presented in this paper show the relationship between the severed thread and the umbilical cord; but is this really the latent, repressed meaning of the myth? In other words, does the myth go back to the trauma of the severed umbilical cord? This is hardly likely. The symbolism is either conscious (allegory) or preconscious. The severance of the umbilical cord is a 'trauma' we have all mastered. In the rites and myths discussed, it is but a preconscious substitute for the sword of Damocles, the ever threatening castration anxiety. The wish is the œdipal desire charged with anxiety. But if myth represents this as merely the cutting of the umbilical cord, it transforms the end into a beginning.

[75] Goethe: *Faust*. Trans. by B. Taylor. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1912, Part II, p. 76.

[76] Mannhardt, W.: *Die Korndämonen*. Berlin: Dummler, 1868, p. 28; quoted by Frazer, J. G.: *Spirits of the Corn and the Wild*. London: Macmillan & Co., 1912, I, p. 150.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Prince Hal's Conflict

Ernst Kris

To cite this article: Ernst Kris (1948) Prince Hal's Conflict, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 487-506, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11925737

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11925737

PRINCE HAL'S CONFLICT

BY ERNST KRIS, PH.D. (NEW YORK)

For well over a century some of Shakespeare's critics have pointed to inconsistencies in the character of Henry, Prince of Wales (later King Henry V), occasionally explained by the poet's lack of interest, whose attention, it is said, was concentrated mainly on the alternate but 'true' hero, Falstaff. This seemed the more plausible since most of the puzzling passages or incidents occur in King Henry IV, Parts I and II of the trilogy; however, closer examination of three inconsistencies, to which critics are wont to refer as typical of others, seems to throw new light on the psychological conflict with which Shakespeare has invested the hero of the trilogy.[1]

Prince Hal's first appearance on the stage as Falstaff's friend and Poins's companion is concluded by the soliloquy in which he reveals his secret intentions. While he has just made plans to riot with the gang and to rob the robbers, his mind turns to the future.

> I know you all, and will awhile uphold
> The unyok'd humour of your idleness:
> Yet herein will I imitate the sun,
> Who doth permit the base contagious clouds
> To smother up his beauty from the world,
> That, when he please again to be himself,
> Being wanted, he may be more wonder'd at,
> By breaking through the foul and ugly mists
> Of vapours that did seem to strangle him.
> If all the year were playing holidays,
> To sport would be as tedious as to work;
> But when they seldom come, they wish'd-for come,
> And nothing pleaseth but rare accidents.

[1] It is generally assumed that Part I of King Henry IV was written in 1596 or 1597, immediately or soon after the completion of King Richard II, and Part II in 1597 or 1598. King Henry V must have been completed shortly before or some time during 1599. *Cf.* Spencer, Hazelton: *The Art and Life of William Shakespeare.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1940.

So, when this loose behaviour I throw off,
And pay the debt I never promised,
By how much better than my word I am,
By so much shall I falsify men's hopes,
And, like bright metal on a sullen ground,
My reformation, glittering o'er my fault,
Shall show more goodly and attract more eyes
Than that which hath no foil to set it off.
I'll so offend, to make offence a skill;
Redeeming time when men think least I will.[2]

Some critics feel that this announcement deprives the play of part of its dramatic effect: the change in the Prince's behavior should surprise the audience as it does the personages on the stage. The anticipation, we are told, was forced on the poet as a concession to the public. Henry V appeared to the Elizabethans as the incarnation of royal dignity and knightly valor. His early debauches had therefore to be made part of a morally oriented plan; but some critics find the price of justification too high, since it leaves a suspicion of hypocrisy on the Prince's character.

The second inconsistency is seen in the course of the Prince's reformation which proceeds in two stages. In Part I, Prince Hal returns to his duties when the realm is endangered by rebels; at Shrewsbury, he saves the King's life and defeats Percy Hotspur in combat; but while the war against other rebels continues, we find him back in Eastcheap feasting with his companions. His final reformation takes place at the King's deathbed. Critics usually account for this protracted and repeated reformation by assuming that the success of the Falstaff episodes in Part I suggested their continuation in Part II, an argument supported by the widely accepted tradition that Falstaff's revival in The Merry Wives of Windsor, after the completion of the trilogy, was at the special request of Queen Elizabeth. It has nevertheless been emphasized that the concluding scenes of Part II follow in all essential details existing tradition.

The third and most frequently discussed inconsistency is

[2] King Henry IV, Part I, Act 1, Sc. 2.

King Henry V's treatment of his former companions with merciless severity. Falstaff, who waits to cheer the new King, is temporarily arrested and, while he hopes that Henry will revoke in private his public pronouncement, we later hear that he has hoped in vain. The King's harshness has broken his heart. In the 'rejection of Falstaff',[3] who has won the audience's heart, the dramatist has 'overshot his mark'; the King's reformation could have been illustrated by gentler means, and some critics suggest how this could have been achieved without offending the Old Knight. The formula of banishment, however, is only partly Shakespeare's invention since it paraphrases traditional accounts.

This tradition originated soon after Henry V suddenly died in Paris, at the age of thirty-five, crowned King of England and France (1421). The tradition grew in chronicles and popular accounts, hesitantly at first, more rapidly later, when Henry's striving for European leadership and hegemony in the Channel appeared as an anticipation of the political goals of Tudor England. In Shakespeare's time, fact and legend had become firmly interwoven.[4]

Prince Henry (of Monmouth, born 1387) was early introduced to affairs of state. He was twelve years old when, in 1399, his father succeeded Richard II. At fifteen he took personal control of the administration of Wales and of the war against the Welsh rebels. He had shared in this task since 1400, initially guided by Henry Percy, Hotspur, who at that time was thirty-nine, three years older than the Prince's father. In 1405 Hotspur led the rebellion of the Percies and attacked the Prince's forces at Shrewsbury. Sup-

[3] *Cf.* Bradley, A. C.: The Rejection of Falstaff, in *Oxford Lectures on Poetry*. London: Macmillan & Co., 1934. Bradley's censure of Shakespeare is moderate compared to that of Hazlitt, William: *Characters of Shakespeare's Plays*. 4th ed., London: C. Templeman, 1848.

[4] For the legend of Prince Hal see especially Kabel, P.: *Die Sage von Heinrich V, bis zur Zeit Shakespeares*, Palaestra, LXIX, Berlin, 1908; and Bowling, W. G.: *The Wild Prince Hal in Legend and Literature*. Washington Studies, Humanist Ser., XIII, 1925–1926, pp. 305–334. For summaries of historical facts see mainly Kingsford, C. L.: *Henry V, The Typical Medieval Hero*. New York: G. P. Putnam Sons, 1901; and McFarlane, K. B.: The Lancastrian Kings, in *The Cambridge Medieval History*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, VIII, 1936, pp. 363–416.

ported by the King and his army, Henry of Monmouth carried the day. The rebellion and the pacification of Wales kept the Prince busy until 1408 or 1409. He then entered politics as leader of the parliamentary opposition against the King's council. Repeated illnesses complicated Henry IV's negotiations with Parliament that at the time of his uprising against Richard II had vested royal power in him. Since 1406 rumors concerning his abdication had been spreading. In 1408 he was thought to have died in an attack of seizures 'but after some hours the vital spirits returned to him'. From January, 1410 to November, 1411 the Prince governed England through the council, supported by the King's half brothers, Henry and Thomas Beaufort. In November, 1411 Henry IV took over again and dismissed the Prince from the council. One of the reasons for the Prince's dismissal was his desire for an active policy in France. It seems that, initially without the King's consent, he had arranged for a small expeditionary force to be sent to the continent in support of Burgundy against the Royal House of France; later the King agreed to the expedition but the Prince had to renounce his intention to lead the forces.

The circumstances that led to Henry of Monmouth's removal from the council are not entirely clear. It seems that Henry IV was motivated by the suspicion that the Prince intended to depose him. The Prince issued public statements denying such intention, and demanded the punishment of those who had slandered him. He finally forced an interview on the King, during which a reconciliation took place. The struggle between father and son was terminated by Henry IV's death in 1413.

According to the chronicle of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Henry of Monmouth's character changed after his accession to the throne. The early chronicles do not state in detail wherein the conversion consisted. They familiarize us, however, with two areas in which the Prince's attitude was different from that of the later King. The first of these areas is less well defined than the second: during the conflict with his father, the Prince appeared twice at court 'with much peoples of lords and gentles'. This show of strength was meant to exercise pressure on King and council. During his reign Henry V never used similar methods; no appeal to forces outside 'government' is attributed to him, neither in his dealings with Parliament nor with the baronage. Within the framework of his age he was a rigorously constitutional monarch. Some-

what better defined is the change of the Prince's attitude to the Church. The noble leader of the Lollards, Sir John Oldcastle, was the Prince's personal friend, and at least by tolerance, the Prince seems vaguely to have favored the cause for which he stood. Shortly after Henry V's accession to the throne the persecution of the Lollards was intensified. Sir John was arrested and asked to abandon his error. He refused any compromise, succeeded twice in escaping, but he was finally, in 1417, executed after Parliament had determined on the extirpation of Lollardy as heresy.

The legendary versions of the Prince's reformation elaborated these incidents later on; in their earliest formulation they simply stated: 'that the Prince was an assiduous center of lasciviousness and addicted exceedingly to instruments of music. Passing the bounds of modesty he was the fervent soldier of Venus as well as of Mars; youthlike, he was tired with her torches and in the midst of the worthy works of war found leisure for excess common to ungoverned age.' [5] Later sources place the Prince's reformation in relation to the conflict with his father: the baronage that had adopted the Prince as leader becomes a group of irresponsible delinquents. Amongst this group the name of Sir John Oldcastle appears. The fanatic leader of a religious sect thus underwent the transformation into Sir John Falstaff, whose name was substituted by Shakespeare only after Oldcastle's descendants had complained of what seemed a vilification of their ancestor; but various traces of the original name are extant in Shakespeare's text. The banishment of Falstaff then may be considered as an elaboration of Henry V's persecution of the Lollards whom he once had favored. Other elements of the legendary tradition are inserted with clearly moralistic intentions: the Prince's reformation is used to exemplify the nature of royal responsibility. Thus Sir Thomas Elliott in his treatise, The Book Called the Governor (1536), introduced the tale of Prince and Chiefjustice according to which the King confirms that Chiefjustice in office who, in the royal name, had once arrested the riotous Prince. The image of Henry V was thus idealized into that of the perfect Renaissance ruler.[6]

Shakespeare borrowed these and similar incidents of his trilogy from a variety of sources, but mainly from the second

[5] Kingsford, C. L.: *Op. cit.* p. 12.

[6] *Cf.* Spencer, Theodor: *Shakespeare and the Nature of Man.* New York: Macmillan & Co., 1942.

edition of Raphael Holinshed's Chronicles of England, Scotland and Ireland (1587).[7] In addition to historical sources he relied upon a popular play produced a few years earlier. So closely does he follow 'The Famous Victories of Henry V' that it seems as if he had set himself the task to retain as many as possible of the incidents familiar to his audience in spite of the total transformation of the context. Without commenting in detail upon this transformation—though such a comparison would permit one to support the hypothesis here to be proposed—it suffices to point to its general direction. The historical facts concerning the conflict between Henry IV and his son and 'heir apparent', Henry of Monmouth, had been blurred by legend. The conversion of the Prince became the dominant theme, a conversion modeled after that of the life of the saints. Shakespeare returns to the core of this tradition, or rather rediscovers that core, in the sources accessible to him. He centers his attention on the conflict between father and son which is made to account for both the Prince's debauchery and his reformation.

The conflict between father and son appears in Part I of Henry IV in three versions, each time enacted by one central and two related characters.[8] The theme is manifestly stated by the King in the introductory scene of the trilogy, when he compares Henry of Monmouth to Henry Percy.

> Yea, there thou makest me sad and makest me sin
> In envy that my Lord Northumberland
> Should be the father to so blest a son,
> A son who is the theme of honour's tongue;
> Amongst a grove, the very straightest plant;
> Who is sweet fortune's minion and her pride:
> Whilst I, by looking on the praise of him,
> See riot and dishonour stain the brow

[7] *Cf.* Ax, Herman: *The Relation of Shakespeare's King Henry IV to Holinshed's Chronicle.* Freiburg I. Breisgau: D. Lauber, 1912.

[8] That the repetition of one theme in various configurations indicates its central position was pointed out by Jekels, Ludwig: *Das Problem der doppelten Motivgestaltung.* Imago, XIX, 1933, pp. 15–26.

Of my young Harry. O! that it could be prov'd
That some night-tripping fairy had exchang'd
In cradle-clothes our children where they lay,
And called mine Percy, his Plantagenet!
Then would I have his Harry, and he mine.[9]

The position of the Prince between Falstaff and the King is almost as explicitly stated; he has two fathers, as the King has two sons. When he enacts with Falstaff his forthcoming interview with his father, the theme is brought into the open.[10] It is not limited to court and tavern, the centers of the 'double plot', as W. Empson calls it,[11] but extends to the rebel camp. Henry Percy stands between a weak father, Northumberland, who is prevented by illness from participating in the decisive battle, and a scheming uncle, Worcester, who plans the rebellion, conceals from Percy that the King offers reconciliation and drives him thus to battle and to death.

The three versions of the father-son conflict compelled Shakespeare to deviate from his sources and thereby to enrich the stage: he sharpened the report of the chronicles on the rebellion of the Percies in order to create the contrast of Worcester and Northumberland; he reduced Henry Percy's age from a slightly older contemporary of Henry IV to a somewhat older contemporary of the Prince—and he invented Falstaff.

The triangular relationships are not only similar to each other, since they all contain variations of the theme of good and bad fathers and sons, but within each triangle the parallel figures are closely interconnected; thus the two Harrys, whom Henry IV compares, form a unit; Hotspur's rebellion represents also Prince Hal's unconscious parricidal impulses.[12] Hotspur is the Prince's double. Impulses pertaining to one situa-

[9] King Henry IV, Part I, Act 1, Sc. 1.

[10] The idea of the travestied interview itself is borrowed from *The Famous Victories of Henry the Fifth.* London: Thomas Creede, 1898. There the Prince and his companion enact the Prince's subsequent interview with the Chiefjustice.

[11] Empson, W.: *Some Versions of the Pastoral.* London: Chatto & Windus, 1935, pp. 43–46.

[12] This point was made by Alexander, Franz: *A Note on Falstaff.* This QUARTERLY, II, 1933, pp. 592–606; and by Empson, W.: *Op. cit.*, p. 43.

tion have thus been divided between two personages; [13] but though in the triangles the characters are paired and contrasted, each of the play's personages transcends the bondage to his function in this thematic configuration. They have all outgrown the symmetry which they serve, into the fullness of life.

To appraise Falstaff as a depreciated father figure is to grasp the superficial aspect of a character who, more than any other of Shakespeare, has enchanted readers and audiences since his creation. Franz Alexander finds two principal psychoanalytic explanations for this universal enchantment: Falstaff's hedonism, he says, represents the uninhibited gratification of an infantile and narcissistic quest for pleasure, a craving alive to some extent in everyone of us; this hedonism, moreover, is made acceptable by contrast: one turns with relief from the court or the rebel camp to the tavern.[14] In accordance with the last is the traditional antithesis of 'tragic King and comic people' (Empson) used by Shakespeare to emphasize a moral antithesis. From Prince Hal's point of view, Falstaff is a contrast to the King, who represents another version of the unsatisfactory paternal image. Henry IV succeeded his cousin Richard II by rebellion and regicide. The feeling of guilt that overshadowed his life becomes manifest when on his deathbed, in addressing the Prince, he reviews the sorrows that the unlawfully acquired crown inflicted on him.

> How I came by the crown, O God forgive;
> And grant it may with thee in true peace live! [15]

In this great scene Prince Henry's mood accords with his father's; he too is burdened with guilt. In the preceding scene he finds his father sleeping, and believes him to be dead. Shakespeare, adapting this scene from the chronicle play, has added a prop device: the crown which lies next to the King's

[13] Ernest Jones speaks in a similar connection of decomposition; see A Psychoanalytic Study of Hamlet, in *Essays in Applied Psycho-Analysis*. London: Int. Psa. Library, No. 5, 1923.

[14] Alexander, Franz: *Op. cit.*

[15] King Henry IV, Part II, Act IV, Sc. 5.

bed.[16] The crown inspires the Prince with awe and apprehension. He longs to possess it, but 'the best of gold' is 'the worst of gold'; it endangers the bearer. He wages 'the quarrel of a true inheritor', controls his desire and, in a mood of contemplation, concludes that royal responsibility is a heavy burden. He has overcome the hostile impulse against the dying King and can now reply to his father:

> You won it, wore it, kept it, gave it me;
> Then plain and right must my possession be; [17]

It is an attempt to reassure: 'Since I have come guiltless into the possession of the crown, since I refrained from regicide and parricide, I shall rightfully be King'; yet in the greatest crisis of his life, the Prince, now King Henry V, reveals that his apprehension has not been vanquished. The night before the battle of Agincourt, when his outnumbered army is weakened by disease, and confidence is more than ever required, he turns to prayer to avert divine retaliation for his father's crime that, with the crown, seems to have moved to his shoulders.

> O God of battles! steel my soldiers' hearts;
> Possess them not with fear; take from them now
> The sense of reckoning, if the opposed numbers
> Pluck their hearts from them! Not to-day, O Lord!
> O, not to-day, think not upon the fault
> My father made in compassing the crown!
> I Richard's body have interred anew;
> And on it have bestow'd more contrite tears
> Than from it issu'd forced drops of blood:
> Five hundred poor I have in yearly pay,
> Who twice a day their wither'd hands hold up
> Toward heaven, to pardon blood; and I have built
> Two chantries, where the sad and solemn priests
> Sing still for Richard's soul. More will I do;

[16] The very crown that literally he had taken from Richard II. *Cf.* Richard II, Act IV, Sc. 1.

[17] King Henry IV, Part II, Act IV, Sc. 5.

Though all that I can do is nothing worth,
Since that my penitence comes after all,
Imploring pardon.[18]

The essential passages of this prayer follow Holinshed's Chronicles wherein it is reported that after his succession to the throne Henry V had King Richard's body ceremoniously interred in Westminster Abbey and made specified donations in commemoration. Reference to this incident and the place in which it is made invite comment. By reintroducing the theme of the tragic guilt attached to the House of Lancaster, Shakespeare establishes a link between Henry V and his older plays that dramatize the downfall of the Lancastrian Kings (Henry VI, Richard III). The victory of Agincourt and the life of Henry V are thus made to appear as a glorious interlude in a tragic tale of crime and doom; however, the King's prayer before the battle reveals the structure of the conflict which Shakespeare embodied in his character: the desire to avoid guilt and to keep himself pure of crime is paramount in Henry V. In one passage of the prayer the King recalls the tears he shed on Richard's coffin, a detail not recorded by Holinshed, and yet obviously suggested by other passages of the Chronicle. It may well be considered a hint—the only one we find in the trilogy—that there ever existed a personal relationship between Richard II and the son of his banished cousin Henry of Lancaster—Henry of Monmouth. During the last months of his rule King Richard II sailed for Ireland to quell a local rebellion and he took Henry of Monmouth with him. The young Prince seems to have attracted the King's attention. The Prince was knighted by King Richard, Holinshed records, 'for some valiant act that he did or some other favourable respect'. Shakespeare was undoubtedly familiar with this account and very probably familiar with reports of the Prince's reaction to the news of his father's rebellion. Young Henry of Monmouth is said to have replied to a question of Richard's that he could not be held responsible for his father's deed.

In Shakespeare's King Richard II no direct reference is

[18] King Henry V, Act IV, Sc. 1.

made to the relationship between Prince Hal and Richard,[19] but the theme to which we refer is present and clearly emphasized: one entire scene is devoted to it, the first in which the Prince is mentioned. Henry IV, newly enthroned, meets with his Lords—but his son is absent.

> Can no man tell of my unthrifty son?
> 'Tis full three months since I did see him last:
> If any plague hang over us, 'tis he.
> I would to God, my lords, he might be found:
> Inquire at London, 'mongst the taverns there,
> For there, they say, he daily doth frequent,
> With unrestrained loose companions,
> Even such, they say, as stand in narrow lanes,
> And beat our watch, and rob our passengers; [20]

The Prince has dissociated himself from the court that his father won by treason. In silent protest he has turned to the tavern rather than to participate in regicide.[21] Regicide dominates the scene that starts with Henry IV's quest for his absent son. The last of Richard's followers and the new King's cousin, the Duke of Aumerle, confesses to Henry IV that he has plotted against his life. Before Aumerle can complete his confession, the Duke of York, his father and the uncle of Henry IV, forces his way into their presence. He doubts whether the purpose of Aumerle's audience be murder or repentance and is prepared to surrender his son.[22] This is the environment from which

[19] One might conjecture that Shakespeare preferred not to refer to the personal relationship between Prince Hal and King Richard since he needed a more mature Prince, not a boy of twelve.

[20] King Richard II, Act V, Sc. 3.

[21] Only once Henry V states openly his disapproval of his father's actions, and then in a highly restrained fashion. When wooing, somewhat abruptly, Katherine of France he says

> . . . I dare not swear thou lovest me; yet my blood begins to flatter me that thou dost, notwithstanding the poor and untempering effect of my visage. *Now beshrew my father's ambition! He was thinking of civil wars when he got me.* . . . (Italics added.)

[22] York himself had plotted against Richard II and seeks his son's punishment out of a displaced feeling of guilt. Some of the complexities of this relationship were elucidated by Taylor, M. P.: *A Father Pleads for the Death of His Son.* Int. J. of Psa., VIII, 1927, pp. 53–55.

the Prince withdraws, to which he prefers the vices of Eastcheap and the freedom of Falstaff's company.

In King Henry IV, Part II, the contrast between court and tavern is re-emphasized in a scene in which Falstaff's carefree vice is juxtaposed with John of Lancaster's virtuous villainy. This younger brother of Prince Hal is in command of the campaign against the still surviving rebels. Falstaff serves in his inglorious army. Lancaster promises the rebels pardon; they accept his offer and he breaks his word to send them to the gallows. We have just witnessed this monstrous performance—taken directly from Holinshed's Chronicles—when Lancaster and Falstaff meet. The 'sober blooded youth' provokes Falstaff's soliloquy in praise of Sherristack and of Prince Hal, whose valor has not made him addicted to 'thin potations'.

Falstaff's loving praise of the Prince, and what others say when they refer to the Prince in the latter part of Part II of Henry IV remind us once more of how well he has succeeded in deceiving the world. His conversion upon his accession to the throne comes as a surprise to the court and to the tavern. Only the audience, having been in his confidence from his first soliloquy, are enabled to understand the contradictions in his behavior as being a part of his paramount conflict.

When Shakespeare familiarized himself with the youth of Henry V this conflict must have imposed itself upon his mind as one that would unify the various traits and incidents reported. The tendentious accounts in the Chronicles had not fully obliterated the traces of antagonism in the relationship between the Prince and the King. This antagonism, the legends of the Prince's debauchery and conversion, and other elements that the dramatist found in his sources, he wove into a plausible character. The Prince tries to dissociate himself from the crime his father had committed; he avoids contamination with regicide because the impulse to regicide (parricide) is alive in his unconscious. When the King's life is threatened he saves the King and kills the adversary, who is his alter ego. In shunning the court for the tavern he expresses his hostility to his father and escapes the temptation to parricide. He can permit himself to

share Falstaff's vices because he does not condone the King's crime; but hostility to the father is only temporarily repressed. When finally he is in possession of the crown, he turns against the father substitute; hence the pointed cruelty of Falstaff's rejection. Both paternal figures between which the Prince oscillates have less meaning to him than appears at first. What he opposes to them is different and of an exalted nature: his ideals of kingship, royal duty and chivalry. These ideals are with him when he first appears on the stage; they grow in and with him throughout the tragedy, and they dominate throughout the five acts of King Henry V.

These ideals, one might speculate, may have been modeled on an idealization of Richard II, the murdered King, whom Prince Hal as a boy had accompanied to Ireland and whose favor he had won. Richard, however, was hardly fit to serve as model of a great king. Shakespeare has drawn him as a weak and irresponsible man, who depended presumptuously on the trappings of royalty for his kingship, on that ceremony that meant so little to Henry V and for which he substituted royal duty. One may conjecture this to have been a further reason why Shakespeare did not explicitly refer to the existence of a personal relationship between Prince Henry and King Richard. But all this is speculative. Opposed to it is solid evidence of the importance of moral conflicts in the personality of Henry V; it would be easy to demonstrate from metaphors and puns alone, with which the poet speaks through the hero, his proclivity to such conflicts. His major actions and interests all indicate too the Prince's search for moral justification.

While living the roistering life of the tavern, his thirst for glory won in battle—but only battle with a moral purpose—and chivalry was great; hence the Prince's bitter caricature of Hotspur.

> . . . I am not yet of Percy's mind, the Hotspur of the North; he that kills me some six or seven dozen of Scots at a breakfast, washes his hands, and says to his wife, 'Fie upon this quiet life! I want work.' 'O my sweet Harry,' says she; 'how many hast thou killed

> to-day?' 'Give my roan horse a drench,' says he; and answers, 'Some fourteen' an hour after; 'a trifle, a trifle.' [23]

There is jubilant relief when Percy turns to rebellion and the Prince can finally fight an envied rival, and in the service of a just cause liberate and use his own aggressive impulses; hence also, before the invasion of France, the preoccupation with legal points; and finally, on the night before Agincourt, the protracted debate with Williams, the soldier. Assuming that his partner in discussion is 'Harry le Roy' an English commoner, the soldier argues

> . . . There are few die well that die in a battle; for how can they charitably dispose of anything, when blood is the argument? Now, if those men do not die well, it will be a black matter for the king that led them to it. . . .[24]

Henry goes to great lengths to refute this thesis. He contends that the King is answerable only for the justice of his cause and cannot be answerable for 'the particular endings of his soldiers', since 'every subject is the King's, but every subject's soul is his own'. The moving subtleties of this theological discourse [25] lead to the King's soliloquy on ceremony and royal destiny:

> Upon the king! let us our lives, our souls,
> Our debts, our careful wives,
> Our children, and our sins lay on the king!
> We must bear all. O hard condition,
> Twin-born with greatness, subject to the breath
> Of every fool, whose sense no more can feel
> But his own wringing! What infinite heart's-ease
> Must kings neglect that private men enjoy!

[23] King Henry IV, Part I, Act II, Sc. 4.
[24] King Henry V, Act IV, Sc. 1.
[25] Canterbury says of the newly enthroned Henry V (Act I, Sc. 1.):

> Hear him but reason in divinity
> And, all admiring, with an inward wish
> You would desire the King were made a prelate.

> And what have kings that privates have not too,
> Save ceremony,—save general ceremony?
> And what art thou, thou idol ceremony?[26]

Summoned to battle, the King kneels in prayer in which he disclaims any complicity in his father's crime; thus prepared, the hero can conquer.

Henry V's preoccupation with morals is not glorified by Shakespeare nor presented as the dominant virtue of 'a Christian soldier'; it is shown in its dynamic interplay with opposite tendencies, and occasionally—with a slightly ironical smile—exposed as a pretense. While the King is urging the clergy to establish his claim to the throne of France, the audience knows that he has forced the support of the Church by political pressure. The bishops, who have accepted the deal and supplied the garbled justification, are well aware of the King's burning desire for conquest. We are left in doubt as to whether it is political shrewdness or self-deception which prompts the King to pose the question: [27]

> May I with right and conscience make this claim? [28]

Ambiguities and schisms of motivation are characteristic of the King. He flees to the tavern to escape from the evils of the court—but he becomes a past master of licentious living. He strives for humane warfare, and protects the citizens of conquered Harfleur; [29] but when the French break the laws of warfare in attacking the English encampment and killing the boys, Henry has every French prisoner's throat cut. The 'friction between flesh and spirit' (Traversi), between impulse and inhibition, is fully resolved only when from moral scrutiny Henry proceeds to heroic venture, when as leader of men who are

[26] King Henry V, Act IV, Sc. 1.

[27] A somewhat similar analysis of this passage has been given by Traversi, D. A.: *Henry V*, Scrutiny. IX, No. 4, March, 1941, pp. 352–374, who in a remarkable essay stresses the importance of 'cool reasoning' and 'self-domination' in the King's character.

[28] King Henry V, Act I, Sc. 2.

[29] Traversi notes that when the King presents his ultimatum to Harfleur his passion rises, and that in accepting the surrender he regains self-control. *Op. cit.*

determined to fight with a clear conscience against overwhelming odds, he feels himself one among peers:

We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.[30]

The inconsistencies in Prince Hal's character that some of Shakespeare's critics thought to have detected are not inconsistencies but attempts to resolve a conflict which is in some of its elements similar to Hamlet's. In Hamlet the œdipus is fully developed, centering around the queen. In Shakespeare's historical dramas women are absent or insignificant. Prince Hal's struggle against his father appears therefore in isolation, enacted in male society. Hamlet stands between a murdered father and a murderous uncle. Prince Hal's father murdered his second cousin—and predecessor—to whom the Prince had an attachment. Thus the crime is in both cases carried out by the father or by his substitute—the King in Hamlet—while both heroes are battling against the murderous impulse in their own hearts.

The psychological plausibility of Prince Hal as a dramatic character is not inferior to that of Hamlet, whatever the difference in depth and dramatic significance of the two plays may be. While only one part of the œdipal conflict is presented, the defenses which Prince Hal mobilizes in order to escape from his internal predicament are well known from the clinical study of male youths. In our analysis of the Prince's character we have implicitly referred mainly to two mechanisms: first, to the formation of the superego; second, the displacement of filial attachment onto a father substitute.

The Prince, in his thoughts, compares the King, his father, with an ideal of royal dignity far superior to the father himself. This ideal, derived from paternal figures but exalted and heightened, is his protection in the struggle against his parricidal impulses and against submission to the King. This mechanism operates in some form or other in every boy's development at the time of the resolution of the œdipal conflict.

[30] King Henry V, Act IV, Sc. 3.

During this process the superego acquires part of its severity and some of its autonomy. It is a process subject to many vicissitudes, as illustrated by a clinical example.

A boy of eight approached his father, a distinguished judge, with a request for advice. He held two one dollar bills and wanted to know whether he might keep them. They had been acquired by the sale to neighbors of pencils which a mail order house had sent him on his request. Upon the receipt of the two dollars he was to be sent a premium to which he now preferred the money. The judge asked to see the advertisement to which the boy had responded and the letter of the mail order house. After reading both he ruled: 'You may keep the money; they have no right to make such contracts with minors'.

When thirty-five years later the incident was recalled in analysis it appeared that he had not only lost confidence in all authority since that time, but also that when he had asked his father's advice he was testing him. He had grown suspicious that the father did not live up to the principles—sexual and moral—he advocated, and when in his own conflict he sought the father's advice, he had hoped that the father would support his own hesitant moral views. When this expectation was disappointed, he acquired a cynical independence. The compulsion to live up to his ideal became part of a complex neurotic symptomatology.

In one detail only did this patient resemble Prince Hal: his own moral standards assured his independence from all paternal figures and were used as aggressive reproach in every contact with them. Prince Hal uses not only his ideal of moral integrity as reproachful contrast against his father, but also his own playful depravity. The second mechanism of defense the Prince mobilizes is no less common than the first. He adopts an extrafamilial substitute who, true to a pattern frequently observed, is the antithesis of the father. Falstaff is closer to the Prince's heart than the King; he satisfies the libidinal demands in the father-son relation through his warmth and freedom. Yet the Prince proves superior to Falstaff in wit

and royal reveling: he triumphs over both father and father substitute.[31] He is paramount in licence as he will be paramount in royal dignity.

Literary critics seem of late weary of the intrusion of psychoanalysis. However politely, they assert—and rightly so—their independence.[32] This essay is a psychological analysis which attempts only to underline a few universal, unconscious mechanisms, and is not intended as literary criticism. It suggests that Shakespeare had puzzled about the nature of Henry V's personality, and that already, while writing the last act of Richard II, was aware of the conflict on which he intended to center the character development of the King. Shakespeare's plan, suggested in this case by the nature of the tradition about the subject, must have been one of the trends of thought that, on various levels of awareness, directed him in writing the trilogy. It is not suggested that the plan was complete from the beginning; it might have manifested itself to the poet during his work, i.e., it might have been preconscious before. Moreover, some elements we here consider part of this plan probably never reached consciousness. What answer Shakespeare might have given if asked why Henry V kills Falstaff by his harshness is comparatively irrelevant. What counts is that he had the King do so, and he surely must have known that this could hardly be popular with an audience. Such internal consistency, the final parricide, can only have been conceived by one who in creating had access to his own unconscious impulses.

If investigations similar to the one here attempted, but more complete and authoritative, were carried out systematically, if they were to comprehend all of Shakespeare's work and, at least for purposes of comparison, the works of other Eliza-

[31] The son's superiority over the father occurs also in other connections in the trilogy. Hotspur is superior to both Worcester and Northumberland and Aumerle is superior to his father, York, who first betrays King Richard before he betrays his own son.

[32] *Cf.* Trilling's excellent essay, *Freud and Literature*. Horizon, XVI, No. 92, 1947, pp. 182–200; or Knights, L. C.: *Explorations*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1946, especially the essay, Prince Hamlet, pp. 66–77.

bethans; if conflicts and their varied or preferred solutions, and those omitted by one author, one group of authors, one period, or one cultural area were collated, such an application of psychoanalysis might be integrated with the work of the literary historian or critic.

Plot and character are clearly not the only, and not always the most important, tools of the dramatic poet. Psychoanalysis suggests other approaches for the study of poetic language, its metaphors and hidden meanings.[33] Systematic investigation in this area may lead to other types of integration than the study of plot or character. The combination of various sequences of such systematic studies might finally lead to a topic in which critics and psychoanalysts are equally interested and about which they are both, each in his own field, almost equally ignorant: the nature of the artist's personality, a question that must be studied in its cultural variations before generalizations can be made.

Psychoanalysis has frequently attempted short cuts, mostly by correlating one of the artist's works with an occurrence noted by his biographers,[34] assumptions that can rarely be verified.

Clinical analysis of creative artists suggests that the life experience of the artist is sometimes only in a limited sense the source of his vision; that his power to imagine conflicts may by far transcend the range of his own experience; or, to put it more accurately, that at least some artists possess the particular gift to generalize from whatever their own experience has been. One is always tempted to look for a cue that would link this or that character to its creator's personality. Falstaff, it has been said, is clearly Shakespeare himself. Why not Percy or Richard II? Are they not equally alive, equally consistent? Could not for each of these characters that very

[33] *Cf.* Sharpe, Ella Freeman: *From King Lear to The Tempest.* Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 19–30. *Cf.* also Kaplan, Abraham and Kris, Ernst: *Æsthetic Ambiguity.* Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, VIII, No. 3, March, 1948, pp. 415–435.

[34] This procedure was initiated in 1900 by a remark of Freud who envisaged the possibility that Shakespeare's choice of Hamlet as a topic and the treatment of the conflict might have to do with the death of Shakespeare's son Hamnet.

same psychological plausibility be claimed, that we here claim for Prince Hal? Such a quest seems futile and contrary to what clinical experience with artists as psychoanalytic subjects seems to indicate.[35] Some great artists seem to be equally close to several of their characters, and may feel many of them as parts of themselves. The artist has created a world and not indulged in a daydream.

This writer is not exempt from the temptation to detect a neat connection between the artist and one of his characters. I therefore record my own venture in this direction, with appropriate reservations. At the time Shakespeare was working on Richard II, and studying the life of Prince Hal, he re-established the prestige of the Shakespeare family (which had been lost through his father's bankruptcy) by purchasing a coat of arms. The motto chosen is one that might well have been used to characterize Prince Hal's striving for the crown: 'Non sanz droict'.

35 *Cf.* Kris, Ernst: *Probleme der Æsthetik.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., u. Imago, XXVI, 1941, pp. 142–178; for clinical aspects *cf.* Bergler, Edmund: Psychoanalysis of Writers and of Literary Production. In *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences.* I. Edited by Géza Róheim. New York: International Universities Press, 1947, pp. 247–296.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Spirituality and Beauty in Artistic Experience

Harry B. Lee

To cite this article: Harry B. Lee (1948) Spirituality and Beauty in Artistic Experience, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 507-523, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11925738

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11925738

Published online: 07 Dec 2017.

SPIRITUALITY AND BEAUTY IN ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE

BY HARRY B. LEE, M.D. (CHICAGO)

It is well known that inspiration and creativeness are lacking in most of the art [1] that is produced, and though moments of inspiration and true creativeness occasionally enrich his life, the creative artist knows that these are more frequently absent than present in his work. The theory of sublimation remains incomplete in claiming for all artistic production certain mental processes which do not explain the contemplative [2] experiences of the creative artist. The same theory is offered to explain the creation of art alive with æsthetic form as well as the production of art that merely copies these forms with a deadly competence. The same theory is offered to explain making and appreciating. The tardiness of psychoanalysis in contributing a more complete and helpful theory to science, æsthetics, and art criticism derives from our neglect to classify the varieties of artistic experience. I have offered a working classification in The Æsthetic States of the Mind.[3] I propose now to help complete the theory with a description of the class of artists whose contemplative creating and appreciating do not arise from the sublimation of sexual energy [4], and whose unconscious aim is not to

---

Read before the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, March 23, 1948.

1 The term 'art' is used collectively for all inventions of the creative imagination. This includes painting, sculpture, literature, music, philosophical and scientific discovery, and invention.

2 'Contemplative experience' refers to such an excited and passionate absorption of subject with object as results in a close sense of union with it and a consequent loss of individuality.

3 Psychiatry, X, 1947, pp. 281–306.

4 It is beyond the scope of the present contribution to consider other classes of artistic experience which are very important because they include our most frequent experiences of art. I refer to those salutary makings and appreciatings that yield less intense spiritual pleasures to the art-sensitive, including the creative artist himself when he is not inspired. In *The Æsthetic States of the Mind, ibid.,* the reader will find these varieties of making and appreciating described, classified, and compared.

bribe conscience in order to gain expression of œdipal fantasies, or to 'water the passions'.

THE CULTURAL VIEW OF ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE AS 'SPIRITUAL'

No matter what chaos exists among theories of æsthetics, or how widely men differ in their judgment of art, or how variously the maker and the appreciator describe their experiences, there is one point of agreement among all: the 'spiritual' quality of artistic experience. The evidence presented in The Cultural Lag in Æsthetics [5] demonstrated that because of the coöperation of cultural and individual factors, the philosopher, the artist, the sensitive appreciator, as well as the man in the street, all hold experience of the arts to be an exercise of the spirit—a 'spiritual language'. It would be remarkable, indeed, if these theories did not agree at least concerning the factor of spirituality.

When we examine the authoritative,[6] philosophical theories of æsthetics for their explanations of what leads to a spiritual kind of satisfaction from art, we find that this is always described as resulting from one's reaction to something outside one's self. The outer stimulus that is said to evoke true creativeness as well as mere rendering is a supernatural one. Most frequently it is stated to be the beauty of nature; but beauty of nature here refers directly, or ultimately, to the beauty of nature as a manifestation of the beauty of God; it represents the divinely perfect and the divinely ideal, Mother Nature. Thus, the external stimulus to the creative activity of the artist is claimed to be the beauty of God at some remove; or else this stimulus is ascribed to another personification in the supernatural—the Muse. It is for this reason that emotive and God-referent terms like 'soul', 'revelation', 'miraculous' and 'divine beauty' retain

[5] Lee, Harry B.: *The Cultural Lag in Æsthetics.* J. of Æsthetics and Art Criticism, V, 1947, pp. 120–139.

[6] The philosophical theories of æsthetics have always been the authoritative ones since they are approved by culture. It is from these that the artist, the art critic, the æsthetician, and the scientist receive their directive.

the currency they have enjoyed since ancient times in descriptions of artistic experience and works of art. They are ingredients as habitual to the discussion of art as they are necessary to the philosopher's theocentric æsthetic from which they are borrowed, and to the theologian's description of religious experience from which they are derived.

Since *a priori* assumptions lead the philosopher to view the beauty of nature and all other beauties as various manifestations of a universal concept, the beauty of God, he always brackets together 'the beauty of nature and art'. Accordingly, he describes the artist as one endowed by constitution with an extraordinary sensitivity to the beauty in nature-and-art or to the perfection of nature-and-art; or else he states that the maker of art possesses a special capacity for perceiving the ideal in the commonplace. The artist is said to enjoy a 'spiritual' kind of satisfaction from his special sensibility to beauty in nature; this sensibility is claimed to evoke an 'æsthetic impulse' that moves him in mysterious ways to make art. His transcription of divine beauty into the work of art is then said to serve those less sensitive appreciators than the artist as the effective stimulus for evoking their apprehension of this beauty. Thus, the work of art yields the less sensitive a measure of the same spiritual satisfaction as the artist enjoyed in reacting directly to a beauty he is gifted to discover in nature. If the reader will read this paragraph again he will observe how closely these theories have claimed the functions of the artist to resemble those of the minister of religion as a specially gifted mediator between God and man; and how closely they claim the relationship of the contemplative appreciator of a work of art to parallel the experience of those who seek spiritual satisfaction from religious ritual officiated by a minister of God. It is evident that theories which explain artistic experience as an interior perception of the beauty of God in nature-and-art are but lightly revised editions of the ancient æsthetic that declared the activity of the artist to result from divine possession.

Now, our objections to the philosopher's æsthetic are not only that it fails to give humanistically oriented explanations

of the making and appreciating of art such as science and art criticism would find more helpful as their directive; or that it discourages investigation of these problems by proscribing them as mysteries, 'unanalyzable ultimates', incapable of solution by the human mind; but also because it has infected all theories of art with the erroneous conclusion that there is but one kind of artistic experience, of which making and appreciating are assumed to be different degrees. Our everyday experience demonstrates this idea to be erroneous since those sensitive to art would find a work of art equally satisfying at all times if there were but one kind of artistic experience, if sensitivity to art were a constitutional endowment, and if pleasure from art were based on a universal quality like the beauty of God. For the same reasons, the tastes of the artistically sensitive should not differ so very widely from their contemporaries and from the tastes of other generations. Our day to day appreciating reveals that we achieve of the same work of art on different occasions the most extreme variations in the kind and extent of our satisfaction. It may be quite absent at times. Sometimes it affords intellectual satisfactions. It may move us with a considerable delight and a salutary sense of peace and order at other times. Occasionally, it becomes the means to an ecstatic degree of contemplation whose occurrence we cannot govern or predict. And we are not much informed about the reasons for all this by going to the vast literature about art. It is not very helpful, for example, to philosophize about the mystery with Schopenhauer: 'You must treat a work of art like a great man: stand before it and wait patiently till it deigns to speak'; or to accept the reassurance of the psychologist that 'the appreciation of beauty comes when the bid is accepted' [7]; or to assume an 'æsthetic impulse' with the artist, art critic, and æsthetician who state that 'man's æsthetic impulse gives to works of art their spiritual significance'.[8]

[7] Ogden, Robert M.: *The Psychology of Art.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938, p. 216.

[8] Fry, Roger: The Arts of Painting and Sculpture, in *An Outline of Modern Knowledge.* New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1931, p. 913.

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF ARTISTIC EXPERIENCE AS 'SPIRITUAL'

When we turn to the evidence from artists concerning their most satisfying moments of creating and appreciating, we find that they, too, describe the pleasure of these experiences as 'spiritual'. What is really arresting is the unanimity of the testimony offered by them and by other artistically sensitive individuals that the making or appreciating of art yields a 'spiritual' delight. This unanimity is impressive since it embraces agnostics and atheists as well as the religious. Some declare that their satisfaction from art is of a frankly 'religious' quality; others testify that their experience is a mystical one; but all agree upon the 'spiritual' quality of their pleasure, both in making and appreciating art.

The testimony of the artist lends credibility also to the philosophical tradition concerning the mysteriousness of art; that the beauty of nature and art is an 'unanalyzable ultimate', a mystery beyond the ken of man. The artist contributes to this tradition from the ineffability of his experience since this leads him to refuse to discuss it or else to offer mystifying, i.e., absurd, vague, and evasive descriptions of his experience; because he often describes it as 'a mysterious gift'; from his belief in a Muse; and from his penchant for employing bizarre magical techniques [9] to invoke the reluctant Muse. With complete sincerity, he states of his creative moments that he is not responsible for them. Generally, he projects their origin to an external source, usually a supernatural one: to God, to Muse, or to

[9] Examples: In order to produce a state of inspiration, Schiller kept rotten apples in his desk; Shelley and Rousseau remained bareheaded in the sunshine; Bossuet worked in a cold room with his head wrapped in furs; Milton, Descartes, Leibniz and Rossini lay stretched out; Tycho-Brahe and Leibniz secluded themselves for very long periods; Thoreau built his hermitage; Proust worked in a cork-lined room; Carlyle in a noise-proof chamber; Balzac wore a monkish working garb; Gretry and Schiller immersed their feet in ice-cold water; Guido Reni could paint, and de Musset could write poetry, only when dressed in magnificent style; Mozart, following exercise; Lamennais, in a room of shadowy darkness; and D'Annunzio, Farnol, and Frost only at night. The æsthetician, Baumgarten, advised poets seeking inspiration to ride horseback, to drink wine in moderation, and, provided they were chaste, to look at beautiful women.

Mother Nature. He claims that they are evoked in him 'from another world', from the 'invisible world', from 'the spiritual world', or by his perception of a 'supernal beauty in nature'. He declares that 'a little fairy told me', that 'the brownies did it', or that he was 'possessed by a spirit'.

Upon the objectivity and scientific value of the evidence of testimony we have important studies that impeach its trustworthiness. The careful historian, psychologist, and jurist no longer believe that an individual's good moral character qualifies him to be a thoroughly reliable witness of what he has observed, particularly when he is observing himself. The chief factor that reduces the scientific worth of testimony is the distortion resulting from unconscious emotional attitudes of the observer. The testimony of the artist is particularly liable to such distortions on account of the ineffability of his experience; from the fact that he usually gives an account of his creative moments long after they have occurred; because his account is generally seasoned with fancies culled from culture's large fund of otherworldly lore about artistic creativeness; and because the artist's description is colored with a tendency to coöperate in manufacturing the legend of himself. While for these reasons we might conclude that the artist's description is not trustworthy as evidence, we must give due weight to the fact that all creative artists agree about the spiritual quality of their pleasure during artistic experience of the contemplative kind, even though they differ remarkably in regard to every other particular.

We may say only that the features of spirituality and mysteriousness which all creative artists agree upon resemble very closely these features of the philosopher's æsthetic. However, it would be superficial to leap to the conclusion that this resemblance derives merely from cultural indoctrination of the artist. We should note the similarity of their descriptions, but we should not conclude without further examination that this similarity is identity.

THE NATURE OF SPIRITUALITY IN THE CONTEMPLATIVE EXPERIENCE OF ART

A psychoanalytic theory of artistic sublimation, which keeps abreast of the evolutionary development that psychoanalysis as a science has long since achieved in regard to other processes of the mind, should offer to general science, æsthetics, and art criticism more complete explanations of artistic experience than we now have.[10] It should explain why the artist is able only occasionally to create inspired work, and why he is able to create just then; why his pleasure is of a spiritual kind; and how art affords the experience of beauty.[11]

I have described elsewhere the mental organization of the creative artist, both as a citizen and a maker.[12] He suffers now and then a neurotic depression in order to deal with the mass of guilt that confronts him when he has relaxed the function of pity sufficiently to permit the expression of destructive rage. At these times, on account of the acute increase in guilt feeling, and because of his incapacity to deal effectively with the worms of conscience by other means than partial regression, he becomes depressed and withdraws from the environment a considerable share of interest which he then devotes to healing the disorder among the institutions of his mind. The first steps in self-healing consist in employing those mental processes which are commonly used to liquidate a sense of guilt: by turning against one's self the same destructive rage as one had vented

[10] 'We are far from the day when analysts were prone to cite the blessed word sublimation as the *deus ex machina* in all social and idealistic impulses. Things have proved to be very much more complicated than they seemed in the early days of psychoanalysis.' Jones, Ernest: *Evolution and Revolution.* Int. J. Psa., XXII, 1941, p. 203.

[11] The emphasis upon 'forbidden fantasies' has encouraged an erroneous assumption that to discover some variation of the œdipus complex in subject matter reveals facts about the processes of artistic sublimation. Its results have disappointed those who work in the arts—artists, art critics, and æstheticians—and who turned to psychoanalysis with the hope that it would resolve some of the chaos that exists in æsthetics.

[12] Lee, Harry B.: *A Theory Concerning Free Creation in the Inventive Arts.* Psychiatry, III, 1940, pp. 229–293.

upon another, by unconscious demands for self-punishment, and by projection. But the neurotic depression of the creative artist is unique in its extensive sense of loss due to the withdrawal of love by the maternal representative in his conscience; this results from the special importance of the representation of his mother in the creative artist's conscience, and from experiencing guilt particularly toward her when he expresses destructive rage. Because of this composition of his conscience, and because of the artist's need of partial regression in the face of great anxiety, when the point is reached where suffering has liquidated enough guilt, the depressed artist is able to muster special mental processes that complete his cure: he sues with reparation and restitution for the return of love and approval from the maternal representative in conscience. His suit begins when 'inspired' conception expresses in fantasy such restitutive intentions as demonstrate to his conscience that pity is being restored for an object toward which the artist had recently experienced destructive rage, and which he again regards lovingly. Upon the continued liquidation of guilt by the creative materialization of these intentions, symbolized in the work of art, the ego is reconciled with the conscience and becomes the object of its love. This love is of the same intensity, and of the same infantile and narcissistic kind, as it received long ago from the good mother of its infancy. A marked elevation of self-esteem results from recapturing the flavor of those moments in early life when, guilty over destructive rage toward its mother, the child regained her love, approval, and gratitude in the reconciliation that occurred when appropriate actions indicated a renewed allegiance to her teachings of pity.[13]

[13] This explanation of the rôle of narcissism in artistic creation differs from that of Sachs who states that the artist *sacrifices* his narcissism and that he displaces it to the work whence it returns as beauty of form. Sachs, Hanns: *Kunst und Persönlichkeit.* Imago, XV, 1929, pp. 1–15, states: 'The daydreamer becomes an artist as soon as he foregoes the wish to be admired and to be without faults himself; when only his work, standing before him and other people, is to receive tribute'. Our theory is incomplete also in its failure to explain how the beauty of form originates, why it is only occasionally possible for the creative artist to create æsthetic form, and why artistically sensitive individuals are able to have widely different appreciating experiences of the same work.

At the same time, the ego is reconciled also with its God and Muse, feeling no longer alienated from them, but especially loved.[14] The inspired concept which rises ready-made from the unconscious of the artist is not attributed to supernatural sources merely because culture provides that lore and that word, 'inspiration', which define creativeness as resulting from a special relationship with a supernatural being. The ego does not view its creative mental processes as revealed only to explain in a self-aggrandizing manner what it cannot account for from the data of consciousness: the mystifying, compulsive nature of the creative process in which, as a seemingly passive vessel, the artist is able to make with ease works with formal and technical qualities such as he never achieves at other times, even with arduous labor. It is the reconciliations with conscience *and* with God or Muse that permit the creating ego to view its work as revealed from an outside source, and that result in the pleasure of the quality we call spiritual.[15] Although there are atheists and agnostics among artists, none is without a secret belief in his Muse and in the efficacy of his magical techniques for invoking and controlling Her.[16] The Muse is, of course, none other than

[14] It is because we cling to the idealized images of our parents that, as Freud has shown, we tend to project these images into the heavens where they become the source of religions. Psychoanalysis has made us familiar with the facts that parents are less harsh than their representations in conscience; and that projection to God facilitates moral control since obedience to an external authority is less exacting than conformity with the severities of conscience. Our concept of God is softened further with displacements of the infantile need to idealize parents as powerful, infinitely good, and perfect enough to cater to demands for passive receptiveness, security, and self-esteem.

[15] The pleasure from a contemplative orientation to art is characterized by the qualities of spirituality and 'disinterestedness'. Disinterested pleasure describes the fact that, although pleasure is intense, there is no desire to possess or consume the object. The disinterestedness of our pleasure in the work of art results from our attainment of a sense of union with it, and our achievement from this union of what we need most just then: to be loved passionately by the maternal representative in conscience.

[16] In ancient times a work of art was begun religiously with an invocation of the Muse, of whom there were nine in number, each assigned to preside over some particular department of art, literature, or science. One of the Muses, the 'heavenly Muse', the feminine 'prophetic spirit', the 'celestial patroness', 'Our Lady', the Virgin Mary, the Holy Ghost, the Regina Coeli, and others, were invoked by the artist according to his preference.

a projection to the supernatural of the idealized mother of the artist's childhood—of whom Hesiod sang:

> Muses, who make man's mind widen with knowledge,
> And his tongue speak from heaven.

Thus, the states of inspiration and creativeness recapture for the ego some delights of the heaven that lay about it in infancy before it acquired a God. This, also, was a passive heaven tended by a powerful and good mother who 'possessed' the ego and fed its self-esteem, even as her images in conscience and in God or Muse do to an equal extent during inspired creativeness; here, too, was one omniscient enough to divine its wishes and to reveal them to an ego that was then little differentiated from an outer world consisting largely of mother.

Inspired fantasies express intentions to restore the damaged or destroyed object and to love it. Creativeness fulfils these intentions magically, in symbol, and so restores further the effective functioning of pity. Upon this renewal of allegiance to ideal ends, conscience and ego are reconciled and unified; conscience no longer regards the ego as unworthy, but loves it excessively instead. The rare harmony now existing among the institutions of the mind is felt as an unusual sense of exaltation and oneness called rapture, exalted peace, transport, mysterious emotion, enthusiasm, ecstacy, elevating excitement of the soul, or 'oceanic' feeling.[17] These terms describe the unification of the personality and the ego's experience of a marked sense of well-being from recapture of an archaic kind of self-regard and omnipotence. The last four terms indicate also the reference of this experience to supernatural sources.

During inspired creativeness, the sensory and motor functions are flooded with energy released from the tasks of repression and self-punishment, so that the depressed artist is transfigured with such a sense of life, power, and acute sensibility, as to enable him to work passionately and strenuously with little

[17] The term 'oceanic feeling' describes the recapture, intrapsychically, of an infantile close union with the mother and with the projections of her idealized image to the supernatural.

fatigue. What to his recent mind seemed difficult and obscure becomes suddenly intelligible and acutely clear. He is aware of a heightened sense of reality, believes that he is 'seeing into the heart of things', and that he is achieving unusual intuitions of the significance of life.[18]

All of his attention is absorbed by the work of creating, to the degree that ordinary distinctions between himself and the work almost disappear; and it continues so, despite exertion and fatigue, until creativeness has transacted the psychic labors of restitution to the Queen's taste. The work is judged by conscience and by others to be animated since it materializes his loving identification with the restored and perfect object, and his sense of its life.[19] It is judged to have a 'soul' because it is a spiritual self-representation and a worthy votive offering. It is judged beautiful since he has embodied in it the same pity, love, and unique harmoniousness as he solicits from conscience for himself.[20]

Freed of its albatross, and reconciled with conscience, the ego expands into abnormally free confluence with its projections of idealized parent images as God and Muse; for it feels as intensely loved by these as by conscience. This is what the inspired artist construes as a sense of the immediacy of some supernatural power. It moves him to declare that he is drawing inspiration from an external source: from God, supernal beauty, Mother Nature, the universe, or just his Muse. It leads him to believe that he is tuning in on transcendental truths, and that he is endowed with the capacity for expressing them in his art during these moments.[21] This exhilarating unification of self is the result of the artist's contemplative attitude toward an

[18] The so-called 'antecedent reality' into which the artist is claimed to have inspired glimpses, is but the recapture, among the institutions of the artist's mind, of the same narcissistic being loved for himself as he was in infancy.

[19] ' 'Tis to create, and in creating live
A being more intense that we endow
With form our fancy, gaining as we give
The life we image, even as I do now.' (Byron)

[20] 'Handsome is that handsome does.'

[21] Thus, it is said of artists that they 'are ahead of their time', and that they express the *Zeitgeist.*

object that he has magically restored with his work; and he enjoys these moments in this extent only when he employs creativeness to complete the self-healing of a neurotic depression.[22] He describes the pleasure of these moments as spiritual; and if he has acquired extensive projections to God he describes the pleasure as a religious one. Since we see the world as we are, it is small wonder that the artist, now keenly attuned with conscience and God, sees the ideal in the real; and that he sees hidden in the natural many intimations of the beauty and the perfection with which he had invested the supernatural representation of parent images.[23] He perceives all objects as he has conceived the restored one—as they ought to be, not as they are; and, in the work he creates, he is able only to re-present the real with the ideal values which are then organic to his personality.[24]

[22] The overtone of melancholy so characteristic of works of creative art is the signature of that residue of the artist's neurotic depression which inspired creativeness has not yet dissolved. The melancholy temper of artists ('the sweet melancholy of the poet') and philosophers is well known. The artist's melancholy disposition has been commented upon at least since the time of Aristotle who remarked that genius is allied to melancholy. The poet partly recognizes this in himself, as when Wordsworth writes:

> 'The Poet, gentle creature that he is
> Hath, like the lover, his unruly times;
> His fits when he is neither sick nor well,
> Though no distress be near him but his own
> Unmanageable thoughts.'

The artist's depression, its recurrent nature, and its symptoms of suffering and inhibition, are not recognized as such by the artist or his friends who regard them as an 'æsthetic retreat', or as the due expressions of a temperamental, because gifted, nature; or else they attribute his depressive hebetude and despondency to external circumstances such as overwork or a presumed organic illness; nor are his desolation and inability to work recognized as depression by psychologists who dismiss these with classification as a period of artistic brooding, æsthetic reverie, contemplation, 'musing', 'incubation', or 'germination'.

[23] Bacon, Francis: *deAugmentis, Scientarum,* ii, 13. 'And, therefore, it (Poesy) was ever thought to have some participation in divineness, because it doth raise and erect the mind, by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind, whereas Reason doth buckle and bow the mind unto the nature of things.'

[24] Plotinus, in *Enneads*: 'The soul does not see beauty if it has not become beautiful itself.'

We may conclude that the spiritual pleasure from artistic experience does not derive from a belief in values that transcend human life, but from this kind of healing restoration of inner harmony among the institutions of the mind.

THE NATURE OF BEAUTY IN THE CONTEMPLATIVE EXPERIENCE OF ART

The mental organization of the partially regressed artist is such that, guilt having been reduced sufficiently by other means, the ego is able to begin re-progression by ushering in an æsthetic state of mind whose object is creativeness. The unconscious object of æsthetic mental activity—art, invention, theoretical activity—is to create something freighted with such convincing overcompensatory signs of integrity, perfection, and aliveness as will convince the conscience, and that only symbol and magical activity could contain. When this æsthetic synthesis of the institutions of the mind succeeds with creativeness, the artist experiences pleasure of a spiritual quality and beauty. This view differs with those of philosophical æsthetics where beauty has been confused with pleasure, religious feeling, knowledge, play, the sensible imitation of natural objects, truth, goodness, the contemplation of passion, 'intransitive love', and morality. It differs, too, with the traditional view of æsthetics that the experience of beauty is evoked by an external stimulus that we judge to be full of beauty, such as the beauties of art and nature.

We have seen that inspiration and creativeness are substitute reaction-formations employed by the depressed artist in order to make restitution. The contemplative ego is an earnest suppliant, eager to redeem itself with the conscience. With inspirational fantasies which are stages in the restitution that replaces a hostile identification with an intensely loving one, the ego begins to redeem itself with the conscience. In these fantasies, the ego regards the destroyed or damaged object in the way it hopes to induce the conscience to regard it: as if the ego intends to restore the object not only perfect and undamaged,

but to restore it to a unique organic unity; and as if the ego intends the object not only to live, but to be animated with an unusual sense of aliveness. The elaboration of these intentions to regenerate an object with whom its recent relationship consisted in a partial hostile identification earns some of the approval for which it sues. Partly redeemed, it becomes more alive; self-esteem returns; hebetude disappears and is replaced with new energy and pressure to activity.

When inspiration is successful, the ego directs its activity to pursue these salutary gains with increased expressions of the same intentions. This activity is creativeness, an attempt to influence conscience magically. It wins complete redemption with conscience. The artist wields this magic by taking a substitute for the destroyed object, some dead matter, and loving it passionately until he has transformed it with an overcompensating sense of unification, perfection, and aliveness.[25] The experience of beauty begins during inspiration which attempts in fantasy to restore these characteristics to the object and to achieve progressively deeper identifications with it. Delight with its beauty reaches greatest intensity when creativeness furthers the expression of these ideal intentions by embodying them in symbol in the formal features of the work, and by loving treatment of the dead materials.[26] The inner sense of beauty in inspiration and creation results from this magical regeneration of the object and the artist's loving union with it.[27] This kind of complete and positively toned absorption with the object is known as 'contemplative' in the literature of æsthetics.[28]

[25] Browning, Robert, in *The Ring and the Book,* described the experience of inspiration as follows:

> 'I fused my live soul with that inert stuff
> Before attempting smithcraft.'

[26] Renoir, Pierre Auguste: 'It is not enough for a painter to be a clever craftsman; he must love to caress his canvas too.'

[27] The artist, therefore, feels reborn in a spiritual sense. He refers to the work as an incubation, a pregnancy, and as his brain child because he has given life to something.

[28] Ducasse states: To contemplate æsthetically an object one attends to is to be at the moment interested in, and as it were to listen for, the particular sensations, feelings, moods, emotions, sentiments or other directly intuitable qualities which the object exhibits or expresses. Ducasse, C. J.: *Æsthetics and the Æsthetic Activities.* J. of Æsthetics and Art Criticism, V, 1947, p. 166.

The contemplative experience of artistic beauty is a supreme example of the synthetic function of the ego. It achieves a synthesis of the institutions of the mind by liquidating with æsthetic experience the needs that arise from guilt over destructive rage. Inspiration is the contemplative activity that experiments in fantasy with the renewal of allegiance to ideal intentions. Creativeness is the contemplative activity that completes the expression of these values by transfiguring dead matter into forms which symbolize wholeness, perfection, aliveness, and lovability. The inspired artist's experience of beauty is greatest during creativeness as he extends his contemplative identification with the object that he is 'bodying forth'.

During inspiration and creativeness, the ego is first delighted with the experience of beauty from identification with the unique perfection of the restored object; and then from being found loveworthy, and being loved intensely, by conscience, God, and Muse. Thus, the experience of beauty is a fusion of narcissistic delights arising from separate psychic activities. One is identification. The other is as the love object of the conscience. It is from the latter activity that the spiritual pleasure results.[29]

When the psychic tasks of restitution are completed, the artist's keen delight in the beauty of the work and also his rapt interest in it are dissipated. The beauty of form remains in the work and is not lost on the sensitive appreciator. When his needs for defense require employment of the contemplative mood, he will be able to tune in its beauties. What will then appeal to him as æsthetic is his intuitive apprehension of the ideal intentions that the creative artist had embodied within the formal characteristics of the work. He will intuit in them a representation of the same allegiance to ideal intentions as he is seeking to renew in himself.

It is now plain why the artist tells us that the delight of his contemplative moments is spiritual or religious; and that he is

[29] The distinctions made in this paragraph are important theoretically since very much of the literature of æsthetics concerns 'the sense of beauty'. Hedonistic theories confuse beauty with pleasure; and theories differ as to whether the beauty is in the subject or the object.

not reciting what he has learned from cultural indoctrination. His is an interior experience of God, if we are mindful that it is an unconscious one, consisting in being loved intensely by an idealized image of the mother who was his first ideal of beauty, and was projected to the heavens as God and Muse. It is in this sense that 'poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man'.

With the need and the purpose of the artist's creativeness understood in these ways, psychoanalysis could offer to æsthetics, psychology, and art criticism a rational directive for their efforts. It can supply to their present authority, the chaos of philosophical æsthetics, the order that its many nuggets of truth must contain in distorted form. It can help us to understand, too, since conscience is also our faculty of moral control, why the boundary between æsthetics and ethics is confused, and why the experience of beauty is said to have moral qualities.

There remains to note an impressive analogy between the mystical character of creative artistic experience and what is reported by the mystic about religious inspiration. The mystic divides his experience into four stages: quiet, union, ecstacy, and spiritual espousal. The quiet refers to his habit of retiring voluntarily into solitude and obscurity in order to solicit inspiration and to await the inner call. This resembles the artist's self-isolation whenever he is overtaken by a neurotic depression. The descriptions of self-punishment followed by union, ecstacy and spiritual espousal resemble the events and the sequence of events in the artist's self-healing of a depression. In both the religious mystic and the creative artist, inspiration follows a period of self-punishment in a person who is sufficiently psychopathological to withdraw from his fellows periodically in a state of depression. In both, inspiration is sudden, passive, transient, and ineffable; it yields a spiritual quality of pleasure and the experience of beauty, and has noetic features that are employed to solve a problem with an ideal aim. The inspired state of each is contemplative; the mystic aims at complete absorption of himself into God, and projects his inspiration as revealed; the artist arrives at complete absorption of himself

in the work of art, whose ideal aim is described above. Although I have not had opportunity to observe clinically a true mystic, we could infer on the basis of these analogies that, with respect to the organization of their minds, the mystic and the creative artist are brothers. I would hazard two guesses: 1, that the neurotic depression of the mystic consists in a more extensive partial regression than that of the artist; and 2, that the conscience of the mystic differs from that of the artist in the dominance of the paternal representative in the conscience of the mystic.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Nature of Reality, the Meaning of Nothing, with an Addendum on Concentration

Bertram D. Lewin

To cite this article: Bertram D. Lewin (1948) The Nature of Reality, the Meaning of Nothing, with an Addendum on Concentration, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 524-526, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11925739

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11925739

Published online: 07 Dec 2017.

THE NATURE OF REALITY, THE MEANING OF NOTHING, WITH AN ADDENDUM ON CONCENTRATION

BY BERTRAM D. LEWIN, M.D. (NEW YORK)

REALITY

Freud states that if a sense of reality accompanies a dream, analysis will show that one or more latent thoughts in it do in fact refer to something real. As an example, he cites a dream accompanied by a sense of reality, in which two pears that the dreamer is given represent the maternal breasts, which the dreamer had once indeed received. The quality of realness in the dream indicates the reality present in the original situation.

One of my patients had a strong castration complex which prevented him from looking at a nude woman. Discussing reality, not in a dream but more abstractly, he lamented that he had never been able to see it starkly. 'I have never faced reality', he said sadly, 'I haven't faced reality since the day I was born'. This equation of reality with the mother's genital differs from the one cited by Freud. However, there are many attitudes to reality, according to whether it is faced optimistically or pessimistically. Proverbially, the optimist sees the doughnut, the pessimist sees the hole.

So far as I have noted, the idea 'reality', as it appears in free associations, stands for the female genitalia. I have been correct in anticipating remarks about the female genital following a patient's expression of thoughts about reality. It occurred to me to check up on some of the literature and see what others have recorded. The Wolf-man's famous dream left him with a strong sense of reality. Among the real things referred to was the real aspect of the vagina. In Ruth Mack Brunswick's paper on paranoid jealousy two pages are devoted to two dreams that had an intense sense of reality. The first dream depicts the patient, a woman, in bed with a woman; the patient is instructed to hold the woman's labia open with one hand and rub the clitoris with the other. The patient has an intense orgasm in the dream and awakes with a feeling of absolute reality; in fact, she examines her own genital with her hand, finds that she is menstruating and wearing a napkin, and only this convinces her that she was dreaming. The second

dream, in which reality also appears, is only slightly different: the patient is masturbating her sister, who has an orgasm, and the patient awakes to find her husband's penis in her hand.

As the free association, 'reality', usually refers to the real female genital, so remarks about 'illusion' signify latent ideas about the imaginary one which, as is well known, Rado has called the 'illusory' penis. The words, 'vagueness' and 'confusion' have the same reference; for reasons sufficient to the patient, the female genital is a vagueness, a confusion. 'In my confusion', said one, 'I found something concrete', referring to the clitoris.

I do not know to what extent unconscious associations of this sort have affected philosophers' ideas on the nature of reality. I note in one instance, however, that a philosopher chides authorities he has read for giving him a false impression, as if anatomic charts had led him to false anticipations. He says: 'They have substituted economical and orderly conceptions for the first sensible tangle; and whether they were morally or only intellectually neat, they were at any rate always æsthetically pure and definite, and aimed at ascribing to the world something clean and intellectual in the way of inner structure'. The view he professes 'offers but a sorry appearance'. 'It is a turbid, muddled, Gothic sort of affair, without a sweeping outline, and with little pictorial solidity. Those of you who are accustomed to the classical construction of reality may be excused if your first reaction upon it be absolute contempt. . . . But one must have lived some time with a system to appreciate its merits. Perhaps a little more familiarity may mitigate your first surprise at such a programme as I offer.'

NOTHING

For the association 'I am thinking of nothing', the interpretation is the same. The phrase is soon followed by allusions to the female genital. One of my patients was pleased with this interpretation, which struck his sense of humor. One day he began his analytic hour by telling me, 'Well, doctor, I've been thinking of nothing all day'.

CONCENTRATION

The common remark, 'I cannot concentrate', refers not to the stream of thought, but to the urinary flow, which in women (and in male

incontinence) is not concentrated. After numerous instances of this reference in my practice, I ventured to guess at a Technical Seminar that a girl complaining of lack of concentration had a urethral story to tell. The student confirmed this by informing us that she had enuresis.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Transference in Borderline Neuroses

Adolph Stern

To cite this article: Adolph Stern (1948) Transference in Borderline Neuroses, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 527-528, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11925740

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11925740

Published online: 07 Dec 2017.

TRANSFERENCE IN BORDERLINE NEUROSES

BY ADOLPH STERN, M.D. (NEW YORK)

The childhood of patients in borderline states reveals that one or both parents had gross psychopathology ranging from distorted characters to psychosis. The parents quarrel, and an anxious, insecure atmosphere pervades the household more or less constantly over long periods of time. Separation of the parents, desertion by one or the other parent, cruelty or brutality, deprive these children of normal affective support for their naturally dependent needs. The 'hunger for love',[1] understanding, support, reassurance, respect and a sense of belonging being ungratified, the effect is severely traumatic.

It is therefore not surprising that, from the very beginning of psychoanalytic treatment, these patients react in the transference as traumatized, preœdipal children. Experience has shown that sitting face to face with the patient obviates some difficulties that ensue if the patient lies on a couch (except occasionally and for specific, limited objectives). It is less liable to produce anxiety at the beginning of treatment. Any tendency to withdraw from reality is made less likely by seeing and watching the analyst directly. The patient is also less apt to lapse into a detached state of reverie; moreover, the analyst has the advantage of being in a position to note the patient's reactions to what is said. But be they rigid, affectless or overtly anxious, each one conveys vividly a spoken or a mute plea for help and support (parental).

From the start there is a high degree of unreality in the transference until the patient has become convinced that the analyst's affective support is constant and dependable, in contrast with his experience in this respect during his childhood. The degree to which this succeeds enables the patient to gain effective insight with a minimum of anxiety.

Because of the preœdipal nature of the dependent transference, it is essential that the analyst be more active than is customary in psychoanalytic therapy. This encourages, as it should, a predominantly positive reaction on the part of the patient. The manage-

[1] This is a modification of David M. Levy's term 'love hunger'.

ment of this phase of the transference is of central, clinical importance from the start. Unless the positive phase is sufficiently maintained and strengthened, the negative phases, which inevitably come later, may involve so much of a threat to the ego as to endanger the therapeutic results.

Since the precœdipal transferences dominate and govern these patients' relationships, in analysis they make use of every device in their own pathologically needy behalf to convince themselves, and to test the analyst, in determining whether this new 'parent' is more dependable, constant, benevolent, surely less punitive and more permissive than their own parents were. The patient is constantly on the alert to note how the analyst feels toward him. His compliance in reporting dreams, experiences, and in giving free associations is chiefly for the purpose of seeking approval or commendation, rather than to supply material for the therapeutic work. His total behavior is tendentious. Ultimately he gains the courage to release his repressed anger in the transference in the form of outbursts of rage and other 'punitive' retaliations. At times these negative affects have the function of testing the analytic relationship. When love and trust are sufficiently encouraged, a point of fulfilment is reached at which a new experience is realized, the significance of which is the security necessary for object love, and the œdipal phase of the transference can then be managed much as it is in the average patient suffering from a psychoneurosis.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

On the Meaning of Losing Teeth in Dreams

Sandor Lorand

To cite this article: Sandor Lorand (1948) On the Meaning of Losing Teeth in Dreams, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 529-530, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11950873

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11950873

Published online: 07 Dec 2017.

ON THE MEANING OF LOSING TEETH IN DREAMS

BY SANDOR LORAND, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Judging from the numerous contributions in psychoanalytic literature to the interpretation of the symbolism of teeth, it appears that at times analysts encounter difficulties in giving the patient a complete interpretation of dreams of that type.

Freud termed certain dreams about teeth 'typical' because so many people have almost identical dreams. He drew attention to the relationship between the immediate dream stimulus and repressed masturbatory desires, fears of castration, and the desires and fears connected with birth fantasies. Freud was of the opinion that the strongest factor in the creation of such dreams derived from masturbatory activities. In women, he believed that they always symbolically expressed parturition; however, he felt that there was need for further clarification of the possible varied meanings of the dream of having one's teeth pulled.

Following is the dream of a patient according to whose associations to it—and my knowledge of the nature of her deepest problems —the one final aim and wish was expressed, which I believe applies to all dreams of that type. She had two dreams the night before, about her early childhood aggression and parental frustrations, expressing attacks on her mother, father, husband and, in the transference, on the analyst. These dreams were thoroughly analyzed. The following night she dreamed:

> I have a painful tooth, a lower front tooth, which is abcessed. I put my fingers in my mouth and pull it out. At the root of the tooth and clinging to it is the pus sac of the abcess. I thought in the dream, 'Why, that is just like a penis in a rubber condom with the seminal fluid collected at the end of the condom'.

Her associations to the dream were first to her castrative tendencies toward her husband as well as against herself. This thought led to the expression of her feelings of guilt and responsibility for causing her husband difficulties in attaining his orgasm. I was able to elicit even deeper associations along the following line: first, self-castration, self-deprivation through castrating her husband (by fellatio—biting); then guilt and self-mutilation as punishment. Fur-

ther thoughts led to ideas of spoiling her appearance by losing a front tooth; making herself unattractive to eliminate the trouble attendant upon involvement in an emotional relationship with a man. Still further associations led to the idea of menopause, which she is approaching, and of growing old, both serving the purpose of precluding emotional entanglement. On the deepest level her associations brought out the basic desire to be a toothless, helpless baby, in order to be taken care of at a level where sex is not a problem, thus saving her all the trouble and frustration she is exposed to in connection with it.

I believe this last thought in the chain of associations is the clue to dreams of this type. In the forty-nine references to dreams about teeth which I checked (there are probably at least as many more), I found only one which includes this idea. Antonie Rhan, in a paper which appeared in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* in 1932, expresses the opinion that such dreams lead back to the earliest stage of thumb sucking, when the baby has no teeth and enjoys itself with little or no disturbance from reality.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis. Volume III. 1947 · Edited by Sandor Lorand. New York: International Universities Press, 1948. 308 pp.

Ralph R. Greenson

To cite this article: Ralph R. Greenson (1948) The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis. Volume III. 1947 · Edited by Sandor Lorand. New York: International Universities Press, 1948. 308 pp., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 531-555, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11950893

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11950893

BOOK REVIEWS

THE YEARBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. Volume III. 1947. Edited by Sandor Lorand. New York: International Universities Press, 1948. 308 pp.

This edition of the Yearbook contains twenty papers on different aspects of psychoanalysis. Some of the contributions contain original ideas; others represent more precise formulations of well-known problems; still others are applications of psychoanalysis to new subject matter.

Fenichel's, Some Remarks on Freud's Place in the History of Science, stresses Freud's scientific contribution as consisting in examining scientifically the hitherto irrational, sacred and taboo. It was a rebellion against the physical scientist's neglect of psychology and against the prejudices of the social forces which sought the maintenance of the status quo. One of the dangers facing psychoanalysis today is a return to magical thinking in excessive theorizing, or a trend to 'idealism' as a cure for the discontents of society.

Bernfeld in An Unknown Autobiographical Fragment by Freud attempts to establish the identity of a patient Freud described in *Uber Deckerinnerungen,* 1899. The patient's history, his unusual grasp of psychoanalytic principles and the fact that this paper was never published in any later collection makes it plausible that the patient was Freud himself.

A Valedictory Address contains the reflections of Ernest Jones' forty years of work in psychoanalysis. Most noteworthy is his comment that anyone who makes comfort his first aim in life is ill-advised to adopt the profession of psychoanalyst. One should avoid the extremes of isolation and pugnacity, the best way of combating opposition being to do better work. We are still a long way from isolating the irreducible mental elements which motivate human life.

Of three papers about functions of the archaic ego the most original contributions are made by Bertram Lewin in Sleep, the Mouth and the Dream Screen. He demonstrates the connection between the oral aspects of sleep, the visual dream content and its relationship to incorporative wishes regarding the mother's breast, and the superimposition of other images on this screen, stemming

from other preconscious or unconscious wishes that threaten to disturb the sleeper. The blank dreams of infancy and in states of elation are intimately associated with the psychology of the narcissistic neurosis, drug addictions and fantasies of death. Angel Garma's paper, Psychoanalytic Investigations in Melancholia and Other Types of Depressions, is a thoughtful review of the important literature on the depressions, guided chiefly by the writings of Freud, Abraham and Rado. His discussion of the manic state is particularly interesting in assessing the importance of the belief in omnipotence and the mechanism of denial. Garma is critical of Melanie Klein's school which does not differentiate the attempts at reparation and restitution in the depressions from the dynamics of infantile development. The third paper of this group is Edith Jacobson's The Effect of Disappointment on Ego and Superego Formation in Normal and Depressive Development. The pathological nucleus in the depressions consists of the precocious formation of a superego which, due to premature disappointments, incorporates the early, inflated parental images. This premature incorporation leads to the formation of a superego dominated by extremely powerful but equally bad and defiled parental figures, which later determine the mood swings in the depressions. Disappointments later in development help a child to evaluate the world more realistically. The explorations are penetrating but the conclusions seem contrived.

Of two papers on compulsive-obsessive neurosis, Sandor Lorand's Compulsion Neurosis deals with the special technical problems that this illness presents in treatment. The handling of the negative transference, the overcoming of the mechanisms of isolation, reaction-formation and undoing are the crucial problems. Hanns Sachs's The Transformation of Impulses Into the Obsessional Ritual is an extremely clear presentation demonstrating the fact that obsessive rituals generally center about autoerotic rather than aggressive conflicts and are primarily in the service of the superego as a means of supplanting the repressed wishes and supplying an alibi. Aggression is generally dealt with by the establishment of reaction formations which lead eventually to changes in the structure of the character.

Fenichel's Introductory Remarks to Psychoanalysis and the Theory of Neurosis is part of the introduction to his book, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. In a systematic and thorough manner Fenichel explains the psychoanalytic point of view as dif-

ferentiated from other psychologies. There is no psychology of man in a vacuum but only a psychology of man in a concrete society and in a certain social place within this concrete society. Freud is accused of being too biologically oriented; yet all his writings are essentially descriptions of how instinctual attitudes, objects and aims are changed under the influence of experience. It is the task of psychoanalysis to study how the primitive biological values of 'gratifying' and 'frustration' are changed to the highly complicated systems of values of modern man. It is true that not everything in psychoanalysis can be taught, but first one has to learn what is teachable.

Two papers on technical problems are contributed: S. M. Payne, Notes on Development in the Theory and Practice of Psychoanalytic Technique and C. P. Oberndorf, Constant Elements in Psychotherapy. Payne, a British psychoanalyst, attempts to explain the variations in techniques employed by different analysts. She cites Strachey, Sterba, Anna Freud, Bibring, Nunberg, Fenichel and Reik, and shows how their theoretical conceptions influence their therapeutic goals. This becomes somewhat bewildering when she describes how the Melanie Klein school tries to handle the situation when the analyst 'takes over the rôle of various introjected objects and parts of the ego'. Oberndorf contends that the psychoanalyst will become bolder in attempting modifications and abbreviations as he gains more experience. Each analyst shifts emphasis to certain aspects of psychoanalytic theory which best meet his subjective clinical talents. Often the dissenter ascribes universality to his own personal strengths and regards them as fundamental. Success in treatment depends partly on the skill of the therapist as well as on favorable or prejudicial circumstances which support or thwart the therapist.

The Anti-Semitic Personality, by Else Frenkel Brunswik and R. Nevitt Sanford is a chapter from Anti-Semitism, a Social Disease, edited by Ernst Simmel. It is their conclusion that in a small group of female college students, those with the greatest demonstrable anti-Semitism were politically conservative, in the higher income brackets, obedient to authority and emotionally inhibited.

Marie Bonaparte examines The Legend of the Unfathomable Waters in different countries and reveals that their common basis, death, symbolizes reunion with the mother and is expressed by the predominance of female divinities who exert an irresistible and fatal attraction.

What Would Have Happened If, is a short paper in which Hanns Sachs demonstrates that the point of divergence between the biographical data of an artist and the life history of the characters he creates usually represents a crucial phase in the life of the artist. Very often the writer uses his writings to elaborate in fantasies what would have happened to him if a certain important event had or had not happened.

Delightfully written, Styes, Barley and Wedding Rings by W. S. Inman points out the universality of folklore which connects styes, barley and wedding rings. He has found in his ophthalmological experience that styes occur in persons who are experiencing some unusual interest in the birth of a child.

For the most part, this collection of papers is representative of the best psychoanalytic thinking today.

RALPH R. GREENSON (BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.)

MAN FOR HIMSELF. An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics. By Erich Fromm. New York: Rinehart & Co., Inc., 1947. 254 pp.

Erich Fromm attempts to establish a system of ethics on what he calls a psychoanalytic basis. He aligns himself with the ethical systems of Aristotle, Spinoza, and John Dewey. He reproaches Freud and psychoanalysis for what he calls a 'relativistic position' in ethics. Either he does not know or he neglects to mention the very important contributions made to ethics by such psychoanalysts as, for instance, Pfister, Flugel, Müller-Braunschweig, Heinz Hartmann, Pichon, and Odier. Fromm tries naïvely to distinguish between what he calls authoritarian ethics and humanistic ethics. The latter he summarizes (p. 20): 'Good in humanistic ethics is the affirmation of life, the unfolding of man's powers. Virtue is responsibility towards his own existence; evil constitutes the crippling of man's powers; vice is irresponsibility towards himself.' By the 'unfolding of man's powers' is meant 'living productively'.

No one will disagree with Fromm on the importance of ethical principles, particularly in modern life, but many will take issue with the rather questionable value of the ethical system he establishes. To Fromm the *primum movens* of the human being is character. Although to some extent his characterology follows psychoanalytic psychology, he takes out of it its real dynamic significance; character

is not formed but is a kind of *deus ex machina;* moreover, he sugar-coats his concepts with naïve judgments, which lower the scientific level he strives to attain.

All this might be of little importance if it were not for the unpleasant consequence Fromm's points of view will have for those unfortunate neurotics who will cross his path. For him neurotics are not only unhappy sufferers; they are 'bad' in the system of his humanistic ethics. Since neurosis cripples 'man's powers', neurosis constitutes 'evil'. In this respect Fromm's attitude toward psychopathology is a very regrettable regression to prepsychiatric concepts.

RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN (NEW YORK)

MYTHS OF WAR. By Marie Bonaparte. London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1947. 161 pp.

Marie Bonaparte has written a series of excellent essays on 'myths' that arose during the second World War. The author uses 'myth' rather loosely. The data collected are legends or folklore; however this is a matter of terminology.

The analysis of the Myth of the Corpse in the Car is well represented in the first version. A young man who is driving his car to Paris takes a lady passenger. She predicts there will be no war because Hitler will die in six months, and to prove that she can predict the future, she says that by the time they arrive in Paris there will be a corpse in the car. A young man asks for a lift; when they arrive in Paris he is dead.

The story is explained very ingeniously on the basis of Hubert and Mauss's theory of sacrifice. To sacrifice is to make sacred, and Hubert and Mauss distinguish entry into the condition of sacredness, sacrifice of the victim, and exit from the condition of sacredness. In this instance, being called up is the entry into sacredness, being dismissed is the exit, and the death of Hitler is the sacrifice. Fate is the officiant, although we might also say that the recruit is the officiant, the soothsayer being the displaced version of the recruit's omnipotent wish; but besides the arch-enemy there is frequently another recruit who dies in the car. In the ritual of sacrifice the place where the sacrifice is carried out has a specific significance: in this instance the temenos is the car, and driving in a car represents, symbolically, the sexual act. The sacrificial object

is the son, punished for parricide, because the hated head of the state is the œdipal father,[1] the first enemy of every male child. In one version the motorist is stopped on the road by a gypsy: 'Your father has had an attack and you'll have a dead man in your car. It is as true as that Hitler will be dead in three months' (p. 25).

In the Myth of the Guessed Money, a soothsayer estimates the amount of money in somebody's pocket and thereby foretells Hitler's death: 'In our myth of The Guessed Money it is as though a man had set a bargain price on Hitler's head which it is the business of the destiny priestess to secure' (p. 47).

In The Myths of the Doctored Wine, soldiers are convinced that wine or food is so treated that they should lose all sexual desire. This persistent fantasy has a striking parallel in the sexual taboo of many primitive people: warriors must be sexually continent. Fate is bribed by temporary castration: 'We are well behaved sons who have no sexual designs on mother; therefore father will not kill us'. Britannia rules the waves because Mother Ocean protects against the enemy father (p. 118).

The Myth of the Devil Jew has been discussed by several psychoanalysts (Fenichel, Simmel, Loewenstein) who all arrive at the conclusion that the core of anti-Semitism is identical with the core of the Christian religion: the sacrifice of the son (Jesus as divinity is the father) and the Jewish people, the brother horde, as scapegoats.

In an epilogue the author arrives at some strikingly true conclusions. With the usual belief, that the Nazis were so inhuman because the restraining influence of the Christian superego was weakened (Wittels), Marie Bonaparte does not agree.

> 'And it so happens that when Christianity flourished most and enjoyed its greatest power, the worst cruelties and massacres were committed in Christ's name—as witness trials, the Inquisition and the wars of religion.
>
> 'Now it is in just this historical fact that the true explanation of the Nazi excesses lies. Christians refuse to admit it yet it alone remains convincing. It was not because they had lost the religious spirit but on the contrary because in them it was so savagely reborn that the Germans could confess themselves so cruel. The Gods are not immortal but the religious spirit is eternal [quoted from Le Bon], and if the Nazis in charge of the concentration camps slaughtered so many victims it was because they obeyed a strict religious injunction, a categorical and mystic imperative which made them deem their horrible deed a wholesome and purifying task' (p. 155).

[1] Cf. Róheim, Géza: *War, Crime and the Covenant.* Monticello, New York: Medical Journal Press, 1945.

This highly original study shows penetrating psychoanalytic insight.

GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

SEX HABITS OF AMERICAN MEN. Edited by Albert Deutsch. New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1948. 244 pp.

This book is a symposium on the Kinsey Report written by a group of thirteen outstanding leaders in sociology, anthropology, psychology, law, education, religion, and psychiatry. It is intended to clarify, highlight, and interpret the major points raised in the Kinsey Report and discuss more fully some important problems only touched on in that Report. Albert Deutsch, who has in numerous magazine articles greatly aided in publicizing the Kinsey Report, in the first paper graphically and succinctly sets the stage, outlines the story of the men who united the taxonomic approach and the Gallup Poll type of survey, and answers some of the criticisms of those who appear to be unaware of the true purpose of the Report, which was to collect as objectively as possible a large body of facts about the sexual behavior of human males, unencumbered by social or moral interpretations. He does feel that Kinsey deviated from this goal in some respects inasmuch as there are many passages in this Report which bear the marks of evaluation or interpretation. It also appears that Kinsey has shown bias against several groups, especially psychiatrists, and an unusual sensitivity to the criticisms of fellow scientists; however, Deutsch is definite in his belief, with most of the other commentators, that important errors and shortcomings have not affected the general validity of the Report.

It is gratifying to note that the contributors as a whole have been very much aware of the psychological deficiencies in the Report and the dangers inherent in the mythological, completely 'scientific' approach. In the discussion of Cultural Factors in Sex Expression, R. J. Havighurst takes up the problem of the origin of the differences in the scores of patterns of sexual behavior and points out the need for studies of children and child-parent relationships extending from birth to the age of eight or nine, which is where Kinsey's published data begin, and the need for study of parent-child pairs. J. K. Folsom, in discussing the social implications, suggests that the rich, sociologically informed, nonstatistical observations in the Report may be more important than the statis-

tics and points out that there is evidence that we are moving towards a sexually affirmative culture which is more important than information as to whether or not there are more or fewer orgasms. 'If . . . every time an American male had an orgasm a little bell rang . . . and a punched Hollerith card dropped into place indicating the case and type of person involved we would still know only a small part of the total field of patterns of sexual behavior.' A variation of this criticism is Kluckhohn's who gives the point of view of the anthropologist. 'Sexual behavior in the human male is taxonomic in the limited as well as in the admirable sense, i.e., this valuable census of sex events is not organized for the testing of scientific theories. It has as it stands about the kind of significance the United States Census possesses—a gold mine of data which must be interpreted by others.' One of the 'others' is Professor Wilbur of Fordham University who gives the Catholic point of view which is, briefly, that things appear to be in a mess and, although 'the evils of self-abuse are well presented in Catholic schools, in view of the Kinsey results more emphasis on the church's stand regarding other aspects of the sexual outlets may be in order'.

The validity of Kinsey's sampling procedure and technique is discussed by Leo Crespi of Princeton. Kinsey aims to get an experimental sample and not a representative sample and uses the control approach rather than the area sample method because the latter takes in an enormous number of cases and the necessity of using many volunteers. He notes that this book is a *progress report* and not a definitive statement. Kinsey does not claim exactness and the Report is being issued, incomplete as it is, as an act of social responsibility and toward the achievement of a more humane and enlightened code, especially legally. The absurdities, contradictions, and stupidities of the law are well described by Morris Ploscowe of the New York City Magistrate's Court: the enforcement of sex laws has failed, penalties should be lightened, and there is need for a basic revision of these laws. Robert Lindner describes the enormous complications involved in managing the distorted expressions of sexuality in prisoners, and the distortion of the taxonomic approach by the regressive effects of detention on human beings.

One of the inevitable by-products of the Kinsey Report will be its therapeutic use in reassurance. An excellent sample of this is found in the chapter by Abraham Stone on How the Kinsey Report Affects Marriage Counseling. After mentioning that Kinsey finds

that 75% of all males reach orgasm in two minutes and that a rapidly ejaculating male, according to Kinsey, might be considered 'superior' no matter how 'inconvenient and unfortunate' it may be from the point of view of the wife, the author states 'for the man with a rapid ejaculation, these findings should be very reassuring'. One can almost hear the patient pleading, 'Can't you make me a little more inferior, Doctor?'

While the majority of the papers are extremely interesting and pertinent, some of them are exceptionally well done. Gruenberg's article on Must We Change Our Methods of Sex Education, emphasizes the harm likely to come from assuming that a highly prevalent trait is normal, as well as the need to assume that heterosexuality is the normal goal of sexuality.

The most brilliant and penetrating paper in the book is that of Dr. Robert P. Knight who discusses the Psychiatric Issues in the Report. He has a great deal of praise for it and feels that few, if any, psychiatrists who study the figures will be able either to confirm or challenge the figures in themselves. He is also of the opinion that the Report will be an aid to mental hygiene and a deterrent to the great American cultural curse of hypocrisy. Psychiatrists, he feels, will particularly welcome the apparent statistical proof of the significance of sex in human experience, especially the claim that sexual behavior begins in infancy and is present throughout childhood; however, he points out that while figures do not lie, implications may be exceedingly erroneous. Beginning with the interview method, he discusses how replies to questions may be distorted by the influencing of memory recall by emotional needs, by repression, by retrospective falsification and by fantasy as well as the enormous inaccuracy inherent in thinking in terms of figures, unless one assumes that these distortions of memory cancel each other out. The most serious criticism is of the implications raised by Kinsey's always highlighting the mean or highest figure of his group statistics instead of the mode or typical figure. 'Thus, whereas the mode might be one orgasm per week, the median might be 1.99 and the mean might be 2.74. Kinsey always highlights the mean or highest figure.' Then there is the error in regard to the accumulative incidence figures which is much more serious. For example, the figures for the incidence of homosexuality (37% of all males from adolescence to old age) includes a great many males who have had a single adolescent experience of no significance whatever in contrast to confirmed overt adult homo-

sexuals. Uncritical readers cannot fail to draw erroneous conclusions. The fallacy of classifying behavior as heterosexual, homosexual, autoerotic, or bestial, without regard to its meaning to the man experiencing the relationship, is discussed in detail as well as the fallacy of focusing on the genital orgasm without regard to the motivation behind the sexual act: 'If an inhibited schizoid youth masturbates two or three dozen times a week, that is just so many orgasms to swell the contribution of masturbation to "Total Outlet", and it is of no significance that this manifest genital outlet is carrying the discharge of tensions, anxieties, homicidal or self-destructive or world destructive fantasies.' This all boils down to the fact that these untaxonomic aspects of male sexual behavior are too important to be overlooked. He deplores the running fight that the authors have kept up with various unidentified psychiatrists and the ridiculous utterances which they have ascribed to psychiatrists in toto. With others in this volume, he shows clearly how the authors of the Kinsey Report have fallen into one of the worst traps of normal-abnormal bipolarity, in confusing 'prevalence' or 'high incidence' with 'normality'. At times they utilize this 'equivalent' for reassurance, as in their defense of the heterosexual position in which the man is underneath, and their espousal of premature ejaculation. Dr. Knight gives credit to Kinsey for rightly criticizing the theory of sublimation which Freud expounded in 1905, although this theory has been revised to consider only pregenital sexual strivings as capable of sublimation.

This book is definitely not a condensed and warmed over discussion of the material in the Kinsey Report written in order to cash in on the publicity it has received, but is an evaluation of the Report by men eminent in and representative of their fields. It should take first place as a commentary and a companion volume to the Report.

WILLIAM F. MURPHY (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

HYPNOTHERAPY—A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE. By Margaret Brenman, Ph.D. and Merton M. Gill, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, 1947. 276 pp.

Dr. Brenman and Dr. Gill deserve congratulations for their lucid account and view of the current status of hypnotherapy. The book is divided into five chapters which deal with historical developments, techniques, hypnotizability, therapeutic applications

and theories of hypnosis. Four case studies are reported in which Dr. Robert P. Knight and Dr. Karl A. Menninger collaborated. Finally, Dr. Brenman contributes an experimental study on the use of hypnotic techniques in a study of tension systems.

This reviewer has been long familiar with the careful, methodical studies on this subject by Brenman and Gill. They have viewed the phenomena of the processes of hypnosis, the state of hypnosis and the therapeutic implications from the point of view of psychoanalysis and Lewinian field theories. The contributions of Gestalt psychology are also applied to their observations.

This report is best regarded as a survey both of a field and of work in progress. For that reason no critical standard is pertinent with respect to the data themselves. From the point of view of psychoanalysis, however, several important problems are brought into the foreground. It is as easy to view the phenomena of hypnotism, and the psychological data derived by this technique by means of psychoanalysis, as any phenomenon in human psychology. Hypnotherapy, however, has been offered as a form of brief psychotherapy which like other brief methods, such as narcotherapy, are intended in some way by certain practitioners to supplant psychoanalysis. The authors have thoughtfully and critically distinguished between so-called brief psychoanalytically oriented therapy and psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method.

In general, most forms of brief psychotherapy have in common the intense application of psychoanalytic psychology to the treatment of mental diseases. The other aspects of psychoanalysis, e.g., that it is an investigative technique, are generally excluded. It remains to be seen whether brief psychotherapy can regularly accomplish characterological alterations to the same degree as psychoanalysis. The trend to brief psychotherapy results allegedly from the need to economize in time and effort, both on the part of the patient and of the therapist. Psychoanalysis in the traditional sense is, of course, the object which is compared. By and large the literature on the brief psychotherapies indicates such extreme internal methodological changes as to make a systematic review exceedingly difficult if not impossible. It rapidly becomes an itemized account of various experiences rather than a statement of principles and practices.

Perhaps it would be useful to record some speculations on the implications of some of the research in brief psychotherapy in

relation to psychoanalysis. This would seem to be particularly necessary in view of the fact that most workers tend to take an eclectic position with respect to a given system of psychology in order to justify and explain the procedures and the results. In the psychoanalytic sense, brief psychotherapy is an activity technique. In part it is a reaction against the passivity of the analyst both in terms of time consumed in the therapeutic process and against the calculated and deliberate inhibition of the analyst. It is fundamental in the methodology of analysis that frustration by abstinence should occur in the patient. The corresponding state in the analyst is handled both through his personal analysis and the group of defense mechanisms comprising the sublimations expressed by scientific interest in psychoanalysis and by therapeutic ambitiousness. The importance of these considerations from the point of view of psychoanalysis is brought into sharp focus when one considers such issues as who does the research and what criteria are developed for the selection of patients for 'brief' or 'active' psychotherapy. To what extent are the applications of these techniques due to limitations in the analyst or to defects in our own knowledge of psychoanalytic psychology? Finally, will the brief therapies advance the boundaries of our theories or will they progress only after advances in our knowledge based on other methods?

These comments in no way are a critical devaluation of the work of Brenman and Gill. In a sense it is an extension of their completely correct concern about the rôle of the hypnotherapist in hypnotherapy.

This report warrants the close attention of psychoanalysts and others who apply psychoanalytic psychology.

SYDNEY G. MARGOLIN (NEW YORK)

THE MIND IN ACTION. By Eric Berne, M.D. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1947. 320 pp.

Despite the prevailing skepticism about the value of guides for the layman on psychiatry and psychoanalysis, a skepticism shared by Freud, they seem to present a perennial temptation to authors and readers alike. Dr. Berne's essay is highly praiseworthy. Psychoanalytically oriented, it presents succinctly the dynamics of the development of personality in health and in illness, with originality and humor. The choice of language is simple, engaging the reader's

interest without condescension. Dr. Berne was free, as Brill states in his preface, 'from the affectivity of the older freudians . . . [to] evaluate Freud's contribution as part and parcel of the whole progressive development of psychiatry'. A noteworthy outcome of this freedom is the simultaneous consideration of all behavior in terms of libido and 'mortido' tensions. The results are enlightening and practical, proving wrong the frequently expressed belief that the death instinct has no demonstrable clinical application.

Dr. Berne's clinical histories are presented like characters in a novel, an interesting literary device, but at times overdone, as are the analogies to complicated mechanisms of the automobile.

To our knowledge this book is the best of its kind: an integrated picture of the mind in action.

I. PETER GLAUBER (NEW YORK)

PERSONALITY. A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structures. By Gardner Murphy. New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1947. 999 pp.

This is an encyclopedic volume of nine hundred ninety-nine pages, a bibliography of seven hundred forty-nine titles, and more than a thousand textual references given by page, paragraph and line. It is only fair, therefore, to state at the outset that 'lest the reader [to quote Professor Murphy's own words] waste time upon what he does not want, it must be emphasized that this is not a book on diagnosis or therapy or upon any type of clinical approach'. I may further add it is not a book on personality in the sense which one ordinarily associates a book of this title, but rather a study of *how* personality comes to be or, again to quote the author, 'an attempt at evaluation of data on how personality grows'.

What Professor Murphy has done in this volume has been to bring together all of the relevant facts and basic theories of the problem of what makes not only Sammy but all of us run. It is a gigantic achievement, and I dare say only a person of Professor Murphy's erudition could have done it. His basic material is necessarily drawn from various branches of psychology, but it also derives much from anthropology, physiology, psychoanalysis and sociology. Its encyclopedic character is at once its strength and its weakness. No one person can be expected to deal effectively with such manifold sources, and certainly no one reviewer could deal

critically with it. I shall, therefore, confine my report to a brief summary of its contents and emphasize a few of the areas which I believe may be of special interest to psychoanalytic readers.

Professor Murphy divides his volume into six parts. Part One, Organic Foundations, deals with such topics as constitution, biology of motivation, measurement of organic traits. Part Two, Learning, deals with various problems in this field, especially with canalization and conditioning. The term 'canalization' may be new to some readers. It may be defined psychoanalytically as 'cathexized learning', or more generally as learning which is accompanied by emotion associated with basic drives and cravings. In this connection psychoanalysts will be interested in Professor Murphy's view that canalization is not subject to extinction because cravings cannot be extinguished. Part Three, Personal Outlook, has chapters on autism, imagination, the dreamer, multiple personality and creativeness. Autisms are levels of perception 'in which the interaction of affect and cognative elements go on without the observer's being sharply aware of what is happening'. Part Four on The Self includes a discussion on the evaluation of self (ego), the enhancement and defense of the self, psychoanalytic mechanisms, compensation for inferiority, extroversion-introversion. Part Five, Wholeness, takes up the problem of gestalt versus the typological approach to the concept of personality, and includes chapters on personality structure, the problem of continuity and projective techniques.

Part Six, Individual and Group, is at once the longest and the most provocative, and in a sense an integration of what is Professor Murphy's basic point of view, namely, that personality is not only a product of biological and psychological forces in the individual but of sociological and cultural influences as well. Included are chapters on economic determinism, history as proving grounds, situationism and field theory and the fitness of culture for personality. It is in the discussion of these and allied topics that Professor Murphy is at his best, and for those acquainted with his previous writings this will come as no surprise. In spite of his long and distinguished career as a teacher of psychology, he is at heart a social philosopher. He is a descendant of James and Dewey rather than a contemporary of Watson and Thorndike.

Psychoanalysis receives generous recognition throughout the book, especially in part four. Professor Murphy devotes a whole chapter to psychoanalytic mechanisms which the reviewer recommends both

to the general reader and to psychoanalysts. It is not a rehash of the familiar, but a penetrating evaluation of the ways in which these mechanisms enter into total personality structure. Professor Murphy has a perception which goes to the heart of the problem and a happy turn of phrase which often sums up in a few words a rather complex series of ideas. It is to be noted that Professor Murphy treats the psychoanalytic mechanisms not strictly from the orthodox psychoanalytic approach but in connection with the general topic of the enhancement of the self—that is, the protection of the ego against dangers of self-disparagement. On the problem of sex, he does not accept the inevitable pervasive rôle of infant sexuality and believes that the mechanism of identification can very often explain conflict without it. The loss of childhood goals is interpreted as a loss of ego status rather than a disturbance of infant sexuality. Murphy does not think that the mechanisms of defense arise as often from the press of aggression as from the needs of enhancement, and finally, that the most serious personality trouble is the need of ego enhancement.

Professor Murphy's book is a substantial contribution to the understanding of personality. Because of its encyclopedic character the book is in some places superficial and in others uncritical (e.g., the discussion of projective techniques). These defects notwithstanding, one can recommend the book on its general merits and provocative evaluations. The volume is beautifully printed on white thin paper, excellently edited and—psychiatric publishers note carefully—reasonably priced.

DAVID WECHSLER (NEW YORK)

TELEPATHY AND MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Jan Ehrenwald, M.D. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1948. 212 pp.

To review this book for the general psychoanalytic reader is a problem of some difficulty. The book is for the most part a collection of speculative essays on theoretical aspects of telepathy and on the application of the telepathic hypothesis to medical psychology. But the great majority of psychoanalysts are so unfamiliar with the wide range of presumptive telepathic phenomenology and are so far from accepting the validity of the basic hypothesis—neither of which subjects are given too adequate coverage in Ehrenwald's book—that extended critical treatment of the theses

presented could scarcely appear to the reader as much more than a private discussion between the reviewer and the author. Several of the latter's ideas nevertheless invite comment.

Ehrenwald offers two main contributions to the understanding of telepathy on the process level. The first, termed the theory of 'minus-function', deals with the psychobiological conditions which, in the author's opinion, tend to favor telepathic percipience. These, as one might gather from the name of the theory, appear to Ehrenwald to be largely states of inadequacy or impairment of function in the percipient's psychological or physiological spheres. As 'minus' conditions Ehrenwald cites such states as sleep, hypnosis, self-induced trance, feeblemindedness or clouding of consciousness due to other causes. Telepathic percipience is seen as a result of 'the tendency to compensate for the existing minus-function or defect, whether this tendency be the outcome of slackened control, of released activity of lower mental strata, or of the otherwise unimpaired general vitality of the person concerned'.

There is no doubt that telepathic percipience occurs in the states cited by Ehrenwald as 'minus'; the question is, however, whether it occurs to greater degree in these states than in other states which, because of their very ordinariness, are less often subject to close investigation. I believe that a less sharply selective and less Adlerian approach to the phenomenology of telepathy would reveal that the 'minus' theory falls considerably short of covering the facts.

The best collection of spontaneous cases of telepathy to date, compiled over sixty years ago by the British Society for Psychical Research and published under the uninviting title, Phantasms of the Living, contains several hundred carefully documented and well-authenticated examples of striking telepathic percipience occurring under conditions that by no stretch of the imagination could be called 'minus' in Ehrenwald's sense of the term. An overwhelming amount of other data variously gathered, moreover, could not even with forcing be made to fit comfortably on Ehrenwald's frame, unless one were to consider as 'minus' functioning the perpetually changing disequilibria inevitably a part of the striving toward adaptation of all living things. But this I would think to be a rather arbitrary conception, just as it is probably somewhat arbitrary to consider all sleep, hypnotic or trance states as 'minus' conditions. Like pregnancy, these states are minus or plus depending on one's frame of reference. As to feeblemindedness and toxic states, there

is actually no adequate evidence that these inevitably facilitate the telepathic process, and Ehrenwald might have been on much safer ground had he limited his thesis to the simple proposition that telepathy can be observed to occur in these states *as well as* in others. (Increasing evidence, as a matter of fact, seems to indicate that telepathy, like the functioning of the vegetative nervous system, is a perfectly normal and necessary, though for the most part unconscious and unobtrusive, component in all human functioning.)

The second theory advanced by Ehrenwald, the theory of telepathic 'scatter', aims to explain the inaccuracies and near-misses which are so prominent in practically all observable telepathy, whether in sleep or waking states, under spontaneous, experimental or mediumistic conditions. This 'theory', unlike the theory of minus-function, covers many of the facts—but fails to explain them. As a descriptive term for a purely static view of events, 'scatter' is no doubt an adequate designation. But one might with equal precision 'explain' the inaccuracies and near-misses in dreams and slips and the seemingly chaotic productions of the mentally disturbed by simply invoking a tendency of the mind to be diffuse and scattered under certain conditions. Such a theory has obvious limitations, and it is more than likely that it will ultimately be less successful in explaining the seeming inaccuracies of telepathic perception than the use of concepts like purposeful distortion, condensation and secondary elaboration which, as has been pointed out by several psychoanalytic investigators including Freud, seem to fit the empirical data very nicely.

In his chapters on paranoia and schizophrenia, the author attempts to apply the telepathic hypothesis toward a fuller understanding of the psychotic personality. He likens the mind to a sort of semipermeable membrane which in a state of health keeps out, or at least represses, the diffuse telepathic 'heteropsychic' perceptions which tend to seep into the consciousness of the psychotically ill. (Ehrenwald's 'autopsychic' and 'heteropsychic' are welcome additions to our terminology.) Paranoid delusions are seen as having a genuine basis in telepathically perceived fact, and catatonic negativisim is regarded as a defensive attempt to ward off disturbing heteropsychic influences. Catatonic stupor may be a phase of refractoriness to excessive heteropsychic stimulation, and command automatism is seen as a submissive response to this very type of stimulation. As to why the psychotic develops such an alleged hypersensitiveness to heteropsychic stimulation, the author

invokes the possibility of cryptic neuroglandular and metabolic influences and the developmental characterology of Kretschmer, Hoch and Meyer.

It is difficult properly to evaluate the author's contribution to the theory of schizophrenia in the absence of adequate empirical data. Although Ehrenwald is to be commended for having made the attempt at all to tie together two as yet little understood fields, one nevertheless suspects that he has been somewhat one-sided in his approach and that he has not been sufficiently appreciative of those nonparapsychological factors which have not yet outlived their usefulness in the understanding of schizophrenic states. Again, it is possible, in the very absence of differentiating data, to arrive theoretically at conclusions which in certain respects are quite different from—in fact directly opposed to—those advanced by the author. But this, at the present state of our clinical knowledge of telepathic functioning, is pure speculation, and perhaps neither one set of theories nor the other really warrants detailed discussion at this point. One hopes that in succeeding volumes the author will present us with data to confirm his highly suggestive but still largely ungrounded theories.

The final chapters, in which the author pleads for a broader conception of personality, contain many profound insights and are the best in the book. The book is extremely well written, and there are passages which are almost sheer poetry. The author is to be congratulated on a stimulating attempt to enrich a sadly neglected field.

JULE EISENBUD (NEW YORK)

INTRODUCTION À LA PSYCHIATRIE NEUROLOGIQUE. By Ferdinand Morel. Paris: Masson & Cie., 1947. 298 pp.

This treatise begins with a long, well-written introduction on neurological physiology inspired by John Fulton's treatise, and containing other data and some original research.

The author has little interest in clinical psychopathology. Only what can be demonstrated in terms of pathology of the nervous system—organic or physiological—is of value to him. Morel has a strict scientific methodology comparable to Theodore Meynert's with the addition of fifty years of accumulated data. Three chapters are outstanding: the hallucinatory syndromes, the amnesic syndromes and the autonomous functions with their metabolic centers. These present not only facts but show deep thinking and originality.

Neuroses are characterized as 'reactive anomalies'. Morel starts with the experimental work of Pavlov and his American followers to prove that neuroses are induced by complicated or contradictory stimuli. While animal experimentation offers verification sufficiently accurate to give a hint of the probable genesis of the neuroses in human beings, these phenomena are so much more complicated than in animals that Morel prefers to wait for more cerebral physiological substantiation before trusting himself on such uncertain ground.

One is amazed at the author's arbitrary choice of 'facts'. Experimental psychology has been applied to children as well as to animals, and if the author wants an experimental background for clinical facts, why does he ignore the first?

Morel also ignores genetic psychology and has similar blind spots for instincts and emotions. His study of memory is based only on motion and action without considering even the physiological motivation of behavior. These omissions or prejudices deprive the book of highly scientific value. But, to be fair, Morel's book has many valuable qualities, and the author's attempt is too sincere to dwell on its shortcomings. Psychiatry investigates very complex phenomena which should be studied from many angles. Organic psychiatry should stimulate psychopathological correlations. Morel's book suggests 1, that we should test our clinical data by more experimental work; 2, that our own method of investigation should not exclude the sound scientific doubt; 3, that free association is not only a therapy but an instrument of scientific investigation not yet exhausted in its resources for understanding general psychological phenomena like memory, the independence of intrapsychic and external perceptions, the laws of psychodynamics and the like.

Introduction à la psychiatrie neurologique should be read for what it is intended to be. It is worthwhile reading.

RAYMOND DE SAUSSURE (NEW YORK)

THE ENGRAMMES OF PSYCHIATRY. By J. M. Nielsen, M.D. and George N. Thompson, M.D. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1947. 509 pp.

Armed with two ancient formulae, and fortified with a blithe ignorance of the history of scientific methodology, Doctors Nielsen and Thompson have added yet another eclectic textbook of psychiatry to a glutted market. The 'blurb' summarizes the authors'

claims: 'For the first time in medical literature the cornerstone of a solid foundation is placed for the support of the great superstructure of psychiatry. The authors accept the discoveries which constitute the body of psychiatric culture as long as the discoveries are *based on observations* with apparently obvious conclusions.'

To accomplish this vast purpose, the '. . . present writers take the attitude that there is *a truth* about everything and that *the truth* will ultimately stand regardless of challenge or rejection' (reviewer's italics). It is impossible to determine from the context what the authors know of the long history of this hoary platitude; at any rate, one is mildly surprised to learn that of all the long line of protagonists of this Platonic-scholastic tradition, they select the priest Bernard Bolzani, with his far from original doctrine of 'truth in itself', as their spiritual forefather. Of an awareness of modern science's desperate and finally triumphant struggle against this point of view, and of the emergence of modern field theories and operational concepts, one finds no trace in this book. It is not to be wondered, therefore, that the cornerstone referred to above is the 'solid' concept of 'engrammes'. Fortunately for the authors, they do not appear to realize that this 'power-in-a-spot' theory is full of unproved and unprovable assumptions.

The truth of the matter is that the authors are not particularly well-equipped to carry out their brave pretensions with any degree of consistency. Practically all they have to say has been said before; what is new is neurological, and not of any fresh import for psychiatry. What they call obvious is often not so at all, and their vaunted 'truth' is in many instances confused, conjectural, and opinionated. A few quotations will illustrate the factual, conceptual, semantic and dynamic confusions in this book. 'Persons *devoid of any sexual drive* are found; they usually are inert *homosexual* individuals' (reviewer's italics). 'Promiscuity is simply uninhibited sexuality.' 'Exaggeration of the sex instinct gives satyriasis and nymphomania.' 'It is common knowledge that Anglo-Saxons are relatively dull, slow to react . . . opinionated . . . less methodical, more easygoing, and more tenacious under adversity.' 'Jews are highly intelligent, artistic, imaginative, scholarly, shrewd and cunning.' Bear in mind that these personality traits are presumably based on hereditary factors, as in various breeds of dogs described by the authors. One cannot, of course, quarrel with their right to such outmoded opinions, but the use of such a highly-charged word as 'cunning' deserves unreserved condemnation.

As if to demonstrate that their hearts are in the right place, Doctors Neilsen and Thompson, having delivered themselves of the above dangerous dogma, assure us shortly thereafter that, 'Personal ties are stronger than group prejudice. The writers consider intimate personal acquaintance and friendly intercourse between countries as the *only basis* for prevention of wars' (reviewer's italics). The first of these affirmations was amply disproved by developments in Nazi Germany. The second, with its cavalier dismissal of the rôle of great economic and political forces, is too naïve to deserve consideration.

It would be a weary, unprofitable task to explore the innumerable inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the authors' system of psychopathology. A few examples will be sufficient. Conceding that the interpretation of dreams is '. . . one of the most difficult phases of psychiatry . . .', the writers show how ill-equipped they are to deal with this task by citing a dream for which they offer interpretations without mentioning a single association; indeed, they say, 'Various interpretations might be placed on this dream but broad generalities are clear to anyone'. Based upon the misconception that dreams are to be analyzed arbitrarily—as in a gypsy dream book—these remarks reveal adequately enough the authors' lack of knowledge of psychoanalytic theory and practice.

'If the habit [daydreaming] is overindulged, it may be vicious in its results, because it is an escape mechanism.' There is a quaintness about such language which is reminiscent of the era of horse-drawn trolley cars. It is used by psychiatrists who elsewhere speak glibly of psychological determinism. Confusion is further evident in the discussion of 'defense mechanisms of the mind'. Depression, the paranoid reaction, and psychosis with psychopathic personality are called defense mechanisms. The phobic patient is '. . . *fundamentally secure* but lives in a state of fear of certain situations'. Hysteria is 'a delusion which remains limited to the immediate person of the patient afflicted'. It '. . . may result from a powerful suggestion (statement by authority, *hypnosis*) or from auto-suggestion' (reviewer's italics).

This, then, is another in a series of contemporary textbooks of psychiatry in which, among other things, psychoanalytic theory and practice are not understood, and are hopelessly misrepresented. Schooled in such confusion, physicians entering the field of psychiatry will have much to unlearn. However, as the tendency to

undertake psychoanalytic training is fast becoming a *sine qua non,* one need not at all despair of the future.

NATHANIEL ROSS (NEW YORK)

THE THEMATIC APPERCEPTION TEST. The Theory and Technique of Interpretation. By Silvan S. Tomkins, Ph.D., New York: Grune & Stratton, 1947. 297 pp.

The Thematic Apperception Test, now commonly called the TAT, is barely fifteen years old, and has been widely used professionally for about twelve years. In this brief time, it has assumed prominence second only to the Rorschach Test in the field of projective testing. The test consists of twenty-nine black-and-white illustrations and a blank card, but only twenty cards are shown to a subject. The thirty cards are divided in such a way that a number is shown to all subjects, some only to boys and girls, others only to men, and some only to women. The subject looks at each picture and is asked to tell a dramatic story about each picture. This technique, originated by Morgan and Murray at the Harvard Psychological Clinic, 'was based on the well-known fact that an individual confronted with an ambiguous social situation and required to interpret it, was likely to reveal his own personality in this process. While interpreting the objective situation, the individual was apt to be less defensive, less aware of the scrutiny of the examiner, and consequently more likely to reveal much of his inner life.'

Morgan's and Murray's first publication in 1935 was followed in 1938 by Murray's Explorations in Personality in which he integrated his preliminary TAT test results with a more general theory of personality. Since then, the TAT has been widely used in the study of psychopathological syndromes such as hysteria, anxiety hysteria, obsessive-compulsive neurosis, schizophrenia, head injuries, delinquency, mental deficiency and stuttering. It has also been found a useful instrument in research on child development, social attitudes, cultural factors and assessment of military personnel. There exist over one hundred publications on various phases of this test. Dr. Tomkins has assembled the materials available in the first comprehensive textbook about this test, removing some of the major obstacles in the way of a more universal application of this projective technique. Among these

are the thorny problems of reliability and validity. Scoring and interpretation were other neglected areas. The rich documentation of various test aspects with clinical case material is a tremendous help to the student of human behavior and to the professional worker.

The history and development of the TAT is followed by chapters on the technique of administration, the scoring scheme and an introduction to the technique of interpretation. Dr. Tomkins begins his excellent chapter on Level Analysis by stating: 'The determination of the relationship between story and storyteller is the keystone of interpretation. This relationship can never be less complex than the one between fantasy and the larger matrix of the personality. . . . The individual is asked for something more than his fleeting, diffuse, private fantasies. He is called upon to interpret the behavior, feelings, and expectations of individuals represented pictorially. It is for this reason that the storyteller in his interpretations of the lives of these characters may expose fragments of his own past history, his contemporary behavior, and his future expectations and aspirations. He may reveal his public behavior, those facets shared only with intimates, and private feelings guarded from any public scrutiny, as well as wishes whose existence has been somehow guarded from even the individual's own awareness.' In the Level Analysis the specific content of the stories is discarded and attention is paid to the levels around which the subject builds up his projections. A particular level, that of the wish, is singled out for demonstration. In order to exploit the sensitivity of the TAT in eliciting repressed material, a revision and extension of Freud's theory of repression is included in this chapter.

The succeeding chapters deal with the diagnosis of personality, love, sex, marital and social relationships, work and vocational setting. The last chapter is a discussion of diagnosis and psychotherapy in which Dr. Tomkins defines diagnosis as the 'general assessment of any pathological condition rather than the determination of a specific nosological entity'. Since current psychiatric practice proceeds on the basis of evidence derived from interviews, Dr. Tomkins concludes that the TAT 'affords a relatively economical method of exploration before therapy is undertaken . . . Typically we find a contrast between what the patient is willing or able to tell and his covert or unconscious antisocial wishes. These are generally

sexual or aggressive wishes which occasion the individual anxiety. However, there are many instances in which the suppressed or repressed wishes are not antisocial and are more readily capable of being assimilated into the adult personality if they can be discovered and brought to the individual's consciousness.' The application of the TAT as a therapeutic method is illustrated by case material, but the author is frank enough to state that there are limitations in which this method may not work. At any rate, he asserts, the TAT can be a very helpful adjunct to therapy in helping to uncover repressed memories.

The administration, scoring and interpretation of projective tests has become a highly specialized field. The TAT might be one projective technique which the psychoanalyst may adapt to his own professional needs. He is trained to analyze dream material and free associations, and should not, therefore, encounter difficulties in eliciting and analyzing stories patients create around the TAT pictorial situations; however Rapaport, in his 1943 paper, states that '. . . an interpretation of the TAT should not be considered a dream interpretation; nor can it, in the majority of cases, be handled as material allowing for symbolic interpretation; nevertheless, the clinical and psychodynamic interrelations of attitudes, strivings, etc., have to be utilized in order to come to a meaningful understanding of how the world of thoughts of the subject is organized, and how the subject himself envisages his world and environment'.

The book is well written, well organized and richly illustrated with case material which adequately covers all the points raised. A comprehensive up-to-date bibliography is appended. Dr. Tomkins' volume is sincerely recommended as a textbook and instruction manual to the professional worker who deals with human, dynamic behavior, its deviations and curative efforts.

ADOLF G. WOLTMANN (NEW YORK)

THE STUBBORN WOOD. By Emily Harvin. Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1948. 365 pp.

This is the story of a young woman, Monica Prystal, whose husband, after sixteen years of unperturbed marital happiness, falls prey to alcohol and the charms of other women. To this unfortunate turn of events, the heroine reacts with a miscarriage and a subsequent

state of psychopathology, the exact nature of which the reader is left to guess. Its fictional function is to justify Mr. Prystal's commitment of his wife to a series of mental hospitals. The first two are private institutions, whose description makes one wonder whether the doctors had not, under duress, changed places with the patients as in Poe's famous story. The third is a state hospital which, contrary to the heroine's and the reader's expectations, proves a boon for the unhappy victim. The administration is not interested in extorting exorbitant fees from her husband, and the completely restored Monica returns to freedom. She re-enters the world of bath salts, permanent waves and nail polish, stripped of her infatuation with her scoundrel of a husband, but equipped with a brand-new social conscience, particularly as regards conditions in mental institutions.

The blurb says that the author 'quarried the material . . . from firsthand investigations of many mental hospitals in a western state'. Emily Harvin is a nom de plume 'to protect certain factual asylum officials [whose ill-treatment of patients she observed with her own eyes] from embarrassing publicity'. It is furthermore stated that 'this novel . . . is founded on factual conditions. The highly significant x-rays of a case investigated by the writer [while serving as deputy and assistant to an administrative officer of the Department of Institutions of a western state] are in the writer's files, together with pertinent legal depositions, notarized affidavits, transcripts of court proceedings, and photostatic reproductions of public records.'

These explicit statements make it all the more incomprehensible why these officials, who apparently are not only clinically sadists but, above all, guilty of the gravest neglect of professional duties and ethics, should be 'protected from embarrassing publicity'. Logically, the highly significant x-rays, pertinent legal depositions, notarized affidavits, and the like, could (and should) have been put to better and socially more effective use if submitted to the District Attorney for action. In favor of these officials, some doubt may be raised as to the author's qualifications in the field of psychiatry. It seems highly doubtful that a novel of this type, which is two-dimensional in characterization and static to utter boredom in content, and in fact, does not even scratch the surface of a social problem, could possibly be of any benefit to the improvement of conditions whose gravity can hardly be overrated.

GERTRUD M. KURTH (NEW YORK)

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Saint Agatha and the Tuesday Woman. Géza Róheim. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 119–126.

H. W.

To cite this article: H. W. (1948) Saint Agatha and the Tuesday Woman. Géza Róheim. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 119–126., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 556-569, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11950894

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11950894

Published online: 07 Dec 2017.

ABSTRACTS

Saint Agatha and the Tuesday Woman. Géza Róheim. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 119–126.

Róheim pores over a host of primitive narratives surrounding the taboo against sexual relations or baby-making on a holy day. This taboo, and its accompanying narratives, are widespread over the eastern continent; it varies little in form but is applied to different days of the week in various cultures. The days are personified and in some cultures, particularly the Russian, the personification represents the mother. Róheim believes that the taboo and the narrated dangers for breaking it stem from dreams, the content of which is an aggression and defiance toward the mother, followed by retributive punishment.

H. W.

The Psychoanalysis of Identical Twins—With Reference to Inheritance. Endre Petö. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 126–129.

After discussing the partial analyses of identical twins, Petö concludes that 'the results are anything but unambiguous'. Although there was a marked similarity in their obsessional symptoms, their 'psychological attitude, the character traits and the symptoms of disease in spite of the identity of temperament and of external influences, resembled one another neither in their development nor in their more delicate structure nor in their final form'. One is moved to ask whether the partial analyses from which these conclusions on 'the identity . . . of external influences' were drawn, were not rather macroscopic investigations which failed to reveal microscopic essential differences.

H. W.

Weeping and Laughing. Endre Petö. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 129–133.

Petö studied, in painstaking detail, the various muscular movements which take place during the acts of laughing and crying from earliest infancy onward. From these observations he draws the twin conclusions that in infancy crying is the expression of an effort to eject and externalize painful stimuli, while laughing is the expression of attempts at introjection of 'good', satisfying, external reality. At birth, infants, in opposition to any need for self-preservation, refuse the nipple and cry. They try to eject the painful stimulus of hunger—which must seem to come in part from the outside breast—in an effort to return to a stimulus-free intrauterine state. Gradually 'under the overwhelming stream of external stimuli the organism partially introjects them, this being its only means of self-preservation'. In the light of these conclusions Petö modifies Ferenczi's theory that 'the newborn infant cannot distinguish the subjective psychical processes, the emotions, from the sensations excited by the outside world', with the observation, 'If we recognize weeping as a projection-function we must concede great importance to it as a warding-off function even from the moment of birth, for it indicates the beginning of the reality sense and therefore the existence of positive and negative object relations immediately after birth'.

H. W.

The Origin of the Mosaic Prohibition Against Cooking the Suckling in Its Mother's Milk. A. Fodor. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 140–144.

Fodor presents a carefully prepared, minutely detailed refutation of the historical data adduced by M. Woolf in a paper on the same subject published in The International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1945. Both, however, come to essentially the same conclusions—which Fodor holds are without the need for any special hypothesis—that the origin of the Mosaic prohibition against cooking a suckling in its mother's milk, and also the Jewish Passover ritual, are derived from: 1, 'the early struggle between the matrilinear and the patrilinear customs of mankind'; and 2, 'an analogous conflict in general outlook between the nomadic and agricultural ways of life'.

H. W.

A Note on the 'Magic of Names'. Ella Freeman Sharpe. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, p. 152.

This is a brief plea to psychoanalysts not to use the words 'good' and 'bad' in our scientific nomenclature—unless they are emasculated by quotations or the like—because of the response evoked in everyone by unconscious (superego) connotations.

H. W.

A Note on the Psychopathology of Convulsive Phenomena in Manic-Depressive States. W. Clifford M. Scott. Int. J. Psa., XXVII, 1946, pp. 152–155.

Scott outlines the psychopathology of two patients who suffered from manic-depressive states, disclosed during their analyses. Both patients, at a certain point in their treatments, exhibited convulsive states but not to the point of losing consciousness. In both, the convulsions occurred when their rage toward an introjected mother-breast was in danger of invading a libidinal object attachment toward the analyst. The convulsion was an attempt to prevent an attack on the external loved object and to concentrate hatred on the internalized object. In addition, in one of the patients there was an effort, during the moments preceding the convulsion, to externalize the hated object but this was impossible because of the complete identification of the patient's own body with the hated object. Thus, in the patients analyzed by Scott, the epileptic states and the manic-depressive illness were both based on severe, very early, oral conflicts.

H. W.

Displacement Guilt and Pain. Henry Harper Hart. Psa. Rev. XXXIV, 1947, pp. 259–273.

'Libido denied outlet at one point will seek it at another'. This mechanism—displacement—operates in the service of the pleasure-pain principle. Transference is defined as a displacement of libidinal cathexis. Zonal displacement is most common in hysteria, and displacement from the vital to the insignificant is characteristic of obsessional neuroses. Sublimation is understood in terms of displacement in the direction of the socially desirable.

Following this theoretical analysis, the motive for displacement, guilt, is discussed and its function is compared to that of pain. Though of all animals, man seems most capable of enduring pain, he is poorly equipped to live with guilt. Concluding with neurophysiological analogies, Hart attributes to the ego the capacity of displacing guilt into peripheral, somatic perception and he assumes that this process is a function of the cerebral cortex or of the corticothalamic organization.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

Learning to Talk. Melitta Schmideberg. Psa. Rev. XXXIV, 1947, pp. 296–335.

This is a rather abstract discussion of the multiple aspects of oral eroticism and its relation to speech. Clinical illustrations are abundant but sketchy, while paranoid and infantile psychotic material is predominant. Schmideberg claims that in psychoanalytic theory, sexual and aggressive impulses have been overstressed. For instance, in the process of learning to talk 'ego libido plays an important part and later becomes displaced onto other sublimations'.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

The Cornerstone Ceremony. Jacques Schnier. Psa. Rev., XXXIV, 1947, pp. 357–369.

The ritual of dedication or consecration of a structure, be it a house, a church, a city wall or a bridge, is old and widespread. In form it has been altered by religion and civilization, but in unconscious significance it still serves the same purpose, the mastering of anxiety.

Schnier carefully analyzes the ritualistic details of such dedications through the ages, from the custom of burying live or murdered slaves in the foundations, and the spattering of bricks with sacrificial blood, up to the present-day embedding of documents in a corner near the entrance of a new building.

Anxiety arises because the new enterprise means growth toward power and maturity and thus, unconsciously, entrance and possession of the structure means intercourse with the mother. This victory over the father evokes guilt, and fear of retaliation calls for his death. Hence the evidence of his ritualistic murder should be buried near the portals of what symbolizes the maternal womb.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

Psicoanalisi. II, No. 3–4, October, 1946.

The first three articles in this issue were read at the first national meeting of psychoanalysts in Rome, Italy.

Anxiety and Neurotic Disturbances of Sensibility and the Body Scheme. J. Flescher.

After a brief polemic in favor of the psychologic-minded psychiatrists against the organic-minded, Flescher explains the sensation of psychogenic pain, hyperalgesia and disturbances in the body image as the result of a conflict. As every analyst knows, one consequence of the castration complex, as Freud described it, is that the individual makes an attempt to renounce an organ which exposes him to conflicts or anxiety. Flescher offers as his own the idea that the tendency

arises to separate one's self from such an organ—as if this were not an expression of the castration complex!

The Œdipus Complex: Revision of the Concept. Emilio Servadio.

This is a brief summary of Freud's additional views on the œdipus complex—found in the New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis—and its implications for the study of the psychosexual development of the girl.

Servadio also discusses Freud's earlier concepts of aggressive drives and seems to believe that Freud, before 1920, regarded aggression as an essential constituent of the ego instincts and ascribed the aggression inherent in the œdipus complex to the ego and not to the id. Furthermore, Servadio adheres to Melanie Klein's findings that superego formation begins in earliest childhood, before the development of the œdipus complex, as Freud describes it. Of course, everyone agrees that the phenomenon of identification commences at almost the onset of life, but whether these early and necessary identifications already form the superego is questionable.

The Affective Basis in Penal Justice, and the Psychology of the Judge. Raffaele Merloni.

This article is, for the most part, a summary of Alexander and Staub's book, The Criminal, the Judge, and the Public. Merloni explains the 'sense of justice' mainly in Alexander and Staub's terms.

The organization and inhibition of the instincts is responsible for the establishment of social life and civilization but the instincts must also be channeled toward useful goals. Aggression may be expressed in socially acceptable forms. Not all aggressive drives are sublimated, however, and so need only some justification in order to be manifested. Such justification is usually due to violated feelings of right and wrong.

Social order equals equilibrium between the renunciation of certain instinctual drives and the assured satisfaction of others. This equilibrium can be broken by the leading class or by individuals. In the former case we have fascism (also when innocents are punished) and forbidden drives are satisfied because the pact between society and the individual has been broken.

When the equilibrium is broken by an individual the situation is more complex. The well-known psychoanalytic formulation of Alexander leans on the common understanding that the same rights and privileges are for all. If an individual breaks this pact, aggression is mobilized in others against the law-breaker in the form of vindictiveness.

Merloni discusses the implications and difficulties involved in treating aggressors—how, for example, the judge wants to be 'just', yet also satisfies his own aggressive drives by 'justification' of the sentences he imposes. In conclusion, he urges that there be a better understanding of personality in the light of psychoanalysis.

The Anti-Semitism of Hitler. Gertrud M. Kurth.

This is a translation of the article which appeared in this QUARTERLY, XVI, No. 1 (1947), under the title, The Jew and Adolf Hitler.

The Function of Discharge in the Epileptic Seizure. J. Flescher.

This is the Italian translation of an article which appeared in The Journal of Nervous and Mental Diseases, XCVI, September, 1942, and in *Schweizer Archiv für Neurologie und Psychiatrie,* L, No. 1, 1942. It presents a thorough discussion of the healing factor in electric shock treatment, with polemics against other scientists. Flescher, who adheres strictly to the dualistic life and death instincts theory of Freud, sees in the discharge of the original aggression (produced through muscular convulsions experienced during the seizure) an overpowering of the ego by the libido. A rich bibliography accompanies the article.

Coquetry in the Light of Psychoanalysis. M. Wulff (translated by J. Flescher).

A description of the behavior known as coquetry is given and its psychological components presented. In stating the characteristics of coquetry, Wulff quotes George Simmel, according to whom coquetry is 'to give one's self and to deny one's self'. Hence, coquetry contains elements of both activity and passivity. Important psychological factors in coquettish women are exhibitionism, infantile traits, and the masculine complex. From case material the writer finds that such women are frigid because of their masculine drives.

The Way to Free Singing. Lodovico Szamosi.

This is a translation and elaboration of an article which first appeared in Budapest in 1939. Szamosi very competently analyzes the manner in which the human voice is produced and discusses inhibitions which prevent the individual from giving free rein, by means of his voice, to inner needs and urges. He repeatedly emphasizes the fact that the voice has a sexual function and that all kinds of erotic and aggressive drives can find expression through it.

While the instrumentalist relies on the mechanics of his particular musical instrument for the expression of feeling through sound production, the vocalist can rely only on himself—a situation in which hesitancy or uncertainty produce inhibition.

Even the early Italian masters recognized the relation between digestive regularity and vocal exhalation (i.e. between oral drives and vocalization). But Szamosi denies that there is a causal relation between the two. In his opinion, it is a matter of a 'specific mechanical identity, with fundamental manifestations typical of the unconscious, recently recognized in other fields of spiritual life'.

Touching on other points of general interest (he quotes many who have studied the vocal organs and the voice), he makes a comparison between the German and the Italian schools of voice training. According to him, the Germans are inhibited and hard, indicating a repression of instincts, while the Italians are much freer, sublimate, and do not repress as much. He accentuates the futility of many methods of teaching singing and closes with the remark that this pedagogic system of freeing inhibitions through singing is of particular importance.

EDOARDO WEISS

A Study of William Heirens. Foster Kennedy, Harry R. Hoffman and William H. Haines. Amer. J. of Psychiatry, CIV, 1947, pp. 113–121.

This study of a particularly notorious series of crimes by an adolescent is a valuable addition to the case histories of sex murders. Heirens was a seventeen-year-old college student who killed two women and a six-year-old girl under very similar circumstances. Psychiatric studies showed that he had developed a fetishistic interest in women's clothes at the age of nine and began to steal them outside his home. He experienced sexual excitement when he put them on. At the age of twelve he entered houses through windows in order to secure clothes and soon found that he could obtain gratification in the act of making such entrances. If an emission occurred in this way, he would leave the house at once without taking anything with him. He struggled against the urge to commit burglaries and invented an imaginary character, George, who would instigate the forbidden acts. The murders were unplanned and occurred when he was disturbed while stealing.

Heirens felt no remorse for his murders but did feel guilty if an emission occurred during his burglaries. He denied masturbation or any intimacies with girls and was of the opinion that masturbation was more reprehensible than burglary. In his personal life, he was seclusive, read Kraff-Ebbing and Freud, and had a craving for power. Pictures of Nazi leaders adorned his sketch books and he was given to philosophic discussions in Nietzschean style in his notebooks. He sometimes contemplated suicide and made feeble and dramatic gestures in this direction after his arrest. He had a masochistic attitude toward pain, and neurological examinations showed profound hyposensitivity of a hysterical type.

Psychiatric and psychological studies convinced the examiners that there was no indication of a psychosis or of malingering, and that the disturbance was to be found in a hysterical personality.

MARK KANZER

The Struggle For and Against the Individual in Psychotherapy. Gregory Zilboorg. Amer. J. of Psychiatry, CIV, 1948, pp. 524–527.

Zilboorg is dubious of methods which do not stress the uniqueness of the individual as the basis for psychotherapy. He particularly disputes the possibility of formulating goals for the patient at an early stage of treatment and is of the opinion that the aim to achieve social recovery is not only a 'recrudescence of old-fashioned pragmatism in a new cloak' but contains dangers through glossing over the neurosis.

MARK KANZER

Delusional and Hallucinatory Experiences in Children. J. Louise Despert. Amer. J. of Psychiatry, CIV, 1948, pp. 528–537.

In another of her studies comparing the mind of the child with the schizophrenic, Despert finds no evidence of true hallucinations or delusions in the normal child. The normal three-year-old is fully able to distinguish between reality and fantasy. Pseudohallucinatory experiences and hypnagogic hallucinations may occur under the influence of anxiety but are not especially associated with

imaginativeness. Several children with true hallucinations and delusions showed an otherwise relatively intact personality. Psychotic children above the age of ten were found to present delusional and hallucinatory experiences very similar to those of psychotic adults, except for greater simplicity and lack of organization.

MARK KANZER

Systematic Psychotherapy of the Psychoses. Louis A. Gottschalk. Psychiatric Quarterly, XXI, 1947, pp. 554–574.

Gottschalk advocates complete flexibility in the psychotherapy of functional psychoses. As far as rules can be laid down, he recommends the following: a therapist-patient relationship simulating a congenial parent-child relationship should be fostered. The therapist must try to be the representative of the external environment; he should try to establish a contact with the patient during the acute stage of the psychosis, but follow no rigid rule, rather individualize as much as possible. The technique of free associations is not usable. The provocation of a transference neurosis is avoided for this rapidly develops into a transference psychosis. The analysis of resistances which maintain repression is avoided because it is not desirable to free more repressed material and thereby make the patient more psychotic. Interpretations of psychotic material should be made cautiously, and the patient's hostility should be met without fear or counterhostility. It is desirable to try to establish the precipitating and contributing factors in the psychosis and to formulate the behavior patterns and personality trends that seemed to lead to unsatisfactory adjustments before the onset of the psychosis. Retraining and modification of personality may be sought as with neurotics; many of the unsatisfactory behavior patterns and psychological mechanisms will be found modifiable if the patient understands their origin or their inconsistency.

The literature on the subject is extensively discussed but no case histories are given.

BERNHARD BERLINER

Telepathy and Psychoanalysis: A Critique of Recent Findings. Albert Ellis. With discussions by Jule Eisenbud, Geraldine Pederson-Krag, and Nandor Fodor. Psychiatric Quarterly, XXI, 1947, pp. 607–659.

Ellis discusses the recent publications of Eisenbud, Pederson-Krag, and Fodor on telepathy and psychoanalysis. He comes to the conclusion that their findings rest on flimsy evidence and are better explained by bias and coincidence than by mental telepathy. He lists a number of criteria which would have to be satisfied before he could accept the evidence for mental telepathy. He implies that the authors he discusses did not satisfy these criteria. These authors, in their rebuttal, attempt to justify their papers and conclusions. In his final rejoinder, Ellis is still unconvinced. This paper adds nothing except polemics to the growing literature on mental telepathy.

JOSEPH BIERNOFF

Psychiatric Social Work Number. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, XI, 1947, No. 6.

The entire contents of this number is devoted to some of the basic problems in establishing training facilities for psychiatric social workers. Margaret Williams, Assistant Professor of Social Work at Washington University at St. Louis, discusses curriculum and field work. The Committee on Psychiatric Social Work, formed by the Group For The Advancement of Psychiatry, submits its conclusions and recommendations in reference to the psychiatric social worker in the mental hospital. Edith Beck, Helvi Boothe and Lewis L. Robbins contribute a discussion of the interrelationship between psychiatry and psychiatric social work. Finally, Edith Beck, Chief of the Social Service Section of the Winter Veterans' Administration Hospital, describes how the social work program was organized in this installation.

RALPH R. GREENSON

Facts and Statistics of Significance for Psychiatry. William C. Menninger. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, XII, 1948, pp. 1–25.

William Menninger believes that psychiatrists today have a responsibility toward the broad social problems of our time. In order to better appraise the needs and the available resources, he feels it is necessary to survey the pertinent statistics relevant to the needs of the community and the existing facilities. In his paper he presents some startling figures regarding the prevalence of mental and emotional maladjustment, the availability of psychiatric personnel and the resources for research. For example, there was a loss of 2,478,000 men in military manpower due to psychiatric disorders. Only four percent of medical education is devoted to psychiatric training whereas thirty to fifty percent of medical practice concerns emotional problems. In the field of research, for every dollar spent in psychiatric research in this country, sixty-five dollars were spent in other medical research and two thousand five hundred dollars in industrial research. These and other significant findings make this paper extremely worthwhile for those interested in broadening their psychiatric horizons.

RALPH R. GREENSON

Lessons to Learn. Alan Gregg. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, XII, 1948, pp. 26–30.

Gregg philosophizes upon the lessons that war offers psychiatrists. They had an opportunity to learn at first hand the importance and power of morale; group therapy and psychotherapy under sedation were refined and expanded. The value of having a psychiatric team composed of psychiatrists, psychoanalysts and social workers was established. The grossly inadequate training in psychiatry given in our medical schools was thoroughly proven. Gregg concludes with the hope that the many pleasant and unpleasant surprises experienced by the medical profession will not be too soon forgotten.

RALPH R. GREENSON

Death from Psychic Causes. Erich Menninger von Lerchenthal. Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic, XII, 1948, pp. 31–36.

This paper is interesting from two standpoints: the topic itself, and the history of the author.

Von Lerchenthal speculates about the possibility of death through hysteria and suggestion and comes to the conclusion that the will to live and the will to die exert some influence over life and death because of the close relationship of emotions to the nervous system. The case material is unfortunately fragmentary but the theme is provocative.

The author is a distant relative of the Menninger family, living in Austria, whose manuscript was sent to the Menninger Bulletin eleven years ago. The European crisis led the editors to believe that it would be best to wait before publishing this paper. Von Lerchenthal survived the Nazis and is now in private practice in Vienna.

RALPH R. GREENSON

Psychiatric Implications of the Kinsey Report. Lawrence S. Kubie. Psychosomatic Medicine, X, 1948, pp. 95–106.

The Kinsey report is an important contribution to the understanding of human behavior. It offers significant statistical data on the incidence of manifest, adult, polymorphous, sexual activity and affords an independent corroboration of the basic psychoanalytic views concerning infantile sexuality. However, Kubie regards the following basic assumptions underlying the work as untenable: first, that the overt sexual patterns are all we need to know about human sexuality, and second, that it is superfluous to attempt to explain any widespread pattern of activity. In addition, a number of errors and exaggerations mar the scientific validity of some aspects of the report. The incidence of various patterns of sexual behavior is probably exaggerated due to errors in sampling, in interviewing and in the manipulation of the statistics. Kinsey and his co-workers fail to recognize the importance of the powerful psychologic forces which influence the objects, the aims, and the quantity of sexual activity.

To correct the errors, deficiencies, and misconceptions in the ensuing part of the investigation—this is but the first and preliminary report—Kubie suggests that intensive, detailed studies of representative individuals in each sexual pattern should be conducted alongside the statistical studies. The investigators should take full cognizance of the fundamental principles of dynamic psychopathology and should not neglect unconscious and latent factors. This necessitates enlargement of the team conducting the investigation to include, in addition to biological taxonomists, workers from the various disciplines that concern themselves with human sexual behavior in its many aspects.

S. GABE

Relation of Personality Problems to Onset and Progress of Multiple Sclerosis. O. R. Langworthy. Arch. of Neurology and Psychiatry, LIX, 1948, pp. 13–28.

Langworthy studied four women with multiple sclerosis and found that all of them suffered from emotional immaturity. Their illness became worse when

their neurotic difficulties were increased. The psychosomatic problem involved in this clinical picture is only touched upon and is not worked out specifically and dynamically.

RALPH R. GREENSON

One Hundred Years of Progress in Neurology, Psychiatry and Neurosurgery. Stanley Cobb. Arch. of Neurology and Psychiatry, LIX, pp. 63–98.

This is a clearly written, interesting sketch of the last hundred years in neurology, psychiatry and neurosurgery. The chapter on dynamic psychiatry describes the scientific prejudices Freud had to combat and indicates the tremendous revolution in medical thinking brought about by him.

RALPH R. GREENSON

Dream Life in a Case of Transvestitism with Particular Attention to the Problem of Latent Homosexuality. Ben Karpman. J. Nerv. and Ment. Disease, CVI, 1947, pp. 292–337.

The partial study of a thirty-seven-year-old male transvestite is presented. Extensive comments accompany a detailed history and many dreams, reported during an analysis of fifty sessions which was discontinued by the disappearance of the patient. The transvestitism appeared as a catalyst in achieving masturbatory gratification. The perversion served as a homosexual variation which 'helped the patient to maintain the fiction of heterosexuality though the man's trends are homosexual'. Eighty percent of the dreams reported by the patient concerned transvestitism and homosexuality.

KENNETH COLBY

Some Applications of a Psychoanalytic Concept in the Treatment of the Psychotic Patient. George H. Alexander. J. Nerv. and Ment. Disease, CVI, 1947, pp. 338–354.

Respect is paid to unconscious forces which influence the physician as well as his patient. A brief discussion of two cases illustrates how the unconscious of both the informant and physician may affect the accuracy of a patient's history. Though wordy platitudes for the psychoanalyst, these remarks should bestir the nondynamic psychiatrist into consideration of his own unconscious wishes as integral to the recovery or even to increasing the debility of the patient. Alexander's terse sarcasm makes a forcible caricature of the vacations-drugs-electricity methods of traditional psychiatry.

KENNETH COLBY

The Processes of Expectation and Anticipation. Their Genetic Development, Neural Basis and Rôle in Psychopathology. Silvano Arieti. J. Nerv. and Ment. Disease, CVI, 1947, pp. 471–481.

Expectation is the capacity to anticipate certain events when a particular external stimulus is present. Anticipation is the capacity to foresee or predict

future events when there are no external stimuli directly or indirectly related to those events. Besides the temporal element, present versus future, these processes are in contrast in that expectation may involve physiological changes whereas anticipation is almost exclusively a mental phenomenon. Anticipation, which originates during the anal period and operates in the experience of anxiety, is a function of the frontal lobes.

Arieti edges up obliquely to the problem of the psychodynamics of time perception but never faces it directly. Incidentally, he is surprised by the clinical observation that neurotics think mainly of the past.

KENNETH COLBY

Objective (Behavioristic) Criteria of Recovery from Neuropsychiatric Disorders. K. R. Eissler. J. Nerv. and Ment. Disease, CVI, 1947, pp. 550–564.

Succinct essays such as this are rare in psychiatric literature. Eissler examines thoroughly the difficult problem of establishing criteria for recovery from neuropsychiatric disorders. He discusses somatic medicine's criterion of restoration of function, in relation to current attitudes in psychiatry toward recovery.

Admittedly no satisfactory test for evaluating cure has been developed. Two short cases illustrate that the patient's outward 'objective' behavior, his social adjustment and his denial of complaint are senseless indices of mental health. Assay of the integration of his 'inner personality', though still a vague concept, promises the most reliable estimation. Three test situations are suggested and described at length: 1, the reaction of the patient's ego to biological changes such as occur in the process of aging; 2, the reaction of the patient's ego to emotional pressures such as the sentiments of unorganized masses; and 3, the patient's effect on his children.

KENNETH COLBY

Observations on Emotional Currents in Interview Group Therapy with Adolescent Girls. Hyman Spotnitz. J. Nerv. and Ment. Disease, CVI, 1947, pp. 565–582.

For two years a group of ten adolescent girls met for discussions in the presence of a social worker who was also treating them individually. Two types of emotional forces at work in the group impressed the author: 1, the drives to have sexual pleasure, to marry, to reproduce and to raise children, which he calls the 'reproductive constellation or id feelings'; 2, the girls' physical, emotional and integration inadequacies, which he calls the 'inadequacy constellation or ego feelings'. When the reproductive constellation was stimulated and the inadequacy constellation diminished, the group held together. When the opposite occurred, the group tended to break up. Society should provide a governing agency to stimulate the reproductive constellation of emotions and dispel the inadequacy constellation.

Noteworthy is the observation that adolescent girls found it possible to discuss incest wishes and related problems in a group. The all-important significance of the group leader as a cohesive force and the girls' rivalry for her favor are factors which are not given sufficient emphasis.

KENNETH COLBY

The Golden Opportunity for Public Education. Harry D. Gideonse. Mental Hygiene, XXXI, 1947, pp. 14–28.

Gideonse deplores the trend of various frustrating forces which prevent youth from assuming an economically or an emotionally adult rôle in our society, forces which are likely to render youth vulnerable to a fascist solution of his dilemma. The influence of the family and of religion in shaping personality has dwindled sharply, in contrast to the tremendous influence now played by advertising and the somewhat less blatant but only slightly less destructive pressures of American journalism and cinema. The educational system as constituted today appears to be hopelessly outweighed in shaping ideals and principles by those other forces which are guided by commercial aims almost to the exclusion of what constitutes the public good.

JOSEPH LANDER

New Opportunities for the Improvement of Mental Hospitals. Frank Fremont-Smith. Mental Hygiene XXXI, 1947, pp. 354–362.

The recent wide-spread interest in psychiatry is manifested not only in novels, moving pictures and the drama but also in journalistic *'exposés'*. This public concern should be channeled constructively in support of desperately needed improvement in our state hospitals. Fremont-Smith offers a remedy which is sound and simple and offers real hope for success: 'Let each [state hospital] superintendent, within the limitations of his particular situation, boldly and progressively inform his community of those basic needs of his patients for which he is now unable to provide. Let him be vigorous and specific in his statement of those needs, so that no leader in his community can remain in ignorance of them.'

Such action is particularly urgent now, as the vigorous expansion of the Veterans Administration program will tend to drain off personnel, thereby aggravating a situation which is already critically bad.

JOSEPH LANDER

The National Mental Health Act, How It Can Operate to Meet a National Problem. Robert H. Felix. Mental Hygiene, XXXI, 1947, pp. 363–374.

The Act, signed by President Truman in July 1946, for the first time in history provides the opportunity for a long-range comprehensive program for dealing with the mental health of the American people. Success, however, can be achieved only by coöperation between the federal government, states, and communities, public and private professional and lay organizations. The Act is directly concerned with research, the training of personnel, and improvement and expansion of community mental health services.

JOSEPH LANDER

The Mental Health of Normal Adolescents. George E. Gardner. Mental Hygiene, XXXI, 1947, pp. 529–540.

Gardner believes that ninety per cent of the 'problems' of adolescents are normal reactions or normal phases of development. He discusses in detail the complexities of achieving emancipation and independence, and stresses the adoles-

cent's ambivalence toward achieving maturity. He emphasizes the point that 'the adolescent is beset by tasks in mental health strikingly similar to those at all age levels' and closes with consolation for the troubled parent: 'It will pass'.

JOSEPH LANDER

Social Science and Social Tensions. Edited by Kenneth B. Clark. Mental Hygiene, XXXII, 1948, pp. 15–26.

'Probably at no other time in the history of man's struggle for survival has the threat of extinction been such a real one.' The rôle of the social scientist in relation to this grim fact is examined in detail, with particular reference to what constitutes social tension. Modern social psychologists no longer recognize the dichotomy of individual and group psychology. Society desperately needs to study the problems of leadership. More data must also be obtained on the way in which social forces determine the structure of personality. Whether or not social science will be allowed to find the answers to fundamental social problems lies in the hands of those 'who now hold the actual economic, political, and military power to decide man's destiny in the immediate present—a decision that will determine whether or not he will be permitted to have a future'.

JOSEPH LANDER

Mental-Health Potentialities of the World Health Organization. Edited by Harry Stack Sullivan. Mental Hygiene, XXXII, 1948, pp. 27–36.

Sullivan pleads for psychiatric support of the W.H.O., the potentialities of which 'are the potentialities of the people who will provide its effective support, of the people who will contribute wise policy, and of the people who will administer this policy in the organization'. He deplores the relatively low numerical representation of psychiatrists at the first assembly of the W.H.O. and emphasizes anew the possibilities inherent in psychiatry's contribution to society. He warns against any conscious or unconscious attempt to impose the standards of our particular culture on societies quite different from our own. Little can or will be achieved, however, without active participation, and without some sense of world citizenship.

JOSEPH LANDER

Problems in Teaching Short Term Psychotherapy. William F. Murphy and Joseph Weinreb. Diseases of the Nervous System, IX, 1948, pp. 1–4.

This is an interesting report by Murphy and Weinreb on their teaching experiences. They recommend teaching students to use the associative anamnesis as described by Felix Deutsch. This technique looks easy but is difficult to apply because it demands emotional maturity of the doctor. Such maturity is hard to find among students of psychiatry, who usually choose this field because of their own emotional difficulties—fateful in psychiatry because the doctor's problems are so similar to those of his patients. One great danger which the authors describe is the overenthusiastic and uncritical acceptance of psychoanalytic principles and the student's tendency to plunge prematurely into full-fledged analytic therapy.

The student's most common problem is that of interpreting the patient's symptoms unwisely, too frequently, and too deeply. If the therapy fails, the student frequently thinks that the revelation of one more secret episode, one more detail of the unconscious, will bring about the miracle of cure.

Two other mistakes were frequently found which are incompatible with success in any type of analytic psychotherapy: acting out, and an isolation of therapy from real life. The acting out on the part of the therapist must be recognized as a response to that of the patient. The transference situation frequently offers special difficulties for the doctor's understanding because his narcissism forbids him to play 'second fiddle'.

Murphy and Weinreb conclude their fruitful and stimulating paper with a hopeful remark: 'Despite the difficulties encountered, the development of true psychotherapeutic insight and ability in the residents has been such that we are convinced our goal is a realistic one'.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

The Evasion of Propaganda: How Prejudiced People Respond to Anti-Prejudice Propaganda. Eunice Cooper and Marie Jahoda. J. of Psychology, XXIII, 1947, pp. 15–25.

Prejudiced subjects may experience antiprejudice propaganda as a threat to their position and instead of accepting or opposing it, may attempt to evade it. Evasion can be achieved in various ways: first, by disidentification from the special instance of prejudice depicted which leads to a 'derailing of understanding'. Second, by invalidation of the message, either by admitting its general validity but insisting on their own position as justified by special experience, or by admitting the validity of the message for special instances but insisting on the general attitude on which prejudice is based. Third, by changing the frame of reference and asserting that the message is directed not against prejudiced people but against some other group. And fourth, evasion can simply be achieved by not understanding.

Cooper and Jahoda claim that the mechanism of evasion is used with particular frequency in present society. That frequency they attribute to the inconsistency of dominant value systems which leads to a departmentalization of personality. Insight into this state of affairs might lead to isolation from an environment in which these inconsistencies prevail.

The authors are obviously aware of the fact that the mechanism of evasion is familiar in psychoanalytic practice where it is generally considered as a special instance of avoidance or denial and mostly studied in resistance to an interpretation.

From the psychoanalytic point of view the value of the present study is twofold. First, it illustrates how the concept of 'defense' can be utilized in a vital area of the social sciences, i.e., in the study of communication. Second, it introduces certain distinctions within the general area of one mechanism of defense, which could easily and profitably be transposed from the area of communication research to the psychoanalytic interview.

ERNST KRIS

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Notes

A. Izeddin

To cite this article: A. Izeddin (1948) Notes, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 570-572, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11950895

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11950895

NOTES

The 1948 Midwinter Meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will take place at the Hotel Pennsylvania, New York City, Friday, Saturday and Sunday, December 17, 18, 19, 1948. The program consists of three panel discussions: Panel A: Second Discussion Group of the Committee on Psychoanalysis in Childhood and Adolescence. Panel B: Dream Theory and Interpretation. Panel C: Technical Implications of Ego Psychology and Character Analysis. There will also be read the following scientific papers: Silence and Verbalization: On the Theory of the Analytic Rule by Robert Fliess, M.D.; Countertransference and Attitudes of the Analyst in the Therapeutic Process by Leo Berman, M.D.; Delinquency and Morality: Clinical Remarks on Character Formation by Bruno Bettelheim, Ph.D. and Emmy Sylvester, M.D.; Unsatisfactory Results of Psychoanalytic Treatment by Clarence P. Oberndorf; Interpretation of the Trauma as a Command by Otto E. Sperling.

The NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE, School of Applied Psychoanalysis, offers the following extension courses for 1948–1949:

FIRST TRIMESTER (September 20, 1948–December 10, 1948). Courses for Physicians: Rorschach Seminar, Dr. Frederic S. Weil; Clinical Case Seminars in Psychosomatic Medicine, Dr. Sydney G. Margolin; Relation Between Child Development and Adult Personality, Dr. Margaret E. Fries. Courses for Social Workers: Seminar on Basic Dynamics of Symptom Formation, Dr. A. André Glaz; Seminar for Psychiatric Social Workers Who Work With Children, Dr. Sidney L. Green. Course for Dentists: Psychoanalysis and Dentistry, Dr. Henry H. Hart. Course for Sociologists: Psychoanalysis and Social Problems, Dr. Raymond de Saussure.

SECOND TRIMESTER (December 13, 1948–March 11, 1949). Courses for Physicians: Introduction to Pediatric Psychosomatic Medicine, Dr. Sydney G. Margolin and Dr. Milton J. E. Senn; Introduction to Psychosomatic Medicine, Dr. Jacob A. Arlow; Sexual Pathology, Dr. Sandor Lorand. Courses for Social Workers: Case Seminar for Social Workers, Dr. Herbert A. Wiggers; Case Seminar, Dr. I. Peter Glauber. Course for Nurses: Introduction to Psychoanalytic Psychiatry for Nurses—Part I, Dr. John Frosch. Course for Dentists: Psychoanalysis and Dentistry, Dr. Emile Gordon Stoloff.

THIRD TRIMESTER (March 14, 1949–June 3, 1949). Course for Physicians: Psychological Problems in Medical Practice, Dr. Samuel Atkin. Course for Nurses: Introduction to Psychoanalytic Psychiatry for Nurses—Part II, Dr. John Frosch. Courses for Social Workers: Advanced Case Seminar for Psychiatric Social Workers, Dr. Marcus Schatner; Seminar for Medical Social Workers on Psychological Processes in Somatic Illness, Dr. Emeline P. Hayward.

All classes are scheduled in the evening and sessions are held either once a week or once every two weeks. Information and application forms may be obtained at The New York Psychoanalytic Institute, 245–247 East 82d Street, New York 28, N. Y.

Recommendations of the Committee on Research of the GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY on Research in State Hospitals (to be implemented by the Committee on Hospitals):

1. The American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology should be chary of accrediting State Hospital residency training except *after* competent teaching and progressive staff attitudes have been proven on investigation to exist or are in the process of development, thus forcing a higher standard of personnel and practice.

2. Each State Hospital should have a competent clinical director with interest and ability in research and teaching, and paid an adequate stipend. This should be accomplished by influencing state welfare agencies by Mental Hygiene Societies and the public.

3. The Public Health Service should be urged to utilize, whenever feasible, funds from the Mental Health Act for research in State Hospitals under the directorship of the Professors of Psychiatry of the state medical school.

4. States should be urged to build a State Hospital of approximately two hundred and fifty beds devoted to training and research close to or on the campus of a medical school.

5. Professors of Psychiatry in State and other medical schools should assume responsibilities for stimulating and supervising teaching and research in their state mental hospitals through exchange of residents in training, postgraduate courses and seminars, utilization of clinical material at the hospitals for research and opening of medical school laboratories and other facilities to the hospital staffs. Teams of teachers and investigators should travel to the hospitals from time to time. If possible, staff members should make regular visits to the hospitals, as now practiced under the Dean's subcommittees for the Veterans Hospitals, for the purpose of stimulating teaching and supervising. Clinical directors of State Hospitals should be included in the medical school faculty. Teaching and research should be paid for and not classed as charity.

6. Members of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry and the district affiliates of the American Psychiatric Association should aid wherever possible in facilitating reorganization of State Hospitals and participate in their teaching and research programs.

Dr. Brock Chisholm, of Canada, internationally known psychiatrist, has been elected first Director-General of the WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION. Dr. Chisholm brings to his post broad practical experience and a record of distinguished national and international service. Born in Oakville, Canada, fifty-two years ago, he served in the Canadian Army during the first World War as an enlisted man before receiving his commission. The latter part of the second World War found him Director-General of the Medical Services of the Canadian Army (which corresponds to the U. S. Army's Surgeon General) and noted as one of the developers of the Pulhems system for determining aptitudes through physical and psychological tests. In the years between he studied medicine (receiving his M.D. from the University of Toronto), interned in England, practiced general medicine in his native Canada, studied Human Relations at Yale Uni-

versity, and returned to England to specialize in psychological medicine which he then practiced for the following six years in Toronto. In November 1944 he became Canada's first Deputy Minister of Health in the new Department of National Health and Welfare, resigning in 1946 to become Executive Secretary of the Interim Commission of the World Health Organization. Among the many honors which he has received in recognition of his work was a citation in connection with the 1945 Albert A. and Mary Lasker Award for 'safeguarding the mental health of Canadian soldiers as a psychiatrist, soldier, philosopher and administrator'. Dr. Chisholm is a member of a number of professional organizations, is associate editor of Psychiatry, and the author of many technical articles.

Dr. Chisholm, discussing the question, What Hope for Man?, with three other leading scientists—Dr. Fairfield Osborn, author and president of the New York Zoological Society; Dr. Edmund Sinnott, director of the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale University; and Dr. Harlow Shapley, director of the Harvard Observatory—believes that human relations will determine the survival of the human race, and this field has been sadly neglected. 'Much of the reason for this neglect', he declared, 'seems to be in the general attitude shared by most physical scientists that people working in the field of the humanities are not really "scientific" and, therefore, should be disregarded'. The word 'scientific', he said, should be used to describe an attitude of mind, not any specific method. Many people, he pointed out, have a sound and considerable knowledge of human relations. Such experts, he said, include social psychologists, psychiatrists, social anthropologists, and sociologists. These experts in the field of human relations, he believes, should be employed on policy-making levels by governments, 'because the policies of governments in this field are going to preserve or kill off the human race'. As an example of what could be accomplished in the field of international policy decisions, Dr. Chisholm cited the World Health Organization, in which people from every part of the world have been working together in the most complete coöperation.

The following communication was sent to the editor in August, 1948. The letter is published essentially as received and is self-explanatory.

Dear Sir:

An old-time psychoanalyst, having lost touch with psychoanalytic centers on account of the war, I failed until recently to read Freud's Moses and Monotheism. I therefore take some liberty in requesting the hospitality of your columns to rectify some of Freud's claims concerning monotheism. . . . What I would like to bring forth is that, as any impartial specialist can determine, the first psychoanalytic study of monotheism was written by me (Izeddin, A.: *Eine mohammedanische Legende.* Imago, XVIII, 1932, pp. 189–213). There I showed—a fact admitted by Freud himself since he had the article translated into German by Schotlander—that psychoanalytic mechanisms discovered previously, and originating from polytheistic legends, could be applied to monotheistic folklore. Freud's analysis postdates mine by six years, and no

one during that period has published anything on that subject. So much for the question of priority.

Concerning monotheism I would like to state that no longer can either Mohammedanism or Judaism be considered as such. In fact, in Mohammedanism there exists a patent but slightly concealed concept of 'trinity', since there exists a Prophet, who is Mohammed; a God, who is Allah, and an intermediary agent represented by the Angel Gabriel in the creed. Mohammedans symbolize the last (though not pictorially) as a bird, and references to him as such are abundant in the Koran: therefore, the *third* element is something analogous to the primitive Christian Holy Spirit (a pigeon). A similar tri-personal representation exists in Judaism with its Jehova as God; Moses, His Spokesman, and the Laws, or Ten Commandments, the third element (the œdipus). That the Ten Commandments represent the Holy Spirit is established by the fact that in some Mohammedan (Sufi) sects the Koran is said to be 'written in the Heavens on the table' (*Levh*), and then is 'descended' on Earth (the identical verb of the Testament). Therefore, in the light of present psychoanalytic research, neither Judaism nor Mohammedanism can be considered as monotheistic creeds; one needs no subsidiary hypothesis to analyze them, and the mechanism of 'the traumatic neurosis' is unnecessary.

These are the points I want to bring forth and I should like someone to go deeper into the subject. I have written this letter not so much to criticize an author whom I esteem, but rather to establish an outmoded fact, as well as to obtain justice for my work, meager as it may be. The facts are there.

Sincerely yours,

A. Izeddin, M.D., Neuropsychiatrist
Medical Inspector to the Ministry
of National Public Education
Ankara, Turkey

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Index

To cite this article: (1948) Index, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 17:4, 573-590, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1948.11950896

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1948.11950896

INDEX