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THALASSA: A THEORY OF GENITALITY

BY SÁNDOR FERENCZI † *

INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 1914 the demands of military service broke in upon the psychoanalytic activities of the author of this work and exiled him to a small garrison town, where he found the duties of chief medical officer to a squadron of Hussars somewhat of a contrast to the pressure of activity to which he had been accustomed. Thus he came to occupy his leisure hours with the translating of Freud's *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*; and it was almost inevitable that he should have elaborated in his mind certain ideas suggested by this work and have set down, however sketchily, the results. These notions revolved around a fuller elucidation of the act of coitus, conceived in the *Abhandlungen* as the final phase in the total course of sexual development, to be sure, but not there dealt with in any detail from the standpoint of its evolution and development. These ideas gradually crystallized into an onto- and phylogenetic theory which in 1915 I submitted to Professor Freud on the occasion of a visit of his to my military station. Later, in 1919, I repeated the exposition of this theory before him and before a small group of friends, and on both occasions was urged to write it out for publication. My failure for some time to act upon this invitation, though due in part to resistances engendered by the singularity of my material, was determined also by objective considerations. My equipment in the natural sciences did not in any wise exceed that of a physician who in his time has studied various branches of natural science with every diligence and out of a special fondness for them, but who for nearly twenty years has not been concerned with them to any detailed extent. And yet my theory dealt with matters which were at that time the very

* Authorized translation by Henry Alden Bunker, Jr.

center of biological discussion. I had at my disposal as works of reference only the fine *Zoölogy* of Hesse and Doflein, and one work each of Lamarck, Darwin, Haeckel, Bölsche, Lloyd Morgan, Godlewsky, H. Hertwig, Piéron and Trömmner; whereas the results of modern biological investigation, notably those concerned with the mechanics of development, were almost wholly unavailable to me.¹

In my speculations on the problems of genitality I boldly transferred to animals, to their organs and the parts thereof, and to their tissues, all kinds of processes with which I had become acquainted through psychoanalysis; and if with the aid of this transposition I arrived at new points of view, I nevertheless became guilty of a psychomorphism which, as a methodological excess, weighed upon my scientific conscience. On the other hand, this train of thought compelled me to make use of observations on animals, data from embryology, etc., as aids in the explanation of mental states; as for example the status of the psyche during coitus, in sleep, and so forth. According to my conviction at that time this too was forbidden; indeed, I had learned in school to consider it a fundamental principle of scientific work to keep strictly separated from each other the respective points of view of the natural sciences and of the mental sciences. The fact that in my speculations this rule was more honored in the breach than the observance was one of the reasons which restrained me from publishing my theory of genitality.

However, at the time when I was immersed in the *Drei Abhandlungen*, I was extraordinarily impressed by the fact that Freud was able to evaluate experiences gained in the field of the treatment of the psychoneuroses, and therefore in the mental realm, in such a way as to be in a position to reconstruct with the aid of these an entire chapter of biology, namely, the knowledge of sexual development. And in the Foreword

¹ For similar reasons I was compelled to limit my investigation of genital functioning to the vertebrates and could not take up the consideration of the extremely interesting case of the insects; nor was it possible to include the genital life of plants.

to my translation I extolled his work as a significantly forward step in scientific methodology, as the reestablishment of an animism no longer anthropomorphic.¹

Gradually the conviction grew upon me that such an importation into psychology of concepts belonging to the field of natural science, and into the natural sciences of psychological concepts, was inevitable and might be extremely fruitful. As long as one is satisfied with mere description, an exact tabulation of the details of a process is sufficient, and one is very easily able to confine oneself within one's own particular scientific boundaries. As soon, however, as one desires, in addition to description, to make some assertion regarding the *meaning* of a process, one involuntarily grasps for analogies in alien scientific fields. The physicist is able to make the phenomena of his science comprehensible only when he compares them to "forces", "attraction", "repulsion", to "resistance", "inertia", and the like—which are simply things with which we are acquainted from the mental side alone. But Freud also was compelled to reduce mental functioning to topographical, dynamic, economic, and therefore purely physical processes, for otherwise he was unable to approach their final explanation. Ultimately I perceived that we need not be ashamed of this reciprocal analogizing, that on the contrary it should be vigorously pushed as a highly necessary and, indeed, inevitable method. In later works I no longer had any hesitation, in fact, in recommending this working method, which I termed a "utraquistic" one; and I expressed the hope that it would enable science to answer even those questions in the face of which it had previously been helpless.

Once the right is granted to make freer use of analogies previously despised, it is perfectly obvious that these should be drawn from fields as remote as possible. Analogies derived from related fields would tend to be, indeed, mere tautologies, and as such could hardly serve the function of proof. In

¹ This introduction has been published in the *Int. Ztschr. f. Psch.* (1915) under the title: *The Scientific Value of Freud's Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.*

scientific statements which purport to be synthetic rather than analytic findings, the subject may not be repeated in the predicate; this is the familiar fundamental rule of every definition. Or, as a different approach, let us utilize the fact that materials are usually measured by a material of another kind; thus we easily may proceed to measure the material by the non-material, and *vice versa*.

The briefest formulation of this knowledge would be that all physical and physiological phenomena require a *meta*-physical (i.e., psychological) explanation and all psychological phenomena a meta-psychological (i.e., physical) one.

Emboldened by the acquisition of this insight and by the fact that the results at which I arrived with the aid of this method have found unexpected confirmation in the most recent and quite differently oriented investigations of others, I have decided upon the publication of the present volume.

Klobenstein am Ritten, August, 1923.

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ONTOGENESIS

CHAPTER 1

AMPHIMIXIS OF EROTISMS IN THE EJACULATORY ACT

It was reserved for psychoanalysis to rescue the problems of sexuality from the poison cabinet of science in which they had been locked away for centuries. A certain perhaps necessitous sequence is clearly apparent, however, in the actual selection of the problems to which psychoanalysis has addressed itself. Just as in the matter of the sexual enlightenment of children even the most liberal approach boggles at the riddle of how the child comes to be in the mother's body, in the same way psychoanalysis has up to the present dealt to a relatively much greater degree with pregnancy and birth, with the acts preparatory to coitus, and with the perversions, than with the meaning and explanation of the phenomena of the act of coitus itself. I too must confess that the ideas which I should now like to communicate, at least in their broad outlines, have lain buried in my desk for more than nine years, and I suspect that my hesitancy in making them known—in giving birth to them, if you like—was attributable not alone to external causes but to my own resistances as well.

My reflections on the subject had their origin in certain psychoanalytic observations on impotence in the male. This seemed a promising lead; we know how often it is that what is in effect a caricature of normal functioning makes it possible to detect certain factors ordinarily masked and thus clarify the course of events in the normal process. Abraham, an especially zealous investigator of the so-called "pregenital organizations", has attributed *ejaculatio præcox* to a too intimate association of urethral erotism with genitality. Patients who suffer from premature ejaculation manifest the same attitude of indifference towards their semen as they would towards their urine, that is to say, as a valueless excretion of the organism. In contrast to this group of observations I have established the fact from a fairly

large number of cases that other patients are excessively economical of their semen, many of them so much so that they suffer, properly speaking, only from *impotentia ejaculandi*; that is, they are capable of erection and intromission and are incapable only of ejaculation. In the unconscious and to some extent even in the conscious mentation of these patients the equating of coitus with the act of defæcation plays an important part (equating of the vagina with the water-closet, of the semen with fæces, etc.). Not infrequently these patients have displaced upon the sexual act the self-will and obstinacy with which in childhood they opposed the strict regulation of their excretory habits imposed on them by convention; they are impotent if the partner desires intercourse, they have erections only when the performance of the act is for some reason impossible or impracticable (as for example in the case of menstruation), they have outbreaks of rage or hatred or suddenly become cold if their partner opposes their willfulness in the slightest imaginable degree. It is easy, then, to assume in these patients as intimate an association of anal elements with the acts of coitus as Abraham has shown to be true of urethral elements in the case of *ejaculatio præcox*; in other words, it has to be assumed that there is such a thing as a specific *anal technique* in impotence in the male.

It then occurred to me that less pronounced disturbances of the act of coitus similarly connected with anal functioning are not especially uncommon. Many men have a compulsion to defæcate before performing the sexual act; moreover, severe nervous digestive disorders may disappear when emotional inhibitions of sexuality have been analytically resolved; one is familiar too with the obstinate constipation which is a not unusual consequence of excessive masturbation and squandering of semen. Among the "character regressions" which I have described I would cite as worthy of mention in this connection the case of men who, in other respects generous, are very petty and even niggardly in the matter of giving money to their wives.

To avoid misunderstanding I should remark that in the

psychoanalytic treatment of both anal and urethral impotence the psychic determinants of the disorder need not be sought in such a deep level of the biological substratum as in the case of the transference neuroses, in the œdipus complex and the related castration complex. The above-mentioned division of impotence into anal and urethral came about as a mere speculative by-product intended to indicate the ways in which the underlying motivation regressively enforces the overt appearance of the symptom. It should also be said that the two impotence mechanisms are almost never observed as separate entities; that much more often in actual practice a patient suffering from *ejaculatio præcox*, hence an urethral individual, acquires a capacity for erection and intromission in the course of the analysis but thereby loses temporarily his *potestas ejaculandi*, that is, he becomes aspermatic. In such patients it would seem that their original urethrality became converted into anality in the course of treatment. The result is an apparent super-potency, which however is satisfactory only to the patient's wife. It is only with the continuation or completion of the analysis that there is brought about a harmonizing, as it were, of the two opposed types of innervation and the establishing of satisfactory potency in consequence.

These observations have led me to suspect that in normal ejaculation a synergetic harmony of anal and urethral innervations is essential, their presence going unrecognized owing perhaps only to the fact that each innervation normally covers up or masks the other; whereas in *ejaculatio præcox* the urethral component, in *ejaculatio retardata* the anal, is alone in evidence.

The simple consideration of the nature of the sex act from the intromission of the penis to ejaculation would seem to support these assumptions. The terminal event of coitus, the ejaculation of semen, is undoubtedly an urethral phenomenon, which has in common with the voiding of urine not only its channel of excretion but the fact of being the ejection of a fluid under great pressure; on the other hand, during the frictional process inhibitory influences, in all probability of

sphincteric origin, seem to assert themselves and to be capable, if they gain the upper hand to an untoward degree, of bringing about complete absence of ejaculation. Everything points to the fact that the urethral (i.e., ejaculatory) tendency is at work from the beginning, throughout the entire frictional process, and that in consequence an unceasing struggle occurs between the evacuatory and the inhibitory purpose, between expulsion and retention, in which the urethral element is eventually victorious. This two-fold innervation might, among other things, manifest itself also in the to-and-fro motion of the frictional process, in which penetration would correspond to the ejaculatory tendency, withdrawal to an ever recurring inhibition. Naturally one would have to ascribe significance also to the increase of excitement consequent upon continued friction, and to assume that this increase is capable, on exceeding a certain level, of finally overcoming the spasm of the sphincter.

This assumption presupposes a highly complicated and finely graduated coördination, a disturbance of which would produce just that ataxia and dyspraxia which one may describe as premature and inhibited emission. One is thereby forcibly reminded of a certain similarity between the anomalies of seminal emission of which I have spoken and the speech disorder which goes under the name of stuttering. In this instance, likewise, the normal flow of speech is assured by the proper coördination of the innervations necessary to the production of vowels and consonants. But if speech is interfered with from time to time by impeded vocalization or by the spasmodic character of the enunciation of consonants, there result the varieties of stuttering which specialists in speech disorders refer to as vocalic and consonantal stuttering. It is not difficult to guess that I should like to compare the innervation necessary to the production of tone with urethrality, and the interruptions of tone by consonantal sounds, which are in many ways suggestive of sphincter action, with anal inhibition. Yet that this is no mere superficial parallel but on the contrary has reference to a fundamental similarity between the two pathological conditions which goes much deeper, is attested by the remarkable

fact that the disturbances of innervation which characterize stuttering are in fact traceable psychoanalytically to anal erotic sources on the one hand and to urethral erotic on the other. In a word, I should like to conceive the pathophysiological mechanism of disturbances of ejaculation as a kind of genital stuttering.

In this connection the embryological fact should not be disregarded that the penis, on which devolves the terminal act of coitus, the emission of semen, is *ab initio* adapted to the uniting of anal and urethral tendencies; for we must not forget that it grows out of the gut, or, in the lower mammals, out of the urogenital cloaca, as a quite late acquisition in developmental history.

Let us return from this physiological digression to our well-founded psychoanalytic knowledge and attempt to bring the situation as we have described it into line with Freud's sexual theory.

The sexual development of the individual culminates, according to the *Drei Abhandlungen*, in the supersession by the primacy of the genital zone of the hitherto active auto-erotisms (excitations of the so-called erotogenic zones) and of the previous organizations of sexuality, whereby the erotisms and the stages of organization which have been thus transcended are retained in the final genital organization as mechanisms of fore-pleasure. At this point, however, the question presents itself whether the analysis of the ejaculatory act into its separate elements, which we have attempted in the preceding paragraphs, does not supply a means of conjecturing, even if only partially, the subtler processes involved in the establishing of genital primacy. For what I described in physiological terms as a coördination of urethral and anal innervations may be expressed in the vocabulary of the sexual theory as a synthesis or an integration of anal and urethral erotisms into genital erotism. I may be permitted to emphasize this new conception by giving it a name of its own; let us term such a synthesis of two or more erotisms in a higher unity the *amphimixis* of erotisms or instinct-components.

But already this very first step towards a psychoanalytic theory of genitality encounters difficulties which seem to throw considerable doubt on its validity. One of these difficulties arises out of the fact that physiology fails to provide us with any means of conceiving how such an amphimixis might take place. Are actual nerve impulses transmitted from one organ to another or even from two organs to a third, or have we to do with chemical processes somewhat after the manner of an accumulation of endocrine products which reciprocally stimulate or inhibit one another? In all these matters we must confess our deep ignorance; but this particular difficulty should not by any means deter us from the pursuit of our theoretical considerations. For the explanation of a given process may be correct and from the standpoint of the psychoanalyst perfectly clear without the physiological side of the process being at the moment completely intelligible. Freud's entire sexual theory is a purely psychoanalytic one; the biological evidence for its correctness must be supplied subsequently by the physiologists.

A much more serious objection to the theory of amphimixis is a metapsychological one—more serious since it emanates from the field of psychoanalysis itself. Metapsychology has heretofore worked with the hypothesis of mechanisms which are charged with energy and from which energy is withdrawn. The difference in reactions was thought of as being caused by a difference in mechanism, whereas in the case of energy it was only the quantity and not the quality or character of it that mattered. We conceived of the mental always as a variety of mechanisms operated by one and the same energy, in such manner that this energy might shift from one system to another; but we have never spoken specifically of a shifting of qualities, above all of qualitative differences in the energies themselves, such as the amphimixis theory would demand. If we look more closely, however, we find that such a conception, even if only implicit, has underlain certain psychoanalytic views. I have in mind in particular the psychoanalytic conception of the phenomena of hysterical conversion and

materialization.¹ The latter we were obliged to consider as a "heterotopic genital function", as a regressive genitalization of earlier autoerotisms, or in other words as processes in which typically genital erotisms, such as erectility, frictional activity, and the ejaculatory tendency, constituting a qualitatively well-defined syndrome, are displaced from the genital to innocuous parts of the body. This "displacement from below upwards" is very possibly nothing but a reversal of the amphimictic downward trend of erotisms to the genital whereby, according to the theory here propounded, the primacy of the genital zone is established. Therefore, the metapsychological objection to the amphimixis theory need not disturb us any longer; on the contrary, we ought to consider whether we shall not have to exchange the conception of one energy but many mechanisms, attractive though this theory is by reason of its simplicity, for that of a multiplicity of forms of energy. This we have already unwittingly done, in that we have considered psychic mechanisms as charged now with ego-tendencies, now with sexual ones.

We are therefore not guilty of any inconsistency in working with erotisms which are displaceable and capable of interoperation, while preserving their qualitative individuality.

The question now presents itself whether the urethro-anal amphimixis which I have described cannot be corroborated by other kinds of linkages between these erotisms, whether other characteristics of coitus can also be referred to similar mixtures of erotisms, and finally whether these can be brought into harmony with the sexual theory.

Between urethral and anal autoerotism there seems in fact to exist a kind of reciprocity well prior to the establishing of genital primacy. The child has a tendency to obtain an extra dividend of pleasure from emptying the bladder and from retaining the stool, but learns to renounce a part of this

¹ Ferenczi, S.: "Hysterische Materialisationsphänomene"; in *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*, Int. Ps. Bibliothek, No. 2, Vienna, 1919. Engl. translation in *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis*, London, 1926.

pleasure in order to insure the love of those who take care of him. But whence does the child derive the ability to follow the instructions of mother or nurse and overcome his prodigality with urine and his parsimony with fæces? I believe that this ability is a result of the fact that the organs participating in urethral functioning are crucially influenced from the anal sphere, the organs of anal functioning from the urethral, so that the bladder acquires a degree of retentiveness from the rectum, the rectum a degree of liberality from the bladder—or, scientifically stated, by means of an amphimixis of the two erotisms in which the urethral erotism receives anal admixtures and the anal erotism urethral. If this is so, we should have to ascribe to the constitution of the admixture and to the finer or grosser apportionment of the ingredients of this combination of erotisms, an enormous importance as regards not only genital normality or individuality but character formation in particular, which latter, as Freud has taught us, is to be regarded as in large measure the psychic superstructure and the psychic transcript of these erotisms.

Even apart from this consideration, the assumption of a urethro-anal amphimixis in the copulative act is notably facilitated by this pregenital amphimixis. The genital would then no longer be the unique and incomparable magic wand which conjures erotisms from all the organs of the body; on the contrary, genital amphimixis would merely be one particular instance out of the many in which such fusion of erotisms takes place. From the standpoint of individual adaptation this special instance is most significant, however; we see by what means in general the force of education brings about renunciation of pleasure and the adoption of an unpleasurable activity, namely, only by a clever combination of mechanisms of pleasure. The bladder learns to retain urine only by making use of another type of pleasure, that of retention; and the bowel renounces the pleasure of constipation by borrowing from the urethral pleasure in voiding. It is possible, perhaps, that in a sufficiently deep analysis the most successful sublimation, even an apparently complete renunciation, might be reduced to such

hidden elements of hedonistic gratification, without which, apparently, no living organism can be induced to make any change in its activity.¹

The question whether there occur other mixtures and transpositions of erotisms can be answered categorically in the affirmative.² Observation of children alone affords numerous indications of their existence. Children are fond of fusing pleasurable activities of the most various kinds into a single act; they like in particular to combine the pleasure of eating with that of emptying the bowel; even infants, as Lindner, the first to make the observation, emphasized, are prone to combine thumb-sucking with rubbing or picking at various skin areas such as the lobe of the ear, the finger, or even the genital. One may very properly speak of a mixture of oral and anal or of oral and skin erotisms in these instances. Furthermore, the well-known activities of perverts customarily strive for such a summation of erotisms, most conspicuously in those *voyeurs* who obtain gratification only by simultaneously watching the act of defæcation and smelling or eating fæces. The most characteristic example of an amphimictically urethro-anal performance I owe, however, to a two-year-old boy who would sit on a chamber and alternately pass a few drops of urine and a little fæces or flatus to the accompaniment of a continuous cry of, "*egy csurr, egy pú—egy csurr, egy pú*", which may be translated

¹ A similar mutual dependence on the part of the urethral spendthrift tendency and the anal inhibitory one is repeated, as I believe, in the struggle to give up masturbation. The onanistic squandering of semen may rightly be regarded as a repetition of the enuretic period, while the hypochondriacal anxiety which impels the giving up of masturbation betrays unmistakable anal trends.

² Under certain circumstances bowel and bladder behave as though they had exchanged functions in a way which could be accounted for on the basis of an excessive influence of each of the two antagonistic innervations upon the other; for example, in nervous diarrhoea the bowel is inundated by urethrality: while in urinary retention of nervous origin the bladder overdoes the inhibition learned from the bowel. In those cases in which I obtained an insight into the causes of such behavior, I found it to be a disguised expression of spite. The child and the neurotic adult succeed in reducing educative measures to an absurdity by overdoing them.

into English, in the vernacular of childhood, as "now a pee, now a poop".

In a few patients I have even obtained some insight into the psychic motivation of such combinations; for example, an essentially anally impotent patient experienced a state of depression, fantasies of impoverishment and feelings of inferiority after every evacuation of the bowels, these being replaced during the consumption of the next meal by prodigious delusions of grandeur. This case demonstrates that the obvious combination of anal with oral erotism, namely, coprophagia, strives to atone for the pain of anal loss by the pleasure of oral incorporation.

As examples of the displacement of erotic qualities I may further mention the shifting of erotism from the clitoris to the vagina described by Freud, the shifting of the erectile tendency to the nipple and the nares, and the tendency to blushing (erection of the entire head) on the part of the maiden who represses sexual excitement.

The so-called synæsthesias, furthermore, in which the stimulation of a given sense organ is accompanied by the illusional stimulation of some other (*audition colorée*, *vision acoustique*, *audition odorée*, etc.), supply evidence for the existence of mixtures of erotic trends, according to the psychoanalytic observations which we owe to Pfister and to Hug-Hellmuth, among others.

All these observations which I have here set down in quite informal fashion have strengthened me in the preconceived notion that the act of ejaculation is a phenomenon of urethro-anal amphimixis. I would now venture to consider from this standpoint the dynamics of the act of coitus in its entirety, including its preparatory activities and those concerned with fore-pleasure.

CHAPTER 2

COITUS AS AN AMPHIMICTIC PHENOMENON

We know from the "sexual theory" that the activities characteristic of infantile erotism reappear in the adult sex act in the form of activities concerned with fore-pleasure, but that in the adult the actual discharge of the excitation only takes place at the moment of ejaculation. Whereas in the child, thumb-sucking, slapping and being slapped, looking and being looked at, are capable of yielding complete satisfaction, in the adult, looking, kissing, embracing, etc., serve only to set in motion the genital mechanism proper. Here, it is as though none of these latter excitations was carried through to a conclusion; it is, rather, as though they were transmuted into another erotism when the intensity of the excitation reached a certain degree. Excitement engendered by erotic looking, hearing and smelling, when it reaches a sufficient intensity, impels embracing and kissing, and it is only when these contacts have attained a certain vehemence that erection and the urge to intromission and friction result, to culminate in the amphimictic phenomenon of ejaculation above described. One might quite properly speak of a condensed recapitulation of sexual development as taking place in each individual sex act. It is as though the individual erotogenic zones were smouldering fires connected by a fuse which finally sets off the explosion of the charge of instinctual energy accumulated in the genital.

More probable, however, is the assumption that such an amphimictic displacement downwards takes place not alone during the sex act but throughout life; indeed this assumption has in its favor the heuristic argument that with its help we can form a more definite conception of the meaning and biological purpose of the achieving of genital primacy. The principal stages in the development of the libido are, as we know, those of the evolution from autoerotism *via* narcissism to genital

object-love. In the autoerotic stage of this evolution the sexuality of each separate organ of the body or instinct-component exists in a state of anarchy which is lacking in all regard for the weal or woe of the rest of the organism. It necessarily signifies a definite advance with regard to the functional capacity—that is, the utility function—of the individual organs when it becomes possible continuously to turn aside sexual excitations from them and to store these up in a special reservoir from which they are periodically tapped. If there were no such separation of pleasure activities, the eye would be absorbed in erotic looking, the mouth would be exclusively utilized as an oral-erotic instrument, instead of being employed in necessary self-preservative activities; even the skin would not be the protective covering whose sensitiveness provides warning of danger, but would be merely the seat of erotic sensations; the musculature would not be the executive instrument of purposive volitional activity, but would subserve only the release of sadistic and other pleasurable motor discharges, etc. By ridding the organism of sexual cravings and concentrating these in the genital, the level of efficiency of the organism is definitely raised and its adaptation to difficult situations—to catastrophes, even—made possible. One must conceive of the genital center so to speak pangenetically, in Darwin's sense; that is to say, there is no part of the organism which is not represented in the genital, so that the genital, in the rôle of executive manager, as it were, provides for the discharge of sexual tension on behalf of the entire organism.

The development from autoerotism to narcissism would then be the even outwardly recognizable result of the amphi-mictic displacement downwards of all erotisms. If we wish to take seriously this provisional idea of the pangensis of the genital function, then we may venture to regard the phallus as a miniature of the total ego, as the embodiment of a pleasure-ego, and to say that this duplication of the ego is for the narcissistic ego the fundamental prerequisite of love. For this miniature ego, which in dreams and other products of fantasy so often symbolically represents the total personality, con-

ditions must be created in the sex act such as shall assure its gratification simply and certainly; and with these conditions we shall now, if only briefly, concern ourselves.

Psychoanalytic experience has established that the acts preparatory to coitus likewise have as their function the bringing about of an identification with the sexual partner through intimate contact and embraces. Kissing, stroking, biting, embracing serve to efface the boundaries between the egos of the sexual partners, so that during the sex act the man, for example, since he has as it were introjected the organ of the woman, need no longer have the feeling of having entrusted to a strange and therefore hazardous environment his most precious organ, the representative of his pleasure-ego; he can therefore quite easily permit himself the luxury of erection, since in consequence of the identification which has taken place the carefully guarded member certainly will not get lost, seeing that it remains with a being with whom the ego has identified itself. Thus there is brought about in the act of coitus a successful compromise between the desire to give out and the desire to retain, between an egoistic and a libidinal striving—a phenomenon which we have already met with in the double determination of all hysterical conversion symptoms. And indeed this analogy is no accidental one, since the hysterical symptom, as countless psychoanalytic observations have shown, is always a reproduction in some manner of genital functioning.

Once there has come about the most intimate possible union between two persons of opposite sex through ties created by kisses, embraces and the insertion of the penis, there then occurs the final and decisive battle between the desire to give away and the desire to keep the genital secretion itself, which at the beginning of our argument we ventured to describe as a struggle between anal and urethral strivings. In fine, therefore, the entire genital warfare rages about the issue of giving up or not giving up a secretory product the escape of which from the male body is permitted by the terminating ejaculation, thus freeing the man from sexual tension, but in a way

which at the same time safeguards the security and welfare of this secretory product inside the body of the woman. This safeguarding, however, may clearly be assumed to constitute an identification between the sexual secretion and the ego, so that we should now have a threefold identification in connection with coitus: identification of the whole organism with the genital, identification with the partner, and identification with the sexual secretion.¹

If now we survey the evolution of sexuality from the thumb-sucking of the infant through the self-love of genital onanism to the heterosexual act of coitus, and keep in mind the complicated identifications of the ego with the penis and with the sexual secretion, we arrive at the conclusion that the purpose of this whole evolution, therefore the purpose likewise of the sex act, can be none other than an attempt on the part of the ego—an attempt at the beginning clumsy and fumbling, then more consciously purposive, and finally in part successful—to return to the mother's womb, where there is no such painful disharmony between ego and environment as characterizes existence in the external world. The sex act achieves this transitory regression in a threefold manner: the whole organism attains this goal by purely hallucinatory means, somewhat as in sleep; the penis, with which the organism as a whole has identified itself, attains it partially or symbolically; while only the sexual secretion possesses the prerogative, as representative of the ego and its narcissistic double, the genital, of attaining *in reality* to the womb of the mother.

In the phraseology of the natural sciences we should have to say of the sex act that it purposes and attains a simultaneous gratification as regards both the soma and the germ-plasm. For the soma, ejaculation signifies being rid of a burdensome secretory product; for the sex cells entry into the *milieu* most favorable to them. The psychoanalytic conception teaches us,

¹ To meet an obvious objection, I would emphasize that this exposition deals exclusively with the simpler conditions pertaining to the male participant. I must postpone to a subsequent occasion the demonstration of the applicability of this conception to the more complicated conditions in the female sex.

however, that the soma (in consequence of its "identification" with the sexual secretion) not only gratifies by means of the ejaculation egoistic tendencies making for the release of tension, but, in the form of a hallucinatory and symbolic (partial) return to the womb so unwillingly left at birth, shares also in the real gratification of the germ cells—which latter we may call from the standpoint of the individual the libidinal side of the sex act.

In the light of this "bioanalytic" conception of genital processes, as I should like to term it, it becomes comprehensible for the first time why the œdipus wish, the wish for sexual intercourse with the mother, recurs so regularly, with an almost wearisome monotony, as the central striving in the analysis of the male. The œdipus wish is precisely the psychological expression of an extremely general biological tendency which lures the organism to a return to the state of rest enjoyed before birth.

One of the most gallant tasks of physiology would be the demonstration of those organic processes which make possible the summation of single erotisms into genital erotism. According to the hypothesis outlined above, whenever an organ fails to indulge its pleasure tendencies directly but renounces these in favor of the organism as a whole, substances may be secreted from this organ or qualitative or quantitative innervations be shifted to other organs and eventually to the genital, it being the task of the latter to equalize in the gratificatory act the free-floating pleasure tensions of all the organs.

For biology, however, there would arise the not less difficult problem of indicating the ways in which the striving for gratification on the part of the germ-plasm and the similar striving on the part of the individual soma, originally altogether independent of each other, achieve a fusion in the sex act or mutually influence each other. It would have to demonstrate the onto- and phylo-genetic causes which compel so many forms of life to seek their highest gratification precisely in the act of copulation, which according to the discussion here presented is nothing but the expression of the striving to return to the mother's womb.

CHAPTER 3

STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EROTIC SENSE OF REALITY

In a previous work on the course of development of the reality sense in the growing child¹ I had already reached the conclusion that the human being is dominated from the moment of birth onwards by a continuous regressive trend toward the reestablishment of the intrauterine situation, and holds fast to this unswervingly by, as it were, magical-hallucinatory means, by the aid of positive and negative hallucinations. The full development of the reality sense is attained, according to this conception, only when this regression is renounced once and for all and a substitute found for it in the world of reality. This development is experienced, however, by only a part of the personality; in sleep and in dreams, in the sex life and the life of fantasy, the striving towards the fulfilment of that primordial wish is still clung to.

In what follows the attempt will be made to supplement to some extent this train of thought. We shall disclose the stages of the development of sexuality, described by Freud, as uncertain and fumbling yet increasingly outspoken attempts to attain the goal of returning to the maternal womb, whereas we must recognize in the final phase of the entire evolution—in the fully developed genital function, that is—the complete attainment of this goal. It was, indeed, indicated in the previous chapter that in the sex act one succeeds in a real sense, even if in only a partial one, in returning to the maternal womb. The fully developed genital function, therefore, may be called, by analogy with the reality sense, the attainment of the “erotic reality sense”.

In the first oral erotic stage of infantile sexual organization those who take care of the child are still solicitous that the

¹ *Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psychoanalyse, I, 1913. (English translation in *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1916.)

illusion of the intrauterine state is preserved to it; they provide the warmth, the darkness and the quiet which are requisite to that illusion. The excretory functions are for the time being entirely uncontrolled, and the actual activity of the newborn infant is limited principally to sucking at the mother's breast. Indeed this first love-object is forced upon the child from the beginning by the mother, so that one may speak in the case of the child of a primary "passive object-love". At all events the rhythmicity of sucking remains permanently fixed as an essential ingredient of every subsequent erotic activity, and becomes incorporated—as we believe, amphimictically—in the act of masturbation and coitus. The purely libidinal activity of this period, thumb-sucking or *Wonnesaugen* (Lindner), is also the first problem of erotism that we encounter. What is it that impels the infant to continue sucking even after the appeasal of his hunger; what is it in this activity that affords him pleasure? We will postpone an attempt to solve this riddle and along with it the fundamental problem of the psychology of erotism until we have considered other erotisms in detail.

The nursling is in the main an ectoparasite on its mother, just as in the foetal period it lived on her endoparasitically. And just as it lorded it in the mother's womb and finally compelled the mother, its liberal host, to put the presumptuous guest out of doors, so also it behaves more and more aggressively towards the nursing mother. It emerges from the period of harmless oral erotism, sucking, into a cannibalistic stage; it develops within the mouth implements for biting with which it would fain eat up, as it were, the beloved mother, compelling her eventually to wean it. Now what we mean by this is not only that this cannibalistic trend subserves the instinct of self-preservation; we suppose, rather, that the teeth are employed also as weapons in the service of a libidinal striving; they are implements with the help of which the child would like to bore its way into its mother's womb.

The sole argument—at all events the argument of moment to the psychoanalyst—which emboldens us to offer this daring hypothesis is the uniformity and unmistakableness with which

the symbolic identity of penis and tooth recurs, both in dreams and in neurotic symptoms. According to our conception the tooth is therefore really a primal penis (*Urpenis*), whose libidinal rôle, however, the child who has been weaned must learn to renounce.¹ It is not that the tooth is therefore the symbol of the penis but rather, to speak paradoxically, that the later maturing penis is the symbol of the more primitive boring implement, the tooth. The paradoxical character of this supposition is perhaps moderated, however, by the consideration that every symbolic association is preceded by a stage in which two things are treated as one and so can represent each other.

Cannibalism, indeed, contains in part those aggressive elements which manifest themselves so obviously in the ensuing sadistic-anal organization. The so strikingly intimate connection between anal libido and expressions of sadism would be, in the sense of the foregoing argument, a displacement of originally "cannibalistic" aggressiveness upon intestinal function. The motive for this displacement is the reaction of displeasure called forth in the child by the necessity for observing certain toilet regulations set by parent or nurse. Furthermore, the oral-erotic regression to the mother which was earlier attempted is not given up in this period; it now returns as identification of the stool with a child, that is, with the subject's own self. It is as though the child produced a kind of introversion of his libido after the rather demoralizing parrying of his oral-erotic aggression on the part of the mother; by being womb and child (*fæces*) in his own person, he makes himself independent of the nurse (mother) in a libidinal sense. This is perhaps the fundamental basis of that character trait of stubbornness into which the anal-sadistic libido is usually converted.

The period of masturbation is to be considered as the first stage of the beginning primacy of the genital zone and thus as

¹ A two-year-old child said on seeing his newborn brother at the breast, "Danny eats meat". The strict Jewish injunction against eating meat and milk simultaneously is perhaps only an arrangement for insuring weaning.

a special stage of development of the libido.¹ Our analyses show unequivocally that large quantities of anal and sadistic libido are associated with masturbatory activity, so that we are now able to trace the displacement of the aggressive components from the oral phase *via* the anal to the genital. In masturbation, however, the symbolic equation: child=fæces, is superseded by that of child=penis, so that in the male child the hollow of his own hand plays the part of the maternal genital. We notice that in the last two phases the child usually plays a double rôle which is certainly related to the fact of infantile bisexuality. At all events it is extraordinarily important for the understanding of the manifestations of the fully developed genital libido, that every human being, whether male or female, can and does enact with his own body the double rôle of the child and of the mother.

In the last phase of development of the infantile libido the child returns, after the periods of passive object-love, after cannibalistic aggression and introversion, to the original object, the mother, but this time equipped with a more suitable weapon of attack. The erectile penis finds of itself the way to the maternal vagina, and would attain this goal did not the taboos of convention or perhaps a special defense mechanism or anxiety bring about a speedy end to this precocious œdipus love.

We will forego the description of the sexual periods now following, the period of latency and that of puberty, since the task which we set ourselves was only that of proving that the ontogenesis of sexuality unswervingly adheres to the striving to return to the womb, and that the genital organization, which is the vehicle of this striving, represents a culminating point in the development of the erotic reality sense. After the first unsuccessful oral attempt to regain the mother's womb, there follow the so to speak *autoplastic* periods of anality and of masturbation in which a fantasied substitute for the lost love-

¹ Very recently Freud has described a special "phallic" stage of organization—Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. IX, 1923. (Freud: *The Infantile Genital Organization of the Libido: A Supplement to the Theory of Sex*. Coll. Papers II, 244–250.)

object is sought for in the subject's own body; but only through the instrumentality of the male organ of copulation is the first serious attempt made to realize, this time *alloplastically*, the striving to return to the womb, first on the mother herself, then on all the other female persons in the environment.

We can fulfil only sketchily the task of representing the genital process as ultimately achieved, as the amphimictic summation of earlier erotisms. Aggressive impulses are manifested in the sex act in the violence of possession of the sexual object and in penetration itself. Upon the utilization of anal and oral erotism in the construction of the *parental erotism* so intimately connected with genitality we shall attempt to throw a little light in the discussion now to follow, which may no longer be postponed, of the modes of development of female sexuality.

The development of genital sexuality, cursorily described above in the male, undergoes in the female a rather sudden interruption. It is characterized above all else by the displacement of erogeneity from the clitoris (the female penis) to the cavity of the vagina. Psychoanalytic experience compels the assumption, however, that not alone the vagina but, in the manner of hysteria, other parts of the body as well are genitalized, in particular the nipple and the surrounding area. It is probable that in nursing something of the lost pleasure of intromission and ejaculation gains satisfaction, and indeed the nipple exhibits definite erectility. But apparently considerable amounts of oral and anal erotism are displaced also upon the vagina, the unstriated musculature of which seems to imitate in its spasmodic contractions as in its peristalsis the oral pleasure of ingestion and the anal of retention. For the leading zone of genitality, in which in the male the emphasis is definitely upon the urethral, regresses again in the female chiefly to the anal, in that in the sex act the accent is shifted to sheltering the penis and its secretion and also the fruit thereof (*parental erotism*). But in addition the partly abandoned male striving to return to the maternal womb is not altogether given up, at any rate in the psychic sphere, where it expresses

itself as a fantasied identification, in coitus, with the penis-possessing male, and as the vaginal sensation of possessing a penis ("hollow penis"), as well as an identification on the part of the woman with the child that she harbors within her own body. Masculine aggressiveness turns into a passive pleasure in experiencing the sex act (masochism), which is explicable in part on the ground of very archaic instinctual forces (the death instinct of Freud), in part on that of the mechanism of identification with the conquering male. All these secondary recathexes of spatially remote and genetically superseded pleasure mechanisms in the female sex seem to have been instituted more or less by way of consolation for the loss of the penis.

Of the transition on the part of the woman from (masculine) activity to passivity one may form the following general idea: the genitality of the female penis is absorbed regressively into the whole body and into the whole ego of the woman, out of which—amphimictically, as we believe—it had arisen, so that a secondary narcissism becomes her portion; on the erotic side, therefore, she becomes again more like a child who wants to be loved, and is thus a being who still clings *in toto* to the fiction of existence in the mother's womb. In this way she can then easily identify herself with the child in her own body (or with the penis as its symbol) and make the transition from the transitive to the intransitive, from active penetration to passivity. The secondary genitalization of the female body also explains her greater proneness to conversion hysteria.¹

To observe the genital development of the female is to obtain the impression that on the occasion of the first sexual intercourse this development is still quite uncompleted. The first attempts at coitus are so to speak only acts of rape in which even blood must flow. It is only later that the woman learns to experience the sex act passively, and later still to feel it as pleasurable or even to take an active part in it. Indeed, in the individual sex act the initial defense is repeated in the form

¹ Ferenczi, S.: "Hysterische Materialisationsphänomene"; in *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*, Int. Ps. Bibliothek, No. 2, Vienna, 1919. (Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc.)

of a muscular resistance on the part of the narrowed vagina; it is only later that the vagina becomes lubricated and easy of entrance, and only later still that there occur the contractions which seem to have as their purpose the aspiration of the semen and the incorporation of the penis—the latter certainly an intended castration as well. These observations, together with certain phylogenetic considerations which will occupy us more fully later, suggested to me the conception that one phase of the warfare between the sexes is here repeated individually—a phase in which the woman comes off second best, since she cedes to the man the privilege of penetrating the mother's body in a real sense, while she herself contents herself with fantasy-like substitutes and particularly with harboring the child whose fortune she shares.¹ At all events, according to the psychoanalytic observations of Groddeck, there is vouchsafed to the female, even in childbirth and hidden behind the painfulness of labor, a meed of pleasure which is denied to the male sex.

In the light of these considerations the modes of gratification of perverts and the symptoms of psychoneurotics receive a new illumination. The fixation of such individuals at a lower stage of sexual development would thus be only an incomplete attainment of the ultimate goal of the erotic reality function, the genital reestablishing of the intrauterine situation. And even neurasthenia, the archetype of the "actual neurosis", which is associated with *ejaculatio præcox*, and anxiety neurosis, which is characterized by a tendency to excessive retention, can now be explained on the ground of an excessive addition to genitality of elements in part urethral, in part anal, and the resulting impotence be traced analytically to anxiety concerning the intrauterine situation.

I doubt not that this train of thought will find striking confirmation in the observation of the sexual life of animals, and I regret only that I lack access to this field of knowledge. The slight acquaintance with it that I possess seems to support my

¹ This is in brief the construction I attempted to which Freud refers in his paper on "The Taboo of Virginity" (*Coll. Papers IV*, 217-236).

conception of the universality of the trend of maternal regression and its undoubted prominence in the sex act. I refer, for example, to the fact that in many animals the sex act is of well-nigh interminable duration.¹

¹ In spiders coitus may last for seven hours, and in the frog for four weeks. It has long been known that a permanent union of the sexes occurs in many parasites, such that, for example, the male remains throughout life in the gullet or the uterus of the female. A peak of erotic reality development is attained, one might say, by those parasites that transfer almost the entire responsibility for their sustenance to the host and whose organization subserves predominantly the sex function.

CHAPTER 4

INTERPRETATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PHENOMENA IN THE SEX ACT

After the foregoing considerations it will be worth while to subject to analysis, as though they were neurotic symptoms, the separate processes involved in the sex act. Of these we have so far devoted particular attention only to ejaculation.

There is above all the phenomenon of erection, for which a seemingly surprising explanation deriving from the maternal womb theory of genitality presents itself. I assume that the permanent invagination of the glans penis within a fold of mucous membrane (within the foreskin, that is) is itself nothing but a replica in miniature of existence in the maternal womb. Since upon an increase of the sexual tension accumulated in the genital the most sensitive portion of the penis (which, as already said, functions as the narcissistic representative of the total personality) is thrust out of its protected place of repose by erection, is as it were born, the sensation of unpleasure (*Unlust*) in the genital is suddenly distinctly increased; and this latter fact makes intelligible the sudden urge to restore the lost *milieu* by intromission into the vagina, or in other words, to seek in the external world of reality, this time actually within a female body, the hitherto autoerotically satisfying place of repose.

But in the sex act in man frictional movements of some duration precede ejaculation, for the understanding of which a rather lengthy exposition will be necessary.

In certain animals, so the zoölogists tell us, there occurs the peculiar reaction known as *autotomy*, consisting in the fact that organs which irritate or otherwise annoy the animal are simply detached from the rest of the body by the action of certain muscles, or, in the literal sense of the word, dropped. There are, for example, worms which are able under such circumstances to extrude the entire intestine from the body; others break into small pieces. The ease with which the lizard

leaves its tail behind in the grasp of its pursuer, only to have it quickly regenerate, is a matter of common knowledge. I do not hesitate to see in this type of reaction a fundamental property of all life and to assume that it represents a biological antecedent stage of repression, of withdrawal of cathexis from the painful.

Now we said at the beginning that all the kinds and amounts of unpleasure (*Unlust*) which, sidetracked during the period of utility functioning of all the organs, were left undealt with, undisposed of, are accumulated in the genital and thence discharged. This discharge can be nothing else than the desire, in the sense of an autotomy, to cast off the organ under tension. From the standpoint of the ego we have already described ejaculation as such an elimination of material productive of "unpleasure"; we may assume a similar tendency also in the case of erection and friction. Further, erection is perhaps only an incompletely achieved attempt to detach the genital, charged with "unpleasure" of various kinds, from the rest of the body. As in the case of ejaculation we may assume here also a struggle between tendencies in the direction of desiring to detach and desiring to retain, but which does not in this case end in the victory of the former.¹ Or one could suppose that the sex act begins as a tendency in the direction of the complete detaching of the genital and thus as a kind of self-castration, but is then satisfied with the detachment of its secretion. The manifold character of sexual behavior in animals permits observation in extreme examples of the varying outcome of this struggle. The armadillo *Dasypus* inserts in the female organ a penis which is enormous in proportion to the size of its body; the penis of the giraffe, on the contrary, gradually tapers on penetration in the manner of a telescope, to end in a filiform appendage through which the ejaculate is conveyed directly into the uterus.

The impulse to genital friction suggests the conjecture that the unpleasure accumulated in the whole body is stored in the

¹ In the autotomic tendency may also be found the final basis of the tooth-extraction symbolization of loss of semen and of birth.

genital in the form of an itching, which is then removed by a kind of scratching. Now the scratching reflex is itself, we presume, only an archaic vestigium of the autotomy tendency, that is, an attempt to tear away the itching part of the body with the nails; actual relief of the itching comes about in reality for the most part only on scratching the itching area to the point of bleeding and thus by means of an actual tearing away of portions of tissue. It is conceivable that erection, friction and ejaculation constitute, then, a process of autotomy, violent at the outset, later moderated, which begins with the intention of casting off the entire organ, then becomes limited to scratching (frictional movements), to be satisfied eventually with the elimination of a fluid. It is self-evident, however, that this characterizes only one aspect of the process—the ego or, soma aspect; from the standpoint of the germ-plasm, or of the libido, this same process is a striving, manifesting itself with diminished vehemence, to return to the maternal womb.

To the deeper motives of the genital self-castration tendency we will return later. It need only be noted here that there exist countless examples of actual self-castration in the animal kingdom, such that not merely is a secretion eliminated in the sex act but the penis is even torn off. One may also refer in this connection to the *annulus tendinosus* on the penis of the *Canidæ* which causes the “hanging” of the male in the female genital and suggests to the observer the idea of the possibility of the penis being broken off.

The active courtship which precedes actual mating has become attenuated in man in the course of the development of civilization, often to the point of being quite unrecognizable, in such a way that again we can recognize its meaning only through the observation of animals. We have already mentioned that according to our assumption the central striving to return to the maternal womb dominates both sexes equally; courting can accordingly have as its purpose nothing else than that the female sex, in giving up or in restricting her own real gratification, be made amenable to tolerating the sex act on the part of the male. We should like to cite in support of this

assertion two pronouncements of Charles Darwin, who can surely speak with authority on the question. "As appearances more than once lead us to believe", he says somewhere, "the female does not take the male that seems most attractive to her but the one that is least repulsive to her." In this conception is also expressed the preferential position of the male sex in the sex act which we have emphasized. In another place Darwin states that sexual variation in the sense of a sexual dimorphism always originates in the male sex, even if it is later adopted in part by the female also. All this agrees strikingly with Freud's assertion that all libido is *per se* "masculine", even when, as in the female, it seeks goals of gratification of a passive type.

We are of the opinion that the secondary sexual characters which thus originally belong only to the male are employed as weapons in a struggle in which it is a question of which combatant can achieve by force the sexual penetration of the body of the partner as substitute for the maternal womb. If we examine into the *modus operandi* of these weapons, we find that they all of them have every appearance of making the female amenable by sheer force or of paralyzing her by fascinating her hypnotically. In the former category belong for example the callosities on the thumb which develop in the male frog at the mating season and which penetrate into the axillæ of the female; in this sense also the greater body size of the male as compared with the female operates, and similarly the procedure of the males among certain reptiles which by beating a tattoo on the head of the female with their forelimbs render her submissive. Still more frequently subjugation of the female is accomplished by frightening her, by inflating the body or some part of it (as in the toad and the chamæleon), by expanding a large lobe of skin, a fleshy appendage, a goitre (as in many birds), or by the sudden great lengthening and elevation of the nose (observation by Darwin on sea-elephants). In one species of seal (*Cristophora cristata*) the male develops at the time of mating a folding cap which is larger than the head. The intimidation of the female by

roars and outcries, which is of common occurrence, is perfectly familiar (cats, for example). To the same effect is the behavior of the male of a species of Malayan lizard which approaches the female in the mating season with the forward part of the body upraised in such a way that on the greatly distended laryngeal pouch every dark spot stands out in strong relief against a yellowish-red background. This manner of courtship seems, however, to contain, in addition to intimidation, elements of fascination through the sense of beauty, and is manifested in much more definite fashion in the display of magnificence of color, in the action of sound-producing mechanisms, in the production of light (in the fern beetle), and in the mating rituals, dancing, spreading the tail, flights of song and the decoy song of so many birds.

The first analogy which forces itself upon one in the consideration of these phenomena is, as already mentioned, that with hypnosis. On the basis of psychoanalytic observations we have been obliged to distinguish two means of inducing a state of hypnotic submission. We have called these father- and mother-hypnosis.¹ The former paralyzes its victim by intimidation, the latter through ingratiation. In both cases, in our opinion, the hypnotized person regresses to the level of an intimidated child; the peculiar cataleptic attitudes of the hypnotized render it easy to assume, however, that a deep regression to the maternal womb is also involved (Bjerre). In view of the general bisexuality of beings that reproduce sexually we shall no longer be astonished by the fact that as regards secondary sexual characters and their activity the male so frequently takes over the characteristic of beauty which I have emphasized as feminine and the feminine function of lulling to sleep. We conjecture therefore that in the course of courtship the female is duped by a hypnotic regression to the maternal womb, and that this fantastic situation of happiness indemnifies her for the endurance of the intrinsically non-pleasurable sex act. If, however, as the zoölogists do, we consider all bodily

¹ Ferenczi, S.: *Introjektion und Übertragung*. Jahrb. f. Ps. I, 1909. (Trans.: "Introjection and Transference", in *Contributions to Psychoanalysis*, 1916.)

sexual apparatus which is not directly concerned with the elaboration of sex secretion as belonging in the category of secondary sexual characters, then we must also properly consider as such the organs of copulation, the penis and vagina. And in fact one cannot escape the impression that the ostentation in regard to the sexual organs, the display of the penis, the exhibition of the vagina, exerts in itself an influence of fascination, that is to say, is capable of arousing the fantasy of the intrauterine situation in the partner who looks on.

Among the means of allurement those which make use of odors of a particular kind deserve special emphasis. The rôle of the odor of valerian in rutting cats is well known, as is also that of goats and of musk, and the power of attraction of the female butterfly, which has been observed to attract males to the city from a meadow many miles distant. It admits of no doubt, at any rate, that the special odor of the female genital has a sexually exciting effect also in the higher animals and in man, even if only through the fact that this odor awakens the longing for the mother's womb. The rabbit, for example, becomes impotent if his olfactory nerves are cut. We must not overlook the fact that the very first and foremost sense impressions of the child—fraught with significance, accordingly, for the whole of life—occur during birth and therefore in the birth canal (Groddeck).

The general attitude of the participants during the sex act itself, the emotions which they manifest during it, have received the least consideration up to the present. As if with regard to these affects the human being would guard his deepest secrets, a well-nigh insuperable feeling of shame prevents him from giving information about them. Even in analysis, where the analysand has to communicate all his reactions, he learns only at long last and only if necessary to describe his subjective train of experiences in the sex act, long after he has become accustomed to stating its objective events without reservation. What I have on occasion been able to gather amounts to this: The individual is dominated from beginning to end by a compulsive attraction to the sexual partner; he feels himself com-

pelled by every means possible to do away with the separation in space between himself and the partner (see Chapter II, paragraph 5, on the tendency of *Brückenbildung*: kissing, embracing). One is forced to maintain that the mutual attraction is nothing but the expression of the fantasy of veritably merging one's self with the body of the partner or perhaps of forcing one's way *in toto* into it (as a substitute for the mother's womb); the ultimate sexual union is only the partial realization of this purpose. The tension which during coitus keeps the participants in a kind of suspense is in itself unpleasurable, and only the expectation of its prospective relief makes it at the same time pleasurable. This kind of unpleasurable tension has a good deal of similarity to anxiety, which, as we know from Freud, is always a reproduction of the unpleasurable sensations connected with the shock attending the process of being born.

It seems that we must accustom ourselves to the idea of the overdetermination of one and the same phenomenon in explaining physiological processes also, as psychoanalysis has taught us is true of psychological processes. The more closely we observe the phenomena of the sex act, the more evident it becomes that the latter is not only a pleasurable toned process (that is, the representation of the happy intrauterine situation) but that it also reproduces painful occurrences (probably the first emotion of anxiety in connection with birth). It is still more probable that these affects are not manifested in haphazard fashion but in an historically predetermined sequence. The increase of painful tension and its culmination in orgasm would thus be the simultaneous representation of two opposite tendencies: the repetition of the unpleasurable birth situation with its happy issue in the accomplishing of birth, and the reestablishing of the still quite undisturbed intrauterine situation by reëntering the maternal womb.

The most striking physical concomitants of these emotions are manifested in the respiration and the circulation of the participants in the sex act. The respiration is obviously dyspnoëic, the pulse rate increased; it is only with orgasm that

a full and satisfying expiration and a subsiding of the heart rate occur. These disturbances suggest a recapitulation of the process of accomplishing that extensive adjustment which the change from the foetal to the extrauterine mode of oxygen supply demands. Whether in drawing an analogy between coitus and the birth process one can go so far as to conceive of the rhythmicity of coitus as an abbreviated repetition of the rhythmicity of labor pains I should like to leave undecided.¹

We must not omit to mention that coitus is accompanied by decidedly aggressive affects as well. This component, which was traced as far as the stage of genitality in Chapter 3, manifests itself during the sex act in increasingly violent muscular movements which not only have the holding fast of the love-object as their purpose but also betray unequivocally sadistic trends (biting, scratching). Even the earliest manifestations of life on the part of the newborn infant point to the fact that the trauma experienced during birth, especially the imprisonment in the birth canal, evokes not only anxiety but rage as well, which latter has equally to attain repetition in the act of coitus.²

The condition of the participants in the sex act during and after orgasm is characterized above all by an extensive reduction or even complete cessation of consciousness, which until then had been confined to and concentrated upon the striving to attain the genital goal. Examples from the animal kingdom certainly exhibit for us still more clearly this concentrating upon the feeling of gratification, which here amounts to a complete abolition also of sensitiveness to pain. There are species of lizards which let themselves be torn in pieces but do not interrupt the sex act, batrachians which are not disturbed in the sex act by mutilation. The rabbit lapses into a kind of catalepsy with orgasm, dropping unconscious and remaining

¹ The close relationship between anxiety and libido is one of the foundations of Freud's teaching. Even Freud's earliest publications made reference to the similarity between the symptoms of anxiety neurosis and the emotions characterizing coitus.

² Possibly the feeling of impotent rage is an important integral part of the affect of anxiety.

for some time motionless beside the female with the penis in the vagina. It would be only consistent to interpret these states and the feeling of complete satisfaction and absence of desire accompanying them, as the unconscious hallucinatory attainment of the goal of coitus on the part of the individual as a whole, the attainment of the intrauterine state, with the simultaneous symbolic and real attainment of this goal by the genitalia and the sex cells. Probably, however, the happy overcoming of the trauma of birth is herein represented as well. We shall presently have more to say about the changes of cathexis which presumably take place in connection with orgasm, and will content ourselves for the present with the foregoing description.

In conclusion I should like only to refer to the fact that both in the human being and among many species of animals, an intimate relationship exists between the procreative function and sleep. Certainly this corresponds to our theoretical expectation, since we consider both sleep and the sex act as regressions to the intrauterine situation. With the analogies and the differences between the two we shall be more fully concerned later on, but at this point we should like to remark that many animals, including the human species, readily fall asleep after coitus. According to psychoanalytic experience the majority of cases of insomnia of psychogenic origin are traceable to disturbances of sexual functioning and are curable only through their removal.

CHAPTER 5

GENITAL FUNCTIONING IN THE INDIVIDUAL

We may now ask ourselves whether on the basis of these and similar observations on the course and ontogenetic development of the procreative function we are finally in a position to predicate anything with regard to the meaning of this phenomenon which recurs periodically with such remarkable uniformity in so large a proportion of the animal kingdom.

Considered from a purely physiological standpoint, coitus seemed to us to be the periodically occurring terminal episode in the equalizing and adjustment of an unpleasure-producing state of libidinal tension which accumulates throughout the entire life of the individual as an accompaniment of every non-erotic activity on the part of the various organs and which is transferred from these organs to the genital in an "amphimictic" manner. In the processes which make up the procreative function are therefore brought together the total amounts and kinds of unsatisfied libido of all organs, and in particular of all erotogenic zones and stages of organization which have been abandoned in adulthood. Without being able to give more than an intimation of the nature of the physiological processes which play their part therein, we refer to the analogy between the terminal event in the act of coitus and the functions of excretion, and conjecture that in the phenomena of erection and ejaculation (which, as we know, are also adumbrated in the female) all those autotomic tendencies are summated, the carrying out of which was neglected by "utility functioning". A being with a developed genital function is therefore better adapted with reference also to the nonerotic activities concerned with the demands of existence; he can defer erotic gratification until the latter no longer interferes with the functions of self-preservation. One may therefore maintain that the genital also is an organ of "utility" which promotes the ends of the reality function.

We can form only an extremely unclear idea with regard to the changes in cathexis which take place after sexual gratification, and only with regard to the psychological aspect of orgasm would we make bold to express a somewhat more concrete point of view. It looks as if under the conditions of coitus a tension which has been keyed up to a maximum is released unexpectedly and extremely easily, so that a large amount of cathectic energy becomes suddenly superfluous. Hence the enormously great sensation of pleasure which here too, as in the case of the pleasure in wit, according to Freud, might be attributable to an economizing of cathectic energy.¹ To this sensation some "genitofugal" backflow of libido into the bodily organs might run parallel, the opposite of that "genitopetal" flow which conducted the excitation from the organs to the genital during the period of tension. At the moment of this backflowing of libido from the genital to all the rest of the psychophysical organism there occurs that ineffable feeling of bliss in which the utility function of the organs finds its reward and at the same time its inducement to renewed activity.²

The process in genital gratification consists so to speak in an eruptive genitalization of the entire organism, the complete identification, attained with the help of the frictional process, of the entire organism with the executive organ.

Be this manner of regarding the procreative process from the standpoint of the psychophysical economy ever so attractive, it throws no light on the question of why the accumulation and discharge of sexual energy have assumed just this form in so large a proportion of the animal kingdom; without an answer to this question we cannot have a feeling of its adequate determination. We have learned from psychoanalysis that such a lack, at least in regard to psychic processes, can be remedied if

¹ To a similar economy of expenditure is also to be attributed the sensuous feeling of tickling. Moreover, the majority of "ticklish" parts of the body may be genitalized, especially the axilla.

² The idea of the genitopetal stream of libido and its reverse course in orgasm was touched upon by the author as early as 1912 at the symposium held in Vienna on onanism (*Über Onanie*).

the purely ontological (descriptive-economic) point of view be supplemented by the historical and genetic. Accordingly we attempted to derive the instinctual manifestations of sexuality, as previously the manifestations of the reality sense, from the striving to reestablish the antenatal situation, as a compromise between this striving, which seems to be completely renounced in actual life but in fact is only thrust to one side, and the obstacles which reality places in its way. The stages of sexual development described by Freud therefore appear to us as a continually repeated attempt to attain that goal—the genital organization itself, however, as a final even if only partial attainment of that which is demanded by the instinct. Now it seems, on the other hand, that this instinctual gratification cannot achieve its goal directly, but must always repeat the genetic history of the instinct itself; in other words, it must repeat the adaptive struggle, itself unpleasant, which the individual must pass through in connection with the disturbing of an earlier pleasurable situation. The first and severest adaptive struggle in the life of every single creature was the harassing experience of birth and the task of adaptation which the change of environment enforced. We indeed supposed that coitus not only signifies the partly fantasied and partly real return to the maternal womb but contrives to represent in its symptomatology both birth anxiety and its overcoming in successful birth. But it is ingeniously arranged in coitus that the amount of anxiety shall not exceed a certain level, and even more ample provision is furnished that this anxiety shall be converted by the sudden almost complete attainment of the goal of gratification (the body of the woman) into enormous pleasure.

We can bring this hypothesis into connection with the examples which Freud adduced by way of illustrating the repetition compulsion in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1921). The value of this comparison will perhaps be enhanced by the fact that it arrives at the results in question on the basis of quite different assumptions.

Certain symptoms of traumatic neurosis and certain remarkable peculiarities of children's play are explained by Freud on the basis of a compulsion to discharge in a gradual manner by means of countless repetitions, but always in small fractions only, undischarged excitations which on account of their intensity may not be discharged *en bloc*. We too consider coitus as such a partial discharge of that still unassimilated shock which is the legacy of the birth trauma; at the same time it appears to be like a game, or, more exactly expressed, a commemoration celebrating a happy liberation from bondage; finally it represents the hallucinatory denial of the trauma altogether.

We can give no consistent answer, at least as regards the procreative instinct, to the question raised by Freud as to whether the repetition is a compulsion or a desire, whether it lies this side of or beyond the pleasure principle. We believe that in so far as it gradually adjusts the traumatic effect just referred to it is a compulsion, that is, a reaction of adaptation compelled by an external disturbance. In so far, however, as the actual disturbance is therein denied in a negative hallucinatory manner or the memory of its overcoming celebrated, we have to do with pure pleasure mechanisms.

There is much that points to the fact that instinctual energies are unequally apportioned between soma and germ-plasm; it is as though the greater part of the instincts which are undisposed of were stored up in the germ-plasm, and as though therefore there emanated from the latter in special measure the traumatic repetition compulsion which discharged a part of the unpleasure (*Unlust*) with each repetition, each coitus. One is tempted to ascribe the self-castration tendencies which are manifested in the sex act to the striving to extrude from the body wholly or in part the sexual matter so productive of unpleasure. Simultaneously, however, the gratification of the individual soma on its own account is also taken care of in coitus, that is, in the form of a delayed dealing with the petty traumata of life, which are thus settled in a way tantamount to play.

In this playfulness we see the purely pleasurable element in genital gratification, and we believe that with its aid we are finally in a position to say something general about the psychology of erotism.

The majority of instinctual activities are set in motion, as we know, in connection with disturbances which impinge upon the organism from without or in connection with equally distressful changes in the interior of the body. In the case of the play instincts, however, among which the erotic may in a certain sense also be reckoned, the instinct itself creates a state of unpleasure (*Unlust*) in order to enjoy the pleasure of doing away with it. The playful and the erotic are therefore characterized by the fact that, in contrast to the usual situation in which the condition of tension occurs unexpectedly, the unpleasure is in the first place permitted only in known and measured dosage, and in the second place the possibility of removing or doing away with it is provided from the beginning, often indeed to a superabundant degree. From this standpoint I should like to consider hunger, for example, in the light of a simple instinct for the removal of a physical state of discomfort due to privation, and appetite as the erotic parallel thereto, since in appetite the certain expectation of adequate gratification makes it even possible to enjoy as a kind of fore-pleasure the slight deprivation involved. Now it is our opinion that in regard to sexuality, and especially to procreation, things are ingeniously arranged in such a way that gratification can be counted upon in any event. Sexuality also, therefore, only *plays* with danger. According to our description the whole sexual tension of the organism is converted, in genital sexuality, into a kind of itching of the genitalia¹ which can be got rid of extremely easily, while at the same time the regressive striving of the entire organism to return to the maternal womb is translated to one organ of the body, the genital, *via* which it can be realized without difficulty.

¹ Hysterical conversion would consist of the converse of this process, the transmutation of genital excitation into different bodily innervations.

The act of coitus is thus reminiscent of those melodramas in which, while there are of course dark clouds threatening all kinds of destruction, just as in a real tragedy, there is always the feeling that "everything will turn out all right".¹

We can only imagine as the motive of such playful repetition the recollection of the once happily experienced freeing from unpleasure which Freud also has stated to be one of the motives of children's play. The fact that the human being succeeds in surviving the serious danger involved in birth, together with the pleasure derived from discovering the possibility of existence outside of the maternal womb—both of these remain indelibly impressed upon the mind and impel to a periodic re-creating of a similar albeit attenuated danger, for the sheer pleasure of again enjoying its conquest. It is possible that the temporary return to the maternal womb and the simultaneous playful repetition and overcoming of all the dangers inherent in the birth struggle and the life struggle of adaptation, which are experienced in coitus, act in a revivifying manner in the same sense as does the nightly regression of sleep. The periodical admission of the pleasure principle to dominance may bring solace to the struggling individual and may give him strength for further toil.

We must admit that we owe to a psychoanalytic experience our persistence in adhering to the central idea of the maternal regression trend in spite of all logical difficulties. It is extremely striking to observe with what regularity and in what a variety of mental constructs (dreams, neuroses, myths, folklore, etc.) coitus and birth are represented by the same symbol of rescue from danger; especially from water (amniotic fluid); how the sensations of swimming, floating and flying express at the same time the sensations in coitus and those of existence in the womb, and, finally, how the genital is so frequently equated

¹ I was glad to have come across this interpretation of erotism in Ossipow's fine work, *Tolstois Kindheitserinnerungen* (1923). He too compares the pleasure of sexual anxiety with appetite, as contrasted with serious deprivations such as hunger.

symbolically with the child.¹ Therewith we believe we have included the whole meaning of the sex act which terminates in orgasm. Since the libidinal tension ordinarily confined to the genital suddenly irradiates the entire organism, the organism not only shares enjoyment with the genital for the moment but shares anew the bliss of intrauterine existence.

According to the conception here presented, the procreative function thus concentrates a whole series of elements of pleasure and of anxiety into a single act: the pleasure of liberation from disturbing stimuli of instinctual origin, the pleasure of return to the maternal womb, the pleasure of happily accomplished birth; and the anxiety, on the other hand, which has been experienced in the course of birth and that which one would necessarily feel in connection with the (fantasied) return to the womb. Since the actual return is limited to the genital and its secretion, while the rest of the body can keep itself unscathed (and takes part in the regression "hallucinatorily"), every element of anxiety is successfully eliminated in orgasm and the procreative act terminates with a feeling of complete satisfaction.

One point in our argument which undeniably remains obscure concerns the peculiar combining of the gratification of desire and the function of race-preservation in the act of coitus. We must grant that individual ontogenesis does not provide an adequate explanation, and we must now see whether the investigation of phylogenetic parallels, carefully avoided so far, will not give us some further assistance.

¹ Should our hypothesis some day be verified, it would in turn operate to clarify the mode of origin of symbols in general. Genuine symbols would then acquire the value of historic monuments, they would be the historical precursors of current modes of activity and memory vestiges to which one remains prone to regress physically and mentally.

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THE DELAY OF THE MACHINE AGE *

BY HANNS SACHS (BOSTON)

1.

History in all its branches deals with the unique event, which is never again repeated in exactly the same form. It can show the causal chains which led to an occurrence, but only with the aid of experiment can it be proven that, and why, an event does not, and cannot, occur as the result of a given cause. Psychoanalysis is in part an historical science—it teaches us to discern the reason, or more correctly, the important reasons, why a person develops just this symptom and has dreamed just that dream, but it does not permit us to predict who will remain free of symptoms or whose sleep will be dreamless. And yet psychoanalysis is not at all points confined to the bounds of the “historical”: the exact and profound observation of phenomena which return in varying but still similar form, as well as the possibility of releasing or hindering psychic reactions, permits us to eliminate gradually the exceptional and irrelevant causal factors. And so psychoanalysis like the experimental sciences may arrive, though by quite a different path, at the establishment of universally valid laws whose influence on every event falling within its sphere of activity can be predicted with certainty. (How strong this influence is in specific cases, whether it is not limited or counteracted in its total effect by other laws, naturally remains indeterminate here as in every other science.) The same amplification appertains also to historical facts in so far as it is possible to ascertain in them the influence of empirically inferred laws or laws employed as a working hypothesis—and these are nearly always of a sociological or psychological nature. Political economy, as the “most finely perfected branch of sociology” (Ludwig Mises), should be especially well adapted to these methods.

* Authorized translation from the German manuscript by Margaret J. Powers.

The nature of the interaction between sociology and psychology cannot of course be theoretically determined in advance. It can be established by nothing else than the fruitfulness of such a tentative coöperation. These reflections have led to the daring, and, in the writer's opinion, hazardous attempt to explain why something did *not* take place in a certain period of history. To this end he chose the specific problem of why the late classical period did not invent or, to any great extent, use machines.

A question of this kind would be entirely out of place wherever the primitive method of production is coincident with a narrow field of distribution. This is usually the case and the situation is not altered even by vastness of territory so long as there is no organization for the exchange of goods. No one needs to ponder over the question as to why, for example, no progress was achieved in the machine production of goods in the Carolingian Empire for, in the self-contented and static form of economy there was no incentive and no starting point for technical progress. The latter was first slowly introduced by the Crusades. Conditions were different in the Roman Empire from Augustus on to at least the time of Marcus Aurelius, that is, for a period of more than two centuries. The *Pax Romana*, the well developed network of roads, the safety of the seas, the uniform monetary standard, laws and language, made possible an imposing expansion of commerce the like of which was again approximated only fifteen centuries later. And there is evidence enough to the effect that this opportunity was actually turned to the best account. The products of the famous ceramic industry of Arretium are found in all of Western Europe, Gallic products, on the other hand, in Pompeii, and numerous coins dating from the reign of Tiberius on have been brought to light in India. These are but a few examples chosen at random. The distribution of certain local products, like tin from England, ores from Spain, marble from Greece and grain from Egypt, over the whole empire is as generally known as the circulation of Oriental articles of luxury like cloth, perfumes, dye-stuffs.

and fruits. People traveled with the wares, some voluntarily as traders and artisans, some involuntarily as slaves, employed in the same occupations, or dragged off to be miners, road builders, and farm laborers. Contemporary literature provides us with full particulars, and the graves attest this even more eloquently. The inscriptions tell of Syrians who lived and died in England, Greeks in Gaul and Spain; as a matter of course people streamed into the one city to which all roads led from every corner of the Empire. In the above mentioned ceramic factory in Arretium two workers by the names of Tigranes and Bargates, who were certainly Orientals, probably Persians, were employed in the time of Augustus.

To be sure, even at that time more was produced for direct consumption than for the market and the primitive forms of economy were as yet by no means superseded, but exchange of goods and division of labor had nevertheless made extraordinary progress and reached a state which the world had never before seen and which was lost after the decline of ancient civilization for a long time. This singular expansion of the market which went hand in hand with a cultural refinement must have resulted in a very considerable increase in wants and market possibilities, and concomitantly, in the exchange values of goods. From this, we are compelled to infer a general and continuous tendency toward increase in production of which we do indeed find numerous traces. Nevertheless there are only very few traces of the use of machine instead of man power, of the "displacement of variable capital by constant capital" such as is, according to Marx, characteristic, and inevitably necessary, for a capitalistic period. This fact may serve as a starting point for an investigation, for when the ancient world disintegrated, the late classical period, comprised by the Imperium Romanum, had made significant achievements in practically every domain of intellectual activity, in literature and history, natural science, mathematics, and astronomy, except in the field in which progress was most to be expected. The contemporaries of the great emperor philosopher, Marcus Aurelius, knew scarcely more about the

exploitation of natural forces to productive ends than the Egyptians under Rameses II had known. Dread of Nature and fear of its exploration, which had such a strong deterrent effect in the Middle Ages, cannot have been the cause; such dread was unknown in antiquity, especially in this late epoch. There is still less plausibility in H. Diels' contention¹ that it was too late for industrial progress, because "science, the mother of technology, was dead". Even though the age produced no great tragic and epic poets, it lacked neither intelligence nor intellectual curiosity: it is necessary only to mention the names Tacitus and Suetonius, Seneca and Pliny, Lucian and Apuleius and to point to the mathematicians and astronomers of the Alexandrian institute. Why did none of these inventive and disciplined minds come upon the idea, so natural to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of applying the acquired information to utilitarian ends? This query is by no means new, for the fact of the failure of antiquity in this respect, in spite of the inevitable drive of its economic development, is a riddle so striking that one could scarcely have overlooked it. The almost unanimous answer to our question has been that the slave industry of the ancient world nipped in the bud all interest in the use of machines. Since so many human machines were available for arbitrary and reckless exploitation, the stimulus for efforts to displace human labor through the forces of nature was lacking. When foreign man-power is as good as at your unlimited disposal, there is no earthly reason to look "for roundabout ways of extending production" (following the theory of capital by Böhm-Bawerk) in order thus to attain a greater output. It can be shown that exactly the opposite holds true for the time of the Cæsars, that in this epoch slave labor was becoming scarcer and more expensive while consumption needs increased rather than decreased, that therefore the Romans of this period would have had the most valid motives for seeking a substitute for slave labor. Evidence of this fact is to be introduced from various sources, not only for the sake of the reliability of the result, but also because the

¹ Diels, H.: *Antike Technik*. P. 32.

investigation of the attitude of the late empire toward the problem of slavery is very closely related to the specifically psychological side of the question.¹

In three different ways the Roman world could maintain the influx of new slaves; through sentences for certain crimes (this source was practically insignificant), through birth (if the mother was a slave, regardless of the father's status), and through conquest or capture in war. Under the Republic, especially after the second Punic war, the latter source had been by far the most important and fruitful. The huge hordes of slaves which were brought into the country through the victorious wars were very probably more responsible than any other factor for the marked political and social upheavals in the last years of the republic. Great landed estates came into existence. They brought their owners large and certain profit because they were worked by slaves who were always cheap to replace and could therefore be exploited carelessly and ruthlessly. The opening of the mines, the construction of the imposing network of roads, the luxury of the metropolis, were all first made possible by this source of labor. With Augustus and his *Pax Romana* this source was almost completely exhausted, never again to revive. The putting down of an uprising in already conquered provinces yielded relatively large numbers of slaves from time to time, like the ninety thousand Jews who were made slaves after the conquest of Jerusalem by Titus and were relegated for the most part to the Egyptian mines. Such desperate risings, however, were exceptional under the Cæsars and great and successful military expeditions were even more rare.

Surplus of births, therefore, remained the only means of maintaining and renewing the supply of slaves. But such a surplus cannot be reached in the case of a ruthlessly exploited class: it is necessary, in fact, not only to take special consideration of the expectant and nursing mother, but also to grant

¹ H. Diels likewise takes the viewpoint that "slavery during the Imperial era gradually died out as the result of the *Pax Romana*", but disposes of the question in the manner described above.

parents a certain measure of well-being, even something similar to family life, in order to induce them to bring up children.

These are indeed the changes characteristic of the Imperial era and thus indicate definitely that people had learned to look upon the slaves as a valuable possession with which one could no longer play fast and loose. The big estates disappeared, and in their stead came the tenant system. Instead of being driven to work as chained prisoners and housed in barred prisons by night, the slaves now lived with their wives and children as tenants on tenant farms, the management of which differed from free ownership only in that they had to hand over a part of their produce and perform gratuitous labor on the master's estate. Although there was no more of a legal marriage for slaves than for domestic animals, people were as a rule careful not to tear couples apart, and gravestones show that the "*contubernales*" held to each other as faithfully as married couples.¹

The law, as usual, took an inflexible stand without insight into the new situation; the first reaction is a stronger inclination toward repression which is expressed in increased severity. Thus the *Senatus Consultum Claudianum* directed that the children of a freed woman should be slaves when the father was a slave, even if the mother was not claimed as a slave by the owner of the one to whom she yielded. A conservative jurist with the aid of the rabble succeeded in resurrecting the obsolete law according to which all the slaves of a man assassinated by a slave should be executed, although that humane Cæsar, Nero, sought to prevent this mass murder. The slave could have no possessions. His savings (*peculium*) counted before the law as indistinguishable from the possessions of the master. But gradually the new tendency begins to make itself felt in law too, partly through the dispensations of progressive emperors, partly out of deference to the *ius gentium*. Now as ever the master may kill a slave at will, but he may no longer cast him before the wild beasts in the circus, nor mutilate him,

¹ A passage like that in Petronius' "Banquet" in which the old freedman vaunts, "*contubernalem meam redemi, ne quis in sinu illius manus tergeret*", says more than the lengthiest discourse on morals.

nor force a female slave to prostitution against the will of her former owner. The slave can find asylum at every statue of the Emperor, if his master abuses him without cause. The *peculium* is not explicitly but indirectly (through a series of decisions of the Digests regarding it, as in cases of testamentary dispositions, liberations, etc.) recognized as the slave's fortune with which he can do as he likes even to the extent of buying his own freedom from his master. Slaves may become members of the only societies permitted in the Roman empire—burial societies and religious brotherhoods, and there may sit with free men, even eventually fill posts of honor.

Many more instances could be cited pointing in the same direction, but the statements above sufficiently illustrate the tendency which first becomes manifest in the social development, and later in criminal and civil law, the tendency to defend the existence of family life and the person and property of the slave. This humane tendency could never have made its way to the surface permanently and decisively so long as slaves were on hand in large enough numbers and the shortage could be supplied without difficulty.

The turn of the tide becomes still more distinct when we observe its more intricate manifestations by means of which popular feeling seeped into literature and moral philosophy; here it can be ascertained reliably even in the early imperial era from Nero to Trajan, namely, just in the period when the universal peace must have been making itself felt in a stoppage of the slave influx. Almost at the same time "*servus homo est*"—the slave is human—rings out in two quarters: once in Juvenal as an ironical question which a woman puts to her husband when he refuses to punish an innocent slave to satisfy her sadistic whim, and once seriously in Petronius in the burlesque scene of the "Banquet" rendered with such incomparable vivacity, this time, to be sure, out of the mouth of a drunken man, Trimalchio, who himself has been a slave. True, the same Trimalchio is unmoved on hearing the report that a slave was crucified because he cursed the "*numen*", the tutelary god, of his master. But at the same time Seneca raises his voice on behalf of the slaves and pleads for recognition of

their humanity on moral and practical grounds. Pliny not only speaks, but acts, accordingly, and Statius speaks in his verses of the death of a young slave as if he were his own departed son. Masters' epitaphs for their slaves, or slaves' for their masters employ not only the usual formula for such things, but often speak the language of true affection: thus, for example, G. Pescennius Chrestio, on the gravestone dedicated to his nurse, calls her the pet name which is about the same as that common in England today—"to his nanny", "*nonnae suae*".

In the days of the republic the freed slave was called *libertus*, his son, *libertinus*, and the grandson of the former was the first to be regarded as *ingenuus*, as a full-fledged citizen. Under the Cæsars the freed man was called *libertus* and *libertinus*, of which the former appellation was used for his relationship to his late master; his son was *ingenuus*. When Horace sarcastically throws out the general question as to how he could belong to the intimate circle of Maecenas' friends despite his lowly origin, the astonished "*tu patre libertino ortus*" means that he was the son of a former slave.

This impressive change is attributed by many scholars to stoicism, which grew visibly in the imperial era and almost completely displaced its philosophical antagonist, epicureanism. That stoicism had a strong influence in this direction, we have observed in the case of Seneca, and the later stoics, almost without exception, took the same course. Christianity, related to stoicism in this as in many other respects, took up its cause of recognizing the humanity of the slave with greater vehemence and a new religious motivation, and gave it, in addition, increased practical expression through kind treatment of slaves and the founding of humanitarian institutions for their benefit.¹ That the change in the general attitude

¹ Early Christianity never took the final step in eliminating class distinctions: not in the earliest period, because it was at that time a transcendental mystic teaching which did not take up social problems, nor at a later time because it would have been just as impossible to participate in the community life of antiquity and reject slavery as to carry out a program of abolishing all machines today. We know of Christians as early as the beginning of the second century who owned slaves.

toward slaves, the newly awakened solicitude for an improved standard of living among them, is to be traced to the influence of a philosophical system has not a strong enough foundation, although this influence is undeniably present. We prefer at this point to accept the reverse causality in the spirit of the materialistic conception of history and say that the great success of stoicism—which had been known in Rome for a long time before this without its having gained ground on the Lucretian epicurianism—and with it the universal inclination toward its teaching of tolerance toward bondsmen was occasioned by the economic situation, namely, by the steadily mounting value of slave labor and the steadily decreasing number of slaves in proportion to the new demands of consumption.

What did that era think of its own social organization? Did it assent to the fact that the largest part of production rested on slave labor? Did it assent to the drafting of slaves for all important services? We should not expect too much criticism. There was a total want of opportunity for comparison. But we have the words of Pliny which betray a great deal in their magnificent clearness that is only hinted at elsewhere: "*alienis pedibus ambulamus; alienis oculis agnoscimus; aliena memoria salutamus; aliena vivimus opera. . . . Nihil aliud pro nostro habemus quam delicias*". (We walk with another's feet; we see with another's eyes, we greet by another's memory; we live by another's work. . . . only pleasures do we keep for ourselves.)

2.

In speaking of the invention of machines, we do not, of course, mean those simple contrivances like the plow, the spinning wheel, the hand loom, and the potter's wheel, which were known to the Romans as well as to all other peoples of antiquity from the earliest times. We do not have in mind tools that render it possible for man to do his work more easily and better, but those complicated machines which, once set in motion, do the work alone, so that man, in a certain sense, need only play the rôle of the master-mind in control—contraptions

like the mechanical loom, the steam hammer, the locomotive. Of the former type of tools, which man uses like a newly acquired organ (it is naturally difficult to draw the line of differentiation) antiquity possessed not a few and some in very highly perfected form, ballistæ, for example, with which stones could be hurled with greater force than with the bare hand, and odometers and time-keepers (hour glasses and clepsydræ) of great precision. Of the other type of tools, which by the independence of their operation give the impression of replacing man, there was hardly an example. Even water power for mills does not seem to have been very widely utilized, for mills were commonly turned by slaves.

Most of the ancients' knowledge of machines is recorded in the writings of Heron of Alexandria. When Heron lived is not known. The opinions of scholars leave a range of no less than two hundred years.¹ His works on mechanics contains descriptions of machines which may have been in part invented, in part improved by him or merely copied from other inventors. It is amazing to see how close antiquity came to the invention of machines. Hydraulic pressure, as well as air pressure and even steam pressure, are known and utilized for moving weights. The apparatus known to this day as Heron's fountain makes use of compressed air (which Ctesibios, 150 B.C., had used in the fire engine). Heron's æolipile is the prototype of the steam turbine. The use of hydraulic pressure for lifting great weights was, as Suetonius testifies, known to the Romans of the Empire, but they used it only for shifting scenes in the Circus. The point in question here is that these were not chance findings, but discoveries based on mathematical and physical facts that nevertheless did not reach practical application. Or rather, this application was limited to one field only, namely that of play. Heron does indeed say in the introduction to his mechanics that this science teaches people "*ἀταραχως ζην*", "to live in comfort". But for the above mentioned significant inventions he knows only one purpose: the amusement of the spectator. The automatically driven

¹ Diels places him at the beginning of the third century A.D.—*loc. cit.*, 57.

marionette theater (invented by Philo of Byzantium) serves the same purpose. An approach toward practical application was made in the service of religion: priests in Egyptian temples set up holy water slot-machines, which on insertion of a coin made the sacred fluid flow over the hands of the devout.

This diversion of every invention verging on the machine into the domain of play continues throughout ancient times. Even when the level-headed, practically inclined mentality of the Romans was supreme, this situation was not altered. Spinning wheels, moving dolls and puppets, all had to show clearly that here only pleasure, with nothing serious behind it, was being pursued. Only then did these objects arouse the complacent joy of the people, who were anything but childish in other respects. It is significant that Heron gives the mechanic the strict injunction to pay close attention to attractiveness of appearance in building a machine, the *εὐπρεπεία*. The ancient world overlooked the invention of machines not through stupidity nor through superficiality. It turned them into playthings in order to evade a repugnance.

3.

The civilized peoples of antiquity assumed the same attitude towards those manlike forms of machines which supplanted man, or rather towards the possibility of such machines, as the inhabitants of "Erewhon" in Samuel Butler's brilliant Utopian novel. There was this difference, however, that the inhabitants of "Erewhon" destroyed the machines and prohibited their further creation in full consciousness of their act, after having been enlightened by a wise and far-sighted teacher on the danger they represented for their descendants; whereas in antiquity the same effect—the repression of the inventive urge which tended towards the discovery of such machines, or their economic use, and its direction into other channels and toward other aims—arose instinctively, or, more precisely, from unconscious motives, though just as inevitably, and was fully accomplished in the psyche instead of in external reality.

We may cite here a further instance of one who, it is

true, did not possess the brilliant and original dialectic of Samuel Butler, but was endowed with the sensitivity and articulateness of a poet and was able to record similar reactions within himself. About a century ago Heinrich Heine visited England, then far ahead of Europe on the threshold of a real machine age. In "Florentine Nights" he makes the Figure which voices his own thoughts and impressions remark as follows: "The perfection of machinery, which is applied to everything there, and has superseded so many human functions, has for me something dismal; this artificial life on wheels, bars, cylinders, and a thousand little hooks, pins, and teeth which move almost passionately, fills me with horror. I was annoyed no less by the definiteness, the precision, the strictness, in the life of the English; for just as the machines in England seem to have the perfection of men, so the men seemed like machines. Yes, wood, iron, and brass seem to have usurped the human mind there, and to have gone almost mad from fulness of mind, while the mindless man, like a hollow ghost, exercises his ordinary duties in a machine-like fashion."

The analyst has reason to take note of such words, especially since they invade a realm of which our science still knows but very little. We have long known that the tools which enable man to accomplish his work more successfully and easily and assist him in carrying on his activities, without achieving an independent and automotive existence of their own, are mostly phallic symbols. Their employment in work was originally, according to Sperber's theory, a substitute for a sexual act. This symbolism can be proven, for instance, regarding the drill, the plane, the hammer, and particularly the plow, from a wealth of folk-lore, mythological, archæological, and philological material, and is fully confirmed by the symbolism of dreams. Concerning the machine here under discussion we can quote little to prove our point from the unconscious of the so-called normal mental life, or from the mass fantasies of the past; it is small wonder, since, as we have just seen, the conception of such machines was one of the most recent accomplishments of mankind.

We follow the method of psychoanalysis if, in such a case, we turn to psychopathology for advice and guidance. We have learned to see in the pathological and abnormal the expression, crude, distorted and one-sided to the point of caricature, of that which in the normal quite escapes our notice. The machine as an "influencing machine" plays, as every psychiatrist is aware, a typical rôle in the persecution fantasies of schizophrenics. Cases of this kind are described in every psychiatric text-book; are demonstrated in every course of lectures; and one encounters them in every institution for the insane. An understanding of the psychic mechanisms involved can naturally be attained only by means of psychoanalysis; this was first successfully accomplished by Tausk, who succeeded in obtaining a complete understanding of this baffling symptom.¹ In a particularly clear case the patient first imagined the "influencing-machine" as a complete reproduction of her own body, something like the outstretched figure on a sarcophagus. Manipulation on a certain part of this figure produced sensations in the corresponding part of the patient's body. In the course of time this figure became flat and indistinct until nothing remained but the usual nebulous "influencing-machine". Other cases, although less striking, justify us in assuming a process of this kind to be typical. Tausk summarized the results of his investigations as follows: "Naturally this projection must be used analogically in the service of the defense of the libido which belongs to the individual's body but which has become either so great or so inopportune that the individual can no longer accept it as belonging to himself."² Nor did Tausk overlook the connection with the normal invention of the machine: "The machines produced by the wit of man are fashioned after the likeness of the human body, an unconscious projection of his own bodily construction."³

¹ *Über die Entstehung des "Beeinflussungsapparates" in der Schizophrenie.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. V, 1919. (Translation in this issue of the QUARTERLY, p. 519.)

² *loc. cit.*, 1.

³ *loc. cit.*, 33 (footnote).

Freud found the change in libido distribution which forms the basis of schizophrenia to consist in a regression to narcissism. In catatonic conditions this expresses itself directly as a complete withdrawal of libido from object-investment. In the deliria and hallucinations of schizophrenics (of which the "influencing machine" is a typical example) Freud sees an attempt at recovery, incomplete, it is true, by which the patient, without being able to abandon the level of regression, spasmodically strives to recapture object cathexis. This conclusion, which Freud first deduced from the schizophrenic and paranoid fantasies of Schreber,¹ has been confirmed by the subsequent psychoanalytic investigations of an extensive amount of pathological material.

Enriched by this knowledge derived from psychopathology, let us now return to our query: what was the enigmatic power which restrained ancient man from either the discovery or the consistent utilization of machines which supplant the worker, notwithstanding that he was driven in this direction by his mathematical-technical knowledge on the one hand, and on the other by economic necessity?

We may hope here for no material, however fragmentary and indirect, to be gleaned from the original sources—literary documents, monuments, inscriptions and digests—which are at our disposal, and even if the peoples of antiquity could again open their lips they could tell us just as little as an analysand is able to relate of the unconscious causes of a neurotic inhibition.

The psychological hypothesis, with which we intend to fill this gap, is to the effect that it was a narcissistic conflict which implanted this inhibition in the peoples of antiquity. Defense against a narcissism which has become overwhelming causes the schizophrenic to create machines, even if only by hallucination. "In the purely physical sense, it [the influenc-

¹ *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides)*. Ges. Schr. VIII, 355. (*Psychoanalytic Notes upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia [Dementia Paranoides]*. Coll. Papers III.)

ing-machine] represents a projection, the body of the patient projected into the external world.”¹ The patient frees himself of psychic tension, in a manner typical of schizophrenia, in that he projects, externalizes, that which is unbearable, declares it to be a part of the outer world, hallucinates the perceptions appropriate to it and thereby ousts this as a part of his inner world (“forfeiture of the ego-boundaries”, in Tausk’s phrase). The conflict which, instead of resulting in the delusional creation of machines through a projection of the excessively loved ego, resulted rather in the inhibition of fantasy activity tending in this direction, was doubtless feebler and less profound than that caused by schizophrenic regression. The characteristic result of this form of defense is the sense of the “uncanny” which is expressed with classical lucidity in those lines of Heine’s. In some vague way, which we ourselves often disavow, we all know this feeling as a reaction to the sudden appearance of animation in the inanimate when without warning an object begins to move or to speak in a human manner. The use of automatons in literature, the theatre, and the cinema, in order to produce an effect of uncanniness, is so general that it seems superfluous to cite examples and proofs.² In the analysis of neuroses it is by no means rare to see this phenomenon increase to the intensity of a violent anxiety attack.³ We have the right to assume that this form of defense was quite generally more active in peoples whose narcissism was more strongly developed than ours and more directly related to the body-ego. Besides, it makes no difference, whether the “uncanny” encounter with the ego-simulacrum actually took place, or whether fantasy broke down or recoiled from each approach to such a mental construction;

¹ Tausk: *loc. cit.*

² Concerning the relation of the “uncanny” to the narcissistic conflict, see Freud: *The Uncanny*. (Coll. Papers IV, 368.) In the analysis of Schiller’s “Geisterseher” I pointed out something similar. (*Gemeinsame Tagträume*. Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1924. P. 41-129.)

³ In the early stages of schizophrenia, preceding its projection as “influencing-apparatus”, this defense against narcissism appears as “feelings of alienation”. (Tausk: *loc. cit.*)

the one would be as understandable as the other as an expression of an increased need for protection. If, as Pliny the Elder laments, there had to be alien eyes, alien legs, alien memory of which the ruling classes pampered by the advances of civilization availed themselves, then at least let them be human eyes and ears—sense organs like their own, but not preterhuman machines. The slave who was used as a machine was, nevertheless, still an actual human being, not an animated anthropoid automaton.

Was the narcissism of the men of ancient civilization more strongly developed, less impaired, or differently disposed than is on the whole the case with us and our contemporaries? Here we have arrived at a point where it will be again possible to be on the lookout for evidence.

4.

One only repeats what has often been said before, when one asserts that the human body was never, either before or since, represented so consummately and ennobled to such a height of perfect beauty as in Greek art, which all the civilizations of antiquity copied. Interest in the body must have existed at that time to such a degree—which is only exceptionally the case with us—that it was exalted to the position of almost exclusive object, and every detail of its appearance—framework, muscles, skin, movement and bearing—was studied with untiring zeal. Purpose was by no means directed toward experimentation with the greatest possible diversity, but rather toward finding a perfect ideal of beauty for each type. From the readiness to neglect much that was vital and characteristic when it stood in the way of preserving the ideal type, we are best able to measure not alone the strength but also the especial sensitivity of the bodily narcissism; which is what we are striving to prove. For these men of antiquity the body, which they could cathect with a libido still undeviated, was their actual being—the soul, on the contrary, only an impalpable flitting shadow, on which the same interest was far from being bestowed until the

Christian era reversed the relationship.¹ After death, too, the body was still the essential thing, to be cared for above all else. In this respect one and the same feeling, that of all antiquity, is expressed in the supplication of Priam, in the self-immolation of Antigone, and in the absurd testament of Trimalchio. Even the slave knew of no more important use for his savings than to buy his way into one of the *collegia funeraticia*, which guaranteed him a decent burial.

Perhaps we may consider here the greater frankness with which the ancients glorified a love-attachment between persons of the same sex. For social reasons homosexuality was never highly regarded since the state was founded upon the family. But when, from Plato to Petronius, homosexuality is nevertheless praised in lofty tones, a powerful instinctual force must have worked in its favor. Narcissism is an important factor in homosexual fixation, which stood out in very definite relief precisely in the homosexuality of the ancient world, idealized and often aim-inhibited as it was, but never divorced by repression from its original sexual goal. The man loved the boy as the ideal of his own youth, the boy the man, who represented his imagined hopes of maturity; this is the formulation which Freud has derived from Greek pædophilia. This narcissistic attraction, which was lacking in the other sex, possessed, if not greater strength, at least more general acceptance than it does today.²

In an earlier article,³ I pointed out the difference between the ancient and the modern feeling toward inanimate Nature. The animistic conception, which saw in trees, and mountains, in water and clouds, and even in the heavenly bodies, living,

¹ In the first lines of the Iliad, Homer tells that the wrath of Achilles cast into Hades the souls of so many brave ones, but "*they themselves*" were left for the birds to devour. The body was the real being and remained so throughout antiquity. The epitaphs of a later time, for example, "*non fui, non sum*", tell the same story.

² I shall not enter here into a discussion of the important rôle played by narcissism in the castration anxiety of male, and in the penis-envy of female homosexuals.

³ *Über Naturgefühl*. Imago I, 1912.

mostly human beings, was no longer taken so literally by the peoples of antiquity as by those of a more primitive stage of culture, although it was never entirely abandoned. The divinities who were valued as protectors of social achievements and institutions, never ceased to personify Nature, and their worship was filled with animistic-magic observances. When all of this retreated into the background in the official Roman religion of State and Emperor, it found a new abode in the cults, with their mystic ritual, which were taken over from other peoples. Man's emotional relation toward surrounding nature expressed itself in the conception of anthropomorphic gods and demigods, who dispensed gifts or did harm, blessed or threatened, but whose presence was everywhere and always palpable. It is true that this projection of the ego is one of the earliest phenomena in the development of humanity, which repeats itself in every child. A remnant of it remains, of course, in adults; yet at our stage of development narcissism follows other paths. The projection to which the ancients adhered represents exactly the same mechanism as that which leads the schizophrenic to the creation of the "influencing-machine"—a casting out of his own ego into the external world in order to settle an inner conflict. But the result is anti-thetical, for the schizophrenic hallucination and the inhibition of the ancients stand in opposition to one another as positive and negative poles. Animistic man vitalized the inanimate world with such narcissism as he could find no other use for, the schizophrenic transforms his own body into something alien and inanimate (first, through "feelings of alienation", in a further stage of regression into the "influencing machine").

At the stage of Græco-Roman civilization, the æsthetic acceptance and valuation of impressions of nature could not remain limited to a mere form of animism, however refined. In order to obtain an accurate picture of their conceptions one would have to collect, compare, and examine all the important descriptions of nature of the classic and late-classic periods, a task for which we have here neither space nor the necessary inclination. Yet from numerous, even if not precisely definite,

impressions, we are forced to the conclusion that æsthetic impressions of nature proceeded much less from nature as such, and far more from nature in its relation to human life and its needs and aspirations. Let us take as one example out of many Horace's almost universally known song of praise to the Venusian spring. The charm of the spring here extolled, which the short and unsurpassably clear strophes still render today, is its "*frigus amabile*", the refreshing coolness which it gives to the shepherd and his flocks. To the minutest detail, everything described has a relation to the humanity which lives in proximity to it; beauty "in and for itself" is as remote from it as it is from the *fons vicinus tectis jugis aquae*, which Horace desires for his ideal country seat. This does not mean to signify that Horace or any other poet of antiquity was capable of regarding nature only from the standpoint of common utilitarianism, but rather, that the human element must always be present and that beauty in nature was primarily regarded for the benefits it held for man. This is confirmed by the fact that the people of antiquity did not know how to react æsthetically to a nature which was strange and hostile to man, which accorded him neither shelter nor nourishment. The ancients neither sought nor found the beauty of nature in the rocks of the mountains and in the boundlessness of the sea. In stark contrast to this we find that type of feeling for nature which came to be accepted in the eighteenth century, and which is most strongly expressed by Rousseau, of which it may almost be said that nature could only be perceived as beautiful where it remained free of all traces of humanity; the utilitarian conception of nature was regarded as thralldom or desecration.

Just as the Ptolemaic system placed the earth in the center of the cosmos, so for the people of antiquity Man, in every case, was the center of the universe. The central figure, who was convinced that it was he whom nature smilingly served, was no mere abstraction of humanity, but the man of their own language, their own people, their own kindred, in whom every individual could recognize himself.

The next chapter of history brought the complete extirpation and ruthless annihilation of precisely this form of narcissism, which we may term "the naïve". The new teaching was that the body was something sinful and abhorrent, only given us to be despised and abused, and to be laid aside as soon as possible. Ascetic anchorites, martyrs and monks, preached the mortification of the flesh by word and precept. Narcissism, which was frustrated in every satisfaction of the bodily ego by deep feelings of sinfulness and unworthiness, was directed toward the conception of a Deity, with whom the ego strove to attain a mystical union and through it, to recapture its complete narcissistic investment. This change had no bearing on the inventive imagination, as long as the economic conditions had sunk to a primitive level, with merely local and often direct exchange of commodities. It was only after the Crusades, when the beginnings of reawakened production and an international exchange of goods based upon gold and the extension of credit developed, that the consequences of the fundamental change in the face of Occidental humanity made itself felt.

It is of great interest for our theme to note the diversity of the early forms of the gradually approaching new age, the era of invention. In Italy, where, due to the Renaissance, it consisted in an attempt to revive the ancient ways of thinking, there recurred the ancient form of narcissism, fixated to the body-ego. The human body was again cherished and honored, its newly rediscovered beauty was, as before, the chief object of art. And it is remarkable that in spite of producing much of genius and of inspiration for the future, despite the inventive genius of a Leonardo, the Italian Renaissance remained, until far into the time of its late flowering, almost entirely barren of discoveries of any great practical value. For example, the invention of fire-arms and of the printing press, which called forth changes amounting to a great revolution, came from the north, although it was in a state of commercial and economic development far inferior to that of Italy. Here, in the north, that feeling for the body which

was held by the peoples of antiquity had never been indigenous, and the new current which gave back to mankind a lost portion of his self-love and self-respect, took another direction. The recapture of power, which in the Middle Ages was surrendered to the Deity and his representatives upon earth, was here made the goal of the regained portion of narcissistic satisfaction. During the Reformation the laity limited the power of the Church, drove the monk from his cloister, took from the priest the privilege of the chalice and the exclusive knowledge of the Holy Scriptures. Yet this striving for power went deeper than the conscious wished or suspected; the goal was the subordination of the forces of nature to man, enabling him to accomplish himself what had hitherto been looked upon as the prerogative of an omnipotent God. Life's necessity and the desire for narcissistic satisfaction through the testing of his power forced man toward the machine, which had now lost for him much of its "uncanniness".*

* Besides the authors mentioned in the text the following books have been used:

BARROW, R. H.—*Slavery in the Roman Empire*.

BOISSIER, G.—*La Religion romaine*.

DIELS, H.—*Antike Technik*.

FOWLER, W. W.—*Social Life at Rome in the Age of Cicero*.

MARQUARDT, J.—*Das Privatleben der Römer*.

MEYER, R.—*De Heronis ætate*.

PANLY-WISSOWA.—*Handbuch: Artikel Heron*.

ROSTOVITZEFF, M.—*The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*.

TENNEY, F.—*An Economic History of Rome*.

Fear of Castration in Women

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FEAR OF CASTRATION IN WOMEN*†

BY SANDOR RADO (NEW YORK)

INTRODUCTION

The expression, "castration complex", which has achieved a certain amount of popularity, was coined by psychoanalysis. At first its application was limited to the male sex, and it was used as the generic designation of an important group of manifestations, which psychoanalysis had discovered in the psychic life of men. The insight obtained from the study of men sensitized the analyst in his observation of women, and it was soon evident that the new term could be applied profitably in female psychology as well. Abundant material justifying the expansion of the term was ably presented and summarized in 1921 by Abraham¹ in a classic study of the castration complex of women, and requires no repetition here. The manifestations in question were ideas and fantasies, attended by strong emotions, dealing with the possession or lack of a penis, the injury involved in being a woman, the desire to be a man, active and passive mutilative experiences, etc. The agreement of such ideas and certain ideas pertaining to the castration complex of men is unmistakable.

We get into difficulty when we are no longer satisfied merely

* Authorized translation from the German manuscript by Bertram D. Lewin.

† The principal ideas contained in the present essay were first presented at a meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in New York City, on the 29th of December, 1931. Following this (January to March, 1933), the same topic was dealt with more extensively in a course of eight lectures held at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. It would be a hopeless task to illustrate the widely distributed matter by means of clinical histories. The clinical material, moreover, is available to all practicing analysts. I can offer the assurance that every assertion contained in the following pages originates from the continuous and searching observation of patients. S. R.

¹ Abraham, Karl: *Manifestations of the Female Castration Complex*. Int. J. Ps-A. III. Reprinted in: *Selected Papers of Karl Abraham*. London: Inst. of Ps-A. and Hogarth Press. Of the earlier literature, see especially Van Ophuijsen, J. H. W.: *Contributions to the Masculinity Complex of Women*. Int. J. Ps-A. V, 1924. (In German in 1916. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps-A. IV.)

to give descriptions of the empirical findings but attempt, in the spirit of our science, to proceed to an understanding of them.

In the case of the man, this task was easy. The man's genitality is characterized by two features: great narcissistic estimation of his own genital organ, and the fear, awakened by early experiences, that this valuable part may come to harm. All manifestations of the male castration complex can be derived from these two fundamental facts. But in the woman these two elements are not present. Since women have no penis, they cannot experience a danger of castration, from which their castration complex might arise. We have, therefore, an obvious logical incompatibility. And it is this incompatibility that accounts ultimately for the obscurities to be found in the (otherwise valuable and competent) analytic literature on this topic.

Indeed, it was only in 1925 that Freud, in his paper, *Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Differences between the Sexes*,¹ showed us a way out of this dilemma. Freud takes as his starting point the impression made on a child by the discovery of the genitalia of the opposite sex and compares the behavior in the two sexes. The boy sees in the "de-masculinized" female body a proof that the threat of castration is to be taken seriously. He develops a fear of castration, and later will be much put to it to emancipate his masculinity from its inhibiting effect. The little girl sees in the penis a great possession in which the boy surpasses her. Compared to the boy, she feels that she has come short—that she is as if castrated. She envies him his penis, and becomes possessed by the hope that she somehow is or will become like him. Much of her later destiny as a woman will depend on the way in which she masters these importunate ideas.

Hence, according to Freud, the specific reaction to the anatomic experience discloses the difference in the castration complex of the two sexes: in men, the leading impulse in the

¹ Freud: Int. J. Ps-A. VIII, 1927.

complex is a *fear of castration*, whereas in women, this position is occupied by *penis envy*. Fear of castration is a warning, of which the effect is to safeguard threatened masculinity. Penis envy represents an attempt on the little girl's part to rebel against her anatomically attested "castration", and to persevere in her imagined masculinity. If she adapts herself to the anatomical facts opportunely, the antagonistic instinctual energy residing in penis envy is deflected into a biologically indicated wish for a child, and thus assists the girl to develop into a woman.

Freud, as it appears, gives the conception of the "female castration complex" a precise theoretical framework; and his theory enabled us properly to arrange in a cohesive system the observed data which at first seemed hopelessly disconnected. The logical incompatibility would also have been eliminated if it had been possible to conclude from Freud's theory that in women there is no fear of castration, but only penis envy. Unfortunately, it is impossible to make this deduction, for empirical analytic experience is sharply contradictory. The neuroses of women, with astonishing frequency, show characteristic anxiety symptoms and inhibitions; to give only the simplest examples, fear of dental or medical procedures, fear of having a haircut or a manicure, excessive sensitivity of certain body areas or organs, etc., which we interpret, when we find them in men, as displaced fears of castration. We have been accustomed to apply the same interpretation in the case of women, and the clinical facts have justified us. From the illustrations given, it must not be thought that we are expanding upon a trivial subject. The anxiety in question may attain almost unbearable degrees of intensity, produce grotesque and tormenting defensive symptoms, and only too frequently create a stubborn resistance to therapeutic efforts. So, practical and theoretical interests alike both compel us to face the riddle of castration fear in women.

We must ask how it happens that offshoots of a fear of castration do appear in women, even though this fear in its original form can never have existed. Here we meet the same logical

difficulty which we thought we had settled. We saw that the nucleus of the castration complex in women is penis envy, but this information throws no light upon the fear. One could, of course, conclude that the two findings are mutually exclusive; for an envy of the penis depends on a castration performed and acknowledged, while a fear of castration depends on one merely imminent and expected. But it would be erroneous indeed to rely solely on this inference and conclude that Freud's construction is at fault. His theory groups facts that are clinical certainties; one group of facts simply confronts the other. It must be possible, therefore, to expand Freud's scheme of the castration complex, to make a place for and give an explanation of castration fear in women.

Since the publication of Freud's 1925 essay, I have paid consistent attention to this problem, and in addition to cases analyzed or supervised by myself, I have utilized for study the abundant case material presented in my Technical Seminars at the Berlin and New York Psychoanalytic Institutes. I am now reporting my conclusions.

I.

THE ILLUSORY PENIS

The analysis of castration fear in women takes us back to the period of infancy when the penis is observed and its possession is envied. Our first clue comes from those cases in which a vigorous "masculinity complex" develops on the basis of this penis envy. The little girl, in this instance, becomes fixed in her belief that she is a boy; she ignores the evidence of her senses, and imagines that she has a penis. We must inquire further into this illusion. Let us call the organ which the girl gives herself in fantasy, the "*illusory penis*";¹ her emotional gratification depends on this fantasy. Unfortunately, I have not directly observed this process in children, but because of certain features of the "repetitive dreams" during analysis, I

¹ Illusory penis=*Wunschpenis*. TRANSLATOR.

should like to draw the retrospective conclusion that the form in which the illusory penis first appears is that of a hallucinatory reproduction, at the proper place on the girl's own body, of the male organ that was seen. At any rate, the early form of illusory penis is short-lived. It must be abandoned, for it cannot be maintained against the refutation of the facts. For this reason, in one group of cases, the girl gradually dispenses entirely with her illusory penis, or tries some other way of renewing her illusion. But the cases that we have in mind take a different course. The illusory penis here is obviously too valuable for the girl to give up. She ceases to hallucinate and retires with her illusory penis into the realm of unconscious fantasies, where the test of reality can no longer so easily imperil her possession of it. The illusory penis is then withdrawn from the sphere of perception, but it has nevertheless unmistakably left its representative at some position or other on the surface of the body that recommends itself for this post (the nose, the eye or elsewhere) because of constitutional fitness or individual experience. The organ thus selected, though previously without sexual significance, is now entrusted by the unconscious with an accessory and essentially inappropriate function, and owing to this excessive unconscious investment behaves as the symbolic substitute for the illusory penis that was excluded from the possibility of conscious perception. We may assert then that the bodily region in question has been neurotically affected and has become the site of a conversion-hysterical symptom.

The mastery of penis envy is thus clearly divisible into two stages: an earlier stage of overt hallucinatory wish fulfilment and a second stage—brought about by the pressure of factual reality—in which the gratification is under cover, and results from the formation of a conversion symptom. It is not difficult to recognize a neurotically affected area of this description. It betrays itself by its oversensitiveness and the propensity to anxiety, which will develop for its protection. We then note that the connection between the unconscious illusory penis and its superficial substitute is not a rigid one. Along the

surface, the unconscious investment is readily displaceable; new substitutes are formed, which either replace the other ones, or more frequently, persist alongside them. Indeed, the entire surface of the body may become a narcissistic substitute for a penis, as Hárník¹ has shown. Or, proceeding, the intellect may be utilized as a penis surrogate—a real or imaginary masculinization of the mental functions, which then may either persist as a symptom or become a sublimation. We infer these processes from the dreams of patients, which reveal the meaning of their flaring, wandering, local oversensitiveness and propensity to anxiety.

The anxiety which arises is marked by the typical features of "displaced" fear of castration. If we seek its origin, we find that the precipitating experiences are such commonplace things as wounds or injuries; and furthermore (not infrequently), that the little girl was present when a little boy was threatened with castration, or else heard of the threat. In view of such observations, one is tempted to formulate the girl's fear of castration as being borrowed from the boy; she has seen his penis, copied it, and consistently takes over the appropriate fear.

Examining the meager results of our considerations, we find that they are far from fulfilling our theoretical expectations. For our conclusion seems to be that it makes no difference whether one really has an organ or merely imagines that one has. This can hardly be true. The penis is an exceedingly pleasure-giving organ, and is, besides, the instrument by means of which a number of component impulses are gratified, as Horney,² in an early article, has ably demonstrated. The little girl can obtain no pleasure at all from an illusory penis, whereas with the organ she really has she can enjoy many satisfactions. The idea naturally arises that this illusory penis should be con-

¹ Hárník, Eugen J.: *The Various Developments Undergone by Narcissism in Men and Women*. Int. J. Ps-A. V, 1924. For additional and confirmatory material see, Lewin, Bertram D.: *The Body as Phallus*. PSA. QUARTERLY II, 1933.

² Horney, Karen: *On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Women*. Int. J. Ps-A. V, 1924.

nected with pleasurable experiences in the clitoris, and that it somehow serves to maintain and assure this source of pleasure. But this suggestion cannot be supported. For in point of fact, it so happens that after the little girl has focussed her interest on her illusory penis, she abruptly loses all interest in her real genital and in masturbation. She is obviously forced to sacrifice her masturbation for the sake of her illusory penis. This process is readily intelligible: the ego has in fantasy corrected an unattractive bit of reality and consequently avoids coming into contact with it. Accordingly, the sole remaining impulse that might account for the illusory penis—that is to say, the one which has created it and finds satisfaction in it—is simply envy, or more accurately, injured self-love manifested as envy. Therefore, our suspicion is justified that so trivial a gratification cannot give the illusory penis the emotional value of the real organ. It must also not be forgotten that the boy's narcissistic pride in the penis has biology on its side, while the girl's narcissistic illusion of having a penis has biology against it.

This lengthy account enables us to deal more briefly with the problem of the fear. If the only motive for the interest in the illusory penis is a narcissistic desire to quell envious feelings, then the terrific intensity of the fear of castration, which arises when the woman's illusory penis is threatened, is unintelligible—it remains a psychological riddle. The theory of the illusory penis is an incontestably true formulation of the observed clinical data, but the economic problem in women's castration fear is not solved by it.

II.

THE MASOCHISTIC DEFORMATION OF THE GENITAL IMPULSE

The answer we need must obviously be sought elsewhere. Women in whose neurosis a fear of castration is most prominent usually are greatly alarmed by the sight of open wounds. A persistent and recurrent theme in their dreams and fantasies

is that they must experience some horror, undergo bloody injuries, frightful mutilations, and the like. With monotonous regularity, analysis demonstrates that these ideas are "revised versions" of fantasies, whose origins can be traced back to the onset of menstruation, and even further back, to the time of infantile sexual florescence. The genital source of these ideas is therefore beyond question, their interpretation as "displaced fears of castration" legitimated, and again we encounter the problem of fear of castration in women.

Analytic literature has given most prominence to the self-punitive intention in these fantasies and has presumed that they originate from the sense of guilt for infantile masturbation. It is to the credit of Helene Deutsch¹ that she exposed the inadequacy of this formulation. "Punishment", she believes, is merely a secondary theme: the true source of these fantasies is the demands made by the instinct of masochism, which according to her views finds its place in female sexuality as far back as infancy, and from that time on remains included as one of its components. My own observations had led me to a conception, which, in its interpretation of castration fantasies, coincides with Deutsch's view, but in other particulars I see the matter differently; perhaps because Deutsch does not go into the problem of castration fear, and does not sufficiently distinguish between the pathological and the normal.

In studying castration fantasies, we may consider one fact as assured. It is impossible for a little girl to get the idea that she is castrated until she knows that her body lacks a penis. This knowledge she can gain only by comparing herself with a boy. Before the discovery of the penis, there can be no castration fantasies. No girl can avoid making this discovery, but not all girls become plagued afterwards by castration fantasies. The persistence of these fantasies, which leads to such serious consequences, must be determined by special conditions. After pursuing many false leads, I was able to ascertain the salient precipitating factor: the anatomical experience was for these

¹ Deutsch, Helene: *The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women*. Int. J. Ps-A. XI, 1930.

girls a psychic trauma. On perceiving the penis they lost self-esteem, suffered a severe emotional upset—and the sanguinary fantasies of castration appeared as a consequence of this narcissistic shock.

A process of this sort is, to be sure, not open to direct observation. I therefore chose an indirect approach. Other, more innocuous experiences that astonish children or bring them disillusion are more readily accessible to observation. I watched the children's reactions to these experiences attentively and united the impressions thus obtained through empathy with what I had concluded from the analysis of adult women. From this we may sketch the course of events in the inferred incident:—

The little girl suddenly catches sight of a penis. She is startled and fascinated. (Later on, in her neurosis the impression made by this initial encounter will be repeated again and again as terror, when a snake, mouse, or other "penis symbol", unexpectedly makes its appearance.) Her eyes are pinioned to the penis, and her field of vision restricted to this one object of perception. (This is probably the origin of the concentric restriction of the visual field, one of the "stigmata" of which so much was made in pre-psychoanalytic days, as a diagnostic point in hysteria.)¹ From her emotional chaos emerges the strident desire: "I want it!" which is followed immediately in fantasy by, "I have it". Then comes the humiliating reflection, "But I haven't";—this knowledge produces severe psychic pain, and terminates in something like a paralysis of feeling.

The narcissistic shock at once inhibits the girl's actively directed desire for gratification, which up to this time was

¹ This notion was substantiated in all particulars by a case presented by Dr. Walter Briehl, in one of my Technical Seminars held at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. The patient had a classical concentric restriction of vision; and an obsessive impulse to stare at the penis of every man she met. Her fixation on the trauma of the infantile observation of the penis was proved by many other symptoms.

discharged in masturbation. But the intense mental pain which she experienced excited her sexually and supplied her with a "substitutive gratification". This emotional experience teaches her that she may obtain a new pleasure in place of the one that was destroyed by the traumatic event—passive pleasure in pain. A period of onanism ensues, in which the imagination dwells on sufferings. She remembers previous painful experiences, impressions of the "primal scene"—among these, possibly, the memory of a shadowy, at that time unintelligible, view of the penis. As a focal point for these fantasies, there is always to be found the idea of her own bloody, injured (mutilated) genital organ; the discovery of this "wound" stirred up the first critical pleasure in pain. The narcissistic wound aches, but in its own way the ache can be desirable.

The time at which the penis is discovered is obviously not a matter of indifference. If the event occurs during a period of genital latency, it is probably elaborated differently. But if it occurs at a time when the girl is masturbating, it is impossible for her to avoid being affected traumatically. We relate this masturbation to the "phallic phase", but it should be considered that this designation is not free from objections from the subjective standpoint of the girl herself. Before discovering the existence of the penis, she could not endow the antithesis, man—woman, with a genital meaning. Similarly she lacked any idea of the dual erotogenic make-up of her genital area, no matter whether she masturbated using her clitoris or her vagina. It seems, therefore, more cautious to designate this level of the girl's psychosexual development, the "amorphous genital phase of the ego". Only after the anatomical experience and because of it, is the girl drastically coerced into distinguishing those who have a penis (male) from those who have none (female). For she then sees that at the same location on the body where she obtains so much pleasure, another child is much better equipped than herself. Her primitive, concrete mode of thinking leads her to the (false) conclusion that the boy's larger instrument must provide him with more and better pleasure. Her offended self-esteem provokes her to ruminate

on her disadvantage. "I am wounded. . . . It must have been cut off . . . while I slept." She comes to the painful fantasies of castration, which will then be utilized by her blighted desire for pleasure to give her pleasure in suffering.

The traumatic discovery of the penis thus results in an abrupt demolition of the "amorphous genital phase of the ego", and in an urgent necessity for the girl to build up too soon and too precipitately, a henceforth sexually differentiated, "female" genital position. For this construction, however, her sexual constitution furnishes her as building material only the capacity of the organism, in an emergency—when it is impeded in its active pleasurable activities, that is—to obtain pleasure from painful excitement and to bring about for this reason the very sufferings that are ordinarily avoided: in other words, what Freud refers to as "erotogenic masochism".¹ The new genital position that is built from this raw material is pleasure in being, or getting one's self, castrated. In this phrase we recognize the initial ideational content of "feminine masochism", as described by Freud.

We revert here to emphasize the crucial rôle played in this development by the masturbatory activity of the "amorphous genital phase". The striking frequency with which the discovery of the penis coincides with this masturbation is not a matter of chance. To begin with, the little girl may frequently miss discovering the penis, even though it may be exposed to her view. A "discovery" consists in a differential perception and an elaboration by thought (an assimilation) of the new ideational content obtained through the differentiation. The girl can discover the penis, then, only after she is prepared, and has an impulse to make the discovery. Such preparedness is primarily brought about or favored by her masturbatory activities in her own genital area. If she happens to see the penis, when she is at a certain stage of maturity, she may naturally discover it for other reasons than those connected with genital pleasure. But, in that case, with what different results! She does not then experience a genital-narcissistic, but a nar-

¹ Freud: *The Economic Problem in Masochism*. Coll. Papers II.

cissistic blow. That is, she does indeed feel that she is "short", but not that she is short by *that* instrument of pleasure; there is lacking any overestimation of the penis, as a superior instrument of pleasure; there is lacking the (genital) instinctual energy that propels the narcissistic rumination, and with this too the degeneration of this rumination into genital masochism. We recognize here a determinant of the development to normality: the penis must be discovered, not in the "phase of amorphous genitality"—a phase of genital activity, that is—but in a phase of genital latency. For a pathological development, then, it is quite certainly the instinctual activity of the "amorphous genital phase" that, after the penis is discovered, compels the immediate, new genital orientation; the desire for genital pleasure kept alive through masturbation is subsequently continued perforce in the pain-pleasure activity of genital masochism.

But from this newly found source of pleasure, masturbatory reverie is never able to extract an adequate gratification, even though it be carried to the point of exhaustion. It is easy to see why. The girl was made a woman by an experience that profoundly offended her self-love. This antecedent history burdens female genitality with a "narcissistic dependency" unknown in the genitality of the male. Subsequently, female genitality, in order to be considered truly satisfying, must include a reparation for this narcissistic blow. Genital masochism does not fulfil this requirement. On the contrary, it aggravates the narcissistic discomfort of the ego, which is mindful of the pleasure principle and desires not pleasure in pain, but pleasure without pain. It is now obvious that the appearance of genital masochism in the ego is not a stage of normal development, but the momentous beginning of a pathological—a masochistically deformed—femininity.

The excesses of painful pleasure endanger self-preservation and drive the ego into despair. Once its tolerance is exhausted, the ego adopts radical protective measures. Having had enough of torture, it now resuscitates its downtrodden narcissism. The ego suppresses the genital masochistic impulses, represses all of the bloody fantasies, and hallucinating, endows

itself with an illusory penis. But, one may well ask in astonishment, how can so overwhelming a psychic alteration be produced? The simple answer is: in sleep, by a dream. This dream, in which the tortured mind of the child finally finds peace, must result in a persistent sense of reality; for the dream is based on a real fact, the observation of a penis. The girl dreams that she has a penis on her body and subsequently, in waking life, she is held in the spell of this illusion. Later, as we have seen, she will be compelled to convert this hallucinatory penis into a conversion symptom.

It may be interesting to give an example of the way in which this childhood event is repeated during an analysis in a patient's dream. She dreamed: "I see a crippled child, and then another child. The latter child turns into Al Smith, has a derby hat, and mounts a fiery steed." The patient begins her associations to the dream with a remark that tells the whole story: "I am the child who turns into Al Smith." When I explained the phallic significance of the derby hat, she laughed heartily and exclaimed: "Of course! Al Smith built the Empire State Building, with the highest tower in the world." The unmistakable phallic architecture of this building with its glans-shaped cupola (derby hat) has not passed unrecognized in popular humor. It has been called "Al Smith's latest erection".—The crippled child, who also represents the dreamer, reminds her of the sufferings of the crippled child in Joseph Roth's novel, *Job*. From this she proceeds to associations concerning gloomy incidents of her own childhood.—The dream was a reaction to a vigorous but unhappy attempt on the patient's part to indulge in, and gain pleasure from sexual intercourse. It represents her flight from her masochistically deformed femininity ("cripple") into phallic masculinity, making use of the most extravagant symbolism.

We are now able to understand the great amount of affect with which the illusory penis is invested. The illusory penis is not a simple product of penis envy, but a *narcissistic reaction formation* of the ego, its bulwark against repressed genital masochistic impulses, and it must be strong enough to resist the

attack of these forces. Thus, the economic problem in women's fear of castration is solved: it is a fear that the repressed genital masochism will return from repression. It is not the signal of an external danger, but of danger from the genital masochistic instinct.

Let us dwell somewhat on the situation produced for the girl's instinctual life by the accession of a hallucinatory penis. Her previous desire for genital pleasure, which was not guided by any idea of sexual differences, is now divided into two sexually differentiated tendencies, but for both the path of discharge is blocked. Her genital masochism must be repressed, as offensive. And her genital masculinity is useless, for she must avoid the site where she has placed her illusory penis, to preserve her illusion. Her masochistic femininity comes to naught because of the pleasure principle, her phallic masculinity because of the anatomical facts. The ego's narcissistic wound is now healed; the girl, as I should like to put it, has made her "autoplastic (phallic) complementation",¹ but her genital impulses have been sacrificed to her narcissistic interests. In consequence, the ego fumbles with both inadequate genital strivings and cannot acquire an orientation to genitality congruous with the genital organ. It may be that clinical data which radiate from this situation led Ernest Jones² to the idea of aphanisis.

Critical compunction leads us to consider one point as yet untouched in this essay. It was obviously advisable to begin our study of the fear of castration by considering its narcissistic determination. Now it may be said that we have let ourselves be riveted to this aspect and have ignored the relation between the fear and the girl's emotional attitude to the members of her family,—to her desires, joys, and disappointments. This is a fair objection, but in defense it must be pointed out that the onesidedness was deliberate and unavoidable. Whoever wishes to find out how a complicated network is made

¹ Autoplastic (phallic) complementation=*autoplastische (phallische) Kompletierung*. TR.

² Jones, Ernest: *The Early Development of Female Sexuality*. Int. J. Ps-A. VIII, 1927.

must first single out the individual threads. Here too, to achieve a useful synthesis, we must consistently follow all points of view through the material, one at a time. Nevertheless it is true that we should be cautious and from time to time stop and see if some nodal point has not been overlooked. We may do so now by asking, who is the object of the sensual desire that finds an outlet in the masochistic masturbation. I have already brought out that this masturbation is predominantly mental¹ and have referred to its relation to the primal scene. Yet this does not imply that the girl's masturbation is caused by a desire for her father and an identification with her mother. This conjecture would be as incorrect as if the rôles were assigned conversely. The masturbation is not due to a sensual desire for anyone, but to the narcissistic distress of the little girl, and is *par excellence* autoerotic. For during this period, we find that she is turned in on herself, isolated, and secluded. To be sure, she is ready to accept (as if unaware) a great deal of tenderness from the environment, but she has no impulse to return it. In her genital masochistic fantasies, it is more important to her that she should be suffering, than that any special person should have made her suffer. She now has an "anatomic depression" (*anatomische Verstimung*),² as we may designate it, which later on in her neurosis will be repeated as "menstrual depressions". Concomitant with her autoplasmic (phallic) complementation, her mood changes into a sort of forced gaiety; she quits masturbating, as we have seen, and now more than ever, for a long time will not have any expectation of sensual love.

Our reference to the parents reminds us to add another detail,

¹ The genital masochistic fantasies are often accompanied by typical, aberrant genital masochistic activities, such as nail-biting, tearing out the hair, etc.

² Abraham knew of the existence of an early depression of this type, and described it as "primal depression" (*Urverstimung*). (Cf. "A Short Study of the Libido" in *Selected Papers of Karl Abraham*. London: Hogarth Press.) He also recognized that this depression was due to an estrangement from both parents. We may add that this twofold estrangement in the "anatomical depression" is an outcome of the girl's anatomical experience, which at one blow turns her love from the persons about her back to herself. The depression is of the severe type that degenerates into overt masochistic gratification.

although its significance will not be discussed here. To begin with, the repetitive dreams show that the girl acquires the illusory penis from her father or brother. (As in the dream reported above.) This is so intelligible that it would seem strange to question its being elementary. Yet in another connection, while studying the cyclothymic phenomena, I discovered that the father's appearance in the ideas relating to the illusory penis is secondary, and occurs only after the girl has experienced a momentous disappointment. In the original form of the fantasy, the girl gets her penis from the mother; and to do this she devours the breast! One's amazement disappears with the reflection that at this age, it is a matter of course that the mother is the source on which to draw for all that is desirable and worth having. To whom else should the child turn for a remedy of this deficiency? Simple children's nurses show great emotional knowledge when they tell children not to swallow the seed when they eat fruit, or a tree will grow out of their stomach. That fruit is symbolic of the breasts has been known for a long while by psychoanalysts.

We may now sum up our theory in a brief formula:

"Anatomical experience → Extinction of the amorphous genital phase of the ego → Domination of the ego by genital masochism ⇌ Narcissistic defense reaction of the ego: phallic complementation → Fear of castration in the ego, as a signal of danger from genital masochism."

III.

THE MODIFICATIONS OF CASTRATION FEAR

Castration anxiety in women is the product of a serious disorder, which arose in the infantile developmental phase of genitality. Unless a process of restitution intervenes during the following years, the deformity suffered will result in a permanent impairment of the female sexual function. The repression of genital masochism prevents the acquisition of the normal female genital attitude; the genital impulse cannot find

its proper psychic expression. Its energy is divided between two mutually opposed strivings: the genital masochistic, and the illusory phallic. The fear of castration will persist as an infallible sign of this unfortunate course. It will be encountered later as the central pathological phenomenon in the neurosis of the mature woman. No matter how confusing the clinical picture presented to us by a neurosis in a woman, it is always possible, after some effort, to separate out of its complexity the following simple situation:

From puberty on, the genital impulse, reënforced in its somatic source, has been more and more insistent upon being gratified; and the girl's standards were formed under pressure of a society that expects her to fulfil her feminine destiny. The young woman despairingly attempts to adapt herself to this prescribed rôle, or at least to find a solution that will be an acceptable compromise, but, again and again, she finds it impossible. We now easily understand why she fails. For that which is being thrust upon her from within as her "female" sexual desire is really a repellent demand that she deliver herself over to excruciating, bloody tortures, in order to enjoy the pleasure of her own pain. Her ego reacts to this suggestion with a fear of castration and strengthens the investment of the illusory penis, which at this time is located where the ego most fears that the genital masochism will burst forth. At each post of danger an illusory penis (a masculine attitude) is stationed as a sentry.¹ The spontaneous attacks by the

¹ For example, in the dream reported on a previous page, each single phallic symbol represents a defense against a particular masochistic attitude. The "fiery steed" is the counterpart of the dreamer's masochistic masturbation fantasy of the sufferings of a horse, which has persisted unchanged since childhood, for which she took the ideas from the story of *Black Beauty*. The "derby hat" hints at her severe masochistic intellectual inhibitions, against which she was constantly trying to defend herself by outbursts of masculine intellectuality. (Cf. the discussion of "spurious feeble-mindedness" below.) Her identification with her father (the "Governor"), who leads his life more or less autocratically isolated from his family, denies the dreamer's intense masochistic fixation to her mother. The "Empire State Building" is, in the latent material of the dream, a symbol of impudent phallic exhibitionism, which takes the place of the earlier, bashfully anxious concealment of her phallic deficiency. This

genital impulse, or the timid attempts of the ego to try out its femininity, immediately precipitate fresh anxiety. The result is an interminable effort on the ego's part to come to some terms with the genital masochistic instinctual danger indicated by the fear of castration. For this purpose a few psychic mechanisms, with which we are sufficiently familiar, are brought into play. The ego relies upon one or another of these procedures, and combines them or elaborates them in lengthy undertakings, during the course of which the same situations come to be repeated. The ego engages in the struggle at many different points, but always with the same unattainable goal: to find some protective "sanctuary" in itself, removed from the jurisdiction of its genital masochism, where it may find freedom from its consuming, impending fear, and peace in a modest pleasure.

To demonstrate the soundness of this theory, let us turn our attention to the neurotic mechanisms referred to above.

To begin with, let us be quite clear as to the "displacement" or "modification" of castration fear, mentioned so often in these pages. We must therefore ask several questions: how can we characterize this process more accurately?—in what way does masochism participate in it?—and in what way does the ego, which experiences the fear and heeds it as a warning participate? As a starting point for this exposition we may use the patients' fear of ordinary commonplace injuries. The thing that is feared here by the ego and considered a danger—physical or mental injury—is precisely what the genital masochism displaced from its original field of operations secretly desires. Genital masochism craves physical or mental pain, so that it may extract pleasure from the painful stimulation. Each apprehension of the ego conceals a latent, synonymous, intention to obtain satisfaction on the part of masochism. Essentially, therefore, what the ego fears (and quite justifiably) are

anxious self-concealment and the self-exposure are both represented in the dreamer's life by a number of extremely characteristic manifestations, which cannot be reported here. I may assure the reader that this phallic dream in its "choice of symbols" reveals all the crucial masochistic tendencies that have gone to form the dreamer's life.

the wishes of its own repressed genital masochism; as if it were aware of what was being planned within itself against its own welfare. It is hard, however, to grant that the ego has such insight, if, in the analytic hour, one sees how violently patients reject this insight when it is proffered them. But there is no need to enter into questionable hypotheses. Careful observation shows clearly the process that takes place in the ego: the ego's sensitiveness, and corresponding alertness, to pain is remarkably increased by the pressure of masochism. As the ego wishes to protect itself from masochistic experiences, it is forced to scour the field of its activities to find the most remote possibility of pain. With this—though completely unaware of what it is doing—it performs an excellent reconnoitering service for its masochism. For masochism seizes upon the new potentialities for suffering that the ego has made visible, and henceforth exerts a pressure towards their realization. The ego perceives the masochistic investment as an increase in internal tension, and the situation into which masochism is trying to bring it inspires it with fear.¹ The ego's attention is diverted entirely from the processes within itself and to the environment, where it seeks and finds the reason for its fears. This articulation with reality conceals the masochistic determination of the fear.

We are now equipped to scrutinize individually the modifications and displacements of the fear of castration. The most important of these originate in the great biological events in female sexual life. The ego, with its wits sharpened by bad

¹ In childhood and often enough later on also, the trouble of discovering new possibilities of "pain" for the masochistically sensitized ego, is taken over by other persons (parents, superiors, friends). It is instructive to compare the attitude of this ego with that of the normal ego. The healthy child is often given the idea of a new possibility of *pleasure* by some ineptly imparted warning on the part of its upbringer, which he then quickly tries out. The healthy ego, later in life too, scents a secret pleasure behind every warning (or prohibition) that proceeds from authority, a pleasure that shall be withheld only from it. It reacts, consistently, with a *temptation to rebel*. The masochistically prepossessed ego has forfeited this healthy sagacity in regard to possibilities of pleasure. The warning (or prohibition) induces only the idea of a new possibility of "pain"; the ego is *masochistically tempted*; it represses the temptation and reacts with fear (anxiety).

masochistic experiences, has to deny that the initial menstruation is a masochistic gratification, and declare that the hæmorrhage resulted from an act of violence, of which it was somehow the victim,—during sleep. This interpretation, which the girl spins out in dreams and reveries, follows the trail of the idea that she had once experienced a similar act of violence, castration. Here genital masochism acquires the second of its ideational contents: the wish to be violated. The ego's reaction to this is a modification of the fear of being castrated into a fear of being violated. The same reactions ensue if the girl's imagination has dealt with the fact of menstruation before she herself began to menstruate; her personal experience then merely reënforces these reactions. The masochistically sensitized ego handles the problem of childbirth in a similar way: again a part of her body is to be torn away. This then becomes the third idea in genital masochism: the wish to be delivered of the fœtus through violence. The corresponding modification of the fear of castration is the fear of childbirth.

We have thus all three manifestations of genital masochism, which Freud described as "feminine masochism", and which Helene Deutsch has considered the "masochistic triad" of normal female sexual life—the three wishes for pleasurable pain: to be castrated, to be violated, and to be forced to deliver the child. We see that this masochistic triad expresses the aims and wishes of a pathologically distorted, masochistically deformed femininity,—against which the ego in alarm defends itself by a correlated triad of fears: a fear of castration, a fear of being violated, and a fear of childbirth. The painful pleasure in childbirth is not then, as Helene Deutsch and Georg Groddeck have supposed, the "orgasm" of *the* woman, but, at most, the sexual fulfilment of the genitally masochistic woman. The ego's fear follows after the genital masochism, when the latter penetrates to new secondary positions, and a number of further modifications proceed from the triad of fears. The fear of being violated persists with only slight modification as a fear of defloration, or as fear of sexual intercourse in general. Fear of delivering a child is intensified into a fear of dying; of which the text might read, "I have to die while in travail".

From the original genital site, these fears spread to include other types of violation, coercion, injury, and so on. The ego's original reaction formation against genital masochism, the narcissistic illusory penis, persists during all of this pathological evolution, and is observable by the analyst as the location at which the ego's anxiety is ready to appear. To another reaction formation, which according to my findings has been formed in the ego and inherits partly or entirely the narcissistic investment of the illusory penis, I have given the name of "illusory foetus". The recognition of this fantasy renders accessible to our understanding the symptomatology of the unconscious pregnancy fantasies, which is as rich in clinical manifestations as in surprises. Since I am interested here in presenting the primary dynamics of the neurosis, in what follows I intentionally neglect these complications, and consequently the whole topic of "the child". They will be made the subject of another essay.

IV.

MORPHOGENESIS IN THE NEUROSES

This survey of the transformations of the fear of castration strengthens our view of the attitude of the ego. Whenever the ego should be perceiving the masochistic instinctual danger, it discovers instead an external one and believes that this is the one it fears. Consistently it then concentrates its efforts on the task of protecting itself against the supposedly external danger. The central "source of danger" in the life of the masochistic woman is the man; the line of defense in her neurosis will be toward him.

The ego that is or supposes itself to be in danger, has three types of defensive means at its disposal:—(1) flight, (2) combat, and (3) the choice of the "lesser evil".

Accordingly, whichever of these three methods may be adopted by the neurosis, for each there results a corresponding special nosological type, or a special type of character, which may be found in life sometimes in pure culture, but more frequently in different transitional or combined forms. Here we

may profitably limit our attention to those types that are best known to the analyst from his everyday practice or from the literature. It will be shown how if our point of view is assumed, the psychic structure of these types is illuminated, and how we can proceed from hesitant explanations, or no explanations, to satisfactory interpretations, and beyond this arrive at a unitary system of classification comprising the entire field. Since it is our intention merely to present a demonstration, we shall not attempt monographic comprehensiveness. The material has also been limited by our excluding the topic of "the child".

1. Flight.

Let us begin with a consideration of the mechanisms of flight.

(a.) The extreme result of flight from men is female *homosexuality*. After an initial period of overdone gushing or passionate tenderness, it regularly finds its way to clitoris pleasure. There are two reasons for the gratification: the successful avoidance of the dangerous man and the "realizing" of the masculinity inaugurated by the illusory penis. The neurotic disturbance peculiar to female homosexuality is a sense of guilt, the avowed source of which is the perversion itself with its attendant exclusion from the group. From this arises the tendency of homosexual women to strengthen their position by forming a group. This sense of guilt has as its roots a tormenting sense of inferiority, an uneasiness that one will be found inadequate, a fear of being exposed as ridiculous. The secret content of this fear is a fear of having the lack of a penis made public, which then would be immediately exploited by their genital masochism. Accordingly fear of exposure is a modified fear of castration, the persistence of which into the phallic sexual organization proves that this solution cannot free women from the pressure of their genital masochism.

(b.) Another type of flight from the male is less conspicuous overtly. I refer to *frigidity*. Here the woman is willing to

enter a sexual relationship with a man, but the relationship is without meaning. She offers him her genital organ, but retreats from it herself. In intercourse the organ is non-existent for her, is consequently not excitable, and provides neither pleasure nor pain. If the genital retains or resurrects its capacity to feel pain, the woman begins to use all measures at her disposal—including hysterical attacks, vaginism, and the like—to resist sexual intercourse. The frigid woman then obtains a substitute gratification from forced intellectual, professional, social, or domestic activities, or from some other source. The sublimation of masculinity in mental work is the solution that is coming to be more and more preferred nowadays. In this work, the mentally masculinized woman again meets her enemy, man, whom she evaded sexually. The gnawing sense of insecurity, the eternal fear of being exposed to ridicule, which arises in the intellectual or professional field, comes from a fear of having her phallic deficiency made apparent, and hence from a fear of her genital masochism. Joan Riviere¹ has very ably shown that such women frequently adopt a “masquerade” of womanliness to hide their masculinity. They ingratiate themselves because of their charm and then emasculate men on a mental plane. This, to be sure, is already an example of “combat”, and might be included in the section dealing with that technique.

The impulsion to reënforce the phallic position by masculinizing the intellect may make its appearance, in gifted girls especially, during the school years, and even this early, fail because of a great variety of emotional conflicts. Puberty sets a severe test. The early defeat of this effort may have very serious sequelæ. As usual, if the illusory penis is destroyed, the position that it was designed to protect becomes a prey to masochism. Masochism can then occupy it. The girl begins to act as though she were stupid, through defiance. From the original site of the conflict, the process spreads first to one point, and then another, until it terminates as a chronic masochistic impairment of the intellectual

¹ Riviere, Joan: *Womanliness as a Masquerade*. Int. J. Ps-A. X, 1929.

functions, and under particularly unpropitious conditions, as a *spurious feeble-mindedness*.¹ In all cases of this type that I have had a chance to observe, the patient as a child was originally above the average in intelligence. Though an apparent paradox, it is none the less true that the talented child is the very one that is most exposed, in the intellectual field, to defeats which the stupid child does not risk. Experiences of this sort that encourage masochism are then of necessity followed by an attempt to utilize the intellectual ability as a phallic means of defense, and after this measure fails, by a masochistic paralysis of the intellect.

(c.) Women with masculine ambitions often pursue another policy in order to avoid the dreaded unmasking of their "incapacity" (their lack of a penis). They withdraw from competition with men and are culturally active in some typically feminine field of endeavor. In this field, they behave more like a man than the men do. This type of avoidance has an interesting infantile history. The little girl, protecting her illusory penis from discovery, turns her interest from the genital region and ceases to masturbate. But this is not sufficient, for she incurs the same danger whenever she urinates. She does not hesitate to suppress her desire to urinate, and often brings on a stubborn, occasionally alarming, *retention of urine*. If, finally, she accedes to the impulse, she urinates like a boy. She may also elect to transport her device into her sleep, where she can urinate with her illusory penis (*nocturnal enuresis*). I suspect that this remarkable accomplishment—urinating with an illusory penis—may determine a subsequent tendency in our little heroine to indulge in *boasting* and *fantastic lying*; to the extent to which she develops a reactive compulsion neurosis, she will deny this past by *fanatic truthfulness*.

(d.) Infantile reluctance to empty the bladder is also at the root of another conversion symptom, which may be continued

¹ Cf. Bornstein, Berta: *Zur Psychogenese der Pseudodebilität*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XVI, 1930.

in a slightly modified way into maturity. I refer to *blushing*, and its accompaniment, the fear of blushing, or *erythrophobia*, so-called. The blush exhibits to us the result of an unsuccessful flight. "If I should urinate now," the child thinks, when the urge is present, "all would be known." This idea is already a masochistic one; the faltering ego must consequently submit to being publicly humiliated by genital masochism. The girl blushes and thus involuntarily confesses that she has no penis. It is correct to say that her suppressed urethral erotic excitement literally goes to her head, there to produce as a consolation something resembling an erection. But this interpretation does not completely elucidate the blushing; for example, a severe headache may also appear—which is often enough the case. The concentration of excitement upon the exposed face indicates that the process does not end in a successful phallic reaction formation, but in the triumph of masochism. The fear of blushing in erythrophobia is accordingly an unconcealed fear of castration. Subsequently, in the dynamics of blushing and erythrophobia, genital excitement takes the place of the urethral variety. The intention was to suppress genital excitement because of its masochistic debasement, but masochism, gaining the upper hand, by means of the woman's self-betraying, erotically exaggerated modesty, is all the more able to deliver over this fearful fugitive to the assaults of men.¹

¹ To judge from a few unfortunately incomplete observations, the obscure condition of *psoriasis*, which from the psychological angle is to be considered a permanent blush, has the same masochistic instinctual basis. For a long while I have endeavored to ascertain the libidinal qualities of the body surface,—that is, of the skin. More than ten years ago there occurred to me the idea (expressed only privately) that we might assume as the earliest phase of libidinal organization, a tactile phase, and relying upon phylogenetic considerations, that we might suppose this to occur in prenatal existence. But I soon abandoned this idea, since it was wholly unproductive. I think now that I can defend my opinion that the skin is not only the narcissistic rind of the ego, but at the same time and completely antithetically, also an exquisite settlement-area for masochism. The skin takes a large part in the protection against stimuli (*Reizschutz* of Freud); because of its exposed position it is not only subjected to the most various insults—thermal, chemical, mechanical, etc.—but it is at the

In several genitally masochistic women, I have observed for a long time that they preferably wear *red clothes* or red articles of clothing (hats, ties, belts, handbags, etc.) while they are menstruating. If one draws their attention to this fact, they are at first surprised or amused or try to contradict it, but finally all admit that they were not aware of their habit. That this is a copy of blushing, is unconsciously planned as a provocation, and originates in the sexually exciting "castration experience" is self-evident.

(e.) Considered as a flight from genitality, frigidity is a success: genital masochism cannot assert itself in the genital area that the ego has deserted. (Yet, such happenings as childbirth, venereal infections and the like may give fresh opportunities.) Genital masochism then finds a way to build a covert ideational bridge between the no longer realizable, damaging genital situation and some other, ordinarily innocuous and commonplace life situation. Such bridges are formed as a rule in childhood and remain potentially ready for use. Furthermore, the ego, with its equivocal anxious-sensual alertness to anything and everything that might injure it, always gives genital masochism the right cue. The previously harmless situation then has a sexual—that is to say, a

same time the place where the first defensive reparative reactions of the organism run their course. The two processes, injury and repair, are alike constantly associated with pain, which masochism can readily utilize as pleasure in suffering. There is thus formed an intimate connection between the cutaneous surface and masochism, of which the disposition may be traced back into the obscure phylogenetic past. (In this type of problem one must not lose sight of phylogenesis.) It would not be in the least miraculous, then, if relations of this sort were at work in the psychopathology of skin diseases, and of the major infectious exanthematous diseases (including syphilis).—From this angle, we may also interpret the libidinal dynamics of *tender stroking*, which is of so much importance in the love life of the masochistic woman. Stroking attains its erotic aim by evoking playfully for the person stroked masochistic instinctual danger, and then giving her all the more delight because of the totally painless nature of the proffered gratification. This is a splendid maneuver for the benefit of the narcissistic ego: the ego is permitted repeatedly to enjoy a triumph of the pleasure principle over genital masochistic temptation. The gratification obtained will naturally be in proportion to the genital masochistic instinctual danger.

genital masochistic significance. As soon as the ego approaches the genito-masochistically exciting situation, it is attacked by fear; the patient takes to her heels and for the future avoids this situation as a danger. She then suffers from a *hysterical situational phobia*. The flight, in the phobia, repeats the flight from the genital at the new position that the displaced genital masochism has brought into relation with genitality.

A few examples will illustrate this analysis: We may begin with the morbid *fear of high places*. Freud with a terse remark indicated the origin of this phobia in a fear of feminine masochistic temptation.¹ It may be added in corroboration that the masochistic temptation here is to throw oneself into the depths, symbolic of a self-inflicted damaging parturition (cf. German *Niederkommen*), and the ego's fear is an intensified fear of childbirth, that is, a fear of dying. The numerous morbid *fears of reptiles and small animals* refer back to the first appearance of a "snake"—the first acquaintance with the penis. The girl's reaction to that experience was masochistic masturbation. The reappearance of the "snake" is an incitement to masturbate masochistically—and later on to indulge in masochistic coitus. The fear of the terrified, recoiling ego has the hidden meaning of a fear of being violated. In the various morbid *fears of traveling* (in trains, automobiles, etc.) a somatic factor enters. The rocking and shaking excites masochistically sensitized persons in a genital masochistic way. The somatic agitation stimulates the repressed genital masochism and the corresponding fear of the ego. The patient who innocently details her apprehensions about a journey, is giving an accurate description of the latent genital masochistic desires aroused by the projected journey. Psychoanalysis then shows that the masochistic elaboration of the traveling links it with the important genital masochistic experiences of childhood,—the primal scene, birth of another child, etc. Many kinds of danger may be encountered while on a journey, and accordingly there is hardly a single variety of castration fear that may not be manifested as a fear of traveling: fear of collisions, of

¹ In a footnote in *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*, Ges. Schr. XI, 111.

being mutilated, of being drugged and robbed, of being raped, of being killed,—in former bedwetters, a fear of being set afire or burnt, and so on.

Agoraphobia, the morbid fear of going out on to the street, has been dealt with repeatedly by analytic writers. Alexander recognized correctly that the essential danger on the streets is a covert temptation to be a prostitute.¹ Deutsch² later convincingly demonstrated that masochism played a great part in this illness. She did not, however, relate this masochism to genitality and narcissism, but to aggression, and thus narrowly missed the explanation to which we hold. It is quite evident that prostitution is a desired aim of genital masochism. It combines sexual gratification with a moral humiliation that the ego wants as little as physical damage. Furthermore, the latent fantasy of being a prostitute is not the sole masochistic ideational content, and surely not the original content, in agoraphobia. In my experience, the crucial fixation in this illness takes place at the primal scene, impressions of which, after the discovery of the penis, stimulated masochistic masturbation. To what extent this fixation of the primal scene depends upon the recurrent opportunity then to observe the penis, I shall not venture to decide. At any rate, the danger exists subsequently that a repetition of the coitus observation will immediately activate the urge to masturbate masochistically. To the observation of sexual intercourse, the ego reacts with a specific sensitiveness, which it later transfers to street traffic. This process of displacement may rest upon verbal associations (as in German, where *Verkehr* means intercourse and traffic), or may utilize the identity of certain perceptual elements ("motion", "noise"). The situation of being on the street activates the idea of parental coitus, which then stimulates the desire to masturbate masochistically, or later to have masochistic sexual relations. The ego's response is a fear of castration, the patient flees in despair and in consequence refuses to

¹ Alexander, Franz: *The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality*. Nerv. and Ment. Monograph no. 52.

² Deutsch, Helene: *The Genesis of Agoraphobia*. Int. J. Ps-A. X, 1929.

go on the street. This comprises the phobic mechanism in the restricted sense of the term. To go out with a companion, whose presence protects the patient from the fear, is then an act of prevention. It is true that the patient here flees from genital masochistic temptation to the protective guardianship of a trusted person. In certain cases in my experience, however, there was an additional secret significance in this symptom. If the girl takes her mother (or later a substitute for the mother) with her, the parents are separated, and nothing can go on between them. Then the symptom is no longer a flight but a "preventive counter-attack", and the aggression here is not one of the determinants of the pathogenic conflict, but one of its results. Many clinical histories contain a variation of this symptom—brought to our attention by Deutsch—that the girl is attacked by fear if she remains at home, while her mother has gone out. It then appears as though she were identifying herself with her mother, who is on the streets, and were vicariously feeling the appropriate fear. In point of fact the matter is simpler than that. The girl has become suspicious that when her mother goes out alone she meets a lover. So, although the girl stays at home, she is beset by the same sexual impression that precipitated her genital masochistic excitement; to be alone increases the temptation to masturbate and with it the fear. Her extreme, conscious or unconscious resentment at her mother is therefore not the cause but the result of her fear—that is, of her genital masochistic excitability.

Even this small selection of illustrations proves how numerous are the mechanisms of displacement in the phobias. They are by no means all of them correctly comprehended, but with our knowledge of the essential structure of phobias it can hardly be the case that any greater obstacle is placed in the way of their evocation. The problem is always the same: From the phobic situation we must dissect out that infantile experience, which compulsorily precipitates the patient into genital masochistic excitement. In the illustrations given, this specific experience was: the (re)appearance of the wound (the deep place), the (re)appearance of the penis, the mechanical

shaking of passive motion, and the (repetition of the) observation of coitus. Obviously, through infantile fixations genital masochism acquires this specific sensitiveness to a particular excitation, which then determines the "selection of the situation" in the "situational phobia".

—*The Problem of Fear (Anxiety)*

The true problem of phobias arises elsewhere. Freud has taught us that fear is a signal of danger; objective fear, so-called, heralds the presence of an external (objective) danger, neurotic fear the presence of an (unknown) instinctual danger.¹ From this foundation we have built up our own views and shown that castration fear in women is the signal of the instinctual danger emanating from genital masochism. Our whole study stands or falls on this point. The phobias—and other types of anxiety hysteria without phobic mechanisms—present the most tempestuous manifestations of fear, culminating in the great hysterical anxiety attack, which may overpower the patient for hours or days, and which so often proves to be refractory to any phobic device. These facts do not conform with the theory of anxiety as a danger signal. Can it be that our theory fails us in the very situation where fear completely dominates the clinical picture? This we cannot believe, for it is too firmly grounded in the facts; so that there must be a gap in our knowledge of anxiety phenomena. The great advance made by Freud's theory of anxiety was the introduction into the problem of the danger situation. The new productive mode of approach nevertheless compelled him to assume that the ego itself manufactured the fear. This is a difficult theoretical position to maintain, for introspection contradicts it. Linguistic usage also assigns an active rôle to anxiety and a passive one to the ego. We describe the experiencing of fear or anxiety in terms that emphasize their originally ego-alien quality: we are beset, attacked, overcome, overwhelmed, or shaken by fear or anxiety. It could also not be determined

¹ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI.

how the ego was supposed to make the fear, whether through "fermentation of the libido", or in some other way. Here then is the gap. A discussion of the problem of fear (anxiety) is not to be avoided.

Let us preserve our clinical point of view and inquire, by what means the anxiety operates as a signal. Unquestionably by means of a momentary constriction of breathing, that is, by means of a minimal transient paralysis, on which there follows an immediate remedial acceleration of the heartbeat. We may without harm ignore the accessory content of the anxiety picture; the nucleus of the experience of fear (anxiety) is the paralysis, and this can be brought about only by masochism. The narcissistic ego, which ordinarily does not wish to have anything to do with masochism, in this instance for a moment gives its archenemy a free hand, to be used as an instrument for the ego's own preservation. Masochism inflicts a trifling injury (the momentary paralysis) upon the ego's own body, which advises the ego of the approach of danger. Freud made the ingenious suggestion that fear (anxiety) anticipates an impending injury in miniature; but this mechanism could not be demonstrated by referring it to the anxiety at birth; insight into the masochistic nature of fear throws light upon it. The ego is obedient to the warning given it by masochism. It sharpens its attention (as Freud describes it) and awaits the danger in complete readiness for action (defense). In the case of neurotic fear, fear of castration, the signaling operations are even simpler. The source of danger, from which the threatened injury alone can emanate, is masochism itself, and the fear signal is a genuine sample of what confronts the ego. The ego's ignorance in regard to this internal source of danger accounts for the inappropriateness of its ensuing behavior. It behaves consistently enough from its own point of view, for it directs the attention aroused by the signal to the environment. Up to this point, the phenomenon of fear is nothing else than a remarkable biological signal service. But even in the less severe cases of anxiety attack, it may be seen that this useful function begins to fail, and that it completely collapses in the

more severe anxiety attacks. The ego here loses its power over masochism, which it wished to put to use for its own purposes. Masochism penetrates deeply into the vital motor sphere of the ego and germinating there, brings forth the paralyzing effects, which become so intense and embracing that they make the ego, to the detriment of its own preservation, for a time incapable of action (defense). The anxiety attack is an explosive discharge of masochism in the field of the ego's psycho-somatic functioning. This anxiety is no longer a utility, a signal, but a severe symptom of illness. The ego can no longer prevent the masochistic self-harming tendency, which craves pleasure from suffering, from producing suffering. But the ego's opposition spoils the pleasure. When masochism invades the ego, no matter whether as an anxiety attack or otherwise, the ego at first finds only suffering without pleasure. Only after the ego has become adapted to the anxiety attacks—or enforced masochistic experiences of other kinds—can it turn the masochistic experience into pleasure-pain; in this case, "pleasurable fear" or "anxious pleasure".

The hysterical anxiety attack depends upon a deepseated disorder of the sexual function, which is removed from the ego's field of authority. What is the case in the anxiety symptoms that appear in the "actual neuroses", from the study of which Freud came to the unique and productive conclusion that anxiety is due to accumulated genital excitement? Here the individual's sexual organization is functionally efficient, intrinsically, but is abusively utilized by the ego. In my opinion, we have only to insert the link "masochism" into Freud's classical description to explain this. The ego's abuse of its sexuality consists in its permitting the excitation of the genital but then suppressing the excitement, or rather preventing its complete fruition and discharge. Inhibition of a pleasure-giving activity is always reacted to by an unleashing of masochism. The greater the tension that remains after the frustration of an act of pleasure, the speedier and the more uncontrollably will the thwarted desire for pleasure throw itself into the exploitation of suffering for pleasure. An ego that is being

checked in the genital act (left in the lurch by the sexual partner) is immediately attacked by genital masochism. In the actual neurosis, therefore, the suppressed genital excitement is not directly transformed into anxiety (fear), but into genital masochism; then, the no longer restrainable genital masochistic excitement is discharged as anxiety. The *Aktualneurose* is well named, for the "*aktual*" origin of this anxiety, (i.e., its origin in the immediate situation) is incontestable. In this way, some of the obscurities in regard to anxiety, which have troubled us for a long while, are satisfactorily dispelled. And the anxiety attack, which threatened to overthrow our theory, now becomes its strongest support.

Here we may venture a "bioanalytic" speculation, in Ferenczi's sense, in regard to the phylogensis of the signaling device, fear (anxiety). We may begin with the primitive living creature, which has not developed such a danger signal and is therefore often in jeopardy of being injured. Each wound restricts the animal's freedom of motion, lessens or frustrates his pleasure-giving acts, and thus compels the pleasure function to turn to pain-pleasure. In other words, the wound is elaborated masochistically by the ego. This is the state of affairs that we were able to study thoroughly in the case of the little girl, in her response to the anatomical experience. To be sure, the animal is responding to a physical injury and the girl to a mental one. But both alike are insults to self-love, narcissistic injuries. No one can be sure that it is not the injury to the animal's narcissism, which accompanies the bodily injury, that initiates the masochistic reaction. If this is true there would be even less disparity between the two cases. Within the limits of a bioanalytic speculation, such a similarity is sufficient to permit the analogy. As we have seen, each reawakening of that wounding impression evokes in the girl an intractable masochistic excitement. The phobic anxiety attack, in which, according to our views, this reaction continues to exist, attests its violence and perseverance. May it not be assumed that the masochistically sensitized animal, too, responds to a new danger of injury with a masochistic paralytic attack—with a kind of hypnotic

fascination?¹ The ego combats these attacks of masochistic paralysis, and learns, in the course of countless generations, to moderate their intensity and duration, until they appear only as a trace. With this the gradual transformation of the injurious paralyzing process into a useful danger-signaling device is complete. The way in which this danger signal is first created, and what modifications it undergoes before it assumes the form of the affect, fear, are problems of which the biologist must supply the solution. Our psychoanalytic study permits him to anticipate that the danger signal from the start would be a transient *paralytic process*, which attacks a *vital* bodily function, and which is due to the energy of the *masochistic* instinct within the organism. Possibly the function attacked by masochism is, in each case, respiration. But one must be wary of any such suggestions; we do not even know, for example, what relationship there may be between the masochistic anxiety attack and the organic disturbance of cardiac function in angina pectoris. For the time being, "bioanalysis" suggests the theory that anxiety (fear) is not produced by the ego, but is only a product domesticated by the ego. We are inevitably reminded of the wise peasant, who succeeded in curing all but a tiny trace of the rheumatism that had tormented him; but this little trace he preserved, so that he might always be apprized in time of the approach of bad weather.

2. Combat.

Entirely different symptomatic pictures are formed by a second variety of defense, which we may call: combat. Its most efficient means is, preferably, preventive counter-attack; and its objectives are, incapacitation and revenge.

(a.) Thus we have the woman who intimidates a man, who marries a weakling, puts an end to his potency, and holds him responsible for her unhappiness. This "masculine sadistic"

¹ Compare with this the "feigned death" of animals in danger ("playing 'possum"). According to our view, the animal *does* not feign death but is paralyzed by an attack of masochism. The dubious value for self-defense of this apparent death is a "secondary gain from illness"

attitude gives her a chance to deny and keep down her own genital masochistic tendencies. Since Abraham's brilliant observations, the "castrative woman" is perhaps the best-known type analytically; as will be remembered, he used the designation, "revenge type". In the connections we are considering, I must regard protection from the enemy, or his incapacitation for combat, as the primary intention of this attitude. It becomes vindictiveness as a rule in relation to the first man who accomplishes her defloration. Premarital defloration rites and customs, found among many primitive peoples and even among the peoples of classical antiquity, are to be accounted for, according to Freud's well-known interpretation, by this fact.¹

(b.) The woman's combative pleasure, which is inaugurated by her effort to protect her genital, is differentiated in several ways. It appears as a pleasure in stealing, in *cleptomania*; and in the so-called "*vampire*", as a pleasure in exploitation.

The true cleptomaniac—who must not be confused with occasional thieves who sham cleptomania—commits her theft while in a state of extreme genital masochistic excitement, and endows the object stolen—in reality usually worthless to her—with great emotional values. She is acquiring a penis, in order to strengthen her tottering phallic position.² This desperate step of the ego is always preceded by a severe genital masochistic temptation, started by a threat to the illusory penis; this point can be clarified only by a consideration of the anal fate of diverted genital masochism, which we cannot give in detail here. The obvious points are that the woman's retention of this illusory penis is soon marred by castration fear, which she experiences as a well-founded "fear of the consequences". The forces involved are too unequal; of these, genital masochism is the stronger. The woman soon flings away what she has

¹ Freud: *The Taboo of Virginity*. Coll. Papers IV.

² The first analytic elucidation of cleptomania we owe to Elisabeth Révész. As early as 1919, on the basis of a case analyzed in masterly fashion, and reported before the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society (but not published), she showed that the impulsive act of the cleptomaniac represents the concealed theft of a penis (or child).

stolen, betrays herself, and in the end satisfies her masochism, in prison. The masochism is now acknowledged as being the ego's, because it can be cloaked under the moralizing motivation of "atonement".¹

The "vamp" is assuredly no baseless invention of the moving picture industry, however much her popularity may be due to this source. I have never analyzed a professional "vamp", but, in compensation, some amateurs. It was not surprising to learn that their vampiric behavior was fundamentally designed to capture a penis. The financial trophy (money=penis) clinches the fact for the woman that she has conquered the enemy and appropriated his power. It is certain now, she feels, that *she* has the penis and no harm can befall her. A rascal then appears on the scene (in the film, the criminal whom the heroine loves and wishes to rescue) and he despoils her. Genital masochism is not to be avoided even on this by-path.

Thus far no light has been thrown on the name "vampire", applied to this type of woman in common parlance.² It is an obvious fact that these women figuratively "suck" men dry, that they make men infatuated with them by using the most childish tricks and flatteries,—very much those that children are accustomed to use with their mothers. This would be an example of the fact, to which the most recent analytic literature has ascribed so much importance, that the woman brings into her later relationship with a man attitudes that began in her early infantile relationship with her *mother*.³ However, I do not share the view of those writers that the little girl at first feels as a boy does, directing her "phallic" genital impulses to her mother, and passing through a "negative oedipus complex" in a genital sense before she begins her female genital career. The little girl at first does not attach any genital ideas to the

¹ Cf., below, the remarks on "moralizing genital masochism".

² I wish to thank Dr. Bertram D. Lewin for the suggestion that the designation (popularly shortened to "vamp") originated in Kipling's poem, "The Vampire".

³ See Freud: *A New Series of Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1933. And the papers of Jeanne Lampl de Groot and others cited there.

fact that she belongs to the female sex; there are no sexually differentiated ideas or desires behind her early masturbation; she knows that she gets pleasure at this part of the body, and she may weave all kinds of ideas into this pleasure,—but that is all. It is the discovery of a penis that raises the veil covering the difference between the sexes; she then learns that she is “castrated”, and develops the wish to be the possessor of a penis, a boy. Up to this time, she was attached to her mother “pre-genitally”; she now turns tempestuously to her mother with a “genital”-need: she hopes through her help to (re)acquire a penis. It had so often been told her that if she wished to grow, she must eat; and that she obtained her first nourishment from her mother’s breast. Now again, she wishes to nurse at her mother’s breast, indeed devour the whole breast, only so that a penis will grow on her after that,—which happens, too, in a dream. This is the secret of the art that the vampire applies with men.

—*The Œdipus Complex*

The views current in the most recent psychoanalytic literature, referred to above, lead me to an exposition that I should not otherwise have presented in this essay. By means of a fragment of an analysis, I should like to demonstrate the way in which the girl’s problem concerning the possession of a penis finds its entrance into her relationship with the parents, the alterations it brings about in these, and the modifications it undergoes itself in so doing:

The patient narrates the following dream:

“I was with my mother in a room. I got into bed with her and had intercourse with her. I believe I was on top and she beneath me, for I could observe her facial expression very well. I felt very well satisfied but did not have any genital sensations. Mother too was satisfied; she made a puzzled and sheepish face. I walked up and down in the room afterwards and became stricken with a bad sense of guilt. ‘Terrible’, I thought, ‘I shall have to tell you [the analyst] this.’ I became enraged with mother: Why had she suppressed me so much? It’s all her fault!”

Then the patient added: "I don't know whether these last thoughts didn't come only when I awoke. I am very much perturbed by the dream. I don't trust myself to meet mother."

Her first associations were: "Yesterday while I was out, my mother came to see the children. She busied herself with a plant that I have in a dish. She told the maid that she had poured in water, for otherwise the plant would have died. This made me lose my composure completely. My mother and brother were at my home for dinner. Mother talked a great deal and made many remarks that I had to think were meant for me. I was intimidated and much agitated. I don't understand how I could dream such a thing after that.—Perhaps I wished to console mother because she is a widow and hasn't any husband."

The analytic situation: The patient is at the apex of her sensual transference. She is quite hurt by the failure of her courtship, depressed, but takes herself in hand.

With the aid of other material brought to light by the patient's analysis, the following interpretation and reconstruction could be made:—

The patient had first discovered the penis on this brother. She then took refuge in the hope that her mother would see to it that she would grow a penis. This appears to have taken place in her dreams, but she could not maintain her dream illusion. Her mother had not, therefore, worried about her daughter's desired penis, and to make matters worse is now giving her attention to that stupid plant and worrying whether it will wither. Our theory permits us to surmise that when the girl's hope of obtaining an illusory penis collapsed originally, there followed an eruption of genital masochism. This surmise could be confirmed only indirectly. Later in life it happened that she three times developed a *pollakiuria* that lasted for weeks. Each time there were no explanatory organic findings. She had no physical complaints, either, but merely was compelled to urinate at brief intervals and felt irked and humiliated because of this. The illnesses appeared imme-

diately after her first menstrual flow, and *after* her two children were born. All three precipitating events destroyed her illusory penis, and the genital masochism that emerged was not discharged, as might have been anticipated, in masochistic masturbation, but in *masochistic* pollakiuria. At these times, she was not able to urinate properly, to "water", and now her mother comes along and takes her place in watering the plant. Why this trifling act should have so excited the patient is now clear. Her mother's action hit her in a tender spot in two ways. Then at dinner she had had the impression that her mother preferred her brother to her. This oversensitiveness and intense emotional reaction betray that the patient was "reliving" a critical event of her own childhood; at one time, she must have regarded it as hostile on the part of the mother, that the mother neglected to fulfil her expectations of having a penis. She turned away from the mother in bitterness (this is unquestionable) and probably immediately turned to her father with the hope that he would arrange for her to grow a penis. At any rate, the disappointment she felt with her mother pulled her out of her ruminations and incited her to make sexual investigations. They were not unsuccessful; she discovered or understood suddenly what it was that took place between mother and father (the primal scene). It came as a revelation to her that only her father had a penis,—and that mother had none. This knowledge acted as a tonic to her narcissism and restored her self-confidence. For she saw that she need no longer inflict suffering upon herself through painful fantasies, because of her defect; she could now look down upon her mother with contempt mitigated by pity. She could renounce her wish to have a penis herself but instead she wished to have father's penis—that is, what the mother has. The discovery of her own phallic deficiency had made her into a masochistic woman, and driven her to phallic complementation. The discovery of her mother's lack made her into a true woman and inaugurated her normal œdipal desires for her father. A process of this type may be called a "remedial developmental step". The expectation that the father would

respond to her advances by turning to her with his penis, subsequently ended in painful disappointment. This expectation and this disappointment the patient now repeats in her transference.

Here we see the application of the two precipitants of the dream. The patient's analysis was provoking her to relive her old disappointment in her father; in addition, an accidental occurrence reactivated the even older offense she had suffered from her mother. The dream then shows the way in which she can put an end to this situation. She kills her father, appropriates his penis, becomes a man and—cohabits with his “widow”. Hence the fear, in the dream, of confessing to the analyst what she is doing to her father (or would like to do to the analyst). Her revenge on her father leaves nothing to be desired. But at the same time she also revenges herself on her mother: the mother did not favor her with a penis and mocked at her deficiency; now she has been a success and has a penis, and she goes and gratifies—her mother. The daughter's magnanimity makes the mother—whose lack of a penis is thus brought home to her—look “puzzled and sheepish”. This is, to be sure, a refined form of revenge. Obviously the old tender affection for the mother has tamed the aggression to her; so that it is the girl's conceit that triumphs in the revenge. The dream process compellingly takes one back to the patient's childhood and makes one believe that he has eavesdropped on the excited girl while she fantasied: “Just wait, you bad father, I'll kill you and take your penis, and then I'll be a man. And you, you bad mother, you shall see then, when I get the penis, how *I* will behave with you.” This infantile fantasy is the basis of the dream.

The girl's phallic sexual act is now adequately explained. This coitus fantasy does not satisfy her genital impulse, but her narcissistic conceit and vindictiveness. The patient's spontaneous remark that she is given satisfaction (redress) in the dream, but feels no trace of a genital sensation, is based upon accurate self-observation. Her narcissistic vindictive impulses arose for genital reasons, and hence are executed with

the (narcissistic) sexual weapon. The sense of triumph, moreover, is soon at an end. Only too quickly does the dreamer begin to be afraid of her own godlike state. The sense of guilt that overtakes her on awakening already announces the resurgence of masochism. The narcissistic counter-post must as rapidly as possible be fortified by the release of an energetic aggression. And this occurs, too; the woman protects herself—still half asleep—from the imminent masochistic self-reproach by means of her reproach to her mother: "It's all your fault." Then throughout the day she becomes more depressed, more masochistic even than before. The satisfaction in the dream was a rich pyrotechnic display, which beautified the tortured woman's sleep, and illuminated the path into the depths for her analysis.

The many hints in the dream of an infantile observation of coitus may be passed by without discussion. It must be remarked, however, that in her analysis before she had this dream, she had never spoken of the fact that her mother was at one time involved in the fate of her wish for a penis. It is evident that the accidental episode with the plant first brought up the material out of repression; for this reason too the infantile documentation was sketchy.

Discussion: The "remedial" development recorded here is not identical with the normal one; it remains undermined by genital masochism. To disappointments that take place after the girl has just reached this "normal" attitude, as we see here, she can only too easily react with a regression to genital masochism and the illusion of phallic masculinity. I have been successful in obtaining an insight into some varieties of remedial (and normal) development. For the time, I should like to limit my account by bringing into relief those points in the process recorded above that remain constant in all varieties.

The girl's genital interest, properly speaking, commences with the discovery of the penis, as a narcissistic problem concerning the organ. The advance to a need for a genital object, which is expressed in fantasies of coitus, can only come into effect if the girl makes a second discovery—namely, that there

is such a thing as coitus, an activity that depends on the difference between the genitalia of the two sexes. Conceivably, the girl may make both discoveries—of the organ, and of the function—at the same time. This, however, is not in accord with my experience. It often happens that coitus is observed before the penis is discovered, but then the little girl simply does not understand that what she is observing is a genital process, and she puts some other interpretation upon it. The accurate observation of a penis, that is, the discovery of the penis, first equips her intellectually to construe (approximately) correctly that which she has experienced or will experience. The girl's desire for coitus is thus inaugurated and made possible by the information that only her father has a penis, and not she herself or her mother. From this it follows that the first wish for coitus is for coitus with her father. From this normal genital orientation, disappointments (fear of castration) may throw her back to the previous stage of the illusory penis. This is not in that case the old illusory penis: the girl introduces into her illusion the phallic impulse to have coitus (with an object) that she has learned from her father. Thus the girl acquires her phallic impetus to coitus, with which she turns to her mother. All attempts to place a different construction on the dynamics of this development lead to inconsistencies and in the end founder upon the more delicate details in the material.

It remains to the credit of Jeanne Lampl de Groot, that she pointed out the occurrence in girls of fantasies of phallic coitus with the mother, but their interpretation and setting should be dealt with in a different way. The suggestion, made by several persons, that the girl carries a genital desire into the original relationship with her mother, is correct; but what she desires from the mother is merely the correction of her organ defect, that is, a penis. The negative œdipus complex is, then, a secondary formation, the reaction to the breakdown of the genital relationship to the father. It must also be explained that the girl's negative œdipus complex, except for its designation, which is fixed through our scientific tradition, has little in common with the positive œdipus complex of the boy. The boy hates his

father because he is afraid his father will take his penis from him. The girl hates her father because she is afraid he will not give her his penis. And of the boy's native genital desire for his mother, the girl shows nothing. Her phallic fantasy of coitus with her mother is a blow aimed at her mother, which gratifies her own narcissistic conceit and vindictiveness, but which does not gratify her sensual love. Only later, after puberty in some women, is this fantasy given a sensual meaning and serves then as a base on which to erect a homosexual attitude.

A closing remark will return us to the vampire, of whom one trait remained obscure. The sucking at the mother's breast, from which the girl at one time expected to grow a penis, was a procedure born of trust in the mother. Only after she then experienced *disappointment*, was there produced the vindictive appetite for exploiting, which the woman who has become a "vamp" satiates on men.

(c.) Genital masochism, repelled so competently by the reaction formation, "castrative woman", finds a good place of refuge in anality. Its vicissitudes there are too manifold for detailed treatment here. I shall mention only the basic position of the aberrant genital masochism in the anal region. I refer to the desire for the pleasure to be obtained from painful and bloody evacuation. The retention of faecal masses, which results from this purpose, is given further support by the ego, because of its totally misguided defensive strategy. Against direct onslaughts of masochism, the ego has no other means of defense then to set up its narcissistic reaction, the illusory penis, in the danger zone. So, the ego is investing an anal penis to protect itself from anal masochism! Hence, both processes, the combated masochism and the narcissistic defensive action of the ego, work together towards the same end: the retention of faeces, which explains the peculiar obstinacy of this symptom. Only after persons in the environment have intervened (as they always do in the case of children) with local measures to relieve the chronic constipation, can the ego's defenses be

turned against an attack that threatens from without. It awaits the impending intestinal irrigations with great (castration) fear and attempts to prevent them by every means possible. After that, it reacts with an outburst of rage and develops a deepseated tendency to inflict revenge on the person who has perpetrated the "assault".

(d.) In this conjoint secondary attitude—pleasure in aggression directed outward, and masochistic gratification from processes within the body—the conflict that the woman wages with her genital masochism has been forced down to the province of the anal and sadistic impulses. Against the nascent refreshing here of early infantile instinctual aims, especially the heightening of destructive tendencies to a murderous pitch, the ego must soon intervene. It acts through fear of conscience; which means here, fear of punishment, fear of masochistic exploitation of the punishment, fear of castration. If the ego fails in its defensive effort, the combat—the same combat—continues in the more elevated region of the *compulsion neurosis*. To broach the discussion of this gigantic field here would be rash. I merely wish to indicate the road that leads from masochistically deformed genitality to the compulsion neurosis.

3. The Choice of the Lesser Evil.

The third variety of defense, the choice of the lesser evil, is the gravest; its discussion leads us into an obscure, almost unexplored field.

If the ego can neither flee nor offer combat, it itself brings about the threatened harm or meets it half way. It takes this desperate step in the hope of lessening the damage it must incur, or in the hope of preventing a greater evil. Freud called our attention to this type of behavior on the part of the ego, in his interpretation of the phenomenon of anxiety (fear);¹ its appearance in the process that gives form to the neuroses has as yet not been described. The choice of the

¹ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI.

lesser evil is as a rule preceded by menacing signs. The process is initiated by the mortification of self-esteem. The patient loses a modest potentiality for gratification, which she still possessed. Concealed beneath this is an injury to her illusory penis, or, even more clearly, an unavertable (sexual) event is approaching, in the patient's life, that she perceives as a violation. Her genital masochism is stimulated and goes into action. Wild apprehensions and terrifying fantasies occupy more and more place in the patient's living. The internal tension grows to an insupportable degree and robs her of the last remnant of her peace. In this state of exalted depression, the impulsive action takes place, by means of which the woman injures herself or gets herself injured. In comparison to the terrors, which she dreads as inevitable, what she does or gets done to herself appears to be a real deliverance. Beneath this rationalistic attitude of the ego may be recognized, as its prototype, that early genital-narcissistic injury which in its time terminated in the self-inflicted injury of masochistic masturbation. It is characteristic of the choice of the lesser evil, that the patient *always* carries out the desperate action while in a sort of self-stupefaction. The ego is blind to the harm it inflicts, or permits to be inflicted, upon itself; or it deceives itself as to the meaning and extent of what it is doing by all kinds of rationalizations. This attitude of the ego does not simplify our assessment of the situation. Especially in cases that terminate in extreme self-injury, one would hesitate to ascribe to the ego any attempt at deliberative reflection. The situation can be more satisfactorily described then as an eruption of genital masochistic desires; the ego, overwhelmed, surrenders to the masochism, and in its weakness must be content to pursue an ostrich policy in regard to its own unwilling doings or inactions. These two formulations differ only in respect of an ego-psychological nuance; they agree in attributing the formation of symptoms to the victory of genital masochism over the ego.

The choice of the lesser evil produces not alone tempestuous individual incidents in a neurosis, but developments that take

a chronic course as well. The patient's self-esteem gradually declines as the result of a series of narcissistic insults; the sensitive spot, at which she is hurt each time, is her phallic reaction formation, which stands guard in the ego, against genital masochism. In accordance with this, the ego's conquest by masochism proceeds in the form of a peaceful penetration; the patient again and again chooses the lesser of the evils, and her life becomes increasingly a renunciation.

(a.) The first opportunity for the choice of the lesser evil is in *self-defloration*. This happening is usually due to roughly executed (post-pubertal) masochistic masturbation. Recently (and I may refer to the series reported by Joan Riviere¹) an increasing number of cases has been encountered in which women use a surgeon to perform the defloration for them before they are married. This may, of course, be undertaken for a second reason—namely, to spare their future husband the defloration, and themselves the resulting vindictive hostility, in order to facilitate their subsequent living with him in a desexualized sexual relationship. The present day neurosis thus arrives at the above-mentioned rite of our ancestors.

(b.) Another method which genital masochism drives the ego to use operates with more cruel measures. Girls who have repeatedly rejected decent suitors because of a fear of castration, or to conceal this fear have always chosen to love where it was obvious from the beginning that nothing would come of it, may in the end have themselves deflorated by the first chance person who happens to be available. The event takes place ordinarily while the girl is drunk and only too often under particularly humiliating circumstances. Clinically, as we know, the most salient theme in this "throwing herself away" is an avoidance of committing incest with her father, or rather, a revenge on her father, which might be phrased as follows: "If it is not father, then it may as well be anybody."

¹ Riviere, Joan: *Womanliness as a Masquerade*. Int. J. Ps-A. X, 1929.

But it is only in the choice of the lesser evil—in the ascendancy of masochism—that we can find the explanation of the offensive self-injuries which enter into this reaction of the woman to her unresolved father attachment. The most extreme achievement in the way of genital masochistic self-debasement is prostitution, fantasied or real.

(c.) Equally serious in effect are those injuries which women driven by genital masochism inflict upon themselves extragenitally. I am acquainted with cases in which a woman's heroic determination to allow a man to approach her sexually continually miscarried because of her unconquerable fear of castration; after each failure, she promptly met with some accident or provoked an unprofitable surgical operation. In the severest cases, there follow frank or covert suicidal attempts, until in the end one attempt succeeds.

(d.) If the ego successfully diverts this overpowering masochism from the physical, sexual sphere to that of general behavior, it can give recognition to the unavoidable self-injury in the form of psychic suffering. The ego accepts the suffering as its own because of the allegation that it comes from the performance of a duty. This is the attitude of "*moralizing genital masochism*".¹ The woman now satiates her masochism, from which anxiety no longer protects her, using her husband and children, as a "*mater dolorosa*". She has exchanged her lot, to suffer in the genital rôle, for the lot of more general suffering in the rôle of wife and mother. However, here too, the ego's endurance is more strictly limited by the pleasure principle than one would at first suppose; it soon rebels against excessive impositions of suffering. The *mater dolorosa*—perpetually anxious about her husband and children—then begins to direct their lives through "protective measures" and "care", which are of no practical value

¹ Cf., for this, Freud's discussion of "moral masochism" in his essay, *The Economic Problem in Masochism*. Coll. Papers II.

but torture the persons thus "protected". With the pretext of fulfilling sacred obligations, she now revenges herself for her suffering upon her husband and children.¹ And if anyone ventures to remonstrate, her sense of guilt causes her to collapse. "But all I want is your welfare", she will say. Not only sexuality, but morality as well, fares badly if it comes into the bondage of masochism.

(e.) The ego may accept genital masochism as an overt *sexual perversion*. This end is usually due to a clever seducer, one who is capable of giving women who have become frigid—because they repressed their masochistically distorted genitality—a chance to "enjoy" the sexual act.

The conflict started in the ego by the anatomical problem is rekindled with the emergence of the problem of "the child". With this, as I hope to show later, there is an opportunity for sexual development to find its way back to the normal channel. Otherwise, symptoms crop out, which to be sure have their own clinical imprint, but which are sustained by the same forces that were inaugurated by the original conflict concerning the organ.

V.

CONCLUSIONS

The clinical pictures sketched are intended as evidence that the morphogenesis of the neuroses makes use of a few stereotyped mechanisms, and depends on a constant relation between genital masochism, ego, and fear of castration, which in turn depends upon a tragic dilemma of the ego that is occupied in finding its sex. It was possible to make brief references only to the way in which the girl interjects her "sexual dilemma", or rather, the misguided efforts that this gives rise to, into all the emotional contacts that she makes with her environment. In my opinion, it is only because of this ominous and

¹ I described this mechanism of "narcissistic insurance" in my article, *An Anxious Mother*, Int. J. Ps-A. IX, 1928.

excessive burden that the early infantile relationship with the parents—with the material for conflict that it includes, material long recognized as inevitable and ubiquitous—attains its outstanding pathogenetic rôle in the etiology of the neuroses. The same legacy is transferred to the relationships with persons that are entered into later in life by women, in which they follow infantile patterns. Whether boys too encounter a kind of “sexual dilemma of the ego”, or in what way the danger from the masochistic genital instinct appears in them, which then would determine the pathogenicity of the œdipus conflicts and hence their health or neurosis, is a question that I shall take up in another essay.¹ It cannot be assumed that the part, recognized here, that genital masochism and fear play in the neurosis of women, is limited to the female sex. For the present, we may say that we now have a better comprehension of how a neurosis is formed in women.

A contrast of normality and neurosis will aid us to recapitulate our results. The functionally efficient genital organization of an adult person is composed of two elements:—first, of the given somatic apparatus, which by a particular instinctual stress indicates its existence to the ego and commends itself for use; and second, of the ego’s readiness and capacity to make use of the opportunity for pleasure thus proffered. The ego’s “genital willingness” is not inborn in the same sense as the somatic apparatus. Like many other biologically required orientations, this must be acquired during the long period of the ego’s infantile development. Some external influences are conducive to the ego’s realization of this goal, while many others—restrictions imposed by civilization—are adverse to it. A further difficulty is determined by the plan of biological development itself. At first the contributions of pleasure received from the activities of organs other than the genital make up the bulk of the organism’s pleasure-receipts; it is only at a more advanced stage in the evolution of the pleasure function that genital activity

¹ Already adumbrated in my essay, *The Psychoanalysis of Pharmacothymia*. PSA. QUARTERLY II, 1933.

becomes by far the richest source of pleasure. The process of construction of the pleasure organization may be disturbed for external or internal reasons; disturbances of this kind do not, to be sure, diminish the vigor of the genital instinct, but nevertheless surely distort its psychic expression, obscure the indications for pleasure, and divert the ego's search for pleasure to other organ activities. In the neurotic woman, infantile sexual development has failed in its purpose of providing the ego with a functionally efficient genital organization. The precocious appearance of the genital instinct, the immaturity of the ego, which is still in the process of developing, and an experience—under these circumstances a shattering experience—result in the deformation of her genital instinct into genital masochism. The ego in alarm at these instinctual demands tries to find refuge in phallic complementation, and attempts to introduce better adapted genital aims, in accord with its possession of the fictive organ. The “female orientation”, degraded to genital masochism, had to be repressed, since it was incompatible with the ego; the “male orientation” founded on the illusory penis collapses because it is incompatible with the genital organ. The impulses brought into the psyche from its organic source by the genital instinct, now are drained into masochism and increase its pressure on the ego. The two-fold erotogenic division of the female genital organ enables the ego to intercept some of the organic force of the instinct to utilize in its phallic orientation and to discharge it in affranchised clitoris pleasure; but this rarely redresses matters. The stronger instinctual energy is firmly attached to the suppressed genital masochism, of which the ego must constantly dread an outbreak; the ego, harassed, cleaves to its fictive possession of a penis and thus provides its fear with the psychic characteristics of a fear of castration. The force of the genital instinct, periodically renewed by its organic sources, and, on the other hand, the social pressure of her environment then coerce the woman into fighting for or against impulses, which so to say waylay her from ambush, without any clue as to what determines them. These strug-

gles, including the oft-repeated attempt to arrive at the sexuality organically prescribed for women, form the nucleus of the woman's neurosis. And the often so remote pathological productions, which apparently are not at all connected with genitality, are only metastases from this one lesion.¹ To put it differently: the basic phenomenon of a neurosis is the deformation of the ego-inherent genital impulse into ego-adverse genital masochism; its essential principle lies in the ineluctable encounter of the ego with the danger of suffering (or death) created by life-destructive masochism; its richness in symptoms is due to the multiplicity of the (ortho- and hetero-topic) effects of genital masochism and the multiplicity of the corresponding defensive (adaptive) measures of the ego. As long as the ego, by persisting in its repressions, is deprived of the true guiding points of inner orientation and steers with an untrue compass, its efforts are necessarily unavailing. What does succeed in the neurosis is after all only masochistically travestied womanliness, or its counterpart, the ego's biologically wrong solution, arising from perplexity: the illusory penis.

¹ The central significance of the genital disorder in the origin of the neurosis is emphasized by Wilhelm Reich.

Motherhood and Sexuality

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MOTHERHOOD AND SEXUALITY*

BY HELENE DEUTSCH (VIENNA)

Sexual inhibition, in men and women alike, to the best of our knowledge takes its origin in the castration complex and the œdipus complex. As we use the term here, "sexual inhibition" designates a state of blocking in the obtainment of sexual gratification: a partial or complete inability to love, unaccompanied however by neurotic symptoms. The inhibition has many forms and degrees of intensity. It may present itself as a total inability to gratify the sexual impulse, an inability even to feel any conscious sexual urgency or longing; or the inhibition may be less severe, so that there may be response and gratification, but this only under certain restrictive conditions, as for example in many men who require an inferiority of some sort in the object of their sexual wishes.

To discuss the various forms of sexual frigidity in women would take us beyond the limits set for this report. In general it may be said that the unconscious determinants of frigidity correspond to those of impotence in men. Frigidity, like impotence, also originates in the development of the castration complex and the œdipus complex. Its most frequent cause is a protest against the assumption of the passive feminine rôle—in other words, the masculinity complex.

I am inclined to ascribe the widespread distribution of frigidity to the masochistic elements in the female libido. Fear of masochistic gratification, and the possibility of obtaining sublimated gratification from motherhood, often deflect female sexuality from normal forms of gratification.¹ Granting this assumption, motherhood would have to be regarded as antagonistic to sexual gratification, a view which ill agrees with

* Authorized translation by Edith B. Jackson.

From a course of lectures on "The Psychic Development of Women", delivered at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Institute, Summer 1932.

¹ Deutsch, Helene: *The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women*. Int. J. Ps-A. XI, 1930.

other conclusions based on other authentic observations. Nevertheless, from the analyses of neurotic women and girls we have learned of the intimate association between the neurotic repudiation of the female erotic response and impaired capacity for maternity. It is, indeed, a matter of frequent observation that sterility and frigidity have the same roots, and we have often had the satisfactory experience of observing, as the result of analysis, the appearance of a ready consent to conception and a restoration of the previously impaired sexual response. Curiously enough, the latter often develops subsequently to the former.

However, there is not always so intimate an association between motherhood and a positive sexual response. There are various possible grades of detachment of the one from the other, which may lead to conditions in the love-life that can be described as neurotic. This is a parallel to the already mentioned split in the love-life of men who disregard chaste and pure women as sexual objects and are sexually aroused only by notorious low-class women. Freud described this type of reaction and its variations, and showed how it is determined by the œdipus complex. Of the antithetical pair, "mother" and "prostitute", the mother is rejected as tabu, and only the prostitute is accepted. Analysis reveals that this separation maintained in the conscious mind is abrogated in the deeper layers of the unconscious. For there was a time—marked by the boy's discovery of sexual secrets—when the mother herself was depreciated and accused of unfaithfulness.

This split in the love-life of men has its parallel in the love-life of women, but with this difference: the woman's own ego takes the place of the man's object. The woman is herself "mother" or "prostitute", and the whole inner conflict represents the struggle between the two tendencies, which appear to be contrary, but which, ultimately, in this case too converge in the single idea of the unworthy mother.

The formulation of this unconscious thought runs somewhat as follows: Since I have discovered my mother's rôle as a sexual object, I can only think of her as a base and besmirched crea-

ture. If I am like my mother—that is, if I identify myself with her—I am as base and soiled as she. I am quite as much a prostitute.

From the compulsion to identify herself with the mother as well as to diverge from her by acquiring the opposite tendency (i.e., the desire to be different from the mother) there result numerous possibilities in the psychical structure.

Let us start with the pre-œdipal relationship and its significance for the girl's later life. Following Freud's account, we may speak of an identification with the *active* mother, which as yet had no relation to the œdipus complex. In this identification the child tries itself out in the rôle of mother, and displaces its own childish rôle on to another object, perhaps a younger child in the family, or a doll, or an adult who is willing to assume the rôle in play. In such play the child makes others suffer or enjoy what she has suffered or enjoyed at the hands of her mother; or she betrays her unfulfilled wishes by imputing to the fantasied child things that were refused her by her mother. If the libido remains attached to the original active and passive rôles of the mother-child relationship, this play will be continued into later life under the guise of homosexuality. In the analyses of homosexual women, the pre-œdipal libidinal components appear repeatedly; nevertheless, one discovers as a rule (this is true at least for my cases), that the women showing such an obdurate mother-attachment had developed a regular, perhaps even an unusually strong œdipus complex in childhood. Indeed, it is usually the difficulties arising out of the œdipus complex that force the little girl to retreat to the pre-œdipal mother relationship.

This is not the place for a further discussion of female homosexuality.¹ We merely wish to draw attention to the fact that it is one way for the pre-œdipal mother relationship to secure its continued existence. Even in this relationship, as mentioned above, it is possible to discover the father's rôle in the libidinal economy, but in the last analysis the situation is inde-

¹ Deutsch, Helene: *On Female Homosexuality*. This QUARTERLY I, 1932.

pendent of the man; and in libidinal relationships only the rôles of mother and child are taken into account, without reference to men. There are various causes and various results of such a repudiation of men.

Numerous possible ways of identifying with the mother are to be found. In analytic work we are most apt to encounter the identification that leads to the normal feminine attitude. The little girl wants to be loved by the father just as her mother is, and like the mother, she wants to have a child by the father (passive identification). This wish can be realized in later life, provided she succeeds in exchanging her infantile object, her father, for another man. Otherwise, she runs into neurotic disturbances, among which we must reckon, along with others, difficulties of conception, of pregnancy and of labor. Instead of a *successful* identification with her mother, the little girl develops a spiteful rivalry, which may result in a grave sense of guilt. Weighed down by this, she renounces the maternal rôle once and for all, and replaces it with symptoms which betray the wish and the reason for its non-fulfilment. In still another possible development, the mother identification is maintained, the idea of having a child is acceptable, and only the part of the man as a sexual partner is denied. The girl wants to be a mother and to have a child, but quite by herself, by immaculate conception or parthenogenesis. I have described this type of wish fantasy elsewhere,¹ but at that time I understood only one of its components, the one due to the masculinity complex. Its formula is: "I have a child all my own. I am its mother and father. I neither need nor desire any man for the conception of my child." As I tried to show, this fantasy contains the fulfilment of various wishes, and betrays the influence of the œdipus complex in many ways; among others, it serves to relieve the sense of guilt by denying the father's share in the child's origin. But the *most important* component is expressed in the formula: "What a man can do, I can", which directly replaces

¹ Deutsch, H.: *Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*, 33 ff. Int. Psa. Verlag, Wien, 1925.

the missing penis by another enlargement of the body-ego, namely, by the self-conceived child.

But what I originally neglected when dealing with this fantasy, I now want to make good, for it belongs to the theme of mother-child relationship. From this point of view, the fantasy is another variety of the mother-child relationship that is expressed in homosexuality. It excludes the troublesome man, and in identification, the active rôle as originally played with dolls is carried on in relation to the self-created fantasy child. Moreover, the original high evaluation of the mother is thereby revived. The fantasy serves as the mother's expiation. It is a counterpart of the prostitution fantasy and a variant of the part of the family romance which might be stated: "I am not my mother's child, for my mother doesn't do such things." Neither does the mother "do such things" in the parthenogenetic fantasy; she has not only borne the child herself, but conceived it by herself—whereas, according to the family romance, the mother has borne no children at all. The parthenogenetic fantasy is an expression of the longing both in boys and girls, which has given rise to the myth of immaculate conception. For the woman it is a matter of identification with the immaculate mother, whose maternity is perpetuated in her ego, with a denial of sexuality, just as she has denied sexuality to her own mother. This, then, is another way for the woman to assent to motherhood while denying sexuality. She may succeed in doing this in a variety of ways.

The first way is indicated by the pre-œdipal mother-child relationship; the maternal libido, which is firmly lodged in a mother-identification, reaches out to an individual of the same sex, and the man's rôle in the libidinal economy is reduced to zero.

The second possible way depends on the marked masochistic tendencies, so dominant in the female libido. They may attain such great satisfaction from motherhood—from the rôle of a *mater dolorosa*—that, due to this gratification, direct sexual satisfaction becomes insignificant.¹

¹ See Deutsch, Helene: *The Significance of Masochism*, etc.

The third form of asexual motherhood is the parthenogenetic, in its various versions. Paradoxical as it may seem, this structure, too, is closely related to masochism—paradoxical, because the masculinity complex is admittedly very important in its determination. I have observed, however, that when the child conceives her mother's sexual experience as something very masochistic, she also develops a strong tendency to deny this experience. It is usually the child's marked sadistic components that account for such a conception of coitus. The mother, according to this conception, endures great suffering, and her inferior position is regarded as an extreme degradation. Now there are two possibilities: either the identification with the mother will be rejected, or the mother's rôle as sexual object will be denied (by the above-described mechanism), and the child will identify herself with the asexual mother. If the little girl's passive-feminine wish has a marked masochistic stamp, sexuality will be rejected in apprehension of the fulfilment of her dangerous masochistic wish, but the wish for the asexual parthenogenetically produced child will be retained.

We encounter this split between motherhood and sexuality quite as often in the neuroses as in the life patterns. We find it in the phenomenon discussed at the beginning of this article, where both trends are present in one and the same individual, but existing quite separately with no possibility of symbiosis. Either of these components may completely dominate the conscious life, while the other remains hidden in the unconscious until brought to consciousness by analysis. The genius of a great artist was able to perceive with an intuitive flash what the painstaking effort of analysis has disclosed. In his book *Two Women*, Balzac gives a masterful description of these two opposing tendencies in the female psyche. Two women relate their experiences to each other in letters. They represent contrary types, but each discovers deep within her the hidden longing for something else, for the opposite. The longing is in itself evidence of the fact that the something else is present, even though in a rudimentary form, and repressed.

It would seem, indeed, that in this case, Balzac had made use of a favorite literary mechanism,—the personification of two opposing psychic reactions. The two women represent, in fact, the opposing tendencies of *one woman*. Opposing tendencies are characteristic of the feminine mind and belong, as a matter of fact, to the normal psyche. Only a marked preponderance of the one or the other leads to complications and neurotic difficulties.

The Baroness Louise de Macumère is the courtesan type, the devotee of love, whose only aim in life is the pursuit of passion, the enjoyment of intense erotic experiences. Her friend, Renée de l'Estorade, on the other hand, is completely given over to her motherhood, even in her relations with her husband. Louise writes: "We are both of us women, I a most blissful love goddess, you the happiest of mothers" . . . "Nothing can be compared to the delights of love" . . . "You, my dear friend, must describe for me the joys of motherhood, so that I may partake of motherhood through you."

And yet, even in the midst of her ecstasy in love relationships, a voice within cries out: "A childless woman is a monstrosity; we are born to be mothers." . . . "I, too, want to be able to sacrifice myself, and I am often absorbed these days in gloomy thoughts—will there never be a little one to call me mother?"

However, this flicker of motherhood is extinguished in the flame of passionate love, and Louise is consumed in this fire without ever having fulfilled her womanhood—in the sense of becoming a mother.

The motherly Madame de l'Estorade writes on the other hand: "My one real happiness (and how precious that was!) lay in my certainty that I had given renewed life to this poor man, even before I had borne him a child!" (i.e., motherhood even in her love relations with her husband).

Desire for children and motherhood completely filled this woman's emotional life. In her repudiation of sexuality she admitted no other feeling beyond motherhood. And yet she writes to her erotic friend: "I had to renounce the pleasures

of love and passionate joys for which I long and can only experience through you, the nocturnal meeting on the starlit balcony, the passionate yearning and unbridled effusions of love."

Thus the longing for the enjoyments of love lurks within the virtuous Renée just as the longing for motherhood lurks within the erotic Louise. She even betrays to us that a vigorous protest and hate against the unborn and newborn child can arise in spite of her self-sacrificing motherhood; a hate whose origin lies in the renunciation of erotic satisfaction, in a curtailment of the ego's expectation of erotic fulfilment. The maternal Madame de l'Estorade holds her child on her lap and writes her frivolous friend: "Marriage has brought me motherhood, and so I am happy, too." . . . But a little later: "Everyone talks about the joy of being a mother! I alone can not feel it; I am almost ashamed to confess to you my total lack of feeling." . . . "I should like to know at just what point this joy of motherhood puts in its appearance. Good-bye, my happy friend, through whom I relive and enjoy those rapturous delights of love, jealousy at a wayward glance, the secret whisper in the ear." . . .

In a word, one is the mother longing for passion, the other the devotee of love who longs for motherhood. No clinical example could describe the phenomenon of cleavage between motherhood and erotism in a more lucid or gripping way than Balzac's portrayal of these two opposite and complementary types. I do not know the sources of Madame de l'Estorade's unbending motherhood—whether it springs from identification with the pre-œdipal mother, or with the later mother whose sexuality she attempts to deny. But I can speak more definitely about my own patients. They were more radical in repressing sexuality and in splitting off their maternal feelings. Madame de l'Estorade, even though clearly sexually anæsthetic, has nevertheless borne a family and has satisfied her maternal feelings on her real and living children. The women under discussion are incapable even of this solution. They transfer their maternal feelings to objects other

than their own children—to other women's children or to adults to whom they extend their maternal protection. Many choose a profession or work which offers an outlet for their maternal feelings.

One of my patients was a German midwife. She had chosen this work (which was very unusual for one of her social class) in order to keep on having children—many, many children—and the weaker they were and the more in need of protection, the more she liked them. Her own fear of childbirth played an important rôle for her; she had to leave the situation of danger to the other woman before she could identify herself with the mother in possession of a child. She was a highly qualified and well trained midwife, and capable of unlimited self-sacrifice in her work. She came into analysis because of certain strange difficulties in the line of duty. "A patient is in labor" was a battle-cry for her, to which she responded like the Germans of old with great fervor (at least inwardly). The agonies of childbirth as seen in other women aroused a curious mixture of feelings of anxiety and pleasure in her. The moment of the child's birth, when she could take it over and give it its first attention, was an ecstatic experience for her. No work was too hard for her; she could stand sleepless nights without fatigue. What she couldn't endure was the knowledge that a labor was going on when she could not be present; it was intolerable to her to have to miss a delivery. Since it was physically impossible for her to be on hand at every birth in a maternity hospital, she developed a state of excitement and exhaustion which brought her to analysis.

The symptoms in themselves are explanatory. Her profession was intended to free her from an oppressive sense of guilt in relation to her mother: out of her original fantasies of killing her mother and the newborn child arose her urge to rescue lives. Death and birth are closely associated in her childhood fantasies. As a child she certainly heard about pain and danger at the times of her mother's numerous deliveries. This was responsible also for her extremely masochistic conception of the female rôle in the sexual act. Her own masochistic wishes had manifested themselves during puberty in very

sanguinary fantasies of violation. So great a danger for her ego lay in the fulfilment of these fantasies that she completely renounced her sexuality, and she could give expression to her maternal feelings only in the manner described. In her choice of work, then, she was serving two masters: her sense of guilt, and her masochism; she satisfied the latter by means of identification. I have in my possession a photograph of her with eight newborn babies in her arms—an ideal representation of motherhood.

In analysis I have come to know many professional women who were able to satisfy very warm and intense maternal feelings in their work, but who were prevented from having children of their own by a repudiation of their mothers' sexuality together with their own.

I should like to cite one of my own cases as an example of motherhood gone astray. Balzac's Louise as a patient would probably have resembled my case, a woman who sought treatment for nymphomania. From her fifteenth year on, she had given herself to any youth on hand; she was always unhappy and unsatisfied, but curiously enough, despite her puritanical upbringing, quite impenitent. Only extracts from her history can be cited here. The patient was twice forced into a respectable, middle-class marriage by friends who wanted to save her from a prostitute's life. Both marriages were, of course, unsuccessful. She had never had children. She was incapable of conceiving, and did not want children. The words "motherhood" and "motherliness" aroused her abhorrence and disgust, and this spread to all words ending in "hood" or "liness". An absolutely unmotherly woman, one would say. And yet—to betray at the outset the key to her long analysis—in her instinctual life she was nothing else but mother. All the youths to whom she gave herself represented her three younger brothers: she was always wanting to give her brothers something; she used to try taking them into her arms when they were little in the hope of attaining a genital union with them; in this she identified herself with her mother, from whom, at the same time, she took away the children.

In this case one can put the responsibility for the whole

neurotic picture on the developmental processes of the pre-œdipal phase and an overstrong primary mother attachment. She was the only child for six long years—an extremely petted and pampered girl. Then she had to live through three of her mother's pregnancies in quick succession, and the withdrawal of her mother's love in favor of the newborn children. At these times she was always told the fiction of the child growing under the heart, and she was filled with bitter disappointment. The relationship between the little boys and her mother had in her mind a libidinal-sexual character; the mother-child unity (the child in the womb or at the breast) in which she in her childhood jealousy had wanted to play both rôles, should accordingly be genitally satisfied in later life. She remained frigid because her fantasies excluded sexuality, and her feelings of guilt were kept in apparent abeyance, because by virtue of her maternal devotion she could deny her hostility toward the youngsters and thereby relieve her sense of guilt.

This case points to various psychic situations in which motherhood either completely denies sexuality, or uses it for its own ends (as in this case) to the detriment of sexual satisfaction; or sexuality may be accepted, but only under conditions which set aside and repudiate motherhood, as mentioned at the beginning of this paper; or, contrariwise, these very conditions must serve to satisfy the demands of motherhood. This may be expressed in the object choice—for example, in the acceptance exclusively of boyish, helpless men as love-objects.

As an illustration I may cite another case from literature which made a great impression on me. It is taken from the book, *Aunt Tula*, by the well-known Spanish author, Miguel de Unamuno. Aunt Tula is obsessed with motherhood. Her whole relation to the world is maternal—and nothing but maternal. She regards anything that approaches sensuality or the erotic as despicable or ugly; but to the act of reproduction in another woman she gives the kind of attentive care that a farmer bestows on his crops, or a gardener on his flowers. Yet, it is only the product, the fruit that ripened under her watchful care, which she appropriates as her own, and to which

she devotes herself in complete absorption. In this way she gains mental possession of a life which someone else has brought forth in pain. Aunt Tula is the psychological twin sister of our German midwife—only she is still more ruthless in the asexuality of her motherhood. She retains a lifelong hold on the children some other woman has borne for her, and—again more thoroughly consistent than the widwife—she cruelly lets the woman die after she has exhausted her function of childbearing. She even makes a child of the man: she kills his erotic attachment to her, and with iron determination steers him to another woman.

The author has described the complete severance of motherhood from eroticism with fine poetical skill and power. One might very well ask how it is possible for a man to obtain such insight into the innermost depths of a woman's psyche.

Aunt Tula lets her sister marry the man whom she herself loves and by whom she is beloved. She arranges the marriage, urges them to have a child, and then takes complete charge of it. She drives her weak sister on from one childbirth to another until the sister dies from exhaustion and leaves the children to the care of Aunt Tula, their spiritual mother. Aunt Tula lives in her brother-in-law's house as the mother of his children and directs his sexual passion on to the servant, the "debased sexual object", who, in turn, is let slowly die after she has repeatedly borne children for Aunt Tula. Aunt Tula lays stress on her rôle as spiritual mother, and never lets the children imagine for a moment that she—the spiritual mother—conceived them in her body and gave them birth. The consciousness of the corporeal mother must always be present in the home, lest the pure, true motherhood of Aunt Tula be stained with a suspicion of physical participation. Occasionally the repressed longing breaks through, and Aunt Tula leaves the village, where she lives with her widowed brother-in-law, for the noisy city. "There is no real purity in the country. Purity develops only where people herd together in a dirty jumble of houses, where they can isolate themselves better. The city is a cloister of lonely people. But in the country the land brings everybody together, the earth on which

nearly everyone lies down to sleep. And as for the animals—they are the ancient serpents of paradise. Back to the city!” But of the man who desires her she says, “He is still very childish in many ways. How may she bring him to be one of her children?”


Once again the unspiritual longing breaks the bonds of her spiritual motherhood. “She took her little nephew who was whining with hunger and shut herself in a room with him. Then she drew out one of her shriveled, virginal breasts—it was flushed and trembling as in a fever, shaken as it was by the heavy pounding of her heart—and she pushed the nipple into the baby’s soft pink mouth, but his whining only grew the worse as his pale lips sucked on the tremulous desiccated nipple.”

Aunt Tula’s refusal to admit that she ever had a father who was co-responsible for her conception is masterfully drawn, and it agrees closely with our analytic knowledge. In her mind the really great and beloved father is Don Primitivo, her mother’s brother and foster-father. It is clearly brought out how Aunt Tula in her fantasy life had wanted to keep her mother’s purity intact, just as she preserves her own, and that her relationship to the children is a repetition of her reaction in her relationship to her own mother. It is easy, therefore, for us to understand the following comments which Aunt Tula makes to her sister about Don Primitivo. “Always still and quiet with hardly a spoken word for us, he consecrated our life to the cult of the Holy Virgin, the Mother of God, and at the same time to the cult of our own mother and grandmother, his sister and mother respectively. He gave us a mother with a rosary, and you he taught how to be a mother.” The fantasy of the mother’s immaculate conception, of motherhood without a father, can be clearly recognized here,—as a matter of fact the book describes Aunt Tula’s memories of her childhood games with dolls which already contained the essence of the subsequent developments in this direction. One could continue thus to quote the entire book, which is to be warmly recommended to psychoanalytic readers.

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PROBLEMS OF FEMININITY*

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1.

Implicit in Freud's doctrine of bisexuality is the warning against too schematic an apposition of femininity in woman and masculinity in man. It is well recognized that no man exists whose masculine traits are not accompanied by more or less obviously feminine characteristics, and that likewise there are no women who fail to show masculine tendencies. Physical examination of the male reveals female residuals, while the female body shows vestigial male characteristics. Psychological investigation demonstrates bisexual elements even more strikingly; these are not only present, but are of important functional significance. Analytical experience reveals many feminine characteristics that man must confront in the course of his psychic development, and many masculine traits complicating the development of femininity. This psychic struggle takes place in the development of every man and woman, whereas the presence of physical rudiments of the opposite sex has little recognizable effect except in those rare cases of hermaphroditism where the reproductive function is impaired.

Demonstration of the processes and forces which affect the differentiation of the sexes in their embryonic development belongs admittedly to the field of biology. Freud pointed out many years ago that the discovery of the organic basis of psychic forces is also one of the tasks of biology. At present Bernfeld and Feitelberg are attempting experiments from which they hope to be able to deduce a physico-biological concept of psychic energy. For the present, however, psychology must satisfy itself with hypotheses concerning the

* Authorized translation from the German manuscript by Irmarita K. Putnam.

correspondences and differences in the physical and psychic development. Nevertheless, we should guard against overlooking those psychological differences in men and women which are caused by a different physical set-up (*Anlage*), and against underestimating the possibility of common development of both sexes during a given period.

Although the child is provided at birth with masculine or feminine genitalia, it is only after the passage of years that the ultimate physical development is attained. The final psychic forms of masculinity and femininity are achieved even later, after the completion of physical maturity. We know, however, that the instinctual life has had a flourishing development much earlier and that the patterns attained then serve as models for the reactions at puberty. Infantile sexuality shows all the psychic characteristics to be found in the later love life. The child falls in love, desires an exclusive possession of the love object, defends this object with the same jealousy, hate and revenge manifestations found among adults. The child has fantasies, sexual wishes and aims similar to those of adults. Infantile sexuality is, however, doomed from the beginning to frustration, as the genital apparatus cannot yet perform its ultimate functions. The incestuous love objects, as well as masturbation, the form of physical discharge of sexual tension which is appropriate to the infantile period, must be abandoned. All these characteristics appear in children of both sexes. Even the first love object, the nurturing mother, is the same for both. This correspondence persists until that period of infantile sexuality when the œdipus complex is in the process of formation. At this time a difference manifests itself, not only in respect to the drive itself, but in respect to the object choice as well. If a normal development ensues at this time, a satisfactory pattern is laid for the love life of maturity in respect to bodily function and object choice. The youth is then capable of securing a wife whom he can love and fertilize in a completely masculine manner; the girl becomes capable of motherhood and yields herself in a feminine manner to the man from whom she can receive a child.

2.

Before entering upon a discussion of this development it seems imperative to attempt a more exact description of the concepts "masculinity" and "femininity". The words "masculine" and "feminine" are not scientifically precise concepts, but borrowed from colloquial speech. When Freud speaks of masculine, it seems clear that he does not wish to designate a quality or a characteristic of behavior which belongs exclusively to men. In Freud's later works masculinity is more and more definitely made analogous to activity, while femininity and passivity appear to be identical. If one accepts this designation one must of necessity consider what one is to understand by activity and passivity. The concepts active and passive are borrowed from the sexual behavior of men and animals. One calls that individual active who approaches his sexual object and conquers it. The partner who submits to the approach and yields, is passive. The first procedure is generally attributed to man, while woman usually plays the latter rôle. This general rule may have caused the apposition masculine=active, feminine=passive, as found in current speech. Since, however, Freud's doctrine recognizes that men and women each have active and passive instinctual drives, it becomes immediately obvious that, in the analytic sense, the concepts masculinity and femininity have no exclusive reference to either one or the other sex. Correspondingly, one may not impute to either of the concepts an appreciative or depreciative evaluation. The terms merely describe forms of expression, or directions of the libido. In his article *Concerning the Sexuality of Woman*¹ Freud speaks of libido strivings with active and passive goals.

Active and passive behavior occur outside the love life. In the above mentioned article (page 202) Freud says, "In every field of mental activity, and not in the realm of sex alone, it is easy to observe that a passively received impression provokes an active response in the child".

¹ This QUARTERLY I, 1932.

Originally, in the newborn, all libido is lodged in the individual; this is the condition known as primary narcissism.¹ If, now, an individual loves an object actively, he cathects that object with libido. This cathexis occurs at the expense of the narcissistic reservoir of energy, an impoverishment of this source ensues, and this condition can only be endured by the individual when a sufficiently well supplied reservoir is available, or when there is compensation for this loss in a reciprocal cathexis. Out of necessity, or desire, or both, man strives to keep his reservoir of narcissistic libido at a certain niveau, and under certain conditions he will seek to accomplish this result by utilizing libido strivings with a passive goal. The demand to be loved, calculated to increase narcissism, creates at the same time a particularly strong dependence upon the object. An intense anxiety occurs at the prospect of a possible loss of love, since every disappointment constitutes a narcissistic insult.

He who has achieved a real love object, if disappointed or disillusioned suffers an object loss, not a narcissistic blow. If development has been normal, the individual knows how to help himself by withdrawing his libido into his ego (as already mentioned above) preparatory to making another love attempt with another object. This mechanism permits him to recover his narcissism intact and makes him less dependent upon his former love object than in the case of the individual whose love has been passive.² In summary, an adequate reserve of narcissism enables the individual to accomplish object love, whereas an insufficient supply of self-love or narcissistic injury incapacitates the person for cathecting an object. If narcissism is sufficiently depleted, the individual attempts to restore it by permitting himself to be loved. Activity, then, in contrast to passivity, denotes object cathexis. An individual loves his object with his masculinity, and permits himself to be loved with his femininity. An especially impressive instance of the apposition of actively and passively directed libido strivings

¹ Freud: *On Narcissism: An Introduction*. Coll. Papers IV.

² Freud: *Libidinal Types*. This *QUARTERLY* I, 1932.

came to my attention during the analysis of a strongly impulsive young man. At first sight it was completely impossible to understand how this exceptionally virile, masculine looking young man had been severely paralyzed in his love life and his work, and how it was possible for him to have attained such marked feminine behavior. During a lengthy analysis it was discovered that as a small boy, feeling himself unloved by his parents, he had reacted to each disappointment in love with intense rage and spitefulness. The governess, whom he soon attempted to love in place of his mother, punished him for these attacks with physical blows, which he regarded as monstrously degrading. This new insult, causing a renewed withdrawal of love, increased his need to be loved and caused him to become a "good little boy" for the sake of inducing love. Complete abandonment of his activity did not, however, take place with the assumption of this attitude, but only later in response to violent reactions to castration threats from his governess and father with reference to his masturbatory activities. These threats were vivified during sexual play instigated by an older brother, who recounted the most creepy tales of castration, until finally the patient was convinced that he would lose his penis in any case and consequently that he might as well forfeit it. A surrender of the active rôle in his love life accompanied the renunciation of the penis. This sacrifice created an acute need for love, which the boy sought to obtain by becoming completely good and obedient. At the same time his aggression was turned inward and procured for him masochistic pleasure, shown in many diversified fantasies, as well as in his inhibited, shy and incapacitated behavior in his studies. Summarizing, (1) disappointment in love and narcissistic insults diminished the patient's ability to play the active rôle in his love life, and established preference for passively directed libido strivings; (2) actual paralysis of activity occurred only when the boy, under pressure of extremely vivid castration threats, saw the necessity of renouncing his penis; (3) the increase in passivity was accompanied by a turning inward of his aggressiveness which continued fixated in later life (masochism).

From this extreme case we may turn to the state of affairs in normal development. Every child suffers frustration in love and narcissistic insults, and every child becomes aware of sex differences. Anxiety concerning the genital is, therefore, never completely lacking. It is inevitable, too, that a certain portion of the aggressive tendency should be turned inward. Nevertheless, the vigorous little boy, who undergoes what is called a normal development, manages to surmount these difficulties. He becomes a man, capable of playing the active rôle in love life, having such a large store of libido that he is in a position to cathect his actual love object. From this store of narcissistic libido in the ego surge the forces peculiar to man, making it possible for him to fulfil his potentialities of marriage and reproduction. His aggressive tendencies find outlet partly in the sadism necessary for approaching the love object and partly in the sublimated form necessary to the rest of his life work, his profession, social interests and relationships. The passive striving which the small boy does not lack is subordinated to the active tendency. Only in pathological cases is this subordination not achieved, by virtue of the fact that the narcissistic insults produce an excessive effect, notably where there is immoderate castration anxiety.

The situation is different in the case of the woman. Achievement of adequate femininity requires a preference for passivity. The aggressive tendency finds its outlet in that form of sadism which is directed inward; some of the most important processes in the sexual life of women, defloration and giving birth are quite normally accompanied by the pleasure of pain,¹ and the passive, "feminine" woman exhibits inverted aggressive tendencies in other spheres of life as well. Karen Horney assumes that the aggressive tendency is a priori stronger in the man, that the libido in the case of the woman gives preference to passive goals from the beginning, and that this is a simple biological law which one can never explain psychologically.

¹ Deutsch, Helene: *Der feminine Masochismus und seine Beziehung zur Frigidität*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVI, 1930. English translation in *The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women*. Int. J. Ps-A. XI, 1930.

It is obvious that differences in physical make-up and function must necessarily be accompanied by different psychic expressions. However, one may be too easily satisfied by such an assumption and fail to pursue psychological investigation as far as may be profitable, even where a psychic explanation should ultimately be found indispensable. Moreover, no theory of phylogenetic inheritance relieves us of the necessity of investigating the time and occasion in the life of the individual when the functioning of given tendencies becomes observable.

Beside these theoretical considerations, there is a whole series of empirical observations which require study. Analysis of adults, as well as observations on little girls, demonstrates that the female is not from the beginning a passive, yielding being who permits herself to be loved, but that she reveals active as well as passive tendencies often not to be differentiated from those of the boy, even quantitatively. The little girl, like the boy, courts with actively directed love, as long as the mother is still the love object. It is necessary, then, to explain how it happens that the little girl, in the course of normal development, renounces her activity. The length of the period in which the little girl displays activity varies in each individual. In one little girl an actively directed relation to the mother was predominant until her fifth year. Not until the sixth year did this situation change and the œdipus situation become perceptible. The father relation up to that time had been exactly the same as that to any other member of the family circle. It was often friendly, often distant, according to the little one's disposition. The passionate love attachment, with all the accompanying feelings of demand for exclusiveness, jealousy, envy, hate when disappointed, were retained for the mother, and secondly for a nurse who often took the mother's place. One may assume with confidence that the turning to the father, and the accompanying preference for the passively directed libido drives, occurs in the case of many small girls at an earlier age, about five, four or perhaps even at three.

The duration of the pre-œdipal mother attachment is of the

greatest significance for the later events in the life of the child. In all cases, however, the mother is the first object which the child cathects and this must leave traces in later life. What is the cause of this turning and of this preference for passively directed drives? We repeat that for the achievement of object cathexis (which occurs by means of active tendencies) the individual requires at his disposal a certain amount of free libido, a superabundance of narcissism; and the individual who is subjected to narcissistic wounds attempts to salve them by adopting passive behavior in the hope of inducing love. The little child suffers from disappointments in love and narcissistic blows even more than the adult; and there is a further difference,—the little child is doomed not to succeed with his incestuous love objects. The child—both male and female—also suffers continuously under the stigma of being small, of being regarded by adults as not complete, as inadequate, even as an object of ridicule. Karen Horney describes the anxiety of the boy that his member may be too small or that the mother will laugh at him or ridicule him. The little girl fears that her vagina may be too small for her father's organ and has exactly the same feeling of insufficiency, of inferiority to her mother, and of anxiety lest she be ridiculed and set aside as wanting. Moreover, this experience of not being sufficient for father has an earlier pattern in not having been adequate for mother, the first love object, by whom the child was also frustrated. In my paper, *Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Ödipuskomplexes der Frau*,¹ I expressed the belief that the inevitability of this frustration is recognized as a corollary of the discovery of the anatomical sex differences. Freud confirms this opinion in his paper *Concerning the Sexuality of Woman*,² and shows that the little girl always holds her mother responsible for her lack of a penis, and that this is the most important motive for resentment toward her.

At this point the development of the girl and boy begins to diverge in normal cases, and it is here that the psychological

¹ Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIII, 1927. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. IX.)

² *loc. cit.*

differences in the sexes have a definite beginning. As long as the children of both sexes have the same love object—the mother, the possibility of satisfying passive as well as active libido strivings exists to the same extent (in the oral, anal and phallic phases), and both sexes are subject to the same disappointments in love and the same narcissistic blows. A certain fundamental identity in the development of boy and girl is present even if there should be a difference in the quantitative relationship between activity and passivity in the two cases. Not until the fact of anatomical differences in sex begins to play a rôle in the psyche, does this fundamental difference in development begin to occur. If the little girl discovers that the boy has something which she lacks, that the little boy can accomplish deeds of which she is not capable (exhibitionism, visible masturbation, urination, etc.), if the little girl comes to the conclusion that such an organ is really indispensable to the possession of the mother, she experiences, in addition to the narcissistic insults common to children of both sexes, still another blow, namely, a feeling of inferiority of her genitals. The absence of a penis cannot be regarded as a matter of secondary and trifling significance for the little girl. Careful and complete analyses of women provide daily evidence of the significance of the phenomenon. Any simple observation leaves no ambiguity concerning the girl's wish for a penis, her feeling of neglect not only by grown-ups but also by her brother or playmates, and her difficulty in reconciling herself to this status. A little girl, well informed about all sexual processes, and already aware of the gratification she could derive from the clitoris or the vaginal entrance, who, moreover, knew that she was capable of motherhood which would be denied to the boy, nevertheless insisted with astonishing stubbornness "But I want a little tassel right now". For the girl the possibility of bearing a child in the dim future furnishes cold comfort—she wishes to have what the boy has, and the discovery that the boy's organ is so much bigger, so much more tangible and more obviously capable of performance, regularly arouses a feeling of envy and deprivation.

To be sure, in the analysis of feminine men one frequently finds the wish to bear a child. Karen Horney regards birth envy among men as analogous to the penis envy of the woman. Birth envy is part of an attempt to rival the mother in the passive object relation to the father. In contrast to the little girl, however, who suffers from the deprivation of something possessed at that very moment by her brother, the boy's envy of the sister is an envy of something only obtainable by her in the remote future and therefore an envy of much less intensity. The question, much discussed recently, as to whether the little girl masturbates on the clitoris, or the vulva or the entrance to the vagina, has little to do with the fact of penis envy, however theoretically important it may be. Without a doubt the little girl is capable of masturbatory satisfaction; whether more or less than the boy, one may not decide. But no matter at what source the girl succeeds in obtaining satisfaction, the wish for the penis is actively present and has far reaching consequences for further development. Freud demonstrated¹ that the castration complex in the little girl appears before the œdipus complex, and that the discovery that she lacks a penis leads her to assume a passive love orientation to the father. In my above-mentioned work, I was able to demonstrate an actively directed object love for the mother present in the little girl before the appearance of the castration complex. It is possible now to understand these processes more in detail. The severe narcissistic insults which the little girl feels because of her genital inferiority, and the coincidental appearance of resentment toward her mother, who is made responsible for this inferiority, is the cause of the girl's surrender of active love and assumption of the passive rôle. She must permit herself to be loved in order to augment her injured self-love. She begins gradually to turn her passively directed love wishes from her mother to her father. This complete change of object is accomplished with the aid of increased enmity toward the mother; hatred and rage complete the

¹ Freud: *Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Differences between the Sexes*. Int. J. Ps-A. VIII, 1927.

process of turning away from the first love object. Then, simultaneously with the paralyzing of the little girl's activity, that part of her aggression which may not be turned outward is directed inward and expresses itself in a variety of masochistic fantasies and modes of behavior, which are normal for women. Should, however, the little boy give such preference to passively directed libido, this process would take place only as the result of excessive castration anxiety and his development would not continue normally.

3.

A few theoretical questions present themselves: (1) Why does the individual require such a high degree of narcissistic cathexis? (2) How is one to explain the fact that the individual seeks to restore his injured narcissism by turning aggression toward his own person? (3) What is the relationship of actively and passively directed libido strivings to the more common active and passive reactions outside the sphere of sexuality? (4) What does psychoanalytic theory contribute toward the explanation of the biological fact that male sexual life is accomplished with the help of actively directed libido strivings while woman utilizes libido strivings with a passive goal?

According to Freud's first views, in the very beginning of psychic existence there is an interaction of two different types of impulses—self-preservation and libidinal object love. It was discovered, however, that self-preservation of the ego is accomplished with the aid of a certain amount of libido cathexis, and the dualism between self-preservation and libidinal object love was redefined as one of libidinal drives (ego and object) and other ego drives. We shall not attempt to define these more closely at present. Further observations then revealed the existence of destructive impulses, striving in a direction opposed to the libido, such as are evident in sadism. Biological observations, as well, led Freud to the concepts of life and death impulses which reveal themselves in the biophysiological processes of the organism from the beginning of

life and later also manifest themselves in psychic reactions, becoming perceptible as outwardly directed object libido and aggression.¹

The theory of instincts attempts to indicate the relationship between psychological and biological events. Such an attempt seems necessary, since the source of the impulses functioning in the psyche are somatic. What are the biological functions of the life and death instincts? One goal of an instinctual drive is, according to Freud, the reinstatement of an earlier condition. The death instinct tends to reduce the organic to the inorganic. When it is successful, the unity of the living being is assailed, there is disintegration and death. The life instinct (Eros) works in the opposite direction—its function is to increase the stability of life by aggregating many unities (cells). In this manner, the life instinct also strives for a restitution of a previous condition, inasmuch as the origin of life is conceived as a dispersion of lifeless substances into numerous particles. The conception, however, remains for the present, an unprovable speculation. On the other hand, the aggregating tendency of the life instinct in its efforts to preserve individual life, and thus the life of the species, is unmistakable. The acme of its potency is reached during the fusion of the germinal cells which are laden with incomparable vital energy when a new unity is formed and the problem of race preservation is solved. The death instinct present in the individual cells of the organism must be neutralized by the life instinct in order that the individual life may be maintained. Freud conceives of these processes as being analogous to the physiological processes of anabolism and catabolism.

As long as the individual is at one with his environment, as in the case of the fœtus in utero, the contest between life and death occurs exclusively within the organism. Birth creates a change in the situation. As soon as the child is delivered, new problems are to be met. It is now surrounded by a number of dangers, of which the most threatening is the cessation of the previously continuous source of nourishment.

¹ Freud: *The Ego and the Id and Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

In a curious manner the process of birth, which initiates the independent life of the individual, is therefore a victory of the death instinct in the biological sense; birth causes the disruption of the mother-child unity and threatens the child daily with vital dangers.

It is patent that the life instinct is responsible for overcoming these dangers. The combining tendency of Eros causes the child to seek union with the mother. At first, physical union with the mother's breast is the only objective. The life instinct cathects this indispensable object with its energy and there arises a libidinal object relationship, at first, however, in the service of self-preservation only. But it is necessary for the child to form an object relationship with the mother herself or some imago, as well as with the breast, since the child requires care as well as nourishment. In the case of such animals as are born completely dependent, the mother instinct is found to ensure food until such time as the offspring can provide for itself. In the case of man, mother love has become a form of libido development (fixation) which persists through life.

The cathexis of the mother object with libido occasions changes in the relationship between the life and death instincts. By diverting portions of the death instinct (tendencies to destruction, aggression and overpowering objects) to the outside world,¹ the internal equilibrium of instincts may be restored. In addition, the life instinct forces the death instinct into service during the conquest of the needed object, at which time an extremely intense union with the object is produced. Moreover, the mechanism of turning instinct components outward for the purpose of self-preservation occurs also in the service of Eros. In this process portions of the two kinds of instincts blend and interrelate.

The newly born child has other tasks to perform beside that of defense against the danger of death. On entrance into the world he becomes subject to the greatest variety of stimuli, arising in part internally from his own organism, since, on

¹ Freud: *The Ego and the Id*.

separation from the mother tensions of needs, hunger, etc., arise, and in part from stimuli and impressions which penetrate through the sense organs from the outside world. The death instinct, which seeks reduction of tension, must master these stimuli if possible. (Fechner's Principle of Constancy.)

The organism deals with these stimuli in a way which is actually in opposition to the unifying tendency of Eros and in harmony with the separating tendency of the death instinct. The process of separation may be observed most clearly in the mastery of stimuli from the outside world when this is accomplished by direct motor flight. This method, however, while often useful in later life, is of no value to the helpless infant. He must manage by means of another mechanism. He separates himself from the stimulus of the outside world by organizing a layer of his nervous apparatus in such a way that the stimuli are prevented from penetrating into the rest of it. This layer is rendered impermeable to stimuli, however, only when cathected with energy which has been mobile.¹

How is the mastery of inner tension accomplished? Apparently the organism attempts to meet this situation in a manner similar to that used against external stimuli. Motor flight and stimuli defense are, however, of no avail. A mechanism similar to flight is nevertheless used, since the individual attempts to place himself at a distance from the disturbing inner stimuli by means of repression (or other psychic defense mechanisms). This psychic process also occurs by means of cathexis; consequently by means of binding mobile energy. Cathexis is necessary to prevent penetration of internal stimuli (the claims of instinct) into consciousness as well as to prevent external stimuli from being perceived. Freud, in the *Ego and the Id*, regards the energy utilized in cathexis as desexualized Eros, or energy originating from the life instinct. This explanation sounds plausible at least in regard to the energy used in cathecting the protective defense against stimuli, since the energy used in this manner is unifying and binding, several cells being combined into a single structure

¹ Freud: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.

entrusted with a definite function. If we accept this hypothesis, we discern in the process of mastering stimuli an instance of the death instinct making use of a part of its antagonist, Eros, for its own purposes. Incidentally, this process is doubtless chronologically the earlier one, since the task of mastering stimuli occurs at the moment of entrance into the outside world, while the necessity of establishing a libidinal object relation for the purpose of satisfying hunger and other needs arises later. It seems that the two instincts, usually in conflict with one another, may unite in the battle against their common enemy, the outside world. In the beginning the infant is threatened only with physical dangers from without. It seeks to protect itself on the one hand by separating itself from these stimuli by means of the protective nerve layer, and on the other hand by binding itself to the object which is necessary for its preservation. However, in the course of the first years of life physical dependence on the mother becomes transformed into psychic dependence. The long continued bodily helplessness appears to have necessitated a libidinal object cathexis. The intensity of psychic fixation to the object, as well as its frequent persistence beyond the time when the individual is physically independent, is unmistakable. This dependence upon objects complicates human relationships enormously and may create a great variety of disturbances in the distribution of cathexes.

Psychic development proceeds not only by the addition of new psychic content to object relationships, but also by a modification of the stability principle. Although the tendency to reduce tension remains through the whole life, the individual soon discovers certain tensions which, in themselves, may give him the gratification of organ pleasure. An explanation of this phenomenon presents us with the greatest difficulty, since we have assumed to date that pleasure ensues from the reduction of tension and not as a result of tension. The nature of instinct tensions is an extremely elusive problem, and quantitative instances seem to play a rôle in the production of pleasure and pain, as well as rhythm and the intensity of

excitement within a given time unit. Perhaps, too, the relationship between the two types of instinct as modified by a time element is of decisive significance.

The child's first pleasurable sensations arise through the excitation of erotogenic zones during the processes of taking nourishment and of being cared for by the mother. This naturally increases the intensity of the mother cathexis. The constancy principle becomes modified by the pleasure-pain principle. At this time defense is directed only against pain bringing tensions. Pleasure-bringing stimuli are not only tolerated but sought. The pleasure-pain principle, then, sometimes supersedes the constancy principle in the service of the sexual (life) instincts, necessitating a new and even more complicated interrelation of the two types of instincts. Gradually pleasure and pain sensations extend to pure psychic object relationships. The mere presence of the object or slight contacts, which are not necessarily accompanied by stimulation of the erogenous zones, may produce pleasure. The absence of the mother, withdrawal of love, or any other type of disappointment occasions pain. Thus the object is not only a source of pleasure but also a possible source of pain and disappointment, a part of the inimical outside world against which the child must protect himself. He attempts to master these unpleasant psychic experiences in a manner similar to the one employed in dealing with disturbing bodily stimuli—by flight, by partial if not complete, rejection of the object, or by turning aggression outward in an attempt to destroy the object. Libido withdrawn from the object is applied to the ego in an attempt to render it more resistant to further pain.

Freud in *The Ego and the Id* regards these different processes as the dynamic forces which produce the various organizations in the psyche. The original inner struggle between Eros and the death instinct takes place in the id. The need to distinguish itself from the outside world (vide *The Pleasure Principle*) causes the id to surround itself by a layer which will take over the business of intercourse with the

outside world. This differentiation within the personality makes it possible to describe the above processes topically. The ego is at first a body-ego, concerning itself with perceptions and the mastery of external stimuli. As soon as the ego has achieved a certain independence of the id, it also receives stimuli from within, from the id. The ego is the agent for the object relationships of the id; however, if libido is withdrawn from objects it is utilized to cathect the ego and does not return to the id. This is the type of ego cathexis that constitutes what is known as secondary narcissism. Withdrawal of libido from the object frees the aggression which has been directed outward and which has been subjugated to serve the libido. This freed aggression seeks to destroy the object and gradually comes to serve the feelings of hate and revenge. Naturally the defense mechanisms of flight from the object and destruction of the same appear only incompletely in the case of the small child who is so extremely dependent upon the object and must make every effort to retain it. He becomes, therefore, inevitably, involved in the ambivalence conflict, with both libidinal and aggressive tendencies directed toward one and the same object. We have seen that certain libidinal strivings which have been withdrawn from the object and which cannot be directed outward turn themselves secondarily back again to the individual's own person. This is true also of the aggression freed in the process of withdrawal. It appears then, that the union which both kinds of instincts form in the battle against the outside world is capable of being dissolved. A new battle between the life and death instincts within the ego ensues as a result of redirecting libido and aggression toward the ego, during which process dissociation or defusion of the drives occurs; and this unfortunate contest between secondary narcissism and self-destruction parallels the original battle between the life and death instincts in the id. Since the processes by which both kinds of instincts are directed toward objects and withdrawn again into the ego are repeated innumerable times with varying intensity and always with different emphasis, it is obvious that these events gradually become extremely complicated.

Changes in the cathexis of objects affect the general internal instinct economy and changes in internal equilibrium have a corresponding effect upon object relationships. Indeed, since there is such an interlacing of relationships, and since it is impossible to determine the intensity of excitation and the relationship of association and dissociation, there is at present little prospect of observing the exact manner in which this equilibrium is maintained in any individual case.

It becomes evident, however, from the previous discussion, that the ego requires a definite niveau of libido cathexis, a definite quantity of narcissism, for the purpose of neutralizing self-destructive tendencies. The relationships in the ego are comparable to the biological processes in the id, where sufficient energy of the life instinct must be present in order to neutralize the death instinct present in the cells. The danger of self-mutilation or self-destruction is incurred, if there is an insufficient amount of narcissistic ego cathexis, or an unusual amount of destructive excitation directed toward the ego. In pathological cases where suicide occurs, the influence of the super-ego is easily recognized. The super-ego is a further differentiation of the psyche and, more specifically of the ego, which arises from the necessity of renouncing object relations at the time when the œdipus complex is pressing for solution. The super-ego represents an introjection of the parental imagos into the ego which occurs because the alternative of complete emancipation from the object is still impossible for the dependent child. To repeat, the return of libido to the ego on surrender of an object is accomplished by desexualization of the libido, dissociation of the two kinds of instincts, and direction of aggression inward. If the ego does not succeed in restoring the instinct equilibrium, the super-ego may avail itself of the inwardly directed aggression to threaten the ego, in which case a masochistic relationship to the super-ego results. Further details of super-ego formation will be considered later.

A second question arises: Why is the attempt to restore wounded narcissism accompanied by the turning of aggression against the individual concerned? Raising the level of the

narcissistic niveau is accomplished by withdrawal of the object libido into the ego. The desexualization of this libido causes dissociation (defusion) of the two kinds of instincts whereby destructive tendencies are freed which cannot be directed outward and therefore must be turned inward. The dependence of the child on the object prevents complete emancipation, and therefore the object tie is maintained by means of a preference for passive love orientation, which strengthens the narcissism and enhances mastery of the increased tendency to self-destruction. The child must abandon active object relationships more and more, since these would further impoverish the narcissistic reservoir, a state of affairs which could not be tolerated when a rich supply of narcissism is required for neutralizing the self-destructive tendencies present.

This leads us to the problem of the cathexis of active and passive goals. It was seen that an individual may be driven to withdraw cathexes already actively directed if his internal equilibrium is threatened by disappointment in love or by other severe narcissistic insults; and this withdrawal may also occur if the destructive excitations are prevented from being directed outward by an especially rigid upbringing, so that a turning inward occurs to such an extreme degree that instinct equilibrium is threatened. Dependence upon the object and the necessity of increasing narcissism cause an increase in the passively directed libido strivings. When, as often occurs, withdrawal of love and suppression of aggression occur together, the conversion of activity to passivity is increased. In the case of our patient mentioned above this was obviously what happened.

The problems of active and passive goals are ultimately biological ones. The procedure by which the ego seeks to keep narcissism on a definite level for the purpose of neutralizing self-destructive tendencies is analogous to the biological events in the cells where the life instinct seeks to bind the death instinct. It may be possible to find parallel processes in the establishment of passive goals by the libido. We have already noted that the establishment of passive sexual goals is usually

accompanied by a passive reaction toward the outside world. This consideration leads us to our third question.

It was suggested at the beginning of this paper that the concepts "active" and "passive" might refer in the last analysis to different types of behavior on the part of man and woman in love life. In general, the former wishes to seize his love object and conquer it, while the latter surrenders herself to the object. The reaction to the outside world, outside the sphere of sexuality, is a similar one. The individual may simply permit stimuli and impressions from the outside world to be borne in upon him, in which case he behaves passively, or he may react actively to the outside world in attempting to overpower and master it. It is obvious that inner reactions precede the observed behavior toward the outside world or toward the love object. Naturally the phenomena of activity and passivity do not appear until the individual comes to see himself in relation to an outside world. As long as the child is still one with his environment such a distinction is purposeless. At first, then, the two types of instincts follow exclusively their inner biological tasks. The striving (*Drang*) and the goal (*Ziel*) of the instincts coincide. Only after birth, when the individual may be differentiated from the outside world is it useful to make a distinction between striving and goal. The striving of the instinct always remains the same. The death instinct strives to shatter unity and to decrease tension, while the libido is binding and unifying. In so far as the instinct is something energetic, there is always an element of activity.¹ The instincts seek differently directed goals only after the outside world enters as a factor compelling the individual to send out portions of instinct to meet it and occasioning inner reactive instinct processes.

Observing the reactions of the newborn child, we find that his first relationships to the outside world, from which he receives impressions and stimuli, are unquestionably passive. He reacts to these impressions and stimuli in accordance with the stability principle; he attempts a defense against them. There

¹ Freud: *Instincts and Their Vicissitudes*. Coll. Papers IV.

are two methods of defense. The first is actual physical flight or, where this is impossible, its equivalent, achieved by means of the protective nervous layer. This inner process is accomplished at the behest of the death instinct with the help of energy from the life instinct. This type of reaction to the outside world is a purely passive one. The second procedure consists in mastering the stimuli and converting them to serve the individual's own purposes. This process occurs in the service of the life instinct which is striving for union with the outside world, aided by aggressive energy from the death instinct. This inner process consists in sending out portions of instinct, and corresponds to active behavior in the outside world. Every individual makes use of both mechanisms, and a passively received impression often calls forth active behavior. Nevertheless, the relationship between active and passive reactions varies greatly in the case of each individual. Even in infancy the passive flight mechanism takes precedence in one case, while the active, overpowering mechanism predominates in another case. The explanation of this fact, which one refers to disposition—to idiosyncrasies peculiar to the instinct from the beginning—is not easy. It seems evident, however, that the preference for active behavior is dependent upon the capacity to project instinct, especially the death instinct, and the problem, in the last analysis, consists in the quantitative energetic relations between Eros and the death instinct.

The stimuli which the newly born child does not care to dispose of, since they are pleasurable, are those which rise through the excitation of erotogenic zones. A modification of the stability principle by the pleasure principle takes place under the influence of these experiences. Inasmuch as the pleasure principle requires the maintenance of tension it may be said to serve the death instinct. However, it accommodates itself also to the demands of Eros, since it also tolerates libidinous tensions and even aspires to them. Extraordinarily little is known about the nature of feelings and emotions, but perhaps one may risk the suspicion that pleasure in pain feelings correspond to quantitative tension units or intensities of Eros

energy, just as anxiety feelings may arise from libidinal energy. The first sexual feelings of pleasure which are conveyed to the child from the outside world (the mother) are received by the child purely passively, as are all stimuli at first. The child's reactions are, however, different from those toward unpleasant stimuli. The mechanism of stimuli defense is utilized only in relation to the latter, whereas the pleasant excitations are taken up and the child seeks to bring about their repetition, in which case the ego cathects the object with libido. This mother tie serves now no longer exclusively for the satisfaction of tension needs, such as hunger, which arise from the inner bio-physiological contest between the death instinct and Eros. As a result of this mother tie new sexual tensions arise within the child's ego, which differentiates and conveys them to the id. This type of satisfaction continues to be passive, since sexual tensions are received quite accidentally in relation to the acts of taking nourishment and of being cared for. Even here, however, passive experience releases an active reaction, the object is cathected with libido, Eros conquers it with the help of aggressive tendencies. The first signs of activity then introduce the consideration of goal. These processes appear very clearly in the first object relations of the infant at the mother's breast. The pleasure feelings originating in the act of nursing lead to active sucking and biting. Both types of instinct are to be seen functioning—taking the object to one's self represents intensive union and at the same time annihilation of the object.

For the sake of completeness we must state that pleasurable organ excitations may be aroused also from portions of the individual's own body. At first these are perceived as if they emanated from objects in the outside world. The development of body feelings permits the child to make the distinction between autoerotic satisfactions and those dependent upon the mother; the child becomes aware that the bodily sensations are always present, while the mother often disappears.

The first sexual satisfactions provided by the mother are, then, of a passive nature, but they release an active reaction

which leads to an object cathexis. The first object relation has an active goal. The passive experiences are repeated, however, and since they are pleasurable are desired anew. The once established object relation is utilized for passively experienced satisfactions and thus a passive goal is set up. The libido strives again toward the object, but demands from it passive types of satisfaction (to be loved, as well as to be looked at, to be touched, to be beaten, and the like). In the service of the death instinct the stability principle seeks flight from external stimuli, while Eros, which aspires to a union with the surroundings for self- and later for race-preservation, encourages active reactions to these passive experiences. The sex instincts, originating in Eros, follow this example, preferring actively directed erotic object cathexis, but passive experiences are again aspired to, in so far as they are pleasurable, that is in so far as they are of a sexual nature or are connected with direct or sublimated sexual strivings. From now on, libido strivings with active goals, as well as those with passive goals, often occur together.

What determines the relationship of these strivings to each other? Both seek sexual satisfaction and therefore oppose the tendency of the death instinct. The libido strivings with an active goal, however, confer libido upon objects, while aggressive energy from the death instinct is projected outward in an effort to master the objects. When a passive goal is instituted, libidinal tension arises in the ego, so that Eros and the death instinct oppose each other within the individual. The preference for active object cathexes or for passive goals is a matter dependent upon the relative strength of Eros and the death instinct, above all upon the capacity of Eros to drive destructive excitations outside the body. We have already seen that situations in the outside world may influence the relation between activity and passivity. Of course, there is one relation between the two which is present *ipso facto*, namely the quantitative energetic relations existing between libido and aggression. This is, to be sure, modifiable by external circumstances, but only within limits which vary for each individual.

We may now turn to the question of the preference of the biological sex functions for activity in males and for passivity in females. In the act of reproduction, in which the unifying tendency of Eros is culminated, the greatest increase of sexual excitation is present. In the case of the male, following this increase in tension, there is a release of it in the sex act, when the germinal cells laden with enormous vital energy are emitted. These, however, are introduced into the woman in whom there is a heightening of vital energy after the fusion of a spermatozoön with an ovarian cell. The sex function of the man, subserving Eros and the preservation of the race, consists in bestowing upon an object his own vital energy. For the accomplishment of this, the death instinct is utilized by Eros for its own purposes, and when the task is completed, Eros again abandons the temporarily associated instinct. (In the case of certain lower animals the victory of the death instinct is complete, since the male dies after sexual union.¹) The function assigned to the woman by Eros consists in the reception of vital energy which has been introduced for the purpose of producing a new living being, in the service of race preservation. The psychic processes in love life partly reflect the biological ones, since the man loves actively and the woman permits herself to be loved. The battle between Eros and the death instinct in relation to the sexual function, serving race preservation, is apportioned to two beings. The man applies himself to the outside world playing his rôle in relation to a partner. The woman's rôle is internal and proceeds with regard to the newly arisen life. The process of giving birth has a significance for the woman of separation, loss of vital energy and thereby victory of the death instinct.

It may not be possible to prove at present that biological processes determine the relationship between Eros and the death instinct in the two sexes. Possibly this relationship is determined by obscure physical and chemical processes within the sex organs. These processes might begin to operate during sexual maturity or they may have been functioning more or

¹ Freud: *The Ego and the Id*.

less from the beginning, though on the basis of analytical observations, which permit such easy recognition of the significance of bisexuality for the development of psychic life, we may assume that the determinants of the predominating sex behavior play little if any rôle until maturity.

4.

Subordination of active to passive libido strivings, however, is seldom complete in woman, and it behooves us to consider the fate of these various active strivings. Their metamorphosis is so varied, complicated and interrelated that I must confine myself at present to only a few considerations.

The purely feminine love orientation of the woman to the man leaves no place for activity. Feminine love is passive, a purely narcissistic process; the purely feminine woman does not love, she permits herself to be loved. When a woman does accomplish object love, however, as in her relation to her child, she does so with actively directed libido components.¹ It is well known that many women retain some of this activity in their relations to men also and love the man with real object love, that is with masculinity. Just as the little girl satisfies her activity in her play with dolls, so the woman utilizes a bit of her masculinity in nourishing and caring for her child and later in educating it. It is quite comprehensible that the narcissistic satisfaction which motherhood offers to woman may so increase her self-love that she may have sufficient active strivings for object cathexis. The child satisfies the early infantile desire for a penis which has been transformed into a wish for a child during the œdipus complex. This process is especially perceptible in the study of the psychic life of young girls and childless women who have chosen professions having to do with children (teachers, pedagogues, etc.). The children whom they teach are substitutes for their own children and satisfy at the same time their masculinity wishes. Their work obviously requires activity. Feminine, narcissistic women are usually poor mothers. Children are a burden to them. On

¹ Freud: *On Narcissism: An Introduction*. Coll. Papers IV.

the other hand, there are very maternal women who are so devoted to their children that they are not infrequently disturbed in their feminine sensibilities, have a poor relationship to their husbands and often suffer from frigidity or other difficulties. Normal development would consist of the attainment of a balance between passivity and activity in which a woman who is feminine in her sexual life develops strong maternal feelings for her children. The rôle of the man in the act of reproduction is completed with conception. For the woman, however, this rôle does not cease with the passively experienced impregnation; the woman must nourish the child, first inside her body, later outside, and then guard it, care for it and train it. For this purpose she must establish an object relationship by means of active libido.

This use of the active strivings is, however, only possible in adult life. What does the little girl do, since she can find no place for activity in the œdipus orientation to her father? She renounces her active wishes with great difficulty, tries to deny the absence of a penis and attempts to insist upon her masculinity. After a disappointment from the father she often returns to her old mother tie, in order to control the original activity through homosexual strivings. Often some of her dependence upon her mother remains beside the father relation, in which case a continuous vacillation between the two may be observed. Further analytic research will throw light upon these extremely complicated relationships.

5.

It is necessary to turn our attention now to a process inaugurated at the time when the child has presumably given up the œdipus orientation to the parents, having suppressed libidinal and aggressive strivings and displaced them by aim-inhibited, tender feelings. The original parent relationship disappears, although incompletely, being displaced and incorporated in the psyche by a process known as introjection. The part of the ego thus modified becomes the super-ego. The introjection or the incorporation of an object is an oral process,—it is,

in general, the first form of object relationship. The pain of hunger and other dangers cause the infant to desire possession of the satisfaction-producing object, the mother. The aggression against the object called forth by Eros is accompanied by libidinal object cathexis in order to protect the object from destruction, while the passively experienced libidinal satisfactions which the infant is proffered simultaneously with feeding and bodily care serve to strengthen his narcissism and bind the aggression against his own person. The incorporation of the object during the formation of the super-ego represents a psychic possession of the object, and must be accomplished by the same energies employed in the oral phase to conquer the mother's breast, namely aggression. Libido strivings which are actively directed and which accompany aggression establish the intrapsychic existence of the objects more securely. Passive libido components are uninvolved in introjection.

Let us now see how this process takes place in the two sexes. The small boy who has, let us assume, developed in a masculine manner, and who has therefore subordinated his passivity to his masculinity, forms a simple œdipus complex,—he loves the mother and wishes to remove the father as a rival. He fears punishment (castration) by this powerful rival, so that narcissistic interest in retaining his organ brings him to renounce his œdipal desires. Desexualization, a certain dissociation, of his sexual wishes takes place. The aggression which, as mentioned above, has gradually stepped into the service of the hostile feelings, is utilized to introject the hated paternal object; while the active libido strivings toward the father, since he is also loved and admired, assure the further existence of the father imago in the super-ego. The actual father relationship becomes characterized by tenderness, which society is willing to tolerate. The love of the mother becomes desexualized also. However, since the mother is no rival, but only a love object (the hatred arising out of the pre-œdipal phase can be transferred in the œdipus orientation to hatred of the father) there is no occasion to destroy, to introject her person. She remains

the tenderly loved object in the outside world while the father image only is concerned in the formation of the super-ego. The raw sexual desires undergo suppression. The more completely the introjective process succeeds the stronger, more energetic and active will the paternal super-ego be. Therefore such an individual would presumably be capable (in his mature years) of rendering important social and cultural contributions.

A complication occurs, however, if sufficient femininity has developed in the boy. A double œdipus complex ensues. In addition to loving the mother, in which case he regards the father as a rival, he permits himself to be loved passively by the father, in which case the mother also becomes a competitor. Passive love for the father presupposes a renunciation of the penis, so that the boy must also renounce the negative œdipus orientation, which requires the narcissistic retention of the genital. In such a case introjection of both mother and father must take place since both are to be disposed of as rivals. The super-ego will then show traits of both parents and correspondingly will be less uniform and less stable. In the case of my already mentioned effeminate patient it was clear that his super-ego represented at times the demands of the father and at other times those of the mother. It is no wonder that such a discordant super-ego would exert an inhibiting and dissipating influence upon the grown man.

So far as the different instinctual drives have not been suppressed, what has happened to them? The aggression directed against the two partly hated objects is responsible for the destructive introjection, while the libido accompanying the aggressive tendencies and actively directed is concerned with the retention of the object in the super-ego. The passive libido components play no rôle in the mechanism of super-ego formation. Their real objects are retained, although tenderness displaces sexual interest. Nevertheless great dependence upon the object persists, since the intensity of the relationship is not altered. The aggression which has been turned inward, assisted by portions of suppressed libido, gives rise to secondary masochism, which may reach the conscious in the form of maso-

chistic fantasies or may appear in some form unrecognizable to consciousness. It is in just those feminine natures that this anxiety in the event of loss of love plays such a great rôle, and they are forced, therefore, to an extreme dependence upon the object. This condition makes the emancipation from the parents in later years difficult and threatens the achievement of independence.

What happens in the process of super-ego formation in the case of the little girl? The essential identity of her first period of development with that of the boy allows the assumption of a certain parallelism in the formation of the super-ego. Nevertheless, the œdipus complex, which is directly responsible for the formation of the super-ego, does differ most thoroughly from that of the boy. The positive œdipus orientation, in which the girl loves her father passively and hates her mother as a rival, occurs only when the negative œdipus orientation (love for the mother and hatred toward the father as a rival) is given up. This renunciation takes place by virtue of hostility towards the mother, as well as by an increase in passivity and strong suppression of masculinity. Let us assume for a moment that this process had succeeded completely and that the entire sexuality of the little girl had been directed into paths of femininity, or that she was originally endowed with few active strivings. Experience proves that the girl must also give up the œdipus orientation. Her motives for doing so must be different from those of the boy whose main incentive is the retention of the penis. However, fear of losing love, as well as other possible dangers, prevail upon the little girl to renounce her œdipus wishes, and she gradually converts her feelings into tender, inhibited ones. Secondary masochism which had already arisen in the process of subordinating her activity to passivity, is now increased by the suppressed portions of libido which ally themselves with the aggressive tendencies directed against her own person. Accordingly there arises a passive, tender, object dependence with strong masochistic fantasies which may be either conscious or unconscious. Since we have assumed that in this case activity is lacking alto-

gether, the process is herewith finished. In the case of a theoretically purely feminine, completely passive woman, the super-ego formation does not occur.

However, this course of events seldom occurs in real life. There are no people without a bisexual disposition, a fact which is of much greater significance to women than to men. Subordination of active libido to passive tendencies never completely succeeds. Even where complete femininity in love-life is achieved, more or less vigorous active tendencies are demonstrable. We have already seen that maternity requires the use of active tendencies. It becomes clear, then, that the little girl in giving up the œdipus complex also forms a super-ego. The girl, like the boy, utilizes activity, that is, her masculinity, to accomplish this process; this may be the reason why the feminine super-ego resembles more closely that of a feminine man than that of a markedly masculine man. The little girl also has a double œdipus complex to overcome. She introjects both parental objects, and the super-ego receives a double character, rendering it less energetic, unified and insistent. These peculiarities are favored also by the circumstance that the little girl renounces her œdipus wishes gradually and achieves super-ego formation slowly and less completely than the boy. It is no wonder that the super-ego of the woman enables her to achieve less significant social and cultural contributions than the man. On the other hand it is not surprising that the complexity of her early instinctual development and the formation of the feminine œdipus complex determine the late development of the woman and cause her super-ego formation to show the greatest variations and differences of character. I shall attempt to describe some of the varieties in a later paper.

Victor Tausk


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ON THE ORIGIN OF THE "INFLUENCING MACHINE" IN SCHIZOPHRENIA*

BY VICTOR TAUSK

[A translation of this article fourteen years after its appearance in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse* requires a word of explanation. Victor Tausk had been a distinguished jurist (judge) and journalist before he became a psychoanalyst. Freud's work found an immediate response in Tausk, who began the study of medicine late in life in order to equip himself more thoroughly for psychoanalysis. Although his tragic death in his forty-second year (July 3, 1919) prevented his contributing more than a mere handful of papers, he was one of the pioneers around Freud, in the creative period of psychoanalysis during the decade of the world war. His work covered a variety of subjects, such as alcoholic psychoses, schizophrenia, infantile sexuality, war neuroses, and psychoanalysis and philosophy. The last and most important of his studies was *Über die Entstehung des "Beeinflussungsapparates" in der Schizophrenie*, read before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society (Jan. 6, 1918), discussed in an evening devoted to the paper (Jan. 30, 1918) and published in 1919.

This study is a classic in psychoanalytic—and psychiatric—literature, presenting a brilliant analysis of a delusory formation, throwing out penetrating comments on such fundamental problems as projection, hallucination and narcissism, and anticipating Abraham's formulation of the libido development as well as later studies by others.

The translator, a classmate in the last year of clinical studies at the University of Vienna, enjoyed a brief period of friendship with him before the war separated them, and—at the time devoted to Kraepelinian psychiatry—was to no small degree attracted to psychoanalysis by Tausk's enthusiasm and by his brilliant presentation of the Freudian theory. The translation, undertaken to fill a gap in the psychoanalytic literature available in English, serves in a measure to discharge a debt of gratitude to the author. D. F.]

1.

The following considerations are based upon a single example of the "influencing machine" complained of by a certain type of schizophrenic patient. Although in this particular case the structure of the machine differs materially, to the best of my knowledge, from all other varieties of apparatus of this sort,

* Translation from the German by Dorian Feigenbaum.

it is hoped that the present example will nevertheless facilitate psychoanalytic insight into the genesis and purpose of this delusional instrument.

My example is a variant—a very rare variant—of the typical influencing machine. The objection can of course be made that it is rash to draw general conclusions from the study of a single case, and that generalizations, to be regarded as scientifically valid, should be based on a larger mass of material. My justification is that I have simply not encountered any further case material in support of my conclusions, and that to the best of my knowledge psychiatric literature contains no descriptions of individual cases of the influencing machine phenomenon, such as would make my paper superfluous. There exist only general descriptions of the apparatus, and its regular features and functions are given only as perfunctory clinical illustrations. Clinical psychiatry, interested only in general descriptions, lays no stress upon the significance of individual symptoms for the study of the dynamics of psychoses. Psychiatry has not hitherto sufficiently investigated the origin, the meaning, and the purpose of a symptom, because, not employing the psychoanalytical method, it does not even postulate such problems. Yet in principle, it is permissible to derive general conclusions from exceptional types. Variants and mixed forms stimulate inquiry into general types. The conformity of typical cases may have the ultimate effect of an impenetrable barrier, while a deviation from type, on the other hand, may be a window in the wall through which a clear view is to be obtained.

Deviations from the rule and ambiguous types compel the assumption that a given phenomenon may be of diverse origin. It is only when an unexpected departure from the accustomed occurs that one feels the necessity of investigating the uniformity which had previously characterized the phenomenon or at least had seemed to do so. Inquiry into extraordinary causative factors has often stimulated inquiry into those ordinarily encountered.

It is to be hoped only that the example taken as a basis for

the following conclusions will prove to justify them, and that the origin and significance of this variant example have been correctly conceived and formulated.

2.

The schizophrenic influencing machine is a machine of mystical nature. The patients are able to give only vague hints of its construction. It consists of boxes, cranks, levers, wheels, buttons, wires, batteries, and the like. Patients endeavor to discover the construction of the apparatus by means of their technical knowledge, and it appears that with the progressive popularization of the sciences, all the forces known to technology are utilized to explain the functioning of the apparatus. All the discoveries of mankind, however, are regarded as inadequate to explain the marvelous powers of this machine, by which the patients feel themselves persecuted.

The main effects of the influencing machine are the following:

1. It makes the patients see pictures. When this is the case, the machine is generally a magic lantern or cinematograph. The pictures are seen on a single plane, on walls or window-panes, and unlike typical visual hallucinations are not three-dimensional.

2. It produces, as well as removes, thoughts and feelings by means of waves or rays or mysterious forces which the patient's knowledge of physics is inadequate to explain. In such cases, the machine is often called a "suggestion-apparatus". Its construction cannot be explained, but its function consists in the transmission or "draining off" of thoughts and feelings by one or several persecutors.

3. It produces motor phenomena in the body, erections and seminal emissions, that are intended to deprive the patient of his male potency and weaken him. This is accomplished either by means of suggestion or by air-currents, electricity, magnetism, or X-rays.

4. It creates sensations that in part cannot be described,

because they are strange to the patient himself, and that in part are sensed as electrical, magnetic, or due to air-currents.

5. It is also responsible for other occurrences in the patient's body, such as cutaneous eruptions, abscesses, and other pathological processes.

The machine serves to persecute the patient and is operated by enemies. To the best of my knowledge, the latter are exclusively of the male sex. They are predominantly physicians by whom the patient has been treated. The manipulation of the apparatus is likewise obscure, the patient rarely having a clear idea of its operation. Buttons are pushed, levers set in motion, cranks turned. The connection with the patient is often established by means of invisible wires leading into his bed, in which case the patient is influenced by the machine only when he is in bed.

However, it is noteworthy that a large number of patients complain of all these ailments without ascribing them to the influence of a machine. Many patients consider the cause of all these alien or hostile sensations of physical or psychic change to be simply an external mental influence, suggestion or telepathic power, emanating from enemies. My own observations and those of other authors leave no room for doubt that these complaints precede the symptom of the influencing apparatus, and that the latter is a subsequent pathological development. Its appearance, as many observers state, serves the purpose of an explanation for the pathologic changes that are felt as alien and painful and dominate the patient's emotional life and sensations.

According to this view, the idea of the influencing machine originates in the need for causality that is inherent in man; and the same need for causality will probably also account for the persecutors who act not through the medium of an apparatus but merely by suggestion or by telepathy. Clinical psychiatry explains the symptom of an influencing machine as analogous to the ideas of persecution in paranoia (which, it is known, the patient invents in order to justify his delusions of grandeur), and calls it "*paranoia somatica*".

However, there is a group of patients that dispenses completely with any gratification of the need for causality, and complains simply of emotional changes and strange apparitions within the physical and psychic personality, without the intervention of a foreign or hostile power. It is particularly declared by some patients that their visions are not foisted upon them in any way but that, to their great astonishment, they simply see them. There also occur other strange sensations for which there is no evidence of an originator, especially, for instance, the complaint of a loss or change of thoughts and feelings, without the thoughts or feelings being "drained" from them or "foisted" upon them; and of a similar nature are complaints of a change of sensations in the skin, face, and extremities. This group of patients does not complain of influences originating from a foreign, hostile force, but of a feeling of inner estrangement. They become strange to themselves, no longer understand themselves: limbs, face, facial expression, thoughts, and feelings, have become estranged. These symptoms clearly are part of an early stage of dementia præcox, although they may also be observed in advanced stages as well.

In some cases it may be stated with certainty, and in others with strong probability, that the sense of persecution originates from the sensations of change accompanied by a sense of estrangement. These feelings of persecution are ascribed to a foreign, personal interference, "suggestion", or "telepathic influence". In other cases, the ideas of persecution or influence may be seen entering into the construction of an influencing apparatus. It is necessary to assume, therefore, that the influencing apparatus represents the terminal stage in the evolution of the symptom, which started with simple sensations of change. I do not believe that heretofore the entire sequence in the development of the symptom could have been studied completely from a single case. But I have observed the connection between at least two stages (of which I shall present an example later), and I have no hesitation in maintaining that under especially favorable circumstances it may be possible to

observe the entire series of developmental stages in a single patient. Meanwhile, I am in the position of the observer of plasmodia who notes various pathological forms in the blood cells as developmental stages of a continuous cycle of growth, although he is never able to observe in any one blood corpuscle more than a single phase.

Recognition of the various symptoms as stages of a unified developmental process is rendered difficult not merely by inaccurate observation but by other factors as well. Patients conceal single stages behind secondary and correlative symptoms—each patient in accordance with his morbid disposition. Changes of feeling are covered up by a simultaneously or consecutively produced psychosis or neurosis belonging to another clinical group, such as depression, mania, paranoia, compulsion neurosis, anxiety hysteria, or amentia; and these clinical pictures, advancing to the foreground, conceal from the observer the more subtle elements in the development of the delusion of reference. It is, besides, very likely that in many cases not every stage of development reaches consciousness, and that one stage or another runs its course in the unconscious and thus leaves gaps in the conscious psyche. Finally, depending upon the rapidity of the pathological process and upon the individual disposition, some of the stages may be missing altogether.

Ideas of reference in schizophrenia develop equally with or without the influencing apparatus. In but one case¹ have I been able to observe electrical currents in the absence of the influencing apparatus to which those are usually ascribed—in the absence, in fact, of any hostile powers whatsoever.

This observation was made in the case of a thirty-four year old man, Josef H., an inmate of insane asylums at frequent intervals throughout his life. He felt electrical currents streaming through him, which entered the earth through his legs; he produced the current within himself, declaring with pride that that was his power! How and for what purpose he did this he refused to disclose. Upon discovering these currents in himself for the first time, he was (he admitted) some-

¹ At the Belgrade Neuropsychiatric Division.

what astonished, but he soon came to the conclusion that this manifestation had a special significance—that the currents served a mysterious end, regarding which he refused any information.

I shall now cite another instance, a singular case of "*paranoia somatica*", having, as will later be seen, a significance of its own in substantiating the developmental process which I have assumed. The same example has already been cited by Freud in another connection. Miss Emma A. felt herself influenced by her lover in a singular manner; she maintained that her eyes were no longer properly placed in her head but were entirely twisted out of position, and this she attributed to the fact that her lover was an evil, deceitful person who twisted eyes. At church one day she suddenly felt a thrust, as if she were being moved from her place, which had its cause in the fact that her lover disguised himself,* and that he had already ruined her and made her as evil as himself.

This patient did not merely feel herself persecuted and influenced; hers was a case of being influenced by identification with the persecutor. If we take into consideration the view held by Freud and myself that in object-choice the mechanism of identification precedes the cathexis proper by projection, we may regard the case of Miss Emma A. as representing the stage in the development of the delusion of reference preceding the projection (namely, on to a distant persecutor in the outer world). The identification is obviously an attempt to project the feelings of the inner change on to the outer world. It constitutes a bridge between the feelings of an inner change without external cause and the attribution of these changes to the power of an external person, a kind of intermediary position between the feeling of self-estrangement and the delusion of reference. This rounds out especially well, and substantiates psychoanalytically, the concept of the development of the symptom, up to its crystallization in the influencing machine. We are here concerned with the discovery, or rather the inven-

* This patient's words, "Sich verstellt"—taken literally, mean "moves himself from one place to another". TRANSLATOR.

tion, of a hostile object; but for the intellectual process it is unimportant whether the objects observed are hostile or friendly, and the psychoanalyst, at least, will certainly have no objection to the equating of love and hate in this instance. Among the illustrations that may be given of the various forms or stages of the delusion of reference, the case of Staudenmayer (whose autobiography was presented before the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society some years ago) may be mentioned.

Staudenmayer—who, if I am not mistaken, was declared to be a paranoiac and is at any rate considered to be one by me—described his sensations during his bowel movements from the beginning of the movement to its conclusion, and attributed every single peristaltic motion coming to his awareness to the activity of special demons allegedly located in the intestines and entrusted with the performance of each separate motion.

We may now summarize and describe schematically the phenomena that in some cases appear to be produced by the influencing machine and that in other cases occur without it.

1. We note, first, simple sensations of inner change, in the beginning devoid of, and later accompanied by, a sense of estrangement, without awareness of an originator. The sensations are of changes in the psychical and physical functions within various parts of one's own body. In many cases this stage of the illness probably occurs at a very early age, before puberty. Since at this age no exact reports can be obtained on inner conditions, and since, in addition, pathological changes are not infrequently compensated by infantile peculiarities of character, such as naughtiness, aggressiveness, concealed fantasies, masturbation, seclusiveness, dullness and so forth, this stage either remains unrecognized or else is misnamed. It is only at puberty, when special adjustments to the environment are required of the individual, who is compelled to relinquish all crude expressions of his abnormality, that the illness comes to the surface; it is at this time, too, that further development of symptoms is stimulated.

2. Feelings of inner change in the form of abnormal sensations, with awareness of an originator,—in this instance the patient himself (case Josef H.).

3. Feelings of inner change accompanied by awareness of an originator, who, although existing within the patient, is nevertheless not the patient himself (case Staudenmayer).

4. Feelings of inner change accompanied by hallucinatory projection of the inner occurrence to the external world, without awareness of an originator; at first, feelings of estrangement are not present, but later on they appear (seeing pictures).

5. Feelings of inner change accompanied by awareness of an external originator as a result of identification (case Emma A.).

6. Feelings of inner change accompanied by projection of the inner occurrence to the outer world and belief in an originator produced by the paranoid mechanism (causing pictures to appear, influencing by suggestion, hypnotism, electricity, producing or draining off thoughts and feelings, effecting bodily motions, weakening potency, producing erection, seminal emissions, and so forth).

7. Feelings of inner change attributed to the workings of the influencing machine manipulated by enemies. At first, the enemies are usually unknown to the patient and only vaguely discerned by him; later on he is able to make them out, knows who they are, and enlarges their circle after the pattern of the paranoid conspiracy. Similarly, the patient is at first completely unable to explain the construction of the influencing apparatus, but familiarizes himself with it gradually.

Having solved the relation between ideas of reference and the influencing apparatus, we may proceed to an examination of the latter without reference to its effects.

It is not necessary to discuss the magic lantern which produces pictures or images, because its structure harmonizes perfectly with the function attributed to it, and because it does not reveal any error of judgment beyond the fact of its non-existence. This rational superstructure is absolutely impenetrable. We must, at the start, use structures less solidly built, the walls of which reveal gaps through which it is possible to look inside.

(a) The ordinary influencing machine has a very obscure construction; large parts of it are completely unimaginable. In cases where the patient believes he understands the construc-

tion of the apparatus well, it is obvious that this feeling is, at best, analogous to that of a dreamer who has a feeling of understanding, but has not the understanding itself. This characteristic may be discovered whenever an accurate description of the apparatus is demanded of the patient.

(b) The apparatus is, as far as I know, always a machine; and a very complicated one.

The psychoanalyst cannot for a moment doubt that this machine must be a symbol—a view recently emphasized by Freud in one of his lectures, in which he stated that the complicated machines appearing in dreams always represent the genitalia. Having studied machine dreams analytically over a long period of time, I can fully confirm Freud's statement; I may add, moreover, that the machines always stand for the dreamer's own genitalia and that the dreams are of a masturbatory character. I can state further that these dreams are dreams of escape, of the type described in my paper on alcoholic delirium.¹ In this paper it is shown that whenever an urge to masturbate, or rather a readiness to ejaculate semen, leads to a dream fantasy which is favorable to discharge, another fantasy is hastily substituted, by means of which a new state of inhibition is induced momentarily, and the ejaculation of semen is made difficult if not impossible. The dream reacts to the repudiated wish for discharge with a successive alteration of symbols.

The machine dream possesses an analogous mechanism, except that the introduction of single components of the machine is not accompanied by the simultaneous disappearance of the other components for which they are substituted, the new components being simply added to the old ones. This is how the hopelessly complex machine originates. In order to strengthen the inhibition, the symbol has been made complex, instead of being displaced by another one; but the result is the same. Each complexity draws the attention of the dreamer to himself, rouses his intellectual interest, reciprocally

¹ Tausk, Victor: *Zur Psychologie des alkohol. Beschäftigungsdelir.* Int. Ztsch. f. Psa. III, 1915.

weakens his libidinal interest, and effects in this manner inhibition of instinct.

In machine dreams the dreamer awakens, more often than not, with his hand on his genitalia, after having dreamed of manipulating the machine. It may, therefore, be assumed that the influencing apparatus is a representation of the patient's genitalia projected to the outer world, analogous in origin to the machine in dreams. The frequent complaint of the schizophrenic that the apparatus causes erection, drains off semen, and weakens potency only confirms this view. At any rate, the analogy of the symptom to a dream production, as well as the accessibility of the symptom to psychoanalytic dream interpretation is a step beyond the rationalizations and the demand for causal connections that underlie the usual clinical interpretation of the influencing machine in schizophrenia. I can now present my example, which will not only strengthen our hypothesis, but will enlarge it materially.

The patient is Miss Natalija A., thirty-one years old, formerly a student of philosophy. She has been completely deaf for a great number of years, due to an ulcer of the ear, and can make herself understood only by means of writing. She declares that for six and a half years she has been under the influence of an electrical machine made in Berlin, though this machine's use is prohibited by the police. It has the form of a human body, indeed, the patient's own form, though not in all details. Her mother, likewise the patient's male and female friends, are also under the influence of this machine or of similar machines. Of the latter she gives no explanation, describing only the apparatus to which she herself is subjected. She is certain that for men there is a masculine machine representing the masculine form and for women a female one. The trunk (torso) has the shape of a lid, resembling the lid of a coffin and is lined with silk or velvet. Regarding the limbs two significant explanations are given. At the first interview she described them as entirely natural parts of the body. A few weeks later these limbs were not placed on the coffin lid in their natural form, but were merely drawn on it in two dimen-

sions, in the position they would occupy in the natural state of the body. She cannot see the head—she says that she is not sure about it and she does not know whether the machine bears her own head. She has practically nothing to report about the head. The patient does not know definitely how this machine is to be handled, neither does she know how it is connected with her; but she vaguely thinks that it is by means of telepathy. The outstanding fact about the machine is that it is being manipulated by someone in a certain manner, and everything that occurs to it happens also to her. When someone strikes this machine, she feels the blow in the corresponding part of her own body. The ulcer (lupus) now present on her nose was first produced on the nose of the machine, and some time later the patient herself became afflicted with it. The inner parts of the machine consist of electric batteries, which are supposed to represent the internal organs of the human body. Those who handle the machine produce a slimy substance in her nose, disgusting smells, dreams, thoughts, feelings, and disturb her while she is thinking, reading or writing. At an earlier stage, sexual sensations were produced in her through manipulation of the genitalia of the machine; but now the machine no longer possesses any genitalia, though why or how they disappeared she cannot tell. Ever since the machine lost its genitalia, the patient has ceased to experience sexual sensations.

She became familiar with the apparatus, about which she had previously heard, through all kinds of occurrences, especially through conversations among people, that is, through auditory hallucinations. The man who utilizes the apparatus to persecute her, her rejected suitor, a college professor, is prompted by jealousy. Very soon after she had refused his courtship she felt that he was trying by means of suggestion to bring about a friendship between his sister-in-law, her mother, and herself, his obvious purpose being to use this influence to make her accept him. When, however, suggestion failed, he subjected her to the influence of the machine; not only she herself but also her mother, her physicians, her friends, all

those who had her welfare at heart, came under the influence of this diabolical apparatus, with the result that the physicians submitted a mistaken diagnosis to her, the apparatus deluding them into diagnosing other ailments than those with which she was afflicted. She could no longer get along with her friends and relatives, arousing everyone's animosity, and feeling compelled to run away. It was impossible to obtain any further details from the patient. On her third visit she became inaccessible and only stated that the analyst, too, was under the influence of the apparatus, that he had become hostile to her, and that they could no longer understand each other.

This case provides a definite reason for believing that the influencing machine represents a stage in the development of a symptom which can also appear without this stage, as a delusion of reference. The patient clearly stated that her persecutor had recourse to the apparatus only when his attempt to influence her by suggestion failed. The fact that she seems to have previously heard about the machine is also enlightening. This vague recognition obviously awakened in the patient old familiar sensations that she had experienced before she was subjected to the apparatus; this is analogous to the well-known fact that persons in a state of infatuation have the feeling of having always known the beloved one—in reality they are merely rediscovering one of their old libidinal imagos. We shall hear later in how remote a past she had first experienced sensations similar to those caused by the influencing apparatus.

The peculiar construction of the machine substantiates our assumptions to a great extent, especially with regard to the significance of the machine as a projected symbol of the genitalia. We may add that the apparatus represents not only the patient's genitalia but obviously, her whole person. It represents the projection of the patient's body on to the outer world. At least, the following results are unquestionably obtained from the patient's report: the apparatus is distinguished above all by its human form, easily recognized despite many non-human char-

acteristics. In form it resembles the patient herself, and she senses all manipulations performed on the apparatus in the corresponding part of her own body and in the same manner. All effects and changes undergone by the apparatus take place simultaneously in the patient's body, and *vice versa*. Thus, the apparatus loses its genitalia following the patient's loss of her genital sensations; it had possessed genitalia for as long a period as her genital sensations had lasted.

Applying the technique of dream interpretation to this case, it may be said that the patient's inability to provide any detailed description of the head of the apparatus, and especially her inability to decide whether it was her own head or not, proves conclusively that it is her own head. We know from analytic observations that the person not recognized in a dream is actually the dreamer himself. In my analysis of the *Dream of the Clinic*,¹ it was clear that the dreamer meant herself when she dreamt of a person whose head she could not see.

A further detail in the description of the apparatus—namely, that the lid is lined with silk or velvet—may substantiate this opinion. Women very frequently describe in such terms the feelings evoked by caressing their own skin. That the intestines appear in the form of batteries is only of slight significance here, although it will assume a profounder meaning later

¹ Published in *Int. Ztschr. f. Psch.* II, 1914. P. 466. Miss N. dreams: I am seated on an upper bench in the surgical amphitheatre. Below a woman is being operated on. She lies with her head towards me, but I cannot see the head, as it seems to be concealed by the lower benches. I see the woman only from her chest down. I see both thighs and a heap of white towels and linens. I see nothing else clearly.

Analysis of the dream reveals that the dreamer sees herself as the woman operated on. A few days before the night of the dream, the dreamer called on a young physician who made advances to her. On this occasion she was reclining on a couch. The physician raised her skirts and while he operated "below", she perceived the heap of white underclothes overhead. Just as much as she saw of herself in this situation, she sees of the woman in the dream, and the woman's head remains invisible to her in the same way as she could not see her own head in the actual situation. According to Freud, the "woman without a head" in a dream represents the mother. The basic reason for this interpretation will not be discussed here, but will be treated in another section of this paper.

on. This superficial interpretation may be associated with the information given directly or indirectly to school children to the effect that the viscera resemble a very complicated machine. In our case the tendency seems to be towards a verbal interpretation of this infantile conception. This conclusion regarding its ontogeny is arrived at with the help of the description given by the patient of her influencing apparatus.

At the very beginning the patient reported that the limbs of the apparatus appeared in their natural form and position. Several weeks later, she declared that the limbs were drawn on the lid. This is obviously a manifestation of the progressive distortion undergone by the apparatus, which, consequently, eventually loses all human characteristics and becomes a typical, unintelligible, influencing machine. First the genitalia, then the limbs are eliminated in this process. The patient, to be sure, is unable to report how the genitalia are removed. She states, however, that the limbs are removed in the following manner: they lose their three-dimensional human form and flatten to a two-dimensional plane. It would not have been surprising if after a lapse of several weeks, the patient had declared that the apparatus did not possess any limbs at all. Nor would it have been astonishing had she stated that the apparatus had never had any limbs. A failure to recall the developmental stages of the apparatus has obviously the same significance as that of forgetting the origin of dream pictures. It is not too bold a conclusion to draw that the coffin lid of the machine is a product of such successive distortions and that originally it had represented a human being—namely, the patient herself.

Psychoanalytic experience brings to light the causative factors in such distortion. Underlying every distortion of a psychic phenomenon there is a defense mechanism which has as its aim the protection of the conscious ego against the appearance or reappearance of undisguised fantasies. The patient obviously seeks not to recognize herself in the influencing machine and therefore in self-protection she divests it of all human features; in a word, the less human the appearance

of the delusion, the less does she recognize herself in it. The origin of this rejection will be examined later.

When the influencing machine of Miss Natalija A. first came to my attention, it was in a special stage of development; I was fortunate, moreover, in observing the machine in the process of development as concerned the limbs, and also in obtaining specific information from the patient herself regarding the genitalia. I assume that this process will end with the production of the typical influencing apparatus known to clinical observation, but I cannot affirm that this apparatus will pass through all the stages of development to the very end. It is very possible that it will stop at a middle point, without proceeding further.

3.

In the meantime, we may consider a second hypothesis that may have suggested itself to the reader. It must be taken into consideration that, notwithstanding all that has been said above, the influencing machine of Miss Natalija A. may be merely an inexplicable exception to the general rule. The complex, unintelligible machine as fantastically described and interpreted by other patients would perhaps first have to be studied and defined before an explanation of Miss N.'s influencing machine could be undertaken. For want of other material at hand to substantiate our hypothesis, except the machine dream, we shall start with the assumption that the influencing apparatus is a projection of the patient's genitalia. In presenting this second hypothesis together with, or in lieu of, the first, I realize how much indulgence is exacted of the reader, and I should not be surprised if I were reproached with levity or legerdemain. I myself was unpleasantly surprised to discover that this second hypothesis was probably as valid as the first, and that in consequence both became improbable or worthless, since their content differs and each leads to quite a different theory. Fortunately, another theory suggests itself which brings into immediate harmony both interpretations of the influencing apparatus. This problem will be touched upon again towards the end of this paper.

Attention may be called now to a symptom in schizophrenia, which I have named "loss of ego boundaries". This symptom is the complaint that "everyone" knows the patient's thoughts, that his thoughts are not enclosed in his own head, but are spread throughout the world and occur simultaneously in the heads of all persons. The patient seems no longer to realize that he is a separate psychical entity, an ego with individual boundaries. A sixteen-year-old patient in the Wagner-Jauregg Clinic indulged in gay laughter whenever she was asked for her thoughts. Catamnesis revealed that for a long while when being questioned, she had believed I had been jesting; she knew that I must be familiar with her thoughts, since they occurred at the same time in my own head.

We are familiar with this infantile stage of thinking, in which a strong belief exists that others know of the child's thoughts. Until the child has been successful in its first lie, the parents are supposed to know everything, even its most secret thoughts. Later on, in the event that the child has been caught lying, this conception may be formed again, now caused by the feeling of guilt. The striving for the right to have secrets from which the parents are excluded is one of the most powerful factors in the formation of the ego, especially in establishing and carrying out one's own will. The developmental stage observed in the above-mentioned case falls into this period, in which the child does not yet sense this right to privacy and does not yet doubt that the parents and educators know everything.¹

¹ This would fall into the period before the first successful lie, which occurs very early in infancy. Lies fabricated in the first year of life are nothing unusual; they can be observed especially in children who resist the regular elimination of bodily wastes when, by means of grimaces, gestures and inarticulated words, they mislead the training person into believing that they have had satisfactory evacuation. The educator who allows herself to be deceived by the child must ultimately look to divine guidance in order to keep the child within the truth, when the latter, to gain forbidden pleasure, begins to enjoy the practice of lying. Very soon the time arrives when recourse to the highest authority of omniscience becomes necessary. The introduction of the omniscient God in the educational system becomes, indeed, a necessity, since, de facto, children learn to lie from parents and upbringers, who by misrepresentations and unkept promises make the child obey and teach him to disguise his true purposes. In

The symptom with the content that "thoughts are given to them", the patients deduce subsequently from their belief that others know their thoughts. This must be attributed to the infantile impressions originating in an earlier period in life, when the child knows nothing through its own efforts but obtains all its knowledge from others: how to make use of its limbs, its language, its thoughts. At that period all is "given to" the child, all joy and all sorrow, and it is difficult to evaluate what share the child itself has in its accomplishments.¹ The sudden discovery that it is able to accomplish a task without the help of others is greeted by the child with a great deal of surprise and excitement. It is probable, therefore, that this symptom represents a regression to this particular stage of infancy. But this special period of infancy presents a problem: How far back does it go? What causes the formation of the ego and, as a reaction to the outer world, the ego boundaries, and what arouses the realization of individuality, of self, as a distinct psychical unit?

Theoretically we cannot assume that the ego begins to take form earlier than the time of object finding. The latter comes with gratification and renunciation of instinctual drives, whereas an awareness of the outer world, independent of the infant's drives and desires, is established only gradually. It is hardly possible that the sex instincts should have a greater influence upon the development of this awareness than the drive to be nourished. To be sure, the sex instincts will soon take on

order to safeguard the success of education, teachers cannot but transfer the power of omniscience to God—an authority which they themselves have abandoned. The incomprehensible nature of this deity precludes the possibility of practicing deception on him. Nevertheless, many children do not submit even to this authority, continually test their God with regard to his omniscience, and not infrequently actually succeed in unmasking him as a phantom of the dethroned parental, specifically paternal, power.

¹ In the discussion of this paper at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Freud emphasized that the infant's conception that others knew its thoughts has its source in the process of learning to speak. Having obtained its language from others, the infant has also received thoughts from them; and the child's feeling that others know his thoughts as well as that others have "made" him the language and, along with it, his thoughts, has, therefore, some basis in reality.

a special significance which must not be underestimated. But for the time being, it should be stated that there is a stage when no objects of the outer world exist, and therefore there is no realization that one has an ego. At that period there nevertheless exist desires and drives, and a specific urge to obtain mastery over whatever stimulates the sex organs is observable. The developmental stage that precedes the stage of object finding has been recognized as that of *identification*. This became evident from the analysis of neurotics, in whom the inability to obtain possession of objects of gratification, or to reach goals of pleasure, was seen to be due to their identification with the objects. The neurotic himself simply stands for what attracts him in the outer world; he has not found his way to the outer world and, therefore, is unable to develop an adequate ego in his stunted, exclusively libidinal relationships. This peculiar organization of libido has been termed narcissistic. The libido in such cases has been directed towards the neurotic's own personality; it is attached to his own ego and not to the objects of the outer world. Observations and theoretical considerations, especially those of Freud, have led to the assumption that this libido organization characterizes the beginning of psychical development, the "objectless" period, and that, at any rate, this libido organization must be considered a correlate, if not a cause, of the "objectlessness". This organization of libido corresponds also to the stage of intellectual development in which the person considers all the sensory stimuli he receives as endogenous and immanent. At this stage of development the psyche does not yet perceive that intervals of time and space exist between the object from which the stimulus emanates and the sensory response.

The next stage of development is then that of an outward projection of the stimulus and the attributing of this stimulus to a distant object, hence a stage of distancing and objectivation of the intellect, and along with this a transfer of libido to the discovered, or rather, self-created, outer world. As a safeguard to this psychical achievement, and as a kind of critical authority for objectivation, there is evolved at the same time the faculty

of distinguishing between objectivity and subjectivity, an awareness of reality, which enables the individual to recognize his inner experiences as distinct from the outer stimuli—in other words, to regard inner experiences as internal and not to confuse them with the objects of sensory response.

This correlative developmental process, however, is apt to meet with inhibitions. There are inhibitions from the intellectual side, or as we say, from the ego—the chief weapon of which is the intellect—and there are inhibitions that arise from the transference of libido in various stages of development, and with various results depending upon the relation of the ego to the libido. These points of inhibition are called, after Freud, fixation-points. In most cases the factor that causes ego disturbances, seems to lie in lesions of the libido. Thus, it is clear from Freud's interpretation that paranoia is a reaction to repressed homosexuality. The prohibition against finding an object for the homosexual drive, which results in an inhibition of the transference of homosexual libido organization, should be recognized as originating from within and remaining within. This projection is a defensive measure of the ego against the renounced homosexual libido that emerges with onrushing force out of repression. Libidinal inhibition leads to intellectual inhibition, which may be manifested in impaired judgment, or in insanity. An internal psychical process due to displacement and projection is mistaken for an external one, which leads to more or less marked "affective weakness of judgment", with the accompanying reactions of the psyche quantitatively and qualitatively determined by the morbid process.

We may say that in the case of an impaired libido organization, the ego finds itself facing the task of mastering an insane outer world, and hence behaves insanely.¹

In the neuropsychoses that usually appear in later life, with a history of previous relative psychic health, it is not difficult to observe that the impairment of the ego is caused by an

¹ The cases in which inhibition endangers the intellect primarily are to be attributed to dementia.

impairment of the libido. However, in cases of psychosis that develop gradually and insidiously, beginning with earliest infancy, we may assume not so much a successive impairment of libido and ego as a correlative inhibition, primarily, of the entire development of the individual. The one group of instinctual drives does not develop normally, and this is paralleled by an arrest of the functions of the other group of drives and by a simultaneous development of secondary relations, which are to be regarded as attempts at self-cure and at adaptation to the functional disturbance by means of compensations and overcompensations. Furthermore, there occur regressions on the part of functions which have developed normally but which, whenever there is a marked discordance between the diseased and the normal portions of the psyche, abandon their normal level and retreat, for the purpose of adaptation, to the lower level of the impaired functions. During this retreat, there may arise various temporary or permanent symptom formations of different clinical types; and from these develop all mixed psychotic formations. The existence of these partial processes and their great variety with regard to levels of regression at a given moment requires careful consideration. In considering inhibitions of instinctual drives we must constantly keep in mind that all inhibited drives are capable of being transformed into, or being discharged as, anxiety. To quote Freud, "It may be said that, in a certain theoretical sense, symptoms are formed only in order to forestall an otherwise inevitable development of anxiety."

4.

We have learned from Freud that the projection of the homosexual libido in paranoia is to be regarded as a defensive measure of the ego against an inopportune and socially reprehensible sexual urge pressing from the unconscious. Is it possible to regard the projection of the patient's own body in the case of Miss Natalija as an analogous situation? Naturally, the projection would have to subserve the defense of that libido which belongs to the patient's own body, and which has

become either too extensive or too inopportune in its demands for the patient to be able to tolerate it as her own. It is also necessary to assume that this projection pertains only to the libido of the body and not to the libido of the psychic ego, as well, that, moreover, the libido of the psychic ego¹ has facili-

¹ The projection of the libido position of the psychic ego produces the symptoms of simple paranoia, the mechanism of which was discovered by Freud. In what follows we shall omit from consideration the fact that ego-libido is necessarily homosexual in its strivings, that is, attracted by the sex which the ego itself represents. We shall describe briefly only one mechanism, which appears to be out of harmony with object-libido and which is exemplified by the symptomatology of our patient, Miss Natalija.

The patient reports: After she had rejected her suitor, she felt that he suggested that her mother and she strike up a friendship with his sister-in-law, so that the patient might be more amenable to a later proposal on his part. What appears here as suggestion on the suitor's part is nothing more than the projection of the patient's own unconscious inclination to accept the proposal of marriage. She had rejected the proposal not without inner conflict and had vacillated between accepting and rejecting her suitor. She gave realization in action to the rejection, while she projected her inclination to accept the proposal on to the object of her conflicting desires and made it appear as the sensory effect of an influence on the part of the object, or in other words as her symptom.

The patient was ambivalent towards her suitor, and projected one side of the conflict, the positive libidinal one, while manifesting in action the negative side, the rejection, because this procedure was in conformity with her ego. The choice, which in this instance has projection as its outcome, may in other cases be the reverse one. Here I am merely calling attention to the mechanism of partial projection of ambivalent tendencies.

A special contribution to the subject of the projection mechanism, which also made me aware of this principle, was made by Dr. Helene Deutsch in her discussion of this paper at the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. A schizophrenic patient had the feeling that her friends always laid down their work when she herself began to work and that they sat down whenever she stood up; in brief, that others were always performing the opposite of what she herself was doing. The patient merely felt this; she could not possibly see it, since she was blind. Dr. Deutsch regarded the symptom as a projection of one of two tendencies present in every one of her patient's actions—namely, the tendency to do and the tendency not to do. This interpretation was confirmed by cases presented by other discussers. On this occasion Freud proposed the formulation that it is ambivalence that makes the projection mechanism possible. Once expressed, this thesis appears self-evident. It has a corollary in another contention of Freud's, to the effect that ambivalence produces repression. This has as its natural consequence the formulation mentioned, above, since only what is repressed is projected, in so far as boundaries between the unconscious and the

tated the defense against the bodily libido because it was, so to speak, ashamed of it. That a projection mechanism has been chosen for the purpose of defense—a mechanism belonging to the primary functioning of the ego in the process of object finding—gives us reason to believe that we are here dealing with a libido position which is coëval with the beginnings of intellectual object finding and which is achieved either by regression or by the persistence of a vestigial phenomenon (*Resterscheinung*—Freud), which has been for years and up to the onset of the illness effectively compensated or concealed. In regressions, however, there is always an effort to reach the formerly uninhibited libido positions. In paranoia, regression reaches a stage when homosexual object choice has not yet come under the prohibition of the ego and there is free homosexual libido which is only later subjected to repression at the behest of the cultural demands of the ego.

The libido directed towards a person's own self, which the ego tries to get rid of by projecting its own body, naturally, is characteristic of a period when it was still free from conflict with the demands of other love-objects. This period must coincide with the developmental stage of the psyche in which object finding still occurs within the individual's own body, and when the latter is still regarded as part of the outer world.

I am intentionally differentiating between object choice and object finding. By the former, I mean only libidinal cathexis; by the latter, the intellectual awareness of this cathexis. An object is *found* by the intellect, and *chosen* by the libido. These processes may occur either simultaneously or in sequence, but for my purpose they are to be regarded as distinct.

The projection of one's body may, then, be traced back to the developmental stage in which one's own body is the goal

conscious still obtain. The entire problem furnishes special justification for Bleuler's term "schizophrenia", and at the same time corroborates Pötl's views discussed on page 549, footnote.

The present paper shows how, albeit unconsciously, I had been demonstrating Freud's formulation.

of the object finding. This must be the time when the infant is discovering his body, part by part, as the outer world, and is still groping for his hands and feet as though they were foreign objects. At this time, everything that "happens" to him emanates from his own body; his psyche is the object of stimuli arising in his own body but acting upon it as if produced by outer objects. These *disjecta membra* are later on pieced together and systematized into a unified whole under the supervision of a psychic unity that receives all sensations of pleasure and pain from these separate parts. This process takes place by means of identification with one's own body. The ego, thus discovered, is cathected with the available libido; in accordance with the psychic nature of the ego, narcissism develops; and, in accordance with the function of individual organs as sources of pleasure, autoeroticism results.

But if the psychoanalytic theories previously employed are correct, this object finding within one's own organs, which can be regarded as parts of the outer world only by projection, must be preceded by a stage of identification with a narcissistic libido position,¹ and it is necessary to assume two successive stages of identification and projection.

The projection which participated in the object finding within one's own organs would, then, be the second phase of the preceding stage, although the part that depends upon the postulated identification has still to be discovered.

I am, then, assuming the existence of these two successive phases of identification and projection in object finding and object choice within one's own body.

I do not run counter to psychoanalytic conceptions in contending that the individual comes into the world as an organic unity in which libido and ego are not yet separated, and all available libido is related to that organic unity, which does not deserve the name "ego" (i.e., a psychical self-protective organi-

¹ Freud has already indicated in his paper on the Schreber biography, that the libido in schizophrenia is located at a stage even earlier than autoeroticism. I arrive at the same conclusion by a different route, and I take the liberty of presenting this fact as proof of the correctness of Freud's contentions.

zation) any more than does the cell. In this situation the individual is equally a sexual and an individual being, simultaneously performing ego and reproductive functions, like the cell that takes nourishment up to the time when it divides. This stage of the newly born child is biological up to the time of conception, but must be regarded as psychological from the time when—at an indeterminable stage of foetal life—cerebral development takes place. From the point of view of libido, we may say that the newly born child is a sexual being. I am in accord with Freud's assumption that the individual's first renunciation is the renunciation of the protection of the mother's body imposed upon the libido and accompanied by that expression of anxiety, the birth-cry. However, once this first trauma is over and no discontent arises to bring the infant into a clash with himself and with the environment, he is in complete possession of his own libido and knows nothing of the outer world, not even that part of the world which he will soon discover within himself. It is this stage of identity that precedes the first projection for the purpose of object finding within one's own body. This stage did not come about because of that psychic activity which may be called identification, but is present from the beginning. Nevertheless the result is the same as in actively established identity—absolute self-satisfaction, no outer world, no objects. Let us designate this stage as the innate narcissistic one. In this situation the libido is directed outward, first cathects the subject's own body by the indirect way of projection, and returns by way of self-discovery to the ego. In the meantime, the ego has undergone a decided alteration under the influence of these first psychic stirrings, which one may call experience, and is now again cathected by libido. Let us call this stage, acquired narcissism. The latter finds a considerable quantity of innate narcissism already present and is superimposed on it. The condition of innate narcissism normally remains attached for all time to the organs and their functions, and is in constant conflict with the various further stages of ego development which, with the assistance of anxiety and judgment, take place

under the ægis of all the faculties that have been gradually acquired in the meantime. The struggle is carried on, at first, chiefly in the sphere of excretory functions and of the auto-erotic sources of pleasure, since these are the spheres that give rise to the greatest difficulties in the individual's relation to the environment. Nevertheless, we must definitely understand that throughout life the ego develops with constant shiftings in the narcissistic libido position, that man in his struggle for existence is constantly compelled to find and recognize himself anew, and that the acquisition of narcissism is immanent in culture and is conceivable only on the basis of intact inborn narcissism that serves as a source of nourishment and regeneration. This constant struggle centering about the self occurs in various degrees in relation to various instinctual drives; it concerns homo- and hetero-sexuality and every libido component in different degrees at different times, and provokes various reactions, compensations, superstructures and eliminations. These secondary psychical formations then enter again into combination and produce insoluble dynamic, qualitative, relative and modal relations, resulting in a great variety of character types and symptoms. The development both of the ego and of the libido—so far as concerns either alone or in their relation to each other—may become arrested and may set up goals of regression at as many points as there are primary, secondary, tertiary (etc.) factors of relationship and development. The entire problem is further complicated by the elements of time and space and so made insoluble. Let us suppose that the projection of one's own body is a pathological repetition of that psychical stage when the individual was endeavoring to discover his body by means of projection. It would not be too much to say that just as the projection in normal primary development has been successful because the innate narcissistic libido position had to be renounced under the attack of outer stimuli, so also pathological projection takes place because there has developed an accumulation of narcissistic libido analogous to the primary narcissism, though here anachronistic, regressive or fixated, but resembling it in char-

acter in so far as it isolates the individual from the outer world. Hence, projection of one's own body may be regarded as a defense against a libido position corresponding to the end of foetal existence and the beginning of extrauterine development. Freud, indeed, has not hesitated to declare, in his *Introductory Lectures*, that psychological problems are to be traced back to intrauterine existence.

These considerations may be used as a starting point for the explanation of various schizophrenic symptoms. Is it not possible that catalepsy, *flexibilitas cerea*, corresponds to the stage when man senses his own organs as foreign, as not belonging to himself, and as being dominated by an outside force? A similar instance is the symptom of having one's limbs moved by someone. This symptom reproduces especially well the situation in which one's own body becomes strange and, so to speak, part of an outer world dominated by outer forces. May we not say that catatonic stupor, which represents a complete rejection of the outer world, is a return to the uterus? May not these severest catatonic symptoms be the ultimate refuge of a psyche that has given up even the most primitive ego functions and has retreated *in toto* to the foetal and nursing stages, because it cannot use in the present state of its libido even the simplest ego functions that maintain the relation to the outer world? The catatonic symptom, the negativistic stare of the schizophrenic, is nothing else than a renunciation of the outer world expressed in "organ language". Does not also the "nursing reflex" in the terminal stages of general paralysis indicate such a regression to infancy? ¹

¹ Many patients are actually aware of this regression to infancy and to the embryonic stage—the latter, though, only as a threat of further illness. A patient said to me: "I feel that I am constantly becoming younger and smaller. Now I am four years old. Shortly, I shall get into diapers and then back into mother."

Dr. Helene Deutsch, during the discussion of this paper, reported the case of a thirty-one year old female schizophrenic who wet and soiled her bed and stated as her justification that "they were making a baby of her".

On the same occasion Freud, referring especially to the influencing machine of Miss Natalija, and to the interchangeability of sexuality and death, called attention to the significance of the mode of burial of Egyptian mummies. To

The psychic correlate of *flexibilitas cerea* and of that stage in which man regards himself as a part of the outer world, lacks consciousness of his own volition and of his own ego boundaries, is the feeling that everyone knows and is in possession of the thoughts of the patient. In the period here duplicated pathologically there are indeed no thoughts, but even thoughts are subjected, as already stated above, to the same process of being regarded at first as coming from the outer world before they are accounted among the functions of the ego. Thoughts must first be assimilated into the consciousness of ego-unity before they can be an automatic ego-function; and this cannot occur before the intellect has advanced to the stage of memory perceptions. Freud has taught that this, too, is a later process, and that it is preceded by the stage of hallucinations of memory pictures, that is, a stage when the perceptions actually appear in the outer world and are not regarded as internal occurrences. Moreover, this stage of hallucinatory perceptions, in itself representing a kind of objectivation, object finding and object choice, also belongs to the first period of life. The regression, of course, does not occur equally in all psychical faculties and relationships. The capacity for thinking with memory perceptions is still intact, but the libido is already degraded to the nursing stage and sets up a relation with the thinking faculty as it exists. The consciousness of personality has been lost, and this loss is shown in the patient's inability to locate his intact psychical inventory. The patient who declares that his thoughts and feelings are in all people's minds merely declares, in words and concepts derived from the

place the mummy in a case resembling the human body suggests the idea of the return to "mother earth", the return to the mother's body in death. Freud's reference shows how as a compensation for the bitterness of death, men take for granted the bliss of existence in the uterus. The fantasy of return to the uterus is, then, an atavistic one, a preformed fantasy, and as such it may be added to the "primal fantasies" postulated by Freud. This fantasy appears symptomatically in schizophrenia as the pathological reality of the regressing, disintegrating psyche. The mummy returns to the mother's body by physical, and the schizophrenic by psychical death. ("*Mutterleibphantasie*"—an expression, as far as I know, first used by Gustav Grüner.)

memory-reserve of a later developmental stage, that his libido finds itself at the stage when it is still identical with the outer world, still has no ego-boundaries set up against the outer world, and his libido is now compelled therefore to renounce the normal intellectual object relations in so far as these depend upon the degraded libido position.

These feelings and this mode of expression depend upon the intactness of the psyche's ability to operate with memory perceptions. This faculty, too, may undergo regression.¹ In this case the patient hallucinates. The libido has retreated behind the stage of identification, the intellect no longer knows how to establish a relation to the outer world, even by means of identification. The psyche is approaching closer and closer to the mother's womb.

Furthermore, may not perhaps "picture-seeing in planes" represent a stage of the development of the visual sense still earlier than the hallucinatory stage?

5.

I have stated that narcissistic self-discovery and self-choice repeat themselves with every new acquisition of the ego, to this effect, that, under the guidance of conscience and judgment, each new acquisition is either rejected, or cathected with libido and attributed to the ego. Let us call this narcissism, psychic narcissism, and let us contrast it with the organic narcissism that guarantees in the unconscious the unity and functioning of the organism. There is nothing new in calling attention to the great dependence of physical health, and even of life itself, upon what is called love of life, or in the reminder that one can actually die of a "broken heart", and that, as Ostwald mentions in his book on *Great Men*, university professors emeritus often die soon after they have been absolved

¹ For further discussion of this subject, see Freud: *Metapsychologische Ergänzung zur Traumlehre*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. VI, 1916/1917. (Translated in *Coll. Papers* IV, 137-152.) This work appeared while the present paper was in proofs. I am pleased to be able to refer to the many points of agreement between my contentions and Freud's in his paper, of which I had no knowledge at the time.

of their duties, even when they have previously been in the best of health. They die, not of old age, but because they lose the love of life when they can no longer perform the duties they have loved. Freud tells of a famous musician who succumbed to his illness because of the discontinuance of his creative work.

We must assume that the libido flows through the entire body, perhaps like a substance (Freud's view), and that the integration of the organism is effected by a libido tonus, the oscillations of which correspond to the oscillations of psychic narcissism and object libido.¹ Upon this tonus depends the resistance to illness and death. Love of life has saved many a man who was given up by physicians as incurable.

Whenever there occurs an influx of organic narcissism to a given organ as a site of predilection,² there may also occur a consciousness of organ relations and organic functions which in normal life are relegated to an unconscious and vegetative rôle. Analogously, objects cathected by psychic narcissism and object love come to consciousness wherever the cathexis has

¹ Melancholia is the illness, the mechanism of which consists in the disintegration of psychic narcissism, in the renunciation of love for the psychic ego. Melancholia, in pure culture, is the paradigm of the dependence of the organic upon the psychic narcissism. The separation of libido from the psychic ego, i.e., the rejection and condemnation of the *raison d'être* of the psychic person, brings with it the rejection of the physical person, the tendency to physical self-destruction. There occurs a consecutive separation of the libido from those organs which guarantee the functioning and the value of the physical individuality, a separation by means of which the organs' function is impaired or given up. Hence appetite is lost, constipation occurs, menstruation ceases, and potency is lost—all as a result of unconscious mechanisms. This failure of function is to be traced to the destruction of the respective organic libido positions which are essentially vegetative, i.e., unconscious; it is thus to be strictly differentiated from the conscious, deliberate suicidal tendency expressed in refusal of nourishment or in activities inimical to life.

Melancholia is the persecution psychosis without projection: its structure is due to a specific mechanism of identification. (Further discussion on this point in my paper *Diagnostische Erörterungen auf Grund der Zustandsbilder der sogenannten Kriegspsychosen*. Wiener med. Wochenschrift XXXVII–XXXVIII, 1916. While this paper was in proof, Freud's article *Trauer und Melancholie* [translated in *Coll. Papers* IV, 152–173] appeared, to which I refer in this connection.)

² This involves the Freudian principle of the erotogenicity of organs, that is, of the erotogenic zones.

reached a sufficient degree of strength. This influx of libido directs attention to the organ and provides the consciousness of a transformation of the organ or its functions, i.e., the feeling of estrangement. This is the mechanism described by Freud as hypochondria. This influx of libido is followed by the turning away of the ego from the organ pathologically overcharged with libido, or from its functions; that is, by estrangement.¹

¹ Dr. Otto Pötzl suggested on a certain occasion (I do not remember whether it was in connection with a thesis of his own or as an addendum to theories of others) that the catatonic stare is an expression of the patient's inability to apportion his motor impulses disintegrated by the split of his volition into agonistic and antagonistic elements, so that a purposeful action may again be performed. (In Meyrinck's story, *Der Fluch der Kröte* ["The Curse of the Toad"], the milliped is unable to move a limb the moment he focusses his attention upon the activity of any one of his thousand legs.)

Pötzl's conception is in harmony with the psychoanalytic theory that the regressive narcissistic libido undergoes a pathological division with the cathexis of the individual functions of the psyche and the organs, so that the agonistic and antagonistic portions of the purposefully directed antithetical pair of forces are brought into the reach of awareness by the disturbance of the equilibrium between their respective libido quantities and are deprived of automatic functioning. This would be a special case of hypochondria and estrangement related to the antithetical pairs of forces with their respective specific consequences.

Pötzl's view does not contradict the assumption that the outer world may be eliminated as a result of regressive narcissistic libido, and it actually allows the application of the theory of hypochondria to further special points in the psycho-physical make-up of men. Pötzl's concept even suggests the hypothesis that there was in the life of man a period—a not definitely determinable one, it is true, and perhaps only potential—in which the activity of the antagonistic pair of forces was still automatic and had to be discovered and learned by the person himself as if from an alien outer world. This period may well be present in ontogenesis only as an "engram" of phylogenetic stages which comprised the origin of the now complex motor organs from the simplest, single-tracked active formations. Regression in schizophrenia would then be traceable to those "engrams" of the oldest era of the race, and the theory would demand that these phylogenetic traces of function retain their capacity for being reactivated. We must not shrink from this hypothesis. It provides us with another idea to use in investigating problems in schizophrenia: perhaps this remarkable disease consists in just this—that the phylogenetic vestiges of function retain in many individuals an extraordinary capacity for being reactivated. Psychoanalysis would have to make room for this conception, since psychoanalysis has already in many instances uncovered the roots of symptoms in the history of the species. From this it may perhaps be possible, via ontogenesis, to proceed to an explanation of the mysterious "electrical currents" complained of by patients. This

This is to be considered a defensive measure against the anxiety associated with hypochondria. The feeling of strangeness is a defense against libidinal cathexis, no matter whether it concerns objects of the outer world, one's own body, or its parts. Of course, the estrangement does not cause the giving up of the unconscious libido position. The estrangement is not a destructive force but merely a denial of the pathological cathexis; it is an instance of the ostrich tactics of the ego, which may be very easily reduced *ad absurdum*, and which must ultimately be supplanted by other or more effective measures of defense.

When, in paranoia, the feeling of estrangement no longer affords protection, the libidinal drive towards the homosexual object is projected on to the latter and appears, by a reversal of direction, as aggression towards the loving one (the patient himself) in the form of a sense of persecution. Strangers become enemies. The enmity is a new and more energetic attempt at protection against the rejected unconscious libido.

The narcissistic organ libido in schizophrenia may undergo a similar transformation. The estranged organ—in our case, the entire body—appears as an outer enemy, as a machine used to afflict the patient.

We are, then, compelled to distinguish three principal stages in the history of the “influencing machine”:

1. The sense of internal alteration produced by the influx of libido into a given organ (hypochondria).
2. The feeling of estrangement produced by rejection, whereby the pathologically altered organs or their functions are so to speak denied and eliminated as something alien to the wholly or partially sound organs and functions accepted by the ego.

paræsthesia may once have been a sensation that accompanied the first nerve and muscle functions. It is perhaps a reminiscence of the sensation of the newly born being who enters the strange air of the external world out of the comfortable covering of the mother's womb, or for whom the latter is replaced by its first garments. The bed he first lay in, is perhaps that one which comes to the patient's consciousness when he feels himself, while lying in bed, electrified by invisible wires.

3. The sense of persecution (*paranoia somatica*) arising from projection of the pathological alteration on to the outer world, (a) by attribution of the alteration to a foreign hostile power, (b) by the construction of the influencing machine as a summation of some or all of the pathologically altered organs (the whole body) projected outward. It is to be noted that among these organs the genitals take precedence in the projection.

The assumption of an influx of libido into specific organs in the physiological sense of the word should receive proper consideration. On the basis of this assumption transient swellings of organs often observed in schizophrenia without inflammation and without an actual oedema may be interpreted as equivalents of erection, produced like erections of the penis and clitoris by an overflow of secretion resulting from libidinal charging of organs.¹

6.

It is not at all surprising that the hostile apparatus is handled by persons who to an objective observer cannot but appear as love objects—suitors, lovers, physicians. All these persons are associated with sensuousness, deal with the body, and demand a transfer of libido to themselves. This is what actually occurs in normal situations. But the narcissistic libido, whenever too strongly fixated, cannot but regard this

¹ These psychological assumptions are strongly supported from the organological standpoint by a report made some years ago by Fauser at Stuttgart on the presence of sexual secretion in the blood of dementia præcox patients, as demonstrated by Abderhalden's dialytic method. New and important findings in this connection are to be expected from Steinach's experiments. When the present paper was completed, there appeared in the *Münchener mediz. Wochenschrift*, No. 6, 1918, under the title *Umstimmungen der Homosexualität durch Austausch der Pubertätsdrüsen* ("Transformations of Homosexuality by Exchange of Puberty Glands"), a very interesting and significant article by Steinach and Lichtenstern, which realized these expectations. After the completion of this paper there also appeared in the *Internationale Zeitschrift f. ärztl. Psa.* Volume IV, 1917, an article by S. Ferenczi, *Von Krankheits- und Pathoneurosen* ("Disease- or Patho-Neuroses", in *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis*, p. 78-89. London, 1926) in which the assumption of the libidinal cathexis of individual organs in the sense above described appears to be applied with notable success.

demand made by love objects as inimical, and looks upon the object as an enemy. It is to be noted, however, that another group of love objects—mother, the patient's present physician, close friends of the family—are not counted among the patient's persecutors but among the persecuted, compelled to share his fate in being subjected to the influencing machine. In contrast to paranoia, the persecuted and not the persecutors are organized into a passive conspiracy, and this conspiracy is of passive nature. Of this phenomenon the following explanation may be offered:

It is noteworthy that the persecutors are all persons who live at some distance from the patient, whereas the persecuted belong to the closest circle of acquaintanceship and—including the physicians who are imagos of the father and hence also family members—represent a kind of constantly present family. Now, the family members are those love objects who because of their presence from the beginning of the patient's life are subjected to the narcissistic object choice by identification. To these persons our patient still applies this form of object choice in so far as she subjects them to her own fate, identifying herself with them. Normally, the demand for transfer of libido with respect to members of the family is not felt either as requiring the overcoming of any great distance or any substantial sacrifice of narcissism. In establishing an identification with these persons the patient follows a well-trodden path, which does not appear sufficiently inimical to the patient to force her to revolt against the cathexis of these objects and to regard them as hostile. It is different with lovers and suitors. These threaten a narcissistic position with their substantial demands for object libido and are, therefore, repulsed as enemies. The fact that these persons are spatially distant evokes a feeling of distance on the part of the libido. The transfer of libido *par distance* is felt as an extraordinarily strong demand for the acknowledgment of an object position, as a demand for self-denial. This also holds for normal conditions. Spatial distance separating the beloved threatens the object libido; it even leads people ultimately to withdraw themselves

and give up the object. To have to love at a distance is a difficult task, only unwillingly performed. Our patient, however, cannot simply give up her love objects in a normal way, because she has not cathected them normally. To those demanding much from her she can only react with the paranoid mechanism; to those demanding less, only with identification. I do not know why the persons who work the influencing machine are in my observations exclusively male. This may be due to faulty observation or to chance. Further investigations must clarify this point. However, that heterosexual objects can appear as persecutors in contradiction to Freud's theory of the exclusively homosexual genesis of paranoia, may be explained by the fact that the influencing machine corresponds to a regressive psychic stage in which the important distinction is not between the sexes but between narcissistic and object libido, and every object demanding a transfer of libido is regarded as hostile irrespective of its sex.

7.

After this long digression—which, I hope, will not be regarded as superfluous—we may return to the question of how even the ordinary, clinically familiar, influencing machine in its typical form can be a projection of the patient's body, as was true in the case of Miss Natalija. The answer should not be difficult to discover. If we do not want to assume that the machine has been established by successive substitutions of the parts of the patient's idea of his own body picture ("*wie Fuchs aus alopex*"),¹ and if we make use, instead of the genitility of the machine, as previously established, to explain the typical influencing machine, we may avail ourselves of the following considerations:

The regression of libido to the early infantile stage determines the re-transformation of the meanwhile genitally centralized libido into the pregenital stage, in which the entire

¹ "Like fox from alopex"—a student parody on etymological derivations consisting of the stringing together of rhyming and nearly rhyming words.—TRANSLATOR.

body is a libidinal zone—in which the entire body is a genital. Such fantasies are also found in cases of narcissistically strongly cathected, sexually extremely infantile, neurosis. I have myself observed such cases. The fantasy originates in the intrauterine (mother's body) complex and usually has the content of the man's desire to creep completely into the genital from which he came, refusing to content himself with any lesser satisfaction. The entire individual is in this case a penis. Further, the road of identification with the father (the penis of the father) is overdetermined in the symptom formation of male patients. The symptom is also to be conceived as regression to a stage of diffuse narcissistic organ libido and is in most cases associated with genital impotence. The genital, too, is renounced.¹ The same situation is revealed by the lack of genitalia in the influencing machine of Miss N. The intrauterine fantasy and the identification² with mother probably find expression in the dome-like lid of the trunk which perhaps represented the patient's mother during pregnancy. The enclosed batteries are perhaps the child, which is the patient herself. The fact that the child is equated with the batteries, that is, with a machine, lends further support to the supposition that the person feels himself to be a genital, and

¹ This renunciation of the genitalia is felt by the male schizophrenic as a loss of virility, which is "drained off" from him, or else as a direct transformation into a woman, corresponding to the infantile notion of boys that there is only one kind of genital, namely their own, and that those of women are the result of castration and really represent a loss of the genital. The castration complex is often combined with the infantile identification of semen with urine resulting from urethral eroticism. I have observed an attack of castration anxiety while catheterizing a schizophrenic who refused to empty his bladder. He maintained that I was practicing coitus with him by means of the catheter and that I had emptied him of all his semen. Thus his retention of urine appears as a refusal to yield semen, representing his virility. The patient's playing with excrement is explicable by the narcissistically rooted conception that feces and urine are parts of the body. Coprophagia is not inhibited by the thought that the excreta are nothing else than the body from which they come.

² The proof of this identification derived from symbolic language has already been given in the dream of "the woman without a head", footnote, page 532.

this all the more because the machine's lack of genitalia stands for the pregenital—in a certain sense, non-genital stage.

The construction of the influencing apparatus in the form of a machine therefore represents a projection of the entire body, now wholly a genital.

The fact that the machine in dreams is nothing but a representation of the genital raised to primacy in no way contradicts the possibility that it is in schizophrenia a symbol of the entire body conceived as a penis, and hence a representative of the pregenital epoch. The patient has indeed not lost the ideational content of his past life. The picture of the genital as a representation of sexuality has been retained in the psychical apparatus. It is therefore used as a means of representation, a mode of expression, a language in which phenomena existing prior to this means of expression are communicated. Here the genital is merely a symbol of a sexuality older than the symbolism and than any means of social expression. The picture, then, is in the language of the later genital period nothing but: "I am sexuality". But the context is, "I am wholly a genital". This test has of course to be translated into the language suited to the actual libido conditions.

It is possible that the ordinary influencing apparatus in the form of the machine owes its existence simply to the fact that its early stages were not formed gradually, because the pathological process seized too precipitately upon remote phases of existence. It is also possible that the early stages were not noticed by observers and not reported by the patient, or not recognized and evaluated as early stages. Thus the connection between the influencing apparatus of Miss N. and the ordinary influencing machine has been lost to science.

But the contradiction between the two concepts—on the one hand, that the machine form of the influencing apparatus originated through successive distortions of the influencing apparatus that represents the projection of the body, and, on the other hand, that the machine form of the influencing apparatus represents, like the machine in a dream, a projection of

the genitalia, is now abolished. The evolution by distortion of the human apparatus into a machine is a projection that corresponds to the development of the pathological process which converts the ego into a diffuse sexual being, or—expressed in the language of the genital period—into a genital, a machine independent of the aims of the ego and subordinated to a foreign will.¹ It is no longer subordinated to the will of the ego, but dominates it. Here, too, we are reminded of the astonishment of boys when they become aware for the first time of erection. And the fact that the erection is shortly conceived as an exceptional and mysterious feat, supports the assumption that erection is felt to be a thing independent of the ego, a part of the outer world not completely mastered.

¹Indeed, the machines produced by man's ingenuity and created in the image of man are unconscious projections of man's bodily structure. Man's ingenuity seems to be unable to free itself from its relation to the unconscious. [See Hanns Sachs' *The Delay of the Machine Age* in this issue of the QUARTERLY!—TRANSLATOR.]

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BODILY MUTILATION AND LEARNING TO EAT

BY LILLIAN MALCOVE (NEW YORK)

The fear of being dismembered, cut to pieces, or mutilated,¹ has a prototype in the universal experience of learning to eat. It is in this procedure that the child sees food cut into pieces, mashed, broken up, and finally eaten. For this purpose special instruments are used, such as knives, forks and spoons, and also what appear to be the very powerful hands belonging to the mother or nurse. The child thus becomes acquainted with useful weapons, which supplement the teeth, and these weapons he soon learns to manipulate himself. Since the child's thinking is at this stage animistic, the food that he cuts and eats is endowed with attributes of human life, and can therefore easily be identified with himself or other persons. One young boy, indeed, went further and animated not only his food but the dish that contained it; he pretended that the dish walked to him and offered him the food; the dish then walked away from him and made the same offer to the stove and the toilet, which he likewise endowed with life, and which were selected not accidentally but because both of them, like the mouth, possessed a capacity for destruction. The identification of the child's self with his food, originally made possible by the animistic mode of thinking, is facilitated by fairy tales, by oral caresses and endearments, and by games improvised to expedite the feeding procedure.² In these games the food is represented by the adult as an entity that can wish to be eaten or wish to eat.

For the child, eating is literally a cannibalistic procedure, which includes the ante-mortem tortures of cutting and crushing, and in which the table silver supplements the teeth and

¹ Bromberg, Walter, and Schilder, Paul: *Psychologic Considerations in Alcoholic Hallucinosi—Castration and Dismembering Motives*. Int. J. Ps-A. XIV, 1933.

² See footnote in the article by Lewin: *The Body as Phallus*. This QUARTERLY II, 23.

the hands. This cannibalistic conception of eating does not disappear with the passing of animistic thinking. "Children", writes Fenichel in his chapter on the manic-depressive group, "often enough show that they still believe emotionally in the possibility of eating persons and of being eaten, even after this idea has been intellectually rejected."³ Vestiges of the cannibalistic interpretation of eating constitute the content of early symptom-formations. The two infantile phobias of Little Hans and the Wolfman, described by Freud, are fears of being bitten or eaten. The child's first phobias of animals, giants, ogres, or cannibals are in content projections of the known cannibalistic gratifications, including tearing, cutting and eating. The child is afraid that the ogre or animal will bite him, or cut and tear him into pieces and eat him. Many children fantasy just such a fate at the hands of the devil after death; being crushed by the gigantic hands of a beast like a gorilla is also a frequent fear. Behind these dreaded dangers to the body, moreover, lies concealed, more or less successfully, the dreaded danger to the genital.

The intimate connection between eating and the mutilative procedures described are clearly illustrated in the following excerpts of a case history:

A boy of seven, who had early feeding difficulties, developed, after the birth of a brother, a violent aggression directed against little children and his mother. Two events of his second year of life that occurred while his mother was nursing this brother remained with him as vivid memories: he performed cunnilingus on a little girl, and hit this same little girl on the head very sharply with a hammer. He explained: "I was mad then 'cause mother wouldn't let me milk the cow." In fantasy and in reality this child persistently sought to satisfy his oral wishes. He talked a great deal, preferring sexual topics, chewed his clothes, performed or wished to perform fellatio and cunnilingus, and constantly wished to be given something. He talked much of overpowering people and killing them, but was in fact cowardly. He had innumerable fears

³ Fenichel, Otto: *Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis*. This QUARTERLY II, 1933.

of being attacked by persons with knives, and of being cut up, mutilated and eaten, and also being swallowed by a shark or whale.

A brief account of his behavior under treatment showed the following illuminating sequence of events. The first hours were taken up with a repetitious recounting of his numerous fears, which he acted out realistically and with much affect. He then began to spend most of the time playing at cooking, usually frankfurters. He cut them into slices and ate them with evident satisfaction. His beverage was milk, but this sometimes changed to coffee or whiskey. Later he began to fantasy that he was a witch who ate people, that he mutilated the bodies by biting off the buttocks and the head, and then ate these parts. After he returned to eating frankfurters, he began to call them male genitalia and later female genitalia. He usually cut them up before eating them. He would also keep them in his mouth, sucking or chewing, or pretending to swallow the mass. The piece of clay he used for this purpose he called a sword, a knife, a tongue, a frankfurter, a snake, and a genital. Several weeks later he made a clay doll, which he recognized as a representation of his mother. He separated the legs, examined the perineum, touched it, and then pretended to reach for the "insides" and for the penis. He removed all the "insides", hollowed out the body and finally dismembered it completely. Still later he elaborated this trend when he used a clay snake to represent his mother. He now attacked her violently with a spear, and made many holes in her body. He cut off the head and the testicles, and took out the heart and the babies. He licked the babies with his tongue before he destroyed them. As he cut out their hearts he said, excitedly, "You see I am cutting it and now it is dying." As he played, he chewed pieces of clay which he then removed and threw about. At times he made a pretense of chewing a clay cigar. Following this play he became quieter and at the same time more anxious. He assumed the rôle of a girl, directed his aggression against himself, and his fears of being attacked and mutilated became intensified. He spoke

more freely of people shooting at his penis, and also at his finger and buttocks. As earlier, he acted out his fears, which ended in death, with or without the loss of a vital part, such as the penis or the finger. He brought out, in addition, that he would be eaten as a punishment for killing little children. This crime he performed by crushing babies under a motor car, or by first assaulting them sexually and later killing them,—the same procedure to which he had subjected his mother. At the end of one hour, in which he had clearly taken over the feminine rôle, he wrote on a piece of paper “kill”, through which he drew a line and then wrote “kiss me”.

The fears of another seven-year-old boy, a meek child of girlish appearance, who stuttered badly, showed a disposal of the dismembered parts that is of interest, since it also occurs in the hallucinations of alcoholics—the mutilated and dismembered parts were thrown into the ocean. This child, after several months of treatment, one day proceeded to destroy the genital of the dreaded giant, whom he had previously identified with the phallic mother. He dismembered the body and threw the pieces into the ocean “for the fish to eat”. He then caught the fish with a spear and ate them. It is of interest to note that this child identified his mother with the “Wolf-Grandmother” of the Little Red Riding-hood tale, and asked repeatedly what would happen to the little baby if the mother were cut open and died “like that wolf”.

Similar fears are found as frequently also in girls: A girl of six described vividly her fears, which were so real to her that she spoke of them as events that had actually occurred, although they were dreamed or fantasied. “I think a lot that men are sharpening their blades and dashing to kill me. I think at night that there is a robber in the bureau drawer. I get up and get him and cut him first in half and then in a million pieces.” “Once I dreamed that a robber put my toes in my mouth and choked me.” (The child sucks her thumb but tries not to, as her mother told her it would disappear if she did.) “I coughed and coughed, so he put me in a bag and slung me over his shoulders and took me to his home where he

killed me, chopped me up into a whole lot of pieces, took my skin off, put me in a stove, and cooked me.”

In these fragmentary illustrations, taken from phobias of children, it is evident that to be cut up, broken, and torn—no less than to be bitten or swallowed—is part of the process of being eaten. A person is treated like food. In these children, the fear of being eaten is known to be an oral-symbolic expression of the fear of being castrated. When the oral language is used, the body as a whole, or parts, are readily identified with the genital, and the anxiety initially pertaining to the safety of the genital is readily displaced and appears as anxiety concerning the safety of other bodily parts or the body as a whole. In these infantile phobias, the castration fear is expressed in oral terms, not only as a biting, but also as a dismembering. In the alcoholic psychoses—where the oral regression is beyond question—the expression would inevitably be the same as in the early “oral” fantasies: to be mutilated or cut up means to be castrated, and is a preparation for being eaten.

Otto Fenichel

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OUTLINE OF CLINICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY OTTO FENICHEL (BERLIN)

CHAPTER VII

NEUROSES RELATED TO PERVERSION

a. Other Neurotic Disorders of Sexual Function

There are a number of neurotic disorders of sexual functioning, which though not perversions are usually discussed in connection with them. Among these are the phenomena of hyposexuality and hypersexuality in persons who compared with the normal appear to have either too weak or too strong a sexual impulse. Obviously such cases may be purely organic in nature, the result of somatic endocrine disorder. However, it is quite often evident that the anomaly only appears to be organic and is actually due to psychological factors. This latter type of pseudo hyposexuality or pseudo hypersexuality will be the topic of our present discussion.

Hyposexuality is frequently a pretense due to a gross confusion of genitality and sexuality in general. Persons ostensibly deficient in sexual desire are those whose libido runs along other than genital channels. In the final analysis all neurotic persons are disturbed by an inhibited sexuality, inhibited because of its unconscious infantile meaning—and by the displacement of their libido. This outcome affects only part of the libido, a part, however, which must be sufficiently large to maintain the existence of the neurotic symptoms, yet may be sufficiently small to let the patient's sexual life appear undisturbed and allow him to feel subjectively that it is satisfactory. However, in most cases the amount of this libido is larger. Reich pointed out quite convincingly how rarely neurotic persons combine the presence of neurotic symptoms with a normal sexual life, and how often even these rare cases are finally found to have an only apparently normal sexual life,

their subjective satisfaction being due to the fact that they do not really know how differently a normal individual feels when enjoying the sexual act.¹ It is quite commonly found that a large number of neurotic persons are impotent or frigid as well, and many of those who appear sexually normal are "orgastically impotent".² The neurotic's constant struggle with his repressed infantile sexuality injures his immediate sexual energy. This is not necessarily expressed in a conscious sense of diminution in sexual pleasure, but it may be so expressed. Hence this pseudo diminution of sexual function is not a separate clinical entity, but is rather a phenomenon attending all neuroses; like other impediments to sexual function (such as impotence, ejaculatio præcox, frigidity, vaginism) it is to be included among the inhibitions described in a previous chapter (Chapter III).

A hypersexuality may be simulated owing to the same set of circumstances that produce hyposexuality. Many neurotic persons strive time and again (failing each time) to discharge through genital activity the sexuality they cannot satisfy because of their neurosis. They thus produce the impression of being very vigorous genitally. But since psychoanalysis has recognized the need of broadening the conception of sex, the symptoms and the unconscious sexual wishes uncovered by analysis may give the impression that the neurotic is equipped with extremely intense and genuinely strong instincts, whereas this impression is really due to his inability to discharge his sexual tensions, and is accounted for by the damming of libido.³ Though one neurotic may succeed in masturbating fourteen times a day and another may be able to perform the sexual act ten times in succession, it requires no very profound analysis to perceive that the apparent plus conceals a real minus. A normal person satisfies his sexual desire without such exaggera-

¹ Reich, Wilhelm: *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*. Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1927. P. 13 ff.

² Reich, Wilhelm: *op. cit.*

³ Freud: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*. Ges. Schr. V, 43 f. (In Brill's trans. [ed. 4], p. 32).

tion, but the neurotic suffers from an incapacity to do this; hence he attempts to encompass his satisfaction by persistently repeating the sexual act. Although he may have an orgasm on each occasion, in Reich's sense he is orgasmically impotent—that is, he is unable to achieve a satisfying relaxation. This serves to explain why most hypersexuals, so-called, are chronic neurasthenics; the amount of libido that finds no outlet in genital activity produces actual-neurotic symptoms,—inner restlessness, a disturbance in the capacity for work, etc., which betrays their unsatisfied state. They cannot attain genuine end pleasure, and this is occasionally manifested in a relatively premature ejaculation or similar disturbances.¹ Many neurotic persons lay too much stress on the fore-pleasure mechanisms. Time and again they generate and enjoy various tensions without an appropriate release; they thus secondarily sexualize numerous activities, which in themselves are innocent enough, and become permanently excited. This can hardly be ascribed to a primary insatiability and need for perpetual pleasure, as Pfeiffer assumes²; rather, the cause is to be sought in a primary insufficiency of the orgasmic function.³ This exaggerated insistence on fore-pleasure—that is to say, on pleasure that accompanies tension—is determined by an anal erotic factor, for pleasure due to tension is experienced most intensely when the anal sphincters are used.

The question then is what produces the insufficiency of the orgasm. If the libido does not develop normally and reach adult genital primacy, and all sexual impulses therefore preserve their unconscious infantile meaning, the orgasm may fail for two reasons:—(1) There is no current possibility of satisfying the infantile sexual wishes (for example, the sexual partners are not the real parents); and (2) the defensive forces—in the form of anxiety and guilt that pertains to infantile sexuality—oppose sexual pleasure and interfere with complete

¹ Reich, Wilhelm: *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*.

² Pfeiffer, Sigmund: *Die neurotische Dauerlust*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV, 1928; and *Über eine Form der Abwehr*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVI, 1930.

³ An opinion first expressed by Reich in *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*.

gratification. These statements are undoubtedly true, yet they are too general to be entirely satisfactory, for they would apply to every neurotic person. It may be argued that the phenomena mentioned are in fact to be found more or less well defined in all neurotics; but there must be an additional factor that determines the nature of those cases in which the above described symptoms are most marked and dominate the clinical picture.

Don Juan's behavior is no doubt due to his œdipus complex; he seeks his mother in all women and cannot find her. But the analysis of Don Juan types shows that the œdipus complex is of a particular kind¹: it is pregenital and pervaded by narcissistic conflicts, and tinged by sadistic impulses. The pregenital quality that accompanies the love of the mother here appears to be not merely a regressive distortion. The Don Juans' œdipus complex from the start is colored by their strong pregenital fixation; their relationship with objects is always attended by strong unconscious narcissistic relations, their love is always mixed with a certain amount of hostility; and their love and hate include a certain amount of unconscious "incorporation" of the object. Their sexual activities are often primarily designed to settle conflicts regarding their self-esteem and elevate their self-regard (as we shall see in following chapters of this book); or it appears to be the covert sadistic and pregenital aim in their unconscious desire for the mother that cannot be satisfied through coitus. The sadism in question is not always directed toward objects but often against their own ego, so that their vigorous sexual activity also includes a masochistic or self-punitive effort at self-destruction. The more stubborn cases of *ejaculatio præcox* almost constantly show this type of pregenital content.² All other perverse inclinations may give rise to analogous clinical pictures. A markedly unconsciously homosexual man, for example, may be aroused by sexual contact with women but not satisfied, and then vainly seek satisfaction in more and more sexual activity.

¹ See Rank, Otto: *Die Don Juan-Gestalt*. Imago VIII, 1922.

² See Chapter III.

(The analyses of dreams with seminal emissions following coitus furnish leads for the understanding of these cases.)

The psychological attitude just described may occasionally find expression in the conversion symptom of priapism, which can thus be understood and cured. It is well, however, to point out the rarity of this symptom and to remind the reader that priapism is more usually due to organic disease; even in ostensibly organically healthy persons a thorough somatic examination is advisable.

Nymphomania, or more accurately pseudo nymphomania (for there is possibly a true endocrine type) has the same psychological structure as the analogous disorder in men.¹ An accurate anamnesis by itself often shows that nymphomaniac women are by no means the most excitable sexually, and do not readily, or not regularly, have an orgasm. Even when they have an orgasm, it is not a true end pleasure and gives them no satisfaction. More unequivocally than in the Don Juans, analysis shows that the condition depends on a marked narcissistic attitude and a very marked pregenital and sadistic coloration of the œdipus complex. The strong sadistic component, directed both against the sexual partner and against themselves, is manifest in the very manner in which they attempt to find the (to them) unobtainable sexual satisfaction. Analysis shows invariably that they unconsciously hate their sexual partner intensely; they strive to coerce him by their violence into giving them the complete sexual satisfaction that is not forthcoming. In this, the nymphomanics are usually repeating an early infantile situation; as little girls, they had desired the father with the same avidity that characterizes their demands on men, which might be formulated, "If you don't give me it of your own accord, I shall take it." This vindictiveness is quite often combined with a tendency to respond to every disappointment as if it were the loss of an object, a mode of reaction that indicates the intense pregenital fixation. Undoubtedly the "it", in the formula above, that is so intensely desired, is associatively

¹ See the chapter, *Die Sexualerregung bei der Nymphomanen*, in Reich's book.

intimately bound up with the desire to have a child and the envy of the penis, and nymphomaniac passion aims to fulfil the wish-phantasy of depriving the man of his penis or biting it off. But the manner in which this penis is taken and incorporated, in phantasy, indicates that the ostensible incessant genital desire is a pseudo-genital one at bottom,—that the essential aim is incorporation, which is oral, and that the object (the child, and more deeply the penis) is treated according to pregenital conceptions of *fæces* and milk. Occasionally, analysis may uncover the early infantile experiences that determined the later development of the *œdipus* complex and first gave it its pregenital imprint, which was later displaced from mother to father.¹ To ravage the interior of the mother's body and destroy its contents by using the mouth is perhaps the most elemental expression of this impulse, a point which Melanie Klein has stressed.² For the child the mother's body contains milk, *fæces*, a child, and more rarely, probably the father's penis. In these stages thinking is too simple to make it plausible that the idea, "Mother takes father's penis from him in coitus; it is hidden in her; I want to get it out", is a typical and constant phantasy. It has been stated several times in psychoanalytic literature that with the transposition of sexual feeling from the clitoris to the vagina, a previous oral orientation is reanimated and displaced from above downward.³ Nymphomaniac women appear to have been excessively affected by this process, so that their vagina remains essentially a mouth, and with it they wish to repeat infantile oral sadistic activities or fulfil oral sadistic wishes.

Since publishing an illustrative case of this type,⁴ I have had the opportunity to study a second characteristic case of the same type. While this girl was still

¹ See Fenichel, Otto: *Zur prägenitalen Vorgeschichte des Ödipuskomplexes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVI, 1930. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. XII.)

² Klein, Melanie: *Frühstadien des Ödipuskomplexes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV, 1928. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. IX) and in later publications.

³ Deutsch, Helene: *Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*. Wien: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1925. Pp. 54.

⁴ Fenichel, Otto: *Zur prägenitalen Vorgeschichte des Ödipuskomplexes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVI, 1930. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. XII.)

a nursing, she had a severe gastro-intestinal illness, because of which she had been starved. The result was a huge oral desire. In the period that followed her illness, she would habitually break her milk bottle after having drained it, which I presume to interpret: "What do I want with an empty bottle? I want a full one!" As a young child she was unusually gluttonous. Correlative with her oral fixation the patient developed an intense fear of losing love, and clung closely to her mother.¹ Hence when she was three years old and her mother became pregnant, she was much embittered. She wished to treat her mother's large abdomen as she had treated the milk bottle: destroy it, devour its contents, and probably put herself in place of the unborn child. After the child was born, she would snatch the bottle from its mouth, drink all the milk, and stick the bottle back into the baby's throat so that it nearly suffocated. It cannot surprise us that, discovering the existence of the penis about this time, she should orient herself to it in the same way as to the unborn child; she did indeed wish to tear it out (push it in), eat it up, and put herself in its place.

The factor that was crucial in bringing about the displacement of her attitude towards her mother on to her father was her mother's death. This occurred when the patient was five years of age, and like the death of all near relatives intensified her oral fixation. The child enjoyed the anticipation of being able to take her mother's place for a brief interval only. Her happiness was disturbed by several factors: by a severe sense of guilt, since she had desired her mother's death as early as the time of the pregnancy; by objective disappointments—a governess entered the household and she became a child again; and, in addition to these, by her (orally determined) incapacity to bear the loss of her mother's affectionate tenderness. The love tie to her father, which was now speedily established and which was so crucial in her future—the œdipus complex proper—received its unconscious specific form entirely because of the displacement of the quality of her pregenital relationship with the mother to the genital relationship with the father.² She had the phantasy of taking his penis (=the child) from him by force and devouring it, then of being on or within the father's abdomen, of being devoured and within the composite father-mother finding peace from her dread of further bereavement, of her entire body's becoming her father's penis in order to have a share in his maleness. All subsequent relationships with men were made after this infantile pattern and were pervaded by tendencies to incorporate and by the idea of being little and being snuggled. A puberty masturbation phantasy, accompanied by a sense of guilt, was of being raped by a blackamoor in a corset shop; this phantasy was a screen for her œdipus complex and contains its pregenital antecedents. For "corset" proved to be an expression that meant "reduce a big abdomen", and the blackamoor was the father in the rôle of the baby-eater who hangs children from his belt and leaves them there dangling.

Here, as in our discussion of male hypersexuality, we may admit that similar (even if less clearcut) symptoms may appear in connection with any other unconscious perversion. In

¹ More will be said of this "clinging" in subsequent chapters.

general, hypersexuality may be considered an attempt to discharge by way of the genital any sort of tension that is not genital. The nongenital quality of this tension is best seen in those cases in which the composite nature of the tension is most clearcut, as in certain compulsions to masturbate, which in psychological structure are analogous to the cases described above. As we learned, compulsions (so far as they do not represent defensive acts) are automatic but inappropriate attempts to find an outlet for infantile instinct-tensions, of which the ego that carries out the actions does not know the meaning. Compulsive masturbation is similarly an attempt to find a pathway of discharge—but of genital discharge. Unlike the normal masturbation of puberty, this type is far from satisfying; instead, it quite frequently is consciously unpleasant and irritating. Often such an impulse to masturbate is, subjectively, purely compulsive; for example, with a text like “masturbate or your father will die”, etc., or the masturbation procedure may include stringent rituals that eliminate all possibility of enjoyment. To use Radó’s phrase, it has turned into a “caricature of masturbation”.¹ Such compulsive masturbation may be analyzed like any other compulsion, and in each case has a specific meaning; the causes of the tension that generates it are various and many, but they are never direct genital impulses. The sadistic impulses appear to be of most importance in these cases, some of which are directed against the object, as can be seen when compulsive masturbation is attended by obsessive fears, and some of which are self-destructive and depend upon the equation, ejaculation=castration, whereby the recurring masturbation unconsciously signifies a protracted suicide.²

Since the original purpose of many compulsions is the prevention of masturbation, we may regard masturbation that

¹ In an address read before the German Psychoanalytic Society, 1931.

² According to Ferenczi the symptom of seminal emission unaccompanied by orgasm is related to compulsive masturbation. See: *Pollution ohne orgasmischen Traum und Orgasmus im Traume ohne Pollution*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. IV, 1917. (Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc.)

takes place as a compulsion as the greatest victory of the "return of the repressed from repression". Indeed, in the end the paradoxical situation may arise that anxiety is not employed to prevent masturbation, but masturbation to prevent anxiety. Advanced cases of compulsion neurosis attempt to masturbate away all tensions produced by the neurosis. Thus not infrequently patients will masturbate while at the climax of an attack of doubting-mania (*folie de doute*), in an inexpedient effort to dispel the doubt.¹

A compulsion neurotic, attempting to send a telegram, handed the written message to the clerk, took it back, handed it in again, and so on until he was overwhelmed by doubt as to what he would finally do,—so much so that his sole recourse was to masturbate in public.

In attempts of this sort to dispel a neurotic conflict by masturbating, under certain conditions and in severe cases, the act of masturbation (usually unaccompanied by phantasies) becomes a nonspecific expression of impulses from all the levels of libidinal organization, aggressive and suicidal included,—an effort to capture a particle of mental well-being from psychic misery. This type of masturbation, in depressions and early schizophrenias may become an "addiction", without any specific unconscious meaning and with a subjective quality quite different from compulsive masturbation proper, and it is found along with the alternation of elation and remorse and the oral traits of character that are characteristic of addicts. The reason this masturbation does not produce the desired relaxation is evident: the person in question is incapable of discharging his tension because of internal psychological factors. It might then be asked why, under pressure of this tension, he strives so insistently to use this inappropriate means, of which the answer is that he remembers that genital orgasm at one time was the appropriate means of discharge. He thus is looking for something that is lost and cannot find it. He is in a vicious circle. Inadequate orgasm is followed by unpleasant tension, masturbation is resorted to to relieve the tension, it fails to do so, this generates more tension, and so on.

¹ See the chapter on Compulsion Neuroses

This explains why he masturbates more and more frequently, and illustrates particularly clearly the influence of "damming of libido" that is so important in all neuroses. It is well to be cautious about mistaking what is simply very intense masturbation, which may be the expression of some neurotic conflict, for the "addiction".

When the presenting symptom of a case is hypersexuality, a preliminary examination and possibly a trial analysis will assist in definitely determining the true nature of the symptom. At times it will be part of a neurasthenia, sometimes of a simple hysteria, a compulsion neurosis, or a beginning psychosis. In other words, it is a symptom that is not a definite specific clinical entity in itself, and it is therefore impossible to prescribe definite indications for therapy or the prognosis. Psychoanalysis may be profitably employed in cases of compulsive polygamy, nymphomania, compulsive masturbation, and similar states; this is limited by the extent to which actual-neurotic or narcissistic elements that are present may hamper the efficacy of the analysis.

At this point we must again take up the discussion of sexual infantilism, begun in the chapter on the perversions. Its relation to the perversions is the same as that of the compulsive character, which is due to disturbances of development (or chronic neurasthenia), to the compulsion neurosis. It is due to a genuine disorder in the development of the libido which arises when there is an obstacle to the organization of the sexual impulse.

It is characterized by the fact that the whole sexual life is like a child's: the perverse acts are polymorphous, sexual satisfaction is not sharply distinguished from sexual excitement, the attitude is predominantly narcissistic, and the sexual acts chiefly autoerotic. Nothing specific is known of cases in which this infantilism is restricted entirely to sexual activity. So far as they have been studied, they reveal that the early infantile fears of castration and losing love, combined with an early narcissistic fixation, are the obstacles to sexual development. More frequently the sexual infantilism is a by-manifestation

of a general infantilism and is then a symptomatic component of a severe anomaly of character development or of an incipient or abortive psychosis. (It must be borne in mind that in all psychoses, because of the narcissistic position, sexual behavior is polymorphous perverse.) This group therefore includes persons whose attitude to life in general and not just to sexuality resembles that of a child, and who would in clinical practice fall into the group generally termed "pseudo imbeciles". In other cases the polymorphously perverse behavior is combined with an equally severe disturbance in the development of object relationships. Such persons neither love nor hate, but adopt a position corresponding to the preliminary stages of love and hate; objects are necessary to them for the regulation of their own self-regard and for the keeping of their narcissistic balance; they constantly require that forgiveness and self-respect should be forthcoming from the external world in order that they may live, as a baby requires the external supply of milk. Many a Don Juan and nymphomaniac are to be included in this group.¹ A detailed discussion will be found in a later chapter. Here it may be stated merely that in their sexual activity not only is there a lack of organization in the expression of all erotogenic zones and component impulses, but that quite peculiar, though never exclusive, tendencies to individual perversions appear, which sometimes suggest childhood naughtiness, sometimes resemble the impulsive behavior of psychopathic personalities, and sometimes the addictions.

A patient of this type was sexually excited whenever he ate sausages, which he did every day avidly, distorting thus only to a very slight extent his oral and anal sexual wishes.

In general the prognosis in these cases is poor, and will depend on the individual features of the case.

In the above discussion, we did not have in mind cases of true perversion which, because of the thoroughly infantile nature of the sexual aim, only appear to be examples of psycho-

¹ In practice this group coincides with the manic-depressive type. See Radó, Sándor: *Das Problem der Melancholie*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIII, 1927. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. IX.)

sexual infantilism. For instance, an adult woman obtained sexual gratification only by sucking her thumb while alone; yet this was a case of true sexual perversion, for the woman was not polymorphously perverse; her oral eroticism was merely the executive of her entire adult sexual life; the essential mechanisms in her case were those of hysteria, and she responded to analysis.

b. Impulsive Behavior and Addictions

It has been stated in the previous pages that impulsive behavior, or so-called "impulsive insanity", occupies a position between compulsion neuroses and perversions. These two are the extremes between which the different states included in the concept of impulsive behavior serve as connecting links, by a series of transitional gradations, in the same manner as the organ neuroses extend between hysteria and hypochondriasis. The psychoanalytic interpretation of these conditions is still incomplete. What is well understood corresponds to the two extremes of the series, which really are only varieties of the familiar compulsion neurosis or perversions. The more specific features of the characteristic cases that lie between these extremes present a number of unsolved problems.

Considered superficially the typical compulsions have the appearance of rather harmless acts; analytically they were proved to represent, like other symptoms of the neurosis, unconscious sadistic impulses, or aggressive impulses, generally speaking, which are in this way either expressed symbolically or magically warded off. Yet it is known that the typical element of a compulsive conflict is the strength of the defense against the underlying instinct, and that the defense is sufficiently effective to preclude the possibility of real injurious behavior in the compulsion. It is also the case that the compulsions representing the direct expression of hostility are usually distorted by means of the mechanism of "displacement to the minute"; indeed, even when the compulsion involves the possibility of doing real harm, as when it consists in opening and shutting off the gas jet, it is subjectively felt to be con-

trolled by the defensive side of the conflict. Murderous impulses, if they become conscious, do so only in the form of obsessions, and are thus far removed from a motor execution.¹ However, there are occasional exceptions to this general rule—that is, compulsions of an objectively aggressive nature, the aggression being directed either against an object or against the ego. Such cases, it is true, can no longer be regarded as typical compulsion neuroses, because of the extent to which the instincts succeed in making a breach in the defense, so that the cases resemble other more severe (usually narcissistic) disorders. Admittedly, there are conceivably cases in which this close resemblance is manifested in this one respect alone, although it is more usual to find other features, especially cyclothymia and symptoms included in the manic-depressive or schizophrenic field, that point to these latter diagnoses. There are cases of impulsive stealing, arson, etc., which essentially conform to all the laws of the compulsion neurosis. The question of a differential etiology, that is to say, of what conditions permit aggressive impulses to emerge in so clearcut a fashion as compulsions, we shall for the moment answer merely by the suggestion that there is involved a coöperation of narcissistic mechanisms in the relationship of the ego and super-ego—and turn immediately to a consideration of the other extreme of the continuous series mentioned above.

In our discussion of fetishism, we referred to the so-called “subjective fetishes” of persons who obtain sexual satisfaction only when certain definite, atypical conditions are fulfilled. It was there stated that the special conditions are determined by the repressed memory of certain infantile experiences, on which the person remains fixed because they are particularly well adapted to solve or bring nearer to a solution the typical infantile sexual conflicts (for example, those related to the castration complex). The possibility of such conditions being set depends basically upon the fact that any exciting experience may simultaneously be a source of sexual excitement, as we explained in our study of erotogenic masochism, and this

¹ See the chapter on Compulsion Neuroses.

circumstance permits the "sexualization" of any type of activity, even though this may in appearance be remote from sexuality. It was also stated that in "subjective conditions of love" there existed a broad transitional field extending toward normality, so that these phenomena were to be considered "pathological" only if the unusual and atypical procedures produced an orgasm and completely took the place of normal sexual activity. Even among these atypical procedures, some may be considered as in a relative sense somewhat typical—that is to say, these tend to set up sexual excitement in everyone, especially in children, although they do not represent the immediate satisfaction of a component instinct. As an illustration, we may cite lighting fires or playing with fire.¹ Many persons remember being immediately excited sexually by these actions and in *Struwwelpeter*, the story of "Paulinchen" indicates the general distribution of such sensations. Such pleasure resembles that which is termed "pleasure in anxiety",² that is, the above-mentioned capacity for utilizing other emotions as sources of sexual excitement. However, it seems to depend upon more primitive and immediately archaic elements than these. Analysis reveals in these cases sadistic instincts that aim to destroy the object, and in addition a deep-seated relationship to urethral eroticism, which is not explicable analytically but must have as yet unknown roots in phylogeny. There are perversions based on urethrality and coprophilia; similarly perversions may be developed that depend on these displacements of urethral eroticism. Like a component impulse, under certain circumstances they may be used to produce an orgasm, and the pleasure in starting a fire (as an objective fact or as a phantasy) may become the indispensable condition for sexual enjoyment. From an analytical point of view such an "incendiary perversion" would not be different theoretically from

¹ See Freud: *Bruchstück einer Hysterie-Analyse*. Ges. Schr. VIII, 73 ff. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* III, 87 ff.); and *Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose*. Ges. Schr. VIII, 535. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* III, 473.)

² Hattingberg, Hans von: *Analerotik, Angstlust und Eigensinn*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. II, 1914. And Laforgue, René: *Über die Erotisierung der Angst*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVI, 1930.

any other perversion, and the problem of the conditions that determine whether such a person will be content with phantasies alone, or whether he will become a pyromaniac resembles the problem of what conditions determine whether a given person will be a sadist in phantasy only or whether he will really commit passionnal murders,—a problem which also awaits solution.

The crucial determinant of whether a case of impulsive incendiarism will be included in one or the other category is usually to be found in the nature of the subjective experiences. In speaking of a gradual transition between the two types, we meant that in most cases there is a combination of symptoms of both orders—that is to say, incendiarism is usually subjectively perceived as something more compulsive and ego-alien than the perverse tendency of a true perversion, yet at the same time, when it does not produce orgasm, it will furnish more sexual pleasure than a genuine compulsion.¹ In the one point of agreement of compulsions and perversions, the impulsive acts offer no exception. They are not the expression of a simple instinct that persists from childhood on or is reawakened later, and which would thus be determined by endocrine influences and not psychogenically. The impulsive act is complex and expresses an unconscious conflict, an unconscious instinctual demand versus the defense, whether the repression is maintained by making use of the symptom (as in a perversion), or whether the appearance of the impulsive act represents an outburst of an instinct already repressed in distorted form (like a compulsion). These unconscious conflicts with infantile sexuality are here (as ordinarily) related to the œdipus complex and the castration complex. In most typical cases of impulsive behavior, we possess information concerning the points of fixation, the typical shaping of the complexes determined by these fixations, and the intermediate formations

¹ See Bychowski, Gustav: *Zur Psychopathologie der Brandstiftung*. Schweizer Arch. f. Neur. u. Psychiat. V, 1919; and in regard to the gradual transition from compulsion neurosis to perversion cf. Ferenczi, Sándor: *Mischgebilde von erotischen und Charakterzügen*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psch. IV, 1916. (Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc.)

that represent them. In our illustration, incendiarism, we are unable to state such points, as too few cases have as yet been thoroughly analyzed. It is only possible to suppose that, as in nymphomania, the œdipus complex has a pregenital sadistic coloration, and that the patient's sexual life is completely governed by deeply hostile and vindictive impulses, or at least colored by them; and that the specific fixation must be urethral erotic. Of cleptomania, which depends on similar preconditions, we have more information. The cleptomaniac is fixed to a definite infantile attitude; he responds to the frustrations of his desire to be loved with hostility and defiance, saying as it were, "If you don't give it to me, I have to take it." The œdipus complex seems to be formed according to the following plan: "Mother (or father) will not gratify my wishes; I myself have to gratify them." In the discussion of hypersexuality, it was shown that an attitude of this sort is the result of a pregenital sadistic, and typically, oral fixation and a partial regression to the oral level. The corresponding anticipation (corroborated by analysis) would be that the property stolen by the cleptomaniac symbolically represents milk, or the breast. But it must not be thought that this "ultimate" (deepest) interpretation is necessarily the decisive one economically. The cleptomaniac craving may more probably be the regressive expression of a desire for objects corresponding to a higher level of organization: fæces, penis, or child. These three, because of the level involved (where the relation to objects is expressed by a wish to incorporate), may be supposed to be in the mother's body, so that the theft is given the meaning which Melanie Klein has described: "I wish to seize the contents of my mother's body."¹ So far as our experience goes, the stolen property apparently always has all three significations, but generally speaking, the most important object of the three is the penis.² This explains why cleptomania is more common in women

¹ Klein, Melanie: *Frühstadien des Ödipuskomplexes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. IX.)

² See Chadwick, Mary: *A Case of Kleptomania in a Girl of Ten Years*. Int. J. Ps-A. VI, 1925; Tamm, Alfild: *Drei Fälle von Stehlen bei Kindern*. Ztschr. f. ps. Pädag. II, 1927; Lorand, Sándor: *Crime in Fantasy and Dreams, and the Neurotic Criminal*. Ps. Rev. XVII, 1930; and others.

than in men. After the little girl has been disappointed in the realization of her œdipal wishes, her typical unconscious thought is, that since she cannot be given a child by her father, she might at any rate have a penis, but since she has not this penis, and since she learned quite early in life that what she did not get for the asking might be obtained by action, she resolves to steal one. In the boy, too, a wish to have a penis is not so absurd as it appears at first sight: he wishes another penis than his own—a large one like his father's. It must be emphasized expressly that cases of kleptomania, like those of incendiarism, may occupy any position in the transitional series and need not, as is so frequently assumed, approach the compulsion neurotic extreme.

A woman of forty, who constantly relapsed into thievery, told me that she was sexually excited whenever she stole, and that she had an orgasm at the moment she had succeeded in her theft. She did not have an orgasm under any other circumstances, was completely frigid, and while masturbating would imagine that she was stealing something.

The impulse to gamble also appears to occupy a place between the two extremes. To my knowledge, no report exists of a gambler's regarding his passion for gambling as an obsession, or of an orgasm obtained through gambling. In analysis, the passion for gambling is also seen to be a displaced expression of the most important conflicts of infantile sexuality.¹ As a rule one finds the same conflict of instinct versus defense that centered about masturbation at an earlier date, the conflict being displaced to the new matter.

The excitement of the game corresponds to sexual excitement; winning, to an orgasm; losing, to being punished by castration. As is always the case when masturbation plays a prominent rôle in the unconscious sexual activities, here too it makes its appearance as the scapegoat for the œdipal impulses of which it is the agent, and which ultimately are gratified or punished by the turns of the game. It will be readily under-

¹ See Freud: *Dostojewski und die Vätertötung*. Almanach der Psa. 1930; and Simmel, Ernst: *Zur Psychoanalyse des Spielers*. Author's abstract in Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. VI, 1920.

stood, that, as analysis proves, prerequisite for a displacement of this sort is a marked pregenital-sadistic quality in the œdipus complex (as shown in the attitude to the other players). The oral element nevertheless appears to be less salient here than the anal (the part played by money).

The single case of passionate gambling that I have had an opportunity to analyze was a gambler in the lotteries. He always behaved as though it was assured and inevitable that he would one day win the grand prize. This was simply a debt that fate owed him. His psychoanalysis showed that "fate", as it so often does, represented his father and was a screen figure for the latter. To accept or to take money from his father was a constantly recurring theme throughout his life. It was correlated with the above described pregenital-sadistic orientation of his (negative) œdipus complex.

The impulse to engage in wandering appears to approximate the compulsion neurosis more than the perversions. Nevertheless most impulsive wanderers derive enjoyment from their symptom, so that it evidently has been extensively sexualized. Obviously the mechanism at work is the one that was described as characteristic of addictions:—A procedure subserving protection from within is secondarily a sexual gratification. Primarily, the typical wanderer appears to have depressive tendencies and feelings of guilt (related to sexual ideas) that he is trying to leave behind him. Bernfeld has pointed out that in order for this mode of avoiding a sense of guilt to become fixed, certain prerequisites are necessary, which are fulfilled only in the social situation of the proletariat.¹ These are the possibilities open to children of this milieu to escape from guilt-provoking quarrels between the parents by really running away from home. We shall return to this in the chapters on character disorders. We have still to mention the various types of hobbies passionately pursued by "eccentrics", which have the appearance of a sort of private perversion, and give the impression of sexualized compulsiveness, or to a certain extent take on a manifest sexual quality.²

¹ Bernfeld, Siegfried: *Der soziale Ort und seine Bedeutung für Neurose, Verwahrlosung und Pädagogik*. Imago XV, 1929.

² Cf., for example, Rickman, John: *Photography as a Pseudo-Perversion*. Int. J. Ps.-A. VI, 1924.

The subject of the unconscious ideational contents of impulsive behavior cannot be considered completely closed unless we clearly state how this behavior is adapted to give satisfaction not only to the suppressed distorted impulses of the id, but, at the same time, those of a severe super-ego as well. In this concept is included the idea that the gambler will eventually come to ruin, and that the arsonist and thief will ultimately be caught. Hence, impulsive behavior is often to be found in "moral masochists". But this does not constitute a theoretical difference between these types and the compulsion neurotics or the sexually perverse, for both of these may at times show a similar manifestation: It is well known that many obsessions and compulsions carry out the task of satisfying super-ego demands; in perversions also there may be present a not inconsiderable need for punishment, as in the case of an exhibitionist, with which I am familiar, where the exposure took place only when a policeman was in the vicinity. But there is nevertheless a quantitative difference in that the narcissistic arrangement between the ego and the super-ego has often completely replaced the original arrangement between the instinctual-ego and the prohibitive parents, a fact which is in favor of the idea that impulsive behavior is more nearly related in essence to the more narcissistic, manic-depressive states, as we have had other reason to suppose.

Impulsive behavior, as a transitional field between compulsion and sexual pleasure, is reminiscent of compulsive masturbation. This external resemblance is correlated with a resemblance of the underlying mechanisms. To complement our statement that the mania for gambling is a distorted form of masturbation, we may add the qualification, of *compulsive* masturbation. An impulsive act may represent a compulsion that has been successfully erotized so that its performance is attended increasingly by pleasure, but it may also be the case, conversely, as in the related phenomenon of compulsive masturbation, that the sexual pleasure originally obtained recedes more and more as the process goes on. Again the execution of a piece of impulsive behavior, with its unconscious sexual meaning, may be considered (like compulsive masturbation)

an inappropriate attempt to discharge, by means of the genital, tensions arising from numerous other sources. The act is carried out not only to obtain pleasure, but also to avoid painful tension and to be relieved of states of unbearable tension, pain, or depression. And it will be readily understood that as in the case of compulsive masturbation such an attempt is doomed to fail, and that the fateful vicious circle of "libido-damming" will develop. It is often observable that besides its unconscious sexual purpose, the impulsive act conceals a destructive, and particularly self-destructive purpose. This is also a point of resemblance between the group of disorders under discussion and the manic-depressive states, for the latter also manifest, alternately, the demands of a severe super-ego (unbearable narcissistic tension) and a complete disappearance of these demands (which impulsive behavior is intended to dispel). It is for this reason that so many patients, while carrying out the impulsive act, give the impression of being manic, and we shall therefore relegate a more detailed discussion of this point to the chapter on the manic-depressive group. Many impulsive acts are executed with all the psychological features that characterize the drug addict—with the alternation of deed and remorse—and thus make the impression of a "drugless" addiction, functioning in fact according to the mechanisms of an addiction that we shall discuss below.

It is now intelligible that the problem raised above, why patients of this class carry out their impulsive behavior in real action, is identical in principle with the question, why one sadist really commits a passionate murder and another sadist does not, and with the other question, why compulsion neurotics in opposition to their customary typical behavior will occasionally execute a compulsion that is objectively and really destructive; and it will be seen that this is a very complex problem. Since normally the super-ego prevents the execution of such acts, there must be a dysfunction of the super-ego.¹ The

¹ A more detailed discussion of this problem is to be found in Alexander, Franz: *Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit*; Reich, Wilhelm: *Der triebhafte Charakter*; and Reik, Theodor: *Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis*.

easy explanation that the super-ego is inherently defective and does not prevent the execution of the actions is contradicted by psychoanalytic experience, which reveals that the super-ego is often quite normal. And even ordinary observation indicates that the super-ego of these patients functions deficiently only at times,—that is, while the actions are being carried out—and that during the intervals it operates quite normally. Hence the ideational contents of the super-ego cannot be held accountable, but rather the manner in which it is constructed, its relationship with the ego, and how it fits in with the total psychic apparatus. This dysfunction of the super-ego can be best studied and understood in cases where it is presented not only occasionally in one action or another, but where it appears more extensively as an essential feature of the person's character or clinical picture. The character manifestation can be best studied in those persons referred to by Reich as "impulsive characters",¹ a designation that covers most of the cases in which impulsive acts are committed. As to pathological states, from what has been said it is obvious that the manic-depressive conditions show this dysfunction. We may therefore relegate further discussion to the two appropriate chapters.

It was stated above, that compulsive masturbation and impulsive behavior of any type may be utilized to combat internal tensions of any sort. They appear, then, as inappropriate means of mastering excessive excitement. To use the language employed by Freud,² who speaks of stimuli from without being sifted through a protective layer (*Reizschutz*), we may speak of an attempt in this instance to utilize masturbation or compulsion as a protection against stimuli from within. Here sexuality loses its specific function and gradually becomes a non-specific protection against stimuli. It is conceivable that the converse process, the gradual secondary sexualization of some device originally used as a protection against internal stimuli, might take place and alter the sexual structure and

¹ Reich, Wilhelm: *Der triebhafte Charakter*, 1925.

² Freud: *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. Ges. Schr. VI, 214. (Trans. by Hubback, p. 30.)

organization. This appears to be true of a group of disorders that very closely resemble, and are often accounted among, the impulsive behaviors—namely, drug addictions. Of this affection there are many valuable studies in the psychoanalytic literature, through which we have become familiar chiefly with the unconscious content of the patient's sexual conflicts, as expressed in the craving itself.¹ Nevertheless, the theoretical investigation of the psychology of addiction and of its pathognomonic features, remains obscure. Lack of personal experience with the analysis of addicts compels me to content myself with a mere summary of the problems and a review of the theory involved.

Radó's important contribution enables us to outline the theory of addictions as follows: A measure used primarily as a defense against internal stimuli becomes secondarily sexualized and for this reason momentarily affects the sexual life and the entire structure of the personality. Most elatant drugs have the pharmacological effect of bringing relief and giving pleasure at the same time. A person who suffers from pain and gives himself an injection of morphine has really been able to set up a protection against inner stimuli, for he has been freed of the irritation. Similarly, the euphoriant drugs are protections against painful mental states, for example, depressions, and are indeed more effective than say compulsive masturbation. As long as the use of drugs remains essentially a protective measure, it is not proper to speak of an addiction. A normal person employing a hypodermic syringe because of physical pains, may easily put it aside as soon as these disappear. But this cannot be the case in the second example given, depression; for the depressed person who wishes to console himself is never "normal". The psychogenesis of depression will be discussed in greater detail later, but we must anticipate this

¹ Radó, Sándor: *Die psychischen Wirkungen der Rauschgifte*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XII, 1926. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. VII.) Simmel, Ernst: *Zum Problem von Zwang und Sucht*. Bericht V. allg. ärztl. Kongress f. Psychotherapie, 1930. Schilder, Paul: "Intoxikationen" in *Entwurf einer Psychiatrie auf psa. Grundlage*. (Trans. by Glueck, Nerv. and Ment. Monograph Series, no. 50.) Besides several articles on alcoholism.

discussion with the statement that manic-depressive persons have very early, oral fixations, and from this we may understand purely superficially that persons with a marked oral disposition become addicts. It is also a peculiarity of the pharmacological effect of elatant drugs that they may provide intense pleasure, the nature of which is still obscure. It might therefore be said that the patient who seeks consolation and finds pleasure, receives more than he expected. It is true, however, that this pleasurable effect attains such an intensity only in certain persons, in whom there then arises a "wish for elation", which moves them to seek this pleasure repeatedly. Not every person who uses such drugs becomes a drug addict; this depends primarily on whether or not a "wish for elation" is produced. The problem of addiction-psychology reduces itself to the question of the nature of the pleasure obtained and the conditions that determine the origin of the wish for the drug.

All psychoanalytical writers on drug addiction so far have agreed that the origin and nature of the addiction is not determined by the chemical effect of the drug but by the psychological make-up of the personality, which is influenced by the chemical effect. The pre-morbid personality, that is, determines its later destiny. Those persons become drug addicts who tend to prefer the pleasure obtained from the drug (which Radó refers to as the "pharmacotoxic orgasm"¹) to sexual pleasure. (We shall presently inquire into the source of this tendency.) As a result, because of its superior substitute, genital pleasure becomes unnecessary. The universe of real objects from whom genital pleasure might be obtained thus becomes divested of interest. The genital organization breaks up, and there ensues an extraordinary regression; and corresponding to the various points of fixation various fields of infantile sexuality—œdipus complex, masturbation conflict, and pregenital impulses—again come to the fore, and in the end the libido remains in the form of an "amorphous erotic

¹ Radó, Sándor: *Die psychischen Wirkungen der Rauschgifte*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XII, 1926. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. VII.)

tension-energy" without "differential characteristics or form of organization".¹

Sexual orgasm is completely replaced by the pharmacotoxic orgasm. Since there is no sexual interest in reality, other types of interest also disappear except those that have to do with enjoying the drug. In the end, all of reality comes to reside in the hypodermic needle.

However, the course of drug addiction is not finished with this disintegration of the personality. There then comes a point at which physiological and psychological conditions, still to be discussed, prevent the appearance of an elation. The patient must resort to larger doses, and the end result corresponds to the picture found in less extreme form in cases of compulsive masturbation. The same objective is desired in both instances,—to drain off narcissistic tension by copying a means that is already familiar, but inappropriate. In compulsive masturbation the genital orgasm, and in drug addiction the pharmacotoxic one, cannot achieve what is expected of them. The patients become "pharmacotoxically orgasmically impotent". They are therefore forced to repeat the drug administration in order to dispel the depression that follows the failure to have an "orgasm" the first time. The hypodermic needle, which they at first used to protect themselves from stimulation and then to obtain sexual pleasure, is again secondarily a new (inappropriate) protection against stimulation.

We have still to discuss the traits in the pre-morbid personality that determine that the pharmacotoxic orgasm will compete so successfully with the sexual one, and what it is that nevertheless makes it insufficient. It appears, evidently, only in persons with a certain mental make-up. Unfortunately, the analysis of drug addicts and of their phantasies do not furnish conclusive data. Such analyses show that the genital primacy tends to collapse in persons whose genital primacy was always unstable, that is to say, those who have intense pregenital fixations; but in other respects we get a picture of a mixture of all

¹ Radó, Sándor: *loc. cit.*

levels of organization. Masturbation and masturbation conflict, the attendant œdipal phantasies and castration anxiety, perverse tendencies of all types, manifestations of pregenital organizations of the libido, intense sadistic, anal, and oral impulses and anxieties—all are to be found intermingled and superimposed on one another.

This plethora, as seen for example in Simmel's communication,¹ is astonishing but at the same time confusing. We should maintain, indeed, that the terminal states in such cases are more instructive than the process. The residual "amorphous tension" must resemble the very earliest stage in libidinal development before there is any organization at all, namely, the oral orientation of the nursling. In point of fact, oral tendencies are very prominent in all addicts. This is most evident in those cases where the drug is taken by mouth. It is true that where the syringe is used the genital symbolic quality predominates, as Simmel² has shown, but even here the pleasure thus obtained most nearly resembles, according to Radó,³ the pleasure felt by the satiated baby, which he terms the "alimentary orgasm". This is made more probable by the fact that the most striking feature of the drug elation is the extraordinary elevation in self-regard. In the drug elation, narcissistic and erotic satisfactions coincide, as they do in a "celebration". The regression probably extends back to a time in which there was no distinction between satisfying self-regard and satisfying erotic needs, that is to say, the time of nursing. This problem will be discussed again in the chapter on manic-depressive states. At all events a fixation that is pregenital, and probably oral-narcissistic, determines whether after the ingestion of the drug as a "protection against stimuli from within" there will be a wish for elation and consequent addiction. Various findings of other writers seem to be in

¹ Simmel, Ernst: *Zum Problem von Zwang und Sucht*. Ber. V. allg. ärztl. Kongr. v. Psychother. 1930.

² Simmel: *l.c.*

³ Radó: *l.c.*

harmony with this theory. According to Simmel, if the use of the drug at first means genital masturbation with its appropriate phantasies and conflicts, then conflicts at all levels of organization as far back as the oral, this corresponds to the gradual regressive disintegration of the genital primacy, a backward repetition of the whole libido development, which is characterized by its terminal point rather than by the midway positions. Simmel also tells us that for addicts, the organs may represent introjected objects,—which is in accord with an oral regression.

Similarly, Gross's¹ finding that in the addict there is a dysfunction of the super-ego and a peculiar (though undescribed) quality about his identifications, is in keeping with the same point of view. For identification (total incorporation) is the object relationship of the oral stage, and consequently disturbances in this field would depend on oral fixations. Many points in the psychology of addicts can be explained by the fact that the super-ego does not disappear but disintegrates, and that its relation with the ego becomes resexualized during the course of the regression. This fact, which Simmel in particular has made very clear, is the essential psychic factor which in combination with physiological factors accounts for the ultimate introduction of "pharmacotoxic impotence" (Radó). We shall understand this economic factor after the analysis of the "morning after" depressions that occur in the interval between the drug elations.

Lastly, the importance of the oral fixation aids us to understand the affinity, in the manifest picture as well, between drug addiction and the manic-depressive states. Simmel correctly designates the elation due to drugs an artificial mania. In the final stages of their illness drug addicts live in a continuous empty state of alternating elation and "morning after" depressions, which—if the comparison between pharmacotoxic orgasm and the alimentary orgasm of the nursling is more than a mere analogy—corresponds to the alternation of hunger and satiety

¹ Gross, Alfred: *Die Stellung des Ichs in der Sucht*. Paper read before the German Ps. Society, 1929.

of the psychically still quite undifferentiated baby. This alternation of great tension and great satisfaction also appears to be an essential factor in manic-depressive states (Radó).

As to the specific psychological action of various individual drugs—a psychoanalytical supplement to their somatic pharmacology—in spite of Schilder's program of a "pharmaco-psychanalysis", the problem has really never been attacked.¹ It is, indeed, doubtful whether such a problem is capable of solution. When the protective device turns into a great sexual or narcissistic gratification, the fact that one or another component impulse becomes especially prominent is probably due more to the pre-morbid personality than to the type of intoxication. Many writers have dealt with psychic forms of alcoholism. All have agreed that here inhibitions are in general weakened by the drug, so that repressed impulses again come to light (which is merely a precondition of "pharmacotoxic orgasm"), and in addition they agree unanimously that the impulses especially striking in alcoholics are homosexual in nature.² It is only necessary to call to mind the numerous drinking customs to be assured of this fact. It remains an open question whether alcohol by its toxic action is conducive to homosexuality, or whether latent homosexuals are particularly fond of alcohol and lose their inhibitions. Hartmann has reported a similar manifestation of homosexuality in cocaine elations.³ The oral and narcissistic fixations that characterize the addictions in general are not absent in alcoholics. For the rest among the alcoholics, as among the morphinists, there are a large number of variants, qualitative and quantitative, that unfortunately have not been sufficiently differentiated. It is

¹ Schilder, Paul: *Entwurf einer Psychiatrie auf psychoanalytischer Grundlage*. P. 195.

² Abraham, Karl: *Die psychologischen Beziehungen zwischen Sexualität und Alkoholismus*. Ztschr. f. Sexualwiss. 1908. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A. VII.) Juliusburger, Otto: *Beitrag zur Psychologie der sogenannten Dipsomanie*. Zentrbl. f. Ps. II, 1912; and *Alkoholismus und Sexualität*. Ztschr. f. Sexualwiss. 1916. Rickman, John: *Alcoholism and Psychoanalysis*. Brit. J. Inebriety XXIII, 1925. And other papers.

³ Hartmann, Heinz: *Kokainismus und Homosexualität*. Ztschr. f. d. ges. Neurol. u. Psychiat. 1925.

very important to distinguish whether a person, from external or internal (depressive) distress, resorts to alcohol to protect himself against the painful irritations, and then leaves off when he ceases to need it for this purpose, or whether his entire psychosexuality and selfregard-economy is governed by a desire to be elatedly drunk, or whether, finally, this desire for elated drunkenness is not itself destined to break down, and the patient then in "pharmacotoxic orgasmic impotence" to course after an unattainable happiness until he himself perishes. With some degree of certainty, the general behavior of the patient in relation to the environment gives an index of the extent to which his object relationships have disintegrated. Those who drink convivially with friends have a better prognosis than lone drinkers. The periodic drinker's disorder is constructed along the same lines as a periodic depression.

Alcoholic psychoses have been but little studied by psychoanalysts.¹ In the next chapter we shall discuss the fact that the "break with reality" is the crucial step that leads to the formation of a psychosis; it is evident that in drug addictions, the uselessness of object libido, which the pharmacotoxic orgasm has rendered superfluous, accounts for a similar break. Psychoses frequently begin during a period of abstinence, due doubtless to the fact that the withdrawal of the alcohol itself is a factor that makes reality unsupportable. It is not as yet established definitely under what circumstances such a fateful break with reality will occur, or whence originate the clinical symptoms that characterize the alcoholic psychoses (one may think in this connection of the phallic nature of the "mice" that are hallucinated; for a discussion of the paranoid symptoms, see the chapter on schizophrenia), nor do we know what is psychologically regressive and what organic or toxic. In a very instructive article, Tausk interpreted the occupational delirium as the expression of a wish for coitus in these patients,

¹ See the chapter on Intoxications in Schilder, Paul: *Entwurf einer Psychiatrie auf ps. Grundlage*. And Kielholz, Arthur: *Analyseversuch bei Delirium tremens*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XII, 1926.

who are erotically stimulated and at the same time rendered impotent by the alcohol, and who are, more deeply considered, narcissistic and homosexual.¹

There is still much contention concerning the psychoanalytic therapy of addicts and persons with morbid impulses. It is, however, generally agreed that psychoanalytic treatment should be instituted whenever possible, because if the pre-morbid disposition is allowed to remain unchanged after a withdrawal cure, it will soon induce the patient to return to the use of drugs. It must be remembered that the chemical effect of the drug is not the only thing that must be combated, but the fateful wish to be drunkenly elated as well. There is also general agreement that psychoanalytic therapy is difficult because of the pregenital narcissistic constitution of these patients; but also, that it is worth while in spite of all difficulties if it leads to success. There is no such unanimity about the relation of withdrawal therapy and psychoanalysis. The best time to begin an analysis is probably during or immediately after withdrawal of the drug, but it is not to be expected that the patient will remain ascetic throughout the whole analysis. If he has an opportunity, he will probably use the drug during a period of analytic resistance. For this reason alone, we must concur with Simmel's view that addicts can be analyzed better in institutions than as ambulant patients.² No general rules can be laid down as to when and how the use of the drug is to be stopped in case of a relapse. From our general conception of the disorder, it follows that the addiction runs the course of a chronic disintegrative process, and that the most important therapeutic point is at what stage of disintegration the analysis is begun. The concept "drug addict" includes persons with quite various relationships to reality, and with quite different capacities for establishing a transference.

¹ Tausk, Viktor: *Zur Psychologie des alkoholischen Beschäftigungsdelirs*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. III, 1915.

² Simmel, Ernst: *Die psychoanalytische Behandlung in der Klinik*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV, 1928.

It must also not be overlooked that an addiction begins as a search for a protective guard against painful stimulation. In the large majority of so-called "drunkards" this is needed not as a protection against internal, psychogenic, complexly constructed depressive states, but as a retreat from insufferable external conditions. Therapy in such cases will be of no avail so long as these external conditions persist unchanged, and any special therapy would probably be unnecessary if the social conditions that lead to drunkenness could be radically altered. Concerning those cases in which the wish to be elatedly intoxicated prevails over the need for protection against painful stimuli, it may in general be said, that the newer the addiction, the better the chances of effecting a cure. All other forms of impulsive behavior, according to the individual features of the case, must be regarded as if they were either compulsion neuroses or perversions. The prognosis especially for those cases that resemble perversions, as in the case of the addictions, depends on the degree and sincerity of the desire to get well. Through a certain type of preliminary treatment, it may be possible to increase the patient's slight awareness that he is ill and strengthen his weak determination to be cured, before the psychoanalysis proper begins. (The same is true of "impulsive characters";¹ see the chapter on Character Disorders.) Generally speaking, in this field the classical psychoanalytic method must be changed and adapted to the exigencies of the particular neuroses. Concerning such modifications of technique the reader is referred to the special literature on the subject.

¹ Reich, Wilhelm: *Der triebhafte Charakter*.

A Note on Falstaff

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A NOTE ON FALSTAFF*

BY FRANZ ALEXANDER (CHICAGO)

In the study of human nature there is one method which certainly cannot lead to reliable results. This is to ask people about their own personality. Nevertheless, many serious psychologists and sociologists still have a naïve confidence in this method, and practice it by sending out questionnaires to thousands of individuals. The sociologist who uses this method in order to establish the presence of certain psychological traits in masses of people, does not know the most elementary characteristic of human nature, which is that people do not know themselves. We might hope that people's actions are more characteristic of them than their opinion of themselves. Actions are indeed more valuable than words, and questionnaires on behavior would yield more interesting results if one could rely on the correctness of the answers. On the other hand, the observation of overt behavior does not disclose real predilections because to a great extent people behave not as they really like to, but as they are supposed to.

Theoretically, the only way to learn about human nature might be to put people on the analytical couch for a year or so and collect reliable data; but unfortunately the whole of humanity cannot be put on the analytical couch and the limitations of the application of this method are well known. There is, however, one situation in which people manifest their innermost feelings more reliably than by words or actions and this is when they attend a play in the theatre or when they read a book. If we could register what people feel at different times during a theatrical performance or while reading a book, we could learn much about their most intimate characteristics. The reader of a book or the spectator of a drama cannot be made responsible for what he feels. If he feels sympathy for

* Based on a lecture presented at the Institute for Psychoanalysis, Chicago, on April 28, 1933.

the treacherous husband who is caught, it is not he who is unfaithful to his wife. When he enjoys Charlie Chaplin's sticking a needle into a fat lady, not he is the naughty boy; and when he is apprehensive about the hero who becomes involved in a dangerous situation, not he is cowardly. He is not responsible for what is going on on the stage and can enjoy himself innocuously and submit to different trends of his personality without exposing himself to any criticism. Not even his own ego can criticize him, because he did not write the play and, what is even more important, nobody is able to give a full account to himself of what he enjoys in attending a play; why he laughs, why he weeps in the theatre. The underlying psychological processes are to a high degree unconscious.

It seems therefore that, if we could establish people's reactions to different products of art and literature, we would have a method of carrying out mass experiments that would yield data of general value about human nature. Problems could be formulated as follows: Why do people like to see Charlie Chaplin? What explains the great influence of Shakespeare's *Hamlet*? Why do people like to read about Baron Munchausen's lies? What is so fascinating in the tragicomical history of the insane Don Quixote? It is unfortunate only that the list of popular literary characters to which people react universally, because their different emotional needs are gratified by them, could be extended almost indefinitely and that in the face of this long list our hope of ever being able to reconstruct a complete picture of the universal features of human nature by this method dwindles away.

One of the most popular characters of literature is Sir John Falstaff, the cowardly and boasting fat drunkard, who is one of the mainstays of Shakespeare's *Henry IV*. Falstaff's popularity in Elizabethan times is conclusively proved by the fact that before the folio edition, *Henry IV*, reached five editions, and it is worth noting that whereas in the first part of *Henry IV* the Falstaff scenes and the scenes in the king's court are evenly distributed, in the second part, which was probably written a year later, the Falstaff scenes are more

numerous and outweigh by far the scenes in the court. Falstaff was so appealing a character that Queen Elizabeth ordered Shakespeare to write another play around him, and in pursuance with the Queen's command Shakespeare wrote *The Merry Wives of Windsor*. Probably all historians of literature, however, would agree with Bernard Alexander's opinion, in one of his studies on Shakespeare, that the Falstaff of *The Merry Wives* bears only a slight resemblance to the original Falstaff of *Henry IV*.¹ We may, therefore, disregard for our purposes the Falstaff of *The Merry Wives* and deal exclusively with the hero of the first and second parts of *Henry IV*.

What is the specific appeal of this mass of fat, this cowardly, boasting and loquacious knight, this drunkard and gourmand, who is not even especially witty? Henry IV has not one, but two heroes. The impression made by Falstaff can only be understood in connection with his boon companion, the Prince. Prince Hal travels with Falstaff's notorious gang, whose main business in life is drinking and engaging in madcap adventures. They are not real bandits—for that they are too cowardly—but occasionally, when in need of money for their drinking bouts, they are not above holding up merchants on the road. In one of the Falstaff-scenes Prince Hal himself participates in a holdup. Indeed the Prince starts out under bad auspices; he is a chronic ne'er-do-well at a time when England requires a strong heir. The feudal barons are in open rebellion against King Henry who usurped the throne with the help of the peers, and are now accusing him of breaking his promise and abusing his power. The historical calling of Prince Henry is to further his father's efforts to reduce the feudal power of the barons and unify England under a strong monarch. At the end, the Prince fulfils his historic task. Under Henry V, the particularistic feudal structure of England was converted into a centralized monarchy and England's international importance begins with his regime. In the battle of Agincourt Henry conquered France and became one of the most powerful kings of England.

¹ Alexander, Bernard: *Shakespeare*. Budapest: Franklin Company, 1920.

Shakespeare uses this section of English history for a well known dramatic motif. The bad boy, after he has thoroughly destroyed hopes in his future, turns out against all expectations to be good. The popularity of this motif is easily understood. Everyone has experienced moments when in his struggle to approximate his ideals he has made the solemn decision to start a new life, and the hope is never quite lost, and is assuredly reborn when the hero on the stage actually succeeds where we have failed. Prince Henry undoubtedly succeeds in destroying the unfavorable expectations regarding him. In a spectacular duel he kills the famous Henry Percy, called Hotspur, the ideal of all masculine virtues, the chivalrous and heroic leader of the conspiring lords, who was always held up to him as an example of bravery to follow. Hotspur was the most bitter of the king's enemies, stubbornly determined to avenge the alleged mistreatment of his best friend, Mortimer. Prince Hal has at the end of the play to his unquestionable credit the rescue of his father's throne.

In the same battle Falstaff also participates, though unwillingly. At the moment when Henry is fighting with Hotspur, Falstaff meets on the battlefield the famous warrior Archibald, the Earl of Douglass, but the cowardly drunkard goes down at once and escapes by simulating death. Henry finds his body and believing him dead bids him a melancholy farewell; but when Henry leaves, Falstaff rises from the ground, hale and hearty. Falstaff symbolizes a portion of human nature which cannot be destroyed easily, and, strangely enough, no one of the spectators would like to see him dead. We can even forgive him that childish trick of his when he takes Hotspur's corpse on his back and later pretends that it was he who killed him. However, before he dares to touch the dead body, to make sure, he stabs the corpse and swears at it. The symbolic depth of this episode has a strong dramatic effect. The principle represented by Falstaff is incompatible with the principle personified by Hotspur. The childish, irresponsible hedonism of Falstaff has no greater enemy than the self-sacrificing masculine heroism of Hotspur who leaves his beautiful young wife to fight for his ideals and for the honor of his friend.

How is it then that our sympathy is still with Falstaff? The plot of the entire drama concerns the metamorphosis of Prince Henry from a hopeless ne'er-do-well into a hero, but Shakespeare makes us feel throughout that this change from the irresponsible and harmless enjoyment of life to the assumption of responsibilities and duties is by no means an unambiguous gain. His description of the intrigues of the court, the partisanship between the peers, the methods by which the affairs of state are settled does not put the court in a very attractive light. One may reasonably doubt whether Falstaff's adventures and drinking bouts are not relatively harmless in comparison with the high politics of his country. What is the highway robbery of Falstaff's gang in comparison with the cynical treachery of John Lancaster, the second son of the king, who in the name of the king promises all the rebels full amnesty if they will send their army home. Believing in the king's promise, they actually dismiss their troops and are captured and executed by Lancaster. There is hardly a Babbitt in the audience who would not at this point begin to doubt the value of respectability. Why should the lords of the court be considered better than this naïve and infantile fat boy, Sir John? No doubt they believe in their code of ethics, and are convinced that they are acting for higher purposes when murdering each other, but it is difficult to respect their thin rationalizations. Falstaff indeed has no respect for the policies and accepted code of ethics of the lords; witness his contemptuous remarks about honor:

"Can honour set-to a leg? no! or an arm? no! or take away the grief of a wound? no. Honour hath no skill in surgery, then? no. What is honour? a word. What is in that word honour? What is that honour? air. A trim reckoning!—Who hath it? he that died o' Wednesday. Does he feel it? no. Doth he hear it? no. Is it insensible, then? yea, to the dead. But will it not live with the living? no. Why? detraction will not suffer it:—therefore I'll none of it! honour is a mere scutcheon: and so ends my catechism."

The double structure of the drama permanently forces us to look alternately at two different aspects of life which are in steady contradiction to each other. Our social self admires

the heroism of Hotspur, and it also identifies itself with the patriotic endeavors of the king, but the next moment another part of our personality is only too ready to accept Falstaff's philosophy of life, with its hedonism and its disrespect for the absoluteness of social values. Prince Hal stands between these two philosophies of life. His social self gradually gains the upper hand, but even at the end of the drama, after he has proved on the battlefield that he will wear the crown to his own and England's honor, he expresses his inner conflict more clearly than ever before.

King Henry IV, lying in his last death struggle, the crown beside him on a pillow, falls asleep as Prince Henry enters. Henry puts on the crown and declaims:

"Why doth the crown lie there upon his pillow,
Being so troublesome a bedfellow?
O polished perturbation! golden care!
That keep'st the ports of slumber open wide
To many a watchful night—sleep with it now!
Yet not so sound and half so deeply sweet
As he whose brow with homely biggin bound
Snores out the watch of night!"

The king, awaking and learning that his heir has taken away the crown, accuses his son of being greedy for power and of hardly being able to wait for his death, but the Prince explains:

"Coming to look on you, thinking you dead,—
And dead almost, my liege, to think you were,—
I spake unto the crown as having sense,
And thus upbraided it: The care on thee depending
Hath fed upon the body of my father;
Therefore thou, best of gold, art worst of gold."

We may indeed believe that the Prince is telling the truth. We saw the other side of his personality, in his reckless enjoyment of life with Falstaff. He changed chiefly from a sense of duty and he cannot but consider his rank and position as an undesirable burden. He became a hero and he will become a great king under the pressure of his social self, but his deepest urges are not gratified by this change. The monologue with the crown in his hands demonstrates this with the utmost clarity

Falstaff is the representative of the non-social portions of his personality. The Prince seems even after his change not to trust himself entirely; he is uncertain that he will be able to resist temptation and maintain the adjustment he has achieved with such difficulty. Why would he otherwise banish Falstaff and his gang under the threat of death penalty ten miles from his body?

The banishment of Falstaff to ten miles from the king's body in order to eliminate temptation is nothing else than a dramatic presentation of what in psychoanalysis we call repression.

Falstaff's effect on an audience is comprehensible now. He represents the deep infantile layers of the personality, the simple innocent wish to live and enjoy life. He has no taste for abstract values like honor or duty and no ambition. Man is only partially social. One part of his personality remains individualistic and resents the restrictions of social life and just these restrictions, especially if they go further than one can tolerate them, mobilize all the destructive instincts of man's nature such as discontent, ill spirit and a negative attitude toward the environment. This is the explanation of the popular belief that people who like to eat and drink well—that is to say, who treat the animal in themselves with consideration—are more amiable and less malicious. The opposite is true of the ascetic self-restricting characters often found among political fanatics and exponents of social doctrines for which they sacrifice their lives. Like Robespierre, the fanatic school-master, under the guise of fighting for humanitarian ideals they can take revenge for all their self-imposed restrictions in destroying their opponents en masse. It is seldom difficult to recognize under the thin surface of their rationalizations, their real motives: hatred and revenge. Hotspur unquestionably belongs to this category of fanatic haters. The king offers him full consideration of all his complaints but what he seeks essentially is a fight. The conditions which he proposes to the king are unacceptable, and even his friends call him drunk with fury. He scarcely can await the battle: "Let the hours be short 'til fields and blows and groans applaud our sport."

Hotspur is the exponent of destruction, but destruction which serves not entirely selfish but also collective, that is, caste, interests. Falstaff is the personification of the wholly self-centered pleasure-seeking principle. Although he represents the opposite of destruction, the principle of life, libido, it is the most primitive manifestation of libido, the primary self-centered, narcissistic libido of the child which he stands for.

Prince Henry in the process of maturing must overcome both of these principles. When he kills Hotspur on the battlefield, he overcomes symbolically his own destructive tendency. In killing Hotspur, the arch-enemy of his father, he overcomes his own aggressions against his parent. But he must overcome also the Falstaff in himself if he is to become a fully balanced adult. In the history of the metamorphosis of Prince Henry, Shakespeare dramatically describes the characteristic course of the development of the male. There are two difficult emotional problems which must be solved by everyone in the course of his development; the first is the fixation to the early pregenital forms of instinctual life which expresses itself in oral receptiveness and narcissistic self-adoration. This old fellow, Sir John Falstaff, is a masterful dramatization of such an early emotional attitude. The second difficulty to be overcome is the hatred and jealousy directed against the father. Hotspur, the rebel, who strives against the life of the king is the personification of these patricidal tendencies. In the play, these inner processes find an externalized dramatic expression. After Prince Henry has overcome these two inner—in the drama, external—enemies he becomes an ideal king.

Bernard Alexander in his essay in which he attempts to reconstruct Shakespeare's development on the basis of his dramas and the few known historical facts about him comes to the conclusion that Prince Henry is the one figure among all the heroes of his plays through which the dramatist tried most directly to give expression to his own personality. But he considers Falstaff as the other pole of Shakespeare's personality:

"Near the peak of his productivity he wrote *Henry IV* and *As You Like It*. It was when this gaiety began to turn to seriousness, as if he

were saying farewell to the merry period of his life. I have read and seen *Henry IV* numerous times, and have often tried to discover what is so bewitching in Prince Hal, why he is so familiar to us, why we understand and love him so much. I cannot get rid of the thought that Shakespeare wrote much of himself into this figure, probably unconsciously, because he had confidence in the incognito provided by appearing in the trappings of a king. Every time I saw Prince Hal I said to myself, 'This is Shakespeare more than any other figure'. Of course I am not thinking of his life story but of the basic trends of his character. Henry is a superior man who dares to give himself away to life, to lend himself to entertainment and even to bad company because he is certain that he can always take himself back. Nobody really knows him, least of all his father. But we know him and we trust in him. Why is he not ashamed to travel with a Falstaff? One must not speak contemptuously of Falstaff. In his own type he, too, is a superior man, not merely the old '*miles gloriosus*' (of the latter there is only a particle in him), but a much more universal figure: the personification of the self-forgetting enjoyment of life, entertainment, gaiety, the other pole of man's nature, the witty unique hero of unrestrained orgies. The Prince understands Falstaff better than anyone else, because there is something Falstaffian in himself. But in the Prince the Falstaffian element is only an episode which he has to overcome; it belongs to the treasury of his personality, to which nothing human should be alien."¹

"At the beginning of *Henry IV* we learn of the death of Falstaff. With a wistful smile we think of him. With the drainage of swamp lands much romanticism fades away, and this is the fate of this kind of romanticism. The humor of Falstaff is episodic, not of a permanent nature; the gaiety of a night, a great laughter after which our soul as well as our face is sore. The king is dead! Long live the king! Falstaff is dead and the reign of the intellect has taken its place. . . . But it would not be quite correct to say that in Shakespeare there is a Falstaff and a Prince because in him the Falstaffian element is more an experience than a constituent part."²

"Who does not sometimes regard Falstaff with envy and longing? Who has nothing of Falstaff in himself? Who would not at times desire to live like him, to sun oneself, to let oneself go, to discharge one's surplus energies, cast off the chains of the world, and forget one's profession, one's worries and life-work. We wake up soon enough and find that this is so difficult to effect. And here Falstaff comes to our assistance. There is no better mentor for this purpose. . . ."³

¹ Alexander, Bernard: *Shakespeare*. Budapest: Franklin Co., 1920. Pp. 393-394. (All quotations translated by the author of the article.)

² *I.c.*, 161.

³ *I.c.*, 197.

In reconstructing Shakespeare's character Bernard Alexander writes:

"It is certain that he could greatly amuse himself. The data of the 'Mermaid Tavern' are reliable. This was the inn of the literati, the hangout of authors and actors, where they had their drinking orgies. It is just as impossible to invent Falstaff as to create him on the basis of mere external observation. Falstaff lived in Shakespeare as Shakespeare lives in Falstaff. Though Falstaff becomes an independent personality, he is the projection of what existed in Shakespeare as a quickly passing eruption of accumulated tensions. Still possibly Shakespeare was more similar to Prince Henry. There was a great buoyancy in Shakespeare but also a great seriousness."⁴

It is interesting that the pre-Freudian student of literature was inclined to look upon Falstaffian elements more as eruptions of temporary tension than permanent integral parts of the personality. Following our analysis, we are inclined to say that in Prince Henry, Shakespeare gave, if not the expression of his actual self, then the most idealized expression of his own personality or in other words the most successful solution of his inner problems. His father complex found in *Hamlet* a neurotic solution. Hamlet cannot decide to kill his mother's lover due to his unconscious father-hatred. In the crown scene of *Henry IV* the Prince's self-coronation is no longer a simple oedipal act, but a real sacrifice. The inheritance of the father-position is not the satisfaction of a wish—rather a duty which the Prince will fulfil indeed honestly but which does not command his enthusiasm. There is sincerity in his calling the crown "an evil gold".

But *Henry IV* is not only a dramatic solution of Shakespeare's oedipus problem; apart from that, it is even more an attempt at solving his Falstaffian problem. This seems, however, to be more difficult. The king banishes Falstaff, but Shakespeare in the epilogue of the drama promises the audience a revival of this part of his self which he apparently cannot renounce so easily:

"One word more, I beseech you. If you be not too much cloyed with fat meat, our humble author will continue the story, with Sir John in it,

⁴ *l.c.*, 409.

and make you merry with fair Katherine of France: where, for anything I know, Falstaff shall die of a sweat, unless already he be killed with your hard opinions."

According to tradition it was the queen who ordered Shakespeare to write a new play with Falstaff as the chief character; probably also the public expressed this wish with the applause which it gave to this immortal figure, but it seems that Shakespeare even without all these external stimuli was determined to revive Falstaff. Indeed it seems to be more difficult than anything to renounce the Falstaffian side of human nature. Is it possible at all? It represents the deepest source of the individual's personality, the principle of Eros in its most primary manifestation as narcissism.

The indestructible narcissism of Falstaff which cannot be shaken by anything is the strongest factor in its effect upon us. This self-satisfaction is not disturbing and provocative because there is no sophistication in it, and we feel that Falstaff does not seriously believe in all his pretended merits. He is childish and sincere; there is no psychological situation, no matter how degrading it may be for Falstaff, from which he cannot extricate himself, from which he cannot escape with unimpaired self-appreciation. After the highway robbery the Prince and one of the members of Falstaff's gang disguise themselves and attack Falstaff and the rest of the gang, and take away their money. Falstaff leaves the money behind and runs for his life. But when the Prince upbraids him for his cowardly behavior and pretended bravado, Falstaff has a ready response:

"By the Lord, I knew ye as well as he that made ye. Why hear ye, my master, was it for me to kill the heir apparent? Should I turn upon the true prince?"

This primitive mode of lying and the indiscriminate use of any method to save his face, this mentality of a three or four year old child in the body of the fat old man, this unperturbed confidence in his own perfection, has something extremely refreshing in it. Naturally at the same time Falstaff knows that all his false courage, virtues and perfections are fantastic, but his force lies just in the fact that fantasy can take the place

of reality. Charlie Chaplin's effect in this respect is very similar to that of Falstaff. Good luck helps Charlie Chaplin over all kinds of external difficulties. The child in us applauds, the child who knows only one principle and that is to live, and does not want to recognize any external obstacle. Since the child actually cannot overcome any external interferences, it takes refuge in fantastic, megalomaniac self-deception. The combination of this childish attitude with the tacit awareness of its fantastic nature is the secret of the never-failing appeal of these figures. The naïve narcissism of the child, in an adult, is distasteful. But if insight is combined with the childish self-complacency, and indulgence in it assumes the character of play, our forgiveness is immediately secured, and our enjoyment is free from interference on the part of the higher critical strata of our ego.

This superior understanding and forgiving attitude towards one's self is, as Freud has shown, fundamental to the phenomenon which we call humor. But Falstaff's self-satisfaction is somewhat more frank and infantile than the superior self-forgiving attitude in ordinary humor. It is coarser than what is commonly called humor, and we do not take offense at it only because of the contrast between Falstaff's attitude and the destructive heroism of Percy and the hypocrisies of the court. If Falstaff were the main figure of the drama, we could not enjoy this drastic kind of humor so freely, and, in fact, in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, where Falstaff is the leading figure, his effect is far less artistic.

The narcissistic nucleus of the human personality which Falstaff represents is so indestructible that Shakespeare gave Falstaff three forms of revival. Falstaff lying on the battlefield, rises, safe and sound, as soon as his friend disappears. Falstaff is banished at the end of the drama, but Shakespeare revives him in the epilogue; he is mentioned again in *Henry V*, and though he definitely dies in this play, all is not over; he is resuscitated in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*.

There is one experiment of nature in which biologically

separate individuals seem to be able to renounce to a unique degree their individuality. This is the mysterious state of the termites. These soft little, ant-like creatures live in a nest made of a solid substance which only dynamite can shatter. They have a perfect social organization. Apart from the queen there are three types of termites anatomically differentiated: the laborers or working types, the soldiers, and the sexual types. The soldiers and laborers have no sexual life whatsoever. The life of these beings goes on with mathematical precision. When their enemies, the ants, succeed in breaking into the nests, soldiers appear at the opening and take up the fight. The body of the soldier consists chiefly of a terrific jaw which opens and closes automatically. Other soldiers have glands which they use as machine guns; they spurt out a fluid which is destructive to the enemy. During the battle the laborers in the rear of their own soldiers build a new wall. Thus the soldiers are sentenced to death. Their function is to fight and keep back the enemy until the laborers have had time to build up the fort. The members of this state are absolutely, even biologically, dependent on each other. The soldiers, for example, have to be fed by the body products of the laborers, they cannot maintain themselves alone. One can hardly consider the termites as independent individuals; they represent a transitional form between cells and individual biological entities.

Once a year in springtime the sexual types swarm out from the nest. After they have left their nest for their nuptial flight, they only have a few hours to live; they fall down to earth and die. It is assumed that copulation takes place if accidentally two swarming groups which belong to two different nests happen to meet during their flight. At the time of the nuptial flight great excitement can be observed in the nests. All the soldiers and laborers participate in a rhythmical dance, a kind of movement to and fro. This represents the residue of the sexual life of the non-sexual types. The nuptial flight with this ceremonial dance can be thus considered a collective sexual

gratification of the whole group, but the proper sexual action itself is the privilege of a relatively small caste.



Here we have the example of a perfect social organization in which the individuals have no private life and all their functions and energies belong to the state. Here is a community in which the state does not serve the welfare of the individual, but the individual lives for the state, which appears as a higher biological unit comparable with the human body, in which the individual cells have no private life but depend on each other and function for the benefit of the whole body.

Is this the future of the human race, which is seemingly drifting towards an increasingly mechanized social organization? The state of the termites appears to us as a horrible nightmare. From this nightmare we are relieved by Falstaff, the apotheosis of self-sufficient careless individuality. So long as we applaud him and want to see him again and again, and expect our writers to create him anew in a thousand different guises, we are safe from the destiny of the termites. Our applause demonstrates that the portion of our personality which stands for individual sovereignty is still stronger than our collectivistic urges. It is difficult to tell whether the dynamic structure of the human personality is in the process of changing in the direction of a more collective type of man, but we may comfort ourselves by the belief that if, and when, the collective forces finally gain the upper hand in us, we will not deplore the loss of individual sovereignty because we will have ceased to understand what it means.

I once had the occasion to ask Freud's view upon the collective potentialities of human nature. I mentioned the example of the termite state to him. I cannot quote him literally, but the sense of his answer was approximately the following: The termites are perhaps one of the weakest biological beings. Even the ants, who have an armored hard body, can destroy these soft helpless beings. The external danger is the force which compels animals to become collective; they are enabled to overcome the danger by means of mutual help and division of labor.

Why should man, who considers himself the crown of creation, who has no serious enemy among living beings except his fellow man, submit to a similar renunciation of his individuality? He is composed of cells which already have renounced entirely their individual independence for the sake of the whole. This new higher unity, the composite human cell-state, seems to be such a successful experiment of nature that there is hope that it will be able to safeguard, at least to a certain degree, man's independence and permit him to escape the fate of the termites.

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ABSTRACTS

WARUM KRIEG? Ein Briefwechsel (Is WAR NECESSARY? An Exchange of Letters). By Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud. Paris: Internationales Institut für geistige Zusammenarbeit, 1933. 62 p.

As a member of the Institute for Cultural Coöperation, and in the interest of the League of Nations, Einstein briefly formulates the problem of war both from the point of view of causation and prevention, and invites Freud to discuss the human motives which have made warfare an integral part of the development of mankind. Einstein states that a better understanding of the structure of the underlying psychological motivation is essential if there is to be an answer to the question: "Is it possible to free mankind from the unfortunate fatality of war?"

Summarizing the present situation, Einstein points out that although it is universally recognized that the technical development of war has reached a point which threatens the very future existence of civilized man, the most ardent efforts to solve the problems involved have failed to an appalling degree. It is possible "for the states to create a legislative and judiciary body to settle their conflicts. They bind themselves to accept its laws, to bring before the court any matters of dispute, and to abide by its decisions unconditionally, as well as to carry out any measures which the court considers necessary for the execution of its mandates". But, "a court is a human institution, prone to the suasion of extralegal influences in proportion to its lack of independent power to execute its decisions. . . . Might and right are inseparably bound, and the verdicts of a legal body approach the ideal justice of a community . . . , only in so far as the community is able to mobilize the power to enforce respect for that ideal of justice."

At the present time we have no supra-state organization with unquestionable authority and with the power to enforce complete obedience to its judgment. International safety depends upon the unconditional surrender of absolute state sovereignty, and doubtless there is no other way to obtain it. The fruitless efforts of the last ten years have proven that powerful psychological factors have paralyzed all attempts to achieve this goal.

The questions involved present themselves to Einstein as follows:

First, the will to power of the erstwhile ruling class of a state opposes the limitation of the rights of sovereignty. This need for political power is frequently sustained by another group, which desires individual advantages or regards war and its attendant constellations as a means for personal gain.

In the *second* place, how is it possible for the ruling minority to force the masses to serve a purpose which rewards them only with suffering and loss? Apparently because the erstwhile rulers control the schools, the press, and usually the religious organizations also, and in this way sway and guide the emotions of the majority, which then becomes a passive tool.

Third, why do the masses permit themselves to be inflamed to the point of madness and self-sacrifice by these means? It seems that hatred and destruction satisfy an innate human drive which ordinarily remains latent. Under abnormal conditions it can easily be aroused and intensified to the point of a mass psychosis.

This question is particularly called to the attention of Freud as well as the *fourth*, which raises the issue of whether it is possible to modify human psychic development in such a way as to produce an increasing resistance to these psychoses of hatred and destruction.

"This applies not only to the uneducated group, since it is the so-called intellectuals who appear to be more prone to mass suggestion, because of the very fact that they are less likely to derive their information from the direct experiences of life, and are more easily and more wholly accessible to the influence of the printed word."

In conclusion, Einstein briefly mentions the general problem of human aggression as it has arisen not only in international warfare, but also in civil, religious, or social wars. The emphasis, however, remains upon the problem of prevention.

Basing his reply on Einstein's approach to the subject, Freud first develops the theme of might and right, thus introducing his views on the other topics under discussion.

Right is the Derivative of Might.

Might was, in the first instance, crude violence. Although violence appears to be the antithesis of law and order, right is nevertheless the derivative of might. Primitive men, like other

animals, settled their differences by main force. "In the beginning muscular power decided to whom something belonged or whose will was to rule. Sheer brawn was soon augmented or displaced by tools, and that man won who had the better arms, or was the more skilled in their use. As soon as weapons were introduced intellectual superiority began to take the place of brute force. However the end-gain of the conflict remained unchanged: one of the two contestants was forced to give up his claims, or his resistance, because of the injury done him, or because of the ebbing of his strength. This can be most thoroughly accomplished if the opponent is permanently done away with, that is, if he is killed. There are two advantages in this—his opposition will not have to be dealt with subsequently, and his fate deters others from following his example. In addition, killing the enemy satisfies an instinctive inclination. . . . The intention to kill can be opposed by the consideration that the enemy can be put to useful service if he has been intimidated but granted his life. In that case violence is content with his subjugation instead of his death. Herein lies the origin of sparing the enemy, but the victor must now count upon the lurking desire for revenge of the vanquished, so that he relinquishes a part of his own safety.

The original condition, then, was the domination of the greater power, that is, of crude force, or of violence supported by the intellect. We know that this regimen has been changed during the course of human development, and that there was a transition from might to right, but how did it take place? Only one possibility exists: through the realization that the superior power of one man could be balanced by the alliance of several weaker ones. '*L'union fait la force.*' Violence can be overcome by union, and the power of the allies now represents the law, in contradistinction to the force of the individual. It follows that right is the might of the community. It is still violence, ready to turn against him who opposes it, to use the same means, and to serve the same purposes. The difference lies only in the fact that it is no longer the power of one man which asserts itself, but that of the community.

One psychological condition is prerequisite to the effectiveness of this transition from might to right: the alliance of the several must be stable and lasting. . . . The community must be permanently maintained, must organize itself, create regulations which

prevent threatening rebellions, and appoint bodies to watch over the observance of the laws and the execution of the legal acts of violence. By means of the recognition of such communal interests the members of a group establish the emotional ties and the common feelings upon which their strength depends."

Progressive changes in the law; the League of Nations.

Difficulties arise due to the unequal strength of the members of any community, be they men and women, parents and children, victors and vanquished. Laws are made in favor of the rulers, who give their subjects as few rights as possible.

Changes in the law may be caused either by an attempt on the part of one of the masters to become a despot and to reestablish the rule of might, or by the persistent effort of the oppressed to obtain equal rights. The latter instance results either in a gradual adaptation to the required level, or in a civil war, which in turn may lead to temporary suspension of the legal code, to rule by force, and finally to new codifications.

Although these conflicts cannot be avoided even in a single commonwealth, the necessity to live within a given territory tends to limit them, and the probability for peaceful settlement is steadily increasing. The history of mankind presents an uninterrupted succession of wars between one community and one or more others. Wars of conquest cannot be judged as an entity, since some were followed only by destruction, while others contributed to the conversion of might into right by creating larger units within which violence became impossible because of the effectiveness of a new code of laws. It was in this way that the Romans established the *Pax Romana* throughout the Mediterranean basin. Although it is apparently a paradox, the fact must be recognized that "War might not be considered an unsuitable means to create 'eternal peace', precisely because it would be a way to form large units within which a strong central power would prevent further wars." For many reasons this has not proven itself to be the case. "The actual result has simply been that mankind has substituted fewer and more comprehensive wars for perpetual petty warfare."

In regard to the present situation: "The certain prevention of war is possible only if the human race will agree to institute a central power which will pass judgment on all questions of dispute. Here two requirements are fused: that such a supreme court be

created, and that it be given the necessary power." The one without the other is useless. The League of Nations is in the position of having no independent power. It can obtain it only if the members of the league will relinquish their absolute sovereignty. For the present there appears to be no such expectation. On the other hand, the league represents "a unique effort in human history to consider that the achievement of decisive authority rests not in the possession of power but in the appeal to certain conceptual ideals. We have seen that a community is unified by the compulsion of force and by the emotional ties of its members, which are technically called identifications. If one of these factors falls away it is possible for the other to maintain unity intact. But ideas have significance only when they express important common interests of the members of the community. It then becomes a question of their power. . . . The Pan-Hellenic ideal, the consciousness of superiority over the surrounding barbarians, . . . was strong enough to modify warfare among the Greeks themselves, but was naturally not in a position to prevent conflicts between them, or even to keep a city, or a league of cities, from forming an alliance with the inimical Persians to the detriment of a rival. Nor did the bond of Christianity, strong though it was, prevent the large and small states of the Renaissance period from seeking the help of the Sultan in their wars against each other. There is no idea today in which such single authority could be vested, . . . and it appears that the attempt to substitute the power of ideas for real force is again doomed to failure. It is an error in judgment to overlook the fact that right was originally crude violence, and that it cannot even now survive without the support of power."

In answer to Einstein's third and fourth queries "*Why is it so easy to inspire human beings to make war?*" and "*Is there an instinct to hate and destroy which welcomes this incitation?*" Freud asserts that there is such an instinct. He postulates two types of innate drives, the erotic or sexual (in the psychoanalytic sense) and the destructive or aggressive. The one is as indispensable to life as the other, consequently the concepts of "good" and "bad" are irrelevant. Now it appears that an instinct of one sort rarely acts independently, but is always alloyed with another which modifies the original aim, or else, under certain circumstances, makes the desired end attainable. The instinct for self-preservation, for instance, is certainly erotic in nature, but it depends upon aggres-

sion for its achievement. It is precisely the problem of separating these two drives and their activities which has made their study so difficult. Human activity rarely deals with sexual and destructive drives alone. More usually several similarly directed forces must fuse to promote action. The willingness to fight may depend upon a variety of motives which may be lofty, mean, frankly outspoken or unmentionable. "The pleasure in aggression and destruction is certainly one of them." The satisfaction derived from these destructive tendencies is of course modified by others which are erotic and ideational in nature. "At times we are under the impression that idealistic motives have simply been a screen for the atrocities of history; at other times that they were more prominent and that the destructive drives came to their assistance for unconscious reasons, as in the cruelties perpetrated during the Holy Inquisition."

The destructive drive is present in each individual and seeks to reduce him to the state of inanimate matter. It is correctly called the *death instinct*, whereas the erotic drives represent the claims upon life. The death instinct is converted into the drive to destroy in that it is turned upon other objects than the self, in other words, the individual saves his own life by destroying something external to himself. A remnant of the death instinct persists in its activity nevertheless. It is unhealthy for too much aggression to be introjected, whereas turning these destructive drives against the outside world is actually a relief. "Let this be the biological excuse for all the ugly and dangerous strivings against which we struggle. They are more natural than the resistance we offer them. For this we must also find an explanation."

Aggression cannot be eliminated, but can be modified by the libidinal drives.

"For our present purposes then, it is useless to try to eliminate the aggressive tendencies in man. . . . The Bolsheviki hope to eliminate human aggression by the guarantee of material needs and the establishment of equality among the members of the community. This, to my way of thinking, is an illusion, since they are fully armed at the present time, and hold their party together chiefly through their hatred of all outsiders. Further, the question is not that of doing away with aggression altogether, but rather of diverting it so that there is no need to express it in warfare. If the

readiness to fight is a discharge of the destructive tendencies, it follows that the libidinal instincts should be called upon to counteract them." The simple injunction "Love thy neighbor" is difficult to carry out, but the mechanism of establishing emotional ties through identification has proved itself to be a powerful one. The Utopian ideal would be that of a community whose judgment controls the instinctive drives. No other condition could create such a state of impermeable and complete unity. In the meanwhile the practical approach to the problem is confined to dealing with the dangers which arise by the immediately available methods. But, "it is unpleasant to think of mills which grind so slowly that one could starve before the meal can be had."

In conclusion Freud raises the question:

Why do we revolt against war instead of accepting it as a painful necessity?

Not only because every man has a right to live. War destroys men of promise, compromises the individual by forcing him into degrading situations, forces him to slay against his will, and also destroys the valuable products of human labor. Further, war at the present time no longer fulfils the heroic ideal of the ancients, and the means of destruction have become perfected to such a point that a future war might result in the extermination of either or both of the adversaries. All these conditions are so obvious that it is perhaps astonishing that warfare has not yet been repudiated by the common agreement of mankind.

"I believe that the main reason for our revolt against war is that we cannot feel otherwise. We are pacifists because we must be, and for organic reasons. It is then simple for us to justify our attitude by arguments. This is probably incomprehensible without an explanation. My reasoning is as follows: Since time immemorial cultural development has been superimposing itself upon mankind. We are indebted to it for our greatest achievements, but also for the greater part of our ailments. The cause and beginning of civilization is obscure and its outcome is uncertain. . . . Perhaps it will lead to the extinction of mankind, since it invalidates the sexual function in more ways than one. Already the uncivilized races and the backward elements of the population multiply more rapidly than the highly cultured strata. Perhaps this process is comparable to the domestication of certain types of

animals, since there is no doubt that bodily changes are involved. It is not a familiar concept that the development of civilization is such an organic process. The concomitant psychic changes are apparent and unequivocal. They consist in the progressive postponement of the gratification of the instinctive drives, and in their restriction. Sensations which were pleasurable to our ancestors, have become indifferent or intolerable to us. There is an organic basis for the change in our ethical and æsthetic demands. Two psychological characteristics of civilization appear to have the greatest importance: the increasing power of the intellect which begins to gain control over the instinctive life, and the introjection of the aggressive tendencies together with all their advantageous and dangerous consequences. Now war is repugnant to the psychic setting which forces the process of civilization upon us. It is revolting to us and no longer agrees with us. We pacifists do not simply harbor intellectual and affective objections, but we have a constitutional lack of tolerance (for war) comparable in all respects to a severe idiosyncrasy, and it seems that the æsthetic debasement of warfare, no less than our resistance to its cruelty, constitutes our opposition to it. It is difficult to say how long we must wait for others to become pacifists also."

Freud emphasizes the fact that he has not been called upon to make practical suggestions so much as to indicate the psychological considerations implied in the prevention of war. He hopes that it is perhaps no mere pipe dream that the combined forces of cultural development and the well-grounded fear of future wars will make an end of the warlords within a reasonable period of time. "In the meantime, we may say that whatever promotes the development of civilization also counteracts warfare." *

BETTINA WARBURG (NEW YORK)

* An English translation of "Warum Krieg?" has just been published under the title of "Why War?" by George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London.

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OLD BOOKS

OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE, CAUSES, AND CURE OF THOSE DISORDERS WHICH HAVE BEEN COMMONLY CALLED NERVOUS, HYPOCHONDRIAC, OR HYSTERIC, To which are prefixed some Remarks on the Sympathy of the Nerves. By Robert Whytt, M.D.F.R.S., Physician to His Majesty, President of the Royal College of Physicians, and Professor of Medicine in the University of Edinburgh. Edinburgh: Printed for T. Becket, and P. DuHondt, London, and J. Balfour, Edinburgh. 1765. viii + 520 p.

A contemporary book owes its immediate reputation to its contemporary critics; hence the value of an initial criticism in the form of a foreword by an eminent contemporary godfather. An old book, however, is sponsored so to say by godsons, by later men who discover in the older writer elements on which to base an identification. Whytt's book is called to our attention by certain psychiatrists of the nineteenth century who share with him a neuro-physiological point of view concerning the neuroses. These psychiatrists, Krafft-Ebing, Schüle, Arndt, rate Whytt's view of "the Disorders which have been common called nervous, hypochondriac, or hysteric" very highly, as the forerunner of Beard's and the modern (to them) neuro-physiological conception of neurasthenia. Krafft-Ebing singles Whytt out from among a round dozen other older writers to credit him with the first attempt to differentiate neurasthenia from the *vapores*, as the nervous disorders had been vaguely termed. "Die ersten Versuche, die Neurasthenie von ihnen abzugrenzen, machte Whytt (1765), der sie als 'Nervousness' schilderte." (*Die Nervosität*, p. 33.)

Whytt's notion of neural function was in keeping with the physiology of the time, yet within this range he remains acute and objective. The theory that the nerves are little tubes for the conduction of "animal fluid" he keeps *sub judice*, and he confines his formulation of nervous function to empirical statements. In the absence of any histology, any idea of the division of nerves into sensory and motor, or theory of reflex or integrative action, the conception which does yeoman duty for all is that of *sympathy* or *consent*. Sympathy (of which "consent" is the latinized form) is a general statement of the inference that somehow through the action

of the nervous system a local stimulus may evoke a physiological alteration in the body as a whole, or at a site spatially removed from the locus of stimulation. The examples given include many that we now attribute to reflex action, lymphatic conduction, hormonal influence, or to central nervous conduction; but the observations, so far as they go stand to-day. Thus: "irritation of the membranes of the brain are frequently attended with a sickness at the stomach or vomiting"; "grief, vexation, or fear lessen the secretion of the saliva, destroy the appetite, and sometimes occasion a looseness"; "the contraction of the pupil is not owing to light acting as a stimulus on the iris, but solely to the sympathy between this membrane and the retina".

Whytt's criterion, then, for a nervous symptom is that it should be due to the action of the nerves, especially sympathy, and his criterion of nerve action was, essentially, spatially remote effect. "To illustrate this by a few examples," he writes, "we do not call the toothache a nervous disease, because the nerves of the teeth are pained; but if, from a particular delicacy of constitution, the patient is, by this pain, thrown into convulsions and faintings, we call these symptoms nervous. An obstruction in the coats of the stomach, or other hypochondriac viscera, is not strictly speaking, a nervous disease; but if the nerves of these parts are so changed from their natural state, that low spirits, melancholy, or madness, are the consequences of this obstruction, then these symptoms deserve the name of nervous . . ."

In accordance with this criterion, the author divides his patients into three groups. The *simply nervous* are, "on account of an unnatural delicacy of their nervous system, apt to be often affected with violent tremors, palpitations, faintings and convulsive fits, from fear, grief, surprise, or other passions; and from whatever greatly irritates or disagreeably affects any of the more sensible parts of the body." The *hysteric*, so-called "in compliance with custom", besides the above symptoms have digestive disturbances, the *clavus hystericus*, giddiness, pains, etc.—in short special head and organ symptoms. The *hypochondriac* patients "are scarce ever affected with violent palpitations, faintings or convulsive motions . . . but on account of a disordered state of the nerves of the stomach and bowels, are seldom free from complaints of indigestion, belching, flatulence, want of appetite, or too great craving, costiveness, or looseness, flushings, giddiness, oppression or faint-

ness about the præcordia, low spirits, disagreeable thoughts, watching or disturbed sleep, *etc.*" We should probably say nowadays that these latter were mostly depressed or neurotic patients with prominent visceral symptoms.

We can reduce Whytt's theory of the neuroses (to use this term loosely, as we necessarily must to preserve our rapport with the author and his times) to a few propositions, which are united in a strict causal nexus: (1) A physiological alteration due to a stimulus in a spatially removed part of the body is effected by nervous sympathy. (2) A symptom due to nervous sympathy is a nervous symptom. (3) Nervous symptoms occur in persons with a constitutionally delicate nervous system; and such persons are sufferers from nervousness. (4) Empirically there are three types of nervousness: (a) simple, (b) hysteric, (c) hypochondriac. This theory is remarkable for its surprising modernness even to-day; for it is the theory of choice in many scientific quarters still. These quarters (and they may be palatial ones) are naturally those to which Charcot, Janet and Freud have not penetrated. If we consider the material presented by Whytt to illustrate the disorders "called nervous, hypochondriac and hysteric", and still largely so-called, and if we eliminate differentially those phenomena now thought to be due to infections (tetanus), allergy (collapse following a bee sting), organic nervous changes (muscular atrophy after paralysis), and others of like order, we are left with a residual of "nervous" symptoms which receive the same interpretation from many neurologists to-day, despite the much vaunted progress in somatic medicine, as Whytt gives them; they are still regarded as "functional" disorders of the nerves in persons with a nervous system of "unnatural delicacy". And upon roughly the same evidence available to Whytt, many persons still maintain that "low spirits, melancholy, or madness, are the consequence" of changes in the nerves due to an "obstruction in the coats of the stomach, or other hypochondriac viscera" and let this pathological theory serve as their guide to therapy.

The magnificent anatomic and physiological discoveries of the nineteenth century acted, to borrow metaphorically from psycho-analytic terminology, as a reaction formation. Heavily invested with narcissistic libido, as reaction formations frequently are, they stood opposed to the older medicine. Interestingly, Freud's conception of the actual neuroses in biochemical terms resembles a

"return of the repressed from repression". The wheel has turned through one revolution, for in the cultural historical sense, Freud's precursors in this particular theory are those writers who preceded Whytt, and whose views were suppressed by the later neurology. These older men held, in terms of classical humoral pathology, that the nervous disorders, known to them as *vapores*, were due to the bad effect of hypothetical noxious vapors originating in and emanating from decomposed semen or menstrual blood. (Cf. Kraft-Ebing, *l.c.*)

This brief review does not do justice to Whytt's very interesting individual observations, clinical and therapeutic, and the level-headedness with which he frequently assesses them. For example, in discussing the efficacy of treating spasms by holding a roll of sulphur in the hand until it snaps, he says, "I am, therefore, of opinion, that brimstone cures spasms not by any medical virtue; but that its effects are to be ascribed to the patient's attention and faith, or rather to the surprize occasioned by the roll snapping in his hand: And as a confirmation of this, I have known some affected with the cramp, who, having been informed that the breaking of the brimstone was owing to the heat of the hand, missed of a cure." He also tells in corroboration of this idea that, "I have been often cured of a slight hiccup by looking stedfastly, for two or three minutes, on the impression upon a shilling, or any other coin: And I know a Lady who, though very liable to hysteric fits, is never affected with them, or even slighter complaints, when any of her children happen to be dangerously ill."

B. D. L.

Forty Years of Psychiatry. By William A. White. New York and Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1933. 154 p.

Karl A. Menninger

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BOOK REVIEWS

FORTY YEARS OF PSYCHIATRY. By William A. White. New York and Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1933. 154 p.

No one is better qualified to record a history of the dynamics of American psychiatry than Dr. White, our revered leader and colleague. Gifted with a clear vision of the deeper meaning of movements and events, a gift which undoubtedly participated in his election of psychiatry as a career and endowed also with the capacity of expressing himself clearly and convincingly, he has summarized in this small volume the growth of psychiatric conceptions in his own mind and, what is almost the same, in his native land.

For what Dr. White was able to see he gladly passed on to others and this made him one of the leaders of the profession, both scientifically and politically. That he has never lacked the courage of his convictions is well known, and perhaps it is because of this rather than in spite of it that he has stood at the head of the profession notwithstanding his early espousal of the unpopular cause of psychoanalysis. Later, when the administrative functions of the "old-fashioned" hospital superintendent were exciting the contempt or at least the disavowal of those who felt that psychiatry should concern itself only with the clinical minutiae of hospital patients, he likewise came to the defense of "these sturdy gentlemen" and in one of his most felicitous passages pointed out that skilful provisions for the care of the mentally sick were intimately and inseparably related to the scientific understanding of their condition, and that the administration of a hospital for the mentally sick is no less a special division of psychiatry than the examination of the spinal fluid or the interpretation of a dream.

Psychoanalysis in particular will admire the courage of his defense of psychoanalysis at the meeting of the American Medical Association in 1914, when the opposition to psychoanalysis was led by an exceedingly powerful and respected psychiatrist, Dr. Carlos McDonald, president of the Association, and also president of the Lunacy Commission of New York State. The well-known Philadelphians, Burr and Dercum, led a vigorous attack on psycho-

analysis to which Dr. White replied with words which it is difficult to realize were quite radical and bold nineteen years ago.

The book is a survey and not a critical study of the development of new ideas in psychiatry, and naturally on account of the author's viewpoint it has a tendency to put more emphasis on public institutional psychiatry than upon the more individual applications. Indeed, if a criticism were to be offered, it might be that the book has a tendency to think of psychiatry in terms of theories and mass applications rather than in terms of the practical application to the individual. The great public institutions for the indigent insane are directed, on the whole, very sagaciously but the fact remains that aside from the work in the author's own institution and one or two others, most of the progress in psychiatry has not come from these asylums but from the painstaking work of individual psychiatrists with individual patients.

Another critical comment might be that in one or two places Dr. White perhaps assumes too great a familiarity on the part of psychiatrists with the origin of Freudian theories.

This is a book which every psychiatrist will want to possess, not alone because of its interesting, well-turned contents, but because William Alanson White wrote it.

KARL A. MENNINGER (TOPEKA)

CRIMES AND CRIMINALS. By William A. White. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1933. 275 p.

Dr. White explains in a brief preface that he is not presenting new material in the field covered by this book; rather he is trying to set forth a total viewpoint in dealing with human behavior which he feels is already familiar in professional circles but needs continual emphasis for its proper development. He states further that, in the writing, he was drawn somewhat away from his original plan until the book became an essay on human relationships in general, illustrated from the field of criminology.

Dr. White has undertaken in the first part of his book to apply the principles of psychoanalysis to the modern understanding of the human personality from both the dynamic and systematic aspects. In spite of occasional references to Freud, it is nowhere set down that this is a psychoanalytic interpretation of human psychology. In thus keeping out of a partisan camp the author may have felt that he would avoid unnecessary prejudice and con-

troversy. Furthermore, this free lance method allows him to borrow occasionally from other fields than psychoanalysis without danger of being charged with heresy.

The psychoanalytic outline is on the whole sound. A rather glaring exception is the retention (pages 82 and 29) of the old division of instincts into those directed toward race and self-preservation respectively. It seems regrettable that the author did not make use of the more recent alignments of instinctual life brought about by the further development of the concept of narcissism. This has made it possible to include the nutritive and other self-preservation tendencies among the manifestations of libido, with the result that a new and more satisfactory dichotomy of instinct in the form of the sexual and the aggressive components is now generally accepted. Among other advantages from such treatment would have been greater ease in fitting into the instinct theory those major emotions of love and hate with which the author has some difficulty (p. 190).

There are other reasons for dissatisfaction with the presentation of psychoanalytic theories. At times it is too discursive to be clear, and the illustrations are not always well chosen. The treatment of the unconscious is a special example in point, as is also the consideration of guilt in the sixth chapter. In this respect, the book must be compared unfavorably with some of the author's other works—works that have played an important part in introducing psychoanalysis to the American people. In general it may be said of this book that without a substantial psychoanalytic background the explanations of the structure and dynamics of the personality can hardly be understood, while with such a background, a good part of the material is more elementary than is necessary.

In the more general and philosophical concepts of his broad subject, Dr. White has, as is his custom, shown a rare power to transcend the detailed and specific and thereby reach universals which illuminate and clarify. His treatment of the subject of mental conflict is a special example; another is to be found in connection with his emphasis on the important double relationship between super-ego and social standards, in the field of cause as well as effect.

The latter half of the book deals more particularly with criminology from the historical, sociological, philosophical and legal aspects; with recommendation and prophecy thrown in. The sub-

ject of psychological determinism and the need for more consideration of the criminal rather than of the crime are newly emphasized. The relation of the law to the social and biological sciences is set forth. The inevitable digression of the paths followed by law as a static entity in contrast to sociology and psychology as dynamics is pointed out. The subject of punishment is discussed at some length from the balanced standpoint of a scientist and humanitarian who has the advantage of wide experience and learning, broad sympathies, and a detached and nonpartisan point of view.

Case illustrations are interspersed throughout the text, presented in quite a superficial way, evidently with a nonpsychiatric reading public in mind. So far as circulation is concerned, the book got off to a good start by being a selection of the Book of the Month Club.

MARTIN W. PECK (BOSTON)

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF FORCED MOVEMENTS IN OCULOGYRIC CRISES.

By Smith Ely Jelliffe. New York and Washington: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1932. 215 p.

An honest review of this monograph must be unsparing, even if it leads to sharp criticism of one who has always battled wittily and often effectively to win respect for dynamic psychology. In a sense it may be looked upon as a tribute to a large and generous and adventurous spirit that the author's original contributions have been subjected so often to vigorous and justifiable attack, even at the hands of the friends and coworkers who hold his spirit in high and affectionate regard.

To this reviewer the present volume contains much to deplore, and little to commend. It seems to embody the author's most serious faults of style, of methodology, and of reasoning. This is all the more regrettable, since there can hardly be a problem more searching in its psychiatric implications than the question which is raised by the occurrence of obsessional thoughts in association with oculogyric crises in cases of chronic encephalitis (post-encephalitis).

Stylistically one must quarrel with the author's choice and use of words, and with his sentence structure, almost line by line, from first to last. It is not asking too much to expect a standard of workmanship in editing a book which will eliminate such clumsy and complex paragraphs as the fourth paragraph on the first page of the introduction, such avoidable repetition of words as occurs

in lines 7 and 8 of page 7, the combative conversational manner of paragraph 3 on page 6, with the frequent use of colloquial, semi-obscene or facetious slang expressions. One has a right to demand a simpler, more factual, less self-conscious form of presentation of facts and of opinion. Science does not profit from such congeries of words as "phyletically agglutinated configurations" (page 158).

More than one-half of this monograph (109 pages) is devoted to a listing of the two hundred cases of oculogyric crises which have been reported since 1920. With a few exceptions, so little data is given in the brief abstract of each case, that the list is of value only as a guide into the literature. Dr. Jelliffe comments rightly on the inadequacy of the studies of the psychological content of these cases, and adds that one case fully and completely studied is worth a hundred superficial descriptions. It is a keen disappointment, therefore, to find that of his four original cases, only one has been subjected to any kind of psychoanalysis, and that no one of them is presented carefully enough or fully enough to clarify the problems involved.

From the discursive text of the monograph, one can assemble six basic problems: (1) Why are the oculogyric crises sometimes attended by acute anxiety, and at other times not? (2) Why are some of the crises attended by pain, and others not? (3) Why are some of the crises attended by an eruption of obsessional ideas, and others not? (4) To what extent are these variable psychological concomitants dependent upon the pre-encephalitic personality, or to what extent are they dependent upon changes in the personality which are induced by the encephalitic process? (5) To what extent are the oculogyric crises themselves due to specific, localized, organic irritation? Or do they represent a distorted expression of the pressure of instinctual forces operating through a mutilated central nervous system? The answering of these questions would lead finally to a discussion which is the essence of the problem, namely, (6) the relationship of compulsive phenomena to tics, and the question of whether there are two kinds of tics—one essentially organic, and the other essentially psychogenetic in origin. Unfortunately Dr. Jelliffe does not ask any of these questions clearly, he indicates no method whereby their answers may be found, and nowhere does he present new data which would help us to answer them. Instead, time and again, just as he approaches a frank grappling with one of the questions, he seems to shy away from it,

and contents himself with comments on the complexities of the issues involved, lauding the contributions of Freudian psychoanalysis, retreating into the world of classical erudition and tilting against the shortsightedness of his adversaries (this sometimes quite unfairly, as where, on pages 178 and 179, he objects to the legitimate efforts at anatomical localization of the lesions which might lie behind these phenomena). It may be granted readily that it is often fruitful in science merely to formulate an intricate problem clearly, even before an answer can be given to the questions involved. But in the absence of clear formulation of the question, or of any adequate presentation of new data or of new methods, it is difficult to see what function this study serves.

Furthermore, with much of the author's reasoning on pathogenesis the reviewer is inclined to differ, as, for instance, with the argument (p. 146) that since there are free intervals between the crises, somatic impairment alone cannot be looked upon as the whole cause of the "thought repression". Similarly insecure would be the reasoning (p. 175) that if a bit of behavior is frequent and widespread, it "may be deemed physiological", *e.g.*—states of ecstasy and raptus. Nor can we agree with Dr. Jelliffe's rejection of Stern's distinction between impulsive behavior disturbances (*Drangshandlungen*) on the one hand, and obsessional phenomena (*Zwangshandlungen*) on the other. This distinction would seem to be allied to the important differences between dreaming and sleep-walking, between neurosis and perversion, or between fantasy and action. One is also bemused by the incomprehensible distinction which the author draws (p. 183) between "organic" and "psychic" processes.

Finally, as psychoanalysts, we are under a special obligation to object to the serious inadequacies and the many minor errors in the presentation of psychoanalytic theory. Among such theoretical errors one might mention the identification (p. 143) of the super-ego with the command to the patient to follow a moving finger, the confusion of the id with Whitehead's "mental states" (p. 162), or (p. 175) the confusion of the id with the unconscious. Again (p. 131) one finds a faulty interchanging of the concepts of the sense of guilt, the super-ego, and the ego ideal. Nor does it give one greater confidence in the author's clarity to find his implying (p. 175, lines 1-4) that there might be a separate anatomical machine for the ego and the super-ego. But even more important

is the fact that one seeks in vain throughout the work for an adequate, succinct presentation of the present status of analytic theory as to the nature of anxiety, compulsion, or tic. In the section which is devoted to compulsions (p. 186 to 192), Dr. Jelliffe discusses the history of the orthodox psychiatric point of view, especially pointing out the errors in outworn doctrines, and explaining in detail the ideas with which he disagrees, but nowhere reaching a clear statement of the platform on which he himself stands.

To trace the author's arguments through the welter of polemic and classical erudition is not easy. In general, however, he seems to take the following position: That the infectious injury to the machinery of the central nervous system makes it possible for instinctive drives to express themselves in distorted forms. The oculogyric crises represent such a distortion and according to the author are unconsciously chosen either as an expression of guilt or as a ritualistic atonement or as a ritual of defense against inadmissible strivings. In various places he takes any one of these positions indifferently. He stresses the fact that the eyes usually roll upward and toward the right and attributes to this either a prayerful significance or a tendency to look "either towards or away from an external or an introjected object". He mentions, but tends to gloss over, those cases in which the direction of gaze is downward or towards the other side or else straight ahead, and he dismisses with scarcely a word the even more puzzling problem that is presented by the convergence spasms which also occur. Nor does he discuss the probable influence of right or left eyedness on the direction chosen.

In support of his thesis, the author offers a few examples of guilt utterances, and of erotic fantasies. That these are significant is clear. It must be obvious, however, that emotionally charged conflicts must inevitably seize upon any dramatic disturbance in the body and use it as a pathway of discharge. Whether these fantasies are sources of energy or mere passengers on the train, remains quite obscure. In the absence of adequate analytic study, therefore, one is justified in looking upon these speculations merely as the author's personal free associations. Finally, it is disappointing to find no adequate analysis of the obsessional thoughts, which, in certain cases, erupt in association with the oculogyric crisis. For it is this phenomenon which presents the most serious challenge to

current psychoanalytic conceptions of the genesis of compulsive tendencies.

LAWRENCE S. KUBIE (NEW YORK)

WHERE IS SCIENCE GOING? By Max Planck. With a Prologue by Albert Einstein. Translation and biographical note by James Murphy. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1932. 220 p.

In this book Planck has followed in the footsteps of those two talented English popularizers of the philosophical implications of modern physics, Eddington and Jeans, but he has not entered a field hitherto foreign to him. On the contrary, Planck has always been interested in the borderline problems of physics and philosophy and has published many addresses and articles in this domain. Especially important for him has been the significance of causality in physics in its bearing upon freedom of will; this problem has long occupied him, and it is discussed again in his latest book, two of the six chapters of which are devoted to it. Next in importance among the topics of the book is that of the reality of the external world. The two remaining chapters (Fifty Years of Science, and From the Relative to the Absolute) are of slighter significance.

It is not necessary to reproduce in this review the development of the author's ideas. The problems that concern him, and his procedures belong to an antiquated academic philosophy, which, it must be said, is not even employed correctly. In discussing the question "Is the external world real?" he attacks positivism, identifies it with a misrepresented solipsism that no one defends, and uses in the process a "Kantianism" that equates the concepts "objective" and "transcendental". With the principle that observation is the sole source of science and sensory experience the only source of physics he is unable to find a connection to the existence of a real external world except by a "jump into the *metaphysical* realm". He opposes to the positivistic postulate that there is no other source of knowledge in physics except within the restricted range of perception through the senses, the two metaphysical postulates: "(1) that there is a real outer world which exists independently of our act of knowledge, and (2) the real outer world is not directly knowable." To this he adds: "to a certain degree these two statements are mutually contradictory. And this fact discloses

the presence of a mystic element which adheres to physical science as to every other branch of knowledge."

Planck arrives at the concept of causality by the same "metaphysical jump". Although first admitting that "in his attempt to build up his hypothetical picture of the external universe the physicist may or may not, just as he likes, base his synthesis on the principle of strict dynamic causality or he may adopt only a statistical causality", he ends with the statement: "having once assumed the existence of an independent external world, science concomitantly assumes the principle of causality as a concept entirely independent of sense perception". However, neither the one nor the other metaphysical jump is convincing. The situation is the same as with the ether, following the triumph of the principle of special relativity: it is not possible to prove that the ether does not exist, but neither is it possible to prove that it does exist. The ether is therefore regarded as superfluous. The great objection to causality in physics, as Eddington recently pointed out in an article (in *Philosophy*, Jan. 1933) is that one does not need it.

The physicist and the epistemologist who finds Planck's argument wholly unconvincing will be inclined to set the entire book aside in disappointment. It is otherwise with the psychoanalyst, who will find the book of the greatest interest exactly where the physicist is most disapproving. The psychoanalyst will not find it difficult to detect that at many points Planck's language becomes unnecessarily emotional. Planck is concerned with the problem of the reality of the external world for other than epistemological reasons. He has other motives. "We are living," he declares, "in a very singular moment of history. It is a moment of crisis . . . to see the tiding of a downfall to which our civilization is fatally destined . . . formerly it was only religion, the object of skeptical attack . . . now the iconoclast has invaded the temple of science. . . . Where shall we look for a firm foundation? . . . physics? . . . but, even within the province of this science itself the spirit of confusion and contradiction has begun to be active. . . . For that reason I feel as a physicist that I ought to put forward my own views on the situation. . . . Perhaps what I shall have to say may throw some light on other fields of human activity which the cloud of skepticism has also darkened."

With this, Planck gives himself away. He has undertaken to rescue causality in order to safeguard authority. We are indebted

to the editor, James Murphy, for his brief biographical sketch of the author. We learn that Planck's father was a jurist, a professor of constitutional law, and the co-author of the Prussian Civil Code. It is characteristic that the English metaphysicians and mystics among the physicists, Eddington and Jeans, can take their leap into metaphysics only after they have demolished the prison walls of strict causality, whereas the physicist Planck, who by the irony of fate was elected to lay the mine under these very walls, is engaged in safeguarding them, even if he must become a metaphysician for this purpose. Causality is the nucleus of strict physical law, and how can the son of a jurist surrender causality? We can surmise now why Planck has always endeavored to reconcile this theoretical, strict causality with the practical freedom of the human will. It has been one of the cardinal problems of juristic philosophy to establish the moral responsibility of the individual while recognizing the determinacy of his behavior.

It is naturally of special interest to discover how Planck makes the determinacy of physical occurrences to agree with those corollaries of the quantum theory which carry with it Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. (See Reiner, Markus: *Causality and Psychoanalysis*. This QUARTERLY I, 1932.) Planck leaves this point unclarified in the present book. We may refer however to a paper of Planck's that appeared about the same time. (Proceedings, Physical Society, 44, 529. 1932.) The following solution was given: Causality is prediction. In classical physics we uphold strict causality by referring the events which we predict, not to the immediately given *world of senses*, where there are always exceptions, but to the scientific picture of the *physical world*, i.e., *we have modified the object of prediction*. Heisenberg showed that this cannot be carried through when we come to quantum processes. Planck, therefore, proposes to modify instead of the object, the *subject* of the prediction: the *predicting mind*. It is obvious that the certainty of the prediction depends to a high degree upon the individuality of the predictor. Let us, therefore, assume an ideal mind not limited by the conditions that brought about Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. "In order, however, to accomplish such a notion logically, we must subject ourselves to a severe restriction: we must forego making the ideal mind the object of scientific investigation."

It is not difficult to recognize this "ideal mind". It is no other than the *omniscient Deity*. We may assume with certainty that Planck has never read Radó's beautiful analysis of the sources of the concept of causality (Radó, Sándor: *The Paths of Natural Science in the Light of Psychoanalysis*. This QUARTERLY I, 1932), but his considerations seem to have been expressly made to provide an example for Radó's contentions.

Thus far the psychoanalyst! As for the physicist, he can only regret that in general he knows so little about psychoanalysis. If he knew more he would be spared many a problem. The problem of the reality of the external world does not actually belong to the realm of physics. There is, however, no need for metaphysics. It may be said that the problem is an ante-physical one. The external world is simply *given* to consciousness. The external world is an *instance of consciousness*. How this happens can be learned not by logic, not by conscious psychology, but by psychoanalysis. The development of the sense of reality was indicated by Freud and described in greater detail by Ferenczi. (*Entwicklungsstufen des Wirklichkeitssinnes* and *Das Problem der Unlustbejahung in Bausteine zur Psychoanalyse*. Translated respectively in *Contributions to Psycho-Analysis* and *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis*.) This development belongs to a period of the psychic existence of the individual which has been *forgotten*. Indeed, the development of the sense of reality occurs as "a series of stages of repression" (Ferenczi). It is clear, then, that without psychoanalysis, which removes the repression, it is impossible to learn how consciousness has derived its conviction of the reality of the external world. Efforts like Planck's at a solution of the problem are doomed to failure from the start.

Planck's book will be read with interest not because of what it has to say, but because its author is the renowned physicist. The psychologically oriented reader may find in it a dry romanticism, a rigorous metaphysics that presents an interesting contrast to the lively freedom which permeates the mysticism of Eddington and Jeans. This will perhaps make Planck's recent pæan to Germany's new master more comprehensible. Perhaps Planck believes he has found here a safeguard against the skepticism that threatens the foundations of his spiritual world.

MARKUS REINER (EASTON, PA.)

HISTORY, PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE. By Alexander Goldenweiser.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1933. xii+475 p.

Dr. Goldenweiser's book can hardly be said to satisfy the anticipations that it may have aroused. Far from being a comprehensive survey of the relations between history, psychology and culture, the book, in the author's own words, "has no other unity than that implied in the term 'social theory' and in being the product of one head". The book is largely a collection of reprints dating from 1910 on, though the author tells us they have been either rewritten or subjected to merciless revision.

The book contains a critical review of anthropological methods and schools of thought, the author's own essays on totemism, and a group of semi-popular essays on religion, race and related subjects. The various parts are of unequal merit, the critical exposition of anthropological methods being by far the best. Those who have studied with Professor Goldenweiser will recognize in this work the discipline which he so effectively propounded in the classroom. The book commends itself to the analytic reader for many reasons, the most important of which is the author's sympathy for a psychological point of view in anthropology. It is, however, to be noted with regret that his approval of psychoanalysis is grudgingly bestowed and is essentially inconsistent with his criticisms.

In one of the essays "Is Freud a Psychologist?" the author contends that Freud cannot really be taken seriously. "The failings and exaggerations of his system are largely due to the fact that it is not rooted in a systematic and comprehensive exploration of the mind" (p. 430). One cannot, the author objects, transfer the mechanisms of the neurotic to the normal, and he blames Freud for not concerning himself with sensations, perceptions, mechanisms of vision, learning and memory processes, creativeness and such common traits as temper and courage. Hence Freud is only half a psychologist, which may or may not be better than none at all. Moreover, Freud is declared to have oversimplified matters by leaning too heavily on sex. The author objects to the derivation of the religious sense or the sense of beauty from the sex urge, finding fault with the entire sexual theory and arguing that since the sex organs reach maturity with adolescence, it is reasonable to assume that the psychological tendencies characteristic of adult sexuality are as congenital as the physical changes they accompany, and that both physical and psychic changes are timed to appear,

not at infancy or childhood, but at puberty. Freud is further blamed for overemphasizing the unconscious at the expense of the conscious,—“the only way to understand the conscious mind is to follow the guide posts it provides to the unconscious, and there understanding will be found”.

The author is constantly telling us how indispensable psychology is for the understanding of primitive man, but complains that “in the case of primitive cultures our [psychological] penetration is slight, on account of the paucity of *relevant psychological material*” (p. 14, italics by reviewer). We are nowhere told what psychological approach is to be used. This is all the more exasperating, for as we read his critique of others it becomes increasingly clear that Goldenweiser himself has no mean psychological acumen. His deficiency lies in a paucity of working concepts and dynamic feeling. Time and again he takes the reader to the point where one can really inaugurate a psychological approach, but refuses to go on from there. This is notably the case in his analysis of totemism. Goldenweiser excels in matters of comparison, of fact, or where he is dealing with problems of logic or dialectic. Social facts are dealt with only in accordance with the laws of logic. He does not get beyond describing phenomena and getting them into some logical concatenation with each other. Whenever an issue of social origins arises he is entirely lost once he is deprived of the historical prop; he fails to see the uses or purpose of institutions unless their usefulness is directly demonstrable. Naturally he recognizes survivals and factors that spread culture, but accounts for them only when direct physical factors are involved, such as diffusion. Diffusion, moreover, is described as if it were a purely physical matter, and the motive for it is apparently attributed to suggestibility or imitativeness. What factors are responsible for continuity of ideas, customs, or institutions we are not told; but it is implied that they have a certain momentum, and change is opposed by that “ole dabil” resistance (inertia). The psychic unity of mankind lies in the truism that the basic nature of man remains perpetually the same. Hence “psychic unity (p. 65) expresses itself in cultural features of universal distribution”. Then Goldenweiser makes a distinction we cannot follow: The features that are universal in culture can be interpreted psychologically; those that are not universal but merely general, such as the clan or mother-in-law taboos, must be explained “historically”,

and by that he means (p. 66, footnote) "a statement of what actually occurred". But we are assured that "historical" does not exclude psychological. And if you abuse your psychology it will corrupt your history and your anthropology (p. 86). Having this acceptable psychological jumping off place we hear no more about it. Psychoanalysis, the author says (p. 67) has done much to uncover the original nature of man, and as a result "we know more today about the urge of sex, repression, conflicts, compensations and sublimations"; and he further recognizes in his scathing indictment of the evolutionists, that inertia or resistance to change is the basic characteristic of man, a trait "which is enhanced by the ponderous inertia of institutionalism, which at its points of operation is also psychological" (p. 75). The evolutionists and diffusionists made their respective errors by refusing to be psychological. Wundt, on the other hand, was all psychological and refused to recognize the influence of reality; "he turned his back upon the external sources of experience"; nor does the author find Freud's approach satisfactory.

The study of totemism begins with a comparison of the "totemic complex" in Australia and Northwest America, only to find that they do not correspond in some essential details. In America no taboo is associated with the totem, whereas in Central Australia it is very strict; in the former, the idea of descent from the totem is absent, whereas it is universal in Central Australia. He extends the comparison to the Baganda and Mabaig (p. 268) and concludes that not all general features of totemism are to be found everywhere.

With regard to interpretations, Goldenweiser is extremely cautious. He ventures on the interpretation of magic practices only because their utilitarian function is obvious; they insure, for example, food supply. The interpretation of marriage restrictions is avoided because (p. 285) "Nothing short of a historical record will enable us to discern a 'cause' in any particular case." He rejects diffusionism not because it is essentially untrue, but because it is not concerned with essentials. He rejects psychologizing because, to put it bluntly, he does not know how to psychologize. He rejects as futile the quest for first origins; totemism must have begun independently in different places. "A totemic complex rests upon a sib system" (a social unit based on kinship). In this unit the psychic atmosphere is saturated with totemic possibilities. Then, either a taboo, an animal name or what not, is assumed to have occurred in one sib. But presently, psychological conditions

remaining favorable, another sib adopts the feature. And so the totemic feature becomes socialized and thus starts on its round of diffusion. This, in short, is his theory of the nature of totemism.

This seems to say exactly nothing. The proposition that the totemic content is associated with a basic social unit is an excellent starting point. But are the two incidentally or necessarily related? Or are the sib and totemic content both the expression of the same need? The author does not tell us. The basic sib system is already a big leap. Here is where we would like to know a bit more of this original nature of man: (1) what necessities of man made for the origin of the sib system? (2) how did the sib system impose upon, alter, or modify this original nature? and (3) how does the sib system connect the individual or the group with its past? Here Goldenweiser rejects the possibility that the totem may be the carrier of attitudes or feelings that originally appertained to someone or something *else*, that it is a displacement. He is compelled, therefore, to account for the rôle of animals and plants in the life of primitive man as a "nature mysticism or supernaturalism". The "socio-psychological atmosphere" that exists in the sib system is a very arbitrary one, but the author insists (p. 365) that "sib systems must have . . . and do have a *predilection* for this nature mysticism". Nothing more provocative than this can arise from such a fine critical sense in contact with data that concern themselves with phenomena rather than with the creature whose functions they represent.

The presentation of Freud's views is hardly adequate. His objections to Freud's ideas on totemism may be formulated as:

1. The existence of the animal phobia in the child is no warrant for belief that the group attitude to the totem is of similar nature.
2. Granting that the principle of "omnipotence of thought" is at the basis of the magical universe, this is not characteristic of primitive man alone but of modern man too. Hence the analogy between primitive man and neurotic breaks down.
3. "Totemic sacrifice is a phenomenon practically unknown to ethnologists (p. 206). Robertson Smith's 'instances' were all based on reconstructed material."
4. The idea of a primitive Cyclopean family is a figment of the imagination.
5. "The eating of the father by patricidal brothers is a notion which doubtless would have met with derision in the aboriginal

fraternity itself, nor is it pleasing to the ethnologist" (p. 206). "Man has never used man as a regular article of diet. . . . We do not hear of the eating of relatives."

6. Even if all the above objections could be answered satisfactorily, there is still one that invalidates the whole. By what means is the original parricide and its consequences brought into relation with those subsequent historical phenomena of society, religion, morality and art? "Freud does not here utilize tradition"—social inheritance. Then what? Is it "racial unconscious", a kind of inheritance of acquired characteristics? "One generation receives nothing from its precursor beyond the general psychophysical inheritance of the race, plus the accumulated cultural possessions acquired thru education and other channels of cultural transfer. The assumption of a Psychic continuity between the generations is but an alluring fantasy . . ." (pp. 207-8).

Whether or not we can collect evidence to prove that some primitive peoples have been known to eat relatives is not a matter of great moment. Such occurrences have actually been observed (Róheim). However, the instances he reports are the eating of children by parents in times of famine, and as such they have no bearing on totemic sacrifice anyhow. The point is whether we assume that totemic sacrifice is a *survival*, or a *dramatized fantasy*. The reënactment of the parricide in totemic ritual is not necessarily any evidence of a historical survival in displaced form, but may have a purely fantasy value. In the latter instance, we would have to have historical data bearing on circumstances that created specific instinctual frustrations, like periods of prolonged famine, which gave the ritual its specific form—eating.

Freud has not attempted to explain *totemism*, but only certain totemic phenomena. Since Goldenweiser believes that the original nature of man has hardly ever changed, it is not the great leap in the dark that he supposes, to assume that if a child of five can, under certain conditions of stress and conflict, be relieved by projecting upon a horse a fear and death wish regarding a father who is also loved, primitive man no less harassed than the child by fears, desires and conflicts, eased the tension by the same psychic mechanism (projection).

The variations found in totemism need not in any way be alarming. The same conflicts can be handled in different ways by different peoples, nor are the conditions ever twice the same. We can

heartily sympathize with Goldenweiser in deploring the absence of historical data, not alone of the history of the institution itself, but of the changing conditions to which these institutions are a response. The author teaches us to beware of making a serious psychological error in examining current institutions or practices; their present significance is not necessarily any indication that the present needs it satisfies are the same as those that gave it origin. In a study by Erich Fromm (*Die Entwicklung des Christusdogmas—Imago*, XVI, No. 3/4, 1930) it is shown that the relation between a dogmatized credo and the needs it is purported to meet, are not always parallel. Christianity which began as the most rebellious of religious doctrines wound up as a complete prototype of the Roman Empire, from which it originally sought liberation, a graded hierarchy with an emperor at the top. Yet as an institution, primitive Christianity contained the same formal teachings as 17th century Christianity. At one time the rebellious son was the focal god; at another the baby Christ; at another the Virgin Mary. The motives for their varying emphases are to be found in the changing social and economic conditions.

Goldenweiser's criticisms largely center on the Cyclopean horde theory. He is quite justified in protesting against the assumption that the murder of the "Ur-Vater" should explain why certain practices exist today. In *Massenpsychologie* (Freud, *Gesammelte Schriften* VI) Freud himself declares that the Ur-Vater is only a *hypothesis*, a "just so story". This hypothesis has suffered much abuse in psychoanalytic literature, in that it is used to explain almost anything and is employed as a historical fact to explain contemporary repressions, without any demonstration of the thread along which the continuity is established. This hypothetical horde must have existed because in social organizations where the patriarchal pattern is present there are many practices which indicate the existence of a sense of guilt towards the departed father. The link, therefore, is to be found in the history of the conditions that originally made the patriarchal family necessary, and which kept it alive.

Whether the "Ur-Vater" was once killed and eaten (or habitually eaten) is of minor importance. There certainly could not have been enough primal fathers to go around. What seems important is that the resolution of the ambivalence to the father should be couched in terms of orality. Whether this indicates that the eating

was a historical fact, or whether it is an elaboration of a contemporary need (famine or scarcity of food), this is where the historical data are missing. It may have a significance not very different from what it has in the individual, as the following clinical observation may illustrate. A young man presents a character disturbance which represents largely an unsuccessful repression of oral sadistic traits. He seems orally fixated on his mother, a fixation that was emphasized by the successive birth of six siblings after him. He dreams: "I am buying some tins of predigested food for my baby." His child is four months old, and in his associations he is much concerned with the weaning of the child from its mother as quickly as possible. The patient himself was nursed for fourteen months. He carried about an untiring hatred of his siblings and all whom he could identify with them. His mother subsequently succumbed to an incurable chronic illness which he, in his fantasies, displaced on a large variety of things, and for which he felt guilty. By way of his child, he is trying to prevent such a thing from happening to his wife. He wants to wean it rapidly. It can be stated with certainty that his prolonged nursing had nothing to do with his mother's illness, yet he carries around a feeling of guilt stimulated largely by current needs, which he must now express in oral terms.

In the custom of the *Couvade* we have another illustration. The economic purpose which the *Couvade* serves is the separation of the father from the child, having a protective value. In some instances the father is even punished as if he had actually hurt the child. He is also made to obey rigid dietary taboos and obligations which affect the child magically. In none of these instances can one say with certainty that in this community fathers actually killed and ate their children. The custom may represent a phase in the development of morality where the repression of oral cravings is enforced for the good of the community, or it may indicate current needs which revive oral cravings that must be continually repressed. The author's intuition was quite correct in wedding history to psychology in an effort to account for cultural development, for neither has any meaning without the other. This is a precaution which even psychoanalytic anthropologists might profitably exercise. Some psychoanalytic accounts of primitive cultures go to extremes describing them as if the community in question had a psyche suspended in a void completely detached from all realities and without a past, whose only business in hand is to work through

its œdipus complex. In the absence of historical data concerning institutions and practices, and with complete disregard for the possibility of secondary elaborations, such accounts make good the deficit by recourse to the theory of primal parricide. Granting even that such psychoanalytic interpretations of current practices is correct, their present meaning is no indication of their history, and offers little evidence concerning their original meaning, as shown by the work of Fromm. Such extravagances are easy to fall into when we forget our clinical psychoanalysis. No analyst or patient would accept the interpretation that a boy of twenty-two has a fear of going into a restaurant because when he was five years old he wished his newly born brother to die. The two facts may indeed be causally related, but the connection is not a direct one. The emotional rationale must be reconstructed, and the history of the conflict traced and then fitted into the current situation. Freud never intended the theory of the Cyclopean horde to substitute en bloc for history, and for current realities.

A. KARDINER (NEW YORK)

SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY. By Paul Radin. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1932. xii+432 p.

Without attempting, in the absence of competence to do so, to pronounce upon the value of this work as an introduction to social anthropology intended for "that vast array of students in economics, history, political science, jurisprudence, sociology and psychology, who realize the bearing of social anthropology on their subjects"—in which rôle, however, it seems to the reviewer to stand approximately midway, in scope and method, between Lowie's *Are We Civilized?* and Kroeber's *Anthropology*, and at the same time to possess few of the more signal merits of either—the reviewer may at least set down such notations as will indicate the value of the book to the psychoanalytic reader. This value is, alas, rather smaller than it might be; and its consideration will take us little further—but the readers of this review shall presently be the judge—than the introductory chapter on The History of Ethnological Theories.

First, however, as conveying some general idea of the content and method of approach of the work, it should be stated that its author has made his treatment of primitive cultures strictly topical. That is to say, under each of his five main headings of The

Organization of the State, The Organization of Law and Custom, The Organization of Economic and Industrial Life, Religion and Ritualism, and Literature and Mythology, the author has described—in a somewhat dry and formal and “text-book” manner—a number of cultures best illustrative of this or that aspect or characteristic of the institution under discussion. Thus, under Economic and Industrial Life we have one chapter devoted to Hunting People: The Bushman, one to Food Gatherers: The Pomo, one to Herding People: The Reindeer Chuckchee, and so on. It is the author’s belief that the defects of such a method are “outweighed by the definiteness and clarity of outline given to each phase of culture described”.

From Dr. Goldenweiser’s *History, Psychology, and Culture* (reviewed in this issue) we have had a somewhat grudging admission of “the contribution which psychology as a special discipline can make to ethnology”, together with an account of the shocking errors committed by Freud and others in their attempted application of the data of psychoanalysis to the elucidation of ethnological problems (pp. 201–208), such that one feels rather flattered that anthropologists should take time from vituperating each other—the *odium anthropologicum* appears to be as virulent a strain as any yet isolated—to expend some of their ammunition upon psychoanalysts. But in the introductory chapter of the volume under review rather greater hospitality is accorded, on the whole, to this application of psychoanalytic tenets—provided, however, that any name but that of Freud is associated therewith. For Freud’s whole treatment “is so arbitrary . . . and the psychoanalysts’ use of ethnographic data [is] still so uncritical that all the inferences they have so far made are of comparatively little value”. That the field of “primitive mythology and its relation to dreams . . . is bound to become of the utmost importance for the ethnology of the future” and “that there are extremely important inferences to be drawn is quite apparent” only makes one’s regret more poignant that Freud and his followers should have been here so incompetent and should so have wasted the opportunities at hand. As it is, however, “even if the analyses made by such Freudians as Rank, Abrahams [*sic*], etc., should prove to be true, it would be necessary to demonstrate that the myths of the primitive people really represent dreams they have now or once had and are not simply old stereotyped patterns”—a pronouncement from which the reader may extract a meaning that the reviewer is unable to.

If a certain ambivalence, fortified by a number of misconceptions, seems to lurk behind these passages quoted from a single paragraph, it is perhaps in his remarks on Adler and Jung that the writer's inadequate orientation with regard to psychoanalysis is most striking. In contrast to the author's preceding pessimism we learn that "the main tenets of his [Adler's] theory could be applied with advantage to ethnological data. Such concepts as the guiding-fiction, the orientation toward a predetermined goal, the will-to-power and the inferiority complex are likely to throw a flood of light on primitive activities and thought". In the case of Jung we are "brought face to face with the most widely known of all Jung's concepts: that of the unconscious". The four pages that follow—to exactly what purpose the reviewer has been unable very clearly to discern—contain views of such a Proteus-like quality that, among other matters and apart from a rebuke to Elliot Smith and other diffusionists for their carelessness in failing to see "that Jung's theories of the unconscious . . . furnish a real psychological basis for the independent origin of many beliefs, ideas and possibly even of customs", even Jung gets whittled away to a mere shadow of his original—four pages earlier—self.

One wonders, after all, why the embattled author has expended one-third of his introductory survey in the above manner when those he arraigns could have been disposed of without further ado by that now hoary, if here somewhat differently worded, criticism that "all the psychoanalysts use ethnological data in a purely incidental manner, simply as illustrations for inferences they have drawn from the study of civilized man".

HENRY ALDEN BUNKER, JR. (NEW YORK)

CORRECTION OF DEFECTIVE SPEECH. By Edwin Burket Twitmyer, Ph.D., and Yale Samuel Nathanson, Ph.D. Philadelphia: P. Blakiston's Son and Co., 1932. xv+413 p.

This volume, which, according to the subtitle, is a complete manual of psycho-physiological technique for the treatment and correction of defects of speech, does not differ in its main essentials from the usual treatises on the subject. It is primarily concerned with phonetic training based on the physiological alphabet and consequently is directed only to the peripheral aspect of speech disorders. Such a method is undoubtedly of value in the correction of faulty articulation and in organic cases of speech mutilation. However, it can be of practically no help in stammering, to which the authors

also apply it, and which seems to be the main purpose of their detailed technique. Stammering is a psychoneurosis, or more specifically a pregenital neurosis, and consequently it is useless to attempt to teach the stammerer *how* to talk, even by means of a physiological alphabet. Such phonetic training is directed only to the peripheral and physical aspects of the psychoneurotic disorder and leaves untouched the dynamics, the complicated mental state, and the character anomalies of the sufferer.

According to the authors, the therapy of speech correction is dependent upon three steps: correct breathing and the subsequent proper utilization of breath; the development of correct kinæsthetic or muscular imagery designated as the oral position or "orotans", and obtained through repeated exercises of memorized material; and a combination of these two to effect a normal output of speech. The numerous exercises and procedures outlined in this volume are directed primarily toward these ends, and according to the authors, they must be followed without deviation. Evidently the authors are aware of some of the fallacies of their method and interpretation as they designate speech as an instinctive process, admitting that most defects are of functional rather than of organic origin; and yet, at the same time, they present their method as a complete means of therapy. In the treatment of these cases they refer to the importance of establishing a proper relationship with the speech teacher; but, apparently they do not realize that these relationships are transference situations. Under these circumstances, if improvement takes place, it should be interpreted more as the result of transference than of the particular phonetic technique employed.

The libidinal origin of speech has been emphasized not only by analysts (Spielrein, Jones, Coriat), but also by philologists (Paget, Jespersen); and the pregenital origin is also indicated by the authors in their statement that probably 90 per cent of children stammer in the third year of their lives. However, the prognosis in stammering does not depend, as the authors believe, upon the ability to learn the memorized material thoroughly, but entirely upon the degree of pregenital fixation. Hence stammering should be treated by trained analysts and not by speech specialists utilizing a technique of phonetic exercises.

All such methods of phonetic training for the treatment of stammering are preëminently mechanistic surface plowings. The

only scientific advance in the therapy of stammering has been through an analytic reconstruction of the deeper dynamics of the disorder. The only mention of psychoanalysis is a reference to it as one of the many "fantastic explanations".

ISADOR H. CORIAT (BOSTON)

CHILD PSYCHOLOGY. By Buford J. Johnson. Baltimore, Maryland: Charles C. Thomas, 1932. 439 p.

Professor Johnson has presented a wide selection from the various experimental studies in child psychology, and direct observations of children's behavior, made primarily in American child institutes and nursery schools. In the preface, she remarks, "The treatment of child behavior in this book is based upon direct observation of children in self-initiated activities in addition to the results from scientific researches of many investigators upon special topics in child psychology". The initial chapter is devoted to Periods of Growth. "Structural" and "psychological" growth are considered. The author establishes the importance of physical growth in influencing psychological development, and proceeds to a discussion of mental growth. She is quite emphatic in minimizing the changes that occur at adolescence. "It is the association of mating with secondary sex characteristics by the social group that enhances the effect of physical changes at puberty, rather than any marked contrast between the amount of change at that time as compared with earlier rates of growth" (p. 23).

A chapter on learning reports many laboratory experiments and discusses variations in stimulus situations, rates of improvement in learning, practice, and a wide variety of specific problems familiar to the experimental psychologist. The section on motivation, not well supported by experimental evidence, contains excellent comment upon children's motives in learning.

A section on infant responses reports observations on motor responses and reactions to sensory stimuli in earliest infancy. In a chapter on Manipulation considerable attention is given to the controversial question of left-handedness. The author comments, "It appears that the major difficulty in training a child who has developed left-hand preference lies in the method of securing his intent to use the right hand" (p. 178). It is the reviewer's impression that insufficient consideration is given to the factor of confusion in eyed-ness and handedness and degree of left or right

handedness as a determining factor in training of left-handed children.

Original observations of children's reaction to the dark are reported in a chapter on emotion. Watson's views of the three original emotions are attacked, and the confusion in interpreting startle as fear pointed out. Studies in fear reactions of children to animals are presented. Implications in training relative to emotional reactions are partially derived from the experimental observations. "The emotion called love appears to follow similar progress in development to that of other emotional reactions. Specific sensory stimuli may produce reactions, that repeated or that occur in combination with other reactions, may result in a changed organic state referred to as love" (p. 360). The author concludes that studies among unadjusted individuals have led to overemphasis of the evils of display of affection to children by parents, and stresses the danger in withholding from the child evidence of parental regard for him.

The author has accomplished an enormous task in culling from the vast literature those studies which constitute the bulk of her book. Her own contributions, which are by no means meagre, are noteworthy, although the book is curiously uneven. It tends to fall into two parts, the reports of experimental observations and the application of the observations to child guidance and education. The former we may accept as having whatever value the original observations may have—it is obvious that in selecting over two hundred studies in the field much of great value is covered. In the comments on child guidance and education, Professor Johnson usually is wise and obviously is experienced in dealing with children. There are curious emphases at times, however. "The practice in many homes of father's appearing just before sleeping time and indulging in a general romp with the child is pernicious. The activity and social play are excellent for the child but should not immediately precede bed-time" (p. 189). If there are other comments on fathers in the book I failed to note them, although fathers seem to play exceptionally important rôles in child development. I think it might be fair to insist that the same precision in observation as characterizes the experimental reports be followed by the author in reporting or commenting on family relationships.

The author almost completely ignores the psychoanalytical literature and the contributions it makes to child psychology. It

would appear to be wise to indicate a specialized approach to child psychology on the part of the author by some modification in the title of the book, perhaps a sub-title. More attention to some psychoanalytic concepts might have been helpful (to the author) in the chapter on Social Behavior and Personality, to which Professor Johnson has given careful consideration. Her discussion of personality is stimulating and interesting; she submits as her definition of personality "the stimulus-pattern formed by the integration of the reactions of the individual, to which other living creatures respond according to their perceptions of this pattern" (p. 382), and on page 384 remarks further, "Some men have sets of habits that result in quite distinct personalities for home, for business, for club, for church, for sports. The dignified churchman who passes the collection plate on Sunday may inspire awe and reverence but he may become a shrewd, abrupt, fist-shaking bargainer on the next day." Unless the functional relationships of these various aspects of behavior are appreciated, one is hardly likely to be in a position to say much authoritatively about personality.

The book has considerable value for reference to American experimental psychological literature. GEORGE J. MOHR (PITTSBURGH)

THE APE AND THE CHILD. By W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg.

New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1933. 341 p.

Here is the record of an experiment which, coming under the sanctified heading *research*, at once seizes the imagination and is entertaining to read. Its "human interest" is attested by notices received in all the metropolitan newspapers with long columns in the news sections. The authors are an associate professor of psychology and his wife who with admirable impartiality reared an infant female chimpanzee with their own son over a period of nine months under conditions as nearly identical as possible. The psychobiologists, who since the beginning of the intensive and systematic study of anthropoid apes in the latter part of the last century have deplored that no thoroughgoing effort to domesticate a subhuman primate had been undertaken, can no longer complain, although they will certainly grumble that it was not continued longer. The experimenters scrupulously avoided treating the ape as a pet and accorded her the same patient consideration and the same technique of care and training given to the child.

The infants were observed and studied continuously over a

period of nine months. At the beginning the chimpanzee was seven and a half and the child ten months old. In spite of the difference in age, the ape possessed certain decided advantages over the child in the matter of strength and agility—necessary equipment for the much less protected environment in which she might reasonably have expected to have been reared. Excluding these, and the striking anatomical differences, one is much more impressed by the similarities than by the differences between the two subjects. Even in the difficult accomplishment of bowel and bladder control, it is left an open question whether the child or his simian competitor was superior in adaptation. In the numerous formal tests and experiments the ape maintains a high standard of performance in comparison with the child. Indeed, in tasks of learning, as for example the problem of maneuvering a chair to a position from which a cookie suspended from the ceiling may be obtained, the ape is strikingly superior. In the Gesell Tests—a set of 150 devices carefully standardized for testing pre-school children—the score for the first two months is a tie; in the third test and in the succeeding ones, the boy maintains a variable lead, which in the final result is 23 for the child and 15 for the ape.

The author's observations are limited by their strictly academic psychological methodology. For example, casual mention is made that when the ape failed to obtain the coveted piece of apple in the hoe experiment, she bit the handle of the implement—a type of primitive animistic reaction which must have been more often exhibited than is recorded and should have been more striking than similar behavior on the part of the child. No mention is made of any infantile sexual behavior of either subject, although the records of the behavior of monkeys contain descriptions of frankly sexual reactions soon after birth. The naïveté of the experimenters in this important field is demonstrated by the following: "We then tactually stimulate the lips of the subjects by holding the end of a finger near the mouth and moving it up and down lightly against the lips. In its downward excursion it catches the lower lip, pulls it downward exposing the teeth and, as it passes, allows the lip to snap upward into place. To our surprise neither subject withdraws, but remains quiet as long as we are willing to continue the stimulation, taking it, as far as we can tell, as a sort of a caress. It is obviously not unpleasant." It is a scandal that in this year of grace students of human behavior should be surprised at such an infant reaction.

When the chapter Conclusion was written, the authors must have wondered why they went to so much trouble. There are recapitulations of Differences Favorable to the Child, and Differences Favorable to the Ape—all objective confirmations of what one might *a priori* expect. One is no whit closer to determining the specific gravities of the two elusive and capricious imponderables, heredity and environment,—the chief purpose for which the study was undertaken.

For those who will be curious to learn the fate of the heroine of the story after this strange interlude in her life, it may be told that she was returned to the Yale Anthropoid Experiment Station at Orange Park, Florida, whence she was borrowed and where she now—one likes to imagine—ponders on the vagaries of human behavior.

RAYMOND GOSSELIN (NEW YORK)

THE ENERGIES OF MAN. By Wm. McDougall. New York: Scribners, 1933. xii+395 p.

Few authors of merit have enhanced their reputation by writing a textbook, and still fewer by an abridged edition of it. Professor McDougall's *The Energies of Man*, which is an abridgment of his *Outline of Psychology and Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, is no exception. But having noted this fact, one must hasten to report that it is the best introduction to psychology that has appeared in America since James's *Briefer Course*, and the first textbook by an academic psychologist, the author of which has had the courage to discard in its entirety the hodgepodge of naïve (and often bad) physiology which, since Wundt, has burdened all textbooks of so-called scientific psychology. Here for the first time we find more space devoted to men and motives than to axones and reaction time. Instead of chapters on the nervous system, color sensation, and explicit bodily reactions, it contains pages devoted to such topics as Disposition, Temperament and Character, The Rôle of Pleasure and Pain, and even Subconscious Working of Tendencies. In brief, the student will find discussed precisely those subjects which common sense and his own experience had led him to suppose might be the proper matter of psychology but whose omission or scant treatment in the usual introductory course causes his bafflement, and explains why a recent graduating class in a leading eastern college voted Introductory Psychology as the most useless of all courses taken. It is quite certain that had they

used a textbook like Professor McDougall's *Energies of Man* that would not have been their conviction.

In this his latest book, as in his *Outlines*, Professor McDougall has espoused the purposive interpretation of human behavior. The hormic interpretation is maintained throughout and serves to integrate the various topics discussed, as well as to give the book a very convincing unity. The limitation of Professor McDougall's approach, however, is that it furnishes him not only with a plan but an ethic, and when ethics creep into scientific presentations there is always the danger of individual bias. This consequence has revealed itself in some of Professor McDougall's previous writings, e.g., in his Sewell Lectures, but in justice to the author it must be added that in this book he has kept such bias well in the background.

While *The Energies of Man* follows closely the material in the *Outlines*, it is a completely new book, and contains an elaboration of the author's recent theories of learning in which he attempts to reconcile the associationist and Gestalt points of view. According to McDougall, while trial and error learning and stamping in of successful movements through pleasure associations must be admitted as an objective fact, the sequence of successful movements cannot be ascribed to chance but to some kind of foresight or expectation. Pleasure indeed is the thing that stamps in chance movements that lead to ultimate success, but the movements themselves are integrated into a continuous process not by their temporal sequence alone, but also by their logical (?) sequence; that is, they are fitted into a plan that has in some measure already been foreseen or expected. This expectation or foresight is the "steering process in learning".

With regard to psychoanalysis, Professor McDougall continues the general attitude he has shown in his *Outlines*, of referring to Freud as the greatest psychologist since Aristotle and then promptly proceeding to insist upon the inadequacy of Freud's contributions. His views on abnormal mental states are a synthesis of Janet, Prince, and Jung. The unconscious is rejected for the subconscious, and the meaning of a directed physiology of life plays an important rôle in psychotherapy. Psychoanalysis as a whole is not adequately treated.

DAVID WECHSLER (NEW YORK)

Current Psychoanalytic Literature

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CURRENT PSYCHOANALYTIC LITERATURE

The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. Vol. XIV, Part 3, July, 1933.

SIGM. FREUD:	Obituary. Sándor Ferenczi.
LUDWIG JEKELS:	The Problem of the Duplicated Expression of Psychic Themes.
M. N. SEARL:	Play, Reality and Aggression.
THEODOR REIK:	New Ways in Psycho-Analytic Technique.
FRITZ WITTELS:	The Super-Ego in Our Judgments of Sex.
M. D. EDER:	The Jewish Phylacteries and Other Jewish Ritual Observances.
KARL A. MENNINGER:	Psychoanalytic Aspects of Suicide.
M. N. SEARL:	A Note on Symbols and Early Intellectual Activity.

Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse. Vol. XIX, Number 3, 1933.

SIGMUND FREUD:	Sándor Ferenczi.
PAUL FEDERN:	Sándor Ferenczi. Gedenkrede. (<i>Sándor Ferenczi: In Memoriam.</i>)
ERNEST JONES:	Die phallische Phase (<i>The Phallic Phase</i>).
HELENE DEUTSCH:	Zur Psychologie der manisch-depressiven Zustände (<i>The Psychology of Manic-Depressive States</i>).
KAREN HORNEY:	Die Verleugnung der Vagina (<i>The Denial of the Vagina</i>).
JEANNE LAMPL DE GROOT:	Zu den Problemen der Weiblichkeit (<i>The Problems of Womanhood</i>).
FANNY HANN-KENDE:	Über Klitorisomanie und Penisneid (<i>Clitoris Onan- ism and Penis Envy</i>).
MICHAEL BÁLINT:	Zwei Notizen über die erotische Komponente der Ich-Triebe (<i>Two Notes on the Erotic Compo- nents of the Ego-Drives</i>).
HEISAKU KOSAWA:	Eine schizophrene Gesichtshalluzination (<i>A Schizo- phrenic Visual Hallucination</i>).
ALEXANDER SZALAI:	Die "ansteckende" Fehlhandlung (<i>"Contagious" Parapraxia</i>).

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PAUL SCHILDER:	Psychoanalyse und Biologie (<i>Psychoanalysis and Biology</i>).
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HANS KELSEN:	Die platonische Liebe II (<i>Platonic Love, II</i>).
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DORIAN FEIGENBAUM:	Bemerkungen zu den "Libidinösen Typen" (<i>Note on the Theory of Libidinal Types</i>).
PAUL KECSKEMÉTI:	Psychologie und Ontologie (<i>Psychology and Ontol- ogy</i>).

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- HAROLD D. LASSWELL: Psychoanalyse und Sozioanalyse (*Psychoanalysis and Social Analysis*).
- ERNST KRIS: Ein geisteskranker Bildhauer. Die Charakterköpfe des Franz Xaver Messerschmidt (*A Psychopathic Sculptor. Franz Xaver Messerschmidt's Heads*).

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- G. BIBRING-LEHNER: Über die phallische Phase und ihre Störungen beim Mädchen (*The Phallic Stage and its Disturbances in Girls*).
- (Erziehungsberatung [Child Guidance])
- A. AICHHORN: Erziehungs-Beratungs-Seminar mit einem anschließenden Referat von G. REINER-OBERNIK (*Child Guidance Seminar, with a Report by G. REINER-OBERNIK*).

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- H. MENG: Psychoanalyse und Heilpädagogik (*Psychoanalysis and Therapeutic Pedagogy*).
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- SIGM. FREUD: In Memoriam. Sándor Ferenczi.
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FRITZ WITTELS: Nachtrag zu meinem Buche "Sigmund Freud", 1923
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EDMUND BERGLER: Unbewusste Motive im Verhalten Napoleons zu
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Revue Française de Psychanalyse. Vol. VII, Number 1, 1933.

- S. FREUD: Le Tabou de la Virginité (*The Taboo of Virginity*).
CH. ODIER: La théorie de Freud et son évolution (*Freud's
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MARIE BONAPARTE: De la Mort et des Fleurs (*On Death and Flowers*).

Rivista Italiana di Psicoanalisi. Vol. II, Number 1, February, 1933.

- SIGM. FREUD: Nuova serie delle Lezioni introduttive alla Psico-
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E. WEISS: Il Super-Io (*The Super-Ego*).
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Arbeiten aus dem Psychiatrischen Institut der Kaiserlich-Japanischen Universität zu Sendai (Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse). Vol. 1, Number 2, 1932.

- R. KIMURA: Psychoanalytische Untersuchungen über die Wahnbildung bei Paranoia. III. Mitteilung, Grössenwahn (*Psychoanalytic Investigations of the Delusions in Paranoia. Third Communication—Delusion of Grandeur*).
- CH. HAYASAKA: Psychoanalytische Studien über neurotische Angst. I. Mitteilung, Angstneurose (*Psychoanalytic Studies on Neurotic Anxiety. First Communication—Anxiety Neurosis*).

Arbeiten aus dem Psychiatrischen Institut der Tohoku Kaiserlichen Universität (Beiträge zur Psychoanalyse). Vol. II, Numbers 1 and 2, 1933.

- H. KOSAWA: Alternierende Charakter- u. Symptomneurose (*Alternating Character and Symptom Neurosis*).
- H. KOSAWA: Magische Mimik bei einer Zwangneurose (*Magical Gesticulation in a Compulsion Neurosis*).
- H. KOSAWA: Psychoanalyse einer sogenannten Neurasthenie (*Psychoanalysis of a So-called Neurasthenia*).
- CH. HAYASAKA: Psychoanalytische Studien über neurotische Angst. III. Mitteilung, Angstneurose (*Psychoanalytic Studies of Neurotic Anxiety. Third Communication—Anxiety Neurosis*).
- M. YAMAMURA: Psychoanalytische Studien über Erythrophobie. I. Mitteilung (*Psychoanalytic Studies of Erythrophobia. First Communication*).

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- NOLAN D. C. LEWIS: Studies on Suicide.
- BEN KARPMAN: Psychic Impotence.
- L. PIERCE CLARK: The Treatment of Narcissistic Neuroses and Psychoses.

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- FRITZ WITTELS: Revision of Biography.
- HERBERT J. CRONIN: An Analysis of the Neuroses of Identical Twins.
- G. V. HAMILTON: The Blackboard as an Analytic Accessory.
- GEORGE C. STEVENS: High Blood Pressure as a Phallic Symbol.
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- PHILIP RESNIKOFF: A Psychoanalytic Study of Lynching.
- MARTIN W. PECK: Outline of Psychoanalysis.
- HERBERT J. CRONIN: Phallic Symbolism in a Narcissistic Neurosis.
- R. ALLENDY: Sadism in Woman.

The American Journal of Psychiatry. Vol. XII, Number 6, May, 1933.

- THOMAS M. FRENCH: Interrelations between Psychoanalysis and the Experimental Work of Pavlov.

Vol. XIII, Number 1, July, 1933.

- FRANZ ALEXANDER: A Voice from the Past: Some Remarks on Dr. Bernard Sachs' Protest against Psychoanalysis.

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Notes

The article THALASSA: A THEORY OF GENITALITY in this issue is the first instalment of the translation of Sándor Ferenczi's *Versuch einer Genitaltheorie* by Dr. Henry Alden Bunker, Jr., of New York. Shortly before his death in Budapest on May 22, 1933, Dr. Ferenczi authorized the QUARTERLY to publish a translation of this work in instalments and subsequently in monograph form, and entrusted Mrs. Alfred V. de Forest of New York with the reading of the translation. The editorial board is indebted to Mrs. de Forest for her valuable assistance. Through the kind coöperation of Dr. Sandor Rado it has been possible to include in the translation several emendations which the author incorporated in the Hungarian translation of the *Genitaltheorie* published in 1928.

Sigm. Freud's *Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* is now available in an authorized English translation by W. J. H. Sprott, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, published by W. W. Norton & Company, New York.

The Educational Committee announces that Dr. Sandor Rado, Visiting Director of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, is in New York for another year (October 1933 to June 1934) under the auspices of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, to continue supervision of the educational activities of the Society. He is available for didactic analyses, controlled analyses, and is giving the following courses: (1) Selected Chapters in Psychoanalytic Technique (8 lectures); (2) Disturbances in Male Potency (8 lectures); (3) The Rôle of Masochism in Mental Life (8 lectures); (4) Technical Seminar (24 sessions). Didactic analyses and controlled analyses are subject to the training regulations of the Educational Committee. Lectures are open to members of the Society, to students in training and to other interested scientists on special application. The Seminar is open only to members of the Society and to students in training. The ultimate decision as to eligibility to any course is vested in the Educational Committee. Further information can be obtained from the Secretary to the Educational Committee, Dr. Monroe A. Meyer, The New York Psychoanalytic Institute, 324 West 86th Street, New York City.

Dr. Rado has, in the meantime, changed the program of his lectures at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute for the remainder of the current academic year. In the second trimester (January-March) his subject will be Motherhood and Genitality instead of The Rôle of Masochism in Mental Life. In the third trimester (March-June) his subject will be Disturbances of Male Potency.

The Institute for Psychoanalysis in Chicago offered the following lectures and seminars for the first quarter of the current academic year:—(1) Case Seminar, by Karen Horney; (2) Four Lectures on Technique of Psychoanalysis, by Karen Horney; (3) Review of Psychoanalytic Literature, a Seminar, by Franz Alexander; (4) Theory and Technique of Dream Interpretation (lectures and seminars), by Franz Alexander and N. Lionel Blitzsten; (5) Instinct Transformation and Reality, by Thomas M. French. The courses were open to members of the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society and students of the Institute. In addition to the regular program of courses, Dr. Erich Fromm of the Institute for Social Research, Geneva, Switzerland, gave three lectures on the application of psychoanalysis to sociology.

The Institute offers for the second quarter the following courses for psychoanalysts:—(1) Technical Case Seminar, by Dr. Horney; (2) Lectures on Technique, by Dr. Horney; (3) Theory and Technique of Dream Interpretation, by Drs. Alexander and Blitzsten; (4) Review of Psychoanalytic Literature (Seminar), by Dr. Alexander; (5) Instinct Transformation and Reality, by Dr. French. There will also be a Round Table Discussion for Physicians, led by Drs. Alexander and Horney, for the consideration of functional medical problems confronting the internist, dermatologist, and gynecologist.

Psychoanalytic research is being continued on cases with organic symptoms, especially gastro-intestinal and gynecological.

The American Psychoanalytic Association will hold its mid-winter meeting on December 26th and 27th at the Hotel Shoreham, Washington, D. C. The following papers will be read:—"Memorial: Eleanora Bennett Saunders" (Ross McClure Chapman); "An Evaluation of Ferenczi's Relaxation Therapy" (Clara M. Thompson); "Feminine Masochism" (Karen Horney); "Symposium on the Influence of Psychological Factors upon Gastro-Intestinal Disturbances" (Franz Alexander, Catherine Bacon, and George W. Wilson); "A Note on the Significance of Infantile Nutritional Disturbances in the Development of Alcoholism" (Bernard S. Robbins); "The Feeling of Guilt" (Herman Nunberg); "The Question of Play Techniques in Child Analysis" (Edward Liss). There will also be a round table discussion on "The Influence of Masturbation Upon the Neuroses", with Dr. Sándor Radó as moderator.

Drs. Henry Sigerist of Johns Hopkins University, Hanns Sachs of Boston and Sandor Rado of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute will be the speakers at next year's QUARTERLY Evening, which is to be held on February 3rd, 1934.

Unforeseen technical difficulties have made it necessary now, for a second time, to issue a double number. The editors wish to state that this is not a permanent policy of the QUARTERLY and the present plans warrant the assurance that in the future the QUARTERLY will appear regularly in single issues.

The January, 1934, issue will contain the rest of Sándor Ferenczi's book, *Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality*. With this issue subscribers will receive without additional charge, as a special supplement, Géza Róheim's *Primitive High Gods*. The April issue will conclude the serialization of Otto Fenichel's *Outline of Clinical Psychoanalysis*. The July issue will be devoted to the subject of child analysis, and will be edited by Anna Freud in collaboration with the editors of the QUARTERLY.

The editors note with regret the death of Dr. Eleanora B. Saunders, a staff member of the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital, who died of carcinoma this fall, and of Dr. L. Pierce Clark of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Dr. Clark died suddenly of coronary thrombosis on December 3rd.

Index

compiled by E. Marion Pilpel

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