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SOME ETIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF REPRESSION, GUILT AND HOSTILITY

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It is becoming increasingly clear that our concepts of the relative roles of biological inheritance and the environment in character development have been sharply challenged by the striking observations of collaborative psychiatric therapists working with parent and child and by the provocative findings of the anthropologists. As all are aware, new light has been shed upon the mechanisms operating in the early development of the psychic apparatus, calling for a re-evaluation of certain of these concepts. Collaborative therapy and repeated discussions with Dr. S. A. Szurek provide much of the background for this paper.

The collaborative therapist and the anthropologist may be overly tempted to depreciate the role of biologically inherited patterns of behavior. Contrarily, these factors may be assigned undue emphasis by some psychoanalysts. To such internal drives as primary masochism and sex are ascribed a volcanic intensity which overwhelms the weaker influences of parental attitudes. It goes without saying that both categories of influences determining character development must be assigned their true weight eventually, although a final answer cannot be attained at this time.

There is no intent to review the entire complex of early development, but rather to explore certain facets of the problem. There is need for a re-evaluation of our concepts of 1, repression as a dynamic mechanism in psychic development; 2, the meaning of restitutive behavior in the child; 3, the genesis of hostility in man.

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REPRESSION AS AN ADAPTIVE MECHANISM

Let us explore the classical concept that repression is a normal reaction of the infantile ego, as a consequence of what Freud thought were the extreme limitations of the integrative capacities of the young ego. Alexander *(1)* stated that 'in the last analysis repression is a primitive device of the ego to maintain its integrity'. Anna Freud *(2)* said, 'the significance of repression is reduced to that of a special method of defense'. This was considered by her and by Freud as one of the psychic processes which served the same purpose: 'the protection of the ego against instinctual demands'. It is freely granted that repression is a necessity in the world of today. Fleeing from an overpowering enemy and fighting another on equal terms are likewise necessities. What more beyond necessity may be truly ascribed to repression?

Anna Freud considered repression as a defense against instincts, in three distinct categories: 1, superego anxiety in the neuroses of adults, related essentially to strictness in the education of the superego; 2, objective anxiety in infantile neurosis, which originates because the infant or little child 'does not combat the instincts of its own accord . . . [but] . . . regards the instincts as dangerous because those who bring the child up have forbidden their gratification . . .'; 3, instinctual anxiety, or an innate dread of the strength of the instincts.

It is difficult to see any genetic distinction between Anna Freud's superego anxiety in the neurosis of adults and her objective anxiety in infantile neurosis except as regards the stage of development during which external influences operate. However, a major issue emerges from her concept of instinctual anxiety. She states, '. . . the human ego, by its very nature, is never a promising soil for the unhampered gratification of instinct. I mean by this that the ego is friendly to the instincts only so long as it is itself but little differentiated from the id. When it has evolved from the primary to the secondary process, from the pleasure principle to the reality principle, it has

become, as I have already shown, alien territory to the instincts.' Her expression, 'the human ego by its very nature . . .', deserves scrutiny. 'By its very nature' could refer to a phylogenetic entity, a character determined by the gene composition of the germ plasm. It is improbable that Anna Freud entertained this thought since, by definition, the ego, as such, is not inherited except for the basic anatomy and physiology which the ego employs in expressing itself.

What then remains as regards the phrase, 'the human ego by its very nature . . .'? Is it not the logical error of *petitio principii,* begging the question in which a definition which has not been proved is smuggled into the sequence of argument? 'By its very nature . . .' is an arbitrary postulation of what remains to be proved. Apparently Anna Freud assumed that something within the ego itself, independent of outside influences and parental attitudes (and presumably, independent of heredity), is operating. She admitted that the ego of a little child 'regards instincts as dangerous because those who bring the child up have forbidden their gratification'. Here she was on sound ground. Yet in her 'instinctual anxiety' she seemed to think that the very young ego may reject certain id impulses apart from such parental attitudes which have been impressed upon the child. Was she here referring to Freud's *(3)* original theory of primal repression as 'a first phase of repression which consists in a denial of entry into consciousness to the mental (ideational) presentation of the instinct'? How else can the ego differentiate from the id, and proceed from pleasure principle to reality principle except through impingement of the external and internal environment upon the id?

Let us postulate conditions in which the external necessity for repression is virtually eliminated. Let us imagine an ideal set of parents, utterly without personality distortions, possessed of perfect subtlety, imagination, and warmth. They note at once any mounting tension in the child and immediately provide adequate and generally acceptable forms of gratification. The surplus energy of erotism is channelized in such an understanding manner that there is 'cathexis toward action that is

acceptable as well as some object cathexis'. There is no imposition of the necessity to repress from parental sources. The external figures resolve the emerging tensions in the child, so that they never reach the point of hostile aggression, renunciation or repression.

Granted this ideal external environment, would there not still remain the repressions necessarily resulting from internal drives and impulses of the child, which are beyond the capacity of the ego to integrate?

Repression is said to occur in the infantile ego because id impulses arise which the young ego cannot integrate into an acceptable pattern of behavior. This concept is based on the assumption that, even under ideal conditions of symbiosis between mother and child, the ego is unprepared at times to deal with mobilized id impulses. There is no doubt that in painful organic disease in the infant, the mother, no matter how subtle, can do little to relieve the child; hence there may be great rage and possibly the need for repression. But even if no such internal organic distress occurs, and even if external parental relationships were ideal, it has always been assumed that impulses would arise that are too powerful for the young ego to integrate acceptably.

Alexander *(1)* said, '. . . the development of erotic drives does not run a course precisely parallel with the rest of either physical or mental growth; sexual impulses outstrip the rest. This discrepancy is clearly observable in the typical emotional constellation of this age, the œdipus complex.' Alexander seemed to indicate that this discrepancy in development is a phylogenetically determined fact. On the other hand, Hartmann et al. *(4)*, Benedek *(5)*, and others no longer conceive of our being born with a reservoir of id impulses. They speak of the birth of an infant with an undifferentiated apparatus, out of which are crystallized or differentiated the ego and the id. With this latter view, many of us today are in agreement. Given no organic distressing disease and a theoretically ideal set of parents, are we still to believe that somehow the ego and id

do develop from the original undifferentiated state at different tempos? If so, this would definitely constitute a negative adaptive reaction, which is indeed rare in biology.

Others have proposed the related concept that the child is driven by powerful impulses to attempt actions for which it lacks the necessary physiological and anatomical equipment. This dilemma mobilizes frustration, humiliation, and rage, and there emerges the need to repress. They refer to the little boy in the œdipal period who has genital impulses (it is maintained) but lacks the necessary physiological development for fulfilment. Hendrick *(6)* seriously questioned the concept of the growth and development of id impulses to act before the required physiological apparatus has appeared. In discussing the pleasure in mastery, he emphasized the fallacy of seeking to 'define infantile life in terms of adult complexes' and he warned that we must be 'on guard against ascribing to all childhood behavior the emotional intensity which is apparent in the neurotic episodes of the child, and in both the erotic and neurotic tensions of adults. This means that the goal of infantile erotism is not normally orgasm; it is not normally a compulsive need unless it is associated with anxiety and, therefore, differs dynamically from the adult's.'

Hendrick suggested that when the impulse or need for a function arises, the physiology and structure are ordinarily ready. He cited multiple illustrations in growth. There is no compelling reason to think that the child has a strong impulse to walk or talk at three months. Yet, such an assumption is as defensible as the assumption that the child has a powerful impulse for intercourse at four years. Again, a child of four has no strong urge to drive a car as its father does, unless there is conflict and a compulsive need for competition. Five-year olds who are happy and have companions give no evidence of being frustrated and angry that they cannot play baseball with twelve-year olds. There is no intention to discard the œdipus, but to qualify its content and intensity, to call attention to Hendrick's redefinition of the goal of the heterosexually directed

instinct of the four-year old, and to guard against our adult projections.

In other words, such a view would support the concept that the ego grows with and is integrated with the task which arises, which is not in keeping with the view of Freud, Anna Freud, and Waelder that somehow the ego's whole organization can be overwhelmed because of the strength of the instincts alone. This does not discount the possibility that the capacity of a phylogenetically developed disposition for repression may vary in children. My thesis is only that in the ontogenesis of the individual this adaptive capacity for repression is activated usually by external environmental factors.

It has been stated frequently that deprivation and repression are necessary for individualization and growth. Freud assumed that as long as all needs are gratified, under 'total' indulgence, the infant tends to experience the source of satisfaction as part of the self. Hartmann and his co-authors *(4)* said, '. . . partial deprivation thus is probably an essential condition for the infant's ability to distinguish between the self and the object; to the extent to which indulgence prevails, comprehension of the breast as part of the self is dominant; to the extent to which deprivation is experienced, or indulgence delayed, the distinction becomes possible'. (The qualification is added that '. . . the distinction, however, seems to become impossible unless a certain amount of gratification is allowed for'.) Granted that a degree of frustration is necessary for such basic developmental processes, it does not follow that the deprivation and frustration must be carried to a point necessitating repression. It would seem that a far more confident, colorful, adventurous child would evolve from a smoothly functioning symbiosis between mother and child in which frustration fails to reach the point where energy is dissipated in repression, and self-esteem and confidence are lost. As Alexander has emphasized often, severe deprivation may be a real stimulus to individualization of cultures and societies. However, such group deprivation does not necessarily involve repression in the individual, and does not

make valid the concept that repression is a primary biological factor, or an adaptive mechanism to phylogenetic influences.

Anthropology can shed some light on our problem, even though it cannot provide ultimate answers, because it does not provide personal analyses of individuals in the societies it studies. Kardiner *(7)* was one of the first analysts in this country to explore more thoroughly the contributions of anthropologists in attempts to delineate more clearly what in behavior is primarily phylogenetic and biological in origin and what is contributed by external pressures.

Kardiner *(7)* and Linton emphasized that the long period of dependency of the human infant provides a potential advantage, if it is well managed. The loose integration and impressible plasticity of a long infancy afford maximal opportunity for the environment to mold and modify and to become channelized. They found that the influence of each culture studied varies with each type of behavior studied. 'Not all impulses are equally susceptible of control. For example, the impulses generally denoted as sexual and aggressive are much more subject to control than eating impulses. . . . Some problems of adaptation in one culture create few difficulties, while in another they form the main façade.' Anthropologists now describe how one culture may allow the widest sexual freedom between children, including even frottage against the mother; here sexual jealousies are minimal. But the nursing period is stormy. Food is scarce. Consequently, the major jealousies and conflicts in children and adults have to do with food rather than sex.

The only universal sexual taboo described by these investigators is mother-son incest. In general, different cultures display widely varied taboos, and, by the same token, widely differing human impulses subject to repression. There emerges compelling evidence for the importance of external rather than phylogenetic origins of repression. We have held the view that freedom in sexual play with themselves or each other in children would on the whole not decrease the inevitable phylogenetically determined sexual need for the parent. Anthropology so far lends little if any support to this view. Analyses

of individuals in culturally different societies are sorely needed, and might provide crucial evidence on the point in question.

In our own culture, where individual analyses are plentiful, it is virtually impossible to determine whether freedom in autoerotism and sexual play between children diminishes the œdipal conflict because most parents, despite the best intellectual intentions to allow such childish gratifications, are so rooted in taboos as to frustrate the proclivity for such freedom by implied uneasiness. Hartmann and Kris *(8)*, in criticizing Freud's concept of the phylogenetic source of castration fear, pointed out that implicit attitudes and anxiety in significant adults were sufficient to cause an intense fear in the child.

Probably no anthropologist commands greater respect from psychoanalysts than the late Ruth Benedict. Benedict *(9)* and Mead *(10)* and their group studied swaddling in certain European cultures. Greenacre and Buxbaum earlier touched on this subject, but without the detailed observations and the clear conclusions of Benedict and Mead. Benedict's and Mead's conclusion was that swaddling could not be relied upon to produce a single set of effects in different cultures: the parental motives for and attitudes toward swaddling were strikingly different in Russia, in Poland, and among Ukrainian Jews.

Benedict pointed out that any investigation of '. . . comparative cultures must press the investigation to the point where the investigator can describe what is *communicated by* the particular variety of the widespread technique he is studying. Thus, in the case of swaddling, the object of investigation is the kind of communication which in different regions is set up between adults and the child by the procedures and sanctions used. . . . In Russia, swaddling is explicitly justified as necessary for the safety of an infant who is regarded as violent and being in danger of "tearing its ears off or breaking its legs".'

The Polish version of swaddling is that '. . . the infant is regarded not as violent, but as exceedingly fragile. It will break in two without the support given by the bindings. . . . Swaddling is conceived as a first step in a long process of "hardening" a child. Hardening is valued in Poland as suffering is valued.

. . . In peasant villages it is good for a baby to cry without attention to strengthen the lungs; beating is likewise good since it is hardening.'

The swaddling of the Jewish baby in the Ukraine is of still another complexion. 'The baby is swaddled on a soft pillow with loose "bindings", the mother singing as she swaddles it. The stress is on warmth and comfort, and the confinement of the limbs is to be pitied. . . . Poor baby, he lies there nice and warm, but, poor baby, he can't move.' This early warmth will later be contrasted with the hard benches and long hours at school. 'The pillowed warmth of his swaddling period apparently becomes a prototype of what home represents.' The mother 'is starting the baby in a way of life where there is a lack of guilt and aggression in being the active partner'. Of paramount importance, these parental attitudes are communicated to the infant. The Russian infant is imprisoned, the Polish infant is hardened, the Ukrainian Jewish infant is comforted.

In commenting on Benedict's conclusions in her report, Margaret Mead stated, '. . . whenever any single practice was followed cross-culturally, a confusing number of contradictions were found, such as would have been the result if, to the material which Doctor Benedict presented today, we had applied a simple hypothesis that swaddling could be relied upon to produce a single set of effects. It has become increasingly clear over the last few years that it was necessary to include a variable, loosely described as *"tone of voice"* or the *quality of the interpersonal relationship* within which a given zone or stage of locomotion or mode of behavior was indulged and frustrated. I think that the research of the last six months makes it possible to proceed one step further and to advance the hypothesis that within the general framework of biological development the *significant specific character-forming elements will be those through which the adults attempt to communicate with the child.* This communication need not be an articulate type of "character education" but it is *affect-laden and emphatic.* . . . By examining the system of communication between parent

and child against a theoretical ground plan provided by the body itself, the pattern of family relationships in the society, and the tempo and rhythm of biological growth, we can distinguish those nuances of emphasis.'

Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein *(4)* have said, with others, that in restraining an active child the hostile response is greatly reduced when the child is handled by a friendly, imaginative adult; they stated, 'cathexis toward action is transformed into object cathexis'.

In certain long-standing communal groups (for example, one in Korea) aunts, cousins, and other relatives share in caring for the baby. In such children, with many mothers, sibling rivalry is far less a problem than in our society. Whether these children develop a sense of deprivation at the absence of a single mother could best be studied in several successive generations. However, the plausible suggestion is made that a girl with many mothers, later mature and herself a mother, is not required to give to her own baby as much as is demanded in our own society.

Similarly, we observe that demand feedings in infants result in calm, happy babies only if the attitudes communicated by the mothers are happy and calm. It is equally true that fairly early toilet training is compatible with serenity in the child depending upon the mother's attitudes. The view that early interruption of anal-erotic pleasures regardless of the mother's attitudes must lead to tragedy remains to be demonstrated.

Maternal attitudes and behavior may not constitute the infant's initial impact with the external environment. We may not correctly assume that the intense motor activity or immediate irritability of a baby at birth is due to only the two factors—inherited biology or the attitude of the mother in dealing with the baby. Evidence of nervous function other than such structural indications as myelinization is now available. Recent studies by neurophysiologists *(11, 12)* indicate electric activity of the cortex not only in the newborn but even in utero as early as seven months. There is no switch thrown at birth which causes cortical cells suddenly to begin to function. Loud,

repeated, disturbing noises or cramped positions causing uncomfortable proprioceptive discharges may stimulate cortical activity and adaptation in utero. We may doubt whether intrauterine life is the Nirvana we have assumed. This returns us again to the view of Rank and more recently of Greenacre *(13)* with regard to the factors of birth in anxiety. We may venture the hypothesis that perhaps some rudimentary distinctions between id and ego commence even before birth *(14)*.

The point at issue may be formulated: repression is an adaptive mechanism of positive value to the organism, a response to and a defense against pathological change. Even with the most wisely educated parents, classical psychoanalysis views this mechanism as a necessity, since the strength of the id impulses is such that they cannot be integrated. I would suggest that the pathological changes might be essentially external in origin—changes in parental or cultural attitudes which interfere with the normal development of the capacity of the ego to perform its task.

In the classical view, part of the repression might be likened to the collateral circulation which develops in infants and children with coarctation of the aorta, an inborn defect. The view presented here would rather liken repression to antibody development in response to an infection of external origin.

The tendency or *Anlage* for repression develops ontogenetically and is activated essentially by the individual's experience with the external environment. In any case, it would appear that repression represents an adaptation of an ego whose integrative capacity has been burdened by pathological change usually having nothing to do with gene determined sources. It is making the best of what might be worse, at the cost of loss of free emotion and the binding of psychic energy.

IDENTIFICATION AND THE MEANING OF RESTITUTIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE CHILD

In a smoothly operating symbiosis between mother and child, the infant adapts itself to the maternal attitudes and demands

in the most subtle detail, involving a striving for incorporation and identification. 'The root of identification [according to Hartmann and his co-workers *(15)*] can be traced to those impulses of the id which strive toward incorporation; the psychological mechanism of identification is a correlate of and is built upon the model of this striving.' Somehow, the child very early senses the slightest anxiety or finest shading of mood in the parent. All of the mother's reactions increase or decrease the child's security and, therefore, stir the reaction of the instinct for self-preservation.

In discussing identification in early development as it relates to superego formation, Hartmann and his co-workers *(4)* stated that the little child, to escape conflicts between love, hate, and guilt, 'does not identify with the parents as they are, but with the idealized parent; i.e., the child purifies their conduct in its mind and the identification proceeds as if they were consistently true to the principles they explicitly profess or aspire to observe'.

I seriously question, as did Szurek *(16)* and Emch *(17)*, whether there is such a partial identification with the parents, a purification of parental conduct, or an incorporation of part of the parent and a discarding of the remainder. The child early incorporates all aspects of the parent, conscious and unconscious, including moral attitudes and the methods of dealing with everyday realities, with the multiple confusions involved in such incorporation.

In the symbiotic relationship the child must learn to integrate and adjust to all facets of the mother's personality, albeit in adjustment the child often represses quickly those aspects too disturbing for consciousness. Because such components are repressed, however, does not mean that identification is not operating, since identification operates unconsciously as well as consciously. For instance, the fact that the parents' sexuality has been repressed by the child does not indicate an identification with an asexual person. The child in our society quite generally desexualizes the parents and 'purifies' them consciously only as it learns it must; the reality principle prevails.

For our culture this is probably a fortunate and less painful adjustment. Nevertheless, just this necessarily repressed component of the parents makes for an unconscious hostile identification which must be resolved finally in 'normal' adolescence if the child is to achieve such a healthy identification as to permit real independence. Collaborative therapy of the neurotic child and parent provides sound evidence that the child does not 'purify' the parent except consciously; also, in the antisocial acting out of a psychopathic personality or a delinquent, it is common to portray the worst features of the parents' conscious or unconscious impulses.

In the process of total identification, in which the child normally learns to master all facets of the mother's personality, the parent is what may be appropriately called a 'needed object'.

The term 'needed object', as contrasted with the common terms 'love object' or 'bad object', requires elaboration. These adult words, 'love', sentimentalized and idealized, and 'bad', judgmental in tone, lack scientific objectivity. The use of such terms as 'love object' or 'bad object', fraught with adult sentiment and emotion, has little justification in our thinking about dynamics. Rather, we must think in terms of multiple needs requiring satisfaction or frustration by someone. This someone, first the mother, becomes a 'needed object'. Rapaport *(18)* refers to the 'need-satisfying' object, and Freud stated that 'we do not say of those objects which serve the interests of self-preservation that we love them; rather we emphasize the fact that we need them . . . '. Such a 'needed object' may provide widely varying degrees of satisfaction to the infant. Gitelson *(19)*, discussing character synthesis in adolescents, especially those who hold one at arms' length, spoke not of loving an object or the therapist, but of the dependability of the object or therapist.

Collaborative therapy has revealed that we cannot understand the formation of the ego and restitutive behavior in many children in terms of guilt toward a loving object, with subsequent repression of forbidden impulses. We see many parents who satisfy such minimal custodial needs of the very little child as food, protection from injury, and provision for sleep,

but who have no warmth or love, in the adult sense, to give to the child. Yet the child may comply completely with the parents' demands, develop anxiety, and make frantic efforts toward restitution. Is this a restitution born of guilt toward a 'loving' object? Probably not. Rather, the child makes restitution because it fears the needed object will not fulfil its needs. The child responds to the mother's demands not primarily because of making restitution for guilt, but purely on the basis of the reality principle. This is the only way in which to deal with her. Parental love and warmth are not indispensable ingredients of this process of satisfying the child's primitive needs for food and protection which elicit responses to the mother's demands. This above concept is far removed from the concept of guilt in which 'because she loves me, I must be good and make restitution'. Rather, 'because I need her, I must make restitution or lose the satisfaction of my needs'. It goes without saying that, without consistent parental warmth, an emotionally healthy development of the child is impossible. Yet it must be emphasized that there is no need for love and warmth in the adult sense for the formation of an ego which will react restitutively or which will forbid antisocial behavior.

The word guilt, as used in the past, is meaningless if it is applied to all restitutive behavior. It appears more justifiable to view guilt as a need for punishment in an urge to make reparation to a 'needed' object purely on the basis of the reality principle. To be sure guilt, in the accepted sense of making restitution, arises from parental love and the fear of losing that love. Such guilt is common. But there is less confusion genetically if we think not of a 'love object' but of a 'needed object', which covers the gamut of satisfactions or frustrations provided the child by the significant parent. Thus can we account for the restitutive behavior, fraught with anxiety, inhibition, and masochism, observed in many children with parents who are consistently unloving in the adult sense. To be sure, many such undependable, cold parents display every conscious and unconscious verbal expression of love for the child, and an

immense concern for its welfare. In response, the child incorporates into its ego structure all the modalities of this pseudo love, exaggerated concern, and multiple, confusing inconsistencies in the parental attitudes.

In brief, Szurek's *(16)* and Johnson's *(20)* studies of little children and adolescents failed to support Hartmann's view that there is partial identification with the parents, an acceptance of the good elements and a rejection of the bad. Although children may and do repress those parts that may cause them the greater conscious conflict, nevertheless they probably early incorporate the whole parent en masse and then, as time goes on and the child sees confusing facets in the parent, it represses much of this which merely simulates idealization and purification. Children may be masochistic, with an intense need for punishment precisely because they learn that only by suffering may they make sufficient restitution to regain some lost sense of security in relation to the provider of basic minimal needs.

GENESIS OF HOSTILITY

This concept of total identification with the mother leads to a better understanding of the origin of hostility in the infant and child. If hostility is not essentially a primal sadism projected from masochism, how does this effect arise? It is said that frustration 'causes aggression'. It seems certain that aggressiveness is part of the biological apparatus of the newborn. But it is imperative to differentiate this from hostile aggressiveness, a distinction many fail to make. In the newborn baby, hunger gives rise to ineffectual skeletal, motor and autonomic discharges with crying, kicking, and flushing. The mother, if she is consciously or unconsciously ambivalent toward the baby, may see in this stormy display a hostile aggression. Unwittingly, she meets this hostility-by-interpretation with her own genuine hostility. The child's growing need for incorporation leads to introjection of the total attitude of the mother, including her hostility. There is no more compelling reason to assume that

hostility is primary and phylogenetic than there is to assume that love originates thus. We should probably regard hostility as introjected, as we tend to do in the case of love. To be sure, such introjection probably does not begin until the infant has made the distinction between itself and the mother.

The incorporation of the ambivalent object leads to increased tension in the child and an augmentation of its demands, to be followed, in turn, by further estrangement and alienation of the mother as she observes the child's behavior. In the average family such alienation may be of moderate intensity, while in other families it may become a mounting, vicious spiral of mutual ambivalence. The prototype of hostility and love, then, is learned, but in one's growth becomes increasingly self-produced. The child and adolescent develop to hate just as they develop to love.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Repression is rather more in the nature of an adaptation to the impingement of external pathological change upon the developing ego than an adjustment to phylogenetically determined imbalances or changes in development. Although repression provides a useful means for coping with pathological change, the extent to which repression occurs is one index of the degree of departure from good health.

Restitutive behavior in the child seeks to preserve the source of gratification of primary needs by a 'needed object', rather than seeking to appease a 'loving object' with a view to preserving the love. Our concept of the meaning of guilt should be expanded to the more inclusive view that guilt is a need for punishment in an urge to make reparation to a 'needed object', rather than limiting the meaning to the common situation in which restitutive behavior arises from parental love and the child's fear of losing it.

Hostile aggressiveness, as distinguished from biologically inherited aggressiveness, originates in the course of the infant's incorporation of the total maternal attitude, which includes the mother's own hostility.

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Anxiety and Orgasm

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ANXIETY AND ORGASM

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The subject of this study is such anxiety, panic, or other painful stimulus which is accompanied by genital sensuality, often ending in spontaneous or masturbatory orgasm, in males, with ejaculation. This symptom is well known, occurring either in dreams or in waking life. The patients describe the orgasm as caused or stimulated by painful threats, as fear of failure in examinations or at public performances; fear of missing trains, of not being able to finish tasks, of not being able to get ready; in dreams or tasks of drudgery, threats of being arrested, of being punished; dreams and fantasies (including the fantasy that a child is being beaten) in which one is brought to trial or sentenced to death. In not all patients were these threats accompanied by genital excitation, and in those patients in which they were, it did not always happen. In the course of this investigation it was realized that, when in such situations the sensual wave or orgasm did not appear, it could have, but the patient was able to suppress it. In all instances it was established that there was present in some form a repressed sensual drive that became activated either by sexual frustration or by some sexual stimulus which, through association, became connected with repressed sexuality; furthermore, in many cases, a guilty sexual desire was entertained, or a desire was present for masturbation with a perverse fantasy. The repressed object was found to be always an incestuous one.

An eleven-year-old boy experienced his first seminal emission when for the first time he pulled the trigger of a rifle. A boy

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of thirteen first ejaculated while climbing a tree with the fantasy that he was Tarzan. A man of twenty was driving his car at an excessive speed when he noticed that a police car was pursuing him. His anxiety mounted as the distance between him and the policeman diminished. When the policeman reached him, he had a seminal discharge without erection. Another man, about thirty years of age, had had for many years masturbatory fantasies of beating or of being beaten. In a dream he found himself in prison, sentenced to death for a crime unknown to him. In prison attire, chained, he was taken to the gallows on which he was to be hanged. At the peak of his anxiety he had an orgasm.[1] With or without orgasm, the dreamer awakes with the feeling of relief described by Freud in connection with examination dreams: 'It was just a dream'. Whenever it occurred, orgasm served to provide the feeling of relief.

Since Freud's classical study, A Child Is Being Beaten, many analytic contributions[2] to the literature have been made to the problem of masochism, and have contributed to our understanding of this well-known and common masturbatory fantasy. It is a masochistic fantasy of punishment accompanied by anxiety, the latter not being strongly felt because the intent is pleasurable, which pleasure is felt immediately when the process starts, or even before. The anxiety, however, is there.

Freud writes that '. . . intensive affective processes, even excitements of a terrifying nature, encroach upon sexuality. . . . In the school child, fear of a coming examination or exertion expended in the solution of a difficult school task, can become significant for a breaking through of sexual manifestations. . . . Under such excitements a sensation often occurs which impels him to touch the genitals, or it may lead to a pollutionlike

[1] The prison dream is similar to the powerful novel by Franz Kafka, *The Trial*. In the 1930 volume of Imago there is a profound study of Kafka by Helmuth Kaiser to which no reference has been found by the writer in the many recently written books on Kafka.

[2] Ludwig Eidelberg, Bernhard Berliner, Otto Fenichel, Theodor Reik, Wilhelm Reich, Fritz Wittels, Alfred Winterstein, Edmund Bergler, Melitta Schmideberg, Rudolph M. Loewenstein, Géza Róheim, Richard Sterba, Margaret Mahler, Heinz Hartmann—the writer is sorry if he may have omitted any.

process. . . .'[3] This statement was in accordance with Freud's first belief that libido was directly convertible into anxiety, and Ferenczi thought that this process is reversible.[4]

Freud was not satisfied with this description leaving unexplained, as it does, a process about which he concludes only that '. . . such a situation would then contain the main roots of the sado-masochistic impulse . . .'.[5] Later, Freud recognizes that a 'painful mood' can become the carrier of wishful impulses; and he says that such moods can become '. . . the motive force of the dream, inasmuch as they awake energetic wishes, which the dream has to fulfil. The material is elaborated until it is serviceable for the expression of the wish fulfilment. The more intense and the more dominating the element of the painful mood of the dream thoughts, the most surely will the most strongly suppressed wish impulses take advantage of the opportunity to secure presentation.' [6]

Following Freud's leads, the seminal emission of the eleven-year-old boy is tentatively interpreted as a transformation of

[3] Freud: *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex.* In: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud.* Trans. and edited, with an introduction by Dr. A. A. Brill. New York: The Modern Library, 1938, p. 601.

[4] 'It seems that imposed preparatory task faced in solitude, represents a state of temptation. It activates unpleasure in two ways: 1, the task at hand does not promise completion with satisfaction; 2, boredom makes the individual aware of the upsurging libidinal and aggressive cravings because of his increased bodily awareness. In this situation, adolescents particularly, often succumb to compulsive masturbation.' Mahler, Margaret: Bulletin of the Amer. Psa. Assn., VI, No. 2, May 1950, pp. 34–35.

Heinz Hartmann speaks of sexualization of the external danger. *Cf.* Bulletin of the Amer. Psa. Assn., V, No. 3, Sept. 1949, p. 72.

'With children, anxiety can awaken, apart from painful sensations, a peculiar, tense pleasure feeling. Anticipation leads to such excitations; fright, confusion over something unexpected or missed may become sources of sexual excitation. Concentration of the attention upon an intellectual accomplishment of any kind is at times connected with sexual pleasure feelings. Many school children thus experience sexual pleasure sensations, or at a corresponding maturity, real pollutions [seminal discharge] during school work or in examinations.' Sterba, Richard: *Introduction to the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Libido.* New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph Series, No. 68, 1942, p. 56.

[5] Freud: *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. Loc. cit.*, pp. 601–602.

[6] Freud: *The Interpretation of Dreams.* In: *The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Loc. cit.*

the nonlibidinal excitement, furnished him by first discharging a rifle, into the gratification of another, a repressed libidinal tension. The boy who fantasies himself as Tarzan, is transforming the physical exertion of climbing for the same purpose. The man who is threatened by the policeman, and the man who dreams that he is sentenced and executed, both achieve a gratification they cannot satisfy with an appropriately pleasurable mood. They have to employ a devious vehicle for this purpose.[7]

In his clinical papers, Freud described the complicated mental processes which precede orgastic gratification, and expressed his metaphysical conception of masochism.[8] Later psychoanalytic investigations clearly reveal that the problem is not satisfactorily explained. There are important contributory factors which play a role in this phenomenon. That there is a genital, orgastic drive preceding and following the anxiety is clearly described by Fenichel: 'It is a familiar fact that in the normal sexual process the excitement tension which precedes the release of tension is itself pleasurable, probably in connection with an anticipation in fantasy of the subsequent end-pleasure. If someone in whom sexual excitation always turns into anxiety nevertheless arrives eventually at a relative release of tension, and if this experience impresses itself on him, he may well come at last to feel the anxiety itself as a forepleasure and to approve of it as the only door open to him that leads to a relative end-pleasure.' [9]

It is guilt that converts sexual excitement into anxiety. But, then, how is orgasm possible despite anxiety? Why, moreover, without anxiety can there be no orgasm? Does the punishment

[7] Rado, Sandor: *Pain-Dependent Sexual Behavior.* An abstract: Seventh Conference Talk, Institute of Living, February 21, 1950. Digest of Neurology and Psychiatry, Series No. XVIII, April 1950, p. 220.

Alexander, Franz: *The Evolution and Present Trends of Psychoanalysis.* Actualités scientifiques et industrielles, 1100 congrès international de psychiatrie Paris 1950, Vol. V, p. 16. E. Hermann & Cie., Editeurs.

[8] Freud: *A Child Is Being Beaten.* Coll. Papers, II; and *The Economic Problem in Masochism.* Coll. Papers, II.

[9] Fenichel, Otto: *Der Begriff 'Trauma' in der heutigen psychoanalytischen Neurosenlehre.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXIII, 1937.

pacify the superego and permit the orgastic gratification?[10] It cannot be so since anxiety is still present; only when all the factors—guilt, punishment, anxiety—are present is orgasm achieved.

The writer has found that the sequence anxiety-punishment-orgasm is the replica of an infantile situation in which the child fantasied (or felt) that the punishing parent was using the corporal and mental punishment (on him or on others) instead of caressing him or making love to him—whether in a genital or pregenital form being irrelevant as far as our problem is concerned. The orgastic drive in a threatening situation is then transferred in toto to any other situation similar to the infantile one. In a rarely quoted footnote Freud says, 'The content of the sexual life of infancy consists in autoerotic activity on the part of the dominant sexual components, in traces of object love, and in the formation of that complex which deserves to be called *the nuclear complex of the neurosis.* It is the complex which comprises the child's earliest impulses, alike tender and hostile, toward its parents and brothers and sisters, after its curiosity has been awakened. . . .'[11] And Fenichel observes: 'The childhood history of cases of this kind shows that usually the parents forced the patients to sexualize the idea of punishment by blocking all other outlets of sexual impulses'.[12] Freud almost solves our problem when he writes that '. . . even punishment dreams are wish fulfilments, but they do not fulfil the wishes of the instinctual impulses, but those of the critical, censuring and punishing function of the mind. If we are faced with a pure punishment dream, a simple mental operation will enable us to reinstate the wish dream to which the punishment dream was the proper rejoinder; on account of this repudiation the punishment dream has appeared

[10] Róheim, Géza: The Œdipus Complex, Magic and Culture. In: *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, Vol. II.* New York: International Universities Press, 1950, p. 219.

[11] Freud: *A Case of Obsessional Neurosis.* Coll. Papers, III, p. 345, fn.

[12] Fenichel, Otto: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945, p. 501.

in place of the wish dream as the manifest one.'[13] Does Freud mean that the latent wish is the punishment, but in the manifest dream content only the punishment appears and not the wish for punishment?[14] Or does he mean that the manifest punishment dream replaces an instinctual libidinal wish? According to the first interpretation, the gratification is love of the object by the superego. But the love of the superego for the object cannot be a sensual one. It is a tender love which does not lead to orgasm, as in the 'compulsion to confess' the aim is to remove the distance created by the secrecy and establish a smooth flow of love.[15] It enables the subject to cling to the love object.

The writer believes that the second interpretation of Freud's statement is the correct one: that the wish is a sensual one and the manifest punishment replaces the latent sensual wish. The ego in such dreams and similar situations in waking life behaves *as if* it wished and accepted punishment, but during the process is more or less aware of the sensual impulse and the orgastic aims, perceiving the tension between itself and the superego not only as a painful stimulus, but as a sensual one also. It is similar to the psychic economy of wit in which the ego reacts 'as if'.[16] While the real tension is sensual, the libido is not transformed into anxiety; both coexist. The ego in connivance with the id is ostensibly threatened by the superego, but the discharge of tension is sensual, pleasurable.

Masochism does not invalidate the pleasure principle. The writer shares with Fenichel the opinion that self-destruction is not actually 'beyond the pleasure principle', but that 'it represents an undesired consequence of something desired'.[17]

[13] Freud: *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis.* Chapter I: Revision of the Theory of Dreams. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1933, p. 38.

[14] Franz Alexander has stated that self-punishment is a superego wish: *Träume mit peinlicher Inhalt.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XVI, 1930, pp. 343–348.

[15] Hermann, I.: *Die Psychoanalyse als Methode.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1934.

[16] Feldmann, Sandor: *Supplement to Freud's Theory of Wit.* Psa. Rev., XXVIII, 1941, pp. 201–217.

[17] Fenichel, Otto: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. Loc. cit.,* p. 364.

One of the writer's patients would jump into ice-cold water which caused him to ejaculate. The orgasm occurred not because of, but despite the punishment, discomfort, or the anxiety which accompanied it. There may well be in such instances a need for punishment but not a desire for it. There is nowadays too much talk about the ego and the superego and too little about the id. Ego and superego can do nothing without yielding to some extent to the demands of the id for gratification.

In the masturbatory fantasy that a child is being beaten the anxiety is either perceptible or it is concealed behind the idea of punishment. In early development the anxiety had been an appropriate reaction to a forbidden sensual drive, but it does not appear conspicuously in the later beating fantasy, the original painful situation having been converted into a playful one.[18] Except in borderline states, sado-masochistic fantasies are usually playful. The patients would be repelled by the opportunity to act them out.[19] When the fantasy includes a partner, both are represented as knowing that the activity is playful. Witnessing the beating of another person may be a stimulus to masturbation, the sensual stimulus being not the punishment but an original infantile association of sensuality with anxiety. Both are repressed, and the playful punishment in fantasy serves the purpose of making it appear as if the punishment contained in the current sado-masochistic fantasy were the cause of anxiety which really is attached to the infantile incestuous gratification.

Freud discovered that the child who is being beaten represents the penis or the clitoris.[20] The process begins when the child has had pleasurable masturbatory experiences, and, with the development of object relationships, the child would like the parents to touch its genitals. Fearful of revealing this aim, it is achieved indirectly, among other ways, by the fantasy of

[18] Loewenstein, Rudolph M.: *L'Origine du Masochisme et la théorie des pulsions.* Revue Française de Psychanalyse, X, No. 2, 1938, pp. 293–321.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] Freud: *Some Psychological Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction Between the Sexes.* Coll. Papers, V.

being beaten. Naturally, the child seeks not punishment but pleasure. The punishment, therefore, is made a playful one. The latent anxiety in the playful fantasy is perceived by only one part of the ego; by the other part it is felt as a sensual, genital tension. Anxiety and punishment are artifices to conceal the original desire that one of the parents should touch the genitals. The regressive sado-masochism is hypocritical,[21] the individual being at least partially aware what he seeks is genital pleasure. Freud's observation that the fantasy usually occurs in persons who have seldom or never been beaten is confirmed by many writers. The guilt and anxiety for enjoying the spanking of others is for the reason that the scene is associated with the specific pleasurable aim of having the genitals touched. Instead, it was the buttocks that were patted, rubbed in fondling, or slapped in punishment. A patient, who was tremendously stimulated by the sight or by the fantasy of being beaten, sought sexual gratification with much older women by lying between the woman's legs with his penis directed toward her genitals and approximated through her spanking his buttocks. Of the many variations of the beating fantasy—sadistic, masochistic, heterosexual, homosexual, sodomitical, homicidal —the common feature of concealing the primarily pleasurable goal by a predominance in consciousness of anxiety, and other painful affects, remains.

In discussing the 'inversion of affect' in the service of dream censorship, Freud establishes a class of dreams which he characterizes as hypocritical, because not the wish but 'in its stead only its suppression and abasement has reached the dream content'. In the same place, Freud considers the examination, anxiety dream as similar to these disagreeable dreams.[22] This attitude of the ego is not identical with Vaihinger's philo-

[21] In the discussion of this paper, Rudolph M. Loewenstein suggested for 'hypocritical' substituting 'make-believe', or 'game'; he made the same suggestion in his paper, *L'Origine du Masochisme et la théorie des pulsions. Loc. cit.* Sandor Lorand suggested the influence of the primal scene in which orgastic excitement and fear are fused. Camille Kereszturi Cayley believes that spontaneous orgasm during states of anxiety may be considered as an effective or ineffective mechanism serving to relieve anxiety.

[22] Freud: *The Interpretation of Dreams. Op. cit.,* pp. 443-447.

sophical conception of the As-If.[23] It is, however, of interest in this connection to quote H. T. Wolf's summary of Vaihinger's concept: 'Our mind is so constituted that it cannot solve many problems by direct approach. We can, however, reach a solution by using as devices fictitious concepts even though they may be contradictory in themselves. The essential requisite of the mental operations is that these contradictory devices be eliminated after the object of research is reached. The principle of the As-If is the indispensable basis for the understanding of higher calculus, economics, and religion.' [24]

Hypocritical attitudes become observable when children begin to understand wit and jokes.[25] They are forced on children by their environment; furthermore, hypocrisy is supported by libidinal development between the phallic and genital phases: both sexes behave as if everybody, males and females, has a penis. Later, when the males are forced to accept castration, they behave as if they were castrated when they are not, and girls behave as if they were not castrated, while they, so to speak, are. Thumb-sucking is an oral forerunner of this hypocritical stage in which the child lives in the illusion that the thumb is the breast.[26] He is indeed a 'sucker'.

In the course of his investigations the writer has found additional interpretations of the typical dreams of examinations and of missing trains—both connected with anxiety—to those commonly recorded.

THE TYPICAL EXAMINATION DREAM

Freud [27] described the general characteristics of the typical examination dream. The dreamer is in school and failed in an

[23] Vaihinger, Hans: *The Philosophy of As-If.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1935; also Rogers, Raymond: *A Note on Vaihinger.* Etc., A Review of General Semantics, Summer 1950, pp. 287–290.

[24] Wolf, H. T.: New York Times, Nov. 7, 1943, Section E, page 11.

The writer was stimulated to the postulation of an as-if state by Freud's discussion of the Wolf-man's castration complex. In a different way I. Hermann arrived at the recognition of an as-if state in his paper: *Zur Triebbesetzung von Ich und Über-Ich.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXV, 1940, p. 137.

[25] Ferenczi, Sandor: *Ten Letters to Freud.* Int. J. Psa., XXX, 1949, p. 243.

[26] Hermann, I.: Personal communication.

[27] Freud: *The Interpretation of Dreams. Op. cit.*

examination which he once passed in real life. He is awakened by the mounting anxiety, and is relieved that 'it was just a dream'. Freud stated his interpretation of such dreams is 'by no means exhaustive',[28] and added that 'a deeper understanding of such dreams has to be accumulated from a considerable number of examples'.[29] Freud found these dreams to be caused by 1, 'ineradicable memories of punishments we suffered as children for misdeeds which we have committed'; 2, 'if we think that we have done something carelessly'; 3, when the dreamer is seeking reassurance in anticipation of a difficult task; 4, 'W. Stekel, who was the first to interpret the "matriculation dream", maintains that this dream invariably refers to sexual experiences and sexual maturity. This has frequently been confirmed in my experience'; [30] 5, punishment or censure for sexual misdeeds; 6, 'you are already so old, so far advanced in life, and yet you still commit such follies, are guilty of such childish behavior . . . the reproaches . . . relate to repetitions of reprehensible sexual acts'.[31]

The writer has observed that all examination dreams do not include failure in a subject which the dreamer in reality once passed. The main feature of these dreams is the tremendous tension of frustration and anxiety at the peak of which the

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 317.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 335.

[30] In support of this statement, compare Dr. D. E.: *Zur sexuellen Deutung des Prüfungtraumes.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., V, 1919, pp. 300–301: 'I am expecting that my sweetheart will come to me on Monday. On Sunday I am in a bad mood, completely unable to work and in a depressive mood that is more than usual. I dream that night that I have forgotten to take my last examination to graduate from high school. (In fact, in a lower class, I had forgotten to attend school on one of the days of an examination, and had therefore, a week later, to make this up and passed it excellently.) I have to return to high school in order to be able to take the examination. On the staircase (a symbol of sexual intercourse) I meet my professor who asks my name. I answer, "Dr. N. N. I have forgotten to take my graduation examination". "Is that so?" he says in a somewhat respectful voice. "Then you are attending school for no good reason. The graduation examination this year doesn't take place in the high school, but in the women's camp." Analyzed, the dream was interpreted: "You are trying in vain to sublimate your libido completely in work. You cannot get rid of your neurosis by going to school forever, but by going to the women's camp (house of prostitution)."'

[31] Freud: *The Interpretation of Dreams. Op. cit.*

dreamer not infrequently awakens with an orgasm. To go back to school in examination dreams means to go back to a specific sensual drive which once was gratified or frustrated. Whether or not the dream includes erotic excitement, the writer considers all examination dreams, similar dreams and similar situations, as attempts to discharge forbidden incestuous genital drives, the painful affect serving as a defense behind which the libidinal drive may progress to gratification.

The feeling after awakening that 'it was just a dream', that 'it is not true', is overdetermined and expresses still another meaning: 'the dream is not a punishment for failing in an examination; the truth is that I want to bring to gratification a forbidden sensual drive'. That the dream is frequently of examination in a subject which one once passed tends to confirm that it is a more or less successful disguise for the gratification of an erotic drive.

Stekel believed that the examiner in the dream is the father or God (The Last Judgment), and that if the subject of the examination were Latin or Greek ('old subjects'), it referred to the period of infancy; if mathematics ('Ma-ma'), it referred to incest or to financial irregularities; if the subject were physics or biology, it referred to lust; if history, to the life history of the dreamer.

Flugel [32] compares the candidates in ancient initiation rites with those taking modern examinations: both are 'heroes who have to solve a riddle'. Sutherland [33] found that the causes which unconsciously motivated the failures were unconscious aggressive attitudes toward a parent, need for punishment, fear of assuming adult responsibility, punishment for prohibited sexual impulses. Sutherland, too, believes that there is some parallel between initiation rites and examinations. Flugel and

[32] Flugel, J. C.: *The Examination as Initiation Rite and Anxiety Situation.* Int. J. Psa., XX, 1939, pp. 275–286, from an abstract by Otto Fenichel in This QUARTERLY, XI, 1942, p. 135.

[33] Sutherland, J. D.: *Three Cases of Anxiety and Failure in Examinations.* British J. of Med. Psychology, XIX, 1941, pp. 73–81, from an abstract by Milton H. Erickson in This QUARTERLY, XII, 1943, p. 305.

Sutherland are right in that the patient strives to overcome opposition to a forbidden sexual drive. Without, however, a hidden forepleasure with an anticipated end-pleasure (Fenichel), the dreamer would not conjure up the danger inherent in the initiation rite or in the examination. The gravest danger can be challenged in the dream when the reward is the consummation of the forbidden, incestuous wish.

Stengel [34] believes that the fear is closely related to initiation rites. The examination is an argument with the father.[35] The tendency to fail is self-punishment, akin to masochism, for reasons of guilt. There is repressed exhibitionism (especially in women) when the examination is witnessed by others—a variation of stage fright. Stengel states that, in reality, fear is mainly present before the examination and fades away during the examination. This, in the writer's opinion, is evidence that the anxious situation of being examined is utilized for another purpose.

Liss [36] gives a good clinical description of the anxiety: gastrointestinal, genitourinary, respiratory disturbances, cardiovascular symptoms, partial or complete blocking. He found sadism, masochism, exhibitionism in his patients, with guilt as an outstanding feature. He states that '. . . learning is a perpetual attempt at sublimation of the individual's erotic desires, knowledge is a substitute for body interest'. One still needs an explanation for the fact that sadism, masochism, etc., can be stimuli for orgasm. That the superego may be bribed by punishment does not completely solve the problem.

Laforgue,[37] investigating the meaning of anxiety in dreams

[34] Stengel, Erwin: *Prüfungsangst und Prüfungsneurose.* Ztschr. f. psa. Pädagogik, X, 1936, pp. 300–320.

[35] Rudolph M. Loewenstein pointed out the important role of the œdipus complex in the masochistic perversion. *Cf. L'Origine du Masochisme et la théorie des pulsions. Loc. cit.*

According to Bertram D. Lewin (discussion), in examination dreams the father is an important factor.

[36] Liss, Edward: *Examination Anxiety.* Amer. J. of Orthopsychiatry, XIV, 1944, pp. 345–348.

[37] Laforgue, René: *On Erotization of Anxiety.* Int. J. Psa., XI, 1930, pp. 312–321.

ending with orgasm, speculates whether anxiety may not be a substitute for a normal orgasm. The anxiety is not only 'a reaction to danger', but in a whole series of cases we 'have to do with an artificial anxiety which stands in the service of erotic gratification . . .'. Laforgue goes on, 'This theatre [Grand Guignol] seems to me to afford the strongest proof of the erotization of anxiety, and the crowds that frequent it warrant us in asserting that many persons find anxiety equivalent to orgasm . . .'. The same is true of ghost stories. The French word *'affoler'* means both to cause anxiety and to excite sensually; *'tu m'affoles'* means 'you arouse me to the point of orgasm'. Laforgue probably does not think that the anxiety is artificial in a literary sense. The anxiety felt, as such, is real; but the ego permits the anxiety to come to the fore because it is the lesser of two evils. It is the intricate way in which the ego is able to serve two masters (Freud) when in a plight.

Marie Bonaparte [38] published the story of Wohlhuter, a famous lion hunter whom she visited in South Africa thirty-eight years after he had been attacked by a lion. Gravely wounded, he was dragged a considerable distance by the lion and dropped near a tree. With his only remaining weapon, a sheath knife, Wohlhuter killed the lion. He managed to climb a tree and tie himself to it in order not to fall should he faint from loss of blood. Immediately following his rescue, and with decreasing frequency through the succeeding years, the horrible experience was re-enacted in his dreams. In not one of these dreams did Wohlhuter succeed in killing the lion. Without being in a position to obtain details of Wohlhuter's life, who was then sixty-six years old, Bonaparte concluded: 'We may assume that in each circumstance of life where Wohlhuter may have doubted his own capacities, the recurrent dream came to reassure him, as do all examination dreams. "See, it is only a dream that you missed the lion. In reality you killed it." ' In the writer's opinion, Wohlhuter's anxious dreams conceal a sexual anxiety which the nearly fatal encounter with the lion

[38] Bonaparte, Marie: *A Lion Hunter's Dream.* This QUARTERLY, XVI, 1947, pp. 1–10.

reactivated, and which Wohlhuter could never resolve. The invincible lion as well as other predatory animals included in the dreams are, Bonaparte states, unmistakable 'unconscious incarnations of a phallic father'.

It appears to the patients that the orgastic stimulus comes from the anxiety, but during treatment patients become gradually aware that the sensual wave starts before the anxiety develops; moreover, they are driven deeper and deeper into the painful situation for the pleasure premium they will obtain from this peculiar psychic adventure. The operation of this defense mechanism is the displacement of anxiety from a deeply repressed, prohibited sensual drive to an actual or potential danger experienced in reality which mounts to the intensity of a panic. Distracted by the paramount danger, the ego is unable to repress the ever present sensual drive which is discharged in orgasm.

CLINICAL EXAMPLES

A professor dreams:

> I have to give my usual lecture to the students and have the feeling that I am not prepared, and I have only half an hour to prepare myself. But this is not sufficient. I feel fear and a violent anxiety that I will disgrace myself. I awake.

This patient is paralyzed with anxiety whenever he has to assert himself. He is sexually attracted to boys. The 'nuclear complex of his neurosis' (Freud) is infantile fear of castration because of incestuous feelings. Homosexual tendencies have failed as a defense against anxiety. The anxiety is displaced to other situations.

A lawyer dreamed:

> I was in my room, but I should have been by this time at the place where I was to take my examination for the bar. It was late. I was looking for writing paper and fountain pen. I tried out the pen. It was distressing to realize that instead of ink there was a yellowish material in the pen. Would it work? I was already twenty-five minutes late. I tried to write

with the pen. One could see the writing but it was not distinct. My sister was in the room, being somehow involved in the whole matter. At some part of the dream I had a seminal discharge. I awoke. Maybe my sister was in the dream at the beginning and not at the end.

In his early childhood the patient had engaged in exhibitionistic play with his sister.

A twenty-four-year-old virgin is intensely anxious whenever her mother leaves the house. She has long had a masturbatory fantasy in which she is punishing her mother by giving her an enema. In the fantasy her mother does not know that the patient is sexually excited, nor that she has an orgasm. It proves that what her mother must not know is her incestuous desires for the father. This is distorted in consciousness by making the mother guilty. She relates a dream:

I was in school having a test in mathematics. I looked at the blackboard but didn't know anything that was written on it. I was afraid. The teacher placed a basket on the blackboard with the opening to the board. At the bottom there was a drawing and we were supposed to place the figure in the most suitable position at the top. I did not know what the teacher was driving at. Desperately I was asking somebody, fighting against time. I knew that I had failed.[39] I got out of the class. I did not know what the next schedule was and couldn't remember to what class I had to go. I was bewildered as to when my next period was.[40] I was in a state of anxiety and thought I should go to the nurse. Then I was in the study hall. Again the test came up, but I didn't know at what the teacher was driving. She said that she was going to call on someone to give us a rhyme. She picked a neat and bright girl who was first taken aback, collected herself, went into the middle aisle and made up a rhyme. She knew how to

[39] That the failure does not take place in the dream is characteristic of most examination dreams.

[40] Having indulged in sexual foreplay with a boy, she was often frightened by her irregular menstrual periods.

do it. I was afraid that I, too, should have to make up a rhyme and that I wouldn't be able to do it.

This patient is afraid of examinations and, it happens, she was at the time uncertain to what class to go. She pretends that she is girlishly innocent. She is afraid that if she reveals she knows (about sex), her mother 'will walk out on me'.

STAGE FRIGHT AND KINDRED SITUATIONS

The writer includes in this group any public performance; also, having to write one's signature in public, eating in a restaurant, sexual intercourse when the partner is expecting it, etc. Spitz[41] has concluded that stage fright is fear of punishment for acting out the primal scene in public. To this may be added the orgastic stimulus contained in the primal scene which the person with stage fright unconsciously seeks to gratify. Behind the fright and the anxiety is lurking the orgastic drive. The latter and the anxiety, so to speak, complement each other. In accordance with the metapsychological conceptions of Freud, the writer believes that ego, superego, and id processes are always interrelated.

CLINICAL EXAMPLES

A young woman with a beautiful operatic voice was unable to sing except in the presence of her teacher. She was especially anxious when a member of her family was present. She fell into the hands of a psychiatrist who declared that her trouble could be cured if she would lose her virginity, and offered himself as a lover. She agreed and fell in love with him. After two weeks he abruptly discharged her. She was crushed and her symptoms increased.

When she was sixteen, her father once came home drunk, got into bed with her, and made sexual overtures. She made

[41] Spitz, René A.: Private communication on stage fright re *Sidelights on Stage Fright and Kindred Phenomena* which he read in 1930 before the New York Psychoanalytic Society.

no protest because, she says, she wanted to save him from the realization of what he was doing. He was always running after girls. She spied on him and once saw him enter a hotel of ill repute with one of her girl friends.

In analysis the patient dreamed she was in a brothel, wearing a nightgown, and singing beautifully, accompanied by a pianist. Her singing had such a sensual effect that men, even from far-away streets, were drawn to it and came in. It became transparent that she wanted to seduce her father. Her anxiety was not only a signal of the danger of such a desire, but the threat of the orgastic energy lurking behind the anxiety.

A married woman suffered from a tremor of her hand whenever in a social gathering she reached to raise a glass. After spilling a few drops on the tablecloth, she was free of the symptom for the rest of that evening (frequently a characteristic of such anxieties). She disclosed in analysis a habitual technique of masturbation from early childhood. When urinating, she would alternately stop and release the flow of urine by the pressure of a finger and, playing with the stream of urine, have an orgasm. She was always afraid she would be detected through wetting the seat and the floor. The tremor was a symbolic expression of her masturbatory desire, a compulsion to confess, but it was also acting out an exhibitionistic fantasy of masturbation. And just as after an orgasm there is a relaxation due to gratification, the anxiety was temporarily dispelled when this patient wet the tablecloth. 'A gratification demoted to a substitute is a symptom', says Freud. The symptom is not only a substitute when it is a prelude to orgastic gratification.

An amateur actress, waiting for her cue to appear on-stage, got into a panic accompanied by intense erotic feeling. She masturbated by rubbing her thighs together, had an orgasm, and played her role without anxiety. The feeling described is of being trapped; that one is helpless. Another woman who was frigid in intercourse, was sexually aroused when trapped

or helpless as, for example, when her small son was once preparing to jump from a height and she could do nothing but watch and see what would happen.

The feeling of being trapped or of being helpless is characteristic of the last stage of the orgastic process.[42] In sexual intercourse or masturbation, it is possible to exercise control up to a point beyond which control is impossible. It is this stage which such patients seek to bring about through a consciously nonsexual but unconsciously identical stimulus. In the unconscious of women and passive homosexual men, the overwhelming threat replaces the overwhelming father as a sensual stimulus. Guilt, anxiety, painful indecision represent the incestuous object to whom one yearns and fears to submit.

DREAMS OF MISSING A TRAIN

According to Freud,[43] the examination dream and the dream of missing trains (both are typical) have the same affective character: 'On account of their similar affective character, the dreams of missing a train deserve to be ranked with the examination dreams; moreover, their interpretation justifies this approximation. They are consolation dreams, directed against another anxiety perceived in dreams—the fear of death. "To depart" is one of the most frequent and one of the most readily established of death symbols. The dream therefore says consolingly: "Reassure yourself, you are not going to die (to depart)", just as the examination dream calms us by saying: "Don't be afraid; this time, too, nothing will happen to you". The difficulty in understanding both kinds of dreams is due to the fact that the anxiety is attached precisely to the expression of consolation.'

We have no evidence that those who have reason to fear death due to sickness, or that soldiers who are about to engage in battle have such dreams; on the contrary, this typical dream occurs in individuals who are not specifically concerned about

[42] Reich, Wilhelm: *Die Funktion des Orgasmus.* Leipzig, Vienna, Zurich: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1927, p. 22.

[43] Freud: *The Interpretation of Dreams. Op. cit.,* pp. 386–387.

death. The outstanding feature of this dream, as in the examination dreams, is the struggle to board a train which is never reached. The dreamer is thwarted by one obstacle after another; he is fighting with time, has only a few minutes, the anxiety mounts and the dreamer awakens. As in the examination dream, the conflict always centers around a deeply repressed incestuous genital drive, or a derivative of it, which is displaced to a nonsexual situation in the service of the defenses of the ego.

It is true, of course, that the anxiety felt by the ego is caused by the conflict between the id and superego, and that the anxiety is a fear of castration (for example, fear of death). When the defense against the id fails in similar situations in waking life, the anxiety is in many instances accompanied by an impulse to masturbate and, occasionally, by spontaneous orgasm. The erotic drive asserts itself despite the anxiety. The anxiety, one suspects, serves also as a means of bribing the superego. In this sense, the ego may be said to invite the anxiety so that in the panic and confusion the illicit wish may be gratified.

CLINICAL EXAMPLES

A young lawyer, always a brilliant student, entered analysis because of complete impotence with women. He had erectile potency with strong erotic sensations only when he exhibited his penis or entertained fantasies during masturbation. In early childhood he had played exhibitionistic games with his sister; furthermore, his mother bathed him until he was twelve, took him in her lap and dried him, including his genitals. He had great difficulty in suppressing erection, fearing that if he failed his mother would not love him and would discontinue bathing him.

He had frequent typical dreams of failing in examinations and of missing trains.

> I am back in school at my present age. The other boys in the class are young children. It is expected that I, naturally, should know more than they do, but I don't even know as much. I awaken with anxiety.

To entertain his incestuous genital desires toward mother and sister, he had to pretend that he did not know what was happening. He was fearful that he might be discovered and punished.

A married woman had a morbid fear of being left alone. It proved in analysis that when she was alone she became sexually aroused and either masturbated or had a spontaneous orgasm with much more gratification than she could achieve in coitus. To achieve orgasm during sexual intercourse, she had to fantasy being punished.

While shopping she invariably became anxious, and attributed this to the fear that she might miss the bus. She was anxious whenever she had to make a decision, became confused and afraid that she might make the wrong decision. The common denominator was the feeling that *she might miss something better,* and when pursuing this something better, she might be found to be wrong, become guilty and anxious. Whenever she became panicky she felt compelled to masturbate, or if she could not she had a spontaneous orgasm. In the course of the analysis she realized that the sensual wave had already started at the beginning of the whole process; she knew how it would end, and permitted herself to be driven into the panic of confusion, guilt, punishment, anxiety. The fear that she would miss something better was analyzed through her fantasy during intercourse: 'What I experience with my husband is good, but there is something better—father'. Her father was a strongly sensual man who flirted conspicuously, and even 'played' with the patient's pretty girl friends but forbade her to associate with boys. 'The childhood history of cases of this kind shows that usually the parents forced the patients to sexualize the idea of punishment by blocking all the outlets for expression of sexual impulses.' [44]

Although it had never happened, a young woman, a writer, was afraid she would vomit in public places or when alone

[44] Fenichel, Otto: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. Op. cit.,* p. 501.

with somebody in a room and be disgraced. In her writing she could not 'let herself go', fearful that she would 'overstep good taste' and embarrass others. Earlier in her life she had had a similar fear of fainting. She felt much easier when close to an exit because there 'was a way out'. In college she had had exaggerated fears of examinations. She had recurrently the typical dream of missing a train, being unable to reach her destination, and awakening with the feeling of relief that it was just a dream. This patient was not analyzed but is included because the presenting symptoms are so typical.

Freud found that '. . . when a sensation of inhibition . . . is accompanied by anxiety, the dream must be concerned with a volition which was at one time capable of arousing libido; there must be a sexual impulse'.[45] 'The peculiar character of emission dreams permits us directly to unmask certain sexual symbols already recognized as typical, but nevertheless violently disputed, and it also convinces us that many an apparently innocent dream situation is merely the symbolic prelude to a crudely sexual scene. This, however, finds *direct* representation, as a rule, only in the comparatively infrequent emission dreams, while it often turns into an anxiety dream which likewise leads to waking.' [46]

CONCLUSION

Is genital libido converted into anxiety (Freud's first theory of anxiety), i.e., does the pent-up libido overwhelm the ego causing anxiety, or is anxiety a danger signal (Freud's second theory of anxiety) to the ego (via superego) when threatened with invasion by the libido, or is it both? [47] The writer's observations lead him to believe that the ego in its struggle between the id and the superego sometimes utilizes anxiety as a partial defense, permitting the discharge of an orgastic drive from the id. It is, in other words, a hypocritical *as-if* state in which

[45] Freud: *The Interpretation of Dreams. Op. cit.*, p. 360.

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 396.

[47] Waelder, Robert: *Das Prinzip der mehrfachen Funktion.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XVI, 1930, pp. 285–300.

the ego perceives anxiety on one level and lust on another. Thus orgasm and anxiety may be energically identical but phenomenologically different, dynamically the same but economically not—another form of the multiple function of the mental apparatus.

Illustrative phenomena viewed from this angle have yielded more readily to therapy. For example, in resolving sado-masochism, especially when the fantasy of being beaten is prominent, one does not always succeed in finding one's way out from the maze of pregenital object relationships. And if one does, it is not sufficient. The process of working through is more effective when the as-if state is taken into consideration. The writer does not believe that following the path he suggests will alone shorten the therapeutic process.

Frustration of mature genital drives does not seem to lead to anxiety. It may appear so because the ability to withstand frustration differs in different individuals. A regressive process takes place which stirs up antagonistic pregenital and genital drives. The greater the frustration and the stronger the fixation, the quicker will be the regression. The ego utilizes all the defenses at its disposal, including the as-if attitude. In addition to unfolding the past, tracing the vicissitudes of the various libidinal drives, removing resistances, we must take into account the as-if state, in order to free the energies of the repressed drives for mature object relationships.

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CHILDHOOD ATTITUDES TOWARD FLATULENCE AND THEIR POSSIBLE RELATION TO ADULT CHARACTER

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When Freud delineated the anal character *(1)*, he said, 'One ought to consider whether other types of character do not also show a connection with the excitability of particular erotogenic zones'. This paper concerns itself with the same zone, but a different mode of excitation. The clinical material at my disposal is inadequate for the establishment of a 'personality type', but there is a similarity of childhood developmental patterns and adult character traits in the small group of cases presented. Furthermore, while he believes that the concept of 'character types' serves a useful purpose in scientific communication between colleagues, the author has never had the experience of finding a clinical example of one in pure form. If this paper serves to stimulate the presentation of further observations on this somewhat neglected topic,[1] the author will be content.

Although stubbornness, pedantry, parsimony, sadism, and obsessive compulsive features are observed in these patients, their outstanding character traits seem to set them apart from the 'anal type' as described by Freud; they bear little resemblance to the 'saccharine' personality which is a reaction-formation to this; and they seem also to be set apart from the 'give-and-give-to-get-affection' personality which has been described as occurring in the diarrheas. An admixture of oral character traits was present in each of them.

Read before the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society, November 14, 1949.

[1] The word 'flatulence" does not appear in the index to Fenichel's *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*. Melanie Klein discusses the topic only in a footnote. The author has been able to find only three brief papers in which flatulence is the central theme *(2, 3, 4)*. Ernest Jones, in *The Madonna's Conception Through the Ear (19)*, presented a comprehensive and scholarly account of some of the sublimations of this function in adults and in some of our cultural patterns, but he did not discuss arrogance, boastfulness, or fraudulence.

The first illustration achieved considerable notoriety in college because of the stertorous roar which regularly accompanied his frequent public passage of flatus, and because of his frequent public demonstrations that flatus is inflammable. Despite a high I.Q. his grades were poor, and he had to extend his college education an extra year. He then only succeeded in getting his degree by virtue of adroit political maneuvering. He had a decidedly arrogant and boastful manner, which no one ever dared to question for fear of becoming the object of his merciless, sarcastic, and often filthy wit. He was talkative and usually 'the life of the party' to those whom he did not attack. His impulsiveness was in part responsible for his not being successful in formal extracurricular activities. Yet he was widely known, and admitted to nearly every honor society which did not require scholastic achievement; this was partly due to his fame as the organizer of a 'barber-shop quartet' but was perhaps as much due to his unending fund of dirty stories. He made a sharp distinction between 'nice' and other girls, and after graduation from college developed a brief depression when his 'nice' girl refused to marry him. After he recovered he continued his ostentatious affairs with women of easy virtue until he developed an alcoholic psychosis, requiring hospitalization four years later. Now in his early forties, he remains a bachelor. The son of a prominent engineer and financier, with influential contacts in the business world, he makes his living by taking people for rides in noisy speedboats.

The second example was described by a patient who arrived for his appointment in an unusual state of tension and irritability. His immediate superior was leaving on a field trip. This meant that for two months he would have to work under X. Usually adept at handling the people with whom he worked, in this instance he felt a complete lack of confidence. He knew that he would have to have extensive contacts with this man, yet he could do nothing but avoid him for fear of losing his temper and making a fool of himself. He then launched into a tirade about the man: 'He seems to think that the more noise he makes, the more important he is. He's never around

without letting you know about it. He's always boasting, but he never gets his work done. When he enters a room, everyone says, "Oh, oh; watch out, here comes X again". He's always telling about his prowess with women, but he's separated from his second wife right now. He really is the most offensive person I've ever known, but he seems to get his way with every one important even though they don't really like him. I guess they're scared of his temper.' When I said, 'Why did you omit any discussion of the way he breaks wind?' the patient confirmed the fact that this man did break wind frequently and ostentatiously, and then became extremely suspicious of me, accusing me of having some secret source of information about his friends.

A third example is a man who cultivated flatulence as an art. He had developed the ability to swallow large amounts of air, pass it through his intestines in a matter of a few minutes, and then expel it anally at will. On one occasion he stood on the front lawn of a fraternity house and passed flatus, thereby wakening every occupant of a third-floor sleeping porch. An adroit conversationalist, accomplished wit, and better than average musician, he had many male friends, and had achieved such notoriety that many people knew of him who had never met him. This notoriety was not the result of any worthwhile accomplishments. He had the means and the intelligence for higher education, but he never succeeded in meeting the requirements for college entrance. He was interested only in sexually promiscuous, socially inferior women.

A thirty-nine-year-old man presented himself for treatment because of depression since his second wife divorced him. One of her complaints had been that he often would break wind in bed and then gather the covers tightly around her neck to keep her from smelling it; but her chief reason for divorcing him was that he had alienated most of their friends by periodic outbursts of rage in which he would insult every one present because he felt they were 'sponging' on him, although he consciously recognized that he could never feel at ease with any one unless he had spent money on him. This man had secured and held, for five

years, a job requiring a specialized college degree. He had never finished high school, and had once started, but not completed, a correspondence course. He succeeded in getting the job by virtue of a combination of deception and persuasion. While on an assignment to a foreign country during the war, the foreign country requested his return because of his frequent breaches of security. He had to talk about his confidential work, he said, in order to convince people of his importance. On another occasion during the war he had been opposed, on a technical point, by the administrative officers of his own company and a board composed of admirals and generals. He nearly lost his job, but he 'made such a stink about it' that finally all opposition dissolved. In treatment he would spend hours berating himself for his boastfulness and arrogance.

During his first attack of anxiety in the course of treatment, he suddenly noticed an odor while he was sitting in a moving picture theater. He realized that it was subjective, and he began to fear that he was 'going crazy'. He had great difficulty describing the odor to me, stating that it was not a fecal odor. After half an hour of fruitless attempts to remember any similar odor, I suggested, 'Would it be anything like the odor of milk, or a woman's breast?' 'Yes!' he said, 'That's it exactly'. But we got no closer to an explanation of the phenomenon for a long time.

He had a few vague impressions of happiness during the first year of his life. At this time the family consisted of the mother and father, and a sister two years older. From all his accounts, the sister seems to have shown little sibling rivalry and to have lavished a great deal of attention on the patient. She died when the patient was a year old. He can only remember a feeling of perplexity at her funeral and a vague, lost feeling afterwards. His memories of the second year of life, from the time of her death until the birth of a younger brother, consisted only of an image of himself feeling empty and reaching up toward his mother's breasts. His feelings about the brother's birth were evidenced in his accidental referral to the event as his mother's 'remarriage'.

He felt that he never had any happiness at home from that time. Until he was six, however, he did find a certain amount of companionship with a boy of his age. He remembered frequently going into a vacant lot with him for the purpose of defecating. Then his family moved to a new neighborhood where all the children teased him, at which he would burst into tears and run to his mother. On one such occasion, an uncle admonished him to go back and 'beat them up'. As he ran out the door he experienced a tingling up and down his spine which he regularly experienced before each of his numerous subsequent fights; also the first time he kissed a girl. He soon became the leader of the gang by beating any one who challenged his authority, and held this position until he left town in his teens.

One day, when he was eleven, he administered the customary initiation to a newcomer in the neighborhood. As the boy ran screaming into his house, his older sister came out and administered such a tongue-lashing to the patient that, for once, he began to question the rightness of his ways. Shortly thereafter his family began to employ this girl as a baby-sitter. Although she was only a year older than the patient, he felt her to be the authority in the house at such times. He developed a secret 'crush' on her which lasted for a year. One day he felt he had sufficient courage to approach her directly and walked over to where she was playing hopscotch with some other children. Suddenly he found that he had passed gas, and he was frozen with fear of what she would say. But she passed the matter off in the neighborhood vernacular, saying, 'Hm, I smell gardenias', and from then on the romance flourished.

One Monday the patient said he had been to a party the preceding Saturday night. Most of the people were strangers and he felt embarrassed at first, especially when the hostess' father was in the room. 'But after he left, people started telling dirty stories and I felt more at ease. Of course, when they do that, I always have to tell one to top them all. The one I told was about the farm boy who had been away at college and then came back and wanted to modernize the farm. He succeeded in getting his father to put in several improvements but,

even though he tried repeatedly, he couldn't get his father to install modern plumbing to replace the outhouse. Finally he decided to take matters into his own hands, so he planted in the outhouse a charge of dynamite with a long fuse. One midnight he lit the fuse and started to run back to the house. Just then he saw his father heading for the outhouse. His father sat down just as the dynamite went off. The son rushed up to him to ask him if he was all right, and the father answered, "Yes, I'm all right; and it's lucky that I didn't let that one go in the house!" '

The story was met with an embarrassed silence during which he felt terribly tense and guilty. After a few minutes, however, he relaxed somewhat, and started to dance with the hostess. He found his attention focusing on her large breasts; then he suddenly passed gas. He felt the same apprehension he had felt in the similar episode in his childhood, but again he was relieved to find that the event seemed to have passed unnoticed. His associations to this episode led him back to childhood bathroom scenes. His father used to read as he sat on the toilet, remaining in the bathroom for very long periods of time. The patient often entered the bathroom when his father was there and 'the odor would nearly overcome' him. He also remembered sitting on the toilet himself once when his father was in the bathroom, looking at his father's huge belly and thinking that it must be full of very foul-smelling feces. He doubted that he would ever be able to be like that. (One of his complaints when he came for treatment was obesity.) When specifically asked about his mother's flatulence, he said she often passed gas while she was working in the kitchen, but he seemed to have little affect connected with the memory.

During analysis the patient repeatedly became involved in explosive arguments at work which culminated in three or four-hour conferences during which he would expound his technical differences of opinion with the rest of the staff. On these occasions he always needlessly offended his opponents, in spite of a strong conscious desire to work things out in a friendly manner. Throughout treatment, he complained about

his inability to get advancement in his work, yet whenever it was suggested that he spend time studying, he became incensed, reacting to the suggestions that there was anything for him to study as a narcissistic wound.

By misrepresenting his economic status, he succeeded in getting the analyst to allow him to sign notes for part of his bill each month. At last he confessed that not only had he been giving the analyst notes, but he had also been borrowing money from his company to furnish his apartment more luxuriously, and on this particular day he had ordered a hundred-dollar suit of clothes to be made to order. When I said I thought that it was unfair of him to buy hundred-dollar suits when he owed me money, he became furious and walked out of the office. He came back once wearing his new suit which was a duplicate of one the analyst had just bought.

Another patient was not as blatant about his flatulence as were the others, but was nevertheless proud of it, and used to boast to friends that he could play tunes with his anus. This patient presented himself for analysis because of his inability to get along with his wife, or any other woman. His personality characteristics, as they were revealed in the analysis, were quite similar to the preceding three cases. He had difficulty with studies despite a high I.Q. He had a ribald, hostile, ever-ready sense of humor, which nearly always involved some unfortunate scapegoat. He was unable to match his boasts with accomplishments. He frequently got into trouble because of impulsive outbursts of aggression. Prior to analysis, the only real satisfaction that life afforded him was a 'bull session' with other men, and one of his chief dissatisfactions with his wife was her lack of conversational ability. Like the other patients he had a bribable superego.

At the age of three he had suffered severe oral traumata from a nurse who habitually threatened to put a hose down his throat and pour food into him if he did not eat. Constipation began at this time. Between the ages of five and seven he was considerably overindulged, given special foods at all hours of the day and allowed to smoke if he wished, etc. When he

was seven his father acquired a mistress. His mother reacted to this by becoming irritable and less indulgent. The patient became apathetic and listless and was taken to a pediatrician who believed the symptoms might be due to sluggish bowels, and ordered gastrointestinal x-rays. This required that his mother withhold food from him for thirty-six hours. He recalls no real happiness with her from that time. He turned his attentions to a gentle, alcoholic manservant who taught him the 'facts of life'. After learning from the servant that his mother and father had intercourse, his repudiation of his mother was nearly complete.

One day he complained to this man about aching and rumblings in his stomach and was told: 'You sap, all you need to do is blow wind'. Until that time he had always felt that such a thing was 'not done', except by bad people. He tried it then and there and was delighted with the sense of power it brought. He began to notice that, in the privacy of their bedrooms, mother and father also blew wind, and very loudly. He began to save his flatus in order to display his prowess to the servant, in a spirit of masculine identification. He reported in analysis that it gave him a tremendous sense of power when he learned that he could blow wind without soiling his pants. One day he shocked the chauffeur into saying: 'My God! You'll shit in your pants!' He calmly replied, 'Oh, no I won't', with the feeling that he now had really become a man. He learned to use this weapon to shock his nursemaids when they displeased him. One nursemaid he disliked particularly. He would wait until she was leaning down to lace his shoes and then blow wind. He now repeated this pattern with his wife. When he was particularly displeased with her, he would, in his sleep, move his buttocks as close as he could to her face and vent flatus. He also noticed that he became particularly flatulent when his wife's conversation bored him.

Prior to adolescence this patient had only one close friend of his age. The two of them were uninterested in sports, except as spectators. The greater part of their years together was spent in making model airplanes; these were always flown to the

accompaniment of a roaring noise, ostensibly in imitation of the plane's motor. The patient's favorite plane was named the 'Odora', and much of their conversation about airplanes consisted of veiled allusions to anal topics.

This patient had a sharply divided feminine ideal which seemed traceable to a failure to resolve his childhood concept of feces as a phallus.

DISCUSSION

All the examples given are men. I have seen a woman who had acute anxiety on her wedding night because of her fear that she would expel flatus during intercourse. This proved to be an expression of her complete rejection of sexual penetration. Berkeley-Hill *(2)* reported a similar case. While the case material presented is totally inadequate for statistical evaluation, I do not feel that the sex difference is insignificant. The concern that women have about genital odors is attested by their use of perfume *(5, 7)* and their exploitation by vendors of preparations for 'feminine hygiene'. It would seem that women when not alone customarily pass flatus silently. Lorand *(3)* considers flatulence the prerogative of the father. A similar view was expressed by Ferenczi *(4)*, but he did not confine it to the father, stating, 'The license referred to [by patients who have an urge to expel flatus on the couch] represents all the prerogatives which parents arrogate to themselves, but strictly deny to their children'.

Lorand's restriction of this prerogative to the father finds corroboration in the last two cases in which flatulence seemed to be an immature and ritualistic compensation for inadequate identification with the father in other spheres of psychosexual development. This inadequate identification with the father is also reflected in their attitudes toward women, and their lack of concrete achievement in work. Adequate data for evaluation of the fathers' personalities were not available in two cases. The fathers of the other three were all hard-driving, awe-inspiring, successful business executives. In our changing economy, the sons could have little hope of outdoing the financial

successes of these fathers. The developmental origins of satisfaction through achievement have been traced to the anal stage by Abraham *(6)*. Menninger *(8)* has also discussed the relationship between the act of evacuation and the enjoyment of achievement. This combination of lack of achievement and compensation for it in the form of being a 'blow-bag' was present in all the cases.

It will be noticed that each of the examples presented had a divided feminine ideal. This stemmed from the usual sources. First, a homosexual defense against castration anxiety by a partial acceptance of castration and erotization of the anus as an organ for seducing father. The passive partner in the sexual act must, by identification, be someone with a dirty anus. Second, an element derived from the denial of the mother's faithlessness: 'It cannot be that mother does it with father instead of me. I don't believe she does it at all. Good women don't and bad women do.' Third, residuals from the infantile stage of cloacal confusion. Fourth, a need to deny the possibility of castration: 'It isn't so that women have no penis. Any hole is an anal hole like mine.'

Each of the cases presented exhibited a ribald, sadistic wit and a tendency to use unusually foul language, which was true of the case described by Lorand *(3)*. A similar case was described by Abraham *(9)*. Wit itself, Freud pointed out *(10)*, is a sudden overwhelming of the superego. This, of course, is the very essence of flatulence. The effort involved in maintaining sphincter control, at the behest of the superego, is suddenly relinquished, but no serious damage is done. The pants are not soiled to an extent associated with the threat of discovery and punishment, and the odor is not particularly offensive to the person who has passed the gas. The subject has been able to regress to a less socialized level of development without fear of punishment. The relationship of swearing, the emission of a sudden aggression-laden charge of gas, to early infantile experiences with flatus has been discussed by others *(8, 21)*. Abraham pointed out that some patients equate all free association with flatulence, and he described the case referred to above *(9)* as

follows: '. . . his sole method of dealing with his external and internal difficulties was to swear violently. These expressions of affect were accompanied by very significant behavior. Instead of thinking about the success of his work, he used to ponder over the question of what would happen to his curses—whether they reached God or the devil, and what was the fate of sound waves in general.'

It is noteworthy that the first two individuals described were better than average musicians. The next two patients made repeatedly unsuccessful attempts to acquire a musical skill, and the last became a fairly successful orator and propagandizer. The relationship between flatulence and musical ability has been commented on by Ernest Jones *(12, 13)*, Menninger *(8)*, Ferenczi *(14)*, and Coriat *(20)*. In the first and third cases, this seemed to be a factor in their notoriety, yet the other had become equally well known to large numbers of people without any commensurate musical ability. Their open abuse of unpopular causes and persons, their wit, and their ability to coin catch phrases undoubtedly contributed to their popularity; but it is the author's belief that some more fundamental cause for the widespread extent of their reputations must be sought. Freud *(15)*, Brill *(7)*, and others *(5)* have delineated the fundamental importance of the sense of smell in the emotional life of man and the important transformation of this function due to the assumption of the erect posture. It is as though these people appealed in the most direct and primitive manner to the feelings of those about them—as if the people could 'smell' them when they were not even in sight.

Impulsiveness and the demanding nature of these people seem, on first consideration, to be a surprising admixture in such anal personalities. It is a clinical fact that these oral characteristics and evidences of inadequate resolution of early oral conflicts are present, and an effort must be made to explain them. A fragment from the life of a child helps to understand this. This infant did not seem to become consciously aware of pass-

ing gas until the age of four months. His first reactions to this awareness were a mixture of surprise and fear whenever this happened. On one occasion he cried. This continued for two months, until he learned to imitate the sound with his mouth. This then became his favorite 'joke' and soon thereafter he began to laugh when he passed gas per rectum. Toilet training was not forced upon him, his parents waiting for him to imitate adults in this regard. This he began to do at about sixteen months. During his early failures, he again went through a period of very frequent 'Bronx-cheering'. On an anal level he could not yet master himself, but orally he could.

Another fragment from a patient illustrates the same point. The woman patient mentioned above had presented herself for treatment in tears, talking baby-talk, and complaining that 'It is so hard to be grown up'. Whenever she was faced with the threat of becoming hostile, she retreated into this sort of behavior, and indulged in playing the role of a coddled baby. Actually, she was an extremely large, muscular, professional woman, who felt that her husband should do the housework and cooking because he was so much better at it than she was. This 'defense-in-sweet-infancy' turned out to be a reaction-formation to murderous impulses arising from envy of her older brother's penis. As we discussed this one day, she told of times when she competed with her older brothers by looking up sesquipedalian words and then using them in a family gathering with malapropian results. Although she had seen quite clearly the unconscious significance of these associations in the early part of the hour, toward the end of the hour she became more and more defensive about considering the long words as phallic equivalents. The next day she started the hour by reporting a dream:

> I came to your office to get a hypodermic injection. I was infatuated with you and felt quite sure that you reciprocated the feeling. But then I found out you didn't, and all you wanted was to have me blow glass. So I blew a sort of glass abstraction of a man.

Her first association was of deleting the 'l' from the word 'glass'. She then recalled the acute anxiety of her wedding night that she might expel flatus during intercourse. The dream seems to say, 'When I used big words as a child, I was competing with my brothers and my father by blowing gas. I come to you to be made into a woman, but then you make me take the initiative for free associations, which to me are gaseous abstractions, and it's the same old masculine identification.'

Jones *(16)*, in a discussion of the magical gestures of children, says: 'Among these signals, sounds accompanying anal activities play a part second only in significance to the voice itself, so that they constitute one of the chief means through which the infant retains its belief in its omnipotence'. This admixture of oral and anal elements becomes less surprising if we consider it in the light of Simmel's *(17)* derivation of aggressive drives from gastrointestinal activity and his reminder that the anus and mouth are psychologically as well as anatomically only two ends of the same tube. A fundamental concept of Erikson *(18)* is also useful in explaining this oral-anal admixture. He has pointed out that in the consideration of the genesis of any complex we should consider not only the point of initial fixation of psychosexual development but the point of final arrest of the development as well.

Unfortunately, the patients studied yielded insufficient infantile material to explain adequately the oral fixation of these patients. There is some evidence of an 'all-or-none' attitude with which they seem to have reacted to the conflicts of bowel training: 'If the anal sphincter is completely controlled, that is good; if not, that is bad'. Apparently they learned only with difficulty that there is an 'in-between area' where one may expel gas harmlessly under the proper circumstances. Later, the tendency was to develop a counterphobic exhibitionism about their flatulence. This attitude of 'either it is black or it is white' was further evidenced by the difficulty that two patients who sought treatment had in understanding the existence of opposites in

the unconscious, the overdetermination of their symptoms, and the structure of various defenses and resistances. This same attitude seems to have had a good deal to do with their divided ego ideal, their arrest in the phallic stage, and their failure to achieve genitality.

SUMMARY

The meaning of flatulence and some possible psychological derivatives of this biological function in a small group of similar personalities have been discussed. These men had achieved inadequate father identifications and at this level their flatulence represented an attempt to achieve this. Their anal development was also stunted, and they exhibited an inadequate enjoyment of achievement. Their disrupted oral development was evidenced by impulsiveness and inadequate superego development.

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THE CONCEPT OF DEFENSE

BY GEORGE GERÖ, M.D. (NEW YORK)

The term *Abwehr,* or defense, made its first appearance in the early writings of Freud *(1),* where it was characterized as an intentional process or wish to forget *(vergessen wollen).* Since then it has acquired a considerably different meaning, for the new experiences that came from the psychoanalytic study of the neuroses demanded a more fitting descriptive and dynamic conception. Today, the conception of defense is extremely complex. It refers to a set of unconscious activities of the ego which partake of all the puzzling qualities of unconscious processes, and which occur without any intentional effort.

The present essay will investigate the concept of defense from the point of view of ego psychology, especially as applied to analytic technique. Defense will therefore be considered in the main as a phenomenon that is seen during the process of analysis. In this context, defense is defined as all those processes which operate toward maintaining a neurotic equilibrium, whether by opposition to an instinctual drive, by counteracting anxiety, or by avoidance of painful emotion.

To clarify the idea of defense, it is helpful to consider certain dualisms in psychoanalysis of which there are several, among others bisexuality, paired component impulses like sadism and masochism, and the active-passive dichotomy. In all these examples there are forces which act simultaneously but in opposite directions. A duality of this type may therefore easily be confused with a defensive process. Early in human development, in infancy, or at any age in the id, such dual strivings co-exist. Although they operate in opposite directions, there is no necessary implication that they are mutually antagonistic, or that one must assume between them a relationship of 'one against the other'.

Often in clinical discussions such a relationship is implied. The statement is made that a patient forces himself to engage

in heterosexual activity as a defense against homosexual temptation; or that a female patient has sadistic fantasies as a defense against masochistic longings. We must therefore distinguish between two possibilities: 1, that a pair of instincts dualistically strive in opposite directions simultaneously—that sadism and masochism, for example, are both called into action together; 2, that one of the pair counteracts the other. The question arises: how may we distinguish between these two situations?

During an analysis certain observations enable us to make this distinction. For example, if a female patient is believed to have sadistic fantasies as a defense against masochistic wishes, we may consider that this makes good sense if analysis repeatedly shows that 1, the masochistic longings are more deeply repressed than the sadistic fantasies; 2, their approach to consciousness causes more anxiety; 3, under circumstances when the material indicates that masochistic longings should emerge, we constantly find in their place, and as a response to them, sadistic fantasies. This describes schematically the characteristics of a process that cannot always be observed in so clear and simple a form. However, a dynamic relationship of this type is the essential feature of a defensive process; criteria such as these do decide whether an instinct is or is not really being used as a defense against another one. Nevertheless, since we know that an instinct's true purpose is gratification only, it may be confusing to say of an instinctual force that it may be used for defensive purposes.

Indeed, by themselves and alone, instincts cannot be defensive processes. This is possible only through an interference of the ego. Only the ego can play off one instinct against another, and only if the ego is able to accept one drive more easily than another is there the possibility of a preference created by the ego's interference.

A descriptive criterion that serves to test the presence of a defense is release from tension. To take a simple example, a woman in analysis complained of a mounting, unpleasant tension, and the associative material showed that anxieties connected with masturbation were being stirred up. Suddenly she

relaxed, curled up on the couch like a small child, and her voice took on a childish quality as she expressed a longing to be loved and protected by the analyst. The shift from dangerous, anxiety-laden yearnings and fantasies to an idyllic oral fantasy released her from tension. In general, I believe it is true of all successful defensive maneuvers during analysis that they bring about a disappearance of tension.

So far our first attempt to clarify the concept of defense has yielded the following: defensive processes are discernible in the analytic situation when the activation of given drives or unconscious fantasies with great regularity brings about ego attitudes and ego activities that release tension and diminish anxiety or superego pressure.

The next very important point, from a technical point of view, may be illustrated by a male patient who reported a dream that expressed passive anal transference wishes. The passive attitude was the most important feature of his character and, among other functions, served as a defense in warding off aggressive impulses. But the same attitude, that is, its libidinal nucleus of passive, erotic, anal wishes relating to the father, was also warded off, so that the patient had to use new and other defensive measures against his passive feminine wishes. This simple example demonstrates that the defenses are stratified, and that at any time during analysis a variety of defenses are at work.

We may approach the problem somewhat differently by considering the defense mechanisms as they are described by Anna Freud *(6)*. One fact holds true for all of them. They are complex entities which have to be analyzed concretely in terms of the patient's experience if they are to have technical usefulness. It serves no purpose to tell a patient that he is repressing, projecting, or the like. Instead we must find ways of demonstrating to him how he does these things—which may certainly be a tortuous procedure. Each defense mechanism involves special problems. Here I shall discuss only the turning of an instinct against the self, and regression.

The turning of an instinct back against the self was first

described by Freud *(2)*. He noted it as a consequence of the development of such paired instincts as sado-masochism, scoptophilia-exhibitionism. Although this particular instinctual vicissitude may arise as a spontaneous product of development, he states that it may occur as the result of conflicts which intensify one member of the instinctual pair, e.g., masochism. Clinical practice demonstrates this defense mechanism particularly well in men whose character structure is dominated by passive feminine trends. It may even be assumed that the formation of this type of character is partly due to the influence of this defense mechanism; nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that character formation involves more than defense mechanisms.

The defense mechanism of turning against the self is operative in the sequence wherein sadistic impulses directed against another person do not reach consciousness and masochistic tendencies appear instead. Such masochistic tendencies may obviously possess different degrees of sexualization, or they may be predominantly expressed as moral masochism—self-depreciation, submissiveness, an exaggeratedly apologetic attitude. Whereas this desexualized expression of masochism permeates the behavior of these patients as a rule, the passive anal fantasies, which are the sexual core of the masochistic pattern, are present although stubbornly repressed. Thus we see that a part of the defense mechanism itself—the masochistic tendencies—is repressed, and that repression must be maintained by appropriate countercathexes.

Thus the defense mechanism is again seen to be a complex entity, which in therapy must be resolved into its components. In the defense mechanism of turning against one's self, the component parts are both masochistic and sadistic impulses, and the sexual cores of both are repressed by different countercathexes. The total sequence of the defense mechanism can be demonstrated only after both the masochistic and the sadistic impulses emerge from repression. During analysis it will make its appearance when the repression of the sadistic impulses is demolished and masochistic tendencies, influenced by castration anxiety and superego pressure, gain the upper hand.

We can distinguish among the defenses and defensive attitudes those which are more or less close to the conscious ego. Thus, the submissive apologetic attitude of male masochistic characters is usually egosyntonic, whereas their deeply repressed, passive, anal or self-castrative impulses are ego-alien. A man who came into treatment because of a severe sexual disturbance, throughout his analysis showed a consistently submissive, apologetic attitude to the analyst. For him this attitude was unproblematic; it never occurred to him that there was any other way of behaving. I called this behavior during the sessions self-imposed submissiveness. It took a long time before the patient could grasp what I was trying to convey to him. Finally in one session he burst forth, 'But what do you want me to do? If I were not meek and submissive and should let out what I have inside, I would go around hitting people!' He realized then that his humility had the defensive function of counteracting and curbing his aggression. When he grasped this fact his attitude changed. A quasi-automatic, unintentional process was transformed into an intentional ego activity. The ability to bring about such changes is one of the great advantages that a knowledge of ego psychology adds to our technique.

The analysis of turning against one's self reveals another characteristic of the defense mechanisms. They appear to overlap, or more than one may be in simultaneous operation. Thus, in the case mentioned, repression and turning against the self work hand in hand. What is their mutual relationship? Is the turning against the self a countercathexis? Does it have the function of maintaining repression, or is it the result of repression? To the last question, 'both' seems to be the right answer.

Recognition of the complex interplay of the defenses and their stratification in terms of nearness to the conscious ego are important in analytic technique because our attention becomes directed to the layers of the defensive processes which are closest to consciousness. Such recognition is not always an easy task. It requires a correlation between the unconscious and what is happening in the layers near the surface of the ego. In dynamic terms, it is our task to grasp not only what is warded

off, but also how this is performed. The 'surface' of the ego is defined as the patient's ego field during a given session. Our attention must focus on the boundary of this field, or on areas in the field wherein we suspect that some defensive process is at work. Sometimes it is possible to sense intuitively the evidence of this process through observation of the patient's behavior. But it is not easy to describe the nuances of facial and vocal expression which indicate to the trained observer that a defensive mechanism is active. One may feel, for example, a dullness in the patient that pervades everything he says. His voice has a diminished resonance, he is unusually passive, or his face becomes expressionless, and the like. These alterations in expression indicate a withdrawal of cathexis from the impulses or emotions which have been mobilized. Instead, we may observe a countercathexis in the form of affected speech, or in such mannerisms as excessively careful pronunciation, lavish use of complicated technical terminology, or in a rigidity of posture which is the anticathexis of a lack of muscular tone. Here, too, it is important to recognize how the quality of expression in the patient's behavior can be utilized for the detection of the defensive process. In all save the most obsessional characters, the expressive layer changes not only from hour to hour but even within the same session. This changeability serves as a delicate seismograph that enables the analyst to follow the actual movement of the defense.

Freud originally introduced the term regression into psychoanalytic nomenclature (in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams) to indicate a shift in direction of an excitatory process during sleep. Subsequently, it was used to describe the movement of libido from maturity toward infancy. Today, though less clearly defined, regression is also used in the domain of ego psychology, as in speaking of ego regression. Definition of the mechanism of defense, regression, is not difficult: it is a defense against the anxiety caused by genitality by means of retreat to pregenital strivings. Two possible results of such regression are: either greater freedom for the libido, as in the perversions, or the development of neurotic symptoms.

However, in the neurotic, too, there may be a free outlet for regressive libidinal trends. The perversions might be regarded as a successful use of the defense mechanism of regression; in the neuroses, regression would then be an unsuccessful defense. The criterion of its 'success' is the avoidance of anxiety or super-ego pressure. If a defense is unsuccessful, and regressively activated libidinal impulses enter into the formation of symptoms, it is evident that its defensive function cannot be demonstrated to the patient, and for two reasons: 1, the regressive process itself is automatic and occurs outside of the range of the ego's conscious control and awareness; 2, the regressively activated impulses are concealed in the symptom. Again we face the basic fact that defenses play into each other in a complicated way, that they overlap or become superimposed. New defensive activities have to be developed to ward off the regressively reactivated pregenital impulses—reaction-formations in the obsessional neurotics, and other defensive measures which include modifications of bodily expressions and functions in other types of neuroses.

From these reflections a technical rule can be formulated. The defensive function of a regressive sequence cannot be demonstrated to the patient so long as the regression increases neurotic suffering and becomes part of the symptomatology. But when the ego uses the regression in order to obtain satisfaction, the more successful the defense, the more must this defensive maneuver itself become the object of analytic interpretation.

The demonstration of the full sequence of a regressive movement includes not only the terminal point to which the regression proceeds, but also the starting point from which originates the pressure that initiates the regression. This complete sequence can be demonstrated ordinarily only after much detailed work. The impulses and fantasies which have been recathected remain unconscious, as do the contents of the anxiety and of the guilt which cause the regression.

Regression occurs automatically, beyond the range of the ego's conscious activities, yet one can often detect a nucleus

of intention which initiates the regressive process. This interplay between automatic regressive processes and the ego's complicity can be observed in hypnagogic phenomena that occur, not infrequently, during analysis. In his excellent paper on phenomena associated with falling asleep, Isakower *(8)* points out that in these hypnagogic states there is not only a regression of the libido but of the ego as well. Isakower remarks that the ego regression is an automatic process. I agree that the hypnagogic phenomena he describes, and which I too have observed, cannot be created by an intentional act; yet I believe that the ego has the power of initiating them. It is as if the ego allows itself to sink into these dreamlike states, which it may initiate but not direct. Where it will be taken by them is beyond the ego's control *(7)*. Thus the will to sleep must be intentional, and an intentional act initiates such regressive phenomena as the hypnagogic states. Lewin *(9)* describes a patient who brought into the analytic session dreams so long and involved that they could not be analyzed. Lewin interpreted the telling of the dreams as a pure acting out, which served to repeat the sleep of the previous night. The wish to sleep was thus the intentional core, the step that represented the ego's active part in initiating the regression. Consequently he found it necessary to interpret to this patient the wish to sleep as a cardinal resistance.

Sometimes the stratification of the defenses in hypnagogic phenomena is quite complicated. A patient produced with great ease a wealth of hypnagogic phenomena. The term 'produced' does not imply here that the production was the result of an intentional act. The phenomena were experienced as occurring during daytime naps. The patient, who was unusually adept at self-observation, distinguished these phenomena from the dreams of deep sleep. They occurred, he reported, at the boundary of sleep and waking states, and he was still aware of his surroundings when they appeared. The vivid hypnagogic images usually depicted sado-masochistic scenes or more archaic fantasies, images of an oral, cannibalistic

nature, and these fantasies played an important role in his analysis.

However, in addition, the hypnagogic images included certain interesting details which seemed almost to illustrate an involved problem. I came to the conclusion that they were substitutes for daydreams, but that the extraordinary clarity with which they were retained was the expression of a wish to see. The scoptophilic wish gave the observing function of the ego, to use Isakower's term, such an added cathexis that the images of the patient's regressive fantasies, which appeared while he was falling asleep, were registered with all their bizarre details.

The contents of the hypnagogic fantasies fitted in well with the context of the analysis, and I tried to make use of them by interpreting their details. I discovered that these interpretations were received without any emotional effect. The images recurred in the analytic hours in a repetitious way and were reported without any affect. It occurred to me that I had not given sufficient attention to the ego's attitude toward these images. It was as if the patient stripped them of all connection with the ego and viewed them as bizarre and interesting but as having nothing to do with him. His attitude was comparable to viewing television in a state of complete passivity with no responsibility for the production. This was the interpretation which finally prevented him from comfortably viewing these images without anxiety. In this example there is the same complicated interplay of defensive attitudes. The patient's hypnagogic images served defensive purposes, they fulfilled regressive needs and removed him from his basic and most intense anxiety. But superimposed on the regression was the additional defense of passive voyeurism, made possible by the denial of its indulgence. To recognize correctly and to point out effectively those hidden, yet not necessarily deeply unconscious, ego attitudes that serve important defensive purpose can be an important technical measure.

The problem repeatedly encountered in this study, of the relation between repression and the other defense mechanisms, is one which deserves thorough investigation. Repression, it

appears, is the basic defense mechanism. Other defense mechanisms are always based on repression.

Currently, psychoanalytic thinking is especially interested in ego psychology. Defense mechanisms, like repression and regression, are automatic processes that occur beyond the direct control of the ego. Yet, as I have shown, the ego may initiate a regression or utilize it for reasons of psychological economy. The ability to repress—to react to an approaching storm of excitement caused by instinctual drives with an automatic curbing of emotional, motor, and ideational responses—is certainly a deeply inherent disposition of the human organism. If the primary repression were able to silence once and for all the demands of the instinctual drives, this process would be completely inaccessible to discovery by introspection. In the neuroses, however, the repressed returns, so that an opportunity is afforded for observation of the renewed struggle of the ego against impulses from the id. In this struggle mechanisms are being discovered which have more in common with intentional acts. Repression, regression, projection, and other mechanisms are preformed mental responses, but they are aided by techniques which vary from individual to individual. Hence each analytic situation and each case provides us with a unique experience. Individual varieties of countercathexis are employed, and there are various ways of withdrawing cathexis which can be observed in the patient's reactions and utterances during the sessions. Hence, in this sense, traits of character are mechanisms of defense to the extent that they play a part in the process of countercathexis or of withdrawal of cathexis. Every new defense that can be detected during an analysis contains possibilities for the improvement and development of analytic technique.

These possibilities are discernible when the conception of defense is investigated in relation to the two basic operational categories of technique—transference and resistance. Freud discovered the unique significance of the relationship between the patient and the analyst as a therapeutic instrument. The curability of a neurosis is determined by the possibility of its transformation into a transference neurosis. In every neurosis

there are forces which work in the direction of shifting pathological attitudes in this relationship. But simultaneously with the tendency to experience irrational emotions and anxieties in relation to the analyst—that is to say, to establish a transference—there are other trends, which operate in a reverse direction. These trends hinder the breaking through of impulses from repression and counteract the development of anxiety. In other words, there are defenses which oppose the establishment of a transference, varying in degree according to the impulses evoked and the concomitant nature of the emotions. This type of defense does not coincide with Freud's *(5)* original description of the resistance that originates in the transference. He then described two groups of manifestations: 1, the difficulty experienced by patients in communicating thoughts and associations directly connected with the analyst's person; 2, the patient's disregard of the irrationality of his reactions in the transference, the excessive intensity of these reactions in which is lost all ability to discriminate between the patient's fantasy and reality. 'Defense against the transference' designated all those undercurrents and processes which produce a deficit in awareness and judgment of the transference reactions. Such defenses interfere with the transformation of the neurosis into a transference neurosis, which is one of the conditions for successful analytic therapy. Hence, the detection of defenses against transference is a step necessary for establishing a transference neurosis.

The distinction between defense and resistance is no hair-splitting, but an important problem in psychoanalytic semantics. It is possible to state that defense is the broader conception that embraces general psychological processes not necessarily pathological, whereas resistance refers only to patterns observable in analytic therapy. This is unquestionably correct, yet it contains nothing of importance concerning the relation of the two ideas. The term defense can also be used in a more limited sense when it is applied to phenomena that appear only during analysis. In this discussion it has been used in this limited sense, yet even in this sense defense and resistance are by no means synonymous.

The meaning of resistance has changed appreciably since its first introduction into analytic terminology. Originally it referred to open rebellion or stubborn silence, with complete lack of insight and absolute unwillingness to entertain any of the analyst's interpretations. As theory and technique developed, the concept of resistance came to embrace all factors that interfered with the therapeutic goal of analysis. As Freud uses the term in The Problem of Anxiety *(4)*, the basic difference seems to be that resistance is a motivating force, while defense is a specific conscious or unconscious activity on the part of the ego. One must distinguish between a motive for resistance (for example, castration anxiety) and the processes which are set in motion by such a motive. In other words, whether in analysis or not, a patient may use different defensive measures to counteract his castration anxiety.

This important distinction may be clarified by a clinical example. A man who entered analysis because of a severe sexual disturbance relived in the transference the basic conflict from which he had been unable to free himself. The center of the struggle was his œdipal hostility to his father, which was displaced to the transference. The active castrative impulses at the core of his hostility were entirely repressed, and direct evidence for their existence could be found only in one of his symptoms, an insect phobia, and in symbolically disguised form in his dreams. The phobia, which could be definitely traced to his œdipal period, had been preceded by a period of sadistically tearing out the legs of insects. The castrative impulses toward the father, reactivated in the transference, tended to break through into consciousness. Among others, the defenses that were mobilized included masochistic reactions and an overcompensatory detachment toward the analyst.

The motive for his conflict was obviously castration anxiety based on a fear of retaliation which led to the defenses mentioned to ward off hostile impulses against the analyst. The resistance appeared in the analytic sessions as a blocking of associations and a feeling of emptiness, expressed in the usual way of not having anything to say.

We used the term resistance colloquially with two meanings in the above discussion. One referred to a motivating force, castration anxiety, the other to overt behavior of the patient during the analytic sessions. In the period during which the associations were interrupted, resistance became synonymous with defense; the blocking represented a form of defense, a withdrawal from thoughts and feelings. But along with such direct expression of the process of repression, many other forms of defensive activities are at work in every patient and in every analytic hour. The importance of distinguishing defense and resistance thus becomes evident. Defense is the broader concept because it embraces subliminal phenomena not necessarily reflected in that behavior of the patient which in accordance with tradition would be called resistance.

To Wilhelm Reich *(11)* we owe the useful distinction between *manifest* and *latent* resistance. By the latter he denoted attitudes of unexpressed hostility or suspicion, which the patient covers with compliance or docility, or with an inner doubt which is never expressed. Attitudes of this type have an obvious defensive function; yet, for the sake of terminological clarity, it would be well to reserve the term resistance for the other type, where the patient is manifestly uncoöperative. In developing this idea, Reich assumed that all defenses are maintained by means of character traits. This generalization is unjustified, for such basic defensive processes as repression, regression and projection are inherent reactions of the human being and they operate in all individuals regardless of character. Nevertheless, it is true that in every patient character traits serve important defensive functions.

The recognition of latent resistance—defenses that are operative though hidden—is significant, for it furnishes a possibility of establishing a new system of coördinates in the analytic process. The symptoms and the dreams of our patients may tell us about the nature of the unconscious processes which produce their neuroses. We have then to look for an unknown, the defenses which are at work during the analytic process to keep them unaware of these forces.

SUMMARY

I have attempted to indicate some of the problems involved in the conception of defense. In a restricted sense, defense is viewed as the sum of those unconscious ego activities which work toward maintaining a neurotic equilibrium and thus hinder the emergence of the transference neurosis; they tend to prevent the crystallization of the neurotic conflicts in the analytic process. Defenses are directed against instinctual drives as well as against anxiety, and those vanguards of the drives, the emotions. I have endeavored to show that the mechanisms of defense are complex entities which may involve several defensive positions, and that it is fruitful to distinguish between the deep, unconscious, automatic defense mechanisms and those located in what we called the layers of defense near the ego. Reflections concerning a differentiation of the concepts, defense and resistance, are presented with the intention of finding the sometimes elusive but nevertheless very specific nature of the concept of defense. These reflections are in accord with the current psychoanalytic endeavor to recognize with greater precision the role played by the ego in the process of defense.

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Three Notes on the Schreber Case

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THREE NOTES ON THE SCHREBER CASE

BY WILLIAM G. NIEDERLAND, M.D. (NEW YORK)

In his classic study of Schreber's Memoirs,[1] Freud states: 'In working upon the case of Schreber I have had a policy of restraint . . . it will not be possible to define the limits of justifiable interpretation until . . . the subject has become more familiar'.

As almost forty years have elapsed since Freud's famous interpretation of the case (and nearly half a century since the publication of the *Denkwürdigkeiten*), the subject has indeed become more familiar, and an attempt is made here to add a few observations to the classic text. Though preliminary in nature and hardly of major importance in themselves, they may contribute in one way or another to the clarification of some obscure points in the *Denkwürdigkeiten* as well as in the English version of Freud's original text.

I

THE ONSET OF SCHREBER'S TWO ILLNESSES

Freud opens his presentation of the case with Schreber's own words: 'I have suffered twice from nervous disorders and each time as a result of mental overstrain'. In this opening statement of the patient, it seems to me that perhaps not the full weight of consideration has been given to the *onset* of *both* illnesses nor to the particular circumstances under which they developed.[2] Although comparatively little is known about

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I wish to express to Dr. René A. Spitz and Dr. Robert Fliess my thanks for their suggestions in the preparation of this paper.

1 Freud: *Psychoanalytic Notes Upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia* (based on *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken* [Memoirs of a Neurotic], by Dr. jur. Daniel Paul Schreber, published 1903). Coll. Papers, III.

2 A reference to Schreber's situation at the outbreak of his two illnesses can be found in a recent paper by E. Klein in *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, Vol. III/IV. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1949.

Schreber's first sickness—except that it is described as a condition of 'severe hypochondriasis' and that it lasted about one year, several months of which the patient spent in a mental hospital—the onset of this first illness is clearly stated. It began in the year 1884, when Schreber was a candidate for election to the Reichstag, running for the office of *Reichstagsabgeordneter,* a position comparable to member of Congress in the United States or member of Parliament in England.

Since Schreber, at the outbreak of his first illness, was a candidate for an important political office, it is worth-while to consider the political conditions then prevailing in Germany. Bismarck, the 'Iron Chancellor', was then not only at the height of his power in the *Vaterland* but, as the highest official and chancellor of the Reich, he could summon the Reichstag or dissolve it arbitrarily, as he had repeatedly done in fact before 1884. It is important to note, for the understanding of Schreber's situation, that dissolving the Reichstag meant punishing it and its members, and that running for the Reichstag signified in a way running against Bismarck, the most powerful man in Germany, who all his life was sternly opposed to parliamentary ('filial') intrusion. If toward Bismarck the Reichstag misbehaved by voting against his policy, it was threatened with dismissal or it was dissolved by him in short order and its members were sent home, much in the way a disciplinarian or authoritarian teacher dismisses a misbehaving class in anger and paternal wrath.

We do not know exactly how Schreber's candidacy for the Reichstag came about, nor what became of it. We do know, however, that it coincided with the first occasion when he fell ill, and as nothing has ever been said or written about a *Reichstagsabgeordneter* Schreber nor about an election campaign conducted by him, it is probably safe to assume that his candidacy ended, perhaps by his withdrawal, because of the very illness that then made its appearance.

The second illness, of course, is known to us in detail, since Schreber's memoirs, as well as Freud's interpretation of them, are almost entirely devoted to this second illness. About the

onset of this recurrence, Schreber states that it began after he was promoted to the high office of a *Senatspräsident* of the Supreme Court of Justice in Saxony. Precisely when he embarked on this new career, still preparing himself for the duties and manifold responsibilities of the presidency of the highest court in the state, he fell ill for the second time.

Viewed in the light of these conditions, it seems difficult indeed to avoid the assumption that the two illnesses, both appearing under such similar circumstances, have a common denominator, perhaps hitherto not fully considered, at least as far as their precipitating cause is concerned. Also, in the beginning at least, there seems to have been little clinical difference between the two: in both instances the onset was marked by severe hypochondriacal symptoms which led to hospitalization. Before the outbreak of the second illness, Schreber remarks that he dreamed two or three times that his old nervous disorder had returned. We thus learn from the patient himself that the two diseases appeared to him closely related; furthermore, he tells us that on each occasion a similar condition prevailed in his life, which he calls 'mental overstrain', mentioning also 'a very heavy burden of work' in the second. No further parallel between the two episodes can be drawn from Schreber's memoirs alone about his situation at that time.

Our question as to the onset of both illnesses, then, reduces itself to a search for potential, precipitating factors which may have activated well-known latent forces in a paranoid individual, of which the patient himself—as so often happens in these cases—was not entirely unaware. His cautious generalizations about 'mental overstrain' or 'a very heavy burden of work' would seem, judging by their consequences, to refer to something more specific. What does he mean by them?

Freud makes no mention of the onset or the meaning of Schreber's first illness, being primarily interested in the protracted, second psychosis. About the outbreak of the latter, Freud draws attention only to 'a somatic factor which may very well have been relevant' in the case, and notes that Schreber then 'had reached a time of life which is of critical importance

in sexual development . . . the climacteric'. Apart from Freud's own doubts about this explanation which recur throughout his text, and without distracting from the importance of the somatic factor emphasized by him, it seems to me that the possible action of such a somatic factor would explain only the outbreak of the second illness when Schreber was fifty-one. It could hardly be regarded as a sufficiently active element in precipitating the first episode which occurred eight or nine years earlier. Consequently, in accepting the 'male climacteric' as a factor in the development of the second illness, one cannot possibly attribute to it the same significance in the earlier outbreak; nor does the presumed existence of such somatic factors preclude the importance of external events in the patient's life each time he became sick. In fact, if our view of the close connection and perhaps identity of Schreber's two illnesses is correct, it is impossible to avoid the assumption of such psychologically precipitating factors, which must have been operative on both occasions, at or shortly before the onset.

From the study of Schreber's memoirs, Freud brilliantly concluded that in this case 'we find ourselves once again upon the familiar ground of the father complex', as evidenced by the clinical picture, the patient's fantasies and delusions, and their analytic interpretation. This being the case, we cannot fail to see that Schreber in his social relations with Flechsig and von W., as well as in his delusions (God-sun-father) during his illness, succumbed to passive feminine fantasies only after having been put in the unbearable situation, prior to each outbreak, of assuming an active masculine role in real life, either by facing the father as the rebellious son or by becoming a father figure himself.

We may assume, indeed, that what Schreber dreaded most was taking the place of the father. For reasons unknown to us, his marriage was childless though he apparently desired to have children. Under circumstances better known to us, however, we see that Schreber could not accept an active masculine role, in a wider sense. When called upon to become a member of the Reichstag as a rebellious son in opposition to the awe-

inspiring Bismarck,[3] he fell ill the first time. When, nine years later, he was called upon to take a father's place by becoming the presiding judge of the supreme court, he again fell ill, and this time for good. Not being able to face the powerful father in fighting competition as a member of the Reichstag, or to take the place of father as *Senatspräsident,* he became incapacitated whenever such a threat appeared. Instead of running *for* office or accepting an appointment to a high office, he had to run *from* it, driven by his castration fantasies which were set in motion the very moment the dreaded masculine role threatened to become a reality.

How unbearable his position seemed to Schreber is stated in his own words in which he describes, almost with insight, the dilemma in which he found himself as a result of his promotion in 1893: 'This burden was the heavier, and put the greater demands on tact in personal intercourse, as the members of the five-man court, of which I had to assume the presidency, were nearly all my seniors, far superior to me in age (up to twenty years) and, moreover, more familiar with the practice of the court to which I was a newcomer'. The patient, in other words, found himself surrounded by threatening father-figures in whose midst he saw himself as a filial intruder, helpless and in danger.

Schreber, therefore, is completely right when, in referring to this situation, he speaks of 'mental overstrain' and 'a very heavy burden of work' to which he succumbed. We have only to add that the strain was not from overwork in the usual sense, but from the unbearable and overpowering burden coming, in 1884, from the threatening election or, in 1893, from the appointment to political (juridical) 'masculinity'. How much even the thought of an active masculine role was dreaded by Schreber is indicated by the fact that shortly after having been notified 'of his *prospective* appointment as *Senatspräsident*', and some time before assuming this office, he had the ominous fantasy that 'after all it really must be very nice to be

[3] There is a somewhat oblique reference to Bismarck in Schreber's book which seems to point in this direction: Bismarck, Goethe, and other great men belong to the 'important souls' which later become higher, godlike unities.

a woman submitting to the act of copulation'. Under the impact of a threatening reality which imperiously demanded of him an active masculine role (this being precisely the situation he feared most, and which was consciously perceived as 'mental overstrain' and 'a very heavy burden'), his latent passive feminine tendencies broke into consciousness and he fell ill.

That, indeed, the same precipitating mechanism must have been at work nine years earlier, at the outbreak of the first illness, may be surmised from his statement, occurring in the same context, about his repeated dreams that the former disease had returned. In the patient's unconscious the determining mental forces as well as their clinical results were obviously closely related. In fact, they were quite likely based on the same mechanisms and escaped from repression under virtually the same circumstances regardless of the presence or absence of an additional somatic factor.

Viewing the onset and the duration of the two diseases in this light, I would like to venture an hypothesis about the different courses of the two illnesses. If they are similar in structure and origin, why did they have such different clinical courses, the one ending in recovery after one year, the other developing over years into an apparently lifelong process? I believe that here, in the protracted course of the second illness, the somatic factor resulting from the patient's age may play an important part. We cannot, however, overlook the fact that the first relatively mild and temporary illness occurred in connection with a political candidacy which, even if successful, would at best have resulted in a comparatively short period in public office. Having in 1884 relinquished his candidacy because of an illness that necessitated his hospitalization in a mental clinic for several months, the chronic relapse followed a promotion which under normal circumstances would have meant a lasting and practically irreversible life status for him. In this instance, a refusal would have been something like a crime, a kind of *lèse majesté* or worse, since such promotions were made by the King of Saxony, or at least confirmed by royal decree, and could not be refused. Illness, then, was the only

way out, and with a lifelong position of this kind as a permanent threat before the patient, it could not be of short duration.

II

OBSERVATIONS OF A LINGUISTIC AND EXPLANATORY NATURE

Various obscure passages in Schreber's *Denkwürdigkeiten* appear unchanged and unexplained in Freud's study and have remained so, perhaps because they have not been deemed important enough to require further elaboration. I have noticed, however, that some of these difficult passages appear in the English translation of Freud's text in such a manner that not only is their meaning lost, but sometimes actually reversed.

One of these passages deals with God's language which in the German original as well as in Freud's monograph is called *Grundsprache*. In the current English translations different versions are used; for instance, 'root language' [4] in the translation of Freud's paper, or 'basic language' [5] in Fenichel's excerpts from the Schreber case. These translations are not only inaccurate, but they also seem to miss a rather interesting point. When Schreber speaks of God's language as *Grundsprache,* it is well to remember that he was a learned and scholarly man, trained in philosophy and abstract thinking. He was certainly informed about such philosophical concepts of God as *Prima Causatio* or, in German, *der Grund allen Seins* ('ground of all being'), etc. God thus being recognized as the *Grund,* it becomes understandable that the language he speaks is the *Grund*-language. In fact, it may be assumed that to Schreber's way of thinking it has to be that way; it may well be that the 'order of things' so often mentioned by him demands it. At any rate, just as a German speaks German and an Englishman, English, it is only natural that God, the 'Ground', uses *his* language, the 'Ground'-language. Using such terms as 'root

[4] Freud: Coll. Papers, III.

[5] Fenichel, Otto: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945.

language' or 'basic language', makes this connection completely unintelligible for the English-speaking reader. There is still another reason why the word 'ground' is here particularly appropriate, since it points the direction of Schreber's thinking. He also speaks of *Grundteufel* ('ground' devil) and certain *Untergrund* (underground) phenomena which, together with *Grundsprache* and other anal word usages, are characteristic of Schreber's trend of anal thinking and writing.

According to Schreber, on the one occasion during his illness when he saw God and heard him speak, a word was uttered which was a very current and forcible one in the *Grundsprache*. This word was *Luder*. Translation of this unmistakable German insult into 'scoundrel', as the English version has it, is even more misleading. *Luder* is related to *liederlich,* the English 'lewd', and clearly refers to a female. 'Scoundrel' in German is *Schuft* or *Schurke,* referring only to males. The expression *Luder,* however, is a strong, antiquated, but often used insult in southern Germany (fitting perfectly into the *Grundsprache* described by Schreber as 'a vigorous, somewhat antiquated German'), and is applied to a lewd female, a hussy, or even a whore. It is frequently used in combination with some other insulting epithet explicitly addressed to a female, such as *Dreckluder* or *Sauluder*. In current American slang, *Luder* could perhaps best be translated as 'bitch' or the like. Schreber, then, is called 'tart', 'bitch' or 'whore' which in the context of the patient's delusional system is perfectly understandable.

Schreber states, in allusion to his emasculation, that the 'rays of God' thought themselves entitled to mock at him by calling him 'Miss Schreber'. The word 'Miss' is one of the very few English words which occur in the *Denkwürdigkeiten*. The question arises why Schreber should here have used an English expression. In certain parts of Germany the English term 'Miss' had (and possibly still has) a definitely derogatory connotation. It designated an unmarried woman of somewhat doubtful reputation and character, who displayed also a certain arrogance and ostentatious superciliousness. The meaning of 'Miss' in the Germany of those days can perhaps best be com-

pared with the use of *Fräulein* by our occupation troops in that country today. Schreber himself makes it clear that his being called 'Miss' can be understood only in this way. In the context in which he reports that the 'rays of God' called him 'Miss Schreber', he states that the voices, which are identical with the 'rays', derided him and jeered at him. How did they do that? By calling him 'Miss'.

Completely incomprehensible in the English version are those passages which are repeatedly translated as 'cursory contraptions'. It is true that the original, *flüchtig hingemachte Männer,* is difficult enough to translate. But it is also true that the *flüchtig hingemachte Männer* of the original and the 'cursory contraptions' of the translation have hardly anything in common, either in their wording or the ideational content. Schreber writes of *'men* cursorily made, drawn, or delineated', and not of contraptions. The full sense of these words remains doubtful, since no detailed elaboration is given by Schreber who describes himself as being extremely puzzled by these phenomena. Freud believes they may refer to children or spermatozoa or a combination of both, and Katan has recently made a special study of Schreber's 'little men'.[6]

The 'ground language', properly understood, perhaps contains also the key to the meaning of these obscure passages. According to Schreber's statement, the expressions *flüchtig hingemachte Männer, kleine Männer, Luder, Grundteufel, Untergrund,* etc., belong in one way or other to the 'ground language'. We are told by Schreber that this language is 'a vigorous, somewhat antiquated German', and we also know from certain words of this language, like *Grund* or *Luder,* that it seems to be especially rich in expressions deriving from or belonging to anal terminology. Viewing Schreber's *flüchtig hingemachte Männer* in this way, and with the additional knowledge that *hinmachen* means not only 'make' but also 'defecate', and that, moreover, it is often used in the sense of 'kill' or 'murder', especially in southern Germany, it becomes evident that these frequent

[6] Katan, M.: *Schreber's Hallucinations About the 'Little Men'.* Int. J. Psa., XXXI, 1950, pp. 32–35.

passages, obscure as they are, have to do with anal-sadistic word usages—certainly not too strange a finding in Schreber who devotes page after page to the description of God's processes of evacuation and other anal activities.

This view is supported by a closer study of those chapters in the *Denkwürdigkeiten* in which the puzzling *flüchtig hingemachten Männer* are mentioned. In the early part of the book they frequently appear in connection with other expressions denoting 'dead', 'dying', 'dissolved', 'disappeared', etc., i.e., destroyed. In other passages the specifically anal meaning emerges even more clearly, for instance, when Schreber writes: 'The orderlies M. and Sch. loaded a part of their bodies as a foul mass into my body in order to sit away'. Schreber describes the noises which he heard repeatedly during the 'sitting of the cursorily made men' as *röcheln,* which literally means 'rattle' or 'death rattle'. In other passages he speaks of these phenomena as 'being really souls', and he equates 'being among cursorily made men' as being 'amongst the fossils', again a clear allusion to dead, destroyed, and anal objects. The expression 'amongst the fossils' is especially characteristic of the 'ground language': fossils are, even literally speaking, ground objects; but in a further sense 'fossils' also refers to persons who are dead or whom one wishes dead, and was often used in German university circles in this sense. Schreber also speaks of the 'little men' as having a repulsive odor, and as being of a strange color, described as *möhrenrot* (carrot-red), a very unusual and, I believe, unique German word. This Schreberian neologism, then, is understandable only in terms of the fecal brownish yellow color of the carrot as well as its shape, while red probably has the sadistic meaning of blood and killing.

A similar meaning emerges from a closer study of those passages in which Schreber discusses the 'little men' in direct connection with specific persons. He repeatedly mentions the 'little men' in close association with 'little Flechsig' and 'little von W.', his two main persecutors. From the associative context and the choice of words, it has clearly the same anal-sadistic, paranoiac meaning.

There remains still another connotation not yet fully considered. The German *hinmachen* means not only to make, to defecate, to kill, but also to draw or to sketch. In the last sense, it may refer to those numerous diagrams, pictures, and drawings of male figures which illustrate a book, *Ärztliche Zimmergymnastik,* written by Schreber's father who was the founder of therapeutic gymnastics in Germany and who prescribed numerous physical exercises which are presented in detail in his book. In fact, some detailed descriptions in the *Denkwürdigkeiten* of, for instance, the 'fore courts' of God, his 'posterior' courts, upper and lower parts, etc., read like graphic though distorted descriptions of the anatomical illustrations included in the elder Schreber's book. In addition, several pages of the *Denkwürdigkeiten* are exclusively devoted to a discussion of drawing and sketching.

III

THE ASCENT FROM FLECHSIG TO GOD IN SCHREBER'S DELUSIONAL SYSTEM

Freud was particularly interested in the psychopathological process which brought about 'the ascent from Flechsig to God', a process in which ultimately the figure of the physician Flechsig was replaced by the superior figure of God.

Without going into the clinical details of Schreber's delusional system, I wish here only to point out that this ascent can be clearly followed in the *Denkwürdigkeiten.* The intermediate steps of this development are presented by Schreber's chronology of the various delusional names belonging to this part of his delusional system.

Of this chronology, the last four items were discussed in detail by Freud. The first four items are taken from the *Denkwürdigkeiten* to show the various intermediate steps in the production of Schreber's delusional system, which culminates in his characteristic Flechsig-father-God delusion. These stages in his delusion can be found in those chapters which deal with his distortion of the intimate relations between the Schreber and Flechsig families.

The successive delusions can perhaps be best understood in the terms of Freud's analysis of the patient's psychotic thought process as an 'attempt at restitution'. One of the characteristic manifestations of this attempt consists in an effort to regain the lost libidinal objects (from which the cathexis was withdrawn) by reinforcing the cathexis of the verbal representations standing for the lost objects. Hence the prominent role played



The circles in the above system indicate Flechsig's successive deifications. The arrows illustrate Schreber's statement with reference to the close relation between the Schreber and Flechsig families: 'I have parts of their souls in my body'.

by verbal production in schizophrenia such as neologisms, verbigeration, word salad, etc. The outstanding libidinal object from which the cathexis is withdrawn in Schreber's case is the father. The verbal representation of his father—his given name, Daniel Gottlieb—is recathected, and it will be noted that in all the variations of the delusional names the word 'God' occurs in one combination or other. Among them, *Fürchtegott* (fear God) is of special interest, revealing the patient's ambivalence, his fear of God as well as the threat he addresses to God.

It is noteworthy that the patient shared the name of Daniel with his father and the name of Paul with his physician. In the delusional system, the father's names, Daniel and Gottlieb, are

bestowed on the physician with the various deifications, thus identifying him clearly as a representative of the father. Of the combinations Paul Theodor Flechsig, Daniel Fürchtegott, and Abraham Fürchtegott, Schreber states: 'I have parts of their souls in my body'. That from Theodor, literally 'God's gift', Schreber draws on his knowledge of Greek is confirmed by him in several passages. The names Abraham and Daniel are of biblical origin, the former meaning 'father of a multitude' and the latter, divine judge or judge appointed by God. It is a matter for speculation whether his use of the name Daniel, containing the Hebrew words *Dan* (judge) and *El* (God), is to be understood, as a double-edged threat, in the same double sense as *Fürchtegott*. At any rate, the deification of the father—a process for which the father's actual middle name, Gottlieb, offered a welcome opportunity—can be easily followed through its various, intermediate steps.

The father as such has vanished in consequence of the withdrawal of cathexis. His name, Daniel Gottlieb, however, has remained, and the cathexis it undergoes can in this system be identified point-blank, as it were, by following the various deifications. In this process the patient arrives step by step at the enthronement of Flechsig as God's administrator or proconsul in Germany, presumably a reference to Bismarck, and from there the cathexis of the word representations proceeds rapidly to culminate finally in 'God'. The process is now completed. First Flechsig, and then God, is reinstated in the place of father. With the new father, God, collecting the totality of cathexis, the schizophrenic thought process has gone as far as possible. It has run its full course in its attempt to restore, with the aid of verbal representations, those libidinal ties which had been abandoned.

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Metapsychology of Artistic Creation

Gustav Bychowski

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METAPSYCHOLOGY OF ARTISTIC CREATION

BY GUSTAV BYCHOWSKI, M.D. (NEW YORK)

To seek a psychoanalytic metapsychology of artistic creation is perhaps prematurely ambitious; yet it should certainly be our ultimate goal. In such a presentation the dynamic and economic point of view should be supplemented by consideration of the role played by various psychic systems and the dynamic barriers separating them from each other. One hesitates to approach this problem not only in view of its extreme complexity but also because it seems imperative, and yet highly doubtful, that such an investigation should capture the secret of beauty created by man.

For clarity of presentation we shall concern ourselves with three main points: first, the wish to create, or in more general terms, the motives for creation; second, the content of the work of art; third, processes deriving from the unconscious which lead to the work of art.

The creative impulse has many components, all of which have their unconscious and conscious motivations. 'Power, fame and love of women', in Freud's original formulation, are more often than not superficial rationalizations. In many instances they correspond to fantasies from childhood, originally conscious, but then either repressed or maintained in the system of the preconscious throughout life.

When we penetrate deeper into their origins, we perceive that they are rooted in œdipal and preœdipal fantasies which provide the immature ego with a compensatory gratification in some distant future: the fame gained by his art will make him more desirable to his incestuous love object, and the power he will attain will make up for his present weakness. As an illustration, among many others, compare Byron's All for Love:

Read at the meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Detroit, April 1950.

> Oh Fame! — if I e'er took delight in thy praises,
> 'Twas less for the sake of thy high-sounding phrases,
> Than to see the bright eyes of the dear one discover
> She thought that I was not unworthy to love her.

and Edgar Allen Poe's passage in The Essay on the Poetic Principle: the poet 'recognizes the ambrosia, which nourishes his soul . . . above all, ah! for above all, he kneels to it, he worships it in the faith, in the purity, in the strength, in the altogether divine majesty of her love'.

The aggressive drive may find expression not only in anticipation of power but in more primitive sadistic fantasies which outline the destruction of rivals and enemies. The progress of psychoanalytic knowledge has taught us the importance of preœdipal conflicts and we have sufficient clinical evidence to include them as sources of creative fantasies. Bergler assigns to them a preponderant position, claiming that the writer's wish to create is an expression of his unconscious desire to reproduce an autarchic infantile fantasy of oral independence as a spiteful defense against his masochistic dependence on the mother.[1]

The defensive character of the creative impulse is a clinical fact which can be detected in many a case, but as a generalization it puts too much emphasis on the neurotic affiliations of artistic creation. However, it may be of considerable importance and account for a great many pathological complications. To give only one example, the defensive wish to be entirely independent of the mother may at any time be overruled by its antagonist, the original craving for dependence. Accordingly, the artist may develop an inhibition of his creativeness almost in proportion to his artistic aspirations, since he is afraid that his wish for independence may be realized too completely.

The biography of Toulouse-Lautrec demonstrates that in the choice of a great many of his subjects, as well as in his way of life, he never stopped acting out his unresolved œdipus by promoting the cult of the courtesan against the aristocratic woman

[1] Bergler, Edmund: Psychoanalysis of Writers and of Literary Production. In: *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, Vol. I.* Edited by Géza Róheim, Ph.D. New York: International Universities Press, 1947.

of society which his mother was. He was nevertheless unable to free himself of his infantile dependence on his mother and, trapped in the desperate impasse into which his conflicts led him, he proceeded to destroy himself slowly but surely with liquor.

Despite such evidence, it is probable that the creative urge springs more often than not from less pathological sources, among which narcissistic omnipotence is preponderant.

Slowacki, a Polish romantic poet, expressed in Lucifer's prayer the anguish and pain of the magic wish, which is doomed to failure, and reveals its origin in the frustration of infantile narcissism: 'How long will there be in me this desire that this world could do nothing without me!' In his childhood, the poet made a pledge and a secret prayer: 'God, let me be unhappy, miserable and scorned in life, if only I can be famous after my death'. Under the guise of renunciation of direct gratification of narcissistic omnipotence, this prayer is only a postponement of its fulfilment, making a virtue of necessity. The magic wish aims at surpassing God.[2]

In his Stundenbuch, Rilke, invoking God, wrote: 'And artists paint their pictures only that you receive back as unperishable the nature that you create perishable; everything becomes eternal . . .'; and Keats wrote in a letter to his brother: 'The Sun, the Moon, then Earth and its contents, are material to form greater things, that is, ethereal things, greater things than the Creator himself made'. The desire to create imperishable objects is rooted in the determination to perpetuate the past in forms which will defy the doom of change and oblivion.

In this way, creativeness serves the purposes of Eros against Thanatos. To be sure, the objective of preserving perishable states of mind is realized by the artist at least to the same extent as by the neurotic or psychotic. One is impressed time and again by the extent to which the artist preserves intact the treasury of his memories, including all his early conflicts. The latter become resolved only exceptionally and thus provide

[2] *Cf.* the author's monograph, *Slowacki, A Psychoanalytic Study.* Warsaw: Mortkowich, 1930.

almost inexhaustible motivations for artistic elaboration. Here, then, a quandary arises as to the metapsychological interpretation of this peculiar quality of the artist. We know of it as much or as little as we know of this quality in the psychotic. Why in either case do early conflicts and attitudes remain unchanged and unresolved throughout decades only to emerge under propitious circumstances? All we can say is that some countercathexis prevents them from erupting into the boundaries of the ego. This countercathexis must be more powerful and, by the same token, we must assume that the cathexis of repressed ideas and instinctual derivatives must be more intense than in ordinary individuals. This, in its turn, may be due to such peculiar features of personality as a combination of intense activation of instinct with unusual sensitivity and vulnerability.

Returning to the problem of creativity, the desire to preserve the past must be qualified to include both painful and pleasurable experiences. The wish to relive past suffering as well as past happiness has far-reaching metapsychological implications. Clinging to the pleasurable gratifications of the past can readily be understood as a reluctance to renounce the happy satisfactions once experienced. No longer attainable in reality, they can be relived by the ego either in mere fantasy or in alloplastic creation. The famous words of Goethe's Faust: 'Linger, you are so beautiful', are appropriate to this situation. At times it seems as though the artist might be satisfied with such a substitute gratification. However, more often than not such a gratification, just because of its substitutive nature, demands constant repetition. In an almost compulsive way the same unconscious motives are elaborated upon in variations which may be striking in their uniformity.

This is even more true of experiences loaded with pain and suffering. Here the ego of the artist reacts in striking resemblance to the ego in traumatic neurosis. We have learned from Freud, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, that such an ego, overwhelmed by the load of overstimulation, makes vain attempts to get rid of its overcharge by repetitively reliving the

trauma. In the work of the artist we can observe the same mechanism operating with reference to past tensions and frustrations. He tends to relive the repressed erotic and aggressive impulses of his childhood in projecting them on objects of his creation. In so doing, he behaves like the dreamer, and, like the dreamer, he may project not only his id impulses but also unconscious components of his superego.

Since in the last analysis these projections can be traced back to early parental images, we can formulate as a general conclusion that the artist projects his early instinctual and emotional constellations partly or in toto onto objects of his own creation. It is then comprehensible why, from the economic point of view, such a process can be continued indefinitely.

Such a faculty of continuous, almost inexhaustible projection presupposes a large stock of unconscious material. This is provided not only by repressed id and superego derivatives but by ego states as well. In general, it may be said that the ego of the artist has an unusual ability for splitting off entire constellations reflected in all parts of the mental apparatus. In this ability it resembles the prepsychotic ego. The question arises whether we should assume an essential difference in the dynamics of splitting in both groups. We may base a tentative answer on discoveries of Federn as recapitulated recently by Weiss: 'An actual splitting of the ego . . . is commonly recognized as the pathognomonic phenomenon of schizophrenia. But, while in the normal person there is repression of previous ego states split off in this fashion from the present ego, in the schizophrenic person repression fails. Consequently two or more separate ego states may struggle to maintain integration and may consciously exist at one time.' [3]

It seems highly probable that this description is valid both for the prepsychotic individual and the creative artist, since both have the split-off material at their disposal, the one to develop a psychosis, the other to create art. Countercathexis of

[3] Weiss, Edoardo: *Principles of Psychodynamics.* New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1950, p. 141.

relative and only temporary value maintains the split-off portions of the ego in incomplete repression from which they re-emerge when drawn upon by the creative ego, or when passively permitted by weakening of the psychotic ego. Even at this point the difference is not complete since it is well known that not only does the psychotic ego become invaded by the repressed forces, but the creative ego as well may experience inspiration as a passive surrender to an overwhelming power. Thus the difference must lie in the manner of this invasion of the ego by the unconscious, and the subsequent fate of the forces released.

With this important difference in view, the truth remains that the creative ego has repressed contents at its disposal to an unusual degree. We may assume that its extraordinary faculty of grasping the unconscious of other human beings, of penetrating—to use somewhat metaphysical terminology—into the essence of things, is based on the same open access to the unconscious in all its extensions. This then must presuppose an unusual mobility of countercathexis and, accordingly, of barriers separating various systems of the mental apparatus. As in a dream—or a neurotic symptom—the return of the repressed is always possible in creative imagination. Obviously, this mobility of countercathexis is only an instance of general mobility of cathexis which we must attribute to the artistic mind. The extent to which it draws on the primary processes and utilizes symbolization is a sufficient proof that it operates closer to the system of the unconscious. Moreover, like the dreaming ego, the creative ego operates through the medium of topical regression which also demonstrates a mobility of cathexis unparalleled by an 'ordinary' mind. In moments of true inspiration almost every 'real' occurrence strikes deep chords in the unconscious and acquires a symbolic meaning, imbued with emotional impact; and, conversely, every intrapsychic experience becomes materialized and expressed in terms of external reality. Thus there is a constant communication through the ego operating in both directions between the unconscious and reality.

Even such well-established divisions as the separation between various sensual perceptions may yield to this general 'mobilization', so that sounds, shapes, colors, and even odors may coalesce or be experienced in rapid succession. This phenomenon of synesthesia is only one example of a type of psychological experience which was well described by a patient, a distinguished poet, who said: 'A chair begun in the awakened mind ends as a melody in the dream'.

If we assume that this mobility of cathexis and countercathexis extends to the ego boundaries as well, then we have a basis for the metapsychological understanding of the extraordinary faculty of the creative ego for multiple identifications. Balzac, going through the anguish of death with Eugénie Grandet, is only an extreme example of the prodigious faculty of the writer for libidinizing the characters created by his imagination to an extent that makes them real human beings vibrating with life. This process of identification extends far beyond human beings so that the artist seems to penetrate into the mysterious essence of things. On the other hand, his personal experience acquires general validity so that through him we learn to see things in a way we never saw them before. In the process of the extension of his ego boundaries the artist encompasses many areas of human experience which in some instances become representative of the joy and suffering of groups, nations, or even all mankind.

In a mysterious process of mental alchemy libido becomes deflected in three directions. First, from its original narcissistic investment the libido flows to innumerable objects of a peculiar nature: they are not so much 'real' objects as imaginary objects created by the artist. They absorb a major part of his narcissistic and object libido. Thus his narcissism shifts from his ego to his work which at times becomes much more important than his own person. His object libido may become so absorbed by imaginary objects that real relationships become depleted and shadowy. Second, through these mechanisms, narcissistic libido expands beyond the ego boundaries and, in a very special way,

embraces various parts of reality. Whitman called this process 'effusion of egotism'. Third, libido becomes deflected from its original sexual or aggressive aims and provides the energy for creative production. This process is what Freud called sublimation. In various instances, according not only to the personality of the artist but also to the nature of the artistic medium, we may observe different combinations of sexual and aggressive drives and their derivatives as expressed in the dynamics of creation. Freud's Leonardo da Vinci remains a classic model of such investigation.

Processes of sublimation in an artist are in essence no different from those in any civilized person; what gives them a mark of distinction is their scope and their intensity. It may well be that in an accomplished artist one observes not only intense sublimation but also, at times, intense libidinization of various images and sublimated drives, a process which may be called resexualization. It is perhaps this process—or processes—that accounts for the unusual intensity and vividity of such artistic imagery as, for instance, the hallucinatory liveliness of some of Van Gogh's paintings, or the libidinal impact of some of the poems of Rimbaud. It is not accidental that in both these instances the ego of the artist had to sustain an unequal and dramatic struggle against psychosis. In this struggle for restoration of the vanishing world of objects, the relibidinization of images and resexualization of sublimated instinctual impulses must have played an important role.

In addition to these processes of reshuffling of cathexis ascribable to artistic creation, mention should be made of narcissistic projection. The artist epitomizes his ego ideal in parts or in toto in his imaginary objects. It is only natural that in order to perform such a deep reorganization of his intrapsychic structure, the artist has at first to dissolve its well-established order. Somewhat analogous to the schizophrenic who is threatened by the destruction of his world in fantasy, the artist may experience catastrophe in reality cathexis, which requires a reorientation and may become, at least temporarily,

healed by a new creation. There is no doubt that in these preliminary stages the repressed destructive drives come to the fore. Their return may account for the depression which so often precedes the period of creation. Lee, in agreement with the findings of the British psychoanalytic school, came to the conclusion that the wish to create was but an attempt to restore the objects destroyed by the unconscious aggressive wishes of the artist.[4]

The origins of the contents of a work of art are closely allied with the motives for creation. Both have their sources in the unconscious, and in the form of a plot or a motif may thus remain preserved for a considerable length of time in the preconscious. At times, a very long process is required before the moment arrives for the ego to transmute this material into creative art. We have some insight into its mechanics from clinical observations and through the study of diaries, correspondence and drafts left by great artists. The Buffalo Library of manuscripts of English-writing poets, the Notebooks of Henry James, and the Diaries of Walt Whitman are a very few of many inestimably valuable sources of study.

As in the dream work, the material emerging from the unconscious of the artist is subjected to secondary elaboration. Many mechanisms known from the study of dreams are found in the working of the creative ego. An important mechanism is overdetermination. In a work of art, as in a dream, one motive becomes deeply meaningful and impressive when it serves to express many unconscious motivations. In both psychological processes, the choice of one particular element may be determined not only by unconscious factors but also by what Freud has called regard for representation.

In dreams it is assumed that the regard for representation is borne by the unconscious forces of the ego. In the artist we assume that both the conscious and the unconscious ego take

[4] Lee, Harry B.: *Spirituality and Beauty in Artistic Experience.* This QUARTERLY, XVII, 1948, pp. 507–523.

part in the shaping of his work. The amount of respective collaboration between the two ego functions varies in different artists. It is clear that while inspiration flows from both the repressed id and the unconscious ego, the planning, elaboration, and final representation are the function of all the psychic systems.

When we study the life work of a great creative artist, we find that throughout his life he elaborates few essential motifs but he does it on different levels, according to his stage of development. The more highly elaborated his development, the more overdetermined his work becomes both in its content and in its form. It can then be interpreted in terms of his repressed unconscious as well as in terms of his conscious, intellectual development and ideals. The more complete the integration of these various levels and their mutual harmony, the more perfect appears the work of art, until in its highest achievements it seems so perfect that nothing in it seems possible of change; no word or line is superfluous or interchangeable: we contemplate and feel a perfection which reaches into the realm of the supernatural.

This synthetic, integrative and organizing function of the artistic ego is most clearly recognizable in patients in whom it has failed. There, may be observed the struggle of the ego for the mastery of the threatening unconscious forces. Every weakness of the ego is marked by the predominance of the purely cathartic factor over the synthetic forces.

Artistic creativity is therefore an expression of the power of the ego to bind energy released from the unconscious. The effort invested in artistic formation is indicative both of the strength of the ego and of the resistance offered not only, as it might seem at first, by the medium of expression, but also by the reaction of the ego to the unconscious impulses. Here, then, lies one of the important sources of productive inhibition, since the final form of a work of art is nothing but the outcome of a complex mental struggle which, with rare exceptions, takes a long time to complete.

It is interesting to note that the concept of artistic form as an expression of overcoming resistance and releasing emotional tension was expressed quite independently of psychoanalysis by John Dewey, who quotes Keats' description of the process of artistic creation as the '. . . innumerable compositions and decompositions which take place between the intellect and its thousand materials before it arrives at that trembling, delicate and snail-horn perception of beauty'.[5]

[5] Quoted by John Dewey in *Art as Experience*. New York: Milton, Balch & Co., 1934, pp. 70–71.

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MOZART: A STUDY IN GENIUS

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The enigma of creative genius is perhaps the most fascinating of problems to students of the human mind. There have been many psychoanalytic contributions to the understanding of this mystery, among them Freud on Dostoevski and Leonardo, Sharpe on Shakespeare, Bonaparte on Poe, Lee on the creative mind, and Bergler on writing, but the genesis of creative genius remains virtually unsolved. Freud stated, 'The nature of artistic attainment is psychoanalytically inaccessible to us . . . [psychoanalysis] can do nothing toward elucidating the nature of the artistic gift . . .' *(1)*. It is nevertheless tempting to seek in the life and work of an artist clues that may lead to just such an elucidation.

Perhaps the greatest in his field, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart's genius was at once unique and so extraordinary that it fairly cries out for investigation. We are comforted by the assurance that whether or not we reach any general conclusions about creative genius, we can learn much of interest about one of the supreme figures of Western art.

DEVELOPMENT AND CHARACTER

Certainly the most striking feature of Mozart's very brief but incredibly productive career was his precocity. The story of his surreptitious pianistics at the age of four is too well known—if not too apocryphal—to bear retelling. Surreptitious or not, it is well established that Mozart was musically active before most children are able to read, and was composing short pieces for the clavier at the age of five.

Outstanding in Mozart's development was his relationship with his father, Leopold. The father, unquestionably the dominant figure in the Mozart home, was a prominent Salzburg musician, author of an internationally known treatise on violin

playing, and from all accounts an effective, sober, rigid authoritarian,[1] but a warm person with a sharp sense of reality and a keen eye for commercial advantage. Emily Anderson, the editor of the letters of Mozart and his family, describes Leopold as '. . . an indefatigable correspondent, a collector of information, a keeper of lists and diaries . . . an overmethodical, rather pedantic, and perhaps too inquisitive parent' *(2)*—an excellent capsule description of an anal character. He was extremely religious, and constantly adjured his son to Catholic piety and churchly devotion. He regarded hard work as a cardinal virtue, and was not entirely insensible of the considerable material advantage that might accrue to him from the application of this ethic to his children.[2]

Anna Maria Mozart, Wolfgang's mother, is a rather shadowy figure. She appears to have been a warm, devoted mother, of considerably less intellectual stature than her husband, friendly, more tolerant than Leopold. Their marriage was an eminently happy and sucessful one. 'Wolfgang loved her dearly, and had not the slightest respect for her authority' *(3)*.

Wolfgang's musical precocity led inevitably to his father's taking him under his wing. The fact that he never went to school and never had any teacher other than Leopold, either in musical or general studies, gave Wolfgang more than the usual opportunity to incorporate his father's ideas and principles, and to identify with him. He has frequently been quoted as having said in childhood, 'After God, Papa' *(4)*. In his early years he was an unquestionably devout Catholic, and in many other areas submitted to his father's authority. The orderliness and meticulousness of Leopold is clearly reflected in Wolfgang's music which, more than any other of the generally orderly classical period, is distinguished by its clarity, precision, and economy.

1 'These passages are for practice. The more distasteful they are, the better I shall be pleased. I have striven to make them so.' *Leopold's Violinschule*, quoted in Turner *(4)*, p. 16.

2 'You know my children are accustomed to work. Should they become used to idleness, my whole edifice is overthrown.' Leopold, quoted in Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

If we look further we can see many indirect consequences of this submission and identification. As Wolfgang matured, and particularly as he traveled about Europe without his father, signs of rebellion became increasingly evident. Even as he was composing the delicate, precise music of his late adolescence, he was writing to his female cousin in Augsburg the famous 'Bäsle' letters. These fascinating documents throw a great deal of light on Mozart's character. They are replete with nonsense, neologisms, wordplay, and innumerable references to feces, defecation, the anus and buttocks, reiterated lovingly and interminably.[3] Granted the greater freedom of the eighteenth century in permitting such expressions, these letters are nonetheless unusual, and it is difficult to doubt the evidence of a marked anal preoccupation, breaking through the reaction-formations imposed by his rigid, anal father and representing the first sign of restiveness.

When he was twenty-two his mother died while she and Wolfgang were in Paris. In his correspondence with his father, which reveals his personal sense of loss and his sensitive consideration for the absent Leopold, there appears an interesting passage: 'I had never seen anyone die', he writes, 'though I had often wished to' *(5)*. One may speculate about the possible connection between this remark and one quoted by Leopold: 'When a child you said you would put me in a glass case and protect me from any breath of air, so that you might always have me with you and honor me' *(6)*. It is not difficult to see in this childish expression of devotion an unambiguous undercurrent of hostility. In such a glass case Leopold would, of course, have suffocated—and who was it that Wolfgang had often wished to see die, and why?

During the succeeding period, in which for the first time he was independent of parental domination and was perforce compelled to manage his own affairs (in addition to sending money home to Salzburg, a duty of which Leopold never wearied of

[3] 'Muck! Sweet word! Muck, suck —! Oh, charmante! Muck, suck. That's what I like, muck, chuck, and suck. Chuck muck and suck muck.' Quoted in Anderson *(2)*, Vol. II, p. 741.

reminding him), Wolfgang conceived innumerable financial schemes, all grossly unrealistic and impractical. Leopold received each of them with expressions of dismay, incredulity, and displeasure. Each such rebuke was greeted by Wolfgang with wounded *amour-propre*—and another, even more impractical scheme. It is difficult to imagine anything he might have thought of that could have irritated his father more, except an unsatisfactory marriage into which he managed to enter somewhat later. One who accepts the principle of unconscious determinism will see in such behavior a compulsion on Wolfgang's part to act out his unconscious hostility toward his father. By presenting these absurd plans he struck his father at a particularly vulnerable point, and he subsequently bribed his superego therefor by accepting his father's rebukes. Superego thus appeased, he could act out his rebellion as he saw fit.

In 1785, Mozart was initiated into the Freemason's Lodge in Vienna at the age of twenty-nine. The Masonic order, then as now, was opposed by the Church of Rome, and was vigorously attacked from the Vatican. But in his travels, and as he became increasingly independent of his father, Mozart's religious observances became more and more heterodox. He openly expressed disdain for the church rules of fasting, and rejected the church's concepts of death and the life hereafter, finding in the doctrines of Freemasonry ideas more congenial to his own independence, fatalism, and spiritual resignation. Though he never left the church, his religious observances became increasingly perfunctory (here we may recall Leopold's strictures on this point) and, significantly, from the time of his initiation until shortly before his death, he wrote no religious music, though Masonic music abounds, capped by his great opera, The Magic Flute.[4]

Mozart's drifting from religious orthodoxy was paralleled by his rupture with his priestly patron, the Archbishop Hieronymus Colloredo of Salzburg. This tyrannical cleric never appreciated the genius of his young court organist and concertmaster,

[4] It should be noted that Leopold joined the Freemasons avowedly through his son's influence. [Ed.]

and Mozart and his father were in perpetual conflict with him. Wolfgang had tried to break away when he was twenty-one; had, in fact, resigned his place, and was induced to return only by the importunities of his father. In 1781, when he was twenty-five, he was subjected to a series of indignities, insults, and physical assaults by the Archbishop and his courtiers. His proud spirit could not support such treatment; against this authority he could express his resentment openly, and he did. He resigned his position, this time for good, not without a series of reproving letters from his father. Fully aware of his genius, Mozart sensed that in this act he had achieved his maturity and his independence, and the tone of his subsequent letters to Salzburg reflect the cooling of his feelings for his father. Leopold's death in 1787 he accepted with notable equanimity, advising his father in a letter shortly before the event to accept death as a friend, without fear but with great expectations. And it was in this spirit that he himself died four years later.[5]

Mozart's confident awareness of his remarkable talents, though reflecting his emotional stability and harmonizing strikingly with Rank's description of the creative personality,[6] served him in poor stead in a society in which the artist was wholly dependent on the favor of wealthy patrons. Mozart could not toady. He had small respect for authority. He realized well enough that he was his father's artistic master and one of the greatest musicians of his time, and his frank, often caustic comments on the work of other musicians (well justified in the light of history) won him many enemies, the number of whom was added to by those who were jealous of him. It has long been regarded in musical circles as a mystery that Mozart could get no court position or steady patronage. But a man who had only recently emerged successfully from the struggle to liberate

[5] Mozart died in a state of deep depression: 'I feel certain I shall not be here long; someone has poisoned me. I cannot shake off the idea.' *Groves Dictionary of Music and Musicians.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1936, Vol. III. [Ed.]

[6] 'The precondition of the creative personality is not only its acceptance, but its actual glorification of itself.' *Art and the Artist,* p. 27.

himself from his father and the Archbishop would scarcely have been likely to adopt behavior that would endear him to paternalistic noblemen. Thus we see that Mozart's achievement of emotional maturity proved his economic ruin in a society not yet emerged from feudalism. It is no coincidence that such a man chose to set to music Da Ponte's libretti, Don Giovanni and The Marriage of Figaro, in each of which the decline of feudalism is symbolized by the frustration and defeat of a concupiscent nobleman at the hands of menials.

In Mozart's relations with women one can trace the pattern of his emotional development. He was, according to his own testimony, a virgin to the day of his marriage. He expressed in his letters to his father (who repeatedly warned him against the dangers of injudicious marriage and illicit sexuality) recurrent assurances that he had not succumbed to temptation, and emphasized his anxiety lest he acquire a disease were he to do so. All his love affairs, and there were several, were chaste flirtations with idealized women (if we except the literary anal erotism lavished on the Bäsle). It was not until he had successfully completed his rebellion that he married—without waiting for his father's consent—a girl of whose limitations he was quite aware and with whom he was probably not in love, but on whom he became quite dependent and with whom he was sexually active, as his six children and one of his letters[7] make abundantly clear.

THE ARTIST AND SUBLIMATION

In his brief span of thirty-five years Mozart composed an almost unbelievable quantity of music, much of which has been lost. The catalogue of his works that are extant numbers over six hundred compositions, ranging from short clavier pieces to operas, symphonies and masses. There was no field of composition at which he did not try his hand, and none at which he did not excel. He repeatedly indicated in his letters his single-

[7] 'Arrange your dear sweet nest very daintily, for my little fellow deserves it indeed . . . and is only longing to possess your sweetest . . . [word deleted by his wife].' Anderson *(2)*, Vol. III, p. 1382.

minded absorption in composition, the sole intellectual activity from which he derived real gratification. He worked with tremendous speed and incredible industry; his manuscripts rarely show changes or erasures. Though he led an active social and musical life, it seems that he was driven by an irresistible impulse to compose, independently of the economic pressures that compelled him to do so.

Before considering Mozart's creative drive, however, it may be profitable to review the contributions of some psychological and psychoanalytic writers on the subjects of sublimation and of artistic creation, which is but one form of it. Sharpe speaks of sublimation as 'a reparation, a control, a nullification of anxiety' *(7)*. Róheim describes it as '. . . the repetition of an infantile situation . . . the happy union of mother and child . . .' *(8)*. Lee *(9)*, who has written extensively on art and creativity, states that art arises out of a neurotic depression produced by an upsurge of destructive rage that is turned on the self. The artist seeks to cure the depression by restoring (symbolically) the hated object in the form of a work of art, in order to reinstate himself with the pitying, loving, maternal elements in the superego.

Otto Rank regards the creative urge as deriving from the need of the artist to immortalize himself due to the 'fear of death' *(10)*. Rank leaves the matter here; he fails to consider the fact, pointed out by Freud *(11)*, that in the unconscious there is no conception of death as such. To the child (and the unconscious) 'death' is equated with loss of maternal love and consequent exposure to the hostile forces of the environment. Thus we see that the logical extension of Rank's thesis leads us to the view that creation represents the artist's effort to reassure himself of continued love and protection from the mother—a conclusion strikingly similar to Róheim's.

A further consideration arises here, however. Freud states *(12)* that fear of death is frequently a representation of fear of castration. Thus, again, by extension of Rank's point, the artistic urge may represent a device for the allaying of castration anxiety, as suggested by Sharpe. Parenthetically, it may be that

in this fact lies a partial explanation for the far greater incidence in our culture of artistic creativity among men than women.

Let us now see how these theoretical constructions may be reconstructed in Mozart's life and work. As we have previously noted, Mozart's mother was a warm, affectionate, quiet person, to whom Mozart was deeply devoted. We have adduced ample evidence of his ambivalent feelings toward his father, and the determining quality of the hostile component. These hostile feelings arose, we must assume, not only from his resentment against his father's domination, but also out of the competitive striving for the mother. Not only did Mozart, in his pursuit of music, identify with his father (aggressor), but, in addition, he sought to outdo him, to win this vital competition. In order to do this, he had to be not merely a musician like his father, but a greater and more productive musician. Thus his insatiable urge to compose, thus the driven and compelling nature of his creative activity.

A curious fact about Mozart's creative activity leads us to further speculation. It has frequently been noted that Mozart (not to mention other composers) wrote some of his gayest, brightest, most beautiful and cheerful music during periods of his life that were, to say the least, trying. In this fact can be seen striking confirmation of Lee's theory of creativity and of Róheim's and Sharpe's conceptions of the function of sublimation. The depression Mozart tells of having suffered during these periods [8] was accompanied by outbursts of creative activity, in which he sought unconsciously to restore the infantile situation of complete bliss at the mother's breast, much as, Freud tells us, we all do when we resort to wit and humor: 'The euphoria . . . is nothing but the state of a bygone time . . . the state of our childhood in which we did not . . . need humor to make us happy' *(13)*. In these depressions Mozart had turned his destruc-

[8] 'If people could see into my heart, I should feel almost ashamed. To me everything is cold as ice . . . everything seems so empty' (September 30, 1790). '. . . a kind of emptiness . . . a kind of longing . . . which increases daily . . .' (July 7, 1791). *(3,* p. 69.)

tive rage inward. Unconsciously the rage was equated with his aggressive impulses toward his father. By diverting his aggression into creative work, and by restoring the hated object by means of musical creation, he unconsciously denied his hostile impulses toward his father, thus allaying the danger of castration, and regained the approval of the maternal elements of his superego.

CONCLUSION

The study of Mozart's creativity confirms and provides a partial synthesis of published theories of sublimation. Some sources of Mozart's creative impulse are traced. Motivations are presented to account for his need to create, for certain aspects of his work, for the tremendous pressure his muse imposed upon him, and for their functions in terms of psychic economy. But these leave unexplained the peculiar greatness of Mozart's music. Lee *(14)* serves us here, in part, by equating the achievement of beauty in art with the symbolic restoration of the ambivalent object in idealized form.

Perhaps the answer to this question lies, as Freud suggested, outside psychoanalysis—in the realm, perhaps, of Gestalt psychology, which will explain Mozart's superior capacity for combining tones into organized, meaningful patterns of sound, or yet of the geneticist, who will demonstrate the hereditary transmission of Mozart's innate talent. For such or other contributions we may devoutly hope. Meanwhile, we must be content with having found in the life of one great artist data which throw light on the problem of artistic creation, and with having suggested some of the necessary if not wholly determining factors that made Mozart the man he was, and the artist whose music we can but hear with wonder, admiration, and delight.

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On the Value of One or Two Interviews

Leon J. Saul

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ON THE VALUE OF ONE OR TWO INTERVIEWS

BY LEON J. SAUL, M.D. (PHILADELPHIA)

A woman of thirty suffered from severe hypochondriacal ideas for as long as she could remember. She had all sorts of fears that she had some dire illness, usually a belief that she had cancer; and the slightest symptom or injury was always a life-threatening condition. She was terrified of dying. In part she could not help being fully convinced that she was suffering from the hopeless condition, but part of her ego always realized that it was not fully true.

She consulted a psychiatrist only when she was offered a good position in a remote area, believing this was her last opportunity. She was seen twice with an interval of three weeks between the visits.

During the first interview the main dynamics could be clearly discerned. She was raised in a family of such excessively high ideals that, though scarcely ever mentioned explicitly, they permeated the entire manner and atmosphere of the household, exceeding any standards with which a child could comply. Failure nevertheless produced shame, and the rebellion was entirely repressed and produced guilt. The guilt and the hostility repressed and turned upon herself were the main sources which activated her symptoms. Her death wishes against her parents were turned into death impulses against herself.

The patient was tremendously relieved in this one interview. She was made to realize that the family standards were too high for anyone to live up to; hence the guilt and shame for her common human shortcomings were unnecessary. She realized, in fact, that she was a very superior person as to character and ideals. She was also relieved to learn that her rebellion was not unjustified; moreover, she could now understand the rational emotional basis for her wanting to leave the family and go to distant parts. These insights undermined her sense of the reality of her symptoms and made her see much more clearly how her beliefs in the afflictions she diagnosed in herself were only the resultants of other forces.

This was put to the test unexpectedly about ten days after the first interview when a physical condition developed which might

have been a malignancy but proved not to be. Instead, as in the past, of going into a panic of fear, the patient was able to realize that her fears were predominantly manifestations of inner conflicts and she behaved with admirable maturity and rationality during the two trying days before the diagnosis of a minor condition was made.

At the second interview she said she wondered what could be accomplished in another interview since she had a bird's-eye view of the whole problem during the first one. She did ask, however, if there were any purely conscious procedure by which she might combat her hypochondriacal beliefs if they should arise when she was far away in her new position. She herself had begun to use the method of reacting each time her fears became intense by consciously forcing herself to dwell upon how good things would be in her new situation on her own. It was suggested that she might, if the symptom arose, look for the emotions which generated it. The hypochondriasis fluctuated. If she were fairly free of anxiety during the day, for example, and noticed in the middle of the afternoon that she was worried lest a minor symptom represented a malignancy, she might then skim back during the day for any situation which might have generated certain feelings, particularly hostility and guilt. These might arise from one of the following.

1. She anticipated missing her home and the contacts in the area in which she had lived her entire life and felt that she might be somewhat homesick when alone. She did not know that any unsatisfied wish—in other words any frustration—generated a certain amount of anger, and that this anger was apt to be important in generating anxiety and other symptoms. When this was pointed out she reacted to this strongly with a burst of insight, and said that one of the things on her mind was how angry she could be when there was no one with whom she could justifiedly be angry. Her high standards required very good reason for any anger. It was a new idea to her that she might be angry from homesickness, even though there was no one to blame, and for this very reason the anger might be repressed and turned against herself in the form of her favorite symptom. Each person has certain favorite symptoms, which are the usual methods of taking care of his undischarged emotions.

2. At the other extreme, she might find that during the day she had openly vented her anger in some situation or in some way to which she would later react with guilt, producing her symptom.

3. Intermediate between the extremes of entirely repressed hostility or openly vented hostility with consequent repressed guilt, the hostility might be felt but not openly expressed.

4. In addition to understanding her reactions to her family, we discussed the fact that hostility and guilt could cause the symptom simply as a dynamic force, even though directed toward objects other than her parents; thus, in a new situation she might become angry because of the usual frustrations of life quite apart from any communications from her parents, and anger and guilt in these situations could also generate her symptoms.

Without going into every detail, this patient was given insight into the dynamics underlying her symptom, and was thereby given a key to the handling of future difficulties. To be forewarned is to be forearmed. She reacted to this by being almost exultant over her newly achieved knowledge and over the confidence which it gave her in facing her projected venture. She was quick to sense that by deflecting her attention from the hypochondriacal anxiety to the emotions which underlay it, she was dealing with the main issues, and had a nucleus of insight which gradually with life experience would grow. Thus, to this small extent in only two interviews, separated by three weeks, she achieved a confidence which to some extent reopened her potentialities for emotional development, and she could be expected to make her separation from home a much more maturing experience through knowing in part what it meant unconsciously to her.

Certainly this is a person who should have systematic treatment if it were practicable. One year later, however, she has remained appreciably helped, prophylactically at least. This case is selected to illustrate the value of two interviews, if the case is suitable, and if the analytic interpretation is accurate and sharply focused upon the central issues.

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Wood as a Bisexual Symbol

Leon J. Saul

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WOOD AS A BISEXUAL SYMBOL

BY LEON J. SAUL, M.D. (PHILADELPHIA)

Freud found that wood is usually a maternal symbol *(materia= mater),* and that trees are often phallic symbols.

A young male patient late in his analysis dreamed of soldiers going through a woods. In his associations he identified himself with the soldiers. That they were foreign, he associated with passive anal homosexuality and with revenge by passive resistance, or by feminine techniques, like Delilah. Going through the woods recalled his heterosexual relations, and the woods recalled early memories of sleeping in the parents' bedroom, hearing sounds, being afraid of the dark, and of curiosity about the female genital which he spontaneously felt the woods represented. But to the trees he associated the phallus, again in connection with the primal scene. In this instance then, the woods was a neat bisexual symbol, a condensation of the genitals of both sexes and, in a more hidden form, of the primal scene.

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Sigmund Freud: His Exploration of the Mind of Man. By Gregory Zilboorg. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. 132 pp.

William G. Barrett

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BOOK REVIEWS

SIGMUND FREUD: HIS EXPLORATION OF THE MIND OF MAN. By Gregory Zilboorg. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. 132 pp.

This small volume is one of a series published as the Twentieth Century Library, the individual titles being the names of such men as Joyce, Darwin, Einstein, Shaw, etc. It is addressed to the enlightened lay public and is designed to show Freud's influence upon and place in our world. It was not the intention of the publishers that this be a biography. The author deals 'with the problem of the essence and the strength of psychoanalysis, the influence of which is now felt in science and literature, in religious discussions, and even in the clinical work of the internist and the surgeon'. This necessitates a review of the misunderstandings concerning it, of the rejection of it by some and the disappointed hopes of those who expected too much, of the services it has rendered and of the accomplishments which reasonably may be expected of it in future. Just because its approach is from the level of meaning rather than content this concise presentation should prove of real interest to psychoanalysts, for the historical perspectives are developed with fine scholarship and the author's gift for reaching to the core of significance in Freud's discoveries gives great vigor to the book.

The author gives a brief chronology of the turning points in Freud's life, a simple picture of his character and personality and the essentials of his discoveries and theories. He points out, 'it was *not* the unconscious that Freud discovered, but its power to hold us in its sway . . . it was the *dynamic power* of the unconscious' that was the discovery. 'As soon as he gained his first insight into the unconscious, he began to seek for methods which would enable him to weaken its power.' His method involved the use of intuition, by means of the unconscious of the observer.

After a glance at the influence of psychoanalysis on literature, Dr. Zilboorg proceeds by way of Zweig's bitter complaint that psychoanalysis can 'give knowledge [but] has no place for faith' to consideration of the relationship between psychoanalysis and the problems of value, faith and religion. He holds that Freud, 'when he

equated superego and conscience—touched definitely on a problem of moral philosophy and possibly religion—and thus made a momentary excursion or raid into a field which lies totally outside psychoanalysis'. Surely we must agree that it can not be expected of psychoanalysis to establish a new faith, but the delineation which follows of a sphere for the theologians (religion) and a sphere for psychoanalysts (psychology) will unquestionably meet with a certain resistance on the part of those who feel that the study of totems and taboos, of mythology, of comparative religion and the deepest strata of the mind of modern man in various cultures demonstrates that matters of the spirit may not be beyond the realm of psychological explanation. The superego in its judicial function, as conscience, does not attempt to create values, but as an introject contains implicitly, for better or worse, the values of the whole cultural development of mankind. Can any value be absolute beyond its psychological genesis? The question of the 'origin of conscience', in the race-historical sense, can not be resolved by anything we can say today about the superego, but it can hardly be any more inaccessible to the methods of science than, say, the problem of the origin of life.

However reluctant some of us may be to forego our narcissistic gratification to 'determine' God, we cannot but be grateful for Dr. Zilboorg's gentle reminder of the practical limitations of our omniscience. There is no implication that religion may contribute to our science, but it is heartening to know that psychoanalysts are coöperating to make the discoveries of Freud available to the theologians. The cultural value of the doctrinaire bigot is not to be compared with that of the man of good will, and if the breach between psychoanalysis and religion can be closed our debt to Dr. Zilboorg and those others working toward this end will, indeed, be great.

In psychoanalytic training we sometimes speak of the duty of the teacher-father to permit his student-son to grow up. It is unfortunate that the reciprocal of this obligation is so often spoken of with bitterness. This need not be the case here, for it is clear throughout that the student, Zilboorg, has no other wish than, with mature respect, to permit the teacher, Freud, to remain just what he was: a scientific genius and a man of good will.

WILLIAM G. BARRETT (SAN FRANCISCO)

COLLECTED PAPERS ON PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. By Ella Freeman Sharpe. London: The Hogarth Press and The Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1950. 280 pp.

Ella Freeman Sharpe is already well known to the psychoanalytic public for her work on dream interpretation. Under the title, Collected Papers on Psychoanalysis, Dr. Marjorie Brierley has edited and presented in book form twelve contributions, which, with the exception of the unfinished paper on Hamlet, have already appeared individually in print over a period of some twenty-two years, from 1925 to 1947. Their publication in this form is not only a tribute to the memory of the late Ella Freeman Sharpe, but, as Dr. Jones puts it in his preface, 'a very valuable addition to psychoanalytic literature'. Miss Sharpe's outstanding gifts as a teacher, her rich and varied clinical experience, and her deep appreciation and knowledge of English literature are reflected in the grouping of the papers into three sections, dealing with Technique, Theory, and Literary Interpretation.

The core of the section on Technique is a series of seven lectures delivered to students at the Institute of Psychoanalysis in London, and published in 1930 in the International Journal. These lectures were envisaged therefore as part of the general training program, not as a comprehensive work on the subject. (The date of publication must be borne in mind, as precluding discussion of more recent advances in ego psychology.) They discuss such topics as the general analytic task, mechanisms of defense, management of transference, countertransference, handling of resistances, anxiety, variations of technique in different neuroses, etc. It would of course be possible to take issue with Miss Sharpe on points such as the advisability of discussing 'transference surprise remarks' with students (p. 65), or the statement that 'interpretation of dream material particularly matters sometimes more for the analyst's narcissism than for the patient's progress' (p. 53); but no criticism can obscure the richness of clinical experience, the profound grasp of psychoanalytic problems, and the unusual ability not only to integrate theory and practice into a convincing whole, but to expound it clearly, vividly illustrated by a wealth of aptly chosen clinical material. Technique in Miss Sharpe's hands is alive and mobile, never a 'dead and rigid set of rules' (p. 10). She emphasized constantly that technique must come through 'inner knowledge, through

the analyzed unconscious' of the analyst (p. 104). In her own case, her 'inner knowledge' and mastery of theory have resulted in a series of papers which after twenty-one years remain invaluable to the student of analysis, and of lasting, stimulating interest to the more experienced analyst. It is a great pity that Miss Sharpe's death prevented the completion of a projected book, Talks to Students of Psychoanalysis, of which the first chapter, The Psychoanalyst, appears in this section.

In reading through Miss Sharpe's papers, one is struck by two fundamental qualities of her work—growth and integration. Her thought evolves in depth and scope, while her interests in theory, in practical clinical work, and in various aspects of art and literature are constantly interwoven and show extraordinary consistency in their development. This is particularly noticeable in the papers on Theory and Literary Interpretation. The early work on Certain Aspects of Sublimation and Delusion (1930), advanced the hypothesis that 'art is a sublimation rooted in the primal identification with the parents. That identification is a magical incorporation of the parents, a psychic happening which runs parallel to what has been for long ages repressed, i.e., actual cannibalism' (p. 135). Similar and Divergent Unconscious Determinants Underlying the Sublimations of Pure Art and Pure Science (1935) continues this trend of thought with the assertion that the divergent mechanisms underlying science and art are those of projection and introjection; the scientist dealing with his problems in terms of the external universe (thought process), the artist in terms of himself (bodily process); that these mechanisms are methods of dealing with a common problem—the preservation of the good object and the self from the aggressive fantasies of infancy, due to internal and external frustration, this frustration being experienced at oral stages, when self-preservative and libidinal desires were inseparable. This paper especially shows the impact of Kleinian concepts. (Incidentally a short note on The Magic of Names [1946], suggests that the terms 'good object' and 'bad object' are unscientific, and have a moral connotation.) Miss Sharpe's fully developed views on Sublimation and the Creative Artist are found in the Unfinished Paper on Hamlet, where she wrote: 'Sin and repentance are not the dynamic powers which initiate and maintain sublimation. The dynamic power is libido, operating through the libidinal wishes frustrated prior to the latency period' (p. 263). She further maintained that 'My impression is that the surge of thwarted genital impulse and

desire at the œdipal climax, reanimates pregenital drives and imparts to them something of the creativity which is the specific attribute of genitality. They are not in themselves the stimulus to sublimation, but are galvanized to a creative outcome by regression' (pp. 263–264).

In 1940 came the interesting work, Psychophysical Problems Revealed in Language—an Examination of Metaphor, which stresses the dynamic significance of unconscious fantasy, and the repetition of early infantile experience in later phases of life. Bodily function with the accompanying affect in early infancy and childhood are expressed later through symbol and metaphor. 'A live metaphor reveals a past forgotten experience and this was originally a psychophysical one' (p. 156).

Meantime her first papers on Literary Interpretation had appeared. Francis Thompson: A Psychoanalytic Study (1925) gives perhaps most scope for Miss Sharpe's own considerable literary talent. Her analytic probing of the 'secret subterranean passages between matter and soul' (p. 183) is subtle and profound. Thompson's life and poetry are presented as an expression of libidinal fixation at the oral level, of initial joy in gratification at the breast, and of the sorrow of deprivation.

This paper indicates the direction of her subsequent work on Shakespeare. In The Impatience of Hamlet (1929), Miss Sharpe develops some aspects of the œdipal conflict described in Dr. Jones's well-known essay, and integrates into the study of Hamlet's character the work of Freud and Abraham on Mourning and Melancholia. She maintains that the marked sadism of Hamlet's superego produced an urgency and precipitation of action which made the play a tragedy of impatience and not of procrastination. It is when Miss Sharpe makes the assertion that 'one needs to think in terms of the creator, not in terms of Hamlet' (p. 205) that she branches off into her most original work—the study of Shakespeare as revealed in his plays. The link with the first paper on Sublimation and Delusion is clear. Hamlet becomes the expression of what Shakespeare might have been if he had not written the play and 'having externalized and elaborated the inner conflict on his father's death, kept the course of sanity' (p. 213).

The paper, From King Lear to the Tempest (1946), shows how the scope of the Shakespeare study has been widened. Miss Sharpe postulated that The Tempest was the psychological sequence of King Lear, and that both plays were linked together in a cycle of

inner experience of manic-depressive character, which seemed to her to be characteristic of creative artists. In King Lear, Shakespeare dramatizes the conflict of his childhood and infancy, and his complex emotional reactions to his parents. It has been said that Miss Sharpe knew her Shakespeare as a devoted priest knows his Bible. She had more than an acquired facility for apt quotation. She possessed an almost detective flair for sensing the inner meaning of word, action, and gesture. Whereas Shakespearean critics in the past have been content to bemoan the lack of biographical material, Miss Sharpe has been able to throw some light on much of the early life of Shakespeare which had remained obscure for some three hundred years. In the absence of corroborative analytic material, the application of Miss Sharpe's concept of the imagery of everyday speech and poetry as an expression and verbal repetition of an early, forgotten psychophysical experience is not without danger. Miss Sharpe, however, was well aware of the pitfalls, and was careful to back up her deductions with convincing evidence and psychoanalytic cogency. Facts are not forced. Such deductions as are made are perfectly compatible with the accredited facts of Shakespeare's life; e.g., that the stimulus for regression in the poet's maturity which produced King Lear was the reactivation of the unconscious incest wishes toward his daughters, the buried hostility toward the father being transferred to the sons-in-law; or that the reinstatement of Prospero marked the re-emergence from depression. Details such as the childhood experiences at the pregnancies of his mother are worked out with great psychological subtlety.

At the time of her death, Miss Sharpe was engaged on a study, The Cyclic Movement in Shakespeare's Plays, a work of which King Lear to The Tempest was to be a chapter. Dr. Brierley's careful editing has salvaged some material from the notes, which shows the scope and direction of the undertaking. It is to be hoped that the scheme which Miss Sharpe outlined may be continued by other workers.

A review of a book of this nature must of necessity leave many topics untouched. But perhaps enough has been said to give some indication of the wide field of contribution of this exceptionally gifted lay analyst. The present volume is another valuable addition to the International Psychoanalytical Library.

ALEXANDER BROMLEY (NEW YORK)

CLINICAL STUDIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Sandor Lorand, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1950. 272 pp.

Fifteen psychiatric papers published in various technical journals between 1928 and 1948, and three chapters from the author's book, The Morbid Personality (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1931) make up this volume. Much of it will be familiar to readers of psychoanalytic journals of the past twenty years.

To republish, without editing, such a series of papers is a bold undertaking. The critical reader inevitably follows the chronology for evidence of change of point of view and the personal development of the author. Such a volume is by no means the equivalent of an autobiography, but this reviewer picks 1939 as a turning point for the author. Of the papers published before this date, only A Note on the Psychology of the Inventor (1934) is of comparable quality to the majority of those produced in 1939 and thereafter.

The first paper, Fetishism in Statu Nascendi (1929), describes a little boy of four who constructed a 'fundamental fantasy of endowing the mother with a penis'. This, the author states, accomplished 'the rejection of the vagina . . . and with it the vaginal childbirth theory' (p. 20). The child is described as precocious, but even so this seems a tall order for a boy of less than five years. Would it not be adequate to content one's self with the hypothesis that the child rejected the idea of the *absence* of a penis?

The second paper, The Mantle Symbol (1929), is based upon the assumption that a coat can be regarded as the equivalent of the 'original covering of the body (the first coat), the hair' (p. 25). There are some interesting clinical observations on hair, but the thesis is at best a tour de force.

The other papers published prior to 1939 show similar loose thinking. The author tends to jump on his theoretical horse and ride off in all directions. There is uncritical acceptance of contradictory points of view. Theory is administered by shotgun prescription to forestall possible criticism of incompleteness. There is at times an unfortunate tendency to 'sell' psychoanalysis, a hucksterish quality of too ready generalization, too certain assurance of success. The glibness of many statements is often maddeningly compounded with *non sequiturs.*

The most disconcerting statements in the book appear on pages 110 and 111, where Dr. Lorand reports his technical handling of

patients whose habits clearly 'were intended to irritate the analyst'. He states that it was necessary to meet these attitudes 'with frank annoyance' so as not to confirm the patients' suspicions 'that the analyst was not trustworthy, not truthful, and did not say what he thought nor show what he felt'. How far would he advocate an analyst should go in expressing his emotions? Should he also declare his sexual responses? Such 'acting out' on the part of the analyst was not acceptable in 1937, when this paper was first published, nor is it today.

The later papers are more mature, better organized and less pretentious. The author's gift for penetrating, vital, clinical characterization comes more to the fore. Even when leaning strongly on theory, as in Contribution to the Problem of Vaginal Orgasm (1939), the author works more soundly. Although of this paper it might be said that he rushes in where only female analysts, and a rather limited group at that, have dared to tread, and makes rather positive statements about a 'period which Freud calls "dim and shadowy" ' (p. 156), his lighting is restrained and not suddenly too bright.

The Comments on the Correlation of Theory and Technique, which appeared in this QUARTERLY in 1948, is a superior job. Here he not only advocates but, for the first time, openly criticizes. His conversance with the literature is enhanced by assurance of his competence as a clinician, without the need to bow to every segment of the spiral of theory. It can fairly be said that Dr. Lorand's book is not only worthy to be dedicated to his great teacher, Sandor Ferenczi, but is also evidence of creditable personal achievement.

WILLIAM G. BARRETT (SAN FRANCISCO)

DE LA PRATIQUE À LA THÉORIE PSYCHANALYTIQUE (Psychoanalytic Practice and Theory). By Dr. Sacha Nacht. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. 165 pp.

The eight papers collected in this volume, which include two very good, brief case presentations, are entitled: Role of the Ego in Psychoanalytic Therapy (a report given in 1939 at the First Franco-British Reunion of Psychoanalysts), The Role of the Ego in the Structure of Character and Behavior, Psychoanalytic Observation of a Masochistic Character, The Clinical Manifestations of Aggression and Their Role in Psychoanalytic Treatment, Introduction to

Psychosomatic Medicine, Remarks on the Cure of an Organic Neurosis by Psychoanalytic Treatment, The Psychoanalytic Therapy, and Reflections on Transference and Countertransference. Some of these articles were written for the nonpsychoanalytic public and the others for analysts.

The book as a whole reveals the clinical and therapeutic experience of its author, who is one of the leading psychoanalysts in Paris. As to the theoretical formulations, of which this volume contains fewer than might be inferred from the title, this reviewer wishes to draw attention to one original viewpoint advanced by the author. Nacht considers the aggressive drive to be the main pathogenic factor. According to him, even libidinal conflicts acquire their pathogenicity only through the addition of elements of aggression. Unfortunately, however, he gives no reasons for this opinion nor does he support it by clinical material.

Without any doubt the last chapter, a paper on transference and countertransference read by the author at the Congress of the International Psychoanalytic Association in Zürich in 1949, is the most interesting. It is characteristic of a trend of which there have recently been some examples also in this country. Discussing the handling of cases in which the transference—or certain forms of it—becomes an obstacle to the termination of treatment, Nacht expresses the belief that in some of these cases it is necessary to take recourse to a wider spacing of sessions and to make the patient aware that the analyst is 'a man among men and not a semi-god or magician'. However, he states that he does not follow the procedures proposed by Alexander and French, but that he uses the customary methods of analytic therapy. As a matter of fact, the methods he advocates are derived from the advice given by Freud that a term be set for the duration of analysis in certain cases of obsessional neurosis; they are also connected with Freud's recommendation for overcoming the defenses in cases of phobia by advising the patient to expose himself to the dreaded situation in order to be able to analyze it. To some extent Nacht's interventions (which, like some other analysts before him, he places under the heading of 'weaning') are part of the rule of abstinence. However, it is to be regretted that this paper contains no explicit reference to the procedure which, according to him, convinces the patient that the analyst is 'a man among men', nor to the role played by interpretation in his technique of terminating the analysis. This reviewer entertains no doubt that Nacht,

who is a brilliant clinician, must be aware of the importance of these points; but some readers may feel dissatisfied because he has not discussed them here.

The book is a very clear and comprehensive presentation of important aspects of psychoanalytic therapy. It is very well worth reading, both for the beginner and the most experienced analyst.

RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN (NEW YORK)

CHRISTIANS AND JEWS. A Psychoanalytic Study. By Rudolph M. Loewenstein, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1951. 224 pp.

This book is an examination of the historical and cultural roots of anti-Semitism. The word is a comparative newcomer to the lexicon, but the social malady which the word connotes is ancient and persistent and shows few signs of abating. The symptoms need no description and, as Dr. Loewenstein states, they display 'a monotonous uniformity' so that the prejudices of the modern anti-Semite are little different from those of his medieval counterpart—just as the image of the 'accursed Jew' has changed but little with the passing of the centuries.

Concisely stated, the author's theme is that anti-Semitism is intimately associated with the rise and development of the Christian religion: hence the title of the book. Jews and Christians form a 'cultural pair'. Despite the schism that separated Judaism from the new religion and the intolerance with which the Christians regarded their ousted rival, they are nevertheless mutually interdependent and linked by very intimate ties. While the Jews helped to beget the new religion, the attitude of the Christians has been markedly ambivalent to the Jews: even when persecuting Judaism it has at the same time ensured its survival, for the Jew is necessary to the Christian as a scapegoat. In the last resort the Jew is indicted for his participation in the death of Christ who, through his sufferings, took upon himself the sins of Christians and so became their Savior. Psychologically speaking, then, Christians, who thus benefit by Christ's death, must unconsciously rejoice in it. One way of atonement which lies open to the Christian is through the Holy Communion. But a more convenient way is to father the guilt onto the Jews. The next step is to project onto the Jews the secret sin of every Christian, viz.: that of unconsciously rejoicing in the

crucifixion of Christ. Thus the Jews are the carriers of the Christians' burden of guilt, the eternal scapegoat and in times of social stress a handy lightning conductor. The Christian, therefore, needs the Jew. Loewenstein effectively quotes Maritain: 'The passion of Israel is more and more clearly taking the shape of the Cross'.

The suitability of the Jew as a scapegoat is manifest. He is at one and the same time identified with the enemies of Christ and with the Jew, Jesus, himself. He is *par excellence* the eternal foreigner, 'the stranger within the gates'. 'The ghetto walls have a dual function': they protect the Jew and also segregate him. The Jew's suitability is further enhanced by his historical role of a 'chosen people', set apart from other men. The traditional image (or cartoon) of the Jew has been used for every type of projection: he can represent the superego, for he, too, is a son of God, at the same time he can represent the forces of the id, the personification of evil.

In passing one might ask: why is it that the Christians, of all people, should need such an abundant supply of scapegoats who shall be 'always available and always expendable'? To participate in the killing of a god is not the prescriptive right of Christian piety. Frazer regards the killing of gods as a frequent habit. May not the answer lie in the fact that the Christian, unlike the pagan whom he seeks to convert, is forced to submit to an impossible ethic—so much so that A. N. Whitehead once warned his readers that 'a literal adherence to the precepts scattered throughout the gospels would mean sudden death'? To pay lip service to an ideal that makes impossible libidinal demands and lays an interdict on all forms of aggression could be regarded as one of the major discontents of our civilization. In view of the exorbitantly high standard of living that his faith demands, the Christian, as it were, has compelled the Jew to pay his income tax for him.

But what about the victim of anti-Semitism? What has been the effect of centuries of ostracism and persecution on the psychology of the Jews? In their fight for survival the Jews have acquired certain neurotic traits which may have provided additional pretexts for persecution. Under the headings of Jewish Character Traits, Marginal Man, and Psychoanalysis of Jews, the author provides an excellent analysis of those traits which, while common to all human beings, have in the case of the Jew developed a special tinge owing to the defensive attitude he has had to adopt toward his Christian 'hosts'. 'Small wonder, then, that the fact of being Jews sometimes

weighs so heavily upon them that their one desire is to rid themselves of the stigma. The more neurotic may deny their Jewish origins in the face of the most palpable evidence to the contrary. Others may become pathologically anti-Semitic. Generally, however, the pendulum swings to the other extreme and they cling to their Jewishness.'

A study so profound as this inevitably raises many questions. Admitting the rivalry between the old and the new religions in which Christianity was an 'incomplete victor', the question arises as to whether there are not other elements that make for the antagonism. While Christianity was Jewish in origin, it appears to have been Roman in organization and most certainly Greek in spirit. It has remained a Western religion and for many years closely identified with that cultural unity we call European. But from the earliest days, certainly from the days of Aniochus IV, there is a distinct rivalry between the spirit of Judaism and that of Hellenism. In the heresies of the early Christian Church, as in Gnosticism, the rivalry becomes clearer. Christ may be the honorary life member of the movement but it is Plato who for the last thirteen centuries has dominated Western theology so that many of our modern churchmen are really neo-Platonists. Matthew Arnold quotes the contrast between Hellenism and Hebraism as representing the dualism in the history of Western civilization. Perhaps the answer lies in a more careful analysis of the complex character of St. Paul who, while a strict Jew, was also a member of the larger Hellenic brotherhood: Christianity is largely the gospel according to St. Paul.

Further, one is curious as to why and by what means this new religion came to be adopted by the Western world. Historians from Gibbon on have given their answer, but the question is still a mystery. Despite its protestations of being a gospel of universal love it is probably, as one of its great historians has observed, 'the most quarrelsome of religions'. It has singularly failed not only to oust its rival but also to subdue the forces of barbarism, and when force of argument has failed it has been only too willing to employ the argument of force.

Apart from the comprehensiveness of this study, the qualities that will commend this book to the general public are the author's humanity and his remarkable lucidity of style.

W. N. EVANS (NEW YORK)

JOURNAL D'UNE SCHIZOPHRÈNE. By M.-A. Sechehaye. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950. 133 pp.

This book [1] supplements—or, rather, complements—the author's earlier publication,[2] in which she reported the history and methods of her treatment of a case of schizophrenia in a young girl. Acquaintance with the first book will, therefore, contribute greatly to the reader's appreciation of the second.

The first and major part of the present volume consists of an 'auto-observation' by the patient, describing the beginnings of her symptoms, their development, her relationship to the therapist, and the success of the cure, as seen through the eyes of the patient. In the second part of the book, Mme. Sechehaye attempts a theoretical evaluation and interpretation of the case history.

The first part represents a unique document of exceptional value to every psychoanalyst and psychiatrist. The patient's descriptions of her symptoms, her anxiety, her depersonalization, and of her struggle against her delusions and hallucinations make fascinating reading. The same is true of her account of the transference during the treatment, the reasons for her relapses, the gradual achievement of therapeutic success, and her emergence from her delusions into reality.

The author's interpretation of the patient's psychosis is extremely interesting and provocative. To the psychoanalytic concepts which she uses, she adds ideas and concepts derived from the research of Jean Piaget. However, this reviewer believes that a complete understanding of the astounding wealth of material in this extraordinary case history still eludes us at the present stage of our knowledge.

The value of Mme. Sechehaye's work cannot be overemphasized. She devised a highly successful method of treatment (described more fully in Symbolic Realization) for her schizophrenic patient. It would be of great importance to apply this new method in other,

[1] Since this review was written, an English translation has been published under the title *Autobiography of a Schizophrenic Girl.* Trans. by Grace Rubin-Rabson. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1951. 161 pp.

[2] *La Réalisation symbolique (Nouvelle méthode de psychothérapie appliquée à un cas de schizophrénie). Supplément à la Revue Suisse de Psychologie et Psychologie Appliquée, No. 12, Édit. médicales.* Berne: Hans Huber Verlag. Trans. by B. and H. Würsten: *Symbolic Realization: A New Method of Psychotherapy Applied to a Case of Schizophrenia.* New York: International Universities Press, 1951. 184 pp.

similar cases. Taking the two books as a whole, there are not many works in recent psychiatric literature that can compare with them in interest.

RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN (NEW YORK)

ANXIETY IN PREGNANCY AND CHILDBIRTH. By Henriette R. Klein, M.D., Howard W. Potter, M.D., and Ruth B. Dyk, M.S. New York: Paul B. Hoeber, Inc., 1950. 111 pp.

On their more or less regular visits at a prenatal clinic for routine checks, twenty-seven primiparæ were interviewed by a social worker. Through discussions, questionnaires, and careful observation during these visits, an impression was obtained about their current emotional states as well as their adjustment prior to pregnancy. Attention also was paid to their descriptions of physical changes and symptoms. During delivery the patients were observed by nurses and physicians, and one more interview took place a month later. The research was carried out in 1945 and 1946, i.e., during the immediate postwar period. All the women belonged to a low-income group. Many reported an increase in bad dreams and nightmares, or of previous neurotic behavior. A large number of them worried about their own or the baby's health, were preoccupied, and revealed superstitions and an easy acceptance of false beliefs. Physical sensations were reported by many. On this the authors base their conclusion that anxiety exists during pregnancy. They classified the women as stable or unstable. As far as the delivery was concerned, four criteria were applied: good or bad labor and delivery, and good or bad psychological reaction. The findings showed that stable, mature women wanted their babies from the beginning, took the delivery well psychologically, and nursed their children. A considerable number of the women who had not wanted their children at the beginning of pregnancy accepted them toward the end, and only a few continued to reject them. It was found that the physiological progression of labor and delivery was not related to the psychological state, and that no prediction as to the type of delivery could be made from the behavior during pregnancy. The authors report that stable women may show poor psychological reactions during labor and delivery, regardless of a good physiological progression, and vice versa.

This reviewer regrets that the research was limited exclusively

to this particular group of women, and that it was only carried out during the immediate postwar period. The majority of the twenty-seven women had husbands in the service, or were unmarried and made pregnant by service men. The increase of anxiety in the cases presented might be explained by the increase of problems in the reality situation due to the pregnancy. Even without pregnancy, these women had ample reasons for anxiety. Unfortunately no clinical and psychological studies were included in the research to substantiate the findings of stability, instability, and anxiety. In this reviewer's opinion, a research of this kind only has validity when substantiated by thorough psychoanalytic studies. The topic of this investigation is a very important one; but due to the reasons mentioned, the content of the book fails to fulfil the expectations aroused by its title.

ELISABETH R. GELEERD (NEW YORK)

TEXTBOOK OF ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY. Revised Edition. By Carney Landis and M. Marjorie Bolles. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. 634 pp.

The first edition of this textbook previously reviewed in this QUARTERLY, in the words of the author 'has become outdated in five years'. Numerous advances in the fields of clinical psychology and psychiatry have been incorporated into this revised edition and, as before, in a cautious and sober manner. The section on psychoanalysis, previously characterized by glaring inadequacies, has been corrected to some degree, but is still grossly inadequate, particularly in the light of the admission that 'most of the explanations advanced in specialized psychopathological studies are phrased in the light of the concepts built up by Freud and his followers'. It still remains difficult to see how college students, for whom this book is intended, can derive any glimmer of understanding from an account which fails to be illuminated by convincing illustrations that can be derived from applying the rich insights of psychoanalysis. The section on the neuroses is pitifully meager. There is no change in the authors' sterile eclecticism. The style is dry and pedestrian. I fail to see how such a textbook, and there are too many like it, can satisfy the hunger of students for a vital, affective understanding of the vagaries of human behavior.

NATHANIEL ROSS (NEW YORK)

NEW DISCOVERIES IN MEDICINE. Their Effect on the Public Health. By Paul R. Hawley, M.D. New York: Columbia University Press, 1950. 134 pp.

In this little book the author takes 'a generous helping of a few delicacies' from the field of medicine and serves them in six lectures to an audience interested in the influence of new discoveries in medicine upon public health. Of these lectures, only Modern Prevention and Treatment of Mental Disease is of interest to readers of this journal.

In this chapter the author tries to cover the development of the treatment of mental diseases from Bedlam to thalamotomy. The author is of the opinion that psychiatry is to a certain degree an inexact science. He views the psychoneuroses and psychosomatic disorders particularly from the point of view of expense. The waste of money for their treatment and the shortage of psychiatric beds are indications to him of the need for national health insurance. He states with satisfaction that the recent, more intensive treatment of psychiatric patients has finally achieved a balance between the number of patients admitted and discharged from Veterans Administration Hospitals: 'approximately seventy-five percent of all new cases are discharged in good condition by the end of three months'.

It is worth while quoting what the author has to say about psychoanalysis. 'Like many other worthy techniques, its reputation has suffered through exploitation by incompetent and unscrupulous charlatans. In certain circles, made up of people with more money than brains, to be psychoanalyzed has become a mark of social distinction. Fashionable poseurs, some of whom have never had any medical training whatsoever, are plucking these shallow-brained geese for all the traffic will bear. In this racket, a foreign name and a foreign origin seem to be tangible assets of great value.'

To the nonmedical reader all chapters of this well-written book will be of interest.

FELIX DEUTSCH (BOSTON)

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Otto Friedman. London: Sylvan Press Ltd., 1950. 220 pp.

This brief book is a masterly work of condensation. It is prepared in association with Ruskin College, Oxford, and is the work of a

former Czech scholar who is psychoanalytically oriented. (Friedman has published Broadcasting For Democracy and The Break-Up of Czech Democracy.) The recent spate of textbooks on social psychology enables one to appreciate by contrast the keen judgment which Friedman has exercised at every step. The four divisions of the book are progressive: the motives of the individual; social interaction; the psychology of groups; the essentials of rational action in society. The last section is usually neglected in the United States where policy thinking is less prevalent among textmakers.

The reading list is sound and the reference utility of the volume is greatly enhanced by an index of subjects and a glossary. Even in a short book of this kind I think that a brief résumé of the history of social psychology would be a useful addition. This is particularly true since many of the citations are from recent literature.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL (NEW HAVEN)

GROUP LIFE: THE NATURE AND TREATMENT OF ITS SPECIFIC CONFLICTS. By Marshall C. Greco. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 357 pp.

This volume is remarkably well calculated to alienate its intended audience. The preface strikes a strident note: 'We hope this book is at least a mediocre attempt toward introducing an idea that will change the meaning of social and personality conflicts as radically as did Freud when he reported a hysterical symptom is effected by a motive and not a neutral [neural] mechanism or an inherently weak neurology'. The error is no doubt typographical, but weaknesses of 'neurology', like the infirmities of other 'ologies', including psychology, ought to be left at the door of the author, and not imputed to nature or left to the mistakes of assistants.

The following conveys something of the author's message and method: 'Once we began to think in terms of providing the client with assets or social avenues rather than dwelling on problems, we began paying a little more attention to ourselves and what we might be able to do. We saw that although we had the potentialities for doing much good our former orientation took us out of life and its resources. We now realize the importance of social connections, knowing individuals who wish to help or share something with another, e.g., employers, school teachers, card-club members,

politicians, and just *ordinary people*. If my capacity to aid my clients is limited today it is because I do not represent enough assets or avenues for providing for client-needs that are, today, cared for by a neurotic setting. The psychologist, then, must live effectively if he is to help his clients live effectively. He must get out of his ivory tower, put aside morbid topics and get into the stream of everyday life. He must get acquainted, increase his social significance' (pp. 296–297).

I suspect that the impact of this report would have been much greater if the author had not written it. His colleagues at the Michigan Center might well have taken his activities as the subject of study, and issued an account of what went on, by what methods, with what results.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL (NEW HAVEN)

EXPERIMENTS IN SOCIAL PROCESS. Edited by James Grier Miller. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950. 205 pp.

The scope of this book is correctly identified by the subtitle which refers to it as a Symposium on Social Psychology. Eight social psychologists, from various parts of the country, gathered at the University of Chicago in November 1947 where they reported and discussed the most recent work in the field of social psychology. Dr. Miller, the editor, felt that from time to time such accounting is necessary because at present we have approximately twelve thousand journals in the field, and in this country there are approximately twenty-eight thousand social scientists. Without claiming to be comprehensive, this book points out the most important aspects of recent developments in social psychology.

The contributors and their topics are as follows: Scientific Methodology in Human Relations by Donald G. Marquis, The Strategy of Sociopsychological Research by Ronald Lippitt, Laboratory Experiments: The Role of Group Belongingness by Leon Festinger, Survey Research: Psychological Economics by Dorwin Cartwright, Survey Techniques in the Evaluation of Morale by Daniel Katz, Field Experiments: Changing Group Productivity by John R. P. French, Jr., A Comparative Study of National Characteristics by Donald V. McGranahan and Ivor Wayne, The Implications of Learning: Theory for Social Psychology by James G. Gibson.

The ninth chapter is a round-table discussion by the members of the Symposium and Leo Szilard on social psychology and the atomic bomb.

It is impossible to review each article comprehensively. One might single out Katz's article in which he describes how we were able after the war to study the moral effect of the war and bombing in Germany. McGranahan's and Wayne's chapter is very unique. Valuable social traits were factored out by comparing German and American plays. A small sample of these plays from the period of 1909–1910 and the forty-five most popular hits in Germany and the United States during the late twenties and early thirties are analyzed and compared. This seems to be a very fertile and new approach toward some understanding of social characteristics of nations.

The round-table discussion on social psychology and the atomic bomb is of great interest and very acute. It is regrettable that the sentiments expressed are buried in books and not easily accessible to the general population.

ADOLF G. WOLTMANN (NEW YORK)

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DICTATORSHIP. Based on an Examination of the Leaders of Nazi Germany. By G. M. Gilbert, Ph.D. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1950. 327 pp.

It is easy to demonstrate the inadequacy of current methods of examination, of recording observations and their evaluation in this and similar contemporary studies of the world's most cruel and 'efficient' criminals. While the Nazi leaders, undergoing trial, were fighting to survive, at least in the memory of their people, the author asked them, for instance, 'Was Hitler a military genius?' 'How could you have committed that crime?' 'Why did you not resign?' and other questions which may be asked by a judge, but not by a psychological observer. They are as meaningless as if an anthropologist were to ask a cannibal why he did not react with symptomatic gastrointestinal conversions after a feast. The psychology of dictatorship as seen by the author is void of understanding or feeling for psychodynamic concepts. Persons like Herman Goering, Rudolph Hess, Councilor Von Papen, Minister Von Ribbentrop, Field Marshal Keitel, Colonel Hoess, and other Nazi leaders are diagnosed by the author and not meaningfully observed,

described, understood or interpreted. Occasionally he limits himself to the simple straight reporting of a man who naïvely and with shocked amazement was a bystander at the Nuremburg trials. The author was a representative, so to speak, of all the little people of the world, looking at the monstrous representation of crime on the bench of the accused, trying, with bewilderment, to understand them. Only a very few of the author's observations may be favorably compared with such historical documents as the report by J. R. Rees about the case of Rudolph Hess, or Trevor-Roper's factual account of The Last Days of Adolph Hitler. Goering's drug addiction and Hess's paranoia and fanatic devotion, Von Papen's almost catatonic detachment, Von Ribbentrop's unbelievable mediocrity are occasionally well documented. In such limited but straight eye-witness reports are found the best parts of the book. For instance, the profile of SS Colonel Hoess gives valuable information. This Colonel worked hard to step up the efficiency of his camp to handle two thousand executions daily, carefully working out the most efficient technique to use the victim's hair to stuff mattresses. He was commended by his superiors when he once disposed of ten thousand lives within twenty-four hours, while working at the extermination of two and a half million human beings. Many an observer, confronted with such people, reaches the limits of his psychological understanding. Even so, if one undertakes to observe and to report his observations, he should do better than to come to almost meaningless, flat, and inappropriate psychological conclusions.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (LOS ANGELES)

MOVIES: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. By Martha Wolfenstein, Ph.D. and Nathan Leites, Ph.D. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1950. 316 pp.

The cinema screen, according to this book, holds the mirror up to nature, to the unconscious conflicts and defenses of the audience. This assertion is demonstrated by analyses of the plots of American, British, and French films of A grade, over two hundred in number, released after 1945. Their themes, classified under Lovers and Loved Ones, Parents and Children, Killers and Victims, Performers and Onlookers, are interpreted in terms of psychoanalytic concepts,

and the characteristic ways in which each national group deals with emotional dilemmas are compared.

In explaining the purpose of this book the authors say '. . . where a group of people share a common culture, they are likely to have daydreams in common'. They quote the lines:

> But when a dream night after night is brought
> Throughout a week and such weeks few or many
> Recur each year for several years, can any
> Discern the dream from real life in aught?

Yet the authors conservatively correlate actuality and celluloid fantasy. Their statements are graded according to their degrees of confirmability. First, there are the assertions that certain defense mechanisms, as revealed in movie plots, are typical of particular nationalities; next, there are the '. . . guesses about the psychological processes of movie makers and their audiences to account for the emotional significance of recurrent themes'; and last, '. . . assumptions about real life patterns of American culture, and attempts to connect them with some of the movie themes and their emotional bases'.

We can follow with confidence the thinking of these authors, since they are armed with caution and self-criticism. Indeed we can go further than their observations and inferences and ask several questions. To what extent can distinctive characteristics of different groups be explained and defined in terms of defense mechanisms? To what extent could similar studies be used to further our understanding of other nations, more remote than the French or British, for purposes of collaboration or propaganda? Could other common daydreams be used for the same purpose with comparable validity? Or, one could ask, as did Dr. Róheim in a private communication, 'To what extent can moving picture plots, synthetic concoctions of professional writers, be compared as cultural criteria to folklore and myth, the spontaneous expressions of unconscious recollections of early life?'.

This book is very readable. Mention of incidents in familiar film plots evokes pleasant memories. The style is succinct without dryness, and lucidly descriptive without verbosity.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG (NEW YORK)

THE PSYCHOANALYST AND THE ARTIST. By Daniel E. Schneider, M.D. New York: Farrar, Strauss and Co., 1950. 306 pp.

This book, addressed primarily to intelligent laymen interested in the arts, is a serious attempt at a solution of some of the many problems of æsthetics, art, and psychoanalysis. It contains a general theoretical discussion and special essays about the works and personalities of certain artists. The lay reader is given an excellent introduction to certain segments of psychoanalytic theory, particularly dream work and the œdipus complex.

The author follows Freud in likening artistic creation to dream work. He conceives the preconscious as the doorway through which the unconscious is thrust to be transformed by the technical tools of the artist and then presented to the world in a special way. The author employs the terms 'creative thrust' and 'creative mastery' to indicate the powers of the unconscious instincts and the constructive powers of the conscious ego. The author believes, as did Freud, that the essential artistic gift is a constitutional predisposition, and that there is a closely related flexibility of repressions which facilitates access to the unconscious, making the latter available for recapture and transformation into artistic products. These, if successful, evoke universal identifications. The essential artistic gift is this possibility of the transformation of the unconscious. Taking Freud's discussion of form in art, wit, and the comic as a starting point, the author discusses the problem of content versus form. The power of transformation of the unconscious is form. In psychoanalytic terms this identifies the primary process as the determinant of artistic form. This concept of form omits the relation of form to the degree of the ability of the ego to master aggressions as well as the problem of flight from affect or from content which might have an obsessional or a schizophrenic quality. The author believes that artistic mastery of form is inherited, although preponderantly by males. Western music is given as an example in which form is predominant, and composers almost universally men.

Illuminating and often brilliant insights with illustrations are given of Delacroix's grasp of the unconscious as the source of artistic imagination, Joyce's musicality and mastery of form, the preoccupations of Chagall and Picasso with the œdipus and rape, and Arthur Miller's preoccupation with the problems of the younger brother.

Some faults of this book are a tendency to neologisms where conventional psychoanalytic terms would have sufficed, the omission of primitive and religious art, and of the magical functions of art which are depreciated. Sublimation is scouted. Dr. Schneider maintains that artistic predisposition is combined with great capacity for object love. This reviewer cannot agree. In fact, some of the biographical essays contradict the author's theoretical position. The author attributes to the artist a much greater degree of conscious awareness and better object relations than he seemingly possesses. The author loves his artists. If he errs on the side of crediting them with greater love of humanity than they appear to possess, it is only because, being himself an artist, he wishes that the world and its artists were better than they are and tries to make them so.

SIDNEY TARACHOW (NEW YORK)

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International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XXX, 1949.

Fanny Hann-Kende, Gerard Fountain, Edmund Bergler & Robert C. Bak

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ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XXX, 1949.

Sándor Ferenczi, Obiit 1933. Michael Balint. Pp. 215–219.

According to a footnote, this paper is based on a paper read to the British Psychoanalytic Society on May 5, 1948, on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of Ferenczi's death. Balint inserts in his commemorative address reviews of Ferenczi's first and last Congress papers (Psychoanalysis and Education, 1908, and Confusion of Tongues Between Adult and Child, 1932) which at that time were not translated into English.

Balint begins his paper by stating that 'Ferenczi's was a tragic fate. . . . Let us follow Freud's example, who compared Ferenczi with Abraham in his obituary note on the latter.' Actually, Freud wrote: 'So high a place had he [Abraham] won for himself that, of all who had followed me . . . there is only one whose name could be put beside his'.[1] Balint goes on to say, 'With Abraham nothing ever went wrong.[!] He was a born president. . . . His theories were universally accepted, have been quoted correctly. . . . Ferenczi was seldom studied thoroughly, seldom quoted correctly, was often criticized, more often than not erroneously. More than once his ideas were rediscovered later and then attributed to the second discoverer.' We have to ask: is not this rather the common than the tragic fate of every original, ingenious thinker? Does not the same hold true for Freud even today?

Balint then sets out to look for the internal causes of the 'tragic fate' in Ferenczi's personality. His whole argument is naïve and full of contradictory statements. This is his conclusion: 'I think this was the insurmountable barrier separating Ferenczi from his colleagues. Freud and Abraham were essentially mature adults. Ferenczi, in spite of his profound insight, of his many-sided talents, his unsurpassed qualities as a clinical observer, and his unbounded scientific fantasies, was essentially a child all his life.'

For those who might be misled by Balint's statements, we quote Freud: 'The sure feeling of belonging together remained undisturbed . . .'.[2] 'One puts aside the little book [Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality] with the conclusion: that is almost too much for one time, I will read it again after a while. And this was not only my experience.'[3] And Ernest Jones: 'Though sensitive to the opinion of others, he [Ferenczi] was the sternest critic of himself and his work. . . . Many of Ferenczi's most original and valuable contributions are now so generally accepted as axiomatic that one is apt to forget their source.'[4]

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[1] Int. J. Psa., VII, 1926.
[2] Int. J. Psa., XIV, 1933.
[3] *Ibid.*
[4] *Ibid.*

Psychoanalysis and Education. Sándor Ferenczi. Pp. 220–224.

This paper is an English translation of Ferenczi's speech delivered in German at the First Psychoanalytic Congress, held in Salzburg in 1908. It was published only in Hungarian, first in a medical magazine (*Gyógyászat*) in 1908, then in the book *Lélekelemzés* (Psychoanalysis) together with other psychoanalytic papers by Ferenczi, in 1909. It includes two appendices, undated, which must have been added to the original paper somewhat later.

The main paper is a bold protest against 'inappropriate pedagogical methods and theories. . . . Clinging to meaningless religious superstitions, to the traditional cult of authorities, to obsolete social institutions is a pathological phenomenon. . . . Leaving children alone during the most violent crisis of their sexual development, without support or instruction, explanation or assurance, is cruel. . . .' At this early date he advises against overpampering or too severe punishment. He also explains the meaning and possible consequences of repression.

In the first appendix he supplements his former comments on repression with well-chosen comparisons. The second appendix is an advocation of psychoanalysis. To this end he includes a picture of a person who underwent psychoanalysis from which we quote because in it Ferenczi involuntarily revealed some facets of his own personality. 'A man with true self-knowledge becomes modest—apart from the exalted feeling created by this knowledge. He is lenient toward the faults of others, willing to forgive; moreover, from the principle "*tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*" he aspires only to understand—he does not feel justified to pardon. He analyzes the motives of his own emotions and thereby prevents their degeneration into passions. He watches with cheerful humor the human groups fighting under various banners; in his actions he is not led by loudly proclaimed morals, but by sober efficiency, and this incites him to watch over and to control those of his wishes whose gratification might offend the rights of other men without, however, denying their existence.'

Ferenczi met Freud personally only a few months prior to the Salzburg Congress but he was already well acquainted with Freud's writings. Having been a neuropsychiatrist for a decade, he recognized the tremendous significance of Freud's discoveries. His admiration for Freud's genius was obvious. This paper was not merely an echo of Freud's open letter on Doctor Fritz (1907), but a courageous challenge to the medical world of Hungary which had unequivocally rejected psychoanalysis.

Confusion of Tongues Between the Adult and the Child. Sándor Ferenczi. Pp. 225–230.

The original title of this paper was announced as The Passions of Adults and Their Influence on the Sexual and Character Development of Children. It was Ferenczi's last congress paper, read in 1932, and is a short extract of his carefully weighed views on the important role which adults play in the child's development.

Adults, not infrequently the parents themselves, can traumatize the child by subjecting him to one or more of three different attitudes: 'the passionate love', 'the passionate punishment', and 'the terrorism of suffering'.

The passionate love of the adult will all too frequently lead him to misuse the child for his own sexual gratification. Ferenczi emphasizes the fact that such abuses in childhood are not always just the fantasies of hysterical patients. Patients whose complete confidence had been won were able to 'establish a contrast between the present and the unbearable past', and by so doing could re-experience the past as an 'objective memory' rather than as a hallucinatory reproduction. Furthermore, patients in analysis often confess their sexual attacks on children.

The child who, even if playfully seductive, has only affectionate feelings for the adult, will be overpowered by the adult's sexual advances and paralyzed by pain and anxiety. 'The same anxiety, if it reaches a certain point, will compel the child to subordinate himself automatically to the will of the aggressor; to divine his desires and to gratify them; to completely efface himself, identifying with the aggressor.' The most important effect of this identification is the 'introjection of the guilt feelings of the adult'. Thus, the child, guilty through identification, does not dare to reveal his secret. Such a child can go through a profound character change: his sexual life may remain undeveloped or he may become a pervert; neurosis and psychosis are also possible consequences.

In the case of passionate punishment the child may experience a similar reaction. Ferenczi says: 'One part of the child's personality, indeed the nucleus, remains arrested at a level where it is not yet able to make use of alloplastic defenses, but operates in an autoplastic way, a kind of mimicry'.

The third traumatogenic agent is 'terrorism of suffering', that is, a sick, complaining mother who can make a lifetime nurse, a substitute mother, out of her own child, with complete disregard for the child's essential needs.

Traumatic experiences can provoke, in contrast to regressive phenomena, a pathological, precocious maturity. Every shock, every fright causes a split in the personality: one part of the personality regresses into the blissful state in which it existed prior to the trauma, in an attempt to undo the traumatic experience. Fragmentation may be caused by successive, manifold traumas—eventually it may result in a state which one would be justified in calling 'atomization'.

Ferenczi himself was not satisfied with this paper, which he began with the sentence: 'It was a mistake to try to confine the all too wide theme of the exogenous origin of character formations and neuroses within a Congress paper'. In addition, he was sidetracked by other issues which may have been a contributing factor in, if not responsible for his discontent with the presentation.

Based on his clinical material, Ferenczi undoubtedly felt himself to be on the threshold of important new comprehensions of human adaptation. Although he was not yet able to crystallize his thoughts, this reviewer feels that this paper is so rich in new ideas that Ferenczi's earnest advice to give serious consideration to it is imperative. Re-examination of this paper will open new vistas of many as yet little-understood character formations, perversions, and psychotic states.

Notes and Fragments (1930–1932). Sándor Ferenczi. Pp. 231–242.

The editor's note explains that these are the fourth or fifth part of the bulk of the notes, scribbled in four languages, which were found among Ferenczi's papers after his death. The notes were translated into German and published in the *Bausteine,* Volume IV.

We shall give only the dates and titles of those notes which were already included in Ferenczi's earlier publications: *Das unwillkomene Kind und sein Todestrieb*[1] (Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., IX, 1923); Thalassa[2] (1934); The Principle of Relaxation and Neocatharsis (Int. J. Psa., XI, 1930); *Kinderanalyse mit Erwachsenen*[3] (*Bausteine,* Volume III); Confusion of Tongues Between Adult and Child (Int. J. Psa., XXX, 1949). The others group themselves as follows:

8.10.1930. Oral Erotism in Education.
8.10.1930. Each Adaptation Is Preceded by an Inhibited Attempt at Splitting.
8.10.1930. Autoplastic and Alloplastic Adaptation.
8.24.1930. Thoughts on 'Pleasure in Passivity'.

In these fragments Ferenczi says that 'without far-reaching speculation' one cannot understand the pleasure in bearing 'unpleasure' or even enjoying 'unpleasure'. He qualifies three sources of masochistic pleasure: '1. Admiration for the greatness and power of the opponent . . . which could be called æsthetic pleasure. . . . 2. Enjoyment of one's own wisdom and intellectual superiority which is compared with the ruthlessly brutal, i.e., completely unintelligent opponent in one's own favor. . . . 3. The acknowledgment and appreciation of the naïve brutality of another ego (or force) has definitely something superior and maternal in it. . . . I have the feeling that with these points the motivation of the pleasure of self-destruction is far from being exhausted. . . .'

8.31.1930. Fundamental Traumatic Effect of Maternal Hatred or of the Lack of Affection.

This note refers to three patients who incessantly complained about maternal rejection from infancy on and who were consequently unable to establish satisfactory object relationships.

3.22.1931. Relaxation and Education.

A fragment expounded in the paper, Confusion of Tongues Between the Adult and the Child.

3.26.1931. On Revision of the Interpretation of Dreams.

Ferenczi states that '. . . instead of "the dream is a wish fulfilment", a more complete definition of the dream function would be: every dream, even an unpleasurable one, is an attempt at a better mastery and settling of traumatic experiences, so to speak, in the sense of an *esprit d'escalier*'. Even the recur-

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[1] Trans. *The Unwelcome Child and His Death Instinct.* Int. J. Psa., X, 1929.

[2] Trans. by Henry Alden Bunker: *Thalassa: A Theory of Genitality.* New York: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc., 1938.

[3] Trans. *Child Analysis in the Analysis of Adults.* Int. J. Psa., XII, 1931.

rence of the day's residue serves this function. Ferenczi substantiates his proposition with the observation that patients, after long years of treatment, typically have two or more dreams every night. Their first dream has no ideational content; they wake up from the deep sleep with a sudden shock. This is usually followed by a nightmare in which the patient is pursued by wild animals, attacked by robbers, or a young girl is lying in the bottom of a boat, deathly pale, and a huge man is oppressing her with his face. The analysis of this dream leads to infantile pleasurable and traumatic experiences with the father. Ferenczi writes: 'I regard the "primary dream" as the traumatic-neurotic repetition; the "secondary dream" as the partial settling of it without external help by means of narcissistic splitting'.

4.2.1931. Aphoristic Remarks on the Theme of Being Dead—Being a Woman.

This fragment contains some highly speculative thoughts, some of which had been expressed in Thalassa. '. . . we must arrive at the question whether the problem of the theory of genitality—the genesis of the differences of sexes—should not be regarded also as a phenomenon of adaptation, i.e., a partial death. If this is so, it is perhaps not impossible that the higher intellectual faculties which I assumed to exist in woman might be explained by her having experienced a trauma.' Speculating further, Ferenczi attributes a kind of clairvoyance to the person who suffered a trauma and adds, 'This could be the source of feminine intuition'.

9.14.1932. The Three Main Principles.

This fragment is again largely speculative. Ferenczi compares the principle of 'egoism' or 'autarchy' with the principle of 'altruism' or 'universality'. Autarchy is expressed in extreme materialism and mechanism, with little or no consideration of others except in expectation of a favorable return. The principle of 'universality' recognizes as justifiable only the existence of groups, i.e., 'mutual consideration, identification are justified—peace, harmony, voluntary renunciation are desirable because they alone are in harmony with reality'. Accordingly 'social guilt' will guard the individual against egoism, and 'ego indebtedness' will protect the followers of altruism from autarchy. The third principle would unify both tendencies.

9.19.1932. Suggestion = Action Without One's Own Will.

These are notes in connection with a case of conversion hysteria. 'Hysteria is a state of complete lack of will . . . and acceptance of another's will, as in childhood.' '. . . Question: is suggestion (healing) necessary after (or even during) the analysis?' '. . . Perhaps as a reparation for a former suggestion which *demanded only obedience;* this time a suggestion which awakens (or bestows) a power of individuality must be given. Consequently: 1. Regression to weakness; 2. Suggestion of power, increase of self-esteem in place of previous suggestion of obedience. . . .'

10.24.1932. The Therapeutic Argument.

'After several reproductions with unending suffering and without cs. recollection, an accidental interruption is followed by striking improvement and

feeling of independence. . . .' Ferenczi asks, 'Is this a sign of: 1. Correctness of interpretation? 2. The end of the period of reproduction? 3. The beginning of the period of *forgetting* (at least of the emotional actuality)? 4. The period of "healing" of the analytic wounds and pointing to possibilities which remain (Jung)?'

10.26.1932. Psychic Infantilism = Hysteria.

'Adult man has two systems of memory: 1. Subjective = emotions = bodily sensations. 2. Objective = projective sensations.' In children, 'the memory remains fixed to the body, and only there can it be awakened. . . . In the moment of trauma the world of objects disappears partially or completely; everything becomes objectless sensation.

'It is unjustifiable to demand in analysis that something should be *recollected consciously* which has never been conscious. Only *repetition* is possible, with subsequent objectivation for the first time *in the analysis*. *Repetition* of the trauma and *interpretation* (understanding) in contrast to the purely subjective "repression" are therefore the double task of analysis.'

10.30.1932. The Vulnerability of Traumatically Acquired Progressive Faculties (Also of Infant Prodigies).

This is a reference to several patients who had shown unusual ability and achievement which were apparently provoked by traumatic experiences. However, such reactive ability is usually transitory.

10.30.1932. The Two Extremes: Credulity and Scepticism.

' "Psychognostic", "Gnosis" = the view that it is impossible to reach by corresponding deep relaxation the direct experience in the past, which then may be accepted as true without any further interpretation.

'Scepticism: the idea that all thoughts and ideas must be examined first very critically and that they represent: 1. Absolutely nothing of the real happening, or 2. A very distorted version of it.'

11.10.1932. Suggestion in (after) Analysis.

'Only what is true may be suggested (to children and patients).' Only if the analyst is trusted, a trust which is gained only through understanding and truthfulness on the part of the analyst, can the analyst give helpful suggestions to the patient.

'Analysis is preparation for suggestion. The intrapsychic adjustment of cathexis of id-ego-superego is not sufficient. ("Synthesis"?) Friendly encouragement (possibly also some "electromagic") from another person makes the removal of the self-splitting possible and with it the "surrender" as a reintegrated person.'

Notes and Fragments was never considered for publication in its present form. These are intruding thoughts, memos in connection with patients, both technical and theoretical. They prove not only how conscientiously Ferenczi used to check and recheck his conceptions, but also that his technical and therapeutic propositions were based on scrupulously examined clinical observations.

Ten Letters to Freud. Sándor Ferenczi. Pp. 243–250.

According to the Editors' introduction, these ten letters were selected from among several hundred. 'The aim is to show Ferenczi as a scientist in full imaginative flight, as a critic of himself and as one who could take criticism, and above all to show his zest.' We hope that eventually the entire correspondence will be published and until then, have little to add to the Editors' remarks.

Some of the letters belong to three different periods of Ferenczi's relationship with Freud: the second and third to the period of mutual inspiration, when Ferenczi was not yet in analysis with Freud; the fourth and fifth show the influence of the transference and countertransference of his analysis; and the following two were written during the period in which Ferenczi was working consistently on his clinical research. The Editors say that these two were 'written during the crisis with Freud'. We doubt that Ferenczi would have consented to the expression 'crisis'. The letter from Capri dated 10.10.1931, belongs to this interval and we quote a sentence which throws light upon Ferenczi's tenderness and consideration in answering Freud's criticism: '*When you are able to travel again,*[1] you must not miss a long stay here'.

At the end of this same letter, Ferenczi characterizes his work in this way: 'I am above all empiric in my approach (you may think this strange in view of the mass of daring theoretical propositions which I have launched). My ideas always originate in the variations of response to treatment shown by my cases and I confirm or reject my hypotheses by reference to this material. I am also very careful as regards publication; perhaps too much so, so that in the intervals it may appear to many as if I had vanished from the scene.'

The subsequent letters also show that Ferenczi did everything in his power, short of stopping his research, to reassure Freud of his unswerving respect and loyalty.

FANNY HANN-KENDE

Love For the Mother and Mother-Love. Alice Balint. Pp. 251–259.

Freud derived object love from the self-preservative instincts through narcissism and auto-erotism. Alice Balint offers a variant theory: object love arises from the vicissitudes of an archaic love existing between mother and child. The child demands that the mother be without needs or interests of her own and that she ask nothing in return for her love. This demand, not governed by reality, we see in the love relationships of certain patients and most clearly in transference love. Conversely, the mother in this archaic, mutual love regards the child as hers, entirely at her disposal. Mother-child love therefore resembles that of the partners in coitus who need not be concerned about each other's needs for each automatically and perfectly satisfies the other.

But between the archaic mother-child love and coital love lies a period of development in which reality sense comes to govern the child as he perceives that he is replaceable and that the mother has interests of her own which he

[1] Italics abstracter's.

must respect. Auto-erotism, moreover, appears whenever love for the mother or other objects is frustrated.

Thus the 'archaic object relation without reality sense' of mother and child is modified into adult object love, with auto-erotism appearing as an alternative when it is needed.

GERARD FOUNTAIN

Infant and Mother. Endre Petö. Pp. 260–264.

This is a report on eight babies, from five days to seven months old, with breast feeding difficulties. In each case rejection of the newborn by the mother or an intercurrent conflict in the mother is adduced as the causative factor. Petö agrees with Ferenczi that 'the child can only be prevented by great tenderness from sliding back into nonexistence which is still near. If love and care are lacking, these destructive impulses soon begin to operate, and they have much more power at this early age than has been willingly assumed hitherto.' He also believes that 'even at the age of five days . . . object relations can be proved to exist'. He concludes: 'It is remarkable that, apart from mealtimes when they are very excited, the infants are quiet, self-sufficient and cheerful despite starvation. . . . One of the infants, aged eight weeks, was sucking his dummy also continuously. . . . If the object-libidinal cathexes are disturbed, they bring about a disturbance of the narcissistic libido, assuming that intake of food is—at least in part—an expression of narcissism. Thus it would seem that the fate of the narcissistic libido is dependent on the vicissitudes of the object libido which, apparently, shape the characteristic behavior of self-sufficiency and turning inward of the ill child. Our observed material seems to suggest that libidinous object cathexes are unconditionally necessary for the preservation of life.'

What Petö calls object cathexis of the five-day-old baby is simply empathy. He underestimates the megalomanic position of the baby who seems to assume that everything good comes from himself, everything bad from the outside. There are good reasons for Freud's assumption that the baby at first believes that the breast (or bottle) is part of himself. The sequence of events is as follows: the fantasy of self-sufficiency, followed much later by depositions of narcissistic libido outside, which is then, according to Freud, called 'object libido'. Petö seems to reverse the process, hence does not explain why these starving children were so 'cheerful despite starvation'. Moreover, the author concentrates with unjustified one-sidedness on bad or disturbed mothers, hence shifts the blame exclusively to them, despite the fact that there are enough feeding difficulties in children with good mothers. The child's development is not a direct photographic copy of the environment; the child itself contributes something—its own misconceptions (projections) and elaborations. If this were not so, the idyllic formula of naïve educators would apply: ideal bringing-up results in ideal children. Clinical experience seems not to confirm this gratuitous assumption: there are normal children in 'neurotic' homes and neurotic children in 'happy' homes. The accent is on the child's own elaboration; that unfavorable external circumstances aggravate the mass of unavoidable infantile conflicts is, of course, true.

EDMUND BERGLER

Early Developmental States of the Ego. Primary Object Love. Michael Balint. Pp. 265–273.

Michael Balint describes the state of 'primary object love', an early developmental phase arrived at from divergent approaches in the Budapest School (A. and M. Balint, I. Hermann). Primary object love must occur very early in life, and all later object relationships can be traced back to it. This form of object relation is not linked to any erotogenic zone, 'but is something on its own'. Its biological basis is the instinctual interdependence of mother and child (dual-unit). The instinctual gratification in this phase never goes beyond the forepleasure, i.e., 'the tranquil, quiet sense of well-being'. The early severance of this relationship accounts for the later manifestations in infancy of increased clinging and insatiable greed. Numerous observations of infant behavior support the assumption of this phase of primary object love and thus contradict the theory, and question the existence of primary narcissism.

Since the date of this paper (1937) the concept of primary narcissism has been clarified and it does encompass the 'fused' mother-child relationship in which the cathexis between self and object is indistinct. There is also clinical evidence that the instinctual goal in this phase is a melting together with the mother through the achievement of identical temperature.

ROBERT C. BAK

Psychiatric Quarterly. XXIV, 1950.

Further Studies on Depersonalization. Edmund Bergler. Pp. 268–277.

The depersonalized neurotic labors under the following conflict: an anal-exhibitionistic repressed wish is warded off with pleasurable self-voyeurism; that defense is in turn prohibited by the superego and a secondary unconscious defense is installed: 'I don't peep at myself, I just mournfully observe my sickness'. The constant self-observation, which is an integral part of the condition, is concerned with beating fantasies. Depersonalization seems to represent one of the many possible—though typical—attenuated end results of the 'a child is being beaten' fantasy executed by means of scoptophilia. The buttocks in these fantasies represent breasts.

Transference in Psychotherapy. Samuel R. Lehrman. Pp. 532–542.

Lehrman defines transference as a spontaneous phenomenon, repetitively lived out as an emotional and behavioral experience, with the complete repression (i.e., forgetting) of the original experience. Transference phenomena have the same meaning for patients as posthypnotic suggestions. The transference attitudes are displaced to new and other ideas from those to which they belong. The patient rationalizes and feels somewhat uncomfortable but does not fully understand his behavior. He expresses the repressed not in memory but in action.

The main psychotherapeutic forces are the patient's transferences to the physician and his capacity for testing reality. The transference is used to mitigate the conflict and to increase the patient's ability to recognize reality.

The Self-Dedication of the Psychoneurotic Sufferer to Hostile Protests and Revenge. Izette de Forest. Pp. 706–715.

Innate forces in the child, particularly his drives toward growth and self-expression and his need for love, are in conflict with the more powerful directing and restricting influences of the parents to which the child has to submit. Angry and hostile reactions to the parents are repressed because of the need for love but they persist as powerful unconscious forces leading to a variety of neurotic symptoms and character disturbances. The patient hides from himself and from others his unwitting dedication to a life of hostile revenge which is acted out in interpersonal relations and in self-sabotage. The neurosis is not only a cry for love and nourishment but also an attempt to punish all adults. Three cases are given illustrating this thesis which refers exclusively to the environmental causation of neurosis.

Spontaneous Remission of Schizophrenic Psychosis Following Maternal Death. Max Cohen and Louis M. Lipton. Pp. 716–725.

Three cases are reported of remissions of acute schizophrenic psychoses shortly after maternal death. The psychodynamics are not elucidated because probing into the meaning to the patients of the deaths of their mothers was considered dangerous. While many schizophrenic patients do not improve after maternal death, it seems justified in these three cases to assume such an effect for the following reasons: all three patients were young and suffered from first attacks of relatively recent onset; all their mothers were actively involved in the delusional and hallucinatory systems; all of the patients were dominated by their mothers and suffered feelings of guilt concerning them. The illnesses of these patients seemed to represent flights from the temptations and frustrations imposed by the mothers, whose deaths allowed an adaptation to a less irritating and provocative reality.

BERNHARD BERLINER

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic. XV, 1951.

Personality Factors in Osteoarthritis. Henry Lihn, Karl Menninger, Martin Mayman. Pp. 1–5.

This paper attempts to establish those personality characteristics which distinguish the sufferer from osteoarthritis from persons who develop other types of illness. The authors' findings are based on data obtained from psychiatric interviews, reactions of the patients on the ward, and the analyses of psychological tests.

Of the twenty cases studied, all were to some degree neglected or rejected by their parents in childhood. Most of them exhibited overt childhood psychopathology, such as temper tantrums, enuresis, phobias, etc. These patients were competitive in adolescence, but were poor sports and subject to quick tempers and impulsive outbursts. Their relationship to people was superficial, opportunistic, cold, and unstable. This is true for the wife, the child, the friend and the boss. In the majority of cases the onset of the specific somatic affliction was precipitated by the threat of desertion or the actual desertion by the wife.

It seems that the osteoarthritis is an attempt to control motility, since motility for these patients is dangerously close to the emergence of violent aggressions. The illness also appeases superego demands through the feeling of painful attrition. Thus a relative equilibrium is established at the price of physical crippling.

The Effect of Baby Bottle Feedings on a Schizophrenic Patient. Leonard J. Duhl. Pp. 21–25.

This case demonstrates how a markedly regressed schizophrenic patient, who had not responded to various treatment programs, improved when efforts were made to partially satisfy his infantile needs by means of baby bottle feedings. The diagnosis was schizophrenic reaction, hebephrenic type. During some four years of hospitalization he was given electroshock treatments, occupational therapy, and psychotherapy to no avail. The patient could not develop any kind of meaningful object relationship and became consistently more withdrawn and apathetic. Since he was constantly drinking, drooling, and smoking, it was decided that he could be approached only by satisfying his predominant oral needs. The patient was then started on milk feedings three times daily, using an eight-ounce baby bottle and nipple, in addition to his regular diet. He improved quickly but regressed when it was decided to substitute hourly feedings of food and candy for the bottle. When bottle feedings were resumed the patient continued to improve to the point of establishing and maintaining enough object relationship to leave the institution.

The Secret. Alfred Gross. Pp. 37–44.

Gross's paper was originally published in Italian, then in German and finally in English—a distinction it deserves. He describes the different meanings of a secret in everyday life, in literature, and in patients undergoing analysis. In the unconscious one finds a reaction to secrets similar to that toward secretions in general; it is a frequent finding in analysis that when a patient has confided a secret this is apt to coincide with an urge to discharge from one or another excretory organ. Secrets, therefore, undergo the vicissitudes of the anal and phallic phases of libidinal development. In the anal stage the secret can be perceived as a possession which is to be retained or expelled. In the phallic phase there is a tendency to use the secret exhibitionistically. Later on, the secret may be conceived of as a gift, as a means of initiating friendship or of establishing intimacy. The importance of the secret shifts from the primary emphasis on content to a later emphasis on function. By and large secrets originate as derivatives of the œdipal conflicts. The child in attempting to cope with his œdipal wishes may identify the secret with the adults' sexuality and by this or other means internalize the secret as a substitute formation.

The Influence of Unconscious Factors on Hypnotizability. Gerald A. Ehrenreich. Pp. 45–57.

This paper is a contribution to the study of the interesting phenomenon that hypnotizability is not a static property of an individual but seems to be a fairly

fluid characteristic. Ehrenreich describes a case which demonstrates the unconscious factors responsible for a patient's inability to respond to certain hypnotic suggestions. In this instance the patient who could be brought into a deep hypnotic trance was unable to accept the suggestion that her hands would remain stuck fast together. Ehrenreich hypnotized the patient on thirteen different occasions and finally discovered that the patient's inability to keep her hands clasped was based on a highly traumatic sexual experience in her childhood. This leads him to conclude that hypnosis is experienced in a highly personal fashion and that the major missing links in our understanding of hypnotizability are probably to be found in the unconscious needs, wishes, prohibitions, etc. of the individual.

RALPH R. GREENSON

Psychiatry. XIII, 1950.

The Place of Action in Personality Change. Allen Wheelis. Pp. 135–148.

Psychoanalytic theory has failed to elucidate explicitly the process whereby psychotherapy effects personality change. To understand what happens in therapy it is necessary to know how personality change in general occurs. By reasoning from the basic function of the psychic apparatus to discharge tension, Wheelis arrives at the conclusion that it is action which leads to personality change. The kind of action initiated to discharge tension is usually determined by the customary mode of behavior of the personality as currently constituted. However, because not all problems can be solved within the framework of the already established modes of behavior, the individual is impelled to initiate new modes of behavior. One action by itself is usually insufficient to establish the new mode because only when sufficient energy has flown through the newly employed channel does it become an established mode of behavior to which the rest of the personality adjusts itself. The new mode of behavior produces alterations in emotional attitudes and in thought processes. Thinking or fantasying by themselves cannot produce a personality change since not enough psychic energy is discharged to effect a rechanneling of energy. Therapy effects personality change only in so far as it leads a patient to adopt a new mode of behavior. An alteration merely in thinking or feeling will not produce a personality change, which explains why insight alone is insufficient to produce a therapeutic result. Between the therapist's interpretation and the personality change in the patient, action must intervene. The initiation of a new mode of behavior usually first occurs in therapy with the therapist the object of the released impulse. However, unless the larger part of a mutative experience is acted out outside of therapy, a lasting personality change is not effected.

S. GABE

A Pilot Study of Psychoanalytic Practice in the United States With Suggestions for Future Studies. Lawrence S. Kubie. Pp. 227–245.

The basis of this study is the response to questionnaires sent to recognized psychoanalysts in this country. The questionnaires were designed to elicit such facts as the fees charged per session, gross analytic incomes, the number of

sessions per week per patient, the analyst's age at the start of analytic practice, the sex and age distribution of patients in various analytic centers, and so on.

Of the answers received, between 42.5 and 49 percent were usable. It seems that at the time of the questionnaires the average fee was $14.50 per session. The number of weekly hours varied between 2.5 and 5. As far as analytic incomes are concerned, it seems that analysts do a little better in the middle group compared with physicians in general, but not as well as specialists in other specialties who receive higher incomes. The ages of analysts when they start analytic practice ranges from twenty-eight to forty-eight years with a majority starting around thirty-six. The paper is of great interest in all its details and in its twelve suggestions for further research.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Some Aspects of the Derogatory Attitudes Toward Female Sexuality. Clara Thompson. Pp. 349–354.

Thompson asserts that male analysts including Freud were hampered in understanding female psychology because one sex has no adequate means of identifying with the experiences of the other. She theorizes that actual envy of the penis as such is not as important in the psychology of women as their envy of the position of privilege and alleged superiority enjoyed by the male in our society. This position is symbolized by the possession of a penis.

Cultural attitudes, especially of the Victorian era, placed a premium on male sexuality and permitted the man to express his sexual needs while erroneously supposing that female sexual needs were practically nonexistent. To have sexual urges was supposed to be not feminine. Childbearing as an aspect of woman's sexual life has diminished in importance in many situations. The cultural attitude of the male's undervaluation of female sexuality has a negative effect on the female's self-esteem. There is also a derogation of the female genitalia, not in terms of comparison with the penis but rather an undervaluation of the female organs arrived at by cultural measurements. Lack of sphincter control, uncleanliness and odor, which may be associated with the female genitalia are contrary to cultural values. With these deprecatory cultural attitudes in the background of women's lives, it is to be expected that there must be important points at which difficulties in interpersonal relations are expressed.

A Philosophy of Personality. Patrick Mullahy. Pp. 417–439.

An approach to the interpersonal theory is made from different viewpoints as expressed in various contributions of certain sciences and philosophies. John Dewey, Ashley Montagu, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Gardner Murphy are among the sources used. The theories of contemporary science and philosophy have changed our concept of the world from a mechanistic-materialistic viewpoint which postulated isolated, self-contained immutable substances, to a concept of the world in terms of 'collective goings-on, interrelated processes or events'. Personality is a product of two dynamic and mutually interdependent processes of transmission, the one hereditary, the other sociocultural (operating by means of learning through symbolic communication). Dependency and interdependency is a basic characteristic of life and therefore coöperation is fundamental to

living, in contrast to competition, destructive aggression, and the struggle for survival which are not. Human activity and experience is profoundly affected by the social and cultural environment, by interpersonal relations. Mind is constituted by more or less organized systems of meaning-systems (symbols) pertaining to various areas, i.e. religious, ethical, scientific, daily life, and others. Lack of personality integration may be expressed by incompatibility, confusion, rigid compartmentalization, or poor development of meaning-systems. A distinction between mind and consciousness is made. The validity of the concept of needs and drives (demands for satisfactions and security) is affirmed, but these are conceived as outcomes of organism-environment instabilities and relations and not as independent entities within the organism. Anxiety-tension and activities for the purpose of its abatement ('security operations') are evoked when anything disturbs one's established patterns of interpersonal relations. Individuality is a unique manner of acting in and with a world of objects and persons. The achievement of individuality is the achievement of self-realization. Self-realization has two essential psychological conditions: the harmonious development of personality along lines of security, and second, the achievement of self-respect and the respect of others without serious conflict and anxiety provoking tendencies.

HARRY H. NIERENBERG

American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. XX, 1950.

Values, Acculturation and Mental Health. A. Irving Hallowell. Pp. 732–743.

Hallowell studies the effects of a disintegrating culture on the personalities of the Ojibway Indians. Outwardly the natives resemble white men in their behavior but deeper investigation shows marked differences. Tracing the tribal values that have been handed down by tradition, Hallowell finds a predominant trend toward passive dependency on nature and superhuman spirits which actually stood the people in good stead in their ancient conditions of life. With exposure to new economic and cultural influences, the older values are detrimental but still prevail beneath the outer conformance to the white man's civilization. Passive dependency now manifests itself in drunkenness, in the failure to seek employment and in a resultant loss of self-regard. Aggression, which had formerly found its outlet in the secret practice of sorcery, now erupts in outbursts of hostility and in crime.

Hallowell holds that culture plays an integrative role in the development and functions of the personality. In the present plight of the Ojibways there is evidence that this integrative process does not take place and that consequently there is a frustration of maturing tendencies, if not actual regression. The Rorschach data on these tribes show little difference between adults and children.

Family Diagnosis: an Approach to the Preschool Child. Nathan W. Ackerman and Raymond Sobel. Pp. 744–753.

Ackerman and Sobel undertake to describe the personalities of preschool children not as separate organizations but as functional parts of the family

group. This approach requires a study of the parents and the siblings with particular emphasis on 'the functions and patterns of interaction of the parents at each stage in the history of their relationship, leading up to the point where the parental relationship and the individual personalities of each parent accommodate to the admission of the child into the family group'.

A clinic team is used to obtain the necessary data. The family is then grouped according to its internal dynamics and social position and the child's problems described in terms of the adjustive behavior required to maintain equilibrium within the disturbed family constellation. The methodology for this approach is still in the process of evolution. Problems of treating one family in such terms are described.

Notes on the Impact of Parental Occupations: Some Cultural Determinants of Symptom Choice in Emotionally Disturbed Children. Bruno Bettelheim and Emmy Sylvester. Pp. 785–795.

Bettelheim and Sylvester discuss the meaning of the father's occupation to the child as he enters upon the latency period. In the cases studied, relations with the mother had been severely disturbed before the œdipal phase, and a correspondingly greater interest in the father had developed. Since experiences with the mother had taught the children to be distrustful, the vaguely understood occupations of the father acquired a threatening character.

To the son of a stockbroker, the father's activities represented a secret magic juggling of figures which resulted in a constant flow of money. The boy spent countless hours manipulating and writing down numbers as a means of testing and acquiring the father's powers. The only subject he seemed able to learn in class was arithmetic. Aspects of his general orientation were revealed in his predilection for constructing burglarproof buildings of which his father, and later he himself, was the owner. During the course of therapy, the magic preoccupation with the paternal profession tended to disappear as the child developed his own interests and resources.

One boy who was constantly concerned with poisons and intricate apparatus was the son of a biochemist. However, the father's occupation merely molded but did not instigate his delusions. Not only the profession of the parent but the attitude of the family and of society toward this profession are conveyed to the child in subtle ways and become factors that make for anxiety or reassurance.

MARK KANZER

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry. LXIV, 1950.

Effects of ACTH in Patients With Mental Disease. Mark D. Altschule, Elaine Promisel, Barbara H. Parkhurst, Henry Grunebaum. Pp. 641–649.

The authors attempt to compare the effect of ACTH on the adrenal cortex function of psychotic and nonpsychotic patients. It seems that psychotic patients respond with greater than normal changes in carbohydrate metabolism after the injection of ACTH than do normals. Otherwise, the eosinophile count, uric acid and sweat sodium concentration were not significantly different.

In addition, the authors injected large amounts of ACTH into two manic depressive psychotics. No improvement was noted.

One Operation Cures Three People: Effect of Prefrontal Leucotomy in a Case of *Folie à deux et demie*. Maurice Partridge. Pp. 792–796.

Partridge describes a woman, age sixty-one, who suffered from the delusion that insects infested her house, hair, and ears. Her husband fully participated in this delusion, but her thirty-seven-year-old daughter did so only when in the mother's home. The author therefore describes this as a case of *folie à deux et demie*. Eventually the mother was treated by a prefrontal leucotomy and lost the delusion. Partridge maintains that the other two affected persons 'have been fully cured in that neither has any current symptoms while both have insight'.

RALPH R. GREENSON

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CXII, 1950.

Psychiatry and Religion. Iago Galdston. Pp. 46–57.

Galdston states that there is a psychological substratum in religion, a thesis easy to accept. However, he reveals that the thinking which permitted him to arrive at this conclusion is not scientific. He really means that man is predisposed to religion. His is a rather mystical conception and not a psychological theory. He brings 'proof': '. . . I myself not only subscribe to the existence and to the operation of the psychologic substratum of religion, but further contend that the most crystal-clear demonstration of its being in operation is to be found in the theoretical framework and in the clinical and other achievements of modern dynamic psychiatry, the psychiatry of Freud, Jung, and Meyer'. He equates the soul and the psychological substratum of religion and says that the denial of one is tantamount to a denial of the other. He makes an excursion into what he calls an analysis of his own emotional response to technicians and craftsmen (he seems to share the attitude toward technicians which is said to have been true of the ancient Greeks) in which he decides that technicians have an 'entirely central vision'. A neat piece of argumentation then follows which states that modern science is a technique and therefore it too has central vision. He now comes to full grips with the issues of his thesis by defining psychoanalysis and reminding us of Freud's use of the phrase 'archaic inheritance' with which Jung did 'much better' in his descriptions of the collective unconscious. These statements of Galdston's are supposed to be psychologic proof of the existence of a force which is an impulsion to religion in man and is part of some *élan vital* to be noted prenatally and postnatally. He does not rest his case on this 'psychological hypothesis'; he adduces 'biologic' and 'clinical' proof. The 'biologic' proof is that since man is subject to powerful antipedal stresses (which need be 'culturally interpreted' for him), he stands in need of 'reconciliation between his mortal self and his immortal end'. The clinical proof derives from Galdston's experience with 'psychopaths' who have a 'weak or lacking superego' and 'cannot be helped unless their superego is strengthened'. It is a little mysterious as to how this

proves the thesis. The psychoanalytic exposition of the psychology of religion by numerous authors is neglected by Galdston.

Family Role in Diagnosis and Treatment of Offenders. David Abrahamsen and Rose Palm. Pp. 311–321.

Abrahamsen and Palm present the case of a twenty-one-year-old man who, because of certain antisocial behavior, required treatment. The entire family was investigated by personal interviews and Rorschach examination. This approach led the authors to a 'new evaluation of the offender, both with regard to the nature of the delinquency, and to his treatment'. The theoretical reasoning to justify their conclusions is vague since much is implicit as though the reader were already familiar with the six papers by Abrahamsen referred to in the text and bibliography. Perhaps it is this vagueness of theoretical reasoning which gives the reviewer the impression that the authors are building a rather loosely jointed therapeutic theory of their own which marries sociological, practical, dynamic and personal concepts without regard to scientific accuracy. These comments do not invalidate the approach used which could be easily justified both pragmatically and heuristically.

Psychopathological Aspects of Deafness. Adolf Zeckel. Pp. 322–346.

This paper is an excellent beginning in the psychological exposition of the problems of the deaf. Zeckel is fully aware of the shortcomings of his observations and deductions. He offers them at the present time only as a preliminary report of the work conducted at the Vanderbilt Clinic with the deaf. He reports a large group of cases briefly to show some of the factors which appear to be important in the production of the emotional constellations encountered in the deaf. In his discussion he gives a short review of the brief literature available (Berry, Fenichel, Fentress, Fowler, Goldstein, Menninger, Solomon, Wells). He concludes that deaf people have no typical characteristics, that those who made a nonneurotic adjustment prior to deafness accept the deprivation and may be able to see advantages and make a good compensation. Zeckel is impressed by the theory that deafness is an unconscious punishment symbolizing castration. He agrees with Fenichel's remarks concerning the economic distribution of libidinal energy while he discounts the usual conception that the deaf are paranoid, though he is cognizant of the development of 'being on the alert' often characteristic of the deaf as a defense compensating for their handicap. Zeckel stresses the fact that many of the problems arise from the simple fact that the communications of the ego of the deaf with the outside world are impaired, bringing discouragement and resentment.

VICTOR CALEF

Mental Hygiene. XXXIV, 1950.

The Present Status of Research in Dementia Præcox. William Malamud. Pp. 554–568.

Malamud visited seventy-five North American institutions engaged in study and research on dementia præcox. Basic research, sometimes indistinguishable

from practice, was found 'definitely in the lead', qualitatively and quantitatively, in the field of child development and biochemistry. Numerous investigations are also being conducted in the areas of anthropology, sociology, psychosurgery, constitutional factors, neurology and many others. There is in some instances a regrettable duplication of research efforts and an equally regrettable unawareness of supplementary or correlative work which could with profit be utilized by research workers.

What Do We Know About Dementia Præcox? Nolan D. C. Lewis. Pp. 569–581.

Current theories fall into two categories: 1, schizophrenia is an abnormal reaction pattern originating in early life; 2, it is organically determined, of unknown cause and obscure pathology. Lewis briefly reviews some of the historical highlights, and prevailing orientations in thinking about schizophrenia. Many writers stress the complexities of our civilization as important in its etiology. Among current productive types of research he mentions drug effects on the brain, neurological studies, brain extirpations, various forms of psychological investigation and Kallmann's studies of twins.

JOSEPH LANDER

British Journal of Medical Psychology. XXI, 1948 and XXII, 1949.

Unconscious Form-Creation in Art. Anton Ehrenzweig. Parts 1 & 2, pp. 88–109. Parts 3 & 4, pp. 185–214.

Part I. Starting with a critique of gestalt theory in relation to the understanding of form creation in Art, Anton Ehrenzweig introduces a psychology of perception fundamentally different from surface perception. Depth vision is gestalt-free. In contrast to traditional art, modern art dispenses with the surface gestalt and lays bare the automatic creations of our depth mind. It seems that our culture quite generally values the surface mind but little, looks for deeper insight beyond the limits of our rationality. Even in science, creative thinking begins with a state of 'fluid vision', from which later, rational ideas emerge. Not only creative thinking, but all creative activity consists of a fluid, gestalt-free vision out of which emerge definite form ideas which can be grasped by the surface mind. The origin of æsthetic feeling is traced back to a primeval sexual crisis, which might also be the origin of the sexual form play of the depth mind and its conversion into the æsthetic experience. The breakdown of rationality in our time allows the unconscious form play to come forward again and disintegrate the surface gestalt.

Part II. The distressing effect of gestalt-free perception may be avoided by transmuting it into a stylized ornamental pattern. Ehrenzweig discusses the theories of Nietzsche and compares Dionysus with the id of psychoanalysis and Apollo with the superego. Æsthetic pleasure serves to keep attention fixed on the surface gestalt by appealing to the all-powerful pleasure principle. Without it one could not explain the permanent success of secondary elaboration into style. According to the author's theory of dynamics, the æsthetic feeling could be formed only to destroy Dionysian emotion, which is probably sexual excitement elicited by the sight of the mate. The example of different tendencies in the interrelation of clothing and style is extensively used. Fashion becomes 'old

fashioned' when it has lost its faculty to excite but has not yet matured into a style.

Part III. The child does not possess the faculty of abstract gestalt perception. Neither has it yet fully suppressed the pangenital significance of real things. The style and geometry of Greek culture is explained as a secondary elaboration of a 'Dionysian Break Through'. The Greeks felt that their æsthetic play with abstract form must also possess a rational meaning and they discovered in geometry the only science in which they excelled.

Part IV. Details are given of the author's theories concerning the constancy of science, of brightness, and of color. The scientist, like the artist, contemplates in his creative vision only his own internal world. Science is connected with 'conscience'. The Bible states that the first knowledge was bought at the price of eternal guilt—the guilt of the woman and the devil serpent which was cleverer than the other animals in paradise. The compelling illusions of external guilt and compulsion, which are found in art and science, would help us to escape from guilt and compulsion within. Originally man explained disaster exclusively in relation to his own guilt. When a disaster occurred, its cause had to be the guilt of the primitive man. Freud found that the rise of new religious beliefs in the Mediterranean peasant two thousand years ago was preceded by an inarticulate feeling of anxiety and guilt connected with the unconscious memory of primal patricide. The rise of modern scientific belief was preceded by a wave of much stronger feelings of guilt and anxiety among the European people as expressed in the medieval witch hunt. It is not coincidental that the only intellectual occupation of many half-educated people is the reading of crime stories. Nothing stimulates intellectual curiosity more than a plot full of unexplained guilt.

Ehrenzweig's thoughts and formulations are extremely interesting and may stimulate present far-reaching applications of analytic principles to the understanding of art form creations. The last pages, pointing to psychodynamic connections between art and science, are extremely thought-provoking if applied to the present time.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Samiksa. IV, 1950.

Boredom of Anticipation ('Pseudo Boredom'). Edmund Bergler. Pp. 19–23.

Boredom is described as an attitude, the result of a combination of an inhibition of voyeurism, inadequate sublimations and concomitant self torture. Pseudo boredom is described as a normal unconscious ego defense against remnants of masochistic reproaches following an external aggressive encounter, when the final results of the encounter are still unknown. A clinical example is outlined to illustrate this mechanism.

DAVID MORGAN

A Contribution to the Psychodynamics of Depression in Women. Melitta Sperling. Pp. 86–101.

The birth of a younger brother constitutes a pathognomonic trauma in the life of girls, productive of a primary depression and predisposing to depression in

later life. This conclusion Sperling derived from the analyses of six depressive women patients. Concise reports of two of the analyses are included in this paper to indicate the nature of the material on which the conclusions are based. In these two cases, as well as in the other material, the displacement of oral envy of the penis following the birth of a younger brother produced the primary depression. The depression could be overcome by controlling the mother and later the mother surrogates of the opposite sex. Not to be in control of the love object was synonymous with being castrated and brought on depression. Control over the object could be achieved either actively or passively. On the phallic level, active control could be achieved through possession of a penis. The feminine role was rejected as inferior and replaced by an unconscious masculinity, as indicated by masturbation fantasies. The entire body represented a phallus. Failure on this level caused regression to the oral level and attempts at passive control through the breast. The conflict in the regressed phase was internalized, and the struggle with the object was carried on by means of introjection and ejection, leading to depression.

S. GABE

Psiquis. I, No. 8, 1950. Mexico D.F., Mexico.

Traffic Dangers to the School Population in the Federal District (Mexico City).

This is an abstract of papers presented at the First National Congress for Traffic Safety by R. A. Paredes, A. R. Esparza, I. S. Macedo, and N. Trevino.

It was agreed that the driver's psychological motives—the need to compensate for feelings of inferiority, guilt feelings projected onto the other driver, projection of 'ego boundaries' onto the car, etc.—were largely responsible for traffic accidents. The car of the Mexican male driver has become for him a symbol of his peculiar 'maleness' (*machismo*), a 'maleness' in the interests of which it is necessary to break laws with impunity.

The pedestrian concomitantly is respected neither by driver nor policeman, and has been forced to adapt himself to traffic hazards with consummate skill as a life-saving measure. However, since neither the young nor the aged are able to 'dance' through traffic with a reasonable life expectancy, remedial measures were strongly recommended. These would take the form of mental hygiene clinics established expressly for the purpose of screening drivers-to-be—both physically and psychologically—to eliminate all those whose personality traits make them 'too great a risk to be trusted behind a wheel'.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

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Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Herbert F. Waldhorn

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NOTES

THE SIGMUND FREUD ARCHIVES was incorporated in the State of New York on February 14, 1951. Organized by a group of internationally eminent psychoanalysts, the aim, as stated in the charter, is 'to discover, assemble, collect and preserve manuscripts, publications and other documents and information relating to the biography of the late Sigmund Freud, and to his medical, psychoanalytic and other scientific activities'. This is the first attempt to obtain and preserve for posterity a complete compilation of Freud's published and unpublished writings. Under an agreement with the Library of Congress, which will serve as curator of the collection, confidential material will be restricted at the request of the donor.

The initial projects of the Archives include collecting all letters to and from Freud; establishing a complete and reliable bibliography of his writings; interviewing all persons who knew Freud personally—regardless of how well they knew him or in what function, whether as friend, brief acquaintance, or as his patient.

Anyone who is in possession of letters or who knows of persons who have such letters, and those who knew Freud personally, are urged to communicate with the Archives at 575 Madison Avenue, New York 22, N. Y.

OFFICERS of the Archives are: Bertram D. Lewin, M.D., President; Marie Bonaparte, Henri Flournoy, M.D., Heinz Hartmann, M.D., Willie Hoffer, M.D., Ernest Jones, M.D., Jeanne Lampl-De Groot, M.D., and Philipp Sarasin, M.D., Vice-Presidents; K. R. Eissler, M.D., Secretary; Ruth S. Eissler, M.D., Treasurer.

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CUSTODIAN OF THE ARCHIVES: The Library of Congress.

The Midwinter Meetings of the AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION were held at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York on December 6, 7, 8, and 9, 1951. Thursday, December 6th, was devoted to an all-day meeting of the Executive Council. The Board on Professional Standards met Thursday evening, December 6th and Friday morning, December 7th. The Business Meeting of the members was held on Sunday morning, December 9th. Friday afternoon, Saturday and Sunday all day were given to the scientific sessions which included round-table discussions as well as individual papers. A dinner dance was held on Saturday evening; a reception and cocktail party late Sunday afternoon.

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

May 15, 1951. ON THE PRINCIPAL OBSCENE WORD OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE—AN INQUIRY, WITH HYPOTHESIS, REGARDING ITS ORIGIN AND PERSISTENCE. Leo Stone, M.D.

Dr. Stone's linguistic and etymological investigations revealed that the word 'fuck' has persisted longer in the English language than all similar terms in both usage and taboo, and that its derivation is obscure.

A female patient had the obsessional thought, 'I want to fuck (occasionally 'rape' or 'kill') the analyst'. Analysis showed that her aggressive, masculine wishes were used as a defense against a deeply repressed passive trend associated with a wish to suck.

It was suggested that there might be a general unconscious association between the words 'fuck' and 'suck' among English-speaking people; that the word related to the first object relationship ('suck') might find representation in the other one related to the second great biological expression of object relationship, sexual intercourse, with a reversal of the situation in regard to activity-passivity. From these and other impressions the hypothesis was developed that the rhyme between 'fuck' and 'suck' might have been an important unconscious determinant in the linguistic fixation and taboo of the former in general usage, regardless of its origin. The introduction of and widespread addiction to tobacco in England in the sixteenth century might have heightened the conflict about the word 'fuck', whose resemblance and relationship to 'suck' was already unconsciously important. During the period of the rapid spread of smoking the word 'fuck' disappeared from dictionaries and from polite usage.

Dr. Ernst Kris agreed that such studies contributed to the reformulation of the antecedents of the œdipus complex, and also noted that shifts in the distribution of passive and active attitudes in individual behavior could be reflected in social usage, speech, and symbolism. Dr. Géza Róheim doubted that the relationship noted between these two words existed in other languages, or that general psychological conclusions could be deduced from it. Dr. I. Peter Glauber and Dr. Max Schur cited clinical examples linking orality and genitality in the conflicts of patients who indulged in certain compulsive usages of the word. Dr. Phyllis Greenacre commented on disturbed orality as a contribution to speech disturbance, where, as part of sibling rivalry, there were marked interest, envy, and rage reactions toward the breast. Dr. Abram Blau and Dr. Rudolph M. Loewenstein discussed the linguistic aspects of the presentation, and Dr. Blau noted the deficiency of a slang or obscene word for the clitoris in English.

HERBERT F. WALDHORN

Under the auspices of the PARIS PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY, Dr. Sacha Nacht presiding, the fourteenth conference of French psychoanalysts met on November 1, 1951 at the *Clinique des Maladies Mentales et de l'Encéphale*, 1 rue Cabanis, Paris. The subject of the conference was The Problem of Transference. The theoretical aspect was presented by Professor Daniel Lagache; the clinical by Dr. Marc Schlumberger.

The newly elected officers of the ARGENTINE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION are: President, Dr. Enrique Pichon-Riviere, Copérnico 2350, Buenos Aires; Secretary, Dr. Luis Rascovsky, Larrea 934, Buenos Aires; Treasurer, Dr. Marie Langer, Arenales 3583, Buenos Aires; Publishing Director, Dr. Arnaldo Rascovsky, Suipacha 1368, Buenos Aires; and Director of the Institute, Dr. Angel Garma, Arenales 3569, Buenos Aires.

The CUBAN SOCIETY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY has elected the following officers for the year 1951–1952: President, Dr. Jose Angel Bustamante; President-elect, Dr. Oscar Sagredo; Secretary, Dr. Jose Perez Villar; Assistant Secretary, Dr. Francisco Aguero; Treasurer, Dr. Armando Cordova; Assistant Treasurer, Dr. Carlos Acosta; Voting Member, Dr. Miguel Angel Nin.

Dr. Arthur Hiler Ruggles delivered the 1951 THOMAS WILLIAM SALMON LECTURES at the New York Academy of Medicine. His subject was The Place and Scope of Psychotherapy, presented on the evenings of November 7th, 14th and 20th. Dr. Ruggles is a former president of the American Psychiatric Association and of the National Committee for Mental Health. During World War II he was consultant to the Secretary of War and chairman of the Committee on War Psychiatry. He is at present general consultant to Butler Hospital, Providence, Rhode Island, of which he was superintendent for twenty-six years, and special consultant to the Emma Pendleton Bradley Home in Providence.

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