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THE EMOTIONAL PROBLEM AND THE THERAPEUTIC ROLE OF INSIGHT

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I

It is always baffling and even a little discouraging to find that throughout history many discoveries and inventions have gained currency without preservation of the name of the given discoverer or inventor in the memory of man, and that the discovery or the invention itself frequently remains diffuse and vague for everybody to use in his own way, following his own bias or whim. Although man's indifference and ingratitude toward those who served him with a discovery or invention is conspicuous, in matters practical and tangible the situation is not so bad. No one knows, for instance, and no one particularly cares to know, who invented the nail, the hammer, or the saw. Literally hundreds of thousands of minor tools and refinements are invented daily by many anonymous, skilled minds and hands whose names will never be known.

In matters much more important but much less tangible—as psychological, ethical, or sociological—the anonymity of the inventor is more deplorable and the clarity of the concepts with which we are dealing suffers considerably more as a result. No one knows who invented or discovered the term and concept of insanity; as a result, almost twenty-five centuries of psychiatric history have failed to produce a clear-cut concept of 'insanity'. The lawyer, the average citizen, the psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, psychologist, each has his own idea of what insanity means, and each has his own unclarities which he glosses over in favor of his own professional, group, or purely fortuitous bias. Neither semantic nor realistic clarity can be

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Read at the midwinter meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York, December 1950.

attained under the circumstances, and we live in a psychological Tower of Babel with feelings that something separates us, and with no understanding as to what might unite us.

Among the unclarities which are of utmost clinical importance and which cause utmost confusion is the term insight. It came from nowhere, so to speak. No one knows who employed it first, and in what sense. I suppose that one might find out by reading everything that has ever been written on psychology and psychiatry since the beginning of time and give credit to him who first used the word. This is well-nigh impossible, and if it were possible it would add nothing to our understanding of this very loose concept; moreover, in the course of the last thirty or forty years it has undergone so many changes and shifts that the concept has become even less clear.

In medical schools, and later in mental hospitals, we were taught even as recently as twenty-five years ago that insight is the knowledge that one is mentally ill. The term was and still is frequently used with the descriptive addendum, 'insight as to illness'. Patients were noted in their case histories as having recovered with or without insight. It was assumed that the patient's normal behavior was clear and known to the patient himself, and the knowledge of what was not normal was sufficient to guide him, or at least a great therapeutic advance. Thus the schizophrenic was considered better off if he said that he knew that all his strange thoughts were 'crazy', that the voices he heard were not real voices. The 'manic-depressive' patient was considered better off if and when he would 'admit to himself' that his moods were abnormal 'swings'; he would then, it was averred, be able to recognize the beginning of these swings and take 'appropriate measures'—from self-control to consulting a psychiatrist or seeking shelter in a mental hospital. The trouble with this type of clinical optimism, which became a tradition and for a time a routine, is that the patient, when he is 'out of it', will easily admit that the voices he heard were not real—but when a second attack sets in, the patient laughs off his previous insight or seems to have entirely forgotten it, or he insists that all he said during the 'lucid period'

was true but 'this time it is entirely different'. As to the swings of mood, these were noticed too late, or the patient admitted that he did notice the change of mood in time but thought he could 'handle it'.

This type of insight became known as 'intellectual insight', and its relative or absolute insignificance soon came to be recognized. What was needed, it was insisted, was emotional and not merely intellectual insight. Mere cerebral, cold understanding was not sufficient; one ought to feel what one thinks in order to have the understanding do its salutary work. What emotional understanding means remains unknown. What the 'emotional component' of intellectual understanding is, was not defined. This lack of clarity is not entirely unexpected. The assertion that the purely intellectual insight must be accompanied by an 'appropriate affect' was both an old-fashioned idea in a new dress and a totally new idea not sufficiently digested by the clinical psychiatrist. It was an old-fashioned idea borrowed from the misconception that dementia præcox shows an absence of emotion, and a manic-depressive psychosis an exaggerated amount of it. The old idea of normalcy thus appeared as a clinical suggestion that intellectual insight should be accompanied by appropriate affect. Such an accompaniment would relieve us from the fear that the patient has dementia præcox, and also assure us that he is not becoming a 'manic' or a 'depressive', as the jargon puts it. The trouble with all this is that no one knew and no one yet knows how to measure or assess the appropriateness of affect, since what is appropriate in one case might prove too much so or inadequate in another. Thus, as far as the idea of 'appropriateness' is concerned, it seems to have had its source in the older rather journalistic psychiatric attitudes.

While it was an old idea, there is no doubt that it did have something new. What was new in it came directly from psychoanalysis, for it was psychoanalysis that from the very outset stressed the affective origin of all neuroses and psychoses. It stressed this fact not in harmony with the older tradition of dividing the human mind into separate entities (intellect, feel-

ing, will), each of which could presumably become pathological independently. Psychoanalysis, stressing that the origin of neuroses (and psychoses) is to be found in the various forms and constellations of instinctual unconscious, emotional conflicts, brought forward the totally novel idea that both intellect and will are unfree as long as the instinctual conflicts operate in such a way as to produce a pathological state. The intensity of these conflicts, psychoanalysis discovered, is registered by the accumulation of affective charges which may or may not enter into consciousness by directly registering a certain feeling. These affective (or rather, these *emotional*) charges must be resolved, i.e., insight into them must be gained. It was under the influence of this psychoanalytic dictum that the term 'emotional insight' was adopted by clinical psychiatry.

However, this proved to be not an unmixed blessing—for emotional insight is not a clinical phenomenon observed in the same manner and by the same method as intellectual insight. The latter could be assessed (only psychiatrically, clinically speaking, of course) by what the patient states. Even if the patient lies a little and admits to the psychiatrist to more than he would admit to himself, he might legitimately be considered as having, in part, intellectual insight. It is different in the case of emotional insight. Direct questioning would yield very little: of course we feel what we say and say what we feel. I doubt whether there are many, or any, patients who would own up to rank insincerity about health or illness, or who would understand us at all were we to inquire as to what extent they feel what they think and say. (I do not overlook, of course, those who complain of a sense of unreality, or cases of mild depersonalization.) To assess the adequacy of affect requires considerable play of intuition and a great deal of affective elasticity on the part of the clinician himself, and this is too complex and 'unscientific' and foreign to the phenomenological psychiatrist even if he does accept the 'dynamic point of view', which more often than not has come to mean (in modern psychiatry) hardly much more than the recognition of the existence of an active unconscious.

I do not mean to depreciate the psychiatrist's sympathy with psychoanalysis nor the contribution of psychoanalysis to psychiatry. One cannot depreciate history but one may evaluate some of its currents. Without such an evaluation history has no meaning. The problem of insight is fundamental, and it is natural that this problem should become a most outstanding one, if a solid edifice is to be erected on the foundation of a synthesis of clinical psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

The meaning of emotional insight as we find it explained in various textbooks and articles is not clearly enough stated, even when it is stated definitely. It cannot be stated clearly because the term has two meanings: it means one thing to the psychiatrist, another to the psychoanalyst. However, the fact that there are two meanings instead of one is not at once appreciated by either psychiatrist or psychoanalyst. This has become particularly true since the last war; so much stress has been laid on what unites traditional psychiatry and psychoanalysis that we have become inclined to overlook what divides them. Yet even a first but direct look at the problem will convince us that there is a real issue. Community of interests and goals does not always mean identity of methods, or even of fundamental concepts.

To the psychiatrist emotional insight, as I said above, means to feel 'appropriately' what one thinks and does. To the psychoanalyst, however, it means primarily being freed of that surplus of unconscious affects which either inhibits or intensifies one's conscious 'intellectual' processes and attitudes toward life. In other words, at the very first glance the psychiatrist appears to see emotional insight as a positive phenomenon which must be acquired through some positive gain, whereas to the psychoanalyst emotional insight means (or ought to mean) the subtraction, the elimination of the affect which (unconsciously) does not let the patient feel what he feels and see what he sees. To the psychoanalyst it is a matter of making the patient give up or lose something. The gain which results from this loss, in the form of acquired psychological health, appears more or less a welcome by-product of liberation, of dropping certain uncon-

scious chains which keep the patient down. It is a gain which seems to come and develop as if spontaneously when the pathogenic agent has been removed, or dropped, or lost—as the case may be.

Freud's basic hope for the future of his patients and of humanity was the freeing of our capacity to acquire knowledge and understanding. Psychoanalysis he thought was the method of setting aside the obstacles on the road toward the ultimate logos. Freud thus always conceived mind and will as essentially free and leading toward the good, provided the unconscious conflicts (affects) are sufficiently weakened to lose their pathological inhibiting hold over mind and will. From this point of view, the term emotional insight as a clinical phenomenon has no meaning whatsoever in psychoanalysis. Vaguely both the psychiatrist and the psychoanalyst apparently appreciated the inadequacy of the term, and gradually its meaning was amended (always anonymously and indefinitely as to time). Emotional insight came to mean insight gained through a discharge of affects related unconsciously to a given symptom or a given pathological character trait, so that that symptom, or character trait, could be looked at in the light of its respective unconscious origins and *without* the impediment of the previous (unconscious) masses of affect. In other words, as already suggested, emotional insight began to mean insight through loss of certain affective charges. Fundamentally this is true, but it is not quite clear enough to mean what it is intended to mean. For how would you (on the basis of pure phenomenology) differentiate a mere abreaction, a cathartic release, and the acquisition of new understanding through that emotional revelation which is known in psychoanalysis as working through? And how would you differentiate psychoanalytic working through from that intellectual construction which is known as interpretation, particularly in the many varieties of short-cut psychoanalysis and other forms of 'projective techniques'?

The psychiatrist has no way of doing the job of working through, in the true sense of the word, and the psychoanalyst who embarks with the patient on the arduous road of working

through recognizes, by the very fact of doing so, that emotional insight (be it by way of acquisition or of loss of affect) in its literal or too generally accepted sense is actually of no great or lasting therapeutic value—if this form of insight does exist at all. I am inclined to think that emotional insight is but a terminological condensation of many elements which have to do with affect and with what is commonly called insight, and that that condensation has in fact not much clinical or realistic meaning.

II

The question now arises whether we should totally discard the concept of insight: if yes, what is it that might serve then as a general guide in assessing the therapeutic process or status of recovery; if no, how could the present condensed concept of emotional insight be clarified or amended so as to become really serviceable? I doubt whether discarding the term and concept and introducing another one would serve any purpose. Old terms, so old that they are familiar to all, are very useful by the very virtue of their familiarity, and science has a tradition of pouring new contents into old terms—the term hysteria is an illustration in point. Thus, let us return to the term insight with a renewed sense of loyalty—but critical, analytical loyalty.

There is no doubt that insight does have a great deal to do with the deepest layers of our affective life and, therefore, we would be remiss if we did not mention once more the rather widespread conception or notion of insight which serves to obscure rather than to clarify the very idea of insight. It is still generally accepted, particularly among those who popularize psychiatry, that when a patient discovers *what* caused his headaches or irritability, he loses his headaches and stops being irritable because he 'learned why' he had headaches and why he was irritable. This, too, is an oversimplification, a condensation which says more than it should and means more than it appears to. It is the psychology of this attitude that is of particular interest. This attitude seems to imply that the mere discovery of the origin of something makes that something disappear—

as if grasping something intellectually or bringing it out from the obscurity of the unconscious into the light of consciousness has a magic effect of killing it. That this is not, and has never been, the case is obvious, but this seemingly self-evident error is worth pondering.

Error it is, but what is this dynamic hold which it has over so many patients and so many psychotherapists? The patients may say, 'Now that I have discovered I don't get along with my wife because I disliked my mother so, I will be able to handle my marital problem better'; or, 'Why is it, doctor, that despite the fact that we now know that I don't get along with my wife because I disliked my mother so, I still have difficulties with her—and I wonder whether there is not something the matter with her?' There are many other ways in which patients, by way of welcoming a new 'insight' or depreciating it, still merely wish (unconsciously) to tell us that they have had enough, that one discovery is plenty and they do not want to go any further. It is not the well-known flight into health that I have in mind here, but that resistance which is aroused by certain insights because those very insights open the way to further confrontation with deeper anxieties which the ego is unwilling to suffer looking at. In common parlance, this is called partial insight which, strictly speaking, is another misnomer; for while theoretically there is a quantitative aspect to insight, it is a matter of psychological fact, and as such it is integral, indivisible. Every approach to insight, every step in the direction of better understanding of one's self, may be considered as a process of ever-increasing insight, but insight is qualitative and it cannot be fractional; moreover, since insight is not something which a mere explanation of the causes of one's trouble can resolve, no insight can be 'given'. 'To give insight' is not infrequently heard in this age of therapeutic varieties and fervors, and if for no other reason than for the sake of completeness I must state the obvious: insight (whatever qualifying or determining adjective we might ultimately add to it) comes from within in a special way and in accordance with special psychological laws and individual variants; and, I must repeat, in the strict sense

of the word it cannot be partial, intellectual, or emotional (I prefer to say affective).

Insight is a state of personality or ego functioning as much as a neurosis is a special state of ego functioning, and the method of properly assessing it should not rest (even though unconsciously) on the antiquated faculty psychology which looks for the intellectual, the affective, and the volitional components of a given psychological state. Rather it should be considered as the ultimate and crowning point of integration of ego functioning. Considered from this point of view, we will not make the mistake of trying to 'give' insight, nor will we try to delve into how much comprehension and how much feeling we may find in a given state of our patient's knowledge of himself at a given time.

The term, unconscious insight, is not uncommon in the psychotherapeutic jargon. This term is a contradiction, for the unconscious is unconscious only as far as consciousness is concerned; in the system unconscious, even when it is fully subject to the primary process, all the reactions and constellations of experiences and their interconnections are always present and, therefore, in the unconscious there is always full knowledge of everything that bothers us. That knowledge may be quite diffuse, as it must be in the state of the primary process, but it is potentially and spontaneously organizable and available to the ego—or else psychoanalysis could never bring it out; hence 'unconscious insight' is tautological, a statement which adds little to our therapeutic armamentarium.

III

Granted that some sort of insight is always needed for the preservation of good therapeutic results, what is the nature of this insight? In this connection there comes to mind Freud's postscript to Little Hans, published many years after the analysis of the boy. The grown-up Hans seemingly had a complete amnesia for his neurosis and treatment; yet he preserved all the therapeutic benefits of the analysis and was strong enough

to withstand a considerable number of trials, such as the divorce of his parents. Theoretically, he had retained complete 'unconscious insight'; it was certainly not conscious. What then is the difference between the unconscious insight of the neurotic, who is being treated but has not yet surrendered his neurosis, and the insight possessed by the little Hans? It would be easy to say that the difference is in the strength of the egos of respective patients. This is granted. But does the strength of the ego alone offer that stability and elasticity which we associate with a good therapeutic result or a normal person? Obviously not, for there are individuals with very strong ego organization whose neurotic character is conspicuous and undeniable. We easily find such paradoxical combinations among many individuals—among them active politicians and criminals —depending upon the fortuitous constellations of social morality and accidents of history. The recent creation of the category of war criminals is a good illustration in point.

To explore the question of what happens to insight, and how affect as well as reason enter into its formation, let me cite two contrasting examples.

The first, a man in his thirties, was in the midst of a very successful academic career. He was unmarried at the time of his psychoanalysis, and had resumed his analysis after the summer vacation. He was a cheerful person, with quite an intellectual bent. There had been evidence of homosexual leanings when he was in his twenties which had subsided. In the first session following a summer holiday, he said he had just seen a friend, named Mr. Riot, who told him an interesting story about an episode that had taken place during a recent visit to Europe. The patient also recalled that a more or less similar occurrence had been reported to him in another connection by another friend, whose name was Tare. At this point the patient smiled with a slight chuckle. It was all very interesting, he said. I asked whether the word 'riot' might be considered a form of going 'on a tear'. He laughed heartily and at once remarked that he had a dream which he wanted to report. I asked him when the dream had occurred, and he

replied that he had had the dream the night before. He then told me the dream, and I asked him—as I occasionally do—to repeat the text of the dream. He said laughingly that there was no text, just an image. We agreed that the recapitulation of the image would do. The dream ran as follows: the patient had a feeling of pain in his mouth; he lifted his lip before a mirror and saw a thin crack in his tooth. That was all—nothing else happened; oh yes, he added, he woke up with a vague taste in his mouth like a faint aftertaste of beer. He did not remember having had any thoughts of any kind when he woke up, except, this he did recall, that he thought he would tell this dream to me that day.

The patient was well versed in psychological literature, including the writings of Freud. He knew what was wanted of him in analysis and at times he even thought he knew what was expected of him, in a speculative sort of way. The dream told, the patient remained in silent repose for a while, and then said that he did not have any associations to this dream, unless it were one stray image of a wall of concrete with a crack in it. That was all he said. All the rest seemed to him 'unrelated'; so he might as well leave the business of the dream, unless I wanted to tell him something about it. As I was silent, he said he would proceed 'away from the dream' with the 'unrelated' thoughts. It so happened that the concrete wall, 'Not the dream, mind you', he emphasized, but the concrete wall reminded him of the harbor of his home town and of the long, concrete quay, alongside which boats were made fast. He was again silent for a moment and recalled that he used to take walks along this uninterrupted concrete waterfront when he was a little boy with his father and mother. Once his grandmother came along, a storm came up and he thought he was frightened, but his grandmother seemed to have had a gay time. With each flash of lightning and each crack of thunder she would exclaim, 'What a wonderful adventure!' Ultimately 'What an adventure!' became a family byword, and the story of a raging storm, meaning a 'wonderful adventure', was frequently recalled. The patient paused, then asked again whether I would not interpret the

dream for him. I told him that I wished to reserve judgment on the subject for a while if I might, but I did want to say a word or two about the general trend of his thought. He frowned slightly and said that he had no association to it. No, I said, everything he had said before he reported the dream and afterward could be considered as a single unit, a trend, a unitary series of associations of which the dream was only one link, Mr. Riot and Mr. Tare (by the sound of their names) another, and the storm and the wonderful adventure a third. It appeared that all this had seemed to the patient at once wonderful, adventurous, i.e., exciting, and also very frightening. The patient's chief character trait was well reflected in this trend: to make merry and laugh whenever he unconsciously felt the opposite and, therefore, to deny the very existence of that of which he was afraid. The patient agreed that this was his preferred type of reaction, and that all this was right as far as it went, but that after all it was his grandmother and not he who called it all an adventure—and did I really believe that there was something in the dream that he was afraid of? At that point the patient frowned slightly, and as I started answering his question by saying, 'The crack in the tooth which occurred to you in the dream . . .', he interjected, 'I can't see . . .'. I reminded him that I had not said anything yet and that he was objecting to some thought of his own. He disclaimed having any at the moment. I then stated tentatively that his thought about the concrete wall, in addition to other meanings, might also be one of those soothing consolations, as if to say: 'The crack in my tooth does not mean any more than the small crack in the concrete wall on the water front'.

This was as far as I was able to go during the session. The possible allusions to the primal scene which appeared here, not for the first time in this patient's analysis, his fear of castration, and his fear-determined denial that the possibility of castration even existed, the fear that I would castrate him if he acknowledged the excitement of watching the primal scene ('the beautiful adventure' was apparently the return of the repressed in the guise of humor)—all this had to be left unsaid

for the time being, because the patient was unconsciously dead set against admitting that any of these things was reflected in his dream and his associations thereto.

One need hardly comment further on this fragment of a psychoanalytic session. Suffice it to say that the whole course of this man's analysis was very similar to the session just reported. What is clear here is that this patient was at the time set like a well-aimed gun against any appreciation of the finer trends of his unconscious conflicts. His method of resistance, like his manner of living, was serene laughing off of anything that made him unconsciously 'tremble in his boots', so to speak. He was ready to acknowledge the aftertaste of beer, but not the drink. There is nothing unusual in this reaction, of course. Clinically it is very difficult to make a dent in it, not because the affect is deficient or the intellect dulled, but because such a compulsive neurotic personality is fully integrated within itself. All the psychological gears at the person's disposal mesh perfectly, and he functions with perfect smoothness. The patient was genuinely interested in knowing what analysis is about, but if something more than the effort of mere reasoning was required, things became difficult. This person had little insight, but he had a good speculative mind which made him speak of himself with a verisimilitude of good insight. Outwardly it may appear to be 'intellectual insight'. Perhaps it is. However, it seemed to me to be a functioning without much conflict —with only the shadows of the infantile conflicts mildly reflected. The cathexes of these conflicts are very weak in such cases. The ego has been put wholly in the service of academic exposition of man in general and no one in particular, certainly not himself, or especially not himself. The neurosis of this man was obvious to a clinician, but it does not seem to be a clinical neurosis. The integration of the personality is so almost perfectly smooth, that it has become—if you wish—a very healthy neurosis.

Did he have insight, this man? Yes, and no, and perhaps. If he had it, he certainly was unable himself to formulate it with any accuracy and sincerity. If he did not have it, he

certainly behaved with the serene balance of a person who possessed perfect insight.

This case is here cited to illustrate how difficult it is at times to convey or to awaken in a person that knowledge and understanding which we call insight, and how such a person stands pat on all the psychoanalytic planes including, of course, the transference, without yielding one iota of his singular inner harmony—that singular ego integration which makes him productive without being creative, a good teacher without being an inspiring one, a conveyor of categories of thought without much originality but with considerable stability and consistency.

We will have to own then that this person really has no insight, that we will always have difficulties in helping him to develop it, and that if he by some chance developed true analytical insight he might become psychologically more dislocated than helped.

I would venture to say that it is this type of personality, this type of smugly integrated ego, in our professional and academic circles, that is largely responsible for such purely intellectual concepts as emotional or unconscious insight, or for the neat yet loosely knit interpretations of cultural, racial, or national patterns.

There is, however, a way of demonstrating rather simply how insight does develop and what it may mean, even if we are unable to define it. For this purpose, let me cite a fragment from the second of the two contrasting examples.

A man of forty, an earnest person who has respect for education and who gravitates toward an ethico-religious attitude, was twice divorced, both marriages having ended for the same reason. He would gradually lose all sexual drive in relation to his wife and in all sincerity consider himself impotent, remaining seemingly quite blind to the fact that during this period of asserted impotence he was rather effortless and free in casual, extramarital relations with a variety of women. When 'the presenting symptoms' were discussed in the interviews preceding the analysis, he consented to amend the description of what appeared to him his major symptom and call it 'impotence

with my wife'. Thus he was seeking analysis to be cured of impotence with his wife when the final decree of the divorce from his second wife was pending. He wanted to be cured of this trouble, but as far as his second marriage was concerned he planned to follow through with the proceedings for its dissolution. He wanted to be cured of his impotence with his second wife so as not to become gradually or suddenly impotent with a possible third. 'No', he did not yet 'have in mind any other woman'; still, 'There might be one, of course. Such things always happen.' This was a person with some Don Juan as well as alcoholic propensities. He would always, albeit without conscious planning, rush into a love affair on the rebound, and almost always felt the pull to drift (but rather impulsively) into a marriage, as if marriage would make something all right, and at the same time offer him (unconsciously) the very prestige of being a husband which in turn led him to impotence after a while.

As soon as the analysis started a definite exacerbation of the need to get married could be observed and it was agreed that as long as he remained under analysis he would desist from another marital entanglement. Before long it became rather clear to me, and to a great extent also to the patient, that his trouble was not impotence with whatever woman happened to be his wife at the time, but a repetitious withdrawal from one woman and a temporary attachment to another, and that the waning and waxing relationships either overlapped or followed one another in extremely close, almost continuous, sequence.

Unconsciously this man was literally afraid to stay a married man, yet it was a status which meant to him masculine prestige; he always needed to have a woman at his side to be certain of, if not secure in, his manhood. There was no history of any obvious homosexual leanings. This was a rather complex case and often more confusing than not, because he was a sensitive, intense, yet quite self-controlled person who had been a miserable failure as a high school and college student, but was a more than average success in the job of learning by himself, in making friends, and in getting along well with people, with

his integrity fully preserved while in active contact with the most contentious groups, which he always learned how to bring together to effect their conciliation. In other words, he dealt with intense human relationships and dealt with them well, with a great sense of probity and reality. A rather important detail: his father was a half employee, half minor partner in the patient's business. The patient was 'good' to his father, and was 'tired' of him.

It will serve no useful purpose further to elaborate on the various details and characterological issues of this case. What has been already said will suffice, I hope, to glean how painfully afraid this man was to be a man-father and how painfully he yearned to be one; how he hated to strive to make himself in the image of his own father, and how much he suffered from repetitive failures in emulating this image. May I say that in a less dramatic but not less painful way, (always unconsciously, of course), his ambivalence toward his mother played an important role. He experienced intense difficulties on this account. This was reflected in his depressive moods and periods of overindulgence in alcohol. We thus have here an assortment of most of the affective difficulties which were a direct result of the conflicting pulls in the contradictory directions of cross identifications.

At the time of the psychoanalytic session, a part of which I am about to report, the patient lived with a friend, a young woman with whom he had recently established an intimate and apparently very satisfactory and warm relationship. This young woman was about to undertake a rather extensive trip to visit her relatives whom she had not seen for several years. Her father had died a tragic, violent death some five or six years previously and she told my patient of that terrible event in her life. As the preparation for the trip reached the practical stage—buying tickets, making hotel reservations—the young lady appeared to anticipate her voyage with great pleasure; yet her sleep seems to have suffered from it. Once she woke up late in the night, apparently in the midst of a nightmare, reliving the death of her father. She was in a mild panic.

Sitting up trembling, she related her nightmare to the patient who had been awakened by her start. He reported the incident to me with considerable warmth and compassion, and he told me how he had tenderly consoled and quieted her till she fell peacefully asleep in his arms. The day before the session I am about to report the young woman had another attack of nocturnal anxiety.

The patient came to his regular psychoanalytic session in what seemed a mildly dejected state. He lay down and told me the following in a rather hesitating, almost halting, manner—which was not his wont. He related that the young woman woke up with a start, very anxious. After a little coaxing she told my patient that she had had a dream which upset her. As if interjecting a purely extraneous or vaguely explanatory remark, he then told me that his father was not doing so well on his job, and he wondered whether he should not do something to have him retire. After a pause he returned to his friend's dream. He had enjoined her to tell him the dream. She finally did. She had seen her uncle in her dream, and her uncle was about to attack her, to rob her. She was intensely frightened. He urged her to tell him what came to her mind in connection with the frightening dream, and after a short series of apparently fragmentary responses which did not seem to add to my patient's enlightenment, he said to her, 'You see, darling, you are afraid to go to visit your former home because you are afraid you would be rejected by your relatives, particularly by your uncle whom you always admired so much. You want him to approve of you. Go and have a good time and you *will* have a good time.' 'You see', the patient added by way of explaining to me, 'the poor thing really did not want to go because she was afraid she would be rejected'.

When I inquired whether he could give me some corroborative facts which would show that she was afraid of being rejected by her relatives, the patient said meekly and apologetically that he knew when he came in that pretending to be his friend's psychoanalyst would get him 'into hot water'; but she was so miserable, and his interpretations 'did work', and she calmed

down and became her own cheerful self. I did not pursue what the patient might have mistaken for a critical interrogation. Instead, I reminded him of his remark about his father, and called his attention to the fact that while his friend might have been diffident about her forthcoming visit to her relatives, it was not rejection that she seemed to be afraid of but attack and robbery, which seemed more like a fear that a brutal injury might be in the offing for her. The patient agreed. He also admitted that at the very time he made his interpretation he felt uneasy and convinced that what he said was not quite true. I inquired what his reaction would be if I suggested that he felt himself for some reason in danger of being rejected, that his keen feeling about the alleged meaning of his friend's dream and her subsequent attack of anxiety was but a reflection of what he himself was afraid of. He was afraid of being rejected and at the same time played a sort of good father or good mother to his friend, assuring her—and through her himself—that she—and he—would not be rejected. The question which remained unanswered was: why did he feel threatened with a possible rejection? The patient thought he was afraid I would reject him for his attempt to be his friend's analyst. He was reminded of the obvious: his attempt to 'analyze' was to assure himself that he would not be rejected; hence for some reason he was afraid of being rejected before he made an attempt to play analyst. The patient readily admitted the justice of this observation. He looked sad, a little tense, and even a little bewildered. Would he be 'rejected' by me because he wanted to get rid of his father? Standing alone without his father for some reason appeared to frighten him intensely. The woman was about to leave him for some weeks. It was he who did not want her to go at that moment, and he 'bent over backwards' to assure her that she might go and that she would not be rejected, even though she was returning to the scene of her father's violent death. He too, the patient, was contemplating getting rid of his father.

At this point the patient appeared as if staggered for a moment. Then he said, 'It is all true, I know it is, yet I feel as

terrible as I ever felt, much worse than when I came in. I felt a little shamefaced when I came in. Now I feel almost scared of you. Why?' After a moment's pause, I pointed out something that I had not at first seen but noticed only a few moments before: I pointed it out by way of asking the patient whether he was aware that he was wearing a bow tie which was identical with mine. As far as I could remember, I had never seen the patient wearing such a tie. 'No, you couldn't have', he said, 'because this is the first time I have put it on'. From this moment the patient began to relax, and he soon told me for the first time and with considerable concern that his friend had been married twice before, and both times had 'walked out' of the marriage when she found that it was a mistake. Here was another line of the patient's identification with his friend. Through her, and through her inner life, actual and partly imagined, he lived out the whole gamut of anxieties from the wish to murder his father to his neurotic jumping into and running out of a marriage. His fear of rejection was, then, anxiety which his paternal superego generated in him while he was in part getting rid of me by assuming himself the role of a psychoanalyst, signified by wearing 'my' tie.

This rather complex accumulation of anxiety, which was generated by crisscross hostile identifications and projections, was both baffling and disturbing to the patient. He left the session in a thoughtful mood. His initial feeling of being threatened with rejection was replaced by a kind of anxious, contemplative state, and in the subsequent sessions he spoke with gradually increasing frankness and just as gradually increasing serenity mixed with a sort of sorrow, as if to say: how sad it is that the human mind is unkind to others and to one's own self. A large number of things came up, some new, some old; they all were worked through and almost imperceptibly began to fall into their proper places like various pieces of a jigsaw puzzle as they became coördinated.

I want to call attention to the emphasis which I here lay on the *gradual* nature of the process, not necessarily systematic or formally logical. By stressing its gradual nature, I do not

mean to say that progress in analysis is never made in leaps and bounds; of course it is. There are various crises alternating with periods of psychological waste, apparent emptiness. But once the main peak has been passed, I believe that the gradual character of the psychoanalytic process is almost universal, regardless of the type of case. We all have known some exceptions.

Now we can return to our main theme. What kind of insight did this last patient develop? Let me just enumerate the usual, the routine aspects of this insight. A knowledge of the mechanisms (in nontechnical terms, of course) was acquired. In so far as we were able to trace some of the patient's reactions to some of his infantile or, at any rate, older sources, considerable knowledge as to the origin of his trouble was acquired. However, all these aspects of psychoanalytic therapy offer, as a rule, those insights which we have discussed under the headings of intellectual, emotional, and unconscious insights—types of insight which I hope I have been able to demonstrate to be therapeutically insufficient, if not actually and essentially insignificant, unless they are used as transient adjuvants of psychoanalysis. As adjuvants and links in the complex chain of the psychoanalytic curative process, they are extremely important, of course. The danger is that we are so frequently apt to stress their importance and overlook that they are only adjuvants. In other words, a given gear in a complex machine is highly important; without that gear the whole machine would jam. But those gears, even the most important of them, are never the machine itself. I am fully aware that this statement is commonplace. But I am also aware that it bears repetition, particularly now in a generation of theoretical divergences and therapeutic variants which are offered as innovations when they actually mark merely the return of the repressed, agelong resistances to the deeper psychology which psychoanalysis inaugurated.

The emphasis on the 'whole machine', on the 'total personality', is fundamentally an emphasis on the integration of the ego functions with the sum total of all those psychological

forces which, if left alone or given autonomy or separated from the ego, produce psychopathological states, from the mildest neurotic to the most severe and irreversible psychotic reactions. Integration, then, is the therapeutic ideal because it is the functional ideal. How to achieve it is another question.

It is clear, however, that ever since the attention of psychoanalysis was drawn to ego psychology as the center of our research and therapeutic interests, the fragmentation of psychoanalysis began into schools and subschools, groups within groups, and free-lance culturalism—a fragmentation which has become especially noxious and pronounced since the war. This breaking up of the scientific unity of psychoanalysis was not accidental, of course; and the coincidence of this breakdown with the development of ego psychology was not at all accidental. It is this fragmentation that revived in theory or in practice the emphasis on insight (intellectual, emotional, and unconscious). The various psychosomatic, hypnotic and other short-cut psychotherapies came into being to dispense insight in the most 'practical', utilitarian sense. It will be noticed that in all these approaches, (from 'narcoanalysis' to some of the widely advertised variants of pragmatic, abbreviated techniques), it is the therapist who is the chief contributor to the development of the patient's insight, in that it is he who takes the initiative and enlightens the patient or infuses him with whatever understanding or bias of which the therapist happens to be possessed. Even in the most 'passive' nonpsychoanalytic or quasi-psychoanalytic techniques, the therapist plays some sort of role of his own choosing or designation, and he utilizes this role for his therapeutic influence.

This, I believe, is one of the greatest weaknesses of all deviations from classical psychoanalysis. Its very pragmatic strength is its greatest weakness, for it gives the patient a kind of insight which, under the circumstances, must be either merely intellectual or affective only in so far as it is a type of automatic compliance. Whether or not accompanied by 'adequate emotional components', it remains intellectual or automatically compliant, and it suffers, therefore, from all the deficiencies of all

the 'insights' which are not accompanied by or are not a result of ego redintegration. It is erroneous both on theoretical as well as clinical, empirical grounds to assume that insight—curative, integrative insight—develops through the rational, the intellectual, the purely conceptual routes. It is erroneous to assume this because the lack of integration and the various pathological deviations from it are not rational or intellectual processes. It is to state a commonplace to say that the varieties of ego disturbances, or the varieties of disturbances of the other parts of the psychic apparatus which are reflected in and through ego reactions, are in the last analysis affective disturbances, for they are caused by pathogenic fluctuations or inhibitions of quantities of libidinal energies. This being the case, therapeutic redintegration must be not only an affective experience, but an affective process, a series of affective reconstructive experiences coming from within the psychic apparatus—and not from without—and coming in all the fullness and completeness of the various cathexes. Under the circumstances, short cuts are impossible since the duration, the nature, the difficulties, and the various nuances of this process depend not only upon the individual clinical condition, but upon the particular *individual's* specific clinical condition.

There is much to be clarified, more to be restudied and relearned in all this, for since Freud introduced ego psychology little further has been contributed except the articles of Waelder and of Nunberg on the integrative and multiple functions of the ego. The pitfalls which have beset the concentration on ego analysis were and are so many for the very reason that to many people ego analysis apparently meant the crystallization of a new formation in psychoanalysis which made the earlier findings of Freud unnecessary. It goes without saying that they were far from unnecessary but did appear to be so to a number of people, and to them the ego became suspended in a vacuum, as it were, without a source of nutrition and without an object to which to be related. The old conscious and unconscious resistances to the harsh truths of the fundamental findings of psychoanalysis—which Jung and Adler perceived so quickly

and loyally espoused with such candor—these same resistances, but in a new dress, were revived and had to be reformulated. Once the earlier findings of psychoanalysis were dropped, nothing was left but to 'correlate' the ego with, to relate it to, to integrate it with, to derive it from, to make it live on, the older phenomenological and conceptual trends of the nineteenth century; in this respect positivistic sociology, cultural, speculative anthropology, philosophy of history and biology and physiology, or moral philosophy became the most available pathways for digressions from basic psychoanalytic theory. Once the ego was put in the center of our field of observation and the libidinal roots of it rejected or overlooked, the concept of compulsive repetition and of transference also had to fall by the wayside or at least to become weaker. Affect, emotion, then became a by-product, a sort of ever-present impediment in the way of 'pure reason' and not the very substance of the matrix of ego functioning. Insight likewise had to become one of those things one talks about but which remains elusive because, on the basis of the above premises, it must be either intellectual or emotional or both (a sum of two), but not something that is a result (and therefore more lasting) rather than a cause (and therefore less reliable) of the process of integration. Insight, therefore, as it is commonly understood, whether 'purely' intellectual or 'purely' emotional, becomes an excellent agency for strengthening the repressive forces of the ego. The ego makes quick use of this new, although transitory and abortive, strength and reinforces many repressions, elaborates many other defenses, particularly rationalization, and offers a temporary sense of well-being. It is this particular reactive picture which is mistaken for the effective cure, the 'peace of mind' and 'mental happiness' to which claim is laid by those in whose opinion classical psychoanalysis has seen its day.

A therapist has no right to turn away from any possibility of ameliorating a pathological condition; therefore one would not wish to discard entirely the 'rapid cures with insight'. However the question of scientific and, therefore, durable results is not answered by such quick methods and results, no matter

how strong an appeal they may have to the uninitiated and no matter how tempting they may be to the therapist.

I can now return for a moment to psychoanalysis at the risk of reiterating the obvious which is often overlooked.

The patient of forty who adopted his analyst's necktie and lived out a good part of his cross-identification and the conflicts contained therein succeeded in living it all out via a partially hostile (at any rate ambivalent) identification with the analyst, and via a strong emotional relationship to and with the analyst. By calling attention to this obvious fact, I want to say that the whole problem of ego reliving and ego redintegration is in the final analysis a problem of causing it to be *relived in the transference.* It must never be forgotten that the analyst during the period of treatment is the only true reality through which the ego can *safely* experiment with the process of integration. By this I mean to say that the phenomenon and the dynamics of transference have become even more vital and more complex since the advent of ego psychology into psychoanalysis. It is, therefore, technically erroneous from the standpoint of therapy, and especially from the point of view of psychoanalytic education, to relate the problems of transference almost exclusively to infantile sexuality or infantile experiences. Transference has been extended and deepened under the influence of ego psychology, and I would not hesitate to state with utmost emphasis that insight *through transference* is the only type of insight which serves the purpose of reorientation and redintegration of the ego. Such insight is a purely affective process *in the wake of which* follows rational and affective appreciation of a new orientation of the ego toward the world and toward one's own self. Without the transference the process of gaining insight leaves only a series of conceptual props for the ego. The ego is bound to use these props, and at that only temporarily, to reinforce its habitual defenses.

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ON THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF INSTINCTS

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Biology is truly the realm of limitless possibilities; we have the most surprising revelations to expect from it, and cannot conjecture what answers it will offer in some decades to the questions we have put to it. Perhaps they may be such as to overthrow the whole artificial structure of hypotheses.[1]

INTRODUCTION

In the present structure of psychoanalytic theory, there is probably no problem more controversial than the theory of instincts. Psychoanalysts seem to be divided into three groups: some who accept Freud's dual instinct theory of Eros and Thanatos, others who do not, and those whose opinion is held in abeyance on the question.[2]

When in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud first proposed the hypothesis of a death instinct, he stated that his views were based primarily on biological considerations, and he presented certain biological data to support his hypothesis. Subsequently, critical evaluations of this problem by Jones *(49)*, Fenichel *(30)*, and Hartmann *(45)*, to mention only a few, have stressed that the hypothesis of a death instinct is primarily a biological representation which cannot be settled by clinical psychoanalytic considerations alone. It is therefore the purpose of this paper to present certain biological data which may be of value in clarifying our basic conceptions concerning instinct theory.

In considering a problem as complex as that of the instincts,

[1] Freud: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*

[2] The appended bibliography contains most of the published discussions in English and German of the controversy about the death instinct. The vast majority of them, pro and con, are based on clinical observations and fail to come to grips with the fundamental issues of the theory of instincts; hence they are not reviewed here.

it may be well to state at the outset, as clearly as possible, what is meant by the term 'instinct'. In Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915), Freud stated: 'If we now apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological point of view, an "instinct" appears to us as a borderland concept between the mental and the physical, being both the mental representative of the stimuli emanating from within the organism and penetrating to the mind, and at the same time a measure of the demand made upon the energy of the latter in consequence of its connection with the body' *(39,* p. 64*)*. He further stated that an instinct may be described in terms of its impetus, aim, object, and source. These criteria apply to Freud's first dualism: the self-preservative (ego) instincts, and the sexual instincts. In his later theory (Eros and Thanatos), 'instinct' is used less precisely and more philosophically, referring to fundamental forces in living matter whose interplay is meant to explain 'the phenomena of life'.[8] We propose here to use the term 'instinct' in a similarly broad sense, but based upon those qualities of living matter which are characteristic of it and which differentiate it from inanimate substances. Used in this manner, our concept of instinct will be an extremely wide one and will not be directly applicable to clinical problems; specific instinctual drives are regarded as derivatives of this single, primary life force, or instinct, which arose through complex modifications in the course of both phylogenetic and ontogenetic development.

THE DEATH INSTINCT AND THE SECOND LAW OF THERMODYNAMICS

In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud leads up to the argument that certain observations drawn from 'behavior during

[8] 'On the basis of speculations concerning the origin of life and of biological parallels, I drew the conclusion that, beside the instinct preserving the organic substance and binding it into ever larger units, there must exist another in antithesis to this, which would seek to dissolve these units and reinstate their antecedent inorganic state; that is to say, a death instinct as well as Eros; the phenomena of life would then be explicable from the interplay of the two and their counteracting effects on each other' *(42,* p. 97).

transference and from the fate of human beings' suggest that one may have to assume 'that there really exists in psychic life a repetition compulsion, which goes beyond the pleasure principle'. In arriving at such a concept, Freud was influenced by certain biological views current at that time. Thus, he tells us quite explicitly that 'there is an attempt on the part of the psychic apparatus to keep the quantity of excitations present as low as possible, or at least constant' *(40,* p. 3*),* and in this he recognizes 'a special case of Fechner's principle of the tendency toward stability . . .' *(40,* p. 4*).* Where, we may ask, did Fechner's principle come from? This question is of considerable importance since the answer to it throws doubt upon the most basic assumptions which Freud made in evolving his theory of a death instinct. Fechner's principle is derived from physics and in it we recognize a special case of the more general second law of thermodynamics.[4] This law, it should be emphasized, applies only to *closed systems,* and it asserts, in general terms, that states of unstable equilibrium tend toward states of greater stability, or that there is a tendency toward increasing randomness.[5] It should be noted, further, that we are not so

[4] Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887) was first a professor of physics at Leipzig; he later turned his interest to psychology. His best known work is *Elemente der Psychophysik* (1860). Fechner was a contemporary of the German physicist Rudolf Clausius (1822–1888) who is often referred to as the 'father of thermodynamics'. It was Clausius who first enunciated, in a paper presented before the Berlin Academy in 1850, the well-known law: 'Heat cannot of itself pass from a colder to a hotter body' (*77,* Vols. V and IX).

[5] The second law of thermodynamics has evolved from Carnot's principle concerning the efficiency of a reversible engine and has become one of the most fundamental laws of physics. The following definitions of the second law and of the concept of entropy are taken from J. K. Roberts' *Heat and Thermodynamics* (*68*). 'It is not possible for a self-acting machine working in a cyclical process, unaided by any external agency, to make heat pass from one body to another at a higher temperature. That is to say, heat will not pass spontaneously from a cold body to a warmer one' (p. 255). 'If a substance which is undergoing a reversible change takes in a quantity of heat dQ, at a temperature T, its *entropy* is said to increase by an amount $\frac{dQ}{T}$. This is the definition of change of entropy. It must be stressed that the change which the substance undergoes must be *reversible*' (p. 260). 'In other words, *every physical or chemical process which takes place in nature proceeds in such a way that the total entropy of all bodies taking any part in the process is increased*' (p. 312).

Thermodynamics is usually discussed and described in terms of mathematical

much concerned with the validity, for psychological research, of these concepts, but rather that we wish to show that this law is not typical of the behavior of living organisms. Moreover, biologists as well as physicists have since shown that the phenomena of life can occur only in open systems; the physics of such systems is not governed by the second law of thermodynamics *(9, 13)*.

Having evolved the concept of a repetition compulsion, (which has been cogently criticized by Kubie [*53*]), Freud proceeds to the problem of instincts.

> In what way is the instinctive connected with the compulsion to repetition? At this point the idea is forced upon us that we have stumbled on the trace of a general and hitherto not clearly recognized—or at least not expressly emphasized—characteristic of instinct, perhaps of all organic life. According to this, *an instinct would be a tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it toward the reinstatement of an earlier condition,* one which it had to abandon under the influence of external disturbing forces—a kind of organic elasticity, or put it another way, the manifestation of inertia in organic life *(40,* pp. 44–45*)*.

The latter definition would make it logically untenable to restrict the use of the term instinct to living matter, although Freud would appear to disclaim this when he states that an instinct is a '*tendency innate in living organic matter impelling it toward the reinstatement of an earlier condition*'. Such a tendency, however, is also characteristic of nonliving matter; indeed, Freud compares this concept of an instinct to the 'manifestation of inertia in organic life'. But it is precisely the distinction between living and nonliving matter which the theory of instincts should elucidate. To denote the operation of certain physical principles in the realm of biology as instincts would not contribute to our understanding of what is life.[6]

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symbols; however, an excellent nonmathematical presentation of this subject may be found in P. W. Bridgman's *The Nature of Thermodynamics* (*11*).

[6] It is not surprising, therefore, since the concept of a death instinct rested ultimately on some basic principles of physics (e.g., tendency to stability, inertia)

WHAT IS LIFE

We have attempted to show that in so far as the death instinct may be regarded as the expression or operation of the second law of thermodynamics in the realm of living matter, it cannot be called an instinct. Accordingly, if we accept what indeed must be axiomatic, that instinct is something which is characteristic of living matter only, then the question arises: what is life? In this, of course, we recognize the problem which has fascinated scientists and philosophers of all ages.

The difficulty of defining clearly what constitutes life is well known. Biologists usually describe certain features which characterize living matter: 1, irritability, 2, contractility, 3, growth and repair, 4, reproduction, 5, organization *(14)*. This is not a very satisfactory method of distinguishing between the living and the nonliving; inanimate matter often behaves in ways which seem very similar to the behavior of living matter.

A more penetrating analysis of what distinguishes the living from the lifeless has been given by the physicist, Schrödinger, and by the biologists, Needham and Lotka. Their approach centers around the principle of entropy. Since the second law of thermodynamics states that isolated (closed) systems tend toward conditions of increasing entropy or—to put it in general terms—the tendency in all natural phenomena is from 'organi-

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that these same physical concepts should be subsequently 'rediscovered' in the death instinct. Alexander (*1*) and later Bernfeld (*7*), thus saw in the death instinct the operation, in biology, of the fundamental physical principle of entropy. This appears to be the result of a chain of methodological errors. The principle of entropy was introduced originally into Freud's conception of the death instinct and its rediscovery is neither surprising nor is it a proof of the validity of the hypothesis of the death instinct.

One of the best criticisms of the view that the death instinct is an expression of the principle of entropy is found in an interesting though somewhat inconclusive article by A. J. Westerman Holstijn (*81*). It seems that this author was one of the first to call attention to the fact that the tendency toward equalization of tensions is typical of inanimate, not of animate, matter. The essence of Holstijn's views is contained in the following statement: 'While we recognized in the entropy principle the tendency of the inanimate—which strives toward ever lower states of excitations—it seems to me that the tendency toward a constant excitation must be linked with vital processes' (p. 212 [author's translation]).

zation' toward 'disorganization', or from 'order' to 'disorder', it was thought by some that living organisms are what G. N. Lewis *(56)* described as 'cheats in the game of entropy'. The controversy between evolution and thermodynamics is classical in the history of science; it was in the forefront of scientific interest for decades around the turn of the century. That living organisms in particular, and evolution in general, do not evade the second law of thermodynamics has, of course, been amply demonstrated. Lotka discussed this question with clarity. 'It must be remembered', he wrote, 'that the principle of increasing entropy applies specifically to isolated systems. Neither the individual organism nor the system of organic nature as a whole is an isolated system. The individual receives a steady stream of energy in the form of food, and the system as a whole is exposed to a constant flood of energy in the form of sunlight. There is no question here of an isolated system and in these circumstances there is no conflict with the laws of thermodynamics if in certain portions of the system there is a decrease of entropy, selecting and discriminating processes tending to produce order out of disorder, tending to sort rather than to shuffle' *(58,* p. 166*)*.

It thus appears that a crucial characteristic of living matter consists in this ability to avoid decay by taking energy from the environment. This is, of course, what one commonly thinks of in connection with the instinct of self-preservation; moreover, it appears that this is the only, or more precisely the only type of, instinctual force operating in living matter.

The physicist, Schrödinger, presents a beautiful analysis of this problem *(72)*. He discusses the relationship between the second law of thermodynamics and its bearing on living organisms. In answer to the question of what is the characteristic feature of life, he states that it is the continued metabolism of cells by which living matter 'evades the decay to equilibrium'. He then proceeds as follows:

> How does the living organism avoid decay? The obvious answer is: by eating, drinking, breathing and (in the case of

plants) assimilating. The technical term is *metabolism.* The Greek word (metabolism) means change or exchange. Exchange of what? Originally, the underlying idea is, no doubt, exchange of material. (E.g., the German for metabolism is *Stoffwechsel.)* That the exchange of material should be the essential thing is absurd. Any atom of nitrogen, oxygen, sulphur, etc., is as good as any other of its kind; what could be gained by exchanging them? For a while in the past our curiosity was silenced by being told that we feed upon energy. In some very advanced country (I don't remember whether it was Germany or the U. S. A. or both) you could find menu cards in restaurants indicating, in addition to the price, the energy content of every dish. Needless to say, taken literally, this is just as absurd. For an adult organism the energy content is as stationary as the material content. Since, surely, any calorie is worth as much as any other calorie, one cannot see how a mere exchange would help. What then is that precious something contained in our food which keeps us from death? That is easily answered. Every process, event, happening—call it what you will; in a word, everything that is going on in Nature—means an increase of the entropy of the part of the world where it is going on. Thus a living organism continually increases its entropy—or, as you may say, produces positive entropy—and thus tends to approach the dangerous state of maximum entropy, which is death. It can only keep aloof from it, i.e., alive, by continually drawing from its environment negative entropy—which is something very positive as we shall immediately see. *What an organism feeds upon is negative entropy.* Or, to put it less paradoxically, the essential thing in metabolism is that the organism succeeds in freeing itself from all the entropy it cannot help producing while alive (pp. 71–72 [author's italics]).

. . . the awkward expression 'negative entropy' can be replaced by a better one: entropy, taken with the negative sign, is itself a measure of order. Thus the device by which an organism maintains itself stationary at a fairly high level of orderliness (= fairly low level of entropy) really consists in continually *sucking orderliness from its environment.* This conclusion is less paradoxical than it appears at first sight. Rather could it be blamed for triviality. Indeed, in the case

> of higher animals we know the kind of orderliness they feed upon, well enough, viz., the extremely well-ordered state of matter in more or less complicated organic compounds, which serve them as foodstuffs. After utilizing it they return it in very much degraded form—not entirely degraded, however, for plants can still make use of it. (These, of course, have their most powerful supply of 'negative entropy' in the sunlight.) [P. 75, author's italics.]

What bearing does this conception of life have upon the psychoanalytic theory of instincts? On the basis of the foregoing biological considerations,[7] we would have to conclude that the ability of living matter 'to suck negative entropy from the environment'—to use Schrödinger's phrase—must be regarded as the primary manifestation of the life instinct.

The great usefulness of this concept becomes immediately apparent if we consider the problem of distinguishing between living and nonliving matter in its borderline stages. It is often said that there is no sharp line of demarcation between the animate and the inanimate, but rather that there is a continuous spectrum at the one end of which matter is clearly nonliving, and at the other, living, with a gradual merging from the former into the latter. This is true. Nevertheless with the help of the above view, according to which living matter is characterized by its ability to take—and now we should add, actively[8]—energy (negative entropy) from its environment, we are in a position to more clearly describe whether something should be called living or not, and even to what extent matter may be considered to be alive.

It is in the realm of viruses that the problem of this shading from the living to the nonliving arises most distinctly. Certain

[7] See also the recent paper by Ludwig von Bertalanffy (*9*).

[8] Living organisms have the power of taking energy from the environment actively. Without restricting this taking of energy to such an active process, the differences between living and nonliving become obscured. The bombardment of certain inorganic substances with elementary particles results in the building up of more complex atoms. This differs fundamentally from living processes in that the substance does not 'take' energy, but 'receives' it passively from the environment.

viruses have been crystallized and thus, according to the usual biological concepts of what characterizes life, they are inanimate. However, in the presence of a favorable host of living cells, these viruses come alive: metabolic processes are initiated and reproduction occurs. The quality of being alive must thus be regarded as a dynamic, operational concept rather than as a statically qualitative one. In terms of the organism's ability to take energy from the environment, viruses are clearly the most primitive forms of life; they have this ability only to a very limited extent. Viruses can take energy only from already highly developed, complex living systems. In the absence of such a favorable environment, they cannot perform this vital function and are then inanimate.

Other primitive organisms, such as Rickettsiae, also depend on a living environment for their own life. Higher forms, on the other hand, are less facultatively alive, so to speak. In other words, animals and plants do not depend on such a complexly animate environment for their own survival; to some extent, however, animals also depend on other living matter for their survival, but not in the same way as do viruses. Animals must have relatively complex substances for their food stuff, but otherwise their survival does not depend on the very 'animateness' of the environment, as is the case with viruses. If we follow this line of thought to its ultimate limits, we would have to regard, at least from this particular point of view, the plants as the most highly developed forms of life, for it is in these organisms that the power to synthesize complex substances out of simpler ones is most highly developed. To put it differently, plants possess the ability to take energy out of the environment to a higher degree than any other form of life.[9]

[9] A recent article about photosynthesis is of considerable interest. Dean Burk and his associates (*15*) describe their studies of the transformations of energy in photosynthesis. As early as 1923, Otto Warburg had reported that four light quanta, absorbed by chlorophyll, can produce one molecule of oxygen under favorable conditions. 'This means that with red light about 65 per cent of the absorbed radiant energy can be transformed into chemical energy. No analogy is known in the nonliving world, where most photochemical reactions, although simpler and effected by quanta of higher energy, are far less efficient in

INSTINCT, SATISFACTION AND FRUSTRATION

According to Freud's conception, the death instinct is one of the two basic instincts; its existence is said to be manifest in all living beings and it is this instinct which causes the organism's ultimate death. Death, according to this view, results from *primary forces within the organism.*

Evidence from the observation of protozoa seemed to cast doubt on such a conception of death. Freud, however, minimized the significance of these facts. He gave only one reason for his critical view of the data derived from this source. 'The primitive organization of these forms of life', he suggested, 'may conceal from us important conditions which are present in them too but can be recognized only among the higher animals where they have achieved for themselves a morphological expression' *(40,* pp. 61–62*).*

The conception of a single 'primary instinct' (which may be designated as the Life Instinct, since it does not differ significantly from Freud's concept, except for its antithesis) is more consistent—as we have tried to show—with current conceptions of biology, than is the dualism of Eros and Thanatos. Ac-

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energy transformations, and are indeed usually exothermic. It became clear that an unknown principle, active in nature, awaited elucidation by physics and chemistry.'

Burk and his associates have reinvestigated the problem of the transformation of radiant energy into chemical energy in photosynthesis and have 'rediscovered . . . the high efficiency of energy transformation in photosynthesis'. Their conclusions are:

'It follows from the data obtained that in the spectral region 630 to 660 mmu. no more than four quanta are required to produce one molecule of oxygen gas. A requirement of three quanta is open to serious consideration, although thus far the average value in our experiments has been nearer four than three.

'A quantum requirement of four means that the efficiency of the energy transformation in our experiments was approximately $\frac{112{,}000 \times 100}{4 \times 44{,}000} = 65$ per cent, whereas the quantum number three would mean an efficiency of about 85 per cent.

'In any event, under favorable conditions the greater part of absorbed light energy can be transformed in green cells into chemical energy, and this is, to quote the man [Otto Warburg] who laid the foundation of quantitative photochemistry, "a marvellous achievement of nature".'

Cf. also *71.*

cording to this view, the protean manifestations of life would be interpreted not as resulting from a conflict between the life and death instincts, but rather as the results of various interferences with the complete satisfaction of the life instinct. This view, while based on the more modern conceptions of biology, is also a return, in some ways, to Freud's earlier thinking about this subject. In other words, the phenomenon of death, according to Freud's later instinct theory, results from the operation of essentially intraorganismal forces. According to the view here proposed, death results from interferences with the life instinct imposed by the external environment.[10] It should be noted, however, that in the course of evolution organisms have developed to ever greater complexity and correspondingly there arose interferences with the life instinct which have come to reside within the organisms themselves.

According to the unitary theory of instinct, living systems have the primary aim of keeping their life processes in operation, which is accomplished by drawing negative entropy from the environment. If all interferences with the life instinct were eliminated, living systems would be immortal. Alexis Carrel undertook the culture in vitro of a fragment of heart muscle from an unhatched chick embryo in 1912. A pure strain of fibroblasts was derived from this tissue and it was kept under such circumstances that the following two conditions were fulfilled at all times: first, the tissue was kept in a medium in which there was an abundance of the proper nutrient materials; second, by removal at frequent intervals the products of metabolism were not permitted to accumulate. Under these circumstances, the fibroblastic tissue continued to grow and was, in fact, shown to be immortal *(16, 20, 27)*. The following, taken from one of his papers written in 1928 *(20)*, warrants quotation here.

> We are entitled to consider the experiment as almost concluded, as it has lasted for a period of nearly sixteen years. Two important facts have been brought to light.

[10] Wilhelm Reich criticized the hypothesis of the death instinct on the basis that it substitutes a conflict between Eros and Thanatos for the more primary conflict of instinct versus outer world *(63, 64)*.

1. The fibroblasts derived from the original heart fragment manufacture large quantities of new tissues from the substances contained in the culture medium. In forty-eight hours, each cell of a colony seems to divide twice, and the colony doubles in volume. Had it been possible to keep all the cells which could have been produced during these sixteen years, their mass would be immense. A colony, originally one cubic millimetre in volume, would produce approximately one cubic centimetre of tissue in about twenty days. After sixty days, the volume of the tissues would be a little more than one cubic metre, and in less than one hundred days, one million cubic metres. It is obvious that tissues growing at this rate for sixteen years would reach a volume greater than that of the solar system.

2. Cell-proliferation is unlimited in time. Today, the rate of growth of the strain of fibroblasts is as great as it was fifteen years ago. The curve representing the variations of the growth velocity during this long period is parallel to the time axis. Time has no action whatever on these tissues. They are immortal.

These facts are of profound significance. They demonstrate not only that tissue cells are endowed with potentialities far greater than they display within the body, but also that these potentialities become actual under definite conditions, i.e., the elimination of certain metabolic products, and the presence of proper nitrogenous food.

The only living forms enjoying eternal youth are the colonies of unicellular organisms which eliminate their metabolic products directly into the outside world. When an animal is composed of a mass of cells organized as a closed system, the process of aging necessarily takes place. Immortality is incompatible with organization.

Carrel's experiments thus appear to substantiate the view that the primary life instinct aims only at insuring the continued operation of those life processes already present in the living system. These experiments have created the unusual condition in which the life instinct is exposed to no frustration whatsoever. Such a situation probably does not occur spontaneously in nature any more, and may have existed at the beginning of life

on this planet for only the briefest period of time. For it is to be noted that in Carrel's experiments not only did uninterrupted growth continue throughout the experimental period (more than thirty-four years), but there occurred no qualitative growth—no development or differentiation, and no aging.[11]

Carrel's experiments also provide some interesting data concerning the question of what happens in consequence of interferences with the satisfaction of the life instinct. Under the optimal metabolic conditions of these experiments, there occurred no changes in the tissues with the passage of time. This illustrates the currently well-established biological principle of an antagonism between growth and differentiation.[12] For example, highly differentiated cells, like the neurons of the central nervous system, have no power of regeneration whereas less differentiated ones, such as connective tissue cells, retain this power to a considerable extent. It thus appears that so long as all of the (instinctual) needs of an organism (cell) are satisfied—a condition of status quo ante is maintained; there is continued increase in size, but there is no qualitative change, no differentiation, no development. The genesis of new structures and functions—which is the essence of development—depends on some frustration of the life instinct. In its most basic form, this frustration consists of some type of interference with the processes of metabolism, that is, with the uptake of energy from the environment, upon which life depends.

The principle that frustration is the stimulus for development is not an original one. It has, however, not received the attention it deserves. Essentially the same idea was expressed

[11] *Cf.* Robertson *(70)*: 'Indeed we may now venture to surmise that so far from death being the necessary outcome of life, potential immortality with unlimited capacity for reproduction is a universal characteristic of living matter. . . . In every instance of sustained reproductive capacity and indefinite duration of existence, however, one essential must be realized, and that is frequent renewal of the pericellular fluid' (pp. 162–163).

[12] 'The property of continuous growth is exhibited by embryonic tissues, so long as differentiation does not occur. . . . Differentiation, the process of specialization of tissues during development, confers certain properties of structure and function, but these are apparently antagonistic to growth and cell divisions' *(14,* pp. 293–294*)*.

by Ferenczi as early as 1913. In his classical paper, Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality, he stated:

> In general the development of the reality sense is represented by a succession of repressions, to which mankind was compelled, not through spontaneous 'strivings toward development', but through adjustment to a demanded renunciation. The first great repression is made necessary by the process of birth, which certainly comes about without active coöperation, without any 'intention' on the part of the child. The fœtus would much rather remain undisturbed longer in the womb, but is cruelly turned into the world, and it has to forget (repress) the kinds of satisfaction it had got fond of, and adjust itself to new ones. The same cruel game is repeated with every new stage of development. . . .
>
> If this thought is logically pursued, one must make oneself familiar with the idea of a tendency of preservation, or regression-tendency, also dominating organic life, the tendency to further development, adaptation, etc., depending only on external stimuli (*32*, pp. 236–237).

It is apparent that Carrel's experiments fully substantiate Ferenczi's foregoing thoughts. In these experiments, dealing as we do with a simple living system, the complexities of what one might mean by frustration and development are greatly simplified and the whole problem appears in much clearer light. In this case, when the external environment provides no frustrations (no stimuli), growth proceeds in an uninterrupted and uninhibited manner. Such cells as these stop growing in an uninhibited manner and undergo differentiation (development) only when exposed to an environment which interferes with uninterrupted growth (of mass). In other words, we conceive of differentiation as an adaptation to frustrations (stimuli originating in the external milieu) which inhibit growth en masse. We may put it still another way, and say that when quantitative growth (growth of mass) is inhibited, then qualitative growth (differentiation, development of structure) may occur.

The foregoing conceptions are not new. Freud's early writings were dominated by similar views, in so far as he was con-

cerned with the manner in which the psychic apparatus adapts itself to the external world. His description (1911) of the way in which the reality principle evolves is a case in point.

> In presupposing that the state of mental equilibrium was originally disturbed by the peremptory demands of inner needs, I am returning to lines of thought which I have developed in another place. In the situation I am considering, whatever was thought of (desired) was simply imagined in an hallucinatory form, as still happens today with our dream thoughts every night. This attempt at satisfaction by means of hallucinations was abandoned only in consequence of the absence of expected gratification, because of the disappointment experienced. Instead, the mental apparatus had to decide to form a conception of the real circumstances in the outer world and to exert itself to alter them. A new principle of mental functioning was thus introduced; what was conceived of was no longer that which was pleasant, but that which was real, even if it should be unpleasant. This institution of the *reality principle* proved a momentous step *(38,* p. 14*).*

Ferenczi's paper was undoubtedly influenced by these views. The changes in Freud's concepts concerning instincts are striking. At first he operated with the conceptual dualism of the organism versus the outer world. It was in this manner that the whole concept of the development of the psychic apparatus —as a response to stimuli from the outer world—was evolved. Following Beyond the Pleasure Principle, however, his basic concepts changed. The fundamental conflict was not thought of in these terms but became 'internalized'. Originally the source of the basic conflict was the outer world which imposed frustrations upon instinctual needs; according to the newer theory, the frustration was not imposed by the outer world, but by the death instinct, which was said to oppose the life instinct.

It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the psychological observations which prompted Freud finally to adopt these views centered around masochism. Similarly, other authors, notably Paul Federn, felt that the phenomena encoun-

tered in severe depressions offer direct evidence of a death instinct *(29)*. In these conditions, as we know, it is the superego that takes a stand against the ego, wishing to inflict punishment on it to the degree of extermination. That this does not necessitate the assumption of a primary destructive instinct has been shown by others *(31, 76)*. What I wish to call attention to is the fact that the superego represents not only the latest product of development in the psychic apparatus, but it constitutes par excellence the internalization of frustrating influences which originate, in the last analysis, in the external environment. This role of the superego may be regarded as a typical example in the realm of the development of the psychic apparatus, of the more general biological antagonism between differentiation (organization) and immortality, referred to earlier. Thus, it is true that parts of the psychic apparatus can, and do, take over these functions from the outer world, and in this way the sources of conflict in man may, indeed, be all endopsychic. Such a state of affairs is, however, a late development in ontogenesis.

ADAPTATIONS TO FRUSTRATION

We have attempted to adduce evidence that living systems appear to be governed by a single biological principle, the life instinct, and that the aim of this instinct is to insure the continued operation of the living system in its current state. It was further suggested that differentiation, and aging, result from external stimuli (frustrations of the life instinct or its derivatives). Accordingly, it is not possible to regard death as a regression. It appears to be rather the result of a long developmental chain of events *(6)*. Indeed, we would be justified in saying that death is the price we pay for development.

According to the hypothesis here proposed, the varied phenomena of life, as we know them, are not due to the interaction of the life and death instincts, but result rather from the adaptations of the organism to external (disturbing) stimuli. In the absence of disturbing stimuli, life consists of nothing but a

potentially endless, undifferentiated growth of cells. If the organism (living substance) is exposed to external stresses, there are but two basic ways in which it can react: 1, by differentiation and development. Quantitative growth must be abandoned and qualitative growth results (individual development and evolution). This direction of change is *progressive;* 2, by loss of differentiation and repetition of previous patterns of behavior. Such a direction of change toward earlier, less complex modes of behavior, is *regressive.*

The concepts of progressive and regressive adaptation to stress are familiar to clinical psychoanalysis. Many of the factors which determine adaptation in particular situations of stress are relatively well understood. Of decisive importance for the outcome of such a conflict is the integrative strength or capacity of the ego (French). In this essay, however, we are not primarily concerned with clinical problems. We are interested rather in the more general, biological problem of what are the factors which determine whether a living system reacts progressively or regressively to stress. We do not claim to know the answer to this question but wish to call attention to one factor which appears to be of outstanding significance in determining the outcome of the above-mentioned process, namely the *degree of development* of the living system in question. That is to say, the most highly developed organisms (cells) are most prone to react regressively and, conversely, primitive organisms (cells) tend to react progressively. Some examples will illustrate these principles.

In the famous experiments of Jacques Loeb the unfertilized ova of sea-urchins were stimulated to undergo division by the action of chemicals. This work should be of particular interest to us since Freud mentioned it in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, and Ferenczi referred to it in his second paper on the sense of reality *(33).* Freud compares this chemical stimulation to the (allegedly) 'invigorating influences of conjugation' in paramecia *(40,* p. 60*).* Ferenczi, on the other hand, speculated '. . . the chemicals disorganize the outer layers of the egg, but out of the detritus a protective bladder (sheath) is formed, which puts a

stop to further injury. In the same way the Eros liberated by instinctual defusion converts destruction into growth, into a further development of the parts that have been protected' *(33,* p. 377*)*. It is possible that Ferenczi recognized one of the crucial elements in this phenomenon when he referred to a conversion of 'destruction into growth'. Put in another way, the chemical stimulation represents the disturbance in the external milieu which, as shown, may make for differentiation and development.

It seems, however, that a most important aspect of this experiment eluded both Freud and Ferenczi, namely, that fertilization of an ovum, be it by a sperm cell or by chemicals, does not represent a developmental step. We must keep clearly in mind what the criteria of development are and, also, on what basis we judge a change to be in the direction of progression or regression. These terms cannot be used as judgments of value but must be based on purely biological considerations. We regard, therefore, cells with a complex structure and function (such as spermatozoa and ova) as more highly developed than those with relatively more undifferentiated structure and more primitive function (such as a fertilized egg); moreover, we should note that the sex cells, in themselves, are not capable of division (reproduction). The fertilized ovum, on the other hand, is a rapidly dividing cell and, as such, a more primitive one.

It thus follows that fertilization represents a prime example in which a cell (the ovum) responds in a regressive manner to external stimulation (fertilization). The result of this process is the most profound (cellular) regression: two previously highly complex cells are transformed into a single, primitive, rapidly dividing cell which, in its subsequent course, undergoes a long process of development. First, it repeats, in a condensed manner, the entire developmental history of the species, finally, to evolve a cell such as gave rise to this long process in the first place.

The principle that complex living systems, when stimulated, tend to regress—for which Jacques Loeb's experiment is a beautiful example—seems also to find expression in the phe-

nomena of carcinogenesis. Indeed, the chemical stimulation of cancer is quite analogous to Loeb's experiment *(47)*. The development of malignant growths, which have an unquestionably greater tendency to occur in older (more highly differentiated) organisms may be interpreted in the following manner. In such organisms, so-called progressive adaptation to stress becomes apparently increasingly difficult; they tend to respond to stimulation, therefore, by regressions (in the case of cancer, a specific de-differentiation, i.e., a regression of certain cells).

The preceding examples have illustrated that complex living systems, under stress, tend to adapt regressively. That primitive systems tend to respond by progression is also easily shown. The entire evolutionary process may be regarded as exemplifying this principle. As a specific example may be cited the observations of Cleveland *(25)* who studied the protozoa which live in the hind gut of the wood-feeding roach, *Cryptocercus punctulatus,* and found that these organisms '. . . exhibit some form of sexual behavior when their host molts, but between molts there is no sexual behavior, they have the haploid number of chromosomes, and division is mitotic'. He concludes that '. . . the results set forth here indicate that the evolution of sexual and asexual phases in the life cycle of protozoa began as an environmental response'. These observations indicate that external stimuli may lead from a primitive to a more complex form of behavior, to a change designated as progressive.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The current status of the psychoanalytic theory of instincts appears ill defined and uncertain. Accordingly some of our basic concepts and postulates concerning the theory of life and death instincts are critically examined. Freud's views regarding the death instinct seemed to have been influenced by the biological theories current at that time. These theories were largely based on the physics of closed systems. In an attempt to explain the nature of life processes, the principle of entropy

(the second law of thermodynamics), valid for closed systems only, was extended to include organic systems. Since, however, life can occur only in open systems, the principle of entropy is not applicable under these circumstances.

The foregoing considerations were presented as the main argument against the validity of the concept of a death instinct. In addition, certain biological data were adduced in support of a unitary instinct theory. The data presented center around present-day biological theories concerning the nature of life processes. Accordingly, the hypothesis is suggested that there is but one primary instinct, a life instinct, the aim of which is to keep the life processes of a particular system in continued operation, and that this is accomplished by drawing negative entropy from the environment.

Carrel's famous tissue culture experiments (the immortal chicken heart) are briefly cited. The results of these experiments appear to be consistent with the unitary instinct theory proposed. Under the optimal metabolic conditions of the experiments, tissues continue to grow indefinitely and are potentially immortal. Aging and death thus appear to develop only in response to environmental interferences with the life instinct. The biological antagonism between differentiation and immortality are briefly discussed.

Carrel's experiments provide an answer to the question of what happens to cells (tissues) when the life instinct in a given system is permitted to operate unopposed. The corollary of this question, namely, what are the results of frustrations of the life instinct (and its derivatives), bridges the gap between biological principles and psychoanalysis. It is suggested that, in general, frustration of instinct may lead to either progressive or regressive adaptation. Among the factors affecting the choice of solution, the degree of complexity, or maturation, of the living system under consideration appears to be of paramount importance. In other words, while primitive systems tend to adapt progressively, complex organizations have a tendency toward earlier, more archaic patterns of behavior.

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THE BRIDGE: A STUDY IN SYMBOLISM

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The first to call attention to the significance and symbolic meaning of bridges in the dreams of neurotic patients was Ferenczi. In a paper published in 1921 [1] he reported the analysis of a man suffering from ejaculatio retardata who manifested a fear of bridges. The analysis revealed a specific traumatizing event, dating back to his ninth year of life, connected with the birth of a sister. It had been a very difficult birth, lasting four hours, during which the boy had become aware of the fact that the infant repeatedly appeared and then withdrew again into the mother's body. 'This to and fro', states Ferenczi, 'this isthmus between life and what is not yet (or no longer) life, thus gave the special form of bridge anxiety to the patient's anxiety hysteria'. Moreover, Ferenczi discovered a forerunner of this trauma that seemed to have prepared the ground for the later neurosis: the patient remembered having been told by his mother that he himself had come half-dead into the world after a difficult birth. Ferenczi induced the patient to cross a bridge in his company and observed that the anxiety became greatly heightened as they approached the center and increasingly so on the distal half. On the return journey the symptoms appeared in reverse sequence. When the proximal bank was reached again, the patient relaxed; his anxiety had vanished.

The analysis of this patient, as well as other observations of bridge dreams, led Ferenczi to the conclusion that there are four levels of meaning in the symbol of the bridge:

An abbreviated version of this paper was read to The New York Psychoanalytic Society on May 22, 1951.

[1] Ferenczi, Sandor: The Symbolism of the Bridge. Trans. by C. M. Baines. In: *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis.* London: Hogarth Press, 1950, pp. 352–356.

1. It is the male member, which unites the parents during sexual intercourse, and to which the little child must cling if it is not to perish in the 'deep water' across which the bridge is thrown.

2. In so far as it is thanks to the male member that we have come into the world at all out of that water, the bridge is an important vehicle between the 'Beyond' (the condition of the unborn, the womb) and the 'Here' (life).

3. Since man is not able to imagine death, the Beyond *after* life, except in the image of the past, consequently as a return to the womb, to water, to Mother Earth, the bridge is also the symbol of the pathway to death.

4. Finally the bridge may be used as a formal representation of 'transition', 'changes of condition', in general.[2]

These conclusions were published by Ferenczi in 1922; he had found a striking confirmation of them in the original version of the Don Juan legend. Don Juan, who 'lighted his cigar with the devil's cigar across the Guadalquivir', once met his own funeral cortège and 'wanted to be buried in the crypt of a chapel built by himself in order to be trodden on by the feet of men. Only after the "burial" did he change and become a repentant sinner.' The cigar lighted across the river is interpreted as a variation of the bridge symbol. By its shape and the fact that it burns, it represents the male organ burning with desire. Don Juan's presence at his own funeral is explained by the idea that this fantasy of a double represents a personification of the chief part of his bodily ego, the sexual organ; for in sexual intercourse the male organ is actually 'buried' (and this in the same place where birth occurs), and the rest of the ego may look anxiously at this 'burial'.

A search of the literature of the intervening thirty years has yielded but few references to bridge dreams[3] which will

[2] Ferenczi, Sandor: Bridge Symbolism and the Don Juan Legend. Trans. by John Rickman. In: *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis*. London: Hogarth Press, 1950, pp. 356–358.

[3] I am greatly indebted to Dr. Henry H. Hart for his kind assistance in this survey by checking approximately three thousand page references to dreams.

be cited presently. However, in the chapter on the Revision of the Theory of Dreams, in the New Introductory Lectures, Freud emphasized the symbolism of the bridge as advanced by Ferenczi and also, in complete agreement with Ferenczi, stressed the fact that 'removed from its original meaning, it indicates transition, or any change of condition whatever'.[4]

Marie Bonaparte, in her analysis of a tale by Edgar Allan Poe, Never Bet the Devil Your Head, a story about a covered bridge,[5] showed the fate which Poe's hero, in contrast to Don Juan, suffered for daring to approach the bridge; i.e., for incestuous designs on the mother. For this defiance he was castrated and killed, and his corpse was destined to be thrown to the dogs. In this same connection, Marie Bonaparte argued that the bridge is not only a representation of the penis which the male infant cannot and the male adult must not use as a means of sexual intercourse with the mother, but also a symbol of the 'extroverted mother=vagina', or vagina dentata. She was reminded of the dream of a man who suffered from ejaculatio præcox. In this dream, a woman appeared with a kind of projecting tube instead of the vulva: 'Due to unconscious memories of the phallic mother, in which all little boys once believed, the vagina was thus represented extroverted; a sort of compromise between vagina and penis'. Marie Bonaparte also cites a recurrent dream in the childhood of a patient described as 'a woman, masculine in temperament'. It was a nightmare in which the child was irresistibly forced to cross a bridge that would become increasingly rickety as she advanced and would finally end in a plank or two hanging in the air over the rushing water of the river. Analysis showed this anxiety dream to have been directly connected with infantile masturbatory experiences. Marie Bonaparte noted that it made its appearance only when the secondary phase of infantile masturbation was re-

[4] Freud: *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis.* Trans. by W. J. H. Sprott. Second edition. London: Hogarth Press, 1937, p. 38.

[5] Bonaparte, Marie: *The Life and Works of Edgar Allan Poe.* Trans. by John Rodker. London: Imago Publishing Co., 1949, pp. 525–536.

pressed, adding that the ruined bridge 're-echoed the notion that the clitoris or female penis was only a penis cut short' and that it was, in fact, a dream of impotence.

It is interesting that in a paper published in 1933,[6] Karen Horney mentioned, among typical dreams of women in whom a general anxiety about the injurious consequences of masturbation is present, the dream of crossing a bridge which breaks off suddenly above a river or chasm.

In a case described by Lewin,[7] a woman dreamed that she was being pursued by men and rescued herself by making her way hand over hand on a taut rope stretched across a deep chasm. This dream occurred at a time when the patient was about to become involved with a man. However, it is significant that in her childhood this same patient used to have dreams of falling off a bridge and drowning.

French,[8] discussing a patient who produced dreams expressing acute anxiety during a particular stage of her analysis, mentions one such dream in which she was walking over a narrow, insecure bridge over a stream far below. To complete the survey of the literature on dreams about bridges, reference may also be made to the bridge dream described in Brill's paper on the Universality of Symbols,[9] although Brill commented only on the phallic significance of the peacock seen in this dream, not on the meaning of the bridge as such.

This discussion is prompted by the fact that during the last ten years I have come across quite a number of bridge dreams in patients with sexual disturbances. Of these dreams, however, less than a dozen were fully analyzed. When Ferenczi first presented his clinical observations concerning the symbolism of the bridge, he wondered whether it was due to coincidence that in his own practice he had been able to detect the sexual con-

[6] Horney, Karen: *The Denial of the Vagina.* Int. J. Psa., XIV, 1933, p. 64.

[7] Lewin, Bertram D.: *The Body as Phallus.* This QUARTERLY, II, 1933, p. 35.

[8] French, Thomas M.: *Ego Analysis as a Guide to Therapy.* This QUARTERLY, XIV, 1945, pp. 344–345.

[9] Brill, A. A.: The Universality of Symbols. In: *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis,* Vol. I. New York: International Universities Press, 1945, pp. 66,ff.

notation of this symbol in a series of cases. In view of the scanty attention which the subject has received in the literature, I entertained similar doubts for some time. However, upon reviewing my clinical material, I was struck by a definite pattern in these cases.

The most important features which I found to be common to the bridge dreams are that they are transference dreams and not only play a crucial role in the analysis but appear at a strategic point in the life of the patient. I gained the impression that the emergence of the bridge symbol in a dream stems from a very deep repression, since the analyses of such dreams seemed to free a great deal of material that had previously been inaccessible or withheld.

The bridge dreams fall into three groups: 1, those in which the dreamer fears even to attempt a crossing; 2, those in which a partial crossing is achieved; 3, those in which he is successful in crossing the bridge and reaching the other shore. However, in almost every bridge dream reported to me there was an impediment to crossing the bridge. Either the bridge itself collapsed, or some other force impeded the attempt to cross it. As indicated by Ferenczi, the paroxysmal fear seems to relate to the distal rather than the proximal part. In most cases, therefore, the impediments encountered in such dreams, as well as the fears expressed by persons who suffer from a phobia of bridges, increase at the center of the span.

This was typically illustrated in the case of a man of about forty-five who suffered from a compulsion neurosis with intermittent impotence. He was born in England and lived in the United States since his early adolescence. He was divorced twice and had remarried his first wife after a separation of fifteen years; immediately after the wedding, he became impotent. He decided to seek treatment, largely because of a recurrent dream which reappeared on this occasion. In this dream he was crossing London Bridge. At the moment when he reached the center of the span, it would open, leaving him suspended in mid-air and clinging to the proximal part of the bridge. Almost every instance when he became impotent was

preceded by this dream, which was thus virtually a prodromal sign of his impotence.

A bridge dream in which the inability to reach the opposite shore symbolized deeper conflicts was brought by a patient of twenty-nine who had likewise become impotent shortly after his wedding. He dreamed that he was riding with a group of people in a train over rough and cavernous country. As the train crossed a poorly constructed bridge above a deep, rock-bedded valley, he ordered it to stop because he sensed that the bridge was giving way. He jumped down into the valley and observed that the train put too much pressure upon the bridge which was supported at one end only, the other resting insecurely on a platform of rock. He ordered everybody out, and as they leaped to safety, the bridge broke. In association to this dream the patient recalled that on his honeymoon he had experienced fear while traveling over bridges of similar construction. However, the analysis revealed that this anxiety related not to the real bridges but to the act of defloration. He had, in fact, become impotent on his honeymoon. He rationalized his impotence as being caused by his wife's aggressive attitude which intimidated him and made him fearful of intercourse; also, he felt she did not love him and had married him only because of his position. The patient, who had a slight acquaintance with psychoanalytic concepts, believed this to be demonstrated in the dream by the fact that the bridge was supported only at one side, whereas the other rested loosely on a rock; this symbolized for him the one-sided love in his marriage. While it was true that his wife was rather aggressive and frigid, it also became clear that the marriage had activated his strong homosexual tendencies and thrown him into a state of panic. It is characteristic that this transference dream, in which the patient expressed his latent homosexuality, occurred on the very day his marriage was annulled.

An even more interesting example, perhaps, is the dream of a young social worker who manifested many compulsive and hysterical symptoms dating back to her early adolescence. This patient, a woman of twenty-nine who had never experienced

sexual intercourse, entertained a violent jealousy of her supervisor. Not only did she feel incapable of competing with her achievements, but she also envied her for her social success and believed her to be involved in many sexual affairs. She dreamed that she was discussing sexual matters with the supervisor who had promised to show her how to enjoy herself socially and was taking her 'to a party'. On their way they crossed a narrow, broken-down bridge which collapsed under them. Both women fell into the water which came up to their hips. The supervisor remarked: 'See, that's what you will have to get into if you follow along with me and my friends'.

Although I cannot give the full analysis of this dream here, I wish to highlight its specific significance in the transference situation. The patient's associations led her to recall a previous dream, not before reported in the analysis, which had evidently been a forerunner of the bridge dream. She dreamed that I had invited her supervisor to a social gathering in my home, and that she (the patient) had reproached me for neglecting her. This dream was based on the fact that the supervisor had consulted me, with the patient's knowledge, about a matter concerning the agency where they both worked. Her memory of this dream, in turn, brought back her underlying, lifelong jealousy of her sister who was the father's favorite and with whom she competed unsuccessfully.

Thus it became clear that 'going to a party with the supervisor' meant sharing me with her, and that it also meant sharing her father with her sister. Moreover, it is significant that the dream occurred at a point in the patient's life when she was fighting the temptation to start an affair with a married man whom she had met in the company of her supervisor.[10] That the collapse of the bridge meant the inability to have heterosexual intercourse hardly needs to be stressed. It symbolized the clitoris: a penis that is too short; besides, it meant punishment for incestuous fantasies. Falling into the water with the supervisor meant being on an equal libidinal level with

[10] *Cf.* the case cited by Lewin, Note 7.

the sister ('being in the same boat'), and being in the water also represented masturbatory and homosexual fantasies [11] and, finally, rebirth fantasies. Freud's statement that a woman who has not yet overcome the desire to be a man may often dream of a bridge too short to reach the other shore [12] is precisely applicable. As for the genital representation of the bridge, this may be an example where the symbol can have both a phallic and a vaginal meaning. The vaginophallic significance of the bridge was evidenced by associations referring to fear of losing her virginity, being penetrated by a penis, breaking of the hymen.

However, while the bridge symbol may have one or the other sexual connotation, its outstanding significance lies not in the static genital representation per se, but in the dynamic process of crossing the bridge to reach the opposite shore. Whether the dreamer be a woman who has not yet accepted her femininity, or a man with a deep castration anxiety, the inability to cross the bridge may in either case represent the incapacity for heterosexual intercourse.

Another case, in which the analysis of a bridge dream likewise proved a turning point in the treatment, was an unmarried woman of twenty-six who since the age of fifteen had had a phobia of walking down stairs. She dreamed she was walking toward a bridge which she had to cross. As soon as she came near it she became frightened because she saw many people lining the approaches to the bridge at both ends. Those who stood at the proximal end were looking at her belligerently and threatening to harm her, and she knew that those on the other shore were waiting to kill her if she crossed over. Repeatedly, she would walk out upon the bridge and then turn back, not daring to go all the way across.

The analysis of the dream revealed that the bridge functioned as a screen memory and referred to an incestuous game which had taken place on several occasions when the patient was about six. She had placed herself on a chair with her back to her three-

[11] *Cf.* the dreams reported by Bonaparte and Horney, Notes 5 and 6.
[12] *New Introductory Lectures,* p. 38.

year-old brother whom she instructed to fondle her vagina, *a tergo,* with a piece of fur. During this procedure she used to look out of the window, watching lest someone should come, and could observe people coming and going over a bridge. Further probing led directly to the patient's phobia of going down stairs which was connected with the primal scene. At the age of about five or six she had witnessed coitus between her parents while she was in bed with them. She remembered that her father, after consummating the intercourse, had touched her with his wet penis; that she had become frightened and wanted to climb out of bed, but was paralyzed with fear. This material had been inaccessible until the analysis of the bridge dream.[18] Although the patient claimed this to be a recurrent dream, it appeared at an important time in the analysis and in her life. Her brother, who was then serving overseas, had been wounded. Moreover, she was considering marriage, and this was contraindicated by the analysis.

The analysis of this dream was especially interesting for two reasons. First, because it disclosed a specific relationship between the manifest dream content (the bridge) and the phobia of the stairs. Second, because it seemed to shed some light on the problem of the choice of a symbol. Ferenczi said that the historical material in his cases did not include any bridge and that where it does occur, it need not necessarily have a deeper significance. However, apart from the fact that there is hardly an individual today whose history would not furnish memories of bridges, my own experience indicates that the use of a symbol in a dream invariably does have a deeper significance, whether it is based on historical material or not. This agrees with Nunberg's view, which he recently confirmed to me, that a symbol always has a deeper meaning except when it is used purely as an allegory. As Jones aptly puts it: 'While

[18] An interesting analogy may be found in a case described by Anny Katan, in which a fear of bridges in an agoraphobic patient made it possible to uncover an obviously traumatic primal scene; the child's movements in attempting to escape were paralleled exactly, later, in her behavior when she was forced to cross a bridge. (Katan, Anny: *The Role of Displacement in Agoraphobia.* Int. J. Psa., XXXII, 1951, p. 46.)

the individual cannot choose what idea shall be represented by a given symbol . . ., he can choose what symbol out of the many possible ones shall be used to represent a given idea'.[14] The choice of a particular symbol, even when it stems from most recent experiences, necessarily must be determined by a specific psychological constellation.

In all the bridge dreams described so far, the common factor was the dreamer's inability to reach the farther shore. The following example, by contrast, illustrates the successful completion of the crossing. The patient was a man of forty, suffering from impotence and ejaculatio præcox, whose condition had considerably improved in analysis. He dreamed that he was driving with his wife 'to a party' in the country while a thunderstorm threatened in the distance. After leaving the party, they had to cross a short bridge over a shallow, muddy ditch in order to get to their car. The bridge was wet with running water. He noticed that it was not rigid, and he had the impression that it would bend if stepped upon. As they came to the bridge, he said to his wife: 'Let me go first, dear, so your feet won't get wet and muddy; I'll help you across'; and she replied: 'I can make it all right'. She proceeded to cross the bridge, and he immediately behind her. But, as they were walking over it, their weight caused it to sag in the middle and both got their feet a little muddy as the center of the bridge sank slightly into the muddy water. After they had gone across they saw a little lamb standing next to their car. He suggested that they take it home to their children but his wife objected.

The associative material to this dream can be summarized as follows. The dream occurred during the night following the Day of Atonement. Two things were significant about this date. First, that the patient, who had been brought up in a rather orthodox Jewish environment, prided himself on his agnosticism and observed only this single holiday which, as he put it, 'tied me to my parents'; second, that it fell three days after the anniversary of his father's death, when he had visited

[14] Jones, Ernest: The Theory of Symbolism. In: *Papers on Psycho-Analysis.* Fifth edition. London: Baillière, Tindall and Cox, 1948, p. 98.

the grave. After attending the service at the synagogue, which included a special prayer for the dead, he had invited several people to his home for a drink. Before he fell asleep he had intercourse with his wife, but at her insistence had to interrupt it in order to put on a contraceptive; he finally completed the intercourse 'in a half-erected state', as he described it. He always hated to use contraceptives and did so only because his wife refused to have a third child. He, on the contrary, without admitting it to her, wished for one; especially for a daughter, as they had two boys. Several days earlier, his wife had told him of her suspicion that their eleven-year-old son had commenced to masturbate. In this connection she had asked him how a father feels when his son begins to become a man, when he has erections, whether the father is jealous of the son? This conversation threw him into a panic. Then, one night before the dream, considerable discussion had taken place between the patient and his wife on the subject of love and fear in the Bible. She said that she remembered from childhood: 'Thou shalt *love* the Lord thy God'. He, however, remembered: 'Thou shalt *fear* the Lord thy God' or, 'Thou shalt be a God-fearing man'. Then, when they went to the temple on the Day of Atonement, a check of the prayer book revealed that they were both right, and that one passage in particular illustrated both the love and the fear of God, where Abraham is about to sacrifice his son Isaac when an angel of the Lord calls his attention to a *lamb* (ram).

The dream, considered against this background, speaks for itself. It not only presents a perfect symbolization of the act of intercourse which preceded it, as shown by the rickety bridge, but, over and above this, it demonstrates the patient's deep castration anxiety and need for atonement, as represented by the sacrificial symbol of the lamb which refers not alone to himself but also to his son. The additional determination of the lamb in the dream, the wish to bring another child into his home, does not detract from this meaning. Since this combination of castration anxiety and need for punishment emerges more clearly in this dream than in any other bridge dream I

have analyzed so far, I am reluctant to draw any general conclusions from it. However, on the one hand, it occurred at a stage in the analysis when the patient had improved sufficiently to resume intercourse; on the other hand, it was precipitated by a chain of events calculated to revive old castration anxieties. For these reasons, I consider it specifically symbolic.

Several days later, the patient dreamed that he was driving a heavy truck across Brooklyn Bridge. Before he came to the bridge, he passed his father (dead two years) and saw him wave and smile proudly and approvingly as he drove on. When he reached the other side, he ran his truck into a small guardhouse, tearing off a door. Then a policeman came who, however, let him go.

The father's approval in this second bridge dream reflected a striking decrease of the castration anxiety, which seemed to indicate that the interpretation of the first dream had been accepted by the patient. The further development of the analysis showed this assumption to be correct.

As Freud and Ferenczi stated, the bridge symbol need not always have a sexual and incestuous connotation, but can indicate any kind of change or transition. A striking and amusing example was told me by a colleague. On the day in his training analysis that he brought a dream of crossing a bridge, he turned to his analyst and said: 'Doctor, I think I am through'; and it proved that he *was* through. We must bear in mind that a reasonable fear of the kind of bridges that existed from primitive times was justified, and that modern construction has not completely obviated it. This *Realangst* might well be a factor expressed in some bridge dreams. The clinical observations presented in this paper are, of course, concerned with neurotic anxiety and not with reality fears.

The neurotic fear of bridges and of the opposite shore, which is so pathognomonic of some patients with sexual disturbances, was perhaps best described in the free associations of a patient who suffered from a true gephyrophobia. He defined it as *a fear that he would cross into an unknown, dangerous country, where*

he might be ripped apart or devoured by prehistoric animals. One might speculate whether this oral connotation of the intrauterine fantasy may not be an underlying motivation of the neurotic fear of bridges. Perhaps further clinical study will substantiate this idea and contribute to our understanding of the symbolic contents of such phobias and dreams.

What I have aimed to show in this study is that the bridge, in addition to being a sexual and incestuous symbol, played a specific role in the analyses of these patients. Evidently it was not merely the correctness of the interpretation and its acceptance by the patient that had the therapeutic effect, but the fact that it led directly to deeply repressed material and enhanced the process of working through the anxieties and the transference. Why bridge dreams assume this significant function in a fair number of cases but do not occur in other patients presenting similar clinical pictures cannot be determined on the basis of our present knowledge.

There is indication that the same ambivalence which we observe in the neurotic's attitude toward the bridge and his fear of the other shore must have existed in the human mind since the dawn of civilization. It might be said that this ambivalence reflects nothing else but the longing to reunite what had been divided by the act of creation, the longing to re-establish a *unio mystica,* and at the same time the fear of defying the very act of creation. Creation is division. The mythologies of many cultures contain the concept that creation is a disruption of the sexual act; thus in the Egyptian theogony the earth and the sky were not separated until the god Shu lifted up the sky and thereby severed the sexual union of the sky goddess and the earth god. This act of division is depicted in Egyptian grave pictures which unmistakably show the phallic link.[15] This myth has been traced to the very early West Asiatic cultures (Elam, Babylon). In the Sudan similar representations were found, but with the position reversed: the natives there spontaneously described the male as 'sky' and the

[15] Wallis Budge, E. A.: *The Gods of the Egyptians.* London: Methuen & Co., 1904, Vol. II, pp. 98, 104.

female as 'earth'. This variant is paralleled in Greek mythology; Uranos (the sky) forbids his children by Gaia (the earth) to be born (come forth into the light); Kronos, the youngest son, attacks and castrates the father at night as he rests upon the earth, thus separating the sky god from the earth goddess. A strikingly similar myth existed among Polynesians in New Zealand.[16]

Small wonder, then, that in the lore of so many cultures we find the dream of reuniting by magic, by supernatural bridges, what had been divided: earth and sky—heaven and earth. It is clearly represented, for example, in the rainbow bridges of the Nordic, the Jewish, and other mythologies. In the Edda, the link between heaven and earth takes the form of a rainbow joining the earth to Valhalla, the heavenly dwelling of Odin; over this bridge, the Valkyries transported the heroic warriors killed in battle. In the Old Testament the rainbow appears as a symbol of the covenant between God and man. Similar ideas underlie the bridge of Parsi myth and the Mohammedan Al Sirat.[17] The 'Perilous Bridge' of Indian lore gave expression to the philosophical and mystical traditions of Buddhism: 'In the beginning these two worlds of Sky and Earth were one; they were divided by the act of creation, and then there came into being the "two shores" of the intervening river or sea of time and space'.[18] The river, in this scheme, is the water of desire; the hither shore is 'embodiment' in the corporeal self, and the bridge carries man to his 'last end' which is disembodiment, 'the extinction of life's fires'.

The recurring symbols in these images of magical bridges, reflecting cultural fantasies in which the process of elaboration is subtler and more obscure than in the neurotic symptom, can easily be elucidated by the methods of dream interpretation. In West Africa the bridge between heaven and earth was

[16] Frobenius, Leo: *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas.* Zürich: Phaidon-Verlag, 1933, pp. 153–160.

[17] *Cf.* Watson, Wilbur J. and Sara Ruth: *Bridges in History and Legend.* Cleveland: J. H. Hansen, 1937, pp. 7–8.

[18] Coomaraswamy, Dona Luisa: *The Perilous Bridge of Welfare.* Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, VIII, 1944–1945, p. 196.

thought to be formed by a stream of arrows—certainly the least disguised of all phallic symbols—shooting rapidly into the air. It does not require great analytic acumen, for example, to discern the phallic symbolism in the 'sword bridge' of Arthurian romance, over which the hero had to pass before he could claim his lady; nor to understand the second ordeal awaiting him on the other shore, the ferocious lions that had to be killed before he could penetrate the fortress in which the heroine was imprisoned. Another significant legend has it that when Charlemagne caused a golden bridge to leap suddenly across the river, it was observed by only one maiden who was promptly burned at the stake for having intercepted 'Satan's Dream'.

Even more striking, perhaps, are the underlying wishes and fantasies about the connection between this world and the other world: the world of the living and that of the dead. A typical legend has the devil wrestling with God for the soul of man on the 'Bridge of Judgment' which links this world to the afterworld; the righteous make the passage successfully while the wicked fall into the raging waters of hell below. In the Greek myth, the river Styx lying between earth and Hades was bridged by the ferry of Charon, to whom the spirits of the departed had to pay a toll before they could cross. (It is interesting to note that even in our day, although our roads and thoroughfares are built and maintained by taxation, bridge tolls are still paid in many places, a custom which seems reminiscent of this myth.[19]) The entrance to the infernal regions was guarded by a monster, the three-headed watchdog Cerberus. Another group of legends about the bridge to the other world exists in the Indian folklore of North America. One of these, reported by Watson, presents a remarkable resemblance to the Greek myth: 'Like Cerberus by the river Styx, the Hurons have a dog guarding a tree trunk [notice the primitive form of the bridge] which spans the river Death'.[20]

[19] Cf. Róheim, Géza: *Charon and the Obolos.* The Psychiatric Quarterly Supplement, XX, 2, 1946, pp. 160–196.

[20] Watson: *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

Special reference should be made here to the extremely interesting fantasies described by Róheim, although in a different connection, in Animism and Religion. 'Among the Zuni the other world is called a womb, and among the Sia the spirit does not die but wakes in the other world as a little child; and in Egypt the dead are the beings who fertilize the womb of the goddess Nut. The passage to the other world is frequently described as leading over a gulf. The gulf has to be crossed by the soul on a bridge or serpent, and the passage is obstructed by a demon or animal trying to devour the soul.' Róheim comments on these somewhat involved fantasies as follows: 'The soul goes to a land of erotic pleasure, to the vagina. . . . The dream is a journey of the soul; the journey of the soul is a dream. And what is there more constant in dream symbolism than the penis significance of sword, bridge, and serpent? . . . The demon who obstructs the road and all the other dangers of the passage represent anxiety derived from the œdipus and castration complex. . . . Sacrifice is a substitute for castration, for to those who are diligent in sacrificing it is promised that the funeral pyre will not burn their genital organs; they shall have plenty of women in the other world, and Yama, the god of death, will not deprive them of their semen.' [21]

This ever recurring theme of sacrifice, which is associated with the bridge motif, plays the central role in innumerable legends and tales in our own culture that deal with bridges spanning rivers or chasms, linking territory to territory. These legends seem to imply acts of defiance which aroused feelings of guilt, thus providing the motivation for sacrificial atonement.

To primitive man, rivers symbolized the divine intention of separating tribe from tribe, territory from territory. Each stream had its own presiding divinity from which it acquired its sacred or semisacred character. But man, the eternal rebel against God, the stubborn builder of the Tower of Babel, could no more resist bridging the stream that would confine him than he could resist eating of the Tree of Knowledge. And

[21] Róheim, Géza: *Animism and Religion.* This QUARTERLY, I, 1932, p. 97.

bridging the stream carried its own retribution. To pacify the river spirits, some sacrificial act was exacted from the transgressor. Of course, these fears may originally have been based on real dangers and only later become rationalized by the wrath of the river spirits, which had to be appeased by human sacrifices. The ambivalence that characterizes man's attitude toward all authority—parental, civil, or divine—is exhibited in the ease with which the river gods were transformed into demons and eventually into the devil himself. But, devil or god, a tribute was required. The crossing of the bridge remained a hazardous venture, and those who lost their footing became the devil's prize.

Folklore abounds in stories about the 'bridge sacrifice' without which the bridge could not be built, which alone could make safe its foundations. Some of the medieval legends had the master builder, desperate after a long series of mishaps and frustrations, enter into a pact with the devil, who would help erect the bridge and in return receive the soul of the first creature that crossed it. Sometimes, the builder outwitted the devil by sending an animal across the bridge first; but more often, aware of the enormous power of Satan for evil, he 'gave the devil his due'. Many bridges in Europe still bear the name Devil's Bridge, and there are some that even today are believed to have the victim's body built into the foundation.[22] In a Siberian story, attributed to V. Moshkov, twelve men building a bridge could not secure its foundation. The chief constructor ordered that the first woman coming to bring food the next morning be sacrificed. The first to come was his own wife, and she was thrown into the pit.[23]

A specific legend associated with London Bridge is that to secure the structure, the stones were sprinkled with the blood of little children. 'London Bridge is falling down, ... Here's a prisoner I have got', children in England and this country still

[22] *Cf.* Watson: *Op. cit.;* also: Bridge, in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* Vol. II. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910, p. 848–856.

[23] Watson: *Op. cit.,* p. 39.

sing today [24] while enacting a ritual of 'locking up' the victim and releasing him only after payment of a forfeit. This is a variant of the 'bridge game', which is played by children all over Europe with much the same action accompanying different versions of the song.

These are but a few examples taken from the wealth of such material in European folklore. They show that recurrent themes in religion and mythology of anxiety, fear, awe, sin and atonement are associated in the popular imagination with bridges, even as they are in the dreams and fantasies of neurotics. Indeed, it is not surprising that the bridge assumed the significance it has had from antiquity to the present. In ancient Rome the most important priesthood was the *Collegium of the Pontifices,* charged with the administration of the *jus divinum,* that part of the civil law which governed the relations of the community with the state deities. The *pontifices* were the builders and guardians of bridges; they alone, apparently, were thought capable of pacifying the river spirits and making the structure of the bridge secure. The word *pontifex* clearly derives from *pons* (bridge) and *facere* (to make), literally *bridgemaker.* This institution was later incorporated in the Catholic Church, and *Pontifex Maximus,* the title borne by the Roman emperor as the head of the *Collegium of the Pontifices,* was assumed by the Pope as head of the Church of Rome. Nor was this merely a formal title; the actual control of bridges also passed to the Church, and bridgebuilding became, officially and in fact, a religious enterprise and a work of notable piety. In 1189 the religious order of the *Fratres Pontifices* was created in France, and chapels were attached to the bridges built by these priests, some of them erected upon the bridge's span.[25]

The river spirits having been appeased and the devil defeated,

[24] The first case I reported in this paper was that of an Englishman who suffered from impotence and had a recurrent dream about London Bridge. This patient's only association to London Bridge was the song cited.

[25] It is believed that the *Pont St. Cloud* in France was called *'un pont maudet'* because it was not built by or under the supervision of the clergy. (Watson: *Op. cit.,* p. 38.)

the bridge became a sacred object. It seems that man's uneasiness in spanning nature's barrier, in defiance of the implied prohibition, was his sense of guilt which has remained buried in the unconscious, ready to be projected into the outer world in situations of psychic torment. This inescapably leads to the conjecture that the symbol of the bridge may indeed be an archaic acquisition of mankind. However, such conclusions must remain speculative as long as the whole question of the inheritance of memory traces remains an open one in psychoanalysis. Freud, Ferenczi, Rank, and Sachs were inclined to answer it in the affirmative, as is Nunberg. Others, among them Jones and Róheim, do not lean to this view. Brill's statement that there seems to be no gap between phylogeny and ontogeny [26] referred to the fact that our attitude toward the incest taboos appears to be as vivid as that of the primitives. In my opinion, much still remains to be learned before a definitive answer can be given. Ferenczi, who studied 'the dynamics of repression active in the formation of symbols', expressed the belief that 'there still remains to be supplied (in order to gain "metapsychological" insight, in Freud's sense, into the essential nature of symbols) a knowledge of the distribution of the psychophysical quantities concerned in this interplay of forces, and more exact data as to its ontogenesis and phylogenesis'.[27]

But whether the symbolism of the bridge is an archaic residue or is acquired by each individual, one thing is certain: that it has a fast hold upon the fancy and the fantasies of man. It appears innumerable times in literature and poetry, from ancient days to our own. To give only one quotation from an ancient Hindu epic, the Ramayana, as profoundly significant as it is beautiful:

> O'er the deep sea where monsters play
> A bridge, O Rama, will I lay;
> For sharer of my father's skill
> Mine is the power, and mine the will.[28]

[26] Brill: *Op cit.*, p. 78.
[27] Ferenczi: *The Symbolism of the Bridge*, pp. 355–356.
[28] Watson: *Op. cit.*, p. 18.

'Sharer of my father's skill' is the motif of myth, romance, and neurotic drive alike. Whether it be a bridge to the forbidden shore, to the omnipotent god, or to the inviolate heroine, the same primitive, incestuous drive is apparent. And it is this common element which illuminates the progression from myth to romance. The sacrifice, in all bridge myths, is the abstention from instinctual satisfaction, involving a renunciation of individual gratification for the greater good of the community, which gave to the bridge its 'holy' character and made of it a sacred monument. The primitive rebellion is personified in the hero of romance, the defiant adventurer ever seeking new exploits by which to assert his manhood. What is an awesome object to the devout exercises a compulsive, an 'unholy' attraction for the hero. He flaunts his potency: 'Mine is the power, and mine the will'.

In the evolution from tribal myth and anonymous romance to the highly differentiated expressions of modern thinking, the symbol of the bridge has acquired new overtones without losing its original meaning. Modern man nurtures illusions of freedom while he hobbles along in the chains of instinctual taboos. He spans rivers that would have defied the imagination, let alone the efforts, of earlier men; he erects structures that were once literally inconceivable; but the more elaborate his technical feats, the more tortured is his psyche.

Hilaire Belloc, the Catholic polemicist, harked back nostalgically to the days when bridges were considerably less safe, more modest, and, to his mind, æsthetically more pleasing. Bridges, according to Belloc, 'were felt to be a special triumph. There was a temptation to make them do more than the art of the time allowed.' In modern times, so he feels, the reverse is true.[29]

From this point of view, there lurks in modern engineering a curious paradox. Aspiring to a purely utilitarian purpose, the very act of creation carries it beyond its goal. As if in testimony to the presence of a foreign, demonic power that

[29] Belloc, Hilaire: On Bridges. In: *A Conversation With an Angel and Other Essays.* London: Jonathan Cape, 1928, pp. 225,ff.

frustrates the intentions of the builder (reminiscent of the wrathful spirits and devils who plagued more primitive minds, yet seemingly with reverse effects), he produces structures that are often higher than they need be, more elaborate and imposing than is necessary by strictly functional standards. Indeed, if one thinks of the old Roman bridges which were able to withstand the vicissitudes of centuries, it is not difficult to translate such nostalgia into psychological terms and to understand the yearning for a simpler order in which men courted physical dangers rather than spiritual peril and in which the bridge, the violation of the ancestral taboo, exacted its own penance in the form of frequent accidents and fatalities. It seems plausible that the neurotic fear attached to the bridge must have influenced bridgebuilding throughout the ages and in some way manifested itself in architectural techniques and forms.

Perhaps its clearest artistic, creative expression may be found in the works of writers and poets which afford many truly illuminating examples of bridge symbolism. It is remarkable that as one examines these expressions of creative imagination, they seem to offer compelling proof that the author has projected himself into this symbol.

There is a story by Goethe, *Das Märchen,* which is an elaborate political allegory of the internal division and chaos in Germany at that time, couched in the terms of a fairy tale. In this tale a serpent, sacrificing itself for the good of the community, turns into a *bridge,* as a symbol of *love* linking the 'ugly' (prerevolutionary) world and the 'ideal' (postrevolutionary) world across the abyss of ruthless asceticism and irresponsible politics. The entire story, with its involved action and symbolism, would be deserving of detailed analytic examination which cannot be attempted here. The most significant point is that Goethe chose two phallic symbols and transformed one into the other: the serpent into the bridge.[30]

The bridge motif plays a prominent role in the autobiography

[30] *Cf.* Róheim's observations quoted on p. 64.

of the English writer, G. K. Chesterton. In this highly revealing memoir, he makes much of the fact that his first visual memory was a scene in a toy theater, in which a handsome young man was walking, almost swaggering, across a bridge. The man wore a large golden crown, and in his hand he carried a disproportionately large key of a shining yellow metal. The bridge stretched over a perilous mountain chasm and was joined at the far side to 'the upper part of the tower of an almost excessively castellated castle'. In the window of the tower a young lady was visible. 'I can no longer behold the beauty of the princess', Chesterton remarks, 'but I can see it in the bridge that the prince crossed to reach her'. This image—which impresses one like a screen memory—was not only his earliest recollection but, he insists, a crucial one: 'All my life I have loved edges; and the boundary-line that brings one thing sharply against another. . . . I have also a pretty taste in abysses and bottomless chasms and everything else that emphasizes a fine shade of distinction between one thing and another; and the warm affection I have always felt for bridges is connected with the fact that the dark and dizzy arch accentuates the chasm even more than the chasm itself.' Concluding his autobiography, Chesterton returns to this image, relating it to the central experience of his spiritual life, his conversion to Catholicism. He saw once again the figure of a man crossing a bridge and carrying a key, and he knew that 'he who is called Pontifex, the Builder of the Bridge, is called also Claviger, the Bearer of the Key; and that such keys were given him to bind and loose when he was a poor fisher in a far province, beside a small and almost secret sea'. It does not detract from this religious testament to note that at one point, explicitly yet almost inadvertently, he identifies the 'Man with the Golden Key' as his greatly admired father.[31]

Chesterton prided himself on his simple religious dogmatism. When asked why he had joined the Church of Rome, he was wont to answer: 'To get rid of my sins'. Few modern men

[31] *The Autobiography of G. K. Chesterton.* New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936, pp. 24–26, 355.

acquire absolution so easily. With the removal of those confining physical and social barriers of which Chesterton was so fond, and which the medieval world supplied in such abundance, the disparity between external freedom and internal inhibitions became more difficult to endure. It is not accidental that one of the most frequent symptoms encountered among the psychoanalyst's patients is psychosexual impotence, and that one of the most prevalent themes in contemporary literature is the inability to love.

The last sentence of Thornton Wilder's 'The Bridge of San Luis Rey' [32] is the clue to the whole novel: 'There is a land of the living and a land of the dead, and the bridge is love, the only survival, the only meaning'. The book ends on this apparently hopeful note. In a wicked world, five good people have died and will be forgotten; but the love that was in them will suffice to give meaning to their lives and to confute the nihilistic suspicion that life has no meaning, that their lives and loves were in vain. Such is the ostensible (though not entirely explicit) burden of the book. Yet the theme itself, with its profoundly tragic implications, belies the moderate optimism of its conclusion; the inescapable fact is that the Bridge of San Luis Rey *breaks*. Love had failed the lovers because it was inherently incapable of giving or receiving satisfaction. Of the five who die in the collapse of the bridge, the three principal characters were guilty of love arrested and excessive, immature and incestuous: the love of a mother for her daughter, of a brother for his twin, and of an old man for his protégée. The other two victims were abandoned, unloved children. That the theme is not the miracle of love, but its failure, is apparent in the final scene. Brother Juniper, intent upon demonstrating in the lives of the victims the ultimate wisdom and righteousness of a God who confounds the wicked and saves the good, is rewarded for his pains by being pronounced a heretic and burned at the stake. His death is the crowning monument to imperfect faith and love.

[32] New York: Albert & Charles Boni, Inc., 1927.

This book and especially the characters of the twins, of whom one dies through the collapse of the bridge, had intrigued me since I first read it. After the above had been written, I informed Mr. Wilder that I was citing his story in a psychoanalytic study of symbolism. His reply not only furnished surprising enlightenment on several important points, including the choice of the twin motif, but Mr. Wilder also kindly permitted quotation of the following passages from his letter.

> Let me jot down a few items which may be pertinent to your inquiry. First let me say how justified I feel it to be that psychoanalysts read imaginative literature as they do dreams.
>
> (1) Though there are several historical characters in The Bridge of San Luis Rey, the accident of the bridge breaking was entirely of my own invention. (Certain travel agencies, however, now take tourists to see the very site!)
>
> (2) Needless to say, I was not aware of any prompting from the unconscious that urged me to use a bridge, symbolically.
>
> (3) At the close, I use the bridge as a connection to a 'meaning of life', i.e., via love. Only one reader in a thousand notices that I have asserted a denial of the survival of identity after death.
>
> (4) The recurrent pattern in the book is 'unrequited love'. I was not fully aware of that at the time.
>
> (5) The twins: I was an identical twin, my brother having died at the age of two hours. That left me very attentive to twinship.
>
> Freud once said to me of psychoanalysis: *'Na, ja—die Dichter haben das alles gekannt.'* [Ah, well—the poets knew all about it.] *Leider,* [alas] that cannot be said of me.

The incapacity for love, as symbolized by the collapse of a bridge, is most daringly pictured by Franz Kafka in his shortest story, The Bridge, in which the author completely identifies himself with the bridge. 'I was stiff and cold', the story opens. 'I was a bridge, I lay over a ravine.' No tourist had yet approached his impassable height over the icy stream, and he was not yet recorded on any map. Nevertheless, he was indubitably a bridge, he reassured himself; for 'without falling, no bridge, once spanned, can cease to be a bridge'. One evening, above

the roar of the stream below, he heard the sound of a human step. 'Straighten yourself, bridge', he told himself, 'make ready, railless beams, to hold up the passenger entrusted to you. If his steps are uncertain, steady him unobtrusively, but if he stumbles show what you are made of and like a mountain god hurl him across to land.' The man advanced, tapped the bridge with the iron point of his walking stick, plunged the stick into 'my bushy hair', and then jumped suddenly and violently with both feet. 'I shuddered with wild pain, not knowing what was happening. Who was it? A child? A dream? A wayfarer? A suicide? A tempter? A destroyer? And I turned round so as to see him. A bridge to turn round! I had not yet quite turned round when I already began to fall. I fell and in a moment I was torn and transpierced by the sharp rocks which had always gazed up at me so peacefully from the rushing water.' [33]

Mysterious and uncanny, this story has the impact of a nightmare or a hallucination. Each of its details is fraught with symbolic significance. One is tempted to treat them as free associations of the author and to speculate whether they represent an intrauterine fantasy, or a screen memory relating to the primal scene, or maybe both. In any event, to anyone familiar with Kafka's history it is obvious that the story epitomizes his psychological tragedy and that his 'destroyer'—in this fantasy as in his life—was his father. Harry Slochower, one of Kafka's best critics, characterizes his writings as representing 'the negative, repressive form of the sex act'.[34] To the psychoanalyst, Kafka's personification of himself as a bridge indicates deep-seated, overwhelming fear of failure in sexual intercourse: the bridge (phallus) bends, loses its rigidity, falls onto the piercing rocks in the water below. Like Poe, Kafka apparently feared the vagina dentata. He seems the prototype of complete, passive homosexual submissiveness. This passivity, which

[33] Kafka, Franz: *The Great Wall of China and Other Pieces.* Trans. by Willa and Edwin Muir. London: Martin Secker Ltd., 1933, pp. 210–211.

[34] Slochower, Harry: *No Voice Is Wholly Lost . . .* New York: Creative Age Press, 1945, p. 105.

characterized his life, is most lucidly expressed in the helpless state of waiting poetically described in The Bridge. Elsewhere, while meditating on the activities of life and work, Kafka again likened himself to a bridge: '. . . A delicate task, a walking on tip-toe over a brittle plank that serves as a bridge; having nothing under one's feet, with one's feet raking together a plank to walk on; walking on nothing but one's own reflection seen in the water below, while holding the world with one's feet so that it doesn't fall apart; clenching one's hands in mid-air merely to help one bear the strain.' [35]

Perhaps the most famous treatment of a bridge in contemporary literature is Hart Crane's poem, The Bridge, immortalizing Brooklyn Bridge.[36] It not only epitomizes the tragic struggle of the poet, but is also a striking example of a work of creative imagination which thwarts the intentions of its author. Crane intended the bridge to stand as a multiple symbol denoting the union of finite and infinite, matter and spirit, physical and spiritual love (Eros and agape), past and present, being and becoming. 'Very roughly', he explained, 'it concerns a mystical synthesis of "America". . . . The initial impulses of "our people" will have to be gathered up toward the climax of the bridge, symbol of our constructive future, our unique identity, in which is also included our scientific hopes and achievements of the future. . . .' [37] The bridge is meant to synthesize the temporal world of chaos and bring man to the state of order which his soul craves; the machinery itself is the benevolent instrument for the expanding consciousness of man, the thrust into an absolute and eternal, beyond time and space.

This was the bridge that Crane, consciously modeling himself upon Walt Whitman, had purposed to represent in his poem. To him, love—the bridge of love—was as much a prerequisite of poetic creation as of physical creation. But normal, hetero-

[35] *A Franz Kafka Miscellany*. Second edition. New York: Twice A Year Press, 1946, p. 86.

[36] *The Collected Poems of Hart Crane*. Edited with an Introduction by Waldo Frank. New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1946, pp. 1–58.

[37] In a letter to Gorham B. Munson, quoted in Weber, Brom: *Hart Crane. A Biographical and Critical Study*. New York: The Bodley Press, 1948, p. 189.

sexual love lay beyond his capacity. 'Sterility', he once wrote, 'is the only decadence I recognize' [38]—and his was the sterility of the homosexual. To the psychoanalyst, Hart Crane might serve as a classic example of the creative homosexual in conflict, of a homosexual unable to bring his homosexuality to a successful resolution and to crystallize his ego. Indeed his life, as described by his biographer Brom Weber, was a continuous twisting and turning within this predicament. Weber states: 'Social isolation, because of the impossibility of being permitted to enjoy a deviant love relationship, fostered a sense of guilt within Crane, since he was essentially a person who believed confusedly in bourgeois values and in the ethical precepts which govern Western society. His sense of guilt was more intense because of the seeming inevitability of his deviation from the code. . . .' [39] Crane himself was not unaware of his deep conflicts and their psychological motivations. Once he wrote: 'I nearly go mad with the intense but always misty realization of what can be done if potentialities are fully freed, realized. It is really not a projection in any but the loosest sense, for I feel more and more that in the absolute sense the artist identifies himself with life.' [40] But Hart Crane was unable to identify himself with life, and this poem was his last attempt to do so.

Crane's biographers and critics have made much of the unhappy family constellation of the poet. It would indeed seem that the familiar life history of the homosexual had a particular impact on his psychosexual development and his creativeness. There was the deep attachment to the mother; the divorce of the parents ('the curse of sundered parentage', he called it in The Bridge); but above all the image of a strong, successful, virile father, contemptuous of the son's poetic leaning and effeminate ways (the parallel with Kafka is striking), and the 'ricochet of antagonism and attraction', as Waldo Frank [41]

[38] In a letter to The Little Review. Weber: *Op. cit.*, p. 402.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

[40] Horton, Philip: *Hart Crane. The Life of an American Poet.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1937.

[41] Crane: *Op. cit.*, p. xii.

characterizes this son's relationship to his father. This strong ambivalence appears to be the underlying principle of his poetry. When the twenty-one-year-old Crane finally broke away from his father ('the image of his overbearing head leaning over me like a gargoyle'), he seemed elated. 'The best thing is that the cloud of my father is beginning to move from the horizon now', he wrote to a friend.[42] In the same breath, he rhapsodized over this severance of the parental tie as the 'bridges burn't behind'. But these very bridges he was attempting to construct and re-establish.

It is evident that for Crane the bridge was not a chance metaphor. Seas, rivers, and bridges were the primary symbols he used in his writings, and they figure prominently in the titles of his poems. It was because of his early and ever present obsession with the sea that he felt compelled to write his paean to the bridge; yet he was as ambivalent in his attitude to the sea as he later became toward the bridge. Waldo Frank believes that Crane was 'using the symbol of the Sea as a principle of unity and release from the contradictions of personal existence'.[43] But the poet's efforts to bring about an integration of the cosmic chaos (his own projection, of course) 'within the active mirror of self' failed disastrously. In The Bridge of Estador, ('High on the bridge of Estador/Where no one has ever been before'), the sea is the mysterious, malignant force that awaits the 'consummations of the tides' to cast on the shore the 'wreck of dreams'. Here the sea and the moon, in a familiar juxtaposition of sexual images, are united in a conspiracy against man. The poem continues: 'But some are twisted with the love/of things irreconcilable,—/The slant moon with the slanting hill'.[44] Crane was racked by this 'love of things irreconcilable': the incestuous love of the mother, and the sterile love of man for man.

It implies no irreverence toward Crane's poetic sensibility to introduce these concepts. The sexual imagery in his poetry

[42] Weber: *Op. cit.*, p. 97.
[43] Crane: *Op. cit.*, p. xvii.
[44] Weber: *Op. cit.*, p. 385.

is overt, undisguised. In a poem aptly titled, The Bottom of the Sea is Cruel, nostalgia for the warm, maternal embrace of the sea alternates with fear of its treachery: '. . . but there is a line/You must not cross nor ever trust beyond it/Spry cordage of your bodies to caresses/Too lichen-faithful from too wide a breast./The bottom of the sea is cruel.' [45] The theme uniting the six lyrics in the famous sequence, Voyages, of which this poem is a part, is the death-dealing sea in which 'sleep, death, desire' are one. Here the psychoanalyst could hardly be more explicit than Crane himself. In the words of Waldo Frank, 'the turbulent experiences of Crane's childhood and youth are merged into a litany of the sea'.[46] The poet's fear of the sea was steadily increasing.

'The bottom of the sea is cruel', Crane felt, and turned his eyes to the bridge overhead. 'We know, eternal gunman, our flesh remembers/The tensile boughs, the nimble blue plateaus,/ The mounted, yielding cities of the air!' [47] Elated by the beginning of a love affair, he announced in a letter to a friend: 'I have seen the Word made Flesh', and spontaneously chose the symbol of the bridge to express his joy: 'I have been able to give freedom and life which was acknowledged in the ecstasy of walking hand in hand across the most beautiful bridge in the world, the cables enclosing us and pulling us upward in such a dance as I have never walked and never can walk with another'.[48] But his joy was shortlived, his sense of fulfilment delusive; for the affair, like all his others, was a homosexual one. As Waldo Frank, to whom this letter was addressed, said: 'It is not accidental that Crane's tender friendships were with boys who followed the Sea.' [49]

Thus the bridge failed him as the sea had betrayed him. 'The Bridge', writes Waldo Frank, 'with its challenging synthesis of life, wherein all the modern multiverse is accepted and

[45] Crane: *Op. cit.*, p. 101.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. xvi.
[47] From: For the Marriage of Faustus and Helen. Crane: *Op. cit.*, p. 98.
[48] Weber: *Op. cit.*, p. 236.
[49] Crane: *Op. cit.*, p. xix.

transfigured without loss into One, could not hold its poet'. (The archetype of Oneness is the act of sexual intercourse, which was beyond Crane's capacity.) Allen Tate, in a discerning critique of his friend's talent, said that the poem failed because of 'the discrepancy between the sensuous fact, the perception, and its organizing symbol—a discrepancy that plunges him into chaos and sentimentality'.[50] If this criticism itself is interpreted psychoanalytically, the discrepancy—between the 'sensuous fact', represented by the bridge, and the principle of love it was intended to symbolize—becomes even more glaring. For the obsession of the poem, in spite of Crane's conscious intentions and in spite of the symbol of the bridge itself, is not with love but with *death*.

He starts out bravely, identifying the bridge as love:

> O harp and altar, of the fury fused,
> (How could mere toil align thy choiring strings!)
> Terrific threshold of the prophet's pledge,
> Prayer of parish, and the lover's cry,—

But the 'prophet' proves a false prophet, and the 'lover' is no lover. There is one beautiful passage of genuine sexual passion (quite out of tune with the rest of the work):

> your hands within my hands are deeds;
> my tongue upon your throat—singing
> arms close; eyes wide, undoubtful
> dark
> drink the dawn—
> a forest shudders in your hair!

The woman whom the poet here embraces is but a phantom, an image in a waking dream. In a gloss to his own words, he comments: 'Is it from the soundless shore of sleep that time recalls you to your love, there in a waking dream to merge your seed—with whom?' With no person, as becomes clear many stanzas later, when the poet returns to the dream:

[50] Tate, Allen: *Reactionary Essays on Poetry and Ideas.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936, p. 41.

The river, spreading, flows—and spends your dream.
What are you, lost within this tideless spell?
You are your father's father, and the stream—
A liquid theme that floating niggers swell.
. . . . . .
All fades but one thin skyline 'round . . . . Ahead
No embrace opens but the stinging sea.

The image of the father (the father's father, by poetic license) has dispelled the dream of love and returns the son to the 'stinging sea', the union with the mother that brings death or rebirth.

Toward the close of the poem, he makes one last attempt to capture love by summoning the image of the bridge.

Through the bound cable strands, the arching path
Upward, veering with light, the flight of strings,—
Taut miles of shuttling moonlight syncopate
The whispered rush, telepathy of wires.
Up the index of night, granite and steel—
Transparent meshes—fleckless the gleaming staves—
Sibylline voices flicker, waveringly stream
As though a god were issue of the strings. . . .
And through that cordage, threading with its call
One arc synoptic of all tides below—
Their labyrinthine mouths of history
Pouring reply as though all ships at sea
Complighted in one vibrant breath made cry,—
'Make thy love sure—to weave whose song we ply!'
—From black embankments, moveless soundings hailed,
So seven oceans answer from their dream.

But the poet is not standing securely on the bridge. On the contrary, he is looking up at it from the great distance of the water below. Almost with his last breath, he calls out: 'Atlantis, —hold thy floating singer late!'

Hart Crane could not erect the bridge of love. One year after the death of his father he committed suicide. In April 1932 he was on a ship returning from Vera Cruz to New York —the New York he had meant to eulogize, but apparently

dreaded. On the night of the 26th he became involved in a brawl with some sailors, was robbed and severely beaten. The next day at noon he walked the length of the deck to the stern of the ship and made a perfect dive into the sea. His death was fitting both to his life and to the deepest import of his poetry. Long before, in Voyages, he had presaged this end: 'O minstrel galleons of Carib fire,/Bequeath us to no earthly shore until/Is answered in the vortex of our grave/The seal's wide spindrift gaze toward paradise.' [51]

One critic summed up Crane's life and work in the simple words: 'In Crane the poet succumbed with the man'.[52] Allen Tate saw in his suicide the only escape for his 'locked-in sensibility', his 'insulated egoism'.[53] The psychoanalyst may add that this deep narcissism caused the total collapse of Crane's sublimational striving and brought about his failure as both man and poet.

[51] Crane: *Op. cit.*, p. 103.

[52] Blackmur, R. P.: *The Double Agent. Essays in Craft and Elucidation.* New York: Arrow Editions, 1935, p. 140.

[53] Tate: *Op. cit.*, p. 29.

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Dream Timing

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DREAM TIMING

BY RICHARD RENNEKER, M.D. (CHICAGO)

Many dreams precede, accompany, are stimulated or terminated by the ringing of an alarm clock.

A patient possessed many highly developed and elaborated defense mechanisms of magic which enabled him to feel in control of his environment. These included ways of omnipotently controlling distance and people. He possessed a fine discriminatory sense of timing which, to a degree, placed him in command of time. He was able, with remarkable precision, to awaken at a predetermined time. It was observed that many of his dreams terminated by the alarm clock were interrupted at rather critical points at which the dream work was beginning to break down and the latent dream wish was becoming revealed in a less disguised fashion, sometimes accompanied by anxiety—usually not. In listening to these dreams one had the feeling that the dreamer was 'saved by the bell'.

I gradually concluded that this timing was not accidental. His exact sense of timing in sleep enabled him so to pace the development of a dream as to allow the most direct, gratifying, and least disguised expression of latent dream wishes at that point in sleep when he knew, intuitively, that he was comparatively safe. In this way he secured maximal gratification combined with the reassuring exercise of his split-second magical defense. This was confirmed when one day the alarm failed to ring and he awoke in terror from a nightmare two minutes after the alarm was supposed to have rung.

One of this patient's symptoms was periodic insufficient erectile potency for intercourse. This impotence protected him from his unconscious fantasy that sexual intercourse was a murderous struggle in which he sought to destroy the woman's sexual organs and the hated and feared fœtus she was bearing.

Read before the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, November 22, 1949.

His sexuality and his hostility were most frequently expressed in urinary acts and in urinary dream symbols. His dream follows.

> There were a lot of people standing by a lake. I was the only one who knew what was going to happen. A man and a woman got in a boat and rowed out of sight in a mist. Then we heard a noise and thought, 'That's it! He's murdered her!' In the next scene I saw this woman, with the same fellow, walking waist deep in swamp water. He said he wanted to show her something in the bullrushes. There was a winding path leading off into the rushes along which they began walking. I began to get worried because there were long, pointed logs sticking up with no bark on them. The idea was he was trying to get her bitten by a water snake. Then I came into the picture, waist deep in the water. I didn't know what I was doing there and decided to get out. There was only one path and I couldn't find it. I could only see an expanse of water and I was in it. I tried to find my way out and couldn't. I got more scared and finally awoke.

'The dream was like a swell story', he said. 'I enjoyed it very much since I knew what was going to happen beforehand, but then I didn't enjoy it because I began to get more and more worried. The alarm didn't ring because the clock was on its back. I must have knocked it over during the night reaching for a glass of water. It had fallen on the alarm button so it couldn't ring. Lucky I woke up when I did, since it was only a couple of minutes later. I'm afraid of water and hate to swim. We talked before about a body of water having something to do with a woman sexually, and with my getting up to urinate in the middle of the night. Somebody in the Bible found a baby in bullrushes. I saw a woman on the street yesterday who attracted me, yet made me angry because she walked so funny. She wasn't pregnant; I looked to see.'

The urinary equivalents in this dream, the water in the lake and the swamp, express the hostile erotic nature of the dreamer's feelings. The dream was prompted by the woman on the street

who reminded him of pregnancy. His dream problem was to give expression to his destructive wishes toward the pregnant woman in such a way as to avoid responsibility and retaliation.

In the first part of the dream the ego is well in control; the patient is hidden in the crowd, and safely removed from the water; moreover, he is able to enjoy the dream because he feels in control and, hence, in no danger. 'I knew what was going to happen' could refer to the expected ringing of the alarm as well as the fact that he is also the man in the boat (but not in the water). He arranges to have the murder committed out of sight. In the second part the dream work is less efficient: the crowd has disappeared and the man is in the water with the woman. As in the first scene, he begins to remove the man and the woman from view, but at this point something happens to his control of the dream, for it assumes nightmarish qualities for the first time. It is my impression that this was the moment when the alarm was supposed to have rung, but instead the dreamer suddenly perceives that all is not going according to schedule and that he will not be saved by the bell. He appears abruptly in the dream undisguised and in the water. The unplanned nature of this turn in the dream is illustrated by his words: 'I didn't know what I was doing there and decided to get out', i.e., to awaken. The path which he could not find was either the saving alarm or else his frenzied reaching toward consciousness. His ego was too far out of control to salvage the dream, since the latent dream thoughts had taken over. As he put it: 'I could only see an expanse of water and I was in it. I tried to find my way out and couldn't.'

The dream was an attempt to gain increasing instinctual gratification by a gradual relaxation of the dream censorship. This diminution of dream censorship, with a more direct expression of the unconscious wish, was possible, since past experience had demonstrated a proven ability to control dream timing to the point where the relatively undisguised unconscious wish would be interrupted by the alarm clock. The mechanical failure of the alarm was responsible for the abrupt change from dream enjoyment to nightmare.

Better to illustrate the operation of the alarm clock in dream timing, let us see how, later in the analysis, the same problem develops in a dream which was interrupted by the alarm.

> Something happened in my garage, and I decided it would have to go. I realized it was an old dilapidated affair. Another man and I began to knock it down, and he was helping me transfer the lumber, giving me advice as to how to do it. It was slow work, so I got out my German pistol and fired at it. The other fellow did too, and we blew up the garage with the pistol.

'I was awakened from the dream by the alarm. Garage is where I put my car, so I guess it is like a woman and putting my penis into her. You are probably the other man; but it is funny because I come to analysis to learn to use a woman and not tear her down. My wife hasn't menstruated yet; two days late. We want a pregnancy so bad we don't even mention to each other that she is overdue. My garage is not dilapidated but in good shape. No, on second thought, the door stuck so I couldn't put the car away the other night. I brought the pistol back from overseas as a souvenir. Boy—we really did a good job on that garage.'

This dream is a reaction to his unconscious fear that his wife is pregnant, and reveals his wish to destroy the pregnancy. The garage is the woman's sexual organ. He rationalizes its destruction by making it old and dilapidated. Help from the analyst legitimizes this work and spreads the responsibility. This dream initiated a long period of impotence, as a defense against the wish to use his penis in a destructive fashion (blowing up the garage with the pistol). The 'stuck door' illustrates his basic fear that a pregnancy would deprive him of his deep passive dependent relationship with the wife (mother). In this dream he progresses from a slow, ordinary tearing down of an old building, to a quick destructiveness more closely related to the underlying dream wish. He awoke from this dream without anxiety.

The almost certain ability to awaken at a specific time,

determined before going to sleep, is by no means unusual. The mechanism of this ability is not clear, but it certainly presupposes an awareness of time during sleep. One of the commonest experiences is regularly to awaken just before the alarm is due to ring. The clock is always set against those occasions, however rare, when the psychological mechanism fails; otherwise sleep would not be restful. Closer observation of dreams of patients in analysis reveals that alarm-clock dreams are not uncommon, including 'reliance' on the interruption of hazardous fulfilment of ego-alien strivings in dreams.

Freud *(5)*, discussing the duration of dream preparation and of dreams, stated: 'It is like fireworks, which require hours of preparation and only a moment for ignition'. The moment for ignition in alarm-clock dreams seems to be more or less under the control of the dreamer. The ignition of a display of fireworks is not fortuitous, but only at the time when the audience is prepared to enjoy the display, and also protected against the pain and shock of being burned.

Best and Taylor *(3)* state: 'In most adults, sleep deepens rapidly to the end of the first hour, after which, it lessens sharply for a time and then more slowly till the time of awakening. *Deep sleep is dreamless*; dreams occur only during light sleep and chiefly in the period which just precedes waking.'

French *(4)* concludes that during deep sleep dreams are unnecessary, since the depth of the sleep provides enough physiological absorption to satisfy various primitive, instinctual, and regressive needs: '. . . the progressive increase in the recognition of disturbing elements in the dream apparently runs parallel to a progressive diminution in the depth of sleep. The obvious inference from this fact is that sleep itself to some degree serves as a substitute for painful affects or, stated in quantitative terms, that there is an absorption of painful affects during sleep that is roughly proportional to the depth of sleep.'

Freud *(7)* had this to say on the matter: 'Penetrating further into the structure of the ego, we may recognize the dream censor again in the ego ideal and in the dynamic utterances of conscience. If this censor is to some extent on the alert even during

sleep, we can understand that the necessary condition of its activity—self-observation and self-criticism—should contribute to the dream control some such thoughts as these: "Now he is too sleepy to think—now he is waking up".' In this paragraph Freud indicated indirectly that he felt dreams were unnecessary in deep sleep and occurred in the hours of awakening. This is clear if we change his last sentence to: 'Now he is too sleepy to dream—now he is waking up and I [dream censorship] must be on guard'.

On the basis of French's belief that dreams are unnecessary in deepest sleep, one may tentatively explain why dreams occur most commonly before awakening. As sleep rises from its deepest level, various unconscious needs are increasingly biologically frustrated. These needs crowd toward consciousness to gain more direct expression and gratification. The portion of the ego which protects sleep becomes increasingly alert to intercept these emerging unconscious wishes. This assumes that the time for dreaming is determined physiologically by the short span of deepest sleep. There is another factor involved in this timing—an economic factor.

Freud *(6)* several times mentioned economy of psychic energy in dreaming, referring to the quantity of energy required in keeping the unconscious in check during the night. Dreams are economical because they require a lesser expenditure of energy than would be required to maintain a constant state of repression throughout the whole night. This is not the particular economic feature of dreams to which I wish to refer.

DREAM PLEASURE

It is commonly accepted that the chief function of dreams is to protect sleep. Several factors have to be in balance in order to ensure effective, gratifying sleep from which one awakens refreshed. It must be uninterrupted, and occur in a state of minimal output of physical and psychic energy; repressed instinctual and conflictful material has to be granted as much gratification as is possible in the dream state. This partial gratification is made legitimate through dream work which

beguiles the conscience-permeated ego into acceptance of a forbidden wish in sheep's clothing.

Ideally dreams are accompanied by a sense of pleasure, interest, or satisfaction. This pleasure is deeply related to the partial gratification of the latent dream thoughts, but is superficially perceived in relationship to the manifest content. A dream fails in one way when this 'pleasure' is replaced by anxiety, due either to the overwhelming strength of an emerging unconscious wish, or to a weakening of the censorship. It will be noted that in the nightmare the dreamer calls upon consciousness to ward off the repressed wish.

In dreams the problem is not to repress the latent dream thoughts completely, since this would require fatiguing energy output, besides depriving the sleeper of a form of pleasure. It is rather to censor the latent dream thoughts in a fashion acceptable to the ego, yet in a manner which will consume the least expenditure of energy (i.e., the term dream work implies expenditure of energy). Dreamers with integrated egos are able to relax and enjoy their dreams, since they know from past experience that there is little danger of the lamb becoming a wolf. It would be interesting to compare the qualitative and quantitative nature of their dream work as opposed to neurotics with weaker egos. After all, a more skilled, experienced performer in any activity is better able to indulge in variations in technique, to take more risks in order to heighten his own enjoyment of the performance.

At this point the question is raised as to why some people usually enjoy their dreams and others do not. The answer is the level of ego integration. Those individuals with intact, well-integrated ego defenses have a tested feeling of confidence in their ability to accomplish successfully the dream work. The ego is king and the potentially rebellious forces of the id are well contained and of comparatively little danger. The dream work in such a situation is more leisurely, better planned and more inclined to the usage of consciously pleasant symbols and dream material.

In such a case there are added sources of enjoyment. The

enjoyment of a job well done and the deep awareness of a convincing and reassuring demonstration of the dreamer's ego strength; moreover, there is the pleasure derived from the creative effort involved in the dream formation. This latter factor is similar to the conscious narcissistic pleasure experienced in the clever handling of a difficult situation or an unexpectedly deft twist of a word or a phrase. Part of the self-enjoyment of a pun is the feeling of control obtained therefrom. The punster intuitively reminds himself of his excellent grasp of reality. He has a feeling of mastery of the situation that obtains in the creative effort involved in successful dream work. The dreamer has a potential source of pleasure: the enjoyment of having economically, cleverly and efficiently performed the necessary dream work. Successful dream work is therefore pleasurable for its own sake.

The man with a poorly integrated ego does not generally enjoy his dream because, on the basis of past performance, he is not certain of his ability to master the impulses emerging from the unconscious. Sleep is usually not restful to the degree that it is among those with stronger egos. There is more energy expended in apprehensive watchfulness. Dreams become a painful necessity, an unavoidable and distasteful activity.

We are accustomed to think of the dream censorship as resisting the latent dream and effecting compromises by distortion and disguise. The element of dream enjoyment on the part of the dreamer has been underevaluated. It is not alone that the dream conflict has to be resolved to relieve unconscious pressures and at the same time preserve sleep, but there is also a secondary or superimposed desire on the part of the sleeping ego for the successful creation of a dream which will add to the pleasure of sleep.

The sleeper then, confronted with the necessity of dreaming, seeks those conditions under which he can dream most safely, pleasurably, and with the least expenditure of energy. One can also restate it and say that the dreamer, confronted with the necessity of sleeping, seeks those conditions under which he

can sleep most safely, pleasurably and with the least expenditure of energy. This occurs partially through proper timing.

AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DREAM TIMING

According to the 'principle of economy' Alexander *(2)* states that '. . . the organism tends to perform the functions necessary for maintenance of constant conditions with minimum expenditure of energy'. Applying this to the psychological economy of dreams, it is again noteworthy that 'dream work' implies a consumption of energy; therefore, we would assume that according to the basic economic principle, the organism would seek conditions for dreaming which would require the least expenditure of energy. Toward morning, as the depth of sleep decreases, the sleeper gradually approaches consciousness, and the ego of the sleeper is accordingly in better control of the dream fantasy. This is analogous to the situation of a man caged with wild dangerous animals. He would consume much energy running away from them and fighting them off with whatever weapons he had at his command. Should he, however, straddle the half-open door of the cage, he could with less effort allow them to approach more closely because he would know that should they get too close or threaten to rush upon him he had only to step out of the cage, slam the door and be safe; furthermore, he would be able to observe the animals more closely while feeling a sense of power in his easy control of the situation. He might thrill to the danger of his position and his proximity to the beasts by reason of his advantageous position. The dreamer also has an awareness of the easy availability of a tested defense (awakening) should the primary defense (dream work) fail. This provides conditions conducive to dreaming with the least expenditure of psychological energy. This is best illustrated in the alarm-clock dreams, where the assurance of an available escape hatch conserves energy in the dream work. The principle of homeostasis '. . . compels the organisms to find by experimentation patterns of behavior suitable for reducing inter-

nal tensions experienced as needs and wishes by gratifying them' *(1)*.

Many people say that their sleep is most gratifying to them around the time of awakening—the familiar tendency to cling to the last few minutes of sleep. Our current thinking characterizes such a tendency as a regressive need. An economic theory of dream timing gives added meaning to this common observation. Clinging to sleep is also a wish to prolong that partial state of sleep and consciousness which provides the condition for maximal unconscious gratification with the least expenditure of energy in the dream work. We linger on the threshold of waking reluctant to give up the delightfully safe dallying with the latent dream wishes of the night.

SUMMARY

The sleeper, confronted with the necessity of dreaming, seeks those conditions under which he can dream most safely, pleasurably, and with the least expenditure of energy. These conditions are partially secured through choice of a time to dream, determined by the fact that the ego maintains in sleep an awareness of time relationships. Economic timing occurs under conditions of adequate ego control; however, should the pressure from the unconscious be exceedingly strong and the conflict with the ego acute, or the ego defenses disorganized, a state of emergency ensues and the sleeper awakes. The ideal time for dreaming is in the morning or around awakening, because during that period sleep is most shallow, the dreamer is closer to consciousness, and there is therefore the added defense of accessibility to reality. The dreamer has the awareness of the easy availability of a tested defense (waking), behind a primary defense (dream work) should the conflict with the unconscious dream wishes become acute. Dreams interrupted by an alarm clock may represent special adaptations of this economic dream factor. In one case they provided also a magical feeling of controlling time and dreams.

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The Panic of the Gods

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THE PANIC OF THE GODS

BY GÉZA RÓHEIM, PH.D. (NEW YORK)

In Indo-Germanic and some Semitic mythologies we find a specific situation: the gods, presumably the most powerful of beings, are helpless. One, or several monsters, threatens and terrifies them; they have, however, a champion who intervenes with a mighty weapon and subdues or kills the antagonist.

In Babylonian mythology Tiamat, the primeval ocean or Chaos, is about to destroy all the gods. Tiamat, who is the mother, and Apsu, the father, want to destroy their progeny, the gods.

> The gods wept as they hastened,
> Silence reigned as they sat whispering.
> The exceedingly wise one, the clever in skill,
> Ea, who knoweth all things, perceived their plan.

Ea, by an incantation, puts Apsu, the male dragon, to sleep in a cave and then kills him. Tiamat, now ready to avenge her husband's death, creates a host of monsters to destroy her children, the gods.

> They cursed the daylight and went forth at the side of Tiamat.
> They raged, they plotted, without resting night and day.
> They raised the standard of battle, they fumed, they raged.
> They assembled forces, making hostility.
> Mother Hubur, the designer of all things,
> Added thereto weapons which are not withstood; she gave birth to mighty serpents,
> Sharp of tooth, sparing not the fang.
> With poisonous blood she filled their bodies.
> Gruesome monsters she caused to be clothed with terror.
> She caused them to bear dreadfulness, she made them like gods.
> Whosoever beholds them they ban with terror.
> Their bodies rear up and none restrain their breasts.[1]

[1] Langdon, S. H.: *The Mythology of All Races.* Vol. V: Semitic. Boston: Marshall Jones, 1931, pp. 292–295.

When Ea hears of Tiamat and her host of monsters, 'painfully he became faint, like one that lapses into silence he sat down'. He appeals to his father, Anshar. Anshar goes to the Sky God Anu who makes an attempt to attack Tiamat, but flees in terror before her. All the gods now appeal to Marduk; he is the only one who can rescue them.

Marduk makes ready a bow and arrow and takes a toothed sickle in his hand. He creates the Seven Winds, and takes his quiver, the 'Cyclone', and drives in his chariot of the storm. A sheen of flames surrounds his head. He advances against Tiamat with the 'plant of extinguishing poison'.

He draws nigh and peers into her inward parts. There he sees the open jaws of Kingu her husband, and his confidence falters, his mind becomes distracted and his movements disordered. The gods are faint with despair, but he rallies to the battle. As Tiamat opens her mouth to devour him, the wind blows into her, and raging winds tear her belly. His arrow tears her belly, severs her inwards, and rends asunder her heart. He splits her into two parts, and with half of her he makes his way to the heavens.[2]

We need not follow the myth further. We shall not be surprised to find variations of the same myth in the area of the same culture. The Canaanite version of this story is that a goddess (or god) who has proven weak is as good as dead in fighting Sir Sea, the enemy of the gods. Baal takes over, and the divine smith, Sir Adroit-and-Cunning, supplies Baal with two magic bludgeons. One of these is called Expeller, and the smith says:

Thou, thy name is Expeller;
Expeller, expel Sir Sea,
Expel Sir Sea from his throne,
The Ruler of the Streams from the seat of his dominion!
Spring from the hand of Baal,
Like a vulture with its talons smite Sir Sea on the shoulder,
The ruler of the Streams on the back!

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 296–300.

But this does not suffice as Sir Sea does not collapse. Baal then received another bludgeon from the divine smith.

Thou, thy name is Driver;
Driver, drive Sir Sea,
Drive Sir Sea from his throne,
The Ruler of the Streams from the seat of his dominion!
Spring from the hand of Baal,
Like a vulture with its talons smite Sir Sea on the skull,
The Ruler of the Streams between the eyes,
So that Sir Stream may fall and sink to the ground!

So the bludgeon springs from the hand of Baal;
Like a vulture with its talons it smites Sir Sea on the skull,
The Ruler of the Streams, between the eyes.
Sir Sea falls and sinks to the ground;
His crest sags;
And his countenance droops.[3]

The same pattern—anxiety of the many, victory achieved by one—is also found in Hebrew tradition, according to Gaster.[4]

In the mythology of Vedic India this situation is quite clear. The fourth hymn of the Rig-Veda is dedicated to Indra.

1. Truly, the gods all, the gracious protectors of Heaven and Earth, choose thee, Indra, the wielder of the thunderbolt, thee alone, O strong and mighty one to fight against Vrtra.

2. The strength of the gods *was waning, they were like the aged.* Then thou, Indra, whose mother was truth, becamest the only ruler. Thou didst strike the dragon who held the waters. Thou didst dig the channel of the rivers that give water to all.

3. With thy thunderbolt thou didst cleave, piercing right through the insatiable, extended, *unawakenable,* not wakening Dragon from his *deep sleep* while he was leaning against the seven rivers.

4. Indra with his might made the depths of the Earth tremble, like the wind that moves the waters and they rise by its might. With his might he conquered the fortress and cleaved the peaks of the mountains.

[3] Gaster, Theodor H.: *Thespis: Ritual, Myth and Drama in the Near East.* New York: Henry Schuman, 1950, pp. 153–159.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

5. Like women they were delivered of their embryos—it was thou who liberated the enclosed rivers.

6. It was thou who made the enormous river that refreshes us all stand still—the flood of the water. It was thou, Indra, who made it possible to cross the rivers.

7. He made the girls pregnant and they were rejoicing like sources that were just breaking through, and young and honorable wives who were pining away, he made them pregnant. He satisfied the thirsty fields and meadows. He gave milk to the sterile ones. Now they had a husband who could work miracles.

8. And in many springs and falls famed in song did Indra, the Vrtra killer, liberate the rivers. Indra bored through the channels of water and they poured out for the earth.[5]

The gods are not consistent in their relationship to Indra. They make him their king and leader, they forge his thunderbolt, but when Vrtra threatens them they hide or run away and he has to face the monster alone.[6] Indra himself displays this retreat from male aggression to flight into the womb. After his victory he is weak, bereft of all his powers and forsaken by the gods. He flees to the end of the world, transforms himself into a tiny being, and hides in a big lotus in a huge lake. To make the uterine meaning of this myth more explicit, it is his wife who finds him in the lotus in the lake.[7]

Indra, who pierces the body of his antagonist with the thunder, who makes the young women pregnant, is the male in the sexual act or the penis itself. 'Indra (the Greek *andros*) is the typical male who penetrates into his mother's body by using his penis as a weapon and thus obtains "the good body contents" from the womb of the dragon mother.'[8] The liberation of the rivers is the sexual act, and the lightning symbolizes ejaculation.

[5] Róheim, Géza: *The Dragon and the Hero.* Amer. Imago, I, 1940, p. 42. Hillebrandt, A.: *Lieder des Rigveda.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1913, Rigveda IV, pp. 45–46.

[6] For references, *cf.* Hillebrandt, A.: *Vedische Mythologie.* Breslau: Koebner, 1902, Vol. III, p. 169.

[7] For references, *cf.* Róheim. Géza: *Op. cit.,* p. 45, fn. 1.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 46.

It is not coitus on a purely genital level, but coitus involving anal (the winds as his allies), oral, sadistic elements; yet we must conclude that the two opponents in this battle are the oral anxiety (retribution) and the phallic weapon, for Vrtra is identified with the belly.

In the Satapatha Brahmana, Vrtra says: 'Do not hurl thy thunderbolt at me. Thou art now what I was before [?]. Only cut me in twain but do not let me be annihilated.' Indra replies, 'Thou shalt be my food!' Accordingly, he cuts him in twain, and from that part of him which was of the nature of the Soma he made the moon, and that which was demoniacal *(asura)* he *made enter these creatures, the asura, as their belly;* hence people say, 'Vrtra was then the consumer of food and Vrtra is so now'. And ever since, whenever the moon waxes, it fills out the world and these creatures crave for food; they pay tribute to this Vrtra the belly.[9]

Soma is the magic intoxicating drink of immortality equated with the moon. Vrtra, the belly, is oral aggression, symbolized in retaliatory form by the 'bad mother'; hence Vrtra is the food that Indra eats.

Tvastr had a son, Visvarupa, who had three heads and six eyes. With one of his three mouths he drank Soma, with one Sura, and the third was for other food. Indra cut all three heads off.[10]

Indra is definitely the vanquisher of orality. His thunderbolt is called *'dorje'* in Tibet. The instruments which represent the *'dorje'* are used in incantations, and a ritual representation of coitus is also performed.[11]

In Scandinavian mythology, the gods are similarly helpless when confronted with a giant. Only Thor can rescue them. Odin visits the giant Hrungnir and bets him that there is no horse in the world that can match his steed. They race from

[9] Eggeling, J.: *The Satapatha Brahmana.* London: Longmans, Green, 1882, p. 166.

[10] Hillebrandt, A.: *Vedische Mythologie. Op. cit.,* I, p. 531.

[11] Blinkenberg, Chr.: *The Thunder-Weapon in Religion and Folklore.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911, p. 45.

Jötunnheim (the home of the giants) to Asgard (the fortress of the gods). Odin arrives first, but the giant is so excited about the race that he does not notice he is already in Asgard. He is invited by the gods to eat and drink. He empties Thor's two cups and then he says he will kill all the gods excepting Freyja and Sif and they shall be his mistresses. The gods are afraid and call out, 'Thor'; and in an instant Thor is there and intimidates the giant with his dreaded hammer (*Skaldskaparsmal*).[12]

In *Gylfaginning,* we are told that one of the giants agreed to build a fortress for the gods. His fee was heavy, including the sun and the moon. The gods were so anxious to have the fortress that they accepted the terms, on condition that the structure be finished by the first day of summer. The giant owned a horse which helped him, and it seemed that the fortress would be finished on time. The gods sought advice from Loki who, as usual, resorted to foul play. In the form of a mare he lured the giant's horse from its work until the time had expired. The giant was furious and the gods discovered the identity of their master builder. Disregarding their oath, they called for help on Thor who with one stroke of his hammer smashed the enemy to pieces.[13]

In another version, the *Thrymskvidha,* Thor's hammer is lost and Thrym, the king of the giants, finds and conceals it. If Thor does not get it back the gods will be in dire straits. The giant's condition for returning it is that he be given Freyja in marriage. Thor himself goes to Jötunnheim masked as the bride. The custom of the marriage ceremony is that the hammer is put in the bride's lap. But when it is done this time, they soon see what kind of a bride they have. Thor gets hold of the hammer and smashes all the giants,[14] who are called the *Jötunn,* the 'eaters'.[15]

[12] Simrock, K.: *Die Edda.* Stuttgart: Cotta, 1896, p. 301. This and the following are songs from the Edda.

[13] *Ibid.,* p. 376.

[14] *Ibid.,* pp. 82–86. On the hammer in marriage ceremonies, *cf.* Meyer, R. M.: *Altgermanische Religionsgeschichte.* Leipzig: Quelle and Meyer, 1910, p. 71.

[15] Grimm, J.: *Deutsche Mythologie,* Vol. I. Gutersloh: Bertelsmann, 1875, pp. 429–430.

In another myth in which there is one who opposes many, it is not the gods who are in a panic but a human being. Orestes, having murdered his mother, flees to the inner shrine of Apollo's temple. The Erinyes evoked by the ghost of his murdered mother are chasing him. In the Eumenides of Æschylus, Pythia describes the Erinyes.

> But out in front of him a rout unknown
> Of women sleepeth, flung from throne to throne.
> Women? Nay, never women! Gorgons more:
> And yet not like the Gorgon shapes of yore . . .
> I saw a picture once of woman things
> That ravished Phineus' banquet. But no wings
> Have these; all shadows, black abominable.
> *The voices of their slumber rise and swell,*
> Back-beating, and their eyes drop gouts of gore.
> Their garb, it is no garb to show before
> God's altar nor the hearths of human kind.[16]

It is quite clear that the Eumenides are identical with the ghost of Clytemnestra and with Orestes' feelings of guilt.[17]

'The Erinyes, who play such a decisive part in the legal ideology of Greek religion, originate, in all probability, in the death soul belief. . . . The ambivalence which is so characteristic for the functioning of the death soul is clearly manifested by the double nature of the Erinyes, who may not only be evil deities but, as Eumenides, are also good, protecting and blessing deities.' [18]

As ghosts, they assumed the form of dogs. Roscher states that Sophocles, Aristophanes, Æschylus call them dogs, and

[16] Æschylus: *Eumenides.* Trans. by Gilbert Murray, in: Cooper, Lane: *Fifteen Greek Plays.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 128. For a more literal translation and the original text, *cf.* Smyth, H. Weir: *Æschylus.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946, Vol. II, p. 276. The Harpies deprive Phineus of his food, or they soil it. Roscher's Lexikon: *Phineus.*

[17] *Cf.* Róheim, Géza: *War, Crime and the Covenant.* Journal of Clinical Psychopathology Monograph Series No. I. Monticello, New York: Medical Journal Press, 1945, pp. 142–146.

[18] Kelsen, H.: *Society and Nature.* Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1943, p. 221.

that this should be interpreted not metaphorically but literally.[19] They drink human blood and are attracted by the odor of blood. Their black color and their awful eyes are emphasized by Lucan.[20] Erichtho calls the Erinyes as follows:

Iam vos ego nomine vero
Eliciam, Stygiasque canes in luce superna
Destituam per busta sequor, per funera custos
Expellam tumulis, abigam vos omnibus urnis.

In The Æneid, Sybilla conducts the hero to the gates of the nether world.

Ecce autem primi sub limina solis et ortus
Sub pedibus mugire solum et iuga coepta moveri
Silvarum, visaeque canes ululare per umbram
Adventante dea.[21]

The Erinyes are the barking dogs and the goddess is Hekate, herself a dog.

In the Eumenides of Æschylus, the stage directions themselves—following the quoted description of the Furies—are significant: '. . . the interior of the temple is disclosed. Enter, from the inner sanctuary, Apollo, who takes his stand beside Orestes at the center stone. Near the suppliant are the Furies asleep. Hermes in the background.'[22] Apollo characterizes the Erinyes as

the virgins without love,
So gray, so old, whom never god above
Hath kissed, nor man, nor from the wilderness
One wild beast.[23]

The ghost of Clytemnestra appears and says to the Furies:

Ye sleep, O God, and what are sleepers worth?
'Tis you have left me among all the dead. . . .

[19] Roscher, W. H. R.: Das von der Kynanthropie handelnde Fragment des Marcellus von Side. *Abh. der philol. hist. Cl. der Königl. Sächisischen Ges. d. Wiss.* Leipzig, 1896, Vol. XVII, p. 49.

[20] *Pharsalia,* VI, line 732.

[21] Virgil: *Æneid,* VI, 255–259.

[22] Smyth, H. Weir: *Op. cit.,* p. 277.

[23] Æschylus: *Eumenides.* Cooper, Lane: *Op. cit.,* p. 129.

Then she shows the wound in her throat:

> In sleep
> The heart hath many eyes and can see deep:
> 'Tis daylight makes man's fate invisible. . . .
> *Children of the Deep, 'tis I,*
> *Your dream, I, Clytemnestra, stand and cry.*[24]

The Furies (called tired bloodhounds by Clytemnestra) awake and pursue their victim, Orestes, but they are powerless for he is in Apollo's temple. Apollo appears at the gate and addresses them.

> Avaunt, I charge you! Get ye from my door!
> Darken this visionary dome no more!
> Quick, lest ye meet that snake of bitter wing
> That leaps a-sudden from my golden string,
> And in your agony spue forth again
> The black froth ye have sucked from tortured men![25]

The Leader of the Eumenides charges that a son who has murdered his mother should be punished. Apollo states his objection on the ground that, having killed her husband, she deserved to die.

> How? Would ye count as a light thing and vain
> The perfect bond of Hera and high Zeus?
> Yea, and thy word dishonoreth too the use
> Of Cypris, whence love groweth to his best.
> The fate-ordained meeting, breast to breast,
> Of man and woman is a tie more sure
> Than oath or pact, if Justice guards it pure.[26]

Apollo of the pillar, of the bow and arrow, is a phallic god although a very much sublimated one. His pillar is confused with the 'herm', the obviously phallic pillar of his brother Hermes; [27] moreover, like Thor, Marduk, Baal, Indra, Apollo

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 130. ("'Tis in a dream I, Clytemnestra, now invoke you.' Trans. by Smyth, H. Weir: *Op. cit.*, pp. 280–281.)

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 133.

[27] Harrison, J. E.: *Themis.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927, p. 410.

too wields the lightning.[28] 'The Pillar Apollo (Apollo Agyieus) is associated with a serpent rising out of a pillar or coiled round a tree trunk.' [29]

These myths are interpreted as signifying that lightning represents ejaculation which vanquishes the demons.

In later Hinduism, 'the fiery *lingam* (phallus) is a form of the Axis Mundi and may be equated with the shaft of light or lightning (*vajra, keraunos*) that penetrates and fertilizes the *yoni* (vagina), the altar of the Earth, the mother of the fire. Light, in the older Christian nativities, is the progenitive power, the ray that penetrates from the sun to the interior of the cave in which the earth goddess bears her son.' [30]

The Wunambal in Northwest Australia explain lightning as follows: 'The Wondjina Kalaru [mythical hero] threw the first flash of lightning by splitting his penis and letting out the fire and the flash of lightning at the same time. He can direct the lightning by taking his penis in his left hand and showing the direction he wants the lightning to go with a club in his right hand.' [31]

Demons and ogres (the bad mother) are all connected with orality. Anxiety is a talion aspect of the child's oral aggression. The mighty weapon which defeats these demons is the phallus in two senses: first, that development progresses from oral to genital organization; second, that coitus, in which quantities of aggression are cathected, is a powerful means of warding off anxieties. That the evil being is represented by a plurality of beings refers either to multiple demons or to the many gods who are afraid of a single giant, or an evil female.

[28] *Cf.* Apollo in Roscher, W. H.: *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie.* Leipzig: Teubner, 1884. Also, Róheim, Géza: *Psychoanalysis and Anthropology.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1950, p. 354.

[29] Küster, E.: *Die Schlange in der griechischen Kunst und Religion.* Heidelberg: Töpelmann, 1913, pp. 123–124.

[30] Zimmer, H.: *Myths and Symbols in Indian Art.* New York: Bollingen Series VI, Pantheon Books, 1946, p. 128.

[31] Lommel, A.: *Notes on Sexual Behavior and Initiation, Wunambal Tribe, North Western Australia.* Oceania, XX, 1949, pp. 160–164. *Cf.* Róheim, Géza: *The Eternal Ones of the Dream.* New York: International Universities Press, 1945, p. 185.

It will be recalled that the Furies were asleep and wakened by the ghost of the murdered mother. Clytemnestra puts it quite clearly when she says that the Furies 'are hunting their quarry in a dream'; [32] but it is not the dream of the Furies—it is Orestes' dream, and Hermes, the god of dreams, is in the background. Ea puts the male dragon Apsu to sleep in a cave and then kills him. We know that in dreams the dreamer often is given multiple representations. In some nightmares the dreamer finds himself persecuted by a host of beings who represent his own aggression. In Babylonian mythology the demons are the parents of the gods who are born by their mother, Ocean, in her rage—a projection of the children's aggression.

The vampire of Eastern European folk belief is above all a bloodsucker. The Macedonian Vrykolakas is a corpse who throttles people and sucks their blood. He resembles a bullskin full of blood with a pair of eyes on one side gleaming like live coals in the dark. An unquenchable thirst, especially for blood, characterizes these beings.[33]

Mannhardt, describing the belief in Germany, writes that the vampire emerges from its grave and lies on the sleeper or, rather, presses down on him; in other words, it has the character of a nightmare. The universal remedy against these beings is to drive a stake through the corpse. The stake may have to be made of a special kind of wood; a long nail driven through the skull of the corpse is an alternative measure. The Wends say that vampires return from their graves and suck the breasts of their relatives until they have sucked out the life blood.[34]

This is clear evidence that the child's oral aggression is the *fons et origo* of the anxiety, with feelings of guilt, which are

[32] Æschylus: *Eumenides.* Smyth, H. Weir: *Op. cit.*, pp. 282–283.

[33] Abbott, G. F.: *Macedonian Folklore.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903, pp. 217–218. *Cf.* also on the vampire, Jones, Ernest: *Nightmare, Witches and Devils.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1931, Chapt. IV.

[34] Mannhardt, W.: *Über Vampyrismus.* Ztschr. f. deutsche Mythologie und Sittenkunde, IV, 1859, pp. 259–282.

represented *in reverse*. The word, vampire, itself *(upir, pjawica)* means drinker, sucker.[35]

In The Libation-Bearers of Æschylus we find our hypothesis confirmed. Orestes questions the Chorus about the dream of Clytemnestra.

Chorus: She dreamed she gave birth to a serpent—such is her own account.
Orestes: And where ends the tale and what its consummation?
Chorus: That she laid it to rest, as it were a child, in swaddling bands.
Orestes: What food did it crave, the newborn, noxious thing?
Chorus: She herself in her dream offered it her breast.
Orestes: Surely her nipple was not unwounded by the loathsome beast?
Chorus: No, with the milk it drew in clotted blood.

Orestes then interprets the dream correctly, saying, 'For I, turned serpent, and her slayer, as this dream declares'.[36]

Hertz has collected instances to show that the vampire is closely related to the demons that are supposed to cause nightmares.[37] Some people, especially dervishes in Macedonia, go about parading a sharply pointed iron rod, attesting that they can cope with vampires.[38]

We can now form a hypothesis regarding the panic of the gods. It is a nightmare in which the many and helpless gods, as well as the many devouring demons, are multiple representations of the dreamer. The prototype of the devouring demon is the infant at the breast; it becomes 'many' to conceal its identity. Its anxieties are also multiplied and frequently combine with the parental objects, primarily the mother, the object of oral aggression.

The dream and the anxiety are dispelled by wakening with an erection which corresponds to the hammer, the stake, etc., of

[35] Ralston, W. R. S.: *Russian Folk-Tales.* London: Ellis & Green, 1873, p. 321.
[36] Smyth, H. Weir: *Op. cit.,* Vol. II, pp. 211–215.
[37] Hertz, W.: *Der Werwolf.* Stuttgart: Kröner, 1862, p. 128.
[38] Abbott, G. F.: *Op. cit.,* p. 221.

the myths. The latent erotic content of the dream, which causes the erection, contributes to the anxiety, and is the guilty œdipal wish and the regressive preœdipal strivings. Hence the dreamer himself is the hero, and these hero-gods (Marduk, Apollo, Thor) are connected with light, i.e., the sun, lightning, or spring.

The interpretation of the myth of Orestes, the Erinyes, and Apollo as a dream gains in clarity if Orestes and Apollo are considered to be two aspects of the same person. According to Robert, the full text of Clytemnestra's dream begins with a dragon approaching her, his head bleeding. Then the dragon becomes her murdered husband Agamemnon. She has intercourse with him and gives birth to another dragon. He sucks her blood with the milk from her breast.[39] This dragon is Orestes. Apollo is also a dragon who has killed a dragon.[40] For the Greeks, dreaming and Apollo-the-Seer were not widely apart.

> He slew the snake; he cast, men say,
> Themis, the child of Earth, away
> From Pytho and her hallowed stream;
> Then Earth, in dark derision,
> Brought forth the Peoples of the Dream
> And all the tribes of Vision.
> And men besought them; and from deep
> Confused underworlds of sleep
> They showed blind things that erst had been
> And are, and yet shall follow.
> So did avenge that old Earth Queen
> Her child's wrong on Apollo.[41]

Apollo gives Orestes the bow and arrow, his own weapon against the Furies.[42] Iphigenia, the sister of Orestes, sacrificed to the virgin Artemis and becoming the virginal priestess of Artemis, is certainly only another form of Artemis, and there-

[39] Quoted in Roscher's Lexikon: *Orestes,* p. 965.

[40] *Cf.* Róheim, Géza: *Animism, Magic and the Divine King.* London: Kegan Paul, 1930, pp. 297–310.

[41] Quoted in Harrison, J. E.: *Op. cit.,* p. 394.

[42] Roscher's Lexikon: *Orestes,* p. 963.

fore her brother Orestes would be Apollo. Höfer assumes several duplications. Pylades, who accompanies Orestes, is the man from Pylos which would mean Apollo; Orestes, the Man of the Hill, is also Apollo, the brother of the Goddess of the Hills, Artemis, while Electra (the radiant one), Iphigenia, and Chrysothemis all represent Artemis.[43] Orestes is the anxious aspect of Apollo, and the phallic god signifies anxiety vanquished—'in awe of the son of Zeus, the far-shooting Apollo' (The Iliad, I, 21).

From a methodological point of view the question is raised as to what the approach of various systems of anthropology or psychology would be to this constellation.

1. Cultural anthropology would try to prove its correlation with a given type of personality or culture. This might have something to contribute to the surface, the form, of the problem; but since we know so little about the people who formed these myths, any proof of this kind is hardly possible.

2. Diffusionist anthropology would look for historical origins, presumably in Sumerian culture. There is something to be said for this point of view except that it gives no psychological explanation as to how the myth arose in the first place.

3. Jungian psychology would claim the dragon, the ogre, the hero-god to be archetypes. This theory of archetypes is vague because it fails to differentiate form and content and assumes universality without even attempting to prove it.

4. Phylogenetic and psychoanalytic interpretation would be based on the primal horde theory. The myth sides with the father. The one hero is the father of the primal horde against the brothers; or the hero represents the group and fights the battle alone which many fought in primeval times. The reasons

[43] Quoted *ibid.*, p. 976. On Apollo as God of the Hill, *cf.* Farnell, L. R.: *The Cults of the Greek States.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1907, Vol. IV, p. 215. Dr. Bunker gives a different interpretation of the Orestes myth, regarding matricide as a veiled form of incest. Bunker, Henry Alden: *Mother Murder in Myth and Legend.* This QUARTERLY, XIII, 1944, pp. 198–207. The principle of overdetermination is valid in this case. *Cf.* also, the phallic Apollo and the phallic grave of Orestes, Farnell, L. R.: *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1921, p. 357.

for not using the phylogenetic interpretation any more have been stated elsewhere.[44] Briefly, it implies Lamarckian and Haeckelian biological hypotheses which are untenable; moreover, it fails especially to explain the maternal character of the object of anxiety.

For completeness, the Bachofen theory, beloved by classical scholars, psychoanalysts, and analytic culturalists should be mentioned. The Eumenides in this theory represent matriarchy, and Apollo stands for the new patriarchal order.[45] What is wrong with this theory is that matriarchy does not precede patriarchy; on the contrary, the more primitive a tribe, the more likely it is to reckon descent in patrilineal form. As to the question of power and importance, as distinguished from relationship systems, matriarchy is a pure product of the imagination of anthropologists, philologists, etc.[46] Obviously, the further one recedes into the past of mankind, the greater the importance of muscle and strength. But even if this assumption be incorrect, the hypothesis is still untenable. A transition between reckoning in the male or the female line would be a gradual process which would hardly be felt in the life of an individual. *Myth is created by the individual*: the group only rewrites it, modifies it, etc.: first taking shape in the form of a dream, the myth reflects a conflict in the development of every individual—that of growing up; hence the hero of the story is genital libido.

[44] Róheim, Géza: The Œdipus Complex, Magic and Culture. In: *Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences, Vol. II.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1950.

[45] Bachofen, J. J.: *Versuch über die Gräbersymbolik der Alten.* Basil: Helbing and Lichtenhahn, 1925, p. 106.

[46] For some examples, *cf.* Neumann, E.: *Über den Mond und das matriarchale Bewusstsein.* Eranos, XVIII, 1950, p. 323; Schneider, Daniel E.: *The Psychoanalyst and the Artist.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1949, p. 34; Fromm, Erich: The Œdipus Complex and the Œdipus Myth. In: *The Family: Its Function and Destiny,* edited by Ruth N. Anshen. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949, p. 340.

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William Needles

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE YEARBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS, VOLUME VI. Edited by Sandor Lorand, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1951. 307 pp.

In this issue of the Yearbook the editors have continued the practice of assembling under one cover the outstanding contributions in various periodicals during the preceding year. Apart from an American Psychoanalytic Association panel, not otherwise available to the reader, no fewer than seven journals are represented in this compilation. Since there are few among us with sufficient time and diligence to scan this volume of literature, and in view of the general excellence of the articles selected, there seems to be ample justification, even in a capsule era, for what might otherwise appear unnecessary reduplication of labor and matériel.

In the opening paper, Wittels in a charming, if somewhat discursive, manner traces the history of certain secessions from the psychoanalytic movement, and directs attention to the tubular sort of vision and the mistaking of a part for the whole of doctrine that gave rise to such deviations. Bernfeld's paper, Freud's Scientific Beginnings, is especially rewarding to those interested in Freudiana. In it he continues his fascinating studies of Freud's intellectual development and conditioning, and acquaints us with relatively little known facts about his life. The 'scientific beginnings' refers to researches carried on by Freud, mainly in Brücke's laboratory, in the preanalytic period 1873–1874, researches which already give intimations of the incisiveness of mind and the need to blaze new trails that later led to the creation of a new psychology. Bergman's paper, Freud's Germinal Observation, likewise is of interest to the historically minded. It assesses the decisive influence of Freud's original observation concerning the beneficial effect of recovery of forgotten memories in the subsequent development of his system.

Studies on the dream find a liberal representation in this volume. Fliess, apparently stimulated by Freud's complaint that little interest had been shown in the dream itself as a subject of psychoanalytic investigation, presents part of a critical survey of contributions on this topic in the past two decades, the remainder to appear in the following issue of the Yearbook. Lewin, in Inferences From the

Dream Screen, elaborates further his exposition of the role of orality in the form and content of the dream, a study begun in the paper, Sleep, the Mouth, and the Dream Screen. As one might anticipate, this essay is a model for succinctness of expression and richness and originality of ideas. Loewenstein's study, A Posttraumatic Dream, and Eisenstein's Dreams Following Intercourse, are familiar to readers of this QUARTERLY where they first appeared. French and Shapiro report some illuminating observations on dreams occurring in the context of psychosomatic illness; the dreams, they find, provide a clue to the underlying conflicts that predispose to illness; with the resolution of the conflicts, and paralleling the easing of the symptoms, the dreams acquire a more permissive content.

Several articles are devoted to psychoanalytic theory. Elizabeth Rosenberg-Zetzel reviews the history of analytic thought on the problem of anxiety, and cites her own observations on war casualties which have led her to conclude that the development and toleration of anxiety in the process of growth, far from being deleterious, are desirable for the formation of a stable personality. Otto Sperling discusses a special mode of defense against overwhelming emotions wherein the affect is temporally spaced and subdivided, and thus, in fractional doses, can be safely assimilated. Richard Sterba contributes a brief and very speculative commentary on the death instinct. Anna Freud, in Notes on Aggression, summarizes some of the conflicting views on the origin and nature of the aggressive impulse, and delineates the various mechanisms of defense mobilized to cope with the impulse. Sacha Nacht, in a paper approaching monographic proportions, describes the vicissitudes of the aggressive impulse at various levels of the child's development and the role of the aggressive component in a variety of clinical syndromes, and derives indications for therapy and preventive measures that stem from these theoretical insights.

In the realm of applied psychoanalysis, Annie Reich contributes a very perspicacious study of mimicry as it sheds light on the dynamics and economics involved in this special form of sublimation. Grotjahn discusses the multiple determinants and significations of wit, and points out how it may be utilized by the analyst on rare, carefully chosen occasions, to convey an otherwise unpalatable interpretation. Jones offers an addendum to his extensive studies of the Hamlet problem, in which he adduces a homosexual component, in addition to the accepted œdipal, to account for Ham-

let's behavior. Hitschmann continues his psychoanalytic literary explorations with an examination of Swedenborg, and presents evidence to prove that Swedenborg suffered from paranoia. Garma, in a paper likewise familiar to readers of this QUARTERLY, puts forth the thesis that the main unconscious determinants for the origin of clothes is their symbolic meaning as fœtal membranes.

In a clinical study (published first in this QUARTERLY) Barag presents the complicated structure and dynamics of a case of pathological jealousy. Hart, in an encompassing review of material culled from various sources—mythology, folklore, religion, literature, history, and the clinic—elucidates the various unconscious meanings of the eye as it appears in symbols and symptoms. He accounts for its frequent psychogenic involvement by the fact that it is not only and per se a pleasure organ and an organ of aggression, but that unconsciously it represents the genitalia and unconsciously, also, physiological vision is equated with psychological vision, so that the eye becomes an organ for gaining, or avoiding, insight.

WILLIAM NEEDLES (NEW YORK)

PSYCHANALYSE DE LA MUSIQUE. By André Michel. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1951. 244 pp.

Much of the psychoanalytic literature on music, sparse as it is, has escaped the author's attention (e.g., Ferenczi's classical description of the use of music in the course of psychoanalytic therapy in The Further Development of an Active Therapy in Psychoanalysis, 1921). In other respects, too, the book is often sketchy, and can hardly be called a monograph in the usual sense. The author, who seems to be pedagogue, psychoanalyst, poet, and musician, composed the volume from several articles written during a period of five years, which may account for some of its unevenness.

The two greatest weaknesses of Michel's approach are insufficient documentation and—even more detrimental—an almost exclusive preoccupation with genetic id psychology which leads to an overly schematic classification of composers according to the classical stages of the development of the libido. He is most convincing where he does not try to establish genetic links from scanty biographical data but restricts himself to the interconnections between the composer's character and his work: Stravinsky, e.g., is orderly, tyrannical, and opinionated; he has an exaggerated disgust for bad

odors; the anal components of his compositions are aggressive rhythms, cruel harmonies, and a predilection for percussion instruments; his use of brass instruments to play his sweetest melodies is rightly recognized as a form of magical undoing of destructive tendencies through music. Excellent, too, is the chapter on Johann Sebastian Bach and the historical conservatism of the superego. An unconscious yet active, Catholic, medieval superego enforced a political as well as an artistic compromise after the Reformation had externally succeeded. Politically, submission to the Pope was replaced by submission to the prince; in the artistic sphere, the dominance of plastic art with its symbol of medieval anonymous collectivism, the cathedral, was replaced by a cathedral of sounds, the music of Bach. Michel corroborates his theory by pointing out that during the Reformation the musical style in the Protestant countries changed, with Schütz, from the former Flemish influence to the Italian (Catholic) tradition.

In the second part of his book Michel proposes to psychoanalyze music itself. His analysis of the music of Debussy's opera Pelleas and Melisande not only reveals subtleties about the operatic characters, which a study of the libretto alone could not supply, but also permits him to draw tentative conclusions about the composer's unconscious conflicts. The author's theoretical statements, however, are hampered by the shortcomings of his metapsychology. He argues correctly that musical mental processes can be among the most developed mental acts, as during the execution of a fugue. Yet, in a polemic against traditional psychoanalysis, which he suspects of recognizing only conceptual thinking as mature, he is carried to the other extreme and proclaims the musical mind as superior to the conceptual: 1, because only the musical mind can perform several different tasks simultaneously and consciously (polyphony); 2, because conceptual thinking is limited to existing reality while musical thought gives us a taste of the 'superior unknown'. Concerning the first claim one wonders whether, for example, being aware of the landscape while driving a car is, with respect to simultaneous consciousness, essentially different from the execution of a fugue on the piano. Unless proven otherwise, one would expect the pianist, too, to have only the single awareness of the total Gestalt of his performance at each moment, supporting it by brief shifts of attention to various details. Michel's basically

mystical assertion that music reveals the 'superior unknown' makes one suspect that he describes an intense infantile emotion which is being experienced in a disguised form. A good deal of difficulty could have been avoided by stressing less the antithesis of conscious versus unconscious (a value judgment in Michel's terms), and more the psychoeconomic differences between primary and secondary mental processes. The classification of highly developed musical thought (*'sensibilité seconde'*) among the secondary processes is quite compatible with the existing metapsychological framework of psychoanalysis. The energy-binding function which musical secondary processes may provide for the musician—as conceptual thinking does for others—is exemplified in the author's account of Schumann who, by studying Bach, succeeded for a while in warding off an imminent psychosis. Yet, while granting musical thought its elevated place, there is no more need to deny the genetic and economic connections between art and its precursor, the play of children, than between scientific zeal and infantile sexual curiosity. One does, thereby, not debase music but rather gains understanding of its psychoeconomic value for the adult. An example of the comparative neglect of psychoeconomics is the author's estimation of simple harmonic accompaniments mainly as a musical commentary that leads the listener to a better understanding, and with it to a greater æsthetic enjoyment, of the more complex melody. He does not seem to recognize that the simple, essentially repetitive accompaniment itself provides a primitive pleasure (primary process) which is hidden behind the ego-acceptable æsthetic pleasure in the more sophisticated part of the music (secondary process), similar to the construction described by Freud in Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious.

To end this review on a note of criticism would leave a wrong impression of the reviewer's overall evaluation. This work contains many splendid thoughts on various aspects of music. One may, finally, also concede to the author that a certain snobbishness toward the artistic-æsthetic side of the human mind is present in some psychoanalysts (not, however, as Michel assumes, in Freud who simply confessed that he was not musical), and that the author's polemic, though exaggerated, may have a limited justification.

HEINZ KOHUT (CHICAGO)

ANXIETY. (The proceedings of the thirty-ninth annual meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, held in New York City, June 1949.) Edited by Paul H. Hoch, M.D. and Joseph Zubin, Ph.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1950. 254 pp.

This symposium, a valuable cross-disciplinary survey of recent investigations into the origins and manifestations of anxiety, presents contributions from the viewpoints of sociology, psychology, animal experimentation, biology, psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

The book starts with papers by Rollo May, Paul Tillich, and O. Hobart Mowrer who develops his well-known view that anxiety represents not repressed id, but repressed superego.

Eugenia Hanfmann gives a very informative review of *psychological methods and studies,* indicating two typical patterns of the individual's functioning under anxiety: a disorganized one, occurring in acute intense anxiety; and a rigid and inhibited one, characteristic of covert chronic anxiety. William N. Schoenfeld presents a critical survey of recent findings in *animal experimentation,* from which he derives an explanation of 'avoidance behavior' in terms of 'escape processes'.

On the basis of experimental investigations of mammalian behavior, Howard S. Liddell explains *animal neurosis* as being due to the disorganizing effect of protracted vigilance; anxiety in human beings, as resulting from long-continued demands upon this expectancy machinery. It would seem more plausible to see in vigilance the result rather than the preliminary cause of anxiety.

Heinrich Waelsch and E. Gellhorn add valuable *biological* data. The latter discusses Cannon's concept of hypothalamic 'downward' and 'upward' discharges which account, respectively, for the bodily expression and the 'feeling tone' of emotion.

Lauretta Bender presents a detailed and instructive study of *anxiety in disturbed children,* based upon fifteen years of experience with seven thousand to eight thousand cases. Two groups are distinguished: 1, psychopathic behavior, least responsive to treatment, which results mainly from disturbances in the relationship to a mothering figure (there is no capacity for anxiety which is replaced by immediate discharges, and there are no neurotic mechanisms of defense); 2, children with biological problems, suffering from severe anxieties, comprising children with organic brain dam-

age—whose greater anxiety is an expression of the frustration resulting from their disabilities and greater need for mothering—and childhood schizophrenia, a deep-seated biological process activated by a physiological crisis, as birth, in which anxiety is the central problem. The author's statement that this anxiety is neither the primary symptom nor the causative factor, but an expression of the child's inability to identify and relate, is debatable. The entities of the second group form neurotic defense mechanisms which may lead to self-healing; they respond to treatment. Anxiety, Lauretta Bender concludes, is not primary or instinctual, nor an immediate response to an instinctual aggression, but a reaction that signals frustration.

David M. Levy makes interesting observations on the *specific causal anxiety-producing situation* that leads to the onset of neurosis. In the search for the 'specific event', which occurs most frequently in the preverbal or very early verbal stage, Levy relies mainly upon the mother as a source of information.

Sandor Rado presents an interesting attempt to re-establish *psychodynamics* on a biological foundation, using adaptation (means to an end) and mechanism (cause and effect) as correlate principles of investigation. The efficiency of pain as a warning signal—fear and rage are based upon anticipation of pain—is seen as the evolutionary basis of emergency behavior, the adaptive purpose of which is to prevent and repair damage. Repression is the automatized riddance of painful thought and emotion, in analogy to such riddance reflexes as sneezing, coughing, etc., which are designed to eliminate pain-causing agents. Elaborate tables show the development of the basic mechanisms of emergency adjustment through different psychodynamic levels. The mechanism of conscience is a higher form of emergency behavior, which arises from the individual's relationship to society. Fear of conscience is an automatized version of the fear of inescapable punishment; guilty fear, a reparative signal, leads to expiatory behavior, an emotional mechanism of repair. Failures of emergency adjustment—considered the basic factors in the etiology of disordered behavior—are due to an overproduction of fear, rage, and pain. Automatization of various responses to the overproduction of emergency emotions results in various syndromes: mainly the phobic, the inhibitory, and the hypochondriac, the most primitive being the repressive syndrome, prompted by 'nonreporting' fears of conscience. The very concise

and clear presentation successfully conveys the author's basic conception, yet makes it sometimes difficult to assess the implications of his—frequently brilliant—individual formulations.

To this reviewer, the idea of pain as the basis of anxiety, which has been accepted by several of the authors of this book, appears less appropriate as a biological working hypothesis than does Freud's concept, which connects anxiety rather with undischargeable tension.

This volume includes a wealth of well-organized, factual material originating largely in the borderlands of psychoanalysis. For this very reason it will, as far as the psychoanalytically oriented reader is concerned, fulfil its purpose—stated by Paul H. Hoch in his Presidential Address—of helping to formulate terms with which to integrate and to explore findings from all fields in relation to anxiety.

MAX M. STERN (NEW YORK)

TREATMENT IN PSYCHIATRY. By Oskar Diethelm, M.D. Second Edition. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C Thomas, 1950. 546 pp.

Dr. Diethelm's new edition is undoubtedly an impressive exposition of Treatment in Psychiatry. Slight changes have been made when compared with the first edition. The author emphasizes that the additions in this new book were necessitated by the progress in psychiatric treatment such as the 'well-established somatic procedures, the advances in psychotherapeutic methods in adults and children, and the need for a closer relationship with the other medical disciplines, especially with internal medicine and pediatrics'.

The essential basis for treatment is Adolf Meyer's psychobiologic and psychopathologic formulations. This is best illustrated in the chapter on the study of personality and distributive analysis and synthesis.

The chapter on psychoanalytic procedure, though well written, is too condensed with a tendency toward oversimplification. The castration complex, which is the core of the neurosis and has so many ramifications, is not given much space. The author, in discussing the œdipus complex, emphasizes only the boy's castration fear and the girl's envy of the male genitalia. There is no mention that in the boy the œdipus complex in a sense vanishes as a result of the threatened castration. In the normal or ideal cases the œdipus complex exists no longer even in the unconscious, the superego becoming its heir. In the girl, because of the absence of a

penis, castration is an established fact. As a consequence she is driven into the œdipus complex. In many women the fear of loss of love takes on the role of castration anxiety present in men.

A similarly important omission in this chapter concerns the use of the positive transference formulated by Federn and others in the treatment of some psychotics. Freud,[1] to the end, remained sceptical about psychoanalytic treatment of the psychoses. Present trends indicate that psychoanalytic treatment can be applied successfully in a modified form to some of the schizophrenias and manic depressive psychoses. Dr. Diethelm dismisses this entirely broadened therapeutic approach by stating rather cursorily that 'some authors have enlarged the therapeutic field to include selected schizophrenic, paranoid, and depressive illnesses'. A more detailed account of this procedure would, in the reviewer's opinion, have enhanced the value of this book. In discussing the selection of cases amenable to psychoanalytic treatment, the author states that 'the patient should be of rather high intelligence and a somewhat stable personality'. This error undoubtedly was not intended by the author, for what psychotic has a stable personality?

In another chapter on various psychotherapeutic procedures, the author mentions the views of Adler, Jung, Rank, Horney, Dubois, the Washington School of Psychiatry, etc.

Paradoxically, it would seem to the reviewer that this book errs in the direction of being too comprehensive from the point of view of practicability to psychiatrists, especially the younger ones. For how could one psychiatrist master all the principles and applications of so many schools of thought without himself becoming confused and, in turn, turning this confusion upon the patient.

CHARLES DAVISON (NEW YORK)

PROGRESS IN NEUROLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY. Volume V. Edited by E. A. Spiegel, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1950. 621 pp.

This volume, like the previous ones, is concerned with a review of the literature in the basic sciences of neurology, neurosurgery, and psychiatry. Chapter twenty-eight on psychoanalysis is reviewed briefly by Richard L. Frank and associates. The physician will find this book valuable as a reference.

CHARLES DAVISON (NEW YORK)

[1] Freud: *An Outline of Psychoanalysis.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1949.

EPIDEMIOLOGY OF MENTAL DISORDER. New York: Milbank Memorial Fund, 1950. 198 pp.

This volume reports the formal papers and the discussions thereof at a round-table conference held by the Milbank Fund in 1949. There were forty participants, drawn not only from the field of psychiatry but of statistics, preventive medicine and public health, sociology and anthropology. The purposes of the conference were to review recent studies on the epidemiology of mental disorder, prepare suitable plans for further study, and to deepen the interest of public health workers in the epidemiological approach to problems of mental health and disease.

Erich Lindemann and associates presented a review of available material on patterns of occurrence of 'minor' mental disorders; Ernest Gruenberg did likewise for the 'major' ones. This material was then evaluated by John H. Dingle and Thomas Francis, Jr. The discussion of plans for study was then carried on by Robert Knight, Alexander Leighton, and Gruenberg, while Gordon, Lindemann, Ipsen, and Vaughan detailed a plan for the epidemiologic study of suicide.

One point of the many suggestive and stimulating ones brought out is the need for accurate diagnosis and the need of separating the various entities from what Gordon terms 'an artificial grouping of many morbid processes'. Certainly the student of statistics will utter a hearty 'Amen'!

It is refreshing to find a revival of interest in the epidemiology of mental disorder. The reviewer looked in vain, however, for a reference to the father of psychiatric epidemiology—Esquirol. In 1824 that eminent successor of Pinel presented before the Royal Academy of Medicine a memoir on the question 'Are there nowadays more mentally ill than there were forty years ago?'—a question which we find being asked today and answered much as Esquirol answered it a century and a quarter ago. He referred to the 'frightening augmentation' of mental disorder which was said to 'menace France as a current calamity', and added, 'This fear is not new'. He was not alarmed, looking as he did upon the alleged increase as partly at least a statistical artifact. He even paraphrased the remarks of some of the sociological contributors to the present parley thus: 'Mental disease is the product of society and of intellectual and moral influences'.

We are fortunate that an old subject is undergoing renewed scrutiny by outstanding scientists under the auspices of the Milbank Fund.

WINFRED OVERHOLSER (WASHINGTON, D. C.)

DAS ICH UND DIE REGULATIONEN DES ERLEBNISVORGANGES (The Self and the Regulations of Experiencing). By F. S. Rothschild, M.D. Basel: S. Karger Verlag, 1950. 388 pp.

Representative of the author's thinking and development are the German scientists, Binswanger, Bleuler, Goldschmidt, Goldstein, Gruhle, Jaspers, Klages, Kraepelin, Kretschmer, and Scheler. Even the reader who is acquainted with these authors, their work and ways of expression, will find it almost impossible to reconcile himself to the difficulties of the text spread over three hundred eighty-eight pages, and the meager return in usable knowledge and meaningful ideas. The stock-piling of semantic blanks may be illustrated by a translation (p. 71): 'Human consciousness and the feeling of being one's self originate as results of a relatively overestimated onrush of static functions in the process of experiencing. . . . Consciousness and individualities are products of a specifically human adaptive adjustment in the inner battle for the preservation of the body-soul unit.'

MARTIN GROTJAHN (BEVERLY HILLS)

PSYCHOSOMATICS AND SUGGESTION THERAPY IN DENTISTRY. By Jacob Stolzenberg, D.D.S. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 152 pp.

There exists a great need for the translation and the implementation of psychoanalytic thought into the clinical subdivisions of medicine. The psychoanalytic orientation of the specialties would lessen the burden which psychoanalysis carries, and bring to it clinical observations which might be valuable.

Dr. Stolzenberg in this book attempts to influence the dental profession to incorporate in its didactic and clinical thinking the dynamics of psychoanalysis. Like many newcomers to the field of psychoanalysis, Dr. Stolzenberg uses many different and sometimes outmoded principles to make a point. The author quotes Ryan, who in turn quotes from Sheldon, on differences of behavior which are directly traceable to specific constitutional types.

In discussing somatic changes in the mouth and their relationships to neurosis, no specific dynamics are presented from the clinical material which would show understanding of underlying motivation. In fact, phobias about dentistry and dentists are treated by the author with suggestion and a placebo. One patient, since such treatment, is 'in better spirits, feels better and there is a happier atmosphere at home'. Apparently finding no one point of view to clarify emotional disturbances, the author uses hypnosis and suggestion as the clinical method for dentists in resolving the emotional problems of dental patients.

In the area of suggestion and hypnosis, Dr. Stolzenberg is without doubt a proficient clinician and his case histories are most interesting. He specifically states that symptoms like gagging, bruxism, nail biting, stammering, stuttering, thumb sucking, and tongue biting may be eliminated through hypnosis without regard for original traumata. Certainly more clinical investigation and control work are necessary before such conclusions can be accepted as routine therapy.

Dentists are vitally interested in psychoanalysis and will undoubtedly use it and contribute to it in the future. They have recognized emotional disturbances in their patients and with the proper orientation may evolve more adequate clinical techniques for handling the relationship of dentist to patient. Dr. Stolzenberg's book with its chief emphasis on hypnosis carries the dentist back fifty years to the origins of psychoanalytic method and provides no definite direction in handling the interrelationships which exist in dental practice.

SOL J. EWEN (NEW YORK)

REALITY AND DREAM: PSYCHOTHERAPY OF A PLAINS INDIAN. By George Devereux, Ph.D. with Prefaces by Karl A. Menninger, M.D. and Robert H. Lowie, Ph.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1951. 438 pp. and 12 plates.

The widespread use of psychoanalytic hypotheses in interpreting 'national character' has made its way into numerous anthropological studies. But in several recent publications, certain misconceptions and oversimplifications concerning these hypotheses have raised a question as to the validity of such blanket application of psychoanalytic theories. The idea of a functional relationship between

precœdipal training and adult habit patterns seemed an easy approach for the explanation of trends in collective behavior. It was assumed by implication that by gathering sufficiently detailed information about the care of infants in a tribe, or even a modern people, much of the manifest adult behavior could be explained.

Reality and Dream constitutes a new and different approach in the vast field of culture and personality. It is a responsible psychiatric-anthropological investigation into the personality of a (Wolf) Plains Indian, under treatment in the Winter Veterans Hospital at Topeka. The author, familiar with the clinical technique of psychoanalytic therapy and a skilled field ethnographer, undertook the counseling of this Indian who suffered from a severe neurosis. As an anthropologist, well acquainted with Plains Indian culture, Devereux was especially fitted to assess this patient's conflicts and needs.

In contrast to other publications of this kind, the author submits the verbatim account of thirty sessions he spent with his patient. On the basis of his intimate knowledge of Plains Indians' beliefs and customs, Dr. Devereux was in a position to distinguish between this man's emotional reactions and the specific conditions fostered by the psychocultural situation of today's American Indians. He understood and utilized fully his role in the transference as a helper and the Indian 'guardian spirit'.

Among the interviews are excellent examples demonstrating this anthropologic-psychoanalytic approach:

'Patient: The old-timers say that they dream of beavers or spirits and they encourage them and that way they can go through with what they want to do. They pray to the spirit they dream about. He tells them what to do.'

'Analyst: Now you see why you started today's interview by talking about religion? You know all along inside yourself that dreaming of me was like dreaming of animal helpers, or spirit helpers.'

Although in some instances one wishes Dr. Devereux had more fully clarified his theoretical views, Reality and Dream is of primary importance. The author comments on major problems of psychoanalytic anthropology. He discusses the influence of the milieu, but demonstrates at the same time that the actual character is certainly not a direct, unmodified product of the precœdipal setting. In studies of this sort it is important to remember 'that which is

chronologically the more primitive is not necessarily also the dynamically most active of contemporary psychic factors' (p. 74).

Reality and Dream is a multidimensional work and of great value to anthropologists and psychoanalysts. Devereux has done important spadework in a field much of which is still terra incognita.

The author's text is followed by the full protocols of a variety of tests, administered and interpreted by Dr. Robert R. Holt (pp. 379–425).

WARNER MUENSTERBERGER (NEW YORK)

FIGHTING WITH PROPERTY. By Helen Codere. Monographs of the American Ethnological Society, XVIII. New York: J. J. Augustin, 1950. 136 pp.

In this well-documented monograph we find the whole history and psychology of the famous potlatch of the Kwakiutl. What the author has to say about warfare and gifts deserves the attention of all who are interested in the mainsprings of actions and attitudes.

Warfare was waged because of feelings of grief, shame, the desire to retaliate and to maintain or acquire prestige; moreover, it was ceremonialized and confined to a season. Whatever violence occurred was outrageously dramatized and exaggerated (p. 98); thus we see again a timorous people who try hard to appear as reckless warriors: warfare serves to ward off reproaches from the superego.[1]

'It is impossible to discover in Kwakiutl warfare an underlying economic motivation' (p. 105). Most of the wars were waged on passers-by who were not plundered.

The potlatch is a dramatic distribution of property by the holder of a fixed social rank and its aim is to maintain this social prestige or to enhance it. With the ending of warfare, the potlatch took over the fulfilment of those same functions it had shared with warfare in prewhite days. The Kwakiutl name for potlatch is 'fighting with property', *Sagari* [*mwadare*] *gidemusa sai-ja*—i.e., 'a feast is like fighting' in Normanby Island.[2]

However, the potlatch is more anal and more self-destructive than its Melanesian counterpart, and its characteristic feature is

[1] *Cf.* Róheim, Géza: *War, Crime and the Covenant.* Monticello, New York: Medical Journal Press, 1945.

[2] Róheim, Géza: *Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types.* Int. J. Psa., XIII, 1932, p. 124.

the destruction of great copper plates. 'The usual word for potlatching was *"p! Esa"*, to flatten, and it came to mean to flatten a rival under a pile of blankets' (another ceremonial object). 'The names of coppers often indicated that they were indeed the weapons of a new kind of warfare.' Such names were 'War', 'About-Whose-Possession-All-Are-Quarreling', 'Cause-Of-Fear', 'Means-Of-Strife'. A great copper was the fort of the tribe and breaking a copper meant the same thing as killing a rival (p. 120). The point is that by destroying one's own property (aggression turned inward) one kills a rival.

We might add that copper and other valuables have the same latent content as gold (money) in our own culture. This is clearly shown by folklore. 'A small bird invites all the animals to a great feast. He pulls mountain goat's fat out of his rectum and feeds them all. Raven boasts, "I can do the same", but he gets only blood or excrement and is put to shame.' [3]

The first gift of the child is its excrement, but for an adult to give excrement combines aggression and regression. The symbolic form makes the masking of the meaning and its value as a sublimation possible.

GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

SOME SEX BELIEFS AND PRACTICES IN A NAVAHO COMMUNITY. By Flora L. Bailey. Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University, Volume XL, No. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Peabody Museum, 1950. 108 pp.

Dr. Bailey studies primarily the reproductive cycle, and more or less ignores many sexual practices. The extensive bibliography, devoted exclusively to works on the Navaho, contains no reference to Hill's study of Navaho homosexuality, though Hill's other works and unpublished manuscripts are copiously quoted. The work includes not merely relevant material extracted from published data, but, above all, both Dr. Bailey's own field data and those of the other members of the magnificent Ramah project.

Tremendous stress has been placed on reliability and on direct quotations as a means of documentation. Time and again a

[3] *Cf.* Róheim, Géza: *The Origin and Function of Culture.* New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Monographs (No. 69), 1943, p. 13. Boas, F.: *Indianische Sagen von der nord-pacifischen Küste amerikas.* Berlin: Ascher & Co., 1895, pp. 76, 177, etc.

general statement is supported both by ten nearly identical direct statements, and by a tabulation of the number of informants affirming, denying, or professing to be ignorant of the practice in question. This gives extraordinary validity to statements made, as well as a perspective on intratribal variations, but it also makes for difficult reading, especially since most quotations are couched in the informants' own bad English.

In brief, as source material, this monograph is priceless. Unfortunately, it suffers from numerous defects. The subtopics within the chapters are poorly organized, e.g., material on twins and material on lactation are both split up between two chapters. Nosebleed and menstruation are said to be affectively equated, but the nature of the nexus remains unexplored. Coitus inversus with a pregnant woman is supposed to cause male pregnancy, but the nature, course, and termination of male pregnancy are not discussed anywhere. There are startling vignettes of native life—the nausea of the husband during his wife's accouchement, the surreptitious visits of the adolescent prostitute to her exposed illegitimate baby —but, somehow, these vignettes are seldom presented in contexts of individual lives, or in terms of the culture.

All sociological structural analysis of the type in which the Harvard anthropologists usually excel is absent, and has to be reconstructed by the reader who wishes to avoid floundering in a mass of data. The anthropologist is left with the feeling that the most characteristic thing about Navaho sexual life is a tremendous ritualization, rather than the occurrence of particular rites capable of being enumerated on a trait list as distinctive of Navaho culture. This need for a massive ritualization of sexual life reveals a high level of anxiety, and may explain a paradox which puzzled Leighton and Kluckhohn, who found that, despite the affection and care lavished on Navaho children, Navaho culture nonetheless produces anxious adults. Had this care and affection been viewed as but another ritual anxiety-binding gesture, the paradox would have disappeared, and analytic theory would once more have been validated.[1] This is strikingly shown by the following fact quoted by Bailey. A Navaho woman for whom, because of obstetrical difficulties, a rite was being held, appeared 'Madonnalike' and

[1] Almost all alleged anthropological 'exceptions' to psychoanalytic theory are predicated on the basis of an incomplete analysis of the facts, and of an incomplete utilization of the entire range of analytic theory.

placid. When a white physician examined her—and thus deritualized the situation—the woman became extremely anxious. This incident shows that the 'ideally maternal' attitude of the Navaho woman is contingent upon a binding of her anxieties by means of a ritual—including, one presumes, the ritual of being a gratifying mother. At this point the thesis of ideal maternal care in Navaho society collapses, since the child's unconscious is not fooled by the ritually produced placidity and motherliness, and senses the underlying anxiety and hostility which this behavior binds and seeks to neutralize. As to psychoanalytic insight, or even concern with the unconscious, there is none.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, Bailey's monograph is a veritable treasure-trove for the psychoanalyst, who will find on almost every page a culturally standardized expression of some material which has to be slowly disengaged from the unconscious of the analysand. The reading of this monograph is a weary task, but well worth the effort, and the analyst has every reason to be grateful to Dr. Bailey for having verified so many of his findings in a study not 'suspect' of psychoanalytic 'bias'.

GEORGE DEVEREUX (TOPEKA)

A HISTORY OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Edwin G. Boring. Second Edition. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1950. 775 pp.

Both those who believe that psychoanalysis is to become the core of an all-embracing psychology and those who expect to find its position within the rest of psychology will welcome this volume. The first will find in it much with which an all-embracing psychology has to cope, the latter an orientation about the remote and recent past of the scientific neighbors among whom it will have to find a place.

Boring's volume is not just a history of experimental psychology, but also of its matrix—general psychology. Flugel,[1] Zilboorg,[2] and even Woodworth [3] tackle only fragments of what this

[1] Flugel, J. C.: *A Hundred Years of Psychology (1833–1933).* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933.

[2] Zilboorg, Gregory: *A History of Medical Psychology.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1941.

[3] Woodworth, Robert S.: *Contemporary Schools of Psychology.* New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1948.

volume encompasses, and only Murphy[4] compares with it. Many will prefer Murphy to Boring. Murphy devotes forty-five percent of his volume to most recent issues and developments, ten percent to psychoanalysis, and speaks about psychoanalysis and psychology in terms we like to hear. Boring spends, in this second edition, only twenty percent on recent developments and only six percent on *all* dynamic psychologies, and is by no means a partisan of dynamic psychology. Yet Boring's is a remarkable book and in many ways more instructive to the psychoanalytic reader than Murphy's. First, since history is not an objective science, if we read it in the version which is close to how our fancy would have it, we are prone to miss too much which a writing of opposite bias would reveal; second, Murphy's emphasis on the recent past obscures somewhat the perspective for the broader design of trends. Finally, the real impact of psychoanalytic theory is more exactingly measured when it passes through the academic die-hard's dissecting scrutiny (even of one as good-humored, bent on attaining objectivity and suppressing his own bias as Boring in this book), than by the critical appreciation of the dynamic psychologist whose tenets are after all indivisibly interwoven with those of psychoanalysis.

In the first edition, Freud was mentioned only incidentally (four times). He now appears as one of the four big figures of psychology (with Darwin, Helmholtz, and James): 'The history of psychology cannot be written in the next three centuries without mention of Freud's name'. Psychoanalysis (previously one reference under Stanley Hall) is discussed in eight pages, and with grudging though real respect. Boring—who at Harvard in the Psychology Department is 'conservatively' separated from all dynamic psychology, set apart in the Social Relations Department—is stiffened in his conservatism in this writing by an impressive sense of responsibility for history. So it is safe to say that academic psychology at its most conservative is bowing to facts. What are these facts? Has Boring, and those for whom he stands, come to appreciate the method and theory of psychoanalysis? Scarcely.

As I understand it, there are three groups of facts to which he bows. First, he is impressed by the impact of Freud and psychoanalysis on our time; to him that which has such impact belongs

[4] Murphy, Gardner: *Historical Introduction to Modern Psychology*. Revised Edition. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949.

to history, and Freud is great 'judged by the criterion of . . . persistent posthumous importance' (p. 743). Second, he is impressed by the fact that clinical psychology 'works' (pp. 576–577, 741), and he knows that this has to do with dynamics and motivation. Perhaps most important, Boring, who has not a single index reference in his first edition to motivation, now is persuaded that 'The psychology of human nature is a motivational psychology, because the prediction and control of behavior is the most important practical thing to know about man as a living, choosing, adapting organism' (p. 693). Motivation is dynamic, and 'the principal source of dynamic psychology is, of course, Freud'. At this point, unlike most psychoanalysts, he *sees* the historical roots of Freud in Leibnitz, and *knows* of Brentano's influence on Freud (pp. 693, 703). Indeed, it seems that linking Freud through Brentano to Wuerzburg is one of the factors which makes psychoanalysis in a way palatable, though not digestible, to this gourmand of history. That these dynamic psychologies give him indigestion becomes rather clear when he says, 'It seems probable that psychology already has enough language —the Yale language—to make "motivology" clear' (p. 729). That in that 'language' most of the essence of what 'motivology' rescued from Brentano and the phenomenologists is lost is forgotten. With soothing calm Boring adds: 'The special vocabularies may belong to the pragmatics of science, not to its semantics, for they seem to be related to group loyalties which stimulate research. Perhaps these languages prevent lethargy in thinking. Certainly they are symptoms of intellectual alertness' (p. 729).

Boring's book abounds in such turns and in striving for objectivity. These are admirable, considering the author's inevitable bias defined by his historical position. Boring is a connoisseur of history; most of his facts have the flavor of firsthand acquaintance, and most of his formulations the earmark of thorough assimilation of his material. This is not so much the case when he writes of dynamic psychologies—but no one can know it all. In his hands figures of psychological history, even though they remain sketches, gain life, and their influence on each other and interaction with their time become tangible.

I wish to give one example of the countless labors of love, so paradoxical and so characteristic of this author and this book. The man who delights in the divorcement of psychology from philosophy and considers it one of its real achievements (p. 742), adds in his

second edition five new pages on Kant because 'German psychology and physiology do not quite make sense when he was slurred over, even if Wundt did have his master eye fixed on the British school [of philosophy]'. The section added is one of penetrating clarity, and the dynamic psychologist reading it will discover—if he has not discovered it for himself before—that the ultimate epistemological foundations of dynamic psychology do not quite make sense without Kant.[5]

This, then, is a book which will be enjoyed for its directness, humor, language, and historical sensitivity, which will be admired for its command and usefulness of data, which will prove helpful in orienting the reader to the psychological landscape, even if its bias and historical caution stint in allotting space to psychoanalysis in the panorama.

DAVID RAPAPORT (STOCKBRIDGE)

HOPE AND HELP FOR THE ALCOHOLIC. By Harold W. Lovell, M.D. New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1951. 215 pp.

Here is another book on the subject of alcoholism for popular consumption. The magnitude of the public health problem is presented. The contributions of Alcoholics Anonymous are set forth, followed by a description of conditioning treatment, the use of antabuse, adrenal cortex extract, and diets. The last chapter, Where to Go for Help, lists some of the agencies which may be contacted for professional and other help.

JAMES H. WALL (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

[5] Rapaport, David: Review of Katona, G.: *Organizing and Memorizing.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1940. In: J. of General Psychology, XXVIII, 1943, pp. 149–158.

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ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XXXI, 1950.

The Role of Anxiety in Depersonalization. C. P. Oberndorf. Pp. 1–5.

Déjà vu and allied phenomena are interpreted by the author as defense reactions against an impending danger through decreasing the anxiety associated with the memory of an unresolved experience originally responsible for the anxiety. This is accomplished by a reassurance that the patient is not venturing into an entirely new field but one which he has survived.

He revises his previous theory of depersonalization, namely, erotization of thinking and the suppression of the superego (masculine or feminine) as inharmonious with the body gender. Erotization of thinking is now regarded as the first step in the defense against anxiety which in turn facilitates the depersonalization. Earlier it was postulated that depersonalization phenomena replaced anxiety. Subsequent investigation led to the conclusion that depersonalization merely acted as a defense which masked anxiety by sequestering and immobilizing it without in any way effectively diminishing its quantum or intensity.

The immobilization of anxiety in depersonalization bears a certain similarity to the apparent absence of anxiety observed after surgical operations which interrupt pathways between the midbrain and the cortex. An attempt is made to correlate the apparent diminution in anxiety through surgical intervention and in depersonalization with Freud's original diagram of the ego and the id in which he states that the human auditory sphere, as modified in the direction of a capacity for language, is to be regarded as a nucleus of the superego.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

'Women Who Fall'. John Leuba. Pp. 6–7.

In this very brief communication, Leuba notes that aggressive and erotic impulses were related to instances of frequent stumbling or falling in some of his women patients. He was able to conclude that a woman whose personality did not 'hold together' must often fall and this was verified by the student through whom he was observing the case. In the absence of neurological disorder, stumbling and falling is, then, as Leuba explains it, a somatic expression of a weak ego further weakened by anxiety to a point where, as in falling, it momentarily vanishes altogether—the cataplexy of neurology.

LEON L. ALTMAN

Illness Following Dreams. Leo H. Bartemeier. Pp. 8–11.

The occurrence of transitory or prolonged illness following in the wake of certain dreams is a phenomenon for which no satisfactory explanation has been offered although it is a common experience in psychoanalytic therapy. These acute reactions which occur in connection with dreams are either psychological

or somatic and vary from mild and fleeting phenomena to prolonged and incapacitating illnesses. The author discusses instances of migraine, skin lesions, an acute anxiety state and an agitated depression requiring hospitalization. Inasmuch as dreams are the expressions of conflicts which are already activated and the acute reactions which follow them have the same psychological structure, we need to look beyond the dream and the acute reaction sequence for the etiology of both. Experiences from his practice have led the author to conclude that those dreams which are followed by acute reactions during psychoanalytic therapy presage momentous events in the transference relationship. This is another way of saying that they represent attempts to cope with the very core of the patient's neurosis. The dreams described provide a true clue to the acute reactions which accompany them. In so far as the remnants of the dream day are always present it seems highly probable that they constitute the precipitating cause of the acute reactions. Consequently, the 'day-remnants' in these dreams are of greater importance than ordinarily and they must be established and understood in these dreams more thoroughly than is our usual custom in practice.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

Emergence of Hidden Ego Tendencies During Dream Analysis. N. Lionel Blitzsten, Ruth S. Eissler, K. R. Eissler. Pp. 12–17.

Dream analysis is the main road to the unraveling of the unconscious, but in the course of dream analysis some patients show attitudes referable to a deep-seated ego disturbance which had manifested itself in no other situation. Thus the patient's behavior during dream analysis may, under favorable circumstances, become an important clinical index of the nature and depth of an ego disturbance which would otherwise become apparent at a much later point of the analysis. Three instances are reported which illustrate this point. The question, why the hidden structure appeared for the first time in the process of dream analysis and not in other situations, is not investigated but the authors believe that in some patients the degree of ego modification, to which Freud attributed the main therapeutic obstacle, can be ascertained by attitudes which appear only during dream analysis in the early phases of the treatment.

K. R. EISSLER

The Mother Tongue and the Mother. Ralph R. Greenson. Pp. 18–23.

This paper is an attempt to investigate those factors which decisively influence the conscious and unconscious attitudes toward the mother tongue. The clinical material was based on an analysis which was begun in English and then, due to certain specific resistances, was carried on in German. This technical maneuver brought to light the way in which the new language became a method of defense for the patient against her past infantile life. Most important, however, was the discovery that the new language was a defense against the strong unconscious precœdipal fixation to the mother which was still accessible in the mother tongue.

On the basis of these observations and findings, a hypothesis is discussed which

contends that the early mechanisms of auditory incorporation and identification necessary for learning to speak a language are decisively influenced by the outcome of the conflicts between mother, breast, and child.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

Homosexuality and Jealousy. Daniel Lagache. Pp. 24–31.

Lagache introduces his topic by reasoning that since jealousy is a recognized defense against a homosexual interest in the rival, it follows that rejection of a conscious, no longer latent homosexual wish might give rise to jealousy.

Theoretically, jealousy and homosexuality may function as defenses one against the other. In practice this is only partially true. Homosexual behavior is rarely seen in jealous people but homosexuals are proverbially jealous. This contradiction is explained by the fact that jealousy has other functions besides that of a defense against homosexuality. For instance, jealousy in an apparently active homosexual may serve as a defense against the underlying passive homosexuality.

Lagache describes a male homosexual, age thirty-two, whose homosexual activity had started at puberty after unsuccessful attempts to interest himself in girls and after he found himself impotent with prostitutes. In the course of his analysis the patient decided to renew his acquaintance with a cousin and childhood sweetheart, with the thought of marriage. The author then describes how the patient brings about a meeting of the girl and the analyst. This meeting is the significant point of the clinical part of the paper in that the patient uses the meeting to express fantasies of jealousy toward the therapist. Lagache concludes from the material that the project of marriage was a defense against his homosexual transference. The visit 'signifies the need for a corporal and emotional contact with the psychoanalyst, for his affection and approbation'.

In his discussion of this episode of jealousy, the author poses the question of whether it represents both progress and resistance—progress, because in turning toward heterosexuality this jealousy was 'normal' in the sense that the object was a woman and the rival a man; resistance, because it represented an obstacle to the analysis of one aspect of homosexuality against which the patient needed to defend himself, namely to submit passively. This passive homosexuality was the patient's most important unconscious problem against which his pseudo-active homosexual practices, his marriage project, and the episode of jealousy were all defenses.

MARCEL HEIMAN

Schreber's Hallucinations About the 'Little Men'. M. Katan. Pp. 32–35.

This paper, like a previous one by the same author, aims at the exploration and further clarification of certain aspects of the Schreber case which have remained somewhat obscure until now. Freud, in his classic study of Schreber's Memoirs of a Neurotic, has of course commented on these aspects, without however always going into a detailed discussion of all their implications. He has left it to others 'to trace back innumerable details of his [Schreber's] delusions to their sources and so discover their meaning'.

Katan, in the present paper, discusses Schreber's hallucinatory 'little men', tiny figures of human shape, only a few millimeters in size, coming down upon the patient's head and leading a brief existence there. Schreber himself mentions these 'little men' very frequently throughout the first part of his memoirs and describes them as the most remarkable and most puzzling phenomena of his illness. Freud has assumed that they represent a condensation product of children and spermatozoa. In Katan's interpretation, too, the tiny creatures descending from the stars and dripping down on the patient's head at night by the thousands are spermatozoa in a symbolic rendition of a nocturnal emission. In a further elaboration of the symbolic meaning of this hallucination, Katan explains that the 'little men' also represent Schreber's male friends toward whom he felt sexually attracted with concomitant anxiety. This can be amply confirmed by a study of numerous details in Schreber's account, such as his continued personal interest in many men of his original circle, in addition to his interest in Flechsig and the male nurses at the clinic. According to Katan the 'little men', since they arouse dangerous homosexual longings in Schreber, have to die. 'Death refers both to the spermatozoa in a nocturnal emission and to these men . . . .'

From the content of the hallucination whereby Schreber wards off the danger through the death of the persons who sexually attracted him, the author develops further insight into the structure of the hallucination and the delusion proper, and points to the difference between them.

WILLIAM G. NIEDERLAND

Children's Interpretation and Reaction to the Unconscious of Their Mothers. Melitta Sperling. Pp. 36–41.

In this paper, material from a series of simultaneous or successive analyses of severely disturbed children and their neurotic mothers is used to demonstrate the interplay of the child's and the mother's unconscious attitudes. Behavior which would otherwise appear unintelligible, and various neurotic and psychotic symptoms in these children could be understood as the unconscious acceptance and immediate acting-out of their mothers' unconscious wishes. Neither mother nor child is aware of the underlying unconscious motivations.

One episode from the analysis of a four-year-old child and her mother is illustrative. The car sickness which this child suddenly developed together with a phobic clinging to the mother could be understood as a reaction of the child to the mother's unconscious wish that the child be unable to ride away from her in a car. This wish the mother transmitted to the child through her anxious behavior, e.g., by continually asking the child whether she felt nauseous, wanted to vomit, etc. When the child responded to this behavior by becoming sick, the mother in turn became extremely disturbed. The child finally screamed at the mere sight of a car and refused to ride in it at all. After the mother had become conscious of, and worked through these feelings, her child was able to ride in the car symptom free. In fact, she enjoyed going on long rides with her father and it took a good deal more work with the mother to help her accept her child's growing independence.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

On Consummated Incest. Matilde Wencelblat de Rascovsky and Arnaldo Rascovsky. Pp. 42–47.

The authors' case concerns a young woman with presenting symptoms of depression, frigidity, promiscuity, and nymphomania. Her sexuality was intensely cannibalistic in character. Relations with men represented a repetition of the longed-for, but frustrated relation with her mother. Each loss repeated the original catastrophic loss of the breast. Intense rage against the breast was transferred to the penis with strong destructive fantasies toward this organ. Each sexual act, especially those of incest with her father, was followed by guilt and depression. In fear of destroying good objects or herself, hostility was projected, and she identified herself with men. There was an overcompensation for the maternal frustration through relations with her father. The patient sought feminine objects disguised as passive men or male homosexuals.

The authors believe that consummation of incest in this case diminished the possibility of psychosis, and have observed manic-depressive traits and dipsomania in other cases with strong incestuous attachments but without consummation.

They state that in the presence of intense anxiety, the ego develops a greater capacity for sublimation which is favored by partial satisfaction in incest. The typical situation is basic depression, incest, fundamentally cannibalistic oral satisfaction, penis envy and masculine identification, reinforcement of homosexuality, nymphomania, with the search for a male homosexual partner as a disguise.

A. O. LUDWIG

Psyche in Nature or the Limits of Psychogenesis. Marie Bonaparte. Pp. 48–52.

In this paper Marie Bonaparte attempts to redefine the territory and the boundaries of psychoanalysis because she feels that the upsurge of psychosomatic medicine threatens to blur the psychological understanding of problems of psychogenesis. She agrees that there are many physical manifestations of psychogenic conflicts but she maintains that there are areas where psychological factors play an unimportant or an inaccessible role.

Marie Bonaparte is of the opinion that there is a deeper unconscious, an organic unconscious, which presides over the vital bodily functions and which is inaccessible to the influences of the human mind. She fears that the crusade for psychosomatic medicine is in part a revival of the old spirit of magic and has once more stirred up one of man's most primitive desires—to believe in the supremacy of the soul over the body. In this way the psychoanalysts who stress psychosomatic medicine inadvertently play into the hands of people who seek to believe that omnipotence of thought assures them of their supremacy over the universe.

RALPH R. GREENSON

On the Pathogenesis of Peptic Ulcer. Angel Garma. Pp. 53–72.

Garma reports the data obtained from the psychoanalysis of six male patients with peptic ulcer. A reference, however, is made to an etiological situation in a female which is associated with subsequent ulcer formation. There is no

effort to account in psychological terms for the striking difference in the incidence of this illness in males and females.

He concludes that his patients had a genetically determined 'psychic complex' which 'may be called the situation of predisposition to ulcer'. This consists of the following factors: 1. Lack of gratification of derivatives of genital instinctual needs. This is experienced regressively as 'hunger' in an individual who has been orally fixated by a frustrating mother. 2. Possible psychic memory traces of the cutting of the umbilical cord at birth which make subsequent separations from parent imagos traumatically overdetermined. 3. Castration anxiety resulting from the prohibition of infantile genitality which is followed by regression involving the stomach in a previously orally fixated patient. 4. Remorse or 'pang of conscience' due to sadistic wishes against the mother imago introjected in the patient's superego. This is experienced as a 'digestive bite'.

In essence, any prohibition or frustration reactivates the archaic situation in which the infant contended with his orally bad and frustrating mother. His defense mechanisms of incorporation and introjection cause him to seek harmful foods, to eat irregularly, and to believe he can 'digest stones'. In this way he conquers the unacceptable aspects of the internalized mother imago and achieves a kind of independence. This contributes to his character structure by developing such traits as 'self-sufficiency', being a 'go-getter', and the assumption of responsibilities. When such a genetically predisposed individual meets a current actual conflict, the development of an ulcer is precipitated. These activating conflicts may be the death of a loved person, a bankruptcy, an unfavorable marriage, etc.

The patient with an ulcer diathesis develops digestive difficulties because of his unconsciously determined dietary indiscretions. He compounds his troubles by denying his distress in order to maintain his façade of independence thus delaying restorative measures. As a physiological defense, he is inclined to increased stomach secretory and motor activity. Since this gastric hyperfunction is an effort to digest symbolic representations of the bad mother and her unacceptable frustrations, it becomes a sadistic effort to rid himself of his infantile submission to his mother. This leads to further guilty remorse and the patient becomes the object of the introjected mother's digestive aggression or biting. This psychological constellation together with rough indigestible food, gastric hyperactivity and a gastric mucosa denuded of mucus produce the ulcerous erosion.

This brief summary tends to oversimplify and perhaps overschematize Garma's dynamic formulations. The supporting psychoanalytic data and observations are thoughtfully and cogently presented. The work and speculations of Franz Alexander, Melanie Klein and Sandor Rado are cited. Reference is made to Wolf and Wolff's study of a patient with a gastric fistula, who, however, was not psychoanalytically observed.

One is, however, tempted to react critically to certain aspects of this highly informative article. It is sometimes exceedingly difficult to follow Garma's reasoning, especially when he extrapolates his conclusions and observations by means of analogies. For example, he comments that the cutting of the umbilical cord results in a scar, the navel, which is similar to the peptic ulcer in shape,

and goes on to say that 'it is probable that the premature cutting of the umbilical cord causes the child painful sensations which seem to be expressed by the child's movements at the time'. 'Memory traces of this primary aggression . . . are reactivated . . . leading to the formation of an analogous wound such as the peptic ulcer in situations in which the individual is forced to sever ties' with his mother or family. 'As a basis for this analogy . . . the digestive tract and the umbilical cord are organs through which the child is fed by its mother.'

The navel results from the contraction of tissues below the site of ligation and cutting of the umbilical cord. There is good evidence that the infant is unconscious at birth. To associate the infant's reactive motility with cutting the cord is to neglect the immense physiological changes which are simultaneously occurring. Moreover, the umbilical cord is a vascular vehicle of excretion as well as of nutrition—why the latter property alone becomes a focus of psychic trauma is not explained.

Dr. Garma's patients used a great deal of so-called 'organ language' in describing their symptoms and their reactions to them. Frequently, such verbalizations represent infantile and primitive conceptions of bodily structure and function. In the adult, such regressive language devices are the earmarks of fantasies of function which indicate that these archaic views are still operating unconsciously. It should be stressed, however, that these fantasies of function are based on early fixations and often have the quality of psychotic productions. In fact, the alternation and association of psychoses with bodily dysfunctions of pregenital origin is becoming well known. Hence, 'organ language', like symbols in dreams or screen memories, must be handled in terms of latent as well as of manifest meanings. The phrases 'digestive bite', 'difficult to swallow', 'fed up', etc. require this kind of differentiation. Moreover, these fantasies of bodily structure and function are not based on actual anatomical and physiological knowledge. Hence, 'digestive bite', by the ambivalent, sadistic mother cannot be experienced consciously in the mucosa of a stomach or duodenum which has no mental representation.

Although Garma purports to describe the pathogenesis of ulcer, he does not state how his well-formulated psychic constellations are mediated to the stomach tissues specifically and not to other bodily structures. Moreover, patients with ulcer have diffuse somatic disturbances. The gastric pathophysiology produces the greatest disability and, as a consequence, this organ is dramatized for the patient and his physician. The pathogenesis of ulcer is not yet clarified. Apparently other functions are involved about which little is known. The roles of lysozyme and adrenal cortical steroids are examples of such mechanisms. In addition, the personality profile hypothesis has not as yet achieved a degree of specificity as to be pathognomonic of ulcer. These considerations suggest that it is still premature to definitively assert a pathogenesis of ulcer.

The above comments do not represent serious or important differences with Garma. At Mt. Sinai Hospital our analytic studies of ulcer patients and of patients with gastric fistuli tend to confirm Garma's psychoanalytic studies. Because our patients were simultaneously studied physiologically, we are inclined to disagree with Garma's psychophysiological theories. For example, one of our patients with a gastric fistula who fits into Garma's 'situation of predisposition

to ulcer' and who was also in an 'actual conflict' situation, was subjected to biopsy of her gastric mucosa while secreting extraordinarily high concentrations of acid. No ulcer resulted and the trauma healed placidly and rapidly.

Garma's use of the term 'hunger' deserves some critical evaluation. It is not entirely clear whether a hypothetical tissue state or its mental representative (appetite) is indicated. The physiology of hunger is not known. Blood chemistry, gastric secretion and motility bear no consistent relationship to nutritional needs or to a desire to ingest food. Such facts emphasize the need to interpret 'organ language' in terms of a latent fantasy of function and not as indicators of actual pathophysiology.

Garma's important contribution, however, lies in his systematic and detailed presentation of the psychoanalytic metapsychological data on patients who are experiencing the syndrome of peptic ulcer. This report will have to be reckoned with when further physiological studies are adduced.

SYDNEY G. MARGOLIN

Chronic, Exudative, Discoid and Lichenoid Dermatitis. (Sulzberger Garbe's Syndrome): Case Analyses. Max Schur. Pp. 73–77.

This is a paper based on studies at the Dermatological Department of Bellevue Hospital and New York University. The purpose of the studies was to establish the importance of emotional factors in the etiology of various dermatoses.

Analysis of representative cases of various entities was chosen as the main method. Among entities in which emotional factors might prove predominant, the entity under discussion invited close investigation because of its many peculiarities. It affects only men, starts in the mid-thirties, nearly always has its first lesion on the penis. Its main symptom is a maddening itch, and it is considered incurable.

The pertinent material of the analysis of two such patients is given. In both cases the somatic symptoms were precipitated by an acute traumatic situation. It was seemingly trivial in the first case but it created, due to its affinity to the main underlying conflict, an insoluble 'obsessional delirium'. The traumatic scene was colorful and dramatic in the second case. It reproduced in surprising detail the patient's life conflict. The somatic symptoms were in both cases fitting symbolic representations of neurotic conflicts. The faculty for somatic symbolism was the most striking feature of the two analyzed cases and of three other cases investigated with narcoanalysis and extensive interviews.

The choice of the organ could for both cases be at least hypothetically explained by the infantile material.

No specificity of the 'personality' or the type of neurosis could be found, yet they had in common the presence of compulsive features and a deep-seated, primitive anxiety. One patient, who could be classified as a hysterical personality, was permanently cured (probably the first case of a severe 'incurable' dermatitis cured by analysis). The second case presented a mixture of perversion, phobias, conversion symptoms, and most severe obsessional symptoms, with definite psychotic features. His skin was nearly cured.

One had in reference to both cases the definite impression that the somatic symptom prevented a psychotic breakdown in a situation of unbearable conflict. The technique had to be adjusted accordingly.

The method of analysis of representative cases is being applied to other entities and should be applied to a great number of dermatoses.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

On the Criteria for the Termination of a Psychoanalysis. Melanie Klein. Pp. 78–80.

The termination of an analysis is a repetition of the experience of being weaned. Before terminating, one should therefore be sure that the first experiences of mourning (separation from the mother) have been sufficiently analyzed to lead one to expect that the patient can successfully pass through the new one about to be imposed by the analyst. Such an analysis would necessarily have considerably reduced the patient's persecutory and depressive anxiety (assumed to arise in the first few months of life). This reduction of anxiety would in turn necessarily have resulted in the achievement of the usual criteria for completion of analysis, i.e., 'established potency and heterosexuality, capacity for love, object relations and work, and certain characteristics of the ego which make for mental stability. . .'. Because the termination of an analysis is like being weaned, it is helpful to let the patient know the date of termination several months ahead, so that some of the work of mourning can be accomplished during the analysis.

CHARLES BRENNER

On Countertransference. Paula Heimann. Pp. 81–84.

An emotional response experienced by the analyst toward the patient should not always be considered a source of trouble, but should be regarded as one of the most important tools for analytic work. It is an instrument of research into the patient's unconscious. Often the emotions aroused in the analyst are nearer to the heart of the matter than his reasoning, that is, his unconscious perception of the patient's unconscious is more acute and in advance of his conscious conception of the situation. The analyst's countertransference is the patient's creation. It is part of the patient's personality and should be treated as such. A proper focus on the analyst's own responsiveness is always necessary and this should stimulate him to the continuing analysis of his own problems. For the analyst to communicate such feelings would constitute a burdensome confession to the patient which in any case leads away from the analysis. The emotions aroused in the analyst will be of value to his patient if used as one more source of insight into the patient's unconscious conflicts and defenses. Heimann illustrates this point with an example from her own experience in which an immediate emotional response of apprehensiveness on the part of the analyst, when properly understood, led to the correct interpretation of a complicated acting out on the part of the patient.

JACOB A. ARLOW

Psychodynamics of the 'Intellectual'. Herbert I. Kupper. Pp. 85–94.

Certain well-known analytic concepts (e.g., 1, infantile omnipotence of speech and thought; 2, libidinization of speech, thought, and intellect; 3, speech, thought, and intellect as modes of ego defense) are used toward a description in psychological terms of a sociological group of people called 'intellectuals'.

The recent interest of large groups of people in the search for absolute truths is also investigated along the following lines: the irrational emotional response to a rational mode of thought is felt to be a compromise between the search for instinctual gratification and the mature ego's striving for the betterment of society. The search for the 'absolute' is a regressive phenomenon wherein an affectful, mystic, precœdipal union is denied by many thinkers in the act of thinking—only to have the content of thought (social utopias, unity with God, etc.) reveal a return of the repressed.

THEODORE BRANFMAN

Masochism as a Pathological and as a Normal Phenomenon in the Human Mind. René de Monchy. Pp. 95–97.

De Monchy disagrees with those who feel that the components of the death instinct which are turned inward should be made to disappear, and predicts that 'the concept of masochism will undergo a development similar to that of narcissism'—i.e., narcissism was discovered first in its pathological form but later it was realized that a part of the libido is always tied to the individual himself and is a prerequisite for health and well-being. He believes there is considerable evidence that 'some moral-masochistic impulses are essential if we are to feel content with ourselves and are to make a satisfactory adjustment'. Thus for many people wholehearted devotion to a task is a prerequisite for happiness and 'the ego often accepts moral demands relatively willingly, in other words masochistically'. He feels that the difficulties in obtaining therapeutic results in patients with masochistic tendencies 'may depend partly on the analyst's tendency to deny masochism its dynamic role in the human mind'.

De Monchy seems to confuse the pathological with the normal, or to use terms denoting the pathological in describing the normal. It may be doubted that because the ego accepts the superego's demands relatively willingly, that this in itself means that the ego is behaving masochistically toward the superego.

LINCOLN RAHMAN

The Mechanisms of Regression in the Poetry of Baudelaire and his Followers. Otakar Kučera. Pp. 98–102.

In this brief article Kučera offers certain conclusions regarding manifestations of regression in the poetry of Baudelaire, Verlaine, Rimbaud, Lautréamont, Mallarmé, and Jarry. (The evidence for these conclusions, one assumes, will be made available in more detailed studies about which the author hints.) He defines the artist as an individual subject to pregenital fixations and expressing in his artistic creation the fantasies of his undissolved œdipus complex, thereby achieving a delayed adjustment. The author distinguishes between epic and lyrical poetry. The former is related to action, involving activity of a sexual,

and as a rule, genital nature; the latter points away from the imagined action toward a mere mental state, mood, or emotional excitation. Gratification in poetry lies in 'finding the word', which is related to the child's experience in learning to speak, and which is connected with oral fixations. The poets whom Kučera is studying are all characterized by the regressive phenomenon of emphasis on the 'pregenital, irrational aspect of verbal expression'. The lives of these poets as well as their poetry give evidence of neurotic disturbance. Baudelaire is described as predominantly identified with a 'hero' father but with alternating masochistic mother identifications and regression toward an anal-sadistic level. In Verlaine the regression is deeper and he presents a bisexual personality. His poetry is in one direction religious, expressing a masochistic submission to the father, while in the other direction it is characterized by an abandonment of the rational meaning of words. Lautréamont goes even further and in his poetry is indifferent to the demands of the ego: 'the world of fantasy rises to independence'. Mallarmé deals with similar conflicts but he utilizes the defense of verbal abstraction with the victory of form over content. In Rimbaud there is the most profound regression to oral narcissism but he quickly renounced his poetic strivings and turned to a life of sober realism. Jarry, according to Kučera, introduces a new factor by including the ego in the regressive process.

DAVID BERES

Poetry and Memories of Childhood. Henri Flournoy. Pp. 103–107.

Flournoy recounts a poet's memory from the height of the poet's œdipal period, of a man swinging on a trapeze, and then gives the short poem into which the poet elaborated this incident. Poems and artistic productions express the same content as daydreams and dreams, but in order to gain social and æsthetic appeal, veil all that is too crude, personal or erotic by the use of methods similar to those of the censorship in dreams (displacement, condensation, symbolic representation). However, they rely especially on another disguise unknown to the dream but specific for art which consists in the special care devoted to form, often involving conscious and sustained effort. The creator of a work of art thus succeeds, by means of stratagems which constitute his technical genius, in removing the stress from the content—which in dreams is of sole importance—and transferring it onto the form. According to the degree of perfection he gives to its form, harmony and arrangement, the work gives pleasure to others and acquires æsthetic value. Its appeal uses the magic of words, and leads to enjoyment resembling forepleasure which is due to the liberation of the contents of the unconscious. Poetry and art differ from ordinary language as a means of expression by their delicacy of expression, which merely sketches in, subtly suggests, and invites us to react.

The special stratagems of form used by poets are rhyme and rhythm, which Flournoy derives from the infant's repetitive, rhythmic pleasure in sucking at the breast and the rhythmic satisfactions involved in learning to walk and in being rocked and swung. In music and the dance particularly, the wild irrational power of instinct is mastered by rhythm and a state of unpleasurable tension converted into pleasurable pulsations.

LINCOLN RAHMAN

The Significance of Freud's Earliest Discoveries. Ernst Kris. Pp. 108–116.

This paper is an account of and a thoughtful comment on Freud's correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess between the years 1887 and 1902, as well as on nineteen of Freud's manuscripts, clinical notes, drafts of papers, several essays, and one monograph. Freud intended none of this material for publication. It has only recently come to light and has now been published in German.[1]

From the wealth of material Kris selects three interrelated problems: the relation of psychology to physiology in Freud's early thought, the circumstances that led to the discovery of infantile sexuality, and the meaning of metapsychology for the development of Freud's ideas. A brief biographical survey culminating in the publication of Studies in Hysteria in 1895 is given. In 1892 Freud gave up hypnosis for treatment and instead used it for exploration and thus arrived at the cathartic method. He formulated the law of constancy after having already introduced metapsychology as a concept. This concept anticipated a future hypothesis and appeared here in its earliest formulation, to be published only twenty years later in his official publication. The concept of quantity is introduced into psychic functioning and the concept of libido formulated. Its toxicological application—'Anxiety is generated by repressed libido'—was abandoned thirty years later. Freud and Fliess had both been trained in the doctrines of a physiology based on physics, that of Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond. Accordingly Freud attempted to organize into a system all his new discoveries in the light of brain physiology in a treatise which he first called Psychology For the Neurologist, draft after draft of which is mentioned in the correspondence. The book was never completed.

A new discovery intervened, for in 1895 he included the psychology of dreams into his research and suddenly the wishfulfilling tendencies of their latent content became evident to him. He embodied the main ideas of his Psychology For the Neurologist into the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams which appeared in 1900, though these ideas were already clearly outlined in Freud's mind in the autumn of 1895. They were to form the backbone of psychoanalytic theory. In the draft of his treatise of 1895 the concept of a special organization, the ego, is formulated for the first time. It is conceived as inhibiting or delaying certain processes of discharge and in particular controlling the secondary process which is distinguished from the primary process that follows the impulse to immediate discharge.

A dynamic hypothesis is formulated in terms of mobile and of bound energy as motive forces. For the assumption of such dynamic relations examples could already be found in neurophysiology and psychology. For the other hypothesis introduced in this draft, namely the ontogenetic hypothesis, no model existed.

Freud's study of the individual past as etiology grew out of his observation of clinical data. The investigation of the etiology of neurosis led Freud in 1896 to the formulation that all neuroses are caused by the seduction by an

[1] Freud: *Aus den Anfängen der Psychoanalyse, Briefe an Wilhelm Fliess, Abhandlungen und Notizen aus den Jahren 1887–1902.* Edited by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud and Ernst Kris. London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1950.

adult. This hypothesis broke down in 1897 and he relates his abandoning it in a letter to Fliess which shows an extraordinary fortitude, courage, and self-reliance. He rejected those parts of his theory which he had found unreliable but at the same time reaffirmed the theory of dreams and indicated that the beginnings of metapsychology have only gained in his esteem. This marks a decisive turning point in the development of Freud.

In July 1897 Freud started his self-analysis which dealt largely with his relation to his father who had died in 1896. In this undertaking, which has no parallel in the history of science, he applied to himself what he discovered in his patients and simultaneously facilitated his progress in therapy with the help of insight gained concerning himself. As a result, the great discoveries followed each other rapidly: the œdipus complex, infantile sexuality, the anal phase of libidinal development. The draft of The Interpretation of Dreams was begun in 1898, written and finished in 1899. Inklings on parapraxes became visible, while the concept of resistance and the phenomena of transference were understood. The therapeutic technique of concentration was replaced with the method of free association.

During the period in which all observations seem to lead back to scenes of seduction, Freud's own infantile fantasies probably limited his capacities as an observer. Kris believes that it was self-analysis which led Freud to the recognition of errors in his theory or at least helped him to reject them.

The consequence of this internal liberation included Freud's change of attitude toward the relation between psychological and physiological concepts from which he had tried to free himself for quite some time. The manuscript of 1895 is the greatest approximation to the physiological tradition. With his findings in the field of ontogenetic hypotheses and with his self-analysis Freud's position changed. He revolted against Fliess's attempts 'to biologize psychodynamics' and the relation between the two ended.

Kris stresses that this problem of the suitable degree of separation is still with us. It is, he says, determined by the specific character of the data on which psychoanalysis is based. The concept of instinct was not formulated to fit into a system but to allow a comprehensive explanation of the data of psychoanalytic observation. Thus it allows for an integration of maturation and social learning.

By the same token the objection against psychoanalysis, that its concepts are antiquated because they are derived in analogy from the neurophysiology of the nineteenth century, is refuted. This objection concerns the terms only, not the concepts, for Freud constructed new concepts closely linked to the data of observation and broad enough to allow far reaching generalizations. With these concepts Freud placed psychoanalysis in the center of modern science: rooted in clinical thought and in biological and physiological hypotheses, it formed a link with the social sciences into which it extends. Kris ends by mentioning another, often overlooked fundamental discovery of Freud, the calibration of the observer by psychoanalysis which is an essential prerequisite for fruitful observation.

Kris's article is a masterful condensation of the fundamental thoughts contained in this collection of unpublished writings of Freud. It points out what Kris calls 'the hidden texture of Freud's writings', the whole of which he sees

as a continued attempt to revise and check theory against experience. It conveys a moving and inspiring picture of Freud's desperate struggle with a new field of science, with a hostile environment, and with the resistances in himself.

RENÉ A. SPITZ

Changing Therapeutical Aims and Techniques in Psychoanalysis. Michael Balint. Pp. 117–124.

In his first chapter Michael Balint reviews changes made by Freud in his formulation of therapeutic techniques and aims in psychoanalysis. In an initial period Freud strove to make the 'unconscious conscious', to overcome the patient's 'resistance' mainly by persuasion, and to remove his 'infantile amnesia' leading to the uncovering of the œdipus complex. This period the author calls that dominated by a dynamic orientation. Its emphasis was on the id, and content analysis was in the foreground. The next approach was the topical one. The neurotic symptom was seen as a compromise between the id, ego, and superego. Freud formulated 'where id was ego shall be'. The emphasis lay on helping the patient to give up costly defense mechanisms and adopt new ones of greater economic value.

Balint holds both formulations limited inasmuch as they take only the individual into consideration. He calls this limitation the 'physiological or biological bias'.

The second chapter holds that a new orientation took place with the observation of 'formal elements'—the observation of the patient's behavior in the analytic situation. This is intimately linked to the patient's character and these formal elements are part and parcel of the 'transference', i.e., an object relationship. The author maintains our technique is now ahead of our theory: we know fairly well how to deal with complicated problems of object-related attitudes or emotions, but are unable to describe them adequately or label them in our diagnostic statements.

The third chapter tries to explain the historical reasons for this difficulty. Freud based his psychological theories on his clinical experiences with obsessional neurotics and his studies on melancholia. Mrs. Klein followed him in the latter. The common quality of these pathological forms is their 'withdrawal from objects'. Hence the lack of a consideration of object relationships in the theory. The 'physiological or biological bias' should be supplemented with an 'object relation bias'.

In his fourth chapter Balint states: 'My contention is, that if we describe the events only from the point of view of the individual, using our well-developed technical terms and concepts such as repression, regression, split, establishment of a severe superego, introjection and projection, displacement, fusion or defusion, ambivalence, etc.—our description, though correct, will be incomplete, for every neurotic symptom means also a distorted object relation, and the change in the individual is only one aspect of the whole process'. Mrs. Klein's theories go a long way toward meeting the author's demands. The most important field for investigation of his point would be the analytic situation

including the analyst's libidinous relation in it. A second source would come from direct observation of children. A third field is being opened by group therapy, or observation of natural groups.

In lieu of summing up, Balint illustrates the difference in therapeutic approach by the example of the treatment of the silent patient. The object relationship approach would be expressed by 'creating the proper atmosphere' to enable the patient to open up, or 'avoiding' an atmosphere which shuts the patient up.

In the end the author subscribes to John Rickman's ideas according to which we may speak of a 'One-Body, Two-Body . . . and Multi-Body psychology'. Up to now psychoanalytic theory has in the main been a 'One-Body psychology'.

This paper is an important one. It should be read, discussed and thought about.

MARTIN WANGH

Functional Aspects of the Mental Apparatus. Edward Glover. Pp. 125–131.

A narcissistic need to deny that ego was once purely id and the overemphasis on structural ego psychology are responsible for the tendency to look upon early disturbances of the mental function as though they did not differ in etiology from the psychoneuroses. Psychoanalytic reconstructions often 'carry back' the established findings of the four-year old and by so doing the early unknown is read in terms of the later known. Glover calls this the anthropomorphizing of Freud's master concept of the mental apparatus.

In this paper, an abbreviated form of which was presented at the Zurich Congress of 1949, Glover studies the earliest levels of mental function and the pathology thereof. To one who tries to isolate these primitive phases, five different topics offer themselves for investigation. They are: the psychic stresses (traumatic excitation), the defense mechanisms characteristic of one given phase, the id-ego boundaries, the ego-object relations and the sequence of symptom formations. By this method Glover arrives at a serial development of the mental apparatus which provides an understanding of the early functional disorders of the mind. Descriptively, three phases can be differentiated. However, these overlap as the earliest mental function does not atrophy but continues throughout life alongside the more developed organizations (primacy of function).

During the primary functional phase, 'stress without conflict' results from damming-up of instinct quantities and the opposition of instinctual aims. The responses are mainly uncoördinated motor discharges and reduction of excitation through regression (to sleep). Anticathexis is used in the control of frustration and leads to the development of the system preconscious which gains importance in the next stage. The id-ego boundaries are determined by primitive imaginal representations and primary identification is maintained by regression and beginning projections. Object relations of the introjection type allow an expansive development of the ego which introduces the secondary (intervening) phase of mental function. At this level it is still stress rather than conflict (e.g., anxiety with flight from excessive excitation rather than guilt) which motivates the abundant use of defense mechanisms. Id-ego boundaries are

characterized by symbolic thinking and object relations are influenced by introjection, repression and displacement. In the tertiary phase, just before latency, stress is replaced by endopsychic conflict, the final ego now having to deal with the superego. The defenses have developed into an organized system of anticathexes and thinking has become conceptual. Identification, more elastic than its predecessor introjection, dominates the object relations.

With regard to the sequence of symptom formations, Glover traces the infantile psychoses to excitatory traumata in the primary and secondary phases, the infantile neuroses to events in the tertiary phase. During the primary functional phase, constitutional factors combine with individual factors to form a predisposition to the (psychosomatically manifest) disorders of excitation and discharge. The different varieties of functional disorder, however, are determined during the secondary phase. According to Glover, then, mental disorders may be understood in terms of continued function of a mental system throughout more advanced stages of development. As a clinical illustration of this vertical rather than horizontal approach, he discusses paranoia. Here the primary fault in the function of the mental apparatus is an excessive use of projection mechanisms. This gives rise to characteristic disorders at each state (e.g., some early infantile phobias and obsessions) but only during the much later period of (primary or reactive) homosexual development can one observe a true paranoid basis for psychosis. This 'canalization of functional disorders' (the vertical piercing of horizontal planes, so to speak) may explain the relative preservation of ego integrity in the paranoiac. Though reinforced by regression, this continuity of system differs from it. Other examples of canalization of mental disorders are found in convulsive disorders, traumatic neuroses and suicide.

In conclusion, Glover states that normal development may be considered the superposition of increasingly effective barriers against the activity of primary discharges; the mental disorders arranged in series, however, give an idea of the way in which these barriers originally functioned.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

Note on the Psychopathology of Confusional States in Chronic Schizophrenics. Herbert Rosenfeld. Pp. 132–137.

Rosenfeld states that confusional states in the schizophrenic process play an important role and may be followed by better integration or by deterioration. He offers some clinical examples to illustrate such states in the course of analytic treatment and points out that the confusion involves impulses, objects, and the ego itself. The patient becomes unable to differentiate libidinal from aggressive impulses, 'good' from 'bad' objects.

The paper suffers because of its brevity. The clinical material offered is insufficient and inadequately described and developed, while the theoretical part of the paper is relatively too lengthy and yet poorly organized. The relation of the clinical phenomena to the theoretical conclusions is not established, and the whole problem of therapeutic technique is untouched.

WILLIAM L. PIOUS

Anxiety in Infancy: A Study of Its Manifestations in the First Year of Life. René A. Spitz. Pp. 138–143.

The phenomenology of anxiety from birth to the end of the first year is discussed on the basis of a behavioristic observation of its manifestations in two hundred and eighty-four infants. At birth only discharge phenomena in the nature of unpleasure are observable. Their counterpart is quiescence. A high perceptive threshold acting as biological stimulus barrier performs defense functions. In the second and third month pleasure and unpleasure responses to environmental psychological stimulation become specific. After the sixth month phenomenologically definable manifestations of anxiety can be observed at the approach of strangers. This is the first normal manifestation of anxiety proper, called by me 'eight months anxiety'. The approaching stranger can overcome it by turning his back on the child which thereupon will reach out for him.

Later this anxiety branches out. Under abnormal circumstances pathological patterns of anxiety appear, such as in marasmus, in anaclitic depression, in coprophagia.

In this sequence tensional states, discharge phenomena and unpleasure manifestations are distinguished phenomenologically from anxiety proper. Anxiety proper appears in the third trimester for two reasons:

1. *The Structural Reason.* Anxiety is experienced in the ego which is not present at birth. The development of the rudiments of an ego which is necessary for the experience of anxiety proper is achieved by the second half of the first year. Before this has taken place the physiological tension states are dealt with by diffuse phenomena of neuromuscular discharge characterized by overflow. At this stage conflicts can arise between the drives themselves, between their component parts, between the whole of the system and environmental demands made upon it, or by the subjection of the system to environmental frustration. Anxiety proper is manifested at the stage at which, through the formation of the ego, a new source of conflict, that between ego and id, becomes possible.

2. *The Libido Theoretical Reason.* During the stage preceding the formation of the ego the infantile organization functions on the narcissistic level. The object is perceived as a function of internal need. This period is objectless.

Following this period is a transitional stage in which pre-objects are formed. They are still lacking in objectal attributes: they do not have a face but only a function.

In the third trimester true objects appear which, however, still participate in the recently established ego. The loss of such objects at this age is a diminution of the ego and a severe narcissistic trauma. Anxiety is evoked by the threatening imminence of this loss.

At this stage the object is recognized by the facial configuration. The approach of an unfamiliar stranger destroys the expectation of the return of the mother and reactivates the anxiety experienced when the child is left by the mother. When by turning one's back on the infant the distinctive facial configuration is withdrawn, the contrast between the stranger and the mother subsides and the child's curiosity prompts it to reach out for the moving object

of the stranger's hand or back. In this activity, of which the stranger has become part, libidinal cathexis will be engaged and will become a bridge to further activity if we again confront the child with the stranger's face.

Anxiety develops from these beginnings into a danger signal for situations in which a threat from the inside or the outside confronts the ego. At the inception of anxiety proper we find the first traces of a variety of clinically distinguishable psychiatric diseases. Each of these can be correlated to specific modalities of the individual child's object relations. This is the point at which basic security and insecurity of the individual child is established and preventive psychiatry can function effectively.

In an appendix the reasons for distinguishing the eight months anxiety from earlier manifestations of tension or fear are discussed. It is classified as 'anxiety proper' on the basis of the metapsychological analysis of the phenomenon and of an exact definition of the terms used.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

Basic Psychic Structure of the Obese. Arnaldo Rascovsky, Matilde W. de Rascovsky, Teodoro Schlossberg. Pp. 144–149.

This is a description of a case of obesity and an attempt at a general formulation of the genetic principles of obesity. The patient, aged nineteen, lived the first six years of his life under the exclusive dominance of his overprotective, seductive mother; he slept in his mother's bed 'and she maintained a frankly seductive attitude toward him, caressing and exciting him, biting him and rubbing him against her, while she repressed any genital attitude on his own part'. The father entered the child's life at six. He was sarcastic, ironical and rather cruel. The boy was always obese; one year before starting treatment he underwent a tonsillectomy, following which his weight increased forty pounds in a few months. During this year he also developed obsessive ideas of having intercourse with his mother, then of killing her. Finally he fled to his father, who worked at that time in a distant city, and confessed his thoughts. His masturbation fantasies consisted of 'the vision of a monster opening its jaw or . . . fellatio of his own penis in church with simultaneous flagellations; sexual organs would appear as sugar and cakes and an urge to destroy would make his hands twitch'. Prior to this, conscious fantasies of feminine identification predominated.

The authors' explanation is as follows: mother's behavior was 'like a prolonged tolerance of the boy's primitive oral relation. The restrictions imposed by his superego on his weak ego in the plane of his dependence on his father forced him to keep up a rigid obsessive attitude, which, with the first traumatic situation, the tonsillectomy, became unbalanced and dragged him into regression. He abandoned the last stand internalized in his superego—the father—and returned to his original position, turning on his mother all the aggressive content of his primitive cannibalistic situation. . . . He flew in search of his externalized father, in order that he might help him to limit his overflowing id. . . .' This psychic structure seems paradigmatic to the authors for other cases as well.

The merits of the authors' deductions in these orally regressed cases is their understanding of the relative unimportance of the father image for the structural process and the predominance of the undigested role of the mother. However, objections are possible against the lack of precise differentiation of the precœdipal and œdipal mother images, both subsumed under the term 'mother'. In the patient described the mother must have appeared to the child as a devouring ogre, represented in his masochistic masturbation fantasy of 'a monster opening its jaw'. Too much stress is put by the authors on the 'overprotective mother'—from the child's viewpoint, arousal ('biting') without satisfaction spelled 'malicious refusal'. It is also doubtful whether the patient's cannibalistic tendencies, his 'overflowing id', represents a *direct* continuation of the baby situation. It is more likely that a defense mechanism intervenes: after the establishment of a masochistic attitude, pseudoaggression is used as defense. This assumption is based on a series of futile attempts of the patient to 'take the blame for the lesser crime'—his conscious feminine identification, his half-conscious expectation of punishment by the father after his confession, his pseudogenital wishes of raping mother, even his pseudoautarchic self-fellatio fantasies, etc. The decisive argument for this assumption is the behavior of obese and orally neurotic people: when they try to reduce they fail because a restriction of food intake is (unconsciously) not perceived as a voluntary, rational act but as repetition of the masochistic situation 'bad mother refuses'. To counteract the accusation of the superego pertaining to the masochistic pleasure, pseudoaggression is mobilized: 'I don't want to be refused; I want to get'. Thus, what superficially impresses one as voracity is but an inner defense. The clinically visible 'wish to get' in adults is by no means identical with its historical precursor. Unfortunately, this paper does not take reducing (in obese neurotics) into consideration.

EDMUND BERGLER

War and Peace as a Psychoanalytic Problem. Oscar Pfister. Pp. 150–151.

Despite Freud's pioneer contribution to the problems of war and peace they have been, by and large, neglected by his followers.

The concept of the death instinct provides the most far-reaching answer to the question of the origin of war. Psychoanalysis should investigate unconscious motives behind the rationalizations frequently given as the cause of war. Even pure and noble conscious motives for war may be but a cover for unconscious hate and death wishes.

Although Freud rejected the idea of a general love of mankind, only such an ideal can remove the danger of the extermination of humanity. Freud's anthropological ideas lead us beyond the analytical to an ethical point of view. It was he who stressed the need for a change in the relationship between nations and the necessity for them to understand their hate so that they may dissolve it. Depth psychology should be used as a means of solving the problem of war.

GUSTAV BYCHOWSKI

Psychoanalysis and the Form Interpretation Test. Hanz Zulliger. Pp. 152–155.

The content of certain Rorschach responses 'seems to be a symbolic representation of unconscious mental processes. These responses appear to represent wish fulfilments in the same way as dreams and symptoms. . . .' The interpreter must, however, guard against 'wild' psychoanalysis by investigating 'inner sequence' in the responses and by comparing responses on alternate forms of the Rorschach test. These revealing Rorschach responses may be useful in follow-up interviews and counseling. An example is offered of a withdrawn fifteen-year-old girl whose responses indicated that she was 'under the sway of powerful sexual fantasies, and that these could be the sources of her dreamy personality'. Sexual curiosity, particularly regarding the parents, and indications of the female œdipus complex were inferred. Significant improvement followed discussion of the girl's sexual preoccupations.

ROY SCHAFER

Oral Aggressiveness and Ego Development. W. Hoffer. Pp. 156–160.

Oral aggressiveness in early infancy does not have to be connected with a primary destructive aim. It may be a mere active grasping and holding of the breast. Frustration of this activity may raise it to an aggressive attack. During and after the teething period there is a true oral-aggressive and sadistic stage of the instinctual development. Why do infants passing through a most active state of oral organization, and especially through that called oral sadism, usually not bite themselves? The destructive instinct is deflected from the baby's own body and self by the pain barrier which is in operation from birth on. From the third month onward this is reinforced by a progressive libidinization of the body (infantile narcissism). The mother likes to identify with the infant's heightened narcissism and her love can be conceived as a third protective barrier.

Failure of these protective mechanisms is demonstrated in the case of a mentally defective daughter of a manic-depressive woman. The child was observed—with one interruption of nine months' duration—between the ages of three and a half months and three and a half years. From the sixth month on she would bite her hands most violently and with visible effect.

The paper was presented at the sixteenth Psychoanalytic Congress in Zurich, August 1949. It is very condensed due to the time limit imposed on such presentations.

ALEXANDER S. ROGAWSKI

Psychoanalytic Review. XXXVI, 1949.

A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Genuine Epilepsy. Alfred Schick. Pp. 217–239.

Certain phenomena of the aura and of the seizure are remnants of mental events which have not gained access to consciousness. Two cases observed in psychotherapy are reported as a basis for the formulation of the particular emotional imbalance which causes temporary homeostatic brain changes. The bibliography numbers thirty-four references.

The Spirit of Psychoanalysis. Fritz Wittels. Pp. 240–254.

In this lecture read at the Annual Memorial Meeting of the Schilder Society, January 1948, a senior practitioner of psychoanalysis speaks his mind. He reviews in an able and mature manner the battles which psychoanalysis had and still has to fight. He makes it clear that during the past fifty years the true nature of the opposition has not altered no matter how well disguised as psychosomatic medicine or as 'psychoanalysis without psychoanalysis', as Wittels calls it. Included in the lecture is a restatement of the basic discoveries of psychoanalysis with proper emphasis on the importance of the 'fore-neuroses' of children. The presentation is original and in many places refreshing, e.g., 'obsessional neurosis is based on a pathological hypertrophy of ego functions'.

CAREL VAN DER HEIDE

Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XLIV, 1949.

George X: The Self-Analysis of an Avowed Fascist. Ephraim Rosen. Pp. 528–540.

This is an autobiographical study offered by a student in a psychology course in lieu of a term paper, presented by Ephraim Rosen. The student appears to be at least a borderline psychotic, paranoid personality, whose dynamics follow closely those ascribed to the authoritarian or prejudiced personality in recent clinical and experimental investigations.

Ambivalence and First Reactions to a Sibling. Anonymous. Pp. 541–548.

This article presents a series of brief diary entries of observations on the reactions to the birth of a brother of a four-year-old girl. The girl's behavior and attitudes toward the brother, the parents and herself are clearly brought out. Regressive, competitive, and destructive responses as well as adaptive, ego-strengthening, identification responses are nicely illustrated.

ROY SCHAFER

British Journal of Psychology. XL, 1949.

Some Problems of Terminology in Psychological Theory. Robert H. Thouless. Pp. 41–46.

Two conditions determining the construction of a body of scientific theory and imposing limitations on the choice of a language to embody that theory are that the language should correlate a variety of experimental results and that it should lead to expectations which can be confirmed or falsified by later experiments. This leads to the problem of a choice between using terms already current in ordinary speech, redefining them to give them technical precision, and of constructing a purely technical vocabulary, the terms of which we both create and define. 'Repression', for example, derives from popular language whereas 'cathexis' is a specific technical term. The danger of using terms from current ordinary speech is that they create an illusion of understanding, par-

ticularly in the minds of unsophisticated listeners; also these terms give rise to many disputes about the meanings of words rather than about the facts to which the words refer. Much theoretical dispute merely involves substituting one word for another and thereby confusing a verbal and a factual proposition. It is futile to argue what 'instinct' *really* means since it is false to assume that there is a real meaning independent of usage. It should be obvious that it is an erroneous idea that we have words with predetermined meanings and that our task is to find psychological facts to fit them. A technical vocabulary created specifically for theoretical purposes is the desirable choice. Although such a vocabulary may not be immediately intelligible to the general public, it may still lend itself to a paraphrasing which retains the specifically intended meanings. Technical vocabularies tend to multiply, however, each theoretician or researcher developing his own terms for phenomena that are much the same as those studied by other men who have given them other names. Better scholarship and greater modesty is the only remedy for this.

ROY SCHAFER

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

A. A. Rosner & Joseph Lander

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

September 25, 1951. RESPIRATORY INCORPORATION AND THE PHALLIC PHASE. Phyllis Greenacre, M.D.

The influence of the phallic phase on ego development is assessed with special reference to respiratory fantasies. The confluence of oral and anal phases of development are reflected in fantasies in which the attributes of both phases occur. To ideas of death associated with defecation are added new influences deriving from phallic and clitoral sources which contribute to earlier preoccupations with questions of life and death. The attributes of motion and movement, associated with the erecting phallus, are assigned to life. Similarly, the distinction between what is dead and what is alive is made in terms of movement. Movement of trees, flowers, clouds, leads to an awareness of wind as a vital agent, and this to anal-respiratory fantasies relating to the passage of air during inspiration and expiration. Air drawn in makes one feel light, buoyant; air thrown out is abandoned and lost. Magical power over life and death comes to be related to inspiration and expiration. Similarly influenced by an increased sense of power stemming from genital sensations, jumping and skipping replace crawling and walking, and time and space become appreciable factors in experience. Through the medium of invisible air, contact through speech and looking is established. Past events can be recalled, and there is a definite awareness of memory and thought. The representation of the object is distinguished from the object itself, and speculations follow about the thing and its airy representations. The passage of flatus, for example, is distinguished from defecation, giving new meanings to idea representations especially with respect to the establishment of ideals and the formation of the superego. Under ordinary conditions, the phallic phase represents a forestage for the formation of ideals essential for the solution of the œdipal disappointment. Under unusual conditions (trauma), this phase may contribute special attributes to the structure of the character, with special emphasis on the uncanny, the weird, the sense of telepathy, and the predilection to religiosity. Case material is presented in which trauma during the phallic phase is clearly related to a characteristic pattern of symptoms and attitudes appearing later in life.

In discussing Dr. Greenacre's paper, Dr. Edith Jacobson presented the case of a woman, the meaning of whose respiratory fantasies was divulged following the death of her father: she threw herself over the corpse and inhaled the odor of the body, experiencing a sort of ecstasy with the conscious fantasy that in this way she had taken in the father's soul. Another patient, a singer, reacted to her voice as a mixture of feces and an illusory penis. In a third case, fantasies of union with the heavenly Father and others were related to death, resurrection, and flying. These were traced to this man's experiences during the phallic-narcissistic phase when, following the pregnancy of his mother, she died, and the child was given no realistic explanation of the event. Dr. Max

Schur concurred with Dr. Greenacre in emphasizing the genetic impact of excessive orality on the vicissitudes of the phallic phase. He reported a case of Sulzberger-Garbe's syndrome in which compulsive squeezing of the pustules of acne and discharge of the contents corresponded to respiratory exhalation, the lesions being phallic displacements with the breast as 'screen'.

A. A. ROSNER

October 16, 1951. PAVOR NOCTURNUS. Max M. Stern, M.D.

'The problem of neurosis is the problem of anxiety', and pavor nocturnus is one of the most striking manifestations of anxiety. In childhood, pavor nocturnus represents mainly the œdipal trauma which also encompasses infantile masturbation and the experience of the primal scene. Awakening in fright without memory of a dream is sometimes called pavor nocturnus, but Stern believes that in every instance there has been a preceding dream. The common denominator of nightmares is an increasing paralysis in the face of an increasing threat. Stern defines pavor nocturnus as an anxiety state during sleep, with real or hallucinated sensations of progressive inhibition affecting CNS functions as well as the vital functions of respiration and circulation. All these are superseded after awakening, by objective (cold sweat, palpitation), and subjective (fear of death) symptoms. There is a sense of utter helplessness. The condition is compared to neurogenic shock of central origin.

Any stress produces physiological shock, and homeostatic response or shock defense. The state of shock is the consequence of failure of the homeostatic response. Any traumatic event, including the experience of anxiety is a danger situation which produces a disturbance of the homeostatic process, and induces the shock complex (shock and shock defense). Observations of children reveal that physiological shock reactions are common responses to postnatal stresses. Depending on the degree of frustration in the postnatal period, there are varying degrees of stress reaction up to the full shock reaction in which paralysis of vital functions may lead to death. In adult anxiety reactions one finds comparable phases of shock reactions. Of special interest is that reaction which Stern labels inhibitory or catatonoid, apparently representing a biological regression to a vegetative existence. 'Its defensive function is a consequence of the anoxic decortization which, through blocking of the registration of inflowing stimuli, diminishes the effect of the exciting, i.e., shock producing factors. . . . Like shock itself, the catatonoid reaction is a consequence of a relative failure of regular defensive mechanisms.' The fright reaction is a transitory catatonoid reaction. Pavor nocturnus is such a catatonoid reaction, intermingled with shock, during sleep, and is therefore different from the usual anxiety state. It is a traumatic situation in which the defensive mechanisms are more or less overwhelmed. Awakening being the mode of terminating anxiety, it represents a reality function. But when there is a paralysis of the awakening function in the face of the progressively rising threat of real danger, from approaching shock, pavor nocturnus takes on the quality of utterly terrifying helplessness.

In true pavor nocturnus, therefore, significant degrees of paralysis are present. The various individual phenomena of the attack (dyspnea, rigidity, etc.) are viewed as the somatic symptoms of the shock complex. The somatic symptoms

in turn produce some of the dreams and signs and symptoms of the shock complex. 'Whenever signs and symptoms of a physiological shock situation appear in a dream, reminiscences of the primal scene appear also.' The child undergoes the primal scene experience in a state of catatonoid shock paralysis. The impact of the experiences in pavor nocturnus is far greater than in ordinary dreams, partly because of the coexistent somatic experiences, partly because a realistic character is imparted to the dream hallucinations by the gradually reviving reality function during the stage of awakening. Because of this intensity of impact, pavor nocturnus exerts a powerful formative influence throughout life. Stern states that pavor nocturnus is of basic importance in understanding the formation of the castration complex: 'The sexual stimulation in pavor nocturnus is experienced as a threat to the genital organs', with fears which persist throughout life. 'The fear of sexuality and of orgasm may have its origin in this experience.'

Dr. C. P. Oberndorf discussed particularly the relation of depersonalization to the shock reaction. The *déjà vu,* with its feeling of unreality, is an attempt to allay anxiety by the feeling of having already experienced and survived a certain traumatic episode. Depersonalization may be a mask for anxiety, the individual attempting to wall off the anxiety from the rest of the personality. Dr. Max Schur stressed the significance of pavor nocturnus as a traumatic experience producing further complications. Dr. I. Peter Glauber pointed out the analogy of pavor nocturnus with homosexual panic and with transference stupor. Dr. Melitta Sperling, referring to the analysis of very young children, stressed the relationship of pavor nocturnus to phobic behavior, and the importance of projection. Dr. Otto Sperling discussed the significance of immobilization, not only in sleep but in the acute indecision of the waking state, and in catatonia. Dr. Brody questioned the use of the word 'shock', which has physiological significance, and wondered whether 'coma' might not be more accurate. He asked whether, in deep sleep, the falling back of the tongue with consequent choking might not underlie some of the somatic sensations, including the sensation of paralysis. Dr. Nunberg reiterated the importance of anxiety as the core of neurosis. In anxiety dreams, the awareness of immobility is a catastrophe, whereas in other dreams such awareness is lacking. He wondered about the value of comparing shock reaction to catatonic reaction. There is a physiological substratum for the shock reaction, and for the anxiety reaction as well as for all other affects.

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YALE UNIVERSITY CENTER OF ALCOHOL STUDIES announces the tenth annual session of its SUMMER SCHOOL OF ALCOHOLIC STUDIES. The program is designed for those in activities or professions requiring knowledge and understanding of the use and misuse of alcoholic beverages. Educators, persons engaged in judicial, police, probation and penal administration, physicians, psychologists, nurses, welfare and social workers, clergymen, workers in public relations, health, personnel in business and industry and insurance personnel, traffic engineers, public health officers, and others directly or indirectly responsible for education, alleviation, control and prevention of the problems associated with alcoholism

or interested in related research in the biological or social sciences make up the student body. The curriculum places emphasis on a broad biological, psychological, sociological, and historical background prior to the consideration of specific problems and programs. Another major emphasis of the School is a disciplined approach to an understanding of the phenomena and problems being studied whether the particular method be scientific, legal, ethical, administrative or other. The tenth session will differ from previous ones: the number of general lectures will be reduced to allow more time for seminar and special meetings. In addition to the staff at the Center of Alcohol Studies, lecturers and seminar leaders are drawn from the University, other universities, and from nonacademic agencies experienced in problems related to alcohol beverages. The School is under the direction of Professor Selden D. Bacon, Associate Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center of Alcohol Studies. Requests for further information and all correspondence should be addressed to: Summer School of Alcohol Studies, Laboratory of Applied Physiology, Yale University, 52 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut.