The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Phobic Symptoms and Dream Interpretation

Bertram D. Lewin

To cite this article: Bertram D. Lewin (1952) Phobic Symptoms and Dream Interpretation, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 295-322, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925883

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925883

Published online: 05 Dec 2017.

PHOBIC SYMPTOMS AND DREAM INTERPRETATION

BY BERTRAM D. LEWIN, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Early in the history of psychoanalysis, Freud discovered that the interpretation of dreams and the interpretation of neurotic and psychotic symptoms were merely two applications of the same depth psychology. Properly translated, dreams and symptoms often said the same thing, and the processes that led to symptom formation were in part identical with those that formed dreams. In 1909, in his General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks, Freud stated this explicitly: the unconscious fantasies of hysterical patients were 'of the same nature as those that may be observed directly in daydreams or revealed by an interpretation of nocturnal dreams'. He added that 'as a rule the pantomimic representation of the fantasy [in the hysterical attack] undergoes distortions of the censorship, analogous to the hallucinatory ones of dreams', and he indicated many distortions (such as condensation, multiple identifications, representation by opposites, reversal of the sequence of events) common to both mental structures. The equivalence of dream and psychosis or neurosis has been accepted in analytic practice and theory, and there has been a constant reciprocal enrichment by borrowings and exchanges between the two fields of study. Among others, Alexander (1927) showed the essential dynamic and topologic similarity of certain paired dreams and the paired symptoms of obsessional neurosis. Recently, I have tried to demonstrate the value of applying the methods of dream interpretation in the study of the elations.

Although the seeds of present-day ego psychology are contained in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud adopted a different set of terms in later publications, especially in The Problem of Anxiety, to describe the intrapsychic processes. Nowadays most writers use both terminologies, the older when discussing dreams, the newer when writing about the neuroses. This cleavage is not deep-seated. It is due in the

main to convenience and tradition, just as in mathematics certain formulations (the algebraic, geometric, trigonometric, etc.) are more convenient and more wieldy for one or another problem. Ordinarily such considerations offset any disadvantages arising from a double terminology. Many terms, such as *displacement* and *repression,* are in fact used in both fields; but others, such as *conversion,* are not used in connection with dreams, and still others, such as *censorship,* only rarely find a place in a discussion of the neuroses. Freud built up his new terminology by resurrecting words used in some of his earliest formulations of neuroses (particularly the word *defense*), yet he had successfully formulated certain mental states, for instance, the acute hallucinatory psychoses, in 'metapsychology' that used the terms of Chapter VII.

Both terminologies have demonstrated their particular merits, and the thought arises that it might be worth-while to crisscross, to put dreams into the terminology of The Problem of Anxiety and neurotic structures into that of The Interpretation of Dreams; for it is conceivable that this maneuver might demonstrate new relationships, or bring out some new thoughts. At least the mathematical precedent is valid, as we know from the Cartesian application of algebra to geometry, Euler's application of trigonometry to complex variables, etc. Where the newer vocabulary excels in the description of conflict, psychic topology, and ego functions, the older, dream-based concepts are superior in utility when conscious manifestations are to be interpreted as derivatives of latent unconscious thoughts.

A familiar and suitable object for this approach is that group of morbid fears called the phobias. Freud, indeed, began the comparison of phobias and dreams in The Introductory Lectures when he said that the phobic façade was analogous to the manifest content of a dream; but later in The Problem of Anxiety he dropped the comparison and used the phobias particularly to demonstrate the relation of symptom and neurotic anxiety. Neurotic anxiety is a signal, and this is most sharply visible in the phobias. Here the central role of anxiety is more evident than in other neuroses, and the phobia (or *anxiety hys-*

teria) became a sort of dynamic paradigm of all other neuroses where the anxiety may not be an evident part of the manifest picture. Phobias were taken as the simplest demonstrations of how symptoms arise. Yet the newer, and very illuminating, formulation of the phobias did not exhaustively explain many elements of individual phobic syndromes.

During the nineteenth century, many morbid fears had been described, and many names were coined to designate them. Usually to the suffix, *-phobia,* the namers prefixed Latin and Greek forms, such as *claustro-* and *agora-,* in the first instance mixing the Chian and the Falernian wines.[1] At different times Freud has indicated how many clues to psychological truth may come from popular etymology and folk wisdom, and from the simple lore of such naïve persons as midwives and children's nurses. The name-givers of the phobias [2] were academic and erudite, and their intentions sophisticated, yet we may permit them to serve us in the same way. For the names imply that there are at least two problems in a phobia: one an anxiety problem (the *-phobia*), the other a claustrum or an agora problem. That is to say, phobias present a need for a theory of anxiety and for an interpretation of the many situations and objects that give their special name and special quality to the various phobias. Another etymological remark concerns the tacit connective between the two parts of the name. It is easy to assume offhand that in all cases this should be the preposition *of,*[3] for this is the preposition so often used or tacitly understood. There are morbid fears *of* dogs, of thunder, of trains, and so on; nevertheless the generalization would be inexact, as we readily see by considering two types of claustrophobia. In one of these, anxiety arises when the patient is about to go through an entrance—the specific fear of going into a closed space. In the second type, the situation is precisely the reverse: the patient enters the space readily, feels comfortable and secure in it, and is attacked by anxiety only when he is disturbed in the claustrum

1 Horace: *Satires* I, x, 20–24.

2 Among them, Westphal, Legrand du Saulle, Raggi, Beard, Verga.

3 As in the definition given in Hack Tuke's *Dictionary.*

by an intrusion, or when he is threatened by expulsion from it. Evidently, in the second case there is no fear *of* the claustrum in any sense, and no tacit simple connective such as *of* will suffice. The connection between anxiety and claustrum differs in the two types enough to compel a somewhat complex explanation of the connective, which, as we shall see, is itself an element in the manifest content of the phobia.

In The Introductory Lectures (1916) Freud expounded the similarity of phobias and dreams. He said that the manifest content of the phobias, or the object or situation which appears to provoke the fear is comparable to the manifest content of a dream, that it is a façade behind which are concealed the latent thoughts that truly call forth the anxiety. Thus phobias are like dreams which fail in their sleep-guarding function and terminate with anxiety. Freud also cited G. Stanley Hall, who suggested that the contents of many phobias were influenced by racial memories, as if they reflected a phylogenetically realistic fear. Thus a fire phobia might be the ontogenetic vestige of a dread such as wild animals have of fire, a falling phobia might reproduce our ancestral primate fear of falling out of a tree, and so on. In these remarks, Freud saw a bearing on the relation of phobic content and manifest dream content, for he believed that dream symbolism has a similar atavistic origin. There would, accordingly, be something like a biogenetic homology between these elements of phobia and dream.

Here Freud is referring to the universal symbolism to be found in dreams, and several students of the neuroses have profitably followed this lead, the most recent being Paul Friedman (1952) in his erudite study of the bridge as symbol. Friedman's analyses of persons with different types of bridge phobia demonstrated that the anxiety in each case was castration anxiety or one of its feminine equivalents or later derivatives. But to show the more general and, as it were, universal meaning of the bridge, Friedman turned to the dream, to folklore, religion, and belles lettres, where the significance of the bridge as an independent symbol, for example, as a road to death or to life eternal, appears more clearly. Regardless of the appli-

cability of the biogenetic law (and its Lamarckian extensions) in psychology,[4] the constant dream symbols have aided us in understanding the neuroses, for many of them appear in the manifest text of the phobias.

Freud's hint to interpret the overt content of the phobia as the psychological equivalent of a manifest dream text has also influenced Fenichel (1944, 1945), who has paid attention to certain manifest details of frequent occurrence in the common phobias, for example, in the street phobias, the quality of narrowness or width of the street. He interprets these details according to the rules for dream interpretation, and I shall take up his discussion later.

Though the procedure seems obvious, its rationale warrants explicit statement. The phobic façade is built up like the manifest content of a dream. There are of course simple dreams with little or no distortion, and comparable anxieties that may or may not justify the appellation, phobia (Freud 1926). But the regular predominance of displacement as a source of distortion in phobias indicates that, as in dream formation, the conscious and preconscious ideas that instigate the anxiety are linked with unconscious libidinal and aggressive impulses, and that the latent thoughts of the phobia, those that determined the façade, were subjected to the primary process.[5] Evidently the manifest text of the phobias, influenced by this dip into the unconscious and the primary process, shows not only the effect of displacement but of other id processes as well, such as condensation, disregard of time and consistency, etc. In addition, as I shall try to illustrate, like the dream text, the phobic façade may also include traces of very early memories, which persist in the system Ucs., in particular those that betray orality and are encountered in connection with the wish to sleep; for example, the dream screen. The possibility of a tendency to visual portrayal should also be considered here. Briefly, the manifest

[4] See the criticism of Freud's evolutionist views by Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein (1951) with which I am in agreement.

[5] *Cf.* Gerö's discussion of this point. Paper read at the panel on Symptom Formation of the American Psychoanalytic Association meeting, December 1951.

phobic façade should reveal, at least to some extent and in its variations, the same sort of overdetermination and the same qualities that we know from dreams. The manifest anxiety itself could be overdetermined and fed by more than one latent source, so that besides castration anxiety, it would contain contributions from the anxieties of pregenital and precœdipal times.

We may in this connection consider the bearing on the psychology of neurosis of what are called typical dreams, like those of flying or of being nude in company without embarrassment. According to Freud such dreams have nothing to do with the history of the race though they are of universal occurrence. They permit of a standard interpretation because they reflect typical, standard situations of childhood—being tossed in the air in the first instance, and being naked in the presence of adults in the second. Due to Freud and others, we are able to utilize what we have learned about typical dreams to explain phenomena in fields other than dream psychology proper, and we can apply our knowledge to the interpretation of certain typical phobias. The guiding principle here is an application of relatively constant interpretations learned from the analysis of dreams.

The dream's most general attribute is its sleep-guarding function. It serves the ego by preserving sleep. If the wish for sleep alone were served, fulfilment would consist in blank sleep, or the nearly blank sleep that is represented by the dream screen. Dreaming in sleep is a compromise, which fulfils mainly through visual and motor hallucinations other wishes besides the wish to sleep, subject to more or less distortion and censorship. In going to sleep we turn away from conscious and preconscious day thoughts and their potential associations with unconscious matters. We forget what is on our mind. But the push of forgotten matters, and particularly our not using words to think about them, seems of itself to promote the use of visual forms of thinking. Such at any rate I take to be the bearing of a remark which Freud published in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (p. 24). I refer to his discussion of forgetting a name. Freud had forgotten the name of the artist, Signorelli,

and his mind might have shown a blank after this repression, for as he said elsewhere (1937) and more generally, 'Repression is to the other methods of defense what omission of words and passages is to the corruption of a text', and in connection with the dream he spoke of repression as 'an erasure' or 'blacking out'. However, in this particular instance the push of the repressed filled the blankness with a visual equivalent of the name. Freud's note reads: 'In the example, Signorelli, as long as the name of the painter remained inaccessible to me, I had more than a clear visual memory of the cycle of his frescoes, and of the picture of himself in the corner; at least it was more intense than any of my other visual memory traces'. This disappeared when the name was recalled.

Some of this 'more than clear visual memory' may appear in childhood phobias, less often in those of adults, especially so if the phobic façade deals with ghosts and bogies that come during the night. Even in children the bugaboos are not often clearly hallucinated, although this happens occasionally. There is more commonly a fear that the specter will suddenly materialize and become visible in the dark, in the way that a sudden manifest dream picture intrudes upon the *tabula rasa* of the sleeping mind. Fear of the ogre resembles the fear of having a bad dream. One is of course helpless to prevent monsters and ogres from becoming visible in dreams, but the phenomenon seems to be due to a general tendency of the repressed to return in visual representations, as in the Signorelli example. The disturber of slumber, the 'waker', is projected outward in dreams, as the source of the anxiety or 'disturber' is similarly projected outward in many phobias. Later in this paper I shall indicate certain reasons for this that are based in precœdipal psychology. Here I may anticipate my exposition and say that there are intrinsic reasons why the ogres, monsters, ghosts and bugaboos in childhood and, later on, burglars and savages and in general all such wakers and disturbers of sleep should represent the father. Night terrors and many infantile anxiety dreams lie in a segment where phobia and dream overlap. The waker, i.e., the manifest element in the dream that apparently

frightens the child, is identical or nearly identical with the 'frightener' in the simple quasi-hallucinatory phobia. In both anxiety dream and phobia the true disturber, that is, the repressed impulse, breaks through as a displacement or projection. Waking up itself has the character of a flight from the object upon which the anxiety was displaced. We could without much difficulty formulate the simple anxiety dreams of childhood in the same terms as the childhood phobias (Freud 1900, Federn 1913, Mittelmann 1949).

In general the anxiety in phobias, which at all ages serves as a signal and a warning to the ego, is currently considered to represent castration anxiety or analogous fears which are involved in female sexual functioning (Freud 1926, Deutsch 1933, Fenichel 1945). Even in the simple phobias of children the anxiety is intercalated differently in the different phobic structures, so that it may be attached to active or passive libidinal wishes, or to aggressive elements in the œdipal situation, a matter thoroughly discussed by Freud in The Problem of Anxiety.

In this same discussion Freud tends to slight a point which he made in his original explanation of the Wolf-man's infantile fears. The Wolf-man, like Little Hans and many other children, expressed his fears in oral terms: he feared that he would be eaten up and die. Freud stated that besides the anxiety which arose from the latent thought of castration, there was amalgamated into the Wolf-man's total manifest emotion another more primitive anxiety which arose from disturbances in the oral pregenital stage of development. He suggested that the fear might be an anxious version of a primitive libidinal wish to be devoured, such as is represented in games where adults pretend that they are wolves or other carnivora and tell the child that they are going to eat him up. In my second paper on the dream screen (1948), I referred to Freud's statement and suggested a reason for the emergence of this pregenital element. I advanced the idea that the Wolf-man's wish to be devoured was activated during the primal scene because of its intimate genetic linkage with the wish to sleep in the triad of early oral wishes, and that the wish to sleep had been a defensive re-

sponse to the wakening disturbance of the primal scene. Be that as it may, Freud's formulation indicates that anxieties which characterize the years before genital development may find a place even in the simpler childhood phobias where they may distort, regressively, the manifest façade.

It is worth our while to examine the manifest content of the common phobias for evidence of such pregenitality and precœdipality, particularly for remnants of the oral triad. A good point of departure is the problem, the meaning of the *claustrum* in claustrophobia. The claustrum, as Jones (1912) and Ferenczi (1922) discovered, represents the uterus, or more exactly the interior of the mother's body. It may, of course, also have secondary or derivative meanings, such as the bed, the bath, or other symbolic substitutes. In the different types of claustrophobia, this significance of the claustrum is invariant, but its functions vary in different contexts, much as one and the same dream symbol may be used in the expression of different latent thoughts. That is to say, the claustrum is the interior of the mother's body, but the emotions and ideas concerning this body are varied. Thus, there is a form of claustrophobia in which the claustrum gives the patient a feeling of safety, and anxiety attacks him only when his stay is threatened (Lewin 1935, 1950). The claustrum, symbol of his intramaternal situation, here is a refuge and a haven, and in it the patient finds protection and defense. As in Poe's tale, The Pit and the Pendulum,[6] anxiety comes from one of two interruptions: the intrusion of the father's penis, represented by the pendulum in the story, or the gradual closing in of the claustral walls. This particular form of claustrophobia is much colored by the oral triad. The fantasy of being a baby in the safe haven of the uterus depends on an identification with an infant, one that was in reality seen eating and sleeping at the breast, and it is this infant that is projected back in time and thought of as a fœtus, to continue its eating and sleeping in the uterus. This baby too is un-

[6] For a fuller interpretation of this tale see Bonaparte (1933. Vol. II, pp. 710–733).

consciously identical with the breast, and the identification includes its being a part of the mother. In fantasy, the entrance to the mother is effected actively, by gnawing, or passively, by being swallowed (Fenichel 1929).

As in the case of the Wolf-man, I consider that this being swallowed had its point of origin in those moments of relaxation that intervene between the infant's satiation at the breast and the subsequent falling asleep, memory traces of which lend content to the second wish of the oral triad. The same element makes its appearance in other forms of claustrophobia. As an illustration we may take the fear that arises when the patient is about to enter a claustrum, such as the common fear of going through the door of a subway station or through the entrance of a tunnel. In a case of this type, reported by Oberndorf (1915), it was evident that the patient equated himself with his penis (or rather with his father's penis), the station entrance with his mother's genital portal, and the underground claustrum with her dangerous interior. Evidently too, the anxiety was a version of castration anxiety. I should like to point out, however, that the fantasy of the body's being a penis in itself connotes a concomitant oral mechanism. The patient has in fantasy swallowed a penis, and he has an anxiety that he will be eaten, so that along with castration anxiety here too there is a trace of this oral fear. Finally, the idea of death, attached to the danger spot of the manifest content, refers to the third element of the oral triad, namely, sleep.

Fenichel (1945) reminds us that such fears of entering a claustrum are to be found in persons who suffer also from a fear of the female genitalia, which they unconsciously equip with teeth in the fantasy known as the *vagina dentata.* The same author, following Oberndorf (1929), interprets the feeling that one will be smothered or suffocated in the claustrum as a repetition of the experience of having the nose pushed into the breast during nursing, or more generally as a reproduction of the infant's difficulty in managing its breathing while it is at the breast. In a converse interpretation, Melanie Klein (1932, p. 329) interprets the fear of having the penis caught by

a clamping vagina as a 'narrowing down' and displacement to the genitals of an originally claustrophobic fear of the whole person's being shut up in the mother's body.

Another, somewhat different version of the dangerous claustrum is present in that type of phobia where the anxiety appears when the person is shut in by the closing of a door. Often this is combined with a fear of being smothered and of being in the dark. The choice of this moment of incipient enclosure and sudden separation from the outer world I take to indicate a fear of losing contact with the world of waking life and of being engulfed in the breast or the intramaternal world of sleep. It repeats childhood fears of going to sleep or being put to sleep. This fear of being sealed in resembles or coincides with the familiar fear of being buried alive to which Jones and Ferenczi (loc. cit.) have referred. It is noteworthy that in this fantasy the fear is not a fear of being dead, but of being alive. The impossibility of imagining one's self really dead does not by itself account for this idea. Being alive means being conscious or awake, and this same fantasy is to be found playing a role in certain neurotic insomnias, where the patient unconsciously fears that his sleep will bring on bad dreams—that he will be awake during sleep. The idea of being awake is also linked with that of being hungry and of being unsatisfied in respect of the second wish of the oral triad, for which we lack a convenient simple word. I refer to the passive analogue of hunger, the craving to be eaten. Briefly, in this form of claustrophobia, the claustrum is a place of deprivation and unpleasure; fear of being shut in the claustrum coincides with fear of disturbed sleep, anticipation of unpleasant effects when the world is shut out. Neither sleep nor death nor the grave as such provokes the anxiety, nor the claustrum itself, but the thought of what happens *after* falling asleep, after death or after being buried. Thus, one of my patients imagined herself alive in the grave, starving and being eaten by worms. She had imagined this fate in her childhood, after the birth of a sibling, at which time it was a self-punitive identification with her pregnant mother and the

fœtus. Later, in adolescence after the mother's death, the same fantasy entered her mourning and expressed the wish for union with her mother in the grave. Being awake and alive in the grave and a lack of satisfaction of oral wishes summarizes the meaning of the fantasy.

The fear of being alive after burial is a variant of an idea which occurs in many forms; it is a special form of the fear of a living death, immortality, or survival. The Wandering Jew legend classically portrays the disadvantages of such unwanted survival; the latent meaning of the curse put upon him is that he shall not sleep. It is sometimes difficult for us to remember that our ancestors were very ambivalent about immortality, which for them was not only credible but inevitable, and that fear of Hell offset the hope of Heaven. Nevertheless, we still encounter many neurotic fears of the afterlife. The thought of being cremated, a defense against being buried alive, when it does not succeed in checking the fear, turns into fears of being caught in a conflagration or of the eternal fires of Hell. One disagreeable picture of the afterlife takes the child in the uterus or at the breast as the prototype of our mental state after death, but a hungry child that cannot rest undisturbed. An analysis of a patient with a fear of this sort, at first called vaguely 'a fear of dying', showed that it depended on a wish to rejoin her dead mother in the other world. The patient had a symptomatic habit of haunting museums of all kinds, from waxworks to the Metropolitan, which indicated her desire to dwell in the 'house of the dead' and of the immortals. It was significant that her dreams placed her mother in Heaven or in Hell, according to the phase of the ambivalence that was temporarily in the ascendance. Her reunion was correspondingly feared and desired.

A young man, complaining of a compulsion to drink, combined his neurotic alcoholism with the type of claustrophobia in which the closing of the door to a subway car or an airplane precipitated the anxiety attack. In other words, the patient became panicky when he found himself caught by the formation of a new claustrum. At the age of four he had really been

caught after the closing of a door, namely, the door of a surgical operating room, where he had been chased around the room by his relatives and the hospital staff, caught, held down, and anesthetized. He woke up from this relieved of his tonsils, as he had anticipated, but unexpectedly of his prepuce as well. This event served as a screen memory employed against passive homosexual fantasies, and his phobia was precipitated by his father's death, after which he also began to overdo his drinking. An accessory determinant of the drinking was his mother's alcoholism, for which she had been hospitalized. In the newly formed claustrum, he feared death by suffocation, which reproduced the anesthesia, and he feared alcoholism because of his mother's fate. But the quasi castration in the traumatic event did not figure in the manifest text of his phobias or of his worries. The significance of his fear of being smothered came out in the analysis of his use of alcohol, which held for him the masochistic temptation of being put to sleep. Alcohol represented his father's semen, for his primal scene fantasy depicted his father as poisoning his mother through fellatio, which put her to sleep or killed her, all after a door had shut the two parents in. The phobia and the use of alcohol arose in related latent fantasies. The alcohol gratified his suicidal feminine wish for sleep; the phobia treated it as a danger.

These various illustrations show that the claustrum functions in many ways within the structure of the phobic symptoms. Precœdipal relationships play an important role in determining these functions. The intraclaustral situation may be a place of wakefulness and starvation; but if the claustrum is affectively toned by the associated idea of a quiet uterus, a good breast, or peaceful sleep, it is a haven and a place that can be used in the construction of defense mechanisms, so that it becomes a natural refuge. The claustrum in this case is not the projection of a danger; the danger is projected elsewhere, and to the claustrum is projected the warding-off function, i.e., a part of the ego's defensive function. The projection in this form of claustrophobia is not limited to id representations, nor to the extrojection of wishful ideas. It also functions to send forth part

of the ego's fantasy of defense. The ego sees its safety as well as the danger in certain external situations, just as in a dream one may see one's self hiding in a safe place from some frightening figure. Both danger and safety are projected.

We may now return to The Pit and the Pendulum and, since we have to a large extent dealt with the pit, inquire into the significance of the pendulum. If the story were a dream, the pendulum would certainly be a disturber. In the manifest text of dreams, the wakening stimulus, the strongest disturber, is ordinarily pictured as some external figure or situation and not as something that arises from within. Similarly in most true phobias, the disturbance is supposed to come from the outside. This is particularly true of one disturber of the peaceful rest in the safe claustrum. The intruder into this peaceful, or at any rate safe, place, the pendulum in Poe's story, is a stock figure, like the 'companion' in Deutsch's interpretation of agoraphobia. Primarily here the intruder is the father's penis. But this phallic interpretation is not sufficient. The pendulum (and the penis) is also the 'waker' and the disturber of infantile sleep and orality; and for this reason it appears suitably in fantasies of the primal scene and intrauterine observation of coitus, where the father's sexual purpose arouses the unwilling witness of the sexual act. In the psychology of dreams, too, the father or his representative appears very often as the arouser. A classic example in the psychoanalytic literature is Silberer's dream (1912) of walking with a certain female figure and then being awakened by a horse who menaces him by drawing back its lips and baring its teeth. Indeed, Silberer could have included among his 'wakening symbols' representations of the father. For when 'sleep' means union with the mother or at the breast, 'being awakened' means by the father, and in accord with oral psychology, as in the above example, by the orally jealous and hungry father. In many dreams and phobias, the biting or ravenous animal has this connotation: it is the greedy and jealous father, intruding with his claims, as the child thinks, for his full share of the oral enjoyment. To those persons who depend on sleep for libidinal gratification, the father is waker

and weaner, for in the unconscious *qui dort mange* is a literal truth. Thus the precœdipal, intrusive function of the father contributes an element to such symbols as the pendulum, and finds its place in dreams and phobias.

More subtly than in Silberer's example, one of my patients expressed the idea of the father as waker and weaner very clearly. Of this young man it could be stated with some justification that he had a 'sleep addiction', for he obtained most of his emotional satisfaction from sleep and dreams. He was awakened from an œdipal dream of taking a ride with a young woman by the sound of the bugle playing reveille. But before he recognized the bugle call for what it was he thought it was the mess call.[7] Where sleep is concerned specifically, the time to wake up is the intruder upon a state that retains some of the timelessness and hence immortality of the primary process. Like so many early demands of the reality principle, the demands of time are originally understood as demands of the upbringers, for the measurement of time is impressed upon the child from without. Particularly the idea of *time* comes to represent the father, and the realistic demand to be awake is joined to this in the conception that it is time to be awake. The demands of time, as part of reality, conflict with the pleasure principle. As there is a general tendency to give to the father attributes of the reality principle in unconscious thinking, so to the mother are given those of the primary process, pleasure principle, and timelessness. Poets and artists depict time as a father figure,[8] but they see immortality in the sense

[7] Evidently Irving Berlin's well-known lines represent an orally conceived œdipus drama: 'Some day I'm going to murder the bugler./ Some day you're going to find him dead./ I'm going to put my gun away and move to Philadelphiay,/ And spend the rest of my life in bed.'

[8] See Panofsky, Erwin: *Studies in Iconography*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939. Chapter 3: Father Time. In early antiquity, time was not represented by the familiar old man with the scythe. This was a later, philosophically elaborated condensation of two concepts, Chronos (time) and Kronos (Saturn). 'The learned writers of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. began to provide Kronos-Saturn with new attributes . . . which were meant to emphasize his temporal significance. Also, they re-interpreted the original features of his image as symbols of time. His sickle, traditionally explained either as an

of timelessness which is a gift of the mother, who in the beginning made us immortal by magical potions of sleep-bringing nourishment. Immortality or timelessness is an oral gift. Goethe's Faust depended for it on *'das ewig weibliche'*, Marlowe's on Helen's kiss. Thus time as the father is the intruder into the timeless relation with the mother, and in the fantasy of being buried alive we have a version of being immortal in the mother or at the mother's breast, where timelessness and immortality reign.

It may seem to the reader that I have generalized rashly as to the 'waker', for there surely are many wishes that intrude into sleep and wake one up, such as the simple wish to urinate, and in the dream text such wakers are represented by well-known elements that may have nothing to do with the father. This is certainly true, but it will be noted that in the examples given above, the father intruded himself into dreams of œdipal fulfilment. I hold that the representations of the waking impulse differ from dream to dream according to the nature of the wishes which the dream is supposed to fulfil. And it is quite in accord with our conception of the phobias that such a simple dream as Silberer's, quoted above, should so nearly resemble an infantile zoöphobia. For the simpler anxiety dreams and the simpler phobias both refer to various latent elements of the œdipus complex, and their attempted fantasy or hallucinatory satisfaction in both forms brings forth castration anxiety. To set up a parallel series between the dreams and the phobias we have been considering, we may equate 1, undisturbed sleep and successful repression; 2, return of the repressed in both cases in a 'distorted' latent fantasy; 3, attempted

agricultural implement or as the instrument of castration [of domesticated animals], came to be interpreted as a symbol of *tempora quae sicut falx in se recurrunt;* and the mythical tale that he had devoured his own children was said to signify that Time, who had already been termed "sharp-toothed" by Simonides and *edax rerum* by Ovid, devours whatever he has created.' The Middle Ages added other elements to the picture borrowed from the astrologic ideas of the 'saturnine' and from the conception of Satan. When I showed the late Fritz Wittels the above passage, he succinctly remarked: 'So Freud was right; death means castration'.

hallucinatory fulfilment in the dream (walking or riding with the sexual object, etc.), and attempted active symbolic fulfilment in the phobias (going out on the street, entering the subway, etc.); 4, the warning to awaken (reveille or the menacing horse) in the one case, and in the other the warning to desist (anxiety).

As to the claustrum, to return to this specific symbol, it appears that we may formulate an empirical rule. Contentment in or acceptance of the claustrum as a place of safety implies the ability to find solace or gratification in sleep as a satisfactory substitute for the protective and precœdipal mother. This may be and often is connected with a corresponding denial of dissatisfaction with her. On the other hand, anxiety over being within the claustrum implies that this fantasy of rest is not attainable because of a disturbance in the relation to the mother, and sleep cannot serve as an equivalent of good mother or good breast. Accepting Freud's statement that the events of the œdipus complex and the phallic stage determine the anxiety of the phobias, we may nevertheless recognize the alterations in the façade that are introduced by the admixture of pregenital motives, and we may note many instances where the anxiety is overdetermined and fed by pregenital fears. The anxiety that arises with the latent thought of castration or its derivatives may contain a large ingredient from the pregenital relationship.

For anxiety, though a signal, is not merely a signal. It has a content and it is a sort of 'memory'. That is, anxiety attacks not only serve as warnings; they also reproduce earlier life events. Freud's theory that anxiety is a 'reliving' and a memory of birth illustrates this idea. I therefore see no difficulty or contradiction in the idea that a given access of anxiety, even though it be a signal and a warning of a danger of presumed impending castration, should also repeat and simultaneously signify some other anxiety, such as a fear of being separated from the mother, or of 'being eaten', or of any fear that might be appropriate somewhere between birth and the œdipal stage.

The topic of the claustrum has not been exhausted, but this discussion has illustrated the approach implicit in the dictum that the phobic façade is the psychological equivalent of the

manifest text of a dream. To continue our application of dream theory to familiar elements of the phobias, we may turn to the agoraphobias. As originally named and described by Westphal in 1872, *agora* in this word retained the literal meaning of the Greek root, namely, a market place or open square since it translated the German *Platz* in *Platzangst*.[9] Westphal's patient was attacked by anxiety on open places, especially when he attempted to cross a public square. This topophobia then was characterized by the wide-openness of the space in the 'phobic façade'. As to the *phobia* part of the word, it again is certain that the anxiety is genital. The danger implied is that of encountering sexual temptation (Freud 1926, Alexander 1927, Deutsch 1929, Weiss 1935, 1936, A. Katan 1937).

In an interesting train of thought relating to the special interpretation of certain qualities of the *topos* in the topophobias, Fenichel (1944) suggested that these might be due to a projection to the external world of conditions having their origin in the patient's own body. Thus the illusion in certain cases that the street was becoming narrow or that the walls were coming together would be in fact a projection of the feeling of constriction which the anxious person feels in his own chest because of the physiological changes during the emotion. Phobics then would displace outward not only the presumed source of danger (and part of the defensive fantasy, as the 'haven'), but part of the anxiety reaction as well, so that the pressure felt in the walls of the thorax is displaced and projected to the walls of the enclosure or street. This explanation is credible when it is applied to forms of claustrophobia and street phobia in which narrowing is a conspicuous element, but its validity is not im-

[9] See Edoardo Weiss (1936, p. 8) 'Nonpsychoanalytic authors described as *agoraphobia* only the phobia connected with squares, wide streets, spacious and empty places (e.g., the interior of a church), etc. (Westphal, Legrand du Saulle.) In the psychoanalytic literature the term *agoraphobia* (German, *Platzangst)* is often extended to all forms of phobia that refer to streets, which might seem an improper usage; at other times, however, they speak more accurately of "street fear" (*Strassenangst*).'

Beard's term *topophobia* originally was synonymous with agoraphobia, but has come to be the general term for all phobias referring to locations, whether wide places, streets, narrow places, claustra, etc.

mediately plausible in the case of agoraphobia of the Westphal type. Here the patient consciously fears the space because it is wide. To meet this difficulty, Fenichel transposed from dream interpretation the idea of 'displacement through reversal', which Freud used when he interpreted the manifest dream element 'to be in a crowd' as meaning the opposite latent idea, 'to be alone'. Accordingly, Fenichel supposed that the agoraphobic person manifestly fears the wide space, the agora, but that he is unconsciously referring 'by opposites' to the same thoracic narrowing. Fenichel's method is proper, but the resort to 'reversal' is uncertain and, given the oral triad, not entirely necessary in the case of the large open spaces.

Instead of the idea of reversal, we may choose another idea that comes from dream interpretation. If we take the fear of being in a crowd, the neurotic homologue of the dream element that Freud uses in his example, we find another possible explanation. This fear is usually grouped with the agoraphobias, since it is an out-of-doors symptom, yet it could as plausibly be considered a claustrophobia, if one thinks of the crowd as a sort of enclosure; and as Weiss justly observes (1936), for dynamic purposes any such strictness of classification is valueless hairsplitting. In many dreams, the idea of a crowd, like that of a forest or the sea, stands for a place where one can be lost, and here 'lost' means to lose one's identity and be merged in a larger whole. In anxiety dreams with this content, the dreamer fears that he will be swallowed by the crowd, join it inseparably and perish as an individual, absorbed by the larger unit. In this dream the crowd stands for what I have called loosely 'the devouring breast', and sinking and merging with it repeats the feeling of sinking, relaxing, and losing the sense of one's individuality which characterizes going to sleep. The corresponding anxiety represents the orally based fear of being devoured into sleep.

On the open space, the agoraphobe misses the protecting presence of his mother; there is a sense of being abandoned, which may be compensated if the patient has a companion of a certain type (Deutsch 1929). Often this companion is not

needed if the patient remains within sight of his home or, by extension, within sight of houses in general. (Janet's agoraphobic patient Hnu said: '*Je vois le vide de chaque côté; quand je vois des maisons cela ne me fait plus le même effet*'.) The companion stands for the mother in many cases, and the homes or houses have a similar symbolic meaning. Again one hears that the agoraphobe feels safe if he is in a place that feels familiar; yet paradoxically in some new situations the anxiety is accompanied by a sense of *déjà vu,* interpretable as a reproduction of something familiar, that is, a reminiscence of childhood; and, as Freud says, of no place so surely as of the mother's body can one say, 'I have been here before'.

Many agoraphobes give other subjective details of their anxiety; they feel their legs giving way, they fear they will fall or lose their minds, etc. Weiss (1936) records 'sensations in them which they find hard to describe; for instance, they say that they feel as if the ground were giving way under their feet or as if they were walking on the verge of a precipice or on an uneven surface, etc.'. He also speaks of fears of fainting, and of traumatic dreamlike states of 'coming to'. The words *uneven surface* in the Italian version are *un piano ricurvo,* which suggests a curving of the ground surface; I remark on this to indicate that this agoral plane has many characteristics of the dream screen. And in many of Weiss's interpretations the open space refers anatomically to the mother: in a dream, the analyst has an open space, *un vuoto,* where his penis should have been, and he represents the castrated mother; or for another patient walking on the ground meant 'trampling on her mother's body and killing the unborn child', and Weiss also records many oral fantasies that accompany the attacks—birth through the mouth, attempts at fellatio, etc. Weiss states that when patients speak of a 'fear of fear' this is inexact: they dread painful changes in consciousness, depersonalizations, half-dream states that overcome them rather than the emotion itself. To such changes in ego feeling (or other hysteric manifestations) in the initial attack, Weiss attributes an etiological, traumatic significance.

The feelings relating to the legs led Abraham (1913) to speak of the locomotor anxiety of these patients. He pointed out the genital significance of the legs, which are hypereroticized and become the site of many displaced fantasies, so that their 'loss' is psychologically tantamount to castration. Besides this interpretation, another meaning suggests itself to account for the special importance of the legs. At least, in cases where the *topos* of the topophobia is a wide expanse, the total picture is of losing one's self into it. Besides Fenichel's interpretation of a 'reversal' of an anxious sense of constriction, a direct interpretation is possible, namely, that the width itself is the frightening element. The wide agora is like the dream screen and all those expanses which stand for the surface of the mother. In one version of agoraphobic anxiety the patient fears that he will spread out and merge with this screen, lose himself in a reproduction of the merging and being merged that takes place when the infant falls asleep. The agora is a mother symbol; the fear is of bad sleep or its equivalent, bad death. Thus it is a version, but an anxious one, of the oceanic feeling of which Romain Rolland wrote to Freud.

In the past six years many colleagues have sent me records of dreams in which a 'dream screen' is discernible. It is striking that the screen is frequently represented precisely as something inedible, tasteless or even disagreeable to the mouth, such as a marble cliff with blue veins in it, a desert, or other wastes and barren tracts.[10] To merge with this sort of dream screen suggests destruction, and it appears that this is the type of expanse to which these particular agoraphobes are referring. Here a collapse of the legs would be a reminiscence of the flaccidity that precedes sleep and of the union with the breast at nursing.

This interpretation of the agoraphobic sense of losing the legs is analogous to that given by Lorand (1948) for the loss of teeth in dreams—that the dreamer wishes to return to the toothless stage when he was being nursed. We are indebted to

[10] *Cf.* Weiss for the resemblance of certain painful elements in the anxiety to states of half-sleep and half-awakening. See Isakower (1938) for unpleasant hypnagogic sensations.

Gerö (1939) and ultimately to Abraham (1913) and Sadger (1911) for the knowledge that a tooth and a leg are mutually replaceable symbols. Both may represent the genitalia or sadistic weapons and they may both be organs with muscular-erotic function. Their loss consequently implies castration or passive masochistic gratification. However, in addition, teeth and legs both may be lost in dreams to fulfil a wish to be nursed and carried, passive feeding and passive locomotion taking the dreamer back to the same stage of infancy. Not to go out is a mild form of not walking at all, and this is probably the main idea behind the remark that Abraham quotes (1913a) of his five-year-old incipient agoraphobic: *'Ich will kein Spazierkind sein, ich will ein Mutterkind sein'*. If the ego drastically eliminates those of its organs that make for independent existence, it is ultimately thrown back on the mother and the helplessness that precedes sleep. When Freud (1916a) described how a person prepares for sleep by shedding his clothes, his false teeth and other prosthetic equipment, he indicated that this procedure was followed by the psychological shedding of the organs of independent action. In fact, except for the rare phenomenon of sleepwalking, the legs in particular are eliminated in the sleeping state. Finally, like Tausk's Miss Natalija N (1919), the dormescent ego loses itself and becomes a blank (Federn 1926, Isakower 1938). It is this process which is subtly reflected in agoraphobic sensations of 'loss' and of the self widening out as if to become congruent with the agora.

Morbid fears of being on the street are usually listed among the agoraphobias, yet they may show differences in several details of the façade. The manifest elements are painted on the same canvas as the agoral picture, but in a different genre. Sometimes, as Fenichel (1944) stated, the houses lining the street seem to approach each other, or the street seems to get narrow, and Fenichel believed this to be due to the anxiety, the *angustia* or constriction felt in the person's own thorax. Here again, despite plausibility, the interpretation is not exhaustive and may conceal deeper possibilities of interpretation. I refer to the possibility that such elements are 'repetitions' of

latent fantasies of joining the mother in sleep, and of hypnagogic or hypnopompic sensations.

The manifest content of the street phobias shows considerable variation, yet certain topics crop up with some regularity. In many well-studied cases, there is a good deal of reference to prostitutes and prostitution, and several observers have been struck by the frequent appearance of a sister in the latent pathogenetic thoughts (Cohn 1928, A. Katan 1937). The topics, sister and prostitute, figured largely in the analysis of a young man in my practice, who spent several weeks unable to go out on the street unless his family doctor went along. The patient, an obsessional neurotic, began his analysis by reporting a dream of intercourse with his sister, in which he had no emotion either pleasant or unpleasant, upon which he commented somewhat contemptuously, 'So what?'. Much of his ensuing analysis was a mixed attempt to give and to prevent an answer to this question. The street phobia followed a break with his mistress, who was a prostitute and a surrogate for his sister. He needed his physician's constant attendance because he was afraid that he might suddenly go into labor and give birth unaided, a frightening event in his sister's history. From this young man and from others it was possible to learn some of the deeper meaning of street, sister, and prostitute, all mutually replaceable conceptions in his unconscious thinking.

Many persons, not only those with a street phobia or a prostitution complex, use nuns, prostitutes, and streets in their dreams to refer to a sister. As to the nuns, they are of course 'sisters' by profession and may by reversal ironically stand for prostitutes. A patient told me of a brothel in which the parlor was furnished like a chapel, where the girls were dressed as nuns, and the madam was called Mother Superior. In the split between sacred and profane love in individual development, a sister comes easily to be equated with a prostitute; she is less respected than the mother and more available as a sexual playmate. As a displacement from the mother in the œdipus complex, the sister tends to be a debased object, cognate with the debased mother representation, while the mother herself retains the

purity. As to the street, the prostitute may be identified with it, as in the French colloquialism, *la rue.* Indeed, my patient's fantasy of his sister's giving birth on the street is of interest linguistically. The etymology of such family names as La Rue, La Place, La Porte, etc. may be based on the same idea, for these names originated in French orphanages where foundlings were named *the street, the place,* etc., that is, for the place where they were found.[11] Most illegitimate children of known mothers received their names; hence the procedure may reflect the unconscious idea that the street or the market place is the prostitute-mother which has borne a fatherless child, in a sort of Black Mass version of the virgin birth.

In the case of the sister there is considerably more identification, as compared with the degree of object love, than in the relation to the mother. The sister may appear in strange symbolic guise in dreams and fantasies, and as the member of strange symbolic equations. I am indebted to Dr. Zilboorg for telling me years ago that a river in the manifest dream text often stands for a sister, in contrast to the maternal ocean or large body of water, and I have met with examples that confirm this interpretation. Whether there is some kinship between the ideas of street and river I cannot say. But there are stranger equivalents for the sister. One of them is the penis, as Fenichel discovered (1936). Certainly this is a narcissistic aspect of the sister relationship; but that the sister may represent a true *alter ego,* indeed a former part of one's self, is best demonstrated in Nunberg's analysis of circumcision (1949). Nunberg's patient not only equated his sister with his lost foreskin, but also approximated in a fantasy Plato's well-known account of the origin of love; namely, that a human being was to begin with a double individual, and that the gods severed this individual, making two, a male and a female, two males, or two females, whereupon love arose as a reciprocal desire for reunion. The knowledge that sister and brother began life in the same mother leads to a theory that they were originally joined in a unity.

11 Thus *Jean le Rond,* the real name of the philosopher D'Alembert, was given him because he was found on the steps of a church of that name.

The nature of this union needs interpretation not available in Nunberg's analysis. Brother and sister were in fact 'separated', but not from each other; both were one, but with the mother, not only in utero but also at the breast, and they were both in a union with the breast while nursing. In fact Plato's drinking-party story denies the fact that a man was originally attached to his mother. In her place Plato puts a narcissistically conceived sister or brother; for the breast he substitutes a Siamese-twin commissure; and for weaning he puts severing. This is a version of the anaclitic basis of love which omits mother and the breast.

For more instruction as to the meaning of *sister,* we may appeal directly to dream psychology in Freud's Interpretation of Dreams. There he states that 'sisters' in the manifest text are symbols for the breasts, and in The Introductory Lectures, he illustrates this by an example. This use of sisters is one instance, of which there are several, where persons in dreams may stand for bodily parts. Therefore one is encouraged to ascribe to the *sister* of the street phobias this same meaning of a narcissistically invested object, genetically related to the breast; for it is an identification with a sister, or a defense against such an identification, which appears in the manifest text of the phobia. Accordingly, the unconscious equation of sister and breast, both as parts (or quasi parts) of the mother, should contribute to an impulse to a 'reunion', to an identification, or to the correlated anxiety. It must be noted that there are agoraphobias which contain no reference to a sister (Alexander 1927, Deutsch 1929, Weiss 1935). Some of these, however, leave no doubt of a strong oral factor. In one of Deutsch's cases where the symptoms were intermediate between phobia and perversion, the patient at twenty-two years of age 'still slept with her mother, and when going to sleep would suck at her mother's breast or finger'.

In certain respects the fear of crossing a bridge is related to the street phobias (A. Katan 1937), but this fear too possesses intrinsic peculiarities. Friedman (1952), in his clinical study of the role of the bridge, revealed the dominance of genital conflicts, for the anxiety ordinarily referred to a sexual danger, œdi-

pal in origin, which was represented manifestly as the collapse of the bridge, at other times as a peril to be encountered on the other shore. The more general study brought out nongenital components of the anxiety, especially those that related to death and destruction. Friedman writes: 'The neurotic fear of bridges and of the opposite shore, which is so pathognomonic of some patients with sexual disturbances, was perhaps best described in the free associations of a patient who suffered from a true gephyrophobia. He defined it as a fear that he would cross into an unknown, dangerous country, where he might be ripped apart or devoured by prehistoric animals. One might speculate whether this oral connotation of the intrauterine fantasy may not be an underlying motivation of the neurotic fear of bridges. Perhaps further clinical study will substantiate this idea and contribute to our understanding of the symbolic contents of such phobias and dreams.'

My experience does not permit me to add to Friedman's cautious comments. However, the oral danger to which he refers was evident in a young woman cited in my paper, The Body as Phallus. In adolescence she had had a bridge phobia, and in a dream she found herself pursued by a man and tried to escape from him by pulling herself hand over hand across a chasm or canyon on a taut rope. Her associations showed that her body represented a phallus, but her fear of falling was expressed in oral terms. She referred to being swallowed and sucked in by the waters beneath; the chasm yawned and gaped for her. Thus she demonstrated that her fear of being deflorated (and impregnated) was condensed with a fear of dying and being eaten up. Two anxieties were fused, one of them genital, the other oral. Yet the presumed safety of the opposite shore must be the safety of the protective mother, and the passage across the canyon a transition to a renewed peaceful sleep. Chasms and canyons are splits, and the first split that is thoroughly perceived by the young child is the split between waking and sleep.

This primal split reminds us that the present application of dream psychology concepts to the neuroses is far from complete.

The phobias offered themselves for study because of their key position in our theory of anxiety and symptom-formation, but we have necessarily omitted more than a passing mention of the mechanism of repression. Is it too soon to suspect that more consideration of sleep and the dream will bring illumination to this topic? The dream is a return from repression, and the earliest defense may well be not denial, as some have suggested, but the forerunner of denial, namely, going to sleep; for sleep and repression bring *tabulae rasae* to the mind. A comparison of sleep and the dream with the manifestations of conversion hysteria and hypnosis, in line with the method illustrated in this paper, might be useful. It would unite one of the oldest of Freud's findings (the essential similarity of dream and neurosis) with one of our latest ego-psychological intentions, the discovering of early forerunners of the mechanisms of defense.

REFERENCES

ABRAHAM, KARL: A Constitutional Basis of Locomotor Anxiety (1913). In: *Selected Papers.* London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psa., 1927.

———: *Zur Psychogenese der Strassenangst im Kindesalter.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., I, 1913a.

ALEXANDER, FRANZ: *The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality* (1927). New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1930.

BONAPARTE, MARIE: *Edgar Poe.* Paris: Denöel et Steele, 1933.

COHN, FRANZ: *Aus der Analyse eines Falles von Strassenangst.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XIV, 1928.

DEUTSCH, HELENE: *The Genesis of Agoraphobia.* Int. J. Psa., X, 1929.

———: *Psychoanalysis of the Neuroses.* London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psa., 1933.

FEDERN, PAUL: *Ein Fall von Pavor nocturnus mit subjektiven Lichterscheinungen.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., I, 1913.

———: *Some Variations in Ego Feeling.* Int. J. Psa., VII, 1926.

FENICHEL, OTTO: *The Dread of Being Eaten.* Int. J. Psa., X, 1929.

———: *The Symbolic Equation: Girl=Phallus* (1936). This QUARTERLY, XVIII, 1949.

———: *Remarks on the Common Phobias.* This QUARTERLY, XIII, 1944.

———: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.* New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1945.

FERENCZI, SANDOR: Bridge Symbolism and the Don Juan Legend (1922). In: *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis.* London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psa., 1926.

FREUD: *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900). New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931.

———: *General Remarks on Hysterical Attacks* (1909). Coll. Papers, II.

———: *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1904). New York: The Macmillan Co., 1914.

———: *Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis* (1916). London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1922.

———: *Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams* (1916). Coll. Papers, IV.

———: *The Problem of Anxiety* (1926). New York: The Psa. Quarterly Press and W. W. Norton and Co., 1936.

———: *Analysis Terminable and Interminable* (1937). Coll. Papers, V.

FRIEDMAN, PAUL: *The Bridge: A Study in Symbolism.* This QUARTERLY, XXI, 1952.

GERÖ, GEORGE: *Zum Problem der oralen Fixierung.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXIV, 1939.

HARTMANN, HEINZ; KRIS, ERNST; LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M.: Some Psychoanalytic Comments on 'Culture and Personality'. In: *Psychoanalysis and Culture.* Essays in Honor of Géza Róheim. Edited by Wilbur, George B. and Muensterberger, Warner. New York: International Universities Press, 1951.

ISAKOWER, OTTO: *A Contribution to the Pathopsychology of Phenomena Associated with Falling Asleep.* Int. J. Psa., XIX, 1938.

JANET, PIERRE: *Les obsessions et la psychasthénie* (1903). Paris: Alcan, 1919.

JONES, ERNEST: *Papers on Psychoanalysis* (1912). Third edition. New York: Wm. Wood and Co., 1923, p. 256.

KATAN, ANNY ANGEL: *The Role of 'Displacement' in Agoraphobia* (1937). Int. J. Psa., XXXII, 1951.

KLEIN, MELANIE: *The Psychoanalysis of Children.* London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psa., 1932.

LEWIN, BERTRAM D.: *The Body as Phallus.* This QUARTERLY, II, 1933.

———: *Claustrophobia.* This QUARTERLY, IV, 1935.

———: *Inferences from the Dream Screen.* Int. J. Psa., XXIX, 1948.

———: *The Psychoanalysis of Elation.* New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1950.

LORAND, SANDOR: *On the Meaning of Losing Teeth in Dreams.* This QUARTERLY, XVII, 1948.

MITTELMANN, BELA: *Ego Function and Dreams.* This QUARTERLY, XVIII, 1949.

NUNBERG, HERMAN: *Problems of Bisexuality as Reflected in Circumcision.* London: Imago Publishing Co., 1949.

OBERNDORF, CLARENCE P.: *Analysis of a Claustrophobia.* Medical Record, 1915.

———: *Submucous Resection as a Castration Symbol.* Int. J. Psa., X, 1929.

SADGER, ISIDOR: *Haut-, Schleimhaut-, und Muskelerotik.* Jahrb. f. psa. Forschungen, III, 1911.

SILBERER, HERBERT: *Symbolik des Erwachens und Schwellensymbolik überhaupt.* Jahrb. f. psa. Forschungen, III, 1911.

TAUSK, VIKTOR: *On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in Schizophrenia* (1919). This QUARTERLY, II, 1933.

WEISS, EDOARDO: *Agoraphobia and Its Relation to Hysterical Attacks and to Traumas.* Int. J. Psa., XVI, 1935.

———: *Agorafobia: Isterismo d'Angoscia.* Rome: Cremonese, 1936.

WESTPHAL, A.: *Agoraphobie.* Archiv. f. Psychiat., III, 1872.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Genesis of Antisocial Acting Out in Children and Adults

Adelaide M. Johnson & S. A. Szurek

To cite this article: Adelaide M. Johnson & S. A. Szurek (1952) The Genesis of Antisocial Acting Out in Children and Adults, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 323-343, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925884

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925884

THE GENESIS OF ANTISOCIAL ACTING OUT IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS

BY ADELAIDE M. JOHNSON, M.D. (ROCHESTER, MINNESOTA) AND S. A. SZUREK, M.D. (SAN FRANCISCO)

Previous publications by the authors on antisocial acting out are to be found mainly in the literature of child psychiatry. The present article, synthesizing concepts developed by the authors for over a decade, is addressed to a wider psychoanalytic audience.

THE PROBLEM

The character problems under consideration are those of young children and adolescents in conflict with parents or some other external authority because of an acting out of forbidden, antisocial impulses. There is no generalized weakness of the superego, but rather a superego defect in circumscribed areas of behavior, which may be termed 'superego lacunae'. For instance, a child may be entirely dependable in virtually every sphere of activity, regular in school attendance and honest in his work; but he engages in petty stealing, or perhaps in serious sexual acting out. Mild-to-severe neurotic conflicts usually accompany such superego lacunae. We are not immediately concerned with the sociologically determined delinquency seen in slum areas, in which individual superego defects are not involved. Nor shall we discuss delinquent children reared in institutions, deprived of a sustained object relationship, although some understanding of such children may be derived from our discussion.

Adelaide M. Johnson, M.D.: From the Section of Psychiatry, Mayo Clinic, Rochester, Minnesota; Member of the Staff, Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis.

S. A. Szurek, M.D.: From the University of California School of Medicine; State of California Department of Mental Hygiene; The Langley Porter Clinic, San Francisco.

Work represented in this paper was carried out primarily at the Chicago Institute for Juvenile Research, University of Illinois, and the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis.

The thesis which emerges is 'that the parents may find vicarious gratification of their own poorly-integrated forbidden impulses in the acting out of the child, through their unconscious permissiveness or inconsistency toward the child in these spheres of behavior. The child's superego lacunae correspond to similar [unconscious] defects of the parents' superego which in turn were derived from the conscious or unconscious permissiveness of their own parents'*(1)*. These conclusions are the results of the collaborative study and treatment of the child and the significant parent or parents, as reported briefly by Szurek in 1942 *(2)* and by Johnson *(3)* in a paper given at the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society in 1947. These authors have elaborated the concepts involved in their chapters in Searchlights on Delinquency *(1, 4)*, from which chapters the authors have borrowed extensively in the present paper, with the generous consent of International Universities Press, Inc.

CONCEPTS OF DELINQUENCY

The literature reveals a variety of descriptions and discussions of the etiology of such circumscribed superego defects. Reich *(5)* coined the term 'impulsive character'. Alexander *(6)* conceived of the need for self-punishment as a motive for acting out. It is granted that these patients frequently suffer from neurotic guilt. Yet, the question remains of why the resolution of guilt was sought specifically in acting out.

Schmideberg *(7)* believed that people who act out their conflicts have a greater constitutional inability to tolerate frustration than the more inhibited persons. Greenacre *(8)* reported in some detail a number of cases of psychopathic personality, but without concomitant study of the parents. She found that the fathers of such patients were usually ambitious and prominent, and the mothers usually frivolous and superficial, giving little attention to the home. She discussed the interrelationships of such parents with the child in respect to its superego development, but did not report defects in the parents' superegos.

Aichhorn *(9)* very early lent great impetus to investigations in this area. He, as well as Healy and Bronner *(10)*, stated that some antisocial children have identified themselves with the gross ethical distortions of their parents. These observers noted such gross pathological correlations as forgery in the parent and stealing in the child. They did not note the subtle unconscious correlations described here. Healy and Bronner attributed the child's inability to develop a normal superego to the coldness and rejection of the parents, so that one child in a family may steal and another will not, depending upon the one being unloved and the other loved. Other authors stress the patient's receiving insufficient love and warmth, so that a strong positive identification with loving parents is impossible. This lack of love is considered by them to be the basic cause of superego defects. Even granting that unloved children may not develop a normal superego, it does not follow that coldness of parents alone can lead to the superego lacunae under discussion. Some very cold parents can create such great guilt or need to make restitution to a needed object that a very punitive superego is developed in the child. It is equally true that there are also relatively warm parents whose child may act out antisocially.

PARENTAL ATTITUDES

What constitutes 'love' and 'warmth' needs definition. If these include *rationalization* by a parent of guilt about his own sado-masochistic impulses, and appear as 'gentleness' or 'indulgence', the child experiences them as condoning, as acceptance of his impulse. Firmness with respect to the *form* of expression of the child's egocentric or revengeful impulse is to be distinguished from sadistic suppression. Firmness bespeaks a parent who has learned how to gratify all his essential egocentric impulses *nondestructively* to himself and to others; such firmness may be devoid of masochistic or sadistic coloring and distortion. The stable parent has learned how his own interests may either eventually be gratified in some measure, or how to choose which interest is pre-eminent, while clearly recognizing and accepting

the consequences of his choice. He may even have learned how all of his major goals may be reached in some creative course of action. He may have the capacity to experiment before committing all his energies to any goal, and continue flexibly to search out the way to satisfaction of his major needs and wishes.

Such parental attitudes provide a child with various experiences encouraging the child in turn to anticipate: 1, that his basic impulses are gratifiable, at least eventually; 2, that his disappointment, rage or revengefulness at delays to his satisfactions are understood and accepted as natural reactions, but that their *form* of expression may invite retaliation from others; and 3, that the parent will patiently respect such reactive feelings, prolonged though they may be. In short, there are, most generally, ways of obtaining sensual and other satisfactions at appropriate times and places, with appropriate people. Pertinent and amplified discussions of the concepts of 'love', 'guilt' and 'restitution' have been presented elsewhere by one of us (Johnson [*11*]).

STUDIES OF PARENT AND CHILD

In 1939, the present authors and colleagues *(12, 13)* at the Institute for Juvenile Research of the University of Illinois observed, in their collaborative therapy studies of neurotic children and their parents, that the parental neurosis often provided the unconscious impetus to the child's neurosis. It seemed logical, therefore, in the cases of the delinquents, to seek some possible links between the superego of parents and the child, even when the parents themselves were not known to act out. As a result of this work, Szurek *(2)* described the psychopathic personality briefly as a defect in personality organization, a defect in the individual conscience. He also defined its genesis. He clearly distinguished between 1, the psychopathic personality, and 2, the delinquency in slum areas, which is on a sociologic basis, and does not involve individual superego defects. He stated:

Clinical experience with children showing predominant behavior which is a problem to others and *concurrent therapeutic effort with the parent* leaves the impression that the genesis of some of the human characteristics included in the definition of psychopathic personality is no greater mystery than other syndromes in psychopathology. Almost literally, in no instance in which adequate psychiatric therapeutic study of *both* parent and child has been possible has it been difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to reconstruct the chief dynamics of the situation. Regularly the more important parent—usually the mother, although the father is always in some way involved—has been seen *unconsciously* to encourage the amoral or antisocial behavior of the child. The neurotic needs of the parent whether of excessively dominating, dependent or erotic character are vicariously gratified by the behavior of the child, or in relation to the child. Such neurotic needs of the parent exist either because of some current inability to satisfy them in the world of adults, or because of the stunting experiences in the parent's own childhood—or more commonly, because of a combination of both of these factors. Because these parental needs are unintegrated, unconscious and unacceptable to the parent himself, the child in every instance is sooner or later frustrated and thus experiences no durable satisfactions.

Interestingly enough, Ferenczi *(14)*, in an address on Confusion of Tongues Between the Adult and the Child (read in 1932 but not published until 1949) arrived at a similar point of view. His sound concepts of the etiology of character and superego disturbances in children were based upon deductions from his experiences with the transference and countertransference of patient and analyst, rather than upon clinical evidence derived from the study of child and parent. Emch *(15)* explored similar concepts, independently and productively.

The unwitting employment of the child to act out for the parent his own poorly integrated and forbidden impulses was observed by us at all economic and educational levels, with the frequency, regularity and predictability of a well-defined psychological mechanism determining human behavior.

SELECTION OF THE SCAPEGOAT

The subtle manner in which one child was unconsciously selected from several children as the scapegoat to act out for the parent was striking. Analytic study of the significant parent showed unmistakably the unique significance of this child to the parent, and the tragic pattern of parent and child moving inexorably in a fatal march of events, usually unconsciously. A profound sympathy was evoked for these consciously well-intentioned parents, whose unconscious needs were unwittingly inviting disaster upon the family.

A striking illustration of 'scapegoat selection' occurred in several families whose children included an adopted child. The common pattern was a parental acting out through the adopted child, which conveniently provided the rationalization of inheritance to account for the delinquency.

In other instances, parental guilt, born of unconscious hostility toward one child, made firmness and fair-dealing difficult. Parental vacillations appeared to be critical factors in the genesis of specific superego lacunae.

The sources of such hostility of the parent are varied. The child may have become unconsciously a rival for the indulgence of the other parent. The child may represent a parent's sibling with whom the parent has unresolved sibling rivalry. The child may be born or reared at times of high tension between parents. Numerous other factors and combinations of factors operate.

Frequently a dual purpose is served: not only is the parent's forbidden impulse acted out vicariously by the unfortunate child, but this very acting out, in a manner distinctly foreign to the conscious wishes of the parent, provides a channel for the hostile, destructive impulses of the parent toward the child. Often, parents may reveal blatantly the child's acting out to schools, family friends and neighbors, in a way most destructive of the child's reputation. This becomes a source of the greatest rage in the child. An adolescent girl recently hanged herself because her mother, missing ten dollars, telephoned the school authorities to search the girl's purse.

Thus, the parents' unconscious condoning of the acting out of asocial impulses by the child may serve the two-fold purpose of allowing the parent vicarious gratification of forbidden impulses, as well as expression of hostile, destructive impulses toward the child. This hostility in the parent is doubly directed: inwardly, toward the parent's own ego and outwardly, toward the child.

Similarly, the child, usually unwittingly, exposes the parents to all degrees of suffering through his acting out. One mother, revealing that her six-year-old daughter's constant masturbation at home and at school was a repetition of her own childhood experience, was frightened lest her husband learn of the latter. To observe her child flagrantly masturbating was thus doubly agonizing. The acting out may often be an exaggerated portrayal of the unconscious impulses of the parent. Again, the child's hostility is doubly directed: toward his own ego as well as toward the egos of his parents.

EARLY SUPEREGO RIGIDITY

We must first understand the behavior of a well-integrated parent, and the subtle conscious and unconscious ways in which this behavior directs the child's superego development, in order to be able to recognize the evidences of destructive sanctions in less integrated parents. To be sure, the dissolution of the œdipus conflict puts the definitive seal on the superego, but it is well to be aware of all the preœdipal and œdipal subtleties in the family involved in this development. To the child in the early and middle latency period, there may be alternative modes of reacting on an ego level, but when the superego is involved the child normally is reared as if there could be *no* alternative reaction in regard to the suppression of the impulses to theft, murder, truancy, and so on. The well-integrated, mature mother who tells a child to do something does not immediately check to see if it has been done, or suggest beforehand that if it is not done there will be serious consequences.

Such constant checking or such warning means to the child that there is an alternative to the mother's order and an alternate

image of *him* in the mother's mind. Identification with the parent does not consist merely of identification with the manifest behavior of the parent. It necessarily includes a sharing by the child of the parent's conscious and unconscious concept of the child as one who is loved and honest, or sometimes unloved or dishonest. It is essential to appreciate this fact if we are to understand the etiology of superego defects and plan a rational therapy. Angry orders, suspiciousness, or commands colored by feelings of guilt, convey to the child the doubtful alternative image of him in the parent's mind. The mature mother expects the thing to be done, and later if she finds the child has sidestepped her wishes, she insists without guilt on her part that it be done. The mother must have this undoubting, firm, unconscious assurance that her child will soon make her intention his own in accordance with her own image of him. This, however, produces a rather rigid and inflexible attitude in the young child. According to Fenichel *(16)*, 'After the dissolution of the œdipus complex . . . the superego is at first rigid and strict . . . and . . . later in normal persons it becomes more amenable to the ego, more plastic and *more sensible*'.

In adolescence the superego is normally still fairly rigid and the child is greatly disturbed when adults express doubts about its probity. Nothing angers adolescents more than to be warned about or accused of indiscretions of which they were not guilty. Such lack of faith in them threatens their repressive defenses, lowers their self-esteem and weakens their assurance that they will do what is right. It suggests an alternative code of behavior which at that age frightens them.

Let us examine the evidence for the hypotheses developed as revealed in some relatively uncomplicated cases of superego lacunae, although still recognizing that a child may evolve and employ character defenses constructed of multiple determinants.

TRUANCY

How does truancy originate? Parental coldness and rejection are insufficient causes, contrary to some authors; these are nonspecific stimuli. The child of six, sensing coldness and rejection,

may say angrily: 'You don't love me—nobody loves me—I hate you all!' Then, and not infrequently, the specific stimulus may be applied by the parent: 'Very well! Why don't you just pack your bag and go live some place else if you think we're so awful?' We have observed that some parents even go so far as to pack the child's suitcase—a terrifying experience for the child. The suggestion to 'run away' comes more frequently from inside the home than outside, for rarely do small children tell their friends that their parents are 'mean', or get suggestions from other children to leave home.

How an adult can initiate 'running away' is found in the illuminating account of Aichhorn *(9)*, who deliberately resorted to such provocation as a technique of treatment. In managing the transference he purposely used a simple suggestive device to provoke a boy to run away from the institution. His aim was to establish a positive contact with the adolescent, in which he had been unsuccessful. This very narcissistic boy, with no positive feeling for Aichhorn, constantly complained about the institution. Aichhorn made subtle suggestions about the attractiveness of the outside world and an hour later the boy ran away, as Aichhorn had anticipated. In keeping with the therapist's predictions, some days later the boy returned, having found the outside world uninviting. He entered at once into a positive relationship with Aichhorn.

Six-year-old Stevie is a good example of the parent's need for vicarious gratification. The child had been running away since he was four. His father knew an inordinate amount of detail concerning the boy's episodes of exploration. This struck us as very significant. This father reported that during these same two years he himself had been forced to discontinue his work as driver of a transcontinental truck, a job in which he had revelled. His present job confined him to the city. It was striking to observe this father asking Stevie to tell of his most recent escapade, and, when the child guiltily hesitated, supplying an intriguing reminder. The account obviously fascinated the father, who eagerly prompted the child from time to time. Then suddenly the father angrily cut off the child

with, 'That's enough, Stevie; now do you see what I mean, Doctor?' Stevie could not fail to sense his father's keen interest and pleasure in his tale upon each return home, despite the inevitable whipping. The father was a kind, well-intentioned man who rightly feared for his little son's safety; but he was quite unconscious of the fact that the stimulus of his own thwarted need to travel was easily conveyed to the small, bright boy of whom the father said: 'Stevie's really a good kid—he would follow me around the top of a wall fifty feet high'. A smile of tacit but unwitting approval often belies a parent's complaints of impulsive and daring behavior of the child brought for treatment.

Helpless resignation in one area of the child's behavior and firm conviction in another area are common among the parents under consideration. On the one hand, effective action regarding a child's temper tantrums may seem hopeless; on the other hand, there may be unquestioned prohibition of the child's violence to a sibling or the destruction of objects in the house.

Summarizing, we found that careful examination of parents and children in cases of the child's running away revealed that it was the parents who unconsciously provided the specific stimulus for the defections, impelled by such motives as a need for vicarious gratification, or hostility, or both.

STEALING

Similar mechanisms operate in petty stealing by children. A woman patient, in analysis for nine months, became very angry at her nine-year-old daughter who was detected stealing money from the teacher's desk. The patient stated that she knew Margaret had occasionally taken nickels from her purse since she was six or seven but had said nothing, believing that Margaret would 'outgrow it'; besides, 'it was never serious, so the less said the better'. The mature mother, we have observed, does not anticipate trouble or constantly check up on her child. But neither does she dismiss a significant transgression as unimportant; instead, she resolves the problem promptly without

anxiety or guilt. She is neither the nagging, checking detective, nor the permissive, lax condoner.

During the same analytic hour, the patient recounted a recent dream, in which she stole a beautiful object from an elegant store. The therapist remarked upon the patient's failure to project the theft upon some other culprit. 'Perhaps you are generally permissive of minor thefts?' For the first time the patient told of her own frequent stealing in childhood and adolescence; her mother had always protected her.

Three generations revealed themselves: our patient, after acquiring considerable insight, clearly recognized her own mother's countless little deceptions and covert permissiveness with the two grandchildren. Hitherto unnoticed, her mother's deviousness now carried meaning in the light of her own new understanding. The grandmother's visits were curtailed until the grandchildren were older. As the analysis progressed, the patient was able to take a definite stand with her daughter, without anxiety or vacillation, without the permissiveness born of the need for vicarious gratification. The child stopped stealing. Formerly unhappy and unpopular, she became a favorite and outstanding pupil at school.

This mother's behavior reveals an attitude commonly observed in parents of children who steal. The parent whose own superego is defective will say, 'My child will outgrow this fault'. Often, it is the parent who is not involved in the acting out who finally insists upon treatment for the child. 'He will outgrow it' is the permissive protective attitude that keeps the problem active. Many such parents, whose own poorly integrated prohibitions permit them to overlook slight offenses, suddenly react with guilt and alarm at the first suggestion of criticism from outside the home, with righteous accusations and punishment of their child. The child is confused and angry at the parental betrayal. If he is not too ashamed or frightened, he may give voice to his recollections of similar parental deceptions, initiating a vicious cycle of hostile blackmail and mutual corruption.

Another illustration was seen in the adopted adolescent son of the head cashier in a large manufacturing concern. The son was brought for treatment because of stealing. The thefts were revealed when the mother surreptitiously secured, actually stole, the key to the boy's diary and discovered a well-ordered bookkeeping system of amounts extracted from guests' purses balanced against his own expenditures. The mother's duplicity was exceeded by the father's who, scrupulously honest in business, had for two summers confiscated checks the boy received in payment for employment by the father's firm. To the boy, such behavior was not only an outrage, but an obvious sanction for his own predatory behavior.

Many have observed that children and adults with severe compulsive neurotic symptoms, such as intensive handwashing, may also steal repeatedly. Such stealing, or the cleptomania of adults, again denotes the existence of one defect in the superego through which the patient may act out tension. Detailed study of such stealing in our adult patients with a compulsive neurosis shows clearly whence this permission stemmed.

There are many variations on the main theme that deception encourages deception, such as the admonition of the mother who says to the child: 'Here is a dollar, but don't tell your father'. To evaluate integrity as a virtue is difficult for a child who has experienced repeatedly broken promises, made lightly and disregarded without explanation or apology. The 'more sensible' superego of the parent forgets the rigidity of the superego of the six-to-nine-year old to whom such behavior is not 'sensible' but dishonest.

Perhaps the concepts in this section may best be epitomized by the words of a nine-year-old girl who asked the therapist, 'When is my mother going to do her own stealing?'

SEXUAL ABERRATIONS

Sexual aberrations also have become more understandable to us when viewed in the light of the concepts described. In several cases of long-standing overt homosexuality, search has revealed an unwitting fostering of some aberration by one of

the parents. If this be true of patients in conflict and seeking treatment, one can but conjecture how great is the superego defect in cases in which the overt homosexuality arouses little or no conflict and no desire for treatment.

Little boys and girls in the œdipal or earlier stages may insist on being of the opposite sex and wearing the clothes of the opposite sex. Detailed collaborative therapy reveals a fostering influence by one parent, such as that of the mother who gave her six-year-old boy all her cast-off clothes. Interestingly, the boy's desire to be a girl dated from the birth of a favored little sister three years earlier.

A young man of great professional talents had been an overt homosexual for several years, since the age of eighteen, when his mother told him that his father was not her husband. The mother's hostile motivation was clear. The youth's unconscious rage was the immediate potent determinant of his homosexual turning to men as a protection against murdering a woman. The precipitating event occurred in a confused family setting, characterized by distorted adjustments and undue maternal permissiveness since our patient had been a child. His rage at rejection by his real father was rapidly erotized.

We have recently treated two men whose mothers were grossly maladjusted maritally and extravagantly seductive with their sons. The mother of one, twenty years old, said to him when his father was dying, 'Jim, I'm madly in love with you; you are so handsome'. This was but the culmination of years of varying degrees of seduction. The major factor in the patient's passive homosexuality had been the protection afforded by his father against the patient's murdering his mother, even transcending in importance the factor of fear of the father, tremendous as it was. This young man refrained from overt homosexuality only with a great struggle, and came to analysis very disturbed.

A colleague *(17)* treated a homosexual young man whose mother had the adolescent son escort her clandestine lovers home, 'to make things look better'. The boy, aware of every-

thing, erotized his rage toward these men, spiting his mother as well.

The unconscious sanctions of parents and their seductions of sons and daughters into homosexuality are revealed by their guilty, anxious, angry interrogations into the children's early conscious or unconscious homosexual play and explorations. Thereby may be stubbornly fixed what otherwise might have been a transient stage of normal growth. The heterosexual or homosexual acting out of a child is thus parentally guided.

A depressed, forty-two-year-old woman came to consultation complaining primarily of the sadistic promiscuity of her twenty-year-old son. Since his adolescence, the mother had intently absorbed the minutest details of his accounts of intimacies with girls. The patient's husband was a beaten and submissive man. The sources of her ambivalent seductiveness with her son were easily adduced. Her own father was a Don Juan. From her early adolescence he came to her bedroom nightly to fondle her and even made attempts to enter her bed. At the first such instance, the patient sought protection from her mother. But the mother did not dare reproach the father, 'lest he kill her'. From the father, to the patient, to her son, sanctions of the forbidden are evident in three generations. The son, refusing treatment, will provide still another generation toward the biblical ten.

Among adolescents, whose parents we have also been able to study, we have seen no exhibitionism or voyeurism that has not revealed indubitably from which parent the necessary sanction stemmed. Admittedly, the opportunity to study such parents is limited; they refuse or soon discontinue treatment. Undoubtedly, multiply determined neurotic conflicts contribute to exhibitionism and voyeurism. We have been concerned here only with the immediate mechanism which precipitates acting out.

SANCTIONS FOR ACTING OUT

The fantasies, hopes and fears expressed by parents regarding some behavior of a child is a common and powerful influence

toward healthy or maladapted living. Horrified parental anxiety over some behavior is expressed to the child: 'You are beyond me; I can't handle you any more; if this doesn't stop, you will end in the reform school'. Or, 'You are just like your uncle; he came to a bad end'. Parental fantasy guides the child's course of action.

Mothers who have seriously erred premaritally frequently betray acute anxiety regarding their daughters' behavior on dates. Accusations, detailed questioning and dire warnings, rather than preventing undesirable behavior, constitute unwitting permissions. The overly anxious mother with poorly integrated promiscuous impulses or reaction-formations against sex may function similarly, even though she may never have acted out. The father also may contribute. Exasperating rigidity about dating, with a casual provocative suggestion, often upsets the balance. Only close collaboration between the two therapists of the parent and the child can reveal the unmistakable mutual provocation.

One mother, early in analysis, glossed over an account of sexual acting out as a girl, in which there had been no conscious fear of pregnancy. A year later in her analysis, anxiety developed lest her young daughter '. . . may go with a fast crowd, drink and get into trouble. All adolescent girls do too much sexual playing. One eggs on the other. I will worry about her getting pregnant. A girl cheapens herself. It's degrading. I don't know how to warn her but I must.' The mother's poorly integrated masochistic impulses, partially repressed, were projected to the child. Not consciously fearful of pregnancy herself, she nevertheless feared her child's being cheapened and becoming pregnant. Her fantasies implied both destructiveness to the child as well as vicarious gratification for her own repressed impulses. Eventually, it was revealed that the patient's stepmother, as glamorous as she was unstable, frequently discussed sex, and suggested, 'You will probably be more highly sexed than your stepsister—*and have more trouble!*' The stepmother was subsequently entranced with lurid accounts of the patient's dates. The patient's analysis fortunately progressed, so that the

heritage from the stepmother was not transmitted to the daughter, whose dates no longer aroused undue anxiety.

In the parental voicing of fears for the imagined acts of a child—even of violence—the transmitted image of the act leaves a bolder imprint than the fear of it. An infant on the lap of a social-worker colleague put his hands about her neck. With genuine fright, the mother said, 'I hope my son won't be a killer!' By the age of fifteen, he was. Another mother, reading a news account of a brutal murder, said to her son, 'I'm glad it wasn't you who did it.' His crimes soon eclipsed those of the news story.

Analysts themselves must take care lest they inadvertently provide sanctions for acting out by their patients, be they children or adults. Patients displaying sexual perversions or even more serious antisocial tendencies are sometimes warned that they may act out. Such a warning to a patient with a defective superego can be tragically destructive, ruining the developing structure of the patient's belief in the therapist's ethical concept of him. Warning or questioning without factual justification may be interpreted both as a humiliation and a permission.

We believe such warnings against acting out are to be distinguished clearly from Freud's concept of warning the patient against future acting out *in the transference.* To warn a patient regarding acting out of the transference is entirely different from the warning against antisocial impulses outside the analytic hour. In fact, Freud warned analysts against too rapid mobilization and interpretation of impulses that might be dangerously expressed outside the analytic hour, particularly sadism. A loose and unclear concept of what is meant by 'acting out' has led a number of analysts to carry over Freud's suggestions about 'acting out' in the transference to the 'acting out' in a serious antisocial way.

COLLABORATIVE THERAPY

Except by simultaneous study of parent and child, the concepts presented in this paper could not have been developed, nor

can they otherwise be subjected to further scrutiny. Such studies can be carried out by two collaborating therapists, if they are unambivalent, uncompetitive and entirely coöperative, or by a single skilled therapist experienced in collaborative therapy dealing with both parent and child.

Prior to our appreciation of this principle we failed repeatedly to understand relatively simple cases of acting out, despite frequent treatment periods (four to five hours per week) extended for months or years. Our consistent warmth and affection failed to stay the continued stealing, truancy and sexual acting out.

It is now apparent that any guilt the child may have mustered toward us was readily dissolved by unconscious permissions at home. The child became increasingly confused and fearful of us, and resolved his immediate conflict by discontinuing treatment. Instances of acting out were managed successfully only if we could either treat the significant parent or separate the child from parents during treatment.

Treatment of the parent requires great care. If his role is unconscious, the uncovering of his own problems is a miserable ordeal for him. If the parent has provided conscious sanctions, treatment is usually impossible.

In serious acting out, treatment of the child is futile unless the significant parent is also adequately treated or the child is separated from the home. Treatment otherwise may be not only useless, but dangerous. The untreated parent can and does act out through the child, foisting responsibility upon the therapist, much as parents incriminate heredity in adopted children.

THE ROLE OF GUILT

Guilt, and a need for punishment, have been advanced by Alexander *(18)* and others as a major etiological determinant of antisocial acting out, citing as evidence the frequency with which such acts are rigged to facilitate detection. While examples are numerous, our experience has not borne out this concept of etiology. It is our impression that the desire to be

caught is a groping for protection against committing even worse offenses which might bring down extreme retaliation, even destruction. The sequence does not appear to be guilt causing acting out so as to be caught, which assuages guilt. Rather, it is unwitting parental prompting which caused acting out, with a fostering of detection aimed at checking more serious future acting out with major dreaded penalties.

The fear displayed by an apprehended delinquent child only simulates the genuine anxiety of an internalized conscience—neurotic guilt. On the contrary, we have found that such fear frequently stems from anticipated punishment, with no guilt coloring.

Failure to appreciate the distinction by the analyst impressed with the apparent guilt of the offender may even foster further offenses by an immediate search for sources of unconscious guilt. There is unconscious guilt in abundance in the cases under discussion, as in all neurotic personalities. A tide of welling hostility against a young sibling may be effectively dammed by defenses. A rent in those defenses, created by unconscious parental permissiveness for a specific form of acting out, may provide an outlet for the emotional energy. Thus forbidden impulses derived from a variety of neurotic conflicts may find expression in stealing, arson, truancy or worse, depending upon the nature of the sanctions. Very commonly, great guilt about sex is acted out in stealing, given appropriate parental permission.

These concepts indicate the error of probing for hidden guilt as the first approach to delinquents. With the rent in the defenses unsealed, the immediate result may be an increased impetus to act out with even greater seriousness through the permitted, though antisocial, channel. The first therapeutic efforts should be directed toward repairing the superego lacuna. In an adolescent who has great guilt about hostility toward siblings, and who unconsciously feels permitted to steal, unless the superego defect of stealing has been adequately managed, it is dangerous to mobilize the neurotic conflict with siblings,

for the acting out may then increase. Only later is it safe to proceed with a thorough analysis.

THERAPY

We cannot here detail the therapeutic procedures employed. The broad outlines may be indicated and have been drawn in part in the preceding discussion.[1]

Effective therapy necessitates the development of a positive and usually dependent attitude toward the therapist, with whom the patient may identify as an ego ideal.

The patient first must be made guilty and neurotic in the area of his acting out. The superego lacuna must be filled. In the process of arousing guilt with neuroticism about the previously unrestrained impulse, therapy continues. It culminates in analysis of the patient's conflicts.

Ideally, the final result should include an independence of the therapist and be characterized by a consciously discriminating, reality-oriented ego function supplanting the superego lacuna, and a freedom from the former self-destructive, rebellious impulsiveness.

THE 'CAUSE' OF ACTING OUT

Science can seldom ascribe any phenomenon to a single cause. Our goal has been to emphasize a major cause of antisocial behavior while still recognizing that the antisocial child reared in a family is the product of a multiplicity of variables of mixed quality and quantity.

Scientific proof of causation is not satisfied by demonstrating the invariable presence of the suspected cause (unwitting parental permissiveness) whenever the effect (antisocial behavior of children) is observed. It must also be demonstrated that the suspected cause does not occur unless the effect is also seen. This, too, has been our experience. Parental permissions have never been revealed without ultimate antisocial behavior in at least one 'scapegoat' child. The superego lacuna of the

[1] For further discussion of therapy, see *Searchlights on Delinquency (1, 4).*

child has always been traceable to a specific parental permission. Our thesis is not *post hoc ergo propter hoc.* The enmeshing interplay of parent and child in the affected area bespeaks more than a fortuitous time sequence.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this paper the authors have assimilated material from their experience and publications since 1942, dealing with the etiology of acting out antisocially. The observations apply equally to the young 'delinquent' or the 'psychopathic personality' of later years, who is etiologically a delinquent grown older. By means of collaborative therapy of children and parents the authors have observed that the parents may unwittingly seduce the child into acting out the parents' own poorly integrated forbidden impulses, thereby achieving vicarious gratification. A specific superego defect in the child is seen as a duplication of a similar distortion in the organization of a parent's own personality. The outcome is doubly destructive toward the child's and the parent's ego organization, unless adequate therapy of both is provided.

REFERENCES

1. JOHNSON, ADELAIDE M.: Sanctions for Superego Lacunae of Adolescents. In: *Searchlights on Delinquency.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1949, pp. 225–245.
2. SZUREK, S. A.: *Notes on the Genesis of Psychopathic Personality Trends.* Psychiatry, V, 1942, pp. 1–6.
3. JOHNSON, ADELAIDE M.: *Sanctions for Superego Lacunae.* Read before the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society, March 25, 1947.
4. SZUREK, S. A.: Some Impressions From Clinical Experience With Delinquents. In: *Searchlights on Delinquency. Loc cit.,* pp. 115–127.
5. REICH, WILHELM: *Der triebhafte Charakter.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1925.
6. ALEXANDER, FRANZ: *The Neurotic Character.* Int. J. Psa., XI, 1930, pp. 292–311.
7. SCHMIDEBERG, MELITTA: *The Mode of Operation of Psychoanalytic Therapy.* Int. J. Psa., XIX, 1938, pp. 310–320.
8. GREENACRE, PHYLLIS: *Conscience in the Psychopath.* Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry, XV, 1945, pp. 495–509.
9. AICHHORN, AUGUST: *Wayward Youth.* New York: Viking Press, 1935.
10. HEALY, WILLIAM AND BRONNER, AUGUSTA: *New Light on Delinquency and Its Treatment.* Inst. of Human Relations Publication. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936.

11. JOHNSON, ADELAIDE M.: *Some Etiologic Aspects of Repression, Guilt and Hostility.* This QUARTERLY, XX, 1951, pp. 511–527.

12. SZUREK, S. A., JOHNSON, ADELAIDE AND FALSTEIN, EUGENE: *Collaborative Psychiatric Treatment of Parent-Child Problems.* Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry, XII, 1942, pp. 511–516.

13. JOHNSON, ADELAIDE, FALSTEIN, E. I., SZUREK, S. A. AND SVENDSEN, MARGARET: *School Phobia.* Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry, XI, 1941, pp. 702–711.

14. FERENCZI, SÁNDOR: *Confusion of Tongues Between the Adult and the Child.* Int. J. Psa., XXX, 1949, pp. 225–230.

15. EMCH, MINNA: *On 'The Need to Know' as Related to Identification and Acting Out.* Int. J. Psa., XXV, 1944, pp. 13–19.

16. FENICHEL, OTTO: *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1945, pp. 468–469.

17. KOLB, L. C.: Personal communication to the authors.

18. ALEXANDER, FRANZ, FRENCH, THOMAS M. AND OTHERS: *Psychoanalytic Therapy: Principles and Application.* New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1946.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Features From a Case of Homosexuality

Hilde Lewinsky

To cite this article: Hilde Lewinsky (1952) Features From a Case of Homosexuality, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 344-354, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925885

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925885

Published online: 05 Dec 2017.

FEATURES FROM A CASE OF HOMOSEXUALITY

BY HILDE LEWINSKY (NEW YORK)

A man, thirty-six years old, short and slender, had been overtly homosexual since he was sixteen. In military service he had been for three years a prisoner of war. He got married shortly after his release and had a son, now three years old. Before marriage, the patient had had intercourse with prostitutes several times, mainly to prove his normality to his male friends. After the first fortnight of marriage, he had had no physical relationship with his wife. The birth of his child was extremely important to him as it helped to maintain his urgent need to be considered normal. He nevertheless loved his son from birth as a narcissistic image of himself. If, he said (having lived for many years in Egypt), the child had been a girl he would have found it 'normal' to divorce his wife.

This man sought treatment because he was continually depressed and suffered from attacks of anxiety. He had a very bad conscience about his relationship with his wife. Superficially, he was anxious because of the legal consequences of apprehension in his homosexual practices: whenever he saw a policeman he became tense. He slept poorly, became anxious in the dark or when alone at home, was very fearful of cats and of burglars.

His craving for homosexuality was extremely urgent, and this he attributed to a great need to be appreciated. Every frustration in his social relationships led to homosexuality, as similarly in early childhood he would masturbate to comfort himself.

His depression, anxiety, and narcissistic choice of love objects, combined with greed for being appreciated, place him in that group of oral types whom Fenichel described as *selbstgefühlsfixiert*. This fixation and the need to prove his

Read at the British Psychoanalytic Society, February 15, 1950.

normality led to some curious contradictions. His anxieties and phobias would characterize him as a timid man; but to others he seemed to be very daring. His disregard of danger is illustrated by the fact that when a prisoner of war he went twice out of bounds, once alone, to get a good meal at the nearest village. If discovered he would have been severely punished if not shot at sight. For him it was a game, not taking the threat of death at all seriously. When taken prisoner, he demanded time to put on his boots—very helpful to him during the long ensuing marches but involving the risk of being dangerously misinterpreted by his captors.

He was the fifth of seven siblings. Into mid-puberty he remained attached to his nurse, and up to that age he was usually dirty and unkempt. Later he became very clean and meticulous of his appearance.

Equal in intensity to the strength of his homosexuality were his attachment to his eldest sister and his hostility toward his eldest brother. He had successfully indulged his disinclination to work, and avoided any kind of discipline. He was addicted to gambling at cards and dog racing, suffered from a compulsory need to weigh himself several times daily, had an overpowering fear of dental treatment, and a tendency to head-colds, coughs and occasional deafness; also a great reluctance to wear his spectacles although very myopic.

The psychiatrist he consulted sent him to an analyst without giving him much hope, expressing to the patient his opinion that 'the leopard cannot change his spots'. At the start of his analysis the patient would seek out two or three homosexual partners daily, usually in public lavatories, his sexual practice consisting mainly of mutual phallic and anal masturbation, and, occasionally, fellatio. He had formerly also performed active pederasty, but recently had been unable to accomplish it (confirming, incidentally, Anna Freud's observation that there are as many sexual disturbances in homosexuality as in heterosexuality). This failure may be regarded as a relative impotence deriving from an unconscious fear of castration. Havelock Ellis in his studies of sexual inversion concluded that '. . . a

feeble sexual energy adapts itself more easily to homosexual relationships, in which there is no definite act to be accomplished, than to normal relationships'.[1] Originally the patient had relationships only with men of his own age or younger, having a horror of elderly men and especially of men who wore glasses. During a phase of his analysis he had relations with elderly men, some of whom wore glasses (father and brother).

He showed his wife very openly how much he disliked her. He refused her every request and for days would not speak to her. He was keen to make her believe that he had numerous affairs with other women. He continued, however, to sleep in a double bed with her, which gave him countless opportunities to push her away, to shudder at her touch and withdraw conspicuously. One reason for sleeping with her was the recurrence of states of anxiety at which times he was very needful of her presence—a fact that he was careful to conceal from her. He had got engaged to be married during a thunderstorm of which he was very frightened, and was relieved to hold her hand and to be held by her. The only obligation toward her which he fulfilled regularly was to wind her wrist watch every evening.

During his analysis the frequency of his homosexual practices decreased rapidly. He promised himself several times to give up homosexuality altogether, and he succeeded in refraining for a maximum of ten days. These promises were interpreted as being made by him partly as a defense against further analytic searching. It also became quite clear that he wanted me to forbid homosexual relationships. He would then probably have felt able to rebel and discontinue the analysis. During the first periods of his abstinence, he had uncontrollable impulses to masturbate. The urge overcame him during the day when he was alone in his office. Having succumbed to his desire, he became severely depressed and felt great remorse. He was astonished at this reaction because he had not been

[1] Ellis, Havelock: *Studies in the Psychology of Sex.* Volume II, *Sexual Inversion.* Third Revised and Enlarged Edition. Philadelphia: F. A. Davis Co., Publishers, 1915, p. 269.

aware that he condemned masturbation so much more strictly than he did homosexuality. It transpired that an important part of his homosexuality was the avoidance of a prohibition against masturbation: the 'You must not touch your penis' was followed literally, but he got someone else to touch his penis, and he touched not his own but another's penis. Infantile masturbation, abandoned as a result of the threat of castration, had been changed into the desire to touch a penis and to have his own touched—an impulse that could only be fulfilled in a homosexual relationship. Freud, Ferenczi, Fenichel, and others have described homosexuality consequent to severe heterosexual prohibitions and coupled with an incapacity to acknowledge the female genital. In the case of my patient, however, the desire for masturbation makes it a *conditio sine qua non* that the sexual object must be male.

The earliest masturbatory fantasy recollected was of touching the anus and the buttocks of a policeman. In this case the patient was not searching for his own lost or not yet attained masculinity (Anna Freud): he was dispelling the threat of authority by a fantasy of seduction; he attacked authority in its very foundation by seducing it and letting it share in his own guilt. Thus the homosexual seduction of the policeman brought, in the fantasy, the advantage to the patient: 'shared responsibility is halved responsibility'. Fenichel[2] states: 'To seduce somebody to feel an identical sense of guilt is evidently of similar service to the ego, which is burdened by feelings of guilt, as being granted direct external pardon'; furthermore, the loss of authority through the shared masturbation has the symbolic value of castration. This patient's feeling toward his homosexual partners is that he is 'top dog'. He gradually became conscious of his repressed sadism, and reached the point, first, where he became sexually excited by fantasies of hurting the penes of his sexual partners, and later by fantasies of sadistic anal coitus.

During their frequent rows, he would tell his wife that she

[2] Fenichel, Otto: *Perversionen, Psychosen, Charakterstörungen.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1931, p. 183.

could become a prostitute for all he cared. One day, when speaking of his attitude toward his wife, he said: 'I am generous with everyone with the exception of my mother'. That he had meant to say 'with the exception of my wife' was for him the first indication of his fixation to his mother.

As his anxiety subsided, he produced some heterosexual fantasies about a married woman of friendly disposition who, in spite of her own and her husband's wish, had not had any children. She was short and rather obese, and the patient, who was especially interested in her breasts, was sure that she would prefer him sexually to her husband. The sexual fantasy started with sucking the breast—a contrast to his strong aversion to kissing anyone, the only exception being his child whose kiss on the mouth he did not mind. He used this aversion to explain his inability to have heterosexual intercourse. The fantasy of sucking the breast led naturally to associations about his mother, at which point he became very reluctant to go on with the subject. The detail that the woman would prefer him evoked associations of jealousy, rivalry and comparison of his penis with the husband's. Though now in a heterosexual form, an essential feature of this fantasy was again his triumph over another man (father and brother). The patient's wife, who was a virgin when she married, and had remained faithful to him, did not provide this important challenge of another man. These developments were soon re-enacted in the transference by speculations about how I spent my holidays: whether I picked up lovers as he did; that they would be discouraged when I told them that I was a psychoanalyst and when, in my analytic manner, I asked 'why' about everything without answering their questions. The underlying motive of jealousy was clear: he wanted all men in my life to be treated alike. His mother had catered to his father in a special way, and his eldest brother was her favorite.

His competitive striving for superiority became clear in his attitudes when playing poker, usually for rather high stakes. He got the greatest thrill from displaying his winning cards to his opponent—even though it is neither necessary nor cus-

tomary—whenever he had successfully bluffed. He not only won, but also felt that he had humiliated his opponent: 'What's the good', he said heatedly, 'of having the better of someone who does not know it? It's like having homosexual relations with a dead man!' He did not risk this maneuver when he played poker with women, '. . . because women are spiteful, catty and revengeful'.

As he became more interested in women, he was more threatened by men. He felt unable to bluff them successfully at cards; he concluded that men are nasty and make unfriendly remarks.

The patient had no conscious awareness of his fear of castration.[3] For a long time he resisted acknowledging it; his belief that one can get venereal disease only from women did not convince him. His fear of burglars was intensified after he learned that his brother had been the victim of robbery; also it precipitated a relapse into the compulsion to weigh himself several times daily. The patient decided it was not the loss of material possessions he feared but, vaguely, a threat of personal danger; a fear of being shot. His next association was D.S.O. (Distinguished Service Order) which he remembered being rendered in the army: Dick Shot Off! When he tried to imagine a danger to his penis, he could only think vaguely about someone touching it, with the realization that homosexuality for him consisted mainly of such mutual touching. He then recalled an old fantasy in which he coped successfully with burglars by having homosexual relations with them.

It appears in this case that, although the basis of the homosexuality is the usual œdipal fixation, the aim is concentrated on getting rid of his rival or rivals, and proving that the patient is superior. This superiority, conceived unconsciously in terms of the size of the penis, is acted out in the compulsive ritual of weighing himself, and included in his taboo against permitting his penis to be seen by any woman, including his

[3] *Cf.* Fenichel with regard to perversions and screen memories: '. . . homosexuality is the product of specific repression, a product which guarantees the continuation of that repression'. *Ibid.*, p. 29.

wife. As he grew slightly more aware of his interest in women, he found himself acutely embarrassed in the presence of one—a very tall woman, the acknowledged beauty of the neighborhood —whom, in his adolescence, he had wanted to have as his girl, only because of the prestige that would accrue. His associations to his embarrassment in her presence were that she knew him when he was young, unkempt and dirty (like mother, nurse, and his eldest sister who, knowing him as a baby, could not be sexually impressed by him).

He exempted his wife from his generalization that women are spiteful and revengeful, though he had given her abundant provocation. His behavior toward her was identical with his reactions toward his frustrating infantile love objects. He retaliated for the denial of instinctual sexual gratifications in these relationships by turning the tables and rejecting the women who wanted him. He began to feel that he could have intercourse with his wife if she were not his wife. (Infantile incestuous fantasy: 'I could have intercourse with mother, sister, if she were not my mother, sister'.) It became increasingly apparent that his wife was inseparably identified unconsciously with his mother-sister. He would not be able, he mused, to have intercourse with his two sisters-in-law. Another condition, he felt strongly, that would make intercourse with his wife possible was the stipulation that it be 'only once'. (His desire for a second child contributed to the idea of trying it once.) His associations disclosed anal attitudes of refusal to comply in whatever was expected of him. At first it appeared as if the sense of obligation were the main obstacle. Associations showed that there was a vindictive reversal of the childish plea, 'only once'. The need to humiliate the woman by treating her as an occasional prostitute also played a part in this fantasy. Another man, not overtly homosexual—also with a fixation to his mother and sister—had the same fantasy that if he could be gratified by them 'only once' he would be cured of his depression and his fear of death.

One afternoon the patient went home and found his wife and their child in bed together. He felt frustrated, then very

angry, and left the house abruptly to act out a compulsive need for a homosexual relationship. Clearly, his reaction to his wife was based on the assumption that she should conform to his infantile fantasy of the ideal mother's love: she should give everything and demand nothing. The idea that his wife might stop loving him provoked anxious alarm.

His hostile rejection of women was expressed very clearly in the transference. He used to go fairly regularly to a public urinal before each session, either to initiate homosexual activities or to urinate. He maintained that the analysis and the analyst were unimportant to him. He was almost always ten minutes late for appointments during his business hours, and was especially late for one session which fell in his 'own time' (playtime) in the early morning. This hour, furthermore, reminded him of going to his mother's bedroom—to which his associations might be too revealing. During the sessions he was frequently deliberately silent. After each interpretation there was a short silence; then, ignoring what I had said, he would talk about the weather, business, holidays, or homosexual activities. His greatest source of irritation in analysis was the implied request for his associations when parts of dreams or phrases he had used were repeated to him for associations.

It was a humiliating blow to his studied indifference to feel ill and depressed during my summer vacation, and to feel remarkably better the day on which analysis was resumed. He strove valiantly for two days to deny the realization that he needed me—a direct threat to his fantasy of omnipotence. His parents used to go regularly to Egypt for the winter months, leaving the children at home. He actually had had to learn not to care in order to survive. The homosexual practices before the sessions and his tardiness had multiple motivations: first, direct defiance of me; second, defiance of his parents, the fantasy being one of wasting their time and their money and not his own—which astonished the patient himself; third, reduction of his libidinal tension in the transference; also the unconscious hope of making me jealous. The third motivation became clear to the patient after the vacation during which he

had no homosexual relationship. He admitted reluctantly that if the homosexual desire had been more than fleeting he would have satisfied it. On the day of returning to analysis he struggled against a strong desire for homosexuality but gratified it after the analytic session, and again that night after having spent the evening in the company of his mother and his wife.

I called his attention to his avoidance of acknowledging my existence by his precipitate arrivals and departures, by not looking at me, and by his embarrassment whenever he had to face me to pay his fees. He thereupon confessed to a sexual curiosity about women, and to a brief daydream of telephonic television which permitted him to see a woman naked, to which he did not react with his customary feelings of disgust.

His precautionary urination before each session followed an occasion when, during the hour, he had a painful urgency to urinate, and he announced he was not going to have that happen again. He could perceive only dimly that the compulsion to frequent public urinals was a defense against sexual excitement during the analytic session. He had never fully realized that men of his social standing hardly ever use public lavatories, while he only rarely used a private one. At home he was tempted to urinate in the wash basin.

During his prisoner-of-war years, when one might have expected him to have orgies of homosexuality, there was hardly any homosexual activity despite the abundant opportunities (there was no woman before whom to flaunt his disinterest and rejection). He went to a dance and told me he was disappointed that his sister was not present; not that he wanted to dance with her, but to have her see how popular he was with other women. However, when he became aware that any woman—other than his wife—was interested in him sexually, he always felt incredulous: 'It can't be; it's not possible'; also the feeling, 'This is too good to be true'.

He confessed that since his marriage, and despite his great precautions, he regularly soiled his drawers which he washed surreptitiously. It was difficult for him to acknowledge that he was always holding something back. Trying to be more

generous to his wife, he gave her a sum of money and expected her to be overjoyed with his magnanimity. The sum would have been royal when he was a child, quite good in prewar days, but rather negligible under present conditions. Another example was his inability to control cheating at cards when losing, but only sums which were ridiculously small compared with the stakes. He held back his emotional responses on principle. One morning when in bed with his wife and the child, he felt a touch. He had first to ascertain who had touched him before he could allow himself a reaction. As it had been the child, the reaction was a pleasant one; if he had found that it was his wife who touched him, he would have shown strong displeasure.

In spite of his fear of being touched by a burglar, the patient maintained that touching a man's penis and buttocks was his female approach to men; when he does that to a man, he considers himself the woman; only when he inserts the penis into anus or mouth is he the man. His fantasies of seducing policemen and burglars never included the possibility that the penis might be inserted into him. As, however, his so-called female approaches were meant to castrate the men, to render them harmless, it becomes understandable why he would fear the touch of a woman. He admitted to a fear of manifest homosexuals, but he felt fascinated when he met one, and he wanted to meet the man again to subdue him. At this point, he mentioned for the first time that he used to have violent fights with a brother two years his senior. He recalled his passionate feelings in these fights, and that he came to fear that he might kill his brother.[4]

Ernest Jones[5] has stated: 'Together with the narcissism a feminine attitude toward the father presents itself as an attempted solution of the intolerable murderous and castrating

[4] This is the reverse of a custom described by Margaret Mead in her book, *Male and Female.* The boys among the Iatmul headhunters '. . . hear any of a dozen words for sodomy hurled about the village, irrespective of the sex of the user, but if two small boys attempt to act out what they have heard, older boys arm them with sticks and force them to fight each other'.

[5] Jones, Ernest: *The Death of Hamlet's Father.* Int. J. Psa., XXIX, 1948, p. 176.

impulses aroused by jealousy. These may persist, but when the fear of the self-castration implied gains the upper hand, i.e. when the masculine impulse is strong, the original aggression re-asserts itself—but this time under the erotic guise of active homosexuality.' Although there was no direct evidence of the feminine attitude toward the father in this patient, the evidence of the assertion of the original aggression was overwhelming. His development stopped at that point where he became aware that he had to cope with and best his rivals in competing for the mother and the sister. This battle, fraught with unconscious fears of castration, became sexualized in order to be bearable.

SUMMARY

Homosexuality in a male proved to be a method of reaction to a very severe prohibition against masturbation. It appeared, furthermore, to be an erotized fixation to that part of the œdipus complex in which the boy was unable to cope with his rivalry in relation to his father and his brothers. His castration anxiety stemmed originally from heterosexual incestuous strivings. Heterosexuality became a double threat of direct punishment from the vagina, and punishment by the father and brother. Unable to beat his superior rivals, he therefore took to a sexualized form of 'stabbing in the back' or 'hitting below the belt' (homosexuality). The unconscious castration anxiety was clinically expressed in phobic and compulsory symptoms. His behavior toward his wife was a mixture of belated obedience and revenge connected with his mother, nurse, and sister.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Feast of Tantalus

Henry Alden Bunker

To cite this article: Henry Alden Bunker (1952) The Feast of Tantalus, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 355-372, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925886

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925886

THE FEAST OF TANTALUS

BY HENRY ALDEN BUNKER, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Of the myriad tales which go to make up the huge body of Greek mythology, the story of the Feast of Tantalus is, I imagine, among the less familiar. But this disadvantage, if such it be, is more than compensated, I venture to think, by certain considerations which lend the story a special interest. In the first place, its manifest content is, perhaps, more than usually remote from its true meaning. Yet the knowledge of a single fact—one lying within the purview of anthropology—supplies immediately the key to this meaning. Even then, however, it is alone the application of psychoanalytic principles—revealing alike the underlying significance of the anthropological observation and of this Greek tale which is in a manner its echo, or, let us say, its counterpart in narrative form—which gives to the story of the Feast of Tantalus its true place, and this of the very highest, it might well be said, among the universal fantasies of mankind.

The principal characters in the 'dark and disreputable' story (as it seemed to Pindar who tells it) of the Feast of Tantalus are three in number, and represent three generations; for Tantalus was the son of Zeus, and Pelops the son of Tantalus.[1] The story is told by Pindar in the First Olympian Ode.

[1] As the father of Atreus, Pelops was the founder of the famous house of the Atreidæ, the kingly house of Mycenæ 'whose cruel deeds and misfortunes have been celebrated in so many famous tragedies', and which numbered Agamemnon and Menelaus among its illustrious members. But since the house was called after Atreus, Pelops appears to have been put at the head of the genealogy secondarily; thus it is probable that he never existed, and can be said to be nothing more than the eponymous hero of the Pelopes, the vanished tribe which gave its name to the Peloponnesus—the form of his name, moreover, being that of a number of Greek tribal names ending in *-ops*. (Nilsson, Martin P.: *The Mycenean Origin of Greek Mythology*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1932, pp. 42–44.)

As to Tantalus, he is of course familiar (apart from having lent his name to our verb 'tantalize', to a chemical element of the vanadium family, and to a kind of decanter locked against the too thirsty guest) as he who stood neck-deep in a pool of water which ever receded as he sought to drink of it, while a wind

Having been invited by the gods to eat nectar and ambrosia at their table, Tantalus asked them in return to a banquet on the summit of Mount Sipylus. As the 'second course', he served them the flesh of his own son Pelops, whom he had cut in pieces and boiled in a cauldron. Demeter, distraught with grief for the loss of Persephone,[2] ate part of one shoulder; but Zeus, perceiving the deception that had been practiced, ordered that the flesh be put back into the cauldron, the missing part replaced by a shoulder of ivory, and the child restored to life, whole and sound. It was the mother-goddess Rhea who, according to the poet Bacchylides, revived Pelops by passing him through the cauldron; in Pindar's account, Klotho[3] 'lifted him out of the purifying waters of the cauldron, his shoulder gleaming with ivory'. Finally, Zeus blasted Mount Sipylus with thunder and earthquake, to punish Tantalus for his impiety.

But this monstrous tale was the devising of envious neighbors, says Pindar. What really happened—and the variant will itself prove instructive—was that Poseidon of the gleaming trident, his heart enthralled with love, seized Pelops and bore him away on his golden chariot to the highest home of Zeus—that home to which in aftertime Ganymede was also brought for the selfsame service; 'and when thou wast seen no more, and, in spite of many a quest, men brought thee not to thy mother, anon some envious neighbors secretly devised the story'[4] recounted above. In this 'expurgated' version which Pindar hastened to substitute, there persists the idea that Pelops was given over to Zeus—in this second instance by Poseidon out of the love which that god bore him, rather than by his father, Tantalus, who presented him to Zeus to be eaten. The 'expur-

tossed always out of his reach the manifold fruits which hung just above his head. It is hardly necessary to point to the precedipal fantasy here depicted; and indeed the theme of oral frustration at the hands of the mother, evidenced also for example in the behavior of the Sirens and of the Harpies, is something of a recurring one in Greek mythology.

[2] Her daughter (and younger double), whom Hades had abducted to be his wife.

[3] A birth spirit, one of the three Moirai, or Fates, who presided over the birth and life of men; her name means the Spinner (of the thread of life).

[4] *Olympian Odes*, I, 40–47.

gation' substitutes love for seeming hostility as the motive for delivering Pelops to Zeus, exculpates the father (Poseidon in place of Tantalus), and, incidentally, conceals the grandfather motif (for Poseidon is not the son but the younger brother of Zeus); likewise, it appears to make the 'love' of Poseidon for Pelops the equivalent of the (intended) eating of the latter by Zeus. And it significantly introduces the fact, absent from the original version, that the disappearance of Pelops is as much a separating of him from his mother as it is a giving of him over to Zeus: 'and when thou wast seen no more, and, in spite of many a quest, men brought thee not to thy mother . . .' .

The Feast of Tantalus is the story of a death and a resurrection, a rebirth or a reanimation. Pelops killed, experiences a second birth by being passed a second time through the 'purifying' cauldron. Furthermore, this same idea is virtually repeated in respect of a single portion of Pelops' body, his shoulder, which is first destroyed, then restored: as the accompaniment of his restoration to life, his missing shoulder, inadvertently eaten by Demeter, is replaced (by Rhea or Klotho) by a new shoulder of ivory.

Now this conception—unique, as far as I know, in Greek mythology—of the loss or destruction of part of the body which is replaced by an equivalent, perhaps more resplendent, more perdurable, has its parallels elsewhere, as will shortly be noted. But in the meantime, and in particular, one cannot fail to note the considerable resemblance between this theme and the fantasy of little Hans [5] that the plumber had removed his 'widdler' with a pair of pincers and had brought him a new one in its place—a bigger 'widdler', one like his father's.[6] It will be recalled, also, that little Hans's phobia was of being bitten by a horse (the father)—an accident that all but befell Pelops at the hands of the All-Father, Zeus; and since it is unquestionable that this phobia of little Hans expressed a fear of castration, we may be entitled to suppose that a similar idea is portrayed in the fate that (temporarily) overtook Pelops not only in the Feast of

[5] Freud: *Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy.* Coll. Papers, III, p. 149.
[6] *Ibid.*, p. 240.

Tantalus (in which, moreover, the loss of a part of the body is noted), but no less in the 'expurgated' version, with its explicit reference to the passive relationship of Pelops to 'love-enthralled' Poseidon of the gleaming trident.[7]

Whether the 'new' shoulder supplied to Pelops was an improvement upon the old one, like the improvement of the replacement in little Hans's fantasy, is not explicit in the Greek tale. There is somewhat less doubt in a curiously similar story of Magyar origin cited by Mannhardt,[8] wherein the hero is cut in pieces, but the serpent-king lays the bones together in their proper order and washes them with water (that frequent birth symbol; compare the cauldron of the Pelops story), whereupon the hero revives, undergoes a second birth brought to pass by the serpent-king, much as Pelops' second birth took place at the command of Zeus.[9] The Magyar hero's shoulder blade has been lost, so the serpent-king supplies in its place one of gold and ivory. Not only is this essentially a duplicate of the Greek tale, but the missing part of the body is also, curiously enough, the same; and its replacement, moreover, is quite explicitly in this case of an increased magnificence.

Another story is told of Pelops by Pausanias[10] in which the shoulder blade is also featured. Whereas Pelops' other bones were buried at Olympia, the shoulder blade, sent to the army before Troy (doubtless as a talisman, *in hoc signo vince,* as it

[7] It is a temptation to see an analogy between the 'gleaming' quality of Poseidon's trident and of Pelops' substituted shoulder (and, to anticipate, of the shining disk, 'bright as the sun in the heavens', of the Modoc Indian myth), and the rather similar quality attributed to the (father's) phallus by the patients reported by Phyllis Greenacre (*Vision, Headache and the Halo.* This QUARTERLY, XVI, 1947, p. 177).

[8] Mannhardt, W.: *Germanische Mythen.* Berlin, 1858, p. 66. (I owe this reference to Frazer, J. G.: *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild.* London: The Macmillan Co., II. p. 263.)

[9] The element common to these two tales of being cut in pieces, of dismemberment, is shared also (along likewise with being put together again) by such beings as Dionysus, Zagreus, Pentheus, Orpheus, Osiris—and, in the attenuated form of the division of his raiment among the centurions, Christ.

[10] Pausanias, v. 13, 4–6; vi, 22, 1; quoted by Myres, J. L.: *Who Were the Greeks?* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930, p. 569, note 83.

were), was lost at sea but subsequently fished up and identified.[11] This feeble doublet of the story told by Pindar—in which the accidental swallowing of the shoulder by the sea parallels its inadvertent swallowing by Demeter, while its ultimate restoration takes the form of a recovery of the shoulder which had been lost instead of the substitution of a 'new' one—forms nevertheless a bridge to a more undisguised myth in which a *phallus* was lost at sea, to be later replaced by a replica thereof. I refer to the story told of Osiris, greatest of Egyptian mythological figures, whose phallus, after his dismemberment, was thrown into the sea and there swallowed by a fish. Set, the brother of Osiris, had cast into the Nile the coffer which he had tricked Osiris into entering (much as Tantalus had put the dismembered Pelops into a cauldron); after various journeyings, the coffer was recovered by Isis, his sister and wife, who with her sister Nephthys lamented for the fair youth thus cut off in his prime—rather as both Adonis and Attis, alike the victims of a fatal love for a goddess, were mourned by Aphrodite and by Cybele. Coming upon the coffer, in Isis's absence, as he was hunting a boar by the light of the full moon, Set rent the body of Osiris into fourteen pieces and scattered them abroad. However, Isis eventually succeeded in recovering them and—with the help of Nephthys, of the jackal-headed god Anubis, of Thoth and Horus—in piecing them together: all of the *disjecta membra,* that is, except the phallus, which had been thrown into the sea and there swallowed by a fish, the oxyrhynchus. So Isis made an image of it, replacing the missing member with one of wood.[12] The striking parallelism between Pelops and Osiris, and specifically between the shoulder of Pelops and the phallus of Osiris, can be further extended; for the oxyrhynchus was believed by the Egyptians to have the function of psychopomp,

[11] 'Presumably by its ivory finish!', Professor Myres somewhat frivolously suggests.

[12] Frazer, J. G.: *Adonis, Attis, Osiris,* II, pp. 7–13; *Spirits of the Corn and of the Wild.* II, p. 264.

See also Róheim, Géza: *Animism, Magic and the Divine King.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930, pp. 27–39.

a carrier of the souls of the dead to the underworld.[13] If we suppose that, by an obvious metonymy, the conductor of souls to the underworld may equally stand for the underworld itself or for a being equated therewith, then the oxyrhynchus is not altogether unlike Demeter the mother-goddess (whose name means either Earth-Mother or Corn-Mother [14])—Demeter who, even though this other function tended to be split off and taken over by her daughter and double, 'dread' Persephone, was as well a goddess of fertility as a goddess of the underworld.[15] In even more than a general sense, then, do the shoulder of Pelops (whether at the Feast of Tantalus or in Pausanias' story) and the phallus of Osiris share the same fate: 1, of being swallowed by a mother figure (Demeter) or a symbolic equivalent (the oxyrhynchus, the sea), with or without her connotations of the underworld and of death; 2, of being restored or replaced—again by a goddess—by a replica or by an improved facsimile (ivory, gold and ivory) which quite strikingly corresponds to the fantasy of little Hans.[16]

It is to be noted that in the Feast of Tantalus not only is Pelops restored to life, sound and whole, not only is his shoulder, swallowed by Demeter, replaced (by Rhea-Klotho) by a

[13] Wiedemann, Alfred: *Religion und Mythologie der alten Ägypter.* Quoted by Róheim, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

[14] Farnell, Lewis Richard: *Cults of the Greek States.* London: Oxford University Press, 1909, III, pp. 29,ff.

[15] In her cult at Phigaleia in Arcadia, Demeter 'appears as the great earth-goddess, giver of life and fruits, but giver also of death and ruler of the shadowy world, a double conception which we find again in the characters of Artemis and Aphrodite, Astarte and Isis' (Farnell: *op. cit.*, p. 59). *Cf.* also Freud's remark: 'The great Mother-goddesses of the oriental peoples all seem to have been both founts of being and destroyers; goddesses of life and fertility, and death-goddesses' (*The Theme of the Three Caskets.* Coll. Papers, IV, p. 254). 'It is a familiar fact, moreover, that many peoples, both Aryan and non-Aryan, have imagined a queen of the dead—"die Hel" in the Teutonic north, Allatu at Babylon—rather than a king; or when the latter exists (the Babylonian Nergal, the Greek Hades), the former appears to have been prior' (Farnell: *op. cit.*, p. 282).

[16] The identity of the shoulder of Pelops with the phallus of Osiris (and with the 'widdler' of little Hans), established above at some risk of laboring the obvious, will presently be paralleled by an analogous example of body symbolism. In the meantime, I must confess my inability to explain the unquestionable fact that it is the shoulder which serves as a symbol for the penis.

resplendent one of ivory, but, in addition, by being passed (for a second time) through the 'purifying' cauldron he has immortality conferred upon him. Boiling, or passing through fire, as a means of attaining 'immortality' is a not uncommon conception in Greek mythology. In a cauldron impregnated with certain magic herbs Medea cooked Jason's aged father Aison, who thereupon came forth a young man. Thetis, mother of Achilles, married to a mere mortal, Peleus, was determined to have an immortal child. Seven children she bore, and each of them in turn she threw into fire, or according to some into a boiling cauldron, either to test their powers or to burn away the mortal part that they had inherited from their father. In the case of Achilles, Peleus interfered and prevented the application of this technique to his son. Demeter, in the course of her wanderings in search of her abducted daughter, Persephone, was employed by Metaneira as nurse to her young son Demophoön, whom by day she rubbed with ambrosia, the food of the immortal gods, while by night she laid him in the fire to burn away his mortality and make him divine. One night Metaneira discovered her doing this, and screamed with terror; in one account it was—as in the case of Achilles—the child's father who interfered.[17] Here again Demeter and Isis meet, for exactly the same story is told of Isis. In the course of her wanderings in search of the coffer which contained the corpse of Osiris, she came to Byblus, on the coast of Syria, where the queen of the country made her the nurse of her son. Isis gave the infant her finger instead of her breast to suck, and at night she began to burn away all that was mortal of him. It is as though her daily and her nightly acts had a common purpose, and that the incorporation of a (symbolic) penis was part of the ritual of rendering the child 'immortal'.[18] 'But the queen spied what she was

[17] Rose, H. J.: *Handbook of Greek Mythology*. London: Methuen & Co., 1928, p. 100, note 60.

[18] In the Demeter version, be it noted, it is not the finger, not the (symbolic) penis, which is 'incorporated', but 'immortality' itself in the form of the food of the immortal gods. It might also and in particular be noted, in the Isis story, that the 'immortalizing' of the child is equated with the *denial of the breast.*

doing and shrieked out when she saw her child in flames, and thereby hindered him from becoming immortal.' [19]

Thus it is Demeter, the nurse, who fosters, and Metaneira, the mother, who opposes, the 'immortalization' of the child; and the same is true, in almost identical words, of Isis and the Queen of Byblus respectively. In the tale of the Feast of Tantalus, in very similar fashion, it was a mother-goddess (Demeter) who deprived Pelops of his shoulder by devouring it, thereby (*pars pro toto*) introjecting the child and thus retaining it, so that a part of him remains with the mother for ever, in a kind of magical denial of their separation, an undoing of the dissolution of the mother-child unity; while if, moreover, the two things that befell Pelops at the command of Zeus—namely, passing him a second time, by putting him back into it, through the 'purifying' cauldron, and replacing the missing shoulder with another (and superior) one—are to be considered therefore equivalent, the one with its latent meaning (as we have just seen) of 'immortality', the other with its unmistakable significance of a superior (or quite literally 'supernatural') penis ('one like father's'), then Demeter enacted a role wholly analogous to that of the Queen of Byblus who 'thereby hindered him [her child] from becoming immortal'. On the other hand, it was another mother figure (Rhea or Klotho) who, at the command of Zeus, restored Pelops' loss by replacing the missing shoulder with one of ivory, in conjunction with passing him through the cauldron; her act was thus just as much, and in the same sense, the antithesis of Demeter's as was Demeter's the antithesis of Metaneira's when the goddess attempted against the opposition of the latter to secure 'immortality' for Demophoön (and Isis for her ward, against the opposition of its mother, the Queen of Byblus). And so it is clear enough, in fact self-evident, that the behavior of Demeter and of Klotho (or Rhea), in relation to the shoulder of Pelops, is altogether analogous to that of Metaneira and of Demeter in relation to the 'immortality' of Demophoön; thus we must regard the shoulder of Pelops and 'immortality' as equivalent and inter-

[19] Frazer, J. G.: *Adonis, Attis, Osiris.* II, p. 9.

changeable terms. But since the shoulder of Pelops, as the story of Osiris puts beyond doubt, unmistakably stands for the penis, and in particular the substituted shoulder of ivory for a superior, a 'supernatural' penis, strangely like the bigger 'widdler', 'like father's', of little Hans's fantasy, we can have no doubt as to the equation between the penis, particularly in this latter sense, and 'immortality'. 'Immortality'—that attribute and prerogative of the gods alone, of which besides they are so jealous—represents in the last analysis the power of procreation, or in other words sexual maturity—the (adult) penis being the concrete embodiment and symbol thereof.[20]

[20] Just as the replaced shoulder of Pelops is the vehicle of 'immortality', and is equated with and symbolizes and indeed *is* immortality—for it perishes but is restored in more enduring form, very much as 'this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality' (I *Corinthians*, xv, 53)—so the idea is rather widespread that some single part of the body 'puts on incorruption', is indestructible, undying, immortal. Of the natives of the lower Congo, for example, Frazer reports that at one point in their puberty rites the novices feigned death and were transported into the sacred enclosure. 'There they were supposed not only to die but to rot till only a single bone of their body remained, of which the initiated had to take the greatest care in expectation of the joyful resurrection that was soon to follow' (Frazer, J. G.: *Balder the Beautiful*, II, pp. 252–253). It is said, also, in Rabbinical writings, that the bone which we call the sacrum owes its name (with its connotation of divinity) to the belief that it alone was immune from decomposition after death. And thus, as that which survives the death of the body (or of the rest of the body) and is the vehicle of a subsequent existence, of immortality indeed, the *soul*, for that matter, appears to differ in no very essential respect from the shoulder of Pelops, the phallus of Osiris, the 'single bone' of the Congo natives, the sacrum, and the crown of the head of the American Indian myth (see below); all are alike expressive of the same fundamental idea: among other things, a denial of death which is at the same time, as the evidence is clear, a denial of castration (Pelops, Osiris).

Indeed, it was the theory put forward by Sir James Frazer, it might here be noted, wherewith he suggested a tentative explanation of the strange rite of circumcision, that 'circumcision was originally intended to ensure the rebirth at some future time of the circumcised man by disposing of the severed portion of his body in such a way as to provide him with a stock of energy on which his disembodied spirit could draw when the critical moment of reincarnation came round. . . . The durability of the teeth . . . might be a sufficient reason . . . for choosing this portion of the corporeal frame on which to pin his hope of immortality' (*The Magic Art*, I, pp. 96–97). But, as Róheim (see below) has shown, using in part the very material that Frazer has adduced (*op. cit.*, p. 98), the *latent* content of all this is the reverse: the ritual observances referred to

If now we glance at certain rituals carried out by various Australian tribes, we are certain to be struck by the similarity between what is described in the myth of the Feast of Tantalus and what is enacted in these rituals.

In a number of tribes in the South and East of Australia, writes Róheim,[21] the initiation ceremony consists of pulling a tooth; and 'even in Central Australia, where circumcision and subincision are the outstanding rites of initiation, tooth evulsion coexists with these as a rite of minor significance. As a rite of separation from the mother, this emphasizes the oral significance of the mother-child relationship, the tooth playing a role similar to the foreskin in the circumcision ritual' [22]—so that in this tooth ritual, according to Róheim, we have the separation of the child from its mother re-enacted in the form of the separating of a part of the child's body from the child; [23] *'separation from the mother is represented as a separation of a part of the body from the whole'*.[24] But if, at the same time, the extracted tooth is given to the novice's mother who buries it beside a pool for the purpose of increasing the number of water-lilies that grow in the pool [25] (an obviously procreative function), if she inserts it in the bark of a tree at the fork of two of the topmost branches,[25] if the tooth is thrown away in the direction of the spot where the novice's mother is supposed to have had her camp in the far-off legendary time known as the *alcheringa* [25]—if, in a word, the mother receives or eats the tooth, she is retaining the child who is taken away from her—precisely as did Demeter retain (by 'eating' the most essential part of him) the child Pelops whom his father, Tantalus, had

---

dramatize the breaking up of the mother-child unity, combining therewith a magical denial of this separation; and the myth of the Feast of Tantalus, if we understand it aright, bears out this interpretation and is indeed an explicit statement of it.

[21] Róheim, Géza: *Transition Rites*. This QUARTERLY, XI, 1942, p. 336.

[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 362–363.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 356.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 366; italics Róheim's.

[25] Frazer. J. G.: *The Magic Art*, I, p. 98.

intendedly dedicated to Zeus, the All-Father—so that, no less than Metaneira and the Queen of Byblus, she would fain have prevented him from becoming 'immortal'.

This *pars pro toto* introjection of the child by the mother, as symbolized in the reception or retention or eating by the mother of the tooth knocked out in connection with the puberty rite (or, among the Nullakun,[26] the foreskin; or, in the Feast of Tantalus, the shoulder blade) whereby is magically effected an undoing of the mother-child separation which the puberty rite not only entails but has as its principal purpose—this introjection has as a forerunner various reintrojections symbolically carried out in connection with that earliest mother-child separation which is represented by birth. Among the Thonga, for example, the mother, having lost through childbirth part of herself, reintrojects it in the form of a cock if the infant is a boy or a hen if it is a girl.[27] Among the Angami Nagas of Assam a similar practice is carried out.[28] Among the Kayans of Borneo the fœtal membranes are dried and preserved by the mother.[29] A cow is given a few hairs of her calf's tail in bread to stop her from crying for the calf.[30] In Silesia, according to Dreschsler,[31] the first milk tooth that falls out should be swallowed by the mother; and the child's first nails should be bitten off by the mother, not cut; otherwise the child may become a thief. Wuttke [31] reports the same practice, with the same prophylactic intent, in East Prussia, in parts of which the mother also swallows the nails. Trevelyan [31] has made the identical observation with regard to Wales. If a part of the body is separated, that is, if it should go into the mother's mouth, the child's otherwise becoming a thief suggests the

[26] Spencer, B.: *Native Tribes of the Northern Territory*, p. 175; cited by Róheim, Géza: *Transition Rites, loc. cit.*

[27] Junod, H. A.: *The Social Life of a South African Tribe;* quoted by Róheim.

[28] Hutten, J. H.: *The Angami Nagas;* quoted by Róheim.

[29] Hose, C. and McDougall, W.: *The Pagan Tribes of Borneo;* quoted by Róheim.

[30] Nemethy, in Ethnographia, XLIX, 1938, p. 230; quoted by Róheim.

[31] Cited by Róheim, Géza: *Loc. cit.*, p. 348.

attempt to retake something to make up for a traumatic separation.[32]

In the Feast of Tantalus, a part of the child's body is separated, and does go into the mother's mouth; moreover, something is then supplied which undoes or makes up for this traumatic separation, namely, at Zeus's command, the shoulder of ivory. In the story of Demeter in search of Persephone, and of Isis in search of the coffer containing the corpse of Osiris, we have again the theme of mother-child separation, and again also the motif of compensation to the child: the attempt to secure 'immortality' for the (foster) child. In connection with the puberty rites of various Australian tribes, Róheim has concisely described the 'system of fictive compensations for separation' at work in them: 'First the boy is taken from the camp, from the society of women, and introduced into a purely male society. Next, the foreskin is separated from the penis. For this the boy is compensated by the *pokuti,* a pigtail that is a penis symbol; by the blood-pouring (for the blood he has lost he receives blood from the men); and by a *tjurunga.* In the Pitjentara ritual the *tjurunga* received at this point is the penis symbol.'[33] Thus we have, as 'compensation' for the traumatic separation of the child from the mother: 1, the *pokuti* or pigtail (a penis symbol), the identificatorily incorporated blood of the elders, and the *tjurunga* (Australian puberty rites); 2, the shoulder of ivory (the Feast of Tantalus); 3, 'immortality' (Demeter and Demophoön, Isis and the child of the Queen of Byblus). If, by the way, as here seems clear, this compensation is compensatory alike for loss of the mother and (symbolic) loss of the penis (as cited quite explicitly in the Australian rites, in more disguised form in the three Greek stories referred to), then the one loss is clearly likened to the other, the danger entailed in separation from the genital is equated with the danger entailed in separation from the mother—as though, as Freud says, 'deprivation of this member were tantamount to a second separation from the mother' (exactly as the above material

[32] Róheim, Géza: *Loc. cit.,* p. 348.

[33] Róheim. Géza: *Loc. cit.,* pp. 354–355.

quite literally states), as if through the displacement of cathexis from the original object to the organ that ensures reunion with that object.[34] Indeed, in those instances already referred to, in which evulsion of a tooth—with its oral as well as its phallic reference—coexists in the puberty rite along with the more predominant circumcision and subincision, it seems legitimate to see a kind of combining or telescoping of the earlier and the later separation of the child from the mother, as if to assert the essential identity of the two, and also, by implication, a parallel identity of castration anxiety and separation anxiety, the former a later and more specific and more differentiated form of the latter (Freud).

To return to the Feast of Tantalus. At the command of Zeus, it will be recalled, the introjection of the child (Pelops) by the mother (Demeter—herself distraught by *the loss of her own child)* was abruptly halted, and Pelops by Zeus's order was passed for a second time through the cauldron, whence Klotho (or Rhea) lifted him, restored to life and made whole by replacing his missing shoulder with one of ivory. Thus some kind of equivalence is clearly indicated between the restoring to life or 'resurrection' and the replacement of the shoulder by one which was, at least in the Magyar myth, even superior[35]—as if to say that this acquiring of a new shoulder (an adult penis 'like

[34] Róheim, Géza: *Loc. cit.*, p. 356.

As Freud goes on to say: 'A seemingly entirely legitimate line of thought of Ferenczi's enables us to recognize clearly here the point of connection with the earlier content of the danger situation. The high narcissistic value attaching to the penis may be referable to the fact that the possession of this organ contains a guarantee of reunion with the mother (or mother substitute) in the act of coitus. Deprivation of this member is tantamount to a second separation from the mother, and thus has again the significance (as in the case of birth) of being delivered over helpless to the unpleasurable tension arising from the non-gratification of a need. This need, of which the increase is feared, is now, however, a specialized one, a need of the genital libido, and no longer an undifferentiated one, as in infancy.' (Freud: *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety*. This QUARTERLY, V, 1936, p. 275.)

[35] *Cf.*, in its striking paralleling of the above, Róheim's (*Loc. cit.*, p. 356, italics added) 'Instead of the dual unity of mother and child, we have in this ritual [of the Pitjentara] the symbolic separation of the child from the mother repeated in *the separation of a part of the child's body from the child, and compensated by a symbolic omnipotent penis (tjurunga)*'.

father's', as we have amply seen) *is* 'resurrection', *is la vita nuova,* and at the same time the compensation as well as the substitution for the loss of the mother. At all events, Pelops underwent a 'second birth'.

Now the *locus classicus,* in Greek mythology, of this theme of a second birth is to be found, in much more explicit and uncensored form, in the myth of the birth of Dionysus, son of Zeus and Semele (asserted on etymological grounds to be an old Thraco-Phrygian Earth-goddess), himself a son-god, himself a leader (with his band of Satyrs, Bacchantes, and the like) of the 'brother-horde'. Through the trickery of the ever-jealous Hera, Semele was consumed (for in the myth she was a mortal) by the lightnings of Zeus. Her unborn child, Dionysus, deified already in some accounts by contact with the divine fire (cf. Demophoön, and Isis's foster child), was caught up from the ashes of his mother's body (here the mother-child separation is indeed complete) by Zeus, who thrust him into his own thigh, crying 'Come, O Dithyrambos, enter this my male womb'[36] whence, at the fulfilment of the time of gestation, he was born. Thus Dionysus, like Pelops, underwent a second birth, not at the mere behest of Zeus but from that god's very 'womb'.

It is of more than a little interest that this tale of the second birth of Dionysus from the thigh of Zeus should find its duplicate, almost down to the last detail, in a myth of the Modoc Indians of southern Oregon.[37] Látkakáwas—and there is evidence that she was in reality, like Semele, a goddess—had lost her husband, by whom she was with child. When his body was burned, there was a disk, bright as the sun in the heavens, in the ashes; this was the crown of the young man's head. Its analogy is obvious to the immortal part of Demophoön (whom Demeter would have made 'deathless and ageless for all his

[36] Euripides: Bacchæ, 526–527. (I owe this reference to Harrison, Jane Ellen: *Themis.* Cambridge: At the University Press, second ed., 1927, p. 34.) The word *Dithyrambos* means He-of-the-Twofold-Door, according to Miss Harrison, who interestingly justifies a discredited statement of Plato's that the dithyramb is a Song of the Birth, a Hymn of the New Birth.

[37] This similarity was first pointed out by Rose, H. J.: *Dionysiaca.* Aberystwyth Studies, IV, 1922, p. 19.

days'), and of Isis's charge, that survived the fire which burned away their mortal parts, and to the single bone, the sacrum, which resists decomposition and becomes thereby the vehicle of a 'joyful resurrection', and to the one remaining bone, of similar function, of the natives of the lower Congo. And thus it is, also, in the Modoc story. For a brother took up the disk, gave it to Látkakáwas, and said, 'Take it to Kumush [the Creator]. Kumush can bring a man to life if he has only one hair of his head.' So Látkakáwas went to Kumush, giving birth to her child on the way. Kumush heated stones, put the hot stones into the basket, and when the water boiled he put in the disk. After a while the disk came to life and became the young man again—exactly as did Pelops at the command of Zeus, when similarly boiled in a cauldron. But when Kumush saw how beautiful the young man was, he wanted him to die and never come to life again; he thought he would like to get the disk and the young man's beauty for himself. In this his feeling was quite like that of Poseidon of the gleaming trident, whose heart was 'enthralled with love' for Pelops, in Pindar's 'expurgated' version of the story of the Feast of Tantalus. So, since it was Kumush's wish, the young man died. But into the fire in which Kumush burned the young man's body Látkakáwas leaped with her baby. Just in time, Kumush snatched the baby from the flames, stilled its cries by naming it Isis, precisely as had Zeus in similar circumstances named Semele's son Dithyrambos. Kumush then looked in the ashes of the fire for the disk which was, once again, all that remained of the young man's body. But having found it, he did not know where to put it. At last he put it in the small of his back. The minute he put it there it grew to his body, and right away he was beautiful and young and bright. The disk had become a part of him, and he was the father of Isis, for the disk was the father of Isis. Later, Kumush kept thinking where he was to hide the baby. At last he hid it in his knee,[38] where it appeared as a

[38] This detail is of perhaps greater interest than might at first sight appear. At least, and as a purely amateur philologist, I cannot but think it rather arresting that the Latin word for knee, *genu*, should contain the very significant

boil. That night he stayed with *two* old women. All night he groaned and complained of the boil on his knee. In the morning he asked one of the old women to press the boil, from which the child appeared. This is strikingly similar to Zeus's calling upon Klotho (or Rhea) to effect the 'rebirth' of Pelops. To inquiries as to how he came to possess the child, Kumush gave an evasive answer,[39] as if denoting the same feeling of 'guilt' in being the 'father' of the 'second birth' as is quite explicitly stated, if in different terms, in the tale of the Feast of Tantalus, wherein Tantalus is punished for the 'crime' of attempting to make of Zeus (the 'grandfather'—Durumulun and the like) the progenitor of the 'second birth';[40, 41] so that there is indeed something 'guilty', as Kumush obviously felt, about this male parturition whereby are given (second) birth Dionysus, Pelops, Isis, Dithyrambos, He-of-the-Twofold-Door—and the neophyte of the puberty rite who is 'reborn' ('except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God') into the adult generation, admitted into the company of the elders of the tribe, of the

syllable *gen-*, with its occurrence in numerous words denoting or having reference to generating, begetting, etc. It is the same in Greek, in which the word for knee, γόνυ, similarly contains the syllable γον-, appearing in γόνος, meaning, like γένος, one's race, stock, descent—and in our word *gonad*.

Since the foregoing was written, this theme has been elaborated in Bunker, Henry Alden and Lewin, Bertram D.: A Psychoanalytic Notation on the Root *GN, KN, CN*. In *Psychoanalysis and Culture*. Edited by Wilbur, George B. and Muensterberger, Warner. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1951.

[39] Curtin, Jeremiah: *Myths of the Modocs*. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1912, pp. 4–6.

[40] As to this 'guilt', *cf.* too the 'exoneration' which Pindar's 'expurgated' version of the story so clearly includes *(supra)*.

[41] The ostensible—i.e., conscious—reason for Zeus's wrath against Tantalus was the latter's testing the omniscience of the gods, which is so universally accredited a sin *(cf. Deuteronomy*, vi, 16: 'Ye shall not tempt the Lord your God').

The deception which Tantalus attempted to practice upon Zeus has a curious but perhaps not relevant counterpart in the deception practiced by the fathers upon the sons in certain puberty rites, in that the former in pretended friendship consign the latter to the mercies of Balum, etc. ('grandfather') (see Reik, Theodor: *Ritual: Psychoanalytic Studies*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1931.), as Tantalus consigned his son, Pelops, to the cauldron, its contents intended for the consumption of Zeus.

'fathers'—that is to say, by an easy metaphor, the kingdom of God.

In sum, then, the tale of the Feast of Tantalus is a considerably disguised narrative representation of the puberty rite, 'the spoken correlative of the acted rite' which is Jane Ellen Harrison's definition of the 'myth'—as is also, quite undisguisedly, the familiar story of the birth of Dionysus from the thigh of Zeus, and likewise the curiously parallel Indian Modoc myth. But the story of the Feast of Tantalus amplifies these latter in two regards. First, there is the emphasis which it seems to place upon the mother-child separation: the retention (ultimately defeated) of the child by the mother, that (attempted) undoing of the mother-child separation entailed in and purposed by the puberty rite, which is so clearly represented by Demeter's 'unwitting' swallowing of the shoulder of Pelops—and, as we have seen, by two parallel if more metaphorical, more disguised, representations of the same motif (Metaneira; the Queen of Byblus).[42] Second, there is in particular the emphasis upon the compensation for that separation, whereby—alike an undoing of Demeter's act and a more than making up for it[43]—Pelops is given a resplendent shoulder of ivory, much as the Pitjentara neophyte is given the *tjurunga*, as a 'symbolic omnipotent penis'.[44] This 'replacement', mimetically

[42] Quite analogously, did not the mother of Achilles hide him (transvestitically) among women in order to prevent his being drafted for the Trojan War?

[43] And Achilles, despite his mother's act, became one of the heroes of the Trojan War.

[44] This element of 'compensation' is given explicit statement in one of the tales told of Teiresias, to compensate whom for the blindness which the goddess Athena had visited upon him for his accidental 'peeping' on her as she rose from her bath, Zeus offered him seercraft and a long life (i.e., 'immortality'). While a punishment for the most forbidden of all acts of voyeurism is here obviously involved, and while this punishment might bear the further interpretation of a symbolic castration for a symbolic incest (in the manner in which [Reik] the symbolic castration characterizing all puberty rites is *inter alia* a punishment for incestuous wishes), three further considerations might nevertheless be in point: (a) the 'castrator' is here a woman (and a mother figure); (b) the blindness is as literally a state of helpless dependence as it is metaphorically a castration; and, in particular, (c) Zeus is here seen in the same opposition to Athena, in nullifying (*so far as might be*) her act, as he was to Demeter in the myth of the

carried out in many puberty rites, is the obvious symbolization of that conscious purpose of the initiation ceremony, the 'graduation' of the neophyte into the ranks of the adults of the tribe, with the sexual and other prerogatives of the latter. But this so clear feature of numerous puberty rites, and likewise (as we have seen) of the myth of the Feast of Tantalus, could be said to have a retrospective as well as an anterospective aim; and indeed it is the myth of the Feast of Tantalus which would seem to put this beyond question: namely—as Róheim has adduced manifold other data to support—that this 'replacement' represents at the same time a compensation for the greatest loss that the human being is ever required to sustain, short of that of life itself: the separation (and how often is it accomplished?) from the (precœdipal) mother. It is of this that I consider the myth of the Feast of Tantalus, when rightly understood, to be, perhaps uniquely among myths, as clear as possible a parable.

Feast of Tantalus in her symbolic act of retaining (incorporating) the child, thus of preserving the mother-child unity, thus of keeping him helpless and dependent upon her—as Metaneira and the Queen of Byblus strove to prevent their sons from becoming 'immortal', and the mother of Achilles hid him among women to prevent his joining his fellow bearers of arms. In explicit compensation for his loss of sight, for his 'symbolic castration' (*cf.* Pelops; *cf.* the puberty rite)—as a counterweight to his state of helpless dependence, if you like—Zeus offers Teiresias seercraft (a divine attribute) and long life ('immortality', the prerogative of the gods)—exactly indeed as, in much less explicit terms, and to all appearances 'compensation' for the mother-child separation, Pelops is furnished forth with a shining shoulder of ivory (Pelops, borne away to the highest home of Zeus, so that 'in spite of many a quest, men brought thee not to thy mother'), the Magyar hero with a shoulder of ivory and gold, the Australian neophyte with the *tjurunga*, the 'symbolic omnipotent penis', and still others with other rather unmistakable symbols of sexual maturity, of fellowship and equality with the elders of the tribe, of the 'new life', of that sole prerogative of the gods, 'immortality'.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Fantasies of W. S. Gilbert

Arthur B. Brenner

To cite this article: Arthur B. Brenner (1952) The Fantasies of W. S. Gilbert, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 373-401, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925887

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925887

Published online: 05 Dec 2017.

THE FANTASIES OF W. S. GILBERT

BY ARTHUR B. BRENNER (NEW YORK)

W. S. Gilbert—of the beloved Gilbert and Sullivan operas—seems to have presented a psychological problem to his biographers. They all find it necessary to assert that despite his well-deserved reputation for irascibility and bad temper, he really had a warm and generous heart. The delight in cruelty which is so conspicuous in his writings was in part the expression of his frustrated craving for domination and recognition; in part it was the bursting forth of his superabundant vitality against his self-imposed decorum and the restraints of mid-Victorian prudery. But there was something indecisive, something inconsistent, in his personality. His brain was not in harmony with his sentiments; he resented the petticoat morality of his day, but he could not free himself from it. He wanted to be a social philosopher and a moral reformer, but he made his reputation as a fanciful humorist. He was furious over the failure of his sentimental plays, for they expressed something which he felt very strongly although he never was quite sure what that something was. He always fought, but only for the sake of the fight, since he had no clear cause to fight for.

BIOGRAPHICAL

William Schwenck Gilbert was born November 18, 1836. Goldberg *(8, 9)* says that his father, William Gilbert, and his mother, Anne, second daughter of a Dr. Thomas Morris, had been married 'on February 4th of the same year in which their first child and only son was born. Four daughters were to follow. . . . The mother of Gilbert disappears from the narrative almost as soon as she is delivered of him.' The biographies by Pearson *(12)* and by Dark and Grey *(3)* mention only three sisters; they add nothing regarding Gilbert's mother.

About the father there is a great deal of information. He was born in 1804. At fourteen, he was a midshipman in the service of the East India Company, but he 'quarreled with his officers

on the matter of human rights, and left after three years'. He served for a time as an assistant surgeon in the Navy but, on receiving an inheritance from his father at the age of twenty-five, he retired and took up literature by way of journalism. He wrote plays, three-decker novels, civic polemics, biographies and religious tracts. 'His work displays a distinct penchant for abnormal psychology, with a certain symptomatic sympathy for the mentally deficient.' His head was 'peopled by fairies and elixirs, necromancies and moralities, wicked barons, orphans and fates'. He had a touch of sadism and a heavy pressure of abnormality. His books fill nearly two columns of the British Museum Index, but he published nothing until he was fifty-nine years old and his son, then twenty-seven, was already known as a promising young author. The son asserted that his father 'never had any exaggerated idea of my abilities; he thought that if I could write anyone could do so, and forthwith he did so'. His son illustrated two of his books. The elder Gilbert was highly irascible and a violent controversialist. He was strongly anti-Catholic. He destroyed all the copies of one of his novels because the proofs had not been corrected properly.

The young Gilbert, shortly after his birth, was taken abroad by his parents. When he was at Naples, at the age of two, a couple of smooth-spoken scoundrels induced his nurse to entrust him to them; thereupon they kidnapped him, holding him several days for £25 ransom. Gilbert always claimed he remembered the incident.

At school he was 'cross-grained, quick to take offense', with 'an inclination to punch the head of anyone who did not agree with him'. He did a good deal of writing and at fifteen he tried unsuccessfully to go on the stage.

Gilbert took his B.A. in 1855 and started studying for a competitive examination for a commission in the Royal Artillery, but the Crimean War ended and the examination was not held. He then passed a competitive examination for an assistant clerkship in the Education Department of the Privy Council Office, a position which he held four years. After hours, he studied law at Kings College. In 1859 he was commissioned

an ensign in the Fifth West York Militia. This military interest continued for many years and he held a number of commissions in the Militia and the Royal Navy Artillery Volunteers.

After four years of clerkship he inherited £400 from an aunt, resigned his civil service position, and used the inheritance to finance his admission to the Bar. He practiced four years, without distinction or even success. Nevertheless, he always retained an interest and an affection for the legal profession.

Gilbert always did a good deal of writing. He contributed to the magazine, Fun, from its beginning in 1861, and it was in that magazine that most of his Bab Ballads were published. (He had been called 'Bab' as a baby.) He illustrated them himself, and for a time he was as much interested in drawing as in writing. He published a perfervid political satire against Napoleon III. He wrote dramatic criticisms, but his vehement outspokenness alternated with his business sense and his desire to be liked; so he gave up writing about the theatre because 'he did not like being hated, which was the doom of any critic who told the truth'.

Altogether, he wrote between sixty and seventy plays. His earliest plays were probably typical of the period; to-day they seem unbelievably thin, flat and trivial, with tediously contrived puns serving for humor. His later works are curiously uneven. His serious plays are sententious, moralistic and sentimental, embodying all the mid-Victorian qualities which his own lighter plays satirized and burlesqued. Only the operas which he wrote with Sullivan—and not all of them—have survived in popular interest or are worthy of survival.

Gilbert's plays nevertheless made a substantial contribution to the development of the English theatre, and he greatly advanced the status of the playwright by his insistence on supervising every detail of the productions, which he first worked out on a model stage at home. He was a tyrant at rehearsals. He would lose his temper, resort to biting sarcasm, show endless patience in having a speech repeated until it suited him, but he insisted on having things done his way. Whenever he was especially bad-tempered at rehearsal, the company would assume

that he had been eating too much almond rock, a candy of which he was very fond although it was bad for his gout. He was severe with professional actors who thought that they knew more than he did; he was paternal to the younger and humbler members of the company, and would pay their cab fares for them after late rehearsals. The moral atmosphere of his theatre was not merely conformable to mid-Victorian convention; it was positively puritanical.

His collaboration with Sullivan created fourteen operas, from Thespis; or The Gods Grown Old, in 1871, to The Grand Duke; or The Statutory Duel, in 1896. Their association was interrupted by misunderstandings and outright quarrels. Each thought that the other was claiming and receiving a disproportionate share of credit for the success of their operas; each was ambitious to do more serious work. But aside from a few of Gilbert's Bab Ballads and Sullivan's Lost Chord and Onward Christian Soldiers, they are remembered today only for the work which they did together.

In writing of the relationship between Gilbert and Sullivan, the biographers usually emphasize Gilbert's 'masculinity', although Goldberg considers it a feminine trait that he always took a personal view of everything and always attributed hostile criticism to a personal motive. Sullivan's personality is described as definitely feminine. Gilbert was gruff and outspoken; Sullivan was socially ingratiating and made no enemies. Gilbert took the initiative in constructing the plots and writing the lyrics, which Sullivan then set to music. Deems Taylor *(14)* points out that for all of his cantankerousness, Gilbert always took the first step toward reconciliation with Sullivan; he believes that the final break came when Gilbert could no longer endure the fact that he was fonder of Sullivan than Sullivan was of him. According to Pearson, 'Friendship between them was out of the question from the start, though if Sullivan had been a woman they would have made a most successful marriage'. Their long collaboration had been a union of opposites —'socially an ideal union if they had been man and woman, a perpetual discord since they were man and man. On the

plane of art their discord ceased and the primary elements of their nature fused to a perfect accord.'

Sullivan never married, but for many years he had a romantic attachment to a married woman who was separated from her husband. Gilbert married in 1867. He had no children but was always exceedingly fond of young people and he became famous for his children's parties; he liked to be surrounded by pretty young women, preferably with some amount of brains. He acquired a yacht in which he and his wife went cruising, and an estate of one hundred ten acres called 'Grim's Dyke'. He set himself up as a country squire and sat as Justice of the Peace, showing indulgence to the destitute and unfortunate but the utmost severity to those who had been cruel to children or animals. He contributed generously to local charities and was honorary secretary to a hospital.

Among men, he was fond of Rabelaisian stories. With women, he was decorously flirtatious—hinting at Don Juan aspects of his character to which he could not give expression. On his sixty-sixth birthday he wrote to an old friend: 'It is so delightful to have attained a time of life when one can feel quite sure that there is not the remotest chance of one's being a snake on another man's hearth. One feels *so* safe and (involuntarily) good.' After his sixty-ninth birthday he wrote this same friend: 'By the way, I think this will be my last year on earth—you see, I am popularly identified with Topsy-Turvydom. Now 69 is still 69 if you turn it upside down. See? The same remark applies to 96. So if I escape this year I may go on to the higher figure.'

Any helplessness appealed to him. 'He loved to be consulted, to be depended upon, to champion the oppressed, to act the fairy godfather.' He liked to sponsor pretty young actresses. 'Occasionally a pretty protégée thought him a little too exigent in his demands for her companionship or gratitude and kicked over the traces.'

Gilbert died on May 29, 1911. He had made an appointment to give two young women a swimming lesson in a pond on his estate. They entered the water before he arrived and one of

them, having got beyond her depth, cried out for help just as he reached the pool. He dived in, told her to keep calm and to put her hand on his shoulder—and then sank to the bottom. He had not drowned, but died of a heart attack.

GILBERT'S PHILOSOPHY

Gilbert took himself seriously as a social critic and moral philosopher, but he is remembered only as a humorist. All his moral fervor was somehow self-limiting and self-defeating; he had a strongly moralistic attitude, but no program.

As is true of every moral reformer, his principal target was hypocrisy—pretentiousness, sham, insincerity, social and moral clichés. But the trouble was that he saw sham and insincerity everywhere, and on both sides of every issue. Snobbish adulation of the aristocracy is ridiculous, but so is the pretense that only the common people are truly virtuous. Rank and officialdom are absurd, but so is republican egalitarianism and the romantic pretense that love levels ranks. In Ruddigore, Rose Maybud (who makes every decision by the stilted precepts of her book of etiquette) and Dick Dauntless (the rough man-o'-war's-man, who always follows the dictates of his simple heart) are both able to rationalize a course of selfish and treacherous meanness.

Gilbert poked fun at all British institutions, but there probably was never a more loyal or a more typical Briton. He satirized the Bench and the Bar, to which he was devoted. He ridiculed the armed services but held commissions in the Militia for many years and had himself photographed in the kilts of the Gordon Highlanders. Not only the things he hated but the things he loved came under his satirical criticism. His grievance was that nothing and nobody is perfect. His discovery of that disappointing fact was hardly sufficient basis for a moral crusade; he was moreover more than a little disturbed by his ability (and his need) to find flaws in everything and everybody. 'The social critic—however much he may 'gild the philosophic pill', however much he may assume the defensive role of the jester—*must* declare wholesome but unpleasant truths; there-

fore he is bound to be disliked. Jesters are frequently crippled or deformed; the conventional garb of the jester accentuates or imitates a physical deformity. But it seemed to Gilbert—and he explicitly developed the idea in Broken Hearts—that physical ugliness is associated with or is even the stigma of a warped personality. Apparently he sensed intuitively the malice that so often underlies the jest. One feels that he identified himself with Jack Point, the bitter jester of The Yeomen of the Guard. At a public dinner in honor of his seventieth birthday, he applied to himself the words of King Gama, that spiteful and deformed utterer of tactless truths in Princess Ida:

> Yet everybody says I'm such a disagreeable man!
> And I can't think why!

In short, no one was good enough to serve as an object for Gilbert's unconditioned love—which means that no one was good enough to satisfy Gilbert's need to be given unconditioned love. The more he complained, the less love he received. Who was to blame for all this? Was he right and everyone else wrong? Or was it somehow his fault; his guilty fault? Doubts like these may produce a humorist but not the leader of a moral crusade.

There was, however, one philosophical concept which Gilbert formulated quite clearly and insistently. It is most explicitly stated in Charity, a highly serious drama written in 1874. Mrs. VanBrugh, a really fine woman, who devotes herself to the rehabilitation of 'fallen women' (a daring topic for the mid-Victorian stage), and Dr. Athelny, a Colonial Bishop-elect (one of the few admirable clergymen in Gilbert's writings), have listened to the story of a 'bad woman', one Ruth Tredgett.

> *Dr. A.* (struggling with his tears) '. . . I say that you, Ruth Tredgett, have been a most discreditable person, and you ought to be heartily ashamed of yourself, Ruth Tredgett; and as a clergyman of the Church of England I feel bound to tell you that—that your life has been—has been what God

knows it couldn't well have helped being under the circumstances . . . .'

Mrs. Van B. '. . . who shall say what the very best of us might not have been but for the accident of education and good example?'

In a song which was written for Strephon of Iolanthe (but was later eliminated), Strephon, now a member of Parliament, inveighs against the cruel irrelevance of penal legislation. 'What should I have been', he asks, 'If I had been born of a tipsy mother' or 'If I'd only had Fagin for a father'. And in his last play, The Hooligan, written in 1911, Gilbert presented the social case history of a slum-bred youth who has moved by inevitable stages from a squalid childhood to the death cell, where he is awaiting execution.

In a lighter vein, there is the song from The Mikado:

> See how the Fates their gifts allot,
> For A is happy—B is not.
> Yet B is worthy, I dare say,
> Of more prosperity than A.

Here we have the theme of the inscrutable and inescapable decrees of Fate; it is not surprising to learn that Gilbert's favorite book in all literature was the Book of Job. One may venture the assumption that all this had some relation to Gilbert's experience as a child: *what would he have become if the kidnappers had not returned him to his family?*

What Gilbert clearly saw and explicitly stated is that a single act of blind fate sets causative forces into motion, and that causality is operative, not only in the material affairs of life, but also in the realm of moral responsibility. This is a concept which society is still unable to accept. In mid-Victorian England only a strong or a thoroughly embittered man could have adopted it as a 'cause'. (It will be remembered that even Samuel Butler dealt with it very gingerly in Erewhon.) It is not discreditable to Gilbert that he lacked the moral fervor to drive home this unpopular thesis, or that he lacked the intellectual vigor to formulate and to solve the many difficult problems

to which it gives rise. In his plays—where he was, of course, master of destiny—he could reverse the decrees of blind fate by a nurse's confession or some other trivial theatrical device. But his only philosophical answer to these problems is given in a song in The Gondoliers.

> Try we lifelong, we can never
> Straighten out life's tangled skein.
> Why should we, in vain endeavor,
> Guess and guess and guess again?
> Life's a pudding full of plums,
> Care's a canker that benumbs.
> Wherefore waste our elocution
> On impossible solution?
> Life's a pleasant institution,
> Let us take it as it comes.

This, after all, is not so far from the conclusion of Ecclesiastes, but it would hardly serve as a rallying cry for a moral reformer.

We must, therefore, disagree with Gilbert's conclusion that his failure to be recognized as a social philosopher was caused merely by the public's preference for his humorous trivialities. There must have been something self-limiting, self-defeating, in his own personality which prevented him from driving home the philosophic truths which he never clearly thought through.

THE THEME OF GILBERT'S FANTASIES

THE BABIES WHO WERE INTERCHANGED; THE QUESTION OF SELF-IDENTITY

Gilbert's almost obsessive concern with fate and destiny found expression in the most conspicuous of his favorite themes: the two men whose personalities and destinies had been interchanged through their having been 'mixed up' in early childhood. Among the Bab ballads, in General John, Private James convinces General John that they had been 'cruelly changed at birth' and so they re-exchange their positions. In The Baby's Vengeance, a baby, neglected by his mother, changes places with a more favored nursling until, years later, he con-

fesses his fraud and again exchanges places with his foster brother. In H.M.S. Pinafore, Ralph Rackstraw and Captain Corcoran had been 'mixed up' by their nurse, Little Buttercup, and resume their rightful stations when she confesses her misdeed. In The Gondoliers, the Grand Inquisitor had kidnapped the Prince of Barataria and had entrusted him to a gondolier who had confused him inextricably with his own son. When the royal nurse is summoned to resolve the enigma, she discloses that neither of the young gondoliers is the royal stripling; suspecting the Grand Inquisitor's plot, she had substituted her own son for the Prince, who is now revealed as Luiz, attendant of the Duke of Plaza-Toro and beloved of the Duke's daughter Casilda. In Ruddigore, the heir to the title flees his estate in order to escape the hereditary curse upon the head of the house, and disguises himself under the name of Robin Oakapple, leaving his younger brother Despard to inherit the title and become a foredoomed villain. When the deception is discovered, Robin becomes a bold bad baronet and Despard becomes a pietist. In The Gentleman in Black, a mysterious stranger, with the consent of Hans and the Baron, puts Hans's personality into the Baron's body and the Baron's personality into Hans's body. The-Baron-in-Hans's-body then tells Hans-in-the-Baron's-body that years before, as babies, they had been interchanged in precisely the manner described in The Baby's Vengeance—but this isn't true at all, because the Baron is twenty years older than Hans.

In The Pirates of Penzance, Ruth, the stupid nursery maid, apprentices Frederick to a pirate instead of to a pilot—thereby subjecting him to a conflict of allegiances. The theme of the interchange of persons thus shades off into the closely related theme of the individual with multiple personalities. In the Bab ballad, The Captain and the Mermaids, Captain Clegg of the Royal Navy is seized by jealous mermen, cut in half, and converted into a merman. He is the prototype of Strephon of Iolanthe who, being the son of a fairy mother and a mortal father, is 'a fairy down to the waist—but his legs are mortal'.

There are numerous characters who combine, in a single personality, a number of official roles. Pooh-Bah of The Mikado is, of course, the classic example of one man dealing with himself in half a dozen different capacities; and he is accompanied by Ko-Ko, who was appointed Lord High Executioner because his first official assignment was to cut off his own head. In Iolanthe, the Chancellor must apply to himself for his permission to marry his own ward. And one cannot forget the mariner in The Yarn of the 'Nancy Bell' who, by a process of successive cannibalism, had become 'a cook and a captain bold / And the mate of the *Nancy* brig, / And a bo'sun tight, and a midshipmite, / And the crew of the captain's gig.'

If these many instances suggest that the theme of interchanged or multiple personalities had some appeal for Gilbert, beyond a popular literary convention, we may add to them a related but even more conventional theme of the voluntarily assumed disguise. In The Mikado, Nanki-Poo conceals his identity in the guise of a wandering minstrel. In His Excellency, the Prince Regent is on a tour of inspection of his realm, disguised as a strolling player, and is hired by the practical joking Governor to *pretend* to be the Prince Regent. And in The Yeomen of the Guard, Colonel Fairfax escapes execution by disguising himself as Leonard Meryll.

In The Mountebanks, a magical potion transforms a number of people—bandits, villagers, a troup of actors—into the kind of people who, for various reasons, they have been pretending to be. These individual mix-ups and interchanges are represented, at a social rather than an individual level, by general topsy-turvydoms: the reversal of social ranks in the republican Kingdom of Barataria, in The Gondoliers; Sir Joseph's conception of navy discipline, in H.M.S. Pinafore; and the explicit topsy-turvydom of the Bab ballad, My Dream:

> Where vice is virtue—virtue, vice:
> Where nice is nasty—nasty, nice:
> Where right is wrong and wrong is right—
> Where white is black and black is white.

All these instances of interchanged, multiple and disguised personalities and interchanged social values seem to add up to a single obsessive concern: what is one's real identity? What does it mean to be 'oneself'? It is not surprising therefore that Gilbert's characters are remarkably self-conscious and introspective for characters in light opera. In The Mikado, Yum-Yum cogitates: 'Yes, I am indeed beautiful! Sometimes I sit and wonder, in my artless Japanese way, why it is that I am so much more attractive than anybody else in the whole world? Can this be vanity? No! Nature is lovely and rejoices in her loveliness. I am a child of Nature and I take after my mother.' In The Mountebanks, Teresa declares that she doesn't really think she is exceptionally beautiful, but everyone else insists that she is, so she may be wrong. The Judge in Trial by Jury, Sir Joseph Porter in H.M.S. Pinafore, Major General Stanley in The Pirates of Penzance, the Peers in Iolanthe, are fully aware of their shortcomings. But perhaps the most self-consciously introspective is Robin Oakapple of Ruddigore. He realizes that if you wish in the world to advance you must blow your own trumpet; he knows that he possesses all possible graces, virtues and capabilities; but he cannot do himself justice because he is cursed with a diffident nature and is modesty personified. And from his lips comes that wonderful statement—the epitome of innumerable cries that have gone up from countless analytic couches:

> Ah, you've no idea what a poor opinion I have of myself and how little I deserve it!

At this point we may pause for a summary and a hypothetical interpretation. Gilbert was seized by the great philosophical discovery that blind fate determines our destinies; he played constantly with the notion of identities being interchanged, multiplied, transformed; he imagined all sorts of topsy-turvydoms and reversals of social roles. We may at least suspect that these are all aspects of the same fundamental concern. No act of fate is more decisive than the cast of dice which allocates one as male or female; no question of self-identity is more

crucial than one's sexual identity; no topsy-turvydom is more radical than a reversal of sex. We are not yet justified in concluding, but we may suspect, that close to the center of Gilbert's concern was the question of his own sexual identification.

GILBERT'S ORAL FANTASIES

The oral nature of Gilbert's personality is fairly obvious. He was a bitter and irascible controversialist, destructively satirical in argument. Indeed, he was afraid of his own oral aggression and withdrew from writing dramatic criticisms because he did not want to make enemies, which he was bound to do if he told the truth. From his adolescence he was interested in the stage; he spent four years at the Bar; he found his chief activity and achieved his success in the use of words. And there is the amusing biographical item that he ate too much candy, even though it was bad for his gout.

Among his oral fantasies there must first be mentioned his interest in cannibalism. Of the Bab ballads, The Yarn of the 'Nancy Bell' is explicitly a story of a multiple cannibalism, which was rejected by the editor of Punch as being 'too cannibalistic'. The Two Ogres specialized in eating good little boys and bad little boys, respectively. King Borria Bungalee Boo was 'a man-eating African swell' who had eaten all his subjects except four males, so they made war upon, conquered and ate a neighboring Amazon queen and her four female subjects.

If cannibalism was too offensive a subject for the readers of Punch, it obviously could not be presented on the stage. But there is a remote and attenuated reference to cannibalism in Iolanthe. In their opening song, the fairies declare:

> If you ask us how we live,
> Lovers all essentials give . . .
> When you know us, you'll discover
> That we almost live on lover.

This linking of cannibalism and love might easily escape notice if it were not for other statements in which Gilbert equates

eating and love. In Trial by Jury the defendant excuses his fickleness in love by the plea:

> You cannot eat breakfast all day,
> Nor is it the act of a sinner,
> When breakfast is taken away,
> To turn your attention to dinner;
> And it's not in the range of belief
> That you would hold him as a glutton,
> Who, when he is tired of beef,
> Determines to tackle the mutton.

In Patience, Lady Jane bursts forth upon the lovesick maidens who are sighing for love of Bunthorne: 'Fools and blind! The man loves—wildly loves! . . . His weird fancy has lighted, for the nonce, on Patience—the village milk-maid! . . . But yesterday I caught him in her dairy, eating fresh butter with a tablespoon.' And among the Heavy Dragons, who break all the girls' hearts, there is one who has the additional advantage of being a Duke. But the adulation which his double attractiveness brings him is like being surfeited with toffee: 'toffee for breakfast, toffee for dinner, toffee for tea'.

In the Bab ballad, Etiquette, Gray and Somers are shipwrecked on an island, but since they have never been introduced, each keeps to his own half of the island and cannot speak to the other. Somers' half of the island abounds in turtles, and this is distressing to Gray, 'For turtle and his mother were the only things he loved'.

Paralleling this equating of food and love is the theme of the magical potion of great power. In Foggarty's Fairy, written in 1878, the tutelary fairy gives Foggarty a phial and a box of pills; a draught from the phial will blot out any event which threatens unpleasant consequences and swallowing one of the pills will summon her to come to his assistance. In The Sorcerer, written in 1877, the magical philtre causes everyone who drinks of it to fall violently in love with the first unmarried person of the opposite sex who comes into sight. Gilbert was literally obsessed with this notion. When Iolanthe, produced

in 1882, was completing its run and Gilbert and Sullivan addressed themselves to the creation of a new opera, Gilbert returned to the idea of what came to be known as the 'lozenge plot'—the story of a magical lozenge. Sullivan rejected it. As they went on with Princess Ida (1884), The Mikado (1885), Ruddigore (1887), The Yeomen of the Guard (1888), and The Gondoliers (1889), Gilbert each time proferred the 'lozenge plot' and each time it was rejected. Finally, in 1892, Gilbert incorporated it in The Mountebanks, where a magic potion turns everyone into the kind of person he has been pretending to be—but the music for this opera was composed by Alfred Cellier, not by Sullivan.

One other instance must be noted, which clearly indicates that this general notion meant more to Gilbert than just a convenient literary convention. In The Grand Duke a group of conspirators against the life of the Duke adopt a secret sign by which to recognize one another. With all the world to choose from, they select *eating a sausage roll!* (British for hot dog.)

Eating, then, means 'love'; it means 'magical power'; it means 'a guilty secret'. Or are these all the same thing?

In The Palace of Truth, everyone who enters the palace comes under a magical compulsion to speak the truth. There is, however, a talisman which exercises a countermagic: a crystal box, the possessor of which is immune to the spell of the castle. The complications of the plot arise from the existence of another crystal box, an imitation, which looks just like the talisman but possesses no magical efficacy. There is no reference to there being anything inside either of these boxes. Here the 'magical' component is explicit, but there is no express reference to the theme of 'eating'. Nevertheless, one suspects that the palace is mother and the two boxes are her breasts—and surely the mother's breast is the focus of all fantasies of cannibalism, of eating as love, as power, and as a shared and possibly guilty secret. All these fantasies center, also, around Little Buttercup,

that 'plump and pleasing person' of H.M.S. Pinafore, the purveyor to the Fleet of:

> . . . treacle and toffee and excellent coffee,
> Soft tommy and succulent chops;
> I've chickens and conies and pretty polonies,
> And excellent peppermint drops.

Little Buttercup, it will be remembered, had 'practiced baby farming'; it was she who had 'mixed those babies up'. She is of the company of the wet nurse of The Baby's Vengeance, the royal nurse of The Gondoliers, and Ruth, the 'stupid nursery maid' of The Pirates of Penzance.

GILBERT'S FANTASIES ABOUT WOMEN

Gilbert's biographers have been rather embarrassed by his conspicuous malice toward elderly women. Lady Jane of Patience, Ruth of The Pirates of Penzance and, above all, Katisha of The Mikado are merely the best known of a host of similar characters. For the most part, however, these elderly women are lampooned, not so much as personalities but in their pretensions as love objects. More specifically, they are pilloried as demanders of love, as pursuers of young men. It would seem that Gilbert was reacting against and defensively projecting his own incestuous desires for a mother.

In the Bab Ballads—in which Gilbert's censor is always less alert than in his plays—there are several suggestions (all the more significant because of their casualness) that elderly women are quite conceivable as love objects. The ballad, Haunted, is a sort of life history told in the first person. After recounting a number of unhappy memories of childhood

> I pass to critical seventeen . . .
> When an elderly colonel stole my queen . . .
> No school girl decked in her nursery curls
> Was my gushing innocent queen of pearls;
> If she wasn't a girl of a thousand girls,
> She was one of forty-seven.

The Precocious Baby is the story of a child, in every way remarkably advanced for his age, born of a mother eighteen years old and a father seventy-three.

> He early determined to marry and wive,
> For better or worse
> With his elderly nurse—
> Which the poor little boy didn't live to contrive:
> His health didn't thrive,
> No longer alive,
> He died an enfeebled old dotard at five!

In Little Oliver, a page boy in the household of an earl falls in love with the earl's daughter and gallantly declares himself to her father. The earl receives him kindly:

> For, oh! the scene recalled too plainly
> The half-forgotten time when he,
> A boy of nine, had worshipped vainly
> A governess of forty-three!

And for all the conscious and unconscious censorship in the plays, the finale of H.M.S. Pinafore produces the rather bizarre outcome of the former Captain, now fore-top-man, Corcoran, marrying Little Buttercup, his former nurse.

Toward younger women Gilbert's attitude was also ambivalent. His heroines, of course, are all young and pretty, but inclined to be egotistical, fickle, vain and mercenary. In life, his attitude toward young and attractive women was rather excessively 'paternal'. There seems to have been something overdone in all this, and here, too, the finale of H.M.S. Pinafore furnishes a clue. Coincidentally with the marriage of Corcoran and his former nurse, Ralph Rackstraw marries Josephine, the daughter of Rackstraw's brother-nursling and *alter ego*. A daughter—not simply as a young woman but specifically *as daughter*—had a great appeal for Gilbert.

Both Ko-Ko of The Mikado and the Chancellor of Iolanthe were in love with their wards. Gilbert obviously identified himself with the philosophical jester Jack Point of The Yeomen

of the Guard and Jack Point loved his protégée Elsie Maynard. In Pygmalion and Galatea, the sculptor's diatribe against crassly ignorant patrons of the arts indicates Gilbert's identification with Pygmalion, the creative artist. When the statue comes to life, Pygmalion declares: 'I love thee (recollecting himself and releasing her) as a sculptor loves his work'. Later it is agreed that Galatea may love him 'as a father' and he will love her 'as a daughter'. Galatea is dear to him because she never had a mother; she is his child alone. Pygmalion had cursed 'the arrogance of the proud gods' because his creativeness had been limited to the production of inanimate objects. When his statue became alive and caused all sorts of trouble, he concluded that the gods had sent her

> . . . to punish me
> For unreflective and presumptuous prayer!
> I prayed that thou shouldst live—I have my prayer,
> And now I see the fearful consequence
> That must attend it!

Even more interesting is the story of Dan'l Druce, Blacksmith. Druce's life had been ruined when his wife ran off with another man; he became a recluse, a miser, and a misanthrope. Remembering Gilbert's explicit identification with the misanthropic King Gama, one may assume that he also felt some identification with the misanthropic Dan'l Druce. Druce describes the tragedy of his marriage.

> Hast thou e'er known what it is to set thy heart night and day on one object, to dream of it, sleepin' and wakin', to find the hope of it flavorin' thy meat and drink, and weavin' itself so into thy life that every thought o' thy brain is born of it, and every deed o' thy hand has some bearin' on it? And havin' done all this, and so fashioned, and twisted, and turned, and trimmed the chances at thy hand that the one hope o' thy soul shall be helped on by it, hast thou known what it is to find, at one bitter black blow, thy hope made hopeless, thy love loveless, thy life lifeless? So did I hope and pray to be blessed with a little child—so was my hope withered when I thought it sure of fulfilment. I had a store of love in my

> battered heart to *set on some one thing of my creating;* it was there for that one end and for none other. When *she* left me (curse him) I knew, for certain, that one thing could never be of flesh and blood, and it never will, for the love of my heart is given over to the next best thing—gold and silver, gold and silver. Ay, brother, I love my gold as other men love their bairns, it's of my making, and I love it, I love it! I've prayed a thousand times that my gold might take a living form, and the one harmless old hope of my wrecked life might come true.

Druce's dream does come true. Some fleeing soldiers steal his hoard and leave behind a baby girl, whom Druce receives as a miraculous answer to his prayer. Around this child he reconstitutes his life and after all sorts of complications it is, of course, eventually revealed that she really is his daughter, of whom his wife had been pregnant when she deserted him.

Gilbert married in 1867; he had no children. Pygmalion and Galatea was written in 1871; Dan'l Druce, Blacksmith, in 1874. Perhaps Gilbert was lamenting his own childlessness. Apparently, however, the focus of his desire was not a child but a daughter.

Whatever may have been Gilbert's desires toward mother and daughter, he was certainly interested in the relationship between woman and woman, and in the attractiveness of a society composed only of women. In Iolanthe the fairies are all female; there is no Fairy King to accompany the Fairy Queen. The Princess (rewritten as Princess Ida) deals with a wholly female society devoted to the ridiculous project of higher education for women. In Broken Hearts a group of women, disappointed in love, take refuge on an island with a crippled dwarf as their servant and the only male—until a prince arrives in a little boat. In The Wicked World (rewritten as Fallen Fairies), the significant fairy population is female; the fairy king and a few male fairies play only minor roles in the action of the play.

In Iolanthe the fairies get along very well with one another. In the other play there is a good deal of jealousy among them, especially when a man comes on the scene. This notion is

developed in The Wicked World and Fallen Fairies. The fairy world is a super-counterpart of this world; every mortal has an *alter ego* in that happier world. The fairy realm is idyllic perfection; the human world is sad and troubled. In the human world, however, there is something called 'love', which causes most of the trouble but nevertheless seems to be highly valued by mortals. While three male fairies are on a mission to earth, the Fairy Queen summons their human counterparts to Fairyland. The fairies fall in love with them, and all sorts of jealousies and trouble ensue; finally the fairies are glad to return the mortals to the lower world. When, then, the Fairy King declares his intention to import 'love' into Fairyland, the fairies recoil in horror and will have none of it. In Broken Hearts, also, a serene society of women is broken up when a handsome young prince lands on their island.

This is a theme which Gilbert took seriously. 'He said, and he believed, that the real Gilbert was the Gilbert of Broken Hearts and not the Gilbert of The Mikado'*(3)*. The Wicked World, Broken Hearts and Gretchen were 'the dearest of all his work to Gilbert, being the plays in which he strove, in the name of art, to express his conception of life'*(1)*.

Evidently a world of women—being obviously 'sexless'(?)—would be a serene and idyllic world, a 'pure' world. It is the intrusion of men into such a world which introduces 'sex' and its ensuing evils. Browne *(1)* declares that the root idea of The Wicked World is the Great Untempted. Doubtless there is validity to the suggestion. But the basic idea remains. A 'sexless' world of women—even though for lack of temptation —is pure and perfect; it is 'sex' (heterosexuality) which causes all the trouble.

GILBERT AND HIS FATHER

Gilbert lampooned just about every conceivable kind of authoritative or official person. His plays are full of rescues of young women from unsuitable marriages with disagreeable old men. All this is so conventional and so contrived that it does not seem to carry any special emotional investment.

More specific significance, however, may attach to casual references to a 'medical man' by Gilbert whose father was a surgeon. In A Medical Man an impecunious dramatist is too shy to approach a woman; one with whom he has had an exchange of letters pretends to be taken ill outside his door, and he is able to talk to her by pretending to be a doctor. In The Baby's Vengeance, when a sick man sends for a doctor, 'A medical man to his bedside came (I can't remember that doctor's name)'. The casual irrelevance of the parenthetical remark is perhaps suggestive.

More ominous, however, in the œdipal context, is the thought expressed by Pygmalion that the arrogant gods had punished his blasphemous wish to create a living being (to beget a child). And even more significant is the theme of marriage, punishable by death or purchasable at the cost of one's life. Iolanthe incurs, but is remitted, the death penalty for marrying the mortal Chancellor (although there are no male inhabitants of her fairyland) and her fellow fairies violate the fairy law which decrees death for every fairy who marries a mortal—just as all the Druid priestesses in The Pretty Druidess incur the death penalty for marrying Romans. In The Mikado, Nanki-Poo will give his life as the price of a month's marriage to Yum Yum. In the Bab ballad, The Two Majors, the two very martial majors are rivals for the vivandière, Fillette; neither can marry her for fear of the other's vengeance. While they are thus deadlocked, a corporal asks their permission to marry her until they make up their minds: 'I will blow out my brains when your honors decide / Who marries the sweet Vivandière'. In The Yeomen of the Guard, Colonel Fairfax marries just before his scheduled execution. In An Old Score, one Casby, in a conversation intended to break off a mutually unsatisfactory engagement, speaks of the permanent merging of personalities in marriage, and refers to marriage as 'our first death'.

It is not altogether clear whether the shadow which hangs over marriage emanates from the œdipal father or from the destructive mother of the orally fixated child. On the whole, the plays present mother figures as more significant and more

powerful than the corresponding father figures. In The Mikado, the Mikado himself is certainly a cruelly punitive father figure, but he cannot be compared with the horrendous Katisha. In The Gondoliers, The Duke of Plaza Toro is completely overshadowed by his Duchess, and the machinations of the Grand Inquisitor are defeated by the Royal Nurse. In The Yeomen of the Guard, Wilfred Shadbolt, Head Jailor and Assistant Tormentor, is a pale and oafish creature in comparison with Dame Caruthers, Housekeeper to the Tower, with her grim song of devotion to the Tower and its implacable sense of duty:

> The screw may twist and the rack may turn,
> And men may bleed and men may burn,
> On London Town and all its hoard
> It keeps its silent watch and ward.

Gilbert was exactly the same kind of man as his father; there are solid pages in the biographies, describing their personalities and interests, which apply to both of them with equal accuracy. Even the fact that the father was a surgeon in the navy while the son was a barrister and an officer in the militia seems to be only a pseudo difference concealing the basic similarity. But one suspects that Gilbert's imitation of his father was based on rivalry rather than on identification. His remark that 'my father never had any exaggerated idea of my abilities; he thought that if I could write, anyone could, and forthwith he did so' is highly significant—regardless of whether it was true or a projection, and whether it was said seriously or in jest. It is noteworthy that in their literary productions the son did lightly and successfully what the father did ponderously and without achieving equal fame. This may have had a double significance. How could anyone say that his light and frothy operas were written in competition with his father's serious three-decker novels? But it was rather gratifying that his humorous trifles achieved more success and made more money than did his father with his serious efforts! In all respects but one the son outdid the father: the father had children; the son had none.

More specifically, the father had *daughters,* and 'daughter' had a special value for Gilbert.

On the whole, it seems that Gilbert did not get very far in solving—or perhaps even in developing—his œdipal relationships, but more interesting is the manner in which he adapted himself to the situation. His efforts to achieve his masculine identity, he was able to express in actual living through competitive imitation of his cantankerous, aggressive, very 'masculine' father. His deeper concern with the mother-sister apex of the œdipal triangle found expression in the fantasies of his literary productions. The almost total lack of biographical material about his mother suggests the possibility that she may have died while he was quite young; if that supposition be correct, it would go some way toward explaining the difference in his adjustment to the two parental figures. However that may be, there is also the possibility that it was his oral fixation on his mother which hindered the full development and resolution of his attitude toward his father. It is not without significance that, in The Grand Duke, the conspirators against the life of the Grand Duke (an obvious father figure) were betrayed to the chief of his secret police by their private recognition signal of eating a sausage roll.

THE BABY'S VENGEANCE

All of these surmises about Gilbert's personality seem to be summarized and brought together in a Bab ballad to which frequent passing reference has already been made. The Baby's Vengeance tells how Paley Vollaire, having squandered his inherited fortune of several hundred thousand pounds, is dying in squalid penury.

> A medical man to his bedside came
> (I can't remember that doctor's name)
> And said, 'You'll die in a very short while
> If you don't set sail for Madeira's isle'.

Vollaire says he can't afford to go to Madeira; he hasn't even the money to pay the doctor's fee. So the doctor leaves him,

assuring him that he's going to die. Thereupon Vollaire sends for Frederick West, a worthy dustman (garbage collector) with a fair young wife and a hard-earned store of one hundred seventy pounds. To him Vollaire makes this confession. Thirty-seven years ago, a young laundress supplemented her income by serving as a wet nurse. Two baby boys lived with her. One was her own child, whom she neglected; tempted by gifts of money, she ministered bountifully to the other baby, the child of wealthy parents. Vollaire was the woman's own child; neglected and hungry, he sobbed and cursed in his little cradle.

> 'Sometimes, in hatred of my foster-brother,
> I gnashed my gums—which terrified my mother.
>
> One darksome day (I should have mentioned that
> We were alike in dress and baby feature)
> I *in my* cradle having placed the brat,
> Crept into his—the pampered little creature!
> It was imprudent—well, disgraceful may be,
> For, oh! I was a bad, black-hearted baby!
>
> So rare a luxury was food, I think
> There was no wickedness I wouldn't try for it,
> *Now* if I wanted anything to drink
> At any time, I only had to cry for it!
> *Once,* if I dared to weep, the bottle lacking,
> My blubbering involved a serious smacking.'

Everyone was deceived by the substitution. The false Vollaire inherited the fortune of his supposed parents, spent it, is dying, and will now make restitution to Frederick West, the man he defrauded.

> 'And all I have is yours—and yours is mine.
> I still may place you in your true position.
> Give me the pounds you've saved, and I'll resign
> My noble name, my rank, and my condition.
> So for my sin in faudulently owning
> Your vasty wealth, I am at last atoning.'

So the simple Frederick West turns over his one hundred seventy pounds to Paley Vollaire (nothing is said about giving him his wife)

And Fred (entitled to all things there)
He took the fever from Mr. Vollaire,
Which killed poor Frederick West. Meanwhile
Vollaire sailed off to Madeira's isle.

Quite aside from its content, the shocking story has several noteworthy aspects. Paley Vollaire recites with ample feeling his sufferings as a baby and the wickedness of his action; the account of his even more appalling 'restitution' is told without any affect whatever. The doctor's advice is interesting: Vollaire will surely die if he doesn't set sail for Madeira's isle. But why Madeira? Surely Madeira is better known as a producer of wine than as a health resort. Moreover, 'Madeira' means 'wood', and phonetically 'Ma-deira' is obviously 'mother dear'. Is not the doctor saying that Vollaire will die if he does not return to his mother's breast? And is not that just where Vollaire does go, after easing his conscience by his cold-blooded 'restitution'?

This Bab ballad, moreover, casts a new light upon the theme of the nurse who 'mixed those babies up'. Here the mother-nurse gave the foster-nursling the favored position which rightfully belonged to her own child; the transposition was merely symbolic in emotional value. But the physical substitution of one child for the other was not *her* act; it was the act, or fantasy, of that 'bad black-hearted baby'. (In Ruddigore, a witch had put a curse on the baronial house many years before; Robin, the heir to the title, runs away and thus compels his brother Despard to assume the title and the curse.) The standard fantasy of having been exchanged in the cradle—of the prince who is reared by peasants—is a very comforting fantasy; but the fantasy of having ousted and replaced one's rival sibling carries a heavy burden of guilt. It is interesting to note that in The Gentleman in Black, when the Baron tells this same story to Hans, he tells it as a conscious fib, as if the guilt of such an act—even in fantasy—is too great to be comfortable.

Clearly The Baby's Vengeance is a significant fantasy and requires only one correction to make its importance even more manifest. We know—what Gilbert did not explicitly say—that his superseding rival at his mother's breast was not a foster-

brother, but a sister (or sisters). Once that substitution is made, The Baby's Vengeance justifies the reconstruction that has been made of Gilbert's personality.

Gilbert's nurse permitted him to be kidnapped when he was two years old. That could not have been long before or long after the birth of one of his sisters. What better screen memory could have been provided for the truly traumatic rejection which was the real (if symbolic) mixing-up of the babies. What it screened was not the displacement from his mother's breast, but Gilbert's own wicked fantasy of becoming a symbolic kidnapper and doing what Paley Vollaire did. Gilbert's task was even harder than Vollaire's: to make that fantasied substitution, he would not only have had to commit a crime; he would have had to exchange his sex. It seemed obvious to Gilbert that his mother—and perhaps his father, too—preferred a girl baby, a *daughter.*

Here we have a clue to Gilbert's moral fervor and his queer ineffectiveness as a moral philosopher. His constant target was hypocrisy and sham, and surely his mother had been false and hypocritical in 'rejecting' him. But how much greater was his own hypocrisy in pretending to love his mother and his sisters while he entertained that wicked fantasy of 'vengeance'. It was his own sense of guilt which made him a moralist and at the same time prevented him from driving his moral home. He was in the position of Ko-Ko, the felon whom the people of Titipu elected Lord High Executioner,

> . . . for we said
> 'Who's next to be decapited
> Cannot cut off another's head
> Until he's cut his own off.'

All this, of course, does not account for the supreme skill with which Gilbert expressed his fantasies, but it does somewhat explain his enduring popularity. We feel safe in yielding to Gilbert's humorous malice because we are assured that it will never get beyond control—either his or ours. We sense that it is self-limiting and will be kept within bounds. We respond,

not perhaps so much to his specific fantasies, as to the admixture of malice and guilt, so humorously combined that no one is threatened or burdened by either. Perhaps the keynote in which we can all join is his brave but pathetic cry:

> Ah! you've no idea what a poor opinion I have of myself, and how little I deserve it.

A HYPOTHETICAL SUGGESTION ABOUT ARTHUR SULLIVAN

Sullivan's ability as a composer, like Gilbert's ability as a humorist and playwright, is not amenable to psychodynamic explanation, but must be taken as datum. In the present state of our ignorance, we cannot interpret Sullivan's musical themes to identify such fantasies as they may have expressed. But the peculiar relationship that existed between these two men, emphasized by the fact that only the work in which they collaborated has survived in popular acceptance, seems to call for some explanation.

The biographers stress Sullivan's feminine nature (which we do not question) and Gilbert's 'masculinity' (as to which we have suggested some qualification). We have noted Pearson's comment *(12)* that if Sullivan had been a woman they would have made a most successful marriage, and Taylor's comment *(14)* that the final break between them came when Gilbert could no longer endure the fact that he was fonder of Sullivan than Sullivan was of him. The validity of this evaluation of their relationship seems to be highly probable.

There is, however, an item of biographical detail which affords evidence—most tenuous, to be sure—for a tentative but tempting hypothesis. Sullivan told his biographer, Arthur Lawrence, that his grandfather, 'an impoverished young Irish squire', had been inveigled into the army when he was somewhat under the influence of liquor. 'After the battle of Waterloo my grandfather was ordered with a detachment of his regiment to St. Helena, and his wife accompanied him. At first they lived in the regimental quarters close to Longwood, where Napoleon lived, and while there a child was born to my grand-

mother. . . . Amongst Napoleon's companions were General Bertrand, the Comte and Comtesse Montholon, faithful adherents, who preferred to share their exile with Napoleon . . . . The Comtesse Montholon was confined about the same time as my grandmother, and being very ill, could not nurse her child. My grandmother, who was strong and healthy, offered to nurse the child with her own, and so removed to Longwood, where she and her husband remained until Napoleon's death, and my grandfather—who was a man of superior education for those days—became, I believe, paymaster of Napoleon's household. The children were brought up together, and when the little ones were old enough to toddle about, Napoleon would make them the companions of his daily walks, taking one child by each hand, giving them cakes, sweets, etc., and he became very much attached to them both' *(11)*.

The temptation is insuperable to remember Little Buttercup's song:

> Two tender babes I nussed:
> One was of low condition,
> The other, upper crust,
> A regular patrician.

Did Sullivan also entertain the fantasy of the mother-wet nurse who '. . . mixed those children up,/And not a creature knew it'? We have no evidence that this was the case. But it is a fact that Sullivan mingled with the socially elite and hobnobbed with royalty and the nobility. He acted as if he were 'upper crust, a regular patrician'. If this was indeed one of the themes of Sullivan's fantasies, it correlates most interestingly with Gilbert's crucial fantasy. For Sullivan's fantasy was of the standard pattern: identification of oneself with the child of noble birth, who is deprived of rightful recognition through having been brought up by commonplace pseudo parents. This is a happy and consoling fantasy. But if Gilbert's unconscious fantasy was in accord with Sullivan's—and how else could they have collaborated so marvelously—Gilbert must have sensed Sullivan as the embodiment of the younger sister who was

the victim of his fantasied 'vengeance'—the sister-daughter with whom he had identified himself because he had wickedly wished to displace her. This is such an attractive hypothesis that attention must again be called to the slightness of the evidence upon which it is based. On the other hand, in psychoanalytic interpretation the alternative hypothesis of 'mere coincidence' is also suspect.

REFERENCES

1. BROWNE, EDITH A.: *W. S. Gilbert.* London: The Bodley Head; New York: John Lane Company, 1907.
2. CELLIER, FRANCIS AND BRIDGEMAN, CUNNINGHAM: *Gilbert, Sullivan and D'Oyly Carte.* London: Sir Isaac Pitnam & Sons, Ltd., 1927.
3. DARK, SIDNEY AND GREY, ROWLAND: *W. S. Gilbert, His Life and Letters.* London: Methuen & Co., Ltd.; New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923.
4. DARLINGTON, W. H.: *The World of Gilbert and Sullivan.* New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1950.
5. FITZ-GERALD, S. J. ADAIR: *The Story of the Savoy Opera in Gilbert and Sullivan's Days.* New York: Appleton, 1925.
6. *Original Plays by W. S. Gilbert.* London: Chatto and Windus, 1922–1925. This is probably the largest collection (forty in all) of Gilbert's plays.
7. GILBERT, W. S. *The Bab Ballads, with which are included Songs of a Savoyard.* London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1922. It contains the best of the Bab Ballads, with a number of songs from the operas.
8. GOLDBERG, ISAAC: *Sir Wm. S. Gilbert, A Study in Modern Satire.* Boston: Stratford Publishing Co., 1913.
9. ———: *The Story of Gilbert and Sullivan.* New York: Simon & Schuster, 1928.
10. LAMBTON, GERVASE: *Gilbertian Characters and a Discourse on Wm. S. Gilbert's Philosophy in the Savoy Operas.* Philadelphia: Philip Allen, 1931
11. LAWRENCE, ARTHUR: *Sir Arthur Sullivan; Life Story, Letters and Reminiscences.* Chicago and New York: Herbert Stone & Co., 1900.
12. PEARSON, HESKETH: *Gilbert and Sullivan.* New York: Harper & Bros., 1935.
13. SEARLE, TOWNLEY: *Sir William Schwenck Gilbert, A Topsy-Turvy Adventure.* London: Alexander Ouseley, Ltd., 1931.
14. TAYLOR, DEEMS: *Plays and Poems of W. S. Gilbert.* New York: Random House, 1932.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Repression and the Electroencephalogram

Herbert I. Harris

To cite this article: Herbert I. Harris (1952) Repression and the Electroencephalogram, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 402-407, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925888

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925888

Published online: 05 Dec 2017.

REPRESSION AND THE ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM

BY HERBERT I. HARRIS, M.D. (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

Attempts to correlate the material of psychoanalysis with the electrochemical activity of the nervous system which produces it have been few. With his customary breadth of view Freud in 1928 *(1)* suggested such a correlation. The development of the electroencephalogram has opened up a field of observation denied Freud, yet even here it seems as if his vigorous mind foresaw brain waves. In his paper on the Mystic Writing Pad he says,

> My theory was that cathectic innervations are sent out and withdrawn in rapid periodic impulses from within into the completely pervious system Pcpt.-Cs. So long as that system is cathected in this manner, it receives perceptions (which are accompanied by consciousness) and passes the excitation on to the unconscious mnemic systems; but as soon as the cathexis is withdrawn, consciousness is extinguished and the functioning of the system comes to a standstill. . . . I further had a suspicion that this discontinuous method of functioning of the system Pcpt.-Cs. lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time.

Like other human institutions, scientific disciplines, as they mature, take on a certain dogmatic rigidity which may be due to the working of the instinct thanatos in their creators. In so far as they become rigid, new approaches to the discipline are frowned on. Speculation, rife in its young days when the discipline is green in judgment, is treated with impatience or neglect. Yet as Langer *(2)* points out, 'All theory is merely speculation in the light of significant facts'. The following speculations are presented, therefore, with the caution that they be so considered and with the hope that they contain thoughts which will stimulate others to prospecting in this field.

Widespread study of the electrochemical activity of brain tissue shows that the steady state or equilibrium of nerve cells

is rhythmical and sustained until the tissue dies *(1, 2, 3)*. The rhythmical beat of living nerve tissue is found at all biological levels whether it be the optic ganglion of a water beetle or the finely organized brain of a scientist *(5)*. Since the material with which the psychoanalyst deals and the theoretical constructions on which he relies are products of brain tissue activity, study of this activity may uncover neural correlates of some of the theoretical constructs used in psychoanalysis.



Records of Alpha Rhythm from optic ganglion of dipsicus and occipital area of man showing suppression of 'A' rhythm in response to a light stimulus. (Courtesy Prof. E. D. Adrian and Dr. Robert S. Schwab.)

Repression, for example, has been defined by Freud as 'the process by which a mental act capable of becoming conscious is made unconscious and forced back into the unconscious system' *(6)*. Suppression and inhibition have much in common with repression since all three are concerned with preventing the outflow of some form of energy. The energy of the brain recorded by the electroencephalograph makes various patterns, most familiar of which is rhythm 'A' or the Alpha rhythm. For the purposes of this discussion the most interesting thing about rhythm 'A', which is a sinusoidal eight to ten per second wave form, is that it disappears when the subject is stimulated by light, sound, or touch *(4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13)*. In other words, external stimuli coming into the brain appear to suppress or inhibit the type of nerve activity that produces the 'A' rhythm pattern on EEG records (Cf. chart). Is it possible, since all nerve tissue has much in common, that the suppression of

Alpha rhythm by incoming stimuli is a predecessor or simple component of the process of repression? If so, is the suppression of Alpha rhythm by problem solving even more like repression? *(4, 7)*. For in problem solving, stimuli which are thought to originate in one area of the brain apparently suppress 'A' rhythm activity in another area.

If this explanation of the phenomenon be valid it may also give us a lead to the possible neurophysiological division of the brain into conscious and unconscious parts. Such a possibility might be developed through the following reasoning. 1. A large amount of Alpha rhythm or a 'high Alpha index' is found with reliably greater frequency in persons who are passive and receptive *(14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20)*. 2. Such persons daydream or have a richer fantasy life than do active independent persons. It would seem that under the conditions of EEG study—lying or sitting in a quiet darkened room—subjects with a high Alpha index would daydream more actively. 3. The daydream appears to be closely related to night dreaming (an entirely unconscious process) and so more likely to represent partly unconscious brain activity than is such obviously conscious brain work as problem solving. 4. It would then follow that regular Alpha rhythm is more closely allied to unconscious brain activity [1] and the rapid, irregular Beta rhythm obtained when the brain is solving problems allied to conscious cortical activity *(21)*.

A study of the energy involved in cortical activity recorded by the EEG and in the suppression of it by external stimuli may help in the study of the economic aspects of repression. The energy [2] in the light, sound or touch that suppresses the

[1] Even in unconscious brain activity, such as dreaming, repression is at work. The distortion in dreams is evidence of its action. Neurophysiologically this is supported by the effects of sodium amytal on the behavior and the EEG *(22)* of the subject it is given to. Much more energy is released by sodium amytal and recorded by the EEG, and the unrepressed behavior of a subject under sodium amytal is common knowledge.

[2] The energy in stimuli and brain waves is comparable to the energy in 'signals' of calculating machines. It is still energy, however, and is probably of the order of that encountered in photosynthesis, using Einstein's photochemical equivalence law *(29)*.

Alpha rhythm is added to the energy already maintaining a steady state in the nerve tissue producing the Alpha beat *(23, 24, 25, 26, 27)*. In other words, energy from the environment flows into the individual in the form of stimuli and suppresses a rhythmic nerve tissue beat that seems to be more like unconscious than conscious activity. Unconscious brain activity produces primitive and impulsive behavior which society restricts. It would seem possible, then, that the energy in external stimuli may be used by us under certain conditions to help repress antisocial and primitive impulses of all kinds. The energy exchange between us and our environment is seen here to be one in which outside energy flows into us to help repress antisocial impulses which would lower the efficiency with which we attempt to master our environment.

Examples of such use of external energy to aid repression are found in the defensive maneuvers of patients in treatment. Some ask questions, we may hypothesize, to get added energy from the physician's responses in order to repress intolerable thoughts and feelings that are trying to emerge from the unconscious. Others comment on objects in the physician's office and such comment often increases as the physician's continued silence deprives (according to the hypothesis) the forces of repression in the patient of the added external energy necessary to keep the powerful thoughts and feelings from the unconscious in check. These patients, too, become anxious if they close their eyes and so perhaps lose the energy that would flow in through the optic nerves to aid repression. Similarly children, whose capacity to repress is less developed than that of *an adult,*[3] *may become anxious if the therapist is too quiet* and inactive.

Some may attempt to liken the process of repression to the

[3] In the brain waves of children, it is interesting to observe that the changes in their character, as one proceeds from the adult pattern toward infancy, parallel to a considerable degree the changes observed in those of adults going to sleep. This finding would perhaps support the concept of less ego strength, i.e. less effective repressive mechanisms, in the child, and also Freud's reflection that sleep is, in part, a process of withdrawal of the libido to infantile narcissistic levels *(31)*.

negative feedback of calculating machines. Repression may differ from negative feedback in just the way suggested above; namely, that it uses energy from the environment rather than from a process in the machine itself. In so using energy from the environment it achieves a mastery over it that the mechanical brain does not. And, as the writer pointed out in a previous paper, repression as a means of aiding the organism's control of its environment *(30)* is an asset as well as a liability *(28)*.

REFERENCES

1. FREUD: *Gesammelte Schriften, XI.* Vienna: Int. Psa. Verlag, 1928, p. 362. Quoted in Cobb, Stanley: *Borderlands of Psychiatry.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943, p. 127.
2. LANGER, S. K.: *Philosophy in a New Key.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1942.
3. HOAGLAND, HUDSON: *Rhythmic Behavior of the Nervous System.* Science, CIX, February 1949, pp. 157–164.
4. ADRIAN, E. D.: *Brain Rhythm.* Nature, CLIII, 1944, pp. 360–362.
5. HARRIS, HERBERT I.: *Brain Electricity, Observations on the Electroencephalogram.* Bull. of the New England Medical Center, VI, June 1944, pp. 102–105.
6. FREUD: *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis.* New York: Liveright & Co., 1935, p. 299.
7. ADRIAN, E. D. AND MATTHEWS, B. H. C.: *The Berger Rhythm.* Brain, LVII, Part 4, 1934, pp. 355–385.
8. DAVIS, H.; DAVIS, P. A., ET AL.: *Analysis of the Electrical Response of the Human Brain to Auditory Stimulation During Sleep.* Proceedings of American Psychological Assn. Amer. J. of Physiology, CXXVI, 1939, pp. 474–475.
9. DAVIS, P. A.: *Effects of Acoustic Stimuli on the Waking Human Brain.* J. of Neurophysiology, II, 1949, pp. 494–499.
10. TRAVIS, L. E. AND EGAN, J. P.: *Increase in Frequency of Alpha Rhythm.* J. of Experimental Psychology, XXIII, 1938, pp. 384–395.
11. DAVIS, H.; DAVIS, P. A., ET AL.: *Electrical Reactions of the Human Brain to Auditory Stimulation During Sleep.* J. of Physiology, II, 1939, pp. 500–514.
12. BARTLY, S. H.: *Changes in Alpha Rhythm.* J. of Experimental Psychology, XXVII, 1940, pp. 624–639.
13. HADLEY, J. M.: *Relationships Between Electrical Signs of Central and Peripheral Activity: 1. During Rest.* J. of Experimental Psychology, XXVII, 1940, pp. 640–656.
14. HENRY, C. E. AND KNOTT, J. R.: *Note on Relationship Between 'Personality' and the Alpha Rhythm of the EEG.* J. of Experimental Psychology, XXVIII, 1941, pp. 362–366.
15. MOSES, LEON: *Psychodynamic and Electroencephalographic Features in Duodenal Ulcers.* Psychosomatic Medicine, VIII, 1946, pp. 405–409.

16. RUBIN, S. AND BOWMAN, K.: *Electroencephalography and Personality in Peptic Ulcer.* Psychosomatic Medicine, IV, 1942, pp. 309–318.
17. SAUL, L. J.; DAVIS, H.; DAVIS, P. A.: *Psychologic Correlations with the Electroencephalogram.* Psychosomatic Medicine, XI, 1949, pp. 361–376.
18. RUBIN, S. AND MOSES, L.: *EEG Studies in Asthma with Some Personality Correlates.* Psychosomatic Medicine, VI, 1944, pp. 31–39.
19. HENRY, C. E.: *EEG Individual Differences.* J. of Experimental Psychology, XXIX, 1941, pp. 236–247.
20. OSTOW, MORTIMER: *Psychic Function and the Electroencephalogram.* Arch. of Neurology and Psychiatry, LXIV, 1950, pp. 385–400.
21. KENNEDY, J. L., ET AL.: *A New EEG Associated with Thinking.* Science, CVIII, 1948, pp. 527–529.
22. BRAZIER, MARY A. B.; FINESINGER, JACOB E., ET AL.: *Action of Barbiturates on the Cerebral Cortex.* Arch. of Neurology and Psychiatry, LIII, 1945, pp. 51–58.
23. KNOTT, J. R.; HENRY, C. E., ET AL.: *Brain Potentials During Sleep: A Comparative Study of the Dominant and Non-Dominant Alpha Groups.* J. of Experimental Psychology, XXIV, 1939, pp. 157–168.
24. WILLIAMS, A. C.: *Some Physiological Correlates of the EEG.* Arch. of Psychology, XXXIV, 1939, pp. 1–48.
25. TRAVIS, L. E.: *Brain Potentials and the Temporal Course of Consciousness.* J. of Experimental Psychology, XXI, 1937, pp. 302–309.
26. DIAZ-GUERRERO, R., ET AL.: *Sleep of Patients with Manic-Depressive Psychosis (Depressed).* Psychosomatic Medicine, VIII, 1946, pp. 399–404.
27. DAWSON, G. D.: *Cerebral Response to Electrical Stimulus of Peripheral Nerve in Man.* J. of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, X, 1947, pp. 137–140.
28. HARRIS, HERBERT I.: *Repression As A Factor in Learning Theory.* This QUARTERLY, XIX, 1950, pp. 410–411.
29. MILNE, LAURENCE J. AND MARJORIE J.: *The Quantum and Life.* The Scientific Monthly, March 1951, pp. 139–147.
30. BARBER, W.: *Studies on Epilepsy: The Petit Mal Attack as a Response Within the Nervous System to Distress in Organism Environment Integration.* Psychosomatic Medicine, X, 1948, pp. 73–94.
31. GIBBS, FREDERIC A. AND GIBBS, ERNA L.: *Atlas of Encephalography.* Cambridge, Mass.: L. A. Cummings, 1941, p. 50.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Psychoanalysis and Culture. Essays in Honor of Géza Róheim. Edited by George B. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1951. 462 pp.

Edward Glover

To cite this article: Edward Glover (1952) Psychoanalysis and Culture. Essays in Honor of Géza Róheim. Edited by George B. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1951. 462 pp., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 408-438, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925889

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925889

Published online: 05 Dec 2017.

BOOK REVIEWS

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND CULTURE. Essays in Honor of Géza Róheim. Edited by George B. Wilbur and Warner Muensterberger. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1951. 462 pp.

The appearance of this collection of essays, gathered in honor of Dr. Géza Róheim, is more than a personal tribute to the fertility and industry of the long acknowledged leader of psychoanalytic anthropology; it provides us with some measure of the progress of this particular branch of applied psychoanalysis during the past forty years. Indeed it is impossible to assess the quality of this very book without some understanding not only of the development of the psychoanalytic approach to anthropology but of the impact on psychoanalytic anthropology of controlled methods of 'field observation'. Looking back from this distance it is clear that the psychoanalytic pioneers were primarily concerned to secure corroboration from anthropological sources of their discoveries regarding the function and content of the individual 'unconscious'. As time passed, however, psychoanalytic forays into anthropological territory developed into a concerted invasion having the explicit object of establishing the significance of 'primary mental processes' in the hierarchy of anthropological elements. Not unnaturally the more stalwart defenders of school anthropology counterattacked, asserting that psychoanalysts ignored the importance of cultural patterns and employed no scientific controls. This latter criticism was strongly reinforced when modern sociologists began to apply more rigid statistical disciplines to their observational data. And, strange as it may seem, it was perfectly true that in their almost exclusive concern with unconscious derivatives, psychoanalysts had neglected to control their observations by close study of the actual environmental settings of infancy and childhood. Incidentally, their latter-day efforts to rectify this omission have led to a somewhat hasty alliance between the techniques of analytic interpretation and those of child observation, a combination which, however ideal in theory, often arrests the progress of discovery. The existence of repression, for example, could scarcely have been inferred

from simple observation. The gulf between clinical psychology and sociology, between 'central' and 'peripheral' theories of mental function, may one day be bridged by a combination of central and peripheral techniques; in the meantime the absence of common definitions, of methods of control and of agreed limits of interpretation renders a good deal of anthropological team discussion an exercise in logomachy.

However that may be, it was a specially happy thought of the editors of Psychoanalysis and Culture to invite Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein to contribute an introductory chapter on the scope and methodology of what might be called 'clinical anthropology'. These recognized authorities on metapsychology have produced a closely reasoned essay, so close indeed that it is sometimes difficult to see the trees for the wood. It would have suited the purposes of the general reader better had these authors contented themselves with indicating the respective limitations of the anayltic and the sociological method, or, shall we say, have delimited more clearly their respective spheres of influences. It would have been an even greater compliment to Róheim had they made clear that the main stumbling block to progress in psychoanalytic anthropology is the fact that, like sociologists who dabble in psychoanalysis, psychoanalysts who dabble in sociology rarely produce more than evidence of their own postgraduate virtuosity. Only those who, following the example of Róheim, train themselves thoroughly in both disciplines can be expected to produce disciplined contributions to the subject.

It would also have been advantageous had they pointed out that whereas the sociologist's main preoccupation with individual man is limited to the (pre)conscious aspects of his behavior, psychoanalytic anthropology can be subdivided in accordance with whether the observer is interested in 'primary' or 'secondary processes' respectively. There is no more fatal blunder than to confuse these two aspects of mental activity. And it is precisely this confusion which (whether he recognizes it or not) irritates the school anthropologist and makes him scornful of psychoanalytic essays on, for example, the 'national characters' of Western civilization.

Incidentally, among their more positive contributions to the subject, the suggestion of Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein that the formal term 'institutional regulation' should be used to designate the more organized social influences, group preferences, conventions

and systems of child care, calls for comment. This seems an unfortunate choice: the term has already specific connotations not only in metapsychology, where it refers to the organized subdivisions of ego structure, but also in sociology, where it is used to distinguish family from group upbringing.

Reviewing the detailed list of contributions, these are easily divided into three sections: essays on various manifestations of primitive culture, essays on the more sophisticated aspects of civilized societies, and essays, very remotely connected with anthropological problems, which signalize only their authors' desire to pay respect in some form or another to the work of Róheim. The editors have sought to smooth out these sharper distinctions by classifying the contributions under such headings as Culture and Personality, Sociology, Mythology, Art, etc.; but the fact remains that a more thorough application of the editorial razor would have added greatly to the value of the book, by pruning down to the vanishing point the third and nondescript, if not totally irrelevant, group.

Among the essays dealing with primitive cultures, pride of place is given to the contributions of Devereux on the primal scene in Mohave society, of Dyk on sex behavior in the Navajo, of Kluckhohn and Morgan on Navajo dreams, and of Goldfrank on the father image in Blood (Blackfoot) society. This priority is thoroughly justified for not only is there urgent need to examine and record the structure and function of relatively uncontaminated primitive groups but, until some consensus of opinion is established regarding their structures and function, it is not likely that we can achieve any deep understanding of more complex and sophisticated societies.

Indeed to judge from these very essays the problem of contamination, that is to say, the percolation of sophisticated culture to a more primitive group, already threatens the reliability of conclusions regarding the latter type of organization. Many of the utterances of the Mohave, Navajo, and Blackfoot Indians, quoted in these essays, can scarcely be distinguished from conventional opinions to be heard any day in the Old Kent Road or at the Elephant and Castle (which correspond, I imagine, to areas in some of the boroughs of New York in which the moral outlook is rather of the lower-class prudish order, combined however with fairly

bawdy conversation). To be sure, this may only mean that the arts of secondary elaboration or moral fabrication among more primitive societies are more developed than one has, perhaps naïvely, assumed. On the other hand, it may mean that a considerable part of so-called primitive behavior is a contamination product. In either case the anthropological situation is one that calls for the nicest discrimination, to say nothing of maintaining a sharp distinction between the respective products of the primary and of the secondary processes. Otherwise the anthropologist runs the same risk as those psychiatrists who not only confuse schizophrenic symptom products with the general mentality of the schizophrenic group but believe that schizophrenic symptoms somehow bring us 'nearer to the unconscious'. Child analysts have sometimes made the same mistake about the preconscious data of child analysis. Anthropological errors of this kind can to some extent be reduced by grading very carefully the degree of contamination in each group and by refraining from making direct comparisons between groups that belong to different levels.

Incidentally the essay of Devereux renders an additional service by raising again the problem of 'latency' as well as that of the 'primal scene'. His view that the 'latency period' is not a normal and necessary stage in psychosexual development and that its absence in the case of Mohave society 'can be convincingly explained in terms of a tolerant attitude of the adults toward infantile sexuality and instinctual strivings' is not, however, quite so convincing as it sounds. Experience of child guidance shows that where parents adopt a tolerant attitude to the genital manifestations of sexuality, these are more freely expressed both in infancy and prepuberty. But no reliable information exists as to the comparative frequency of these early genital manifestations and no final conclusions can be drawn from variations attributable to parental attitudes. Presumably where tolerance exists throughout the adult group, as is alleged to be the case among the Mohave, as well as in individual families, as is the case in Western cultures, genital impulses will obtain still more frequent expression. This would not, however, exclude the normality of the latency period. The question can be settled only when statistically controlled observations are made and checked by analytic investigation of sample groups selected from a wide cultural range. And incidentally, as the pregenital

regressions occurring at puberty clearly indicate, the existence or absence of a latency period does not depend solely on examination of conscious genital elements.

Moreover, it is necessary to examine more closely than does Devereux the concept of 'tolerance', a subject, incidentally, which is dealt with on comprehensive lines by J. C. Flugel in this same volume. It would appear that when discussing the influence of Mohave behavior on the child's reactions to the 'primal scene' Devereux uses the term tolerance in a restricted sense, namely, the attitude of the Mohave adult to his own genital activities and to those of his children. In other respects, however, it would seem that the influence of explicit or implicit moral inhibition practiced by the Mohave group does not differ greatly from that of other societies, either primitive or sophisticated. In any case the traumatic effects of the so-called 'primal scene' are due not just to the observation of parental coitus but to the simultaneous effect of œdipus excitation and the massive frustration consequent thereon. And it is notorious that the children of those psychoanalysts who make a point of avoiding the conditions of an actual primal scene do not escape traumatic reactions to the unconscious or conscious fantasy of parental coitus. In short, the whole problem bristles with unsolved and often unexamined difficulties.

Among other papers belonging to the 'deep' group, the essays of Zeckel on the totemistic significance of the Unicorn, of Bunker and Lewin on the analytic significance of the etymological root, GN, KN, CN, are well up to current standards of psychoanalytic anthropology.

Turning now to essays on the social characteristics of more complex societies, one cannot but be struck with the fact that when analysts cast off their traditional mooring to unconscious content and venture on the uncharted seas of social speculation, the value of their work depends on the individual factors of perspective and common sense, not to mention training and experience in sociological method. And all this in turn depends on their capacity to distinguish the elaborate products of fabrication and secondary elaboration from the residues of primary processes. Admittedly Main Street is as fruitful a field for anthropological study as are the Trobriand Islands; but clearly the former type of field work calls for more discrimination.

Four essays from this group deserve to be singled out. Two

of these are in a sense introductory, namely, the experimental approach outlined by Spitz in his short article on environment as an etiological factor in psychiatric disturbances, and the joint work of Ronald and Catherine Berndt on the concept of abnormality in an Australian aboriginal society. For although the subject matter of both essays appears to be somewhat remote from the characteristics of modern societies, it is only after practicing such preliminary disciplines that we may safely approach the more complex problem of the pathological determinants of 'disorder' in Western cultures.

With this preamble we may consider the articles of Waelder on authoritarianism and totalitarianism, and of Money-Kyrle on some aspects of state and character in Germany. The former is largely a dialectic consideration of various forms of government, classified in accordance with the manner in which they exercise power, either temporal or spiritual. The influence of these forms on the internal conflict or sense of freedom of the individual is also discussed in the simplest analytic terms of superego function. Waelder traces the differences between totalitarianism and Western democracy to the monistic and pluralistic sense of social values held by the respective protagonists. A closer examination of the instinctual origins of these pluralistic values might have enabled the author to present his case in terms of total displacement of family authority to the state, as distinguished from a variety of partial displacements, or, for the matter of that, in terms of passive as contrasted with active reactions to displaced authority.

Dealing with his subject on such general terms, no anthropologist can go very far astray. It is when they attempt to establish more precise racial differences, and further when they assume a fundamental difference between the racial sheep and the racial goats, that writers put their sagacity to a hazard. Money-Kyrle prefaces his observations on the results of psychiatric interviews carried out on a selected group of German officials, mostly permanent civil servants who had been 'not very active' Nazis, and who might be expected to have a relatively normal, sympathetic attitude to others, with some definitions of e.g. a 'normal individual', a 'normal society', 'authoritarian' and 'humanist' types. These definitions require, as Waelder's paper shows, the most careful consideration and we are left with the uneasy feeling that Money-Kyrle has answered his preliminary questions by begging them. In any case none of the factors, either developmental or environ-

mental, which he establishes for the various Nazi types seems to be specific; a parallel investigation of high-ranking civil servants in Whitehall or Washington would doubtless have disclosed equally striking reactions. In any case it is not to be expected that the technique of the single psychiatric interview, however lengthy, will provide us with reliable correlations between individual development and political behavior, more particularly when, as seems to have been the case, they were carried out as part of a political purge by specialists from a former enemy country with a manifest bias in favor of the ideals of Western democracy. The selection techniques practiced by armies of occupation may or may not prove a useful preamble to making peace treaties, but before the data acquired in the process can be considered a scientific contribution to anthropology they should be controlled by parallel investigations of British or United States civil servants, carried out by German psychiatrists.

It would seem then that one of the most difficult tasks confronting the student of applied psychoanalysis is to create a reliable psychoanalytic sociology. Faced on the one side with the danger of doing nothing more than rediscovering 'the unconscious' in man's sociopolitical end products, and on the other with the risk of allowing his sociopolitical bias and sense of value—in other words, his political countertransferences—to direct his scientific researches, the psychoanalytic sociologist may consider himself lucky to emerge from his study with an untarnished scientific reputation. There is, however, a way out of this difficulty. Progress in individual psychology has depended in the past on isolating and studying those transitional phases of mental function which lie between the great and easily recognizable stages of libido and ego development. It is the task of the psychoanalytic sociologists to perform a like service for sociology. The structure of society is a composite in which the main phases of man's development can be readily recognized. Fascinating as the exercise may be, it is now a work of supererogation to establish links between the most primitive of these phases and the complex products of modern society. On the other hand, it is essential to establish the dynamic balances which, operating through innumerable infrasocietal institutions, determine the behavior of large and complex social groups. These can only be demonstrated convincingly by studying the transitional forms of social organization which lie between the primitive and the

sophisticated forms of social groups. Such investigations of barbaric cultures would have the additional advantage of reducing counter-transferences to a minimum, there being no urgent necessity in such historical explorations to distinguish the sheep from the goats.

From this methodological point of view it is interesting to review the series of essays on art and literature with which the volume closes. For not only does it epitomize the development of psychoanalytic anthropology, but it illustrates both the virtues and defects of the system. An erudite essay by Muensterberger holds closely to the classical tradition of demonstrating the influence of œdipus derivatives in the creation of art products; on the other hand, in his discussion of the position of the primitive 'artist', the author seeks to establish the psychodynamic function of the modern artist by comparing it with the function of what one might call the 'transitional' artist. Bychowski pursues this matter more closely by attempting to outline the transition from the catharsis of the primitive artist to the secondary elaboration of the modern artist. As far as literary products are concerned, the essays of Kanzer on Robert Louis Stevenson and of Pederson-Krag on Keats are purely in the classical analytic tradition; the authors are content to demonstrate the cathartic aspects of œdipal conflict in the work of a poet and an imaginative prose writer.

From all of which it may be concluded that, unlike the poet, the psychoanalytic anthropologist may not presume on his birthright. *Fit non nascitur* would indeed be an excellent heraldic motto for the applied psychoanalyst. Although the academic sociologist is blind to the manifestations of unconscious activity, indeed eschews all interpretations of data that cannot be run through a chi-square, he is respectful of the traditions of the controlled investigation. This aspect of methodology has been unduly neglected by the applied psychoanalyst, who up till now has legitimately presumed on the special information derived from the analysis of individuals. Inevitably, however, he spends a good deal of valuable time rediscovering his own premises. As this handsome volume clearly demonstrates, the time is ripe for a fresh advance. To create a science rather than an art of psychoanalytic anthropology would indeed be a tribute to that doughty and indefatigable pioneer and individualist—Géza Róheim.

EDWARD GLOVER (LONDON)

TOTEM AND TABOO. By Sigmund Freud. Authorized translation by James Strachey. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1952. 161 pp.

The publication of a new translation makes this monograph available in a separate volume, as Dr. A. A. Brill's translation has long been incorporated among The Modern Library's Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud.

In an introductory translator's note, Mr. Strachey states: 'For the purposes of the present, entirely new, version I have made an effort to verify all quotations and references so far as possible; and I have put right a considerable number of inaccuracies which had crept into the German editions'. Mr. Strachey has supplied numerous references and explanatory notes, identifiable from Freud's text by their inclusion between square brackets.

This new edition provides an occasion for rereading this classic in a form and format most highly to be recommended.

R. G.

SUICIDE. By Emile Durkheim. Translated by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson. Edited with an Introduction by George Simpson. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951. 405 pp.

Habent sua fata libelli. That so important a classic should not have reached the English reading public until fifty-three years after its publication in French seems baffling indeed. Today, of course, this work by the initiator of classical sociology will appear anachronistic to anyone acquainted with the literature on suicide, particularly to the psychoanalyst; for, as the editor rightly remarks in his Introduction, the development of psychoanalysis has enabled us to gain new insight into the dynamics of suicide. Nevertheless, even for the psychologically oriented reader the book holds more than merely historical interest. One cannot help being impressed by the wealth of knowledge and the perspicacity revealed in it, and there have certainly been few more compact presentations of socio-psychological problems.

So wide, indeed, is the range of topics treated by the author that one can hardly attempt to review it comprehensively. What may be most interesting to the readers of this QUARTERLY is the influence of psychology and psychiatry on Durkheim's thinking.

Here we are faced with the striking paradox of a man endowed with genuine psychological intuition, who rejected psychological factors as determinants of suicide.

The purely descriptive and nondynamic psychiatry of his time was incapable of serving Durkheim's evaluation of his remarkable observations and statistics. He was as critical of Esquirol's thesis that 'suicide shows all the characteristics of mental alienation', and of its description as a 'monomania' by Brierre de Boismont, as he was of Bourdin's theory which viewed it as a disease *sui generis*, a special form of insanity. 'Clinical experience', he states, 'has never been able to observe a diseased mental impulse in a state of pure isolation; whenever there is lesion of one faculty the others are also attacked, and if these concomitant lesions have not been observed by the believers in monomania, it is because of poorly conducted observations' (p. 60).

Durkheim's own theory is based entirely on the collective principle, the concept of a 'social suicide-rate'. Very briefly, it might be summarized as follows. Two fundamental tendencies, which are inherent in any group or collective agency, create the conditions responsible for the phenomenon of 'social suicide': the tendency to *integrate* its members into a whole and the tendency to *regulate* their feelings and behavior. Any overintensification or weakening of these tendencies results in a specific type of 'suicidogenetic current', and the intensity of this social current determines the 'suicide-rate' of a given society or group. Durkheim thus distinguishes theoretically four (actually three) basic 'social types of suicide': 1. *Weakening of Integration—Egotistical Suicide* (the individual becomes detached from the collective life of the group, places his own personality above that of the group and thus is thrown back upon his own, weaker, resources); 2. *Excessive Integration—Altruistic Suicide* (in Oriental or primitive societies which prescribe the widow's suicide at the death of the husband, the servant's at the death of the master, etc.); 3. *Weakening of Regulation—Anomic Suicide* (individuals rising above or sinking below their class lack proper social pressure, resulting in a spirit of rebellion against collective discipline); 4. *Excessive Regulation—Fatalistic Suicide* (an individual's helplessness under pressure of the rule, considered by Durkheim merely historical and of minor importance). From these basic forms, secondary varieties and

mixed forms are derived, resulting in the diversity of individual manifestations.

The very consistency of this conception, in which everything is reduced to the single factor of a 'social element', led Durkheim into the pitfall he was bent to avoid, unaware, so it seems, that his own view had become as one-sided as those he criticized and rejected. It is true, he granted the premise: 'We see no objection to calling sociology a variety of psychology, if we carefully add that social psychology has its own laws which are not those of individual psychology' (p. 312). But almost immediately he states: 'Not only have we admitted that the social states of mind are qualitatively different from individual ones, but that they are in a sense exterior to individuals'; and he adds: 'The force uniting the conglomerate multitude of individual cases, scattered over the face of the earth, must necessarily be external to each of them' (p. 313). Elsewhere he states: 'The causes which thus fix the contingent of voluntary deaths for a given society or one part of it must then be independent of individuals, since they retain the same intensity no matter what particular persons they operate on' (p. 307).

Durkheim was critical of the philosophical and pessimistic approach of Quételet who held that the suicide rate, being based upon what he called the 'average type', must be immutable in any given society. But he himself arrived at a hardly less fatalistic conclusion: 'From this point of view there is no longer anything mysterious about the stability of the suicide rate, any more than about its individual manifestations. For since each society has its own temperament, unchangeable within brief periods, and since this inclination to suicide has its source in the moral constitution of groups, it must differ from group to group and in each of them remain for long periods practically the same. It is one of the essential elements of social coenæsthesia' (p. 305).

These paradoxes in Durkheim's approach to the problem will hardly surprise the psychoanalyst. They are notable only because they show how much the thinking of this original and keenly scientific mind remained colored by the universal resistance to psychological phenomena. 'Since the system of accepted ideas must be modified to make room for the new order of things and to establish new concepts, men's minds resist through mere inertia', said Durkheim, commenting critically on traditional prejudices and resistances to objective scientific study. But one might add that this

inertia and resistance are particularly inherent in his approach to the problem of suicide.

As this reviewer pointed out elsewhere,[1] the phenomenon of suicide has throughout history aroused the fear and contempt of mankind, baffling those who sought to explore its causes. The most diverse explanations have been advanced, and it is significant that almost without exception they attempted to account for this specifically human phenomenon by external influences or causes. As late as 1910, the same year when the problem of suicide was the subject of a psychoanalytic symposium in Vienna,[2] the Viennese pathologist Bartel published a theory ascribing the disposition to suicide to constitutional abnormalities of the lymphatic system. To the psychologist this thesis and its subsequent elaborations appear no more advanced than the ideas of Montesquieu, who thought to have found the cause of suicide, and of the 'spleen' of the English, in the climate of the British Isles; they certainly seem much less discerning than those of Durkheim.

Indeed, nineteenth century sociology recorded a wealth of astute and valuable observations which have become meaningful only with the development of dynamic psychology. Thus Morselli and Ferri, for instance, arrived at the fundamental fact that suicide and homicide stem from one and the same cause, which they believed to be organic degeneration. Today we know that the common origin of both phenomena lies in the vicissitudes of aggression and, specifically, in the return of homicidal aggression against the ego.

This reviewer fully agrees with the editor that Durkheim's study represents the prototype of systematic attack on the subject with the data, techniques, and knowledge at his disposal, and that 'there is every precedent in his work for believing that he would strive to bring his sociological analysis into harmony with psychoanalysis'.

Psychoanalysts no less than sociologists will find the study of Durkheim's book instructive and rewarding. The editor and translators are to be commended for making the work available in an excellent and remarkably lucid translation.

PAUL FRIEDMAN (NEW YORK)

[1] Friedman, P.: *Sur le Suicide.* Revue Française de Psychanalyse, VIII, 1935, pp. 106-148.

[2] This is the symposium cited in the Editor's Introduction. It was held in 1910, not in 1918 as mentioned there (p. 21).

DEMENTIA PRÆCOX OR THE GROUP OF SCHIZOPHRENIAS. By Eugen Bleuler. New York: International Universities Press, 1950. 548 pp.

Bleuler's Dementia Præcox or the Group of Schizophrenias, was originally published in German in 1911. It seems incredible that this work which revolutionized psychiatric thinking should have been denied to English-speaking psychiatrists for more than forty years. We are indebted to all who had a hand in its publication, especially to Dr. Joseph Zinkin, the translator.

Bleuler, a sensitive and painstaking student, began his investigations in the 1880's when psychiatric research was limited mainly to brain pathology, and diagnostic criteria were only in the process of formulation. In 1899, Kraepelin classified the so-called 'deteriorating psychoses' under the heading of Dementia Præcox, subdividing this group according to its predominant catatonic, hebephrenic, or paranoid symptomatology. These diagnoses were based on what Bleuler came later to call accessory symptoms—delusions, hallucinations, motor expressions, silly behavior, etc. Many patients who showed these symptoms suffered from alcoholism, infectious diseases, senility, or other organic involvement that had only an incidental connection with the functional psychoses, but were grouped with them because of the apparent similarity of symptomatology. Bleuler's great contribution was the discovery that only in true dementia præcox were what he called the fundamental symptoms to be found: disturbances of association and affectivity, intense ambivalence, and a predilection for fantasy. He also pointed out that in certain cases of alcoholism, where the accessory symptoms were usually attributed to alcohol, the fundamental symptoms were also present. In these cases he felt that the alcoholism itself could be understood as a secondary manifestation of the fundamental (schizoid) process. This was equally true for other predominantly organic syndromes where the underlying fundamental symptoms could be found. By isolating for the first time the specific symptomatology of the dementia præcox group of psychoses, Bleuler went a considerable distance toward bringing order out of the well-nigh hopeless confusion existing at that time. In place of the misleading term 'dementia præcox' which had become meaningless since these patients showed neither the dementia nor the precocious onset formerly associated with the disease, Bleuler coined the word,

'schizophrenia', to emphasize the fundamental disharmony or 'split' in the personality that was specific for this disorder and for no other.

Although Bleuler understood and never lost interest in the possible organic origin of schizophrenia, (as evidenced, for example, by the fact that he uses the term deterioration sometimes in an organic and sometimes in a nonorganic sense), he directed his attention mainly toward the psychology of schizophrenia. To further his understanding of this disease, he did something which very few psychiatrists have ever done. For twelve years, roughly from 1885 to 1897, unhampered by family ties or outside interests, he devoted himself to a study of the schizophrenic patients at the mental hospital in Rheinau, Switzerland. He lived at the hospital and spent almost all his time with patients, lending them a sympathetic ear and bending every effort to understand what they were saying and doing. He left Rheinau to become the Director of Burghölzli, with Jung as his first assistant. During the next decade he made an intensive study of Freud's works, became acquainted with Freud personally, and worked in close collaboration with many gifted psychoanalytic minds. Bleuler's great knowledge of schizophrenia gained through his experience at Rheinau and Burghölzli, plus the insights gained through his study of psychoanalysis, made it possible for him to create a new school of dynamic psychiatry. Burghölzli became a Mecca, attracting students from all over the world. Our debt to this small group of men who had such a tremendous influence on the development of dynamic psychiatry is incalculable. Our special debt to one man in particular is acknowledged by Bleuler on page 389 of his text where he says, '. . . we still owe it only to Freud that it has become possible to explain the special symptomatology of schizophrenia'.

To the modern psychiatrist who works actively with schizophrenic patients, the book will prove disappointing in some respects. Because Bleuler's influence on modern psychiatry has been so great much of what appeared new and inspiring in 1911 is now commonplace. Bleuler's brilliant reclassification of diagnostic categories, his refinement of terminology, and his dynamic approach to mental disease have become part of our psychiatric curriculum. In a sense, then, this book is dated because it has already done the job it was intended to do. Nowadays, those of us who favor a dynamic approach take much for granted that Bleuler is at pains to explain. What the present-day psychotherapist looks for, and what is con-

spicuously lacking in this book, is Bleuler's method of psychotherapy. It is a reflection of the times rather than on the author that in five hundred pages of text only eighteen are devoted to therapy. From Bleuler's son, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Zurich and Director of Burghölzli, as well as from Dr. H. Nunberg, Dr. A. A. Brill, and others, I understand that Bleuler did much psychotherapy on an experimental basis. It is unfortunate that he tells us nothing of his therapeutic approach and results.

This book, nonetheless, should be required reading for any psychiatrist who would understand and treat schizophrenic patients. As a stimulus to dynamic thinking, the case material and theoretical discussion are incomparable. The very concept of the fundamental symptoms compels the reader to think: are they evidence of an organic predisposition, as Bleuler believed, or are they not rather the unrepressed manifestations of the unconscious that exists in all of us; is it not true that these fundamental symptoms are also found in normal people; is there any individual free of ambivalence, disturbed affectivity and association, and a predisposition to fantasy? In the schizophrenic, to be sure, the unconscious is not controlled by the healthy defenses of the normal person but bursts forth in delusions, hallucinations, etc. Is not this difference between the normal and the schizophrenic one of degree rather than of kind? It is my belief that anyone can become schizophrenic, no matter how healthy his development might have been. There is no such thing as mental health that can withstand all destructive environmental influences. I realize, of course, that there are degrees of susceptibility and that to a given trauma one individual might respond with schizophrenic and another with neurotic symptoms. To believe, however, that nothing could convert the neurotic into a schizophrenic seems to me wishful thinking. Once the shaky neurotic defenses give way, the unconscious pours out or, in the terminology of Bleuler, both fundamental and accessory symptoms are manifested. The disappearance of the accessory symptoms and the diminished intensity of the fundamental symptoms indicate that the unconscious has been returned to where it belongs, betraying its presence only in times of stress and in dream life. But this does not mean, as Bleuler indicates, that the patient is still schizophrenic. It implies, rather, that he is potentially schizophrenic—as are we all. What constitutes cure, recovery, or even improvement, for that matter, is still debatable.

The book is replete with numerous examples of schizophrenic productions which challenge the analytic imagination of the reader and would furnish fascinating material for seminar discussion. For example,

> In a certain case of abortive ecstasy, the patient, after taking communion, felt, 'Bathed for two whole days in an infinite, heavenly happiness so that all he could do was cry with sheer joy'. The schizophrenic ecstatic mood can also be transferred to quite insignificant things. Thus a catatonic with ecstatic expression verbigerates, 'I have knitted, I have knitted, I have knitted, yes, indeed, I have knitted (she had never as yet done any work in the hospital); it was beautiful, wonderful! These beautiful embroidered curtains! (there were no curtains at all). When the curtains were parted, how they did sing! ('Who was there?') Mother was there, everyone was there, etc., etc. I follow the Lord God!'

Interpreted on the oral level, following B. D. Lewin's analysis of the dream screen, the embroidered curtains might represent mother's undergarment and, when the patient says, 'Mother was there', she refers to the breast, i.e., to the dream screen. The ecstasy experienced by the patient is the blissful oral satisfaction of the infant. Following Abraham's analysis in his paper on the first pregenital level, emphasis would be placed on the knitting (masturbation); the parted curtains would be interpreted as the parted labia, and the exposed genital, which the unconscious equates with the breast, provides the medium through which the patient can relive the oral ecstasy she once knew and longs to re-experience. In both instances, there is a complete merging of the ego with the superego (the mother with the child).

I ask the reader's indulgence for my personal speculations on those parts of the book most interesting to me. Bleuler's case material is unusually rich in content and lends itself readily to dynamic understanding. I found this part of the book most stimulating, and in the long run it may prove to be the book's greatest usefulness to the modern student.

JOHN N. ROSEN (NEW YORK)

A PRIMER FOR PSYCHOTHERAPISTS. By Kenneth Mark Colby, M.D. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1951. 167 pp.

It is a brave man who undertakes to write a text book on psychotherapy. While psychoanalysis has gone far in developing a coherent body of theoretical concepts and a method of applying these

concepts in standard analytic treatment, the use of analytic insights in other therapeutic approaches has yet to be reduced to any kind of transmissible formulation. To formulate the unformulated for an audience of beginners in psychotherapy is therefore an undertaking beset with inevitable difficulties. Dr. Colby's book, despite a great deal of excellent content, does not entirely succeed in surmounting these difficulties. To put the matter briefly: Dr. Colby gives his readers valuable instruction in the minute-to-minute management of a variety of therapeutic interview situations, but does not succeed, in my opinion, in conveying a picture of the over-all management of the therapy of a neurosis.

The author addresses himself to 'the beginners in psychotherapy . . . interns or residents in psychiatric hospitals, practicing psychiatrists, clinical psychologists and psychiatric social workers'. The initial chapters, dealing with the selection of patients, the qualifications of the therapist, and details of procedure and physical set-up, contain sound counsel which should be helpful to any beginner. Perhaps the one piece of practical advice with which analysts would most readily disagree is the injunction, 'If it is at all possible, use a couch'. At least the beginner should be made aware that this is a debatable point, and that the use of the couch involves much more than just the question of the therapist's comfort. The first portion of the book also presents a short statement of basic analytic concepts. The author assumes that his readers will have read and mastered Fenichel's The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis. For his audience, this is a large assumption, but it has led him to reduce his discussion of basic theory to an absolute minimum, and unfortunately parts of it are couched in language which cannot be very meaningful to the neophyte. Take, for example, the following formulation (p. 6); 'More specifically, a wish (internal tension-producing stimulus) may be totally gratified (tension discharged), totally denied (tension bound), or both gratified and denied (partially discharged, partially bound). The binding process is thought of in terms of defenses'; or this definition of the ego (p. 11): 'Here I use the term "ego" to mean acting wish-defense systems (including the superego as a crystallization of special systems) organized and differentiated to mediate between the external world and internal strivings'. The book would render a much greater service to its users if the author had set out to formulate the basic theoretical concepts from scratch, as though his readers knew nothing about them. Among other advantages of this approach, it

would make the book a more self-contained work and permit the reader, as he goes through the clinical discussions, to refer to the chapter on theory, instead of sending him off to a frequently discouraging struggle with Fenichel.

The meat of this book is contained in three chapters on the beginning, the 'middle course' and the ending of therapy. These chapters consist of verbatim reports of sessions with patients, interlarded with comments as to what is going on. Here Dr. Colby is at his best. He gives one the impression of being a gentle, tactful, skilful therapist, and he succeeds very well in conveying the texture of a well-conducted session. He has obviously given much thought to formulating exactly how he meets specific problems, and he does a good job of teaching the beginning therapist how to handle a variety of situations of the sort that are commonplace in day-to-day clinical experience. These verbatim accounts can be read with profit by anyone interested in learning something about psychotherapy.

Where the author has fallen short is in his failure to weld these individual sessions into a coherent picture of the treatment of a patient. In the chapter on Beginning the Therapy, Dr. Colby says: 'Upon establishing, usually after the first or second interview, working clinical and dynamic diagnosis, along with an estimate of the patient's suitability for psychotherapy, the therapist proceeds to plan his future moves'. Many analysts who have wrestled with the problems of psychotherapy will agree with this statement, while perhaps being less sanguine about the feasibility of reaching such conclusions in one or two interviews. But the rather off-hand way in which the author tosses out this advice is misleading; it gives the beginner no hint of the complexities involved, in most cases, in the attempt to reach an early formulation and plan of treatment.

Having presented this proposition, Dr. Colby seems to have made rather little effort to show his readers how it is done. It might have been helpful, for example, to devote the three chapters on therapy to one patient instead of three. This would have made it possible to show in detail how a dynamic formulation and plan of therapy were reached and carried through to the end of treatment. The sacrifice in variety might have given the reader a better idea as to what is involved in the task of formulating and planning in psychotherapy.

But this is not the whole story. The concept of 'planning' in psychotherapy (which is taken for granted in this work) is not such

an open and shut matter as it may seem. Many other problems in psychotherapy remain unsettled or poorly understood: e.g., the nature and use of the transference, the effect of interpretations, the use of dreams, the extent to which uncovering is possible, etc. It is true that these theoretical considerations have no place in the content of a book of this type, but an awareness of their existence should inspire a great feeling of tentativeness in anyone who approaches the task of teaching this largely unformulated art to its neophyte practitioners.

DAVID KAIRYS (NEW YORK)

RECENT PROGRESS IN PSYCHIATRY. Edited by G. W. T. H. Fleming. Journal of Mental Science, Special Issue. London: J. and A. Churchill, Ltd. 711 pp.

This second volume consists, as did its predecessor seven years ago, of a collection of papers by various British writers, covering a wide field of psychiatric and ancillary subjects. There are twenty-four articles, dealing with such diverse topics as Psychiatric Genetics, Cybernetics, Physiological Psychology, Intelligence Testing, Schizophrenia, Epilepsy, Insulin Therapy, Suicide, etc. Each article is accompanied by an extensive bibliography, and a conscientious effort has been made to bring as much as possible of the plethora of published literature under consideration as could be encompassed within seven hundred odd pages. From this point of view, the volume is a useful one for the reference shelf.

The general emphasis of the articles is on the organic aspects of psychiatry, and these aspects and the developments in physical therapy are competently summarized.

The psychoanalyst, however, will find the book disappointing in the eclecticism of those articles which touch more specifically on psychotherapy, psychodynamics, and psychopathology. Fairly profuse references are made to psychoanalytic literature, but a lack of understanding of fundamental concepts has prevented correlation and synthesis. The presentation of material has been obscured by an overemphasis on divergent trends and controversial issues, so that the reader for whom the volume is intended is likely to be left confused and bewildered.

ALEXANDER BROMLEY (NEW YORK)

KUNAPIPI. By Ronald M. Berndt. Melbourne, Australia: F. W. Cheshire, 1951. 223 pp.

From the point of view of psychoanalysis the data in this book are remarkable because of the transparent sexual symbolism: for example, large conical mats used in rituals consciously represent the uterus; the *rangga* sticks, beside being totemic emblems, are penes which when not used ritually are kept in these mats. The parallelism with Central Australia is striking; there the *tjurunga* symbolizes the penis, the totemic caves, the uterus. However, in Central Australia this content is not conscious and when the reviewer demonstrated its meaning many years ago, anthropologists looked incredulous and very wise. The myth of Djanggawul is very close to the Central Australian 'wild-cat' mythology in which Malpunga, whose penis breaks through mountains, is the leading hero.

Djanggawul had an elongated penis and his two sisters had elongated clitori which dragged on the ground as they walked. From time to time Djanggawul would lift their clitori to one side and put his hand into the uteri to remove many children of both sexes which are the ancestors of the present aborigines (p. 7). Translated into the language of Central Australian mythology, this would mean that the phallic wild-cat ancestors wandered about and left spirit-children—which emanated from their *tjurungas* or pouches—wherever they went.

In the Central Australian version, the feminine element is repressed and represented by symbols only. Whereas up to the present all other Australian tribes have been shown to have a male type of religion and mythology, Berndt presents something quite different: 'This Mother is always present behind the ritual, the dancing and the singing. She is a symbol of the productive qualities of the earth, the eternal replenisher of human and natural resources; it was from her uterus that human and totemic beings came forth. She has no totem herself nor is she a totemic concept; she does not herself perform totemic ritual although her neophytes do' (p. 13). Compare this with the Euahlayi: 'Byamee (the All Father) had a totem name for every part of his body even to a different one for each finger and toe. And when he was passing on to fresh fields he gave each kinship of the tribe he was leaving one of his totems.'[1] In this area the female significance of symbols

[1] Parker, K. Langloh: *The Euahlayi Tribe.* London: Archibald Constable, 1905, p. 7.

is emphasized at the expense of the male. Thus Berndt tells us that the sound of the bull-roarer is the Fertility Mother's voice and the object itself symbolizes the uterus (p. 37). Everywhere else in the world the bull-roarer, an oblong piece of wood swung on a string, is used at the initiation of males as thunder-magic. For obvious reasons this swinging motion with increased rapidity is more likely to be a phallic than a uterine symbol. There is, in addition, the striking fact that here the neophytes at puberty enter into and are reborn from a female being, which in most areas is a male. Since it has to do with birth, the male symbolism is secondary.

Ceremonial promiscuity is part of the ritual. Some women in order to stimulate the men 'take up a piece of stick and hold it erect like a man's penis and moving it up and down as in coitus' (p. 51). At one phase of the ritual the women march around with the mythical snake and forbid the men to look 'or your bellies will come up like pregnant women' (p. 50).

With these proofs of penis envy among the women, a quotation will show the castration anxiety of the men: 'In some regions, as along the Roper River, there is a belief that a man's body may not touch the woman during coitus. During the act he suspends himself above the woman or inserts paper bark between their bodies. It is said that the sweat of the woman is possessed of great potency which if transferred to the man will cause harm' (pp. 51–52).

This book is so full of interesting data that a review cannot do it justice and the reader is advised to obtain his knowledge firsthand.

GÉZA RÓHEIM (NEW YORK)

THE HEALTH OF THE MIND. By J. R. Rees, M.D. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1951. 207 pp.

This little volume by the Director of the World Federation for Mental Health is a presentation of general mental hygiene principles designed for the lay reader. Some of the chapter headings are: The Physical Machine; Mind and Body; Psychological Mechanisms: Mental Breakdown, its Cause and its Cure; Sex Education; The Art of Adjustment. The general orientation is dynamic—the presentation sound and highly readable. The book is a useful addi-

tion to the growing number of dependable psychiatric books for the nonmedical reader.

WINFRED OVERHOLSER (WASHINGTON, D. C.)

SEX OFFENSES. THE PROBLEMS, CAUSES AND PREVENTION. By Manfred Guttmacher. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1951. 159 pp.

This volume is the substance of Dr. Guttmacher's addresses at Stanford University in 1950 as participant in the annual Jacob Gimbel Lectures on Sex Psychology. In it is compressed the work and viewpoint of a psychiatrist of twenty years' experience in criminal courts, developed under the pressure of the urgent social needs of the courts. The author frequently explains that his numerous 'vignetted and silhouetted' case reports suffer from a lack of depth because of the restrictions of time imposed on court examiners. The psychoanalyst reading this volume will feel perhaps that the lectures lack penetration into the unconscious determinants of sexual offenses or in illumination of the interplay between defensive and instinctual forces in the sexual offender. The author recognizes this but in an attempt to visualize the first line of sociopsychological defense, he aims to dispel not uncommon misconceptions concerning the sexual criminal.

The opening lecture presents prevalent prejudices, (some of them included in recognized psychiatric writings), and theories that are not entirely supportable factually. There is a discussion on the paucity of biological correlation with the present state of knowledge of psychosexual development. The clinical section describes rapists, exhibitionists, pedophiliacs, fetishists, incest offenders and homosexuals. The inaccessibility of the individual offender is offset, the author feels, by information gained from the Rorschach and other projective tests. For the difficulty in establishing personal relationships, the plausible explanation is given that the criminal act is an impulsive essay into such a relationship. In this connection, the unconscious seductive participation of the child victim of a pedophilic attack is a subject which requires further study. There is a discussion of the part played by psychosis and mental deficiency in the sex criminal, and a note on the extreme phenomenological variability in the surface presented by the offender and in the psychological meaning of his specific crime.

Without precise knowledge of the etiology of criminal sexual deviation, prevention and treatment necessarily must be empirical. The author's plea is for a sustained coördination of medical science and legal procedure, embodied in a comprehensive plan for institutes under the auspices of the World Health Organization, as the basis for a serious attack on the problem of criminal activity.

WALTER BROMBERG (SACRAMENTO)

THE PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By William James. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1950. 689 pp.

This volume is the reprinting of James's famous 'longer course', published first in 1890 and not reprinted since 1907. It is not only *the* American classic of psychology but, to this reviewer's mind, is unequalled in breadth and scope in the entire psychological literature.

It is reprinted at just the right time. The hegemony of conditioned response in psychology has been broken. Gestalt psychology, Tolman's purposive behaviorism, Allport's psychology of the personality and the ego and, last but not least, the attacks of physiological psychologists (Lashley, Kluever, Hebb) delivered the decisive blows. The impact of psychoanalysis on psychology—partly through the growth of clinical psychology, though planless and untutored—also did its share. Conditioned-response psychology—'the psychology of the empty organism'—is dead, but it does not seem to take cognizance of the fact. It attempts to rejuvenate itself by a marriage of convenience with psychoanalysis: 'you give me the goods, and I'll give you the respectability'. And Sears's, Dollard and Miller's, as well as Mowrer's attempts to this end will be sooner or later recognized as showing that psychoanalysis has to be emasculated before it will fit the conditioning robes of academic respectability, and that conditioning theory, when trying to adapt itself to clinical reality and psychoanalysis, produces wilder flights of speculation, and more striking disregard for established clinical fact and psychoanalytic theory than any disregard for experimentally established facts and theory built on them to which accusing academic fingers could point in psychoanalysis. The main reason that conditioning theory, though dead, does not lie down is that no broad and bold synthesis has arisen to sweep it aside.

But now James is republished: one of the fathers of American positivism speaks again. Much of what he said may be interpreted as carrying the message: Conditioning? Law of effect? No introspection? Experiments which ask no essential questions of nature? Facts that should speak for themselves and reveal the nature of the mind without theory? This is not what I meant by positivism!

Here is a general psychology which regards psychology in relation to philosophy and epistemology, clearly envisaging that ultimately every psychology depends on the stand it takes in regard to the possibility of attaining knowledge. James rejects the Platonic, as well as the Locke-Hume, solution: neither the 'soul' nor the 'soulless mechanics of ideas' for him.

Here is a psychology in which pathological phenomena have as much place and are as much regarded as are 'normal' phenomena, everyday observations as much as experimental facts, brain- and perceptual-physiology of the time as much as psychological data.

Here is a psychology which, though preoccupied with habit and memory dynamics, centers on the self and on thought defined in the broadest possible sense. James's is a psychology in which the virtues of experiment are extolled, yet self-observation and the comparative method are given a status equal to experiment's.

Here is a psychology which is a positivist's, and yet purposes and goals have as much place in it as do causes, facts of behavior as much place as Brentano's intentionality (i.e., the object directedness of all psychic acts).

For the psychoanalyst, as well as the dynamics psychologist, the republication of James is an important event. If read carefully it is found to contain a blueprint for a psychology broad enough to have space and place for all that psychoanalysis and academic psychology have discovered to date. It is not a rival of the many psychologies that exist now; it is a view of psychology catholic enough to lead the reader's mind toward a broad synthesis. Perhaps Schilder's Medical Psychology is the only volume since James's which has as broad a synthesizing scope as his, but none, including Schilder's, is as free of the partisanship and premature commitment which limit scope. Though dated in its details, its main lines are still as valid as ever.

DAVID RAPAPORT (STOCKBRIDGE)

AN INTRODUCTION TO MODERN PSYCHOLOGY. By O. L. Zangwill. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950. 227 pp.

This is a well-intended book, the author stating at the beginning that he wishes to present modern psychology in terms of its physiological aspects. However, Zangwill finds himself in the unenviable position of attempting to treat psychology as a body of verifiable data but unable to by-pass the wealth of psychoanalytic findings.

Since this book is reviewed from the psychoanalytic point of view, I consider this contradiction one of the major shortcomings of the book. Interestingly enough, Chapter 7, Psychoanalysis and General Psychology, is adequate within the scope of the book. In his introduction to this chapter, however, Zangwill states that to the academic psychologist the data of Freud's theory ought to be viewed with suspicion and scepticism, and admonishes the reader to bear in mind 'the shrewd verdict of the Scottish legal code—*not proven*'. In other words, from Zangwill's point of view, psychoanalysis has no place in a book on psychology.

The author's attitude can be further demonstrated by his naïve comments, as in the chapter Modern Physiological Psychology (p. 130): 'In the unfolding of instinct, then, the vicissitudes of early environment may prove to have greater significance than is commonly supposed'. Or (p. 156), in speaking of identical twins reared apart he says, 'In one such pair a difference of nearly four years in mental age was ascertained. This finding leads one to think that the influence of education and environment upon test performance is somewhat greater than is often supposed.' In the same chapter (p. 161) he presents the supposition, and proceeds to support it on the basis of one single investigation, that 'the more intelligent an individual, the more capably will he cope with his personal problems'; conversely, 'the duller an individual the more prone will he be to succumb to psychoneurotic illness'!

While the reviewer could not recommend this book without a correction of those parts, he would like to point out the excellent chapter on Psychology and the Future. In a coördination between psychology and brain physiology and between psychology and neurology, the author foresees fruitful results. Unfortunately, recent work in the United States is not mentioned.

MARCEL HEIMAN (NEW YORK)

CHANGING CONCEPTS OF THE BIBLE. A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS WORDS, SYMBOLS AND BELIEFS. By Werner Wolff. New York: Hermitage House, Inc., 1951. 473 pp.

According to the Talmud, each generation writes its own commentary of the Law. In this fashion the Bible, ancient source of inspiration and authority, is brought into consonance with the changing conditions of life and with man's advancing insight into himself and the world about him. Attempts to reconcile the traditional authority for morality with current scientific knowledge have characterized the writings of philosophers like Philo of Alexandria, Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron) and Maimonides, to mention but a few. This book represents a twentieth century effort in the same direction. In this instance, however, the reinterpretation is in terms of modern dynamic philosophy, metaphysics and psychology.

Ostensibly it is the author's purpose to bring to light the collective metaphysical and psychological concepts of 'Biblical man' through a symbolic interpretation of the story of Genesis. The unity of these concepts, he maintains, once served as the basis for the value systems of our culture and enabled the Biblical man to 'overcome social insecurity, the bewilderment of the mind, and anxiety of the soul', as well as the narcissistic mortification of personal extinction.

The methodology of this reinterpretation the author calls 'metapsychology in Biblical research; it is an analysis based upon scientific methods of psychology brought to bear upon metaphysical problems. Hence the objections to the interpretations of theologians, as well as those of psychoanalysis, would not apply to our analysis.' The term 'metapsychology' is used in a sense quite different from its use in psychoanalysis. A wealth of standard symbols culled from folklore, mythology, mysticism and comparative religion is marshalled according to the principles of depth psychology (Jung). Taken together with semantic and anthropological data, this material is used to interpret the story of Genesis in the same manner as a psychoanalyst, apparently, would use associations to interpret a dream. This analysis is carried through with daring imagination and is conveyed to the reader in a highly lucid and elegant style. The result is an intriguing volume which makes

fascinating reading. The credulity of the average psychoanalyst, already strained by the loose and polymorphous symbolization of 'depth' psychology, is in this instance taxed even more by the frequent recurrence of tenuous symbolic connections and associations which are *non sequiturs*. This so-called metapsychological reinterpretation of the Bible, which resolves every perplexity and which illuminates every obscurity, fails nevertheless to leave the reader convinced.

As the personal document of the search by a highly erudite individual for a sense of integrity in a world whose base is built on stubble, this record of return to the inspiration of his youth, the Bible, for guidance makes intriguing reading. Certain chapters on symbolism, especially the section on the significance of trees, collate data which should stimulate psychoanalytic research.

JACOB A. ARLOW (NEW YORK)

PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES IN SOCIAL CASEWORK. Selected Articles, 1940-1950. Edited by Cora Kasius. New York: Family Service Association of America, 1950. 433 pp.

This book is a compilation of thirty-two articles selected by the advisory committee and the editor of the journal, Social Casework, with the objective of supplying a textbook of trends in the field of casework during the decade of the forties. The articles chosen include papers delivered before certain groups and republished here. Six are written by psychoanalysts who have served as consultants to social agencies or who have offered institutes for social workers: Drs. Leroy M. A. Maeder, Grete L. Bibring, H. M. Margolis and Jules Coleman. Seven are written by one-time members of the advisory committee and in one instance, three papers are by the same author.

In a Foreword the editor lists four major trends discernable in the decade of the forties: 1, a process of synthesis and integration, both of knowledge and method; 2, the art of helping has moved on to a more extensive social, cultural and clinical knowledge; 3, therapeutic experiences are more completely understood and relationship factors are under more disciplined control; 4, theoretical and technical differences between the functional and the

diagnostic schools of thought have come to be better understood.

Although examples of these points are found in the papers selected, it is not possible to detect any steps in the development of such trends. Rather, we find articles descriptive of different fields: public assistance, family welfare, and medical social work.

It is interesting to note the contrast between a paper written in 1941 on The Underlying Philosophy in Social Casework and a second paper by the same author written in 1948, entitled The Growth of a Profession, showing the way one experienced worker has increased her own skills and enlarged her perspective.

Part II deals in a detailed manner with some technical aspects of field supervision and of curriculum in the schools. The first four and the eighth papers, drawn chiefly from the data of committees, will appeal to a limited group. The material is the product of considerable group discussion. A brilliant paper is one entitled The Field Supervisor as Educator by Eleanor Neustaedter (p. 200).

The third section is about practice. Five of the twelve contributions are written by doctors. Unfortunately, four are from the same meeting in Boston. One can say that this section does not show how casework practice grew to be different in 1950 than in 1940. Country-wide, this decade offered many illustrations of rapid refinement of techniques and skills.

This is a book which will chiefly interest teachers and supervisors of casework. Someday it may be of some assistance to an author who undertakes the history of social work. The impression is gained that the editor and her committee, who received many requests for reprints of articles, have selected those with generic emphasis and have grouped them into book form. If this is kept in mind the book is of value, but disappointing if one looks for fulfilment of its stated promise: 'This compilation reflects the major trends of the period'. One minor lack is that nowhere are the authors identified as to affiliation or experience. Some names will be recognized only by social workers in the East who represent schools and agencies in New York and New England. On the whole, however, since the literature is all too scanty on these subjects, this book is a welcome addition to a social worker's professional bookshelf.

ELISABETH B. BECH (CLINTON, NEW JERSEY)

IT'S MINE! By Elly McKean. With a foreword by Lawrence K. Frank. New York: Vanguard Press, Inc., 1951. 18 pp.

This is a book about learning to share one's possessions. To this end, it has thirty-two photographs illustrating daily events involving Randy, a boy about four years old, his playmates, and his parents.

The pictures are so dramatic that they are almost sufficient to convey the story. The captions serve to explain, in lay terms, the psychiatric implications, the dynamics of object relationship: the child must sufficiently receive before he can give—whether it be of love or of possessions (symbols of love). Clearly and simply pictures and text portray the dynamics of establishing ego boundaries and relationship to one's own possessions and those of others.

Lawrence Frank's foreword, which like all the written text is in quasi blank verse, is simple and explicit.

The format, designed by Jerome Kuhl, is excellent. While a few pages contain only photograph or only print, most of them are about half picture, half text; the number and color of the printed lines gives an unusually pleasing and stimulating effect to the eye, a successful application of visual education.

Psychodynamics, so well integrated in such an agreeable, homey, yet visually impressive way, will evoke an emotional as well as an intellectual response, which is the best method in education.

MARGARET E. FRIES (NEW YORK)

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XXXI, 1950.

Jacob A. Arlow & David Rubinfine

To cite this article: Jacob A. Arlow & David Rubinfine (1952) International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XXXI, 1950., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 437-454, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925890

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925890

Published online: 05 Dec 2017.

ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XXXI, 1950.

The Psychobiological Origins of Circumcision. C. D. Daly. Pp. 217–236.

Daly speculates as follows concerning the origin of circumcision: during the prehistory of man, actual castration was practiced in order to repress the positive incestuous drives. This resulted in a pathological inhibition of heterosexual reproductive impulses and a pathological inversion, i.e., an exaggeration of constitutional homosexual elements. It was at this juncture that circumcision arose in order to promote heterosexual development and, apparently, the survival of the race. Circumcision tended to counteract the pathological tendency to inversion in males by removing the female element (prepuce equals vagina). Clitoridectomy accomplished the corresponding object in the female. 'Though the original traumatic repression of incest was responsible for the psychopathological increase of homosexuality in both sexes (i.e., the inverted tendencies), the means by which a psychobiological adaptation was effected, viz. circumcision, actually deprived men and women of that portion of their sexual organs through which nature intended them to receive gratification of the *normal* homosexual component of the physiological bisexuality. Thus circumcision, it is suggested, leaves them with the unconscious wish to regain their *original bisexual unity*.'

Daly sees in the development of the individual a recapitulation of the events which presumably took place on a universal scale in the prehistory of mankind. He maintains that there is a primary repression of the positive œdipus complex followed by a repression of the secondary negative œdipus complex which, although constitutionally influenced, is nevertheless, in its genital form, a psychopathological reaction phenomenon. In these considerations the castration anxiety, aroused by the so-called 'menstruation complex' and the olfactory responses to the female genitalia, is of prime importance. He sees in the recent studies of Nunberg concerning circumcision a validation of his own anthropological and psychodynamic speculations.

JACOB A. ARLOW

The Psychology of Feminine Genital Bleeding. An Analysis of Mohave Indian Puberty and Menstrual Rites. George Devereux. Pp. 237–257.

Mohave Indian puberty and menstrual rites are correlated with genital bleeding during defloration and childbirth. Factual data include a discussion of Mohave beliefs concerning the menstrual cycle, an analysis of the purpose of and attitudes toward menstruation itself and the rites pertaining to it, a detailed description of the puberty and menstrual rites and of the girl's instruction and indoctrination during pubertal confinement. In discussing the obsolescence of these rites, it is pointed out that since, at each repetition, the rite is simplified in some respect this, in itself, provides a model for the gradual decline and obsolescing of the rite as a whole. The climacterium is also described and the

absence of tensions both during puberty and during the climacteric is noted. The lack of tension during puberty is attributed to the binding of anxiety by rituals and to early sexual enlightenment, while the lack of tension and depression during the climacteric is explained by the fact that this event does not mark the end of the Mohave woman's active sexual life and that in many respects the older woman's sphere of social activities tends to expand at that time.

Menstruation, defloration, and childbirth hemorrhage appear to be unconsciously equated by the Mohave. This is shown both by the fact that similar attitudes are demanded from the women who bleed for any of these three reasons and by the fact that menstrual and birth rites resemble each other a great deal. It is also shown that, unlike most groups, the Mohave do not particularly fear the menstruating woman. In this context it is pointed out that the social oppression of woman and the fear of women disguise man's awareness of woman's true power and importance in the scheme of things. Genital bleeding is then linked with cloacal theories and with castration fantasies. Coitus appears to be fantasied as a robbing of the maternal womb by means of the penis which, by its intrusion, causes genital bleeding.

The bibliography includes fifty-nine items.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

A Contribution to the Psychology of Menstruation. Isidor Silbermann. Pp. 258–267.

The psychological symptoms of menstruation indicate that each monthly bleeding leads to a pregenital regression. Thus women show regressions in cycles which expose them to increased danger since each regression is a perilous event.

Besides the term 'physiological menstruation', the concept of 'psychic menstruation' is suggested. The latter expresses itself in a host of symptoms before, during, and shortly after the monthly flow. The phenomenon of pregenital regression is traced through these symptoms in a group of women and illustrated with particularity in four patients during analysis, and in the dreams of others.

The degree of the pregenital regression in menstruation depends upon the degree of anxiety, guilt feelings, and the libidinal development. The more mature the libidinal development, the safer and more stable is the latency growth, which in turn militates against retreat. This means the more secure the basis of the personality, the less severe are the defense measures necessitated by the onslaught of puberty and the menarche.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

Some Aspects of the Analysis of a Schizophrenic. Hanna Segal. Pp. 268–278.

Noting the growing interest in the modified psychoanalytic treatment of schizophrenic patients, Segal feels that this case is of special interest because of her attempt to analyze him 'with only minor deviations from strict analytic technique'.

She then proceeds to a brief summary of the patient's prepsychotic ad-

justment and the development of the psychosis during military service. Particular attention is focused on world destruction fantasies, persecutory ideas, loss of ego boundaries, and concretization of thought, especially with reference to symbols.

The treatment process is described from its beginning in an institution, in the patient's home, and finally in the analyst's office under conditions of 'strict analytic technique'.

Segal emphasized her refusal to give the patient reassurance and sympathy, and her insistence on analyzing the transference and resistances. The theoretical formulations and terminology used are those of Melanie Klein. With this orientation it seems likely that 'strict technique' allows latitude for interpretations of delusion, dream, and behavior based largely on manifest content and without the patient's associations.

However, a technical problem of extreme importance is raised by the author —although it is not pursued sufficiently—which is the necessity for the analyst to accept the role of persecutor (to become involved in the patient's delusional system) rather than to strive always to maintain an atmosphere of positive feeling (Federn).

While Segal attributes her therapeutic success to interpretation, it would seem worth while to explore the contribution made by her firm, controlling, and restrictive attitudes toward the patient's anxiety and his departure from the reality principle.

Thus this paper renders an important service by focusing attention on a technical device which is attracting increasing attention in the treatment of psychotic patients: the application, on the basis of structural and economic considerations, of planned aggression by the therapist against the patient's instinctual impulses.

DAVID RUBINFINE

Psychoanalytic Review. XXXVIII, 1951.

Origin and Significance of the Jewish Rite of Circumcision. Frank Zimmerman. Pp. 103–112.

Among Jews the rite of circumcision takes precedence over any other institution or observance. Zimmerman believes it was through this rite that the ancient Hebrews sought reassurance that death was not annihilation and the utter end of all. The circumcised penis, with its exposed glands, resembles the uncircumcised penis in erection when the head of the penis is disclosed and the foreskin retracted. 'A circumcised penis is a copy of a penis in erection', therefore it symbolizes potency and fertility, and in this way 'ensures' the continuity of one's self through one's sons and sons' sons.

The Transference Function: A Study of Normal and Pathological Transference. Joost A. M. Meerloo and Marie L. Coleman. Pp. 205–220.

Transference, a basic element in communication, is explored in its normal and its neurotic aspects. Its gains and values, normally achieved by the emotionally mature individual, are sought in analysis by the neurotic. Through

transference, one seeks bonds to substitute for old losses. Through the 'fetish' person, affects and ideas become connected with earlier hidden love objects. Inner conflicts are externalized, and sublimation facilitated by projecting fantasies onto real objects, rendering them more acceptable. The new identifications and relationships established with the help of transference strengthen the ego. Empathy is promoted and verbal conflict substituted for physical conflict. Recall is aided through repetition, with gradual decrease in the affect connected with the loss of the primary objects. Other values deriving from transference function are enumerated and described.

Types of Activity in Psychoanalytic Technique. George Frumkes. Pp. 305–317.

Frumkes examines the activity of the analyst, quoting from Freud, Ferenczi and others. Activity aims at re-education and at enforcing abstinence. Case histories illustrate such activity as that of giving active advice, establishing programs of behavior for the patient, prohibiting, etc. Frumkes states that such vigorous intervention is not a substitute for accepted techniques in analysis. 'The main object is still to make the unconscious conscious.' His objective is 'to use the activities and problems of daily life as a means of fixing the character changes which occur during the process of analysis'.

Haitian Voodoo and the Ritualization of the Nightmare. Louis Mars and George Devereux. Pp. 334–341.

Dreams and visions often reveal the latent meaning of social practices and institutions. This study is concerned with the relationship between nightmares and the institution of voodoo, the animistic religion of Haiti. In that system, the divinities manifest themselves by 'possession' of people whom they ride like horses. The language roots of the 'mare' in 'nightmare' are explored. Sexual, ghost, demon and horse connotations are found. Jones has postulated that the nightmare is closely related to the problems of incest and the primal scene. 'Possession in Haiti, viewed as a religious and socially recognized phenomenon, and as an important component of the voodoo ritual, may perhaps represent a ritual elaboration of the nightmare.'

Unconscious Motives in Pro-Semitic Attitudes. Stefi Pedersen. Pp. 361–373.

Fenichel and others have stressed that the anti-Semite is one who hates and despises the projected image of one's own unconscious impulses and drives; his ambivalence is revealed by his envy. Patients seeking a Jewish analyst apparently do so out of the belief that Jews are closer to the secrets of childhood than are others and that Jews are 'the only living people who are within reach of unlimited satisfaction of all infantile drives' through the promised (lost) land of milk and honey. The attitudes of three analyzed patients toward Jews was determined by two different stages in their relationships to their mothers. The conscious picture of the Jew as liberated and independent, with the strength to stand up against a hostile world, is an expression of the desire to be liberated from mother. At a deeper level, the Jew's promised return to his paradise and his closeness to his God represent the lost paradise of childhood and the longing

for a blissful reunion with mother. Pro-Semitic attitudes develop more easily when the Jew represents the phallic mother; anti-Semitism when the Jew symbolizes conflict with the father.

JOSEPH LANDER

American Journal of Psychiatry. CVII, 1951.

Impaired Cerebral Functions in Essential Hypertension. Nathaniel S. Apter, Ward C. Halstead and Robert F. Heimburger. Pp. 808–813.

The cerebral course of essential hypertension is reviewed. By combined studies of a psychiatrist, neurologist, internist and psychologist, a psychiatric syndrome is defined, consisting of changes in the expression of hostility, willingness to yield to dependent needs and reduction in perfectionistic drives. There are also mild judgment and memory defects, insomnia, loss of energy and anxiety symptoms that are not explicable by changes in the cardiovascular status. The appearance of this syndrome signifies the onset of organic involvement of the brain. The duration of the disorder depends not so much upon the quantitative aspects of the cerebral damage as upon the integrative ability of the premorbid personality.

Comments on the Psychopathology of Children With Somatic Illness. S. A. Szurek. Pp. 844–849.

Among the factors which determine the meaning of pain and illness to a child are the reactions of his parents. Szurek distinguishes obsessive, anxious and indifferent parental attitudes and outlines their effects upon the sick child. These developments are of particular importance in establishing sadomasochistic patterns and are of significance for the prognosis of the illness.

Peptic Ulcer—Facts and Assumptions. Eugen Kahn and F. A. Freyhan. Pp. 866–867.

Kahn and Freyhan cast doubt on prevalent assumptions concerning the psychosomatic aspects of peptic ulcer. Statistics do not justify the conclusion that this ailment is increasing in frequency; correspondingly, generalizations to the effect that 'our civilization breeds peptic ulcer' are unwarranted. The concept of a special type of personality disposed to this disorder fails to find positive confirmation. Few such patients have been intensively investigated. No attempt has been made to correlate so-called oral needs with the actual development of the ulcer. The occurrence of the malady among individuals of the most varied personalities is demonstrable, while typical 'ulcer personalities' fail to succumb to this illness. The authors conclude that 'we are confronted with a lack of distinction between established facts and impressions' and that there is 'an acute need for scientific restraint' in dealing with this subject.

Inference Testing in Psychotherapy. John R. Reid and Jacob E. Finesinger. Pp. 894–900.

Reid and Finesinger study the logic of inference testing as employed in psychotherapy. For example, inasmuch as the past is irrevocable and can only be described in terms of symbols, or relived in imagination, the psychiatrist must depend upon reconstructions and inferences for his knowledge of the patient's early life. To validate such assumptions as that dyspnœa or aphonia are related to 'repressed oral material', further assumptions must be made. A term like 'superego' is of value as a device for cognitive orientation but cannot serve as a phenomenological description.

With such postulates, Freud's case of Dora is subjected to scrutiny. The supposition that her spasmodic cough was the expression of a fantasy of intercourse between her father and Frau K. is found to present 'a veritable thicket of logical problems'. The cough, it is concluded, must have been a sign of the fantasy not to the girl but to Freud, who had certain ideas about this symptom and certain beliefs with regard to its etiology. In fact, this single hypothesis cannot be evaluated without reference to the entire system of psychoanalytic thinking.

The authors, while appreciating the need and utility of clinical formulation, urge that the ideal be maintained of clearly defining and verifying the terms and concepts used in psychotherapy.

MARK KANZER

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic. XV, 1951.

Freud's Dream Interpretation in the Light of His Letters to Fliess. Edith Buxbaum. Pp. 197–212.

In this paper Buxbaum attempts to reconstruct the course of Freud's self-analysis. As the main source of clinical material, the author uses Freud's letters to Fliess written between the years 1887 and 1902. In addition, she carefully pieces together data from The Interpretation of Dreams and The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, as well as some historical findings of Ernst Kris and Siegfried Bernfeld. In a very systematic and disciplined manner Buxbaum connects the clinical material that Freud published in disguised form with the historical data obtained from his letters to Fliess. She is able to demonstrate that Fliess was the important transference object in Freud's transference neurosis during his self-analysis. The friendly relationship was eventually broken off, apparently because of Freud's inability to completely analyze his homosexual transference. Nevertheless, Freud was able to analyze his railroad phobia and other anxieties in this setting. By verifying the findings from his own analysis with those from his patients, Freud discovered during this period such fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis as the œdipus complex, the anal phase of development, bisexuality, the importance of resistance in analysis, the infantile neurosis and problems of character formation.

Buxbaum works with this material in a true psychoanalytic fashion. Un-

fortunately, her emphasis is preponderantly upon the adverse effects of Freud's neurosis upon his work. It would seem to me her paper would be more complete if it also demonstrated how neurotic conflicts led to creative work.

One comment about the limitations of self-analysis in Buxbaum's paper is worth repeating: 'Do you know what is wrong with self-analysis? It's the countertransference.'

Psychodynamic Significance of the First Conscious Memory. Victor W. Eisenstein and Rowena Ryerson. Pp. 213–220.

This paper presents the idea that the patient's first memory can be useful in formulating a psychodynamic diagnosis as well as affording a convenient illustrative device for teaching dynamic psychiatry. The first memory is not merely a recollection which contains the earliest and clearest derivatives of basic infantile conflicts, but is also a highly overdetermined construction which serves as a compromise formation just as does the neurotic symptom. The authors present examples of earliest remembrances of patients suffering from psychosomatic disorders, masochistic character neuroses, anxiety hysteria, etc. and demonstrate how in the earliest memories one finds significant correlations with the diagnostic category. It is interesting that the first memories of schizoid and schizophrenic patients do not fall into any one pattern; these memories often emphasize a solitary situation or one of autoerotic activity. It is one of the few diagnostic categories in which the first memory may be a frankly sexual one. The authors advocate the eliciting of the first conscious memory routinely as part of the anamnesis of all psychiatric patients.

The Structural Problem in Schizophrenia: The Role of the Internal Object. Milton Wexler. Pp. 221–234.

During the course of treatment in a chronic schizophrenic, Wexler found it therapeutically efficacious at times to agree with the patient's moral scruples and join in with her severe feelings of self-condemnation. With this as a starting point, Wexler explores some of the theoretical problems involved in the treatment of schizophrenics. He draws some tentative conclusions from his observations: 1. Classical psychoanalytic methods are inapplicable. 2. We need to resurrect a reasonable ego. 3. Between the therapist and the ego lies a chaotic battleground. 4. The structural aspect of the problem must be understood, particularly the relationship of the superego function to reality testing. 5. Sometimes it is the archaic superego of the patient which lies closest to the surface and therefore would be approached first.

Wexler then goes on to describe some of the clinical reports of the work of others in this field which seem to confirm his own clinical experience. He then explores the idea that the therapist may have to play the role of the patient's alter-superego in order to help produce a reasonable ego. This seems to be in keeping with some aspects of Rosen's work as well as with Rado's formulation of the parasitic double of the superego observable in hypnosis. Bender's work with schizophrenic children also seems to confirm this hypothesis.

Wexler believes that it is necessary for the therapist actively to play the role of the schizophrenic patient's archaic superego during some phases of the treatment. This helps the patient to control his overwhelming impulses and also to establish communication with the patient. Finally, it gives the patient a recognizable object in the external world which he can then incorporate and thereby establish some continuity of object relationship. Later, as the therapist's attitude changes the nature of the internal object will change, which can lead to a beneficial therapeutic result.

RALPH R. GREENSON

American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. XXI, 1951.

The Contribution of Psychoanalysis to Genetic Psychology. Anna Freud. Pp. 476–497.

This article represents the contribution of Anna Freud to the symposium on genetic psychology that took place on April 20, 1950 as part of a program commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of Clark University. She discusses the historical development of the relationship between psychoanalysis and academic psychology. She finds them drawing closer together. Projective tests in particular have provided an avenue of access to the unconscious that is of mutual interest. Despite inherent difficulties, progress is being made toward the application of experimental and statistical techniques to psychoanalytic research. There are also promising attempts to reformulate the concepts of metapsychology and genetic psychology in terms that would establish a greater community between the two systems.

Citing the distinction drawn by Hartmann and Kris between the dynamic and genetic hypotheses of psychoanalysis, Anna Freud finds that the former are more likely to be used as a basis for special therapeutic techniques in borderline fields such as psychiatric social work and counseling, while the latter have gained influence in education and child care. Education, in its widest sense, might be regarded as an attempt to make the child adopt those solutions of conflict between the ego and the id which are acceptable to the environment.

Psychoanalysis, in its genetic investigations, tries to establish three developmental sequences: in instinctual development, in ego and superego development, and in successive interactions between these two. Differences among the id strivings of individuals are negligible in comparison with those differences in ego and superego structure which account for the infinite variety of personality and clinical patterns. There are comparatively few fixed relationships between specific infantile strivings and the ego methods that are brought to bear on them. As a result, it is difficult to validate the existence of infantile urges through inquiry into the residues in adult memory. Nevertheless, certain overt manifestations of unconscious contents may serve as a starting point for academic research. Among these are character traits and common symbols.

The fundamental contributions of psychoanalysis to related fields have come

hitherto largely from data furnished by its own methods; the future will doubtless see the closest coöperation of workers thoroughly trained in the theoretical and practical aspects of multiple disciplines.

A Mirth Response Test. Fredrick C. Redlich, Jacob Levine and Theodore P. Sohler. Discussant: Phyllis Blanchard. Pp. 717–734.

The authors undertake to investigate systematically the relationship between humor, personality, and clinical findings. A psychodiagnostic procedure, called the Mirth Response Test, examines expressive and verbal responses to popular cartoons. Certain assumptions, based on postulates of Freud, were applied to the findings—for example, a humorous response was interpreted as an indication that a momentary release of some primary repressed need had taken place without accompanying anxiety. Disturbances in humor reactions were classified on the basis of a 'Mirth Response Spectrum'.

Certain characteristic and consistent humor patterns were established. Organic reaction types found difficulty in understanding the cartoons. In some types of neurotic depression there was a good and aggressive sense of humor; in one case of agitated depression that later terminated in suicide, a violent and uninhibited enjoyment of aggressive cartoons was noted. 'Parahumor' in schizophrenics took the form of deviant and personal responses, such as laughter at a fat man because it occurred to the patient that he was pregnant.

Redlich and his coworkers find that their tests confirm Freud's theory of humor. Further validation and extension of the mirth response investigations are under way.

MARK KANZER

Psychosomatic Medicine. XIII, 1951.

Atopic Dermatitis. A Clinical Psychiatric Study. Joseph G. Kepecs, Albert Rabin and Milton Robin. Pp. 1–9.

Twenty patients with atopic dermatitis, sixteen females and four males, were studied in psychiatric interviews, hypnotic sessions, and some in prolonged psychotherapy. Rorschach tests were also administered. Both clinically and by Rorschach study, the patients fell into two groups: one, emotionally labile, tending to hysteria, and the other, rigid, tending to compulsiveness. In the hysterical group, conflicts in the sphere of heterosexual relations were prominently connected with exacerbations of the skin disease. The more rigid patients manifested major tensions in the sphere of work and responsibility, with sexual problems less on the surface. The characteristic family constellation in both groups of patients was a strongly hostile-dependent relationship to the mother. Itching and scratching were manifestations of anger at mother figures or heterosexual objects. The anger was handled masochistically because of guilt and fear. Secondary erotization of the scratching occurred. Weeping was a prominent symptom and expressed a desire to overcome separation from a loved object,

basically the mother. Hostile attitudes were usually conscious and much anger was expressed in interviews, dreams, and the Rorschach test.

Relationship Between Certain Emotional States and Exudation Into the Skin. Joseph G. Kepecs, Milton Robin and Matthew J. Brunner. Pp. 10–17.

This experiment was devised to study the relation between emotional states associated with weeping and exudation into the skin. The technique consisted of a quantitative measurement of the rate of exudation into the site of a blister produced by cantharides, under emotional states induced by hypnosis. Sharp rises in the rate of exudation were noted in emotional states associated with weeping, both in patients with exudative skin disease and in subjects with non-pathologic skins. Inhibition of weeping, either as a result of suggestion or through inner resistance on the part of the patient, resulted first in a drop in the exudation rate followed later by a rise, indicating a tendency to break through the inhibition at the blister site.

Edema of the skin is one of the outstanding findings in the pathophysiology of a number of skin conditions, such as atrophic dermatitis, urticaria, exfoliative erythroderma. The findings in this experiment suggest that such edemas may result from an increased passage of fluid into the skin induced by changes in the emotional state of the individual.

S. GABE

A Psychosomatic Theory of Thyrotoxicosis. George C. Ham, Franz Alexander and Hugh T. Carmichael. Pp. 18–35.

According to the investigations of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis it seems that patients with thyrotoxicosis have been exposed to early insecurities and have developed a chronic fear of death. Rejecting attitudes of parents broken homes, excessive number of siblings, or the fact of being the eldest child make the patient unable to allay these insecurities through gratification of dependent needs. They make desperate and premature attempts to master insecurity by taking care of themselves and frequently of their younger siblings they suffer from an excessive urge to perform in order to control the situation and to master fear; in short, they slip into a precocious maturity. This continued effort to mature and to be self-sufficient, which constituted a chronic emotional stimulus, was considered of outstanding importance in a group of twenty-three patients studied at the Institute. With what amounted to a counterphobic attitude, these patients attempted to persuade or reassure themselves that they were not afraid of death. In women the struggle against anxiety caused by frustrated dependent needs manifests itself primarily in the wish for children. Fear of death appears directly in dreams in which they see dead persons or are drawn into caskets. Suppression and repression of hostility caused by guilt over excessive sibling rivalry is typical and is again based on fear of death. The actual thyrotoxicosis develops when the defense breaks down and the patient is no longer protected against anxiety.

MARTIN GROTJAHN

Psychodynamics of Depression from the Etiologic Point of View. Sandor Rado. Pp. 51–55.

Depression is a process of miscarried repair. It is a desperate cry for love, precipitated by an actual or imagined loss. It is patterned on the hungry infant's cry for help. The emotional overreaction to this emergency unfolds unconsciously as an expiatory process of self-punishment. By blaming and punishing himself for the loss he has suffered, the patient wishes to reconcile the mother. However, a coercive rage is also set in operation: the patient would coerce his object to love him. He has the same idea as had the infant: to destroy the frustrating aspect of the mother while retaining the gratifying aspect. When the patient feels that his coercive rage is defeated, repentance gains the upper hand and self-punishment is augmented by a retroflexive recoil of the rage. As a superlative bid for forgiveness, the patient may be driven to suicide. Thus, the patient strives to regain the mother's love by the simultaneous use of two antagonistic forces. In the depressive period the struggle ends in the triumph of submissive fear over coercive rage. Similar grave conflicts between excessive emergency emotions are also a primary constituent in obsessional and paranoid patterns, although the relative strength of the contending forces is different, as are their disordering effects. In the psychodynamics of all disordered behavior, the patient's emotional overreactions to danger in terms of pain, fear and rage are of surpassing importance. An investigation of this problem must include the physiologic and genetic aspects. To make fruitful collaboration with related scientific fields possible, obsolete methods and concepts in psychoanalysis must be abandoned and interpretation of the patient's behavior must be expressed in terms of adaptational psychodynamics. A sound, consistent and verifiable conceptual scheme must be evolved to keep pace with the general advance of science.

S. CABE

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry. LXV, 1951.

Intellectual and Emotional Makeup of the Epileptic. F. T. Zimmerman, B. B. Burgemeister and T. J. Putnam. Pp. 545–556.

Zimmerman, Burgemeister, and Putnam summarize in this paper a five-year study on the relation of epilepsy, intelligence, and personality makeup, using as their material three hundred case records from the Neurological Institute of the Columbia-Presbyterian Medical Center, plus a small series of patients from Vanderbilt Clinic. Since man's mental functioning depends on the efficiency of his state of conscious awareness, the cases were broken down and divided according to the various clinical types of seizures, each type representing a different degree of impairment of conscious awareness. Objective psychological tests were performed, including intelligence and performance tests and Rorschachs, as well as clinical evaluations.

The studies show a definite correlation between the degree of disturbance of conscious awareness and the adequacy of mental functioning. Petit mal epilepsy, with its transitory lapses of consciousness and related mild clinical manifestations, shows the highest intelligence quotient and the least amount of per-

sonality deviation, while in the severer types of seizures, the intelligence quotient is lowered and productiveness is more curtailed. The intelligence quotient is higher among children if the onset of the grand mal attacks occurs later in life. The Rorschachs show a reduction in M responses, indicating 'organicness', in all forms of epilepsy, including petit mal and the idiopathic types, though this is more marked in the symptomatic and traumatic forms. Intellect and emotions are inextricably entwined and are both involved along with disturbances in conscious awareness. The findings confirm the view of epilepsy as a disturbance of the total organism.

Psychological Effects of Chronic Barbiturate Intoxication. C. H. Kornetsky. Pp. 557–567.

Kornetsky studied the changes in performance on psychological tests by human subjects experimentally addicted to barbiturates. Five former morphine addicts who volunteered for the experiments were given sufficiently large doses of seconal, amytal, and nembutal, for from ninety-two to one hundred and forty-four days with the production of chronic intoxication. Six different psychological tests were used. The same studies were made during the period of withdrawal from the barbiturates, during the recovery period lasting two or three months, and then again during a period of re-intoxication.

During the chronic intoxication period there was a quick decline in ability followed by a period of increased efficiency and then a slight drop again. There was greatest impairment in tasks involving speed, less impairment in those involving copying, and least in tasks requiring behavior that had been stabilized in the past experience of the subject. Kornetsky found a loss of ego control manifested by pathology in the projective tests. 'Id factors' in the personality were expressed more easily by the subject, this becoming more pronounced as intoxication continued. Those patients who developed psychotic reactions during the withdrawal phase showed certain typical preaddiction Rorschach patterns such as deficiency in affect and fantasy. After discontinuance of the barbiturates, the performance of the subjects quickly reverted to the preaddiction level with no evidence of residual damage.

Experimental Physiological Studies with Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD-25). G. R. Forrer and R. D. Goldner. Pp. 581–588.

Following up recent work in which lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25) was used on psychotic patients, Forrer and Goldner administered the drug to six schizophrenic patients in order to clarify its physiological and psychic effects. This drug is a partial synthetic representative of the ergobasine group of the ergot alkaloids. It was administered by mouth in ascending doses, from 0.5 to 6 micrograms per kilogram of body weight. The results produced were slight increase in blood pressure and pulse rate, increased salivation and lacrimation, marked pupillary dilatation, increase in deep reflexes and slight ataxia. Psychically, it produced episodes of euphoria, increased amiability and accessibility, and increased spontaneous productivity. Also, however, hallu-

cinations, usually of the visual type, occurred in all patients. The mode of action of the drug is considered by the authors to be on the cortex, with a release of subcortical centers from cortical control. They believe that further investigation with this substance for therapeutic possibilities in the psychoses is indicated.

Traumatic Neurosis, Compensation Neurosis or Attitudinal Pathosis? G. R. Kamman. Pp. 593–603.

In an attempt to bring some clarity to the vexing medical and forensic problems of post-accident neuroses, Kamman distinguishes and describes traumatic neuroses, compensation neuroses, and then adds a third middle condition, 'attitudinal pathoses'. The first he considers an uncommon condition, due to a narcissistic regression, occurring in people who have previously been well adjusted but who, after a trifling injury, manifest a set of variegated symptoms involving their psyche in all its ramifications. In the compensation neuroses, where most of the cases fall, there is a 'volitional factor' for compensative gain. They are to be distinguished, however, from malingerers since the 'volitional integrant is at least foreconscious, and it may even be unconscious'. The attitudinal pathoses Kamman considers maladjustments related to a morbid attitude, more limited, circumscribed and voluntary than the psychoneuroses. The patient believes that he is 'right', and there is a consonance between what he believes and what he feels.

His differentiations are artificial and strained, with enough overlapping and inconsistencies to render them of little help. While he recognizes that there exists here a spectrum of disease rather than absolutes, his divisions fail to add clarity to this confused group of cases.

A Dynamic Factor Correlated with the Prognosis in Paranoid Schizophrenia. P. F. D. Seitz. Pp. 604–606.

Seitz divides paranoid patients into two groups, the defiant type who opposes and fights against the accusatory judgments, even his own projected ones, and the passive, compliant type who accepts these accusations. Sixty-nine paranoid schizophrenic patients were studied in an attempt to correlate these attitudes with prognosis. The following results were obtained: the defiant type is three times as common as the compliant type. The prognosis for the compliant type is significantly better than for the defiant variety, regardless of method of treatment used. Electric shock treatment does not significantly improve the prognosis in the defiant type but there is a suggestively greater tendency toward improvement in the compliant type when electric shock therapy is used. The theoretical aspects of these findings will be discussed in a later paper.

Anticonvulsant Drug Therapy of Behavior Problem Children with Abnormal Electroencephalograms. B. Pasamanick. Pp. 752–766.

Pasamanick records the results of a study of the treatment with various anticonvulsant drugs of twenty-one boys with various behavior disorders and with

electroencephalic abnormalities. The medications used included dilantin, mesantoin, tridione and phenobarbital, and the treatment was carried on during residential stay in a children's psychiatric ward. Many simultaneous independent observations were made. The anticonvulsant drugs yielded almost uniformly disappointing results. Better results reported elsewhere in outpatient treatment may well have been due to various psychological effects. An hypothesis is also offered for the rather consistent reports of improvement of behavior disorders under amphetamine therapy. It is postulated by the author that amphetamine may inhibit some of the 'random, circular and poorly integrated stimuli tracks secondary to minor or major lesions, which have been set off in the brain by an extrinsic or intrinsic stimulus'.

LEO RANGELL

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CXIII, 1951.

The Technique of Histamine Biochemotherapy and Suggestions for Its Use in Psychiatry. Mortimer D. Sackler, Raymond R. Sackler, Arthur M. Sackler, J. H. W. Van Ophuijsen. Pp. 40–51.

The indications for histamine therapy are discussed briefly. The preparation of the patient, the contraindications and the technique of the therapy are given in minute detail along with the reactions of the patient during the therapeutic procedure. Histamine therapy is combined with other forms of shock and sub-shock therapy for refractory cases. The character of the therapeutic response varies. The authors state, 'In a few instances the results may be dramatic, but in most cases the changes are very subtle, though definitive'. Both objective and subjective changes are noted.

Comparison of Insulin Coma Therapy and Electronarcosis in Schizophrenia. Samuel Reznick and Vitold Arnett. Pp. 159–164.

Each of one hundred and twenty-six patients who received insulin coma therapy and seventy-four patients who received electronarcosis were evaluated two weeks after the completion of therapy. The method of evaluation is outlined and tables of the results are supplied. The highest percentage of satisfactory results was correlated with the administration of ten or more treatments and with a duration of illness not exceeding twelve months. The patients who received insulin coma therapy did better than those who had electronarcosis. The EEG changes were severe in both the improved and unimproved patients who had undergone electronarcosis, while the patients who had insulin showed severe changes in the EEG only when improvement was noted and little change where there was no improvement. In nine mental functions (estimated by a battery of psychological tests) the insulin coma group showed either a greater gain or a smaller loss than the group which received electronarcosis. The findings suggest that it is of doubtful value to prolong electronarcosis beyond thirty treatments. This is not true of insulin coma.

Treatment of Schizophrenia. A Comparison of Three Methods: Brief Psychotherapy, nsulin Coma and Electric Shock. Jacques S. Gottlieb and Paul E. Huston. Pp. 237–246.

Three groups of schizophrenic patients were treated, one group of one hundred and thirty-eight with brief psychotherapy as described by Malamud and Miller, the second group of sixty-five with insulin coma and the third group of one hundred and forty-three with electric shock. The results are tabulated and analyzed. None of the methods was found to be superior to the others. This statement applies to the final clinical status over a one to four-year-follow-up period, to the clinical status at successive follow-up periods after discharge, to the constancy of the course after discharge, to the final clinical status by type of onset, to the final clinical status by duration of illness before treatment, and to the final clinical status by schizophrenic subtype. Patients who had an acute onset had a better recovery rate than those with a gradual onset. Patients who had been ill for less than six months had a better recovery rate than those who had been ill seven months or longer. The paranoid, catatonic, and unclassified subgroups had a better recovery rate than the hebephrenic or simple types. It seemed that more important for recovery than the methods of treatment employed were these variables of type of onset, duration of illness before treatment, and schizophrenic subtype.

Sexual Behavior After Lobotomy. Julius Levine and Harold Albert. Pp. 332–341.

This is an exploratory study of forty patients selected on the basis of the fact that they were coöperative, in fair to good contact, available for interviews, had been living in the community and were making a reasonable social adjustment after lobotomy. From six months to four years had elapsed from the time of operation to the day of interview. It was impossible to assess the importance of other factors, such as hospitalization, length of illness, prolonged abstinence, aging, changes in attitude toward significant persons in the environment, etc., and therefore impossible to come to any sweeping conclusions about the effects of lobotomy on the sex life of the psychotic individual. Of the fifteen men, there was a decrease in sexual drive in three, increase in six, no change in five, and one could not be evaluated. Of the twenty-five women, there was a decrease in drive in thirteen, increase in five, no change in three, and six could not be evaluated. Only one patient who had not been a social problem before operation became one after operation. Homosexuality did not arise anew after operation. The predominant prelobotomy mode of sexual activity was maintained postoperatively. There was a decrease in feelings of guilt, modesty, and anxiety in connection with sexual activity which was not correlated with a decrease in inhibition. Fantasies seemed diminished after lobotomy. Patients and relatives reported that preoperative moral, social, and religious attitudes continued to operate after lobotomy, even though there was a reduction in guilt, modesty, and embarrassment in association with sexual activity.

VICTOR CALEF

British Journal of Medical Psychology. XXIV, 1951.

Methodology and Research in Psychopathology. I: J. Rickman. Pp. 1–7. II: R. H. Thouless. Pp. 8–12. III: N. Isaacs. Pp. 13–25.

Rickman begins this symposium by dividing the field of psychology into areas of research according to the number of persons studied: One-Body Psychology (perception, learning), Two-Body (mother-child relationships), Three-Body (the œdipus complex, two parents and a child), Four-Body (the œdipus complex plus a sibling rival), and Multi-Body (groups). In his clinical work a psychiatrist matches patterns of behavior with other patterns with which his experience has provided him. He must be aware of the influence of mental pain on this behavior. His research and therapeutic activities are inseparable. Those research approaches which do not take into account mental pain may contribute to the basic sciences but will add little to psychiatry.

Thouless emphasizes some elements in the scientific method. A scientific theory is a way of talking and a system of rules enabling us to understand a range of facts. The testing of a theory is looking for facts which the theory excludes. If these are found the theory must be modified. Scientific hypotheses must be stated in forms that can be falsifiable by experiment or observation.

It takes Isaacs some time to develop his point that we should study the ways in which we obtain knowledge. A systematic empirical-psychological examination of human learning history would provide the foundation for a practical methodology. If we are to grasp how words and concepts function or go wrong, we must treat language and word meanings as psychological formations with a psychological history.

The Scientific Testing of Psychoanalytic Findings and Theory. I: E. Stengel. Pp. 26–29. II: H. Ezriel. Pp. 30–34. III: B. A. Farrell. Pp. 35–41.

The first paper by Stengel roughly surveys experimental attempts to validate psychoanalytic concepts. The results are meager thus far and new approaches will have to be conceived to do justice to the complexity of the problems.

Ezriel insists that experimental methods require the observation of *here and now* phenomena in situations which allow us to test whether a number of defined conditions will produce a certain predicted event. He describes the analytic interview as such a situation. One law characteristic of this situation is that if the therapist points out an unconscious impulse and the fantasy-determined reason for its rejection, then the subsequent material will contain the hitherto unconscious impulse in a less repressed form. His overemphasis of present situations, however, leads Ezriel to declare that psychoanalysis has become an ahistorical science concerned only with the interaction between analyst and patient.

The welcome voice of a philosopher appears in the third paper to tell us to watch our language, particularly words like 'testing' and 'theory'. One does not test a finding or a theory. We test hypotheses and certain propositions of a theory. Farrell, admitting he is an 'outsider', feels that the disconformation of œdipal and other genetic propositions is sufficient to require a modification

of psychoanalytic theory. His reasons, however, are based on evidence from papers in the literature which 'insiders' know are pitifully crude and inadequate.

KENNETH MARK COLBY

Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. XLVI, 1951.

Sucking Behavior in Neonatal Dogs. Sherman Ross. Pp. 142–149.

Observations of sucking behavior were made on puppies fed (a) by dropper, (b) by bottle, and (c) by the mother. Those nursed by the bitch did not show a significant amount of nonnutritive sucking from the sixth day after birth, while puppies fed by dropper and bottle showed longer, more intense nutritive sucking, as well as considerable nonnutritive sucking. When the dropper-fed and bottle-fed puppies were returned to the mother, nonnutritive sucking diminished considerably. Ross concludes that 'the concept of sucking "deprivation" is a meaningful one in the neonatal behavior of puppies. The results support the notion that a sucking need exists which if not satisfied yields excess nonnutritive sucking.'

The Prognostic Importance of Delusions in Schizophrenia. George W. Albee. Pp. 208–212.

The purpose of this study is to explore the existence of a relationship between the types of delusion manifested by schizophrenics and the 'outcome of a period of intensive treatment'. Delusions were classified into five groups: 1, bizarre and depersonalization; 2, self-condemnatory; 3, persecutory; 4, wish-fulfilment; and 5, grandiose. The subjects were two hundred and sixty-one schizophrenics who had been overtly psychotic for seven years or less. The treatments included psychotherapy, electric shock, insulin, lobotomy, narcosis, occupational therapy, and physiotherapy. Each patient received a combination of several of these. Considered recovered were 'those who, after a year, continued to exhibit no trace of their psychotic episode, and who had returned to their prepsychotic social and occupational level'. The results show a greater incidence of self-condemnatory delusions in those schizophrenics who recovered than in those who remained unimproved. Persecutory delusions were significantly more frequent in the nonrecovered group. Albee cautions that these are group trends and have no individual predictive significance.

The Mechanisms of Hypnotic Age Regression: An Experimental Study. Martin T. Orne. Pp. 213–225.

If a person under deep hypnosis is told he is six years old, his behavior is remarkably like that of a child of six. Is this actually a condition of regression in which all knowledge acquired after the age of six is absent, or is this effective, genuine role playing—an approximation of what might have occurred at the age of six? Ten university students were hypnotically regressed to age six. Drawings, handwriting samples, and Rorschach records were obtained from them during hypnosis and in the waking state. These protocols were compared with some drawings of one subject done when he actually was six years old. The

drawings and handwriting showed formal characteristics which were childlike, but the manner of execution was more like that of an adult. 'Sophisticated oversimplification seems appropriate for these drawings.' The Rorschach records were in many ways the same under hypnosis as when the subjects were awake. While there was some evidence of changes in ego organization in the Rorschach protocols taken under hypnosis, the changes appear in the context of an adult ego. In the situations of hypnotic age regression the nature of the situation aids the subject to take the role appropriate to an imagined world. 'The terms age regression or "ablation of the personality" appear to be inappropriate. The changes observed . . . may be viewed as role taking on a primarily emotional basis.'

Reindividualizing the Repression Hypothesis. Lillian Belmont and Herbert G. Birch. Pp. 226–235.

Belmont and Birch operationally define repression as the forgetting of nonsense syllables learned under conditions of 'negative affect'—the experiencing of an electric shock. They find that of a group of fifty-five college students, thirty-eight learned the shock syllables at a greater rate than the no-shock syllables, while sixteen found it more difficult to learn the shock syllables. One subject learned the shock and no-shock syllables at an equal rate. In a recognition test, all subjects were able to recognize all the syllables correctly. The authors' principal conclusion is that 'when strong negative affect is attached to learning material the recall of this material is significantly less than the recall of neutral material for some individuals, and significantly more than the recall of neutral material for others'. 'Repression', or forgetting the nonsense syllables, is one of the ways people may cope with this particular learning situation.

The basic assumption of the study, that repression was measured, is open to serious question. It is not likely that in this situation an instinctual derivative was being coped with in the forgetting or slow learning of the nonsense syllables. It appears, rather, that the authors were observing the various ways in which their subjects coped with extraneous distractors (electric shocks) as these impinged on the learning of a list of nonsense syllables.

PHILIP S. HOLZMAN

Psychological Review. LVIII, 1951.

Autonomic Discrimination Without Awareness: A Study of Subception. Richard S. Lazarus and Robert A. McCleary. Pp. 113–122.

'Galvanic skin response evidence is presented to indicate that though a tachistoscopic exposure speeds too rapidly for conscious discrimination (as measured by the subject's inability to report which stimulus was presented), the subject is still capable of making a discrimination. We suggest that the level of perceptual activity indicated by this finding be called subception.'

ROY SCHAFER

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

David Kairys, Albern N. Mayers, Mortimer Ostow & Bruce Ruddick

To cite this article: David Kairys, Albern N. Mayers, Mortimer Ostow & Bruce Ruddick (1952) Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 455-463, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925891

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925891

Published online: 05 Dec 2017.

NOTES

THE EIGHTEENTH INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOANALYTIC CONGRESS will be held at Bedford College, Regents Park, London, N. W. 1., from Sunday, July 26th to Thursday, July 30th, 1953.

The Program Committee is ready to receive papers from those wishing to participate. Communications regarding papers for the program should be addressed to Phyllis Greenacre, M.D., 970 Park Avenue, New York 28, N. Y.

Program Committee:

Dr. Phyllis Greenacre, New York, Co-Chairman
Dr. Ernst Kris, New York, Co-Chairman

Dr. Willie Hoffer, London
Dr. William H. Gillespie, London
Mrs. Melanie Klein, London

Dr. Leo Bartemeier, Detroit
Dr. Edward Bibring, Boston
Dr. Charles Brenner, New York
Dr. Maxwell Gitelson, Chicago
Dr. Robert P. Knight, Stockbridge
Dr. Emanuel Windholz, San Francisco

The Administrative Committee of the Congress has appointed Messrs. Thos. Cook & Son Ltd. and The Cie. Internationale des Wagons-Lits as the official agents for travel and hotel accommodation in connection with the Congress. Application should be made to the nearest office of these two organizations as soon as possible. Members should note that there is likely to be a great demand for hotel accommodation in London during June and July owing to the Coronation and they are urged, therefore, to make their travel and accommodation reservations as early as possible.

Dr. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, Washington, D. C., is announced as the first winner of the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION'S 'ISAAC RAY AWARD'. Made possible through the efforts of Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, Chairman of the A.P.A. Committee on the History of Psychiatry, the Award is named in honor of Dr. Isaac Ray, one of the founding fathers of the A.P.A. and the first American author in the field of legal problems connected with mental disorders. The Award is to be given annually to some person of outstanding accomplishment in psychiatry and jurisprudence. The winner receives one thousand dollars and is appointed to deliver the Isaac Ray Lectures at some University which has both medical and law schools. Dr. Overholser will deliver his series of lectures at Harvard University next year at times to be announced later.

A modern pioneer in the legal aspects of psychiatry, Dr. Overholser is well

known for his many contributions to professional journals on the subject. For many years he served as Chairman of the A.P.A. Committee on Legal Aspects of Psychiatry. A former Commissioner of Mental Diseases for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, he has served as Superintendent of St. Elizabeth's since 1937. He is also Professor of Psychiatry at George Washington University Medical School. A past President of the A.P.A., he was recently made a Chevalier of the Legion of Honor by the French Government.

Mr. Eugene Reynal, Vice-President, and Mr. Robert Giroux, Editor-in-chief of Harcourt Brace & Co., New York City, have announced that the Isaac Ray Lectures will be published by their firm.

Dr. Charles F. Menninger, founder of the Menninger Clinic and chairman of the Board of Trustees of The Menninger Foundation, observed his ninetieth birthday on July 11, in Topeka, Kansas. Dr. Menninger was born in Tell City, Indiana on July 11, 1862. After graduating from Central Normal College in Danville, Indiana and serving as an instructor in science at Campbell College, Holton, Kansas, Doctor Menninger enrolled in Hahnemann Medical College, then a homeopathic school in Chicago, Illinois. He remained dissatisfied with his rudimentary medical education and attended frequent postgraduate courses sponsored by medical institutions in various parts of the country. In 1906 he was awarded—as a result of his further studies—a degree of Doctor of Medicine (aleopathic) by the Kansas Medical College of Washburn University. The same year he was named to the faculty of the college where he served for a number of years as a lecturer in physiological chemistry, dietetics, and diseases of disturbed metabolism. It was while attending a postgraduate institute at the Mayo Clinic in 1908 that Dr. Menninger conceived the idea of the Menninger Clinic, a father and son partnership which became a reality in 1919 and was reorganized as the nonprofit Menninger Foundation in 1941. Dr. Menninger is a former president of the Shawnee County Medical Society, and has served as president of the Topeka Board of Health. A specialist in internal medicine, he has had a particular interest in the subject of diabetes and other metabolic disturbances and has published a number of papers dealing with the subject. Dr. Menninger remains in good health and continues to be active in Foundation affairs. Only recently he journeyed to Chicago to preside at a meeting of the Foundation's Board and to address three hundred members of the Foundation on Sidelights of Sixty Years of Medical Progress. Twice weekly at the Foundation he instructs therapeutic classes in horticulture, mineralogy and conchology. Two of Dr. Menninger's sons, Dr. Karl and Dr. William C. Menninger, are psychiatrists and leaders of The Menninger Foundation. A third son, Edwin Menninger, is publisher of the Stuart (Florida) News.

A recent news release from Rome indicated that the Roman Catholic Church is opposed to psychoanalysis. At the Fourth International Congress on Mental Health (Mexico, D.F., 1951), the WORKING GROUP ON MENTAL HEALTH AND RELIGION included—among twenty-one discussants—eight 'practicing Catholics':

Dr. E. E. Krapf, psychoanalyst, Buenos Aires, Argentine
Dr. Nicolas Camara-Peon, psychiatrist now undergoing analytic training, Yucatan, Mexico
Dr. Ramon Gomez-Arias, Jesuit Priest and clinical psychologist, Mexico City, Mexico
Dr. Cristobal Macia, psychiatrist, Venezuela
Dr. Paul Reiter, psychiatrist, Copenhagen, Denmark
Dr. Hertha Tarrasch, psychiatrist, Janesville, Wisconsin
Dr. Hernan Verrgara, psychiatrist, Bogota, Colombia
Dr. Frank J. Curran, psychiatrist, Charlottesville, Virginia

'Mental health' was defined by the Working Group as the realization of an individual's capacity to develop his own complete biological, social and spiritual maturity in accordance with reality. Reality was divided into outer, inner, and divine reality, leading to psycho-socio-spiritual integration. Differentiation was made between 'natural religion' and 'positive religion': the former, a feeling of loving dependence on God, and a knowledge of one's own limitations; the latter, referring to specific, established creeds. It was felt that doubting can be a normal element in the religious process when it is not a neurotic symptom. The Group differentiated the healthy, mature person's use of religion from the psychoneurotic's distortion of religion. Freud's statement about religion as a 'mass neurosis' should not prevent a person from accepting freudian concepts which can be verified by others (the unconscious, free-association, etc.) without accepting Freud's philosophical conceptions of life. The apparent conflict between psychiatry and religion comes from a lack of knowledge of the facts of psychology and psychiatry on the part of the clergy, and similar ignorance of religion on the part of psychiatrists, psychologists, etc. The Group concluded that religion and psychology are mutually enriching, and have nothing to fear from each other.

The INTERAMERICAN SOCIETY OF PSYCHOLOGY was formed in Mexico City in December, 1951. The following officers were elected: President: Eduardo Krapf, University of Buenos Aires, Argentine; Vice-President: Werner Wolff, Bard College, Annandale-on-Hudson, New York; Secretary: Oswaldo Robles, University of Mexico; Treasurer: Hernan Verrgara, University of Bogota, Colombia; Associated Vice-Presidents: W. Line, Canada; Enrique B. Roxo, Brazil; Carlos Nassar, Chile; Jaime Barrios Pena, Guatemala. The society has its Latin-American office at the University of Mexico and its U.S.A. office at Bard College.

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

October 30, 1951. TECHNICAL AND THERAPEUTIC ASPECTS OF CHARACTER RESISTANCE. Richard Sterba, M.D.

The term, character resistance, is derived from the theory and technique of Wilhelm Reich; hence, it is necessary to review and evaluate Reich's early psychoanalytic contributions. Psychoanalytic therapy was born when resistance

was taken into account and Reich participated in this development which was later largely replaced by Anna Freud's work. Reich's concept of 'character resistance' must be described as an artifact, although his first rule of therapy is still valid: interpretations should start from the ego rather than from the id. Reich stressed this particularly in the analysis of the transference. He assumed that *all* transference is a resistance and he regarded no initial transference as the repetition of a genuine object relationship, therefore distrusting any early positive transference. Reich believed that the form of the initial transference resistance is characteristic of the personality, hence an expression of *character,* and he called it 'character resistance'. He conceived of the mental apparatus as having a 'layer cake' structure and insisted that interpretations must follow this layering.

Reich's belief that all initial transference is a resistance is incorrect. Freud observed in 1915 that the resistance *uses* transference-love but does not create it nor diminish its genuineness. Reich's conception of transference is an outgrowth of his own aggressive and suspicious personality traits. An indication of this is the frequency with which he uses comparisons from the battlefield, speaking of resistance as a dangerous and tricky enemy which must be exterminated at all costs. He does not accept ambivalence as a basic fact of the instinctual life of man. When negative and positive elements appear in the transference, he thinks of them as arising from different layers rather than as evidence of ambivalence.

The systematic peeling off of psychic layers, upon which Reich insisted, is technically incorrect. It is true that interpretations should be given in an orderly fashion; i.e., defense interpretation before id interpretation, avoidance of too early 'deep' interpretations, etc., but beyond that systematization cannot be taught. A case is cited in which failure to recognize an initial 'secret' resistance did not have the dire consequences that Reich says it must.

The concept of character advanced by Reich is too narrow. The definition of character should include also the id and the superego rather than only the resisting ego. The concept of 'character resistance' is outdated. Reich's work played a great role in its time, stimulating analysts to clarify their concepts. Anna Freud's The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense grew out of the controversy stimulated by Reich. Her concept of character is much broader, and she led the way to the detailed study of the defensive activities of the ego. Her contribution to psychoanalysis has not sufficiently penetrated the thinking of most analysts. The activities of the ego are inconspicuous, and it is difficult to remain aware of them. Reich thinks of the ego only as an enemy of analysis; Anna Freud studies the defensive activities of the ego in the life of the individual, demonstrating that the mechanisms of defense found useful throughout a lifetime will of necessity find expression in analytic therapy. The term 'character resistance' is no longer appropriate and can be justifiably abandoned.

In the discussion, Dr. Robert Fliess agreed with Sterba, noting that it is a theoretical impossibility to construct character out of what appears as resistance in analysis. Dr. Heinz Hartmann commented that character traits which originate as a defense against an instinct may later take over other functions, such as serving adaptive and synthetic needs. These interactions between the defensive and nondefensive aspects of the same character trait present a problem

for investigation. Dr. Rudolph M. Loewenstein emphasized that just as the positive transference is not created by the resistance, so also hostile transference reactions need not be resistance, but may represent progress in the analysis. He noted also that a patient's hostile feelings may at times be justified reactions to the reality of the analyst's behavior. Dr. Bertram D. Lewin expressed gratification about the mention that some of Reich's theories were due to Reich's personality for, he said, while there is much interest in countertransference it is not sufficiently estimated in many of our discussions. Dr. Abram Blau discussed the distinction between the analysis of symptoms and the analysis of character traits: Reich analyzed character by attacking the patient; Freud showed it must be done through the analysis of the transference neurosis.

DAVID KAIRYS

November 13, 1951. PROBLEMS IN THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF AFFECTS. Edith Jacobson, M.D.

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the concepts of affect from a structural point of view. There has long been a need for a consistent theory of affect which psychoanalysis has so far failed to develop: for more precise definition of emotions, affects and feelings; for more precise explanation of their nature and origin; for a more profound understanding of their qualities.

Freud distinguished between affects and feelings. The term affects refers to a whole set of psychophysiological discharges which are physiological in so far as they express themselves in body changes and psychological in so far as they are perceived as feelings.

After a discussion of Read and Rapaport's contributions, the following conclusion was reached. There is no reason why psychoanalysis should not adopt or use more often the term 'emotions'. The term emotion might be used to designate the whole complex set of psychological, physiological and motor manifestations. Such a definition would include both affective motor phenomena and behavior patterns for which the term 'affect equivalent' has been customarily employed; also all the neurophysiological aspects that several decades of research have gradually discovered. Emotion should include the mild as well as the more violent states. Affects and feelings might be limited to psychological manifestations.

The site of the origin of affects and their relation to instinctual drive was changed by Freud. In the early papers the development of all affects was attached to the system Cs—to the ego—with anxiety as the only exception. However, in his later theory he places the genesis of anxiety in the ego, not in the unconscious.

In the classification of affects almost insurmountable barriers are encountered. The following classification utilizes structural concepts which are in part derived from Glover and Brierley: 1. Simple and compound affect arising from intrasystematic tension: a. affects that represent instinctual drives proper, that is, those that arise directly from tensions in the id, such as sexual excitement, rage; b. affects that develop directly from tensions in the ego, such as fear of reality and physical pain, as well as components of the more enduring feelings, such as object love and hate, or thing interests. 2. Simple and compound affects induced

by intersystemic tensions: a. affects induced by tensions between the ego and the id, such as fear of the id, components of disgust, shame and pity; b. affects induced by tensions between the ego and superego, such as guilt feelings, components of depression.

However, such a classification, from a dynamic and structural point of view, cannot divulge the meaning even of a specific and apparently simple affect because it arises out of a series of intrasystemic and intersystemic tensions. One question is whether affects are either tension or discharge or both. In relating tension to discharge, we must realize that in sexual, as in any other process of psychic release that develops from the depth to the surface of the psychic apparatus, the strength of the stimulus will cause the tension to mount even while discharge has already begun to operate until the point is reached where the energy, having come to the surface, can be fully dispersed and the level of tension declines. Orgastic experience is given as the best example. Pleasurable tensions may induce the urge for higher degrees of excitement; climactic pleasure, the urge for relief; and relief, the longing for renewed tension. This schema reflects the dynamic course of life. Cycles of pleasure have different qualities, alternating between tension and relief, cycles corresponding to our biological existence and rooted in our instinctual life. We very rarely experience sheer, unmixed pleasure for long periods. The relation between principles of pleasure and constancy are not simple. Eating and sex provide high excitement as well as relief pleasures, that is, enjoyment derived from rising and falling tension.

Regarding the relation between pleasure-unpleasure and the psychic economy, under the pressure of reality the ego learns not only to tolerate but even to enjoy mounting tension up to a certain point. A homeostatic or constancy law may be considered to control the psychic economy and can be regarded as the median line around which the pleasure-unpleasure principle directs the course of the cycles of tension. The speed of the swing of the energetic tension to either side has an influence on the affects. The quick discharge of laughter is an example. Modes of psychic release and discharge that are unpleasurable in early development become pleasurable later by virtue of a change in the speed of the discharge. A mature ego can tolerate tension and frustration. Direct aggressive release may occur with higher speed than direct libidinal release. The pace of discharge depends greatly on the quality and intensity of external stimuli. One explanation of how pleasure may be induced by aggressive release is to assume the fusion of aggression with libido; another explanation, once masochism is excluded, is that aggression serves to avoid pain and injury, and serves many ego functions, common even to gaining pleasure. It is difficult to see how the pleasure-unpleasure principle operates in instances where the aggressive drive is turned against the self. Suicide does not necessarily indicate that the aggressive drives aim at the total elimination of tension, but rather that the pleasure principle and homeostasis first fail.

ALBERN N. MAYERS

November 27, 1951. SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS OF MODERN CONCEPTS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE BRAIN. Lawrence S. Kubie, M.D.

Current research in the structure and function of the central nervous system has yielded data of interest to psychoanalysis. The theory that reverberating

circuits exist in the central nervous system was proposed by Dr. Kubie in 1930. Such phenomena as self-perpetuation, immunity from psychotherapeutic influence and susceptibility to shock therapy could be explained by such circuits. One phase of central nervous system function is the reception, generation and redistribution of energy. The sensorimotor cortex is related in a point-for-point manner with external receptors and effectors and by projection with the external world. Penfield's work has demonstrated, however, that in the cortex of the temporal lobe (at least in the temporal lobe subject to epileptic discharge), memories are stored. Organized impressions rather than the elements of experiences are stored. Illusory variations in the quality of perception—for example, deja vu, distortions of time, space and clarity—appear in the reproduction of such temporal lobe memories. MacLean has pointed out that the primitive forebrain, derived from the rhinencephalon, is linked both with the depths of the temporal lobe and with the nontemporal cortex. At this site, therefore, one can imagine the association of external and internal sensations, conceptions of the material and of the abstract, and also phylogenetically and ontogenetically old and new nervous mechanisms—a site par excellence for symbol formation. The structures immediately necessary for the phenomenon of consciousness are presumed by Penfield to lie in the diencephalic region and he has called them collectively the centrencephalic system. In the possible relations between temporal cortex and centrencephalic system one may speculatively see the basis of conscious, preconscious and unconscious. Magoun and his associates have demonstrated the existence in the brain stem of a mechanism whereby the somnolent animal can be roused to a state of waking tension and be maintained in this condition. The work of Kubie and Margolin and of Barach has demonstrated that respiratory rhythms both influence and are influenced by states of consciousness. The chemical requirements of the soma, transmitted to the central nervous system via signaling fluids, evoke appropriate central nervous system behavior by altering the degree of synchronization and desynchronization of individual cellular units.

To demonstrate the application of this approach to psychoanalytic theory, the problem of symbolization is considered. Reviewing the symbolic process in general, one may discern at least three qualitatively different forms: the symbolization of abstract concept formation; the symbolization used in the creative endeavors of artists and scientists to transfer the properties of familiar ideas to new ideas; and the symbolization which describes the relation of the unconscious pattern to its conscious or preconscious derivative. Any single psychic element or process participates simultaneously in all forms of symbolization. Every symbol refers to and reflects both somatic and environmental percepts simultaneously. The close relation between internal and external concepts is demonstrated in an experiment performed by Dr. Penfield, witnessed and described by Dr. Kubie. Among the memories evoked by stimulation of the temporal lobe one sees enteroceptive and exteroceptive elements in all possible proportions, ranging from extreme subjectivity to extreme objectivity. Vivid experiences from the past may be reproduced as though they were current. A memory may be reproduced with the same subjective experience which attended its initial presentation. What is the relation of the deposition and recalling of such memories to the phenomenon of repression? It may be that the same event is recorded both verbally and subjectively; that the verbal record is more accessible to consciousness than the subjective. In that case the psychoanalyst's

preoccupation with verbal techniques may block his approach to the affectively charged, subjective memories, as though the words served a screening function.

Dr. Sydney G. Margolin reviewed the history of previous attempts to understand psychoanalytic theory in terms of physiologic data as well as the history of Dr. Kubie's earlier explorations in this effort. The implications of some of Dr. Kubie's generalizations for further clarification of the problems of psychosomatic medicine and psychoanalytic theory in general were alluded to. Dr. Mortimer Ostow spoke of recent work relating the entropy function to psychic energy and of the difficulty of conceiving of a transmission of nervous energy across the boundaries of the central nervous system. He noted that in Magoun's experiments alerting could be produced by stimuli which had no access to consciousness and that alerting might be related to the problem of ego cathexis, especially that portion of ego cathexis provided by anxiety. He was not sure whether fully repressed pregenital fantasies could be re-evoked by electrical stimulation. Dr. Bela Mittelmann described three types of approach in psychophysiologic studies: that in which certain psychic phenomena are observed in the presence of certain types of brain disease; that in which some part of the brain could be inferred to have a necessary though indeterminate kind of relation to a psychic function; and that in which psychic processes were seen as analogies to physical processes. He considered the first most reliable and the last the least reliable of the methods. He concurred with Dr. Kubie in the matter of the therapeutic use of words with affective leverage. Dr. Rudolph M. Loewenstein observed that even though words might have a defensive function in therapeutic analysis, the analysis of the verbal resistance was a vital part of the analytic process. Dr. Gustav Bychowski enthusiastically approved of Dr. Kubie's approach and quoted similar efforts in the past with which he was familiar. He listed some fields in which he thought Dr. Kubie's approach might be most immediately productive. Dr. Laci Fessler said that in Dr. Kubie's data one could see the basis for that type of dynamic equilibrium characteristic of living processes in general. Dr. Charles Brenner wondered whether the concepts of wakefulness and consciousness were of similar physiologic significance. In his closing discussion Dr. Kubie mentioned, in reply to Dr. Loewenstein, that the therapeutic effectiveness of directly evoked memory would have to be evaluated empirically and that a priori considerations were not sufficient to resolve the problem.

MORTIMER OSTOW

December 18, 1951. ST. PAUL AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY: A PSYCHOANALYTIC AND HISTORICAL STUDY. Sidney Tarachow, M.D.

Tarachow pointed out that little is known of Paul's early development or family. Physically small and probably deformed, he was a celibate with no real relationship to women, and in a constant battle with the demands of the flesh which resemble adolescent struggles with masturbation.

From the history of his life as a missionary and from his writings Tarachow has reconstructed his personality: prior to conversion, a doctrinaire bigot; submissive to the church; the first-named persecutor of the Christians, who completely suppressed his aggression against the father, brooking no deviation in

himself or others. His rage and intolerance of Christians led to the murder of Stephen and a vindictive persecution of the Christians, with intense religiosity and scrupulosity—an attempt to deny his own rebellious tendencies.

A severe masochist, his conversion was a violent emotional upheaval with a shift in identification, from the Father, to the elevation of the Son, accompanied by severe temporary castrations: he could neither eat nor drink for three days, and was blinded.

Paul's earlier persecutions were unofficial. He himself could not tolerate submission to human authority. Just prior to his conversion, he had been officially appointed as an agent of the Sanhedrin. Tarachow postulated that this was an intolerable position allowing for no ambivalence, and creating a conflict over submission as a fully committed ally of God. Tarachow suggests that the elevation of the son and identification with Christ, showing where Paul's real sympathies lay, masked an unconscious passive homosexual surrender, since Paul had difficulty in differentiating God and Christ.

He had frequent hysterical spells, had the gift of tongues, and had ecstatic states (mutual introjection) in his complete identification with Christ. His frequent hallucinatory revelations seem closely integrated to reality and were astute solutions of immediate reality and emotional problems, enabling him to embark on new specific courses of action.

Subsequent to his conversion he seemed unable to accept the authority of a group and unable to function when alone. In a constant struggle against the father he could act only under the reconciliation of father surrogates such as Barnabas, Silas, and Luke.

He was a provocative man with extensive masochistic strivings, glorying in shipwrecks, floggings, stonings and punishments, culminating in his final appearance for punishment before Caesar, in identification with Christ.

Dr. Mark Kanzer noted the mythological analogies; Paul's conversion and blinding at high noon, and the blinding of men who dare look at the Sun God; the similarities between Paul on the road to Damascus and Œdipus on the road to Thebes. Dr. H. Alden Bunker connected Paul's conversion with primitive initiation rites. Dr. Géza Róheim connected it with the initiation of the Shaman, where there are such characteristic versions. Dr. Otto Sperling cited clinical examples to suggest that in Paul's case parricide may have been more important than fratricide, and beneath that, strong oral sadistic drives against the mother. Dr. Max Stern discussed the shift from Judaism to Christianity as a substitution from the tribal covenant, an almost legalistic relationship, to an emotional and personal relationship to God. Dr. Leonard Sillman emphasized Paul's synthesis of Judaism and the Mithraic religion and questioned the basis of Paul's actions as a renegade.

BRUCE RUDDICK

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Books Received

To cite this article: (1952) Books Received, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 21:3, 464-464, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1952.11925892

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1952.11925892

BOOKS RECEIVED

ALEXANDER, FRANZ and ROSS, HELEN, Editors: *Dynamic Psychiatry.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952.

WINTER. J. A.: *Are Your Troubles Psychosomatic?* New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1952.

VON FOERSTER, HEINZ, Editor: *Cybernetics.* Transactions of the Eighth Conference, March 15–16, 1951. New York: Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation, 1952.

RAVEN, JOHN C.: *Controlled Projection for Children.* London: H. K. Lewis & Co. Ltd., 1951.

BOND, DOUGLAS D.: *The Love and Fear of Flying.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1952.

RANK, OTTO: *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero.* New York: Robert Brunner, 1952.

RANK, OTTO: *The Trauma of Birth.* New York: Robert Brunner, 1952.

RIESMAN, DAVID: *Faces in the Crowd. Individual Studies in Character and Politics.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952.

THOMPSON, LAWRANCE: *Melville's Quarrel with God.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952.

VOGT, EVON Z.: *Navaho Veterans. A Study of Changing Values.* Cambridge: Peabody Museum of American Archæology and Ethnology, Harvard University, 1951.

ROBERTS, JOHN M.: *Three Navaho Households. A Comparative Study in Small Group Culture.* Cambridge: Peabody Museum of American Archæology and Ethnology, Harvard University, 1951.

Diagnostic and Statistical Manual: Mental Disorders. Prepared by The Committee on Nomenclature and Statistics. Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association Mental Hospital Service, 1952.

Working Programs in Mental Hospitals. Proceedings of the Third Mental Hospital Institute. Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association Mental Hospital Service, 1952.

STRAUSS, HANS; OSTOW, MORTIMER and GREENSTEIN, LOUIS: *Diagnostic Electroencephalography.* New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1952.

STAGNER, ROSS and KARWOSKI, T. F.: *Psychology.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952.

SHAW, ARTIE: *The Trouble with Cinderella. An Outline of Identity.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, Inc., 1952.

CHESSER, EUSTACE: *Cruelty to Children.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1952.

KRIS, ERNST: *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1952.

SILVERBERG, WILLIAM V.: *Childhood Experience and Personal Destiny.* New York: Springer Publishing Company, Inc., 1952.

FRENCH, THOMAS M.: *The Integration of Behavior. Vol. I. Basic Postulates.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1952.

JOSSELYN, IRENE M.: *The Adolescent and His World.* New York: Family Service Association of America, 1952.

VANDERVELDT, JAMES H. and ODENWALD, ROBERT P.: *Psychiatry and Catholicism.* New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1952.

VERNIER, CLAIRE MEYERS: *Projective Test Productions. 1. Projective Drawings.* New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1952.