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DREAM PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYTIC SITUATION

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This paper will try to apply some of our knowledge and theory about sleep and the dream to an understanding of the analytic situation, which is here defined, empirically, as the familiar standard hour, or loosely, as 'what happens on the couch'; and sometimes the word 'couch' will be used metaphorically as synonymous with 'analytic situation'. Included in the idea of analytic situation are the phenomena of free association, resistance, transference, repetition, and others well known and generally admitted as working concepts.

Genetically, the analytic situation is an altered hypnotic situation, as the analytic hour is an altered hypnotic session. The analytic patient takes his origin from the hypnotic patient, for originally Freud's patients were attracted to therapy by their knowledge of cures due to hypnosis. The development of analysis from hypnosis has been studied and told with much detail and perspicacity by Ernest Jones (1953). It seems that some patients could not be hypnotized, or they 'countersuggested' too vigorously; that is, they had a resistance to being hypnotized or, more likely, a fear of being put to sleep. The refractory patient made the following *as if* proposal that the treatment be modified: 'Although I cannot, for reasons of my own, let myself be put to sleep,[1] or into a state resembling sleep, nevertheless, I promise to relax as if I were in bed and to tell everything that comes to me in this quasi-hypnotic or

[1] The wording of the 'patient's proposal' does not mean that hypnosis is necessarily sleep, any more than 'to be put to sleep by ether' means that drug anesthesia is absolutely the same thing as natural sleep. No assumption of the sort is necessary. The assumption merely is that the patient regards being hypnotized, as he might regard being anesthetized, as such an action, and that he has the same attitude toward being hypnotized as he might have toward going to sleep. See Freud (1888); also Lewin (1954).

quasi-hypnagogic state. In return for this concession, I accept more responsibility for what I say.'

We may put it that a resistance appeared in therapy even before psychoanalysis was properly born and was of major importance in its subsequent development. It changed the hypnotic situation into an analytic situation. It should be noted that the time of this change coincides with the time in the embryology of psychoanalysis, when hypnosis was being used not to produce suggestive, irrational cures, but to uncover traumatic, repressed memories; so that this purpose is tacitly assumed in the above-stated bargain.

With this modification of the hypnotic session into the analytic hour, the therapist's theoretical interest was diverted from the problems centering about sleeplike states and became more and more focused on the contents of the patient's remarks and behavior. The study of the patient as a quasi-sleeper or quasi-dreamer was completely subordinated to the therapeutic and theoretical study of his symptoms. The theory of the neuroses was developed, and it seems in retrospect inevitable that the writings on technique should have been couched largely in terms of this theory. The patient on the couch was prima facie a neurotic person and only incidentally a dreamer. It is well, however, to question the complete inevitability of this particular choice of formulation and terminology. We may plausibly speculate whether an alternative path could not have been chosen; namely, to regard the analytic material and 'what happens on the couch' not as something like a neurosis, but instead, something like a dream, and to introduce dream concepts and dream psychological terminology. If this path had been taken, quite possibly we would have developed a poorer and less useful terminology than we have now, but that is not the issue. We are not raising the question of better or worse, merely of difference.

The relationship between neurosis theory and dream theory seems to have been a slippery one for analysts to hang on to. Thus, Freud (1950) confessed that he discovered the essential

unity of the two, then forgot, and had to rediscover it. Perhaps it is necessary for all of us to repeat this rediscovery. So much of our analytic phylogeny recapitulates Freud's scientific ontogeny that we may not have, even now, thoroughly 'worked through' this insight and taken in all its implications. We have no doubt that the dream is the royal road to the unconscious and that dream analysis is an indispensable instrument in therapeutic practice. We know that the dream is a wish fulfilment and a communication, and we bank heavily on this knowledge. But we have paid little attention to the chief function of dreaming, its guardianship of sleep. Attention to the interpretation of contents and to the dream work has distracted us, here too, from the problem of sleep and from a consideration of the analytic subject as a fractional dreamer or sleeper. Again in retrospect, Freud's rejection of Breuer's ideas of hypnoidal states appears consistent with the general turning from an interest in the sleeper as such.

We all know the psychoanalytic dictum that whatever is rejected in the course of conflict-solving may return and find a disguised place in that which is accepted. So, sleep, excluded by agreement from the analytic situation, gained access to it in another form—the method of free association. I developed this idea in a recent paper (1954), where I pointed out that the wish to be put to sleep, which the patient brought to the hypnotic situation, has been supplanted by the wish to associate freely in the analytic situation. The patient lies down, not to sleep, but to associate. The interpretation of free association as the substitute for sleep in the therapeutic situation was based not only on the tacit bargain cited above, but also on one of Freud's definitions of free association, given in The Interpretation of Dreams (Standard Edition, IV, p. 102), where it is likened to the state of mind that precedes sleep (also to the hypnotic state).

For our present purposes, then, we shall project the metapsychology of sleep and the dream on to the analytic situation. We readily note certain coincidences. Thus the narcissism of

sleep, an element assumed in dream psychology, coincides with narcissism on the couch, and the rare blank 'sleep dreams' are analogous to the rare transient falling asleep on the couch, both phenomena being the unusual near zeros of their respective domains. The manifest dream text coincides with the manifest analytic material, expressing, in processed form, latent thoughts become preconscious. Dream formation is to be compared with 'analytic-situation formation'; it is the 'exception', to use Freud's word, to the basic narcissism. Other analogies suggest themselves, but because there are so many differences of detail and elaboration, due to the opposite paths taken in the psychic apparatus by the dream process and the analytic-situation process (one terminating mainly in visual hallucinations, the other mainly in words), it is well to consider at first only the broader coincidences.

NARCISSISM

Since we mentioned the concept of *narcissism* as an element of the psychoanalytic theory of sleep and the dream, and suggested its application in the analytic situation, it would be well to come to terms with this word and its meaning. To ignore its origin in sexology, *narcissism* was introduced into psychoanalysis as a definition of an erotic relationship in which the self was the object, that is to say, self-love; but the youth gazing at his image in the fountain always had a more abstract and symbolical quality, as a representation of a form of love, than did, for example, the picture conjured up by the word, *libido,* with its etymology of sexual desire and its implication of the excited genital and sexual congress as the representation of object relationship. Narcissism has always seemed to be more conceptual, to be something behind the phenomena, and as far as factual existence is concerned, it has some of the shadowy and absent quality of its mythological eponym's forlorn sweetheart, the nymph Echo.

I mean that narcissism is an abstraction, with visible correlates in childhood psychology, in neurosis, in sleep, and in the love life. Narcissism, as a concept, is behind the dream, behind

the depression and elation, behind somatic symptoms, etc. We must carefully distinguish between narcissism the concept and narcissistic phenomena as we distinguish the conceptual points and lines of pure mathematics from the ink dots and strokes that we see and measure (cf. Hartmann, Kris and Loewenstein's discussion of theory [1953]). But as the dot is the *approximate* concrete representative of the abstract point, so, I believe, we may take a certain type of blank dream as a sort of concrete, approximate, 'inkspot' picture of the abstract 'point' narcissism. This blank dream (1953), though concrete, approximates the narcissism of sleep, and as a manifestation, epitomizes what *narcissism* can mean not only in dream and sleep psychology but also in the phrase *narcissistic neurosis,* its content signifying an intense, primitive, direct experience of the baby in the nursing situation, inclusive of sleep at the breast.

The relevance of this discussion of narcissism to the theme, the application of dream psychology to the analytic situation, depends on a rather subtle point. Despite our theory, in ordinary dream interpretation, narcissism is left to one side, and to a certain extent this is also true in our ordinary interpretation of the standard analytic situation. However, certain narcissistic phenomena that appear on the couch (some of them related to sleep) will help us to understand the nature and psychology of the standard situation, as the 'narcissistic dream' throws light on the psychology of sleep and ordinary dreaming.

TOXIC TECHNIQUE

Before entering into an investigation of the standard analytic hour, it will be profitable to take up another, simpler modification of the older hypnotist's seance. I refer to what might be called the *toxic therapeutic situation,* where one or another drug is used as an adjuvant or an initiator of something like a cathartic situation. Here it is easy to apply dream psychology to interpret the situation, for the drug produces something like a sleep or a half-sleep state, and the fantasies that appear are readily compared to dream formations. For theoretical pur-

poses, however, let us approach the matter indirectly, and treat the situation as a toxic neurosis.

In Mourning and Melancholia, Freud states that a 'toxic' condition might of itself lead to narcissistic regression and depression (and presumably also elation) without the intervention of any object loss. But toxins may initiate many other types of mental states. In psychiatry, it has long been known that the psychological contents of a drug psychosis may include not only manifestations of direct impairment of the cerebral cortex (disorientation, torpor, intellectual inhibition, etc.), but also others called 'psychogenic' and due to individual mental factors, such as significant life experiences. In other words, a drug delirium has somewhat the structure of a dream, the drug being the incentive to a kind of sleep or 'state of narcissism', the psychogenic symptoms being cast in a form resembling a dream.

When 'narco' drugs are used in combined sleep- and psychotherapy, they produce a comparable state, where the narcissistic regression of anesthesia, like the narcissism of natural sleep, is made imperfect by an 'exception', which is like a dream. Excluding such heavy methods as the *Dauerschlaf,* which would be dreamless, the desideratum in the therapies I have in mind is not deep sleep nor hallucinosis, but a state nearer 'muttering delirium with sense in it'; that is, something not too far from intelligible or interpretable hypnagogic free association and catharsis.

From our present standpoint of historical reconstruction, we may say that the therapist acts here to supply a different answer to the problem raised by the Anna O type of patient, the type which resists and 'cannot be hypnotized'. The primitive resistance to being put to sleep is overcome by pharmacological aid. The drug promotes the relaxation and submission which is undertaken voluntarily in the hypnotic or standard analytic situation.

FEAR OF SLEEP AND DEATH

The wish for a soothing drug, or the fear of it, often comes up in associations during an analytic hour, among other reasons because of conflicts centering about sleep. The interpretation of this wish or fear throws light on the resistance of patients to hypnotism, which was not interpreted when historically the bargain of free association was struck. Some of the ambivalence about sleep and anesthesia was discussed in a previous paper (1954), where I recounted some of the fantasies of seduction, or of being disgracefully uninhibited in language and action, and the moral objections that were raised to the introduction of the use of chloroform. In his 1888 paper, Freud tried to allay some of the public's and the medical profession's fear of harm coming from hypnotism by reminding his readers that anesthesia had been feared in the same way, but that this fear had gradually been dispelled through familiarity and reason.

It is true, as Freud says, that common sense and familiarity have overcome some of the irrational alarm over being put to sleep by chloroform, and its social sanctioning *(accouchement à la reine)* has caused some of the anxiety to be ignored. Nevertheless, there still remain certain fears of being anesthetized, and the commonest one is not the fear of being uninhibited and losing self-control but the fear of dying. There is no need here to repeat arguments or furnish evidence for the idea that this fear is symptomatic and covers other latent ones. I shall merely name some of the pregenital varieties of the fear of death, or the fear of being put to sleep which is the same. These are: the fear of being devoured, of being poisoned, of being suffocated; and finally, a variety which is not so much a fear of dying in the sense of losing consciousness (sleeping) as a fear of the afterlife (and bad dreams), a fear rather ignored in our materialistic era. The equivalence of sleep and death and its clinical applicability is demonstrated in the following account, kindly placed at my disposal some years ago by Dr. Maxwell Gitelson.

'The patient was a fifty-six-year-old man, seen in consultation, who had had a coronary attack, and who after recovery from

this was suffering from an aversion to food, from a feeling that food did not go down, and from breathing difficulties, subjectively experienced as "inability to get enough of what I need". After much emotional distress and subjective torture, at one point he burst out to his wife and daughter, who were standing by, "I am going to stop fighting this thing. I am going to let myself die." Thereupon he collapsed on the pillow, fully believing that he was going to die, and instead dropped into the first peaceful sleep that he had had in many months.' Dr. Gitelson comments: 'This resignation to death really represented in his critical emotional state the development of a capacity to accept a profound oral regression with which death and sleep were equated'. A not irrelevant illness in this patient was a peptic ulcer of many years' standing. (Cf. Stone [1947], who describes sleep on the analytic couch in a duodenal ulcer patient.)

It would not be difficult to imagine that Dr. Gitelson's patient might have shown the same behavior if he had tried to accommodate himself to the analytic couch. The resistance to analysis, like the resistance to sleep or to anesthesia, may, particularly at the beginning, be due to a fear of death or its corollaries. Being hypnotized, anesthetized, killed, put to sleep, are equivalents, and all may be represented by lying down on the analytic couch. Many patients have dreamed of their analysis as a surgical operation, the table (the surgical one this time, not the dining table) representing the bed or couch. By extension, and for other reasons that come from medical education, physicians often think of themselves being dissected when they dream of their analysis, and sometimes they even turn the autopsy into a cannibal procedure. In the literature we have a record of a famous dream in which a young physician with strong scientific curiosity sees himself as a cadaver undergoing dissection. The analysand was of course Freud (Standard Edition, V, p. 452), and since it was a self-analysis, appropriately he is also the anatomist. The dream begins: 'Old Brücke must have set me some task; strangely enough it related to a dissec-

tion of the lower part of my own body, my pelvis and legs, which I saw before me as though in the dissecting room, but without noticing their absence in myself and also without a trace of any gruesome feeling. . . . The pelvis had been eviscerated . . . ', etc. It is significant historically that the founder of psychoanalysis could see himself as a prosector and at the same time as the anatomical preparation, and later we shall have more to say about the identification of an analysand with a physically ill patient or a cadaver.

At this point, however, I should merely like to emphasize once more the natural unconscious equivalence of sleep and death, both of them states of narcissism, psychologically. Also that the exception to the narcissism of sleep, to wit, the dream, is the same as the exception to the narcissism of death, to wit, the afterlife. But more to the present purpose, I wish to indicate by these examples the sort of resistances there might be to lying down on the analytic couch, and how the couch and the analytic situation itself need interpretation. In all its variety, the most obvious interpretation, not necessarily the deepest, is that the couch is a place for sleeping.

RANK'S FALLACY

In the above exposition I have tried to tie up some loose ends, many of them historical, which are related to the main theme of this paper, and to offer some justification for applying sleep metapsychology to the analytic situation. I should like now briefly to discuss an important error, which has a position in the history of psychoanalysis, and which involved both the theory of the analytic situation and the matter of sleep. I refer to the theory propounded by Otto Rank, and by him embodied in a technique, that in analysis patients relive their stay in the uterus and with its termination, their birth.

Rank, I believe, always had an unconscious feeling that the analytic situation was somehow a sleep and that the associative material was the equivalent of manifest dreaming. This I infer from an article of his called *Eine Neurosenanalyse in Träumen*

(1924), a tour de force, based on the tacit assumption that an entire analysis and the whole process of the analytic situation could be understood as if it were a dream. A reading of this paper clarifies some of Rank's later erroneous views.

Rank's argument (1924-a) that the analytic situation represents an intrauterine state and its termination a rebirth begins with the observation, correct enough, that rebirth fantasies accompany the resolution of the analytic situation, that patients dream of leaving the analyst as a being born. In this Rank saw not a metaphorical expression of separation, but a 'so to speak biological' repetition of the act of birth, *'meist in allen seinen Einzelheiten getreu'* (for the most part accurate in all details), so that the time spent on the couch is a true and immediate replica and reliving of that spent in the uterus. This idea Rank got directly from his patients, and he says, *'psychologisch hat also der Pazient recht',* a quotation which conceals evident special pleading. It seems that Rank fell into the same sort of error which so distressed Freud when, at a critical moment in psychoanalytic history, he found that he had been misled by hysterical women's fantasies during analysis into believing that they had really been seduced in early childhood by their father or a near male relative. Freud took the hard step, then, of recognizing his error and realizing that he was dealing with the memory of an infantile fantasy. Rank was not aware that he had been deceived in the same way. He did not take into account the comparable alternative to his interpretation of the rebirth fantasy, namely, that it was a fantasy of waking up. For, among the fantastic elaborations of the fact of pleasurable sleep is the idea that one is *in utero,* or rather, within the mother's body, and this intramaternal fantasy is a later, more complicated and more highly processed fantasy of the œdipal period, which contains later knowledge and impressions about gestation.

In other words, Rank could equally well have thought that the fœtal postures adopted by patients on the couch and other signs and symptoms of the 'intramaternal situation' were fantasy attempts to fulfil the wish to sleep; similarly he could have inter-

preted the 'birth trauma' manifestations as the correlated resistance to waking up from the analytic bed. The insight that really resides in Rank's theory, if one analyzes his elaborations and misunderstandings, is expressed in his statement that '. . . *die eigentliche Übertragungsliebe, die wir bei beiden Geschlechtern analytisch aufzulösen haben, die mütterliche ist . . .*', which is blurry and an overstatement, but nevertheless contains an intuition of the whole preœdipal development and approximates in a way an interpretation of the position on the couch as a relationship to the mother. This it is, though hardly so directly and 'biologically' (whatever that implies) as Rank states. The couch is reminiscent of *sleep* and therefore an important element of the nursing situation. Rank felt the importance of the fact that the patient was lying down, and that somehow this was connected with the preœdipal relationship to the mother, but in his qualification of the statement quoted above, he himself fell into a fantasy in the clause, '*. . . wie sie in der pränatalen physiologischen Bindung zwischen Mutter und Kind gegeben war*'. Here he was believing a fantasy to be a literal statement of genetic facts.

To Rank, in fact, as to Jung, the story of Œdipus seemed only a myth, not a genetic fact. However, the point here is that Rank's analysis of the analytic situation and his failure to see that he was observing symptoms of sleeping and waking, led him to theorize falsely, and along with Ferenczi for a while, to regress in his technique to a quasi catharsis, where the patient relived fantasies on the couch and acted out the script suggested, and this acting out Rank identified with the therapeutic process. His active injunction, the setting of a definite terminal date, provoked the patient into a regressive protest to having his stay on the couch cut short, and the patient then portrayed being 'untimely ripp'd' from the analytic couch as an anxious, painful awakening, the traumatic 'birth'. In the œdipal setting, the regressively expressed formula for this would read: the father is waking and weaning me betimes from my sleep with the mother.

Rank was not saved from his fallacy by his knowledge of the theory of the neuroses, which indeed was shattered when he applied it to the analytic situation; but he might have been saved from his mistake if he had followed and analyzed thoroughly his perception about the 'prenatal state', which meant that the analytic situation was some kind of sleep and the associative material some kind of dreamlike production; that is, if he had consistently applied the metapsychology of the dream. Instead, he built his theory of the analytic situation on unanalyzed infantile fantasies about the unborn child and childbirth.

The reason I have dealt here so extensively with Rank's theory may not be immediately evident. But I regard it as an attempt, thwarted by a mistake, to do what I am attempting now, that is, to project upon the couch and the analytic situation the idea that the patient is as if somewhat asleep.

FREE ASSOCIATION

From such general expositions of the analytic situation in terms of sleep and dream psychology, we may turn to individual elements in it, and to begin with, the very important one of free association. It is often profitable and instructive to see a familiar fact in a different context—to see the dream, for instance, as something that occurs in nature as well as in an analytic procedure, which as a matter of fact Freud's own dreams gave us a chance to do. We must, in other words, remind ourselves occasionally that God could not care less whether a dream is reported to an analyst or not; and we may well look for the phenomenal elements of the analytic situation in their natural habitats.

Let us, therefore, consider a solitary individual who is contemplating his own thoughts, feelings, memories and impulses. Let him approximate Freud's idea of free association by having him limit action to a minimum and by letting him put his mental processes into words with no care for style or form. That he should report these words to anyone is, for the time being, irrelevant. In any event, we have as yet no 'analysis', not even

a self-analysis, for many persons have used very much this method of introspection for many purposes.

Freud tells us that he came upon this method of giving free rein to the contents of consciousness in the writings of the German author, Boerne. In an essay, The Art of Becoming an Original Writer in Three Days (1827), Boerne concludes his exposition with the following words: 'Take a sheet of paper and for three days in succession write down, without any falsification or hypocrisy, everything that comes into your head. Write what you think of yourself, of your women, of the Turkish War, of Goethe, of the Funk criminal case, of the Last Judgment, of those senior to you in authority—and when the three days are over, you will be amazed at what novel and startling thoughts have welled up in you. This is the art of becoming a writer in three days.'[2] Boerne evidently intended to use the scribbling as the raw material for his literary work. He had as his purpose the liberation of the imagination, or as we might prefer to say, the exploration of the preconscious system, for the advancement of literary composition. In The Interpretation of Dreams (Standard Edition, IV, p. 102), Freud calls attention to Schiller's use of a method very like free association for the same purpose. We see, therefore, that from the start analysts have known that there was involved not merely a way of thinking, but also purposes and intentions that determined its use.

These intentions may be various. If we consider the works of Herbert Silberer (1909, 1912), another solitary associator, we see two evident motives for his recording freely arising ideas and feelings. One of these motives was psychological investigation in the narrower sense; he was interested in examining the why and how of this variety of thinking. His second purpose might be called, loosely, philosophical or mystical. Pursuing his first intention, Silberer noted his associations and the contents of his dreams and hypnagogic reveries, making scientific

[2] Ernest Jones (1953). Zilboorg (1952).

inferences and assumptions concerning the representation of waking up, the nature of symbols, and the way certain states of the dreamer enter the manifest dream text. His scientific psychological interest lay not in dream interpretation in Freud's sense of unearthing unconscious contents and wishes, but in establishing the nature of certain formal properties in the manifest contents. In addition to this interest, Silberer had another which he called 'anagogic'. He used the dream thoughts and associations as incentives and directives for philosophic and theologic speculation, and possibly for the evocation of moods and feelings that went with them. In both endeavors, there was of course nothing like the 'analytic situation' or a 'therapeutic intention'. Silberer was led from verbal associations—a cardinal requirement in Freud's definition of free association—into visual and symbolic representation, and in reveries, during states of fatigue, he came very near to dreaming.

Jung was much influenced by Silberer, and it is fair to assume that he was describing his own variant of free association when (1911) he spoke of 'undirected thinking', which, he says, starts in words but is later replaced by visual images and after that by dreamlike fantasies. The latter he came to regard as the basic or elemental contents of the unconscious, and he held them in a certain awe, much as the ancients had for dreams that emerged through the gates of horn and ivory to bring to mortals the messages of the gods. They suggested to him ethical and religious beliefs and goals, and reminded him of parallels in myth and fable. As Boerne took notes for literary composition, so Jung (and in part, Silberer) used associations and reveries for metaphysical and mythological constructions. In fact, as Glover (1950) noted, Jung's psychological constructions resemble an Olympus, and his allegedly basic concepts are themselves the complex condensations, distortions, and symbols of a sort of manifest dream text.

Given any fantasy which arises during free and solitary ruminations, such as Silberer's while he gazed into his crystal globe, it is clear that one or another feature will be more likely

to impress the observer when he retrospectively assesses them, and that he will be guided by his purposes, special interests and education. One observer will be struck by the similarity of the given fantasy to ideas he held as a child or which possibly he has heard expressed by children. Another person, with little empathy for children but well-versed in cultural history or anthropology, will be more aware that the fantasy resembles a certain series of myths. Consequently, the first observer would ultimately try to construct a psychology of the child, while the second might contribute to anthropology or the history of culture. A third observer, departing from the principle of putting the fantasy into words and running into complex reveries and unusual absorbed states, might come to accept these manifest, processed, ideas and qualities as the final desiderata of the method. Still another observer could ignore all the frames of reference mentioned; in fact from Zilboorg's account (1952) of Francis Galton's use of the method, an academic psychologist of the old school, interested in the study of the mind according to the old canons of the science, might view the associations simply as novel, static 'enlargements of consciousness'. Clearly, all such observers have brought to the field their own measures and coördinates.

Freud's self-analytic intentions and purposes can be indicated in a few words. He approached his own associations as he did those of his patients, and he was guided by the same medical and analytic intentions, little concerned, to begin with, as to their nonmedical application. However, when one uses the word *medical* in connection with Freud, it must be in a very broad and enlightened sense, not synonymous with *therapy,* and including all the connotations and implications of science and research. Free association for him was calm self-observation, and the verbal reporting or recording of the associations, which rules out of the method some of the 'inexpressibles' to which Jung refers, or at least insists on attempting to verbalize. This verbalization is by no means impossible; witness the brilliant descriptions of mystical experiences by many saints and poets.

We might use as an instance of Freud's attitude toward nonverbalization his pursuit through indirect associations of the forgotten name, *Signorelli,* when he could bring to mind only the visual images of the artist's frescoes. Under the same circumstances, it is conceivable that some other person, say an artist, not particularly interested in the problem of forgetting, might have been sidetracked into æsthetic moods, and he might have lost his interest in the painter's name. Freud's special interest in remembering and forgetting outweighed any tendency toward pleasurable æsthetic memories. From the purely psychoanalytic point of view or according to Freud's rules, many of the reveries and states of mind in question represent resistances to putting thoughts into words and to the hidden implications and associative links to these same thoughts. In his reference to calm self-observation, as well as in the account of resistance and transference which immediately follows this in The Introductory Lectures, Freud leaves aside the problem of the relative awakeness of the person who is freely associating.

There are doubtless many other purposes that free association might be made to serve. Those mentioned are: 1, literary creation; 2, psychological science; 3, mystical experience; 4, ethical and philosophical guidance or inspiration; 5, therapy. As a drug is only *materia medica* in itself and variously utilizable for experiment or therapy or pleasure, so are free associations capable of varied employment. They can be elaborated, superseded, used 'anagogically' for moral illumination, or permitted to lead to buried memories, according to the interests and intentions, conscious or unconscious, of the self-observer. The thoughts and reveries of the relaxed, solitary person may lead off in many directions, guided by the pleasure principle, by impulses to action (Hartmann [1947]), or by intellectual and secondary intentions. Actions may include gestures or fugues or 'rational behavior'. The spontaneous ideas of the solitary self-observer can belong to various parts of his personality: different ego interests and pleasure strivings can seize upon the newly arisen ideas and feelings, progressively or regressively

(E. Kris [1950]). They may be turned into practical channels, such as literary production or problem solving, go over into æsthetic or athletic action, or be passively enjoyed or tolerated.

For the purposes of this discussion, it will be noted that the conception of free association is given a very loose construction. But at its core, again for our purposes, stands Freud's special, tight definition of a 'condition of calm self-observation . . . something which is quite different from reflection without precluding it', an attention to what is on the conscious surface of the mind, with a relinquishing of all objections to what might appear there, no matter from what source, or what the form or content. Around this nuclear, strictly defined norm, radiate the states of consciousness of all degrees of awakeness and sleepiness, including the artificial 'toxic' states; and there are insensible transitions toward reveries and dreams in one direction, and, in the other, toward directed, secondarily processed, structured mental work.

Indeed, what William James (1890, II, pp. 325-326) has to say about primitive reasoning may be interesting in this context. 'It is', he says, 'by no means easy to decide just what is meant by reason, or how the peculiar thinking process called reasoning differs from other thought sequences which lead to similar results. Much of our thinking consists of trains of images suggested one by another, a sort of spontaneous reverie, of which it seems likely enough that the higher brutes should be capable. This sort of thinking leads nevertheless to rational conclusions, both practical and theoretical. . . . As a rule in this sort of irresponsible thinking, the terms which fall to be coupled together are empirical concretes, not abstractions. A sunset may call up the vessel's deck from which I saw one last summer, the companions of my voyage, my arrival into port, etc.; or it may make me think of solar myths, of Hercules' and Hector's funeral pyres, of Homer and whether he could write, of the Greek alphabet, etc. If habitual contiguities predominate, we have a prosaic mind; if rare contiguities, or similarities, have free play, we call the person fanciful, poetic,

or witty. The upshot of it may be that we are reminded of some practical duty: we may write a letter to a friend abroad, or we may take down the lexicon and study our Greek lessons.'[3]

Evidently, James was associating pretty freely himself, and he goes on to say that such actions as he mentioned, although 'rational', are not performed as the result of reasoning. (Cf. Hartmann, loc. cit.) Later under the rubric of *resistance,* we shall refer to a special sort of action that may issue under such circumstances. Here it will suffice to call attention to James's quietly inspired differentiation of the prosaic and the poetic mind in free association, which contains *in nuce* premonitions of psychoanalytic formulations. Writing in 1889, James often astonishes us by what he might have called 'poetic' prophecy; for after trying to sum up thinking, he says, 'if we could say in English "it thinks" as we say "it rains" or "it blows", we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on' (ibid., p. 224).

I might of course have omitted James's remarks and simply referred to E. Kris's exposition (1950) of preconscious thinking, which covers this field; yet, James's words seemed worth quoting for themselves.

We must now ask how this big, loose process of solitary thinking or associating differs from the association desirable on the analytic couch. We may say, first of all, that there is probably no transference situation; we say *probably,* for there may be an occult one, such as we believe existed in Freud's thinking in relation to Wilhelm Fliess, and we cannot be too sure whether some of the accounts of self-analysis are entirely accurate when their reporter assumes that there was no analyst. I have in mind Pickworth Farrow's account (1945) and Freud's

[3] William James said that if you have a noble emotion such as you might get from going to The Symphony, you should do something about it, act on it, even go and pay a call on your great-aunt.

I wish to thank Dr. Carl Binger for this reference, which he rightly calls 'the apotheosis of the pragmatic'.

comments thereon. Certainly, if one has been in an analytic situation, subsequent self-analytic procedures will contain elements of the original transference. However, in nature, there would probably be no analyst in a self-analysis in the narrower sense.

On the other hand, there would certainly be resistances, in the freudian sense. These Freud observed in his own self-analysis, and he constantly alludes to them in his work with his own dreams. Nor is it hard to make them out in Silberer's or in Jung's writings. Indeed, the recognition that there are resistances to free thought ranks as one of Freud's great technical discoveries. Although some of the persons mentioned near the beginning of this discussion, like Boerne and Schiller, had an inkling that they were overcoming some sort of impediment to thinking, and although some mystics write of the 'darkness' when no ineffable experiences can be reached, yet it remained for Freud to note that certain paths of thought 'led nowhere', or to a halt, or *ins Unendliche* (into the endless, as he says in one place), and in general certainly away from the place that Freud was interested in—from repressed material which is not egosyntonic. In short, in free solitary association, there may be no transference but there is surely resistance. If, for terminological reasons, one wishes to reserve the word *resistance* for the situation on the couch,[4] then one would still have to say *repression* or *defense*.

RESISTANCE, SLEEP, AND THE DREAM

The analytic resistance is a pragmatic concept. After hypnotism was abandoned, Freud found that the patient would or could not live up completely to his promise to associate freely in a useful way; and it is well to emphasize the word *useful* and to specify the use. Freud had a therapeutic and scientific intention, and the resistance was directed against the instrument of

[4] One should not take the phrase *on the couch* too physically and literally. Free association, and an analytic situation too, occur with a person sitting up or in other positions. But this alters only a few obvious details; the person can also daydream, doze, and even sleep in the sitting position, and he can 'associate'.

this intention. I follow Freud in calling free association an instrument, for he compares analytic resistance to the resistance a person might offer to the use of dental forceps. The resistance was discovered in the analytic situation; but in his self-analysis also, Freud felt his resistances as he felt those of his neurotic patients. They felt like a counterforce that reminded him of the countersuggestion he knew from his prepsychoanalytic work, which recalcitrants used against being hypnotized. Resistance, therefore, is something that exists in self-analysis too, but, be it noted, in self-analysis which coincides with freudian intentions. It also exists in free association and rumination that resembles free association, but if this occurs without freudian intentions, it may not be noted or, if it is, not considered to be of practical importance.

There is no need here to repeat the insight into resistances which came from further experience with the neuroses. I shall merely mention the addenda to The Problem of Anxiety, Anna Freud's classic account in The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, and call attention to Loewenstein's recent paper, Defenses, Autonomous Ego, and Technique (1954), and to its bibliography.

I wish to go back to nature and the more general field of solitary association outside the analytic situation. Solitary meditators, or whatever we may choose to call them, who do not have the specific freudian intent have no objection to the appearance of resistances. When they encounter what we call resistances, they do not face them as Freud had to, for they are swayed by other motives. They are not co-signers of the contract with Anna O. They elaborate the resistances, act them out, enjoy them, or use them in some other way, but they do not recognize them. The intentions and the point of view are crucial. Freudians must call such manifestations *resistance,* but others may be content with manifest, processed material not to be further analyzed. Boerne and Silberer and William James arrive at ends different from Freud.

On the couch, however, the resistance to being hypnotized

or put to sleep shown by Anna O has been replaced by the resistance to free association, its substitute. In the resistance to free association, the old agreement about being put to sleep may be placed on the agenda for reconsideration. The patient, in conflict about free association, may suggest that he be hypnotized or be given a drug. Or he may depart from the basic contract by getting into a mystic state of mind, or into some of the sleepy states described by Silberer. I have indicated in a previous paper that the resistive patient may become either too sleepy or too alert for useful free association. His behavior may come to resemble that of the solitary associator with no freudian intentions.

If you recall William James's hypothetical case of associations to a sunset, one outcome of the undirected thinking was action: the person was led by his associations to take down a Greek lexicon and study his Greek lesson. Such an action, from our standpoint, would not be an end, though it might have been for James's nonfreudian; we should consider it, even in self-analysis, an evasion of the fundamental rule. We should say, This man has quit associating. In a discussion, Rado once compared a certain resistive acting out to sleepwalking, thus correlating phenomena of resistance with those of the dream, and R. Sterba (1946) reported instances where persons have acted out the dream contents of the previous night. More often action in place of association should be considered a waking-up analogue. But Rado's reference to sleepwalking, perhaps the least 'rational' of actions, brings out hyperbolically the fact that, to a freudian, motion is not in itself an end. It may be as disturbing to free association as to sleep. Aphoristically, one might say that the dream is the guardian of sleep, but the analyst is the guardian of free association.

In the cathartic cure and in early psychoanalysis, did the listening doctor relinquish the use of sleep? Perhaps not entirely, on close inspection, for when the patient found communication impeded, he was encouraged to associate freely (even by the laying on of hands), and in effect he was set to

work to produce more or less dreamlike fantasies, to approach therefore in quality the mentation of sleep. At the point of resistance, to put it strongly, the patient was soothed a little, encouraged to be 'more asleep'. In this context, resistance meant too much alertness which thwarted the doctor's intentions. Other resistances were soon encountered, in which, contrariwise, the patient let himself be in too much of a dream and eliminated too much responsibility and reality testing. With the years, after much study of the neuroses and psychoses, a good deal of this behavior was clarified, and the knowledge that accumulated was formulated in terms of a theory, and finally organized in The Problem of Anxiety and the literature that stems from this work.

AFFECTS

Affects on the couch or arising during solitary association are like those that appear in dreams. They are part of the manifest content. The freudian intention is to analyze them, and as in dream analysis determine whether a 'happy mood' may not conceal a fear of death, or whether an anxiety is a signal and a repetition. The solitary meditator may take the affect at its face manifest value and go on from there, taking the elated and depressed feelings especially as warranted.

THE ANALYST

We may approach the matter of the analyst and where he fits into the metapsychology of the dream by a preliminary consideration of the solitary associator. If he is following Freud's rules, i.e., if he is a self-analyst, there may be a kind of occult analyst, or at least an occult transference figure, as we learn from the role which Wilhelm Fliess played in Freud's self-analysis. Let us assume, however, for the general situation of self-analysis, that it is possible to do what Freud did in his self-study without someone else (real or ideal), therefore, without a transference.

As to the unanalytic free associator, for his unanalytic pur-

poses he may wish to confide, so that we may speak of a possible confidant for such solitary meditations who would be the recipient of the ideas that go through his mind. It is needless to list here the possibilities of such a relationship, which might include any kind of human communication from the most primitive to the most sophisticated, nor do I wish to document them. We again encounter the matter of purpose. Hanns Sachs has described one variety of such communication in his article, Daydreams in Common (1920), where the common ground was originally the sharing of masturbation fantasies, later of more elaborate stories. Supposing Boerne or Schiller had sought a confidant; then the other person could have been called an editor or a collaborator. Silberer might simply have considered such a person an intruder.

It was during the transition from hypnotic treatment to catharsis and analysis that the neurotic patient changed from being a hypnotic subject to being a confider, and the therapist *pari passu* became a psychoanalyst. Freud's and Breuer's first subjects came to them with the stated purpose of relief from symptoms, and to the end persons continued to go to Freud either to be cured or to learn, by sampling the cure, a therapeutic method. But before there was an official psychoanalysis, patients had come to be put under hypnosis, which they knew of as a sort of magical sleep. The idea that sleep is a magical healing method must be very ancient, more ancient than the sleep of the Æsculapian temple; and the general prevalence of this idea in the unconscious may well have attracted patients to hypnotists. 'And God put Adam into a deep sleep', the early anesthetists reminded their theologically oriented opponents and their reluctant patients, and certainly sleep has its rational place in therapy even today. In its origins, however, the therapeutic use of sleep quite possibly depended on fantasy, and the original hypnotic patients may have asked for it with the idea that after sleep should come a better waking, one into a new world, a dreamworld or heaven, in short, into a wish-fulfilling world where the blind see, the mute speak, the lame walk and are

whole. Baudelaire called the drug addict's goal an artificial paradise, and this it was that the seeker after hypnotic sleep desired. The hysterical person, having been hypnotized, acted out many fantasies and miracles of therapy, and we still see often enough flights into health of the same shaky order.

The magical sleep-maker became a confidant, and the analytic situation arrived in history. But the confidant listening to associations as they appear is a very special kind of listener. Sometimes the person on the couch is hardly aware of his presence and is even surprised by it at the end of an analytic session; at other times, the patient can think of nothing but the analyst's person. We speak of the transference, thinking of the building up of fantasies about the analyst which are new editions of older ones in the patient's history. Evidently the analyst is not a unitary element that can be directly mapped to a unitary spot in the diagram of the psychic apparatus and into the psychology of sleep and the dream. In fact, in what follows it will become clear that the analyst belongs in several places in the diagram, also 'around' the diagram, and that he can be mapped in terms of dream psychology as a day residue, as an external excitant, and as an external or 'border' soother.

As the focus for infantile transference fantasies, the analyst was compared by Otto Rank, with Freud's approval (1916, footnote), to a day residue, a recent stimulus of the immediate environment which is processed into manifest material by the addition of unconscious ideas. In this sense, the analyst is a perception, he is recent material. Rank's point was made in refuting some of Silberer's views of 'anagogy' and in reference to dreams about the analyst, but the waking fantasies on the couch use him in the same way in this context. That the analyst is a sleep-maker or a waker needs more elaboration, and will receive it in the discussion that follows. Also, it will be necessary to analyze in dream metapsychology the superego role often attributed to him.

Let us leave the patient aside for a moment and consider the analyst as an interpreter, where his wishes and actions are

central. Is the patient still clothed for him in traces of the sleep or part-sleep from his phylogenetic history as a hypnotic and cathartic subject? Or has the concept of the recumbent sleeper and dreamer been repressed? In the latter case we might look for some return of the repressed, and possibly see it when analysts turn to drugs as an adjuvant to cathartic or analytic therapy. However, let us consider two psychoanalytic aphorisms which epitomize the aim of analysis. The first is: 'Where id was, there let ego be!' Let us combine this with another familiar remark, that the ego rejoins the id in deep sleep. The inference is that the analyst is a waker. To confirm this inference, we have another aphoristic statement, much quoted, *'Ich verstand, dass ich von jetzt ab zu denen gehörte, die "am Schlaf der Welt gerührt" haben, nach Hebbels Ausdruck'*, (Freud, 1914). ['I understood that from now on, I belonged among those who "disturbed the sleep of the world", as Hebbel says.'] Inescapably the analyst is an arouser, as well as a day residue. As an external neutral fact, regardless of his intentions, he may become part of the subject's analytic-situation manifest content, and he is in the structure of the analytic situation as if a dream-day residue. But when the analyst's intentions come into play, and he interprets and analyzes, he is often not in the structure but an external waker or disturber of the situation. We shall see later that he may also at times play the role of a soother.

I suggested in a previous paper (1954) that coincidental with all other effects of the analyst's remarks or perhaps even of his presence, there is a deep effect, which I likened to the musical: the analyst continuously operates either to wake the patient somewhat or to put him to sleep a little, to soothe or to arouse; and this effect may be quite unconscious both for subject and analyst.

There are apparently some simple therapeutic situations, comparable to the standard analytic but different nevertheless, in which the aim is more nearly the simple one of arousing or wakening the patient. The idea that a psychosis is a kind of

dream is ancient, and many maneuvers used in the treatment of schizophrenia have a rousing intention, as those most experienced in the field have stated or indicated. Zilboorg (1930), for example, as a preliminary to using the classical technique, put his schizophrenic patient through a course of training in reality discrimination, as if to insert into a dream some of the functions of the waking state. K. R. Eissler (1951) insists on dealing directly with 'the primary process', which is a concept of dream psychology, so that the maneuver is a concession to the patient's dreaming. In a somewhat different context, Eissler (1951, 1943) states that at one stage of the treatment, the intellectual content of what is told the patient is not as important as the therapist's voice or manner—that one could influence the patient perhaps even by mumbling, surely a 'musical' remark. John Rosen says explicitly and generally, 'What is the psychosis but an interminable nightmare in which the wishes are so well disguised that the psychotic does not awaken? Why not then awaken him by unmasking the real content of his psychosis? Once the psychosis is stripped of its disguises, will not this dreamer awaken too?' (1953).

Other, less clearly understood, methods of dealing with schizophrenia put the patient to 'sleep' by more or less drastic means. Empirically they often wake up different, and often they speak of the experience as a 'rebirth'. The 'rebirth' fantasy is the counterpart of the 'intrauterine fantasy'; the latter is an infantile fantasy which takes the child asleep as its model for life before birth; the 'birth' fantasy uses the child's waking up, or perhaps its 'waking up' into a dream. In any case, the therapist appears to have the intention of fulfilling the sleeper's wish for a healthy paradise, as I suggested in discussing the use of hypnotic sleep as an implementation of this idea in neurotics. We can gain some insight into the sleep-making intention of the physician by considering the ambivalence of physicians toward patients, their vacillation between a preference for a live or a dead patient, which I partly analyzed as due to their double experience in medical school, where they dealt with cadavers

as their first patients and later had to transfer some of their conception of the patient as cadaver to live persons (Lewin [1946]). But as the sleep therapies of schizophrenia are organized, the doctor's wish to put the patient to sleep is subordinated to his wish to waken him and to cure him. As in surgery, the physician's sleep-making enters the larger therapeutic activity with its arousing intention, as a 'feed-back' and regulator or subordinate action.

To return to the topic of arousing, and the analyst's excitant role in this direction, we may again consider a schizophrenic case. I refer to Nunberg's classic analysis (1920, 1921) of the patient who had had a catatonic attack. He constantly referred to the attack as 'my dream', and he called his desire for recovery a wish to forget this dream completely. Elsewhere (1953) I have shown how the wish to forget a dream is equivalent to a wish to be completely awake, and in Nunberg's patient the way this was expressed is worth noting. For he set the physician up as a father and ego ideal, endowed him with tremendous power, expressed deep submission, and stated that he wished to be cured by the 'power' of this father's words. That is, as I interpret it, he wished the father to awaken him through powerful loud noises. In infancy, words and noises are powerful excitants and arousers, and apparently the same holds in the case of the dream.

Here I rely on Isakower's studies (1939, 1954), according to which manifest words that appear just at the end of dreams during wakening moments represent wakener-superego, and because they have not been caught by the full dream work, they retain their verbal and environmental sense. Reasoning further, to be wakened is to be weaned, and as a variant, to be brought back to this world, which returns us to Rank and his fallacy. It also reminds us of Rank's insight into the preœdipal transference situation, and of his attempted analysis of the 'couch' and of the analytic situation *per se*. The 'couch' means sleep, with its maternal implications; and the spoor of the preœdipal father, who is not a dream element but a wakener,

is sublimated in the therapy into the analyst who is not an element of the 'couch situation', but one who disturbs the sleep of the world and its inhabitants. The 'auditory sphere', which borders on the atmosphere where the sound waves travel, catches most of the stimuli (though surely not all) that awaken the child, the dreamer, and the analysand.

That the analyst is on the border of the dream becomes evident, by contrast, in those dreams where he is represented as a soother, and where there is no border. I am referring to those unprojected, blank, 'sleep', or 'narcissistic' dreams in which the analyst is represented. For example, in the dream reported by Rycroft (1951), where the border of the dreamer is vague, and the dream is not visually projected but is 'pure feeling', the analyst is a soothing atmosphere and the homologue of the breast or dream screen. In Rycroft's report, the patient said he felt as if he were being taken under the analyst's wing, but that there was no visual content, and that it was an allegorical way of expressing a feeling which was more like an emotion. I have encountered comparable 'transference remarks' in patients who expressed their precœdipal wish to sleep at the breast by fantasies of occupying the same space as the analyst, as if they could walk right into or through him. This is an unusual mapping of the analyst; it puts him in the place of sleep itself.

Nunberg's patient wished to be thoroughly awake and to forget his catatonic 'dream'. Rycroft's patient, not psychotic, in dreaming portrayed his analyst as the bland 'spirit of sleep' and enjoyed the best night's sleep he had ever had. Both patients centered their relationship about the fact of *sleep*, reminding us again of Freud's bargain with Anna O, and suggesting that both of these patients sensed the relationship *as if* in terms of the old prepsychoanalytic days, when the hypnotist put his patient to sleep and awakened him. Their manifest thoughts referred to this latent doctor-patient relationship.

Other clinical examples might be given, but they are readily available in analytic practice. Therefore, I shall be content

to summarize some of the results of our mapping of the elements of dream psychology to the couch situation. With ingenuity, it is possible to find the couch situation's counterparts in The Interpretation of Dreams. In the sense of 'transference figure', the analyst is to be paired with what seemed in dream interpretation a very minor piece of material: he is the opposite number of indifferent precipitates or day residues to which unconscious ideas lend their cathexis. As interpreter, he stands for another minor element—a current external stimulus, which may threaten to arouse the dreamer, like the real fire in Freud's paradigm of the dream in Chapter VII, that of the burning child. He is also the opposite number of certain external stimuli which did not interest Freud in connection with the dream—the stimuli which promote sleep. These were taken for granted and did not need to be counteracted by the guardianship function of the dream, for they too assisted the maintenance of sleep and ordinarily were not registered in the dream. We know a great many of these, differing at different ages: lulling and crooning, the full meal, and other satisfactions, all in a way wish fulfilments too. There are also soporific drugs, and as an interesting psychological example, the memory of the nursing situation, which, when it appears, often coincides with sound and happy sleep. In this context, the analyst's position is that of peripheral stimulus.

It will be noted that the analyst is at both ends and around the diagram of the psychic apparatus; that he is 'around' the couch as the external world is around the dream.

The rest of the mapping on to the couch of dream psychology is not difficult, for 'analysis-formation' is like dream-formation and involves the same memory traces and psychic systems, though usually in different proportions. Blank dreams are approximated by the 'blank couch', that is, sleep on the couch where the narcissism of sleep which is 'under' the dream comes out into the open as 'couch narcissism'. I omit what the analyst does besides lulling and rousing from the present statement; that is, I omit most of analytic technique, the contents of the

specific interpretations and other operations, which of course matter very much. To fall back on Freud's old comparison of hypnosis and chloroform anesthesia, it is what one does after the patient is chloroformed that matters most, and this is what we call technique and not situation. As the surgeon cannot always ignore or completely forget the basic situation of anesthesia, so we cannot always ignore the ratio between sleep and waking in the analytic patient.

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'It's My Own Invention': A Special Screen Memory of Mr. Lewis Carroll, Its Form and Its History

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'IT'S MY OWN INVENTION': A SPECIAL SCREEN MEMORY OF MR. LEWIS CARROLL, ITS FORM AND ITS HISTORY

BY PHYLLIS GREENACRE, M.D. (NEW YORK)

I

It is no news to anyone that Lewis Carroll was preoccupied with dreams. He stated it many times over. Both of the 'Alice' books are stated by him to be in dream form. In his extraordinary novel, *Sylvie and Bruno,* he showed a concern with shifts from one level of consciousness to another, which he characterized as 1, real life, 2, the 'eerie' stage in which one sees fairies, and 3, the trance in which the body sleeps but the individual does not. The third was not exactly dreaming, although somewhat related to it. These three forms or levels of consciousness were also somewhat based on observations of what analysts know as the conscious, the preconscious, and the unconscious, although here again, the comparison cannot be made very precise. It is interesting however that the shift from one level of consciousness to another often came about automatically through some *switch* word (a punning word) or when the subject was in a clearly musing or daydreamy state in which free association was likely to take the place of directed thinking, as while looking into the fire, riding on a railway train, looking at a shiny surface, or walking in the depth of the woods.

That Carroll had feelings of unreality in general about life and compared it to a dream was announced also in the poems with which he introduced these major works. In the prefatory

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poem to *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,* he writes of the trip on the Isis River with the three little Liddell girls.

Ah cruel Three! In such an hour,
  Beneath such dreamy weather,
To beg a tale of breath too weak
  To stir the tiniest feather!
Yet what can one poor voice avail
  Against three tongues together?

. . .

Anon, to sudden silence won,
  In fancy they pursue
The dream-child moving through a land
  Of wonders wild and new,
In friendly chat with bird or beast—
  And half believe it true.

. . .

Alice! A childish story take,
  And, with a gentle hand,
Lay it where Childhood's dreams are twined
  In Memory's mystic band,
Like pilgrims' wither'd wreath of flowers
  Pluck'd in a far off land.

Through the Looking Glass, written nine years later, also had its introductory poem. It was now clearly addressed to Alice Liddell, and offered the story as a love gift. At the time it was written, Alice was about seventeen years old and had passed somewhat out of Carroll's life, both by her increasing years and by a degree of alienation between Carroll and the Liddell family. But she is addressed as

Child of the pure unclouded brow
  And dreaming eyes of wonder!

and he indicates that he would like to protect her from the stresses of adulthood, by entrancing her with his fairy tale.

Without, the frost, the blinding snow,
The storm-wind's moody madness—
Within, the firelight's ruddy glow,
And childhood's nest of gladness.
The magic words shall hold thee fast:
Thou shalt not heed the raving blast.

Just as 'Wonderland' opens with Alice attempting to read her sister's book and dropping off into sleepy reverie instead, so at the end of 'Looking Glass' Alice is considering whether she has dreamed the story or whether it was really the dream of the Red King who had appeared in the dream. Thus the idea of a dream within a dream, or perhaps a dreamer within a dream, it subtly suggested, only in a bit more complex way than the usual dream within a dream. There is really the question of identity; 'who dreamed it?'.

At the end of 'Looking Glass' there is a closing poem, which clearly takes up the themes of the poem at the beginning of 'Wonderland' about the rowing trip on the Isis River. This is recapitulated in the first two stanzas, again emphasizing the dreaminess of the weather, and adds, concerning Alice Liddell,

. . .

Still she haunts me, phantomwise,
Alice moving under skies
Never seen by waking eyes.

Children yet, the tale to hear,
Eager eye and willing ear,
Lovingly shall nestle near.

In a Wonderland they lie,
Dreaming as the days go by,
Dreaming as the summers die:

Ever drifting down the stream—
Lingering in the golden gleam—
Life, what is it but a dream?

The initial letters of this poem, only part of which is quoted

here, spell out the name Alice Pleasance Liddell. In addition it should be noted that its author seems to be considering the children yet to come, probably the unborn children who may hear the tale in the future. This theme of the unborn children was even more clearly stated at the end of 'Wonderland' when Alice considers how her little sister will ultimately grow up but keep the simple and loving heart of her childhood, and 'how she would gather about her other little children, and make their eyes bright and eager with many a strange tale, perhaps even with the dream of Wonderland of long ago . . . and find a pleasure in all their simple joys, remembering her own child-life and the happy summer days'.

Sylvie and Bruno and *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* were Carroll's most ambitious works, and were published in 1889 and 1893 respectively, but were made up of shorter stories and sketches which were published at intervals from 1867. These were then pieced together with what their author refers to as 'padding' to make them stick into the semblance of a unified fabric. They are not really quite a crazy quilt in design. The repetitive pattern is irregular in outline and rhythm.

The introductory poem for *Sylvie and Bruno* repeats the theme of the dream.

> Is all our Life, then, but a dream
> Seen faintly in the golden gleam
> Athwart Time's dark resistless stream?
>
> Bowed to the earth with bitter woe,
> Or laughing at some raree-show,
> We flutter idly to and fro.

And in introducing *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded,* Carroll writes:

> Dreams, that elude the Maker's frenzied grasp—
> Hands, stark and still, on a dead Mother's breast
> Which never more shall render clasp for clasp,

Or deftly soothe a weeping Child to rest—
In such like forms me listeth to portray
My Tale, here ended. There delicious Fay—
The guardian of a Sprite that lives to tease thee—
Loving in earnest, chiding but in play
The merry mocking Bruno! Who, that sees thee
Can fail to love thee, Darling, even as I?—
My Sweetest Sylvie, we must say 'Good-bye'.

Whereas these writings from his mature years showed Carroll as one who thought of the world as a place of raving winds and bitter woe—and that the dreamy state of childhood was the best reasonable protection until death—, as a boy he wrote most graphically of nightmares ('Horrors' [1850][1] and 'As It Fell Upon a Day'[2]). It should be noted too that Bruno, the mocking teasing sprite who cannot be entirely silenced, is ruled by the loving Sylvie. This Bruno is the only boy who is treated sympathetically in all of Carroll's writings. He is five years old, talks cute baby talk, and is ever under the watchful loving sisterly eye of Sylvie. Sylvie bears a considerable resemblance to Alice.

II

Lewis Carroll was born Charles Lutwidge Dodgson, the third child and oldest son in a family of eleven children, seven of whom were girls. His father was the latest in a line of Anglican clergymen. Carroll and his three brothers all became clergymen,— though he himself was ordained only as a deacon and never as a priest. Of the entire family, only two brothers and one sister married. Several of the siblings, including the famous Charles, were stammerers: some say that all suffered some speech disturbance. Until the boy was between eleven and twelve (1843) the family lived in a small farmhouse, which

[1] 'Early Verse'. In: *Complete Works of Lewis Carroll.* New York: Random House, 1933, p. 786.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 788.

served as a rectory, in an isolated farming area outside the village of Daresbury, in Cheshire. Here they must have lived in very limited space, with the family increasing at the rate of about one child every eighteen months. The eleventh child was born approximately three years after the family had moved into a much more prosperous and spacious place, when the father was given a church at Croft in Yorkshire. Charles went away to school at twelve or thirteen, first to a nearby school at Richmond, then to Rugby, and finally to Oxford at nineteen. He was considered a child who showed genius, was early dedicated to the church, and had also a special interest in mathematics, a combination of interests which he shared with his father. It was further noted during his Rugby years that he took uncanny liberties with words and made them mean what he wanted them to mean. He was probably lonesome, unhappy, and even depressed during his years at Rugby, which was a rugged school with great emphasis on physical competitiveness and sportsmanship. He had whooping cough and mumps during this period, to which a slight later deafness was attributed. He won honors consistently, but, if anything, they distressed him. He once wrote, 'If I had shot the dean, no more fuss could have been made about it'. It is probable that academic honors did not improve his standing with the schoolboys. There is a period unaccounted for—perhaps a year or a little more—between Rugby and the beginning of his residence at Oxford (eighteen to nineteen), when he seems to have been at home. Practically all that is known of this time is that his mother worried somewhat about his health but that he gradually grew stronger. During this time he was writing some of the eeriest and cleverest schoolboy rhymes and parodies, which he illustrated himself and circulated as a home journal for his brothers and sisters. His drawings showed strange body distortions and a hint of combining the sexes.

In the Daresbury days, the children had played much in the garden where the youthful Charles was the inventor of games and gadgets, writer of rhymes, maker of toys and director

of a marionette theater. Although this was remembered as a happy period of his life, and the rectory gardens of Daresbury and Croft were almost surely the early models for the gardens of the Wonderland and Looking Glass worlds, there is some indication that even then his dreamy separation from life had set in. The scene around the sundial, portrayed in 'Jabberwocky', probably came from this time. The preoccupation with manipulating puppets and an unusually strong tendency to animate inanimate objects and to humanize animals are indicative of some tendency to withdraw from adulthood. In evaluating these interests, one must recall that Charles was *not* a lonely child, in need of companionship, but was surrounded by brothers and sisters, overly close to him in age.

In regard to animals, it is reported that he was especially fond of small, slimy ones, and that he was devoted to cats but had a fairly marked fear of dogs. He invented fanciful animals —like his fabulous portmanteau words—which were combinations, condensations, and aggregations of parts or wholes of animals. In his mature years he did not like pets, but played with ideas of animals.

His mother died when he was nineteen, only a few days after his entrance to Christ Church College, Oxford, where he was to remain until his death in January 1898, approximately forty-seven years. At Oxford he was awarded various scholarships and was presented a teaching studentship in mathematics, which carried with it fair monetary provision, on condition that he remain a celibate and take Holy Orders. He seems not to have developed much as a mathematician, not because of lack of ability, nor lack of contact with the best mathematical minds of the day, but probably because he used his mathematics to keep his thoughts well in compulsive order and could not therefore allow his imagination full reign. Geometry seemed to enclose space rather than to explore it. He continued as a don in mathematics until he was fifty, but his teaching was hampered by his stammer and his stereotypy, and he never gained much pleasure from teaching or research although he

showed great skill in the production of mathematical and verbal puzzles.

Charles Dodgson took the pen name, Lewis Carroll, at the age of twenty-four (February 1856) when he was writing sketches and poems, mostly parodies, for a magazine, The Train. For a brief time he had signed his contributions 'B.B.'. His nom de plume, Lewis Carroll, he derived consciously from his two first names, Charles and Lutwidge (Ludovici), reversed in order.

The young man, obscure as a mathematics teacher at Oxford, became famous with the publication of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,* in July 1865. This was the written, slightly expanded version of a story which Dodgson had told the three little Liddell girls, daughters of the dean of Christ Church College, on a boat trip on the Isis River on the fourth of July 1862, where they had been accompanied by another don named Duckworth. It is an interesting fact that all of the members of this little rowing party remember the day as a golden afternoon. Carroll wrote of it many years later (The Theater, April 1887):

> Full many a year has slipped away, since that 'golden afternoon' that gave thee birth [i.e., the Alice story] but I can call it up almost as clearly as if it were yesterday—the cloudless blue above, the watery mirror below, the boat drifting idly on its way, the tinkle of the drops that fell from the oars, as they waved so sleepily to and fro, and (the one bright gleam of life in all the slumberous scene) the three eager faces, hungry for news of fairyland, and who would not be said 'nay' to: from whose lips 'Tell us a story please' had all the stern immutability of Fate!

Canon Duckworth, in contributing to a memorial fund after Carroll's death, wrote of his memories of 'that beautiful summer afternoon in the Long Vacation'. Alice, later Mrs. Hargreaves, also remembered the *burning* sun of that July afternoon and wrote (in the Cornhill magazine) of 'that blazing summer afternoon with the heat haze shimmering over the

meadows where the party landed to shelter for a while in the shadow cast by the haycocks near Godstow'.

These descriptions by three of the main adventurers on the little trip tally in their description of the brightness of the day which is, however, *not* corroborated by the records of the meteorological office, where it is indicated that the weather in Oxford on July 4, 1862 was 'cool and rather wet'; and that between ten a.m. on July fourth and ten a.m. on July fifth 0.17 of an inch of rain fell, mostly after two p.m. on July fourth. This discrepancy between memory and factual evidence is very puzzling, especially because of the clear memory of Alice who spoke of the shadows of the haycocks. This matter of the singularly bright and sunny memory which Mr. Carroll could always recall as clearly as though it were only yesterday has this characteristic which it shares with the typical screen memory: the insistent overbrightness. It is entirely possible that it was a memory which served a screening function to all three of these main participants.

In 1871, Carroll published *Through the Looking Glass* and in March 1876, *The Hunting of the Snark*. By 1882, at the age of fifty, he had resigned from teaching but remained on as Curator of the Common Room, including custody of the wine cellar. He spent his time writing and publishing a rather odd assortment of rhymes, puzzles, brief mathematical treatises, various adaptations of the Alice books; and he was much involved with the minutiae of his strangely complicated compulsive systems. He indexed and cross-referenced all his correspondence until he had reached the astounding number of more than ninety-eight thousand items. He kept diagrams of all his dinner parties, and records of the menus. He invented numerous gadgets, made collections of music boxes and fountain pens. Between 1856 and 1880 he was an assiduous and excellent photographer. He devoted himself almost entirely to portrait photography with a special interest in famous people and prepubertal girls. He stopped his photography abruptly without

giving any reason. When he died he left directions for the destruction of some of his negatives.

He is not known to have ever loved any woman in the usual sense, but he was passionately devoted to little girls of about eight years of age; in his later years the age rose to eleven or twelve. Some have thought he was in love with Ellen Terry whom he first saw on the stage when she was eight, but he did not meet her until after her marriage at sixteen. Certainly he was fascinated by her. It does not seem to have been more. There was a long succession of little girl friends whom he invited to visit him, who corresponded with him, and whom he photographed—sometimes in fancy dress and on a few occasions, in the nude. He was a tremendous kisser, both by letter and by mouth.

III

With this very brief sketch of one of the most complicated of men, we shall proceed to investigate a repetitive, perhaps compulsive, screen memory which appears in different versions throughout Carroll's writings.

Through the Looking Glass presents, like *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,* the story of Alice's entrance into the secret or inner garden. In 'Wonderland', the author is concerned with the general theme of time, announced by Alice's encounter with the White Rabbit who is hurriedly looking at his watch, fearful of being late. In the 'Looking Glass', the initial and dominant theme is space—the other or reversed world which is seen in the looking glass. Time and space play sometimes similar or complementary, and sometimes contrasting, roles in Alice's explorations. Both tales have a general theme of guilt and possible punishment, and end in a grand explosion. In 'Wonderland' there is an actual trial going on with the Knave of Hearts being tried for the famous theft of the tarts; but just as the sentence is about to be passed, Alice upsets the whole proceedings by bringing everyone back to reality and

announcing that the Royal Family are really just a pack of playing cards. Thereupon the whole pack rises up and flies at her. At this she awakens, finding that leaves have fluttered down on her face and that she has been dreaming.

Through the Looking Glass ends with Alice being inducted into queenship, but just as she arises, actually rising in the air by several inches, to give thanks, everything explodes at the banquet table, the plates and silverware take wings and fly into the air, inanimate things become animate, and pandemonium reigns. Alice finds that the Red Queen is really the black kitten which she is shaking vigorously. As she awakens from the dream the question is posed, to whom does the dream belong: to Alice or to the Red King, and which one was only an actor in the other's dream? 'Which do *you* think it was?', is the end of the story.

It is clear from these excerpts that both stories have to do with a little girl not yet at puberty, preparing to be a Queen in her own right, but in a peculiarly dreamy state, in which the phenomena of the shared dream (first with the sister, then with the Red King) and the dream within a dream are noteworthy. Her question, 'Whose dream is it? Which is which?', reminds us indeed of the quandary in regard to sexual identity of many prepubertal girls. But her anticipations for the future are clear: there will be future generations of children to hear her dream story.

It is not the dream within a dream, however, but a rather special screen memory in *Through the Looking Glass* that deserves presentation. It is a screen memory within a screen memory within a song within a dream on the other side of the looking glass. There are innumerable wrappings of this memory, and like a mirror image within a mirror image, within a mirror image, etc., it seems to stretch on into infinity and to suggest momentary finite boundaries which stretch and merge endlessly backward into ancestry and forward into posterity, even in a way that Alice seemed to foresee for her sister in her dream within the dream of Wonderland. It certainly has to

do with the prepubertal girl pausing for a few moments, not only to ask 'Which is which?', but with further bewilderment 'Where did I come from?', and 'What comes from me?'.

The special screen memory, however, is one shared more or less by Alice and the White Knight, and it is presented in a chapter entitled 'It's My Own Invention'.

> Of all the strange things that Alice saw in her journey through the Looking Glass, this is the one that she always remembered most clearly. Years afterward she could bring the whole scene back again, as if it had been only yesterday,—the mild blue eyes and the kindly smile of the Knight—the setting sun gleaming through his hair and shining on his armor in a blaze of light that dazzled her—the horse quietly moving about, with the reins hanging loose at the neck, cropping the grass at her feet—and the black shadows of the forest behind—all this she took in like a picture—as, with one hand shading her eyes, she leant against a tree watching the strange pair, and listening in a half-dream to the melancholy music of the song.

This picture, which in texture and rhythm is reminiscent of Carroll's own description of the afternoon of the rowing trip on the Isis River, is a perfect description of a screen memory—Alice's—in the making. The feeling, 'This I will always remember', (the sense and satisfaction of the screen-memory-hunger together with the command to remember described by Fenichel), the sense of brightness, of light, of sharpness, of contrast, of darkness and light (like Alice Liddell Hargreaves' description of the shadows of the haycocks), the vividness combined with an apparently prosaic scene and the pervading feeling, 'This is overly real, but is it quite real?'—all these are parts of the unconscious determination to conceal the reality. So far the screen memory, in statu nascendi, belongs to Mr. Lewis Carroll as Alice, since he wrote it.

At the beginning of the chapter, Alice is troubled about reality, as she is repeatedly throughout her explorations. The hubbub of the fight between the lion and the unicorn has died down and in the ensuing silence Alice becomes alarmed and

thinks she must have been dreaming; but seeing evidence of the dreamed scene around her, she considers that maybe she is only a character in a dream. But is it her own dream or that of the Red King?—in which latter case she may disappear when he awakens. Before this can happen, however, she hears the Red Knight clattering down the road, threatening to take her prisoner. He is quickly superseded by a White Knight who announces himself falteringly as her rescuer. A mock battle for ownership of Alice follows, in which the two Knights joust with each other in a kind of parody of the lion and the unicorn, Haigha and Hatta, or as Alice rather pertinently remarks to herself, very much like Punch and Judy. Curiously, the horses remain quiet and silent and remind her of tables (or perhaps of beds?), as they look so flat. The battle continues until they have both fallen on their heads after which they are satisfied. Alice emerges from this bewildered; she wishes to escape being a prisoner, whether of attacker or of rescuer, and would prefer just to proceed to queenship which will be accomplished as soon as she crosses the next brook. The Red Knight having galloped away, the White Knight stays with Alice.

The White Knight is a strange fellow, wearing on his shoulders a deal box upside down, the lid hanging open. He explains this as a sandwich box hung upside down to keep the rain out at the expense of not keeping the sandwiches in. He then decides to hang it on a tree to serve as a beehive, since the one hanging from his saddle has remained untenanted, perhaps because of its proximity to an equally untenanted mousetrap. The White Knight ponders whether (the thought of) mice would keep the bees out, or (the thought of) bees would keep the mice out, very much as Alice pondered whether cats eat bats or bats eat cats—as she fell down the rabbit hole into Wonderland. (This question as to who does what and whose dream it is anyway seems also to be a motif of all the jousting Punch and Judy battles.) Another of the White Knight's inventions is the horse's anklets devised to protect the steed against the bites of sharks. The White Knight takes Alice's dish for

plumcake just in case they should find any, but he gets mixed up as to whether he is the dish or himself and so falls into the bag which he has intended to contain the dish. He describes to Alice some other of his inventions—to wit, a plan to keep hair from falling off or out, by making it creep up a stick, as how can it fall *down* if it is moving upward? (Incidentally Charles Dodgson was fascinated by the idea of hair standing on end. He once took a photograph of a little girl being given an electric shock to determine if hair really stood on end under such circumstances.) But the poor White Knight keeps tumbling head downward from his horse, sometimes in front, sometimes behind, and sometimes sideways and toward Alice. Just as he begins to explain what a really great rider he is, he falls headlong—not once, but twice or thrice. In this state, he is seized with the idea of inventing a way of getting over a gate. He proposes to accomplish this by standing on his head atop the gate and then toppling over. While he is explaining another which-is-what act—in which he has fallen into his own helmet only to have the Red Knight come up and put the helmet on so forcibly that the White Knight is stuck as fast as lightning inside it—he again falls headlong into a ditch from which he is rescued by Alice.

To recapitulate interpretively the incidents of this strange preparation for Alice's debut as Queen, she is haunted by dreamy memories of primal scene jousting, recurring with obsessional repetitiveness. The differentiation between the sexes and whether there are one or two participants are rather hazy to the little girl, although the essential core of the scene is succinctly grasped by the child who likens these fights to a Punch and Judy show. It seems then that the White Knight, impotent, exhibitionistic, and valiant as he is, falls repeatedly for Alice. He intends to rescue her, but ends by being rescued by her.

There can be little doubt that the White Knight represents Charles Dodgson, the puzzler, the gadgeteer, the puppeteer, the man who travelled with innumerable boxes and valises, and

who certainly fell in love in his own strange way with little Alice Liddell before she had crossed the brook to queenship.

The situation that immediately preceded the screen memory is, Carroll-fashion, given at the beginning rather than at the end of the chapter where it occurs. This scene is one in which the White Knight describes how he has such intellectual powers as an inventor that he has invented a new pudding during the meat course. Alice congratulates him on his performance in being in the nick of time to provide the dessert. But having introduced the subject of the pudding, with the boast that his mind keeps on working no matter where his body happens to be, he becomes engaged in a word game of accenting in turn each successive word in a sentence and seeing what different effects are produced (a typical wordplay of both Carroll and Dodgson). In the end it turns out that the pudding is made of blotting paper, sealing wax, and gunpowder. So perhaps the game of words is not irrelevant, and the White Knight may only have been testing the point of explosiveness: whether at the end of the meal or at the end of the story, whether today's, yesterday's or tomorrow's. It is clearly an invention in fantasy only, and in its displacement from body to mind it proclaims the White Knight's ability to work up to an explosive climax, with the danger of getting destructively out of control. This indeed does happen two chapters later, when the banquet celebrating Alice's queenship blows up completely and brings her back to reality.

Alice, being a rather practical little girl, is disappointed that the White Knight does not have a pudding treat to offer her. To console her, he offers her a song, the tune of which, like the pudding, is his own invention. The song is introduced with a play on accents and meaning of words. The White Knight gives the title of the song successively as 'Haddocks' Eyes', 'The Aged Aged Man', 'Ways and Means', and it finally emerges as 'A-sitting on a Gate'.

The scene which Alice 'would always remember' thus begins with the White Knight sitting on his horse, the reins fallen

loosely on its neck, and 'slowly beating time with one hand, and with a faint smile lighting up his gently foolish face as if he enjoyed the music of his song'. As the White Knight sings, Alice realizes that the tune is not his own invention but that of 'I give thee all, I can no more' (by Thomas Moore). The words too are a parody of the poem, 'Resolution and Independence'. The 'invention' can hardly be said to belong only to the White Knight, and to be shared with Alice. Mr. Moore and Mr. Wordsworth are now also in the game.

The song is one which must have been evolving in Mr. Carroll's mind, whether in connection with or separate from the body, for some time, for it had appeared in another form entitled 'Upon a Lonely Moor', published when Carroll was just emerging from Dodgson, at twenty-four. World famous as Lewis Carroll, he was forty-one at the time of the publication of *Through the Looking Glass* containing 'A-sitting on a Gate'. There is something of a hint of the same theme in 'The Storm', which appeared in the *Rectory Umbrella* when Dodgson was nineteen, in the interval between Rugby and Oxford. Parts of the tale are to be found also in 'The Tale of a Tail' and in 'The Headstrong Man' written when he was only twelve or thirteen and had produced *Useful and Instructive Poetry*. In Carroll's mature years we still see reflections and fragments of the same pervasive theme in 'Father William' of *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland,* in the melodiously mad Gardener of *Sylvie and Bruno,* and in the Snark of *The Hunting of the Snark.*

But before we become completely addled by all the facets of this memory as they are drawn into its screen picture or reflect outward new derivatives, let us get back to the White Knight swaying on his horse, while the sun shone on his armor and the black shadows of the forest were in the background on that bright and memorable afternoon. This was *Alice's* screen memory. But the Knight's song as he sat there furnished *his* screen memory. This is our next step. It starts with the White Knight's compulsion to tell.

I'll tell thee everything I can:
  There's little to relate.[3]
I saw an aged man,
  A-sitting on a gate.
'Who are you, aged man?' I said.
  'And how is it you live?'
And his answer trickled through my head,
  Like water through a sieve.

He said, 'I look for butterflies
  That sleep among the wheat:
I make them into mutton-pies,
  And sell them in the street.
I sell them unto men,' he said,
  'Who sail on stormy seas;
And that's the way I get my bread—
  A trifle, if you please.'

But I was thinking of a plan
  To dye one's whiskers green,
And always use so large a fan
  That they could not be seen.
So, having no reply to give
To what the old man said,
I cried, 'Come, tell me how you live!'
  And thumped him on the head.[4]

His accents mild took up the tale:
  He said, 'I go my ways,
And when I find a mountain-rill,
  I set it in a blaze;
And thence they make a stuff they call
  Rowland's Macassar-Oil—
Yet twopence-halfpenny is all
  They give me for my toil.'

But I was thinking of a way
  To feed oneself on batter,
And so go on from day to day

[3] *Cf.* the dog's bark in 'The Tale of a Tail'; also Moore's, 'My Heart and Lute'.
[4] *Cf.* 'The Headstrong Man'.

Getting a little fatter.
I shook him well from side to side,
Until his face was blue:
'Come, tell me how you live,' I cried,
'And what it is you do!'

He said, 'I hunt for haddocks' eyes
Among the heather bright,
And work them into waist-coat buttons
In the silent night.
And these I do not sell for gold
Or coin of silvery shine,
But for a copper halfpenny,
And that will purchase nine.

'I sometimes dig for buttered rolls,
Or set limed twigs for crabs:
I sometimes search the grassy knolls
For wheels of Hansom-cabs.
And that's the way' (he gave a wink)
'By which I get my wealth—
And very gladly will I drink
Your Honor's noble health.'

I heard him then, for I had just
Completed my design
To keep the Menai bridge from rust
By boiling it in wine.
I thanked him much for telling me
The way he got his wealth,
But chiefly for his wish that he
Might drink my noble health.[5]

And now, if e'er by chance I put
My fingers into glue,[6]

[5] Compare this with Carroll's fantasy about the vampirish nature of drinking health, expressed in his letters to Gertrude Chattaway. (*Letters of Lewis Carroll to His Child Friends*. Edited by Evelyn Hatch. London: Macmillan & Co., 1933, pp. 100-106.)

[6] Compare this with the glue story of the Cats of Finborough Road in the letters to the Hughes children. (*Ibid.*, pp. 64-68.)

Or madly squeeze a right-hand foot
  Into a left-hand shoe,[7]
Or if I drop upon my toe
  A very heavy weight,
I weep, for it reminds me so[8]
Of that old man I used to know—
Whose look was mild, whose speech was slow,
Whose hair was whiter than the snow,
Whose face was very like a crow,
With eyes, like cinders, all aglow,
Who seemed distracted with his woe,
Who rocked his body to and fro,
And muttered mumblingly and low,
As if his mouth were full of dough,
Who snorted like a buffalo—[9]
That summer evening long ago,
  A-sitting on a gate.

[7] When the Croft Rectory was remodelled in 1950, the floor boards of a second floor room, previously used as a nursery, were torn up and gave evidence of having been laid, probably in an earlier renovation in 1843, soon after the Dodgson family moved there when Charles was eleven. In a cache under the floor boards was a collection of childhood relics including a 'left-hand shoe', a child's white glove (which makes us think of Mr. W. Rabbit), a thimble (which appears both in the Caucus race of 'Wonderland' and in *The Hunting of the Snark),* a lid from a doll's tea set (from the mad tea party or Alice's debut banquet?), a letter from a child's alphabet, and other significant articles. It would seem that the young Dodgsons may already have had some fantasies which were the forerunners of those supposedly spun spontaneously on the rowing trip on the Isis River.

[8] The White Knight had been quite sure that his song would make Alice weep, possibly as the old man a-sitting on a gate made *him* weep.

[9] Three pieces of board in the cache bore pencilled inscriptions. One of them gave the name of the workmen who laid the floor and the date as June 19, 1843; the inscription on one was not decipherable; the third bore the words:

And we'll wander through
The wide world
and chase the buffalo.

The Gardener in *Sylvie and Bruno,* who sang so much of the things he thought he saw, sang

He thought he saw a Buffalo
Upon the chimney piece.

Before going back over the earlier versions of the 'Aged Aged Man', it is well to look at the poem 'Resolution and Independence' of which the 'Aged Aged Man' was a kind of parody. This was written by Wordsworth sometime between 1802 and 1807. It is probable that young Dodgson read this in 1843 or 1844, or at least by 1849 or 1850, when the clearest parody of it emerged. The *Rectory Umbrella* of the 1849 to 1850 period contained many parodies, including one of *The Lady of the Lake,* another of *Lays of Ancient Rome.* The poem, 'The Storm', of this time is the first clear parody of the Wordsworth poem. The poems of the thirteen-year-old period, appearing in *Useful and Instructive Poetry,* have more the character of expanded nursery rhymes or children's poems, possibly influenced by Edward Lear whose rhymes were then famous.

Wordsworth's poem purports to be an old man's account of himself, as he encountered the poet, who was himself in a somewhat mystical enraptured state in communion with the calm bright dawn after a night of wind and rain.

> All things that love the sun are out of doors;
> The sky rejoices in the morning's birth;
> The grass is bright with rain drops;—on the moors
> The hare is running races in her mirth;
> And with her feet she from the plashy earth
> Raises a mist, that, glittering in the sun,
> Runs with her all the way, wherever she doth run.

There follows then a statement of the alternating moods:

> But, as it sometimes chanceth, from the night
> Of joy in minds that can no further go,
> As high as we have mounted in delight
> In our dejection do we sink as low;
> To me that morning did it happen so.

One suspects young Dodgson may at nineteen have responded

greatly to this. Later it would seem the contrasts were between day and the restless sleepless nights.

. . .

Beside a pool bare to the eye of Heaven
I saw a Man before me unawares:
The oldest man he seemed that ever wore grey hairs.

As a huge stone is sometimes seen to lie
Couched on the bald top of an eminence;
Wonder to all who do the same espy,
By what means it could thither come, and whence;
So that it seems a thing endued with sense:
Like a sea-beast crawled forth, that on a shelf
Of rock or sand reposeth, there to sun itself.

Such seemed this man—not all alive nor dead
Nor all asleep—in his extreme old age:
His body was bent double, feet and head
Coming together in life's pilgrimage;
As if some dire constraint of pain or rage
Of sickness felt by him in times long past,
A more than human weight upon his frame had cast.

. . .

A gentle answer did the old man make
In courteous speech which forth he slowly drew:
And him with further words I thus bespake,
'What occupation do you there pursue?
This is a lonesome place for one like you.'
Ere he replied, a flash of mild surprise
Broke from the sable orbs of his yet vivid eyes.

. . .

He told that to these waters he had come
To gather leeches, being old and poor:
Employment hazardous and wearisome!
And he had many hardships to endure:
From pond to pond he roamed, from moor to moor;

Housing with God's good help by choice or chance,
And in this way he gained an honest maintenance.

. . .

And the whole body of the man did seem
Like one whom I had met with in a dream;
Or like a man from some far region sent,
To give me human strength, by apt admonishment.

My former thought returned: the fear that kills
And hope that is unwilling to be fed
Cold, pain, and labor, and all fleshly ills;
And mighty Poets in their misery dead.
—Perplexed, and longing to be comforted,
My question eagerly did I renew,
'How is it that you live, and what is it you do?'

The old man then replies that he is and has been a leech gatherer for many years; but leeches are no longer plentiful and he finds them where he may. The poet then imagines the lonely gatherer of leeches who for all his destitute wandering retains a kind demeanor and stately bearing. He laughs to find so firm a mind in this decrepit man. 'God', he says, 'be my help and stay secure: I'll think of the leech gatherer on the lonely moor!'

Returning to the White Knight's song, it is very clear that the aged, aged man, sitting wobbling on the gate, is a memory to the White Knight corresponding to himself in Alice's memory. It is equally clear that he is closely akin to Wordsworth's vision of the old man who collected bloodsuckers. But the aged, aged man's leeches have become butterflies, haddocks' eyes, buttered rolls, wheels of hansom cabs—a veritable witches' brew, which with his batter might permit him to go on from day to day getting a little fatter.

The earlier version of the poem, 'Upon a Lonely Moor', published in 1856, is not strikingly different. Throughout it, however, difficulty in hearing takes the place of difficulty in

thinking or understanding, and the reciter of the poem is more outspokenly aggressive.

I met an aged, aged man
  Upon the lonely moor;
I knew I was a gentleman,
  And he was but a boor.
So I stopped and roughly questioned him
  'Come, tell me how you live!'
But his words impressed my ear no more[10]
  Than if it were a sieve.

. . .

But I was thinking of a way
  To multiply by ten
And always, in the answer get
  The question back again.[11]
I did not hear a word he said
  But kicked that old man calm,
And said 'Come, tell me how you live!'
  And punched him in the arm.

But I was thinking of a plan
  To paint one's gaiters green
So much the color of the grass
  That they would ne'er be seen.
I gave his ear a sudden box,
  And questioned him again
And tweaked his grey and reverent locks,
  And put him into pain.

. . .

[10] This was written in the period when Dodgson was at home after having mumps and whooping cough which resulted in slight deafness.

[11] Carroll was not a man to desert an idea after a single usage of it. Here his mathematical scheme is very similar to a fantasy he had of a traveler's bath so devised that the water would be conveyed back into the tub as soon as it was drawn out of it: a closed circle without waste.

In this version of the aged, aged man the poem ends not with the memory of the swaying, snorting, rocking old man with eyes glowing like cinders—a picture certainly suggestive of sexual excitement—but the reference is a calmer one, suggesting uncertainty, unreliability or perhaps unreality.

Or if a statement I aver
  Of which I am not sure
I think of that strange wanderer
  Upon the lonely moor.

'The Storm' written for the *Rectory Umbrella* when Dodgson was about eighteen is the first version of the aged, aged man which is unmistakably a parody of Wordsworth. Interestingly too, it contains, through a misspelling of *leer* as *lear,* a possible admission of his earlier indebtedness to Edward Lear. 'The Storm' is as follows:

An old man sat anent a clough
  A grizzled old man an' weird
Deep were the wrinks in his aged brow
  An' hoar his snowy beard.
All tremmed before his glance, I trow
  Sae savagely he leared.

The rain cloud cam frae out the west,
  An' spread athwart the sky,
The crow has cowered in her nest
  She kens the storm is nigh.
He folds his arms across his breast,
'Thunder an' lightning do your best!
  I will not flinch nor fly!'

Draggles with wet the tall oak tree,
  Beneath the dashing rain
The old man sat, an' gloomily
  He gazed athwart the plain
Down on the wild and heaving sea,
Where heavily an' toilsomely
  Yon vessel ploughs the main.

Above the thunder-cloud frowns black,
The dark waves heave below,
Scarce can she hold along her track
Fast rocking to an' fro,
And oft the billow drives her back
And oft her straining timbers crack
Yet onward she doth go.

The old man gazed without a wink
An' with a deadly grin:
'I laid a wager she would sink,
Strong hopes had I to win,
'Twas ten to one, but now I think,
That Bob will sack the tin'
Then from the precipice's brink
He plunged head foremost in.

The ending of this poem is strikingly like the end of the 'Snark', and is related, too, to the earlier poem, 'The Headstrong Man'. The cracking of timbers in the next to the last stanza here resembles the breaking of the branch of the tree in 'The Headstrong Man'. That this theme was continually preoccupying the young Charles is again brought home to us by 'The Poet's Farewell', at the end of the *Rectory Umbrella,* where it appears in another form.

All day he sat without a hat
The comical old feller,
Shading his form from the driving storm
With the Rectory Umbrella.[12]
When the storm had passed by, and the ground was dry,
And the sun shone bright on the plain
He arose from his seat, and he stood on his feet
And sang a melting strain.

. . .

[12] Thus it is clear that the bearded old man with an open umbrella above his head and a closed umbrella worn like a little girl's skirt—which appeared as the frontispiece of the *Rectory Umbrella*—is the version of the aged man belonging to this nineteen-year-old time. It is probably the time of the displacement of, or extension of, the castration fears to the head, with only a partial sublimation accomplished.

It is probable that Charles Dodgson saw the Wordsworth poem sometime in his teens and that it crystallized for him similar wandering memories of *his* old man seen on a summer evening long ago, and so impelled him to a parody of his memory. The earlier versions, in *Useful and Instructive Poetry,* published at thirteen, are not Wordsworthian in form, but the elements of the central experience are there in 'The Headstrong Man' and in 'The Tale of a Tail'. The former was the second poem in the collection and told of a man who was clearly the prototype of Humpty Dumpty in 'Wonderland'.

There was a man who stood on high
  Upon a lofty wall;
And every one who passed him by,
  Called out 'I fear you'll fall'.

Naught heeded he of their advice,
  He was a headstrong youth—
He stood as if fixed in a vice
  Or like a nail forsooth.

While thus he stood the wind began,
  To blow both long and loud
And soon it blew this headstrong man
  Right down among the crowd.

Full many a head was broken then,
  Full many an arm was cracked,
Much they abused the headstrong man
  Who sense and wisdom lacked.

For this mishap he cared naught
  As we shall shortly see,
For the next day, as if in sport
  He mounted in a tree.

The tree was withered, old, and gray[13]
  And propped up with a stake
And all who passed him by did say
  'That branch you're on will break'.

[13] 'Withered, old and gray' is a phrase Carroll twice uses in describing the face of a dead loved one—possibly his mother. In 'Stolen Waters' (1862) and 'Faces in the Fire' (1860). In: *Complete Works of Lewis Carroll. Loc. cit.,* pp. 962 and 975.

Naught heeded he of their advice,
He was a headstrong youth,
He stood as if fixed in a vice,
Or like a nail forsooth.

While thus he stood the branch began
To break, where he did stand,
And soon it dropped this headstrong man
Into a cart of sand.

The sandman vainly sought for him
For half an hour or more,
At last he found him in a trim
He ne'er was in before.

For sand his face did nearly hide
He was a mass of sand:
Loud laughed the sandman when he spied
The branch where he did stand.

'Why what a foolish man thou art,
To stand in such a place!'
Then took some sand from out his cart
And flung it in his face.

All wrathful then was sandy coat
Wrath filled his sandy eye
He raised his sandy hand and smote
The sandman lustily.

Full soon upon the ground he lay,
Urged by the sandman's fist,
These words were all that he could say,
For those to hear who list.

Moral:
'If headstrong men *will* stand like me,
Nor yield to good advice,
All that they can expect will be
To get sand in their eyes.'

The content of this is strongly suggestive again of a primal scene, but with a preliminary awareness of the excited tumes-

cent state of the man. The idea of the breaking of the branch of the tree that has been mounted is a possible indication of the boy's latent fantasy of the castrating injury occurring to the phallic woman. The ending of the scene in a state of sleepy exhaustion, both for participants and onlooker, is neatly condensed in the sandman stanzas. One must recall that these verses were written just at the age of puberty. This poem seems clearly supplemented by another, also from this period, entitled 'The Tale of a Tail' and has to do with a gardener.

An aged gardener gooseberries picked
From off a gooseberry tree;
The thorns they oft his fingers pricked
Yet never a word said he.

A dog sat by him with a tail
Oh! *such* a tail I ween,
That never such in hill or dale
Hath hitherto been seen.

It was a tail of desperate length
A tail of grizzly fur
A tail of muscle, bone and strength
Unmeet for such a cur.

The first stanza presents clearly the stoical ideal, the reaction-formation against fear of experiencing or seeing suffering which Collingwood was to describe as so marked a characteristic of Charles's adult years. The illustration accompanying the poem shows the gardener with witchlike prominence of nose and chin, but a pitifully ratty tail, apparently the tail to his coat. The next two stanzas describe the dog which appears as an awesome creature with a tail possessing virile qualities out of proportion to the degraded character of its owner. There would appear to be a certain reversal of roles: the dog is a better man than his master.

Yet of this tail the dog seemed proud.
  And ever and anon,
He raised his head and barked so loud
  That though the man seemed *somewhat* cowed
Yet still his work went on.

At length in lashing out its tail
  It twisted it so tight
Around his legs, 'twas no avail,
  To pull with all its might.

The gardener scarce could make a guess,
  What round his legs had got,
Yet he worked on in weariness
  Although his wrath was hot.

'Why, what's the matter?' he did say
  'I can't keep on my feet,
Yet not a glass I've had this day
  Save one, of brandy neat.

'Two quarts of ale and one good sup,
  Of whiskey sweet and strong
And yet I scarce can now stand up
  I fear that something's wrong.'

There is thus a mutual entanglement between cur and gardener in which one pulls the other, and produces a state of intoxication, bewilderment, and confused excitement which reminds us of Charles Dodgson's horror of convulsions, the idiot boy, and alcoholism.

His work reluctantly he stopped
  The cause of this to view,
Then quickly siezed an axe and chopped
  The guilty tail in two.

When this was done, with mirth he bowed
  Till he was black and blue,[14]
The dog it barked both long and loud
  And with good reason too.

Moral: Don't get drunk.

[14] *Cf.* 'The Aged Aged Man'.

It would seem here that the dog is associated with or represents the young boy, as indeed it seems to, in other of Carroll's writings, especially in *Sylvie and Bruno*. It is to be recalled that while this book deals with the dog with mercy and respect, and further accepts the five-year-old boy as a charming child in need of taming, Carroll otherwise developed a strong aversion to dogs as well as to boys and was especially fearful of being bitten by dogs. In the entanglement between cur and gardener, subject and object become reciprocally confused, and the turmoil ends, not with the customary decapitation, but with decaudation. It may be suspected also that the obvious pun on *tail,* made manifest in 'The Tale of a Tail', indicates further the pressure to tell that was created in the boy as he grew to be a man. This is repetitively expressed in the poem: the tail is '*such* a tail', one 'of desperate length'; it is lashed out by the cur (words which also refer to speech), and the dog ends up barking 'both long and loud and with good reason too'. This emphasis on telling also occurs at the beginning of the last version of 'A-sitting on a Gate': 'I'll tell thee everything I can,/ There's little to relate'; although it is decidedly a restraint from the original by Moore, 'I'll give thee all: I can no more'. The old gardener bowing with mirth till he is black and blue reminds one of Father William, the White Knight falling from his horse, the Aged Aged Man swaying on the gate, whom the White Knight shook 'so well from side to side until his face was blue', and of Dodgson himself who felt like rolling on the lawn with horrified laughter after his visit to Bowes where he saw a 'mouthing idiot'.

Indeed it is remarkable that in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Through the Looking Glass,* and *Sylvie and Bruno,* there are three off-stage characters which are closely related, namely the Aged Aged Man, Father William, and the mad Gardener. (We suspect that the Snark is here too, only even farther off stage.) All of the three are heard in song or rhyme, but appear scantly or not at all. All are really memories which come to life in their vividness. All are older men, parodies, foolish

inferior characters, but merry and glamorously enchanting in their unexpectedly acrobatic behavior and lilting rhythms. In 'Wonderland', Father William appears in the poetry which Alice recites, on the advice of the caterpillar, to test her memory which she fears is failing. In the Looking Glass world the 'aged, aged man a-sitting on a gate' is in the White Knight's song which he brings out as *his* memory to comfort Alice who in turn thinks she can never forget the scene of the foolish Knight sitting swaying in his saddle as he sings. In *Sylvie and Bruno,* the mad, musical Gardener comes to life out of the reverie of the narrator, 'I', as he half sleeps on a railway journey to Elveston, and finds himself automatically conjugating 'I thought I saw . . .' as though to test his memory. When he reaches, 'He thought he saw . . .' this proves to be the switch phrase which causes a break-through of a stanza of the Gardener's song.

> He thought he saw an Elephant
> That practiced on a fife
> He looked again and saw it was
> A letter from his wife.
> 'At length, I realize', he said
> 'The bitterness of Life'.

At this point the scene shifts to a garden enclosure similar to Wonderland and Looking Glass worlds. In *The Hunting of the Snark,* a similar but more powerful version of the amazing off-stage character exists in the Snark itself, which does not actually appear though its presence is indicated by the sudden vanishing of the Baker.

The rhyme, 'Father William', is the colloquy between a fat merry old man and a bewildered, timid, lean one. Father William, in spite of hair as white as that of the White Knight or the aged man, insistently stands on his head, balances an eel on the end of his nose, somersaults in the door backward (very much as the White Knight thought of somersaulting over the gate), and defiantly says he intends to 'do it again and again',

all to the consternation of the younger man. He explains that he has kept his limbs supple with the use of a special ointment which he offers to sell to the young man for a shilling a box; and that since he has reached brainless old age, he no longer fears injuring his brain with his antics as he did in boyhood. He ends by kicking out the anemic youth.

The character of Father William certainly is closely related to that of the aged man a-sitting on a gate. The latter is even older, a beggar who is engaged in senseless pursuits, such as chasing butterflies to bake in mutton pies. He also has *his* ointment, Rowland's Macassar oil, which he recommends and offers for sale. The place of the lean young man is taken by the White Knight, who sings the song about the aged man and is himself preoccupied with rejuvenation schemes—such as to dye his whiskers green (but hide them behind a fan, thus reminding us of the White Rabbit), and to feed himself on batter and so go on from day to day getting a little fatter. Father William's acrobatics are toned down and the scene is no longer one of defiance but rather of sad reminiscence which causes the White Knight to weep because it reminds him so

> Of that old man I used to know
> Whose look was mild, whose speech was slow
> Whose hair was whiter than the snow
>
> . . .
>
> Who rocked his body to and fro
> And muttered mumblingly and low
>
> . . .

The Gardener is the keeper of the door *out* of the garden in which the fairy children Sylvie and Bruno find themselves from time to time. He is vigorous, merry, melodious and mad. He usually appears first as a song heard from some indefinite place, and later materializes. There is a description of him only on the occasion of his first appearance, when he was

clearly 'mad, madder and maddest' as he danced his frantic jig and brandished his rake. His feet were large (like those of the elephant of which he sang) and were disproportionate to his body which was rather like a scarecrow deprived of its stuffing. These proportions resemble those of the lean young man who was amazed by Father William, or of the White Knight who sang of the aged man whom he had seen years before, and of the aged man himself. The Gardener too is the onlooker for he sings repeatedly of the fantastic things which he has seen which start out appearing to be one thing and then turn into something extraordinarily and unexpectedly different. His visions and conversation singularly suggest those of the creatures in the garden in Wonderland and the Looking Glass worlds. Only his exuberant jigging recalls Father William.

That all this is connected with the conception of an older man, a father, but one who may appear either in a degraded form or as a beneficent lordly king-father is apparent in the chapters in *Sylvie and Bruno* which introduce the mad Gardener. It is the Gardener who is the keeper of the garden door and permits the children to go out to give cake to a miserable beggar who then reveals himself as their father, the Fairy King, who is to teach them about universal rather than personal love.

The figure appearing sometimes in one guise and sometimes in another, but with his acrobatic swaying, jigging and snorting rhythm, is, as already noted, a typical dream representation of sexual excitement. It is interesting, therefore, to realize that in the very structure of Carroll's stories, these figures all appear as memories which are represented in dreams. The Gardener's song always comes at the point of a shift from one state to another. The repetitiveness of this excited figure and his constant association with a secret garden, the concern about whether the onlooker's memory is good, and the reciprocal question as to whether the silly old fellow's brain has been injured—whether his behavior is merrily exciting or a comfort

to him in a state of distress—lead to the conclusion that there was some actual event as the basis of a repressed memory of the author which was insistently recurring in this hidden form, an observation of excitement which also stirred him, the observer.

The Jabberwock, the Bandersnatch, and the Snark are three other off-stage creatures even less clearly described than Father William, the Aged Aged Man, and the Gardener. They are mysterious frightening animals, having some connection with the excited old men, appearing rather as a second line of even more distorted shadows. The Jabberwock appears only in a poem, read by Alice in a book at the very entrance to the Looking Glass world. It is a poem which Carroll composed as part of a rhyme-writing contest at a Dodgson family party, and later incorporated into the Looking Glass story. In this way it was like the last stanza of the 'Snark' which occurred first to the author and then gradually drew the rest of the poem out after it. The business of 'Jabberwocky' occurs at a time when the White King is limp and bewildered after Alice has lifted him from the hearth and dusted him off. He is trying to express his horror, and the fact that he will never be able to forget this incident. (Certainly this is again a variation of the compulsion to remember.) The White Queen then tells him that his memory is so bad that he had best make a memorandum of his experience or he will forget his feelings. Alice interferes with his writing, however, and, guiding the pencil for him, causes him to make involuntarily a factual note concerning the behavior of the White Knight. Thus again a problem of memory is involved, even as it had been in the instances of the excited old men. It would seem too that Alice's interference with the White King produces a memorandum which is strikingly like that of Charles Dodgson's own diary recordings which repress feelings but record facts.

'Jabberwocky', possibly the most famous nonsense poem in the English language, contains many arresting portmanteau words, neologisms, which leave us groping and a little tickled

at our own stupidity: they sound so natural and reasonable. To enumerate some of them: brillig, slithy, toves, gyre, gimble, wabe, mimsy, borogoves, mome, raths, outgrabe occur in the first stanza. Some of the other stanzas are not so loaded, but all contain two or three. A few are onomatopoeic like 'whiffling' and 'galumphing' but most are built on other principles. Later, in *Through the Looking Glass,* Humpty Dumpty explains them to Alice, adding that though he is more than a little slow in mathematics, there are few words he can't explain. Like the adolescent Charles Dodgson, he obviously has much fun taking liberties with language. He has conquered words and makes them mean whatever he wants them to, *but* they are troublesome little creatures with tempers all their own and sometimes must be subjugated. This is accomplished by putting them into portmanteaux, two or more at a time, subjecting them in this way to extra labor for which they receive extra pay on Saturday nights. Humpty Dumpty explains that 'brillig' means four o'clock in the afternoon when things begin to broil for dinner; that 'slithy' is a portmanteau treatment of 'lithe' and 'slimy'; 'toves' is a portmanteau combination of ideas containing badgers, lizards, corkscrews, little creatures that live in the grass at the foot of the sundial and feed upon cheese. 'Gyre' means to revolve like a gyroscope; the 'wabe' is a portmanteau word for the grass plot *way be*hind and *way be*fore the sundial; 'mimsy' is 'miserable' combined with 'flimsy'. In 'mome' the structure is a little different; it is probably composed from *home.* Thus the animated words can be made to combine in different fashions. In the Preface to *The Hunting of the Snark,* Carroll quotes Humpty Dumpty's portmanteau theory with approval; and stating that 'frumious' is derived from fuming and furious, explains that the two words might come into collision in the mind and articulation of the speaker whereupon the person with the perfectly balanced mind would say 'frumious'. It is certainly a just solution and perhaps avoids stammering. We would suspect, however, that frustrated may be somewhere in the portmanteau.

'Jabberwocky' is the story of a little boy who, warned to beware the Jabberwock, the Jubjub bird, and the Bandersnatch, ventures out into the forest, sword in hand, on a summer afternoon and actually encounters the fabulous Jabberwock, who with eyes aflame comes whiffling and burbling through the wood. He succeeds in beheading the monstrous Jabberwock and returns home to a hero's welcome. The scene then sinks again into the hot, bright afternoon in which slithy toves gyre and gimble around the sundial just as they had at the beginning of the poem. The illustration by Tenniel, approved by Carroll, shows a small boy with girlishly long hair manfully striking with a small sword at a gigantic creature, many times his size, that looms over him. The Jabberwock resembles a particularly ugly gryphon but has a long serpentine neck, a fierce face with bared teeth, a tail like a prehistoric reptile, eaglelike claws and oversize rear hoofs. Its wings are spread like a huge bat. It is a gigantic portmanteau creature, indeed! The *first* impression of the Tenniel illustration is of a monstrous octopus, since neck and tail add to the effect of multiple attacking and encircling members. It seems probable that the whole poem presents the drowsy fantasy of a small child in a garden on a summer afternoon, and that the Jabberwock is an enormous enlargement and fusion of the little animals—lizards, worms, and other small creatures—condensed as toves which are first seen on the wabe of the sundial. These are the very animals that the infant Charles was so fond of. Indeed the story was that as a little boy he had a plan for supplying earthworms with pieces of pipe for weapons and leading them into warfare. The Jabberwock is the momentary enlargement of the tove in the sleepy eyes of the child who indulges then in a dream of glory, slaying the dragon and bringing the trophy home victoriously.

In his later years Charles Dodgson, the Oxford don, played a somewhat similarly fanciful game as he sat in front of his fireplace, the tiles of which contained pictures of these same fabled animals. For the benefit of visiting little girls, he made

the creatures have long, amusing conversations.

But the Jabberwock has other meanings too. The encounter with this monster is certainly related to *The Hunting of the Snark* in which a whole crew participate. The Baker's uncle calls him a 'beamish' nephew just as the parent has congratulated his 'beamish' son in 'Jabberwocky'. The boy looks 'uffish' before the appearance of the Jabberwock and the Bellman has the same 'uffish' expression when he hears of the terrors of the Boojum Snark. When the Butcher and the Beaver, comrades in anxiety, hear 'a scream shrill and high' and realize that danger is at hand, they think it is the voice of the Jubjub and begin to count the shrieks. Then the Beaver is so disconcerted that he 'outgribes' in despair just as the 'mome raths outgrabe' in 'Jabberwocky'. ('Outgribing' is described as a sound between bellowing and whistling with a kind of sneeze in the middle. To hear it made one quite content not to hear it again. A 'Rath' is a kind of little green pig; and pigs are certainly associated with babies in Wonderland.) The Butcher gives a kind of illicit lesson in Natural History to the Beaver (until recently his enemy) and explains that the Jubjub is a desperate bird as it lives in a state of perpetual passion; it is so very upright and incorruptible that it collects, but does not contribute, at charitable meetings. The grateful Beaver feels he has learned more from the Butcher in ten minutes than he could have learned in seventy years of formal study from books. The bond of their mutual experience with the Jubjub bird cements their friendship forever.

Again it is seen that the land of the Snark is close to that of the Jabberwock, for the Banker in the Snark while hunting finds himself grabbed at by a fear-inspiring Bandersnatch with frumiously snapping jaws and an extensible neck like the Jabberwock's. The poor Banker faints, recovering only after the others have expelled the Bandersnatch; but then he can only stammer in his fright:

To the horror of all who were present that day
He uprose in full evening dress.
And with senseless grimaces endeavored to say
What his tongue could no longer express.

Down he sank in a chair—ran his hands through his hair
And chanted in mimsiest tones
Words whose utter inanity proved his insanity
While he rattled a couple of bones.

It is the Baker, seemingly so inefficient, who becomes the hero of the expedition which is at least in part a would-be bridal journey, as indicated in the verse,

He came as a Baker, but owned when too late
And it drove the poor Bellman half-mad
He could only bake Bride-cake—for which I may state
No materials were to be had.

It is the Baker too who finally sees the Snark and suffers the fate of instant disappearance, as all must who encounter a Boojum Snark.

It is interesting to note that the excited old men—the Aged Aged Man, Father William, and the mad Gardener—are conspicuous for their motions, swaying, or acrobatics, but their speech is generally clear, although the Aged Aged Man does at the pitch of his excitement snort and talk as though he had dough in his mouth. With the next line of characters—the monstrous forms of Jabberwock, Bandersnatch, and Snark, distorted and oversize in the eyes of the children—terror takes the place of fascination and speech becomes stammering, elided, and confused. Panic seems to have gained control.

While any precise explanation of the nature of the Boojum is evaded by Carroll, some hints are given, not so much in the Snark poem itself, as in other writings. 'Boo' seems to be derived in part from boo, the frightening syllable which is used to scare children. This ability to frighten was certainly the Boojum Snark's major characteristic. But 'boo' is also

the first syllable of '*boo*hoo', a word Carroll used frequently in jests with his little girl friends. 'Jum' is related to *Jam,* which is suggested in the Baker's tale in which jam and judicious advice are offered to the Baker to nerve him from his faint at the mere mention of the Boojum Snark. Thus the word 'boojum' contains both the fear and the remedy, the phobia and its counteractant in one word. But 'jam' comes around to another pair of opposites again, in the pun on the word 'jam' in *Sylvie and Bruno* where the word 'Boojum' is explained as a kind of elision of sounds for Bootjack and Bootjam, the jack removing the jammed boot. In the same story is the chapter, 'Jabbering and Jam', in which Jabber clearly means chatter, talk, and jam, like wine, is the senseless subject talked about with fine distinctions regarding the degrees of sensual enjoyment. 'Jabber' in Jabberwock may have this hidden meaning, making a word akin to walky-talky, but it is more manifestly the little boy who goes for a walk and jabs with his sword. The two parts of the word are then somehow similar and opposite.

The Baker tells the assembled crew of the terror of the Boojum Snark as follows:

> I engage with the Snark—every night after dark—
> In a dreamy delirious fight:
> I serve it with greens in those shadowy scenes
> And I use it for striking a light.[15]

He adds that he knows very well that if he ever encounters a Boojum Snark he will vanish—a thought which has caused him to faint at the very word 'Boo'. The end of *The Hunting of the Snark* portrays the Baker's fate exactly as he, in his anxiety, has predicted it.

> They gazed in delight, while the Butcher exclaimed
> 'He was always a desperate wag!'
> They beheld him—their Baker—their hero unnamed—
> On the top of a neighboring crag,

[15] The combination of taking food and taking in the visual stimulation is here apparent.

Erect and sublime, for one moment of time
In the next, that wild figure they saw
(As if stung by a spasm) plunge into a chasm
While they waited and listened in awe.

The resemblance of these stanzas to those of 'The Storm', 'The Headstrong Man', and 'The Aged Aged Man' has already been noted.

'It's a Snark!' was the sound that first came to their ears
And seemed almost too good to be true
Then followed a torrent of laughter and cheers
And the ominous word 'It's a Boo——'.

. . .

Then Silence. Some fancied they heard in the air
A weary and wandering sigh
That sounded like 'Jum!' but the others declare
It was only a breeze that went by.

. . . .

And the concluding stanza is

In the midst of the word he was trying to say
In the midst of his laughter and glee
He had softly and suddenly vanished away—
For the Snark *was* a Boojum, you see.

Thus it is apparent that the disappearance caused by merely meeting a Boojum Snark is related to fainting, taking leave of one's senses, losing one's head, having a fit or convulsion, being struck dumb or caused to stammer, frightened or awed in the extreme, or falling asleep with sand in the eyes. One form or another of this theme is omnipresent in Carroll's writing.

Many children have some fabled ogre, often in animal form, or some 'secret', with which they scare each other and themselves. This is the antithesis of the imaginary companion whose presence is comforting, strengthening or relieving. Psycho-

analysis reveals that this is generally some representation of the primal scene in which the sexual images of the parents are fused into a frightening or awe-inspiring single figure. This is probably the significance of the Snark in which the last 'fit' is an acting out of the primal scene with the Baker standing 'erect and sublime' and then plunging into the chasm between crags. (This inevitably reminds us of the Headstrong Man who stood 'as if fixed in a vice, or like a nail forsooth'.) The Jabberwock, too, seems another form of the Snark, but in the hunting of the latter, a whole crew of children participate, i.e., they tell this secret to each other under the leadership of the Baker, who is rather clearly identified as Charles. The part of the poem in which the Butcher gives the docile Beaver a lesson in Natural History is possibly only a thinly disguised picture of a consultation among the little Dodgsons in the Daresbury garden regarding the mysterious life of their awesome parents. It is only the Baker, however, who really knows and suffers.

The screams, which are counted, seem quite possibly to be the clue to that recurrent mystery inevitably becoming sharp reality in the Dodgson household: the births of eight babies after Charles, just as there are eight fits in the poem of agony. This, it appears, is the deepest underlying cause of Charles Dodgson's concern about pain, and whether he can bear to see the sufferer if he is helpless to offer relief.

One other connection of this whole picture of the awful fascination and terror of the sexual life of the adults, and the stirring effect of even fantasying about it, is brought out again in *Sylvie and Bruno* where there is an extraordinary description of an attack of rage, so severe as to have a convulsive quality. This is suffered by Prince Uggug, the loathsome boy, the indulged bad side of Bruno. He is described as prickly and porcupinish, but obviously gets beyond this stage of irritability.

> All along the gallery that led to the Prince's apartment an excited crowd was surging to and fro, and the Babel of voices was

> deafening: against the door of the room three strong men were leaning vainly trying to shut it,—for some great animal inside was constantly bursting it half open, and we had a glimpse . . . of the heat of a furious wild beast, with great fiery eyes and gnashing teeth. Its voice was a kind of mixture—there was the roaring of a lion, and the bellowing of a bull, and now and then the scream of a gigantic parrot. 'There is no judging by the voice!' the Professor cried in great excitement. 'What is it' he shouted to the men at the door. And a general chorus of voices answered him. 'Porcupine! Prince Uggug has turned into a Porcupine.'

It is then arranged to entice and trap the animalish Uggug into a kind of tunnel made by blankets and a cage like an oversize mousetrap. When the door to this contraption was about to be opened, 'the fearful monster threw the door open for itself, and with a yell like the whistle of a steam engine, rushed into the cage'. One sees the probable outline of the primal scene in this, but more too. Bruno watches this odd scene and moralizes complacently that he can never become so porcupinish since he has always been filled with love for Sylvie. It is only a little later that the Professor explains to Bruno that a Boojum is a Bootjack, but remembers vaguely that Boojum had once referred to a creature in a fable, which has almost completely slipped from his memory now. It is possible that this picture of the animal, after a terrible struggle, bursting forth amidst blankets, uttering a yell and then subsiding into a cage, is also a disguised representation of the birth of a baby which is then cradled. But it is also a picture, much closer to consciousness, of rage, the jealous rage of the displaced prince at the birth of another child. And it is a record of the massive overstimulation which results in bursting, exploding, devastating feelings. It is probable that within the cage of extreme reasonableness, intense self-criticism, control to the point of pedantic accuracy and infinite patience of the Christ Church lecturer on Mathematics, that was the adult Charles Dodgson, there were old mad memories, like prehistoric monsters, Boo-

jums, which he, like the Professor in *Sylvie and Bruno,* thought he had forgotten.

It appears that the little boy Charles lived too full and exciting a life and was confronted with life's greatest mysteries too emphatically before he could assimilate them. Love and maternal kisses may have quieted but they did not and could not explain. 'Please explain', became Charles's repetitive request. The Boojums finally broke through the restraining bars surrounding them and repeated themselves endlessly in hidden fantasy forms in the games of Charles and the others in the quiet rectory garden, and in the strangely appealing stories of the famous Lewis Carroll. One must remember that the person who has so much difficulty in developing and accepting the satisfaction of adulthood, prefers to remain in the fantasy of a beautiful childhood, usually because he is caught by the terrors and anxieties of childhood which he is constantly and actively denying, by pretending that childhood has been all beautiful. Charles Dodgson, the Oxford don, did not really like pets or small animals, but he enjoyed fantasies about them and played with the ideas, not the creatures.

IV

I have attempted to trace through the various writings of both Charles Dodgson and Lewis Carroll, the associative connections of the Alice-Carroll-White Knight's screen memory of the aged, aged man. This has led to the conclusion that there was a series of interlocking, overlapping and telescoping screen memories and dreams, which appeared with obsessional repetitiveness throughout the writer's entire life. The themes which appear time and again are the primal scene, fused with the sight of an older and degraded man, perhaps a gardener, in a state of excitement which produced a counterexcitement in a small boy onlooker; all this in turn fused with the awareness of the birth of babies—of the birth cries, and either the very clear fantasy of the event or the actual partial sight of it. The

excitement aroused in the passive auditor is both sexualized and aggressive.

The screen memory within the screen memory, and the screen memory within a dream, are, I believe, close to the dream within a dream. Then there is the phenomenon of a series of successive enclosures, one within another, within another, etc. And yet another phenomenon is illustrated by Carroll, the dreamer within the dream, ending in the questions of whose dream was it, and which one exists only in the dream of the other.

Freud has written, 'The inclusion of a certain content in "a dream within a dream" is . . . equivalent to the wish that what has been characterized as a dream had never occurred. In other words: when a particular incident is represented by the dream work within a "dream", it signifies the strongest confirmation of the reality of this incident, the most emphatic affirmation of it. The dream work utilizes the dream itself as a form of repudiation.'[16] We have all had an opportunity to test this observation of Freud, the importance of which in assaying reconstructions may not have been sufficiently emphasized. Carroll's repetitive memories within memories within dreams present an intensification of this repudiation and represent therefore the force of impact of the original experiences. Even the use of parody in them is not so much an attack on another, as furnishing another form of denial, as though to say, 'It is only a parody'. Furthermore, at least in some instances, these serially enclosed memories represent the symbolism of the dream form itself, here especially the symbolism of pregnancy and of the series of generations. Certainly with the young Charles Dodgson, before whom there had been several other Charles Dodgsons, and during whose childhood there were eight more little Dodgsons born, there was every reason for such disguised and denied fantasies to arise, to ward off the

[16] Freud: *The Interpretation of Dreams.* New York: The Macmillan Co., 1933, p. 322.

everlasting succession of hidden realities, of pregnancies becoming babies. This as well as the special fascination with tumescence and detumescence was reflected not only in his dream within dream structures, but in his preoccupation with changing body sizes and proportions, ubiquitous in the Alice books.

But in the dreamer within the dream there is still another theme as well as those already mentioned, viz., that of primitive identification and destruction: which eats the other up; and then which one exists, the eater or the eaten? This question too is omnipresent in Wonderland and Looking Glass worlds, where eating and sometimes the combination of eating and looking are the most frequent forms of identification, as indeed is to be expected where the primary process rules. It is the fixation on the least sexual form of childhood—the girl child at the age of eight—which serves best as a fused and castrated version of both sexes, and the greatest defense against the anxieties of the changing body forms, whether the phallic boy or the phallic (pregnant) mother.

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On Weeping

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ON WEEPING

BY GERT HEILBRUNN, M. D. (SEATTLE)

Under ordinary circumstances the lacrimal glands produce little secretion — a mere half gram of tears in sixteen waking hours, and none during sleep. Increased secretion occurs promptly however in response to physical stimulation of the eyeball or its immediate surroundings, this response serving to remove the disturbing stimulus as quickly as possible. Pain anywhere in the body may also cause lacrimation, as if the flood of tears could magically wash away even the most distant irritants. Lacrimal discharge caused by emotional pain serves a similar purpose, riddance of the foreign body, so to speak, and maintenance of psychological homeostasis, as suggested by Petö *(8)*. Whenever stimuli of grief, disappointment, anger, or 'overwhelming' joy exceed the tolerance of the organism, the ensuing state of tension is alleviated by a release of energy from various organs or organ systems which abolishes the tension. The shedding of tears furthers the homeostatic principle so well that it is the favorite mechanism of release during childhood. Probably it would so continue throughout life were it not suppressed by the demand of society for emotional restraint and replaced by other modes of discharge.

When an adult weeps we are likely to assume that he suffers a pain of extraordinary intensity. Are such tears in the adult a principal means of release, as they are in children, or are they merely auxiliary to other mechanisms of discharge? Or have they a special function, particularly in quiet weeping, when the discharge seems less forceful than in a violent, explosive outburst? The consoling effect of quiet tears suggests an influence as comforting and soothing as the soft flow of the tears.

Read at the annual meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association in St. Louis, May 1954.

A young woman sought psychiatric help for an 'undefinable anxiety', which had not yielded to therapy with another analyst. She was a thirty-four-year-old unmarried student of psychology who combined great sensitivity with remarkable intellectual acuity. Soon after beginning analysis weeping became the outstanding symptom during analytic hours and at other times. Often she fought against her tears, but invariably they would well up, soak many handkerchiefs, and drop on the pillow, her dress, and the couch, until she was veritably bathed in tears. The weeping became almost constant in two out of three analytic sessions, varying in intensity from a furtive tear to uninterrupted sobbing lasting for several minutes and punctuating the hour with paroxysms. She and I were puzzled because the tears were so often inappropriate to what she was saying. She would weep whether she reported a dream, recalled scenes from her childhood, or talked about daily events. Sometimes she would laugh through her tears when their incongruity was so marked as to approach the comic. Usually she consoled herself — and perhaps also me — by saying that she never had dared to cry in the presence of her previous analyst and that this release must be a sign of progress. Eventually it became clear that she responded tearfully not only to her own communications but also with increasing frequency to my interpretations; she explained that it was not the specific interpretation that moved her but rather the resulting overwhelming gratification of being understood or, more often, the feeling of being misunderstood. The pain from being misunderstood could be unequivocally traced to an actual or fantasied attitude of her parents toward her.

The patient's mother was said to be descended from the Stuarts and Sir Walter Scott. Her father's forebears held the oldest authenticated peerage in the British Isles. Her father had been expected to become a viscount and was educated accordingly. He became instead a geologist and mining engineer and helped his own father to make and lose several fortunes. In his youth he had been a promising musician and had

been considered a genius by all who knew him. His business did not prosper, and a valuable patent held by him was somehow 'stolen' and a lawsuit concerning it was lost; the family was consequently destitute and dependent upon relatives. The patient's father never lost hope of obtaining the millions of dollars in royalties rightfully due him. Our patient, the only child, was very early impressed by her parents with stories of her aristocratic lineage and her father's genius. The more desperate the condition of the family became, the more glamorous grew these stories. The parents named the girl after a member of the British royal family, called her princess, and, as she said, created in her 'a sense of being destined and obligated to leadership and bearing a great responsibility from the time I was very little'. Her father acted as her private tutor both before and after she entered school, preparing her for that success in a brilliant world to which he had himself never attained. Thus the little girl found herself in a make-believe world full of strange standards which clashed painfully not only with life around her but also with her inner sense of reality. Many of her spontaneous realistic thoughts were impatiently dismissed as 'nonsense' and her questions summarily suppressed as 'impertinent'. Her parents were sure that their child could do no wrong; the little girl therefore became afraid to mention anything regarded as naughty or dirty. The comfort derived from compliance with these fantastic parental demands was sharply offset by the danger of having her ego crippled and her independence smothered. Analytic interpretations were to her like the threatening parental dicta which had implied disapproval of her naughty and dirty but nevertheless natural and normal thoughts. These 'nasty' thoughts were œdipal fantasies which led to the analysis of a strong compensatory penis envy concealed behind anal symbolism.

When the patient understood this her anxiety was diminished but the flow of tears was unabated. In fact the weeping was now accompanied by painful writhing which clearly resembled infantile movements. She held her head between her hands,

chewed occasionally on the back of her left fist, and rocked the upper part of her body slowly back and forth, tears streaming down her face, a picture of utter helplessness and despair. This behavior so strongly suggested dramatization of a former experience that I suggested that she ask her parents about it. Her father at length took courage to disclose the following story. She was suckled until the age of fourteen months. At about the eighth month many of the feedings were insufficient, as was shown by the baby's persistent crying, sucking motions, and mouthing of her hands after withdrawal of the breast. Her proud mother indignantly refused to heed the father's advice that she supplement the feedings or otherwise pacify the baby. He had therefore no choice but to pacify her himself. As often as time permitted he gathered the child in his arms, rocked her gently, and hummed or softly whistled symphonic and operatic melodies to her until she was sound asleep.

The symptoms were not alleviated by the patient's mounting awareness of this infantile trauma. On the contrary, another symptom, hitherto sporadic, became persistent: she would lie prone and look at me constantly while speaking or crying. I suggested that this meant looking at her father's face to receive visual as well as auditory satisfaction as a substitute for feeding, and that she was seeking to replace passive suffering by active control. These interpretations provoked endless floods of tears and the familiar rocking movements. The patient admitted that my explanations must be correct but complained that she felt pushed by them, and she begged me to let her proceed at her 'own rate of speed'. I could easily sense panic behind her negative transference, and decided to allow her free rein without interpretation or, as she put it, criticism. My silent expectancy was not as I feared taken as another threat to her security, but rather as a benevolent trustfulness which afforded her the strength and self-confidence to develop, recognize, and work through her relationship with her mother rather than that with her father.

Her disappointment at mother's breast had caused a grave narcissistic wound which was torn open again and again by later events, when her vitality was stifled by an antiquated code of artificial manners, her curiosity left unsatisfied, and her emotional needs ignored as too ignoble to exist. She took mother's prohibitions of certain thoughts and actions to mean that she was herself innately bad, and thus she was filled with guilt and insecurity. She would anxiously watch her mother's face for signs of approval or disapproval of her behavior. Frequently the discrepancy between her perceptions and her mother's reactions left her in a state of confused loneliness, obliged to abide by adult rules and standards which took no cognizance of her real inner world. She hoped desperately to see in her mother's face true understanding of her daughter's emotions; this method of reality testing she repeated in the analytic hour by looking at me with anxious eyes. Eventually she displayed glowering hatred, her brow furrowed and her lower lip protruded in spiteful, aggressive determination. She accused me of lacking empathy and of hiding a 'cold-blooded and downright mean attitude' behind the convenient mask of scientific objectivity. Fantasies about her father's expected death and her mother's ensuing emotional collapse led to the disclosure of real and imagined occurrences in childhood which not only explained her attack upon me but also solved her principal problem and ended her weeping.

The distortion of reality that could be realistically attributed to her mother had been greatly increased by the patient's projection of her own reactive hostility upon the mother, with the inevitable effect that the mother became in the child's eyes a 'cold-blooded and downright mean' person with murderous intentions. These fantasies culminated in a nightmare.

> I was speaking to mother about something she planned to do. Everything seemed rational and matter-of-fact. There was an unexpected silence. I started to say 'Mother, no', and then switched to what I used to call her as a child, 'Mama, what

> is it Mama, what . . .?' The words froze in my throat and I could not move to protect myself as I realized with horror that she was stealthily creeping up to the bed. I heard a hand scrape across the pillow and reach toward my throat. I think I thought she was going to strangle me, but all this was so fast, I woke up with the strangled words, 'Mama what is it . . .?'

The patient added in association, 'It was horrible. I remembered that I had had many dreams along this pattern when I was a child and later, but it never was a specific person before. It always was a vague, awful something. After the dream I kept wondering if mother ever had tried to do something like that. It could come from something I saw when I was four that set up a thought so fantastic it fairly curdles my blood. We boarded in an old house which we shared with several people, among them an old woman and a kitchen girl with her baby boy. One night the girl woke the house screaming that the old woman had been standing over the baby's crib and had fled downstairs on being discovered. It was shortly before that time that mother had a miscarriage. Could mother have been so upset that she went in the night to look at the baby boy who was such a burden to the kitchen girl and had she then been taken for the other old woman? That's why I looked at you. It's only when I can't see what's there that I get scared. The minute there is light so that I can see, I am all right.'

This deadly fear of mother had been the cause of a long-standing compulsive ritual at bedtime in which the patient took elaborate precautions against 'some awful, unknown something in the night'. This anxiety and its latent homosexual components were worked through. She now became free of the compulsion and able to enjoy the company of men. She unraveled the 'dreadful insecurities' caused in her puberty and adolescence by the distortions of her own perceptions forced upon her by figures in authority. She began to view her parents, particularly her mother, in proper perspective and her weeping stopped. She felt free and independent and had the courage to do things for herself, no longer enslaved by the

formula: 'You are bad; you are not right if you feel more right than mother. Mother can't stand your not being right. She will turn on you and something horrible will happen.'

The patient thus emphasized as her central problem the injury to her narcissism, and this injury she blamed upon her mother. She became confident of her appraisal of reality after she worked through this injury in the transference, placing the analyst first in a father then in a mother role. She could admit her shortcomings and accept criticism without fear of losing her identity. Her tears ceased when she could trust her judgment instead of complying with her parents' fantastic dictates.

She had automatically re-enacted in the transference the trauma inflicted upon her by her hunger long after she had become aware of it. Her father's attempts to substitute for food by his attentions to her could not make her forget the basic narcissistic injury, particularly since it was repeated again and again throughout her life. She cried for milk to assuage the painful disappointment of separation from the breast. Forced to accept substitutes in spite of her inner awareness that her needs were real, she cried herself to sleep. The weeping assumed the composite function of protest, call for help, and discharge of disturbing stimuli in preparation for sleep, which brought desirable freedom from tension. Sleep often represents a temporary return to the intrauterine state. We may conceive of her weeping as enhancing regression to the prenatal existence in response to stimuli injurious to the organism's vital 'libidinal complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation' *(2)*.

We recognize this regression when children or adults cry themselves to sleep. Usually however weeping does not lead to sleep, but merely to a state of relaxed satisfaction which often creates a serene and optimistic attitude and affords the strength to cope with the event that provoked the tears. What specific quality of weeping, we may ask, enables it to grant such blissful relief? Were discharge of tension the only means by

which tears can be soothing, should we not expect other means of such discharge to be brought into play? The respiratory muscles and those muscles used in rocking and cradling furthered the discharge in our patient. Muscular discharge is slight, however, in quiet weeping. Such quiet weeping seems to take the weeper under its protective cloak as the warm tears moisten his face.

Let us consider the tears themselves. Tears are wet and warm. Perhaps these qualities suggest the warm and wet prenatal surroundings, and thus simulate intrauterine life, which is the goal of regression. (It is an interesting fact that amniotic fluid and tears are strikingly similar; in content of sugar, protein, and sodium chloride they are almost identical.)

It seems plausible to suppose that the feeling of tears on the skin is reminiscent of existence in the amniotic fluid. Kepecs and his associates observed that the exudate from experimental lesions of the skin decreased when weeping was inhibited spontaneously or by hypnotic suggestion, but increased as the inhibition continued *(5)*. They recorded 'actual weeping, and more important, inhibited weeping close to the surface [as] a prominent symptom' in most patients with atopic dermatitis and emphasized that the patients' strong desire to be reunited with a maternal figure is the most usual cause *(6)*.

Our patient clearly suffered a trauma when the supply of breast milk became inadequate when she was eight months old. This trauma caused regression with an attempted return, by means of weeping, to the former ideal state of satiation. In the nursery, hunger is acknowledged to be the commonest cause of crying. In a similar way, withdrawal of the nurse or mother from the baby's room provokes crying because of fear of abandonment and of annihilation. The tears of the adult when a dear person or object is lost remind one of the old response to violation of infantile omnipotence. Occasional weeping of three men undergoing analysis was invariably associated with dreams and associations concerning their yearn-

ing for the breast or their unhappy relationship with their wives or mothers.

Women enjoy greater license to be dependent and to regress than men and are therefore freer with their tears. Analysis of any occurrence of weeping in men or women will always reveal a frustrating event which can be traced to more deeply hidden narcissistic injuries. The oral element may remain concealed as if it were unimportant and its cathexis be displaced onto later narcissistic traumas which may completely obscure it. Dr. Greenacre demonstrated that strong penis envy was the chief disturbance in two cases of neurotic weeping in women *(3)*. Since her interest was the relationship between weeping and urination, oral determinants were not intensively treated. However she says of one patient, 'In her infancy she had been a fretful first baby nursed solicitously, but not very successfully, by the mother'. A dream of the same patient led to the following reconstruction: '. . . the little girl, almost a baby . . . received so bewildering and shocking a blow she wanted to be cared for by the mother and was devastated by finding herself displaced by the birth of the brother'. Throughout life she 'maintained a deep underlying yearning for the mother'.

Analysis of a dream of another patient suggested to Dr. Greenacre '. . . that the vagina, which was confused with the urethra, was her more important mouth and that she was continually in search of the missing breast (penis)'. The patient had vied with her younger brother for 'their babyhood and their possession of the mother'.

These cases show clearly the shift from the original oral frustration to a later different phase of conflict, which however betrayed its kinship to the earlier one by its symptoms of the search for the mother and the breast. Fenichel *(1)*, Lewin *(7)*, and Greenacre *(4)* show the reciprocity between urination and weeping as mechanisms for discharge of tension, emphasizing that urination in the male serves more specifically the expression of aggression. Perhaps urination like weeping serves also for a symbolic regression to an intra-amniotic state.

CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY

The quantity of lacrimal secretion is small under ordinary circumstances, but increases when foreign stimuli enter the conjunctival sac. The power of tears to wash away irritants is symbolically extended to painful excitations of any part of the physical and psychological structure of the organism; they are a physiological means of relieving the state of tension generated by the stimulus, thus re-establishing the pleasurable absence of tension. Any stimulus that threatens to penetrate the protective barrier of the ego may evoke this reaction. Since such stimuli violate the narcissistic state of well-being, weeping like any other mechanism of defense is stimulated by injuries to narcissism. Any defense that seeks to maintain homeostasis by warding off a disturbing factor is regressive in nature. Weeping appears during the fourth postnatal week; therefore if it is regressive its goal must be the intrauterine state, for that was the preceding state of maximal narcissistic gratification. Weeping then, in addition to its homeostatic function of release of tension, represents a retreat to the wet and warm amniotic sac. The physical and chemical similarities of the amniotic and lacrimal fluids seem to support that supposition. There arises of course the critical objection that tears are not shed during the first four weeks of life, when their regresssive function would be particularly necessary to meet the many new, painful stimuli. I have no answer and can only speculate that the long hours of sleep characteristic of that period afford sufficient regression until the exigencies of life have stimulated cerebration and the further development of the lacrimal glands. Weeping then becomes the response to a great variety of unpleasant excitations. It may be pathological when a decisive infantile trauma renders the patient hypersensitive to later narcissistic injuries.

The analysis of a young woman with excessive weeping as one of her presenting symptoms revealed that the discrepancy between her parents' unrealistic social and educational standards and her own sense of reality was a continual source of

insecurity and narcissistic insult. Certain actions which accompanied her weeping led to the discovery of the original trauma during the nursing period and the ensuing basic conflict with her mother. The severity and importance of her oral deprivation at the age of eight months was reflected by the patient's later fear of being killed by her mother. Her weeping was a symptomatic effort to discharge and retreat from tension arising from past and current narcissistic injuries. It did not end until the patient by working through them had reduced the intensity of the primary and secondary traumatic situations to such a degree that they no longer were activated by slight provocations.

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A Psychoanalytic Study of Social-Mindedness

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A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF SOCIAL-MINDEDNESS

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Alfred Adler postulated a 'social feeling' as a 'primal energy' which binds human beings more closely to one another.[1] Freud however did not attribute to a social feeling or to a 'herd instinct'[2] the position of a primary instinct. While in a young sheep, for instance, closeness to the herd would relieve the anxiety aroused by separation, this is not true of a young human being. After an infant has learned to recognize its mother, the approach of a person who is similar to the mother, but not the mother herself, arouses anxiety.[3] In 1911 Freud assumed that, 'after the stage of heterosexual object choice has been reached, the homosexual tendencies are not, as might be supposed, done away with or brought to a stop; they are merely deflected from their sexual aim and applied to fresh uses. They now combine with portions of the ego instincts and, as "anaclitic" components, help to constitute the social instincts, thus contributing an erotic factor to friendship and comradeship, to *esprit de corps* and to the love of mankind in general.'[4]

In 1921 Freud described another mechanism in the formation of social feelings: primary rivalry between the members of the

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[1] Adler, Alfred: *Social Interest: A Challenge to Mankind.* London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1938, p. 273.

[2] Trotter, W.: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916.

[3] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* London: International Psychoanalytic Press, 1922.

[4] Freud: *A Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides).* Coll. Papers, III, pp. 446-447.

group, overcome through identification with the leader.[5] In 1922 he added that 'both the personal affectionate and the social identification feelings arise as reaction-formations against the repressed aggressive impulses'.[6]

The problem of social instinct is important for an understanding of group psychology. I have tried to approach it through the psychoanalytic study of patients in whom social-mindedness is a pronounced trait of character. In genuine social-mindedness a highly sublimated form of love is directed toward an abstract object, for instance, society as a whole, or toward the underprivileged.

The Viennese comedian Johann Nestroy said one hundred years ago, 'It is nice that the rich go to so much trouble and expense to feed and entertain their guests. But why do they invite only rich people who don't need the food?' Most rich persons associate with the rich and feel that this is the class to which they belong. But there is a minority that identifies itself with the underprivileged. Among some such persons the motivation seems clearly of a prevalently narcissistic nature. 'Among the blind, the one-eyed is king.' Such persons leave their own class to become the leaders of the lower class. Some of them would explain that they feel sympathy for the underprivileged. This does not make clear why they feel pity for the exploited worker. Why not for the exploited taxpayer, the exploited animal, the exploited soil? The motivation 'pity' does not say more than that they identify themselves with one group and not with another. Three cases histories will show the complexity of the problem.

CASE I

A forty-five-year-old lawyer sought treatment for chronic gastric ulcer. He said he felt personally responsible for the improvement of social conditions. He had given much time

[5] See fn. 3.

[6] Freud: *Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality.* Coll. Papers, II, p. 242.

to the study of social conditions and their multiple socio-economic causation. He was tireless in searching for solutions, and was confident that present conditions can be basically remedied. He did not strive for leadership. He got neither economic gains nor popularity nor political advantages from his efforts and sacrifices. His wife came to regard him as a fool who permitted others to take advantage of him, but whenever his wife or some of his friends tried to exploit him he did not permit it. He gladly served more than his share of clients without charging them fees, and not only became emotionally involved in these cases much more than others did, but also accepted risks although he had never been a physically courageous man.

In his high school and college days he had been a conscientious student, but felt guilty about getting better marks than others and managed, with some awareness of doing so, to avoid being first in his classes. He helped many others with their school work and took the risk of helping them to cheat in examinations. When any of his classmates were in trouble with the teachers, he undertook their defense, often arousing thereby the displeasure of the principal or dean. His parents felt that he was exploited by his classmates.

He was the oldest of four children and the acknowledged favorite of his father and mother. Both indeed vied for his favor from his early childhood until his adolescence and to a slighter degree thereafter. He had been born after the death of an older brother and—probably because of self-reproach over the death of that child—his parents had smothered him with love. He was hardly a year old when a sister was born; the parents had not wanted her. My patient was regarded as handsome, the girl as ugly. He was a good baby; the sister cried all night, presented problems in feeding, and seemed to bring bad luck in business. This prejudiced the parents against her. When the boy went to school two more children were born, but they did not detract from the admiration and love he received from his parents. He remembered having been

spanked only once, at the age of about three. It was painful and the boy raged and wanted to take revenge on his father and to attack him. His mother brought about a reconciliation but a spark of resentment remained. His sister however was always in trouble, and the boy witnessed her being spanked by the father on the naked buttocks almost daily. His mother used to attempt to mitigate the father's rage but without success because the father clearly expressed his disdain for her. From the boy's childhood until his adolescence his father made no secret of preferring this son to his wife and the other children. The father himself had suffered in childhood from the indifference and cruelty of a stepfather and apparently wished to give his son all the fatherly love he himself would have liked to receive. The father expressed his love generously toward the boy by praise, gifts, and signs of confidence and esteem. The son however felt guilty, was pained by the unfairness of his father toward his sister, and intervened, often successfully, in her behalf. He did not identify himself with his father; indeed he decided that if he became a father he would be affectionate and loving to his wife and would treat his children with absolute fairness. He identified himself with his mother, his sister, and later with his baby brother and sister.

During the latency period he had sadistic fantasies instigated by the punishment of stepmothers in Grimm's Fairy Tales, culminating in a fantasy of a naked woman being whipped in public. His religious attitude around the age of fourteen had a sexual connotation expressed in the wish 'Come O God and punish me'. When he thought of God, an abstraction, he could regress to masochism as he could not do in connection with any person in his daily life. The sadistic attitude did not continue in later life, nor did he become an overt masochist. He did not permit exploitation by father images.

Knowing all this, one might have logically interpreted his social-mindedness as an overcompensation for the malicious joy experienced when his sister was being spanked. There had really been in the beginning a period of open rivalry with the

younger sister, and outbreaks of rage against her because she liked to take and to destroy his toys and treasures. He was not permitted to hit her and she teased him about his impotent anger. He even used to demand of his mother that she spank her, which she usually refused to do. But only the later attitude toward his sister was transferred to his younger siblings, his inferior classmates, and thereafter the underprivileged in general. We can assume that the change from joy at seeing her spanked to the pleading against it was brought about by a feeling of guilt over his sadistic gratification. Such an interpretation corresponds to Freud's concept of positive feelings among the members of the mass.

But I think that this interpretation is not sufficient. The behavior of the sister was so provocative that she deserved punishment, and we should ascribe to this little boy goodness greater than an angel's were we to suppose that her being punished—not by him but by the father—caused so strong a feeling of guilt. Moreover his relationship to his sister and his later social-mindedness had much more genuine understanding and empathy than we find in reaction-formations. And what can have been the origin of this tremendous expenditure of object libido in his relationship to his sister and in his social-mindedness? A feeling of guilt is no source of libido. Continued psychoanalysis showed that the change from malicious joy to social-mindedness occurred shortly after he was spanked by his father. At that time he had lost much of his feeling for his father (a fact he kept secret) while his father continued to shower him with love. His feelings of guilt increased with every new evidence of love; the guilt arose from the difference between the love he received and the love he was able to give. Aichhorn[7] made use of a similar mechanism in aggressive children to produce a feeling of guilt and an outbreak of neurosis. Our patient's awareness that he did not deserve his talents, his good education, and his privileged social position, meant basically

[7] Aichhorn, August: *Wayward Youth.* New York: The Viking Press, 1935.

that he did not deserve his father's love. His avoidance of the position of leader and of first in his class expressed his respect for the privileges of his father. His wish 'Come O God and punish me' had the purpose of relieving the unbearable burden of being the preferred one. This explanation also answers the economic problem of the origin of the object libido displayed in his social-mindedness. The analysis of the screen memory of being spanked by his father revealed that he had resentment for father arising from his œdipus complex; nevertheless it was the strength of his love for his father that provided libido for his social-mindedness. Out of love for his father he learned to love his sister and the younger siblings. In his adolescence the transformation of love for father into love for God made it easier for him to redirect his social-mindedness; his concern became not the members of the family but the underprivileged children of God throughout the world. Although later he abandoned his religious beliefs, this broad direction of his social feelings continued. The expectation of evidences of love from substitute fathers, which was based on the factual experiences of his childhood, was the important conflict in the genesis of his gastric ulcer. Psychoanalysis next revealed that his love for his father was a second phase after he had suffered oral frustrations from his mother. According to my experience, the situation of this boy in childhood was not unusual. The evidences of a father's love which boys so often get while they still feel œdipal resentment against him create that feeling of guilt later expressed in social-mindedness. While children who are not loved feel that the world owes them something, those who are loved may, under certain circumstances, feel that they do not deserve it and believe that they owe something to the world.

CASE II

A thirty-eight-year-old woman sought psychoanalysis because of overeating and constipation. She too was the oldest child in her family and was much admired in childhood and later for

her beauty and her talents. Her two brothers, two and four years younger than she, were frequently sick. She was healthy. She ate well, slept well, and was a happy baby admired by all. The brothers offered her no competition. One stuttered; the other, always unhappy, lied, stole, and failed in school despite normal intelligence. The brothers were continually spanked and scolded; she, very rarely. Her father brought a gift for her every day. But my patient wanted to be the only one loved by her mother. The brothers were, in this respect, less of a threat than the father, but not for long. Once when he forced her to take medicine, she wished him to drop dead. Soon afterward, when she was five years old, he died. Now she was given the father's place in her mother's bed. She decided she would grow up to earn a great deal of money and support her family.

There was a time when she envied the younger brother's penis. Once she almost killed him by stuffing bread into his mouth. She was very helpful and sacrificed her playtime with children of her own age to take care of her brothers. Occasionally she sucked on the penis of the baby brother. Although the brothers were often hostile to her, she defended them when other boys hit them because she was tall and strong and healthy while her brothers were such small, weak, and pitiful creatures. She felt guilt for having so many advantages over them, for getting so much more love and praise than they. She was a brilliant student and helped her brothers and her classmates with their schoolwork, but occasionally, for neurotic reasons, she failed and spoiled her record in school so that she was never really at the top of her class. She also spoiled her appearance by periods of overeating. As a career she became interested in work with labor unions. She undertook the defense, often very successfully, of individuals who were in trouble. She did not become a union leader; she merely took over the jobs nobody else wanted, such as collecting dues. Her financial sacrifices and contributions were disproportionately large. Her mother and her friends scolded her for permitting others to exploit her. Although her husband was well-to-do

and she had a good-sized income of her own, she felt that she belonged among the downtrodden, ate at the same table with her Negro servant, and felt guilty for her physical beauty, her health, her strength, her talents, and her possession of material goods. She gave generously to her brothers and their children although her brothers remained openly hostile to her.

She once called a doctor for a neighbor stricken suddenly by coronary thrombosis, but the old man died before the doctor reached him. She became excited and berated the doctor and the doctor's secretary; this convinced her during her psychoanalysis that she still felt guilty for the death of her father. In her relationship with her husband she was giving and protective but occasionally castrative. Masochistic fantasies played an important part in her sexuality. There is no doubt that she had oral envy and later penis envy and castrative tendencies against her brothers, and that she afterward felt guilty and protective toward them; but it would be erroneous to conclude that her love for the brothers stemmed from her hatred for them. Love comes from love. The debt of love that she owed her father was repaid to her brothers. The feeling of guilt for her being the preferred child and later for being a privileged citizen received its main strength not from her sadistic tendencies toward her brothers but from the difference between the great amount of love she had received from her father and the little that she had been able to return. This disproportion had been repeated later in her relationship with her mother and in the gifts of fate. Beauty, talents, and wealth were evidence of being preferred by God or fate. She gained the strength to overcome oral envy and penis envy toward her brothers not only from her compensation for sadism but also from her love for her father. By humiliating herself and by taking risks in favor of underprivileged persons she could diminish the injustice of her having had a doting father and a too kind fate. This case convinced me that, contrary to Freud's early assumptions, heterosexual tendencies as well as homosexual ones can motivate social-mindedness.

CASE III

An elderly gentleman with gastric ulcers was fanatically devoted to world betterment. However great the sacrifice required, he was not deterred from putting his ideas of social reform into print. He gave up his profession, ignored his wife and children, and wrote pamphlets which he published himself. He became so poor that he ended his days receiving relief. Although he was fairly intelligent and had had opportunity for education, he knew very little about the matters of which he wrote. He submitted to every hardship that fate brought, but he was very sensitive about his theories. He could not have advanced his ideas anonymously for his chief interest lay, though he would not acknowledge it, in narcissistic satisfaction. He had been extremely shy as a child and interested only in playing with adults, especially his father. Quarrels between his parents made him feel guilty and desirous of reconciling them. This feeling of guilt was based on his earlier wish to separate them. In his œdipal wishes he was more successful than he had hoped; both his parents loved him more than each other. It later became for him almost an obsession to reconcile boys who fought in school, and lovers or married couples who quarreled. The disunity among nations, and especially the First World War, affected him deeply. His devotion to his father was later transferred to a male teacher and, after several heterosexual adventures, to his wife. But his marriage was drab, and his wife frigid. When he was forty-four his father died and his wife went for the first time, with the children, for an extended stay in the country. He was lonesome, lost interest in his business, and brooded. He emerged from his depression with hypochondriasis (for instance, the idea of having cancer) and a fanatic determination to devote his life to the elimination of class struggles and national feuds. He alternated between periods filled with complaints such as hiccups, heartburn, and fantastic hypochondriacal ideas, and other periods of soapbox speeches, conferences with political leaders, and pamphleteering. We learned that the depression at the age of forty-four had covered

a withdrawal of interest from his love objects and regression to a narcissistic phase. In his attempts to rebuild the world that had collapsed for him he attached narcissistic libido to previously unimportant ideas of world reconciliation. The narcissistic character of this passionate endeavor expressed itself in the lack of understanding and the inability to learn. He felt that the fighting parties were parts of his own body, as if his left hand were fighting against his right hand. This made him feel physically uncomfortable. He had appersonated the combatting parties. To bring peace to them meant to bring peace to his own mind.

Various origins of social-mindedness have been suggested. The child's need for the mother and social-mindedness in the adult have been explained as deriving from the herd instinct.[8] Social hunger, the desire to be accepted by the group, has also been postulated as a source;[9] but this desire can explain only certain spurious kinds of social-mindedness. The social-mindedness of my patients brought only criticism from the group among whom they were brought up.

To ascribe social-mindedness to identification[10] is a logical short cut, but one which obscures the real question. If identification is the source of social feelings, whence comes the libido? Object libido is the driving force behind the identification that accompanies or follows love. Aggressive instinct is the motivating force of identification with the aggressor. In Freud's opinion, the social feelings of siblings for each other are a reaction-formation against an original envy. I can understand that envy can be transformed into a demand for equality and into a hatred against the privileged members of the group. But what is the source of the positive object relationship? I cannot convince myself that love comes out of hate. In some of my cases a short period of hatred preceded violent falling in love. But

[8] Trotter, W.: *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. Op cit.*

[9] Slavson, S. R.: *An Introduction to Group Therapy.* New York: The Commonwealth Fund. Oxford University Press, 1943, p. 15.

[10] Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. Op. cit.*

in the analysis this love was revealed to be not an overcompensation for the initial hatred; rather, the hatred was a defense against falling in love, a defense which finally failed. Freud mentions that homosexuality may result from a reaction-formation against a sibling.[11] This incomplete description has been developed by Melanie Klein and her school into the concept of the emergence of love from hatred. Oral frustration is said to lead to aggression, which causes anxiety; feelings of guilt and anxiety stimulate the libidinal development.[12] Love as a reaction-formation against hate is of the sort shown to their children by overprotective mothers, causing unhappiness and resentment. The love expressed in social-mindedness is not of this quality. Nor can we suppose that feelings of guilt cause any genuine affection.

After careful analysis I have concluded that there exists a genuine libidinal source of that tremendous expenditure of energy that we observe in social-mindedness.[13] This libidinal source of social-mindedness originates in early relationships with the parents and other members of the family.

Freud was fully aware that the child's love for the mother is anaclitic. It is characteristic of infantile sexuality in general that it is associated in the beginning with functions that serve self-preservation, such as feeding and excretion. As development proceeds, libido that was directed to the mother is redirected to new objects. These new objects are also anaclitic, for they also serve the instincts of self-preservation. Living in a close community of interests in the family not only arouses rivalries and jealousies but also favors an anaclitic object choice. The mechanism of appersonation facilitates the transition from an egotistical community of interests to anaclitic love of the

[11] Freud: *Certain Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality.* Coll. Papers, II, p. 242.

[12] Klein, Melanie: Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant. In: *Developments in Psychoanalysis.* Edited by Joan Riviere. London: Hogarth Press Ltd., 1952.

[13] This suggestion conforms with an opinion expressed by Freud in his paper on the Schreber case.

members of the family.[14] The first two patients I have described attained an object-libidinal cathexis of their social-mindedness, but the fanatical world-betterment complex of the third patient was based on narcissistic libido through the mechanism of appersonation.

Study of war neurosis has shown that groups can be divided into two categories: the primary group, people we are used to seeing face to face and with whom we have personal dealings; and secondary, abstract groups, such as the nation, humanity, and the church.[15] From the analysis of children we have learned that not only does the child transfer feelings from original objects of its early years, but it also establishes toward the psychoanalyst a new object relationship.[16] We expect adults who are psychoanalyzed to be able to establish new object relationships. These will never be free from elements of transference, but they should permit an understanding of the real personality of the object.

In a primary group of approximately healthy people, we have a right to assume that their relationships to each other are not more than tinted by elements of transference. In the relationship with the abstract group, the relationship is however strongly colored by elements of transference. In the psychoanalysis of adults, the psychoanalyst keeps his personality in the background as much as possible. The better the psychoanalyst succeeds in being like a blank screen, the easier it is for the patient to regress from an object relationship to a transference relationship, to project upon the psychoanalyst infantile fantasies and to re-enact phases and situations of the remote past. It is, in other words, desirable that the analyst avoid becoming a member of the patient's primary group. In the analysis of

[14] Sperling, Otto E.: *On Appersonation.* Int. J. Psa., XXV, 1944.

[15] Sperling, Otto E.: *The Interpretation of the Trauma as a Command.* This QUARTERLY, XIX, 1950, pp. 352-370.

Cooley, Charles H.: *Social Organization.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

[16] Freud, Anna: *Introduction to the Technique of Child Analysis.* New York: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Co., 1928.

cases of war neurosis the relationship to the primary group was approximately an adult one but the relationship to one's country became the heir of the love for a father or mother in early childhood. Linebarger[17] noted during the war a similar fact regarding enemy propaganda. The more vague and impersonal the enemy, the more readily could he resemble the image of a punishing but forgiving father. Another example is the matter of theft and fraud. Most people refrain from even small crimes against individual persons but are far more ready to perpetrate tax fraud, insurance fraud, or stealing from large corporations or the public. Anti-Semitism illustrates the same principle. A man may have a normal relationship to the Jew whom he knows personally, yet entertain paranoid fantasies about 'the Jews'.

The object of social-mindeness is not the large primary group of real individuals, but rather the abstract idea of society as a whole, or of the vague group of the underprivileged. Upon these groups is transferred love that was directed to the parents in the œdipal phase. Among the primary group, the vividness and reality of the persons involved counteract the unconscious tendencies to regression and projection.

During analysis it at first seemed that the social-mindedness of my first patient (Case I) might have a different explanation. His concern for the weak might, for example, be a way of permitting himself to feel superior. Or it could be that he favored the underprivileged class in order to avoid shyness in the company of those who were his equals. His behavior could be an identification with his father who had been so generous with praise and encouragement toward him. He might possibly have been identifying himself with his mother by being exploited by society in the same way as his mother had been exploited by his father. Sadism could perhaps have been the source of his social-mindedness, because in taking the part of the underprivileged he hated their enemies. Masochism might have been

[17] Linebarger, Paul M. A.: *Psychological Warfare.* Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948.

the source of his social-mindedness, as his wife and his friends seemed to think.

All these are possible motivations of social-mindedness. We must not oversimplify the problem. Popular thinking differentiates between genuine and spurious social-mindedness. Genuine social-mindedness is based on an object libidinal cathexis; spurious social-mindedness on such other motivations as narcissism, exhibitionism, and masochism. To the psychoanalyst, genuine and spurious social-mindedness differ only in the relative quantities of their constituent factors. In genuine social-mindedness, narcissistic and aggressive components can be detected, but the principal cathexis is object libidinal.

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THE STEREOTYPED WESTERN STORY

ITS LATENT MEANING AND PSYCHOECONOMIC FUNCTION

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I

Since Freud's elucidation of the Œdipus myth *(3)*, Rank *(8)*, Róheim *(11)*, Reik *(10)*, and others have studied a great number of myths and legends. Abraham *(1)* compared the myth and the dream. Jones *(4)* contributed a masterly analysis of the unconscious meaning of Shakespeare's Hamlet. Pederson-Krag *(7)* noted the importance of the primal scene for the detective story, and Evans *(2)* discussed the latent content of the Arthurian romances. With Jones *(5)* we sincerely regret that her death ended Ella Sharpe's projected unifying study of all Shakespeare's important works.

II

That colorful and durable bit of Americana, the western story, has a latent meaning and a psychoeconomic function.

The stirring history of the American West, especially during the nineteenth century, has served as the basis for thousands of short stories, novels, radio programs, cartoon 'comic strips', and motion pictures. Over the years their production and dissemination throughout the world have steadily increased. The passage of time has seen history changed into a wish-motivated legend in the accounts of that period. While it is true that most of them are exciting narration, only a few are historically informative or emotionally and æsthetically satisfying. The form and content of the western story has, during its development, become increasingly stereotyped. Such stories seem to

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be turned out according to a time-tested formula. Individual authorship has become indistinct and, except perhaps for proprietary reasons, unimportant. This anonymity of authorship is a characteristic of ancient myths. Apparently collective emotional needs and collective creativity can be depended upon to produce a number of myths in every culture.

Today, especially by the 'comic book', the radio, and the motion picture film, the stereotyped western legend is brought to the attention of millions of people every day, and seems to hold a continual fascination for children as well as adults. The western story is repetitious in production, content, form, and consumption.

Observing the intense absorption with which televised films are followed, especially by children, one is forced to doubt that the manifest narrative content, despite its furious action and striking setting, can entirely account for the widespread and tenacious interest in it. One suspects that the ostensible historic struggle to bring law and order to the geographical frontier serves as a relatively unimportant façade behind which a far more ancient and universal battle rages, the battle of every child to master the dark forces that would bar expansion and a tolerable peace on its own emotional frontier. This suggests a resemblance to the dream in which events and experiences of the preceding day are often utilized as the framework into which are woven the latent dream thoughts.

The central figure in the frontier myth is not the stump-pulling, land-tilling, patriarchal settler who was probably the really significant person in the westward expansion of the United States, nor is it the artisan, businessman, and industrial organizer who followed in his path. It is, rather, a man who caricatures the pioneer virtues of self-reliance, courage, initiative, and fraternal interdependence in the face of common danger. In the western myth one easily recognizes him as one who in other times, other costumes, other dramas has struggled in the valleys of the Euphrates and the Nile, in Greece, Spain, Scandinavia, and Camelot. He is the Hero. In the western

legend he has exchanged his shining helmet for a ten-gallon hat, his breastplate for an embroidered shirt, and his lance for a pair of 'six-shooters'. The scene has shifted to the American Southwest; ranch houses and sheriff's offices have replaced castles, and saloons and 'hide-outs' have been substituted for lairs of dragons; but the Hero's interminable adventures follow the ancient pattern. It is apparent that the cowboy hero is the eternal son, repetitively and compulsively acting out an archetypal fantasy.

III

The run-of-the-mill televised film version of the western story can be described somewhat as follows.

A young, wandering cowboy, astride his handsome gelding, rides into view on a lonely western landscape. He is accompanied by one or two male companions. The sound of gunfire in the distance introduces the fact that a local rancher—a complete stranger to the hero—has been murdered or his life menaced, and his property unlawfully wrested from him or from his rightful heirs. Without a moment's hesitation the cowboy springs into unrelenting retributive action. After a number of desperate pursuits through desolate and forbidding terrain, after gun battles and saloon brawls, with almost superhuman effectiveness he overcomes the villain in personal combat, avenges the crimes, and restores the undamaged ranch or herd to the lawful owner. Having performed these services he rejects the offer that he assume office as sheriff, or become the foreman of the restored property with the rancher's daughter or the school-ma'am as his bride. With complete self-effacement, the laconic cowboy tips his hat politely and gallops away, accompanied still by his faithful companion.

Another adventure inevitably follows, in which the whole drama is repeated with minor variations. Like the mechanical figure that strikes the hours on a medieval turret clock, the western hero seems obliged to gallop jerkily around an unchanging orbit.

The hero is at once proud and modest, bold and shy. His courage, agility, and reckless self-confidence in righting wrongs are in marked contrast to his respectful backwardness in the presence of women. He is decoratively and conspicuously dressed, wearing a large white hat, embroidered shirt, skin-tight trousers, and high-heeled boots. From his hips hang two large pistols. He is never profane, rarely smokes, and never drinks intoxicating liquors. He adheres rigidly to the code of the prairie, never taking unfair advantage even of the villainous enemy. When the latter is ultimately disarmed, the cowboy tosses aside his own pistols and subdues him with his bare fists, sometimes undergoing what appears to be unnecessary punishment.

The western hero is usually accompanied by one or more male companions who are faithful to him from one adventure to the next. Ordinarily, the companion is of approximately the same age as the hero, but frequently is considerably younger, or sometimes much older. This person is dependent on the hero for leadership and is inclined to be indecisive, inept, and impulsive. He is patronized and dominated by the cowboy even when he is old enough to be his father. At times his ineptitude jeopardizes the cowboy's safety or his own. Reciprocal rescues are frequent. The subaltern is often permitted to make innocent, abortive, romantic advances toward women but always retreats and remains faithful to the hero; his comic misadventures at the end of the story are greeted with derisive laughter from all the 'good' people, and the glee of his idol is more conspicuous than that of any other. This companion is the 'comedy relief' in these mirthless films.

The villain is an absolute contrast to the hero. He is often portrayed as a saloonkeeper. No action is too dastardly for him to contemplate or attempt. His activity is perpetually counter to conventional morality. When thwarted and brought to justice he remains defiant and sullenly unrepentant. He drinks, gambles, and stares lasciviously at his dancing girls. His loutish hirelings are encouraged to imitate his behavior. Wearing a

black hat and suit, lurking behind a black cigar, he broods, scowls, and schemes to 'get' the worthy rancher's property and his virginal daughter. When the villain is a banker or a sheriff, who pretends to be an upright and law-abiding citizen, his mendacity is the more odious. Only the hero has a clear conviction from the outset of his duplicity and evil intentions. In more elaborate productions the villain is in alliance with hostile Indians.

In a common variation, the sheriff is one of the law-abiding inhabitants but is weak, vacillating, and ineffectual in the performance of his function of maintaining law and order. When this is so, the cowboy reluctantly usurps his duties temporarily for the purpose of rescuing the imperiled and bringing the archcriminal and his gang to justice. All offers to retain this position of authority permanently are declined, just as the cowboy also usually refuses to marry the rancher's daughter.

The rancher who must be protected or avenged by the hero is cut from the same cloth as the ineffectual, benign sheriff and he plays a minor role. If he survives the opening moments of the story, he is occasionally permitted to organize a posse and assist in the capture of the villain's henchmen. If the rancher has a son he is depicted as 'spoiled', or perhaps treacherous, and secretly in league with the villain. The daughter is traditionally proud, courageous, and fanatically vengeful. Her independent efforts to redress the wrongs of the villain are premature and planless; consequently, she usually falls into his clutches, is roughly handled, and is carried off, struggling, to the villain's lair. When ultimately she is rescued by the superhuman efforts of the cowboy she is chastened and worshipfully grateful.

IV

For the spectator or the reader, the western romance is a ready-made game or fantasy in which he identifies himself mainly with the hero. As Rank said *(9)*, '. . . we feel justified in analogizing the ego of the child with the hero of the myth in view of the unanimous tendency of family romances and hero myths . . .'.

One can assume, as in dream interpretation, that every person in the story represents some aspect of the hero in relation to those who also more obviously represent father, mother, and siblings. By a process of 'decomposition' the entire family group, consisting of the son (hero), parents, and siblings, with their various attributes, has been dissolved and several other individuals invented. Onto these, the characters in the story, have been projected a number of the original attributes of the members of the family. Each of the newly invented characters is a kind of 'isomer' of the hero. Other personal attributes are symbolized by animals and inanimate objects. The cowboy's faithful horse—the object of such solicitude, pride, and respect —probably represents the hero's narcissistically overvalued phallus and also the father as totem animal.

The cowboy hero is thus invested with the egosyntonic characteristics of the child who aspires to pseudo adulthood, and his ego-alien tendencies are displaced onto others. As with the dreamer, the hero is ultimately held responsible for every action and counteraction that takes place in the romance: the hero's compulsion to redress the wrongs committed against the rancher—a father surrogate—points to his responsibility and guilt, although manifestly the crimes are attributed to the villain. Like hostile tendencies toward the father, the incestuous, oral, and hostile tendencies toward the mother are also displaced, mainly to the villain. The villain represents the 'bad' father who deprives the narcissistic 'king of the nursery' of his heart's desire, the good mother. In overwhelming the villain, the hero is simultaneously re-enacting the œdipal crime against the father, making restitution for it, and avenging both his father and himself. By rescuing the maiden—the mother is forever young in the unconscious—the hero undoes the incest which he has 'permitted' the villain to commit. It is noteworthy that in the 'formula' western, the villain is never killed. Insurance against the castration of the hero, in so far as the villain is an 'isomer' of the hero, is an essential of the formula.

The hero's loyal companion represents another aspect of the

hero as well as a brother figure; sometimes he is like the hero's father. The hero both loves and depreciates him; always, however, the companion's wayward tendencies are kept under control, and the hero is reassured that he has nothing to fear from him, is always superior to him.

The good father is represented first by the rancher, next by the benign but ineffective sheriff, and of course by the hero's restitutive and protective virtues. The good mother is not clearly personified. Sometimes the rancher has a wife who fulfils this role to some extent, but in a sense, the ranch itself represents the providing mother. The idealized mother is personified principally by the rancher's daughter or the schoolma'am; the seductive, 'bad' mother is the fickle mistress of the saloonkeeper. All these women also represent the hero's own unacceptable feminine tendencies. Like the archvillain himself, the disloyal son of the rancher personifies those ego-alien tendencies in the hero that are subject to the strongest repression.

The cowboy hero's arrival from nowhere at the beginning of each adventure suggests the child's feeling of mystery and confusion about its own origin.[1] In the typical ancient myth, and in the family romance, the hero is a foundling, the long-lost son of noble parents who have abandoned him to the care of beasts or of a humble family. In the western legend it is significant that the code demands that no one express any curiosity about the identity, origin, or parentage of the hero. His lonely existence at the beginning and at the end of each adventure is a commentary on the child's recurrent but vain wish to return to a blissful symbiosis with mother, to a childhood Garden of Eden from which it was exiled by reason of its awakened knowledge of sexual and hostile impulses.

The saloon and the 'hide-out' are allusions to the primal scene. This is also latent in the chase with the rhythmic gal-

[1] *Cf.* the nursery rhyme

'Where did you come from baby dear?'
'Out of the everywhere into here.'

loping of the horses and the firing of guns. The gun battles are threats and counterthreats of castration in the hero's rivalry with the father and the brothers. As if to re-enforce the idea that this is after all just a game and that anxiety will not get out of hand, even the scenes of the greatest violence in these stories seem to be rather dispassionate.

What Jones *(6)* said of Hamlet also applies to the western legend; it is '. . . a highly elaborated and disguised account of a boy's love for his mother and consequent jealousy of and hatred for his father'; and, 'The picture here presented of the son as avenger instead of slayer of the father illustrates the highest degree of psychological "repression", in which the true meaning of the story is concealed by the identical mechanisms that in real life conceal "repressed" hostility and jealousy in so many families, namely, the exact opposite attitude of exaggerated solicitude, care, and respect'. But the lowly western also reflects a number of other conflicts, some preceding (pregenital), some concomitant with, others derivative from, the more obvious œdipal struggle. Among these, one which Rank considered central in every myth is the endeavor to get rid of both parents, the same wish as arises in the fantasies of the child when it is trying to establish its independence. This is an understandable protest of the healthy child against the prolonged, helpless dependence on its parents that is the common lot of the human animal. For the child who is emotionally disturbed, it may represent a compensatory attempt to deny strong regressive oral and dependent wishes. Other interwoven conflicts are the relationships of brother with brother, brother with sister, and sister with father. This overdetermination and these subsidiary conflicts permit the ego of the reader or viewer some choice, as it were, in concentrating unconsciously first upon one and then another of these universal conflicts.

V

Dreams, daydreams, legends, myths, and other fictions share the common dynamic element of a struggle between wish and

inhibition. One is justified in believing that these legends serve an integrative educational function, especially for the young child, and they are by no means entirely a passive, regressive, or purposeless pastime. Like the military commander who engages his troops in tactical maneuvers with an imaginary or simulated enemy, the boy utilizes the 'western' to anticipate difficulties, to experiment, and to seek socially acceptable and tolerable answers to his most urgent and pressing unconscious emotional conflicts. Toy pistols and a cowboy costume help him to act out the story in play.

From the setting of the nineteenth century frontier, the quiet but resounding voice of the primeval son warns his modern counterpart: 'These are your dangerous inclinations! These are the dread consequences! But here are some possible solutions.' For a brief hour of glory the participant vicariously acts out the role of the omnipotent hero. Surreptitiously, in unconscious identification with the 'isomers' of the hero, he lives out his forbidden wishes in relation to the other members of the family. In so doing, he enjoys a temporary triumph, and anxiety is held in check. In spite of many and various defenses the solution is not entirely to his liking, since he also experiences the downfall and disgrace of those with whom he is in secret alliance. Apprehensive and dissatisfied, buoyed up only by an illusory omnipotence and the fragile, uncertain pleasure of expiation and renunciation, he must ride back into womanless exile with his lonely hero. The fantasy is endlessly repeated in the hope that a way will be found next time to reconcile more effectively the forbidden wishes, real or imagined, with the demands, also real and imagined, of the environment. The preadolescent has limited emotional and physical equipment and limited integrative capacity, and his family and society impose strictures and limitations upon him; it is therefore not surprising that he finds relief in the compromise of the western story. Just as the dream serves to prevent awakening into a frustrating reality, the western story partially and temporarily alleviates the pressure of the child's ungratified forbidden

wishes and prevents attempts at premature direct satisfaction of these wishes by action which would be beyond the child's action capacity or might lead to dangerous consequences.

The healthy child will in good time outgrow the psychosexual immaturity of his western hero; he will eventually transform his death wishes, aimed at eliminating competitors, into constructive, realistic activity; and his incestuous wishes will be relinquished when he abandons the quest for the inaccessible mother imago in favor of other women who become the suitable objects of his heterosexual strivings. As for those passive persons who continue to be fascinated by the stereotyped western story beyond early childhood to such a degree that they shun realistic, active efforts to achieve a more mature adjustment to the real world around them, one had best look upon such 'addiction' as the manifestation of a pre-existing emotional difficulty rather than as the result of too intense an interest in the western story and in other similar attempts at vicarious gratification.

Perhaps the hero of the western myth, like the ancient and honorable heroes of other lands and other times, fulfils a definite need at some time in the life of every child.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the fictional formula that has become the American 'western', the ostensible historical account of the struggle to bring law and order to the expanding frontier seems to be a relatively unimportant façade behind which a far more ancient and universal battle rages having to do with the task of every child to master the dark forces of the œdipus which threaten to inhibit his progression into maturity. The western story may be considered as a heroic myth in which are concealed themes of œdipal and other conflicts. Absorption in the western story is not necessarily a regressive or purposeless pastime but may be, particularly for a child, a way of dealing with pressing unconscious conflicts. A healthy child can be expected to seek active, realistic, and satisfactory ways of solving these universal conflicts

other than those represented by the compromise of relinquishing genital maturity for the gratifications of the cowboy superman.

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William H. Dunn 1898-1955

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WILLIAM H. DUNN

1898-1955

Dr. William Harold Dunn died suddenly on the evening of February 12, 1955. Although he had earlier had a cardiac illness, he had remained more than ordinarily active to the day of his death. Merciful as this was for him, it left an unusual void and a great difficulty in the realization of his passing in the minds and hearts of his friends. For he was a man with a rare gift for and fidelity to friendship. 'Jack' Dunn, as he was known, was the most amiable and quietly courageous of men, an unusually fine companion and an excellent doctor. Essentially a modest and retiring man, little inclined to speak much of his own very considerable achievements, he was also gregarious and fun-loving. His appreciation of the picturesque, vivid panorama of life colored his humor and enhanced his talent as a clinician and, together with his warmth, gave him a special capacity for what one might call immediate and relieving relationships. One of his patients, talking to me after his death, highlighted one aspect of this in saying, 'He had the most soothing sense of the ridiculous. I have never known anything like it.'

I worked side by side with Jack Dunn for more than ten years in a hospital service which brought us a seemingly endless vista of human suffering and poverty. It was a setting in which one appreciated the caliber of a man of Dunn's character: his seeming tirelessness, his absolute dependability, and his patience, such that any tension found its relief in sparkling humor.

Dr. Dunn was only fifty-six at the time of his death. He was born in 1898, in the rich and beautiful farming country of western New York State, descended on both sides from early American settlers. He was the youngest of three children. The early loss of his mother may have contributed to a haunting

sense of loneliness which one sometimes glimpsed in him. At thirteen he had already become ambitious to study medicine and was interested in psychiatry. He attended Mercersburg Academy, where he led his class. He went later to the University of Rochester, where he was outstanding academically and in practically all student activities. He volunteered service in both World Wars. In the First, as a boy of nineteen, he served as stretcher-bearer in France; in the Second, he was a Lieutenant Colonel in the Cornell Unit. Between these years he had graduated from Harvard Medical College, served a general internship at Rochester General Hospital, a neurological residency at Bellevue Hospital, and a psychiatric residency at Bloomingdale Hospital. In 1931, he went to Berlin to begin personal psychoanalysis and to study in the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute. Returning to New York, he was appointed to the Psychiatric Staff of the New York Hospital, an affiliation which he maintained continuously thereafter.

During the Second World War his services and attainments were significant and characteristic. After almost a year in New Guinea, he returned to this country as psychiatric consultant to the Fifth Service Command. There he was energetic in introducing better methods in psychiatric hospitals and appreciably reduced the period of hospitalization for patients in hospitals in his command. On one occasion he broke up a riot in a prison by walking into the thick of it, so effectively impressing the men with his calmness and his talking with them that the riot subsided. He received several commendations, including the Legion of Merit for his military services. He was later recalled into service as a special consultant to the Nürnburg trials in Germany.

He had a considerable love for and a talent for teaching medical students and younger staff members, by whom he was greatly beloved. He also contributed occasional articles to the literature. He became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society in 1939, and served as its vice president for two

years. He was a member also of the Association for Psychoanalytic Medicine.

He is survived by his wife, Lora Lester Dunn, whom he married in 1924, and by two children, Frederick Lester Dunn, a medical student at Harvard University, and Cynthia Dunn Fleming, a student at Wellesley College.

PHYLLIS GREENACRE

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The Origins of Psychoanalysis. Letters to Wilhelm Fliess, Drafts and Notes: 1887-1902. By Sigmund Freud. Edited by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1954. 486 pp.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE ORIGINS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. LETTERS TO WILHELM FLIESS, DRAFTS AND NOTES: 1887-1902. By Sigmund Freud. Edited by Marie Bonaparte, Anna Freud, and Ernst Kris. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1954. 486 pp.

The English translation of Freud's letters to Wilhelm Fliess is an important document that supplements the biography of Freud by Ernest Jones. It is a document for scientists and not a *roman à clef*. The instructive introduction by Ernst Kris orients the reader to the historic context in which the correspondence evolved and integrates the material with the subsequent work of Freud. The correspondence reports the beginning and development of Freud's self-analysis and contains important material for the development of psychoanalytic psychology.

To a generation that knew Freud only as a scientist and teacher, calm, judicious, Olympian, this volume shows the hard work and the obstinate, stubborn struggle with which he mastered his personality and created the foundation on which psychoanalytic theory rests. Here is revealed the violent current that cut the deep, calm stream of the Freud we knew.

If one tries to reconstruct these letters as a case history, one fails to glean sufficient valid information. Even if one may have isolated pertinent ideas and surmises, a comprehensive view cannot be gained. This highly selected material has not been derived according to the basic rule of psychoanalytic therapy and inferences based upon it are therefore of questionable validity. For example, as Dr. Bernfeld demonstrated,[1] the screen memories which Freud sent to Fliess were never mentioned as being his own. He was willing to discuss his death anxiety, his hope to outlive Fliess, but even in this intimate correspondence he did not discuss erotic material that he was working through at the time.

The recipient of Freud's letters was Wilhelm Fliess, a twenty-nine-year-old ear, nose, and throat specialist who at that time seemed to give promise of original ideas and brilliant scientific

[1] Bernfeld, Siegfried: *An Unknown Autobiographical Fragment by Freud.* American Imago, IV, No. 1, August 1946.

achievements. Freud, who had been happy in Brücke's laboratory doing research on brain anatomy, had only become a physician after his great teacher had reminded him that his financial situation was too precarious to permit him to remain in research. He had never examined and treated a patient. Fliess, who was an experienced practitioner, and was greatly interested in physiological problems, possessed a clinical knowledge to which Freud deferred. He was excellently cast as the authority Freud needed at that time. Charcot was far away, Brücke was no longer available, Meynert had proved to be an enemy, and Breuer was, at best, an ambivalent mentor. In this situation Fliess's friendship, his physiological interests and explorations, offered to Freud a substitute for the teacher he felt he still needed. 'I feel', wrote Freud, 'very isolated, scientifically blunted, stagnant and resigned. When I talked to you, and saw that you thought something of me, I actually started thinking something of myself, and the picture of confident energy which you offered was not without its effect. I should also have profited professionally from meeting you . . . because for years now I have been without anyone who could teach me anything . . .' (p. 60).

Freud at that time still operated within the milieu of his family, in which he fought to order and clarify his position. His social and professional relationships were transferred back into his family relationships which consisted of a much older father, two half brothers who were as old as his mother, a nephew older than himself, and the six children who grew up after him. He was not yet free from the peculiar conditions of his childhood. This was, in fact, to be the content of his self-analysis and the catalytic function that Fliess was to fulfil for him. In his very first letter he struck the keynote of the theme: 'I must start with the confession that I hope to remain in contact with you, and that you left a deep impression on me, which might lead easily to my telling you frankly in what class of men I place you'. Invested with this role, the recipient and the object of transferences which, of course, he could not understand, Fliess was bound to fail and the relationship inevitably had to founder. It is unnecessary, and also impossible since Fliess's letters were destroyed by Freud, to evaluate Fliess psychoanalytically and try to understand the influence that such a friendship might have had on him. For Freud's self-analysis he served only as a sounding board.

The demands made upon Fliess are clear enough. Freud's involvement was passionate and strong, and for many years he could not see Fliess often enough. He had many plans for joint scientific ventures; he hoped to have a holiday with Fliess on Italian soil; he was greatly interested in Fliess's children; and had many suggestions to offer for Fliess's scientific work. His own investigations and activities were at the time all written with what he called his 'one public' in mind.

Since there could be no interpretations of the transference, it is remarkable that Freud neither broke off the relationship nor lost interest in the scientific material which he was developing. Instead he did something that is familiar to us in clinical practice. After a jealous remark about Mrs. Fliess, who 'will see to it that I stop when I have bothered you too much' (p. 122), he does not take the proffered opportunity to meet Fliess but demonstrates his resistance according to the reality principle by writing, 'I am going to Venice with my little brother between the 22nd and the 24th, so unfortunately I shall not be able . . . to be in Oberhof at the same time. I had to make up my mind one way or the other, and what decided me was concern for the young man who shares with me responsibility for two old people and so many women and children . . . .'

In psychoanalytic therapy some patients, who are not given an interpretation when it is called for, keep on working for a while because their interest in their own problems carries them along and they do not give up the hope that an eventual clarification will take place.

These letters show Freud's achievement in hacking his way through the nosologic jungle of the descriptive neuropathology of his time that 'had no more relation to reality than an Egyptian dream book', and in finding a path in the development of a systematic psychology through which he could order his experiences. His insistent need for clarity made him see that the chaos existed not only in neuropathology but in the therapist as well. Clarity and order became the guideposts of his self-analysis.

In addition, another factor seems to have been operating. Whenever in his work he established a mechanism that for him had power of clarification, he seemed to transfer to this reliable mechanism the hope he had originally invested in the person-

ality of Fliess. The more he salvaged and reconstructed of his childhood, the greater insight he gained, the more independently did his psychology become systematized, the more did Fliess as a catalyst fade. Freud maintained for many years a sentimental attachment and attempted repeatedly to invest Fliess with the superior powers one tends to attribute to a knowledgeable analyst. Freud did not so much drive as he was driven. He wrote that most of his results were obtained in a half-conscious way, '. . . with odd states of mind not intelligible to consciousness—cloudy thoughts and veiled doubts, with barely here and there a ray of light . . .' (pp. 210-211). 'Every now and then ideas whirl through my head which promise to explain everything, and to connect the normal and the pathological, the sexual and psychological, and then they disappear again. . . . On stagnant days such as yesterday and today everything inside me is stagnant and terribly lonely. I cannot talk about it to anyone, and I cannot force myself to work, as other workers can. I have to wait until things move inside me and I experience them. And so I often dream whole days away' (p. 236). 'It was all written by the unconscious, on the well-known principle of Itzig, the Sunday horseman. "Itzig, where are you going?" "Don't ask me, ask the horse!" At the beginning of a paragraph I never knew where I should end up. It was not written to be read, of course—any attempt at style was abandoned after the first two pages. In spite of all that, I of course believe in the results. I have not the slightest idea yet what form the contents will finally take' (p. 258).

Although Fliess was unable to interpret and resolve the transference, he did make one important contribution to Freud's understanding of himself and to the development of his theories. He suggested to Freud that bisexuality was the solution for all emotional problems. This was a new idea which Freud appropriated and used as a lever. Two and a half years were to elapse between the suggestion and Freud's final evolvement of a bisexuality freed of Fliess's schematic encumbrances. It was this matter which brought about the final break with Fliess. 'There is no concealing the fact that we have drawn somewhat apart from each other. By this and that I can see how much. . . . In this you came to the limit of your penetration, you take sides against me and tell me that "the thought reader merely reads his own thoughts into other people". . . . If I

am such a one, throw my Everyday Life into the wastepaper basket. It is full of references to you: obvious ones, where you supplied the material, and concealed ones, where the motivation derives from you. Also you supplied the motto. Apart from any permanent value that its content may have, you can take it as a testimonial to the role you have hitherto played in my life. . . . And now for the most important thing of all. My next book, so far as I can see, will be called Bisexuality in Man; it will tackle the root of the problem and say the last word which it will be granted to me to say on the subject—the last and the deepest. . . . But then I shall need a long and serious discussion with you. The idea itself is yours. You remember my saying to you years ago . . . that the solution lay in sexuality. Years later you corrected me and said bisexuality, and I see that you are right' (p. 334). 'Your last letter was really beneficial. I can now understand the way you have been writing to me during the past year. It was at any rate the first time that you have ever said anything but the truth to me. . . . Perhaps you have been too quick to renounce me as a listener. A friend who has the right to contradict, who because of his ignorance can never be dangerous, is not without value to one who explores such dark paths and associates with very few people, all of whom admire him uncritically and unconditionally. . . . I was sorry to lose my "only audience" as our Nestroy called it. For whom shall I write now? If as soon as an interpretation of mine makes you feel uncomfortable you are ready to conclude that the "thought reader" perceives nothing in others but merely projects his own thoughts into them, you really are no longer my audience, and you must regard the whole technique as just as worthless as the others do. . . . I do not understand your answer about bisexuality. It is obviously very difficult to understand one another. I certainly had no intention of doing anything but get to grips, as my contribution to the theory of bisexuality, with the thesis that repression and the neuroses, and thus the independence of the unconscious, presuppose bisexuality. . . . You will have seen from the reference to you as the discoverer of the idea in the Everyday Life that I have no intention of exaggerating my share in it. . . . One cannot simply say "the conscious is the dominant, the unconscious the underlying, sexual factor" without grossly oversimplifying the very complicated nature of the case' (pp. 336-337).

In his writings, Freud used what he was able of the ideas of Fliess. Without being defensive he demonstrated a capacity for directness and openness that in the context of the time is extraordinary.

Space does not permit evaluation of the drafts and theories which Freud sent to Fliess, in which Kris's introduction is most helpful. I want, at least, to mention what in the German edition is called Psychology for Neurologists, and in the American edition has the title, Project for a Scientific Psychology. It is noteworthy that Freud never asked for the return of that manuscript which caused him so much trouble; nor, apparently, did he ever want to see it again. In sending it, he said he was withholding a final section of the psychopathology of repression which he was finding extremely difficult. His mood about it was alternately 'proud and happy' or 'abashed and miserable'. The Project was probably never completed. He refers to it with the sentence, 'For two whole weeks I was in a fever of writing and thought I had found the secret, but now I know I have not got it yet and have laid the thing aside again'.

This document is a magnificent tour de force. Nowhere in Freud's published writings do we find such a brilliant example of his capacity for abstract thought and sustained close reasoning. With its elliptical style and somewhat obscure phraseology, unrelieved by concrete examples, it imposes more exacting demands on the reader than any of his published work; much of this difficulty, of course, stems from the fact that the essay was couched in language familiar to its solitary audience. It shows what a hold the concrete studies of his youth had obtained over him. In the realm of visual, of definite neurological processes that could be examined microscopically, he had for many years felt entirely at home; he was as safe there as he was at the family hearth. To wander away from them and embark on the perilous seas of the world of emotions, where all was unknown and where what was invisible was of far greater consequence than the little that was visible, must have cost him dearly. He was destined to a high endeavor, which he was now about to undertake. The feverish writing of the Project may be regarded as a last desperate effort to cling to the safety of neuroanatomy. It was his vain hope that the mind could be described in terms of neurones, their processes and synapses. Another important consideration is that never again, until the last period of his life, so far as we know, did Freud indulge in such purely

deductive reasoning. The great Herbart, it is true, had maintained that in psychology deduction has equal rights with induction; but this was considered metaphysical heresy by Griesinger and Meynert; and Freud had been drilled in the sacred doctrine that all conclusions were to be founded on experience alone. In the Project, however, there is very little direct reference to any experience. Axioms and assumptions are taken as the basis for far-reaching trains of thought and conclusions. It is an essay one would have expected from a philosopher rather than a pathologist.

The word philosopher is suggestive. Perhaps Freud was here, for the first time, releasing his early and thoroughly checked tendency to theorize. The feverish obsessiveness with which he wrote the essay hints at some deep undercurrent trend, one of which his quick subsequent repudiation expressed disapproval. Had it not been controlled, this tendency could have ended in empty speculation and arid intellectualization. Without any guidance Freud resolved this problem. He returned to the empiricism of clinical observations; but the fact is that he had taken the crucial step of releasing, even if only for a month or six weeks, something vital in him that was soon to become his scientific imagination—a realm in which both sides of his nature were to find free play in a fertile coöperation.

It is indeed remarkable how closely the Project already unites and expresses the two opposite sides of Freud's nature, the conservative and the freely imaginative. It was doubtless that combination, once effected, that gave such a powerful impetus to its composition. Its relative sterility is understandable because of its divorce from clinical data. He had still to find more fruitful outlets which only the courage to explore emotional experiences could provide.

Although he continued to rely on the neuronic system in his descriptions, Freud was now rapidly moving into the field of pure psychology. This was, in fact, the last we hear from Freud of brain physiology.

There is a later echo in a letter written September 22, 1898. 'I am not in the least in disagreement with you, and have no desire at all to leave the psychology hanging in the air with no organic basis. But, beyond a feeling of conviction [that there must be such a basis], I have nothing, either theoretical or therapeutic, to work

on, and so I must behave as if I were confronted by psychological factors only. I have no idea yet why I cannot fit it together (p. 264). He never moved from this position. Heroically he discarded the limited constructs within which he had formerly worked, and in clarifying his personal and scientific problems achieved one of those great leaps in the history of science.

SUZANNE CASSIRER BERNFELD (SAN FRANCISCO)

THE NEED TO BELIEVE. The Psychology of Religion. By Mortimer Ostow, M.D. and Ben-Ami Scharfstein, Ph.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1954. 162 pp.

The thesis of this text of one hundred and fifty pages is more or less this: religious feelings are an expression of a need to believe—a need which grows out of the fear of death and out of that general though vague insecurity which our social life generates. This insecurity is a result of the pressure which our instincts exert from within us in their demand for full and unbridled expression. Religious faith acts as a restraint; it is a socializing factor. Thus, religion, or religious faith, or the need to believe, appears to be a phenomenon of biosociological origin—even though religion is not the result of conscious, voluntary organization, but rather a more or less spontaneous response to the insecurities and anxieties which our instincts and the aggregate of our fellow men tend to generate within us. Religion thus relieves us of the pessimism into which we would inevitably fall were it not for the psychological crutch that faith offers us.

Here the issue narrows down to rather minimal and not too enlightening proportions; for it is not then a matter of religion in any specific sense, but religion in a general sense (too general, I am afraid) that the authors begin to talk about—a sort of belief or faith in something. The authors do not state it in this way, but pretty nearly; one of them is, we are told, a student of Bergson's philosophy. Unfortunately, all that is left of Bergson in this book is but an early and incomplete statement that gives a somewhat slanted impression—as if man is driven to religious faith by some special instinct and that (as the authors state time and again) religious faith is essentially a form of adjustment of man to the demands which societies make on him to protect him from himself.

'Believing is almost as necessary to humans as eating', the authors state. References are made to Durkheim, who to say the least is somewhat superannuated, and to William James. The orientation of this little book is thus more pragmatic than the title would indicate, and one finishes reading it with a sense of considerable regret that the authors—one of whom is a psychoanalyst and rather ambitiously ventures into both biological and sociological fields—deal less with the psychology of religion and more with how useful religion might become, and how almost utilitarian an aim it fulfils in the vague but annoying business of keeping our psychosocial economy in some sort of equilibrium or state of integration.

One could easily forgive the authors some fuzziness of historical perspective as, following some sort of uncritical tradition, the Middle Ages and the Inquisition are usually considered as contemporaneous. There is, however, a far cry between the contemplative 'dark ages' and Middle Ages, and the Inquisition—the burning and bloody stepchild of the counter-Renaissance and counter-Reformation. One could also easily forgive the writers the error which they commit, in common with so many well-meaning critics, when they say that Christianity rejects or turns away from woman because it, like all religions, came from a peculiar solution of the conflicts related to the murder of the father. But there is something insufficient and a little narrow in this point of view. For after all Christianity reveres the Mother of Christ, and like most of the major religions makes the attainment of family life the cornerstone of its morality; and it makes ascetic life the cornerstone of its contemplative, sacrificial service to the ultimate ideal. As to the family, this is equally true of Jews, Christians, and Hindus. As to asceticism, it is just as true except for the Jews. Misogyny, so often found during periods of spiritual crisis in the history of religions, is not a turning away from women; it is perhaps more a narcissistic assertion of man over his first chattel (the woman) which we find among very ancient semi-savages as well as among the earliest Jewish tradition and the monkish sadism of a century like the fifteenth or the sixteenth.

What seems a little more difficult to accept is the authors' assumption that what they have done really justifies the subtitle, The Psychology of Religion, when they have merely pointed out a few concordistic parallels between some religious trends and some well-known psychological mechanisms. This kind of approach will not

do nowadays. One can find similar or corresponding mechanisms underlying such widespread traditions as interest in science, in history, or even photography. Then, too, to put the ritual in the center of a given religion is not very enlightening, any more than calling our society oral erotic just because we always end at banquets and testimonial dinners—even psychoanalysts.

It would seem that the authors have made a very serious and very concerted effort in the direction of a psychosocial teleology, and have inevitably ended in the pragmatic lap of Jung, who in recent years has chosen to make a formal acceptance of many tenets of Christianity merely, it would seem, because 'it works'. In so far as the authors skirt around neopragmatism, they give us little insight into religion; in so far as they tend toward the teleology of religion in the service of psychosociological hypotheses, they give no new psychological insight but engage rather in a sort of teleology without faith. For as soon as one begins to stress teleology, one interprets the work of Nature with a capital N as if to escape calling it Creator, or God.

It is the real and unreal, the rational and irrational, that the authors keep on juxtaposing. As a result, they straddle the principle that we just have to believe, and the pride that we are accustomed to take in what we call reason. They almost seem to think that believing is humiliating to reason, and on the last page they admonish us quite rightly not to be too embarrassed, 'for shame is born of a false pride'—which is quite correct.

Their discussion of God as the 'archetypal idea-image of an omnipotent existence', giving reference to what Jung calls God, makes one recall Freud's words: 'One would like to count oneself among the believers, so as to admonish the philosophers who try to preserve the God of religion by substituting for him an impersonal, shadowy, abstract principle, and say, "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord, thy God, in vain!" '.[1]

C. Z.

[1] Freud: *Civilization and Its Discontents.* New York: Jonathan Cape & Harrison Smith, 1930, p. 24.

THE INTEGRATION OF BEHAVIOR. Volume II. The Integrative Process in Dreams. By Thomas M. French, M.D. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954. 367 pp.

In Basic Postulates,[1] the first of a projected five volume series, Dr. French sketched his hypothesis that there is an 'integrative process in terms of which all kinds of behavior, rational as well as irrational, should be understood as variations'. Now, in his second volume, he attempts to demonstrate the operation of this hypothesis in dreams.

Addressing himself in the beginning to the psychoanalytically unsophisticated reader, he explains that dreams have since ancient times been regarded with superstitious awe as illogical and mysterious, and that Freud found out a few things about them; but that not until now is the full mystery to be resolved and the basic logic of the dream demonstrated. The new approach, he indicates, is eclectic, drawing upon gestalt and field psychology as well as psychoanalysis.

Different interpretations are sometimes made of the same dream by different psychoanalysts. Dr. French explains that these ' *"over-determined" meanings of a dream* seem often to have only accidental relations to one another; but when we study them carefully, we find that they *fit together into a close-knit logical structure.* We shall call this logical structure the "cognitive structure" of the dream' (p. 3). The cognitive structure is the result of 'dream organization', consisting of 'successive reorganizations' of 'cognitive patterns'. Many examples of the method of finding these cognitive patterns are presented, too lengthy to reproduce here, and too involved to summarize. The method makes limited use of the 'inarticulate' patient's admittedly 'meager' associations and liberal use of the very articulate author's abundant associations. As a result, interpretation of metaphor and allegory is at a minimum, and there is heavy reliance on symbols, intuition, and 'common sense'. (Analysts use more common sense than they realize but apparently not enough, according to Dr. French.) The author bases his speculations on second-hand incomplete data, using the clinical notes of a colleague who treated a forty-five-year-old impotent

[1] Reviewed by Jacob A. Arlow. This QUARTERLY, XXII, 1953, pp. 268-271.

asthmatic patient with irregular frequency, never oftener than three times a week.

The book offers no basis for sweeping revisions of time-tested theories or for creation of new ones. It is in fact difficult to understand why Dr. French has thought such revision necessary. Throughout the book we find a puzzled and puzzling preoccupation with 'tangled' associations and with the 'apparent senselessness' of displacements and condensations—as if the method in this madness had never been shown. It is stated that Freud believes that 'the dream work . . . disregards the sense of the latent dream thoughts and displaces energy along any available associative pathway' (p. 181). It seems that Dr. French disregards the sense of Freud's thought. Is not Freud clear and correct when he explains that the logical connection of various dream thoughts is expressed by combining the whole material into a single situation? Are the concepts of 'censorship' and 'regression' (not discussed in the book) not helpful here? Apparently not, for Dr. French says further, 'We attribute our better-organized picture of the dream work to the fact that, instead of tracing chains of associations, we attempt to follow the modifications in the dreamer's practical grasp of his conflict. We suspect that the seeming chaos of the primary process is in part an artifact, resulting from the study of associations rather than total situations in the dream work' (p. 11).

Well, we have our suspicions too. We suspect that the seeming logic of the 'integrative process' is an artifact, resulting from the study of 'total situations' rather than associations. We suspect that the error is based upon more than the seeming neglect to study the careful work on dreams that has gone before. We suspect that it is also based upon neglect to study patients carefully. That Dr. French finds this patient's productions typical means either that all his patients are of a similar type or that they all respond to a similar type of treatment in a similar way, by mobilization of resistances. Neither possibility provides adequate foundation for such general formulations as his. It is to be noted that this patient's productions are characterized by few associations (and not very 'free' ones), with little conscious fantasy, and by the coherent, *'petit roman'* type of dream showing a high degree of secondary elaboration (not mentioned in the book). This secondary elaboration is, of course, employed to make the manifest content of the dream

appear 'logical'. As Freud pointed out, it is as if the dream had already been interpreted once.

This book suffers from a crucial omission: the whole of psychoanalytic ego psychology and characterology. This omission permits the author to draw the conclusion that 'the constellations of fantasy patterns underlying this patient's dreams are all parts of a single intercommunicating system' (p. 329), without realization of their full significance. Actually, this case only proves once again the difficulties inherent in treatment of patients with 'borderline' conditions and character disorders. That this patient's resistances were not worked through occasions no surprise, considering the degree of his illness and the cavalier approach to treatment of it.

RICHARD BURNETT (NEW YORK)

PSYCHANALYSE DE L'ARTISTE ET DE SON OEUVRE (Psychoanalysis of the Artist and His Work). By Dr. N. N. Dracoulidès. Geneva: Collection Action et Pensée aux Editions du Mont-Blanc, 1952. 232 pp.

Dr. Dracoulidès, a Greek psychoanalyst educated in France, discusses not only the creative expression of individual artists but also modern literary, æsthetic, and philosophic movements. He undertakes to interpret the unconscious motivations of Symbolism, Cubism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Existentialism, and other similar movements. He quotes at length from both analytic and nonanalytic sources concerning the creative process and the lives of the artists.

Those with analytic training or background will find the author's interpretations of artistic motivation too simple to be satisfactory, while artists, critics of æsthetics, and the general public will be irritated by his prejudiced and narrow judgments of all modern artistic developments. Consider for instance Dr. Dracoulidès's estimate of Existentialism: 'The two pivotal, though mutually contradictory, tenets of Existentialism are absolute freedom and absolute responsibility; these, we may be sure, represent in psychoanalytic terms the œdipal revolt against the father'.

Dr. Dracoulidès writes in no uncertain terms of the effect of analysis upon the creative expression of the artist: 'The poet or novelist who after submitting to a therapeutic analysis continued to produce subjective works of real artistic value would thereby

prove that his analysis either had been incomplete or had failed. Happiness . . . and, generally speaking, inner peace are incompatible with artistic creation.' In the early days of psychoanalysis, such a sweeping statement about the destruction of an artist's creative powers by analysis was not unusual. But this is no longer the opinion of many prominent psychoanalysts in the United States, for a number of their patients have been among the leading writers, painters, dramatists, composers and virtuosi of this country. Analysis of these artists has not, it seems, tended to destroy, but rather to liberate their creative powers.

The author is ready to admit the usefulness of artistic expression in education and therapy of children. He also recognizes the value of drawing for psychoanalytic diagnosis and therapy of adults. He reproduces several symbolic designs made by his own patients; these are so interesting that one regrets his failure to give any complete reports on his method of combining the use of spontaneous art with analytic treatment.

Repeated generalizations about the nature of the artist and the motivation of his creative expression are oversimplifications. For example, 'Artistic talent cannot be fully developed without contributions from emotional disturbances (conflicts, complexes, fixations, and traumas) primarily sexual in nature and from privations in the artist's life. . . . A large part of artistic creation originates in the œdipus complex and in the fear of punishment and sense of guilt to which it gives rise.'

Dr. Dracoulidès discusses the life and work of innumerable artists and writers, including da Vinci, Dostoievski, Apollinaire, Picasso, Stravinsky, and Sartre. He is satisfied to interpret Ibsen's plays as deriving their meaning from their author's unhappy and unloved childhood; by transferring the hostility he felt toward his parents onto society Ibsen developed all the themes of his plays. As to Proust, Dracoulidès quotes as acceptable the interpretation by a French critic, Rivane, that Proust's style was due to his asthmatic condition. The inadequacy of so superficial a judgment of the work of so important and original a writer recalls, by contrast, the brilliant study by Felix Deutsch of another writer, Charles Kingsley, who was also afflicted with a respiratory neurosis.[1] Proust's life and

[1] Deutsch, Felix: *Artistic Expression and Neurotic Illness: Respiratory Neurosis of Charles Kingsley*. American Imago, IV, 1947, pp. 3-41.

work would lend themselves to a more profound analytic study.

After several chapters on the function of art in the twentieth century, Dr. Dracoulidès concludes that much modern art is completely decadent. 'It seems to us that Symbolism, Impressionism, Futurism, Expressionism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Existentialism, Suprematism, Letterism, Abstractism . . . are steps in a symbolic stairway which the man of our century must descend to the very bottom if he is to be able to ascend once more with a firmer and more hopeful stride. . . .

'In art this descent has been accompanied by the successive abolition of every quality it had possessed—its rationality, its intellectual, affective, and æsthetic qualities, its morality, its formal element, its beauty, its external reality. Among the smoking ruins of that destruction survive only a few primal elements: colors, sounds, words, all totally lacking in coherence and orderliness.'

Such indiscriminate condemnation of recent art and literature leaves the reader with little regard for the objectivity of the author's critical estimate of modern art and artists. This volume illustrates how a superficial application of psychoanalysis to the life and work of many outstanding writers and artists may lead to analytic clichés without achieving added insight into the unique significance of some of the great creators of the past and present.

MARGARET NAUMBURG (NEW YORK)

THE SIX SCHIZOPHRENIAS. Reaction Patterns in Children and Adults. By Samuel J. Beck, Ph.D. Introduction by Roy Grinker, M.D. and a chapter on Q methodology by Professor William Stephenson. New York: American Orthopsychiatric Association, 1954. 237 pp.

The reviewer's initial prejudice caused by the numerous tabulations and statistical tables in this book was quickly overcome. This research by a team of co-workers is an important contribution to the puzzling problems of schizophrenia.

The analysis of a sizable series of Rorschach records of adults and children was made to establish criteria for a group of normals of various ages. Subsequently the analysis of the clinical histories and the Rorschach tests of known schizophrenics was followed by

correlations between the psychological and psychiatric data. The investigators then analyzed according to their results psychoanalytic concepts and correlated them with the structure of the environment.

The Stephenson Q technique was utilized for the sorting of the clinical and Rorschach data in each case. 'The result was a delineation of six types of schizophrenia, two of these occurring only in children as impermanent or intransitive states. Two represent advanced stages with marked intellectual disruption and little fantasy; these individuals do not recover. Three are identified only by the Rorschach test and cannot be discriminated clinically. The six schizophrenias are six different kinds of solution, maladjustment adopted by some humans under certain life conditions.'

It is gratifying to follow the progress of the research and the clarification of concepts achieved by the workers. Analytic ego psychology proved its usefulness in the analysis of the ego functions and defenses. The objects of psychological scrutiny were attention, perception, and thinking, which can also be viewed clinically from the point of view of ego losses, manifest either as simple reduction of function or as actual retreat to earlier ways of perceiving and thinking.

One clinical type, called S-1, may exemplify this classification. This type is characterized by pathogenic defenses, disrupted intellectual functioning, and little fantasy; these patients are absorbed in themselves and try to make restitution in their efforts at social adaptation. The two childhood forms are described as 'eggs of schizophrenia', that is, schizophrenia in statu nascendi. Their recognition is of prime importance in establishing therapeutic measures.

Study of the actual course of the schizophrenic children over the years, taking into account longitudinal observation by the psychiatrist and the social worker and repeated Rorschach tests, shows that all the children retain a schizophrenic structure. The authors come to the not entirely surprising conclusion that schizophrenia is a permanent character structure. Yet the fact remains that this character structure does not necessarily lead to manifest psychosis.

Analysis and computation of data show that certain traits found often in schizophrenics cannot be considered as characteristic. They

are called nondiscriminatory and therefore clinically not significant. They include fantasies of oral reunion, mechanisms of 'undoing', fantasies of world destruction, and inappropriateness of gestures.

Analysis of environmental factors suggests that 'parental attitudes too unmistakably influence the decision as to whether the course is to be schizophrenia or not schizophrenia'.

Correlation of clinical and psychological data with the patients' life histories leads to the important conclusion that 'no one is schizophrenic all the time, nor (with the exception of the small percent of end-stage hospital patients) is anyone all schizophrenic at any time. . . . The question is always one of how much.' Proper evaluation of healthy residues of personality ought to form a basis for a therapeutic technique which will activate these residues and bring improvement.

This is an attempt to study the individual with statistical methods. The authors proudly claim: 'To the extent of our success the method lays the ghost of the dictum that the human personality is unapproachable by scientific method'. This conclusion sounds less revealing to the psychoanalyst than to representatives of other scientific disciplines.

Incidentally, the distinction between the nomothetic and the idiographic disciplines, a point stressed by the authors, was made by Windelband. To one who takes pride in being a former student at Heidelberg of this distinguished German philosopher, it is shocking to see him referred to as Windeldrand.

GUSTAV BYCHOWSKI (NEW YORK)

MATERNAL DEPENDENCY AND SCHIZOPHRENIA. By Joseph Abrahams, M.D. and Edith Varon. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1953. 240 pp.

The authors describe relationships among a group of young hospitalized schizophrenic women and their mothers who visited the patients periodically. Very little preliminary history was taken from either patients or mothers, for the investigators were more concerned with changes in the present relationships of mothers and daughters than with their influence upon each other in the past.

Group therapy prepared mothers and daughters for subsequent individual therapy.

It would be tangential to review this book as a contribution to the phenomenology of schizophrenia or the techniques and problems of group therapy. The creation of new methods of research is in itself scientifically important. Truly great knowledge is frequently derived from courageous, imaginative methods of observation. Unfortunately Abrahams and Varon have felt compelled to arrive at specific conclusions, perhaps because of the common notion that conclusions are primary in research and that methods of study are ancillary. The validity of these conclusions may be challenged by many readers. For instance, the observation that 'the mothers were apparently all deeply obsessive characters' may be questioned. 'In the group each related to her daughter to a great extent as an alter ego who, when she conformed to mother's extremely rigid unrealistic and idealized image of herself, was given tenderness and understanding.' This observation is not a defensible generalization. Previous investigators have studied intensively the mothers of schizophrenic daughters; these mothers certainly are not all deeply obsessive characters.

But to debate such issues is less important than to realize that if we are ever to achieve an understanding of causes of schizophrenia we must evolve new methods of observing transactions and communications between persons. These authors travel a rational road. They may have missed some signs along the highway, and the method of study they employ is of a sort that demands the resolution of many emotional problems in the observers. But they have had the courage and freshness of vision to begin an arduous journey.

Concerning the etiology of schizophrenia, the 'evidence pointed toward the importance of nurture . . . as the nurture changed, the nature seemed to change'. However, 'this would not remove from consideration the possibility that the daughters were significantly different from most girls from early age. It merely pointed to the fact that there were psychological factors of a reversible nature.' The authors provide no data to indicate why one child became ill and the other siblings escaped.

The mutual dependency between mother and daughter was striking. The dependence of the mothers on the sickness of the

daughters is certainly demonstrated clearly. This condition is not peculiar to schizophrenia; it has been shown repeatedly that neurotic adults may become severely ill if a marital partner or child improves. The account of the dependence of the mothers on the sickness or health of the daughters is supplemented with excellent, rather detailed observations of just how this hostile interdependence is communicated between the two participants.

If we look to this book to teach us a new method of study rather than to demonstrate conclusions from the present phase of the study, we shall find it most rewarding.

ADELAIDE M. JOHNSON (ROCHESTER, MINNESOTA)

CHILD PSYCHOLOGY. By Arthur T. Jersild, Ph.D. Fourth Edition. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954. 676 pp.

This fourth edition of a well-known introductory textbook by the Professor of Education at Teachers College, Columbia University, is distinctly better than the bulk of collegiate books on child psychology. Its style is simple, generally lucid, and it is relatively uncluttered by the turgid hedging, graphs, tables, and footnotes which so often parade as scientific writing. Jersild's approach is dynamic and eclectic; he has been increasingly influenced by psychoanalysis in spite of the lacunæ in his reading of recent contributions. Particularly to be noted is the omission from the bibliography of E. H. Erikson's Childhood and Society.

It would be captious to list all the points with which the psychoanalytic reader may take issue, but certain major deficiencies should be discussed especially because of the book's deserved popularity and the likelihood of a fifth edition. Jersild leans heavily on the writers who are heroically reconstructing psychoanalysis with the aim of eliminating the unconscious. His own ambivalence about unconscious psychic processes is revealed by his invariable use of the term unconscious in quotation marks—he is too forthright to use clumsy circumlocutions—and without using the term he frequently presents material which any psychoanalyst would regard as nicely exemplifying unconscious forces in operation. In fact a good deal of his laudable emphasis on interaction of total personalities and on the child's development of the concept of self lacks substance because the role of unconscious communication is not

spelled out. For example, if we agree in considering the subject of weaning that the mother's technique is not as important as her fundamental attitudes toward the child, how are these attitudes communicated, especially when the most destructive are unacceptable to the mother's consciousness? How much more demonstration is required to prove that overindulgence frequently masks unconscious hatred for the child? That Jersild is actually aware of unconscious activity can hardly be questioned judging from the following statement in the chapter entitled Emotional Development: 'From an early age emotion is driven underground. The child learns to disguise its feelings or to hide them, or to express them in devious ways.'

More confusing to the unsophisticated student, however, is Jersild's explicit and implied reiteration of certain clichés. Repeatedly he alludes to 'freudian' theory as though, emanating from Freud's brain, it provided some 'brilliant insights' but proved to be too narrowly limited to drives and did not take into account the parent-child relationship in its totality. The broadening is ostensibly being effected by nonfreudians who do research before they express an opinion. As if in illustration of this statement, the research of such workers as René Spitz and Margaret Fries is referred to approvingly, without any mention of their 'freudian' allegiance. We should not be too harsh with Jersild for his limited knowledge of the history of psychoanalysis and its continuing development in practice, research, and theory, inasmuch as this ignorance is shared to a greater degree by many writers who have had the benefit of psychoanalytic training. Jersild demonstrates frequently a sound awareness of important psychoanalytic principles even if he does not always know their origin. This is particularly evident in his last chapter, Personality Problems and the Search for Self. Much of the confusion over psychoanalysis could be eliminated in the fifth edition, at no risk to the author's eclecticism or independence of opinion, if the subject were presented systematically rather than in scattered fragments.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, NEW YORK)

YOUR CHILD AND HIS PROBLEMS. A Basic Guide for Parents. By Joseph D. Teicher, M.D. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1953. 302 pp.

This little book is good. It is easy to imagine that many will be inclined to find fault with it. They may find it 'not specific enough', not practical enough,—this despite the fact that the book covers the whole range of problems from early difficulties in feeding the baby through all stages of development of the child and the adolescent, through difficulties with and within the family: discord, divorce, sickness, truancy, speech difficulties and delinquency. Perhaps it is this very wide coverage that imparts to the book a certain summariness and a certain diffuseness. One cannot speak with depth and in detail about so many topics in so short a span.

Yet this book has considerable quality. It is written with quiet simplicity and unassuming directness of language. It does not pontificate, it promises nothing; it does not 'lecture' anyone. It just states a number of problems and describes them briefly, avoiding the pomposity of terminological profuseness. In other words, this book seems to be addressed to simple people, and it talks to them simply. Dr. Teicher assigned himself just this task, and he has fulfilled it very well indeed. There are many books on the same subject, many 'manuals' for young, middle-aged, and aging mothers, young mothers-in-law, and others. Among the mass of these books, Teicher's first work will not be lost. It is obviously the work of a psychoanalyst who wrote his piece not to 'drum up' (again and again) child guidance according to freudian principles, but rather to set down a few points to be thought over, quietly worked over, and humanely resolved in some practical but not too utilitarian manner. The average psychoanalyst will not find anything new in this book, but the average mother will find a number of things worth learning.

G. Z.

PSYCHOSOMATIC CASE BOOK. By Roy R. Grinker, M.D. and Fred P. Robbins, M.D. New York: The Blakiston Co., Inc., 1954. 346 pp.

The authors attempt to show how the theory of 'psychosomatic' illness can clarify our understanding of certain relationships in

disease. They discuss basic concepts and diagnosis, describe specific syndromes, and outline methods of therapy. Seventy-nine cases are presented, not to give understanding of somatic processes, but in order to 'demonstrate how psychiatric concepts and methods add to the understanding and management of illness'. These illustrative cases provide valuable suggestions for securing illuminating histories. Some of the techniques of treatment should be valuable both to beginners and to more experienced therapists. But this is more than a mere 'case book'.

Dr. Grinker has repeatedly sought to make psychosomatic theory more scientific and scholarly. He has long recognized how unreliable, unscientific, and muddled are the 'profile studies' of many students. He and Dr. Robbins apply to psychosomatic science the 'field theory', a dynamic scheme for the study of organization of parts and wholes. This organization, although constantly in the process of change, has a stability in its 'part-whole relationships'. 'The psychosomatic field becomes, according to the theory, a continuum in which there is a tendency through transactions to maintain equilibrium, orderliness or a steady state.' The field theory offers a well-integrated picture of intrapsychic events, in refreshing contrast to classical analytic concepts which represent intrapsychic events as if they were isolated occurrences. The field theory pictures all the factors influencing the organism as continuously in operation, rather than as delimited and mutually exclusive forces.

The authors' concept of disease seems to the reviewer to resemble the thinking in Adolf Meyer's psychobiology. Meyer never fully accepted the dynamic unconscious of psychoanalytic theory; but fortunately he also could not accept the theory that man is beset by isolated conflicts, such as the conflict between life and death instincts. He insisted upon a dynamic continuum as did Sullivan and as do the present authors. They have redirected our attention to the integration expounded by Meyer and they have discussed in detail the important problem of achieving a more orderly scientific approach.

Their book suffers from the unevenness common in collaborative writing. Unless it is read thoughtfully, the same students who

complained of obscurity in Meyer's 'psychobiologic approach' will similarly complain of the 'field theory approach' as presented by Grinker and Robbins. It nevertheless will repay careful study.

ADELAIDE M. JOHNSON (ROCHESTER, MINNESOTA)

ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Karl Mannheim. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. 319 pp.

ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY. By Talcott Parsons. Revised Edition. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1954. 459 pp.

These two collections of essays will be helpful to readers who desire a general understanding of the recent development of sociological thinking. Those by Karl Mannheim were edited after the author's death in 1947. The essays by Talcott Parsons originate from a period between the publication of his Structure of Social Action (1937) and a number of his comprehensive works published in 1951 and 1953. Readers whose knowledge of sociology is derived from American studies will find a basically different approach in the papers collected here. Mannheim was a European scholar, and Parsons's scientific roots lie in the work of three great European sociologists, Vilfredo Pareto, Emile Durkheim, and Max Weber.

Some discussion of the relationship between sociology and psychoanalysis is to be found in both volumes. Mannheim in his essay On War-Conditioned Changes in Our Psychic Economy endeavors 'to work out those methods of investigation on the basis of which psychologists and sociologists could work together' (p. 243). His suggestions emphasize that the goal is 'to ascertain the mutual relationships between individual mechanisms and the social mechanisms impinging upon them' (p. 249). Parsons discusses the relationship between psychoanalysis and sociology in Psychoanalysis and the Social Structure, a paper read at the 1950 meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association. He points out that psychoanalysts and sociologists are both concerned with social action; but whereas the psychoanalyst is concerned with the individual personality as a system, the sociologist deals with the social system and its structure. That structure is defined as 'a system of pattern expectations of the behavior of individuals who occupy particular statuses in the social system'. This system is identical with what is called by

sociologists 'a system of roles'. The psychoanalyst tries to understand why and how the individual functions the way he does. The sociologist's interest is not the behavior of individuals but the behavior of persons in certain roles within a social system, such as husband, wife, child, employee, or leader.

Psychoanalysts will probably disagree with Mannheim and Parsons on many points,—for instance, with Parsons's generalization that in boys there is a 'tendency to feminine identification, inherent in the especially intense relation to the mother and the remoteness of the father' (pp. 344-345). But no differences of opinion on details should substantially reduce the value of the important discussions of method presented in these two volumes, particularly in Parsons's essays on The Professions and Social Structure or The Prospects of Sociological Theory. The psychoanalyst will find many parallels between problems of method in sociology and those in psychoanalysis.

FRITZ SCHMIDL (SEATTLE)

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ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XXXIV, 1953.

Understanding the Paradox of Japanese Psychoanalysis. James Clark Moloney. Pp. 291-303.

It is surprising that Westerners have shown so little interest in Japanese psychoanalysis; more surprising that psychoanalysis should exist in so authoritarian a country. The Japanese child's status in the family and in society is determined at birth; the extent to which it remains obedient to its allotted position determines its personal security.

A Japanese psychiatrist writes of a Japanese psychoanalyst: '[He] seems bravely to lead patients "individualistically" and seems sometimes to cause trouble among their families'. Kosawa, the psychoanalyst, quotes a Japanese patient who, as he approached the successful conclusion of his treatment (by Japanese standards), said: 'During my vacation my mother told me on one occasion that I was now pleasing my father better again'. Kosawa says: 'His psychic state is now as harmonious a one as can ever be reached by human beings'.

Between 1932 and 1945, sixty thousand people in Japan were arrested for 'improper thoughts'. It could hardly be possible for analysts or their patients to survive under such a regime if analysis were practiced according to occidental standards. Examination of The Tokyo Journal of Psychoanalysis suggests that such standards do not exist for Japanese psychoanalysis.

In a typical contribution Kenji Ohtski, editor of the Journal and director of the Tokyo Institute for Psychoanalysis, concludes that the Japanese people are childish, untidy, and fickle. These, Ohtski says, are weaknesses of character; but if we examine carefully the meaning of these qualities, we find that they are qualities of open-mindedness or individualism. Elsewhere Ohtski writes, 'The racial characteristics of the Orientals are "id-ic" and feminine as compared with those of the Occidentals, which are "ego-ic" and masculine. . . . Among the Orientals . . . the Japanese are relatively strong in ego and not so regressive as the Chinese. . . . But the death instinct of the Japanese is crudely aggressive and not extensively sublimated into intellectual ability. This can be explained in various ways; it is probably partially due to the natural effect of the peculiar family system of the Japanese.' Such statements are understandable only if it is assumed that psychoanalysis is 'processed' to conform to Japanese psychology, culture, and tradition.

Many Japanese leaders have warned against the dangers of foreign influence on the Japanese: '. . . if foreign ways are copied without due thought . . . the great principle binding the sovereign and his subject . . . will in course of time be forgotten'; consequently a 'National Entity of Japan' program was instituted for their intelligent assimilation. A system so foreign to the 'National

Entity' as Western psychoanalysis—stressing as it does the importance of individualism—must be drastically revised to render it suitable to Japanese requirements. The Japanese equate psychoanalysis with the Nirvana principle. Since Nirvana means the 'extinction of individualism', Japanese psychoanalysis must come to mean the same thing.

Japanese psychoanalysts, as do all psychoanalysts, must endeavor to adapt a patient to his environment; hence, while espousing Western psychoanalysis Japanese psychoanalysts preach one doctrine and follow quite another.

The Japanese nation is expected to behave as an entity which is analogous to the occidental concept of the individual; thus it is reasonable to the Japanese that psychoanalysis can be syncretized with the Japanese 'National Entity'. The Japanese identify the superego with the unlimited power and person of the Emperor. The conscious ego becomes synonymous with an awareness of the cardinal principles of the 'National Entity'.

AUTHOR'S ABSTRACT

Defensive Aspects of Orality. Lawrence J. Friedman. Pp. 304-312.

The œdipus complex frequently utilizes distorted manifestations of preœdipal phases for defensive purposes. This paper is particularly concerned with characteristic uses of preœdipal orality for this purpose. Psychoanalysts tend to emphasize that pregenital points of fixation, particularly oral ones, determine œdipal patterns, but they neglect the reverse phenomenon. Clinical evidence shows that many symptoms apparently of oral origin are regressive attempts to ward off castration anxiety aroused by activities that have the unconscious meaning of competing for the role of the parent of the same sex. The author quotes Niederland to suggest that Schreber developed his delusional system after succumbing to passive feminine fantasies which are to be understood as a reaction to the unbearable assumption, prior to each outbreak, of an active masculine role in life. The author found similar mechanisms in a male 'borderline' schizophrenic, a young woman with predominantly depressive symptoms, and a male homosexual.

When pregenital and genital drives become mingled in this way, the pregenital drive becomes invested with genital meaning; because this genital meaning arouses castration anxiety, the pregenital drive cannot now be sublimated. Failures and inhibitions of sublimation, and other sorts of inhibition too, occur in this way.

The paper is a useful reminder of an important mechanism and adds some interesting material on symptom-formation in terms of this defense. The author points out that the œdipus complex is not the only problem that we deal with in psychoanalysis. One feels the need, after reading this interesting paper, of an inquiry into the special structural, genetic, and especially economic conditions that facilitate such a regressive defense.

VICTOR H. ROSEN

A Contribution to the Problem of Countertransference. Heinrich Racker. Pp. 313-324.

This paper is based on a lecture delivered before the Argentine Psychoanalytic Association in 1948. In his footnotes the author includes references to papers on countertransference that have appeared since his original lecture. He delineates what he calls the 'countertransference neurosis', the neurotic part of the countertransference which he considers to be universally present though with qualitative and quantitative differences in analysts of varying experience. The analyst has a profound resistance to the recognition of his countertransference though he may have considerable theoretical knowledge of it.

Countertransference is centered in the œdipus complex. (The author limits his study to male analysts.) Prohibition of active phallic impulses favors a passive phallic reaction and the unconscious desire that the female patient fall in love with the analyst's penis. If this desire is frustrated, the analyst rejects and hates the patient. The erotic desire for the mother may also cause the analyst to wish that the patient establish no new relationships outside of the transference. The analyst rationalizes this wish by the rule of abstinence and by warning the patient of the importance of avoiding acting out. With a male patient a negative œdipal countertransference is more usual. The analyst desires to be loved by the patient, to be possessed anally by the father. The analyst reacts to the patient's sexual life as to a primal scene and feels rejected and excluded, with reactions of envy, irritation, inferiority, anxiety, and guilt.

The patient may serve as a direct object for the expression of the analyst's needs through countertransference. The patient may also be used indirectly as an instrument for acting out by the analyst in relation to his professional activities. The profession of psychoanalysis has in itself an œdipal significance. The role of the control analyst or didactic analyst as an archaic superego is discussed. Therapeutic zeal may represent the wish to please the control analyst, the superego. Fear of criticism by an older analyst, or exhibitionistic impulses, may similarly affect the analytic work.

The author describes countertransferential prephallic manifestations, reporting a case in which the analyst acted out with the patient his own oral needs by giving to the patient. He discusses the danger of masochistic submission in the analyst, and describes certain countertransferential reactions to resistance in the patient that are in part supported by infantile frustrations in the analyst. ' . . . The two children—the one inside the analyst and the one inside the patient—should not come to blows.'

Countertransference is a tool in the analytic work, and the author suggests the importance of emphasizing problems of countertransference in psychoanalytic training.

DAVID BERES

The Lure of the Forbidden. Emilio Servadio. Pp. 325-327.

For persons attracted by the forbidden, 'dangerous' actions are accompanied by a specific feeling which cannot be traced simply to realistic fear of punish-

ment. This is a feeling of intoxicating pleasure mixed with anxiety, and does not result in gratification without tension. Residual dissatisfaction spurs such persons to repeat the action. At the root of such behavior is more than the simple need to compensate actively for the loss of infantile omnipotence. He who is subject to the lure of the forbidden is striving '1, to overcome his inferiority feelings, regularly bound up with internal insecurity caused by the superego; 2, to train his aggression against the superego, or a representative of it, whether real or imaginary; 3, to obtain a libidinal outlet by erotizing his anxiety'. The last point is of great importance for distinguishing compulsive defiance of 'the forbidden' from those types of masochistic behavior dominated by an almost pure need for punishment. 'Basically, he who performs an action because it is forbidden wants to prove to himself that he can defy some possible inner retaliation, and find pleasure in a situation of danger.' But such an individual wants two opposing things at the same time, and is unable to tolerate either: he can 'endure neither the temporary triumph of the id, nor the domination of the superego'. The lure of the forbidden is thus like the fascination of gambling to the gambler who can endure neither losing nor winning. Since no satisfactory solution can be achieved, the behavior becomes cyclic.

JULE EISENBUD

The Psychoanalytic Review. XLI, 1954.

Some Notes on a Forgotten Religion. Thomas Freeman. Pp. 9-27.

Of the several religions vying with Christianity at the beginning of our era, Mithraism was the most important. The unifying influence of the Roman Empire made a single universal religion possible. The mass movements of soldiers, slaves, and merchants through the Empire provided the physical means for the spread of this religion from Asia Minor into Europe. Once introduced, about the middle of the first century, it became disseminated with remarkable rapidity in the western world, especially where a military influence predominated.

'Mithraism exalted the manly virtues as best exemplified in military life.' Mithra himself embodied all the qualities desired by the little boy; he even assisted at his own birth, procreating himself with his mother, excluding the father. The killing of the bull, a constant element in the portrayals of Mithra's exploits, depicted the castration of the father, evidenced also in other ways. But the anxiety over the fear of being castrated led to renunciation of heterosexuality, the exclusion of all women from the religion, and an increasing trend toward homosexuality.

Mithraism eradicated the incestuous wish for the mother, and neutralized the fear of castration. It gave the common man, the poverty stricken masses of the later periods of the Roman Empire, some ethical and moral guidance, and held out hope for a life beyond the grave. It differed from Christianity in demanding less renunciation of aggressiveness, and it did not insist on 'brotherly love'. Because of its strikingly stabilizing influence on the army, it was actively fostered by numerous leaders.

With the weakening and ultimate decay of the Empire, beginning about the fourth century, the feeling of being punished for sin and the increased sense of guilt drew vast numbers to the Christian religion which satisfied that feeling of guilt. Various rituals of Mithraism, such as baptism and the sacrament, made the transition relatively easy. 'Mithraism lost the struggle with Christianity not only because of the exclusion of women, but primarily because of its inability to satisfy the strong guilt feelings which swept over the Roman world in the first century after Christ.'

Some Atypical Forms of Impotence and Frigidity. Edmund Bergler. Pp. 29-47.

Bergler discusses some special cases of the unconscious misuse of genital sexuality for the expression of infantile repressed aims. One patient became impotent when his wife finally and reluctantly consented to becoming pregnant at his insistence on having a second child. The impotence was intended to prevent him from having that second child, which was desired in order to cause deprivation to the first child, as the patient himself, a first child, had been deprived by his younger sibling. The patient wanted to repeat actively what had happened to him passively. His aggression was a boomerang, with libidinization of guilt (masochism). The erectile failure of another patient was due to his identification of his penis with his sister's admired breast: in imitating her breast, he trained himself to have no erection.

A man who married a semiprostitute 'to rescue her' became completely impotent with her. His marriage constituted a 'magic gesture', a reproach against his parents for their divorce which left him an 'orphan'; and the impotence symbolized the parental incompatibility, at the same time that it punished him for his reproach of them for their divorce. Other unusual cases are described.

Psychoanalytic Study of the Minor Prophet, Jonah. Hyman H. Fingert. Pp. 55-65.

The Book of Jonah, unlike other parts of Biblical lore, appears to be the product of a single mind, according to various Biblical scholars. Psychoanalytic study corroborates this, and suggests that it is a story of a man's internal conflict, with regression, depression, and ultimate reintegration and strengthening of the ego. The Lord's command that Jonah warn Nineveh of threatened punishment for its wickedness is interpreted as anger against the mother. In flight from this conflict, Jonah seeks refuge in a ship bound elsewhere (mother symbol) but is thrown into the sea (union with mother) and swallowed by a whale (return to the womb). After oral rebirth he makes his peace with father (the Lord saves him by commanding the whale to vomit Jonah up onto dry land). The saving of Nineveh represents the renunciation of his wishes for mother and for her destruction. Suicidal impulses nevertheless appear. Jonah is a depressed and desolate man who has suffered a great loss, by inference the death of his wife. Recognition of the irrational nature of childhood wishes

and impulses paves the way for recovery. Analogies to Twenty Thousand Leagues Under the Sea and other literature are drawn.

JOSEPH LANDER

American Journal of Psychiatry. CX, 1954.

Countertransference in Freud's Rejection of Hypnosis. Jerome M. Schneck. Pp. 928-931.

Schneck, reviewing Freud's autobiographical writings, concludes that the transition from hypnosis to analysis was chiefly induced by problems of countertransference. Such later developments in analytic technique as emphasis on the uncovering of resistances would, he believes, have emerged through the continued use of hypnosis.

MARK KANZER

Psychiatric Quarterly. XXVIII, 1954.

The Phonetic-Associative Element in Thought Development and in Thought Imagination in the Dream. Marten N. Damstra. Pp. 24-56.

Visual representation is characteristic of the dream and is a primitive form of thinking. Concepts which do not lend themselves to visual representation are forced by the dream process into visual form.

The author seeks to demonstrate that the images in the dream, like figures in heraldry, are chosen unconsciously for their phonetic associations. In heraldry, for example, an owl (French: *duc*) represents the name Duke. The Dutch name Hart can be represented by a heart (Dutch: *hart*) or by a deer (Dutch: *hert*). In dreams a similar device is used.

Condensation in the dream results from the necessity for phonetic association. Unreal combinations are attempts to correct imperfect phonetic associations. The dream censor is identical with the moral critic of consciousness and is responsible for the substitution of images of a harmless character for sexual organs and their functions. The dream is an autonomous dynamic expression of human activity, not merely a wish fulfilment. The task of the psychotherapist is not the search for dynamically represented latent content but the exploration of the thoughts that are reproduced by the primitive visual mechanisms, which use phonetically associated elements rather than affectively associated ones.

This ill-written demonstration that phonetic association is the basic ingredient of the dream is a poor challenge to the supremacy of The Interpretation of Dreams.

Instinct of Self-Preservation and Neurosis. Siegfried Fischer. Pp. 253-263.

Fischer discusses three cases according to Adler's theory that all neuroses are due to feelings of inferiority caused by parental rejection.

The œdipus complex he explains as follows. 'The desire of a son for his mother is not necessarily primarily sexual; it may not be sexual at all. The son needs his mother, first of all, in order to feel secure and valuable. The same is true of many neurotic patients. Such neurotic men want to have their mothers, so that they may feel safe and valuable through their mother's protection, love and approval. It is true that in some cases a neurotic person wants to have sex relations with his mother. The deeper analysis, however, shows that it is not primarily the gratification of a sex desire that these neurotics anticipate, but the feeling of being accepted entirely.' Throughout his paper, Fischer confuses œdipal and preœdipal drives and fails to understand the role of libido in the genesis of neurosis.

He believes that patients can be helped by applying Adler's theory without emphasizing sexual problems. One wonders why he considers this an advantage.

Hostility and Psychotic Symptoms. Felix Cohen. Pp. 264-278.

The author purposes to present evidence that symptoms in schizophrenia are an attempt to internalize certain severely hostile impulses. He draws his conclusions from 'individual intensive analytically oriented psychotherapy' of six schizophrenic patients. Hostile impulses during therapy were kept latent by the psychotic symptoms. As the psychotic defenses were weakened by treatment, the hostile impulses became manifest. Cohen asks, 'Why should these schizophrenic patients have such intensely hostile feelings? What is their source and genesis?' An inquiry into the intensity and primitive quality of the schizophrenic's need for love, his sensitivity to rejection, and the weakness that renders his ego too weak to deal with his ensuing hostility, would have been enlightening for both reader and therapist.

This paper unfortunately exemplifies a tendency faced by psychoanalysis in its earliest days. The concepts of the unconscious, transference, and resistance were to be made palatable by eliminating the objectionable sexual elements.

JOSEPH BIERNOFF

American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. XXIV, 1954.

Techniques for Preventing Separation Trauma in Child Placement. Margaret W. Gerard and Rita Dukette. Discussant: Joseph C. Solomon. Pp. 111-127.

Problems of child placement are discussed in the light of psychoanalytic knowledge. A 'transition method of placement' is described which eases the difficulties involved. A gradual acquaintance with the new parents is begun even before the placement occurs. Planning includes study of the history and personality of the child, evaluation of its previous reactions to placement, and guidance for the prospective parents and the child itself during the critical period of adjustment. Other theories and practices of placement are compared.

Laughter in Psychiatric Staff Conferences: A Sociopsychiatric Analysis. Anne T. Goodrich, Jules Henry and D. Wells Goodrich. Pp. 175-184.

An analysis of the laughter of psychiatric personnel in group conferences led to the following conclusions. Most laughter of the group was determined by both the content and the form of the stimulus remark. The two forms of remark most likely to evoke laughter were disparaging remarks and those demonstrating incongruity, whereas the commonest contents involved physicians and patients. Attitudes toward the latter were disparaging; sexual themes evoked much less laughter than death. Such reactions were likely to occur under tense conditions such as during controversies, when there had been a violation of mores, or when the individual was in need of emotional support from the group.

The Ego in Adolescence. Irene Josselyn. Pp. 223-237.

The ego of the adolescent must experiment with a variety of defense mechanisms and patterns of integration. It finally achieves a compromise that gratifies the greatest number of needs within the limitations imposed by the superego—a superego that has been modified, however, by the abandonment of infantile inhibitions. The relationship to the parents passes through important phases which, if successfully managed, result in independence. Potentially neurotic conflicts are often spontaneously resolved. The ego seems to have at its disposal during this period an increased amount of energy that is probably derived, in part, from endocrine changes.

Psychotherapeutic Techniques With Adolescents. Sidney Berman. Pp. 238-245.

The use of analysis in the treatment of adolescents is fraught with many difficulties. The organization of the ego is so greatly in flux that the transference is unstable. Moreover there is a strong drive toward emancipation. Sexual conflicts at this age do not lend themselves readily to analytic control; the adolescent almost never seeks therapy of his own accord.

Nevertheless, analytic principles are valuable for devising therapeutic techniques. The therapist seeks to become an ally and exert educational influences. Because of the resistances and evasiveness, however, one interview weekly is often best. Contact between the therapist and the parents is essential, even when the parents do not wish it. Although the fantasy of the patient may sometimes be revealed and interpretations made, one must often be content with early withdrawal from treatment as soon as the adolescent is able to hold his own with other adolescents.

Delinquency and Control. Joseph J. Michaels. Pp. 258-265.

Sociologists lack a basic and accepted theory of human behavior. Psychoanalysis could supply this. For example, J. Reiss's Delinquency and the Failure of Personal and Social Controls would be more valuable if the clinician's knowledge of controls were added to the sociologist's.

MARK KANZER

Psychosomatic Medicine. XVI, 1954.

Vomiting in Pregnancy: A Psychiatric Study. William A. Harvey and Mary Jane Sherfey. Pp. 1-9.

Twenty pregnant women admitted to the hospital for vomiting in pregnancy were studied by clinical interviews and Rorschach tests. It was found that each of these patients had previously experienced gastrointestinal disturbances in response to emotional stress. Each of the patients was 'immature', was entirely frigid in her sexual life, and had become very anxious during her pregnancy.

Psychosomatic Correlations in Certain Blood Dyscrasias. Ruth B. Benedict. Pp. 41-46.

In five out of eight patients with thrombocytopenic purpura, the onset or reactivation of the disease followed a long period of psychic stress. This in several cases involved loss or threatened loss of the mother or of a substitute for the mother. In some cases of thrombocytopenic purpura, sudden increased bleeding in the active stage of the disease, or spontaneous bruising in the quiescent phase, occurred after an upsetting experience.

Two cases of familial spherocytosis were studied. In one case a crisis and in the other an episode of sharply increased hemolysis occurred after upsetting experiences. In some cases of sickle-cell anemia crises occurred after emotional upsets.

Several mechanisms that could account for some of these observations are discussed.

Psychodynamics of Peptic Ulcer Pathogenesis in Hospitalized Schizophrenic Patients. Melvin Myron Katz. Pp. 47-55.

Thirty male schizophrenic patients with peptic ulcer were compared to thirty male schizophrenic patients without peptic ulcer. The patients were studied by a battery of clinical psychological tests and consideration of their clinical histories. It was found that 'the ulcer schizophrenic generally tends to react to the threatening external world by repressing his emotional impulses, while the nonulcer schizophrenic tends to deny the external world and obey his emotional impulses'.

Diaphragmatic Flutter As a Manifestation of Hysteria. J. B. Harris, H. E. Hoff, and R. A. Wise. Pp. 56-66.

Two cases of diaphragmatic flutter are discussed. 'Evidence is offered in support of the view that in both cases the condition is of hysterical origin and, in one of the cases, probably directly associated with the patient's sexual impotence.'

Some Somatic Considerations in Addison's Disease. Robert S. Wallerstein, Richard L. Sutherland, and Joseph Lyons. Pp. 67-75.

A twenty-seven-year-old man defended himself against various stresses while in the army by developing sleepiness and fatigue. These defenses became more pronounced during the two years following his discharge. Then the tiredness and sleepiness, now accompanied by weight loss and obvious pigmentation, led to the diagnosis of Addison's disease. 'Those psychic defense mechanisms that have served as the patient's major adaptive reactions to stress seem to parallel precisely the chief symptoms of his somatic disease complex.'

JOSEPH WEISS

Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry. LXIX, 1953.

Language Behavior in Psychoneurotic Patients. Maria Lorenz and Stanley Cobb. Pp. 684-694.

Lorenz and Cobb continue their studies of the correlation between linguistic characteristics and various psychiatric syndromes. Linguistic characteristics, apart from content of speech, can convey information about habits of thought and feeling. The study of the structure of language, its grammar and syntax, is an objective means of psychiatric investigation, susceptible to quantitative methods of study. In the present study, an analysis is made of samplings of speech of ten patients with the clinical diagnosis 'psychoneurosis, hysteria', compared with ten normal controls. The samplings consist of a thousand consecutive words taken at random from a fifteen-minute recording of spontaneous speech, compared then with samplings of the spoken responses to two thematic apperception test cards.

The results show that in general there is less flexible use of language in neurotic patients than in normal controls. The neurotics prefer verbs and pronouns and use fewer substantives, adjectives, and articulatory words. Their verb-adjective quotient, considered to be a measurement of anxiety, is found to be high. The constriction in the spontaneous use of language goes with a narrowing of interests and preoccupation with a specific type of mental content. Much use of the pronoun 'I' occurs, indicating egocentricity. The substitution of 'is' for 'was' indicates a greater orientation to the immediate present and a tendency to assertiveness. There is emphasis upon actions and relationships rather than upon objects, and a restriction of the flow of ideas away from a given focus. Language is used primarily as a medium for self-expression and less to provide contents for mutual consideration with others.

Psychodynamics in the Excessive Drinking of Alcohol. John W. Higgins. Pp. 713-726.

This clinical study offers a hypothesis concerning pathological drinking. Seven patients who received intensive psychotherapy are described. According to Higgins, psychoanalysis at present regards alcoholism as resulting from a se-

quence of events: threat of oral narcissistic deprivation, anxiety, drinking, elation. But Higgins believes that the anxiety allayed by drinking is specifically related not only to oral but also to sadistic, genital-sexual, and other impulses. The alcohol may diminish awareness of internal or external stress, or, by its depressant action, may facilitate the operation of a mechanism of defense.

The initial stages of alcoholism thus arise out of a variety of psychological conflicts. These conflicts continue to be the specific causes of the drinking as long as it is moderate. However as the drinking continues, the pleasure of intoxication, rather than the relief from the original anxiety, becomes the goal, and the early specific psychodynamic conflict is overshadowed by the nonspecific oral narcissistic gratifications.

Effect of Mephenesin Upon Anxiety. Stanley L. Block. Pp. 727-731.

Block administered mephenesin (myanesin, tolserol), and placebos as controls, to eleven patients with subjective and objective anxiety. Doses of 1.0 to 1.5 Gm. were given orally four times a day. The drug alone in this dosage brought no relief. Four of the patients felt worse with the drug; two had severe diarrhea and vomiting.

LEO RANGELL

Mental Hygiene. XXXVIII, 1954.

A Study of Administration of State Psychiatric Services. Raymond G. Fuller. Pp. 177-235.

A huge machinery exists for state psychiatric services, but the 'cultural lag' in their administration is enormous. Detailed recommendations are offered for correction of the 'stone age' character of the state services.

The Use of Masks as an Adjunct to Role-Playing. Penelope Pearl Pollaczek and Harold D. Homefield. Pp. 299-304.

The use of masks to facilitate the enacting of roles materially aided the therapy of five elementary school boys, all stutterers. They met for ten sessions, each of which began with discussion of some emotionally important topic. Wearing masks enabled them to enact a variety of scenes, causing striking improvement in their speech. The assumption of the new role at first required the actual wearing of the mask. Later, role-playing was more spontaneous, and the boys felt free to dispense with their masks. The weakening of suppressions and repressions in these meetings led to increased freedom in acting out in their classroom, with some disciplinary problems. Teachers were amenable to discussion and interpretation of such changed behavior.

Mental Hygiene and World Peace. Kilton Stewart. Pp. 387-403.

The Senoi, an illiterate animistic tribe in the Malayan highlands, has for a century (or much longer, perhaps) been free of crime, mental illness, and psychosomatic disorders. This fact is attributed to their highly sophisticated

educational system, based on dream interpretation. Children are taught that all characters in dreams are good if they are 'outfaced' and bent to the dreamer's will. This means that dream forces are one's psychological resources which must be controlled lest they hurt the dreamer or his associates. The dreamer must rule the psyche and not be ruled by it. The Senoi child begins its dream education as soon as it can talk. Each day the child's dream is discussed by the parents, who advise how its attitudes and behavior should change in future dreams and recommend certain social activities or gestures which the dream makes necessary; for example, conciliation of an enemy in a dream, when this individual or force is an enemy because of projected hostility. Each day the village elders, assembled in council, discuss their dreams. Children display human nature as we know it; but the adults are unselfish, coöperative, self-reliant, with a highly developed set of identifications directed to the good of their society. There are remarkable parallels between the analytic theory of dreams and dream understanding among the Senoi. The author urges our use at home and in school of the principles employed by the Senoi, in the belief that we can thus move toward a healthier personal and social adjustment.

JOSEPH LANDER

The Journal of Mental Science. C, 1954.

The Early History of Psychoanalysis. Ernest Jones. Pp. 198-210.

Dr. Jones is pre-eminently qualified to discuss the early history of psychoanalysis not only because of his historical role in the psychoanalytic movement, but also because of his authoritative researches on the early life of Freud. In this paper, he demonstrates from his own experience the significance of psychoanalysis in relation to psychiatry and neurology during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Jones began his career as a physician with an intense interest in the psychopathology of the neuroses. At that time psychiatry was at a low level in England. There were no opportunities for psychiatric training comparable to those that exist today. The psychopathology of neurosis was the province of the neurologists, 'doubtless in deference to the popular belief that neurologists being concerned with the nervous system were the proper people to cure "nerves" as neurotic conditions were then called'. Jones, therefore, was trained as a neurologist, but supplemented his experience with regular visits to the asylums near London. Even the most prominent neurologists treated the neuroses empirically as disorders of the brain, whereas in the asylums treatment of mental patients was primarily custodial. Nowhere did he encounter much clinical or psychological interest until he went to Kraepelin's Institute in Munich where he observed that patients were studied 'with absorbed interest from every point of view'. This experience gave him an entirely different view of psychiatry and led to his becoming a psychiatrist. However, he everywhere 'missed any concern with the psychodynamics of the processes in question, any explanation of what brought them about and what they represented in the patient's mind'. In an effort to elucidate this problem he began independently to investigate patients' memories under hypnosis. When in 1905 he came across

Freud's psychoanalytic writings he was well prepared to appreciate them. Freud actually listened to his patients and took their every utterance into account 'as if it were a physical sign in clinical medicine'. He dealt with symbolism and freely admitted the significance of sexuality. 'Above all there was Freud's constant search for meaning, purpose, motivation.' That year Jones began his practice of psychoanalysis. In 1907 he met Jung and made plans with him for the first Psychoanalytic Congress in 1908, at which he met Freud. There are interesting vignettes of Freud at that time, as well as of several of Freud's early supporters, including Sadger, Stekel, Adler, Rank, and others.

During recent years the author's researches have shed new light on the genesis of Freud's ideas. He has come 'to the unexpected conclusion that hardly any of Freud's early ideas were completely new. . . . Perhaps the two for which novelty can best be claimed—both, it is true, of great importance—were his theory of the dissociation of affects from ideas and his explanations of dream life.' By tracing the historical roots of most of the elements that went to make up Freud's theory of mind, he has found that they were in fact 'lying about in scattered places, ready for him to pick up and make use of'. This however in no way detracts from Freud's status as a revolutionary genius. 'What to others had been little more than bright ideas were to Freud important conclusions to be taken with the utmost seriousness, to be carefully explored and then woven into a comprehensive theory.'

The reception of psychoanalysis has followed a characteristic pattern in all countries where it has gone. There have been storms of criticism and abuse (most marked in Germany) which gradually died down and were replaced by some degree of toleration, sometimes of understanding. This is characteristic of the history of startling novelties in science. Jones cautions that apparent acceptance need not imply understanding since belief is 'far more of an affective process than a purely ideational one. . . . In the stage of respectability that psychoanalysis has reached in England and America there is an increasing danger of the insight we have by such hard work gained into the nature of the unconscious mind becoming more superficial.'

HASKELL F. NORMAN

The British Journal of Medical Psychology. XXVII, 1954.

The Interrelations of Delinquency and Neurosis: The Analysis of Two Cases. Andrew Petö. Pp. 1-14.

Case histories are reported of two male patients, both in their forties, each of whom had an earlier criminal period in his life, one as a cardsharper and the other as a blackmailer. Treatment was sought for both several years after the the cessation of the delinquent behavior, because of ensuing symptoms. It was possible to carry out with them the classical analytical technique, and their analyses provided the author with opportunities to investigate the psychodynamics of their delinquent behavior, as well as the interchange of neurotic and delinquent symptoms.

Severe oral conflicts, caused in one patient by extreme overindulgence and

in the other by extreme deprivation, resulted in formation of relatively weak egos and severe archaic superegos. At the œdipal stage they failed to master their conflicts with autoplastic defenses and regression occurred to alloplastic activity which was manifest in both as antisocial behavior at the age of four and as criminal behavior later. These activities were intended to master their œdipal conflicts, chiefly oral ones, by projection. During their delinquent acts or immediately after them, both patients experienced feelings of elation described by the author as feelings of being happily lost in a secure way. Similar feelings were experienced in the transference when the analyst represented a harmless, giving mother. Their 'delinquency was seen to be a manifestation of paranoid, projective defenses that aimed at elation, so as to avoid in that archaic way the superego which originated from an unusually dangerous mother imago'. When their antisocial activities later repeatedly failed to achieve this elation, the delinquency had to be given up and symptoms followed. One patient developed a neurosis with phobic and depressive symptoms; the other developed a psychosis with hallucinations.

It is the author's opinion that the abandonment of alloplastic behavior occurred as a result of maturation or strengthening of the ego which led to internalization of the conflict and its solution in autoplastic form. This may help to explain the fact that most juvenile delinquents spontaneously grow out of their delinquency.

HASKELL F. NORMAN

Revista de Psicoanálisis. X, 1953.

Screen Memory, Symptom, and Transference. Jose Luis Gonzalez. Pp. 277-307.

This article gives a clear description of the psychological determinants of a screen memory, and shows how they were woven into transference fantasies. Interpretations were skilfully made. Unconscious painful situations and affect were indirectly expressed in the 'screen' of the false memory. The screen memory appeared for the first time when the patient was five years old; it referred to a scene in her first year. The theme of the memory underwent secondary elaboration. At puberty the patient pretended to be asleep while her younger brother touched her. This scarcely disguised œdipal activity, together with her mother's last pregnancy and the patient's becoming engaged, caused the screen memory to lose its effectiveness. The patient was unable to handle these new excitations. Her unresolved œdipal conflict seems to have been the chief reason for her abandoning her defense mechanisms and developing symptoms. These symptoms were of three sorts: 1, magical gestures, mannerisms, propulsion of the arms, hysterical attacks, and an attack of fainting that occurred when she first had intercourse with her husband; 2, 'expulsive' symptoms, including vaginal discharge, vaginismus and frigidity, nausea, vomiting, and attacks of coughing with sputum; 3, mixed introjective and projective symptoms, including hallucinations in which she immobilized an incorporated object and then tried to get rid of it,—for example, she felt pins in her throat and strained to get them 'in or out'. Apparently she wished to incorporate the desired object (penis or

breast) but immediately wished to expel it as dangerous and harmful (semen or poison). Her fantasies were intensely sadistic. These mechanisms of defense she repeated in treatment, which she experienced as an incestuous coitus; the interpretations were taken as if they were poisonous semen.

Brief Communications. Pp. 372-380.

An Analytic Session with a Schizophrenic Patient. Gina Gioia and David Liberman.

One analytic session with a schizophrenic patient is described. This patient had tried to strangle his mother and had accidentally killed a maid by shooting her. To express his rebellious and sadistic fantasies against his analyst, a woman, he made use of all the mechanisms of the primary process. His speech became elliptical, confused, and rambling, characteristics that serve to cover the displacement, representation by the opposite, and other mechanisms found in the manifest content of a dream. The dynamic importance of the transference relationship is also discussed.

The Psychoanalytic Clinic in London. Fidias R. Cesio.

The functioning of this clinic is described. It was the third such clinic to be created, preceded only by the Polyclinic (Berlin, 1920) and the Psychoanalytic Clinic (Vienna, 1922). The London clinic has existed since 1926 and trains physicians and lay persons. It has facilities for treatment of adults and, since 1929, of children. It has remained an independent group, avoiding 'nationalization', and has remained a branch of the Institute for Psychoanalysis.

Some Meanings of Ornamentation and of the Genesis of Plastic Art. Angel Garma. Pp. 399-421.

This article was included by Robert Lindner in his book, Explorations in Psychoanalysis. The author traces the unconscious meanings of symbolisms employed in clothing, architecture, and ornament in general. He uses anthropological and clinical material in an erudite but facile way. The genital meanings of such symbolism, and its transformation and 'sublimation' are illustrated by anthropological and clinical studies. Garma believes that dress began as the symbolic representation of fœtal membranes. The ornamentation of such various objects as Doric, Ionic, Corinthian, and medieval columns, and the designs on Argentine money are derived from primitive designs, executed perhaps by mothers on the skin of newborn babies using excrement or other elemental substances. This primitive human ornamentation later developed into the phallic and feminine genital symbolism of columns, temples, and religious rituals. The author follows this transformation through Egyptian, Greek, Mayan, and other religious rituals and architecture.

Asthma, Abandonment, and Birth Trauma. Jose Luis Gonzalez. Pp. 422-432.

This is a fragment from the psychoanalysis of a patient who suffered from asthma from the seventh month of pregnancy until, six months later, she recovered when the infantile œdipal situation and her unconscious fantasies about it were uncovered in treatment. She feared being left alone with her mother because of strong ambivalence, rebelliousness, guilt, and masochistic submission, and this fear made her repress her mourning at the death of her father. Her husband was also being analyzed. He offered interpretations to his wife, and of these interpretations Gonzalez says, 'Any interpretation made outside the analytic situation will be experienced as an aggression, for it is not supported by the unlimited tolerance experienced in the psychoanalytic treatment'.

The patient had suffered frequent asthmatic attacks until she was six years old. These attacks were her somatic expression of the excitement at the primal scene and represented the patient's sadistic concept of her parents' coitus. When she was six the family moved to a house in which the patient could for the first time have a room of her own; her bronchial asthma then disappeared. Although the asthma disappeared during her analytic treatment, the patient developed 'chronic bronchitis' once again.

Reaction to an Incomplete Interpretation in the Analysis of a Psychotic Child. Diego Garcia Reinoso. Pp. 433-438.

A ten-year-old severely disturbed schizophrenic boy reacted to an incomplete interpretation by showing a change in the object of his aggression. In response to previous interpretations, the patient had destroyed crayons or toys by chewing or breaking them. When the incomplete interpretation was made, the boy went to the toilet, urinated in the sink, mixed the urine with soap, drank of it, and then spat it out, attacking the analyst. The analyst who had been attacked before by the patient, this time became annoyed and counterattacked. The author feels that his anger and the patient's behavior could have been avoided if his interpretation had included the meaning of the patient's previous behavior and had expressed the patient's feeling of abandonment and basic depression. 'My two previous interpretations calmed the patient's persecutory and depressive anxieties, and he was therefore able to attack again . . . he broke a toy . . . but in doing so his guilt over his sadistic impulses against mother's abdomen and against his sister overwhelmed him. . . . My incomplete interpretation did not calm his anxieties and he therefore violently projected inside of me his urine filled with all the hostile contents and the destroyed parts of the object.' The author concludes that '. . . the usefulness of a complete interpretation, especially in such disturbed cases, is precisely that it is accepted as a substitute for a good libidinal object, a good breast, which will permit a synthesis of the ego and protect against threatened collapse of the ego'.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Henry F. Marasse, Victor H. Rosen & Harry Joseph

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NOTES

All those who are planning to attend THE NINETEENTH INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOANALYTIC CONGRESS in Geneva (July 24-28, 1955) are urged to register and make their travel and hotel arrangements at the earliest possible moment, if they have not yet done so. Dr. Ruth S. Eissler, Secretary of the International Psychoanalytic Association, draws attention to the fact that in view of other international conferences which will be held in the summer of 1955 in Geneva, hotel accommodations will be scarce and extremely difficult to obtain at a late date. Registration forms and the fee for the Congress should be sent to Dr. Raymond de Saussure, The Congress Administrative Committee, Tertasse 2, Geneva, Switzerland.

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

April 13, 1954. RECONSTRUCTION OF A TRAUMATIC CHILDHOOD EVENT IN A CASE OF DEREALIZATION. Victor H. Rosen, M.D.

A twenty-seven-year-old professional man, whose main complaint was a feeling of unreality, struggled with suicidal thoughts and had many bizarre somatic sensations, among them a feeling of choking as if the upper and lower parts of his body were being separated. These symptoms started suddenly after he broke an engagement to marry. He developed the obsessive fantasy that girls with whom he had sexual relations would be found strangled in their rooms and he would be unable to provide an alibi. His mother was an unstable woman subject to depressions. The patient accused her of incestuous feelings toward him. The father tried to dominate the patient by financial pressure.

Because of marked feelings of unreality on the couch which served the resistances, the patient was treated vis-à-vis. The turning point of the treatment, which lasted four years, came after the analyst interrupted treatment several months because the patient refused to pay his bills, claiming they had no reality. When the treatment was resumed the patient complained of wry neck, as if his head were being twisted off. He talked about Venetian blind ropes which seemed like a hangman's rope to him. In association to a dream he mentioned that his father did not allow iodine in the house and had bathroom locks removed from the door. At this point it became clear that the patient must have witnessed a suicidal attempt on his mother's part in early childhood. The patient responded to this reconstruction with very severe emotion, following which he began to improve. He then began to discuss his masturbation fantasies, acknowledging that he considered the payment of the fee as a punishment for masturbation. His father confirmed the mother's suicidal attempt which occurred when the patient was three, and which had been treated by the family as a 'bad dream' whenever he mentioned it.

This emphasizes the importance of the traumatic event in the formation of neurotic symptoms. In this case repression obviously failed and the patient was constantly threatened with being overwhelmed by the associative affects. Dr. Rosen feels that denial of the reality of the event interfered with the repressive process, and identification with the hanging mother thus became the main mechanism. The derealization resulted from the fact that the traumatic event occurred at an age when reality and fantasy were not sufficiently well differentiated, the process in addition being complicated by the parental denial of the event. It is concluded that in derealization the actuality of the reconstructed event is of great importance.

In the discussion Dr. Bak brought out the importance of the patient's identification with the sadistic father in producing the derealization. He also discussed the psychopathology of this phenomenon in terms of deneutralization where the defense against the aggressive drive fails. He also pointed out the similarity of the loss of the fiancée which precipitated the onset of symptoms and the loss of a beloved nurse which followed the mother's suicidal attempt. Dr. Jacobson cited a case of a seven-year-old boy in analysis who had an acute sadistic outburst upon watching his mother's heart attack. The anxiety, crying, and sobbing occurred later. She thinks that the sight of injury to an object with which the patient has a primitive narcissistic identification provokes sadistic impulses that in turn lead to primitive masochistic identification followed by an impulse to eliminate the incorporated injured body parts. This is accomplished by the mechanism of denial. Dr. Loewenstein expressed doubts about the validity of 'phase specificity' of ego development from such a trauma with symptoms occurring so much later. He emphasized the role of subsequent events and the development of the superego. Dr. Arlow quoted a case in which the childhood experience nuclear to the derealization was not real but a fantasy.

HENRY F. MARASSE

June 22, 1954. LIBIDINAL PHASES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLAY. Lili Peller.

Mrs. Peller feels that in the psychological study of play there is the possibility for considerable mutual sharing and elaborating of experiences between the fields of academic psychology and psychoanalysis. Aside from Freud's original contributions in a variety of places to the psychoanalytic principles of play and Waelder's amplification of Freud's theory, there has been no consistent organized psychoanalytic theory of the structure of play. Play is defined as the mastering of anxiety aroused equally by the external exigencies of reality and the internal pressures arising from instinctual tensions. Play can be described and characterized on the basis of the libidinal phases in which it appears, and its general purposes, or its secondary gain, have to do with the development of mastery and the transformation of passive endurance into active mastery. Childhood play has three characteristic phases: precœdipal, œdipal, and latency. There is also a 'preplay' period in the very early stages of infancy. Precœdipal play is character-

ized by its stereotypy. It appears to have one central idea for the conquering of anxiety and is likely to bore the adult. Œdipal play is characterized by a much richer acting out of complex fantasies in which stories and plots can be discerned. This is much better suited to the participation of adults. Play of the latency period is characterized by the formation of an independent superego and in this stage the term is better supplanted with the word 'games'. The game stage is characterized by the ascendancy of a formal structure to the play itself and the strictness of the rules which surround it. Latency games are also characterized by the addition of the element of self-criticism. The social aspect of play is also emphasized in the latency period where the importance of the team and coöperation are given major emphasis in contrast to the solitary aspect of precœdipal play and the more fluid quality of œdipal games.

In the discussion Dr. Hartmann noted some of the general characteristics of the psychoanalytic theory of play. It is useful to make a clear-cut differentiation between what is the origin of play and what are the functions to which it is put. He believes that one aspect of play has something to do with the learning process—the influence of the prolonged dependency of the child—and prefers not to use the term 'secondary gain' which was originally employed in connection with the dynamics of the neurosis rather than normal ego processes. Dr. Ernst Kris also emphasized phase differences in regard to childhood play. He pointed out that early play is very much connected with the problem of active substitution for the object. In its earliest beginnings, play is by definition activity and identification, and aims at substituting for the adult. This must be differentiated from the stage in which the consciousness of 'I am playing' seems to arise and where there is a clear-cut differentiation between what Kris would call 'play' and 'not play'. Dr. Kestenberg gave examples of phase differences in play. She felt that the term 'secondary gain' is a happy expression because it describes how children feel about play themselves and emphasizes what she feels is its dual function of problem solving and discharge of inner tension in functional pleasure. She disagrees with Mrs. Peller's thesis that play is sublimation and feels that where sublimation begins, play ceases. Dr. Neubauer emphasized the hope that the understanding of play in relation to phase specificity will be amplified in future investigations to include the problem of differences in various types of children 'so as not to eliminate the individual variation'. Dr. Alpert emphasized the importance of the family triangle and the abreaction of anxiety and hostility in play. She related the ability to play to certain problems in psychopathology and pointed out that it is only after achieving a certain kind of object relationship with the mother that the child is able to play. Dr. Otto Sperling felt that by limiting ourselves to the problem of anxiety, we were narrowing the formulation. He suggested the possibility that a number of games served the purpose of mitigating feelings of guilt and a bridge between reality limitations of the child and its ego ideal.

VICTOR H. ROSEN

November 16, 1954. A CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF PREGENITAL CHARACTER DISORDER. Isidor Silbermann, M.D.

The similarities in structure and function of two types of character disorder and their infantile prototypes, described in the literature as the autistic psychotic child and the symbiotic psychotic child, are described. Quoting Hartmann on the hereditary transmission of the autonomous part of the ego, the constituent factors—sense of perception, primordial memory, quality of primitive differentiation and synthesis, function of self-preservation, inhibitory function serving postponement of discharge, motoric and sensoric function, and the basic function of neutralization—are defined. Neutralized drives do not appear as identical neutral energies but retain specific propensities. In the ego, neutralized libido appears as the organizing force, as the synthesizing power in its various forms and as the energy responsible for the secondary process. Neutralized aggression travels in the direction of differentiation, abstraction, censorship, inhibitory function, defenses. The consequences of distorted ego functioning are multiple. The relationship of the infant and neonate to the mother is briefly reviewed. From unity with the mother the child slowly proceeds to the establishment of an ego. Symbiosis is an expression of the eros, but with advancing years it slowly recedes when aggressive drives gain priority. The mother-child bond can be pathological for such various reasons as inherent structural defects of the ego, a psychopathological mother, or other environmental damages. After discussing the autistic psychotic child (Kanner) and the symbiotic psychotic child (Mahler), Dr. Silbermann described two analogous types of adult patients encountered in psychoanalysis. Common characteristics of both types include anxiety attacks, phobias, bisexual conflicts, depressions, and marked ambivalence. They are cognizant of their brittle, fragile relationships and their partly longing, partly hostile attitudes. They are also aware of their sexual disturbances which may appear as tendencies toward perversions, homosexual inclinations, sadistic and masochistic desires, impotency, etc. Although frequently successful in their occupations they suffer from disturbances of thinking, especially their inability to advance from the concrete to the abstract, from the personal to the general. There are no specific abnormalities of ideational content. These patients can be divided into two groups, and because they resemble the two infantile psychotic types they may be described as pregenital character disorders with autistic tendencies or pregenital character disorders with symbiotic tendencies. A patient of the first type, one with autistic tendencies, entered analysis because of depression, inability to concentrate or form attachments. The other case, manifesting symbiotic tendencies, seemed to have a fixation to his mother by an elastic chain which permitted him a certain freedom and conversely caused him panic whenever he attempted to go beyond its confines. Dr. Silbermann presented a vivid description of both patients and a comparison of their symptomatology, dynamics, and pathology. He then postulated that the infantile psychotic child, being constitutionally damaged, does not possess the means of creating a functioning ego, whereas the child with a pregenital character disorder, being equipped merely with an immature and delayed ego nucleus, will, in an unfavorable environment, develop an immature, incompetent ego. Schematically expressed,

in the latter instance if the mother's personality plays into the hands of the aggressive drives, an autistic character results, or conversely a symbiotic character results if the libidinal forces are favored. If the mother's aggressions are added to the patient's, the precarious balance will tend toward the aggressive autistic position; if she adds her own clinging symbiotic tendencies, a symbiotic distortion will result.

In his discussion Dr. Ernst Kris noted the wealth of theoretical and clinical material in the presentation. From a theoretical point of view the idea of neutralization as a very early function of the ego organization is combined with Freud's idea of the fusion between libido and aggression. This point raises many theoretical questions. From a clinical approach the many influences of the mother which decide the choice and direction of the predominant symptomatology furnish a vast area for further study. Dr. Mahler described similar clinical problems in children and noted a trend toward similar conclusions in recent papers. Earliest relationships between child and mother are receiving constantly increasing attention. Dr. Neubauer, noting the importance of the autistic and symbiotic features, believed it equally necessary to add a careful understanding of the developmental experience and to combine it with our tested knowledge of libidinal organizations.

HARRY JOSEPH

On January 15, 1855, SAINT ELIZABETHS HOSPITAL, in Washington, D. C., admitted its first patients. This year it celebrates its centennial. Now a component unit of the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, it was established by Act of Congress as the Government Hospital for the Insane. Dorothea Lynde Dix (1802-1887), one of the most remarkable women America has produced, was responsible for this action by the Congress, and her name will be given this year to the new four hundred and twenty bed Admission and Treatment Building at Saint Elizabeths, the Dorothea Lynde Dix Memorial Pavilion. On May 5 and 6, 1955, there will be held at the Hospital a two-day meeting with invited guest speakers of international repute. An historical pageant depicting the life and works of Miss Dix—planned, written, and enacted by patients of the Hospital—will also be presented at this time.

During its hundred years of service, this Hospital has had but five superintendents, including the present Superintendent, Dr. Winfred Overholser. All five have been Presidents of the American Psychiatric Association. Throughout its existence, Saint Elizabeths has been respected both in this country and abroad as a public mental hospital of the highest repute. Never identified with any single school of psychiatric thought, it has been proud of its eclectic approach to the treatment of the mentally ill. It has trained thousands of psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric nurses and social workers, ministers, occupational therapists, and others engaged in the treatment of the mentally ill.

In the twentieth century, Saint Elizabeths has been noted for its pioneering

efforts in establishing neuropathology and clinical psychology departments. It was the first hospital in the Americas to use the malaria treatment for paresis. Its late Superintendent, Dr. William A. White, was one of the few American psychiatrists to give early support to the then new psychoanalysis of Freud. With Smith Ely Jelliffe he founded (in 1913) the first psychoanalytic journal in America. Dr. Edward J. Kempf, of the staff of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, was probably the first American psychiatrist to treat schizophrenia in an American hospital by the psychoanalytic technique. His early book on psychopathology was one of the first in America to present a psychopathology that was psychologic in its premises. The late Harry Stack Sullivan carried out his earliest work in psychiatry at Saint Elizabeths. Several of Korzybski's early studies in semantics were conducted here. The several superintendents, notably Drs. White and Overholser, as well as a number of members of the staff (Bernard Glueck, John Lind, Ben Karpman), have enjoyed outstanding reputations as forensic psychiatrists. Shortly after the Russo-Japanese War, military psychiatry was introduced to this country at Saint Elizabeths Hospital and, during the past forty years, there has been a close liaison between the psychiatric division of the military medical services and the Hospital. In World War II, hundreds of medical officers, nurses, corpsmen, and Red Cross workers received their psychiatric orientation here. Psychodrama was first adopted for use in a public mental hospital at Saint Elizabeths and the arts, including music and the dance, have been developed here as valuable therapeutic tools. The only public mental hospital in America which offers an A.M.A. approved general internship is Saint Elizabeths. The annals of this Hospital, the only one of its kind in America, proudly record a hundred years of Progress in American Psychiatry.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR:

Dr. Bertram D. Lewin quotes me in This QUARTERLY, Volume XXIII, No. 4, p. 494, as quoting from Freud the statement, '. . . the wish to sleep is "biological" '. Freud did not say, and I have not quoted him as saying that the problem of sleep is biological, but as saying that it is a *physiological* problem. Freud stated: *'Ich hatte wenig Anlass mich mit dem Problem des Schlafes zu befassen, denn dies ist ein wesentlich physiologisches Problem . . .'. (Die Traumdeutung. Gesammelte Werke,* Vol. II-III. London: Imago Publishing Co., 1942, p. 6.) My quotation from Freud reads: 'I have had little cause to concern myself with the problem of sleep, for this is essentially a physiological problem . . .'. (Revival of Interest in the Dream. New York: International Universities Press, 1953, p. 108.) The misquotation is an important one inasmuch as it vitiates Dr. Lewin's subsequent argument.

ROBERT FLIESS, M.D. (NEW YORK)

The review of Jean-Paul Sartre's Existential Psychology (This QUARTERLY, Volume XXIV, No. 1, 1955, p. 137) . . . does an injustice to readers who may . . . think

there is nothing in Sartre's work of very serious interest to them. . . . Whether or not one agrees with or is even generally sympathetic toward Sartre's kind of philosophical approach, I think that an examination of his major work, *L'Être et le néant* . . . reveals a serious philosophical intellect, engaging problems which are deeply rooted in the history of philosophy . . . [as your reviewer states, these essays are fragments of Sartre's treatise]. As fragments these essays not only are out of philosophical context but are reversed in their order of appearance. . . . On the basis of a serious inquiry into Sartre's philosophy, it is my view that there is much of crucial importance in his contributions for the professional audience you reach.

MAURICE NATANSON, UNIVERSITY OF HOUSTON, HOUSTON, TEXAS.