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PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF A TYPICAL DREAM

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Everyone recognizes motility as an important characteristic of life and living matter—whether it is the act of extension of the pseudopod of a Paramecium, or the locomotion of man. This is reflected in the verb 'animate', which has a double meaning: 'To make alive, or fill with breath; also, to give motion to or put into action'. The dictionary cites as an example of its use, 'the breeze animated the leaves'. Often we equate death with the absence of motility. Voluntary control of motility is renounced during sleep, a fact which becomes important in certain neurotic sleep disturbances. During sleep the characteristic unconscious content of such disturbances often expresses an inability to flee from certain dangers or nameless dreads. Sleep itself, if it becomes equated with death, arouses great anxiety.

The identification of life with motility does not always exist, as, for small children, this concept is indistinct and is subject to considerable confusion. Piaget *(11)* writes of a time 'when the child takes cognizance of the difference between life and death'. In describing how one child attempted to satisfy his curiosity about death and to discover distinguishing criteria between life and death, Piaget wrote: 'Are they dead (those leaves)?—Yes.—But they move with the wind'. By coincidence both Piaget's little boy and the lexicographer used the identical image: leaves in the wind.

Over a period of years I have observed what appears to be a typical dream in the analyses of a number of patients. A typical dream is, in the classical sense, one whose manifest content is stereotyped and one which occurs fairly frequently in a variety of dreamers.

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Freud was fascinated by typical dreams, among which he included examination dreams, dreams of nakedness, dreams of falling and flying, of missing a train, and those which refer to the deaths of relatives or other persons who are close to or have been in an intimate relation with the dreamer. Freud *(5,* p. 241*)* stated that 'as a general rule, each person is at liberty to construct his dreamworld according to his individual peculiarities and so to make it unintelligible to other people. It now appears, however, that in complete contrast to this, there are a certain number of dreams which almost everyone has dreamt alike and which we are accustomed to assume must have the same meaning for everyone. A special interest attaches, moreover, to these typical dreams because they presumably arise from the same sources in every case and thus seem particularly well qualified to throw light on the sources of dreams.' Freud noted 'with great reluctance' that the accepted, usual technique of dream interpretation was disappointing in revealing the latent content of these typical dreams as the dreamer generally failed to produce associations essential to their understanding. 'We are not in general in a position to interpret another person's dream unless he is prepared to communicate to us the unconscious thoughts that lie behind its content. The practical applicability of our method of interpreting dreams is in consequence severely restricted.' In a footnote, which he added in 1925, Freud made an exception of dreams which employ *symbolic* elements, in the analysis of which he proposed the use of 'a secondary and auxiliary method of dream interpretation'.

In his study of dreams and myths, Abraham *(1,* pp. 151-209*)* showed that there were certain fantasies which could not be ascribed to any single individual. Such collective fantasies or myths, and also fairy tales, revealed 'the fantasy of a nation'. Abraham had as his purpose the demonstration that Freud's doctrines concerning the dream could to a considerable extent be applied to the psychology of myths and thus provide a new basis for their understanding. He believed that typical dreams had their origin in infantile wishes shared by all mankind, and

that these same wishes formed the basis of certain ubiquitous myths. Usually, such desires are repressed during the dreamer's earliest years, and Abraham stressed the derivation of myths and typical dreams from such repressed infantile wishes and memories. Highly instructive in this respect are dreams about the deaths of near relatives. Such dreams do not necessarily mean that the dreamer entertains such a wish at the present time but often signify that he once did so, perhaps in his distant past. Such desires, common to most if not all mankind, are also encountered in myths which thus express the collective wishes and strivings of a nation.

Referring to Freud, Abraham concluded that the legend of Œdipus contains something which arouses kindred feelings in us all. 'In the Œdipus tragedy we see our childhood wishes fulfilled, while we ourselves have in the course of our development replaced our sexual attraction to the mother and our rebellion against the father by feelings of love and piety.' (In the Yeats translation, Œdipus, in his death throes, says, 'No living man has loved as I have loved'.) 'As Freud says, the tragedy itself contains an allusion to the typical dream in which the dreamer becomes sexually united with his mother. . . . The analysis of most myths, as of most dreams, is rendered more difficult by the symbolic disguise of the intrinsic content. It is precisely because this complication is absent in the Œdipus legend, and in the typical dreams whose content is related to it that it is particularly suitable to serve as an introduction to the problem which interests us.' Abraham then conjectures that the symbolism to which Freud called our attention is, and has always been, deeply imbedded in everyone.

Dream-formation and myth-formation display important similarities and internal relationships. The Prometheus myth, for example, shows the psychological relationship between myths and dreams. Behind the manifest content of both lies a latent content, and the latent content of the dream is accessible through the associations of its dreamer, as the latent content of a myth may be understood by the traditions and legends of what

might be called the period of infancy in the life of a people. Similarly, condensation, displacement, and repression are common both to the myth and the typical dream. It is because of a tendency to 'mass repression' that a people is no longer able to understand the original meaning of its myths, just as we fail through repression to understand our dreams.

Martin Wangh *(12)* described similar unconscious sources of a patient's dream and the ubiquitous myths of 'little folk'. He also showed that the day residue of the dream has a similar counterpart in the formation of a myth.

The well-populated underworld (or afterworld) of the ancient Greeks contained as one of its geographic landmarks the Acheron, the 'river of woe' which, according to legend, emptied into Cocytus, 'the river of lamentation'. There were three other rivers in Greek mythology involved in the passage of the dead to the Elysian fields or to Hades, the last of them being the Styx, called 'the river of the unbreakable oath' by which the gods swear *(9)*. Charon, an aged boatman, ferried the souls of the newly dead across the water; however, Charon permitted in his boat only the souls of those on whose lips passage money had been placed. This story of Charon, the ferryman of the dead and of the rivers of the underworld, is here described to call attention to the fact that even in ancient Greece, as today, the necessity of some vehicle for the transportation of the souls of the dead was assumed.[1] This is in sharp contrast to the ghost of Hamlet's father who was 'doom'd for a certain term to walk the night'. The coin which was placed on a corpse's lips or

[1] I am indebted to Dr. Bertram D. Lewin for the following observation which was told by the daughter of a dying man.

> In his near terminal delirium, an old man was evidently imagining and sometimes hallucinating that he was on board a boat, in a way reminiscent of the play, Outward Bound. He would get out of bed saying that he had to get off the boat, and he would sometimes, when not watched, run into the wall or the furniture in his room. He seemed in this way to show that he knew he was on his last journey and was trying to interrupt it. A stubborn man, he had never in his clear periods admitted that he was in any danger of death.

tongue became known as 'Charon's obol', a silver piece which represented the fee exacted by Charon for the journey to one or other of the realms of the dead. Similar coins, used for like purposes, were prevalent in Japan, the Balkans, and elsewhere. In Brittany the dead are thought to travel in a type of cart. In Mexico certain indigenous Indian tribes have evolved an elaborate journey which is undertaken by the souls of the newly dead, a journey which lasts for seven days and which involves crossing one or more rivers.

Quite recently, in historical terms, a widespread myth became manifest in Europe. It was described by Marie Bonaparte *(3)* as The Myth of the Corpse in the Car. During World War II the story of the corpse in the car assumed 'the widespread dignity of a myth' throughout France. 'The death . . . of the stray passenger, the death of a man, seems a pledge of far greater potency and appears to set a seal of finality on fate's decrees.'

In the autumn of 1938, Rudolph M. Loewenstein related a curious event as told to him by Marie Bonaparte. 'In September 1938, a young man who was expecting his call up was driving his fiancée to Laval, intending to leave her with relatives. Outside Paris he stops for petrol. A middle-aged couple ask where he is going and then beg a lift for the lady who is going in that direction, whereas the man is returning to Paris to join up the following day. As they drive, the fiancée begins to cry and talk about their imminent separation. The stranger, however, assures them that all will be well and tells the girl to stop crying. "You'll never be called up", she says to the man, "because there won't be a war. Anyway Hitler will be dead in six months." This she repeats several times. At Laval, before taking leave of the young man, she asks whether he intends to return to Paris and when. He replies that he is returning immediately. The lady then advises him not to drive back that night because, if he does, he will find a corpse in his car. The young people however think her "dotty" and drive off without asking either her name or address. Later, before he leaves Laval, the young man's relatives ask him to give a lift to a lad they know who is also ex-

pecting an immediate call up. He agrees. En route the passenger says he feels drowsy, stretches out on the back seat, and falls asleep. Back in Paris, the car stops at the passenger's address; the young man opens the door to wake him and finds the lad dead.'

The following story was told to Bonaparte's husband 'with similar assurances of authenticity'. 'A man is called up. With his wife and daughter he drives to Versailles. It is late and he says to his wife: "I shan't have petrol enough to get up the hill". Two or three hundred meters from the top of the rise to St. Cloud, his tank runs dry. He gets out, looks right and left, but to no effect. Then, however, under the trees, he sees some gypsies to whom he calls for help to push the car uphill. One of the gypsies says: "You won't get back tonight without a stiff in your car". He fills up with petrol and is returning to Paris when he is stopped by a policeman who asks him to take an injured man to the hospital. Before they could reach the hospital, the injured man dies in the car.'

Bonaparte speculates about the link between these two happenings which she interprets as much deeper '. . . than the mere truth of one prediction vouching for another. . . . If the myth seemed almost universally to crop up, it is doubtless because war, with its anxieties and dangers, must have revivified within us some of humanity's most ancient beliefs; in this case the conviction of the need for a sacrifice, to obtain some great good fortune.' Although Bonaparte does not speculate on the specific nature of this sacrifice, it would seem a likely reference to the death of Hitler, and the release from repression of this ubiquitous death wish.

DREAMS

I

A dream was reported by a lawyer who was in psychoanalysis because of a sexual perversion.

> I was driving in my new car through snowdrifts when I realized I was off the road and that I would have difficulty swinging her back, but managed to do so. I looked at the car from the outside and noticed it was grey and wrinkled. I drove to a shop and

discussed having it repainted. The question arose as to why I was carrying a corpse around in the car. I don't know if it was in a shroud or coffin but there was some legal question as to whether I could park a car with a corpse in it—this was a source of embarrassment to me.

This patient had just acquired a new car and he came to his analytic hour in it each day, driving a considerable distance. This situation created various problems and much anxiety when the weather was snowy. On the night preceding the dream there had been a heavy snowfall.

The patient's father had died when he was an adolescent and since then he had become more emotionally involved with his mother, a domineering, highly intelligent, erratic alcoholic. His relationship to her was submissive, and he was frequently faced with the conflict of acceding either to his mother's demands or to his duties toward his wife. The snowdrifts in the dream made high piles similar to those left by a snowplow, and it was difficult to drive the car between them. At this point the patient suddenly recalled a recent difficulty he had experienced during coitus. This consisted of an inability to effect vaginal entry each time he determined to attempt intercourse without recourse to the perverse sexual practice which initially caused him to seek psychoanalytic help. The paint of the car was grey, not unlike the color of his father's hair, and the wrinkled appearance of this paint recalled to the patient James Joyce's reference to the 'scrotum-tightening sea'. Although the corpse looked unfamiliar, there were many associations to the death of his father and to his horrified fascination at seeing him in the casket. As he recalled looking at the body of his dead father he began to cry, realizing the finality of their aloof, cool, strained, and emotionally unfulfilled relationship. At the time he had cast about for some means of reversing what intellectually he knew to be an irreversible state.

II

Another patient was preoccupied by a conflict of whether or not to leave his elderly, enfeebled parents and to accept a very

attractive and remunerative post which would have necessitated living in Europe.

> I am seated in a room and am suddenly aware of my wife dragging L into it. He seems to be dead-drunk. Then I am going along a canal when I see a small ship all decorated in black coming from the other direction. I hear funeral drums and somebody tells me not to be so gay because the ship is carrying L's body.

L, a friend, always reminded the patient of his brother, who was nine years older than the patient. There was a striking physical resemblance between L and this brother and they had certain common mannerisms and mutual interests. At one time they shared the same apartment. During the evening preceding the dream the patient had come across a letter which L had written, recommending him for the European post. A few years before the patient had arranged a *pro forma* marriage between L and a former girl friend of the patient whose uncertain immigration status he wished to clarify and support. Shortly after this marriage it was found that the girl was 'highly unreliable'. The patient interceded, this time unsuccessfully, trying to persuade her to grant L a divorce. Although L repeatedly attempted to reassure the patient that he had gone into the marriage with open eyes and did not hold it against him, the patient nonetheless felt bad about it.

For many years L drank excessively and often would return after an absence of days with a black eye and bandaged head. When sober he had a shy, serious, smiling manner and looked like a bookworm; in these attributes he resembled the patient's infirm, aged father, a retired physician.

The dream occurred the night before the resumption of analysis after my summer vacation. The patient had resented this break in the treatment and had speculated about how I would look when next he saw me. The boat in the dream recalled the little ship which as a boy he and his parents took each year to reach their summer home. 'It practically belonged

to my father, who made the return trip at least once and sometimes twice a day and so got to know the engineer quite well.'

In telling the dream the patient emphasized the enormous sense of gaiety with which he greeted the sight of this boat even after he had been told that it was transporting L's dead body. On awakening he had been struck by the apparent inappropriateness of the affect in the dream.

III

The day after the death of Pope Pius XII, a very successful young business executive with strong latent homosexual tendencies told of having a dream.

> My father was lying like the Pope, stretched out on the back seat of a car. My wife was driving. I was being taken along for the ride—somehow I didn't want to go yet I did. I remember being afraid to say anything about not wanting to go and still feeling that I wanted to see what was going on. I was afraid of the driver. My mother was 'in on' the disposal of my father. We drove frantically with father's body twisting along on the back seat. It all resembled an Agatha Christie movie: the man on the back seat of the car, and this group of women who had killed him but not by sticking a knife into him. Somehow they had got the best of him and had done away with him.

During intercourse the previous night the patient suddenly recalled having heard of the Pope's death. Immediately this thought became conscious, he lost his erection and had to withdraw. Why thinking of the Pope's death should have produced this effect puzzled him. He remembered that a pope is, in Italian, called *Il Papa.* He expressed vague fears that somehow the dream might be used against him.

His parents were divorced when he was four or five years of age. His mother was then disconsolate and told him that he would now be the man of the household and take care of her; that they would henceforth be inseparable. He became depressed and hostile when, a few months after the divorce, a stranger moved into the house. The stranger married his mother not long afterward. The patient grew increasingly resentful and

began to yearn for his father. In further associations to the dream he remembered the bitterness that had characterized his mother's attitude toward his father, and how provocative had been her exhibitionistic behavior toward the patient. Although not Catholic, the patient had been sent to a parochial school for several years of his childhood. During this period he had been fascinated by the Sisters of the Immaculate Conception who were his teachers.

When an adolescent he arrived unannounced to rejoin and live with his father. He went to his father's apartment without notifying him, found the doors unlocked, and discovered his father having intercourse with a strange woman who he thought must be a prostitute. The father was embarrassed and apologetic, but the patient never completely forgave what seemed at the time so patent a betrayal.

On the following night the patient dreamed what was clearly a continuation of the first dream.

> Somebody had died and I was terribly frightened. I was masturbating in a compulsive way a much older fellow with a large, uncircumcised penis. I couldn't help myself and still I hated doing it. I always hated uncircumcised penises.

The patient was glad that he had been circumcised at birth although at times he expressed a wish that it had not been done. He loathed the sight of an uncircumcised penis, which he regarded as 'something horrid and dirty'. He immediately thought of his father whose big, uncircumcised penis had been a source of grim fascination for him during the years of adolescence which followed their reunion. He thought of the uncircumcised penis as unclean, comparing it with the vagina with which it shared malodorous and unappetizing characteristics. When a young boy he asked his father, 'What is that?', pointing to his father's penis, and was told, 'Oh, that's my chocolate bar'.

He complained, 'If only they wouldn't plaster pictures of his body all over the papers when a pope dies'. It was evident that his father had been killed in the dream and was stretched out

on the back seat of the car; it seemed as if all the women who had been close to the patient had killed his father and that he had been one with them. He speculated whether the sexual attraction of playing with his father's uncircumcised penis might be related to his sudden impotence the night before: 'Obviously I loved my father much more than I ever realized and yet I also hated him for having left me and mother when I was young'.

He suddenly recalled an episode which corresponded to the time of the parents' divorce, during his fourth or fifth year, in which his mother displayed her breasts. He also remembered how exciting but upsetting it had been to see her pubic hair. He apologetically expressed fears of boring me with these memories since without doubt I must have heard similar ones often before. He hated the thought of being sexually under the control of his wife, who was now pregnant. It was she who was driving the car in the dream. Her pregnancy imposed on him a considerable degree of sexual frustration. In recent weeks he had experienced an insatiable appetite for chocolate candy bars, remembering again this reference to his father's penis. He noted various differences between the appearance of his father's uncircumcised and his own circumcised penis. When he was three or four years of age his mother had found him masturbating. She warned him that this would cause his penis to be cut or bitten off.

IV

During an interruption of her analysis, a highly intelligent woman in her middle forties began to speculate about where I might have gone and why. Gradually she noticed that she was becoming increasingly depressed and dreamed

> I was at a family funeral. I saw my father's sister standing at the side of a carriage or caisson on which a dead body was resting. I awoke with a start, terribly worried about my parents' health, and felt that I must phone at once to see if anything had happened to my father. Then I fell asleep again and saw my

father dressed in an army uniform, seated on a cot in a barracks room. He looked very much as he usually does. Then I dreamt of finding an analyst with a peculiar name—it seemed to be Japanese.

This dream followed by several days my having told her of plans to move to the West Coast. She found this news unwelcome and repeated it to a confidante who then mentioned an acquaintance recently departed for California and now going to an analyst with a Japanese name. She wondered whether my absence might have been related to a trip to California. Heretofore she had always felt diffident in describing her feelings about me. She regretted never having been able to tell her father that she was in psychoanalysis, and she felt it frustrating that for her this subject was taboo. Yet her father, a retired missionary, would not have understood; he was strict and quick to scold. It had never been possible to have uninhibited talk with her parents, whom she had come increasingly to avoid. She tearfully recalled that her father had been in the army during the first World War. There was some vague memory of having missed him, of having resented his absence, and of having thought she would never see him again. Reconstruction placed these feelings in her fourth or fifth year. She wondered whether his military service accounted for the caisson in her dream. Because, she said, she had had a highly religious training, whenever she contemplated her father's death it was with a feeling of sinfulness: 'Talking or even thinking about such things makes me feel awful and unworthy; besides I love my father very much'.

V

A woman patient dreamed

I was with somebody in an old car. It's funny, he seemed familiar and yet I could not recognize him. The old, broken-down car had square lines similar to one in a comic strip. I was driving, and on the right side of the road there was a little house with two doors. I got out and knocked at the left door.

> My oldest sister came to the door and I told her I was looking for father and she said he was dead and showed me some kind of certificate. I took a lot of blankets and covered the whole car like a corpse so I could only see straight ahead.

The patient's father had recently died in a remote city, and she was occupied with protracted funeral arrangements. She added to the dream that the other person in the car was in the back seat. 'I looked again at this person and saw that it was my father, stretched out in the back very still, as if he were dead or asleep.' Now she could see her father lying naked on top of the bed with her mother, perhaps following intercourse. The sister who appeared in the dream had occupied the room next to hers during her early years, and she often heard this older sister and her husband making strange noises which she thought must be sexual. Repeatedly at such times she felt how nice it would be to be in her sister's place, yet she feared her unpredictable, violent brother-in-law who 'couldn't resist young girls or young children'.

This patient's father had seduced her sexually during her fourth year, an experience which had been totally repressed and one to which she returned repeatedly following its emergence during later phases of analysis. She remembered that he had sworn her to secrecy with threats.

A night or two before the dream the patient feared she was going to be smothered by the weight of her husband. Once, when a little girl, she was rescued by her brother-in-law when she almost drowned while swimming. She knew that 'fascinating' things occurred between her parents as well as between her brother-in-law and sister; because she was so much younger than her sister the adults of the family felt free to do things in her hearing which otherwise they would not. She visualized her father's appearance, during the first of several sexual contacts, '. . . like a great mass of white flesh. I remember that both my father and my brother-in-law sometimes would touch or play with me when I was nine. I thought this was my "magical secret"; the way I had of getting them to love me.'

VI

An author was in the third year of analysis when his father died suddenly though not unexpectedly. He was married but remained too strongly attached to his mother. His feelings for his father had always been highly ambivalent. A fortnight after the father's death, the patient reported a dream.

> Last night I dreamed I was driving a large black car down a country road. Suddenly I became aware that someone else was in the car. I turned around and saw it was my father, slumped over and ashen. I thought he must be asleep or dead, and I awoke shaking with fright.

The country road reminded him of Shakespeare's pun in Hamlet.[2] The road resembled one on which his father had bought a country house some years previously. The patient never learned to drive a car. The big, black car seemed like a hearse. The patient now thought about his father almost constantly in a regretful, ruminative manner. He expressed identical rueful feelings of unfulfilment and regret at the loss of his father, as had the lawyer who reported the initial dream of this series.[3]

[2] Hamlet: Lady, shall I lie in your lap?
Ophelia: No, my lord.
Hamlet: I mean, my head upon your lap?
Ophelia: Ay, my lord
Hamlet: Do you think I meant country matters?
Ophelia: I think nothing, my lord.
Hamlet: That's a fair thought to lie between maid's legs.
(Act III, Scene II.)

[3] In this connection it is instructive to recall a passage from Freud's preface to the second edition of The Interpretation of Dreams (*5*, p. xxvi). 'For this book has a further subjective significance for me personally—a significance which I only grasped after I had completed it. It was, I found, a portion of my own self-analysis, my reaction to my father's death—that is to say, to the most important event, the most poignant loss, of a man's life.' Freud's father had died in 1896, and on November second of that year he wrote to Wilhelm Fliess: 'By one of the obscure routes behind the official consciousness the old man's death affected me deeply. I valued him highly and understood him very well indeed, and with his peculiar mixture of deep wisdom and imaginative lightheartedness he meant a great deal in my life. By the time he died his life had

The evening preceding the dream, the patient had dined alone with his mother for the first time since his father's death: 'It was pleasant being alone with her, just the two of us, although she is still quite sad. We spoke of father and of his sudden death on the train on the way south. I'm sorry I wasn't along with them, especially as they had suggested that I accompany them. In the dream I was shocked at my father's appearance—he certainly seemed to be dead; or maybe dying. I was surprised to be in the driver's seat.'

There is a striking similarity in all these dreams. The patient is either a passenger or the driver in some vehicle, typically a car. In the back of the vehicle is a corpse, manifestly the patient's father, or identified as the father or as an older brother in the latent dream content. The dreams were dreamed by both female and male patients. In each instance some actual situation reactivated early infantile memories and the œdipal conflict. These patients without exception had had severe preœdipal disturbance with severe castration anxiety and a tendency toward regression. These neurotic and developmental disturbances are consonant with the findings of Lampl-de Groot *(10)*.

These dreams of the death of the father represented either an œdipal wish or a counterphobic fantasy in which the father was rescued. Abraham *(2)* showed that the son's impulses of defiance against his father find their chief expression in rescue fantasies. Often in such fantasies the son saves his father or a substitute, for example a king, from death.

Abraham writes: 'In the fantasy which I have in mind the patient imagines himself walking in a street. Suddenly he sees a carriage with the king, or some other highly placed person in it, approaching with alarming rapidity. Boldly he seizes the horses' reins and brings the carriage to a standstill, thus saving the king from mortal danger.' Abraham notes that the manifest content of this rescue fantasy contravenes the myth of Œdipus. He emphasizes the similarity between the two fantasies, the

long been over, but at a death the whole past stirs within one. I feel now as if I had been torn up by the roots' *(6)*.

manifest content of both having a remarkable similarity. 'In both the encounter with the king is represented as a chance occurrence. It is particularly striking, moreover, that in both the king rides in a carriage. The symbolic substitution of king for father and rescue for killing indicates the parallel to the Œdipus myth. The transformation of attack into rescue is a product of the censorship of the neurotic.' Abraham observes that the horse is '. . . a symbol of masculine potency and of the male sexual organ. We know that the following dream symbols have the same meaning: engine, motorcar, and steamship. They share in common the quality of pushing forward with overwhelming force. If the son successfully stops the runaway horses, he proves by doing so that his masculine potency is superior to that of his father.'

Abraham cites a dream of the rescue. 'I am sitting on the left side of my mother in a small two-wheeled carriage, a dogcart which is drawn by one horse. To the right of the carriage, close to the wheel, stands my father. His attitude signifies that he is speaking, or has just spoken, to my mother, but no word is to be heard, and certainly my mother does not react in any way. He looks noticeably tired and pale. Now he turns silently away from the carriage and walks off in the opposite direction to that in which the carriage is facing. Whilst I watch him disappear I have the expectation that he will soon come back again and I turn to my mother with the words: "We could meanwhile drive up and down". Mother now makes a slight movement with the reins which she holds in her hands whereupon the horse slowly begins to move. After a few moments I take the reins from her hands, whip up the horse, and we quickly drive away.' Abraham notes the obvious derivation of this dream from the œdipus complex. The son is in the father's place in the two-seated carriage. The father is disposed of. Incest is here represented by mother and son driving away together and, characteristically, the incest begins at the moment when the father disappears. Abraham felt that this fantasy had as its aim '. . . the tendency to prevent the parents from coming together.

The intention to separate the parents belongs to those instinctual manifestations which derive with particular frequency from the œdipus complex.'

The elements of rescue in the œdipus complex are seen with especial clarity in Hamlet which, according to the renowned Shakespearean scholar Georg Brandes (1896), was written immediately after the death of Shakespeare's father. Shakespeare was thus '. . . under the immediate impact of his bereavement and, as we may well assume, . . . his childhood feelings about his father had been freshly revived' *(5,* p. 265*)*. Usually it is evident that the rescue in the œdipal myth is associated with, and a reaction to the primary hostile attitude of the son toward his father. Œdipus is told by the oracle that he will kill his father and marry his mother, acts which he subsequently unwittingly performs.

A vivid description of the subjective elements of the rescue fantasy appears in chapter nine of Mohandas Gandhi's autobiography *(8)*.

During Gandhi's sixteenth year his father was bedridden and Gandhi acted as his nurse. Every night Gandhi massaged his father's legs, a service he loved to do and which he could not remember ever having neglected. Gandhi went for an evening stroll or retired only at the insistence of his father, or after the latter had fallen asleep. 'This', says Gandhi, 'was also the time when my wife was expecting a baby, a circumstance which, as I can see today, meant a double shame for me. For one thing I did not restrain myself as I should have done whilst I was yet a student. And secondly, this carnal lust got the better of what . . . was even a greater duty, my devotion to my parents, Shravana having been my ideal since childhood.' Gandhi's father had bought his young son, Mohandas, a book describing Shravana's unusual devotion to his parents. Says Gandhi, 'I read it with intense interest. There came to our place about the same time itinerant showmen. One of the pictures I was shown was of Shravana carrying, by means of slings fitted for his shoulders, his blind parents on a pilgrimage.' The book and the picture left an indelible impression on his mind. Another version relates how Shravana's father was accidentally shot one night by a hunter who

mistook him for an animal. Shravana never forgave himself for having put his father down on the ground, thus making the accident possible.

Despite the efforts of physicians and local quacks, the condition of Gandhi's father deteriorated. An operation was recommended but then thought inadvisable because of his advanced age. Gandhi's uncle, much devoted to his brother, arrived. 'The dreadful night came. . . . It was ten-thirty or eleven P.M. I was giving the massage. My uncle offered to relieve me. I was glad and went straight to the bedroom. My wife, poor thing, was fast asleep. But how could she sleep when I was there? I woke her up. In five or six minutes, however, the servant knocked at the door. . . . "Get up", he said, "Father is very ill". I knew of course that he was very ill, and so I guessed what "very ill" meant at that moment. I sprang out of bed. "What is the matter? Do tell me!" "Father is no more." So all was over! I had but to wring my hands. I felt deeply ashamed and miserable. . . . I saw that, if animal passion had not blinded me, I should have been spared the torture of separation from my father during his last moments. I should have been massaging him, and he would have died in my arms. But now it was my uncle who had had this privilege. He was so deeply devoted to his elder brother that he had earned the honor of doing him the last services! . . . The shame, to which I have referred, . . . was this shame of my carnal desire even at the crucial hour of my father's death, which demanded wakeful service. It is a blot I have never been able to efface or forget, and I have always thought that although my devotion to my parents knew no bounds and I would have given up anything for it, yet it was weighed and found unpardonably wanting because my mind was at the same moment in the grip of lust. I have always regarded myself as a lustful, though a faithful husband. . . . Before I close this chapter of my double shame, I may mention that the poor mite that was born to my wife scarcely breathed for more than three or four days. Nothing else could be expected. Let all those who are married be warned by my example.'

Freud thought that the rescue fantasy might be derived from the child's hearing it said that he owed his life to his parents, more specifically that his mother gave him life *(7)*. The boy desired '. . . to return this gift to the parents and to repay them

with one of equal value. . . . [The boy] then forms the fantasy of *rescuing his father from danger and saving his life;* in this way he puts his account square with him. . . . In its application to a boy's father it is the defiant meaning in the idea of rescuing which is by far the most important; where his mother is concerned it is usually its tender meaning. . . . The son shows his gratitude by wishing to have by his mother a son who is like himself: in other words, in the rescue fantasy he is completely identifying himself with his father. . . . Under the laws governing the expression of unconscious thoughts, the meaning of rescuing may vary, depending on whether the author of the fantasy is a man or a woman. . . . At times there is also a tender meaning contained in rescue fantasies directed toward the father. In such cases they aim at expressing the subject's wish to have his father as a son—that is, to have a son who is like his father.'

It is clear that normally, in the œdipal phase of development, a son desires to take his father's place, a daughter her mother's. A frequent variant of this is the fantasy in which a son rescues his father from mortal danger and a daughter her mother from the same.

In 1872, Frances Power Cobbe *(4)* published a book which she called Darwinism in Morals, and Other Essays. A chapter on dreams, from which the following passage is quoted, is contiguous to our subject.

'The subject of a dream being . . . suggested to the brain . . . , the next thing to be noted is, How does the brain treat its theme when it has got it? Does it dryly reflect upon it, as we are wont to do awake? Or does it pursue a course wholly foreign to the laws of waking thoughts? It does, I conceive, neither one nor the other, but treats its theme, whenever it is possible to do so, according to a certain very important, though obscure, law of thought, whose action we are too apt to ignore. We have been accustomed to consider the myth-creating power of the human mind as one specially belonging to the earlier stages of growth of society and of the individual. It will throw, I think, a rather curious light on the

subject if we discover that this instinct exists in every one of us, and exerts itself with more or less energy through the whole of our lives. In hours of waking consciousness, indeed, it is suppressed, or has only the narrowest range of exercise, as in the tendency, noticeable in all persons not of the very strictest veracity, to supplement an incomplete anecdote with explanatory incidents, or to throw a slightly-known story into the dramatic form, with dialogues constructed out of their own consciousness. But such small play of the myth-making faculty is nothing compared to its achievements during sleep. The instant that daylight and commonsense are excluded, the fairy work begins. At the very least half our dreams (unless I greatly err) are nothing else than myths formed by unconscious cerebration on the same approved principles, whereby Greece and India and Scandinavia gave to us the stories which we were once pleased to set apart as "mythology" proper. Have we not here, then, evidence that there is a real law of the human mind causing us constantly to compose ingenious fables explanatory of the phenomena around us,—a law which only sinks into abeyance in the waking hours of persons in whom the reason has been highly cultivated, but which resumes its sway even over their well-tutored brains when they sleep.'*

*'A correspondent has kindly sent me [Frances Power Cobbe] the following interesting remarks on the above: "When dropping asleep some nights ago I suddenly started awake with the thought on my mind, 'Why I was *making* a dream!' I had detected myself in the act of inventing a dream. Three or four impressions of scenes and events which had passed across my mind during the day were present together in my mind, and the effort was certainly being made, but not by my fully conscious will, to arrange them so as to form a continuous story. They had actually not the slightest connection, but a process was evidently going on in my brain by which they were being united into one scheme or plot. Had I remained asleep until the plot had been matured, I presume my waking sensation would have been that I had had an ordinary dream. But perhaps through the partial failure of the unconscious effort at a plan, I woke up just in time to catch a trace of the 'unconscious cerebration' as it was vanishing before the full light of conscious life. I accordingly propounded a tentative theory to my friends, that the brain uniting upon one thread the fancies and memories present at the same time in the mind, is really what takes place in dreams—a sort of faint shadow of the mind's natural craving for and effort after system and unity. Your explanation of dreams, by reference to the 'myth-making tendency', seems to be so nearly in accord with mine that I venture to write on the subject." '

The relationship between dreams and the collective fantasies known as myths is thus well known and long established. As the dream reflects in part the infantile wishes of an individual, so does the myth reflect the strivings, taboos, and motivations of a people. Freud and Abraham have commented on the intimate relationship between dream and myth as regards their comprehensibility, contents, motive forces, and pathological structures which, in Rank's words, justify 'the interpretation of myth as a dream of the masses of the people'. The hostility of a son toward his father is described in the classical myths of Œdipus and others in all of which some royal father is the recipient of the prophecy of a future disaster to which he ultimately succumbs, the victim of his son. In the Œdipus story parricide is combined with incest with the mother; in another version, the story of Cronos, Cronos having been warned that he would be slain by one of his children, kills all of them but one, Zeus, to whom he in turn succumbs.

Abraham *(1,* p. 161*)* explained the difficulty in analyzing the typical dream 'by the symbolic disguise of the intrinsic content'. He drew a detailed and close analogy between myths and dreams, both of which employ a symbolic mode of representation, and other familiar mental mechanisms, both of which have manifest as well as latent contents, and both of which are susceptible not only to repression but also to proper analysis.

SUMMARY

The analysis of a number of instances of the same typical dream, reported by various analysands, is recorded. Their common theme of the death of a parent and the rescue fantasy is discussed. The similarity of typical dreams to folklore and myth is reviewed.

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FANTASY SYSTEMS IN TWINS

BY JACOB A. ARLOW, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Since ancient times twins, especially identical twins, have aroused wonderment and awe. In the mythology of almost all ancient and primitive cultures twins have figured as cultural heroes, demigods, and progenitors. The birth of twins into a community was often regarded as a magical symbol full of portent for either good or evil, and supernatural powers were ascribed to pairs of twins.

Scientific interest in twins is of relatively recent origin, stemming from the pioneer work of Galton less than one hundred years ago. From his early work to the work of current investigators such as Slater *(29)*, Kallman *(15)*, and Newman *(24)*, two sets of problems in the main have been studied: first, the biology of twinning with emphasis on growth and development, and second, twins as an experiment of nature. Interest in the latter centered almost exclusively on uniovular or identical twins. From the point of view of the geneticist, binovular twins are essentially distinct and different individuals. Their relationship is fraternal and their twin birth is merely an accident of timing. Uniovular twins are, however, genetically identical. The subsequent course of their life histories has been made a proving ground for testing various hypotheses, especially the relative influence of environment or heredity on personality structure and character formation *(31)*.

Essentially these studies *on* twins are not studies *of* twins. Twins are used as a vehicle for investigating some problem not specifically related to the twinship. A truly voluminous literature of this sort has appeared in psychiatry. Such studies are usually statistical and attempt to derive from the development of twins evidence establishing the hereditary nature of criminality, psychosis, and sexual perversion *(15, 29, 31)*. Naturally,

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these studies shed very little light on the psychology of twins. A systematic psychoanalytic study of fraternal and identical twins would constitute an invaluable area for research and would increase our knowledge concerning a host of problems in developmental psychology, character formation, and choice of symptom, among others. Nonetheless, the psychology of twinship, especially the subjective experience of having a twin and of being a twin, is a fascinating subject in itself, and is the subject of this paper.

The literature of psychoanalysis is not extensive on twins, but the studies published are quite illuminating. Orr *(25)* has reviewed the literature, including the contributions of Grotjahn *(12)*, Hartmann *(13, 14)*, Cronin *(4)*, Steinfeld *(30)*, Knight *(17)*, and Menninger *(23)*. I will discuss only those features of the problem pertinent to the present study. Hartmann warned against connecting to the twinship those elements not specifically related to it from the etiological point of view.

The disadvantageous aspects of being a twin were stressed by Cronin *(4)*. He pointed out the strong feelings of inferiority which derive from the twinship, the feelings of resentment at the attention directed to the twin, and the hampering of independent initiative. In his study twin rivalry was not conspicuous but the homosexual relationship between the twins was satisfied through the medium of a common love object. The less mature twin felt a need to prove himself and to establish his equality with the other. The feeling of lack of completeness and disturbed sense of identity have been discussed by Steinfeld *(30)* who emphasized the reaction-formations growing out of the intense rivalry between the twins and their struggle for identity.[1] Ambivalence was one of the outstanding features in his observations and he felt that there is no security for a twin in a homosexual adjustment; rather there is a tendency to develop severe compulsions or anxiety neuroses.[2]

[1] *Cf.* also: Joseph, Edward D.: *An Unusual Fantasy in a Twin with an Inquiry into the Nature of Fantasy*. This QUARTERLY, XXVIII, 1959, pp. 189-206. [Ed.]

[2] See also Karpman *(16)*.

The need to re-create the twinship relationship was stressed by Knight *(17)* who also emphasized the crippling effects on ego development from being confronted by a mirror image of oneself and from the feeling that the environment regards each of the twins only as a reflection of the other. The tendency, observed in studies by academic psychologists, for twins to form reciprocal relationships with aggressive and submissive partners was also noted by Orr. His patient, a fraternal twin, felt vastly inferior to his stronger and more mature twin who seemed more plenteously endowed from the phallic point of view. Orr demonstrated that a premium was placed upon twins being identical because, in such an adjustment, neither could excel or be preferred. At the same time the price paid in achieving this solution was a certain sacrifice of individuality and the development as a separate personality. He also observed a tendency to accentuate passive oral dependent attitudes and pregenital sexuality in his twin patient. Orr raises the question why one twin became the more passive, but produced no differentiating factor in the experience or in the relationship of the twins toward each other.

With the exception of Steinfeld's cases, the twins reported in the literature are fraternal and not identical twins. Concerning identical twins, psychoanalytic literature contains few references to the attitude toward the twinship and little material concerning possible differentiating factors which might operate in fostering distinct psychological structures in members of a set of identical twins. No mention is made of the relationship between the older and the younger twin, or of the role which fantasies concerning the twinship may play in the formation of character structure or in the choice of symptomatology.

The searching, psychoanalytically oriented observations of children by Dorothy Burlingham *(3)* are most pertinent and illuminating. She reminds us that in popular fantasy twins are reputedly very proud of their twinship and fond of each other. This concept formed the beginning of her investigation into

the psychology of twins. She traces the fantasy of having a twin to the period when the œdipal wish to possess the parent has ended in disappointment. The child then fantasies having a twin who will be an inseparable companion. A companion created in compensation for the lost love object is one who will be ever-loving and ever-present: 'The bond of complete understanding which is missing with the parent unites the twins in the wish fantasy'. Burlingham considers from her observations of children to what extent the actual experience of having a twin fulfils the wishes of the fantasy. She concludes that although reality shows that the twin relationship is threatened by negative and aggressive feelings which manifest themselves in competition and rivalry for the parents' love, and that the twin relationship goes through stormy periods, nevertheless the need for the twin survives these conflicts and the partners in the twinship adjust and mutually adapt their personalities: 'In this manner the twin relationship becomes the closest known tie between two individuals'. She states that since the twins have equal status, and since neither could claim the prerogatives of the elder nor the indulgence usually afforded to the younger, envies and jealousies could not be settled by falling completely into the roles of stronger and weaker, as siblings usually do. Twins change roles repeatedly and the need for each other serves as a powerful check to negative feelings which arise from envy, jealousy, and competition.

Burlingham's observations were made in the unusual and rather atypical setting of a wartime evacuation nursery. Separation from parents, intermittent visiting, group living, and a professional staff shared by a large group constituted only a few of the special conditions which have to be borne in mind in evaluating this experience. In addition, the setting was one of observation and education of children by psychoanalytically trained nurses, teachers, and supervisors. The relationship to psychoanalytic formulations of child observation and therapeutic psychoanalysis carried out on children and adults has been covered in great detail by Kris *(18)* and his associates at

Yale, and by many others. The data obtained by analysis of children and by observation of children are obviously not identical, and different orders of propositions may be drawn from the derived experiences. Each field of observation has its own characteristic advantages and disadvantages. The two approaches clearly serve to complement each other. Reconstructions in adult analyses enable us to supply missing data which observations of children cannot provide—specifically, unverbalized, wishful fantasies which children are unable to communicate because of language difficulties and which, at best, in observations of children, can only be inferred through interpretation of behavior.

Among the voluminous data of analytic observations I have decided to limit this presentation to the fantasy systems, especially as they relate to twinship, to the vicissitudes of certain of the drive conflicts, and to problems of object choice. The principles which serve to justify this emphasis on the fantasy system have been outlined in a paper on the relationship between masturbation and symptom-formation *(2)*. It will be recalled that Freud considered the fantasy life a special preserve, immune from the inroads of the reality principle. Fantasies represent a distillate or a continuing precipitate of the effects of the earliest wishes related to the drives. Fantasy systems grow and develop in their concrete expression, although the underlying instinctual wish may remain unchanged. The concrete terms in which the current version of the fantasy or its predecessors are expressed demonstrate the effects of the various components of the psychic structure as they mature, and how they transform the deepest instinctual strivings of the individual. Derivative representation of the wishes and the images representing the objects involved undergo many defensive vicissitudes in the course of development, and at various phases in the life of the individual the defensive function of the ego may be observed in operation by comparing the unconscious version of the fantasy with the daydream or with that part of the fantasy which contributes toward acting out and symptom-formation.

As mythology may be regarded from one point of view as a communal fantasy expressing elaborations of current drive conflicts projected onto figures of the past *(1, 28)*, the study of mythology may furnish us with clues concerning the psychology of twins. In the literature of mythology two patterns of twin relationship emerge: a positive, friendly one, and a negative, hostile one. In the former twins work as a unit and by the complementary relationship of their attributes lend strength, wisdom, and alertness to each other, especially at critical moments when they either protect, save, or augment the forces of the other. Twins, furthermore, are believed to have a special telepathic form of communication. This communication may be expressed in the form of transfer of thought or, symbolically, through events which transpire to common or identical belongings. This form of communication serves to enhance the expression of the sense of identity which signifies the essential unity of the twins. What happens to one happens to the other; or the changes or dangers experienced to the belongings of one may cause similar changes to occur in the belongings of the other and thus serve to communicate a signal for help. The obvious implication of the need which arises in these myths for one twin to rescue the other will not be elaborated at this point. Two myths of special significance, however, should be mentioned. First, Plato's myth about the origin of love between the sexes, which is essentially a twin relationship. What was originally a unit, an androgynous individual, was split into a pair, each of whom continued to seek the other to consummate a reunion. The second myth is a little-known story of Narcissus quoted by Pausanius *(8)*. In this myth Narcissus pines away while looking into a pool, not only looking at his own reflected image but searching for the image of his beloved twin sister who had drowned in the same pool.

Equally numerous are those myths of twins in which a hostile competitiveness predominates. An inequality between the twins is the motive: one is superior, the other inferior. Occasionally one is an immortal god, the other a mortal man. The

superior twin may be characterized by outstanding qualities of strength, fleetness, wisdom, while the other is slow-witted, weak, cowardly. At another level, one twin is the mother's favorite, the other the father's favorite. Not infrequently in such myths one of the twins is murdered either intentionally or inadvertently by the other.

These two themes in the mythology of twins are not mutually exclusive. The initially friendly relationship between twin heroes is transformed into a mortal struggle for supremacy. This form of resolution of prototypical situations in terms of the antecedent instinctual conflict is a very common tendency in myths. This type of myth, therefore, epitomizes the polarization of attitudes which are observed once unconscious processes are brought to consciousness in the course of psychoanalytic therapy. The underlying ambivalence emerges once the defensive reaction-formations are analyzed.

I am not of the opinion that being one of a set of twins is the exclusive, definitive element in the development of the personality, character structure, or the etiology of a neurotic illness in a member of a twin pair. Twins are individuals before they are aware of their special relationship. The first experience with the twin sibling is clearly that of a rival and an intruder in the earliest phases of instinctual gratification. As a result of later data obtained from experience with the reactions of individuals in the environment, the awareness of a clear self-image, a sense of identity, and the relationship between the sense of self and the mirror image *(7)*, the knowledge of twinship develops, and with it the conflict concerning the self-image. This is clearly borne out by the very striking reports of development made by Burlingham. The material of my analytic observations confirms her findings. The mirror image of the self is identified by the child as his twin before the child realizes that it is a reflection of his own self.

None of the literature cited to this point, however, dwells upon the very crucial bit of information which comes to all twins in the course of development: the fact that they are dis-

tinguished from other individuals by virtue of having been born together, that is, by virtue of having shared the womb during their period of gestation, and of having emerged not simultaneously but one following the other. Such concepts do not develop until the fourth to sixth years of life. At this point the twins realize that they must recast their entire personal myth, as Kris calls it, of the early years of their lives in terms of this newly found knowledge. A new sense of relationship to each other, to individuals born separately, and to the mother who bore them together develops.

The two patients whose analyses form the basis of this communication were both males from separate sets of reputedly identical twins who resembled each other to such an extent that even their mothers had difficulty in telling them apart in the early years of life.

Twin A was a surviving twin, the younger sibling. He had lost his twin at the age of eighteen and entered analysis in his early thirties because of acute anxiety hysteria. His chief symptoms were various abdominal pains and other sensations, and claustrophobia. Both members of this twin group had enjoyed their twinship. They had, in fact, emphasized their identity and were treated as a unit during the early years by their mother. They were a pair of 'friendly' twins.

The neurotic illness which A suffered was definitely related to his twinship. He and his twin brother had been born to poverty-stricken parents. His mother was extremely proud of them and treated them as a unit, often calling them simply, 'the twins'. There were an older sister and brother. The twins were reared also in part by the sister and an aunt.

Because of their parents' inadequacies the twins soon learned to depend upon each other and became an extremely self-reliant unit. From earliest childhood, the patient felt that he and his brother were happy in their shared sense of unity, so much so that in the course of the years certain aspects of his sense of identity became blurred. It became difficult, for ex-

ample, for the patient to recall whether certain events happened to him or to his twin. The two harmonized naturally when they sang, and when they read a book together they either read at the same rate or knew in a kind of telepathic way when they were both ready to turn the page. They shared their belongings and their activities, and while they were not openly competitive, they competed as a pair with their contemporaries, often maintaining good terms with each other at the price of arousing hostility among their friends. The patient believed he gained a sense of accrued power in this duality and felt no resentment at being a twin. His twin was sufficiently an alter ego and mirror image that often when he wanted to know if an article of clothing was suited to him, he would look to see how it appeared on his twin brother.

Twin A had a definite feeling of inferiority and submissiveness toward his older twin. He felt that the brother had a slight advantage over him, part of which he believed was anatomically determined. This he related to the fact that he bore a slight scar on his phallus from circumcision, and he felt that his brother's organ was stronger and more attractive than his own. In addition he felt that his brother was a trifle taller, handsomer, and brighter in his studies, although only a small fraction of a percentage separated their averages. A's brother, however, did get a prize in school which A did not attain, but the patient was sure that he recalled sharing vicariously the pleasure of his brother's achievement.

There was a definite period of childhood neurosis between the ages of four and six. Twin A had repeated nightmares in which he felt that an intruder was banging on the door, or a murderer or thief had entered his room with a knife. During these nightmares he observed that the twin brother's bed was empty. He also had a fear of the dark when going into the cellar. He maintained that this was a fear of being alone and that the sense of aloneness included his brother; thus, the presence of his brother did not alleviate his anxiety when they went into the dark cellar, but the presence of someone other than

his twin did. He had an anxiety during a short period when he was separated from his brother and was greatly relieved when they were reunited. During puberty he developed constipation and abdominal cramps which he felt were related to eating something which he should not have, especially cucumbers. This gave him a premonition that he would suffer an attack of appendicitis and would have to undergo an operation. Three female members of his family had had appendectomies.

Toward the end of adolescence, and shortly before the death of his twin, he became aware of a wish to establish his own identity. There were two things which he did not share with his brother. They were masturbation, and the money he had saved to begin taking out girls. It was against the background of this emerging attempt to establish himself as an independent entity that the critical events connected with his brother's death took place. At this time the patient began to experience a wish to surpass his brother in his studies. The twins were taking the same final examinations in college when, prior to a test, the brother complained of some abdominal pain. In the course of the test, the patient observed his brother leaving when he himself had only half finished the examination. His thought was that his brother, as usual, had done very well and had finished early. He determined to stay to the very end in order to check his examination paper and to get the highest possible grade. When he arrived home he discovered that his brother had not returned from school. He was terrified by his mother's questioning and shortly afterward a policeman notified them that his brother had collapsed in the subway. He had been taken to a hospital where a diagnosis of appendicitis was made but no operation was performed for several days. The twin developed peritonitis and after a period of delirium during which my patient urgently assured his brother that he had passed his examination with an 'A', the twin brother died. At the moment of his brother's death, A was at a movie. This greatly intensified his feeling of guilt.

My patient responded to his brother's death by massive

denial. He did not once look at the corpse nor did he go into the funeral parlor. When the coffin was being lowered into the grave he averted his eyes. Subsequently, whenever he met anyone who did not know that his brother had died he did not inform him. When questioned directly, 'How is your brother?', he would reply, 'He is all right'. Each evening he would say 'good night' to the brother's empty bed and often when he took walks by himself he would converse with his brother, asking his opinions with respect to various plans. When he visited the grave he would speak to his brother and would be convinced that in the sound of the wind rustling through the trees or in the distant call of a bird in flight he heard his brother's response. To bolster this denial he asserted vigorously his belief in a hereafter although by the time he entered analysis his faith in religion had been shattered.

Accompanying the denial there was evidence of introjection of the lost object. He appropriated his brother's club cap and had his brother buried in his own club cap. He also incorporated the initial of his brother's first name into his own and asked his friends to write memoirs of his brother. These, with other mementos, he stored in a shoe box which he treasured as his most valuable possession.

Through this massive denial and the mechanism of introjection he managed to avert a severe psychological illness. A combination of events were precipitating factors in his illness ten years later. In military service he was assigned to a special combat battalion. At the last moment before he was to be sent overseas, he was separated from his unit to permit use of his specialized business training by the armed services. Subsequently it developed that his battalion was the spearhead of an invasion and was decimated in its first military engagement.

Shortly after discharge from service he went to visit the aunt who had played an important role in rearing him and found his uncle critically ill with asthma. The family physician absolved himself of any responsibility for treating the case at home, urging the aunt to take her husband to a hospital. The

hospital attendant who came with the ambulance felt that the man was too sick to be moved and refused to take the responsibility of transporting him to the hospital. The aunt then turned to her nephew to make the decision. As he could not stand by passively watching his uncle expire, he agreed to take him to the hospital in the ambulance. On the way to the hospital, the uncle died in the patient's arms.

The next evening the patient had a nightmare in which he saw a mirror image of himself leave his sleeping body and begin to float toward the ceiling. He made a desperate effort to pull the image back into himself and awoke in great panic with a sense of depersonalization, a panic at being alone, and a feeling of losing his identity. The following day, while traveling home from work with a group of contemporaries, who served as sibling substitutes, he had an acute attack of claustrophobia in the subway and arranged to be taken to an excellent hospital near the station. He had had acute anxiety, a sense of suffocation, a fear of being caught in the train, and was uneasy at the presence of other people in the train. The abdominal pains of his puberty years recurred, and the fear of being alone was intense. When the abdominal pains became acute he would turn to his body, as if addressing his abdomen, saying, 'What do you want from me? Why don't you leave me alone? Am I not suffering enough?'.

The main features of the analysis of his two principal sets of symptoms related to conflicts concerning his guilt over his brother's death. After the denial of this event had been analyzed, he began to face his hostile wishes toward his brother, his resentment toward his mother for having borne him as one of a set of twins, and his unconscious wish to repudiate the twinship in the fantasy of having been born as a single individual. He realized that he had accepted an inferior, hostilely submissive attitude toward his older twin because he felt that he himself was the intruder. The older was the real baby entitled to exclusive possession of the breast and mother. This attitude colored every position he took in subsequent typical

situations of conflict or competition. By yielding to his brother some token of superiority, no matter how slight, he had tried to overcome his guilt at being a thief. Since actual privation relating to food was a common experience in his family during childhood, he had many opportunities to re-experience this sense of guilt.

The idea of being born a single individual had fascinated him secretly as a child and he had envied his friends whom he considered more fortunate in this respect. The neurotic fear of being alone constituted in part that special form of self-punishment described by Freud *(10)* and Loewenstein *(22)*. In this form of self-punishment, what was formerly a striving of the id is transformed into a punishment by the superego. As he had wished to be alone, he was now being punished by being alone.

As the younger of the twins he imagined that his brother had opened the womb for him, had paved the way for the difficult passage into life. As the weaker of the two, he doubted whether he would have been able to manage the task. This fear was connected with the fear of being trapped in a subway train with a sense of suffocation.

Fantasies of being alone in the womb were retrospective, orally regressive expressions of œdipal wishes. In this fantasy he envisaged himself a solitary fœtus luxuriating in a state of undisturbed satiety, growing strong and robust, nurtured by the contents of the mother's body. To emerge as a solitary individual instead of as a twin it was necessary to have first devoured his sibling *in utero;* accordingly, the hostile introject, which figured so prominently in his later neurosis and which acted as an internalized persecutor as well as a vengeful superego figure, was derived from an early wish-fulfilling fantasy of incorporating the rival twin with the view toward eliminating him as well as acquiring his phallic strength. The patient's own body, in this instance, served as the claustrum for the incorporated twin, but far from having been an incorporative fusion into one individual as he had fantasied it to be

in childhood, the neurotic illness proved it to be a stressful internal dualism. A hated and injured rival had been incorporated into the patient's body. The patient began to study the manifestations of the activity of this internalized twin and identified him with the popular concept of a dibbuk,[3] which made itself manifest through the suffering it caused the patient. As long as the patient suffered he was satisfied that his denial of his brother's death was effective. The brother still lived within him and he had no need to feel guilty. Expelling the introject was unconsciously equated with killing the brother again.

A's feeling of having stolen breast and mother, and his fear of retaliation had formed part of his childhood neurosis—that aspect of it which related to the fear of the intruding thief of the nightmare. He felt that the secondary position which a younger twin adopts, because of guilt, leaves an indelible stamp on his character which is especially marked in comparison with the older twin. The older twin exists by virtue of a rightful prerogative and his general attitude toward objects reflects this. The younger twin, he maintained, exists only by sufferance, and his haunting sense of guilt colors his personality. On the basis of this distinction, A asserted that he was able to determine in any pair of identical twins he met who was the older and who was the younger.[4]

From the material presented, the analysis of the claustrophobic symptoms seemed in part quite clear. The anxiety generated by the presence of other people in the claustrum derived from the fear of the vengeful twin figure who had shared intrauterine existence with the patient. When the patient became claustrophobic, he could relieve his anxiety by looking at the occupant of an adjacent car; observing that the other individual was comfortable, he became comfortable. The identity of the

[3] An image from Jewish folklore in which a dead spirit enters and takes possession of a living person's body.

[4] In an independent effort to check this observation, I have come to the conclusion that my patient was probably quite correct in his assertion.

other individual as a twin figure was established when the patient looked in the mirror and said, 'If that fellow in the mirror seems so comfortable, why should I be upset?'. The patient was thus reproducing the mechanism of the protector under protection *(6)*, and assuring himself magically that his hostile wishes had not destroyed his brother *in utero*. Other elements contributing to the symptom will only be mentioned: the wish to undo the brother's death; taking the introject to 'an excellent hospital' where proper care could be administered; the wish to resurrect the dead brother by giving birth to the fantasied pregnancy which the patient carried first in the shoe box and then in his own body.[5]

Surveying the world of adults, twins observe other groups of two, a male and female pair who form a unit and share a bed. Accordingly, the already established prephallic tendency of each twin to assume a dominant or a submissive role *(3, 5, 16, 19)* develops, in the phallic phase, into a relationship which consists of acting out the fantasy of being a heterosexual couple. This new libidinal tie is utilized at the same time to cement the friendly relationship which may have been established as a reaction-formation against the intense rivalries of earlier phases. Characteristically, the patient unconsciously identified himself as the feminine member of the couple. He yearned, however, to castrate and incorporate the older twin's phallus in a fantasy of sexual relations in which he submitted passively. As could be anticipated, this wish was projected into the prenatal phase and was expressed in a fantasy of intrauterine

[5] In this presentation special emphasis has been placed on the rivalry between the twins. The twin sibling, of course, is a most convenient representative of the father, older brother, or other rivals of the œdipal phase. The intruder into the claustrum, in this instance, also represented the father's phallus. The major conflicts related to the œdipal phase and, in keeping with this level of conflict, the outstanding anxiety was castration. Patient A also had the fantasy that his twin brother represented his own phallus *(20)*. Accordingly, separation from the twin came to represent castration. The presence of the twin or of the mirror image could be used as assurance against the danger of castration. Separation anxiety and conflict over possession of the breast, in this case, were regressive oral manifestations of the œdipal rivalry.

sexual relations. This libidinal bond was augmented by the tendency to narcissistic object choice. The harmonious solution of the twin rivalry *(9)* and the libidinal tie which binds the twins culminates in a wish which is quite common among twins, namely, the desire to marry twins and to live in a *ménage à quatre,* either in one or in two homes. A case is reported by Cronin in which one twin shared his wife with his brother. Twin A, before the death of his brother, fantasied two distinct but contiguous households in which both he and his twin brother were married to a pair of twins. Mutual exchange of wives as a result of confusion was one of the elements of the fantasy. After the death of his brother, twin A expressed in the transference the wish to live in a house near me.

Twin B was the older sibling of his twin pair. He sought analysis complaining of impotence. Although not expressed, it became clear that he also had what one might call 'claustrophilia'. Other complaints were of feelings of loneliness, inability to fall in love, and difficulty in maintaining close contacts and friendships. He preferred, in fact, to be alone in his room. The mother of the B twins made no special effort to treat them as a unit, and the patient made every effort to repudiate their identity, at times resorting to outright denial of the twin relationship when he was mistaken for his brother. This was an 'unfriendly' set of twins who had not achieved a harmonious resolution of the twin rivalry, at least in so far as the patient was concerned. Twin B and his brother, who was some three minutes his junior, were both short in stature. Their older brother was quite tall and attractive.

The parents had severe characterological disturbances. The father was a highly successful, megalomanic businessman who acted out an illusion of omnipotence. He was unusually penurious and seemed to be motivated by a fear of starvation. The mother was some twenty years her husband's junior and to a considerable degree shared some of his tendencies. Since the family was wealthy there was always a maid or a nurse to assist

the mother with the twins. When they were about five years old, their mother returned to employment in the father's business. She was a compulsive feeder; she made no effort to treat the twins as a unit or to dress them alike, nor was she successful in helping them resolve their early rivalry.

As a result, the twin relationship of identity never was accepted openly, certainly not by my patient who was the older. He repudiated his brother and fantasied that his twin was not really a member of the family. He recalled only the disadvantages of having a twin. He refused to associate with his brother, would not share his friends with him, resented his presence. He treated him with the contempt of a superior in every respect.

He was openly resentful at being confused with his twin by his mother and others. He did everything he could to compound the confusion which meant to him that he was unloved and denied the dignity of a person in his own right. He felt in this regard that he had been wronged by fate (mother), and he developed the psychology of the exception in exaggerated form. He vented his revenge by being as confusing as possible in his behavior and speech. This hostility found expression in pathological lying; he was, moreover, untrustworthy in his business and personal dealings. When he was six years old he dressed in the underclothing of one of the nurses and acted a hostile caricature of her. When she discovered some damage had been done to her clothing, he said that his twin was guilty. The innocent brother was accordingly punished. The patient was surprised some weeks later when the nurse discovered the truth that she should be angry with him: as one of the twins had been punished, he felt there was no longer reason for anyone to be angry.

Unresolved prephallic conflicts dominated B's personality and led to marked impairment in object relationships. As a child, he would refuse his mother's food, surreptitiously throw it into the toilet or hide it in some convenient place. The tendency to repudiate the mother's food persisted into adult

life in a habit of becoming quarrelsome with waitresses and the management of restaurants. Whenever the patient dined with his twin he managed in one way or another to make him feel guilty, especially about food. The hostile rivalry which the twins bore each other, as well as their resentment toward the mother who abandoned them at the age of five, resulted in a common renunciation of the love object in favor of the self as the object. Midway in this process was the narcissistic object choice of each twin by the other. At the beginning of puberty, for a period of a few months, they played a game of performing fellatio on each other. This was done alternately by one twin on the other who was supposedly asleep. Analysis revealed that one of the unconscious wishes expressed in this activity consisted of devouring and incorporating the other twin.

Although B could not live with his twin he did not want to live without him—at least in the sense of relinquishing any control or surveillance over him. It was a case of the reversal of the protector under protection. B feared that his brother would gain some advantage over him, and this pattern he repeated in all relationships. He found it impossible to coöperate with another individual, and with a series of 'friends' he acted out the demand, 'If I can't have what I want he should not have it either'.

One of the determinants of his impotence was the desire to wreak vengeance on the disappointing woman by disappointing her in turn. He had only the most tenuous relationships with members of either sex but especially with women. He changed partners frequently, rarely referred to them by name, and characteristically spoke of having a date with a pair of breasts or with a vagina.

This patient actually had 'claustrophilia' *(21)*. He tried to live out a fantasy of being in sole possession of the womb. He furnished an apartment most tastefully but was completely negligent in caring for it. After some work in analysis he hired, to keep it clean, a maid whom he pirated from his twin brother. In this apartment he was a recluse. He retired to its comfort and

security whenever possible and refused to answer the doorbell or the telephone.

It was his fantasy that the older of the twins was the real child while the second was an afterthought which he identified with the afterbirth. The second child had developed at the expense of the first, out of the supporting matrix, the contents of the interior of the mother's body. As B expressed his concept of twins: 'One is the real baby; the other is a shit'. He felt justified in assuming an attitude of haughty contempt toward his younger twin and regarded him as worthless. He blamed him for his short stature and lack of attractiveness. Had he had the opportunity to occupy the womb alone, he would have been as tall and attractive as his older brother.

The œdipal wish for sexual union with the mother bore the imprint of prephallic passive wishes. Unconsciously he confused the functions of the penis with those of the umbilical cord. During puberty he had erotic fantasies about a middle-aged school teacher. He imagined himself lying on the floor with a long, erect penis exposed. The school teacher, standing above him, permitted the supine patient to insert his penis into her. Connected in this way by the penis (umbilicus), the patient was transported passively by the teacher (mother) during all her activities. During intercourse, he re-enacted this fantasy as closely as he could. In business, he was constantly seeking some strong, successful person to whom he could attach himself dependently.

These observations demonstrate that twins are most ambivalent about their twinship. The final manifest attitude which twins adopt depends upon which aspect of the ambivalent relationship is repressed. It is almost unavoidable for twins to experience accentuated rivalry at all phases of instinctual development. This rivalry becomes especially notable during the œdipal phase and lends special color to the conflict. The probability of regressive reactivation of the preœdipal rivalry is very great in the case of twins. Whether the twins compete as indi-

viduals or try to please as a couple depends upon a great many factors which are operative from the earliest oral competition to the œdipal conflict, and even to later phases. Among these factors special attention must be given to the attitude of the mother toward the twins *(19, 26)*. Additionally significant is the manner in which the twins are integrated into the human environment. Apparently, the more common resolution of the rivalry is the harmonious twin relationships described by Burlingham. The ultimate relationships which such twins achieve are based upon the transformation of a competitive hostility into what resembles altruism *(9)* but which is fundamentally quite the opposite.

The solution is apparently achieved in a series of distinct phases. In the initial phase there is the self-centered wish to possess the breast and the mother without regard for the sibling. This is coupled with resentment toward both mother and sibling for having to share food, attention, or love in any form. In the next phase, the twin comes to realize that exclusive gratification is impossible and that some form of renunciation is inevitable. He begins to be willing to renounce his demands on condition that an equal renunciation be exacted from his rival. This gradually merges into a phase of complete sharing of the same objects or of complete renunciation of the objects. Since this goal is difficult to attain, a final solution is effected whereby separate but equal possession of object or objects becomes the necessary condition under which the twin relationship can be maintained in peace. The demand, to which the twins had complied passively with their parents that they share equally, is transformed into an actively asserted insistence by the twins that they should be treated equally.

The rivalry is by no means completely eliminated by this solution. In the distribution of possessions, for instance, it was noted repeatedly during the analytic work that any unintentional transgression of propriety on the part of one twin toward the other precipitated immediate and violent conflict. In the case of twin set B, the intense competitive hostility was never re-

solved and eventuated instead in a mutual renunciation of the mother. A profound disturbance of object relations followed, with a tendency toward heightened narcissism and narcissistic object choice. Of course, the unusual nature of the ego structure of the twins' parents must be taken into account. Gardner and Rexford *(11)* reported similar observations on a pair of female identical twins under similar circumstances of disturbed object relations (Cf. also [5]). In a sense, it is probable that all twins purchase good relations with each other at the expense of their relationships with other individuals.

Twins do not always enjoy the notion of being different from others although in childhood they may enjoy their identical appearance and may experience a certain sense of omnipotence from the twinship. As they grow older each resents not having a unique and separate identity. They tend to become increasingly annoyed at being confused with the other twin. Twin groups A and B showed opposite conscious attitudes toward the twinship, yet the analysis of 'friendly' twin A revealed unconscious repudiation of the twinship and the yearning to be a single individual. Both of these patients at some time had wished for an unshared childhood. This wish, in turn, revived the hostility stemming from the early rivalry and stimulated a great deal of guilt. These twins felt that they had been deprived by the mother and by fate because of having to share everything from the period of intrauterine existence onward.

To what extent superego structure in twins is influenced by the element of twinship is a problem which must await further study from a much larger sample than is available at this time. In varying degrees, it would appear that the psychology of the exception may be an important factor interfering with the normal development of superego function in twins. In addition, the possibility exists that, by possessing an alter ego who may be temporarily cast in the role of superego or ego ideal, a twin may find it easier to project and to deny impulses ordinarily repudiated and condemned by the superego. The fact that another person may represent the function of the superego

may not only interfere with the process of internalization of superego demands but may facilitate the possibility of deceiving or corrupting the superego.

Within the twin relationship it is of considerable moment which is the older and which the younger twin. The hostility and guilt felt between two siblings under ordinary circumstances were experienced in a most exaggerated way in the cases of twins A and B. The older twin (B) claimed the prerogatives of seniority although he had been delivered only a few minutes before his brother; the junior was regarded as an intruder, an intolerable rival at all stages of instinctual development. A, a junior twin, felt guilty, fantasying himself as a thief who had stolen the breast, and as a usurper during the phase of œdipal rivalry. Various retrospective intrauterine fantasies emerged or were reconstructed from the analytic material, and the wishes associated with these fantasies accorded with personality traits and characteristic symptoms which were encountered in these twins. It would be important to correlate these findings with the experience of other analysts who have analyzed twins to conclude to what extent generalizations may be derived. In these two cases, the rivalry which was imagined as beginning in the womb culminated in a struggle during the œdipal phase for the father's blessings, possessions, and prerogatives.

The clinical material raises many suggestions concerning the vicissitudes of object relations among twins. It is possible that the early libidinal tie between the twins and the vicissitudes of their rivalry may facilitate a tendency toward narcissistic object choice. In twin A, this was especially marked following the death of his brother when he sought to find a partner in marriage to replace him. Twinship promotes characteristic disturbances of the sense of identity. The threat to the sense of identity may be related, as in twin A, to castration anxiety, for, in this patient, the fantasy that the twin equals the phallus was very strong. In addition, the existence of another individual who is a reflection of the self brings the experience of twinship in line with the psychology of the double, of the mirror image

and of the shadow. These phenomena have been studied by Rank *(27)*, Elkisch *(7)*, and others. For the most part, these studies deal with the double as a typical defensive maneuver against danger, especially castration. In addition to the possibility which a real double affords in fending off certain specific dangers, the presence of a twin facilitates direct narcissistic gratification and indulgence. Praising and admiring a twin are more acceptable than saying the same thing about oneself. Both A and B were quick to share vicariously any advantage or special attribute which their twins demonstrated.

It is possible that the experience of having a twin accentuates the tendency toward ambivalence and facilitates the utilization of mechanisms of denial, projection, and the splitting of the ambivalent attitude between two different objects in the environment. Twin A had very strong and stable relationships to objects. In the case of twin B, impaired object relations was characteristic for members of his family. To what extent the element of being one of a twin aggravated the impairment of object relations is an open and important question. The bond which these twins had for each other not only weakened their dependence upon the mother but also interfered with relationships which they effected with other objects.

One general conclusion emerges very clearly from this study of twins. There is a vast difference between the wish to have a twin and the reality of being one. While it may be true that twinship represents one of the closest relationships possible between two individuals, it should be noted that this relationship is basically a highly ambivalent and narcissistic one fraught with a series of special psychological hazards.

SUMMARY

Following an outline of the literature and some observations from mythology, the analyses of two adult males from separate sets of reputedly identical twins are used as the basis for discussing fantasy systems, especially as they relate to twinship,

to the vicissitudes of certain drive conflicts, and to problems of object choice among twins.

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THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF CHILDREN'S FORMAL GAMES

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A patient recalled enthusiastically the fun he and his brother had had when as children they played a favorite game. The game was a common one to which they added minor variations. They colored some spools red with a crayon; these were Indians; other spools they colored black were the cavalry. With some large matchboxes, the horses, they then played hour after hour, conducting countless aggressive and counteraggressive maneuvers between the rival forces. When they were eleven and twelve their father objected so strongly to the continuation of this game that when they played it they locked themselves in a room to avoid his irritation. The father did not of course object to their playing, nor even to that particular game. His objection was to that game at that age.

The stand the father took is neither surprising nor unusual. It is based upon certain widely held assumptions regarding the appropriateness of games to the stage of development during which the game is played. A child of fifteen does not play hide-and-seek, nor does a child of nine play drop-the-handkerchief. The explanation offered here for this and related phenomena is based upon the nature and function of children's games.

'Play' and 'games' are words used in an overlapping way. The tendency is to use 'play' as a verb and 'game' as a noun (Let's play a game); but there are so many exceptions that no rule can be recognized. The term 'game' may also indicate play of a formal nature—what Waelder has called official games.

Instead of selecting play improvised by a single child, I have chosen for examination a group of formal, official, common or

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standard games, played almost universally throughout Western culture.

Let us first examine a number of academic psychological theories concerning the purpose of play as these have been summarized and classified by Kanner *(2)*.

The surplus energy theory postulates that in play the child 'blows off steam'. There is an 'aimless expenditure of energy' (Schiller 1875). A view closely related to this states that play is an expression of energy left over after the necessities of life have been satisfied (Spencer 1873).

The instinct practice theory holds that man does not play because he is young, but because he is required by nature to go through a period of childhood so that he may play and thus prepare himself for adult activities (Groos 1896).

The recreation theory assumes that play is a necessary means of satisfying a physiological need for relaxation: 'After work we require rest which accomplishes recuperation' (Lazarus 1883). Expressed somewhat differently the idea is that at the present stage of human evolution, there is a greater exercise of mental powers than previously; hence greater mental fatigue. Play avoids such fatigue by reverting to phylogenetically older, more deeply rooted racial habits which involve the relaxing use of muscles (Patrick 1916).

The recapitulation theory of G. Stanley Hall (1906) is based upon the idea that play can be explained by the history of the human race. The child goes through stages which recapitulate 'cultural epochs' in the evolution of the human race: animal, savage, nomadic, agricultural, and tribal. Hall regarded play as 'the motor habits and spirit of the past race persisting in the present as rudimentary functions. . . . This is why the heart of youth goes out to play, as into nothing else, as if in it man remembered a lost paradise.'

These theories presented are either physiologic or phylogenetic. They however provide a poor frame of reference for understanding the specific significance or the appropriateness of any particular game.

Of more recent origin are theories of play formulated by psychoanalysts. Play as data for psychoanalytic investigation and as a standard technique in psychoanalytic therapy with children has brought to it far greater understanding and deeper interest.

Waelder *(4)* summarizes the psychoanalytic theory as follows: 'The psychoanalytic contributions to the problem of play may be indicated by the following phrases: instinct of mastery; wish fulfilment; assimilation of overpowering experiences according to the mechanism of the repetition compulsion; transformation from passivity to activity; leave of absence from reality and from the superego; fantasies about real objects'.

Mitchell and Mason *(3)* suggest a theory of self-expression. 'Children find in play the medium for satisfaction of the great majority of their motives. Indeed, to children play is the serious business of life.' Play is the natural, most readily available outlet for those children's needs which cannot be expressed verbally, vocationally, or in other ways.

Erikson *(1)* says that he considers play 'a function of the ego . . . yet the emphasis . . . should be on the ego's need to master areas of life, especially those in which the individual finds his self, his body, and his social role wanting and trailing'. Erikson cites Freud's observation of an eighteen-month-old boy who invented a game of tossing toys into a corner; later he used a spool attached to a piece of string which he would toss out of sight and then retrieve. For this child, Freud stated, this game tempered the emotions aroused in him by prolonged absences of his mother from home. He thus became the master of absences and reappearances.

Of all the theories considered only the psychoanalytic provides a theoretical basis for understanding the individual meanings of a child's play.

It is my thesis that in standard games children attempt to master specific anxieties associated with individual situations which they are not able to resolve realistically. A standard

game has an underlying meaning which is perceived unconsciously by child and adult alike. A particular game is sanctioned if the situation it is designed to master is one which is recognized as legitimate at a certain age. It is not sanctioned if the situation is one which the child is expected to have mastered earlier in life. To illustrate, I offer an interpretative discussion of five formal games.

One of the most primitive, in some ways one of the most ingenious, of all children's games is the one known as peekaboo. It is primitive because there is no rule for it except an implicit one that no real harm shall come to the child. It is primitive also because competition, an element which occurs in nearly all games played by older children, is absent. Characteristically, in this game, a mother hides or more likely hides her face from the very young child; then suddenly she reappears, saying 'peekaboo', whereupon, if all goes well, the baby smiles or laughs. This universal game provides an excellent initial training for the mastery of anxiety in infancy about object loss.

By the time a child's ego has developed to a point where he has a reasonable grasp of the fate of external objects,—when, in other words, he has learned that things are not swallowed up and do not disappear arbitrarily—he should be finished with peekaboo. This can easily be confirmed by attempting the game with a three-or-four-year-old child. The 'boo' portion often survives into adolescence, but it then has a quite different significance. The recipient becomes an unintentional participant and the procedure is like a practical joke which, if a game at all, is of a different kind.

To demonstrate the mastery of anxiety associated with another situation, let us consider hide-and-seek. This game has many other names: red line, red light, beckon, kick-the-can, tappy-on-the-icebox to list but a few. The basic game is the same and variations are chiefly in the selection of a 'seeker', in the manner of establishing the time allowed for hiding, and in the finality with which a hider is 'caught' when he is found.

Typically, in hide-and-seek one of a group of children, gen-

erally called 'it', covers his eyes for a period of time while the others hide, then sets out to find them. This game appears to have been handed down from generation to generation. A child is lost; his whereabouts are unknown to 'it', who in this case is a surrogate for the searching parent. The game does not intend to have the child remain undiscovered, but almost undiscovered and then found,—or indeed, in most variants of the game, to be passed by and to run 'home free', that is, unpunished.

Interestingly, the child's punishment prescribed after he is found is that he play the part of the anxious searcher (the parent), thus assuming the concern felt by the anxious parent regarding separation. In hide-and-seek the child has an opportunity to play both the lost child and the searching parent,[1] and to obtain valuable information about the way he would feel or does feel if lost. When taking his turn as the searcher, the child also experiences the limits of parental anger and exasperation. Each of these mock experiences provides training in mastering the anxiety about being lost, and the game is so constructed that it will not fail and leave anxiety unresolved. That aspect of the game called running 'home free' provides this assurance. The lost child will always reach home. If not found by the 'it', the child can, so to speak, always find himself.

Children routinely stop playing hide-and-seek about the time of puberty. This coincides with the time when children leave home, by train, bus, airplane, or on long hikes without adult supervision, confident of their ability to find their way to a destination and to return home. In answer to the question, 'How long has it been since you played hide-and-seek?', a thirteen-year-old girl stated, 'About a year'. And when asked, 'Why?', she answered, 'Because nobody plays it any more, and because all of the old hiding places are gone'.

[1] Waelder observed that in play the child may change roles. Whereas in reality he is the suffering party or the anxious onlooker, in play he becomes the aggressor. Special attention should be called to the fact that in games the child does not simply reverse the role of reality, but provides himself with an opportunity to perform all the roles, e.g., exhibitor and spectator, chaser and chased, seeker and sought, laugher and fool, aggressor and passive recipient.

The game I-spy is very simple. A trinket, classically a thimble, is hidden by one member of a group and is sought by the remainder. 'Hidden' is inaccurate, since the rules of the game require that the object be placed in plain sight. To make certain that the game comes off, the person who has hidden the trinket says 'hot' or 'cold' to indicate proximity between the searcher and the object if the hunt flags. The first to locate the trinket announces 'I spy'.

In I-spy the child masters the anxiety regarding a lost or mislaid object which has been given affective importance. In the game nothing else in the room is of any interest. The child masters anxiety by finding what is lost. He demonstrates his visual acuity and wits; he competes and is maximally assured if he can spy first. Significantly, in this game the first one to find the object is then allowed to hide it. The child may also reassure himself against the loss of valued objects by cleverly demonstrating an ability to hide them from others.

An interesting point in regard to I-spy is that under certain circumstances adults may play the game; peekaboo is dropped by age two and hide-and-seek by twelve. Adults perhaps must continue to master their anxieties about lost or mislaid objects.

Let us consider now two games, drop-the-handkerchief and tag, which appear to have something in common. In drop-the-handkerchief a circle of children join hands, facing the center, while another child, a handkerchief in hand, circles behind them and drops it. The child then skirts the outside of the circle as quickly as he can, attempting not to be 'caught' by the person behind whom he has dropped the handkerchief. If he can go once around the circle, the child may take the place left vacant by his pursuer; thus one complete cycle of the game is completed.

In the game of tag, which has a number of minor variations as to what provides protection (squatting, touching a tree, striking a motionless pose), one person who is 'it' touches another person who then becomes 'it', which completes one unit

of the game. What these two games have in common is the disposing of something undesirable.

Drop-the-handkerchief is more complicated and yet at the same time, I feel, a more primitive game. Mastery consists in overcoming a stigma. Blame or responsibility is placed upon the child for an event over which he has no control. The stigmatizing object, the handkerchief, is placed directly behind the child or between his legs. The child's part of the game is to pick up the object and to relocate responsibility. If he can resume a position within the group, the child is then no more vulnerable than any of the other children. Drop-the-handkerchief is a preschool and first grade game. The anxiety which is mastered in this game represents one of the great preschool and first grade anxieties: that associated with the embarrassment which arises from the inability to anticipate and control excretion, a matter of concern to all young children away from home and mother for any length of time. After the age of six, a child can rarely be induced to play drop-the-handkerchief with any enthusiasm, although, except for its unconscious significance, this game is in no way more nonsensical than many others played by the older children who scorn it.

In the game of tag no tangible object is used, but as in drop-the-handkerchief the child has been stigmatized. The child attempts here to master the anxiety associated with dangers of physical contact, first by avoidance, then by disposing of the contamination. A definite ritual is apparent in tag, with evidence of magical thinking. By a mere touch one child places a stigma upon another and magically relieves himself of the stigma. One very ingenious aspect of tag is that the thing passed from one player to another is not seen. The 'nothing' that is passed may represent many things: disease or impregnation, bad luck or misfortune.

Because of the amorphous, unknown nature of what is transmitted, tag is played with more enthusiasm and over a broader span of years than any of the other games. Perhaps anxiety associated with magical contamination is never outgrown, so that

some activities carried on into adult life might be considered derivatives of tag (e.g., getting in the last lick or having the last word in a hostile exchange).

SUMMARY

Children of similar ages share problems in regard to the anxiety associated with the inability to master specific situations. In an attempt to solve these problems, they collaborate in playing specific games which in a symbolic way master anxiety, at the same time keeping it out of awareness. Adults as well as children unconsciously perceive the symbolic nature of 'the game'. Whether the game is considered appropriate or not depends upon whether it is felt to be proper for the child's age, or whether it is a game that should have been mastered earlier. This theoretical frame of reference may be useful in throwing light upon the meaning of other comparable standard games as well as upon certain types of spontaneous individual play.

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WOMAN AS ARTIST

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It is readily apparent that special creativity in the arts and sciences, including inventiveness, appears to be less frequent in women than in men. Only the most fanatical feminist would strive to deny this fact. Certainly there are, and have been, competent and distinguished women writers and painters, not as many of the latter as of the former; and the light of an occasional outstanding woman scientist shines the more brightly because of its relative isolation. Women as noteworthy musicians are almost as rare as women scientists and seem to be largely interpreters. It is difficult to think of a single woman composer of note. In a recent Dictionary of Art and Artists (painters and sculptors) the names of only five women appear among a total of over seven hundred; and two of the five were not of sufficient note to appear in the last edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica. This dictionary *(12)*, intended as an informational handbook for visitors to the museums of the Western world, restricts itself to Western artists of the seven centuries preceding Picasso. Just why the authors hit upon this particular limit is their secret which I have not attempted to fathom. Another history of art includes three thousand names, only forty of which are those of women *(11)*.

At any rate, such compilations are inevitably limited to those individuals whose creative products have won the kind of acclaim which has placed their work in museums. This obviously is a practical, but not necessarily an accurate gauge of actual merit. Although time does do something to sort out the really great from the merely competent and fashionable, it is by no means a reliably just and accurate judge and only occasionally delivers up 'lost work' which has not previously had some

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recognition. But it must also be noted that especially among painters the height of their fame is often not reached until some time after death. Any appraisal of creative work based largely on the degree of recognition must risk grave inaccuracy. Perhaps nowhere is this more obvious than in Sir Francis Galton's Study of Genius, which floundered so badly in the estimate of artists and writers (as compared to military and civic leaders) even though he otherwise gave some valuable hints. There has similarly been a serious fault in the studies of many later geneticists who based their estimates of ability almost exclusively on recognition in Who's Who and similar compilations.

In spite of all these reservations and the inadequacy of such compilations, it certainly must be recognized that there is a great discrepancy between the number of men and the number of women who realize outstanding creative talent in producing lasting work.

We are faced then with the question why this discrepancy between the sexes in the realization of artistic creative potential exists. Does it, for one set of reasons or another, lie in the area of ability to achieve this externalization? Are women more inhibited than men in this respect? Or may there be more basically, or even in addition, a difference in fundamental capacity? Before we proceed further it is desirable to emphasize too that in this present discussion, the word *artistic* will be used for any creative ability involving not only skill, but originality and vision. We would differentiate it on the one hand from mere skill perfected by practice, and on the other from a more limited kind of creative productivity involving adeptness in synthetizing design but without marked originality. The term *artist* is used here in the same sense in which it was used in two earlier papers, where the special term is discussed *(3, 4)*.

Robert Graves is reported to have said that when a woman has a baby her artistic creativity ceases. I seem also to remember that Freda Kirchwey, writing in The Nation some years ago, said somewhat wryly that women might not be such productive artists as men because they lacked the ability to abstract them-

selves, and were always worrying about whether the potatoes were burning. These two homely statements clearly face up to the opposition of the forces of biological and artistic creativity. Certainly common observation bears this out. A woman's part in biological creativity is much more prolonged, more physically involving and emotionally committing than that of man. The very facts that she carries the baby as a part of her own body for the better part of a year and that there are further years of his relative helplessness in which her concern, activity, and direct physical ministration are generally called upon, naturally cause her all-around practical absorption in the young child to be greater than that of man. Certainly there is superb artistic creativity involved in the sound rearing of a child, a fact recently emphasized again by Ernest Jones in his Freud centennial lecture *(6)*, and the woman must here play the primary role. But the canvas is so large, and the span of time and the intricacies of development so great, that even the artistry of a talented and dedicated mother may fail, be interfered with, or lost sight of.

In studying the conditions which may be the basis of woman's lesser productivity in the arts than man's, we shall deal with the problems under two general headings: first, are there differences between the sexes in constitutional equipment and functioning which have bearing in this special sphere?; second, what, if any, neurotic interferences with the processes involved in the externalization of creative forces may be greater in women than in men? These do not necessarily involve inherent differences in potential creative capacity, but rather interferences in the executive work of expressing these creative powers. This distinction may become clearer as we progress. As the genetic point of view influences much of the thought of this paper, material will be presented largely from this angle. Other approaches however are certainly possible—as the topographical. For example, Kubie's recent lectures *(9)* deal essentially with disturbances due to neuroses affecting preconscious activity, which may be so important a stage in the development of crea-

tive work. It would be a mistake however to consider the *creative process* as synonymous with *creativity,* or with creative ability. While Kubie's presentation is valuable and provocative, focusing clearly on one of the most vulnerable areas involved in creative work, it does not deal with some of the other neurotic and general problems of creativity with which this paper will concern itself.

Creativity seems to us to rest on a basis of certain fundamental biological potentials, probably inborn but not necessarily hereditary. They may develop well or little according to the vicissitudes of the individual life which promote or impede their flowering. Important in these potentials are an especial range and intensity of sensory responsiveness present from the first months onward, including marked kinesthetic as well as other sensory responsiveness to rhythm and an innate capacity or tendency to feel sensory responses in gestalt or patterned ways but with great flexibility and variability. This permits the sensing of a wide variety of similarities and differences and promotes richness and persistence of formation and utilization of symbols. All this is enhanced by good intellect and good memory, but marked superiority in these latter respects is not intrinsic in creative ability itself. Elsewhere *(4)* I have presented my own ideas that these special capacities draw the potential artist into an early relationship with collective figures and forms in nature (both animate and inanimate) which are related to the objects of the personal relationship, for which they may readily be substituted; hence they are referred to as *collective alternates.*

Such a capacity for substitution also means that when the relationship to the personal object is disturbed, the young child may turn away to the collective substitute object and there gratify his wishes in actuality or in fantasy. Consequently, in our estimation, there is the possibility of a less clear resolution of the problems of the libidinal phase development in some potentially gifted young children than there might be in less gifted children. This is reflected in the high degree of pre-

genital neurotic elements in the later lives of many artists,—apparent in failure to make stable adult object relationships, relative ease of dissociation, and even a seemingly high incidence of outcroppings of perverse tendencies. The 'instability' of the artist and his right to a different sort of life from that of the ordinary citizen is generally recognized by the public *(7)*. This right may be granted as a special privilege to those touched with divine inspiration, or may cause them to be devaluated—according to the nature and stage of the culture at any given time. It probably also contributes to the idea that creative talent is akin to psychosis, a conception on which psychiatrists of the past spent so much time *(8)*. It must be definitely understood, however, that such interferences with or deviations in libidinal phase development are not *obligatorily* inherent in the development of creatively gifted children. Under specially favorable conditions a good development of libidinal phases and resolution of their problems, leading to a sound œdipal development, may occur. There are accordingly many different interrelationships possible between the personal relationships and those of the collective alternates. This much of a resumé of my earlier paper is presented for readers who may not be familiar with my ideas of which, to a considerable extent, this work is a continuation.

The material of this paper is drawn very largely from my own analytic practice. To be sure I have attempted to increase my knowledge by as much reading as possible about the lives of many women artists—for the most part writers; but the study of the more detailed or even microscopic structure of the development of creativity in women and the interferences with its full fruition are the result of my own analytical work. There has recently been some good-humored reproach to me concerning my articles on creativity, expressed in recent reviews with statements of regret that clinical illustrations have been drawn too exclusively from biographies of famous people and not sufficiently from my own analytic practice. I shall, however, still maintain caution about presenting case material very specifi-

cally, to avoid possible harmful effects on patients when it is impossible sufficiently to preserve their anonymity, an especially difficult task when one is dealing with gifted patients. Consequently the pleasure of giving vivid clinical illustrations must be sacrificed no matter how much they would increase the effectiveness of this presentation.

Attention is next turned to the consideration of *constitutional differences between the sexes in anatomical structure and function* which might influence artistic productivity, that is, the capacity to bring to external form the conceptions coming from true creative ability. There seems to be no sufficient way at present of ascertaining clearly whether there is any innate difference between boys and girls in the properties of sensory sensitivity, response to rhythm, and the spontaneous tendency to gestalt or patterned organization of perceptions. But there are differences in other respects—in the influence of anatomical structure and functioning—which can readily be seen to shape and channel the unfolding of these capacities, and it is to an examination of these influences that we would now turn.

In a comprehensive and imperative sense, women's absorption in childbearing and child rearing occupies the center of the stage. Does this mean more than the crowding out of the fulfilment of one set of talents by the realization of another, such as might be implied in the remarks of Miss Kirchwey and Mr. Graves? Certainly the jostling for position in the choice of one talent or medium of expression at the expense of another may be seen in many people who are gifted in more than one direction. Woman has the fateful biological gift of childbearing. It is conspicuous when one studies the lives of a number of women writers and painters who on the whole are not a very biologically prolific lot; nor are they conspicuously successful mothers. When nevertheless they forego or limit the realization of this natural destiny, not many women seem to achieve great preeminence in the arts. It is desirable to look as well at the other and less massive determinants in the situation.

One may look then at the shaping pressures on creative pro-

ductivity which may differ in the two sexes; first in accordance with the inherent influence of differences in general body build and structure; second in the specific awareness of and reaction to the sexual parts which are so uniquely contrasted in the two sexes. There is only a moderate contrast in general body structure and configuration between male and female affecting direction and utilization of energy; but these differences seem to contribute to fundamental differences in secondary attitudes. The male, with greater muscular development of extremities and of shoulder girdle, is built more for an active and mobile muscular life, perhaps determined originally by fitness for the fight and the chase. The female, with greater pelvic girdle development and lesser strength in the extremities, is clearly more destined for conservation and endurance rather than for immediate and forceful thrust of energetic response. While analysts are used to contrasting male and female as respectively active and passive, one might emphasize receptivity rather than any extreme of passivity in the female. To some extent there are characteristic centrifugal energetic responses in the one sex, and centripetal ones in the other. Clearly, giving birth is an exception, being a climactic, energetic, centrifugal, and aggressive female response.

Characteristically the girl baby talks earlier than the boy, but he precedes her slightly in walking. Even in quite young nursery school children the girl's greater preoccupation with personal relationships and the boy's with muscular activities is noticeable. While children of both sexes show great capacity for imaginative games in the period of latency, the boy generally shows a greater interest in adventure and physical aggression, in experimentation, manual activity, reality testing, and what might be called executive expansion. His acquisition of skill in bodily performance with emphasis on precision and logic is conspicuous. In the girl, imaginative fantasy seems characteristically less linked with experimentation. It is involved more with romanticizing on the basis of personal emotional involvements. Externalization of fantasy appears often in the form of

playing a role or dramatization. Frequently there is more secretiveness regarding her fantasy, with a lesser need to test or act it out openly. These differences are not so great as to exclude a very considerable overlapping of interests between the sexes, which seems especially conspicuous in the prepuberty years and may extend well into adolescence, whenever it is reenforced by strong special identifications with the opposite sex.

Still, by and large, it seems that the male characteristics of need for externalization, of testing, of development of precision, may greatly promote male superiority in artistic creative *productivity,* and may contribute further to the choice of certain areas for development of special giftedness. Thus the boy conspicuously excels in science and in mathematics more frequently than does his sister. Woman's creative work seems stamped with attributes resembling her biologically creative functions, as it is most often involved in problems of human relationship and interpretation, and rarely shows a high degree of originality in other respects. This may be the basis of the fact that women are frequently skilled as musical interpreters but are rarely great composers, because composition demands the precise skill of a creative engineer as well as the emotional response to and auditory 'vision' of the total sound picture. Similarly among painters, those women who have gained some eminence have been concerned much with portraits and illustrating. We can include here also the excellence of women in the performing arts of the theater and other entertainments.

The psychological importance of these basic differences lies not only in the direct selection of certain activities by men, and others by women, but in their tendency to lend patterns, and subtly to stamp other characteristics and attitudes which are not primarily based on them.

In considering next the influences of the awareness of the differences between the sexes with respect to their genitals, such secondary effects on character, interests, and attitudes are, we believe, more conspicuous, even as the contrast in the sexual organs is more striking. The external exposed position of the

boy's genitals means that from earliest infancy he becomes aware of them to a much greater degree than can be true in the girl. They are visible, they are touchable, and the penis becomes early involved in the acquisition of a skill in controlling and accurately directing the urinary flow, which in turn means focus and precision. The boy further tends to have an earlier, more frequent, and more extensive external genital stimulation than does the girl. This takes place first by the external frictions of cleansing and clothing and later in compliance with endogenously arising internal sensations. This obligatory externalization of genital awareness and sensation in the male, in contrast to the female, and the clear implications of genital thrust and power long before maturity seem to re-enforce the masculine characteristics associated with the body build, the greater manual and bodily dexterity evident in competitive games.

The girl's genitals, being almost completely invaginated, are hidden from her view. They are ordinarily almost 'silent' in early sensation except for the clitoris and the mucous membranes around the vaginal orifice. While the clitoris is the site of strong infantile genital sensations, it is not readily seen by the girl, is sufficiently variable in size and degree of embedding as not always to be readily located manually by her, and her ideas of its location and function are frequently confused. Her early sexuality then must be much more mysterious and uncertain, and under most conditions lacks those specific, precise, and organizing qualities which are so characteristic of the male.

While the exposure of the male genitals promotes their stimulability, it also heightens the direct threat and fear of injury to the organs; but the whole problem is a focused one. The castration problem of the girl, with its devious explanations and its excess of hypothetical guilt, is linked with her envy and confusion due to her awareness of the difference from the boy and her inability to see her own organs clearly. It gives rise to a type of competitiveness which cannot be met directly with reality testing and so must depend on displacement, rationaliza-

tion, and fantasy. The girl's resolution of her envy of the boy's phallus, with the realization that she will later be able to have a child, contains so great a deferment that its acceptance cannot be achieved until she has reached the degree of maturity to tolerate this postponement. In addition, it is an unusual woman who attains so nearly complete an acceptance of her own intrinsic feminine role as to include a full object relationship to the child—an acceptance of the child as different and separate from rather than an extension of herself. The marked dependence of the child on the physical care of the mother certainly increases and prolongs the inner attitude in the mother that the child is essentially still a part of herself. Childbearing remains in feminine psychology heavily stamped with a tacit attitude of considering it essentially a substitute, although possibly a superior recompense for the original inferiority in her presumed genital deficiency. A more nearly complete acceptance of herself by the woman, and of the child as a separate individual is sometimes accomplished only after parenthood has actually been experienced, but it is relatively infrequent even then.

The effect of the body build and of the relationship to one's own genitals thus tend to combine with and emphasize different character traits in the sexes which apparently in turn promote a greater artistic productivity in the man than in the woman, largely through a greater concern with and development of precise externalization. Here I would again emphasize that productivity as such is the channel of delivery of creativity, but is not the index of the inherent creative potential itself.

We come now to the question of *neurotic interferences with creative productivity*. Up to this point, consideration has been focused on problems arising from inherent natural sexual differences, present throughout all mankind. It is necessary to examine specifically those problems uniquely adherent to remarkable giftedness, and to attempt to elucidate the ways in which the possession of a remarkable endowment of artistic creativity in a woman tends, paradoxically, to increase her vulnerability to certain blocking neurotic developments which interfere with its fulfilment.

In my earlier papers, the view is stated that many gifted people develop at least two and sometimes more than two self-images with more or less separate identities—that of the ordinary citizen and that of the artist. In many creative people there is a considerable struggle between these self-images. I am aware that some colleagues do not accept at all this point of view, but to me it seems clear that this is true at least in a very considerable number of artists, is rather vividly described by some, and is frequently reflected in the use of different names for different identities. It is also reflected in the titles of many autobiographies. Not only is there a struggle between the different identities, but there are various degrees of fusion and interaction between them, with unevenness in their development. Consequently problems existing in the personal life and identity may invade the development of the artist's life (which is proceeding in the same body and environment), or in some instances there is flight from one identity to the other. Inevitably the invasion of the artistic work is greatest when the personal life is the dominant one or when the two are fused. As has been suggested, there may be a greater tendency for such fusion to occur in women than in men because of the absorption of the girl child in, and her generally progressive commitment to the enveloping life of childbearing and child rearing; but there are other influences too which are at work.

Clinical observations based on the analyses of a few very gifted people—both men and women—have led me to the conclusion that the greatest blocking in realization of talent arises from disturbances at the anal and œdipal levels. In the former it arises in connection with anal functioning which is the prototype of productivity in general. This is a chapter in itself but probably does not show an extreme contrast between the two sexes. Susceptibility to such blocking due to anal problems may possibly be greater in women than in men due to the tendency to identify the vagina with the anus. The disturbances due to castration fears on the genital or œdipal levels may interfere with the work of truly artistic conception, in contrast to that

of production alone. These problems may be neurotically devastating to the personal life, but when the two identities are relatively discrete, the artist sometimes takes flight from personal into creative activity, the beginnings of which may seem to be enhanced rather than blocked by personal exigencies. It may be because of this latter apparent gain in incentive to launch into creative work that many gifted individuals fear the loss of anxiety by analysis and sometimes fear a 'successful' analysis.

Because of the inborn heightened sensitivity and general responsiveness of creatively gifted people, they may suffer from overstimulation even in infancy. The world may rush upon them with seemingly greater intensity than is the case in the less gifted. One of the most striking findings in the autobiographical accounts of artists concerning their early years (as well as in the analyses of gifted patients) is the regular appearance of especially strong exhilarating, inspiring, or even frightening experiences, felt as transcendental implications and occurring in the precœdipal years. Frequently their occurrence is rather precisely placed at the age of four, i.e., at the height of the phallic phase. Sometimes they are even earlier. They are characterized by generally strong sensations of all sorts, but especially of brilliant light, and also of body lightness. They may readily be recognized as screen memories or even screening experiences. They may arise as part of the invigoration of the total body as well as from the localized genital sensations of the phallic phase *(5)*.

Sometimes the intensity of stimulation is overwhelmingly terrifying and produces a blocking or a susceptibility to inhibition rather than an exhilaration. An illustration of this is given in the opening pages of the autobiography of Ellen Glasgow, a competent though not a great writer *(2)*. She was aptly described by her Negro mammy as having been born without a skin. Of her first recollection she says:

> Moving forward and backward, as contented and mindless as an amœba, submerged in the vast fog of existence, I open my

> eyes and look at the top windowpanes. . . . In the midst of a red glow, I see a face without a body staring in at me, a vacant face, round, pallid, grotesque, malevolent. Terror—or was it merely sensation?—stabbed me into consciousness. Terror of the sinking sun? Or terror of the formless, the unknown, the mystery, the terror of life, of the world, of nothing or everything? Convulsions seized me, a spasm of dumb agony. One minute, I was not: the next minute, I was. I felt. I was separate. I could be hurt. I had discovered too the universe apart from myself. . . . I cannot now divide the outgrowth from the apparition, distorted, unreal, yet more real to me than either myself or the world. . . . What, I wondered long afterwards, could have caused the illusion? What had I seen or imagined before I could make myself understood? What unknown terror had startled my consciousness or my senses awake? . . . Why should that one instant, that one vision, pierce through my covering of unawareness, and pin me to life as a pin fixes a butterfly? . . . .

Miss Glasgow fixes this experience as occurring probably during her second year. From other memories which she gives, it may be surmised that the nucleus of this startling vision from the second-year period—which is so characteristically and generally linked with the phallic period *(10)*—has been used as a condensing screen for later memories which were then projected backward onto it. It is of interest here too that at another time Miss Glasgow refers to her mother as 'the sun in my universe' *(2,* p. 13*)* in a benevolent sense, but was from her earliest recollections frightened by her austere and threatening father, whose cruelty to animals made a dark impression on her entire life. The essentially castrating and castrated effect of the evil, glowing, bodyless head is impressive.

It is also noteworthy that although Miss Glasgow makes a strong point in her autobiography of the fact that she was never in the least aware of any maternal instinct and believed herself to be 'born without it', she did not recognize that her passionate love of animals and her intense resentment of her father's interference with this had all the earmarks of being the substitute for the lacking demand for maternity. She seems also to

have been influenced by her mother's life of self-abnegation and individual lostness as the head of a very large family, of whom the child, Ellen, was next to the youngest member.

It is a common clinical observation that a high degree of bisexuality exists in creative artists. The forces of bisexual identifications may be actively felt in states of inspiration and in the working of the creative process in which there is a personal surrender to the forces of the artist's creative power. This is not surprising if we are correct in our view of the extreme sensitivity of the potential artist even in earliest infancy; for this means a wider and a deeper capacity for universal empathy during the period of incomplete differentiation of the sexual identity. This extraordinary empathic capacity is retained throughout life, since in the artist the barrier between primary and secondary process thinking is conspicuously slight.

Among girls especially, the combination of this strong bisexual empathy with increased, often precocious, genital sensations gives rise to special problems. From this tendency to early genitalization, which results from the prolonged and strong sensory overstimulation that is inevitable in the gifted child, an unusual degree of clitoral pressure develops. While this arises probably endogenously, the degree to which it becomes sharply focused may also depend upon the extent of the exposure of the clitoris and consequently its availability for external stimulation, whether this be from contact with clothing, active seduction, or by self-manipulation. In any event this makes the gifted girl child unduly susceptible to the formation of a fantasied or illusory phallus, and further increases her bisexuality. In this excessive stimulation there may also be some early development of vaginal awareness, partly borrowed from rectal and anal tensions, and partly by displacement from disturbed conditions of the clitoris. If the clitoris is well developed and actually stimulated from without in response to an endogenously aroused appetite, the illusory phallus may assume considerable durability. It is this phenomenon, in turn, which seems, from the analyses of especially gifted women, to have

played so much havoc in interfering with both personal and artistically creative lives.

The presence of giftedness often arouses in those who possess it—whether men or women—the inner questions: 'By what right do I have this?'; 'Why is it bestowed on me?'; and even, 'Does it really belong to me?'. These implicit questions may otherwise appear in the form of a feeling of guilt, as though the special ability had been stolen, and the realization of it then involves the feeling of being fraudulent. In the girl the sense of a special gift may utilize the illusory phallus as its representative and either be highly prized or give rise to a wish to repudiate it in conformity with the wish to be a 'regular woman' and have the fullest experience of woman's life.

I have found in analyzing very talented women who were blocked in the realization of their abilities that this bisexual conflict was strong indeed, based fundamentally on the two body images—the one arising from the realistic knowledge of their own feminine bodies and the identification, by comparison, with others of their own sex; and the other, that of the phallic girl or woman with the mysterious unseen phallus, subjectively experienced as real because of the early insistent clitoral-phallic pressure. Wherever such a degree of phallic illusion exists (in those of lesser as well as in those of greater giftedness), the young woman after puberty suffers an extreme and often incapacitating set of castration problems, compounded of both masculine and feminine elements. But if the specially gifted young woman has associated her talent with the illusory phallus, the realization of her talent may become impossible whenever the definitely feminine aims or obligatory evidences of femininity are in the ascendancy—as with the onset of menstruation or the experience of pregnancy. There may be short bursts of creative interest and activity, but without sufficient ability to sustain them to bring the experience of organic growth and development into realization.

There may, furthermore, develop a definite fear of her imagination, since this means unconsciously the possible re-

establishment of the illusory phallus and the repetitive excruciating re-enactment of the castration experience with each menstruation. Such women—if they cross the bridge to achieve maternity—may in turn devote themselves to the child with a possessiveness and excluding intensity which risks much for the future of the child. More commonly, I believe, the realization of artistic creativity in the girl child takes one of the following courses. 1. It may go into eclipse at puberty as she gives up the imaginary phallic world in favor of the more regular feminine goals and aims. 2. She regresses to the anal level, depending on the earlier vicissitudes of this period, and develops a restraining compulsiveness. 3. She abandons her feminine identification largely or almost completely in her official life although it still teams up with the phallic identification in the bisexual activity of her artistically creative work.

Inhibition of artistic interest to the extent of its actual suspension seems particularly likely to occur if the parents, especially the father, react with disfavor toward this interest of the daughter. In other words, the push of creative drive can hardly be sustained against the full force of the œdipal attachment. On the other hand, the father's approval and encouragement, particularly if he is himself an artist, may permit the girl to develop a predominantly positive œdipal relationship, together with a limited identification with him, in such a way as to salvage or even free her artistic interests. This appears possibly to have been true in two—and perhaps three—of the five women artists listed among the seven hundred in the Dictionary of Art and Artists mentioned at the beginning of this paper.[1]

On the whole women artists—in whatever medium—do not seem to have been conspicuously excellent mothers. There are undoubtedly exceptions, but as one thinks of the various women writers of note in the past (in a field in which women have

[1] These five were Rosalba Carriera (1675-1757); Mary Cassatt (1845-1926); Barbara Hepworth (1903-); Angelica Kauffman (1761-1807); Louise Elizabeth Vigee-Lebrun (1755-1842). These last two were child prodigies, and also were the children of painter fathers. The first of the five had a sister who was also a painter, and came of a family much concerned with art.

produced more than in any other) it seems that there are some who married rather late and had no children, a number who never married at all, and others who, though sometimes marrying early, had one or two children whom they treated with a combination of neglect and narcissistic devotion, to the detriment of the child. It is not an easy subject to study and one on which I have done an inadequate amount of research to speak further with explicit conviction.

There are some women artists who, as already noted, abandon their positions as women, assume very largely roles of masculine identification, and follow much more the path of the man in their artistic creativity. I have never analyzed such a woman, but from reading biographies I have thought I could decipher this probable outline in the cases of several illustrious women. Here I must speak with caution, but for the sake of illustration I will confide my surmise that such a one was Gertrude Stein, who despite this attempt at simplification of life's problems by abandonment of most of the goals of womanhood, seemed never sure of her own sexual identity and was continually preoccupied with this quandary, as most of her writing testifies. She seemed at first to be almost in the relationship of a doppelganger with her brother; then assuming the ascendancy she parted from him, (at the expense of an alienation lasting the rest of her life), and presently she established herself with a woman in a relationship which lasted the rest of her life. It is interesting that in the four autobiographies which Miss Stein wrote, none was simply the autobiography of Gertrude Stein. One was called, Two—Gertrude Stein and Her Brother *(18);* another was entitled The Making of Americans *(16).* It must be noted that Gertrude Stein, who boasted that American doughboys mistook her for the American flag, could nevertheless only maintain her identity as an American by remaining consistently an expatriate. Her third autobiography was entitled The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas *(15),* written as though by Miss Toklas; the fourth *(17),* was Everybody's Autobiography *(14, 1).* There are other women artists who play out

bisexual roles dramatically, as seems to have been true in the cases of George Sand and Madame de Staël. The latter became repeatedly the center of a bisexually oriented circle whose members seemed constantly driven by the interplay of their jealousies.

The most prolific woman composer whose life has come to my awareness was Dame Ethel Smyth. She attained considerable recognition as a composer and conductor in late Victorian England, and believed herself to be one of 'the great' who suffered from incomplete recognition because of her sex. A cooler judgment indicates that her fame was possibly enhanced by her sex. She seems to have had a very strong masculine identification, as her extensive autobiography and memoirs reveal; and her conducting was early characterized by an exuberance which was sometimes an interference *(13)*.

There is one aspect of the œdipal problem of women which tends to focus their creative activity on an emotionally interpretative role rather than on courageous originality, and which I have thus far overlooked. This has to do with the peculiarly intricate development of the little girl's œdipus complex. It is a well-recognized fact that the girl child develops an early and bisexually complicated œdipal stage, due perhaps to her early castration problems and to her need to separate herself from too overwhelming an identifying attachment to the mother, combined with the natural stimulation of awareness of the difference from the father. The oneness with the mother may be engulfingly comforting; and by the same token, the difference from the father is stimulating and exciting. This means that in the ascendancy of the œdipal attachment to the father the girl has to maintain herself in a practical dependence on her mother for her physical care and direct nutrition at the very same time that there is a growing hostility and rivalry. Hence, there is a complexity in the little girl's emotional development, in contrast to the more nearly straight-line course of her brother. It means an early development of caution growing out of ambivalence—the forerunner of tact—, the need for careful balance and

infantile diplomacy. This in turn restricts the full expansiveness of creative originality.

SUMMARY

It appears that in general fewer women than men realize substantial artistic creative talent. This paper limits itself to a consideration of early genetic factors, which may restrict the female's later development of adequate capacity for externalization of artistic creativity. It does not seek to examine evidence of differences between the two sexes in intrinsic creative potentialities; nor does it deal at all with special neurotic interferences in the creative process. Differences in anatomical structure between the sexes which tend to make for a lesser degree of precise externalization seem to contribute to the lesser artistic productivity of women. The obligatory differences in attitude toward their own genitals pattern different attitudes toward, and content of, the fantasy involved in artistic creativity. In girls, fantasy is much more concerned with emotional and personal relationships and less with impersonal or abstract constructions than in boys. Girls appear to be more readily blocked in materializing artistic creativity than boys, both through the nature of the castration complex and the special exigencies of the œdipal conflict. In specially talented girls, both areas of conflict are hazardous due fundamentally to the increased bisexual elements among creative individuals.

The author wishes to express again a debt of gratitude to the late Ernst Kris, whose papers published in Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art have contributed very substantially to the interest and understanding of the material of this and allied papers.

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The First Application of Psychoanalysis to a Literary Work

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THE FIRST APPLICATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS TO A LITERARY WORK

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Contrary to widespread belief neither *Gradiva* (1907) nor the *Denkwürdigkeiten eines Nervenkranken* (1911) are the first works of literature to which Freud applied the sensitive methods of his newly discovered investigative system. The first application of psychoanalysis to a work of literature was in 1898 when Freud employed it in the analysis of a small, little-known novel by the Swiss writer, Conrad Ferdinand Meyer (1825-1898), called *Die Richterin.*

To be sure, a number of references to literary works, as Hamlet, Grillparzer's *Ahnfrau,* Jacobsen's *Niel Lyhne,* Gottfried Keller's *Der Grüne Heinrich,* and to medieval documents like the *Malleus Maleficarum,* appear in Freud's letters to Fliess with growing frequency between the years 1895 and 1897. Into that period also falls the first direct reference to Œdipus, mentioned in a letter to Fliess dated October 15, 1897. The earliest example of a literary work methodically analyzed in a separate essay is undoubtedly *Die Richterin.* Late in 1897, or early in 1898, Freud became acquainted with the writings of the Swiss poet and novelist through Wilhelm Fliess who had drawn Freud's attention to Meyer's poem, *Am Himmelstor,* in which the washing compulsion of a young woman is described with the impact and immediacy of a clinical experience. Kris *(2)* has pointed out that Freud subsequently paid much attention to Meyer's works, and his interest in them remained with Freud for the rest of his life *(5).* A number of Freud's letters to Fliess contain references to the Swiss poet who is repeatedly mentioned as 'our beloved C. F. Meyer' or 'our author', and he is also quoted in one of the case histories *(1).* Since Freud's

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predilection for Meyer clearly dates from reading the poem, *Am Himmelstor,*[1] it is presented here in translation.[2]

I dreamt I came to the heavenly gate
And there found you, my sweet;
You sat before it, near the spring,
Washing, washing your feet.

You washed and washed without a rest
The luster, white and blinding,
And with a strange and wondrous haste
Began anew your shining.

I asked: 'Why are you bathing here,
So wet with tears your cheek?'
You spoke: 'Because with you in dust
I walked; with you in dust so deep'.

On June 20, 1898 Freud sent Fliess an essay entitled *Die Richterin.* He had announced in a previous letter that he was working on such an essay. Following are a few excerpts from Freud's short analysis of the book on which the essay was based.

> There is no doubt that this is a defense against the writer's memory of an affair with his sister. The only remarkable thing is that this happens exactly as it does in neurosis. All neurotics create a so-called family romance . . . on the one hand it serves the need for self-aggrandizement and on the other as a defense against incest. If your sister is not your mother's child, you are relieved of guilt. . . . But in the story the sister's condition, her anorexia, obviously the neurotic consequence of infantile seduction, is not laid to the brother's door, but to the mother's . . . the violence which is never absent from an infantile love affair is represented in the story by the sister who is dashed against the rocks. . . . The father figure makes his appearance in the person of the Emperor Charles, who stands for the father's greatness and remoteness from the world of the child's

[1] On March 15, 1898, Freud wrote to Fliess: 'If I ever underestimated Conrad Ferdinand, you converted me long since with the *Himmelstor*'.

[2] I am greatly indebted to Mrs. Eva Meyer, chief librarian of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, for this translation.

> activities. In another incarnation he appears as he whose life was poisoned by the mother and he whom the family romance regularly does away with because he stands in the son's way (wishful-dream of the father's death). . . . Hostility to the mother is expressed in the story by the fact that she is turned into a stepmother. Thus in every single feature it is identical with the revenge-and-exoneration romances which my hysterics compose about their mothers if they are boys *(2)*.

Conrad Ferdinand Meyer died in November 1898. On December 5, 1898 Freud noted his death in a letter to Fliess, adding that he could hardly tear himself away from another novel, *Pescara,* written by this author. It was the story of the death struggle of a famous Italian *condottiere* (undoubtedly a father figure to the poet) in the time of the Roman Emperor, Charles V. Freud wrote: 'I marked the passing of our beloved C. F. Meyer by buying the volumes I lacked—*Hutten, Pescara, Der Heilige.* I believe I am now as enthusiastic about him as you are. . . . I should like to know something about his life story and the order in which his books were written, which is indispensable for interpretation' *(2)*.

Die Richterin, briefly, describes an episode which takes place in the Swiss mountains during the reign of Charlemagne, shortly after his coronation by Pope Leo. It is a tragedy in a stark setting of gloom and dire forebodings. The action, filled with incest, violence, murder, and suicide, takes place in the Swiss canton of Graubünden. There Stemma, the mother of Palma, her only daughter, lives and rules, having poisoned her husband *fifteen* years earlier. Her stepson, the murdered husband's son and heir, who had fled, returns with an army unit of the Emperor and engages in a love affair with his half-sister, Palma. The *Richterin,* who had usurped the father's judge-and-rulership, now uncovered as a criminal and condemned, commits suicide.

From this stark and involved story Freud made several deductions which are here summarized. He first characterized it as 'a defense against the writer's memory of an affair with his

sister'. In this connection Freud says the story is typical of the family romance and its œdipal meaning. The infantile conception of the parental sexual relationship is a fantasy of violence and murderous attack which, in fact, is 'never absent from an infantile love affair'. His clinical observations, he said, included many patients whose fantasies resembled 'in every single feature' some of the detailed descriptions in Meyer's novel. He also noted a neurotic symptom (anorexia) in the seduced girl and traced it to the early trauma.

To substantiate Freud's analysis, I wish to mention briefly a few biographical circumstances about the poet's life which, as Freud wrote to Fliess, were unknown to him. Meyer's father, a Swiss magistrate, died when his son was *fifteen* years old. The boy lived with his mother and only sister, six years his junior. The father, a respected jurist and civil servant, a conservative in his political thinking, held high offices in Swiss cantonal administrations, and was also well known as a writer on historical and religious subjects that had been acclaimed by such a noted expert in the field as von Ranke, among others. The poet's mother, daughter of a progressive educator, has been described as having suffered from attacks of depression and migraine. She was overly anxious and delicate—*'fast überzart'*, the poet says. She opposed her son's literary and artistic aspirations, tried to dissuade him from writing, and had him hospitalized in his twenties, allegedly with his consent, in a mental sanitarium from which he was discharged after three months.

Meyer's first, and unsuccessful, literary ventures were epic and dramatic fragments on historical personalities (Otto III, Henry IV, and Frederick II). These initial literary attempts were started by the young writer shortly after his father died and can therefore be understood as unconscious efforts to regain the lost paternal object. He read these stories to his sister who encouraged his ambitions as a poet and writer. At the age of thirty he became a teacher of history at the institute for the blind in Lausanne, but remained there only a short time. A year later his mother was hospitalized in the same mental

institution to which she had sent her son a few years before. Shortly thereafter she committed suicide by drowning. From that time, until he married in his late forties, the poet lived mostly with his sister in a close and personal relationship. She remained single, acting as her brother's housekeeper, traveling companion, secretary, personal and professional adviser in all his affairs. Sadger *(6)* reports that the relationship between Meyer and his sister has been compared to that between a Catholic priest and his housekeeper, and that the poet, after his marriage, traveled almost every week across the lake of Zürich to visit his sister. They also journeyed to foreign countries and spent their vacations together.

My interest in *Die Richterin,* quite apart from the historical one as the first application of psychoanalysis to a work of literature, relates to my studies of river symbolism *(4)*. In the course of research into literary sources pertaining to this study I found that the biographies of the two poets, Byron and Meyer, (who otherwise have little in common), disclosed the existence of well-authenticated incestuous—or at least incestuously tinged—brother-sister relations. I postulated on theoretical grounds that their literary works would contain demonstrable manifestations of or references to this theme, most likely in terms of river symbolism. Ample corroborative material of this type can be found in Byron's Childe Harold, as well as in Meyer's *Die Richterin.*

In Childe Harold, the river Rhine appears repeatedly in direct connection with Byron's love for his half-sister, Augusta, as evidenced in the following stanzas. For emphasis I have italicized the pertinent phrases:

> The castled crag of Drachenfels
> Frowns o'er the *wide and winding Rhine*
> Whose *breast of waters* broadly swells
> Between the *banks that bear* the vine . . .

While the poet *travels on the 'exulting and abounding river'*

which *'nobly foams and flows'*, he reminisces that *'a thousand battles have assailed thy banks'*.

> Nor was all *love* shut from him, . . .
> For there was soft remembrance, and sweet trust
> In one *fond breast,* to which his own would melt,
> And in its tenderer hour on that his bosom dwelt . . . .
> And there was *one soft breast,* as hath been said,
> Which unto his was bound by stronger ties
> Than the church links withal; and, *though unwed,*
> *That* love was pure and far above disguise, . . .
> Nor could on earth a spot be found
> To nature and to me so dear,
> Could thy dear eyes in following mine
> Still sweeten more these *banks of Rhine*! . . .
> Once more *upon the waters*! Yet once more!
> And the *waves bound beneath me as a steed*
> *That knows his rider.* Welcome to their roars! . . .
> . . . once I loved
> Torn ocean's roar, but thy soft murmuring
> Sounds sweet as if a *Sister's* voice . . .[3]

Byron thus wove the story of his incestuous love into the haunting stanzas of his poem, part of which was composed for Augusta and sent to her from the Rhine with flowers especially dried for her. The available biographical material in Meyer's case is inconclusive with respect to the actual degree of intimacy between the siblings. Freud *(2)* comments that Meyer's biographer, Frey, 'does not know the intimate side, or withholds it through discretion'. Besides biographical material, notes by the sister, and other contemporary sources, the following lines addressed by Meyer to his sister are suggestive of a very close relationship: 'The true course of my life is incredibly strange. How will they later try to decipher it! Only you could report it and you do not do it.' Whatever the factual circumstances to which the poet here alludes, Freud's emphasis on

[3] Here the poet directly equates river and sister as is so often clinically observable in related dreams *(4)*.

the writer's memory of an affair with his sister appears justified. Writing about his original plans for the novel, Meyer tells us that he had first thought of Sicily as the scene of action for his story, but that he had then changed it to Switzerland as 'the natural background' for the events he was to describe in it.

Featured in the novel is a wild mountain stream. As the passion between brother and sister mounts and reaches its climax with irresistible force, the consummation of the incestuous love takes place on the shore of a hidden mountain lake. The scene then shifts to a ravine formed by the rushing waters, and to the river bank itself. As the stream foams and roars with elemental power, the girl is dashed against a rock by the brother. She sinks to the ground, bleeding from a wound in her forehead.[4] She is carried away, pale and unconscious, by her terror-stricken, guilt-ridden brother. This scene graphically, if symbolically, depicts the violence and sadistic features 'never absent from an infantile love affair', as Freud concisely puts it. When, in the end, it is revealed that Palma is not the hero's sister ['if your sister is not your mother's child, you are relieved of guilt', Freud tersely comments], the reader's attention is again focused on the mother, who is the real culprit, the 'criminal' in Meyer's story and life.

It will be recalled that the poet's mother drowned herself while in a state of severe depression. Before committing suicide she had called herself, according to Sadger *(6),* 'a great sinner'; she had also accused herself of being a murderess who had caused the death of an old man who had lived and died in their home. It comes therefore as no surprise to learn that the original title which Meyer had considered for the novel was *Magna Peccatrix.* He later changed the title to *Die Richterin,* but restated its leitmotiv in the opening and concluding paragraphs of the novel: *'concepit in iniquitatibus mater mea'.* As the story unfolds, it is further stated that the father was murdered be-

[4] The unconscious sexual meaning of such terms as ravine, crevice, creek, river bed, and the like is discussed elsewhere *(4).*

cause 'he sinned against my mother; a drunkard he was, filled with lust under his grey hair . . .'.

Die Richterin, published in 1885, was followed in quick succession by several other works, culminating in 1891 in what was probably Meyer's weakest historical novel, *Angela Borgia,* another story of an incestuous brother-sister relationship. Early in 1892, the author spoke of a plan to rewrite or re-edit *Die Richterin,* possibly for the theater. In July 1892 he had what was diagnosed as senile melancholia and was in a mental hospital for over a year. Nothing is known of this illness except remarks indicating disorientation as to time, such as: *'in welchem Jahrhundert leben wir eigentlich?'*. Released from the hospital in 1893, the poet never fully recovered and never resumed writing. He died in 1898 and was commemorated by Freud in a letter to Fliess on December 5th of the same year.

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Cedipus at Colonus and the Aged Sophocles

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ŒDIPUS AT COLONUS AND THE AGED SOPHOCLES

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The name of Œdipus is generally associated in our minds with incest and patricide and with the punishment which is the theme of Sophocles' play Œdipus Tyrannus. Sophocles' Œdipus at Colonus *(3, 5, 10)* is less well known. At Colonus near Athens, Œdipus, banished, abandoned by his sons, infirm, blinded, and having long wandered in destitution, finds a refuge. An embittered and vindictive old man, he receives care and comfort only from his daughters, Antigone, and Ismene. His crimes expiated, he is intensely hostile toward his neglectful sons and places a curse upon them. When one of them, Polyneices, at last comes to Œdipus for aid, Œdipus rebukes him and predicts that both he and his brother, Eteocles, will kill each other in battle.

Previously despised and shunned, he is now befriended by Theseus, King of Athens, who gives him sanctuary and aid in exchange for 'the power of the grave', which it seems he is now able to bestow. Whence this power came to Œdipus is not disclosed, but the former outcast is now a hero with supernatural power. He exacts from Theseus a promise that no one, not even Antigone and Ismene, may see his burial site. At his death, Œdipus achieves divine stature and Theseus guards this secret against the strong protest and curiosity of Antigone. Bowra *(2)* states that this apotheosis from a blind outcast to a potent spirit, who lives eternally in the earth at Colonus, is a theme unique in Greek plays.

Because of the emphasis on Œdipus' unpardonable transgressions and condign punishment, it is not commonly known that great glory came to him in his old age and after death. In psychoanalytic literature Œdipus at Colonus has been neglected, except, notably, by Kanzer *(7)* and by H. A. van der Sterren *(11, 12)*. Kanzer compares various parts of the play to phases of a neurosis. The basic drives of Œdipus are said to be reactivated in an effort to master the original trauma. Kanzer interprets his wandering with his

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daughter, Antigone, as a renewal of the dependent relationship with the mother, his blindness having absolved his crimes. This father-daughter relationship is a reversal of generations. Kanzer, moreover, interprets the establishment of a friendship between Œdipus and King Theseus as the passing of the œdipus complex at latency. Van der Sterren, taking issue with Kanzer, considers the theme of Œdipus at Colonus to be the œdipus complex in another form: his death is an ultimate reunion with his mother. Both authors have contributed greatly to the understanding of Œdipus at Colonus.

Kanzer *(7)*, in addition, discusses Sophocles' personal life and the Athenian political situation at the time the play was written, which it is reasonable to assume were important in the creation of this drama. In the biographical data about Sophocles it is difficult to distinguish fact from legend *(8)*. We learn, however, that Sophocles himself was born in Colonus, and that he too died there. He was born in 497 B.C., seven years before Marathon, at the beginning of Athens' golden age. He lived to see the triumph over Persia, the glory, and the decline of the Athenian commonwealth.

Early in life he married Theoris, a woman of Sicilian birth by whom he had a son, Ariston. Because Theoris was a foreigner, the marriage was not considered legal nor was the son recognized as his heir. Some years later, Sophocles married Nicostrate, a free Athenian, who bore him four sons, the eldest, Iophon, becoming the legal heir.

According to legend, Ariston had a son whom he named Sophocles. This grandson was the darling of the old man's heart. Iophon, also a dramatist, feared that Ariston and his offspring might endear themselves to his father and become his heirs. Therefore, it is alleged, Iophon tried to persuade a court to declare Sophocles incompetent to manage his affairs. Pleading his own case, Sophocles quoted parts of his recently written play, Œdipus at Colonus, and declared to the court, 'If I am Sophocles I am not beside myself; and if I am beside myself I am not Sophocles'. The court, astonished by the beauty and clarity of the lines which Sophocles read, dismissed the case with a rebuke to the offending son. Sophocles forgave his son and a reconciliation ensued.

Little more is known of Sophocles' domestic affairs. Daughters are never mentioned in his biographies, but unless they were gifted,

women were rarely considered worthy of mention by Greek biographers. Daughters rarely interested their fathers, and an Athenian woman might substitute another woman's infant son for her only baby girl.The misogyny of the ancients is reflected in Œdipus' words of gratitude for his daughters' loyalty: 'But they have saved me; they are my support; they are not girls but men in faithfulness'.

Letters *(8)* indicates that Sophocles loved wine. Of his sexual character, it is said that, although he realized keenly the appeal of women, his homosexuality was sufficient to incur the reproaches of his contemporaries: 'Even the Athenians felt he lacked restraint in the matter'. Sophocles was nevertheless very pious and a priest by vocation. Although criticized for his excesses and humiliated by his son, during his life Sophocles was considered a truly great man of letters. Aristophanes *(4)* says of Sophocles: 'A life which even the passage of death cannot affect—which remains both there and here —content'. This recalls the death of Œdipus, unseen by the eyes of men, an uncommon fate.

When Sophocles wrote Œdipus at Colonus he was ninety-two years old. Unlike the Romans, the Greeks never learned to grow old gracefully and in old age saw nothing but misery *(8)*. Aristotle wrote, 'Neither old people nor sour people seem to make friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them, and no one can spend his days with one whose company is painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the painful and to aim at the pleasant'. Sophocles was an exception to this. In answer to the question, How does love suit with age?, Plato *(6)* reported him as replying, 'Peace, most gladly have I escaped the thing of which you speak; I feel as if I have escaped from a mad and furious master'. Elsewhere *(3, 9)* Sophocles wrote, 'Old age is not burdensome if it is borne with composure. . . . Generally age has a riper intelligence and wider experience. . . . It is intelligence which relieves old age of its burden and makes it worthy of much reverence. . . . Old age is alleviated and dignified by the wisdom which accompanies it. . . . Age teaches all and time's experience. . . . No man can die twice; and that makes life all the sweeter, as an experience that can never be repeated.' Evidently to the aged in ancient Greece, banishment and dispossession were sometimes added to physical ills and bodily deterioration.

Œdipus at Colonus resolves the grim threats of aging and the fear of imminent death by denial and ideas of omnipotence (deifica-

tion). The secrecy of Œdipus' burial place implies that he does not die but continues to live in the mother-earth of his native Colonus. He did not die but became a hero-god, and the place of his death became holy. There are Christian parallels for this *(1)*.

At Colonus, Œdipus, the blind beggar, promises 'the power of the grave' to the King of Athens. When Sophocles was born, Athens was at the height of its glory. In his old age, the Peloponnesian War was ending in victory for Sparta and defeat and humiliation for Athens. The city struggled to restore its glory. This indeed constituted the *agon* of that period. The leaders of Athens needed wisdom. They found pleas for introspection in Socrates, plans for social and political reorganization in Plato, pedagogic critiques in Isocrates, and patriotic exhortations in Demosthenes *(4)*.

If Œdipus at Colonus was a denial, it was also a prophecy. Athens, enfeebled, defeated and mutilated, rose to a new greatness dreamed of only by Sophocles.

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Bela Mittelmann 1899-1959

Max Schur

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BELA MITTELMANN

1899-1959

Bela Mittelmann was born in a family of physicians. He was fifteen when his father died; however, in the tradition of the family, he became a doctor. His first scientific work was published while he was still a student in medical school at the University of Prague. He emigrated from Czechoslovakia in 1923 and trained in this country to become a psychiatrist and later a psychoanalyst. He became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society in 1937. Between 1925 and 1950 most of Mittelmann's thirty-five publications were devoted to various aspects of 'psychosomatic disorders'. He contributed valuable clinical observations on many topics included in this category. His keen clinical observations led him to suspect an emotional factor in Raynaud's Disease, and stimulated him to experimental work on emotions and skin temperature which has generally been accepted as one of the classics of psychosomatic research. He also published valuable contributions to problems of mental hygiene in industry.

His last line of research, which started around 1950, opened the field of normal and abnormal development of motility, and showed how important this factor is in psychosexual development. This was demonstrated in a series of important papers and films. His last project dealt with Expressive Autoerotic, Autoaggressive Movements in Normal, Neurotic, Blind, and Schizophrenic Children, with special emphasis on the comparison of motility of the last two groups. A film about this work was shown recently.

During his distinguished career Bela Mittelmann filled many important offices. He taught at New York University, Columbia University, and at the Albert Einstein Medical School. He was chairman of the Psychosomatic Forum for many years.

MAX SCHUR, M.D.

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The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Volume XIII. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958. 579 pp.

Elizabeth B. Goldner

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, VOLUME XIII. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958. 579 pp.

Besides its value for a number of excellent papers, this volume is of particular significance because it contains the proceedings of the Ernst Kris Memorial Meeting and a complete bibliography of Ernst Kris's writings. The papers presented at the Memorial Meeting give a glimpse of Ernst Kris at work: the range and variety of his interests, the research he initiated, the teacher who stimulated both students and colleagues. The first paper, The Family Romance of the Artist by Phyllis Greenacre, is based on Kris's paper, The Image of the Artist, and Greenacre's own previous investigations of creative people. She discusses the family romance in Chatterton, Stanley, Gogol, Rilke, and St. Francis of Assisi and concludes that the heightened sensitivity of specially gifted persons is determined by the particular form of their family romance.

Leo Loomie, Victor Rosen, and Martin Stein present in their paper, Ernst Kris and the Gifted Adolescent Project, a report on the planning and organization of this study, and outline the problem that this project was designed to investigate. They indicate some of the ideas to which the project has given rise, such as a reconsideration of the nature of sublimation in creative persons. Kris was impressed by the closeness to consciousness of the conflict in creativity, and he also suggested that the special gift of the artist may be his capacity to transform with particular speed primary into secondary processes.

Ritvo and Solnit's paper, Influence of Early Mother-Child Interaction on Identification Processes, is based on data from the Longitudinal Study at the Yale Child Study Center. They present Kris's idea that environmental influence may re-enforce the equipment or predisposition of the child or it may act in the opposite direction and they illustrate this with two case reports.

In her Child Observation and Prediction of Development: A Memorial Lecture in Honor of Ernst Kris, Anna Freud selects as her starting point a paper by Ernst Kris, Notes on the Development and Some Current Problems of Psychoanalytic Child Psychology, in which he suggests a double approach to child investigation, using

reconstruction and direct observation of children to investigate variations of mental health and to permit early recognition of illness. While Anna Freud originally objected to Ernst Kris's term, 'prediction', as unanalytical she 'slowly' accepted it as 'clinical foresight of development' or 'early assessment and diagnosis of disturbance of childhood'. Miss Freud expresses in her paper some reservations in regard to clinical foresight: 1. She doubts that maturational processes derive equally from the ego and from the drive, which may present unpredictable deviations. 2 There is no way to predict quantitative factors. 3. The environmental factor will always be unpredictable. Miss Freud presents clinical material showing the value of early diagnosis for treatment, and discusses the early relation of mother and child, assessment of sublimations, and assessment of traumatic events. In this last part of her contribution she shows how a highly traumatic event in a child's life has been cathected. A detailed description of the case is given in Mary Bergen's paper, included in the clinical part of this volume.

Three contributions to psychoanalytic theory, Hartmann's Comments on the Scientific Aspects of Psychoanalysis; Ramzy and Wallerstein's Pain, Fear, and Anxiety: A Study in Their Interrelationships; and Schur's The Ego and the Id in Anxiety, are closely reasoned, systematic investigations that clarify basic analytic concepts. A paper by van der Leeuw emphasizes the precœdipal factors, particularly the oral ones and the identification with the precœdipal mother, in the development of male homosexuality. Spitz and Beres discuss early superego components and superego precursors. Annie Reich presents a fascinating case demonstrating integration of unusual solutions of conflict into the ego structure producing a specific character formation. Of particular interest in this section are four papers on adolescence, which still presents many unsolved issues. Spiegel discusses some general problems of adolescence, and Geleerd describes clinical and technical aspects of 'borderline' states. Papers by Anna Freud and Kurt Eissler are devoted to problems of technique in adolescence and merit attention for their novel approach. While Miss Freud's book, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense, is a comprehensive study of the ego's defenses against instinctual drives, in the current paper she gives us a description of defenses against object relationship.

Among the clinical contributions are papers by Bierman and co-

workers who describe a depression in a young child with poliomyelitis. Vivian Jarvis describes the visual problem in reading disability. Niederland attempts to delineate the connection between early auditory experiences, the primal scene, and beating fantasies. This section also contains Christine Olden's last paper on a topic that preoccupied her for many years, the development of empathy in general and that of adults with children in particular. Mary Bergen's paper was mentioned previously.

In the section, Applied Psychoanalysis, Philip Weissman relates Shaw's childhood to Pygmalion, and Phyllis Greenacre describes the relation of the impostor to the artist, an observation based primarily on her study of Thomas Mann's novel, The Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man.

This volume contains many excellent contributions, most of which merit a full individual review, and the above can merely indicate the main areas of investigation. This annual has become one of the most valuable publications on psychoanalysis.

ELIZABETH B. GOLDNER (NEW YORK)

FREE ASSOCIATIONS. MEMORIES OF A PSYCHOANALYST. By Ernest Jones, M.D. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959. 264 pp.

In 1944, at the age of sixty-five, Ernest Jones wrote eleven chapters of his autobiography, bringing the account of his life through the end of the first World War. He temporarily abandoned this work to begin what he obviously considered a more important task, Freud's biography. When he returned to his autobiography in 1957, he decided to revise and rewrite it, as recurrent illness made its completion difficult, and he had decided that whatever interest there was in the story of his life lay in his early years.

In the preface to this book Jones gives his reasons for writing an autobiography: First, 'gratitude for life', the need to acknowledge that he had found life rich, good, and beautiful; 'a deep need to say so, to tell someone so, to thank someone'. Second, since he had assisted in the evolution of Freud's work and ideas, it might be of interest to know what kind of person played such a role.

The style is urbane and restrained, frequently digressive and witty, simple in self-portrayal but forceful in criticism of himself and colleagues. Even though not written as a psychoanalytic case

history, Jones reveals enough of himself to evoke admiration, especially in his revelation of how he nurtured the given spark within him. He describes his early life and schooling in Wales, student days in London, the early years as a physician, culminating in a highly successful Harley Street practice. The latter half of the book relates the story of his interest in psychoanalysis, his life in Canada, his return to Europe to become one of the leaders in the psychoanalytic movement.

What results is the portrait of an eager and ambitious, courageous and gifted man, striving for a rational approach to life's problems via both medicine and psychoanalysis. A fascinating picture of the cultural and scientific climate of the early years of psychoanalysis emerges with numerous anecdotes about Freud, Brill, William James, Wilfred Trotter, Ferenczi, Stekel, Jung, Morton Prince, and many others.

Perhaps intentionally there are only occasional references to the development of his own concepts and a modest omission of any list of his personal contributions. It is as if Jones intended his fame to rest on his own extensive scientific work and his biographical masterpiece, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud.

NORMAN REIDER (SAN FRANCISCO)

HYPNOSIS AND RELATED STATES. Psychoanalytic Studies in Regression. By Merton M. Gill, M. D. and Margaret Brenman, Ph. D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1959. 405 pp.

Interest in the psychoanalytic process far exceeds interest in the hypnotic process. Indeed, resistance to hypnosis is implicit in the history of psychoanalysis. Freud abandoned hypnosis for clinical reasons, but also it made him uncomfortable. Resistance to hypnosis on the part of the patient—according to one hypothesis—is the basic conflict about which the psychoanalytic process revolves. However, to consider the hypnotic process solely as a resistance minimizes its phenomenological significance and its natural place among other established activities of the psychic apparatus. When considered from the structural, dynamic, economic, genetic, and adaptive points of view, the phenomenology of hypnosis and the vicissitudes to which it is subject may be expected to emerge in proper perspective, free of prejudicial encumbrances.

This expectation is wholly fulfilled by the publication of this book. It meets the need for a thorough, up-to-date, comprehensive study of hypnosis, a review of which, in conformity with modern psychoanalytic standards, has been long overdue. Its value is materially enhanced because the authors' investigations are not limited to hypnotic phenomena, but include inquiries into the basic nature of the psychotherapeutic and analytic processes as well.

The book was fifteen years in the making. It was begun during the war years as a project suited to the pressing needs of the time—to find out whether and in what circumstances hypnosis could be used to shorten the duration of psychotherapy. In time the focus of interest shifted from immediate practical concerns to more fundamental and theoretical ones. The alteration in aim determined a significant achievement of the book—the successful application of psychoanalytic principles to the problem of hypnosis which, although immediate and adjacent to its sphere of interest, was never successfully incorporated within the framework of a general psychology.

The substantive value of this contribution stems from close adherence to two principles—direct clinical observations of a selected and most interesting sample of the patient population, and the construction of precise theoretical and conceptual models that combine the best that psychoanalysis has to offer. The authors consider their theory of hypnosis an amplification of the psychoanalytic theory of hypnosis, particularly in the realm of ego psychology. They point out that the psychoanalytic theory of hypnosis clearly implies that hypnosis is a form of regression. Induction of hypnosis is therefore considered as the process of bringing about a regression, and the hypnotic state itself as the established regression.

The decisive difference between induction and established state is the former's relative instability, and its greater liability to primary process influences and to shifts from a conceptual organization of thought toward a drive organization of thought (Rapaport). The established state, in contrast, is relatively stable. Early chapters in the book dealing with the induction of hypnosis emphasize the relevance to the theory of hypnosis of recent experimental work on the reduction of sensory intake and motility, and on the manipulation of attention. The established state of hypnosis is defined as a total regression of the ego and involves a general alteration as well as a

specific change in particular ego functions. The principle of selective alteration of ego functions, proposed earlier by one of the authors, is restated and modified so as to encompass the specific transference characteristics that differentiate hypnotic regression from regressive states induced by drugs, sensory deprivation, and other means. The relationship to the hypnotist, considered as the essence of hypnosis, also distinguishes it from spontaneous regressions, fugue states, and related phenomena.

Transference manifestations are described as part functions of the ego in regression, brought about by conflict between the ego and id. The authors assume that the hypnotic state alters ego functioning, and, conversely, that changes in transference alter the depth of hypnosis. Hence, the regressive process of hypnosis can be initiated either by an attack on the sensorimotor ideational level or by stimulation, through whatever means, of an intense transference. Observations on the dedifferentiation of function in the ego in the established state show that the preservation of the ego's reality-testing function and of some control of the sensorimotor apparatus makes this mode of regression a form of regression in the service of the ego.

The authors are definite, however, in their view that regression in the service of the ego is not to be distinguished from regression proper, either by the degree to which the personality is submerged in regression or by the degree to which autonomous apparatuses continue to operate during hypnosis. According to the authors, a general theory of regression that fully clarifies this distinction does not exist. They propose, therefore, to define regression in terms of loss of ego autonomy.

The fifty pages of Chapter Five entitled The Metapsychology of Regression and Hypnosis is recommended to everyone interested in the current transitional phases of ego psychology. The metapsychological treatment of hypnosis as regression rests upon the concept of relative autonomy of the ego from the id (Hartmann), the much less familiar concept of relative autonomy of the ego from the environment (Rapaport),[1] and the relationship between the two autonomies. As to the autonomy of the ego from the environment, the

[1] The authors note that this concept was described—but not so named—by Hartmann in terms of 'internalization' and the creation of an 'inner world' in Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.

concept preferred is one in which both means and motivation are considered relatively autonomous from the basic drives. As to the relative autonomy from the environment, 'just as the ego is not enslaved to the immediate drive demand, so it is not enslaved to the immediate external conditions'.

The most provocative and controversial aspects of the chapter on metapsychology are in the distinction drawn between an over-all ego regression and a selective or differential regression involving autonomous subsets of ego functioning. The authors' thesis is that diminished input, or strong press or urge by influences exerted on the ego—or both—facilitate de-automatization (loss of secondary autonomy) of ego apparatuses, and that this brings about alteration in the relative autonomy of the ego from the id and from the environment which is the central feature of the hypnotic state.

'In hypnosis, a subsystem is set up within the ego. This subsystem is a regressed system which is in the service of the over-all ego; it has control of some or all the apparatuses, and to the extent that it has control, those apparatuses which were de-automatized (during the induction of hypnosis) are now re-automatized. It is the subsystem alone which is under the control of the hypnotist, and it is by virtue of this control that the hypnotist can control and direct the apparatuses.'

Access by the subsystem to regressed id and superego derivatives accounts for the altered interpersonal relationship to the hypnotist. In the transference, 'the ego is dominated by the environment after the autonomy has been lost'.[2] According to this view, for example, patients with traumatic neuroses are considered more susceptible to hypnosis 'because their repressive countercathexes, already occupied with holding the traumatic memory and associated drive in repression, are less available to prevent the activation of infantile drives toward the hypnotist'.

Though not specifically stated, from this example it appears that the authors' theory of regression—like Freud's—considers the psychology of repression as the 'heart of the riddle'.

In subsequent chapters, the theory of regression as loss of au-

[2] The authors hold that because the subject reacts by regression to environmental demand (the hypnotist), and because the loss of control and loss of autonomy is only temporary, conditional, and partial, the hypnotic regression represents a form of regressive adaptation (Hartmann).

tonomy is tested and applied in a wide variety of clinical conditions related to the hypnotic state. One may judge the value and scientific validity of the hypothesis in relation to the phenomena of sleep, somnambulism, fugue, traumatic neurosis, and forceful indoctrination (brain washing). The chapter, Trance in Bali, derived from material in Bateson and Mead's Balinese Character, provides an illuminating analysis of the cultural determinants of the susceptibility to hypnotic trance. The final section is a detailed, balanced, and richly documented account of experiences and explorations of the use of hypnosis in psychotherapy.

The authors were younger when they began this project fifteen years ago, closer to the beginning of their careers, and susceptible to the influences and changes that were taking place in psychoanalysis. The lapse in time between beginning and publication is responsible for an occasional unevenness in style. It is, however, also responsible for providing a firsthand and revealing account of the impact of a succession of new ideas and concepts on the course and development of the authors' formulations—and on recent developments in psychoanalysis as well.

Does the use of hypnosis in therapy constitute rational or irrational action? What is the measure of its problem-solving potential or its value as a form of regressive adaptation? The best technical means of achieving a goal are not necessarily the most rational ones, and maximal rationality does not always represent optimal adaptation (Hartmann). It might be anticipated that hypnosis, considered as a form of regression in the service of the ego, might effectively exploit an irrational mode of action in order to establish a new order of organization in the ego and a higher level of adaptive achievement. The indications are, nevertheless, that hypnosis more often fails than succeeds in this aim; its effectiveness as therapy is limited to a relatively small and select group of patients. If psychoanalysis is defined as an attenuated form of the hypnotic relationship, and if both represent a regression in the service of the ego, why is the hypnotic process abandoned and replaced by another that presumably operates on the same principle?

A partial answer may be that successful analysis of the transference-defense in the hypnotic process is not altogether possible, whereas its resolution is possible in the psychoanalytic process. The transference in hypnosis interferes with the two-phase process of

problem-solving by regression followed by reintegration within the ego. The transference is not 'real', so that the way back to reality via the transference object is blocked at its most critical point. Hence, by definition, all the requirements of a successful regressive adaptation are not met. Reality cannot be forced upon a patient by magical means. From the results of experiments with hypnosis in therapy that began with Freud it seems—to quote a venerable Latin poet—*'Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret'*.[3]

ALBERT A. ROSNER (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. SELECTED PAPERS OF FRIEDA FROMM-REICHMANN. Edited by Dexter M. Bullard, M.D. Foreword by Edith V. Weigert, M.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1959. 350 pp.

When Hitler took over Germany, the physicians who found refuge here in America were bound to affect our current psychiatric practices. More than any other specialty of medicine, our psychiatric hospitals were suffering from a shortage of staff, not only quantitatively but qualitatively. Our top men here, never lacking in ability or heart, welcomed the revolution brought in by the refugees, whose presence restored professionalism to the lower echelons and whose methods assumed a relationship between practice and theory. Strongly characteristic of these refugee traits was Frieda Fromm-Reichmann.

Fromm-Reichmann's added contribution was specific and peculiar to her, as all readers of this book will immediately and gratefully recognize. Her experiences in the treatment of schizophrenics had convinced her, contrary to an early formulation of Freud's, that her patients were capable of transferences and that therefore they could be successfully treated. Freud redefined his views on secondary narcissism in 1926, but it took many years before his newer concept was correlated into clinical practice. Fromm-Reichmann was a convincing demonstrator of this change. Standing almost alone in the American field at that time, the balance she held between her results and her reasons, between practice and theory, appealed equally to beginners and to those who shared her goal while using techniques other than hers.

[3] 'When nature is driven out with a fork, it will always return.'

Her techniques arose naturally from her sincerity and sensitivity. For example, her recognition of the importance of the initial interview came straight out of her readiness to accept transferences, which is of course the royal road to eliciting them. Her warning against insincerity, against trying to manipulate the patient-doctor relationship, was as superfluous for her as it is still needed by some others. Likewise, she had no undue fear of giving inexact interpretations; for in offering interpretations she and her patients knew that she was not aggrandizing herself.

Of all that she wrote on the subject of technique, the following statement is as characteristic of her, as persuasive as any that comes to mind: '. . . failure to understand a patient should not be looked upon as a result of unfamiliarity with the schizophrenic's means of communication per se. . . . The psychiatrist should learn to accept the fact of the potential meaningfulness of schizophrenic communication, and to resign himself to the fact that his ability to catch on to it is limited.' The clear inference is that *not* to grope omnipotently for the content every single time is to offer a patient that opportunity for pause after his utterance, which alone can inoculate him against the anxiety which gave that utterance its peculiar form.

Since it is always easier to exercise one's talents than to explain them, Fromm-Reichmann sometimes puts the reader in a better position than she is herself to understand her effectiveness at a given point. Thus Arlow[1] is undoubtedly correct when he states: 'In this connection, I would submit that Dr. Fromm-Reichmann's comment to the patient who shouted, "Best, best, best! Why do you always have to get the best?" was more than an interpretation of content. It was also an acceptance of the patient's competitive hostility, an acceptance which proved most reassuring to the patient' (p. 117). In that same volume, Robert C. Bak adds scientific thoroughness to several of her ideas, while discussing another paper: 'Is it not possible that the *agreement* with the patient is a highly potent factor? It would certainly correspond with my views on the therapist's attitude that I expressed in 1943, when I had the privilege to discuss Dr. Fromm-Reichmann's paper and advocated that the therapist should represent a narcissistic object, appearing as part of the

[1] Arlow, Jacob A.: Quoted in *Psychotherapy with Schizophrenics. A Symposium.* Edited by Eugene B. Brody and Fredrick C. Redlich. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1952.

patient because there is no object cathexis possible' (p. 203).

But these examples are only a measure of how stimulating Fromm-Reichmann was, how clear were her presentations, and how founded in clinical sense were her formulations.

EDWARD E. HARKAVY (NEW YORK)

OBSERVATIONS ON DIRECT ANALYSIS. The Therapeutic Technique of Dr. John N. Rosen. By Morris W. Brody, M.D. With Forewords by John N. Rosen, M.D. and O. Spurgeon English, M.D. New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1959. 104 pp.

In this short book, Brody takes a direct look at 'Direct Analysis'. He comes well equipped for his task since he is a staff member of Temple University, director of resident training and a training analyst at the Philadelphia Psychoanalytic Institute. He is also the leader (since 1957) of a seminar conducted at the Institute for Direct Analysis (Dr. English is the director) where he has observed John Rosen at work. Brody's book is a masterful example of the methodology and technique of analytic observation and its use as a tool in the investigation of psychotherapeutic techniques. It also gives an excellent description of an interesting technique, reporting it briefly and precisely. It is a pioneer work in an attempt to explain the essentials of the psychotherapeutic process. In this respect Brody's work is much more than an excellent report about Rosen's treatment of psychotics.

Brody summarizes his interpretation of Rosen's technique thus: Psychosis in its manifest content is a nightmare in which forbidden wishes are so well disguised that the psychotic does not awaken. Unmask the latent meaning of the illness, and the patient will (or may) emerge from his sickness. A picture of Rosen's 'frontal assault' is then presented. The therapeutic task is to help the patient feel less fear and guilt about unconscious forbidden impulses, and to displace this guilt and shame upon the fact of being sick. Past observers have found it difficult to explain 'direct analysis' because the importance of moving the sense of guilt from the unconscious impulses to the fact of being psychotically sick was not recognized. It is designed to modify the patient's superego so as to break his previous identification and to establish new introjects. Previous commentators were not aware of Rosen's single-mindedness of purpose when he treats a

patient. He never deviates from telling the patient: 'You are crazy; this is shameful behavior; stop acting in this shameful, crazy way'. The patient is made to feel less guilty about his unconscious and more guilty about being psychotic. Although it is not acceptable to be crazy it is a distinction to have been crazy. Rosen never sounds more convincing than when he asserts that only in psychosis does one achieve intimacy with the unconscious. This is claimed to be an unusually valuable experience and consistent help in the therapy is given by former patients who have recovered from psychoses.

This book is also an enormously stimulating contribution to the discussion of many controversial issues of current psychotherapeutic techniques. The topics range from the initial interview to the termination of therapy; from the task of awakening the patient from his psychosis to consideration of the external setting of direct analysis. The group is an essential part of the setting for direct analysis. The group, which includes observers, represents a mother image. There are a few restrained attempts to conclude what the therapeutic technique means to Rosen who plays the central role opposite his patient. A short chapter on the special management of dream material concludes the book.

In a few words of introduction, Dr. Rosen states that he could not always appreciate the inquisitorial fervor with which Dr. Brody pursued his investigation. However, a feedback mechanism soon led Rosen to a broader understanding of the principles of his own technique and enabled him to improve it. Dr. English states in the introduction that this book by Brody is the first of five reports. It is hoped that the volumes to come will be on an equally high level as this first report on a truly analytic teamwork.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (BEVERLY HILLS)

SIGMUND FREUD'S MISSION. AN ANALYSIS OF HIS PERSONALITY AND INFLUENCE. By Erich Fromm. New York: Harper & Bros., 1959. 120 pp.

Fromm has written this book on the assumption that understanding and analyzing the creator of psychoanalysis will throw true light on 'its achievements and defects'. He feels the time has come for an 'objective' biography of Freud. He considers Jones's three volumes

to be an idolizing, naïve document by a disciple who could not bear to face negative, undesirable qualities in his master.

In contrast to Jones's biographical method of eliciting Freud's personality from his work and letters, Fromm abuses such material to advance his personal theory about Freud and his mission.

The ten chapters of the book contradict one another. When the facts do not agree and truth cannot be distorted to accord with his theory, Fromm reaches for the unconscious and resorts to speculation and interpretation. By abusing the tools of analysis, he manages in one paragraph to prove that Freud was helpless and overdependent; in the next that he is provokingly authoritarian. He charges him both with passionate love and inability to love.

Fromm's undynamic approach, compounded with 'wild analysis', reveals little about Freud but a great deal about this interpreter. To Fromm, Freud's statement, 'My character is little suited to the role of a protected child. I have always entertained a strong desire to be a strong man myself', is proof of Freud's repressed and unresolved oral dependence on his mother. Freud's relationships with Breuer, Fliess, Adler, Jung, Ferenczi are all dependencies on the mother, displaced to men. Although Freud at one time regarded Jung as his son and intellectual heir, Fromm decides that Jung was a mother image to whom Freud clung and whom he dropped when his dependency needs were frustrated.

Fromm theorizes that Freud had a pathological mother attachment which he not only concealed from the world but from himself. Fromm concedes the discovery of the œdipus complex as a basic contribution, but he treats it as the result of repression and resistance and as Freud's inability to face the overwhelming impact of the strongest drive in man—Fromm's own great 'revelation'—the need to be nursed by 'Mother'.

Throughout the book Freud's theories are interpreted as expressions and rationalizations of his character disorder and personal conflicts. The fact that psychoanalysis developed as an empirical science, based on clinical data, is ignored.

It puzzles Fromm that the discoverer of infantile sexuality did not become a sex maniac, but lived an exemplary life of supreme discipline. He is indignant that Freud, an ardent lover in his youth who was tempted to put his love above his career, became a scientist who devoted the largest part of his libidinal life to his work. Fromm

considers Freud's concepts of female sexuality insulting to the fair sex, born of the need to devaluate women. Fromm quotes Freud's response to the plea of a young American colleague for equality of the sex partners: 'Equality of the partners is a practical impossibility. There must be inequality, and the superiority of the man is the lesser of the two evils.' This is proof to Fromm that Freud expressed the patriarchal prejudices of his time; yet elsewhere he classifies Freud as a rebel.

The last chapters are devoted to 'the quasi-political character of psychoanalysis'. Fromm sees in Freud a frustrated political leader who has subserved his science to tyrannical ambition. He concedes Freud insisted that psychoanalysis is a branch of science and not a *Weltanschauung,* but Fromm 'can only come to the conclusion that this is what Freud consciously believed, and what he wanted to believe, while his wish to have founded a new philosophical, scientific religion was repressed and thus unconscious'. As proof he declares that Freud's ardent wish to protect his work has no counterpart in the history of science.

There are probably two reasons why this book has been so favorably received in some quarters: first, Fromm, like others before him, needs to minimize the significance of the sexual instinct in human development; second, the great man, whose very existence is disquieting, is reduced to the status of a dependent child craving for 'Mother'.

YELA LOWENFELD (NEW YORK)

JEWISH SYMBOLS IN THE GRECO-ROMAN PERIOD. By Erwin R. Goodenough. Bollingen Series XXXVII, Vols. I–VI. New York: Published for Bollingen Foundation Inc. by Pantheon Books, Inc., 1953, 1954, 1956.

When I set out to review the first six volumes of this series I did not realize the magnitude of Professor Goodenough's monumental work. Two further volumes have appeared in the meantime, and two more are still to come. Rarely has a task proved more rewarding for one interested in the history of psychology and symbolism, but rarely has a review proved so difficult. It is wellnigh impossible to convey

the essence of these volumes in sufficiently condensed yet comprehensive form.

In an article published some time ago, the author referred to the discovery of the decorations on Jewish graves and synagogues of the Greco-Roman period as perhaps even more important than that of the Dead Sea scrolls. Although theologians may disagree with that view, these discoveries and their systematic presentation by Professor Goodenough are one of the most significant contributions to understanding of the universality of symbols. The various theories and explanations based upon the breach of the Jewish prohibition of image-making are of little relevance here. Most interesting, from the psychologist's point of view, is the choice of specific symbols revealed by these findings.

The first three volumes, published in 1953, comprise an archeological description and illustrations of Jewish tombs and synagogues of the Greco-Roman period in Palestine and in the Diaspora. Included are all the ornaments and objects found there, such as water basins, ossuaries, sarcophagi, lamps, coins, glasses, charms, and amulets. The purpose of these initial volumes is the methodical compilation and presentation of symbols used by the Jews of the period, to prepare for analysis of the individual symbols in later volumes. Starting with the basic contention that the Hellenization of Christianity became possible because ideas of the pagan world had found their way into Judaism, the author proposes to show that such pagan elements were not borrowed for the simple purpose of decoration but held active symbolic meaning for the Jews. In order to prove this thesis, he first subjects to systematic review the remains of Jewish art that archeology has recovered.

In the fourth volume, published a year later, Goodenough explains his method of evaluating symbols and then starts the detailed analysis of specific symbols from the Jewish cult. He finds that in their synagogues and graves the Jews obviously favored certain symbols and avoided some others, confirming his original belief that what they used was chosen not for its decorative appeal but for its symbolic value to themselves. These borrowed motifs held real meaning for the Jews as symbols, the values of which they had thoroughly Judaized by giving them Jewish explanations. Had they failed to do so, had they used them in pagan ways with pagan meanings, the Jews would not have been able to remain Jews. Goode-

nough hypothesizes that these symbols meant much more to the Jews of antiquity than they mean to Jewry today because the ancient Jews read pagan mysticism into them.

He next proceeds to examine his hypothesis by analyzing such Jewish symbols as the Menorah, the Torah Shrine, the Lulab and Ethrog, the Shofar and the Incense Shovel. His examination leads him to conclusions that find no support in orthodox Judaism: although it has been recognized that Jewish borrowings from pagan symbolism are for the most part funerary symbols, Goodenough is the first to emphasize that synagogue worship at the time of those borrowings must have been oriented in mysticism and the hope of life after death. That the use of such symbols was not confined to tombs, but extended to the synagogues, indicates to him that 'synagogue worship was concerned with life after death in a sense far beyond anything that appears in synagogue worship under rabbinic guidance'. The author has compiled a formidable array of evidence to support this thesis. His views on the psychology of religion, which he unfolds in the context of this same volume, will be discussed later.

Volumes five and six (1956) are devoted to scrutiny of three major religious symbols: fish, bread, and wine.[1] These are traced as they moved from religion to religion, always acquiring new interpretations yet always retaining their universal values. In particular the fish, before its adaptation as a Jewish symbol, represented an important symbol of immortality and fertility throughout Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, and, to a lesser degree, Greece. Here it is possible barely to summarize the gist of Goodenough's impressively detailed research on the symbolic values of fish, bread, and wine.

Describing an Egyptian tomb from the Hellenistic period, in which a fish replaces the usual soul-bird, he infers that in this representation the fish stands for Osiris, phallus, giver of life, and immortality. In Mesopotamia, the fish figured as a fertility and also as a funerary symbol; in both connotations it is a life symbol. The author remarks that symbols of fertility and phallic symbols were often identical and that the fish may have had phallic significance from the beginning. He prefers, however, not to interpret this meaning in the psychoanalytic sense, but suggests that the fish referred to

[1] Volumes seven and eight (1958) must be deferred for later review. One deals with the bull, the lion, the tree, and the crown; the other, with primarily erotic symbols and with psychopomps.

the universal source of life rather than to the individual human phallus or human sexuality. In Syria fish served as a ritualistic food; its consumption was believed to unite the faithful with their goddess Atatargis, in heaven. The fish seems to have had little religious significance in Greece during classical times. In the Roman Empire, the ritual offering of fish for the dead was adopted from Eastern practices. Many tombstones and lamps decorated with fish, dating from the Roman period, are thought to be Christian but are actually of pagan origin. Modern survivals of fish symbolism are found in North Africa and Syria; in these regions the fish often is used as an amulet. Significantly, in communities where there is a Jewish quarter it is pre-empted as a Jewish symbol. Jewish fish lore certainly antedates Mahomet, but fish serves as an active talismanic symbol among Moslems as well.

Discussing the symbolic value of the fish in Judaism, Goodenough notes that the pious man was proverbially compared to a fish who can survive only in his native element. Moreover, Jewish tradition contrasts this 'little fish' with the 'great fish', Leviathan, symbolizing the glory of the Messianic age when it will be caught and its kosher flesh given to the faithful. This saving power of the fish's pure flesh for those who eat it is a constant theme from paganism to Judaism and Christianity. Such continuity of the symbol and rite of the fish meal was made possible only by Jewish and, later, Christian reinterpretation. Thus to the Jews of that era eating the fish represented a mystic sharing in the divine power which would be fully manifest in the Messianic age, and in which each faithful Jew placed his hope for resurrection and future life. In Christianity, both symbol and meal continue to express the same hope and faith, although the 'little fishes' here swim not in the Law but in the water of baptism: in Christ.

Turning to the next symbol, bread, Goodenough centers his analysis around the equation of 'round objects' with loaves of bread. It is considered likely that certain 'round objects' found on Palestinian jars, Menorahs, and other objects are representations of loaves. Since 'round objects' frequently are symbols of light, bread and the divine light are equated and identified. The 'round object' was the hieroglyph for *Ra,* the sun god of the ancient Egyptians. This sign, probably with the double connotation of sun and bread, lent its form to the Egyptian ceremonial cake used as a burial offer-

ing. Concentric circles are frequently found on Greek vases, where they seem to represent the sun; the form of these ornaments points to Greece's heritage from the East. In Coptic art, many tombstones show the 'round object' placed at the head of a cross. Here the Egyptian *ankh,* the symbol of life (especially of life as it flows in the divine light stream), was deliberately adapted into the cross, the crucifix: Christ is represented on it in the form of the holy wafer of the Eucharist. That the Jews had a sense of sanctity with regard to bread is strongly suggested by the fact that they used 'round objects' so commonly to represent bread, as the pagans had done and the Christians did later. Such direct transition of a symbol indicates a continuity of value. The bread offered in sacrifice to the gods was a form of communion with them; the same symbolism remains attached to the Christian Host. Between these pagan and Christian usages stands the Jewish 'round object'; indeed, baskets of bread in the Jewish form became the Christians' favorite way of representing the bread of heaven.

Further connection is provided by the symbolic value attaching to 'first fruits'. In Judaism they were proverbially a symbol of immortality, perhaps of some special saving principle or being, which Christianity came to identify with the Savior who brings redemption, which is equivalent to immortality. Thus, the author strongly suspects, the Jews may have felt that by the blessing of bread and wine they received more than physical nourishment, and that bread for them became the 'bread from heaven'. The values in both religions today are amazingly similar, and it seems more reasonable to assume that early Christianity adapted an old Jewish usage for the Eucharist than vice versa.

Wine carries the symbolic meaning of divine fluid. The remains of ancient Jewish art present wine in purely pagan forms, and these same pagan forms reappear as the most important group of symbols of early Christianity. In Judaism and Christianity alike, wine could be represented as the wine, cluster of grapes, cup, wine jar, basket of grapes, vintage scenes, wine press. In Christianity the holy drink was further portrayed in scenes which probably had their origin also in Jewish art. Wine was a deeply symbolic element already at the period of the early Maccabees; and by the time of the construction of the Temple, the vine was lavishly represented. On the basis of its archeological appearance it suggests at once a mystic symbol

and a reference to an actual sacrament, precisely as it later was in Christianity.

The author brings rich observations on symbolic uses of the 'divine fluid' throughout Mesopotamia, Syria, and Egypt. The late Hittites associated immortality with the grape, as shown on the tombstone of a married couple where the man holds a bunch of grapes. This funerary representation remained customary for many centuries and was found on a Jewish tombstone. To explain the psychological urge that prompted such ritualistic practices originally and caused them to continue basically unchanged even to the present, Goodenough suggests that the satisfaction arises from a participation of the individual in the divine.

The Ras Shamra poems of early Semites in Syria describe a fertility ritual which Gaster called the prototype of the Israelite Feast of Weeks (Pentecost) when the first fruits were offered. By the seventh century before Christ these mysteries became concentrated in the person of Adonis; still later, they were associated with Dionysus, and as such they were replaced only by Christianity. In the traditional Adonis cult, the fertility of the water flow was definitely visualized as a phallic flow from the gods. The fluid of the river was not merely the giver of crops, it represented a god who was also a savior and the giver of immortality to men.

In ancient Egypt, representations of the vine appear from early times, continuing without interruption into the Hellenistic period. In Mesopotamia, however, the symbolic references to fluid in general are much more illuminating than those to wine. A fluid of some sort, but not necessarily a specific one like wine, had to be furnished to the dead if they were to hope for immortality. The fluid was represented as the spermatic flow from the divine phallus. In all those civilizations, the meaning of the divine stream found clearest expression through their treatment of this aspect of religion. Whether it was envisaged in terms of water or of the sun, the stream of life invariably signified the stream of fertilizing divinity which produced new life and birth. A stream of fluid is presented that is at once solar and phallic and, in both senses, the source of life: agricultural, royal, and eternal. It seems likely that despite the utter difference in approach and imagery, this stream was for the Egyptians what 'grace' later was for the Christians; the two concepts seem as closely similar in their psychological value for the devout

as they are different in their symbolic presentations.

Goodenough has devoted a great deal of study and thought to the psychology of symbolism, and displays wide erudition in discussing this aspect. He finds depth psychology indispensable for the analysis of his material, but does not commit himself to any specific system or school of thought. Susanne Langer's distinction between 'connotative' and 'denotative' thinking, which is largely a differentiation between verbal and nonverbal thought, seems to appeal to him particularly. He emphasizes these two types of thinking in contemporary life; namely, the 'denotative' in science and the 'connotative' in art, poetry, and music. Likewise Langer's idea that symbols of religion are nature symbols meets with his full agreement. However he does not share her view that the conflict between religion and science is a conflict between connotative and denotative thinking.

In his discussion of religious symbols the author shows how they could pass from one religion to another because they did not carry *literal* meanings. By taking over such symbols while rejecting the myths of the pagans, Jews and Christians were demonstrating a continuity of religious experience. Thus both Christianity and Judaism rejected Dionysus 'with horror', but they preserved his symbols. There is a definite meaning inherent in a religious symbol, which to the devout is as expressive and as direct as verbal language.

The religious symbol, however, is not only a direct purveyor of meaning, 'but also a thing of power, or value, operating upon us to inspire, to release tensions, to arouse guilt, or to bring a sense of forgiveness and reconciliation'. We may love a symbol or hate it, but 'as long as it is a symbol we register its message, feel its power'. Symbols have a way of dying, of losing their power and becoming mere decorations, but they also can come back to life with the same power that was invested in them before. A new movement usually revives one of the primordial symbols rather than inventing a new one. In its migration, however, the symbol may acquire different meaning. There is a *lingua franca* in the history of religious symbols, which consist primarily of abstract signs and not of mythological scenes.

The eclectic approach, unfortunately, does not always make for consistency. Goodenough, who explicitly refuses to accept the Jungian concepts of a collective unconscious and of archetypes, found himself so 'deeply affected' by the force of the basic symbols he

studied that he has 'great sympathy with those who insist upon their inherent potency'.

On the whole, he tends to rely considerably upon classical psychoanalytic concepts. It is true that he rejects the concept of libido, replacing it by a more general philosophical principle of 'life urge' reminiscent of the Bergsonian '*élan vital*'. He likewise rejects the universality of the œdipus complex. Nevertheless, he unfolds views on the psychology of religion that unmistakably reflect the psychoanalytic theory of infantile development; step by step, he shows how the evolution of religions parallels the maturation of the individual. Using this method, he explains the phenomena of identification with the mother figure (the *unio mystica*) and the formation of the superego through complete submission to the father (God). 'To the original pure nostalgia for complete gratification has been added a sense that the price of gratification is obedience to laws, social and ritualistic, while the concept of the mediator has made its highly important appearance.' These are the conditions, Goodenough believes, underlying Judaism 'in which the mother element has become quite unrecognizably obscured in the dominant pattern of the relation between a boy and his father. Here the individual is given the rewards of this life and the next strictly on the basis of obedience.'

Very interesting are his speculations on the development of the Judæo-Christian religions and rituals as being based on the 'life urge', the quest for fertility and immortality.

Despite his attempt to construct a conceptual framework more appropriate perhaps, in his view, for a history of religion than the concept of libido, the author found himself 'driven with relentless regularity to identical explanations, and to ascribing identical values to all the symbols—driven not by my predilections but by the evidence itself. The basic value . . . appeared definitely an erotic one. This was the major element all the symbols had in common.' Indeed, his reluctance to accept the libido theory may be due only to insufficient familiarity with its clinical applications. This would also explain his misunderstanding and rejection of the concept of sublimation.[2]

[2] It is interesting to mention in this connection that Goodenough refers to three major steps in the historical development of religion: 'At first the sex symbol was the instrument of literal fertility magic to bring crops, as when a

Coming back to Goodenough's scholarly evaluation of religious symbols, this reviewer agrees with him that the search for original meaning in symbolism inevitably creates a tendency to oversimplify. As he says, there is every reason to suppose that religious symbolism in itself antedates by far even the earliest prehistoric relics, and that no analysis can hope to recover what Reik calls the 'hidden dynamic melody'. This is why he refuses, for instance, to accept Reik's hypothesis that the Shofar is a symbol of totemistic origin. Rather, Goodenough believes that the Shofar may be connected with the legend of the Akedah. Looking at it, as he does, from the vantage point of the Greco-Roman period and the development of Christianity, it is not the œdipal killing of the father by the son, but the killing of the son by the father that would have originated the eternal priesthood and permanent atonement. He cites some medieval Hebrew liturgical interpretations, according to which the sacrifice of Isaac was actually consummated,—an idea possibly grounded in the doctrine of Christ's murder and resurrection. While this reviewer is not competent to judge the merits of either theory, from a psychoanalytic standpoint Reik's speculation has the advantage of profound consistency. In adhering to the Biblical version that not Isaac was killed but the ram, his totemistic interpretation fits both the Shofar and the Akedah.

This single example, out of a multitude that might have been chosen, certainly demonstrates the extreme complexity of such a study. By the same token, it gives but a bare hint of the inestimable labor Goodenough has spent in organizing and analyzing his richly varied, significant, and lucidly presented material. He insists that the psychological discussion plays only a secondary role in this work, and disclaims having made a major contribution to psychology. But beyond doubt is his success in showing that the combination of historical with psychological methods of investigation is able greatly to enhance our understanding of religious symbolism. And even if he has not solved the riddles inherent in the deeper strata of

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figure of Priapus was placed in a garden. Later, the significance of man's sex experience as a door to greater personal life came increasingly to be felt, and sex symbols or acts were used as open means to achieving unity with the deity, male or female. Finally, all conscious reference to the sexual act was eliminated, and the overtly sexual pictures and rites were abandoned, so that religion could achieve the "higher" gratification.'

symbolic language, for years to come his work will serve psychological research and be as fresh an inspiration and as rich a source of information as it was for this reviewer.

The frame befits the contents. Indeed, the publishers deserve to be congratulated on this outstanding edition. The volumes are impressive by their format, binding, quality, exceptional in clarity of print and illustrations. The student and the bibliophile alike will find the set a valuable addition to their libraries.

PAUL FRIEDMAN (NEW YORK)

TRÄUME DER BLINDEN VOM STANDPUNKT DER PHÄNOMENOLOGIE, TIEFENPSYCHOLOGIE, MYTHOLOGIE UND KUNST (Dreams of the Blind from the Standpoint of Phenomenology, Depth Psychology, Mythology, and Art). By Hans-Joachim von Schumann. Basel, Switzerland: S. Karger AG., 1959. 152 pp.

This major contribution to the phenomenology of dreams of the blind constitutes a summary of the author's clinical experience and explorations in the graphic and musical arts, literature, philosophy, and religion. The psychoanalyst will find stimulation on almost every page. Of unusual interest are five reproductions of drawings and paintings illustrating dreams of the blind, and a musical analysis of the treatment of dreams of the blind in Stravinsky's Œdipus Rex, Moussorgsky's Boris Godunoff, and d'Albert's *Die toten Augen*. Dreams in the polar night—vivid wish-fulfilling visual dreams and anxiety dreams resulting from living in prolonged darkness and in a generally monotonous environment—are similar to dreams of the blind. There is also an instructive discussion of dreams of patients with organic brain disease whose vision itself is not affected but who have serious disturbances in visual memory and apperception.

Unfortunately the monograph has serious shortcomings which should not deter the psychoanalytic reader but which vitiates its value for other readers, particularly professional workers with the blind or those in training for such work. Von Schumann's *Tiefenpsychologie* turns out to be a mixture of existentialism and Jungian mysticism with a solid endocrino-neuro-physiology. His rich observations remain unintegrated, a cataloguing under this and that phenomenological heading or field of study. He repeatedly finds his clinical observations confirmed in mythology and the arts. There is

vague talk about the unconscious and its importance with no reference to psychoanalytic structural theory. Sexual conflict is alluded to peripherally and *sotto voce*. Aggression is briefly discussed late in the book but not in connection with the many dreams that are loaded with aggression and sadomasochism. Freud is referred to on one occasion to support von Schumann's uneasy belief in the telepathic dream. He is convinced that telepathic and extrasensory abilities are more common among the blind than the seeing. Elsewhere he states that a certain dream is an example of 'wish fulfilment in Freud's sense'! If there is any central purpose or goal in the dream it seems to be *'Individuationsprozess'*—self-realization or self-differentiation.

Von Schumann's attribution to the blind of special access to the depths of their unconscious is matched by his archaic attitude toward the education of the blind. He believes that integrated teaching of the blind and seeing is an ideal incapable of accomplishment because of practical considerations. Hence blind children have to be taught in schools for the blind, although afterschool association with seeing children is advocated. For the author and those who share his views, I would cite one of many examples of the accomplishment of the impossible: the itinerant teaching program of the Industrial Home for the Blind in Brooklyn supervises the education of over four hundred blind children in the public schools of four counties; these children live in their own homes or private foster homes.

If the blind infant receives optimal sensory stimulation and encouragement of motility functions, and this is followed by formal education with seeing children, we should have little concern about his *'Geist'* and *'Individuationsprozess'*.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, NEW YORK)

DREAMING. By Norman Malcolm. Studies in Philosophical Psychology Series edited by R. F. Holland. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959. New York: The Humanities Press, Inc., 1959. 128 pp.

This is a brief, condensed, interesting, and stimulating monograph which revives some of the age-old problems connected with dreaming from a philosophical point of view. Basing his argument on considerations of the manifest content of dreams, the author concludes that dreams are exempt from connection with any phase of mental

life. They cannot be hallucinations, thoughts, or the like. We cannot perform any mental act while fully asleep, hence continuity between dreaming and waking does not exist. An appearance of continuity arises, however, because the same language is used to relate both a dream and a historical event. The author states, furthermore, that there is no continuity between the states of being fully awake and fully asleep. Only sleeplike states reveal a continuity between sleeping and waking.

One of the criteria of dreaming, the author goes on to say, demands that the appearances between dreaming and waking be discrepant. Consequently, dreams are experiences which have not taken place, and it is nonsensical to say that a wish could be fulfilled in a dream or that dreams take place in physical time. Dement and Kleitman are severely criticized in this monograph because they use as their criterion for the 'correct' duration of dreams the associated rapid eye movements. Professor Malcolm rightly remarks that physiological phenomena 'may be found to stand in interesting empirical correlation with dreaming, but the possibility of these discoveries presupposes that these phenomena are not used as the criterion for dreaming'. We agree with the author that recollection is the criterion of the occurrence and content of a dream, and also that hallucinations cannot occur while we are fully asleep. But neither can dreams occur under such circumstances. Dreaming always signifies a certain amount of awakening due to interference with sleep and the teleological justification of dreaming resides in the function to dispose of sleep-disturbing stimuli.

There is no point in belaboring the question whether dreams are hallucinations. They obviously share essential features with hallucinations. On the other hand, simply by saying that dreams are only comparable with dreams and that dreams are experiences which have not taken place does not clarify the situation. Indeed, dreams do take place in the mind, but the archaic state to which the mind regresses during dreaming corresponds to a developmental stage in which the ability to distinguish between external and internal stimuli has not yet been established. The ability to so distinguish is established genetically in the course of mental development and repetitively with each awakening. The theory of wish fulfilment takes this contingency into account. The wish to sleep is, however, satisfied by every successful dream.

Although the dreamer considers his experiences to be real, he nevertheless knows that he is dreaming and sleeping. The awareness that he is asleep remains implicit; that he is dreaming may be manifestly rendered by means of a dream within a dream. This may occur when the dream goes astray and threatens to become incompatible with sleep. The fact that such diametrically opposite notions are maintained simultaneously is another characteristic feature of the mind functioning in keeping with archaic patterns.

There is an error in reasoning in the assertion that the continuity between dreaming and waking is only an apparent one and due to the same language being used to relate both dream and real event. Language is merely a vehicle; it conveys thought and ideas. But ideation was present long before the acquisition of language. Dreams employ another vehicle to express ideas, namely, an archaic one.

The question of continuity between states of complete sleep and complete awakening can be decided in the affirmative on the basis of incontrovertible data. Falling asleep is a step-by-step diminution of differentiation of the mind which, implicitly, or explicitly, regressively recapitulates the phases of its development. In full sleep the organization of the mind approximates that of the mind of the neonate. An immediate shift from being fully asleep to being fully awake is as inconceivable as an immediate shift from being a neonate to being an adult with no intermediate developmental stages.

Dreams must remain compatible with sleep and if they are to live up to this function they must render our ideas in a disguised way. But to discuss this circumstance would exceed the framework of a book review as well as the scope of the monograph, which does not intend to deal with the 'essence' of dreaming.

NICHOLAS YOUNG (NEW YORK)

AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY. Two Volumes. Edited by Silvano Arieti, M.D. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959. 2098 pp.

Here at last is a compilation in the tradition of the German *Handbücher*: a comprehensive presentation of the best in modern psychiatric thought by acknowledged authorities in their respective fields. Dr. Arieti is assisted by a distinguished editorial board: Kenneth E. Appel, Daniel Blain, Norman Cameron, Kurt Goldstein, and Lawrence C. Kolb, but the credit of editorship properly goes to Dr. Arieti.

To summarize the one hundred chapters is impossible; one can only enumerate some of the features. The comprehensiveness of the work is illustrated by the titles of the fifteen parts: General (historical, behavior, genetics, examination); Psychoneuroses and Allied Conditions; Functional Psychoses; Psychopathic Conditions, Deviations, Addictions; Psychosomatic Medicine; Childhood and Adolescence; Language, Speech, Communication; Organic Considerations; The Psychotherapies (chapters by Muncie, Goldstein, Rollo May, Jerome Frank and Florence Powdermaker, and Moreno); Psychoanalytic Therapies (Greenson, Kelman, Wolberg, Ruth Munroe, *inter alia);* The Physical Therapies (Horwitz, Kalinowski, Freeman, Hoch, and McGraw); Relations with Basic Sciences and Experimental Psychiatry; Contributions from Related Fields (psychology, cybernetics, philosophy, religion); Management and Care of the Patient; Legal, Administrative, Didactical, and Preventive Psychiatry (forensic, teaching, mental hygiene).

Every effort has been made to present varying and also conflicting points of view. In all, one hundred eleven authors participated—a sufficient guarantee of differences! Dr. Arieti says in the Preface: '. . . the book is offered as representative of American Psychiatry today . . . . Although most of the great psychiatric contributions originated in Europe, in no country other than the United States is there such willingness to listen to, to try out, and evaluate all theories, methodologies, and techniques, and to absorb and find a place for all or many of them.' The work is a tribute not only to Dr. Arieti and the authors but to the breadth and scope of the volumes.

The volumes are of necessity large and the pages printed in double columns. The type is clear and easily readable; the binding is well suited to ready handling. There are name and comprehensive subject indices. Each of the chapters is followed by a bibliography. The Handbook is a valuable addition to every psychiatrist' slibrary.

WINFRED OVERHOLSER (WASHINGTON, D. C.)

FAMILY AND CLASS DYNAMICS IN MENTAL ILLNESS. By Jerome K. Myers and Bertram H. Roberts. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1959. 295 pp.

This happy melding of sociology and psychiatry is the second part of a research project carried out at Yale on the question of whether there are class differences in the development, definition, manifes-

tation, and treatment of mental disorders. The first part of this work dealing with the prevalence of treated mental illness, types of diagnosed psychiatric disorders, and kinds of psychiatric treatment given as they vary from one social stratum to another is described in Social Class and Mental Illness by Hollingshead and Redlich.[1] The epidemiological approach used in this report is here supplemented by intensive case studies on fifty individuals diagnosed as schizophrenic and psychoneurotic from two subgroups of the population of New Haven. One of these was the lowest level of the white-collar category, some twenty-one percent of the total community (Class III) and the other, the lower ranks of the semiskilled and unskilled, eighteen percent of the whole (Class V). All these patients were white and between twenty-two and sixty-six years of age. They were evenly distributed by sex, class, and diagnosis. The ethnic origins, housing, education, marital and family status, religious and community affiliations, leisure activities, and attitudes to life of both social strata are compared.

Using a well-devised and tested technique, the investigators found that in Class III the lack of clarity of the parental roles, the relative maternal dominance and devaluation of the father, the yearning for upward mobility, and dread of loss of parental affection produced stress especially noticeable in the schizophrenic group. The harsh inconsistency of the physical control by both parents, the dread of aloof fathers, the neglect by overworked mothers, and the resentment from sibling competition and delegated control occurred frequently in the etiology of cases from the slum homes of Class V. In both social groups, the withdrawn submission of the schizophrenic was associated with instability and disorganization in the home, lack of parental interest and affection, paternal inadequacy, and moody, severely neurotic, alcoholic, or psychotic parents. This finding is compared to other studies which indicate that internal discord rather than the actual breaking up of the home is the trauma, since this means that the children can find neither emotional support nor an example for behavior. These emotional characteristics were present to a less degree in the histories of psychoneurotics as compared to schizophrenics.

In the light of these findings, it is readily seen how and why all

[1] Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXVIII, 1959, pp. 272-274.

these patients had unresolved positive and negative œdipal relationships, anxiety concerning parental objections to dating among girls and masturbation among boys. However, the Class III girl had the additional stress of the conflicting claims of marriage or a career, while in Class V, physical abuses by men were the greater danger. Class III boys had greater difficulty in breaking home ties to establish themselves in a male role, while their Class V counterparts found the greater burden was in supporting their families. On both social levels, the schizophrenic tended to be sexually inhibited, the neurotic hyperactive.

Upward mobility, which distinguished the middle as contrasted with the lower class, was significant in that it was found to be most marked in the schizophrenic, less so in the neurotic, and least of all among their so-called normal siblings. The associated external stresses were parental pressures for success, difficulty in social relations, difficulty of identification with the parents, and parental inability to finance a higher education. However, lower class people were swamped by their ever-present worry about food and lodging, which contributed to their tendency to dissociate themselves from full participation in school or other community activities. Their aspirations were frustrated by the stark reality of their economic deprivation, increasing that suspicion, hostility, and envy that further isolated them from enjoyment of the society of their peers.

The focus of the inquiry then turns from consideration of the causes of mental disorder to the experience of the malady itself. Whereas the families of neurotic middle-class patients and the patients themselves were able early to recognize the symptoms, physical or emotional, as evidence of inner pathology for which help could be found, the lower class ignored such manifestations until they became unbearable. Then the middle class as a rule coöperated and could be helped, the lower class resented therapy, since they asserted that their illness was of organic origin, and for the most part they responded poorly if at all. This was true too of lower class hospitalized schizophrenics. These received treatment (mostly electric shock) only when the illness was well established, an unfavorable circumstance augmented by the patient's suspicious hostility to the hospital authorities—a cultural inheritance—and to the usual indifference or neglect shown to them by their families. On the other hand, the early admission, the approval of the fami-

lies of the hospital, the prestige of the patient's social status, the attentiveness of the relatives all proved fortunate in the middle class.

Possibly the greatest contrast between classes can be found in the actual symptoms shown by patients with both diagnoses, since these symptoms are integrated with patterns of daily life. Though every neurotic complained of increasing inadequacy, physical malaise, and disordered personal relationships, organic complaints were more frequent and intractable in the lower class. Emotional turmoil, the authors feel, is likely to be expressed somatically because of the heavy stigma attached to mental aberrations by this group. Among them quarrels and lawbreaking were frequent, as well as paranoia. The middle-class neurotic, perhaps reflecting his tyrannical upbringing, was likely to be enslaved by obsessions and rituals, and depressed by the contrast between his failure in life and the ideal of success with which he had been reared. Among schizophrenics, the middle class achieve and outstrip in delusion the goals for which they failed in reality, while the lower class are violent to excess.

Thus the authors have demonstrated their belief that social class itself is not a direct cause of mental illness but contributes to the exposure to specific external pressures which may lead to the development of pathogenic internal stress. This work, they believe, has been a worthy steppingstone to further similar investigations, for example, an inquiry as to why one particular child in a family becomes ill.

The findings and hypotheses, presented with an exactness and lucidity, are nevertheless often redundant. The style and format of the book suggest that it has been designed for, and could very well be used as, a text for students of sociology.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG (NORTHPORT, N. Y.)

MEDICINE AND ANTHROPOLOGY. The New York Academy of Medicine Lectures to the Laity, No. XXI. Edited by Iago Galdston, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1959. 165 pp.

The contributors to this book have cast a net which is vast enough to encompass the planet, but the catch consists mostly of small fish and large platitudes.

Since medicine has become 'much less of a humanistic pursuit

and more of a scientific-technologic discipline', and since it no longer treats 'the whole man' or views him in historical and sociocultural perspective, it is expected that the humanities and social sciences can correct this imbalance. Certainly the phenomenal increase in medical knowledge during the present century cannot be decried, even if this has resulted in types of specialization and 'mechanization' which were alien to the philosopher-physician of earlier times.

For better or worse, specialization has its roots in science and society. Where 'mechanization' leaves a gap in the doctor-patient relationship, the space is taken up to a considerable extent by psychotherapy, which does concern itself with 'the whole man' and his milieu.

Several subdivisions of anthropology, itself highly specialized, can offer valuable insights and data to certain branches of medicine. It is also desirable for humanists and social scientists to serve as co-researchers in any problem where medicine alone is inadequate; but in this instance they have been invited to become consultants, if not *dei ex machina,* to the medical profession as a whole and to the human race. However, as Firth notes, 'We anthropologists sometimes may have to be cautious lest some of our more enthusiastic medical friends flatter us into thinking we are greater than we know'.

S. H. POSINSKY (NEW YORK)

PERSONALITY IN YOUNG CHILDREN. Volume I. Methods for the Study of Personality in Young Children. 424 pp. Volume II. Colin—A Normal Child. 267 pp. By Lois Barclay Murphy, et al. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1956.

In these two volumes, Mrs. Murphy and her associates at Sarah Lawrence Nursery School describe, with sample observations and a longer 'case study', the methods they used to evaluate the personalities of preschool children.

The first volume consists of a description of the methods employed, which include observing the child alone or in a group and in both relatively free and experimentally controlled situations. Among the free methods are miniature life toys such as dolls, furniture, blocks, and cars; sensory toys such as fur strips, colored skeins

of wool; musical toys, and painting and Rorschach tests. Mrs. Murphy reports the play interviews and shows what aspects of the personality may be studied in this way and what such play may mean. Paintings were studied by Trude Schmidl-Waehner, who presents a system of scoring resembling Rorschach methods. The Rorschach tests were analyzed by Anna Hartoch without her having seen the children. Two psychologists, L. J. Stone and Eugene Lerner, conducted the experiments in group play, experiments with balloons to gauge aggressiveness, and procedures designed to elicit responses to frustration. Evelyn Beyer, a teacher, reports observations in the nursery school.

In the second volume, these methods are applied to the study of a single 'normal' child, Colin.

The results are rather disappointing. Instead of a clear picture, one gets a magnified, multifaceted image,—detailed and enlarged but distorted and difficult to comprehend. The reader is overwhelmed by a mass of data, some of it trivial. Here and there references to the child's home and family illuminate the otherwise isolated observations and give meaning to them. On the whole, the approach suffers from a strenuous effort to be objective which results in a frequently sterile overcategorizing and overanalyzing of data.

The descriptions of methods may, however, be of value to teachers as illustrations of ways of observing children. Psychologists may also find suggestions for possible investigations.

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ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XL, 1959.

Expression in Symbolic Logic of the Characteristics of the System UCS or the Logic of the System UCS. Ignacio Matte-Blanco. Pp. 1-5.

His studies of schizophrenic thinking lead Matte-Blanco to believe that all unconscious mentation conforms to two principles, the first in agreement with Aristotelian logic, the second contrary to it. Unconscious thought follows either the second principle or a mixture of the two, never the first alone. According to the first (Aristotelian) principle, an individual thing is treated as if it were a member of a class. This class is treated as a subclass of a more general class, and so forth. According to the second principle, the converse of any relation may be treated as identical or symmetrical with the relation. For example, if John is the brother of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the brother of John. The relation which exists between them is symmetrical, because the converse is identical with the direct relation. But if John is the father of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the son of John. In this case, the relation and its converse are not identical. In symbolic logic, this type is called asymmetrical. The unconscious tends to treat any relation as if it were symmetrical.

In displacement, we witness the simultaneous action of these two principles. The primal object and the object onto which displacement takes place are treated as elements of a class. For example, all father figures are treated as if they were dangerous. This would not suffice without the action of the second principle. The unconscious not only treats them as possessors of something in common but also as if they were identical.

The Problem of the Identical Twin as Reflected in a Masochistic Compulsion to Cheat. Pierre Lacombe. Pp. 6-12.

Lacombe describes the successful analysis of a forty-one-year-old male identical twin affected by a severe obsessional neurosis with a masochistic compulsion to cheat. His childhood relation to his twin was marked by intense precœdipal ambivalence due to sibling envy. His twin brother was treated as the baby, being some thirty-three minutes younger. On the œdipal level he was envious of the father from whom he wanted the œdipal mother. His precœdipal conflicts were used as a defense against œdipal strivings. He cheated father and brother in his transference relationships as he felt they had cheated him in childhood. His sense of unity with his twin led to conflicts of ego identity since he sought to free himself from this bond, yet felt incomplete without it. The author used a successful parameter in this therapy. He gave sessions of two hours duration, for the patient felt cheated in the usual one-hour session since unconsciously half of it belonged to his brother. He retaliated by keeping material from the analyst. The two-hour session made him feel as if he were receiving his just due.

Liebestod Fantasies in a Patient Faced With A Fatal Illness. Bernard Brodsky. Pp. 13-16.

A cultured, attractive young woman on learning that she had leukemia attempted to ward off her fear of death with the fantasy of eternal union with her dead brother. It represented, among other things, the phallic wholeness of the father as well as the fusion with the good mother image. As a child, she had felt rejected by an aloof mother. In her œdipal strivings, she at first transferred her affection to her father. He failed to live up to her ideals and also seemed fonder of her brother. Her libido finally rested with her brother. As children they had read Tristan and Isolde together. She was particularly impressed by Isolde's wish to become united with Tristan in death. After her brother's death, she developed leukemia which she attributed to guilt caused by incestuous fantasies. This psychogenic theory was also used by her to deny the seriousness of her illness and to employ the analyst to exorcise the demons.

On the Continuation of the Analytic Process After Psychoanalysis. (A Self-Observation.) Maria K. Kramer. Pp. 17-25.

Kramer, by examples from self-observation, shows how the processes of ego transformation, after being initiated by psychoanalysis, continue without conscious volition. She assumes that the capacity to integrate unconscious conflicts can become an autonomous ego function peculiar to the analyzed. The non-volitional nature of this autoanalytic function is demonstrated by the emergence of insight without intervention of the conscious will.

In Analysis Terminable and Interminable Freud recommends that an analyst be re-analyzed every five years. For emotional and practical reasons, this is seldom done. The alternative is a continuing self-analysis. This can be done if the resistances are not too strong, using the superego and ego ideal to play the role of analyst to the rest of the self as patient. The analyzed ego has acquired the new ability to use liberated countercathectic energies to gain further insight. The increased ego mobility leads to the breakdown of defenses. This serves in place of the analyst's interpretations. Other ego functions such as mastery and synthesis contribute to the motivations for and efficacy of self-analysis.

The Contribution of Psychoanalysis to the Biography of the Artist. David Beres. Pp. 26-37.

Biographical reconstruction cannot, with the tools of psychoanalysis, go further than the stage of assumption. The writer does not have available the patient himself to form further associations or correct faulty interpretations. Furthermore, the analyst must guard against identifying himself with the object of his study. He must keep in mind his proper aim, elucidation of the relation between the artist's life and his work. Here we are offered rewarding insight into the processes leading to creativity and imagination.

There are many errors in biographical data. In modern examples, we must guard against the assumption that the artist's conscious use of contents of the id is valid. Further difficulties arise when the analyst applies preconceived theories

to fit the life under investigation. We must not assume a direct relation between psychopathology and the creative act. One must distinguish between the artist's neurosis and his gifts and capacity to sublimate.

Beres reviews various theories pertaining to creativity, some favorably. He supports his views by citing his writings on Coleridge. 'The external experiences of the artist enter into the creative act to an important degree, but as the day residues of the dream they are secondary to the unconscious stimuli, the repressed content, to which they are attached. The first is the province of the scholar, the second that of the psychoanalyst.'

Creative Passion of the Artist and Its Synesthetic Aspects. Felix Deutsch. Pp. 38-51.

Deutsch speculates on the origin of the creative passion of the artist and the reason for his choice of medium. Perception of external objects is based on early cathected sensory perceptions of sensations and movements within our own bodies, later formed into a body image. The body image is the precursor of object representation. The choice of medium by the artist is based on the impairment of certain sensory modalities at an early stage of development when the means for handling a threatened reality should have been unlimited. At this point, the ego brings into service another sensory faculty to compensate synesthetically for the loss. This faculty then remains the supreme modality for resolution of primal conflict. In sculptors, it is the tactile sense. Once the modality is established, it becomes re-enforced in subsequent phases of development.

In artistic creation, ego, id, and superego become united; this unity gives rise to the power and passion necessary for the resolution of the unconscious conflict. The act of creation requires both the inspirational phase with use of uninhibited infantile ego forces and the later elaborational phase with its mature synesthetic ego functions. The work of art can never represent the final solution since the appeasement of the unconscious conflicts lasts only during its creation. In the true artist this basic and successful means of exploiting and resolving conflict will not be threatened by analysis. The writer supports his speculations by illustrations from the lives of three artists, Rodin, Kollwitz, and Ambrosi.

Autobiographical Aspects of the Writer's Imagery. Mark Kanzer. Pp. 52-58.

Biography is meaningful mainly in relation to the understanding of character. The interpretation of character rests in turn on the study of inner motivations and conflicts. Psychoanalytic theory can be used to understand the writer's imagery as expressed in his works. As a projective technique, it can give us rewarding insight into his history, personality, and creative processes. We assume the imagery, as in the manifest content of a dream, to be based on his particular experiences.

The writer who has left extensive written records of his imaginings and thoughts is most suitable for analysis by this method. The records are used like free associations. Particular attention should be paid to repetitive preoccupation

with definitive themes. It is also most rewarding when we can compare source material such as personal notebooks or diaries with the author's studied creations. Kanzer gives examples of the procedure, using abstracts from both literature and analytic writings. He applies to the method the concepts of primary process, interplay between unconscious and preconscious derivatives, formation of symbols, functional phenomena, and formal elements.

The Metapsychology of Pleasure. R. de Saussure. Pp. 81-93.

De Saussure discusses the metapsychology of pleasure under four headings.

1. The organization of psychological energy under the pleasure-pain principle. Freud suggested that in infancy all desire is at first gratified by hallucinations; later the infant organizes a secondary system of inhibition and discharge, based not only on the reality principle but also on the more archaic pleasure principle and repetition compulsion. Inhibition is indispensable to secondary process. It should be regarded as an instinctual activity with its own energy, purpose, and pleasure. Freud thought that the prime mover of our actions is a tension or desire that must be appeased; whereas de Saussure agrees with Edith Jacobson that pleasure consists in a maintenance of optimum tension through homeostasis.

2. Study of pleasure as affect. Pleasure is associated with satisfaction of libidinal drives in relation to the object. It has a special quality derived from the erogenous zone associated with each level of development. The relation to the object is of paramount importance. The child experiences reactions of love and hate with regard to the object and himself. The development of ego and superego tempers these feelings in an effort to maintain the optimum tension which we experience as the affect of pleasure.

3. The metapsychology of cure. Repressed complexes contain a libidinal drive, an aggressive drive set in motion by frustration, a charge of anxiety, and an element of guilt. This complex is projected onto a displaced external object which becomes the object of a phobia; the ego avoids it in its effort to withdraw as far as possible from the unassimilated internal emotions. In the transference, the frustration of not being loved induces a reliving of the past but the derivatives of the infantile complex do not encounter the hostilities of the external world and are even accepted with a certain sympathy. The growing insight into their origins also decreases the patient's sense of guilt and anxiety. There is a new reorganization in the ego based more on the reality and less on the pleasure and repetition principles.

4. The pathology of pleasure. In mental health, pleasure experienced by ego, id, and superego is harmonious with itself and with reality. In pathological pleasures, this is untrue.

A Clinical View of Affect Theory in Psychoanalysis. Samuel Novey. Pp. 94-104.

Freud too much centered his formulations regarding affects on the problem of anxiety, to the neglect of other aspects. Anxiety is not a typical affect and is not suited to serve as a model for theory of affects. Clinical experience shows the manifold influence of affect. Novey, by numerous clinical examples, illustrates the impact of affect on behavior, communication, organic states, and through

countercathexis (mainly influenced by guilt and anxiety) on the instinct and on other affects. To speak of affects only as discharge processes derived from instincts minimizes the other important functions of affects as dynamic forces which constitute an essential part of the complicated metapsychology of the mind.

An Investigation Into the Psychoanalytic Theory of Depression. Herbert Rosenfeld. Pp. 105-129.

In an extensive review of the psychoanalytic literature pertaining to theories of depression, Rosenfeld was struck by the recurrence of certain themes. These were: the role of constitutional factors; the importance of aggression or increased ambivalence; the importance of oral elements, the role of introjection and identification; the importance of narcissism; the nature of the early object relations; the importance of processes of splitting of objects and the self into good and bad parts; the origin and nature of the depressive superego; the importance of certain infantile phases; and the relation of paranoia and mania to depression. He concludes that most writers agree on the importance of constitutional factors, the role of aggression, fixation to some period in the first year, the role of narcissism, and the importance of certain early object relations and mechanisms such as splitting of the mother into a good and a bad image. There is controversy about how the superego develops. The author favors the Kleinian explanation that the severity of the melancholic's superego is due to the retention of sadistic impulses formed at the end of the first year of life.

The Predisposing Situation to Peptic Ulcer in Children. Elisabeth Garma. Pp. 130-133.

Following an earlier paper by A. Garma, the author regards peptic ulcer as the psychosomatic consequence of an unconscious conflict with the bad internalized mother. This imago obliges the unconscious ego to injure the self through perforation of the stomach or duodenum. The evil image originates in the first months of life and is a talion of the child's own developing sadistic orality. Fixation is afforded by traumatic experiences to which the ego may later regress as a defense against œdipal or genital problems. The analysis of a four-year-old boy with anorexia and vomiting, but no ulcer, is described. (The author's speculations would have been more convincing had he had an ulcer.)

A Differentiating Mechanism of Psychosomatic Disorder. J. O. Wisdom. Pp. 134-146.

Most theories of psychosomatic disease fail to account for the choice of somatic discharge. Wisdom has before proposed that a disorder becomes psychosomatic if the conflict involved is experienced in terms of tactile and kinesthetic sensations, rather than as visual imagery. Disorders such as diabetes are difficult to explain on this basis. In the present paper, Wisdom enlarges his hypothesis to cover those psychosomatic cases that do not show guilt or anxiety. In all psychosomatic cases, there is some unconscious concept of an attack by an internalized

bad parent. The damage is caused not by the attack but by the body's reaction to it, which is real. Where anxiety and guilt are projected, the attack is experienced as an unjustified assault from without. There is a seeming absence of dependency needs in these patients. They think they have a right to complain and to secure assistance from the transference parent since their illness is due to no fault of their own. By this device the patient keeps his dependency on a maternal object while denying its existence.

JOSEPH BIERNOFF

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. V, 1957.

A Study of the Preliminary Stages of the Construction of Dreams and Images. Charles Fisher. Pp. 5-60.

Subliminally perceived pictures are registered as memory images and appear to the subject during the period of 'free imagery' as formally and structurally similar, though often distorted, visual images. The images range from exact reproduction of the perceptual stimulus to distortions and condensations by other recent memory images, childhood memory images, and unconscious wishes (hence their similarity to the manifest dream reported by the subjects). The appearance of such conscious imagery from subliminal recorded percepts depends in part on defensive activity. The author concludes that preconscious percepts outside of awareness are particularly apt to be utilized by unconscious wishes. Furthermore, conscious perception proceeds via three steps: preconscious registration; contact with pre-existing memory schemata; and emergence into consciousness, the latter step being delayed only if the perceptual stimulus is subliminal. Distortions and condensation of the latter type of stimulus probably occur during the second of these three steps. Besides immediate entry into consciousness, there may be delivery into consciousness after a latent period, in the form of image, dream, or hallucination, or the registered percept may become an unconscious memory image per se.

Denial and Repression. Edith Jacobson. Pp. 61-92.

Many borderline and psychotic patients produce conscious incestuous or homosexual fantasies which not only mask more deep-lying and threatening fantasies, but also many vital childhood experiences. One fantasy denies another; it is characteristic of such patients that structural conflicts are replaced by instinctual ones. Such patients have vivid, circumscribed, and undistorted memories of childhood which cover up frightening and disappointing experiences. The author graphically illustrates by a case history the denial of anxiety and guilt. She then discusses ontogenetic, topologic, and structural aspects, and the adaptive function of denial, comparing and contrasting denial and repression, stating that denial is ontogenetically older and a forerunner of repression. Denial acts fundamentally against any perception—be it external or of an idea or affect, whereas repression opposes the instinctual drive per se. Denial acts against signal anxiety once it has developed, and against the drive's ideational representation; therefore, it can do no more than prevent preconscious ideas from attaining consciousness. Structurally denial works only within the realm of the

ego and affects other ego functions, in particular reality testing and logical thought.

Body Image of a Photographer. Henry M. Fox. Pp. 93-107.

The analysis of a man whose hobby and profession was photography is described, and the overdetermination of this vocational choice is made explicit. Photography gratified the patient's voyeuristic and exhibitionistic tendencies; the eroticism of vision substituted for frustrated oral wishes. Photography was a means of achieving active, visual focus on the external world; defensively, it was a way of controlling vision and of re-enforcing difficulties in differentiating inner and outer reality. The camera was also incorporated into the patient's body image.

Transient Disturbances in Perception: Two Psychoanalytic Observations. Sanford Gifford. Pp. 108-114.

The author describes two cases. One suffered from photophobia, pain over the eyes, and vomiting. Her perceptions were inexact in regard to details and identifying features. During analysis she kept her eyes closed and covered them with her hands, a way of preventing herself from being overwhelmed by scoptophilic and exhibitionistic impulses. The second patient was sensitive to all kinds of sensory impressions which he reduced by smoking. Not only would the smoking subdue these vivid impressions, but it also slowed his thoughts and his aggressive impulses. Per contra, when he gave up smoking there was a hypersensitivity to taste and smell.

A Psychoanalytic Study of Hypnagogic Hallucinations. Otto Sperling. Pp. 115-123.

A series of hypnagogic hallucinations were understood by analysis of the dreams which followed. The specific hallucinations in four different patients consisted of a ball and point, a fleur-de-lis, a pentagon, and a feeling of crumpled dryness in the mouth. In each case the dream yielded memories of thumb, finger, and fist sucking, and in the last instance also sucking the blanket cover. These memories reached back to the second and third years and were concrete, hypnagogic representations of the sucking activity.

A Specific Defense Met in Psychoanalytic Therapy: 'Comes the Knight in Shining Armor'. Alexander Grinstein. Pp. 124-129.

This paper describes four cases who early in analysis offered to do a special favor for the analyst which promised material or professional gain for him. The defensive nature of this behavior is described as a way of rendering the analyst dependent on the patient and harmless. The obvious aggression toward the analyst was also revealed. The author states that in these patients narcissistic and a combination of narcissistic and obsessive character traits predominated.

The Use of Checkers in Handling Certain Resistances in Child Therapy and Child Analysis. Earl A. Loomis, Jr. Pp. 130-135.

The author illustrates his experience with the use of checkers in the therapy of

children and adolescents. During the course of the game various resistances may be uncovered and dealt with, and the underlying contents revealed. The game itself becomes a vehicle of communication between therapist and these patients.

A Contribution to the Psychoanalytic Theory of Masochism. Rudolph M. Loewenstein. Pp. 197-234.

In further refining and defining the behavior of the perverse masochist and the moral masochist the author discusses some of the necessary, if not sufficient, psychological and developmental conditions for their inception. In the case of the perverse masochist some of these necessary conditions are passivity and the wish to be cared for and to be helpless, experienced as humiliation; the humiliation in turn is enjoyed as the active anticipation of that which is feared as possibly occurring passively. The masochistic pervert during his masochistic behavior is never physically in danger and his partner participates in the experience which has qualities of play or make-believe. The transaction can be traced back to analogous childhood situations in which the parent of the opposite sex was induced to participate in an erotic game or fantasy with the child, but rebuffed or disapproved of these either by actual or imagined ridicule, threat, or punishment. Later this scene is re-enacted in suffering and actual physical insult which is, as already mentioned, never life-endangering. Thus the partner 'annuls' or undoes the threat.

In regard to the superego the perverse masochist is never self-destructive or self-mutilating. The person who mutilates himself does so at the behest of a sadistic superego which makes him closer to a moral than to a perverse masochist. In both kinds of masochist another necessary condition is the early development of a behavior which the author calls 'the seduction of the aggressor', that is, behavior which initially incites scolding, disapproval, or fear. As soon as these occur the child seeks by his behavior to change the parent's attitude to loving behavior. The role of aggression and the role of guilt feelings in the masochist are further discussed, and developmental situations are described in which aggression is turned upon the self for fear of object loss.

The Psychological Significance of the Mirror. Paula Elkisch. Pp. 235-244.

The European clinical psychiatric literature makes many references to the so-called 'mirror sign', a behavioral event seen both in psychotic and neurotic patients of which the author describes three cases, two adolescents and one child. In each case the patient would look at himself in the mirror whenever there was fear of the loss of self or a fear of the loss of ego boundaries, thus relieving the fear.

On Pouting. Carl P. Adatto. Pp. 245-249.

The author describes a case who during his analysis demonstrated pouting and a sullen affect. The latter expressed throttled anger. The pouting was a persistence of a childhood behavior designed to evoke concern and attention from the mother, but was also an identification with the sullen father. It was furthermore the expression of an oral conflict, a way of communicating oral wishes which otherwise were denied.

The Symbolic Meaning of the Corner. Samuel J. Sperling. Pp. 250-266.

The symbolic meaning of the 'corner' is seen as representing the perineogenital region or any of its parts. It may be a bisexual symbol.

The Phenomenon of 'Ego Passage'. Edoardo Weiss. Pp. 267-281.

The phenomenon of 'ego passage', defined as the process by which an 'ego trait is externalized to become an object representation', is discussed. Here it should be noted that the term 'object representation' is not used in the sense of Hartmann and Jacobson. Thus ego passage implies some change in the 'object representation' that derived from a previous identification by virtue of which the later object representations acquire some of the characteristics of the subject. Thus a man's heterosexual love object has characteristics not only of himself but also of his mother. The particular clinical examples which may be understood by use of this concept refer to the self-accusations of melancholic patients which contain not only reproaches against the ambivalently held object but also are reproaches for actions, or repressed wishes, that existed previously. When these accusations are in the form of hallucinations the patient no longer feels guilty. In a manic episode which follows a melancholic state the 'portion of the ego which was persecuted by the superego' becomes externalized; thus the behavior of the manic patient becomes that of a persecutor and accuser of others for their misdeeds, therefore supporting the thesis that during the process of 'ego passage' the object representation is modified by the subject's ego.

Notes on the Concept of Self-Representation. Louis Kaywin. Pp. 293-301.

The author extends the concept of self-representation of Hartmann and Jacobson by indicating that during development these may acquire positive (pleasurable) and negative (unpleasurable) 'valences'. The repression of the latter is one of the most important functions of the ego. He believes the earliest appearance of such self-representations occurs once some distinction between self and object has been made, undergoing continuous change, modification, and re-evaluation during development. He further discusses under what conditions negative self-representations may develop; how an animal phobia reveals the harbinger's perception of his self-representation; and the relationship of negative self-representation to ambivalence. What is not too clear, however, is whether the author is speaking only of the concept of 'self-representation' or also about the concept of 'self'.

Questioning and Pain, Truth and Negation. Stanley L. Olinick. Pp. 302-324.

The multiple facets of asking a question and being asked are reviewed. A question may be assertive, searching, inquisitive, and hence may gratify both aggression and curiosity in the service of adaptation and mastery of the environment. When a patient is asked a question by his physician, the latter may be acting in an authoritative, intrusive, or domineering way toward his patient. The questioner either knows the answer or implies that he has the answer available, whereas he who is questioned either knows the answer or represses or denies it. If the defense is breached by the question there may be anxiety or

guilt. At times what is wished for is phrased as a question; therefore the assertion of the question is a way of denying a thought.

Transient Psychotic Episodes During Psychoanalysis. May E. Romm. Pp. 325-341.

Three cases considered suitable for psychoanalytic therapy by the usual criteria developed transient psychotic episodes during the course of the analysis. In one, the episode was characterized by increasing, severe jealousy of her husband and auditory hallucinations. In the second case, a somatic delusion was present; and the third became hypomanic and grandiose. In each case the psychotic episode was initiated by the emergence of conflicting, homosexual fantasies.

Telephone Anxiety. Herbert I. Harris. Pp. 342-347.

In each of four cases coming from diverse clinical groups, telephone anxiety was a manifestation of castration anxiety in patients in whom the œdipal attachment is unresolved. In this series the patients had seductive and aggressive mothers, and fathers who were passive and the target of the child's hostility.

The Transference in the Borderline Group of Neuroses. Adolph Stern. Pp. 348-350.

In the analysis of patients with borderline neuroses there is a re-enactment in the transference of intense wishes to be cared for, loved, and nursed which have remained unsatisfied from childrhood. The analyst must recognize these wishes and be ready to work with and initially supply them so that the transference phenomenon can develop. However, in this group there were great difficulties in the resolution of the transference, greater than in the neurotic patient.

HERBERT WEINER

Observations on the Psychological Function of Music. Heinz Kohut. Pp. 389-407.

Kohut thinks that music involves the whole personality of the composer, performer, or listener. It is viewed as a source of libidinal satisfaction obtained in an aim-inhibited and displaced manner, and as a nonverbal medium that lies outside the field of most structural conflicts. Thus, it allows for emotional experience, ego mastery, and an expression of rules to which one submits. Primary and secondary musical processes (rhythm and tune) are discussed as they relate to the primary and secondary psychic processes. The author thinks that the deeper layers of the superego are related to a preverbal acoustic sphere which can explain the effects of some forms of music. A case report is included in which the patient utilized musical activity for the relief of pregenital, libidinal, and aggressive tensions. Kohut points out that music allows a controlled and limited regression which does not tax the secondary process in patients with ego weakness and thus has therapeutic possibilities in schizophrenic conditions. The controlled temporary regressions which music fosters tend to prevent or counteract uncon-

trolled chronic regressions and can be described as regression in the service of the ego, offering substitutive solutions of structural conflicts.

Communication in Psychoanalysis and the Creative Process: A Parallel. David Beres. Pp. 408-423.

Controlled regression in psychoanalysis results in emergence of the primary process in the initial phase of analysis and is compared to inspiration in the artist. This passive phase must be followed by active elaboration in order to 'tame the chaos' with the synthetic function of the ego. Both the artist and the analysand need distance (dissociation) for observation, yet in both the emotion must be recollected and relived. The path from the unconscious to consciousness in treatment is viewed as a growing toleration of id drives through the transference and identification with the doctor, and through superego changes. The poet uses his 'skill' to effect unconscious expression. Beres sees much in common in analytic productions, art, and myths, and uses excellent quotations from poets to demonstrate this. In addition to the ego's desire to objectify, Beres views the need for communication as the need to relieve guilt and anxiety through sharing of fantasies. Art is communication of an emotional experience which re-creates the experience in the audience. The patient and the artist both need an audience for expression of fantasies, synthesis of fantasies, and conviction of the truth behind them. The analyst is seen as an active audience creating in his mind the images and affects of the patient, and must, like the poet, keep the images and emotions controlled within the demands of the ego. Interpretation is seen as re-enforcing the synthetic function of the patient's ego. Analysis must go beyond art and involve conscious awareness as well as experience, whereas art is felt but not understood. Without the equivalent of the æsthetic experience in treatment there is no conviction. This requires communication, but communication does not explain the treatment. In art 'communication achieves its most human expression, the transmission of emotion, and this quality is shared in psychoanalysis . . . [and] is an essential part of the creative process that comprises both'.

The Therapeutic Man Friday. Robert H. Koff. Pp. 424-431.

Defoe's 'Robinson Crusoe' is analyzed as a disguised account of the world destruction, rebirth, and world reconstruction fantasies of a paranoid schizophrenic. It is pointed out that Crusoe's efforts to return to society were hopeless and involved a complete retreat to living within a cave until his man Friday arrived. Koff regards Friday in the role of analyst. Crusoe at first regarded Friday as a dangerous (cannibalistic) interloper, but then treated him as a slave in order to use him as a bridge to escape from isolation. Finally he wanted Friday's friendship and tested him out for his fealty. Friday accomplished a gradual change in Crusoe's superego which allowed him to be more accepting of primitive impulses. An analogy is drawn to the methods needed to approach withdrawn schizophrenics and some children: the analyst must be at first a willing slave to establish contact with the patient, and then can help him to return to 'civilization'.

Conscious and Unconscious Autobiographical Dramas of Eugene O'Neill. Philip Weissman. Pp. 432-460.

O'Neill's posthumously released Long Day's Journey Into Night is viewed as conscious autobiographical material with screen memories and repressions, while Desire Under the Elms, published many years before, is viewed as its unconscious counterpart. The conscious dealing with biographical and autobiographical material apparently led to a neurotic inhibition of the union between artistic creation and communication as manifested by O'Neill's direction to delay publication for twenty-five years after his death. He had been unconcerned about public moral censure of Desire Under the Elms, yet himself morally censured Long Day's Journey Into Night. O'Neill apparently was guilt ridden due to his strong ambivalence toward his father and the revelation of his mother's narcotic addiction. With his tuberculosis, he apparently was identified with his mother in her illness, yet both of them denied any illness.

Weissman views the artist as having a personal identity and a world (artistic) identity. When the artist creates from his personal identity, the product has more stringent restrictions in the realm of communication. O'Neill was seen as having an alternate aggressiveness and submissiveness toward his father. His tuberculosis stopped his overt acting out and shifted it to sublimated dramatic enactments. Desire Under the Elms, as an unconscious autobiography, is similar to free association which reveals the presence of fantasies and conflicts later portrayed in Long Day's Journey Into Night. His sense of tragedy is seen by Weissman to result from his psychic conflicts. The artist's works are reviewed and Weissman has taken great pains to avoid unfounded speculation. The material produced from O'Neill's personal psychic conflicts appears to have been inextricably bound up with his great creative talent.

Origin of the Creation Myth: A Hypothesis. Laurence D. Trevett. Pp. 461-468.

Most cultures have produced myths wherein the universe emerged from chaos, and light, sound, and form emerged out of darkness. These myths are similar to our concept of the infant's early perceptions based on the study of the Isakower phenomenon and Lewin's dream screen. The darkness is viewed by Trevett as the baby's perception of the world. Out of this darkness comes perception of the mother-breast, the sounds of nursing, and the beginning of personal awareness, which in the myths is equated with world creation.

A Psychoanalytic Study of the Confessions of St. Augustine. Charles Kligerman. Pp. 469-484.

The Confessions is regarded as an exhaustive and insightful study of the self by one of the great minds of history. Biographical material displays the childhood of St. Augustine and describes the intense conflicts he had with his parents. His writing is described as having the spontaneous quality of free association and Kligerman thinks that it clearly indicates the important role of earliest infancy in personality development. St. Augustine is viewed as having been overstimulated as a child which resulted in a character type who sought constantly to master his overwhelming tension yet never found adequate discharge.

His possessive mother did not permit him to identify with his father and insisted that he relinquish sexuality in favor of the church. Kligerman points out that unconsciously this meant that he should belong to his mother forever. The struggle in this conflict and his efforts to defy his mother are described in detail. This included a direct re-enactment of the story of Æneas and Dido which had preoccupied him in boyhood. However, his mother did not commit suicide when he fled to Rome but joined him there. Apparently from that moment, he surrendered to her will and ended up with a profound identification with her, developing a passive feminine attitude to his father whom he displaced to God. The instability of this equilibrium is viewed as providing the motivation for a lifelong series of polemics 'supposedly to convince others, but also to still his own doubts and externalize the conflict'.

The Death of Maui. S. H. Posinsky. Pp. 485-489.

Maui, a Polynesian culture hero, brought all kinds of good and wonderful things to the human race and ended up being killed between the thighs of the great Daughter of Night as he was attempting to achieve immortality for the human race. Posinsky reviews previous theories as to the meaning of this myth. He understands it as a tale of incest and of the disastrous consequences of incest. The author cautions against utilizing natural phenomena to explain such myths as such phenomena merely serve as screen memories in the interests of repression.

A Consideration of the Etiology of Prejudice. Brian Bird. Pp. 490-513.

A review of the scant literature on prejudice reveals that all the authors agree on the œdipal origin of this symptom. Bird's contention is that prejudice keeps aggression from being acted out and thus can serve as an important and constructive ego function. He states that the cause of any case of prejudice should be looked for in an unsuspected rivalrous relationship to a more fortunate or desired third party. An illuminating case report of a 'liberal' woman describes an acute and short-lived attack of prejudice. She had displaced her erotic transference impulses onto the object of prejudice due to her fear of being ridden by her impulses.

Bird thinks that any fixed opinion, no matter how reasonable, well-founded, or well-documented, should be suspected of being a prejudice. He discusses lucidly the relationship of prejudice and status, and thinks that prejudice is a defense against strong aspirations to a higher status in life, the wish being displaced onto the oppressed race and the oppressing group, taking upon itself the anticipated critical reaction of the race toward which it feels unconscious envy and desire. He views the oppressing group as incorporating the superego indignation of a 'higher' race and projecting its own guilt to a 'lower' race. Bird contrives the word 'incorprojection' to describe this state of affairs. High or low status should eliminate any individual of any race as an object of prejudice.

With the absence of unconscious guilt, there is no need for prejudice as a defense to control the acting out of aggression by allowing verbal expression of hostility. Guilt is not felt because the accusations are false and are really self-accusations. Due to this defensive aspect of prejudice, it implies the active functioning of at least a halfway normal ego. Bird thinks this is an absolute contrast

to racial abuse as it occurred in Nazi Germany. Normal prejudice is reviewed as self-criticism gone wrong, or not fully developed, and is regarded as a normal step in development. Pathological prejudice is viewed as either a return to this childhood state or a fixation at that level due to the ego's inability to allow certain aggressive impulses to be acted upon, as well as its inability to tolerate the guilt and self-criticism generated by them. Prejudice is viewed as not being without a positive measure of value for the individual and in a broad sense for society as a whole.

The Function of Acting Out, Play Action, and Play Acting in the Psychotherapeutic Process. Rudolph Ekstein and Seymour W. Friedman. Pp. 581-629.

Acting out is viewed as a form of experimental recollection and a more primitive type of problem solving than play. It is the unconscious repetition of a conflict and differs from action, the conscious solution of a conflict. Stages of mental development are described, progressing from action without delay through play action, pure fantasy, play acting, to reality oriented secondary process thinking. The need for action is progressively given up in this mental development. In treatment, whatever the patient produces, acts out, plays out, or talks out is his way of communicating his unconscious conflicts to the therapist.

A case report of an adolescent boy demonstrates how unconscious conflicts were not re-enacted by way of play but in actuality. This boy had little capacity for verbal communications or free associations in the form of play but communicated by acting out and play acting through much of his intensive treatment. A very 'active' type of treatment was utilized wherein the therapist entered into the patient's fantasy life and play-acted parts with him in a very imaginative manner. From time to time the patient could not maintain play acting but regressed to delinquent acting out. As he mastered his anxiety he moved from acting out to playing out a problem, to talking it out, and finally to resolving it in a reality oriented manner. The more mature the ego organization and the more neutralized energy available, the less tendency there is to acting out as a method of communication and of problem solving. The therapist must avoid 'counteracting out' with the patient.

The authors differentiate play action and play acting. In play action the patient unconsciously repeats the original conflict. In play acting he tries to master the problem by cue taking, imitation, and pretending and attempts to modify a past identification in an effort to adapt and grow. Perhaps the difference between play action and play acting could be more simply demonstrated by pointing out the difference between a child 'being a baby' and acting or playing at being a baby in an effort to solve a problem. The authors' observations are amply confirmed in psychoanalytic work with children.

A Specific Peculiarity of Acting Out. Brian Bird. Pp. 630-647.

The acting-out patient is seen as being unable to internalize his conflicts but as involving other people in them because of a developmental defect in the differentiation between his ego and the ego of his mother. The defect is described as a continuation of the symbiotic stage of development wherein

mother and child directly respond to the id of the other. Normally with separation and individuation of the child from his mother, communication is carried on only through the agency of the ego. Bird amplifies the theory of Johnson and Szurek in regard to acting out; he thinks that the mother does not allow the ego of the child to become an independent operating agency but continues to maintain direct contact with the child's id and directly influences his ego with her id representatives. Thus the child retains an unconscious method of communication, which results in an uncanny ability to sense the hidden impulses of others, as if each new person were his mother. The analyst's unconscious is an open book to the patient and cannot be concealed. Treatment is invariably complicated by the patient's acting out with other people, including the analyst. When this occurs the analyst should suspect his own part in it. Examples are given.

Acting-out patients are seriously upset by the transference due to the great threat to narcissism of object formation. Therefore, the analyst of this type of patient should help him to develop an infantile narcissistic symbiotic relationship in which he is one with the analyst. From this 'strange transference state' work can proceed to help the patient overcome his narcissism. Interpretations that threaten the patient's narcissism can cause an attack of acting out. Rather than interpret the transference meaning of feelings, one interprets the purely narcissistic meaning of the patient's acting out. The frequent existence of a split self-image in these people can sometimes be brought to light by talking to them in the third person, as is often done in child analysis. A frankly narcissistic attitude on the part of the analyst may be helpful, since narcissistic people are not threatened by other narcissistic people. When these patients make personal remarks about the analyst they are often not projections but actual observations. It is the analyst's task to discover the many forms of nonverbal communication used by the patient. Behind all techniques should be the therapeutic aim in the early stages of assisting the patient to place the analyst in the position of the acting-out mother, yet the analyst must not act out with the patient. At the same time he must support the patient in every attempt he makes to struggle internally with himself. If this is successful, the patient will gradually move in the direction of internalizing his conflicts and be ready for real neurotic transference and standard analytic procedure.

On the Oral Nature of Acting Out. A Case of Acting Out Between Parent and Child. Leon L. Altman. Pp. 648-662.

The observation that both oral cravings and acting out need a satisfying object, demand immediate gratification, and have urgent incorporating tendencies without regard for the object leads Altman to view oral impulses and acting out as identical. When instinctual urges of both child and parent coincide there is a summation of effect. The child is threatened from within and without and has no chance of conflict-free fulfilment. Because of the partial instinctual gratification occurring in such acting out between parent and child the only course open is an effort to master and bind the excitation through repeated acting out, which produces a specific by-passing of the ego with a reversion to oral activity with further impairment of ego function.

A detailed case report of a thirty-year-old man demonstrates these mechanisms and the summation effect when the instinctual urges of child and mother coincided. Everything the patient did had an oral imprint. The patient never had any real satisfaction with gratification of his repressed wishes because there was 'nothing in it for the ego'. The mother's acting out was frequently indiscernible from the patient's who had a great struggle in distinguishing that which belonged to his mother and that which was his. Derivatives of his interacting relation with his mother appeared in all of the patient's relations outside the analysis as well as in it. After much struggle in the analysis he was extricated from this trap through the experience of transference in which his conflicts came to the fore and in which he relived his infantile experiences without the bilateral acting out which had paralyzed his attempts to find a solution. Altman states that without taking into account and validating for the patient the real fact of his mother's actions no progress would have been possible. Acting out outside of the treatment became converted into acting out in the analysis, and thought replaced action. The patient must act out until he develops some tolerant observing ego which is able to defer immediate action, reflect, and find an adaptive solution to conflicts.

Acting Out, Sublimation, and Reality Testing. Mark Kanzer. Pp. 663-684.

Sublimations as well as acting out can be a representation of the past through actions instead of memory. This serves to discharge impulses outside rather than within the analytic situation. In a case report Kanzer demonstrates how sublimations were halfway methods of resolving feminine castration conflicts. The term 'acting out' is used by analysts both to describe a resistance in the course of therapy and also to delineate a more general character trait. The acting-out person has infantile identifications which do not permit a delay between impulse and discharge. The parents of these patients were inadequate in providing objects and identifications needed to keep instinctual tensions within proper bounds for ego growth. Sublimations may be both a character trait as ordinarily described and may also be used as resistances. In sublimation patients usually have more mature and stronger identifications and a greater ability to tolerate tension and are usually able to internalize motor discharge, an important influence in superego formation.

Sublimation is characterized by integration whereas acting out is characterized by disintegrative tendencies. Acting out and sublimations in work have their origins in successive stages of reality testing which mark the ascendancy of the secondary over the primary process. Their psychic forerunners are found in the dream, in fantasy, and in play; an ascending hierarchy of trial actions mobilizes the resources of the ego into new combinations for reality adaptation. Kanzer compares acting out to Ferenczi's stage of magic gestures and Anna Freud's denial in act, which succeed hallucinations and dreams in the ego's developing controls; sublimations are compared to Ferenczi's stage of speech symbolism and Anna Freud's denial through fantasy and word, where thought substitutes for action and supersedes direct motor discharge.

The author discusses the phases of reality testing, each of which is successful in its own setting and is subsequently absorbed into the maturing ego if inte-

gration develops normally. He thinks that there is a hierarchy of sublimation going from motor control of objects, through singing and acting, identification, painting and sculpture, to literature and logical activities. The key to this hierarchy must be sought in the inner meaning and play of forces at work in the formation of the sublimation. Sublimations are viewed as an intermediate between acting out as a direct discharge of inspiration and normal action or work as the product of an elaboration into conscious planning. Most normal adults have a combination of sublimations and reaction-formations which enable them to perform useful work as their supreme accomplishment in reality testing. In analysis, sublimations must be transformed into the work of external adaptation, and must be curbed and if possible interpreted when they become resistances.

Acting In: A Contribution to the Meaning of Some Postural Attitudes Observed During Analysis. Meyer A. Zeligs. Pp. 685-706.

'Acting in' describes certain 'hidden transactions' going on within the analytic situation through the use of nonverbal, nonmobile, inhibitory, and tonic aspects of muscular function. Previous literature is reviewed, including Mittelmann's studies on motility and Felix Deutsch's fundamental contributions to analytic posturology. Postural attitudes often represent a compromise between conflicts which protect the ego from illicit unconscious impulses. A detailed case presentation illuminates a 'piece of postural behavior' which demonstrates the interrelationship between postural attitudes, unconscious tendencies, and selective amnesia. In this case, the patient's silent rigidity was a masturbatory equivalent. Only after it was interpreted and worked through did her troublesome amnesia begin to lift. Following this the patient's overt behavior shifted from an obsessional pattern to a clearly hysterical one. The author describes how the patient utilized a precœdipal tendency to express her œdipal conflicts. After the analysis of the postural defenses and the amnesia, she developed fugues, globus, and hysterical pain which were subsequently analyzed in a classical manner. 'Acting in' is considered a middle phase between acting out without verbalization and verbalizing with remembering.

KENNETH H. GORDON, JR.

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXV, 1958.

An Explanation for Transference Cure: Its Occurrence in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy. Lawrence C. Kolb and John Montgomery. Pp. 414-421.

This is a report of a case of apparent spontaneous improvement and subsequent 'cure', following an unexpected transference reaction. The patient, who had an image of his therapist as distant and hostile, discovered that his response was distorted. Then this insight was the basis of the patient's own examination of other relationships. It is suggested by the authors that such a mechanism may be an important factor in transference improvement and cure.

LAURENCE LOEB

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXV, 1959.

Psychogenic Hypersomnia. N. P. Goldstein and M. E. Giffin. Pp. 922-928.

A syndrome of paroxysmal diurnal hypersomnia, differentiated from narcolepsy, is described, as derived from material from twelve patients. Fear of their own anger seemed to be based on a fear of ego dissolution upon the threat of breaking the symbiotic bond with a parent. As might be anticipated, unusual sleepiness was a frequent defense against hostility in the transference.

On the Dynamics of the Manic-Depressive Personality. R. W. Gibson, M. B. Cohen, and R. A. Cohen. Pp. 1101-1107.

An attempt is made to define the personality characteristics of people having manic-depressive illness, with particular reference to the vicissitudes of ego development. Factors felt to be important were dependency drives, difficulty in coping with envy and competition, the use of denial as a defense, and what is described as 'the almost total orientation of values in terms of social convention and what others think'.

LAURENCE LOEB

Psychosomatic Medicine. XXI, 1959.

Health Oriented Psychotherapy. Bernard Bandler. Pp. 177-181.

Bandler urges that the healthy or positive aspects of the patient's personality, and not only his illness, should be understood. Psychotherapy has always been directed to the patient's pathology, and in some ways more is understood about disease than about health. In the initial interview, for example, we should pay special attention to learning in what circumstances the patient has functioned best. The study should not be merely an inventory of assets but should also provide an understanding of the dynamics of health in the particular individual. This approach helps to establish a basically sustaining positive transference and avoids exacerbation or decompensation by too early interpretation of repressions. A 'positive' relationship may by itself lead to rapid subsidence of symptoms. The functions of a therapist are to resolve conflicts, solve problems, satisfy needs, and mobilize inner and outer resources. In order to do any of these things, the therapist must know how the patient has done them for himself in the past. Then the therapist must assist the patient in his relationships, in management of his feelings, and in obtaining satisfaction. It may not be necessary to work in all these areas, since a gain in one may produce general improvement. The value of insight is still overestimated in psychotherapy, and the basis for most success in psychotherapy is transference, suggestion, and sublimation (either re-establishing old sublimations or achieving new ones).

Contribution to the Psychological Understanding of Pruritus Ani: Report of a Case. Richard P. Alexander. Pp. 182-192.

Alexander describes the four-year psychoanalysis of a patient who had suffered from pruritus ani for seven years. The patient came into analysis because of anxieties and chronic social and marital difficulties. She had anal and genital

itching, vaginal discharge, nausea, bloating and fullness of the abdomen, constipation, and diarrhea. She also showed aggressive defiance, a stubborn and retentive personality, hostility, and periods of depression. Defensive struggles against conscious recognition of passive, oral-receptive wishes and destructive, rivalrous impulses underlay the symptoms. The author believes that the patient's unconscious desires to receive all the nourishment of the mother's breast, all the love and warmth from the mother's body, were denied and rejected by the use of anal mechanisms which permitted both retention of desired bodily content and a degree of control of the frustrating, disappointing mother. The itching and scratching thus represented aggressive grabbing of desired objects according to the equation feces = penis = baby = breast. Simultaneously, the scratching provided guilt-relieving punishment for the hostile, incorporative nature of these impulses. The author thinks that the anal sensations were necessary to bind primary separation anxiety; that is, to prevent symbolic loss of the internalized objects.

The Ego and the Psychosomatic State: Report of Two Cases. Peter L. Giovacchini. Pp. 218-227.

This article seeks to illustrate a temporal relationship of shifts in psychic integration and somatic dysfunction. A woman in psychoanalytic treatment for migraine headaches used obsessive-compulsive defenses against repressed anger. Because of repression, the anger only minimally affected the higher, reality-oriented ego systems. As some of the defenses were breached in the analysis, the ego was flooded with conscious anger and the migraine disappeared; hypertension appeared, however, as the patient tried consciously to suppress her anger. The patient succeeded in suppressing anger, and gained confidence and defensive stability; anxiety vanished. But hypertension progressed and retinal changes developed. Further breakdown of defenses brought regression to a panicky, infantile, orally incorporative state with anger finally expressed openly; and then the hypertension disappeared.

A second patient, a male scientist, also suffering from migraine, began analysis in a relatively stable ego state, his defenses repressing anger. When ego decompensation occurred, rage emerged in the transference, migraine disappeared, and asthma appeared. Unlike the first case this patient was fearful of deriving any dependent gratification in analysis in the period of disintegration. Later still, in a placid, ego-reintegrated state in which he allowed himself partial dependent gratification, the patient lost his asthma but acquired a peptic ulcer.

The author suggests that somatic dysfunctions may be either integrative or disintegrative in affecting the equilibrium of the ego, and that these reactions are not mutually exclusive if various levels of ego function are considered. In the hierarchy of levels of drive discharge, massive primitive methods of affective discharge recede with maturation. Where higher integrative centers (secondary process operations) fail to provide drive discharge, drive energy is dealt with relatively diffusely by more archaic ego systems, including somatic and visceral ego systems. Interrelationships among multicausal variables determine whether a particular syndrome emerges.

DAVID W. ALLEN

Psychophysiologic Studies of the Neonate: An Approach Toward the Methodological and Theoretical Problems Involved. Wagner H. Bridger and Morton F. Reiser. Pp. 265-276.

Babies show individual behavioral characteristics that distinguish them from one another even at birth; the authors devised techniques to measure these differences in order to determine whether or not basic temperamental differences are important in evaluating the results of various ways of rearing children. Change in the heart rate in response to various stimuli was studied; this change proved to vary inversely with the degree of the heart rate response of the babies at the time of stimulation. The results suggest a neonatal barrier against stimuli. Comparative evaluations of differences in the responses of individuals appear to be meaningful only in relation to certain specific relationships within each individual infant which must be determined prior to the comparative study.

An Experimental Investigation of Sexual Symbolism in Anorexia Nervosa Employing a Subliminal Stimulation Technique. Preliminary Report. H. R. Beech. Pp. 277-280.

Beech remarks on the symbolic relation between eating, becoming fat, and genital activity,—a relation frequently found in patients suffering from anorexia nervosa. An experimental study utilizing subliminal stimulation tested the hypothesis that this symbolic relationship between food and sexuality does in fact exist. The results are consistent with the hypothesis although the repetition of this test with many more patients, as well as with the same number of normals, is necessary before a final conclusion can be reached.

Obesity and Denial of Hunger. Albert Stunkard. Pp. 281-290.

Stunkard investigates the relationship between gastric motility and the experience of hunger and finds that whereas a group of nonobese women reported hunger during contractions of the empty stomach and no hunger in the absence of such contractions, a group of obese women failed to report hunger during stomach contractions. This denial extended to all sensations caused by gastric emptiness. Denial of hunger occurred in a significantly greater number of obese individuals manifesting the 'night eating syndrome'. It is suggested that this denial of hunger occurs most frequently in persons with conflict over eating or undergoing strong social pressures about eating too much ('calorie counters').

In commenting on Stunkard's paper, Walter W. Hamburger distinguishes between the nutritional demand of 'hunger' and the emotional demand of 'appetite'. He believes that obese individuals are responding to their emotionally conditioned 'appetites' rather than to their physiologically conditioned 'hunger'. In healthy persons there is an adequate integration of hunger and appetite whereas in the obese women studied there is dissociation between these two factors.

JOSEPH P. GUTSTADT

Psychiatry. XXII, 1959.

The Adaptation to the Stronger Person's Reality: Some Aspects of the Symbiotic Relationship of the Schizophrenic. Helm Stierlin. Pp. 143-152.

The schizophrenic's relationship with his mother is strikingly similar in certain superficial aspects to other relations consisting of controlling power in one partner and adaptive maneuvers in the other submissive partner; for example, the relation between boss and subordinate in a totalitarian state, between husband and wife in a patriarchy, and between master and slave. However, in these culturally determined examples the weaker partner's reality testing is not fundamentally impaired; it is primarily a matter of assuming a role imposed by the social situation. The schizophrenic has a fundamental ego defect that is psychologically determined in early childhood by the mother's pressure on him to experience reality as *she* wanted it to be (constitutional predisposition is not hereby dismissed). Stierlin develops this thesis, indicating its implications for therapy with schizophrenics. He acknowledges his indebtedness to Freud, Fromm-Reichmann, and Sullivan.

On the Formation of Mother-Daughter Symbiotic Relationship Patterns in Schizophrenia. George C. Lyketsos. Pp. 161-166.

Certain common conditions were noted in a study of nine hospitalized female schizophrenics who demonstrated obvious symbiotic attachments to their mothers. 1. The mother was domineering, castrating, and overprotective, not permitting the daughter any autonomy. 2. The father was passive, ineffectual, and virtually nonexistent as a personality-determining force in the daughter's childhood. 3. Because of reality factors the mother was left more or less isolated with this daughter early in the latter's life. 4. The patient's breakdown occurred during an attempted adaptation to separation from the mother. 5. The maternal grandmother was reported to be a domineering and overprotective person, and the maternal grandfather passive.

Human Relatedness and the Schizophrenic Reaction. Otto Allen Will, Jr. Pp. 205-223.

The Second Annual Frieda Fromm-Reichmann Memorial Lecture, this paper presents an approach to schizophrenia based on the well-known work of Fromm-Reichmann, and is supported by clinical, experimental psychological, biological, and philosophic data. A distaste for the concept 'disease of the ego' is expressed; schizophrenia is a 'reaction to, and an expression of, the social scenes in which an organism with certain biological endowments—usually adequate . . . to the task of becoming fully human—has its being'. In spite of this formulation the author's clinical observations and comments on technique indicate considerable psychoanalytic perceptiveness.

The Vocabulary of Emotion. A Study of Javanese Socialization Practices. Hildred Geertz. Pp. 225-237.

Specific child-rearing practices with their appropriate verbal and nonverbal concomitants seem to assure the maintenance (internalization, in the case of

the individual child) of Javanese cultural desiderata regarding status and respect. Interaction outside and inside the home is characterized by patterns of exaggerated formal behavior governed by status hierarchies. The father has the highest status in the family; he is addressed only by circumlocutions; in many families he eats alone, receiving the best food while the other members of the family wait. Until he is weaned and able to walk the infant is handled almost exclusively by his mother and other females in what we would call an overprotective, overindulgent manner, so that he is spared frustration. The infant's every wish is anticipated and he is expected to have no initiative of his own. A Javanese baby misses the crawling stage completely; he is carried about and otherwise physically supported until he can walk. Then he begins to explore his environment, but his formal indoctrination begins at the same time with repeated detailed unemotional instructions and directives, where he should go to do what, what he should say, etc. Threats are used of horrible fates at the hands of outsiders or spirits if the child is bad, but not by members of the family. Actual punishment by parents is rare. The child learns early to trust his mother and immediate family completely, and to fear those in the outside world. Gradually, as the child matures and becomes more independent, the actual fear is succeeded by an acute vigilance masked by a superficially poised, relaxed manner and exaggerated formality in personal relations. There are many other observations of great interest to psychoanalysts, particularly those concerning the unique changing role of the father in child rearing.

A Marriage Pattern: The 'Lovesick' Wife and the 'Cold, Sick' Husband. Peter A. Martin and H. Waldo Bird. Pp. 245-249.

In ten years of collaborative work as a team treating marriage partners, the authors have delimited a clinical entity referred to in the title. The wife comes first for treatment in an emotionally decompensated state with multiple somatic, anxiety, and depressive symptoms, blaming her desperate state on an unloving, cold, cruel, even murderous and psychotic husband. She insists that her husband needs treatment so she can get well; otherwise she will get a divorce. Characteristically the husband turns out to be a much more integrated, mature individual than his wife. He is functioning well in his professional and civic roles and, more often than not, is the more adequate partner in the home. He shows much more capacity for love than his wife, and his more favorable response to psychotherapy is predictable. Actually the wives are bound in a symbiotic infant-mother relationship with their husbands; they are oral characters who feign a capacity for love and project their unacceptable drives onto their husbands. The problems in treatment of fourteen such couples are reviewed with emphasis on close collaboration between the psychiatrists.

Further Considerations of the 'Cold, Sick' Husband. H. Waldo Bird and Peter A. Martin. Pp. 250-254.

This sequel to the preceding paper presents a more detailed evaluation of the fourteen husbands. While they varied considerably in overt psychopathology and ego strength, these men had the following in common: 1. An unusual capacity to endure external and intrapsychic stresses. Most of them had 'come up the

hard way' and each of them in the course of his marriage was obliged to endure the abuse, criticism, and complaining of his wife, while being forced to work extremely hard to pay for her impulsive activities and medical care. 2. Contrary to their wives' assertions, they manifested warmth and responsibility in their interpersonal relations. 3. They revealed a marked capacity to mature. 4. They not only responded favorably to psychotherapy but this response was essential for successful psychotherapy with the wives.

Primitive Psychotherapy. Wolfgang Lederer. Pp. 255-265.

Psychoanalytic therapy is compared with the following types of primitive psychotherapy: 1. Religious exorcism of demoniacal possession in the sixteenth century, illustrated by an analysis of The Confessions of Jeanne Ferey. 2. Current native practices on the African Gold Coast. 3. Zen Buddhism as a method of psychotherapy. These primitive psychotherapies are strikingly similar and resemble our psychotherapy in that they all often succeed and they all take a good deal of time with frequent, often daily, contacts between therapist and patient. Moreover, they all utilize the development of an intense relationship between patient and therapist that seems to be resolved in cases with a favorable outcome. The 'cured' patient not infrequently becomes a therapist. How the primitive methods differ from psychoanalytic therapy is considered very briefly. Tentative conclusions are presented which offer little more than an awareness that cultural and intrapsychic factors are intricately involved in the therapeutic process, and a caveat that one should not minimize the operation of the primary process in therapeutic success and not confuse theoretical understanding with therapeutic efficiency.

H. ROBERT BLANK

Journal of Personality. XXVII, 1959.

Thematic Drive Content and Creativity. Fred Pine. Pp. 136-151.

TAT stories of college students were rated for literary quality and drive content. The greater use of drive material by subjects who produced higher quality stories suggests greater receptivity to drive derivatives and greater ability to control these in a constructive ego activity.

Castration Anxiety and the Fear of Death. Irving Sarnoff and Seth M. Corwin. Pp. 376-385.

Subjects with high castration-anxiety scores showed a significantly greater increase in fear of death than subjects with low castration-anxiety scores, after being exposed to the pictures of nude women. No such differences were found with the corresponding groups who were shown pictures of fashion models. Subjects who differed in the strength of their moral standards of sexual behavior did not differ significantly in their fear-of-death scores after being exposed to the more sexually arousing pictures; hence this plausible alternative explanation of the obtained results could be rejected.

STEPHEN A. APPLEBAUM

Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. LVII, 1958.

Cognition Without Awareness: Subliminal Influences Upon Conscious Thought. George S. Klein, Donald P. Spence, Robert R. Holt, and Susannah Gourevitch. Pp. 255-266.

The authors investigated the influence of realistic and symbolic sexual pictures, presented subliminally, on check list and drawing responses to a consciously perceived figure of ambiguous sex. Effects of the realistic figures of the genitals were highly consistent on both check list and drawing; the subjects tended either to incorporate or to exclude attributes of the subliminal figure in their impressions of the consciously seen figure. Symbols of genitals were significantly effective in influencing subjects' drawings, but this effect was not correlated with responses on the check list. Recognition thresholds for the genital figures were related to check list responsiveness, while thresholds for the symbolic figures were related only to responsiveness on the drawings. Findings imply that stimuli may acquire psychological representation without the subject's awareness, and subsequently affect cognitive and behavioral processes to a measurable degree. Principal effects, however, appeared only in subtle measures and were complicated by idiosyncratic interactions among the variables. This seemingly unstable phenomenon may imply that unconscious influences on perception are small under ordinary circumstances. Maximizing their effects might bring important theoretical issues into relief.

Some Dynamic Aspects of Posthypnotic Compliance. Milton J. Rosenberg and Charles W. Gardner. Pp. 351-366.

The content, and the phenomenal symbolic meaning to the subject, of posthypnotic suggestions may account for interindividual and intraindividual compliance with such suggestions. Before hypnotizing subjects, the authors measured their attitudes toward certain social issues and their beliefs and values as these related to the ascertained attitudes. After posthypnotic suggestion of change in these attitudes, measurement was made again. Experimental subjects changed attitudes and reorganized their beliefs significantly more than a control group. Several case reports illustrate two hypotheses about the nature of compliance with posthypnotic suggestion. According to the first hypothesis, such compliance is facilitated by the subject's being able to interpret the content of the posthypnotic suggestion in a manner consistent with the mechanism and affective reactions that, for him, characterized and maintained the hypnotic relationship. According to the second hypothesis, compliance is facilitated if that suggestion permits the subject safely to express and indulge a previously warded-off drive.

STEPHEN A. APPLEBAUM

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

John Donadeo & John Donadeo

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NOTES

At the Twenty-Second Congress of the INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION to be held in Edinburgh, Scotland, from July 31st to August 3rd, 1961, instead of the usual method of asking members to submit titles of individual papers for presentation to the Congress, the Program Committee has selected certain themes from a large number of suggested topics that have been submitted to them, around which they wish to organize symposia and discussions. The following themes have been selected: 1. The superego and the ego ideal. 2. Training for psychoanalysis. 3. Research in psychoanalysis. 4. The psychoanalytic study of thinking. 5. Applied psychoanalysis. 6. The psychoanalytic situation (the setting and the process of treatment). 7. Child analysis. 8. The reclassification of psychopathological states.

Members of the International Psychoanalytic Association who wish to read a paper related to one of the above subjects should notify Miss Cecily de Monchaux, Ph.D., Hon. Secretary, Program Committee, Psychology Department, University College, Gower Street, London, W.C. 1. The inclusion of an outline of the intended contribution will greatly help the Program Committee. Each paper should take about thirty minutes to read.

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

September 15, 1959. NOTES ON THE ENVIRONMENT OF A GENIUS. K. R. Eissler, M.D.

In this paper the author attempts to bring the environmental features of Goethe's boyhood he considers most important into meaningful connection with Goethe's later genius. Among these features of undoubted importance in the boy's development was the fact that his father, relieved of the necessity of earning a living, so organized his life as to make the rearing and education of his children his principal occupation. His industriousness and zeal made him a propitious subject of identification for the future genius, whose colossal output also required a combination of play activity and self-discipline. From an early age Goethe shared in the daily activities of his father, familiarizing himself with the adult world. This must have had a relevant bearing on his later proficiency in every activity he undertook as poet, dramatist, statesman, scientist. The father possessed, too, a subtle feeling for the phaseal needs of the child, manifested by the early, benign, tender, and actively maternal behavior toward him, changing gradually to the stern representative of law and order. This blending of images, of a benign precœdipal father and of a law-enforcing and prohibiting œdipal father, was a fortunate prerequisite for the relationship between ego and superego, on whose proper coöperation in the adult largely depended the intensity and quality of creativity. The relationship between father and son is described as reflecting a combination of wholesome narcissism and strong object love, one almost completely free of ambivalence, and serving the best possible interests of the future genius.

The unusual qualities in his mother's relationship to Goethe and the unique circumstances stemming from it are similarly significant. Of fateful consequence was the mother's passionate story-telling, which more and more dominated the family's evening gatherings. These recitals were followed avidly and excitedly by the boy; when she postponed the denouement of a story until the next evening, he would confide to his grandmother what he thought the outcome should be. The grandmother in turn, and in secret, passed them on to his mother who would then follow his wishes, elaborate on them, and bring them to glowing fulfilment. Such a constellation was bound to have a profound effect on all provinces of the personality: '. . . one may think of the triumph the boy experienced, the penetration into the mother, the uniting with her, the consequent separation, the receiving from her and giving back, the omnipotence of mastering her, the relief of feelings of guilt, the immense stimulation of fantasy life, the encouragement to objectivation, the gratification of œdipal wishes without the price of guilt, the harmony between him and her, and the unending feeling of being loved and understood by her'.

Documentation of episodes and events leads to the conclusion that Goethe was most skilfully protected against traumatization at those times when the human being is most vulnerable to portentous injury. Potentially traumatic events which, in a different child might have precipitated intense psychopathology, were fatefully provided against by an assemblage of circumstances which proffered the kind of support needed by the boy at critical turns in his development. These circumstances in no way diminished the importance of the part played by his own ability to use for maximum benefit that which, had it occurred at a different time or been necessary to be met by a less resourceful subject, might have produced undesirable effects. The historical record reveals an environment replete with situations of trauma and conflict. A tabulation of births and deaths in the family makes it clear that the boy grew up in a world of constant pregnancy and death and that periods lacking these conspicuous conflicts were rather short. It could be said that the biology of life took care of the boy's familiarization with the tragic aspects of human existence while still explaining the tendency to conflict which was unusually intense throughout his life.

The unambivalent relationship Goethe's mother maintained with him is cited as probably one of the most consequential factors in his life; from it he derived his profound attachment to the world, his *au fond* unambivalent attitude to objects and human beings. This does not mean that there was not frequent evidence of ambivalence in Goethe; indeed, artistic creation requires a certain degree of ambivalence toward objects. The answer appears to be that, being fundamentally in such firm contact with the world, he could safely indulge in the luxury of marked ambivalence and always find his way back to the real world despite conflict, frustration, and even fugue states imposed by creative processes.

An example is presented of how Goethe dealt with one part of the œdipal conflict, namely, in relationship to the father. Sufficient evidence exists to support the assumption that Goethe had sexual relations for the first time when he was about thirty-nine, very close to the same age at which his father had married; and this coincided, almost to the day, with the father's age when he begot his

first child. The most satisfactory hypothesis as to its unconscious meaning is its celebration of a kind of self-generation, performed in identification with the father. The delay, thus interpreted, expresses love, respect, obedience, and loyalty to the father, and simultaneously a complete abrogation; thus not, 'you are my father, you have begotten me', but, 'I am my own father'. In this Eissler sees not ambivalence but rather, Goethe's capacity to synthesize the gratification of mutually contradictory strivings into a reality-adequate action. Another circumstance in relation to the father is cited wherein reality spared the boy the trauma that the male child suffers when, in comparing himself with his father, he becomes aware of his biological inferiority. Historical evidence indicates the father had been circumcised before marriage (probably for a phymosis). In this most relevant context, reality provided the boy, paradoxically, with a position of partial superiority over his father.

In these œdipal components—as well as two others, namely, his mother's preference for him over his father (mother and son were closer in age than mother and father), and his victory, by survival, over his siblings—Goethe was provided by reality with what in others has to be created in fantasy by a special effort. Subtly perceived realities, rather than being mere interesting coincidences, could constitute a principal issue in determining whether high endowment will result in talent, or develop into its true potential for full genius. Freud is another example of genius in whom it seems probable that apparent fantasy was almost identical with early reality; who, having held exactly the same place in relation to his father and mother as the Biblical Joseph, later too became the famous interpreter of dreams.

Would any other than the actual environmental constellation have brought to manifestation the total constitutional creative potential? The author's impression is that, however resistant to environment the constitutional factor related to creativity was in Goethe, only one very special environment could have led to the maximal realization of his genius.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Rudolph Loewenstein, after remarking on the difficulties in discussing creativity and especially genius, said he felt convinced of two points made in the paper: Goethe's unique position as oldest and practically only surviving son in a potentially large family, and the particular roles and attitudes of the parents. He recalled that Freud once said the development of unusual ability and achievement is encouraged in a son who reaches superiority over the father in childhood, if the father wishes and accepts it. He inquired if Dr. Eissler attributed some particular creative incentive to Goethe's long sexual abstinence.

Dr. Edward Harkavy attributed the difficulties in discussing Goethe to the richness and multiplicity of Goethe himself, and noted that one could substantiate or disprove any hypothesis regarding him by what he himself had said and written. He emphasized what had been reiterated in the paper: that genius requires an original talent which then will make use of certain events in an optimal way.

Dr. Heinz Hartmann called attention to a methodological difficulty in using what is retrospectively plausible to form a scientific statement. He added, how-

ever, that in dealing with material in applied psychoanalysis, one must form hypotheses in order to be able to say anything at all, and that these hypotheses can be useful if we understand them as conditional. He felt the material could gain in importance if formulations could be provided as to etiology of productivity, for example, the preconditions for it, what enhances it, what facilitates it. Such hypotheses could then be tested in other cases.

Dr. Victor Rosen called attention to one special methodological pitfall in 'pathographic reconstruction'; namely, circular reasoning. Since genius emerges at such an early stage in the child's life, those events in the environment which may be the result of the emergence of genius may be adduced as the cause of it. It is a pitfall different from the difficulties of knowing whether the dynamic explanations are valid or not.

Dr. David Beres, after emphasizing that Dr. Eissler had convincingly demonstrated that creativity arises from conflict and not neurosis, drew some parallels and contrasts between the early lives of Coleridge and Goethe. Coleridge's father, too, devoted a great deal of time and attention to his son, but the mother was an extremely ambivalent person who had so little feeling for the child that after the father's death she sent the boy off to school, and saw him again only once during her life. The important point of difference between Goethe and Coleridge is that while the former was productive all of his life, the latter was really productive for only one year, after which his creativity ceased because his illness became the predominant factor in his life.

Dr. Philip Weissman cited the example of Stanislavski, whose father, like Goethe's, had devoted himself to promoting his son's genius. From the age of eight, he led and directed the entire family in their theatrical activities, and continued uninterruptedly productive until the time of his death. Shaw, too, like Goethe, did not have intercourse till late in adult life. Perhaps the sublimation and neutralization of libidinal and aggressive energies in the artist's 'love affair with the world' are greatly responsible for the 'less personal' lives that artists lead.

Dr. Eissler, in reply, stated that he accepted von Bode's conclusions regarding Goethe's sex life. Close scrutiny of the historical material shows that for Goethe creativity and intercourse were not quite compatible. Yet, the relevant point is not the frequency of intercourse, but the emotional experience during it. If it does not lead to full orgasm but, rather, to a subdued subjective experience, interference with the creative potential may be avoided. The environment which was beneficial for Goethe could, in a different individual, have led to vastly different results, possibly delinquency or psychosis. Regarding the question of neutralized energy, he thought that for Goethe creating was one of the deepest instinctual processes. Rather than presuming a direct causal connection between genius and environment, he suggested that certain environmental circumstances facilitated processes basic to later creativity. An etiology of creativity was not attempted, but rather the presentation of a typology of environments that seem to be meaningfully connected with the later creativity of the person exposed to them. The concept of circular causality finds ample exemplification in Goethe's life. The beneficial reaction of the parents presupposes all the assets and charm the child possessed. Possibly we are not well prepared to deal psychoanalytically

with situations in which parents might have a good effect on their children, rather than the opposite!

JOHN DONADEO

September 29, 1959. THE 'MIRACLED-UP' WORLD OF SCHREBER'S CHILDHOOD. William G. Niederland, M.D.

The author's purpose is to establish the 'historical truth' in certain phenomena of Schreber's psychopathology and to demonstrate in their origins important elements of the early relationship with the father. Until recently only two facts were known about Schreber's childhood: that he was the son of a famous physician, and that he had had a brother who had died before him. Newly found medical writings of the father reveal relevant information regarding Schreber's childhood, especially early experiences important in the genesis of the 'miracles' described by him in his illness. He was subjected to an elaborate system of relentless mental and physical pressures alternating with occasional indulgences—carried out by the father with missionary zeal under the guise of medical and educational principles. What stands revealed is a sadism best described as sustained terror interrupted by brief periods of seductive benevolence.

Schreber's 'miracles' of heat and cold are traced to daily washings and showers in cold water advocated by the father for infants, beginning at the age of three months. Similarly, according to the father's theories, crying without reason in infancy is the first emergence of stubbornness and should be dealt with summarily and effectively by means ranging from distraction to 'corporeal admonishment', thus insuring mastery over the child 'forever'. Training in the 'art of renouncing' should also begin in the first year. It is accomplished by having the child sit in the mother's or nurse's lap while she eats what she pleases, but no morsel must be given the child outside his regular meals. As might be expected, Dr. Schreber was tireless in his campaign against masturbation, exhorting parents to incessant vigilance against 'this insidious plague' which makes people stupid, vulnerable to countless diseases of the lower abdomen and nervous system, leading soon to impotence and sterility. These pronouncements and dire threats are recognizable in Schreber's reference to himself as a *'Pestkranker'*, and the author considers it likely that the lack of children in Schreber's marriage may have been perceived by him as confirmation of these pronouncements.

In addition to the educational methods and measures so far described others are discussed, to which those phenomena Schreber called 'divine miracles' on his body owe their genesis. These pertain to physical manipulations, orthopedic devices, and mechanical apparatuses devised by the father and rigorously applied and carried out from an early age on the child's body. They included helmet-like head harnesses (*Kopfhälter*), chest-compressing belts, and other contrivances to insure strong bones, teeth, and muscles. Their purpose was to maintain an absolutely straight posture at all times, day and night, whether standing or walking, sitting or lying down. To quote the Memoirs: 'From the beginning . . . I may say that hardly a single limb or organ in my body escaped being damaged by miracles, . . . and that hardly any memory from my life is more certain than the miracles [recounted] in this chapter'.

In such early and continued traumatization the author sees a combination of

ego-disruptive experiences resulting in serious distortions in body image, ego structure, object relations, and reality testing. The fact that these procedures were supposed to be carried out in a manner pleasurable to the child intensified their impact on psychosexual development, producing overstimulation, premature interference with libidinal needs in general, and homosexual libido in particular.

A fragment of historical truth is concealed, too, in the delusion of the end of the world. In his idea of earth's allotted span (two hundred twelve years), Schreber seems to refer to his chronological position among his siblings. His description of the world's end in flood, water, and cataclysm reflects birth fantasies presumably modeled on the birth of his two younger siblings, their arrival marking the *Weltuntergang*.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Maurits Katan's discussion, read by Dr. Annie Reich, first referred to that aspect of the paper which aims at furnishing objective proof that the content of Schreber's hypochondriacal delusions may contain further elaborations of the stimulation he received in childhood. This acquisition of new data about Schreber's father and his peculiar methods, granted their traumatic effect on Schreber's development, leaves us uninformed as before about how Schreber reacted to them and, hence, leaves undisclosed the infantile neurosis and its relationship to the prepsychotic state. Katan next pointed out the wide gap that exists between the knowledge of the methods applied by Schreber's father and the final outcome, the psychosis. We are at a loss in our attempt to understand why Schreber's childhood memories could return only as psychotic ideas; the long series of intricate psychological processes involved remains unrevealed. Katan objected to the speculative rather than deductive approach in attempting to explain the psychosis. As in any analysis where the patient is practically the only source of material used, in Schreber's case too the deductive approach should be followed. As in other analyses, we are no better informed about the inner experiences when we take recourse to material from outside sources.

Dr. Phyllis Greenacre considered the discovery of the new material important and did not think the author had implied the whole explanation of Schreber's psychosis. She spoke of the effects of restraints, both physical and moral, which she had observed in patients, and was impressed with how such effects differed according to the way in which the restraint had been applied: in a neutral way, to meet the reality of illness, in anger, or with a degree of seductiveness. She thought some connection existed between Schreber's 'miracled-up' delusional experiences and the inspirational experiences of some artists and mystics, as well as certain religious experiences. Though not common to all creative individuals, this sort of inspiration seems to be part of the creative process. Schreber's 'miracled-up' state represents the erotization of the relationship to the father through diffusion of the erotization back to the areas of restraint, all of which had to be denied. Such denial is probably due to masturbatory fantasies containing either bisexual elements which are unacceptable, or elements of strong, early fantasy relations with vicissitudes of the phallic œdipal period which have mitigated the intensity of the œdipal crisis. Greenacre did not think memories of these early experiences of Schreber's would have been present in a prepsychotic state but, rather, that they returned with the psychosis.

Dr. Burness E. Moore was generally convinced of the validity of the explanations presented. He considered the delusions an expression of the repetition compulsion, a regressive reliving of Schreber's inverted œdipal relationship to his father, and representing, as Freud pointed out, the return of the repressed accomplished by means of projection. He considered it possible that the choice of the primary defense, i.e., projection, could also be based, through identification, on the historical truth of the father's own projection. Evidence indicates the existence of a positive œdipus complex in Schreber's delusions. In sum, there is represented in these delusions Schreber's identification first with one, then with the other parental figure, with all the conflicting aggressive and libidinal impulses which are implied. The Schreber case was an important contribution not only in itself but also because from it came Freud's papers on metapsychology. Some puzzling aspects of Freud's treatment of the material, his preoccupation with Schreber, his 'rationalized' restraint in using and interpreting the material are explicable by the circumstances of Freud's life at the time; namely, that the appearance of the Schreber case coincided with a critical period in the history of psychoanalysis, and marked the starting point of differences and defections which Freud saw threatening him and his life work.

Dr. Max Schur gave a clinical example which he thought fortified the thesis presented in the paper. In the patient observed by him, it became apparent that some manipulations had been carried out on him. This was corroborated by the discovery of a diary and a publication of the father's in which chest measurements, carried out on the patient, were part of the father's obsession with the correlation of chest expansion and physical and intellectual prowess. To this patient, maximal inspiration was both the expression of passive surrender to his father and of extreme phallic exhibitionism. It was also the cause of the patient's death from a severe, progressive emphysema.

Dr. Melitta Sperling, in the simultaneous treatment of psychotic children and their parents, was able to observe the interaction between the unconscious of the mother and the particular child, and found the outstanding dynamic factor in children of autistic and symbiotic types to be an unconscious response of the child to unconscious wishes of the parent, father or mother, with whom the child had the particular relationship.

Dr. Philip Weissman asked whether one might not conclude from the material that Schreber's father was psychotic or prepsychotic; and if one could not then view Schreber's psychosis, in Jacobson's terms, as the result of an early pregenital identification with a psychotic parent.

In conclusion, Dr. Niederland concurred that the data do not disclose Schreber's infantile neurosis but they do disprove a point made by Dr. Katan in a previous paper (1954): 'Psychotic symptoms do not have a direct connection with infancy'. He agreed that the manner in which restraints are applied may determine their meaning for the subject and find expression in later illness. Schreber's identification with both parental figures is evident in his illness and 'concretized' in his given names: Daniel from his father; Paul from Pauline, his mother's name. Freud's 'restraint' in dealing with the material, a point he himself made explicit in the monograph, was probably due to the fact that many of the principals connected with the case were still alive. He, too, had for a while thought

Schreber's father to be psychotic, but changed his mind after considering certain factors denoting constructive and 'commonsense' features in his widely successful campaigns to promote the 'harmonious upbringing of the young'.

JOHN DONADEO

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

January 18, 1960. PANEL DISCUSSION: AN APPRAISAL OF MELANIE KLEIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY AND TECHNIQUE. Moderator: Ludwig Eidelberg, M.D. Panel: Melitta Sperling, M.D.; Maurice Friend, M.D.; Nathaniel Ross, M.D.; Judith Kestenberg, M.D.

Dr. Eidelberg stated that continuing interest in Melanie Klein's work merits a reconsideration of her writings. This should be conducted in a spirit of friendly criticism. The accusation of orthodoxy against classical freudians should be ignored and Mrs. Klein's writings appraised strictly on their scientific merits. Rejection should not be considered simply as resistance. He then introduced the speakers whose comments are herewith summarized.

Dr. Sperling discussed and took issue with Klein's statement that pavor nocturnus occurring during the second year of life is an elaboration of the œdipal conflict. She demonstrated with case reports that pavor nocturnus, phobias, and the child's total behavior were the results of preœdipal conflicts. It was necessary to analyze repressed oral and anal-sadistic impulses in her patients, as well as the oral envy. Sleep disturbances and other symptoms are related to excessive and abrupt repression of anal-erotic and anal-sadistic impulses. The Kleinian theory leaves little room for the significance of the anal phases in the development of the ego and its defenses. Mrs. Klein's lack of consideration of the real personalities of the parents was noted. The feelings of the child, although exaggerated and distorted, were not merely a result of magical, destructive impulses but had some real basis in the mother's feelings.

Dr. Friend spoke of Anna Freud's careful approach to interpretation and contrasted it with Klein's active interpretation based on the assumption that play activities were analogous to the verbal free associations of adults. Mrs. Klein's formulations concerning the paranoid position, the subsequent depressive position, and the œdipus complex characterize her departure from accepted analytic concepts. Dr. Friend also took up the problem of identification, pointing out that Klein utilizes introjective and projective identification in such a way that there is little differentiation from the physiological prototypes of incorporation and expulsion, thus anthropomorphizing human physiology. He inclined toward the 'transactional' viewpoint and saw the 'final' complicated identification between mother and child as mutually reciprocal and the result of many interacting influences. A case report giving a series of identifications in a six-year-old boy was presented. In none of the material could the speaker find the severe regression and accompanying mental content that Mrs. Klein ascribes to infancy, nor in the child's play was the symbolic equivalent to free association noted.

Deviation of Kleinian formulations from those of Freud were discussed by Dr.

Ross. Kleinian concepts concerning instinctual and ego development emphasize aggressive impulses as generating the œdipal conflict and the superego, both in the first year of life. Fixation and regression are also related to aggression, the former due to the libido failing to master destructive impulses, and the latter constituting a defense against anxiety, itself a resultant of aggression. These concepts markedly reduce the demonstrated importance of the libido theory and its relationship to the œdipus complex. Ross reminded us that it is the libido which is labile and subject to modification in aim and object choice, while the aggressive drive is less modifiable. Kleinian metapsychology attributes an early maturity and complexity to the psychic apparatus which is in conflict with the freudian concept of development from the simple to the complex and with observational data. Kleinian definitions of fantasy are in sharp contrast with Freud's, while distinctions between memory traces, images, object representations, etc., are ignored.

Dr. Kestenberg surveyed a number of Klein's ideas to show that in them primary process connections have been substituted for secondary process logic. For instance, differentiation between the concrete and the abstract has been replaced by associations via similarity; and the complex organization of a gestalt has been equated with development through the addition of elements. Differences between categories such as affects, feelings, and thought have been ignored. Kestenberg then established a differentiation between the period of early infancy in which 'good or bad' is related to bodily feelings, and the anal period in which the concepts of good or bad are related to anal achievement and self-appraisement. The categorical generalization of objects as good or bad is considered typical for the œdipal period. The study of the changing concept of 'good or bad' reveals its intimate connection with the development of object relations from its rudimentary need-satisfying origins to the vicissitudes of superego development. Mrs. Klein fails to make these distinctions.

Dr. Eidelberg pointed out that it is very difficult to accept Melanie Klein's clinical contributions while rejecting her explanations, because in most of her papers she confuses the descriptive with the explanatory terms. He added that all psychoanalysts utilize their intuition and develop empathy with their patients, but do not accept dogmatically as scientific truth what appear to them as intuitive impressions. Aware of patients' resistances and also of their own, they carefully check their statements and avoid any pretense of omniscience.

ROBERT DICKES

Aldous Huxley, renowned author, was the twelfth ALFRED P. SLOAN VISITING PROFESSOR in The Menninger Foundation School of Psychiatry during March and April of this year.

At the Annual Meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOSOMATIC SOCIETY, held in March 1960, the following officers were appointed: Morton F. Reiser, M.D., President; Stewart Wolf, M.D., President-Elect; Eugene Meyer, M.D., Secretary-Treasurer,

Elected to Council positions were: John I. Lacey, Ph.D.; John W. Mason, M.D.; John P. Spiegel, M.D.

The Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the American Psychosomatic Society will be held on April 29 and 30, 1961, in Atlantic City.

The AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION held its Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting in Chicago, February 25-27, 1960. Dr. William S. Langford assumed the presidency. Elected were Dr. Fritz Redl, President-Elect, Dr. Gisela Konopka, Vice-President, and Dr. Soll Goodman, Secretary. Among the invited guests were Professor A. R. Luria, Director of the Institute of Defectology in Moscow, who spoke on the significance of speech in the regulation of behavior, and Judge David Reifen, Magistrate of the Children's Court of Tel Aviv, who reported on revised Israeli parliamentary law on juvenile sex assault cases. The 1961 Annual Meeting will be held at the Hotel Statler-Hilton, New York City, March 23, 24, and 25, 1961.

Professor A. R. Luria and Professor E. N. Sokolov of the U.S.S.R. delivered three lectures in New York City in March 1960 on ADVANCED STUDIES IN NEUROPHYSIOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR, under the sponsorship of The Postgraduate Center for Psychotherapy and The Samuel Rubin International Seminars on Mental Health. The lectures will be published in a monograph.

CORRECTION: Dr. Herbert I. Harris makes two corrections in the second paragraph of his review of Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, edited by John D. Sutherland (This QUARTERLY, XXIX, 1960, pp. 116-117). 1. The first lecture, Psychoanalysis and the Sense of Guilt, was written by Winnicott, not, as implied, by Bowlby. 2. The work of the ethologist Lorenz is discussed by Bowlby, not by Winnicott.