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DEANIMATION. A STUDY OF THE COMMUNICATION OF MEANING BY TRANSIENT EXPRESSIVE CONFIGURATION

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THE DEANIMATION SYNDROME AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

The investigation of endopsychic conflict in psychoanalytic practice led us toward exploring ever deeper and more archaic levels of personality. The scrutiny of ego structure and our understanding of defenses, of perceptive and adaptive processes, turned our attention to early object relations. Observation of patients and interaction with them in prepsychotic and psychotic states pointed beyond the interpretation of resistance, transference, and content, to methods derived from direct observation of children, both toddlers and infants. The uncovering of the deepest unconscious layers of personality progressed alongside and together with the elucidation of the earliest stages of infant behavior, including the assessment of the endowments of the neonate. In the present study, clinical observations of a number of years are correlated with our knowledge of the stages of psychosexual development. This leads to conclusions regarding a specific disturbance of ego function and enables us to clarify certain aspects of ego feeling and its variations in the course of psychosexual maturation.

Not infrequently patients relate a peculiar, disturbing experience: people around them seem to have become puppetlike or lifeless marionettes; their movements appear disconnected and devoid of the flowing continuity of spontaneous expression.

The first section of this paper was read in May 1962, in commemoration of Sigmund Freud's birthday, at the Max Eitingon Institute of the Israel Psychoanalytic Society, Jerusalem.

At times a sense of utter loneliness prevails. Considerable anxiety, occasionally culminating in panic, may be present. They feel isolated in a world of unintelligible, threatening robots. This phenomenon occurs in catatonic and paranoid conditions as well as in prepsychotic, neurotic-depressive, and anxiety states. As a transitory symptom, it may be found in the neuroses and also emerges in free association.

In some cases patients learn to live with this feeling; a chronic paranoid patient remarked that he always felt that way. Or conversely, the feeling may occur suddenly and even precipitate a request for admission to an institution. To one patient the feeling of isolation from those around him came as a flash of insight. In a visionlike, vivid daydream he had seen those dear to him arrayed in a motionless, expressionless phalanx against him. Another patient reflected his mood of isolation in a vision of vessels at sea, immobilized at great distances from each other with communications severed; people around him had strange, unintelligible expressions, and were 'like animals in the primeval forest'. Traumatic separation experiences, early conflicting identifications, and attempts to ward off early incestuous attachments could frequently be related to such feelings of isolation.

The associative material often pointed to primal-scene fantasies or experiences. Thus, a young woman recalled a feeling of 'terrible aloneness, aloneness not loneliness' that took hold of her in childhood, when her parents sent her into the garden so they could talk about things not meant to be overheard by children. There, she found solace in daydreaming: she was an actress, and a famous actor came to fetch her for a ride in his sleigh. Wrapped in heavy clothes, they would journey on and on until in the end they froze to death amidst whirling snowflakes. Actually she lived in a subtropical climate, but she had spent part of the first year of her life in a northern country. She remembered the house in which her later childhood was spent, but she said, 'I cannot remember my parents in action'. Then in a sudden vision, she saw a brilliantly lit skyscraper. She was looking through the windows at the private lives of the

people, but she exclaimed, 'It is unnatural, it is inhuman, they seem to be no human beings at all, only puppets, mechanically moved, with no life in them!'

The patient may feel that he himself has become a puppet. Thus, in a case of agoraphobia in which the symptoms began with the death of the patient's grandfather, the main determinants were death wishes against a younger brother, recurrent separation experiences and primal-scene fantasies associated with them, as well as ambiguous identifications. When his brother, for years his phobic companion, was about to marry, the patient returned for further treatment. He now had an uncanny feeling that his grandfather's ghost was around, full of reproach for not being well remembered. This patient had slept in his mother's bed until the age of two (occasionally later) and had shared his parents' room until he was nine years old; yet he did not recall having witnessed any expression of tender feelings between them. He visualized them each motionless in their bed, as if carved out of wood. In his second treatment he referred to a puppet show that toured the country. He felt that he, too, was a puppet worked by the unseen strings of fate.

An analogous, if opposite role is frequently assigned to pictures and photographs. They are treated as if they were real people and not merely their likenesses. Thus, a paranoid patient complained that his drawings separated him from his fellow beings by arresting their features in expressionless, transfixed rigidity, yet the drawings were his only remaining link with them. He had lost a leg at the age of twelve in an attempted suicide which followed his discovery that an aunt who took care of him had sexual relations with an officer of an occupation army. Primal-scene fantasies and identification conflicts had played a determining role in shaping his personality. As a child he had observed young couples in the doorway of his house. His father had also taken him along on frequent business trips and he had learned of his extramarital affairs. In relating this, the patient would side with his mother. 'She was annoyed because father brought nonkosher meat into the

home.' The ravages of war added to the confusions of childhood. Utterly alone in a dangerous, hostile, and unintelligible world, he ended up by hating all those who should have been dear to him. In a fit of spite he had scattered the family photographs and those of his parents, and had defecated on the pictures before boarding the tramcar for his intended final trip.

In the transference similar phenomena emerge. The analyst's features are frequently misinterpreted and falsely apprehended. The analyst may seem overly benevolent, or cold and rejecting, younger or older than his real age, and the patient often feels uneasy in his unsuccessful attempts to visualize him. After discovering that the expression ascribed to the analyst was merely a reflection of his own mood, a patient remembered that as a child of six he had spent hours at his mother's sewing machine, working the pedal. The connecting rod that turned the crank appeared to him a puppetlike figure, incessantly exerting itself at his behest. He had thought of his analysis as an obligation to be carried out in a similarly helpless, mechanical manner. His early relation to his father, repeated in the puppet play at the sewing machine, recurred in the treatment, transforming him into a mechanical mannikin.

These observations bring into relief a quality, particularly of visual experience, to which scant attention is devoted in psychoanalytic writing. It consists first, in the recognition of fleeting gestures and the transient play of features as expressively significant; second, in the assigning of animated status to the objects from which they emanate. We deal here with an ego function, namely, the *interpretation of transient expressive configurations,* and a specific feeling attached to it at times, i.e., the feeling that the features thus interpreted belong to an animate being.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANIMATE AND INANIMATE OBJECTS

The peculiar quality of experience that consists in attributing animation to visually perceived objects is inescapable if,

unduly heightened, it interferes with the rational comprehension of reality. Animation is at times wrongly attributed to inanimate objects. In intoxication with hallucinogenic drugs, a portrait may seem to turn around in its frame or to step out of it. In myths, tales, and drama, the inanimate is made to talk and act, to give guidance and criticism. Stories, which resemble the results of dreamwork, abound in talking horses, cats, frogs, and objects such as Snow White's mirror.

In the theater the spectator is prepared to see the dramatis personae and ignore the personality of the actors who impersonate them. In spectacles such as Don Giovanni, we are prepared to be taken by surprise when one of the singers, impersonating the Commandant's ghost, sings through the statue's mouth. To achieve this, the spectator must first participate in the illusion that the statue, being inanimate, has no business to sing. Only by dint of this first illusion is there anything uncanny about a duet between the statue and his host. The device of animated objects is often made to convey ego-alien experiences or thoughts which the author of the plot assumes would demand ego participation and would be an imposition on the reader or spectator. Thus, Dr. Jekyll is ego-syntonic, Mr. Hyde, ego-alien. In Dorian Gray the conflict is represented by referring the repulsive appearance of depravity to a picture supposedly lifeless, yet in the novel uncannily animated. We are made to feel that the hero may be bereft of his humanity when he preserves the looks of dispassionate youth. When Wittels *(75)* tells us that, to him, Mona Lisa seemed to start laughing at any moment, or when Reik *(61)* says that Freud's portrait seemed to give him an encouraging glance, we see that the projection which erroneously attributes animation to pictures may be acknowledged consciously as a fantasy without interfering with reality testing.

In primitive animism and in the animism of childhood, the scrutiny of reality is less painstaking. In both, inanimate objects are experienced as expressing intentions charged with affect. They convey threats and lures, blessings and curses,

penalties and promises, danger and protection. For the child, things not only look as if they had faces; they actually make faces at him. It is not *as if* they were expressing meaningful communications, they actively convey them. To the child, an object looks happy, angry, or sad, because it *is* happy, angry, or sad. The projection takes place regardless of whether the mood is ego-syntonic or not. The child's own mood spills over and, radiating onto his entire surroundings, seems to emanate from them. This projection in the primitive and in the child does not pick and choose; it affects ideational content indiscriminately, for it is due to as yet insufficiently established defenses and weakly cathected ego boundaries. In certain schizoid states of depersonalization, the ideational content appears in consciousness, but the ego feeling that originally belonged to it succumbs to morbid repression. In paranoid states, the re-emergence of projection indicates a regression to the early conditions of an insufficiently cathected ego boundary. Here established defenses fail or prove insufficient to cope with an unexpected increase in libidinal charge. Accordingly, the projection affects ideational content that can be 'kept out of the ego' by none of the other defenses instituted in the course of development. Thus, projection operates here as a morbid regressive defense and correspondingly distorts reality testing and the perception of the surrounding world.

Endopsychic representation relies on complex, partly eidetic imagery, rooted in the reverberating traces of past experience. Endowed with both duration and change, it is elicited and constantly re-created by reality testing. Simultaneously, it also carries the markings of its unconscious provenience. Synesthetic associations and motor impulse manifestations reveal the part played by gustatory, olfactory, tactile, proprioceptive, and auditory elements in completing the visual representation of endopsychic imagery. They may also serve as indicators of the psychosexual developmental level from which the imagery emerges in free association. The visual field assumes the task of organizing the representations of perception and experience

at an early stage of life. Observations of deep regression as well as experimental results point to the nursing mother's face as an early organizer of the visual field, at a time when the representation of experience is still chaotic. Long before distinguishable objects define themselves as the elements of imagery, and long before their status of nonego or ego is thrashed out by the formation of a separating boundary, communication between mother and neonate is well under way.

The earliest manifestations of the neonate, such as blushing, yawning, stretching, turning the head, or opening the mouth, are interpreted as information on the baby's internal condition. By reacting to the infant as to a source of information conveyed through expressive phenomena, the nursing mother establishes and confirms their communication value even as they are experienced in a primordial and archaic way by the neonate at that stage. Step by step, learning the communication value of the infant's activities, the nursing mother endows them with the selfsame expressive significance that she herself learns to decipher. Thus, it belongs to the earliest experience of the neonate that his activities are reacted to as messages. Indeed, the establishment of communication and the exchange of significant messages occurs earlier than any type of adaptive-manipulative activity, except suckling. Slowly and gradually, in the emerging chaotic nuclear ego at the onset of subjective experience, the infant's motor impulses and the sensory impressions from the mother become intimately alloyed. Projection of subjective experience and introjection of primordial percepts go inextricably together. At the dawn of the baby's awareness of himself as a source of activity, the nursing mother's features are identified in projection and concomitant introjection long before their, or his own, demarcation as a distinctly separate object is concluded.

Later, experience will become associated with feelings that mark its belonging to the ego or its provenience from the environment. Dissociation of these feelings from the remaining elements of experience leads to states of inner or outer estrange-

ment, to symptoms of depersonalization, or to feelings of unreality. The present observations point to a third group of feelings, linked with the awareness that part of the subject's activity is expressive. Their origin can be traced to the expressive interpretative interaction between nursing mother and suckling infant, by which the infant's behavior may elicit a merely manipulative response, but may also be interpreted by the mother as meaningful. Its repetition by the baby then assumes the character of a message. Gradually and purposefully, part of the subject's activity is applied to the end of making himself understood. In part, the expressive activities go back to lingering phylogenetic instinctive action patterns such as feeding, fight, submission, sex, and play *(16)*. The feeling tone, if joined to certain activities, transforms them into intentional messages and communications and may be projected onto the environment. This is demonstrated by the animism of the primitive and of the child. Having discovered in the mother not only an instinctual object but also a source of meaningful, interpretable, configurational messages, the child repeats this feeling in his relation to the outer world. He feels that sun and moon, clouds and trees have things to say to him. In turn, he talks to dolls and flowers as if they too would respond to his communications.

At the stage of primary identification, when the features and activities of the nursing mother confirm and amplify the early self-awareness of the nuclear ego, the projection necessary for the communication between mother and infant is adaptive. Later, the infant's attention turns toward further objects and applies the same projection, which is then recognizable in the phenomena of infantile animism. Instead of remaining in the service of adaptation, it will have to be corrected by the emerging function of reality testing. The environment must then be differentiated and recognized as consisting only to a certain extent of *beings* that communicate their own intentions and the rest, of *things* that do not communicate or respond to communications. Henceforth, the relation to the environment uses

two distinct channels: first, adaptive-manipulative activities concerned with grasping the qualities of things and their reaction to inquisitive investigation; second, the interpretative-expressive ones, aimed at comprehending and interpreting the significance of communicated messages. To these, the reaction may be either a manipulative or a communicative response, or both, and it may also be aimed at eliciting either or both. While manipulative-adaptive activity constitutes a unilateral physical interference with surrounding objects, communicative-interpretative activity rests on the assumption of *reciprocity*. In order to distinguish inanimate from animate objects, yearning for this reciprocity has to be renounced. In this light, infantile animism appears as an attempt to prolong the security of the oral period by maintaining, through a projection now inappropriate, the illusion of reciprocal communication with nature. In this it resembles the hallucinated gratifications that substitute for the absent real ones. Moreover, with the establishment of a self-image, the experiencing person arrays himself among the objects of his environment. As such, he is now receiving messages from himself as well as originating them for communication with others. Thus, the experiences stemming from the ego, associated with the ego feeling that separates them from those of external origin, become further differentiated. Those originating in the ego and emanating from it as messages become distinguished from others belonging to the ego while yet devoid of the expressive feeling tone. These latter are not meant to mean anything even though they are felt to belong to the self. Psychoanalysis may uncover meaning and communication in endopsychic events in which the ego feeling persists in consciousness while the feeling of expressive significance is selectively repressed, for instance, in the seemingly accidental manifestations of acting out, or in postural changes during treatment.

In the course of psychosexual maturation, communicative interaction too is subjected to characteristic vicissitudes. The gradual establishment of reality testing engages some phenom-

ena of anticipation and expectation. Some of these may be observed in a dog on the leash, who reacts eagerly to smells, noises, and sights. Alerted by the dogs, cats, and birds of the neighborhood but foiled in his impulses of pursuit and chase, he will strain and pull at the sight of an empty paper bag, a fluffy rag, or a likely looking stone, as if they too were animals. If free, he could easily find out but the illusion is maintained by an interplay between stirred-up expectation and the restraint of inquisitive action. In children too, expectation may lead to attributing animation erroneously to things. Thus, a life-size doll sitting on a lawn was mistaken for one of the children until it toppled over. The illusion lasted only a few seconds and probably would have ceased soon because of the doll's immobility. Similarly, a little girl of three demanded excitedly to be told who it was who lay on a sofa in an adjoining room, particularly since she had already been told that no one was there. She took her grandmother by the hand and led her to the sofa on which a cello, wrapped in a blanket, had caught her attention. Only when the blanket was lifted did she understand that it had covered a *what* and not a *who*. To place a stuffed dummy under a blanket and thus mislead the guard not only belongs to the stock in trade of slapstick comedy, but also to the actual practice of boarding schools, military units, and mental institutions. The trick succeeds because of the spectator's readiness to foster the illusion. This accounts, too, for the fascination of marionettes and ventriloquists' dummies. In these situations, the discovery of the trick has a characteristic effect on the participant. Disillusionment acts, so to speak, as a joke in reverse. The spectator remains baffled afterwards and somewhat subdued. The exhilarating effect of a joke stems from an economy in countercathexis that is no longer needed to maintain a repression. But here we are led to the conclusion that the opposite process takes place. To correct the impression by which a perceived form affects one as animated, and to achieve the discovery that in reality it is a lifeless object, demands a repressive effort, an investment of countercathexis.

This confirms the earlier stated view of the paranoid, quasi-animistic projection as stemming from a deficiency or failure of countercathectic investment, which leads to a morbid re-animation of reality. When repression fails and prohibited ideational representations emerge in consciousness, the same failing repression facilitates their projection as messages coming from the outer world. Having failed to arrest the 'unwanted' idea at the id-ego boundary, the failing defenses are likewise unable to prevent the projection of the emerging content. The ego boundary, consolidated with the renouncing of the oral yearning for communicative reciprocity, is loosened up in these cases by regression, and the early animistic projection is resumed in a reality-distorting fashion.

Reality testing is only gradually and reluctantly substituted for the pleasure-pain principle of the primary process and of early infancy, to which the projections of animism belong. Even in adult life, the projection of animation occasionally re-emerges. This could be traced to regression *(75, 61)* or to increase in libidinal impulses (doll on lawn, cello under blanket, dummy under cover), or to a decrease or failure of countercathectic defenses (hallucinations, intoxication). Conversely, the normal communicative interaction in which the projection of animation ought to be maintained within the framework of reality testing may be impaired or may cease altogether. These observations point to an attempt to increase the repressing countercathexes. For instance, if a strong incestuous impulse distorts the relation to certain persons, those who come to represent the incestuous object may appear inanimate, 'dead', 'like puppets'. The characteristic syndrome thereby produced may be designated by the term, *deanimation syndrome*, by analogy to the syndromes of depersonalization and of unreality feelings. The psychodynamic imbalance at its source may consist of the above-mentioned increased countercathectic investment that goes with attempts at restoring threatened defenses, or it may point to the lowering of libidinal investment because of an ebbing of the libidinal cathexes in

exhaustion states, and some depressive conditions, or because of a redistribution of the libidinal cathexis in some autistic states. In all these, the deanimation syndrome is not infrequently encountered.

COMMUNICATION IN THE COURSE OF MATURATION

The interplay between augmented expectation and restrained inquisitiveness observed in the dog on the leash may illustrate the endopsychic conflict in the infant at a time when primal scene or primal-scene fantasies must be faced and worked through. Incessantly striving curiosity, aimed at exploring the human anatomy, the difference between the sexes and its uses, sharpen the infant's perceptive acuity for movement. The desire to remain undetected and the necessity to maintain control (at times precariously) over powerful instinctual impulses correspond to the restraining leash. For the toddler geared to his expectation, the primal scene comes as a shock and the real or imagined course of events in it are often decisive for the later structure of personality and the form and course of neurosis. An instinctual turmoil is released and leads to powerful repressions that utilize the full array of defenses. Denial, upward displacement, transformation into the opposite are common, and partial repressions of the ego feeling as well as disintegrative pathological defenses of the prepsychotic and psychotic type occur. The parents may be recalled only as motionless, separated, and as if carved out of wood. Fork and knife and similar pairs of implements may have to be kept compulsively separated lest their closeness recall the primal-scene fantasy. Displacement upward and transformation of movement into frozen stillness lead to the immobile staring faces in the Wolfman's dream, in which, along with other elements subjected to repression, the animated expression of the features is denied. In exposure dreams, persons that might be expected to react to the embarrassing nudity appear indifferent, expressionless, and impassive. The powerful defenses thus match the strength of the libidinal conflict. Through displacement upward, the

face now symbolizes the genitals. Through transformation into the opposite, vehement movement is replaced by lifeless rigidity. The symbolic equation of genitals with elements of the human face recurs in schizophrenia. It is also acted out in certain perversions. Here, the return of the repressed is bound and fused through the artifice of denying the expressive function as well as identification. Castration is symbolized by deanimating the experiencing subject. In these cases, the complaint is that the patient feels that he himself has become a puppet.

Communication by transient expressive configurations is rooted in instinctive purposeful animal interaction. The expressive-interpretative function becomes independent after partial inhibition of direct instinctual discharge. The original innervations are partly maintained but they are made to convey significant intentions instead of being put into practice as real action patterns. In the infant, too, expressive and reflex adaptive sequences are at first closely linked. The infant reacts to internal discomfort—for instance, a colic—with motility that resembles the later expression of attempts to remove an external annoyance. Oral expressive features, such as opening the mouth if one beholds a beautiful sight or tightening the lips while envisaging a problem, persist into maturity. Later, the anal phase is reflected in sadistic traits of disregarding the expressive significance of the features. Toddler-age siblings manipulate each others' faces and those of elders as if these were objects. Mouth, nose, ear, and eye are lustily explored, signs of discomfort notwithstanding. If, however, the tot is made to understand that he does cause discomfort or pain, he is likely to burst into tears. These, of course, are at best only precursors of later compassion. Here, they indicate a regression to the earlier state of identification with the partner. In this light, the manipulation of expressive features in early childhood is seen as a transitory defense against identification. By a binding of the projection and by an inhibition of the interpretative-expressive phase of reality testing, the ego boundary is secured and consolidated. Thus, prior to the repressions im-

posed by the primal scene, projective-introjective identification is counteracted in the interest of fortifying the ego boundary. This helps to define the individually characteristic self-image as different from the perceived, unconsciously introjected, surrounding images. Gradually, the mastery of the self paves the way for the transition from identifications to imitation. Imitation frequently serves as a defense against identification by displaying mastery over the expressive self-image, for instance, in its aggressive use of derisive impersonation of peers and adults. These activities reach their height in the phallic phase. Their morbid fixation recurs in exhibitionism. The pathological persistence and exaggeration of the anal-sadistic disregard of the human expression manifests itself in the excesses of man's inhumanity to man. Identification is here altogether destroyed. The expression of the victim, his pleadings and sufferings are of no avail. Similar dynamics are brought into play—*mutatis mutandis*—in the treatment meted out to animals slaughtered for consumption as against the relation with household pets. The devaluation of expressive features recurs also in the symbolic equation of the corpse with feces. The clipping of nails and hair and the relegation of feces to the status of repulsive outer objects teach the infant that transitions occur from inner to outer as well as from meaningful to meaningless states.

The course taken by the development of expressive-interpretative activity is related to the dynamics of pictorial representation. The projections instrumental in recognizing animation in one's fellow beings are also used in the interpretation of representational works of art. They are strongly stimulated by figures such as statues, portraits, animated cartoons, comic strips, etc. They sum up and condense the intricately complex relations between model, artist, painting, and beholder. For the comprehension of works of art, perception must be enriched through the projection of space and time elements. A painting spreads in two dimensions only: depth, needed for the illusion of space, is provided by a projective effort of the viewer; time, needed for the illusion of movement and action,

is similarly contributed. Here, the presumed circumstances that led to the depicted situation, and those that it will bring about in turn, are provided by the onlooker's fantasy. Both depth and action are selectively projected. Thus, the figures represented in a painting are easily discernible from figures that appear in a painting on the wall shown within the main painting. This illustrates the quantitative fluctuation of the projections of animation and shows their discerning cognitive role in the service of perception and reality testing. These projections are intensified in toxic and regressive conditions. In primitive animism, drawings assume magic functions. The hunting adventures shown in cave paintings reproduce and evoke vivid eidetic imagery. The elements of action in the depicted scene and its presumed outcome emanate a magic influence on the world by ensuring the recurrence of similar events. Likewise, the magic of fertility rites formalizes the primal scene in order to cast a beneficial spell of fruitfulness; in formal ritual exhibition, the mystery of cohabitation is reenacted and divulged. Ethnic development reflects in these rituals the element of exhibitionistic display of the phallic phase. To be sure, the participants in an imitative ritual are sternly required to perform the fertility rites in representative performance only, so that effective control over the freedom of living experience is never relinquished. They may not always have mustered the necessary repression that separates imitation from identification. This is no less true of the modern version of ritual performance on stage, screen, and ballet. Scandal stirs if those who should merely play-act passionate love identify with their role to the extent of living it out. The spectator, robbed of his assurance that it is all only make-believe, feels exposed to a threat against his established defenses, for he is called upon to rectify the quantity of libidinal flow invested in the projections of identifications by a partial repression.

In magic, ritual, and related performances, animation operates even though it runs counter to reality testing. The opposite process, namely, the deanimation of ritual performances and

pictorial representation occurs whenever, for instance, repetition reduces their expressive value to that of an expectable stereotype. Here, libidinal interest and the regressive movement toward projective identification are not stimulated. The fox terrier on RCA recordings, the roaring lion in MGM motion pictures, the heraldic animals, concert-hall caryatids and trade-mark Samsons are not viewed for their meaningful expressions. The juxtaposition of advertising stereotypes in commercial broadcasting with spectacles that demand a different dynamic balance between repression and regression are, therefore, a source of distress to the viewer. Similarly, the drawings of primitive man were turned from their original magic purpose to that of recording business transactions. With the transition from the nomadic to the sedentary form of life, recorded deals became commonplace and their symbolic representation increasingly stereotyped. Once started, this process was expanded in order to record, convey, and communicate astronomical, natural, and historic events. Pictographic messages demand the investment of considerable fantasy from their readers. Understanding them means to be able to relive their content to a certain degree. In this, it resembles present-day art appreciation. In the course of centuries, pictographs assumed a progressively stereotyped character. Their readers could, indeed had to, shed their erratic emotional involvement. The projections of animated interpretation were curbed, the significance of the pictographic sign became severely constricted and restricted. Magic uses and the opportunity for subjective interpretation were abandoned. Bereft of their representational function, stereotyped and increasingly rigid in shape, the ideograms and finally the characters of the phonetic alphabet retained a severely circumscribed, restricted significance only, as recurring, stereotyped elements of communication. They acquired meaning through the patterning of context. The flexibility of interpretations was then restored with the fluctuations, the transient changes imposed on the pattern within the limits of syntax. Written communication, even though it uses

stable elements, is still ambiguous to a varying degree. It may permit considerable investment of fantasy, as in lyric poetry. It may demand extremes of precision, as in scientific presentations. As a means of transmitting information, it has in large measure superseded the method of direct communication by means of transient expressive configurations that belong to the features of immediate human interaction through touch, sight, and sound. In our times of identity papers, documented findings, and filed records, a deliberate libidinal effort is required if one wishes to regain the direct relation to the human beings represented by them.

The development of the phonetic alphabet is reflected in the personal acquisition of writing and reading and in the dynamics of the latency period. At the first beginnings of reality testing, the projection of animated ego feelings and their inhibition, with its resultant devaluation of expressive features, are still in constant flux. With the added repressions from the primal scene, re-enforced by those of the œdipus complex, a new cathectic balance is reached. The massive repressions that maintain the childhood amnesia provide a permanent countercathexis of the projections of animism. Henceforth, reality testing under the guidance of the secondary process prevails over the magic world of earlier years. Endopsychic imagery acquires the definition essential for the sharper discriminations of the thought process. Precise conceptual patterns are formed by isolating the object representations from their affective element of feeling tones. In detached scientific observation, communicative interaction is substituted by objective nonparticipant measurement. The endopsychic representations instrumental in the adaptive transactions of reality testing have to be separable from the ego feelings that would mark them with inadmissible subjectivity. They also must be kept apart from animistic features. Hence, scientific attempts to comprehend the communications in nature as actively conveyed messages are frowned upon by critics. Such an approach taxes their established defenses. As with the discovery that the love affair

thought to be only a theatrical performance involves the actors in earnest, the critical reader feels his defenses threatened when he discovers that he is exposed to 'getting involved'. He prefers an 'objective' description of animal and human psychology. To him, any interpretation based on assumptions of reciprocity between observer and 'test subject' looks untrustworthily subjective, as if carrying an aura of belief. This uneasiness about anything but 'objective, detached, scientific observation' arises from the endopsychic threat of (libidinal) involvement felt by those who try to maintain an attitude of aloofness regarding the objects of their inquiry. While the problem of objectivity in the exact physical sciences leads beyond the frame of the present paper, the objectivity at times sought in the psychological sciences is an illusion created by 'scotomatization' through repressive processes. To achieve the desired adaptation to reality, this objectivity must be tempered by the knowledge that reciprocity in human relations is an inescapable fact.

At the onset of latency, the complex communication system of spoken language is well developed. The later personality is already recognizable and almost fully preformed. Usually, the latency period is explained as a manifestation of the diphasic onset of sexuality in man. The latter is taken to be an irreducible biological fact. Undoubtedly, physiological and social circumstances express the biological genital incapacity of children at that age. Yet, the somatic sources of libido clearly do not undergo any sudden change just then and, since somatic development makes impressive progress, we may expect the endopsychic aspect of the libido to be active too. Indeed, throughout the period of latency, libidinal forces of tremendous efficiency press on to counter the repressions instituted with the decline and passing of the œdipus complex. Operating since the inception of individual time in the service of communication, they are now bereft of their archaic object. The nursing mother, an active source of information—not of milk only—is now replaced by the objects of an indifferent world. Those that communicate with the child keep the cathexes of

reciprocal identification and the projections that go with them continuously at the critical point. Written language is ideally suited to provide a substitute object onto which these cathexes are now displaced. The three R's—reading, 'riting, and 'rithmetic—are forged into a reliable intermediary for posing questions to nature while yet avoiding the awesome and untrustworthy qualities of an animistic world. The libidinal investment is transferred from the interpretation of transient expressive configurations to the interpretation of stable stereotyped images, the characters of the alphabet. As would be expected, what has been repressed returns in states of regression and intoxication: on occasions, the dead letter is revivified and turns to fiery magic script.

Thus the repression of animation appropriate for sound reality testing is achieved by developmental steps in three stages of psychosexual organization: first, at the time of consolidation of the self-image and archaic, precœdipal reality testing; second, at the period when the inhibitions and repressions from the primal scene hold sway; third, at the ascent of the latency period, when the persistent claims of inquisitiveness and curiosity, stably bound by permanent countercathexis, finally substitute the study of the written word for the facial expression of elders as a source of judgment. Through latency and early adolescence, an unceasing drive to acquire knowledge and accumulate information parallels the striving to expand manipulative skills. Simultaneously, the range, diversity, and number of partners in communication increase. Group processes reactivate identification and regression by intensive stimulation from gangs and other modern versions of the brother-horde. Thus, the ground is prepared for the ultimate re-emergence of the archaic dyadic communication channel. Falling in love restores an interactional relation in which communication by means of transient expressive configurations reassumes its hegemony within the framework of reality testing. However, while in the nursing team the archaic mode constitutes the only viable channel, a pair of lovers, given a reasonable degree

of maturity, now dispose of the full spectrum of communicative potential. Furthermore, with the establishment of a stable link between the mates, a still more primeval system of information exchange is activated. Expressing their unique individual chromosomal pattern through their features, their mutual choice assumes the age-old creative task of starting a new human being on the vagaries of life.

DISCUSSION

IMAGERY AND OBJECTS

In the following discussion an attempt is made to clarify some of the theoretical implications tacitly assumed. The clinical examples would of course demand an entirely different frame for an adequate psychoanalytic report. The given details merely show that the deanimation syndrome appears in typical manner in a variety of well-defined circumstances. The reference list is presented without claim to completeness or inclusiveness. Lastly, even though the recognition of animation enlists all the available channels of perception, the visual field receives preferential treatment and the reasons for this are elaborated.

> Let him rejoice who breathes up here in the roseate light! *(43,* p. 73*).*

The concept of virtual endopsychic objects in the inner, subjective representational process, pivotal in the formulation of psychic reality, leads one to comprehend the processes of libidinal cathexis as a play of endopsychic forces affecting these objects *(34,* p. 346*).* The same applies for concepts of binding by countercathexis and of repression that excludes these objects from conscious representation, relegating them to the system Ucs and its peculiar rules. The fact that the objects of the real world are thinglike (real), while the endopsychic objects are virtual and configurational, is often inadequately stressed (Cf. *29,* p. 73*).* Cathexis was compared to the fluctuating, dynamically maintained condition of occupying a province.

It is frequently conceived as being deployed upon the endopsychic object in the manner of occupying forces that hold a territory (*Besetzung, Besatzung*). The real counterparts of these endopsychic entities, the objects and phenomena of the real world in which we live, engage the organism in the interplay of object relations. Psychoanalysis has demonstrated that these operationally real, pragmatically tested transactions, which relate us to surrounding reality, reflect the inner representational counterparts, preformed in previous similar transactional attempts. Feelings, associative connotations, distortions of significance and of perceived qualities, affect the endopsychic object, but only seemingly its outer real counterpart. In other words, object cathexis occupies the inner object only, whereas object relations take place in the interaction between the experiencing subject and the outer real objects that surround him. This discriminating definition is indispensable if the early factors that affect the inner objects are to be elucidated. The formations of inner object representations are amenable to neurophysiological *(59)* as well as to psychoanalytic scrutiny, even though at present the latter is the more sensitive tool. However, in the earliest transactions as well as in conditions different from those for which the concepts of psychoanalytic interpretation were formulated and validated, our ideas will have to be adjusted very carefully to limiting, marginal, and extreme circumstances *(15; 25,* p. 135, ff.*)*.

By and large, our concept of the endopsychic object has borrowed features from the visual objects of daily experience. But, unlike an eidetic image that may have served as its perceptual model to some extent, it encompasses the manifold associative ramifications that link the various sensory, proprioceptive, and sensorimotor channels into an intricately complex network. Thus, in word-representations, the motor sequences from writing, the imitative, ideational movement sequences, the audiovisual elements and the manifold 'clang' elements, and, finally, connotations that link up with preconscious inhibitory mechanisms, determine the matrix to which the unconscious signifi-

cance is connected before the word is understood *(23)*. Moreover, in the course of development, the configurational association of stimuli, excitations, and impulses that constitute the inner representational image is probably centered around a leading sensory channel that corresponds to the developmental level concerned. One may assume that, in the oral period, corresponding to the erotogenic zone appropriate to the level, olfactory and gustatory stimuli constitute the main avenues of sensory input onto which the strongest 'task force' of cathexis is thrown, in order to engage the cluster of sensations that corresponds to the endopsychic object at that stage. The complexity of the processes of experience leads to the danger that, for their adequate description, one would have to use an involved style with mixed metaphors abounding. Yet, simplicity of description may well have to be paid for in oversimplification. The choice of method must depend, therefore, on the purpose of the description. In this, inevitably, our concepts reiterate elements of subjective experience. Just as in the physical sciences, theory at first started with blunt ideas such as force, resistance, output, later gradually was abstracted and refined in arriving at more adequately discerning notions of field, vector, 'wavicle', continuum, etc. A critical review of well-established concepts in any science becomes necessary *(52)* if one wishes to carry them to the extreme of their descriptive and communicative capacity. For the purpose of the present framework, it suffices to define incongruities and ambiguities as they arise and to hint at differentiations possible in existing terminology in order to preserve the keenness of our conceptual tools. Balint *(4)* has discussed the notion of 'objects' and has noted that gustatory and olfactory stimuli are felt as localized 'inside', while visual and auditory sensations are located as coming from the environment. By belonging to the threshold of the inner world as well as to the elements of the environment, sensations in and from the oral region assume a definite task in differentiating between the two *(70)*. One has to keep such associated elements in mind when examining interactions controlled by the visual field.

Visual performance in animals relies in part on instinctual sequences *(67)*. The visual link also helps to mold group behavior, e.g., in shoals of fish or flocks of birds. The direction in which an object is seen to move may determine the meaning given to it. Movement within the visual field attracts attention. A kitten is induced to play with a fluff as long as it is kept moving, but it loses interest if the movement ceases. Insects and small animals save their lives through becoming immobile. Thus, a mouse once took refuge under a wooden trunk in my room. I called my cat and lifted the box on its edge. As long as the mouse remained completely still the cat eyed the field with perfunctory indifference. But as soon as the slightest movement occurred, it darted after its prey, making the mouse flee. This illustrates that moving objects against a fixed background draw attention. The ensuing sensorimotor activity results in 'locking' onto the object, 'framing' it so that it is held in the center of the visual field. By its becoming fixed against the now swiftly shifting background, appropriate action is facilitated. Correspondingly, in the periphery of the visual field, sensitivity for movement is greater, while at its center, discrimination for form constancy prevails. If a constant configuration is spotted, small saccadic movements of the eyeballs maintain it around a central position; hence after one looks at a bright object such as a light bulb, the afterimages appear in clusters. These movements account for the fact that the contours of objects become stressed, being eagerly scanned for straightness and form constancy. If these movements are prevented, scotomatization follows; this accounts for the invisibility of the retinal vessels. To spot an object and to look at it is accompanied by a feeling of concentrated effort. This experience may have influenced our concepts of the hypercathexis of attention. Moreover, the proprioceptive registration of body movements that produce parallactic alterations in the visual image enables us to distinguish immobile objects against a fixed background and to achieve monocular stereoscopic vision. These examples suffice to show that purposeful activity under visual guidance entails a highly com-

plex, multiply coördinated sensorimotor interaction with th environment. Yet it is only a small part of the vast array of ac tivities engaged in reality testing. Nevertheless, it is of para mount importance in flexibly adapted interactions such as driv ing a car. The driver learns to keep a steady eye on his path c travel in order to avoid the sensorimotor 'attraction' exerted b oncoming and overtaking traffic. The acquired adaptive patter is substituted here for the involuntary reaction probably relate to instinctual remnants of flight and chase sequences that 'temp one to 'lock' to the car in front and dart after it. Re-emergenc of such archaic transactions may well account for types of acc dent proneness where, as in the neuroses, regressive pattern take over from rational reality testing. While projected filr sequences are successfully used in teaching and testing driver the procedure is unsatisfactory for teaching psychotherapy be cause a multitude of clues, at times of subliminal intensity, i left out. The constancy of the camera angle, too, leads to a impoverishment of informative content, frequently makin these spectacles ambiguous. Children are more sensitive t movement than adults. Freud related this to children's increase readiness to discover the secrets of the primal scene prior t latency *(40, 42)*. Incidentally, he refers to 'primal fantasies foreshadowing as it were stimulus situations of typical develop mental importance at *more than one point* in the course c maturation. 'I believe that these *primal fantasies* . . . are phylogenetic possession. In them the individual, wherever h own experience has become insufficient, stretches out beyond to the experience of past ages' *(34,* p. 311*)*. One is reminde here of the newer concepts of imprinting by which innate re lease mechanisms become activated (Lorenz, in *67,* p. 208 While, from the beginning, movement belongs to the qualitie of the visual image, in the adult the discernment of stable con figurations and objects prevails over the preoccupation wit fleeting change. Nonetheless, the swaying foliage of a tree, drifting cloud, and even the everflowing brooks and streams ar envisaged as coherent units. Also, to a child, perspective di

tortion and change will not detract from recognizing the identity of his toys. The early distinction of small objects from parts of the body may rely on their 'dropableness' *(8,* p. 18*).* The sensation of things in our grasp, related to *how they look,* constitutes a tactile-visual coördination by which our concepts of stable objects are strongly influenced. This integration fails in Pötzl's optic-agnostic aphasia. The wealth of associations gathered into a unity through the common relation to the visual image may be appreciated from cases of blind persons to whom eyesight is later restored *(*von Senden, in *3,* p. 160*).* The arbitrary demarcation of visual objects in a poorly structured plane surface, such as the Rorschach blots, relies on projections of spatial elements for depth, and time factors for action sequences resembling those required to comprehend pictures and illustrations. This, and particularly the recognition of oneself in a picture, is by no means directly achieved. Primitives, new to the experience, need time to learn it. The projected elements stem from the test subject's past experience, deriving from memories in part unconscious or from their detached fragments, reconnected in relation to the integrating visual field stimulus supplied by the cloudy blot.

The flow of free associations related by the patient by means of the spoken word in psychoanalysis constitutes a report on the emergence of endopsychic, frequently visual, imagery. These actual, or composite, or creatively edited residues of outer reality enable one to reach conclusions regarding unconscious events simultaneously represented or symbolized by them. The endopsychic representational process is engaged here in the integrating task of the ego. Elements of perception, proprioception, memories of activity and experience are linked in associative clusters by the labels and connotations of the audiovisual and sensorimotor configurations of language. These communications elicit in the analyst not only verbal comprehension, but also a corresponding set of imagery of his own making. Referring to his own and to his predecessors' experience, his attention is attuned to significant connections that

evade the patient's awareness because of defenses. In this, the analyst resembles a physicist who imparts significance to seemingly erratic events in a cloud chamber by relating them to his previous experience regarding subatomic processes, or a roentgenologist who interprets cloudy patterns on an x-ray film in the light of former findings. The spontaneous imagery in free association, determined in the absence of reality testing mainly by significant unconscious impulses, reveals the pattern of the patient's primary process. But the analyst, who considers this information in the light of his earlier observations, and who views them in a tried and proven general contest, uses his own imagery that stems in part from his own unconscious sources. He has to distinguish between his own secondary process and its unconscious determinants. Otherwise, representations that symbolize the patient's primary process gain significance by becoming translations of the analyst's primary process *(30)*. Such confused contamination, based on partial identifications in countertransference, engages the analyst's projections in their discharge function instead of utilizing them in their cognitive task. This illustrates the variations of projection serving facultatively in the tasks of defense, cognition, discharge of tension, and communication proper *(51)*.

A peasant, taught to read by Maxim Gorki, 'wondered that the reader sees people, woods, and fields, as if all this were reality. This was magic, he exclaimed!' *(57,* p. 122*)*. Noting the analogy between endopsychic imagery and written script, Freud says: 'If we reflect that the means of representation in dreams are principally visual images and not words, we shall see that it is even more appropriate to compare dreams with a system of writing than with a language. In fact the interpretation of dreams is completely analogous to the decipherment of an ancient pictographic script such as Egyptian hieroglyphs.' He regretted that the experience and knowledge of a linguist was generally not available to the analyst *(31,* p. 177*)*. Discussing the libido in schizophrenia *(34,* p. 366*)*, he remarks that 'the efforts of the libido to get back to its objects, that is, to the

nental idea of its objects, do really succeed in conjuring up some-
hing of them, something that at the same time is only the
hadow of them—namely, the verbal images, the words, attached
o them'. The communication systems of ancient languages show
ıncertainties that would be inadmissible in modern writing *(13,*
4). Hieroglyphs were phonetically ambiguous, and even the
ense in which they were to be read was arbitrarily decided by the
cribe *(67)*. Most irritatingly, hieroglyphic writing dispenses
vith the separation between words. The apparent ambiguities
›f the Chinese language, too, resemble the uncertainties of
lream imagery. It conveys the raw material of symbolic repre-
entation, omitting the structuring relative particles of speech.
›imilarly, the dreamer beholds only the raw material of 'thought
anguage' (*Denksprache*). Nevertheless, this lack of definition
ıeed not and does not lead to real difficulties in understanding
24, 34). These conclusions resemble those of B. L. Whorf *(72)*
egarding the Hopi Indian language, namely, that it is an ef-
ıcient vehicle in conveying meaning with all its peculiarities.
Cf. also F. A. Beach quoting W. Dennis, *67*, p. 59.) The firmly
:neaded Hopi syntax evokes the simile of a chemical bond as
gainst the merely mechanical mixture of the standard average
:uropean grammar. There is no conceptualization of time,
›nly a participation in becoming, and no appreciation of dis-
ance except that embracing expanses of time as well as space.
)ne is reminded of dreams in which spans of time are featured
.s spatial remoteness. In this light, the discerning of a primary
›rocess through the manifestations and beneath the forms of
:xpression of thought resembles a translation from a language
hat obeys one form of syntax into another language in which
ı different structure prevails. From the subject-predicate, object-
ubject structure of ratiocination, it behooves us to retranslate
nto a submerged idiom that knows no sharp dividing line to
lefine the events of living experience as things, but allows them
o acquire and emanate their true meaning by coalescence and
rradiation. Reminiscent of those contaminations in which
ubject and object merge in 'harmonious mix-up' *(4)* and in

which objective entities have not yet taken shape, this idiom : the language of early childhood. It belongs to a lost world tha lies beyond the ramparts of œdipal repression, primitive in th sense of individual as well as of anthropological human infanc (*54*, pp. 87-144; *71*, pp. 28-32, ff.).

'... you're so exactly like other people'.
'The face is what one goes by, generally', Alice remarked (*11*).

In free association, the particular regressive level of prov nience to which the emerging ideational imagery belongs often marked by the synesthetic and postural phenomena tha go with it (*17, 18*). Thus, a patient, looking at Freud's chara teristic portrait, remarked that the old man's protruding ciga appeared as glowing as his piercing look. Suddenly, he thoug of the delicious, refreshing ice-cream cones that his father use to buy for him. He saw himself walking in the street lickin his ice cream, some of which would occasionally drop. Th sequence of associations corresponded to an attempt to de with the hot, fiery, and threatening features by replacing the with sweet, cool, and soothing ones at the price of a regressio from the anal to the oral level. Vividly felt sensations of mout and the oral cavity appear in deep regressive states durin analysis (*70*). Corresponding to the period of life to which the belong, these phenomena are vaguely defined, insufficientl demarcated, and not always amenable to verbal interpretatio In these circumstances progress in therapy may depend on th analyst's readiness to permit and manage regressive swings. Th emergence of archaic forms of transference necessitates a flex ble adaptation of treatment technique in order to let the patien re-experience very early life situations under improved cond tions (*4*). The regressive aspect may have to take precedenc over the somewhat more obvious interpretations in terms c later preœdipal content. Here too, visual imagery, associatio of oral incorporation, and projection are closely related. Th patient with the ice-cream cone memory suffered from occ sional mild attacks of bronchial asthma. Complaining of thir

and dryness in the mouth, he had a vision of an undefined shiny white object very near his face and a feeling of drowsiness. 'Breast and face are experienced as one and indivisible' *(70)*. 'They do not know whether the nice feeling comes in the breast or in the face' *(73,* p. 5*)*. In deep regression as well as in the early stages corresponding to it, 'overflow is the rule of the hour' *(70,* p. 222*)*. Tactile and visual stimulations are felt by the infant together with sensations in the oral cavity and with the impression of the nursing mother's face. An undifferentiated unity ensues in which any one part comes to stand for the total experience. Moreover, sensations from the labyrinth and the body surface combine with the intraoral ones into a 'unified situational experience' *(70)*. Accordingly, the dream screen may be traced to this composite event, 'which, in the visual field, represents the approaching face of the mother'. Her features provide the visual constituent in this primeval 'synesthesia of many senses'. Much later, as word representations become attached to the visual imagery, the close link between mouth, hands, eyes, and ears in the tasks of speech and language persists. The role of reading music, where word representations have no part to play, demonstrates that the visual field retains a nodal role in the integration of experience, including the expressive-interpretative interactions molded by syntactic rules. These are acquired in the course of a learning process that, originating in the earliest communicative interchanges, can be followed as it continues its unbroken course in the stream of codified knowledge, the arts and sciences. Cherry, who cryptically dedicates his book to Pym, the dog, hopes that the explanation of pattern recognition will be found by starting with 'simple' figures, such as a triangle, achieving in the end an understanding for complex configurations such as a caricature *(12,* p. 289*)*. However, the observation of earliest transactions shows that communication in living organisms is patterned and structured from the outset, relying on transient configurations long before recognition of stable patterns becomes established.

Usually, the course taken by the first experiences serves as a model for the differentiation of the primeval ego from the primordial id. The stimuli, expectably suited to induce gratification by releasing pre-established reflex patterns, such as taking the breast, pave the way for the channeling of the subsequent primordial tension impulses of alerted anticipation. Concerning the very first reactions, such as the stimuli and response of taking the first breath, life itself perishes if it is not met by conditions of the 'average expected environment' *(49)*. If these conditions do not exceed a definite range, their physiological occurrence sets those first traces of experience against which later stimuli may be 'compared'. Absence of appropriate stimulation leads to atresia of the respective transactional channel (Penfield quoted in *3*, p. 160). Its presence elicits the state of activity in the central nervous system that constitutes the precondition for the generation of the drive tension from which the demand for further gratification originates. The autochthonous libidinal impulses are viewed here as having been evoked, facilitated, and made viable by the expectable stimulation. In its absence, they fail to occur altogether. After its first occurrence, the organism is set to function and made capable of starting the process of adaptation by gradually coping with variations in the recurrent gratification, particularly with delay, frustration, and unpleasure. Later, some of these operations will elicit anxiety. Although the mother cannot be designated as an object in the psychological sense for the fœtus *in utero*, the later endopsychic mother image replaces the biological fœtal situation for the infant *(41)*. In other words, the very first transactions in the life of the neonate are already patterned in an intricately complex configurational programming, out of which the virtual objects within the later endopsychic part organizations gradually evolve. The various sensory channels take their turn in contributing by associative accretions toward ever fuller establishment of the endopsychic virtual object representation. From the outset, interaction with the infant develops by way of two distinct modalities, designated here

as the *manipulative-adaptive* and the *interpretative-expressive* respectively. This latter stimulates, maintains, and exploits the symbolic function of the organism. The present study brings into relief the radical difference between our relation to animate objects and thinglike, inanimate ones. However, it also points out the futility of trying to localize the elements necessary for discerning the difference in qualities of the object alone. At its root, the distinction is endopsychic and resides in the *observer's expectations of reciprocity* as against the alternative of discarding this attitude in favor of 'objective' nonparticipant observation.

> Life definitely reveals two categories of people, — artists and thinkers. Between them is a marked difference. The artists comprehend reality as a whole, as a continuity, a complete living reality, without divisions, without separations. The other group, the thinkers, pull it apart, kill it, so to speak . . . only gradually putting it together again. The average person holds a middle position *(58,* pp. 112-113*)*.

The particular character of life and the animated state is occasionally given as the ability to preserve and maintain its own patterns, possibly complemented by teleologic conceptions of self-sufficient purposefulness *(55)* and hierarchic concepts of striving toward stages of maximum organization *(6,* p. 184, ff.*)*. In such attempts to define the animated state in objective terms, an essential further factor characteristic of life and the animated state is omitted. The observer himself is an animated being, and the recognition of another one depends on a relation of reciprocity between the two. In other words, the pattern constancy of the living organism is in the service of a faculty for expression through which the intercommunication between the different forms of life is safeguarded by way of reciprocally interpretable manifestations. Rothschild connects the animated state with the fact that the very architecture of the organism may be viewed as a symbol of its experience. Structure is expressing its own function to the extent of becoming its symbol.

'The central nervous system is a symbol of life experience, developed by nature' *(64,* p. 29*)*. A certain conceptual difficulty arises here from the fact that anatomical structure, being merely a residue of function, lacks the active expressive quality of animated creatures and their spontaneously conveyed messages. Endopsychic phenomena, their structural substratum, and their objective display in living interaction, manifesting the interplay of eros and thanatos, were the objects of scrutiny that led to a formulation of the regulations of subjective experience. 'The problem, formulated by Freud, how such opposing but intimately connected and alloyed primal drives (eros and thanatos) succeed to achieve the observable behavior, turned into the question, how the organism overcomes the contrast between his own animation and his own corporeality' *(65,* p. 70*)*. In a recent exposition of 'biosemiotic', Rothschild surveys the inner and outer communication processes in man as a hierarchy of communication systems, evolved and superposed in the course of phylogeny, and culminating in language, a specific human manifestation. 'Language not only assists in constituting the ego, but it also serves to express this constitution' *(66)*.

Interpretation was raised to the status of a scientific method by Freud *(24)*. Interpreting a phenomenon of behavior or a symptom in terms of its own expressive value, rather than in terms of its meaning within a conceptualized description, constituted a radical departure from nineteenth-century science. Freud was fully aware of the fundamental and revolutionary significance of this step *(38,* p. 238*)*. Nevertheless, the basic implications of this interpretability for the understanding of human communication is not yet fully explored. The analytic situation made reciprocal communication an exception to the rule of reinterpreting the patient's thoughts in terms of the patient's experience only. It stressed the analyst's anonymity and led to a certain delay in the scrutiny of countertransference phenomena. However, as the present study demonstrates, disturbances in the patient's ability to communicate may be part of the patient's symptoms. This in itself is a good reason why

they merit our full attention, since, rooted in faulty early object relations, the failure to communicate reappears in the transference. Communication belongs to the symbolic function of the living organism. It starts early in life, and there are indications that, like other vital functions (e.g., muscle tonus, breathing, or feeding) it too must be activated and elicited by appropriate environmental stimulation. Over and above the transactions and gratifications that keep him going as a physicochemical structure bent on pattern preservation, goal directedness, and the reduction of unpleasurable tension, the neonate is induced to start his own expressive-interpretative activity. At the risk of oversimplification, one may use the formula, that if the mother will not animate the child, there is danger of his developing into a soulless creature. The timing of the appropriate stimuli for the release of the onset of the vital functions is restricted to a comparatively narrow range. It does not seem unreasonable to estimate the expectable stimulations for the communicative functions to occur within the first few dozen hours of life.

COMMUNICATION AND SOCIAL INTERACTION

Animal observation demonstrates that the imprinting mechanism belongs to the earliest automatic reactions controlled by the visual field. The expectably patterned and sharply timed stimulus achieves a penetrating direct impact *(67,* pp. 221, 227, 233*)*. The organism, as it were, anticipates the occurrence of the appropriate stimulus. It is geared to register it in a flash of conflict-free transaction. Usually these processes are discussed only under the aspect here termed adaptive-manipulative *(49, 50)*. Concepts referring to the inchoate state of the psychic systems will have to reckon with the 'running-in' period of the central nervous system that presets the later faculties at a very early stage *(17)*. The totality of earliest impressions is certainly not entirely amorphous or chaotic. The channels of perception contribute through their pre-established structure toward the sorting out of incoming information and its distribution in the

associative network for processing. Concepts of 'object-formation' were influenced by clinical neurophysiological findings supplementing the psychological view. In aphasia, psychological categories such as mind-blindness encroach on the neurological description *(23)*. Conversely, neurotic reading difficulties, for instance, recall localized neurological disturbances *(62)*. For the comprehension of the earliest phases of psychic functioning, our knowledge of neural function and structure is inevitably called in to round out our notions of the later psychic apparatus in which virtual configurations and images shift and change.

The radical difference between events in the earliest stages and between later transactions is illustrated by the development of anxiety. The autonomous innervations operating at birth are originally adaptive: 'The danger of birth has as yet no psychical content' *(41,* p. 132*)*. In later anxiety, they recur either inappropriately in novel circumstances of danger, or adequately as signals to ward off approaching known danger. Thus, while at birth there occurs a tremendous upheaval of narcissistic libido economy, possibly causing increased organ cathexes in the infant and toddler, anxiety arises only with the further progress of mental development *(41,* p. 137*)*. 'The ego is the actual seat of anxiety' *(Ibid.,* p. 140; *39)*. The inner objects to which anxiety is attached change with the psychosexual phase *(41,* p. 141*)*, but in the infant, the constant recurring precondition for anxiety is the absence of the beloved person whose memory image is strongly cathected 'probably in a hallucinatory way at first' *(Ibid.,* p. 137*)*. 'It is as if the undeveloped creature knew of no better way to invest its yearning cathexes. . . .' Clearly, 'to consider every inborn mechanism an inborn drive would contradict the concept as it is commonly used in psychoanalysis. . . . Strictly speaking, there is no ego before the differentiation of the ego and the id, but there is no id either, since both are products of differentiation' *(49)*. Thus the stimuli that assail the neonate can only be conceived as creating, with the effect of the initial impact, a specific area receptivity. Once a channel of receptivity becomes established, subsequent stimuli

flowing in through that channel become actively discernible in comparison with the original imprinting pattern. 'The first social relations of the child are crucial for the maintenance of his biological equilibrium also. It is for this reason that man's first object relations became our main concern in psychoanalysis. Thus the task of man to adapt to man is present from the very begining of life' *(Ibid.,* p. 31; cf. *17).* 'The normal newborn human and his average expectable environment are adapted to each other from the very first moment' *(49).*

A conceptual difficulty arises here from the competition between two approaches in the observation of the neonate. A similar dichotomy arose above with the psychological and the neurological aspects. Now the conflict derives from having to supplement the objective view by the surmise of the subjective experience in the neonate. This latter rests on observable spontaneous activities of the expressive-interpretative mode of interaction with the environment to which the observer belongs. Thus the outward phenomena that compel us to assume that a psychic organization has started functioning are said to arise around the third month of life *(49,* p. 51, ff.*).* This is in agreement with well-established data *(69; 52,* p. 78*)* showing that 'no other visual percept is recognized or reacted to in the same reliable manner as the human face' *(70).* Yet if one considers the intricate complexity of even such a fundamentally simple reaction as the smiling response, one will have to conclude that from the earliest quasi-reflex transactions onward, a magnificent progress of coördinative and associative organization must have taken place in order to achieve this first manifest signal of social communication.

Suitable observation pushes the timing of the earliest active communicative transactions to earlier and earlier junctures. 'From the very beginning, the baby appreciates the aliveness of the mother' *(73,* p. 48*).* This implies that the problem of the psychic organization *in statu nascendi* will have to be carefully and suitably formulated in order not to distract us from blatantly obvious clinical facts such as the report concerning a boy

whose young mother had helped to establish early contact from the first day of his birth *(Ibid.,* p. 6*)*. After each feeding, he would lie awake in the quiet of the room. 'Before he was a week old, he began to catch hold of her fingers *and to look up in her direction'* (Cf. also Mead, in *67,* p. 227, ff.*)*. Visual fixation patterns are present, if 'uncoördinated and aimless', at birth. 'On the first day of life, incipient fixation of a near approaching object can be observed' *(53,* p. 58*)*. The time of their onset was seen as early as four hours after birth *(48)*.

A challenge for research emerges with these findings in the question: What exactly is the average expected environment for the human neonate? Does an interaction akin to imprinting occur within the first hours of life? The proximity of the mother and perhaps the imprint of a human face may well constitute the primeval message indelibly marked as the backdrop of all human experience. Too little is known of the factors that influence the setting up of earliest communication between the neonate and his environment. The present study indicates that communication starts early, that it is complex from the beginning, and relies on reciprocal interaction using synesthetic configurational messages. The possible single factors are as yet insufficiently investigated. From the rural and primitive circumstances of nativity in the past, a change has taken place in the modern surroundings of glaringly lighted stereotyped cots and cribs. By presetting the organism toward the requirements of later human interaction, the new environment may influence or interfere with the later establishment of communication. Disturbances of the relation with either animate or inanimate objects are known to occur relatively early in life. A three-year-old girl related to only inanimate objects. Her eyes, unfocused, seemed to look through, rather than at, one. 'Her body was flaccid and her voice had a curious sameness, a questioning lilting quality.' In the first twenty-four days of life she had been exposed to severe deprivation followed by intense distress lasting for the first few months *(61)*. Another report concerns a premature infant who became an autistic child. In moments of anxiety, he would turn to bright sources of light as if for

comfort. Unfortunately the full report was unavailable for the present study (Cf. *63*). Edith Buxbaum *(9)* quoted a more recent report from Yale University Clinic of an infant who could relate only to animated beings. This may indicate that children become unable to transfer their relations to the inanimate objects of primary fetishism once their necessary physiological symbiotic relation with the mother is disturbed (Cf. *74, 76*).

At these earliest stages only precursors of later ego feelings can be assumed in the infant. The feelings of animation that belong to the main concern of the present study appear at a later stage than the ability to communicate. This may be assumed since the feelings of animation relate to at least an incipient ego organization, whereas communication operates from the outset. In this context the animated feelings, their projection in early communication, and the beginnings of the ego and of the 'self' that express themselves in the communication appear in their relationship. The self was termed 'a constant in all interchange with the environment. When it disintegrates, the perception of and the relationship with the environment disintegrate too' *(52,* p. 77, ff.). The child's reactions to his own body, e.g., if 'the hand is put into the mouth in order to relieve oral tension', are early observable sequences that indicate the onset of these integrative ego functions. However, this study as well as observation reminds one that, long before motor control serves to reduce tension by enabling the infant to use part of himself as a substitute source of gratification, there operates an integrative factor in the neonate, more reliably constant and focal than the self, namely, the 'incorporated' experience of the total mothering situation, including possibly the visual imprint of the human face *(73)*. Our methods of recording, comparing, and following up observations of these stages will have to be adapted carefully to include the observer's activities, since he enters the observed phenomenon in a more than metaphoric meaning of the word.

The same applies in the observation and evaluation of the nursing mother's role in molding the precursors of the infant's personality. The total nursing situation, its personages and

events, constitute a complex unity. This setting is reflected in the earliest impressions, leaving their trace on later development. The entire picture must be viewed as an integral part of the earliest phase of life. Taking the infant out of this context results in observations on an artifact, namely, the isolated infant. Winnicott *(73,* p. 199*)*, who examined these interactions in a different context, writes: 'Every happy person is in infinite debt to a woman. Acknowledging this debt will result in a lessening in ourselves of fear. If our society delays making acknowledgment of this absolute dependence, there must remain a block both to progression and regression, a block that is based on fear. . . . There are therefore good social reasons for instigating research into the very early stages of the infant-mother relationship.' As viewed here, the two blocks of fear operate at the two pivotal points of projective identification: first, the primeval projection that links the neonate to his mother; second, the mature adult identification that could yet unite a true brotherhood of man. The sources of this fear may well reside in the lack of conditions suitable to activate and induce the reciprocal symbol function in the neonate, a function instrumental in establishing the link of communication in the circle as well as in the cycle of life. Balint *(4,* p. 131*)* writes: '. . . all mankind aim at—and are afraid of—the same ultimate satisfaction, the restoration of the harmonious mix-up with the environment . . .'. Even in ideal conditions, this bond of identification and human communication would have to contend with the destructive forces shown by Freud to be incessantly at work in devaluating and dissolving the human image *(43,* p. 122*)*. 'But in spite of all these difficulties, we may expect that one day someone will venture to embark upon a pathology of cultural communities' *(Ibid.,* p. 144*)*. The scrutiny of endopsychic processes in their relation to behavior in groups and to the general rules of human interaction will have to reckon with the tremendous difficulties of communicating information across the interdisciplinary frontiers. The elaborated results carry the seeds of overconceptualization and overreification. Thus the processes of identification *(*Cf. *19,*

p. 97) present us with the problem of involving more than one person's endopsychic processes. Reciprocal or complementary role patterning, reflected in people who participate in social groups, is described as taking place in such a way that '. . . corresponding to an external object . . . is an internalized object, . . . the reciprocal pattern is internalized *simply* [italics added] in the sense that it becomes a pattern of organization of behavior' (Parsons in *3*, p. 66). However, 'it is more than just a metaphoric way of saying it. The internalization takes place through a . . . set of images . . . reflected in the unconscious in the form of *actually* [italics added] swallowing the object' (Zilboorg in *3*, p. 66). In this connection, a study on the imagery of Madonna and Child through the centuries was quoted, showing that the represented relation changes with the period in characteristic fashion. Sir James Spence *(68)* wrote: 'The mother and child subject favored by the medieval painters has been replaced by the baby and bottle of the modern photographic poster'. Warning that 'remote results' may derive from artificially disturbing the 'miraculous physiological arrangement' of the earliest period of life, Sir James advocated breast feeding and thought that the family doctor should become a 'focus of education for young mothers', since the problems of child rearing were connected with those of the 'nomadic societies now to be seen in some industrial towns', both forming a challenge to our understanding (Cf. also *56*). This study, too, points to a possible connection between earliest impressions and the conditions of growing stereotypy in social relations. The mechanization of human expression, the anonymity of suffering and of charity, as well as that of destructive aggression, are making of true communication a curiosity, rapidly to be replaced by the merely external mechanics of organization.

> We made the robots' faces all alike!
> A hundred thousand faces, all alike . . .
> . . . it's like a nightmare! . . . *(10)*.

The wealth of personages in E.T.A. Hoffmann's Tales was traced by the poet to the manifold impressions during a journey

in a post coach as an infant still at his mother's breast. Freud quoted this because he felt that it was insufficiently realized that 'the strongest obsessive influence derives from those experiences which the child undergoes at a time when we have reason to believe his psychical apparatus to be incompletely fitted for accepting them' *(47,* pp. 161-162*)*. The term *Aufnahme,* used in comparing this receptivity (*Aufnahmefähigkeit*) with 'taking' a snapshot, effectively conveys the distinction between the earliest 'take' (Cf. 'prehension' [*8,* p. 21]) and later 'perceiving' receptivity. The latter is made discerning by the operation of preconscious defenses, while the former consists in defenseless exposure to and the taking in of impressions that profoundly alter subsequent experience. The creative imagination of the painter, Segantini, also originated in early experience *(2)*. An orphan at five years of age, he had been so weak at birth 'that he had to be baptized before the appointed time'. After giving birth to him, his mother had contracted a weakness from which she later died. Segantini cherished the memory of her image all through life. 'A rose aroused in him a sensual feeling . . . he was overpowered by the vision of a rosy youthful face. . . . A large flower, clearly silhouetted against the bright blue sky . . . grew to gigantic size before his eyes and took on the attractive human forms of a young woman holding a child.' Tracing the deeply regressive ambivalent emotions in the picture, Hell of the Voluptuaries, Abraham *(2)* foreshadowed the psychoanalytic understanding of surrealism. As an instance of sublimation in which the libidinal balance resembles the conditions of the latency period, we know that the early quest for sexual knowledge may turn into a quest for general knowledge, thereby evading repression *(26, 28)*. Carried over into the period of maturity, this would lead to conditions where research would come to replace love. Thus, Leonardo da Vinci's interests 'embraced the entire realm of letters and science'. He was a voracious reader. Later in life '. . . a new transformation came over him. Still deeper layers of the contents of his mind became active once more. . . . With the help of the oldest of

all his erotic impulses he enjoyed the triumph of once more conquering the inhibition in his art' *(28,* p. 134*).* The sources of art stem from earliest origins. Its creation is complemented by contemplation and appreciation. Freud, admiring Michelangelo's Moses, re-creates the tide of emotion and movement that precedes the attitude immortalized in the sculpture. '. . . An almost oppressively solemn calm emanated from it . . .'. '. . . He has added something new and more than human to the figure . . . a concrete expression of the highest mental achievement that is possible in a man, that of struggling successfully against an inward passion for the sake of a cause to which he has devoted himself' *(32,* pp. 220, 233*).* The triumph of spirituality over sensuality, the discovery of the mind, the awareness of the animated breath of life, never lost their charm for Freud: 'Now the realm of spirits had opened for man, and he was ready to endow everything in nature with the soul he had discovered in himself. The whole world became animated, and science, coming so much later, had enough to do in disestablishing the former state of affairs and has not yet finished this task' *(47,* p. 146*).* 'To me it seems just as arbitrary to endow the whole of nature with a psyche as radically to deny that it has one at all. Let us grant to nature her infinite variety which rises from the inanimate to the organically animated, from the just physically alive to the spiritual' *(35,* p. 318*).*

> *. . . d'humbles marionettes dont le fil*
> *est aux mains de la Nécessité (5).*

The uncanny effect of deanimation fantasies in E.T.A. Hoffmann's Tales derives from the re-enactment of infantile beliefs and wishes together with their talion punishment *(36; 20,* p. 228*).* Coppelius who works on the hero, Nathaniel, as if on a puppet, unhinging his arms and legs after having magnanimously refrained from blinding him, is the expression of a castration fantasy displaying split-off subsystems of the personality, 're-duplicated, re-edited reincarnations' of the hero's divided father imago: Spallanzani-Coppola. The hero loses true love by loving

but himself in Olympia, the automated doll, a 'materialization of Nathaniel's feminine orientation toward his father in early childhood'. The fleeting return of a rejected opinion originally held in infancy explains the emergence of a feeling tone much better than the 'uncertainty whether an object is living or inanimate, which admittedly applied to the doll' *(20,* p. 230*)*. Other sources of the uncanny, the duplication partition and exchange of the ego and the return of identical features through several generations, go back to times when the ego was not yet completely detached from the nonego. Seen from this vantage point, Schreber's *hingewunderte, flüchtig hingemachte Männer* are understandable as shadowy remnants of former personal relationships *(29,* p. 68*)*. The archaic libidinal upsurge invested in their endopsychic representations transforms the surrounding persons into threatening symbols of instinctual drives. This threat is bound by throwing into action countervailing repressive forces. The resulting libidinal balance is achieved at the price of partially deanimating these bystanders. Should the countercathexis falter or the libidinal onslaught prevail, an experience of disintegration ensues, perceived as the world cataclysm experience, that appears as the alternative of the deanimation syndrome *(29,* p. 73*)*.[1]

[1] I am grateful to Dr. William G. Niederland for calling my attention to the observations of Dr. Margaret S. Mahler on deanimation phenomena in infants and children. Further research may be necessary for a full understanding of the conditions that cause the syndrome to persist or to reappear in the adult. For the problem of libidinal balance in these conditions, *cf.* Elkisch, F. B. and Mahler, Margaret S.: Precursors of the 'Influencing Machine'. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XIV.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1959, p. 223.

For concepts of the mother-infant symbiosis and the perception of mother's gestalt, *cf.* Mahler, Margaret S.: On Sadness and Grief in Infancy and Childhood. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. VII.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1953, p. 258.

A theoretical survey appeared in the *Symposium on Psychotic Object Relationships.* Int. J. Psa., XLI, 1960, p. 548, ff.

The role of vivid early memories, reproduced in Schreber's psychotic experiences, was expounded by Dr. Niederland. They reflect the severely traumatic father-son relationship, reiterated in the psychotic 'gadget-experience'. *Cf.* The

In these examples [footnote 1], the disturbance of ego feeling manifested in deanimation experiences results from insoluble conflict between part entities demarcated within the psychic apparatus. A similar interpretation explains ghosts, visions, and apparitions *(1)*. These images interact with each other in the manner in which their infantile prototypes were felt to act. The resulting, sensitively variable balance of forces operates in the framework of defense mechanisms. Anna Freud writes: '. . . identification and projection are normal activities of the ego and their results vary greatly according to the material upon which they are employed' *(22,* p. 129*)*. Early in life, projection may operate as a defense *(Ibid.,* p. 55*)*, it may alternate with introjection in the impersonation of the aggressor without identification proper *(Ibid.,* p. 117, ff.*)*, and in puberty, with the consolidation of the inner psychic agencies; it accounts for the brilliantly sharp abstract thought at a time of personal fickleness and callousness. Disclaiming his early allegiances, the adolescent may live with his own family as if with strangers *(Ibid.,* p. 182*)*. This withdrawal from object relations rests on partial repressions (Cf. *28, 46)*. Under the influence of superego conflict, outward affective damping and unstable identification marks the damage in the carrying capacity of the communication channels.

Thus, the endopsychic agencies must have become sufficiently permanent to cause longer lasting disruptions of experiences and perception. Affects and emotions, turned ego-dystonic through the agency of superego conflict, may divest the split-off, partially independent segments of the personality of their animated quality. These more or less coherent parts of the experiencing person, represented as stable inner virtual objects, evoke variations of ego feeling ranging from depersonalization to feelings of unreality and of deanimation (Cf. *74)*.

'Miracled-up' World of Schreber's Childhood. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XV.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1959, p. 383, ff.; *Three Notes on the Schreber Case.* This QUARTERLY, XX, 1951, pp. 579-591; *Schreber: Father and Son.* This QUARTERLY, XXVIII, 1959, pp. 151-169.

Freud described unreality feelings that pointed to a personal conflict of this type *(46)* and showed that the elements of perception kept away from the ego in depersonalization stem from inner experience, while those in unreality feelings relate to meaningful factors from the environment. This study traces the impairment of communication in experiences of deanimation to similar partial repressions, namely, repressions of impulses of projection normally generated in the service of identification. Fenichel describes the libidinal balance in depersonalization as 'due to a special type of defense, namely, to a countercathexis against one's own feelings which had been altered and intensified by a preceding increase in narcissism' *(21,* p. 419*)*. The ego feeling forcibly separated from objectionable ideational representations is strongly denied or repressed. He believes repression and projection are related and states: 'Sometimes repressed ideas are unconsciously felt as objects that have been removed from the ego' *(Ibid.,* p. 149*)*. Estrangement and depersonalization are seen to 'represent a reaction of the ego to the *perception* [italics added] of the increase in narcissistic libido' *(Ibid.,* p. 420*)*. A review of concepts of early narcissism would lead beyond the present frame of reference. However, it is clear that one is led to regard the earliest experience as occurring without feeling of localization, within the representational space of 'harmonious mix-up' *(4)* and under the influence of the mother's features as the main structured organizer. From this primeval undifferentiated experience, the ego feeling is gradually built up for those endopsychic events that, by their autochthonous motor control, are felt to originate within the experiencing infant. The ego feeling emerges in the wake of experiences in which the primeval fusion within the common preceptive continuum of mother-child unity recedes in favor of early proprioceptions accompanied by sensations due to the interplay of protagonistic-antagonistic somatic impulses originating within the infant *(39,* pp. 17, 25, 46*)*. Thus the concept that intrapsychic tension is perceived as an 'inside something' before an 'outside something' can be found to quiet

the tension *(21,* p. 35*)* must be qualified. This study encourages one to stress that both tension and relief occur in the primeval inchoate experience. Only later is the discovery made that part of the experienced events are amenable to the early stirrings of subjective control. These are the sensations from which the ego feeling of later life derives. Thus a primeval archaic structuring process and a minimum of differentiation between the whole of inchoate experience and that part of it which is 'ego' precedes the slightly later state in which the instinctual need is perceived as an 'inner' tension to be assuaged only by an 'outer' object or its hallucinated replacement. 'It may well be that, before its sharp cleavage into an ego and an id, and before the formation of a superego, the mental apparatus makes use of different methods of defense from those which it employs after it has reached these stages of organization' *(41,* p. 164; cf. p. 77, ff.*)*. But Freud noted the specific difficulties in the scientific elaboration of these early feelings; e.g., the feeling of indissoluble bondage to the surrounding world which, for him, had more the character of an intellectual insight, albeit not without a feeling tone to go with it. Comparably, the boundary between the self and the object threatens to dissolve at the height of amorous infatuation. Initially, the ego contains everything *(43,* p. 68*)*. Later, the ego detaches itself from the environment by demarcating the outer world. In many persons the primal ego feeling is preserved as the oceanic feeling. Freud was disinclined to interpret this beyond the longing of the helpless child for his father. Thus the role of the oceanic feeling, perchance to reinstate a condition of unrestrained narcissism, was 'pushed away from the foreground'. For the time being, whatever else *(*Cf. *44; 45,* p. 226*)* hid beneath that helplessness remained shrouded in mist *(43,* p. 72*)*. Nevertheless, 'the primal condition in which object libido and ego libido cannot be distinguished' had already been compared much earlier with 'real happy love', a notable source of marked variations of the ego feeling *(33,* p. 100; *4,* p. 131*)*.

Although some earlier ideas will have to be repeated, a re-

view of the processes involved in the ego feeling is now indicated. In the primal undifferentiated state, introjection and concomitant projection of the archaic primordial experience operate in inextricable continuity; introjection, in the sense that the organism is as yet undefended or insufficiently defended against stimulation and its direct impact; projection, in the sense that whatever experience does take place must be conceived as 'located' in the unbounded archaic representational space *(4,* p. 62*)*. Soon, however, there occur in this unbounded 'protopsyche' not only stimuli that originate in the environment and subside on their own, but also stimuli that can be made to subside by felt activities. Gradually these become steered by proprioceptive motor control, the precursor of later coördination. Moreover, endogenous stimuli, unsuitable for tension-free discharge, can only be bound within the organism. Some examples will illustrate these processes. A light, for instance, may come and go. It may also be made to subside by closing the eyelids. Similarly, a pressure felt on the body surface may recede by itself or may subside concomitant to felt motor events. More striking, if slightly more complex, are the sequences of irritation and stimulation in the wake of autochthonous impulses. The infant's nails, for instance, may be sunk in his own cheek. The antagonistic impulse, able to counteract the irritation, proprioceptively registered, furthers the feeling that the whole event is autochthonous. Thus, from the boundless 'protopsychic' representation, the ego becomes differentiated by phenomena of autochthonous restraint of endogenous excitations. For this, the initial projections that suffice to 'locate' the experience in the unbounded protopsychic space have to be controlled by inhibitions. This balanced control of projections constitutes the binding of the ego feeling *(*Cf. *37,* pp. 30-31*)*. Gradually, the stimulus and impulse clusters are grouped in two categories: first, those where projection persists and the experience becomes located 'there'; second, those where projection is bound, locating the experience as within the experiencing organism. Attention lingers on events

made ambiguous by belonging to both the outer and the inner world; they help to establish a felt boundary between the two groups of stimulation. For a considerable time, the perception of reality continues to rely on projections and introjections, observable, for instance, in the phenomena of ideational motility *(27,* p. 192*)*. For the purpose of adaptation, these mechanisms have to be kept active as well as subjected to partial restraining inhibition. Furthermore, the ordering of sensations through the organismic structure reminds one that, in a certain sense, the psychic apparatus is engaged in the processing of inflowing information. But long before organizing even the earliest archaic perception *(60, 66)*, the organism already by its very existence is expressive of its own condition and generates information coded in the idiom of transient configurations *to which its average expectable environment has become attuned through evolution (16)*. The neonate is self-expressive from the moment of birth. His ability to interpret the world must be elicited and activated. Thereafter, for him, the projection of sensations not bound in the ego marks them as belonging to the environment. Gradually, here too a distinction takes place. The alloy of projection and introjection leading to identification is confirmed and kept 'critical' by communications from those who are in reciprocal relations with the child. Thus all things that belong to the environment are felt as 'there'. But those that do *not respond* evoke in the infant an inhibition of the impulses of expressive activity and their projection. Similar to the balanced inhibition by which the self detaches itself from the rest of the world, balanced inhibition of communicative impulses gradually permits distinguishing the *things* 'there' from an outside world at first indiscriminately animated through the projection of expressive activity. Thereafter projection and partial identification through concomitant introjections have to be maintained, but only in regard to animated *beings*. They must be restrained with regard to *things* that now become more 'objectively' perceived. The subject is less involved if his impulses of animation are thus

restrained. The objects are now perceived as constant and merely existent, not like the transient expressive, ever-changing features of *beings*. This view takes into account that the neonate is a source of activity from the beginning, generating and emitting impulses even as he gathers stimuli and sensations. Adaptive as well as expressive impulses have to be bound in order to demarcate the ego and in order to establish and confirm the ego boundary. Expressive impulses must be only selectively bound in order to demarcate the thinglike objects from the early, indiscriminately animated world. Much later, a renewed similar binding of expressive as well as manipulative motor impulses sets in; this leads to the endopsychic experience of true ideational configurations that are not 'real' in the thinglike objective sense; for example, a triangle (Cf. *12*). These derealized and deanimated configurations are the ideational entities of abstract thought. *Pari passu*, the human being learns to create the set of real symbols of seen and heard language. Ego feelings ranging through the whole spectrum here exposed are generated in association with any of the stimulus clusters just envisaged. Their survey, starting from the earliest undifferentiated states of the organism, through the psychosexual phases of childhood, and up to latency and early maturity, demonstrates their uninterrupted activity in the field of living communication.

SUMMARY

The investigation of the specific clinical syndrome, here defined and called the deanimation syndrome, leads to the elucidation of a clearly distinguished perceptive function. This is the ego function of intuitively perceiving and communicating with animated beings, of which the environment in part consists. The scrutiny of the perceptive performance therein engaged reveals that in the service of communication there operates an incessant activity of projection, probably induced at a period when the earliest functions that maintain life are also activated. Communication thus emerges as an essential,

at present, irreducible quality of the animated state, experienced in the adult as a strong feeling of belonging, and in the archaic unbounded primeval experience of the infant as symbiotic fusion with the mother. In the course of maturation, the projective activity undergoes partial repressions at three clearly defined developmental stages: the ego boundary consolidation, the primal-scene fantasy, and the repressions of the passing of the œdipal phase. Pathological distortion of these partial repressions is responsible for prepsychotic experiences of deanimation as well as for anal-sadistic deanimation phenomena. These are disruptive of human communication, since they destroy identification and deface the human image. Normally, however, if the first two stages are concluded in a reality-adapted libidinal balance, then the œdipal repressions merely serve to safeguard the advent of the latency period, and the intrapsychic representational idiom of the primary process is replaced by the symbolic representational system of rational thought, by which the secondary process attunes endopsychic imagery to the word representations of language. The rich intuitive animistic relation to the primitive world subsides. The state of close belonging, in which ego boundaries as well as object demarcations are blurred and fluctuating, is gradually replaced by the more distant, objective attitude of knowledge and science: objects emerge detached from their affective and emotional connotations—a process related to the isolation of affect. This process reflects the anthropological and historical development of writing. From its origins in magic pictorial representation and through its progress toward pictographic and ideographic script, writing suffered a deanimation of its own that led to the stereotyped signs and characters of the alphabet *(7,* p. 62*)*. Thus, the libidinal impulses and projective processes, activated early in life by the mother, are invested, after the passing of the œdipus complex, in communication by way of rigid stereotyped configurations. These convey meaning by their variation within the limits set by the structure of language. At the conclusion of the latency period, identification

resumes a leading role, now within a higher level of organization, and facilitates group cohesion and the alloerotic attachments of this period.

In clinical psychiatry, a group of schizoid states can now be set apart, in which experiences of isolation and deanimation predominate. They differ from paranoid prepsychotic states in the clinical picture and in the psychodynamic balance. In deanimation states, there is less disintegration of personality and less disruption of coherence in thought and speech. There may be more anxiety than in true psychotic states, since the separateness and isolation are keenly felt. By contrast, the schizophrenic condition effectively isolates the patient, who need not necessarily be aware of this. The strong feeling of aloneness in deanimation often causes the patient to seek help and so renew his contacts with the world. The psychodynamic balance in deanimation consists either in increased repressive attempts or in an ebbing of the libidinal flow. The syndrome appears, therefore, occasionally as a sign of exhaustion of somatic origin, such as strain and overwork in adolescents. In therapy one may concentrate on the restoration of the metabolic balance through anabolic measures. If the circumstances of the onset point to increased repressions rather than decreased libidinal claims, this may indicate an attempt to put up defenses against an increasing libidinal demand, felt as a threat of breakdown. In such cases rest and sedation usually enable the patient to rally sooner than could be expected in true beginning psychotic breakdown. The differential diagnosis is reflected in the prognostic chances and in the therapeutic indication. In psychoanalytic treatment, one gains insight regarding the symbolic meaning of the printed page, an open book, a letter, etc. They signify a reference to the human face, usually the face of the mother, with an indication of an age level of the early postœdipal period or latency. Frequently patients in analysis show a surprising keenness of vision that enables them to read the titles of books at a distance. This sign, as well as compulsive reading or other associations related to the deanimation syn-

drome, may refer to wishes and memory images of reciprocal communication with the mother or her later substitutes; and the interpretation, as always, will have to take into account the context of defense, resistance, and transference. As for research, the present findings point to the need to elucidate the optimal expected environment for the neonate and the very young infant. This may help to clarify the problems of infantile autism as well as phenomena of identification in twins and the vicissitudes of the earliest object relations. Finally, further study of the link between early symbiotic identification and later reality-adapted, social functioning may help us toward a clearer understanding of human relations and of their disruption by the malaises of social fragmentation, loneliness, and isolation, and by other antisocial trends, all of which point to disturbances in the ability to communicate.

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EXAGGERATION AS A DEFENSE

BY OTTO E. SPERLING, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Heinrich Heine introduced a device in his poems of expressing emotion with great passion and genuine feeling, and then surprising the reader with a prosaic or even cynical last line. This device in poetry is called romantic irony. Some may feel that Heine was insincere from the beginning, but others (with better reason) conclude that the poet has expressed the contrary aspects of his personality. The expression of passion always precedes the sobering countertheme. This sequence seems illustrative of a conflict in which the ego gains control of an id derivative. This is a tenable hypothesis for poetry. It is possible, however, to come to a definite conclusion from the analysis of a similar clinical phenomenon, namely, the sequence of exaggerated passion and sudden sobriety.

The first three patients to be described had an awareness that their feelings were not genuine, and they often accused themselves of hypocrisy. None was a schizophrenic.

CASE 1

The first group of examples stems from the analysis of a twenty-eight-year-old piano teacher who suffered from obsessional brooding and vacillation in her ability to work. She was intelligent, fanatically truthful, and a good observer of herself. Her pupils liked her and she made a good impression on most people. On closer observation, it was apparent that her vivacity was an overcompensation for her inhibitions. Her speech was hurried with the intent of preventing the analyst from saying anything that she might not like. Her manner and her smile

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were constrained, and she habitually drew up her shoulders. An only child, she lived throughout her childhood in a household which was comprised of her parents and her maternal grandparents. The mother and the grandparents were simple, strongly religious, severely inhibited people. The mother was blindly obedient to her parents and, after their death, to her husband. The father was an atheist, intelligent, witty, often maliciously so, liberal both with his money and in his marital infidelities. The patient was silently disdainful of her mother who pretended ignorance.

At three years of age, the patient was much admired for her brightness. In public school she was inhibited; although she learned easily, she became obsessed with doubts about being a moron. At nine she developed scruples about lying; if she had lied, her parents would die. She doubted whether she had gargled enough to protect her parents from dying of cholera.

She chose her profession after deliberating that even a moron could succeed in it, a notion which precluded her achieving any virtuosity. When, at twenty-seven, she gave promise of attaining some success, she first contracted tenosynovitis in her hands, later, muscular rheumatism, and finally, arthritis. Her physician advised psychoanalysis, during which the symptoms disappeared and were still absent after thirty-three years.

At twenty she fell in love. She continued this relationship—despite her parents' disapproval—and was capable of some sexual enjoyment but without orgasm. She struggled with impulses to be unfaithful to her lover and suspected him of faithlessness which she was afraid to try to substantiate. In a theater with him, she feared that he might fall from the balcony; the sound of an automobile horn suggested to her that he might have been run over.

One day she said derisively: 'Why am I so inhibited with others, while here I am able to express so many ideas? What other people say about me is important to me, but I don't care what you say.' This she quickly amended, 'I say this only to please you; it really isn't so'. The attitude of superior imperviousness

to the analyst was feigned, but the derision was real. As a result she continued to believe that she had no resistances. Her positive transference was similarly ambiguous. After making the plea, with appropriate affect, 'I don't want to go away; please send the patient home who waits outside; I want to have you alone to myself', she would continue impersonally: 'I'm only playing a part; I'm just behaving as if I were in love with you. What I really want is for you to fall in love with me as I do with every man I meet, and as I do with my pupils. When I once heard that an analytic patient could fall in love with her doctor, I immediately decided that I'd lay a trap for the doctor.'

When she gained some conviction that I represented her hated father, there followed a number of fantasies and dreams in which I was poisoned, shot, hit by an automobile, and tortured by her unfaithfulness. She had a fantasy of biting off my penis which she amended: 'It looks as if I had deliberated all day how to torture you most; but I say those things only because you expect them of me; all this hatred is put on'.

She overcame a strong reluctance against saying the word 'fart' which her grandmother had used. She repeated it three times. Later she reported that her father had not washed his hands after using the bathroom. When he cleaned his dentures, it reminded her of playing with feces. 'I behave', she said, 'as if I took pleasure in speaking about these things'.

She had had severe quarrels with her father in which she would tell him hatefully that she would not let him cheat her as he had cheated her mother; she was aware of all his tricks. Had she more income she would move out of the house immediately so she would not have to look at him. To herself she argued that she had deceived him; he believed that she hated him. He did not recognize that this hatred was a pretense. Although she continued to love him, he became convinced that she hated him, and he reacted accordingly. After she reached the age of forty-eight, the hatred prevailed.

The mechanism here is one in which, even before it can be perceived and evaluated, hatred is grotesquely distorted and

in this form is so ego alien that it is felt as hypocrisy. Although it is in fact the exaggerated expression of a real emotion, it is easy to overlook the core of truth in a tissue of lies. Exaggeration was this patient's characteristic mechanism of defense, used against pressures from the outside as well as against id and superego demands.

In these examples we see how resistances, positive and negative transference, and gross anal-sadistic fantasies were given utterance, then retracted as false and denied recognition.

At the age of seven, the patient had been told, by the girl who was her best friend, that she was a moron. From that time, she was very sensitive in this respect. Whenever her teacher said to a chattering schoolgirl, 'Sit with Emily. She is quiet', the patient felt sure the teacher meant that she was a moron. Whenever she heard people whisper in her presence, she wondered whether they were not saying this, too. In the analysis, she showed an unusual deftness in misinterpreting comments of the psychoanalyst in this regard: all this despite the fact that she led her classes in school, was generally well-informed, and impressed others as having unusual intelligence and ability to participate in discussions of difficult topics. She once shunned the recital of the foremost piano virtuoso because the fact that he played better than she did might make her angry. She expected that analysis would enable her to become a genius. Once she said: 'If I were not a moron, I could be a genius'.

To be a moron was, for her, to be a woman and to be cheated like her mother; in addition, it was punishment for masturbation. Her exaggerated self-depreciation forced reassuring denials and compliments from her parents and others. It was no accident that she had chosen for proclaiming her feelings of inferiority just that aspect of her personality which had been extolled in her childhood. To her real shortcomings, however, she was completely blind and her exaggerated self-esteem was not easily affected by criticism. In contrast to the previous examples, her ego was less beset by threats from unconscious instinctual drives than by criticisms by her superego. These

were reduced to absurdity by exaggeration: 'What do you want of me; what more can I do than to regard myself as a moron?'. By this device she functioned with little effective self-criticism and preserved her colossal self-esteem. This patient acquired the mechanism of exaggeration from her mother who used to say to her when she was a child: 'Go ahead, hit your mother. I probably do not deserve any better.'

CASE II

The mechanism of exaggeration as a defense against the superego is even more evident in the case of a twenty-three-year-old man who, when he first came for treatment, held a minor political position which he had obtained through the influence of his father. He was a mixture of gross masculinity and neurotic shyness. He was persuasive and sly but by reactions of blushing or pallor betrayed a striking vulnerability. For three years he had been obsessed, whenever he looked at his father's tie pin, with the tormenting doubt, 'Don't you wish he were dead so you could have the tie pin?'. Knives and other cutting instruments obsessed him with the fantasy of killing his father—all of which caused him to be depressed, feel guilty, and entertain thoughts of suicide. A trip to Italy provided a respite, but soon after his return, the father died of coronary thrombosis. In order not to be conspicuous, the son had to assume a semblance of grief he did not feel. He cried and told his mother outright that he felt no grief; that he had driven his father to his death by his obsessions; that he had, in effect, murdered his father—and so on, with endless self-recrimination. He was readily comforted by his mother's reassurances and temporarily relieved of his feelings of guilt. His dramatic exaggeration of remorse was a defense against his superego and served to obscure his hatred for his father. Later, he accused himself of having wished his father dead and debated abstaining (as atonement) from association with his girl friend with whom he had a platonic relationship. He sought help from a priest with whom he had an extended psychotherapy and to whom he confessed his sins, but with no relief from his feelings of guilt.

His father, a pious Catholic, quarreled violently with the patient and his mother and was then deeply remorseful. At three the boy was already inhibited and self-accusatory about eating. At five, the boy suffered from asthma which subsided whenever his mother took him into her bed. In school he was ritually conscientious and unhappy. At thirteen, he was obsessionally self-accusatory about cursing, fighting, and masturbating. He was seduced at this age by his older sister to masturbate her; and prior to that, he had indulged in mutual anal masturbation with boys. He made the ritual confession of his sins twice to make sure he had included everything. At eighteen, he had obsessional fears that his nocturnal emissions could cause his sister to become pregnant.

Quite upset during one hour, he restrained his tears with difficulty and declared: 'I am very common . . . I shall never have a friend . . . I don't deserve to have anybody love me . . . I'll never be able to atone for what I have done'. Toward the end of the hour, he interrupted himself and said flatly, 'Now I have faked enough. I'd better tell you what really happened.' He had been with his girl friend who suddenly started to cry and accused him of being selfish. For the past five years, he had seen her regularly but could not make up his mind to marry. No one knew this better than the patient. Still, the result of the forced contrition in the analysis was his conviction that his remorse had no basis in reality. 'It is not true', he said, 'that I made her unhappy; she was probably just hysterical'. In this way he disposed of his guilt, his remorse for tormenting the girl by his indecisiveness, and naturally saved himself from making the decision.

CASE III

Another patient, a woman, dreamed: 'My sister was standing behind me, pressing against me. She was masturbating herself in that way. At that moment I had an orgasm.' On the day before, her sister had said, 'I don't understand how you can lie in bed so long. If I stay in bed a long time, I have to masturbate.' There had never been an experience of mutual mastur-

bation with her sister. In fact, her relationship with her sister was rather hostile. When this dream, in connection with previous material, was interpreted as an expression of her unconscious homosexuality, the patient recalled additional experiences with her girl friends but emphasized that she felt only disgust for her sister. At home after the analytic hour, she threw herself on her bed and cried until her sister returned. She greeted her with tears and accusations: 'It's all your fault. I'm so unhappy. I'm a pervert. How unlucky for me to have fallen in love with you! Now I know why I haven't married up to now. You monster! I'm moving out. I don't want to stay with you one day longer. I would rather spend the night under the bridge than under the same roof with you.' Finally, she was quieted by her sister's reassurances. The next day she could declare with a clear conscience, 'Your suggestion concerning homosexuality lasted until evening; then I found out there was no truth in it'.

Exaggeration as a means of devaluating interpretations is an everyday experience. After all, it is to be expected that a mechanism which plays so important a role in the symptomatology of compulsion neurosis should manifest itself in the analytic situation.

Using the term exaggeration implies that a true representation is possible. In the visual field a wax model or a drawing could be a true rendering of a subject. A caricature, however, has a true portrait as its basis but, by relatively small distortions, serves another purpose, i.e., that of ridiculing the subject *(12)*. Exaggeration begins as the genuine expression of an emotion or an attitude but the accretion of manifest distortions reveals that the purpose has imperceptibly changed, and there finally is a gross disproportion between the situation and the affect. Although no objective measurement of this disproportion exists, the psychiatrist can trust his clinical judgment.[1]

When the patient says, 'This is hypocrisy', and the analyst

[1] It is scarcely necessary to note here the differences from the flatness of affect or of the intrapsychic ataxia in schizophrenia, familiar to every psychiatrist.

responds, 'It is exaggeration', he emphasizes that there is a substantial kernel of truth in what the patient has said. The comparison may be made to the interpretation of lying. Helene Deutsch *(3)* has demonstrated that in pseudologia, despite all the distortions, something that really happened is communicated. Many lies still betray the truth to the psychoanalyst in spite of the intention of the liar to deny it. The same is true of hypocrisy. Lying is deception by verbal or nonverbal communication; hypocrisy is deception about the true nature of one's person by pretending that one's feelings, values, or attitudes are other than one knows them to be. In his fight against hypocrisy, Nietzsche enjoyed tearing off the mask, emphasizing the difference between the surface and what is behind it; but the psychoanalyst finds the content of what the patient feels to be hypocrisy sufficiently revelatory of what it is supposed to hide.

Ferenczi *(5)* described a phase which occurs in the child between the time of his original amorality and the development of the superego, in which every instinctual renunciation and every acceptance of displeasure are clearly connected with the feeling of hypocrisy. Something similar occurs in the reactions of many patients to interpretations until the analysis of resistances and of the transference neurosis permits their assimilation.

On this subject, Winterstein *(20)*, following Federn's *(4)* concept of depersonalization as a condition in which the ego boundary is not cathected with narcissistic libido, has proposed that depersonalization is the extreme case of doubt in the genuineness of one's feelings. In the cases which I have described, the ego boundary was not so fully cathected as in genuine feelings but neither was it so void of cathexis as in depersonalization. Bergler *(1, 2)* suggested that, in every case of hypocrisy, there is a fight between the ego and the superego. He traced this defense to a tyrannical father who would value lip service more than inner conviction: 'The result was masochistic submission and pesudoacceptance, which carried retaliation in the form of hypocrisy toward the tyrant. The superego follows the pattern

of the educator who tyrannically enforces his rules with no regard as to whether the acceptance is real or feigned. The ego then outsmarts the superego through pseudoacceptance.'

Looking for reasons for the choice of exaggeration as a defense, Pumpian-Mindlin *(14)* suggested the possibility that the parents were polar opposites and therefore offered great difficulty for identification. This difference, however, is beneficial because it facilitates the establishment of masculine or feminine identity. It is a fact that children can establish a superego (despite differences in the persons who contributed to its formation) which is a sign of the strength of the synthetic function in the ego as well as in the superego. When this synthetic function fails as, for instance, in acute alcoholic hallucinosis, the superego disintegrates and the sources of the superego reappear as acoustic hallucinations.

Here we might pose this question: could not the emotional outburst, followed by sobriety, be a natural sequence, a characteristic of the functioning of the human mind? Ungratified instinctual drives are cumulative while, after gratification, the instinctual drive seems to disappear temporarily. The concept of catharsis is based on the observation that, after an emotional re-enactment, the pathogenic effect of the traumatic experience disappears. Is it necessary to assume an ego mechanism when what happened might be explained without it? Perhaps, in the third patient described, whatever force was behind the regressive homosexual drive was so much diminished after the emotional outburst that her ego was then strong enough to reorganize the personality to its former state. In the cases I have reported here, further analysis and follow-up of some thirty-three years have convinced me that my doubts were unjustified; but it is true that nowadays too many functions are ascribed to the ego.

In Vienna, in the 1920's, I took part in many discussions between individual psychologists and psychoanalysts. The Adlerians regarded everything that a person does as planned, as done for a purpose. We freudians looked for the causes of things; they only for the arrangements done by the individual

according to his life style. It is true that purposes are of secondary importance in the causation of symptoms (the secondary gain), but first there are primary forces which move the person in their direction. If there is a conflict between these primary forces, a compromise is reached, not as a purposive action of the person, but as a result of forces. The Adlerians had fallen victim to teleological thinking. Their thinking had the earmarks of ideas of reference: everything was arranged.

With the development of ego analysis, teleologic thinking has infiltrated psychoanalysis to a much greater degree than before, but we call it ego mechanisms. Now the ego is made responsible for most of the things which happen. The role of the id and of the superego is reduced. Some drive vicissitudes are interpreted as defenses *(11)*. Even the repetition-compulsion is regarded as a device of the ego for mastering traumatic stimuli *(13)*. In my studies on war neurosis, I could not confirm this view *(17)*; rather, I was convinced that the ego, faced with the repetition-compulsion, tries to make the best of it by using it to master the trauma.

The three cases here reported convinced me that exaggeration can be an ego mechanism, but a careful analysis of other instances of exaggeration brought me to the conclusion that, in most cases, the ego is forced into exaggeration by pressures from the id and the superego. In 1920, Stärcke *(19)* tried to explain the tendency to exaggeration on the part of hysterical women as a symbolization of the unconscious wish to have a bigger genital, namely, a penis. This explanation seems to me an unfair generalization from secondary meanings in special cases; but just as one-sided would be an attempt to explain exaggeration as an ego function or an ego mechanism. It is a much more comprehensive and ubiquitous phenomenon.

Exaggeration occurs everywhere in nature. Phylogenesis is full of examples. Development of a characteristic like the saber tooth was exaggerated to such a degree that the species could not survive. The apparent purpose of the saber tooth, survival, was frustrated by the very fact that it became too large. Only an

intelligent mind, which has developed a concept of economy, of an adequate minimum, and of the subordination of the means to an end, can avoid or correct exaggeration. Neither the instinctual drives nor the unconscious part of the superego is influenced by such moderation. Derivatives of the id tend toward exaggeration like everything in nature. It is a tendency of the human ego to impose moderation and economy on our passions; therefore, we find more exaggeration in situations where the ego is weak and fewer where the ego is strong.

Freud *(7)* observed exaggeration in dreams and, before him, Scherner *(15)* and Spitta *(18)*. It is characteristic for psychoanalytic research to look for the kernel of truth even in delusions. The basis of pathological jealousy is sometimes the observation of a change in the responsiveness of the partner. A woman who, in a depression, accused herself of being a prostitute had sensed her lack of feeling for her husband. In the reaction-formation of compulsion neurosis, exaggeration is not an ego mechanism. By its very excess, reaction-formation reveals itself to be a compromise with id derivatives, which might finally lead to a return of the repressed. Hysterical exaggeration, resulting from the overcompensation of the opposite (the hysterical solution of the ambivalence conflict), also acquires the character of exaggeration from the id component.

We see more exaggeration in children than in adults. A six-year-old boy will say to his mother, 'I love you more than Eddy [his brother]. Twice as much. Three times as much. A hundred thousand times. Ten million billion times as much.'

In The Ego and the Id *(9)*, Freud compared the ego to a horseback rider who thinks he directs the horse, whereas he actually has to go where the horse takes him. To use Freud's simile in explaining romantic irony, after the rider has been taken by the horse for some distance, he regains his strength and directs the horse where he wants it to go. Likewise, after the poet has been carried away by a beautiful illusion, he wakes with a start and expresses his underlying, habitual cynicism. The same applies to the mechanism of exaggeration. The patient who was

carried away by her feelings for her sister, when faced with her homosexuality, reconsidered and had, like Freud's rider, the illusion that she was directing the horse all the time.

We have to consider also those cases in which the ego is not in command at all. The analytic investigation of general paresis *(16)* proved that, even in this disease, the mind closes the gaps of psychological causality. The disease appears as a self-punishment for sexual sins and the mind remains master of its fate. We have good reason to doubt the claim of some patients that they had masterminded their experiences by ego mechanisms for a good purpose.

CASE IV

A woman, after the birth of a child, developed an acute schizophrenic psychosis with the delusion that her son was the Saviour and she was the Mother of God. Later she explained that her husband was not his father; she was in conflict with a lover and wanted to get rid of him. She wanted to get away from husband, child, lover, and mother and have complete rest to think things over. 'Every mother thinks that her child is important', she said, 'and will bring happiness not only to her but also to other people. I have only exaggerated what every mother feels anyhow.' It is a triumph of the synthetic function of the ego that even psychotic delusions are integrated by interpreting them as an exaggeration aimed at a practical gain; but this exaggeration is not a mechanism of the ego.

CASE V

An inexperienced girl with neurodermatitis, who was having an extended, platonic love affair with a suitor whom she considered not good enough for marriage and whose love she felt was only a pretense, decided, in order to get rid of him, to have her first sexual intercourse with him. She believed that by pretending to be very passionate she would frighten him away. Later she could not understand how she could have expected this to happen. While Freud *(8, 10)* and Ferenczi *(6)* described the fright-

ening effect on males of sudden exposure of the female body, this girl fooled herself by thinking that her ego was in control, whereas in reality her instinctual drive overpowered not only her actions but also her thinking.

The device of frightening a child into compliance by a show of undisguised id derivatives is sometimes resorted to in his upbringing. A mother, for instance, catching a child playing with matches, may say, 'Go ahead, start a fire! Burn your brother in his crib and your grandmother who cannot run! Kill the whole neighborhood!'. To quell the rebellious attitude of one of his students, the instructor may ask him to take charge and lead the class in a discussion. The expectation is that, after having been faced with the fulfilment of his wish, the person will be better able to control his aggression. This technique is used in child analysis when the analyst assumes the role of the child and the child enacts the analyst, often thereby becoming aware of his unconscious fantasies.

A parallelogram of forces adequately represents the dynamics of the situation in Case V.



Figure 1. Intensity and Direction of Conflicting Forces at a Given Moment in Case V.

For exaggeration as a defense and for the romantic irony, the parallelogram of forces does not suffice; instead, the following diagram is proposed.

As the id derivative (or the superego) finds expression in motility, the ego awakens in order to make a stronger effort. The two forces combine in the mechanism of exaggeration. As a re-



Figure 2. Changes of the Intensity of the Conflicting Forces During the Emotional Episode.

sult, the id derivative (or the superego) finds some gratification and therefore diminishes in strength; at the same time the ego, realizing the danger, gains the strength to puncture the illusion, to dispel the fog of passion or remorse, and thereby triumphs.

There is a similarity between the mechanism of exaggeration and the behavior of the ego in war neurosis *(17)*. After interpreting the trauma as a command, the ego expresses exaggerated obedience; for instance, fainting (being dead), showing fear, etc. Then the ego defends itself against this command and recognizes the absurdity of it. Similarly, in some individuals the ego first obeys the id or superego derivatives, exaggerates them, and then finds it easier to recognize their absurdity.

As a defense, exaggeration is similar to repression in pushing certain ideas out of consciousness, but it is distinguished by the fact that the instinctual drive is acted out. In this respect, exaggeration is similar to the mechanism of undoing. The individual, however, defends himself, not by a second action which should undo the first one, but by depriving the experience of the character of reality.

SUMMARY

In principle, exaggeration is characteristic of all emotions, passions, grief, and remorse. If not moderated by the ego, derivatives of the id and of the superego have a tendency to be ex-

cessively intense and oblivious to the hierarchy of goals. Only an intelligent mind which has a concept of an adequate minimum and of the subordination of the means to an end can avoid or correct exaggeration. The ego may participate in exaggeration in three ways: 1, it may be overwhelmed by the id (for example, in psychosis and in hysteria); 2, it may be overwhelmed but secondarily tries to integrate the happenings by the illusion or delusion that what happened was only an exaggeration (especially in schizophrenia); and 3, in the case of exaggeration as a defense, the ego may awaken too late to prevent the expression of id or superego derivatives, but goes along with it, exaggerates it, and, realizing the danger, gains the strength to dispel the fog of passion or remorse and thereby triumphs.

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IDENTITY AND JOSEPH CONRAD

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The relationship between the personality of an artist and his creations has always been a challenging enigma to psychoanalysts. This problem has been studied in psychobiographies of the artist *(19)*; in analyses of the artistic products, usually literary works *(23, 28)*, and in attempts to correlate these two approaches. In this latter effort it was often assumed that the products of creation were directly correlated with the creator's experience, emotional states, and fantasy life. As psychoanalytic theory and experience have developed, it has been realized that the process of creativity is more complicated than that, and that the creative product of a talented person, or a genius, is more than the expression of a fantasy in a highly developed form. Kris expressed it thus *(28)*: 'The artist has created a world and not indulged in a daydream'.[1]

Current efforts at understanding creativity have gone in two main directions: the first, to understand the nature of the process *(3, 24, 29)*; the other, to look for determinants common in the lives of artists in general, in an effort to pick out those features which differentiate them from other people *(15, 16, 27, 33)*. Others combine both approaches *(10, 17)*. In this paper an attempt is made to examine the life and personality of Joseph Conrad, the nature of his works and their principle themes, and to demonstrate the observation made by Kris as well as the identity problems of Conrad expressed in the totality of his work.

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[1] *Cf.* the comment by Spencer: 'One of the most remarkable things about Shakespeare is that although he uses the same materials for the achievement of size and universality in his great tragedies, he creates in each [tragedy] a distinctive and particular world' *(31, p. 153)*.

Identity is a concept which has a certain vogue among psychoanalysts. With increasing sophistication of psychoanalytic theory, the term ego has been reserved to represent the whole of a psychic structure, while 'self-representation' is used to indicate one's self *(18, 20)*. The concept of self-representation is part of a pair: 'object-representation' in relation to outside objects and 'self-representation' in relation to one's self. However, Erikson *(11)*, Jacobson *(20)*, and others have shown the sense of one's self is more than self-representation alone. Rather, it seems to depend upon a number of interrelationships between various ego functions as well as between certain aspects of the ego, superego, and id. These interrelationships involve the body image, the nature of object representations, the relationship with reality, the level of libidinal development, the impact and influence of fantasies of an earlier period of life, and the form of the ego ideal and of the superego. Each of these various aspects of mental functioning interact between themselves and the self-representation that serves to establish and maintain a sense of identity *(25)*. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss in greater detail the nature of identity.

After a consideration of the life of Joseph Conrad, his major literary works will be examined in an effort to demonstrate that, through various writings, he emphasized different aspects of the interrelationships just mentioned and thereby, in the totality of his work, achieved an identity and mental harmony that was lacking in his nonliterary life.

THE BIOGRAPHY OF AN ARTIST

Józef Teodor Konrad Nalecz Korzeniowski was born in 1857 in the Polish Ukraine, then under Russian control. He was the only child of parents whose courtship and marriage contained all the elements of a fictional romance—prolonged courtship, plans to marry, father's disapproval, daughter's hesitation, father's death, loyalty to the memory of father's last wishes, then love triumphant and a happy marriage leading to the birth of the little boy. His father, Apollo, was an improvident man

whose marriage at the age of thirty-six did not reform his ways. He engaged in revolutionary activity against Russian control of his country; he was also a writer of comedies and poetry and had translated several of Hugo's works. When Józef was three, his father went to a larger city where he could publish popular literature and engage in more intensive political activity. He was eventually arrested, imprisoned, and exiled by the Czarist government to a distant province near the White Sea. Conrad's mother, Evalyna, volunteered to accompany her husband into exile and to submit to all the conditions of his punishment. Therefore, when Józef was four, he and his family were on their way to exile. Two important experiences occurred on that journey that have been recorded by Conrad. Young Conrad became dangerously ill, but the convoy refused to stop. Finally it did and a doctor from Moscow found the little boy suffering from pneumonia. Leeches and medicines were applied but the escort refused to wait longer to allow time for recovery and convalescence. On the same trip his mother became so weak that she had to be carried. Again the convoy refused to halt until outside influence was brought to bear. During this intervention, the family stayed in a comfortable house until Conrad's mother recovered sufficiently.

In their place of exile they were treated as comfortably and humanely as possible, but it was a frontier town having two seasons of the year (according to his father)—a white winter and a green winter. There was a shortage of food and adequate lodging. His mother rapidly became ill, probably from tuberculosis. As a result, the father's sentence was eased and the family was moved near Kiev, where they had better living conditions. Conrad and his mother were privileged to visit her family who lived nearby. Conrad has described in glowing terms his visit to the family and most particularly the last fond farewell as they returned to the father in exile. His mother's health rapidly declined, and four years after the start of their exile, she died when he was not quite eight years old. Shortly before his mother's death, his father wrote to a friend, 'My

little Conrad is inevitably neglected in the middle of all of this'.

After his mother's death, his father undertook his education and care. Conrad's life, however, was one of complete isolation from everyday activities with no friends of his own age. He did, however, have the stimulation of his father's work and access to his father's relatively large library. At that time Apollo was translating Shakespeare and Victor Hugo. Conrad has described how one day, while he was looking at some manuscript sheets of a translation of Two Gentlemen of Verona, his father came in and caught him turning the pages of the translation. Conrad's note continues: 'I was greatly confused, expecting to get into trouble. He stood in the doorway looking at me with some surprise but the only thing he said after a moment of silence was, "Read the page aloud".

'Luckily the page lying before me was not overblotted with erasures and corrections, and my father's handwriting was otherwise extremely legible. When I got to the end he nodded and I flew out of doors thinking myself lucky to have escaped reproof for that piece of impulsive audacity' *(7 i)*.

It is also known that he read his father's translation of Hugo's Toilers of the Sea, and he himself recalled having been a great reader from the age of five, reading travel books, novels in Polish and French, including those of James Fenimore Cooper, Dickens, Captain Marrayat, and others.

Within a year of the mother's death, his father became ill, probably also from tuberculosis, and was eventually allowed to leave Russia. He went to Lwów, a part of Austria-Poland. The father's letters at this time report that Conrad was suffering from his old complaint (whatever that was) which apparently 'is a form of ill health which interfered with his working for the two years previously even though he is aged eleven'. In another letter the father wrote, 'My little Conrad is well and that cheers me up most because his nerves were in a very bad state. He is fairly able but so far has no love of study and there is nothing definite in him yet. Of course he is only eleven. He likes to criticize all, but unmaliciously. He is sensitive in his attitude and good beyond words.'

During this stay in Lwów, Conrad went to school and began to write plays with patriotic Polish themes, with the Russians cast as villians. He declared that he had a great talent and would become a great writer. During the long period of his father's decline and eventual death, Conrad went to school in the day, coming home to sit alone outside his father's bedroom at night. He claimed his avid reading was the only thing that helped him to survive those difficult days. He would occasionally be allowed to see his father who lay ill and motionless in bed. The nurses would pass between the bedroom and the corridor in which he sat while, through the doorway, he would catch glimpses of his father. His father was buried as a hero of the Polish Resistance. In later years he described his father as 'a man of great sensibilities, of exalted and dreamy temperament; with a terrible gift of irony and of gloomy disposition; withal of strong religious feeling degenerating after the loss of his wife into mysticism touched with despair. His aspect was distinguished; his conversation very fascinating; his face, in repose somber, lighter all over when he smiled' *(13)*.

Thus at the age of eleven he was an orphan and was taken in by his mother's family. His mother's brother, Thaddeus, in particular, was his close guardian and counselor. For many years Conrad remained in correspondence with this uncle, receiving both moral and financial support. School life was not to his liking and at the age of fourteen he expressed a desire to go to sea. Members of his family violently opposed this. Conrad wrote that the violence of their opposition, falling about the ears of a teen-age boy, aroused in him such a storm of feeling that he would find himself, thirty-five years later, in the silence of his study, meeting and answering arguments which arose from that time. He was about to give up his choice of a sea career when, on a trip through Switzerland, he saw an English family hiking. At the head of the family marched the father in tweeds, plus fours, with a stout walking stick, leading the way. This sight so encouraged Conrad in his resolve that at the age of sixteen he left his family and Poland to go to sea. Conrad attributed his choice to the influence of his reading about ad-

venture and exploration. He recalls in this connection having looked at a map at the age of nine and, putting his finger on the center of unexplored Africa, saying, 'Some day I will go there'. Various writers relate this to the general restlessness among the younger Polish generation at about that time; that as the son of a political prisoner Conrad would have been subject to surveillance by the police, and that he disliked the conventional, disciplined school life in which he was living, to which was coupled a desire to escape to freedom and adventure. These factors are not sufficient to explain such an unusual move on the part of a Polish youth.

Conrad went to Marseilles where, through family connections, he was accepted among seamen and bankers and rapidly acquired the necessary maritime skills. He made several voyages in and around the Mediterranean, as well as to the West Indies. In addition, he became involved in Spanish Carlist revolutionary activities. He went on several gun-running expeditions. On one occasion his ship barely escaped capture by the coast guard. One of the men with whom he worked, Dominic Cervoni, a Corsican, made a great impression upon him because of his manliness, bravery, and evidently his interest in Conrad himself. This man served as a model for several characters in his later stories. At the time that Conrad was engaged in these activities, he apparently began a love affair with the mistress to the Pretender to the Spanish throne, a love affair which terminated either in a duel in which he was severely wounded or in an attempted suicide. To this romantic tale is coupled the suggestion that the woman with whom he had the affair nursed him back to health only to disappear from his life. The events of that time are obscure and to date scholars have not agreed on the actual occurrences, although the present trend is to regard this as a fictionalized account and to feel he attempted suicide *(2)*.

It might be stated at this point that little is known of Conrad's relationship with women other than the one in Marseilles. Prior to leaving Poland he had one, or possibly two, girls in

whom he was interested: one young lady was the object of a secret love and did not know the depth of his feeling until he went to say farewell to her; the other possible adolescent crush may have concerned the daughter of a neighbor about whom in later correspondence he commented most particularly on the warmth of the girl's mother in welcoming him into that household. Eight to ten years subsequent to the affair in Marseilles there is the hint of a flirtation on the island of Mauritius with a Frenchwoman whom he left abruptly as the relationship became more serious. On this same island, and at the same time, he encountered the daughter of a trader. The suggestion has been made that he looked upon her with favor and may actually have tried to steal a kiss, possibly having been discovered by the trader in this situation *(21, 7 k)*. On the other hand, prior to his marriage, he carried on a long, and at times intense, correspondence with his French 'aunt', Marguerite Poradowska. She was, of course, much older than he. While his letters were always polite, he spoke freely in them and used her as a confidante. She was a writer with whom he would discuss his writing problems after he began his own career. At times he proposed collaboration, with the suggestion that she could be the senior author. He also suggested that she translate his early writings and offered to allow her to publish them under her name rather than his. The only other woman about whom anything is known was his wife, Jessie, whom he married when he was thirty-eight.

After Marseilles he set to work to achieve his greatest ambitions: to work and sail on an English ship, to learn the English language, and to become an English citizen. He spoke perfect French from early youth. However, within a few months after shipping out on an English ship, he was sufficiently conversant with the English language to be understood, and within eight years he worked his way up from ordinary seaman to the possession of a Master's certificate. Throughout his sailing career he received commendations for his work and his certificates of qualification always stated, among other things, that he was sober, conscientious, and industrious. He was a good seaman

although subject to periods of mild depression and poor health. He was the only Polish seaman on all the ships on which he sailed. After obtaining his Master's certificate (and shortly after, British citizenship), he sailed as first mate on a ship to the Far East. On his way there he was struck in the back by a falling spar and was hospitalized for months suffering from, as he described it, some mysterious ailment the nature of which doctors could not fathom. There is little doubt that his prolonged illness had a large neurotic component. During his convalescence he became first mate on a coastal steamer which steamed in and out of the Indonesian islands. From this trip he obtained the material used in his first novel, Almayer's Folly *(7 a)*. He became captain of a ship—an experience he commemorated in The Shadow Line *(7 m)*—for a period of two years and then returned to London. At this point, aged thirty-one or thirty-two, he began to write his first book, an event he described as occurring without any conscious awareness of what he was setting out to do, but rather of being moved by forces within him. This book took five years and was interrupted by several sea voyages and a trip to the Congo. The experiences there later served as background of one of his great stories, Heart of Darkness *(7 d)*. It is interesting that when he returned from the Congo, feverish, sick, and having lost almost all of his personal possessions, he had preserved the manuscript on which he was working.

Immediately after his return from the Congo he had a six-month period of profound exhaustion amounting to a severe depression. After this he suffered periods of intense ill health which plagued him for the rest of his life. He was subject to tropical fevers, probably malaria, and to periodic episodes of 'gout' which affected his wrists, fingers, knees, ankles, and feet. In 1895, Almayer's Folly *(7 a)* appeared, marking the end of his career as a seaman. Lest it be thought that his own statement of lack of preparation for a writing career is accurate, it should be noted that he had been raised in a literary family—his father and his grandfather before him—and had read extensively dur-

ing his youth and even while he was in the merchant marine. He said of himself that he was the only sailor who went aboard ship with a copy of Shakespeare in his pocket. He also read widely in the French literature—Balzac, de Maupassant, Flaubert. His letters to his uncle were apparently of sufficient quality and interest to lead to the suggestion that he write for the Polish press, but he never did.

Soon after the publication of his first book he started to court an Englishwoman, Jessie George. The courtship was sporadic; he would see her, and then disappear for months at a time. She knew him as Joseph Conrad, yet he signed his first written communication to her with his Polish name, confusing her. When he actually proposed, suggesting immediate marriage (he was thirty-eight), he offered as a recommendation the fact that he had not long to live. He later repeated this same statement to her mother, adding that he did not think they would ever have any children. He lived twenty-six more years and fathered two children. After his marriage he settled down to a steady writing career, although for a long time he hoped to return to the sea. For a number of years, during which he produced some of his finest stories (*7 b, 7 c, 7 d, 7 g*), he found himself under constant financial strain about which he informed his friends with unceasing fervor accompanied by complaints of his tremendous problems in creating and writing. His letters are a long wail about his inability to produce, his lack of creativity, his need to force every word with the greatest of effort. He wrote of seeing whole scenes in his mind and yet being unable to put a word of this on paper. At other times he described sitting at his desk for eight hours and producing a sentence which he would throw away, only to start over the next day. Reading his letters in chronological order one gets little impression of his productivity, yet during this time works of great merit were forthcoming. It is true that he did not gain popular acceptance at first, achieving only literary acclaim, but he gradually acquired a growing public. Even after his popularity had brought him financial security, he complained about expenses

and was unable to balance his budget. At the same time he complained of financial stringencies, he was extravagant in his tastes and disregarded the value of money. His wife tells numerous stories about this. He liked to work in solitude, yet living arrangements often made this impossible. He added to these difficulties by placing his table in the middle of the area of family activity and then complained of the annoyance. There were also a number of mishaps: one manuscript, for example, was burned. His letters also convey the impression that all he did was work; everything else was subordinate.

He spoke English but apparently with a thick accent so that there never was any doubt of his foreign origin. One of the greatest insults was to be told that he was not English, did not know the language, nor speak it correctly. He himself would make such statements, but did not want to hear them from anyone else. At the same time, he did not relinquish the variety of names with which he was originally christened and used these in varying combinations in his correspondence. According to his wife, he employed eight different variations of his name. Also, according to her, he was a veritable tyrant about the house, insistent upon his prerogative of writing and of entertaining his multitude of friends while, at the same time, inconsiderate of the problems of running a household and of the needs and desires of other members of the family. He worried whenever any of them were ill but soon demanded attention for himself. He was extremely hospitable and no matter what time someone arrived he would immediately insist that the guest be served. This his wife attributes to a Polish custom. He had periods of unpredictable rage and anger. Friends regarded him as a man of great sensibility, of exalted and dreamy temperament, yet with a gloomy disposition. His aspect was distinguished and his conversation fascinating (Bertrand Russell met him in 1915 and reported that he had never been so impressed). His face was somber in repose but would light up when he smiled. These are almost the same terms with which his father had been described.

Of his gloomy disposition, let it be noted that he was intensely preoccupied with fears of mishaps to members of his family; during the first war he was positive that his son had been killed, although there had been no word of this. At another time he had a similar feeling of death regarding a servant. He was constantly predicting the end of his life, his inability to work, his inability to support his family, but, on the other hand, any period of nonproductivity he regarded as laziness and felt that he should constantly be working. At the time of his death in 1924, he was still writing. Although he held no brief for the work of writers he considered incompetent, the work of any of his friends or of any new promising writer brought forth lavish, extravagant praise. His evaluation of his own work was usually one of deprecation. If, however, a friend would write praising him, he would reply that his words of praise were such music to his ears that it made all the pain and travail worth while in order to reach the attention of such a discerning critic. But, in the few business letters preserved, he gives a realistic evaluation and appraisal of the merits of his work *(4)*.

It seems evident from his letters and from his wife's account that, although he had many friends *(32)* and enjoyed their company, he was a man who was essentially cut off from most people, including those of his own household. The impression gained from his autobiographical notes is of an individual who could not bring himself to express openly his feelings and innermost thoughts. E. M. Forster, in his essay on Conrad *(12)*, complains of this, suggesting the difficulty may stem from Conrad's own problems. The nature of his literary works tended to emphasize his isolation from people. He became known as a teller of sea tales, a reputation which angered him since he felt that the message of his stories was far more than that of sea adventure. Conrad described his method of writing as one in which he would bring to the attention of the reader a 'moment of truth', make the reader feel such a feeling, and most particularly, 'make him see it'. To this end his writing is richly filled with allusions which vividly picture the scenes that he

is describing. His reputation is based in part upon the vividness of the reality that he created. He has been called the 'grandfather of the modern novel' by the nature of his manner of writing, his parsimony of words, and most particularly by his themes *(30, 14)*. He founded no school of writing but he influenced Faulkner, Fitzgerald, Graham Greene, and Hemingway. He has not had a host of followers, only of readers *(1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 21, 22, 30, 32)*.

THE PERSONALITY OF CONRAD

Without going into an extended discussion of the psychodynamics of Joseph Conrad, I wish to emphasize certain pertinent aspects of his personality. First, his depressive disposition, which has been well documented by himself and others. Second, his constant concern with bodily illness, aggravated by disabling conditions such as gout, which affected his ability to write and produce. He blamed much of his difficulty on the 'gout'; his wife states that she felt that many of his attacks were brought on by rage. Third, worthy of note were his constant deprecation of his work, his testy, yet friendly, nature toward strangers, and his apparent inability to decide upon a career for himself. Even while at sea he would write to his uncle concerning plans of a business nature and hopes of going into some business activity which, of course, was in keeping with his uncle's desires. There is the fact of his relatively late start as a writer, seeming to slip into this career without being aware at all of what was happening to him. Finally, his seeming lack of relationship with women. His wife appeared to be as much a maternal caretaker as a conjugal partner.

The depressive element can be related to the early deaths of his parents and to mourning for them as well as identifying with them as sick, ailing, and finally deceased individuals. From his father's comment that Conrad was ailing at the time his mother was sick, there is a suggestion of a maternal identification, regardless of the nature of the ailment. Her death made him all the more dependent on his father whose illness and

death left him alone. His own almost fatal illness and the real physical deprivation would, on the one hand, cause a regression of both ego and libidinal organization (one luxury he always allowed himself was a well-set table), while on the other, it would have threatened his very existence. His identification with his father is seen in his choice of career (perhaps the sea represented a form of exile) and, later, writing; in his early reading and intrusion upon his father's work; in his first literary efforts in which he portrayed the Russians as villains (his own experience as well as identification); his revolutionary activities in Marseilles; and finally, in the revolutionary background of several of his books *(7 g, 7 h)*. His masculine identification was complicated by a close relationship with his practical, businesslike, bachelor uncle, Thaddeus. Later paternal figures, such as Dominic Cervoni, and friends suggest a constant seeking of a paternal figure who would not disappoint him. The figure of the English father marching at the head of his family in Switzerland must have seemed an idealized father and a revival of the memory of his father's march into exile.[2]

Conrad also seemed to continue to yearn for the maternal care so unfortunately lacking in his youth. The symbolism of the sea as a maternal figure may have been an unconscious factor in his leaving Poland. His comments on the girl friend of his early adolescence are mostly about the kindness of her mother. His wife apparently played a larger maternal role than do most wives. His relationships with women are tinged with mystery but it is striking that, after his affair in Marseilles with the mistress of the Pretender (with its œdipal overtones), women as love objects disappear from his life for years and the only mention then is of a flirtation and possible discovery by a father. His relationship with his older 'aunt' suggests an unresolved œdipal attachment. Œdipal conflicts can be seen also in his fear of discovery by his father of his prying into father's writing,

[2] Bernard Meyer, in his discussion of this paper, has pointed out the fetishistic aspect of this memory since Conrad speaks of his fascination with the legs of the English father.

his wish to visit the center of an unknown area and the profound depression following the realization of this childhood wish, and his anticipation of death when he proposed marriage.

His depressions, his constant deprecation of his work, and his continual suffering and anguish suggest a severe superego. He paid a price whenever he achieved anything—illness after his Master's certificate and British citizenship, depression after the Congo trip, depression after the completion of a piece of work, etc. This also attests to the severity of the superego. Knowing the nature of the deprivations of his childhood and the primitive aggressions aroused, it seems to follow that the archaic superego would be especially primitive. He was alone and, with conflicts between various psychic structures and within the ego structure itself, never achieved the harmony necessary for his identity. His use of many names displays this factor.

THE ARTISTIC CREATIONS

It is necessary to examine some of Conrad's literary work in order to show that the world created in each story has certain common themes yet is unique. In pointing out the differences it is possible to see that these accentuate the intrapsychic components comprising 'identity' as outlined earlier. In order to show this, many of the subsidiary, complex interrelationships which contribute to the richness of the characters he created are omitted. The totality of his creations represents not merely a working out of certain underlying fantasies, but the creation of a new world which in turn gives an 'identity' beyond his own actual experience.

In the main, Conrad's stories have a general theme of guilt and atonement, resulting in the death of the main character. In more detail, the theme is man's attempt to find his place in a hostile world. He may succumb to the hostility or join forces with it *(7 d)* or, more frequently, he may forfeit life or happiness in order to remain faithful to a guiding principle which sets him above the hostility *(7 c, 7 d, 7 l)*. A third solution exists

for those men so lacking in imagination that they are not aware of the nature of the forces against which they struggle and sail blindly through (Captain McWhirr), neither to redemption nor to failure, but merely to existence in their blindness *(7 e)*.

In literary evaluations of his stories *(8, 30)*, by and large, Conrad's sympathies seem to be with those who find redemption through recognition of the forces against which they struggle and rise above them, even at the expense of happiness or of life. However, it is possible to examine the stories and see other aspects of the world that he created. Each of the following accounts emphasizes a main point at the expense of omitting subsidiary, but important, relationships.

Lord Jim *(7 c)* is a young man who is essentially a dreamer. As an apprentice seaman he dreams of deeds of heroism in which he is so immersed that when an occasion arises to rescue a fellow student he fails to react. He consoles himself that he was preparing for the real test which is to come, at which time he will be the hero as in his dreams. He goes through a series of misadventures including injury aboard ship by a falling spar and spending time in a hospital in the Far East under treatment for a strange physical disorder. He becomes first mate of a ship and, when it strikes some submerged object, suddenly finds the crisis he is seeking: the passengers do not know of the danger of sinking—only the white officers know; only a few aboard can be saved since there are not enough lifeboats; there might be a panic and all would be lost. The other officers are leaving the ship and passengers to their fate in order to save themselves. Jim has pictures of all the possibilities—heroic and otherwise. He is paralyzed, indecisive, and unsure until 'I found myself jumping through the air landing aboard the rowboat', deserting his ship and his ideals. The ship does not sink, but is brought to port safely by a passing boat.

Jim is disgraced and stripped of all seaman's status. He attempts to hide from the consequences of his misdeed, but everywhere he goes, the slightest reference to this event produces a sense of shame and he moves on (the superego knows

all). Eventually, he goes to a small island, makes peace between two warring factions of natives, and becomes known as Tuan Jim (Lord Jim). In this paradise he is honored and respected, has a native girl as wife and companion, and his existence is secure; yet he is vaguely unhappy. A wandering band of white desperadoes comes upon this island and he prepares to fight them off until the leader says to him, 'You are as bad as we'. He withdraws from the fight, arranges a truce, and pledges his life for the safety of the natives. The desperadoes break the truce and Jim is again faced with the choice of his physical safety or of remaining true to his pledge. In his moment of death he is triumphant and happy. To put it analytically, his superego is appeased, or more particularly, ego and ego ideal are reunited. The struggle at first centers about his fantasy of himself as a hero which has no basis in reality. It becomes part of his ego ideal. At the moment of crisis there is conflict between fantasy and reality, between heroism and safety. He depersonalizes, and from then on there is conflict between ego and superego (ego ideal). Jim is unable to achieve a true harmonious identity until the moment of death when ego and ego ideal are united, erasing the conflict between them. Inner harmony and identity is paid for by death, but he is himself!

In Under Western Eyes *(7 h)*, an orphaned Russian student falls privy to plans to assassinate an important official. He is at a loss and finally turns the assassin over to the secret police with no one aware of his action except the chief of police. He then appears in Switzerland where he is to join the ranks of the anarchists to spy for the Russian secret police. He is utterly guilt ridden, an attitude accentuated by his falling in love with the sister of the betrayed man. Ultimately he confesses to the revolutionaries, is maimed for life, and is cared for by an elderly woman, having lost both the friends and the girl he sought. In giving up the prizes he wanted most, he atones for his murderous betrayal and achieves, through his confession and punishment, a state of harmony between his ego and punitive superego. It is true also that the love of a woman accentuates the sense of guilt and the sense of guilt prevents him from achieving the

object relationship he is seeking, but he gains a maternal care he previously lacked.

In one of Conrad's greatest books, Victory *(7 l)*, this struggle for a place in the universe centers about object relationships. The hero, Axel Heyst, is a man who, in part brought about by his father's teachings, prefers a lonely, friendless existence, cut off from any intimate human relationship. He does a good deed but in such a way as to maintain his isolation from the rest of mankind. However, the second good deed involves the rescue of a girl from the unwanted attentions of a German hotelkeeper. Heyst brings her to his island and love begins to develop between them. He is completely unaccustomed to such a feeling and really does not know what is happening. He becomes aware that the previous tenets of his life, expounded by his father, which he had followed blindly, are no longer valid. A band of desperadoes invades this relative paradise and it is apparent that the leader of the desperadoes, Mr. Jones, is the evil mirror image of Heyst so that there is a confrontation between the two aspects of the same personality. In the subsequent struggle between them, the girl, Lena, aware of her own growing love for Heyst, is willing to sacrifice her life to save his, while he also sacrifices his in order to save her. In thus sacrificing for each other they reach a union through death that defeats the forces of evil working against them. In this story the main emphasis is on the isolation of the man and his achieving an awareness of himself, an identity, through his relationship with a woman[3] as well as through a confrontation and overcoming of his mirror image—the leader of the desperadoes. In Victory, identity is achieved through the medium of object relationships with the relationship reaching fruition through death. Another aspect of identity is introduced through the mirror image of the hero. This mechanism is better seen in other stories.

In a number of his tales, Conrad introduces an omnipresent

[3] It should be noted, incidentally, that the heroine of this story is one of the two women best drawn by Conrad, the other being Winnie in The Secret Agent *(7 g)*. Both these women are willing to kill for the person they love, even at the expense of their own lives.

narrator, Marlow, who furthers the telling of the story. Marlow is more than a narrator; at times he is an active participant. In Lord Jim *(7 c)*, the contrast is between Jim, the romantic dreamer, and Marlow, the realistic, practical man. In Heart of Darkness *(7 d)*, the tale is mostly Marlow's search for the legendary Kurtz who is supposed to have found peace and understanding in the Congo jungle. Marlow, disappointed, finds that Kurtz has succumbed to the forces of evil surrounding him and has become more savage than the natives. Kurtz dies and Marlow returns to civilization but, being a good man, in contrast to Kurtz, he is unable to tell Kurtz's fiancée the truth of the betrayal of civilization and maintains the fiction of Kurtz's goodness.

The contrast between characters is most clearly seen in a short story, The Secret Sharer *(7 j)*, in which, upon assuming command of a ship, a sea captain, the same night, rescues a man from the sea who is to all intents and purposes his identical twin. The only difference between them is that one is a captain while the other is a man accused of murder, perhaps justly so, who is trying to flee to an unknown land or commit suicide. The story concerns the growing awareness on the part of the captain of his complete identity with the fugitive and of his eventual efforts to help the escaped man to a life of exile on a South Sea island, at the same time freeing himself of this foreign identity. In achieving the separation of the two identities, the captain also gains the respect and admiration of his crew as both a seaman and a man. Conrad seems to grasp in this story, as well as in the other descriptions of the good and bad self-representation, the essential nature of what Tabor and I called 'the twinning reaction' in a recent paper on identical twins *(26)*. It is a splitting of the self-representation into parts. In The Secret Sharer, the more idealized aspect of the self-representation gains ascendancy and identity is preserved at a useful, socially acceptable level, while the more evil aspect of it is consigned to exile. It is recognized of course that this use of a twin or a twin representative as a literary device appeared

in earlier European literature. Yet Conrad's use of these different aspects of it serves to establish the identity of his character through a description of the vicissitudes of the self-representation; they are also used to speak for other ego functions. Marlow, in both Lord Jim and Heart of Darkness, represents the reality functioning of the ego in contrast to the less reality-directed activities of the main characters.

The reality aspect of identity is the theme of another of Conrad's great novels, Nostromo *(7 f)*, in which there is an intermingling of object relationships. There is a struggle with a sense of duty, but the main struggle centers about the relationship of the various characters to reality—the reality of the possession of a silver mine and a load of silver ingots which overshadows all the acts of the main characters and determines the interplay between them and the nature of the events which shape their lives. Through the acceptance of the existence of this reality each of the various characters achieves his place and his inner peace, thus finding an aspect of his identity in his relationship to reality.

A trilogy *(7 d)*, which to Conrad himself represents the ages of man, deals with periods of transition in life. Youth is an autobiographical account of a series of mishaps at sea involving the shifting of cargo, a storm, the demasting, and finally, the burning of a coal cargo in the hold of a ship, abandoning the ship, and flight in a lifeboat. These events actually happened to Conrad, but in relating the story he particularly stresses the ability of youth to rise above misadventures because of the buoyancy, hopefulness, and, in a sense, elated outlook on life of the young. Heart of Darkness, depicting the middle period, was described above. The End of the Tether, the story of a captain who must work in order to support his married daughter, represents old age. He is going blind, conceals this fact, and buys a ship to engage in trading, using a faithful servant as his guide and executor of his commands. As he is about to be unmasked for the deceiver he is, the captain arranges for his ship to go aground in such circumstances that only he knows

what is happening. He goes down with his ship, dies a hero's death, and secures for his daughter the insurance money she needs. He thus rises above his circumstances and, in his death, redeems himself and discharges his responsibility. The Shadow Line *(7 m)*, involving the transition from youth to manhood, starts with a description of the golden period of youth and the passage of time 'until one perceives ahead a shadow line warning one that the region of early youth too must be left behind'. This is also autobiographical and deals with Conrad's first command.

Without going into further details, these stories of transition deal not only with important epochs of an individual's maturing, but also probably represent the changes in Conrad's own body image, associated in later life with the swellings and detumescence of his 'gouty' joints and, what must be postulated, the bodily changes associated with both his severe debilitating illness at the age of four to five, and the physical deprivations in the years immediately after, affecting body image development. These tales of transition may be said to emphasize the relationship of body image to self-representation and to the total identity.

Finally, one story and two fragments suggest more deeply repressed fantasies that would disturb the psychic balance necessary to maintain identity. The story, Falk *(7 e)*, centers on a sea captain who is regarded by others and himself as a pariah. The basis of this feeling is the fact that he indulged in cannibalism in order to save his life at a time when he was shipwrecked. In Heart of Darkness, Marlow, at one point in his trip up the Congo River, falls to musing about the cannibalistic practices of the natives and speaks of this in terms of horror, disgust, and inability to comprehend the practice. In A Personal Record *(7 i)*, Conrad relates his first return to Poland in adult years. He describes the delight and growing emotion as he approaches the home in which he had lived before going to sea. Suddenly, as he is about to reach the home, his account breaks off into a recollection of his childhood, the story of an uncle who was

part of Napoleon's Grand Army that invaded Russia. His memory centers about the uncle's experiences during the retreat from Moscow and, particularly, about his being reduced to such a state of starvation that he captured a dog, and killed, cooked, and ate it. He describes this tale as having filled him with horror and repugnance, yet it was one that fascinated him and he wanted to hear it again and again.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In Conrad's works it is possible to see in each tale, as a guiding principle in unraveling the life of his hero, an emphasis on a different aspect of psychic functioning necessary to maintain identity. In the totality of his work his characters achieve an identity, a place in the hostile world created by him, through a relationship to different aspects of the psychic apparatus. The working out of the identity evolves through establishing a state of harmony between disparate elements of the mind, whether between ego and ego ideal; ego and superego; elements within the ego, such as the relationship to reality, to other objects, and within components of the self-representation; and between ego and id. Needless to say, I do not believe that Conrad was consciously aware of the selective nature of his creative processes which I ascribe to 'regression in the service of the ego' *(29)*. He apparently had an intuitive understanding of the relationship of his own lack of complete identity to various mental functions and worked out each of these in his stories. In this sense, Conrad's appraisal that his works were not of the imagination but were based upon his own experiences acquires a new validity; not a verity in the conscious sense the statement probably was meant, but in the sense of utilizing his experiences in order to illuminate and play out the different aspects of his identity.

It is possible to discuss Joseph Conrad in the terms of Ernst Kris *(27)* since Conrad's recollection of pointing to Africa on the map, his tale of discovery by his father, and his successful escape from this are indicative of the legendary image that the artist may build up about himself. The truthfulness of these

events in his life is open to question. Greenacre's observations on the importance of the family romance in the life of the artist *(16)* are also borne out by the material from Conrad's life. The nature of his 'love affair' with the world is certainly suggested by the all-encompassing world which he depicted in the totality of his works. Greenacre observed that the childhood of the artist demonstrates great sensitivity to sensory stimulation, unusual capacity for relations between various stimuli, a basic predisposition to an empathy of wider range than average, and an intactness of sensorimotor equipment allowing the building up of projective motor discharge for expressive functions *(15)*. Weissman added a fifth condition, that is, the lifelong durability of sensory experiences, perhaps even from infancy, and their lifelong potential transformability into creative expression *(33)*. All these factors might be illustrated by detailed material from a biographical study of Conrad. Beres' comment that the creative, autonomous portion of the ego functions somewhat separately from the personal portion of the ego *(3)* would seem also to be illustrated by the nature of Conrad's relationship to his wife and to his work.

An important part of Joseph Conrad's personal life appears to have been bound around an intense sense of guilt, no doubt related to his early relationships, deprivations, and losses. He had a need to atone constantly, a personal attitude which found its reflection in his creative works. By surveying the totality of Conrad's work, it is possible to show the unifying principle in the world which he created. That principle seems to be a finding of personal identity through establishing a state of relative harmony between various structures of the psychic apparatus.

It would be of interest to do as Helene Deutsch has done with Lord Jim *(9)*, i.e., study each of his individual stories psychoanalytically. It would also be interesting to study Conrad's manipulation of the time sequences to produce the sensation similar to that of the timelessness of the unconscious; his use of symbolism; the sociologic aspects of his stories (the descriptions of white brutality in the Congo in Heart of Darkness are

particularly pertinent today), and many other more detailed studies. These, however, must be reserved for the future.

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Thaddeus Hoyt Ames 1885-1963

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THADDEUS HOYT AMES

1885-1963

Thaddeus Hoyt Ames, one of the early pioneers in the development of psychoanalysis in the United States, died April 17, 1963 at the age of seventy-eight.

He was graduated from the University of Michigan in 1907. Immediately thereafter, he pursued a carefully charted course of medical studies in this country which gave him a thorough foundation in medicine, neurology, and psychiatry. In harmony with the customary procedure of that era, he went to Europe for his post-graduate work. In this ideal setting he came under the direct influence of Freud in Vienna and of Jung (who at that time was an ardent supporter of Freud) in Zurich. He also had the opportunity to further his studies in neurology and psychiatry with leading authorities, including such men as Marburg and Kraepelin.

Upon his return to the United States, Dr. Ames began the private practice of psychoanalysis. He was appointed to the faculty of the College of Physicians and Surgeons and taught psychiatry at the Cornell Medical Clinic. He became an active participating member of The New York Psychoanalytic Society during the trying period of its infancy and was elected president of the Society in 1921.

Dr. Ames contributed many important scientific papers. Those pertaining to his research on shell shock and malingering are of particular significance. His profound interest in religion allowed him to become a leader in pastoral psychiatry.

Psychoanalysis mourns the loss of an important personality; those who had the good fortune to know him have lost a sensitive, warm, cultured, wise colleague and friend.

DUDLEY D. SHOENFELD, M.D.

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Sigmund Freud-Oskar Pfister: Briefe [Letters]. 1909-1939. Edited by Ernst L. Freud and Heinrich Meng. Frankfurt-am-Main, West Germany: S. Fischer Verlag, 1963. 168 pp.

Martin Grotjahn

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BOOK REVIEWS

SIGMUND FREUD-OSKAR PFISTER: BRIEFE [LETTERS]. 1909-1939. Edited by Ernst L. Freud and Heinrich Meng. Frankfurt-am-Main, West Germany: S. Fischer Verlag, 1963. 168 pp.

In a short introduction, Heinrich Meng gives a few data about Pfarrer Oskar Pfister, who was born February 23, 1873 and died in 1956. Ernst Freud's introduction states that, from this correspondence which covered thirty years, one hundred of the one hundred thirty-four letters written by his father were chosen for publication. A third, also very brief introduction, by Anna Freud describes the parson as a strange figure in Freud's home which was so turned away from religion and church. He differed from other visiting analysts in his warmth, enthusiasm, and ability to be interested in the most minute details of the Freud family. In the eyes of the Freud children, he was not a holy man but more like the Pied Piper of Hamelin.

Approximately thirty letters from Pfister are included, the majority of which were written after 1927 when Freud, at Pfister's request, destroyed most of the clergyman's letters. More than half of those published here have been shortened.

It is a special delight to have both sides of this correspondence available. Even when the difference in stature, style, and depth of the two letter writers becomes obvious, both men stand their ground well. Their affection for each other remained unchanged throughout these thirty years.

In his first letter in 1909, Freud is enthusiastic over having found a minister interested in psychoanalysis. He considers the parson's therapeutic position a fortunate one, since he may guide his patient's transference from the therapist toward God. Freud is surprised that he had not realized before how well psychoanalysis could be handled by an understanding clergyman.

Pfister is quick to answer that 'the Protestant Reformation is nothing but psychoanalysis of Catholic sexual repression', and Freud finally calls Pfister and himself 'sexual Protestants'. From the beginning, Freud admonishes Pfister not to shy away from sexuality: he declares that all censorship is bad and cuts deeply into the body of psychoanalysis.

Some of the early letters are written with great patience and in

considerable detail, as though Freud were giving a seminar in writing. For instance, Freud protests against Pfister's use of tests: every word spoken to the patient interferes with his free associations. Freud never disguises his impatience or disagreement. He warns against philosophy and religion: all fundamentals should be left in that semidarkness in which they look so well in our present state of knowledge.

In 1911 he warns against Adler's theories and tries to use words that the parson will understand: 'Adler forgets the words of the Apostle Paul, whose exact words you know better than I do: "and if you don't have love". He has created for himself a system of the world without love, and I am now going to wreak the vengeance of the insulted goddess Libido on him. I certainly have always tried to be tolerant and not to exercise any authority; in reality, this does not work. It is the same as with the carriage and the pedestrians: when I started to drive in a carriage all day long, I got angry at the carelessness of the pedestrians—as I used to be angry formerly at the unmindfulness of the drivers.'

Several years later, October 22, 1927, Freud comments on a technical controversy: 'You know how people are inclined to take rules literally and then to overdo them. This is done, as I very well know, by some of my pupils with analytic passivity. Especially with H. I assume that he spoils the efficiency of analysis through a certain moody indifference, and that he then misses his chance to uncover resistances which he caused through his behavior with the patient. One should not conclude from this case that after the analysis a synthesis is needed; what is really needed is a thoroughgoing analysis, especially of the transference situation. What then remains from the transference should, even ought to, have the character of a heartfelt human relationship.'

Some references provide analytic insights into Freud's own unconscious. For instance, on May 10, 1909, Freud confesses that he has analyzed his 'father complex' (a term which he credits to Jung) and has decided to correct his compulsion to do better financially than his father. He had actually lost his need to do so and had learned this from the relationship to Oskar Pfister.

There are no letters between March 1913 and October 1918, but then the correspondence resumes with a deepened warmth and recognition of Pfister's enthusiasm, his love for truth and humanity,

his courage, devotion, understanding, and optimism. Naturally, Freud's tragic realism remains unchanged: 'I do not torture myself about good and evil, but I have found little good in people'.

Altogether, these letters contain more references to Freud's children and their great affection for Pfister than can be found in any other known correspondence. The children are enthusiastic about the Swiss clergyman, and they always want to visit him and climb mountains with him.

Only once in these one hundred letters does Freud vary the customary salutation of 'Dear Doctor' to 'My dear Man of God' (October 4, 1909). The deepest expression of mutual understanding and respect is perhaps reached in the famous letters of October 1918, already known from Ernest Jones's biography of Freud (Vol. II, p. 199 and pp. 457-459): 'In the first place you are not a Jew, which my endless admiration for Amos, Isaiah, Jeremiah, with the men who composed Job and the Prophets makes me greatly regret; and in the second place you are not so godless, since whoever lives for the truth lives in God and whoever strives for the freeing of love "dwelleth in God". If you would fuse your own contribution with the great world harmony, like the synthesis of notes in a Beethoven symphony into a musical whole, I could say of you, "There never was a better Christian".'

Freud admired Pfister's mildness in his writings which is so much more appropriate for the reader and so little directed against the enemy; Freud confesses that he could not write that way. He can write only in order to free his soul and to express his emotions. Since his enemies would be very pleased to see him angry, he prefers not to answer them at all. Compared with the parson—'a good, loving man, incapable of injustice', Freud calls himself terribly intolerant toward fools.

Pfister considers a world without religion, without art, without poetry, as a Devil's Island fit only for Satan. If psychoanalysis offers such a gruesome, icy climate, he cannot blame people for preferring sickness. Both men discuss matters of religion with ease because, as Pfister explains, 'the danger is not great that you will apply for baptism or that I will come hopping down from my pulpit'.

After the publication of The Future of an Illusion (1927), Freud tells Pfister that it is not his intention to become a successor to Jesus Christ—even if he has great understanding of the words: 'Your sins

are forgiven you. Arise and walk.' He wonders what would happen if the patient were to ask: 'How do you know that my sins are forgiven?'. Freud could not simply answer: 'I am the Son of God. I forgive you.' He could not invite such unlimited confidence; he would have to say: 'I, Professor Sigmund Freud, forgive you your sins'. This, Freud admits, would not work very well.

This letter (November 25, 1928) concludes with a remarkable paragraph: 'I do not know whether you have guessed the secret bond between Lay Analysis and Illusion. In the first one, I want to protect analysis against physicians; in the other one, against priests. I would like to hand it over to a profession which does not yet exist, a group of worldly physicians of the soul, who do not need to be physicians and who should not be allowed to be priests.'

On February 4, 1921, Freud mails an angry postcard. There had been some trouble between Pfister and Rank, as there had been between Pfister and Sachs. Then comes the sentence: 'I defend Groddeck with all my energy against your respectability. What would you have said if you had been a contemporary of Rabelais?'

Oskar Pfister, who is often reprimanded in strong terms by Freud, takes the reproof well and answers undisturbed, as a man from Switzerland might be expected to do (March 14, 1921): 'I understand very well that it is impossible for you to judge differently. The spirit which prompts you to advocate Groddeck is exactly the same as that which makes you the discoverer and pioneer of psychoanalysis. Still I cannot make your judgments mine, not even with the best intentions, and you did not expect that. There exists really a big difference between Rabelais and Groddeck: the former remains in the role of the satirist and avoids the *lapsus* of being taken for a scientist. Groddeck, however, flits between science and literature. You yourself say the trend seems to be definitely scientific, but the deeply rooted punning (*die Verwurstelung mit Witzeleien*) is unpleasant to me. I love a clean sheet of paper, and I love fresh butter. But butter spots on a clean sheet of paper do not satisfy my eye nor my stomach.'

Freud answers almost immediately (March 20, 1921): 'Your statement in matters of Groddeck has honestly pleased me. It must really be possible for us to tell the truth to one another rudely and still remain good friends, as in this case. I, too, do not abandon my opinion about Groddeck; I do not easily become madly fond of someone

(*dass ich an jemandem einen Narren fresse*), but that does not matter.'

In later years, Freud allows a certain melancholic mood to break through (May 26, 1926): 'Life at any rate is not easy; its value is doubtful, and that one should be thankful for having reached seventy-three years of age is one of the unjustified things which my friend Pfister accepts better than I do'. A few years later, Freud discusses the death instinct with Pfister. He realizes that the dissimilarities in their respective philosophies have remained unchanged over the thirty years of their correspondence. He does not have an emotional need to postulate the death instinct, but he does want to explain that puzzling reality which is beyond ourselves. He compares Pfister's optimism with a marriage for love, while his own pessimism is like a marriage for good, rational reasons. He hopes that Pfister's 'marriage' is happier than his own.

Finally come letters from the last, bitter years in Vienna, and Freud begins to worry about his family and writes with tired resignation (May 28, 1933): 'Switzerland does not belong to the hospitable countries. My judgment about the nature of man, especially about the Christian Aryan man, has very little reason to be changed.'

A deeply moving letter from Pfister to Mrs. Freud concludes this remarkable documentation of a lifelong friendship.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (BEVERLY HILLS)

MY SISTER, MY SPOUSE. A BIOGRAPHY OF LOU ANDREAS-SALOMÉ. By H. F. Peters. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962. 320 pp.

When Lou Andreas-Salomé died in 1937, Freud wrote in his obituary note for her: 'Those who knew her well were profoundly impressed by the sincerity and harmony of her life, and they made the amazing discovery that she was by nature free from the weaknesses of womankind, perhaps most human weaknesses generally, or had transcended them in the course of her life'.

Freud was a generous and chivalrous man, but such unqualified praise was rare for him. He was attached to Lou Andreas-Salomé by a warm friendship that endured throughout the twenty-five years of their acquaintance. She was a loyal follower, an analyst, and an enthusiastic correspondent. This detailed and scholarly biography

is an important contribution to the history of the psychoanalytic movement.

Until the publication of this book her name in this country seems to have been virtually unknown except to a few students of German literature, and even they remembered her mainly as the friend of Nietzsche and Rilke. Her complex personality and her remarkable personal history begin to come to life again in this book, although it is far from complete as a psychological study.

She was born in St. Petersburg a little over a hundred years ago, the daughter of a General in the Imperial Russian Army. Her parents were of principally German descent, the name Salomé, however, being that of a family of French Huguenots who had fled to Germany. She was the sixth child, having been preceded by five brothers, and the darling of her elderly father, whose image 'merged imperceptibly in her mind with the picture of a kind and paternal God'.

In later life Lou drew upon the journals she kept from her earliest youth when she wrote her strangely oblique autobiography, *Lebensrückblick*. She recalled there and elsewhere the period of her childhood when she engaged in elaborate fantasy making, so intense that it obscured the distinction between her inner world and external reality. The psychoanalyst cannot help detecting in this possibly dangerous game the source of her later development as a writer of fiction, which was indeed largely autobiographical. Nor was it less important perhaps as the root of her belief in the reality of the inner world which finds scientific demonstration in psychoanalysis.

During adolescence Lou Salomé fell in love with the first of the older men who, after her father, most influenced her intellectual life. This was the Dutch Reformed pastor, Hendrik Gillet, who had taken complete charge of her education—on her initiative—, but who also made the fatal mistake of asking her to marry him. It was a mistake not so much because he was already married and the father of a family but because Lou Salomé, although she did marry later, had already resolved never to be bound to one man.

She left St. Petersburg, traveled in Switzerland and Italy, and through the young philosopher Paul Rée, met Friedrich Nietzsche in 1882 when she was twenty-one and he thirty-eight. Her friendship with Nietzsche was not only almost incredibly eventful but was also ridden with a demonic excitement that cannot have proceeded

from Nietzsche alone. The interminable conversations and letters, the operatic posturings, the violent scenes and protestations, and Nietzsche's wild fury and deep depression seem to have resulted as much from Lou Salomé's visionary life as from his tormented spirit.

A few years later she met Friedrich Carl Andreas, already a distinguished student of linguistics, who succeeded in overcoming her resistance to marriage by attempting suicide in her presence. She remained married to him for fifty years, but apparently did not accept him as a sexual partner. Instead, a long succession of men became part of her life, some of them as claimants for a permanent relationship, but all rejected after a period of years or only months. Of these the most important was the young poet, Rainer Maria Rilke, who found in her the inspiration and the maternal support —she was thirty-six, he twenty-two—that, no doubt, provided a critical release for his creativity. The further list of her friends, not all men but women as well, reads like a Who's Who of the intellectual life of central Europe. Even Rilke became acquainted with her through another great writer, Jakob Wassermann, the novelist.

Yet the remarkable thing about the life of this *femme fatale* is that it was unusually productive for her as well as for the men whom she so irresistibly attracted. They found in her the most understanding of listeners (as Freud also did later), one able to bring to life in them their own emergent ideas, so that traces of her influence can be found in many of their writings. On the other hand, her unusually dominant imaginativeness, powers of reflection and synthesis, and her shrewdness of appraisal led to her own extensive writings which, in Dr. Peters' list, come to twenty volumes and over one hundred articles. She was at once one of those much-loved women of whom Freud wrote that their personalities are indelibly marked by the characters of the men they have loved and, at the same time, so emphatic a character herself that her lovers and friends reflected her too.

Inevitably, some of these many loves had tragic outcomes. Rejected men suffered, some were bitter, and two of them appear to have committed suicide on account of her. She herself lost, perhaps voluntarily, the pregnancy for which surely one side of her being longed most of all. Her literary activities also seem to have come into a period of dryness preceding the last great phase of her life following her meeting with Freud in 1911—a meeting she shortly

afterward called the 'turning point'. This too came about through another man, Dr. Paul Bjerre, who accompanied her to the psychoanalytic congress in Weimar.

Her exceptional capacity for comprehending new ideas and reading from them consequences which even their begetters did not expect would have shown itself in other situations, but she was particularly well prepared to understand Freud. Her long preoccupation with the vicissitudes of sexuality, her personal attachments, and her firsthand grasp of the creative process, found their intellectual recognition in Freud's system. Oddly enough, however, her journal, *In der Schule bei Freud,* in a passage not mentioned by Dr. Peters, indicates a lack of insight into her own neurosis; she wrote there that it was 'no conflict between the surface and the depths' of her psyche that brought her to psychoanalysis. Her history reads otherwise. She was certainly one of those for whom psychoanalysis served to exorcise devils through reason and, at least partially, to transcend the dichotomies of experience. Though not a great innovator herself in psychoanalysis, she found in it a new medium for the expression of her own ideas.

Freud wrote once that his case histories read like novels. The biography of Lou Andreas-Salomé is more surprising than most novels, and Dr. Peters writes it well. If he does not quite succeed in showing how the many faces of Lou Andreas-Salomé could have been unified in the serenity and nobility that Freud saw in her, it may be because of her very mystery which fascinated men. It may also be because Dr. Peters had to depend so much on her published writings. Professor Binion of Columbia University has lately had access to her unpublished journals and he informs me that she concealed as much as she revealed when she wrote about herself. Her story, well told in this book, has perhaps not yet come to an end.

STANLEY A. LEAVY (NEW HAVEN, CONN.)

FREUD: A CRITICAL RE-EVALUATION OF HIS THEORIES. By Reuben Fine, Ph.D. New York: David McKay Co., Inc., 1962. 307 pp.

'This book undertakes to examine the whole body of Freud's thoughts, to clarify what he said, and to review his ideas critically in the light of the best available existing knowledge.' So the author

begins his preface. He goes on to state that in the course of writing his book he found that no comparable attempt had ever been made 'with the exception of Ernest Jones' whose work is in a different category. It would not be difficult to take issue with Fine in this regard; others have undoubtedly done the same in various ways. Fenichel's The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis, which is still the classic, certainly discusses every point that Fine makes, but in a different context and with a somewhat different aim.

What distinguishes Fine's work is that he restricts himself almost exclusively to what Freud has written. He does this by dividing his book into four parts. The first covers the beginning of psychoanalysis from 1886 to 1900: the historical antecedents, the early explorations of neurosis, and the period of Freud's self-analysis. The second part has to do with the first attempt to formulate a psychoanalytic system (1900-1914) and covers id psychology, with chapters on the unconscious, libido theory, transference and resistance, and resolution of the classical neurosis; twenty-five pages of famous case histories; the relationship of psychoanalysis to anthropology and art; and a brief chapter on the reactions of the scientific world to Freud (which might better have been omitted). The next five chapters take up ego psychology, the period of Freud's writings from 1914 to 1939. With the exception of the chapter previously objected to, Fine writes with excellent clarity and simplicity. His review of Freud's writings is admirable.

The last part of the book, entitled Retrospect and Prospect, covers subsequent developments in freudian theory, the relation of psychoanalysis to psychiatry and psychology, and the 'schools' of psychoanalysis. Here the tendency to review the field too briefly, as, for example, to treat the various schools in two pages, does not do justice to the subject. Fine is so eager to prove his thesis 'that basically today we are all freudians no matter what name we are called', that his critical objectivity leaves him. Such lapses, however, do not detract from the excellence of the major intent of reviewing and abstracting Freud's writings so succinctly, though it is a little difficult to understand why, beginning with the avowed objective of being critical, he has to press the point that 'we is all God's chillun'. This is noble brotherliness but not necessarily scientific.

The book is primarily a review and might better have been so titled. The critique of Freud is hardly substantial. It consists mainly

of tracing historically some of the changes that occurred in Freud's ideas and theories. One may wonder what audience the author intended to reach. It may very well be suitable for some sophisticated lay groups who want condensed abstracts of Freud's works. The book would also be excellent for a one-year seminar or a course in some of the ancillary professions in which an over-all view of Freud's work might be prescribed. It is hardly suitable, however, as a textbook for training in psychoanalysis because students would be expected to study original sources. Notes at the end of chapters giving further pertinent references and brief comments are extremely useful, as are also the extensive footnotes and bibliography. A chronological list of Freud's writings is appended.

Obviously committed to the historical approach, Fine makes the task of reviewing Freud's works somewhat easier. Whether this is the best way to study Freud's writings, from the point of view of psychoanalysis as a psychological system, is debatable. It is easier to teach psychoanalysis chronologically. It may be that, in the not-too-distant future, this traditional approach will give way to the presentation of psychoanalysis as a systematic science.

NORMAN REIDER (SAN FRANCISCO)

CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND CHILD PSYCHIATRY. Edited by Charles Shagass, M.D. and Benjamin Pasamanick, M.D. Washington, D. C.: The American Psychiatric Association, 1960. 225 pp.

This paperbound volume, the outcome of a Regional Research Conference in honor of Dr. Arnold Gesell's eightieth birthday in 1960, is not a report to read from cover to cover. The papers are uneven and they are only loosely related. Although many of the papers raise provocative questions about methodological obstacles to the study of child development, contributions from psychoanalysis (except Anthony's paper) and those stimulated by Piaget are conspicuously absent. Some psychoanalytic formulations that are cited are characteristically oversimplified in order that they may become categories that can be counted.

Knobloch and Pasamanick report on An Evaluation of the Consistency and Predictive Value of the 40-Week Gesell Developmental Schedule, finding it '. . . reliable and valid . . . for identifying infants

with deviations in neurologic or intellectual development . . .'. Their conclusion, however, that in healthy infants the test is useful predictively in the intellectual sphere is questionable; most workers in child development agree that later superior intelligence cannot be predicted from infant test scores. Escalona and Moriarty (1961) state that this report by Knobloch and Pasamanick is the only one not in agreement with the observation that '. . . no significant correlations have been reported between test scores obtained at less than one year of age and intelligence test scores obtained in middle childhood'. The disagreements center about the fact that what is described and measured by infant tests is related to but not the same as those functions that are assessed by tests of intellectual capacity at a later age. As Provence (1962) has stated, 'Infant tests do have predictive value if one looks at something other than developmental quotients'. Knobloch and Pasamanick go beyond the limitations of the test.

At the end of the discussion following her presentation, Dr. Knobloch indicates that adoptions should not take place before four months of age because some of the maturational neurological factors may not show up as deviant until that age and because 'I do not believe that we have ever had any difficulty in this country in placing babies four months of age for adoption'. There is increasing evidence that what happens to the baby and the adoptive mother in the first four months of the infant's life is important for their later development as individuals and as a mutually interacting couple. The developmental needs of adoptive parents as well as the infant can be seriously thwarted by not permitting healthy babies to be taken by the adoptive parents before four months of age.

The expectation that the Gesell test can do a respectable job in predicting from the forty-week test what the healthy infant's functioning intellectual capacity will become in later life tends to delay early adoptions on the questionable basis that infants and parents can be better matched after the forty-week test. Fortunately, there is growing conviction that the advantages of early placement can be protected and the risks of inappropriately placing a defective child can be minimized by a careful pediatric evaluation of the neonate.

In the authors' presentation there appears to be apprehension

that organic factors will be overlooked if one gives serious attention to psychologic factors in early child development. It is essential to realize that both factors are crucial. In emphasizing the importance of organic neurologic deviations, Dr. Knobloch states in the discussion of this paper, 'I believe there are probably many subclinical encephalitides of which we become aware merely because someone happens to do a spinal tap in a situation where he ordinarily would not have bothered if he were a little more rushed'. It is not clear what is meant by subclinical, but if Dr. Knobloch is referring to a clinical consideration of encephalitis, such a statement is capricious since the medical procedures involved in the diagnosis and treatment of this condition are serious and are not usually determined by whether the physician is rushed.

In the paper, Rate of Development, Body Build and Personality, Boyd R. McCandless interprets reports from the literature on this subject. He believes that early physical maturation is socially advantageous for boys because of society's reactions to the mature as compared to the immature boy. What is defined as advantageous emphasizes social conformity and omits such traits as independence, initiative, and intellectual development. McCandless believes that there is evidence to suggest that for girls it is a social disadvantage to mature early rather than late. The studies reported depend heavily on content interviews and projective tests. Such evidence tends to corroborate clinical impressions derived from studies of manifest behavior, but omits the consideration of underlying determinants essential for the assessment of personality development.

E. James Anthony reports on An Experimental Approach to the Psychopathology of Childhood—Micropsia. Dr. Anthony ingeniously combines clinical observations, theoretical concepts of perceptual development, and experimental methods to study the clinical phenomena of micropsia in childhood. This report is deserving of careful reading because of Anthony's attempts to utilize experimental methods that respect the complexity of the clinical subject, using the theoretical considerations of perceptual development that psychoanalysis and Piagetian inquiries have contributed. Children with micropsia often prove to be timid and introspective with a compelling interest in perceptual phenomena. They have had difficulty in autonomously establishing an image and concept of the size-constancy of a given external object when its proximity varies.

Anthony describes a phase of perceptual development between five and twelve years which results in the child's no longer interpreting the apparent shrinking of the receding object as a diminution in size of the object. Using simple visual procedures, Anthony demonstrates experimentally how vulnerable the constancy factor is to perceptual manipulations, especially during the middle years of childhood (five to twelve). The major difficulty in clinical micropsia is that of the central organization of the visual image, which can be influenced by organic, emotional, or developmental factors as the retinal image is transformed and interpreted. In micropsia determined by emotional factors, there is regression in which the retinal image replaces the centrally organized interpretation of it. Thus, there is a dominance of the retinal image in the field of perception. Anthony suggests that such a regression may be instituted to deny the danger or discomfort of what is perceived or that it may serve to defend against regressive wishes for the breast, thus relating it to the Isakower phenomenon.

Alfred M. Freedman and his co-workers, in The Influence of Hyperbilirubinemia on the Early Development of the Premature, show that increased blood bilirubin is associated with retarded development and that it is one of the specific factors responsible for an increased incidence of brain dysfunction in premature infants. Along with this conclusion they note, without explanation, that male infants are more vulnerable than female to prematurity and to hyperbilirubinemia. There is a tendency to cancel the varying influence of experience on these children, as though it is relatively the same, and can be considered a constant. Freedman lucidly discusses the need for better prenatal care for those of the lower socioeconomic groups who do not avail themselves of such care and who appear to have a high incidence of premature births.

Blauvelt and McKenna, by a method using standard stimulation of a neonate, conclude that 'the repetitive response of the neonate to perioral stimulation is shown experimentally to be precisely patterned to the pattern of the stimulation'. As one of the discussants, A. S. Norris, suggests, the method is awesome and there is the difficulty of relating the microscopic view of behavior elicited by this method to the over-all behavior of the child and mother.

Bayley and Schaefer report on one segment of the Berkeley growth study, attempting to find correlations between certain attitudes of

mothers and the development of certain personality patterns in their children. 'The data with which we are working are very complex, and we are struggling with the process of organizing them into meaningful patterns, and with presenting them in useful form.' Later they state: 'We have converted descriptive notes on both the mothers and the children into scores that can be treated statistically'. Throughout there is an effort, as the authors note, to force the clinical and observational data to fit a measuring instrument that can be analyzed statistically. For this reviewer the methods used did not clarify, systematize, or reduce the data for the purposes of making the subject more understandable. The authors state: 'We should emphasize that we are dealing with observed overt behaviors, and can thus make no direct tests of underlying conflicts or motivations'; and yet this research is reported to yield findings about attitudes, behavior, and personality development that require an understanding of underlying conflicts and motivations. For example, Bayley and Schaefer attempt to assess maternal traits in the continuum of autonomy-control and love-hostility from observations of mothers while their children are being tested. No clinical evidence is offered of the mothers' underlying reactions to or conflicts about the test or the mothers' conflicting attitudes toward the children. The ratings report assessments of friendliness-affection as compared to hostility without the data necessary for an understanding of the vicissitudes of ambivalent attitudes.

The authors conclude: 'What we do have is some evidence for trends in mother-child relationships for a group of normal [1] children. These trends show sex differences and changes over time as the children grow older. The boys in this study tended to do well if their mothers are loving at an early age and at adolescence also granted autonomy. The girls appear to be a little more consistent in their own behavior patterns, and also to show more correlation with their mothers' concurrent maternal behavior. From our data we cannot say whether the mother-child interactions are determined primarily by the behavior tendencies of the mother or the child.'

Gildea and her group relied heavily on questionnaires in their Two Approaches to the Study of Maternal Attitudes. It seems to this reviewer that research using questionnaires does not answer our need for better tools when we are attempting to make progress in the

[1] No evidence or criteria are given for what the authors consider 'normal'.

area that Freud opened up by his pioneer work. Questionnaires may help to describe defenses and to corroborate clinical impressions, but they are unsatisfactory for describing highly charged attitudes which are involved in unconscious conflict.

This report describes a correlation between the attitudes of mothers and the adjustment of children as observed by their teachers. The authors state: 'The mothers who can perceive the multiple influences on child behavior, and at the same time can see their own role as one potent influence, are relatively less likely to have disturbed children. On the other hand, the mothers who cannot see themselves as either responsible or potent are more likely to have disturbed children.'

In the last paper Albert J. Reiss sets forth a sociologist's approach to Conforming and Deviating Behavior and the Problem of Guilt. 'This paper is an exploratory study providing some empirical evidence to answer the question: How do most individuals respond to having violated a moral standard?' Reiss utilized personal interviews with one thousand eight boys aged ten to eighteen to classify types of deviating moral behavior.

It is his conviction that 'the fear of being found out and the corollary consequences of social sanctions operate against reintegration of the deviator with the larger conforming society'. He adapts psychoanalytic theory to a sociological investigation in a manner that distorts its theoretical and clinical implications. For example, in the interviews of these boys they were told, 'Now, let's think of a time not long ago when you did something you knew was wrong or bad. . . . I don't want you to tell me about it, but just think about it . . . O.K.?' Later, less than one half of the boys were asked what wrongdoing they had been thinking about. From what we know of adolescent development and of how people behave, psychoanalysts would not be surprised to find that these boys become defensive and less concerned with telling what they know of themselves than with protecting themselves from discomforts and the feelings of apprehension evoked when an investigating adult asks them to discuss their secrets of wrongdoing. Professor Reiss is surprised that '. . . boys are about as likely to show an instrumental concern for themselves as to show a moral concern for the welfare of others'. This study seems designed to evoke that finding. Guilt feelings and a sense of moral wrongdoing are related significantly to unconscious reactions,

and usually cannot be accurately assessed by interviews such as those described in this paper.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of this volume is the opportunity it provides to consider a number of research methods and designs as applied to the investigation of child development by individuals with differing theoretical and technical orientations.

ALBERT J. SOLNIT (NEW HAVEN, CONN.)

CHILDHOOD SCHIZOPHRENIA. By William Goldfarb, M.D. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962. 216 pp.

The Director of the Henry Ittelson Center for Child Research again demonstrates his creativeness as clinician, researcher, multidisciplinary team leader, and writer, in this account of twenty-six latency-age schizophrenic children, eighteen boys and eight girls, in residential treatment. Controls were a group of public school children matched for age and sex.

History, clinical observations, neurological studies, and a series of quantitative and qualitative tests of ego functions and adaptive capacities were used to assess the children. Rigorous attention was given to avoidance of bias and to independence of observations and evaluations. For example, the neurologist made his evaluations without knowledge of the neurological appraisals of the psychiatrists. The statistical data derived from over seventy tests were subjected to an independent statistical analysis by the late Irving Lorge who employed the Factors Approach. The families of the schizophrenic children (all intact families living in the neighborhood) and of the controls were studied and rated on a scale designed to yield a measure of family adequacy. Extended home visits, during which the experimenter was a participant observer with the family, made possible accurate appraisals of such variables as parental exercise of control over the child.

The findings support the hypothesis that childhood schizophrenia 'obviously is not a unitary, etiologically specific and positive disease entity relentlessly unfolding itself; it is merely a label indicating that the child deviates dramatically from normal in ego functioning, that he lacks normal guides for self-regulation, for achieving self-identity, and for differentiating himself from the world outside

himself. Aside from the deficits in ego, one notes clinically a panic-inducing state of strangeness and a complicated variety of compensatory adjustments for finding constancy.'

The study delineated two groups of schizophrenias, the organic and the nonorganic. Seventeen of the twenty-six schizophrenic children were diagnosed organic, nine nonorganic, a distribution even more striking when we learn that, while the Ittelson Center admits only the most seriously disturbed children, it excludes those with obvious neurological disorders such as epilepsy and cerebral palsy. The diagnostic procedures developed by Goldfarb and his co-workers for detecting the less obvious or 'soft' signs of organicity will be regarded by some clinicians as the most valuable single product of the research.

The similarities and differences between the normal and schizophrenic groups in general, and between the organic and nonorganic schizophrenic subgroups are presented in detail. That the nonorganic schizophrenic child is more adaptive and has a better prognosis in general than the organic was foreseen, but Goldfarb, unlike some writers on the subject, is not hopeless about the treatment of the schizophrenic brain-injured child; the discouragement of so many writers about such children probably results from their having experience only with advanced cases, schizophrenic children suffering from the secondary and tertiary effects of prolonged family, community, and medical neglect. More precise, prognostic knowledge will emerge only from early and intensive treatment (of the quality provided by the Ittelson Center) of many more children. This treatment program and its development is summarized in the introductory chapter.

The families of the normal children were found to be significantly more adequate than those of the schizophrenic group as a whole, but the families of the organic schizophrenic children were significantly more adequate than those of the nonorganic children, and not significantly inferior to the families of the normal children. Of the several possible explanations for these findings, Goldfarb prefers the hypothesis of multiple etiology which impresses me as the most parsimonious. The parental psychopathology important in the development of childhood schizophrenia is 'parental perplexity', particularly 'parental uncertainty and indecisiveness, the absence of parental spontaneity and empathy, the absence of

immediate parental sensitivity to the child's needs for gratification, parental bewilderment in the face of bizarre behavior by the child, and a striking absence of clear, definable parental control and authority'. The need for concurrent treatment of the parents is stressed.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF TWO PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC INTERVIEWS. Edited by Louis A. Gottschalk, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1961. 221 pp.

Divided into three parts, this volume consists of an introduction, five research papers, and a discussion by each contributor. Four research groups in psycholinguistics were given tape recordings of two psychotherapeutic sessions and each was asked to make an independent analysis. Autonomic changes in the patient and therapist were measured during these sessions. The investigators then met, presented their analyses, and briefly discussed each other's work. The introduction explains this arrangement, presents a description of the patient and the therapy, and publishes a transcription of each of the two sessions and a table of physiological measurements.

The investigators included workers in psycholinguistics, a physiologist, several psychiatrists, and psychologists apparently acquainted with psychoanalysis or learning theory and content analysis.

The first paper, by Hans Strupp, analyzes the therapist's activities by means of the author's familiar sets of categories and intensity scales. These scales involve such items as type of therapeutic activity, the degree of inference, and the dynamic focus of the therapist's statements, his initiative, and the therapeutic 'climate'.

Jaffe analyzes the two sessions by a series of ratios which measure diversity of word choice, rate of verbal output, and the tense of the verbs. Jaffe describes what he calls dyadic analysis—consideration of verbalizations of the two interactants collectively. His paper shows careful statistical analysis. By using five-minute intervals, Jaffe attempted to measure change in his indices as the session proceeded. It is noted that his measures seem to have little relationship to his intention of analyzing the organization of the two speakers as a unit. His three indices relate to both paralanguage and language, between which Jaffe does not differentiate.

The essence of Mahl's approach is correlation of speech variables with the patient's anxiety. Mahl, like Jaffe, introduces ratios, counts selected variables, and uses statistical correlation. He employs a 'speech disturbance ratio' and a 'silence quotient'. Mahl's techniques seem ingenious and his paper is commendable for detailed presentation of source data and statistical analysis. To this reviewer, however, his decision that his ratios measure degrees of anxiety represents speculation which Mahl treats as established.

The paper of Gottschalk, Springer, and Gleser is also based on content analysis. Unlike the previous three researchers, these men confine themselves to lexical content which they do not confuse, at least explicitly, with paralanguage. The categories are based upon psychoanalytic theory. They consist of scales to measure hostility, anxiety, and schizophrenic disorganization. The report is outstanding in its painstaking application of the technique of content analysis. Careful ratings, graphs, and statistics are presented and the method appears to be based on long-term research in establishing the categories and their validity. Their approach seems useful for clinical research in situations which call for structured description of one interactant.

DiMascio's paper is a clear presentation of the physiological data and its correlation to the psycholinguistic indices. The correlations between DiMascio's autonomic measures and the psycholinguist's ratios are not striking, a point which leads DiMascio to question the validity of the indices. One of his most interesting findings is suggestive correlations between some of the ratios in the patient's speech and the autonomic measurements of the therapist.

The psycholinguistic analyses are by far the most detailed and sophisticated this reviewer has seen. There is a pressing need in research in psychotherapy for objective analysis and the publication of raw data instead of highly generalized conclusions. These authors have shown precision and clarity of operational definition.

The work, then, is a fine example of the psycholinguistic approach, but a critique of that discipline in general should be presented to the psychoanalytic reader. The criticisms to be made apply not only to this volume but to most psycholinguistic research.

Work in psycholinguistics is limited by a tradition of method inherited from experimental psychology and chemistry. An axiom of the American experimental method is isolation of variables, and the

isolate is selected by speculation rather than research. In this volume three traditional isolations are practiced: 1, taking one individual out of his communicational and social context; 2, selecting only one modality of expression or communication; and 3, chopping out segments of time without reference to natural units of function. The meaning or reference of any event is found not within the event but in its relations. The meaning of a dream symbol lies not in the symbol alone but also in its relations to such contexts as daily residues, transference, and childhood experience. Isolation of single speech variables allows description of some mechanisms within the speech of one individual. It does not allow conclusions about communication in the doctor-patient relationship or about individual states such as affect.

The isolation of one individual and the examination of him by psychological or psychoanalytic methods permits us to learn what he intended to say, what he thinks he said, or how he feels about it. It does not tell us what was communicated. Communication is a group phenomenon like coöperation or symbiosis.

The isolation of the speech modalities from total individual communicational behavior, however, deprives us of conclusions even about the individual. Communicational behavior is an organization or totality of multiple modalities including speech, body movement, touch, and body noise. Affect is not conveyed in a single modality.

Body motion at any moment may re-enforce, negate, modify, or belong to a pattern other than speech. Furthermore, speech consists of two modalities, language and paralanguage, which also can have different functions in communication. Psycholinguistics, in general, fails to differentiate language and paralanguage and completely ignores the other modalities. To isolate one subject and then further isolate modalities of expression will leave the researcher with quite fragmentary data.

The psycholinguist then complicates his task by making a further arbitrary isolate in time. Communicational events can last from fractions of a second to years. Their length is not determined by astronomical time. Many last about one-eighth to one-quarter second, so that a five-minute interval may aggregate thousands of successive messages in one modality. Also, the meaning of behavior is determined by the way in which it is cross-referenced in larger units of time. For example, a certain type of smile may indicate that

hereafter each statement made is to be regarded as figurative. The opening statement, 'I had a dream', demands that subsequent revelation, in affect and content, have a different reference from discourse which is initiated by saying, 'I had a horrible experience'. These and other vital elements are lost in an arbitrary isolation.

In other words, within the same arbitrary unit of time will be found multiple messages with very different durations and implications, while some of the elements which are essential to the meaning will not even be contained within this arbitrary unit of time. Imagine interpreting an isolated piece of tape from the recording of an actress who was imitating someone else being anxious!

Another distortion results from arbitrary isolation and counting. The number of recurrences of behavior may indicate many things. Stuttering, for example, may continue until it is reacted to by another participant. Even if speech deviations do measure anxiety, the number of repetitions does not necessarily indicate a greater intensity of affect. Strupp takes up this general problem in his sophisticated discussion (chapter nine).

The choice of an isolate is not an a priori decision but must be a result of the research. The fragmentation of natural units distorts phenomena which have natural integrity. Such fragmentation, moreover, has been rendered unnecessary by progress in the sound filming of psychotherapy. These recently developed techniques provide a record for analysis in multiple modalities.

The methods of natural history enable us to deal systematically with the complexities of both behavior and interaction. Methods for delineating units of language have already been laid out. Work in the units of language has been carried forward markedly in twenty-five years of precise and rigorous research by the structural linguists. Thus the psycholinguists do not have to take on the tedious investigations necessary to establish these units. Rate, intensity, and other paralinguistic elements have also been under study for years, for example, in Lorenz's psycholinguistic study of speech rate nearly a generation ago. Yet there is no reference in this volume to the literature of structural linguistics, or for that matter to kinesics, interaction chronography, discourse analysis, or to the other disciplines used in analyzing communication. Mention of certain pertinent research in psycholinguistics is also omitted.

In summary the authors do a precise and competent job within

their framework, but the psycholinguistic framework requires critical reformulation. The key to human communication lies in seeing it whole rather than in atomizing it into artificial fragments.

ALBERT E. SCHEFLEN (PHILADELPHIA)

SOCIETY AND PERSONALITY. AN INTERACTIONIST APPROACH TO SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY. By Tamotsu Shibutani. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961. 630 pp.

'To understand what a man does', says Shibutani, 'an observer must get at the assumptions with which he begins'. To appreciate this book, one must accept the interactionist approach in social psychology, the formulation of 'man's personality . . . as developing and being reaffirmed from day to day in his interaction with his associates'. To the author, such a study bears to psychoanalysis and other individualistic disciplines a relation like that of anatomy and physiology to cytology. His own treatment, however, is microscopic as he dissects and defines conduct as reflected in act, in meaning, in role in the person, and in the group.

Shibutani ranges widely over variations in cultures, in communications, in the roles played by individuals, in the development of their sense of identity, their self-esteem, status, and self-control; yet he is consistently guided by one recurring theme—that those with whom an individual associates re-enforce or inhibit the tendencies peculiar to him. The author's explorations end in the contemplation of social psychology in this brave new world, courageous of necessity because it is perplexed, and awed by the potential threats of nuclear power and of automation, and by the bewilderment of living in the 'gigantic interdependent units' of industrialized urban life. Here he sees the social psychologist as mentor and as leader.

Widespread and diversified as is his field, and complex as are some of the details, he describes it simply enough for a freshman newly come to college from his father's dairy farm, or the hypothetical visitor from outer space to visualize it, to understand from it much of human society. This is largely because the author's abstractions are delineated sharply enough to serve as beacons from lookout to lookout, and his generalizations are endorsed by many examples.

So much for what the author says; what does he leave out, de-

liberately refrain from including? Reflections of Ruesch are to be found in the importance imputed to communication, whether this be information passing from one man to another, or the awareness of one's own state of mind. Sullivan's shadow falls on many pages where relations between psychopathology and disturbed interpersonal relationships are discussed. But the freudian reviewer has a sense of lack in the many instances when mention of the primary process, or of repression, or of defense mechanisms, or of the pleasure principle, would elucidate and connect phenomena described as discrete and largely unrelated and without apparent cause. Again, the forces which are described as conscience—the author scrupulously avoiding the term superego—are depicted as reactions to contemporary evaluation rather than as archaic and due to parental influences.

Yet, as the author is a social psychologist and not a classical analyst, it is prejudiced and unrealistic to compare his book to what it would have been had someone else written it. The classical analyst viewing environment and behavior as projection and expression of intrapsychic turmoil is refreshed and startled by the social psychologist who peers into the psyche from without and depicts conduct as the result of solely contemporary rather than of partly archaic forces.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG (NORTHPORT, N. Y.)

AN ANATOMY FOR CONFORMITY. By Edward L. Walker and Roger W. Heyns. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. 103 pp.

For those rooted in the clinical methods of approach this study project, financed by the Ford Foundation, is difficult to accept as a guide. Both authors see mature research as experimental and steeped in measurement and quantification. For them the historical method does not exist. This principal reduction of field implies that the clinician will not find an investigation of the various modes of behavior and awareness as manifested in the processes of identification and conformity. Worst of all, this great source of information is for the most part omitted. The result is an experimental investigation of the obvious: asking students various questions and arranging the answers neatly and statistically so that the result acquires a tinge of sophistication. No differentiation is made between apparent and pseudo conformity, taking into account the ambivalence of mo-

tivations. The role of anxiety and terror as related to conformity is not investigated, nor is the influence of transference and other elements of emotional interaction.

The authors let their postulates of Q-technique and quantification stand in their own way. That is why they do not get a final answer other than that the more valued the reward, the more frequently we see conformity of behavior. The investigators do not seem concerned that psychoanalysis is relevant here in postulating a great variety of contrasting motivations that originate from various phases of the individual's growth.

Yet this kind of *reductio ad absurdum* is what is called scientific in our age of upheaval and attracts the bulk of money available for research. The book connotes not 'an anatomy for conformity' but only the imposition of a special scheme of research onto a huge and profound problem. We do not find any sinews in this anatomy, only the brand of the Q-technique.

JOOST A. M. MEERLOO (NEW YORK)

PSYCHIATRY, VOLUME I. PRINCIPLES. Part 1, Personology; Part 2, General Psychiatry. By Eduardo E. Krapf, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1961. 244 pp.

In his presentation Krapf does not necessarily follow the doctrines of any school, nor does he offer a textbook, but rather an outline to be used in preparation for an examination. Describing himself as a disciple of Aristotle and of Thomas Aquinas, he believes that the basic position of Freud was not positivism but an anti-Cartesian humanism which serves well as the central core of a universalistic conception of man, assigning to their proper places the cerebral apparatus, the instincts, and the specific 'spiritual' energy of the ego. Within the framework of this clear, simple, and modestly stated philosophy, Krapf describes, in Part 1, Personology; in Part 2, the Principles of General Psychiatry.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (BEVERLY HILLS)

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Renée L. Gelman

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ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XLIII, 1962.

Contributions to the Twenty-second International Psychoanalytic Congress. Edinburgh, July-August 1961.

The Curative Factors in Psychoanalysis.

Gitelson discusses the theoretical curative factors already operating at the beginning of analysis. The 'more or less good' mother-child situation is the model for the relationship with the analyst with its potentialities for health. Under normal conditions, spontaneous tendencies of the libido to move from deep narcissistic attachments toward investment of external and internal objects are given an element of structure and an opportunity for ego change in a transference relationship. The analyst, by his own ego-controlled regression, achieves a diatrophic attitude, acting like a good mother in fostering the drives which permit ego development and progression. Rather than becoming a good object or suggesting 'growth' to the patient, the analyst operates as an auxiliary to the patient's ego with its own intrinsic potentiality for reality-testing synthesis and adaptation.

Nacht discusses the 'humane relation in the transference'. He feels, with Glover, that therapeutic effect must be credited not to interpretation alone, but in combination with other factors, and that the common denominator of the curative factors resides in the person of the analyst. What the analyst is rather than what he says is important.

Segal returns to the point that insight is a precondition for any lasting personality change and that all other subjects are related to it. She defines psychoanalytic insight as the acquisition of knowledge about one's unconscious through experiencing consciously and, in most cases, being able to acknowledge explicitly and verbally, hitherto unconscious processes. She feels that such insight can be experienced only in the transference relationship and credits Melanie Klein with expanding the concept of the transference. Insight is therapeutic because it leads to the regaining and reintegration of lost parts of the ego, permitting normal personality growth. This is inevitably accompanied by more correct perception of reality. Knowledge replaces omnipotence and the external world can therefore be dealt with more realistically.

The importance of integrating split-off early envy is mentioned because devaluation and excessive idealization—defenses against envy—are damaging to the ego. At the completion of analysis, the patient does not retain insight in the same way it was experienced during the analysis but subjects it to normal repression. It is therefore possible to speak of unconscious insight which is available to the ego as are other experiences under normal repression.

In the discussion, Pieter Kuiper objects to Gitelson's description of the attitude of the analyst as providing measured gratification to the patient's irrupting instincts and direction and purpose to his developmental drive. He feels that this should occur only in more disturbed patients. Many analysts treat neurotic patients as borderline cases, because of their own early experience with severely disturbed people. New insights into ego psychology, aggression, and the precedipal phase must be used in the classic analytic technique.

Pearl King agrees that the quality of the analytic situation contains the 'cure' and that Gitelson's description of the analyst's function as diatrophic seems useful if he means maintaining an open-end acceptance of the patient as he is.

Paula Heimann comments that the analyst must both respect and foster the inner psychic process which began in the patient before analysis. Criticism is directed to the clarification of the 'measured gratification' which the analyst provides, and also the instructive, advisory, and persuasive interventions described by Gitelson. Heimann feels that the analogy with the infant in the object finding stage can be carried too far; the analyst is not the patient's mother, nor is the patient the infant of long ago.

In his reply, Gitelson emphasizes that he is exploring what is already operative toward 'cure' in the patient when he comes for analysis and during the early development of the psychoanalytic situation. These may be more easily studied in more disturbed patients but are nevertheless also present in others.

Referring to Nacht's paper, Angel Garma reports continuing research concerning the motivation of incorrect interpretation on the part of candidates in psychoanalytic training. With further analysis of the unconscious attitudes producing incorrect interpretations, candidates became better therapists.

Heimann points out that Klein's last theories of the inborn nature of envy and gratitude essentially change the understanding of instinctual drives as Freud presented them. Acceptance of these theories conditions the analyst's technique in that the patient's actual fears and fantasies, based on his observation of the analyst, would appear not to be important for interpretation, while the analyst would focus on the patient's envy, splitting, and projection.

The final formulations are in terms of ego psychology. The curative factors are those which free and strengthen the patient's ego. The analyst's interpretations aim to stimulate the patient to know and to perceive himself. This self-awareness is effective only if the experience includes the emotional change and cathexis that pertains to the immediate situation.

The Superego and the Ego Ideal.

I. Herbert Rosenfeld. Pp. 258-263.
II. Superego and Time. Hans W. Loewald. Pp. 264-268.
III. Edith Weigert. Pp. 269-271.

Rosenfeld discusses the relation between the early and the later superego. In latency, because of the persistence of inner persecutory anxieties deriving from the early superego, complete and uncritical identifications with the external objects are made, thereby splitting off the persecutory and highly idealized aspects of the early superego.

In adolescence, these split-off parts normally come to the surface and are projected onto external objects, denying the real aspect of the external object. In order to achieve change in the early superego, which is concentrated around and related to reactions to early reality experiences, the relations to the mother and the breast in the transference situation must be worked through. During analysis, fixation and the original paranoid-schizoid position lessens, and the patient can move toward the depressive position which is shown in a greater capacity to experience ambivalence and, therefore, concern for the object.

Changes in the ego and object relations and in the superego can then occur. Only when the early superego has overcome most of its persecutory qualities can selective identification with real objects and their qualities take place.

Loewald suggests that structural relations be thought of in temporal terms. Psychic time implies an active relation among the temporal modes, past, present, and future. The ego represents the psychic present, which acts on the psychic past. The superego functions from the standpoint of the ego's future—which is to be reached, or is being reached, or is being failed or abandoned by the ego. The superego, as the structure looking back toward the ego, commands, threatens, rewards, loves, and hates it. Conscience speaks to us from the viewpoint of an inner future.

Loewald describes the successive stages of development beginning with the ideal ego which represents the recapture of the primary narcissistic omnipotent perception of the child by magical identification with the parental figures. At that time the distinction between inside and outside is not yet recognizable. When the œdipal objects and libidinal aggressional relationship with the œdipal figures have been relinquished, the external relationship is set up in the ego as an internal relationship; then the ego envisages an inner future for itself, the superego being the representative of the ego's futurity. The later superego is more fluid and less stable than the ego although its elements, the superego introjects, are more structured than the ego introjects and are more easily visible. The superego introjects represent the id drives as much as the drive objects, and their character is determined by the quality and strength of the libidinal and aggressive drives of the œdipus complex. They may lose their character as superego elements and may merge into the ego or regain a measure of object quality.

New elements enter and are assimilated into the structural pattern of the superego at various stages, most clearly in adolescence and during analysis, when parts of the superego are re-externalized and projected. New objects can be internalized at this time. In order for superego elements to merge into the ego, further desexualization and deaggressivization of the introjects must take place. When the superego development is distorted or pathological, the sexual aggressive character of the internalized elements is pronounced. Mourning involves the relinquishment and internalization of aspects of the lost object relationship and leads to enrichment of the superego.

Weigert points out that the predominance of identifications over introjects, of ego ideal over superego, is vital for instinctual maturation and immunity to trauma and regression. The healthy ego tends to reconcile ego ideal and superego. For this reason, these terms seem to be used interchangeably in the

literature. Deviation of the ego from the ego ideal elicits shame, while deviation of the ego from the superego is reflected in guilt.

Weigert makes a point regarding the precursors of the healthy superego which must be differentiated from psychopathological superego development. The latter results from a neurotic parent-child relationship loaded with excessive anxiety. An ego-syntonic superego endorses the ego, even through periods of intense frustration, mourning, and repentance, with the hope of ultimate reconciliation of the various dependencies on superego, reality, and id impulses. Breakdown of the child's early ego ideal and loss of primary trust mobilizes persecutory anxieties and delays or prevents ego synthesis.

Symposium: Selection Criteria for the Training of Psychoanalytic Students.

I. Marie Langer. Pp. 272-276.

II. Pieter J. van der Leeuw. Pp. 277-282.

III. The Selection of Candidates. Robert Waelder. Pp. 283-286.

Langer believes only two methods of selection are available to the psychoanalytic institute. 1. The interview serves to appraise those qualities of intelligence, empathy, and moral integrity which are assumed to be necessary as a matter of course and to eliminate obviously inadequate applicants. It also evaluates the applicant's 'vocation' which is defined as the feeling of being summoned by an inner voice, the superego, to the realization of a determination, and the degree to which he has so far been able to attain this goal. 2. Analysis is the only adequate way of recognizing the future analytic capacity and analyzability of the candidate, thus determining how far his 'vocation may be freed of its neurotic shackles'. Psychoanalytically oriented group therapy is recommended if therapeutic analysis is not feasible.

Van der Leeuw lists the following qualities as being desirable in an analyst: the capacity for introspection, identification, empathy, and self-analysis; insight into his own instabilities, 'blind spots', and limitations, and the ability to recognize his own illness; the capacity to experience the analysis as something new; integrity, maturity, and possibilities for further maturation; emotional warmth and kindness, sympathy for others, and the capacity for self-discipline.

The author feels the interview only partially determines how nearly a candidate meets these criteria. Van der Leeuw is interested mainly in the functioning of the healthy part of the candidate's personality rather than in his illness or psychiatric diagnosis. The extent to which pathological defenses are reversible largely determines the suitability of the candidate. Normal people are the most difficult to assess, and here the greatest mistakes in selection are made because many 'pseudohealthy' people hide a chronic depersonalized state.

Waelder feels that a personality with depth is more important than empathy or psychological intuition. A good candidate is free from extreme forms of abnormality. He is not a psychotic, an addict, nor a delinquent; has interest in and good contact with human beings; is intelligent, has depth of personality, and a long-standing interest in and considerable knowledge of things human. Waelder feels that only the training analyst is qualified to judge these criteria and points out the dangers inherent in contaminating the analyst-patient

relationship. He prefers that occasionally an ill-qualified candidate be selected than that the whole climate of psychoanalysis be changed by the sacrifice of confidentiality.

Research in Psychoanalysis.

The Hampstead Index as an Instrument of Psychoanalytic Research. Joseph Sandler. Pp. 287-291.

Contribution to Discussion. Ishak Ramzy. Pp. 292-296.

Sandler outlines the indexing method used at the Hampstead Clinic. A preliminary set of common categories which would eventually contain much of the case material was drawn up. Greater precision leading to further theoretical discussion and some new formulations have been a secondary gain.

Like other scientists, the psychoanalyst is concerned with modification of theories on the basis of experience. His special training and knowledge of mental processes, his capacity to observe and to suspend judgment are scientific aids to his work. Psychoanalytic material may be grossly overdetermined and the analyst's perception may be distorted. He may have a resistance to progressive integration and modification of concepts. Sandler feels that this resistance can be overcome by cultivation of a critical attitude toward ideas, by discussion with colleagues, and by honest reading of the literature.

In constructing the Index, conceptualizing and categorizing material in terms of psychoanalytic theory resulted in a closer relationship of theory and observation because of keener perception; it revealed gaps in material and some inaccuracies in understanding. Internal psychoanalytic models had to be refined so that they accorded more precisely with observations. The final stage consists of re-evaluation of analytic observation according to revised theoretical formulations. The procedure of constructing an index then falls into line with other scientific methods as a special technique of reality and concept testing.

In the discussion, Ramzy points out the intrinsic work of psychoanalysis as a research method. He carefully traces its logic and its scientific aspects. He feels that the answers to the fundamental questions of psychoanalysis have to be sought within the discipline itself. What is needed for the correction of findings, the validation of conclusions, the sharpening of its instrument, and whatever it lacks to keep it on a par with more advanced disciplines must be provided by the psychoanalytic method and its articulation.

Symposium: The Psychoanalytic Study of Thinking.

I. Meaning, Meaning Schemata, and Body Schemata in Thought. Lajos Székely. Pp. 297-305.

II. A Theory of Thinking. W. R. Bion. Pp. 306-310.

III. Thinking and Negative Hallucination. Cecily de Monchaux. Pp. 311-314.

Among the disturbances that occur in the thinking process two groups can be distinguished: 1, the regressive incursion of infantile or archaic meanings into the processes of reality-adapted thinking; and 2, the use of regressive (infantile) thinking operations and thinking methods. Controlled temporary

regression in connection with intact reality testing and the synthetic function of the ego is sometimes used in productive thinking. The analyst utilizes 'the selective style of thinking' to make his interpretations more effective.

There is a phase, perhaps in the first few weeks after birth, when sensory impressions and gratification tension are not yet organized as meaningful perceptions. This is the undifferentiated phase. The child subsequently 'apprehends' actions in the external world in the light of body experiences with which he is acquainted. These are organized by the aid of archaic meaning schemata. The elimination of contradictions apparently takes place in several developmental stages and is completed only after the attainment of puberty. In the latency period, actions are internalized, form a system, and become instruments of thought. From puberty on, the operations become formal. The schemata described seemingly elaborate Freud's transition from primary process to secondary process thinking.

Bion presents a theoretical system of thinking. 'Psychopathological developments . . . may be related to a breakdown in the development of thoughts, or a breakdown of the development of the apparatus for "thinking" or dealing with thoughts, or both.' He then elaborates on preconceptions, conceptions, and thoughts, and, finally, concepts. He limits the term 'thought' to the mating of a preconception with a frustration, using the example of an infant whose expectation of the breast is confronted with the realization of no breast available for satisfaction. The author then considers Klein's ideas of good and bad objects. Normal development follows if the relation between infant and breast permits the infant to project a feeling into the mother and reintroject it after its sojourn in the breast has made it tolerable to the infant's psyche. If the projection is not accepted by the mother, the infant reintrojects the maternally projected unacceptable feeling.

He further discusses the relationship between making projective identification, which may be normal, or may be associated with evasion by evacuation, and communication and correlation. A sense of truth is experienced if the object which is hated can be joined to a view of the same object when it is loved; this confirms that the object experienced by different emotions is one and the same. Establishment of a correlation, made possible by bringing conscious and unconscious to bear in the analysis, gives reality to psychoanalytic objects.

De Monchaux points out that, using Freud's model of the mind, regression from secondary to primary process can be understood. The re-excitation of specific memory images occurs, producing a hallucinatory revival of perceptual images as in dreams. The advance from primary to secondary process is explained by the model of the infant after the first frustration, including negative as well as positive hallucinations. A positive hallucination is a subjective perception of what does not exist. A negative hallucination is a subjective perception that something does not exist. This may be considered a primal form of denial rather than of repression. A negative hallucination results in blindness to external stimuli.

Thought disorders have been correlated to regressive and destructive fantasies toward internal imagos, and effective and creative thinking has been equated with symbolic 'good' internal imagos. However, mature thinking

should be able to overcome these early ties as well as the enactment of primitive internal emotional dramas, thus permitting new creative possibilities.

The Psychoanalytic Situation.

Affects, Emotional Reliving, and Insight in the Psychoanalytic Process. Arthur F. Valenstein. Pp. 315-324.

Contribution to Discussion. Emanuel Windholz. Pp. 325-327.

The role of affects and emotion, i.e., emotionally charged remembering and emotional reliving, is discussed in relation to the development of insight. A general theory of affects is reviewed. Psychoanalytic theory as it evolved was often a reflection of the technique in current use. At the beginning, Freud was under the influence of Breuer's experience with the case of Anna O and was using the cathartic method for the treatment of hysteria. Abreaction was essential for 'cure'. Affect (emotion) and tension were in some way equivalent. Psychoanalysis and its technique of free association came into existence when Freud developed the true dynamic theory of conflict at unconscious levels. The first theory of anxiety was concerned with repressed libido, which was directly and automatically converted into anxiety and was also connected with the idea of the habitual working off of affects in normal life, through weeping, laughter, anger, etc.

The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) furthered the development of the theory of affects. When drives could not be discharged through direct action, affect as a motor or secretory function could be the outcome. With the advent of systematic ego psychology in 1923, Freud hypothesized that anxiety arose as a signal response warning of danger. However, affects remained closely related to the concept of tension and instinctual discharge. In 1953 Jacobson pointed out that affects are not so much a substitute for inhibited direct instinctual discharge through action as an inner subjective experience associated with changes in instinctual tension, whether increased or discharged.

Valenstein proposes a new concept which he calls 'affectualization'. This is a special defense mechanism built out of affects. Resistance to insight occurs through direct discharge in the form of an emotional storm or acting out. It is not merely symptomatic of the neurosis and is closely related to the mode of instinctual satisfaction in these individuals. In addition, a superfluity of affects is unconsciously utilized for defensive purposes, often in association with instinctual derivatives and their discharge. In regard to affect and emotional reliving, the author discusses the ideas of Ferenczi and Rank which emphasize repeating and experiencing rather than remembering and understanding. Such methods may be necessary in extremely disturbed patients but not in the usual analytic patient where the ego is less malformed.

Affects, because of their close relationship to the instinctual drive and tension levels, are nearer the primary process and consequently more archaic than ideas which are an expression of secondary process and ego functioning. Mature ego psychological development implies the ability to apply intellectual reasoning and judgment to emotions. Regression in the psychoanalytic situation brings about not only increased primary process activity, but also a loss of

the function of self-observation in the ego. The presence of the analyst and the restorative and strengthening effect of his alliance with the patient re-enforces the self-observing ego, functioning in accordance with the secondary process, in its ability to deal with the experiential, affect-laden, primary process involved ego.

Windholz notes the similarity in Bibring's, Kris's, and Bertram D. Lewin's thoughts on the patient's reactions to correct interpretation and points out Valenstein's elaborations on the problem of timing and of combining intellect and emotion. Further discussion of Kris's 'good analytic hour' illustrates the importance of the analyst's alliance with the patient to protect the self-observing ego and assure secondary process functioning.

Symposium on Child Analysis.

I. Child Analysis Today. Esther Bick. Pp. 328-332.

II. The Ego's Participation in the Therapeutic Alliance. Liselotte Frankl and Ilse Hellman. Pp. 333-337.

Contributions to Discussion. Pp. 338-343.

Bick considers the slow growth of child analysis; the attempts to understand this problem; the differences between adult and child analysis from the viewpoints of student and practicing analyst; and the stresses and gratifications, both external and internal.

External stresses include financial difficulties, time consideration, and the difficulty in finding parents who will bring the child five times a week over a period of years.

Internal stresses are: the therapist's anxieties over his feelings about communicating with children; taking responsibility; conflicting with parents' expectations; and specific countertransference problems. Bick feels that countertransference stresses are more severe in the analysis of children than of adults because of the child's greater dependence, his positive and negative transference, and the primitive nature of his fantasies. The child analyst must depend more on his own unconscious to provide clues to the meaning of the play and nonverbal communication. The strain in bearing the child's suffering is intensified because of the appeal to the analyst's parental feeling.

The child analyst has to provide both an external and internal atmosphere in which the patient can re-experience irrational infantile and childhood relationships. The student analyst should do his child training while he himself is in treatment because the anxieties aroused will help to deepen his own analysis.

Frankl and Hellman point out that the child analyst must evaluate carefully the ego's relations to both the inner and the outer world. This determines his interpretation as well as his timing and formulation. The analyst's understanding of the child's need to defend himself helps to develop a confidential relationship in which the child will want to share with his analyst his fantasy life as well as his day-to-day experiences.

Interpretations must be in terms of the immature ego, perhaps not yet able to comprehend reality or abstract thinking. Direct confrontation with unconscious impulses rather than with their derivatives may have an immediate

seductive effect, or cause an anxiety outburst which precipitates flight from the threatening interpretation, or drive the child into defensive measures more intense than those established before treatment. During latency, the ego wards off the intensity of early œdipal and preœdipal wishes by strengthening its defenses and thus establishes a stronger link with external reality. Analytic work can be experienced as a threat to this equilibrium. The child can accept the analyst's role as a representative of reality and as an ally on the way to clearer distinction between reality and fantasy and between opposing forces of his inner and outer world.

The variety of problems in establishing a treatment alliance with patients in puberty and adolescence is also pointed out.

Elisabeth R. Geleerd asserts in the discussion that not only is a treatment alliance with the autonomous ego of the child necessary, but that a similar relation with the healthy ego of the parents must also be established. She points out the similarities of the various stages in child and adult analysis. The goal is the analysis of defenses, starting at the surface; the analysis of transference; and, after sufficient preparation of the ego, the interpretation of unconscious repressed memories and fantasies; and lastly, the understanding of feelings and emotional relationships by means of verbalization, leading the patient to a greater awareness of his reactions.

Geleerd contrasts the difference in interpretation by the authors of the two previous papers and feels that Bick uses Freud's earlier procedures as a model and gives interpretations before a workable transference is established. She stresses that the analyst should help the child test reality.

Bick's reply indicates some disagreement with the idea that the analyst represents reality to the child. She believes the fundamental function of the analyst is to investigate the child's psychic reality, while the fundamental method of analysis enables the child's ego to develop judgment. Nothing in the current reality of the analyst's behavior should intervene to give the transference concurrent validity. Timing, a concept centering on the child's readiness to accept a particular interpretation consciously, would have no place in the work of an analyst who is convinced that interpreting anxieties constitutes relief rather than a threat.

Hellman, in her reply, feels that timing relates to the ego's inability to accept intrapsychic conflicts and related unconscious fantasies. The interpretation must proceed from the surface to the depth. She believes that Kleinian analysis does not do this. Every child brings a readiness to transfer into the consulting room, but the transference neurosis develops during the process of analysis.

Symposium: A Reclassification of Psychopathological States. W. Clifford M. Scott. Pp. 344-350.

Newer models of metapsychological abnormality should allow 1, more adequate classification of the normal and abnormal aspects of personality at any age and 2, more adequate classification of patients, for discussion with colleagues in other sciences. Scott feels a new method of classification using the

constitutional, zonal, ego, superego, and environmental aspects would permit more than a list of single-word diagnoses, although less than the usual metapsychological analyses. He concludes with some suggestions and a warning about future work along these lines.

RENÉE L. GELMAN

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Suicide and Suicidal Attempts in Children and Adolescents. James M. Toolan. Pp. 719-724.

Toolan points out that, contrary to general opinion, suicidal attempts and suicide are not rare in childhood and adolescence. This paper reports a study of one hundred two children presenting suicidal thoughts and actions, and accounting for eleven percent of all patients under sixteen years of age admitted to Bellevue Hospital in New York City. The author feels that most such cases are a result of 1, anger at another, 2, attempts to manipulate another, 3, a signal of distress, 4, reactions to feelings of inner disintegration, or 5, a desire to join a dead relative.

Ulcerative Colitis in Children. Stuart M. Finch and John H. Hess. Pp. 819-825.

Finch and Hess review the literature concerning idiopathic ulcerative colitis in children, adding the results of their study of seventeen of them with this condition. They were unable to garner any clues as to why these children had developed ulcerative colitis, since no specific factors could be found in their psychological development. The authors present a speculative hypothesis regarding etiology built on constitutional predisposition. They then posit a mother seeking, perhaps unconsciously, the destruction or ill health of the child, and leading to what is termed a negative symbiotic relationship. The suppressed rage of the child in his struggle toward autonomy leads to the development of the symptom, and this may serve as a compromise for the child, the mother, and the rest of the family.

Parental Deviance and the Genesis of Sociopathic Personality. Patricia O'Neal; Lee N. Robins; Lucy Jane King; Jeanette Schaefer. Pp. 1114-1124.

This study represents a thirty-year follow-up of five hundred twenty-four patients seen originally in a child guidance center for various reasons and one hundred patients chosen from the schools as controls. One fifth of the original child guidance population were later felt to have criteria sufficient for the diagnosis of sociopathic personality, as compared to two percent of the control group. The authors found no form of rejection specifically directed at the child to be associated with the development of sociopathic personality, but did find that divorced parents were more likely than nondivorced parents to have sociopathic children. They feel that a relation exists between the generalized antisocial behavior of the father and that of the child.

LAURENCE LOEB

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXIX, 1962.

The Course and Outcome of Pseudoneurotic Schizophrenia. P. H. Hoch; J. P. Cattell; M. O. Strahl; H. H. Pennes. Pp. 106-115.

This is a report of one hundred nine patients with a diagnosis of pseudoneurotic schizophrenia seen in five- to twenty-year follow-up studies. There seemed to be a lifelong history of illness in many such patients. Ten percent attempted suicide during the follow-up period; two succeeded in their attempts. About one fifth developed overt schizophrenic symptomatology at some time during the follow-up period; half of these had remissions. About one third of the patients had done well, one third fairly well, and one third poorly at follow-up.

LAURENCE LOEB

Psychosomatic Medicine. XXIV, 1962.

Bereavement in Childhood and Adult Psychiatric Disturbance. Herbert C. Archibald; Dorothy Bell; Christine Miller; Read D. Tuddenham. Pp. 343-352.

The incidence of childhood bereavement was determined for a sample of one thousand Veterans Administration outpatients (of whom one quarter were diagnosed as psychotic). These figures were compared statistically with expected incidence figures from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company estimates and from other studies. As expected, the patient group showed a markedly higher incidence of early loss (before twelve years). In contrast to the control data, the patient population showed a decreasing incidence of parental loss as the age of the child increased, although the data was insufficient to delimit any specific traumatic time. MMPI studies on one hundred subjects showed marked depressive features but no typical 'orphan' profile. Problems of masculine identity predominated in those who had lost their fathers, and oral problems involving their marital partners prevailed in those who had lost their mothers.

Psychoendocrinologic Studies in a Male with Cyclic Changes in Sexuality. Harold I. Lief; Joseph F. Dingman; Melvin P. Bishop. Pp. 357-369.

In the first report of its kind, the authors detail their joint study of a twenty-three-year-old male with an eleven-year history of alternating three-to-four-day cycles of male and female behavior and feelings. Increasing homosexual impulses forced him to seek aid, and the initial diagnosis revealed a highly intellectualizing paranoid schizophrenic, with marked scoptophilic conflicts and body image confusion. As a child he had been the object of his father's sadistic behavior, with four to five daily enemas in the first years of life.

By age four he was overtly effeminate and remained so in body and behavior except for intervening cycles of masculine feelings after puberty. Although he had shown signs of somatic masculinization during the previous year, steroid assays at the start of therapy showed abnormally low androgen and FSH levels of presumed pituitary origin. Eight months later, re-assay showed a rise in both to normal levels.

After six interviews the cyclic behavior abated and was thought to have

been a defense against his homosexual impulses which became acceptable during therapy. Since there was no evidence of hyperestrogenism, the authors feel the androgen deficiency thus enhanced the predominantly female identification. The rise in androgen intensified the drive but not the behavior through which it found expression. This is consistent with the findings of Ford and Beach.

Gynecomastia in Adolescence: Effect on Body Image and Personality Adaptation. William A. Schonfeld. Pp. 379-390.

Because of the particular significance of self-image during adolescence, a study was undertaken of two hundred eighty-four men and boys with varying degrees of breast enlargement (nodules, general obesity, and gynecomastia). A group of thirty-one with pendulous gynecomastia during puberty was studied in depth. Those who used the condition as a focus for underlying psychotic or neurotic identity confusion were differentiated from those in whom the reaction seemed predominantly somatopsychic. Combined psychotherapy and reconstructive surgery is recommended for both types unless surgery is contraindicated psychiatrically.

Changes in Hydrochloric Acid Secretion in a Patient with a Gastric Fistula During Intensive Psychotherapy. Aaron Stein; M. Ralph Kaufman; Henry D. Janowitz; Milton H. Levy; Franklin Hollander; Asher Winkelstein. Pp. 427-458.

This elegantly documented, long-term psychophysiologic study of a sixty-year-old female patient with a chronic gastric fistula should stand alongside those of Engel, Wolff, and Margolin. After a preliminary study showed a persistent hyperchlorhydria, continuous gastric observations were made while the patient was in therapy with a separate individual. In an attempt to predict fluctuation in HCl secretion, the interviews were scored for the strength of the patient's basic oral aggressive drives and the status of her defenses in regard to them. There was agreement on the former, but the latter were difficult to assess.

Eight months after the start of therapy, there was a sudden drop in HCl secretion which persisted throughout the next eighteen months. At this time the patient was beginning to verbalize many of her oral aggressive fantasies, and the physiological change may have been due to this. However, the change also occurred during a period of deterioration in her relationship to the key figure of the physiologist. In this type of combined study, the erotization of the physiological procedure invests the physiologist with the major portion of the transference. Thus the drop in gastric secretion resembles the 'withdrawal-depression' type found in Monica. Although such factors add to the difficulty in predicting physiological effects, they should not prevent continued efforts in this type of individual case study.

Cardiovascular Responses and Their Psychological Correlates. I. A Study in Healthy Young Adults and Patients with Peptic Ulcer and Hypertension. Herbert Weiner; Margaret T. Singer; Morton F. Reiser. Pp. 477-498.

Cardiovascular changes were recorded in a group of army subjects coincident with the presentation of four TAT cards. The technique was designed to

elucidate the multiple psychological aspects of the experimental situation which have often been overlooked in classic physiological studies. The authors conclude that the degree of physiological response is directly related to the intensity of the interaction between subject and experimenter. The task aspect of the situation was determined by the social role of the participants and examiners (varied for sex and army rank) and further modified by the affective state and ego defenses of the subject. Irrespective of its content, when the fantasy was not communicated (card 4), there was no response. Furthermore, subjects with hypertension were remarkably unreactive physiologically because their characterological defense 'insulated' them from interacting with the experimenter.

A Remission Through Crisis in Ulcerative Colitis. Ralph J. Kahana. Pp. 499-506.

This is a well-documented account of the psychotherapy of a man with ulcerative colitis and psychological features commonly accompanying this condition, whose gastrointestinal dysfunction was related to the incorporation and threatened loss of a maternal image. A crisis occurred which was accompanied by classic Isakower phenomena and dreams of the renunciation of this incorporated figure, which the author feels were the 'equivalent of a weaning experience'. Following this there was a permanent remission of bowel symptomatology and a transition to a less narcissistic, more mature type of object relationship.

Psychological Factors Lowering Plasma 17-Hydroxycorticosteroid Concentration. Joseph H. Handlon; Ralph W. Wadeson; Jacob R. Fishman; Edward J. Sachar; David A. Hamburg; John W. Mason. Pp. 535-542.

A significant decrease in 17-hydroxycorticosteroid levels was observed in a group of nineteen normal male volunteers during the showing of a bland movie (Disney nature film). The decrease was significant in contrast to the corticosteroid rise during an overtly 'arousing' film or during various control procedures. Because of a similar corticosteroid drop during hypnosis, the authors suggest that these subjects may center their attention on the nonnoxious material and avoid anxiety producing internal or external material. Although this technique fails to explore the unconscious meaning of the bland film, the decreased endocrine response again emphasizes that the cerebral cortex may exert a continuous tonic effect on pituitary-adrenal function.

EUGENE L. GOLDBERG

Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review. XLIX, No. 4, 1962.

Death as a Countertransference. Arthur Burton. Pp. 3-20.

Burton feels that in these times patients introduce discussions of death with greater frequency and suggests that, hampered by countertransference problems toward death, psychotherapists do not deal adequately with this problem in their patients. In order to study possible manifest and latent attitudes of psychotherapists toward death, he devised a questionnaire of statement-items on death and

sent it to members of the American Psychoanalytic Association. From the replies, he concludes that psychoanalysts are not without deeply rooted defenses against anxieties about death. He discusses these defenses and divides them into three general groups, denial, displacement, and compensation. The interpretation of thanatophobia as castration or separation anxiety would be an example of denial. The overwhelming emphasis on analysis of the libido would be an example of displacement. A 'fiction of invincibility' for feelings of weakness and finiteness would be an example of a compensatory defense. Included for purposes of comparison and control are the responses to the same questionnaire from a group of Episcopal ministers.

Transference and Countertransference in a Case of a Dying Patient. Florence Joseph. Pp. 21-34.

In the termination phase of what had been a successful analysis, the analyst learned from the patient's internist that the thirty-two-year-old woman had incurable cancer. The analyst was disturbed by her profound emotional reaction to this development. She discarded what she considered might be technical rules and began to gratify all the wishes of her rapidly regressing patient. This included letters, visits, gifts, and mother-infant type of physical contact. The patient was not informed of the truth. Her dreams indicated an unconscious realization that she was dying. She increasingly lost interest in the world around her and became absorbed in the process of dying, but retained her defense against allowing her realization of impending death to become conscious. The author discusses her countertransference problems and feels that her own difficulty in accepting the physical decline helped her patient's defenses.

The Psychodynamics of *Déjà Vu*. Jerome M. Schneck. Pp. 48-54.

Schneck reviews existing psychoanalytic formulations regarding the *déjà vu* phenomenon. He discusses two examples of *déjà vu* reported by a patient and concurs with the patient's own interpretation that they represented a regression into the past which served to control time and to avoid dealing with the current problem. Schneck suggests that there is no one psychodynamic explanation of the *déjà vu* phenomenon which fits all cases.

On the Phrase, 'Beautiful but Dumb'. David B. Friedman. Pp. 100-102.

This phrase, when used by certain men, expresses an unconscious wish: 'I see a beautiful woman and wish that she be dumb (voiceless)'. Voice or intelligence often symbolizes the phallus. The phrase therefore reassures the man that the beautiful woman is not the phallic mother and permits him to have sexual feelings toward her.

The Unique Self. George Shugart. Pp. 103-112.

The sense of uniqueness, separateness, aloneness may not be intolerable until a painful feeling of loneliness also becomes associated with it. Three persons in whom this occurred are described. All three developed fantasy systems which had the following characteristic in common: each was the only real person in an empty world of fantasy and illusion that merely served to make existence more bearable.

Out of the Dream Came the Faucet. Calvin S. Hall. Pp. 113-116.

Taking off from a dream in which the penis was represented by a faucet, Hall suggests that one reason why a symbol rather than the actual object is used in the dream is that the dreamer is dissatisfied with the object and creates a better one. The dreamer in the example cited wished for a penis he could turn on and off as easily as a faucet. Conversely, in Hall's opinion, the inventor of the faucet was acting out his fantasy of a penis which could be turned on and off at will. Inventions in general must be based on dissatisfaction with what exists. Progressively more elaborate inventions, for example, from automobile to aeroplane to rocket, are motivated by unsatisfied infantile wishes.

A Psychoanalytical Interpretation of the Crucifixion. Bernard G. Meyerson and Louis Stollar. Pp. 117-118.

The cross is a symbol of love because it resembles geometrically the form of a man with arms outstretched, about to embrace, ready to love. Psychoanalysis has demonstrated man's inability and fear to love. Crucifixion, therefore, represents a warning. It shows the man who terrified mankind by loving and demanding complete love, with outstretched arms, ready to embrace, but tied and nailed in such a way that he could no longer do so.

HERBERT LEHMANN

Revista de Psicoanalisis. XIX, 1962.

Symbiosis in 'The Warrior Rests'. Jose Bleger. Pp. 173-199.

The character description of Genevieve Le Theil in this book is studied from the point of view of all the vicissitudes of the symbiotic relationship. When she arrives from Paris to collect her inheritance, she finds herself alone and, by coincidence, in a hotel room with a man who has tried to commit suicide. The contradiction of the double aspect of the 'transference' is analyzed. The vicissitudes include a phobic panic at two typical moments. The first, when she establishes the symbiotic relationship with a man, creates claustrophobia; the second, when the symbiotic relationship is weakened and threatens to break, brings on agoraphobia. This quality of symbiosis is compared to a 'pact', such as that of a patient in treatment, which leads to a negative therapeutic reaction. The element of timelessness is well illustrated in the symbiotic relationship, as is the compulsive quality of sexuality as a means of communication. In fact, there is no need to speak because communication is experienced regressively, body to body—'the freedom of the dead ones'. It is not coincidence that compulsive sexual life is exemplified in the drinking bouts preceding intercourse. 'In that way life is experienced with no anxiety, no annihilation, and the sexual relation becomes a technique to pacify all types of anxieties. This is a vicious cycle feeding itself.'

Time is Stopped by Claustrophobia and Actualization—A Clinical Description. Reggy Serebriany. Pp. 218-233.

Analytic work is understood as a special type of omnipotence. The patient can handle the analyst only by complete control and thus becomes omnipotent

because 'now I am he and therefore I cannot leave'. When the situation is immobilized, he shows rage and fear. This is a technique he has used in real life—always running and getting nowhere; but he cannot stop and rest because it means 'to have time', and the symbiotic relationship would be threatened. Technically, he handles the fears by vomiting, severe diarrhea, and other somatic attacks. But these techniques will fail because the projected anxiety cannot be controlled on the outside; hence, the agoraphobia. The author stresses the 'nontemporal' in which time is denied. Time must cease and become 'an ever present today' because the ego can deal with it only through immobility; otherwise time must be denied.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

John A. Cook

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

March 12, 1963. PATHOGENESIS, SYMPTOM FORMATION, AND ENERGETICS. Mortimer Ostow, M.D.

Dr. Ostow discusses the pathogenesis of mental illness from the economic point of view, using data from his daily observation of analysands whose symptomatology and mental states he controlled by the administration and withdrawal of two types of antipsychotic drugs, reciprocal in their action. The tranquilizers relieved some acute, excited attacks of schizophrenia and mania and, when given in excess, produced symptoms characteristic of melancholia, whereas the antidepressives, or 'psychic energizers' had a reverse effect, relieving melancholia but, when taken in excess, producing mania and schizophrenia. If, as according to Freud, melancholia reflects an ego libido impoverishment, while the excited states reflect a surfeit, then it may be postulated that the tranquilizers act by depleting the ego of its libido and the antidepressives or 'psychic energizers' by increasing it.

Dr. Ostow refers to his paper of 1962 describing the construction of an indicator of an ego libido supply based on nine clinically observable variables. Using pharmacological agents to control libido supply and this indicator to measure its level quantitatively, it becomes possible to make observations from which a theory of pathogenesis based on energetics can be developed.

The first theoretical conclusion is that ego-libido depletion is a normal homeostatic mechanism whose function is to correct actual or threatened flooding of the ego by libido; when the device overcorrects, a deficiency syndrome such as melancholia results. The homeostatic mechanism may be replicated by giving some patients a small amount of tranquilizer along with basic energizing supports. In such cases the patient, instead of passing from melancholia to mania or schizophrenia as he would ordinarily do with an energizer alone, actually remains within a channel of libido fluctuation not unlike that of the normal person.

Object loss is seen by the author as precipitating melancholia by reason of energic imbalance. Loss of object prevents instinctual gratification and threatens to dam up the libido within the ego. The organism may overcorrect against this, especially if a concurrent narcissistic blow precludes narcissism as a defense. Anxiety and guilt may also trigger a depletion syndrome when they are sufficiently intense to provoke surrender of the object. The concept that accumulation of libido always precedes libido depletion is in accordance with classical theory, which postulates such accumulation as an initial result of inhibition of instinctual discharge; it is also observable clinically that libido plethora occurs at the beginning of an illness and usually gives way subsequently to a state of libido deficiency.

A depletion state characterized by a decline in libido level may often be masked by a condition of paradoxical hypermotivation. This is a mixed energic condition in which signs of libido plethora exist side by side with signs of libido

deficiency. The impulses which appear are not derived from the genital libido, but are characterized by a clinging, anaclitic, oral, or anal quality, and a strong aggressive component of pregenital origin. Patients in this state react paradoxically to the antipsychotic drugs. Thus a tranquilizer unexpectedly increases excitement and an energizer reduces it for an interim period, following which the expected drug action prevails. The explanation of the phenomenon is that to counteract declining libido levels the organism draws on pregenital energy. The drugs seem initially to act paradoxically because the compensatory use of pregenital energy is inverse to the directional trend of the genital libido level, the latter being directly affected by the drug.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Louis Linn commented on the originality of this contribution in exploring the psychological and behavioral consequences of energy shifts. He gave a hydrostatic analogy of Dr. Ostow's thesis.

Dr. Max Schur raised several theoretical questions. If the ego is the sole reservoir of libido, how may one then consider the id which comprises the instinctual drives and which supplies energy to the ego and superego? Is there not also a conflict regarding the ego-libido level as decisive in the formation of illness, when the ego is more customarily seen as an organ which mediates between the demands of the id and the environment, and contains the drives or, if necessary, executes them according to a compromise between the pleasure-unpleasure principle and the reality principle? Dr. Schur also questioned whether we can really utilize an energy concept as applied to the ego which neglects the concept of aggressive energy and the way the ego deals with it.

Dr. Edith Jacobson questioned whether Dr. Ostow's theory was as congruent with classical theory as he believed it to be. For instance, in Mourning and Melancholia, Freud alludes to the reduced libidinal cathexis characteristic of melancholia, but he means reduced cathexis of the self-representations and not of the ego. In On Narcissism: An Introduction, Freud speaks of the damming up of narcissistic libido in schizophrenia, but he does not intend to say that as a result of this damming up the psychotic's ego libido increases. Dr. Jacobson felt that Dr. Ostow's theory does not distinguish sufficiently between ego and id. It suffers also in that it stresses libido quantities at the expense of an adequate consideration of the role of aggression and of the dynamic and structural aspects of illness. She also questioned whether we can categorize mania, schizophrenia, and paranoia in one class. She saw difficulties in the use of clinical indicators of libido level and asked, if projection is indicative of high libido level, how may we consider the libido level of a paranoid depressive?

Dr. Leo L. Orenstein raised the question, should the analyst administer the drug or should someone else be delegated to do so?

In response to the discussion, Dr. Ostow asserted that so far as questions of fact were concerned his observations were correct. Placebo effects could be discounted as a factor because the effect of each drug given was specifically recognizable and typical. Drugs should be administered and their effects measured by one person, the analyst. They should be given, however, only when not to do so would threaten the analysis. The aggressive energy used in symptom-formation is a function of the libido state, he asserted. In the center of the

libido range, aggressiveness is minimal. In states of plethora or paradoxical hypermotivation, aggression is usually directed to the love object; in states of deficiency it is usually directed against the self.

JOHN A. COOK

March 26, 1963. A SECRET IN PREPUBERTY (ITS BISEXUAL ASPECTS). Marjorie Harley, Ph.D.

Dr. Harley describes a particular version of a secret, observable in the analysis of two girls in prepuberty, which seemed directly traceable to the special nature of bisexual interplay in this period. She traces the changing content of this secret to the changing texture of the girls' inner life. Analytic writings on the phase specific aspects of prepuberty emphasize a girl's increased phallic strivings but tend to reserve her bisexual conflict for the pubertal and postpubertal periods. Many authors also have emphasized the central and crucial conflict of this period as the girl's endeavor to loosen the precœdipal ties to the mother.

Dr. Harley emphasizes that in prepuberty the meagerness of differentiation between boys and girls in their general body build and configuration may contribute to intense bisexual conflicts and confusion. The girl's supposedly wholly feminine identifications (breast size, high heels, hairdos) are frequently endowed unconsciously with bisexual attributes. As puberty draws nearer, the close intermingling of bisexual strivings begins to give way to the girl's efforts to delineate her own sexual identity.

Dr. Harley's clinical example concerns a girl who suffered a series of traumata during the precœdipal and œdipal stages. These included a disturbed mother-infant relationship, severe somatic illnesses, early and forceful weaning and bowel training, and traumatic primal-scene observations.

The patient's 'secrets' expressed the desire for the father's phallus, and later a bisexual procreative role. Her first fantasy was of wresting 'infinity' from God. The second fantasy was of being endowed with creative talent by God, where she is chosen as the 'special one' and 'sprinkled with magic fire'. She also told of a secret fear that her feces would 'start to come out and get stuck'. The most obviously bisexual secret was, first, her wish to be the Virgin Mary ('If someone married God, it was like becoming God') so that she was both a woman and God; and, second, a fantasy of having a perfect twelve-year-old daughter, popular, beautiful, and intelligent, even though on her honeymoon, her husband discovers that she also has a penis!

Her bisexual fantasy of a self-produced baby allowed her to retain the father's phallic powers and combine them with the achievement of motherhood, which probably had furnished the earliest basis for her feminine ideal. It was a fantasy, supreme in its narcissism, ultimately traceable to the earliest overvaluation of the parents, yet one in which both parents could now be surpassed. Dr. Harley sees three conditions of prepuberty as having been particularly conducive to the formation of this secret: the indiscriminate arousal of infantile sexuality from all previous developmental levels, the peculiar nature of bisexual interplay during this period, and the maturational demands in preparation for the future.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Samuel Ritvo felt that the evidence for the increased importance of bisexuality conflicts in girls during prepuberty seemed quite convincing. The sense of identity at any age has a large root in the concept of body structure and organization, and certainly the meagerness of body differentiation between the sexes in prepuberty would be expected to have an important phase specific effect. He noted that early menarche in girls with disturbed backgrounds often led to very disturbed and violent acting-out behavior. He inquired about the relative absence of the mother in the case material presented and whether a dread of the mother could have led to the marked degradation of the father as part of a defensive reaction.

Dr. Jacob Arlow commented on this 'delicately told and meticulously documented' case as indicating again the relationship between ego structure and mythology. He felt that the major conflict, however, was not so much the conflict over bisexuality as it was the struggle between emerging womanhood and the particularly intense wish for the father's penis. He also suggested that there was an unusual vicissitude in the manifest structure of the fantasy because it attempted the undoing of the usual pedagogic function of the religious myth (the fantasy usually serving to allow the child to identify with the Virgin Mary, thus strengthening the moral qualities of the girl for motherhood). Here, instead, the girl attempted to attain omnipotence and thus foster her own narcissistic needs. Dr. Arlow related and compared the myths of the Annunciation to the Madonna, and its male counterpart, the Consecration of the Prophet, in both of which the aggressive components are denied. Also an important ego aspect is the denial of aggressive wishes against the father and his phallus. Myths take on deeper meaning when we understand them also as part of a defensive struggle. Finally, he felt that every childhood fantasy has some mythological root.

Dr. Philip Weissman inquired whether, in girls whose fantasies involved the Virgin Mary myth and the Immaculate Conception, there could be a prediction of the fear of intercourse in adult life.

In reply, Dr. Harley stated that actually the mother did play a paramount role in the analysis, but this had not been emphasized here because of the specific nature of the presentation. She also felt that the degradation of the father was related to the girl's persistent desire to have her father's penis and her rage because of her failure. She emphasized again that the secret was a clear-cut bisexual fantasy with much evidence for this; also, the child's religious education was practically nil and did not appear to influence the development of the fantasy. Finally, she mentioned that the patient actually had an intense fear of intercourse and penetration, and it seemed likely that this could persist as an active factor in adult life.

BERNARD D. FINE

April 9, 1963. PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES ON JOSEPH CONRAD: THE FAMILY ROMANCE. Bernard C. Meyer, M.D.

The family romance fantasy played an extraordinarily large role in the life and works of Joseph Conrad. It led him to massive attempts at acting out his fantasy identifications with great masculine figures—which attempts invariably

ended in humiliation, disaster, and disease. His preoccupation with Stanley and his world-acclaimed African rescues led Conrad to his ill-fated effort to pilot a boat up the Congo. Other attempts at acting out resulted in periods spent as a French sailor-adventurer, as a master mariner in the British marine, as a great lover on the island of Mauritius. The 'protector-protegé' aspect of the family romance, which Kris demonstrated as characteristic of the artist, was exemplified in his relationship with several men, especially Ford Madox Ford (also an 'author in search of a character'), with whom Conrad had a mutually shifting father-son relation, to the great enrichment of his own creativity.

The 'rescue', or 'need of rescue', element in the family romance was not confined to the Stanley episode but permeates Conrad's writings and characterizes an astonishing number of heroes, heroines, and even villains: Alice Jacobus (A Smile of Fortune), Razumov (Under Western Eyes), and especially Rita de Lastola (Arrow of Gold). Conrad himself can be recognized as Rita's swashbuckling lover, wounded in a duel for her sake and nursed back to health by her. Here the various elements of his own family romance are grouped: the rise to lofty station, the heroism, the rescue.

Conrad's personal identity was inconstant throughout. His avowed rejection of Catholicism and the accompanying nostalgia for it is paralleled, in the professed Englishman, by a lifelong passion for the suffering of his native Poland and extreme sensitivity to charges of betraying her cause (*vide:* the Patna episode in Lord Jim). As a boy, Conrad exemplified another special element in the family romance encountered in gifted children, one that had implications for his sexuality as well. Kris found that the history of the artist frequently includes an episode in which the child is discovered in some 'childish activity' and receives, in place of the expected punishment, his father's approbation and support. In Conrad's case, he was discovered reading some of his father's writings, which his father then ordered him to read aloud. By condoning his son's poaching on his own literary preserve, Conrad's father gave added charge to the boy's ambition to embark on the same road. It eroticized his writing, moreover, so that in productivity he alternated between unhappy 'impotence', as he called it, and output which he described as orgastic.

His personal sexual life shows evidence of the same paternal identifications—he began his courtship at the same age his father was when he married; his wife's age, at marriage, was the same as his mother's. But in his fiction, the men are regularly undone by androgynous, dangerous, active women, frequently through 'penetrating' action. Such a woman is strikingly portrayed in an illustration Conrad drew for Arrow of Gold, and a man and woman of this type, with the roles grossly reversed, are depicted in another series of drawings shown when this paper was presented.

Much of Conrad's relationship with women and much of his writing can be understood against the background of his tragic memories of his mother. When his father was exiled to northern Russia for proscribed political activities, Conrad and his mother accompanied him; during this journey the little boy became seriously ill of pneumonia, and was nursed back to health by his mother. Shortly thereafter, when Conrad was five, she fell ill of tuberculosis and died before he was seven. Compare this with Rita's nursing of M. George for his

chest wound, then to disappear forever. In his actual relationship with a Brussels woman, eleven years his senior, he adored her, wrote her nearly one hundred letters, addressed her as Aunt, and portrayed himself as a sick, helpless, hurt child. Toward the close of his life, he was obsessed with a yearning to return finally to his motherland where he hoped to find his elusive self in her embrace.

His death (in England) was hastened by bitterness over the secret marriage of his son—a betrayal of father by son, a recurrent theme in his fiction. Toward the end, too, the theme of the 'lethal' woman overcame him even in connection with his devoted wife—he accused her of evil designs. He died in 1924, and it was in the Roman church in Canterbury that he found 'port after stormie seas'.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Edward D. Joseph commented that while the family romance fantasy was extraordinarily prominent in Conrad's life, his search for a hero was also motivated by the search for his real hero-father, a revolutionary honored by Polish nobility and granted the unique distinction, for a proscribed man, of a public funeral. His uncle's efforts to lure him away to his mother's side were unavailing. Ford was not the only, nor even the greatest, male influence in his adult life. His letters to Garnett evidence a son-father relationship as well as gratitude for inspiration to create. The search for males was determined, additionally, by fear of women whom he conceptualized as distant, predatory, and lethal.

Dr. David Beres stated that conflict, which is ubiquitous, is ordinarily dealt with by fantasy or action or, failing these, symptom. The artist has open to him the additional outlet in that he can communicate and externalize his conflict in creation and thus share his anxiety and guilt. The question remains, why Conrad wrote fiction rather than poetry, or why he did not adopt another artistic medium. Many authors (e.g., Anna Freud, Friedlander, Peller, Sachs) have noted the relationship of the story to the masturbation fantasy. Dr. Meyer pointed out the relevance of his hypothesis for Conrad as exemplified by his inhibitions in writing, his dilatoriness and suffering; and, on the other hand, by his physically exhausting, orgastic method of working. Conrad's writing illustrates the principle that what makes the artist is the ability to deal with conflict by the creative act. There is an optimum distance from the conflict where it can be experienced and stated without the individual's being overwhelmed by it. Where Conrad's neurosis supervened, his art failed, e.g., in his relationship with women.

Dr. Phyllis Greenacre offered an explanation for the ubiquity of the specific kind of biographic formula described by Kris: the poor shepherd boy discovered, recognized, and launched by the great man whom he then surpasses. This is the artist's own legend of himself, his own version of the family romance, and is almost inevitable in a creative person. Uneasy awareness of unusual talent gives special pressure to œdipal problems, with a consequent need to find a patron who will, as materialized family romance father, permit and even further creative interest, rather than be threatened by it. The identity problem of this artist may have been more involved in his personality than in his family romance, and there is evidence of perversion and approach to impostorship. As for the

role of his mother, it may be that her death from tuberculosis during the œdipal period of Conrad's life created birth guilt as well as fear of this disease. Could his sea-wandering have been a search for her, and his self-inflicted chest wound an expression of a bisexual wish and reunion?

Dr. Bernard Brodsky underscored the striking fact that Conrad, although a Pole and the son of a patriotic Polish writer, became an author in English. In painting, where words are not involved, it is easier, but here it must be accounted part of the family romance.

Dr. Victor Rosen asked, how can undisguised family romance and masturbation fantasy become literature? He suggested that this comes about through the distance created by: 1, transcending them in general terms and æsthetic ambiguity (disguise); 2, removal of the person of the writer by the use of a pen name (disavowal); or, as perhaps here, 3, by writing not in his native tongue (Polish), nor even in his second (French), but in his third language (English). Was distance attained by transformation of language?

In closing, Dr. Meyer commented that in Conrad there were great variations in the maintenance of the conflict-free area where talent could be freely exercised, so that both the grandest and the most platitudinous prose followed each other, sometimes in the same book. Agreeing with Dr. Rosen, Dr. Meyer speculated that if Conrad had not written in English, he might not have written at all. As for impostorship and perverse character, Conrad seemed truly to believe that what happened to others really happened to him.

MILTON MALEV

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

November 19, 1962. PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES ON ADDICTION: EGO STRUCTURE IN NARCOTIC ADDICTION. Robert A. Savitt, M.D.

The complete paper was published in this volume, No. 1, pp. 43-57.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Max Schur stated that he was pleased that the American Psychoanalytic Association is planning to appoint a committee to study this most pressing problem of addiction. He agreed with Dr. Savitt that the intravenous route and its effects may achieve for the addict the symbolic meaning of complete fusion with the mother, of complete re-fusion of self and object representations, and even of the return to the womb, but he wished to stress that we should not ascribe a primary motivational or etiological status to what is secondary symbolization. He felt that this error is made at times in the psychoanalytic literature. Dr. Schur mentioned certain conditioning experiments *in utero* by psychobiologists, factors which are possibly quite important but which never reach the status of mental representation. He called special attention to certain aspects which have to be considered in addiction: different degrees of structural maturation; the immediate and prolonged consequences of the addicting agent; the impact of the route of administration (the intravenous route being tied up with immediate regression and rapid psychological deterioration);

sociological factors, especially the age of the patient when initially exposed; and the inescapable factor of delinquency.

Dr. Sidney Green discussed certain characteristics of infant behavior as revealed by recent research on neonates and young infants that appeared pertinent to the problem of addiction. He spoke of severe infantile depression, especially marasmus, where the infant's oral apparatus is useless as an avenue of nutrition and vascular feeding must be resorted to as a lifesaving measure. These infants are unable to respond to the conventional ministrations of maternal figures and require, in addition, the impersonal intervention of parenteral nourishment. He discussed the importance of the young infant's 'state' at any given time in determining his ability optimally to register and respond to relationship-promoting stimuli; he further suggested that the mothers discussed may have been unable to provide their infants with the proper kind, amount, or timing of care. Children such as these frequently grow up and remain unable to identify their actual feelings and needs involved in interpersonal experiences.

Dr. Gustav Bychowski spoke of his experiences with addicts, especially in Europe, and the many modifications of classical technique which have to be used. He stressed the problem that some of these patients have in handling aggression. Some develop a paranoid personality structure. Others resort to somatization and develop psychosomatic symptoms which provide a rationalization for addiction. Finally, a large group develops a passive feminine character with a strong masochistic streak. The underlying personality structure is clearly seen during the period of drug withdrawal.

Dr. Merl Jackel discussed a case of heroin addiction in a 'call girl' treated by psychotherapy. A highly ambivalent conflict with the mother was transferred to the drug and the opiate appeared to be used to counteract a withdrawn, almost stuporous state. He hoped that Dr. Savitt would soon report on the technical handling of these patients.

Dr. Sidney Tarachow congratulated Dr. Savitt on his ability to get these most difficult patients to work in analysis. He contrasted the addict with the catatonic in whom the active use of the mouth is seen as dangerous and has to be bypassed. He mentioned the importance of the 'minor addictions' which cluster around the transference in many cases and require analysis.

Dr. William Niederland presented material from the analysis of a female pill addict. In contrast to Dr. Savitt's patients, the father, himself a chronic pill user, was the key figure in the addiction. He also stressed the pathology of the oceanic feeling and the marked need for warmth and bodily contact that addicts express; how they wish desperately to return to the breast and to be lovingly enveloped by mother.

Dr. Melitta Sperling spoke of a patient she had analyzed who had become a codeine addict in an attempt to control migraine attacks. She remarked upon the relation of the migraine to depression and stressed the destructive and suicidal impulses of this patient. In the analysis of an exhibitionist she had found that exhibitionism occurred under the pressure of overwhelmingly strong destructive impulses and was not so much a means for seeking pleasure as a defense against intense anxiety, 'as if a catastrophe was imminent'. She wondered whether this was not similar to the situation in the cases of addiction.

In closing, Dr. Savitt re-emphasized the gradations in degree of ego impairment. All cases, however, show an archaic ego structure with extreme difficulty in impulse control, especially of the aggressive drives.

STANLEY S. WEISS

MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR PSYCHOANALYTIC MEDICINE

February 5, 1963. A PSYCHODYNAMIC FORMULATION FOR PSYCHOTHERAPY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY. Lionel Ovesey, M.D.; Willard M. Gaylin, M.D.; Herbert Hendin, M.D.

The authors describe a theoretical approach to the treatment of male homosexuality with the admittedly narrow focus of a 'definitive therapeutic goal of establishing and maintaining pleasurable heterosexual behavior in a homosexual patient'. The motivational basis for homosexual and pseudohomosexual behavior is described as threefold: homosexuality, dependency, and power. The latter two are considered nonsexual though using genital organs to achieve their aims whereas the former component, homosexuality, utilizes sexual gratification as an end goal.

The homosexual motivation is based on fear, derived from parental discipline particularly in regard to sexual behavior, or from nonsexual intimidation that interferes with assertion and assumption of the masculine role. Subsequent heterosexual desire in the growing male is felt to be dangerous with fantasied punishments of castration or death, thus reviving earlier fears, inhibiting normal sexual expression, and resulting in the 'safer' homosexual object choice. Other solutions for the same infantile conflict may be impotence, fetishism, and exhibitionism. Homosexuality may be viewed as a symptom, a defense against castration anxiety by phobic avoidance of the female genitalia.

The dependency motivation is nonsexual and in the adult is an indication of adaptive failure. The wish to maintain the earlier mother-child relationship is projected onto other adults. The resultant failure of assertion, stemming from earlier inhibitions, is misinterpreted as a failure in the masculine role, and hence as a castration. Magical repair of this failure is based on the equation breast equals penis and consists of the magical incorporation of the penis through sucking or *per anum*.

The power motivation is a denial of weakness (dependency) in the nonassertive male and is acted out in homosexual relationships in terms of dominance and submission. The relationships are symbolically placed in a male-female contest in which the weaker male is forced to submit (as a woman) to the stronger male. This unconscious conception of power struggles between men derives primarily from œdipal rivalry and to a lesser extent from sibling rivalry. Fantasies of control and power through domination are a significant aspect of homosexual behavior.

These three motivational components are present in varying degrees in all homosexuals. The nonsexual motivations enhance and shape the psychosocial structure and mechanics of the homosexual relationship. A dynamic is estab-

lished in which any real or fantasied male contact, where power and dependency are motives, leads to a wish for homosexual gratification. Conversely, homosexuality inhibits assertion and strengthens dependency needs, or brings about the compensatory striving for power or a mixture of both.

The psychoanalytic treatment consists of interfering with this mutually reenforcing cycle by decreasing the intensity of all its components, with primary emphasis on the homosexual motivation and phobic avoidance of female genitalia. The simultaneous exploration of the patient's unconscious, fearful fantasies is essential but not an end in itself. The phobic homosexual must attempt heterosexual intercourse until successful in its mechanics and in the achievement of pleasure.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Aaron Stern summarized two major points, one explicit in terms of a theoretical psychodynamic construct, the other implicit in terms of the fundamental significance of learning relative to a given psychodynamic complex in successful therapy. The assumption that insight guarantees positive therapeutic results has not been corroborated by studies. The ego, rather than release of impounded drive flow, is the crucial agency in treatment. Dr. Stern questioned the methodology leading to formulation of the interactive system of the three basic motivational components as the etiological force in the psychic structure of the homosexual.

Dr. Lawrence C. Kolb noted that in the case cited neither the way in which the therapeutic change had occurred nor the actions of the therapist had been made explicit; he emphasized the need for changes in the superego and for the therapist to behave differently from past figures, thus helping the patient establish a different set of values. He assumed this had occurred in the treatment described by the authors. Dr. Aaron Karush spoke of the necessity for a self-rewarding system in setting new behavior patterns, emphasizing that identification with the analyst is crucial.

Dr. Ovesey restated that this is a formulation on psychodynamics, not on technique. It provides a therapist with an understanding of the unconscious motivations that impel the homosexual to flee from women and seek contact with men. Such an understanding enables the therapist to use emotional insight therapeutically.

HENRIETTE R. KLEIN

The Fall Meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held December 6 through 8, 1963, at the Commodore Hotel, New York City. The preliminary program includes four panel discussions, entitled: Prepuberty and Child Analysis; Some Aspects of Psychoanalytic Methodology; Theory of Psychoanalytic Therapy; and Repetition-Compulsion.

The twenty-first annual meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOSOMATIC SOCIETY will be held at the Sheraton-Palace Hotel, San Francisco, on Saturday and Sunday,

April 4 and 5, 1964. The Program Committee invites interested persons to attend and to submit abstracts of original work to be considered for presentation. Abstracts should be limited to one, if possible, or at most two pages of double-spaced type. Those accepted will be printed and circulated to members of the Society prior to the meeting and will be available in San Francisco at a minimal charge. Abstracts, in eleven copies, should be submitted by December 1, 1963 to the Chairman, Carl Binger, M.D., 265 Nassau Road, Roosevelt, New York.

Dr. Charles Fisher, a training psychoanalyst on the faculty of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, was the ALFRED P. SLOAN VISITING PROFESSOR in the Menninger School of Psychiatry, Topeka, Kansas, from July 15 to August 15, 1963.

The following officers have been elected by the SOCIEDADE BRASILEIRA DE PSICANÁLISE, São Paulo, Brazil, for 1963-1964: President: Prof. Henrique Julio Schlomann; Secretary: Prof. Lygia Alcántara do Amaral; Treasurer: Dr. Flávio Rodrigues Dias.

CORRESPONDENCE

Dear Mr. Evans:

Your paper on Serendipity, published in THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY, No. 2, 1963, was sent to me by Dr. Arthur A. Miller of Chicago because I am known to have a special interest in Serendipity.

I write to call your attention to the definition from which you reached some erroneous conclusions and which led you to use the word Serendipitist improperly to describe one suffering from certain abnormalities.

You claim that the dictionary definition (which you fail to cite) is technically correct. My guess is that it is from the Oxford English Dictionary. Unfortunately, this definition is incompatible with the very etymology supplied by Oxford and therefore the definition is a distortion of the word invented by Walpole. This I will demonstrate.

The dictionary definition omits the essential component, *sagacity*. You correctly quote the gist of Walpole's definition on page 167 which includes it: discovery 'by accidents and sagacity of things which they were not in quest of'.

Without sagacity you do not have Serendipity; you concerned yourself with what is left. This residue could be anything you wish to call it—except Serendipity. Whatever the maladies suffered by your patients which led them to become helplessly engulfed in labyrinths of unimportant and unrelated miscellany, their discoveries are not the result of Serendipity nor therefore are they Serendipitists.

The correct use of the words Serendipity or Serendipitists is self-contradictory to the symptoms described above and as gleaned from your paper.

Nevertheless, you call this patient 'a confirmed Serendipitist' and describe him as a 'snapper-up of unconsidered trifles of knowledge'. Where is the sagacity? The words quoted appear on pages 165 and 166 and are verbatim from pages 1 and 2 of Beards by Reginald Reynolds (Doubleday, 1949). On page 168 of your paper, you cite Mr. Reynolds (for the first time) as your authority who described symptoms which you adopt as typical of a Serendipitist.

Who is this man Reynolds? You describe him as a humorist. But if you ploughed through his book beyond pages 1 and 2, you would doubt that he is. You would also find that his introduction was only a means of attracting attention by the use of a word, Serendipity, which was then (1949) even more exotic (or 'magical', to use his own adjective—see page 178 as noted below) than it is today. It is not a book on Serendipity. I checked the index to find and examine his treatment of the subject matter. What follows is his total contribution except for his introductory remarks on pages 1 and 2:

P. 52: Although indexed, no mention of the subject appears.

P. 53: 'Assessment of hair pulled from the roots. In a word, there is serendipity enough to drive a man mad, but not a word that I can find about fining a man for pulling another's whiskers.' No comment.

P. 116: For no apparent reason he entitled a paragraph: 'Mere Serendipity'.

P. 178: He includes 'Serendip' as one of a number of names he regards as 'magical' as 'Trebizond'.

P. 294: He gives an example of a custom prevailing in a distant island and concludes his book with: 'Significantly this island was none other than Serendip. *As they say in the movies, this is where we came in.*' This last deathless statement is his, the italics mine.

I read little of Beards other than the pages referred to, but what I read was fulsome enough to convince me that he had been successful in collecting as dreary a mass of trivia as ever was entrapped in a single book coming to my attention. For example: titbits about boiling corpses; the measuring of damages for the stealth or the wrongful death of a cat—with details; *ad nauseam.*

Mr. Reynolds is known for another collection of miscellany, running to three hundred pages, under the title Beds, also published by Doubleday. This is relieved only by a whimsical bibliography in which he cites all the books on the subject which he did NOT read. He has a noteworthy treatise on 'Water closets', indexed by this title on the Library of Congress card for his book, Cleanliness and Godliness.

You furnish better authorities and more appropriate examples of Walpole's splendid definition but with the denigrating comment that they were contrary to the spirit of the inventor. You refer to Professor Abbott's discovery of the Boswell Papers as being hailed as 'the most extraordinary example of serendipity in literature'. It would have been well to have furnished the citation for this statement. It looks fruitful.

Your quotation from Ernest Jones is not so illuminating as one from Sigmund Freud would have been; Jones did this in the sentence preceding your quote. The sentence is from the preface to the third English edition of The Interpreta-

tion of Dreams (which you state is Freud's major work), i.e., 'Insight such as this falls to one's lot but once in a lifetime'. This is the quintessence of true Serendipity.

I cannot argue with your psychoanalytic nomenclature since you are a psychoanalyst and I am not. But you cannot play Harry with an important word about which you are misinformed and which could set a dangerous precedent if incorporated into your professional nomenclature by a perverse act—resulting in an antonym of Serendipity.

I do find fault with some of your logic. You say your unfortunate patient learned Hebrew in order to understand the private conversations of his parents which took place in Yiddish. Maybe it is not your logic which is awry—but there is as much in common between Yiddish and Hebrew as there is between Walpole's Serendipity and Reynolds' concept of what constitutes a Serendipitist. In Hebrew and Yiddish the alphabet is the same. Almost all the letters appearing in Walpole's Serendipity are found in Reynolds' word Serendipitists. Many Hebrew scholars and most Sabras do not understand Yiddish. I could not communicate with such people while in Israel a number of years ago. I have but a smattering knowledge of Hebrew and I thought I could rely on Yiddish. The roots of Yiddish are mostly Germanic.

Instead of a psychoanalytic approach to the word Serendipity, it may be that an examination of the Walpole enigmas with relation to that word could constitute a new and useful contribution not only to your profession but to general literature as well. I offer these for such an examination:

1. Walpole's apparently faulty memory of details he tried to recall of one of the many stories in a collection entitled The Three Princes. He recounted it with numerous errors and omissions in his letter to Mann. He read a French translation (di Mailly, 1721, Amsterdam) of the Italian collection published in Venice in 1557. (See Paget Toynbee: Walpole Letters, Vol. 2, Supp., p. 93. See also Horace Walpole's Correspondence, edited by Wilmarth Sheldon Lewis, Yale, Vol. 20, p. 407, fn. 3, and Appendix II.) Lewis does not share your low opinion of Serendipity nor has he ever expressed any irony with which Walpole allegedly viewed the tales of the three princes or his definition. To the contrary, see Mr. Lewis's autobiography, Collector's Progress, pages 236, 240, and 241, to learn his opinion of the awe-inspiring implications of Serendipity.

2. Walpole's failure to supply connecting links to support his conclusions that the princes' gifts constituted Serendipity as defined by him.

3. Walpole's unwarranted appellation of 'silly'. It might be helpful to indicate that there may be some connection between the use by Walpole of a mechanism from one of the tales of The Three Princes for his own device to get his Castle of Otranto started. It should be remembered that the Castle was the first great Gothic or murder mystery in English.

The Walpole enigmas, however, do not diminish his contribution to the English language—his splendid definition of a word he invented.

A scholar would find that the tales are not silly. They have been the subject of study and research by German scholars since 1583 when Johann Wetzel translated and commented on them. The Sanskritist and philologist, the eminent Theodor Benfey, in the nineteenth century made a learned but incomplete

study of them. Imagine this—scholars, including German scholars, in 1932 commemorated (safely in Helsinki, to be sure) the fiftieth anniversary of the Jew Benfey by compiling a *Festschrift* (Folklore Fellows, Communication No. 98) completing the Benfey study. Silly indeed!

Your brave but erroneous use of the word Serendipity will not meet with much enthusiasm from your brethren who respect Jones and revere Freud. I strongly suspect that you did read Dr. Walter Bradford Cannon's autobiography since you mention the Saul incident, which is familiar as an example attributed to Dr. Cannon. The enthusiasm for Serendipity by the medical profession is so great that in a single issue of the Journal of The American Medical Association (December 21, 1957) there were two articles and an editorial on the subject. Recently the Archives of Internal Medicine had an editorial on Serendipity, and the January 1963 issue of the Illinois Medical Journal contains a paper on the subject.

In conclusion, remember Serendipity is Walpole's word. Since he invented it, it is wrong to confuse others with any substitute definition. Walpole's concept was magnificent. With great economy he defines an age-old baffling phenomenon.

THEODORE G. REMER

Chicago, Illinois

Dear Mr. Remer:

Although Walpole invented the word serendipity, he did not exactly define it: 'you will understand it better by the derivation than by the definition'. He then tells his little story. So everything depends on how you interpret it. It is my contention that if you take it seriously it is quite absurd. Who could possibly be interested in the activities of this one-eyed mule? And why commemorate such a discovery?

But if you perceive the irony of it, then this 'silly' little fairy tale springs to life. And this is the whole point. It is an exceedingly ironic comment on those who constantly allow themselves to be deflected from the important and devote their intelligence and their time to matters which are relatively unimportant, things which are trivial, amusing, or out-of-the-way—what, in fact, we call 'curiosities'. A two-eyed mule is useful but a one-eyed mule unusual. And at this point we have arrived at caricature for this is the only sample we are given of the princes' accidental discoveries. The story tells us much of the mentality of the collector: its wit is in its brevity.

Never once in this letter did Walpole even hint that the methods of the princes should be regarded as a paradigm for scientists. But there is a hint that this is a paradigm for collectors who are always making discoveries accidentally. And Walpole uses the story in order to introduce his item of news: he has come upon a Venetian coat of arms. If you miss the irony you miss the point. But there is more.

Why did he call this story 'silly'? You explain his use of the word in terms of his errors and omissions and his apparent faulty memory of his sources. But

we are only concerned with the story as he told it, for that is the version he called silly.

Why did he? Here is my answer, a psychoanalytic one, but none the worse for that. Having told this ironic little story—a cartoon if you like—this 'masked gentleman' caught a fleeting glimpse of himself and he responded to that flash of insight with the word, silly. You will recall Macaulay's judgment of Walpole: 'The conformation of his mind was such that whatever was little seemed to him great, and whatever was great seemed to him little. Serious business was a trifle to him, and trifles were his serious business.' And again: 'In everything in which Walpole busied himself, in the fine arts, in literature, in public affairs he was drawn by some strange attraction from the great to the little and from the useful to the odd'.

I have said that Walpole momentarily saw himself in the portrait of the three princes. Macaulay would also agree: 'He had, it is plain, an uneasy consciousness of the frivolity of his favorite pursuits'. And Walpole himself? In his letter to Conway (August 18, 1774), he is ironical at his own expense when, with his tongue in his cheek, he calls himself the greatest philosopher in the world, 'without even having thought of being so: always employed and never busy; eager about trifles and indifferent to everything serious'. Why the defensive irony? Defensive against what? I would reply, against a still small voice that said to him, 'you are no different from the the princes in the fairy tale', who, you will remember, were always applying their gifts to the accidental discoveries of things they 'were not in quest of'. And no doubt Walpole would be reminded of his increasing obsession with his museum of curios in Strawberry Hill.

What, then, was Walpole in quest of? This man of talent enters politics but he could never be the formidable prime minister—with all his faults—that his father had been; not even a smalltime politician if, as Macaulay said, he was more interested in lath and plaster than the results of the Middlesex elections; and still less a great statesman if, as Macaulay said, he cared about 'a miniature of Gramont more than about the American Revolution'.

Where could this highly gifted man have reached his full stature? You have only to glance at the letters to get the answer. Here was a superlative writer with a shrewd eye for the foibles and hypocrisies of that leisured, elegant society he knew so intimately. Perhaps he might have become the great ironic novelist of his century. We know that he had conflicts about writing, regarding himself as an amateur. What prevented him? I think the answer is in that little cartoon, as I regard it, in his ever-increasing passion for collecting curiosities. Strawberry Hill, that strange curiosity shop, became, I think, his substitute satisfaction, his consolation prize.

In order, then, to understand serendipity, one needs to know more of the mentality of the connoisseur and the collector: for this obsession with what Chesterton once called 'tremendous trifles' can crowd out every other interest in life so that eventually one is left with a dilettante.

And now about 'accidents'. That is commonly the way a collector makes his discoveries and is indeed part of the pleasure. But it is not the way a scientist makes his. Facts do not of themselves fall into ordered patterns. In-

sight must be brought to bear on those facts, and that is no accident. Ernest Jones, in discussing Freud's Psychology in 1910, put it very simply: 'Psychical processes are never isolated or accidental phenomena, but are as precisely related to preceding and succeeding ones as are successive physical events; there is no more room for "chance" in the mental world than in the physical one'. Apples have been falling ever since Eden but it was no mere chance that Newton 'fell into a speculation on the power of gravity' and then asked himself this daring question, 'why not as high as the moon and, if so, her motion must be influenced by it'. Freud also speaks of the 'chance opportunity' he had to observe a child's play. But the insight he brought to bear was no accident: you will find the reason in the long train of thought that had preceded it over many years.

On the other hand, if you reject the principle of psychic determinism, how are you to explain these sudden insights? Why not call them accidents—no better than a slip of the tongue? And what have you said of the man to whom the honor is due? He was lucky. I find it hard to believe that such is your point of view.

Now concerning this sort of scientific discoveries to which Walpole's word has applied, you will agree that a classification is not an explanation—unless you include the concept of 'accident' in your classification, in which case there is nothing to be explained. But if you set out to find out why the discovery *appeared* to be accidental and what factors are involved, then a whole field of investigation is opened up. How far is it possible that a scientist may have known the answer but without knowing that he knew, i.e., it was repressed. Why, after asking his profound question, did Newton put the matter aside for twenty years? One could go on.

You use the word abnormality. I think it would help if one remembered that normality is a mental concept and that nothing is gained by dividing people into normal and abnormal. It is all a matter of degree, and this I emphasized in my paper: in some instances the deflection may be slight, in others crippling. In fact, there is something of Walpole in all of us.

W. N. EVANS

P.S.

I thank you for your correction and your explanation of the differences between Yiddish and Hebrew.

About Mr. Reynolds: if a writer is ironical and you are unaware of the fact, then what he says may sound absurd. But in this instance the publishers were kind enough to provide a helpful blurb warning the unwary of this writer's 'dead-pan, mock-serious scholarship'. The point about his satire on 'the perils of Serendip' (page 1) is not to be found in checking the index, but in the structure of the book. He stumbles on a pedantic statement in a learned journal when he was 'marooned' on the Isle of Serendip, which for him is the reading room of the British Museum. He sets out to investigate it. In doing so he travels through all the byways of pedantry and displays all the curiosities which he had discovered 'by accidents', etc. In the last paragraph he brings you back to Serendip. The whole book is an exercise in self-irony for he, too, had read the little fairy tale and seen a reflection of himself: but he does not

repudiate what he has seen for he knows that he suffers from 'this incurable disease'. Jesters often perceive truths that are denied to princes, and this one knew what Walpole meant when he emphatically stressed that one condition without which no man can qualify as a serendipitist: you must never find what you are looking for.

W. N. E.

Chester, England

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Index

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INDEX

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