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FREUD'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE

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From the earliest days of his concern with aphasia *(2)* and the cathartic treatment of hysterical illness *(3)*, Freud gave thought to the psychological nature of language. His most systematic discussion of the subject is to be found in the Project for a Scientific Psychology *(4)*, and he referred to themes set forth therein throughout his subsequent writing.

Freud developed a conceptual model of language which dealt with its role in consciousness, its relation to thought, the development of language in the child, its origins as an instrument of social communication, its function in the restitutive efforts of schizophrenic patients, and the motivated nature of parapraxes and distortions in language. The psychoanalyst's interest in Freud's model of language may therefore be shared by anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists studying verbal behavior. The present paper describes this model of language and considers some of the criticisms directed against it.

The most striking and most puzzling thing Freud said about language was that it provides the distinction between a conscious and an unconscious idea. The proposition, in its simplest and most often quoted form, may be found in The Unconscious: '. . . the conscious presentation comprises the presentation of the thing plus the presentation of the word belonging to it, while the unconscious presentation is the presentation of the thing alone' *(8,* p. 201*)*.

The distinction between presentation of word and presentation of thing goes back to Freud's book, On Aphasia *(2)*, in which he attempted to explain various types of aphasic disorders in terms of damage to areas of the brain contributing to the 'word' and 'thing' functions. He affirmed and used this distinction many times and with remarkable consistency throughout his writings *(4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10)*. However, in one of his last works, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Freud no longer be-

lieved that verbal associations are the only or even the crucial discriminants between preconscious and unconscious processes. He wrote: 'It would not be right, however, to assert that a connection with the memory traces of speech is a prerequisite of the preconscious condition. On the contrary, that condition does not depend upon any such prerequisite, although the presence of speech gives a safe clue to the preconscious nature of a process. The preconscious condition, which is characterized on the one hand by having access to consciousness and on the other hand by being linked with the verbal residues, is nevertheless something peculiar, the nature of which is not exhausted by these two characteristics' *(11,* p. 42*)*.

Freud then went on to inquire concerning the nature of the distinction between preconscious and unconscious. He answered: 'We seem to recognize that nervous or psychical energy exists in two forms, one freely mobile and the other, by contrast, bound; we speak of cathexes and hypercathexes of the material of the mind and even venture to suppose that a hypercathexis brings about a sort of synthesis of different processes—a synthesis in the course of which free energy is transformed into bound energy. Further than this we have been unable to go. Nevertheless, we hold firmly to the view that the distinction between the unconscious and the preconscious condition also lies in dynamic relations of this same kind, which would explain how it is that, whether spontaneously or with our assistance, the one can be changed into the other' (pp. 44-45).

The apparent change in Freud's theory of the role of language in the distinction between unconscious and preconscious seems to have encouraged the view that his earlier ideas were mistaken. Kris, for example, wrote: 'At a time when Freud still characterized the preconscious as a functional system, he considered verbalization as one of its functions. Unconscious thoughts, he believed, had to pass through the stage of verbalization on their way to consciousness; feelings could reach consciousness "directly". Freud later avoided the obvious pitfalls of this assumption. . .' *(14,* p. 543*)*.

Holt, quoting the passage in The Unconscious given above, stated: '. . . this attempt to explain consciousness in terms of verbal ideas will not hold up. . .' *(13,* p. 498*).*[1]

Earlier Schilder had offered an explicit criticism of Freud's view. 'Freud has developed the rather complicated idea that the difference between the conscious and the unconscious idea is not that they are different records of the same content situated in different parts of the mind but that the conscious idea comprises the concrete idea plus the verbal idea corresponding to it while the unconscious idea is that for the thing alone. The relation between sign and reference is so fundamental that it is hard to believe that it should not be present in what Freud calls "unconscious thinking" ' *(16,* p. 206*).*

Rapaport also rejected Freud's idea in discussing attention-cathexes and consciousness. The passage is worth quoting at length since it introduces the important idea of reality relations, which was, for Freud, intimately connected with language.

'The additional cathexis, which a drive-cathected idea must obtain to become conscious, is conceptualized as *hypercathexis* or *attention-cathexis.* Ideas which otherwise have access to consciousness, but at a given moment are not conscious are described as *preconscious*—that is, not countercathected, but with-

1 Holt has elaborated on his comment in a personal communication (October 16, 1962). He suggests that Freud's conception makes it difficult to account for any conscious thoughts except verbal ones, whereas there exists a whole realm of conscious and preconscious nonverbal phenomena (including imageless thought). Secondly, he believes many clinical phenomena suggest that unconscious processes may be verbal and that it is difficult to account for some primarily verbal dreams (e.g., Freud's *Autodidasker* dream [*5,* pp. 298-302]) if one rejects the idea that words can exist as such in the unconscious. It will be seen in the present discussion that Freud was aware of the first considerations mentioned by Holt and took them into account. Although auditory perceptions were given pre-eminence by Freud as the vehicle for consciousness, he recognized other sensory modalities as also capable of contributing to consciousness *but in a relatively limited fashion* as compared to verbally mediated consciousness *(10,* p. 21*).* With respect to Holt's second point, I believe this paper will make clear, first, that in Freud's view words *cannot* be unconscious and, second, that verbalizations in dreams as well as in psychotic speech, i.e., verbalizations under control of the primary process, are fundamentally different from normal waking language.

out hypercathexis. It has been assumed that attainment of attention-cathexis amounts to establishing connection with verbal traces. This is indeed often the case. However, it seems safer to assume that full consciousness of an idea entails only its hypercathecting and the availability of its relationships to all relevant psychic content; among these, its relationship to the verbal trace may or may not play a role. By contrast, a drive-cathected idea (such as a hallucinatory image, an obsessional or delusional thought, or a dream picture) usually entails perceptual memories, but may entail verbal memories also, or even verbal memories alone; but its relationships are restricted to those of the drive organization of memories; its form, unlike that of a hypercathected idea, may be distorted or symbolically disguised by these relationships. What a drive-cathected idea does not entail is its *relations* to reality by which its "unreality"—or in other words its mere "intrapsychic reality"—may be assessed.

'*Consciousness* therefore is now conceptualized as a matter of the distribution of attention-cathexes, which are available only in a certain quantity' *(15,* pp. 698-699*).*

Bearing in mind these explicit and implicit criticisms of Freud's use of language as a criterion to distinguish between conscious and unconscious, we may go on to examine in detail his thinking in this area. In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud offered the following description of conscious and preconscious: 'For consciousness, which we look upon in the light of a sense organ for the apprehension of psychical qualities, is capable in waking life of receiving excitations from two directions. In the first place, it can receive excitations from the periphery of the whole apparatus, the perceptual system; and in addition to this, it can receive excitations of pleasure and unpleasure, which prove to be almost the only psychical quality attaching to transpositions of energy in the inside of the apparatus. . . . But, in order to make more delicately adjusted performances possible, it later became necessary to make the course of ideas less dependent upon the presence or absence of unpleasure. For this purpose the *Pcs.* system needed to have qualities of its own

which could attract consciousness; and it seems highly probable that it obtained them by linking the preconscious processes with the mnemic system of indications of speech, a system not without quality. By means of the qualities of that system, consciousness, which had hitherto been a sense organ for perceptions alone, also became a sense organ for a portion of our thought processes. Now, therefore, there are, as it were, *two* sensory surfaces, one directed toward perception and the other toward the preconscious thought processes' *(5,* p. 574*).*

Freud thus postulated that the mnemic residues of speech provide the preconscious with qualities necessary to attract consciousness. However, it is important to note that he had already, in the Project for a Scientific Psychology, indicated that other modalities such as the kinesthetic *(4,* p. 445*)* can also provide the necessary qualities for consciousness. In The Ego and the Id he made this explicit again in accounting for certain preconscious fantasies involving visual thinking: 'Verbal residues are derived primarily from auditory perceptions, so that the system *Pcs.* has, as it were, a special sensory source. . . . We must not be led, in the interests of simplification perhaps, to forget the importance of optical mnemic residues, when they are of *things,* or to deny that it is possible for thought processes to become conscious through a reversion to visual residues, and that in many people this seems to be the favored method. The study of dreams and of preconscious fantasies as shown in Varendonck's observations can give us an idea of the special character of this visual thinking. We learn that what becomes conscious in it is as a rule only the concrete subject matter of the thought, and that the relations between the various elements of this subject matter, which is what specially characterizes thoughts, cannot be given visual expression. Thinking in pictures is, therefore, only a very incomplete form of becoming conscious. In some way, too, it stands nearer to unconscious processes than does thinking in words, and it is unquestionably older than the latter both ontogenetically and phylogenetically' *(10,* pp. 20-21*).*

Thus the path open to consciousness is broader than if it

were provided by language alone. It includes the mnemic residues of other sensory modalities beside the auditory, residues which are capable of making conscious the 'concrete subject matter' of past perceptions but not, as may the verbal residues, relations between such subject matters. Although it is clear that access to consciousness is not limited, in Freud's conception, to the verbal modality, he often spoke *only* of word presentations as the vehicles of consciousness, to the exclusion of such modalities as the kinesthetic and visual. Perhaps this was because he believed that the qualities associated with verbalizations permit, as do no others, the highest development of objective thought. *'Thus, thought which is accompanied by the cathexis of indications of thought reality or of indications of speech is the highest and most secure form of cognitive thought process' (4,* p. 431*).*

In describing the relation between language and thought, Freud drew on the qualitative nature of language. He said in The Interpretation of Dreams: 'Thought processes are in themselves without quality, except for the pleasurable and unpleasurable excitations which accompany them, and which, in view of their possible disturbing effect upon thinking, must be kept within bounds. In order that thought processes may acquire quality, they are associated in human beings with verbal memories, whose residues of quality are sufficient to draw the attention of consciousness to them and to endow the process of thinking with a new mobile cathexis from consciousness' *(5,* p. 617*).*

What is the nature of the quality provided by language which makes thought processes available to consciousness?[2] In the

[2] In discussing the general nature of quality, Freud wrote: 'Consciousness gives us what we call "qualities"—sensations which show a great variety of "differences" and whose differences depend on relations to the external world. Among these differences there are series, similarities, and so on, but there is nothing quantitative about them' *(4,* p. 369*).*

'Thus we must summon up enough courage to assume that there is a *third* system of neurones—"perceptual neurones" they might be called—which are excited along with the others during perception but not during reproduction, and whose states of excitation give rise to the different qualities—are, that is to

work which he did with Breuer on the hypnotic treatment of hysterical neuroses, Freud characterized language as a discharge mechanism. He found that symptoms disappear if under hypnosis the patient recovers the traumatic memory and describes the disturbing event in detail, giving utterance to the affect. The curative result was accounted for, in part, by the fact that the strangulated affect is able to find a way out through speech. 'The injured person's reaction to the trauma only exercises a completely "cathartic" effect if it is an *adequate* reaction—as, for instance, revenge. But language serves as a substitute for action; by its help, an affect can be "abreacted" almost as effectively' (*3*, p. 8).

This energic aspect of language may be understood more clearly from the discussion of language and quality in the Project for a Scientific Psychology. Here Freud introduced the idea of speech associations in order to account for conscious observant thought. The reasoning was as follows:[8] 'We now have to find a mechanism which will cause the ego to follow perceptions and influence them. This mechanism lies, I believe, in the fact that, according to my hypotheses, a perception invariably excites ω, that is, passes on indications of quality. To put it more accurately, it excites consciousness (consciousness of a quality) in W: and the discharge of the perceptual excitation furnishes ψ with a report which in fact constitutes the indication of quality. I therefore suggest that it is such indications of quality which *interest* ψ in the perception. Here we seem to have the mechanism of *psychical attention*' (*4*, p. 417).

In discussing how memories are laid down Freud said: 'The perceptual neurone is hypercathected. The quantity that is compounded of external and psychical quantity (Q and $Q\hat{n}$) flows

say, conscious sensations' (p. 370). Further on, Freud attributed quality to the periodicity of an excitation rather than to its quantity.

[8] The editor's notes explain ω and ψ as follows: 'The system of ω-neurones is also frequently referred to as the system of "perceptual neurones" [or "W-neurones" . . .]' (*4*, p. 355, n.). '. . . the ψ-neurones are retentive, serve the purpose of mastering internal stimuli, and are to be identified with the superimposed gray matter of the brain' (p. 360, n.).

away along the best facilitations and will overcome a certain number of barriers, according to the resistance and quantity concerned. . . . But finally the current will come to an end in this case too in one or more terminal cathexes. The outcome of attention will be that in place of the perception, one or more memory cathexes will appear, connected by association with the initial neurone' (p. 420).

If the memory traces are again cathected with attention, a quantity of energy will once more begin to flow along the path of best facilitation. The problem for observant thought must be to get as exhaustive a knowledge of the perceptual object as possible. 'For this reason a ψ-cathexis is once again required for the memory images which have been reached; but some mechanism is also required which shall direct that cathexis to the right places. . . . A mechanism of attention, such as the one described above, once more presupposes, however, the presence of indications of quality. . . . Indications of quality normally arise only from perception. Thus it is a question of obtaining a perception from the passage of a quantity ($Q\eta$). If, in addition to the mere passage, there were a *discharge* attached to the passage of the quantity ($Q\eta$), that discharge, like any other movement, would give rise to a *report* of the movement. After all, indications of quality are themselves reports of discharges. . . .

'This purpose is served by *speech associations*. These consist in the linking of ψ-neurones with neurones which are employed by auditory images. . . . These speech associations have the advantage over others of possessing two further characteristics: they are circumscribed (i.e., are few in number) and exclusive. The excitation proceeds from the auditory image to the verbal image, and thence to discharge. If, therefore, the memory images are of such a kind that a branch stream can pass from them to the auditory images and motor verbal images, then the cathexis of the memory images is accompanied by reports of a discharge, and these are indications of quality and at the same time indications of the memory being conscious. Now if the ego precathects these verbal images as it earlier precathected the

images of the discharge of perceptions, it has created a mechanism for directing the ψ-cathexis to the memories which emerge during the passage of quantity ($Q\eta$). Here we have *conscious, observant thought'* (pp. 421-422).

Freud then went on to consider how, beside making cognition possible, speech associations make it possible to remember thoughts. '. . . the facilitations produced by *thought* leave only their result behind them and not a *memory*. . . . Now the indications of discharge by way of speech help to make good this lack. They put thought processes on a level with perceptual processes; they lend them reality and *make it possible to remember them'* (p. 422).

These quotations from the Project may be summarized as follows: perceptions give rise to indications of quality which excite consciousness and attention. The outcome of the energy flow related to external and psychical quantity (Q and $Q\eta$) in perception is that memories are laid down. In order for attention to range systematically over these memories, some indications of quality, such as those that arise in perception, must be available to guide the attention. If there were a *discharge* associated with the passage of psychic quantity, this would give rise to indications of quality which could guide attention. Speech associations provide such discharge opportunities. They do so in the following way: 1, excitation (presumably associated with initial attention) passes via a branch stream from the memory image to the associated auditory image, to the verbal *motor* image, and thence to discharge; 2, reports of discharge give rise to, or are themselves, indication of quality, which in turn lend consciousness to the memories; and 3, there is thus a mechanism —tied to word presentations—which permits attention to bring systematically into consciousness a connected series of memories. This is conscious, observant thought. Finally, speech associations, because of their indications of quality, put the thoughts with which they are linked on a level with perceptual processes and make it possible to remember thoughts.

Freud repeatedly stressed the verbal *motor* aspect of language.

This he did because the idea of energy discharge and the attendant consciously perceivable quality are crucial in his discussion. The clinical application of this concept of energy discharge has already been alluded to in reference to Freud's use of the 'talking cure' *(3,* p. 38*)* in the treatment of hysteria. In the Project, Freud was explicit about the role of language as an energy discharge mechanism associated with thought:[4] 'Thus we have found that the characteristic thing about the process of cognitive thought is that the attention is from the start directed to the indications of the discharge of thought—that is, to indications of speech. It is well known that what is known as "conscious" thought is accompanied by a slight motor expenditure' *(4,* p. 424*).*

Let us now go to a discussion of language in secondary and in primary process. The role of language in secondary process was stated succinctly in The Unconscious. 'The system *Ucs.* contains the thing cathexes of the objects, the first and true object cathexes; the system *Pcs.* comes about by this thing presentation being hypercathected through being linked with the word presentations corresponding to it. It is these hypercathexes, we may suppose, that bring about a higher psychical organization and make it possible for the primary process to be succeeded by the secondary process which is dominant in the *Pcs.' (8,* pp. 201-202*).*

But what of words that appear in dreams, whose forms are determined by primary process? Does the presence of words in dreams contradict the statement that the hypercathexis associated with word presentations makes it possible for primary process to be succeeded by secondary process? In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud said: 'For the dream work cannot

[4] It is noteworthy that in this respect (as in others) Watson's ideas of language were very close to Freud's. Watson said: 'My theory does hold that the muscular habits learned in overt speech are responsible for implicit or internal speech (thought). It holds, too, that there are hundreds of muscular combinations with which one can say either aloud or to himself almost any word, so rich and so flexible is language organization and so varied are our overt speech habits. . . . Soon *any and every* bodily response *may become a word substitute' (17,* p. 192*).*

actually *create* speeches. However much speeches and conversations, whether reasonable or unreasonable in themselves, may figure in dreams, analysis invariably proves that all that the dream has done is to extract from the dream thoughts fragments of speeches which have really been made or heard. It deals with these fragments in the most arbitrary fashion. Not only does it drag them out of their context and cut them in pieces, incorporating some portions and rejecting others, but it often puts them together in a new order, so that a speech which appears in the dream to be a connected whole turns out in the analysis to be composed of three or four detached fragments' *(5,* p. 418*).*

This was clearly an effort to distinguish between language as a primary process and language as a secondary process phenomenon. Furthermore, in A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams, Freud said: 'We have already in The Interpretation of Dreams described the way in which the regression of the preconscious day's residues takes place in dream formation. In this process thoughts are transformed into images, mainly of a visual sort; that is to say, word presentations are taken back to the thing presentations which correspond to them, as if, in general, the process were dominated by considerations of *representability*. . . . Only where the word presentations occurring in the day's residues are recent and current residues of *perceptions,* and not the expression of *thoughts,* are they themselves treated like thing presentations, and subjected to the influence of condensation and displacement. Hence the rule laid down in The Interpretation of Dreams, and since confirmed beyond all doubt, that words and speeches in the dream content are not freshly formed, but are modeled on speeches from the day preceding the dream (or on some other recent impressions, such as something that has been read). It is very noteworthy how little the dream work keeps to the word presentations; it is always ready to exchange one word for another till it finds the expression which is most handy for plastic representation' *(9,* p. 228*).*

This differentiation between language as a primary process

and language as a secondary process phenomenon may, I believe, be given further definition by drawing from an important area of linguistic theory. The noted French linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure, advanced a distinction between what he called *la langue* and *la parole*. Of these two aspects of language de Saussure said: 'Among all the individuals that are linked together by speech, some sort of average will be set up: all will reproduce —not exactly of course, but approximately—the same signs united with the same concepts. . . . In separating language *(la langue)* from speaking *(la parole)* we are at the same time separating: 1, what is social from what is individual; and 2, what is essential from what is accessory and more or less accidental' *(1,* pp. 13-14*)*.

La langue may be described as consensually valid language, that which makes communication possible, while *la parole,* in its extreme form, may be described as idiosyncratic speech. I will try to make the essence of this distinction clear. If a patient uses the nonsense word 'gryx' to refer to the object 'horse', his listeners will not respond in a way consistent with his psychic representation of 'horse'. If the patient uses the word 'horse' to refer to the object 'cat', others will again respond in a way inconsistent with his psychic representation. These are discordances in the patient's speech, between thing presentation and word presentation, *as seen from the point of view of* la langue, *the communal language.*

Freud's ideas suggest that 'gryx' and 'horse' in the examples offered above are not language as we ordinarily understand it, that is, consensually valid language, in which a communally accepted word is matched with a common experience. In these cases either the word is not communally accepted or there is a disjunction between communal word (word presentation) and communal experience (thing presentation).

The distinction between secondary process and primary process language also entered into Freud's interpretation of the language distortions of schizophrenic patients. 'In schizophrenia *words* are subjected to the same process as that which makes the

dream images out of latent dream thoughts—to what we have called the primary psychical process. They undergo condensation, and by means of displacement transfer their cathexes to one another in their entirety. The process may go so far that a single word, if it is specially suitable on account of its numerous connections, takes over the representation of a whole train of thought' *(8,* p. 199*)*. Furthermore: 'It turns out that the cathexis of the word presentation is not part of the act of repression, but represents the first of the attempts at recovery or cure which so conspicuously dominate the clinical picture of schizophrenia. These endeavors are directed toward regaining the lost object, and it may well be that to achieve this purpose they set off on a path that leads to the object via the verbal part of it, but then find themselves obliged to be content with words instead of things' (pp. 203-204).

In the restitutive efforts of schizophrenic patients, words are operated upon in a primary process, rather than a secondary process, manner. Like other drive-organized presentations, words have meaning for the patient not through a consensual validation that insures fulfilment of reality requirements, but through arbitrary, idiosyncratic connections and features.

We may turn now to development. The Project for a Scientific Psychology provided an account of the earliest phases of language development, which stem on the one hand from experiences of pain and on the other from imitative tendencies in the infant. 'There are, in the first place, objects (perceptions) which make one scream because they cause pain; and it is an immensely significant fact that this association of a sound (which also gives rise to motor images of the subject's own movements) with a perception that is already a complex one emphasizes the *hostile* character of the object and serves to direct attention to the perception. Where otherwise, owing to the pain, one would have received no clear indications of quality from the object, the report of one's own scream serves to characterize the object. This association is thus a means of

making conscious memories that cause unpleasure and of bringing attention to bear on them: the first class of *conscious memories* has been created. It is a short step from here to the discovery of speech. There are objects of a second kind which are themselves constantly giving vent to certain noises—objects, that is, in whose perceptual complex a sound plays a part. In consequence of the impulse to *imitate* which emerges during the process of judging, it is possible to find a report of a movement [of one's own] attaching to this sound image. So that this class of memories too can now become conscious. It remains to associate *deliberately produced* sounds with perceptions' *(4,* p. 423*).*

These ideas relating to the experience of pain were in part forerunners of what in later psychoanalytic theory became the 'reality principle' *(6).* The screaming of the child is the early paradigm of registration in consciousness (as opposed to repression) of verbalizations associated with unpleasure so that impartial judgment may be passed upon them. Freud devoted a long section in the Project *(4,* pp. 437-440*)* to a discussion of how painful memory images become 'tamed' and how the release of unpleasure associated with such images can be taken by the ego either as a signal to abandon a particular path (in the case of practical thought), or can be disregarded by the ego (in the case of theoretical thought).

It is interesting to note that Freud considered the social function of speech as communication to be a secondary acquisition. 'The innervation of speech is originally a discharge in the nature of a safety valve for the benefit of ψ, serving to regulate the oscillations of quantity ($Q\eta$) in it—a part of the path to *internal change,* which is the sole means of discharge until the "specific action" has been discovered. This path acquires a secondary function by attracting the attention of some helpful personage (who is usually the wished-for object itself) to the child's longing and distress, and thenceforward it serves the purpose of bringing about an understanding with other people

and is thus absorbed into the specific action' (pp. 422-423).[5]

The primary role of speech, in its earliest stages, is as a mechanism for the moderation of psychic energy prior to discovery of the specific action. This earliest function of speech as described in the Project is like the discharge function given such an important measure of responsibility for the curative effects in treatment of hysteria *(3)*.

The importance of language in ego has been implicit in the discussion of language and consciousness, language as an energy mechanism, and language and secondary process. In The Ego and the Id, Freud offered a schematic diagram showing the relation of the *Pcpt.-Cs.*, *Pcs.*, ego, id, and repressed *(10,* p. 24*)*. He gave a special place to the acoustic function in the diagram and said: 'We might add, perhaps, that the ego wears a "cap of hearing"—on one side only, as we learn from cerebral anatomy. It might be said to wear it awry' (p. 25). In the diagram, as we should expect, the acoustic cap was placed in the area of the *Pcs.*

Finally, from The Ego and the Id came the suggestion that not only the ego, but also the superego originates in things heard. 'In all these situations the superego displays its independence of the conscious ego and its intimate relations with the unconscious id. Having regard, now, to the importance we have ascribed to preconscious verbal residues in the ego, the question arises whether it can be the case that the superego, in so far as it is *Ucs.*, consists in such word presentations and, if it does not, what else it consists in. Our tentative answer will be that it is as impossible for the superego as for the ego to disclaim its origin from things heard; for it is a part of the ego and remains accessible to consciousness by way of these word presentations (concepts, abstractions)' (p. 52).

Let us come back to Freud's comments in An Outline of Psychoanalysis *(11)*. In the light of the foregoing discussion, a

[5] *Cf. 4,* p. 379.

careful reading of the passage quoted earlier from page 42 of the Outline and of the related sections will reveal that Freud was not abandoning his idea of the role of language in the distinction between unconscious and preconscious, but was essaying a more general characterization of the difference less intimately tied to the specific manifestations in language. We have already seen that Freud attributed access to consciousness to all indications of quality, including visual, kinesthetic, and verbal. The Outline suggests that the peculiar nature of the preconscious condition is related to the type of energy (bound energy in the preconscious as contrasted with mobile energy in the unconscious). In his discussion of Freud's concept of bound versus free cathexis, Holt pointed out that one important meaning of binding is that 'the cathectic charge becomes increasingly more difficult to separate from its idea, a state that is aptly called bound. A bound cathexis stays with a content, at least for the most part, contributing to the sustained identity of thoughts' *(13,* pp. 517-518*)*. Further, Holt offered the following definition: *'Binding is a synthetic process, carried out by hypercathexes, wherein drive cathexes are stably linked to mental representations.* It is a quantitative, not an all-or-none concept, so that free energy can be thought of as becoming increasingly bound, as we go from the primary process pole along the continuum of thought toward the secondary process pole' (p. 521).

This idea of binding appears to fit language as a consensually valid event, in which a particular word is commonly experienced by members of the community as referring to (bound to) a particular set of events. It is important to note that we have here introduced via language a communal criterion of binding, or of secondary process, which is ultimately the criterion of the reality of a thought process. The language of an individual, then, to the extent that it reflects a shared reference, i.e., that it is consistent with *la langue,* is a manifestation of the binding of drive cathexis. That is, it indicates that the individual accepts and uses the name given by his community to a particular

experience. The consequence of this contract is nothing less than the acculturation of the individual. To the extent that the individual's language is inconsistent with *la langue*, his language reflects primary process and absence of the communally valid reality. The schizophrenic patient who calls people by a code number rather than by name is using language in a primary process manner, since his private code is not shared by others, even though it has been thoroughly learned and is consistently used by him. Language, by nature, is that realm of human behavior which is most socialized as compared, for example, to kinesthetic and visual experiences which also produce 'indications of quality'. Freud believed that 'thinking in pictures' is only an incomplete form of becoming conscious, but that it is nearer to unconscious processes than 'thinking in words' *(10,* p. 21*)*.

The discussion of Freud's views of language offered here emphasizes the dimension of communal reality in language as a secondary process phenomenon. Gill *(12)* has recently stressed the exceptions to the parallelism of the conscious-unconscious and primary process-secondary process dimensions in psychoanalytic theory. Freud regarded language (consensually valid language) as a nodal phenomenon through which unconscious can become conscious and which at the same time is a sure criterion of the presence of secondary process. Since word presentations carry indications of quality, either consensually valid or idiosyncratic language can never be an unconscious event. Language in dreams and schizophrenic language, that is, idiosyncratic language as distinct from *la langue*, is conscious, but under control of the primary process.

SUMMARY

Freud developed a theory of language that dealt with the role of language in consciousness, the relation between language and thought, development of language in the child, and the origins of language as an instrument of social communication.

Some psychoanalysts have been critical of his idea that a conscious presentation is associated with a word presentation, whereas an unconscious presentation is not. Drawing largely on Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology, the present paper discusses the 'qualitative' nature of language which permits thought to become conscious.

A distinction between consensually valid language (*la langue* as used by the linguist, de Saussure) and idiosyncratic speech (*la parole* in an extreme form) is offered. This distinction helps us understand Freud's statements in The Interpretation of Dreams and A Metapsychological Supplement to the Theory of Dreams. In these he says that dreams cannot 'create' speeches and suggests that dream speeches are not expressions of thoughts. The distinction between these two types of language is readily applied to language in primary process and language in secondary process.

Discussing developmental aspects of language, the paper points out that the primary function of language for the infant, in Freud's view, is as a mechanism for the moderation of energy. In the course of such energic discharges, language acquires the secondary function of social communication. In The Ego and the Id, Freud pointed out that language is central to the development of both ego and superego.

Finally, it is suggested that the definition of language in terms of communal, consensual validation (*la langue*) as opposed to idiosyncratic, drive-organized language may be related to the idea of 'binding' of cathexis.

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COLOR IN DREAMS

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Dreams have been described as being similar to silent black-and-white motion pictures *(16)*. Except in dreams of the blind *(6)*, color is the most frequent actual sensory impression experienced in dreams. Some observers *(12, 16, 25)* have reported an incidence as high as thirty percent, although the most careful analytic study reports one of fifteen percent. In contrast, actual auditory and kinesthetic sensory impressions have been estimated to occur in five to ten percent of dreams and those of taste and smell in less than one percent *(16)*.

Freud *(9)* felt that color in dreams could be understood in three ways: 1, as actual reproductions of new and old sensory images; 2, as symbols for old sensory impressions; and 3, as partaking of the regression inherent in the sensory images of a dream (cf. *8*). Essentially, he was inclined to treat color as he would any other dream element. Freud was not disposed to give it any special attention although one half of his own reported dreams contained color elements *(16)*. Many color dreams are reported in the literature, but most writers tend to follow Freud and treat color elements in a general and nonspecific way.

Some nonanalytic and analytic investigators have related color in dreams to organic factors such as drugs *(13)*; organic migraine attacks *(19)*; normal neurophysiologic mechanisms *(2)*; neurologic responses to anxiety *(21, 22)*, etc. Intermediate to physiology and psychology is Greenacre's suggestion that the psychophysiological shock reaction resulting from observation of the paternal phallus may be represented in dreams by color *(11)*.

A more purely psychological approach, but bordering on physiology, has been the discussion of the affective implications of color representation in dreams. Authors indicate that color

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(as well as other sensory modalities) appears in dreams when repressions are breaking down and represent 'hidden' affects *(8, 16)*. In this context, color elements are seen as reflecting a defensive and economic 'crisis' while dreaming which threatens sleep. These ideas are consistent with Lewin's idea of the regressive move in dreaming toward the blank dream *(17)*.

Clinical psychologists have made studies germane to the observations of these analysts and to Greenacre's. One such study *(20)* revealed that as adolescence proceeds and repression is being more successfully effected, figure drawings use progressively less color. Similarly, Rorschach investigations have been made dealing with the relationship of color responsiveness to affectivity and impulsivity *(3, 5, 7, 26)*.

Some writers *(1, 4)* have indicated the specific relationship of color in dreams to body products, such as blood and feces. Others *(14, 15, 23)* have incidentally described their metaphorical use. Linn *(18)* devotes an article to the lack of a comprehensive analytic approach to this subject. He cites some clinical fragments in questioning the claim of the auditory sphere to the primary place in the development of the superego, feeling that color in dreams provides ready evidence of superego function in the nonauditory sphere. The expression of id derivatives and ego identifications through the use of color in dreams is also noted. His article is not a detailed presentation, but he does highlight the need for a metapsychological approach to the understanding of color in dreams. Garma *(10)* has recently made the generalization (which has been found rather difficult to accept) that 'the real common denominator is the existence of repressed anal excremental contents'.

Certain aspects of the work of Calef *(8)* and Knapp *(16)* are specially pertinent here. Both authors stress the frequent relationship of the appearance of color in dreams to the emergence of voyeuristic-exhibitionistic impulses and conflicts. Neither is able to offer specific reasons for the association of color and voyeuristic-exhibitionistic impulses, although Calef suggests that the use of color may be related to maturational changes in

color perception occurring about the time that scopophilic-exhibitionistic impulses come to the fore in the child.

As has been indicated, the literature has placed much emphasis on the relationship of color in dreams to various forms of psychic imbalance. I have been impressed, however, by the frequent manifestations of carefully controlled, integrated, and artful utilization of color by the ego during dreaming—even during states of intense affective experience. The intent of this paper is to extend the work of Calef and Knapp. Specific reasons will be offered for the use of color in relation to voyeuristic-exhibitionistic impulses and associated body ego problems. Clinical illustrations will be offered to demonstrate that color and color contrasts are utilized by the ego to give disguised representation, via defensive reversals and displacements, to childhood memory traces of the color contrasts perceived on viewing the genitals of adults and children. It will also be shown how the ego further utilizes these color contrasts as an artist might to create certain visual effects or illusions in the service of defense. These mechanisms are similar to those observed in the case of screen memories, fetishism, and the day residue. It will be further demonstrated that the same psychodynamics and defense mechanisms can be observed where color assumes a role in a fantasy, a symptom, and a sublimation. Where possible, other specific genetic determinants for the use of color will be cited, and clinical details will be given to highlight the intense affective climate in which color elements appeared.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE I: *Case A*

A frigid, thirty-year-old single woman, with a mixed neurosis, entered analysis because of rectal somatic symptoms associated with intense anxiety and multiple phobic tendencies. After four years of analysis, she had successfully worked through many of her symptoms deriving from oral and anal regressions and was analytically struggling with powerful castration anxieties. Prior to this she had reported very few dreams but they often involved color. During one session she became aware of strong

vaginal excitement which she attempted to repress and displace to the rectum. When this defensive maneuver was interpreted, she became even more vaginally aroused and developed intense anxiety, simultaneously recalling a story of a woman who was killed by her lover at the moment she achieved orgasm. She then recalled a dream of the previous evening which consisted simply of seeing the head of a woman with a swept-back hairdo. The hair was colored brownish-blonde. As she observed the head she kept wondering whether it was that of a woman or a man. On awakening she was startled by the confusion in the dream since the head was unmistakably that of a woman.

Careful questioning elicited certain important facts about the dream. The features were idealized as in certain kinds of sculpture. The face had a strange color flatness or paleness which, along with the stereotyped idealization, resulted in its not being especially noticeable. The dreamer's attention was primarily directed to the striking hairdo and its coloration.

Detailed analysis of the dream was quite revealing. The face was an idealization of her own. The confusion of sex reflected her own confusion with all its attendant penis envy and castration anxiety. The patient appreciated the implications of recalling the dream while sexually aroused and indirectly fantasying having intercourse with the analyst. Speaking of the fact that she had recently worn such a hairdo, she suddenly recalled that as a pubescent girl she would often stare at her face in the mirror, sweep back her hair as seen in the dream, and imagine how she would have looked as a boy. These conscious ruminations were always restricted to considerations of her face. She realized that from that time to the present she was in the habit of drawing women's faces, always with the idealization noted in the dream image. Observing that the color of the woman's hair in the dream was slightly different from her own and tighter in texture, it dawned on her that the color and texture were the same as that of her pubic hair.

The conflict over accepting heterosexual wishes is reflected in her confused thoughts in the dream and in her 'repair' of the

vagina by depicting it as an idealized face—a face without defects. As a subtle addition to the defense she colors the face pale and makes it even less arresting by giving it features neither distinctive nor striking. Thus the viewer is led to focus on the unusual blonde hair. The result of these artistic maneuvers is neglect of the vagina and emphasis on the pubic hair. Although the differences between male and female pubic hair are negligible compared to those between the genitalia, the patient eliminated even these minor differences by depicting the hair swept back in the manner of a boy as in her pubertal imaginations. Beside her innate artistic capacities, color played a special part in her life experience. Although the patient is blonde, her brother is brown-haired, her father's hair is black, and her mother is a redhead. Their complexion coloring also differs widely. Thus, color contrasts generally and pubic hair coloring specifically had a special place in her life and were important genetic factors in her predisposition to color in dreams.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE 2: *Case B*

A thirty-five-year-old mother of two children was referred for analysis by her former psychotherapist because of the exacerbation of anxiety, conversion symptoms, and phobias from which she had suffered intermittently for years. Beside the old symptoms, she had experienced new hysterical outbreaks in her physician's office; injections for a secondary anemia had precipitated attacks in which she was unable to stand, move, or speak although she was mentally clear. Both her psychotherapist and the author felt this naïve, devoutly Catholic woman to be one of the rare present-day cases of classical hysteria. Subsequent analysis confirmed this impression. The diagnostic aspect has been stressed because of the floridity of the material that appeared early in the analysis.

The first few analytic sessions threw her into a hypnoticlike state. Soon she was describing the fear she had had since adolescence of being locked in a bathroom, and how from ages five to six she would lock herself in the bathroom and actively mas-

turbate. By the end of the second session she had developed a phobic attitude about the bathroom off my waiting room. In her third session, she related her first dream in which she went into a bathroom and struggled with the temptation to masturbate until anxiety terminated the dream. Associations led back again to childhood masturbation. Although avoiding the dream thereafter, she recalled that period of her childhood when she had been close to her beloved father from whom she was presently estranged. Reflecting also on her current distance from her mother, she began to wonder how she would feel if her mother should die. The consistently transparent material brought in to date had primarily revolved around positive œdipal struggles followed by regression to phallic conflicts. Occasionally her anxiety reduced her to a transient helpless state.

During the first six weeks of analysis she reported six dreams, none of which contained color elements. In the latter part of this period, a great deal of material reported dealt with her conscious childhood resentment over being a girl, her tomboy activities, and teenage disgust and vomiting during menstruation, accompanied by conscious protests against being a woman. In this emotional atmosphere she reported her first color dream. In it she entered a bathroom with green fixtures, where she found herself embarrassedly walking about with other men and women, with only a towel about her nude body. She resisted analyzing this dream. It is significant that color entered her dreams for the first time in the context of a dream centering on exhibitionistic and voyeuristic impulses. Later recall suggested that the green fixtures were related to the phallus and associated pregnancy fantasies.

In the next month she related several dreams, a few containing color elements. However, the whole period was characterized by intense resistance. During the Yuletide season, she became consciously preoccupied with Christmas trees, unconsciously yearned for a penis, and developed a depression. A color dream was reported which was only slightly analyzed, although it was evident the color had direct reference to the genitals.

Preoccupation with the state of her genitals and sexual confusion became progressively more evident. In the midst of this she reported a dream whose form emphasized shadings of black and white. Black was equated with the vagina and pubic hair and white with the surrounding skin. The next day two dreams with many color elements were reported, which allowed a considerable degree of analysis.

> I entered a room with a low ceiling, such as in your office, and a man showed me his fine acoustic equipment. Then he took me into another room containing priceless art treasures and showed me a plaque which was pink and white trimmed in gold, with a name inscribed on it. I was then shown a bathroom which had blue tiles and black accents.

In the second dream she found herself about to enter a beautiful home.

> I decided to make inquiries of a negro woman across the street and started walking toward her. She looked at me as if I were dangerous. The negro woman was dressed in blue and had with her a beautiful, blonde little girl.

These dreams had many transference implications, but attention will be limited to the meaning of the use of color. The pink-and-white plaque trimmed with gold led the patient to a previous dream involving association to 'dirty' menstrual pads and her horror of the vagina. The name inscribed on the plaque was that of a firm which produced dress manikins that were headless and without extremities. The patient stated, 'Those dummies were so formless; just like me in some way'. Significantly, she went on to talk about the lovely, delicate colors of the plaque as contrasted with the revolting colors of 'dirty' menstrual pads. Here she could give plastic representation to thoughts about the vagina and menstruation on condition that æsthetically pleasing color contrasts were used to disguise the truth.

The long, narrow, blue-and-black bathroom also represented her vagina, as did the negro woman dressed in blue. Blue was

highly overdetermined with associations to the blue dress and purity of the Virgin Mary, the blue rosary beads the patient used for prayer, the blue suit her husband wore on their wedding day, and blue clothing traditionally worn by baby boys. The dark, frightening vagina was reflected in the black accents of the bathroom and the black skin of the woman. However, the dreamer's visual attention centered on the blue color (with its multiple phallic associations) of the tiles and the dress while the black color was perceived only peripherally.

The patient's complexion is dark, and the beautiful, blonde, fair-skinned little girl was an idealized representation of herself as a child. 'The little girl is from that time of my life before I wanted to be a boy, and she looked as I would have liked to look.' Beside other meanings, the fair, blonde girl represented, by reversal of color, the patient's dark vagina and black pubic hair. Pleasing color contrasts, displacements, color reversals, and visual tricks give representation to frightening color percepts. Displacement, replacement, and hypercathexis of innocuous percepts suggest the technique used by the ego in forming screen memories and fetishistic fantasies.

It is of special note that, subsequent to this dream, the underlying conflicts continued to emerge into consciousness. She reported a dream in almost every session, and every dream contained color elements. After a few months, the patient herself was surprised at the profusion of color in her dreams and discussed in a general way the conscious meaning of color to her. Her interest in art had led to conscious attempts to train her mind to 'think in colors'. Certain colors had come to connote specific affective states. Finally, she stated simply but effectively, 'Colors are a form of protection in some way. They make something hideous pretty.' To date the analysis has brought to light another specific determinant fostering the special role of color in her life. This factor is the marked contrasts in skin color within her immediate family, some of the children being dark-skinned and others very fair. The fair children were the father's favorites. The patient herself has two boys, one fair, the other

dark like herself. In the analysis it became clear that occasional feelings of aversion for her dark-skinned son were based on her unconsciously equating him with her own dark vagina, whereas fair skin was associated with the clearly visible penis.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE 3: *Case A*

Case A presented dream material which exemplifies very well the subtlety and control with which the ego can utilize color in dreams. The patient reported a dream in which she was taking an auto ride with her father. During the drive they passed and observed a very long, thin building whose architecture was rather amorphous. This curious building was painted steel gray and was trimmed in black. Her father told her the history of the building. On one level this dream dealt with the examination which she and the analyst had been making recently of the structure and history, as it were, of her genitals. The meaning of the colors in the dream essentially followed the pattern outlined in the previously cited case material.

The following session was of special interest. At the outset the patient reported feeling sexually aroused and angry—a typical prelude to the emergence of a sadomasochistic transference fantasy. While talking about a belt she had purchased as a birthday gift for her boy friend, she recalled the dream of the previous evening. In it she gave him the gift. He looked at it and became angry because the belt was not the color he had expected. She was surprised and confused to observe rows of diamond-shaped suede patches hand-sewn on the belt. They then studied the patches which were seen in detailed close-up. She observed that the patches, outlined by the dark background of the belt leather, were alternately light, burnt orange, and light, pastel green. Her boy friend continued to berate her for having been careless about the color. The patient became angry and an argument ensued.

This patient always treated the occasional dreams she presented to the analyst as special gifts. Having offered the analyst the dream gift (equated unconsciously with her vagina) as she

had offered the belt to her boy friend in the dream, she then proceeded to act out the manifest content of the dream.

At this juncture in her analysis, the patient appreciated the analyst's special interest in color in dreams and anticipated being questioned about the color element. When the analyst drew her attention to the color, as the boy friend had in the dream, she became resistant and angrily insisted the analyst was 'probing too much'. Nonetheless, interesting facts about the colors were elicited.

The patient herself realized that the belt and content of the dream mirrored her sexual confusion and her refusal to clarify it. The colors themselves led, by a circuitous chain of associations that dealt with symbolic references to her and her mother's genitals, to a dress she owned which contained both colors observed in the dream. She pointed out that these colors had a complementary relationship and when utilized in proper combinations, as in her dress, created a gray effect. Similar associations about the relationship of gray to primary colors brought her back to the long, thin gray house in the dream of the previous session and her attempts to define her genitals. It is evident that full understanding of the meaning of the orange and green in the dream required appreciation of the meaning of the gray and black in the first dream which was part of the day residue. The breaking down of gray into its component primary colors and their skilfully integrated use reflects the exquisite æsthetic considerations and precise ego controls which can be brought to bear in the creation of a color dream, even in an intensely affect-laden transference relationship.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE 4: *Case A*

The dream processes described above can be observed in conscious fantasy formations which utilize color. This was observed in statu nascendi in the case of the patient who dreamed about the idealized head of a blonde woman. At one stage of her analysis when powerful sadomasochistic sexual fantasies relating to the father had been activated, she developed fears of rape in the

street and was terrified on the couch. In one session during that period, tension mounted in her throat to such a degree that she felt the urge to slit her throat in order to obtain relief. This was an old pattern occurring in response to rising sexual tension and associated identification with the mother in violent primal-scene fantasies. The throat was a vehicle for this conflict since the mother had had throat surgery when the patient was four years old.

At this point in the session she had a fantasy of a four-year-old blonde girl dressed in a very attractive red pinafore and white blouse. The girl was placid, had her hands at her side, and was 'doing nothing, as if she were staring out of a magazine ad'. The patient had no affective response to the fantasy. After some resistance the image recurred, but this time superimposed on it was another image of a vagina and a hand masturbating it. She noted that there was no pubic hair in the image and then became consciously aware of being deeply aroused sexually.

Historical determinants in the color choice of the first image were evident, as well as certain displacements, denial, and other defenses against her intense anxiety. It appeared though that the ego had integrated and unified these memory traces and defenses via the technique described in the case of the dreams reported earlier in the paper. The mother's red scar, contrasted with the white skin of her neck, and the patient's pinkish infantile vulva, contrasted with the white surrounding skin, were terrifying to her in childhood. On one level, the fantasy reflected her wish to exhibit her genitals to the analyst as she had wished to exhibit them to her father. To do so meant acknowledging her genitals and also running the risk of having her illusory penis destroyed in the ensuing rape.

In reporting the fantasy, she was unconsciously communicating to the analyst her exhibitionistic wish but, even in the affectively isolated fantasy, she was able to do so only by replacing the unacceptable color contrasts with acceptable ones. Presumably the defensive color contrasts were almost identical with those in the original percepts because of the tenuous defenses

operative at that time. Although her defenses were adequate enough to create in a fetishistic manner a very attractive æsthetic combination in the fantasy, they were not able to check the drives which were quickly revealed by the superimposition of a vagina being masturbated and a break-through into consciousness of intense sexual excitement.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE 5: *Case C*

The use of color in symptom-formation was seen in the case of a twenty-five-year-old psychotic female, who at the time of consultation was floridly delusional and hallucinating. Intensive psychotherapy resulted in the remission of her overt psychosis. With the remission sufficiently stabilized, exploratory analytically oriented therapy was conducted three times weekly.

A forceps accident during birth blinded one eye, and throughout her life she experienced functional visual difficulties with her normal eye. During childhood she also suffered from severe orthopedic difficulties. Almost complete inattention on the part of the parents was compounded by her being subjected to a long series of governesses, some of whom proved to be quite cruel. Other childhood traumata completed the picture of misery. Putting aside the issue of whether these factors caused or aggravated her schizophrenia, it is apparent that problems surrounding vision and body integrity were even more stark than is commonly the case with schizophrenics. For example, denial of her blindness and visual difficulties was so massive that she would engage in activities which literally physically endangered her normal eye and at times her life. On one occasion she attempted to comply with the advice of a physician to douche which required looking at and manipulating her genitals. The sight of her genitals so terrified her that she went into a catatonic stupor lasting many hours. Although talented in sculpture, she gave it up because her instructors constantly urged her to use the human figure instead of restricting her work to animals. After five years of therapy these problems were sufficiently worked through so that she began to take pride and

pleasure in her looks, would strut about her bedroom nude, and in a childlike manner would 'explore' her genitals and report her discoveries to the analyst. Needless to say, she discovered, or rather rediscovered, masturbation of which she became a devotee.

At this point in the therapy, she related certain waiting-room experiences never before divulged. In my waiting room is a print of an ancient Roman fresco, whose content consists solely of a Roman woman picking flowers and putting them into a vaselike container. Of special significance for the patient was the depiction in the print of cracks in the fresco wall running directly through the figure of the woman. The figure is in fact sedate and well clothed, but to the patient it seemed nude and sensuous.

In the early years of therapy she often found herself staring fixedly, against her will, at the figure in the print. She reacted to it with fascination, awe, disgust, and acute anxiety. The unconscious sexual fantasies precipitating these reactions were so disturbing that she often was unable to talk when the session began. Over the course of time she observed that she could no longer stare at the figure and that her attention had shifted to the flowers. However, this too began to create anxiety and a further displacement was necessary. She remarked, 'The peculiar yellow color in the flowers was offensive against the green background. It made the flowers look as if they were dying.' The final defensive shift was concerned with the color contrasts in themselves. As might be expected, her tenuous defenses weakened and she observed that 'even the colors themselves became distasteful'. In this striking material one can see projection to the figure in the print of the patient's sexual impulses, fantasies, and body imagery. The body of the figure is then symbolically equated with the genitals; there is further symbolic displacement to the vase and the flowers; and as a final defensive maneuver, preoccupation with color and color contrasts. Interestingly, with reduction of her anxieties, she noted that she began to like the print and took pleasure in observing and studying the body contours and color contrasts. This culminated in a

strong fondness for the print. Appropriate to these revelations, in the same session she again talked of how much she was enjoying masturbating and walking about her bedroom while completely nude.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE 6: *Case D*

The analytic findings of a thirty-year-old man who dreamt prolifically, and often in color, exemplifies the thesis of this paper in regard to both his dream life and conscious æsthetic pleasures and sublimations. Suffering from a mixed neurosis, he had sustained severe bodily injuries during his phallic phase which intensified and became incorporated into his castration anxieties. The patient reflected this in his distaste for vague and poorly illuminated visual perceptions. Analysis revealed that when he was a child, his perceptions of the female genitals seemed vague as compared with those of the penis whose form was sharply perceived and which had a quality of illumination.

A recurrent feature of his dreams was a difference in the acuity with which objects or persons were perceived. Objects, persons, or whole sections of a dream would be described as 'vague', 'unclear', and 'formless'; with exasperation or evident discomfort he would say, 'I'm unable to make it out', or 'I just can't see it'. These visual representations were also dark or poorly illuminated. Analysis indicated that they represented in various forms the female genitals, coupled with projections of his own subjective state on perceiving them. Conversely, other persons, objects, or sections of the same dream would be well illuminated, clearly perceived, and traceable to the clarity of his childhood perceptions of the penis as well as his subjective reactions. As his castration anxieties were analytically worked through, the dream representations began to crystallize into representations of his mother and father. The mother's entire figure would be seen as vague and dark, while the father's entire figure was bright and sharp, with all details of facial features, clothing, etc. Analysis of these dreams led in a quick, straight line to childhood voyeuristic experiences and anxieties.

In his waking life this whole problem was reflected in certain æsthetic interests and pleasures. This man would take special pleasure in observing the play of light on certain objects; for instance, the reflection of light on shiny black objects, such as a telephone, would intrigue him. The blackness of the area from the genitals to inanimate objects. To secure the defensive creating for him fascinating bands of contrasting silver and black. The æsthetic pleasure clearly permitted a gratifying and anxiety-free discharge of voyeuristic impulses. This sublimatory activity was built upon the displacement of an instinctual aim from the genitals to inanimate objects. To secure the defensive aspect of the sublimation, the patient would further displace the aim from perceiving form to that of perceiving color contrasts. His anxiety-laden interest in the pubic hair and genitals was thus successfully discharged without anxiety by viewing pleasing black-and-white contrasts rather than black pubic hair and white flesh. This sublimational structure reached a higher and even more secure level in his interest in contrasting primary colors. In those instances one could see a displacement from black-and-white to primary color contrasts, which were even more removed from the original lighting and color percepts of the genitals. When he painted he enjoyed using rich, vivid colors in contrasting patterns. In his own paintings, or in those of others, he found vagueness of form æsthetically distasteful or repelling. However, lack of form clarity was æsthetically acceptable on condition that the color be vivid and the contrasts interestingly patterned.

Instability and conflict were nonetheless associated with this sublimation, as evidenced by his analysis. When his voyeurism and related anxieties were analyzed, he experienced an even more heightened interest in color contrasts associated with increasing stability of the sublimation. A single analytic experience dramatically highlighted this problem. An analytic session in which voyeuristic repressions lifted, allowing interpretation of his anxieties, brought a feeling of relief and excitement. The resulting release of voyeuristic impulses impelled him to go to

an art museum upon completing his session. There he subjectively felt that he had entered a world he had never known. He was deeply moved and excited by these new visual pleasures; the beauty of the paintings literally dazzled him. Defensive forces were still operative, however, and compelled him to leave rather quickly. He carried away with him the special impact made by the depth of color intensity and the richness of color contrasts. Content and form, however, made little impression; he was unable to recall exactly which paintings he had seen.

After he read this paper, Tarachow referred me to a clinical note *(24)* he had published which supports the present thesis in regard to the role of color in sublimations. The note was brief and is quoted here in its entirety: 'A male patient had intense feelings of pleasure at the beauty of various color contrasts. In his analysis the color contrast was found to be derived from the contrast of color between the white abdominal skin and the female pubic hair. His symptomatology was heavily fetishistic and was, as to be expected, quite occupied with castration denial. Another male patient, whose occupation was connected with designing women's clothing, also had the intense feeling of pleasure in the beauty of color contrasts. In the analysis of this patient the color contrast was found to be related to the color contrast between abdominal skin and female pubic hair.'

In the foregoing clinical examples the author has attempted to trace meanings of the use of color in dreams, fantasies, symptoms, and sublimations. An important gap in this psychic continuum is that of the screen memory where the color elements have proved elusive in the author's case material. However, it is probable that the same mechanisms could be demonstrated in view of the evident similarities with well-known screen memory mechanisms.

SUMMARY

Color and color contrasts are utilized by the ego to give disguised representation to childhood memory traces of the color

contrasts perceived on viewing genitals and pubic hair of adults and children. Mechanisms used by the ego to effect this are described and compared to those observed in the case of screen memories, fetishism, and the day residue. The same psychodynamics and mechanisms are shown to be present in cases where color assumes a role in a fantasy, in a symptom, and in sublimation. Where possible, other genetic determinants for the use of color are cited.

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SOME COMMENTS ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF C. G. JUNG

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(NEW YORK)

Through the publication of Jung's Collected Works, a venture made possible by the Bollingen Foundation, his writings have become accessible to the English-reading public. Some, it is true, were available in English before, and some were originally published in English. However, the versions in the Bollingen series are not mere reprintings or translations but include recent revisions and elaborations. In addition, the major writings of several of Jung's disciples *(32, 34, 58)* have also become available in English. Twenty volumes have already been issued, and new ones still continue to appear.

It is not the authors' intention to present a comprehensive analysis of the Jungian system of psychology, for which the reader is referred to the excellent work by Glover *(23)*. Rather, this essay, which is in nature an extended review, will focus mainly on Jung's few recent works.

Since 1913 some original issues raised by Jung *(39)* have lost importance and new ones have appeared in their place. Thus, Jung's original objection to Freud's distinction between sexual instincts and ego instincts became largely of historical interest as far back as 1923 when Freud introduced the structural viewpoint *(14)*, paving the way for the development of contemporary ego psychology *(30)*. However, as a result of more recent developments, the freudian and Jungian schools have, if anything, grown even further apart.

The development of distinctly Jungian concepts as they appear in the recent writings of Jung and his followers seems to have been a gradual process. When Jung published the original version of his Psychology of the Unconscious *(40)* he had already made some attacks on psychoanalytic theory. This early work has since been thoroughly revised in line with more recent

developments of Jungian psychology, and the revised version is entitled Symbols of Transformation *(44)*. But in this volume Jung still cites Freud extensively and, to a lesser extent, other psychoanalytic authors, and he seems to accept much, though not all, of Freud's theory of dreams and of sexual symbolism. That the indebtedness of 'analytic psychology' to Freud was emphatically acknowledged at that early period is evident from the Introduction written by Beatrice M. Hinkle, who had translated the original volume into English *(42)*.[1]

In the preface to The Psychology of Dementia Praecox *(42)*, Jung wrote that from the very beginning he had 'naturally entertained all the objections which are advanced in the literature against Freud', but felt that 'Freud could only be refuted by one who himself had made much use of the psychoanalytic method'. Though acknowledging his indebtedness 'to the ingenious conceptions of Freud', he expressed reservations about the 'exclusive' importance of infantile sexual trauma 'seemingly attributed to it by Freud' and about the 'psychological universality' which Freud 'apparently' assigned to sexuality. As regards Freud's therapeutic method, Jung stated that 'it is at best a possible one, and perhaps does not always offer what one expects for it theoretically'. Obviously, from the very start Jung had not fully agreed with fundamental psychoanalytic concepts.[2]

[1] It may be of interest to note that as late as 1936—when the cleavage between the freudian and Jungian schools was already very sharp—Brill, who many years earlier had received part of his clinical training at Burghölzli, wrote a very favorable introduction to this reprinting of Jung's early monograph on schizophrenia *(42)*.

[2] The underlying motivation of Jung's ambivalence toward psychoanalysis may have become clearer years later, as, for instance, in the following statement:

'Freud has made a courageous attempt to elucidate the intricacies of dream psychology with the help of views which he gathered in the field of psychopathology. Much as I admire the boldness of his attempt, I cannot agree either with his method or with its results. He explains the dream as a mere façade behind which something has been carefully hidden. There is no doubt that neurotics hide disagreeable things, probably just as much as normal people do. But it is a serious question whether this category can be applied to such a normal and world-wide phenomenon as the dream. I am rather inclined to quote another Jewish authority, the Talmud, which says: "The dream is its own interpretation.

Whatever may be the merits of Jung's psychology as such, the fact is that some of his concepts have had a considerable influence on thinking and research in psychology and psychiatry. There is now an extensive literature on the concepts of introversion and extroversion *(7, 27, 57, 64)*, some of it departing rather far from the original Jungian notions, most of it, nevertheless, showing traces of Jungian influence, an influence also discernible in the literature on projective techniques. The very terms 'introversion' and 'extroversion' have become part of the common language. Moreover, Jungian concepts have influenced literature and art.[3] Some social scientists *(60, 61, 63)*, although often critical of Jung's specific theories, particularly his doctrine of the archetypes and of the collective unconscious, have expressed considerable interest in his approach, regarding it as free from the 'reductionism' they attribute to Freud.

Jungian psychology, with its emphasis on the archaic and its tendency to passive preoccupation with symbolic content, stands in strong contrast to the rationalism and determinism characteristic of Western thought in general and of modern science in particular. In this respect Jungian psychology resembles existential psychiatry, some of whose exponents *(4)* are much more explicit than Jung in their rejection of rationalism and the modern scientific tradition. Both Jungian and existential psychiatrists focus much of their criticism of psychoanalysis on what they describe as 'reductionism'; both show considerable interest in Zen Buddhism, another approach which emphasizes

. . . The dream is a natural occurrence, and there is no earthly reason why we should assume that it is a crafty device to lead us astray. . . ." Moreover, we know so little about the psychology of the dream process that we must be more than careful when we introduce into its explanation elements that are foreign to the dream itself' *(46,* pp. 26-27*)*.

This somewhat facetious and sarcastic statement sheds proper light on the nature of Jung's longstanding and 'archetypal' hostility to Freud. It is in itself significant how from a great variety of Talmudic references to dream interpretation Jung chose the most suitable one for his 'inclination'.

[3] Thomas Mann made extensive use of the term 'archetype' in his Biblical series. A detailed study of the influence of Jungian psychology on Hermann Hesse has been made by Maier *(54)*.

the limitations of the human intellect. Moreover, the existential school with its phenomenological emphasis tends to underplay the role of the individual unconscious.

To point out these similarities is not, of course, to deny the existence of some real differences between the two schools. On the one hand, some existentialists have outdone Jung in rejecting the notion of causality *(4;* cf. *18).* On the other hand, the notions of archetype and of racial unconscious that give a specifically mystical flavor to much of Jung's psychology play no role in existential psychiatry which shows relatively little interest in phylogenesis. As a matter of fact, Boss objects strongly to the Jungian theory of archetypes because it attempts to explain phenomenal data in terms of hypothetical constants not directly experienced. From his standpoint the charge of 'reductionism', which both he and Jung level at Freud, is even more applicable to Jung's theory of the archetypes.

Although Jung has not fully abandoned the notion of causality, he has supplemented it with the concept of 'synchronicity', an ambiguous term which allows room for exceptions to causality. Thus for him, Rhine's experiments, which he accepts wholeheartedly, 'have demonstrated that space and time, and hence causality, are factors that can be eliminated, with the result that acausal phenomena, otherwise called miracles, appear possible. All natural phenomena of this kind are unique and exceedingly curious combinations of chance, held together by the common meaning of their parts to form an unmistakable whole' *(48).* Later in the same paragraph, Jung makes another statement which seems to imply that the principle of synchronicity represents a confession of ignorance concerning underlying relationships, rather than a positive theory: 'Causality is the way we explain the link between two successive events. Synchronicity designates the parallelism of time and meaning between psychic and psychophysical events, *which scientific knowledge so far has been unable to reduce to a common principle'* (italics added). Jung's search for meaningful coincidences is responsible for his interest in the Book of Chance, a Chinese book of riddles

in which the elements are juxtaposed in chance combinations.

Jung's recent writings on synchronicity and his enthusiastic endorsement of Rhine's work sharply contrast with some of his earlier views. In Psychology of the Unconscious (1931) he rejected the notion of precognition in dreams as unlikely, but he accepts it in his more recent works *(46)*.

Jung has repeatedly asserted that his approach to the psychology of religion involves no assumptions as to the truth or falsity of religious doctrines. Glover *(23)* has aptly noted that Jung's position is essentially that of an agnostic who, in his role as psychotherapist, favors religious experience not on the ground of its truth value, but on the ground that such experience is emotionally satisfying. As Glover further notes, this emotional gratification in religious experience, which is sought by Jungian therapy, is essentially narcissistic.

A somewhat similar criticism is expressed by Fromm *(19)*, who points out that problems pertaining to the truth or falsity of religious propositions and problems of ethical conduct are of crucial importance to religious thinkers but play practically no role in Jung's psychology.[4]

[4] Jung's attitude toward religion has led to criticism by some theologians. A prominent Catholic author *(22)*, declared that Jung 'does not really understand the dogmas and rites of Christianity about which he speaks', and that 'notwithstanding his good faith he has made analysis neither Christian nor acceptable to Catholics'. Another Catholic authority *(24)*, while utilizing Jungian concepts, nevertheless expressed strong objections to Jung's attitude toward religion. On the other hand, Jung has received strong endorsement from White *(69)* and some other Catholic ecclesiastical authors.

Certain Protestant criticisms of Jung's writings have also been voiced, particularly following the appearance in 1954 of Answer to Job—subsequently included in Psychology and Religion: West and East *(46)*—although some Protestant comment has been on the favorable side.

Criticism has also been voiced by the Jewish author, Martin Buber *(6)*, who maintains that Jung is essentially asserting a tautology by his emphasis on the psychic character of the God concept, since experiencing is by definition psychic; this is in spite of an explicit denial by Jung that such emphasis is tantamount to denying the extrapsychic existence of God. The latter point, which has been explicitly denied by Jung, seems somewhat overdrawn. It would be more correct to say that Jung shows very little concern about the question of correspondence between the God archetype and extrapsychic reality.

SCOPE OF THE JUNGIAN SYSTEM

In a recent discussion of psychoanalysis as a system of psychology, Rapaport *(62)* observed that none of the deviant schools had ever presented a system comparable in scope to that of the psychoanalytic system. This statement holds eminently true for the Jungian system, especially for its most recent structure. There is, for instance, very little in Jung's later writings to equal the wealth of current psychoanalytic formulations concerning early childhood development, ego psychology, or the vicissitudes of aggression. In fact, despite the vast body of Jung's publications, very little in his recent works can be described as clinical, although some of his early contributions *(42, 45)* did indicate outstanding gifts in this area. Such references to Jungian psychology as are found in contemporary psychoanalytic journals pertain nearly always to Jung's early works.

It may be argued that at this stage in his career Jung is concerned primarily with the psychology of religion and art, not with the consolidation of a conceptual system. However, the fact remains that his introduction of such concepts as the archetype raises questions which need to be answered if his propositions are to be adequately evaluated.

The more recent psychoanalytic sources are hardly ever cited in contemporary Jungian literature. References to Freud have become fewer in number, less favorable, and usually pertain only to Freud's early writings. To use Jung's own term, one might say that his psychology is primarily 'introversive'. Indeed it focuses mainly on the description of certain types of mental content and places very little emphasis on social relations. Even among the 'introspective' psychologies, the Jungian system occupies a rather narrow area. Its central topics are images and the feelings and thoughts associated with these images. The phenomenology of reasoning, problem solving, and memory, as well as perception in the technical meaning of the term, are of only marginal concern to Jung.

THE ARCHETYPES AND THE COLLECTIVE UNCONSCIOUS

These two closely interrelated concepts play a key role in Jungian psychology. The term *archetype,* borrowed from early Christian writings, stands for mental predispositions independent of individual experience, which have their source in the collective unconscious.

Although Jung had introduced the idea of the archetype in 1919, it was not until 1946 that he formulated an important distinction between the archetypes proper, which are in the nature of *predispositions,* and 'archetypal images', defined as their *psychic representations.* Strictly speaking, therefore, at least in his later and more careful theoretical formulations, he does not postulate an inheritance of specific mental content. But even his most recent writings *(46, 47)* abound in the phenomenological descriptions of anthropomorphic figures, such as *anima, animus,* or *shadow,* which occasionally intrude into waking consciousness or make their appearance as dream figures. According to Jung, these archetypal images appear phenomenally as entities having an external existence, rather than as parts of the self.[5]

To make matters still more complex, Jung makes frequent references to archetypes which are even more specific in their content: *Christ archetype, archetype of rebirth, child archetype, archetype of the Great Mother,* and so on. To be sure, he qualifies this by saying that archetypes as such can never be fully known, since they are buried deep in the collective unconscious and any knowledge about them can be gained only through their more accessible manifestations. However, the basis for the transition from contentless predispositions to such relatively specific structures as the Christ archetype remains obscure.[6]

[5] Jung explains the presence of the anima in the male and the animus in the female in terms of biological bisexuality, paralleling the presence of genes of the opposite sex. This does not elucidate, however, why these images are experienced as being external to the self.

[6] According to Jung, the archetypes are built up gradually through a process whereby accretions based on the experience of many generations are transmitted

Archetypal qualities are attributed by Jung and his followers to a wide variety of artistic, cultural, and dream materials. Archetypal images are assumed in Jungian psychology to be dependent to some extent on cultural factors and individual experience, but the basic archetypal predispositions are assumed to be independent of individual experience. One of the criteria which the Jungians use to establish archetypal origin is that of the universality, or, rather, the independent origin, of certain themes or motifs (e.g., the theme of rebirth). The other criterion, usually less explicitly formulated, is *numinosity*. As far as can be gathered from Jacobi's formulations *(33, 34)*, dream content is considered close to the archetype if it makes a deep impression on the dreamer for which he cannot account. Jacobi *(33)* presents a number of drawings which are supposed to show archetypal content. It seems true that they convey strong emotional impressions and that the reasons for these impressions are difficult to formulate in verbal terms; this, of course, does not necessarily mean that the Jungian hypothesis concerning the basis for these impressions is correct.

If the distinction between archetypes and archetypal images is taken seriously, a difficulty arises concerning the use of numinosity as a criterion of archetypal origin. Since all psychic events are to some extent determined by psychic predispositions, one comes to wonder whether there are any experiences which are not archetypal. The problem thus posed is not an insoluble one. One might assume, for instance, that some content is closer to the archetype than other content. However, the Jungian literature is not specific on this point, and the criterion of numinosity implies the assumption that content is inherited.

In a recent volume *(47)* Jung makes the startling assertion that what is usually regarded as projection of parental images is really a reflection of the archetypal parent figures. He main-

to the offspring. This essentially Lamarckian position provided Jung with a pseudoscientific justification of his anti-Semitic leanings. In more recent writings he occasionally condemned the Nazi persecution of the Jews. However, as editor of the *Zeitschrift für Psychotherapie* he shared some of the responsibility for the racist doctrine officially endorsed by that journal *(23)*.

tains that parent images based upon actual experience are least likely to be unconscious and are therefore not subject to projection. He does not even consider the possibility that individuals carry not one but a series of images of each parent, and that such images differ both in the degree to which they are accessible to consciousness as well as in the developmental level from which they originate *(10)*. Obviously, Jung's theory cannot account for those transference phenomena which are usually interpreted as an unconscious equation of the therapist with the parent figure. One also wonders what predictions one could make using this parent-archetype theory concerning children whose early experience provided no opportunity for forming long-range attachments to parents or to parent substitutes. Anna Freud's clinical observations *(11)* show that such children do not seek attachment to parent substitutes later. One wonders also how Jung's theory would explain the fact that some children who lose their parents under traumatic circumstances at an early but postinfantile stage, and who have no conscious recollection of the parents, nevertheless express through their TAT stories strong feelings relating to parent figures. There are obviously no criteria that enable one to determine the presence or absence of the parent archetype from behavioral data.

Although Jung acknowledges the operation of repression, he assigns it a relatively limited role. In his conception, only the individual unconscious can be based upon repression; the contents of the racial unconscious never fall subject to repression because they never existed in the individual conscious *(47)*.

On the other hand, some of his statements seem to suggest that archetypal content may be repressed or suppressed precisely because it becomes unacceptable in the course of cultural development. He repeatedly asserts that the primitive concept of God combined the notions of benevolence and malevolence, and that the malevolent aspect disappeared only gradually *(47)*. This process evidently implies repression or suppression. Moreover, in his discussions of the vision of St. Nicholas *(46,* pp. 316, ff., 574; *47,* pp. 8, ff., 63, ff.*)*, Jung apparently postulates a

repression (or partial repression) of unacceptable archetypal content which had broken through into consciousness.

PREFIGURATION

What Jung calls *prefigurations* are those universal myths which originate in certain basic human situations. According to him, the historical data concerning the life of Jesus are of secondary importance compared with the fact that, almost as soon as he appeared on the scene, details of his life began to be elaborated in line with a pre-existing Christ archetype. Jung further contends that some aspects of the Christ myth were 'prefigured' in Jewish sources; e.g., in the story of Abraham and Isaac, where the theme of sacrifice of son by father anticipated an important feature of the story of the Crucifixion. As Jung points out, a reference to the sacrifice (or rather, the near-sacrifice) of Isaac is indeed a regular feature of the Mass.

However, there are differences between the legends of Isaac and of Jesus as important as the similarities. Jesus in the Christ myth is a divine being who knows that his crucifixion is necessary for the redemption of others, and who also knows that, notwithstanding His sacrificial death, He is destined for eternal life. In contrast, Isaac in the Jewish legend is a strictly human child, whose role is essentially passive; the stated purpose of the proceeding is not at all to sacrifice Isaac's life, which is saved at the last moment by divine intervention, but to test Abraham's obedience to God.[7]

[7] Beside the common theme of sacrifice, there is another parallel between the myths of Isaac and of Jesus: each was supposed to have been born through an unusual process involving divine intervention, and in both cases this intervention was linked to a purpose of far-reaching significance in the predetermined pattern of human history. But this parallel between the two legends should not be overestimated. The conditions of Isaac's birth were unusual. His mother, long past the age of childbearing, was enabled to conceive by a special act of God and his birth was especially important because it was necessary for the perpetuation of the Jewish nation and of Judaism. Yet Isaac is a human being with a human father and a human mother, and indeed one of his chief functions in carrying out God's will is to procreate offspring through the usual biological processes. In contrast, the Jesus legend envisages a paradoxical figure simul-

As for the prefiguration of the story of Jacob and Esau by that of Cain and Abel, both legends do reflect the ubiquitous theme of sibling rivalry, and the concept of prefiguration here is used essentially to stress the universality of such a theme. However, it is not methodologically sound to use prefiguration to exemplify the development of archetypes, which are presumably more complex than the basic themes of the prefigurations. After all, one might as well say that Napoleon's story was prefigured by Caesar's and that the popular image of Einstein was prefigured in the popular image of Newton. The analogy is certainly not complete, but it does point to an arbitrary element in Jung's selection of the archetypal figures.

SYMBOLISM

In psychoanalytic theory the meaning of symbols is attributed either to experience or to structural similarities between symbol and the symbolized. In contrast, Jungian psychology considers symbols to be determined mainly by phylogenetic factors. As Glover *(23)* points out, the phylogenetic factors that Freud postulated were of the same kind as the ontogenetic ones, representing essentially an accumulation of similar influences over a number of generations. In Jung's system the phylogenetic factors are the very archetypes whose meaning cannot be discovered on the basis of individual experience *(32, 34)*.

According to the psychoanalytic concept, as formulated by Jones *(36)*, 'A symbol is a representative or substitute of some other idea from which it derives a secondary significance not inherent in itself'. Symbols may have a multiplicity of simultaneous meanings and, with some exceptions, are expressible in ideational or verbal terms. Again in contrast to this view, Jungians assert that the meaning of symbols is largely inexpressible in words. In fact, since the symbol is for them essentially the archetype, one questions whether they draw any rigor-

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taneously human and divine, the Son of God, yet identical with God the Father. He is born and dies at specific points of time, yet has existed from the beginning and is immortal.

ous distinction between symbol and the symbolized. (Jung's characterization of the Christ archetype as a symbol of the self does not seem to provide a genuine exception to this.) Perhaps what they understand as symbol can better be described, in phenomenological terms, as a system of closely interrelated affects, images, and ideas.

Moreover, according to psychoanalytic theory, 'all symbols represent ideas of the self and the immediate blood relatives, or of the phenomena of birth, love, and death' *(36)*. While the number of objects used as symbols is large, the number of objects represented is limited. This limitation does not prevail in Jungian psychology, since the development of specific archetypes seems to be ascribed essentially to accidental factors in phylogenetic history. Even in his relatively recent writings, Jung gives recognition to the fact that symbols of the kind described by psychoanalytic theory do occur, but he assigns a secondary importance to them.[8]

PSYCHOTHERAPY

Although Jung and his associates have written extensively on psychotherapy, a coherent picture of Jungian therapy is not easy to obtain. On the one hand, Jung stresses the need for extreme caution in seeking the individual meaning of symbols and repeatedly characterizes the process of therapy as a 'dialectic' process in which the patient and the therapist are exploring

[8] In presenting data with possible symbolic meanings. Jung does not always consider possibilities of interpretation in terms other than his own. His treatment of the vision of St. Nicholas (*46*, pp. 316, ff., 574; *47*, pp. 8, ff., 63, ff.) may serve as an example. Jung rightly emphasizes that the terror which this vision aroused in the saint was quite out of line with the prevailing religious doctrine that viewed God as benevolent, and considerable elaboration was needed before the vision could be described in a theologically acceptable form. According to Jung, the source of the terror was in the archetype. Here he overlooks another possibility. The original vision, so far as can be gathered from the limited amount of information available, had some of the characteristics of a nightmare. Jones *(35)* has suggested that the experience of terror in the nightmare arises from guilt feelings resulting from fantasy gratification of œdipal impulses. The terror experienced by St. Nicholas might thus have been an expression of guilt derived from œdipal sources. (*Cf.* discussion of Jacobi's 'amplification' procedure [*32*, p. 21, ff.])

very difficult territory *(43)*. On the other hand, in his introduction to a book by Jacobi *(34)*, Jung endorses it as containing a correct summary of his views although it seems to be inconsistent with this approach.[9] For, according to Jacobi, *amplification*, which she presents as the main method of Jungian therapy, is 'not a causally connected chain of associations to be followed backward, but a broadening and enrichment of the dream content with all possible similar, analogous images'. It is 'further distinguished from free association in that the associations are contributed not only by the patient or dreamer but also by the physician', and often 'it is the latter who through his contribution of analogies determines the direction that the associations of the patient take'. Moreover, amplification 'must be applied to all the elements of the dream content', since only then 'does the full picture come into being out of which the "meaning" can be read' (pp. 80-81). Jacobi compares this procedure with what she calls the freudian method of 'reduction' whereby the separate elements of the dream content are viewed as distortions of 'originally different contents'. In contrast, amplification is supposed to illuminate all possible meanings of the dream elements in their 'contemporary, present significance'.

To illustrate the procedure of amplification, Jacobi presents a detailed discussion of a dream of an eight-year-old girl who called it The Dream of the Bad Animal and recorded it in a notebook. The child died a year later of scarlet fever. Jacobi's interpretation, done without the aid of the dreamer's own associations, apparently incorporates comments made by Jung in a seminar on children's dreams. The little girl's description of her dream was as follows:

> Once in a dream I saw an animal that had lots of horns. It spiked up other little animals with them. It wriggled like a snake and that was how it lived. Then a blue fog came out of all the four corners, and it stopped eating. Then God came, but

[9] To complicate matters, Jung repeatedly states that he finds freudian as well as Adlerian therapy appropriate for some types of cases. In one of his recent publications *(48,* pp. 204-205*)* Jung makes a brief reference to ***amplification*** (or,

there were really four Gods in the four corners. Then the animal died, and all the animals it had eaten came out alive again.

In her amplification of this dream Jacobi emphasizes the cosmic character of its theme; she also notes that human beings do not appear, all of the dream figures being either subhuman or superhuman, and that the dreamer plays no role in the dream, an observation which is certainly correct so long as one limits one's attention to the manifest content. Again using manifest content, Jacobi indicates—in line with a Jungian notion—that the dream has the structure of a drama, the dramatic events taking place at an unspecified point in (universal) time. Jacobi's interpretations of the particular symbols deal essentially with the manifest content of the dream. There is no associative material to support or refute them.

Moreover, Jacobi shows a conspicuous tendency to omit or underemphasize precisely those possible connotations which would involve oral, anal, or genital symbolism, and to overlook the fact that a symbol may have the function of concealing a hidden meaning. She notes the 'phallic significance of horns', for example, but overlooks other possible phallic interpretations of the dream symbols. Her emphasis, even when she points to phallic symbolism, is upon archetypal images which bear no relation (or only a remote one) to the sexuality of the dreamer. The latter is considered a mere passive spectator, not only in a phenomenal, but also in a causal sense.

However, the most crucial difference between the Jungian and the psychoanalytic interpretation of the dream goes far beyond the question of meanings assigned to individual symbols. It concerns the very source of the symbolism, as well as its relationship to current problems engaging the dreamer. In Jacobi's view The Dream of the Bad Animal is an archetypal

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more specifically, 'spontaneous' or 'natural' amplification). It is, however, clear from the context that he is referring to an elaboration of archetypes (which, as such, do not appear in consciousness) into archetypal images.

dream, a resurgence of fantasy content derived from the racial unconscious, which presents cosmic meanings beyond the comprehension of the dreamer. Taking at face value one of its manifest characteristics, namely, the position of the dreamer as a passive observer having no direct part in the drama, she is led to conclude that the child's own personality and problems had virtually nothing to do with this dream.

We referred above to Jung's distinction between archetypes (predispositions) and archetypal images (their psychic representations), a distinction which clearly implies that individual experience does play some role in shaping the specific content of an archetypal fantasy. From this standpoint, therefore, the issue would be whether such fantasies are demonstrably related to current problems faced by the dreamer. Jacobi's conclusion in this respect may be connected with her selective bias in emphasizing some possible meanings while paying no heed to others. For example, had she considered the possible meaning of the *quaternity* symbolism as a denial of male sexuality, this might have suggested the further possibility that such denial had a definite significance in terms of the psychosexual conflicts of an eight-year-old girl. Moreover, if denial of male sexuality is surmised to be one of the major latent themes of the dream, certain other details begin to make sense in this light. Thus the bisexuality of the Bad Animal—which Jacobi recognizes, but interprets exclusively in archetypal terms—may be seen as a possible expression of the little girl's conflicts about her own sexual role, an assumption that would fit into Jung's notion of interpretation at the 'subjective level'. The fact that the Bad Animal, which is defeated at the end by the divine quaternity, has a horn, might similarly lend support to an interpretation of the dream as representing symbolically a defeat of the male by the female or a denial of the existence of the penis. And finally, the fact that the dreamer does not see herself as one of the actors in this dream might signify denial or repression of the latent content, rather than indicate the archetypal character of the dream. Such alternative inferences may easily be drawn from

the dream's manifest content and from the age and sex of the dreamer, even though one cannot conjecture about the personal meanings the child's symbols had for her.

The additional interpretations suggested here would not invalidate Jacobi's thesis that the dream expresses a cosmic theme. The principle of overdetermination allows for supplementary explanations, and the cosmic theme, in this instance, need not be incongruent with the theme of denial of male sexuality.

Again, in the conception of Jung and Jacobi, the dreamer's individual conflicts are assigned a minor role, at least with regard to archetypal dreams. The arousal of a particular archetypal source would seem to be largely a matter of chance. Although the biographical factor is recognized, its influence is limited to providing specific imagery for a universal archetype.

From the psychoanalytic point of view, the role of symbols is somewhat analogous to the role of words in a language. Some symbolic meanings are assumed to be virtually universal, but their specific application is always a matter of context which, as we know, usually can be understood only via information about the dreamer which does not form part of his manifest dream. We may legitimately raise the question whether Jacobi, on the basis of the scanty data at her disposal, has justified her conclusion that this dream did not reflect the child's individual wishes and conflicts.

An interesting sidelight on this problem is provided by Karon *(50)* in a paper describing the case of a paranoid schizophrenic for whom the number four had a special mystical significance. Karon interprets this patient's use of the number four as a symbolic denial of the male genital and cites some evidence supporting his interpretation. He suggests that the same meaning may be present in the quaternity symbolism so often referred to by Jungian authors. He also uses his clinical example to refute assertions made by Jung, Fromm *(20)*, and C. S. Hall *(28, 29)*, that symbolism is simply a primitive language and need not involve a function of concealment. In this paper Karon also notes that, while Jacobi characterizes odd numbers as

masculine and even numbers as feminine, she does not relate this symbolism to the genitals.

Since we cannot know any associations of the eight-year-old girl to her quaternity dream, we cannot judge whether this symbol had the same sexual meaning for her as for Karon's patient. However, in view of what we know of the latency period, it does not seem unlikely that the quaternity symbol may here also have represented a denial of the male organ.

It is rather difficult to judge, on the basis of published reports, just how large a role amplification actually plays in Jungian therapy. But if we are to take literally Jacobi's indication that this is one of the main procedures used to interpret archetypal content to the patient, and if the selective bias shown by Jacobi in her analysis of The Dream of the Bad Animal and by Jung in his interpretation of the vision of St. Nicholas *(46,* pp. 316, ff., 574; *47,* pp. 8, ff., 63, ff.*)* is typical of Jungian interpretations in general, the conclusion seems inescapable that the course of therapeutic interpretations is guided to a considerable extent by the therapist's preconceptions as to the archetypal meanings of the symbols.

It goes without saying that such arbitrary interpretations not only affect the transference situation but must inhibit the spontaneous development of the patient's associative processes. In virtually every analysis there are occasions when symbolic meanings not immediately apparent to the patient are suggested to him. Ordinarily, however, such suggestion by the psychoanalyst remains distinctly subordinate to free association by the analysand. In the method of amplification, the situation appears to be reversed: the suggestion of meanings by the therapist is given the primary role. Apart from any implications this procedure may have in terms of therapy, it raises a serious methodological problem. Since presumably most of the suggested meanings refer to archetypal content, the question arises to what extent clinical material which is supposed to support the Jungian notions about archetypes is itself a result of suggestion.

Two other points of emphasis in Jungian discussions of

dreams and of symbolism deserve comment. One is Jung's distinction between objective and subjective methods of dream interpretation. The other is his differentiation between causal and teleological dream analysis. Both these distinctions date from a period when Jung's position was much closer to Freud's than it became later.

According to Jung, the objective method seeks to interpret dream figures as representations of external objects; the subjective method seeks to interpret them as representations of various aspects of the dreamer's personality. All or most dreams contain images representing simultaneously some aspects of the self and external objects, and can thus be interpreted at both the subjective and the objective level. This idea is essentially in line with the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination. Viewed either in theoretical or in technical terms, the distinction seems to be sound but does it constitute a real departure from psychoanalytic theory?

Much the same can be said regarding Jung's distinction between causal and teleological interpretation. At the time of its introduction Jung still accepted the principle of causality, which he seems to have at least partly abandoned in later years *(48,* pp. 5-6*)*. However, he felt that the causal analysis in terms of the past should be supplemented by a future-oriented analysis that emphasized the goals and strivings expressed by the dream. Again, it is doubtful whether Jung here advanced anything basically different from the standard psychoanalytic procedure. Freud's emphasis on causal interpretations in The Interpretation of Dreams *(12)* resulted, of course, from the fact that he was concerned with *explaining* dream phenomena in a scientific manner. When Jung speaks of the teleological approach, he refers mainly to the *utilization* of dream data as part of the therapeutic process. In any case, future-oriented interpretations must often depend upon prior analysis and understanding of the dream material in causal terms.

The distinction between the objective and subjective levels of analysis forms an important part of widely accepted princi-

ples of Rorschach interpretation and of the interpretation of Human Figure Drawings, although usually it is not formulated in precisely these terms.

An example of the simultaneous and mutually supplementary use of the objective and subjective interpretation of projective test data is the technique described by Machover *(53)*, in which the subject is asked to draw human figures, which are assumed to reflect the images of the parents. If the drawing of the female figure is larger than that of the male, for instance, this is considered to indicate that either in reality or at least in the subject's perceptions the mother was the dominant figure in his childhood ('objective' interpretation). On the other hand, if the feet of one or both figures—particularly the same-sex figure or, more precisely, the one corresponding to the subject's dominant sexual identification—should be omitted or not clearly drawn, this might be taken as a metaphorical projection of the subject's feeling that he lacks a solid footing in the world ('subjective' interpretation).[10] Of course, this mutually complementary use of objective and subjective modes of interpreting the figure drawings is predicted, at least implicitly, on the psychoanalytic concept of overdetermination.

THE CONCEPT OF THE MANDALA

One of Jung's important empirical observations pertains to what he termed the *mandala:* essentially a circular pattern, with multiform variations, which appears to play an important role in religious ceremonies of diverse cultures. He found that it was also being spontaneously produced by some patients in drawings and paintings. Quite apart from the question of their theoretical meaning, Jung's pictorial documentation of these findings is indeed impressive. In a very recent clinical paper *(43)*

[10] Since this example serves only to illustrate the distinction between objective and subjective modes of interpretation, we cannot go into whether such metaphorical representations belong under the heading of symbolism. There is a difference in this respect between the classical formulation of Jones *(36)* and more recent psychoanalytic views as formulated by Kubie *(52)*.

he presented a long series of paintings by one of his patients, and discussed gradual changes in the character of these paintings in terms of the transformation of the mandala symbol.

From Jung's viewpoint the source of this symbolism is archetypal. But there is a striking difference between the mandala and many of the other archetypal images which Jung postulated, since it refers primarily to a geometric form rather than to a 'content' with anthropomorphic attributes. Although the mandala symbol, as Jung conceived it, seems to be somewhat anthropomorphic too, it clearly differs in this respect from the Christ symbol, for example.

The concept of the mandala bears a certain resemblance to the views of gestalt psychologists *(1, 31, 51)* who maintain that preference for symmetry and simplicity in geometric forms is independent, to some extent, of specific experience. Thus, Arnheim's comment on the Jungian mandala symbolism is of considerable interest: 'The reader will recognize the mandala as a form of the sunburst pattern, which was found to be characteristic for an early stage of differentiation. The universal occurrence of the pattern in children's drawings would seem to be sufficiently explained by the need of the young mind for visual order at a low level of complexity. At the same time such patterns are able to symbolize deepest insights into the nature of the cosmos as they are intuited and shaped by the unconscious and the conscious mind. This demonstrates the unity of the mind, which needs and creates the same forms in the outermost layers of sensory perception and in the hidden core, from which dreams and visions originate' *(1,* p. 167*)*.

This idea would not be incompatible with Karon's *(50)* understanding of the mandala symbol as a denial of male sexuality. Arnheim's interpretation in terms of form and Karon's interpretation in terms of content seem entirely congruous on the basis of overdetermination.[11]

[11] According to Jacobi *(34)*, Jung's belief in the archetypal nature of the symbolism of the number four lies at the basis of his classification of psychological types into the four subclasses (thinking, feeling, sensory, intuitive) which cut

EASTERN VERSUS WESTERN RELIGIONS

According to Jung *(46)*, one of the characteristics of Western as compared with Eastern thought is that 'with us a thought has no proper reality; we treat it as if it were nothingness. . . . We can produce the most devastating fact like the atom bomb with the help of this ever-changing phantasmagoria of virtually nonexistent thoughts, but it seems wholly absurd to us that one could ever establish the reality of thought itself' (p. 480). This is by no means an isolated idea, but a theme frequently emphasized in Jung's recent writings.

While this statement does point up a peculiarity of the Western attitude toward life, it certainly is an exaggeration. Some of the major developments in the study of the psyche have come from the West; and though it is true that the great Western creeds originated in the Middle East, religious meditation has long been part of the Western tradition.[12]

Jung continually stresses what he considers an inadequacy or incompleteness in Western religious concepts in which God is viewed as a purely benevolent entity, in contrast to certain Eastern concepts of God as simultaneously good and evil. Thus the doctrine of the Trinity, although derived from an archetype, appears incomplete because it does not include a representation of the forces of evil; e.g., by Lucifer, who as an older son of God is a perfect counterpart to the figure of Christ.

Jung's insistence on the incompleteness of the Trinity reflects two of his major contentions: 1, that the concept of a divine quaternity is archetypal in character; and 2, that the really primordial archetypal images combine in themselves the notions of good and evil. To support the first contention, and

across the two major categories of introvert and extravert. This fourfold classification obviously is an arbitrary one. It has raised much less interest than Jung's main distinction between introversion and extraversion.

[12] Some findings reported in a recent volume by Morris *(55)* seem to indicate that Jung's East-West dichotomy is at least an oversimplification. Morris, who administered a 'Ways of Life' questionnaire to students in various countries, found considerable similarity between response patterns in the United States and in Oriental countries, especially China.

also the archetypal significance he attaches to the square, the number four, and to various geometric and numerical variations on the quaternity theme, Jung cites a large number of ancient examples of quaternity symbolism. The notion that the primordial archetypal images are simultaneously good and evil finds perhaps its most elaborate expression in Jung's Answer of Job *(46)*, which sets forth the idea that the God represented in the Book of Job was a God whose qualities of self-consciousness were still quite rudimentary and who was simultaneously evil and good. (Jung's analysis of the concept of God, as reflected in the Book of Job, raises problems which alone would require extensive discussion beyond the scope of this paper.)

In presenting these notions, Jung repeatedly affirms that he is not a theologian and that he is concerned with the psychological aspects of the experiences, rather than with their truth value. Nevertheless, one can hardly escape the impression that he places a high value on experience which conforms closely to the archetype.

One of the features of Zen Buddhism which Jung finds particularly impressive is the use of paradoxical or sometimes deliberately nonsensical answers to questions as a means of emphasizing that a given problem does not lend itself to a purely rational solution. He does not advocate that the West take over the Eastern modes of thought; in fact he maintains rather emphatically that Western man must continue to cultivate his own distinct traditions. Nevertheless, he regards Eastern tradition as superior from the archetypal standpoint. In making these comparisons Jung inevitably becomes involved in difficulties he does not explain away. For example, it is not clear whether the archetypal images of one culture are superior to those of another because they are closer to, or because they are further removed from, the archetype. He leaves equally unclear whether the Christian Trinity is an amputated form of an earlier quaternity or the product of an arrested development.

Even though he regards the Trinity as less complete than a

quaternity, Jung finds some highly attractive features in this Christian doctrine. One of these is the fact that the concept of the Holy Ghost involves a paradoxical element and represents much more an abstraction than the concepts of the Father and of the Son. Jung notes that in some earlier versions the third member of the Trinity was a female figure (either Sophia or Mary), but he does not describe the introduction of the abstract element as a development of the archetype. He emphasizes instead the paradox in juxtaposing two concrete elements with an abstract one which belongs to a different dimension. The tendency toward such paradoxical formulations, according to Jung, is developed more highly in the Eastern than in the Western religions. Strangely enough, he does not stress the way in which Catholic dogma enhances the irrational aspect of the Trinity doctrine. In the Catholic view, this doctrine is beyond human comprehension and must be believed even though it appears absurd.

Although Jung finds that Catholic doctrine tends to stifle the expression of certain types of emotions which are determined by the archetype, there are other contexts in which he considers Catholicism to be superior. One of these pertains to the dogma of the Assumption, which he calls 'the most important religious event since the Reformation' *(46,* p. 464*)*. The logical consistency of the papal declaration cannot be surpassed, and it leaves Protestantism with the odium of being nothing but a *man's religion* which allows no metaphysical representation of woman' (p. 465). Jung makes clear in this context that he is not concerned with the dogma's literal truth but with the psychological needs to which it corresponds. To support his thesis that this dogma corresponds to an archetypal need, Jung remarks that in the period before its announcement many visions of Mary were seen by young children. He implies, apparently, that their visions were unaffected or but slightly affected by religious teachings. Yet, Catholic indoctrination begins quite early and since Catholic children are accustomed to seeing pictures of the Virgin, such influence cannot be easily excluded.

INTROVERSION AND EXTRAVERSION

One of Jung's best-known contributions to personality theory is the typology which he developed in his volume, Psychological Types *(41)*. The key categories of this typology are introversion and extraversion.[13] Introversion is characterized by a turning inward of the libido or a withdrawal of interest from the outside world, a mode of adaptation which is essentially regressive. In contrast, extraversion is characterized by an investment of the libido in outside objects. The 'libido' concept which Jung uses in this typology is, of course, the Jungian one *(40)*, which is not specifically limited to the sexual drive even in the broader sense *(13)* but corresponds more closely to Bergson's *élan vital*. The idea of introversion is derived essentially from a statement by Freud and Breuer *(5)*, subsequently further developed in Freud's writings *(15, 16, 17)*, namely, that repression involves the withdrawal of cathexis from external objects and that the repressed material then undergoes extensive elaboration.

Jung views introversion and extraversion as extreme regions of a continuum, with most individuals falling somewhere in the intermediate region. He adds, however, that in each individual unconscious tendencies incline to compensate for conscious ones, so that one who is consciously introversive tends to be unconsciously extraversive and vice versa. This notion of a mutually compensatory relationship between conscious and unconscious tendencies occupies an important place in Jungian personality theory. Jung, in developing his typology further, assumes that introverted and extraverted individuals differ in the kinds of psychoneurotic disturbances toward which they are predisposed.

Jung makes it quite clear that he regards both introversion and extraversion as compatible both with mental health and with neurosis, but he asserts essentially that *if* there is a neurosis, its form is likely to be related to the individual's position

[13] In this formulation Jung was influenced by earlier typologists, notably Jordan *(38)* and Gross *(25, 26)*.

on the introversion-extraversion dimension. This assumption has recently been reformulated by Eysenck *(8)*, who has used a statistical model to indicate the postulated independence of the dimension of introversion-extraversion and neuroticism. He has collected statistical data which seem to give support to this notion of independence.

The introversion-extraversion typology has served as a source of hypotheses for a large number of statistical studies, for the most part carried out within the framework of the psychology of individual differences. The problems dealt with fall essentially under two broad headings. The first concerns the internal homogeneity of introversion-extraversion as a dimension along which individuals may be said to differ. The second (which presupposes the existence of such a homogeneous dimension) concerns the correlation between position on the introversion-extraversion continuum and other personality variables.

The evidence on both of these counts is at best inconclusive. Eysenck *(9)*, who reviewed the literature in 1953, presented apparently positive evidence in support of both hypotheses, reformulating them, however, in a framework quite different from that of Jung. Other statistical studies have cast doubt on the genuineness of the introversion-extraversion dimension. Carrigan *(7)*, reviewing more than one hundred studies—many of them published subsequent to 1953—finds that 'the status of introversion-extraversion as a dimension of personality ... remains somewhat tenuous' (p. 357).

From a psychodynamic standpoint the question as to whether individuals can be reliably differentiated on a dimension of introversion-extraversion is of considerably less interest than are some other problems pertaining to the Jungian typology. In fact, the confusing results produced by the numerous statistical studies in this area are not at all surprising in view of the fact that all of these studies tend to view introversion and extraversion as relatively static attributes, rather than as attributes relatively specific to objects and situations.

The Jungian introversion-extraversion hypothesis has, of

course, been criticized by numerous authors. Fenichel *(10)* emphasized the essentially descriptive character of Jung's introversion-extraversion dichotomy and noted that both withdrawal from the environment and its opposite—the 'flight into reality'—can serve defensive functions. Rorschach *(64)*, Murphy *(57)*, and Fenichel *(10)* have all questioned Jung's assumption that introversive and extraversive tendencies are negatively correlated.

Jungian typology has also been criticized by social psychologists *(65)*, who are sceptical of personality typologies that do not take the social context into account.

The lack of specificity with respect to objects in the Jungian concept of introversion has been emphasized by Glover, who points to the contrast in this respect between the concepts of Freud and Jung *(23*, p. 81). Glover also states in this connection that the introversion-extraversion dichotomy, as Jung describes it, holds strictly only for the infant, and that it represents at best an oversimplification when applied to later stages of development. Although Glover does not elaborate on this point, he presumably means that at later stages of development the turning inward is directed in part toward introjected images originally derived from the external environment.

Of greater psychodynamic interest than the issue of individual differences in the introversion-extraversion dimension is the previously mentioned Jungian notion of a compensatory relationship between conscious and unconscious tendencies. This notion, which Jung does not limit to the introversion-extraversion typology, has parallels in psychoanalytic theory, e.g., with reference to the mechanism of reaction-formation. However, as Glover points out, Jung gives the concept of compensation much greater generality than is the case in psychoanalytic theory. Glover also correctly notes that in Jungian psychology the existence of the unconscious compensating tendencies is inferred from conscious end products.[14]

[14] Although fully agreeing with Glover's criticisms, the authors would nevertheless like to note that Jung's conception of the contrast between the surface and the underlying tendencies has found a highly useful application in the Szondi

SUMMARY

There is no doubt that if Jung had remained close to his original clinical interests, he himself would have elaborated and enriched his early concepts of introversion and extraversion as well as many others. However, in his increasing preoccupation with mysticism Jung appears to have gradually moved further and further away from the empirical roots of his concepts.

It is most appropriate, therefore, before concluding these remarks to remind ourselves of Jung's important role in the development of psychoanalysis. Undeniably Jung was one of the major pioneers and collaborators of Freud, and his contributions to psychoanalysis have left their historical imprint. It would go beyond the scope of this essay to hark back to the years of Jung's enthusiastic collaboration with Freud, except to note that for many years he was a source of inspiration to his co-workers at Burghölzli.

It was indeed an irreparable loss for Freud when Jung, the 'Crown Prince' and logical successor, severed his ties with traditional psychoanalysis and expressed his disbelief in infantile sexuality. In his reminiscences of this period, Jones tells of Freud's deep disappointment over Jung's sudden change. This was particularly difficult for Freud to accept, since it occurred shortly after Jung had contributed an important case study of infantile psychosexual development.

Jung's repudiation of Freud did not prove as astonishing to

Test, whose rationale involves the use of polar opposites. While already present in the test as originally developed, this notion is even more directly utilized in more recent developments. Thus, the latent profile technique *(66)*, which involves making a secondary selection from the photograph that had not been chosen as either 'likes' or 'dislikes', is based on the assumption that the initial choices represent the relatively more manifest personality, while the secondary choices reflect the more latent personality. The Dur-Moll scale *(56, 68)* is related more specifically to the concept of *persona*.

While these concepts are derived from Jungian psychology, their use is not dependent on the Jungian framework. In fact, Moser's previously mentioned paper *(56)* is couched in what are essentially psychoanalytic terms.

many contemporaries, especially to Jones, who had always considered Jung 'a man with deep mystical tendencies that prevented a clear vision of a scientific attitude in general, or a psychoanalytic one in particular . . . the superstructure was brilliant, but the foundation was insecure' *(37,* p. 215*).* Be that as it may, Jung's early writings and clinical contributions to psychoanalysis before his mystical period remain basic.

At several points in the preceding comments, references have been made to the relationship of Jungian psychology to projective techniques, but a more general statement concerning Jung's contribution in this area is perhaps indicated here. In the Journal of Projective Techniques, Vol. XIX, 1955—an issue devoted to the commemoration of Jung's birthday—these contributions were discussed at some length and received official recognition.

Jung's most direct contribution to projective techniques was his famous study, Word Association *(49).* When Jung published his first paper on this subject he aroused enormous interest in the method and thereby initiated many further studies at Burghölzli. Bleuler *(3)* himself ascribed great value to Jung's study for future clinical investigation and therapeutic interpretation. And yet these studies did not spring from a vacuum. In fact, the word association method had been originated considerably earlier by Galton *(21)* and had been used extensively in Wundt's laboratory in studies of reaction time *(70).* Jung's contribution consisted, however, in utilizing this technique for the exploration of mental contents below the threshold of consciousness and in showing that principles similar to those used in dream analysis could also be used in the analysis of associations. Jung's contribution to other projective techniques—the Rorschach, the TAT and its derivatives, the Szondi, and the various drawing techniques—is less direct but nevertheless unmistakable.

His typology has had a great influence on theories of personality. When Rorschach *(64)* pointed to the differences between Jung's introversion-extraversion typology and his own

views, he was referring to an early formulation. Rorschach died approximately a year after the publication of Jung's Psychological Types, and even if he were familiar with it he would have been unlikely to have had this in mind at the time he wrote his critical remarks on Jung.

Whatever may have been the merits of Jung's early clinical contributions and whatever may have been their influence on general psychodynamic thinking, the fact is that in the forty-odd years which followed the publication of Psychological Types, Jung moved further away from clinical observations and became more and more absorbed in studies of mythology and in metaphysical speculations. In this process the psychoanalytic and the Jungian schools moved further and further apart.

While our main critical comments have been directed against these late developments of Jungian psychology, it is necessary to point out that some of them are of definite interest. One of these is the study of comparative mythology and of the parallels between mythological and individual dreams and fantasies *(2, 32, 34, 46, 47, 59)*. The second is the extensive use of pictorial material, largely as a means of investigating such parallels between myths and individual fantasies *(2, 32, 33, 34, 59)*.

Neither of these contributions is limited to the Jungian school. Parallels between myths and unconscious products have occupied the attention of Freud and of many other psychoanalytic authors. Without reference to specifically Jungian concepts, and without the use of pictorial products in the study of such parallels, similar methods have often been used outside the Jungian framework. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the Jungian publications contain a large body of empirical material under these two headings—material which is rarely referred to in psychoanalytic writings. The hesitation of psychoanalytic authors to bring this material into relation with their own work is doubtless due in part to the difficulties of the theoretical framework in which the Jungian analyses are presented and partly to obscurities of exposition characteristic of some of the Jungian authors.

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THE HAUNTING LYRIC

THE PERSONAL AND SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF AMERICAN POPULAR SONGS

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I

The psychological functions of music have so far attracted little attention and the field remains relatively unexplored, particularly in the area of the song lyric. For some time I was marginally aware that early morning whistling by members of my family often expressed the mood of the moment—happy, sad, resigned, or hopeful. Usually only a phrase or two was being whistled but, as I thought of the lyrics for that part of the tune, they would give me the clue to the mood; for example, OH, WHAT A BEAUTIFUL MORNIN' from Oklahoma! or He Floats Through the Air with the Greatest of Ease, THE DARING YOUNG MAN ON THE FLYING TRAPEZE.[1] Often the whistler could not have recalled the words. It was a song without conscious words.

More or less coincident with this observation came the realization that a patient who had been in analysis for some time had established a pattern of reporting snatches of songs which occurred to him during our session or at other times. These song fragments had an insistent quality that he did not understand. Occasionally he would recognize a link between the remembered and plaguing words and the content of a previous

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[1] Song titles are indicated in capital letters throughout the paper.

hour. More often the connection remained obscure. When I realized that the lyrics were preconscious expressions, it became clear that the patient was using them to convey emotions and feelings he could not express directly. This revealed particularly the patient's resistance since he had until then succeeded in impressing me with his great verbal capacity. It was evident that a direct statement from him would have been too close to emotions which he was not yet ready to experience. Another's words provided the necessary distance and yet gave a hint of the underlying turmoil. The lyrics were used to express most specifically the transference, though they often provided a clue to the current conflict in the analysis.

From this point on a careful record was kept of lyrics which appeared during the hours. The accumulated data were fascinating, for they showed clearly the turning point of the analysis and the resolution of the transference neurosis. In fact, the analysis of one song lyric made it possible to prove conclusively to the patient that he was giving only lip service to the solution of a problem he had regarded as worked through.

As one might anticipate, the patient resorted less and less to song lyrics as the analysis approached its end and he could begin to speak for himself. Now he is bothered only rarely by this obsession with songs and, when a phrase does come frequently to mind, he tries to understand what it means and why.

II

The literature in this area is scant. Freud *(9)* had only this to say on the subject: '. . . the tunes which suddenly come into a man's head can be shown to be conditioned by some train of thought to which they belong, and which for some reason is occupying his mind without his knowing anything about it. It is easy to show that the connection with the tune is to be sought either in the words which belong to it or in the source from which it comes: I must, however, make this reservation, that I do not maintain this in the case of really musical people of whom I happen to have had no experience; in them the musical

value of the tune may account for its suddenly emerging into consciousness.'

Reik *(23)* asks what it means when a tune occurs so persistently that it becomes a 'haunting melody'. He speaks of music as carrying with it 'an infinite variety of primitive and subtle emotions'; he says that 'inward singing' has a special meaning which when understood would 'discover not only what is on your mind without your being aware of it but also what is in your heart'. In other words, musical phrases express mood as well as thought. 'The secret message it carries, the incidental music accompanying our conscious thinking is never accidental.'

Kohut *(15)* views music from the standpoint of the three psychic functions: id, ego, and superego. In relation to the id, he feels that music is primarily a cathartic expression—one of the transference phenomena, compromise formations, or sublimations. The effect of musical activity on the ego is chiefly one of experiencing an enjoyable mastery of the anxiety produced by the perception of sound as a direct threat to the archaic mental apparatus. When related to the superego, music involves the recognition and obedience to a set of æsthetic rules which gives the musician a feeling of satisfaction and security akin to the moral satisfaction of having behaved properly.

Again, Kohut *(16)* has pointed out that Freud, in the remarks quoted above, implied three separate problems in the question of the haunting melody: 1, its emergence from the unconscious; 2, the extramusical context that produces obsessional significance; and 3, the question whether an intrinsically musical factor, alone or combined with extramusical factors, can account for the sudden emergence of a tune.

Reik's interest includes all three problems, though he is chiefly concerned with the first two. Kohut deals primarily with the third problem. Generally, previous interest has been invested in the musical form itself, that is, the melody or tune as it occurs either to the patient or to the analyst. My position is that what appears to be true for the lingering or haunting melody is equally true for the obsessively persistent lyric. Like

the former, its 'secret message' is never accidental. Clinical examples will demonstrate this.

III

The patient mentioned earlier was a young man with bisexual problems. One day during the transition period between the overt acting out of his homosexual impulses and the development of the maternal transference (which was to be his way to freedom from this perversion), he concluded the hour feeling confident that he would be able to avoid any future physical contact with his homosexual lover. As he left my office, he was whistling a fragment of a familiar tune of which I could recall only the words, 'a castle rising in Spain'. This may not seem an unusual ending to an hour which had focused on the budding heterosexual transference. Nevertheless, I felt it worth while to call the incident to his attention the next day. He had been unaware of his whistling. As anticipated, his associations to the song fragment showed that, under the influence of the maternal transference, he had hoped to contain his homosexual acting out. The underlying fear, however, was that this hope was as nebulous as 'a castle rising in Spain'. He wanted to be free from his lover but he could not yet break the tie.

At the time neither of us could recall the title of the song from which this phrase had come. Consequently, the opportunity to deal with more than the manifest meaning of the lyric was lost. I later found the title and was able to complete its analytic meaning. The song is MY ROMANCE, and the patient had condensed, as we would expect, both impulse and defense. There were, of course, two romances: the incipient heterosexual one with the analyst in the mother transference and the fading one with the homosexual partner.

Some time later the patient emphatically declared that he now felt he really understood his homosexual impulses and was sufficiently in control never again to be involved in a homosexual encounter. Nevertheless, near the end of this session, he became aware of the words of a popular song entitled YOU

CAN'T STOP ME FROM DREAMING. These words had been at the back of his mind most of the hour. That night he dreamed of being in a situation which repeated the theme of his homosexual acting out. What he had been sure was under control during the day seemed less certain during sleep. The contingent line of the lyric is: 'I'll get even with you tonight'.[2]

On another occasion this same patient talked most of the hour about his fear of loneliness and his defenses against it, of which the overt homosexual acts were an important part. He began humming a phrase which he identified as, 'I meant to call you on the telephone because I didn't like to feel so all alone'.[3] His wish to be near the analyst, if only to hear the sound of her voice, is clearly expressed in the intrusive song fragment. Through this transference insight he came to understand his frequent, compulsive telephone calls with long, often unnecessary conversations. The calls helped him avoid his terrible sense of loneliness which was related to his profound oral attachment to his mother.

Many months later, after the intrusion of many song fragments, a song introduced the turning point of his analysis. He saw the musical comedy, My Fair Lady, and became preoccupied with one of its songs, GET ME TO THE CHURCH ON TIME. Since I had not seen the play, he repeated the lyric to me. I remarked naïvely that apparently the elderly bachelor in the play had found a woman he could love and now he was eager to begin a normal married life. This comment expressed what both the patient and I hoped would be the outcome of his analysis. But the facts were quite different and the patient put me straight. For him the import of the lyric was the duplicity involved in the marriage. The man was going to get married and pretend to enter a settled existence while, at the same time, he connived to get back to his old barroom cronies and his accustomed ways. The patient immediately saw the striking dif-

[2] © 1937, Remick Music Corporation. Used by permission.

[3] I could find no song with this title. I assume that this is either a phrase from a song or one which the patient invented for this use.

ference between my matter-of-fact remark about the song and its real implications. Simultaneously, he recognized his own identification with the unreformed singer. Until then he sincerely believed that he had given up his homosexual attachments. He now had to face the fact that this was not the case. A deeply repressed and cherished remnant of the homosexual defense came to light. Analysis of it released the patient from his homosexual bonds and, with their real abandonment, the direct maternal transference blossomed, permitting the analysis to go on to a successful conclusion.

In one of the closing hours of this treatment, there occurred to the patient a musical jingle which was puzzling. He was obsessed by a radio advertisement for 'Holsum [wholesome] Bread, the Kind like Grandmother Made'. Its meaning became clear only when he associated with it his feeling about what he called the 'dark tunnel' of analysis and reaching the light at the far end. He was experiencing a rebirth phenomenon—a new beginning—but it was not until we had juggled the order of the generations that we understood it was his mother and his relationship to her that he was leaving behind. She was a rare one who still baked wholesome (Holsum), nourishing bread for the family. Because of her age at the time of the patient's birth (he was the last child in a large family), his mother actually had seemed more like a grandmother to him while an older sister had played the role of mother. I was that sister in the transference.

IV

Once the analyst has worked through the meaning of a particular type of defense in one patient, it can be used to understand similar problems in others. Thus, when I began to study lyric fragments regularly, a rich vein of source material became available. The examples cited can be multiplied many times.

A doctor-patient had the following dreams:

> I am in the Alps walking with an older couple. The woman is between me and the older man. I take her hand in mine just

because I feel friendly. There is nothing sexual in it. However, I wonder, what if someone were taking my wife's hand like this, would I like it? I decide I wouldn't.

I am in a pathology laboratory. A pathological liver is being demonstrated. Then a normal liver is shown and the difference can be seen.

The patient awoke from these dreams mentally singing the words from the duet, *La ci darem la mano,* from Don Giovanni. Freely translated, this means, 'Right here you should (or must) give me your hand'. The next line is *La mi dirai di si* ('there you will tell me yes,'). The duet is a direct reference to the manifest content of the first dream. The patient recalled that, not long before, someone had told him that the Italian colloquial meaning of the second line is, 'come screw with me'. The dream had direct sexual meaning and, in this instance, referred to undisguised incestuous wishes.

The theme of the opera is, of course, seduction without marriage and the 'pathological liver' refers to Don Giovanni. The patient, because of his wish to have sexual relations with his mother, viewed himself as pathological.

Some time later this patient had another dream:

You were singing a Mozart refrain or song in A minor. You were doing it so beautifully that I was sure you had had voice training at one time.

The patient immediately referred to the two dreams cited above and wondered in what key the duet had been written. He recalled that his mother often sang in a minor key. 'It was a bittersweet sort of singing. She was a bittersweet sort of a person', he said. I indicated that possibly 'A minor' referred to the time when he was a minor, a small child, and the sweetness of the song to the feeling of a child when the mother sings a lullaby. The patient immediately recalled that, when he was very little, a close friend would care for him when his mother was away or ill. The analyst had come to represent this person—the one who cared for him. The choice of the operatic selection

now became clear: he was speaking of a time when his mother must have said to him, 'Give me your hand', as all mothers do when a protective gesture is required, as in crossing a street.

Another male patient said, 'Way out there (referring to the fact that, because of anxiety, he felt removed from the thought) I'm thinking, DON'T LET THEM TAKE IT AWAY!'. This was the theme song of the Democratic Party Convention in 1956, but the patient used the title to refer to his fear of castration. Incidentally, the Democratic Party lost that election.

A woman patient who came to her session feeling angry with me could not account for her anger until she realized that, as she came into the office, she had been thinking of the music for the lyric fragment, '[Please] give me SOMETHING TO REMEMBER YOU BY when you are far away from me'. She had been told a few hours earlier that the analyst was going away on vacation and had not reacted overtly then to the impending separation, but her feelings were now clear enough. The word 'please' was inserted by the patient to intensify the plea for a talisman to avert the loneliness she feared to experience.

Another patient returned angry and petulant after a Christmas interruption. Outwardly he related his anger to the fact that he had seen a Christmas tree in the analyst's living room. He is a Jew, reared in a traditional environment. Since I am not, I was a taboo object for him, although he was aware that my husband is a Jew. This last fact and the fact that my office is in my home placed him in a tempting, seductive situation. But when I proclaimed my non-Jewishness with a Christmas tree, he encountered limits he could not cross and he was filled with rage. In discussing it he became aware that, in the transference distortion, he had made me appear much younger—about the age of an aunt to whom he had been deeply attached as a small boy. She was, in fact, a mother substitute at a critical period in his life and, in the transference, he had wished to relive with me the happy days when he was so close to her. In the background of this hour, he suddenly realized, were the words of the song, [You are] THE OBJECT OF MY AFFECTION,

which he had been humming silently. Behind the heterosexual façade lay the attachment to and longing for the aunt who had been his pregenital mother.

'There will never be another love like this'[4] was the lyric theme of an hour in which still another patient asked, 'Can you ever feel your wife loves you and you love her as you did your mother?'.

A male patient awakened one morning whistling, 'I GOT PLENTY O' NUTTIN' and nuttin's plenty fo' me, got my gal, got my song, Hebben the whole day long'. This followed an hour which had included a painful discussion of his impotence and his consequent fear of losing his wife. The previous night he had successfully met the sexual challenge, and the lyric was the humorous expression of both a wish and a happy reassurance. Behind these, however, lay the resistance and perhaps the clue to his impotence, for the cripple who sings the song in Porgy and Bess uses his physical handicap as a means of securing pregenital care.

A highly intellectual and hypersophisticated young man wept unrestrainedly at a reference to MOTHER, MOTHER, ARE YOU THERE? from Menotti's opera, The Medium. His associations referred to his mother's engulfing possessiveness and to his struggle against his own wish to be incorporated orally. He had gone to Germany to learn German, his mother tongue, and had studied it much as a small child first learns language—through immersion in sounds and associations. To this end he had isolated himself from English-speaking people. Although at first he understood almost nothing that was said, he had received a tremendous thrill from just listening to the language. He left Germany, having mastered the language in this unique manner, in what appeared to be a homosexual panic. In the analysis this panic turned out to be mother-sexual.

A male patient came into the office humming a tune which he identified as the opening phrase of the musical, Trouble in Tahiti. These three words were the only ones the patient

[4] I could not locate the source of this phrase.

associated to the melody, but he thought the libretto dealt with the marital problems typical of suburbia. No connection with this improbable title was seen. His first verbal productions of the hour were concerned with how able and gifted he was. The variations on this theme obviously represented his identification with the composer of this work, Leonard Bernstein, whom he considered a great person. But why Tahiti? It developed that he had spent the previous afternoon with his girl friend and had found that, for some reason, the unity in their relationship, of which he had made so much, was missing. He had been longing for her and would have liked to saturate himself sexually without restraint. The frustration of his wish the day before had then emerged as trouble in Tahiti.

The often veiled sexual meanings in lyrics are translated literally by patients. SHE HAD TO GO AND LOSE IT AT THE ASTOR manifestly speaks of a lost fur coat but actually refers to a loss of virginity. This lyric was one female patient's introduction to an account of her premarital affairs.

A colleague gave me two examples of how children also use lyrics to express deep-seated feelings. A boy in latency had made a toy drum for his older sister's birthday party and wrote the name of her boy friend on it. As he made the toy, he hummed Chopin's Funeral March. Although this melody has no lyrics, the patient was able to put words to it, expressing his sexual jealousy and his great hostility toward his sister and her friend. In the second example, a girl often sang popular songs—until she realized that her therapist used the words of the songs to understand what the patient was not saying directly. She then began to hum the tunes without the words. Fortunately, the therapist was familiar with popular songs and knew their lyrics. One day after the therapist had talked with the patient's older sister over the telephone, the child came in humming I'LL NEVER BE JEALOUS AGAIN, and she was brought face to face with the jealousy and hostility that had been denied previously.

A series of three hours will illustrate how a patient used sentimental ballads to approach painful and important material. He

reported that he had been listening to sentimental popular songs on the radio while driving to his session. 'As I was listening, I drifted back in time with these sad songs and I could see myself as a little boy wanting to go back to my mother. It made me cry. It was the saddest thing; this little guy (inside me) wanted to go back to his mother in the worst way. It's a bottomless pit of sorrow. Even though I say to myself, "This can't be", that doesn't stop it. It must have been a very sad separation. This is a very basic feeling.'

One month later he reported that he had played some popular records the previous evening when he was home alone. He felt 'like a sad and lonesome little boy with the world ahead of him all scary'. The records were AUTUMN LEAVES and GONE WITH THE WIND. Speaking of these lyrics, he said that at the beginning of his treatment seven months earlier he would have found himself sobbing and 'wracked with depression' but today he had only feelings of what he must have experienced 'long ago'.

Three weeks later he again reported listening to the radio en route to his hour. The song, LAURA, aroused in him the same nostalgia he had described previously. Then, a few minutes later and just a block from his destination, THE NEARNESS OF YOU was played. With this he was flooded with a feeling of deep attachment to the analyst and the sensual awareness of what it might be like to dance with her. He then recalled a time when his mother had embraced him and he had felt her breast on his shoulder. He had been afraid to mention his attitude toward the breast because it was connected with 'shameful' sexual excitement. By way of song lyrics, however, he had been able to introduce this painful topic.

After a discussion of my interest in song lyrics and the use patients often make of them, a colleague reported the following personal experience. He had once talked with his father about his decision to marry a girl of whom his family disapproved. He had been firm with his father but at the same time felt sorry for him. He knew he had upset him by the decision. Afterward, while driving to the home of his fiancée, he found himself hum-

ming the phrase, 'the land of the free and the home of the brave'. He had obviously made his own declaration of independence.

The foregoing examples support the thesis that the haunting lyric is a 'voice of the preconscious' and must be understood in the same way as a dream fragment, a fantasy, or a repetitive act. Such lyric fragments have both manifest and latent meaning. The manifest meaning restates the defensive surface position. The latent meaning, referring to the impulses and wishes and their genetic origin, is revealed only by analysis of the lyric as if it were a dream. The first case cited provided the opportunity to discover this. The persistent analysis of his song lyrics as a form of resistance made it possible to follow through, in this patient, the evolution and eventual resolution of the mother transference. The subsequent study of song fragments occurring to other patients revealed a striking fact: the overwhelming majority of such lyric phrases, when analyzed, furthered each patient's understanding of his relationship to his mother. This repeated observation led to the question whether or not popular songs have a basic theme. If they do, what is the nature and function of that theme? The following section describes an attempt to find an answer through the study of American popular music.

V

The chorus lyrics of American hit songs[5] from 1900 through 1949 were examined. This period was chosen because it covers the half century during which popular music had its heyday and because the end of World War II ushered in various artificial influences[6] which made it difficult or impossible to determine the intrinsic popular appeal of more recent so-called 'hits'.

A total of 2111 hit songs was examined. This number consti-

[5] A hit song is one which has gained top ranking or appreciable acceptance by the public. Before radio, the popularity of a tune was determined by the sales of sheet music and Victrola recordings. Later, with the advent of radio and television, the success of a song depended on the amount of exposure it received through these media as well as on the sales of recordings and sheet music.

[6] Commercial rivalries among music producers, radio networks, disc jockeys, etc.

tutes 95 percent of all songs listed in the bibliographical sources below.[7] The lyrics for the other 5 percent could not be found. These songs have been divided into three classes:

1. Romantic love songs	1470	69%
2. Sentimental songs referring to home and/or mother	113	6%
3. Nonromantic (topical) songs: war, patriotism, dancing, jazz, nature, nonsense ditties, etc.; and 66 songs referring to the Negro and reflecting his place and influence in American music	528	25%

In this paper only the romantic love songs have been con-

[7] The first eight references supplied the basic list of relevant hit tunes gathered from many sources. Additional songs considered had to appear more than once in other sources used.

1. *Academy Award Winners.* Hollywood, Calif.: Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences, 1934-1957.

2. *BMI Top Song Hits.* New York: Broadcast Music, Inc., 1939-1951.

3. *Forty Years of Hit Tunes.* New York: American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), 1957.

4. Freeman, Larry: *The Melodies Linger On. Fifty Years of Popular Song.* Watkins Glen, N. Y.: Century House, 1951.

5. *Half a Century of Song Hits.* New York: American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP), n. d.

6. Kopp, Sam, Compiler: *Million Copy Songs, Authors, Composers, and Publishers.* 25th ASCAP Anniversary, July 31, 1940.

7. *One Million Copy Hits.* New York: Edward B. Marks Music Corporation, n.d.

8. *Your Hit Parade* (Radio Program). April 20, 1935—December 31, 1957. List supplied by the American Tobacco Co., sponsor.

9. Boni, Margaret and Lloyd, Norman: *Fireside Book of Favorite American Songs.* New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952.

10. Burton, Jack: *The Blue Book of Tin Pan Alley.* Watkins Glen, N. Y.: Century House, 1951.

11. Ewen, David: *Songs of America.* Chicago: Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 1947.

12. Fuld, James J.: *American Popular Music, 1875-1950.* Philadelphia: Musical Americana, 1955.

13. Mattfeld, Julius: *Variety-Music Cavalcade.* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1952.

14. *Memory Songs, 1886-1951.* New York: Edward B. Marks Music Corporation, n.d.

sidered in detail. These lyrics deal with a two-person relationship usually based on unreal, fanciful, extravagant love. Only infrequently do such lyrics touch on mature love. The sentimental group of the 1900's and the romantic and sentimental songs of the 1800's are used for comparison. The third group, nonromantic or topical, is too heterogeneous and too specialized for this study.

Since song fragments can be interpreted in the same way as dreams, an attempt will now be made to understand the implicit and latent significance of popular lyrics as a class from this point of view. The results appear in three tables which present statistics for 1900-1949 and 1800-1899 in parallel columns. We shall take up the twentieth-century songs first.

TABLE No. I

ROMANTIC LOVE SONGS

Lyrics classified according to level of fantasy and 'ego distance'

	1900-1949 (1470 Songs)		1800-1899 (153 Songs)	
	No.	%	No.	%
1. Songs of Narcissistic Self-Absorption	69	5		
2. Songs of Internal Dialogue	907	61	61	40
3. Songs Naming the Loved One	113	8	38	25
4. Songs of Soliloquy About the Loved One	170	11.5	30	20
5. Songs of Displacement to Place or Situation Associated with or Reminiscent of the Loved One	141	9.5	7	4
a. Place	(112)		(5)	
b. Train	(9)		(1)	
c. Moon	(20)		(1)	
6. Songs of Displacement to Situation Wholly Separate from the Self	70	5	17	11

Table No. I shows six headings obtained by classifying popular lyrics according to the level of fantasy from which the love theme stems and in terms of 'ego distance' between the protagonist (lyricist) and the object of his sentiments. Although many songs could fit easily into more than one group, that category was chosen which seems most clearly to match the spirit or intention of the writer.[8] According to the table, love is the ubiquitous theme, but this still does not answer the central question: Is there a latent theme common to all popular songs?

TABLE No. II

ROMANTIC LOVE SONGS

Lyrics classified according to content

(Figures and percentages indicate absolute incidence of each content in the total number of songs. A song may have several contents.)

	1900-1949 (1470 Songs)		1800-1899 (153 Songs)	
	No.	%	No.	%
1. Love	850	57	77	44
2. Heart	475	32	39	24
3. Anaclitic Affects				
a. Possessive Dependence	462	31	16	11
b. Depressive and Hostile Affects	390	27	25	18
c. Separation Anxiety	356	24	46	30
d. Dreams of Wish Fulfilment	338	22	16	11
4. Duration of Love	276	18	45	28
a. Faithfulness	(192)		(36)	
b. Faithlessness	(84)		(9)	
5. Sexuality	245	16	6	3
a. Inferred Contact	(208)			
b. Explicit Contact	(37)		(6)	
c. Prostitution	(6)			

[8] THE DESERT SONG is an example. Its theme, 'you must be mine', is common in popular songs, but the description of the desert adds a particular flavor. It was therefore considered as a Place song (Table No. I, 5-a).

TABLE No. II (cont'd)

	1900-1949 (1470 Songs)		1800-1899 (153 Songs)	
	No.	%	No.	%
6. Affirmative Affects	176	12		
a. Bliss, Divine, Paradise, Rapture, etc.	(94)			
b. Power of Love	(80)			
c. Self-confidence	(2)			
7. Nostalgia	8			
Memory	104	7	7	5
Déjà Vu	9		1	
8. Romance	106	7		
a. Overvaluation	(22)			
b. Desire, Passion	(47)			
c. Romance	(51)			
9. Marriage	67	4.5	13	8
10. Mother, Father, Baby	54	3.6	10	6
11. Dance	47	3.2		
12. Sentiment	28	1.9	4	2
13. Mature Love	16	1	2	1
14. Fate	17	1		
15. Exhortation	9	0.6		
16. Death	3	0.2	17	11
17. Symbols	588	40	53	34
a. Moon	(185)		(10)	
b. Flowers	(161)		(24)	
c. Stars	(149)		(9)	
d. Spring	(111)		(15)	
e. Islands, South	(92)		(3)	
f. Magic, Music, Bluebird, Gypsy	(81)		(1)	
g. Sun	(80)		(13)	

Table No. II approaches the problem by way of the fact that lyrics are written in the form of a simple story. Their manifest and latent content thus provides a basis for further analysis. Seventeen topics were identified.

The word, Love, occurs at least once in more than half (57 percent) of the lyrics. It is presented from every conceivable angle. Every age of man has been exploited. No facet of love is too trite, too insignificant, too intimate, or too sacred to be exposed by song writers. A few examples will illustrate: love is enduring (ALWAYS; THROUGH THE YEARS); love is powerful (I'D CLIMB THE HIGHEST MOUNTAIN); love chooses ideally (YOU ARE THE IDEAL OF MY DREAMS); love's devotion is limitless (HOW DEEP IS THE OCEAN?); love is fickle (I MIGHT BE YOUR ONCE IN A WHILE); love is possessive (LOVE ME AND THE WORLD IS MINE); and in the end love is incomprehensible (WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED LOVE?; AH! SWEET MYSTERY OF LIFE).

The Heart is second in importance to song writers, appearing in 32 percent of the songs. There is no doubt in the minds of lyricists that the heart is the seat of the emotions, and in many instances it is assigned an animistic role. It can be 'lonely', it 'talks', 'smiles', 'sings', in addition to its normal characteristics of beating or momentarily standing still (MY HEART STOOD STILL; ALL OF A SUDDEN MY HEART SINGS; BEAT OF MY HEART).

Disposing thus of the two most frequent topics in popular songs, we come now to a group of special interest to this study.

Anaclitic Affects: in this group, on the basis of both manifest and latent content, we can differentiate four subgroups whose central concern is the quality of the relationship between the lover and the beloved.

(a) Songs of Possessive Dependence (31 percent) are specifically concerned with either the gratification or the frustration of the wish for closeness, dependency, and clinging. They deal with themes of holding or of being held, of needfulness, pleading, possessiveness, and engulfment. The clinging passivity to the love object is spelled out. No interpretation is necessary, for rationalization and secondary elaboration are minimal; the

words speak for themselves (I'VE GOT YOU UNDER MY SKIN; YOU'RE ALL I NEED; HOLD ME; EVERYTHING I HAVE IS YOURS '. . . my life, my all'[9]). The wish, expressed or clearly implied, is for primitive infantile gratification.

(b) Depressive and Hostile Affects comprise 27 percent of the songs. They are concerned with the consequences or 'pain specific' results when the infantile wish for a symbiotic relationship is thwarted: loneliness, the 'blues', grief, self-pity, cynicism, satire, regret, disillusionment, and revenge. The loss of the beloved produces the same affects and reaction in fantasy as are experienced by dependent persons when an anaclitic relationship is disrupted (I KNOW WHAT IT MEANS TO BE LONESOME; HAVE YOU EVER BEEN LONELY?; AM I BLUE?; NOBODY KNOWS AND NOBODY SEEMS TO CARE; ALL ALONE; ALL BY MYSELF).

(c) Songs of Separation Anxiety (24 percent) are concerned with the separation trauma, ranging from depressive fixation to efforts at mastering the trauma. These efforts take the form of wishes, pleas, and patient waiting; but always the insistence is on the aversion to the separation and the need to undo it (I'LL ALWAYS BE IN LOVE WITH YOU '. . . if you should stray a million miles away';[10] WHERE ARE YOU? '. . . I couldn't believe we're parted';[11] INDIAN LOVE CALL '. . . If you refuse me I will be blue and waiting all alone';[12] SOME DAY, SOMEWHERE '. . . We will meet again';[13] LOVER, COME BACK TO ME).

(d) Songs about Dreams as Wish Fulfilment (22 percent) are explicitly gratifying and are similar in this respect to the dreams of children. The dreamer achieves reunion with the lost loved one, though often the specter of separation still hovers

[9] Written by Harold Adamson and Burton Lane. © 1933, Robbins Music Corp. Used by permission of the publisher.

[10] ©, 1929, Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., New York, N. Y. Copyright renewed and assigned. Used by permission of the publisher.

[11] Written by Harold Adams and Jimmy McHugh. © 1936, Leo Feist, Inc. Used by permission of the publisher.

[12] © 1924, Harms, Inc. Copyright renewed. Used by permission.

[13] Written by Joan Brooks, Jack Segal, and Dick Miles. © 1944, Music Workshop, Inc. Used by permission.

(A DREAM IS A WISH YOUR HEART MAKES; I'LL SEE YOU IN MY DREAMS; IN ALL MY DREAMS I DREAM OF YOU).

These four expressions of immaturity—possessive dependence, depressive and hostile affects, separation anxiety, and dreams as wish fulfilment—seem to characterize popular songs that appeal to aspects of the personality which have been only incompletely separated from dependent attachment to supporting imagos.

The Duration of Love (18 percent) is the concern of songs which treat love as faithful and enduring, or as fickle and of passing moment. However, almost twice as many lyrics are written from the first viewpoint. Even though the lyricist may apologize for the inability of the lover to maintain a true and lasting affection, the dominant wish is for permanence (ALWAYS; MONDAY, TUESDAY, WEDNESDAY '. . . every single second, ev'ry minute . . . I love you';[14] ONLY FOREVER; I MIGHT BE YOUR ONCE IN A WHILE). Nevertheless, while lasting love is preferred, it is the theme of only about half as many songs as those concerned with clinging. It appears that with attachment to the love object, the lasting quality of love is taken for granted.

In 16 percent of the lyrics, Sexuality is the principal topic. This may be either blatant or veiled. The word most often used by lyricists to represent sexuality is 'it'. On the surface an air of innocence prevails, but the underlying, contrapuntal theme is undoubtedly one of sexual encounter and/or sexual surrender. It is understood that in a song 'a hug and a kiss may represent any stage of procreative activity, that nighttime is not limited to sleeping, and illicit relationship can be charmingly discussed' *(25)*. Sexuality in songs runs the gamut from seduction (CALL ME UP SOME RAINY AFTERNOON) and inferred sexual contact (YOU TOOK ADVANTAGE OF ME '. . . I have no will, you've made your kill';[15] IT CAN'T BE WRONG '. . . when I need you so

[14] Music by Ross Parker. © 1949, Irwin Dash Music Co., Ltd., London. Authorized for sale by Leeds Music Corp., 322 W. 48th St., New York 36, N. Y. Sole selling agents in the U. S., Canada, Mexico, Central and South America. Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

[15] © 1928, Harms, Inc. Used by permission.

much and I have waited so long, it must be right'[16]) to explicit and forthright statements of sexual activity (ONE NIGHT OF LOVE; ALL OR NOTHING AT ALL; I WANT WHAT I WANT WHEN I WANT IT; DO IT AGAIN). Even prostitution has been exploited in song (BROADWAY ROSE).

Affirmative Affects (12 percent) appear in songs which extol the beneficent results of union with the loved one. We are informed that all is right with the world once lover and beloved are united, whether forever by marriage, briefly for a moment, or for a longer, even though still temporary, period of time. A state of bliss or rapture is professed and paradise or heaven is expected; life is held to be rosy, uncomplicated, and forever without problems. In addition, there appears to be a significant enhancement of self-esteem and self-confidence when one is loved (OH PROMISE ME; SONG OF LOVE '. . . echo of paradise'[17]).

The eleven other categories in this tabulation are generally self-explanatory. However, Nostalgia, Romance, Mature Love, and Symbolism require elaboration.

Nostalgia, Memory, and *Déjà Vu* (7 percent) have been grouped together, since they all concern the remembrance of a relationship with a loved one. The tie to the beloved can be weak or strong, but the link is always through preoccupation with a cherished earlier experience. It has been pleasant or it has had enough pleasant connotations to make the singer wish to experience it again. Yet in the lyrics there is an explicit acknowledgment of the inability to re-create the old reality. The current pleasure is, therefore, derived from the elaboration of nostalgic memories. But the clinging is transitory in all. The quality of longing is minimal. Existence and the sense of well-being are not dependent on the memory of the past love. The love object has been surrendered (DOWN BY THE OLD MILL STREAM; THESE FOOLISH THINGS REMIND ME OF YOU; THANKS FOR THE MEMORY; I'VE HEARD THAT SONG BEFORE; WHERE OR WHEN).

[16] © 1942, Harms, Inc. Used by permission.

[17] Music and words by Sigmund Romberg and Dorothy Donnelly. © 1921, Leo Feist, Inc. Used by permission.

The word, Romance (7 percent), makes infrequent appearances. Various symbols for it (the moon, stars, springtime, tropics, etc.) are used to conjure up the setting or aura associated with love. Despite the fact that affection and tenderness can exist apart from romance and love can be sustained even after passion has died *(24)*, these lyrics equate romance with love.

The Symbols (40 percent) which appear in songs support the basic idea of this paper. Freud *(10)* pointed out that the dreamer has a choice of various symbols for the representation of the latent content of his dream and his choice will be typically and individually motivated. Similarly, if we view lyrics, the creation of the lyricist, in the way we view the dreams of the dreamer, we find that the song writer, too, draws upon the reservoir of commonly recognized symbols for the unconscious themes of his songs.

Seven symbols occur repeatedly in the material surveyed here. The outstanding favorite is the moon. Its waxing and waning are compared to similar phases of love. A moonless night stands for life without love; a bright moon for love in full bloom or for conditions conducive to its flowering. Lunar influence on man and his moods finds abundant expression in our folklore, and that same influence is reflected in popular songs. However, the moon's principal function in song is to refer to the time when ego controls are most relaxed and when expressions of love can be given and accepted most easily. Stars mark the time of darkness and night—their disappearance, the break of day. Occasionally they are assigned an animistic quality, but usually they form the backdrop for romance and love.

The flower is the second most important symbol. It is used to indicate a season or recall a particular place; but more important, the flower is the ultimate reference to a lovely, desirable (more often, pure and virginal) woman. Names of flowers are popular as women's names. But the basic link between women and flowers comes from the fact that flowers are sex organs. The word 'defloration' signifies the spoliation of virginity and girlhood. The idealized woman is often associated with a flower,

and even in those songs which indicate a woman's departure from chastity (I FOUND A ROSE IN THE DEVIL'S GARDEN), the flower is used to imply that at heart she remains pure and innocent.

Springtime (April, May, June) comes next in popularity as a symbol. In song and fable it represents the time of life when the sap is rising, when falling in love and courting are as inevitable as rain and often as passing as the season itself. It is a period of restlessness; sunny, peaceful days are intermixed with APRIL SHOWERS. It is the time when man seeds his soil and nature is burgeoning. Eventually, JUNE IS BUSTIN' OUT ALL OVER, and orange blossoms foretell wedding bells.

One more significant group of symbols remains: islands, the tropics, and the South. All have warmth and sunshine in common. The first two have additional implications of an enchanted life in which all dreams of love's fulfilment can come true. In a striking number of songs, however, this enchantment is surrendered to the reality principle—duty calls. But it is remembered with longing (NOW IS THE HOUR '. . . when we must say good-bye . . . when you return you'll find me waiting here'[18]). Implied, too, in many songs is the easy sexual indulgence associated with the relaxed living of the tropics (PAGAN LOVE SONG). The connection with the romantic setting is apparent; more important are the associated ideas of passion and the sense of aloneness with the beloved. These seem to be unique to this context. The tropics also imply the Garden of Eden with fantasies of warmth, comfort, easy oral gratification, sexual intimacy, and freedom from care and responsibility. This symbol is synonymous with the fantasied erotic union with the precœdipal mother. For the brief moment of the song, the immature relationship with an infantile love object can be re-experienced.

Somewhat in contrast, but really only another facet of the

[18] MAORI FAREWELL SONG, by Maewa Kaihan, Clement Scott, and Dorothy Stewart. © 1913, by W. H. Paling & Co., Ltd. (Renewed.) © 1946, 1960, by Leeds Music Corporation, 322 W. 48th St., New York 36, N. Y., by arrangement with Boston Music Corporation of Boston, Mass., and W. H. Paling & Co., Ltd. of Sydney, Australia. Authorized for sale only in the U.S.A. and the Dominion of Canada. Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

same idea, are songs which concern themselves with our own Deep South or Dixie. The common idea that runs through most of these is the home from which one has wandered and to which one wants to return (I'D LOVE TO FALL ASLEEP AND WAKE UP IN MY MAMMY'S ARMS; TUCK ME TO SLEEP IN MY OLD 'TUCKY HOME).

Magic remains as a last recourse (THAT OLD BLACK MAGIC; LOVE, YOUR MAGIC SPELL IS EVERYWHERE), be it music and its enchantment (MUSIC, MAESTRO, PLEASE!), the bluebird and its mythical association with happiness (OVER THE RAINBOW 'Somewhere . . . bluebirds fly';[19] BLUE SKIES '. . . bluebirds singing a song, nothing but bluebirds all day long'[20]); or by the 'luck' of the gypsy (TELL ME, LITTLE GYPSY; GOLDEN EARRINGS '. . . cast their spell tonight'[21]). Songs accept the magic of love itself as omnipresent and eternal. Its power to make life worth living is nowhere better expressed than in the song, NATURE BOY ('The greatest thing you'll ever learn is just to love and be loved in return'[22]). Magic, whatever its lyric form, has its familiar role of pregenital omnipotence.

It is evident from the foregoing that song writers and poets use symbols in much the same way. Through the use of symbols, the background is briefly stated but broadly understood by the listener. In other words, primary process with its pictorial and concrete images is appealed to, and the wordiness of the secondary process is circumvented. The desired climate is created in the feelings of the listener with the greatest economy of expression.

Do symbols contribute more than the contextual setting? Once the romantic connections of the symbol have been established, the remaining lyrics, comparable to free associations,

[19] Written by E. Y. Harburg and Harold Arlen. © 1939, Leo Feist, Inc. Reprinted by permission.

[20] Written by Irving Berlin. © 1927, Irving Berlin, Inc., copyright renewed. Reprinted by permission.

[21] Written by Jay Livingston, Ray Evans, and Victor Young. © 1946, Paramount Music Corp. Reprinted by permission.

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provide clues to the underlying theme. On the surface is the wish for the beloved who will be true and faithful, either in reality or in dreams or memories. But the latent content carries, *sotto voce,* the repetitive theme of need, longing, dependence, engulfment, possessiveness, and desire for oneness in terms that are appropriate for childhood.

VI

The sentimental songs (about Home and Mother) share many of the elaborations of the romantic love songs but lack the façade of exogamous love. In order to compare the two groups, the same themes were studied and similarly categorized (Table No. III).

TABLE NO. III
SENTIMENTAL SONGS
(Songs About Home and Mother)
Lyrics classified according to content

	1900-1949 (113 Songs) Number	1800-1899 (68 Songs) Number
1. Love	10	12
2. Heart	13	14
3. Anaclitic Affects		
a. Possessive Dependence	16	3
b. Depressive and Hostile Affects	32	9
c. Separation Anxiety	18	19
d. Dreams as Wish Fulfilment	12	4
4. Duration of Love	3	3
a. Faithfulness	(3)	(2)
b. Faithlessness		(1)
5. Sexuality	5	5
6. Affirmative Affects	3	
7. Nostalgia, Memory, *Déjà Vu*	15	9 (memory only)

TABLE No. III (cont'd)

	1900-1949 (113 Songs) Number	1800-1899 (68 Songs) Number
8. Romance		
9. Marriage	1	
10. Mother, Father, Baby	113	68
a. Mother	(52)	(25)
b. Father	(9)	(6)
c. Baby	(25)	(12)
11. Dance		
12. Sentiment	20	11
13. Mature Love		
14. Fate		
15. Exhortation		
16. Death	1	10
17. Symbols	38	15
a. Moon	(9)	(2)
b. Flowers	(8)	(5)
c. Stars	(6)	
d. Spring	(1)	(1)
e. Tropics, Islands, South	(15)	(5)
f. Magic, Music, Bluebird, Gypsy	(1)	(1)
g. Sun	(1)	(3)

If we look at this table and the one preceding, it is apparent that the subject preoccupation with love and the heart which figures so prominently in the romantic songs (850 and 475, respectively) is of minor consequence in the sentimental songs (Love, 10; Heart, 13). Instead, the primary reference is to a loved member of the family (mother [mammy], father, baby). In each of these 113 songs, the word 'home' or some unmistak-

able reference to it is used. As the loved one, the mother is the overwhelming favorite. She is named five times more frequently than the father, and three and a half times more often than the child. Occasionally, mother, father, and child are mentioned in the same song. So dominant is the mother theme in these songs that to equate home with mother is inevitable. Also, when home and mother are linked together, love is taken for granted, and there is little need to be specific about it.

Embedded in the home-and-mother frame of reference, the familiar themes associated with anaclitic affects in romantic love songs appear again though with different emphases. Depressive reactions, particularly loneliness, longing, and self-pity, outrank all others almost two to one, whereas the other themes of clinging, separation anxiety, and dreams as wish fulfilment occur about half as often. The lyrics stress the urgent need for home and mother. The message conveyed is: until reunion is accomplished, even if it means overcoming terrible odds, there can be no peace.

The most notable contrast between the sentimental and the romantic love songs is the shift in the emotional quality. Apparently the combination of home and mother provides the proper setting for overemotional, artificially tender, mawkish sentiments. Some songs become positively maudlin, especially when they deal with maternal concern for a child or vice versa (IN THE BAGGAGE COACH AHEAD '. . . but the baby's cries can't waken her, in the baggage coach ahead').

The same comments can be made about the remaining categories in Table No. III as for their counterparts in Table No. II.

The sentimental lyrics are distinguished by the fact that in them little attempt is made to disguise the primary wish. Clearly and simply stated, it is: 'I want to be home with mother and once I am there with her, I will find the peace and contentment for which I long'. When this wish is frustrated, the same reactions come into play as in the romantic songs; the plaint is helpless loneliness (WHEN YOU'RE A LONG, LONG WAY FROM HOME; MAMMY O' MINE '. . . then I start thinking of you and feeling

so blue I could cry')[23]. In this respect, the two song groups are so close in feeling and spirit that the meaning would remain the same if the words 'mother' and 'beloved' were interchanged.

VII

American popular songs of the nineteenth century (statistics in the second column in each Table)[24] were studied and classified in the same manner as modern hit tunes.[25] While the over-all themes are similar, there are some noteworthy differences in the distribution of the form of the lyrics. Only 33 percent (153) of the songs from the 1800's could be classified under romantic love[26] as compared with 57 percent (1470) of the songs during the 1900's. As in this century, the most important ones numerically deal with a current two-person relationship: but they are significantly less prevalent than in recent times (37 percent versus 61 percent).

It is striking that upward of one half more songs (11 percent versus 7 percent) refer to the loved one in the third person (songs of soliloquy), and over three times as many (24 percent versus 7 percent) name a specific person. This characteristic of nineteenth-century romantic love songs may be a reflection of the more formalized, less intimate contact between men and women of those years. The easy familiarity which is so much a part of present daily life did not exist until some time after the First World War. The starched collars and stiff manners of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries are clearly reflected in their popular songs.

Classification of the various themes showed a different range

[23] © 1919, by Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., Inc. Copyright renewed and assigned. Used by permission.

[24] *Variety-Musical Cavalcade* lists 634 titles. I was able to find 458 (72 percent) of the lyrics. It is interesting that among these occur 84 hymns, or 13 percent of the popular songs of that period. The last hymn to become a hit (BRIGHTEN THE CORNER WHERE YOU ARE) was published as late as 1913. However, this category has been excluded from this study.

[25] It is to be kept in mind that the twentieth-century figures are based on only fifty years of popular song. Important contrasts are exhibited in the percentages.

[26] Slightly more than one half dealt with topical themes: war, nature, patriotism, the Negro (the largest single group of songs), etc. The other significant

of importance in nineteenth-century songs. Then, too, love was the dominant concern but songs of separation anxiety took precedence over those about the heart. Next in order as the main theme is faithfulness (25 percent). Significantly, these songs were more prominent than those dealing with depression, dependence, and wish fulfilment. It should also be noted that this incidence is four times more frequent than songs concerned with faithlessness.

Death figured prominently in ballads, particularly in the latter half of the century, but after 1900 only 17 (10 percent) had death or dying as the main theme.

The percentage of songs concerned with separation anxiety is essentially the same in both periods, but those dealing with clinging and depressive reactions were more frequent in the 1800's. In contrast, songs of possessive dependence, which ranked only seventh, rose to third place in the twentieth century and were almost three times more numerous (31 percent versus 11 percent). Two major world wars and a severe economic depression in less than fifty years may account for this later preoccupation with regressive tendencies. Perhaps man could no longer hide his basic insecurities in the face of such overwhelming external adversities. To judge from the songs he preferred, this would seem to be the case.

VIII

In what has preceded, it has become clear that 'love' is generically the favorite and ever-present theme of popular songs. It appears in various and conflicting guises. Songs assert that love is a battle, a burden, a dream, a pilgrim, a sickness, a song, a traitor, a treasure; it is blind, not blind, mine, everywhere, fair, free, a lottery, the sun, the wind, a thing, an interlude, the best of all things, the big idea; it is like a bird, a butterfly, a cigarette, a firefly, a melody; and it 'is sweeping the country' *(25)*.

It is clear that love confounds the lyricist in his attempts to

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group in the last century is about home and mother. They made up about 13 percent as contrasted with 6 percent in the twentieth century.

define it as much as it perplexes the psychologist in his efforts to understand its essential nature. Nevertheless, by applying such concepts of love as we have, I shall attempt to elucidate its role as expressed in song.

It is a fact of life that passion does not endure. Either a maturing of the relationship with the beloved develops or neurotic clinging results—if not disillusionment and withdrawal. In happier instances, people arrive at a stage of affection in which the shortcomings of each are clearly seen but tenderly accepted. This is not the end of love; 'it is only the end of romance' *(24)*. Thus mature love is characterized by altruism and generosity; it is not demanding, greedy, possessive, or insatiable in its need for reciprocity; its egoistic, oral quality is reduced to the minimum. It is without desire to dominate, hurt, or humiliate; it is free of physical squeamishness and of moral depreciation; anal sadism and reaction-formation are minimal. The phallic pride of the male and the passive receptive modesty of the female are complemented by the wish to please and to receive pleasure. Finally, mature love is characterized by the more complicated but less understood emotion of tenderness. Though this arises from adaptive modifications of all aspects of psychosexuality, it probably draws most deeply on the reservoir of maternal love accumulated by one's own experience of it during childhood. This complex of attitudes has come to be referred to as genital love *(1)*. On the other hand, immature love is comparable to the imperious demands of selfishness and insatiability and the dependency of infancy and early childhood. This complex is known as pregenital love.

Bearing these premises in mind, let us glance at two popular lyrics. In THROUGH THE YEARS, a lover tells the loved one that he will always be beside her no matter what the time or place; that all he possesses is to be shared between them; and that he will be there 'though clouds may come and hide you', all the while 'smiling through the years'.[27] In contrast, IT'S A BLUE WORLD is

[27] Words by Edward Heyman, music by Vincent Youmans. © 1931, Miller Music, Inc., and Vincent Youmans. Used by permission.

a complaint about life without the beloved, when one is left alone and days and nights are empty. The mood is indigo blue.

These lyrics illustrate the gamut of the love theme in popular songs. THROUGH THE YEARS is an example of the verbal expression of mature (genital) love. Joys and sorrows are shared, reliance on the partner is real without engulfment, and the relationship is steadfast. The mood and feeling of the second song are evidenced by reliance on another, by urgency, and necessity; there is no apparent concern for the partner—only longing, depression, and self-pity. The manifest content intimates that it is adult, heterosexual, and therefore mature love. But the implicit or latent meaning is quite the opposite, and the song can only be a statement of anaclitic or pregenital love. The mood of masochistic despondency may be denied by an attitude of omnipotence in which the loved one is taken for granted. In terms of two-person psychology, a pregenital object relation is one in which only one of the partners is viewed as having needs and thus as being entitled to make demands *(1)*.

If we accept these descriptions of genital and pregenital love, it follows that pregenital love is the outcome of unresolved infantile attitudes toward the mother. In mature love, the maternal figure has been released by the child, and the child has been freed by the mother. Each is independent of the other, capable of going separate ways, but preserving a relationship which does not involve clinging, needful dependency.

In terms of the criteria discussed here, *of the 1470 contemporary songs which this study has considered in detail, only 16, or about 1 percent, come under the heading of mature love.*

IX

From the contents of the tables and the preceding discussion, I believe there is evidence that (a) the popular lyric expresses unconscious infantile attitudes and that (b) unresolved whole or partial attachments to the image of the precedipal mother provide the latent matrix for American popular songs. It is clear that their familiar romantic and sentimental elaborations

are disguises for an underlying anaclitic mother-child theme, expressed as concern with separation from a loved one. Hit songs thus seem to reveal an undercurrent of common concern affecting large numbers of people. The questions which follow are: do popular songs generally express the prevailing unconscious sentiments and mood of the society in which they arise; and, if so, what do they reveal about Americans during the first half of the twentieth century?

The history of popular music goes back to Homer. His epic songs record the manners, customs, relations between the sexes, religion, and current events of the early Greeks. Similarly, the Middle Ages were recorded and interpreted in the songs of the troubadours which, among other matters, passed on the tradition of courtly love. Behind the persistence of the mother theme in song is the fact, as Wittels *(28)* has said, that 'there have always been mothers'. So, too, have there always been children. And though man, in his social evolution, has largely given up the overt forms of his matriarchal orientation, our religions and cultural forms carry, as a heritage from Greek and Roman civilization, the influence of the Great Mother. I suggest that this influence strongly marks the form and content of American popular song, and I shall now attempt to discuss the sociohistorical basis for this view.

The concept and the cult of the Great Mother is complex indeed. Over and over again, her dual role is emphasized. She is the goddess of fertility and famine, of goodness and evil, of life and death. The positive aspect of the Great Mother is her capacity to bear fruit and release it, but she is also retentive and possessive *(20)*. She can be as irresistible as Circe, or as repulsive as Medusa. In both forms, however, she is hostile and destructive. This concept survives today; 'the modern epithets for female beauty hint at the image of the dangerous woman: alluring, fascinating, charming, entrancing, captivating, bewitching—all these refer to the power of the woman to ensnare and enthral' *(8)*. Her victims struggle in the 'trap'. 'Net', 'noose', 'spider', 'octopus' are fitting symbols of their lost freedom.

Although man values his freedom, there remains in him the paradoxical tendency to feel it as a rejection when it means separation from the mother. This process begins with birth, and our deeper subjective reactions to it are distress, suffering, and a sense of helplessness. These feelings appear, vestigially or in full force, when any crucial change occurs in our accustomed state of existence. They are a manifestation of separation anxiety and derive from the emotional implication that the good, nurturing mother has become bad and depriving. Birth which, on the one hand, is a release into life is also regarded as expulsion from the paradise of passive uterine existence *(20)*.

Weigert-Vowinckel *(27)* has likened the adult who has not progressed beyond the preœdipal stage to the little child who lacks 'the reservoir of narcissistic power to bridge over a period of emptiness . . .'. The deserted one is swamped by destructive instinctual forces and a feeling of guilt. 'His magic attitudes, his dances, his *music* [italics added] are like the cry of the hungry, forsaken child for the help of the mother.'

The more or less good mother permits separation and helps her child accept its freedom and individuality. For both mother and child, the capacity to become autonomous means attaining the ability to love maturely. The childish mutual clinging, holding, and incorporative attitudes are given up and the recognition of each other as individuals is born *(12)*. But when withdrawal of love is used to control the love object, the sense of rejection and deprivation becomes transformed into attitudes of clinging and engulfment.

While we no longer give obeisance or recognition to the Great Mother as such, the Virgin Mary is unquestionably a derivative of this earlier cultural and emotional figure.[28] In the beginning, Christianity, under the influence of the Judaic and Mithraic religions, ignored the woman-goddess. But in the fourth century a Mary cult began to appear and Mary's increasing importance, especially in her maternal role, dates from that

[28] Reik *(22)* has suggested that the biblical Eve is also a late representative of an ancient goddess.

time *(13)*. It has been suggested that, had not Christianity taken Mary into account, it might not have become the powerful force it is today.

Jones *(14)* says: 'Although in the Christian Trinity itself the Holy Ghost is the only figure that replaces the primal mother, nevertheless there is in Christian theology a female figure in the Virgin Mary, who also plays an important part. It would thus be truer to say that the original Goddess has been "decomposed" . . . into two, one of which goes to make the Holy Ghost and the other of which becomes the Madonna.' This is in line with Freud's demonstration that man tends to split women into two different categories: the goddess or good woman from whom all sexual feelings are withdrawn, and the prostitute or bad woman on whom all erotic feelings are concentrated. With this view of Freud's in mind, Jones suggests that both the 'Lady' and the 'harlot' are derivatives of the mother figure. Lampl-de Groot *(17)* has shown that the degraded woman represents the indulgent precœdipal mother who actively gratifies the male's archaic wishes. The idealized woman is the œdipal mother who is forbidden and taboo.

Not until the period of the Romanticists in the seventeenth century were love and sex conjoined. Samuel Richardson is credited by Beigel *(3)* as the first to recognize that love may accompany marriage. Formalized love in Western culture can be understood as having had four distinguishable phases: early Christian love; twelfth-century courtly love; nineteenth-century romanticism; and our present-day version in which we find a blend of all these modes.

The most immediate influence, of course, was exerted by prevailing conditions during the settlement of this country, beginning with the earliest emigrations from Europe. Moreover, these forces were rooted in the teachings of early Christianity. Within that framework women were considered social inferiors. This attitude seems to have grown out of man's attempt to control his sexual impulses toward the female in the group *(11)*. Man could have viewed his sexual temptations as evidence of

his own 'weakness', but instead he chose to regard woman, the cause of his temptations, as less than himself.[29] This attitude toward women derived from the Judaic religion, which required men to cleanse themselves ceremonially and periodically of the taints acquired by sexual congress. Spiritual life and sexuality were, for Jews, incompatible. This asceticism was part of St. Paul's heritage, and its reverberations are found in his own teachings (Epistles) to the early Christian churches. In this he was dominated by two ideas: 1, the kingdom of God on earth was near at hand, and 2, for that reason he wanted no scandal or suspicion arising from the unorthodox behavior of women to interfere with the spread of the gospel *(11)*.

St. Paul conceived of Christian living as a conflict between the flesh and the spirit. Thus, by depreciating sexuality, Christianity, despite its belief in the worth of the individual, accepted the tenet of woman's inferiority while at the same time according her more freedom and equality than ever before. The new religion continued to develop away from the Jewish theological system in which 'women were not of positive importance at the sacred level' *(26)*. It attracted the kind of people who modified it ever further; recently converted from paganism, they gradually introduced some of their surviving ancient beliefs in the goddesses and the Great Mother, with the consequent evolution of the cult of the Virgin Mary. It might be assumed that with this the lot of women would have improved even more. Actually this was not the case because the Virgin Birth distinguished Mary from all other mothers. Consonant with the times, it placed the emphasis on her virginity and preserved her from the feared and hated sexual function of woman.

More or less concurrent with the founding of the new Church, the Roman Empire began to decline. Flagrant corruption and sexual license were rife. Christian asceticism reacted

[29] 'Although woman was banished from the Protestant pantheon, the revolt against her was not so much an attack on her for what she is in herself as a person but as the procreative partner and the one who symbolizes and arouses the erotic impulses of men. The revolt was not against her as the mother but as the central symbol of species life' *(26)*.

against this and thus became an added force in the disintegration of the Empire. A new civilization emerged in which spirituality became the way of life for the Middle Ages. Men entered monastic orders, and women, even some who had been married previously, entered nunneries. While celibacy was always a cardinal virtue for religious, it did not become obligatory until the eleventh century.

In religious orders, avoidance of evil and firm belief in the kingdom of God constituted the order of the day in a setting of philanthropy and practical undertakings. 'It seems a harsh description of the prevailing social conditions to say that aside from marriage, which carried inherently a social inferiority for most women, there was opened to them as an alternative only the life of a prostitute on the one side or that of a nun on the other' *(11)*. That prostitution flourished in the Middle Ages proves that the role of the prostitute was important and attracted many women. By contrast, the nun enjoyed social prestige and, if she became the head of her order, was a power in the community. Unburdened by domestic cares and forbidden a sexual life, she could devote her energies to the organization and activities of her order. Social work began in the monasteries and convents of the Middle Ages. The accomplishments of women in this field were considerable. Men, however, controlled the 'mediums of self-expression and social distinction' *(11)*. Since women were excluded from warfare, this was a potent argument against giving them equality with men. Moreover, feudalism deprived them of property rights. Thus legal inequality was added to social and spiritual denigration.

In this setting courtly love began to flourish. It was characterized by intense passion and frustration, and it has changed little since that time. A lover (usually a knight) chose a married woman (or a widow, in which case a rival was invented) and fell passionately in love with her but never realized fulfilment of his love. De Rougement *(6)*, quoting M. Charles Albert Cingria, says, 'The whole of the Occitanian, Petrarchian, and Dantesque lyric has but a single theme—love: and not happy, crowned, and satisfied love (the sight of which yields nothing),

but, on the contrary, love perpetually unsatisfied—and but two characters: a poet reiterating his plaint eight hundred, nine hundred, a thousand times; and a fair lady who ever says "No" '. The more separation, the more obstacles, the more hindrances to the meeting of the two lovers, the more the suffering and the greater the ecstasy. In fact, 'Whatever turns into reality is no longer love' *(6)*. An excellent example is the story of Tristram and Iseult: behind the passion of the lovers, which is disguised as thwarted love, is the deeper truth that the suffering is what is glorified. The troubadours' songs conveyed a masochistic emphasis in which suffering and frustration were sought as ends in themselves *(8)*.

Arising as it did during the period of Christianity when contempt for sexuality was paramount, a principal requirement of courtly love was chastity. Thus connubial love had no importance. Since the feudal system was breaking down and women of the ruling class were no longer economic assets, they were substitutively endowed with spiritual values. Gentleness and refinement became their idealized virtues. The codes and rules for the expression of love between lovers stemmed from these values which, in effect, protected the marital rights of the husband. The displaced œdipal conflict involving the lover, the lady, and the lady's husband thus found its classical resolution with the husband-father victorious. The lover-child, after an intensely eroticized, long-suffering, frustrated relationship with the lady-mother, became masochistically fixated on the loss of the pre-œdipal mother.

De Rougemont has said that romance comes into existence only where love is fatal, frowned upon, and doomed by life itself. What stirs lyrical poets (and song writers) to their finest efforts is not happy love, not the satisfaction of love, but its passion. And passion means suffering. It is seen as a transfiguring force. In it 'we are no longer aware of that "which suffers", only of what is "thrilling". We seek the kind of love that promises the most feeling, and a major ingredient of this love is some form of obstruction, either real or imagined.'

Western poetry is derived from courtly love and the Arthu-

rian romances. 'That is why our poetry [and, I would add, our songs] employs a pseudomystical vocabulary from which, quite unaware of what they are doing, persons in love still draw today their most commonplace metaphors' *(6)*. The man of passion wants to discover his own type of woman and to love no other. De Rougemont quotes a poem by Gerard de Nerval which relates a dream in which a noble lady appears to him in a landscape of childhood memories:

> She's fair, dark eyes, and in old-fashioned clothes
> That in another life I may withal
> Have seen before, and now but do recall.

This is quite certainly a description of a *déjà vu* phenomenon referring to a precœdipal mother image. 'The themes, the conventions, and the emotional clichés are still with us. . . . In the standardized pulp literature, in the lyrics of our popular dance music—particularly the blues—and in the dramas of stage and screen, the masochistic element predominates and, of course, the illusion is maintained that love and love alone is sought' *(8)*.

To counter the cult of the love for the idealized woman, the Church strengthened the worship of the Virgin Mary some time during the twelfth century.[80] Since then, Mary has held a firm place in the Christian (Catholic) religion; even in Episcopal doctrine the Mary cult has assumed some importance. At about this same time a radical change occurred in the game of chess. The piece first known as the vizier now became the queen. This piece had had essentially the same powers as the king. But in the fifteenth century the queen suddenly became the most powerful piece on the board, the position she holds today. Reider *(21)*, quoting Colby, states that the rise of the queen's power in chess seems to have followed closely the rise of Caterina Sforza when she took over the ducal duties from her weak husband.

Chivalry, associated with courtly love, was the prerogative of the privileged leisure class and offered an escape from the rigors

[80] She became both the ascetic and sensuous ideal of womanhood. 'While the secular troubadours were singing the knights' chivalrous and perpetual love of

of the Church and the burdens of feudalism. Then came the Protestant Reformation and the Counter Reformation within the Catholic Church. While Luther, Calvin, and Knox, creatures of their time, accepted the idea of woman's inferiority, 'as crusaders for greater individualism in their religion, they were contributing to the forces that were to enlarge the life of women and release them from social handicaps' *(11)*. So the idea of courtly love spread and became accessible to the masses. Eventually, in its bourgeois version, it was promulgated by the Romanticists. While marriage was still arranged on a family basis, for the first time words of love were directed toward a possible love object—an unmarried girl. It was found possible to combine love and marriage. The right to make a personal choice of the marital partner evolved. The middle-class woman now equalled the aristocratic lady, so far as man was concerned.

The reign of Queen Elizabeth I gave additional stimulus to interest in women and their affairs. They were criticized for their behavior, their preoccupation with fashion, and their extravagance. Oddly enough, this very criticism provided them an opportunity for self-expression and recognition by men. It also led to English and, eventually, American Puritanism.

The Puritans who settled the New World were concerned chiefly with two by now familiar problems—man's relation to God and man's relations with woman. The external forms may appear different from courtly and early Christian love but the basic questions remained: how can man desire woman without sinning, and how can woman respond to his desire without herself being damned? The Puritans took a step forward when they recognized 'the woman as a responsible individual, an equal partner with her husband before God, and the bearer and educator of his children'. She now began to assume an importance which, as time passed, changed the general pattern of the family unit *(7)*. The sturdy and courageous women who accompanied their husbands to the New World possessed the same pioneering

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the unattainable woman, using symbols of erotic love, the clergy and laity were offering prayers to the sacred woman whose cult as the Virgin and Queen of Heaven flowered in the rites of the Church' *(26)*.

spirit as their men. No longer did they attend only to household duties; of necessity, many began to be concerned with matters outside the home. Frontiers were pushed ahead rapidly and women, who often had to be left behind temporarily, had to cope with family problems. Their role gradually became more dominant, especially after they began to control the family finances. Life on the frontier, and even in town, demanded that women assume more and more responsibility.

'The story of the American woman of the nineteenth century is the story of her struggle for recognition, of her claim to equality with man and often to superiority over him, and of her gradual isolation, and consequently the partial loss of her femininity' *(7)*. As the economy improved, women were relieved of some household burdens. Yet convention still demanded that the home be their sole interest. The traditional Puritan view prevailed, and the distinction between the good (asexual) and the bad (sexual) woman persisted. Nineteenth-century man, absorbed in his 'masculine' affairs, did not recognize that rigid social standards, based on chastity and domestic virtue, were depriving woman of the emotional outlets she required and were forcing her 'to escape into a world of fantasy and romance' (7). The dawn of the twentieth century found woman still ungratified as a female. Unfulfilled, she remained an adolescent in personality, fixated in her ambivalent attitude toward the ideal of chastity and her latent but persistent sexual fantasies and impulses. Passion was shameful and had to be suppressed and denied. Submission to man's sexuality was expected, but enjoyment was proscribed. No 'good' woman could reach her full sexual potential; she dared not be a mature woman. Her daughters in turn were caught in the same bind; her sons could not hope to be freed from her. The final result is the American social phenomenon which has been called 'Momism'.

The 'good' woman, so prized in our culture, finds her prototype in the idealized mother. American Protestantism, a strongly masculine religion, allowed no room for the female in its doctrine until recently when it began to observe Mother's Day (originally a secular holiday). But this has only emphasized that

'established image of all women in the form of each man's mother' *(26)* whose love is divine. Perhaps this quick acceptance of a special day of tribute to mothers came about because of increasing awareness of the necessity for a female figure in Protestantism—a belated recognition of the needs which were gratified by the Great Mother in pagan days.

This brief account points up woman's difficult and ambivalent role from earliest times. Beginning with the Jews, continuing with St. Paul and his later counterparts in the Middle Ages, and finally the preachers of the Reformation and Puritanism, almost to the present time, woman has been told that she must deny her sexual needs. She must submit herself only for reasons of procreation and for the male's release from passion. Though the woman seems to dominate in American society, she is still subordinate to man in her sexual functions. Montagu *(19)* has suggested that man, in his need to suppress the magical qualities he has imputed to woman by virtue of her creative powers, has had to subject her in every other way. Concerned primarily with his business and extrafamilial affairs, man leaves woman to assume additional responsibilities without additional recognition or compensation. She is left sexually unsatisfied and is told in essence that if she wishes to be considered decent, she must deny her sexual desires. Man is, in effect, woman's greatest problem.

De Beauvoir (*5*) suggests that man's dilemma arises from his need to make his wife both servant and companion. 'How he will resolve this attitude is yet to be seen but as it is accomplished it will entail change and "evolution" also in the destiny of woman.' Menninger (*18*), recognizing woman's predicament, says: 'We are left in a seemingly hopeless impasse: the social and economic structure deprives women of satisfaction in their femininity and antagonizes them toward (male) children; the children reflect this in their subsequent associations with other adults and with the next generation; men turn away from women to the company of other men and thwart women further; men and women unite only to go to war with other men and women'.

Bettelheim (*4*), in a recent article, states that our attitude

toward sex has affected the young female more than the male. Our educational system fails to prepare the girl for life since she is reared 'in contradiction'. Education fosters thinking and acting for one's self, but femininity is couched in terms of passivity; '. . . without clearly understanding her own nature, she does not know where and when to be feminine and where or when to be equal'.

A common resolution of this dilemma is control and domination of the man, even as woman herself feels dominated by him. She may also turn to her child for vicarious gratification. Maintenance of the anaclitic relationship prevents the male child from attaining his full maturation and stature. Thus the female thwarts the male as she herself feels thwarted by him in the full realization of her femininity. In the absence of a strong and satisfying father (husband) figure, the growing child is overwhelmed and seduced by maternal indulgence. The precœdipal mother has functioned too well. Only a strong father and husband can help the child attain maturity, because he both sets the example for identification and averts the impulses of the mother to infantilize the child. He also confronts the child with reality: 'It is through encountering the strength of the opposing father that one obtains a mastery of reality; for one can then feel the strength of one's own impulses and measure them against a superior force. . . . The father's role is of greatest importance in disengaging the son from an engulfed relationship to his mother —a relationship in which son and mother, comprising the inner and outer worlds, are magically blended together . . .'(2).

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The clinical material presented here shows the lyric associations of patients to be connected with unconscious persistent ties to their mothers. Published lyrics reveal an explicit and implicit preoccupation of song writers with the same theme. Since these lyrics were 'hits', it is concluded that their mass appeal depended on a general readiness to accept this theme. The poignant and haunting quality of the lyrics and tunes reveals the prevalence

of a depressive mood in American society during the last half century. It seems that the sales appeal of popular songs of this period is not to be found in their sex appeal but rather in their expression of this depressive mood or of correctives for it.

An attempt has also been made, by tracing the existence of the mother theme along a sociohistorical axis, to answer the question: does popular song reflect the spirit of its time? It has been suggested that the American woman derives her ambiguous emotional position from the Great Mother fantasy inherited from Graeco-Roman culture and preserved in the doctrines of Christianity. It has been inferred that this culturally enforced position of American mothers has resulted in the infantilization of their children, especially the sons. From this, the central conclusion is that songs preferred by the children of these mothers express that unresolved anaclitic relationship in its many ramifications. Popular lyrics seem to recast in existential terms the ancient fantasy of the Great Mother who controls the fate of man.

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'Open End' Technique in Psychoanalysis

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'OPEN END' TECHNIQUE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY MARTIN GROTJAHN, M.D. (BEVERLY HILLS)

Resumption of analysis for brief or longer periods is a common practice. Freud long ago suggested that all analysts might profit from brief periodic resumptions of personal analysis. Analysts have always realized that analysis is a continuous process if only because in their work they are obliged at every step to analyze their countertransference. To forward this concept, the term 'open end'[1] technique was coined and introduced to the discussion of technique.

It is the aim of psychoanalysis to interpret and resolve the transference neurosis in the terminal phase of analysis. This should not interfere with the patient's need for an indefinite continuation of his analysis by himself and occasionally by analytic interviews with his former or a new analyst. I have referred to this technique occasionally as 'supervision of continuous self-analysis'.

The term and the technique of the open end procedure gives the patient or the former student of psychoanalysis a sense of obligation and inner urgency to allow the analytic process to continue. The term implies that some libido is transferred from the person of the analyst to the process of further analytic introspection.

Emphasis on the open end technique is specially indicated in the analytic training situation. Even the most careful, consistent, and conscientious transference interpretation by the training analyst must at times meet with special difficulties in the proper analytic interpretation of negative transference phenomena in his students who, after all, by the choice of their profession have a more intense identification with their analyst than the average patient. Many students of psychoanalysis go through episodes when they want to become analysts just like their analysts. Such trend for identification may find its counterpart in the countertransference of the training analyst, and with all due respect for the power of transference interpretation by the training analyst, a part of this transference

[1] The term, 'open end' technique, was suggested by Werner M. Mendel, M. D., in a discussion of psychotherapeutic transaction on March 27, 1963, at a meeting of the California Medical Association, Los Angeles, California.

residual may remain incompletely analyzed. Attempts to reach it may contribute to excessive length of the training analysis. The open end technique provides an opportunity to dissolve transference residuals in two ways: by former students' (now colleagues) continued self-analysis, and by the open end attitude which implies that the door is always open for periodic continuation of their more formal analysis.

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Bernard Brodsky

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BOOK REVIEWS

PSYCHOANALYSIS OF BEHAVIOR. COLLECTED PAPERS. VOL. II: 1956-1961. By Sandor Rado, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1962. 196 pp.

This second collection of Rado's papers consists of twenty contributions varying from general theoretical discussions such as Observations on the Development of Psychoanalytic Theory (1960) to more specific clinical papers dealing with subjects such as drug addiction, obsessive behavior, masochism, and sexual anesthesia in the female.

As culled from these papers Rado's concept of psychic life is that the action-self (roughly corresponding to the ego) is engaged in an adaptive struggle for existence with the outside world. This adaptive struggle is on the basis of the pleasure principle—'the organism moves toward the source of pleasure (reward) and away from the source of pain (punishment)' (p. 44). This basic and primal pattern of behavior is called by Rado the hedonic unit or basic pattern of hedonic self-regulation. By learning and maturation the organism can substitute delayed reward for immediate reward. This is accomplished by a hierarchy of types of responses. A second stage following hedonic self-regulation consists of emotional responses such as desire, affection, joy, and self-respect, and emergency emotions such as fear, rage, and guilty fear. These emotional responses, like the preceding hedonic self-regulations, are innate forms of behavior based upon neurophysiologically pre-existent substrates. Higher units of such integrative apparatuses are emotional thought and, lastly, unemotional (impartial) thought. The self has also a hierarchy of organizations. The primordial self, in its pursuit of the hedonic goal, pictures itself as omnipotent and strives for constant aggrandizement. As the organism grows this original nucleus is modified to form the tested self which now strives for a more or less realistic system of self-government rather than for omnipotent magical goals. It is in this adaptive struggle that pathological states may enter: 'If in the adaptive struggle for existence self-government fails, the organism may seek to strengthen its tested self with regressively revived features of its primordial self. However, such repair work

is bound to miscarry since the resulting aggrandized self-image can only undermine realistic self-government' (pp. 22-23).

To spell it out a little more clearly, what Rado means is that there is a tendency to regression to the omnipotent magical primordial self if, because of defects in maturation and development of later stages, the organism finds itself inadequate to cope with a difficult life situation. In terms of freudian psychoanalysis, we may say that Rado has placed at the center of his dynamic considerations the question of the weakness of the ego's adaptive capacity with attempts at restitution by narcissistic regression.

By shifting the emphasis in psychic life almost exclusively to the question of adaptation to the outside world, Rado has all but abandoned the possibility of a consistent approach to the study of intrapsychic conflict, for example, the conflict between the drives and the counterpoised defenses. In the chapter on the development of psychoanalytic theory he mentions six elements laid down by Freud in his early papers which constitute the basic constituents of any dynamic theory of mental activity. Among these he gives first place to motivation. However, despite this acknowledged debt to the originator of psychoanalysis, he hastens to affirm that motivation embraces all inner promptings rather than the instincts (drives) alone. Defense mechanisms are little spoken of by Rado who speaks rather of 'controls' which constitute all restraining and shaping influences originating in the environment. Controls, he says, are a category of mental mechanism more inclusive than defenses. Clearly Rado here so broadens the categories in which drives and defenses fit that their own outstanding significance for psychic life, including psychological illness, is entirely lost.

Striving for greater scientific respectability, Rado arrives at the conclusion that Freud's concept of the id, the ego, and the superego is animistic in the sense that Freud conceived of opposing homunculi striving against each other—the id, for example, is but an imaginary little personage struggling against other imaginary little personages, the ego and the superego. He accuses Freud of an excess of imagination, and it is indeed ironic that he quotes Freud's having won the Goethe prize for literature as proving—to Freud's detriment—that he was more artist than scientist.

To this reviewer, the central importance of intrapsychic conflict between opposing mental forces is not an animistic confabulation

but an impelling scientific necessity based upon everyday clinical observation. Concerning Freud's supposed overimaginativeness, for a number of years now students of the scientific imagination have shown how closely linked are the modes of scientific and artistic creativity, both being well served by flights of imagination. Dostoevski was, after all, a pretty good psychologist. Rado may accuse Freud of being imaginative, but his own thinking is, by contrast, oversimplified and laconic, if not a bit tedious. In his effort to fit psychic life into his too much pared-down conceptualization he has come up with a system that seems incapable of dealing with the clinically observable facts of transference or transference neurosis; nor does he leave room for a truly comprehensive conceptualization of genetic maturational sequences or of specific individual vicissitudes of development. Perhaps Rado's simplicity is the reason for his appeal to some minds.

BERNARD BRODSKY (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOANALYTIC CLINICAL INTERPRETATION. Edited by Louis Paul, M.D. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963. 276 pp.

The prime role of interpretation in psychoanalytic practice has long been recognized, yet relatively little has been written about its theory and technique. In this work, Louis Paul brings together thirteen papers by various authors which appeared between 1934 and 1958 dealing with precisely these aspects of interpretation. In so doing he has performed a service to psychoanalysts, for the cumulative effect of these papers shows a continuity and development of thinking over the twenty-five-year period. As is inevitable in articles written for individual publication, there is some repetition of content. This repetition, however, reveals that in a quarter of a century the problems of interpretation have not been fully clarified.

Included are James Strachey's discussion in 1934 of the nature of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis; Henry Ezriel's and George Devereux's ideas on experimentation and technique; Rudolph Loewenstein's thoughts on the role of interpretation in the theory and practice of psychoanalysis; Leon Saul's spelling out of technical rules in detail; Thomas French's considerations of many topics including countertransference; Heinrich Racker's writings on counterresistance; and a final paper by the editor summarizing and

rephrasing the logic of psychoanalytic interpretation. Together, these and the other papers cover the range of the theory and practice of interpretative interventions, all within the framework of modern ego psychology.

Freud's cogent paper in 1935 on Constructions in Psychoanalysis remains valid after twenty-five years. It serves as a background and standard against which the others can be measured. Freud limited his concept of interpretation to those statements that explain a single event and provide dynamic understanding of it. He preferred the name 'constructions' for statements that bring together a dynamic understanding of some current situation with its genetic background. He also used the term 'constructions' for statements that seek to make the patient aware of some forgotten event. Not many of the authors in this volume maintain this distinction. Most tend to regard an interpretation as an explanation to a patient, whether of the present or of the past. Ezriel, however, believes that, to qualify as an interpretation, any statement must contain 'a because clause' which points out to the patient why he is adopting a particular course of behavior; without this 'because' the statement is not technically an interpretation. In this sense, an interpretation may be of present experience, an explanation of past experiences that throw light upon the present, or, conversely, something of the present that throws light on the past.

Each author gives a great deal of attention to the importance of interpretation in advancing the progress of analysis, in providing a testing ground for psychoanalytic theory, and finally in providing the pathway to new theoretical formulations. All agree upon the importance of certain criteria, first enunciated by Freud, in judging the validity of a given interpretation. All point to the danger of the compliant or the intellectualizing patient who seemingly accepts an interpretation without in fact being convinced of its validity. Ezriel and Wisdom suggest the possible use of experimentation in interpretations as a means of testing the validity of given explanations. Most other authors believe that it is not necessary to have an elaborate investigative procedure, dependent upon such devices as recordings and one-way screens to test the accurateness of an interpretation. Loewenstein, for example, points out that each analysis is an experiment in itself, and the clinical data obtained served to test the validity of psychoanalytic hypotheses as well as

pave the way for new hypotheses. Most authors in this symposium are in agreement with this view.

Each writer assumes that the analyst giving the interpretation has been adequately analyzed. Only French considers countertransference phenomena, but these are not discussed at great length. Racker, in his paper, carefully separates countertransference, in its technical sense, from what he calls counterresistance. This is a reaction within the analyst to a resistance in the patient, based on an intuitive understanding of the patient's defense. Once such counterresistance is detected by the analyst in himself, he is in a position to interpret it to the patient, furthering the work of analysis. This is part of the process within the analyst leading to an intervention.

In his summation, Paul concludes that the basis of psychoanalytic interpretation is a psychoanalytic appraisal of the therapeutic situation, an observation implicit in all the papers and explicitly stated in some. Such appraisal is based upon the analyst's knowledge of the current analytic situation, the patient's history, defenses, and character structure, the transference and countertransference, identifications, counteridentifications, and the analyst's theoretical frame of reference. With such an appraisal, the analyst is in a position to explain certain aspects of behavior or productions. Paul states, 'To interpret means essentially to name, i.e., identify, categorize, denote, describe, designate, specify, label, construe, or translate, *something to somebody*'. This naming of something to somebody may be an interpretation that gives the 'what, who, where, and when' of the presenting behavior and may add the 'why, or how come' of such behavior. Paul describes in detail two types of statement and means of confirming the validity of interpretations. The language of Paul's paper is more sophisticated than that of papers of the earlier period, but the basic concepts have changed little.

All in all, the articles presented herein represent a valuable addition to the theory and practice of interpretation, the art of which is so necessary for the analyst to understand. By bringing together these contributions, Paul has performed a valuable task and has provided a springboard for future studies of this most important area.

EDWARD D. JOSEPH (NEW YORK)

DEVELOPMENTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Leon Salzman, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1962. 302 pp.

The early chapters of Salzman's book about developments in psychoanalysis are disappointing. His accounts of Freud, Adler, Jung, Ferenczi, and others seem to this reviewer not only rudimentary but biased, and occasionally inaccurate. For example, Topology is a faulty heading for a discussion of Freud's structural approach. A brief criticism of the preconscious misses the point of Freud's careful description of topography in its relationship to the structural constructs of id, ego, and superego. Surely Freud himself refuted the allegation (repeated here) that the unconscious is merely the repository of infantile urges and repressions.

When it reaches Horney, the book picks up momentum and skill. The account of Horney is first rate. Emphasis is laid mainly on her last book, Neurosis and Human Growth, but not without adequate discussion of Our Inner Conflicts and earlier books suggesting the cultural element in neurosis. Her later concern with the self as an entity is related to Adler and in a way to Jung. This reviewer regrets that it is not carried forward explicitly. Fromm is described as a sociologist and philosopher of ethics. Escape from Freedom (1941) was a very important book for clinicians struggling to see their patients and themselves in a social perspective. One wonders why Kardiner's more systematic efforts to study the relation between the individual and his culture are not even mentioned.

The next author discussed is Sullivan, and here Salzman really feels at home. He comments that Sullivan is the most fruitful contributor to psychiatric theory since Freud. He evolved a complete theory of personality that concerns itself largely with the adaptability of the individual to the culture and to other individuals. He combined the contributions of earlier thinkers into an approach which Salzman considers 'closest to an operational statement of human behavior that has been developed up to date'. The next chapter deals with later 'neofreudians'. Rado's adaptational theory is presented sympathetically without its complexities and without Kardiner. Silverberg, Robbins, Clara Thompson, and Fromm-Reichmann have their word, and European existentialism gets five pages. Rollo May is not mentioned, nor are Goldstein, Maslow, Rogers, and others who might be generally sympathetic to Salzman's ap-

proach. Freudian ego psychology is dismissed as too technical or too hidebound for presentation. Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein are thus barely mentioned. Anna Freud, Erikson, Rapaport, and many others are conspicuous by their absence.

The second half of the book deals with special issues: sex, female psychology, homosexuality, love-hostility-depression, masochism, and finally therapy. Systematic critique of the orthodox freudian position begins each chapter, and each continues to free discussion of the interpersonal origins of conflicts, their manifestation in interpersonal current difficulties, and their resolution in interpersonal relationship with the therapist.

The clinical sections are well presented, and should be of interest to any freudian who can surmount the annoyance of a poor presentation of his own approach.

†RUTH L. MUNROE

PERSPECTIVES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HEINZ WERNER. Edited by Bernard Kaplan and Seymour Wapner. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1960. 384 pp.

'Good music is music played by good musicians',—a definition applicable to this book, for its authors are good musicians of their science. Eighteen of them present these fourteen essays as an honor to Heinz Werner, by whose comparative-developmental approach to behavior all have been affected. The air of pleasant enthusiasm and affection for Dr. Werner gives a festive spirit to this *Festschrift.*

One would expect among so many essays by so many authors to find some unevenness, but all the contributions are scholarly and some are brilliant. Expositions and definitions of philosophical problems, experimental propositions, and theoretical thinking are supported by careful, and sometimes Talmudic, argument. It is interesting to find that even though the authors include psychiatrists, comparative, social, and research psychologists, a linguist, and a psychoanalyst, the semantic operations peculiar to each discipline seem easily translatable from one to the other, so that coherence is for the most part maintained throughout. If there is a weakness, it lies in the attempts to quantify psychological data, attempts usually fraught with theoretical dangers.

The one essay by a psychoanalyst, David Rapaport's Psycho-

analysis as a Developmental Psychology, is a gem; Rapaport uses his knowledge and historical perspective to review and define propositions related to Werner's developmental theories. He ranges from instinct and ego psychology to Piaget and ethology. The book should prove interesting and significant not only to psychologists, psychoanalysts, and psychiatrists, but also to social scientists and those interested in combining biological and psychological entities in research studies.

MARTIN A. BEREZIN (WEST NEWTON, MASS.)

PERSONALITY STRUCTURE AND HUMAN INTERACTION. THE DEVELOPING SYNTHESIS OF PSYCHODYNAMIC THEORY. By Harry Guntrip, Ph.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1961. 456 pp.

This volume records an intense and sometimes embarrassing transference romance between its author and W. R. D. Fairbairn. As in all such affairs, outsiders are devaluated or seen as intruders, predominantly bad. As Guntrip might put it, opponents are 'antilibidinal forces' representing the 'rejecting object'. Naturally, Freud and his followers fit into this scheme or drama as the 'sadistic superego' persecuting the 'libidinal ego'. Obviously such 'persecutors' must be overthrown if the 'forces of progress' are to win the field. And indeed Guntrip casually discards drive theory (and in particular infantile sexuality); the structural hypothesis; the accepted understanding of the process of symptom-formation; and the œdipus complex as a significant determinant of neurosis. Freud is seen as a giant shackled by his theory of instinctual drives and hence able only to elaborate an 'atomistic Helmholtzian psychology'. Guntrip takes a passing swipe at Glover for his concept of ego nuclei as also being atomistic and as missing the real significance of the primary unitary ego, 'the core of the personal self'.

It seems that in this romance the three musketeers, Klein, Fairbairn, and the author, have rescued ego psychology from its freudian slough of despond. Klein is the courageous but still naïve pioneer, braving the dangers of heresy to uncover the heretofore concealed secrets of object relations. However, because she believed in the death instinct, she erred in assuming that active aggressive forces in the infant operate primarily and are later projected onto

objects which are then introjected as 'bad' or 'persecutory'. Fairbairn and Guntrip have gallantly rescued her theory from its irrelevant instinctual trappings, refining the pure gold of 'internal bad object relations' and discarding the dross of the theory of aggression. Fairbairn conceives of the ego as a 'pristine, whole structure' which becomes differentiated through the experience of object relations. These differentiations (or splittings, as Fairbairn labels them) of the ego are secondary to the plurality of internal objects. Guntrip contrasts the 'bad', mechanistic, biologically based, freudian view of the mind with Fairbairn's 'good' view of the whole person and his striving for object relationships. In this scheme, pleasure is merely a signpost to the object, and failures in this striving are due to schizoid weakness and fear of closeness and dependence. By contrast, Freud's psychology is seen as a moralistic system of impulse control leaning on guilt and depression. The œdipus complex is significant only in the formation of a civilized and moral ego, while the schizoid position is central to all pathology. Endopsychic life is seen as an expression of self-hate, directed by the split-off 'antilibidinal ego' (which includes the attitudes of the 'rejecting object') against the 'libidinal ego' which persists in seeking satisfaction of its needs despite extreme masochistic suffering.

This is a 'new look' at the so-called hard core of neurosis out of which all conflict and symptoms allegedly arise. There is another split-off ego, the 'central ego', which is in touch with outer reality. This delibidinized central ego carries on its transactions with outer reality as a helpless spectator to a vivid sadomasochistic drama. These nuclear data are frequently disguised in sexual symbols, oral, anal, and genital. They are merely costumes and disguises for the real cause of neurosis, which is the persistence of infantile dependence caused by the failure of parents to love their child as a person in his own right. Psychoanalytic therapy of the neuroses then is not merely a matter of the gradual widening of consciousness leading to reconstruction and recall. Interpretation in this framework is designed merely to dissipate symptoms and to uncover the real, deep trouble, the struggle of the immature ego to survive in the face of its bad objects and its attempt to ward off the temptation to become the 'regressed ego' which flees from life, both external and internal.

The essential religio-ethical character of this psychological system is nowhere so apparent as in the recurrent calling of certain phenomena 'bad' as opposed to 'good'. Thus regression is 'unwelcome, bad'. It is almost unfair to criticize this work on scientific grounds for to this reader it is a work of fiction in which the concepts are the thinly disguised main characters of the story. Just as in any tale of suspense, the split-off 'good egos' wage a fearsome and continuous struggle against the 'bad egos' and 'bad internal objects'. Yet it behooves one at least to state that the elevation of the phenomenology of adult psychotic patients to the status of explanatory concepts pertinent to all life leads to the blurring of essential distinctions of etiology, of mechanism, and of structure. It is clear that conflict between drive and drive-controlling structures does not in itself account for psychotic disturbances. However it does account, eminently well, for the genesis of the neuroses. One can very adequately explain, predict, and successfully treat the various manifestations of neurosis without assuming that so-called ego splitting and the schizoid process play a significant role. However, I am not one to carp about science as a deterrent to writing a book. If one complains about the excessively large cast of characters, one should remember that it is better fun when there are so many imaginary companions in the game.

DAVID L. RUBINFINE (NEW YORK)

DIRECT PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHIATRY. By John N. Rosen, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1962. 253 pp.

John Rosen's treatment of schizophrenics was one of the most talked about developments of postwar psychiatry. The present volume is an attempt to make clearer his theory and method. 'As we understand it', he writes, 'we are attempting to do with the psychotic what Freud evidently did in treating the neurotic: that is, to make patent to him the latent meaning of his manifestations. The individual himself, of course, is the creator of these manifestations, and unconsciously he knows their latent meaning as well or better than we do. Accordingly, making conscious to him what is unconscious in him is our task in treatment.' Rosen's technique is thus predicated on some of Freud's very early concepts, particularly his topographical model and his theory of drives. One looks in vain

for any substantial awareness of ego psychology or for any other sophistication in theory or practice.

A little over one hundred pages are devoted to what Rosen calls Manifestations, Understanding and Treatment. A slightly abridged sample will convey the essence (p. 145):

MANIFESTATION GROUP 4: APPEARANCE AND MANNERS

Manifestation

Item: 4a, drooping posture.

Definition: the individual is markedly limp or slouching while he stands, sits, or moves; his arms hang by his sides. . . .

Example: the case of 'A.I.', who would slouch in his chair for hours at a time, or sit leaning forward with his head and arms hanging limply. . . .

Direct Psychoanalytic Understanding

Motif: 1. 'I am dreaming that I am mourning (because I have lost the penis, feces, and breast)'.

Traditional Classification: Manic-depressive reaction, depressed type.

Amplification: This individual's drooping posture is in physical compliance with his dejected state of mind. He is like the baby who becomes limp from physical exhaustion after having importuned his mother in vain for attention and comfort. The attitude here might be crystallized in the words, 'I give up.'

Treatment Session

The direct psychoanalyst may make specific references to this individual's drooping posture, based on the idea that the superego is commanding the individual to be 'still' and 'quiet'.

Otherwise, the direct psychoanalyst can proceed as suggested in the discussions of 'slight amount of talk' (Item 1b) and 'slight amount of activity' (Item 2b).

This material is neatly organized; some psychoanalysts may be disturbed by the fact that it follows a cookbook pattern. I am not. In psychiatry there is so much loose talk that I should welcome a 'cookbook' on treatment. My complaint is rather that the fare is oversimplified, using too few ingredients to support life.

Evaluation of the therapeutic method of direct psychoanalysis can be safely based on its conceptual foundations. As others also have concluded, Rosen's method of cathartic interpretations (now supplemented to a greater extent than before by imposition of certain authoritative controls) can undoubtedly be successful in reversing some acute psychotic symptoms. I have no doubt that this process alone, in some patients, may be enough to encourage almost

autonomous development of new structure. Having myself sat on the floor of 'strong rooms' and engaged in this kind of communication with psychotics more than twenty years ago, I do not doubt that the method has certain advantages. In fact, I think every psychiatric resident should have some experience with it, as a way of learning and as a unique source of personal illumination and gratification; but the resident must be taught to go on from there, as this method is but one of many and treats but one phase of the disturbance; he must also learn more sophisticated theory.

I am truly disappointed. In many ways, ego-psychological analysis has been carried to extremes these days. 'Microanalysts' often lose therapeutic perspectives by persisting obsessively with the analysis of ego-psychological minutiae to the point where secondary gains of the analytic situation endanger the curative process. A statement of the value of judicious and selective technical use of direct interpretations could have been of considerable service. The fact that chapter headings are set in heavy slugs more appropriate to a political manifesto than a scholarly volume adds an unnecessary, regrettable feature.

Rosen is a vital man, a deeply committed one; but his theoretical formulations as well as his clinical approach are one-dimensional and of very limited use.

LEOPOLD BELLAK (LARCHMONT, N. Y.)

THE SELF AND OTHERS. FURTHER STUDIES IN SANITY AND MADNESS. By R. D. Laing. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1962. 186 pp.

This is a small book about a large subject. In less than two hundred pages, the author has attempted 'to depict the own person within a social system or nexus of other persons; . . . to understand the way in which the others affect his experience of himself and of them, and how, accordingly, his actions take shape'. For such a task an author needs a firm position, a consistent point of view, and a theme. Dr. Laing's position is existential, his point of view phenomenological, and his theme a quotation from Confucius, 'The way out is via the door. Why is it that no one will use this method?'

Readers will enjoy the author's style, which is graceful yet clear, and his skilful use of illustrations from the classics, modern literature, and clinical practice. Unlike many existential writers,

Laing avoids obscurity. The book is well organized and edited. There is an adequate index and a well-selected bibliography.

The first part of the book deals with modes of interpersonal experience. 'Experience as lived is always a blend of fantasy, imagination, dreams of extraordinary complexity, and a constant destructuring-restructuring of their synthetic unity.' Fantasy as a mode of experience gets special emphasis. A number of propositions about fantasy are developed. These are derived from psychoanalytic sources and are a contribution to further psychoanalytic thinking. Although most people are unconscious of this experience, 'one lives all the time involved in, or participating in, other persons' fantasy modality as they do in one's own. The relatedness of self and others that can occur on fantasy level is as basic to all human relatedness as the interactions that most people, most of the time, are more aware of.' Thus, in a dyadic or family relationship producing intense psychological stress, an outsider sees that the way out is via the door. But within the fantasy of the nexus, to leave may be an act of ingratitude, cruelty, suicide, murder. The first steps must be taken still within the fantasy—herein is the risk of defeat or madness.

The second part of the book deals with forms of interpersonal action. Many of the ideas here are familiar from publications concerned with transactional analysis, communication, person perception, and family process, particularly by the group at Palo Alto. For example, there are chapters on identity and complementarity, confirmation and disconfirmation, collusion, ambiguous injunction, and driving the other crazy. The concepts are clear and consistent with each other, but the author specifically disclaims any effort to introduce a complete or comprehensive system that could be used as a model of interpersonal relationships. He draws few conclusions. The book has no summarizing or concluding chapter.

Laing, who is a psychoanalyst at the Tavistock Clinic, London, seems to be presenting his observations and concepts as working ideas that have helped him to understand and study the process of interaction in marriages, families, and groups. The book will be of special interest to others who are working in the same areas of clinical practice and research.

ROBERT E. LITMAN (BEVERLY HILLS)

DRUGS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOTHERAPY. By Mortimer Ostow, M.D. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1962. 348 pp.

Freud expected a time when drugs would be used during analysis to direct it into the most fruitful channels. Ostow explains his own use of drugs as an aid to psychotherapy or psychoanalysis of highly disturbed patients. The book is based on observation of thirteen patients in analysis and five in intensive psychotherapy. As a control he used thirty-three patients treated primarily by drugs. He gives a detailed account of treatment of a neurotic and a psychotic patient (both still in analysis at the time of writing) to demonstrate the use of drugs.

Ostow summarizes his recommendations thus: 'No drug should be given in the course of psychoanalysis or psychotherapy which is of the uncovering, insight-giving type, unless the treatment cannot proceed without it, or unless there is a serious threat to the patient which medication can alleviate. No drug can substitute for good psychotherapeutic technique, and drugs should not be invoked simply to overcome resistances which should properly be handled by interpretation. The correct administration and regulation of pharmaceutic agents is . . . complex and difficult. . . . [But] when there is an acute need, and the right drug is given at the right time, its effect on both the patient and the therapy is striking.' Use of drugs may obviate shock treatment or hospitalization, which procedures are damaging to transference.

The study involves the application of the libido theory with emphasis on the variation of libidinal psychic energy arising within instinctual sources and driving the dynamic processes. To regulate the administration of drugs only libidinal energy was considered. Ego function varied with the amount of psychic energy available to it. In melancholia, for example, antidepressant drugs—'energizers'—increase the libido content of the ego. Tranquilizing drugs decrease the amount of instinctual energy available to the ego. Both types act upon the basal ganglia, which are concerned with the generation and distribution of instinctual energy. Ostow conceives the energizer as putting a 'floor' beneath the libido level in contrast to the tranquilizer, which fixes a ceiling over it. At times he uses both drugs to define a channel for ego libido fluctuations. 'The drugs however do not act upon disease entities but rather upon the dis-

tribution of psychic energies. . . . Indications for selection and dosage depend upon energetic criteria rather than upon diagnostic or dynamic criteria.'

Ostow offers a 'scale of ego libido', showing degrees from zero ('profound, inert melancholia or catatonia') to ten ('delusional mania or schizophrenia'); position four, for example, shows 'self-orientation, feeling of enervation'. This reviewer wonders how reliable is the scale. Ostow himself suggests that two observers would not differ by more than two scale positions and that anyhow 'this problem does not arise when an individual analyst or therapist employs the scale to follow the vicissitudes of his patient's illness'.

In the cases presented, the sessions are reported in varying detail. Carefully worked out charts are included. These omit vicissitudes of aggression since only libidinal changes are traced. However, amounts of aggression can be reduced by increasing libido supply as pointed out by Ostow recently.[1] A later panel took up the question of psychic energy and its measurement. Ostow defended the concept of psychic energy, distinguishing between psychic energy as the impetus of an impulse and as a kind of ego fuel supply. It is the latter that is involved in drug action.[2]

The book also contains An Epilogue: On Human Understanding, which explores the implications of energy theory for group and cultural behavior, and an appendix that describes relevant pharmaceutical agents.

This volume is an important contribution to the use of drugs in analysis of difficult patients or in critical situations that arise during treatment. The cases reported demonstrate that the drugs used can alter the clinical picture. But one wonders whether we can definitely say that the quantity of libido is the factor changed.

PAUL GOOLKER (GREAT NECK, N.Y.)

ŒDIPUS IN NOTTINGHAM: D. H. LAWRENCE. By Daniel A. Weiss. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962. 128 pp.

This book, written by a literary critic, is a psychoanalytic inquiry into the work of D. H. Lawrence. In a brief introductory chapter

1 *Symptom Formation* (Symposium). J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XI, 1963, p. 166.

2 *The Concept of Psychic Energy* (Symposium). J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XI, 1963, pp. 605-618.

Weiss expresses his conviction that psychoanalytic thinking has value in interpretation of works of literature, yet cautions against 'reduction of literature to a limited number of preliterary elements'. 'At its best, then', he believes, 'psychological criticism should constitute a bureau of tragic or comic weights and measures, testing in the work of art for the organic, psychologically valid material'.

The chapters, The Father in the Blood, and The Mother in the Mind, present mainly an analysis of Sons and Lovers, an analysis fascinating not so much by its demonstration of œdipal material in the novel (which is obvious), but by its sensitive elaboration of details and juxtaposition of passages from the novel with analogous passages from psychoanalytic literature.

In the chapter, The Great Circle, Weiss demonstrates that 'the less fully resolved relationship between the father and son in Sons and Lovers is the relationship upon whose psychic residue Lawrence was to draw for the rest of his life'. This part of the book is especially valuable. Discussing the sequence of Lawrence's writings after Sons and Lovers, Weiss describes the gradual changes in the novelist's presentation of an unsophisticated, sexually potent father figure. It is of great interest to see how the rather negative figure of the father (Walter Morel) in Sons and Lovers is replaced by the idealized figure of the gamekeeper in Lady Chatterley's Lover.

From the recently published Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, we know that in a scientific meeting held on December 11, 1907 Max Graf, Freud's musicologist friend who was then a member of the inner group, presented a paper on Methodology of the Psychology of Poets. Graf pointed out that 'the central themes of the poet's creations betray the innermost mechanisms of the poet's mind'. He stressed the advantages of a psychoanalytic study of the relation between a poet's work and his psychology. At the end of his presentation he added a note of caution saying that the clinical point of view will never be sufficient and that 'the highly complicated sensitive organism of the poet can be understood only by one who is artistically endowed in the first place'. According to the Minutes, Freud 'emphasized that he agrees with Graf in principle'.

In his book Weiss does exactly what Graf considered the essence of a psychoanalytic inquiry into the work of a poet. It is good that he uses a minimum of biographical evidence and arrives at his interpretation mainly through an inquiry into Lawrence's total

literary creation. A poet's work forms a much more reliable basis for understanding than biographical knowledge, which usually is heavily biased.

FRITZ SCHMIDL (SEATTLE)

HENDERSON AND GILLESPIE'S TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY. Ninth Edition. Revised by Sir David Henderson and Ivor R. C. Batchelor. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 578 pp.

The ninth edition of Henderson and Gillespie is worthy of its predecessors; it is one of the best introductions to psychiatry. The historic, social, legal, genetic, neurologic, biochemical, and statistical aspects of psychiatry are ably presented. The classification and diagnosis of psychiatric disorders are sound and instructive. While drugs and other physical modalities of treatment are clearly and succinctly described, the authors warn against reliance on such measures to the neglect of psychotherapy, hospital and community milieu therapy, vocational rehabilitation, and work with the patient's family, all so essential to his treatment.

In spite of their coolness to psychoanalysis, the authors' psychotherapeutic approach compounds a good deal of valid psychoanalytic theory into their fundamentally Meyerian psychobiologic orientation. One can think of far less felicitous eclecticism. Freud, Abraham, Jones, Ferenczi, and Fenichel are quoted or referred to. The concept of unconscious psychic conflict, among other psychoanalytic formulations, is held worthy of incorporation into the fundamentals of psychiatry, but the theory of infantile sexuality still evokes conspicuous gagging.

More serious is the fact that the authors regard as safe the use of the 'main psychoanalytic techniques' (free association, dream interpretation, and analysis of the transference) by psychotherapists untrained in psychoanalysis. Whereas 'classical psychoanalysis as a treatment method has limited applicability' and 'wrongly used psychoanalysis can be dangerous', neither the dangers nor the wrong use is elaborated. One is left with the impression that psychoanalysis by a psychoanalyst is risky business, but not psychotherapy by someone using the main techniques. It may be no accident that countertransference is not mentioned. The matter is worth clari-

fying in the tenth edition, which might easily remedy the conspicuous omission in the ninth of an account of approved psychiatric as well as psychoanalytic training.

Finally, one can only hope fervently that, in a work of such general excellence and popularity, the tenth edition will contain an up-to-date summary of psychoanalysis that will more accurately reflect current theory, practice, and research.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

INFANTS IN INSTITUTIONS. A COMPARISON OF THEIR DEVELOPMENT WITH FAMILY-REARED INFANTS DURING THE FIRST YEAR. By Sally Provence, M.D. and Rose C. Lipton, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1962. 191 pp.

This monograph is the result of a brilliantly conceived and executed effort to delineate the specific psychological deficits produced by maternal deprivation. Seventy-five infants who were placed in institutions in the first month of life and remained there for about a year were the subjects of the study. Fourteen of the children were observed at various times after their subsequent placement in foster homes. Most of the significant data were gathered by application of the Gesell and Hetzer-Wolfe Baby Tests, used not only to obtain quantitative data and profiles in various areas of development, but also as a 'structured and observational setup' from which clinical observations could be made. Consistently and with great clarity these data are compared with the data on normal development obtained by the same investigators using the same procedures with infants reared in families. To make this comparison meaningful, the authors present for each set of data a condensed review of the underlying psychoanalytic theory in terms of drive and ego development, especially as interrelated with object relations. Psychoanalytic theory determined the focus and direction of observation.

The findings constitute another, but this time exhaustively and precisely documented, demonstration of the vital importance of the mother in the earliest years of life and will not be surprising to psychoanalysts. However it is impressive to learn from direct observations of pathological development that deviations occur so early, so extensively, and in so many unforeseen areas. In the absence of the mother the fundamental pathways for development are missing.

Denied the nurturing care of a mother, these babies do not show confident expectation; as there is no turning from passivity to activity through identification with the active mother, they suffer serious interference with adaptation to both outer and inner reality; lack of opportunity to adapt to experiences and conflicts with the mother diminishes the richness and variety of emotional life.

This study lends further support to the value of distinguishing between maturation and development. Provence and Lipton show many instances where the autonomous ego apparatuses have matured but have not been used because the 'carrier and organizer of experience' — the mother — was absent. The most severe instance of this, as one might expect, is in language, revealed not only in paucity of words but also by deficiency in affective communication. The authors locate the beginning of deviation in the children at two months of age, when the institutionalized infants fail to make a postural adaptation to the adult embrace. At four to five months of age their difference from family-reared infants becomes apparent on immediate observation of the infant *in toto,* his body and especially his facial expression.

One problem raised by this study is the vicissitudes of the infants' drives, especially aggression. There seems to be, in general, a low level of drive discharge; for example, in the almost universal rocking behavior that was observed, it was the investigators' impression that there was a lack of intensity, and to them a lack of libidinal investment in what otherwise is expected to be an autoerotic activity. Even less apparent were expressions of aggressive discharge, either of an autoaggressive nature or toward adults or other children, in the face of repeated and severe frustrations. In contrast, the urgency, distress, and aggressive nature of the self-stimulating activity of psychotic children may be evident early in the second year of life.

One can only wonder whether the 'blandness' of these infants is a manifestation of depression due to delay in drive maturation because of the absence of objects for drive investment or, as suggested by the authors, a consequence of the infants' inability to use their bodies for either comfort or aggressive discharge—a matter of drive regulation rather than of maturation. It seems noteworthy that the institutional environment is described as consistently bland. The low level of external stimuli may not only present a less intense

external reality for adaptation and be less stimulating in general, but may also serve a protective function via some form of primitive identification. When the infants are placed in families, aggressive manifestations appear and are considered a sign of healthy development. It is hoped that follow-up studies will be made.

This book offers detailed findings and a remarkably clear integration of psychoanalytic theory with the facts of normal and disorder development in the first year of life. It should provide a thought-provoking experience for psychoanalysts.

MANUEL FURER (NEW YORK)

ESCAPE FROM AUTHORITY. THE PERSPECTIVES OF ERICH FROMM. By John H. Schaar. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1961. 324 pp.

It is not difficult to share ideals with Erich Fromm, humanist, idealist, and powerful social critic. At least John H. Schaar, political scientist, believes so. He admires Fromm for his critical scrutiny of society and willingness to define what he considers to be the good, the moral man in a sane and good society. But to share ideals is not synonymous with sharing ideas; and in this particular instance Schaar's penetrating analysis of Fromm's ideas finds them inconsistent, contradictory, and lacking in logic though they are, at first blush, attractive, dazzling, and even plausible. Schaar dissects Fromm's Utopia, probes the depths of its logical and philosophical position to unveil its origins and its consequences. The Utopian society conceived by Fromm is humanitarian, naturalistic, and mystical. He cures society and abolishes man in the social system he visualizes for mankind.

Fromm believes that ethical standards, value judgments, the norms of conduct can and must be derived from man himself, not from authority; that ethics is inherent in the living; that he has found objective norms based on the nature of life itself. It is an important consideration that he believes that his insights about the human condition stem from his knowledge and experience as a psychoanalyst, that his grasp of man's basic needs is derived from empirical data which permit him to know what is good for man and what is evil. Schaar's analysis demonstrates otherwise: Fromm's insights are normative and philosophical in their derivation rather than empirical. In the first few pages of his prologue Schaar makes

clear that he considers Fromm's ethics more idiosyncratic than psychoanalytic. Two quotations will illustrate how Schaar understands Fromm's relation to psychoanalytic theory:

'The passion and vision of Prometheus also explains Fromm's peculiar relations with psychoanalysis. Fromm's diagnosis of the modern condition is grounded in psychoanalytic premises and his discourse is usually carried on in psychoanalytic language, but his therapy is designed not so much to relieve individuals of their neurotic burdens as to cure society. In Fromm's clinic society is the patient. Like Marx and Rousseau, he believes that man is the victim of vicious institutions. Prometheus has been chained to the rock not by the angry gods but by an evil society. . . .'

Again: 'Most misleading of all [the many labels that have been applied to Fromm] is the standard label, that of freudian revisionist. It is certainly true that Fromm has carried on a one-sided argument with Freud for something over a quarter of a century, but an argument which embraces values Freud shunned, starts from premises he rejected, accepts types of evidence unknown to him, employs methods he denied, and leads to different conclusions on all the basic issues ought to be called what it is—opposition and not revision, revolt and not reform. Fromm is a revisionist of Freud in about the same degree, if not in the same direction, that the Prince of Darkness was a revisionist of the Prince of Light.'

Schaar notes some of the differences between Freud's and Fromm's concepts of man and his civilization, but does not merely say that Fromm's system of ethics is not derivable from psychoanalytic theory. Schaar states, 'Fromm's appeal to "science" is a foreign element in his argument. Fromm does have an image of human nature, and he does set forth a panel of basic human needs which must be satisfied if life is to be good, but this common core, this model of human nature, is not a construct inferred from empirical-scientific observations of human behavior. It is, rather, based upon a philosophical analysis of the human condition.' The mystical religion, the philosophical stance is a product of a peculiar eclecticism that combines and marries diverse systems of thought which are incompatible and which contain unverifiable assumptions and untenable conclusions. 'Fromm's theory of ethics is not logically convincing.' His vision of man is partial and unreal; he makes envy, hate, cruelty, pride, and selfishness unreal and only secondary qualities. His civilization arises

'out of a full expression of man's power'. He identifies the good with the realization of the 'self' ('man is basically good if he can fulfil himself'). His theory of moral selfhood is based on a concept of self as substance. His overvaluation of the human conscience and his doctrine of living for the sake of living are full of pitfalls, one of which is that the morality of Fromm sometimes seems to resemble moral anarchy.

An example of his capacity to combine disparate systems of thought is contained in his theory of character. The ideas of Freud, Marx, Hippocrates, Harry Stack Sullivan, and Rousseau are all encompassed in his exposition of characterological types. However, Schaar feels that it is just in this area that Fromm shows his greatest brilliance and boldness and achieves his greatest integrative success in his description of character. Nevertheless Schaar's discussion of Character and Goodness demonstrates that Fromm's concepts of love and character present irreconcilable paradoxes; what is explicitly stated and advocated is implicitly abrogated; for example, in Fromm's assurance of man's capacity for love and morality he implicitly banishes morality. Fromm misunderstands the problems and the very nature of liberty and authority. In his seeking for freedom, his hatred of authority, his wish to eliminate conflict for the common good, and to achieve gratification and the good life, he abolishes ordered society in favor of spontaneity.

Schaar's book is well conceived and well executed. His historical, philosophical, and logical perspectives produce more than an adequate analysis. It must be considered a work of considerable importance. The author himself is an important commentator on the human condition. His evaluation of Fromm's work will not surprise the psychoanalyst who will certainly not take exception to his conclusions, readily recognizing them as compatible with his own. Nevertheless the details of Schaar's reasoning are fresh, informative, and written in a style easy and pleasant to read. His discussion of Fromm's concepts of character and typology and of the self are particularly recommended to the psychoanalytic reader. He says much that is worth while about many things and one wishes that this present volume may be followed by many more.

VICTOR CALEF (SAN FRANCISCO)

PERSONALITY FACTORS ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS. Edited by Robert L. Sutherland, et al. Austin, Texas: The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, 1962. 242 pp.

The social scientists, who for years have gone out from the colleges to study various cultures, have now redirected their studies toward the colleges in order to investigate the social processes occurring on the campuses and to attempt to understand the processes of learning and development that take place there. The present symposium offers studies from various universities; they range from theoretical and philosophical to proved and practical, and concern acceptance as well as nonacceptance of the importance of mental health to education. An interesting innovation is to interpose parts of the discussion in the body of the paper. In general, the papers are of high caliber, recommended for college psychiatrists, faculty, and administrators who deal directly with mental health. The practicing analyst may find it of less interest.

Nevitt Sanford of Vassar emphasizes the need to help the student commit himself to the educational process in its broadest sense so as to increase the outlets available for his impulses, such as can be expressed through poetry, art, and literature, and through creativity in the sciences. Young people must be taught how to deal increasingly with life via symbols rather than primarily by direct action or sensations. He also suggests that development of certain processes of learning can be even more important than the specific content of the learning itself; for example, the experience of pursuing some basic truth in an individual project uses resources that can become firmly integrated within the student's personality and remain active long after the factual details may be dimmed or forgotten. In the freshman year a core curriculum should be offered with emphasis on developing a community of knowledge but in later years independent work must be done to insure good balance. Also the freshman must be won over to the basic concept of the intellectual enterprise at hand; his imagination must be captured and he must develop a sense of what it means to become deeply involved in some discipline or subject. The author discusses how literature, language, and science can be used to contribute to development of the individual. The discussion of this paper suggests that it was probably the most thought-provoking in the symposium.

T. R. McConnell, of the University of California, shows the change from freshman to senior years toward greater tolerance in attitude toward civil liberties. He also shows a difference in basic attitude toward civil liberties in different colleges and discusses this in terms of selection of students at the various institutions and the portrayal of differing images of colleges. C. Robert Pace, of Syracuse, finds that faculty, administration, and trustees, much more than the students, cause colleges to have distinctive patterns with predictable effects on students.

Dana Farnsworth considers, with practical recommendations, the influence of college administrators. The president must set the tone of an environment stimulating to the student, with good morale, firm discipline, and high intellectual standards. He offers for the director of admissions seven clear warning signs of emotional instability in prospective students. So much is required of the director in psychological and educational knowledge that the consensus of a small group seems preferable. The dean of students must avoid the position of antagonist or police officer to students, while teaching responsibility to student leaders and upholding the standards of a decent community. The position of specialized counselors, including psychiatrists, is not discussed because of the hope that these special services may be dispensed with when a more nearly ideal educational environment can be established, but this seems Utopian, if not frankly unsound.

Robert F. Peck describes the wide range of mental health found in a college population. To help those who are moderately disturbed, their stereotyped, unimaginative, and overly simplified habits of thinking should be met by involving them emotionally in their work through a personal interest on the part of the teacher. The emotional reactions aroused can thus ultimately be invested in the ideas presented, leading to increased commitment to the ideas and, one hopes, to greater depth of learning. For those with good mental health a rich library and informed, stimulating professors must supply wide variety and depth of ideas. These students should be given a generally loose rein, just enough guidance to keep them on the track of their information seeking, and enough personal support to broaden their horizons and keep a challenge forever in front of them. Peck evaluates the cost and practicability of his suggestions

which, though impossible of immediate fulfilment, are yet not visionary.

In the final chapter Martin Trow, of the University of California, describes four cultural groups usually found on the larger campuses, the 'collegiate', the 'vocational', the 'academic', and the 'nonconformist'. His concern is to develop student intellectual life, particularly of the two latter groups.

TOM G. STAUFFER (SCARSDALE, N. Y.)

THE CRY FOR HELP. Edited by Norman L. Farberow, Ph.D. and Edwin S. Schneidman, Ph.D. New York: The Blakiston Division, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1961. 398 pp.

Of this book the first and most important part is a report on research on suicide and its prevention. The second is an account of attempted suicide by a twenty-three-year-old man, its data stripped, as far as possible, of material that might direct the clinical and theoretical bias of the reader; this is followed by discussions of the pathology of suicide and its management by two analysts and followers of Jung, Adler, Sullivan, Horney, and the schools of personal construct and nondirective management. The third part of the book is an extensive bibliography on suicide, from 1897 to 1957, with no reference to Freud, not even to Mourning and Melancholia.

Out of the great mass of statistics gathered by the Suicide Prevention Center in Los Angeles, certain generalizations are interesting and of practical use. This reviewer, however, does not share the authors' enthusiastic belief that a significant contribution has been made to the prevention of suicide, its pathology, or its management. We must assume that their experience in both short- and long-term treatment of a variety of patients is limited. They are limited, too, by the fact that they have not had to assume medical responsibility for whatever patients they have treated. It is noted that 'psychotherapists' call the Suicide Center for advice and are told, among other details, about facilities for hospitalization and procedures such as commitment. It is rare today, especially in our larger cities, to find a physician who is not familiar with this information. This report seems to represent the kind of fact-finding (apart from compilation of numbers) that could be obtained by having a half-dozen

experienced psychiatrists and analysts sit down and tell all they know about suicide. This book carries us no further than what is already known.

In an important chapter on The Assessment of Self-Destructive Potentiality, the conclusion drawn is that the more infantile the person, the greater the danger of suicide. This reminds one of the old personality profiles for the psychosomatic patient. The formulations of intrapsychic mechanisms are superficial and seem to be addressed to a wide variety of helping people who cannot be expected to know, by training or by experience, the intimate details of mental functioning.

In another chapter on suicide among schizophrenic patients, several warning criteria are noted. But, again, the criteria established for spotting the potential suicide seem to apply to every schizophrenic. Is there a schizophrenic who does not qualify as suicidal when the three major criteria are taken to be: 1, a driving necessity for relief from tension; 2, a life situation that is too difficult and stressful for the patient to endure without relief; 3, an inability to find a better way out of difficulties? Likewise, the suggestions for both hospital and extrahospital management seem to apply to all schizophrenics, suicidal or not. In other words, good treatment will help the schizophrenic patient. In this chapter the authors suggest that one might consider psychosis a protection against suicide; this reviewer and several of his colleagues in 1950 described schizophrenia as an alternative to suicide or murder.

In describing the 'psychological autopsy' (recently widely publicized in the case of Marilyn Monroe), the example is cited of a collector of guns who regularly played Russian roulette and had a 'foolproof' system. The case is described as one of accidental death, because there was no indication of suicidal affect nor of suicidal ideation. The authors do not ask what kind of person plays Russian roulette.

The book makes clear how large is the divergence of opinion among some of the schools of thought regarding diagnosis and treatment of mental disorder. The contribution to this volume by Hendin, one of the two analysts represented, is a concise analysis of suicide more specific than most of the remainder of the work.

One can only agree that persons considering suicide usually make known their 'cry for help' in a variety of ways and that it is an easy

matter for those near the patient to ignore the cries. The establishment of centers for immediate help for suicidal patients makes good sense. Providing immediate attention will be sufficient in the majority of cases; in others, the determination to destroy oneself physically will override all attempts imposed from without.

The Cry for Help represents much hard and devoted work where hard work is badly needed, but it serves merely to show the extent of the problem while looking only superficially into its sources. The psychoanalyst will learn little more than that suicide is a problem of greater magnitude than perhaps he had suspected.

JAMES MANN (BOSTON)

DISEASES OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. Sixth Edition. By Lord Brain. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1962. 879 pp.

A review for psychoanalysts of a textbook of neurology should answer two questions: How good is the book as a reference work for the practicing psychoanalyst? What picture of the human mind, aside from its neurologic substrate, is presented; can the book be recommended as the basic neurological text for the medical student?

Brain begins with an excellent chapter on Disorders of Function in the Light of Anatomy and Physiology. The neurologic syndromes are then presented systematically and lucidly with adequate space and emphasis for the common disorders. For example, the difficult subject of extrapyramidal syndromes is handled most instructively.

In the last chapter, Psychological Aspects of Neurology, the need to present a summary of the psychopathology daily confronting the neurologist proves too much for Lord Brain. Hysteria and occupational neurosis are the only two neuroses officially identified. Allusion is made to 'mental conflict' as a cause of neurosis and to the need to discover this cause but the matter is then dropped. More specific and detailed advice is given about 'firm handling' and symptomatic treatment, particularly hypnosis. In enuresis, 'Hypnotic suggestion will often rapidly bring about a cure in hitherto intractable cases. . . . An attempt should always be made to cure hysterical vomiting in one sitting, a cure once effected usually being permanent.' The four references at the end of the chapter are

grossly inadequate. Psychoanalysis does not appear in the index or in the text. One is also disappointed in not finding a chapter on the history of neurology in a book of this size.

It is precisely in these areas where Brain is deficient that Wechsler[1] is strong, and the latter remains my favorite neurology text for the medical student and general practitioner.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

[1] Wechsler, Israel S.: *A Textbook of Clinical Neurology*. Eighth Edition. Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Co., 1958.

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Edwin F. Alston

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ABSTRACTS

Bulletin of the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis. XIII, 1963.

Further Comments on Adoption. Lili E. Peller. Pp. 1-14.

A young child's archaic fantasies may lead to gross distortion of emotionally charged information. This is discussed as being of central relevance to the issue of what and when to tell a child of his adoption. Out of her clinical experience with agencies, adopted children, and parents, Peller recommends latency, when the child has enlarged his social orbit to include other children and their parents, as the time to discuss adoption. She is against prescribing specific words to convey the information and also opposes forced raising of the adoption issue, irrespective of the child's wishes. She suggests that it may be helpful if, in addition to his parents, the child has the opportunity to discuss the matter with a psychoanalytically trained person such as a judge, social worker, teacher, or minister. Peller underlines the need for more study of the impact of adoption as it affects the child, the mother who gave him birth, and the adoptive parents.

Snow White: A Study in Psychosexual Development. Louis S. Kaplan. Pp. 49-65.

Kaplan concludes from his study of Snow White that this fairy tale describes the steps in feminine psychosexual development essential to the attainment of sexual maturity. He develops the principal thesis that the libidinal changes of puberty constitute a recapitulation of the sexual experiences of childhood. Thus it is the love of the man superimposed upon the love from father during the œdipal period which makes genital primacy possible. Several case histories are presented to illustrate variations on this theme.

Fee Problems in Supervised Analysis. Virginia Huffer. Pp. 66-83.

Huffer presents a rather extensive discussion of the problem of setting fees in analysis, including a review of the literature, presentation of relevant material from four analytic cases, and a report on responses from candidates and recent graduates of the Baltimore Psychoanalytic Institute to a questionnaire on various aspects of fee problems. The topic of the fee may be highly charged with transference and countertransference conflicts and resistances. The reduced fee and the situation in which the fee is paid by someone other than the analysand are especially subject to a vast range of meanings, and it is necessary for the analysis to include thorough work on this material. A number of recommendations are presented to help the analytic student particularly to set a fee on as realistic a basis as possible.

EDWIN F. ALSTON

Archives of General Psychiatry. VIII, 1963.

Self-Awareness in Schizophrenic Children. William Goldfarb. Pp. 47-60.

Goldfarb is concerned with the subjective facet of the child's ego, self-awareness, as seen in schizophrenic children. He describes impaired body ego and

confusion over internal physiologic stimuli. Receptor aberrations are discussed and viewed as changes in the integration of sensory experience rather than lowered thresholds of sensory acuity. Distance receptors, the eyes and ears, which favor the abstraction of constancy and universality in the environment, are impaired. Proximal receptors, taste, smell, and touch, which favor reaction to the immediate, the concrete, and the disparate, come to the fore.

The Mechanism of Shame. Leon Wallace. Pp. 80-85.

The author explores the psychodynamics of shame and stresses its relationship with and differentiation from guilt. Dominant in shame are oral needs for narcissistic supplies from another person. Being looked at is also important. In guilt the relationship is to an introjected person.

Women's Fantasies During Sexual Intercourse. Marc H. Hollender. Pp. 86-90.

Hollender sees withdrawal into fantasy as prompted by fear of the penis, stemming from sadomasochistic fantasies or penis envy. Fantasy during the act, which usually eliminates the penis, allows a shift from the real to an imaginary situation controlled by the woman and like her masturbatory fantasy.

Pathology of Identity as Related to the Borderline Ego. Alvin Suslick. Pp. 252-262.

Suslick reviews current ideas concerning identity. He presents clinical data to show the pathology of identity in borderline cases, although he views problems of this kind as universal. He sees personal identity as being established early in life, arising from the circumstances of the individual's relationship to his caretakers and setting a lifetime organizing pattern. Several special types of identity pathology are considered common, such as malignant and reactive.

Psychodynamics and Management of Paranoid States in Women. Herbert C. Modlin. Pp. 263-268.

This study was limited to a small group of women, diagnosed as paranoid state, without evidence of schizophrenia, in order to reduce the number of variables. The author feels that evidence from these cases refutes Freud's formulation of paranoia in woman as a projective defense against homosexuality. Instead, Modlin sees the process as initiated by a disruption of sexual relations in a fairly normal marriage adjustment, a reactive depression, and then regression with a projective delusional mechanism. In this the threatened loss of the heterosexual self-image is warded off by projection onto conniving women, e.g.: 'It is not that I am unwomanly, but that she is a seductive husband-snatcher'.

Which Dream Does the Patient Tell? Roy M. Whitman; Milton Kramer; Bill Baldridge. Pp. 277-282.

Using EEG and eye movements during sleep as evidence of dreaming, an experimenter awakened subjects to record their dreams. The next day, a psychiatrist elicited the remembered dreams. Those omitted showed certain significant features, confirming the belief that at some level a person understands his dreams. The male subject forgot the dreams with unconscious homosexual

impulses. The female left out, first, those with unconscious sexual impulses toward the psychiatrist and, later, those with unconscious dependency feelings.

An Investigation of the Sexual Cycle in Women. Therese Benedek. Pp. 311-322.

In this nostalgic review for the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic, Benedek revisits her research of twenty-five years ago in order to reaffirm the validity of using analysis as a tool for research.

A Re-View of the 'Paranoid' Concept. D. A. Schwartz. Pp. 349-361.

The author presents a comprehensive re-evaluation of the concept of paranoia in the light of the broad conceptual spectrum involved. Beginning with the formulations of Melanie Klein, he examines the ideas of Freud and major analysts and psychiatrists who have dealt with this topic. Except for some distortions of analytic views he presents an interesting attempt to delineate the central core which allows for such differences in clinical manifestations as characterological bent, megalomania, benign outside influences, and malevolent persecution. He sees this core as consisting of feelings of unworth and insignificance, the incapacity for self-referral of responsibility, the inability to tolerate ambivalence, and especially the insistence on being overwhelmingly important to others. He does not see as essential the defense against homosexual impulses.

Psychological Testing of Borderline Psychotic Children. Mary Engel. Pp. 426-434.

The interesting clinical category of the borderline psychotic child, made prominent especially by Ekstein and his co-workers, is explored from the standpoint of psychological testing. The very clinical features that are so striking point up and present problems to the tester. Prominent among these are the issue of survival, the struggle for reality contact, a feeling of incompetence to meet demands by the environment, and the use of fantastic metaphors and distance devices.

Clinical Studies of Sequential Dreams. William Offenkrantz and Allan Rechtschaffen. Pp. 497-508.

A patient who was in therapy slept in a lab and was awakened whenever evidence of EEG and sleep patterns showed that he was dreaming. He was asked to relate his dream with associations, which were obtained also in subsequent therapy hours. In the case of sequential dreams it appeared that the same or a limited number of conflicts were worked upon. The organization of each dream seemed to depend upon the solutions in the previous dreams, that is, toward bolder gratification or greater defensive reactions.

KENNETH RUBIN

Psychosomatic Medicine. XXV, 1963.

Vomiting and the Wish to Have a Child. L. Chertok; M. L. Mondzain; M. Bonnaud. Pp. 13-18.

In an attempt to confirm experimentally Helene Deutsch's concept that vomit-

ing in pregnancy reflects maternal ambivalence, the authors conducted semi-structured interviews with one hundred primiparas. Maternal feelings, derived solely from manifest material and scored by independent judges, were divided into 'clearly defined attitudes' with predominant desire or rejection and 'ambivalence' where both were expressed. Vomiting, which was moderate in fifty-three cases and severe in fourteen, showed statistical correlation solely with the ambivalent group. The authors admit these limitations of inference because of their reliance on nonanalytic content but feel the results are valid because all interview procedures involve a dialogue between two people.

Omnipotence, Denial, and Psychosomatic Medicine. Robert Steinberg. Pp. 31-36.

The acceptance of psychosomatic concepts paradoxically has enabled patients to deny a serious or chronic physical illness by attributing it to emotional factors. The patient thus can alleviate his feelings of helplessness by a regression to primitive beliefs in the personal omnipotence of his thoughts. As his thoughts become less troubled, his body will be given health in a 'return to grace' through psychotherapy. With three excellent illustrations, the author painfully speculates about his countertransference fantasies and warns us that our biases may be enticed by the plethora of psychological data provided by such a patient.

Psychoanalytical Explorations of Emotional Correlates of Cancer of the Breast. R. E. Renneker; R. Cutler; J. Hora; Catherine Bacon; G. Bradley; J. Kearney; M. Cutler. Pp. 106-123.

This report, a research project of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, is as thought provoking as its valuable predecessor. The cases studied include two whose lesion appeared during analysis and three referred to the research psychotherapist after diagnosis. The women uniformly demonstrated maternal frustration of their oral needs and substitute gratification by indulgent fathers. The accompanying guilt led to a later masochistic identification with the feared mother and a consistent choice of an inadequately providing male partner, with 'acting out' of these orally derived heterosexual impulses. In line with Engel's findings, these potentially depressive women showed clinical manifestations of the disease following traumatic abandonment or disappointment by their selected objects. The authors hypothesize that the psychological decompensation in depression is accompanied by a 'decompensation of biological mechanisms'. Since cancer of the breast is hormone-dependent, they quote Board's 1956 paper showing a decrease in thyroid and adrenal hormones during depression as possible evidence of estrogen alterations. They suggest studying the relationships between estrogen levels and psychopathological sexual behavior, or disturbances of maternal drive manifested by the previous infertility of many such patients.

Thematic Content Associated with Two Gastrointestinal Disorders. E. G. Poser and S. G. Lee. Pp. 162-173.

Five selected TAT cards were presented to matched groups of ulcer and colitis patients and control subjects. The protocols, devoid of medical clues,

were correctly classified beyond chance by a single author conversant with classical psychosomatic literature. Then the protocols, scored for six 'need' parameters, significantly differentiated the patients from the control subjects but not one disease entity from another. The most potent technique, performed by four independent judges, was an analysis of manifest content and stylistic aspects of communication. This latter technique seems to deserve further utilization in objectifying psychosomatic and perhaps psychoanalytic research.

Dream Recall as a Function of Method of Awakening. A. Shapiro; D. R. Goodenough; R. B. Gryler. Pp. 174-180.

This preliminary study suggests that abrupt awakening, used in experimental studies of rapid eye movement, may account for the higher yield of recallable material. The same subjects, awakened gradually during an REM period, often produced feelings of having had a thought or no dream. There is also a suggestion that recall may be more effective during the longer, later REM periods of uninterrupted sleep due to a decrease in sleep depth and a shift in the level of ego regression.

The Psychogenic Etiology of Premature Births. A. Blau; B. Slaff; K. Easton; Joan Welkowitz; J. Springarn; J. Cohen. Pp. 201-211.

In studying this leading cause of neonatal mortality, the authors hypothesized that the psychological attitude of the mother is a prime factor in the absence of organic pathology. A personal interview and a battery of psychological tests were administered to a group of thirty mothers who delivered prematurely and to an equal number of matched controls. The data were then scored for sixty-seven items under four headings: maternal attitudes, femininity, mental stability, and familial-social relationships. Subsequently, when an independent rater rescored the protocols devoid of all cues relating to prematurity, statistical agreement was found.

Although no specific psychiatric syndrome was elicited and the attitudes of the matched groups overlapped considerably, striking individual differences in scores were sufficient to differentiate the controls and subjects. 'In general the premature mother tends to be young, immature, narcissistically concerned with her body image, and insecure in her feminine identification and development.' In contrast to Chertok's study of vomiting in pregnancy where ambivalence predominated, the mothers who delivered prematurely were more overtly negative and hostile toward the fœtus and had many destructive fantasies about delivery.

From the pilot study the authors have designed a multiple-choice questionnaire about the Maternal Attitude to Pregnancy which may help predict the premature terminators and alert the obstetrician to their need for greater support during their pregnancies.

An Investigation of Criteria for Brief Psychotherapy of Neurodermatitis. B. Schoenberg and A. C. Carr. Pp. 253-263.

Twenty-six patients with neurodermatitis were treated in brief psychotherapy (twelve sessions) which specifically encouraged the expression of hostility toward a contemporary figure, a technique first introduced by Seitz. In an attempt to

help select suitable patients for future treatment, a screening interview was conducted by a psychiatrist who was not to be the therapist, and a battery of psychological tests was administered. The interview and test data concentrated on the intensity of the hostility and its overt or covert quality. The sixteen improved patients showed a significantly greater awareness of their anger and had the highest scores on the 'hostile contents' of their Rorschachs. Contrary to expectation there was no contraindication to treatment in the presence of psychosis; nor did the removal of the symptom precipitate substitute symptom-formation or 'acting out'. The prime prognostic factor seemed to be the accessibility aggressive ideation which was elicited most easily from the intake interview itself.

Duodenal Ulcer in One of Identical Twins: A Follow-up Study. M. L. Pilot; J. Rubin; R. Schafer; H. M. Spiro. Pp. 285-290.

By controlling the constitutional factor of gastric hypersecretion in the development of an ulcer, this identical twin study has shown how divergencies in development and environmental stress can contribute to the illness. Alexander's concept that ulcer develops in an individual in 'conflict over passive dependent needs, when the nurturance of these is compromised', continues to receive support in this follow-up study. Originally the more rigid, less adaptable twin had an ulcer. The more successful, flexible, and easygoing twin, who could accept gratification of his dependency needs from an adequate wife, developed an ulcer only when the wife lost her job and feared what appeared to be a late pregnancy. The lesion cleared rapidly with job improvements and assurance that the amenorrhea was menopausal. The subsequent maternal death was handled by this twin with appropriate grief reaction, whereas the rigid twin, in spite of growth during psychotherapy, had a recurrence of ulcer during his overtly depressive reaction.

Body Image Boundaries and Histamine Flare Reaction. Wilfred A. Cassell and Seymour Fisher. Pp. 344-351.

In prior studies Fisher and Cleveland developed an experimental test by noting that the boundary of the body image was projected into a subject's description of the periphery of an ink blot. They found that subjects whose Rorschach responses emphasized the protective, decorative, or limiting function of the blot margin had a high 'barrier' score and used skin and muscle as organs of physiological discharge (neurodermatitic and arthritic patients). In contrast were those with a high 'penetrability' score, a less well-defined body image boundary, whose physiological discharge was visceral (ulcer and ulcerative colitis patients). Earlier studies showed a minimal histamine response in chronic schizophrenics with their impaired sense of body image.

With this in mind the present authors, using fifty-five male and forty-five female college students as 'normals', predicted that the higher the 'barrier' score the greater the intradermal reaction to histamine. This was confirmed statistically in the female group but not in the male subjects. Cassell and Fisher suggest that the present dilution of the drug may not affect male subjects or that its difference may be due to communicative factors. They then add '. . . it

is conceivable but unlikely that the sex of the examiner could account for the gross difference in the results obtained'. Perhaps their choice of the phrase 'barrier' score should have made them aware of the unconscious significance of the laboratory procedure and its erotic potentialities, one of the pitfalls of evaluating 'pure' physiological responsivity.

Relations Between Maternal Anxiety and Obstetric Complications. R. L. McDonald; M. D. Gynther; A. C. Christakos. Pp. 357-364.

This third paper dealing with psychosomatic aspects of pregnancy is a complement to the Chertok and Blau studies (*vide supra*). In this study, Kent EGY scales and IPAT anxiety scales were administered to eighty-six white gravid patients at the beginning of the third trimester, and previously collected MMPI protocols were scored for repressive defenses. Subsequently each case was scored independently for the absence or presence of obstetric complications. Those with complications had significantly higher composite anxiety scores than the normal group, had 'less ego strength', and used more obsessive defenses. The normal group employed repression and denial predominantly.

EUGENE L. GOLDBERG

American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. XXXIII, 1963.

Disturbed Communication in Eating Disorders. Hilde Bruch. Pp. 99-104.

Bruch offers a new theoretical formulation, based on the genetic interrelation of drive and interpersonal factors, which links severe eating disturbances with schizophrenia. The patients studied demonstrated a delusional self-concept with inability to recognize the internal signals of hunger and satiety. The symptoms in such cases involve the falsification of a bodily need which serves as a solution to an interpersonal conflict within the disturbed family group. Case histories are used to demonstrate that this condition has its genesis in an incorrect, pathological learning experience in which the mother or her substitute feeds the child according to her own needs and wishes, thereby preventing differentiation. Unless the underlying cognitive defect is corrected, treatment will be ineffective.

Some Psychoanalytic Aspects of Group Therapy. Three papers presented at the Leo Berman Memorial Meeting of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, October 1959.

I. The Psychoanalytic Contributions of Leo Berman. Joseph J. Michaels. Pp. 132-135.

This opening paper emphasizes Berman's investigations in psychoanalytic group psychology, their application to the disciplines of education, psychiatry, social work, nursing, mental health, and preventive medicine, and finally his theoretical considerations on the role of reality.

II. Psychoanalysis and Group Therapy: A Developmental Point of View. Fritz Redl. Pp. 135-147.

Redl offers first a vivid description of the historical changes in the attitude of

psychoanalysis toward group therapy. He then discusses phenomena of group therapy not explained by our present metapsychology and the model of personality derived from individual therapy.

III. Some Comparative Observations of Psychoanalytically Oriented Group and Individual Psychotherapy. Sidney Levin. Pp. 148-160.

Group therapy is an invaluable technique in its own right and is not to be regarded as a substitutive, superficial, or diluted form of treatment. Its differences from individual therapy are considered under several headings: transference and instinctual gratification; self-exposure; interaction and character analysis; perception of reality by the patient; perception of reality by the therapist; and the therapeutic effect of the patient's interpretations.

A Special Therapeutic Technique for Prelatency Children With a History of Deficiency in Maternal Care. Augusta Alpert. Pp. 161-182.

A lucid and detailed account of successful work with a severely disturbed four-year-old girl is used to illustrate clinical and theoretical aspects of the treatment method called COR (Corrective Object Relations). It is a psychoanalytically oriented approach to prelatency children with ego disturbances arising from severe oral deprivation due to the mother's pathology, absence, or death. These children were inaccessible to conventional psychotherapy or analysis since they could not establish an object relationship without direct gratification and could not communicate adequately. They are to be differentiated from children with severe ego defects based on organic damage, schizophrenia, or autism.

As the name implies, the technique seeks to provide a corrective experience based on systematic restitution by a constant object (therapist) symbolizing the good mother. An exclusive need-satisfying relationship is set up, regression to the traumatic phase promoted, and then direct gratification of regressive needs provided along with verbal accompaniment designed to facilitate mastery and reality testing. Progressive tendencies are supported as they appear. The regression is confined to the therapeutic situation and is self-limiting. The entire course of treatment is designed to last from seven to nine months, with sessions of one hour a day, four or five days a week. The parents are treated on a less intensive basis.

It is hypothesized that the need-satisfying relationship produces a regression to the oral introjective phase resembling the identification with the primary object and that the libidinal relationship with the restitutive person promotes therapeutic change by facilitating drive fusion, neutralization, greater ego integration, and more favorable ego drive balance.

One of the goals of COR is to prepare the child for more exploratory and analytic types of psychotherapy.

Psychological Effects on the Child Raised by an Older Sibling. Milton Rosenbaum. Pp. 515-520.

The author offers the intriguing hypothesis that the experience of being raised by an older sibling may contain a specific and uniquely harmful element

stemming directly from the unmitigated violence of the older sibling's feelings and attitudes. Such violence is extreme because the biological and psychological immaturity of the older sibling does not permit maternal drives to temper aggressive impulses. The parental loss in such cases may tend to overshadow and obscure the importance of the dynamic constellation described. A case of a suicidal five-year-old boy, who was for the most part in the care of his eight-year-old brother, is discussed in relation to the above hypothesis.

Development of Autonomy and Parent-Child Interaction in Late Adolescence. Elizabeth B. Murphey; Earle Silber; George V. Coelho; David A. Hamburg; Irwin Greenberg. Pp. 643-652.

One of the developmental tasks of late adolescence involves the integration of a desire for independence from the parents with the wish to continue a positive relationship with them. Proceeding on the basis that the transition from high school to college away from home is a crisis situation in which this problem challenges the adolescent, the authors followed twenty competent high school seniors through their first year of college. The students were rated according to 'autonomous-relatedness', that is, the capacity for integration of independent behavior and maintenance of family ties. The ratings appeared related to particular modes of parental interaction with the adolescent.

PHILIP SPIELMAN

Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. LXVI, 1963.

The Accuracy of Parental Recall of Aspects of Child Development and of Child Rearing Practices. Lillian C. Robbins. Pp. 261-270.

Forty-four mothers and thirty-nine fathers were given a questionnaire concerning important development aspects of their children. Included were questions about feeding, weaning, sucking behavior, toilet training, sleeping, motor development, and medical history. Responses to the questionnaires were compared with earlier material given by the parents in connection with a longitudinal study that had been in progress since the birth of these children. The parents were quite inaccurate in their memory of details about child rearing practices and early developmental progress. The largest number of errors dealt with the age of weaning and toilet training, the occurrence of thumb sucking, and demand feeding. The parents also tended to be inexact concerning recommendations of experts in child rearing. The mothers, however, proved to be more correct in remembering than the fathers.

A Ubiquitous Sex Difference in Dreams. Calvin Hall and Bill Domhoff. Pp. 278-280.

Dreams collected from approximately fourteen hundred men and fourteen hundred women indicate that, in terms of manifest content, men dream more about other men than they do about women, whereas women dream about men and women in approximately equal proportions. The reported sex differences were characteristic of the sample throughout the age range (two to eighty years).

The dreams of neurotic and normal males contained approximately the same percentage of male characters. Collaborative evidence of this finding from anthropological studies is cited, as well as a survey of the subjects of creative writing by male and female authors. The finding is explained in terms of 1, a conflict theory of dreaming and 2, the content and fate of the male and female œdipus complex.

The Role of Dread in Suicide Behavior. Donald E. Spiegel and Charles Neuringer. Pp. 507-511.

In a comparison of thirty-three pairs of genuine and faked suicide notes, the authors find that the genuine notes showed a marked avoidance of the word suicide, of the proposed suicidal method, or of any anxiety connected with the act. They discuss 'the inhibition of dread at the prospect of suicide' as being one condition necessary to suicide, and call into question such anxiety-allaying practices as reassurance and support or the administration of tranquilizing drugs to potentially suicidal patients.

Experimental Desensitization of a Phobia. P. J. Lang and A. D. Lazovik. Pp. 519-525.

The authors report the successful treatment of twenty-four snake-phobic subjects, utilizing a desensitization technique, in which the subjects, under hypnosis, were conditioned to respond to the phobic object in ways that inhibited or were incompatible with anxiety (i.e., muscular relaxation, approach rather than avoidance). From results at the termination of the experiment and six-month follow-up studies, the authors conclude that: 1, it is not necessary to explore with the subject the factors contributing to the learning of a phobia or its unconscious meaning in order to eliminate the fear behavior; 2, the form of treatment employed did not lead to symptom substitution or create new disturbances of behavior; and 3, in reducing phobic behavior it is not necessary to change basic attitudes and values or attempt to modify the personality as a whole. The unlearning of phobic behavior appears to be analogous to the elimination of other responses from a subject's behavior repertoire.

IRWIN C. ROSEN

The British Journal of Medical Psychology. XXXVI, 1963.

Object Relations Theory and the Conceptual Model of Psychoanalysis. J. D. Sutherland. Pp. 109-125.

Sutherland offers a model of psychoanalytic theory representing a prominent English school of psychoanalysis and then attempts to clarify the relationship between this object relations theory and ego psychology. He feels that some of the apparent differences actually are complementary rather than incompatible. He does believe, however, that the classical conceptual model of psychoanalysis and ego psychology, especially as developed by Rapaport, is not sufficiently flexible and comprehensive to help us understand behavior in terms of here-and-now manifestations and how these are the product of historical layerings. The object relations theory overcomes this defect by sticking closer to clinical

practice in contrast to the classical conceptual model of analysis in ego psychology which is too 'scientific' and 'cleansed of anthropomorphic concepts' to serve as a useful means of understanding behavior. Sutherland seems to see Erikson's work on the maturational basis of development as a step toward bringing together the theories of object relations and ego psychology.

Observations on Early Ego Development. R. E. D. Markillie. Pp. 131-139.

The author gives his observations on early ego development using Fairbairn's outline of human psychological development and structure as the basis for an inquiry into the nature of the events or structures he is describing.

Markillie believes that Fairbairn's isolation from the mainstream of British psychoanalysis has enabled him to think more originally than he might otherwise have done; however, this isolation has also had its negative results. This is evident in his technique and in his tendency to make too great a distinction between personal and biological and between therapeutic and scientific. The author attempts to redefine the term 'personal' and to explore the confusion between the psychological and biological at the beginning of human life. He believes that a study of this earliest period of ego development will bring about an integration of views between those who are convinced of the primacy of inheritance and those who favor the importance of the environment and nurture; and between those who advocate learning theories and the importance of conditioning and those who prefer the unlearned components of behavior.

He expounds his concepts further by taking two of Fairbairn's postulates as the point of departure for his discussion: 1, 'The pristine personality of the child consists of a unitary dynamic ego'; and 2, 'The first defense adopted by the original ego to deal with an unsatisfying personal relationship is mental internalization or introjection of the unsatisfying object'. In criticism of the second postulate, he points out the generally accepted point of view that introjection of the good object is an important part of normal ego development but is not sufficiently recognized by Fairbairn. Further discussion, criticism, and modification of Fairbairn's concepts complete the paper.

Fairbairn's Contribution on Object Relationship, Splitting, and Ego Structure. J. O. Wisdom. Pp. 145-159.

The author provides a very lucid description of Fairbairn's principal work as follows: 1, theory of universality of object-relationships; 2, theory of the schizoid position; and 3, theory of dynamic structure: the mind as three egos. Wisdom then discusses the over-all theory, arriving at the following conclusions: Fairbairn's most important contributions relate to the dominant role of schizoid mechanisms, the primacy of object relationships, and the ingredients of the ego. In the opinion of the author, all seem likely to become permanent parts of psychoanalytic theory. He is less impressed with Fairbairn's rejection of primacy of aggression, his view of the nature of first objects in infantile experience, and the absolute independence of impersonal roots that he attributes to the ego. He feels that even without these concepts one could concede the primacy of object relationships.

RICHARD M. GREENBERG

Revista de Psicoanalisis. XX, 1963.

Symptom Formation, Regression, and Conflict. Jacob A. Arlow. Pp. 1-19.

Character and Symptom Formation. Jeanne Lampl-de Groot. Pp. 20-37.

These didactic articles, which appeared simultaneously in Spanish and French, give summary presentations of new structural concepts in relation to the selection of symptoms and the dynamic determination of character formation with a good correlation to the ideas of regression, fixation, and conflicting psychic representations.

Round-Table Discussion About Technique. Marie Langer; Janic Puget; Eduardo Teper. Pp. 38-62.

This discussion is based primarily on a questionnaire about technique sent by the authors to students, graduates, and practicing analysts. Results showed that an 'Argentine group' of psychoanalysts has been evolving with the usual 'group' characteristics and having subgroups within it. The authors stress that an interaction is constantly present between the analyst and the group to which he belongs. To have a properly functioning analytic group, each analyst must maintain his individuality. Although the questionnaire was answered by only twenty percent of those circulated, the data gathered correlate with the results obtained in 1939 by Glover in England. In any case, it is felt that this experimental approach has validity in bringing together different opinions held by various analysts.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Herbert Weiner, Stephen K. Firestein & Walter A. Stewart

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

October 15, 1963. THE REPETITION COMPULSION AND MATURATIONAL DRIVE REPRESENTATIVES. Theodore Lipin, M.D.

The author reviewed Freud's concept of the repetition compulsion, which should be restricted to the reliving and re-enactment of distressing, unrecallable past experiences without awareness of the connection between past and present. Patients continually relive the derivatives of these experiences in various editions while foregoing gratifications, in order finally to re-create the original one. These activities are 'manifestations of a process aimed toward reorganizing structured functioning in such a way that amnesias resolve' and occur in one of three ways.

The first pattern involves unconscious utilization of currently available internal and external stimuli for unconscious construction of experiential replicas. The second pattern involves unconscious transformation of external reality so that previously absent, required stimuli become available externally. The third pattern involves unconscious transformation of internal milieu so that previously absent, required stimuli, too dangerous or too bizarre for external materialization, become available internally.

Freud's contention that the unconscious activity behind these phenomena is a kind of instinctual drive representative is supported and amplified by the data presented. The theory of instinctual drives was then reviewed with the aim of understanding its relationship to the repetition compulsion, specifically the relationship of the hierarchically ordered drive representations to regulating processes which may exist only in 'higher' layers of psychic organization. The unconscious psychological activity behind manifestations of the repetition compulsion lacks structuring in the usual psychoanalytic sense but may become structured during the course of analytic therapy. In contrast to the usual psychological derivatives of instinctual drive representatives, these representatives are less psychologically regulated and resort less to the pleasure principle. It is suggested that the latter be called 'maturational drive representatives' in view of the fact that they are analogous to processes which 'produce progressive maturational unfolding of structured functioning according to an innate genetic blueprint and timetable'. In their usual form drive processes maintain the integrity of phase specific structured functioning and might be called 'structural' drive representatives.

The further characteristics of maturational drive representatives are biological discharge patterns, triggering of percepts and representations which differ according to phases, and the ensuing impulses and capacities which in turn are perceived, integrated, elaborated, and represented. A new organization develops and is in turn molded by experience in the social and environmental matrix and by the processes within the organism. Deficiencies in experience or in environmental stimulation, traumatic experiences, or internal conflict may adversely influence development. Amongst these are experiences which later give rise to repetition compulsion activity, because they are registered differ-

ently, and are more disruptive of the ongoing psychic organization and the usual further development and maturation of psychic structure. Premature, regressive, or unusual developments may occur under such circumstances to cope with the stress. Traumatic experiences may also prevent discharge of maturational drive patterns. The resultant defensive-adaptive stress structure is based on a profound reorganization of psychic structure with the result that instinctual drive representatives subserving tension regulation discharge may occlude, distort, or interfere with instinctual drive representatives subserving maturation. An id conflict is set up between the two types of instinctual drive representatives and may lead to repetition compulsion activity. When this activity is powerful all mental functioning may be the result of this conflict. During treatment the re-experiencing of the traumatic incident liberates and actualizes capacities and impulses previously latent, activates defenses against the original experience, and brings it into perceptual awareness.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Phyllis Greenacre reviewed the psychoanalytic concept of trauma. She stated that one must specify whether traumatic events or experiences have occurred, when they occurred during development, and how sustained they were. Furthermore, in psychoanalysis the relationship of the biological to the psychological is ambiguous, and a dichotomy rather than a parallelism is assumed. Certain aspects of the earliest phases of development, the early ego and libido, are considered biological. Yet the requirements of psychoanalytic therapy set limits to our understanding the biological organism in view of the fact that therapy is carried on only via psychological means. Thus all of psychoanalytic theory is perforce weighted on the psychological side.

In her experience, severe early trauma so threatens the organism as to cause a total, organismic, survival response. The obligation to repeat is organismic and intermingled with instinctual satisfaction; reliving is an attempt at achieving better internal harmony. Early, severe, sustained trauma with its profound organismic reaction causes a disorganization of the developmental phase with regression, not progression as Dr. Lipin suggested. The trauma is denied in an archaic way. If too severe, death follows; if the trauma is survived and successfully overcome, a normal phase hierarchy ensues. Later, massive repetitions of the trauma are, however, masochistic phenomena. Patients in whom these early disturbances caused by the trauma are biologically rooted are not good cases for treatment because preverbal stages are not analyzable. The therapeutic alliance is hard to establish and then becomes intertwined with the transference and leads to 'acting out', while massive denials impede treatment.

Dr. Heinz Hartmann addressed himself to the relationship of observation to concept in the paper, and to the use of some of the terminology. The repetition compulsion is a construct, not a clinical entity; other repetitive phenomena are 'beyond the pleasure principle' such as the phenomenon of perseveration in brain damaged persons, or the reproduction of memories, including unpleasant ones, by outside factors. The phenomena described in the paper might be conceived of in simpler terms, such as placing the repetition compulsion in the service of ego functioning and thus restructuring it.

Dr. Edith Jacobson suggested that the active mastery of a traumatic experi-

ence is not necessarily 'beyond the pleasure principle'. She felt that the author had extended the use of the word 'structure' and that the relationship of the pleasure to the constancy principle should be clarified.

HERBERT WEINER

October 29, 1963. A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF PAIN OF MENTAL ORIGIN IN RELATION TO SELF AND OBJECT; ITS DIFFERENTIATION FROM ANXIETY. Leo A. Spiegel, M.D.

In this contribution to the metapsychological differentiation between pain and anxiety, the term 'pain' is employed to designate a specific affect, not unpleasure in general. The expressions, 'pain of mental origin' or 'pain of physical origin', emphasize that no stand is taken as to whether there is a difference between the two experiences.

Freud considered the subject of pain as early as 1895, in the Project, as well as in later papers. The paucity of references to pain in psychoanalytic literature may be partly a result of complications in approaching the subject, but is probably more the consequence of the relative rarity of explicit references to pain by analysands. Dr. Spiegel develops the thesis, however, that pain appears in analytic productions of highly narcissistic patients, taking the concealed form of affects such as shame, humiliation, and feelings of inferiority.

The theory of narcissism helps little to clarify this area of narcissistic lesions. Work with patients in whom narcissistic lesions are prominent prompted Dr. Spiegel to propose a guideline for such clinical phenomena, with their correlated affects; they all refer, in one way or another, to actual or potential pain of mental origin.

Reference is made to Freud's notation that observations of infants contending with absence of the object reveal pain as well as anxiety. The source of this pain of mental origin is seen as external, whereas the source of anxiety may be altogether internal—the pressure of instincts. Freud did not make clear why absence of the object may in one instance produce pain, in another, anxiety, in still another, both.

In contrast to Fenichel and others, who considered 'narcissistic needs' to be noninstinctual, Dr. Spiegel advances the thesis that narcissistic affects are also drive derivatives. 'Longing', an important affect in the development of this contribution, is the state of distress that an infant experiences when the permanent, constant object is absent. It may be considered parallel to the state of 'need' experienced when the transient, need-satisfying object is absent.

Freud gave a biphasic formulation of pain of physical origin in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The first aspect is the penetration of the stimulus barrier. The second is the ego's reaction to this penetration by mustering countercathectic energies to the breach area. Unless the second phase develops, an ordinarily pain-eliciting stimulus could be applied without a subjective experience of pain.

With reference to pain of mental origin, we find no direct analogue to the important physical idea of externality, which Dr. Spiegel suggests we assume to be replicated by the polarity of self- and object representations. That is to say,

the object representation can turn its energies upon the self-representation and becomes thereby a peripheral stimulus. There must be something analogous to the stimulus barrier to protect the self-representation from those energies emanating from the object representation, while still leaving the self-representation vulnerable to onslaughts from the id.

Object loss must lead to pain: if the transient, need-satisfying object is absent, the self-representation is hypercathected. If the permanent, real, external object is absent, the object representation must become hypercathected, and the energies within the latter threaten the self-representation with disorganization. The ego hastens to bind these energies, so pain is experienced. It is only the loss of the constant object that leads to pain. The state of 'longing' may exist even though needs have been satisfied.

Dr. Spiegel demonstrated the applicability of this biphasic formulation of pain of mental origin to understanding mourning and melancholia. The processes of introjection in the two conditions are contrasted, as also the courses of efforts to decathect the object representation.

In usual psychoanalytic practice, frank pain is less frequently encountered than affects believed by Dr. Spiegel to be related, namely, humiliation, shame, and feelings of inferiority. Unlike pain, humiliation is not automatically produced by object loss. It is linked to frustration in the external world, but the frustration has been filtered through a hypothetical 'center' in the psychic apparatus where the cathexes of past experiences of frustration and gratification have been pooled and the tolerance to frustration eventually set at a certain individual level. Unless the level is exceeded, the ego does not feel the painful affect; if exceeded, the affect may not be pain, but humiliation. Shame, the author suggests, is humiliation experienced when someone else looks on. Dr. Spiegel proposes that this center for development of tolerance to frustration be regarded as a primordial ego ideal.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Heinz Hartmann noted the difficult analytic problem posed by pain of psychic origin and referred to Freud's comments on the differing cathectic conditions determining the experience of pain or anxiety as hard to comprehend. Dr. Hartmann considered that Dr. Spiegel had made remarkable inroads into this difficult area but expressed some reservation about the author's references to a 'base cathectic level' within the self-representation. He also raised the question of what it could mean to postulate that the energies of the object representation turn upon the self-representation. He wondered what ego functions and defenses might correspond, in the psychic context, to the physiologic notion of the stimulus barrier. He concurred in the usefulness of postulating a special center in the psychic apparatus in connection with the development of frustration tolerance but was not convinced that it should be regarded as a primordial ego ideal.

Dr. Victor Rosen questioned the postulates forming the basis of Dr. Spiegel's paper, especially the contention that pain is an affect and not merely a sensation that becomes attached to an affect. To speak of physical pain and of mortification of pride in the same lexical terms is insufficient evidence for an identity. Dr. Rosen did, however, agree that psychic experience of physical pain has

certain features overlapping certain attributes of some affects more than other sensory modalities. Conversions of sensation into affect were cited, with the comment that we cannot assert that the affect involved is an intrinsic feature of sensation, or vice versa. Dr. Rosen suggested another formulation of the experience of pain as a result of object loss without excluding it from its position as a primary sensory modality.

Dr. Rudolph Loewenstein noted the general interest and stimulating qualities of this contribution but felt that the theoretical formulation of the distinction between mourning and melancholia required clarification. The differentiations between anxiety and humiliation and longing seemed convincing and important. Dr. Loewenstein ventured the questions: what are we describing when we designate anxiety as a painful emotion, and is this the same kind of pain as the pain of longing?

In his concluding responses Dr. Spiegel addressed himself particularly to Dr. Rosen's critique, emphasizing that he had not postulated an identity of pain of physical and mental origin, only an analogy. The usefulness of this analogy will have to be determined by its theoretic and practical applicability.

STEPHEN K. FIRESTEIN

November 26, 1963. UNCONSCIOUS FANTASY AND DISTURBANCES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE. Jacob A. Arlow, M.D.

In the Abraham A. Brill Memorial Lecture, Dr. Arlow examines the disturbance in conscious experience resulting from the presence of an unconscious fantasy. Such fantasies reveal themselves in parapraxes, symptoms, dreams, action, and character formation. For example, the fantasy of being beaten is often at the root of a masochistic character disorder. In spite of the fact that the concept is well documented clinically and an essential part of our theoretical understanding, many questions remain when we try to understand the problem in terms of the structural theory.

It is still uncertain what the nature, form, and function of unconscious fantasies are. Are they simply vehicles for the instinctual energies of the id or do ego and superego play a role in their formation? Paradoxically, the states of consciousness and unconsciousness appear to be of secondary importance, and preoccupation with this aspect of the problem may have burdened rather than helped our understanding. More relevant is the nature of the data of perception, the level of cathectic potential, and the state of the ego's functioning, including reality testing, defense, adaptation, and integration. Since fantasy activity is a constant ongoing process, Dr. Arlow prefers the term 'unconscious fantasy function' to the more static term 'unconscious fantasies'.

It is well known that the analysis of metaphorical expression very often leads associatively to repressed fantasy material. The central concept in Dr. Arlow's presentation is that in a similar manner the analysis of alterations in experiencing the external world and of the self may lead to repressed fantasy material. This becomes understandable when we realize that unconscious fantasy activity provides the 'mental set' in which sensory stimuli are perceived and integrated.

Both situations of perceptual ambiguity and a high cathectic potential of fantasy activity facilitate the emergence of unconscious fantasies. The situation is similar to the relationship of day residue to the manifest content of the dream.

Dr. Arlow presents a clinical vignette of a patient whose unconscious fantasy was a wish to castrate the analyst. He became angry and resentful over the requirement to pay for an hour he had missed. Two days later, in a moment of confusion, he became convinced he had not paid his bill. The fantasy of recouping his money dominated for a moment his capacity for recall; he could not distinguish between his wish and reality. An example of *déjà vu* is presented which is understandable as the consequence of the threatened emergence of violent unconscious claustral fantasy combined with the reassurance, 'You have been through all of this before and everything came out all right'.

Unconscious fantasy may be verbal and visual and contribute to defense, as illustrated by the fantasy of the phallic woman, an example of denial in unconscious fantasy which plays an important role in the psychodynamics of many perversions. A defensive use of the mechanism of identification with the aggressor may be incorporated into an unconscious fantasy involving self-representation and lead to the symptom of depersonalization. Neurotic illness may occur when an individual finds himself in, or actively provokes, an experience which contains elements unconsciously interpreted as a repetition of an unmastered childhood trauma around which an unconscious fantasy was formed.

Unconscious fantasy activity is intimately related to variations in self-representation. The individual's identity is made up of the fusion of many self-representations, each having a variety of unconscious fantasies. Under the impact of conflict the organized identity may disintegrate into its component parts. Then one or another self-representation emerges, mediated by an unconscious fantasy in which the self-representation is expressed in concrete terms. The psychoanalytic situation is designed to aid in the emergence of unconscious fantasies. The transference situation represents the involvement of the analyst as a figure in the patient's preformed, latent unconscious fantasies. A phenomenological description of any activity is incomplete and may be misleading unless one knows the unconscious fantasy being entertained. Contributions to the dynamics and structure of unconscious fantasies are drawn from all sectors of the psychic apparatus—id, ego, and superego. Applying the concept of psychic determinism to the ever-present unconscious day dreaming that accompanies conscious experience allows an understanding of their mutual interaction.

WALTER A. STEWART

MEETINGS OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

April 15, 1963. EGO IDEAL, EXCITEMENT, AND THE THREAT OF ANNIHILATION. M. Masud R. Khan.

Mr. Khan discusses a schizoid male patient in whom the special pathogenic creation of a highly organized secretive ego ideal was the defensive result of early disturbances in his infancy-childhood relations to his mother. A teacher

in his thirties, he sought treatment because of obsessive brooding over religion. In treatment it was discovered that he operated as four distinct characters, tenuously held together and labeled Mr. A, Mr. B, Mr. C, and Mr. D. Mr. A was the professional—meek, conscientious, exploited for unpleasant tasks, and devoted to his students though he did not think of them as individuals. Mr. B was prone to religious brooding. His God was cruel and demanded endless renunciations which were carried out with exhibitionistic thoroughness. Mr. C lived in a world of exhibitionistic fantasies and private perverse masturbatory practices, a gay, childishly frolicsome person whose existence was denied by retreating into a depressive religious obsession. Mr. D, who was partly unconscious, was recognized only after five years of treatment. He was a perfect person, blissfully merged with nature, capable of all feats (e.g., playing golf flawlessly with no previous experience). Mr. D also was disrupted by a religious obsession. This symptom screened the threat of disaster and annihilation which he always expected when he was in an ideal situation. He was a phobic, withdrawn, passive child who exploited his intellectual abilities to hide anxieties.

The father had a melancholic breakdown when the patient was seven, but little other information about him is given in this paper. A recurrent childhood experience involved being happily engaged in some activity (sitting next to mother drawing pictures), becoming panicky (feeling 'dread'), and displacing the panic onto a detail (breaking a pencil) with which mother would deal. Mr. Khan feels that such episodes contain an uncommunicable dread of annihilation, made tangible by the later developing religious anxieties.

The author notes some peculiarities in this patient's ego functions: phobic attitudes inhibiting any real involvement with others, mistrust of others, and incapacity to surrender—to a task or to spontaneous fantasies. All experiences were arranged and manipulated, yet there was an underlying uncontrollable excitement with which his ego could deal only reactively, with resultant feelings of depersonalization, a painful lack of pleasure in any instinctual discharge, hypochondriacal and psychosomatic symptoms, and 'the last line of defense . . . his coercive and vigilant superego'.

Mr. Khan discusses the origins and nature of this excitement, relating normal infantile excited states and their distorted handling in the interaction between mother and infant to the specific ego defect which resulted in this patient's type of ego ideal, designated as Mr. D. Mr. Khan postulates that the mother dealt quickly with all instinctual 'crises' but was emotionally absent between such crises. Also, the author feels that the mother's readiness to help, prevented separation into an alert executive self; by age five, the patient showed muscular passivity, unusual solitary manipulative activities, and was whiny and shy.

The author states that the ego ideal emerges in relation to and through ego functions, though earlier than the superego. It incorporates into itself both the earliest representations of the pleasure ego and the object, which in this stage are more or less fused. Thus it is the carrier of 'illusion' (Winnicott) and of primary identifications. The ego ideal arises from the earliest psychophysical transactions between mother and infant (Spitz), from stages where the actual ministrations of the mother are soon needed to master frustrations and sustain an experience. Citing Loewald's distinction, the author feels that his patient foresaw 'a future

for the ego and not as yet a future *of* the ego'. As Mr. D, he *was* an ideal being (he had split off the primitive pleasure self and the maternal object) and was totally passive about real aims in his adult life. He was also afraid that, if he expressed the inner reality of Mr. D for more than a flash, 'he would go mad'. The author traces the meaning of this dread of annihilation experienced only by Mr. D. He feels that his patient vividly illustrates Winnicott's 'fear of a lack of anxiety at regression to an unintegrated state'. The author further concludes that Mr. A, Mr. B, and Mr. C 'were experts at concocting anxiety situations and anxiety ridden concerns in social, moral, and sexual contexts'. In the protecting ego ideal which removed him from the threat of annihilation was imbedded the same threat of madness or disintegration. The infant's rage and distress at the mother's lapse of attention during quietly active periods (e.g., in bath, playing, etc.) constituted the core of his dreadful expectancy of annihilation which threatened to break into the good experiences of the dissociated ideal self and ideal mother.

The denial of dependency needs and the corresponding avoidance of the dread of abandonment were a fixed attitude of his ego, aided by substituting the masochistic negotiations with God for human relationships, and by the magical alliance between the ego and the ego ideal which was dissociated from reality ego (Mr. A), superego (Mr. B), and the private masturbatory sexual practices (Mr. C). As the patient became capable of bringing himself (Mr. D) to analysis, he began to experience intense sensations of being abandoned, which sometimes became a fear of going mad, of bodily dissolution, or of death from exhaustion. These states were warded off by the patient's awareness of the analyst's sustained attentiveness. This prevented a destruction of self, a 'wiping out' of all object representations, a seeking of the 'rock bottom', and full regression with the hope of renewed progression.

Only after a long time did the patient begin to be able to bear disillusionment and experience sadness without resorting to his crippling defenses. Gradually he could see a future *of* his ego in the world of human beings.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Mark Kanzer stated that the inner core of the semi-paranoid persons who emerge from these analyses is the frustrated and terrified child with oral drives inhibited because avenues of motor discharge were not developed in the mothering process. Instead, the successors of hallucinatory wish fulfilment—the dreamy states and ultimately the ego ideal—were preferred methods of binding excitation. The dreamlike fusions with the analyst were threatened with disruption.

In disentangling the contributory sources of Mr. D's excited states, Dr. Kanzer was inclined to focus on the 'resistances that offer the presenting point at the given moment'. Mr. D appeared in the analysis after a period of silence and the patient's assumption of omnipotence by turning around to look at the analyst. The patient braves the danger of mutual annihilation from daring to establish contact with the parent in the real world. The dreams and idealization represent a retreat as forepleasure mounts toward end pleasure while the motility, 'looking danger in the face', probably represents a therapeutic advance.

Dr. Kanzer recalled Freud's observation that the superego is a structure while

the ego ideal is an idea—an object that has undergone the process of idealization. Concerning the question of whether idealization takes place independently of, or prior to, superego formation, he also suggested a recent formulation of Hartmann and Loewenstein which seems to agree with Mr. Khan's ideas. They state that there is a self-idealizing process in the infant which helps to restore the state of omnipotence; for the ego ideal proper they see an intimate bond with the superego. Dr. Kanzer suggested that Mr. Khan sees the ego ideal as heir to the healing powers of the dream wish, while the superego is heir to the œdipus complex.

Dr. Max Schur questioned the extent to which the abnormal development of the patient's ego ideal has been responsible for the manifestations attributed to Mr. D. He pointed out that annihilation represents the traumatic situation and is not an affect related to the dread of abandonment, as Mr. Khan states. In childhood, the closeness of mother set off an incident in which 'castration' anxiety rapidly deteriorated into panic because the signal function of anxiety was deeply impaired in this child. The castration fear extends to all the genetic antecedents of castration. But the deeper danger—and wish—in such 'borderline' people is complete refusion of self- and object representations. Thus, Dr. Schur commented, one can formulate certain manifestations of the Mr. D phase without referring to the concept of ego ideal. Finally, he objected to the teleological formulations which suggest that the ego ideal or hypochondriacal and psychosomatic symptoms are created respectively to protect against the threat of annihilation and 'to deal with excited states'.

SHELLEY ORGEL

October 21, 1963. A SUGGESTION FOR A PSYCHOANALYTIC DICTIONARY. Ludwig Eidelberg, M.D.

The author describes the basic format, policies, and problems involved in compiling a psychoanalytic encyclopedic dictionary. He feels there is a strong need for such a work because the confusion of terminology constantly interferes in scientific communication among psychoanalysts. Many terms originally introduced by Freud and his followers were only vaguely defined and later took on new and varied meanings. Other terms have been borrowed from different sciences or from lay language and still carry confusing connotations of their original meanings. Dr. Eidelberg has organized a staff of associate editors (Drs. Eisnitz, Kanzer, Bertram D. Lewin, Niederland, Shengold, and Otto E. Sperling) and assistant editors (Drs. Almansi, Donadeo, Silverman, Stamm, and Yazmajian). The contents of the dictionary will not be limited to those definitions used or accepted by the majority of psychoanalysts but will include terms that have been used in a manner seemingly contradictory to basic laws of methodology. It is Dr. Eidelberg's intention that the editorial staff point out pertinent misunderstandings in terminology, suggest improvements, and constantly strive toward further clarification of thought.

Some practical considerations involved in the writing of this dictionary were illustrated in detail by the following examples: instinct and instinctual drive,

instinctual vicissitude, love, and parapraxis. Three of these will be discussed here to convey the style and methodology of the approach used.

In defining the term 'defense mechanism', Dr. Eidelberg focused on the intimate relationships of this concept to instinct theory and to related concepts of psychic conflict, anxiety, and psychic structure. In developing a definition of the term 'instinct' and 'instinctual drive', the confusion results from the lack of a truly adequate English word to translate the German *Trieb* as used by Freud. Dr. Eidelberg feels that the term 'instinctual drive' is preferable, as it comes closer to capturing some of the basic concepts expressed by *Trieb*. The term 'instinct' is often used confusingly in a more academic, static sense, and frequently as a synonym for impulse, urge, or wish.

The definition of 'instinctual vicissitude' began with a description of the four vicissitudes originally formulated by Freud in 1915. Transformation into affects, as mentioned in Freud's paper on repression, is also included. To this are added definitions of regression and progression of instinctual drives, the formation of psychic structure, and the libidinization and aggressivization of ego activity, all representing additional vicissitudes of instinctual drives. The frequent lack of a clear distinction between the concepts of defense mechanism and instinctual vicissitude is noted; Dr. Eidelberg stresses the idea that the concept of defense reflects the structural approach and emphasizes the role of the ego, while the concept of instinctual vicissitude represents an economic approach involving minimal ego activity.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Charles Brenner affirmed the incontestable importance of a psychoanalytic encyclopedic dictionary. He emphasized that the lexicography should be an exacting, pedantic discipline which should try to avoid the more informal, discursive approach he felt was manifested at times in Dr. Eidelberg's presentation. A dictionary of this type should be not merely a survey of the varying opinions and meanings of a term but should convey a sense of authoritative evaluation. In referring to the concrete examples from the dictionary, he noted that in the matter of the preferable translation of *Trieb* Strachey, in contrast to Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, prefers the term 'instinct'. Dr. Brenner noted several examples of Freud's own inconsistencies and confusion in his usage of terminology he himself had originated. Dr. Brenner felt that the definition of the term defense mechanism, as presented in the paper, could be widened to include such considerations as defense against superego demands. Which specific mechanisms should be chosen to be defined under the heading of defense is really a matter of convention, since in the broad sense anything available to the ego can be utilized for defensive purposes.

Dr. Richard Drooz believed that the clarity of thought, as illustrated in the examples taken from the work, was admirable but he had reservations about aspects of the format in regard to lexicography. Dr. Mark Kanzer emphasized the vastness of the task of examining the basic terminology of psychoanalysis. It has taken four years for the editorial staff of this dictionary to examine and define a mere two hundred terms. Dr. Jan Frank commented that perhaps we should not be so defensive about the complications and contradictions in our terminology, for these very features indicate scientific growth and progress. In

commenting on the format of the dictionary, Dr. Otto Sperling suggested that minority opinions of the meaning and usage of certain terms could be contained in an appendix.

In conclusion Dr. Eidelberg commented that the 'ideal' dictionary, like the 'ideal' analyst, does not exist. We must work as effectively as possible within the time available for such a huge undertaking. The terminology of Freud will be used as a base; terminology and definitions with which the editors are at variance will be included and attributed to the originator. An effort will be made to avoid being too authoritarian, but terminology which 'doesn't make sense' will not be included.

NORMAN N. RALSKE

After several years in Denver where he was a valued 'geographic' faculty member of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis, DOCTOR RENÉ SPITZ returned in December to Switzerland in what he announced as retirement. For his American friends who will wish to interrupt this busy leisure, Dr. Spitz's address is: 12 Rue Robert de Traz, Geneva.

The ACADEMY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS will hold its two-day annual meeting at the Hotel Biltmore, Los Angeles, California, on May 2nd and 3rd, 1964.

EXCERPTA MEDICA has published abstracts of papers of the XXIII INTERNATIONAL PSYCHOANALYTIC CONGRESS held in Stockholm from July 29 through August 1, 1963 under the auspices of the Swedish Psychoanalytic Society. The abstracts are in English, French, Spanish, and German. Copies of individual abstracts can be obtained from Excerpta Medica Foundation, Herengracht 119-123, Amsterdam-C, The Netherlands.