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INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS AND ANXIETY: FORTY YEARS LATER

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PRELUDE: THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT

Hemmung, Symptom und Angst appeared in the fall of 1926. I was given the assignment to report on the book in one of the small meetings which were then taking place in Freud's home.[1] This report was later published as a review in the *Internationale Zeitschrift fur Psychoanalyse* and, in English translation, in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis. The original review *(14)* is herewith reprinted,[2] with a few minor corrections:

The extraordinary richness of the content of this book, which not only discusses a series of the most important problems of psycho-analysis, but at the same time throws new light on nearly every question within the range of psycho-analytical investigation, even if only in passing, presents the reviewer with a particular difficulty. Confronted with this wealth he has hardly any other course open than to make a selection, in which naturally an element of subjective interest is bound to enter. Perhaps this danger will be most readily diminished, even if not avoided, by presenting his material along the lines of the leading problems of the work.

Freud begins with the question of the difference between inhibition and symptom. Clearly both ideas have ground in common; there are inhibitions which are symptoms and symptoms which consist essentially of inhibitions; but they do not in general coin-

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[1] Freud had ceased to attend the regular meetings of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society early in 1924. By 1926 meetings of smaller size were organized which took place in Freud's waiting room about once a month if his condition permitted; they continued until 1930 or 1931.

[2] With permission of the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.

cide. Now what are inhibitions? Freud discusses the various possible kinds of inhibition, and after reviewing the results of analytical empiricism he comes to distinguish three mechanisms. In one group of cases an activity appears to be inhibited on account of the meaning which it takes on; when an activity becomes sexualized, i.e. takes on a sexual meaning for the person concerned, or when this meaning, which may indeed be present in any case, becomes excessively pressing, the activity itself becomes subject to the defensive measures appropriate to its sexual significance.

In the second group it is not the meaning of the activity that is responsible for its inhibition, but the possibility of attaining results in reality by means of it; the person who is governed by the need for punishment must deny himself an action which the world or fate would reward with success. And finally the inhibition of an activity, apart from its meaning and its possible results, may be founded on a general impoverishment of the ego. An excessive absorption at another point, as in a case of mourning, or an excessive expenditure, in order to safeguard repressions, laboriously to maintain a labile equilibrium, make the ego weak and powerless for other tasks, make it appear inhibited in face of them.

Clearly it is common to all these cases that they relate to limitations of an ego-function, which may thus be seen to constitute the essence of an inhibition; a first distinction between inhibition and symptom then becomes self-evident, for a symptom cannot be described as a process of the ego.

These introductory considerations lead us to the first fundamental problem of the book, to the question of the boundary between ego and id, of ascertaining the part which both systems play in every psychical act. The boundary in question is the boundary between instinctual and purposive processes, between blind propulsion on the one hand and the choice of suitable means for particular purposes on the other hand, and this purposiveness need not even be objectively appropriate, but may have validity only in the psychical world. It is the boundary between 'possession' and control. The distinction sought for is not of such a kind that, say, one group of psychical phenomena is then to be regarded as originating in the id, and another as formed out of the ego; the aim is rather to determine and mark the share of both in every phenomenon.

This is the point at which A. Adler came to grief. To him all mental processes appeared explicable in terms of the ego alone, neurosis and character were to him merely purposive. But even a conception of a quite opposite nature, a possible demonological theory of mental life, as it were, does not meet the facts. Freud decisively rejects every attempt at a philosophical simplification of the problem in this or that direction; only exact empirical investigation which penetrates into the niceties of the psychological structure of every act can bring us gradually nearer its solution. The boundary between ego and id can only be found on the basis of abundant observations methodically investigated.

It is not difficult to fit this problem into its place in the history of analytical science. The first feat of analysis was the discovery of the id; ego-psychology existed even before psycho-analysis, what was essentially new was the discovery of forces which affect the ego, which limit it and also determine it. The second of these two modes of influence showed the way to the next object of analytic inquiry, to analytic ego-psychology which has investigated the share of the libido in building up the ego. And now we come to the third task, that of dividing off empirically the sphere of action of the two systems.

In this book Freud investigates three phenomena with regard to the share of the id and ego in each: anxiety, resistance and—in less detail—regression. One may ask why these phenomena in particular are difficult to fit into place. The conditions are in each case very characteristic. If we consider anxiety as experience then there can be no question that in face of it we behave essentially passively; we are seized by anxiety, and therefore the older theory postulated an origin for anxiety unconnected with the ego. But, on the other hand, anxiety has also a certain function which occasions a revision or amplification of the first very simple statement about it. And again, resistance was originally ascribed only to the ego; here it was an observation, that of the repetition-compulsion and the negative therapeutic reaction, which complicated the theory and made it necessary to recognize resistances of the id and of the ego-ideal too. Finally, with regression the position is the same as with anxiety; the falling back of the libido into old positions appears at first to be merely a legitimate reaction of the libido to privation; only on closer observation is its function for

the defensive tendencies of the ego visible. Alongside this group of problems a second one is developed in the course of the book; the results of the new investigation of anxiety supply the means for probing more deeply into the problem of option of neurosis.

Discussion of the problem of anxiety now occupies the chief place. Since the beginnings of analysis there has been a theory of the origin of anxiety which sprang from the simplest case open to observation. In the actual neuroses Freud was able to establish a regular connection between the appearance of anxiety and disturbances of the normal course of the libido; this discovery led to the conclusion that in every case anxiety appears in the place of the restrained gratification, forms, as it were, a transformation-product of the libido, thus offering a first stepping-stone to a theory of anxiety.

In this book Freud now subjects the whole question to renewed investigation with the help of the two carefully studied phobias of 'little Hans' and 'the Wolf-man'. The result of these considerations does not give grounds for the universal validity of the older conception. In both cases it is clear that anxiety did not arise in the first place as the result of repression, as a product of the transformation of the affects inhibited in their normal course by repression, but that it already preceded the repression, and in fact was the cause of the repression. This anxiety, as far as its content is concerned, is in both cases castration-anxiety. Little Hans had to fear the punishment of castration if his instinctual tendencies were pursued further; his anxiety related to the real consequences of his action as threatened by the outer world. With the Russian it is a somewhat different matter; his instinctual tendencies were of a passive-homosexual nature and it is just from their fulfilment that the loss of his masculinity is to be feared: anxiety of castration as the external result of an instinctual gratification, or as an accompanying phenomenon belonging to the nature of the instinctual gratification itself; anxiety, that is to say, of the vindictive outer world or of the instinctual claims dangerous to the integrity of the personality. It is common to both phobias that this anxiety appears on closer analysis to be the pre-condition and cause of the repression and not only its waste-product. And this conclusion cannot be altered by the possibility that the anxiety might be increased by the process of repression.

Thus the anxiety in the phobias is a reaction to a danger and a warning-signal on the part of the ego, which makes it possible to ward off the instinctual danger. The earlier conception, which put anxiety in a regular relation to any damming of the libido, still remains, but it is not yet clear how the two theories can be united in a single point of view. It is tempting to try and subsume the old conception under the new one by assuming that the damming of the libido is felt by the individual as a danger; but for the present we cannot get very far with this.

Freud now makes a comprehensive review of everything that psycho-analytic investigations have been able to tell us about anxiety. The earliest is the explanation of the formation of anxiety from damming of the libido. Anxiety then appears as the reaction to danger, a conception not far removed from the everyday view of the subject; as a biological reaction, we may say, thus relieving psychology and putting the solution of the problem into the field of biology. But this leaves the nature of the danger still unexplained. Further, the work of psycho-analysis has shown us that anxiety-affects are connected with a reproduction of the act of birth, and on this fact Rank has attempted to build up a complete theory of neurosis and character. Again anxiety also appears along with a reproduction of the reaction to danger, and the recent analysis of infantile phobias has led to the view that anxiety may arise from the ego as a provoked signal which is to interfere, by virtue of the pleasure principle, through the pain which it induces, with the course of the instinctual processes, and divert them away from a direction which might lead to an internal or external situation of danger. But these possibilities are not in any way to be considered as different forms of anxiety, in the sense that anxiety would have one origin in one case and in another case another. On the contrary, they are characteristics of anxiety which have a general validity, though at one time this and at another time that connection may be the more striking. We are now confronted with the task of working out a new superimposed point of view which shall co-ordinate and include them all. This point of view is to be gained from a consideration and more precise conception of the idea of danger.

The observation of the first and simplest situations which may be considered as dangerous, say a small child being left alone, gives us

a penetrating insight into the essence of danger; it is the condition of non-gratification and with it the growth of tensions resulting from ungratified needs.

Danger appears to be—and this has a universal application—everything which allows the stimulus-tensions to increase to such a degree that the psychical apparatus no longer feels able to cope with them. This view of the meaning of danger supplies a bridge to the first theory of anxiety, which represented anxiety as the immediate effect of an increase of stimulus-tensions which were being denied appropriate discharge. The new, more thorough researches show how this effect may be forestalled by the ego and how the ego already reacts with anxiety to the possibility of such a hyper-tension in the future—with an anxiety which through the mechanism of the pleasure principle henceforth influences the course of events and so prevents the actual occurrence of this possibility, thus acting as a warning-signal. The first studies made at the earliest period dealt with the automatic appearance of anxiety; the present investigation shows how the ego can, as it were, anticipate the future situation in small doses and through this capacity make effective action possible. We now also understand the Janus-like quality of anxiety, which appears to flow like a torrent from the id and yet at the same time is the servant of the ego. In the immediate reaction to the increase of stimulus-tension lies the share of the id; in the anticipation of the future and the reasonable action thereby made possible we have the share of the ego.

The relation of anxiety as automatic phenomenon to anxiety as signal seems to be analogous to the relation of the pleasure-principle to the reality-principle. Both can be reduced to the single conception of the striving for pleasure, just as anxiety can be to the single conception of being the product of excessive stimulus-tensions. It is essential to the reality-principle that the ego should anticipate future pleasure-pain situations, thus enabling the mechanism of the pleasure-principle to be set in motion and the action influenced appropriately.

The phenomena of anxiety can now be differentiated according to two points of view. They may be considered according to their greater or smaller distance from the danger; the nearer the danger the more automatic the reaction, and the further from it the more

active and impressive the role of the ego. Thus we may distinguish different kinds of anxiety according to their object, according to the content of the danger to which they react. Should we succeed in correlating the particular forms of anxiety differentiated by their content with the particular types of neurosis, we should have gained thereby a new vantage-point for the problem of option of neurosis. At this point in our observations we are confronted with the subsidiary problem of applying our deeper insight into the essence of anxiety to the question of the option of neurosis.

In previous psycho-analytical theory there were two conceptions of which we could avail ourselves for this problem: the conception of fixation, the retention of obsolete conditions of pleasure or regressive re-animation of them, and that of an internal divergence of development, of the unequal development of ego and libido.

Freud does not now reject these views, but amplifies and completes them by adding a point of view which takes into account the fundamental importance of anxiety in the origin of neurotic repression. The essence of the neurotic now appears to be the retention or reanimation of past and obsolete conditions of anxiety. That the libido regressively cathects earlier positions is not yet enough to cause a neurosis; only when the ego scents in this cathexis a danger which, though almost entirely appropriate to the infantile attitude, is anachronistic in the case of the adult (i.e. when the ego has preserved its infantile condition of anxiety) are the conditions for a neurosis completely present. It is easy to assume that various dangerous situations correspond to various stages of the development of the ego, and that anxiety-conditions may be retained as 'petrifactions' of various stages of development; the question then arises whether these 'anxiety-fixations', if one may so call them, may be exclusively correlated to particular neuroses. Freud distinguishes in the first instance anxiety about loss of love, castration-anxiety and anxiety in face of the super-ego, and makes the following relations: anxiety about loss of love is particularly characteristic of women; it belongs to the genital phase and seems characteristic of hysteria. Castration-anxiety is male: it belongs to the phallic phase and has an unmistakable relation to phobias. Finally, super-ego anxiety is also essentially man's affair: it comes to the fore in the latency period and forms the centre of the obsessional neurosis.

Thus through these considerations we appear to have found a new approach to the old and obstinate problem of option of neurosis. But by correlating the forms of anxiety with stages of the development of the ego and with types of neurosis, all the possibilities contained in the new conceptions are not yet exhausted. We have still to distinguish the various forms of defense and to relate them to these correlations. The concepts of 'defense' and 'repression' have not yet been thoroughly differentiated. Freud proposes to reserve the old expression 'defense' for the more general idea; repression should be described as merely a certain characteristic special case of defense. From the great number of other defense-mechanisms, two processes peculiar to the obsessional neurosis ('undoing' and the process of 'isolation') are discussed in detail. Even regression appears on closer observation no longer exclusively as an automatism of the id, but reveals the participation of the defensive ego; so that this process too takes its place among the ranks of defense-mechanisms. The question now arises whether these forms of defense do not stand in a regular relation to the particular affections, such as, for instance, might be presumed to exist between hysteria and repression. Our task, which arose from considering the nature of danger, has now been extended to the correlating of certain phases of infantile development with certain situations of danger, certain forms of anxiety, certain defense-mechanisms, with the peculiar nature of the anti-cathexis and finally with a particular symptomatology, a type of neurosis. The problem of option of neurosis is thus probed to a much greater depth; the missing links, so to speak, which were lacking between the first and last factors, have been supplied.

But not even the addition of these links into the chain of the genesis of neurosis can alter the fact that what is really specific in neurosis eludes us now as ever. Neurosis is the automatization of anxiety-reactions; but in the last analysis what is responsible for the fact that one group of people falls victim to this automatization, so remaining in an important part of their being perpetually infantile, while the rest of mankind manage to escape it to a degree sufficient for practical purposes? What is the specific cause of developing a neurosis?

There are two attempts at a solution of this question. One of them, Adler's, presupposes the inferiority of an organ; it is too sim-

ple to do justice to the phenomena; the other, Rank's, disregarding all experience, hovers about in space. Psycho-analysis has no solution to hand. Freud draws attention to three factors which make special demands on man's mentality and which thus bear in them the possibilities of disaster: one biological, one phylogenetic and one purely psychological. We do not yet know what is specific in neurosis, we know only where it might be sought. The first has its roots in the long-drawn-out helplessness and dependence of the child; thence comes man's eternal need for love. To this must be added the peculiar and surprising fact of the twofold 'thrust' of his developing sexuality; it imposes on human development a violent change of direction twice over and thus contains possibilities of misfortune. Finally, the purely psychological aspect of man's disposition to neurosis must be sought in the differentiation of the mental apparatus, in the construction of institutions which represent the claims of the outer world, so that an external battlefield is extended to within man's mind. Each of these three factors makes extraordinary demands on man and hence points out the territory in which the characteristic causes of neurotic reaction must be sought.

After his discussion of the problem of anxiety and the application of the results gained to the option of neurosis, Freud goes on to subject the phenomenon of resistance to a renewed investigation, with a view to correlating it with the institutions in the mind. He distinguishes five forms of resistance. Two of them are directed against making the unconscious conscious (the repression-resistance and the transference-resistance) and proceed from the ego. Appertaining equally to the ego, yet working as a resistance against recovery, is that one which is rooted in the secondary gain through illness. The need-for-punishment resistance, which likewise guards against recovery, is to be ascribed to the super-ego; and finally the repetition-compulsion resistance must be described as an id-resistance. The two last-named were the last to be discovered; from our knowledge of them proceeded the most important amplifications of analytic theory.

It is not quite clear to the reviewer exactly how the line is to be drawn between the transference-resistance which pertains to the ego, and the repetition-compulsion resistance which must be ascribed to the id; both repeat instead of remembering. Perhaps

the distinction between the two should be sought in a displacement of the accent; in the sense, say, that the transference-resistance repeats in order not to have to remember (chief significance: I will not remember), while the repetition-compulsion resistance rejects the memory in order that it may repeat (accent: I will repeat).

If we now cast a glance over the revisions and corrections which Freud makes to the analytic conceptions of anxiety and resistance, we notice that in both cases they take a different direction. With anxiety the earlier view, according to which the ego was, as it were, only the object, must be corrected in the sense that the ego is now seen to take a leading part. With resistance, on the contrary, the ego no longer appears to be the sole actor as in the earlier theoretic assumption. Both signify in the first place a complicating of analytical theory; but yet there can be no doubt that they alone supply the necessary completion which was to be gained from employing Freud's differentiation of the psychical apparatus as made in 'The Ego and the Id'.

A continuous transition now takes place between the functions of the ego and the id. On the one hand a descent into the id by way of automatization, but on the other hand an ascent into the regions governed by the ego by way of *play*. The repetition-compulsion can enter into the service of the ego. 'The ego which has passively experienced a trauma, now actively repeats a modified reproduction of the same, in the hope that it will be able to direct its course independently. We know that the child behaves in this way towards all impressions that are painful to it, by reproducing them in play; by changing in this way from passivity to activity it seeks to master psychically the impressions of its existence.' This book is almost too full of the seeds of new problems and solutions; in the lines cited we find a stepping-stone to the solution of the question how the process which is the opposite of automatization, the emergence of psychical phenomena into the ego and thus out of compulsion into freedom, takes place.

Thus in this book Freud has opened new paths in every direction. Three questions, above all, appear which are of decisive importance for the problems which confront psycho-analysis. The first is the differentiation of the psychical institutions according to their participation in particular psychical phenomena. The second con-

cerns the nature of the ego which appears to have a capacity for anticipating the future in small samples, whereby the course of events is actually altered by the mechanism of the pleasure-principle coming into force. From this point we find an approach to a causal explanation for the meaningful operations of the ego. And finally the third problem is a fresh statement on an extraordinarily extended basis of the question of the specific ætiology of particular neuroses; to the old conception of libido-fixation is added the new one of danger, of its various contents, and the various forms of reaction to them.

All who know psycho-analysis and who live in its mental atmosphere are conscious that what is essential to it is not to be found in a volume of theory dating from a definite period, but in its method and its development—its development, which is perhaps characterized by the fact that it is continually divesting our knowledge of the mind of its subjective features and disguises, and which thus indeed conforms to the essence of the development of scientific thought in general, overcoming by an endlessly converging process its basic antimony, i.e. that its means of dealing with its subject are themselves part of this subject, and that therefore investigation of the psychical is itself psychical. In this process and the inviolability of its law is contained, as in every true science, the essence of psycho-analysis also. This fact of the evolutionary character of psycho-analysis has been brought home to the reviewer once again by his study of *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.*

FORTY YEARS LATER

I. THE EQUALITY OF EGO AND ID AND THE BEGINNINGS OF PSYCHOANALYTIC EGO PSYCHOLOGY

In the life of individuals as well as of groups or nations, events, onesidely conceived even while they occur, immediately become subject to a process of editing and distorting in order to make them better conform to one's expectations and preferences. Thus, man's consciousness of the past is largely a collection of myths, with a nucleus of truth embedded in a cake of fantasy.

The history of psychoanalysis as it is widely seen today is no

exception to this rule: The way things are now supposed to have been must appear distorted to those who have lived through parts of it. Of course, those of us who are survivors of an earlier period must be aware of the fact that our memory is not immune to the universal tendency of mythmaking and of seeing the past in the light of what has materialized later, and colored our wishes; we must beware of this temptation while giving our testimony.

It is now widely believed that in Freud's lifetime psychoanalysis was for all practical purposes a drive psychology, a psychology of the id, and that balance was restored later, in the 1940's and 1950's, through the development of the new ego psychology. This, to my mind, is a myth; as myths do, it contains an element of truth under a thick crust of error. Its main disadvantage is that it blocks understanding of what actually happened, and so blocks the view to the underlying problems which, however unrecognized, are still with us.

As far as acknowledging ego and id as equal partners in psychic life in general and in the etiology of the neuroses in particular is concerned, it seems to me that we must distinguish between the level of clinical discourse, i.e., of conceptualization for practical purposes, and the level of ultimate, general theory. On the practical, clinical level, the recognition of this equality is a great deal older; on the theoretical level, the problem is as open today as it ever was.

On the clinical level, Lou Andreas-Salomé noted in her diary on April 6, 1913 that in a number of points—including, for instance, the view of neurosis as a disturbance of both 'ego instinct' and 'sexual instinct'—the 'ego factor' has become 'more equal' to the sexual factor. The development which then began continued and reached in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety the point of full consummation and clear formulation:

> Just as the ego controls the path to action in regard to the external world, so it controls access to consciousness. In repression it exercises its power in both directions, acting in the one manner upon the instinctual impulse itself and in the other

> upon the [psychical] representative of that impulse. At this point it is relevant to ask how I can reconcile this acknowledgement of the might of the ego with the description of its position which I gave in *The Ego and the Id.* In that book I drew a picture of its dependent relationship to the id and to the superego and revealed how powerless and apprehensive it was in regard to both and with what an effort it maintained its show of superiority over them. This view has been widely echoed in psycho-analytic literature. Many writers have laid much stress on the weakness of the ego in relation to the id and of our rational elements in the face of the daemonic forces within us; and they display a strong tendency to make what I have said into a corner-stone of a psycho-analytic *Weltanschauung.* Yet surely the psycho-analyst, with his knowledge of the way in which repression works, should, of all people, be restrained from adopting such an extreme and one-sided view *(5,* p. 95*).*

These words are followed by the famous warning against the fabrication of *Weltanschauungen* which are described as protections against anxiety without any cognitive value: 'The benighted traveller may sing aloud in the dark to decry his own fears; but, for all that, he does not see an inch farther beyond his nose.'

Thus, the ego was well recognized in the mid-twenties as an equal partner in the adventure of life—on the clinical level of discourse at any rate. Whether it can be recognized as an equally fundamental element in a general theory of the mind, however, is a different question because the 'ego' is a concept of a different kind from, say, 'instinct', 'drive', or 'id'. A drive is a force like, say, gravity; it pushes things in a particular direction with a certain intensity. It is what the medieval philosophers called a *vis a tergo,* a force pushing from behind. But the ego can be so described only on the lowest level of its activities, viz., that of reflex action; in its higher operations it is a *problem solving agent* and thus a *teleological* concept. It explains psychic activities in terms of the purposes they serve. It is a close relative of Aristotle's *entelechy,* the pre-existing

form which guides the development of plant or animal according to nature; or a relative of the medieval physician's *vis medicatrix naturae,* the healing power of nature.

In the first case, we try to explain behavior in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions (the tire became flat *because* it ran over a nail; the cells became necrotic *because* of anoxia, etc.). In the second case, events are explained in terms of their ends (we have our children vaccinated *in order to* secure them against certain infectious diseases, etc.).

Seneca saw the difference between the Romans and the Etruscans in that the former thought causally, the latter teleologically: *Nos putamus quia nubes collisae sunt fulmina emitti; ipsi existimant nubes collidi ut fulmina emittant.* (We believe that lightning is emitted because clouds have collided; they think that clouds collide in order to emit lightning.)

That the ego is, in fact, largely a teleological concept may be seen from Freud's extensive definition in his last comprehensive treatise on psychoanalysis, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, written thirteen years after Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety.

> *Here are the principal characteristics of the ego.* In consequence of the pre-established connection between sense perception and muscular action, the ego has voluntary movement at its command. It has the task of self-preservation. As regards *external* events, it performs that task by becoming aware of stimuli, by storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards *internal* events, in relation to the id, it performs that task, by gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favorable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations entirely. It is guided in its activity by consideration of the tensions produced by stimuli, whether these tensions are present in it or in-

> troduced into it. The raising of these tensions is in general felt as *unpleasure,* and their lowering as *pleasure.* It is probable, however, that what is felt as pleasure or unpleasure is not the *absolute* height of this tension but something in the rhythm of the changes in them. The ego strives after pleasure and seeks to avoid unpleasure. An increase in unpleasure that is expected and foreseen is met by a *signal of anxiety;* the occasion of such an increase, whether it threatens from without or within, is known as a *danger.* From time to time the ego gives up its connection with the external world and withdraws into the state of sleep, in which it makes far-reaching changes in its organization. It is to be inferred from the state of sleep that this organization consists in a particular distribution of mental energy *(7,* pp. 145-146*).*

The goal-directed expressions abound in this text: 'The ego has . . . *at its command* . . . it has the *task* of . . . it *performs* that task . . . by gaining *control* . . . by *deciding* . . . by *postponing* . . . it is guided by *consideration. . . '.* Causal explanations in terms of tensions and pressures still turn up but they appear to be subordinated to the ego rather than determining it: ('The ego is guided in its activity by *consideration* of the tensions produced by stimuli . . .'); energetic considerations appear in the description of sleep ('this organization consists in a particular distribution of mental energy') but this new distribution does not appear to be the cause of sleep but rather the consequence or the implication of an act of the ego ('the ego gives up the connection with the external world and withdraws into a state of sleep . . .'). Only in the middle part of the quotation, dealing with pleasure and unpleasure as functions of tension, is the treatment causal (or mechanistic, if one prefers).

Teleological concepts may be quite illuminating on the clinical level but the question is whether they are satisfactory as ultimate, irreducible constructs.

It is quite permissible for a physician at the sickbed to say that his patient has a strong 'will to live', has great recupera-

tive powers, and to base his prognosis on impressions such as these. But 'will to live' or 'recuperative power' are not accepted in physiology as ultimate, irreducible categories; they are to be reduced to physicochemical processes.

In the decades preceding the First World War, the teleological approach was widely practiced in the historical disciplines (or *Geisteswissenschaften* in the German style) but was thoroughly discredited in the sciences of nature. Characteristic for the view of the time is the following passage from the Presidential Address of Dr. William H. Welch before the Congress of American Physicians and Surgeons (1897):

> The teleological concept of a useful purpose in no case affords an explanation of the mechanism of an adaptive process *(15)*.

This was certainly Freud's view in the earlier times. He always tried to find explanations in terms of forces, tensions, conditioning by past experience, and the like. It is characteristic that in earlier times he speaks less of the 'ego' than of '*ego instincts*'—a term suggestive of forces, vectors. Basically, it has probably always remained his view though, as the above quoted passage from An Outline of Psychoanalysis shows, he grew progressively more tolerant of teleological concepts in later years.

Freud's approach has been severely criticized by Alfred Adler who claimed, in the trail of the ideas of Dilthey, Windelband, and Rickert, then dominant in German academic circles, that psychic life cannot be 'explained' in terms of general laws but can only be 'understood' in terms of purposes.

In the beginning of the century, the climate of opinion began to change and tolerance toward teleological conceptualization began to grow in some quarters. One of the first symptoms of the change was the appearance of the school of *Denkpsychologie* in Germany early in the century (Kuelpe, Ach, Buehler, Selz). The earlier school of association psychology (Wundt) had treated individual ideas as the atoms of mental

life and saw them connected by laws of association which determined their sequence. The new school saw the process of thinking determined not by mechanical links between its elements but by its aim; it dealt with goal-directed behavior, and Selz's monumental work on the processes of organized thought was a study of problem solving.

Strange as it may sound, American behaviorism is also a symptom of growing permissiveness toward teleological concepts though this fact is characteristically hidden behind a deliberately materialistic, technological language. 'Behavior' is not really a mechanistic concept; an observer unaware of purposes and unsuspecting of their existence would only notice changes in the spatial distribution of matter. To speak of flight or fight or mating behavior means seeing one set of such changes of matter as meaningfully integrated by an implicit purpose.

Freud remained faithful to the imperative of analyzing—or trying to analyze—goal-directed behavior in terms of conditioning by antecedents; he tried to find the 'mechanism' of which Welch spoke. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety offers a clear example of this tendency. After having stated that the ego gives an *Angstsignal,* an anxiety signal, which brings about the adaptive response, he searched for its mechanism and found it in the following process: The ego *anticipates* future events and samples the unpleasure of a future catastrophe in small doses—the anxiety signal—which then, through the pleasure-pain principle, sets the avoidance reaction into motion; this would be the 'mechanism' of the adaptive response.

The question is open, of course, whether the process is thereby effectively reduced to mechanical terms because the implicit ability of the ego to anticipate still contains the whole secret: how does the ego do the anticipating? The same difficulty appears in the physiology of the reaction to danger: one has understood much about the chain from the pituitary gland to the adrenal gland and the release of hormones which put various organs into a condition of readiness, but it remains un-

explained how the pituitary recognizes danger in the first place.

Be that as it may—the tendency toward finding the mechanism of a meaningful process, toward understanding 'how it works', is unmistakable, in both cases.

Once again, the question before us is: is a phenomenon sufficiently explained by showing that it serves a purpose? Is, for instance, the appearance of milk in the young mother's breast after delivery satisfactorily explained by the fact that it serves the needs of the infant? Is the appearance of sublimations in a situation of instinctual frustration sufficiently explained by attributing it to an 'ego function'? Perhaps necessity is the mother of invention but does it not have a father, too?

Hume said that explanation is a place where the mind comes to rest. Does our mind come to rest when we learn that what happened has served a purpose?

It all depends on what kinds of insight we are after. If science is viewed in the way the ancients saw it, viz., as a contemplative understanding of the cosmos and as part of wisdom, then our understanding of phenomena in terms of their purposes, i.e., as part of a design, may be quite satisfactory; learning how well the female body prepares for the business of motherhood may give us a glimpse into an intricate design of nature—of 'that unconscious omniscience which we call nature' *(12,* p. 126*)*—and so fill us with awe or with confidence.

But post-Galilean science does not approach nature in a spirit of contemplation and with a readiness to admire and to worship but rather as a conquering master; it wants to manipulate nature or at least to predict it; and explanations in terms of purpose have little predictive value. They would have predictive value if all organisms were always able to realize their purposes; in that case, knowledge of purpose would mean knowledge of behavior. But things are not that way; sometimes we can realize our purposes, sometimes we cannot. The female body produces milk when it needs it for the sustenance of its offspring, but in countless other instances we lack similar

abilities. For a man trapped by, say, wild animals it would be very useful to have wings grow out instantaneously from his body so that he could take off in the air; but that does not happen.[3] If it did, there would undoubtedly be some who would 'explain' it in terms of an ego function. These explanations bring to mind the remark of Mephistopheles about teleological explanations in his interview with the freshman student:

> *Encheiresin naturae nennt's die Chimie,*
> *Spottet ihrer selbst und weiss nicht wie.*
> *Encheiresis naturae* the chemists baptize it,
> Mock themselves and do not realize it *(8).*

Explanations in terms of purpose have predictive value only if we know the conditions under which the organism can fulfil this purpose and, in the case of alternate roads to fulfilment, the conditions under which one road is taken rather than another. But if we know these conditions,—for instance, if we know what kind of inherited neurological patterns and/or what kind of postnatal experiences bring about a particular kind of ego—the whole concept of purpose becomes dispensable because we can then directly correlate the resulting action with the determining conditions.

Thus, if we are content to contemplate, to admire or to worship, teleological explanations are quite satisfactory and the mind comes to rest; but if we want to influence the course of events, we must search for the 'mechanism' which can give us an entry wedge for our intervention.

This was essentially the issue behind the nineteenth century

[3] In recent times, teleological explanations have come back under the cover of Darwinian evolution which is an attempt to explain mechanistically the appearance of functional design. It is not directly argued that something exists because it fulfils a function, but it is said that what exists is the result of selective survival of random mutations, i.e., among countless structures emerging haphazardly, only those which fulfilled a function have survived; in effect it amounts to the same. The difficulty with this kind of explanation is the same as with direct teleological explanations, viz., that adaptive changes are taking place in some cases—as, for instance, the development of resistant strains among microorganisms long exposed to antimicrobial drugs—but do not take place in others.

dispute between mechanists and vitalists. The problem is probably ultimately insoluble. On the one hand it is probably true that life, and particularly the higher forms of life, cannot be *completely* explained in terms of laws similar to those of classical physics; that there is an area of creative innovation and that life will therefore never be completely predictable. But it is also true that patterns applying to these very processes can still be found though they do not exhaust them; hence, as long as our attitude to nature is active and interventionist rather than passive and contemplative, we must continuously seek for new regularities which permit predictions. The universal lawfulness of nature in the sense of Laplace may not be our metaphysical position; it must still remain our practical guide as researchers.

O Lord, said St. Augustine, give me chastity but do not give it to me as yet; we may say in a similar vein that we will acknowledge the limits of our power *but not yet.*

Thus Freud's hesitation to admit the 'ego' as an equal to the drives, not only on the level of clinical theory but also as one of the fundamental facts of nature, reflects his reluctance to accept teleological explanations as the last word; it reflects the ethos of modern science. It can be criticized *on that level* by those who are either prepared to challenge the whole modern approach to nature—the exclusive alloplastic orientation, the constant striving for domination—or are willing to resign themselves to definite limits of predictability and accessibility to influence in matters of life; but within the orientation of modern science, Freud's hesitation is justified.

So much about the equality of id and ego. A word may also be said about their delineation.

The model of the psychic personality as currently used seems to me to be more schematic than the model which emerges from the pages of Freud. We are wont to think of ego and id as separate agencies or structures, clearly differentiated from one another. With Freud, the boundaries appear to be more fluid—'the ego is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it' *(4,* p. 24*)*—and there is a constant traffic or migration

back and forth. In the words of my old review, 'there is on the one hand a descent into the id by way of automatization, but on the other hand an ascent into the regions governed by the ego by way of *play* . . . the emergence of psychic phenomena into the ego and thus out of compulsion into freedom'. Ego becomes id, id may become ego. This double process of freezing what had been liquid and of liquifying what had been frozen is an aspect in which Freud's vision seems to me to be truer to life than the currently more common form of the model.

II. ANXIETY

The main point of the work was, of course, the revision of the theory of anxiety. An American edition has even changed the title into 'The Problem of Anxiety' in order to make it conform to this fact.

The revision is widely known yet often misunderstood. Kardiner, Karush, and Ovesey, for instance, state that the book 're-established the common-sense position that anxiety was a reaction to danger' *(10)*. What is a common-sense position is that *Realangst,* or realistic fear, is a reaction to danger; but that was never questioned. In his Introductory Lectures, Freud spoke of 'the fact . . . that realistic anxiety in the face of a danger seems to be a manifestation of the self-preservative instinct—which, after all, can scarcely be disputed . . .' *(3,* p. 430*)*. There was never any question that the concern of a man who undergoes a biopsy of a suspicious growth, or who travels a road made hazardous by guerilla attacks, is a reaction to danger, at least as long as it seems to be in reasonable proportion to the actual risks and does not become the source of secret pleasure.

The revision of the theory of anxiety did not deal with realistic fear at all but only with neurotic anxiety, i.e., with anxiety in situations in which average people can either detect no danger at all or no danger great enough to justify the intensity of the worry. The person who is afraid of dogs, the adult woman who is afraid to walk down Park Avenue or Regent Street in broad daylight, during the hours of heavy traffic, or the healthy young

man who lives in constant terror lest he may come down with, or may already suffer from, a fatal disease, are cases in point; we then speak of neurotic anxiety because of its intensity, its refractoriness to ordinary explanations of fact and probability, and its omnipresence.

It was with reference to neurotic anxiety only that the famous shift of view has taken place. In the case of the agoraphobic woman, for instance, who is likely to harbor rape fantasies, one would have assumed, according to the older theory, that her frustrated sexual desires had been transformed into anxiety, while the new viewpoint holds that she is *afraid of* her sexual desires and that this fear, always present, becomes greatly intensified in situations of opportunity and, hence, of temptation. In short, neurotic anxiety, i.e., anxiety without, or without sufficient, danger, has now come to be seen as basically similar to realistic fear, i.e., as a reaction to danger, albeit an inner one.

It is not too much to say that this revision has greatly altered and enriched psychoanalytic treatment; of all the later additions to the original theory conceived at the turn of the century—additions which include narcissism, repetition compulsion, an instinct of aggression, and unconscious guilt feelings—it is perhaps the most important one. For while hitherto the analyst's intention was exclusively geared to the vicissitudes of the libido, the analyst was now alerted to look for the specific dangers and pitfalls between which the ship of life, propelled by the drives, is steering its course. It is only after this innovation that a complete theory of the personality becomes possible.

The new view has been universally accepted among analysts and has long become an integral part both of theory and practice of psychoanalysis. We find it difficult to imagine that it could ever have been different.

But there is more to Freud's discussion of the problem of anxiety than just this. Freud did not mean to discard altogether the old view of anxiety as a transformation product of dammed-up libido; he considered it as valid for what he called

Aktualneurose, i.e., neurosis due exclusively to current sexual practices involving the building up of tension without adequate discharge, and remediable through a change in the current mode of life. Freud maintained that this type of neurosis of which he had seen many examples in his earlier professional life did, in fact, exist. Few of his disciples followed him on this point; most of them held that the cases diagnosed as *Aktualneurose* in the early days would reveal themselves as genuine psychoneuroses if looked at with the more experienced diagnostic eye of a later day. Whether this is so or whether the late Victorian age did in fact produce a type of neurotic reaction which tended to disappear together with the more severe restrictions of adult sexuality, seems to me to be an open question.

In any case, Freud continued to believe that high sexual excitement with subsequent frustration can by itself alone produce anxiety, and that a general theory of anxiety must find a place for this phenomenon as much as for the phenomena of neurotic anxiety as a reaction to inner danger, or of realistic anxiety as a reaction to external danger.

We know the solution which Freud attempted in this book. Anxiety, he suggested, breaks out both as a reaction to a trauma (defined as a rapid accumulation of need tensions) *and* as a reaction to danger, i.e., to the anticipation of a future trauma; in one case, the organism is flooded by high level tensions, in the other case such a catastrophe is only anticipated: the former would be the case of anxiety in *Aktualneurose,* or anxiety due to dammed-up libido, the latter would be the case of realistic anxiety or of neurotic anxiety as reactions to dangers. We see also why this attempt at a unified theory has been unsatisfactory: in the case of trauma, the 'need tensions' by which the organism is flooded need not be sexual tensions; they may be situations involving, for instance, the threat of death. But the older theory of anxiety as a transformation product of dammed-up libido required that what had been dammed up were not need tensions in general but quite specifically *sexual* tensions.

Most psychoanalysts have disregarded this part of Freud's deliberations. They do not believe in the existence of *Aktualneurose* and they do not believe that anxiety is caused by high level sexual tension without discharge; all anxiety, in their eyes, is a reaction to danger,[4] and the problem with which Freud struggled is to them an artificial problem, created by a faulty theory.

But whether or not *Aktualneurose* exists, it seems to me that there are *phenomenological* characteristics of neurotic anxiety —a kind of frustraneous excitement—which remind us of some sexual manifestations so that the possibility of relationship between anxiety and sexuality should not be so easily dismissed.

The most suggestive result along this line of inquiry, following soon after the publication of Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, was the discovery of the *sexualization of anxiety,* first published by René Laforgue *(11)* and developed independently at the same time in Anna Freud's Seminar on Child Analysis in Vienna: anxiety—or, perhaps, we should better say: fear—develops as a reaction to danger but it is seized by sexual drives and made a source of pleasure—of a masochistic sensation or, in what we may call 'flirting with danger', of play of alternately mastering it and surrendering to it, the former with narcissistic, the latter with masochistic gratifications, and the former necessary to prevent the situation from getting out of hand, as masochistic lust, as a rule, is predicated upon the existence of limits beyond which things cannot go. The practical importance of these contributions need not be emphasized.[5]

Thus, the development of an integrated theory of anxiety is still a task before us. It seems to me that it might proceed approximately along the following lines.

[4] It is particularly interesting to note that Leo Rangell, one of the very few analysts who actually believes in the existence of *Aktualneurose,* thinks that the anxiety in these cases is nevertheless not a direct product of accumulation of tension but has to be seen as a reaction to danger, too, viz., 'the danger that (a) the helpless state will get worse, and/or (b) it will continue and never stop' *(13,* p. 397).

[5] For further clinical material on this subject, see Feldman, Sandor: *Anxiety and Orgasm,* This QUARTERLY, XX, 1951, pp. 528-549.

There was an earlier attempt by Freud, a decade before Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, in which some important points were made; but Freud did not follow them up. This is the passage (part of which was quoted before):

> I have said that there is something that does not tally with the relation (so thoroughly recognized apart from this) between anxiety and libido: the fact, namely, that realistic anxiety in face of a danger seems to be a manifestation of the self-preservative instinct—which, after all, can scarcely be disputed. How would it be, though, if what was responsible for the affect of anxiety was not the egoistic ego-instincts but the ego-libido? After all, the state of anxiety is in every instance inexpedient, and its inexpedience becomes obvious if it reaches a fairly high pitch. In such cases it interferes with action,whether flight or defence, which alone is expedient and alone serves the cause of self-preservation. If, therefore, we attribute the affective portion of realistic anxiety to ego-libido and the accompanying action to the self-preservative instinct, we shall have got rid of the theoretical difficulty. After all, you do not seriously believe that one runs away because one feels anxiety? No. One feels anxiety and one runs away for a common motive, which is roused by the perception of danger. People who have been through a great mortal danger tell us that they were not at all afraid but merely acted—for instance, that they aimed their rifle at the wild beast—and that is unquestionably what was most expedient *(3,* p. 430*).*

The first important point in this passage is that men may act appropriately in danger *without experiencing any sensation of anxiety at all;* in fact, Freud even stated here that he considered anxiety as always inexpedient, and that he did not look upon it as the motor force of action. But whether or not one will get as far as the latter conclusion suggests, it seems to be well enough established that a sensation of anxiety is not needed as a goad to action in situations of great and immediate danger. But if this is so, if fear (or anxiety) is not an indispensable element in the sequence 'perception of danger—adaptive reaction', the idea of an 'anxiety signal' is in need of re-

vision. What is obviously biologically necessary is a *danger signal* that sets in motion certain responses but that danger signal need not consist of the sensation of fear.

The existence of a warning system is obviously vital for any organism which is exposed to other than merely typical situations, i.e., that has an individual destiny, and a species not equipped with such a system would probably not survive. Hence, the very survival of a species might suggest that danger signals are operative.

If, however, the danger signal need not consist of the sensation of fear or anxiety, which would set the pleasure principle into motion, of what, then, does it consist? We have in the meantime learned a great deal about the physiology of the reactions of the organism to danger: it may well be that this process is physiological and that the sensation of fear or anxiety is merely the psychic representation of this process, or the organism's awareness of it, which may be a biological luxury, at least in the case of *imminent* danger

If this is so, the next step would be to ask under what conditions the sensation of fear or anxiety appears, i.e., under what conditions the process rises to consciousness. Since the adaptive reaction without the experience of fear seems to be limited to cases in which *immediate action is both indicated and possible*—as, for instance, in Freud's example: shooting—the answer to this question seems to be that the sensation of fear appears when immediate action is either not called for (as in the case of more remote dangers) or impossible (as in the case of an individual trapped) or prevented by inner inhibitions (as in the case of ambivalence regarding the response, or of hesitation). In short, the *sensation* of fear seems to be predicated upon an *obstacle to motor activity*. In this sense, Federn's view of anxiety as inhibited flight seems to me to have captured an important aspect of the problem.

Second, we may have to distinguish between dangers to life and limb, i.e., to physical existence, on the one hand, and dangers to the level of narcissistic gratification on the other,—to dis-

tinguish between dangers to the *existence* of the ego and dangers to its *libidinal satiation.* The danger of losing love has both implications at an early age; later, it belongs only to the second category. So does, at any time, the danger of castration.

Fear of dangers to the libidinal satiation of the ego, to its narcissistic level, i.e., fear of libidinal dangers, seems to take on some of the characteristics of sexuality; where the dangers are sexual in nature, the fear assumes the quality of sexual excitation. In such cases, the reaction to danger seems less realistic, less adaptive, than in the reaction to dangers to pure existence not involving sexual implications; this would be in accordance with the fundamental psychoanalytic principle that it is the sexual drives which disturb the business of adaptation.

Finally, there is the possibility of sexualization of the fear itself. The warning signal has then been turned into a source of sexual enjoyment or has become an object of sexual play, and its original adaptive function has been totally subverted.

We would thus have to make these distinctions: the simple case of a *danger signal* unaccompanied by sensations of fear and releasing the impulses toward appropriate action; the appearance of a sensation of fear where immediate motor activity is obstructed by external or internal obstacles, i.e., *consciousness as a consequence of motor inhibition,* with a biological function in the case of remote dangers; the enlargement of the concept of danger from the threat to existence to the threat of *libidinal* frustration, a consequence, probably, of the greater abundance in the higher forms of life and the more developed cultures of men; and the actual *sexualization* of fear itself. While the first layer appears as an inescapable necessity of survival, the second and third fulfil biological functions under certain circumstances but can also be inexpedient or pathological; the fourth and last is purely pathological or, at the very least, a *liaison dangéreuse.*[6]

III. DEFENSE MECHANISMS

In another area, that of defense mechanisms, Freud's seminal

[6] Allusion to the 18th century novel under this title, by Choderlos de Laclos.

ideas have led to a rich harvest which was brought in mainly by Anna Freud. The ground for a psychoanalysis of defense mechanisms, and of psychoanalytic ego psychology in general, was laid by the realization that not only instinctual drives but also parts of the ego and superego are unconscious. It had at first been assumed that only drives were unconscious and that they were so because they conflict with the ideas and aspirations of the conscious personality. Since psychoanalysis is the psychology of the unconscious, it appeared that its concern was with the otherwise neglected or denied instinctual drives. This did not mean that there was no need for a psychology of the ego but merely that psychoanalysis, as a psychology of the unconscious, was not concerned with it; it was the business of what was then called academic psychology, i.e., conscious psychology. It was first in The Ego and the Id that Freud stated clearly that parts of the ego were unconscious, too,[7] and that they were so because of their connection with repressed drives, through something like 'guilt by association'. One cannot securely repress an idea and yet be aware of having repressed it because this awareness would set the mind on search and so keep the repression insecure. In The Ego and the Id Freud made the point particularly with reference to that 'differentiating grade within the ego' which he had first called ego ideal and which he now called superego; Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety applied it to ego activities in the narrower sense of the word.

While this development led to the conclusion that the ego was not the exclusive domain of the conscious psychologist but, in some aspects, an object of legitimate concern for the

[7] Against this it may be held that Freud referred to defense as unconscious in one of his earliest papers: '. . . symptoms arose through the psychical mechanism of (unconscious) defence—that is, in an attempt to repress an incompatible idea which had come into distressing opposition to the patient's ego' *(2,* p. 162*)*.

But the unconsciousness of defense was then neither explained nor elaborated and applied in theory and technique and Freud referred more than twenty-five years later to unconscious guilt feelings as a 'new discovery' *(4,* p. 27*)*. Thus, while the passage proves that the idea was present, or germinating, in Freud's mind, it can hardly be maintained that it was already part of psychoanalysis as a common and communicable body of knowledge or theory

psychoanalyst as student of the unconscious, another innovation, made more specifically in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety, pointed the way toward the study of the defense mechanisms. *Abwehr* (defense) was Freud's first term for what he later called repression; and the later word, more plastic as a description of the process and more appealing to the imagination, made the earlier term dispensable; it disappeared from the literature. Freud now suggested that repression, while probably the most important of the 'processes that have the same purpose—namely, the protection of the ego against instinctual demands . . .' *(5,* p. 164*)*—was not the only one; there were others such as isolation, undoing, reaction-formation, or regression. Freud therefore proposed to reactivate the discarded term, to call it back to active duty, as it were, but as a generic term covering all these techniques, with repression being but one member of the class.

These two innovations—the (partial) unconsciousness of the ego and the existence of a variety of responses to instinctual challenges—together opened the way to the psychoanalysis of the defense mechanisms which Anna Freud pursued with so much success *(1)*.

The defense mechanisms have become very popular, not only in psychoanalysis and psychiatry but also in allied professions such as social work and education. We can often hear that a person's 'defenses' have been elucidated in a brief contact, in fact, in a few interviews.

Walter Rathenau said once that popularity is usually based on misunderstanding; the popularity of the defense mechanisms seems to be based on *two*. First, 'defense' is widely believed to refer to the ways in which people protect themselves against pain and frustration in social relations[8] and to the stratagems and ruses which they apply in the struggle for existence and

[8] Cf., for instance, the following statement by Kardiner: '. . . his daughter Anna rediscovered the *adaptive* devices described by her father in 1900, but which since that time had enjoyed a position exterritorial to the theory. *They were now called mechanisms of defense' (9,* p. 87, Italics added*)*.

the jockeying for position—in short, the devices described and studied by Alfred Adler and his (conscious or unconscious) followers. The second assumption is that by focusing on these defenses, attention is deflected from the manifestations of sexuality which psychoanalysts had so long emphasized.

But both these assumptions rest on misunderstanding. The defense mechanisms of Freud or Anna Freud are not stratagems in the competitive struggle of the market place; they are responses to inner dangers. And since these inner dangers stem from the demands of instinctual drives, the occupation with them cannot detract attention from the instinctual drives against which these mechanisms defend, and cannot play down the importance of instinctual drives for human pathology and human destiny.

Pasteur and Koch found microbial carriers of disease and so became the founders of the science of bacteriology. It was at first believed that contact with these microorganisms was not only a necessary but a sufficient condition of disease, that prophylaxis lay in avoiding such contact, and that therapy would be found in the destruction of these microorganisms. It was learned later that clinical disease depended not only on the presence of the respective bacteria or viruses but also on the condition of the host organism and that the control of microbial disease involved complex questions of balance; these experiences gave rise to the science of immunology. But this development did not mean that one could now forget about the invading microorganisms; it merely meant that those working with infectious diseases and concerned about their control had to study and to consider *both* the invaders and the responses of the host.

Anna Freud's work dealt with defense *mechanisms,* i.e., with the stereotyped, or automatic, responses of the ego. They represent a kind of fixation of the ego, analogous to the fixations of the libido. They are standardized, repetitive, and thus in some degree predictable. Moreover, as Anna Freud could show, each individual uses only a limited number of defense mecha-

nisms and behaves in accordance with these patterns in dealing with his affects too. It is for these reasons that defense mechanisms are characteristic for an individual—as characteristic as his libidinal fixations and sexual fantasies.

The psychoanalysis of an individual is then no longer merely the study of the vicissitudes of his drives, supplemented by a study of the dangers to which he is particularly geared, but also the study of his specific responses to dangers.

This brought a new attitude to resistances in analysis. Resistance, as the name suggests, had hitherto been looked upon only as an obstacle, as that which interferes with the progress of analysis, and, hence, as something which has to be removed or conquered.

This statement is in need of some qualifications, though. First, it was well recognized that resistances are necessary and that results achieved without encountering sizable resistances, with patients always gladly coöperating, will turn out to be ephemeral; they are, as Freud was to formulate it later, 'written on water' *(6,* p. 241*)*. It was therefore said that 'the overcoming of these resistances is the essential function of analysis' *(3,* p. 291*)*.

It was also known that resistances could lead to valuable information as Freud said close to the passage just quoted:

> Resistances of this kind should not be one-sidedly condemned. They include so much of the most important material from the patient's past and bring it back in so convincing a fashion that they become some of the best supports of the analysis if a skilful technique knows how to give them the right turn *(3,* p. 291*)*.

Thus, the information which Freud at this point credited resistance with bringing to light is material from the patient's past, not the working of the ego; as far as the latter is concerned, Freud says a few sentences later:

> . . . that what is being mobilized for fighting against the alterations we are striving for are character-traits, attitudes of the ego. In this connection we discover that these character-traits

> were formed in relation to the determinants of the neurosis and in reaction against its demands, and we come upon traits which cannot normally emerge, or not to the same extent, and which may be described as latent. . . . We are aware that these resistances are bound to come to light; in fact we are dissatisfied if we cannot provoke them clearly enough and are unable *to demonstrate them to the patient* (*3*, p. 291, Italics added).

Hence, the manifestation of the 'character-traits' is necessary not in order to be able to study their mechanism and to follow its pattern throughout the patient's life but in order to demonstrate them to the patient with a view to his overcoming them.

Finally, the means of overcoming resistances had changed in the course of time, from the *authoritarian* approach of hypnosis in the cathartic era over the *democratic* approach of gentle persuasion through the use of positive transference to the *indirect* approach of analyzing the motives or the historical prototypes of the resistance. But with all that, the goal had remained the same, viz., to overcome them

With Anna Freud's innovation, however, it appears that resistances—or, more precisely, resistances of repression—were important communications about the standard operating procedures of the ego.

This outlook added a new dimension to analytic work. It also meant that the analyst has to take 'his stand at a point equidistant from the id, the ego and the superego' (*1*, p. 30), a principle which gave to the old principle of analytic neutrality a new and deeper meaning.

Together, these changes amounted to an enrichment and refinement of analytic technique as great as the consideration of specific dangers had been.

A decade later, Freud summed up the whole development as follows:

> . . . the patient repeats these modes of reaction during the work of analysis as well . . . he produces them before our eyes, as it were. In fact, it is only in this way that we get to know

> them. This does not mean that they make analysis impossible. On the contrary, they constitute half of our analytic task. The other half, the one which was first tackled by analysis in its early days, is the uncovering of what is hidden in the id. During the treatment *our therapeutic work is constantly swinging backwards and forwards like a pendulum between a piece of id-analysis and a piece of ego-analysis (6,* p. 238, Italics added).

There still remains the task of drafting a systematic theory of defenses—a comprehensive map of the defense mechanisms, their typical chronology, their dependence on inherited reaction patterns and postnatal experience. The following may perhaps be suggested as preliminary considerations.

There is, first, the strong impression that defense mechanisms show different degrees of complexity, from the apparent simplicity of repression to the intricate complexity of a mechanism such as, for instance, 'altruistic surrender'. That suggests that some of the defense mechanisms may be composites, built out of more elementary building stones.

Second, repression does not seem to be just one mechanism among many, on an equal footing with the others, but seems to have a particularly important position inasmuch as repression —or something similar to it—accompanies all other defense mechanisms. It is the omnipresent mainstay of the show while the others are accidental, appearing in some cases and lacking in others. It is not for nothing that it has exclusively occupied the analyst's attention for so long. Thus, for instance, reaction-formation is actually repression of certain drives *plus* emphasis on the opposite of the repressed drives as a means of counter-cathexis; altruistic surrender is repression of certain drives *plus* identification with a person who can indulge with impunity in the satisfaction of the desires one has ostracized in oneself or whom one has actively maneuvered into this role—an instinctual gratification through identification, freed from guilt feelings because of personal abdication.

It thus appears that defensive mechanisms can be mapped according to *three coördinates.* There is, first, one aspect that is

never missing: an operation which *evicts* the representatives of the dangerous drive *from consciousness*—either radically as in repression or only partially as in isolation. They can be compared with different methods of censorship—one taking the entire issue of a periodical out of circulation, the other merely cutting out some passages or words from an offending article. Some analysts including myself think that there is an even less radical way of eliminating from consciousness, viz., the articulate denial.

These are ways of blotting out awareness—more or less radical, more or less effective.

Then, two other aspects have to be considered: the *channeling* of the warded-off drive into some kind of substitute gratification—as the new aim in the case of displacement, or the identification with those to whom everything is permitted (one might say: *quod non licet bovi licet Jovi*)—and a particular kind of *countercathexis* such as the overcultivation of the opposite in reaction-formation or a magical ritual in undoing.

These appear to be the three aspects of defense mechanisms and the latter can be defined by indicating, (a) the particular way or degree of ouster from consciousness, (b) the type of countercathexis, and (c) the kind—if any—of rechanneling of forces.

SUMMARY

This, then, is the rough balance sheet. Equality of id and ego have long become part and parcel of psychoanalytic thought and psychoanalysts try to distinguish between drive and ego aspect in various psychic activities, without much thought that it could be otherwise. All the time, however, whether teleological concepts are *ultimate*ly satisfactory remains in doubt as it always has been and, I am afraid, is likely to remain.

Id and ego are handled today in a more schematic fashion than Freud had intended them to be. The revision of the theory of (neurotic) anxiety and the realization of a variety of defense

mechanisms have borne rich fruit and have changed the outlook and the practice of psychoanalysis. The attempt to construct a unified theory of anxiety, encompassing both anxiety as a consequence of dammed-up libido and anxiety as a signal in danger, has not been successful, and most analysts do not feel a need for such a unified theory in the first place because they do not believe in the existence of the first type of anxiety. However, there seem to be relations between anxiety, or at least its more pathological manifestations, and sexuality, and the theory should give an account of these relations; the concept of sexualized anxiety, developed later, is an important contribution in this direction but does not, in my opinion, exhaust the subject of the relations between anxiety and sexuality.

On a number of other points, Freud's ideas have been quietly accepted and become noncontroversial parts of the clinical theory of psychoanalysis. I would mention in this group the theory of inhibitions as due either to a sexualization of an ego function or to a need for self-punishment or to a general impoverishment through absorption by an inner process. There are also points in which Freud's suggestions have as yet not been given sufficient thought; I would mention among them the role of countercathexis in pain, both physical and mental.

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Theoretical Considerations of Ego Regression and Ego Functions in Creativity

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THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF EGO REGRESSION AND EGO FUNCTIONS IN CREATIVITY

BY PHILIP WEISSMAN, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Regression in the service of the ego has become an important criterion for differentiating creative from pathological psychic activity. But is this criterion an accurate or adequate estimation of the *modus operandi* of the ego in creative inspirations? I shall attempt to show that controlled regression in the service of the ego, as a theoretical and clinical formulation, has as many, if not more, limitations than other broad assessments of ego activity ascribed to other psychic states.[1]

My contention is that controlled regression in the service of the ego should be replaced by more detailed statements on the specific ego functions. A more serious problem confronts us in the evaluation of the state of the ego and its function in the creative process. It is a presumptive assessment to state that a controlled regression in the service of the ego takes place during inspiration when we have not as yet specified which specific functions or what specific parts of the ego might be regressively involved. This study attempts to show that a dissociative or desynthesizing function, as I shall call it, along with the synthetic or integrative functions of the ego, constitute a more definitive approximation of nonregressive ego functioning in creativity.

Read before the Southern California Psychoanalytic Society, in Los Angeles, March 1966, and at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, in Atlantic City, May 1966.

[1] Freud stated that obsessional neurosis is characterized by a precocity of ego development *(3)*. While this assessment of precocious development of the ego in obsessional neurosis had been useful, Hartmann criticized the unmodified concepts of precocious and retarded ego development. He felt it would be 'useful to replace the global use of terms like "precocious" or "retarded" ego development by more detailed statements on what ego functions have actually undergone a precocious or retarded development in relation to their drives and in relation to one another' *(8)*.

While controlled regression has not been dissected into its ego components, creativity—one of the few fields in which we may study this special type of ego functioning—has been subdivided into inspiration and elaboration.[2] In current ego psychology controlled regression in the service of the ego is applicable to inspiration but not to elaboration. The ego in elaboration operates without regressing and is in much the same state it would be in during ordinary work *(11)*. In spite of these established distinctions between inspiration and elaboration and because of other psychological determinants, there remains a strong tendency unconsciously to confuse the total creative process with inspiration and regression.[3] Hartmann, for example, writes, 'But we also find instances of successful adaptation achieved by way of regression. These comprise many examples of the activity of the imagination; a further illustration is afforded by artistic activity' *(9,* p. 13*)*. This statement implies that the total creative act, like inspiration itself, operates under the guise of a controlled regression in the service of the ego.

This tendency may be further illustrated in the writings of Kris, who is in the forefront of current advances in ego psychology, especially in its different applications to inspiration and elaboration in creative processes. Kris states, 'Inspiration—in which the ego controls the primary process and puts it into its service—needs to be contrasted with the opposite, the psychotic condition in which the ego is overwhelmed by the primary process. The difference [between inspiration and the psychotic process] is clearest where the relation to the public is concerned' *(11,* p. 60*)*.

[2] According to Arlow and Brenner, '. . . controlled ego regressions are essential to the enjoyment of art and humor, of play, of sexual relations, and to inspiration and creative activity in general' *(1)*.

[3] Inspiration had been viewed by Plato as a state of 'creative' madness and a divine release from the ordinary state of man. In the earlier history of civilization as well as in the early history of psychoanalysis, creativity was exclusively equated with inspiration whereas elaboration was underestimated or overlooked. Creativity was then considered by Freud to reflect the artist's 'flexibility in repression' *(4)*.

Kris has unintentionally compared inspiration with the psychotic process when he apparently intends to compare the total creative state with the psychotic one. The unconscious substitution of inspiration for creativity is most glaring when he suggests that the difference between inspiration and the psychotic condition is clearest 'where the relation to the public is concerned'. Immediately following, in the next paragraph wherein he elaborates the distinction between the two 'for the public', he never again mentions inspiration but appropriately calls it the creative process or the artist's work.

If we pursue Kris' slip in substituting inspiration for creation, as he investigates the latter's relation to the public, it may help us to come upon the more subjective and psychological reasons why creativity is so often consciously or unconsciously referred to as inspiration. The public reacts subjectively to an æsthetic work with an 'inspirational' response. There is an automatic tendency to project this inspirational response to the given work onto its creator as the exclusive state of the artist during the creative process. While the projection of the audience's inspirational response is minimally accurate about the creator's inspired state, it does not acknowledge the efforts, struggles, and stringencies of creative elaboration. Thus when the audience 'loves' a creative work, its identification with the creator is similar to the identification with the loved object in the act of falling in love, wherein the object is overvalued and exclusively assigned the exaggerated qualities which the loving one has experienced.[4]

Not only can we now better comprehend Kris' unconscious equation of the part (inspiration) and the whole (creation), but we can well expect from less critical and analytic minds a larger tendency toward similar erroneous condensations of the nature of the creative process. It is the frequent condensation of creativity into inspiration, plus the paucity of statements on the role of ego functioning in the totality of artistic activity,

[4] Freud (*5*) described the pitfalls awaiting the biographer who is in love with his subject—often enough a creative artist.

which have contributed to the unassailed position assigned to controlled regression in the service of the ego as the hallmark of creativity. It would be less erroneous to consider whether in creativity the phenomenon of the emerging drive content takes place under a controlled regression of the ego.

Kris *(11)* contends that the inspirational aspect of creativity reflects the primary process mode of emergence of the id material into consciousness. This controlled inundation of the ego would naturally invite a comparison to the uncontrolled primary process flooding of the regressed ego with id derivatives in pathological mental states. However, the conditions and circumstances under which inspirational activity takes place are varied and diversified. The emergence of drive content usable for creative purposes has been known to occur to creative minds not only during sleep and within dreams, but during wakeful activities varying from a conscious search for inspiration to inexplicable eruptions during work, play, conversation, and other nonspecific activities. Creative people are wont to have optimal emergence of inspirational content under the most individual and, to themselves, surprising circumstances *(12)*.

We are, in fact, hard pressed to find any deviant state of mental activity in the artist during which the emergence of inspiration content would not be possible. Such content may optimally appear in different creative individuals during states of elation or depression, during states of and remissions from other psychoses, addiction, and physical illness. It is difficult if not impossible to comprehend how all these unlimited variations of mental states, which often reflect in themselves severe unmodifiable regressive ego states can be favorable for a simultaneous controlled regression in the service of the ego. It is also difficult to comprehend how the additional confrontation of the ego with more directly discharged id material can transform an already uncontrolled state of ego regression into a controlled one.

One of the main justifications for considering the mental state to be a regressive one during creative inspirational activity is the passive emergence of primary process drive discharge into con-

sciousness. But we should consider a number of relevant phenomena in which passive entry of drive cathexis into consciousness may occur without a concomitant regression of the ego.

The well-known phenomenon of the return of the repressed has been understood to occur because of the intensity of drive cathexis which at a given moment can overcome ego censorship. This does not require a regression of the ego. The return of the repressed, for example, often contains id derivatives usable in creative inspirational states.

Psychoanalytic writings on creative imagination frequently demonstrate that the same id material in varying inspirational content appears and reappears at different times in a creative mind. Many studies show the common source of drive cathexis of these inspirational emergences, albeit their external presenting form disguises their origin with past and future inspirations. In my studies of dramatists *(17, 18)* I found that the cathected derivatives of the inspirational material for a play have often been the same as those that are operating in the dramatist's personal life. The id derivatives may also enter consciousness repetitively under the guise of the return of the repressed. When it is used for creative purposes, the cathected inspirational content is controlled and put into the service of the ego. But none of this constitutes a regression either in its use for a creation or in its abuse for purposes of acting out. Elsewhere I have quoted Shaw's statement that he would abort his personal enactment and instead create a play about it *(18)*. This was his inspiration for Pygmalion.

Having contended that repressed id content can re-enter the ego for inspirational creative purposes without ego regression, let us examine how it can be directed and controlled in the service of the ego for creative goals without ego regression. Using the example of Shaw, where personal enactment was transformed into creative activity, we might consider what ego function or functions could be involved in such a process.

The alteration from personal enactment to creative enactment can be ascribed to the dissociative function of the ego. Beres

(2) showed that the capacity for dissociation, first suggested by Glover *(6),* is a predominant feature of ego functioning in the creative process. Kris confirmed this finding and, in addition, suggested that the more creative the artist, the greater the dissociation between his personal life and his creation *(13).* Greenacre suggested that the artist has a 'creative self' and a more 'conventional self' *(7).* Such splits in 'self-presentation' and sense of identity can be attributed to the dissociative function as defined here.

In structural terms, the dissociative or desynthesizing function may be viewed as the ego's capacity to dissociate itself from its established object relationships and responses to specific id derivatives and superego demands. Libidinal and aggressive derivatives entering consciousness during any given creative period of dissociative functioning are not subject to their characteristic fate at the hands of the ego (defenses and functions) or under the established governing principles of the superego's prohibitions and ideals.

Questions could be raised as to the nature of the dissociative function. Is it a special endowment for creative people? If not, how does the dissociative function operate in noncreative people and when do we see it in early human development? In answer to the last question, I suggest that the dissociative or desynthesizing function develops at the early stage of the conflict between the established pleasure principle and the developing reality principle. Its earliest function is to disrupt the established patterns that existed under the pleasure principle and to permit the reality principle to establish new modifications.[5] Subse-

[5] The early appearance in psychic life of the dissociative function as well as its *modus operandi* suggest that it may be closely allied to what Peto called the fragmentizing function of the ego *(15, 16).* Peto concerns himself with the fragmentizing function in connection with the vicissitudes of the drives and object relationships in both developmental and pathological states. Another shared feature of these two functions is their intimate continuity with the synthetic or integrative function of the ego. Further study may lead to the evaluation that the dissociative and fragmentizing functions of the ego are one and the same.

quently, the dissociative function precedes the integration of each new stage of ego functioning as well as each new stage of superego formation. Scrutinized more closely, the dissociative function re-emerges during phases of structural development to disrupt the established order, which had been brought about by differentiating and integrative functions *(10),* to make way for the ensuing forms of more mature integrated functions and structures.

This is not to say that one never uses the dissociative function once psychological growth and development have been completed. In the lives of adults new undertakings or adventures which constitute a revolutionary change from an existing life, such as one of business, profession, or marriage, are undertaken in the presence of the dissociative function which first must disrupt what has been established.

Applied to the creative person, the dissociative function re-emerges whenever he is in search of a creative state. The dissociative function liberates him from his customary mode of operation and permits emerging drive-derived cathexis to new treatment by the ego and the superego. It is probable that the dissociative function (rather than ego regression) is receptive to the new id-derived cathexis available to the ego. This constitutes the optimal state of the ego for creative inspirational activity.

It might be argued that the dissociative function is a regressive phenomenon since it is disruptive and disorganizing in nature and is derived from the earliest stages of ego development. If this were granted, the term, dissociative (or desynthesizing) function, would still be more precise than the general term, regression in the service of the ego. However, certain characteristics of the dissociative function make it ill-advised to consider it a regressive phenomenon. The functionless destructive nature of regression stands apart from the disruptive and disorganizing qualities of the dissociative function which is intimately associated with the synthetic function. The constant reappearance of the dissociative function as a condition for maturation and de-

velopment or for inspiration and elaboration in creative activity, aided by the synthetic function of the ego, distinguishes the dissociative function from regression which does not promote utilization of the synthetic function. Rather, it generally disturbs the established functions while fixing and restricting the ego to earlier reinstinctualized stages of functioning.

The utilization of the early developed and 'primitive' dissociative function does not in itself constitute a regressive state of affairs. Arlow and Brenner point out that primitive forms of ego functioning 'exist as a rule alongside the more mature forms of functioning, and under the appropriate circumstances they may come to dominate the operation of one or more parts of the mental apparatus' *(1)*. The early development of the dissociative function as well as its lifelong potential availability helps to explain why the creative process may emerge in the very young as well as the old individual. It is the domination of the dissociative function in creative activity which results in more rapid availability of drive cathexis to the creative ego. There is no evidence that this increased availability of drive cathexis during a creative state is necessarily a primary process discharge from the id. Nor is there any evidence that newly available drive cathexis in creative activity is in danger if left uncontrolled, that it will lead to pathological regression. In current ego psychology regression is not measured in terms of large quantitative shifts in drive cathexis with which the ego may have to contend. When the primary process drive discharge contaminates the ego functions and these functions are reinstinctualized, as in schizophrenia, then we can speak of a true regression. Thus an early developed so-called primitive ego function such as the dissociative function need not be considered regressive so long as it operates as a stabilized, neutralized autonomous function. Similarly, the newly released drive cathexis made available by the dissociative function in creativity is quite apart from the primary process content that becomes regressively available as a result of a weakening or disintegration of ego functions.

Rather than regression in the service of the ego, the ego in creativity utilizes its dissociative function in the service of the synthetic function.[6] In a noncreative individual the dissociative function is in the service of integrating maturer development in new undertakings. In the creative person it is in the service of synthesizing his highest capacity—creative activity.[7]

There are, of course, instances, leading to pathological states, in which the dissociative function does not operate in the service of the synthetic function. Fugue states, characterized by a departure from established behavior and existence, may be due to the dissociative function of the ego. In fugue states the established self and object representation may be irreparably disrupted by the dissociative function of the ego. In creative states the disruption of self and object representation is replaced under the guidance of the synthetic function into new arrangements. Object relations in creative people are more flexible and will be discussed in relation to the artist's love affair with the world under the dissociative and synthetic functions of his ego. Depersonalization and feelings of unreality are additional examples of uncontrolled dissociative functioning of the ego wherein the established cathexis is withdrawn from the self and external objects respectively.

Theoretically, one might contend that most psychotic states represent a disruption of established normal functioning brought about by the dissociative function. It may also be argued that all ego regressions are under the influence of the dissociative function without the re-enforcement of synthetic function. But this is beyond the scope of present considerations. What is pertinent is whether psychotics capable of creative activity, aided by the synthetic function, directly utilize id material

[6] Nunberg was well aware of the significance of the synthetic function of the ego in creative activity *(14)*. He concludes, 'Under the influence of this synthetic faculty he [man] creates that which is socially valuable (in science, art, etc.) . . .' .

[7] This could explain why creative people may appear to be relatively immature and different. It is as if their dissociative and synthetic functions are more directed at new original solutions and have little interest in, or disregard, maturer, established solutions.

released by the pre-existing regressive psychotic state for creative purposes. Or, does the established psychotic regression require further modification by the dissociative function of the ego before it can be synthesized for creative functioning? Since our main theme is ego functioning in creativity, it seems logical to conclude that the dissociative function, or a regressive equivalent, may operate with the synthetic function in the creative activities of psychotics, as it does with other creative persons. This would imply that psychotics may achieve a respite from a psychotic regression during creative activity due to the effects of the dissociative function.

If we are to consider the role of the dissociative and synthetic functions of the ego as a more definitive assessment of ego activity in creativity than controlled regression in the service of the ego, we must view these functions more specifically in relation to inspiration and elaboration—the two major features of creative activity. In contrast to the established view that regression in the service of the ego is more applicable to inspiration and less so to elaboration, it is my impression that the dissociative and synthetic functions are utilized in both inspiration and elaboration. We consider the two aspects of creative activity to be thoroughly enmeshed in actual operation. They are separated here only for theoretical consideration.

In psychoanalytic formulations on creativity, elaboration has been equated with ordinary work and inspiration alone reflects the creative spirit. Kris writes, 'The second [the phase of elaboration] has many features in common with what characterizes "work"—dedication and concentration. . . . But wherever art reaches a certain level, inspiration is at work' *(12)*. Kris does not account for the fact that the work in creative elaboration, like inspirational activity, aims at new and original solutions. Ordinary work, on the other hand, mainly aims for existing solutions. It should also be noted that Kris considers the dedication of ordinary work and creative work to be the same. Ordinary work may occasionally, but not usually, reflect dedication. When ordinary work has the quality of dedication, the psycho-

logical source of the dedication is derived from the worker's superego and ego ideals. Creative work seems to derive its dedication from its essence, not from the artist's morality. The artist's creation may well reflect a highly moral point of view, but this does not mean that he used a moral dedication to create the moral product. It is well known that if a creative artist is 'dedicated' it is because he is driven in his artistic work, but these ego attitudes are rarely transferable to ordinary work.

Other differences between creative and ordinary work may be expressed in current terms of ego functions. In ordinary work the synthetic function operates without the dissociative function and produces established, useful solutions. In creative work the synthetic function is re-enforced by the dissociative function. Their combined functions hold in abeyance the established solutions, thus permitting new, original ones to be synthesized.

Referring to Kris' statement that the level of art is more reflected by inspiration than elaboration, it is well known that Shakespeare's plays were often rewritten plots of earlier dramatists, yet his elaboration of old themes transcends the highest levels of artistic creation. This is in keeping with the concepts of ego functioning in creativity suggested above. Both inspiration and elaboration utilize the dissociative and synthetic functions for creative goals. Here inspiration is distinguished only by the new availability of id-derived cathexis. The higher artistic evaluation for inspiration suggested by Kris is in keeping with current tastes and standards in modern art which searches man's inner life and thus is more accessible through the primary process content of inspiration

In addition to regression in the service of his ego, the artist has been viewed as having the capacity for special object relationships as reflected in his love affair with the world *(7)*. There has been no effort to tie together the artist's capacity for regression in the service of the ego and his capacity for a love affair with the world. Perhaps this has been due more to avoidance than neglect, since a simultaneous consideration of these contributing attributes to creative activity does not suggest a co-

hesive correlation or coördination of their roles in the creative person. This insular state of affairs is due, in part, to the inadequacy of the assessment of regression in the service of the ego in the creative process.

In contrast, the artist's love affair with the world can be better understood when it is considered from the orientation of the dissociative and synthetic functions as essential to creativity. As originally formulated by Greenacre the artist's love affair with the world implies that more libidinal cathexis was often attached to a potential collective object than to a personal one. The artist is uniquely capable of displacing his libidinal interest in a personal object onto a collective one. If we view the collective object as unique and nonestablished when compared to the more usual personal object, then the detachment of libido from the established object may be considered to be under the sway of the dissociative or desynthesizing function. The re-investment of the libido onto a new and original object, the collective one, operates under the combined activity of the dissociative and synthetic functions. The artist's personal and creative identities have already been ascribed to the combined activities of the dissociative and synthetic functions. In creative persons the dissociative and synthetic functions not only disrupt established solutions and synthesize new ones, but they also can suspend established self-representations and object relationships and synthesize new and original ones, such as the creative self and the collective object. The artist's love affair is brought about by creative dissociative and synthetic ego functions.

Finally, the dissociative and synthetic functions of the ego are not the exclusive functions involved in the creative process. For example, the creator's identification with the audience plays a considerable role in shaping his creative efforts. My emphasis on the dissociative and synthetic functions is only intended to replace implicit ego functions, that remain unspecified in the formulation of controlled regression in the service of the ego, with explicit ego functions.

While this study has taken general issue with controlled re-

gression in the service of the ego, the more specific issue centers around its validity and applicability to creativity. It is said that controlled regression in the service of the ego is also essential to the enjoyment of art, humor, play, and sexual relations *(1)*. Such a special regression may be required for these various enjoyments. However, further investigation and validation are essential to substantiate this as the most succinct formulation. It remains perplexing how the complex act of creativity, often enough a painful experience, came to be considered an 'ego bedfellow' with the above-mentioned so-called regressive pleasures of the 'good life'.

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Spider Phobias

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SPIDER PHOBIAS

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Spider symbolism has received some attention as a means for externalizing conflicts involving fears of phallic castration by an aggressive mother. Another feature of spider symbolism is that the spider may represent the fearful, pregenital, orally incorporating mother. The transference fantasies of some patients reveal many symbolic similarities between the silent, hidden, watchful, waiting spider and the analyst. It is the purpose of this presentation to enlarge upon the transference implications of spider symbolism and its oral nature.

CASE I

The main conflicts of a successful young businessman were manifest in multiple spider phobias. Although he had an active fantasy life, with frequent visualizations of human-sized spiders, at no time was he psychotic. With the development of a transference neurosis he became convinced at times that I was a spider about to devour him.

The patient's main problem centered on fear of separation from his mother and was evidenced by a constant dread of death: 'If she lives, I die; if I die, she lives'. As punishment for his angry feelings toward his parents, he was convinced that he would be reincarnated as a spider and be forced to remember that he was once a human being. Then, as a spider, he would have to endure the torment of either being crunched by his mother's fingers or squashed under his father's foot. At times during treatment he feared that a spider would drop down from the ceiling and devour him. This fear was increased by his belief that during sleep his mouth would open and a spider drop in, and he would have to spit it out. At one point he felt that spiders could represent all his fears.

The patient's mother appeared to be a borderline psychotic. She was sloppy and careless in her attire and centered her ma-

ternal interest in the patient, despite three other children. Because of her aggressive overprotectiveness, the patient described her as the 'Chief Warrior'. She was overly attentive to see that he was not harmed by insects. Whenever she could, she would squeeze insects to death and then inform the patient that she had saved him from certain harm. When he was an infant she often told him she loved him so much she could 'eat him up'; yet she complained that his demands were so excessive that they would kill her.

The patient's most vivid childhood memory occurred when he was about five. One day his mother terrified him by dramatically revealing to him for the first time her new false teeth. All he could see were the new teeth. He screamed, 'Get away from me!'. Overcome with terror and panic, he imagined for the first time that she was a spider who would bite him. Subsequently, whenever he saw her dentures in the night receptacle, he felt them to be alive.

Spiders were symbolic of many of the patient's fears, particularly of his mother as the feared oral aggressive object. He could not forget a science fiction movie entitled The Fly. In this movie a scientist was transformed into a fly but retained his human head. The movie ended as this human fly was helplessly caught in the spider's web, about to be devoured by a slowly approaching, terrifying, eight-eyed, eight-legged spider.

The development of this spider phobia clearly demonstrates how the feared mother can be symbolized. In this case, the initial fear of separation from the mother involved primitive pregenital oral conflicts, that is, to eat or to be eaten. Although the spider represented the dominating, castrating mother, it was the symbolic object of a sadistic oral attacker that most terrified the patient. Therefore, it was not surprising that the development of the mother transference caused the patient to fear the therapist as he would a spider. In addition to various symbolic meanings, the spider phobia was utilized defensively by the patient to avoid experiencing the transference affect. In associating to the theme of the inverted œdipus com-

plex, the patient revealed that at times the spider was also symbolic of his father.

CASE II

The basic problem of a middle-aged man suffering from an extremely severe obsessive compulsive neurosis was his inability to deal with his fear of and hostility toward his mother. While working through the mother transference toward the end of his treatment, he described his feeling of being trapped by his mother and 'being lured into her trap'. At this point the analyst asked, 'Have you ever feared spiders?' Amazed at the question, he said, 'I didn't realize until you just mentioned it, but I have had a fear of spiders all my life'. He seemed puzzled that he had not mentioned this before.

He feared that if he touched a spider he would be poisoned by it without being bitten. Today, if he must kill a house spider, he is overly fearful of the act. Through his associations to spiders he gained additional insight into his dread of displeasing his mother. 'When I think of a spider, I think of my mother. She will eat me and suck me up, and then I will be nothing. I will be submerged into her.'

When trying to picture a spider, he could see only its hairy legs; yet there was something in between which he could not picture. That which was in between would suck him dry. 'I can see only the hairy legs. I feel like they are going to wrap themselves around me like an octopus and suck me in. At other times, they will just squeeze me. At times when my wife puts her arms around me, I have to push her away quickly for fear I will be smothered.'

This fear of being sucked seemed familiar. He fantasied that as a child he had probably seen his mother naked and imagined that she would suck him up into her genital area. It was both a wish and fear to be back in the genitals. 'This seems like the ultimate fear, the living death, yet it would equal security. I have feelings of wanting to devour my mother's breast, but her genitals have a mouth and will devour me. Recently I have

had difficulty maintaining an erection during intercourse with my wife. My wife reminds me of many hairy-legged creatures, like a spider. I am afraid that she will encircle, overwhelm me, swallow me up.' While engaging in mutual oral contact with his wife, he fantasied, 'She will suck me up, and kill me while I am killing her'.

This case demonstrates that the fear of spiders can originate in both oral and phallic phases of development.

CASE III

An elderly male biologist was neurotically depressed and plagued by much guilt. He ruminated over his mother's suicide, blaming himself for her death. His fantasies revealed that the only way he felt he could survive was to overproduce, to placate his mother so she would not destroy him.

During the height of the mother transference, he would come into the office looking me over very carefully before he would sit down and reluctantly use the couch. He said that I reminded him of a black spider. Once he felt that I was wearing a black suit, when in reality the suit was brown. During this period of treatment he would bring candy to the hour and always offer some to me.

In an attempt to ward off his fear of oral incorporation, he frequently recalled a habit of a type of spider about which he had known. He felt that this was one of the funniest biological events he had ever encountered. A small male spider approaches the big female spider, seeking intercourse. She has a habit of getting hungry after her lovemaking and eats her lover before he can escape. Prior to his embrace, the male spider offers her a gift wrapped in the spider's silk. After lovemaking she opens the package, giving him time to escape. The funniest part of the story for this patient was that the present is usually a worthless grain of sand.

When he realized that he did not have to produce for me and could have things for himself, I no longer appeared to him as his devouring mother spider. Only in the transference was the

spider used symbolically as a means of externalizing and displacing his fears of being the object of a sadistic, orally incorporating mother.

CASE IV

Toward the end of an analytic hour, a patient described his inability to protect himself from his mother's dominating, castrating attitude. He was beginning to express his resentment for certain childhood sessions with his mother. She would take him into her room and lecture him about how he had failed her. She then would instruct him to do the impossible to please her. During this recital, the patient saw a spider crawling on my bookcase. He made no mention of it until the end of the hour, when he said, 'Well, I don't have to worry about that spider. That spider cannot harm me.' The transference implications are obvious. The patient had no further associations to spider symbolism.

CASE V

Another patient exemplifies the possible relationship of spider symbolism to masturbatory activity and beating fantasies. Unfortunately, as I saw this patient only twice I was able to get only meager association material.

He began his masturbatory practice by putting on tight feminine clothing. He would then tie a rope lightly around his waist, tie it to a beam in the ceiling, draw his legs up from the floor, suspending himself, and then wind the rope tightly around his legs. He would have preferred someone to tie his hands and beat him. While in this position, he would cause a rocking motion and have an emission. In a vague way he felt there was some relationship between this activity and an act he once had seen as a child, when he was beginning this practice. He had witnessed a spider catch a moth in her web, wrap it up with silk, and then proceed to eat it. This was sexually exciting to him.

DISCUSSION

The case material indicates that the spider may symbolize both oral and phallic fantasies. The question arises whether these fantasies are related to œdipal conflict or occur primarily during the pregenital phase of development. That is, is the conflict centered on losing the penis (castration) or on being swallowed (incorporation)?

Arlow *(2)* feels that, although pathological pregenital factors have deleterious effects on the maturation of drives, 'the œdipal phase is crucial for symptom formation because by this time there has occurred a degree of crystallization of psychic structure which is necessary for intrapsychic conflict'. Of course, without psychic conflict there can be no symptom formation. On the other hand, the Kleinian school believes that there can be pregenital pathological fantasies formed before the œdipal phase. In discussing the origin of oral fantasies following an œdipal conflict, Arlow states, 'The level of regression in such symptoms would not be to the "oral phase". It would be a typical regression to an oral fantasy which originated during the phallic (œdipal) phase. Cannibalistic fantasies derived from the phallic phase do not necessarily signify a regression or a recapitulation of the conflict or events of the oral phase.'

My observations would tend to differ with Arlow's conclusions for I found that spiders can be symbolic of many different defensive fantasies. However, it is often difficult to decide where the primary pathology originates. In the first patient (Case I), who had a lifelong problem with his mother, the spider became symbolic of many pregenital as well as phallic fantasies. This became evident in the transference when we dealt with preœdipal problems. In another paper *(12)* I discussed an example of how this patient's spider symbolism was used to deal with his separation anxiety. Another example occurred while he was working through the challenges of sibling rivalry. Rather than conceiving the analyst to be a big

hairy spider who would squeeze him to death, or a big hairy black one that would bite him, he reacted as though I were a small spider. It seemed that the spider became the symbol by which he had to deal with his unconscious fantasies during different levels of his development.

On the other hand, Case II clearly demonstrates that fear of œdipal fulfilment could lead to ambivalent, regressive, oral fantasies. His spider fears seemed primarily to represent more his fear of losing his penis by swallowing than the oral fear of total incorporation. The observations of these two patients offer evidence that the spider can be symbolic of fantasies originating in both the oral and phallic phases of development.

Consideration of transference manifestations of spider symbolism in four of these five patients demonstrates that pathological fantasies can occur in the transference situation. Case I, while attempting to avoid the various transference affects, talked about biting spiders and big spiders that would squeeze their victims, the small spiders. In Case II a latent unrevealed spider phobia, whose analysis was ultimately therapeutically valuable, came to light during the mother transference. This patient felt that I was 'trapping' him and not permitting him to express himself. A transference reaction experienced in Case III was so severe that tenuous ego boundaries resulted in a distortion of reality during one phase of the mother transference. He claimed he had to placate me, lest I pounce on him and kill him. A fleeting reference in Case IV to seeing a live spider in my office afforded additional insight into spider symbolism in the transference. The symbolic similarities of the spider and his web and the analyst and his couch were apparent.

Abraham *(1)* was the first to note that spiders symbolically may represent the wicked phallic mother who castrates by phallic attack or oral engulfing. Others *(3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 15)* have supported Abraham's emphasis on the threat of phallic castration. Sterba *(16)* related spider symbolism to aggressive conflicts about the father. Van Emden *(17)* cited the spider as

symbolizing both mother and father while Foulkes *(6)* described a woman whose spider phobia demonstrated the common bisexual nature of symbolism.

Sterba made the observation that spiders as well as vampires could symbolize the destructiveness and ambivalence inherent in the primitive oral need to love and to be loved. Thus, the loved object could be the victim of an oral attack. There seemed to be sufficient evidence that the spider could symbolize primitive oral fears as well as later castration fears. Garma *(9)*, Segal *(14)*, Schnier *(13)*, and the author *(12)* have confirmed Sterba's impressions. In three of the above references *(3, 15, 17)* mention was made of transference fantasies very similar to those cited here.

Although a number of authors have referred to spider symbolism, the actual treatment of the subject is not well elaborated in the literature. Much of the discussion is sketchy and in more general contexts; there are only three articles devoted exclusively to the subject. One of these papers *(10)*, presented to a national music fraternity, traced the origin during the Middle Ages of the well-known dance, the Tarantella, to a mass hysterical reaction induced by the feared bite of a certain tarantula spider. The only cure for tarantism, as the illness was named, was to dance uninhibitedly to a special tune.

The special phenomenon of a mass hysterical reaction is reflective of the general distaste with which people regard spiders. In The 'Uncanny' *(7)*, Freud notes that certain objects in our environment may evoke uncomfortable responses in all of us. Perhaps this is one possible explanation for the relative paucity of psychoanalytic literature on spider symbolism and the failure during analyses to more frequently obtain access to latent spider phobias. An example in point is that of a colleague who learned of my interest in spider phobias and confided that as a child he had had a spider phobia—which was not uncovered in his personal analysis. In counterphobic maneuvers, he would collect black widow spiders and kill them. Later, he developed a phobic reaction to the place where he had

collected them, fearing that if he went into that area the spiders would somehow unite and harm him for his previous acts against them.

SUMMARY

Case material suggests that the spider may serve as the vehicle of fantasies originating in both oral and phallic phases of development. Transference fantasies utilizing the symbol of the spider are presented. It is postulated that the spider may symbolize both the phallic and the oral incorporative mother.

Awareness of the ubiquitous nature of spider phobias and spider symbolism may reveal latent phobias of the patient. Increased knowledge of spider symbolism and some of its clinical manifestations may facilitate treatment.

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Language, Consciousness, and Experience

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LANGUAGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND EXPERIENCE

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There has been considerable discussion among American anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists that language may shape experience *(6, 11)*. That experience shapes language has not been seriously questioned, but this proposition seems to have less inherent interest than its counterpart. Formulations which treat language and experience as if they were separate and as if one could precede the other are lacking in that they do not identify the link *within the individual* that joins the two. I believe it may be possible to identify such a link, drawing on Freud's ideas about language as an energy discharge mechanism and that the role of language in consciousness can be utilized to identify this link.

LANGUAGE AS ENERGY DISCHARGE

During their collaboration on the treatment of hysteria, Breuer and Freud *(1)* regarded speech as a mechanism which permitted the discharge of strangulated affects while serving as a substitute for direct action. The idea of discharge was further developed by Freud in his Project for a Scientific Psychology *(3)*, where he pointed out that the earliest paradigms of language were the infant's screams of pain and want. While these are motor discharges, they also bring relief or help in the person of the mother. Thus vocalization, a mechanism for discharge of energy associated with various bodily tensions, becomes a means of social communication about these bodily states.

Throughout life language continues to serve a discharge function in addition to its function as an instrument of communication and social union. Communication is most effective where a

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speaker uses exactly those words which the community has applied to the experiences he wishes to describe. To the extent that he uses these communal tokens accurately, his verbalizations permit comparable cognitive bodily adjustments in others, they share his experience, and his communication is clear.

The discharge function of language increases in importance when stimulation or the need state of the individual is unduly high. The communicative function then suffers and the individual may begin to produce socially less pertinent verbalizations. In the more serious psychological disturbances, such as psychosis, there may be a marked loss of precision of reference and responses may be evoked in any given situation which appear irrelevant to the ordinary observer. Figuratively speaking, if the energy level of the need is too high, the channels of expression may be flooded and whatever the patient says may have the quality of a diffuse discharge as opposed to a channelized communication.

Lack of precision in reference has been variously described as primary process thought *(4)*, primitive thought *(10)*, loss of abstract attitude *(5)*, and syncretic thought *(9)*. In his use of words, the patient appears to act on the assumption that he is operating well within the social framework, that others have the same associations as he, and that they understand his meaning. This feeling that people are in tune with him, permits him a measure of gratification and security.

The psychotic use of language is supported in another way. Bodily and verbal components of experience are so intimately joined that at some point in the maturation of the individual it becomes almost impossible for him to tell whether he says 'I am happy' because he feels happy, or whether he feels happy because he says 'I am happy'. At that point the experience of the individual may be managed verbally; the hungry man who says 'I have just finished eating' may momentarily experience relief of his hunger. The disturbed individual who experiences the feeling of separation may draw upon words to establish an 'as if' relationship with people. Hunger returns with full force

to undeceive the individual who has not eaten; but many ties between people lack such obstinate reality, making it possible to maintain a fiction.

Loss of discrimination in the use of words, which attends the increase of importance of energy discharge, produces a broken-record quality in psychotic speech. The patient reiterates in many forms some fundamental paradigm like 'I have just eaten'. From the point of view of the observer the theme being reiterated may not be readily apparent since the words lack referential precision. Thus, 'I have just eaten' may become 'I am not hungry' or 'I have just returned from a trip'. For the psychotic, speech itself becomes the vehicle of discharge of psychological energy, at the cost of its function as an instrument of social communication. It is this altered function of language that gives psychotic language its obscure and puzzling quality.

Glossolalia, or 'speaking in tongues', *(7, 8)*[1] is perhaps the clearest example of the discharge function of language. This phenomenon sometimes appears in schizophrenic speech but is more often found in apparently normal individuals. A speaker, in a religious fervor, finds himself uttering 'divinely given words' of a strange language which he does not understand. The fulfilment reported by individuals who speak in tongues is of inspirational proportions. We may assume that these utterances in which recognizability and specificity of reference have been lost serve the purpose of discharging the psychic energy associated with wishes and conflicts. By the fact of verbalization, glossolalia brings close to consciousness what the individual cannot put into words. Since the specific social tokens are lacking, the shame, guilt, despair, or anxiety that might accompany the appropriate labeling are avoided while the person feels that he has expressed the ineffable. The idea of divine inspiration further propagates the feeling that he is not in the grip of the ordinary conflicts and ungratified needs that characterize all of us and about which we have the most guilt and anxiety.

[1] Ref. 8 reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXXVI, 1967, pp. 108-112.

LANGUAGE AND CONSCIOUSNESS

In an early work on aphasia, Freud *(2)* made a distinction between the 'object presentation' and the 'word presentation'. Object presentation is a complex of visual, acoustic, tactile, kinesthetic, and other associations; word presentation is a complex of auditory, visual, and kinesthetic elements that has meaning by virtue of being tied to an object presentation, primarily by way of the acoustic aspect of the word. In the Project, Freud made an effort to distinguish between conscious and unconscious events in terms of object presentations and word presentations. He stated that stimulation of sensory organs creates 'qualities' which entail consciousness by virtue of sensory discharge, and that verbal associations also give rise to qualities because of their auditory-motor aspects. Unconscious memories may become conscious if they are associated with sensory images or with verbal associations that provide the necessary sensory discharge. However, of all the modalities that provide qualities, verbal associations permit the most intricate and exact applications, as contrasted, for example, with visual or kinesthetic imagery that cannot readily represent relationships between things. Since the verbal symbols are more flexible than visual or kinesthetic symbols, it is the verbal associations that make possible the most complex achievements of thought. In subsequent writings, Freud characterized the conscious idea as the object presentation joined with the word presentation and the unconscious idea as the object presentation alone. When a word is attached to an experience, there is an increase in cognitive and referential precision which may, in some instances, amount to becoming 'aware' of what was previously only vague and undefined.

The implication of this idea is that in large measure what becomes conscious is what can be named. Language as an energic mechanism raises to the level of consciousness inner processes otherwise out of our grasp, while serving at the same time as a means of sharing such processes with others.

The crucial properties of human vocalization are energy discharge, consciousness, and social communication. Once language passes beyond the energic discharge phase and its tokens become selectively related to bodily states and experiences, it becomes itself a means of evoking such states and of being conscious of them. This very central role in consciousness is the link between the individual's experience and language as social communication. Social communication by means of language is thus the end product of a development which is deeply rooted in the constitutional structure of the individual.

From all the experiential possibilities of individuals, the culture provides words for only some, thereby relegating others to oblivion. In turn, the individual may, for whatever reason, limit his conscious experience to only a segment of what the culture identifies. In this light it seems most meaningful to ask not whether experience shapes language or language shapes experience, but rather why a particular community favors certain features of the available experiential-language possibilities and why a particular individual selects from what the community favors. If we can define areas of experiential predilection by examining the language of speakers, then we may go further and explore causal factors for such choices within the individual or within the group and its setting.

SUMMARY

Freud's ideas of language as an energy discharge mechanism and of the role of language in consciousness provide the link within the individual that connects language and experience. Language in early life serves as an energy discharge mechanism; in psychological disturbances this function increases in importance at the expense of communication. Language serves to give conscious precision to otherwise vague and unconscious psychological states. What becomes conscious is what can be named, and naming is the basis of social communication. Cultures select experiences by providing words for some but not for others; individuals further select the cultural experience of

which they will be conscious. If we can establish experiential predilections of groups and individuals by examining their language, we may go on to explore causal factors in their choices.

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Psychopathology in Mixed Marriages

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PSYCHOPATHOLOGY IN MIXED MARRIAGES

BY SAMUEL R. LEHRMAN, M.D. (HEWLETT, N. Y.)

Mixed marriage or intermarriage refers to a union of mates who belong to different races or religions. International (interethnic) marriages between people of the same religion and skin color may also be considered 'mixed' from a psychodynamic point of view, but such marriages do not attract any particular social attention in the United States. The incidence of psychopathology in intermarriage and the nature of that pathology are of interest to both sociologists and psychiatrists.

Sociological studies of mixed marriage are numerous, but psychoanalytic and psychiatric studies are scarce. There is no index reference to mixed marriage in Eisenstein's Neurotic Interaction in Marriage *(7);* and the Psychoanalytic Symposium on Marriage held in New York in 1965 also fails to refer to mixed marriage.[1]

Sociological viewpoints vary. The most liberal writers contend that, ideally, society would be best served by the disappearance of racial and religious prejudice, thus paving the way for unlimited mixed marriage *(4)*. The opposite opinion, supported by divorce and crime statistics, holds that mixed marriage is sufficiently precarious to be considered undesirable, at least at the present time *(17)*.[2]

Clinical observation indicates that many of the psychody-

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Read at the meeting of the Long Island Psychoanalytic Society, June 1965. Modified versions read at Mt. Zion Hospital, in San Francisco, February 1965 and at the Veterans' Hospital, Northport, N. Y., March 1965.

[1] The Society of Medical Psychoanalysts, Psychoanalytic Symposium on Marriage, March 1965, New York, N. Y.

[2] Sociologists complain about the lack of adequate statistical data. The data now available show that mixed marriages end in divorce two to four times more often than unmixed marriages *(17, 20)*.

namic factors which operate in mixed marriages are also at work in endogamous marriages, though to a less extreme degree. Franzblau concludes from this that not all mixed marriages are 'psychologically suspect' *(10)*. Individual mixed marriages can be successful and happy. Just as endogamous marriages contracted as a result of neurotic needs may succeed through the agency of treatment or benevolent fate, so may exogamous marriages succeed. Modern marriage is now rarely contracted as a political alliance, a compulsive religious duty, or a communal matter. Even economics, though it still plays a part, is of lesser significance. The most evident functions of marriage, sexual gratification, raising a family, and companionship *(5)*, are served by romantic love, the development of which among unchaperoned young people has become the main factor in mate selection in Western culture *(18)*. Kubie warns that love is a poor criterion for marriage because judgment in mate selection is seriously impaired *(19)*. However, it is difficult to envision man's relinquishment of romantic love as the principal motive for marriage. Freud shows how narcissism is the basis for the exclusiveness and overvaluation of the love object, which 'serves as a substitute for some unattained ego ideal of our own. We love it on account of the perfections which we have striven to reach for our own ego, and which we should now like to procure in this roundabout way as a means of satisfying our narcissism' *(11,* pp. 112-113*)*.

Abraham contrasts marriage between close relatives with mixed marriages, stating that the former represents a pathological œdipal fixation, while the latter constitutes an 'exaggerated phobia of incest' *(1, 2)*. He calls attention to the hostile rejection of the family in instances of mixed marriage and ascribes this hatred to disappointed incestuous love.

Ferenczi emphasizes the aspect of 'misalliance' in mixed marriage *(9)*. He describes a case of 'family romance' *(12)* in reverse and explains it on the basis of the tug of sexual instinct. Position and rank are sacrificed for freedom in love. Little also underscored this factor in white-Negro marriages *(23)*.

The Negro, both male and female, is regarded as a symbol of lust. In addition, a surrogate œdipal factor may be present in the early childhood of the white partner in the form of a wet nurse, servant, or companion. This aspect of mate selection was first described by Freud in two papers on the psychology of love *(13, 14)*.

This paper is based on clinical observation of thirty patients who were partners in intermarriages. Most of the patients were either in analysis or psychotherapy. Several were seen once or only a few times in consultation. Three of the white women in the group (two were Protestant, one was Jewish) had had affairs with Negroes. But only one of those women who were observed was actually married to a Negro. The remaining observations of interracial marriage were limited to white Jewish men who married Japanese or Korean women, whom they had met while stationed overseas as soldiers. The psychopathology of these interracial marriages appeared to be similar to that of the interfaith marriages.[3]

Chance or co-incidental reality factors such as separation from home, freedom from restraint, absence of endogamous objects and propinquity of exogamous objects, repetitive sexual excitement and gratification, all satisfying the necessary conditions for love, play a part which should not be underestimated. This is similar to the role of chance in transference-fixation and hysteria *(21)*. Ego factors may also contribute to the overdetermination required for symptom-formation, as well as for constructive action.

Nine selected case histories illustrate psychopathological factors in mixed marriages, three in some detail, six more briefly.

[3] This contradicts a statement made in a recent study to the effect that foreign marriages in the military differ from the mixed marriages of civilian couples *(6)*. Druss found five per cent of his mixed marriage couples to be 'without psychiatric disorder'. He referred to only two psychodynamic elements in mixed marriage: œdipal guilt and rebellion against the family. He regarded mixed marriages in the military as primarily due to chance.

CASE 1[4]

A twenty-six-year-old married Protestant woman was referred for treatment because of a *post partum* depression. She had married a Jew against her mother's advice and had developed a markedly dependent attitude toward her mother-in-law. The birth of her son had aroused in her complex feelings harking back to her childhood. An only child, she had developed intense feelings of rivalry with peers in her class taught by her mother.

In the course of analysis the development of her obsessive-compulsive and depressive trends and their relationship to her unique œdipus complex unfolded. Her mother had toilet-trained her early, abandoned her to a housekeeper, and returned to work. But at the insistence of the patient's father, the mother had stopped working when the child was two years old. Though the father had wanted a boy, he had been extremely affectionate to the patient until his death when she was four years old. Thus the patient lost an important source of narcissistic supplies at the onset of the œdipal period. The injury was compounded when her mother returned to work, this time out of necessity. The patient sought to please her mother and her other caretakers, and learned that she could keep her mother at home by becoming ill. She developed a markedly obsessive-compulsive character, with depressive trends, allergies and asthma. With considerable emotional conflict she competed successfully with the children in her mother's class and developed an attitude of overvaluation to money and intellect. To be wealthy meant that mother would love her since mother paid more attention to the wealthy children in the private school. The intellectual interests originating on oral and anal levels (identification with mother and mother's compulsiveness) were re-enforced by penis envy at the œdipal level. She

[4] This case was reported in a shorter version in a previous paper dealing with reactions to untimely death *(22)*.

reacted to her father's death with a repetition of her earlier response to the loss of her mother, i.e., the development of depressive and obsessional trends.

Her œdipus complex acquired its unique qualities through the unfortunate timing of her father's death (when she was four) and the concurrent influence of her religious ideas. She accepted the explanation that her father had gone to Heaven and confused him with the 'Father' of the Lord's prayer. Thus in her fantasies her father continued alive in Heaven as a Jew (Jesus). Other qualities which she associated with Jewishness were wealth and intellect, as well as castration and victimization. In all these respects, with the exception of wealth, she herself felt like a Jew.

Shortly before the patient's puberty her mother remarried. Because she liked her Protestant stepfather and because the actual incest barrier was now absent, it became necessary for her to erect an exaggerated taboo against him. This was further encouraged by the parents' misguided attempts at sex education for this adolescent girl. Their explicit speech and free behavior stimulated her sexual fantasies, aroused her anger, and called forth even stronger defenses. Her selection of a well-to-do Jewish mate satisfied the unconscious pregenital and œdipal needs of her childhood and the incest taboos of adolescence. Simultaneously there was a gratification of her narcissistic and aggressive trends and a relief from feelings of loneliness.

The patient responded well to treatment, early in the course of which her husband sought analysis. The husband had a strong œdipal fixation and a severe castration complex. His rejection of Judaism represented, among other things, a defense against castration anxiety. This rejection of religion came into conflict with his wife's needs. The analysis of both partners enabled them to become more accepting of each other. The husband was able to effect a lukewarm acceptance of Judaism and the wife was able to accept a nonfanatical conversion.

CASE 2

A thirty-one-year-old divorced Jewish man presented a complaint of impotence. He rationalized that this, like his small penis, was due to mumps contracted at the age of twelve. His symptomatic impotence was not consistent. Usually he was potent with his sweetheart, a young and eligible Jewish divorcée who was free in her moral attitude and sexual behavior. Yet he could not bring himself to marry her. The thought of marriage brought on a fear of impotence with consequent failure. Several years earlier he had married a Christian girl of easy virtue who later became psychotic. His family practically disowned him, but forgave him after the divorce. He was unable to marry again because of his œdipus complex and the incest taboo. Every Jewish girl represented his mother and older sister. At the same time his father and family denied him the outlet of an out-group marriage.

In the analysis the transference was largely paternal. A determinant of his entering analysis was the injunction against marrying during treatment. His masturbation fantasies from adolescence on concerned women with large breasts. This referred principally to his sister. He had been stimulated by seeing her petting like a 'dirty' girl with her boy friend. (Screen memory of primal scene.) He had also felt her breasts while she slept. Marked sexual conflicts had evolved. Sex could be enjoyed only in secret and in fantasy or with degraded women. He wished to continue his current affair without marriage; and the analysis permitted him to do so. He acted out his neurotic conflict by throwing his best friend into the company of his sweetheart, and one day he was confronted with their elopement. This afforded an opportunity to analyze his masochistic homosexual attachment to both father and friend—and to the analyst in the transference. Thus he was able to recognize his unconscious complicity.

When he had worked through his feelings of inferiority and aggression toward his father in the transference, it became

more positive and his functioning in work and in social life improved. In addition, on his mother's death in the course of the analysis it was possible to work through the œdipus complex and the mourning process. He became conscious of women as individuals. His feelings of inferiority lessened, his impotence disappeared, and a termination date was set. He felt he was a man in his own right who did not need his father's permission. He began to court a Jewish girl. About a year after termination he phoned to announce his marriage and to express his gratitude to me.

CASE 3

A thirty-three-year-old married, first-generation Protestant woman of Corsican origin whose husband was first-generation American Jewish (both indifferent to religion) came for treatment because of unhappiness, frigidity, and an obsession with suicide. Eight years earlier she had been treated by a woman analyst, but had broken off treatment after several months in order to marry. For about six months before consulting me, she had been in treatment with a young male psychiatrist who had become concerned over the intensity of the patient's positive transference. The patient was an attractive and talented woman who formed extremely close attachments to both women and men. The attachments to the women fared well as long as they mothered her. The attachments to the men tended to evolve into love affairs sometimes with a sexual relationship, then disappointment, guilt, and a break-up. The men selected did not have to be older than the patient, but invariably they were in a position of authority or superior knowledge. She frequently took courses and developed crushes on her teachers. The same held for her private teachers and her various doctors. If the latter were overtly paternal, her attachment precluded sexual fantasies.

The patient was the youngest child in the family. There were four brothers and one sister. She had been the prettiest and most talented in the family and the apple of her father's

eye. Some time prior to puberty she and an older brother had engaged in sex play leading ultimately to sexual relations, which was attended with enormous feelings of guilt. When her father died, she wondered if her sexual crimes had killed him. During adolescence she fought against temptation to masturbate by working hard at cultural and intellectual pursuits. In addition her older brothers seemed to be much concerned that she preserve her virginity. One of her tutors had made love to her, but this was a secret. There was no intercourse. She felt more comfortable with Jewish boys. They were warm and kind like her father, not harsh and forbidding like her brothers and her mother. Unconscious œdipal longings could be gratified when the different race or religion of her partner proved the absence of incest.

Shortly after intercourse for the first time as an adult with a Catholic man whom she did not love, she fell in love with the Jewish man who later became her husband. He was even-tempered and had cultural interests similar to hers. They had a satisfactory affair for some time and then decided to marry. When her daughter was born, she was disappointed and became frigid in her sexual response to her husband.

She developed the same intensely erotic transference toward me which she had had toward her previous psychiatrist, but persistent analysis of the transference, even though she was in psychotherapy, enabled her to gain understanding and relief, and thus go on with treatment. Her frigidity was relieved; relations with her family improved; so treatment was discontinued.

About a year and a half later she returned because of a recurrence of the symptomatology. She vaguely recognized that she was indulging in some form of regressive or recurrent neurotic behavior in having begun an affair with a Negro professional man. Once again through treatment she was able to master her impulses. Subsequently her treatment was sporadic. Whenever she recognized that an erotic transference was developing and she felt the threat of sexual action to be imminent, she called for an appointment.

This patient suffered from severe penis envy and had a strong fixation on her father. The incest taboo had a special effect upon her because of her transgressions. Her facial beauty and artistic talents had elicited an atmosphere conducive to intense narcissism. This, when coupled with her penis envy, brought about a strong feeling of being an exception. This feeling was aggravated by a sense of inferiority and by guilt over sexual actions and fantasies.

The genetic precursors to mixed marriage in these cases (the compromise solution between id strivings and superego prohibitions) is reasonably well documented. In the six remaining brief cases, only the highlights appear.

CASE 4

A young, attractive Jewish girl, a middle child, sought out only Italian and Irish Catholic boys. Her mother favored her older brother; her father favored her younger sister and treated the patient harshly. She had developed a hatred for her father. She described the Catholic boys as warm, kind, gentlemanly, and not out to take advantage. (Note: these were exactly the same terms which Case 3, the Protestant patient, had used for Jewish boys.) The outstanding genetic psychopathological feature was the hostility toward her family because of the disappointment of unconscious incestuous love impulses.

CASE 5

A twenty-five-year-old single, handsome, educated and well-to-do, Jewish man was referred because of what he called a 'healthy problem'. He had fallen in love with a Christian divorcée of questionable morals, who worked in his father's factory. She was already the mother of a child and, during the time she was sleeping with the patient, had become pregnant by her ex-husband, later losing the child. The young man refused treatment and married the divorcée. This case is almost a

classic example of the type of patient reported by Freud *(13)*. Present in this case are an injured third party, a woman of bad repute, and the urge to rescue the woman. Only the compulsive repetitiveness is absent.

CASE 6

A charming and attractive young Jewish woman with superior intelligence and education had married a handsome Irish Catholic man who drank and whose family history was blotted by crime. The marriage was not working and she was anxious, depressed, and undecided about whether she wanted to go through with the impending annulment. Toward the end of the consultation she dramatically presented the key to the problem: she lifted her hair and revealed a scar behind her ear where a birthmark had been removed. She had felt blemished (castrated) and inadequate in any relations with Jewish boys and was able to be at ease only with Gentiles. Her exploitation of the œdipal-incest taboo factors of her attractiveness was almost conscious. She remarked, 'My being Jewish is a source of attraction to Christians'.

CASE 7

A Protestant actress of great beauty, talent, and intelligence had lost her mother when she was a baby. She had been indulgently raised by her immigrant father until she was ten when he died in an accident. Several foster homes ensued. Prior to puberty she had been gently seduced (cunnilingus) by a middle-aged Protestant man. During adolescence several of her Protestant foster fathers had attempted seduction which she resisted. She had made three marriages, the first to a Catholic, and the next two to Jews. The outstanding genetic features were fixation on her father, the sense of being an alien, feelings of degradation, and feelings of being an exception.

CASE 8

A single Catholic woman in her thirties, a professional model, was courted by a divorced Jewish man, but she refused

to marry him because the Church did not sanction the marriage. She felt that sexual intercourse with a beloved man out of wedlock was less sinful than violating a sacrament of the Church. Of three daughters she had been her father's favorite and had deeply mourned him when he died. She had also been tragically disappointed five years before when her fiancé, a Catholic, had suddenly died shortly before their wedding date.

The outstanding genetic features were fixation on the father, the sense of being an alien (her parents were European immigrants), feelings of degradation and of being an exception.

Psychotherapy enabled the patient to see how she was using her religious scruples as a rationalization for the avoidance of marriage and motherhood. She finally accepted a civil wedding and one year later gave birth to a child.

In mixed marriages contracted because of seeming convenience or escapism, conscious considerations often appear to obscure the unconscious ones. However, the underlying psychopathology is usually suggested.

CASE 9

A white Protestant middle-aged widow married a Protestant mulatto. He was a kind person, a conscientious worker, and a good provider. She was depressed and angry at her children. Her conscious motive in marrying was a search for security. His was the consolidation of an objective to 'pass' as white.

When Jews marry Christians and Catholics marry Protestants, it is often out of a desire to assimilate. Assimilated Jews who are somewhat indifferent or hostile to religion may encourage their children to contract mixed marriages. In these cases the marriage bond may assume the phallic significance noted by Stein *(24)*. In various mixed marriages entered into for the purpose of 'passing', the psychopathology of the superego strongly resembles that seen in the 'exceptions' *(15)*. This

resemblance was marked, however, not only in the 'passing' cases, but in most of the mixed marriages I observed.

From the other side it is characteristic of love to regard the love object as exceptional. Narcissism contributes heavily to one of the characteristic qualities of love itself, i.e., overvaluation of the object. There is an additional quantity of narcissism from the subjective feeling of being an exception in being loved and loving.

Courage is required for a mixed marriage, especially if there is family disapproval; but when defiant hostility is present toward parents, it may denote a pathological quality and intensity in the œdipus complex. Frequently there is a hint of masochism. In some of the Jewish men observed there was a strong counterphobic attitude as a defense against castration anxiety *(8)*: their behavior seemed to be determined by what Jews regard as Christian ideals of acceptable aggressiveness.[5]

In about one-third of the cases observed, the patients came under psychiatric observation because of conscious concern with certain aspects of the problem of mixed marriage. In many of these cases the concern was produced largely by social pressure, the patients being only peripherally aware of the contributions of neurotic drives to their choice of mate. The rest of the patients were seen because of seemingly unrelated reasons, the mixed marriage emerging as another facet of their psychic conflicts.

In a sense normal love may be regarded as something of a pathological phenomenon in that the function of reality testing is so markedly disturbed when one is in love. Freud's comparison of romantic love to transference love contributes to our understanding of mixed marriage love. He writes that transference love is 'greatly intensified by the resistance, . . . it is lacking to a high degree in regard for reality, is less sensible, less concerned about consequences and more blind in its valu-

[5] Weissman's recent observation concerning the mistress as a counterphobic and fetishistic object seems to apply to the marriage partner in some cases of mixed marriages *(25)*.

ation of the loved person than we are prepared to admit in the case of normal love. We should not forget, however, that these departures from the norm constitute precisely what is essential about being in love' *(16,* p. 168-169*)*. Freud then demonstrates that the difference between normal love and transference love depends on both the analytic situation and the quantity of the patient's infantile fixations. In the instances of mixed marriage love here discussed, the departure from the norm seems also to depend on the quantity of the patient's infantile fixations.

Franzblau *(10),* writing about mixed marriage from both the religious and psychoanalytically oriented psychiatric viewpoints, summarizes the dynamics of mixed marriage: he believes that interfaith marriages need not show psychopathology and may be 'purely circumstantial' as, for example, influenced by the incidence of mixed marriages already existing in the family, or determined by a narrowed or absent 'religious distance between the couple, or the intensity of their religious feeling or that of their parents'. He also places exaggerated fantasies about the sex drives of certain groups (the 'exotic is erotic') in the category of conscious motivations. His classification of unconscious motivations includes rebellion against the father, 'blemish-mating' (debasement in the sphere of love), 'combat-mating' (a pattern of prolonged hostility permitted toward a mate, but forbidden toward those inside the family), 'stand-in' marriages (a partner is unconsciously exploited, usually for fathering a child, hence selected from outgroups), and 'reversed-role marriages' (where husbands identify with phallic mothers who have mistreated their fathers). The most prominent infantile fixations described here refer to the œdipus complex in both positive and negative forms, the tendency to debasement in the sphere of love, and displaced hostility. These same features are amply demonstrated in the clinical cases presented, as well as by others in this series which have not been reported.

In uncomplicated love-and-marriage an important determi-

nant is the need for the resolution of the œdipus complex with its complement of narcissism. The choice of object is œdipal, narcissistic, or a combination of both. In mixed marriage the event becomes complicated and, like any other symptom, is usually overdetermined. Hence we might regard this as another pathological feature of mixed marriages: the high degree of overdetermination, i.e., the consistent simultaneous presence in one or both of the mates of many of the psychopathological factors described.[6]

Interfaith and interracial marriages among actors, musicians, writers, and other artists are well publicized and seemingly frequent. Among people of artistic talent the feeling of being an exception may be more highly developed than among the general population. Such people often behave like exceptions, disregarding some of the commonly accepted moral conventions or indulging in minor lawbreaking.

SUMMARY

Nine case histories illustrate that the psychopathological factors which have been found to overdetermine mixed marriages are: 1, unresolved œdipus complex and incest-taboo problems (exaggerated phobia of incest); 2, debasement in the sphere of love (special types of choice of object made by men, misalliance, 'family romance' in reverse); 3, hostility as a result of disappointment of unconscious incestuous love impulses, often accompanied by masochism; 4, exaggerated narcissism, including the phallic significance of the marriage bond; 5, ex-

[6] The fate of any marriage depends on both internal and external conditions and their interreactions with each other. Assuming that external conditions are favorable, the fate of a mixed marriage depends on the evolution and interplay of the neurotic processes which brought the couple together *(19)*. Despite the discouraging statistics, when both partners have the capacity for growth and adaptability, the marriage may be successful. Bergler's *(3)* suggestion that the participants first be analyzed is a worthy one. Unfortunately, when treatment is sought, it is usually after marriage. However, with treatment many mixed marriages have been saved; and when divorce was inevitable, the next marriage had greater chance of success because of treatment.

hibitionism; 6, the conviction that one is an exception; 7, counterphobic and fetishistic attitudes and choices which defend against castration anxiety.

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Symbolism of the Umbrella

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SYMBOLISM OF THE UMBRELLA

BY C. PHILIP WILSON, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Freud in the Introductory Lectures originally described the umbrella as a symbol of the male genital.[1] I have learned from a male patient in analysis that the umbrella in dreams also has an earlier precœdipal significance.

The patient sought analysis because of bisexuality. In association to an umbrella seen in a dream, he recalled that the day before he had had an erection that distended his trousers. His associations showed that the shaft of the umbrella symbolized his erect phallus and the cloth of the opened umbrella represented the cloth of his trousers stretched by it. We may conclude that the day residue for umbrella symbols may often, or always, be an erection, experienced or observed by the dreamer, covered by clothing.

The patient also recalled observing an attractive young woman's breasts distending the cloth of her dress. The umbrella in his dream was formed from the sight of the cloth-covered breasts of the woman combined with the kinesthetic and proprioceptive sensations of his own erection. The umbrella really symbolized a fantasied breast-penis for the dreamer and masked the feminine identification of this man who enjoyed having his breast-penis sucked by men and women, as he had once sucked at his mother's breast. The original umbrella, then, seems to be the nursing mother's breast distended with milk and covered by her dress, the nipple corresponding to the tip of the umbrella shaft protruding through the cloth of the umbrella.

The umbrella is a bisexual symbol. That an umbrella in reality protects us from the wet and cold also points to the maternal source of the symbol. One finds typically in the homosexual that the phallic œdipal aspects of the symbol are largely exhibitionistic. The patient in his erection that distends his trousers is expressing the wish to have a breast to exhibit like mother's. It is well known how much homosexual men enjoy tight pants that exhibit

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[1] Standard Edition, XV, p. 154.

but also cover their genitals. Further analysis revealed that this patient very early supposed that women have a penis, which to him was equivalent to the woman's breast.

Analysis of the parapraxis of a female patient showed me that for her the beautiful gold-handled umbrella, which she left in my waiting room for all to admire, represented her wish for a breast-phallus. She suffered from a severe latent homosexual attachment to her mother, whom she supposed to have been a male in childhood because during the patient's early years her father was unemployed and stayed home to care for her, while mother went to an office to support the family

Careful scrutiny of both these cases led me to conclude that the umbrella symbolized for them a primitive magical bisexual breast-phallus. The analysis of other umbrella dreams shows that an umbrella in dreams always is an indication of a bisexual conflict. I also conclude that the overdetermined and extremely ambivalent meaning of the symbol offers an explanation for an irritating parapraxis that is a boon to the umbrella manufacturers, namely the frequent 'loss' of umbrellas.

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Binswanger and Freud

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BINSWANGER AND FREUD

BY HENRY EDELHEIT, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Ludwig Binswanger's *Daseinanalyse* is, according to Professor Needleman, who writes an introduction to his selected papers,[1] 'an effort to complement and correct the view of man and human experience implicit in Freudian psychoanalysis'. It is an imposing effort, and if in the long run it is unconvincing to a psychoanalytic reader, this is largely because clinical observation and straightforward interpretation are sacrificed to the philosophical framework. Moreover, that framework seems to be largely inspired by a need to reject psychoanalytic interpretations.

Freud's discovery of infantile sexuality and of the sexual etiology of the neuroses has made possible unprecedented clarifications in our understanding of man. At the same time, the unpalatability of his findings provoked an unending wave of repudiation. With Jung and Adler that repudiation was dramatic and led to violent rupture that was not only doctrinal but personal. Binswanger's non-acceptance of Freud's views was subtler and more civilized. It early took a form that was compatible with a lifelong friendship between the two men. Nevertheless, Binswanger's rejection of infantile sexuality (his repeated demurrers notwithstanding) is as total and as limiting as that of the great heresiarchs of the psychoanalytic movement. His rejection also included the concepts of psychic determinism and of a dynamic unconscious.

The selection of writings included in Being-in-the-World is intended to give a synopsis of Binswanger's philosophical and psychological views together with examples of their clinical application. Needleman's introductory study sets Binswanger against Freud in a context of philosophical exegesis; his efforts are directed toward establishing the superiority of Binswanger's views over those of Freud, both in terms of philosophical soundness and clinical usefulness. Taking his cues from Binswanger himself, Needleman pays homage to Freud as pioneer and invokes the history of science and

[1] BINSWANGER, LUDWIG: *Being-in-the-World. Selected Papers.* Translated and with a critical introduction to his Existential Psychoanalysis by Jacob Needleman, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1963. 364 pp.

philosophy in the nineteenth century to explain Freud's ostensible errors and limitations.[2]

Such, in fact, is the gist of the first paper in this volume—Freud's Conception of Man in the Light of Anthropology. It is a testament to the friendship that existed between Binswanger and Freud for it was written on invitation from the Vienna Society for Medical Psychology to be presented at a symposium in honor of Freud's eightieth birthday. A copy of the paper elicited a now famous reply from Freud (October 8, 1936):

> . . . I have always lived on the ground floor and in the basement of the building—you maintain that on changing one's viewpoint one can also see an upper floor housing such distinguished guests as religion, art, and others. You are not the only one; most cultivated specimens of *homo natura* think likewise. In this respect you are the conservative, I the revolutionary. If I had another life of work ahead of me, I would dare to offer even those high-born people a home in my lowly hut. I already found one for religion when I stumbled on the category 'neurosis of mankind'. But we are probably talking at cross purposes and it will be centuries before our dispute is settled *(2,* p. 431*)*.

Almost a decade earlier, Freud had written to Binswanger:

> . . . Quite unlike so many others you have not allowed the fact of your intellectual development moving away more and more from my influence to disturb our personal relationship, and you do not know how agreeable I find such decent behavior *(1,* p. 85*)*.

The first paper and the next, Freud and the Magna Charta of Clinical Psychiatry, are historical exercises and are of greater interest than the theoretical and clinical papers that follow. The first attempts to place Freud in a philosophical context; the second purports to be a critical appreciation of Freud's contribution as it appears in relation to the history of medical psychology in the nineteenth century. Both essays exploit the device of setting Freud within a context that demonstrates his limitations while paying conditional homage to his achievements. We are indebted to Freud, Binswanger says, for the natural-scientific concept of man. But, he adds, man is more than *'homo natura'* and it is the task of an-

[2] The prevalence of such trends in the history of ideas was noted by V. I. Lenin in The State and Revolution: 'It is the fate of revolutionary thinkers to be attacked during their lifetime and then to be worshipped in the next generation by those who watered down their ideas'.

thropology to provide man with an adequte view of his multifaceted existence. (The term, anthropology, as used by Binswanger, embraces 'the totality of man's experience of himself in all his modes of existence'. The natural-scientific mode is regarded as only one among many, including the philosophical, the religious, the artistic, and others. In this company, the natural-scientific mode is granted no hegemony, but is assigned an equal, if not actually inferior, place among the others.) It is not difficult to see in this an attempt to minimize biological factors in human psychology. Mirroring in miniature the reciprocal relationship between civilization and instinctual expression, Binswanger and Needleman build an elaborate theoretical structure on a foundation of suppressed and rejected instinct theory. In this project Binswanger enlists the phenomenology of Husserl and the existentialism of Heidegger.

Though I may be incautious to challenge such a massive intellectual apparatus, I suspect that Binswanger has misappropriated the ideas of both philosophers. For example, in his application of Heidegger's concept of existential modes, Binswanger takes a philosophical concept which attempts to encompass the wholeness of human experience and sets it, rather uncritically, to disparate and limited tasks. Writing as a commentator on method, Binswanger uses the concept of existential modes to denote such frames of reference as 'natural-scientific', 'theological', or 'artistic'. Each of these is elevated to peer status with the others, not simply as a way of seeing but as a way of life. On the other hand, he reduces the concept of existential modes to a kind of 'applied ontology', narrowing it to the purpose of clinical pathography. Here also a homogenizing tendency makes itself felt, so that a pathological mode of being becomes something not merely comparable to a nonpathological one but, by implication, acquires equal status as a valid way of life. From here a dangerously easy step brings about the generalization and elevation of pathology, converting it into a tragic view of the human condition.

Moreover, Binswanger's attempted abrogation of the unconscious makes much of his clinical presentation seem simply foolish. Given his phenomenological orientation, which does not allow for a dynamic unconscious, Binswanger is compelled to interpret consciousness entirely in terms of the limitations of structure ('horizon'). The unconscious in psychoanalysis includes not only what has

never lain within the scope of the structural ego, but also what has been repressed in the sense of having been expelled from consciousness. Freud's dictum: 'Where id was, there shall ego be', implies a relation between the two, a growth in scope and competency of the ego concomitant with the lifting of repressions and the reorganization of defensive structures. For Binswanger, only broadening the purview of the *Dasein* (the existential self) brings new elements into the range of consciousness. And though he has some very stimulating ideas on the relation of structure to experience, he pays a heavy price in the loss of the dynamic force and specificity of the repressed. This price is nowhere more evident than in the weaknesses of the clinical interpretations. For example, in The Case of Lola Voss, unconscious incestuous strivings and conflict provoked by frustration of Lola's ostensible wish to marry are nowhere brought into relation to her falling ill. Pathogenesis is rather attributed to her dependence on a 'language oracle' (a magical use of words) through which she surrenders her will and allows herself to be victimized by the world. Binswanger writes:

> She became melancholic and peculiarly superstitious: she would . . . display an irresistible aversion to a variety of objects, particularly umbrellas and rubber shoes, which, she said, brought her bad luck. When she noticed that her chambermaid at the hotel was a hunchback, she immediately left the place. Hunchbacked men she considered lucky, however, and even tried to touch them.

Several weeks of therapeutic effort finally elicited the following information.

> When her father had bought a new umbrella two years ago, she met a woman hunchback on the street. She had been afraid of hunchbacks before; but now all the bad luck emanating from that hunchback was displaced onto the umbrella. . . . Shortly thereafter her mother had touched the umbrella. From that moment on, she was set against her mother and against traveling with her to France where she was supposed to meet her fiancé. Why? Because her mother would transfer the bad luck from herself and her umbrella to her boy friend. . . . After eight months, Lola's situation became more complicated when her anxiety focused upon a certain nurse. . . . The nurse . . . owned an umbrella similar to her father's. It had been lying about in various places, all of which now made her feel very frightened, and was the cause of her feeling so much sicker. . . . She was particularly fearful of everything that could possibly be connected with the closet in which she had seen [the nurse's] umbrella. She asked people to swear that this or that had not touched anything

> that was in that closet. She refused to use the towels because they could have been close to a brush that might possibly have been in contact with the umbrella. . . .

The sexual source of conflict is clear enough in the case material, but Binswanger includes such details only to ignore them. His single-minded effort to make an existential analysis results in what seems almost a wilful aversion to interpretation of well-established sexual symbolism, a refusal to acknowledge what is obtrusively obvious, and an attempt to submerge it in obscure and pretentious terminology. It is hard not to be reminded of the defensive obfuscations of obsessional patients.

Instead of a woman with a fragile ego, overwhelmed by conflict and progressively disabled by obsessional defenses, Binswanger sees in Lola the expression of an inadequate 'ideal' which cannot be harmonized with reality. 'Her ideal is being alone and being left alone by the world. From the very beginning she preferred being by herself.' This is an extraordinarily simplistic conception of mental illness. The primitivity of the conception is concealed by the existentialist verbiage:

> In the case of Lola, we could observe in an extreme degree the phenomenon of what we call mundanization [*Verweltlichung*]. . . . In all these cases, the *Dasein* can no longer freely allow the world to be but is, rather, increasingly surrendered over to one particular world-design, possessed by it, overwhelmed by it. The technical term for this state of being surrendered over is 'thrownness' [*Geworfenheit*].

A good part of the strangeness and obscurity of the existential terminology arises from a failure to understand the role played by language in psychic structure and function. In terms of language, Heidegger's concepts, as adapted by Binswanger and explicated by Needleman, can often be restated in a simpler and more comprehensible way. For example, it is much less opaque to say that 'the individual constructs his world through the medium of language', than to say (as Needleman does) that '*Dasein* constitutes its world through the meaning-context of the Existential A Priori'. At the same time, if we accept the mediating role of language in consciousness (Freud *defined* repression as the withdrawal of cathexis from word-representations) we need not reject out of hand such a valuable insight as is contained in Binswanger's statement: 'what we perceive are "first and foremost" not impressions of taste, tone,

smell or touch, not even things or objects, but rather, meanings'.

With the term *Dasein* (translated as *being-in-the-world* and used by Binswanger as a synonym for the *self*) Heidegger attempted, 'by fiat', to 'undercut' the subject-object dichotomy. But that dichotomy is in fact experiential, even when the experience is delusional. The fact that subject-object designations are repugnant to the Heideggerians does not eradicate the universal experience of the dichotomy. Evasion of the dichotomy does not solve the problem of a proper definition of the subject-object relation. Such a definition might be attempted in terms of the differential between normal and psychotic constructs of the world.

For such a purpose the conception of the self as constitutive of its world deserves our consideration. It would be fruitful in this connection to examine further the relation of language to psychic structure or the role of language in the organization of perception and in the construction of reality. There is a place in such investigations for psychoanalytic research, both clinical and experimental. The existentialist conception of a self that builds its own world (whether that world is adapted to reality or distorted by pathology) is relevant to such a study. That concept, appropriately reformulated and modified, could provide a fresh dimension to psychoanalytic thinking. It might also make possible, after all, a step in the direction of finding for theology and philosophy a home in the lowly hut of Freud.

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BOOK REVIEWS

A PSYCHOANALYTIC DIALOGUE. The Letters of Sigmund Freud and Karl Abraham, 1907-1926. Edited by Hilda C. Abraham and Ernst L. Freud. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965. 406 pp.

With the appearance of this book more illumination of the beginnings of psychoanalysis has been added to that already provided by the publication of Freud's letters to Fliess, his general correspondence from 1873 to 1939, his correspondence with Pfister, and the Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Association. The particular value of this contribution is declared in the title itself. This is a dialogue between two who lived and made the history of a most fascinating, productive, and troubled period in psychoanalysis. At first as master and pupil, they range over a wide variety of topics: clinical, theoretical, social, political (psychoanalytic as well as international), and personal problems. The relationship matures, as does Abraham the psychoanalyst, until at last we see him exchanging ideas as an equal and even confronting Freud with unpleasant realities the latter had been avoiding. The mutual respect and warmth by far outweigh the occasional disagreements (mainly in their different judgments of Jung and Rank) but it was characteristic of Abraham to take a stand, forthrightly though sometimes regretfully, whenever he believed the welfare of psychoanalysis (and Freud) was at stake.

A happy inspiration was the inclusion of an introduction by Edward Glover. From the double vantage point of his position of eminence in psychoanalysis and his having been Abraham's analysand he provides the reader with some foresight and historical perspective, including a brief sketch of Abraham's life. After reading the book one cannot but agree with Glover's disagreement with those analysts who would consider the works of earlier analysts outmoded. One is struck by the freshness and continued validity of most of the analytic ideas the correspondents discuss in language refreshingly free of jargon.

To this reviewer the two main points of interest in the correspondence are the behind-the-scenes look at the problems and per-

sonalities involved in the development of the young science, and the insight into the characters of Freud and Abraham. The turmoil surrounding first Jung and then Rank fills many letters as Abraham, the *Menschenkenner,* repeatedly warns Freud of the psychopathology of these favorite sons and the upheaval that threatened. Here as in the earlier relationship with Fliess ('I once loved him very much and therefore overlooked a great deal') Freud at first could not let himself grasp the true state of affairs and even blamed Abraham for stirring up trouble. According to Jones, even after Rank finally broke with Freud, and after Abraham's death, Freud still had not quite forgiven Abraham for venturing to warn him of the coming disaster.

Abraham had the clearer vision in regard to men, but Freud understood better the difficulties in gaining scientific and public acceptance of psychoanalysis. Thus he opposed an ill-fated film project on psychoanalysis of which Abraham was a sponsor. This led to another disagreement possibly worsened by the ill health both men were suffering. It must have caused Freud some pain to remember that his last letter to Abraham expressed this disagreement with some sharpness.

In the matter of the qualities of character revealed by these letters, Glover in his Introduction rightly points out the 'simplicity and sincerity that are characteristic of great men'. Freud, the sure genius, could yet admit the limits of his knowledge and therapeutic ability, as well as his imperfect judgment of some of his followers. Abraham, the optimist and confident clinician, was unstinting in his praise of a colleague's good work, as well as willingly accepting Freud's demonstration of some point he had not grasped. Each could call attention to the slips and 'complexes' of the other.

As would be expected of such men, a sense of humor comes through, as when they share a laugh at one Professor Ziehen who attempts to disprove the sexual meaning of an obviously sexual obsession by pointing out that it involves the patient's mother and sister. Freud's answer to Abraham's question as to how he manages to write as well as conduct analyses ten hours a day: 'I have to recuperate from psychoanalysis by working, otherwise I should not be able to stand it'.

Concern is always expressed when great men are revealed as having frailties and shortcomings that this will be used as ammuni-

tion for sniping. And it is true that this book has evoked some adverse criticisms of unscientific attitudes, evangelistic fervor, and so forth, as well as of the psychological disturbances revealed in important figures in analytic history. It is true of psychoanalysis as it is of any new development, scientific or other, that the excitement of discovery can spill over into a fervor for the 'cause'. The future development of such a movement, if it claims to be scientific, depends on constant and rigorous criticism of existing theories for the purpose of finding better explanations and ruling out the influence of magical thinking. Above all, regardless of the personalities of the discoverers or creative thinkers, the resulting product must stand and be judged on its own merits, separately from the conflicts, intrapsychic and interpersonal, which are bound to be an accompaniment of the turbulent beginnings of a new way of thinking, especially if it 'disturbs the sleep of the world'. That psychoanalysis is not alone in this regard is evidenced by emotionally-charged conflicts in fields that claim much more precision than psychoanalysis. For example, Einstein never really accepted quantum theory, which went beyond his own thinking. He and Niels Bohr engaged in many arguments, in one of which Einstein even neglected an essential point that depended on Einstein's own general theory of relativity. Yet such disagreements, influenced by the personal conflicts of those involved, do not necessarily disqualify the early thinking or resulting advances from achieving scientific status. This must be measured by other criteria, often in cool retrospect.

The editors have done a commendable job in their editing and translation of the letters. However, the value of the book would have been enhanced for all but the most informed reader if the editors had inserted a good many more explanatory footnotes (as was done in The Origins of Psychoanalysis) to clarify allusions in the letters and to provide a better historical perspective. Lacking these, one might keep Jones' biography of Freud at hand.

This is a pleasing book, with discovery, humor, tragedy, and even suspense. Above all it enriches our knowledge and respect for two men of genius to whom psychoanalysis and the world owe a great debt. Is it permissible in this age of the antihero to declare: 'There were giants in the earth in those days'?

HOMER C. CURTIS (PHILADELPHIA)

THE COCAINE PAPERS. By Sigmund Freud. Vienna: Dunquin Press, 1963. 62 pp. (Distributed by Schoenhof's Foreign Books, Inc., Cambridge, Mass.)

Freud's publications on cocaine, which appeared originally between 1884 and 1887, have been translated and collected in a single volume. A. K. Donoghue and James Hillman provide a foreword.

The work is of interest today for the information it contributes about the author rather than about the subject matter. The topic involves physiological and psychological aspects of functioning, which Freud attempted to synthesize during the remainder of his life. The method employed involves his characteristic combination of self-observation and observation of others.

The first paper is a review of the history and pharmacology of coca leaf and cocaine. It is written in a lively and lucid style so that one is hardly aware that it contains information from ninety references. The mood is optimistic regarding various therapeutic applications. There are some self-observations as well as a report of the management with cocaine of one case of morphine withdrawal. An addendum takes note of individual differences in reactions to cocaine. In view of the role which the need to discharge excessive excitation and to reduce anxiety played in Freud's later theories, the following explanation of the mode of action of cocaine is interesting: 'This gives the impression that the mood induced by coca in such cases is due not so much to direct stimulation as to the disappearance of elements in one's general state of well-being which cause depression. One may, perhaps, assume that the euphoria resulting from good health is also nothing more than the normal condition of a well-nourished cerebral cortex which "is not conscious" of the organs of the body to which it belongs.'

In the second paper, Freud employed Burq's dynamometer to investigate the effect of cocaine on himself. He noted two variations: 'Firstly, the figures for the motor energy of a muscle group reveal a regular fluctuation in the course of a day; secondly, the same figures reach quite different absolute values on different days'. This reveals an interest in periodic processes before his encounter with Fliess and represents an early investigation of a circadian cycle.

There follows an address to the Psychiatric Society in which he urged that the effect of cocaine in melancholia, morphine addic-

tion, and alcoholism be investigated. The high cost of cocaine produced by Merck restricted its applicability. The introduction of a cheaper preparation by Parke, Davis and Company was the occasion of a short note comparing the effectiveness of both products.

The variety of topics covered in The Cocaine Papers goes well beyond that found in most pharmacological works. This productive phase was brought to a halt as reports of toxic reactions and addiction to the drug began to pour in. In the last paper Freud attempted to save cocaine from excessive criticism. He offered a physiological theory for the toxic effects—individual variations in the excitability of vascular centers—and hoped they could be obviated by administering the drug orally. He also noted that all reported cases of cocaine addiction had been former morphine addicts and surmised that a psychological factor was involved.

This volume will be welcomed by all students of the background of psychoanalysis.

ALEXANDER SCHUSDEK (NEW YORK)

THE PARAPRAXIS IN THE HAIZMANN CASE OF SIGMUND FREUD. By Gaston Vandendriessche. Louvain: Editions Nauwelaerts S.P.R.L., 1965. 192 pp.

Haizmann's Devil rides again. Since 1923 when Freud, in his paper A Neurosis of Demoniacal Possession in the Seventeenth Century, transported him from his peaceful and pastoral abode in the shrine of the Holy Virgin in Mariazell in Upper Austria and the archives of the old Imperial Library in Vienna into the world of modern psychiatry, this lively ghost of the past has continued his journey through the contemporary literature with remarkable alacrity. After having sojourned for a while in London, under the tutelage of Doctors Macalpine and Hunter (1956), he now emerges anew and with unabated vigor in the *Studia Psychologia* of the University of Louvain.

The present volume gives an account of the investigations conducted by the studious researchers of Louvain into the historical data of the Haizmann Case, with special reference to the merits or demerits of Freud's original study. According to the author, a psychologist and 'qualified researcher of the Belgian Foundation for

the Advancement of Scientific Research', the demerits prevail. No fewer than *nine* professors of the University of Louvain, including the director of its Institute of Psychology, assisted in Dr. Vandendriessche's work, furnishing 'human and scientific help', and the whole investigation was supported by a research grant of unnamed size. (How different, indeed, from Freud's virtually single-handed effort!) With this vast amount of resources the author went to work and assiduously compiled data, manuscripts, and other textual material—even an old folk song—related to the Haizmann story.

As will be recalled, one day in September Anno Domini 1677, i.e., in the *ninth* month of that year, the painter Christoph Haizmann (or Haitzmann), a native of Bavaria, arrived at the Holy Shrine of Mariazell in acute distress, after having confessed that *nine* years previously, in a state of despondency, he had succumbed to the *nine*-times-repeated entreaties of the Evil One; the latter had then persuaded the painter to sign a pact which contained the specific stipulation that he, Haizmann, would belong to the Devil body and soul at the end of *nine* years. Without going into the further vicissitudes of the sick artist's life and demoniacal tribulations, suffice it to say that, on the basis of Haizmann's clinical manifestations, his well-documented pathology, his pictorial and verbal productions, and other evidence, Freud interpreted the painter's condition as a serious depression initially caused by the recent death of his father and the subsequent pact with the Devil as the delusional reinstatement of the lost object. Under the heading, The Devil as a Father Substitute, Freud elaborated on this analytically and demonstrated how the exalted father, 'a reproduction of the father as seen and met with in childhood', thus became for the son the individual prototype of both God and the Devil, finally drawing a parallel to the earlier discovery in his Schreber analysis (1911) about the unconscious latent homosexuality in the infantile father-son relation. At the same time, Freud carefully stated that in his analytic approach to the Haizmann case he limited himself to 'summarizing the contents . . . of the *Trophaeum Mariano-Cellense*' and to narrating but 'a part of its contents'. With respect to certain details and some other peculiarities of the Haizmann story, such as the existence of *two* pacts with the Devil, the recorded depositions by various priests,

the exact dating of the respective pacts, the conflicting evidence in parts of the textual material which showed a paragraph interpolated by a strange hand, Freud wrote: '. . . *my suspicions were aroused.* . . . I found it impossible to explain the case in a manner which *disposed of all doubt,* but in the course of my study of the situation I ventured on a *surmise* . . . though the documentary evidence does not entirely cover it' (Italics added).

In a lengthy discourse, replete with argumentation and counter-argumentation, the author of the present volume takes issue with Freud, whose work he grades in a somewhat schoolmasterish way as deficient in terms of 'accuracy, selectivity, objectivity, certainty', and similar qualities. To single out only a few items from our author-headmaster's report card: Regarding 'objectivity' he declares that Freud's approach is characterized 'first, by a feature of unwarranted mistrust . . . Freud indulged in an exaggerated mistrust'. As to 'certainty', he criticizes Freud's cautious method which did not permit him in 'deciding upon a cherished solution' to offer it 'as a flawless solution, established beyond all doubt', thus lowering—'in all honesty', to be sure—'the level of certainty'.

It is a little disconcerting nowadays to come upon a professional treatise in which scholarly reticence and judicious expressions of doubt or uncertainty as to a textual discrepancy or a proposed solution are criticized on account of the very restraint employed. Perhaps Haizmann's Devil, hovering over the whole laborious effort, has something to do with it, though—as devils go—he receives relatively little justice in the pages of this book. His visible paternal-phallic attributes (beard, horns, multiple bony protuberances), so prominent in Haizmann's paintings, are hardly mentioned; nor is his huge, semi-erect penis which in one of the apparitions depicted by the sick painter reaches at least half of the Devil's total body size, a penis of really devilish appearance and proportions. This reviewer previously dealt with the conspicuous disregard for such important material in nonanalytic, ostensibly 'objective' studies of the Haizmann case.[1] The author of the present book, after considerable meandering through the intricacies of the story, focuses on the dating of the two pacts which, in view of manifest chronological and textual discrepancies, Freud analytically explored in the sense of a parapraxia, a *Verschreibung,* as Freud put

[1] This QUARTERLY, XXVII, 1958, pp. 107-111.

it. In regard to his reconstructive analysis Freud again speaks of an 'attempt at explanation'. The unconscious meaning of a parapraxia escapes the author almost entirely; for he believes he sees in it 'an intentional untruthfulness, a deliberate distortion of reality' (p. 152). Not unexpectedly the author's final conclusions read: '. . . Christoph Haizmann, in presenting the story of his bonds, has drawn a perfectly logical and coherent picture, even in the matter of the dates of these bonds, and even in the matter of the date of expiry. . . . Freud's psychoanalytic interpretation is to be replaced by an historic-juridical one. . . .' This, then, is offered as a flawless 'solution'.

To 'draw a perfectly logical and coherent picture' must certainly be viewed as a notable achievement on the part of a man who was owned by the Devil body and soul. The painter's mental illness and its part in his bizarre productions are disregarded in this so-called solution. Various hitherto unknown manuscripts which the author unearthed in the archives are worth reading in the original and the old folk song he discovered has a *schwermuetigen Character* befitting Haizmann's stark illness.

WILLIAM G. NIEDERLAND (NEW YORK)

NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD. Assessments of Development. By Anna Freud. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1965. 273 pp.

Anna Freud with her usual simplicity and clarity of style, illuminates the unique contribution of psychoanalysis to research in human development.

After Freud's discoveries concerning the genesis of personality, Anna Freud persistently focused her attention on development. She devised a method of child analysis, central to which is the recognition that children are not miniature adults. She offered a systematic, hierarchical presentation of the defense mechanisms of the ego. She elucidated the effect of early separations on mental health, thus sharpening understanding of stages of object relationships. She now introduces for the assessment of development a diagnostic sys-

tem that frees psychoanalysis from the restraint imposed by static, 'adultomorphic' classifications of childhood disorders, borrowed from child psychiatry.

In these four phases of her work, Anna Freud generated the era of child analysis and, with Hartmann and Kris, opened the road to psychoanalytic child psychology and ego-oriented psychoanalytic research and technique. Her emphasis on the use of clinical data from analyses and from direct observation of children not only extended the scope of psychoanalysis but also influenced all areas of endeavor connected with child care. The present book has already begun to affect the thinking of analysts both of children and adults. Some highly condensed passages raise issues and bring up questions requiring elaboration and discussion. Brief references to important issues, not essential to the central theme of the book, whet the appetite of the reader for further contributions by the author. Only the highlights can be touched upon in a brief review.

Anna Freud is still unconvinced that 'transference neurosis with children equals the adult variety'. The child's hunger for new experiences counteracts the urge to repeat, which is used in transference. The child's acting out in transference overemphasizes the aggressive pregenital components of transference and overshadows libidinous phallic-œdipal manifestations conveyed through free associations in adult analysis.

Tracing categories of behavior through each stage of development, Anna Freud shows how difficult it is to assess normality and pathology in childhood. The 'two way traffic in progression and regression', different rates of progress along different developmental lines, the threat of arrest, of malfunction, and of fixation in transitions from one developmental level to the next, the frequency with which children's disorders change their appearance—all these are obstacles that make prediction uncertain. Dissocial, addictive, and perverse behavior of children differs greatly from similar but much more complex disorders of adults. Adult analyses need to be freed from traditional attitudes in tracing development backwards.

To assess childhood disturbances and decide whether treatment is indicated and how intensive it should be requires consideration of all areas of psychic functioning. The 'metapsychological profile' provides a guideline for the appraisal of libido development, and of the phase-adequacy of object relationship; of aggression, its quantity, di-

rection, and correspondence to the level of the libido; and of ego and superego functions. It includes the evaluation of the proportion of progressive to regressive forces, of the child's potential for sublimation, his attitude toward anxiety and of the degree to which he can tolerate frustration. The 'profile' shows how to make a genetic assessment of fixation points and regression, and look into the dynamics and structure of conflicts, which we must do if we are to determine the severity of disorders and intensity of therapy needed. All Anna Freud's diagnostic categories emphasize the pathogenic process rather than the symptoms.

Child analysis, unlike more one-sided methods of treatment, offers a broad spectrum of therapeutic agents both in the specific analytic technique and in its unintended by-products, from which children with transitory disorders—neurotic, borderline, libidinally deprived, psychotic, organically ill, or mentally retarded—all can derive a chance to reveal and to cure themselves.

The profile offers a framework for organizing data about developmental processes, transitory pathology, and initial stages of disorders. Its revised form, suitable for the assessment of adults, was published by Anna Freud with E. Freud and H. Nagera in The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child in 1965. Apart from its intended use for diagnostic assessment and appraisal of psychoanalytic cures, the profile should become standard in longitudinal studies and replace the uncertain methods of selection of patients and candidates for training. Only in actual use can its full value be appreciated.

Anna Freud expresses many views that will open new vistas for psychoanalytic theory and for the technique of child and adult analysis. Topics of special interest are: the synchronization of the aims of drives with qualities of object relationships; the transformation of childhood symptoms into variant adult forms; prediction and reconstruction; transference neurosis; and the wide range of therapeutic tools available to the analyst.

One must wholeheartedly agree with her all-too-modest statement that child analysts, whose approach differs 'subtly' from that of adult analysts, 'make their own contributions to metapsychology and the theory of psychoanalytic therapy'.

JUDITH KESTENBERG (SANDS POINT, N. Y.)

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, VOL. XX. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1965. 566 pp.

This volume uses the same format and is up to the same high quality as its predecessors. It is divided into sections which include diagnostic assessments, aspects of normal and pathological development, contributions to psychoanalytic theory, and clinical contributions. The continuing policy of combining clinical and theoretical material both from practice and research, as well as maintaining a bridge between adult and child analysis, promotes a deeper understanding and stimulates fruitful interest.

The initial section is devoted to current work on diagnostic profiles. The diagnostic assessments represent further elaboration of the diagnostic profiles developed at the Hampstead Clinic by Anna Freud. In Metapsychological Assessment of the Adult Personality: The Adult Profile, by Anna Freud, Humberto Nagera, and W. Ernst Freud, assessment by profile is made on the basis of developmental considerations. Pathology is evaluated according to its interference with orderly and steady progress of development. Normality is judged by the quality of functioning, the pleasure derived, and by the quality of the individual's object and community relations. Although childhood and adult profiles are not identical in orientation, it is felt that the schemata may prove valuable for the correlation of items such as importance within the individual structure of particular drives, the quality of the defense organization, the content of ideal self and superego, and the developmental phase governing the quality of object relationships.

In Frequency of Psychotherapeutic Sessions as a Factor Affecting the Child's Developmental Status, by Christoph M. Heinicke, the findings are based on experience with ten children, four of whom were seen four times per week and six, once a week. All were judged suitable for psychoanalytic treatment in that permanent and severe symptom-formation of a predominantly neurotic character and the retardation of ego and libidinal growth were associated with permanent regressions and fixations. The paper is organized with regard to the assessment of each child at the beginning, one year, and two years after treatment. The Developmental Profile is used to integrate the information derived from the assessment.

Moses Laufer, in Assessment of Adolescent Disturbances; the Application of Anna Freud's Diagnostic Profile, writes of some of the changes needed in some sectors of the Profile, now used in all diagnostic work at the Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic, when used in the assesssment of adolescent disturbances.

The Impulsive Psychopathic Character According to the Diagnostic Profile, by Joseph J. Michaels and Irene Pierce Stever, is concerned with investigations of the impulsive psychopathic character. These have been directed toward developing an integrated picture of this type, and Anna Freud's Profile seemed a most appropriate vehicle for synthesizing the observations gathered to date.

In the section on aspects of normal and pathological development Peter Blos has a paper on The Initial Stage of Male Adolescence. He views adolescence as the second individuation process. Toward the close of adolescence, self and object representations acquire firm boundaries, so that they are resistive to cathectic shifts resulting in constancy of self-esteem and inner regulation of such self-esteem. Blos divides adolescence into a number of phases. Whether or not the reader accepts this formulation in part or in its entirety, the article is provocative, thoughtful, and increases the analytic understanding of adolescence.

Dorothy Burlingham contributes another interesting paper, Some Problems of Ego Development in Blind Children, in a field where she has displayed competence. The impression has evolved that in addition to the lack of vision, blind children lack the stimulation which vision normally exercises on the other senses. Consequently the blind must learn to protect themselves from harm in ways which are not based on identifications, but are acquired independently by methods of trial and error. Essentially they must achieve motor restraint. The energies which are held off from their normal outlet find expression in rhythmical movements, repetitiveness, and use of the musculature for other than active purposes, similar to regressions noted in the mentally retarded.

On the Development and Function of Tears, Phyllis Greenacre notes that weeping occurs most frequently associated with some internal change in psychic attitudes, coincident with a beginning change from hostile aggression to the use of energy in a positive and nondistinctive way. In weeping it is difficult to separate the metapsychological from overt physiological activity, and the total

process might be referred to as a psychobiological one. The tears come insidiously as part of the individual's attitude toward his modified external reality, usually with a reciprocal change in his self-appreciation and even in his self-image. This involves some degree of renunciation, and the resultant relaxation and the tears both express and help along such an internal change.

In Reflections Regarding Psychomotor Activities during the Latency Period, Elizabeth Kaplan enriches our understanding of the problems of the latency period. The motility of latency cannot be understood without taking into account the development of the perceptual motor organization, including such basic patterns as posture, walking, and speech during the pregenital period. During the first two years of life the avenue for gratification and discharge of erotic and aggressive drives should be through the musculature. With superego stabilization during the eight-to-ten-year period, there is increasing verbalization of aggression, taking the place of action. Thus ethical standards of right and wrong gradually come to replace bad and good based on parental prohibitions or permissions of actions.

Some Observations on Blind Nursery School Children's Understanding of Their World, from the on-going study of blind children at the Hampstead Clinic, is contributed by Doris M. Wills who emphasizes the importance of the mother as the child's auxiliary ego, helping him to cathect and organize his world without the aid of sight.

In the section on psychoanalytic theory Irving Handelsman has a paper entitled Effect of Early Object Relationships on Sexual Development. This is a careful, tightly reasoned, and timely contribution to our conceptions of the role of object relations in structural development. The purpose of the paper is to discuss sexuality by considering only the factor of object relations and specifically those difficulties which arise when there is some ego modification as a consequence of unresolved problems in the autistic, symbiotic, and separation-individuation phases of ego development. Handelsman contends that disturbance in any of these specific phases will result in a certain type of sexual adaptation, the outcome being dependent upon the nature of the parent-child relationship during the child's development in the early years.

Douglas Holmes, in A Contribution to a Psychoanalytic Theory of Work, writes that initially the functions imputed to work are a means of drive reduction and of binding the person to reality. These two functions of work exist in a complementary relationship in a given individual. Holmes concludes that the greater the investment of drive energy, the less neutralized energy is available for investment in work activity. This is an interesting concept but requires further elaboration and documentation.

A stimulating addition to the theory of depression is entitled Notes on Pain, Depression and Individuation, by W. G. Joffe and Joseph Sandler. They describe the depressive reaction and note the basic affective response forming its core. They feel this affect represents a fundamental psychological response rooted in a primary psychophysiological state which is an ultimate reaction to the experiencing of helplessness in the face of physical or psychological pain. This basic response can occur at any time in the individual's life span and should not be confused with those forms of depressive illness which are the consequence of further defensive and restitutive processes in which pathogenic identifications and introjections occur.

In Notes on Obsessional Manifestations in Children, Joseph Sandler and W. G. Joffe present an interesting theoretical contribution concerning the need to distinguish between ego structure and ego function. The true obsessional neurosis seen in children resembles its adult counterpart very closely and its development follows the 'classical etiological formula' for neurosis in general with a regressive analization of œdipal relationships and conflicts. The ego changes which occur are attributable at least in part to a functional ego regression, particularly those functions which relate to cognition, perception, and control in general. The authors conclude that drive regression to the anal-sadistic phase is an essential ingredient in the genesis of an obsessional neurosis, along with a particular type of superego structure, highly ambivalent object relationships, and a particular type of ego organization reflected in a particular style of the perceptual and cognitive functions of the ego.

The section on clinical contributions contains five articles. Puppet Play of a Psychotic Adolescent Girl in the Psychotherapeutic Process, by Rudolph Ekstein, is a scholarly, well-balance, and

carefully outlined clinical presentation. The psychotic child's play is seen to represent the ceaseless struggle between the forces of individuation and identity formation on the one hand, and the forces which aim toward symbiotic union or symbiotic conflict.

In The Mourning Reaction of a Ten-and-a-Half-Year-Old Boy, Yvon Gautier presents the thesis that the attempted introjection of the lost, ambivalently cathected object is prevented because a real object, the analyst, is available as a substitute, thus avoiding internally directed aggression and depression.

In Some Thoughts on the Technical Handling of Borderline Children, Sara Kut Rosenfeld and Marjorie P. Sprince highlight the difference in the treatment of the neurotic child, whose ego is sufficiently developed to enable the therapist to understand conflicts from transferred features, and that of the borderline child, whose treatment relationship is governed by his fragmentary ego, his proneness to acute anxiety, and his low level of object relationship.

Ego Impairment in Patients with Early Physical Malformations, by William G. Niederland, is a study based on patients with secret or hidden afflictions who tended to remain silent about their presence and kept them concealed from themselves as well as from the outer world. Niederland notes that body image distortion is an inevitable outcome of early physical defectiveness.

The final paper is a long, detailed clinical case study entitled Inhibitions of Ego Functions and the Psychoanalytic Theory of Acalculia by Pierre Vereecken. This is a well-written and detailed description of the treatment of a learning problem. Vereecken feels that the inhibition of ego functions and arithmetic is especially severe because functions have not been cathected with stable neutralized energies.

As must be expected in a volume of this nature, there is some unevenness in quality as well as considerable diversity of interest. The former can be overlooked since in the main there is a sufficiency of high quality, while the latter will serve to enlarge its appeal. This volume can be recommended to the student as well as the long-time practicing analyst. Both will find it rewarding.

STEVEN HAMMERMAN (PHILADELPHIA)

ACTING OUT. THEORETICAL AND CLINICAL ASPECTS. Edited by Lawrence Edwin Abt, Ph.D. and Stuart L. Weissman, Ph.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1965. 336 pp.

Twenty-eight papers cover theoretical, clinical, and treatment aspects of acting out as well as the use of psychological tests for prediction of the acting out tendency. Dr. Leopold Bellak, the author of the first paper, presents a fine general review of the concept, including a metapsychological formulation of the problem.

The remaining papers are of uneven content and often only distantly related to the subject. This appears to be the consequence of a very wide definition of the term. It is variously employed in the book to mean action in general, neurotic action in particular, impulsivity, overactivity, symptoms (homosexuality), asocial behavior, and criminality.

Acting Out is an interesting and readable book in which depth of understanding is sacrificed to width of coverage.

WALTER A. STEWART (NEW YORK)

DEATH AND IDENTITY. Edited by Robert Fulton. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965. 415 pp.

This collection of essays by psychiatrists, psychologists, sociologists, an anthropologist, a historian, and a gerontologist among others, is divided into four sections: a theoretical discussion of death; attitudes and responses toward death; grief and mourning; and a part entitled, Ceremony, the Self and Society. The editor, a professor of sociology at California State College, has written an introduction to each section.

The common denominator is a pragmatic goal; through understanding the problems involved, to show individuals how to preserve rather than to lose their identities. The thesis is that the way people live and the way they die are usually manifestations of a lack of commitment to the realities of existence, in which living and death are both immutable parts of a cycle.

Psychological Effects of the Atomic Bomb in Hiroshima: The Theme of Death, by Robert Jay Lifton, is a stimulating study of the impact of the tragic bombings on the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Among the survivors there was intense psy-

chic defense against acknowledging the horror of the carnage immediately following the atomic explosion; some of them walked about in a trancelike state in which complete denial and isolation of affective response led to an apathy that Lifton terms 'closure'. Subsequently, there developed in many instances an impenetrable guilt and a traumatic fixation upon some ultimate horror. In the years that followed, some of the survivors developed a personality state called *hibakusha* (one who was a victim of the atomic bomb) in which they felt separate from the rest of humankind, unwanted, and repellent since they bore the taint of death. To himself the *hibakusha* is degraded by identification with death and by his sense of guilt because he survived. The *hibakusha's* life was immutably altered by the experience of the bombing, and probably illness is maintained in many cases by severe radiation sickness. As among concentration camp survivors, the long months of malnutrition and illness physically devastated the victims permanently. The *hibakusha* are instances of 'the exception' by degradation, not by elevation.

In The Fear of Death, C. W. Wahl observes that the child who is adequately loved is likely to retain a portion of infantile omnipotence sufficient to dispel his fear of death. A defensive denial of death is often found in psychiatrists. Freud, he says, was an exemplary exception. After living for sixteen years with the daily reality of a malignancy and while his sons were facing death on the battlefield, Freud was able to say, '. . . to deal frankly with the psychology of death has the merit of taking more into account the true state of affairs and in making life more endurable for us'.

Erich Lindemann in an article entitled The Symptomatology and Management of Acute Grief, includes a study of cases of acute grief among survivors and relatives of dead victims of the Coconut Grove fire. If anyone doubts that object loss may lead to compulsive primitive identification, his doubts will be dispelled by this case material. This paper is requisite reading for those interested in severe reactions to object loss.

Also interesting is the chapter by Octavio Paz, entitled The Day of the Dead, an excerpt from his book, The Labyrinth of Solitude: Life and Thought in Mexico. Paz, author and diplomat, is the Mexican Ambassador to India. In this essay he compares the way Mexicans and North Americans tend to face death. He postulates

that the Mexican's turning away from the old Aztec concept of life and death as a re-creation by the gods of the universe, and the American's turning away from the Christian concept of death as a part of the cycle of man's rise and fall, have left both in a state of alienation toward death and life. Reading this essay, one vividly feels the tragedy of the psychic emptiness of many lives, even if unimpressed by Paz's preference for the old ways.

The psychoanalyst can read many of these papers with profit.

BERNARD BRODSKY (NEW YORK)

PATHOLOGICAL AND NORMAL LANGUAGE. By Julius Laffal, Ph.D. New York: Atherton Press, 1965. 249 pp.

If the reviewer takes the liberty of starting his task of examination and scrutiny with a personal reminiscence, it is because the anecdote to be reported throws light not only on the importance of the subject matter with which this book deals, but also on the peculiar type of *Problematik* of at least one aspect of its topic.

The first time this reviewer became interested in and acutely aware of problems of language goes back to a lesson in history shortly after World War I. One of the reasons why Germany lost that war—the history teacher told his class—was the fact that in 1916-1917 the Kaiser's government in Berlin had understood the meaning of the word *anxious* in the secret communications it received from the United States as denoting *aengstlich,* i.e., fearful or timid, and it had therefore dismissed the thought of America's entry into the war from its further calculations. (The alleged reports had said that America *was anxious to enter the war* against Germany, the meaning of which was understood in Berlin to be that the United States *was afraid of a war* against Imperial Germany.) If so, the Kaiser's government would have been well advised to consult the work of the great linguist Ferdinand de Saussure whose work, Course in General Linguistics (1915), had just been published. He had written: '. . . a particular word is like the center of a constellation; it is the point of convergence of an indefinite number of coördinated terms' and associative relationships.

Though the little war story—*se non è vero è bene trovato*—is not

contained in the volume under review, Laffal's scholarly study takes de Saussure's work as a suitable point of departure in a serious and painstaking effort to unravel the manifold complexities of normal and pathological language. The author, who is director of psychological research at the Veterans Administration Hospital in West Haven, Connecticut, and Associate Clinical Professor of Psychology at Yale University, offers a well-organized, integrated, carefully elaborated, though condensed presentation of what is known at present about the psychology of language. His stated aim, to be more precise, is 'a psychological analysis of language' and in view of his lucid discussion of older linguistic studies, the inclusion of rich contemporary material and the addition of his own pertinent findings in his field of linguistic research, one can say that this goal is *in toto* reached. In seven main chapters, numerous subchapters, many illustrative examples and tables, the author examines the collective and individual phenomena of language—originally differentiated by de Saussure as *la langue* and *la parole* respectively—and then proceeds to dissect in detail associative relationships, meaning ('how language does its work'), distortion and structure in free speech, language in relation to personal experience, certain characteristics of psychotic language, and finally 'language in psychoanalytic theory'. Laffal develops his often illuminating observations on language theory, language categories, language usage, and other types of verbal behavior for the most part against a background of solid knowledge in linguistics and psychology, in part also within the framework of analytic thinking and theory.

As to the latter and also with respect to various clinical vignettes, Laffal's data, interesting as they are, require a fuller investigation than the one undertaken in his study. At times one has the impression that he is more interested in the breadth and dimensional quality than in the depth of the material presented and that his formulations are designatory rather than analytically clarifying in character. For instance, in his frequently adduced example regarding associations to the stimulus word *table,* 840 out of a group of 1008 normal adults gave the response *chair,* 41 *food,* 21 *desk,* 15 *top* (p. 11), he correctly recognizes that the associations belonging to the furniture class refer to the same material, usually *wood* (p. 100). But he fails to relate this descriptive find-

ing to the common matrix of all verbal *wood* responses to which ultimately the very word *table* (as well as *material* and *matrix*) also belongs, namely, *mother*. As early as 1916, in his first Introductory Lectures, Freud dealt with these connections so beautifully that it may be permissible to quote, in part, from his text: 'And, speaking of wood, it is hard to understand how that material came to represent what is maternal and female. But here comparative philology may come to our help. . . . This seems to be an instance of the not uncommon event of the general name of a material eventually coming to be reserved for some particular material. . . . in the Portuguese language "*madeira*" means "wood". . . . a modified form of the Latin word "*materia*", which . . . is derived from "*mater*", "mother": the material out of which anything is made is, as it were, a mother to it. This ancient view of the thing survives, therefore, in the symbolic use of wood for "woman" or "mother".'[1]

There is scant reference to these connections in Laffal's book. One also misses them in some of his clinical illustrations. If, according to him, the verbal behavior of one of his schizophrenic patients 'shows the fantastic ways in which language may be turned to irrational uses' (p. 35), the point is missed (or at least not sufficiently stressed) that within his own field of view the 'opposite speech' of the patient was rational indeed, because it expressed concretely and verbally his total opposition to the numerous coercive procedures to which he had been subjected. Only much later, and outside the hospital, did psychotherapy disclose the patient's 'anxiety-ridden, obsessive fantasy of being unexpectedly seized and subjected to electric-shock treatment'—and, after the prior administration of forty-five electroshock treatments without result, was this 'fantasy' really so 'fantastic' or rather a concrete and, under the circumstances, well-founded fear? In fact, as the recorded interviews indicate, by dint of his strange verbal behavior the patient succeeded admirably in attracting the doctors' attention and having them concentrate on his linguistic bravura, thus averting further administration of the dreaded treatments. Also, in another clinical illustration the discussion of the case material does not seem to penetrate to the deeper strata of psychic functioning. In this case the author's detailed analysis of the verbal-

[1] Standard Edition, XV, pp. 159-160.

izations by a patient who had been a schizophrenic of many years' duration, revealed—not unexpectedly—a close connection between language and mother. Moreover, the author correctly recognized that the mother's profession as a prominent dental hygienist was an important element in the patient's oral type of speech (p. 148). Other notable factors in the patient's past and present verbal productions, nevertheless, remained unconnected in the psychological account: The patient, as an adolescent, had presumably expressed the idea that children were 'spit out of their mother's mouth' and he later liked to assert that he had been born by Caesarean section, though his delivery according to the mother had been a normal one (p. 128). Do not these verbalized ideas, however disconnected chronologically, belong to the same class of phenomena as his oral speech, expressing again *concretely* the archaically tinged thought of having been born with the help of forceps—that is, by *extraction* as in dentistry—and ultimately indicating the regressive wish to return to the 'mouth' of his mother, the very body part to which the 'dental mother', as he occasionally called her, gave her attention and from which he felt 'spat out'? These basic relations that pertain to the body roots of schizophrenic and symbolic language are not fully dealt with in Laffal's otherwise so lucid case presentations. Nor does his linguistic approach consider Lewin and Bunker's study on the Indo-European root *GN, KN, CN* (1951) or Greenson's analytic paper on the sound 'Mm . . .' (1954).[2] Other psychoanalysts, especially Freud, Ferenczi, Jones, Kubie, Rapaport, and Spitz, are well represented in the text.

Of great theoretical and practical interest are Laffal's pioneering studies on the significance, consistency, and differential meaning of so-called 'contextual associates' in the spoken or written language of individuals. His painstaking observations of these may open up new avenues for a more refined investigation in certain areas of clinical and psychobiographical work. Starting from the premise that on the basis of adequate sampling of an individual's language, his use of various key words and other verbal productions on different occasions, one can arrive at characteristic uniformities in a given context, he develops a methodical approach for the determination of contextual word-associates which yields 'some-

[2] This QUARTERLY, XXIII, 1954, pp. 234-239.

thing like a group of associatively related statements, phrases, categories, or words'. As the author shows, such a grouping can point to the latent content associated with the key words, and through extending the language analysis to synonyms, linguistic similarities, and the total vocabulary structure, the method can be used for the establishment of a system of categories that emerge from the language productions and yield further information as to reference, content, differential meaning, and so forth. This, then, is essentially a mining operation, if I may so designate it, employed by the author with great skill and impressive thoroughness. He presents no fewer than one hundred fourteen categories into which the vocabulary of the English language can be grouped. Laffal's category system is based on the common vocabulary; it is directed at relatedness within the general framework of contextual and meaningful reference including, but not limited to, synonymity. It reads, in part, like a methodical elaboration of Keats' poignant observation: 'Every point of thought is the centre of an intellectual world'.

More specifically, Laffal illustrates his technique with the help of a meticulous study of the contextual associates in the recorded language productions of two psychotic patients and of one printed autobiographical account, the famous Schreber Memoirs. Though his approach to the latter is slightly marred—he bases his linguistic exploration on the English translation of the *Denkwuerdigkeiten*—Laffal arrives through his examination of the language contexts of *God, male, sun* in Schreber's autobiography at the same conclusions as Freud in his 1911 Schreber analysis. This is a noteworthy result. It also confirms the fact that linguistics is complementary to psychoanalysis and at the same time demonstrates the possibility of selective validation of analytic propositions through thoughtful interdisciplinary methodology, if judiciously employed.

This book can be strongly recommended to analysts, psychiatrists, psychologists, and students of human language. For the practicing psychoanalyst, in particular, an awareness of linguistic patterning can be of considerable value in understanding his patients' multifaceted verbal productions.

WILLIAM G. NIEDERLAND (NEW YORK)

STREAM AND STRUCTURE OF COMMUNICATIONAL BEHAVIOR. CONTEXT ANALYSIS OF A PSYCHOTHERAPY SESSION. By Albert E. Scheflen. Philadelphia: Mental Health Research Foundation, 1965. 203 pp.

If communication is central to the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, Scheflen's monograph deserves careful objective review and study by analysts, for it focuses on fundamental theory of human communication and presents a detailed methodology stemming from this theory. In his opening section Scheflen stresses the importance of the search for naturally occurring behavioral patterns; he inveighs against the reductionism, the 'merely counting', of much research in psychotherapy, which, by emphasizing the sorting of preselected isolates, successfully eliminates 'the integration of humanness from the study'. Instead, wedding concepts of general systems theory and the operations of the natural history method, Dr. Scheflen studies communication by 'context analysis', which is a systematic description, level by level, of the structure of communicational behavior. Without statistics, attitude surveys or self-revelations by patient or therapist, he scrupulously avoids fragmentation into isolates and interpretation of unobservable events. The method is exact, explicit, painstaking, and methodical.

The first step is 'general observation', the repeated viewing of a motion picture sound film of a given session hundreds of times, at various speeds or even frame by frame, with and without sound. The second step is the abstraction of the communicative behavior: '*all* behaviors are studies; no *a priori* decision is made about the importance of a given event; if its absence and presence makes a difference in the participants or in the interaction, a behavior is communicative', regardless of any other function it may have. The third step is construction of the diachronic narrative, the sequential record of lexical and postural-kinesic activity coördinated on a common time graph. The fourth step is determination of what units are present and how they are organized. Tests are made to determine if behaviors are 1, interdependent, 2, contrasting, and 3, belong to the same context. 'When each tentative unit at a level has been tested, the structural units that occur together are looked at as possible units of a larger unit at the level above. They are grouped as a tentative unit and the three tests are again applied.

In this way we can construct the units level by level, at each step abstracting to a single entity until a whole session or meeting, or, in fact, a whole communicative system is seen as a single structure.'

To demonstrate the method of context analysis, the author applies it to a filmed session of a psychotherapeutic encounter of Carl Whitaker and Thomas Malone of Atlanta with 'Marge', a young schizophrenic girl and 'Mrs. V', her mother. After describing the participants, including physical appearance, personality makeup, and communicative behavior, Scheflen presents a six-minute segment of the multimodality transcript, and initial sequence of abstracted structural units. In complex detail the behavior of each individual, of each combination of individuals, and of the group as a unit is specified. This transcript, with sufficient study, amply demonstrates the great precision and exactitude possible in diachronic description.

This therapy session, like many others plotted in this way, has a characteristic hierarchic configuration, of two or three 'phases' of fifteen to twenty minutes duration, each consisting of frequent repetition of 'cycles', which in turn are composed of shorter 'periods'. The 'body' of the session is preceded by a brief period of 'introduction' and is ended by a brief period of 'termination'.

The diachronic narrative locates each event in the time dimension; the synchronic description locates behaviors in the structure of the communicative system. In great detail, level by level, Scheflen builds the structure of the entire filmed interview, demonstrating the interlocking integration of the structural units and their conjoint performance. Abandoning any distinction between 'verbal' and 'nonverbal' communication, the author finds the units to be composed of linguistic, kinesic, tactile, and other elements. There are three levels of organization of these units. The 'point' is a structure about the order of a syntactic sentence or its body motion equivalent (kinemorphic construction). The 'position' is an integration of several points corresponding to a more sustained position in an interaction. The 'presentation', the natural program of the positions occurring through an interview, is roughly equivalent to the concept of an appearance.

These units are performed by the interactants in multiple ways. Any individual can participate simultaneously in a number of units; conversely the behaviors of a number of individuals may

be necessary to complete a single unit. Simultaneous multiple performance is accomplished by means of *modality-splitting,* where one relationship may be postural at the same time another is lexical; and by means of *body-splitting,* where one part of the body participates in one unit with one person, while another part participates in another relationship with a second person. Units are performed *conjointly* or *individually*. Conjoint performances are of two types; *complementary* in parallel postures vis-à-vis a third party, and *reciprocally,* vis-à-vis each other. For each level, point, position, presentation, the author describes and illustrates each structural unit in terms of individual performances of each participant, of the complementary performances of each unit, and of the totality of the structural units. Furthermore, he characterizes in similarly precise and thorough fashion the mechanisms of maintenance and modification of the organization of the entire session.

Units of clinical techniques are conceived of as specialized structural units of communication, conceptualized within the framework of the total communication process and integral with it, and not as a series of isolated action-reaction paradigms of uncertain relevance. Units of technique are hierarchically organized: a 'tactic' consists of the organization of multiple 'maneuvers'; a 'strategy' is an organization of multiple tactics; a 'course' of psychotherapy is an organization of multiple strategies. Thus, rapport, rather than being an intuitive operation, 'is a definite structural unit consisting of very standard postural configurations, facial expressions, voice projection, and paralanguage—a unit initiated and terminated by a very small range of possible behaviors'.

In the final chapter, the processes in a session or a course of therapy are viewed both synchronically and diachronically. 'Combining these views allows us to choose the structural units at a given level, stick to this level, and examine the succession of the units. The sequence of structural units at a given level we have called the program.' Scheflen also discusses the meaning of 'change' from the points of view he has developed and repeatedly demonstrated throughout his presentation, emphasizing once more the importance of context, and its hierarchic organization in the assessment of therapeutic results. The appendix contains a list of the 'points' and the 'positions' of this filmed session and a complete lexical transcript.

This is not an easy book to read. There is a notable absence of facile verbiage and a refreshing freedom from *ad hoc* conceptualizing. The author's style is spare, often terse, which gives the language a seeming simplicity compounded of compactness and economy of expression. And it must be read as Scheflen 'reads' his psychotherapy films; at first diachronically, page after page, and then, synchronically, garnering comprehension level by level until the program of the demonstration of the method of context analysis becomes comprehensible. As the concepts are understood, as the nature of the methodology becomes comprehensible, the psychoanalytically oriented reader is very likely to conclude that this wedding of the general theory of systems with the method of natural history has produced a powerful analytic tool, as potent as the microscope, with direct and obvious application to a multitude of problems in psychoanalysis. The theory of psychoanalytic technique comes immediately to mind, with all the questions being raised about necessary and sufficient conditions, about modifications and parameters, and about the thorny question of assessment of change and its technical implementation. The difficulties in the psychoanalytic theory of affects and in the clinical manifestations of affect states appear to be amenable to elucidation with context analysis. It may foreshadow a new approach to diagnosis, or perhaps a psychoanalytic nosology.

This monograph is a challenge. It may provide analytic research with an objective, comprehensive, nonstatistical, yet precise and detailed study of the structure of a psychoanalytic hour, or, even of a whole analysis and with a methodology which shares in the great scientific advances of the twentieth century, moving boldly forward from Freud's brilliant beginnings.

E. JOSEPH CHARNEY (PITTSBURGH)

THE VANGUARD ARTIST: PORTRAIT AND SELF-PORTRAIT. By Bernard Rosenberg and Norris Fliegel. New York: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1965. 366 pp.

More than the challenge offered by the enigma of the work of art itself, the mystery and the elusiveness of the creative act have enticed a succession of students into an impenetrable jungle of patho-

graphic and analytic studies of artists in the hope of finding the explanation of artistic creativity. Some promising trails have been blazed, following the lead of Freud. It is, perhaps, too much to expect that so complex an enigma can be completely solved.

The authors of The Vanguard Artist—a sociologist and an educational psychologist—have had the happy idea of interviewing a group of twenty-nine recent, unidentified but prominent and successful representatives of the avant-garde of the early 1960's (for the most part, of abstract-expressionist painters and nonrepresentational sculptors). In one or two carefully designed interviews they sought to learn as much about the formative experiences and current attitudes of each of these highly gifted and creative men and women as could be gained from direct inquiry. They have compared their data and attempted to integrate it with psychoanalytic conceptualizations of the creative process and of the genetic background of the artist.

The brilliance of their achievement—and no less enthusiastic a description suffices—is not mitigated by their failure to advance us much farther toward complete understanding of our enigma. They have succeeded in mapping the surrounding terrain with a wealth of fascinating information dealing with, among other matters, social origins, familial patterns, education and its virtues and defects, significant identifications, awakening of awareness of creative gifts, feelings of alienation from prevailing social attitudes, self-evaluations, intellectual functioning, work habits, relations with other artists, critics, dealers, museums, and the general public, and last but not least, sexuality. Their quotations, summarizations, and formulations are informed with a profound sympathy for their subjects, a high level of æsthetic sensibility, and solid grounding in both psychoanalytic and sociological principles. The artists come alive through their statements, so much so that it is often tempting to treat the book as a *roman à clef*.

One is struck by the congruence of many of the findings both with previous sociopsychological studies such as those of Anne Roe and Eiduson and with those of such psychoanalysts as Greenacre, Kris, and Eissler. They confirm the predominance of middle-class origins, and of early appearance of talent, the important role of early encouragement by parents, and the crucial significance of a specific (usually male) object of identification qua artist, and the

universality of hard, disciplined work in the lives of successful creative people.

Talent is seen as a given, capable of being nurtured under certain circumstances, but impossible to account for. Some of its manifestations are, as Greenacre has pointed out, a heightened perceptual sensitivity, an unusual awareness of relationships, a special predisposition to empathy, and a superior sensorimotor equipment. It is only in a setting of 'character'—a high sense of personal responsibility, thoroughgoing individuation from early bonds to the family, profound dedication to work, and work-based self-esteem bordering on the grandiose—that talent effloresces into creative achievement. With all this, however, it remains clear that no uniform or consistent developmental pattern can be established that generates the 'creative personality'.

In an appendix the authors consider the question of sublimation as an explanatory concept for creative activity. A number of their subjects testify to the manifestly sexual quality of their creative experiences, and the authors therefore call into question such concepts as 'neutralized' and 'desexualized' energies. They are inclined to concur with Eissler, who doubts the occurrence of any energy transformations in the creative process, and with the investigators of gifted adolescents, notably Kris, who conclude that true 'sublimatory' activity is compatible with a change only in the aim of the instinctual discharge, without any transformation of the energies involved. This, of course, is consistent with the more refined and elaborate contemporary view of the role of the ego's activity in all complex psychic functions, allowing for intricate merging of drive and defense elements in the creative act without necessarily requiring such (to use Kris' term) 'bookish' notions as qualitative energy transformations.

It is of special methodological as well as substantive interest that Rosenberg and Fliegel derive from their brief interviews data that so closely coincide with conclusions from such profound and extended analytic studies as those of Kris and his collaborators. They do not go further to consider to what extent their data might cast doubt on the energy concept in general, but the reader is free to draw his own inferences. They (and indirectly their subjects) take vigorous exception to Eissler's idea that high-level creativity occurs only in states of sexual abstinence, or 'dammed-up' genital pres-

sure. Though they consider the possibility that the energy powering the creative act is pregenital in origin, they conclude that their data do not support this view. Their treatment of the subject highlights, certainly, the extent to which the concept of sublimation is submerged in a swamp of confusion.

Innumerable provocative questions emerge, of course, from such a book. In their treatment of the artists' rejection of middle-class values, for instance, the authors (obviously approvingly) suggest that this indicates the extent of their mature individuation. They do not consider that the artists' frequently-quoted contempt for collectors and the consuming public, on whom they are economically dependent, reflects their continuing struggle against unresolved dependency wishes; this is certainly a possibility that deserves some thought. Similarly, one may wonder whether the almost universal disdain for and contempt of the younger generation of rising talents (notably the 'pop' and 'junk' artists), representing as they obviously do a generational conflict having to do with more than æsthetic issues, might not reflect a failure to resolve old œdipal rivalries with the 'idealized father', referred to by Greenacre and cited with enthusiastic concurrence by the authors of this study.

Unfortunately, at times, the authors' tendency to identification makes it difficult to distinguish the views of their subjects from their own. One does not gather from their data any picture of the fluidity of object cathexes and of narcissistic self-preoccupation (often including hypochondriasis) that other observers whose data go beyond the artist's self-appraisal have been wont to report. One wonders, too, to what extent the data are determined by the relative stylistic and ideological homogeneity of the group sampled. Though it is likely that the younger generation of avant-garde artists (of whom this group is, as noted, generally scornful) would, despite their very different æsthetic attitudes, have comparable backgrounds and personality characteristics, a similar study of this group would be useful.

The reader whose interests go beyond the purely psychoanalytic cannot but be grateful for the chapter on The Negro Artist, which draws largely on the observations of the highly articulate artist-subjects to account for the clear disparity between the number of successful Negroes in other creative fields and their virtual absence in the plastic arts. The discussion of The Woman Artist as a new force

in the field also contains a carefully reasoned treatment of the recent emergence of a group of highly regarded and obviously talented artists in a field from which their sex had, with rare exceptions, been notably absent until the past two decades. The Vanguard Artist is, in sum, an endlessly fascinating, stimulating, thought-provoking volume, with special significance for those who are (and which of us is not?) particularly intrigued by the delights of visual art and the riddle of its creation.

AARON H. ESMAN (NEW YORK)

THE CANDLE OF VISION. By Æ (George William Russell). New Hyde Park, N. Y.: University Books, Inc., 1965. 175 pp.

The author of the introspective essays in this volume was a visionary and a mystic who described in distinguished poetry the imagery awakened in him. The title of the book expresses the author's idea that there is in every man 'a Lamp of the World', in his own case 'a mysterious life quickening within my life', that lights up the mysteries of nature and man. The author is unhesitating in his conviction that there is a 'divine imagination', an 'eternal memory' responsible for his visions and that he has the good fortune to share in this universal experience.

Mysticism is a cultural force, pervasive in the East and sporadic in the West, that cannot be dismissed because it lacks scientific validation. It is a phenomenon that demands study as an expression of psychic functioning. Psychoanalytic authors have directed their attention to the problem. I mention here only Freud's comments in Civilization and Its Discontents and the paper by Arlow, The Consecration of the Prophet.[1] It may be noted that Æ in describing the mystic union consistently uses the metaphor of the 'Mighty Mother'. He says, 'As the mother nourishes the body so the "Mighty Mother" nourishes the soul'. Æ denies the psychoanalytic concept of unconscious mental activity but he speaks of 'a deeper being of ours that has wider vision than the waking consciousness'. For him the source of these visions lies in 'forms peculiar to the mid-world and heaven-world'.

1 This QUARTERLY, XX, 1951, pp. 374-397.

As long as there are unanswered questions there will be a need for mysticism in man. The need lessens as knowledge increases. This is most evident in the progress of the physical sciences and increasingly so in the psychological sciences. To the latter psychoanalysis can contribute much. Coleridge expressed well his debt to the writings of the mystics: 'If they were too often a moving cloud of smoke to me by day, yet they were always a pillar of fire throughout the night, during my wanderings through the wilderness of doubt, and enabled me to skirt, without crossing, the sandy deserts of utter disbelief'. Today the deserts are not so vast as they were one hundred and fifty years ago.

This book deserves the attention of the psychoanalyst. To the student of mysticism it is a valuable source of firsthand material.

DAVID BERES (NEW YORK)

THEATRE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. Edited by Robert W. Corrigan. New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1965. 320 pp.

These essays by famous men (and no women) appeared in the Tulane Drama Review during the years 1956-1961. The book offers 'cameos' of the great, without a central theme, a hasty job with not enough concern for accuracy or scholarship.

There are three groups of writers: playwrights, artists, and critics. Playwrights writing about their vision and their method include Miller, Ionesco, Brecht, and Sartre. The critics similarly speak for themselves, but the artists, apart from the directors, are largely spoken for. Freud's essay on Psychopathic Characters on the Stage is included. It, however, deals mainly with the metapsychology of audiences and has little to do with the artist and acting. Unfortunately, this brief piece is unrepresentative of Freud and psychoanalysis; it was better left unanthologized and better yet unpublished, unless for historical reasons. In fact, Freud himself never did have it published. It appeared for the first time in THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY in 1942 (not in 1952 as Mr. Corrigan's all too brief footnote indicates) and it appears with proper introduction in volume seven of the Standard Edition. No mention is made that Freud wrote it in 1905 or 1906. THE PSYCHOANALYTIC QUARTERLY must share responsibility for permitting use of this article without

(I assume) requesting that an explanatory note on its history be included.

Without such a note, Freud sounds quite primitive. Handicapped by unawareness of his own later discoveries, he presents a simplistic topographical view in which what is conscious is normal and what is unconscious, pathological. Dramas involving conscious problems, such as conflict between love and duty, are enjoyed by normal people. Those portraying conflicts between the conscious and 'the repressed' are enjoyed only by the neurotic. 'Here', Freud writes, 'the precondition for enjoyment is that the spectator shall also be neurotic'. Since our very best dramas and literature are of the latter nature, who could want to be anything but sick? This may be historical Freud, but it is not Freud at his best, and is misleading to the general reader.

If this work was to be an anthology, more than Mr. Corrigan's brilliant and perceptive introduction and careless gathering together of luminaries is necessary.

ROBERT SEIDENBERG (SYRACUSE, N. Y.)

THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF ARTISTIC VISION AND HEARING. An Introduction to a Theory of Unconscious Perception. Second edition. By Anton Ehrenzweig. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1965. 272 pp.

In a preface to the present American edition (the first English edition was published in 1953)[1] the author reviews for us the reticent responses of psychologists to this book in contrast to its enthusiastic reception by artists. In effect, his ideas proved to be so harmonious with, and so prophetic about, the developing American art scene (particularly as it applied to abstract and action painting) that it justified its revival in the current edition.

Ehrenzweig suggests that the dubious responses from psychologists may be due to his use of novel psychological terminology (such as the 'surface' and the 'depth' mind) as well as to his intentional avoidance of the principles of primary process mental functioning in unconscious processes. He also proposes that deep unconscious processes may indeed not be chaotic but may be char-

[1] First edition reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXIII, 1954, pp. 454-456.

acterized by a 'complex organization that is superior to logical thought'. There is little doubt that Ehrenzweig has correctly pinpointed the area of conflict between his concepts and those of psychoanalysis.

Briefly stated, the author evolves his concept of artistic perception and artistic creation, beginning with the two principles which govern surface perception—the abstract gestalt principle and that of the perception of biologically relevant thing shapes. Accordingly, nongestalt-bound perceptions and accidental thing distortions are respectively relegated to gestalt-free and thing-free depth perceptions. The re-enforcement of depth perception at the expense of surface perception leads to a secondary reification of the thing-free elements and to a secondary gestalt elaboration of the gestalt-free elements. These newly articulated shapes are upwardly directed as newly enriched surface perceptions of art forms which may then impress us as beautiful or ornamental. There is a concomitant downwardly directed process in unconscious perception—namely, repression, which pulls perception toward inarticulate depth perception. Ehrenzweig finds the dynamic equilibrium created by these opposing forces characteristic of the psychoanalytic concept of mental processes. From these formulations on artistic perception and creation, the author suggests that we can gain 'new insights into the unconscious processes of perception and into ego functions in general'.

Ehrenzweig sharply parts company with psychoanalytic thinking when he proposes that mental functioning in both artistic perception and artistic creation can simply be extended to include mental functioning in general. Psychoanalysis has always contended that the mental processes in creativity are at least special and often unique. Whether we consider Freud's early conceptualization of creativity as a greater than usual flexibility of repression or Kris' formulation of controlled regression in the service of the ego, it is apparent that creative mental functioning has been viewed as an exception in both normal and pathological mental processes.

If one considers Ehrenzweig's concepts as they apply only to creative functioning, one gets the impression that he has anthropomorphized gestalt and gestalt-free perception with qualities of good and bad or ego-syntonic and ego alien. Accordingly, they may

be subject to the jurisdiction of repression which may result in a fate of either surface (conscious) or depth (unconscious) existence.

It is also an oversimplification to equate, as Ehrenzweig does, the psychodynamics of æsthetic appreciation with those of æsthetic creation. While it is acknowledged that æsthetic communication between the artist and his audience entails a mutual identification of each with the other, the total psychodynamics involved in an artist's given creative activity is uniquely different from those of the audience during an æsthetic experience.

In spite of their psychoanalytic limitations, Ehrenzweig's theories on creativity have a compelling attraction, especially as they may apply to some special forms of modern painting and music. For example, the extensive use by today's artists of unconscious images as the presenting objects or the theme of a given painting is in need of the type of understanding which this book attempts. There is little doubt that the spread and advances of psychoanalysis itself have contributed significantly to the current artist's indifference to the landscapes of external reality and his preoccupation with the perceptions and portraits of his unconscious images. But it is another matter to consider whether there is an over-all domination by the principles of psychoanalysis in artistic vision and hearing.

PHILIP WEISSMANN (NEW YORK)

EMERGENCY PSYCHOTHERAPY AND BRIEF PSYCHOTHERAPY. By Leopold Bellak, M.D. and Leonard Small, Ph.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1965. 254 pp.

This example of applied psychoanalysis and contribution to community mental health will instruct many psychoanalysts engaged in training psychiatric residents in hospitals, clinics, and social agencies. It will prove frustrating to those seeking magical answers to the complex reality problems and intrapsychic conflicts of typical clinic patients. The authors make it clear that effective brief psychotherapy cannot be accomplished by briefly trained therapists.

Most of the experience forming the clinical core of the volume was obtained at the 'trouble-shooting clinic' of the Elmhurst City Hospital developed by Bellak and his co-workers. The clinic was

available twenty-four hours a day for emergency consultation or treatment. Psychotherapy was limited to five sessions; those requiring prolonged treatment were referred elsewhere.

The authors believe that for brief psychotherapy to be successful the therapist must be able to make a rapid assessment, in the first or first two sessions, of the patient's ego functioning: his adaptation to reality, the regulation or impulsiveness of his drives, the quality of his object relationships, and the clarity of his thinking. The therapy is directed toward repairing the distortions, the patient's healthy functioning being utilized to enhance the transference. This approach acknowledges the dignity of the patient and contrasts with a currently stereotypic approach to the unsophisticated patient as inaccessible to psychotherapy, and for whom only supportive reassurance is indicated.

The authors do not ignore the limitations of brief psychotherapy, particularly when there are severe distortions of reality, when symptoms of latent psychosis make therapeutic communication impossible. In such instances there often is required adjunctive therapy; for example, drugs, electroconvulsive therapy, or other active intervention. These are not substitutes for psychotherapy. The value of family casework, vocational rehabilitation, and other community resources is outlined.

Some Clinical Syndromes comprise six chapters which discuss depression, panic, depersonalization, incipient and acute psychotic states, acting out, and severe somatic conditions. Each is a lucid psychodynamic exposition with recommendations for therapy and illustrative clinical summaries.

One appendix evaluates the findings which '. . . support the statement that very brief, well-conceptualized . . .' psychoanalytic psychotherapy '. . . has a demonstrable rationale and success, and merits a place in comprehensive mental health programs'. A second appendix presents five tape-recorded sessions of a depressed woman with suicidal impulses. The therapist's comments are interspersed as analytic evaluations of developments in the treatment. This case provides an explicit example of the therapeutic possibilities, difficulties, and limitations of brief psychotherapy.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

ROOTS OF MODERN PSYCHIATRY. ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHIATRY. By Mark D. Altschule, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1965. 208 pp.

The author unfortunately appears to lack the qualities of discrimination essential for a historian of ideas. His idea of history seems to be that of Lord Chesterton for whom history was a confused heap of facts. Striving to derive lessons from the past, he succeeds only in such observations as there is nothing new under the sun. History here is mainly a chronology intended to disparage Freud and psychoanalysis. Excerpts from philosophers and psychologists are strung together indiscriminately to refer to concepts which are not defined, but are left to languish inchoate; until a time when 'modern physiology and experimental psychology . . . [will] provide the data for a valid theory of behavior'.

'Perhaps nowadays', the author tells us, 'there actually is more interest in sex than in earlier years. Today the urge towards muscular exercise, instinctive in men not yet in middle age, cannot be easily satisfied in urban America; sexual intercourse is the only form of vigorous exercise that can still be conveniently indulged in by the adult male inhabitants of American cities.' History is unwittingly served by the book. It demonstrates the confusion in psychiatry that existed before psychoanalysis, and what psychiatry would now be without the clinical observations and basic organizing concepts of Freud.

LEONARD SHENGOLD (NEW YORK)

PSYCHIATRY AND PASTORAL CARE. By Edgar Draper, M.D. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. 138 pp.

This book is one of a series with the over-all title of successful Pastoral Counselling. This score of books deals with almost any conceivable aspect of the concerns of a minister who counsels with his parishioners or clients, from Counselling with Teen Agers to Ministering to the Dying and to the Grief Sufferer. The current volume is the only one in the series written by a psychiatrist, one well grounded in both fields. After having been ordained as a Methodist minister and serving in several churches, Draper returned to

school to go through the arduous sequence of medical, psychiatric, and psychoanalytic training.

The book is a valiant attempt to translate Freud's findings into a core of information that can help the minister to be a 'community mental health resource person', a role that the needs of his flock ascribe to him whether he seeks it or not.

Appropriately, the two main chapters are Pastoral Diagnosis and Pastoral Treatment. In the first, the author tries to widen the minister's perceptiveness to normal development and its vicissitudes, to the various ways of coping with stress, to the fact that the usual 'blessings' can be dangerous crises for some, that the call on the pastor for a friendly chat may disguise a desperate cry for help, etc. Above all, he tries to impart some of the meaning of transference to a profession which has given open recognition to its existence by calling some of their members Father, Mother, Sister, and Brother. Wisely, he counsels a judicious use of awareness, not interpretation. This, essentially, becomes the basis of what Dr. Draper refers to as pastoral treatment. He advocates a supervisory form of training such as he himself has successfully conducted.

He carefully avoids making this a 'how-to' manual and raises many more sound questions than he offers easy answers. Finally, Dr. Draper asserts quite convincingly that psychological analysis of religion does not destroy it; rather the better understanding of its ego-syntonic functions may enhance its value for many.

GERHART PIERS (CHICAGO)

THE FAMILY AND THE LAW. By Joseph Goldstein and Jay Katz. New York: The Free Press, 1965. 1229 pp.

This source book of case and textual materials compiled by Goldstein, a Professor of Law at Yale University, and Katz, a psychiatrist and Associate Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at Yale Medical School, demonstates that data from many disciplines—psychology, philosophy, political science, genetics, psychoanalysis, sociology, anthropology, religion, medicine, geriatrics, economics, social work—must combine with law in solving the problems of present-day family discord.

Intended for use in teaching family law and as a reference book

for lawyers, legislators, and judges, The Family and the Law is a pioneering 'elbow-to-elbow collaboration' by scholars from two professions. Goldstein and Katz are architects and builders although never with materials of their own making: aside from the preface and introduction totaling but seven pages, Goldstein and Katz write chapter headings and rubrics only. The materials are judicial decisions, trial transcripts, commentaries, and excerpts from writings in the fields of law and psychiatry. The compilation sets out a total of ten quotations from the writings of Sigmund Freud, fifteen from those of Anna Freud, and many from other relevant disciplines including religion and philosophy—but not a word from the writings of either Goldstein or Katz.

Professors Goldstein and Katz have provided source materials for prying open the question whether there is a better way than litigation to deal not only with divorce but with additional commonplaces of family strife, such as allocating and overseeing custody of children of broken homes, the criteria to be followed in adoptions, the proper compass of the alimony burden, and under what conditions marriages should be annulled.

Even the modernizing process in the New York legislature (1966) has not removed grave risks confronting the professional advisor of patients in marital difficulties. While retaining recrimination, consent, and condonation (which Goldstein and Katz deal with under the heading, The Relevance of Sexual Gratification to Reorganizing Relationships) as defenses to an action for divorce on the ground of adultery, the legislature has required the parties to participate in a conciliation proceeding as a condition to winning a divorce. The risk of mandatory conciliation procedures, like the risk of advising a patient to explore reconciliation, is that in the course of inconclusive efforts at reconciliation the other spouse may acquire the defense of condonation or recrimination, thereby creating what A. P. Herbert called 'Holy Deadlock'.

If the compilers do not express value judgments, their materials often do. After quoting a 1959 New Jersey court opinion in an action by the husband for a divorce on the ground of his wife's lesbianism, to the effect that 'few behavioral deviations are more offensive to American mores than is homosexuality', Goldstein and Katz proceed to excerpt large sections of Freud's Three Essays on Sexuality, published in 1905. The juxtaposition carries its own

commentary. Every day one sees the lack of such perspective. The 1966 New York divorce legislation, while extending the grounds so far beyond infidelity as to suggest that the doctrine of the matrimonial offense is being scuttled, proceeds to illustrate the tenacity of cherished concepts by not only retaining the significance of one act of adultery but adding a homosexual act to the list of grounds for divorce.

Ill-equipped as courts, judges, and lawyers have usually been by training and orientation to cope with emotionally upset members of discordant families, our legal system must continue to administer the governmental powers to dissolve the legal obligations of marriage, free the parties to contract with new mates, provide collectible financial support, determine title to property, and award custody of children. Before the unhappy victims reach those terminal stages, the breakdown of their family relationships demands understanding for which modern man looks to psychiatry. The compilers have rendered a substantial service in making possible better communication between the two concerned professions, and at the same time helping progressive law schools to educate lawyers, legislators, and judges of the future in the disciplines other than law which shape competent work with the troubled family.

WILLIAM G. MULLIGAN (NEW YORK)

SIGMUND FREUD IN UBERSETZUNGEN (SIGMUND FREUD TRANSLATED). A Bibliography of Freud's Writings in Book Form and Anthology. Translated 1945-1960/61, By Hans W. Bentz. Frankfort A/M.: Hans W. Bentz Verlag, 1961. 58 pp.

The bibliography is a compilation of the translations of Freud's writings based on the title entries of the *Chartotheca Translationum Alphabetica* (International Bibliography of Translations on Index Cards). The editor's foreword explaining the make up and purpose of this reference tool is written in German and so has limited usefulness. The Introduction, also in German, written by M. Bayer-Meissen, gives a brief historical background of Freud's theories and Jung's defection. The importance of the application of Freud's theory to child and personality development is stressed. The foreword ends with a quotation from Stefan Zweig emphasiz-

ing Freud's influence on twentieth century thinking. The table of contents in German, English, and French is followed by a trilingual listing of abbreviations.

The main part of the Index gives the alphabetic listing of the titles of the original publications, including the publisher's name, year of publication, and retail price. Section A lists translations of the Collected Works into English, Japanese, and Spanish, but omits the Portugese noted in Grinstein's Index of Psychoanalytic Writings, Volume I. (Grinstein, on the other hand, omits the 1959 translation into Spanish.) Section B lists the English translations of the *Briefe-Lettres,* 1873-1939. Section C lists extracts of other works and single titles. The first entry given in Danish includes neither the German nor the English title. There are discrepancies in the notations of the different translations of the Living Thoughts of Freud, edited by Robert Waelder.

An appendix listing Bibliographically Incomplete Titles follows the main part, and is then followed by a listing of: A. Translations' Titles (alphabetically), B. Titles of Originals and Titles of Translations in One Alphabet, C. Original Titles Arranged by Languages of Translations, D. Publishers of the Originals, E. Publishers of the Translations, F. Translators. There is also a list of the translations into various languages, including the number of translations of the individual papers.

The principal feature of this series (International Bibliography of Translations on Index Cards) is that all translations of the works of one author are listed in one place. But for the researcher this particular volume of the series is of little value: the list of Freud's writings is limited to one hundred eighty entries; many of the main papers published in the *Gesammelte Werke* are not listed; and the Standard Edition translations are not given.

To this reviewer the only advantage of this Index seems to be a more complete listing of the recent translations, especially in the cheaper editions, than can be found in Grinstein's Index. However, the final volume of the Grinstein supplement may yield this information.

LISELOTTE BENDIX (NEW YORK)

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Julian L. Stamm

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ABSTRACTS

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. XII, 1964.

On the Identity Crisis in American Psychoanalysis. Maxwell Gitelson. Pp. 451-476.

This timely paper examines crucial issues confronting psychoanalysis: its adoption by American psychiatry as a dynamic and therapeutic tool, the growing criticisms of its not being more therapeutically effective in all areas of human behavior, and finally, its struggle to maintain its identity in the face of splinter movements. Psychoanalysis is a science and the analytic paradigm was established by Freud to meet a crisis in the field of human behavior as the theories then in vogue were inadequate to the task of understanding or treating mental illness.

Gitelson doubts that another crisis now exists and believes that our current period in analysis is comparable to the 'normal period' in any science during which time there is further working through, elaboration, and corroboration of the paradigm. He cautions against too much therapeutic zeal in analysis, a trend which might tend to dilute its investigative powers. The classic technique must be retained in order to pursue the scientific investigation of human behavior. A reappraisal of the qualifications for future analysts is also suggested; and these should not necessarily be based on a medical or psychiatric background.

Narcissism and the Ego Ideal. John M. Murray. Pp. 477-511.

Murray emphasizes the importance of analyzing the narcissistic as well as the libidinal components of the ego if structural change is to be achieved. The ego ideal is transformed from primordial pregenital origins by change of aim and object relationships. It may lose its intactness and regression to the level of its earlier narcissistic antecedents may ensue.

Various types of symptomatology can be explained on the basis of regression from the desexualized and deaggressivized components of the ego ideal into more primitive pregenital components. Such disorders as schizophrenia, depression, homosexuality, and criminality are dealt with by clinical examples. An individual with severe narcissistic fixations may be unable to relinquish the primitive satisfactions once enjoyed and to liberate himself from his sick attachment to the primary mother. Failure to achieve the ego ideal may lead to regressive processes with release of homosexual libido and concomitant guilt (social anxiety).

The criminal is depicted as an individual with the persistence of the old infantile, pregenital narcissistic attitudes. In the criminal these elements have not been transformed into the socially useful elements of the sound ego ideal.

Some Clinical Considerations of the Ego Ideal. Helene Deutsch. Pp. 512-516.

In this paper Dr. Deutsch considers the examples of ego ideal discussed in Murray's paper. The development of the ego ideal represents an oscillation between projection and introjection, the identifications with parents—the interplay between ego ideal and superego. Observation of cultural backgrounds provides us with a better understanding of the differences in ego ideals. In some the

ego ideal is more abstract and internalized, in some it is gratified in action. This may result in varying degrees of sublimation or the expression of the ego ideal more directly in sexual terms. In those whose ego is fixated on precursors of the ego ideal, a typical outcome may be an 'as if' personality whose ego ideal fluctuates according to the object of identification.

Deutsch cites many varieties of ego ideal: one in which the group situation provides the sole outlet for the functioning of the ego ideal; or the 'fragmented ego ideal' cited by Murray and exemplified by the impostor and in the fragmented personality of Lawrence of Arabia. Lord Jim was one who experienced his ego ideal only in fantasy. In other instances reality testing is impaired and the ego succumbs to an inflated ego ideal illustrated in Don Quixotism. Other special variants of ego ideal formation are based on the particular mother-child unit.

Some Considerations Regarding the Ego Ideal in the Psychoanalytic Process. Grete L. Bibring. Pp. 517-521.

In discussing Murray's paper Bibring emphasizes the need to further define and understand the ego ideal, the theoretical elaboration of which has been neglected in the past. Some of the characteristics of the ego ideal mentioned are: its predominantly narcissistic features, its role as a guide to ego and superego, its influence by holding forth a promise, and, genetically, the strength it derives from libidinal drives as opposed to superego, stemming from aggressive derivatives. Bibring concurs with Murray's emphasis on the infantile sources of the ego ideal, their significant role in the development of neurotic conditions, and the special use at times of the analyst's own ego ideal in the analytic process.

An important question is raised concerning the role of the analyst's ego ideal; does this problem arise only when the analyst points out the irrational, infantile, and narcissistic elements in the patient's ego ideal and compares it with the mature ideal of adults? 'And are there other patients whose analysis is influenced greatly by introducing a new model of ego ideal?' Bibring agrees that the importance of re-organization of the ego ideal is an essential prerequisite in every successful analysis.

Narcissism and the Prepuberty Ego Ideal. Ives Hendrick. Pp. 522-528.

The author reiterates Freud's original concept of narcissism; namely, that it represents one of the vicissitudes of libido and is characterized by a cathexis of self-representation. He does not subscribe to Murray's view that the ego ideal is a transformation of narcissism but rather believes it to be an organization of part-object representations cathected by narcissistic libido which had cathected more primitive self-representations during earlier autoerotic phases of development. Many forms of psychopathology, as in schizophrenia, some severe forms of character neurosis, and criminality, cannot be fully understood without realizing that the ego ideal in such cases is very fragile. Different ego ideals express a variety of instinctual aims, both libidinal and aggressive. Hendrick discusses one particular variety of ego ideal, namely, the prepuberty type. Here there is failure of displacement of the love of the idealized person to new objects in adolescence. He, too, affirms the necessity of exploring psychoanalytically the vicissitudes of the development of the ego ideal in various personalities.

Freud's Uses of the Terms 'Autoerotism' and 'Narcissism'. Mark Kanzer. Pp. 529-539.

This important paper reviews the terms autoerotism and narcissism from a historical perspective in the light of Freud's evolving constructs. Kanzer points out that the term autoerotism has always referred to sensual pleasure derived from one's body. The term narcissism 'in conjunction with the development of ego concept has . . . implied an attitude of love toward the self . . . in which the sexual aims have been delibidinized and at least a rudimentary self-image has been formed'. Both terms were further clarified with the delineation of the self-concept.

Kanzer suggests that autoerotism can be understood in terms of the pleasurable experiences for the ego derived from somatic sensations associated with the direct discharge of drive energy—a pleasure obtained from one's own body in the absence of another object. It may be specifically defined in terms of the particular source of the pleasure; e.g., oral or phallic.

Narcissism is no longer viewed as an advanced autoerotic organization of libido but part of the ego organization that functions with the onset of mental life, and encompasses 'the pleasurable feelings of identity between the self-image and the ego ideal associated with the discharge of neutral energy'. Primary narcissism may be referred to as an ego cathexis or self-cathexis depending on whether 'reference is made to the ego system or self-image'.

Some Aspects of Pathological Narcissism. Thomas Freeman. Pp. 540-561.

Freeman subscribes to Glover's viewpoint and defines pathological narcissism as 'a condition which arises when there is a defensive exaggeration of narcissism which disturbs normal function and leads to mental suffering'. The pathological narcissism of the psychotic patient differs from that observed in certain psychoneurotic patients and in sexual deviates. The narcissism seen in the latter two types appears to arise from an advanced level of ego and instinctual development, whereas the narcissism of the psychotic stems from a more primitive matrix associated with primary process functioning. It is suggested that the concept of pathological narcissism may be of value in studying the relationships between the psychoses, borderline states, and psychoneuroses.

Psychoanalytic Studies on Joseph Conrad. III. Aspects of Orality. Bernard C. Meyer. Pp. 562-586.

The author presents material from various novels of Conrad, such as Amy Foster, The Secret Agent, and An Outcast of the Islands, to demonstrate Conrad's unresolved oral fixations and how the vicissitudes of his own life are depicted in his novels. For example, Amy Foster is a narrative depicting Conrad's own expatriation, his marriage to an English girl, and his subsequent fear of *dethronement* by his son, Bornys. The depiction of a symbolic reunion of mother and child is a frequent theme of Conrad. His writings not only provided an outlet for his active oral cravings but expressed the more subtle aspects of orality as conceptualized in Lewin's oral triad.

In Conrad's personal life, as well as in his fictional world, orality played a

striking role. Likewise, the death of Conrad's mother when he was very young left a profound melancholic imprint on his character and a constant yearning to retrieve the lost mother. It is suggested that Conrad avoided his mother tongues —Polish and French—in his literary creations in order to maintain a screen between his fictional world and his own unhappy childhood. Yet, his narratives did not suffice to conceal his melancholy, and in the last phase of his life 'his thoughts turned to going home to Poland, there to live out what remained of his life and, no doubt, to die too . . .' .

Parameters in Child Analysis. Samuel Weiss. Pp. 587-599.

The author stresses the need to maintain a basic model technique in child analysis and to analyze carefully all parameters employed if the analysis is to succeed. Weiss further questions the validity of certain traditional procedures in child analysis, such as presentation of gifts by the analyst, consultation with parents, and manipulation of the transference. Does analytic theory apply to the technique of child analysis or does the immaturity of the child's ego require fundamental alterations in the basic technique?

JULIAN L. STAMM

Journal of the Hillside Hospital. XII, 1963.

On the Problem of Character Neurosis. Maxwell Gitelson. Pp. 3-17.

This succinct review of character, symptoms, neurotic character, character neurosis, character neurotic types, and borderline cases begins by defining character as an adaptive synthesis of biological givens, the quality of the infantile environment, psychic structure, identifications, and social mores. The phallic position has been reached and the œdipus complex resolved. Psychoneurosis is evidence of the failure of defense and a partial disruption of this synthesis; symptom formation closes the breach. Neurotic character formation involves the œdipus complex with a quality of compelled and patterned acting out; repression and regression are hardly seen. The character neurotic presents the picture and structure of defense; the personality is shaped by the neurosis. In contrast with the neurotic character the conflict is internalized; in contrast with the psychoneurotic symptom, secondary gain is greatly enhanced.

Different character types illustrate different constellations of factors entering into character; i.e., erotic, compulsive, narcissistic, and their mixtures. The borderline cases contrast with those character structures which stem from the vicissitudes of the œdipus complex. Here, the central conflict is the preœdipal relationship to the mothering person. Instinctual and ego development are grossly out of phase. There has been a lack of stable object relations and compatible identifications.

The disorders of character may be more prevalent today partly as a result of the psychological climate of families in which parental status, differentiation, and functions have become uncertain. Repression is no longer the primary and central mechanism of defense and adaptation.

Character Neuroses. Therapeutic Problems. Lewis L. Robbins. Pp. 18-29.

People with character neuroses, while dissatisfied with themselves, do not experience the anxiety or the incapacities that usually accompany the typical symptom neuroses. Intrapsychic conflicts are handled through more or less ego-syntonic, highly individualistic impulse-defense configurations. Thus, the principal motive forces for analytic work, anxiety, and suffering are absent. The therapeutic process involves the mobilization of old conflicts. The resistances which arise demonstrate the patient's style and manner and are significant subjects for study. The analyst needs to serve as an additional autonomous ego, as well as the object of the patient's drives in the transference. As symptoms develop in the analysis, character resistance may become transformed into intense transference resistance. A cautionary note: since ego defenses are undermined in the course of analysis, a careful assessment of the degree of ego distortion is necessary in order to determine whether the patient can undertake and utilize the analytic process.

Some Technical Problems in Character Analysis. Emanuel Windholz. Pp. 30-40.

Certain character traits may exert a resistance to the analysis of unconscious defense mechanisms. Unanticipated changes may occur in the function of some defensive attitudes. An example of a particular problem is the negative therapeutic reaction wherein we must search for the punitive superego forces and the masochistic attitudes of the ego. An awareness of the relationship between shifting transference reactions and masochistic attitudes is important. A reliable therapeutic alliance has to be based on safely established identifications. The patient can then also use the support of the analyst's 'autonomous' ego as his own ego becomes helpless, regresses, and abandons defenses. A 'good analytic hour' is evidence that conditions have been created for a spontaneous process of recall. The relationship between transference reactions and externalizations has been worked through. Regression can now be used by the ego for specific purposes and the patient can lift out of repression and re-experience in the transference specific infantile traumata.

Regression. Technical and Theoretical Problems. Sandor Lorand. Pp. 67-79.

Regression is not only a defense mechanism. It can be thought of as a basic drive present all the time in various degrees. It involves different parts of psychological functioning. During treatment, the roots of the original fixation toward which the patient tends to regress will be uncovered gradually. In analysis, new and deeper regressive tendencies may occur and analytic intervention involves questions of timing and dosage. It is important to evaluate the strength of the unsettled conflicts in the patient's neurosis as well as the degree of early fixations and pregenital conflicts. The best way to study regression is in dreams. Dreams can demonstrate to the patient his tendency to regress in order to avoid the present. For patients with strong regressive tendencies, guidance and exploitation of the transference have to be employed at times in order to strengthen the mobilized drives for adult adjustment.

The Genesis of a Compulsive Neurosis. Lucie Jessner. Pp. 81-95.

The history of a nine-year-old boy with a compulsive neurosis showed the prominent feature of a constitutional disposition toward hyperactivity. In infancy he developed rhythmical patterns to deal with a surplus of motor impulses. These were later elaborated into compulsive rituals. His hyperactivity and severe anxiety, re-enforced by early stressful experiences in regard to feeding, illnesses, sibling birth, and habit training, seemed to lead to premature ego and superego functioning. Parental apprehensiveness and contradictory expectations also contributed to his illness.

The Treatment of a Septuagenarian. Martin Hurvitz. Pp. 99-105.

The brief treatment of a seventy-one-year-old depressed married man was directed to a relief of his guilt concerning his sexual needs as well as a ventilation of his repressed anger. The criteria for treatment of the elderly are the same as those for the young. Œdipal sequelae and sexual interests persist. The aging process, while gradual, impairs physical integrity and contributes to a loss of self-esteem. Socially, any process which maintains the older person in contact with the mainstream of life prevents the regressions and deteriorations of age.

The Psychoanalytic Approach to Group Psychotherapy. Walderedo Ismael de Oliveira. Pp. 156-166.

Among analysts there is much variation in points of view regarding theory and technique. Three sources of the author's particular stance are: Freud's theory of superego formation and the inner reality of the child; Melanie Klein's ideas of the primitive stages of children's mental functions, the schizoparanoid and depressive positions; Bion's theories of group dynamics. Bion postulates that a group forms in regard to an external reality task. The work group functions similarly to the ego of an individual. 'Basic assumption activities' interfere with the rational activity of the group. These are 'dependence', the search for leader nourishment and support; 'the pairing group', hope and expectation involving the leader and creating a twosome; 'fight-flight', a collective fantasy to fight against a persecutor or to defend oneself by running away. Therapeutic group dynamics oscillate between 'dependency' and the reproduction of primitive stages of development and integrative forces. Considering the former, group settings are much nearer psychotic patterns of conduct. Here then is the essential difference between group and bipersonal analytic situations. The group mobilizes the most ancient irrational fantasies and anxieties.

Ego Ideal, Excitement, and the Threat of Annihilation. M. Masud R. Khan. Pp. 195-217.

The analysis of a schizoid man showed how infant disturbance and a particular type of child-mother relation led to the defensive formation, through idealizations, of a highly organized secretive ego ideal. In his total life he operated as four different types of characters: Mr. A, a meek diligent teacher; Mr. B, preoccupied with religious thoughts; Mr. C, the fantast of erotic daydreams and perverse practices; and Mr. D, the most jealously hidden one. Mr. D existed as a

being with a terrible expectancy of annihilation. Yet, if this could be endured, he would become his ideal self, a creative human being to whom everything has been given. His constant attempts to control, arrange, and manipulate his experiences via these 'characters' disclosed an underlying excitement. He neither could absorb nor regulate this, but could only react to it. A coercive superego, hypochondriacal and psychosomatic symptoms were related to this excitement.

His primitive pleasure self and the maternal object had been dissociated and split off through the process of idealization. It was used to protect the self (infant) and the mother from the strains of disillusionment of childhood. This type of defensive idealization arose in the matrix of localized or episodic infantile satisfaction via the nursing mother. Specific affective crises were met, but continuity was not achieved. As Mr. D, the transference was one of fusion, good nursing experiences, and ideal maternal (nonverbal) response. The treatment generally was a matter of marking time until the 'ideal' session would happen and he would rediscover his ideal self and be reunited with it. There was a corresponding dread of annihilation and madness. The core of these dreads were those times of infantile quiet excitement and of infantile rage when mother's attention lapsed. The dread of madness was also a dread of abandonment and helplessness. The character of Mr. D, with its magical alliance of ego and ego ideal, denied dependency needs.

Perception and Memory. Nathan Roth. Pp. 218-231.

Otto Pötzl postulated a relationship between primitive, nascent, and undeveloped sense data with memories of the distant past. Clinical psychoanalytic evidence tends to verify this. In an illustrative case, one could trace many determinants of dream content containing visual elements of surprise as well as associations preoccupied with the past. These followed an ophthalmologic examination which included perimetry. The effects of the incompletely developed percepts of this examination, as well as his poor vision following this, were as stated above. Pötzl's statement is a particular example of a more general proposition: i.e., the more primitive the sense data developed by the perceptual apparatus, the more primitive and infantile are the memories brought to consciousness.

JOSEPH AFTERMAN

American Imago. XXIII, 1966.

Albee's Tiny Alice. John W. Markson. Pp. 3-21.

After an excellent synopsis of the play, its divers œdipal themes are explored. Alice is compared with Jocasta and the Eleusinian mother goddess. An idiosyncratic use of the negative œdipal concept detracts from the discussion.

A Nursery Rhyme: One, Two, Buckle My Shoe. . . . Thomas Mintz. Pp. 22-47.

'One, Two, Buckle My Shoe . . .' traces psychosexual development. The numerals refer to age and the words indicate in sequence oral, anal, phallic, and genital interests and activities. Nursery rhymes are devices passed from adults to children by which the latter attempt magically to bring about their fondest wishes. The majority of nursery rhymes are 'precipitates' of ballads, folksongs,

barrack-room refrains, ancient custom and ritual, and the like. There is evidence, both historical and in the manifest content, that this rhyme is a derivative of a druidic ceremony in which human sacrifices were burned.

Aristophanes: The Clouds and The Wasps. N. N. Dracoulides. Pp. 48-62.

In The Clouds Socrates conducts a psychic investigation with the subject lying on a couch attempting free association. In The Wasps a therapy identical to psychodrama is portrayed. The author calls these plays the origins of psychoanalysis and psychodrama respectively, on the sole apparent basis of their having long preceded the works of Freud and Moreno. Another instance of *post hoc* reasoning is found in the contention Aristophanes liberated himself of wrath and aggression in writing The Wasps inasmuch as subsequent plays are filled with joy and affection.

Keats: *La Belle Dame Sans Merci.* A. Hyatt Williams. Pp. 63-81.

La Belle Dame Sans Merci is a personification of pulmonary tuberculosis which had taken the lives of the poet's mother and brother Tom and which in 1819 was threatening the life of Keats himself. On a deeper level it had the significance of the death dealing, bad-breast mother. While the verse by verse analysis of the poem is in places tendentious, this article in the main is convincing.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

Psychoanalytic Review. LIII, 1966.

Some Dynamics of Anti-Negro Prejudice. James W. Hamilton. Pp. 5-15.

Anal sadism is rated as the most important dynamic mechanism that compels the sociological phenomena of hostile white segregation of the Negro. The article is weakened by what could be a strength in a more lengthy presentation that could adequately describe the scope of the problem of the Negro revolution including the religious, economic, political, and sociological implications. All of these implications are explained by Hamilton on the basis of the anal dynamic. Miscegenation is not dealt with or related to the threat of anal sadism. Any light shed on this problem however is worth while. The author's courageous position and the position of those who think like him is having a constructive effect on even the most indifferent and intransigent segregationists.

A Bar to Conversion. Lawrence M. Siegel. Pp. 16-23.

The author describes how he has been fated to discover what his grandmother already knew about the meaning of 'kosher'. The Jewish people at the time of Christ for the most part did not want to eat and drink the flesh and blood of a God. Thus they did not convert to Christianity and continued to kosher, or take the blood out of, their meat. This is related to ideas in Totem and Taboo.

Psychoanalysis and Anti-Semitism. C. G. Schoenfeld. Pp. 25-37.

An attempt is made to find a rational explanation and solution to the irrational problem of anti-Semitism. The formulation is in terms of the essentially

paranoid depressed Gentile's projections onto the Jew. The weaknesses, dark impulses, and conscience of the Gentile who experiences failure are projected so that the Jew becomes a 'living Rorschach inkblot'. The author states that the Jews by their own separateness in such things as kosher eating and circumcision and by their own arrogance in success in intellectual and financial matters invite attack. He infers that the Jew should give up separateness if he does not want to be attacked. Thus the author has apparently forgotten or ignored who has been attacking whom, with the unacceptable implication that the attacker should not be judged too harshly.

Toward a Unitary Theory on the Passing of the Œdipal Conflict. David B. Friedman. Pp. 38-48.

The author relates actual teasing by the parent of the opposite sex to the lack of resolution of the œdipal problem of the child. He quotes S. J. Sperling on the dual functions of teasing. There is defensive denial at the same time that there is the more constructive function of the child learning to libidinize and master the painful frustration.

When the adult patient expects sexual gratification from the analyst, the author recommends that the patient be told explicitly that no such gratification is possible. Clinical examples are a husband and wife seen separately by the same analyst. One wonders if the author was aware that seeing both husband and wife might have been perceived as a seductive tease, especially by the wife who was not content merely to have a sit-in-the-lap fantasy. This potential seduction might have made it seem all the more necessary for the analyst to be authoritarian to the extent of making the taboo explicit.

The Golem: Significance of the Legend. Earl P. Petrus. Pp. 63-68.

The Golem, a clay monster, was originally a magical protection against the accusation that the Jews practiced ritual murder. It became useful in many ways but provided only limited and temporary relief from anxiety. The author neglects to mention the final turn of the Golem myth that is similar to the Frankenstein story to which he refers. In the end the monster turns against its maker in a fight to the finish.

Classical Psychoanalysis: Policies, Values, and the Future. Donald M. Kaplan. Pp. 99-111.

Classical psychoanalysis is here to stay because it works toward and represents a system of values and an ideal theory of mind and behavior. Its survival is not helped by orthodoxy saying what is proper or improper analytic thinking. It is not helped by liberals who believe in the adaptability of any idea nor by the progressive who, as an avowed pragmatist, is actually an arch cynic. The author states that the analyst has a long-range view of social and historical events and is not among those who are publicized for espousing political causes since he is not an activist. Kaplan refers to existentialists as intellectual anti-intellectuals. He does not suggest eclecticism. 'You can be freudian or something else; I cannot see how you can really be both.' He believes there is and will continue

to be a place for a professionally trained analyst to take the time to listen and interpret to the individual patient in our frenetic age.

Subnormal Functioning in Mental Illness. Albert M. Honig. Pp. 112-133.

A method of psychotherapy for those who are retarded is described. The patient is separated from the parents and lives with a therapeutic family. Those who are hyperaggressive are actually babied so that they regress and become docile. The mental retardation syndrome is described in detail. There is one case report of a twenty-year-old man with ten verbatim examples of therapeutic maneuvers in the interviews.

STEWART R. SMITH

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CXXXIX, 1964.

The Smiling Response. II. Visual Discrimination and the Onset of Depth Perception. Paul R. Polak; Robert N. Emde; and René A. Spitz. Pp. 407-415.

The beginning of depth perception in infants was found to be between two months and twenty days and three months. Two-dimensional models of faces proved to be poor elicitors of the smiling response, particularly in babies older than three and one-half months, whereas three-dimensional models were more effective. A method of using the smiling response in order to investigate the development of visual discrimination and depth perception is described.

Patterns of Dreaming. The Interrelationship of the Dreams of a Night. Milton Kramer; Roy M. Whitman; Bill J. Baldridge; and Leonard M. Lansky. Pp. 426-439.

Through the study of dream series occurring in a single night, obtained in clinical and experimental situations, two broad patterns are described. In the first, dreams progress in a sequence in which each dream solution acts as a 'night residue' for the next dream. There is progressive tension discharge and regression in keeping with Freud's observation that in a series of dreams the impulse becomes bolder and less disguised. In the second pattern each dream repetitiously restates the same problem with little or no progression. It is as if the day residue, in the form of an unresolved problem, continued to dominate and guide the dreams to repeat themselves. The writers suggest that dream series which are sequential point to an ego better able to cope with current stresses with a fuller solutional range. A repetitive pattern would suggest an ego whose current integrative capacity is being taxed and whose range of possible solutions is limited.

The Hermaphroditic Identity of Hermaphrodites. Robert J. Stoller. Pp. 453-457.

Stoller presents an interesting case of a male with a bound-down short penis with hypospadias as a point of departure for a discussion of his thesis that in some rare individuals the core gender identity ('I am male' or 'I am female') may be hermaphroditic. In such an instance the individual is convinced that he is not male or female but both. He is a member of a third gender—a hermaphroditic gender. This situation arises when the individual has been raised in an atmos-

phere of parental doubts caused by ambiguous genitalia. A person who does not have a clear-cut gender identity as either male or female and who does have a hermaphroditic gender identity is able to shift with relative ease from one side to the other. In treating intersexed patients one must accurately determine the patient's core gender identity.

Psychiatric Disorders Among Persecution Victims. William G. Niederland. Pp. 458-473.

Niederland reviews his experience with concentration camp victims and formulates their present psychiatric state in terms of current psychoanalytic thinking. This attempt is of forensic relevance in that to gain restitution from West Germany the victim must prove a causal connection between the state of ill health and the traumatic experience to which he had been subjected by the Nazi regime. In the author's opinion 'expert' testimony in West Germany pays little or no attention to the vast body of scientific knowledge which has accumulated in psychiatry.

In breaking down the concentration camp experience into psychodynamics, four aspects are distinguished and discussed: the assault on the ego; the assault on the superego; factors contributing to survival; and clinical consequences of persecution and survival.

Survival guilt is noted to be the most pathogenic single factor, i.e., guilt for surviving while loved ones perished. Such guilt is usually not permitted to enter consciousness, remains for the most part repressed, and tends to manifest itself clinically in depressive, persecutory, psychosomatic, and neurovegetative symptoms. In the matter of psychotherapy the author stresses the need to relive the traumatic experiences and situations and to re-experience, in relation to the therapist, the pain, anxiety, and guilt connected with those events.

The Problem of 'Depth' in the Psychology of Dreaming. Richard M. Jones. Pp. 507-515.

Recent observations on the psychophysiology of sleep and dreaming are brought to bear on Freud's hypothesis that the dream serves the function of protecting sleep. EEG monitored sleep showing the metronomically recurring periods of dreaming sleep, and the continuum of sleep depth are viewed by the author as supporting a neurophysiological basis for dreaming and casting doubt on the purely psychological hypothesis of sleep protection.

The Influence of the Laboratory Situation on the Dreams of the Experimental Subject. William C. Dement; Edwin Kahn; and Howard P. Roffwarg. Pp. 119-131.

Paid volunteers slept at night in the laboratory and were awakened during periods of rapid eye movement in order to obtain dream recall. A study of the manifest dreams of these subjects revealed that on the first night in the laboratory the dreams tended to deal directly with the experimental situation and to be anxiety laden. On subsequent nights the importance of the laboratory situation seemed to be reduced. There was also a greater tendency for the early dreams of the night to be related to the experiments.

Individual Differences in the Recall of a Drug Experience. I. H. Paul; Robert J. Langs; and Harriet Linton Barr. Pp. 132-145.

The present study focuses on significant individual differences which effect the recall of experience under LSD-25. Subjects were tested while they were under the influence of the drug and then subsequently. Some accurately recalled the drug experience (recallers). Others tended to drop or forget aspects of the experience (subtracters); and others embellished and enlarged the experience in retrospect (adders). The subtracter was found to be an obsessive-compulsive character with hysterical features. He is well integrated, effectively defends, uses intellectual defenses, and shows strong striving for independence. His defenses are likely to be adaptive in the face of the threatening nature of the drug experience. The adder is narcissistic and schizoid and may show a thought disturbance. In contrast to the subtracter he is poorly integrated, uses a wide variety of defenses, but does not seem to be able to use them effectively. He is dependent, naïve, trusting, and passive-receptive. The recaller is an inhibited obsessive-compulsive character who generally experiences little manifest anxiety and has a narrow range of rigid yet quite effective defenses. The authors conclude that the modes of recalling the drug experience seem to be a function of the individual's cognitive style and personality structure.

Dependency in Adult Patients following Early Maternal Bereavement. Herbert Barry, Jr.; Herbert Barry, III; and Erich Lindemann. Pp. 196-205.

In this study a sample of fifteen adult psychiatric patients whose mothers had died when they were between three months and four years of age (early bereaved) are compared with fifteen patients whose mothers had died during the adolescent period (late bereaved). The authors are struck by the existence of strong dependency needs with numerous clinical manifestations in adulthood in the group of early bereaved. They hypothesize that if death removes the mother from her infant or young child, the need and craving for the mother's love, normal at that early stage of development, is not eliminated but instead may appear in late life, both intensified and displaced onto mother surrogates.

The EEG, Eye Movements, and Dreaming in Adult Enuresis. Sheldon K. Schiff. Pp. 397-403.

The relationship of enuretic episodes to rapid eye movement sleep (indicative of dreaming) and reports of dream activity on arousal were studied in three enuretic servicemen. Surprisingly, dreams did not seem to accompany or precede the enuretic episode. There were no changes in rapid eye movements and, except for a single instance, the subject reported no dream on being awakened after an enuretic bout. This suggests that childhood and adult enuresis differ in respect to their relation to dreaming periods.

A Psychoanalytic Approach to Sleep Paralysis. Stephen B. Payn. Pp. 427-433.

Sleep paralysis is that frightening experience in which an individual just before falling asleep or before awakening finds himself completely paralyzed. He is partly aware of his surroundings but is unable to move or call for help. He may feel that the spell would be broken if he could only manage to make the

slightest movement. Recovery occurs spontaneously or when the individual is roused. A young woman is described in whom sleep paralysis was a prominent symptom. The author relates her sleep paralysis to a personality conflict between passive and aggressive trends. Inhibition represented her main defense against aggressivity and sexuality. The sleep paralysis, which appeared at the time of acute anxiety, was viewed as extreme inhibition, representing a compromise between fulfilment of her sexual and hostile wishes and a defense against them.

Maternal Separation in the Rhesus Monkey. Bill Seay and Harry F. Harlow. Pp. 434-441.

Eight monkey mother-infant pairs were separated for a period of two weeks and measurements were made of the behavior of the infants before, during, and after reunion with their mothers. All infants showed emotional disturbance in response to separation with drastic increases in crying and decreases in playing. From an initial response of violent protest, they passed into a stage characterized by low activity, little or no play, and occasional crying. This pattern of response to separation in monkey infants is similar to that described by Bowlby in human infants. Of Bowlby's three phases—protest, despair, and detachment—the authors find striking support in the monkey, particularly with respect to the first two.

BENNETT F. MARKEL

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CXLI, 1965.

Emotional Factors in Prenatal Environment. Antonio J. Ferreira. Pp. 108-118.

The belief that the emotional attitude and behavior of the pregnant woman may affect the child she carries is present in the folklore and ritual of every known human society. Only recently has scientific interest been turned on this subject. The author reviews those observations which substantiate the notion of a prenatal environment and its part in the shaping of the individual's behavior pattern. The mother's negative attitude toward pregnancy may be, by many different means, conveyed to the fœtus and reflected in complications of pregnancy or in the child's early deviant behavior. It has been shown that a mother undergoing severe emotional stress tends to have a hyperactive fœtus. In turn hyperactive fœtuses often tend to become hyperactive infants, irritable, fussy, crying easily, with frequent bowel movements, and food intolerance. In one study the hyperactive fœtuses, two and one-half years later were found to be the nursery's problem children.

BENNETT F. MARKEL

Archives of General Psychiatry. XIII, 1965.

Thought Disturbance in Schizophrenia. T. L. Trunnell. Pp. 9-18.

Piaget's theory of cognitive development was used to construct a test battery which was administered to adult schizophrenics and a matched group of controls.

Performance was analyzed and used to delineate more clearly what constitutes a schizophrenic thought disorder, namely, poor logical ability to form conjunctive classes and to order relationships. The hypothesis is put forth that schizophrenic thought disorder is a developmental aberration and is the result of faulty intrafamilial communication.

Psychotherapeutic Focus in Social Psychiatry. T. B. Bieber and I. Bieber. Pp. 62-66.

The role of individual psychotherapy within the context of social psychiatry and community mental health programs is discussed. Emphasis is given to the concept that whatever the therapeutic context the aim is the resolution of individual psychopathology. Three major categories of pathogenesis are suggested. A plea is made that psychoanalytically trained therapists play a greater role in the community mental health structure and aid in the development of programs designed for prophylaxis and prevention of psychopathology.

Anterospective Data Following Childhood Loss of a Parent. I. Delinquency and High School Dropout. Pp. 99-109. **II. Pathology, Performance, and Potential Among College Students.** I. Gregory. Pp. 110-120.

These two studies are complementary to the many retrospective studies and case reports on the effect of parental loss on the emotional development of children as reflected in delinquent behavior or dropping out of school. The highest rates of delinquency for both boys and girls occurs where the parents are separated or divorced and the next to highest rate is found among those who are living alone with the parent of the opposite sex. A higher rate of delinquency is found among boys and girls who have lost the parent of the same sex than of the opposite sex. High school dropout rates showed a similar correlation.

The study of college students who had lost one or both parents in childhood showed few significant correlations.

Psychological Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination. B. Rubin. Pp. 121-132.

This brief historical, medico-psychological, legal theological review is coupled with some data and comments about why human artificial insemination continues to cause conflict and serious concern. The views presented relate these attitudes to the potential danger of consanguinity and breach of the incest barrier.

Male Psychosexual Inversion: Transsexualism. I. B. Pauly. Pp. 172-181.

The author reviews the Western literature on one hundred males who desired sexual transformation by surgical and/or hormonal means. Of these, forty-eight obtained some radical anatomical change. Although reports of postoperative success and emotional adaptation are frequent, Pauly urges considerable caution in interpreting these results.

Follow-Up Study of Childhood Elective Mutism. A. Elson; C. Pearson; C. D. Jones; and E. Schumacher. Pp. 182-187.

Four latency age girls, diagnosed as having a neurotic symptom complex which centered on an elective refusal to speak except to a small group of relatives and peers, received intensive milieu therapy in a residential treatment center for periods of four to twelve months. Six months to five years after discharge intensive follow-up interviews were made. Common features in these cases were maternal hostility and rejection, paternal disinterest, and school phobia. The dynamic formulation was in the category of passive-aggressive personality. Follow-up revealed that the children had made a surprisingly good adjustment but the mother remained unchanged.

PETER BLOS, JR.

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Hilda Shanzer, John Donadeo & Herman Roiphe

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 11, 1966. TRAUMA AND INFANTILE EXPERIENCES: A LONGITUDINAL PERSPECTIVE. Albert J. Solnit, M.D. and Marianne Kris, M.D.

Data from the longitudinal and psychoanalytic study of one child in whom the consideration of acute and chronic trauma was essential for understanding the child's development were presented. The child, Margaret, and her surroundings were studied from *in utero* to age fourteen and the data were correlated with detailed clinical material from her analysis.

Both parents came from a deprived lower socio-economic group. The mother liked to receive gifts from mother substitutes and felt that men had all the advantages. She vomited until the seventh month of pregnancy and feared both that the child had been damaged and that the child might damage her. From the second day of life, the child showed poor tolerance for tactile, kinesthetic auditory stimuli which evoked a jarring startle reaction. Child and mother interacted in a way that interfered with the development of a mutually harmonious intimate physical closeness. At age three months Margaret could comfort herself more effectively than could the mother by holding her. At six to twelve months she reacted with panic to a stranger's touching her or the absence of her mother from the room. She showed relative acceleration of motor development in the second half of the first year, and her capacity to recognize and organize her impressions of the environment was advanced. In the second and third years there was evidence of an arrest in her development of identification as an adaptive function of the ego.

At three-and-a-half years, when she had been in psychoanalytic treatment for three months, a traumatic incident occurred. Because she was being noisy and restless on the back seat of the car, her mother stopped the car in a swampy, uninhabited area and commanded Margaret to get out of the car. She became frightened and cried, but finally allowed her mother to strap her in the front seat of the car. This incident occurred at the time Margaret was coping with her reaction to an eight-month-old sibling and dealing with phallic and œdipal phases of development as well as certain anal regressive impulses. She was also involved in separating from her mother. In several analytic hours following the threat of abandonment, she played games expressing genital differences she was trying to cope with and of being abandoned. At the end of treatment, Margaret seemed to have worked out her positive œdipal disappointment and her negative œdipal attachment to her mother but the threat of abandonment never left her. She remained compliant and submissive, and at age fourteen the analyst found that Margaret felt a repetition of the early traumatic incident in any new anxiety-evoking situation.

Dr. Solnit hypothesized that the mother-child interaction in the first months of Margaret's life resulted in an avoidance of tactile and kinesthetic intimacy and prevented her from exercising spontaneous feelings in an exploratory manner. The inadequacy of premature substitutions of distance-receptor contacts for

near-receptor needs promoted in her an intolerance for new or physically intense experiences. She lacked tolerance to unfold and express id derivatives.

Lack of tactile-kinesthetic experiences with the mother produced an obstacle in the child's turning from proprioceptive awareness to a balanced sensory awareness of the outer world. She failed to form a well-internalized identification with her mother, which tended to exaggerate the anxiety she experienced in new situations and resulted in a severe and inadequately elaborated superego.

In an effort to define the concept of shock trauma, Dr. Solnit considers it a phenomenon or stimulus that is experienced as overwhelming the mediating functions of the ego. It is sudden, disruptive, and immobilizing, and suddenly deprives the ego of certain autonomous functions.

DISCUSSION: Dr. David Beres questioned the authors' assumption that 'an intolerance of direct passive experiences with the need-satisfying object' had led Margaret to avoid discomfort by her own activity and that this had become a model for her later object relationships. Further, the implication that the trauma of this mother-child relationship resulted in perceptual, central nervous system sensitivities requires more evidence to support it. He wondered if an isolated shock experience ever produces lasting effects on later symptom or character development unless there is some pre-existing earlier stress trauma with unconscious fantasies.

Dr. Kenneth Calder discussed two prevalent views of trauma: one in which favorable results can be expected, the other doubting the modifiability of trauma. He feels the meaning of trauma and the capacity of the ego to handle trauma is strongly influenced by a person's conflicts at the time of the trauma.

Dr. Phyllis Greenacre stressed the neonatal qualities of the infant, which she feels could hardly be the result of the mother's ineptness and restrained aggression in holding the child, but might be due to the prolonged labor terminating in uterine inertia and forceps delivery, as well as the disturbed conditions of the later months of pregnancy. In her clinical experience, Dr. Greenacre has found the fourth year of life a particularly vulnerable time for traumatic incidents. In the case of Margaret, Dr. Greenacre felt the father's role in her œdipal development was not sufficiently documented; there is a possibility of certain rivalry between the child's œdipal attachment to the therapist and to the father. Further, it seemed that the trauma may have been provoked by the child as a result of the œdipal rivalry going on between mother and child; traumas are frequently coöperative affairs.

Dr. Elisabeth Geleerd felt the presentation especially fruitful as the child was in analysis at the period of an important developmental phase, i.e., the œdipus complex, and one could thus observe the vicissitudes of drive and ego development. She did not consider the trauma to be an outside factor but rather an exaggeration of a particular form of interpersonal relationship which had always existed. Trauma can be organically interwoven with the defensive and adaptive forces of the personality.

HILDA SHANZER

January 25, 1966. SELF-OBSERVATION, REALITY, AND THE SUPEREGO. Martin H. Stein, M.D.

Self-observation, an essential element in the process of reality testing, is inextricably linked to self-evaluation, and the two are involved with superego functions. Hence, superego functions play an essential, if indirect, role in reality testing and reality adaptation. After tracing the development of Freud's views on reality testing and those resulting from the structural hypothesis, Dr. Stein attempted to show that metapsychological explanations have not sufficiently taken into account the role of stimuli arising from the individual's inner world and disturbances in the capacity to perceive and evaluate them. One of the basic assumptions underlying the theory of psychoanalytic therapy is that as a result of treatment patients will be able to see the world more clearly and deal with it more efficiently because of having corrected distortions of self-observation as they become evident in the analysis. While defects in self-observation are not solely responsible for misinterpretations of percepts, self-observation is necessary for the adequate evaluation of reality.

In 1921 Freud ascribed reality testing to the ego ideal, but he did not consider the problem settled. As late as 1932 he was still not certain whether responsibility for the evaluation of psychic processes pertained to the ego or superego, or both. With the explanations of ego psychology, especially by Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, self-observation has come to be considered more and more an ego function rather than a superego function. These developments have posed a dilemma. If the superego is responsible for some vital aspects of self-evaluation but not self-observation, how is the latter performed? While superego functions of a general adaptive nature are readily ascertainable, it is not easy to correlate superego functions specifically with reality testing. It is a common analytic observation that a patient will respond to an interpretation of some bit of behavior with projected guilt. While the guilt may be explained in terms of drive and defense, it is not so easy to explain why it was experienced and how it was accompanied by distortions of perceptions of both the inner and outer worlds, thus interfering with the capacity for useful observation and evaluation of one's inner life.

The author then considered the sphere of superego functioning in sleep and dreams. The analogy between sleeper and analytic patient may explain why interpretations are often treated by patients as if they had a 'superego tinge'. When Freud originally placed reality testing in the ego-ideal, it was in the context of the dreamlike hypnotic trance.

Repressive states of consciousness do not account for all intrusions of superego functions. The dependence of 'truth-telling' on 'truth-knowing', and therefore on reality testing, is familiar to analysts. In the young child, moral teaching and reality testing are barely distinguishable; in the adult both ego and superego functions are involved in 'telling the truth' and the automatic control of the tendency to lie is a well-internalized response in which superego function is dominant. But even in adult life, we may infer that the superego has 'prompted' the ego in a situation in which there is no longer a true moral issue.

Denying the superego a clear role in self-observation and relegating this func-

tion entirely to the ego makes for internal consistency regarding the ego but reduces the superego to a tenuous structure without clear connection to either drives or ego. Hartmann's concepts leave gaps in our theory, and Rapaport felt that adaptive aspects of the superego were still in need of clarification. Our metapsychology poses the inescapable dilemma that if we ascribe self-observation to the ego, we are required to do the same for self-evaluation which reduces the superego to a vestigial structure, active only in pathological conditions; or that we consider the superego as a permanent and integral part of the psychic apparatus with functions of self-observation allowing it some role, however indirect, in the handling of reality. If we consider reality testing as a manifestation of ego, superego, and drives, we are only applying the principle of multiple functioning; should we then apply the same principle to other manifest operations of the psychic apparatus and speak of a structural rather than an ego psychology?

DISCUSSION: Dr. Rudolph Loewenstein noted that Freud based the concept of superego on, among other phenomena, the delusion of being observed. Self-observation may have self-disparaging or self-punitive motives and can lead to self-deception based on guilt feelings; if all self-observation contained self-deceptive elements, one would have to attribute self-observation to the system superego. However, every favorable analytic experience shows that toward the end of treatment patients are capable of objective self-observation untainted by self-deception. Further, the superego helps to maintain objectivity, and only rarely impairs self-observation due to self-punitive tendencies. However, the essential elements—the perception of what really is observable within oneself—are functions attributable to the ego, albeit often standing in the service of the superego. The superego does not need to possess a special apparatus of observation for what the ego feeds it, any more than the id needs an apparatus of observation for what the ego feeds it.

Dr. Manuel Furer mentioned the difficult task presented by psychoanalytic theory because, to be useful, an explanatory idea must apply to both health and neurosis, to developmental phases, and to the later periods of life. He did not feel that developmental data are consonant with Dr. Stein's conclusions. Efficiency in reality testing is more dependent on the subsequent modifications of prohibitions than on their automatic functioning. In superego learning, the drives and conflicts are more likely to be involved, the comforting portion of the superego is more likely to lead to helpful illusions, and the prohibiting portions to correct appreciations of reality. Dr. Furer referred to Anna Freud's description of a preliminary stage of morality in the phase of identification with the aggressor: 'True morality begins when the internalized criticism, now embodied in the standard exacted by the superego, coincides with the ego's perception of its own fault'—an inner reality testing.

Dr. Heinz Hartmann agreed that self-observation influenced reality testing and that the superego influenced self-observation, but he would not ascribe to the superego system a function of self-observation. Freud defined reality testing as the capacity to differentiate between perception and representation. In theory, there is no difficulty in attributing perception to the ego and evaluation to the

superego, although moral judgments may also refer to other persons and hence involve perceptions. While guilt feelings belong to the ego, they could not come about without the superego. Superego activities need not be seen only as negative and prohibitive; they may also serve adaptive purposes.

Dr. Mortimer Ostow noted that in schizophrenia the superego can force the individual to abandon reality, and that when the ego breaks with reality, the superego may protest through the arousal of guilt feelings.

Dr. Robert Bak thought the necessity of the concept of the superego might well be questioned. Guilt feelings could be explained in terms of ego functions without having recourse to the concept of a superego and its functions.

In concluding, Dr. Stein said that the fact that a structure has a function does not require that function to be specifically attributed to it. He feels that the principle of multiple functioning is honored more in the breach than in the observance because we tend to ascribe phenomena to one or the other of the psychic systems. He remarked that although we do not know exactly what to do with the concept of the superego, we apparently cannot do without it.

JOHN DONADEO

February 8, 1966. TOWARD AN INTEGRATED PSYCHOANALYTIC-PHYSIOLOGICAL THEORY OF PSYCHOSOMATIC DISORDERS. Morton F. Reiser, M.D.

Despite the rich accretion of new facts in psychophysiology and neurophysiology and rapid expansion of psychoanalytic ego psychology, a satisfactory integrated formulation of the mind-body interrelationship has not been achieved. Dr. Reiser suggests the approach of developing parallel psychological and physiological theories which may lead to an ultimate integration through the gradual convergence of the two theoretical lines.

As a central conceptualization from the recent psychoanalytic literature, the author presents Schur's thesis that there is an interdependence between the normal developmental desomatization of responses and the ego's faculty to use secondary processes and to neutralize sexual and aggressive energies. Conversely, the resomatization of responses follows from ego regression with the relative prevalence of primary processes and deneutralization of sexual and aggressive energies. The conflicts involved derive from all phases but are predominantly pregenital in character and accordingly the essential traumatization is thought to have occurred early, perhaps in the perinatal or earliest neonatal period. Engel and his co-workers have emphasized the role of object loss and the reactive affects of helplessness and hopelessness as central issues in psychosomatic disorders. Schmale has suggested the importance of the role of separation. These psychological dimensions are general in character and do not indicate why an individual develops one disease rather than another, nor why a psychosomatic disorder results rather than a predominantly psychological one. Grinker, Deutsch, and Schur tend to see choice of organ system as dependent mainly on genic factors or early psychophysiological fixations. Mirsky has identified the hypersecretion of pepsinogen into the blood as the genetically determined physiological condition necessary, but not sufficient, for the development of duodenal ulcer. He believes that this inborn trait also plays a central role in personality development

and in determining the types of social conflicts that may be pathogenic for the individual in adult life.

The author then discussed some physiological parameters which might be considered parallel to the psychological ones summarized. First, a major feature of pathological physiology of most, if not all, psychosomatic conditions is a profound disturbance in vegetative functions. The dysfunctions include excessive lability and range of response as well as abnormal sustained levels of activity and exaggerations or disturbances of integrative patterns of autonomic mobilization responses and homeostatic mechanisms. These features of autonomic nervous system physiology are strikingly similar to autonomic functions in the neonate and infant. Although little is known of the developmental physiology of the vegetative system, nevertheless a cardinal characteristic of its maturation is the development of modulating, patterning, and homeostatic regulating mechanisms. Snyder's studies of the physiology of REM sleep show that autonomically innervated functions during this phase of sleep increase in range and lability. Endocrine dysfunction is involved in all these conditions. Although changes of activation of the hypothalamic adrenal axis have been most extensively studied, more recent data indicate significant changes in activity for most of the endocrine glands.

Neurophysiological studies have demonstrated that the deeper visceral functions involved in the various psychosomatic disorders may be profoundly altered by manipulation of subcortical and paleocortical structures. Finally, immune mechanisms have been implicated in rheumatoid arthritis, in addition to their well-established role in bronchial asthma and neurodermatitis.

The author considers these psychophysiological lines under three categories: considerations of the premorbid state; conditions and mechanisms of precipitation; mechanisms of maintenance, exacerbation, and remission. In the physiological premorbid conditions, Reiser finds it useful to think of the individual who eventually develops a psychosomatic disorder as being 'pre-programmed' for it. This would involve local tissue factors in the affected organs and central nervous system circuitry for activating appropriate autonomic and endocrine mechanisms. Both factors would likely be of genic origin or result from early developmental sensitization. He hypothesizes that the central connections for all psychosomatic diseases are part of the normal brain structure and that predisposition to sustained activity in particular circuits in specific individuals is determined genically or experientially.

In conditions and mechanisms of precipitation, the two lines of psychological and physiological evidence converge. Recent work has shown that in situations of acute psychological decompensation there is a reciprocal relationship between the effectiveness of ego defenses and the level of adrenal cortical and medullary hormone output. The psychological and physiological parameters may be integrated by failure of ego defenses and reactivation of conflictual instinctual pressures, causing acute nonspecific neuroendocrine mobilization of the automatic-adrenal system. Simultaneously, affective arousal and regressive changes are seen in the ego, which may enhance and be enhanced by the hormonal reactions. In a reaction thus re-enforced and sustained, an altered state of the brain may result, providing the necessary condition for central nervous system

recircuiting so that medically pathogenic circuits become activated and gain access to outflow paths to the periphery of the body. Once the disease is activated, the individual is changed physiologically and psychologically. It is probably important to distinguish between those conditions which allow for the original activation of the disease and states which may subsequently affect its course, e.g., rage and anxiety may produce a change in the blood pressure of the hypertensive patient but may not necessarily have been the conditions involved in triggering the disease originally. It is not possible to separate original causes from epiphenomena without longitudinal study.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Charles Fisher noted that recent work has shown that adrenal and pituitary secretion is increased during REM sleep. This endocrine activity is regulated and modulated by the nonolfactory rhinencephalon which includes certain temporal lobe structures, the limbic system, and hypothalamus. These same structures regulate emotional and drive behavior, and also regulate sleep. Thus there is increased lability and variability of autonomic activities, increased endocrine function, a release of instinctual drives, and an altered state of consciousness, conditions similar to those postulated by Reiser as involved in psychosomatic dysfunction. Recently it has been reported that HCl secretion in patients with duodenal ulcer is markedly elevated during REM sleep and it has been suggested that coronary and asthmatic attacks occur during REM sleep. The normal increased variability of respiratory and cardiovascular function during this state may facilitate the opening of pathways for peripheral discharge from those dormant, medically pathogenic central nervous system circuits of which Reiser speaks.

Dr. Max Schur stressed the importance of examining the implications of multiple anlagen and genic linkages in psychosomatic illness. Expressed in analytic terms, there can be a linkage in predisposition between drive endowment and the anlage for certain apparatuses of primary autonomy such as motility and coördination, between the predilection for certain defense mechanisms and certain somatic apparatuses serving as the somatic source for stimuli which, through mental representation, gain the status of component instinctual drives. In psychosomatic disorders he believes we must consider not a genic factor but a constellation of multiple anlagen.

HERMAN ROIPHE

MEETINGS OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

November 1, 1965. THE PARADOXICAL EFFECT OF EFFORT. Justin Simon, M.D.

In 1939 Hartmann wrote: 'What we do not yet have is a systematic psychoanalytic knowledge of this [conflict-free] sphere [of the ego]. . . . We do not need to prove that investigations which are limited to this sphere . . . inevitably overlook basic psychological relationships.' But because psychoanalytic treatment attempts to reduce behavior to elementary conflicts, analysts may overlook contributions to behavior which issue from the conflict-free sphere.

Dr. Simon attempts to explain some clinical phenomena inadequately explained by psychodynamic considerations. Freud advised analysts not to make special effort to remember what the patient says but to maintain an 'evenly suspended attention'. Research findings, as well as personal observations, substantiate that effort sometimes has a paradoxical effect that impairs efficient functioning which is difficult to account for in dynamic terms alone. Dr. Simon suggests that these paradoxical effects occur when the heightened effort directs attention cathexis onto specific automatized mental functions which are responsible for efficient performance.

Genetically, attention cathexis and the automatic functions of the mental apparatus are inversely related. Consciousness is essential to learning, but as mastery of a task is achieved, performance improves and attention to performance diminishes. 'Automatic' means literally 'performed without awareness'. One of the unappreciated functions of consciousness is to break up existing automatisms. Since automatization insures smoothness and efficient functioning, de-automatization effects the reverse. This is the mechanism of the paradoxical effect of effort. It is also the mechanism utilized by the ego to maintain flexibility, which is essential to adaptation. The ego must be able to suspend temporarily automatisms.

Growth and development depend upon the coördination maintenance of structure-building and structure-breaking. Regression in the service of the ego is that structure-breaking which paves the way for different solutions, new growth, and the development of more efficient automatisms. However, structure-breaking may also initiate or serve regression proper or symptom development. The combined effects of de-automatization and psychodynamics are seen in many clinical conditions, from insomnia and hyperventilation to stage fright and obsessional thinking.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Nathaniel Ross agreed with Dr. Simon's emphasis on the importance of automatization in facilitating and initiating the learning process in the most subtle operations of the ego. However, he questioned whether it was consciousness as such that brings about the 'paradoxical effect', and suggested rather that an accompanying phenomena not in the conflict-free sphere of ego functioning (anxiety) might be responsible. Dr. Ross felt that what appears to be necessary for learning are intervals between the exertion of efforts, during which time automatization appears to take place relatively rapidly.

Dr. Jerome Levine found Dr. Simon's theoretical suggestions provocative but expressed reservations. Such terms as 'effort', 'motivation', and 'attention' were used without precise distinction between them.

Dr. Jan Frank raised the question of how Dr. Simon would reconcile the adaptive functions of automatizations in the schizophrenias, where there exists an obfuscation of consciousness and attention cathexis. He noted that automatisms are not always adaptive; they may be maladaptive when they interfere with the proper distribution of bound psychic energy.

Dr. Max Schur stated that preconscious automatisms are not derived from instinctual gratifications; the pleasure involved in the well-performed automatism is an instinctual pleasure. Hence, any change in a preconscious automatism in-

volves a disruption of the pleasure principle and introduces certain disruptions that cannot be attributed only to consciousness. Dr. Schur felt that the phenomenon described by Dr. Simon was really a relearning process and more complex than implied by the author.

NORMAN N. RALSKE

January 17, 1966. REMARKS ABOUT FEAR OF DEATH AND NEUROSIS. Max M. Stern, M.D.

Dr. Stern introduced as an addendum to the classic psychoanalytic technique, the working through of the fear of death which seems to him to be imperative for successful termination. To ward off fear of death and the depression emerging from its inevitability, the neurotic uses gratification of infantile symbiotic needs which in the past protected him against trauma. Working through the fear of death makes possible dissolution of the amalgamation of the past trauma with that threatening in the future. Material about fear of death appears early in associations. When understood, not only the patient's present preoccupations with death but also memories of past struggles with the fact of death come impressively to the fore. The symbiotic fixation often takes the form of wishes to remain infantile; the patient is afraid to grow up and to die.

The author cited several cases, including one of perversion and one of fetishism, that were terminated successfully by the working through of fear of death. In these cases the early mother-child relationship had been especially disturbed. Consequently the transference was strongly ambivalent and involved wishes for fusion with the analyst as protection against death, together with strong defenses against it. The insight gained by the interpretation of the transference as an irrational attempt to escape death elicited signs of marked depression: feelings of emptiness and despair, paralysis of activity, and an alarming dimming of the sensorium felt as haziness. In the wake of the depression, strong ambivalent symbiotic wishes for fusion with the analyst or with the mate emerged. Their working through made possible successful mastery of the once deficient separation-individuation and led to ego maturation in terms of establishment of identity, object relations, and a sense of reality.

Elaborating on Freud's equation in The Ego and the Id of mortal terror with depression, Dr. Stern postulated that fear of death originates in the mortal terror experienced in the child's early trauma of separation. The later arising fear of one's own death contains a projection of this early situation. The beginning of adaptation to death occurred in Dr. Stern's patients simultaneously with successful separation-individuation and the passing of the œdipal conflict.

The author stressed that the analytic technique should take into account that in all patients symptoms and transference have a Janus aspect—one aspect anchored in infancy and elicited by traumas threatening from infantile instinctual deprivation or gratification, the other relating to the ultimate trauma threatening in the future. Anal regression may be not only regression to anal

instinctual gratification but also clinging to the anal object as representative of the self in defense against its vanishing in death.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Kurt Eissler felt that Dr. Stern had made a most useful contribution in redirecting our attention toward the fear of death in the analytic process. He confirmed that in cases in which fear of death plays an inordinate role, one finds an archaic precœdipal relationship to the mother—an intense wish to return to the womb simultaneously with the dread of fulfilment of that wish. The excessive passivity in such cases, and the defense against it, is often combined with feminine identification and converts castration fear into the wish for castration, enormously increasing anxiety. There is a need to study the conditions under which anxiety leads into the regressive forms described by Dr. Stern. The formula 'rather castrated than dead' appears to be a secondary defense in order to cope with inordinate castration fear. He felt that anxiety and depressive affects cannot be reduced to the same denominator; depression is a response not to danger but to loss.

Dr. Frank Berchenko agreed with Dr. Stern's concept that early traumas later become associated with fear of dying, and presented material from the analyses of two cases in which fear of death played a prominent role. In both cases excessive exposure to frustrating non-nurturing parents caused fusion fantasies. Death wishes played a role in fear of death in one of the cases. He also found that patients in whom fear of death is prominent are afraid to grow up and remain infantile in their behavior.

Dr. Jan Frank spoke of the fact that in deep regressive states there is the potentiality to climb up and resculpture the complete dependence on the mother image.

In conclusion, Dr. Stern stressed that he did not intend to deal with special cases characterized by exorbitant fear of death but with the role of fear of death in every neurosis. His cases showed no more fear of death than presumably does any case of perversion. He stressed that Freud's term 'mortal terror' is not identical with signal anxiety; it is not a response to danger but a reponse to a traumatic situation, later called by Freud 'automatic anxiety'. Its paralyzing quality explains Freud's equation of mortal terror with depression. As Fenichel stressed, depression has to be recognized as being, beside anxiety, the main affect underlying human pathology.

MELVIN SCHARFMAN

The Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held at the Statler Hilton Hotel, Detroit, Michigan, May 5-8, 1967.

The Forty-fourth Annual Meeting of the AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION will be held at the Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C., March 20 through March 23, 1967. For further information write: Marion Langer, Ph.D., Executive Secretary, 1790 Broadway, New York, N. Y. 10019.

Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman has been named Dean of the new Page and William Black Post-Graduate School, Mount Sinai School of Medicine, New York.

Miss Anna Freud was visiting professor of psychiatry at the University of Chicago in December 1966.

The New York Psychoanalytic Institute has announced that Miss Anna Freud is the recipient of the First Annual HEINZ HARTMANN AWARD for her book, Normality and Pathology in Childhood: Assessments of Development. The award will be given annually.