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THE HUMANNESS OF HUMAN BEINGS: PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS

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Psychoanalysis is a dynamic psychology, the study of man's mind. The psychoanalyst in his daily work with his patients observes the richness, the interaction, and the complexity of human thought, emotion, and behavior which comprise human nature, the functions which distinguish man from animal. The psychoanalyst observes human psychic functions in adaptation to environmental demands, to interpersonal relations, and to inner conflict, as well as in mental illness, in which the individual fails in his efforts to cope with stress and conflict.

Psychoanalysis is also a developmental psychology concerned with the study of the development and maturation of psychic functions in the individual, the interaction of environmental influences and innate capacities. As a developmental psychology the interest of psychoanalysis extends to comparative psychology, the similarities of and differences between man and animal, and the evolution of human psychic functioning. A comparative study of behavior in different animal species, whether between human and animal or between different animals, may be approached in one of two ways—either to emphasize similarities or to emphasize differences. If the approach goes to either extreme, it will be misleading, and the proper approach must be to place similarities and differences in perspective.

There is, of course, a biological basis for human structure and function, whether these be anatomical, physiological, or psychic. Man shares with nonhuman species numerous anatomical and physiological attributes, and there is certainly much

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value in animal experimentation, in the observation of animal behavior, especially primate behavior, and in the study of basic neuropsychological functions such as perception and memory. But there remains the problem of the significance of these studies for the elucidation of human behavior and of psychic functioning.

Man is, by his own standards, at the peak of the evolutionary scale. The recent discoveries of hominid, or protoman, fossils give clear evidence of the evolutionary development leading to his present status as Homo sapiens. Man, according to modern reckoning, has inhabited the earth not more than one to two hundred thousand years. His progenitors, the hominids, the so-called ape men, may have appeared as long ago as two million years.[1]

What concerns us is the specific nature of the evolution of man. We may conclude from the fact that the basic structure and chemistry of the cell, especially the hereditary substance, is the same in all animals, from the unicellar organism to man, that evolution in man has taken place, as in other living creatures, by similar mechanisms, that is, by mutation and natural selection. We deduce from this theory not only the relationship of earlier forms to later forms, but also that there must have been a slow and gradual transition in the progression to the present state of man. But we also observe striking differences in the different forms of life as we see them now. There is in evolution both continuity and discontinuity.

Whatever may be the antecedents of structure and function in any evolved form of life, the new structure and function comprise a new level of integration and organization. What is new is based on what came before, but what is new is dif-

[1] Evidence of primitive elements of culture such as tool making and hunting has been demonstrated in the paleontological discoveries of the Leakeys, Dart, Dubois, and others. We do not know that these fossils, whether of Australopithecus, Zinjanthropus, or any other hominid, are those of the direct ancestor of Homo sapiens, but their closeness to man in anatomical features and behavior (as deduced) is unmistakable. For detailed discussion see contributions by Leakey *(36)*, and by Washburn and Howell *(52)* in The Evolution of Man.

ferent from what came before. The bird can fly, but not the reptile from which the bird evolved.[2]

So, too, with man who has evolved from earlier hominids but who now has distinctive characteristics which permit us to speak of him as a different being. Sir Julian Huxley on this point has said, 'After Darwin, man could no longer avoid considering himself as an animal; but he is beginning to see himself as a very peculiar and in many ways a unique animal' *(30)*.

There is a trend in current psychological writing, which has extended even to psychoanalytic studies, to emphasize the biological and physiological aspects of human behavior, to stress the anatomical similarities to the primates, the comparable social behavior of primates and humans, and to extrapolate to human behavior from even lower animals—monkeys, as well as rats and pigeons. That these studies have great value and importance in their own right and even as indications for more direct studies on humans I do not question. I do doubt the validity of the premature application of animal observations to human behavior and I question the interpretations which some workers place on their observations.

My purpose in this paper is to discuss some of the characteristics that distinguish man as the peculiar and unique animal of Huxley. More specifically, I shall attempt to describe and to discuss these characteristics in terms of the concepts of psychoanalysis.

It is a banality to say that the essential distinction of man is the unique nature of human psychic activity, but it is one that demands restatement. Susanne Langer, in her recent book, Mind, makes this point. She says, 'For animals have mental functions, but only man has a mind and a mental life. Some

[2] There is among evolutionists much discussion on this question. One author writes, 'Each level of organization possesses unique properties of structure and behavior which, though dependent on the properties of the constituent elements, appear only when these elements are combined in the new system. Knowledge of the laws of the lower level is necessary for a full understanding of the higher level; yet the unique properties of the phenomena at the higher level cannot be predicted, *a priori,* from the laws of the lower level' *(44)*.

animals are intelligent, but only man can be intellectual' *(35,* p. xvi).

One would be hard put to select from Freud's monumental contributions any one that is the most significant or the most seminal. However, I venture to say that the concept of a mediating factor, the functions of ego and superego, between drive impulses and their consummation in human psychic activity is among the most illuminating. In this concept is comprised the structural theory of psychoanalysis, the division of the psyche into id, ego, and superego.[8] Structure and function are inextricably interrelated. We postulate structure in psychoanalytic theory according to the organization of functions in adaptation and conflict. But, it must be remembered, even structure is not enduring and changes as function changes.

Hartmann *(25)* has pointed out that it is to the 'process of structural differentiation . . . [that] the differences . . . between the instinctual behavior of lower animals and the behavior of human beings are mainly due'. He adds, 'Obviously many functions, which are taken care of by instincts in the former, are in man functions of the ego'. We might ask at this point whether nonhumans also have a psychic structure with id, ego, and superego. I believe this is a question wrongly stated. It should be, rather, do nonhumans have psychic functions that can be structured as id, ego, and superego? In my opinion, they do not. I am aware that Freud *(19,* p. 147*)* and Hartmann *(25)* have suggested that in the higher primates there may be some rudimentary structuralization along lines similar to human psychic structure, but I consider the evidence to be inconclusive and I prefer to leave this an open and unproved question. There are some aspects of animal behavior in the primate and in domesticated animals which, from our anthro-

[8] In the first sentence of Bertrand Russell's autobiography he says, 'Three passions, simple but overwhelmingly strong, have governed my life: the longing for love, the search for knowledge, and unbearable pity for the suffering of mankind' *(47).* In this sentence there is an eloquent statement of the humanness of human beings which adumbrates what in the structural theory of psychoanalysis is designated as id, ego, and superego.

pomorphic point of view, are equated with human behavior, but more important and significant are the differences among the underlying psychological processes.

I shall approach my topic by consideration of the three subdivisions of the human psyche according to the structural theory of psychoanalysis.

DRIVE AND INSTINCT

The first problem is the distinction between the psychoanalytic concept of 'drive' in man and the concept of 'instinct' in nonhumans. Both are concepts surrounded by controversy and disagreement, not only among workers in different disciplines, but also among workers in the same discipline. The matter is for psychoanalysts all the more confounded by the use of the word 'instinct' for the translation of the German word *trieb*. The result is a blurring of differences between drive and instinct which, I hope to demonstrate, should rather be emphasized.

Both man and animal are subject to excitations from external and internal sources which lead to action. The external source of excitation is spoken of as a stimulus which, Freud emphasized, 'operates with a single impact, so that it can be disposed of by a single expedient action' *(13,* p. 118*)*. The inner sources of excitation are more complex: they are hormonal and neurophysiological. By the constancy of their impact, these inner sources of excitation create the pressure which Freud designated as one characteristic of drives.

Man shares with animals basic biological needs. These include not only the gratification of bodily needs, but also specific relationships with other members of the same species, and the capacity to adapt to and survive in the external environment. Though basic needs are similar in man and animal, they are manifested in different ways in each species. The differences become more significant when we study the processes and apparatuses with which man and animal effect gratification of their needs.

Tinbergen defines instinct 'as a hierarchically organized

nervous mechanism which is susceptible to certain priming, releasing, and directing impulses of internal as well as of external origin, and which responds to those impulses by coördinated movements that contribute to the maintenance of the individual and the species' *(49,* p. 112*)*. Instinctive behavior is described as inherited, specific, and stereotyped. The lower in the evolutionary scale, the more striking are these characteristics and the less capable of change by learning. The ethologist, in fact, uses the fixity of animal behavior, especially in birds, for taxonomic classification.

Among the higher animals, and especially in primates, behavior is so complicated and so often simulates 'human' qualities that one is tempted to assume that it is more than instinctive. Most observers of the behavior of higher animals, including chimpanzees and gorillas, however, conclude that even the complicated problem-solving activities of these primates can be explained on the basis of complex instinctive responses.

Wolfgang Köhler *(33,* p. 186*)*, whose studies of primates are by now classic, states that the remarkable problem-solving exploits of the chimpanzee come about as the result of the fortuitous connection of separate acts which individually are natural to the animal, and it is only chance that brings them together. Thus the stick and the food appearing in the same line of vision will, or may, permit the animal to reach the food with the stick. Once the animal has learned to do this, it can repeat the act whenever the occasion arises.[4]

[4] Paul Schiller *(48)* in a study of chimpanzees, notes the importance of prior play activity in the young chimpanzee, where certain performances are experienced and later applied in problem solving. The lack of opportunity to play with sticklike objects, for example, he says definitely retards the development of the capacity to manipulate sticks. He also describes a number of chimpanzees subjected to the removal of the prefrontal regions of their cerebral cortex, which, nevertheless, were able to carry out complicated problem-solving experiments. He concludes that the brain regions essential for adaptive instrumentation are certainly not located in the prefrontal areas allegedly responsible for highest coördination of adaptive behavior (p. 268). He also indicates that animals quite expert in their play activity are sometimes quite unable to carry out similar activities in a problem-solving situation. Schiller concludes that 'even

The ethologist in his definition of instinctive behavior describes a total activity including the stimulus, the exploratory searching activity (which the ethologist calls appetitive behavior), and the consummatory act. These are all part of the instinct and contribute, as Tinbergen states in his definition, to 'the maintenance of the individual and the species'.

When we turn to the psychoanalytic concept of drive, we find that it is of a different order.[5] Drive and instinct are concepts, not observable phenomena. They are inferred from observed behavior whether in action or speech, the latter, of course, limited to the human. Drive in the psychoanalytic sense is, in the words of Freud, a ' . . . psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of its connection with the body. . . . [It is] on the frontier between the mental and the somatic . . .' *(13,* p. 122*)*. It is not, as the instinct of animals, a total activity, and in this essential difference it is a basic human quality. What in animals is called instinct includes an innate apparatus for the consummation of needs, whereas in the human there are other functions which mediate between the drives and the demands of reality, with delay and reality-oriented consummation.

The psychoanalytic concept of mental functioning is more than drive theory, a fact that many critics of drive theory seem to ignore. The drives may be conceptualized as the motive

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the highest vertebrates, primates, have certain peculiar manipulative forms of activity available, without specific training to develop them. They are present uniformly in all individuals of the same age group, and are invariably displayed if the general condition of the animal favors them. They bear all the criteria of instinctive activities, and can be correlated to known patterns of functional cycles such as nesting, mating, social activities, etc. These internally coördinated manipulative patterns are not derived from experience, but, on the contrary, the adaptive learned performances seem to be derived from them by a mechanism of association with external and internal cues in consequence of repeated and consistent occurrences' (p. 286).

[5] I should like to make it clear that here, and wherever else I speak of 'drive', I refer to its specific psychoanalytic meaning and not to the more general meaning used by ethologists and psychologists.

force which sets into action the rest of the psychic apparatus. What distinguishes man is how he deals with his drives. These demand immediate gratification, but man has psychic functions which permit delay, modification, and even renunciation. It is these latter functions that distinguish man, not his drives, and it is these functions as well as drives that occupy the attention of psychoanalytic conceptualization. To dismiss drives from human psychic functioning is to deny the dynamic nature of human mental activity, the source of motivation.

Is there evidence of instinctive behavior in man similar to that of animals? The early responses of the human infant both to internal stimuli and external stimuli appear to be of an instinctive nature, but the repertory of responses is quite limited and certainly has little survival value unless there is an adult available to meet the infant's needs. In this connection we note that in contrast to the nonhuman neonate, the human infant requires more extensive and more prolonged care by the mothering person. Further study in this area is necessary. We need to know more about the transition from the early neurophysiological state of the infant to the later psychological state marked by the development of a functioning ego. I venture the opinion that in the course of development all psychic activity of the human is mediated by ego functions and that instinctive behavior disappears.[6]

Ritual acts, repetitive compulsive symptoms, the automatisms, such as we see in the musical virtuoso, must not be confused with the instinctive behavior of animals. The former are the result of complex interactions of the substructures of the human psyche. They have meaning, mental content, and where their meaning is not on the surface, it is possible, by psychoanalytic methods, to uncover their unconscious determinants.

I shall not discuss the historical development of drive theory, which has passed through a number of changes, for the most

[6] Human beings, of course, are subject to reflex action involving the viscera and musculature, but reflex action is not to be equated with instinctive behavior.

part initiated by Freud himself. It is enough for my purpose to note the current concept that drives are subsumed under two categories, libidinal and aggressive, and that at the level of clinical observation their derivatives appear as admixtures of both libido and aggression. Nor have I given consideration to the problem of the source, either of instinctive behavior in animals or of drive impulses in man. This, too, is beyond the scope of my presentation and I shall make only a few remarks.

Freud comments that 'the study of the sources of instincts [drives][7] lies outside the scope of psychology. . . . By the source *(Quelle)* of an instinct [drive] is meant the somatic process which occurs in an organ or part of the body and whose stimulus is represented in mental life by an instinct [drive]' *(13,* p. 123). As Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein *(27)* and later Brenner *(7,* p. 31*)* have pointed out, this hypothesis applies only to the libidinal drive, and as of the present we know nothing of the somatic source of the aggressive drive. The energic force of the drive becomes the basis of motivation. The interaction of excitation, of both internal and external origin, results in an inner imbalance which the organism is impelled, in some instances, to restore to the earlier state of equilibrium; in other instances, the organism must establish a new level of equilibrium. The role of the external stimulus is the more obvious. The nature of internal excitation poses many unanswered questions. Recent neurophysiological studies indicate that there is from the reticular activating system and the limbic system a constant bombardment of excitations reaching the cortical structures of the brain, both in man and animal. It has also been demonstrated in dramatic fashion that stimulation of specific areas of the mid-brain can produce startling changes in the behavior of the individual, whether man or animal. For example, the charging bull may, on electrical stimulation, suddenly become placid and amenable. These

[7] I have introduced the term 'drive' in brackets wherever the Standard Edition translation uses the term 'instinct.'

findings give evidence of the anatomical and physiological substratum of human behavior as well as animal behavior, which the psychoanalyst takes for granted, keeping for his own realm of study the resultant psychological phenomena.

To repeat: 'instinct' in the animal is a total, innate organized mechanism which is patterned to include stimulus, behavior, and consummation; 'drive' in man is a psychical representative of an inner stimulus. It is the first step toward consummation and sets into action the other psychic functions of ego and superego which mediate between drive and the outside world.

REGULATION OF DRIVE AND INSTINCT IN MAN AND ANIMAL: LEARNING

The difference between drive in the human and instinct in the nonhuman becomes more significant as we move on to the next problem. This is the problem of the regulatory mechanisms of human psychic activity, the consummation and control of drive impulses in action vis-à-vis the modification of instinct patterns in nonhumans. This involves the problem of learning, my next topic. The concept of ego as a group of functions mediating between drive impulse and reality, and leading to a reality-oriented response, is, as I have already indicated, central to this question.

Patterns of response in animals above the most primitive level are subject to modification by environmental influences. This statement fits in with Gardner Murphy's definition of learning: 'The process by which the organism becomes able to respond more adequately to a given situation in consequence of experience in responding to it' (*43*, p. 990). The question is whether the process of learning is the same in man and animal.

The ethologists have described two phenomena effecting modification of animal behavior: imprinting and conditioning. More and more we find these terms applied to human beings, and there is even at the present time renewed interest in so-called 'de-conditioning' or 'counter-conditioning', a therapy based on the proposition that 'abnormal behavior should be

thought of not as a symptom of internal conditions, but rather as a problem of "social learning" ', that change comes about by 'positive reinforcement', that is, reward for acceptable behavior.[8]

Konrad Lorenz *(38),* who has done pioneer work on the phenomenon of imprinting in the graylag gosling, describes this as a specific response of young birds, which attach themselves to the first object, animate or inanimate, that they see immediately after hatching. Lorenz considers this phenomenon to be an instinctive one based upon an innate mechanism specific for each species described. Although some authors consider imprinting as a form of learning, Lorenz distinguishes it from a learning process. He says, 'It has no equal in the psychology of any other animal, least of all a mammal. The phenomenon can take place only within the brief critical period immediately after hatching'. Recent ethological studies confirm Lorenz's position and conclude that imprinting differs from associative learning and is, rather, the evocation of an innate response pattern.[9] I know of no human phenomenon to which the term imprinting in the defined sense can be applied, and

[8] For an article supporting this approach see Bandura *(1).* Though this therapeutic technique claims scientific validity in that it calls on 'principles of learning that are based on experimentation and are subject to testing and verification', there is reason to doubt that such a claim is warranted. To mention one point—the example described by Bandura concerns a child in a kindergarten setting involved in interaction with other children and a teacher but no mention is made of the significance of the object relationships or the possible role of identification. With schizophrenic children, for instance, the technique consists of 'modeling the desired behavior and rewarding the child when he emulates it'. Further: 'the most impressive thing about this form of treatment is that it can be conducted under the supervision of nurses, students, and parents, to whom the methods are easily taught'.

[9] For detailed discussion see also Hess *(28).* He states that 'while there is a point of similarity between imprinting and association learning in that a relationship or "connection" is established between an object and a response, there is a basic distinction in that in imprinting there is a critical period, developmentally timed, during which certain wide classes of stimuli act as releasers or unconditional stimuli for certain types of innate responses, whereas in association learning, the object in question does not act as an unconditional stimulus for the response but is initially neutral for its effect on the animal's behavior'.

I think it is misleading to use the term 'imprinting' when we speak, for example, of the late effects of psychic trauma in infancy and early childhood.

To equate, or even to analogize, the complex development of the psychic functioning and disturbance of functioning in the human child, which involves object relations, conceptualization, cognition, and affect, with a phenomenon that is limited to a critical period of only thirty-two to thirty-six hours after hatching and that is so stereotyped in its manifestation, is, I contend, both a logical error and a semantic confusion. It is a striking indication of the caution demanded in applying animal observation to human psychic activity. There are, as psychoanalytic studies have demonstrated, critical phases in the child's psychic development, but these are both phenomenologically and dynamically totally different from imprinting.

Conditioning is another phenomenon to which psychologists are devoting a great deal of attention and which is being applied to human beings. It is not easy to follow their reports because of the complexity of the terminology, and even more because of the different meanings attached to the term.[10]

We are all familiar with Pavlov's early experiments on the conditioned reflex by which the unconditioned reflex response of the dog to food is associated with a sound, a bell for example, so that the original unconditioned response, namely the secretion of saliva or gastric juice, can be elicited by the stimulus of the bell in the absence of food. The second type of response is spoken of as a conditioned reflex in contrast to the original unconditioned reflex. But later studies have changed the concept to a great extent. Later authors speak of 'operant conditioning' where re-enforcement is used in learning, the basis of the Skinner box, or 'instrumental conditioning', until as one author notes, 'What was originally a very limited domain has

10 A special difficulty arises from the use of the term 'conditioned' in its common-sense meaning, 'influenced' or 'modified', in scientific articles, a use not infrequent in psychoanalytic papers. My concern is with its strict scientific meaning.

been extended to encompass most of behavior modification under one term, "conditioning" ' *(20)*. According to another psychologist, O. Hobart Mowrer, ' . . . in the final analysis, all learning can be reduced to conditioning, if that process is properly defined' *(42,* p. 19*)*. I need hardly add here that the problem lies precisely in defining the process properly.

Pavlov *(45)* extended his concept of conditioning as a physiological process to human psychic functioning and psychopathology. He distinguished two types of 'signaling systems', a 'first signaling system' which responds to sensation and perception, and a 'second signaling system' which responds to speech, ideas, verbal thoughts, abstractions, and generalizations. The latter he limited to humans.[11]

I do not question the importance of the concept of conditioning as applied to nonhumans, and I can envisage a significant contribution to the understanding of psychosomatic disorders, the changes in human visceral responses to external stimulation and emotional states, by what has been described as 'interoceptive conditioning'.[12] But the application of conditioning to human psychopathology, to human learning and thought, to object relationships, to the creations of artists and scientists, is far from established.

My contention is first, that in the human, conditioning, in the strict sense of the term, has limited application, and second, that other factors unique to man are of primary importance. Studies of experimental conditioning in man are limited to neurophysiological phenomena such as eye blinking, knee jerk, heart rate, and vasomotor and psychogalvanic responses *(29,*

[11] Pavlov follows Janet in assuming 'hysteria is a production of a weak nervous system', and 'a psychical disorder belonging to the immense group of diseases resulting from weakness and exhaustion of the brain'. On this basis he assumes further the inability of the cortex to synthesize and control the effects of external stimuli with resultant 'unreasoned and emotional life directed by the subcortical rather than by cortical functions' *(45,* p. 107, ff.). These assumptions remain unproved.

[12] For an informative and detailed discussion of interoceptive conditioning see Razran *(46)*.

p. 615). When Mowrer speaks of conditioning 'conceived as the development of certain perceptions, expectations, anticipations, meanings, emotions' (*42*, p. 279), he has gone a great distance from the original concept of Pavlov and he is also raising, in my mind at least, a question whether it is appropriate to conceive of conditioning in these terms, and whether it can be applied to animals. It seems to me rather that he has so diluted the term that it has lost any significant meaning.

What of human learning? Where does it differ from animal learning? There has so far been no definitive study of learning from the psychoanalytic point of view, nor shall I be able to offer more than a few thoughts. The essential point is that learning in man may be equated with the development of ego and superego functions, the structural differentiation of human psychic functioning. We have here a circular process: learning leads to ego and superego development and the ego functions are necessary for learning to take place. These functions, which I shall here only list, comprise the uniqueness of man, the humanness of human beings: his capacity to control his drives and to postpone gratification; his thought processes which include conceptualization, abstraction, speech, and imagination; the nature of his affective responses; his relationship to other persons; and, above all, his moral functions, his ethical standards, and his capacity to experience guilt.

We no longer quarrel about nature versus nurture. What is innate, that is to say, inherited, is never the structure or the function being observed, but a capacity to develop in one direction or another. The geneticist describes a plant, a variety of the primula, which grows white flowers in the valley and red flowers on the cold mountain top (*41*, p. 38). Clearly, what is innate in this instance is the capacity to grow differently colored flowers under different environmental influences of temperature and soil. Man has the capacity to develop the various functions we speak of as ego and superego, but the specific manifestations of the function are the result of the interaction of heredity and environment. This Freud recognized in

his earliest writings and the reiterated statement that psychoanalysis neglects environmental and social influences can come only from critics who have not read carefully enough.

Learning in both man and nonhumans is the result of the interaction of external influences and innate capacities, but the essential difference between the two lies in the specific nature of man's innate capacities and his experiences. Man brings to his experiences his capacity for thought, imagination, and conceptualization, and above all is subject to the influence of a very special kind of relationship to the persons about him. There is in man an aspect of his relationship to other persons which I assert to be unique, that is, his capacity for identification, internalization, and individuation, the last carrying with it the capacity for self-observation. A psychoanalytic theory of learning would make a central issue the problem of identification. It is, indeed, surprising that one finds almost no reference to identification in the psychological literature on learning. Even more, recently proposed educational methods would, in effect, eliminate the teacher and place the child in a cubicle by himself to communicate with an electronic machine.

I would designate identification as a basic human tendency toward unification with others. The child strives to be like the admired parental figures and in this way establishes his first emotional ties. Identification is based on a drive vicissitude and in many instances represents the attempt to retain a lost object. In other instances it serves as a defense, as is seen in identification with the aggressor.

Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein say, 'The roots of identification can be traced to those impulses of the id, which strive toward incorporation; the psychological mechanism of identification is a correlate of and is built upon the model of this striving. In the earliest phases of the child's ego development, the child relies upon the adults in his dealing with the external world; he participates in their reactions and thus acquires their methods of solving problems and coping with emergencies' *(26,* p. 29*)*. Identification is thus more than a drive vicissitude

—it is also an ego mechanism that permits the child to learn the behavior, the thought, and the attitudes of the admired and loved adult. Identification involves in addition other developing and maturing ego functions—awareness, cognition, conceptualization, affect, and eventually separation of self and nonself.

We recognize learning as we observe the developing ego and superego functions. It is by the process of identification that ego and superego development takes place, along with, of course, the maturational process which goes on concurrently. Without the opportunity for identification, as occurs when infants are deprived of maternal care, there are serious distortions of both ego and superego development.

The early identifications are unstable and transient. We are aware clinically of transient identifications both in the young child before stable character structure has crystallized and in the adult in normally empathic responses, or in certain pathological states. Only gradually do identifications become stabilized and lead to the significant next step in this process—the onset of internalization. This term, though frequently used, is not easy to define. One can say little more about it than that what was external has become internal. A basic question not yet fully answered is: how does what is in the outer world become part of the inner world of the individual? We recognize internalization indirectly by the behavior, attitude, and manifestations of the individual, especially the separation of self and nonself.

I have discussed identification for two reasons, first, because it is a unique form of object relationships in humans, and second, because of its role in learning. It is the role of identification in learning that makes the process in the human so different from that in nonhumans, even the primates.

But there are other elements that add to the uniqueness of man. I have already noted that as learning goes on there is a circular process: as the child learns, his ego and superego functions develop and stabilize to the point where it is possible

to speak of ego and superego structures. These stabilized structures are essential for the continuation and furtherance of the learning process. There are characteristic differences in learning at different stages of growth from that of the infant who learns to manipulate a spoon, through kindergarten play, the schooling of latency and adolescence, to the adult learning of college and postgraduate studies. In each successive phase there is increasing complexity of conceptualization and abstraction along with increasing intellectual and motor skills.

I turn now to consider certain of these ego functions, specifically thought and imagination.

THOUGHT AND IMAGINATION

That even what has been called 'the savage mind' is extremely complex has been documented in great detail in the book of that title by Claude Lévi-Strauss *(37)*. Within the limits of his needs and his knowledge of his world, primitive man is capable of conceptualization, abstraction, and organized language as well as of art, poetry, and religion.

Thought is a process involving many ego functions, some of which I have just listed. Along with conceptualization, abstraction, and speech, there are memory and the capacity for symbol formation. Above all, man has the unique faculty of imagination. I have elsewhere pointed out that it is incorrect to set up for imagination a limiting and confining definition as the obverse of realistic thought, and that I consider more significant its functional role in human psychic activity. I would define imagination as the capacity to form a mental representation of an absent object, whether it be an object in the outside world or an internal activity, a mental function, an affect, a body function, or a drive.[18] The capacity to form a mental

[18] For detailed discussion of this concept of imagination and further bibliography see Beres *(2, 3, 4)*. See also editors' note in Freud: 'It is scarcely necessary to explain that here as elsewhere, in speaking of the libido concentrating on "objects", withdrawing from "objects", etc., Freud has in mind the mental presentations *(Vorstellungen)* of objects and not, of course, objects in the external world' *(12,* p. 217*)*.

representation where the object is not present to the senses, is, according to all observers—psychologists, ethologists, anthropologists, and philosophers—a purely human capacity.[14] I remind you here of Köhler's experiments in which it was necessary for the objects which the chimpanzee used in its problem solving to be in its direct line of vision before it was able to solve the problem. I question the statement by Harlow that the infant monkey 'probably has far more capability of imaginative thought than the year-old human infant' *(22,* p. 307). There is no evidence that even the adult monkey is capable of imaginative thought, the evocation of an image or idea without an external and immediate stimulus.

Memory is a function that man shares with animals. Mental registration can occur in all forms of animal life where there is a brain, and thus form the basis of memory. I distinguish sharply mental registration from mental representation. If an animal has registered an experience, memory makes possible under later direct stimulation the finding of an object, or even the duplication of a complex procedure to achieve a desired result. A memory trace or a memory schema may be activated by a new stimulus, and in animals always by a new stimulus.[15] We do not know at this stage of our knowledge what are the neurophysiological processes that facilitate the imaginative faculty. We may speculate that there is in the human being a process of continuous cortical activity capable of evoking imagery, thought, and fantasy without external stimula-

[14] Hallowell, an anthropologist, describes 'man's capacity for the transcendence of the immediate, local, time- and space-bound world of the other primates who lack the capacity for dealing effectively with objects and events outside the field of direct perception' *(21,* p. 7).

[15] I am here raising the question of the *evocation* of a memory trace or memory schema. This is a problem that has been insufficiently studied by experimental psychologists in comparative psychology. Most studies of memory, both in man and animal, are concerned with retention, the neurophysiological basis of memory and, more recently, the biochemical basis of memory. Only in psychoanalysis is there a direct approach to the recovery of repressed infantile memories, both as a clinical procedure and as a theoretical problem. The reports of ethologists and also of observers of primate behavior give no

tion. This postulated cortical activity would be the neurophysiological substratum of mental representation and of unconscious mental functioning. There remains the further question how the products of this activity are brought to consciousness.

Imagination is an important factor in man's relation to reality. I have emphasized the basic distinction between the animal response and the human response to external stimulation. Whereas the animal responds immediately and directly, the human response is mediated through ego functions. The animal responds to signals, to presentations; the human being changes the perceptions to mental representations and then responds to the mental representations. The animal does not test reality; it responds to it. Whereas the reality of animals is determined by direct perception, man's perception and conception of the reality of the outer world is to a great extent influenced by his inner conflicts and emotional state. All external perceptions in the human are to some degree distorted on the path to psychic representation and in the testing of reality. In the testing of the relation of an external perception to an internal representation, one psychic representation is compared to another. Freud recognized this point, and in his paper on Negation, he said, 'The antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there. The first and immediate aim, therefore, of reality testing is, not to *find* an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but

evidence that nonhumans are capable of the evocation of memory except when subjected to new and immediate external stimuli related to the original experience, although the memories thus evoked may be remarkable. (See the chapter in Köhler's book, Some Contributions to the Psychology of Chimpanzees [*33*, p. 271, ff.]). Further, as I shall try to indicate below, the evidence points to the conclusion that nonhumans do not have the capacity for either symbolization or imagery, both functions that I consider essential for the evocation of memory independent of external stimulation.

to *refind* such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there' *(15,* p. 237*)*.

We know that animals discriminate between complex configurations, but the evidence indicates that they do so in a global sensorimotor fashion described by Heinz Werner as concrete, syncretic, with fusion of sensorimeter and affective elements and always in relation to direct, immediate sensory stimulation *(53,* p. 213*)*. This type of response, which characterizes also the human infant, lacks those qualities that mark the imaginative process. Only gradually as the child develops is he capable of evoking the absent object, of speech, of symbolization, and thus able to conceptualize the outer world, the self, the future, and the past. He creates order out of the chaos of his perceptions and has at his disposal a tool for adaptation to the external environment and to other humans that is not available to nonhumans.

SYMBOLISM AND SPEECH

Consideration of thought, imagination, and conceptualization takes us to the topics of symbolism and speech, which call first for a short digression into neurophysiology.

The comparative anatomist has described the evolutionary development of the human brain both in regard to its size and to the complexity of its structure. Washburn, following Penfield and Rasmussen, notes that the areas of the cortex concerned with speech are very large in the human. He adds that the reason a chimpanzee cannot learn to talk is simply that the large amounts of brain necessary for speech are not there. He says, 'Our brains, then, are not just enlarged, but the increase in size is directly related to tool use, speech, and to increased memory and planning. The general pattern of the human brain is very similar to that of ape or monkey. Its uniqueness lies in its large size and in the particular areas which are enlarged' *(51)*. It is an open question whether in the higher primates there is a speech area in the brain. This is difficult to establish because there is no demonstrable anatomic

distinction between the speech area and other parts of the cortex. It would appear that apes cannot talk, even though, as has so often been pointed out, they have the necessary anatomical structures of larynx and tongue for vocalization, because they lack the cortical structures for speech. Paleontologists suggest that in the early hominids also there was probably no such development, though they already were capable of tool making and bipedal locomotion which, it is believed, preceded the use of speech.

There are, as is well known, complex communicative processes in the lower animals, even in insects. However, these are entirely different from language as we know it in the human being. What is lacking in animal communication is abstraction and symbolism. Human communication consists of symbols and signs, whereas animal communication is limited to signals.

Magoun offers a neurophysiological explanation of the distinction between emotional vocalization and discursive language or symbolic speech which is pertinent to my thesis. He says, 'Animal studies suggest that vocalization in emotional expression is managed by a neural mechanism in the middle brain stem, and data from clinical neurology support the presence of such a subcortical emotional mechanism in man as well. No functional relationship is known between this deep-lying mesencephalic system for emotional vocalization, widely present through the animal kingdom, and the topographically distant cortical areas for symbolic speech, which exist only in the associational cortex of the human brain. In keeping with their phylogenetic difference, these two mechanisms for vocal communication display widely different maturation times in the ontogeny of the human infant. As might be expected, the older, more stereotyped, subcortical emotional mechanism is fully functional at birth. By contrast, in the infant, activity of the cortical mechanism for symbolic speech is only manifest about six months later, as the incomprehensible babbling and jabbering, described as vocal play. Its function in understand-

able speech only develops between one and two years after birth' *(40,* p. 43*)*. These neurophysiological findings, I suggest, plead for caution in comparing animal communications with human speech.

As these neurophysiological developments are progressing in the child, there is concurrent functional development, a change in the representational capacity of the child's mind—the capacity to create symbols. A symbol is, the dictionary tells us, 'something that stands for, represents, or denotes something else'. But when comparing the mental functioning of human and nonhuman, it is necessary to recognize that there are different kinds of substitution of one object for another, a difference noted in the distinction between signs and symbols.[16]

There is a universal need to seek the familiar, to find 'similitude in dissimilitude'. And where the gratifying object is not available when the need presses, a substitute object will be accepted. In lower animals, as well as in man, something may substitute for something else. The stimulus from the substitute object would then result in a response appropriate to the original object, but this substitute object is not a symbol. How then does it differ from the symbol? The substitute object is to the organism in every sense equal to the original object. It does not *represent* the original object to the animal. The animal responds to the substitute object as to the original object with immediacy and with the specific sensorimotor behavior that characterizes its species. For example, the surrogate mothers which Harlow supplied to the monkeys are substitute mothers; they are not symbols of the mother, and the infant treats the surrogate mother as though it were the real mother. The fact that a real mother is necessary even for the infant monkey for satisfactory development is a finding of considerable importance *(23, 24)*.

Animals respond to specific stimuli which serve as signals. The sight of a predatory enemy which the animal recognizes will bring on specific fight or flight response. It is possible to

[16] I have discussed symbolism in greater detail in an earlier paper *(5)*.

produce similar responses by substituting abstract forms that resemble the predatory enemy. The psychologist also describes numerous examples of training lower animals to discriminate among abstract forms which serve as signals to obtain food or to avoid pain. These substitutions are not symbols. One finds frequent reference in the writings of psychologists to 'primitive' or 'simple' forms of symbolism in nonhumans. In most instances these authors use the word 'symbol' where 'sign' or 'signal' would be correct. In other instances the assumption of symbolic activity is made without convincing evidence that there is more than the substitution of one object for another.

The human infant also passes through a presymbolic phase in his early development, and I suggest that the transitional object described by Winnicott *(54)* is an illustration of transition from the substitute object to the symbolic object.

The key significance of the symbol in contrast to the sign is that it is a representational object that can be evoked in the absence of an immediate external stimulus. The relation of the symbolic process to consciousness presents complex questions, some as yet unanswered. Man can consciously create a representational object—an emblem, a painted image, a verbal image. The emblem may represent a nation or a fraternal organization; the painted image, a remembered landscape or a religious ecstasy; the verbal image, a passionate love or a scientific model. The symbol may be a word, a person, an external object, or even a work of art. The symbol is a manifest product of which the individual is conscious, though the referent, that which is symbolized, may be either conscious, easily available to consciousness, or repressed and not conscious. In the latter instance we have what Ferenczi *(10)* and Jones *(31)* consider the 'true symbol' in the psychoanalytic sense.

The artist or scientist who is consciously creating a representational object is at the same time under the influence of unconscious forces of which he is not aware. We see this in the recurrent imagery in the work of an artist, the choice of a metaphor or simile to explain a scientific observation.

The symbolic process, the formation of symbols, is an unconscious process and shares the qualities of other unconscious mental activities, essentially the mechanisms of displacement and condensation. We know only the final product, the conscious symbol, and we infer its unconscious referent and relation to the individual's overt behavior and thought. The symbol is the conscious derivative of the unconscious mental representation, the psychic reality of Freud. There is considerable evidence for the postulation of organized unconscious mental representations which may be spoken of as unconscious fantasies and which can be inferred from the externalized conscious symbols. In this sense symbolism gives conscious expression to unconscious mental content and serves both adaptation and communication *(4)*.[17]

Much remains to be learned about the development of the capacity for symbolization. The evidence indicates that this capacity is not present at birth, and much of the weakness of the Kleinian approach to child psychology rests on its assumption of innate symbolic activity in the newborn and young infant. There is universal agreement, except for the Kleinians, that perception must precede registration and mental representation, though the perception may be subliminal and not necessarily conscious. It is further likely that symbol formation begins before speech is acquired. There is here, also, I suggest, a difference between the play of children and the play of animals. The function of play may be similar in the child and the animal, the preparation for dealing with the outside world. But the kitten playing with a ball of yarn is following an instinctive pattern which later will serve it in stalking a mouse. The ball of yarn is a real immediate object to which it responds as it will later to a mouse. For the child, as he learns to distinguish between reality and fantasy, the play object is a

[17] *Cf.* Freud: 'The unconscious is the true psychical reality: in its innermost nature it is as much unknown to us as the reality of the external world, and it is as incompletely presented by the data of consciousness as is the external world by the communications of our sense organs' *(11*, p. 613*)*.

symbol and the play activity is more than the release of an instinctive pattern. It serves communication, the mastery of anxiety, and—in Ernst Kris's *(34)* definition of functional pleasure—mastery of the body functions and the outer world. In all this the child will have passed from the stage of the substitute object to the stage of the symbolic object. He has learned the art of make-believe. An important psychopathological manifestation of disturbance of the symbolic process is the persistence into adult life of the young child's incapacity to distinguish between the substitute object and the original object. This manifests itself in marked pathology of thought processes, speech, and object relationship, even to the point of autistic or psychotic proportions.

The capacity for symbolism is so characteristically and uniquely a human faculty that Ernst Cassirer has said, 'Instead of defining man as an *animal rationale,* we should define him as an *animal symbolicum.* By so doing we can designate his specific difference, and we can understand the new way open to man—the way to civilization' *(8,* p. 26*).*

Symbolism provides the building stones for the various mental representations, for the imaginative process. Symbols are the basis of the dream, the fantasy, the thought, the hallucination, the word, and the symptom. By formation of symbols, mental representations are interposed between the external stimulus and the response of the organism, and facilitate the delay of discharge of tension produced by the stimulus.

Symbolism and imagination reach their heights in the productions of the artist. Wordsworth has asked, 'What is a Poet?' He answers, 'To whom does he address himself? And what language is to be expected from him?—. He is a man speaking to men: A man, it is true, endowed with more lively sensibility, more enthusiasm and tenderness, who has a greater knowledge of human nature, and a more comprehensive soul, than are supposed to be common among mankind; a man pleased with his own passions and volitions, and who rejoices more than other men in the spirit of life that is in him; delighting to

contemplate similar volitions and passions as manifested in the goings-on of the Universe, and habitually impelled to create them where he does not find them. To these qualities he has added a *disposition to be affected more than other men by absent things as if they were present*; an ability of conjuring up in himself passions, which are indeed far from being the same as those produced by real events, yet (especially in those parts of the general sympathy which are pleasing and delightful) do more resemble the passions produced by real events, than anything which, from the motions of their own minds merely, other men are accustomed to feel in themselves:—whence, and from practice, he has acquired a greater readiness and power in expressing what he thinks and feels, and especially those thoughts and feelings which, by his own choice, or from the structure of his own mind, *arise in him without immediate external excitement' (55,* Vol. II, p. 87; I have added italics).

Susanne Langer, in a discussion of 'animal art', notes that the great apes that have been led to imitate the human technique of painting on paper never try to produce an image. She adds, ' . . . the interpretation of a visual form as an image, just like the phonetic form as a word, is strictly human' *(35,* p. 145*)*.

We have no evidence that permits definitive conclusion regarding the capacity of animals for imagery, whether in the waking or sleeping state. It is too early to be sure of the significance of the exciting work on the neurophysiology of sleep and dream to the observations and theories of psychoanalysis. We have learned that rapid eye movements, the REMs described by research workers in dream activity, occur in association with dreaming in humans, but they also occur to even more marked degree in animals, and more in the infant than in the developing child or adult. Whether visual dreaming occurs in animals or early infancy is an open question, and it is unwarranted to assume without further evidence that the presence of rapid eye movements in animals or infants indicates dreaming. It would seem to me consistent with the concept that I have presented of mental representation in

humans and the absence of evidence that animals are capable of evoking the representation of an absent object, to assume, rather, until further evidence is available, that animals are not capable either of imagery or dreaming.

AFFECTS

The subject of affects is of central importance in psychoanalytic theory and practice, where it is placed among the functions of the ego. Darwin, in Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals *(9)*, gives clear evidence of the fact that animals respond to stimuli with observable phenomena in accordance with their pleasurable or unpleasurable effects. The question is whether man has added to these observable phenomena a component not present in the lower animal. I believe this is so. What Darwin has described are the motor and autonomic concomitants of emotion which may be seen in both man and animal. What is added in man's emotional expression is the awareness that accompanies these motor and autonomic responses. Freud has pointed out that affects do not go through an unconscious phase *(14)*. When we speak of unconscious anxiety or unconscious guilt, what we are actually referring to is the repression of awareness of the anxiety or the guilt. There is no doubt that animals respond to loss of objects but whether, for instance, the response of a dog which has lost its master is to be equated with the human reaction of mourning is difficult to answer. It is especially dangerous to equate the physiognomic expression of animals to the emotional responses of human beings with a similar surface appearance.

The mother-child relationship should be considered in this context. I have mentioned Harlow's experiments with monkeys which demonstrate the important role of contact with a living mother and not a surrogate mother for satisfactory later development. In a recent report, Kaufman and Rosenblum *(32)* have described what they consider a depressive reaction in infant monkeys separated from their mothers. Here again I suggest the need for further study to determine whether the

surface manifestations, though externally similar to the response of human infants, are similar in their dynamic significance.

Harlow notes the striking observation in monkeys that ' . . . if the prefrontal areas of the cortex of the baby are taken out bilaterally, neither its affectional responses to other babies are interfered with nor its responses to a surrogate mother' *(22,* p. 341*)*. We may conclude that the emotional responses of the monkey are controlled by subcortical neural structures and this may be true also of the human neonate. The question is: when do cortical influences begin to operate in the human baby or, to rephrase the question, when do ego functions become evident?

Bowlby, following Imre Hermann states that the young, whether man or animal, follow for the sake of following, and cling for the sake of clinging. He argues against the significance of libidinal phases and especially the oral phase of early childhood *(6)*. Bowlby is correct in describing the reaction of the neonate, but it seems to me that he neglects precisely those elements in the later development of the child that characterize him as a human being.

MENTAL CONFLICT

Affect enters into the problem of mental conflict. Much has been written about animal neurosis. I question, however, whether this is a valid designation. That animals may be exposed to conflict with the external environment is, of course, obvious; and that an animal will respond to noxious stimulation with evidence of disturbance is to be expected, but I consider it a misuse of the term neurosis to apply it to such observations. When we think of neurosis, we think in terms of intrapsychic conflict and this is, from the evidence available, a purely human characteristic. Freud said this when he spoke of neurosis as 'in a sense a human prerogative' *(18,* p. 75*)*. Similarly, Huxley said, 'Man is the only organism normally and inevitably subject to psychological conflict' *(30,* p. 21*)*.

Psychoanalysis has been defined as the psychology of conflict, and it is in fact according to their role in adaptation and

conflict, as I have said, that psychic functions are structured as id, ego, and superego. I need not enter here into the nosogenesis of mental illness, to point up the conflict between drive derivatives, the demands of reality, and the commands of superego function, nor the role of defense mechanisms of the ego and the compromise formation of symptoms. For there to be intrapsychic conflict, there must be psychic structures, and, as I have tried to bring out throughout this presentation, structuralization of the psyche in the psychoanalytic sense is limited to the human being.

Because man is rational, he has also the capacity to be irrational. Because his ego functions give him wide flexibility of response, he is capable of unfortunate choices and unpredictability of response.

Another human quality which enters into the manifestations of conflict and mental illness arises from the fact that mental activity may assume different qualities, consciousness or unconsciousness. Where man has awareness, I suggest, animals have only sentience.

The recognition by Freud of the significance of different danger situations at different phases of development and the role of anxiety as a signal leading to repression and intrapsychic conflict, marked a turning point in psychoanalytic theory and practice. Intrapsychic conflict, in metaphorical terms, is between id and ego, between id and superego, or between ego and superego. Id elements are unconscious; ego and superego elements may be conscious or unconscious. The lack of evidence, not only of psychic structuralization in nonhumans, but also of the dichotomy of consciousness and unconsciousness implies the absence of repressed unconscious mental content. It is for these reasons that I question the use of the terms neurosis or psychosis in animals.

DELAY OF DISCHARGE: SUPEREGO FUNCTIONS

I come now to the final point I shall discuss. It offers the opportunity also to demonstrate the interaction of the substruc-

tures of the human psyche. I have stated, as Freud indicated in his early writings, that drives strive for immediate gratification. In this regard, humans do not differ from nonhumans. The essential difference is the unique nature of the human psychic apparatus for the delay of gratification.

We observe in the human two kinds of behavior, whether in speech or in action, the one immediate, irrational, without relation to the limitations of reality; the second delayed, rational, and logical, and related to the demands of reality. In our theory we speak of the first as primary process, the second as secondary process. We say the first is regulated by the pleasure principle, the second by the reality principle. When we attempt further theoretical explanation, we postulate a psychic energy which operates in the motivation, activation, and consummation of a psychological event, a postulate which is, to my mind, indispensable when one is dealing with so dynamic a process as psychoanalysis demonstrates human psychic activity to be.

What is important for our consideration is that this dual functional capacity is uniquely human and distinguishes the delay and inhibitory mechanisms of the human from the inhibitory behavior of animals. In the first instance, the primary process, the energy is freely mobile, unbound, subject to displacement and condensation, and pressing for immediate discharge; whereas in the second instance, the secondary process, the energies are bound, no longer freely mobile, subject to organization, and capable of delay of discharge. Where the animal has available an instinct apparatus to respond to reality demands, man has a complex group of functions, the functions of the ego, to achieve a similar end.

We know that animals also can inhibit or delay response to a stimulus. Lorenz describes the behavior of the mother turkey who responds to a specific sound emitted by her young, which protects them from her instinctive pecking attack on any small object. He describes an experiment in which the auditory function in the mother turkey is destroyed, whereupon she will peck to death her young because she does not hear the appro-

priate signal *(39,* p. 118*)*. Lorenz further emphasizes that only in man is there lacking an innate instinctive mechanism for the inhibition of intraspecies aggression *(39,* p. 241*)*.

Tinbergen notes that intraspecies fighting is in relation to the reproductive function or in defense of feeding territory. He notes also that fight-evoking signals are specific and very different even in closely related species *(49,* p. 175*)*. Observers of animals in their natural habitat give abundant evidence that intraspecies fighting is ritualized and aims at intimidation and threat rather than injury and annihilation of the opponent, so different from human aggression *(50,* p. 58*)*. The evocation of intraspecies conflict, its manifestations, and its inhibitions are in animals controlled by innate instinctive mechanisms.

It is also possible to teach animals to delay discharge of instinctive behavior, as indeed it is possible to teach human beings to delay gratification. But whereas the first involves a change from one instinctive response to another by conditioning, the second involves the exercise of the functions of ego and superego.

The complexity of human behavior, the delay of response, the evocation as well as the inhibition of both libidinal and aggressive manifestations, makes any comparison to animal behavior no more than superficial analogy.

Man's psychic endowment—his capacity to symbolize, to conceptualize, to speak, to visualize, to recall the past and envisage the future, to idealize—all these have freed him from the immediate, the here-and-now, the what-is-visible, and with that freedom he has soared to unbelievable heights and he has descended to disastrous depths. The human capacity to modify his environment, not merely to respond to it, has not always led to happy results. Man's freedom from the bonds with which instinct limits the animal demands a price of contradiction and paradox. We see in man charity and malice, altruism and egoism, coöperation and selfishness, compassion and greed, tolerance and bigotry.

Man is capable of love and he is capable of hate. Whether

or not one accepts that there is in man an aggressive drive, it is undeniable that man kills and destroys his fellow man, sometimes with conscious purpose and sometimes without obvious reason. An important contribution of psychoanalysis is the recognition that even behind what appears to be wanton aggression there is unconscious drive and purpose.

Man also has the drive 'to preserve and unite' *(17,* p. 209*)* which expresses itself in the relations of two persons, in group relations, and in society at large. The two forces of libido and aggression are in constant interaction. We see this in the ever-present ambivalence of human relations. At the same time we recognize that aggression can have an adaptive function, that libido and aggression may work together toward desirable goals. We see this in the striving of man in his art and his search for knowledge. Man has an aggressive drive, but not an instinct for war. He has the capacity to channel his aggressive drive to aims that further the needs of mankind and not the destruction of himself and others.

I am attempting in these last remarks to bring into focus the role of ego and superego functions in the social life of man. It is my conviction that psychoanalysis, because it considers the unconscious as well as conscious factors in man, makes an indispensable contribution to the scientific understanding of human behavior. Can we expect that this knowledge will effect any change in the relations of men? I have no answer, but if men will ignore what is the science of the mind, they will only bumble along from war to war, from lynching to lynching, and from riot to riot and they will rationalize their actions by recourse to clichés and slogans. I do not deny the importance of economic and political factors in social problems, but consideration of these alone is not enough.

I do not suggest that everyone be psychoanalyzed nor even, as some have recommended, that all heads of state be psychoanalyzed. I have in mind, rather, the wide application of psychoanalytic understanding to the problems of education, child rearing, social welfare, civil rights, the planning of cities, and

even international relations,—the realization that in all these instances one deals with individuals, human beings, with unique human psychic functions and structures.

I decry above all the computerization of man, the attempt to reduce his mind to a physical model. The technological gains of the past decades promise much for the future comfort and security of man. At present they offer us hydrogen bombs, traffic congestion, polluted air and water, and housing not fit to live in. It is man's intellect that programs the computer and that has devised the mechanisms that operate it with such marvelous speed and accuracy. The computer is a tool and a valuable one, not an end in itself. No machine can duplicate the emotions of man; no machine can strive and idealize.

In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud *(16)* describes the conflict in the individual between his desire to give full expression to his drive impulses and the inhibitions imposed by the society and culture in which he must live. The culture imposes ethical standards that the individual is called upon to accept. The crucial issue is whether he obeys under the pressure of an external authority, whether secular or divine, or whether he internalizes these standards—in psychoanalytic terms, whether he makes of the ethical standards an internalized morality, a structured superego. I would measure the level of civilization of a society by the degree to which such internalization involves more and more of the masses of man. There would concurrently be a lessening of dependence on an outer authority for determining man's conduct and social relations.

But the internalization of ethical standards, the development of an inner moral agency, though it arises from identification with parental attitudes and the mores of the society in which the person lives, does not mean blind adherence to these mores. Man progresses in his insights, in his values, and there arise in each generation a few men to teach these values to their fellow men, to point the way to new possibilities in the relation of man to man. This can only come about by a process of cultural evolution. We cannot wait for biological evolution

to change the nature of man's drives, his ego and superego functions. We can only try to enhance his capacity to channel his drives with the capacities he now has in the direction of a better social system. That man has, even now, the capacity to govern himself, to integrate his drives, his ego functions, and his superego ideals and prohibitions, I do not doubt; that he will accomplish this before he destroys himself, I cannot say. In this choice lies the humanness of human beings.

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ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GIRL'S WISH FOR A CHILD

BY EDITH JACOBSON, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Freud's paper on female sexuality[1] has put in a new light the discussion of the still unsolved problems of woman's instinctual development. We therefore hope that a clinical report on this subject might be of some interest although our findings do not bring new insights but rather illustrate known facts. The value of the material lies mainly in the fact that it was gathered in the direct observation and analysis of a little girl from the third to the fifth year of life while she was in great difficulties trying to resolve the precœdipal relation to her mother.

Woman's wish to bear a child, while not definitely and heterosexually constituted before the œdipal phase, goes back to a long pregenital history of fixation to the mother. In the course of the treatment of this little girl, its origin and development became apparent in all its phases.

From her third to her fifth year, little Hertha was in an analysis which was interrupted by intermissions lasting several months. A wealth of colorful fantasies came to light, often contradicted, now interrupted, now resumed. It was not always easy to distinguish the essential from the transitory and the momentary; and the difficulties in working out a clear line of development were great. The intertwining of spontaneous and analytical processes of development added to these difficulties. Nevertheless, we gained insight into quite a few interesting facts on female sexuality in its early childhood phase.

Let us begin by reporting the most important anamnestic data. Little Hertha, a charming, very intelligent, but unstable

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Translated by Mrs. Eva Kessler.

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[1] *Female Sexuality* (1931), Standard Edition, XXI, pp. 225-243.

and undisciplined child, was brought to me for treatment because of her tormenting fixation to her mother. Ever since birth she had been a difficult child. For nine months she was breast-fed; in the fifth month she violently repelled every attempt at giving her mashed food. Later on, great difficulties arose when her mother tried to wean her. Subsequent difficulties in feeding were encountered regularly, and for a long time she refused to eat vegetables and meat. Right after Hertha's birth her mother had got a divorce; she married again soon thereafter and the real father scarcely played a role in Hertha's analysis. Toilet training was started at the age of one, but it did not succeed before the beginning of the third year. The child was susceptible to irritations of the bladder, undoubtedly partly due to a psychological component. At the age of one and a half years, she was discovered having her genitals licked by a dog. Thereafter she begged her mother to kiss that part of her body, and with the mother's permission she began to masturbate, but her nurses prohibited it on repeated occasions. I was assured that no direct threats of castration had been voiced. When she was two years old the parents informed her of the possibility of the arrival of a sibling. After apparently reacting joyfully, she crept into the doll carriage, played the baby, and wet herself. From that time on she was very preoccupied with the thought of having children, incessantly played with dolls, and became more and more demanding toward her mother. Between the ages of two and a quarter and two and three-quarters, she experienced her nurse's pregnancy. Later, another nurse died following an operation. Of all these events her parents talked quite thoughtlessly in her presence, giving her only partially understandable explanations. Early observations of menstruation were not missing in the wealth of her experiences: around the third year of her life, she discovered her mother wearing a sanitary napkin and also saw blood in the nurse's bed. Since then she showed a preference for the color red. When at the age of about two-and-a-half she came upon her stepfather urinating in the bathroom, she cried out enthusiastically: 'What a sweet behind! He can

push standing!'. At about that time she became aware of the parents' intercourse by night in the next room, which was not lacking in real sadomasochistic scenes. She reacted with attacks of fear and nightmares, and with frequent vomiting. Often she managed to interrupt the parents' intercourse by compelling her mother to come to her bedside. Subsequently the anxious fixation to her mother became stronger and the disturbances in feeding and in the function of the bladder became more and more apparent.

At the beginning of the analysis, the three-year-old child was in a severely neurotic state of mind, apparently dominated by the fear of losing her mother. Each day, when the mother was going to leave the house the child would stage pathetic scenes: she clung to her mother, screamed, and cried fearfully and desperately until finally the mother put an end to it by tearing herself away.

On one occasion, despite Hertha's protests, her mother left her alone with me, whereupon she turned against me in her rage. This scene and later ones were caught in drawings, the contents of which she dictated to me: 'Old witch, old hag, I shall bite off your nose', she cried. 'Paint my mother, you, you are mother, then paint me, I am the little baby. And now I shall bite off everything, your nose, your eyes, your ears, and everything. And now I eat it all up . . . it's all swimming around in my tummy. Look what a big tummy I have!' She began walking around the room, her tummy protruding, apparently imitating the nursemaid's pregnancy. 'I have a big tummy, nearly as big as Mama's. Paint Mama with her top tummy, with two big round ball-breasts. Paint Daddy with his bottom tummy. Paint Mama once more inside my tummy. I have eaten her up.' Suddenly she was overcome by an attack of anxiety: 'Take her out, make her whole again, paint her, now she's quite new, a little Mama-child. My sweet darling Mama, take her out. Come, Mama.' She took a paper doll into her arms: 'Now you are my sweet baby. I shall feed you, I shall put you on the toilet', and reacting with oversolicitous love, she got deeply involved in

playing with the doll. At the end of this and similar sessions, the child felt the urge to empty her bladder and bowels, and would frequently ask: 'Is the sausage already as big as my doll?'.

These and similar fantasies lend themselves to the following interpretation: she wanted to devour the wicked mother who abandoned her in order to make sure that she would never lose her again. In reaction to this oral sadism, she suffered from fear of retribution and tried to reconstitute and restore the incorporated, destroyed mother, to enact the mother's rebirth as a child onto whom she heaped the same abundance of exaggerated maternal love which she would have liked to receive from her mother. In terms of libido economy, the incorporation fantasy made it possible for the child to fulfil her oral hating and loving wishes toward her rejecting mother. Thereupon she freed herself of her projective fear of retribution by undoing the destruction through rebirth of the mother and reactive love to the mother-child. In playing with the doll, she experienced also the maternal satisfaction which was denied her, by identification with the doll. At the same time, the birth fantasy provided pregenital pleasure. This pleasure, in becoming condensed with fantasies of repentance, took a masochistic turn, corresponding to the original feeling of hate toward the mother: Hertha suffered very much from irritations of the bladder; and she would say about defecating, 'It's wonderful but it hurts'.[2]

Other such fantasies threw light on the representation of birth and death in the symbolism of water and rescue from the water. Here this development is made ontogenetically understandable by the fact that Hertha had really seen a child drowning. In all these fantasies the contents of the tummy were represented as a liquidlike milk or urine. The devoured mother was swimming in the tummy in a liquid (which she made me paint too); she would then be 'rescued', i.e., reborn in compact form as feces in the urine. Later on in the course of the analysis, fantasies of rescue of this kind occurred quite frequently. Ad-

[2] Similar fantasies have frequently been reported by Melanie Klein and other English psychoanalysts.

dressing a friend she said: 'I love you so much, I want to save you from the water'. Also she constantly wanted to rescue her mother from the father, the representative of her own sadistic wishes. The rescue always stood for 'making whole again' (for undoing the devouring), for rebirth.

The development of Hertha's conflicts of oral ambivalence toward her mother had certainly been favored by unwise oral and anal overindulgence. They were further strongly augmented by Hertha's pathological reaction to the hint of an addition to the family: she tried to identify with the baby in the mother's womb (in her drawings Hertha unequivocally represented the baby carriage as a symbol of the womb). Afterward she developed boundless jealousy toward every rival for her mother's love and she would hardly allow her to give a present to another child. Upon seeing a baby suckling, she cried out, full of envy and complaint: 'But he's eating up his mother's breast!'. Observing the nursemaid's pregnancy added to her fear of another sibling. Only now can we understand the meaning of the flaring-up of aggression against her mother as expressed in her oral-sadistic fantasies: she wanted to take away the coming baby from the mother and devour it. That leads us to an interpretation of a typical symptom appearing at that time: her anxious revulsion from everything 'filled' (filled dumplings and the like).

But the sibling conflict was not the sole cause of the unconscious hate toward the mother against which Hertha tried to protect herself by neurotic clinging. She suffered other traumatic experiences—we do not know exactly at what time; she observed her father urinating and, last but not least, she observed primal scenes which led her to be jealous of another rival, a real one: the father. Seeing his penis, the child surely envied and admired her father greatly. But around the same time, observation of the parents' intercourse led to pavor nocturnus with attacks of vomiting and general anxiety, and difficulties in feeding and the irritations of the bladder were augmented. Admiration for the father based on the envy of his penis might have developed into a narcissistic-ambivalent relationship to the

father; but under the impression of the traumatic primal scenes it apparently broke down into anxiety and neurosis.

Let us have a further look at the analytic material: Hertha, while steadily complaining that she was thirsty, watered my rubber plant 'to make the new leaf grow'. 'But from the bottom!' [Why?] 'I want the bottom of my tummy to grow too! My Daddy has a tassel (*Zipfel*) because they give him so much to drink. My Daddy is naughty, he eats everything up.' Thus in her father Hertha hated the favored rival to whom her mother gave all the oral satisfaction denied her. Apparently, in accordance with her own impulses, she had interpreted the nightly happenings as oral-sadistic acts. That is why she reacted by vomiting, in defense against oral excitement. In her fantasies she had connected the primal scene with the observation of the urinating father's penis, assimilating oral envy with penis envy. She thought her mother gave him the breast instead of her, and that was why he had a penis.

We go on listening. 'Paint Daddy one line bigger than Mama' —she drew a line herself between the legs—'cross it out right away!'. 'You are a man, you smoke cigarettes. I shall take the ashes away; put them into water . . . that's meat in peepee. I'll eat it and drink it and grow.' Thus she wanted to take her father's penis away and eat it and drink it in order to have it grow on her too. The mother's breast and the father's penis equally represented objects of oral incorporation which would counteract her deprivation. The castrating fellatio fantasies were her revenge on the father and at the same time provided her with the longed-for oral satisfaction and with a penis too.

In the following period of observation (at the end of the fourth year) her oral attitude shifted to her own genital. Having in the meantime been enlightened by her mother in regard to the sex differences, she accepted the existence of the vagina as a 'lower mouth', clinging at the same time to the illusion of possessing a 'tassel' too. Thus amazingly, for the time being, she was spared the full experience of the 'shock of castration'. 'Watering from on top makes only a top leaf', she said, 'but

watering from the bottom makes the bottom leaf grow'. That is, drinking at the breast one would only grow a breast, but if her father urinated into her genital she would grow a 'tassel'. She thus proceeded from the wish to castrate her father orally to the genital (urethral) fantasy with passive instinctual goals. While these were still subordinate to the narcissistic desire for a penis, the child at the same time developed phallic object strivings toward her mother. She began to masturbate more intensely, to pull at her 'bottom', i.e., at the clitoris and the labia. During the analytic session she tried to put her finger into every opening of my face; she played 'get in' and 'get out', i.e., she would climb into my lap and into my encircling arms and climb out again. She painted 'peepee and A-a, that I shall feed you and the doll from the top and from the bottom'. While acting like this she got sexually excited; she tried to masturbate while sitting on my lap and overcame the tension by passing urine and feces. The corresponding masturbation fantasies consisted then of penetrating into the mother, urinating into her mouth and into her genital, and defecating; these represented the active reversal of her wishes toward the father (and the continuation of her feeding play with the dolls). Thus we can say that by now Hertha had simultaneously developed oral (receptive genital) demands toward her father, connected with penis envy, and phallic-urethral as well as active anal, object-directed strivings toward her mother, thereby identifying with her father, as will be more apparent later on.

Reacting with outbursts of anger and veiled threats of castration to the intensified demands of the child, the father made it more and more difficult for her to cope with her penis envy and with the realization of her own 'castration'. When a tower collapsed that we had built with blocks during an analytic session, Hertha reacted with a severe attack of anxiety, ending in a temper tantrum against me: 'You wicked witch! It's all your fault.' [What is my fault?] 'Pulling.' [Why?] 'Because you said it doesn't harm.' (In contrast to the maid, her mother and I had allowed her to masturbate.) [Why is pulling bad?] 'Because I've pulled

out my tassel, because I have a hole that's sore.' She would no longer accept the explanation that there is a sex difference. 'A hole is *kaput'*, she stated in deep sorrow, painting lots of red circles. Hertha thus made her mother responsible for her lack of a penis because she had allowed her to masturbate. But at a deeper level, she blamed the oral seduction for it (and, at still another level, the anal seduction—but we shall not discuss that here). The next association made it quite clear: 'I have a blister in my mouth. Look at the man in the book, he has a very red mouth.' It was a comfort for her to know that her mother, who was responsible for it all, was not better off than she herself.

'My mother has no tassel either, she has a sore hole. I saw it. I'm sure she pulled it out too.' She rejected her mother's renewed attempts at enlightening her in regard to sex differences and to childbirth, relying on her own impressions of menstruation and operations. More and more fearfully she cried: 'All the things you are saying are not true. Children do not come out of the bottom, but the top. I jumped out of Mama's breast when she was lying in the bathtub, and her breast fell off like the leaf' (like the outer leaf of the rubber plant when a new leaf unfolds). Her displacement of the process of birth to the breast, and the return of the repressed in her idea of the falling off of the breast were overdetermined. For one thing, they turn away from the genital; furthermore, we should not forget that the content of Hertha's birth fantasies was the anal-urethral rebirth of the orally incorporated mother. Masturbation fantasies were condensed with masochistic ideas of birth in such a way that masturbation itself was experienced as a kind of 'delivery castration'. Similar experiences were reported by Reich.[3] Since the mother had given birth to her, the mother masturbated too, and thus she too was castrated. The shift to the breast led back to orality, i.e., to the original wish for the possession of the mother's body. That was the meaning of her deepest complaints against the mother:

[3] Reich, Wilhelm: *Der masochistische Charakter.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XVIII, 1932.

that she had seduced her orally. Not the child, but the mother is to blame for the birth and for the loss of the breast because she had borne her and she had given her the breast. She found comfort in the thought: 'Later on Mama grew a new breast for a new child' (she had heard that the mother's breast fills with milk after every childbirth). In this hope, her sadistic attitude to try and get what had been denied her shifted to the father. She said: 'The father pulls too; in time he will pull out his tassel too', and she added: 'I saw it in the toilet', referring to her observation of his urinating. She imagined that the husband lost his penis to his wife during intercourse, and thus his urinating would be equal to masturbation. 'In time, he will pull out his tassel too', she said hopefully, adding, 'Now you, the Mama are the Daddy, now you have a thing and he hasn't got one anymore. . .' . 'Daddy is pulling too' thus meant: he has a phallic-urethral relationship to mother and, as a punishment, he will—like her—lose the penis to the mother. (That makes the mother's breast grow again.) In a game, with changing roles, she showed that she, like her mother, wanted to get the penis back from her father: 'Chop my arms off, make me quite dead . . . make ssss, then my arms come back and I come to life again'. 'Ssss' stands for the flushing of the toilet: producing this sound she imitated the father's urinating. Hence the game meant: castration by her mother could be repaired by the father's stream of urine, which would bring back the penis to her. The father's angry threats of castration turned this hope too into fear and feelings of guilt. It was only now that the experience of castration seemed to culminate: at this moment she felt abandoned by her father as formerly by her mother, i.e., she was disappointed in the expectation of getting a penis.[4]

The subsequent overcoming of her depression was accomplished by the diminution of the sadistic expression of penis envy, renunciation of phallic strivings, and progress toward the

[4] Fenichel, Otto: *The Pregenital Antecedent of the Œdipus Complex.* Int. J. Psa., XII, 1931, pp. 141-166.

genital relationship to the father, that is, the hope of getting a child from him instead of possessing the penis.

In this period of her development (from her fourth to fifth years), Hertha came to her analytic treatment only at great intervals, and we can report only important fragments. The urethral-phallic (childbirth) fantasies brought about a transition from the wish for a penis to the wish for a child, i.e., the wish for a child was revived and fortified on a genital basis. A new theory of birth appeared: 'There are Mama and Daddy children. Mama's jump out of the breast. Daddy's jump out of his tassel and it falls off. I'm a Daddy-tassel child, the new one will be Mama's.' Renouncing her mother in favor of a new sibling, Hertha turned increasingly to her father, although in playing she frequently made the mother play the father's role: 'Mama, now you are Daddy—you have no tassel, but you have me instead of your baby; Daddy is the Mama, he has a tassel and makes peepee'. Regressively, she substituted the wish to get a child from the father by the wish to be the father's penis-child. By offering herself as a substitute for his penis she tried, so to speak, to make good her wish to castrate the father (or else the mother). Later on in playing she more and more frequently took a doll as a 'tassel-child' between her legs, ambivalently fondling and beating it. Still later, in the course of thorough discussion of the real genital relations between the parents and about her future role as a female, she became more and more capable of renouncing the penis. She masturbated more rarely, still in the same way as formerly but accompanied by less sadistic and more genital incestuous fantasies. The fantasies of childbirth accordingly became less masochistic. Hertha began to enter into friendly, tender relations with father-substitutes, friends of her mother, but she could be quite satisfied with having friendly relations with little boys too.

So far there were not observed any signs of the beginning of latency. Presently Hertha came back to me because of a conflict with a girl friend whom she had sexually enlightened to the indignation of the friend's mother. 'Too bad, I have to wait

until I'm a grown-up, but maybe if I ask hard enough, Mama might allow me just once to watch when Daddy gives her the sperm.' To be sure from time to time Hertha was in a state of libidinal overstimulation and at such times she would produce hysterical and phobic reactions. But she succeeded in severing her ties to her mother, and the disturbances in feeding and in the functioning of the bladder greatly diminished; the moody, unhappy child was happier and less restless; she adjusted well to kindergarten and her intellectual development was outstanding.

To sum up, in the course of this treatment we were able to observe three steps in the development of the girl's wish for a child. Let me characterize them briefly.

First phase: From approximately the second to the third year of age, we found a strongly narcissistic object relation to the mother, full of ambivalence caused by deprivation and by fear of the future arrival of siblings. We found a powerful oral envy and identification with the child in the mother's womb. Observation of pregnancy added to the envy of pregnancy, coupled with envy of the breast. The child developed wishes for oral-sadistic incorporation with respect to the mother, or to the child in the mother's womb. Anal and urethral fantasies of rebirth appeared.

Second phase: During the third to the fourth year, the patient observed the penis and primal scenes. Her oral perception of the primal scenes led to a condensation of the oral-sadistic strivings, formerly directed toward the mother, with penis envy toward the father, and further led to oral fantasies of robbing him of the penis. Enlightenment in regard to the difference between the sexes made it possible for the child to accept the vagina as 'the lower mouth', while she still harbored the illusion of possessing a penis. She began to masturbate more frequently with bisexual fantasies. She developed receptive genital (urethral) wishes toward the father's penis and, at the same time, phallic-urethral and anal-sadistic fantasies toward the mother. This development was accompanied by mounting anxiety.

Third phase: From the fourth to the fifth years, following threats and outbursts of rage by her father, the patient definitely went through the experience of 'being castrated'. She accused her mother of having orally as well as genitally seduced her, and of having castrated her; she accused the father of having seduced her to masturbate and of having castrated her. The wish for a child was revived in the direction from feces-child to penis-child. The receptive genital (urethral) wishes to rob the father of his penis and the anal as well as the phallic-urethral tendencies toward the mother flowed together in genital œdipal strivings, accompanied by the wish to have a child. She overcame the sadistic impulses against the father and at the same time the masochistic character of the childbirth fantasies receded.

With individual variations, the development of the child, Hertha, is fundamentally in accordance with Freud's description. We obtained some supplementary material in regard to the development of the earliest pregenital and preœdipal wish for a child from the mother. In our case it generated from the ambivalent attitude toward the mother which, in turn, was caused by the oral envy of future siblings, and of the father. The formula for this attitude was: 'I want to appropriate the contents of my mother's body and make it the contents of my own body'. One does not feel entitled to call the wish for such a 'child with the mother' a longing to 'give a child to the mother', because Hertha imagined procreation to be a kind of oral conception. Nevertheless, the accompanying anal-sadistic fantasies of childbirth impress us as being of a rather active character. Having met with similar mechanisms in the analyses of several adult female patients, we can assume that their occurrence is frequent or nearly ubiquitous.[5]

I would like to mention the case of another patient whose neurosis and indeed entire life centered around her 'rescue wishes'. Having known physical suffering from her early youth,

[5] Real or imagined siblings appeared as oral rivals; but quite frequently it would happen that, in a deep layer, the father was represented as the hated rival, in a reversal of the œdipus complex.

she had devoted her life to social work with ill children. She had an extreme fixation to both sisters and constantly supported them with her strength and with her money. The sisters' children too were financially supported by her; she had completely taken over the duties of a mother for the child of the younger sister of whom she was especially fond. She felt it was her task to 'rescue' the very difficult boy from the bad influences of the environment. The analysis uncovered a deep masochistic tie to the sister: as punishment for her oral-sadistic impulses toward her in early childhood, she let herself be fleeced by this sister, mentally as well as financially. The actions of taking away, rescuing, and returning the child corresponded to an early fantasy of conception by oral introjection—that is, through oral castration of the sister and her rebirth in the child which, in restitution, she would give back to her 'cured'. The original precœdipal mother complex came to light as lying at the bottom of the sister relationship: she had wanted to take away the later born sister from her mother by devouring her. The sexual fantasies of the patient were completely filled with pregenital ideas of 'rescue'.

Perhaps as basis of a 'femininity complex' one can observe similar developments in little boys in that early phase: in the course of regressions to the oral fixation to the mother they may be revived. In a very early period, at the beginning of their second year, many boys go through an active motherly phase, playing intensely with dolls in order to master their oral relation to the mother. To be sure, as soon as the phallic impulses come to life, the boy gives up these endeavors in favor of more boyish games. But, with the first awakening of their wish for a penis, in the third and fourth year of life, some girls too play less with their dolls for a while; playing with dolls becomes important again at the height of the œdipal relation as an expression of the genital wishes for a child from the father.

In the course of the treatment with little Hertha, we had an opportunity to get a glimpse of the problems of woman's castration anxiety. To be sure, the main content of her neurotic anxiety was the fear of losing love (the fear of being abandoned by

her mother); but right from the beginning, this fear was in competition with the fear of certain physical injuries. In the second phase, while Hertha still believed that she possessed a penis, she began to doubt more and more that it would grow; at that time, the fear seemed to take the form of fear of losing the imagined penis, fear that its growth was halted in punishment for her masturbation, for her wishes of castration toward her father, for her phallic strivings toward her mother. This fear reached its height when she could no longer avoid the reality of not possessing a penis. At that moment the anxiety turned into depression, which seems to be the model for later female depressions grouped around defloration, menses, childbirth. Hence, in female development, the fear of castration belongs in the precœdipal period; it is strongly connected with fears of humiliation, of degradation, of physical injury, in accordance with pregenital impulses ('oral-sadistic fears of retribution'). When the child, after overcoming the trauma of castration, developed her genital œdipal relation to the father, her impulses were restrained again by the fear of genital injury, by the idea of losing love, by the fear of being disappointed in her wish for a child, and of being abandoned. Similar forms of castration experiences are sometimes found in male neurotics: they do not trust, they doubt that they have a 'real' penis, they even come to be convinced that they are castrated or, at least, they act as if they were convinced of this fact. Maybe this behavior, according to the tactic of 'the lesser evil', is meant to avert the 'real' castration.

Freud further reports that the experience of not possessing a penis makes girls feel disgusted with the clitoris and often induces them to give up the clitoris masturbation. In some cases this is certainly true. But, on the other hand, in our experiences with many girls we have made the following observations: when they really renounce the possession of a penis, the clitoris, although it loses its phallic character in their fantasies, nevertheless remains an erogenous zone. If masturbation then is accompanied by œdipal fantasies its technique in some cases may change

too, in so far as the entrance to the vagina and the region of the anus may become involved; little Hertha only changed her fantasies while sticking to masturbation of the clitoris and labia.

We know with certainty that early enlightenment in regard to the difference between the sexes decisively influences the development of masturbation. But in Hertha's case, as well as in those of many other girls, we found that this knowledge did not protect her from the deep narcissistic hurt of not possessing a penis,—at least not in our society which attaches higher value to the male sex. But enlightenment brings about a shift from the oral to the genital fantasies, preparing the girl to overcome this hurt and thus helping her to develop her feminine attitude later on. In comparison, the unenlightened child seems to suffer ever so much greater damage to genital self-confidence through the experience of not possessing a penis. When we realize the enormous extent of this damage and the resulting depreciation of the genital, we come to understand the frequency of frigidity.

Finally, let me touch upon a problem of the female sexual development upon which, in this presentation, we could not especially elaborate: female masochism. We observed that little Hertha, already in her precœdipal period, went through a masochistic phase: pregenital and phallic-sadistic strivings, originally directed against the mother, were turned back against her own self. When unconsciously the sadistic wishes to rob him of his penis concentrated on her father, the masochistic fantasies were enhanced. To be sure, the sadomasochistic attitude in the case of little Hertha was pathologically intensified in consequence of traumatic experiences (the observation of primal scenes, of menstruation, of illness, and of death). As she learned to renounce the penis, as her oral-sadistic demands were diminishing, her masochistic fantasies lost intensity too. Thus, confirmed by experience in other cases, we might say that normally the curve of the female masochistic attitude reaches its height in the precœdipal and in the beginning of the œdipal phase, and falls again in the receptive genital œdipal period,—just as the boy's sadistic impulses are receding at the height of the genital period.

We observe strongly developed genital masochistic fantasies most frequently in cases where the sadistic wish to rob the penis was never completely relinquished, or where it had been revived regressively. As an example, let me point to the 'revenge type' of woman who, while fighting the male in social life, in her love life, not unlike Brunhilde, again and again shows a longing for a masochistic enslavement to a man.

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JAPAN AND THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF HISTORY

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In 1854 the proud, traditional, warlike nation of Japan, threatened by warships of the United States, peacefully agreed to commercial infringement of her sovereignty, accepted the Western tradition as a norm of civilization, and laid the foundation for an expansionist military program that led to her devastation. In this curious story K. R. Eissler *(4, 5)* detects the outline of a neurotic historical process, and suggests that the tragedy is the kind that might be avoided by psychoanalytically sophisticated statesmen. What follows is a critical examination of this view.

I

Eissler's thesis is related to two hypotheses: first, that Japan's uncharacteristic fear of United States warships and her unique submissiveness to demands of the United States reveal a phobia of invasion; second, that the friendly emulation of Western culture that followed her humiliation and, in particular, the strong pro-Western attitude of those Japanese who had been subjected to actual military defeat, reveal the defensive operation of an identification with the aggressor.

To say that fear of invasion was phobic is to say that it was inappropriate to the actual danger, or that such a danger would not ordinarily have been so evaluated in Japan, or that the fear was 'abnormal' compared to the reaction of other nations similarly threatened. For the Japanese, according to this argument, the idea of invasion symbolized some greater, unconscious threat, which Eissler suggests may have been assault on the mother who was mythologically identified with the Emperor and nation. But if Japan's national integrity had unconscious meanings, her concern about it was not on that account phobic. It was phobic only if the threat was related to

the *wishes* of the Japanese. Eissler's discussion suggests that matricidal impulses may have been the source of the phobia: perhaps American threats awakened latent matricidal impulses that had been previously repressed. When Japan was bombarded the phobic danger could not be avoided. The Japanese emerged from the shelling with their rage hidden under an apparently coöperative and ungrudging admiration of their enemy, thus avoiding confrontation with their own ambivalence about their progenitors until reminded of it by Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is this picture of an ill-starred psychological defense pattern that makes Eissler hopeful about psychoanalytic guidance of national destinies. Is there really something ominous in the psychology of the nation that could have been perceived and corrected before the final disaster? If we suppose that Eissler's hypotheses are correct—that phobic and identificatory defense mechanisms were in fact at work—what kind of comment or lesson can be drawn from them? Would it have been less neurotic to fight a suicidal battle against overwhelming odds to protect the inviolability of a 'mother Emperor' than it was to shy from a fight because of fear of matricidal impulses? A man fleeing from a tiger may have an underlying tiger-phobia, but if he turns and wrestles it with his bare hands he shows that he is afflicted with something (besides the tiger) that is still worse. Discussing this point, Eissler cites the fact that for irrational reasons soldiers are more fearful of land-mines than of shell-fire, though the latter is more dangerous, and argues that real danger does not exclude irrational fear. But we must observe that the degree of denial involved in willingly subjecting oneself to shell-fire in a modern war is in the most general sense as neurotic as a phobia of land-mines. All of which is to say, as we learn from Civilization and Its Discontents, that civilization is built on neurotic mechanisms. That a process in history has the form of a neurotic mechanism tells little about its potentiality and nothing about its outcome. We

must never forget that what in form was a psychotic plan for the destruction of Europe's Jews was, for practical purposes, perfectly successful.

Eissler believes that Japan's identification with the aggressor, besides being neurotic, was unstable because it was formed entirely from hostile components. That an individual identification can be devoid of affectionate elements is debatable. It is extremely doubtful within a social organization if only because society is more complex than an individual. Even if Japan as a whole had the most enormous grudge against the West, her identification was influenced by such men as Fukuzawa Yukichi whose ambivalence encompassed admiration and love of Western individualism.

But does a hostile *preponderance* perhaps make identification fragile? In military history, where a hostile identification with the aggressor is most closely approximated, it is also a regular and successful mode of adaptation; indeed, it may be the standard form of learning. One simply picks up the superior technique of the enemy.

And it is inconsistent with Eissler's own hypothesis to regard the Japanese identification with the West as based entirely on hostility. If the threat of American bombardment reawakened latent matricidal impulses in Japan, then identification with the American aggressor was not simply defensive but was partly a troubled recognition of an ally of one part of her own ambivalent stand. Eissler's view of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atom bombs as a return of the repressed seems to imply the same thing. It suggests either that the Japanese hostility was directed toward her own central symbols, or that Japan unconsciously aimed for expiation of a hostility directed toward her central symbols, and neither possibility speaks for an exclusively hostile aim toward her Western models.

Besides a picture of Japan reacting with lopsided hostile neurotic mechanisms, Eissler's account leaves the impression that Japan's modern history has been an attempt to undo the

events of the Nineteenth Century. Is it possible that a national neurosis that aims at revising the past is doomed to re-evoke misfortunes?

The attempt to reconstruct actively what has been suffered passively is a main tool of growth and learning (*7*, p. 264). Hence we should be prepared to find, as we do in Moses and Monotheism, that among the most significant and enduring cultural events are those that have attempted to rewrite the past. In fact the central theme of Freud's anthropological theory is the need to undo a primordial deed.

According to Eissler, Japan's unconscious intention of destroying the Western intruder facilitated her rapid modernization. Actually that intention was by no means unconscious. What may have been unconscious was the futile wish to restore the previous status quo, to expunge Perry and the taint of defeat from her history. If this is so, it simply means that the tendency to remain the same can sometimes be the midwife to change. For change it is, though Eissler claims that Japan did not really assimilate its model. Though one may hold some favorite quality to be the essence of our culture, or claim that an imitation lacking the right spirit is a sham, he must still acknowledge that the development, for instance, of a modern, rationalized, democratic army was a big change, as heavily influenced by the West as it was portentous for Japan's fate.

Thus, in Eissler's account, Japan's fixation to her ambivalently cathected past becomes an explanation of her ability to change; her rigidity explains her flexibility. Here we have a perfectly legitimate paradox. Japan's adherence to traditional forms probably accelerated modernization. Some writers (*2*, p. 373, *16*, p. 181) argue that Japan's loyalty to her guiding principles not only facilitated but may have forced the bold sacrifice of particular institutions. It is certainly questionable whether abolition of the fiefs by simple fiat could have been accomplished without drawing on the ample fund of feudal discipline and loyalty. And this is not surprising. Individually or in groups people perceive the emergent present in terms of their accomplished and struc-

tured past and it is this past that helps them to direct and organize their future development. Without such organization they cannot assimilate and exploit the new things that are offered *(9)*. It is as true of the development of a neurosis as of any other development. If Japan suffered from a national neurosis that is only to say that Japan was making use of her special proclivities in order to safeguard what was most important to her in her new situation: in other words, the opportunities that lay before her were to determine her path, as they were to select her neurosis. One understands her decisions to the extent that one understands her opportunities.

Eissler has traced a line through phobic and identificatory defenses to the devastation of Japan. The presence of such defenses is one question, their relation to the final disaster quite another. We have so far found no ominous significance in them: their neurotic nature, their hostile intent, their fixation to the past do not whisper doom to us.

However, they do remind us that when a culture changes it tries, as an individual does, to make what is new usable to its past self, to fend off what it cannot assimilate, and to accommodate itself to what it cannot fend off (to use Piaget's terms). To understand the direction of change we must understand the opportunities available for this fending off, this assimilating and accommodating: opportunities which depend on external events, traditional goals, a vision of the universe, and, of course, unconscious drives, memories, conflicts, and defenses. The significance of phobias and identifications with the aggressor for the outcome of modern Japanese history depends on where they fit in the array of opportunities before her. By themselves they tell us nothing.

II

Our thesis will be illustrated by a cursory glance at the period during which Japan reacted to the intrusion of the West and carried out her modernizing revolution.[1]

[1] See Eissler's essay for a masterly review of significant currents in Japanese history *(5)*.

When Perry arrived in Japan, central power was exercised from Edo (old Tokyo) by the head of the Tokugawa family which for two and a half centuries had furnished the Shogun—the military overlords of Japan who directed the government apparatus known as the Bakufu. Three hundred miles away in Kyoto, the Emperor, surrounded by his court of nobles, remained the perpetual symbol of the nation and ceremonial seal of legitimacy to the *de facto* ruler of Japan. Under the Shogun the great lords, administering the fiefs into which Japan was divided, stood in various relationships to the central government. Some were members of the Tokugawa family; some, the Inside Lords, were vassals of the Tokugawa and helped staff the Bakufu. But the Outside Lords ruled only their own fiefs. Among them were families that had joined the Tokugawa only after its final victory, and some that had actively contested the founder's hegemony.

The various ranks of samurai retainers within each fief owed hereditary allegiance to their clan lord from whom they derived sustenance, and their fortunes during stable times depended entirely on the fortunes of their clan. Educated to the heroic ideals, the stoic and sanguinary virtues of feudal militarism, the acme of their expectation during the long Tokugawa Peace was mere bureaucratic service severely limited by family rank; many simply tilled the soil. Clans managed their own internal affairs and travel between their people was closely supervised and restricted.

When the Shogun was threatened with attack by the United States if he did not grant trade and consular rights, he revealed his political insecurity by the extraordinary procedure of asking the lords, both Outside and Inside, for their suggestions. Their answers reflected the general wish to eventually exclude the foreigner, together with varying degrees of caution regarding immediate defiance, all of which left the Bakufu with no clear support for any policy and a sharp division extending to within the Tokugawa family itself as to what answer to give the United States. The Bakufu decided to comply with

Western demands and, recognizing that support for this was questionable, took the fateful step of asking for Imperial backing. This it received together with some unsolicited advice, and thereafter the ceremonial Court was on its way to political power. Not only the various clans, but also rival factions within the Tokugawa family itself lobbied among the Court nobles. These nobles listened sympathetically to those who advocated a larger role for the Emperor, and eventually they were persuaded to order the Shogun to reverse his compliant policy and to drive out the foreigner with whom he had already signed treaties.

The Bakufu had now invited both the clans and the Court into national politics, and both not surprisingly tended to challenge the traditional monopoly of power held by the Bakufu. Though the clans must still be outwardly obedient to the Shogun who was their feudal lord, samurai thoughts now reached national issues and samurai blood was stirred by the prospect of fighting to expel the barbarian and punish those who dealt with him. Sometimes illegally leaving a docile clan and joining forces with likeminded fanatics, passionate adventurers known as *shishi* dedicated themselves to a romantic and bloody crusade of intrigue and assassination, traveling about the country engaging in daring exploits far removed from the ordinary, anonymous, regulated clan life where their samurai virtues had flashed only in fencing clubs.

The Imperial Court, finding itself an arbitrator in a divided nation, was now transformed from a ceremonial adornment of the Bakufu into a rival locus of power. Court nobles could entertain political ambition behind the swords of heavily armed anti-Bakufu clans, and offer in return the color of Imperial legitimacy to the *de facto* power of whatever clan had the favor of the Court. If Tokugawa owned the Bakufu, the question now was who would own the Emperor.

Among the Outside Lords the two most powerful governed the fiefs of Satsuma and Choshu. Old enemies of the Bakufu, they had been the chief opponents of Tokugawa Ieyasu's drive

to establish his family's rule over Japan, and paid for this with economic penalties and the loss of lands, despite which historic grievance their domains were still large, strategically situated at Japan's waterways, and geographically remote from Bakufu control. Satsuma further strengthened its economic and military position by a severely repressive social organization and merciless state exploitation of the Luchu Islands trade. Her ports had brought her early contact with Western traders, and her knowledge of Western arts was ahead of the rest of the country. She early challenged the British in battle, and had learned that it was more profitable to acquire British cannon for payment than shells for defiance. Choshu had inaugurated a disciplined fiscal policy which provided her a large emergency reserve for the purchase of arms and gave her a freedom of action unique among Japanese fiefs, which she augmented by developing Japan's first modern army. It need hardly be added that two such powerful clans as Choshu and Satsuma were bitter enemies.

Since the victory of Ieyasu the clans had carried out their feudal obligation to the reigning Tokugawa. But now political power was again on the block. To reach for it too soon would risk destruction of the clan by the forces of the past (the Bakufu), but not to reach at all would doom the clan to subordination under the powers of the future. Choshu jumped first, afraid that Satsuma would pre-empt the initiative. Choshu was historically a special friend of the Court and exploited this now by offering flattering advice to the Emperor, proclaiming itself the chief exponent and authentic executor of the Emperor's wish to drive out the foreigner, and arranging for the expulsion of Satsuma's Imperial guards. Satsuma responded by chasing the Choshu men from Kyoto back to their fief where they had to content themselves with sniping at foreign shipping as evidence of their loyalty to the Emperor. In vain Choshu tried an armed re-entry into Kyoto and the Bakufu seized the opportunity to chastise the insubordinate clan which it succeeded in humiliating but did not humble. Now branded officially an enemy of the Imperial Court (since this was in rival Satsuma hands), and

next defeated by the foreign barbarian she had vowed to expel, Choshu had only one banner left to her, and that bore the inscription: 'Overthrow the Bakufu!'. But now it was the Bakufu's turn to over-reach itself. Preening itself on its first victory over Choshu, the Bakufu set out this time not to chastise but to destroy the clan, and reassert the authority it had lost since Perry's arrival. In fact it could not do this without mighty Satsuma. And Satsuma had no wish to help the Shogun grasp more firmly the national power which was finally about to be shared among the Outside Lords. Instead Satsuma made peace with Choshu and called the Bakufu's bluff. With unenthusiastic backing by the Inside Lords, the Bakufu was powerless to accomplish its purpose. A military government without an effective army, it was dead and awaited only the formality of battle to bury it. The Meiji Restoration institutionalized the Revolution and the 'Sat-Cho' alliance proceeded to modernize Japan *(14)*.

Where does a phobia of invasion fit into this picture? In contrast to the fearfulness of the Bakufu there was clearly much sentiment in favor of giving battle to the foreigner, and two clans, Satsuma and Choshu, did just that. That fact does not disprove the phobia hypothesis. After all, a common argument even among those who wanted to fight was that Japan's patent weakness and disunity could only be repaired by war, whatever the odds, a position that might be construed as the counterphobic alternative to phobic conciliation. What I want to show is that whatever the national psychology was, it was not a plan of action. What did determine the course of action?

Initially the Bakufu was for appeasement, the lords hedged, the Imperial Court and the clans that wished to dominate the Bakufu favored expulsion, and some lower samurai were fanatically bent on war. It looks as though the enthusiasm for battle increased with remoteness from responsibility for it *(16,* p. 181). Later when these same *shishi* were the rulers, the rebel clans now the government, and the Imperial Court at last politically responsible, there was hardly a 'wild' man in the lot. Nor can

we assume that some constant national phobia (manifested by appeasement of the foreigner) while not apparent in every individual was communicated like a badge of office to whatever faction was in power. For to the rebellious *shishi* the importance of acquiring Western technology, social organization, and military equipment loomed larger and larger, the recognition of the hopelessness of an early struggle clearer and clearer, while they were still out of power *(13,* pp. 250, ff*)*.

It is easy to imagine that a chance of glory in battle might pale beside the opportunity to take and keep the nation's helm. That could account for the prudence of those in power and those who sensed that they might soon be. Historians have also observed that the kind of aggressive response to the West that Eissler considers normal tended to come from young men, of low rank and authority, who were relatively comfortable economically *(1, 13)*. Accordingly Beasley thinks that 'a sense of worthiness unrecognized' was a factor in generating a rebellious attitude, that this grudge was appeased by any active role the home clan played in national politics (especially if it employed these vigorous but unofficial young men), and that it otherwise expressed itself in individual activism *(1)*. Thus while the political frustration of some lower samurai first found expression in expulsionist fanaticism, any kind of political effectiveness developed during those turbulent years might naturally moderate their ideological obsession.

The timorousness of the Bakufu no doubt reflected its awareness that major political changes would be required for resistance, just as those who wished to drive out the foreigner were also those who could happily contemplate a reorganization of the Japanese government. Thus at the beginning it was the conservatives who were phobic about challenging the invader, while radical and inventive voices were likely to scream for expulsion.[2]

[2] 'Conservative' and 'radical' here refer to national politics. The revolutionary Satsuma was one of the most ironclad traditional societies in Japan, and conservative interests within Choshu exploited radical sentiment to win favor at Court.

But the radical outlook was also more suited to capitalizing on the opportunities offered by Western technology and culture. So by the time they took power, the radicals had come to accept as a vehicle of change the same policy of commerce with the West which the Bakufu had adopted to preserve the status quo.

Those who had risen to expel the foreigner, outraged by the central government's timidity, discovered, as power slipped from the hands of the central government, that the foreigner's knowledge, technology, and material assistance could help transfer that power to themselves and that they could use it to forge a stronger Japan. It is no surprise, therefore, that when the exclusionists took control of Japan, they continued the same old moderate policy toward the foreigners who turned out to have been in a sense their allies in the revolution. If acquiescence to the intruder was phobic, that phobia helped various segments of society to thread their different ways through the different opportunities that progressively opened to them. Whether to fight or conciliate depended on these opportunities.

The following incident illustrates this: Satsuma had been defeated in a battle with English vessels and one of its strong men, Okubo Toshimichi (who was to become Japan's first great statesman during its Westernizing period), demanded from the Bakufu treasury the indemnity required by the British. When the Bakufu refused, Okubo threatened to lead a foray against the foreign missions. The threat of embarrassing the central government by antiforeign action succeeded in extorting the money with which to satisfy the foreigner *(12,* p. 79*)*. The existence of antiforeign sentiment was here used deliberately to squeeze the Bakufu for the benefit of a rival clan which had already come to terms with the foreigners. I do not suggest that the sentiment was ordinarily so cynically employed, but the incident illustrates how complex is the relationship between an attitude of acquiescence and one of defiance, and between phobic defense and opportunity.

The encounter between the English and Satsuma that led to Okubo's need for indemnity happens to be one of the two

incidents that suggest to Eissler the operation of an identification with the aggressor in Japan's attitude toward the West. An Englishman had been killed by a Satsuma samurai, and England had enforced her punitive demands by bombarding the Satsuma capital. The other incident cited by Eissler occurred when Choshu fired on foreign ships at the Straits of Shimonoseki. In each case the clan was defeated, an agreement was reached with the foreign powers, amiable relations established, and the clan became a leader in the Westernizing movement when it took power after the Restoration. Was this sudden change of heart an identification with the aggressor? Was it, in fact, a sudden change of heart?

For proper perspective we must bear in mind that foreign influence had been felt by both clans long before these incidents. Satsuma had already risked bankruptcy investing in foreign research (*13*, p. 43, *2*, pp. 82, 131). Choshu officials appreciated the promise of emulation of the West more consistently than the Bakufu (*13*, pp. 42-43) and had experimented with changes in its army in the direction of Western organization and training (*2*, p. 134, ff). Craig emphasizes that the expulsionist radicals were by no means necessarily anti-Western in the intellectual sense (*2*, p. 201).

Even the attitude toward the physical presence of the Western power is not simple. At the time Satsuma was bombarded by the British, it was, in fact, *not* advocating exclusion of the foreigner (*12*, p. 78), and the subsequent friendliness therefore was not the result of that aggression. (Note, however, that an increased friendliness on the part of the *British* may have resulted from the encounter, which demonstrated to them that the Bakufu was not in command of the situation and that understanding with the rival lords could be more profitable than negotiation with the central government.) On the other hand, Choshu's policy did change drastically as a result of its encounter with the West. After its initial battering by Western guns, Choshu accelerated the modernization and democratization of its armed forces and continued to harass allied shipping off the Straits of Shimonoseki,

until a coalition of Great Britain, France, Holland, and the United States smashed both its forts and its troops. Choshu then signed a treaty and henceforth respected Western power. But the reaction of Choshu to defeat was not entirely a change of heart. Consider, for instance, that when the threat of allied bombardment came to the attention of two Choshu samurai studying in England, they hastened home to persuade their clan to give up its defiance, and when finally the allied fleet gathered in preparation for the assault, Choshu, reeling from a serious defeat in its war with the Bakufu, tried to surrender. Tragically the peace emissaries (including one of the English students) were delayed by fanatical warriors and missed the Allied embarkation. The two students, Ito and Inoue, who had tried to avoid the disastrous battle, became the two great Westernizing Choshu statesmen in the Meiji government. Clearly their attitude to the West was a reaction to Japan's weakness, not her defeat. Perhaps Eissler is right when he argues that people do not learn a lesson as quickly as Choshu appeared to. But behind the appearance was a slower education in the superiority of the West, starting earlier with men like Ito and Inoue, and taking much longer with the average warrior who indeed, so far from being suddenly converted to pro-Westernism by the drubbing he had suffered, threatened the lives of those who had negotiated the surrender.[8]

The picture of Choshu after Western intimidation is one of indifferent peasants, vengeful samurai, and a friendly government which now gave power to those officials who had always

[8] 'Historians have often stressed the sudden change within Choshu brought about by the four-nation attack, and, in particular, they have emphasized the adaptability of the Choshu samurai and the quick reversal of their attitudes toward foreigners. Seen in historical perspective, this is true in a very general way, but it needs serious qualification. First, most of the han leaders had been well aware of the superiority of Western arms for several years before the attacks. Second, it would be more accurate to say that those who were already inclined toward the West had now begun to come to the fore, rather than to say that all became pro-Western. Some did begin to turn to the West at this time, but we must stress that the majority of politically active samurai remained *joi* [exclusionist] in opinion' (2).

been more moderate. Does that mean the government was institutionally if not individually identifying with the aggressor? In answering this question we must remember that Choshu was involved in a three-front war, and consequently faced three aggressors. Before being attacked by the West, she had been ejected from national politics by force of Satsuma arms and defeated in battle by armies of the Bakufu. Moreover the Bakufu was about to undertake the total destruction of the Choshu clan.[4] We cannot even assume that the West was the *principal* enemy. Though antiforeign sentiment was rife among local samurai, Choshu official zeal for expelling the foreigner was primarily a strategy for competing with Satsuma and the Bakufu for influence at the Imperial Court. Choshu antiforeign militancy, in other words, was an instrument of domestic politics.[5]

When the clan was forced to sign a treaty with the Western powers, it had to replace this instrument with a straightforward declaration of hostility to the Bakufu, and face a Shogun determined to destroy it. Its other enemies, Satsuma and the Western powers, helped Choshu to win this life and death struggle, and with it half the lordship of Japan. If this involved identification

[4] Such was the bitterness between Satsuma and Choshu that when mutual interests dictated a conspiracy between them, their representatives met repeatedly without being able to broach the subject until a mediator from another clan prodded them. Even then some Choshu troops 'swore that even though they should be forced to make peace with the barbarians they would never be friends with Satsuma' *(2)*. The animosity of Choshu toward the Bakufu was no less serious, as shown by the traditional, annual, secret ceremony during which, at the first crowing of the cock, the Elders and Direct Inspectors would go to the Choshu Lord and ask, 'Has the time come to begin the subjugation of the Bakufu?', and the Lord would reply, 'It is still too early; the time is not yet come'. Choshu children were taught to sleep with their feet toward the Bakufu capital. Clearly anti-Bakufu feeling was no late, *ad hoc* diversion of antiforeign sentiment.

[5] 'The *sonno joi* [revere the Emperor and expel the foreigner] program had been adopted by a traditional bureaucratic clique, not because they favored it, not because of the strength of the *sonno joi* faction in Choshu, but solely because it was the only program remaining with which they could compete successfully against the mediation of Satsuma' *(2)*.

with the aggressor, then that defense mechanism was a means whereby Choshu made the most of its opportunities.

To describe the switch in Choshu's attitude by its gross formal shape of identification with the aggressor obscures the fact that Choshu first saw the American threat as her own great opportunity, and then found that the aggressor's friendship also favored the same opportunity. 'Some day', wrote the *shishi* Nakaoka, 'we will look back on these days and recognize the foreign disease as a purgative that really did a great deal for our country. If this is so we will have put it to good use' *(13)*. A colleague even toyed with the idea of using Christianity as a weapon against the Bakufu *(13)*.

How much these shifts of attitude have to do with opportunities can be seen as well among the individuals involved. Early in the development of these events, one Sakamoto Ryoma, a hotheaded, masterless *shishi* who had left the discipline of his fief to campaign by sword for the immediate expulsion of the foreigner, arranged an appointment with a Bakufu official named Katsu Rintaro who was interested in absorbing the knowledge of the West in order to acquire the power to resist it. Characteristically Sakamoto's purpose was simply to kill Katsu. However, Katsu's comments quickly convinced Sakamoto that Katsu resented Western bullying as much as he did, and he listened as Katsu pointed to the opportunities Western technique provided for strengthening Japan. Before the interview ended, the two were talking enthusiastically about what can only be described as a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere'. There were also more immediate opportunities visible, especially that of effective political employment for Sakamoto and his friends. Instead of assassinating Katsu, Sakamoto joined him, beginning the metamorphosis of a simple, violent swordsman into the statesman who helped to join the two great revolutionary clans and mold the Meiji constitution.

Here then on the individual level is an identification with the victim which anticipated what would later appear as identification with the aggressor on the governmental level. Both are

in fact a rechanneling of aggression in line with changed, reappraised, or suddenly discovered opportunities. Note that the rechanneling still leads in roughly the same direction. Neither in the minds of Sakamoto and Katsu, nor in the mood of Japan had there been or was there to be a pretense of indiscriminate, peaceable amiability concealing a treacherous heart bent on vengeance. Political activists of all colors had always openly wanted a Japan strong enough to undo what was happening to her. They had wanted it when they strained to fight off the foreign ships with their swords, and they wanted it when they marshalled their people into a national, Western-style consensus state. When they urged a reckless struggle they hoped that war would strengthen the spirit and enforce a reorganization of Japan's defensive potential. If they despised old ways it was because they thought them a handicap to Japan's national and international strength. When they identified with the aggressor they looked for that in the aggressor which would sharpen Japan's sword.[6] Old aims were not repressed but guided selective identifications in line with new opportunities.

III

Men and cultures act according to their opportunities. Their opportunities are whatever in the day's news can be exploited by their abilities to realize their aims. Opportunity is thus a synthesis of aims, abilities, and emergent reality.

For example, the events of the day brought within Japan's reach the technology and social organization of the West. This was an opportunity for Japan to strengthen her world position. First, it was an opportunity because Japan's military pride made it desirable. Second, it was an opportunity because Japan had the social, intellectual, and attitudinal tools to make it possible

[6] The Choshu student Ito who had wanted to appease the barbarian at the Straits, later fought vigorously for the adoption of a Prussian rather than an English constitution. As Sansom points out this was the kind of identification where the subject finds a model reflecting his own interests rather than the kind where the subject conforms himself to an alien model *(15,* p. 314*)*. How much of Japan's identification with the aggressor was of this narcissistic type?

for her to absorb some of the new way of doing things.[7] And third, it was an opportunity because her military purpose and learning attitudes let her perceive in the dangerous ambiguities of current events a ladder to the status of a great power.

Aims, talents, and reality mutually influence each other. The relevant reality depends on aims and talents. Though the military and commercial forces may have been the same, the *opportunities* offered by Western intrusion on Japan were different from those China and India faced since Japan's aims and talents were different.

Talents also influence aims and both are swayed by external events: Choshu inaugurated its bid for national power by seeking both to control the Emperor and strengthen his national prestige. The Imperial Court had asked for expulsion of the foreigner, so Choshu made itself the spokesman for this position and its drive for national power carried the slogan: 'Revere the Emperor and Drive Out the Barbarian'. The historic feeling for the sacred dynasty with all its unconscious significance provided an *aim* which could be implemented by the unique financial and military position Choshu had achieved. These same patriotic feelings provided a *means* whereby Choshu's military prowess could be exploited. When this compound of sentimental aim and political means, and political aim and sentimental means proved unequal to the task of controlling the Court and battling the combined forces of the great Western industrial

[7] Dore states: 'The authoritarian teacher-pupil relation, which was part and parcel of the schools' bookish pedagogic tradition, required humility on the part of the pupil. Knowledge was imparted by the teacher to be accepted, not to be improved upon. And this attitude, given the initial decision to learn from the West, produced a humble attentiveness and an assiduous thoroughness' *(3)*. In this study Dore also points to other factors, such as the general level of literacy and the political sophistication of the samurai, which made it possible for Japan to emulate the West. In general one can speculate that a country that had learned its culture from a quite dissimilar civilization (China) would be adept at doing the same with another civilization (Western), the more so because the new one would be replacing not an indigenous but a foreign culture *(15*, p. 314*)*. Fukuzawa Yukichi, the most influential educator of the time, portrayed himself as freeing his country from the shackles of Chinese superstition *(10)*.

powers, the emphasis of Choshu's aim shifted to stripping the Shogun of his power. External reality both changed and reenforced Choshu's program, strengthening the political struggle and subordinating the sentimental aim of driving out the barbarian, but the change was mainly in priority since national defense could be better accomplished by a more modern Japan.

On another level, consider an unlearned *shishi* like Sakamoto whose perception of the Western threat was initially conditioned by his loyalties, his personal opportunities for adventure, and his skills which were only swordsmanship and daring. In the crucible of struggle with a technologically superior enemy he developed the new skills of a statesman and new aims in national politics. He found that he could do less about the barbarian than he had wanted, but more about Japan than he had dreamed. As a result the Western threat looked very different to him toward the end of his career, though he lost neither his initial aggressive patriotism nor his personal ambition.

The interaction of reality, purpose, and means is further illustrated by Eissler's argument that without the threat from the West the Bakufu might have long maintained its hold on the clans' allegiance. For the Western threat alone did not destroy the Bakufu. If there had not been a pre-existing flexibility (or ambiguity) in the purposes of the clan—on the one hand a hitherto frustrated inclination toward a really central government and on the other hand enormous loyalty to clan interests (*2*, p. 369)—a feudal Japan could not have overthrown her lord and become a powerful modern state able to defend herself against Western pressure. Thus while external events affect a nation's purposes, the quality of its purposes constitutes part of its fund of talents for exploiting external reality.

What is Japan's identification with the aggressor? It appears to be a denial of a (foreign) threat; but look again and it is a confrontation with a (domestic) threat. It is evading the shame of one course of action (capitulation to the West); it is embracing the glory of another (capturing Japan's government, girding for world power). It is bowing to destiny (her then world

inferiority); it is assuming captaincy (steering Japan to world competition). It is an inhibition of aims (to throw out the foreigner); it is a definition of aims (to outdo the foreigner). It is a declaration of weakness (in arms); it is an exploitation of strength (in growth and learning potential). It is an interruption of a historic course (isolation; clan government); it is the embodiment of a historic course (toward a centralized state and glorification of the Emperor). It is a denial of reality (being bullied); it is the perception of an opportunity (the fulfilment of personal and national ambitions).

Considering that the factors in parentheses are a mere sampling of the myriad of actual meanings, one can see how difficult it is to draw conclusions from the forms of unconscious threat and defense that we detect in a nation's history. Unconscious processes simultaneously serve many historical functions, all of which interact with each other and with external intrusions in a subtle synthesis defining opportunities for action. If the forms of unconscious defense are isolated from the opportunities in which they are embedded, they will not reveal to us their role in history.

Why is the analysis of history harder than the analysis of individuals? Because in individuals we have an already known organization which we call maturity. We refer to that organization when we say that some opportunities are given, and that a certain defense mechanism plays a certain role in realizing or inhibiting them. Superimposed upon the model of maturity we can see unconscious mechanisms as influencing desires, fostering or impeding performance, distorting or reflecting reality. We can do this because we know what an individual can grow to be, what opportunities are latent within him, at least in so far as these opportunities are determined by the biological process of maturation. But there is no maturity in history. Consistency, perhaps; growth, maybe; but as to an objective goal, there is none. Since there is no adult culture we have no platform from which we can see cultural opportunities as clearly as, if we are reasonably mature, we see the opportunities that maturity offers

to a neurotic patient. Not knowing where we are all headed, we cannot say that a particular historical advantage is only a secondary gain. We can be sure that the advantage represents various kinds of secondary gain for the participants. But the opportunities luring the culture as a whole, determining which men would be chosen by history as its sculptors, or conversely what opportunities would be formed and served by their individual defense mechanisms, we cannot know simply from the presence of defense mechanisms.[8]

Lacking a preordained destination, history must be creative, as indeed we might infer from the creativity of its components. For instance, art has no maturity; there is no style to which all other styles approximate. There is a progression through time, but time brings new developments, not adjustments of old error. What is true of art is true of vision generally. Gombrich *(11)* has shown that we always see in some historically codified style. Wölfflin *(17)* has shown that this style changes through history. And history generally is the summation of all such innovations, —an endless series of variations on the theme of Man. The array of cultures with their styles of personal relationships and meanings, of ideologies and techniques, is certainly no less a creative play than the dramas man self-consciously contrives.[9]

In painting, the problem of how to represent a group of three figures is successively reworked in the Christian world. A parallel in Moses and Monotheism *(8)* is cultural history as an endless succession of creative revisions of solutions to the primal conflicts of socialized man. The bare forms of psychological defense tell us as little about the history from which we pluck them as the relative precision of line tells us about a work of art. In both cases what we want to know is the creative use that is made of these elements for the new exploitation of certain opportunities. Freud's historical speculation met this problem by dealing

[8] Erikson's historical work both illuminates and overcomes this difficulty.

[9] I call attention to the creativity of history not to invite appreciation of its *œuvres* which have often been unspeakably ugly, but to emphasize the kind of arbitrariness that world history shares with art history.

with already mythologized history wherein cultural possibilities and the significance of events to that culture are predigested, elucidated, and put into perspective by the culture itself. That is a fundamentally different project from the attempt to conceptualize international events in psychological terms.

If we ignore the difference between the known opportunities of the individual and the unknown opportunities of history—if we pretend that the appearance of the Black Ships off the Japanese coast had one objective meaning which could be responded to more or less rationally—we are in fact confining objective reality to our own horizon of opportunities, and creating a myth that tells more about us than about our subject. Does unarmed Japan's passive response to our greedy bullying seem to us dysfunctional, but armed Japan's active attack on helpless China equally so? Does Japan's identification with the militaristic and aggressive aspect of Western civilization rather than Western individualism and humanism seem a clear warrant that the identification was faulty, hateful, and doomed to failure? The laughter of posterity awaits us if we confuse our scientific knowledge with our current style of experiencing. We should remember that our outlook can never be scientific. It is not in the nature of an outlook to be scientific. Values, Freud insisted, are rationalizations of interest *(6,* p. 143*)*. Our world view today is not scientific, but 'scientistic'. It reflects the interests of a culture which respects the uses of contemporary science and it is inspired by the many nonrational resonances induced by our rational theories.

It is true that Freud suggested that knowledge of the unconscious might conceivably, though improbably, let strong men shake off their illusions and rise above the bias of the irrational. Such wistfulness is offset by the more consistent message (for instance, in Civilization and Its Discontents) that illusions are not simply a crutch for our weakness but the stuff of our art and graces, the support of our abstract thought, and the scaffolding of communion with our fellow men. In short, though we may

discredit this one or that, illusions are the essence of humanity. Who rises above them will swing in the trees.

So let us say that Japan's path at Meiji was wrong because it led to consequences that you and I agree are bad. Fortunately she was defeated along with her allies, but only after a very hard fight. I myself find less evidence of collusion in her own destruction than was shown by her allies or, for that matter, considering Pearl Harbor and Singapore, her enemies. Nowhere in the course of the Pacific War is it easy to see an 'awe' of her mentor interfering with her will to defeat him. Atom bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki because they were made first in the United States. Had they been made first in Japan, or more plausibly in Germany, the war would have come to a bad end.

Japan's defeat was no more a sign of emotional dysfunction than would have been her defeat had she stood on her pride and been beaten by Perry. What Japan lacked for victory was material strength. Of course, the Japanese should have been more devoted to Chinese lives than to the Emperor's glory, and more concerned about their children's happiness than their duty to their superiors. But no psychological insight would have corrected this perspective because, though it may have been bad, it was not more unrealistic than a good perspective.

In the Twentieth Century 'scientistic' spirit we are naturally and happily inclined to view misfortune as malfunction and badness as disease. We are professionally as well as culturally conditioned to look to understanding for the solution of all problems. Psychoanalysts, however, are the guardians of two important reservations about this approach. The first Freud described in this way:

> . . . men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness. As a result their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work

> without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. *Homo homini lupus.* . . . The existence of this inclination to aggression, which we can detect in ourselves . . . is the factor which disturbs our relations with our neighbor and which forces civilization into such a high expenditure [of energy] *(6,* pp. 111-112*).*

Understanding is undeniably part of the cultural safeguard. Just as undeniably, it is only a part.

The second caveat is contained in the following:

> So . . . two urges, the one towards personal happiness and the other towards union with other human beings must struggle with each other in every individual; and so, also, the two processes of individual and of cultural development must stand in hostile opposition to each other and mutually dispute the ground. But this struggle between the individual and society is not a derivative of the contradiction . . . between the primal instincts of Eros and death. It is a dispute within the economics of the libido, comparable to the context concerning the distribution of libido between ego and objects; and it does admit of an eventual accommodation in the individual, as, it may be hoped, it will also do in the future of civilization, however much that civilization may oppress the life of the individual today *(6,* p. 141*).*

Libidinal ties, as they extend from our immediate partners in successive rings to society at large, conflict with each other and torment us. Freud hoped that some satisfactory distribution could eventually be achieved, but that time is far off. Meanwhile we are torn by the claims of irreconcilable loyalties.

The evils of our times, as of all times, flow largely from these difficulties. They are mostly the result not of misunderstanding but of ill will and moral dilemmas. Psychoanalysis confirms the lesson that experience vainly preaches: in politics it is almost impossible to make good choices. It is as important to respect Freud's finding that harmony is not currently possible, as it is to endorse his hopefulness. Perhaps it is more important. For

if we do not recognize how necessarily in conflict are our values and how inevitably inadequate our solutions, if we are offered even the remotest escape from the moral dilemmas that confront us, we shall all too readily convince ourselves that the 'good' is wrapped up in our faulty programs. When that happens we are lucky to get by with repeated disillusionment. More frequently we forget the original shape of our ideals, discarding what we have had to compromise.[10] A psychological touchstone for political action may be a dangerous denial of reality: the reality of unresolvable moral dilemmas.

It may be that the greatest service psychoanalysts can render to those responsible for human affairs is an incorruptible refusal to give the benediction of advice, and with Freud *(6)*, when invited to show the way, '. . . bow to their reproach that I have no consolation to offer them'.

SUMMARY

This paper takes issue with a suggestion by Eissler that because Japan's reaction to Western aggression was influenced by defense mechanisms of phobia and identification with the aggressor, the country met with a disaster of a kind that might be prevented by psychoanalytically sophisticated statesmen.

It is my thesis that the neurotic nature of Japan's reaction, her hostile intent, and attempt to rewrite the past are not in principle different from the way all cultures are organized and transformed. The attitudes of the various factions within Japan at the time of her confrontation with the West depended on the several opportunities before them. The same was true of Japan's over-all course.

[10] A good example of this is the ideal of freedom. Practical considerations (conflicts with other values) have made us compromise the ideal. But do we mourn the loss? Not readily. Seeing no better solution than we have made, and assuming that conflicts are resolvable, we find ourselves saying, 'Freedom never meant the right to do merely whatever one pleases'. Civilization and Its Discontents is a good corrective to this fallacy. In politics when one is doing one's best one is doing much harm, and the statesman who does not realize this does still more harm. I believe that is Niebuhr's message, and also Freud's.

Psychological defense mechanisms within a society help define the relevant reality in a challenge, help determine the use the society desires to make of the challenge, and help provide the means for exploiting the challenge. Aims, means, and challenge constitute the society's opportunity. A society moves in the direction of its opportunities, and psychological defense mechanisms influence the course of history by contributing to the creation of opportunities. The prevalence of certain defenses is not as revealing as the *use* that is made of them. The significance of psychological defense mechanisms in a culture's growth cannot be extrapolated from the significance they would have in the growth of an individual, because in history we are lacking the standard of maturity that we can use to measure individual adaptation.

Man's aggression and the conflicts between his values are the main source of political misfortune. Whatever advice the psychoanalyst may wish to give the statesman, he should take care not to foster the illusion that these difficulties are avoidable.

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ZOOPHILY AND ZOERASTY

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Animals, even those not strictly domesticated, have always been very popular as love objects. They enable children, especially little girls, to compete or identify in various ways with their mothers by being mothers to their own kittens, puppies, bunnies, or other animals. Single women or men can acquire one or more 'babies' of the kind that guarantee to remain little and dependent. Also, if they compare the proverbial canine obedience and submission to the independent self-assertion of a human companion they prefer a dog. Brill pointed out characteristic sayings such as: 'Love me, love my dog', or 'the more I know of men, the better I love my dog' *(3)*.

The role animals play in the fantasy life of children and the dreams of adults was noted by Freud when he wrote that animals owe a good deal of the importance which they possess in myths and fairy tales to the frankness with which they show their genitals and sexual functions to the curious human child *(8)*. Brill simply said that animals symbolize the primitive passions *(3)*. I would add that by being allowed to display openly their unbridled animal instincts they also arouse the envy of children and their desire to identify with animals. Children always feel nearer to animals because even if animals grow older they do not seem to change their behavior; they never become threatening adults with their puzzling restrictions, prohibitions, and contradictions. Children are fascinated by the polymorphous sexual behavior of animals which produces vicarious excitement in them. Animal spectacles observed by children need not even be specifically sexual to arouse sexual excitement in the child and may be recaptured and elaborated in perverse masturbation fantasies throughout life.

Therefore, the assumption that animal pets not only allow children to maintain a healthy belief in man's inseparateness from the universe *(19)*, and also to prepare them better for fu-

ture interpersonal relationships is controversial, unless the animal serves only as a transitional object which automatically and in time becomes decathected before a too intensive identification with the animal has been established *(21)*. Marcel Heiman characterized the dog as protector and talisman against separation anxiety and the fear of death *(10)*. In this connection he also mentioned sublimation. A woman who has successfully alienated all the people in her neighborhood is inclined to ostentatiously hug and kiss her 'baby', a Chihuahua dog: I wonder if we can speak here of sublimation of her aggressions. However, it is true that animals can be controlled more easily than people and this, in addition to their symbolizing capacity for displacement and substitution of people, makes them suitable phobic objects. They represent as such only the last vestiges of their once exalted position as gods who could in their original zoomorphic shape be controlled more easily than their anthropomorphic successors.

According to Havelock Ellis, the peasant lives with animals and because of their being his constant companions and friends he understands them far better than men and women. He knows and witnesses all the details of their sexual lives and regards animals not only as near to him but even nearer than his fellow human beings. Ellis cited a German peasant, accused of having had intercourse with his sow, who defended himself before the magistrate with the naïve explanation, 'my wife was away too long and so I went with the sow'. This use of an animal was felt by Ellis to be merely *'faute de mieux'*, in other words, an emergency outlet like masturbation. Actually this explanation contradicts his own view that he shared with Freud, namely, that primitive people and children feel themselves more like animals *(6,* p. 81*)*.

Michael Balint states that according to his limited experience, bestialism never reaches the height of proper perversion but always seems to come about for want of something better, *'faute de mieux'*, as first proclaimed by Havelock Ellis. 'The unhappy people who indulge in it are either simpletons, some-

times even imbeciles, or they are in the throes of the great passions of puberty without the hope of finding a proper partner. As I see it, these people temporarily make use of the fact that animals are in their care by resorting to them as an outlet' *(1)*.

Freud specifically emphasized that the arrogance to put himself above the animal is still foreign to the child, as it is to primitive man and the savage *(9)*. Géza Róheim stated that to a man of the African Dinka tribe cattle are dearer than wife or child. Further, that in Central Australia one may observe a woman with a baby feeding at one breast and a puppy at the other. He also noted that in New Guinea a woman might kill her child but keep her milk for a pig. At any rate, they do suckle the pigs *(16)*.

There is no evidence for Havelock Ellis' opinion, which is shared by Michael Balint, that individuals such as the German peasant are dull, insensitive, and unfastidious, or even mentally defective *(9,* p. 79*)*, as the cases I am going to present will illustrate. For the title of this paper I have used the anglicized spelling of two terms introduced by Krafft-Ebing: *Zoophilia* and *Zoerastia*. The former he described as a lustful emotion while petting and stroking domestic animals, mostly cats and dogs, and associated it with fetishism; as *zoerastia* he defined a category of cases which in his opinion were of definitely pathological nature and characterized by 'impotence for the normal act and impulsive manner of performing the unnatural act' with the animal *(13)*. He dealt with all this later in a less disconnected way. As my case material will show, it is not really possible to keep zoophily and zoerasty apart, just as one can hardly separate paedophilia from paederasty.

When John started analysis with me he was a twenty-year-old employe at a meat packing house, had received a B.A. from a university in the east, studied at a conservatory of music, and played the organ in a church for the boys' choir. He was an adopted child who did not know his parents. His adoptive father was an only boy with seven older sisters, each of whom

competed with the mother in worshipping him. The father had been a celebrated athlete when in college, had married an heiress, and had taken his parents to live with him on his wife's estate. Forced to give up a pugilistic career when he entered, as an executive, the meat packing business of his father-in-law he wanted to train John to succeed him in sports. He let the boy ride piggy-back and threw him up in the air to catch him again; while lying on his back, he let the boy crawl over him and they 'rough-housed', or 'horsed around'. At times the father must have become aware of his erection and his paederastic impulses as often he suddenly pushed the boy away and jumped up to take a cold shower. At other times he took the boy with him into the bathroom where the boy was startled when he saw the gush and heard the loud splashing into the toilet bowl when his father urinated.

When John was five years old he had scarlet fever and was sent to the hospital. On his return home a pet pony was gone and instead he found a rival, a newly adopted sister. His old crippled nursemaid, who had been more of a mother to him than his mother, now took care of this little sister and even his father was increasingly reluctant to engage in horseplay with him. Searching for some attention he provoked and bullied his playmates and had a fight with his cousin, who had told him that he was not even his father's son but an adopted child. In his panic about his cousin's disclosure he ran to his mother to inquire about his origin and also where his sister came from. The mother confirmed that he was adopted like his sister but consoled him by saying that he was God's child, that he came from the Cradle, and that one day he could even marry his sister. John's mother had experienced very little love in her life. She was four years old when her own mother died. She had been reared by a strict aunt, then a stepmother, and finally in a convent where she had learned to play the piano. At the time of her marriage she was undecided about whether or not to become a nun.

It is worth while to mention that the patient was toilet

trained at the age of two and a half years, the training supposedly having been completed in two weeks. Needless to say, he remained enuretic until the age of six, if not longer. At the age of three John was a Little Hans with a horse phobia. His father had received a pony as a gift and urged John to climb on the pony. Disappointed when the little boy shied away from the horse, the father teased him, saying he was such a sissy that he was afraid of a horse. It was at the age of twelve, when at last he had learned to master his fear, that he experienced an emission while riding a horse. He was terrified and told his mother and then his father about it. The mother showed some sympathy but kept silent; the father, however, told him not to do it again and to take a cold shower. He also warned him of the dire consequences of masturbation and mentioned something about girls that John did not understand.

He liked kittens and while he studied he had urinating and defecating kittens all around him. Once a cat had a bowel movement on the book he was reading. He grabbed the cat and threw it on the floor as hard as he could so that it had a spastic reaction as if it were dying. Listening to the still beating heart, he associated something bad with having a bowel movement and remembered that when he was small he wondered whether Christ urinated and defecated. When John was in a public urinal with a friend he was unable to urinate but pretended he did; he would return when no one was around.

John was very upset one day when he was at a party with his father and his mother phoned to tell him that she was taking the cat to the veterinary because his father wanted to get rid of it. He protested and demanded that at least his sister should be asked for permission because it was actually her cat. He felt humiliated when his father, in the presence of his bridge partner, teased him about taking cats into his bedroom and one of the men asked him if he slept with cats. Although he conceded that cats are girls' pets and that having a cat in the home is a sissy thing, he resented his father's never letting him and his sister have what they loved. Simultaneously he

hoped that the absence of the cat would help him learn to love his father.

Therefore, when the cat returned he was first glad but then felt frustrated as he did not want to get used to the cat again. Mother had brought the cat back from the veterinarian who had diagnosed only a minor skin ailment. The cat was used to sleeping at the foot of his bed and liked to suck on his blanket or to tickle his foot until he would pick it up and permit his hand to be licked or engage in a sham fight with the cat, which could become quite rough. Now the cat was again licking his bedclothes and causing an erection from this alone. He grabbed the cat and put it into the bathroom so that it would not bother him. He wondered if he was so starved for sexual relations that by now even animals could arouse him. This made him think at once of his roommate at college to whom he had a very strong homosexual attraction. When John was small his younger sister always had kittens and he used to join her playing with them. When the kittens grew up they were disposed of and father made a sport of killing them by stabbing a pocket knife through the cat's ear into the brain. This was done in the presence of the children who maintained a cat cemetery and put stones on each of the cats' graves. John had a list of the genealogy of each cat and of those that had kittens.

The patient's perversion was not limited to cats. In one of the early hours of analysis he confessed: 'What the cats are doing to me is the same as what the horses permit me to do, to crawl on them and kick them'. What he wanted to say was: 'I represent a horse to the cats and I play cat with the horses', and he added, 'I could not tease my sister as I can tease a cat and could not tease my father as I am teasing horses'. Habitually he sneaked or broke into stables where he knew he would find horses—he could get sexually excited merely from the smell of horses—and then would try to squeeze the neck of a horse between his legs, at the same time masturbating the horse's penis. Drawing forcefully on the horse's bridle to pull its neck backward he wanted the horse to get on its hind legs, or best of all

to make it roll on its back, in either case for the purpose of making the penis point upward. Often after he had sneaked into a stable he tied up a stallion's legs, made it go on its knees, and then pushed the horse down, jumped on top of it and had an 'emission', as he called it. At times he managed to insert his own erected penis into the foreskin of a stallion. A few times he came close to being arrested; once he broke a finger and another time he suffered an injury to his foot when a horse kicked him, but all this did not deter him. Of course he could not really get a stallion excited; therefore he wanted to bring a mare to the stallion and then, when the stallion was aroused, to separate the two animals by a wooden plank or a fence and to masturbate the stallion. However, what he wanted most of all was to have the stallion mount the mare and then to jump on top of the stallion and to ejaculate simultaneously with the stallion.

It is worth while to compare the case of John with the classical case of Little Hans. Whereas, in the case of Little Hans 'the original object of great pleasure was turned into a phobic object' *(8),* John's originally phobic object persisted as his sole sexual aim and gratification. Both patients shared the special interest in the widdler and in the capacity of the penis to pass water in a gush, as it comes from an ordinary horse or an idling steam engine—as Hans once observed, a steam horse. Little John had ample opportunity to watch his father urinate and Little Hans most likely was not only permitted to accompany his mother to the toilet but also his father, and had learned to distinguish between the sounds made by a urinating man and a urinating woman. When Little Hans was fidgety and pawing the ground with his feet like a pony impatient to run, he was also holding back the urine so that eventually he could produce a gush similar to that of his father, the big horse. The associative connection between water and the horse has been made in Greek mythology. Poseidon, the god of the roaring rivers and oceans, was called Poseidon Hippios, the horsy Poseidon.

And it was Apollo's steed, Pegasus, who caused the spring Hippocrene to gush from Mount Parnassus. Niederland has referred to the river Traun emptying into Traun Lake in Gmunden and considers it most unlikely that Little Hans, who spent the summers in Gmunden where he watched the horses in the stable each day, would not have observed the river and the lake *(14)*.

Little Hans was in conflict between his compulsive need to look at horses and his desperate attempts to keep them out of his visual field. The symbolic significance of the horse and the condensation of all his fears in the horse were products of his vivid imagination. They also resulted in a psychic economic advantage, as he had to deal merely with one fear instead of a multitude of fears. John's conflict was his fear of the pony and at the same time his desperate desire to win his father's love and respect by not being a sissy and accepting the pony as a playmate. The pony was forced on him by the father and the symbolizing activity of his imagination was secondary. He felt that the horse was supposed to substitute for the father; therefore the fear of the horse was to a great extent a fear that the horse would separate him from the father. However, while he was in the hospital father gave the pony away, which John interpreted as father's despair that his son would ever possess virility. Thus, the horse and the later perversion became ego syntonic and John was habitually searching for a horse.

Little Hans was afraid of being bitten by a white horse; in contrast, John bit horses in the neck. Although the phallic appearance of the horse's long neck is quite obvious, Little Hans emphasized the whiteness of the horse. Thus we must consider the phallic significance of the mother's breast and his fear of retaliation for the wish to bite her breast when she was nursing a sibling. Furthermore, we have to keep in mind that Little Hans' mother became a load-bearing *Stellwagenpferd* (coach horse) because of her pregnancy; but if he were bitten, not by a white horse, but as the German saying goes, by the stork, he would be able to compete with mother by

getting pregnant himself. Corresponding to this, John was keeping kittens (babies) to compete with his sister, but in spite of treating them just as sadistically as did his father, he could not gain the respect of either his father or his mother. Hans feared especially that the horse would fall down. In contrast, John took great effort to make the horse roll over on its back for the purpose of making the horse's penis point upward, just like his father's penis when father was 'horsing around' with him in the morning. Of course, this must also have been the repressed pleasurable experience of Hans when his father, who was his first horse, was on his back in the morning, kicking and teasing him.

Considering the roughness of the horseplay, the aggressive, sadistic wishes were quite close to consciousness; Little Hans wished his father to drop out of sight so that he would be mother's big horse and 'little John', while biting the neck of the horse he was trying to subdue in the stable, symbolically was biting his father's erected penis. The bit and the bridle of the horse reminded Hans of his father's emblem of masculinity, the mustache; the same items reminded John of the headgear his father had worn when he had tackled his opponents in football games. However John was at least to some degree aware of the underlying feminine aspects of his father's 'he-man' personality.

The deepest source of anxiety in both cases was not the father, but the mother. When John was three years old his mother had a so-called 'nervous breakdown' and was confined to a hospital. Her adoption of the boy had not helped her to emerge from her withdrawn state and she remembered him only occasionally at parties in her home when she presented him to her guests as if he were some curio. Nevertheless, John identified with his mother professionally and became a musician and composer. The mother of Little Hans, by her inability to put a stop to his most indiscreet curiosity, betrayed a sort of helplessness that often is indicative of serious conflicts in regard to motherliness and fears of pregnancy which probably recurred when

she was pregnant again. By his agoraphobia Hans also tried to chaperone his mother and to prevent any further *'Niederkunft'*, i.e., coming down of her with child.

As a valuable fact in the light of totemism, the animal phobia, according to Freud, serves to ameliorate the ambivalent feelings against the father by displacing the hostile and anxious part of the feelings to the animal. Soon, however, the animal substituting for the father becomes more and more respected and admired and approximates even closer the imago of the father. From the phobia to the perversion is only one more step: Little Hans, no longer content to avoid or to seek the horse as if it were his father, then, so to speak, insisted that the horse was his father and therefore demanded from the animal a complete and compulsively repetitive re-enactment of the dominant childhood experiences to which he was addicted. The phobia contains all the aspects of the perversion but keeps them bottled up by the phobic mechanisms; the perversion, counterphobic by its nature, dissolves the phobic defenses. One would be inclined to assume that the phobic, by his avoidances, tries to guarantee a minus of libidinous excitement, while the pervert seeks a plus out of it. Quite the opposite is true: the phobic is using the technique of avoidance for preventing a letdown, or should we say, a detumescence? He keeps himself in a persistent state of libidinized fears. The pervert acts out when he is no longer able to resist his compulsion. Eventually, especially in treatment, he spends the free intervals after such a catharsis with remorse and the building up of good intentions for the future, but when he becomes recidivous it only increases his libidinized rage against the animal.

All horsemen and horsewomen have absorbed something equine, reminiscent of the stable, and they feel bigger and stronger on the horse than they feel ordinarily. We need only to think of the American centaur, the Western cowboy, whose extraordinary accomplishments on the movie screen have put all old-time centaurs to shame. For the patient John, whose most

ambitious desire was to get on top of a stallion in the act of mounting a mare, and thus to be the dominant part of the body image of two horses, the stable and the horses had also a special meaning in regard to his adoption.

In contrast to the horse and the overdomesticated dog, the cat has never been fully domesticated. It often leaves the house at night and prowls about the streets. Therefore, the word cat, in slang, means tramp, hobo, or prostitute; a cat house is a cheap brothel, and pussy is the vagina. A black cat is said to bring luck, but it also has been associated with skulls and witches. In contrast to the faithfulness of the dog and his devoted facial expression when looking at his master, the cat's facial expression is narcissistic and aloof.

Angelo, a twenty-five-year-old college student, a native of Rome, entered analysis because of his feelings of inadequacy aroused by the refusal of his girl to have sexual relations with him though they had been dating for nine months, and his frantic fear that this would cause his relapse into overt homosexuality in which he had engaged between the ages of ten and sixteen and from which he had refrained for the last nine years. The sexual inhibition with his girl, which was shared by her, appeared rather surprising when he claimed that he had sexual relations with a female for the first time at the age of eighteen and that he had impregnated her so that she had to undergo an abortion which had aroused guilt feelings of being a murderer. This woman, however, had been a married woman who even had the same first name as his mother, Dolores. His mother had rented a room to her after the death of his father and when to her chagrin she had learned that her son was having an affair with the boarder she forbade him in vain to go to the woman's room. She could not be evicted because of the protective law for subtenants.

Angelo kept an old dog which he took to bed with him at times and to which he had a zoophilic attachment. His zoerastic impulses were acted out on stray cats he picked up from the

street and either kept for himself or brought to his girl, a cat lover, as gifts. (I am using in this context the term zoerastic for sadistic.) He pulled cats by the tail, swung them in the air by holding the tail, or bit the tail, something he liked as much as biting his girl's neck. He pulled so hard on the tail of one kitten that it suffered an injury to the spine and was paralyzed. He asked me if I thought the cat should be killed. He also liked to press his fingers into the eyeballs of a cat, which provided the clue to a dream in which he sneaked behind a young Negro and playfully pinched the fellow's testicles between the legs. In his fantasies the Negro is a swinger, a hep or hipster, and a jazz-howling and prowling stray cat. One day he picked up a stray black cat from the street and took it home with him. He grabbed it and put it on his lap, but it meowed and jumped down. Then, after a while the cat jumped on his lap and he began to tickle the cat's belly, but it meowed again. It made him think that the cat stayed 'cool' and refused to acknowledge his affectionate intentions which put him into such a rage that he grabbed the cat by the tail and threw it to the floor with such violence that it died. When he visited his girl, her cat, remembering how badly he had mistreated it, immediately slipped under the furniture. It was the second cat he had brought to his girl, the first having died from injuries he had inflicted on it. In a dream portion he was a vagabond, a cat, swinging his satchel over his shoulder and wandering on the road, unshaven as he used to come to my office.

The patient's mother was attractive, but a conservative bigot from a backward island, while his father, an accountant, was a worldly Roman and an anti-Fascist. The mother was already pregnant with the patient when she married and he was an unwanted child who remained the only child from this marriage. His mother was not prepared for the responsibilities of motherhood. She was afraid to touch him because of her unconscious hostility and successively gave him to the care of a wet nurse, a dry nurse, and a day nursery maintained by nuns. He was told that he was weaned by having pepper put

into his mouth and he remembers that he was always longing for his mother. Therefore, he forced her to keep an eye on him. Frequently he locked himself up in the toilet, climbed on the window sill and sat at the open window while his mother could only peer through the keyhole helpless and horrified. One day, while his mother thought he was still asleep in bed and was talking to the maid, he sneaked into the room she had rented to a student and threw the student's books, papers, pants, and shoes out the window.

His earliest acting out with an animal was in the day nursery. The nuns had an Angora rabbit, which in his opinion had malformed legs. Obsessed with the idea of straightening out its legs, he killed the rabbit. He also grabbed chickens or ducks by their necks, pulled out their feathers, and then twirled them in the air triumphantly. When he was five years old he witnessed a scene in which his father, in a rage, slapped his mother in the face and knocked her down on the bed. From then on he began chasing cats, which are ubiquitous in the streets of Rome. For a time he could not run fast enough to catch one, but when he finally caught a cat he pumped air into its rectum with a bicycle pump.

It was the time of the Allied invasion of Italy and rumors spread about the brutality of the American Negroes and that the dark-skinned Moroccans who had come with the English had raped and torn apart females of every age, even nuns, all the way from Sicily and southern Italy to Rome. After the liberation of Rome, Angelo's mother had started an adulterous affair with an American sergeant. One day an Allied jeep was parked on the inclining street where Angelo lived. He released the emergency brake so that the jeep rolled backward and downward rapidly and hit a building, injuring the Yankee soldier who was taking a nap in the driver's seat. It was finally for this reason that his mother tricked him into a boarding school, again operated by nuns. While she was waiting in the reception room, the head nun took him supposedly for a tour of the school; when they returned his mother was gone. She came to

visit him only every two or three months, but then was nicely perfumed and wore a new black fur coat. In the cold sitting room while nobody was around, his legs encircled his mother's lap and she covered them with her warm fur coat. However, his contentment lasted only a few minutes, then the visiting time was over and he was again in the power of the nuns who punished him severely for every mischief, as well as his bedwetting.

After four years he was placed in another boarding school, this time on high school level and operated by monks. His parents, in the meantime, were legally separated since they could not get a divorce. The father maintained the old apartment while the mother moved into a luxurious villa with her consort, a gambler and black-market operator who provided American troops with British whiskey. When Angelo came home he slept with his father but, when his father took in a mistress and wanted Angelo to accept her as a stepmother, he refused, claiming that she had been known in the neighborhood as a prostitute. He had become a street urchin and had joined a gang of boys who, aside from other mischief, engaged in homosexual practices to which he had been introduced at the boarding schools. He had bad luck when one of the boys, preparing himself for holy communion, was persuaded by his mother to make a preliminary confession to her and betrayed the names of all his homosexual chums, including Angelo. She blamed Angelo as the seducer of her son and informed the best friend of Angelo's mother, a spinster who kept up to eighteen cats in her apartment, all of which she had picked up on the streets. The spinster tried to make a deal with Angelo by promising not to tell his mother about his homosexuality if he would refrain from doing any more harm to cats.

When Angelo was fourteen years old his father committed suicide by hanging himself, just when Angelo had begun to love him. The mother sold the big home of her paramour, who had been sent to the United States for psychiatric treatment after a psychotic episode in which he had threatened to shoot

her and attempted to throw her out of a window. She moved with the patient's half-brother to the old apartment and saved up money for the emigration of the family. A year later she travelled to the United States, married Angelo's stepfather, and procured emigration papers for her two sons.

Angelo came to this country at the age of twenty and was inducted into the Armed Services. While in training for the artillery he was nostalgic for his mother and phoned her twice a week. He read Karl Menninger's book, Man Against Himself, and thereupon decided to commit suicide. He jumped from the barracks' second floor, landed on concrete but remained unscathed. He was taken to the closed ward of the hospital for observation. When he was finally transferred to the open ward instead of waiting for his discharge he simply sneaked out, took a bus to Chicago, and went AWOL. He escaped a court martial and received an honorable discharge only because his mother hired a lawyer for him who pleaded insanity.

In analysis, Angelo's first dream was that he was running along a moving train desperately holding onto the handrail while a train came from the opposite direction. He also dreamed that he was in the washroom with his girl and pulled worms out of her anus. His immediate association was that cats have worms frequently. He used to beat the cat when it would go to the box to defecate. It frustrated him that the cat minded its own business. He remembered that he was afraid to find fecal material from his mother in the toilet bowl because it was in conflict with his concept of the mother as a madonna. Once he awoke from a nightmare in which he was in the old apartment in Rome and mother came out of the toilet where she had one of her noisy arguments with his stepfather and had bloody marks on her breasts and one shoulder. He wanted to grab the man by the neck and kill him because, as he assured his mother, he loved her so much. However, she told him in a 'catty' manner that it was none of his business.

He dreamed that he was in the washroom himself with the cat or his girl and that she was angry at him and turned her back toward him. Then he was beating her and she became giddy and joking. His mother came and wondered what was happening and he told her that the girl had had a nervous breakdown, which in his associations meant that she had an orgasm. His zoerastic abuse of the cat was a re-enactment of primal scene memories and fantasies re-enforced by his mother's adultery and subsequently her giving birth to a child by another man.

By her protracted refusal to have sexual relations with him, his girl halfway met his own unconscious wish to keep her legs straight. This reflected his original obsession with the Angora rabbit in the day nursery. He also straightened out the dislocated paw of a cat, but the cat jumped away and dislocated the paw again. As a child he was often in bed between his parents and observed how they tickled and kicked each other's legs. As partial objects the rabbit's foot and the cat's paw were vague representations of the mother's pubic hair, especially when she spread her legs.

The most persistent symptom of the patient is his paranoid jealousy. His father used to draw pictures of himself as a horned cuckold on the walls of the apartment for mother to see. When Angelo was the lover of his mother's roomer, Dolores, a kept woman, he used every opportunity when she had gone out to search in her room for notes and letters, to examine her drawers, and to smell her handkerchiefs, slips, and undergarments for traces of sperm. He has not stopped bothering his girl with jealous suspicions and has a second key to her mail box. However, his obsessional search for a proof of the woman's unfaithfulness is only a screen for his obsessional search for the woman's penis. When he was fourteen years old he slept for a while in the same room with his girl cousin from Sardinia, who was a house guest. One night while the girl was asleep he lit a candle, lifted the blanket with which she was covered, and investigated her genital. The paranoid jealousy not only is an

associative link to the search for the penis, but it is also an award for the search in so far as the unfaithful woman has got the penis, namely, the penis of the male rival. When his girl, after a courtship of nine months, at last permitted him to have intercourse, he preserved his bloody underpants as an evidence of her defloration and as a trophy, and also made such excessive demands on her for repeated coitus that it appeared as if he wanted to seal off her vagina with his penis in order to assure her faithfulness.

Angelo's sadistic mistreatment of chickens and ducks was set off by the witnessing of slaughter scenes similar to those involved in the chicken phobia of Ferenczi's patient Arpad *(7)*. As Géza Róheim learned by personal communication from Dr. Ferenczi, little Arpad became in later life the owner of a poultry farm *(16)*. Thus, his interest in the raising and killing of chickens continued to find ample opportunity. The spectacle of the animal's neck being grabbed and cut with a knife and the rhythmic gushing out of blood excites children sexually. Boys construct fantasies in the phallic stage involving an association between the neck and the phallus and between rhythmic exsanguination and ejaculation. The theme can be elaborated in an equation of neck=phallus=girl; then girls are slaughtered at the peak of the masturbation fantasy. A young girl, especially if attractive, is referred to as a 'chick'. Pulling out the feathers is undressing the chick and getting it ready for the pot. On the other hand, newly hatched chickens, rabbits, and eggs symbolize fertility and birth.

John actually envied kittens for not being toilet trained. When in his rage he threw a kitten to the floor, he did to the cat what his father had done to him when he had soiled the bed or when he had excited his father sexually so that the father was afraid he might wet the bed or had done so. The kitten, as John's baby, first was part of his rivalry with the younger sister, but when the kitten was sucking on the blanket and he responded with an erection he became aware of mysterious

sexual wishes which pulled him away from his admired father to sissified objects like cats and girls and he locked the cat in the bathroom.

In the transference John, by provoking me, persisted for a long time in his attempts to make me also into a stallion. After he married he could manage to have intercourse with his wife at times, but he had to darken the room and to imagine that she was a horse. Little Arpad, when he was grown up, purchased a poultry farm; why did John not buy himself a stallion; why did he have to break into somebody else's stable and risk being arrested? The answer is that breaking into a stable which was not his own was simultaneously a re-enactment of his adoption and an insistence on being reunited with his real parents. Like Little Hans, 'little John' was preoccupied with his widdler. He had been told by his adoptive mother that he was a child of God and that he came from the Cradle. It is true that he envied his father the loud gush of urine that the father could produce, but he also knew that this was only his adoptive father and that possibly there was no need to envy him. He wondered whether Christ urinated and in accordance with his fantasy of being the son of God himself he liked to make people wonder whether he urinated. The hypercathected childhood fantasy of the stable was created by a combination of the adoptive father's fixation to sports and the adoptive mother's preoccupation with the church, and was a product of the boy's intense need for an identity. In the stable fantasies of the crib of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, his mother, and the manger with the horse, were neatly side by side.

Both patients experienced early sexual stimulation, i.e., overstimulation caused by the romping around in bed with the father, and in Angelo's case, with the mother too. Such excessive excitement without available release mechanisms and starting in the pregenital stage invariably leads to sadomasochistic manifestations. If we add the introjection of the fathers' sadism reflecting their only partially repressed paederastic impulses, especially in the case of John's father, and if we further take into

consideration the continual frustrations and abandonments to which these patients were exposed in childhood, we can understand the enormous amount of rage they must have accumulated. It is, of course, not just a coincidence that both fathers died a violent death. John's father shot himself and Angelo's father hanged himself. Angelo's stepfather for years has had difficulty restraining his homicidal and suicidal impulses.

CONCLUSIONS

In most cases of zoophily the animal serves as a substitute for the absent human love object. To a deserted child it is a surrogate of the missing mother; to a child competing with the mother but unable to acquire a real baby of his own and taking care of it like the mother, it substitutes for a baby; and for a lonely person it substitutes for the missing or otherwise unavailable companion or sexual partner. To John, 'horsing around' had the meaning of intercourse; therefore he was always searching for a horse. An Arab nomad in the desert may engage in sexual horseplay with a camel; the lonely woman worshipping her *Schosshündchen* (lap dog) may use it as a substitute for both a baby and a sexual partner and train it to practice cunnilingus on her; the parent with some sort of guilt feeling toward the child often buys an animal for the child as a compensation. The child usually loses interest rapidly in the care of the animal and the parent has only acquired an additional responsibility. Dog owners, for instance, though they have to go out in every kind of weather, at least have the opportunity to meet one another at the fire hydrant and to compare the virtues of their dogs and their eliminatory and sexual proclivities. The animal's sexual activities not only stimulate the child's curiosity but the frank display of its eliminatory and sexual activities frequently arouses the child's envy and wish to identify with the animal.

In zoerasty the animal not only serves as a substitute for a human object, it is also abused for the re-enactment of trau-

matic experiences under pressure of the principle of repetition compulsion. The animal then becomes an outlet for sadistic-murderous impulses. The child is acting out his anger at the parent by hurting or killing the pet. Different species of pets serve the young pervert's need for multiple identifications. It is for this reason that John craved to be on top of a stallion mounting a mare, which is also manifestation of an ego extension. Angelo, loyal to his old faithful dog (father), identified with the sniffing dog on the trail and diverted his rage toward mother, who had gone astray, to the stray cat. By hurting the cat he took revenge for his mother's desertion of him as well as for her infidelity to his father. The cat also represented his half-brother whom he used to pull by the neck when they were alone, and who was identified with his mother and her illicit behavior which resulted in his birth. Angelo often quoted Baudelaire's words on how swift, treacherous, and sensuous a cat is, but this description fitted nobody better than himself. His favorite place was on the window sill, like a cat or an oriental prostitute; he could jump from high up without getting hurt, and while shopping at the supermarket could steal a steak as swiftly as a cat in one of his dreams could steal a slice of salami that had dropped under the table.

Just as the child can displace his rage at the parent onto the animal, the parent can abuse the animal as an outlet for his or her hostility against the child. John's father acted out his hostility against his adopted children by executing with his pocket knife the kittens that the children had adopted. Dunbar *(5)* mentioned a patient who called herself lucky to have a cat so that she would not jump at her son's throat. Arminda de Pichon Riviere *(4)* reported a very traumatic childhood memory of an impotent young man: when he was eight or nine years old his dog would masturbate by rubbing against anything it came near—people, furniture, or cushions. The patient also masturbated a great deal at this time but with other companions. (One may wonder why a point was made of excluding his dog from companionship.) His father would get

furious when he saw the dog masturbating and would threaten to turn the dog out. One day when the boy returned from school he found his pet lying on the floor dispirited and covered with blood. Father had had it castrated. While relating the story, the patient experienced terrible pain in his genitals as if he were being castrated.

As a correlate to the parent displacing criticism and punishment that was intended for the child to the animal, the priest flings curses at an outlet—in Yiddish *kappora* (animal)—for instance, a chicken. The child, who can sense that the parent originally wanted only to divert his own guilt, by identifying with the *kappora,* also identifies with the Savior who saves the parents by accepting their sins upon Himself. It is because of these fantasies that zoophily and zoerasty have played such an important role in religious customs and ceremonies since ancient times. In reference to the scapegoat, Plutarch *(15),* Herodotus *(11),* and Strabo *(20)* corroborate in their reports that Egyptian women in the service of the sacred goat Mendas had intercourse with goats. The Athenian sculptor Scopas represented Aphrodite Pandemos riding on a goat. According to Iwan Bloch, the sodomy with nanny goats still occurring in South Italy must have some logical connection with the worship of the goat as a sexual deity in Hellas and Italy. In the witch and Satan cult the animal plays the same role *(2).* Of course it is obvious that the worship of the Lamb of God also belongs in this context.

One would be inclined to differentiate between a heterogenital and a homogenital type of zoerasty. However, this would be an inconsistency inasmuch as an individual capable of heterogenital love would not be in need of a perversion and certainly not of such a degrading kind. In fact, zoerasty not only serves to divert the acting out of violent sadistic impulses from human objects but also of homosexual impulses. Anyway, it usually is sadism which is predominant in the homosexual perversion.

A woman at times may masturbate while riding a horse

although she may not have noticed the gender of the horse. Schrenck Notzing *(17)* reported the case of a country woman who masturbated for thirty years while imagining she was covered by a stallion. From my experience, such a masturbation fantasy would involve an identification with both the stallion and the mare. According to Juvenal *(12)*, Roman women eager to satisfy their nymphomania had a special preference for the donkey, which was notorious for its lecherousness. One wonders about Juvenal's hostility against Roman women and if the gossip does not betray his homosexual inclination.

The apostate monk Heriger (in German *Hoeriger* means someone in bondage) in Anthony Shafton's novel *(18)*, written in the style of a medieval chronicle, compulsively has intercourse with female dogs. However, in the course of his voluntary confession without absolution, it becomes obvious that he was involved in a persistent struggle with the devil as the true image of his morose, sinister father who had assumed the role of the mother after her death when the monk was still an infant. Thus, citing Goethe's Faust, we can conclude with the recognition: *'Das also war des Pudels Kern.'* Well then, this was the poodle's essence.

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Slips of the Tongue in Dreams

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SLIPS OF THE TONGUE IN DREAMS

BY RICHARD V. YAZMAJIAN, M.D. (NEW YORK)

Traditionally slips of the tongue have been understood clinically and theoretically as reflecting opposing mental trends that are ascertainable through associations to their component words. In two recent papers *(4, 5)* I have demonstrated that this is not always true and that in some slips, associations to the component words may be of secondary or little importance. Moreover, in some cases the very process of 'slip formation' becomes defensively instinctualized and assumes value for a symbolic discharge. The ego can unconsciously use the technique of formation of a slip for the symbolic expression of oral, anal, phallic, and genital drives and fantasies as well as certain ego identifications and superego demands.

No papers in the literature deal specifically with slips of the tongue in dreams. This may be due not only to a lack of active attention to the subject over the years, but also to the apparent rarity of the phenomenon. Despite my interest in the subject, I have encountered slips of the tongue in dreams on only five occasions. In personal communications, some analysts have reported similar clinical experience; others reported that they could not recall a single instance of slips in dreams. Richardson *(2)*, in his discussion of this paper, drew attention to two dreams reported by Freud in which there were slips in the manifest content (*1*, p. 421 and p. 455). Freud did not give associations sufficiently 'in depth' to permit assessment of the slips in terms of the propositions to be offered here.

Of the five slips in dreams encountered, one was in the context of the resistive reporting of a flurry of dreams, and was not analyzable. The other four permitted extensive analysis and revealed psychodynamic consistency. In each instance, the process of slip formation had been regressively instinctualized

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and was used for symbolic instinctual discharge in the manner described in my previous papers.

CASE I

For several weeks during the sixth year of her analysis, a patient with mixed neurotic symptoms was working through transference conflicts whose central theme involved wishes to castrate the analyst orally. The erotization of these drives was such that she was terrified lest their mobilization create intense sexual excitement leading to orgasm, loss of control, and cannibalization of the analyst, herself, or both. During sleep she would often bite her nails savagely but have no recollection on awakening of having done so. When these emerging conflicts reached a new peak on the analytic couch, she reacted by instituting a fresh wave of intense resistance. The session to be described occurred in just such an emotional climate.

Arriving late, she launched into complaints that no one in her family had telephoned to inform her of her parents' decision to see a psychiatrist about their marital difficulties. She bitterly complained that the family considered her an 'unfeeling' person and gave her realistic reasons for feeling 'left out'. Noting that she had again slept through the night without biting her nails, she then described a dream which she could not recall clearly.

> It was about Alice, who is a company vice-president. She is a bitch who makes oodles of money. Sometimes she is nice, but then becomes bitchy. I was talking to her in Joey's fancy office; she also has a fancy office. Every time I addressed Alice by name I used the wrong name. I couldn't help making the slip! I could have buttoned my tongue. [The use of 'buttoned' here may have been a slip, but was unrecognized as such by both the patient and the analyst.] I can't recall many of the names, but the point is that I just couldn't say the correct name.

'That's the dream. Why Joey's office? Her name really is

Joie—as in French—but they all call her Joey; it's confusing.' Direct associations to the dream were halted and she complained of 'starving' despite having eaten before the session. This comment was followed by a period of silence. Silence was a typical response when she was threatened by oral impulses: any use of her mouth was dangerous and muteness reassured her of being in control of primitive urges to bite and devour.

Soon she began to talk but could only verbalize vague feelings of 'something bothering' her. Her attention was drawn back to the dream. She observed, 'Strange, when I thought of the dream your name came to mind for some reason. I've been coming here for almost six years and yet I am not sure I can pronounce it. I keep forgetting it. I'm afraid to say it! What is your office apartment number? Seven. I can't recall the letter. I looked at you coming in and don't know your suit's color: just a vague, *neutral* gray. [The suit was blue.] I've never noticed whether you have a name plate over the bell.'

I remarked that there was a name plate on the door and that she certainly must have noticed it. 'I guess I had to forget. I'm removing your identity in some way. I'm afraid of saying your name. Something wrong will come out; I'm afraid I'll not say the name as I "hear" it in my mind. I *know* I'll say it wrong. My teeth ache.'

The interpretation was made that she was afraid that she would mutilate my name with her mouth because she unconsciously wished to, just as she did in the dream with her slips. 'Yes! That's it. Last week I said there was war between us. But why your name? It must be something special since it's been going on since the analysis began.' I reminded her of recent wishes to bite and swallow my penis and suggested that she unconsciously equated my name and identity with my penis. Further, that her not seeing my name plate and my suit color were all facets of her attempt to castrate me symbolically. 'No wonder I portrayed you in the dream as a woman. In yesterday's dream, I was a man!'

The patient became quite depressed and verbalized feelings

of deep grief, abandonment, and aloneness. Her rage broke into consciousness and she pleaded for my understanding of her inability to get rid of such feelings. Her teeth began to ache and she experienced 'frustration in my teeth'. The session closed with her wish to scream which she dared not risk expressing.

The clinical material has been presented in detail in order to illustrate clearly the primacy of instinctual and symbolic aspects of the process of formation of slips in the dream. Although it is usually advisable to obtain associations to both word components of slip, in this instance it did not even appear necessary to pursue direct associations to them; in fact, the patient was not asked to recall the various names that occurred in the dream's repetitive slips. It is possible that doing this might have been productive. However, the clinical material seemed so crystal clear and the transference situation so 'tight' that it seemed more clinically productive to follow the patient's own route which led directly to the primary dynamic conflicts involved in the slip.

CASE II

As he was about to enter the consultation room, a patient experienced severe bowel cramps and dashed into the bathroom, where he had an explosive bowel movement. In the early part of the session he tentatively and guardedly expressed doubts about my capacities as an analyst and wondered if he would not do better with another analyst. His quiet controlled speech would be suddenly punctuated by a very loud burst of words and then the pattern would be repeated. This was characteristic of the patient and reflected displacement of anal sadistic drives to speech. The sudden loud burst of speech was a symbolic expression of the wish violently to expel feces.

A dream was then reported in which he and his youngest son were walking together when the boy carelessly walked out into the street alone despite previous admonitions by the patient. Terrified, he screamed his son's name. However, he was

startled in the dream to hear that he had shouted the name of his older brother, rather than that of his son.

Associations to his elder brother revolved about the theme of his brother's stupidity, ineffectiveness, and general unreliability. His expressions of bitterness about his brother were all allusions to the transference feelings which he had difficulty in expressing except in elliptical terms. Consistent with the actual bowel movement preceding the session and the symbolic bowel movements expressed verbally in the early part of the session, the shouting of his brother's name represented an anal-sadistic attack upon the analyst.[1]

CASE III

A severely hysterical patient had such intense castration anxieties that she often felt depersonalized during menstruation. In these states she would feel 'disembodied' and as if she were standing outside of and observing herself. This feature of the depersonalization was a derivative of unconscious childhood fantasies of having an imaginary playmate who was her male twin. The twin had all the virtues which she felt she sorely lacked, including, of course, a penis. These unconscious fantasies were mobilized during menstruation and she would unconsciously identify with her twin and dispassionately observe the poor bleeding girl. She was becoming progressively aware of these conflicts and their relation to feelings of being rejected by her family when she reported a dream containing a slip. This occurred, significantly, a day before the onset of her menstrual period. The dream was recalled following a series of associations which led to memories of observing a veterinarian castrating a cat.

> She was leading her entire family through African bush country [where in reality she had spent many years], with a knife at her

[1] In a discussion of this paper, Wilson *(3)* reported two dreams in which the psychodynamic factors outlined here are verified. The slips in both dreams encountered by him symbolically represented displaced anal-sadistic drives, as was the case with the patient described above.

side. The rope which bound the family together was loose and falling apart. As she was an Indian in the dream, her family expected her to be able to make a new rope from the bark of a tree. She wanted to say contemptuously to them—in Swahili—'You are *only* white men.' Instead, she said, 'You are *one* white man.' Noticing her slip, she thought that it made no difference since they didn't understand Swahili enough to be aware of the error. They passed a six-foot frog and she noted with satisfaction that only the female of the species reaches such proportions. The family huddled behind a rock and whispered about her. She furtively tried to listen but retreated when observed. The rest of the dream dealt with her leading them through the bush and their being respectful and completely dependent upon her.

The dream was analyzed over two sessions and, as might be expected from a patient of this type who is working well, material revolving about phallic conflicts poured out. In relation to her impending menstrual flow, there was an element of resistance in the effusion of material. Nevertheless, the productions were important and brought to light multiple childhood fantasies concerning bisexual conflicts as well as childhood exhibitionistic screen memories.

Her initial remarks about the slip were not direct associations to the word components as such, but were focused more on the structural and emotional aspects of her comment within the context of the Swahili language. She was immediately aware that both the intended and unintended words were reflections of her aggression toward the entire family. As the material emerged it became apparent that her special target was her mother, and further, that the slip represented a symbolic castration of her mother who was unconsciously viewed as possessing a penis.

During the second session in which the dream was analyzed, the productions indicated that the symbolic meaning of the slip was overdetermined as is characteristic of symbolic expression in dreams. In relation to childhood exhibitionistic memo-

ries it quickly became evident that the slip in Swahili, which no one would notice, was the vehicle for the symbolic expression of exhibitionistic needs; that is, she could publicly expose her speech defect which was equated with her 'defective' vagina, and not fear censure or ridicule. At the same time, her reaction to the slip—which was 'it makes no difference'—was also a way of undoing the vaginal defect.

CASE IV

Medical discretion permits only a brief allusion to the fourth patient. An uncircumcised patient with a mixed neurosis had an unconscious dread of being circumcised which was greatly re-enforced by displaced phallic castration anxieties. Intending in a dream to say Roosevelt [referring to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.], he said instead, Foosevelt. There were no associations to the name Foosevelt. However, there were important associations to the letter 'F', such as foreskin, and to the fact that he had 'mutilated' the 'tip' of Roosevelt's name. The material sharply indicated that removing the letter 'R' symbolically represented an aggressive act of circumcision of the father as well as of himself in retribution. The need for simultaneous representation of both father and son in the dream was the basis for the very apt choice of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr.

The infrequency of slips in dreams is surprising in view of the ubiquity of slips in everyday life and analytic practice as well as the regularity with which regressive speech forms, such as word condensations and neologisms, do appear in dreams. I am unable to offer any effective explanatory hypothesis, which undoubtedly will require a broader range of experience than is presently available.

Also I find unanswerable the question of why these particular patients had such dreams. Their neuroses, symptoms, and characterology had no common denominators. Even their commissions of slips in everyday life and on the analytic couch were quite variable: some committed slips frequently and others rarely.

In discussing Freud's dreams containing slips, Richardson *(2)* made the cogent observation that Freud's day residues were replete with speeches in which slips had been made and suggested that this may have been responsible for the appearance of slips in the manifest content. My own experience does not support this interesting conjecture.

It has been demonstrated that the process of slip formation in dreams has been regularly regressively instinctualized and used for the symbolic instinctual discharge of oral, anal, and phallic fantasies in the manner described in previous papers for some slips during waking life. I suspect, in view of Wilson's *(3)* corroboration and our general knowledge of the extensiveness of regressive ego functioning and symbolism in the dream, that further study would support the findings. It is hoped that this paper will stimulate the analytic attention necessary to clarify further this unique dream form.

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Psychoanalysis—A General Psychology. Essays in Honor of Heinz Hartmann. Edited by Rudolph M. Loewenstein, Lottie M. Newman, Max Schur, and Albert J. Solnit. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1966. 677 pp.

Paul Friedman

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BOOK REVIEWS

PSYCHOANALYSIS—A GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF HEINZ HARTMANN. Edited by Rudolph M. Loewenstein, Lottie M. Newman, Max Schur, and Albert J. Solnit. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1966. 677 pp.

This volume, published on the occasion of Hartmann's seventieth birthday, includes over thirty papers, a preface, a poem written in Hartmann's honor by one of his sons, and a chronologically arranged bibliography of Hartmann's publications from 1917 to 1964 inclusive. An introductory biographical paper by Ruth and K. R. Eissler presents an impressive picture of Hartmann as a person and scientist.

The papers in the main body of the volume are grouped into six parts: The Man and His Work, History of Psychoanalysis, Aspects of Normal and Pathological Development, Contributions to Psychoanalytic Theory, Clinical Problems, and Correlations and Applications of Psychoanalysis. Some of the papers, those by Anna Freud, Benjamin, and Weiner, for instance, are concerned specifically with evaluation or elucidation of Hartmann's ego psychological concepts. In Anna Freud's paper, the focus of the discussion is on the relationship between Hartmann's ego psychology and child analysis. In some of the other papers the focus is on the application of Hartmann's concepts or, more generally, of the concepts of psychoanalytic ego psychology to various areas such as old age (Bibring), post-traumatic amnesia (Deutsch), dreaming and sexuality (Fisher), and work (Jahoda). Fisher's paper, in which he reports evidence in support of the proposition that 'dreaming in the male is accompanied, on a physiological level, by massive sustained genital excitation', is the only paper in the volume which presents new experimental data; the other papers make an equally significant contribution in terms of theoretical and clinical thinking. In this connection one should mention a few outstanding examples: Stein, Loewenstein, and Spiegel on the superego and the paper by Spitz on Metapsychology in Dormant Infant Observations. It is, of course, not possible to do justice within the scope of this review to each of the contributions to this volume. This is regrettable because many are of high quality and raise problems which would merit discussion.

One cannot help being impressed once more with the scope of Hartmann's influence on contemporary psychoanalytic thinking. Although the beginning of ego psychology as we know it today goes back to Freud's own writings and to the pioneering theories by Nunberg and Anna Freud, there is no doubt that Hartmann's Ego Psychology and the Problems of Adaptation (1939) represents a milestone in this development. Hartmann's subsequent contributions to ego psychology—including his collaborative work with Kris and Loewenstein—are well known to American readers. The earlier clinical contributions are not as well known in this country, though some of them are now available in English translation.

I should like to end this review on a personal note. Many years ago, while still an assistant at the Psychiatric Clinic of Lausanne, I became interested in investigating thought processes in the Korsakoff syndrome and carried out a study of several cases under Professor Hans Steck, expecting to publish the findings. Subsequently, I came across the paper by Bettelheim and Hartmann, *Über Fehlreaktionen bei der Korsakowschen Psychose* (1924) and Hartmann's *Gedächtnis und Lustprinzip. Untersuchungen an Korsakow Kranken (1930).* About to enter my own psychoanalytic training, these contributions, grounded in psychoanalytic principles, were by far more convincing and inspiring than any purely phenomenological observations of that time. Thus, my first encounter with Hartmann's work marked the beginning of my lasting admiration of his scientific and clinical acumen.

PAUL FRIEDMAN (NEW YORK)

THE ID AND THE REGULATORY PRINCIPLES OF MENTAL FUNCTIONING. By Max Schur, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1966. 220 pp.

This volume concerns itself with an area of psychoanalytic theory that has been relatively neglected in the current era of interest in ego psychology. Its author has himself written extensively on the topic of anxiety from the point of view of the ego, as well as on other aspects of metapsychology. Here he has set himself the task of supplying and remedying the lacks in the recent psychoanalytic

literature. The volume deals with a variety of topics in psychoanalytic theory (metapsychology), all of which are related more or less directly to the instinctual drives. Among the topics discussed are the mental representatives of the drives, the primary process as a mode of mental functioning, the pleasure-unpleasure principle, and the repetition compulsion. The two major chapters are on the primary process and repetition compulsion; other topics are dealt with in a series of very brief chapters.

Schur has followed Rapaport and Gill in defining metapsychology as a synthesis of five 'points of view': dynamic, structural, adaptive, genetic, and economic. Since in the monograph itself such stress has been laid on this terminology and on this way of conceptualizing what is meant by 'metapsychology', it seems worth noting that they are not as yet universally accepted by psychoanalysts. For example, Arlow and the reviewer used the term 'structural' to refer to the whole area of psychoanalytic theory (metapsychology),[1] which Rapaport and Gill preferred to divide into five areas, of which the word 'structural' refers to only one. Thus the same word, 'structural', has a rather different meaning in the works of different authors. Schur's failure to take account of this fact has involved him in some polemics which seem unnecessary. It might be added that the schema used by Rapaport and Gill, which proposes to subsume all of psychoanalytic theory (metapsychology) under five points of view, omits one of the most important features of mental functioning according to psychoanalytic theory: namely, the significance of compromise formations or multiple functioning.[2] Since Schur mentions the importance of this aspect of mental functioning several times in his monograph, it is surprising that he was content with a definition of metapsychology that fails to mention it.

In discussing the id, Schur has laid stress on the fact that, according to Freud, mental representatives of instinctual drives are for each individual specific wishes based on the individual's own infantile experiences of gratification. In this connection he

[1] Arlow, Jacob A. and Brenner, Charles: *Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory*. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1964.

[2] Waelder, Robert: *The Principle of Multiple Function: Observations on Overdetermination*. This QUARTERLY, V, 1936, pp. 45-62.

takes issue with certain authors (for instance, Beres and Marcovitz) who, according to Schur, have proposed to define the id rather as a repository of mental energies. Schur has failed, however, to do full justice to the theoretical formulations advanced by Beres and Marcovitz, or to make clear to the reader the reasons which they and others have advanced in support of their position. This omission once again gives to the discussion a more polemical cast than the author himself probably intended.

The principal point of the chapter on the primary process is that, according to Schur, the term is best used to include both an economic tendency of the mind and thought processes associated with that tendency. The economic aspect is the tendency for mental energy to be discharged fully and without delay. The aspect that has to do with thought processes is the tendency to use condensation and displacement, to tolerate logical contradictions, and to disregard time. The author's quarrel with the discussion of the same subject by Arlow and the reviewer (1964) seems more contrived than substantial. The two views of the matter seem to the reviewer to be closer together than Schur has implied. It is the terminologies, rather than the content of the ideas themselves, that are different.

A discussion of various aspects of the regulatory principles of mental functioning occupies the second half of the monograph. The first of these principles to appear in Freud's writings was the pleasure principle. Later he added the reality principle, though this is a concept which has largely disappeared as such, having been subsumed under those aspects of ego functioning which have to do with the individual's relationship to his environment. In 1920 the concept of a repetition compulsion was introduced. Freud also made brief mention in his later writing of a Nirvana principle and of a principle of constancy, attributed to Fechner. Of these several principles, the two that have been chosen by Schur for discussion at length are the pleasure principle and the repetition compulsion.

Schur is of the opinion that the pleasure principle should be divided into two separate principles: a pleasure principle and an unpleasure principle. The unpleasure principle is to be defined as a tendency to withdraw from unpleasurable stimuli, which, generally speaking, means stimuli which are 'too intense'. The pleasure

principle is to be defined as a tendency to seek pleasurable gratification, specifically, to recathect memories which were pleasurable in the past; in Freud's language, to achieve an identity of perception with a previous experience of satisfaction. Freud considered the two principles to be two halves of a single whole. In his view the avoidance of unpleasure caused by instinctual drive tension is achieved by attaining an identity of perception: the instinctual tension both drives the mind to action and is experienced, in the main, as unpleasure, while the action is ended when gratification (identity of perception) is achieved, which is, in the main, experienced as pleasure. Schur considers it illogical, or inaccurate, to link these two tendencies of the mind so closely. According to his view it is more correct to postulate two separate tendencies, as noted above. Of these, the unpleasure principle contains nothing which is novel to psychoanalytic theory; the pleasure principle, however, postulates a tendency to seek actively after pleasure-giving stimuli and experiences: a 'need to seek the object for gratification through approach responses'. The term, 'approach response', is borrowed from animal psychology. Indeed, Schur's whole discussion of the inadequacy of Freud's formulation appears to center on problems of neurophysiology and animal psychology.

One can readily agree with Schur that the neurophysiology of the 1890's which Freud took as his starting point, by analogy, for his *psychological* theories of mental functioning, is now known to be inaccurate; but this is not, or should not be, the principal question as far as metapsychology is concerned. The principal question is, how adequate Freud's psychological theories are with respect to the facts with which psychoanalysts are confronted in the field of human psychology; not, how correct were, or are, the physiological, or other, theories which first suggested the psychological ones to Freud. Unfortunately, Schur's discussion is not focused on *psychoanalytic* facts. He did not make clear what the psychoanalytic data are which speak in favor of his opinion that it is better to suppose mental functioning to be regulated by two principles, a pleasure principle (tendency to *seek* gratification) and an unpleasure principle (tendency to *avoid* sources of unpleasure), rather than to try to combine the two, as Freud did, into a single, pleasure-unpleasure principle. Had his discussion

been focused on psychoanalytic reasons which support his view, it might well have been both more pertinent and more convincing.

The major chapter in the second section is devoted to a lengthy critique of Freud's concept of a repetition compulsion. In it Schur has emphasized the connection between that concept and the concept of a death instinct in Freud's work. Schur's own conclusion is that neither concept is acceptable as a metapsychological theory, though he has not attempted any thorough discussion of the death instinct theory. There is no convincing evidence in Schur's opinion of a 'repetition compulsion' which transcends either the pleasure principle or the unpleasure principle; in other words, of a compulsion to repeat which is, to use Freud's words, beyond the pleasure principle. In a brief, succeeding chapter, Schur has acknowledged the importance of tendencies toward repetition in human mental functioning. Some of these he would recognize as adaptive, others, which occur in cases of neurosis, he would call regressive. In either case, he would prefer to think of them as instances of compulsive or stereotyped repetitiveness, rather than as consequences of a primitive compulsion to repeat which, according to Freud, derives from the most fundamental property of the instinctual drives, i.e., from a repetition compulsion.

In this connection Schur has taken occasion to suggest a clinical application of his views on the repetition compulsion. He emphasizes the importance of 'the ego's' wish to undo a trauma and suggests that it may be useful to analyze this wish in a patient. For example, one should analyze not only a woman's unconscious (instinctual) wish for a penis, or for a baby. One should also analyze the associated (ego) wish to undo the fact of not having one. Doubtless because of the brevity of this part of his exposition, it is not clear why such a wish should be called an 'ego wish'. How does it differ from wishes usually thought of as ones of instinctual origin, for instance a girl's fantasy that she has a penis? Is it the drive or is it, as Schur seems to say, some ego function which is the more important in the genesis of such a wish?

In conclusion, a few general remarks on the subject of metapsychology appear to be in order. Schur's approach to the sub-

ject is representative of a particular trend in the psychoanalytic literature and in psychoanalytic thinking in general. However, different analysts approach metapsychology in different ways. For some, metapsychology comprises those theories of mental functioning that derive principally from the data obtained by psychoanalysis, supplemented and guided by knowledge and observations derived from other related sources and by other means. For them metapsychology is first and foremost psychoanalytic in its origins, though not in contradiction to the rest of our knowledge concerning mental functioning. For other authors metapsychology is essentially a logical exercise, deriving from sets of principles and postulates, and from branches of science other than psychoanalysis, such as neurophysiology, comparative psychology (ethology), genetics, paleontology, biophysics, computer theory, and thermodynamics. As such it rests little or not at all upon psychoanalysis and upon psychoanalytic findings as far as its derivation is concerned, though it is considered to 'explain' psychoanalytic data and 'lower level' theories. For these authors metapsychology has no direct clinical application, nor is it expected to have any, since it is 'theoretical', not 'clinical'. The best known representative of the second point of view in recent years was David Rapaport. The present monograph would seem, by and large, to exemplify such an approach to metapsychology, despite the author's experience and competence as a psychoanalytic clinician. It contains many references to physiology and ethology, as well as to metapsychological formulations and discussions. At the same time it is bare of references to clinical analytic material. Such a separation—one might almost say, divorce—of theory from practice, in the reviewer's opinion, is less likely to lead to useful and valid hypotheses (theories) than an approach to metapsychology which attempts to link it as closely as possible to the data of observation; in particular to the data available in clinical work by using the method of psychoanalysis. The theories of psychoanalysis should derive in the main from the data available through practicing analysis. Psychoanalysis does, in fact, afford the analyst an unrivaled view of man's mind in action. No other method of study yet devised comes close.

CHARLES BRENNER (NEW YORK)

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF SOCIETY. Vol. IV. Edited by Warner Muensterberger, Ph.D., and Sidney Axelrad, D.S.Sc. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1967. 350 pp.

Psychoanalysts will find much of interest here. Derek Freeman reviews Freud's Totem and Taboo in the light of current anthropologic and genetic knowledge. Freud attempted to explain the origins of moral reactions in terms of sequels to a great collectively perpetrated crime—patricide. He was able to picture a feasible setting for such a crime in Darwin's postulates about the 'primal horde' condition of early man. Freud insisted that the original killing of the father in the 'primal horde' situation was an actual event, and that memory of this, together with guilt about it, had been transmitted to subsequent generations for all time by 'the inheritance of psychical dispositions'. There is no evidence for a primal horde condition with a single father, and genetics has thoroughly disproved any such hereditary potentiality as Freud envisioned. Freeman finds Freud's insistence on the actuality of the primeval killing all the more interesting because Freud himself stated that fantasies of such a killing would lead to the same superego formation as he described. Such a theory would be consistent both with the main body of psychoanalytic theory and with anthropological evidence. By means of cogent observations on Freud's life and neurosis, Freeman explains Freud's adherence to actuality over fantasy.

Noel Bradley has written a rich account of gleanings from archaeology, art, myth, and literature which might be heuristically interpreted as referring to unconscious conflicts about primal scene experiences. He is especially interested in the condensed images of the copulating parents which, he feels, shape myths such as Plato's myth of the primeval men-women. Bradley also presents two excerpts from analyses in which patients alluded to this myth, both directly and by the over-all content of the hour, 'some months after' he had drafted his views of the myth. Readers will have to decide for themselves in what sense these excerpts establish or confirm assumptions about the original unconscious matrix of the myth. Bradley does not go into the problem which will occur to some analysts: whether the patients' mention of the myth was in any way determined by their unconscious observations of the analyst's special interests. It may be essential to evaluate the

whole transference when confronted with such esoteric associations.

A complementary pair of papers, the first by Savage and Prince and the second by Muensterberger and Kishner, deal with depression in the Yoruba, one of the principal Nigerian tribes. Savage and Prince conclude that clinical depression among the Yoruba is most frequent in barren women and in students because the faith these groups have in the magic cure of ills is regularly tested by the recurrence of menses and examinations. Pervading confidence in the efficacy of magic carries the Yoruba over most other difficulties in his native setting. Magic is directed against witches who are responsible for all evil. It is likely that the ever-present danger from female demons, of which the child is made aware early, contaminates much of the effect of the excellent mothering within this tribe. The second paper describes the genesis and resolution of a psychotic depressive reaction in a Yoruba student when transplanted to an urban American setting.

Hunter and Babcock present data gathered during the therapy of a Negro American woman from which they draw some conclusions about her motivations for formal learning and for work. The authors interpret their data in the light of the theories of Mahler and Gosliner on the vicissitudes of the separation-individuation phase of development. They extend their data into a discussion of some problems of major culture-subculture interaction in America during the past three hundred years. The paper is specified as a portion of 'an ongoing long-term psychoanalytic study', and analysts will want to assess in what sense it is analytic. The treatment from which the data was derived is stated to be 'psychoanalytic techniques . . . used at a frequency of four consultations per week'. It is further specified that 'written notes were recorded in each analytic hour; examination of the data deferred until . . . approximately 600 hours of analysis'. This statement will again raise the question of to what extent an analyst can depart from or add to his analyzing function and still feel that the derived data carries the weight of psychoanalytic data.

John S. White, who is associate director of the New York City Opera, presents a highly readable account of Kafka's psychopathology derived from his diaries and other writings. It is shown that Kafka was clearly aware of the significance of his tuberculosis as a symptom aiding in the economy of his psychosis.

Analysts interested in adolescents will find in Lewy's paper, The Transformation of Frederick the Great: A Psychoanalytic Study, a detailed account of an adolescent rebellion toward a father who had literally the power of life and death over his son and who exercised that power upon a proxy for the son in the son's presence. This carefully done pathography makes exciting reading, but leaves a sense of frustration about the many points which can never be cleared up satisfactorily.

Derek Freeman discusses his observations of a Borneo shaman in the light of psychoanalytic theory. A shaman is a superior grade of magician who not only tries to work good magic, but goes out actively to meet demons, conjuring them into corporeal form in order to slay them. In Borneo the shaman is called upon to treat women who are possessed by a cleverly erotic incubus. In analytic terms they have, in pathogenic form, the universal fantasy of being violated. Freeman alludes to the homosexuality of the shaman as shown in his relation with the incubus and with the husband of the afflicted woman. The capacity of the magical system to explain everything is discussed, together with opportunities for intrapsychic defensive operations resulting from the projection of libidinally powerful fantasies onto the incubus. This particular shaman showed signs of wanting to communicate to the outside observer that he knew that his deception was known to the observer. The author surmises that the shaman justified his deception not only by his material remuneration, but by the knowledge of the genuine therapeutic effectiveness of his method.

Boyer and Boyer present a piece of field work by a psychoanalyst-anthropologist team. The conclusion reached is that descendants of two different subdivisions of Apache Indians show differences in personality structure because of the sharply different treatment accorded their forebears when they were overwhelmed and plunged into a mourning situation by the westward expansion of the young American nation. It is stated that the Indians were studied by means of 'psychoanalytically oriented investigative interviews in a psychotherapeutic situation'. The paper disappoints because the assessments of personality differences appear to be based entirely on the results of Rorschach testing.

ALAN W. FRASER (NEW YORK)

VINCENT VAN GOGH. A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. By Humberto Nagera, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1967. 182 pp.

Van Gogh's combination of psychopathology and innovative artistic creativity has held a fascination for many.[1] Most of his would-be interpreters have become preoccupied with attempts to establish a diagnosis and some, like Irving Stone, took off into a fantasy 'correction' of the sad tale of his life. Dr. Nagera fills a need by providing a very readable, well thought out study of the life and struggles of this great artist.

Vincent was the second child of an inept, rigid, moralizing country preacher and a 'spinsterly', unsympathetic mother. The cards were stacked against him before his birth when the couple's first son was stillborn and they decided that their next child would be a more perfect version of the same child—returned to them by God. Accordingly, they gave him the same name and approached the child with a highly ambivalent, magically tainted expectation. Vincent not only failed to fulfil their exalted ideas, but was 'difficult in temper, troublesome and self-willed'. Apparently, he was early and repeatedly rejected, and became progressively more solitary, withdrawn, and preoccupied with nature. By the age of twelve he was sent away to school, and later for an apprenticeship. He responded to both with homesickness, taking the separation from his father especially hard and depressively.

While away in London, unhappy but doing well as an art dealer's apprentice, he suffered a disappointment in his first love which 'led to severe regression and a breakdown in his ability to relate to others, in his reality adaptation and affective life'. The pattern of defiance, failure, and self-destructive behavior became dominant in Vincent's life from then on, interspersed with his attempts to find a life, a career, a solution for himself. It is interesting to reflect that his life style was one which might now be called 'hippy' with his shabby, dirty, and peculiar clothes, general untidiness, defiance, and alienation of 'bourgeois' associates, dependence on drugs (especially absinthe), and a reluctance to display his paintings, i.e., to communicate with others. He thus managed to alienate virtually everyone.

[1] For example, *cf.*, Lubin, Albert J.: *Vincent van Gogh's Ear.* This QUARTERLY, XXX, 1961, pp. 351-384.

Only his younger brother, Theo, formed an intimate, mutually sustaining relationship with the painter. The remains of Vincent's lifeline, the letters to Theo, provide the basic material for this study. Nagera traces van Gogh's life in its repeated failures and regressions as an expression of the ongoing emotional disturbances and the repeated struggle to regain 'the lost emotional stability . . . and dynamic equilibrium . . . as attempts to reorganize his personality structure and his inner conflicts in new ways. . . '. He shows the role of these struggles in van Gogh's attempts to become an art dealer, individual, missionary, and finally, painter. He demonstrates that Vincent's final breakdown followed his brother's engagement, marriage, and fatherhood. Vincent's feminine identification (he often verbalized that his paintings were his children fecundated by Theo), ambivalence, and dread of desertion threw him into a self-destructive spin.

Many themes in the artist's life are carefully traced, such as the 'need to succeed and the need to fail', the influence of the oral and anal libidinal regressions in both his life and art, and the passive yearning which made him long for and dread a father surrogate. This last struggle led to his famous encounter with Gauguin. Vincent cut off his ear instead of killing Gauguin. Sending his severed ear to a casually known prostitute in the Arles brothel harks back to the cannibalistic 'witch-mother' image of his mother who preferred the dead (first) Vincent.

While this volume is quite complete in regard to van Gogh's life, it is limited in its approaches to his art. The notable exception is a study of two paintings of chairs: Vincent's and the one he chose for Gauguin. This is a very instructive study, and one only wishes that more of the artistic themes were approached in this way.

Anna Freud in her Foreword felt that Nagera had implied that 'even the highly prized and universally envied gift of creative activity may fail tragically to provide sufficient outlets or acceptable solutions for the relief of intolerable internal conflicts and overwhelming destructive powers active within the personality'. Van Gogh himself felt that his art could only exist *in the place* of a happy and fulfilling marriage, and that it was his struggle and misery that were portrayed in his art. The process of regression and *recovery,* facing despair and death daily—what Tillich

calls a 'trip through hell'—may have been the source of his stirring and inspiring vision.

Dr. Nagera seems to share the special ability of our child analyst colleagues to write simply, understandably, and expressively. This adds to the charm and pleasure in reading this interesting study.

HENRY KRYSTAL (SOUTHFIELD, MICH.)

THE HIDDEN ORDER IN ART. A Study in the Psychology of Artistic Imagination. By Anton Ehrenzweig. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 306 pp.

Anton Ehrenzweig, who died in London shortly after this book was completed, had studied law and psychoanalysis in Vienna where he was appointed a judge in 1936. Two years later he settled in London where he worked as a lecturer on art at the University of London. In 1956-1957, Ehrenzweig lectured in the United States where he had been known by his psychoanalytic approach to art through several of his books, especially, The Psychoanalysis of Artistic Vision and Hearing.[1] Sir Herbert Read wrote of this book that it combines a profound knowledge of psychoanalysis with a profound knowledge of all the arts, particularly painting and music. This, Ehrenzweig's first book, had a great influence on the explanation, justification, and interpretation of modern art; it has inspired many artists and is now experiencing a deepened impact.

With the publication of The Hidden Order in Art, Ehrenzweig's work is now completed. It is an admirable presentation of his views and is written with self-assurance, confidence, and clearness of insight and expression. It is difficult to read only because of the difficulties of the topic. In a new approach, it combines a profound knowledge of psychoanalysis, art, history, and anthropology.

In the first part, the author shows that in addition to conscious intellectual critical powers the artist relies on unconscious critical processes and that his unconscious 'scanning' of serial structures plays a major part in the organization of pictorial space, the use

[1] *Cf.*, This QUARTERLY, XXIII, 1954. pp. 454-456, and XXXVI, 1967, pp. 122-124, for reviews of this volume.

of color, and the final creation of artistic form. The artistic and psychological significance of this concept of unconscious scanning is discussed in detail, with particular reference to modern painting and music. It is also applied to the problems of teaching art and to the development of the child's artistic faculties. A new term, 'poemagogic imagery', is coined and is used to mark the common root of symbol formation and creativity. Analysis of art must continue where analysis of dreams has left off.

In the second part of the book, starting from the most recent advances in psychoanalytic theories which include a critical evaluation of Melanie Klein's work, Dr. Ehrenzweig discusses the way in which artists are particularly stimulated by certain psychological situations and shows how the theme of the 'dying God' underlies much of the greatest art of all periods, in music, literature, and the visual arts. There are several illustrations of great and familiar artistic creations which after Ehrenzweig's interpretation look quite different and become understandable in a deeper and more moving way than they did before his interpretation. The myth of the dying God is used as an allegoric interpretation of the unconscious motivation for all creativity.

Poemagogic images originate on different levels. They go back to 'oceanic levels' where individual experience is lost in mystic union with the unconscious, symbolized by the image of the divine self-creating children so important in all early mythology. Higher levels of poemagogic imagery reach more familiar ground and correspond to the oral, anal, and genital levels of fantasy. With the help of unconscious scanning a fast syncretistic grasp or vision is perceived (p. 38). All creative search starts with undifferentiation, unfocused vision (p. 41). Only then can a differentiation in background and focus be made, the background being compared to the dream screen. After this syncretistic grasp has been performed a differentiation in gestalt will occur, implying the help of poemagogic imagery, and the law of closure will then apply. Undifferentiated, unfocused vision is inherent in any creative search; syncretistic vision can be precise in grasping the total structure of many components. This is significant for the primary processes. We must learn how to think in terms of unconscious perception in contrast to conscious (gestalt) perception which takes place after the law of closure has occurred (p. 41).

Modern art is an attack on conscious gestalt perception. When this attack is successful, modern art will probably die (p. 69).

The process of secondary revision belongs to the third and last phase in the rhythm of creation. The first phase, of fragmented projection, is 'schizoid' in character. It is followed by a 'manic' phase of unconscious scanning and integration when art's unconscious substructure is formed. The secondary revision occurs in the ultimate 'depressive' feedback and reintrojection of the work into the surface ego (p. 79).

Ehrenzweig agrees with Otto Rank's interpretation that a vast quantity of mythological material is the birth fantasy of undoing and returning to the womb (p. 173). Robert Graves has an intuitive grasp of the vast stratification in poemagogic imagery, cutting through many levels of image-making; he extracts the ubiquitous theme of the White Goddess from almost any myth by removing the top layers of late versions. Graves' work emulates Frazer's and Rank's methods; all three of them searched for a basic theme in a vast amount of cultural material. Even the Œdipus myth is not safe from Graves' reinterpretation: the sphinx slain by Œdipus was the moon goddess of Thebes, Jocasta was her priestess whom a new king had to marry according to the laws of a matriarchal society; by vanquishing the sphinx, Œdipus becomes the patriarchal conqueror of the old society. Similarly in other Greek myths the patriarchal Olympian religion supersedes the older mother religion. According to the old law the new king had to become a 'son' of the old king by marrying his widow. This holy custom is perverted into the crime of patricide and incest by the patriarchal revision of the myth. Graves would never have been able to link scattered clues in so bold a manner had not psychoanalysis shown the way to such techniques of reinterpretation.

Symbolically, Anton Ehrenzweig makes the death instinct live: the unconscious part of the ego constantly experiences self-destruction. Death once accepted becomes a feast of cosmic bliss, a liberation from human bondage, an æsthetic experience. The ultimate manic experience and triumph over death is consistent with the extreme dedifferentiation when death and birth, love and hatred have no separate meaning. This fusion which is a part of the unconscious scanning sets the scene for the reintegration of the frag-

mented self and later rebirth. The important constructive role of manic fusion in creative work has not yet obtained a secure place in psychoanalytic literature.

Melanie Klein has stressed the depressive aspect of creativity: the child fears the harm his aggressions have perpetrated and feels committed to reparation. Ehrenzweig believes that depressive anxieties are part of creativity. The first phase of free projection and fragmentation is beset by schizoid-paranoid persecutory anxieties. The scientist, in particular, seeks parts of physical reality that are still seen as incoherent or fragmented; he almost provokes schizoid anxieties as he contemplates this fragmentation. In the second phase of creativity, man prepares, as it were, a receiving 'womb' or the image of a benevolent mother-figure, to contain and integrate the fragmented material. In so far as integration succeeds, persecutory anxieties are replaced by depressive anxieties. Progression from schizoid projection to depressive containment repeats the momentous crisis in the child's development; paranoid-schizoid anxieties lead to excessive splintering of the self and to massive and undirected projections. Later the child learns to deal with his anxieties in a different way: instead of projecting split-off parts of the self into a void, he prepares a 'womb' in his unconscious into which the split-off material is repressed. Then, after transformation into symbol representation, the repressed material can gain re-entry into the surface ego (pp. 190-192).

Ehrenzweig concludes that the primary process is undifferentiated. Unconscious symbolism fails to distinguish between opposites, displaces the significant to the insignificant, condenses incompatibles, and ignores the rational sequence of time and space. Unconscious perception on the level of the primary process has not been considered sufficiently as a part of the unconscious ego function. It is characterized by disjunctive serial structures of so wide a sweep that they can easily accommodate all contradictions. Accepted dedifferentiation is a precise structural principle of unconscious perception and image-making. This allows us to remove the taint of chaos that has adhered to the primary process for far too long (p. 262). The ego's dedifferentiation of conscious gestalt perception is the basis for image-making. This implies that we cannot produce the originally undifferentiated structure of the primary process for conscious inspection, but only its conscious derivates

such as conglomerated, bizarre condensations, illogical displacements, and the like (p. 268).

MARTIN GROTJAHN (BEVERLY HILLS)

PSYCHOTIC STATES. A Psycho-Analytical Approach. By Herbert A. Rosenfeld. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1965. 263 pp.

STUDIES ON PSYCHOSIS. Descriptive, Psychoanalytic, and Psychological Aspects. By Thomas Freeman, M.D. with John L. Cameron and Andrew McGhie, Ph.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1966. 245 pp.

During a decade in which 'tranquillizer' and 'psychedelic' have become common parlance and physicians and public alike have shown an increasing fascination with the effects of a rapidly widening spectrum of experimental psycho-pharmacological agents, it is heartening to find that in some quarters there remains a sustained interest in studying and treating the psychotic process in a state unaltered by drugs. These two books, though divergent in point of view, are products of such sustained interest.

In Psychotic States, Rosenfeld has brought together thirteen papers, many of which have previously appeared in The International Journal of Psychoanalysis. His devotion to Melanie Klein and her point of view is never in doubt. Although there are lengthy theoretical discusssions this is essentially a compilation of clinical papers in which the author describes his technique of treating severely disturbed psychotic patients, many of whom are hallucinated and delusional, some even assaultive. This technique takes personal courage, dogged determination, patience, and a sustained interest in a most difficult task. All of this comes through indirectly in Rosenfeld's descriptions of his clinical work. Initially he does not hesitate to see an acutely disturbed patient six times a week, often for ninety minutes at a stretch. If necessary this is done in a hospital or in the patient's home. Reassurance or other direct supportive measures are staunchly avoided. When the patient improves and feels more comfortable he is seen in the examining room where he may choose to use the couch.

Within the framework of Kleinian theory, transference interpretations are immediately aimed at infantile conflicts and defenses assumed to have their roots in the earliest weeks and months of life. Rosenfeld relies strongly upon an intuitive understanding of the patient's bizarre mannerisms and garbled productions. On reading the rather detailed descriptions of patient-doctor exchange one may be struck by the author's implicit assumption of a ubiquitous unalterable pattern of infantile life in which the probability of important individual experience and reaction are given little weight. Rosenfeld makes rather modest claims for the results of his treatment and improvement seems to be gradual rather than flashily dramatic.

Very few psychoanalysts or, for that matter, psychiatrists have attempted to work in this intensive way and for such long periods with so severely disturbed a group of patients. In this sense it remains pioneer work. Here as with so many pioneer efforts there may well be a greater personal factor than Rosenfeld recognizes. A few years ago many of these patients would quickly have been relegated to the back wards. Though difficult to assay in psychoanalytic terms, the sense of dedication, determination, and sustained interest with which therapists such as Rosenfeld approach their patients may in itself offer them a unique and new experience in object relationship which should not be undervalued as a therapeutic force.

While Rosenfeld's book is the work of a clinician with a fervent dedication to Kleinian concepts, Thomas Freeman's Studies in Psychosis is a more dispassionate work with an investigative rather than clinical bias. The opening historical review of the psychoanalytic theories of the psychoses is excellent. The basic orientation is freudian but there is a free recognition of the incompleteness of our understanding of the psychotic process. As an investigator Freeman is clearly trying to learn from his patients, to observe and record, and, as the title suggests, to study the psychoses. Unlike Rosenfeld, he does not assume that an immediate transference reaction develops nor that it is necessarily followed by a transference psychosis. Many, though by no means all, psychotic patients, he feels, are unable to form any real transference relationship. In his pursuit of measurable objectivity, interviews with patients were tape-recorded and verbatim ex-

cerpts of sessions are included in the text. For purposes of specific illustration this is helpful. There is, however, an accompanying paucity of important though less readily objectifiable clinical data which often leaves a dry and somewhat constricted picture of the patient.

In separate chapters Freeman discusses disturbances of attention and concentration; object relations as related to the cognitive function; the nature of hallucinations. The chief frame of reference throughout is the interrelationship of disturbances of object relationships and ego functions.

Freeman's long experience with experimental studies of the psychoses has led him to include a chapter on the reactions of patients to experimental situations. Here he cautions that the investigator may be misled if he is not sufficiently sensitive to the multitude of reactions which psychotic patients may have to both the experimental situation and the experimenter. In his last chapter on the classification and diagnosis of functional psychosis he takes a rather extreme position in suggesting that the diagnosis of schizophrenia be reserved for patients showing 'the unequivocal presence of serious damage to object relationship', together with delusions and hallucinations having a restitutive function. 'Concern for others is enough to contra-indicate the diagnosis of schizophrenia.'

A chapter contributed by A. McGhie includes some interesting experimental data on the selective and inhibitory functions of attention in schizophrenic patients. His subjects tended to do less well with experimental tasks when the stimuli were visual rather than auditory—possibly due to the extra step of recording visual into auditory stimuli before storage. There is also a brief but lucid review of some recent studies on the effects of 'contextual constraint'—a rather cumbersome phrase for indicating that while normal subjects show increasing ability to recall immediately sentences on a scale of decreasing nonsense content or conversely increasing over-all meaningfulness, schizophrenics show little change. What is rather striking in terms of the schizophrenic's defect is that he does about as well as the normal subject with sentences of low contextual constraint suggesting that the basic disturbance is one of both attention and synthesis. Translating his studies into the clinical setting, McGhie suggests that even

a seemingly insignificant change in the interviewing situation may act as a major distraction to the schizophrenic.

Cameron's concluding chapter on the psychoanalytic treatment of the psychoses is based upon his work at Chestnut Lodge where the patient is assigned two physicians—administrator and therapist. The administrator takes responsibility for all decisions about the patient's relationship to his environment, presumably sparing the therapist and patient the direct conflicts which such decisions inevitably engender. While there is some discussion of broader aspects of psychopathology, the chief emphasis is in the direction of manipulation of the milieu and exploration of interpersonal relationships.

These two volumes point up once again the divergent points of view from which analysts here and abroad see the psychotic process.

PETER RICHTER (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA. Edited by Paul H. Hoch, M.D. and Joseph Zubin, Ph.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1966. 582 pp.

This hefty volume contains some thirty papers on schizophrenia given at the 1964 annual meeting of the American Psychopathological Association. While the articles reflect the varied points of view of a number of well-known investigators in the field, with few exceptions they contain little of interest to most analysts. As there is no over-all continuity of theoretical viewpoint and the orientation of the bulk of the studies is either organic or statistical, it is difficult to do more than touch upon a few areas that stimulated the reviewer's personal interests.

There is a phenomenological study by Frieske and Wilson of the formal qualities of hallucinations. Using a brief series of interviews with a large number of patients suffering from schizophrenia, organic and affective psychoses, a comparison is made on the basis of the patient's subjective experiences. The comparisons, though interesting, seem less fruitful than the detailed material about schizophrenic visual hallucinations. The study suggested that in a predominant number of patients hallucinations, when present, are continuous, broken only by sleep or closing of

the eyes. Objects are generally seen as three dimensional, in vivid color, often 'shining' or 'glowing'. Changes in object size and shape, though frequent, are not often extreme. This kind of phenomenological approach, perhaps less popular now because of its directness and lack of sophistication, might be profitably pursued in other areas.

In the Association's Presidential Address on The Contribution of Behavioral Scientists toward a World without War, Dr. Jerome Frank suggests that psychologists and psychiatrists could play critical roles in resolving various areas of international conflict which in the past have led to war. While his aim is certainly noble, many of the suggestions seem naïve. Sweeping extrapolations are made from the psychopathology of the individual to that of the group and nation. At the same time there is a surprising lack of awareness of the psychological implications of certain 'practical suggestions' for eliminating major obstacles to international peace. For example: in discussing means of establishing good faith in negotiating nuclear treaties, Frank sights with some enthusiasm the suggestion of Ralph Gerard that honesty and good faith could be verified at the conference table by subjecting the negotiators to lie detector tests. In this one can find rather frightening comparison with Orwell's 1984.

Kety's brief review of the current status of biochemical research in schizophrenia should be of general interest to psychoanalysts. So is the ten-year follow-up study of prediction of schizophrenia in infancy by Barbara Fish and her associates.

Included is the Samuel W. Hamilton Memorial Lecture given by the book's editor, the late Paul Hoch. Much of the lecture is an excellent review of the changing concepts of schizophrenia from Kraepelin's day to the present. While Hoch gives little recognition to the contributions of Freud and other analysts, he does make some very interesting suggestions in an outline of his own theoretical orientation. He sees schizophrenia as basically an organic disorder, 'a special form of integrative disorganization . . . the regulatory disorganization is a total biological affair'. In many respects this is an attractive hypothesis, one which has not been fully explored by analysts within the framework of ego psychology.

PETER RICHTER (NEW YORK)

PROJECTIVE TESTING AND PSYCHOANALYSIS. Selected Papers. By Roy Schafer, Ph.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1967. 229 pp.

This collection of papers published between 1954 and 1960 by Roy Schafer, clinical psychologist who is on the staff of the Department of University Health of Yale University and President of the Western New England Psychoanalytic Society, presents a cogent fusion of clinical and theoretical freudian psychoanalysis and fundamental concepts of psychodynamic test interpretation. The papers focus upon the Rorschach and Thematic Apperception tests and explicate the theoretical foundation and operational processes that guide the psychologist in his formulation of the patient's defensive and adaptive resources, his integrative status at various stages of treatment, the parameters of his psychodynamics, and prognostic probabilities. Of special interest to the psychoanalyst are the chapters on Psychological Test Evaluation of Personality Change During Intensive Psychotherapy, the Psychoanalytic Study of Retest Results, and Regression in the Service of the Ego. Incisive case illustrations round out these lucid and synthesized papers, as timely now as when they were written, and give the therapist a clearer understanding of what he can expect when he refers a patient for psychodiagnostic evaluation.

FRED BROWN (NEW YORK)

THE FEAR OF BEING A WOMAN: A THEORY OF MATERNAL DESTRUCTIVENESS. By Joseph C. Rheingold, M.D., Ph.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1964. 756 pp.

The author has dedicated this seven hundred fifty-six page book on his theory of maternal destructiveness to his women patients. It is divided into three parts: The Mother, The Child, and Treatment and Prevention.

In the preface Rheingold explains how he came to observe what is contained in his book. The book is the report of an experiment, 'not a designed piece of research—but what may be called an epistemologic experiment . . . to allow observations to take original form in a merging-of-consciousness psychotherapeutic procedure'. He 'wondered whether psychiatry could be served not only by structured research but as well by an expanded consciousness

in the individual observer'. This experiment lasted twelve years during which time he was immersed in practice to such a degree that it 'almost precluded professional reading and associations'. He saw twenty-five hundred patients during the twelve years.

The observations of maternal destructiveness he found of such invariability that he first considered himself biased, 'but the result was to impair the therapeutic process, for no other discovery has the same remedial potential'. Therefore, he resigned himself to the truth: 'To me it is truth: it *is* congruent with what I observe in the consultation room and in the world, it is coherent, and it "works" '. The 'truth about women' as he again and again emphasizes, is that all women are destructive, mostly toward their children but also toward their husbands. He expresses, however, his conviction throughout the book that 'destructiveness is the product of fear and not malignity of character'.

The first section of the book deals with the phenomena of maternal destructiveness: 'our primary concern at all times is with mother-daughter relationship'. In the first chapter of this section, Rheingold deals with his retrospective method to unfold the 'pathogenic influence of maternal attitudes'. In order to gain 'adequate knowledge of the meaning of the mother to the child', one has to be the child or, 'at second best, to merge with the patient's consciousness as he revives the experience with her mother. . . . It is part of the burden of this book to advance the proposition . . . that active destructiveness together with deprivation provides the origin of conflict rather than instinctually rooted psychic processes.'

Rheingold's main thesis is that mother's cruelty to her daughter is universal and is the 'truth'. Mother's cruelty is more important than instinctual processes. The patient's memories of childhood are accepted as undistorted reality. Fantasy and reality are placed side by side with battered child syndromes.

Identifying with his patients without allowing them or himself any correction of fantasies, any reality testing, he leads his patients down the path to the inferno of infantile unconscious processes, the only reality he acknowledges. Without the anchor of knowledge and utilization of instinctual drives and the developing structure of the ego, Rheingold and his patients become flotsam in the maelstrom of his patients' unconscious.

The major part of the book is devoted to what may be the vicissitudes of the life and reproductive functions of women, all from the point of view of the fear of being a woman.

Part Three of the book deals with Treatment and Prevention. Despite all the arguments Rheingold expects to be raised, he believes it is justifiable 'to use the therapeutic issue to substantiate the theory'. He sees as most important in the therapeutic situation 'the therapist's role as a *protective* parent figure'. This role spells the difference between success and failure. 'The reclamation of psychotic children is impressive, but even more impressive is the transformation, under assurance alone, of a mutilated and mutilating adult into a nurturant being.' According to Rheingold the 'core of the remedying effect' is based on the patient's 'belief in the nurturant power of the therapist. . . . Some patients attain it after a visit or two . . . [and] the fact that, even in a few instances, the dependence upon a protective parent can remedy symptoms, allay anxiety, and perhaps fashion a re-orientation to life, provides evidence that the fault of ego-development lies in the want of such trust in the milieu during the early years. In this way we receive corroboration of the theory of maternal destructiveness.'

While such transference improvements are well known, I do find it difficult, if not impossible, to follow Rheingold's reasoning that such improvement corroborates his theory of maternal destructiveness. It is equally difficult to understand how 'the brief experience with a supportive figure in adult life' is capable of inducing 'a lasting reversal of the affect of experience with a destructive figure in childhood'.

Rheingold's therapy is admittedly 'manipulative'. If a patient does not soon talk about her relationship with her mother and about the destructive aspects of this relationship, he directs the patient to the destructiveness of the mother and herself, to hostility as a universal phenomenon, to destruction as a life force. This philosophic view is more important than unburdening. 'The attainment of this broad insight, transcending the patient's personal experience, personal hurt, marks an endpoint of therapy.'

This is a book by a person whose intention one may respect and whose long labor and efforts demand our admiration, but whose views are one-sided, arbitrary, and impractical. Rheingold

honestly believes that he has found 'the Truth' and he implores the reader to believe him. This reviewer put the book down, his body weary, his mind unconvinced.

MARCEL HEIMAN (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOTHERAPY AND MORALITY. A Study of Two Concepts. By Joseph Margolis. New York: Random House, Inc., 1966. 174 pp.

The author of this volume is a philosopher whose inquiries into the relationship between psychotherapy and morality began through participation in seminars and research projects at the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Cincinnati and were subsequently supported by a Public Health Service Special Fellowship. His approach is clearly and appropriately that of an outsider who 'cannot and does not' attempt to add to the body of findings of any given discipline—in this case psychotherapy or psychiatry. His efforts are directed toward elucidating the manner in which values and morals or ethical judgments enter into the psychotherapeutic procedure and the psychotherapist's professional code. He also deals at considerable length with the related but nevertheless special problems of determinism and of the moral and legal responsibilities of the mentally ill.

Stating that his primary interest in this volume is 'in the ways in which the practice of psychotherapy entails value judgments', Margolis observes that a 'competent discussion' of this topic requires both 'a working knowledge of the actual routines of psychotherapeutic practice and of the psychotherapeutic literature' and a knowledge of philosophical literature on value theory (p. 7). Apparently, however, the first of these requirements is not to be interpreted as implying actual competence in the practice of psychiatry or psychotherapy, but rather the kind of knowledge which makes it possible to describe therapeutic theory and practice in terms of 'relevant philosophical categories'. He views it as outside the scope of his function as a professional philosopher to deal with substantive questions of morality as they arise in psychiatric practice. His concern is rather with such questions as 'whether, on *any* admissable view of psychotherapy, therapeutic practice necessarily raises and must face moral questions' (p. 8). In

this view the philosopher 'is concerned only with the logical picture of the practice, not with the practice itself. He might, for instance, analyze the concept of health in order to characterize its use with respect to therapeutic judgments, but he will not (and could not, competently) make such judgments himself' (p. 9). At the same time Margolis expresses the hope that this view 'will not be wrongly construed as an admission of the irrelevance of philosophical clarity' to the behavioral and medical disciplines.

Speaking from experience, as he claims to do, the author is very critical of the entire psychiatric profession, including psychoanalysts, for sidestepping the issue of moral values. On the other hand, he seems equally critical of those who have given attention to the problem of values. He attacks Hartmann's formulations according to which analytic therapy is 'a kind of technology [with] its own appropriate goals which are not questioned in the professional setting' (p. 13). While acknowledging that this 'narrowly technological' view of therapy is 'in a sense' correct, it 'altogether fails to provide for the profession's concern with altering behavior and motivation' (p. 21). He correctly maintains that, 'The enterprise of psychotherapy, whatever the variety in doctrinal conviction, clearly presupposes a set of values in the name of which the alternation of the lives of patients is undertaken' (p. 21). Apparently acknowledging the appropriateness of such valuational loading, Margolis takes the view that 'the model of health, in the setting of psychotherapy, is a mixed model that shows clear affinities with the models of happiness and well being that obtain in the ethical domain' (pp. 81-82). In presenting this view he offers some highly pertinent criticisms of Szasz's thesis according to which mental illness is a 'myth'.

In a chapter on Freedom and Responsibility, Margolis discusses the problem of criminal responsibility and of determinism and free will. The contents of this chapter appear to be largely tangential to the main theme of the volume. Margolis notes that a psychiatrist who takes a position in favor of either limiting or extending criminal responsibilities of the mentally ill is making a moral or legal, rather than a professional judgment.

The author then embarks on a discussion of Freud's concept of psychic determinism 'which is taken to deny human freedom and therefore, the very ground of responsibility'. He argues that the

doctrine of psychic determinism, although in principle applicable to both the physician and the patient, is applied by Freud only to the latter, while the therapist is viewed as a 'respectable agent, who must take appropriate care in the weighing of his professional decisions' (p. 93). Although Margolis is correct in noting that the doctrine of psychic determinism was not intended to preclude 'responsible therapy', it is by no means true that Freud did not apply this doctrine to the therapist. It may be relevant in this connection to note that the term 'countertransference' is not listed in the index.

While citing some reservations concerning the concept of psychic determinism, Margolis makes out a convincing case for the view that causality and freedom are not necessarily incompatible, but that causal influences of a certain type (e.g., unconscious factors) may have the effect of limiting freedom. In the closing chapter the author presents some interesting comments concerning the relationship between religion and psychotherapy.

Although Margolis' arguments are presented with considerable skill, and although many of his conclusions are sound, the volume as a whole is disappointing. Since he disclaims the intention of making a substantive contribution to the field of psychiatry, it would be unfair to criticize him too harshly on that score. But even within the limits of his stated objectives, his contribution would have gained in scope had he examined more concretely the problem of values as it enters into various types of clinical situations.

It may be added that Margolis' criticism of Hartmann rests on what is probably too literal an interpretation of Hartmann's highly condensed formulations. To place Hartmann's comments on this subject in a more adequate context, it is only fair to point out that Hartmann is among the most significant contributors to the psychoanalytic understanding of the genesis and function of values and that the psychoanalytic 'technology' to which he refers is undoubtedly intended to presuppose a great deal of this understanding.

In spite of the previously mentioned limitations, Margolis' volume has the merit of again calling attention to misconceptions. There can be no doubt that moral judgments play a continuous role in the therapist's day-to-day activities. Whether or not we spell it out, psychoanalysis is committed to the proposition that moral health is an integral part of mental health.

PAUL FRIEDMAN (NEW YORK)

MICROCOSM. STRUCTURAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS EVOLUTION IN GROUPS. By Philip E. Slater. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966. 276 pp.

The subtitle gives the essence of this book. The author, now Associate Professor of Sociology at Brandeis, from 1958 to 1961 gave a course at Harvard on Social Relations: Analysis of Interpersonal Behavior which utilized a special type of small group discussion, the so-called training group. The book is based on the material derived from this course. As the author states, 'One of the advantages most frequently claimed for the study of small groups is the opportunity it provides for examination of elementary societal phenomena in microcosmic form'.

In the introduction the author describes the two parts of the book as follows: 'Part I deals with some of the vicissitudes of the group's orientation to its formal leader, pointing out certain parallels with the rituals and beliefs of larger social entities and speculating about the possible principles underlying these variegated social phenomena. Part II is an attempt to generalize and extend these observations—to approach a more abstract conceptualization of these issues in group formation and development. The member-leader phenomena are placed in the larger context of changes in the nature of group bonds and these are, in turn, related to existing paradigms of religious and mythological evolution. Fluctuations in the (conscious) awareness of individual and group boundaries are seen as the factor common to all these systems.'

The first part of the book is of special interest in connection with the application of psychoanalytic concepts to the development of groups and of group psychology, particularly those of Freud as given in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego and Totem and Taboo. The illustrations given from the training group sessions are most interesting and quite apt, seeming to confirm the ideas of Freud and others on the dynamics of leader-member interaction and group development. The author continually cites Freud's original explanation of group development and states, 'As we shall see, the correspondences between the group revolt [against the leader in the training groups] and Freud's primal horde myth are quite elaborate, suggesting the possibility that the latter reflects a systematic process rather than a historical event'.

In the second, theoretical part of the book Slater elaborates on the idea that the revolt against the leader is a necessary and constantly recurring process which leads to the social development of large groups. He compares the theories of many authors and summarizes them in a table. As he puts it, his concepts are offered 'more in the nature of a protracted interpretation—an attempt to order a variety of phenomena which are curious, interesting and not fully understood'. The author does succeed in a very interesting way in showing how the repetition of different kinds of revolt against a leader has led to the development of groups along religious, political, and psychological lines.

The book is difficult to read because of its complicated and abstract way of presenting material. The description of the training groups as given in Appendix I is inadequate and does not clearly describe the actual relationship of the leader to the group of students, although the illustration indicates he was the teacher who gave grades and examinations. It is indicated that the students in the groups were assigned reading such as Freud, Frazer, and others dealing with the development of groups. Since the students knew the teacher's interests, one may question how valid the illustrations are as spontaneous expressions of group interaction.

Nevertheless, this is an interesting and useful book. In a most stimulating fashion it brings together excellent clinical and theoretical material relating to modern concepts of group development.

AARON STEIN (NEW YORK)

THALASSA. A THEORY OF GENITALITY. (Paperbound.) By Sandor Ferenczi. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1968. 110 pp.

Henry Alden Bunker's translation of Thalassa, which first appeared in This QUARTERLY, Volumes II and III, and was later published as a book by The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc., has been out of print for several years. It has now been republished by W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., in their Library series.

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ABSTRACTS

Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association. XIII, 1965.

Freud and the Controversy over Shakespearean Authorship. Harry Trosman. Pp. 475-498.

This paper deals with Freud's longstanding fascination with the true identity and authorship of Shakespeare. After reading J. Thomas Looney's book, Shakespeare Identified, in 1923 he became convinced, like Looney, that Edward de Vere, the seventeenth Earl of Oxford was the true author of Shakespeare's plays and poems. Looney's position is examined and compared with the arguments subscribing authorship to the humble bard of Stratford. The change in Freud's belief in support of Looney's is attributed to a form of family romance fantasy in Freud himself. In addition, Looney's manner of drawing conclusions about authorship and biographical data from the plays is similar to an important cognitive style employed by Freud.

Darwin as the Source of Freud's Neo-Lamarckianism. Lucille B. Ritvo. Pp. 499-517.

In this scholarly paper the author demonstrates how Freud's neo-Lamarckian statements were based on Darwin's own Lamarckian statements following the first edition of On the Origin of Species. Following his great discovery of natural selection Darwin was more and more compelled to acknowledge neo-Lamarckian mechanisms because his theory had posed serious problems and was being assailed by leading biologists and physicists of that period. It was only in the thirties, the last decade of Freud's life, that accumulated evidence from genetics and ecology strongly substantiated Darwin's thesis and ended the controversy.

Observations on a 'Natural Experiment': Helen Keller. Hartvig Dahl. Pp. 533-550.

In this interesting paper the author attempts to validate some important analytic constructs, namely, the models for primary and secondary process thinking, by employing Helen Keller's recollections of her perceptual world in childhood as a natural experiment. The author points out that Helen's early childhood behavior described in her book, The World I Live In, supports Freud's and Rapaport's primary model of affect: drive at threshold → absence of drive object → affect discharge. He provides samples of her later behavior to illustrate the shift from primary process to secondary process thinking, emphasizing that the first important step toward the development of secondary process thinking results from 'structuralized delay'.

Emphasis is placed on the distinction between self and non-self in Helen's development as an important step in her capacity to attain the level of abstract thinking. He suggests two requirements for the experience of self-consciousness or awareness: 1, that the self as an object have a name; 2, that this object, self, have a function—the ordering of thought and behavior. Under these conditions attention cathexes can then be deployed in the service of the concept, self. He concludes that the study of Helen Keller's behavior fits the main re-

quirements of the primary process model of thinking, and also provides some of the conditions for understanding the emergence of secondary process thinking.

Rossini. A Psychoanalytic Approach to 'the Great Renunciation'. Daniel W. Schwartz. Pp. 551-569.

At the age of thirty-seven, after achieving world acclaim as a great opera composer, Rossini rather suddenly ceased all creative operatic work. This block persisted for the remainder of his life. In a well-written essay the author speculates that this puzzling renunciation could be explained as a result of Rossini's mother's death two years previously, a mother for whom he had markedly ambivalent feelings. Rossini's œdipal and precœdipal conflicts had been expressed in sublimated form in his operas, exemplified in The Barber of Seville and William Tell. For two years after his mother's death Rossini displayed little overt mourning reaction. Marked oral and anal regression then occurred. His cessation of work was accompanied by marked neurotic and, at times, psychotic regressing. This paper illustrates anew how significant unconscious conflict may be in the inspiration of creativity as well as in its inhibition.

Remarks on Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness. Richard F. Sterba. Pp. 570-583.

Attention is directed once more to the importance of Greenacre's concept of collective (cosmic) alternates as a special attribute of creativity. Behind the beautiful, awesome descriptions of river passage through the jungles of Africa lurk primal memories of early infancy, primal scene fantasies, and castration themes. Involved too in creativity are projective-introjective experiences of bodily *Gestalten*. The gift of the creative artist is based on the alive feelings of conditions dependent on the establishment of cosmic alternates. It consists of the fusion of outside and inner self. In addition to the increased perceptive capacity of the artist there is his ability to express these perceptual and emotional nuances in communicable form. It is suggested that in Heart of Darkness Conrad was sensitive to the cultural and spiritual currents of the time and was both describing and forecasting the revolt against colonialism.

Historical Notes Concerning Psychoanalysis and Early Language Development. Rudolf Ekstein. Pp. 707-731.

This is a useful paper enumerating the historical phases of current psychoanalytic constructs regarding the development of language. Mention is made of Freud's early notions of the development of language in On Aphasia. This was followed by the extensive work of several analytic colleagues stressing the instinctual roots of language. More recently, the approaches have utilized knowledge gained from other disciplines as well as emphasis on ego psychology.

The author stresses the importance of studying psychotic children and adults as an additional means of understanding the evolution of language from its autistic form through its development as signal, and ultimately its expression as communication in symbolic and abstract forms. Excerpts from the production of an autistic child are cited to indicate the psychotic's defense against the dialogue of communication and the regression to a symbiotic state. The

capacity for symbiotic communication indicates some ego growth, differentiation of psychic structure, and beginning of object relationship, whereas the employment of autistic language speaks for regression, dedifferentiation, and return to the pre-object phase.

Comments on Libidinal Organization and Child Development. Lili E. Peller. Pp. 732-747.

The author reviews the psychosexual phases of development, emphasizing how Freud modified his theoretical constructs in the wake of clinical experience. Particular attention is paid to instinctual drives on the psychic organizers for later structural development. The author stresses the drive of mastery, and the pleasure derived from muscular activity and play that gains prominence during the anal sadistic phase. She underscores the fact that insufficient weight is given to the sadistic component as a significant factor in psychosexual development during the anal phase. Academic psychologists fail to give sufficient recognition to the drive aspects of human behavior.

The Goals of Psychoanalysis. A Survey of Analytic Viewpoints. Robert S. Wallerstein. Pp. 748-770.

This excellent paper discusses the diverse points of view concerning the goals of analysis and the analytic process necessary for achieving these goals, including comments on structural changes as opposed to amelioration of symptoms as an ultimate aim. The opinions of various authors concerning the possibility of achieving structural change are described; the technique leading to re-orientation of the psychic to bring about harmony amongst id, ego, and superego; the limitations of analysis and its widening scope; whether insight and working through may suffice to bring about structural change or whether another dimension must be added, such as relevant action postulated by Wheelis and Valenstein, in order to make the analytic process more effective in achieving its ultimate goals.

Modes of Insight. Paul Graves Myerson. Pp. 771-792.

Two episodes of insight near the end of a patient's analysis are presented. The author describes one as psychoanalytic, the other as reality-oriented. Both are considered essential for working through. An attempt is made to delineate various phases in the achievement of insight such as suspension of active attention, attempted mastery through fantasy, self-observation, and re-integration. While reality-oriented insight is also achieved by working through there is a different manner in 'deploying attention', and mastery through fantasy production is not as important. In the former the observing ego is better able to revive the original childhood conflict, to cope with and master it. The analysand may continue to employ such technique even after the termination of his analysis.

Genetic factors that may foster the capacity for psychoanalytic insight are also discussed. Of paramount importance in developing this capacity are the interactions between child and parents in which the child is permitted to tolerate uncertainty and to gain mastery over conflicts.

Incomplete Psychoanalytic Training. Sidney Levin and Joseph J. Michaels. Pp. 793-818.

Some tentative statistics are provided concerning the number of dropouts of psychoanalytic candidates. Data included candidates who began analytic training during the period, 1945-1953. The authors conclude that a fairly high dropout rate is to be expected. Realization of this fact may permit us to take more risks in accepting qualified candidates about whom there may be some reservations; it may also aid us to terminate a candidacy more expeditiously. The paper would have been more instructive if the authors had discussed the psychodynamic conflicts involved in the failures.

The Relation of Experimentally Induced Presleep Experiences to Dreams. Herman A. Witkin and Helen B. Lewis. Pp. 819-849.

An interesting experimental study has been devised to determine how presleep experiences affect the dreams of the subject. Several types of presleep experiences were employed on different subjects, such as viewing exciting films and neutral films and having suggestive sessions prior to the subject's falling asleep. The hypnagogic reveries prior to falling asleep were also studied and evaluated to demonstrate how the day residue gradually entered the dream material. The results clearly demonstrate that elements from the presleep events can definitely be identified in subsequent dreams. The experiments offer validation of the relation between the waking experience and dreams. The procedure may also be useful in shedding light on dream recall and forgetting, and indicate how certain elements are transformed into dreams in accordance with the history and conflicts of the subject. The method may therefore be useful in exploring the relationship of the 'style of dreaming' and differences in personality.

The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. A Tribute. P. 850.

This is a tribute to this publication on its twentieth anniversary with a reminder of its great psychoanalytic contributions in the fields of genetic psychology, ego psychology, child development, metapsychology, and child analysis.

JULIAN L. STAMM

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXII, 1966.

Combined Psychiatric Residency and Psychoanalytic Training. Harold I. Kaplan; Alfred M. Freedman; Simon H. Nagler. Pp. 806-809.

The authors, associated with the Department of Psychiatry of the New York Medical College, describe a joint program of psychiatric residency and psychoanalytic training. The two programs have been established in such a way that a resident may participate in both concurrently after one year of residency has been completed. Resident applications to the analytic faculty are processed in much the same way as those not in the residency program. At the completion of three years of the residency program, the resident would have completed two-thirds of the psychoanalytic course work, two years of personal

analysis, and one year of supervised analytic work. It is felt that such combined training does not conflict with a standard residency program but can serve both to enrich and complement it. They point to the saving in time of such a program, and discuss what they see as advantages.

The Psychoanalyst as Community Psychiatrist. Harry R. Brickman; Donald A. Schwartz; S. Mark Doran. Pp. 1081-1087.

Of three hundred twenty-one graduates and candidates of psychoanalytic institutes in Los Angeles, seventy-one participated in the County Mental Health Department. They were polled by questionnaire in an attempt to get their views on the relationship of community psychiatry and psychoanalysis. In view of the general trend of community psychiatry of short-term approaches to large numbers, it might have been anticipated that a psychoanalyst, with major interest in long-term intensive psychotherapy, would have but little interest in the community field. In Los Angeles, this is not the case; the psychoanalyst is keenly interested in community mental health programs.

The Symptomatic Adolescent: Psychiatric Illness or Adolescent Turmoil? James F. Masterson, Jr. and Antonia Washburn. Pp. 1240-1246.

From their experiences in work with adolescents at the Payne-Whitney Clinic in New York, the authors feel that there is a significant difference between those adolescents having true psychiatric disorder and those whose disturbance is transient. Of the relatively healthy group they state that 'although they may have mild character disorder traits or psychoneurotic symptoms these latter tend to be single rather than multiple, of mild intensity, episodic rather than persistent, and not to impair functioning'. They do not feel that the usual turmoil of adolescence in any way simulates psychiatric illness.

LAURENCE LOEB

Archives of General Psychiatry. XIV, 1966.

Incest: A Family Group Survival Pattern. Noel Lustig; John W. Dresser; Seth W. Spellman; Thomas B. Murray. Pp. 31-40.

This report of six cases of father-daughter incest approaches the problem from a family transactional framework as well as an intrapsychic one. Incest is viewed as a symptomatic act which tends to maintain the familial homeostasis in a dysfunctional family. The individual intrapsychic condition of all of the family members mesh in using incest as a behavior pattern which reduces family tension. Characteristic were: 1, mother-daughter role reversal with the daughter the essential maternal figure in the household; 2, mothers who consciously or unconsciously facilitate the incestuous relationship with strong hostility against the daughter as well as considerable dependency on her as a substitute mother; 3, daughters who are revengeful toward the mother because of her deficient mothering and her disparaging of the woman's role as self-sacrificing with little or no gain; 4, wives who generate considerable sexual tension in their husbands while simultaneously depreciating them; 5, husbands

who are unable to relieve their sexual tensions outside the family since this conflicts with their ego ideals; 6, a common terror of family disintegration which is so strong that any tension relieving behavior is preferable; 7, a parental need to maintain a façade of adult role competency. It was when the mother's façade was threatened that the incestuous relationship was noted and disrupted.

The authors were impressed with the fathers' psychological passivity and with the role of the mothers who appeared to be the cornerstone in the dysfunctional family.

Comparative Psychiatric Study of Accidental and Suicidal Death. Norman Tabachnick; Robert L. Litman; Marvin Osman; Warren L. Jones; L. Cohn; August Kasper; John Moffat. Pp. 60-68.

This study of fifteen cases of suicidal and fifteen cases of accidental death is based on the theory that psychological forces brought into play by certain life stresses can manifest themselves as serious accidents as well as suicides. Only males were chosen and they were matched for age. All suicides were self-inflicted gun shootings, and all accidental deaths were one-car accidents in which the driver was the victim. Both groups tended to be conscientious men who were concerned with performing well. They would often respond to stress with increased verbal and motoric activity. One-half were considered impulsive in their actions. One-half of both groups had been drinking and used alcohol as a way to cope with stress.

Differences between the two groups were manifest in that the men who had died by accident had no clear-cut traumatic incident before death. However, two-thirds of these men were contemplating or had just moved into situations of greater responsibility. These men were particularly sensitive to being slighted or criticized by others. In general they tended to have a life style of activity and exhibitionism. Those who died by suicide had, just prior to their deaths, experienced the loss of an important person, or a feeling of failure or being unloved.

Left, Right, and Identity. Steven J. Hirsch. Pp. 84-88.

This is a brief study of psychotic identity search in which the fragmentation is concretely experienced as a right and left side of the body. This polarization represents unresolved unconscious bisexuality and reflects the ego's inability to interpret reality, master intense anxiety, and express ambivalence in language. This illusory absolute antithesis is a defense against the threatened regression to the undifferentiated wholeness of infancy and the total loss of relatedness to objects.

PETER BLOS, JR.

International Journal of Group Psychotherapy. XVII, 1967.

Neurotic Factor of Voyeurism and Exhibitionism in Group Psychotherapy. Henriette T. Glatzer. Pp. 3-9.

Clinical examples of patients in group psychotherapy illustrate Freud's observations that scopophilia is primarily autoerotic, and that exhibitionism is

a defense against scopophilic wishes. In one of the cases given, the exhibitionism was negative and associated with somatic symptoms. Group participation favors the development of both these partial drives, since it provides a number of targets in the genital organs of members; a number of people engaged in mutual voyeurism.

A Multiple Family Group Approach to Some Problems of Adolescence. Kexall L. Kembro; Harvey A. Taschman; Harold W. Wylie; Bryce W. McLennan. Pp. 18-24.

The Mental Health Study Center of the National Institute of Mental Health, concerned with 'understanding a given family's style of interacting with one another', instituted sessions with three complete families simultaneously for one-and-one-half-hour periods, twelve in all. The children of these families were at first male adolescent underachievers without the presence of their siblings; later the children were delinquents. The investigators asked themselves, 'What is the structure in which therapy occurs here, and of what exactly does that therapy consist?'.

During these sessions, when it became apparent that the underachievers were passively resisting their parents, while the delinquents were bullying theirs, these same parents showed the same reactions toward the group therapist. The underachievers' parents elicited a feeling in the therapist that he should take all responsibility for the treatment, while the delinquents' parents aroused anxiety that if pushed too hard they might walk out.

A therapeutic milieu was developed by 1, establishing rules, 2, encouraging individual participation, 3, supporting shared concerns, 4, redirecting discussions often by summarizing and interpreting, challenging validity of attitudes, and direct guidance. Introspective attitudes were fostered by translating abstract issues to specific family situations; paraphrasing expressions of emotions and directing them to their real target; encouraging the deeper understanding of such expressions and suggesting, when indicated, the substitution of other relationships.

Group Psychotherapy of Male Homosexuals by a Male and Female Co-Therapy Team. Melvin Singer and Ruth Fishcher. Pp. 44-51.

Male and female co-therapists conducted a group of overt male homosexuals who were between twenty-two and forty-eight years of age and of superior intelligence, appearance, sophistication, and education. The group met for one and a half hours weekly for a year. The parental dyad of therapists engendered violent transferences. The female therapist was regarded as dangerous and demanding, similar to their own mothers. Diminution of hostile words was concomitant with a more heterosexual adjustment. At the same time, a denigration of the male therapist was revealed. This hostility undermined the assumption that their homosexuality resulted from loving men. After a year, a decrease in homosexual activity in favor of heterosexual, and of self-destructiveness in favor of work efficiency, was noted.

Interrelating Group-Dynamic, Therapeutic and Psychodynamic Concepts. Albert W. Silver. Pp. 139-150.

The author hypothesizes that 'the less structured by purpose or by directive leadership a group is, the more capable it is of inducing regressive tendencies and anxiety', and that 'the less structured by extrinsic tasks, activities, purposes or goals a group is, the more capable it becomes of gaining awareness of psychological relationships among its members'. Accordingly, developmental and training groups are found to develop immediate awareness in participants, while therapy groups serve to reveal and to work through unconscious conflicts as observed in the participants' mutual relationships.

Group Therapy with Convicted Pedophiles. H. L. P. Resnik and Joseph J. Peters. Pp. 151-158.

Twenty-four male convicted pedophiles were treated in groups of about twelve for at least sixteen ninety-minute sessions. First the members had to overcome their distrust of the therapist, next a peer relationship developed with identification and group focused aggression, and finally relations with adult women were discussed. The authors felt this process achieved its goal of lessening the pedophilia, and recommended that such sessions start as soon as possible after conviction.

Countertransference and an Adolescent Group Crisis. Vann Spruill. Pp. 298-308.

An open ended group of neurotic adolescent underachievers was treated by a male therapist and a female observer, the latter saying little or nothing. The removal of the observer, for reasons irrelevant to the group, initiated a crisis characterized by denial and aggression, followed by a more therapeutic equilibrium. The crisis revealed that the therapist and observer unconsciously acted with each other in a way similar to parental interactions in the families of the patients.

Notes on Help-Rejecting Complainers. Milton M. Berger and Max Rosenbaum, Pp. 357–370.

The authors define the help-rejecting complainer (HRC) with clinical illustrations, compare him with the sadomasochist, and offer techniques for treatment. They quote Frank, 'The pattern of the HRC is characterized by behavior suggesting that the patients fear that they will be ignored unless they manifest a continuing claim for attention. They do this by repeatedly presenting a complaint or problem, while at the same time . . . rejecting any advice or help offered. . . . Its effects are to cause others . . . to offer advice, and to . . . break the continuity of the group. The would-be help givers soon become . . . annoyed.' They conclude the HRCs appear to lack belief in the possibility of authentic human experience. People were rejected as independent entities, but regarded as objects for manipulation. Group rather than individual therapy precipitates and reveals the HRC process.

Resistance to Change in Group Psychotherapy. Pinchas Noy. Pp. 371-377.

Resistances in therapy are felt as 1, disturbing the formation of initial rapport, 2, impeding the achievement of insight, and 3, obstructing changes in behavior. Patients may devote themselves to denying the possibility of changing behavior, often against their own insight. The morbid ego builds up a secondary defense against accepting this enlightenment. The author urges that therapy not be terminated before change.

Some Characteristics of Dreams in Group-Analytic Psychotherapy. David Zimmermann. Pp. 524-535.

The author, a Kleinian psychiatrist, quotes other writers in pointing out that the patient feels less responsible for the contents of his dream than he does for his social behavior since the dream is unplanned. Dreams in group psychotherapy are less obscure and distorted than those produced during individual analysis since transference reactions in groups, as contrasted to individual therapy, are less anxiety producing because they are projected and shared. Many dreams denote the current state of the group transference. By clinical examples the author illustrates his contention that the group is a dynamic unity in the inner perception of the participants.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG

Revista Uruguaya de Psicoanalisis. VIII, 1966.

Synthesis of Clinical Material Presented and Discussed at the Sixth Psychoanalytic Congress of Latin America. Willy Baranza and Jorge Mom. Pp. 347-362.

This is a compact and well-reasoned evaluation of the friction among analysts in any congress. The authors note differences among the analysts in approach, modality, style, or school of thought. The idiosyncrasies and some of the ontogenetic roots are described; for instance, there are fifty different systems in the Melanie Klein 'school'. In discussing the different meanings of the interpretation and of the analytic process itself, they state, 'We were left with the impression that in the analytic treatment, when the setting and its structure corroborate the preconceived ideas of the analyst, it is in reality an involuntary imposition of the analyst by the sequence, more or less strict, of his interpretation and selection of material, and the patient suffers. In other words, a technical artifact has been created.'

Considerations on Acting Out in the Manic Depressive Syndrome. Hector Garbarino. Pp. 363-374.

It is assumed that any acting out in the manic depressive syndrome is a defense against the envy of the idealized primary love object. Technically, it interferes when the analyst himself has not resolved his own idealized imagoes. When this happens, it permits the patient to dissociate the negative aspects of the analyst from other objects, such as the mother, to maintain in fact the positive aspects of the transference. There is, in essence, a denial and a state of doubt covering up ambivalent feelings. The clinical presentation validates

the conclusion that the difficulties are with the superego; that which the patient cannot elaborate, resolve, and verbalize, as well as the mental representations of the parental imagoes, will be acted out.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

Revista del Hospital Psiquiatrico de la Habana. VIII, 1967.

The Lack of a Paternal Figure and the Transformation of the Feminine Role. F. Escardo. Pp. 313-320.

Rural family constellations in Cuba are studied from the psychobiological point of view. The study does not cover all rural areas, but primarily some of the Indian communities. The mother bears the children of several fathers, one father disappearing as another appears. Comparisons are made to the lives of the urban lower, middle, and upper classes. The conclusion is that the psychobiological impact of these rapid changes is manifested in the children. Children grow up without a clear father image; there is a poor masculine identification in the males. The father's main interest is earning more money and the children therefore understand a man's role simply as the provider of money and material things. The burden of child rearing falls on the mother. The mother representation in the child is that of a domineering, phallic type.

The mother does not obtain emotional security from the husband, and consistently seeks psychological help in raising children. Behavior difficulties, especially in the males, are common with increasing numbers of adolescents with severe homosexual problems and delinquency. In the girls, there tends to be lack of understanding of what it means to be a woman. In children of both sexes there is defective development of ego functions and defective child-parent relations.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

Revista de Psicoanalisis. XXIV, 1967.

The Hermaphrodite Ideal and Its Relation to the Tone of Voice. Hilda S. Rollman-Branch. Pp. 79-95.

After discussing the mythological origin of hermaphrodite studies, Rollman-Branch contrasts the bisexual myth with the modern bipsychological concept, stating that the fœtus begins as a female and eventually is transformed into a male. She also studies bisexual fantasies in men and women, the envy of the opposite sex, and narcissistic tendencies. Bisexual fantasies in artistic creation are presented in which the theme of bisexuality is disguised in manifold ways; for instance, through the years the voice of the eunuch, the castrated male, not only epitomized an ideal bisexual fantasy but was practiced in reality for religious purposes. Real bisexual phenomena are infrequent but the current preference for a type of voice, such as the Beatles and other groups, reflects the adolescent bisexual desires. These are manifest in long, feminine hair in the male and in the unkempt appearance (sex=dirt).

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Ernest Kafka

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

June 13, 1967. AN INFANTILE FETISH AND ITS PERSISTENCE INTO YOUNG WOMANHOOD. Nancy Tow Spiegel, M.A. (by invitation).

A female patient entered analysis because of agitation about masturbating and feelings of emptiness. The analysis centered on her changing relationship with an inanimate object, a shoelace. As a result of 'losses, hypersexual exposures at phase specific periods, together with constitutional proclivities', the inanimate object played the part of a biphasic fetish in masturbatory rituals that began in adolescence.

The masturbatory ritual consisted of a 'bad' act followed by a 'purifying' act. A typical accompanying fantasy in the bad act was of an old man masturbating and weeping as he watched his cruel wife perform fellatio on a virile man he had procured for her. The shoelace had to be kept out of this act to preserve it from contamination and degradation. In order to recapture a feeling of 'purity' after this bad act, the patient lay clothed across the bed, legs closed and stiff, staring unblinkingly at a blank wall, while she clutched and then twirled the shoelace. The purifying act was also carried out when she felt morally bad because of feelings of hatred or desires to steal, as well as 'an expression of joy' when she had mastered some realistic task. A fantasy associated with the purifying act was that on a car trip with a young man, her mother, and 'her mother's son', the mother is killed, the patient assumes care of the boy, and gives birth to a girl baby without any man being involved.

Mrs. Spiegel feels that the 'bad' act followed by the 'pure' act exemplified doing and undoing. Analysis revealed the changing functions of the shoelace in the patient's life. At the time of weaning at age nine months, she was fascinated by a string of beads. Enemas administered by her mother for 'cramps' from infancy to age eight caused fear and excitement and disposed the patient to an anal organization. At about age two, she had several traumatic experiences and felt intense rage, especially when the mother breast-fed an infant brother. The breast and enema bag were equated in fantasy. She compensated for her losses by fingering a shoelace she had taken from her mother's shoe. At age six to seven, she dealt with longings for mother and frustrations by fondling a string while she imagined 'eating mother's homemade bread'; the author feels the string was now equated with the phallus. In adolescence, the ritual with the string included elements from all libidinal phases, 'trends toward omnipotence and idealization, disavowal of castration, and undoing of guilt'; the patient now had 'alternate feelings of affection and hostility toward the fetish', as mother and phallus.

Analytic work, especially interpretations that clarified the patient's identification of the shoelace with mother, resulted in renunciation of the fetish, gradual improvement of ego functions, and disgust with anal masturbation. Mrs. Spiegel feels that the inanimate object which ultimately played a fe-

tishistic role in masturbatory activity, had a central role in the patient's development. It represented breast, mother, feces, phallus, and a magic talisman, and could be used for protection and consolation and as a repository for aggression.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Charles Feigelson noted that if a strict definition of a fetish as an object that inspires sexual arousal and is consciously eroticized is used, the patient's shoelace would not be considered a fetish. Using a broader definition—that it unconsciously represents a maternal phallus and is obligatory for sexual experience—it could be included. He cited Winnicott who stated that string universally symbolizes joining, wrapping, and communication, but when it is used to deny separation, a perversion may develop as in the patient described. He noted that Greenacre has said the phallic-œdipal period is a time when traumatic disturbance 'leaves the deposit of specific content compulsively or ritualistically acted out'.

Dr. Walter Stewart discussed the relationship of childhood fetish and the fetish of structuralized perversion, of precœdipal and phallic phase castration anxiety, and of precœdipal and phallic phases to fetishistic perversions. In Freud's formulation of fetishism, the fetish symbolizes the mother's phallus and serves to deny and affirm her castration. Dr. Stewart felt there was insufficient genetic evidence of the vicissitudes of aggression and libido in Mrs. Spiegel's case to confirm that in the 'pure' fantasy the body represented a phallus and the string a symbolic penis. Further, there is little clinical evidence that transitional objects, generally cuddly, are related to the later true fetish. Female fetishism has only a superficial resemblance to the male perversion. Dr. Stewart preferred to view the observations presented by Mrs. Spiegel as related to the multiple function of an inanimate object in the life history of a female patient.

ERNEST KAFKA

September 26, 1967. SOME ASPECTS OF THE NATURE OF EVIDENCE. Dr. Jacob A. Arlow's Section of the Ernst Kris Study Group.

Dr. Mortimer J. Blumenthal described the progress of the Study group. Consideration of what analysts mean by, and require as, satisfactory evidence for interpretation in clinical situations, led to questions about analytic theory, scientific methodology, and how the analyst thinks about clinical data. While psychoanalysis need not be identical in model or methodology with other sciences, it should be possible to share psychoanalytic knowledge with the rest of the scientific community. A frequent criticism of psychoanalytic methodology has been that there is no consistent set of rules for making interpretations and that this permits varying and contradictory inferences from the same data. However difficult it is to make explicit the clarifying, simplifying, and abstract principles, the Study group found they could arrive at a common conclusion in examining clinical data; alternative methods of evaluating the data would also be valuable in establishing the validity of interpretations. There remains the need to clarify and order the conceptual foundations of psychoanalysis.

Dr. Robert S. Grayson discussed the nature of evidence in clinical work. In evaluating clinical data, two controversies arose: the microscopic versus the macroscopic approach, and the intuitive, empathic versus the intellectual and rational approach. A specific clinical interpretation presupposes assumptions about psychoanalytic principles in general and about the particular analysis under study. A second dichotomy of opinion occurred in evaluating the importance of the responses of the analyst as evidence for an interpretation; affective responses, fantasies, and intuitive thoughts about his patient are not in themselves evidence for an interpretation. The ultimate criterion of validity is the material that the patient brings to the analysis.

Dr. Joan B. Erle dealt with the nature and use of hypothetical constructs in psychoanalysis, which range from observation to more abstract hypotheses that are difficult or impossible to verify from observation. During the course of an analysis, satisfactory supporting evidence for hypotheses on the clinical level may be available and considered valid. More abstract concepts of clinical theory and metapsychology may be judged according to their usefulness. A construct should be logically consistent, applicable, and useful in ordering data. For fruitful discussion we must have a common vocabulary, agree on the use of terms, and indicate both the level of discourse and the data to which the concept refers. In the course of the Study, the group was impressed with the need to understand clearly the concepts used, implicitly or explicitly, to reach conclusions. Disciplined approach is important not only in clinical work but also in the development of a scientific psychoanalytic psychology.

Dr. David L. Mayer discussed ideas about differing, co-existing modes of psychoanalytic thought. While psychoanalysis is recognized as a psychology, a treatment, and a research method, the psychoanalyst's thought processes may be different in form, depending on the task at hand. Sharing some observations about different forms of thought and discourse, the Study group dealt with three areas: 1, certain typical disputes (for instance, what constitutes evidence for a given concept depends on the context in which the concept is used); 2, certain typical confusions resulting from shift in level of discourse; 3, various theoretical trends. It seems unlikely that a scientific psychology or scientifically based treatment can come through either the claim of an absolute phenomenology or attempts to prove true what is essentially theoretical. We might be better advised to tolerate complexities and to recognize the interaction that occurs between the clinical and the theoretical.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Rudolph Loewenstein stated that the question was whether a certain number of psychic phenomena co-exist which constitute a group of functions that can be usefully grouped as a substructure—a construct. In regard to the discussion of the nature of evidence, Dr. Charles Brenner cited Freud, who stated that interpretations can be confirmed because the data are repeated from case to case. Concerning Dr. Mayer's comment on not trying to prove as 'true' something that is essentially theoretical, Dr. Brenner asked what 'true' means; it is a nonscientific word.

Dr. David Beres wondered, if we are unable to agree on a fundamental definition or construct, are our candidates being taught the use of logic, the

meaning of psychoanalytic data, etc.? Do we need revamped training procedures for this purpose? Dr. Martin Stein thought we may be working toward a definition (for example, superego), and should not be discouraged by disagreement. Concerning the significance of empathy and intuition, Dr. Stein said the emotional reaction of the analyst tells something about the analyst and his reaction to the patient. Dr. Benjamin Rubinstein discussed 'evidence'; when events are encountered in cases other than the one under study that are coherent with the data noted, we consider it evidence. He felt that in Dr. Erle's presentation there was a tendency to view hierarchical constructions as a one-way street.

Dr. Loewenstein felt that Dr. Stein offered an important distinction when he stressed our concern with the question of what something we consider evidence is evidence for—something in the analyst or something in the patient. This relates to the question of the term, intuition, which perhaps should be reserved to cover instances of exceptional illumination and not to instances of inferences from data that proceed unconsciously.

Dr. Charles Fisher spoke of other criteria for evaluating psychoanalytic data, such as those described by Dalbiev who cited five attributes: continuity of elements, similarity, repetition, convergence, verification. There may also be the contribution of consultation with the family to check on the accuracy of reconstruction. Dr. Samuel Atkin, citing Kohut, stated that psychoanalysis is a shared experience and both patient and analyst must be examined painstakingly. He disagreed that the finding of relevant or identical data in other cases determines whether our procedure and productions are scientific; each case is unique and one can discover analytic theory in each case.

In response, Dr. Francis Baudry stated that the group did discuss criteria for the correctness of interpretation but felt they were not sufficient in themselves. Dr. Grayson said that in the Study stress was on a definition of what is evidence for the understanding of the patient. Dr. Erle acknowledged that the background of concepts developed in training and clinical experience is always present but, in the presentation of a concept and the relevant data, we should be able to establish or justify our position. Dr. Mayer commented on semantic complexities; 'true', in his paper, coincided with observational knowledge.

JOAN B. ERLE

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

September 25, 1967. PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCOMITANTS OF EGO FUNCTIONING IN CREATIVITY. Philip Weissman, M.D.

In a recent study the author suggested that the ego's role in creativity is more active than a controlled regression in the service of the ego and involves the utilization of two specific ego functions. A dissociative or desynthesizing function was postulated as essential to temporary liberation of the established order of the psyche so that newly available drive discharges can be restructured

with the aid of the ego's synthetic or integrative function. The genetic roots of the dissociative function were traced to early development when the influence of the reality principle demands an alteration of the established order of the psyche under the pleasure principle. It is the dissociative function of the ego which repeatedly undoes a previous stage of psychic development so that the next successive stage may dominate.

In the present paper aspects of psychosexual development in creative personalities and mental functioning in creative activity are investigated and correlated to the concept that the coördinated activities of the dissociative and synthetic functions of the ego are essential features of creative processes. Aspects of psychosexual development of creative people considered are the nature of their character traits and the organized drives and object relations in their infantile and childhood development. The role of sublimation and neutralization are re-evaluated as to their specific contributions to creative functioning.

The character traits of oddness, eccentricity, rebelliousness, and obstinacy are frequently formed early in life from the highly developed and essential dissociative function. With the aid of this ego function, the neutralized energy developed and utilized by creative people differs from energy derived from sublimation. Such neutralized energy is more autonomously achieved, precœdipally attained, and not confined to the precœdipal drives. A special mode of ego functioning may enable the creative person to accomplish early in infancy and childhood a unique processing of object relations, which may be subsequently significant in his creative work and his creative direction.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Joseph Coltrera agreed with Dr. Weissman's choice of an approach through ego psychology; in pre-ego psychology the role of creativity was seen as cathartic. With the advent of ego psychology creative experience came to be understood as a process that has as much to do with the creation of tension as it does with tension discharge. Like Greenacre, Dr. Coltrera has noted that the creative individual feels a sense of difference and an apartness in the latency period. He believes that the creative ego is able through its unique apparatus of consciousness to distribute pattern modalities of attention cathexis of a radical cognitive organization, probably related to the desynthesizing function.

Dr. Leon Altman felt that adding the dissociative function to the ego functions when discussing creativity might burden the ego. He agrees that it is not enough to use sublimation in relation to the drives to explain creativity. He has seen creative people who could function when there was severe disorganization and breakdown of sublimation in the rest of the personality. He asked how the detachment from objects occurs, what is meant by a creative person, how is creativity defined?

Dr. Emanuel Klein felt that desynthesizing and resynthesizing is an interesting way for the creative person to formulate the capacity to see familiar experiences in a new light. Dr. Bernard Meyer wondered whether facts learned in dealing with people who manifest pathology can be applied to creative people. Dr. Jay Stanton challenged the idea that neutralization of energy is necessary to creativity.

Dr. Max Schur noted that the author's aim was to describe certain characteristics of the creative process and to demonstrate that only in the presence of endowment with special talents may these characteristics result in real creativity. He felt that shifting the main emphasis from a special constellation of drive vicissitudes to certain modes of ego functioning, described as the 'dissociative or desynthesizing function', was a real contribution. He wondered if the creative person could not only tolerate but utilize a relative prevalence of primary process and blurring of self and object-representations in a different way.

In conclusion, Dr. Weissman explained that he thought of his concept of the dissociative function as an alternative to regression in the service of the ego. This paper was limited to an introduction of this concept.

CHARLES SARNOFF

THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS will hold its Winter Meeting at the Royal Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana, on December 13-15, 1968. The theme of the meeting will be Adolescent and Early Adult Sexuality.

The Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOSOMATIC SOCIETY will be held in Cincinnati, Ohio, March 28-30, 1969. Information about submitting papers for presentation at the meeting may be obtained from Thomas H. Holmes, M.D., Chairman of the Program Committee, 265 Nassau Road, Roosevelt, New York 11575.

A two-year program of Research Training in Psychiatry is offered by the Graduate Educational Program of the State University of New York Downstate Medical Center. Information about the program may be obtained by writing to: Office of Admissions, Downstate Medical Center, 450 Clarkson Avenue, Brooklyn, New York 11203.

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