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EDWARD GLOVER

ABSTRACTED FROM A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF EDWARD GLOVER BY LAWRENCE S. KUBIE, M.D.

Edward Glover, born on the 13th of January, 1888, in Lesmahagow, Scotland, was the third of three sons of Matthew Glover, a country school master, and Elizabeth Shanks Glover. According to Edward Glover, like many school masters of the period, his father had mastered a wide curriculum and taught with equal ease Greek, Latin, Hebrew, French, 'not omitting an English of the type that most Scottish dominies considered their rightful and unchallenged domain'—an influence apparent in his son's own writings. Matthew Glover's major purpose was to educate and train 'country boys "of parts" in the way in which they should go, namely on the high road to a university education'. Inevitably therefore his sons should follow academic careers. The church was quite out of the question, the father being a Darwinian agnostic. This left only the professions of law and medicine for the sons to follow.

After some conflict over what his future career should be, Edward Glover's close identification with his oldest brother, James, led him into medicine. In the course of his university years, the topics and men who fired his enthusiasm were Graham Kerr in evolutional zoology, Ralph Stockman in medical therapeutics, and Robert Muir in pathology. In retrospect Glover has commented that he came to appreciate that 'there was a central flaw in the fact that medicine and biology as taught in those days [1906] had certain incompatibilities'. Several years later he realized to what extent the resolution of this situation lay in medical psychology, at that time looked

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upon as 'the step-child of metaphysics'. While in 1907 the names of Freud, Jones, and Brill were unknown in provincial Scotland, Glover took note of certain vague rumors about somebody named 'Janet'.

He graduated from Glasgow University with the degrees of M.D., Ch.B. at the age of twenty-one. Professor John Cowan of the Royal Infirmary of Glasgow then offered him a vacancy as house physician. Glover remarks, 'Cowan, a somewhat etiolated Cantabridgian personality, not easy to love but easy to admire and a disciplined scientist, taught me how to examine patients, conduct research and control observations, and inculcated the imperative necessity of holding a professional yardstick to life, a measure which in effect meant nothing better than the best'. This led him to his first efforts at writing research papers about diseases of the heart and chest 'but the psychosomatic aspects of cardiovascular disease remained a closed book until I became senior resident in the local children's hospital—then the facts of psychological life could no longer be gainsaid'. It is of special interest to note that for Glover the high road into psychoanalytic psychology and an understanding of psychosomatic interrelationships began with this understanding of the child.

He next turned to London where he was appointed an assistant physician in a 'snobbish institution for pulmonary tuberculosis', where the 'eminence of the medical council established a few contacts with metropolitan medicine'. Here the influence of a 'first-rate Irish pathologist, J. A. D. Radcliffe' gave him 'a discipline which added to my understanding of the methods of natural science'. He also experienced for the first time 'the clash between disciplined organic knowledge and the imprecision of clinical prognosis'. In 1914 he was struggling with the question why 'similar cases with similar lesions and apparently similar prognoses could pursue such widely varied courses toward a fatal termination'.

The First World War prepared the ground for his later move toward training in psychological medicine. The domi-

nant factor was the renewal of a close association with his brother, James, who had received a wartime appointment to a nearby eye hospital, and who introduced him to Freud's work. Glover feels that it was a rather unfortunate event that the first of Freud's writings which he read was The Interpretation of Dreams, 'not the best for neophytes'. James soon gave up ophthalmology to establish a psychological practice and became associated with the Brunswick Square Psychological Clinic. After attending the Hague Congress as a guest, James Glover, who had entered into analysis with Abraham, persuaded Edward to abandon organic medicine and to take up analytic training.

Edward Glover was then thirty-two years old but found that the change was 'prompt, irrevocable, and effortless'. He moved to Germany with an honorary appointment as a medical officer to an English Quaker Relief Commission and by the end of 1920 had settled in Berlin's Grunewald, close to Abraham's residence. He describes his first training as an 'apprenticeship' rather than a 'training analysis' plus a 'roving commission to pick up as much psychiatry as the Berlin hospital system afforded'. He followed Abraham on his holiday trips to Austria and Italy. Of those days, he comments that he is 'one of the few survivors who from time to time had an analytic session under the olive trees of the Gardone Riviera'. Among those with him on this Odyssey were his brother, James,[1] Ella Freeman Sharpe, and Mary Chadwick. They became honorary guests of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society where they had an opportunity to observe and listen to 'Abraham, the silent Eitingon, Hárnik, Löwenstein, and subsequently Melanie Klein'. As he looks back, Glover is rather perplexed by the fact that in spite of his highly disciplined earlier training, his new enthusiasm swept away all scientific critique so that for a time he was able 'to swallow hook, line

1 It is of interest that before James Glover's early death, he and Edward were among the first to repudiate Rank's birth trauma theory at a time when it was accepted uncritically by most analysts.

and sinker any undisciplined extravagance in ideology and methods'. 'But for the clinical gifts of Abraham, the more metaphysical cast of Sachs's mind would have run unchecked.' Later however he could no longer avoid asking himself: 'Was this science, art, or religion, or a special compound of all three? And was it characteristic of all psychoanalytic societies?' Whatever the answer, the experience was critical for his subsequent development. It became more and more essential for him to attempt to 'correct extravagance' and to find 'a common ground of essential theory' under a more 'controlled system of techniques'. To this search his psychoanalytic life has since been dedicated.

After returning to London, Edward Glover was made an associate and later a full member of the British Psycho-Analytical Society. Several years after he became a founder-member of the London Institute and after the death of his brother he was appointed sequentially Scientific Secretary of the British Society, Director of Research at the Institute, and Assistant Director of the London Clinic under Dr. Ernest Jones. It was also at this time that he was appointed Secretary of the Training Committee of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. On Jones's retirement from the Clinic, Glover became its Director. During World War II, he became Chairman of the Training Committee and later Acting Chairman of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, posts which he held until his resignation in 1944.

During this period Glover's interest spread to another area which was to become one of the major concerns of his scientific career. In 1930 he joined a committee interested in reform of procedures for dealing with criminals, and in 1931, with the help of colleagues, he founded the Institute for the Study and Treatment of Delinquency. Later this Institute started a clinic for the treatment of delinquency and Glover remained a co-director of the clinic until it was taken over by the National Health Services in 1948. In 1950, with Drs. Mannheim and Emanuel Miller, he founded the British Journal of Delin-

quency (subsequently the British Journal of Criminology). He became Chairman of the Scientific Committee of the London Institute of Criminology and early in 1963, of the Institute itself.

These interests and posts combined to shape his activities and his writings. Glover comments on his writings with characteristic if sometimes caustic humor, often at his own expense. He is not prone to turn his humor on others, but he never feels it necessary to spare himself—and this is an important aspect of the man and his work. He points out that it is an optimistic estimate to assume that more than five per cent of the writings in any branch of science are of significance; consequently when he confesses to more than two hundred books and papers, he does not find it unduly modest to assert that not more than two-and-a-half per cent of the total have significance.

On the basis of this modest assumption, Glover points to subjects of special interest to him.

1. The conscious and unconscious bent of the observer.

2. The extrinsic and accidental influences which directed his attention to 'gaps in our knowledge or to controversies over points of view'.

3. The accidental differences in the nature of the clinical material which one has an opportunity to study. (In this connection he groups all of his early papers on the oral phase as being chiefly of 'antiquarian interest determined by the influence of Abraham and the fact that the phase itself had been neglected'.)

4. All problems of technique. It was the neglect of this critical issue that challenged him, plus the coincidence that it was just at the time Ferenczi's suggestions about 'active technique' were being much discussed. Also in his early work he happened to deal with an especially large group of drug addicts, alcoholics, and obsessional neurotics. (His interest in technique and the importance of controlling its variations continued. His lectures on the subject were first published as a supplement to

the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis in 1928, and later became the basis of his book on technique.)

5. Of deep significance was his continuous attraction to problems having to do with psychological development between birth and the age of four. This field has remained a major focus down through his most recent book, The Birth of the Ego. It is of further interest that in his paper on the classification of mental disorders he recognized, as early as 1932, that any systematic classification and understanding of the early stages and development were interdependent, which led to his concept of ego development and ego differentiation, and his 'nuclear theory' of ego formation. Glover comments, 'It is my view that the vast majority of papers on the ego and superego stultify themselves by the sheer improbability of the assumption that major differentiations are synthesized *ab initio*'. He adds, 'This is metaphysical, not metapsychological' but balances this by saying 'there is nothing original about the nuclear theory. It is only a logical extension of Freud's instinctual concepts of polymorphous infantile sexuality.'

6. Glover regards his paper on the therapeutic effects of inexact interpretations 'of some potential value to psychoanalysis'.

7. The social applications of psychoanalytic psychology to therapy and research made him aware of some of the defects of the so-called 'team techniques'. He placed his finger on the critical issue, namely that the limiting factor is the weakness or strength of the weakest link. He comments that 'I do not think very highly of my own book on the subject, The Roots of Crime'; he thinks of it now as being useful mainly for the general orientation of non-analytic workers.

8. During the early thirties, and after World War I, he became increasingly preoccupied with the 'psychoanalytical brand of social psychology' that links the study of crime to that of war. Lectures in Geneva under the auspices of the Association for the League of Nations, led to the publication of War, Sadism and Pacifism. Before and during World War II,

this interest continued and overlapped the exchange of letters between Freud and Einstein, *Warum Krieg?*, which Glover comments, 'extended fully the biological function I had tentatively advanced'.

In his brilliant survey of the history of psychoanalysis in England, Glover summarizes the steps in forming the London Psycho-Analytical Society. From the first this society was 'a hot bed of dissension' and after the first two years meetings were suspended (anyway, most of the members were away serving in World War I). In February 1919 Jones reassembled a group which the two Glovers joined. By 1924 the London Institute was projected and shortly thereafter the London Clinic.

Interestingly enough the first 'seeds of scientific dissension in the society grew in the field of child analysis'. In 1925 Melanie Klein, a visitor who was then a child analyst in Berlin, lectured on the subject. Klein settled in London permanently in 1926, and continued to lecture on the psychoanalysis of children. Her theories concerning mental development during the first year of life were published in 1932. These theories embodied some provocative new ideas, as did her hypotheses concerning depressive and paranoid positions and manic defenses dating presumably from the third month of life. Later this adultomorphizing of infantile psychology became a focus for lasting controversies that led to the formation of unofficial subgroups. The first was Kleinian, but with the arrival in London of Anna Freud and others from Vienna, a second group was formed, and finally a third, intermediate group. Dissensions were intense just before World War II, were masked during the war, but immediately after the war erupted again.

Looking back on this in 1961, Glover writes: 'After the lapse of twelve years it would appear that whereas the Freudian and Kleinian subgroups were gradually dwindling, the middle groupers (for whom the expedient term "independent" is now suggested) greatly increased their strength and have now acquired strategic administrative power'. In summarizing the whole picture, Glover comments that 'whereas on the surface

the issues were regarded as purely scientific, the closer one came to the scene the clearer it became that it could best be described as a pseudo-scientific manifestation of the battle of the sexes'. Glover puts his faith largely in that which is ultimately the best teacher—the patient. He takes comfort from 'the clinical observation that neophytes in psychoanalysis tend to rediscover Freud throughout their whole professional life. It is hoped that this may stem both undisciplined speculation and adulterization.'

Glover emphasizes that if there is to be a wide range of subgroups stretched along not one but many different spectra, each must be 'carefully and deeply disciplined in training and in careful balance, with much self-criticism and self-evaluation'. He feels that this is what was lost and what threatened the contribution of the British school to psychoanalysis as a theoretical system, as a technique, as a process, and also what most deeply betrayed its students. With this type of adulterization he could not compromise. He points out that 'it may be maintained that a series of subgroups constitute a spectrum of a total society, each one representing a different depth of psychoanalytic approach. It may even be asserted that there is room in psychoanalysis for each variety of speculation ranging from biology, ethology, embryology, neurology to the most superficial aspects of "person-to-person psychology". . . . What cannot be denied is the urgent need to ensure that speculative exercises in reconstruction do not by-pass the fundamental Freudian theses in favor of allegedly deeper insights, the evidence of which so far remains largely personal . . . not very reliable criteria, since both depend in part on the enthusiasm of the observer or theoretician. Our training and transference systems themselves tend to continue unsound and inexact theories.'

There are different versions of the circumstances which led to Edward Glover's resignation from the British Psycho-Analytical Society and Institute in 1944. In any event it never tempted Glover, as so many others, to launch his own messianic school,

Because of his deep and penetrating understanding of psychoanalysis, his clinical maturity, and his conviction that analysis is strong enough to withstand criticism and correction, Glover's concern was rather about the way psychoanalysis was developing. He continues to feel that no science can progress unless it has a vigorous heterodoxy. He has not been afraid to recognize and point out the difference between metaphysics and metapsychology, and how often analysts have lost their way in this bog. He has had the courage to challenge all the popular clichés that are tossed about, such as ego psychology, identity crises, and others. Above all, he challenges the fantasy that we have made great changes and great progress.

Glover himself has never lost his capacity to change. In the late twenties, he welcomed the challenge which Melanie Klein represented, although he was never so blindly subservient to her as Ernest Jones. At the same time he worked, with deep respect, for Anna Freud and her position. But as time went on he realized that Klein's theories were a curious brand of pseudo-psychoanalytic science fiction, and had the courage to reverse his position. Primarily it was this that brought him into the profound and painful conflict with his colleagues in the British group. But there was also the political maneuvering which threatened the integrity and effectiveness of the British society and the honesty of its relationship to students.

Glover does not deplore the existence of factions in a society even though he points out that instead of making discussions more fruitful they tend to make each side more stereotyped. He emphasizes that whereas older analysts can protect themselves, their time, and their tempers by abstaining, 'candidates' are not in a position to abstain under existing training rules. Not only are their professional lives at stake but more importantly so is that freedom of mind on which future research capacities depend. He adds: 'Over the years I have gathered a somewhat pathetic collection of letters from British candidates, some of whom were undergoing at the same time classical Freudian training analysis and a standard Kleinian control

analysis; others the reverse. More than any other factor, the compromise organized by the training committee in 1944 determined my ultimate resignation. Training systems had by then developed into a form of power politics thinly concealed by the rationalization that however unsatisfactory eclectic policy had proved in general psychotherapy, it had somehow acquired virtue when it developed in general psychoanalytic systems. I can well remember the state of relative euphoria I experienced when, once having resigned, I was no longer under an obligation as an office-bearer to restrain my criticism.'

Characteristically however, Glover did not merely criticize. Instead he proposed the formation of an International Research Committee of which he was made chairman in 1951. Although this Committee, like so many others with similar hopes, failed to achieve its goals, he feels that it had some value as propaganda and as experience. He looks forward to the time when each branch society will develop its own research committee.

At the present time Edward Glover is an honorary member of the American Psychoanalytic Association, an honorary member of the Swiss Analytical Society, and a Contributing Editor of This QUARTERLY.

In his reminiscences Glover indicated that his effort to establish an international research project was his last psychoanalytic venture in an official capacity. He adds that 'one should gather one's papers together . . . tidy them up', even perhaps 'put on record a testament of faith'. 'I still have a high affection for some papers I wrote, for instance on free association or on the "fundamental" aspects of the mental apparatus, on ego distortions, on techniques in psychoanalysis. Although for modern taste they may have an antiquated flavor, I think they serve to indicate that basic principles have a habit of remaining basic whether or not they are overgrown by new terminology and new theory.'

Glover is unhappy about much that is happening today. He doubts that the psychoanalytic progress claimed by modern theoreticians has much reality; he can see little sign of this

progress. 'Metapsychology, it seems to me, has become in recent years very largely an armchair exercise in metaphysics; and many clinical contributions do no more than dress up theoretical notions in the most diaphanous clinical garments. . . . So when I read in psychoanalytic literature of self-images and identity formations, I am reminded of the Jungian "persona". There is a lot to be said for basic mental concepts and for disciplined Freudian research on theoretical and therapeutic issues. That, in brief, is my confession of analytical faith.'

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PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

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INTRODUCTION

This exploration of ideas about language and thought was prompted by the obvious importance of language in the communication process in psychoanalysis, and of cognition (i.e., knowing, understanding, insight, meaning) in psychoanalytic theory and the scientific rationale of its therapy.

Language and thought are uniquely human faculties, and should be a center of psychoanalytic interest. Yet they have been largely taken for granted and until recently insufficiently dealt with. Freud recognized language as the most important repository of human experience. He turned from neurophysiological inquiry to build a theory of the psychic apparatus on the data acquired by listening to his patients and on his inferences from their verbalizations.

Language and its relationship to thought was given great importance in Freud's earliest formulations of psychoanalytic theory. As early as the Project, he stated, '. . . *thought accompanied by a cathexis of the indications of thought-reality or of the indications of speech is the highest, securest form of cognitive thought-process' (10,* p. 374*).*

Psychoanalysis was bound to develop its own theory of language, without necessarily characterizing it as such. What are the characteristics of this theory? What are its strengths? Its shortcomings? Has psychoanalysis anything special to offer to

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language theory as developed by the linguists? Conversely, has language theory anything to offer psychoanalytic theory that would enhance its completeness or clarity? The same questions may be asked about the theory of cognition.

To anticipate the discussion of these questions, psychoanalysis, with its unique contribution to the psychological comprehension of 'meaning', was bound to contribute its own conception of the language and thought functions. In general, however, the formulations of psychologists and linguists have illuminated areas that have remained vague in psychoanalytic understanding. Mutual reciprocal enrichment of the related sciences should be attainable.

PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPT OF THOUGHT

The 'wish', and the striving of the total organism for its attainment, is the epitome of psychoanalysis. Drive, motivation, affect, and ultimately, 'meaning' enter into thought and all psychic functioning. Rapaport recommended that we 'broaden the customary concepts of thought to include other processes, conscious and unconscious, which occur as an integral part of the process by which motivation finds its outlet in action. . . . Thought processes are an aspect of most psychological processes' *(42,* p. 3*)*. In other words, by thought is meant something more complex than secondary process or concept formation and is more difficult to define.

However, it is concept formation that will be under consideration in this comparative study since it is this area of thought function that psychoanalysis and psycholinguistics have most in common, and that many psycholinguists deal with almost exclusively. Furthermore, most of our discussion will be concerned with one aspect of concept formation—the *symbolizing-categorizing function*—, since it is this aspect which is a common denominator of both thought and language. By symbolizing-categorizing function is meant 'the representation of classes and relations in linguistic symbols' and 'categorizing the world of varying objects' *(4)*.

The most important symbols are *words*. A word stands for a category of things on the level of conceptualization rather than for a single object, or for a perceptual attribute of the 'thing', or for an association to the 'idea' of the 'thing', as it is conceived in psychoanalytic formulation.[1]

Language is a means of coding—i.e., using word symbols—that enables people to think of the same things, to have concepts in common, and to verify concepts jointly. It consists of symbols (code) which carry the meaning of things in the common environment of all individuals and of communicating the environment 'second hand' *(26)*.[2] 'A language (English, French, etc.) is a system of arbitrary vocal symbols by which members of a social group coöperate and interact' *(51)*.

RELATIONSHIP OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

From the genetic point of view, how do thought and language develop, and what is the relationship between the growth and development of each with the other? Do these faculties stem from different roots and develop separately? Or are they two interdependent variables of a unitary function, interrelated both in their origins and their maturation?

One school of psycholinguistics conceives of language as the vehicle of thought.[3] It might be asked, if language is the ve-

[1] In regard to the distinction between perception and memory (idea), Freud wrote: '. . . [the] *idea* should not be so strongly cathected that it might be confused with a perception' *(10,* p. 361*)*. Stewart *(50)* reports: 'These associations (auditory and . . . verbal) [words] arouse quality and following the biological rule of attention, this report of quality will be hypercathected by attention cathexis. This allows the memory [memory (idea)] to enter consciousness.'

I shall attempt to elucidate Freud's development of the above concept in the discussion that follows. An important linguistic idea of Freud was that the linking of 'word' to the memory of the percept (the 'idea') permitted the memory to reach consciousness.

[2] Rapaport wrote: '. . . ideation changes into thought . . . by the superimposition of a conceptual-organization on the drive-organization of thought-process. There is a crucial change from the idiosyncratic character of ideation to the socially shared characteristic of thinking. Thinking tends to be syntonic with society' *(42,* p. 723*)*.

[3] This is the Sapir-Whorf Relativity Principle. In *Language, Thought and Reality,* Whorf writes that the study of language 'shows that the form of a

hicle of thought, or even a necessary vehicle of thought, is there an intrinsic and unitary interrelationship between them? Is there thought apart from language?[4] Many scientists hold that they are more or less independent functions, as evidenced by imageless thought, mathematical thought, etc. The concept of relationship thinking, altogether apart from the language function, is often considered. But what about images, particularly visual images, so prominent in dream phenomena?[5] How do they figure in thought?

Thought evolves from its earliest primitive manifestations, seen as 'delay' in response to stimulation, to 'thought proper', its highest stage based on the symbolizing-categorizing faculty. Vygotsky *(53)* defines thought proper as 'thought at a higher level governed by the relationship of generality between concepts—a system of relations absent from perceptions and memory'. Components characterizing the thought function include directedness, intentionality, anticipation, and, above all, attention and attention cathexis. Economy of energy and trial action are also implicated.

Similarly, language evolves from a means of communication and the direct expression of affects or emotion (which may or may not serve communication) to that advanced stage in which

person's thoughts (thinking) is controlled by inexorable laws of pattern [which] are the unperceived intricate systematization of his own language. . . . And every language is a vast pattern-system, different from others in which are culturally ordained the forms and categories by which the personality not only communicates but also analyzes nature, notices or neglects types of relationship and phenomena, channels his reasoning, and builds the house of his consciousness' *(58,* p. 252*)*.

[4] Freud first expressed the opinion that there is thought apart from language in *An Outline of Psychoanalysis (11)*. In his earlier writings, he held views closer to the Sapir-Whorf Relativity Principle.

[5] The bulk of our dream thoughts, verbal and others, undegoes plastic representation, mainly into visual images. Freud posits that for 'consideration of representability' the prosaic language usually employed in our thoughts is replaced by more easily symbolized poetic language, rich in simile and metaphor. He also posits that in dreaming there occurs a topographic, temporal, and 'formal regression where primitive methods of expression and representation take the place of the usual ones' *(12)*.

it serves as the instrument or vehicle of thought. The symbolizing-categorizing function also operates in the coding of human emotional experience. Thus language serves to communicate affect in a uniquely human way through the 'emotive' (as distinct from the emotional) utilization of situationally independent arbitrary symbols *(5,* p. 300*)*. These two aspects of language must be kept in mind, although they are synthesized into a 'fully formed functional system' serving a 'gamut of psychic uses' *(47)*.

The special aspect of thought, concept formation, corresponds to that special aspect of language that serves the thought process, and it is this distinctly human acquisition that must be differentiated from the intercommunicative aspect of language which expresses emotions and affects, or the signalling of information of the nonconceptual kind—a function humans share with lower animals. Both concept formation and the aspects of language that serve the thought process utilize the symbolizing-categorizing function. Thus language is implicated in the thought process and thought is implicated in the language process. Sapir states: 'Each element [of a] sentence defines a separate concept or conceptual relation, or both combined' *(48)*, a fact of prime importance in considering the relation of language and thought.

Psychoanalysis has lagged behind modern language theory in several areas. In the main, psychoanalysis deals with the verbal representation of 'things', essentially with 'names'. To be explicit, for psychoanalysis words 'symbolize', i.e., stand for the 'thing' because of the perceptual attributes they share. Words have a surrogate actuality, actually being-the-thing *(27)*. They are 'signals'. They have a primary process meaning. Whorf states, 'Because of the systematic, configurative nature of . . . mind, the patternment aspects of language always override . . . the name-giving aspects. . . . Sentences, not words, are the essence of speech' *(58,* p. 258*)*.

Inevitably, grammar and syntax have not entered psychoanalytic theory, nor for that matter has the symbolizing-categorizing

function in general. Hence psychoanalysis could not properly tackle the relationship of language and thought in its secondary process aspect. Notably, psychoanalysis has not dealt with the entity, language, as it is comprehended and defined by modern psycholinguistics. Nor has language as a cultural entity entered importantly into psychoanalytic theory, although the awareness of the cultural derivation of language has nagged many psychoanalysts. One finds repeated allusions to this by Freud and others, especially in the linkage of language and the superego and in psychological phenomena that have a psychosocial derivation and serve social adaptation.

Turning to psycholinguistics, new questions confront psychoanalysis. Language as defined by modern linguists is an entity that transcends its content of mere verbalization, as it is still dealt with by psychoanalysts. Even definitions of words as language symbols and how they pertain to true language fall short of fully defining language in its entirety. For such a definition of language none serves better than that of Edward Sapir, the great anthropologist and linguist. He writes: 'Language is a fully formed functional system', a perfect self-contained configurative creation of the human mind, which is capable of the full expression of all thought, feeling, emotion, etc. It is a non-intuitive method of communicating ideas, emotions, and desires by a system of voluntarily produced symbols 'which have no discernible instinctive basis'. Every language is a 'perfect means of expression and communication among every known people[6] . . . a perfect symbolic system for handling all references or meanings in a given culture . . . in actual communications or . . . such ideal substitutes of communication as thought. . . . It symbolizes actual meanings [and] can discover meanings for its speakers [which are] not traceable . . . to experience, but [behave] as projections. . . . Language completely interpenetrates [and] directs experience. . . . Language is what it is, not because of its admirable expressive power but in spite

[6] The out-dated correlation of primitive (preliterate) language and thought with infantile language and thought persists in psychoanalytic writing.

of it. . . . Speech as behavior is a wonderfully complex blend of the two pattern systems, the symbolic and the expressive [and communicative]. . . . Language has evolved from the symbolic tendency, the uniquely human one, and has then become language. . . . The historical nucleus of language is, curiously . . . how *vocal articulations become dissociated from their original expressive power*' (*48,* pp. 1-44 *passim*).

This expresses the basic idea that language is a completely organized, self-contained entity. It is a configuration and is contextual to the individual on the one side and to the culture on the other. It is this complete symbolic system that is adequate for the expression of the whole range of human thought and feeling.

In considering language (and perhaps thought) there are a number of givens in human psychological equipment that are crucial to social process and that derive somehow from its eminent place in human behavior. Language is already present in full-blown form from the beginning of the child's development. Correct syntax is used at the beginning of language acquisition by infants. The fact that language is also a cultural acquisition immediately establishes it as a bridge between the individual and his society. Neither individual psychology nor genetic psychology can sidestep this fact.

In recent years there have been advances in the knowledge of child development which may enhance the comprehension of both language and thought. For example, the role of the identification processes in internalization and in object representation in ego development may open the way to a fuller understanding of language acquisition. A corollary of the psychology of object relations is the development of socialization functions. The importance and interrelatedness of both functions are obvious.

The language function and the symbolizing-categorizing function may have developed in the course of man's evolution as an exquisitely social animal. They are in an integral relationship to his progressively increased socialization in the

course of evolution, a hypothesis which will be elaborated later in this paper with evidence adduced from specific human features in early child development and particularly in the early mother-child interrelationship.

Why has psychoanalytic language theory not kept pace with modern psycholinguistics in dealing with symbols of the symbolizing-categorizing class and with language as a configurative entity and cultural artifact? Why the inertia to bring its language theory up to date in conformity with its great advances in developmental theory? One might answer that in psychoanalytic developmental observations—i.e., studies of children—, the observations of signs and signals (the more primitive components of language and close to the concrete aspects of the infantile behavior observed) lend themselves satisfactorily to the requirements of a clinical-psychological theory. It was thus possible to ignore or postpone the elucidation of the ego functions involved in language and thought.[7]

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THOUGHT

Freud's early formulations on the genesis of secondary process remain essentially unaltered in psychoanalytic theory.[8] In-

[7] The smooth and frictionless efficiency of language in communication and thought may paradoxically have accounted for this omission. Scientific curiosity was not compelled and generated. We are like the woman who was surprised to discover she was speaking 'prose' all her life.

[8] This has been beautifully epitomized in Arlow's report of the paper by Guttman and Sloane, *The Development of Freud's Theory of Thinking*. Arlow stated: 'The inadequacy of hallucination as an ultimate method for eliminating tension, of necessity, turns the developing infant's mind to the environment. The immediate discharge of drive cathexis by way of hallucination fails in a twofold way; first, regarding survival value; second, regarding the attainment of pleasure. The organism must learn to delay discharge long enough to distinguish perception from hallucination; i.e., between what is real and what is momentarily pleasant but . . . unreal. In this manner the reality principle is instituted. From the economic point of view delay of drive discharge [becomes] essential. Thinking becomes a major agency in the pursuit of this goal because in a limited way thought provides discharge of tension. Cathexis not immediately discharged now becomes available for exploring and understanding the environment from which the need-satisfying object may be summoned. Of course, gratification is not always forthcoming immediately. Therefore, Freud proposed that

troducing the concept of primary and secondary process in relation to language, Freud spoke of the creation of a new series of qualities or attributes leading to a 'new process of regulation'. He explained the development of this new series of qualities thus: On the one hand, mental functions have no sensory qualities; they can neither be heard, seen, nor touched. On the other hand, affects (lust and *unlust)* accompanying thought must be kept within narrow confines so as not to disturb its course. How, then, can mental processes as such reach consciousness? In Freud's words, 'how can the presentation . . . of the thing alone . . . the thing-cathexis of the objects, the first and true object cathexes' become conscious? Stated otherwise, how does primary process thinking become secondary process thinking? According to Freud, it does so by the mental processes becoming associated with word memories, or verbal signs (*13,* pp. 201-202). This development is specific for human beings and is not shared by any other animal.

Klein *(27)* pointed out that Freud's idea of verbal signs permitting mental processes to reach consciousness may be misleading. He raised the question: Are animals conscious? On the presumption that they are, yet do not have words in this crucial sense that humans do (i.e., language), Freud's statement does not hold. (Moreover there is reason to believe that the contents of consciousness in humans transcend expression in words.) Klein asked further, if language is thought of as coding 'mental processes', is not the coding process itself non-conscious?[9] What

the functions of attention, memory and judgment develop out of the inexorable conflict between the wish for drive gratification on one hand and the inevitability of environmentally imposed frustration on the other. Thinking as a form of trial action helps to secure a more accurate assessment of the situation of need by relating the situation to previous experiences of success or failure in achieving drive gratification. Logical thinking which utilizes well-demarcated concepts renders the pursuit of gratification more efficient. For this purpose, the fluidity of concepts, the easy shifting of cathexis from one object representation to another—so characteristic of primary process—must be inhibited. Delay of discharge implies that cathexes must be bound to concepts which are well defined' *(1,* p. 144).

[9] Whorf *(58)* and others think of it as 'non-conscious'.

words do is to fix meanings of events; they permit attention, or rather they make prolonged attention over a meaning possible. He added that words are different from other products of thought in that they are responses at the same time that they are stimuli and as such they are realities of a social group. It is the function of words as language to be thus a social event, and in this sense alone one can say that they enable events to reach consciousness.

Rosen, on the other hand, believes that the unconscious contains the faculty of abstract thought. In explaining Freud's aforementioned statement, Rosen *(43)* gave the following example: 'With ideas that have no sensory modalities, like "space" or "justice", or the relationship of A to B, the word provides an acoustic-visual hitching post in consciousness which makes it possible to communicate or think about the abstraction'. These may not be the 'ideas'[10] that Freud had in mind, but where abstract thought takes place topographically seems to be unclear.

A crucial fact for psychoanalysis is that thought and language are drive determined, i.e., they are rooted in emotional motivations. Hence the affective, expressive, emotional components of language figure prominently, tending to emphasize the primary process.

The psychoanalytic use of 'id' symbols is appropriate only to primary process thought. To quote Lili Peller, 'A symbol in the psychoanalytic sense refers to an image carrying an affect that in the deepest strata belongs to something else' *(40)*. She called these 'primordial symbols'. And Ferenczi stated: 'Only such things (or ideas) are symbols in the sense of psychoanalysis as are invested in consciousness with a logically inexplicable and unfounded affect . . . which they owe . . . to unconscious identification with another thing (or idea) to which the surplus of affect really belongs' *(8)*.

Id symbolism is inappropriate to secondary process thought, though it is so utilized by psychoanalysis. In psycholinguistics, symbolism derives from the symbolizing-categorizing function.

[10] *Cf.* footnote 1.

This symbolism would seem to be essential to the psychoanalytic concept of secondary process thought.[11] By neglecting it, psychoanalysis limits itself. Similarly, by neglecting a comprehensive theory of abstract thought, cognition, and most strikingly and astonishingly by the oversight of syntax and grammar—the algebraic aspects of language and thought—, psychoanalysis further limits itself.

Klein emphasizes the critical distinction between vocally communicated events that serve as signals and true language. When words lose their symbolic aspects as a universal code, they become more in the nature of 'signals' of internal states (like vocal communication of animals). This is the *primary process* aspect of language; indeed, 'pure primary process' here means that words have lost their language function, being mainly expressive *(28)*.

CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS TO THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

Psychologists have been giving increasing attention to the relationship of language and thought. They assume the capacity for thought as a given. Their concentration on the symbolizing-categorizing function makes them better able than psychoanalysts to deal conceptually with certain ego functions. However, they are handicapped in dealing with 'meaning' by their oversight of drives and motivation in thought and language func-

[11] '*Primordial symbols* are seemingly derived from body parts and body functions, especially the functions of the erotogenic zones. We associate them with primary process and see them spontaneously coming into being in dreams, fantasies, and symptoms. They are concrete, non-arbitrary, and remarkably limited in form and content (though subject to infinite variation in detail). *Conceptual symbols,* on the other hand, appear as manifestations of secondary process thinking. They are characteristically abstract, arbitrary, protean in form, and infinite in their potential for investment with meaning. They are subject to evolutionary change under social pressure but are not formed spontaneously (and always in the same shape) like primordial symbols. They seem rather to have been established at some traceless time in the distant prehistory of man. From that archaic past they persist into the present as the bearers of meaning and of culture. Language is the principal repository of conceptual symbols and thus also of the experience of the race' *(6)*.

tions. Székely *(52)* expressed this criticism: 'The investment of meaning is a problem relatively neglected by academic psychology, which relegates it to the field of perceptions and of memory functions, and makes assumptions about the interaction between the process of perception and memory-traces. All these theories are based on the fundamental assumption that the external world already possesses endopsychic meaningful representatives. In fact, these theories are concerned only with ascertaining the rules according to which a new member is accepted into the society of the old members. Psychoanalysis shows, however, that one's own bodily experience within the pleasure-unpleasure series gives external perceptions their primary meaning.'

It is among the educational psychologists, who were predisposed to study their problems from a developmental and often from a genetic point of view, that an approach sympathetic to the psychoanalytic is encountered. Here are found studies on thought and language, on language acquisition, and on concept formation, particularly the symbolizing-categorizing function, that are understandable and important to the psychoanalyst.[12] Here too are found data that confirm psychoanalytic observation and theory, pointing to new directions for psychoanalysis to follow.

Piaget's writings, on the whole, are a theory of knowledge more than a psychological theory of development. He is not interested in psychopathology or motivation. Drive plays a small role in his sensorimotor theory, which he expresses in mathematical and quantitative terms. But his clinical observations on children, particularly his ontogenetic studies of thought and language, have had a strong appeal to psychoanalysts, and he was one of the first psychologists to receive their attention. The introduction of the concept of primary autonomy in ego psychology by Hartmann has drawn the theories of Piaget and of psychoanalysis closer together *(59)*.

[12] The appeal of the educational psychologists to American psychiatrists is exemplified in Kasanin's application of Vygotsky's experimental method to his study of thought disorders in schizophrenia *(23)*.

The major theme of Piaget's Language and Thought of the Child *(41)*, is that 'the child's cognitive structure, the kind of logic his thinking possesses, gets expressed in his use of language. Thus language behavior is a dependent variable, with cognition an independent variable; language is viewed as a symptom of an underlying intellectual orientation and can achieve a relative independence from it. Thus egocentric speech (and its source "inner speech")[13] which continues up to seven years, does not serve communication or the social function, and words are correlated with the "syncretic" in the conceptions of causality in the child's thinking' *(9)*.

A school of Russian psychologists, initiated in the thirties by the short-lived theoretical genius, Vygotsky, and continued to the present by his pupil, the experimenter, Alex Luria, has bridged modern language theory and the psychological sciences, projecting itself into the social sciences in an imposing way. The language-thought interrelationship[14] has been clearly expounded and concretely demonstrated by them. Further, these psychologists began to show how 'language and symbolization serve to free the human being from the control of stimuli, so that it may gain control over its activities through the transformation of thought' *(3)*.[15]

Luria performed neurophysiological stimulus-response experiments on infants, in which external instructions were introduced and were eventually internalized (i.e., 'inner speech').[16] He concluded that 'the introduction of the child's

[13] 'Inner speech': an internalized and automatized functional component of inter- and intrasystemic communication.

[14] It should be noted that Vygotsky posits two roots of human thought which merge: a pre-language thought and pre-intellectual verbalization.

[15] Hartmann presents a similar formulation from a psychoanalytic view: 'Self-regulation can be described on different levels . . . there is one level of self-regulation which corresponds to what we usually call the synthetic function of the ego or, as I would prefer to call it, its organizing function. . . . The development of this organizing function seems to be part of a general biological trend towards internalization; it also helps towards a growing independence from the immediate impact of stimuli' *(20*, p. 384*)*.

[16] Inner speech has its own specific structural characteristics.

own speech brings into being initial stages of formation of the self-regulatory system, in which the neurodynamically most perfect and developed link assumes the role of a regulating mechanism re-enforced by the verbal instruction which makes possible the accomplishment of a real voluntary act' *(37)*. According to Vygotsky, 'egocentric speech' is a transition from the interpsychic (social communication) to intrapsychic (individual action-thinking process), a pattern of development common to all the higher psychological functions. 'Speech for oneself originates from speech for others' *(53)*.[17]

The intellectual development that occurs with the growth of language is a progression in the 'levels of generality' on which thought functions, with an ever-increasing capacity for symbolizing and categorizing. Spontaneous thinking advances to 'I think'; consciousness advances to self-consciousness; deliberate speech can now be initiated.[18]

Vygotsky, and later Luria, distinguished 'directed thought' and 'thought proper' from perception and memory by showing that 'thought at a higher level is governed by the relations of generality between concepts' *(37)*. The advance from spontaneous or nonconscious concepts to deliberate or 'scientific thinking' is also so governed. There is an advance in hierarchy from thought as an involuntary activity to thought as a voluntary and self-conscious state.

CONTRIBUTION OF NEUROPSYCHIATRISTS TO THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

A number of psychiatrists have dealt with the subject of language and thought, notably Paul Schilder. His formulations

[17] Note the correlation between the process of introjection-identification and the socialization facts and process alluded to in this brief quotation. This formulation of the developmental transition from social communication (interpsychic speech) to intrapsychic (inner speech) parallels the psychoanalytic proposition of internalization (introjection, identification) and the establishment of such internal discourse suggests communicated differentiation within the ego (intrasystemic) and communication between the ego and superego (intersystemic).

[18] This parallels the psychoanalytic concept of the development of 'identity' and the 'self' *(21, 22)*. It also bears on the development of an increase in self-regulation occurring with ego maturation.

are on the borderline between psychoanalysis and experimental psychology, and are close to those of Freud. Schilder wrote: 'Transitory phases of thought development become manifest when various intentions related to reality meet; that is, when new reality relationships enter the thought process. The value of thinking, however, lies in the utilization of these reality relationships. . . . The images which indicate that an object-directed intention has been *checked* are essentials to fruitful thinking.[19] The checking effect becomes manifest in the form of *images*. The essence of productive thought process is that in spite of these checks they reach their goal, which is to gain insight into object relationships' *(49)*.

In Schilder's view, words are only one category of images that enters the thought process. Visual images are also an important category. He follows Darwin in thinking of language as a 'differentiated expressive movement' (words are then more than signals), and expressive movements are instrumental means and rudimentary forms of affect directed movement. 'Readiness for action' is incompletely consummated by words and it follows that there must exist thought which needs no words. In fact, Schilder postulated 'imageless thought' as an important component in abstract thinking. He considered speech an expressive movement and denied emphatically any identity of speech with thought. 'Speechless thought is thought', he stated.

Aphasia has been a psychopathological laboratory for the study of the relation of language and thought. Indeed it was through an interest in aphasia that Freud first approached the study of language and thought. Kurt Goldstein *(16, 17, 18)* developed his abstract-concrete hypothesis in thought and language from his studies on aphasia. He assumed two 'attitudes' or 'behaviors' in man's orientation to the world—the abstract and the concrete. Concrete behavior is directed toward the actual thing in its uniqueness; abstract behavior is determined by

19 This 'checking' would seem to be equivalent to the 'delay', as crucial to the genesis of the thought function as stated by Freud,—qualifying as the most important indication of the existence of thought, even in lower animals, according to Bruner (preverbal or nonverbal thought?) *(3)*.

a principle, a category, or a concept in which the objects are only incidental and representative (i.e., the symbolizing-categorizing function).

A high degree of abstract behavior is requisite for consciousness and volition. Assuming a close interplay of functions or behaviors in his holistic theory, Goldstein did not commit himself about the extent to which the secondary process is derived from language formation beyond saying that patients who have lost the capacity to use words as symbols show the same deficiency in thinking. Words are a means of helping man organize the world in a conceptual, a symbolic, way. A classification of language that should prove important from a developmental point of view—i.e., the study of the early stages of language and presymbolic language—is: 1, language proper, in which words have the character of symbols; and 2, language consisting of learned motor and sensory performances, which Goldstein calls 'instrumentalities of language'. In living speech, symbolic language and instrumentalities are intermingled. Concrete thinking in schizophrenia and, perhaps, concrete thinking of subjects with an early libidinal fixation are in point here.

Beginning with the consideration that language as a vehicle of thought (symbolizing-categorizing) develops beyond speech as an intercommunication activity, Goldstein's formulation on the concrete-abstract phases of thought and speech, with his classification of language into 'language proper' and the 'instrumentalities of language', fits into previous discussions. These classifications may be correlated to: (a) Piaget's classifications of early global (concrete) thought function and developmentally later to abstract thought function as expressed in language; (b) psychoanalytic language theory of the 'thing' concept preceding the 'word' concept developmentally;[20] (c) Ogden and Richards' *(38)* classification of language into its semantic (symbolizing-categorizing function) and expressive-

[20] Peter Wolff states: '. . . the representation of concrete things and the representation of classes and relations in linguistic symbols, are qualitatively distinct psychic events acquired at different stages in the development of thought' *(60)*.

affective-poetic phases (intercommunications); (d) Rosen's *(44)* conception of the primary process in dreams being the signs and signals of language, and the latent thought being the secondary process; (e) Klein's *(27)* formulation about regression from words as symbols in the universal code to 'signals' of internal states.

Thought and language in schizophrenia have been extensively studied. Kasanin *(23)* viewed language as the external representative of thought and stressed that they must be differentiated. The loose relationship between these two functions corresponds to the view of many other authors. Lidz and associates *(31)* demonstrated the importance of language in ego development by showing that language disorders in parents (irrationality, 'masking') may eventuate in schizophrenia—'a thinking disorder'—in their children.

CONTRIBUTION OF PSYCHOANALYSTS TO THE RELATION OF LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT

Until recently most psychoanalytic studies dealing with the development of language function have been studies of the ontogenetic development of speech and have stopped short of dealing with the entity, language. Commonly viewed as an oral-erotic manifestation, speech and language have not been considered separately. To this extent a hiatus in psychoanalytic theory has existed. Also lacking is the necessary differentiation between the more primitive expressive function (e.g., the affective, emotional) and the symbolizing-categorizing function, that distinct addition due to humanization.

Psychologists have dealt mainly with the cognitive aspects of the language function, with drive and motivation figuring little in their formulations. On the whole, it can be generalized that academic psychology has concerned itself with *knowing*, and psychoanalysis with *wishing*. Thus psychology lends itself to the study of cognition and semantics while psychoanalysis offers the best approach to the study of the intercommunicative and, notably, the 'emotive' aspects of language. It can also best

deal with 'meaning' in the sense of that which is purposed or intended, as in 'purposive ideas' referred to by Freud: 'No influence . . . can ever enable us to think without purposive ideas' *(12)*.

The psychoanalytic contributors to the study of language and thought can be divided into two groups. In the first are those analysts who utilize Freud's original metapsychological formulations and whose approach is mainly from the classical psychopathological point of view. Aided by recent observations in early ego development, they have noted that disturbances in speech produce disturbances in thought.

Anny Katan *(24)* was the first to point out that a child unable to express his feelings will develop severe ego disturbances. The question is not raised of which came first, the disturbance in the language function or the emotional disturbance that disturbs the language function. Keiser *(25)* made essentially the same point. He stated: 'Schilder commented that thinking continuously establishes the attributes of objects and thereby makes it possible to cope with them in action. Since babbling speech does not encompass such a possibility, the objects and their qualities remain vague and no such action is possible.' Babbling is not presented as a prestage in the development of language function, nor is the interdependence of language function development and object relations considered. These authors demonstrated that there is some intrinsic and important relationship between speech and ego development, and that if one is disturbed, the other is affected. As specific processes are not dealt with, their functional interrelationship was not considered.

Loewenstein has had an abiding interest in language theory and has dealt with the role of verbalization in his investigations of the therapeutic process in the psychoanalytic situation in a series of papers on psychoanalytic technique and on interpretation *(33, 34, 35, 36)*. He has discussed the importance of speech function in a wide and important variety of psychic manifestations, stressing both the cognitive functions and the emotional (affective) discharge function [the 'emotive' aspects of lan-

guage] in the utterances of the patient and analyst. On the cognitive side verbalizations are 'social acts binding for the individual' and 'affects expressed in words are henceforth external as well as internal realities'. Loewenstein epitomizes the classical psychoanalytic language theory in the statement: 'The reason for the importance of the wording of an interpretation resides in the function of speech in the analytic procedure. Speech . . . is the main vehicle that permits the lifting of psychological processes out of their unconscious state into the preconscious and finally into consciousness' *(35,* p. 145*)*. Further, 'Inasmuch as speech is the vehicle of object relations, the patient uses it for the discharge of his instinctual drives in the infant-mother paradigm of the analytic situation. The patient's primary process thinking is being reactivated, but he communicates it in words, thus imparting to the primary process important characteristics of secondary process thinking; speech creates an outside reality shared with the analyst; a social, objective and binding reality' *(36,* pp. 69-70*)*.

A second group of analysts, recent authors in the field of language and thought, have ventured beyond purely phenomenological observations to the investigation of the thought process and of verbalization. Balkanyi and Wolff have concerned themselves mainly with language acquisition; Székely and George Klein have tackled the problem of thought and cognition; Victor Rosen and Edelheit have considered other areas in which psycholinguistics and psychoanalysis overlap.

Balkanyi *(2)* has dealt particularly with verbalization and its relationship to the secondary process. Differentiating verbalization from speech, she states that 'speech is a specific performance of the erotogenic zone and a means of communication', whereas verbalization is 'that (intrapsychic) ego function by which we put our impulses into words'. Thus she clarified the confusion in which speech and verbalization are sometimes dealt with indiscriminately as activities of the erotogenic zones. But in line with psychoanalytic neglect of modern language theory, she rejected the idea that words are mainly arbitary

signs. Hence, her valuable psychoanalytic formulation did not come to grips with the relationship of language and concept formation.

Balkanyi extended the freudian concept of the preconscious in her description of how the preconscious is involved in the functions of verbalization and thought. The system preconscious begins during the transition from the oral to the anal stage when 'the child can link the thing-presentation to the *meaning* of the word presented . . . either from without or from within. . . . It is cathexis with words which brings about the preconscious quality of thought, and that genetically the preconscious came about by gradual development of the verbal function' (p. 67). She formulated the psychological 'mediational process' (of 'how' as well as 'when').[21] 'When the mental apparatus is . . . in a state of attention-cathexis . . . we hark back to the unconscious waiting for the emergence of the word-presentation. This harking readiness would be the peculiar preconscious state, which, when the intention is to express meaning, would immediately be followed by the presentation of the memory of the word' (p. 66).

To prove the intrinsic connection between verbalization and thought and their operation in the preconscious, Balkanyi described her observation of deaf mutes who suffer from 'preconscious dysfunction (as sleepers do from preconscious afunction)'. Commenting on Balkanyi's thesis, Rosen pointed out that 'if it were not for the feedback of verbalization either for the self or through communication with the other, the displacements, condensations, the ordinary primary process aspects of thought would never develop into secondary process' *(45)*.

Székely *(52)* has dealt with the development of the operation of thought function. He said, 'We cannot explain . . . the part

[21] There is something about the psychoanalytic method that comes more easily to grips with the contents of thought and the psychology of motivation, conflict, and defenses than with 'mediation processes'. See also, Wolff's criticism of Hartmann's ego psychology in regard to its failure 'to generate a psychoanalytic conception of language acquisition . . . since it simply postulates inborn apparatuses like language capacity, not specifying their structure, function, or development . . . nor explaining how they determine the child's experience' *(60)*.

played by cognition in the psychoanalytic process' because we possess no systematic and uniform theory of thought. He asked a practical question: How does knowledge act therapeutically? He posited that 'a psychoanalytic theory of thought must differentiate between the thinking process, the means or instruments of thought, and the products of thinking. The products of thinking are, for example, ideas, plans, etc. . . . Examples of the thinking process . . . [are] Freud's description of dream work and wit work. . . . Examples of instruments . . . of thought [are] mechanisms such as displacement, condensation, etc.' (p. 299).

Székely used the psychoanalytic theory of libidinal stage development and the effect of the wish (motivation) to answer the question: How does the child know? Using a clinical example of how motivation operates in concept formation as observed in a child under two years, he pointed out that when certain bodily processes are going on in such a child—in this case, anal processes of which the child is conceptually unaware and cannot fully comprehend his own defecation—they are nonetheless a part of his body schemata. These processes are connected with somatic and coenesthetic memory traces invested with a pleasurable affect. The child may conceptualize thus: when he sees a bird defecate, he says, 'Birdie do big'. He says the same—'do big'—when he sees a parcel drop from a car, or any small object separating from a large one. Székely demonstrated how this child might project, as it were, this inner image of defecation in his own bodily process onto the way he sees the world in anal terms which he expresses clearly and beautifully in linguistic form. Székely calls this an 'instance of apprehensive thinking', the expression of 'concept formation and body schemata'.

Edelheit *(7)*, in his highly original thesis in Speech and Psychic Structure: The Vocal-Auditory Organization of the Ego, makes an attempt to conceptualize early ego formation as a corollary of speech and language development. He states that 'speech more than any other function characterizes the ego as a whole'. He speaks of the ego as a 'vocal-auditory organization,

a language-determined and language-determining structure, which functions as the characteristically human organ of adaptation'. This ego development is spelled out in correlated linguistic and psychoanalytic modalities and 'a detailed working out of the relationship of the ontogenesis of speech to the ontogenesis of psychic structure, the ego' is presented.

DISCUSSION

The late Lili Peller presented advanced views on the subject of the relationship of language to the secondary process. She emphasized that it was not in the language function alone that 'the gulf between the preverbal human infant and the offspring of other primates lies. This gulf is no smaller than the gulf between adults of the respective groups' *(40)*. She described many infantile behaviors to prove that the child is distinctly human from the first moment of life—human not merely in the species-specific sense but in the sense of having advanced to a higher evolutionary category. The endowment of the symbolizing-categorizing function and the acquisition of language by the species in an exquisitely social context, I emphasize, are the most important criteria.

The dependency of the human child is more prolonged, greater, more complex, and qualitatively different from other primates. These differences are inherent in a symbiosis which is a more comprehensive dialectic mother-child interrelationship than it is ordinarily conceived of. Even narcissism is generated mainly through this interaction, since the dual function of mothering is not only to gratify needs (and 'wishes') but to awaken them in the child by stimulation and 'seduction'. The needs which are newly evoked by the mother's stimulation lead the child to turn to the mother for his gratification. It is through this process that object constancy is bestowed upon the mother.

Out of the preverbal dialogue comes a libidinization of the striving for mastery and a type of tireless play not directed toward reality goals, which Peller calls 'metaphoric play'.

This play does not seem immediately related to need satisfac-

tion or survival but seems rather to belong in some other functional context not immediately comprehensible. There are rich biological implications in this activity which occurs within the symbiotic mother-child interaction. What is the aim of the child's ceaseless practicing activity? Does this activity transcend hierarchically the dual unit (mother-child) and pertain to the 'larger context'—that of the social group organism—, which in turn may be regarded as a larger symbiotic organization of which the particular infant is a developing individual? Is it in this social matrix that the child is operating in his 'metaphoric play', practicing, as it were, for his social role? A comprehension of this social matrix may throw light on this phenomenon.

It might be predicated that with the fuller acquisition of language occurring in the course of individuation, the variety and range of such 'metaphoric play' activities eventually encompass much of human mental and social life, including some 'sublimations'. This early activity may then be a practicing for group functioning in adult life—for social roles in political, cultural, and other group activities and institutions.

Individual behavior cannot be fully comprehended without predicating a social group organism—(a virtual 'metazoan')[22] —and a functional system rooted in this hypothetical group organism. But to do so requires more than the tools of individual psychology. It requires a dialectic approach including a sociological as well as an individual psychological study of complementary interaction. To illustrate, take a developmental hypothesis from individual psychology and look at it from this broader angle. The completely helpless infant must cry out to his mother in his need. The mother responds to the signal. This interaction would seem to be the kernel of speech and language development. But this is only part of the story. The hypothesis must be expanded by suggesting that the infant's extreme helplessness and almost fœtal immaturity implicated in the psychic interaction with the mother is itself a phenomenon

[22] I use the word 'metazoan' with intended exaggeration to convey the idea of the very great role that social process plays in man's life.

of the social unit—the postulated 'metazoan' organism. These developmental facts are correlated with the predisposition to and acquisition of language, which, in this larger context, can be conceived as a function of the 'social organism'.

To consider this 'larger context' further. Vygotsky considered the evolution of man into an extremely social animal as a revolutionary step into the historical-cultural dimension of human development. He wrote: 'If we compare the early development of speech and of the intellect . . . with the development of inner speech and of verbal thought, we must conclude that the later stage is not a simple continuation of the earlier. *The nature of the development itself changes,* from biological to socio-historical' *(53,* p. 51*)*. Although Vygotsky wrote about individual development, this concept can also be applied to the special evolution of man into an exquisitely social animal—an animal with a culture. It may be necessary to modify methodological approaches in order to deal psychoanalytically with this new dimension in human ontogeny and phylogeny—the stage in which language and concept formation enter.

A DYNAMIC FORMULATION

Although there is evidence of a genetic or hereditary predisposition in language acquisition, and that the capacity is present from birth as a given, the actual acquisition of language begins in the intercommunication between mother and child.[23] Language is thus seen as object bound and its acquisition, development, and utilization is intimately bound to the development of the ego function of object relations *(21, 22)*. This fact is of preponderant importance. No human being can exist

[23] Werner and Kaplan *(55)* present two hypotheses that may make this point more concrete. First, regarding the genesis of the language symbol, they see the symbol 'formed when mother, child, and referential object become differentiated out of an initially undifferentiated matrix (from the infant's point of view). By going through a similar and parallel process of tripartite differentiation, the "designation" of the object subsequently becomes a full-fledged representation, i.e., a symbol.' Secondly, 'out of the common matrix with a shared object . . . follows not only a progressive polarization, or distancing, between mother and child, but simultantously a *distancing* between symbolic vehicle (word) and the object for which it stands'.

without objects—without a society and its culture. Without them he can have no identity, no mental development, no humanity, indeed no survival.

The role of language can be traced from its development in the earliest mother-child unit to its role in the larger family unit and ultimately to its role in the social sphere. Language derives most of its meaning in this social and cultural context. It is the most efficient conveyor of meaning—first and continuing of emotionally laden meaning, and increasingly of cognitive meaning or secondary process thought, which deals with reality. Klein states that language is intimately involved in secondary process thinking. For secondary process thinking has to do with internally representing man's relations in the world (his environment and his community) and steering his behavior accordingly. It is, like language, therefore, a *social* process *(29)*.

A METAPSYCHOLOGICAL SPECULATION

For metapsychological speculation, the thought aspect of language can be conceived of as having a developmental root of its own and as being of narcissistic derivation.[24] The symbolizing-categorizing function may then be primarily a faculty of the thought function. In the interpersonal communication of thought, it also tends to become libido cathected. In its feedback, the social function of language promotes object relations; and in the internalization of the language process, such as 'inner speech', the feedback promotes the thought function.

Thought, then, in psychoanalytic terms, operates along a spectrum ranging from primary process activity to secondary process activity,[25] with the structuralized and configurative aspects probably increasing as the thought function progresses along the spectrum. One might expect, then, that the preponderant imagery would be auditory (language bound at the secondary process end) and that the imagery would be visual or in

[24] Rosen *(45)* hypothesizes that two separate processes become fused. He says: 'Thought is polarized around the vicissitudes of the drives and their frustration-gratification phenomena and is predominantly narcissistic; while language is polarized around the development of object libido and object relations and the need to communicate.'

[25] I owe this 'spectrum' model of thought to Jacob Arlow and Peter Wolff.

other sensory modalities at the primary process end. There may be polarization with the affective and expressive component of language at the primary process pole, and the symbolizing-categorizing component, predominant in logical and reality-bound thought, at the secondary process pole.

Begging the question as to whether thought operates apart from the language function, one can see that much that is structured and configurative in both thought and language occurs reciprocally. This is the substance of the idea that language is the groove of thought (the Sapir-Whorf Relativity Principle).[26] A critique of the language-thought interrelationship gives rich support to Hartmann's theory of primary and secondary autonomous ego functions. Thought has a primary autonomy. The drive cathexes involved in secondary process thought are bound, and thus thought is relatively free from drives. To quote Freud: 'The fact that thought can be associated with speech not only allows it to register in consciousness, but also gives it a stability and a capacity to resist distortion . . . the highest, securest form of cognitive thought process' (*10*, p. 374).

Once acquired, language is at once a personal equipment and an impersonal acquisition borrowed from the culture. The concept can be proposed that language, social and cultural in derivation and relatively free from the individual's instinctual organization,[27] serves as an in-between organization, interlarded between drive, wish, and impulse on the one side, and action and thought on the other. Internalized, it serves the executive function of the ego. It can remain to a great extent objective and

[26] Peller *(40)* avers that language is the main tool in the construction of a symbolically organized universe. She stated: 'Words are the signifiers and symbolizers . . . they make possible a different organization of the mental apparatus'. Language makes possible a 'distance' from our physical and mental acts which contribute to 'self-awareness and a new intimacy with ourselves'.

[27] *Cf.*, Loewenstein: 'We know that the autonomous functions . . . can be placed at the service of the instinctual drives or can be used by them. . . . Language is used even more extensively in this way than are other autonomous functions of the ego' *(36*, p. 469).

impersonal, standing as it does for social reality, for the culture, for the shared superego.

Language, implicated in conscious and preconscious functions, would affect experience in a special way and would itself grow and change as it was affected by experience. From this interaction would come a constant alteration, expansion, and transfiguration of consciousness along with simultaneous enrichment of the language structure. Meaning would be involved at every stage. (Obviously there are conditions, as well as pathological factors, that could alter the results in the interactive process.)

An expansion of the understanding of cognition and language may come nearer to the probability that as (a) states of consciousness are constantly changing and developing by virtue of their very exercise, (b) language, its form and its meaning, and consequently the meaning of reality, is constantly changing in the same way. They are not rigidly fixed to perceptual and memory traces. Thus the comprehension of human 'experience' would be advanced.

PHYLOGENETIC HYPOTHESES: LANGUAGE AS A GIVEN

What is uniquely human and new in evolution is language as an instrument of thought. This—its algebraic aspect—is already present at a very early stage of the child's language acquisition. There is evidence that language is genetically acquired, i.e., that it has primary autonomy. According to Wolff, 'children intuit syntactic rules consistent with the formal structures of their language. While their verbal inventions are still meaningless and display faulty logic, their syntax is usually correct' (*60,* pp. 301-302).

Lenneberg *(30)* holds the view that language capacity is species-specific and may be transmitted genetically. He predicated that the language ability comes first and intelligence and increase in brain weight follows as an effect. In her observation that language propensity is better protected genetically than non-specific intelligence, Goldman-Eisler *(15)* supports Len-

neberg's thesis that language and non-specific intelligence are independent traits and that language is species-specific. Proof has even been adduced recently that the evolutionary development of symbolic functions may be explained along the lines of natural selection *(54)*.

Lidz summed up these views by stating that 'the evolution of man was determined by the selection of those traits that made possible tool-bearing and the use of language. . . . [These] evolved in the course of a million years or more . . . partly because of the requirement of a social animal dependent on communication with other members of his group' *(32*, p. 116*)*.

Washburn *(54)* speculated on the evolutionary factors in the unique mother-child relationship of Homo sapiens. With bipedalism the mother could hold the infant and this invoked greater maternal responsibility. The slowing down of the mother thereby made the man the sole hunter and gave complicated form to the family and social organization. Freed from glandular control, sexual activity became year round, and the controls were replaced by a bewildering variety of social customs. Like Lenneberg, Washburn believes that the brain evolved under the pressure of the ever more complex social life and the evolution of language.

How valid these contemporary evolutionary speculations are, cannot be judged. Sapir said: 'When we study the origin of language we come upon a blank wall as to this original leap into symbolizing' *(47)*.

It is fascinating to conjecture that a mutational evolutionary 'leap' may actually have occurred. White *(57)* offered an intriguing evolutionary hypothesis, ranging from reflex (stage I) to conditioned reflex (stage II) to 'will' and 'intention' as in the anthropoids (stage III) to 'symboling', exemplified by speech, symbolic expression and symbolic manipulation (stage IV). It is with the 'leap' into stage IV that the historical-cultural 'leap' with the genesis of the language function occurs.

This revolutionary step occurs with the emergence of a physically feeble, embryologically immature Homo sapiens, now in

possession of an enormously increased brain both in size and functional capacity.[28] Concurrent with this revolutionary stage is the development of this Homo sapiens into an exquisitely social animal, the young of whose species represent the only instance in mammalia of a profound helplessness, a prolonged immaturity, and a unique rearing process.

Whether or not this mutation theory is correct, one is obliged to take this 'leap' in thinking about the human condition. Perhaps it is here that the gap between individual psychology and the social sciences may be bridged.

LANGUAGE AS AN ARTISTIC PRODUCT

Up to this point we have dealt with language as a vehicle of thought and the conveyor and communicator of affect. Language serves also as a medium for creative expression: speech itself, the communicative arts, the literary arts, etc. Language itself a configurative entity, is an artistic product.[29] Though language can be scrutinized scientifically, as an artistic product it defies analysis.

Freud, with his extraordinary prescience and prophetic anticipation of the eventual formulations of language theory, wrote: 'A language is a *work of art,* but it is an *artistic product* of the group mind. . . . Its group mind is capable of creative genius . . . as shown by language itself' *(14,* p. 83*).*

A language is undeniably a product of culture, appearing full-grown and complete for our use. In A Dictionary of the Social Sciences *(19),* Sapir wrote that language may be 'treated as a total patterned configuration . . . analogous to the concept of a total culture . . . the interrelationship between language as a

[28] This view of human evolution was first brought to my attention by Simon Weyl, who developed an aspect of the theory in *Retardation, Acceleration and Psychoanalysis (56).*

[29] In his paper, *On Style,* Rosen points out that the language function and the thought function of concept formation is a highly individualized, integrally interrelated entity. 'We talk about entity in terms of style and of products, whether artistic or conceptual products, and I think this is an important step toward the next important development in language theory and its relationship to concept formation' *(46).*

structure reflecting the definition of the universe, time, action, etc. and the culture premise of the group speaking a given language'.

To be specific, there is obviously a categorical difference between the *process* (with its instruments) and the *product* of these processes. For example, there is thinking and there are thoughts—thoughts of various levels of organization and systematization, ranging from 'ideas'[30] to integrated concepts on the highest level of abstraction and generalization; *viz.,* scientific thoughts and theories, religious thoughts and systems, poetic thoughts and poems, etc. To take another example, there is dreaming—the process studies by Fisher or the physiologists, and there are dreams—the wish expressed (and often gratified) in a dream—for psychoanalytic interpretation, in which unravelling the dream work is only a portion of the task.

How are we to deal psychoanalytically with this complete and perfect product, language? Also how are we to examine this artistic product—something new and apart and different phenomenologically from the processes that produced it? An investigative procedure must be found to deal with this perfect product and the creative processes that produced it. An enriched concept of man would result.

CONCLUSIONS

This comparative study of language and thought has demonstrated the value of a multidimensional approach for extending the horizons of psychoanalysis. Although the psychoanalytic and the psycholinguistic concepts of language and thought are at variance in many dimensions, they can supplement and complement each other to gain a more complete picture of man's mental apparatus.

[30] 'Ideas' as the memories of the percepts are so defined in the Project *(10)* and in Freud's later writings.

Psychoanalysis, in its drive-motivational framework, provides a rich mine of information about the intercommunicative aspects of language and thought, but largely omits consideration of the symbolizing-categorizing function. Psycholinguistics has much to contribute about the cognitive and epistomological aspects of language and thought but is weak on the expressive functions. Each science could profit from the other. An example of increased knowledge from this complementarity of sciences is seen in the field of early childhood development, where the ontogenetic formulations of psychoanalysis and the developmental studies of Piaget, Vygotsky, Luria, and other psychologists have been so advantageously utilized in the work of Kasanin, Wolff, Spitz, Székely, and others.

Language acquisition and socialization as part of early personality development can be projected onto phylogenetic hypotheses of man as an exquisitely social animal. The acquisition of his very special social faculties occurs ontogenetically as a recapitulation of phylogenesis. At the same time, the transmission of language is the effect of culture operating through the family. This process is a continuum of man's cultural development—of his history.

One can correlate the development of language and thought function in the individual with the evolution of language in its various stages and functions. The internalization of language can be correlated with the internalization of the object world and the formulation and maturation of psychic structure. The development of the thought function, ranging from the primary to the secondary process, can be correlated with the probable evolution of language genetically.

The development of psychoanalysis as an open system would continue psychoanalytic tradition. Freud very early opened broad prospects for its further development when he delved into anthropology, æsthetics, mythology, religion, and history, using the substance of these sciences for psychoanalytic syntheses.

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The Impact of Psychoanalytic Theory on the Freedom of Speech

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THE IMPACT OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY ON THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH

BY ERIC H. STEELE (CHICAGO)

THE CLASSICAL TRADITION

What does the First Amendment freedom of speech mean? We need a 'theory' of just what it is that it protects, a rational principle to mark the limits of constitutional protection. Three general theories of the freedom of speech are present in the classical tradition:

1. *The Negative Theory of Freedom of Speech*

No man can be entrusted with the power of the censor because no man is free enough of bias and prejudice or wise enough to discern what is erroneous and what is valuable from the plethora of ideas and expressions. Thus the government of men cannot be allowed to act in any way that impinges upon the freedom of speech. Mill wrote:

> We can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a false opinion. . . . Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind and exclude every other person from the means of judging. . . . All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility *(10,* pp. 21-22*).*

This theory is consonant with our tradition of limited governmental powers. The assumption is not that all men are ignorant or prejudiced, but that none are infallible, and that the risk, however remote, is never worth the taking.

2. *Freedom of Speech as Individual Self-Realization*

The end of government is to ensure the maximum amount of liberty to individuals. This underlies the declaration of the

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sanctity of 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness'. Justice Brandeis once wrote:

> Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties. . . . They valued liberty . . . as an end *(21,* p. 375*)*.

From this point of view the First Amendment protects the freedom of men to express themselves as part of the process of individual development which is an inalienable right and an end in itself.

3. *Freedom of Speech as the Process of Discovering Truth*

This theory asserts that the faltering and imperfect process of formulating correct attitudes, opinions, and policies most often succeeds if everyone is allowed to participate in open discussion of the issues. In our more pessimistic age one need not assert as Milton did *(11,* pp. 34, 44*)* that falsehood is never triumphant over truth; one may be content to argue that the free and open encounter of ideas provides the only substantial possibility that falsehood will give way to truth, however rarely this may occur.

Of these three theories the third seems most likely to yield a theory of freedom which can be used to delimit and give content to the constitutional protection. The first theory, although its force cannot be escaped, simply admonishes us that all restrictions are arbitrary and thus to be avoided. But we fallible men must of necessity make some restrictions, if solely to delimit an area of absolute inviolability. The first theory gives us little guidance as to the proper scope and definition of protected freedom of speech. Similarly, the second theory gives us a strong value orientation toward favoring freedom of speech, but it does not help us to define the scope of the freedom of speech in a world of complex cases where one cannot simply allow total freedom to every individual. The third theory refers to a more concrete process, discussion and opinion formation, and thus seems a more promising basis on which to define a rational principle to mark the limits of the freedom of speech.

One modern writer, Alexander Meiklejohn, has greatly refined the third theory. For Meiklejohn the true meaning of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment is to be found in its essential function in the regime of self-government. Meiklejohn takes as his root metaphor the decision process of the town meeting. 'In that method of political self-government', he writes,

> the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers, but the minds of the hearers. The final aim of the meeting is the voting of wise decisions. . . . And this, in turn, requires that so far as time allows, all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and fairly presented to the meeting. . . . As the self-governing community seeks, by the method of voting, to gain wisdom in action, it can find it only in the minds of its individual citizens. If they fail, it fails. That is why freedom of discussion for those minds may not be abridged. . . . The First Amendment was not written primarily for the protection of those intellectual aristocrats who pursue knowledge for the fun of the game. . . . It was written to clear the way for thinking which serves the general welfare. It offers defense to men who plan and advocate and incite toward corporate action for the common good. On behalf of such men it tells us that every plan of action must have a hearing, every relevant idea of fact or value must have full consideration, whatever may be the dangers which that activity involves *(9,* pp. 25-26*).*

If this is the reason for the freedom of speech, what are its boundaries?

The first boundary lies at the 'emergency situation' when there is no time or opportunity to expose through discussion the falsehood and to avert the evil by the process of education. In such a civil or military emergency the social contexts necessary for the processes of public discussion have broken down and discussion, not by one party but by all parties alike, may be curtailed until order is restored. This formulation of the first boundary is narrower than the classical 'clear and present danger' test and was embodied by Justice Brandeis as follows:

> If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence *(21,* p. 377*)*.

The second boundary lies at the point where expression is 'more than speech', that is when argument and advocacy give way to overt action and incitement which is utterance so related to a specific overt act that it may be treated and regarded as part of the doing of the act itself. Implicit in the logic of this second boundary is the notion that discussion, opinion formation, and the making of judgments can be effectively conducted with certain forms of expression, and that other forms of expression add nothing significant to the effectiveness of the discussion. This notion involves a particular model of the process of discussion and its appropriate forms.

Meiklejohn sets out a third boundary when he writes: 'The First Amendment does not protect a "freedom to speak". It protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we "govern" ' (*8,* p. 255). Meiklejohn uses this distinction to explain why it is that libel, slander, misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false advertising, solicitation of crime and conspiracy, for example, can be regulated—it is because such utterances have 'no relation to the business of governing' *(8,* pp. 258-59*)*.

At this point I think Meiklejohn is on very shaky ground. The distinction between speech that is and speech that is not of 'social importance' or 'governing importance', which he equates *(8,* p. 262*)* is just the sort of judgment which no individual, much less the government, can be allowed to make if we are to take seriously the negative theory of the freedom of speech. Moreover, since almost any speech may be relevant to public issues, broadly defined, all speech that forms a part of the process of discussion must be protected. By thus shifting the emphasis of Meiklejohn's 'public discussion' heavily away from the 'public' and toward the 'discussion' we avoid judgments made with respect to the content of the speech which are objectionable under the negative theory of the First Amendment.

Ultimately what must be protected is the process of discussion itself, not the private rights of individuals to speak out or the particular utterances. If balancing is to be done it is the injury to the process of discussion which must be weighed against the injury to order, morality, or national security, not the right of the individual speaker or writer which will always appear puny in comparison.

In order to give substance to such a theory of the freedom of speech we need a much clearer understanding of the process of discussion and individual attitude formation—a model of how man thinks and forms his opinions and beliefs.

The traditional model of discussion is the notion of the 'market place of ideas'. Mill gives us his model of the process of discussion when he writes:

> [Man] is capable of rectifying his mistakes by discussion and experience. Not by experience alone. There must be discussion to show how experience is to be interpreted. Wrong opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument; but facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it. . . . The whole strength and value, then, of human judgment depending on the one property, that it can be set right when it is wrong, reliance can be placed on it only when the means of setting it right are kept constantly at hand. . . . The steady habit of correcting and completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others . . . *(10,* p. 25*).*

The precise mechanism by which the competing ideas are placed before individuals (i.e., 'in the market') may vary, but the crux of the process, according to this model, remains the reasoned choice by individuals between such ideas. This is the model of man the 'rational animal'. By characterizing man as rational it is not meant that individual men are to be characterized by highly developed powers of rational analysis or that their actions are directed primarily by high-grade reasoned deliberation. What is meant, rather, is that man's decisions are made on essentially rational grounds—however faulty of assumption and analysis—and that men are to be persuaded and con-

vinced by reasoning with them. Superstition is faulty rational analysis, not mere irrationality, and it is to be overcome by 'education' and rational argument, that is, by more adequate rational analysis. Prejudice and bias are unexamined and traditionally accepted opinions. They are to be exposed as based upon inaccurate assumptions by the presentation of correct facts to the reason which will then recognize the inaccuracy of its former assumption. The passions and temptations are to be overcome by the exercise of the will, motivated and informed by the results of rational thought.

A CHALLENGE TO THE CLASSICAL TRADITION: THE PHENOMENON OF SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION

It has been demonstrated many times that visual and auditory stimuli that do not enter into the awareness of an individual may nevertheless be perceived by him and stored in his memory, and emerge in some situations to influence the course of his thoughts and actions. Hypnotic suggestion is one demonstration of this point. More recent and systematic experiments have shown that the content of stimuli perceived without awareness ('subliminally', 'peripherally', 'incidentally', or 'marginally') emerge in manifest dream content, daydreaming, and imaging, and influence the manner in which other objects and situations are perceived or cognitively structured.

It has been demonstrated that subliminally perceived stimuli, tachistoscopically projected, do affect the perception and cognitive construction of a consciously perceived stimulus of which the individual *is* aware. The result is that the individual perceives the objective conscious stimulus differently when the subliminal stimuli are present than when they are not; he is aware of neither the subliminal stimuli nor their influence on him.

One piece of research *(17)* compared the impressions of individuals to faces in two different situations by means of the Thematic Apperception Test: (a) with only the (supraliminal) face stimulus present, and (b) with the subliminally pro-

jected word 'angry' or 'happy' shown concurrently with the face stimulus. The experiment appears to demonstrate that the conscious impressions of particular stimuli are altered and their meanings affected by the registration outside of awareness of contiguous subliminal words. The experimenters go on to theorize that the lack of awareness increases the effectiveness of the subliminal stimuli because, being peripheral to awareness, they 'escape the disciplined categorizing and appraisal of conscious judgment which fosters differentiation of stimuli and they can be more easily combined with impressions of the face' *(17,* p. 175*)*. Contrast this with the situation in which the individual is aware of the stimulus and may or may not be influenced by the suggestion implicit in the stimulus, but in any event is usually (or may be) aware of the influence on him.

In another study *(22)* the phrases 'write more' or 'don't write' were subliminally projected on the Thematic Apperception Test pictures about which the subjects were to write stories. The resulting stories were significantly longer or shorter in accordance with the subliminal suggestion, but without the subjects' awareness of the subliminal stimulus or of its influence. But when the same phrases were projected supraliminally, they had no significant effect on the length of the stories. This difference in result between subliminal and supraliminal stimuli perhaps reflects the fact that supraliminal stimuli can be taken or left, made use of as appropriate or ignored as irrelevant, but subliminal stimuli which do not command attention thus by-pass the critical assessments that occur in the focused attention of the waking consciousness.

Or, to use the psychoanalytic model, the vicissitudes of subliminal stimuli appear to be governed to a large degree by the laws of primary process thinking and to escape the critical reality-adaptive aspects of ego (secondary process) functioning to which focal supraliminal stimuli are subjected.

Peripheral and subliminal perception occur almost constantly in a person's life outside the laboratory. There are continually stimuli which are too faint, too soft, or too distant to

enter into awareness, and there is no reason to believe that these are not perceived 'subliminally' just as are the deliberately projected subliminal stimuli of the laboratory experiments. Similarly, there is always a myriad of aspects and qualities of the objects of which we are (peripherally) aware to which we do not attend, and of which we are 'not aware' in the sense of being attentive to them and realizing their presence. Again there is no reason to believe that these stimuli are not perceived. In both cases sense perceptions enter the person, form memory traces, and interact in his stream of cognition. As nonrigorous support for this proposition is the fact that a person under hypnosis, or under the influence of certain drugs, is able to recall details and impressions about situations which in his normal waking state he can neither remember nor remember having sensed. Similarly, dreams contain details of situations which the person in his waking state does not remember—what Freud called 'incidental stimuli'.

Nor is the manipulation of the peripheral stimulus a novelty. Orators and leaders have always tailored their dress, their gestures, their smiles, their hair styles, and their allusions. This is as true of tribal leaders who exhibit anthropological 'charisma' as it is of the current politician who readies for a television interview or debate. Such techniques are designed to enhance the persuasiveness of the content of what is being communicated concurrently by means of peripheral symbolic stimuli which are irrelevant to that content in a rational sense. These peripheral stimuli have their effect indirectly in so far as they influence the viewer's or hearer's perception of and attitudes toward the content of the communication being presented. Another example of the attempt to influence a person's perception and cognitive response to situations by means of peripheral stimuli is the use of 'hospital green' walls or soft background 'wallpaper' music to 'relax' people and to influence them to respond in a less excited way to the focal stimuli to which they do attend while under the influence of such devices. But in all of these cases the person who is to be influenced can focus his

attention, by an act of conscious will, on the stimuli that are intended to be peripheral, critically assess them and their intended influence and, to a degree, decide not to be influenced by them, or at least be aware that his impressions reflect their influence. It is, for example, open to one to distrust a politician who looks too 'smooth' or makes too many emotional allusions. One can note the light green walls and soft music and become coldly unrelaxed or hostile to the attempt to soothe him. One can assess critically the cigarette advertisement and note that the tattoo or the girl or the brook or the sunset is irrelevant to the cigarette which is the topic of the communication, and thus by focusing attention on the peripheral stimuli, the effectiveness of which depends upon their remaining peripheral, fail to be 'persuaded' or influenced in the intended manner.

Subliminal projection changes the situation in so far as it provides a method of insuring that the peripheral stimuli will remain peripheral, since the stimuli are below the threshold of physiological conscious awareness. The possibility, on which the classical theory of the First Amendment rests, of persuading people by reasoned discussion, is no longer present: since one is not and cannot be aware that he is being influenced by the stimulus or that his opinions reflect this influence, he cannot even attempt to undermine the effectiveness of the stimuli by realizing that they are irrelevant or unpersuasive. One might, for example, advertise cigarettes by explaining that they are cheaper and that one ought to smoke his brand for that reason, and attempt to explain that the tattoo is an erroneous reason to smoke that other brand. Or, one might combat an attempt to influence attitudes toward a political candidate—e.g., by associating him, through the use of peripheral stimuli, with negatively charged emotional symbols (such as Goldwater and the bomb in 1964)—by exposing the tactic as unpersuasive on rational grounds.

However, subliminal communication is qualitatively different from supraliminal peripheral communication: it cannot be brought into focused attention. Subliminal communication con-

tains no element of rational discussion, on the classical model of the First Amendment; no ideas are presented to the mind to be considered critically on their merits and in comparison to other ideas present in the 'market' of ideas. Rather, subliminal communication attempts to exert its influence in a manner outside of this model of how ideas have their influence. The classical model of the First Amendment does not give us much guidance as to how to classify and deal with subliminal communication. Peripheral communication has not forced us to face this issue because it has always been possible, and perhaps Constitutionally required, to reason that the peripheral stimuli were an integral part of the whole communication which was protected as a whole under the First Amendment, and any attempt to deal with one aspect of protected communication is suspect as a judgment based on the content of the communication and the style in which it is made. Subliminal communication cannot be dealt with in this manner: it is not at all obvious whether or not it is protected speech, and so these issues must be faced. The thesis of this paper is that the classical model of the First Amendment freedom of speech is not adequate for this purpose, and that it must be supplemented by a more sophisticated model of how man thinks and forms opinions and attitudes.

The confrontation of subliminal communication and the First Amendment can occur in two ways: (1) If a state or the federal government attempts to regulate or prohibit the use of subliminal communication beyond the limits within which any type of speech may constitutionally be regulated; and, (2) If a state or the federal government (or anyone chargeable with 'state action') makes use of the technique of subliminal communication, presumably in an attempt to shape public opinion.

(1) Can a state regulate or prohibit the use of subliminal communication? The basic question is whether or not subliminal communication is placed outside the area of protected speech by virtue of its being subliminal. There is an initial visceral response that subliminal projection is so pernicious

that we cannot tolerate it and if it must be considered to be speech within the First Amendment then we must make an exception because it has no possible benefits to society. The exception of obscenity from First Amendment protection might be seen to be based on this sort of rationale, but it seems a crude and undesirable approach.

When one attempts to analyze subliminal communication one can argue both ways. One might say that subliminal communication is expression and communication and is an attempt to persuade people of the ideas and positions thus advocated. Since this is one way in which people are susceptible to influence, it is as much a part of that 'market place' of ideas and influences as any other sort of speech, and hence is protected under the First Amendment. To the contrary one might argue that the market place of ideas which is protected extends no further than the possibility of rational discussion of the ideas presented by the persons to whom they are communicated, and thus that subliminal communication is not within the area of protected speech because it cannot enter into awareness, which is a prerequisite to rational discussion. The classical theory of the First Amendment seems to offer no way to decide between these two arguments because it rests on the assumption that the process of opinion formation is identical with the rational process of evaluating and comparing arguments and perceived facts that are present in awareness.

Mill's statement of the premise that 'facts and arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought before it' involves two erroneous assumptions which undermine the validity of the whole classical model in so far as it rests on this premise: (a) 'facts and arguments' do not have to be brought before the mind to produce any effect on it, if 'brought before' means presented to the mind's conscious awareness—in fact items which enter the mind peripherally or even subliminally may have a much stronger influence by virtue of their escaping the critical assessments of focal attention and awareness; and (b) 'facts and arguments' are not the only sorts of things that

produce effects in the mind—symbols, associations, references to motivations and emotions, and the like may have an influence also, and may in some circumstances completely overshadow the influence of facts and arguments.

In order to solve this dilemma a theory of the First Amendment is required which defines the scope of protected speech in terms of the much more complex model of human thought, communication and opinion formation that is now emerging. Such a theory must take into account the mechanisms of thought and perception that operate outside of awareness and their influences on the conscious parts or aspects of cognition of which we are aware.

(2) Can a state itself make use of the technique of subliminal communication? There would seem to be no objection to a state expressing ideas—offering them in the 'market place' of free discussion—if that is all that is involved. But is the state 'coercing' individuals by the use of subliminal communication? Surely there is no element of physical force employed. And it is hard to see how any pressure or force is being applied to coerce belief in the presented ideas. Short of the use of force to coerce belief, there seems to be no objection to the state presenting ideas to individuals in great quantity and intensity with seemingly little opportunity for opposing points of view to be heard, even in captive audience situations—for example, instruction in schools. The Constitutional objection to school instruction as 'coercing' belief arises only when the beliefs 'coerced' violate the nonestablishment or free exercise of religion clauses of the First Amendment.

A state might, however, be prohibited from making use of subliminal communication if that use were seen to interfere with the exercise by others of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. The broad language of *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* suggests such a theory: 'We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which

it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control' *(20,* p. 642*)*. It seems too broad to say that the state is not to invade 'the sphere of intellect and spirit' with any communications. One might read the *Barnette* case more narrowly to prohibit the state from entering this sphere when the effect would be to interfere with the process of free discussion. The Court of Appeals opinion in *Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission (16)* suggests that the First Amendment guarantees us against any state action that interferes with our exercise of our freedom of thought and speech. In that case, riders of a government granted transportation monopoly were subjected to radio broadcasts while on the buses. The Court of Appeals held that 'Freedom of attention, which forced listening destroys, is a part of liberty essential to individuals and to society' *(16,* p. 456*)*. If it interferes with freedom of thought and of expression to force someone to give his attention to something of the state's choosing, it is arguably much more of an interference to force upon individuals influences of the state's choosing in such a manner (subliminally) that they have not even the defense of critical assessment and rejection of the content presented. But unless we know exactly what is the process of thought which underlies the process of opinion formation and expression, we cannot judge whether or not an activity interferes with it. Ultimately we are left with the same dilemma: does subliminal communication interfere with and destroy the effectiveness of the process of free discussion which the First Amendment protects, or is it simply a manner of speaking and presenting ideas in that discussion? Again, to answer this question we must understand what processes of thinking, opinion formation, and communication are really at work in the process of discussion which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to protect.

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF MAN AND THOUGHT

Psychoanalytic theory presents us with a model of different modes of cognitive functioning dominated by distinctly differ-

ent principles of organization and elaboration. It is important for our purposes to note that the primary and secondary process modes are simply ideal poles or fictional extremes. The phenomena that they represent are arranged in a continuum, as the formulation in terms of free versus bound cathexis suggests. The ego and the id themselves are really ideal constructs to explain a continuum of functioning. Affect, conation, and cognition are interpenetrating aspects or dimensions of one unity of functioning, not independent and insulated processes occurring in close proximity. The reality-syntonic and objective nature of 'ordinary' thinking is seen as a relative quality, varying perhaps with the degree of ego control and attention focused on the process. As Bleuler observes, there is no sharp borderline between 'autistic' (primary process) and 'ordinary' (secondary process) thinking, but the former easily interpenetrates the latter *(2,* p. 404*)*.

Such considerations of the relativity of the characteristics of ordinary thinking and the interpenetration of autistic processes are highly relevant to our model of attitude and opinion formation and change. What is an attitude? From the standpoint of behavior it is a set or readiness for action or attention of a certain sort *(1)*. From the psychological point of view an attitude is a complex and at least loosely integrated construct composed of feelings, fears, desires, prejudices, convictions, and associations. Attitudes tend to be built up in a spontaneous and incidental manner through associations and vague analogies. Some of the components that go into the make-up of attitudes are realistic observations or intuitions, accurate memories, and logical inferences. Other components are autistic associations and affective analogies, condensations, displacements, substitutions, and other primary process-derived elements. Autisms, the products of autistic functioning, are not recognized as such, but simply enter into consciousness and are indistinguishable from veridical memory traces without extensive analysis. Much of this process of attitude formation occurs outside of explicit awareness or attention, and without strict ego control or at least without strict conscious ego control.

It is an open question to what extent one can eliminate the penetration and influence of autistic elements in secondary process thinking when one sets out explicitly and with full attention to form a rational attitude based solely on reality-syntonic elements. The crucial fact is that such an express attempt is not always, or perhaps seldom, made and thus that in reality spontaneously formed attitudes and opinions containing much that is autistic are usually controlling.

Similarly, the process of rumor elaboration exhibits many of the characteristics of autistic primary process functioning. Rumor elaboration is at one end of several continua: the designation 'rumor' is given to the result of elaboration that occurs through mental processes which are not subjected to the strict ego controls of focused attention and which operate upon peculiarly ambiguous stimuli, whether the ambiguity stems from inattention or objective ambiguity. The resulting elaborated content is not recognized as autistically transformed but is thought to be simply retained and repeated substantially as it was received, in contrast, for instance, to artistic creation or self-conscious fantasying or dreaming. Such autistic elaboration occurs in all spontaneous mental functioning to a greater or lesser extent, varying with the inherent ambiguity of the stimulus and with the degree to which critical attention is focused upon controlling the thought process. One must note that, on the one hand, all stimuli are to some extent ambiguous even if most accurately perceived, especially as to their value content and implications for the future and the light they shed on other current events; and, on the other hand, that one cannot focus his critical attention on each aspect of each item upon which his mind works because of the sheer number and complexity of events and the limited capacity of the mind.

Since attitude formation is influenced by such autistic elements as well as more rational critical elements, the types of communication which are relevant to attitude formation and change come to be seen as much broader than discursively educational and rational argument. Since individuals do not always respond to stimuli with purely secondary process con-

sideration it may be effective in influencing attitudes to present them with stimuli that will have their 'persuasive' effect on attitude formation if they enter into the primary process functioning of the individual, or somewhat in that direction along the continuum. Thus, communications, the principal effect of which is calculated to be in their affective impact and through primary process transformations of their content, may influence attitude formation and change as well as the more traditional rational argumentation of the classical model of attitude formation and mental functioning.

THE IMPACT OF PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT

The First Amendment and its judicial interpretation have been constructed within the framework of what I have described as the traditional model of man. This classical model takes the objectivity and rationality of the secondary process as the essential nature of man. In the perspective of a vastly more complex system of drive-related levels of psychic functioning such characteristics are seen as one end point of a continuum of characteristics of psychic functioning. This continuum exhibits interpenetration of different levels at many points. 'Ordinary' thought is only superficially insulated from the larger structure of affective functioning.

Attitudes, opinions, biases, prejudices, convictions, and perception itself are part of this larger system of affective functioning, and are subject constantly to some degree of distortion, transformation, and interpretation according to the more autistic rules of the primary process.

Such a radical reorientation of our model of man, if it is not to be simply ignored when thinking legally, must have a profound impact on our theory and interpretation of the First Amendment which necessarily relies, as we have seen, on some model of human thought and attitude formation. This essay poses the question as to how the scope of First Amendment protection is to be defined in light of this new conception of mental

functioning and communication processes. The classical model of man pictured man's mental processes exclusively in terms of rational intellectual faculties. It saw discussion and expression as logical argument and as the communication of both information and ways of organizing that information. Examples of purported discussion which fell short of this model were viewed as deserving less protection because they contained less of the essence of discussion, the process to be protected. Such denial of protection was based on a sort of reasonable alternative test. Anything of a rational nature, and this was all that was thought to enter into protected discussion and expression, could be communicated in a rational intellectual manner. Thus, other manners of 'expression' that are undesirable for other reasons could be abridged because if anything was being said, it could as well be said in a more ordered and rational manner. Illogic, rhetoric, and appeals to the emotions were viewed as extraneous to the essence of discussion and were tolerated only because men habitually combined them with speech that is protected, and it seemed better to protect the whole than to empower someone to prescribe the style in which discussion must be cast—the negative theory of the freedom of speech.

In the light of psychoanalytic theory the sharp distinction between the rational intellectual faculties and the irrational nether region of man which trades in biases, prejudices, fears, myths, emotions, and the like, dissolves and they are seen to be two interpenetrating aspects of one integrated system of mental functioning. Virtually no mental functioning occurs without some of the characteristics described by each of these polar abstractions. The classical model of man describes thought as if it consisted exclusively of secondary process functioning. This model does not deny the existence of the emotional and irrational primary process, but it considers the latter to be an independent and unorganized aspect of man which, although it surely can influence man's behavior, has no significant connection with the ordered mental processes of thought.

The fact that the mind functions in ways distinctly differing

from the rational intellectual mode and that such processes enter significantly into attitude formation means that the process of discussion, if we view it as expression and persuasion relating to the content of attitudes and opinions, may take the form of communication intended to be persuasive in modes other than the rational and the intellectual. Subliminal communication is an extreme example of expression or persuasion that is intended to by-pass the rational critical processes. Much advertising, rhetoric, and ritual, for example, are also intended to have their principle impact and effect otherwise than through their rational intellectual persuasiveness. Thus, one can speak of primary process communication, meaning communications that make their principal appeal to the primary processes of mental functioning, and of secondary process communication, which makes its principal appeal to secondary process functioning.

The question then becomes the extent to which the protection of the First Amendment ought to apply to primary process communication. Perhaps one must ask the prior question as to whether there is any nonarbitrary way of drawing a line on the primary-secondary continuum beyond which communication ought not to be characterized as secondary process communication. Even conceding, for the moment, that such a line could be drawn, ought the protection be limited to secondary process communication and expression? Such a limitation appears to be both arbitrary and, in a sense, normative. Even granting that the world would be better if rationality were more dominant than it often is and that the secondary process ought to prevail in all matters relating to the external world, there is no reason to think that denying the protection of the First Amendment to primary process communication would have the effect of strengthening the secondary process. Further, the First Amendment cannot easily be interpreted to authorize such an enterprise of psychological improvement or social engineering. The effect seems rather to be an arbitrary denial of protection to speakers who do not choose to use the secondary modes of communication or who wish to communicate content which is not

amenable to effective secondary process communication. The fact that men actually form their attitudes and opinions on the basis of primary as well as secondary process communication would seem to indicate that communications of both types should be protected in order to avoid restrictions and distortions of the process of communication, discussion, and attitude formation, and arbitrary decisions by the courts as to whether or not a communication is 'rational'.

Where speech contains a mixture of primary and secondary process communication it is easy to say that the whole expression must be protected because the two elements cannot be separated. In this way the issue has been avoided in most cases. But cases in which the secondary process communication element is not significantly present are not amenable to such treatment. One such case is subliminal communication. Other such cases occur where the activity in question would not be classified as speech but for the element of primary process communication. Such cases include nonverbal or symbolic communication through images and conduct, the impact of which is largely through nonverbal primary process communication.

Let us now look briefly at several examples of such symbolic action, and the recognition it has received as protected under the First Amendment by the Supreme Court. The so-called 'red flag laws' led to perhaps the first recognition of the inclusion of symbolic speech within the scope of First Amendment protection. One typical red flag law provided that 'any person who displays a red flag, banner or badge or any flag, badge, banner, or device of any color or form whatever . . . as a sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to anarchic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character is guilty of a felony'. The Supreme Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, found that statute to be unconstitutionally broad, stating that 'the maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system. A statute which . . . is so vague and indefinite as to permit the punishment of the fair

use of this opportunity is repugnant to the guaranty of liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment' *(18,* p. 369*)*. Although there was involved no 'speech' in the traditional sense—the utterance of spoken or written words—the Court saw no obstacle to characterizing the symbolic display of a flag as speech for First Amendment purposes.

It might be argued that the characterization of such flag display as speech does not require the recognition of primary process communication as speech because the conduct was used deliberately and explicitly as a symbolic shorthand for certain sets of ideas which could be, and in other places were, spelled out in the usual terms of rational intellectual speech, and hence that the conduct is not essentially different from the use of written word-symbols as a shorthand for verbal speech. Whether or not the Court had this in mind in this case, the use of flags does have a strong symbolic content in addition to any such rational intellectual meaning. The nonrational primary process content of flag symbolism, in this case the more friendly United States flag, is referred to by Justice Frankfurter when he alluded to 'those almost unconscious feelings which bind men together in a comprehending loyalty' *(12,* p. 600*)* that are inculcated and communicated by the ritual of the flag salute. This observation is reaffirmed by Justice Jackson in *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette* where he says:

> There is no doubt that, in connection with the pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind to mind. Causes and nations, political parties, lodges and ecclesiastical groups seek to knit the loyalty of their followings to a flag or banner, a color or design. The State announces rank, function, and authority through crowns and maces, uniforms and black robes; the church speaks through the Cross, the Crucifix, the altar and shrine and clerical raiment. Symbols of State often convey political ideas just as religious symbols come to convey theological ones. Associated with many of these symbols are appropriate gestures of accept-

> ance or respect: a salute, a bowed or bared head, a bended knee *(20,* p. 632*).*

This passage hints at the primary process symbolic content of such conduct as the rites of religion and of the flag salute, and their effectiveness to communicate certain 'collective representations', 'mental states', and attitudes that may not be otherwise communicable. The relevance of this point is to show that such ritual symbolism is sufficiently different from the rational intellectual secondary process mode of expression that its inclusion within the scope of First Amendment protection must rest on a broader principle than the inclusion of such traditional 'speech'.

Speaking in one of the 'draft card' burning cases, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said:

> This case raises perplexing issues of whether symbolic conduct is speech embraced by the First Amendment and the extent of its protection thereunder *(19,* p. 78*)*

The Court cites the flag salute cases, the 'red flag' case, a picketing case, and several of the civil rights 'sit-in' cases, and concludes that 'other unconventional symbolic acts have been recognized as means of communication' *(19,* p. 78*),* and thus finds that symbolic speech is within the scope of the First Amendment protection. In a similar case *(15)* it is contended that the symbolic conduct can communicate not only more dramatically than traditional speech, but that it can communicate a broader range of meanings. If the printed word has a certain power and authority lacked by the spoken or handwritten word, the idea communicated by human conduct has a stronger empathic appeal still by virtue of the presence of primary process communication. Symbolic action can communicate the sense of group coherence and identification, a mutual 'heightened consciousness' of moral courage or righteousness or other attitudes, and strong irrational sympathies, the communication of which is almost wholly independent of any rational intellectual secondary process content that may also be present with the conduct. Such symbolic speech embodies empathic or primary process communication also by the fact that human actors are present and participate as the

very symbols that communicate meaning, which adds a dimension of communication not present in 'ordinary' secondary process speech.

The same element of primary process or empathic communication is present in the civil rights 'sit-in' demonstration where nothing need be said and no signs carried to make the point. Justice Harlan hints at the primary process aspect of the communication in *Garner v. Louisana* where he says:

> There was more to the conduct of those petitioners than a bare desire to remain at the 'white' lunch counter and their refusal of a police request to move from the counter. We would surely have to be blind not to recognize that petitioners were sitting at these counters, where they knew they would not be served, in order to demonstrate that their race was being segregated in dining facilities in this part of the country.
>
> Such a demonstration, in the circumstances of these two cases, is as much a part of the 'free trade in ideas' . . . as is verbal expression, more commonly thought of as 'speech'. It, like speech, appeals to good sense and to 'the power of reason as applied through public discussion' . . . just as much as, if not more than, a public oration delivered from a soapbox at a street corner. This Court has never limited the right to speak . . . to mere verbal expression. . . . If the act of displaying a red flag as a symbol of opposition to organized government is a liberty encompassed within free speech as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment . . . the act of sitting at a privately owned lunch counter with the consent of the owner, as a demonstration of opposition to enforced segregation, is surely within the same range of protections . . . *(4,* pp. 201-202*).*

In *Cox v. Louisiana,* a case involving civil rights picketing, the Court said: 'We are not concerned here with such a pure form of expression as newspaper comment or a telegram by a citizen to a public official. We deal in this case not with free speech alone, but with expression mixed with particular conduct' *(3,* p. 564*).* The Court here seems to ignore the primary process communicative aspect of the conduct involved, and seems to limit the con-

cept of 'speech' to the traditional rational intellectual speech which is intertwined with the conduct. In a separate opinion Justice Black makes the point quite clearly. The case, he says, involves a statute 'regulating *conduct*—patrolling and marching —as distinguished from *speech*. . . . Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment' *(3,* pp. 577-78*).* Kalven describes the conduct in the *Cox* and other 'sit-in' cases as 'ceremonials of protest . . . expressing the concern of the young Negro about his situation. What was symbolized was a deep grievance, a break with the society' *(7,* p. 6*).* There is here a strong element of primary process ritual symbolic communication as well as secondary communication.

In the context of labor picketing the Court said:

> But while picketing is a mode of communication it is inseparably something more and different. Industrial picketing 'is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated'. . . . Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a picket line. But the very purpose of a picket line is to exert influences, and it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication *(6,* pp. 464-65*).*

The Court here recognizes an aspect of 'influences . . . different from other modes of communication' but does not classify it as another mode of communication.

Assembly and association are within the scope of the First Amendment protection for two reasons. First, assembly is necessary to traditional free speech both as a bringing together of individuals so that there can be effective discussion and as a pooling of resources to disseminate shared opinion and belief.

The second reason for this inclusion is more interesting for our purpose. It is that the conduct of associating is itself a mode of nonverbal communication, an expresssion of conviction and a

communication of sincerity, group solidarity, and dedication as well as of belief itself. One cannot resist mentioning in this context the adage 'actions speak louder than words'. The Court stated this point in *Griswold v. Connecticut* in this way:

> The right of 'association', like the right of belief . . . is more than the right to express one's attitudes and philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a form of expression of opinion *(5,* p. 483*)*.

In *N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama* the Court seems to have in mind both reasons for protecting association when it says:

> [The Association] is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the expression of their own views. . . . Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court more than once has recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly *(13,* pp. 459-60*)*.

In the related area of association to undertake litigation, the Court has made the point that litigation may in some circumstances be assimilated to speech for First Amendment purposes. The Court said:

> We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record, whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal conception of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. For there is no longer any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect certain forms of orderly group activity *(14,* p. 430*)*.

Thus, we see that primary process symbolic communication has received some degree of recognition in the cases as expression protected by the First Amendment, but such recognition has been impressionistic and limited to the most blatant cases where failure to protect this aspect of expression would have led to untenable results.

RECAPITULATION

In order to illustrate our analysis of the scope of the First Amendment let us consider several hypothetical cases.

First, let us suppose that the Federal government has prohibited the use of subliminal projection but has itself undertaken a vast campaign to improve the patriotic or racial attitudes of the citizenry using the latest techniques of depth advertising, manipulating the most primitive primary process mechanisms and making extensive use of subliminal projection to communicate the messages. A citizen has brought suit to enjoin this campaign on the grounds that it is a denial of the freedom of speech for the government to create for itself a monopoly of a means of communication.

One argument the citizen might make is that the government transcends the constitutional limitations on its power and invades 'the sphere of the intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control' *(20,* p. 642*)*. If this argument is that the government ought to be prohibited from making use of the means of communication to express policies and arguments, the argument is clearly untenably broad. Part of the business of governing involves communication and persuasion. The argument is much stronger if we narrow it and focus on the word 'control'. It is the presence of official control rather than mere official use of the means of communication and persuasion which arguably abridges the freedom of speech. Once it is admitted that subliminal communication is to be protected under the First Amendment freedom of expression, it follows inevitably that the government cannot deny to all but itself the use of one mode of communication without abridging the First Amendment rights of all others who wish to use this means to express themselves and to persuade others.

There is also an element of coercion involved in the government's use of a means of communication to the exclusion of all others. This is classical censorship which restricts the sources of communication and expression that run counter to the govern-

mental line. For these reasons it seems fairly clear that the government would not be permitted to use subliminal communication and at the same time prohibit others from using it.

Next, let us suppose that one has been convicted of violating a law prohibiting the use of subliminal projection by making use of a tachistoscope and sound reproduction equipment to project subliminal images and messages designed to induce the audience in a movie theater to vote for a particular candidate for public office. He claims that his First Amendment right to freedom of speech and expression is abridged by this law which prohibits him from using a particular mode of communication. He argues that it is plain censorship to threaten punishment for the exercise of the right of free speech, and that it is the exercise of arbitrary state power to make a blanket prohibition of all expression making use of a particular mode of communication. He argues that subliminal projection is a means of communicating material that is actually used by people in forming their attitudes and opinions. Since the content of such communication enters into the process by which opinion is formed, it would be an abridgment of freedom of expression to deny one's right to communicate his ideas and attitudes and to persuade people to espouse them. He points out that maintenance of freedom of expression and the integrity of the process of free attitude formation is especially necessary in the area of political election campaigning which is so central to our democratic way of government.

The prosecution argues that subliminal projection is not to be included within the protection of the First Amendment since, because he is not aware that he is being influenced, the recipient cannot consciously consider the ideas presented and form a rational opinion on the basis of them, and that this is the crux of the process of opinion formation protected by the First Amendment. This law prohibiting the use of subliminal projection, far from abridging freedom of expression, removes a potential obstacle to the process of free discussion which alone makes free speech effective and valuable. If men can be influenced beyond their awareness, they cannot escape such influence, and they are in that

situation, in effect, members of a captive audience because of the very nature of the means of communication. Further, the prosecution argues, one is free to express his views in other ways. Punishment is not threatened for the expression of the content of what is communicated. The law and its administration are neutral as to the content of the influence; they simply outlaw the means of communicating. One is free to say the same things by other modes of communication, and if he claims the right to use subliminal projection as his means of communication, he is claiming the right to use coercion of a captive audience as well as the right to speak his mind, which exceeds his legitimate rights.

This hypothetical case confronts us with the basic dilemma as to whether primary process communication is protected within the First Amendment. The argument that it does not enter into conscious rational cogitation, which is the traditionally valued end of the freedom of speech, is countered by the argument that it does in fact enter into the processes by which opinion is formed and must be protected in order to avoid distorting these processes. If the latter argument rests on the negative theory of the First Amendment, perhaps it has lost its force in the case of subliminal projection which appears, to the extent that we now understand it, to be clearly distinguishable from secondary process rational processes, and hence might not be protected. If the argument rests on a positive theory of the protection of the actual process by which opinion is formed, subliminal projection is in the same position as other forms of primary process communication and mixed primary and secondary process communication.

Let us now suppose that the Federal Government has abandoned its attempt to prohibit the use of subliminal projection by others, but goes ahead with its broad campaign to change the attitudes of the citizenry in a particular direction through the same vast array of modern techniques as in our first hypothetical case. Again a citizen has brought suit to enjoin the campaign on the grounds that the conduct tends to break down the processes

of free thought and discussion and thereby abridges his rights under the First Amendment.

The citizen might argue that such a massive government campaign amounts to coercion by saturating a captive audience with government controlled expression (i.e., propaganda). The communication is so persuasive that one cannot escape it. One is subjected to it in public places, places where he must be and places where he has a right to be. Although no use of physical force is involved there is an aspect of coercion. It would be difficult, if an injunction were to issue on this ground, to distinguish most other types of governmental action. Anything that the government does is backed by the prestige of the nation and the implicit threat of the use of its vast resources and force.

Another argument that could be made is that the action by the government must be enjoined because it tends to break down the very process of free expression and discussion by foreclosing the opportunity of citizens to enter, through their own expression, into the process by which opinion is formed. The cumulative effect of such a massive campaign is so strong that it destroys the possibility of influencing attitudes in a divergent direction, and thus effectively denies to others the freedom to communicate. This foreclosing effect is peculiar to the case of primary process communication because it is the impact of the cumulation which is insurmountable. In the case of secondary process communication, the ideas and arguments can be countered with further arguments, facts, and ideas, and a differential in cumulative exposure is not so crucial as to foreclose the possibility of counter influence. If the course of conduct by the government in this case does tend to break down the process and possibility of freedom of expression, then the citizen's rights protected under the First Amendment are abridged and an injunction ought to issue.

As another example, let us suppose that a Negro or other minority community group appeals the denial of its application for a permit to use a park for a concert of the community chamber orchestra on the grounds that its members' freedom of speech

is abridged by the denial of the permit. The park is several square blocks in area and located near a much patronized shopping and business area. The city has a policy of prohibiting the use of the park for organized group activities in order to keep to a minimum any danger of disturbances or obstruction of traffic. The city is mindful, however, of its Constitutional obligations to allow the free use of this park for the expression of any and all viewpoints or opinions. The city has therefore instituted a permit system to regulate the use of the park for public speeches, on the ground that they are likely to gather crowds. It issues permits without discrimination in order of application to all applicants for permits to use the park for purposes of the public expression of opinion. In this case a permit was denied on the grounds that the group did not intend to use the park for purposes of speech, but instead for group recreation for which it was not the policy of the city to issue permits.

The community group argues that this concert is expression within the First Amendment and that the permit thus may not Constitutionally be denied. It argues that in order to overcome the prejudice and distorted stereotypes of other citizens of the city this concert was planned to communicate and demonstrate in a tangible way the fact that the Black community of the city is cultured, educated, and a part of the community of which the city should be proud. The group argues that the only way to communicate this effectively is to present to the people of the city the concrete scene of a large group of members of the Black community engaging in an activity that is a shared symbol of cultivated achievement. It argues that this point can be made only by the presence of human beings and their symbolic communication through conduct. The content could not be communicated effectively by speeches, pamphlets, advertisements, or any of the other more traditional means of expression. The group argues that it cannot Constitutionally be denied the use of a public park to express and communicate such things that are basic to the attitude formation process.

How would this case be decided? One argument which must be

passed upon is that music is a form of expression and thus cannot be abridged under the First Amendment. This is a radical argument that would expand the scope of First Amendment protection drastically. While it cannot be denied that music, painting, dance, and other nonverbal forms of art are forms of expression, it appears that they are not the sort of expression which has been protected. Expression relating to ideas is what has been protected. While we ought not demand that the ideas expressed be phrased in rational verbal terms, we may perhaps demand that they be relevant to the formation of attitudes and policy. It may be an impossible task to define such relevance and determine it in particular cases, but in this case the music itself does not seem sufficiently relevant to be protected as speech or expression. At any rate this need not be decided in this case.

A more powerful argument is that the acts of associating, playing music, and listening to it, in the context of prevalent attitudes which such conduct may well tend to influence through its expression of dissonant facts and attitudes, is primary process or empathic communication and expression that must be protected by the First Amendment. If one concludes that this conduct is within the scope of First Amendment protection, the next step is to decide whether the activity creates a clear and present danger of breach of public order or of some other evil which the city has a right to prohibit.

If one includes the conduct in question within the protection of the First Amendment, the balance favors requiring the permit to be issued, while if it is not so included, the permit would not be required. The case seems to turn directly on whether primary process communication is to be included within the protection of the First Amendment.

What then shall be the response of the Constitutional law of the First Amendment to the insights of psychoanalysis which have undermined its traditional theoretical premises? Its first response will be, no doubt, and has already been, to ignore such assaults on the foundations of the body of legal precedent.

Courts will not be adept at handling such subtleties or the sophistries that will be woven of them in the course of the argument of a case. The law gropes viscerally, one case at a time, and rarely articulates a new abstraction until the decisions which may be deduced from and rationalized by it have already been reached. However, as new cases arise and are decided, the hypothetical cases I have discussed or others, which cannot be made sense of with only the traditional concepts, the theory of the First Amendment will have to take account of the vastly more complex concepts of communication and thought that arise from psychoanalytic experience. One of the crucial questions that will have to be answered is whether or not the primary, nonrational aspects of communication are to be included within the area of speech which is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment.

SUMMARY

Judicial interpretation of the freedom of speech which is guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution has traditionally been based on the model of man as a rational being whose conduct is controlled by reasoned thought and decision and whose interaction in the process of attitude and opinion formation is characterized by the 'market place of ideas' in which the process of discussion or the competition of ideas tends to the result that the true ideas are 'bought' and the false ones discarded.

The model of man and his thought which arises out of psychoanalytic theory and experience includes the new dimension of primary process functioning and views the whole of mental functioning as a process interpenetrated by both primary and secondary process modes of functioning. Man's rationality is no longer his dominant and defining characteristic; rather, it has come to be seen as one among several modes of mental functioning, none of which occurs without the interpenetration to some degree of the other modes. Along with primary process mental functioning comes interpersonal interaction, the influence of which is mainly

on the primary aspects of functioning rather than the secondary, and a new model of attitude and opinion formation that includes such primary process mode communication and influence.

This new model of man and thought challenges the model on which the assumptions of the traditional theory of the freedom of speech are based. The use of subliminal projection as a means of influencing attitudes and opinions, for example, would force the law to face the issue of whether or not nonrational means of influencing attitudes and ideas are to be included within the area of expression which is constitutionally protected by the First Amendment. This basic question is presented by primary process nonrational elements of many types of symbolic and behavioral communication. The Supreme Court has extended the mantle of protection of the First Amendment to symbolic speech in several cases but has not articulated a theory of the freedom of speech that adequately takes account of the model of thought and communication that has arisen out of psychoanalytic theory and experience.

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PATHOLOGICAL JEALOUSY

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During analysis of over six years' duration, it was possible to study in considerable detail the symptom of pathological jealousy, which at times assumed delusional proportions, in a man who otherwise showed no impairment of major ego functions, was able to carry on productive work without interruption, and who could undertake classical analysis without the use of parameters. This rare combination of an intact ego and the isolated but persistent symptom of pathological jealousy is unlike many cases reported in the literature in which the patients were either psychotic, or briefly studied, or the pathological jealousy was a transient symptom. In the analysis of this case, the original trauma that left an oral cast on his future personality development and that paved the way for the formation of his pathological jealousy could be reconstructed. It was therefore possible not only to confirm Riviere's *(16)* and Fenichel's *(6)* observations that oral fixations are important in the development of pathological jealousy, but also to augment the 'historical details about the origin of the fixation' *(6)*.

Freud first formulated the mechanism of pathological jealousy on the basis of Schreber's case in Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia *(8)*, and later elaborated on it in Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality *(9)*. He distinguished between the projected and the delusional jealousies: '. . . *projected* jealousy is derived in both men and women either from their own actual unfaithfulness in real life or from impulses toward it which have succumbed to repression. . . . [The delusional jealousy] too has its origin in repressed impulses towards unfaithfulness; but the object in these cases is the same sex as the subject' *(9,* pp. 224-225*)*. He also made these penetrating observations: normal jealousy, although by no means rational, 'is compounded of grief . . . and of the narcissistic wound, . . .

further, of feelings of enmity against the successful rival, and of a greater or lesser amount of self-criticism which tries to hold the subject's own ego accountable for his loss. . . . [Jealousy] is a continuation of the earliest stirrings of a child's affective life and it originates in the œdipus or brother-and-sister complex of the first sexual period' *(9,* p. 223*).*

Jones *(13)* agreed with Freud on projection and homosexuality. In the elaboration of Freud's thesis that jealousy is compounded of grief, hatred, and narcissistic wound, he made valuable contributions to the elucidation of the narcissistic dependency in the person predisposed to pathological jealousy. In Jones's view, narcissistic dependency results from guilt in œdipal situations; guilt leads to fear of the father and inversion; inversion leads to fear of the woman, from which flight and infidelity arise; the latter is projected in jealousy. Jones presented summarized conclusions in his paper but did not use illustrative cases.

Brunswick *(3)* described in detail her two-and-a-half months' analysis of a case of delusional jealousy which supported her conclusions that 'the unconscious homosexuality was the cause of the illness of the woman patient but the homosexuality has its basis in the accidental attachment of the normal passivity of the small child to an object which happens to be feminine [though phallic] sister' and that 'the striking point in this case is the entire absence of the œdipus complex. . . . The patient . . . is fixed at a preœdipal level.' It is obvious that Brunswick's work was handicapped by the fact that the patient was psychotic and the analytic work brief.

Riviere *(16)* described the analysis of a transitory symptom of morbid jealousy which occurred during the course of her analysis of a woman patient. She noted that the patient's jealousy was associated with an unconscious fantasy which 'consisted of an impulse or an act on the patient's part of seizing and obtaining from some other person something she greatly desired, thus robbing and despoiling him or her'. The triangular situation included the patient and two other objects, 'one of

these two objects was the object of her desire which she would take possession of for gratification; . . . the other object . . . was the person who suffered the robbery and spoliation'. Riviere observed that the general explanation of the patient's jealousy as a projection of her infidelity was clearly insufficient and she therefore offered the following interpretation for the relationship between flirtation and jealousy: in the jealousy mood, others were robbing the patient of everything, whereas in flirtation she was doing the same to all around her. Riviere noted that 'the origin of the phantasy in the oral-erotic and oral-sadistic phase of development is not to be doubted, although I cannot here quote material in support of this statement' and that 'simple genital . . . desire and jealousy played little part in it, despite what one might call the attempt to rationalize the unconscious phantasy by "genitalizing" it into infidelity and jealousy situations'.

Fenichel's contribution *(7)* can be viewed as a direct extension of Freud's and Jones's works. Elaborating also on narcissistic dependency as Jones did before him, Fenichel observed however that the narcissistic fixation, or a fixation on a primitive mechanism of regulation of self-regard, coincides with an oral fixation. From the illustrative case (a woman) he thus concludes that 'though no historical details about the origins of the patient's oral-sadistic fixation were ascertained, we can summarize the situation as follows: robbing (or turning against the ego, being robbed at the same time) became her condition of love. Her jealousy was, in the final resort, oral-sadistic wishes directed toward her mother.' Fenichel's conclusion is parallel to Riviere's, as he had also noted. (Their different theoretical orientations in regard to the concept of defense, the concept of superego, etc., will not be discussed here.)

Seemingly unaware of Riviere's and Fenichel's contributions, Chatterji *(4)*, an Indian analyst, laboriously drew conclusions from his clinical material that 'the pathological jealousy is not one of a genital œdipal level but is of purely oral origin'. However, Barag's *(1)* report on her analytic work of

less than a year with a case of pathological jealousy seemed to deviate from the above trend of investigation. Barag characterized her patient (a man) as remaining narcissistically fixated on the phallus: 'He loves his wife narcissistically as he loves his penis. To the extent that she becomes, for him, his penis, he has a partial feminine identification. This phase [penis-mother identification] would be the transition in the development of the increasing hetero- or homosexual object choice' *(1,* pp. 10-11*).* At one point she spoke of the patient's 'thieving' from mother but gave the impression that this 'thievery' was in no way related to oral-sadistic drives. It is most unfortunate that Barag did not mention Riviere's or Fenichel's work. As a consequence, we are left to wonder if the oral material abounding in the presentation played any role in the symptoms of pathological jealousy.

Seidenberg *(18),* like Barag, viewed the jealousy as a precipitate of œdipal struggle. 'The delusion of jealousy is actually a wish that mother should be loose sexually and that she should have an affair with another man—the other man being, of course, the patient himself.' Using as evidence the plots of two dramas as well as two clinical cases, Seidenberg stated that the castration fear implied in this wish must be responsible for the suffering and anxiety of the jealousy.

CLINICAL MATERIAL

R was referred for psychoanalysis because of his acute anxiety and depression which were increasing and interfering with his work. An efficient corporation executive in his mid-thirties, he had been married for over ten years and had four children. About two months before beginning his psychoanalysis, his wife had informed him that she was in love with another man who happened to be his best friend. This took the patient completely by surprise; he had thought that their marriage was a good one even though he never felt satisfied with his wife. The most upsetting aspect was that his best friend should do this to him. As the wife walked out of their home and bade him good-

bye, the patient felt betrayed, humiliated, and bitter; he wanted to 'tear down the pillars of the temple, to kill all the Philistines as Samson did'. He must get revenge, he told himself again and again. He decided on two courses of action, to make his friend cuckold, and to woo back his wife and then 'dump' her as she did him. Step by step he carried out his plans. But, when his wife returned home, his desire for revenge had disappeared.

Following their sexual reunion, the patient became very self-conscious about the size of his penis and began to probe his wife about her experiences with her lover. Listening to her description he felt overwhelmingly jealous. Now he thought about his wife all the time. At work (he attended to his work perfunctorily) his thoughts would dwell on her eyes, her smiles, etc., which to him became perfect creations of nature, and he felt he could not wait to go home to embrace her. As soon as he got home he was troubled by the thought that she had a lover who was once his best friend. In order to assure himself that he meant more to her than her lover did, he pressed her to tell him all the details, without any omissions, of how she and her lover spent their time together. If she refused to coöperate, he decided that she had secrets to hide from him and his jealousy was heightened. If she did coöperate, he would weigh carefully whether or not he was better than his wife's lover and whether or not she was more giving to him than to her lover; as a rule he could always find reasons to feel self-loathing and jealousy. On nights when his wife went to community functions he felt lost and compelled to spy on her to make sure that she was not meeting with her lover. He made mysterious phone calls to be sure she was at the destined place. When she returned he felt that she did not greet him warmly and seemed indifferent to the suffering he had just gone through. He felt jealous and suspicious. He would study the creases in her dress, stealthily examine her purse, the car, etc., to be sure there was no evidence of her meeting with her lover. To dispel his doubts he would then ask devious questions to get to the smallest detail about what she did and to whom she talked. His energy seemed indefati-

gable. When she felt exhausted, he decided that she was evasive.

Soon he hit upon an idea: 'If she loves me, I need not be jealous. So let her prove to me that she loves me.' Thereafter he designed task after task for her to perform. Because of the nature of these tasks she could rarely have passed his test; for instance, he would suddenly issue an order forbidding her to do a chore which she had to attend to; he would ask her to undress when and where he wanted her to, disregarding the fact that she would then be exposing herself to their children; he would ask her to perform perverse acts which he knew she would not do. Even on those occasions when she did pass his test he was not satisfied; he would muse, 'This task was too easy. I must try her with another one which is a bit more difficult.' Thus he was compelled to design task after task and to ask her to perform them again and again.

At times, when feeling very tired and agonized by his own activities, he entertained the idea of getting far, far away. He thought: 'My wife was the cause of the trouble. If only I get away from her I'll be all right.' He would drive away, drink solitarily at different bars, feel lonely, and fantasy more satisfactory relations with girl friends he had had in the distant past. As he turned his thoughts, as he invariably did, to recollections of unflattering experiences with them, he became disgusted with himself, wished that he was dead, and contemplated suicide. When he found himself dwelling on suicidal thoughts he became scornful of himself for being a coward and would then turn his thoughts toward his wife. Then he would worry that his wife might again turn to her lover. He had to rush home to 'stop all the nonsense'. Essentially he knew what he was doing was ridiculous, but he felt unable to stop. As time went on and he felt his misery getting more and more intolerable, he decided to seek relief through treatment.

The patient was in good contact with reality. Despite his current internal struggle, which resulted in increased use of alcohol, poor sleep, and generally depressed mood and appearance, he was working full time. 'When I got into the swing of

things I could do a good job.' Being a prolific reader he was familiar with psychoanalysis.

His parents were living and well. His father was a self-made man, but despite his success in his business was hypochondriacal at home and always in the background of his excitable, suspicious, and demanding wife. R was the second of three brothers; the older brother was five years his senior (the mother had no pregnancies in these five years) and the other brother, thirteen months younger. Both brothers, as well as their families, were described as being free from neurotic problems.

R perceived himself as a complacent person. From the age of nine he enjoyed solitary reading more than anything else. Merely to prove that he 'could too', he entered competition at times, especially when feeling challenged by the younger brother. He had won high academic degrees in his graduate and postgraduate work, and recognition in high school sports. During puberty he was acutely aware that he 'did not belong', even though he always had friends; he was an intellectual, a highbrow, who had little in common with others. His experience with girls was satisfactory but he felt he never had enough of his share with the type of girls he coveted, those who were beautiful and popular.

Following graduation from college he married; his wife was beautiful but not very popular: 'in fact, she was sort of alienated like myself'. He admitted his ambivalence toward the marriage and gave the following reason: 'I did not quite want to get married but I did not want to let go of her either. I didn't propose; she did.' He described his ten years of marital life as being good, for his wife never complained, even though he did not feel satisfied with her. When she made a suicide attempt and subsequently asked to leave him, he was so shocked that he thought of treatment for her as well as for himself. Now he seemed to have 'forgotten' the impact of these events. He said he loved his children but admitted that he had not been spending much time with them for the last three to four years, although he could not give any reason for his change of attitude.

At work, he felt 'insignificant' even though he was actually highly respected for his knowledge of his own and the related fields. He was close to only a few of his colleagues with whom he could engage in intense intellectual arguments which he would win. He related to his 'best' friend, involved in the present crisis, in an entirely different fashion. They shared a common interest in ham radio, took trips together, and rarely argued competitively. Their relationship was an altogether congenial one. Above all, R admired this friend for his self-assurance, virility, and chivalrous ways with women. This friendship, which had begun about four years before, was not limited to the two men; their wives were also congenial.

Following the brief review of his background, the content of the hours in the next four months consisted essentially of his description of his feelings. When it was pointed out to him that his jealousy seemed to weld his wife, his friend, and himself together, he began to speak of his sadness for having lost his 'good' woman, and for having lost his best friend. Some time later he began to experience anger. At first the anger was directed at himself for not watching his wife, not treating her better, etc., but later it was directed toward his wife, which she took without uttering a complaint. During these four months, although the patient seemed to put concerted effort into delimiting his conscious thoughts to a description of his various feelings and his recent interactions between himself and his wife (including assignment of tasks, etc.) to substantiate his grief, his jealousy, or his rage, he freely associated and had many dreams. These free associations and dream associations revealed his preoccupation over the size of his genitalia, castration fears, maternal identification, and fear of this identification. Clearly the preoccupation earmarked the appearance of hitherto repressed œdipal fantasies.

At about the time the patient began his analysis, his wife also started analysis. In the fourth month of her analysis she decided she would not respond to her husband's incessant questioning

of her relationship with her lover; in short, she struggled to discontinue the sadomasochistic relationship which had been established between them. This change on her part resulted in the patient's repeatedly dreaming of being murdered and subsequently in a brief paranoid reaction for which there was no need to introduce any parameter of treatment. He reported that he was being 'investigated' at his work, and he was visibly panic-stricken. In reality, this investigation was an annual affair to which he had been subjected several times in previous years. Yet such knowledge did not allay his anxiety for he felt there was something different this time. 'The investigators were looking for something special', and therefore he had to look out. Thus, when meeting with the investigators he was evasive and argumentative. This attitude of his had puzzled them and aroused their suspicions, resulting in an unnecessarily thorough and prolonged check. Interpretation of the 'loss' of his wife dispelled the paranoid symptom. Instantly, however, he returned to various themes of jealousy. In the beginning, he had 'controlled' the hours in such a way that he rarely allowed his analyst to complete a sentence. Despite interpretation of the defense, his 'control' persisted. As a result the analyst's activity was, for a time, limited to saying 'jealousy again'.

R's associations can be exemplified by the following excerpt: 'Last night we had blueberries for dessert. I asked my wife why she didn't serve blackberries; we had plenty of blackberries in the garden. I told her so many times that the grocery bill was exorbitant, that she was always exceeding the budget, and that she could save by serving the blackberries, cabbage, string beans, etc., which I planted in the garden. She said she would, but she bought the blueberries; she said the kids wanted blueberries. Maybe they did, but she should have carried out her promise to me. I don't know why I asked her to come home. Now I have a new problem, to send her away, to divorce her. I do not love her now. . . . I don't love my mother, I guess I never loved anyone.' At this point he cleared his throat and went on. 'It is not true. I loved my wife and I must still love her. This

morning she said that tonight when I came home she would not be home, she would be downtown shopping and would come home later. I asked her if I could meet her somewhere. She said, "It is not necessary". I felt then that she was to meet some man . . . she could be stepping out on me again.' From the association it was obvious that the thought of his offer to meet her downtown, which was to him an indication of his love for her, was used to obscure his fear that he was incapable of love. When his extreme effort to obscure whether he could or could not love was finally explained to him, he relaxed his 'controlling'.

In the subsequent months it was possible to note that jealousy consisted of two components: 'I love her', and 'let her prove to me she loves me too'. At first, he perceived that the component 'I love her' was *ipso facto* one which no one, the patient himself least, should question: therefore, his primary concern was 'Let her prove her love to me'. It took some time for him to realize that 'Let her prove to me', was merely a projection of his own feeling of incapacity for loving. He seemed to be saying, 'It is not I who cannot love; it is you who does not love'. When he did realize the purpose of the projection, he stopped 'testing' his wife's love for him by assigning her tasks to perform.

Although he continued to function well at his work and did, in fact, receive promotions, his behavior in the sessions now became more regressive. Earlier in his accounts of the triangular situations, his wife was identified as the mother and the third person (her lover or her analyst) as the father. While included in the triangle, the patient found himself 'standing outside looking in . . . to discern their interaction . . . to find out their secret'. Now his wife was still identified as the mother, whereas the third person was the younger sibling. Thus, casting the analyst in the mother's role, he watched closely to see if the analyst was more attentive to him than to his other patients. Arriving for his hour early, and leaving late, he scanned other patients' emotional states when they left the analyst's office. One day when he observed a patient leaving the office laughing, he became very distressed for he felt the analyst had never treated

him so well as to make him feel so happy. On another day, when he left the office he encountered a new patient, a woman, and then complained bitterly in the next hour: 'I can accept those I saw before; they must have started treatment before me. This face was new; she must be a new patient. I can't stand the thought of you having a new patient.'

Subsequent associations and enactments in the transference led to clarification of the infantile composition of the triangle by the mother, R, and his younger brother. At age sixteen months, three months after the birth of his younger brother, he had measles and was 'isolated' for a time. After recovering he became a poor eater and his mother's obsession about 'feeding people right' made her begin to force food upon him. This eventually resulted in setting up a pattern of interaction between the mother and the son: he was indifferent to food; she would urge him to 'have another bite'; there was a tug-of-war between the two of them; the mother felt frustrated and would then say, 'Nobody loves me, I'm going out and eat worms'. She would go away, pouting, and he would feel guilty about not having given in to his mother's wishes. This interaction must have served him well in 'winning' his mother to himself; but, needless to say, this way of winning the mother was not at the expense of his younger brother. As R became mother-tied, the younger brother was free to leave the mother. For instance, while the younger brother learned how to roller skate with children in the neighborhood, R, now feeling challenged, had to learn the same thing in his mother's kitchen. Perhaps because of this close mother-son tie, with increased proximity which facilitated identification between the mother and the son (or was it because of the massive introjection of the lost mother at thirteen to sixteen months of age?), his personality and his mother's showed a great resemblance. Both were sensitive, easily hurt, ready to make others (who were considered offenders) feel guilty, and both were jealous and suspicious (mother always fussed at others, believing they had secrets which were kept from her).

After working through the triangular relationship, the analysis entered another phase. Now the analyst was seen essentially as the patient's older brother, whom he adored, and his father, whom he despised. Since the patient was five or six, this brother, five years his senior, was his hero. The older brother was acclaimed everywhere he went and was a successful professional man. Despite his brother's various merits, the patient's aggrandized view of his brother was, he felt, engendered and re-enforced by his mother who went out of her way to extol her older son's success among her relatives and friends. In contrast, the mother never spoke of her husband in this manner. Whenever she did mention the father to her children she assigned him a punitive role: 'Wait until I tell your father when he comes home'. That the father indiscriminately carried out his wife's wishes had been one of the reasons for R's disrespect for his father, the other reason being the father's assumption of 'a child's role' through his hypochondriacal complaints and other acts that minimized his own importance in the presence of his wife.

Casting the analyst in the role of the older brother and father, the patient saw him either as a socially successful professional man or as a helpless milktoast, led by his wife. It was many months later before he could recall his walks with his father, in the woods and alongside the river bank near his father's summer home. He recalled how amazed he was to discover his father was on boxing and basketball teams in college, that his father was shrewd in his business dealings. It was then that he began to respect his father and then that the split paternal imagos became united. Speaking of his father's sexual potency, the patient recalled with intense fear a screen memory in which he (at about age six to eight) and his younger brother were riding pillows in the bed, a game they often played at bedtime. Suddenly, responding to his brother's statement, 'a stick, jumping up and down', R was panic-stricken. He screamed and screamed until his father rushed to his aid and showed him that there was no stick in the room. This screen memory led to as-

sociations of witnessing the primal scene. (Both the patient and his younger brother slept in the parents' bedroom until R was six.) There followed a series of anxiety dreams of plane crashes, of being stabbed, of being given injections and enemas. He recalled that during Army service he had fears that he would be approached homosexually. He recalled no conscious thoughts of this kind during the rest of his developmental years, including the years with his best friend. These thoughts about homosexuality led to associations related to passivity and maternal identification.

The patient now wanted to be a man. Enacting the œdipal situation, he had a 'compulsion to steal' a married woman. His effort was rewarded. When the woman began to speak of marrying, he at first became elated, but soon became terrified and terminated the affair; he felt that if they were married the woman would soon find out his incapacity to love. At this juncture he became jealous of his wife again. At the sight of his wife, he was reminded of her lover even though this man had not been coming near her for the past three years. He perceived his wife not as his own but as 'some man's wife' who was desirable but who was forbidden to him. He was greatly distraught and he again needed to design tasks for his wife to perform. This recrudescence of his jealousy was brief; it passed away when its defensive use was noticed. It was then clarified that, in the content of the œdipal situation, the meaning of the two components of jealousy were: 'I love you' equates 'I love you, Mother', and, 'Let *her* prove she loves *me*', was addressed to the father in order to shift responsibility, so as to allay R's own castration fear and guilt.

As his feelings of fear and guilt were worked through the patient began to feel that his wife was now his own. They bought a house; previously he resisted his wife's desire to own a house because of his fear of transience. At this juncture, his wife was planning to discontinue her analysis and he spoke of terminating his analysis so that he might finish before she did. Thoughts of termination of analysis produced anxiety dreams and fan-

tasies that he would never amount to anything unless he could enact the Bible story in which David killed Goliath. He felt that he had to choose between kill-and-replace and remain-in-the-background. Now it became understandable that he could argue (or compete) with and win over those for whom he held no respect; he had to avoid those whom he did respect for they stirred up conflict in him. Following this phase of analysis he felt more at ease with his competitiveness and undertook to write a book, to fulfil a long-cherished, but suppressed, wish to outdo others. It was not obvious at first that writing a book was an acting out of maternal transference. Soon, however, it became evident that the completion of his wife's analysis had re-opened the narcissistic wound of his lagging behind his brothers' successes in the past as well as in the present. Now, while in analysis, he had to seek concrete success by himself through the book, just as he had to learn to roller skate in his mother's kitchen.

In the process of writing this book there was a re-experiencing of anal material (withholding, difficulty in expelling, need for milk of magnesia, or an enema) as well as oral (compulsion to read and take in from books). But of utmost interest during this phase was his repeated demonstration of narcissistic absorption in his undertaking and of ignoring the existence of the analyst. During the hours, after perfunctory reports of current events, often devoid of emotion, R began to 'write' his book or to turn his thoughts to the book. This behavior persisted, despite interpretations which he validated, until the first draft of the book was completed.

In retrospect, he noted that his behavior in analysis during the writing of the book was also reflected in his daily living with his family, i.e., he 'ignored' them and he 'disappeared' from them. By 'ignoring' he meant wilfully paying no attention to them in order to establish the fact that they should attend to his needs but not he to theirs. By 'disappearing' he meant an automatic, unwilled turning off his mind, in the midst of conversation, to something else, a passage in a book he had just

read, a scientific subject, etc. He said he had to ignore his wife; otherwise he could be reminded of her act of infidelity which had established the fact that he was second best and that he had wed a second-best wife. He had to ignore the analyst while writing the book, for he would likewise be reminded of his wife's analysis being finished first. 'Thinking of myself as second best, and as one qualified to get only second best, makes me angry.' He also became aware of his hate for his mother as the one whose behavior made him feel 'I could not be anybody or get anything but second best'.

In analysis he now enacted the 'ignoring' and the 'disappearing'. He fell silent when he 'disappeared'. When the silence was punctured, he would engage in a brief argument and would fall silent again. He said he felt depressed, that 'fighting with you is better than feeling depressed . . . but I don't even feel like fighting'. During R's silent hours the analyst felt a general malaise, lacked concrete thoughts, lacked energy to formulate his thoughts, and often felt an urge not so much to end the silence as to end his own unpleasant feelings. As the cycle of the patient's falling silent, the analyst's effort to break the silence, the ensuing protest on R's part was repeated again and again, it became gradually clear that this must simulate the feeding struggle that was set up between the mother and the son when he was about sixteen months old. As he accepted the interpretation that his 'disappearing' served the function of getting the analyst, his wife, or others, to arouse him as once it served to get his mother to coax him to eat, he described his belief that to love is to possess; for instance, if his wife loved him she must possess him or claim him from 'disappearing'. He further elaborated that his disappearing protected his 'secrets'. This was related to the Bible stories of David and Goliath and the destructive rage of Samson who, after being betrayed by a woman, tore down the pillars of the temple.

But R revealed secrets other than destructiveness; he had always felt that he was second best, would only get second best, and he had therefore decided not to love others or to respect

others' needs. He had been quite aware, since adolescence, that there existed a 'gulf' between him and others that made him feel alienated and not belonging. Vaguely he felt that this 'gulf' was his fault but decided 'What the hell! Why bother to get something second best that I didn't want anyway?' He secretly entertained the idea that he was a great lover, but did not want to waste his great love on anyone who did not deserve it. When he first met his wife he had hopes of realizing his dreams of being a great lover, but he soon 'discovered' his wife was a disappointment. She had many drawbacks (e.g., she was not popular; she did not give in enough, and therefore she did not love him enough) and she was, at best, a second best. When he was about to get married, he decided to be generous and to make her over but, in the ensuing years of marriage, he realized that he was mistaken to want to turn a disappointment into something different. Then he began to ignore her or disappear from her although he did not consciously experience rage or hatred toward her. He turned more and more to books, having first become an avid reader at age nine. 'Books are greater than human beings. One can take in or reject whatever one wants to without feeling guilty. Such simplicity of life one cannot expect from his fellow human beings.'

Following much working through of his 'disappearing' or narcissistic engrossment, R was subsequently able to consider terminating the analysis which had lasted six years.

DISCUSSION

Narcissistic Fixation and Narcissistic Object Relation

R was five years younger than his older brother. It was unclear how his mother felt about becoming pregnant, or about having a baby after not having had an infant in the house for over five years, or how this lapse of five years made her care of R different from the way she cared for her other two children. Also, there was no information in regard to R's special sensi-

tivity or his behavior as a newborn infant. Although the early mother-infant interaction is unknown, it might be assumed that he was reared in an average expectable environment *(12)* or in a good enough holding environment *(21)*, and that the mother served reasonably well as the protective shield *(14)*.

At the height of R's late oral and early anal phases of development, the mother's pregnancy (her reaction toward it is also unknown) with R's younger brother became evident. His reaction to the pregnancy and to the events associated with the birth of the younger brother was not traceable. It is conceivable however that after having been subjected to these events—especially the birth of the younger brother when R was thirteen months old—that aggression and loss were linked together. When he was sixteen months old, a critical age of becoming assertive, demanding, and locomotively active *(10)* and of acquiring awareness of self *(20)*, he contracted measles; the timing of this event might consequently stir fear of self-assertion or of aggressivity. And the experience of separation from the mother at this stage might re-enforce the linkage between aggression and loss. When the mother and the son were reunited, R declined feeding, resulting in the development of a unique interaction between the two of them; namely, R's refusal of food, mother's urging him to take another bite, and the ensuing struggle until one (usually the child) succumbed to the other's will. It is possible that, at an earlier stage of the struggle, R was not 'refusing' but was simply anorexic, that his lack of appetite was symptomatic of a reaction to the loss of the mother *(19)*. The repeated forcing of food by the mother who misread the cues could, however, serve as cumulative traumata, as Khan *(14)* puts it, which led eventually to the formation of what Greenacre *(11)* has termed 'focal symbiosis' with the mother, to the precipitation of an oral cast to his future character development, to the narcissistic fixation with the tendency of self-engrossment and grandiosity, and to the need on R's part to mold himself into behaving passively in order to free himself from the responsibility of being an initiator of the loss.

In his object relations, following the traumatic experience, R was most at ease if he actively set up the above-mentioned interaction and could behave passively in it. Or, he would simply not relate to others either by becoming self-engrossed or by engaging them, without a real consideration of their existence, in a struggle to win. To him, to love was to possess. For instance, he loved his wife, therefore he possessed or owned her. Because he desired to be loved by her he expected her to possess him and therefore to claim him from his self-engrossment. In general, he was never content, for he never did find himself in total possession of others, nor others of him. In pre-adolescence he discovered a special value in reading; namely, from the books he could take or reject without guilty feelings. Henceforth, hiding behind the bookstacks became an effective way to nurse his narcissistic wound. But the more he found satisfaction in books, the more his relations with humans suffered.

Notwithstanding the traumata and the resultant fixation, R did develop adequate ego strength and adaptive skill to sail through various developmental crises and become a husband and a father and assume a responsible job. But however successful he was in the eyes of society, he could not be unaware of his internal strife or the existence of the 'gulf' between himself and others. Obviously feeling helpless to deal with his inner conflict alone (and his narcissistic grandiosity could not allow him to seek help from others), he simply tried to be more self-engrossed and, in a sense, more regressed. His withdrawal led to the deterioration of the marital relation, the wife's suicide attempt, his increasing distance from his children, his need to form the friendship with the man who became his best friend, and, eventually, to the crisis which brought him to analysis.

Jealousy is a universal experience. The differences between 'normal' and pathological jealousy is, as Fenichel puts it, similar to that between grief and melancholia. Unlike envy, the experience of jealousy involves three persons instead of two *(5)*. Because three persons act as the 'stars' of the jealousy drama, it

may be intimated that jealousy must be first experienced at a time when the developing and maturing child acquires the ability to clearly distinguish persons around him.[1] At such times, he must have already been able to distinguish self from others, to establish a certain degree of object constancy, and to formulate a rudimentary set of self-representations and object representations.

The intrusion on the dyad relation between the mother and the child by a third person, such as the father, sibling, or others, is inevitable. Therefore, every child knows jealousy feelings as soon as his ego equipment permits him to conceptualize them. But, to formulate the self-representations and the object representations in order to stage or restage the jealousy drama requires something special. In R's case, as much as he might have had fleeting experiences of jealousy toward his father and his older brother, it was not until his traumatic experience at the age of thirteen to sixteen months, causing grief and fear of aggressivity, that he began to boost the importance of his younger brother as the star in the jealousy drama of the self-representation and the object representation, and to enact it. The replaying of the drama could have various repercussions; for instance, the creation of an ego state of jealousy which could be reactivated by the experience of grief or aggressivity, or both; the exploitation of such primitive defenses as projection, denial, etc., in order to avoid the experience of grief and aggressivity and to maintain a homeostatic or tension-free state; the re-enforcement of the ego-syntonic value of narcissism, etc. During the œdipal phase all the repercussions could be exaggerated, resulting in ego distortion, in constrained object relations, and in the re-enforcement of the experience of the ego state of jealousy, which paved the way for the symptom-formation of pathological jealousy at a later date.

[1] It is not the intention here to even speculate which of the two emotional experiences—jealousy or envy—could possibly be first experienced by a human child. Three-person or two-person dramas are mere descriptions of the phenomena, with no implication of sequences of developmental phases.

The Mechanism of Pathological Jealousy

The symptom of pathological jealousy in R's case appeared after he was reunited with his wife. When he lost his wife to his best friend, he was sad, angry, and revengeful. When he got even with his friend, he concentrated his vengeful feelings on his wife. He wanted to 'dump' her as she did him. But, upon reunion and following their sexual relations he was seized by jealousy, became concerned with the size of his penis, and questioned his wife persistently about her relations with her lover. The sequence of the occurrence of the events would seem to confirm the generally accepted view of union of penises and of homosexuality and thereby the theory that pathological jealousy is the result of the projected homosexual impulses. However fitting the theory appeared, one is nevertheless puzzled as to why the symptom did not occur at the time R made his friend a cuckold. Did not the penises unite then too? When one studies the symptom of pathological jealousy during the course of this analysis, one finds with astonishment that the rise and fall of the symptom did not coincide with the homosexual impulses but with a concern over narcissistic self-engrossment. Saddled with the two inconsistencies listed above, one proposes to turn to the consideration that jealousy is an ego state that can be reinstated by various conflicts, like those over homosexual impulses, oral-sadistic impulses, etc. In R's case, the onset of the symptom was not precipitated by homosexual impulses alone but was also compounded by oral-sadistic impulses. And later in the analysis the symptom seemed to be brought to the fore by conflicts over aggressivity and narcissism.

It seems that by conceiving pathological jealousy as a persistent ego state which can be reinstated by various conflicts, Riviere's and Fenichel's studies are rendered more consistent with Freud's. It must be emphasized that the concept of jealousy as an ego state was implied in Freud's definition of jealousy which, when condensed by Jones, is: 'Jealousy is compounded of grief, hatred, and narcissism'. To wit, in this definition jeal-

ousy is a complex ego state involving all components of the psychic structure—id, ego, and superego.

Homosexuality and Projection

R's best friend fits into the description of what Sandler *(17)* called the 'part-ideal self' and of what Blos *(2)* described as the 'idealized self-image'. In his best friend, R could find those traits required in a 'successful' object relation. Perhaps a desire on his part to imitate or identify with this friend determined their congenial and unrestrained relationship devoid of the 'gulf' which existed in the patient's relations with other human beings of either sex at that time. In this narcissistic homosexual relationship various disturbing thoughts could occur. For instance, there might be momentary existence of the 'gulf', there might be experience of homosexual impulses. Although such disturbing thoughts were not confirmed by R, their existence could safely be speculated as they could be documented in the transference manifestations in the analytic work. Perhaps it is due to such disturbing thoughts that men feel it necessary to bring their wives onto the scene. Although one must take into account the mental state of both R's wife and his best friend at the time to understand the eventual outcome of the whole affair, one could agree with Riviere, Chatterji, Barag, and Seidenberg that 'the patient plays an active role . . . , actually or imaginatively bringing together his spouse and her lover'. However, the purpose of bringing the two together, in R's association, did not quite substantiate the generally accepted view of 'union of penises in the woman' (at least in the concrete sense) nor Barag's view of union of the wife—who was identified as one's own penis—with her lover's penis, nor Chatterji's view of removing the danger inside the wife by means of her lover's penis. It fitted better Seidenberg's view, the revival of the œdipal conflict with the third person, a part-ideal self, playing the role of the son in the œdipal triangle.

Lagache *(15)* studied pathological jealousy in overt homosexuals. He found it necessary to distinguish active and passive

homosexuality and concluded that pathological jealousy was only related to passive homosexuality, whereas overt, active homosexuality was only a form of acting out. In the analysis of my patient, however, the connection between jealousy symptoms and passive homosexuality was not always traceable. Projection of infidelity impulses, both homosexual and heterosexual, was considered as the basis for pathological jealousy, although Riviere takes exception to this view. While projection was very much used by R as a defensive mechanism, causal links between infidelity and projection were not obvious. At one point, when he had an extramarital affair, he developed jealousy feelings toward his wife. In this instance, jealousy certainly appeared to be a reprojection of his own infidelity, but closer scrutiny revealed that, even there, his concern over narcissistic unrelatedness was interpolated between the jealousy and the infidelity impulses. In short, in the study of the associations in R's case, the data about homosexuality, passivity, and projection were abundant, but they did not seem to be direct, causative factors of the symptom-formation of pathological jealousy. Rather they all existed in parallel.

SUMMARY

From the detailed study of a patient, pathological jealousy could best be understood as a persistent ego state, capable of being instituted by conflicts over homosexual and oral-sadistic impluses, and by other conflicts as well, including those surrounding grief and narcissism. From this point of view, divergent explanations of pathological jealousy, as expressed in the literature, became complementary.

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A Note on 'The Pill' and Emotional Conflict

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A NOTE ON 'THE PILL' AND EMOTIONAL CONFLICT

BY VIVIAN JARVIS, M. A. (FREEPORT, NEW YORK)

On the morning of the tragic newscast that Senator Robert Kennedy had succumbed to head wounds, a young Catholic woman patient used the toilet adjoining my office after she had been called to enter. Though in the waiting-room for over quarter of an hour she had waited to see my previous patient leave before entering the bathroom. As she lay down she commented on enjoying the background noise of the air-conditioner turned on for the first time of the season. It somewhat muffled her voice and gave her the illusion of saying what she wanted, yet inaudibly. I told her this was like wishing not to be overheard in the toilet. She commented that it was also like the confessional, where she did not like to sit too close to the priest, hoping he would be unable to hear clearly her 'dirty little sins'. However, she said, somehow the priest did not matter too much, because she knew God could hear every word. The priest bothered her; God did not. She felt evasive because of her unconfessed use of 'the pill' (oral contraception). By making it a matter approved by her own conscience she was relieved of the necessity of confessing it. She thought this must be some kind of rationalization.

She went on to say laughingly that lately she had been thinking it was unfair for a woman to receive passively the semen of her husband whenever he wanted to 'shit all over her'. She sometimes wished it were the other way around. I reminded her that the day before she had complained of having sharp labor-like pains while exercising at home, but that she had discounted the possibility because she was taking the pill. The pains had finally ended in a 'shooting', explosive diarrhea.[1]

[1] The shooting diarrhea and toilet noises had much to do with this patient's unconscious overvaluation of flatus whose symbolic connections with words, breath, and fertilization Ernest Jones explored in The Madonna's Conception Through the Ear (In: *Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis, Vol. II,* London: Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1951.) Her erotization and aggressivization of intestinal functioning, its smells and noises, were of primary importance in the early onset of asthma.

She then spoke of the shooting of Kennedy which had saddened her immeasurably. He was a faithful follower of the Roman Catholic Church, truly entitled to the sacrament at his death. *He* had connected sexual activity with the duty of procreation to which his ten children attested. On the other hand, a friend of hers who had renounced Catholicism mocked her for being able to take both the pill and the holy wafer when receiving communion. She had been affected far differently by the assassination of Martin Luther King which she felt in her 'insides' with a sense of guilt and personal involvement. Clearly, Kennedy represented her superego still experienced at times as an outward agency reminding her of her own shortcomings. King, the brown fecal man, represented the uncontrollable impulses inside her. She associated King's skin color to her sexual wishes to perform as a man does in orgasm by her shooting diarrhea.

The patient now remembered that as a child she used to confess in church to sibling quarrels and disobedience to her mother. As an older adolescent, following the death of her devout father, a stern parent and strict disciplinarian, she confessed to sexual temptations. She began to anticipate with growing indifference the priest's usual admonition that she cleanse her mind and rid herself of dirty thoughts. Control over her thinking proved impossible. The priest she associated to her mother and me, standing as barriers between herself and her father, who after his death was ensconced in heaven at a safe distance and soon identified with God. Since her father was no longer physically present to direct her thinking or punish her actions, solitary thinking replaced communication. Since she found that she could not really control her dirty thoughts about father-God who was now at last aware of them (God could hear her every word), it was right for her to keep her thoughts from turning into actions by taking the pills and so prevent incestuous conception.

My patient's dirty words could be put in a state of grace, as it were, so that her thoughts would remain thoughts only by the cleansing action of swallowing the sterilizing pill. It was thus that her personal conscience could—in fact, *had* to—transcend churchly directives about using the risky rhythm method of contraception when the threat of incest was too great. The dirty words were a variant of the anal shooting noises by which she fantasied herself

as being both competitive and active with her father sexually. In latency she had defended against such ideas by developing constipation and using her mother's method of cleansing her insides with lemon and hot water. Her earlier bouts of diarrhea returned after she married and experienced coitus, and they also arose during difficult periods of her treatment.

Implicit but not as yet worked out were the deeper oral sexual fantasies of identifying the holy wafer and the pill. The guilt was displaced onto the pill following the unconscious sexualization of the wafer. Interestingly enough, one of her earliest remarks on religion was her indifference to the role of Mary (the oral aspect) and her total focus on the Trinity, a three-way re-enforcement of a masculine genital symbol in the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. Her religion had become a protective agency for her unconscious fantasies, but because of the danger of the return of repressed impulses, she was forever caught up in a vacillation between being a faithful follower of the church and a rejecter of those tenets which provoked unconscious conflict. These latter caused her to take an independent stand, permitting her to consider herself a progressive, intellectual Catholic. Thus, she would read forbidden books and exercise no censorship in seeing plays, but her discussion of controversial literature would soon leave her floundering as to the critical issues. Her early curiosity and adolescent rebelliousness had not established a true intellectual development despite her good native intelligence and education.

It was also interesting to note that her superego had not given way sufficiently to such ego functioning as evaluation or judgment but remained 'phallic', as it were. She spoke of Kennedy's stand against our involvement in the Vietnam war and could not agree with it. Although quite humane in her daily living and with adequate restitutive mechanisms operating, she could none the less condone the bombing and the appalling waste of life. She was ambivalent about this too, and wondered why she felt this way, never having really thought out her position. It reminded her of her being unable to watch any scenes of violence in a movie *except* shooting. It was likely that the overriding need to have a shooting mechanism like her father's explained her attitude toward war. This kind of phallic fantasy may be a factor in women's patriotic acceptance of war, taking pride in the participation of their

beloved men whom they might lose and all this without having a serious commitment to issues or, at times, even an understanding of them.

SUMMARY

Features of a case are described where the contemporary assassination of two leaders brought to the fore early conflicts in a young Catholic woman. The anal-phallic defenses which followed led to an overinvestment of flatus and a present continuation of this unresolved problem in the ambivalent use of oral contraception.

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Sigmund Freud—Arnold Zweig Briefwechsel. Edited by Ernst L. Freud. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968. 203 pp.

Hans A. Illing

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BOOK REVIEWS

SIGMUND FREUD—ARNOLD ZWEIG BRIEFWECHSEL. Edited by Ernst L. Freud. Frankfurt am Main, Germany: S. Fischer Verlag, 1968. 203 pp.

As previously suggested by the reviewer in this journal,[1] the opening up to the world of the gold mine in Freud's correspondence has just begun, and it is my guess that this century will not see the publication of all of it. The latest ore brought to light may surprise many analysts, though Freud's interest in the arts and in literature is well known.

Throughout these letters Freud is obviously steeped in Zweig's problems, both personal and literary, particularly since Zweig had gone through analysis but never completed it, and since Zweig's son was still in analysis while the father corresponded with Freud. As the reader familiar with the literary family of Zweig might assume, there is some 'sibling rivalry' between Arnold and his brother, Stefan (who undoubtedly was the more important literary figure of the two) over Freud, although no letters or messages from Stefan to Freud are mentioned in this volume. On the other hand, it was not always easy for Freud to distinguish between the writings of these brothers, as has sometimes been the case for the general reader. The thoughtful reader will understand why Zweig changes his form of address from 'Herr Professor' to 'Herr Doktor' and, finally, to 'Herr Freud', which Freud accepted as a whim of his correspondent without even answering a point which Zweig specifically tried to make regarding the changes of Zweig's addressing the master.

Throughout the tone of the letters is cordial and often intimate; on the part of Zweig, often respectful but never submissive. There is also doubt that Zweig had the need to exhibit narcissistic tendencies, to which 'Vater' Freud responded as sympathetically as anyone. We learn a great deal about such contemporary writers as Thomas Mann, Bertold Brecht, Jacob Burckardt, as well as about Freud's own friends and students, Max Eitingon, Lou Andreas-Salomé, Siegfried Jacobsohn, Ernest Jones, Otto Rank, et al. Some are well known, others are not. Hence, any mention of such students as Jacobsohn (to name just one) is particularly important.

[1] *Cf.*, This QUARTERLY, XXXVIII, 1969, pp. 126-127.

Needless to say, the volume mirrors the upheavals of the times as they affected both writers. Zweig preceded Freud into exile, Zweig going to Palestine and, a little later, Freud to London. Their feelings about the threatening exile (before it happened) come to the fore in these letters perhaps better than in any correspondence or pieces of writing by Freud that I know of.

Freud's son, Ernst, who signs himself as editor of this correspondence, has made frequent annotations regarding various names occurring in the letters, which many readers will appreciate. He has also attempted to answer some of his father's questions, giving answers which I feel to be either doubtful or redundant, as in the case of the name of the 'Rockefeller Museum' in Luxor, Egypt (instead of the 'Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago'). Generally, it can be stated that this volume will enrich us just as the preceding collections of correspondence did. We patiently await more.

HANS A. ILLING (LOS ANGELES)

THE CHILD ANALYST AT WORK. Edited by Elisabeth R. Geleerd, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1967. 310 pp.

This aptly titled volume has as its primary aim the presentation of the analytic treatment of a child, or an aspect thereof, with the inclusion of representative examples of the dialogue between the child patient and the analyst. On this basis alone the book is of value since it helps round out the literature on child analysis which, for the most part, is lacking in such case reports. In addition, each paper demonstrates the methodology and technique of its author in practical application—an exposure which deserves our gratitude since it removes child analysis from the realm of the abstract and makes it palpable and real. Here is an unusual opportunity then for those, not conversant with child analysis, to study it in operation and for the student of child analysis to learn from his colleagues.

The papers also address themselves, variably and with varying degrees of effectiveness, to theoretical considerations pertinent to child analysis. In some instances the theoretical exposition is thorough and well-documented; in others it is only touched upon in passing or incompletely presented. Several papers have either no bibliography or one that does not do justice to the literature, thus depriving the reader of the benefit of a considered comparison of

the author's thinking with that of other analysts. The fact that the primary purpose of the volume is to give a view of the child analyst at work does not justify neglect of the scientific, theoretical framework which provides the basis for the analytic treatment.

The ten contributors present material on a total of eleven cases: six in the precœdipal or œdipal period, ranging in age from two years eleven months to six years; four in latency, ages seven and a half to nine years; and one adolescent, age thirteen years. Diagnostically, the clinical problems presented by eight of the children were determined by neurotic psychopathology of varying degrees of severity; they include an essentially impulse-ridden latency age boy, a prelatency girl with asthma, and a latency girl with petit mal seizures. The adolescent boy and two of the latency age girls had more severe disorders, best characterized as being 'borderline'.

From this sampling of cases it is evident that the application of child analysis, as is also true of adult analysis, is being extended beyond neuroses and character neuroses to borderline problems wherein there are impairments in the area of object relationships and of ego development and function. This fact means, of course, that the standard model psychoanalytic technique, particularly in the beginning or preparatory phases of the analysis, has to be modified in accordance with the patient's deficiencies. As is stated by Geleerd in her excellent introductory summary of the child analytic method, interventions in child analysis have always been geared to the child's state or level of ego development. The child analyst therefore is accustomed to adapting his technique while adhering to the analytic, therapeutic goal of achieving change in intrapsychic structure. These papers, individually and collectively, illustrate ways in which analytic technique may be temporarily modified toward the end of achieving a satisfactory therapeutic alliance and enabling the patient whose ego is, at the outset, either developmentally or psychopathologically too immature or inadequate in relation to id and superego to become a full participant in a valid psychoanalysis.

All of the papers are illustrative of the child analytic method developed originally by Anna Freud. The development and interpretation of analyzable transference or transference manifestations is an essential of child analysis but a good deal of important analytic work, both in its own right and as a preliminary to transference interpretation, consists of the analysis of the patient's defenses and

affects (feelings, moods). As is explicated by Geleerd in the introduction, and by various of the other contributors, defense and affect analysis is usually done first and in terms of current experiences and relationships, including the relationship to the analyst, as a means of facilitating the emergence and understanding of the repressed unconscious material, the genetically significant experiences and fantasies.

In speaking to the question of the analyst's gratifying the child in the analysis, Geleerd states that the analyst is used by the child as the anaclitic love object of the earliest phases of object relationship to make up for the residual deficits of need gratification of these early phases. She further indicates that this relationship is characteristic of all analytic work, and has to be analyzed so that it becomes part of the regular transference relationship. I agree that such a relationship needs to be analyzed, particularly so if the analyst in fact has actively gratified the child's needs or if it constitutes a resistance to analysis, even though it is one-sided and the analyst has not given such gratification. However, inasmuch as child analysts have to guard against the tendency to gratify instead of analyze, it would be unfortunate if the reader gains the impression that the analyst, as a regular part of child analysis, attempts in active ways to make up the residual defects from the earliest phases of object relationship. On the contrary, except for the psychotic or borderline cases (which Geleerd refers to in her discussion), need deprivation is essential in child analysis as in adult analysis and serves the same purposes. In my view, gratification, when given, should be offered on the basis of necessity, i.e., indications that the analysis cannot progress without it.

Returning to the papers, all of them, but particularly those of Fraiberg, R. Furman, Harley, and McDevitt, can be particularly valuable to the student in child analytic training. Comprehensive and detailed case discussions such as these offer an all too rare opportunity for a view of child analysis in process. They demonstrate in a most convincing way the importance of carefully timed confrontations and interpretations sensitive to the child's need for his defenses and to his fear of being overwhelmed from within. They also point up, reassuringly for the beginning child analyst, the inevitability of resistance and the importance of timing as well as empathy, intuition, and imagination in helping the patient to over-

come the resistance to making unconscious psychic content conscious in extending the realm of dominance of the ego and of object relationships.

I feel that the papers in this volume are timely in emphasizing the complexity of the psychic functioning which underlies human behavior, already in the very young child. At a time when much of psychiatric and psychologic theorization and conceptualization of treatment approaches are simplistic and reductionistic, these case reports provide a needed counterbalance and underscore psychoanalysis as a general psychology: a theory of human development and behavior, a basis for observational studies of child development, and a treatment method and investigative instrument which provides an access to and an understanding of behavior which is not available through any other approach.

CALVIN F. SETTLAGE (ARDMORE, PA.)

INFANCY AND EARLY CHILDHOOD. A Handbook and Guide to Human Development. Edited by Yvonne Brackbill. New York: The Free Press, 1967. 523 pp.

The title of this book is misleading. It should be Selected Studies of Infancy from Birth to Three years. Several chapters deal with special processes such as cognition or motor development during the first three years of life. The deliberate avoidance of biographical and clinical material and the accent on experimental approaches to the study of infants, reflect current trends in nonanalytic developmental research. A neglect of psychoanalytic findings precludes the viewing of the infant within the comprehensive system of child psychology on which prediction and reconstruction can be based.

Too condensed and too selective to be used for students other than those actively engaged in laboratory research, this book will nevertheless interest psychoanalysts who are immersed in the study of infancy. Certain general propositions and a great many excerpts from specialized fields of research, presented in individual chapters, are thought provoking. They challenge us to re-examine psychoanalytic theorizations about infancy and psychoanalytic methods of approach to research.

Authors of several chapters present conclusive data which show that the newborn's behavior cannot be characterized as 'undifferen-

tiated' or 'random'. The question arises whether our own concept of an 'undifferentiated phase' in early infancy is a useful proposition that can be upheld in investigations of nonverbal thought processes.

Alfred Steinschneider's chapter on Developmental Psychophysiology is very complete but overladen with details on research design. Because the author aspires to an interdisciplinary approach to the study of the newborn, it is rather unfortunate that he did not include a review of Seymour Lustman's interpretation of the newer findings in developmental psychophysiology.

From the detailed chapter on Sensory and Perceptual Processes in Infants by W. C. Spears and R. H. Hohle, I would like to single out the interesting finding that the young infant prefers patterned stimuli to primary visual stimuli, but is not capable of recognizing certain shapes within variations of context. This brings to mind that the infant responds better to the complex cues given to him by his mother than to stimuli emanating from siblings, animals, and a great many inanimate objects. Despite this preference for complexity, which belies the view that development proceeds from the simple to the complex, the infant cannot establish constancy of Piaget's 'object permanent' and of the drive object unless a high degree of sameness is preserved—a fact familiar to us from pathologies arising through frequent changes of child-rearing personnel.

Possibly because of the reviewer's special interest in motor patterns, the section on motor development by David H. Crowell appeared least complete and least helpful. In discussing modern views on infant testing the author is aware of the spuriousness of the dichotomy between motor and mental patterns. Probably because of the complete omission of psychoanalytic literature, even to the exclusion of Margaret Fries's universally recognized pioneering studies of infantile activity levels, motor behavior of infants is presented primarily from the viewpoint of postural adjustments, reflexes, and responses rather than as meaningful patterns which reflect nonverbal thinking processes. It was interesting to note that Balint's fundamental, often neglected observations and experiments on infants were mentioned.

Most valuable is the systematic section on conditioning and learning, by the editor and M. M. Koltsova. New Russian literature is summarized in great detail. Without spelling it out, the authors lead the reader to the shocking realization that infants and children

are treated like dogs not only in classical conditioning but also in operant conditioning used widely in Russia and the United States.

The chapter on Language Development: The First Four Years, by Freda G. Rebelsky, Raymond H. Starr, Jr., and Zella Luria, concentrates on the contribution of linguistics to the study of development. Questions such as 'how does a word acquire meaning?' have been in the foreground of psychoanalytic thinking for a long time. The analysis of young children may substantially contribute to this concern of linguists and psychologists.

Most enjoyable because of its comprehensiveness, its commonsense approach, and the author's delightful sense of humor is the chapter on Cognition in Infancy and Childhood by D. Elkind. It contains a concise and exceptionally lucid summary of Piaget's findings.

The chapters on The Development of Social Behavior by Darrell K. Adams and on Emotional Behavior and Personality Development by Daniel G. Freedman, Charlotte B. Loring, and Robert M. Martin suffer greatly from the omission of psychoanalytic data on the development of object relations. No reference is made in the first chapter to the superego as a force influencing socialization; in the second the authors try to build evolutionary theory of 'attachment and personality' without considering the fundamental differences between animals and humans. One is sorely tempted to recommend reading Margaret Mahler's recent book on symbiosis and separation-individuation. Despite a fair summary of psychoanalytic theory, the exclusion of Edith Jacobson's work on affects and objects and Mahler's work on object relationship, as well as many misunderstandings of psychoanalytic data, lead the authors to an approach to human development which tends to dehumanize the infant.

Throughout the book great care is taken to describe research designs in detail and to stress differences in methodology on which controversies about conflicting results of similar investigations are based. In contrast, next to nothing is said about psychoanalytic methodology which differs so greatly from that used by neurophysiologists, experimental psychologists, evolutionists, and sociologists. One cannot blame the authors for this omission. Psychoanalysts have examined the methodology of psychoanalytic treatment but have not attempted to investigate the research methods used in psychoanalysis and in psychoanalytic observation of children.

Some psychoanalytic investigators have become apologetic, almost ashamed of their 'unscientific method' and have begun to overestimate ritualistic research tools, based on measurements, controls and statistics. There is no doubt that 'psychoanalysis, . . . appears to be the first truly developmental psychological system' (p. 471). After surveying the various approaches to the study of development presented in this book, one must come to the conclusion that the widely criticized psychoanalytic method has been much more successful than all the others in building a comprehensive framework for a developmental psychology to which all investigators of human behavior can contribute.

The psychoanalytic approach to infancy has been guilty of anthropomorphization and can be criticized for its injection of humanitarianism into science which may stem from its therapeutic orientation. Psychoanalytic research should not be limited to the confinement of a methodology which uses verbalization as its prime tool. A psychoanalysis of nonverbal behavior is yet to come. Without it, we run the danger of imposing verbal concepts on nonverbal modes of functioning. It is for an interdisciplinary team to decide whether excessive emphasis on measurements, controls, consensus, and statistics will not detract more from the understanding of development than the 'unscientific' humanitarian approach of the psychoanalytic investigator.

Notwithstanding the many criticisms of this book, the reviewer learned a great deal from reading it.

JUDITH S. KESTENBERG (SANDS POINT, N.Y.)

EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES OF DREAMING. Edited by Herman A. Witkin and Helen B. Lewis. New York: Random House, Inc., 1967. 242 pp.

The rapid growth of the scientific study of sleep and dreaming during the past fifteen years has led in many directions, including the physiological and to some extent chemical delineation of several qualitatively different sleep states. The editors of the present volume are most interested in explaining the implications of this body of research for a psychological understanding of the dream and its relationship to the dreamer.

This is a pleasant, highly readable, hard to define little volume. Although there are five separate authors, the result is not the frequent and unsatisfactory attempt at summarizing a field by sticking together a conglomerate of unedited papers by a variety of experts, each writing on his own sub-area. The book consists of four chapters: two general review articles, followed by two papers which are in effect reports of recent research projects, one dealing with dream recall and the other with incorporation of presleep material into dreams. Much of the material in the first two articles, by Frederick Snyder and by Charles Fisher, may already be familiar to readers who have any knowledge of recent sleep research; the material in the last two papers, by Goodenough and by Witkin and Lewis, will be new to most. The book will be especially useful to persons who are interested in the work of the latter authors and who can use the first two articles as background.

Snyder's chapter, In Quest of Dreaming, is a lucid and unimpeachable review of the biology of dreaming, i.e., the physiological characteristics of the D-state or REM-state. Fisher's chapter presents a thorough discussion of possible psychoanalytic implications of recent biological research which deserves a thorough reading. Dr. Fisher unfortunately feels that recent biological studies denigrate or demote dreaming itself to a sort of meaningless epiphenomenon. This is not the case. The dream is as fascinating now as it always has been. Undeniably, the principal recent advances have been in the study of the concomitant *biological* state, the D-state, and the dream content has frequently not been relevant to these chemical and neurophysiological studies. However, I cannot see that this in any sense reduces the meaningfulness of dreams.

Goodenough has written an excellent chapter reporting on his laboratory studies of dream recall. He makes a careful differentiation between actual recall of a dream with content and various kinds of 'negative' reports: reports of dreamless sleep which the author finds associated with 'deep' (high arousal threshold) REM periods; *no content dream reports* in which the subject says he was dreaming but cannot remember what the dream was about are found to be associated with stressful or anxious nights and with repression of embarrassing or painful material; reports of *being awake* and *thinking,* obtained chiefly after *gradual* awakenings from either REM or non-REM sleep.

Witkin and Lewis discuss their studies on incorporation of presleep material into dreams. Their method involves showing subjects one of several movies before sleep and assessing the effect on the night's dreams. These exciting long-term studies obviously will still be in progress for some time. The authors again show great sensitivity to the issues raised, such as different types of incorporation and interaction between their stimulus movie and related dormant personal material, as well as personal dream styles and the influence of the experimenter and the laboratory on dreams. Surprisingly the authors omit any mention of when, during a dream period, the awakenings took place; this is an important variable which can make a great deal of difference to the type of dream material elicited. From the tenor of this work there is no question that the authors are aware of this variable and merely neglected to mention it in this chapter. The results, presented only tentatively, are difficult to summarize; but clearly presleep stimuli did influence dreaming, and the particular manner or style of influences appear to be a complex function of the dreamer's personality and his cognitive and perceptual style.

All in all, this is a worthwhile, informative book which will be of interest to anyone concerned with sleep and dream research, and especially important to those whose interest lies in the psychological problems of how the dream is created and how it is obliterated or forgotten.

ERNEST HARTMANN (BOSTON)

THE BORDERLINE SYNDROME. A Behavioral Study of Ego-Functions. By Roy R. Grinker, Sr., Beatrice Werble, and Robert C. Drye. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968. 274 pp.

This book reports the results of a research study undertaken with two main goals in mind. One was to clarify the concept, borderline; the other more general goal was to develop a research technique applicable to the classification of other syndromes in terms of their causes, their course, the natural history of their disturbance, and the effectiveness of various therapies. The book can be judged in terms of its success in classifying the borderline syndrome since, if it is successful in this endeavor, the research method would be validated.

The authors report their work as the first systematic investigation of the clinical phenomena described for at least several decades as 'borderline'. They emphasize the importance of classification as opposed to the currently more popular preoccupation with the dynamic problem of the individual patient. They decry the tendency to infer and interpret, and the underemphasis on and derogation of clinical observations of behavior. The goal of classification should serve to disclose new relationships. In this spirit the book offers a 'fresh look derived from modern theories of processes and new methods of description, noting and statistical analysis'. The authors wish to clarify the 'what' of the question before answering the 'how' and speculating about the 'why'.

This somewhat polemical introduction is unfortunately characteristic of the book. There are undoubtedly advantages to a statistical approach which identifies, defines, and clarifies a syndrome. At the same time a study of a particular case history, for example the Schreber case, can elucidate more than the individual dynamics involved. The two approaches are not mutually exclusive, nor even simply complementary; they also overlap to a considerable degree. This is shown by the fact that studies employing psychoanalytic technique have already disclosed a great deal about the so-called borderline case.

The book, nevertheless, is a serious and valuable study inside its limited method. The 'strategy' employed was for the hospital personnel to observe and note the process ego functions of the patients selected for admission to the ward. The fundamental approach in the research is the study of behavior which is understood in psychoanalytic and operational terms as the ego in action.

The review, or overview, of the literature appropriately emphasizes the ego defects and fragile object relations of the borderline patient. These are seen as the consequence of poor early maternal care. The drive conflict centers on the problems of aggression rather than on sexuality. The literature is criticized as being repetitive, discursive, and not well documented by empirical references. In this overview the authors make little effort to synthesize the literature, but prefer to present it as a chaotic, unclear series of vignettes when it could have been unified. In fact the research reported in the work does not uncover any new facts, but mostly serves to confirm what has already been discovered. A more careful study of the

relevant literature would have shown that the book only scratches the surface of what is known. For example, the authors neglect the contributions of Melanie Klein on introjection and projection, Mahler's formulations concerning the symbiotic and separation-individuation developmental phase, Imre Hermann's early emphasis on clinging and going-on search, Lewin's oral triad, and Anna Freud's concept of oral surrender, not to mention Freud's valuable descriptions of early object-self differentiation and fears of dedifferentiation.

The weakest chapter in the book is the one describing the individual patient. The case material and dynamic formulations are at the most simplistic level of psychiatric understanding. The chapter on etiology (i.e., choice of neurosis) is modest in its claims, although pretentious and repetitive in its attempt to clarify a theoretical approach.

The technique of cluster analysis by which the behavioral observations are analyzed is beyond this reviewer's mathematical understanding. As a result of a consultation with a young mathematician and theoretician of science, I learned that the cluster analysis and the use of the null hypothesis was mathematically correct. Each patient is assigned a position in a seventy-one dimensional vector space or coördinate system, and certain clustering is noticed. But the clustering has a self-fulfilling quality based on the assumptions and no new links are established.

No new causal or dynamic understanding emerges from this research. The only benefit is to offer certain criteria by which the patients may be classified. When Linnaeus classified animals which looked alike, the new observation emerged that they could also interbreed and so a hidden relationship was revealed. These studies lead neither to new correlations nor to new hypotheses. What emerges is what was already known and was even used as the criteria for classification: the borderline patient has a manifest or latent problem with aggression, poorly sustained and primitive object relations, and defects in ego functioning. In spite of the book, the term borderline remains poorly defined and is probably of questionable value.

WALTER A. STEWART (NEW YORK)

FIDELITY AND INFIDELITY—AND WHAT MAKES OR BREAKS A MARRIAGE. By Leon J. Saul, M.D. New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1967. 244 pp.

Anyone who has tried to write for the lay reader knows the problems which beset Dr. Saul in writing a book '. . . first, for the married', and then '. . . for the single, who plan to marry one day'. The temptation to oversimplify struggles with the urge to dip into the 'gobbledegook' of psychoanalytic concepts and terminology and sometimes both the author and the reader are the losers.

Dr. Saul presents a wealth of interesting case material growing out of his extensive experience in private practice and in teaching. He attempts to spotlight and highlight the common marital problems encountered by couples who fail to attain the joys and fulfilments of which they dreamed in their courting days. The dialogue between the psychiatrist and the troubled spouse, or the couple, is given in illuminating snatches, and the general technique of the marital therapy applied is clearly presented. There is a discussion of the nature of marriage, common problems in marriage and their causes, sex outside marriage, repetition in marriage of childhood patterns, some hazards of marriage and their prevention, and some rapid resolutions, in respective sections of the book. The writing is clear and interesting.

Sometimes the case seems too glib, to the professional at least, the dynamics too 'assembly-line', the methodology too 'pat'. There is a certain sameness about the Arthurs and Amys, the Johns and Janes, the Mels and Madeleines, as they file through the book's pages, and also about the causes of their difficulty, which so often lie in what happened to them in their early years 'from 0 to 6' as revealed so infallibly in the patients' 'very first memory'. The urge to popularize entails the sacrifice of depth and authenticity, and this reviewer questions whether even Dr. Saul can really make this sacrifice and still give his readers the help he promises.

The author repeats an old error in regard to the statistics of marriage and divorce, namely, that 'close to a third of all marriages end in divorce', and he adds a new distortion of his own—'or separation'. He states that the figures refer to marriages and divorces 'in a given year', which is correct, but he does not correct his former implication. The fact is that to strike a ratio one must add the marriages in any one year to all already-contracted mar-

riages, and the year's divorces to those previously in the divorced state. When this is done the ratio is actually one in twelve even for new marriages (one to three years), while for longer marriages (up to nine years), it is one in twenty-seven. For all marriages the ratio is one divorce in thirty-three marriages according to the same HEW Vital Statistics Reports from which the often misinterpreted annual figures come.

Since so few acceptable books on the subject are available, Dr. Saul's Fidelity and Infidelity must be included on the list. One continues to hope for a book that one can turn over to patients with complete confidence. This book is not it.

ABRAHAM N. FRANZBLAU (NEW YORK)

PSY'CHO-A-NAL'-Y-SIS: USES AND ABUSES. By Lawrence J. Friedman, M.D. New York: Paul S. Eriksson, Inc., 1968. 172 pp.

It is a painful pleasure to write a review of this charming book. The good will, the clarity of presentation, and the absence of obsessive intellectualization are strong points in its favor. However, the goals described by the title are not, nor could they be, achieved in this short monograph. The first two thirds of the book, one hundred and nine pages, is devoted to a presentation of the theory of psychoanalysis. Five pages are devoted to the distinction between conscious, preconscious, and unconscious. The theory of drives and their division into oral, anal, phallic, and œdipal phases is covered in twenty pages. The pace continues as illustrated by the fact that the concepts of fixation and regression are delineated in two and a half pages. To the author's credit he is able to describe the problem without misstatement in few sentences, but complexity of thought and richness of concept are inevitably sacrificed. At the level of exposition there is little to criticize except the fact that the presentation is only an outline. However, where Dr. Friedman turns to an expression of his own views about current problems the quality of the book is markedly reduced. This is illustrated in his chapter, The Obstacles to Growth: Automobiles and Television. These are presented as major influences in the restriction of ego development. The author suddenly changes from his rigorous goal of presenting analytic theory and becomes a lovable fuddy-duddy offering his own somewhat simplistic views of current sociological outlets for action and fantasy.

It is not easy to imagine whom the book can serve. To the potential patient for analytic treatment wanting to understand the specialty, it is too condensed; to the analyst in training it is too schematic; and for the advanced student it is too simplistic. The book is in competition with Kubie's book, Practical and Theoretical Aspects of Psychoanalysis and with Brenner's book, An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis. It comes off a poor third.

The fault of the book would seem to lie with the editors. In spite of all obstacles, including writing about psychoanalytic theory as well as automobiles, television, and the future of man, the author comes through as a devoted man of good will.

WALTER A. STEWART (NEW YORK)

CROSSCURRENTS IN PSYCHIATRY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS. Edited by Robert W. Gibson, M.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1967. 259 pp.

This book consists of a series of papers and discussions delivered at a two-day scientific program at the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital on its seventy-fifth anniversary. Since the speakers, all former members of the hospital staff, were free to choose their own topics, the book is somewhat discursive. Although the majority of the participants were psychoanalysts, the papers cover the wide range of modern psychiatry in its varied aspects.

Philip S. Wagner gives a detailed picture of community psychiatry as he attempts to apply brief psychotherapy to lower income groups in a project sponsored by a labor organization. Samuel Novey presents an interesting comparison of the differing criteria that must be applied to an evaluation of the results in different modes of treatment. He compares studies on three groups: psychotherapy with psychotics, psychotherapy with neurotic patients from the lowest socio-economic group, and prolonged psychotherapy or analysis with patients in private practice. In the first two groups, the emphasis is upon changing behavior. With the private group, the emphasis is upon the change in the experience of living. Novey points out the limitations of a purely behavioral psychology and stresses the fact that man is not simply what he does, but more particularly is also what he thinks and feels, and that these latter experiences are subject to treatment and change.

Leon Eisenberg writes about social class and individual develop-

ment. He overemphasizes man's progressive maturation as a mere reflection of his social and economic status 'with convincing evidence that human malfunction results in large part from society's failure to employ its resources equitably'. In his discussion of this paper, Eugene Brody expresses a differing point of view and suggests that 'in terms of environmental deficit, what is missing, I believe, is the opportunity for certain kinds of relationships'. Eisenberg's paper is an interesting example of the degree to which personal prejudices may shape the statements made by a psychiatrist as he quotes or presents Freud and psychoanalytic theory. It is easy to extrapolate some statement from Freud's early writings so that, bereft of important qualifications and its place in the general theory of psychoanalysis, it becomes a seemingly justifiable point of attack.

The area of research is represented by two papers which relate to important aspects of psychiatric thinking. Wilson Shaffer discusses hypnosis and suggestion and outlines the results of certain experiments he has conducted. Douglas Noble describes some research work he has done with the help of students in a psychoanalytic institute on auditory residues in dreams.

Two other papers represent topics which contribute to the fullness of the volume. Ives Hendrick, speaking from the viewpoint of general psychiatry, compares the changes in the usage of terms as well as many fundamental ideas over the past forty to fifty years. Lawrence Kubie gives an excellent review of the future of the private psychiatric hospital in which he delineates its possible functions and the special place that it occupies for psychiatric treatment.

In The Dedicated Physician, Harold Searles speaks from his massive experience and understanding of the schizophrenic patient. He opens up many interesting avenues of approach for those of us who do so little therapy with this group, and whose goals and approach are based upon patients with such different types of ego development and object relations. He stresses the great pressure that overdedication places upon the patient, with the resultant maintenance of an infantilized state. I wish that Searles had formulated his ideas in terms of more definite concepts so that they might not be misconstrued and thus possibly lead to careless and untherapeutic action. Certainly the treatment of the psychoses demands wide and free experimentation which, in turn, needs careful evaluation and formulation.

In his paper, Superego as a Structuring of Roles, Joseph Chassell attempts to outline the concept of superego from a few passages in Freud which are chosen to serve his purpose. He overlooks the importance of the superego as an internalized structure with a complex origin and seems to ignore its crucial importance as a working concept necessary to the understanding of human behavior. He ignores psychoanalytic research, theory, and thinking, and approaches psychoanalytic concepts entirely from the vantage of behavior, role learning, and structuring of roles by the external environment. He even defines empathy as a learning process based upon the observation of overt behavior with no mention of its essential meaning, which obviously has to do with the subtle grasp of the particular emotional experience of another person. According to this paper, there is no inner life, no meaningful object relations, and man is merely a creature who acquired useful or common modes of behavior and reactions to the external world. Chassell proposes that the best formulation of the superego would be that it is the repository of group role learning and includes all gradations of socialization 'from the so-called precursors of the superego through the phases of moral realism into moral relativism and social norms by the way of peer interactions and experiences in the secondary groups of society'. The discussion by Sarah Tower pinpoints how the methodology employed by Chassell, namely direct observations of behavior alone, will not 'produce the associatively structured, predominantly verbal material of a psychoanalysis that permits exploration of the depth of the mind'. She states that since the spectrum of conscious-unconscious mental functioning with its dynamic and economic aspects is basic to analytic theory in general, an observational method that cannot yield and does not use these conceptual tools cannot be considered centrally useful in psychoanalysis.

Edith Weigert, in her paper on Narcissism: Benign and Malignant Forms, attempts to enlarge our concept of secondary narcissism by dividing it into two types. One of these would be negative and at the core of psychic maladjustment while the other would lead to a positive ego development with increasing self-esteem. As Weigert points out, narcissism was originally seen as an intermediate stage of development between autoerotism and object libido, and it was the instinct of self-preservation which had the major role in

'building up of human solidarity'. She states that at a later time 'Freud's instinct theory became centered upon a dualism of Eros and Thanatos—libidinal versus aggressive, and that according to his Beyond the Pleasure Principle the preservation of the individual as well as communal existence, would depend upon a preponderance of Eros over Thanatos'. Weigert attempts to introduce the aggressive drive into the concept of narcissism, along with that of libido, by calling the self-destructive tendencies and self-hatred, malignant narcissism as the aggressive drive is particularly evident in the so-called narcissistic neuroses or major psychoses. While this would allow a place for the two drives, it would essentially alter the concept of secondary narcissism. Rudolf Marburg states, in his discussion, that secondary narcissism is also the libidinal investment in the various parts and functions of psychic structure as they progressively develop the self-image and the ego ideal. The article itself is somewhat involved and unclear with the presentation of analytic theory miscegenated with existential concepts.

Francis McLaughlin's paper on The Concept of Health stresses how the development of psychoanalysis began with an emphasis on the study of illness and pathology, which later shifted to a general theory of psychic functioning and included the course of maturation, plus its vicissitudes. He points out that two seemingly opposite approaches exist: one of these stresses a balance of the internal psychic structures with emphasis upon the organization of the ego and its synthetic capacity; the other, nonpsychoanalytic view, considers adjustment and health in terms of a cultural setting. McLaughlin underscores the difficulty in developing any absolute concept of health and the importance of Hartmann's work on adaptation. He concludes that mental health is a positive quality, not just the absence of illness, yet that it is always relative and in reference to the here and now.

A. RUSSELL ANDERSON (BALTIMORE)

THE MIDWIFE AND THE WITCH. By Thomas R. Forbes. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 196 pp.

The psychoanalyst interested in the folklore of pregnancy and childbirth should not overlook this beautiful little book. The titles of its ten essays provide a good idea of its rich and fascinating

contents: The Crowing Hen; Heifer, Freemartin, and Ridgeling; Pregnancy and Fertility Tests; The Prediction of Sex; Chalcedony and Childbirth; Word Charms and the Sator Mystery; The Veil of Good Fortune [caul]; The Midwife and the Witch; Perette the Midwife; and Early Regulation of English Midwives.

Professor Forbes lucidly and entertainingly describes many popular superstitions, and outlines their gradual replacement by scientific fact and theory. He utilizes modern endocrinologic and pharmacologic data to demonstrate the kernels of truth in some of the beliefs of the credulous. The most notable example is that of the early midwives who experimented with witchcraft. Several of the ingredients of the 'flying ointments' they concocted contained narcotic and hallucinogenic drugs of sufficient strength to be absorbed through the skin and provide 'trips' that the poor women could, in all honesty, have sworn to even as they went to the stake.

My most serious reservation about the book is directed to the nonpsychoanalytic reader: while his material repeatedly begs for a psychoanalytic commentary, Forbes remains oblivious to psychoanalysis. The psychoanalytic reader will supply the missing interpretation. The most valuable part of the book for the scholar is the surprising bibliography consisting of almost nine hundred items, most of them primary sources unfamiliar to many American students of magic and superstition.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N.Y.)

THE SUBCONSCIOUS LANGUAGE. By Theodore Thass-Thienemann. New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1967. 437 pp.

If the criterion of interest rather than authenticity is applied to this book, it merits attention. On any other grounds its substantive contributions are open to a variety of questions—psychological, linguistic and philosophical. The author invites the reader to join in his highly speculative exploration of the 'universally shared *subconscious* fantasies' which underlie the origins of language. Actually, he is primarily interested in the phylogenesis of words and it is the English lexicon which he uses to the greatest extent for his specific examples.

The author's intention is to offer a 'pilot study' for what he hopes will ultimately become an 'Interpretation of Language' in the same

sense and serving a purpose similar to Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams. One reviewer, who is quoted in part on the book jacket, says, 'This book is the most intellectually exciting work I have read since my first reading of Freud's Interpretation of Dreams. In fact it is a companion volume to Freud's because it does for language what Freud did for the dream. . . .' One is certainly impressed by the author's philological erudition and the encyclopedic range of his information about word derivations. This seems, however, to be more of a contribution to philology than it is to either linguistics or psychoanalysis. It certainly cannot be compared seriously to Freud's classic work.

The phylogenesis of language has been to date such a literally and figuratively undocumentable subject that for some years now international linguistic congresses are said to have practically banned papers dealing with this subject from their programs. This should not discourage the potential reader from approaching theses on the subject with the same delight he might have in a credible work of science fiction that has literary merit as well.

Dr. Thass-Thienemann's propositions are both stimulating and plausible, especially his attempts to demonstrate that certain nouns and verbs cluster, in their semantic connotations, as phonetic forms around some of the universal instinctual and developmental features of human existence. The argument is organized into three parts. Part I, titled Separation and Reunification, refers to the precœdipal phase, so to speak, of human evolution. The author attempts to show how certain word clusters have their origins in conflicts and problems of individuation. Part II, Œdipus—Identity and Knowledge, deals with word derivations arising from the universal myths of this genre. The chapter headings of this section may give some flavor of the author's unique ability to synthesize a propositional and a poetic style: Self Identity, Negation, Dolls and Masks, Reality, Knowledge, Œdipus, Castration. Part III, The Return—Childhood Lost, seems to me more poetic than propositional. Dr. Thass-Thienemann implies that there is an epilogue to the œdipal myth that should also be treated as a stage in human development, at least as far as language is concerned. He introduces this section as follows: 'The wandering about of the confused and disoriented Œdipus is characterized by a salient feature: the unintentional and unconscious return to the mother. Our question is

once more: how far was this blindfolded return home which touched the very core of Œdipus's existence described by specific terms of the Greek language? Verbal fantasies may have developed long before they were elaborated on by mythology. . . . In fact the Œdipus complex as the return to the mother is implicated in the pre-history of our language, dating back as far as the early Stone Ages.' The chapter headings in this section are: Regression, Dark and Deep, Heaven and Earth, Creation, Paradise and Golden Age.

It is not speculation as such that one finds disquieting in this study. Speculation which attempts to be convincing should deal with all conceivable possibilities and should attempt to offer counterclaims that seem less congenial to the author than his own. Thass-Thienemann does not do this in any consistent way. For example, he does not deal with the hypothesis that language is an arbitrary convention made possible by a species specific biological substrate in the evolution of the human brain that developed primarily as a communicative 'tool' rather than as an expressive need. In this case the possibility that language shows the imprint of the id may be a secondary effect rather than an indication of its origin. It would be quite impossible to offer any crucial evidence that mythopoesis was a significant factor in the earliest stages of the evolution of language. In fact the argument that at least a rudimentary language was a prior necessity for mythopoesis seems more plausible. A sceptic might also argue that Thass-Thienemann's groupings of the lexical components of language are procrustean and that similar classificatory schemata along many other lines are possible. Whatever the 'truth' of the matter, the author's formulations are imaginative and stimulating, and great effort has gone into the compilation of a large catalogue of philological detail with which to buttress his argument. Some of this data is valuable in its own right.

I have two further reservations. The first may seem to be in the nature of semantic 'nit picking' but I think that it raises questions which bear on the second more fundamental problem. The term 'unconscious' with which Freud supplanted the previous careless usage of 'subconscious' was, according to the editors of the Standard Edition, first used in The Studies in the case of Emmy von N. Freud specifically disapproves of the term 'subconscious' in several contexts; for example in The Interpretation of Dreams and in more emphatic terms in The Problem of Lay Analysis where he says:

'The other names are of no use. And do not try to give me literature instead of science. If someone talks of subconsciousness, I cannot tell whether he means the term topographically—to indicate something lying in the mind beneath consciousness—or qualitatively—to indicate another consciousness, a subterranean one, as it were. He is probably not clear about any of it. The only trustworthy antithesis is between conscious and unconscious. But it would be a serious mistake to think that this antithesis coincides with the distinction between ego and id. Of course it would be delightful if it were as simple as that: our theory would have a smooth passage. But things are not so simple. All that is true is that everything that happens in the id is and remains unconscious and that processes in the ego, and they alone, *can* become conscious. But not all of them are, nor always, nor necessarily; and large portions of the ego can remain permanently unconscious.' I have the impression that some of the author's ambiguous formulations arise from his failure to distinguish the term 'subconscious' from 'unconscious' and 'ego' from 'id'. In using the terms 'subconscious' and 'unconscious' interchangeably I think he produces considerable confusion for the reader.

In the same vein the author seems to use the superordinate concept 'language' as if it were synonymous with one of its subordinate parts, lexicon, or vocabulary. Thus he seems to be out of touch with the preoccupation of modern linguists who find that the problems of syntax, for example, may be more fundamental to an understanding of the 'deep structure' of language which, in turn, may be closer to its universalities than a study of word derivations. Thass-Thienemann does not mention in his bibliography the work of Heckett, Chomsky, G. A. Miller, and others whose analyses of linguistic structure suggest that a purely lexical approach to the relationship between language and meaning is a naïve one.

However posterity may judge this book as a contribution to psycholinguistic theory, I found it to be interesting reading if only for the wealth of incidental information that it contains. The author has enthusiasm for his subject and obviously worked very hard to collect the etymological and mythological data with which he supports his conclusions.

VICTOR H. ROSEN (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION OF CHILDREN'S HUMAN FIGURE DRAWINGS. By Elizabeth Munsterberg Koppitz, Ph.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1968. 341 pp.

Dr. Koppitz, an educator and school psychologist, has made a heroic effort to combine the intimacy of the clinical approach with the rigorous demands of statistical classification of groups oriented toward detection, screening, classification, and prediction. She is less convincing in the posture of the statistical 'scientist' than in her capacity for warmth, intuition, and insight revealed in the individual case illustrations. In her group studies, she makes limited use of the potentials for comprehensive analysis of the individual inherent in projective drawings. Were it possible to combine the clinical and statistical, the book would have made a unique contribution. While some of the facts and opinions are of interest to the clinician, the offer of practical, tangible, and simple solutions that provide the enduring truth are only misleading aspirations.

Analogues of the conflict between the statistical and clinical approach are seen by Dr. Koppitz in the Goodenough-Harris use of drawings for the measurement of intellectual maturity and the Machover projective analysis of human figure drawings. She purports to improve upon the limitations of both. The author erroneously regards the Machover approach as dealing with only the emotional aspects as contrasted with the Goodenough system which is restricted to the intellectual aspect, as if they were separate and distinct parts of the total person. Organic items are also added to the checklist. Dr. Koppitz ignores the fact that the projective drawing principles, which cover the structure and content of a figure drawn, derive from the essential and universal focus of the body image and provide a guide for the understanding of the whole individual in his dynamic complexity. The author offers a scale comprised of thirty developmental (intellectual) items, drawn mostly from the longer Goodenough scale, thirty emotional and eleven organic items. No weighting or syndroming of items for clinical significance is attempted. Deviance from her norms are equated with pathology and approximately two-plus items are the cut-off. In her discussion, Dr. Koppitz is beset with contradictions. Based on her system, she offers dogmatic conclusions and recommendations without recourse to other data. In another context, she firmly cautions that 'all

interpretations of figure drawings are speculative until verified by the child's history and other clinical data', which follows a general statement that 'drawings are an objective and reliable indicator of the child's self-concept, his attitude toward others, and . . . offer a picture of his emotional adjustment'.

While the author repeatedly asserts that the concept of the body image is 'not valid', she nevertheless clings, in her case illustrations, to such interpretations as slanted figures reflecting 'off balance'; marked asymmetry denoting 'poor integration'; shading revealing 'anxiety'; omission of neck betraying 'faulty control of impulses'; omission of arms expressing problems relating to contact or doing; fingers referring to manipulation, etc. Also, although Dr. Koppitz declares her preference for Sullivanian dynamics, she makes in her case studies such heretical freudian statements as a specific body area being 'the seat of sexual impulses' and 'the excessively large foot reflecting consciousness about the child's sexual thoughts and activities' while giving no attention to her stated preference for Sullivanian interpersonal dynamics. As if dealing with embattled issues, the author is driven by defensive urgency to validate and prove, leading often to laborious rationalizations that succeed only in blocking what appears to be an honest interest in the full implications of projective drawings and a richer understanding of the individual child. This conflict makes for vacillation between caution and dogmatism. Freed from the statistical demands of the 'objective' and 'scientific', Dr. Koppitz emerges as an intuitive and insightful clinician, sensitive to the dynamics of drawing projection.

The book is clearly and well written; the tables, summaries, and index are useful. It cites literature sporadically, concentrating mostly on affirmation or denial of Machover's principles with which the author is not too intimate. If Dr. Koppitz used more of her energy in exploring the details of her excellent drawing illustrations and less in proving and disproving, the book would have been a more valuable addition to the library of the active clinician. Perhaps too, it would have fared better were it reviewed by one less identified with the development of projective drawing analysis.

KAREN MACHOVER (BROOKLYN, N.Y.)

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ANXIETY. By Eugene E. Levitt. New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1967. 223 pp.

The author, professor of Clinical Psychology at Indiana University School of Medicine, offers an elementary and somewhat narrow view of the problem of anxiety. The first three chapters consider terminology, theories of anxiety deriving from psychoanalysis and experimental psychology, and defenses against anxiety. The references to psychoanalysis reflect grave misunderstanding of Freud's views and a total ignorance of modern ego psychology. The balance of the book is concerned with methods of experimental measurements of anxiety and their application to learning, cognitive processes, and personality dimensions. Even in the author's own field of competence the treatment is superficial and uncritical. Committed to the premise that only the experimental is scientific, Levitt dismisses other methods of data collection, including 'mere observation', as unworthy of serious consideration. As a result he often neglects to consider what it is that is being 'measured' as 'anxiety'. The net result is a work that has little to offer a psychoanalyst, and far less to offer a psychologist.

GEORGE L. ENGEL (ROCHESTER, N.Y.)

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ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. XLIX, 1968.

This issue consists of symposia and papers presented at the Twenty-Fifth International Psychoanalytic Congress, held in Copenhagen in 1967.

Acting Out. Pp. 164-230.

Anna Freud points out that her father originally used the term, acting out, to describe repetition of the past in the transference in contradistinction to remembering and verbalizing. As analytic interest shifted from œdipal to preœdipal conflicts and from id to ego, increasingly positive value was placed on acting out in the transference. The same term came to be applied only to reenactment of the past outside of the analysis. This confusion about the definition of acting out remains a troublesome theme throughout the symposium and is not resolved.

Leon Grinberg describes the role of object loss and separation in acting out; during analysis, vacations often trigger acting out episodes. In an attempt to clarify the meaning of the term and particularly to differentiate it from neurotic action, Leo Rangell defines acting out as 'action undertaken by the patient to resist the movement of the therapeutic process, . . . a specific type of neurotic action, directed towards interrupting the process of achieving effective insight . . .'. Similarly, Thorkil Vanggaard confines acting out to behavior outside the analysis, meant to provide relief of tensions created by the analytic situation. If this behavior is not motivated by tensions from the analysis, he calls it simply 'impulsive action'. The confusion and frustration surrounding the term, acting out, were well expressed by David Beres in the panel discussion at the close of the Congress. He had conducted a seminar on acting out for two years and 'we came out with more uncertainty about what the concept meant and how it was used than when we started'.

Psychosomatics. Pp. 231-253.

Morton Reiser presents an excellent overview of the application of psychoanalytic principles to the understanding of psychosomatic illness. He points out the need for further psychoanalytic observations of patients with physical illness. Alexander Mitscherlich introduces the interesting concept of 'bi-phasic defenses'. He feels that chronic somatic symptomatology occurs in persons who failed in a previous attempt at resolving their conflicts on a psychic level. Melitta Sperling comments on the frequent association of acting out and psychosomatic illness in the same patient. She feels that psychosomatic illness occurs in the analysis of an acting out patient when the analysis comes to be viewed as a threat to his pregenital character structure; breaking off analysis would mobilize intense separation anxiety. The patient submits to the analyst and stops his overt acting out, but continues the rebellion against the analyst via somatic acting out.

Indications and Contraindications. Pp. 254-275.

'The So Called Good Hysteric' by Elizabeth Zetzel describes four groups of female patients who present hysterical characters or hysterical neuroses. Only the first group, the 'true hysteric', is a good analytic risk; the others offer problems of varying severity to analysis. Most of the 'good hysterics' fall into the poor risk group, tend to be depressive characters, and have defects in basic ego functions. P. C. Kuiper makes a plea for more exacting criteria in the selection of patients for analysis. He feels that too often the analyst chooses unsuitable patients and thereby becomes disillusioned with his work.

Child Analysis and Pediatrics. Pp. 276-297.

Albert Solnit presents a most stimulating account of ten years of collaborative work between a child analyst and a group of pediatricians. The goals were to improve the psychological acumen of the participating pediatricians and to refine and sharpen psychoanalytic formulations and concepts.

Psychic Traumatization through Social Catastrophe. Pp. 298-329.

This fascinating but painful symposium addresses itself primarily to the psychopathology of survivors of the Nazi concentration camps. William Niederland describes the 'survivor syndrome', based on observations of eight hundred survivors, as consisting of: 1, anxiety with associated phobias, insomnia, and nightmares; 2, disturbances of cognition and memory; 3, chronic depressive states associated with 'survivor guilt'; 4, tendency to isolation, withdrawal, brooding, unstable object relationships, and marked ambivalence; 5, psychotic and psychosis-like pictures; 6, alteration of personal identity; 7, psychosomatic conditions; and 8, a 'living corpse' appearance and behavior. The most prevalent manifestation is a chronic state of anxious, bland depression. Very often these patients cannot verbalize the traumatic events. Niederland is particularly impressed by the 'all pervasive guilt' of these survivors.

Alfred Lorenzer describes the puzzling 'latency period' that often exists between the traumatic internment and the appearance of symptoms. He feels that there occurs an ego split with blanket denial of the traumatization, and a 'super-normal' kind of functioning. At a later date some small additional insult overstresses the system, and the patient decompensates into clinical illness.

Erich Simenauer, speaking from personal experience, describes the very rapid personality disorganization that occurs in prison inmates. He feels that 'it is beyond reasonable doubt that previous personality plays a relatively small part in the psychic sequelæ of ex-prisoners of Nazi camps'. This raises some interesting questions about the genetic principle in psychoanalytic theory.

Martin Wangh puts forth the notion that a predisposition to seek war in the resolution of conflicts results from the stresses of a previous war which so traumatized these individuals that they seek a repetition of the traumatic events in accord with the 'repetition compulsion'. He feels that a trauma in adulthood can acquire the same unconscious significance as a childhood trauma and demand similar reworking.

Following these symposia, the issue contains thirty-four brief papers, many with discussions. Six are abstracted below.

Psychosomatic Asthma and Acting Out. C. Philip Wilson. Pp. 330-333.

Wilson presents clinical material about an adult female who developed asthma for the first time during the terminal phase of her analysis. Further analysis of the transference led to a cessation of asthmatic attacks and a successful termination. The author feels that there is no specific personality profile in asthmatics, and that the unconscious fantasies leading to asthmatic attacks vary from patient to patient.

Short Term Effects as Indicators of the Role of Interpretations in Psychoanalysis. James Naiman. Pp. 353-356.

Naiman attempts to clarify the short term effects of analytic interpretation and discusses the controversial issue of whether cure comes about through interpretation alone, or through 'corrective emotional experience', identification with the analyst, or introjective-projective mechanisms. He illustrates with clinical material how an interpretation effected change in the direction of homosexuality to heterosexuality. The interpretation had five effects: feeling of discovery, relevant associations, behavioral change, change in affect, and change in dream material.

Indications and Contraindications: Lessons from the Second Analysis. Herbert F. Waldhorn. Pp. 358-362.

In cases of unsuccessful first analyses, Waldhorn feels that limitations of the analyst are most frequently responsible, particularly failures in persistent analysis of the transference. There is an unwillingness to recognize the limitations of analysis as a therapy. In some cases re-analysis is necessary, not because of any inadequacy of the first analysis, but because analysis cannot ensure against the development of new difficulties with changing life stresses. Unrealistic therapeutic expectations have their roots in the anxiety of the analyst.

Dis-Identifying from Mother: Its Special Importance for the Boy. Ralph R. Greenson. Pp. 370-374.

Dis-identifying from mother is a precœdipal phenomenon, but is closely related to the later identification with father in the psychic development of boys. Greenson feels that an important factor in the boy's motivation to identify with father is the mother's love and respect for the father.

The Psychology of the Fool. James Alexander and Kenneth S. Isaacs. Pp. 420-423.

The fool engages in neurotically motivated acting out called folly; the unconscious aim of folly is destructive aggression which is denied by the fool to himself and to others. The authors distinguish the 'fool' from the 'buffoon' who 'plays the fool' with conscious intent. The fool, because of his basic dishonesty, is seldom motivated to enter treatment.

Archaic Features of Ego Functioning. Charles Brenner. Pp. 426-429.

Brenner makes the point that many features of infantile ego functioning persist normally into adult life. He raises the question of whether 'regression in the service of the ego' is not often misapplied to infantile ego functioning thereby leading to a concept of normal adult ego functioning which is unrealistic.

LAWRENCE H. ROCKLAND

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CXLVIII, 1969.

A Tripartite Model of Ego Functioning Values and Clinical and Research Applications. Norma Haan. Pp. 14-30.

The author presents a conceptual model for evaluating ego functions in terms of the processes which occur in response to internal and external changes. The emphasis is on how effective such a process is in coping with the stress situation. The ego responses are categorized as to whether they are coping mechanisms, defense mechanisms, or failures. The heuristic and therapeutic value presented is largely concerned with the aspect of adaptation and does not deal with the other psychoanalytic frames of study, such as topographical, economic, and genetic. Although the model may offer a structure for studying adaptation, the particular ego functions cited and followed through are sufficiently diverse from the usual psychoanalytic categories to present some terminological confusion.

The Effects of Hearing One's Own Voice on Dream Content: A Replication. Vincenzo Castaldo and Philip S. Holzman. Pp. 74-82.

Previous studies by the same authors demonstrated affective disturbances of subjects on hearing their own voices whether they were aware of it or not. This was seen as a momentary startle in regarding their voices as perceptual stimuli with aspects of character and personality not recognized while speaking. The present study, quite well controlled, repeats one done a few years ago. The results were the same. During sleep, when a subject hears his own voice, the manifest content presents the dreamer or principal figure as active, assertive, and independent. When another person's voice is presented with the same content, the dreamer is pictured in a passive role.

A number of explanations are postulated. Since the voice functions genetically in the control and modulation of behavior, hearing one's own voice bears the implication of achieving mastery. Hearing another's voice, with its connotations of command, prohibition, and permission, leads to a passive role. The psychophysiological response produced on hearing one's own voice leads to a heightened activation productive of an active role in the dream. Since the state of defensiveness toward one's own needs and wishes is diminished in sleep, the subject's discrimination between his own voice and those of others is enhanced as compared to the waking state.

Homosexual Incest. James B. Raybin. Pp. 105-110.

This case report of overt homosexual incest involves three generations of a family. The informing patient showed a variety of neurotic and character problems. His father, although not examined, presented no gross psychiatric difficulties; the son was hospitalized with an acute psychotic disorder. Although extensive dynamic formulations were not possible from the data, the author speculates about the basis for the pathology both in terms of the individual's development and the family interaction.

HAROLD R. GALEF

American Imago. XXV, 1968.

Fortinbras and Hamlet. K. R. Eissler. Pp. 199-223.

Eissler considers possible functions of the character, Fortinbras, in Hamlet. One idea holds that Fortinbras, whose father died before he was born and whose mother conceivably died in childbirth, was spared the 'œdipal poison' and could act without conflictual hesitation and doubt. Flexible and reality-adapted, he sharpens by contrast Hamlet's highly conflicted, hesitant personality. Another idea maintains that Fortinbras is a Hamlet reborn and as such tempers the emotional impact of the tragic ending on the Elizabethan audience. This and other devices (jigs, multilayered endings) were required because Elizabethan actors had a far deeper effect on their audiences than their modern counterparts. The deeper effect is attributed to a higher emotional susceptibility in the Elizabethan and to the greater ability of Elizabethan actors to pour 'enormous quantities of emotion' into their performances. Eissler feels this ability derives from a phase in their careers when they played female roles which allowed them to unfold, exhibit, enjoy, and experience their feminine and homosexual inclinations.

Coriolanus: The Anxious Bridegroom. Emmett Wilson, Jr. Pp. 224-241.

This highly plausible essay seeks to demonstrate latent œdipal themes in Coriolanus. In the early part of the play Coriolanus attempts to master his seductive mother, Volumnia. However, he fears engulfment in her ambitious designs to use him for her own military and political purposes. He reacts with aggression and hatred which is projected onto her genital, re-enforcing his expectation of castration. In the latter part he joins forces with a virile, loving father, Aufidius, against Volumnia. Later he provokes Aufidius to attack his body and thus achieves a love-death at his hands.

Macbeth: 'Fair is Foul and Foul is Fair'. L. Veszy-Wagner. Pp. 242-257.

The author contends that the problem in Macbeth is the protagonist's uncertainty as to whether he is an effeminate man or a mannish woman. Lady Macbeth represents both the projected feminine aspect of Macbeth and Macbeth's mother. She, like the witches, is both phallic and evil, and bears the responsibility for the evil in his nature. While the paper contains interesting ideas, readers may wish they had been better clarified and substantiated.

Iago. Shelley Orgel. Pp. 258-273.

Othello's engagement and marriage to Desdemona is understood as an œdipal crime; guilt is aroused and there is regression to oral phase conflicts. Iago is the personification of Othello's regressively reprojected sadistic superego.

Othello's Jealousy. Stephen Reid. Pp. 274-293.

Reid explains Othello's behavior toward Desdemona as deriving from suddenly released œdipal feelings. His accusation of infidelity is understood as a projection of guilt for heterosexual incestuous desires and not as a defense against homosexuality. The thesis is amply substantiated by references to the text.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

Psychoanalytic Review. LV, 1968.

Freud and Nietzsche. Bruce Mazlish. Pp. 360-375.

The author has gone to considerable effort to explore the major writings by and about Freud for references to the relationship between Freud and Nietzsche. He found only a dozen references and of these one has Freud stating that Nietzsche's ideas have had no influence whatsoever on his work. Mazlish does not emphasize Freud's calling attention to Nietzsche's serious illness, general paralysis. He does not suggest that the megalomania often associated with this illness might be related to some of Nietzsche's grandiose statements. Nietzsche's concept of Superman viewed from a freudian approach makes an interesting discussion in this scholarly article.

Conversations on Freud. Ludwig Wittgenstein and Rush Rhees. Pp. 376-386.

These conversations, dated 1942-1946, declare that Freud is absurd and psychoanalysis is a delusion that does harm. The rambling discourse on anxiety, the unconscious, symbolism, the correctness of interpretations, and especially on dreams, sounds like the superficial carping of little men who envy a giant.

Heracles and the Centaur. Charlotte Olmsted Kursh. Pp. 387-399.

The author's task in her book, Theseus, to which this article is related, is to demonstrate symbiotic role relationships and, unlike Freud, to accent the mother's side of the œdipal story. Her emphasis is in explicating Heracles and the Centaur with a clarification of Heracles as applied to master-slave relationships in various cultures, primarily in the Greco-Roman and in the American South. The slave becomes powerful, resourceful, and intelligent while the master regresses to an infantile state of brutal but helpless stupidity and terror after he has relied on his slave.

Schizoid Rule-Following. Robert W. Daly. Pp. 400-414.

The author outlines a number of rules or alternatives that schizoid types employ in their pattern of living. His style of writing verges on the poetic at

times, but he alludes to clinical observations often enough to make the article quite useful. The subject material of anxiety-ridden alienation, however, is so broad and so frequently employed in mass media that the carefully formulated eight-point definition of schizoid seems like a description of everyday occurrence in our frenetic, industrialized society. This definition revolves around the concept of a pattern of 'approach-avoidance conflict'. The author concentrates on the intrapersonal and the interpersonal and avoids sociological explanations. Notably lacking in his clinical emphasis is any mention of actual physical inferiority that goes along with the feeling of failure leading to paranoid ideation. He does, however, include Alfred Adler in his interesting list of references.

Sartre's 'Words'; An Existential Self-Analysis. Joseph P. Fell. Pp. 426-441.

Words by Sartre might be considered a confession of the imposture of his previous works, such as Being and Nothingness. Words deals with Sartre's first ten years of life. The lack of a father which he emphasizes in 'loathing' his childhood and, in effect, denying a superego, should be balanced by the fact that he had a grandfather who 'drove' him into literature. This implies that the grandfather cared a great deal about the boy and the boy denied it. Words is an exposure of Sartre's previous self-deception. The author wonders if this may be still another deceit escaping our grasp in a shifting dialectic of possibility and necessity.

The Concept of Creative Illness. Henri F. Ellenberger. Pp. 442-456.

The cure of an illness can result in a feeling of enthusiasm, the production of creative ideas, and a lasting personality change. This paper attempts to impress by leaping references, much in the style of Jung, going from German and French romanticists to Siberian shamans. The author finally comes to his main thesis: the creative work of Freud and Jung came as a result of their 'neurotic illness'. He omits the more ominous signs of Jung's illness, such as having kept a loaded revolver in his desk and being frightened by his homocidal-suicidal dreams soon after separating from Freud. There is very interesting documentation on the source of the term, the pleasure principle, which Freud admittedly borrowed from the philosopher, Fechner. Fechner had arrived at the concept after a serious depression had been replaced by hypomania. The paper ends in a continuation of the Freud-Jung controversy, in defense of Jung.

A Category of the Human Spirit. Marcel Mauss. Pp. 457-481.

The author applies French sociology and ethnology to the idea of the persona. He quotes anthropologists, theologians, and philosophers, gives a nod to psychologists and neurologists, but omits entirely any mention of psychoanalysts. There is an informative section on the development of the idea of the persona under the Romans. Persona is related to cognomen and imago. Slaves, however, had no persona, no body, no name, no cognomen, and no goods of their own. The author asserts that Christianity changed all this without explaining how. There is a description of the evolution of the persona from the man defined by his status to the concept of man as a human person.

Person, Ego, Human Spirit in Marcel Mauss: Comments. Lawrence Krader. Pp. 482-490.

Krader comments on Mauss's essay on the development of the person not in the Western World but as an organicism of man in his universal mode of being. Therefore Krader asserts that Mauss should have added Hegel to his list of philosophers. The idea of the person is a construct arising out of problems in law, theology, morals, and economy. Only one final remark in a footnote seems to have any bearing on psychoanalysis. Linnaeus thought the larval stage in the life cycle masks the true imago of insects. This is an inversion of the Latin word according to which the imago would mask the larva. The early analysts used the version of Linnaeus. They used imago to denote the final perfect form of personality that remains largely unchanged after a certain age for one's entire lifetime.

The Cure of Souls and the Winds of Change. Paul Meadows. Pp. 491-504.

The history and the kinds of psychotherapy are briefly reviewed. A half dozen authors, who have written about what therapy is, are cited. Therapy by the priest is distinguished from that of the medical person. Insight therapy is differentiated from action therapy, and there is an interesting discussion of the criticisms each has received. The American Psychoanalytic Association is quoted as having concluded that 'the case is as good for one therapy as it is for another' in its evaluation of the efficacy of therapy. Among the references cited is The Greeks and the Irrational by E. R. Dodds. We are still having difficulty being rational.

Avant-Garde Dramatists from Ibsen to Ionesco. Benjamin Nelson. Pp. 505-512.

The author equates psychoanalysts with double agents. He means that therapists must be many things to many men. In this way they can be compared to playwrights and their audiences. He does not differentiate between experience as a patient and the activity of playgoers who 'experience in their depth'.

Playwrights are classified as proto-freudian, freudian, and post-freudian. Two or three are named in each category and these categories are further delineated in ways that make more sense than the simplistic and questionable freudian categorization. Unlike other authors on this subject, Nelson does not use the term 'controlled regression' into nihilism that suggests the avant-garde might be renamed 'backward-guard'. He states that the 'alienation effect' of recent drama is akin to the procedures of paradigmatic psychotherapists. He warns that audiences do not wish to be stripped of their last defenses. This certainly would apply to patients as well.

STEWART R. SMITH

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Notes

Martin H. Stein & Norman Reider

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NOTES

ELISABETH R. GELEERD died on May 25, 1969. A beloved and respected colleague, her loss is deeply felt by all of us: students, colleagues, friends, and not least by the many patients, child and adult, whom she treated in her long experience as a psychoanalyst.

Born in the Netherlands, Dr. Geleerd received her psychoanalytic education in London. She came to the United States in 1940, worked at the Menninger Clinic for over four years, and then transferred to New York. In 1947 she became a training analyst and an active and valuable participant in the training program of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. Her contributions to the child analysis curriculum were noteworthy and she became a leader in the new training program in the psychoanalysis of adolescents. Much of the credit for the integration of child development and child analysis into the educational program of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute must go to Elisabeth Geleerd. She was a Fellow of the Board on Professional Standards of the American Psychoanalytic Association and one of the founders of the American Association for Child Psychoanalysis. She was the author of a number of important papers on child analysis and metapsychology, and the editor of The Child Analyst at Work.

MARTIN H. STEIN

FRITZ SCHMIDL died on May 5, 1969. His devotion to psychoanalysis went back to the days of the Youth Movement in Vienna where Bernfeld and Fenichel were among his many friends. Though trained in law, his interests were primarily in methodology and applied psychoanalysis, especially in literature and history. His papers and reviews, some of which appeared in This QUARTERLY, exemplified a rare, gemlike clarity. A member of the Faculty of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Washington and of the Seattle Psychoanalytic Institute, he was distinguished for his brilliance, warmth, and wisdom.

NORMAN REIDER

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

April 16, 1968. DIFFICULTIES IN THE PATH OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. (Eighteenth Sigmund Freud Anniversary Lecture.) Anna Freud.

Miss Freud addresses herself to the seemingly negative topic in the established psychoanalytic tradition which finds it more profitable to approach the obstacles than those parts of the work which come easily. She is aware that the world has frequently blamed analysts for this approach, seeing it as inherently pessimistic and negative. Her topic is in the tradition of three of Freud's papers: A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis (1917), The Resistances to Psychoanalysis (1925), and Analysis, Terminable and Interminable (1937). To the two areas approached by her father, i.e., difficulties within the patient and difficulties in

the attitude of the external world, she has added a third—difficulties within analysts themselves.

She queries whether—vis-à-vis the external world—we are really much better off than we were fifty years ago. The general disbelief in the unconscious at that time has now been overcome. Only in a few areas, where systems of thought are built more or less entirely on the concept of the conscious mind, as in law and certain areas of psychology, are some of those original difficulties encountered. Where once public discussion of sex was an obstacle, today one might say that psychoanalysis has fallen behind the general public in this regard. From such publications as the studies of Kinsey and Masters and Johnson, one can see that people are free to work and write about things for which they once would have been severely criticized or even indicted. Questioning why the world had not risen in opposition to the psychoanalytic observations of the place of aggression in man's nature, Miss Freud conjectures that the atrocities of two world wars have convinced people that aggression is not an analytic invention. Among the factors contributing to a cool reception of Freud's original interest in dreams was a sense that dreams were not really worthy of study. This attitude has changed markedly as shown by the studies of physiologists and academic psychologists uncovering the nature of dreaming and the severe consequences of dream deprivation. Thus none of the original 'stumbling blocks' which separated the analyst from the world around him can be regarded as obstacles today.

But, shedding these, the analyst still cannot feel wholly comfortable in the external world. He encounters new dangers. Now, for instance, there is a rivalry between psychiatry and psychoanalysis which did not exist before. At first psychiatry had few therapeutic methods to offer; now many analysts feel they have a hard time keeping their place in the treatment of mental illness, particularly in consideration of the helpfulness of drugs in certain conditions. Analysts now feel *too* comfortable vis-à-vis academic psychology whereas the original obstacle was against acceptance; the current danger is that through a new found acceptance, analysts feel a pressure to be more 'scientific', although methods in one discipline do not necessarily fit the material available in another. Finally, and importantly, the question arises whether analysis will keep the allegiance of the young. In the early days of analysis the young were engaged by the view of the struggle of man against himself which analysis exposed. Today, it seems that the young are more interested in man against society, and they are suspicious that analysis will lead to adaptation to the present forms of society.

Miss Freud then turned to the obstacles to cure in the patients being treated, which were listed in Analysis, Terminable and Interminable. From her observations with children, she would add other factors that often prevent cure: a constitutional low frustration or low anxiety tolerance; variations in the readiness to accept substitute satisfaction; a constitutional lack of vigor in the desire to be grown-up. Many of these obstacles can be seen as qualities of the ego, which is understandable when we consider that the reasonable ego is the most important analytic ally and we depend importantly on its synthetic function. As Dr. Eissler first noted, the analytic process as we know it fits only the 'normal' ego; but Freud stated that a normal ego of this kind is an ideal fiction. Citing

Brenner's Archaic Features in Ego Functioning, Miss Freud pointed out that it is the synthetic function which leaves us in the lurch since normal people tolerate many contradictions. What efforts have analysts made to overcome this impasse? Some analysts, using the early discoveries of analysis that one must go back to the infantile neurosis to effect a cure, conclude that one must go back to the first year of life and to the interaction of mother and child. Perhaps starting with Melanie Klein, this contention seems today to have grown far beyond that. Recently Jeanne Lampl-de Groot proposed something similar in a paper, Obstacles in the Way of Psychoanalysis, giving examples of how leading the analysis back to the first year of life can solve difficulties within the patient previously thought insoluble by psychoanalysis. Many do not share this point of view. Leading the analysis back from the infantile neurosis to the first year of life requires certain assumptions which are not always spelled out, such as that the material is no longer verbal and therefore not really available to consciousness and verbalization. This, then, leads to neglect of certain technical procedures which analysts have always felt to be very important—free association perhaps being one. If the analyst works with the first year of life he does not work any longer with conflicts of the structured personality; he works with the details of how this structure was built up. This is an enormous difference. According to these views the division between the innate and early acquired constitution is altered significantly, most of the constitution considered as acquired in the first year of life. Miss Freud does not think that the assumption that whatever is acquired is reversible can be proved.

Miss Freud then turned to the difficulties within analysts themselves, by-passing such familiar topics as 'blind spots'. Rather she speaks of a concern that led the American Psychoanalytic Association to set up an *ad hoc* committee for scientific activities, i.e., the question of whether there is a deficiency of creative research in the central areas of psychoanalysis. She asks why analysts are so concerned about creativity; an analyst is not a creator but an explorer. She believes that what has been lost is a closeness of clinical and theoretical thinking. A misunderstanding has crept into the field centering around the concept, metapsychology. Metapsychology was meant to be an attitude to look at the clinical facts not from one side but always from four sides simultaneously: genetic, dynamic, topographic or stuctural, and economic (some later added the adaptive aspect). These facets have never received equal interest. At first the dynamic captured the attention of both the world and analyst alike. For conflicts to be understood clinically and therapeutically, the topographic view gained attention. The structural idea came into vogue after 1926, when Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety appeared. The economic point of view has always been a step-child, although all internal battles are won and lost according to the strength of the forces engaged in them. In treatment the alteration we attempt to bring about is in the dynamics and economics within the structure; the genetic aspect is merely a means to an end, eliciting facts we can offer to the ego for its mediating role. Miss Freud remembers how fascinated she was with dynamics at the time she wrote The Ego and the Mechanism of Defense; Hartmann was fascinated with genetics at the same time in his Ego

Psychology and Problems of Adaptation. With the current emphasis on the first year of life, we are in an era where genetics seems to 'have the upper hand' and we will have to wait until genetics again becomes connected to the other aspects. When that has happened, we will be back in what the *ad hoc* committee for scientific activities has hopefully called 'a creative era of psychoanalysis'.

ALAN BARRE

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

May 20, 1968. THE PSYCHOANALYTIC TREATMENT OF NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITIES: OUTLINE OF A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH. (Third Freud Anniversary Lecture.) Heinz Kohut, M.D.

In accordance with his previous conceptualizations, the idealized parent imago and the grandiose self, Dr. Kohut examines their therapeutic activation in what he refers to as the idealizing transference and the mirror transference.

The idealizing transference is the therapeutic revival of the early state in which the psyche saves a part of the lost experience of global narcissistic perfection by assigning it to an archaic (transitional) object—the idealized parent imago. Idealization whether it is directed at a dimly perceived archaic mother-breast or at a clearly recognized œdipal parent, belongs genetically and dynamically in a narcissistic context. The stream of narcissism which is subsumed under the term, idealized parent imago, remains vulnerable throughout early development. The period of greatest vulnerability ends when an idealized superego has been formed. Under optimal circumstances, the child experiences gradual disappointment in the idealized object, leading to a withdrawal of the narcissistic idealizing cathexes from the object imago and to their gradual internalization. If the child suffers the loss of the idealized object, or disappointment in it, the needed internal structure is not acquired and the child's psyche remains fixated on the archaic object imago.

The mirror transference occurs in three forms, relating to specific states of development of the grandiose self: 1, an archaic form in which the self-experience of the analysand includes the analyst; 2, a less archaic form in which the patient assumes that the analyst is like him; 3, a still less archaic form in which the analyst is experienced as a separate person who has significance for the patient only as an approving and confirming 'mirror' of the patient's narcissistic display. If the development of the grandiose self is disturbed, this psychic structure may be cut off from further integrative participation in the development of the personality. In the mirror transference it may become cohesively remobilized and a new road to its gradual modification is opened. The central activity in the clinical process during the mirror transference concerns the raising to consciousness of the infantile fantasies of exhibitionistic grandeur.

The principal aim of the working-through processes in the mirror transference is the transformation of the grandiose self, resulting in a firming of the ego's potential for action and in increasingly realistic self-esteem. The principal

aim of the working-through processes in the idealizing transference is the internalization of the idealized object, leading to a strengthening of the matrix of the ego and to the strengthening of the patient's ideals.

Countertransference may result if the analyst has not come to terms with his own grandiose self. He may respond to the patient's idealization of him with intense stimulation of his unconscious grandiose fantasies and an intensification of defenses which bring about his rejection of the patient's idealizing transference. In the mirror transference, the analyst's own narcissistic needs may make him intolerant of a situation in which he is reduced to the role of mirror for the patient's infantile narcissism.

MARTIN J. WEICH

The Fall Meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION with be held December 12-14, 1969, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York City.

The WORLD MENTAL HEALTH ASSEMBLY, sponsored by the World Federation for Mental Health and the U. S. National Association for Mental Health, will take place at the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., November 17-21, 1969. For further information, write to: Dr. Paul V. Lemkau, Chairman, 615 North Wolfe Street, Baltimore, Maryland 21205.

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