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Stanley A. Leavy

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JOHN KEATS'S PSYCHOLOGY OF CREATIVE IMAGINATION

BY STANLEY A. LEAVY, M. D. (NEW HAVEN)

I

In a letter to his brothers written in December 1817, when he was twenty-two years old, John Keats wrote: 'I had not a dispute but a disquisition with Dilke [a member of his intimate circle], on various subjects; several things dovetailed in my mind, & at once it struck me, what quality went to form a Man of Achievement especially in Literature & which Shakespeare possessed so enormously—I mean *Negative Capability,* that is when man is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason—' *(9,* p. 193*).*

The striking phrase underscored by Keats does not recur as such in his writings. Its sense however appears frequently as one of the essential points in his understanding of the workings of the creative mind, and consideration of it may serve as an entrance into Keats's theory of creativity that can perhaps be best summed up in another phrase: 'That which is creative must create itself' *(9,* p. 374*).* This theory seems to me to deserve attention not only in view of the literary achievement of Keats, but with regard to certain implications for psychoanalysis latent in the poet's expressions.

Keats contrasted men of 'negative capability' with 'consequitive' men *(9,* p. 218*),* like his friend and publisher John Taylor, whom he respects as reasoners, philosophers, with thoroughly logical minds—but at their most developed polar opposites from himself, and above all from his supreme ideal, Shakespeare. At one time or another Keats varied in his estimation of the importance of knowledge as such, at times reproaching himself for his lack of knowledge and complaining, a few months after he wrote the 'negative capability' letter, now in a letter to Taylor, that he knew nothing, had read

nothing, and meant 'to follow Solomon's directions of "get Wisdom—get understanding" ' (*9*, p. 271). Knowledge—and here meaning the knowledge of science and philosophy—was 'needful' and helped 'by widening speculation, to ease the Burden of the Mystery'. Nevertheless he also had to confess elsewhere that he had 'never yet been able to perceive how any thing can be known for truth by consequitive reasoning', and he wonders in a letter to Benjamin Bailey whether 'even the greatest Philosopher ever arrived at his goal without putting aside numerous objections' *(9*, p. 185*)*, that is, without having to overlook the doubts which would inevitably creep in to corrupt his certainties if he had not already closed himself to them. For just as 'philosophy' intends to reach a certain assurance about things within the limitations imposed by logical thought, so the poetic mind is open—as one of Keats's biographers (*11*, p. 161) has defined 'Negative Capability'—to 'tolerance for ambiguity', or in the words of another biographer *(1*, p. 242*)*—'the heart's hunger for settlement, for finality, cannot be answered unless we shut ourselves off from the amplitude of experience, with all its contradictory diversity'. Keats put the whole thing tersely in a letter to J. H. Reynolds: 'Axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are proved upon our pulses' *(9*, p. 279*)*.

The contrast implied in these thoughts is that existing between reason and imagination, and rather to the credit of the latter than the former. If we accept as a functional meaning of 'reason' something like 'the capacity to think clearly' we do not run into any contradiction with 'imagination', but familiarly the notion of reason includes its critical actions at their most stringent. Reason by such extension of meaning is antipoetical, interposing syllogistic thinking in such a fashion that all tendencies toward symbol and metaphor are excluded unless they are so labeled,—and being so labeled they are reduced from poetry to technical prose. Imagination on the other hand is free, having shaken off the shackles of logic; it sees the identity of opposites, the middle between being and not-being, the overlap between approximated images and ideas, and admits

the full reality of 'secondary' qualities, not acknowledging the primacy of the statistical and the quantifiable. If imagination finds its pathological form in delusion, reason, more insidiously because more respectably, is represented symptomatically in constricted, rationalizing thought which may eventuate in the strait jacket of obsessionalism. Imagination, intrepid in its admission of all 'uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts' is exposed to the possibility of terror as well as wonder, but the poet must let go and trust the 'pulses' of his private experience. Yet Keats also recognized that in so far as 'reason' led to increased knowledge of the objective world, it enhanced rather than limited imagination by 'widening speculation'. To use the concepts of our own time, it is consonant with Keats's point of view to assert that we may be as imaginative in our interpretation of atomic particles as in reliving a pastoral tradition.

Keats said to Bailey, his friend studying for Holy Orders, 'I am certain of nothing but the holiness of the Heart's affections and the truth of Imagination' and 'The Imagination may be compared to Adam's dream [in Paradise Lost]—he awoke and found it truth' *(9,* pp. 184-185*)*. The relations between imagination and dream, and the connection of both with the objective world are recurrent themes in the poems as well as the letters of Keats; in his effort to make real the world of fantasy and dream, a struggle existed there that he could not fully resolve. If he saw in the writing of Endymion, his long early poem, a 'Regular stepping of the Imagination towards a Truth' and a progress in the direction of

> fellowship divine
> A fellowship with essence, till we shine
> Full alchymized and free of space—*(9,* p. 218*)*

nevertheless he was also to understand that this progress beyond the mortal 'bourne' cannot be realized within the limitations imposed by the human condition, and some of his greatest poems embody the attempt and the failure *(12)*.

Becoming familiar with these and certain others of Keats's psychological ideas, it struck me how remarkably they prefigure

and also illuminate psychoanalytic concepts of creative imagination. No reader of the letters of Keats will take them for the statement of a systematic psychology, which it will already be apparent would have been quite foreign to Keats's mind. Nor are the ideas themselves original with Keats. In abstract form they derive from the philosophical idealism of his time *(1,* pp. 232, ff.*)* through the principal mediation of the writings and lectures of his older friend, the critic William Hazlitt. Sometimes the ideas are no more than quotations from Hazlitt *(7)*; sometimes the borrowings from the speculations of other romantic poets, especially Coleridge and Wordsworth, are equally apparent.[1] What confers a peculiar validity on Keats's ideas is their intimate association with the writing of his poems, and with their latent content. If they are bound to the romantic-idealist attitude to life, and also to Keats's highly personal understanding of that attitude, they were subjected to the irreplaceable test of poetic practice. In short, use of Keats's ideas on creativity depends on our willingness to concede that the poet possessed an exceptional access to the working of his own mind permitting him to know what he was doing and how he did it. I am therefore quite deliberately using Keats's ideas as if they were themselves, so to speak, 'psychoanalytic interpretations' of the data of experience. I am making almost no attempt to 'analyze' Keats by uncovering the unconscious intentions of his ideas; if anything the thrust is in the opposite direction, to determine what the poet's experience as *he* understood it may do for psychoanalysis. That he borrowed some of his ideas from others and assimilated them into himself as his experience dictated is only further evidence that he was convinced of their pertinence to what he knew directly.

1 A direct affiliation of psychoanalysis to romanticism can be seen, as Dr. Bertram Lewin has reminded me, in the remarkable passage from Schiller's work quoted by Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* Standard Edition, IV, pages 102-103. The influence of German romanticism on Coleridge is well known, but Hazlitt was probably its main source for Keats.

Almost all Keats's ideas, not only the psychological ones, that reached expression in prose did so in his letters, a magnificent collection of materials for autobiography, bountifully disclosing the inner life of the poet in a stage intermediate between experience and poetry. There are critics who claim as high literary value for the letters as for the poems, but such considerations aside it is intensely interesting that one of the most enduring poets seems to have been able to catch and to put into simple prose some of the secrets of his own creative ability, and by extension the poetic process in general. The letters that have been preserved cover the whole period of his creative life (1817-1821) and are among many other things a commentary on it.

'Negative capability' then would be a capacity to give free rein to the imagination. The disparate, absurd, inchoate, illogical, impossible would not present stop-signs. It can be taken for granted that equipped with this gift any person might attain hitherto unrecorded—because personally unique—imaginings. All that prevents that from happening is the restraint ordinarily imposed in the face of 'uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts' and a need for the security of 'fact and reason'; it is these that balk the flight of fancy. They induce sobriety, make for order, propriety, punctuality, accomplishment, but—this is what counts—they block the way to truth. Unhappily, while 'many have original Minds who do not think it' *(9,* p. 231*),* only a few have the confidence to put down in tangible signs the record of what they have discovered with their fancy; the rest escape the experience by sliding into conformity with custom. A truly 'complex mind', Keats said, would be 'one that is imaginative and at the same time careful of its fruits', and would exist 'partly on sensations partly on thought', qualities he generously attributed at that point to his rather unsubtle friend Bailey, and which are more appropriately assigned to Keats himself *(9,* p. 186*).*

The contribution of imagination to the acquiring of significant new knowledge has by now become a commonplace, which

it does not appear to have been in Keats's day. But it is not primarily knowledge of the kind we relate to scientific understanding that Keats refers to here in any case. If any common phrase will designate it, 'truth' is 'existential' knowledge, and that is what our grasping for security inhibits. A barrier exists between the person and his experience; it becomes too rapidly detached, cold, past and passed-by, the memory lacking the enrichment of imaginative reconstruction within himself. The poetic experience—if not the poetic gift—is universally possible, but the conduct of life is antipoetic. Bergson's distinction between intuitive and discursive knowledge has been usefully applied with reference to this problem *(2)*, but how familiar a ring it has, and how much it sounds like the analysis of certain kinds of character resistance!

There is reason enough for the 'resistance'. While making its daring and even dangerous venture 'beyond its proper bound', going too far, and yet still within the confines of mortality, the imagination reveals to the soul the 'eternal fierce destruction' of nature *(9,* p. 262*)*. The risk must be taken since there is no other approach to truth. There are further tragic implications: from Keats's metaphysical position, the attainment of truth in its fullness remains outside mortal life, and Keats had only spasmodic faith in any other sort of life. As it is, only approximations of truth can be made (the reasons for this depend on certain other ideas of Keats which also call for examination), but it is the emotion aroused by ceaseless striving toward the imaginative grasp of that which is, and the inevitable failure of the attempt, that enriches and deepens poetry. Set free on its impossible task, the imagination does all it can 'to add a mite to that mass of beauty which is harvested from these great materials, by the finest spirits, and put into etherial existence for the relish of our fellows'. Yet—he was visiting the Lake District when he wrote thus to his brother Tom—it was just there, surrounded by natural beauty, that he felt limits to his own mind too: 'I live in the eye; and my imagination, surpassed, is at rest' *(9,* p. 301*)*.

What is this power of imagination to reach truth? Keats is specific about this. For one thing he accepts without question the proposition that knowledge is not just the impression of the objective world on the mind, but an active interchange between the mind and its objects, amounting to a union between the knower and the known, the percipient and the perceived, the subject and the object. He wrote precisely about this unitive process as he witnessed it in his own mind. 'No sooner am I alone than shapes of epic greatness are stationed around me' and 'according to my state of mind I am with Achilles shouting in the trenches, or with Theocritus in the Vales of Sicily' *(9,* pp. 403, 404*)*. Far from being in union with literary images alone, he also finds himself one with the sparrow picking about the gravel *(9,* p. 186*)*, and, according to his friend Richard Woodhouse, he could even 'conceive of a billiard ball that it may have a sense of delight in its own roundness, smoothness, volubility and the rapidity of its motion' *(9,* p. 389*)*. Surely that is a convincing example of imagination set free by 'negative capability', and, as is the rule with Keats, the sanity of the projective thinking is guaranteed by the humor of the statement. Imaginative union of another sort appears in a letter in which Keats writes of an exotic young woman, Jane Cox ,whom he had met at the home of his friends the Reynoldses:

> She is not a Cleopatra; but she is at least a Charmian.—When she comes into the room she makes an impression the same as the Beauty of a Leopardess. I always find myself there at ease with such a woman; the picture before me always gives me life and animation which I cannot feel with any thing inferiour—I am at such times too much occupied in admiring to be awkward or on a tremble. I forget myself entirely *because I live in her (9,* p. 395*)*.

He added that he was not in love with her and had lost 'but one night's sleep' thinking of her.

Whatever the nature of the attraction he felt toward Jane Cox, in this passage he refers to something closer to a form of

identification than to sensual love, or perhaps to that form of identification which may be an unrecognized part of sensual love. But the point of it is that imagination made possible empathic participation in the existence of other persons and other objects generally. The poet is the man of particularly strong empathic development:

> 'Tis the man who with a bird,
> Wren or Eagle, finds his way to
> All its instincts; he hath heard
> The Lion's roaring, and can tell
> What his horny threat expresseth . . . *(4,* pp. 393-394*).*

As an objective statement about the external world, all such claims are absurd. As a declaration of preconditions for knowledge they may stand on firmer ground, and psychoanalytically, with especial concern for *personal* knowledge, they demand a hearing.

The power of unitive imagination, or empathy, is not accorded equally to all men. It is to be found in men who 'have not any individuality, any determined Character' *(9,* p. 184*).* This rather surprising idea, which at first sounds only like an example of the paradoxical 'rodomontade' for which Keats was celebrated among his friends, is on the contrary one to which he clung steadfastly, and which is another fixed part of Keats's psychology. He found it a pre-eminent attribute of Shakespeare, and he refers to it many times in his letters. He wrote to Woodhouse in October 1816 (in reply to Woodhouse's earnest injunction that he not carry out his threat to abandon poetry because it was so poorly received by the public):

> As to the poetic Character itself—it is not itself—it has no self—it is everything and nothing. It has no character—it enjoys light and hate; it loves in gusto, be it foul or fair, high or low—It has as much delight in conceiving an Iago as an Imogen. What shocks the virtuous philosopher, delights the camelion Poet—A Poet is the most unpoetical of anything in existence; because he has no identity—Not one word I ever utter

> can be taken for granted as an opinion growing out of my identical nature—the identity of everyone begins to press upon me *(9,* pp. 386-387*)*.

And even *this* 'opinion', he added, might not be his own but that of 'some character in whose soul I now live'.

A life without 'identity' of its own, fused with the things of its experience and the creatures of its imagination, is a life of 'allegory' such as Shakespeare led, 'and his works are the comments on it' *(10,* p. 67*)*. This apodictic expression notwithstanding, Keats could also write that human life is passed in a 'Vale of Soul-making' *(10,* p. 102*)* in which men are not 'souls' until they acquire identities, till each one is personally himself, and that 'takes a world of Pains and troubles'. And further, the soul 'is a world of itself and has enough to do in its own home' *(10,* p. 146*)*. The contradiction is at least partly resolved if we read Keats's meaning to be that it is not the innate or early fixed character of a man that makes him a creative person but rather his openness to new formative experiences, in the absence of a determinately ordered character-structure. Keats at twenty-two soberly recommended 'a very gradual ripening of the intellectual powers' as the basis of 'great productions', a comment which he follows with an instance from his own experience: 'I sat down yesterday to read King Lear once again the thing appeared to demand the prologue of a Sonnet, I wrote it & began to read' (*9,* p. 214). How much is condensed in that experience! In the absence of 'identity' Keats had lived long both with and *as* the characters of Shakespeare's imagination, and the poem comes into being suddenly under the inspiration of Shakespeare, whom he had already long regarded as 'the presider' over his poetic life *(9,* p. 142*)*.

The outward movement of the poet's mind then is unimpeded because of certain peculiarities in his 'identity', a term that we can take over from Keats into our own language with no change in its meaning. The nonpoetical mind is more bound by habit; it clings to its past interpretations, because

they are so much a part of it. It is defended against novelty from the objective world, but it is more important that it is intolerant of incursions from the inner world, which would disrupt its form. The gradually developed mind of the poet is one in which earlier formed impressions are freer to exist, and remain available for the working of the released, active imagination. Less confident than the average man about *who* he is, the poet's ego goes out to meet its objects, seeking union with them, becoming them. Keats borrows again, this time from Edmund Spenser, in selecting a metaphor to describe the nature of the union:

> The noble heart that harbors vertuous thought,
> And is with child of glorious great intent,
> Can never rest, until it forth have brought
> Th' eternal Brood of Glory excellent *(9,* p. 134*)*.

The creative mind then is here likened to the pregnant womb. In his own famous sonnet Keats began:

> When I have fears that I may cease to be
> Before my pen has glean'd my teeming brain . . . *(9,* p. 222*)*.

As a result of the adventure of the ego-without-identity of the poet, his mind has achieved empathic union with its objects, and he is unable to rest (in the letter in which Spenser is quoted, Keats was referring literally to insomnia) until the delivery of the 'child' has taken place. Incidentally, the equivocal nature of the child with which the heart is pregnant is amply demonstrated by the company kept by this sonnet: it is preceded in the letter in which it first appeared by some bawdy verses of no great merit ('O blush not so') and some pretentious doggerel ('Hence Burgundy, Claret & port'). It is as if the poet, while able, as Keats surely was, to tell the difference between the valuable and the trivial in his own work, still had an affection for whatever had been conceived in and by his mind.

The 'conception' of poetry is a bisexual process. The bee and the flower he said 'receive a fair guerdon' of one another,

and, perhaps with Teiresias in mind, he asks, 'who shall say between Man and Woman which is the most delighted?' *(9,* p. 232*)*. If at one point he concludes: 'Let us open our leaves like a flower and be passive and receptive' we recall on the other hand his account of the active progress of the imagination into the life of the sparrow, or of 'Charmian', or into the roundness of the billiard ball, for a more complete picture of the way that the released imagination is able to produce poetry. There is an active, willed grasping of and entrance into the images which have imprinted themselves on the poet's mind as sensations, and which have continued to live within him. 'Passivity' is not inactive spongelike quiescence, but, after the manner of 'negative capability', a withholding of judgment on the images so eagerly collected, from reading, scenery, art, and especially human nature.

The birth of the poem is usually spontaneous: '—if Poetry comes not as naturally as the Leaves to a tree it had better not come at all' *(9,* pp. 238-239*)*, and the data of Keats's method indicate that the best poems were written rapidly, with long periods (relatively long, out of such a short total span of life) spent unproductively between times of eruptive creativity. Which is not to overlook the care expended by the poet on the emendation of the poems *after* they were written. On the other hand the Ode to a Nightingale, according to Charles Brown *(1,* p. 501*)*, his companion at that time in the house on Hampstead Heath which they and the Brawne family shared, was composed in a few hours of a morning spent sitting on the lawn, but there are intimations of its mood, images, and intent in earlier poems and letters. Keats could write extemporaneous poetry, either on his own or at the request of a friend like Leigh Hunt in one of their competitions, but these were far from his best poems. His only completed long poem, Endymion, was at least a year being written, and has the marks of a prolonged labor. It is in fact tempting to a psychoanalyst, in view of Keats's own attitude toward Endymion, to look on it as among other things a sort of analysis of his resistance, which

left him free for his great work, when the creative act was sudden, and that very suddenness contributed to the 'surprise by a fine excess' *(9,* p. 238*)* and helped 'load every rift with ore' *(10,* p. 323*),* as he admonished Shelley. Woodhouse wrote of Keats that 'he is generally more troubled by redundancy than by a poverty of images' *(1,* p. 234*),* and this no doubt refers to the 'intensity' and 'gusto' which he claimed for the true poetical mind. In these latter terms Keats once again borrowed ideas from Hazlitt because they offered in general form witness to his personal experience with poetry. Often his letters, like his conversations as remembered by a few of his circle, are so loaded with images and associations that these erupt out of context.

II

It has recently been shown *(8)* how certain works of painting and sculpture influenced Keats's poetry. Paintings in which Greek mythological themes were represented were prominent, as in some of the work of Poussin, and the embodiment of poetic themes in visible elements had a powerfully stimulating effect on the poet. Attitude, coloring, associations among the figures on canvas or in stone became part of the perceptual material on which his imagination could work. For all its grand themes however, art had no more significance than the rest of the mass of experiences which Keats elaborated into his magical constructions. He could be as lyrical in his letters about the taste of claret, or of a nectarine, as about the Elgin marbles. His reading, of Shakespeare foremost, but also of lesser writers and especially Robert Burton, was absorbed in his thought. One can trace the preconscious associations of his writing and his reading and the impressions made on him by persons around him. A direct affiliation lies between the manifest images of a poem and certain concrete sensory experiences —from the taste of claret to the 'beaker of Hippocrene', from nursing his dying brother Tom to 'the fever and the fret', from the sight of the Elgin marbles to the sonnet on them and to the

Grecian Urn. The transformation imposed by and on the perceptions, the real work of the poet, is the result of their elaboration through both conscious and unconscious mental activity. Keats described, he said, in contrast to Byron, not what he saw but what he imagined *(10,* p. 200*).* Keats's best work is loaded with the imagery of vision as well as other sensory modalities and the particularity of perception is what distinguishes him from other poets. Rhetoric, generalization are of more importance in others, and perhaps it is for this reason that we are able to see an affinity between Keats's psychological ideas and those of psychoanalysis, which is likewise concerned with the details of experience and their psychic transformation.

If we distinguish two kinds of 'unconscious' mental processes, literary criticism (to the extent to which it is psychological) may be said to be engaged with the explication of one of them, namely the 'preconscious'. Social attitudes, personal philosophy, artistic usages, or even quite deep personal intentions may be far from explicit statement in a poem, but the characteristic ambiguity of poetic language permits the critic to discover them latent in highly overdetermined interrelationships among the parts of the poem. Sometimes we may feel that such relationships are read into the poem to suit the interests of the critic; while that may be so, it is wrong to make this a general proposition, because to deny the existence of latent meaning, or to deny that it can be rationally investigated, suggests not only that critics merely rediscover their projected fantasies, but also that poets are not so creative as they actually are.

Psychoanalysis is not unlike criticism in its approach to the 'texts'; we often refer to the 'dream-text' as if it were a literary work. The main difference is one of 'depth' in the psychoanalytic meaning of the word; a perhaps oversimplified distinction might be made between those elements latent in the work which were once at least subliminally conscious and those which were always unconscious in adult life. Gittings, in his admirable recent biography of Keats *(5),* and earlier in his

study limited to the single great creative year of the poet *(6)*, has made it his special task to trace the preconscious sources of a very large number of Keats's poetic images and ideas. Having as they do the merit of a superabundance of convincing material, it is the more significant that such studies do not tell us very much about the psychological process whereby the materials of experience are transformed into poetry. Nor on the other hand are we always satisfied with psychoanalytic works which do make a claim to explain as well as to describe the creative process. Does Keats himself have anything to tell us when we consider his observations on creativity to be spontaneous but essentially 'psychoanalytic' insights into the nature of the poet's art?

I began with 'negative capability' because that somewhat cryptic term stands for a function that has much in common with the ability to 'free associate' and to dream, mental activities which are usual technical tools in analysis. The obvious connecting link is in the comparable state of the ego defenses, and the consequent degree to which the primary process takes over. It is essential however not to exaggerate the dominance of the primary process over the secondary in creative imagining, if in fact it ever does dominate. Formal properties of literature exact a control over the imaginal contents and their contextual relations. Even dreams possess formal properties, being themselves means of communicating between different psychic elements, or, if you will, different parts of the self. There are probably varying styles of dreaming as there certainly are of dream narration, subject to varying æsthetic criteria of the time and the society, just as there are styles of art and literature pressed by the same necessities. The peculiar relief afforded by dreams, resembling the pleasurable aspect of artistic experience, lies in the withdrawal of the canons of order and propriety proceeding from the censorship of the superego, and from the ego's insistence on at least the appearance of logical rationality, but the positive element is also gratifying—the creative act, that is, of dream-making.

Even the poet is unable to admit into consciousness just anything at all that is stirring in his mind. In Keats's letters, for example, we may find associations of ideas which serve to deny the fear and proximity of death, which he was at other times more prepared to acknowledge consciously. 'Negative capability' enables the poet to withhold making up his mind; he practices a sort of *laissez-faire* with respect to any and all images that are admitted. But just as the free associations of the analysand and the analyst are the source of the unconscious content and not that content itself, so the poet's ideas are uninhibited, but still subject to censorship, and they may serve other defensive purposes as well.

Even Keats was unable to offer a prescription to help us become poets, and we cannot find in his letters the answer to the all-important question how to acquire 'negative capability'. Psychoanalytic patients learn the meanings of their associations, including the meaning of the intrusions of unexpected ideas into their consciousness, tolerated long enough and possessing enough intensity to attract other words to themselves. Experience teaches us that the pedagogic influence at work is the proven interest of the analyst, and his abstinence from judgment. Patients are as much surprised that such trivial 'rags and tags' of ideas that they produce are tolerated, as they are about the neutral reception accorded to memories and fantasies of which they are ashamed. Perhaps teachers and other guardians of the growing poet help in a similar way, by safeguarding inner freedom of imagery in all its childish delicacy from becoming stultified through defensiveness and conformity to conventional formulations. Keats's own delight in metaphor, his physical enactment of it, in fact, was appreciated by his early friend Charles Cowden Clarke. But it is also likely that the fostering of imaginative freedom is itself an intrapsychic phenomenon, and that teachers like analysts can only assist its evolution. In such extreme cases as that of Keats it may originate in intensities of sensation at which we can only guess, imperiously sweeping aside logical objections until the ego is

forced to listen. The poet like our patients and like ourselves as analysts must learn to listen before he can make sense of himself.

'Negative capability' however is only one of the essentials of the creative imagination in Keats's psychology. Its existence may differentiate the poetical mind from others, but it stands in a special relation to the inner and the outer worlds. This question is represented most clearly by Keats's apparently ambivalent concept of 'identity'. I believe that the ambivalence is only apparent, because Keats saw as quite different qualities, not really comparable, the poet's lack of identity and the process of 'soul-making'. Of these the former is the more readily accessible, and there is not much to add here to what has been said in quoting Keats directly. It has a particular appeal at present because so much has been said lately about identity and the absence of it, or its negative forms, and it comes as a little shock that Keats looked on identity as a barrier to creative work.

Maybe the word 'character', which Keats usually equates with identity, helps clarify the meaning of all this. We ought to bear in mind that Keats's thought always turned to Shakespeare the dramatist, and that with Hazlitt *(1,* p. 33*)* he saw in Shakespeare's achievement above all else his ability—once he had laid hold on a personage for a play—to pour himself, as it were, into the mold of the dramatic character and allow himself to be empathetically identified with that character. Nothing of the original shape of the poet intruded itself on his creation, which is why it is so inordinately difficult to find out much about Shakespeare's life and personality from his plays, and why we have to be bold indeed to proceed from analyzing the unconscious intentions of his characters to analyzing the poet's own. The poet's limitations, values, predilections cannot be read from the images which he has projected into his characters. The etymological meaning of 'character' as a 'brand' or 'stamp' is significant, and there is little of the stamp of the private world of Shakespeare in the worlds in which his

characters existed. Shakespeare bestows no less of his art on the arch-villain Iago than on the paragon Imogen; he yields to the fascination of his own creatures and lets them have their own being, first within himself, and then as the 'character' of the play, or the poem.

Looked at this way, the problem of identity in Keats's reflections seems to come down merely to an unusual way of describing the author's relations with his inventions. At all events Keats seems to leave unchallenged our customary notion that the 'man of achievement' is a 'man of character', of an exceptionally high degree of integration, with minimal splitting in the structure of his ego. True, Keats asserted something of the sort in his antithesis between the man of action and the creative man, and he complained about Dilke that he was 'a man who cannot feel he has a personal identity unless he has made up his mind about everything', whereas 'the only means of strengthening one's intellect is to make up one's mind about nothing' *(10,* p. 213*)*. If Keats understands as 'intellect' here something other than 'identity', he nevertheless also contends that there *are* men whose feelings of personal identity are not contingent on the assurance of their opinions.

It may be useless to strain for exact exegesis of the words of a poet who only half-facetiously warned his friends (in a letter already quoted) that his views of the moment might not be his own at all, but those of 'some character in whose soul I now live'. Keats was an 'identity' to himself. He not only presented a constant character—though not at all a uniform one—to the people around him but he also recognized himself as a person with strong convictions, social, political, religious, æsthetic, and a person of vigorous sensuality. But none of this gets to the heart of the meaning of 'identity' as Keats understood it. That lies in another kind of affirmation, which can perhaps be put most economically in psychoanalytic language: the poet can separate himself from any of his powerfully cathected interests and ideas, and allow himself to be confronted by new real objects. The organization of his ego is fluid enough for novelty

of experience to reawaken a wide mass of preconsciously and unconsciously withheld memories and refocus them into new clusters. While the defensive structure is weaker than it is in other kinds of personality, the tenacity of the hold on earlier objects which have become internalized is also less. Does that mean that objects are not strongly cathected libidinally by the poet so that he has to go in search of new objects for that reason, as is said of actors? That is very doubtful indeed, and Keats's life illustrates the contrary. But it does seem, on the basis of Keats's observation or self-observation, that for all the strength of the libidinal cathexis, poets do not feel themselves to be 'formed', they are perpetually 'fetal', or as Goethe once put it more modestly, 'pubertal'. (One cannot help remarking that what is true of the poet might also be true of the poet *manqué*, a much more numerous class.)

Keats's account of 'Soul-making' belongs to the discussion of both identity and creativity. It deserves extended quotation:

> Call the world if you Please 'The vale of Soul-making' Then you will find out the use of the world—I say *Soul-making* as distinguished from an Intelligence—There may be intelligence or sparks of divinity in millions—but they are not Souls till they acquire identities, till each one is personally himself.

He then goes on to describe his 'system of Spirit-creation':

> This is effected by three grand materials—The *Intelligence* —the *human heart* (as distinguished from intelligence or Mind) and the *World* or *Elemental space* suited for the proper action *of Mind and Heart* on each other for the purpose of forming the *Soul* or *Intelligence destined to possess the sense of Identity*.—I will call the *world* a School instituted for the purpose of teaching little children to read—I will call the *human heart* the *horn Book* used in that School—and I will call the *Child able to read, the Soul* made from that *school* and its *hornbook*. Do you not see how necessary a World of Pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and make it a soul? A Place where the heart must feel and suffer in a thousand diverse ways! Not merely is the Heart a Hornbook, it is

> the Minds Bible, it is the Minds experience, it is a teat from which the Mind or intelligence sucks its identity (*10*, pp. 102, ff.).

I do not think we go beyond paraphrase into technical words in place of poetical ones when we translate Keats to say that personal identity is achieved by the internalization of affectively cathected objects,—'self' being a precipitate of its experience.

About a year before Keats wrote to his brother George and his sister-in-law Georgiana about 'Soul making' he used another metaphor in a letter to Reynolds, also bearing on the relation between the self and creativity:

> —I compare human life to a large Mansion of Many Apartments, two of which I can only describe, the doors of the rest being as yet shut upon me—The first we step into we call the infant or thoughtless Chamber, in which we remain as long as we do not think—We remain there a long while—but are at length imperceptibly impelled by the awakening of the thinking principle—within us—we no sooner get into the second Chamber, which I shall call the Chamber of Maiden-Thought, than we become intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere, we see nothing but pleasant wonders—However among the effects this breathing is father of is that tremendous one of sharpening one's vision into the heart and nature of Man—of convincing ones nerves that the World is full of Misery and Heartbreak, Pain, Sickness and oppression—whereby this Chamber of Maiden Thought becomes gradually darken'd—all dark—all leading to dark passages—We see not the ballance of good and evil. We are in a Mist *We* are now in that state—Now if we live and go on thinking, we too shall explore them . . . (*9*, p. 280).

Neither the 'Chambers' nor the 'Vale of Soul-making' seems to be concerned in the first instance with creativity. We might assume that Keats is here composing a more general psychology, but the contexts of the two passages have to do with the making of the poetic soul first and foremost, and with the

closely observed phenomenon of himself as its chief example. It is especially to be noted that the instigation to inner development is found in the 'World of Pains and troubles', in Keats's thought, in the inevitability of disappointment, and, again translating, the inevitability of the internalization of bad as well as good objects. The poet is the seeker of experience par excellence; the universal human need to make a world for oneself in him finds the special expression of verbal organization, so that he creates objects that organize his own ego and provide organizing ideas for others.

Keats defines poetic internalization allusively and yet with the clearest explicitness in the first of his great odes, the Ode to Psyche. Through the medium of intricate condensations in his adaptation of the myth of Cupid and Psyche, Keats at once gives homage to the creative spirit *and* erects a temple to the spirit within himself:

> Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a fane
> In some untrodden region of my mind,
> Where branched thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain,
> Instead of pines shall murmur in the wind:
> . . . .
> And in the midst of this wide quietness
> A rosy sanctuary will I dress
> With the wreath'd trellis of a working brain,
> With buds, and bells, and stars without a name,
> With all the gardener Fancy e'er could feign,
> Who breeding flowers, will never breed the same . . .
>
> (*4*, pp. 211-212)

The richness of condensation and illusion in these lines invokes and yet renders futile attempts at exhaustive analysis, like all true art. In the earlier part of the poem, the myth narrated by Apuleius in his Metamorphoses is as though recollected by sculptures and paintings probably seen by the poet in London, all the while tinctured by the religion of beauty as it was understood by the romantics. Precise observation of nature, romantic nostalgia, contemporary neurological theory, erotic longing, are bound together by the poet's ego into a new con-

stellation of introjects, having among its meanings, the meaning that poetic art is itself a refashioning of the world as it is absorbed into the 'psyche'. I do not think that we would be turning the Ode to Psyche to an Ode to Psychology by seeing it this way, as perhaps the culmination of the poet's efforts to give expository form to the creative experience as he had lived it. The creative act is personified in the 'gardener Fancy', who alongside his homage to the spirit exists 'within the working brain', which I take to be also the 'teeming brain' of the sonnet, 'When I have fears—' and also, in the lines of Spenser quoted from Keats's letter earlier, 'the heart . . . with child of glorious great intent'. Because the identity of the poet is fluid, he can become and remain at once the 'gardener' and the 'sanctuary', and having psychically possessed the object, move on 'and never breed the same'. The sexual tone of the process is pitched climactically in the last line of the Ode, when Psyche's window is opened 'to let the warm Love in' *(3)*.

The Keats critics have more than once pointed out that the aim of the creative artist, the re-creation of the world within the self, is never successful: after all the 'gardener Fancy' can only 'feign', the Nightingale cannot be held in union with the poet's being, but disappears

> Past the near meadows, over the still stream
> Up the hill-side; and now 'tis buried deep
> In the next valley-glades—*(4*, p. 209*)*.

Individual life has barriers against the admission of the outside world, the lover and beloved are not one, fantasy and reality differ. The inner world is pathetically dependent on the continuity of the life of its creator, and is, it seems, dissolved with his death. Herein lies the tragic quality and the abiding melancholy of romantic art: failure to achieve completely its real goal, the union of the soul and its objects, is part of the mystery which it celebrates. Likewise it is inherent in the poet's demonstration of the poetic process. But to assert that the effort cannot fully succeed is not to abandon it. The romantics de-

serve full credit for a high order of realism in their apprehension of what art is for,—nothing less than 'Soul-making', in its intensest form.

With varying degrees of definitiveness and permanence, 'objects' are intended by the ego, and endowed with its cathexes. The ego forms and is formed by them, as the infant unwittingly plays a part in forming the maternal attitudes with which in turn he unites to form his own primary identity. The difficult psychoanalytic problem that faces us at this point is obviously one regarding motivation: what engages the poet so relentlessly in this way, so that the universal need to make a world for oneself is turned into an active process which—except during fallow periods, themselves a part of the whole—the creative artist cannot let go?

Such questions, which come down to the psychology of artistic talent or artistic genius, resolve themselves into two aspects, only one of which is really germane: it does not get us anywhere to discover that the poet, like everyone else, is beset by mental conflict. The peculiarity of his species is that he makes poems, not that he has conflicts. I do not mean that we ought to belittle the efforts of psychoanalysts to demonstrate the nature of the conflicts (I am using that word to represent psychopathological situations in general) from the evidence left by the poet. On the contrary it seems to me that as in Keats's case we have a lot to learn, for the very reason that the poet, the word-man, leaves a more persuasive record of his inner experience than we can hope to find elsewhere. Thus, Dr. Hyatt Williams, in a short study of Keats's poem, *La Belle Dame sans Merci (13)*, analyzes the situation in which the poet lived at the time of the writing of that poem, during the great year of his work, and finds ample evidence that the poem itself is an unconscious revelation of the poet's effort to break out of the paranoid position with its concomitant ego-splitting, unconsciously aware of his illness as an internal persecutor, and striving toward the depressive position in which restitution would be possible, as it was later represented in the Ode to Psyche.

Thus Dr. Williams, using some of the same literary material with which I have been concerned, treats it as itself a symptomatology, which can be translated into its equivalent in unconscious fantasies of a universal kind. One might take issue with him for his method of approach to the poem, which he treats as a kind of word-for-word code; still he may be quite right in his psychodiagnosis. But 'where's the poet?'

It is not to the point how we settle the issue theoretically, but the ambivalence of object-cathexes is a basic observation. The delicacy of the poet's balance lies in his awareness that his world, the inner temple erected to the goddess, being the object of all kinds of unconscious intentions, is in danger of destruction. If *La Belle Dame sans Merci* does represent at once, and among other things, Keats's infection with tuberculosis and his love for Fanny Brawne, it is easy to see how he could make an equivalence between the passionately cathected image of the girl and the illness that was consuming him. Later on his letters to her become intelligible only when we make some such inference. But the writing of the poem is to be understood neither as a product of love nor as symptom of tuberculosis. Trauma may be a necessary cause of poetry; it is certainly not a sufficient cause.

To get some idea of what the specific psychic qualities of the poet are, in Keats's understanding of them, I must revert to some concepts which have already been suggested. Keats had a literal meaning in mind when he wrote that he went to Scotland, on the trip with Brown, in search of 'new Objects', but he might just as well have been writing psychologically. The poet's ego seeks objects, a function which is universal, but which here is unique in respect to the fate of the representations of these objects. The ego that so actively seeks them out is also passive to them, it is both the 'bee' and the 'flower', the 'gardener' and the 'fane', the 'man' and the 'woman'. Endymion is both the lover in pursuit of Cynthia, his object, and the sleeping shepherd discovered by her. Exposed as he is to such an abundance of psychic experience, and entering as he does into

transient but intense fusions with his images in the empathic moment, he requires, summarily speaking, only one further property for the poem to be the form in which he internalizes his experience; namely the words. While by themselves an abundance of words might make one a lexicographer, not a poet, when 'the shadow of the object' *falls* on the ego of the poet (it is no accident that this phrase with its implications for melancholia occurs in connection with Keats) it does so in a way that distinguishes the poet. It may be—and here I confess that my source does not give me direct support—that the poet's abundant stock of words becomes accessible to him and flows so freely because the psychic barrier between unconscious images and the preconscious verbal cathexis of them is attenuated, as another aspect of 'negative capability'.

Verbalization makes for world-building in several ways. It roots the fleeting experience to a readily recoverable sign, each reiteration of which flashes the latent image into vision. The struggle over transiency, the poet's own version of everyone's need to hold onto the changing, vanishing world, is met by the production of concrete literary objects, stabilizing his memories; not with the stony permanence of the 'urn' itself of course, because words even more than the objects of plastic art must submit to transfers of meaning that arise in the minds of those who encounter them. And the poet's inner world is guaranteed through consensual validation, since the word is shared by all who come within his semiotic orbit. His world of inner objects is constantly fortified by the poem itself, which is a steady reminder of those objects, and which persists on the page no matter what alteration may take place in his state of being, and is further re-enforced by communication. At the same time by making his internal objects into *things,* the poet is freed from them. He can become unattached, for they exist apart from him and are not endangered by his ambivalence toward them. The poet rarely burns *all* his poems, and the published ones are outside the reach of his hostility. Like well brought-up children, poems strengthen their progenitor by becoming autonomous.

The making of poems is the poet's way of completing the process of internalization of the world of experience. He may or may not be more driven to making an imaginal world for himself than others, but for him building that world and articulating it in words are inseparable. While in a literal sense the persistent unconscious engram or memory of any perception is an internalized object, a part of the inner milieu which can possibly be returned to consciousness, it is the word that classifies and defines the engram, making it a part of the self, the poet's enduring inner structure with a past, a present, and a possible future. And, moreover, through verbalization of his inner world in all its utmost privacy, the poet has something to give to other men, 'to add a mite to that mass of beauty which is harvested from these great materials'.

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Herbert Lehmann

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SIGMUND FREUD AND THOMAS MANN

BY HERBERT LEHMANN, M.D. (SAN FRANCISCO)

In the chronicle of Freud's encounters with contemporary men of literature an important chapter will have to be devoted to Thomas Mann. When I scanned the potential material for that particular chapter, my attention was caught by Freud's confession of an act of forgetting which occurred in reaction to Mann at the height of their relationship. What might have remained for me a catalogue of letters, meetings, and respectful utterances became a chance of discovering what feelings these two men might have had toward each other.

Freud refers to the parapraxis in the last paragraph of a remarkable letter. He wrote it in November of 1936, six months after Mann read to him his famous address, Freud and the Future, on the occasion of Freud's eightieth birthday and after Mann had sent him his newly published volume in the Joseph series, Joseph in Egypt. Freud writes:

> The effect of this story [Joseph in Egypt] combined with the idea of the 'lived *vita*' in your lecture and the mythological prototype has started within me a trend of thought. . . . I keep wondering if there isn't a figure in history for whom the life of Joseph was a mythical prototype, allowing us to detect the phantasy of Joseph as the secret daemonic motor behind the scenes of his complex life. I am thinking of Napoleon I *(3,* p. 432*)*.

Freud then goes on to develop the thesis that the name of Napoleon's eldest brother, Joseph, 'was fateful for him'. On this supposition, Freud constructs a compellingly plausible interpretation of the Emperor's destiny. It explains Napoleon's relationship to Josephine, his expedition to Egypt, his taking care of his brothers by making them kings and princes. It was when 'he forsook his myth' and repudiated Josephine that his

decline began. His eventual 'being cast into the pit' repeats another chapter in the Joseph legend.

The letter deserves to be considered as an unusual example of the application of psychoanalysis to the art of biography. It is also of special interest to the Freud biographer, because of the parapraxis referred to in its final paragraph: 'My daughter reminds me that I have already divulged to you this interpretation of the daemonic man after you read your essay here. She is right, of course, I had forgotten, and the idea revived after reading your book. And now I hesitate whether to hold onto these lines or send them to you after all with many apologies' *(3,* p. 434*)*.

Freud did, of course, send the letter, and Thomas Mann's reply to this extraordinary letter has become available recently with the German publication of Thomas Mann's letters *(21)*:

> How vividly your letter once again evoked the afternoon with you, one which belongs among the most beautiful memories of my life, and on the occasion of which I was permitted to present my anniversary speech to you, in private this time. Your daughter is quite right: immediately after the conclusion of the reading, you developed for me and the guests the remarkable, indeed fascinating thoughts about Napoleon and the unconscious fixations in his life which you set down in this memorable letter. Thus they were not new for me any more, but they retain their quality of surprise and their striking probability, compared to which the question of their erstwhile reality is of secondary importance to me. In any case, this letter is an exciting example of your ingenious flair in matters of unconscious psychic functioning and the effects emanating from the depths, and I consider myself fortunate to be able to call myself its recipient. (Author's translation.)

Thomas Mann placed great importance on this meeting with Freud. In his address *(19)* he refers to the occasion as 'this hour of formal encounter between creative literature and the psychoanalytic' and states that 'the solemn significance of this hour lies, at least in my eyes and as a matter of personal feel-

ing, in that on this evening is taking place the first official meeting between the two spheres, in the acknowledgment and demonstration of their relationship'. It seems extraordinary that Freud should have forgotten his contribution to such an occasion. He too is on record that this tribute by the greatest contemporary figure in German literature pleased him. He wrote to Arnold Zweig on May 31, 1936: 'Thomas Mann's visit, the address he presented to me, and the public lecture he delivered for the celebration, were gratifying and impressive events' *(3,* p. 430*)*.

A partial interpretation of this parapraxis is provided indirectly by Freud himself. It was only the year before that Freud caught himself in a parapraxis when he prepared to send a birthday gift (a ring) to a friend. The episode is reported in a brief paper, The Subtleties of a Faulty Action, and it involved a curious parallel with the event under discussion in that Freud forgot that he had made the same offering once before. Moreover, Freud's daughter played the identical role: 'But you gave her a stone like that for a ring once before. *That's* probably the repetition you want to avoid. One doesn't like always to be making the same present.' Freud writes he was convinced by this and went a little further with his analysis to arrive at the realization, 'I wanted not to give the stone away at all. I liked it very much myself. . . . A consoling thought soon occurred to me: regrets of this kind only enhance the value of a gift. What sort of gift would it be if one were not a little bit sorry to part with it?' *(7,* p. 234*)*.

I think Freud's interpretation of Napoleon can be regarded as a gift to Thomas Mann. The following sentence from the preamble would corroborate this. He calls the letter 'a talk with you as though you were sitting opposite me here in my study, but without wishing to provoke a polite reply, let alone a detailed appreciation' *(3,* p. 432*)*. Mann's *(21)* reply, 'I consider myself fortunate to be able to call myself its [the letter's] recipient', shows that he too responded to it as a gift, as something of value. Having forgotten that he presented it to Mann already

is an act of undoing, a taking back of the gift. Then as in the episode with the ring he is embarrassed. '. . . I hesitate whether to hold onto these lines or send them to you after all with many apologies.'

We are justified in drawing the conclusion that something in Freud worked against parting with this ingenious interpretation of Napoleon, but we are in the dark about what might have contributed to the conflict. Jones in his Freud biography mentions two facts which could have a significant bearing on the complete interpretation of this parapraxis. First, Freud had already communicated his interpretation of Napoleon's 'Joseph Complex' to Arnold Zweig in a letter written in November, 1934, two years before. Second, Jones claims that it was he who suggested to Freud more than twenty years before the importance of Joseph in Napoleon's life. He says he 'spent two years in collecting material for a book to be called Napoleon's Orient Complex, and had talked over its contents several times with Freud' *(11,* p. 191*)*. Jones adds without reproach that Freud passed on some of these ideas to Ludwig Jekels who then wrote an excellent essay on Napoleon, but states that his own book never got written because 'the cream was gone, the war and other interests supervened'. Thus it is possible that Freud had some unconscious conflict about using this material again. In this essay, however, our main interest revolves around the possibility of ambivalence on Freud's part toward Mann, and how this might have contributed to the parapraxis. Our next task, therefore, is to see what can be discovered about the relationship between the two men.

We find out that although Buddenbrooks *(13)* and The Interpretation of Dreams *(4)* first appeared within the same year (1901), it was not until the 1920's that the two men began to take official notice of each other. Hoffman *(10)* who was also interested in the beginnings of this relationship and seems to have had a correspondence about it with Mann writes: 'Just when Mann first encountered the theories and practices of psychoanalysis in general is not certain; it is not unreason-

able to assume, however, that he was well aware of the discussions and writings of a variety of psychologists sometime before he offered his first public tribute to Freud'. In an unpublished letter to Hoffman in January, 1944, Mann says: 'One could be influenced in this sphere without any direct contact with his [Freud's] work, because for a long time the air had been filled with the thoughts and results of the psychoanalytic school'. Mann's first reading of the major works of Freud began in 1925, after the publication of The Magic Mountain *(15)* in which Mann presents his first understanding of psychoanalysis through the character of Dr. Krokowski. Irony and caricature contributed much to the painting of this portrait of the psychoanalyst.

Mann's ambivalence toward Freud and psychoanalysis at that particular time is well illustrated by two references in the psychoanalytic literature. The first *(22)* is the report of an interview in an Italian newspaper in 1925 in which Mann discussed the influence of the sciences on modern literature.

> As far as I am concerned, at least one of my works, the short novel, Death in Venice, originated under the immediate influence of Freud. Without Freud I would never have thought of dealing with this erotic motive, or I would certainly have treated it differently. If it is permissible to express it in military language, I would say that Sigmund Freud's thesis represents a kind of general offensive against the Unconscious with the objective of its conquest. As an artist I have to confess, however, that I am not at all satisfied with Freudian ideas; rather, I feel disquieted and reduced by them. The artist is being X-rayed by Freud's ideas to the point of violation of the secret of his creative act.

Death in Venice was published in 1912.

The second reference appears in the *Almanach der Psychoanalyse* in 1926. It is a brief article by Mann entitled My Relation to Psychoanalysis *(16)*. He calls this relationship 'unsimple'. Mann says one can see in psychoanalysis something great, admirable, a bold discovery, a profound advance of insight, a

surprising even sensational increase of the knowledge of man. One can find on the other hand that it can—improperly introduced to people—grow into an instrument for malicious enlightenment, for an uncivilized mania for disclosure and discreditation. Its concern is insight, melancholic insight, especially where art and artist are concerned at whom it is aimed in particular. Mann says this was nothing new to him when he first encountered it. He had experienced it essentially with Nietzsche, especially in his Wagner critique, and it had become, in the form of irony, an element of his intellectual make-up and production. This is a circumstance to which he undoubtedly owes the fact that psychoanalytic scholars have shown a predilection for critical attention to his writings. Mann quotes a passage from Death in Venice which he calls 'strongly anti-analytic' but which he says has been interpreted as a characteristic example of 'repression'. Somewhat crisply he states that indeed what may lend the artist-neurotic the impudence to do what is *his,* despite all analytic uncovering, will have to be marked not only as repression but—more aptly, even if more unscientifically—as 'letting a thing be'. With this somewhat angry reproach out of the way, Mann begins to concede—perhaps begrudgingly—the usefulness of psychoanalysis and the incontrovertible fact that it can no longer be eliminated. He says that his preceding remarks mean in no way simply hostility, because insight, in principle unproductive, may yet, as the phenomenon of Nietzsche demonstrates, have much to do with art, and the artist can be on excellent terms with it. It also means nothing less than the delusion that the world can never again get around the discoveries of Freud and his group by closing its eyes. The world cannot get around them at all and neither will art. Psychoanalysis plays into the fiction of our whole sphere of culture, has colored it, and will possibly influence it to an increasing degree. Mann mentions that psychoanalysis plays a role in the just published novel, The Magic Mountain. 'Dr. Krokowski, as its agent is named in the novel, is admittedly a little comical. But perhaps his funniness is only

an indemnification for the deeper concessions which the author makes to psychoanalysis in the core of his works.'

In 1925 Mann arrived at an important turn in his development. His intense preoccupation with disease and death as artistic concepts approaches some resolution in The Magic Mountain and gives way to a fascination with the mythological-psychological in the Joseph series *(18)*.

It is in this development of the foremost figure in contemporary German literature that the influence of Freud and psychoanalysis plays an important part. A psychoanalytic discussion of Mann's personal neurotic conflicts and how they are reflected in his short novel, Death in Venice, has been published by Kohut *(12)*. Brennan *(1)* in his comments on The Magic Mountain writes: 'At some time during the composition of the work, Mann had experience with psychoanalytic treatment. The novel itself can be conceived as self-administered analysis, in which the author brings to the surface of consciousness the roots of the disease and death concepts, objectifying in a work of art what had for long years weighed on his mind. In short, The Magic Mountain can be regarded as a dissolving of Mann's own personal bond to disease and death. In dislodging an incubus, Mann produced his greatest work.'

This is the only reference to a personal experience with therapy that I have been able to locate in the literature about Thomas Mann. Its veracity has to be accepted since in the acknowledgments in Brennan's book he writes: 'Thomas Mann himself graciously read the manuscript and supplemented his kind words with a welcome to his home'.

The result of Mann's more serious study of Freud's works, after the completion of The Magic Mountain, is his essay, Freud's Position in the History of Modern Thought *(17)*. It begins by informing us that Totem and Taboo made the strongest impression on Mann because, 'for the reader who is interested in the riddles of Man, it opens up immense perspectives of the psychic past, the primeval, moral, social, mythic-religious prehistory of mankind'. While acknowledging

the valid application of the clinical viewpoint, he extols the essay as 'artistically the greatest of Freud's works' and calls it 'a piece of world literature'. The main body of Mann's essay, however, is devoted to a long, scholarly discussion of the German Romantic movement in its philosophical and political implications. Mann thinks that Freud as 'explorer in depth and psychologist of the instinct joins the ranks of the 19th and 20th century writers who, as historians, philosophers, social critics, or archeologists emphasize the dark side of nature and the soul as the really life-determining and life-creating force'. This emphasis stands 'in contrast to rationalism, intellectualism, classicism, in a word, the credo of the 18th and perhaps also the 19th century'. In the last few pages Mann returns to a discussion of Freud, psychoanalysis, and its relationship to the romantic movement, to point out that Freud's research interest in the affective processes does not degenerate into the glorification of them at the expense of the intellectual sphere. Freud serves the revolutionary future victory of reason and the intellect. He serves the enlightenment. He quotes Freud: 'We may emphasize over and over again that the human intellect is powerless in comparison to human instinctual life and be correct in this. But there is something special about this weakness. The voice of intellect is soft but it does not rest until it has obtained a hearing.' Alluding to the political exploitation of romanticism in Germany, Mann adds that it would be difficult to make reactionary use of a doctrine in which the primacy of reason is tersely called 'the psychological ideal'.

Mann devotes some space to the fact that Freud was not familiar with the great romantic literature like Novalis or Nietzsche, 'where Freud's insights are lightningly anticipated everywhere'. He finds the phenomenon of influence to be mysterious. 'It is often of such indirect, atmospheric and intellectual nature which can only be described inadequately with words.' He speaks of an 'unconscious tradition'. He illustrates what he means by quoting from The Magic Mountain and comparing it with a passage from Beyond the Pleasure Principle, yet,

'when I wrote my novel, The Magic Mountain into which psychoanalysis enters, I did not know more of Freud than the most general ideas; I had not seriously read any of his writings'. He uses a similar comparison of passages from Freud and Novalis to illustrate Freud's 'most remarkable relations' to German romanticism. Freud's libido theory, 'to say it briefly, is romanticism divested of mysticism and converted into natural science'. This essay was sufficiently important to Freud to elicit from him in 1929 the first letter to Thomas Mann, and the gift of his latest book. Unfortunately this interesting letter is not available, but something of its content can be learned from Thomas Mann's reply dated January, 1930 *(21)*.

Verehrter Herr Professor,

In the confusion of a correspondence which, thanks to the herd instincts of our world, has taken on catastrophic dimensions, I can thank you only most inadequately for the extraordinary gift of your book—this work whose inner greatness so far exceeds its external size. I have read it without interruption, touched by a sense of truth, in which the older I become, the more I recognize the source of all genius. Accept my thanks on this occasion also for your magnificent letter of November. Since I received it there have been all kinds of adventures, but they were not able to detract in the least from the significance of that event for me. Your correction of certain conjectures in my article concerning your insight into the nonmedical importance of your discoveries, is of the greatest interest to me, and it shows me that I would have done better had I sought out contact with you before the composition of the work. On the other hand one writes, I believe, freer and better, as long as the personality with whom he is concerned has not yet achieved social reality, but remains in the realm of myth.

Not without emotion I read what you tell me of the years of your loneliness and isolation. It is funny to say it, but I can to some extent gauge what you experienced from what I have come to hear now, today, after this victory of your teachings, on account of my essay, from all kinds of German piety and

complex-conservatism. It was not well meaning, but alas, I have little reason to be proud of it. I have come ashamedly late—slow in nature, which I am in general. Everything has to become very ripe in me before I can communicate it.

You love writers? Probably mainly as objects of your research, for which, with boring exceptions, we are all born—I especially, I would say, if it did not sound conceited. A conversation with you about this subject and related matters would be good. I have been requested to come to Vienna this month in order to attend the Halsmann trial in the Obersten Gerichtshof, and I am tempted. If I agree (and it's true I've had a little too much travel) may I call on you then?

With respectful greetings, yours,

Thomas Mann (Author's translation.)

The only direct comment we have by Freud on Mann's essay is contained in a letter to Lou Andreas-Salomé, July 28, 1929. '. . . Thomas Mann's essay is no doubt quite an honour. He gives me the impression of having just completed an essay on romanticism when he was asked to write about me, and so he applied a veneer, as the cabinetmaker says, of psychoanalysis to the front and the back of this essay: the bulk of it is of a different wood. Nevertheless, whenever Mann says something it is pretty sound' *(3,* p. 390*)*. While these words express respect for Mann's intellect and scholarship, they also convey a certain pique at the secondary place ascribed to psychoanalysis in relation to philosophy.

When did the first face-to-face meeting of the two men take place? Jones reports that Mann's first visit with Freud did not take place until March 17, 1932. He writes that 'Freud at once got on intimate terms with him [Mann]: "What he had to say was very understanding: it gave the impression of a background." His [Freud's] wife and her sister, who were enthusiastic readers of Mann, were still more delighted. Mann's association with the Hanse Towns was an additional link' *(11,* p. 170*)*. The *Neue Freie Presse* reported Mann as saying: 'I was very pleased to talk again to the great investigator and to find

him intellectually as lively as ever. To my question whether he is satisfied with the triumph of his life's work and feels happy, Professor Freud answered he had to suffer too bitterly for this good fortune. I made the claim to Sigmund Freud that the seed which he planted years ago had grown by today to a tree whose shadow covered the whole world—a fact which surely must fill him with satisfaction, which he finally admitted' *(23)*. This newspaper article would indicate that Mann had talked with Freud before, but no record of an earlier visit can be found. It may have taken place in 1930 when Mann had asked for permission to call on Freud.

The next reference to the personal relationship is a letter of Freud to Mann in honor of the latter's sixtieth birthday, in June 1935. In this letter Freud calls himself one of Mann's 'oldest' readers and admirers. He ends the letter: '. . . in the name of countless numbers of your contemporaries I wish to express the confidence that you will never do or say anything—an author's words, after all, are deeds—that is cowardly or base, and that even at a time which blurs judgment you will choose the right way and show it to others' *(3,* p. 423*)*. Freud tells Arnold Zweig (May 2, 1935) that he composed this letter at the suggestion of the ***Fischer Verlag*** and into it 'slipped a warning which I trust will not go unnoticed' *(3,* p. 425*)*.

At this point Thomas Mann was already in political exile from Germany, yet it sounds as if Freud expresses here a measure of distrust. This is not astonishing when one considers that many liberal intellectuals in Europe shared this distrust of Mann's political positions. It originated in the days of World War I when Mann expressed himself quite enthusiastically in support of Imperial Germany's cause. His views and his at times passionate anti-Western and anti-liberal feelings are recorded in Mann's essays of this period, Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, 1918. It is of interest that because of these ideas a serious rift developed between Thomas Mann and his older brother, Heinrich, an eminent German novelist himself and always unequivocally aligned with the large group of

European pacifist writers. The two brothers did not speak to each other for years, but carried on a bitter literary polemic. When Thomas Mann, after the German defeat, came out in support of the Weimar Republic he was accused in many quarters of political opportunism. Many readers of The Magic Mountain still thought they found support for their suspicions in the book. They were dismayed at its resolution with the hero returning from Switzerland to Germany to fight in the war. They believed that the debates between Settembrini and Naphtha represented the respective ideologies of the two Mann brothers. Some even thought that the choice of the half-Polish, half-Jewish sounding name of Krokowski for the psychoanalyst in the book was a subtle manifestation of anti-Semitism.

Did Freud feel this? As one examines the communications between Freud and Mann, one is forced to conclude that their friendship did not extend beyond the limits of respect, formality, and a certain self-consciousness. This becomes particularly apparent in a comparison with the exchange of letters between Freud and Arnold Zweig, another major literary figure. Those letters exude warmth and intimacy.

This brings us to the high point of the relationship between Freud and Mann: Freud's eightieth birthday in 1936, when Mann came to Vienna to honor Freud with his important essay, Freud and the Future *(19)*. Mann discusses the relationship of creative literature and psychoanalysis and reiterates much of what he said already in his first Freud essay in 1929 and to which Freud reacted so wryly. The emphasis is given to Freud's precursors. 'Sigmund Freud took the path alone without knowing that reinforcement and encouragement lay to his hand in literature. . . . Freud did not know Nietzsche . . . Novalis . . . Kierkegaard . . . Schopenhauer. . . . Probably it must be so.' Does Mann sound incredulous?

Freud had stated explicitly in his autobiographical study that he 'carefully avoided any contact with philosophy proper. This avoidance has been greatly facilitated by constitutional incapacity. . . . The large extent to which psycho-analysis coin-

cides with the philosophy of Schopenhauer . . . is not to be traced to my acquaintance with his teaching. I read Schopenhauer very late in my life. Nietzsche, another philospher whose guesses and intuitions often agree in the most astonishing way with the laborious findings of psycho-analysis, was for a long time avoided by me on that very account; I was less concerned with the question of priority than with keeping my mind unembarrassed' *(6,* p. 59*)*.

It must be in response to this paragraph that Mann in his essay goes on to 'indulge on this festive occasion in a little polemic against Freud himself. He does not esteem philosophy very highly', whereas Mann believes 'that in actual fact philosophy ranks before and above the natural sciences . . . one might strain the point and say that science has never made a discovery without being authorized and encouraged thereto by philosophy'.

It is also worth mentioning that this 'little polemic' is inserted into a paragraph in which C. G. Jung, 'an able but somewhat ungrateful scion of the Freudian school', is given considerable appreciation. 'Nobody has focused so sharply as he [Jung], the Schopenhauer-Freud perception that "the giver of all given conditions resides in ourselves".'

If Freud reacted to this polemic we have no record of it. I am tempted to suggest that a second memory failure found in Freud's letter may betray the presence of a reaction. When describing the family constellation of Napoleon, Freud writes: 'In a Corsican family the privilege of the eldest is guarded with particularly sacred awe. (I think Alphonse Daudet once described this in a novel. In *Le Nabob*? Or am I mistaken? Was it in some other book? In Balzac?)' *(3,* p. 432*)*. Freud is in fact partially mistaken. The Nabob is not Corsican himself, but by using dishonest means furthers his social ambitions in Paris by getting himself elected deputy from Corsica. But Freud is right and demonstrates his fantastic memory in that Daudet *(2)* does mention the right of primogeniture in this context and in the same sentence tells that the Nabob's oldest brother was sent to Paris and 'had started with four or five marshal

batons in his trunk'—a figure of speech generally associated with Napoleon.

That Freud should have thought of Daudet at the beginning of this communication to Mann cannot be without significance. Not only is Daudet one of the first, if not the first prominent literary man with whom Freud had a personal encounter during his stay in Paris, but a parapraxis involving the novel, *Le Nabob,* played a part in Freud's life before and was subjected by him to a careful analysis published in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. I suspect that the association to that particular piece of self-analysis is the reason for Daudet's appearance and the uncertainty about the correctness of the quotation in this particular letter to Mann. Freud states: '. . . in Paris where I frequently walked about the streets, lonely and full of longings, greatly in need of a helper and protector, until the great Charcot took me into his circle. Later I more than once met the author of *Le Nabob* in Charcot's house. . . . But the irritating part of it is that there is scarcely any group of ideas to which I feel so antagonistic as that of being someone's protégé. . . . I have always felt an unusually strong urge "to be the strong man myself" ' *(5,* p. 149*)*.

I think Mann's implied assertion that Freud made his discoveries by being authorized and encouraged thereto by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche touched on precisely this group of ideas to which he feels so antagonistic. Perhaps this contributed to Freud's unconscious conflict about making Mann a present of his brilliant interpretation of Napoleon.

But much of what Mann says in his essay must have had great interest and appeal for Freud, particularly when Mann speaks about his own work, especially his mythological novel, Joseph and His Brothers. Like Mann, Freud himself was then engaged in writing a work about a mythical figure from the Old Testament and we have some evidence that he drew comparisons between himself and Thomas Mann. When he first mentioned his Moses work to Arnold Zweig in September of 1934 he said, '. . . my essay received the title: The Man Moses, a Historical Novel' *(3,* p. 421*)*. Two months later, however, he

wrote to Eitingon: 'I am not good at historical romances. Let us leave them to Thomas Mann' *(11,* p. 194*)*. The difference in form between Mann's Joseph and Freud's Moses is undoubtedly characteristic of a difference between the two men.

Mann is generous in acknowledging his debt to Freud and psychoanalysis as he discusses the development of his understanding of myth and 'lived *vita*—life as succession, as a moving in other's steps, as identification'.

> The typical is actually the mythical and one may as well say 'lived myth' as 'lived life'. . . . It is plain to me that when as a novelist I took the step in my subject matter from the bourgeois and individual [Buddenbrooks, Magic Mountain] to the mythical and typical [Joseph] my personal connection with the analytic field passed into its acute stage. The mythical interest is as native to psychoanalysis as the psychological interest is to all creative writing. Its penetration into the childhood of the individual soul is at the same time a penetration into the childhood of mankind, into the primitive and mythical. . . . The myth is the foundation of life; it is the timeless schema, the pious formula into which life flows when it reproduces its traits out of the unconscious. . . . Certainly when a writer has acquired the habit of regarding life as mythical and typical there comes a curious heightening of his artist temper, a new refreshment to his perceiving and shaping powers. . . . What is gained is an insight into the higher truth depicted in the actual; . . . a knowledge of the schema in which and according to which the supposed individual lives, unaware, in his naïve belief in himself as unique in space and time, of the extent to which his life is but formula and repetition and his path marked out for him by those who trod it before him. His character is a mythical role which the actor just emerged from the depths to the light plays in the illusion that it is his own and unique, that he, as it were, has invented it all himself . . . *(19)*.

The reader who is interested in the unconscious communications cannot help wondering whether this thought is not behind Mann's insistence to link Freud to the romantic philos-

ophers and whether Freud's unconscious reaction manifested itself in the parapraxis.

The final portion of Mann's essay is an expression of the author's appreciation of psychoanalysis and the conviction that its teachings will lead to a wiser and freer humanity in the future. Freud then reciprocates generously with his demonstration of the applicability of Mann's thesis of the 'lived myth' to the life of Napoleon.

With this intellectual exchange on Freud's eightieth birthday the Mann-Freud relationship reached its zenith. Mann visited Freud once more in January of 1937 and in February of the same year joined vain efforts with Romain Rolland to win a Nobel prize for Freud. The last recorded communication is a congratulatory telegram from Mann on the occasion of Freud's birthday in 1939, a few months before his death. It is noteworthy that in 1943 Mann chose to write a novella entitled *Das Gesetz (20).* This is the story of Moses, the subject of Freud's last book, Moses and Monotheism *(9),* which put forward his controversial theory that Moses was an Egyptian. Moses and Monotheism was one of the important source books in Mann's research. Perhaps it is characteristic of Mann's relationship to Freud and psychoanalysis that he made his Moses half Egyptian and half Jewish.

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Leon J. Saul

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INNER SUSTAINMENT: THE CONCEPT[1]

BY LEON J. SAUL, M.D. (PHILADELPHIA)

This paper attempts to bring into focus something well known to every analyst. Psychoanalysis involves an understanding of the patient and a use of this understanding to help the patient resolve his problems. We have long known that a patient can be internally sustained or unsustained. Awareness of this is of value as it provides clearer insight for analyst and patient into the concept of inner sustainment and into the ego's strengths and weaknesses in dealing with it.

CLINICAL CASES

A Jewish refugee from Holland had no home and no family; his father, mother, and sister were long since dead. He had a partial scholarship in a Midwestern school and supplemented this by working as a waiter and at other odd jobs. He was so poor that for some periods he lived only on bananas. Yet he did outstandingly well in his studies, and made Phi Beta Kappa. Moreover, he participated in the college theatrical group, had dates, and was popular with students of both sexes and with the faculty. He continued thus through law school. Upon graduation he married and five years later was well established in his profession and happy with his wife and two children. Where did he get his strength and confidence?

His father and sister had died in an automobile accident when he was four years old. Thereafter his mother had had to work long hours, and he helped increasingly with the housework. As soon as he was old enough he was sent on errands; he learned to tidy up, to clean, to cook, to shop. He had playmates and friends, and visited back and forth. His mother loved him

From the Department of Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania, and the Institute of the Pennsylvania Hospital, Philadelphia.

[1] In his paper, immediately following this presentation, Dr. Henri Parens discusses the metapsychological considerations of inner sustainment.

wisely. She provided unquestioning love and all the security she could, combined with safety and freedom. Therefore he felt loved and protected but still free and independent. In his mind there grew and became consolidated the image of a loving, tolerant, permissive mother who had confidence in him and in his judgment and ability to carry responsibility. This served him well; it saved his life. When he was twelve years old the Nazis overran Europe, and he and his mother were herded into a detention camp. His resourceful mother instructed him how to escape and where to go, and he obeyed her suggestions. His mother was taken to a camp in Germany and was never heard from again. The boy found persons who got him to the United States.

His symptoms from this experience were a degree of preoccupation with the Nazis and anxiety. The anxiety, which was not enough to interfere with his daily living, stemmed from anger because of a continuing sense of lack of loving support after the sudden premature loss of his mother. Clinically this looked like a traumatic neurosis *(2)*; the anxiety diminished rapidly upon analysis.

He had the usual emotional tensions and problems from which few human beings are free, but no more than most people, perhaps even less. His inner security and confidence saw him through dangers and difficulties, and his self-image never wavered. He felt that he was a good, sound person, as able as the next, and capable of doing what needed to be done and of meeting situations as they arose. He was sustained from within by the continuing image in his mind formed early by the love from his father, sister, and mother. His help with the problems of living had won his mother's admiring approval. He could escape from a concentration camp and make his way alone in a foreign land, but he was not truly alone for in his mind was the sustaining image of his loving, intelligently permissive mother. By expecting this attitude from others, he made friends. Feeling loved, he loved others; hence they responded with warmth to him. He was devoted to several older men and

women who were good, admired friends.

The man's story demonstrates the fundamental importance of a good, loving, encouraging image of parents—an image formed by experience from birth through early childhood.

The opposite kind of person, the unsustained, are many. Their backgrounds in childhood vary in detail: 'Father died and mother worked. She did a good job, but never let us forget that she was a martyr, that she was sacrificing herself for us.'—'I felt that I was just supposed to be good and not cause any trouble, that mother would have been happier if I were not there.'—'Father worked hard and wasn't around much. Mother didn't care too much for any of us, but liked me the least.'—'Recently father told me I was his favorite, but he never treated me that way. I felt as though he treated me like some business associate of his.'—'Father was very friendly and nice to me but was constantly being criticized and torn down by mother. I was too. Sometimes she'd let fly the most devastating criticism as though nothing I did was right. Then she'd make up and be loving again. It tore me apart. I never knew where I stood and I never could stop hoping and trying to keep her loving me.'—'My parents had their troubles with each other. They sent me off to school, maybe to get me out of their hair. But then they never cared. I wrote them my problems and they never bothered to answer; or if they did, they didn't help but as much as told me to manage somehow and not bother them.'—'I felt sort of loved, but dispensable.' And so on.

Some patients are quite aware of these feelings; others express them only with anguish after much analytic work. Many are intelligent, healthy, and attractive, but they feel unloved and unlovable, insecure, unsure of themselves in work and with people. One young man, a junior in college, said: 'I can't study. Some kind of personal problems get in the way. I have a constant feeling of failure in academic things. And I can't get on with people. I rarely can get close to anyone and if I do, then I fight with them.' Some of these people seek love and closeness through the sexual act.

A girl of well-to-do family with every advantage felt equally lost and inadequate at school, in studies, and socially. Beautiful and wealthy, she attracted many beaux, and this was her one consolation, her one way of feeling that she was lovable and acceptable. She married and had two children, but her troubles deepened as she began to feel toward her husband as she felt toward her mother. Although potentially very capable, she was inadequate emotionally. If the furnace sputtered, she panicked and called in her neighbor for help. She lacked self-confidence to such a degree that she developed a common symptom—fear of being alone. It was a wrench when her husband left for work in the morning, and she tried to prevent his leaving her unless she knew where he was at every moment of the day and was sure that her near neighbors would be in. When I saw her she would not drive a car. On one occasion she went to the nearby shopping center and became panic-stricken because her husband left her alone in the supermarket while he stopped in the adjacent drugstore.

This is like the behavior of a young child. While the adult part of such people is fully capable, there is no emotional support within—no expression of love and no self-confidence. The parents' attitudes and feelings are felt about the self—feelings of being rejected, neglected, criticized, unaccepted, unsupported. There is no feeling of being sustained from within. Such partial rejection, insufficient love and acceptance during childhood continue in one's inner feelings and creep into every relationship with others. One expects that every relationship will sooner or later become like the original one with parents. This certainty of eventual disapproval and rejection is fought off in many ways: it is often hidden under a mask of gaiety, a euphoria, to cover the inner depression at feeling unvalued.

The consequences of all this are so typical as to form an almost mathematical progression. The first reaction is the same as to any threat or frustration: solve it by flight or fight. Flight means a withdrawal from people, from closeness, from responsibilities. Fight creates anger, either open or repressed. The

anger usually has two results. First, it causes guilt and thereby self-injurious behavior—'I always seem to get myself into hot water', as one young man said. 'Oh, I don't blame him for leaving me; I drove him away, I drove him away. It's my own fault, I did it, I did it', wailed a young woman when her husband left her and their three children. Second, the chronic undercurrent of anger and guilt, and an unsupporting superego, lead to anxiety, often a nameless dread, without content.

If one compares the two cases in this note, the implications for treatment are obvious. In the first patient, who was internally sustained, there was some problem with his dependent needs for love and with narcissistic competition, which derived from the loss of parental support before puberty, from the premature requirements for independence, and from the wish to continue as the only child in a world of competitors. But here the analysis could proceed rapidly and successfully because of the firm foundation of the personality upon the loving, giving, tolerant, confidence-imparting maternal superego. The dependence on the analyst, the identification with him, the wishes for his love and approval, the competition and hostility toward him, were all moderate in degree. The basic background of transference in which the analysis progressed was that of the child to his supporting maternal superego. This *basic transference* repeats the central dynamics, continued from childhood, and determines the atmosphere and dynamics of the treatment.

In the second case, the internally unsustained woman, there was a hollowness or softness—a feeling of being insufficiently loved and wanted; a lack of confidence in the self because there had been deficient experience with loving, respecting parents who had confidence in her during early childhood.

A person unsustained feels alone even with friends and often has agoraphobia, anthropophobia, and general fears and anxieties because of an unsupporting superego that imparts no self-confidence. He feels inadequate to life and its problems and challenges. Out of this insecurity and sense of inadequacy, he

clings desperately to whomever can give him acceptance, guidance, and leadership. His excessive needs for dependence and love and his inner emotional inadequacy render him supersensitive to frustration. Any sudden problem, even a minor nuisance, or slight to his self-esteem, any hint of disapproval or rejection, stirs up anxiety and therefore anger. Hence there is chronic anger and usually guilt from this. The person is demanding, clinging, and hostile and feels guilty toward those to whom these feelings come out in behavior. This anger and guilt add to the anxiety from the lack of a supporting superego, and usually cause masochistic, self-injurious behavior.

THERAPY

In treatment, the transference of the unsustained person may rise far above what is optimal in intensity because of the exaggerated needs for dependence and love, whether they are strongly erotized or not, because of hostility, guilt, and masochism, and because of envy. But this is not the main problem in therapy if one is to deal with the core of the difficulty. The analyst not only has to alter the balance of forces as with a secure person but, with the unsustained, he must try to build a personality from that which was insufficient and minimal. Of course, there is always some degree of inner sustainment. Otherwise an individual would not have sufficient strength to be carrying on at all in life, or to be in analytic treatment. Nevertheless therapy must build up something from a minimal amount, not just alter the balance of forces; it must build a proper, supportive superego almost from scratch.

For this task, the emotional attitude of the analyst, always of fundamental importance, becomes vital and crucial for treatment. The internally strong can withstand much; the unsustained are terribly vulnerable and can be seriously damaged rather than helped by the scalpel of analysis if it is not used supportively, ego-syntonically *(1, 3)*. We now know that analysis is a potent instrument that can damage as well as save. There is no such thing as the analyst's having no attitude. If he is formal and distant, that is an attitude. If he is silent for long

periods, this is potent silence; one patient takes it as assent and support, another as censure and disapprobation, another as lack of interest. The patient with an unsustaining superego will interpret the analyst's attitude in terms of his needs, of his parental imagos and identifications, of his superego. A young man came to see me in a pitiful state. He had had a year and a half of analysis. 'My analyst', he said, 'is right in everything he tells me; but I just can't take it any more. The analysis is beating me down. What he says is true—but it makes me feel I am a hopeless child, that I'm infantile, that I'm inadequate and full of anger. I felt this myself before seeing him. And I know I'm terribly dependent. I can't stand being alone. But hammering at all this makes me feel worse and worse.'

This illustrates our point precisely. After this young man lost his father at the age of three, his mother had had to work part time. It was too much for her. He was a nuisance to her. He felt this, felt that he was only tolerated, that she would have preferred it if he were not there, and that he was expected simply to be good and not make trouble. The dynamics were clear and simple, but therapy was extremely difficult, for this was a 'hollow man', lacking in inner sustainment. The analyst had to be accurate in reading his associations, in interpreting his dreams, in understanding what the patient's unconscious was saying. But he had to communicate this in an understanding, supportive, ego-building way, and not make his insight into the infantile roots of the problem come through to the patient as examples of the patient's childish qualities. His analyst had been trying, by correct interpretation of the infantile alone, to encourage the patient to drop these attitudes. But this focus on the infantile made the patient feel disparaged and rejected, as in his childhood.

For the unsustained, the analyst must provide the experience which the patient lacked in childhood: that of having an interested, sympathetic, understanding person always available in his life. Without such an attitude, technically correct interpretations may be interpreted by the patient as disapproval. Accurate interpretations also require an attitude of human under-

standing, of being on the patient's side, of having confidence in him. The patient must be shown his mature strengths and capacities. The analyst's confidence is partly internalized and can move even the 'hollow' ones in the direction of a sense of sustainment, of identity, a good self-image and self-acceptance.

SUMMARY

A young man won through in life against serious dangers and disadvantages. He was internally sustained by the continuance in his mind, in his feelings, his self-image, his relations with others because of the love, confidence, and tolerance of his mother during his early years. In contrast, others with every external advantage but with a lack of parental sustenance in early life remain unsustained in facing even the most protected lives. In the unsustained the consequences are usually fight-flight reactions to the fear, frustration, and hurt self-esteem arising from impaired maturing,—flight causing regression and withdrawal from people and responsibilities; fight causing anger, guilt, and behavior injurious to self and others. Both fight and flight, aggression and regression, generate anxiety in a vicious circle. The anger, however, may contribute to a 'fighting spirit', a great ally in therapy. A person may be internally sustained but feel emotionally incapable, from overprotection or other causes. The analyst who perceives that a patient is sustained or unsustained can better help the patient to outgrow childhood attitudes toward self and others, to build up an adequate superego, and to develop a more mature sense of his identity, ability, and value.

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Henri Parens

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INNER SUSTAINMENT: METAPSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

BY HENRI PARENS, M.D. (PHILADELPHIA)

Saul suggests that the organism's well-being is determined largely by what we may call inner sustainment. Inner sustainment results from the dynamic and economic state within the psychic organization that leads to feeling loved and supported from within. This quality of inner sustainment, or its lack, is derived predominantly from early experiences. Saul holds, perhaps more than others, that in emotional disorders, evidence for hereditary or chemical factors is at present inadequate and that errors in upbringing—from conception onward—and experiences with the objects in the environment are the critical cause of the psychic conflicts that plague the emotionally disturbed *(32)*.[1]

From clinical data, Saul suggests that inner sustainment results from the qualities of internal representations, or introjections and identifications that occur early and influence the character of psychic functioning and object-relations. He writes, 'He was internally sustained by the continuance in his mind . . . his self-image, his relations with others, . . . of the love, confidence, and tolerance of his mother'. In The Ego and the Id, Freud writes: '. . . the effects of the first identifications made in earliest childhood will be general and lasting' *(12,* p. 31*)*. Mahler similarly refers to the residue of the mother-child relationship that remains at the core of the psychic life of the organism *(23, 24)*. Novey addresses himself most directly to this thesis: the subject's 'inner experiences of . . . objects (i.e., their internal representations) is . . . of prime significance in determining—his degree of internal comfort' *(25,* p. 60*)*.

[1] See his extensive review of the literature on this issue that takes into account studies by six different methods *(35)*.

The internal representation may be understood, as Sandler, et al., *(30, 31)* describe it, as a modifiable schema constructed over a long time out of a multitude of impressions, images, affects, and events. It is the psychic representation of the inner and outer worlds as perceived by the subject. There are representations of objects, self, and psychic experience (events) which are represented as they are perceived, with affective coloring, within an action content, and with variable degrees of cathexis. The internal representation is a product and not a process (see Waelder, *38,* p. 418). The exchange of 'cathexis with psychic energy' in object relations takes place on the internal representations of the external object and the self *(36, 25,* p. 62*)*.

The processes that introduce the representations into the psychic organization (internalization [*20*]) and that act upon and integrate these representations (identification and introjection) into psychic structure and self-concepts, may be called the assimilative processes, as this term is used by Brody and Mahoney *(4)*.[2]

Contributions to inner sustainment come from interrelated sources within the psychic organization:

1. The characteristics of internal representations that result from the character of experiences and object relations, as well as the character of assimilations of these representations (by identification and introjection) into the psychic organization. Upon these depend: (a) the status of separation-individuation (Mahler) which evolves epigenetically about the nuclear elements of basic trust, differentiations of self from object, self and object constancy, and identity formations; and, (b) the character of structural differentiation, of structural functioning, and of structural content.

2. The quality of development of autonomous and conflict-free ego functioning to age-appropriate competence which contributes to self-confidence, to the character of self-concepts, and to individuation.

[2] See also, Sandler, *29*.

3. The presence of residual infantile, and perhaps current, intrapsychic conflict, particularly ego-superego tensions leading to shame or guilt, with resultant loss of self-esteem or threat of loss of love from the superego *(16, 27)*.

Inner sustainment is subject to regression depending on the stresses that impinge on the psychic organization, on its areas of specific vulnerability *(32, 34)* coming from the drives and the environment. Moreover, the degree of inner sustainment is dependent on the level of development of the psychic organization. There is an age-adequate *(8, 9)* spectrum of feeling sustained from within in balance with the expectation of sustainment from without.

GENETIC CONSIDERATIONS

Inner sustainment at all ages depends on the character of internal representations, the actions of the assimilative processes, and ultimately the character these impart to ego and to superego functioning as well as to self-concepts and identity-formation. At the core of inner sustainment is one of its genetically fundamental ego qualities, basic trust *(7)*, which arises from the earliest life experiences. Essentially the term is the equivalent of 'confidence' used earlier by Benedek *(3)*. Erikson believes that basic trust or mistrust is the outcome of the psychosocial crisis of the first year of life, and the intrapsychic consequences of this outcome, this ego quality, are of prime importance to inner sustainment. If early life experiences include a large proportion of interactions with competent, loving, realistically tolerant parents who respect the individuality of the child, the psychic representations of the parents, the self, and the experiences will generally have these characteristics *(2, 3)*, and here basic trust evolves. If such experiences have been hostile and ungratifying, the internal representations will have these characteristics, and basic trust will be poor.

The internal representations and assimilative processes are essential to two major interrelated developmental processes:

1. *Separation-individuation.* The sense of basic trust is important to the child's capacity to accept the reality that the omnipotent symbiosis with the mother cannot be maintained and that he cannot always be sustained by her. As Erikson remarks: 'It is against the . . . impressions of having been deprived, . . . divided . . . abandoned . . . that basic trust must be established and maintained *(7,* pp. 60-61*).* Mahler and her co-workers carry this process further by their observations and formulations of separation-individuation *(22, 23, 24, 28).* Stabilization of object representations makes possible, and leads to, object constancy *(19, 22, 23, 24),* that is, to stable mental representations of the love object who is thus not lost to the ego, nor to the self, when the object is physically absent. The ego sustained from within by the 'good' object-representation further secures its quality of basic trust. The phase of separation-individuation achieves its goal with the attainment of object constancy *(23, 24),* and object constancy is nuclear to inner sustainment. Identification with the object-representations is particularly relevant to the stabilization of self-representation and thence to identity-formation. Both object constancy, with stable object representations, and beginning identity-formation, with stabilizing self-representation, facilitate the process of individuation.

2. *Differentiation of Psychic Structure.* Freud formulated the relevance of introjections and identifications to the character of ego functioning. In The Ego and the Id he states that identification (by which an object cathexis is replaced in the ego) 'has a great share in determining the form taken by the ego and . . . it makes an essential contribution towards building up what is called its "character". . . . . the process, especially in the early phases of development, is a very frequent one, and it makes it possible to suppose that the character of the ego . . . contains the history of those object-choices' *(12,* pp. 28, 29*).* Thus is the genetic relevance of the processes of introjection and identification to structural differentiation highlighted. Freud had, of course, brought attention to these assimilative

processes earlier, particularly in Mourning and Melancholia *(10)* and in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego *(11)*, but it was not until the structural theory was spelled out that their genetic relevance to psychic structure could be appreciated. We emphasize here the importance of the qualities of the internal representations which by assimilation into structure act upon and influence the ego's inherent tendencies.

Freud also spells out the genetic relevance of identifications to the formation of the superego. Referring to the origin of the superego, he states: '. . . for behind it there lies hidden an individual's first and most important identification, his identification with the father in his own personal prehistory. [And] . . . the object-choices belonging to the first sexual period and relating to the father and mother seem normally to find their outcome in an identification . . . and would . . . reinforce the primary one' *(12,* p. 31*)*. It is clear that Freud sees the superego as differentiated from the ego by 'the forming of a precipitate in the ego' consisting of the identifications with both the mother and the father (p. 34). These identifications, 'the representative of our relation to our parents' (p. 36), provide models and the patterns for the critical, moral functions of the superego, those of the loving, supportive superego and those of the ego-ideal.

Thus we can suggest the relation of internalization and assimilation of early life experiences into psychic structure to the quality of inner sustainment. The patterns of parental interactions with the self are taken into the ego and thence also into the superego; the qualities of these internalized interactions will appear in the character of the functions of the ego and the superego. Thus for the usual child with average maturational and developmental capacity the degree and quality to which he was sustained from without by his parents will by internalization and assimilation become the degree and quality to which he is sustained from within. (Although we have oversimplified issues to make our point, we do not underestimate

other factors also operative in development, such as the influence of intrapsychic conflict, or the character of the drives upon structural differentiation and functioning.)

Briefly then, the basic characteristics of the ego, as well as of the superego, are determined, to a greater or lesser degree, by the nature of internal representations as these are assimilated into psychic structure. We assume, on the other hand, that the young ego does to some degree determine the character of the introjection and identification processes and their results, at first by its own inherent characteristics and limitations *(12, 14, 17, 18, 19)*, and then, as the ego develops, by its own tendencies and capabilities to accept or reject certain experiences and object characteristics.

With further differentiation of psychic structure, assimilation of new internal representations and identifications, not necessarily new objects, continues and with entry into latency the architectural framework of the psychic organization is set. Much, however, has yet to impinge on that structure; new events, new object relations, massive upsurges of libidinal drives, remarkable development of ego functioning and ego skills. Changes in internal representations prevail well into adulthood and continue to modify the intrapsychic agencies *(1, 11, 15, 25, 38)* and resultant inner sustainment.

DYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS

Intrapsychic structure functions and develops at all times by the principle of multiple function *(37)*. The functions of the ego and the superego in interaction with nuclear components of the self (internal representations and identity formations) will at a given point in time yield the quality of inner sustainment. At any particular age, separation-individuation as well as ego[3] and later superego differentiations are only as suc-

[3] We are simplifying to present clearly our thesis. We suspect that constitutionally defective ego apparatuses are less capable of realistic internalizations and identifications than are ego apparatuses that function normally.

cessful and stable as the introjections and identifications. With reference to separation-individuation it means the ability to survive in comfort, without undue anxiety, in the absence of the mother. The child now can be alone in 'external' reality, as the ego holds self and object representations within *(39)*. The child has achieved self-reliance adequate to his age. As ego functions develop, competence and self-confidence develop with experiences of mastery in an atmosphere of relative stability, love, and well-being.

The internal representations and the assimilative processes not only contribute to the characteristics of ego and superego functioning; to a large degree they determine also the character of identity-formations. These in turn stand in a reciprocal relation to inner sustainment. The sense of the self, the concepts one holds of oneself, are subject to the value one places on oneself. Genetically this comes largely from the value objects place on the subject. If one thinks well of oneself, if one has a reasonable degree of self-confidence, one tends to trust one's judgment and decisions, one's taste and ideas. Of course, self-esteem and superego function enter here as well. How well one achieves an approximation to one's ego ideal is dependent upon the ego quality of self-confidence.

Achievements and goals for the self are determined by internal representations and idealized self-representations as they are influenced by the compromise formations between environmental expectations and the pressure of drive derivatives *(30)*. As development progresses, the ego ideal is modified by later identification *(16)*. It holds up the compromise formations of the ideal self *(30)*; and the discrepancy between the ego ideal and the ego *(27)*, 'between the self-representation and the wishful concept of the self' *(21,* p. 131*)*, determine the status of self-esteem. Self-esteem in turn is a prime contributor to the status of inner sustainment—a supply of love from within.

The assimilative processes impinging on the ego also provide the precipitates for the superego. As is implied in Freud's

Danger-Situation Series, from latency on, fear of loss of love from the superego is a nodal source of anxiety. Eventually inner sustainment is directly dependent upon the characteristics of the superego in its relations to the ego. If the superego is reasonably benevolent and supportive, inner sustainment is further assured. Following the structural differentiations of the psychic organization of the latency-age child, at any one time the quality and status of feeling sustained will largely depend on the harmony between the ego and the superego as these stand in their relations to the id and reality.

Function improves with age; the psychic organization evolves. The economic and dynamic degree of inner sustainment must also develop if there is to be lessened dependence for support on external sources and improved capacity to be alone with one's internal representations, as Sandler and Winnicott point out. The degree to which the ego is sustained from within determines its capability of dealing with internal and external realities independently, in a way appropriate to the subject's age. With optimal inner sustainment, external deprivations and hazards can be met with optimal stability and the ego can set itself maximally to the task of adaptation. With inner sustainment transiently overtaxed, as by the presence of stress *(32, 34)*, the ego reacts with patterns of fight or flight *(33)*, often regressing to earlier patterns of dependence by turning to external sources for the support it lacks within.

The dynamic state that results from the quality of basic trust, of object constancy and concepts of self, of ego function with self-reliance and competence, of superego support and of self-esteem determines the quality of sustainment from within. Much of the character of these structural functions and qualities comes from the influence of internal representations, of introjections and identifications on the constitutional givens of the individual. Which brings to mind René Dubos's *(5)* recent reminder that the environment determines the phenotypic expression of our genotypic endowment.

TREATMENT

We suggest that increase or decrease in sustainment from within can be affected by changes in internal representations and by synchronous changes in psychic functions that are influenced by these representations and identifications. In 1925, Karl Abraham *(1)*, referring to a menopausal patient, stated that 'we should not overestimate the fixity of character even in later years'. He goes on, 'It was Freud who first pointed out that important changes can take place at any time in the mental make-up of the individual through the process of introjection'. That Abraham is not reflecting only on changes that occur in regression is evident when he says: 'It is . . . worth noticing that husbands and wives who have lived long together tend to resemble one another in character' (p. 412). In discussing superego development, Waelder *(38)* states that after the formation of the superego proper there is a long period of the superego's susceptibility to influence by internalization of new object(s) 'probably lasting till the end of the twenties'. With the final phase of superego development in adulthood, when maximal stability is achieved, he adds, however, changes are possible, by way of analysis, and as in 'persons under hypnosis and in crowds' (p. 438). There is much clinical evidence to suggest the hypothesis that changes in internal representations and their assimilations into structure occur in psychoanalytic treatment. Saul's evidence seems to support this hypothesis; so do cases discussed by Brody *(4)* and Hammerman *(16)*. We remind ourselves, however, of Freud's cautionary remark when speaking of 'the possibility of reviving old conditions [that] not everything can be brought to life again. Some changes seem to be definitive . . .' *(13,* p. 154*)*. This caution is repeated with even greater deliberation in Analysis Terminable and Interminable *(14)*.

We assume that changes in cathexis of internal representations may continue to effect changes in structure. Novey addresses himself to this issue: 'When we speak of the significant

social units; but it permits a larger number of permutations and integrates larger populations. In each of the systems and subsystems, kinship terms and relationships—together with the related rules of descent, residence, inheritance, etc.—point to prescribed and proscribed marriages.

The *structural* analysis of kinship is scientifically valuable, and it has been carried into other areas: linguistics, mythology, ritual, symbolism, clothing and fashions, cooking, etc. In every instance the results, no matter how instructive, describe the rules of communication, but not its contents or dynamics. A structural analysis of the *rules* of baseball, or poker, will doubtless reveal an underlying system of exchange, reciprocity, alliance, and communication; but it will fall frustratingly short of what the game is all about to the participants and spectators.

And, inevitably, structuralism is limited to a demonstration of the bipolar opposites which it finds in every system, from mythology to cooking: society, nature; sacred, profane; hot, cold; wet, dry; cooked, raw. These typologies or dichotomies may be valuable as logical constructs and sorting devices, but they are both self-propelling and self-limiting.

The limitations of the method are most clearly seen in the problem of incest avoidance. To Lévi-Strauss, 'Incest is socially absurd before it is morally culpable'. The reverse can also be argued, and there is no reason to postulate an unbridgeable dichotomy. The incest taboos, by creating alliances between social groups, are socially beneficial, but these social benefits can also be seen as secondary gains, not primary determinants. Exchange and reciprocity have an important function, and especially in nonmarket economies. Man is a gregarious animal, but not all that social and rational. Lévi-Strauss emphasizes the positive, rational, and socially cohesive aspects of kinship; and he sees these as more important than the negative, if inevitably complementary, incest taboos. For all their symmetry and logic, the kinship systems—like this masterful book—derive from a vaguely metaphysical antagonism between society and nature.

This is an important and difficult book. Psychoanalytic readers with more than a casual interest in anthropology will find it challenging and rewarding.

S. H. POSINSKY (NEW YORK)

and observing functions of the more differentiated ego obtain greater autonomy from conflict and infantile patterns of function, archaic internal representations found not to fit the actual objects and self become less imperative; changes result in the hierarchy of internal representations (i.e., of their cathexes). Therewith changes in identifications occur as well.

3. In the transference, the archaic representations in their constellations of conflict are relived, made conscious and after re-evaluation are reinternalized again and again. Such serial processes lead to serial changes in internal representations of former actual objects and object relations (parents, etc,). Similarly, serial changes in self-representations by serial identifications with the more recent object-representations occur.

4. The analyst and the analytic setting become significantly cathected and thereby become part of internal representations *(25)*. Internal representations and identification with the analyst come from at least two related sources within the transference: (a) Those associated with the transference neurosis per se; the analyst is the object upon whom the archaic representations are displaced or projected. From him, in turn, recent and modified object-representations are reinternalized. (b) Those derived from the termination of the analytic relationship which is viewed as object loss, as a mourning process (Ferenczi so described it, according to Ekstein [*16*]); the termination may be more generally a working-through of the original separation from the mother or both parents.

These types of loss are metapsychologically related to each other: in both occur assimilations of, and identifications with, the representations of the object from whom the separation is taking place.

The transference neurosis develops as a result of the displacement of internal representations, and their respective cathexes, of former objects upon internal representations of the analyst and the analytic situation. Perhaps we should reserve the term displacement, as suggested by Jacobson *(21)*, for shifts in cathexes from former to contemporary object-rep-

resentations, and speak of externalization for internal representations of former objects that are cast upon the analyst (i.e., from object to object).[4] The analysand's internal representations of the analyst are not true to the actual object; it is rather, as Federn observed *(25)*, the subject's perceptions of the analyst that are internalized. In fact, what is internalized (in effect 're-internalized') comes from the internal representational world, from which it is externalized by allocation of the internal representation, and displacement of its cathexis, onto the analyst. In the transference neurosis, a serial process of 'externalization upon, and displacement onto, the analyst—reinternalization of the representation of the analyst' occurs that leads to modifications in archaic internal representations that influence ego and superego function. It is largely within the ego *(36)*, but also within the actual analytic relationship, that the archaic representations are compared to both the more recent internal representations and the actual self and object (the analyst). We suggest, in agreement with Novey, that it is from such comparisons—if the reality-appraising functions of the ego gain in autonomy over the infantile functional residue —that modifications in internal representations, in identifications (assimilations), and in psychic structure follow.

The idea of serial modifications in cathexis of object-representations and self-representations in analysis is related to an assumption made by Freud in Mourning and Melancholia. He states:

> . . . 'the unconscious (thing-) presentation ["*Dingvorstellung*"] of the object has been abandoned by the libido'. In reality, however, this presentation is made up of innumerable single impressions (or unconscious traces of them), and this withdrawal of libido is not a process that can be accomplished in a moment, but must certainly . . . be one in which progress is long-drawn-out and gradual. . . . In analyses it often becomes evident that first one and then another memory is activated, and that the laments which always sound the same and are wearisome in their monotony never-

[4] Jacobson reserves the term projection for shifts of self-cathexes onto objects.

> theless take their rise each time in some different source. If the object does not possess this great significance for the ego—a significance reinforced by a thousand links—then, too, its loss will not be of a kind to cause either mourning or melancholia. This characteristic of detaching the libido bit by bit is therefore to be ascribed alike to mourning and to melancholia; it is probably supported by the same economic situation and serves the same purposes in both *(10,* p. 256).

Freud is here referring to the same process we have been discussing: the fundamental process of decathexis of the infantile (archaic) psychic representations of the object and of the self. In reactions to object loss and in the analytic process we find the work of decathexis of the psychic representation of the archaic object, an object of 'great significance for the ego—a significance reinforced by a thousand links'. And indeed, it is a process that occurs 'bit by bit'. Of course there are also significant differences between the analytic process of decathexis of archaic psychic representations and that of decathexis of the representation of a suddenly, unexpectedly lost contemporary object of 'great significance for the ego', as occurs in mourning.

We also suggest that the ego and the superego are serially modified in so far as changes in internal representation occur and can effect a relative, synchronous change within ego and superego functioning. Thus, for example, if in the process of analysis hostile internal representations eventually become modified or less imperative, the superego becomes less hostile, structural conflicts between the superego and the id and the ego decrease in intensity with the freeing of energies, decrease in guilt, rise in self-esteem, and more. The resultant dynamic shift leads to an increased sense of sustainment from within. We are focusing on but one of the various processes by which psychoanalytic treatment achieves change in inner sustainment. Another, of course, is that of resolution of conflict.

Under what conditions and to what degree can significant changes in ego and superego functioning—and thence inner

sustainment—be effected past adolescence, in young adulthood, and later? When can such changes be effected? What must already exist in actual functioning, in development, for further developmental change to be possible? To what degree does Erikson's postulate of horizontal and longitudinal compensations *(7,* p. 59*)* apply? None of us doubts the complexity of these issues.

There is considerable agreement that from latency and beyond, significant structural changes become very much less. We know that from latency into adolescence important changes do occur and that stabilization of the psychic structure comes about late in adolescence and in young adulthood. Still, we continue to see changes in ourselves when we marry, when we become parents, and later. Erikson has delineated the series of adaptational tasks of the ego. He suggests that the tasks imply intrapsychic activity that must result in inherent personality changes directly referent to sustainment from within, changes due to shifts in cathexes, in object relations, and in psychic functioning. We remind ourselves again that Freud and Abraham suggested years ago that personality changes as the organism matures and ages. Erikson's life chart is based on this concept.

SUMMARY

The paper examines some metapsychological aspects of inner sustainment and its implications for treatment. Internalization of the external environment is of central importance in the development of the organism. That is, separation-individuation and differentiation of psychic structure are given their particular characteristics by the processes whereby the experiences in the external environment—particularly those of the first six years of life—are taken into and form much of the content of the internal environment.

Inner sustainment is the product of 'multiple function' of the psychic organization. The genesis and dynamics of the forces interacting to effect the character of inner sustainment

are delineated. Changes in internal representations by the action of assimilative processes effect changes in psychic structure not only in childhood and adolescence but even in adulthood; and this fact is important for treatment. The character of inner sustainment can be modified by treatment, and well-being increased; treatment can cause development to a greater degree of self-reliance and maturity.

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The Transitional Object and the Creative Act

Arnold H. Modell

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THE TRANSITIONAL OBJECT AND THE CREATIVE ACT

BY ARNOLD H. MODELL, M.D. (BROOKLINE, MASS.)

Freud suggested in Totem and Taboo that the social institutions of primitive man functioned in a manner analogous to the inner reality of modern man; the dread of incest, the intensity of ambivalence, the belief in the omnipotence of thought, which form the rubric of primitive religions, have become the content of inner reality of modern man. Freud said, 'We are thus prepared to find that primitive man transposed the structural conditions of his own mind into the external world . . .' *(3,* p. 91*)*. If Freud was correct, we would expect that the tangible products—that is, the art work associated with man's oldest institution, paleolithic religion, might in some respect be interpreted as the externalization of a process that remains internalized and unconscious in modern man. Jones *(8)* has also recognized the importance of paleolithic art as a tangible expression of the primitive mind. Unfortunately, his comments were based upon questionable archeological data, namely, that the female genitals were portrayed more frequently in the earlier Aurignacian period, while phalli were more frequently used in the later sculpture of the Magdalenian period. There are specific aspects of paleolithic art which, as we shall describe, may be interpreted as these tangible expressions of the psychology of the creative process itself—an externalization of something that remains internal and relatively hidden in modern man.

Paleolithic art, perhaps the oldest known cultural product of Western man, consists not only of cave drawings but also of statuary, sculpture, and engraved ornaments (for a comprehensive inventory, refer to *[12]*). According to recent authorities *(5, 12)* this art existed, with only minor stylistic changes, over a span of time so long that we can apprehend it only with difficulty. The chronology of the art (supported in part by radioactive carbon dating) extends from approximately 30,000 B.C. to approximately 12,000 B.C., a period of nearly 20,000 years.

Within this almost unimaginable period of time there were minor stylistic changes suggesting an evolution of this art from cruder to more sophisticated forms, although the assigning of periods to the stylistic changes remains controversial and a problem for the specialist.

For our purpose it is enough to note that this art is the creation of Homo sapiens, that is, Cro-Magnon man, and not of Neanderthal man who co-existed with him and whom he eventually replaced. The homogeneity of this art, found over a large area of southern Europe, and its great stability suggest that it was part of a nearly indestructible religious institution and is not an expression of man's decorative urge, an example of *homo ludens,* or 'art for art's sake'. The fact that the paintings are relatively inaccessible, found for the most part in deep, dark recesses of limestone caves and that many of them, such as those at Lascaux, appear on the ceilings of the caves which must have presented an extraordinarily difficult task of execution, suggests that the caves were not family dwellings, but instead were sacred shrines for the performance of magical rites. These paintings are described in somewhat greater detail in a recent monograph *(17)* where I speculate on the more general aspects of the symbolism of the paintings, especially in relation to separation anxiety and the fear of death. In this essay I restrict my attention to the very specific characteristics of paleolithic art that suggest a correspondence to Winnicott's concept of the transitional object.

Not infrequently the paleolithic artists made use of the natural geologic formation of the walls, floor, and ceiling of the cave itself. In Altamira rounded protuberances on the ceiling of the cave were covered with paint and transformed into bisons in various postures *(5)*. On the clay floor of the cave at Niaux there are ten round cavities caused by the dripping water. Lines were engraved around the holes to transform the area into the image of a bison. One hole became the pupil of the animal's eye:

and others were elaborated as wounds, when arrows were drawn extending from the hole:

The created and the actual environment interpenetrated.

In Castillo a formation of stalagmites is transformed into the figure of a bison rearing up on its hind quarters. There are many more instances of this process of the interpenetration of reality with the artistic vision. In Pech-Merle a stalagmitic formation is used as the head and trunk of a hairy mammoth and the rest of the animal is completed with a few schematic black strokes. Bulges of rock are transformed into animals, and where the body parts are missing they are completed by the artist with colored paint. It is as if the cave itself and the artists were combined in harmonious collaboration: mother earth fused with the created symbol.

It could be argued that these natural formations merely suggested the animal to the artist, perhaps by means of a kind of eidetic imagery. This suggestion was made by Herbert Read *(19)*.[1] While this is a possible interpretation it is not to be supposed that the use of these natural accidents, or found objects, was caused by a lack of imagination or skill; the modeling of these objects was exquisitely sensitive.

I should like to suggest another interpretation, one in accord with Freud's earlier hypothesis that primitive institutions represent an externalization of inner mental processes; namely, that this interpretation of the symbol and the real world is a tangible expression of the mental process of creation itself. The psychological significance of the use of these 'natural accidents' or 'found objects' of paleolithic art was noted by Fairbairn *(2)*, who interpreted the use of such found objects or real objects, which are now a common element in pop painting and sculpture, as representative of an intermediate point between the attitude of the artist and the beholder. He suggests that 'in so far as the artist is not responsible for the existence of the object, but

[1] After this paper was written I learned that Lewin *(14)* has also interpreted paleolithic art as a type of eidetic image, as an 'image in the head'.

simply "finds" it, he may be said to play the role of a beholder as much as any member of the general public who "finds" such an object in a surrealistic exhibition'.

The notion that there is something intermediate between the attitude of the creator and the beholder approaches Winnicott's concept of the transitional object. The interpenetration of the actual environment—that is, the walls and ceilings of the cave itself—with the created image, may represent an externalization of a psychic process: the child's first creative relationship with the environment, which Winnicott has described as the transitional object and transitional phenomena *(21)*. The created image invests an inanimate object with significance, but the image is not entirely a psychic process: what is created is not an hallucination. The chthonic power of the cave itself has collaborated with the creator to give substance, hardness, and permanence to what is created. By analogy, the transitional object is an object that is part of the environment: it is something—it is not an hallucination—it is an inanimate object that is invested with the qualities of life by the child. It is a thing created by the infant and yet at the same time provided by the environment. As with paleolithic paintings, the inner process interpenetrates the objects of the environment and gives them life.[2]

Winnicott *(21, 22)* also recognizes that in the child's play there are those psychological motives that may have contributed to the origin of culture itself. The mother is the child's first environment, and in the child's later relationship to the inanimate environment are employed those psychological forces that were first used in relation to his human environment. That is, magical thought, which mitigates separation anxiety, makes no distinction between human and inanimate objects. The illusory sense of connectedness between the child and his transitional object is analogous to the illusory connection between the created symbol of the paleolithic artist and the real object that the symbol denotes. We believe that for paleolithic man symbols were not used in a denotative sense—the symbol *was* the

[2] I have discussed this in detail in a monograph, Object Love and Reality *(17)*.

object, and symbol and object were fused; action upon the symbol affected the 'object in the environment'.

I view the transitional object as a watershed concept, a great psychological divide: on one side there is a sense of connectedness of the subject to the object, a sense of connectedness that supports a denial of separation; while on the other side there is an acknowledgment of that which is outside the self; the transitional object is a thing in the environment and not entirely self-created. Therefore I would interpret the paleolithic artist's use of the actual formation of the cave walls and ceilings themselves as a concretization of the interpenetration of the inner and the actual environment, that is, the art work itself is a tangible expression of the psychology of the creative process.

What is created is not an entirely new environment but a *transformation* of that which already exists. This suggests that an essential element of creativity is an *acceptance* of that which is outside the self. This acceptance implies some mastery of the attitude of primitive ambivalence toward the original (maternal) object, a testimony to the synthetic powers of Eros. In the creative process, whether art or science, it is convention and tradition that are equated with the nonself. This equation has been noted by Milner *(16)* who states that the artist 'may contribute to this convention, enrich it and enlarge, but he cannot start off without it, he cannot jump off from nothing'. And Winnicott *(22)* states, 'the interplay between originality and the acceptance of tradition as the basis for inventiveness seems to me to be just one more example, and a very exciting one, of the interplay between separateness and union' (p. 370).

The creation of the transitional object is therefore seen as a derivative of the child's first object relationship. We have suggested that the environment itself may be equated with this, the child's first love object. The psychology of creativity, which is the psychology of a created environment, can therefore be modeled on the psychology of object relations. If we understand the transitional object concept as a great psychologic divide with a progressive and a regressive side, we can discern an

analogy in creative processes between primitive and more mature modes of loving. Mature love requires an acceptance of the nonself. We believe that true creativity, whether in art or science, also requires the acceptance of a prior tradition which stands for the nonself, that is transformed by the creative act. What appears as a scientific revolution cannot be entirely self-created. Greenacre *(6)* has noted that there has been an undue emphasis on the narcissistic aspects of creativity. As she views it, 'the artistic product has rather universally the character of a love gift'. A 'collective love affair with the world' may be an obligatory condition for the development of great talent.

A necessary precondition for scientific creativity, a precondition that parallels the capacity for mature love relationships, is the quality of fidelity. Those who have created scientific revolutions, such as Darwin[8] and Freud, have first shown a fidelity to, one could say a love of, the tradition that they subsequently transformed. This fidelity was accompanied by an identification with a great man who exemplified that tradition. In Freud's life that man was Brücke *(1, 9)* and the tradition was the school of Helmholtz. Brücke, who was a leading member of the school of Helmholtz, was pledged by:

> . . . a solemn oath to put into effect this truth: 'No other forces than the common physical-chemical ones are active within the organism. In those cases which cannot at the time be explained by these forces one has either to find the specific way or form of their action by means of the physical-mathematical method or to assume new forces equal in dignity to the chemical-physical forces inherent in matter, reducible to the force of attraction and repulsion' *(9,* pp. 40-41*)*.

Although Freud transformed this tradition, to a significant extent he remained loyal to it and never completely abandoned it. This is shown in his continued interest in psychophysical models that would characterize the mental apparatus as a whole. An example would be Freud's attempt to find in clinical observation evidence of Fechner's constancy principle: that it is

[8] See his relation to Lyell's geology *(7)*.

a general law of the mental apparatus to keep the quantity of excitation low and anything that is calculated to increase that quantity is felt as unpleasurable.

The failure of creativity, if we may continue to compare it to a love relationship, might correspond to more primitive forms of loving, that is, the regressive side of the transitional phenomena. The failure to accept that which exists outside of the self reflects a failure to resolve ambivalence. There may be an actual hatred of the recognition of the existence of objects outside of the self. On this regressive side of the psychological divide are those phenomena that we label psychotic. Kris *(10)* has observed that psychotic art fails to retain its communicative function as it does not accept the need for others to comprehend. Indeed it does not even accept the existence of 'others'. In psychoanalysis we may observe similar psychotic-like defenses in people who are not fundamentally psychotic. For in the psychoanalysis of certain creative people we can observe the failure of creativity where there is an excessive reliance on fantasies of omnipotence, an attempt to be entirely self-creative, an inability to acknowledge the contribution of others, which is at bottom a failure to accept the existence of objects outside of the self.

I have employed the analogy of the transitional object to describe the creative illusion of transference in certain borderline and schizophrenic people *(17)*. In these people the element of illusory connectedness between self and object is retained to the point where the analyst's separateness, that is, his uniqueness, cannot be fully acknowledged. Yet an element of transitional object relations is retained alongside of or beneath more mature modes of loving—it is a necessary illusion of connectedness that deepens one's relation to reality. If we each experience the world uniquely we require a sense of connectedness to others to provide the necessary illusion that we are sharing a common reality. Winnicott *(22)* has described this as 'the place where cultural experience is located in the *potential space* between the individual and the environment . . .' (p. 371).

The analogy between the transitional object, paleolithic art, and creativity in modern man breaks down in one significant respect. In our society, where originality is idealized, the source of the creative image is attributed to the individual experience of the creator. The almost incomprehensible stability of paleolithic art, extending for nearly 20,000 years, demonstrates that this art could not have been the self-conscious creation of individuals; the individual artists themselves were simply the instruments of a rigidly enforced religious tradition. If this paleolithic society was at all analogous to contemporary primitive peoples it is likely that these artists were shamans *(18),* a class of men endowed with special powers but whose creative performance is ritualized, as in a modern priest who celebrates mass. To preserve such a tradition there may have been a positive prohibition against the variations that are the consequence of individuality. The sense of individuality is a cultural and not a biological given. It is difficult for us to imagine the time when even the idea of distinguishing the characters of individual men was an incredible novelty.

Although the paleolithic artists possessed sufficient skill to render animals with such naturalistic fidelity that now extinct species can be accurately identified *(11),* representations of human beings are few in number and, by comparison to the animal paintings, human portraits are stylistically crude and subject to peculiar distortions. The few human figures that are found are seen mostly as engravings on bone or stone. In contrast to the elegant naturalism of the animal portraits, the human figures lack three-dimensional modeling and frequently the heads and faces are distorted. The human heads may be left empty or blank or may have been replaced with animal heads, such as the famous 'sorcerer' of *Les Trois Frères,* who has the genitals of a man with the tail possibly that of a horse, and with head, ears, and antlers resembling those of an elk. In other hybrid figures the human face has been replaced by that of an animal, but it is not possible to recognize the species. These hybrid

figures have been interpreted as either portraits of shamans wearing animal masks, or perhaps representations of godlike or mythical ancestors. Other human figures associated with paleolithic art include so-called Venus statues, female figures, faceless, with exaggerated breasts, buttocks, and vulva. Although the function of these figures is not known, they are thought to be associated with worship of a mother goddess *(13)*. A not unreasonable conclusion is that the paleolithic artist possessed the ability to portray himself with the same naturalistic fidelity with which he could portray animal species, but that he was prohibited from doing so by a taboo, similar to the one the Jews observe regarding the production of graven images. Prohibition of the sense of individuality insured the preservation of an unchanging, historically frozen, paleolithic culture. The creative act of the paleolithic artist is not analogous to the spontaneous product of the child's play. In the baby that which is created is spontaneous, whereas for the paleolithic artist the art work is not attributable to the creative act of an individual but is part of a holy ritual. But the infant who creates a transitional object is also unaware of a sense of self that is responsible for the creation. As Winnicott has reiterated *(21)*:

> Of the transitional object can be said that it is a matter of agreement between us and the baby that we will never ask the question, 'Did you conceive of this or was it presented to you from without?'. The important point is that no decision on this point is expected. The question is not to be formulated.

But if we leave this objection aside we can still discern a convergence between the child's first creative act and the origin of culture. The cultural transformation of the environment may be understood in part as a process modeled on the child's relation to his primary environment, that is, his mother. Separation anxiety provides the motive for the child's first creative play, and separation anxiety (to which the fear of death is added) may also be the motive for the institution of a magically created environment. Both symbolic processes serve to mitigate the experience of total helplessness *(17)*.

These speculations are, I believe, consistent with the theory of the origin of culture, suggested by Freud *(3, 4)* and elaborated by Róheim *(20)*. The motive for the origin of culture is derived in part from man's prolonged and helpless infancy. Instead of the stereotypic relations to the environment that are dictated by instinct in other animals, man places his reliance on the protection afforded by external objects. This leads to prolongation of the period in which the mother is the environment of the developing child. Hence culture, which is the creative transformation of the environment, bears the imprint of the psychological equation, mother[4] = environment. In this larger sense, then, the creation of cultural forms is analogous to a love relationship. It requires sufficient mastery of ambivalence so that the acceptance of the existence of something outside of the self can be achieved. A cultural form cannot be completely self-creative: there must be a certain limitation upon narcissism that enables the expression of fidelity to and a love of the tradition that has been transformed.

SUMMARY

1. The use of actual geologic formations by paleolithic artists suggests that the creative act consists of the interpenetration of the actual and the inner world. This description is analogous to Winnicott's concept of the transitional object.

2. The transitional object is a watershed concept in that it has a progressive and regressive side correlated with the acceptance or nonacceptance of external objects.

3. The failure of creativity may be related to a failure to accept the separateness of objects. The successful creator must have some love for and fidelity to tradition outside of the self that he transforms in the creative act.

4. These views are discussed in relation to Freud's and Róheim's theories of the origin of culture, theories that place special emphasis on man's prolonged and helpless infancy with the consequent need to fend against separation anxiety.

[4] Mother here stands for all protective parental objects.

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Cryptorchism and Homosexuality

Laurence Schweitzer, Richard C. Simons & Richard Weidenbacher

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CRYPTORCHISM AND HOMOSEXUALITY

BY LAURENCE SCHWEITZER, M.D., RICHARD C. SIMONS, M.D., and RICHARD WEIDENBACHER, M.D. (BROOKLYN, NEW YORK)

This paper presents the case histories of two adult male homosexual patients, both of whom suffered from cryptorchism during childhood. We shall discuss only one of the patients in depth (Case II), with particular emphasis on the effect of cryptorchism in the genesis of his homosexuality.

I

A twenty-year-old white single man sought psychiatric help for recurring depression and feelings of inadequacy. He also complained of left leg and back pain for which no physical cause could be found. During the initial interview, he gave a history of overt homosexuality dating back to puberty. He was in psychotherapy twice a week for a period of two years.

The patient was the younger of two brothers. At birth it was noted that he was bilaterally cryptorchid, and during his childhood both parents and his brother, but especially his father, conducted frequent scrotal examinations in an attempt to locate the missing testicles. The right testicle was usually palpable but the left was not. The family's anxiety about his cryptorchism was abetted and complicated by the fact that his mother had wanted him to be a girl. She kept him in long curls until he was four and encouraged his helping with household chores. The patient and his mother were very close. He felt that he was his mother's favorite and that his father hated him.

When he was three years old he was separated from his family for several months, living first on a farm and later in a convent. While on the farm he was forced to sit on a small pot and

From the Department of Psychiatry, State University of New York, Downstate Medical Center, Brooklyn, New York.

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move his bowels while a small girl watched him. At the convent he was forced by the nuns on one occasion to lick up his own urine from the floor. He was afraid that he might also be made to eat his own feces. After recalling these experiences in therapy, the patient mentioned that he had always retained his stool at school and in other public places until he could return home. He had also often been aware of testicular retractions while having a bowel movement.

The patient described himself as an effeminate child who was always surrounded by his mother and his aunts. Periodically during his early years he would dress up in his mother's clothes and play the role of a beautiful woman while his brother or cousin played the role of a man.

When he was about seven years old, while watching a man urinating at a public urinal, he had the impression that the man had three penises. Later he developed the fantasy that when he grew up, he would also have three penises. Intensely aware of his cryptorchism, he experienced strong feelings of inadequacy. Moreover, he considered his penis to be abnormally small. Such thoughts persisted into adult life despite the fact that his penis was apparently of normal size.

When the patient was about nine years old, a physician prescribed a series of intragluteal hormonal injections. After a month the right testicle descended, but the left one remained beyond palpation within the inguinal canal. Shortly after these injections, the patient noticed the development of secondary sex characteristics. He began to participate in mutual masturbation and fellatio with neighborhood friends. He became aware of sexual thoughts toward his father, whom he described as attractive and handsome. He viewed his older brother, who protected the patient against the father's outbursts, as 'big, strong and powerful'. An inconsistent, self-indulgent man, the father was prone to temper tantrums; often he would not speak to the family members for weeks. In secret the patient and his brother joked about their father. They fantasied that their natural father was a paternal uncle, who had died during World

War II and who was alleged to have been very potent sexually. When the patient was eleven years old, orchiopexy was performed and his left testicle was brought down into the scrotum. He developed the belief that he had been made sterile by the operation and that the growth of his penis had been further impaired. Several months prior to the orchiopexy the patient was masturbated to orgasm by his brother. Shortly after the orchiopexy the brother again began to masturbate him. By age twelve the patient was masturbating his brother as well, and this practice continued almost nightly for another year.

When the patient was fourteen, the family moved from a rural area to a large city, at which time he became involved in a pattern of homosexuality that persisted to the time of treatment. He began to seek out young men his own age whom he found attractive by virtue of their masculinity. 'I need somebody strong—a man—to make up for what I think I never had.' The sexual activity usually consisted of mutual masturbation during which he would be preoccupied with comparing the size of his penis with that of his partner. He felt relieved when his partner's penis was smaller than his own.

II

A twenty-eight-year-old white married man sought help ostensibly for the relief of periodic depressions which had begun approximately ten years previously in association with the onset of diabetes mellitus. In addition, he initially spoke of problems associated with his marriage and of an inability to have close male friendships. He was in psychotherapy twice weekly for a period of three years. Shortly after treatment began, he indicated that it was his concern over his homosexual behavior that had actually prompted him to seek help.

The patient was the second of four brothers, one three years older, the others six and thirteen years younger. It was noted at birth that his right testicle was undescended. Both parents conducted frequent scrotal examinations during his childhood and early teens in an attempt to locate the missing testicle.

The patient's early years were initially recalled as happy except for the disquieting memory of an event that occurred when he was three. While taking a shower with his father he was disturbed to see that his father had what seemed to be two penises while he possessed only one small one. He looked at the genitals of his older brother for reassurance. In his mid-teens he decided that his father's pendulous scrotum must have appeared to him as the second penis. The memory of his father's fantasied second penis came up repeatedly during the course of the therapy, usually in association with a profound concern that he lacked essential male attributes.

After several months of therapy memories began to emerge which contradicted the patient's earlier description of his childhood as happy and tranquil. For example, there was little privacy in his house and the patient was exposed to a good deal of sexual stimulation as a child. He often saw his mother dressing in the bathroom and he regularly took showers with his father, apparently a rather vain man who spent a great deal of time grooming himself in front of a mirror. The patient was a somewhat obese, good-looking, appealing child who was frequently cuddled and admired by his aunts and mother and told by them that he would have made a pretty girl. During these early years he became aware of his mother's disappointment in having a second male child and of her often expressed wish that he had been a girl.

When he was six and a half years old, shortly after the birth of his next younger brother, transvestite behavior began. He would wear his mother's shoes, dresses, and jewelry and admire himself in the mirror. He thought of himself as a man within a woman's body. At these times he became excited and developed erections. This behavior was initially greeted with laughter by his parents but when it became more frequent and persistent, both parents, but especially his father, beat him severely. Although the beatings were frightening and he took elaborate precautions to prevent being caught in his mother's clothes, he inevitably gave himself away. By wearing his

mother's clothes he had wished to please her by being a girl and to attract her attention away from the new born brother. He also wanted to gain the attention and affection that his father seemed to be lavishing on the favored older brother. At the age of ten the transvestitism suddenly stopped.

When he was twelve, he received a series of hormone injections in his buttocks that eventuated in the descent of his right testicle. The vague feeling of 'not being right' crystallized into a belief that he had been born lacking an essential male hormone which he now received by the injection of other men's hormones. This belief was confirmed with the subsequent rapid development of secondary sex characteristics, i.e., elongation and pigmentation of his penis. Masturbation began a short time later, accompanied by both heterosexual and homosexual imagery.

A few months later, at the age of thirteen, the patient had his first homosexual experience, which in many respects has served as the prototype of his subsequent homosexual behavior. He and a friend masturbated together. He was able to ejaculate while his friend was unable to do so. The thought that he was more potent and masculine than the other boy was very gratifying. Following this experience, however, he felt guilty and for the next five years he consciously renounced such behavior although his masturbatory fantasies regularly included a repetition of this incident.

His teen-age years were unhappy. He was overweight, made few friends, and rarely dated. He felt that he was weak and incomplete, and avoided competitive situations with boys his own age. He feared they might injure him ('kick me in the balls') if he angered them. An experience at the age of sixteen is illustrative of his sexual confusion. He went into a store to buy an athletic supporter; when the salesman asked him what size cup he needed, the thought flashed across his mind that a supporter was like a brassiere and that his genitals were like a breast. This thought made him feel feminine and even more incapable of competing with other boys.

When he was eighteen, he developed diabetes mellitus. This was a profoundly disturbing event which precipitated the periodic depressions. He thought that diabetes is a disease of women, only inherited from grandmothers. He recalled that his friends had made fun of an obese, diabetic man on the block, saying that he could not have intercourse. This man had had an amputation of his fingers. He knew also of a diabetic woman who had had an amputation of her leg. He had a fear that his penis would fall off from the diabetes and imagined himself as having a raw, gaping wound in his genital area. However, the most upsetting thought that occurred to him at the time of his illness was the fear that he had finally fallen apart, and that in his attempt to use his already deficient energies to control his homosexual urges, another area of his body had deteriorated. He felt that he had been cheated and that he had been born with a woman's body and constitution. He recalled experiencing a deep-seated rage at having been born 'deficient', and bitterly resented his diabetic illness.

His father injected the first dose of insulin into his buttocks. At that moment he had the thought that the white insulin was like semen and in therapy he related this thought to a fantasy that the insulin was his father's semen. Following this incident he administered the injections himself. In contrast to his father, his mother reacted to his diabetes with extreme shame and mortification. She counseled him against ever telling anyone of his illness. (He was not able to tell his fiancée of this condition till two weeks before the wedding.) In the third year of therapy, while discussing his mother's reaction to his diabetes mellitus, he recalled that she had shown a similar reaction of disappointment and shame at the time of the early scrotal examinations, and he became increasingly aware of the humiliation that he had experienced during these examinations.

Two or three weeks after beginning the insulin injections, he developed a pattern of homosexual behavior. While riding in a subway he was attracted to a man whose penis was outlined through his tight fitting pants. They entered a subway

bathroom together. The patient held the man's penis and kissed him while the patient masturbated himself. At the same time he compared the size of his penis to that of his partner. As soon as he had ejaculated, he told the man to 'shove off' and he ran out of the bathroom. In the following nine years he repeated this behavior several times a week, always seeking a man who appeared to be strong and good-looking. He would frequent subway bathrooms in order to 'find a source of strength' from these men and then 'cheat them of their pleasure'. He made no sustained contacts and remained anonymous in these experiences. His only interest was in finding a penis to hold so that he could masturbate himself and then leave the other man 'high and dry'. In addition to repeatedly using this phrase 'high and dry' when describing his homosexual behavior, he characteristically used two other expressions in a repetitive way: he frequently referred to himself as being 'up tight' and as having 'hang ups'.

He married at twenty in an attempt to control his homosexual impulses but was disappointed to find that sex with his wife was uninteresting and made him feel 'depleted'. He resumed the homosexual pattern of behavior about three months after the marriage. When he heard that his wife had given birth to a daughter, he experienced a pain at the base of his penis, and he had the upsetting thought that in some way girl babies were deprived of their penises.

About a year prior to beginning therapy he took up singing lessons in the hope of becoming a famous, admired, and sought-after artist. Behind this wish was a fantasy of being discovered by an older man who would make him into a 'star'. He felt that he could not establish a career through his own efforts and that it was necessary for him to have the strength and help of another man. Two months prior to seeking treatment he became homosexually involved with a man whom he knew socially and to whose wife he was strongly attracted. For the first time the patient submitted to anal intercourse. Following this experience, which was in some ways pleasurable, he feared he

might be a 'real homosexual' and shortly thereafter sought treatment.

During the course of therapy it became clear that one of the patient's major concerns centered about his cryptorchism and that his homosexuality was related to this deficit. For example, he was able to recall in therapy that at the time of the birth of his younger brother he felt unacceptable. He felt that there was something wrong with him, that he was only 'half right', that he had been dealt a 'bad hand' in life, and that perhaps he was lacking something that he needed in order to be acceptable. During the fifth month of therapy he anxiously explained that he had noticed a man sitting in a stall of a public bathroom wiping himself from behind. The patient was shocked. 'I have always wiped myself from the front. I guess I must have seen my mother do it from the front and I learned from her.' He would feel his testicles and penis every time he wiped himself, and when some fecal material would get on his scrotum in the process, he would wash his scrotum. He also recalled that just before his marriage he developed a fungus infection of the scrotum. As this rash grew worse, he had the thought that the rash might cause his testicles to fall off.

In the seventh month of therapy, while discussing his fear of homosexuality, he reported the following dream:

> I was alone in my house. Someone knocked at the door. It was a Negro man and woman. I was afraid to let them in. They were going to rob my house. I fought to keep the door closed but they were very strong. I ran back to my room and took my jewelry with me. I thought—they can have what they want. I will save my jewelry.

His immediate association to this dream was a recollection of a Negro couple who had lived in the basement of his apartment when he was a boy and who were chronic alcoholics. On occasions he saw the woman exposed and wished to see more. He was always afraid that the man would beat him up, perhaps kick him 'in the balls'. To the jewelry he associated his cuff links, which were valuable and very important to him.

During the tenth month of therapy the patient reluctantly began to talk about his diabetes mellitus and his physical neglect of himself. He talked with great difficulty about his feelings of being cheated and deprived of something important because of this illness. It was during that same session that he referred to his cryptorchism for the first time. He mentioned it casually, briefly, as if in passing, when describing the fact that fate had played a cruel trick on him by making him less adequate than other men. He recalled the time when his father gave him insulin shots at the age of eighteen and how this event reminded him of the hormone injections he had received at age twelve to bring his right testicle down. His next association was to the white insulin which reminded him of semen, and he then recalled his fantasy that his father was injecting him with male hormones because he had been born deficient and had never been given enough of his own. Shortly afterward he reported another dream.

> I noticed that my thumb was all the way up near my elbow and I woke up very frightened.

His associations led to his cryptorchid right testis, but he became very angry when the therapist pointed out this connection.

Seven months later, after some of his vengeful feelings in relation to his homosexual partners had been discussed, and after he had become aware of his wish to rip off their penises and to humiliate the men by leaving them unsatisfied, the homosexual behavior diminished greatly. However, his wishes to appropriate the strength of other men persisted.

DISCUSSION

A review of the literature has disclosed only a few instances where an association of homosexuality and cryptorchism is specifically noted. Peritz *(22)* reported on fifty-two eunuchoid patients, one of whom was homosexual. There is no indication as to whether this particular patient was cryptorchid. Ombredane *(21)* discussed a twenty-two-year-old schizophrenic patient with bilateral cryptorchism who had been homosexually

seduced twice at the age of ten by older men but who did not become homosexual. The patient developed the interesting symptom of hearing insulting, derogatory words emanating from his testicles and of seeing these insulting words written out '. . . attached by wires to his penis, where they stand out like luminous signs, like burning coals'. Klann *(18)* described a seventeen-year-old unilaterally cryptorchid boy who, after a successful orchiopexy, developed homosexual behavior of mutual masturbation with both older and much younger boys. Davidoff and Noetzel *(11)* and later Davidoff *(10)* have reported the case of a seventeen-year-old severely sociopathic boy with one undescended testicle who was actively homosexual. Carmichael *(6)* reported on the psychoanalysis of a thirty-one-year-old eunuchoid, but not cryptorchid, male. The patient recalled a single episode of fellatio at eight years with an older brother and a transient interest in the penises of other boys at ten.

Yazmajian *(23)* has described a thirty-two-year-old man who sought psychiatric help because of transvestitism which developed following a divorce. This patient was bilaterally cryptorchid at birth and remained so until spontaneous descent of both testicles occurred at age seven. A history of homosexuality in early adolescence was obtained and while the genesis of the homosexuality was only partially reconstructed in the analysis, it became clear that unconscious fantasies involving the testes were an important determinant in the homosexuality. For example, '. . . a typical fantasy in his fellatio practices involved the wish to suck the other boy's testes directly through the penis, orally incorporate them and make them his own'. Yazmajian was also able to demonstrate that this patient's transvestitism was related to problems of separation and individuation. Analysis of the transvestite impulses revealed that they represented an identification with the mother which thus served to repair the body image defect derived from faulty self-differentiation in the earliest phases of ego development and re-enforced in early childhood by awareness of the cryptorchism. By

'genitalizing' his mother's body, representing her body trunk as the phallus and her breasts as testicles, the continued identification with the mother was maintained.

Other psychiatric reports *(7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 17, 19, 20)* of patients with cryptorchism and/or eunuchoidism either do not mention homosexual behavior, or comment specifically on its absence (see especially [7] and [17]). Indeed Blos *(5)* states that cryptorchism may possibly be a mitigating factor against the development of homosexuality: '. . . in the case of cryptorchism by the very fact of a defective genital the feminine castration wish did not advance to the state of an integrated self-representation but stayed attached to the genital organ in its physical reality. Feminine tendencies became, therefore, organized around this organ defect and remained in a state of unsettledness due to the implicit reversibility of the condition.'

Bell *(1, 2, 3, 4)* has described the role of the scrotal sac and testicles in the psychosexual development of some children. Beginning with a description of the physiologic and psychophysiologic role of the testes in the development of the castration complex, she has considered the manifold influence of testicular retractions and the consequences of cryptorchism. She was the first to note the psychological implications of the fact that under conditions of fear, cold, sexual excitation, and defecation, the child experiences testicular retractions. Her case material indicated that a fusion of the visual and kinesthetic percepts of the testes and feces may develop during the prephallic period, and she ascribed this lack of differentiation to the developing child's inability to clearly distinguish these simultaneous stimuli. A biological determinant in the child's confusion and lack of precision in distinguishing the movements of the testicles from those of the feces is that as the sphincter ani contracts following passage of the stool, a similar reflex contraction of the cremasteric muscle draws the testicles up, occasionally entirely out of the scrotum. The visual percept is simultaneously one of a decrease in size of the scrotum, accompanied by the appearance of stool in the water below.

Both the kinesthetic and visual impressions occurring simultaneously touch upon the leading concern of that period, namely, separation anxiety. The fact that this anxiety is related to the movement of the testicles and is experienced as a threat to genital integrity, places the first such experience antecedent to the œdipal phase. Bell considers œdipal castration anxieties as capable of touching off testicular concerns which at this later period augment in cumulative fashion the phallic castration anxiety. She has also noted that anxieties in relation to the loss of the testicles are often defensively displaced to the penis.

The fact that Bell's clinical material has demonstrated that the scrotal sac and testicles play an important role in the development of feminine identifications is of particular importance in regard to the case material presented here. It is clear from Bell's work, as well as from that of Blos *(5)*, Glenn *(14)*, and Yazmajian *(23, 24)*, that the testes and scrotal sac are symbolically equated with the eyes, breasts, and other paired organs and as such play an important role in terms of body image. The regular occurrence of testicles=breasts equation is typical of the confusion that may develop in relation to the scrotal contents; moreover, in Bell's opinion, it clearly relates to the development of feminine identifications. She has commented on the fact that a hollow container or sac might well represent the feminine component of the external male genitalia and has raised the question of its relationship to certain homosexual practices. Most recently she has noted the role of the scrotum and testes in the development of passivity and feminine identifications in prephallic boys. On the basis of these observations and Glenn's contribution *(14)* to our understanding of the symbol 'three', Bell has postulated the existence of a testicular stage of psychosexual development occurring between the anal and phallic phases. She states: 'The experience of the helpless passive state due to uncontrollable retractions stimulates a turning to active mastery attempts and to a feminine identification with the active creative female, thus laying the early roots of bisexuality' *(4*, p. 647*)*.

Greenacre *(15)* has stressed the genetic importance of certain real events ('organizing experiences') which occur during the unfolding of the psychosexual stages prior to puberty. These experiences (death of a parent, birth of a sibling, sex of a sibling, etc.) can modify the force of the phase-specific fantasies that are genetically linked to the later development of symptoms. '. . . specific "fantasies" which persist until adult life are rarely *only* "typical" fantasies, common to all infantile development, but rather those typical ones which have been given a special strength, form, and pressure for repetition through having been confirmed by external events. These reality confirmations may have been incipiently instigated by the child or more rarely have been almost purely coincidental. . . . If the reinforcement has been much influenced by a single disturbing experience, verifying the infantile fantasy and making it powerfully real, the organizing effect of such an event is very great and the fantasy behind it gains much force. This predisposes to later repetition in acting out.'

Blos was the first to attempt to utilize Greenacre's concept of an organizing experience to account for the organizing effect that the cryptorchid condition exerts on the formation of phase-specific fantasy content and especially on the eventual symptomatology. We feel that it is inaccurate, however, to term the cryptorchid state an organizing experience. Greenacre's original description pertains specifically to reality experiences which generally occurred during latency or prepuberty, which were determined by an earlier childhood fantasy, and which were then '. . . almost completely repressed from memory and their contents projected backward onto the infantile years, where they enhanced the brightness of and added elaborations to the early screen memories'.

It seems more accurate to consider the cryptorchid state as a condition capable of generating intense fantasy activity that may later be acted out. The fantasies would presumably be related to the theme of object loss and thus linked to separation anxiety. As Greenacre points out, such 'typical' fantasies will

undoubtedly find their way into and influence the successive phallic and œdipal concerns. Concurrently the child's relationship to his parents and the parents' reactions to the child's defect will further modify the child's perception of the cryptorchid state and influence his fantasy life. Blos *(5)* has elaborated on this latter point and has described three cryptorchid prepubertal boys who evidenced a triad of: 1, disturbance in motility; 2, disturbance in learning; and 3, compulsive toying with physical danger. He ascribed the similarities to the fact that the anxious and aggressive preoccupation of the parents with the genital defect eventually designated the testicle as the focal point around which body image and psychosexual development became distorted. Blos concludes that cryptorchism occurring within the context of a particular parent-child relationship can function to organize psychopathology. In contrast, Bell feels that the perception and cognition of the testicular defect is in itself a primary pathogenic experience regardless of the parent-child relationship. Clearly the role of the scrotum in development remains an unsettled question. The case material presented here attempts to draw a causal relationship between cryptorchism and homosexuality.

Both of the patients described were second children and each was by virtue of his sex a severe disappointment to his mother. Each had been told during his pregenital years that his maleness was a disappointment to his mother, and various members of the family encouraged feminine behavior in the patients. The castrating behavior of both mothers is clear. Furthermore, both patients were repeatedly examined by the parents who would palpate their scrotums for the missing testicle. The mother of our second patient openly expressed her mortification and embarrassment at her son's cryptorchism; his father reacted to his son's cryptorchism with disappointment and withdrawal, and later to the child's transvestitism with beatings. Multiple bisexual identifications were present and powerful aggressive elements of an oral and anal nature colored the œdipal relationships of both patients. Castration anxiety and

a compulsive denial of such is evident in their transvestite behavior.

On the basis of these dynamic configurations, the development of homosexuality in either patient would not be surprising. However, both patients present an unusual fantasy which is not adequately explained within the context of phallic castration anxiety. Both patients cite as a focal experience seeing an adult male with multiple penises. In particular the intense anxiety surrounding this experience, documented in our second patient at the age of three, is somewhat early to be explained only in terms of œdipal conflicts. We suggest that this anxiety relates primarily to testicular concerns.

This patient initially described his childhood as happy except for an unusual event which occurred at the age of three. While taking a shower with his father, he noted with chagrin and shock that his father had two penises while he had 'only one small one'. This prompted him to compare himself to his older brother who like himself had only one penis. We know that from the time of his birth the patient's genital defect was a painful and embarrassing fact for both parents, but especially for his mother. She told him on many occasions that to talk about oneself is dangerous, and when he developed diabetes mellitus, she cautioned him against telling anyone. Her repeated wish that he should have been a girl, her aggressive preoccupation with examining his scrotum, and her seductive overstimulation were very disturbing to him. In therapy it became clear that the memories of these early years had been exhausted of their unpleasant and anxiety-producing content through repression. The one unpleasant memory was that of his father's two penises. The disturbing impact of this memory, standing as it were in relief to the supposedly untroubled childhood, can best be understood in the context of a screen memory condensing upon itself the previous and subsequent experiences associated with the parental examination and seductions. It seems that at the time of the misperception of the two penises, the previously engendered anxiety related to his

testicular defect had by displacement already been bound to the penis, thus taking on the character of later phallic castration anxiety.

The fantasy of having less, of being deficient in some way, gradually emerged from the case material as the generalization and displacement of affect and ideation from the undescended testicle. This fantasy was connected to the notion of deficient masculinity and gradually became woven into the phase-specific fantasy content of his œdipal and latency years. The fantasy of having less, of being deficient, and of being part male and part female, took on a more specific character at the age of twelve when he was given hormone injections to bring his right testicle down. The subsequent changes in his secondary sex characteristics seemed to attest to the correctness of the patient's fantasy of deficiency and furthermore characterized the deficiency as being one of hormones, specifically male hormones. Significantly, several months later he had his first homosexual experience during which he triumphed over the other boy who was unable to ejaculate. Subsequently he made every effort to avoid a repetition of this experience in spite of its increasingly frequent intrusion into his thoughts.

When at the age of eighteen he developed diabetes mellitus, the notion of a hormonal deficiency once again received a substantiation in fact. His dependence on insulin, which magically provided him with the energy and strength necessary for him to work, recapitulated the first series of hormone injections at age twelve and more basically was linked to the memory of his father's superior genital apparatus via his fantasy that he was receiving his father's semen. His rage and bitterness at the world for dealing him a 'bad hand' quickly turned to grief and depression, and two weeks later he re-established the homosexual behavior. In this behavior he wanted to find a man with a large penis, to appropriate this man's strength in order to make up for his own deficiency, and to humiliate him.

In this case it appears that the cryptorchid condition occurring within a particular family situation served to relate child-

hood experiences and the phase-specific drives to a fantasy of masculine deficiency. The hormone injections during the prepubertal years tended to confirm the infantile fantasy and promoted organization and crystallization of the infantile memories. As Greenacre *(15, 16)* has pointed out, such experiences, occurring in latency or the prepubertal years, serve to organize and facilitate subsequent repetition and acting out of the fantasy. The trauma of the diabetes mellitus was the final event that led to the acting out of compulsive homosexual behavior based on the fantasy of masculine deficiency.

SUMMARY

In 1960 Blos published an account of three pubescent cryptorchid boys relating their disturbances to a pathogenic parent-child relationship. He showed how the cryptorchid testicle was a focus for the distortion of body-image formation and psychosexual development. In the following year Bell delineated the psychological importance of the testicles and the scrotal sac, and hypothesized the existence of a testicular phase of psychosexual development. In subsequent years she again emphasized the significance of the scrotal sac and its contents in both the normal development as well as the psychopathology of children. Yazmajian recently outlined the importance of cryptorchism in the genesis of transvestite behavior. We have presented two case histories which show how cryptorchism in childhood played a vital role in the genesis of adult homosexual behavior.

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Ellen M. Jensen

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ANNA O—A STUDY OF HER LATER LIFE

BY ELLEN M. JENSEN (RISSKOV, DENMARK)

The incentive to take up work on the subject of this paper arose when I was indeed overwhelmed and dumbfounded on opening a book edited by A. A. Roback *(36)*, dedicated 'To the memory of Bertha Pappenheim (Anna O), a noble soul in a beautiful body, who unwittingly provided the occasion for the discovery of a new principle in the mental and social sciences'. Besides the dedication and a few lines about Anna O —differing little from what Ernest Jones says about her *(20,* p. 245*)*—I found a picture of a beautful postage stamp commemorating Bertha Pappenheim *(36,* p. 213*)*. The stamp was issued in 1954 in West Germany in a series entitled 'helpers of humanity', represented by personalities in European and international social life. Other people represented in the series were: Käthe Kollwitz (1867-1945), the humanely compassionate painter of the poor; Lorenz Werthmann (1858-1921), the organizer of the German Caritas Movement; and Johann Friedrich Oberlin (1740-1828), the founder of infant care. In this context it is appropriate to quote from The Holy Land Philatelist, Israel's Stamps *(16)*.

> From welfare work for girls and the poor, [Bertha Pappenheim] soon turned to the more extensive field of emerging social work for women, Jewish as well as universal. Her activi-

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From the Medical Library, The Psychiatric Institute, Risskov, Denmark.

I am grateful to Dr. H. Stokholm, Chief of the Clinic for Ambulatory Treatment of Neurotics, of the same Institute, for his helpful discussions of this paper with me.

Part of the paper was published in 1961 in German in *Acta psychiatrica et neurologica Scandinavica (19)* before and independently of Karpe's paper in This QUARTERLY *(21)*. It was read in 1968 at The Institute of Living, Hartford, Connecticut, The Psychiatric Clinics of Yale University, New Haven, Yeshiva University, New York, and Rochester University, Rochester, New York.

> ties were never limited to Germany. Her vision transcended all borders. Since the turn of the century, particularly since the pogroms against the Jews in Eastern Europe shocked the civilized world, she made repeated on-the-spot studies of social conditions in the Balkans, Russia, Galicia, and Palestine. During her travels—which brought her to Salonica, Lemberg, Lodz, Warsaw, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Smyrna, Jaffa, and in 1909 even to London and Washington—women's problems, social work, Jewish life, white slavery, and problems of education were uppermost in her mind. In 1911 she presented a report to the German National Committee against White Slavery. In 1928 she reported on the same problem to the Secretariat of the League of Nations in Geneva.

After publication in German of my paper in 1961, I continued my study of Anna O and have found additional material which I believe to be pertinent and of interest. The following quotation is from a chapter by Else Rabin in The Jewish Library *(35)*.

> Possessed of boundless sympathy for the underprivileged, [Bertha Pappenheim] dedicated her life to their service. She sought out her brethren in all stations, and made personal studies of the life and problems of several communities in different countries. She possessed not only a noble heart, but also great leadership and organizing ability (p. 299).

It may be asked whether it is not misplaced curiosity to take an interest in Bertha Pappenheim as Anna O. When Ernest Jones *(20,* pp. 245-248*)* revealed that Anna O and Bertha Pappenheim were one and the same person, he encountered a strong reaction on the part of her relatives and also in a subsequent discussion in *Der Aufbau,* a German-Jewish immigrants' periodical published in New York *(17)*. I answer the question concerning this curiosity in the negative: the purpose is in accord with what I sense in Bertha Pappenheim's own writing. For instance, in a report concerning work in an institution for social care, she says: '. . . the recording of individual cases and biographies of the subsequent aftercare are

bound in time to yield valuable material about the life and the fate of former alumni' *(29,* p. 11*).* In another report she says: 'To be something to someone is the best a woman can achieve, and I am happy when now and then I feel that I do not burn down, before somebody has warmed himself by my small fire' *(28,* p. 89*).*

Martin Buber, the religious historian and philosopher, whom Bertha Pappenheim knew in Frankfort, has this to say about her: '. . . this white flame has burnt in our time. Now she is burned out . . . pass on the picture, propagate the memory' *(6,* p. 2*),* and he adds: *'Bürgschaft ist 's',* which means something like, It is gospel truth. It is in this spirit that I offer my contribution.

Among her friends in Frankfort-on-the-Main was Dr. Dora Edinger, a remote relative. In 1963, Dr. Edinger published a collection of some of Bertha Pappenheim's letters, addresses, essays, aphorisms, and miscellaneous manuscripts *(7).*[1] An enlarged English edition has since been published *(8).* In 1963, I spent a week in Frankfort, seeking out whoever might remember Bertha Pappenheim and was fortunate enough to talk with a number of people who had known her.

As the author of this paper is not a physician, no discussion of Anna O's diagnosis and symptoms will be found in what follows. Reference will be made to Anna O only where I think I can draw connecting lines between her and Bertha Pappenheim. However, I shall refresh the memory of the reader by quoting a few passages from Freud's first lecture at Clark University in 1909 *(15).*

> Dr. Breuer's patient was a girl of twenty-one, of high intellectual gifts. Her illness lasted for over two years, and in the course of it she developed a series of physical and psychological disturbances which decidedly deserved to be taken seriously. She suffered from a rigid paralysis, accompanied by loss of sensation, of both extremities on the right side of her body; and the same trouble from time to time affected her on her

[1] Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXXIII, 1964, p. 439.

> left side. Her eye movements were disturbed and her power of vision was subject to numerous restrictions. She had difficulties over the posture of her head; she had a severe nervous cough. She had an aversion to taking nourishment, and on one occasion she was for several weeks unable to drink in spite of a tormenting thirst. Her powers of speech were reduced, even to the point of her being unable to speak or understand her native language. Finally, she was subject to conditions of *'absence'*, of confusion, of delirium, and of alteration of her whole personality. . . . There is no need for us to know, however, how a differential diagnosis of that kind is made; it will suffice to have an assurance that the case of Breuer's patient was precisely of a kind in which no competent physician could fail to make a diagnosis of hysteria. And here we may quote from the report of the patient's illness the further fact that it made its appearance at a time when she was nursing her father, of whom she was devotedly fond, through the grave illness which led to his death, and that, as a result of her own illness, she was obliged to give up nursing him (pp. 10, 11).

Freud further mentions the general attitude toward hysteria on the part of physicians in 1909. '[The physician] attributes every kind of wickedness to [hysterical patients], accuses them of exaggeration, of deliberate deceit, of malingering. And he punishes them by withdrawing his interest from them' (p. 12). Then follows a description of the way Breuer used hypnosis, and how Anna O was relieved, calling the treatment the 'talking cure' and 'chimney sweeping'. Freud continues:

> One was driven to assume that the illness occurred because the affects generated in the pathogenic situations had their normal outlet blocked, and that the essence of the illness lay in the fact that these 'strangulated' affects were then put to an abnormal use. In part they remained as a permanent burden upon the patient's mental life and a source of constant excitation for it; and in part they underwent a transformation into unusual somatic innervations and inhibitions, which manifested themselves as the physical symptoms of the case. For this latter process we coined the term 'hysterical conversion' (p. 18).

Bertha Pappenheim later learned how to master the mental burden of emotionally charged material by writing down short stories, taking for her subjects current problems in the Jewish communities of Eastern Europe as she encountered them on her travels, and by writing letters to her co-workers almost daily, short aphorisms which she called *'Denkzettel'*, memoranda which contained both practical ideas and more profound thoughts, and poems which she called *'Gebete'* (prayers) and which were very expressive in their free rhythm.

Anna O is mentioned by her real name in a letter written by Freud after a conversation with Breuer. On July 13, 1883, at two A.M., he wrote to his fiancée: 'Then followed a long medical conversation on "moral insanity" and nervous diseases and peculiar cases. Also the subject of your friend Bertha Pappenheim once again turned up, and then we became intimately personal and very confidential and he told me much about wife and children which I shall not recount until I have married my Martha' *(14,* p. 39*)*. This passage deserves attention because Anna O is often characterized as asexual; Breuer made her into an asexual being, not wishing or daring to consider her sexuality.

According to Ernest Jones, Breuer told Freud about an episode near the end of treatment. Far from being cured the patient 'was now in the throes of an hysterical childbirth (pseudocyesis), the logical termination of a phantom pregnancy that had been invisibly developing in response to Breuer's ministrations'. Breuer hypnotized her, whereupon he 'fled the house in a cold sweat. . . . The next day he and his wife left for Venice to spend a second honeymoon.' The patient was 'removed to an institution in Gross Enzersdorf' *(20,* p. 247*)*.[2]

To give help was natural for Anna O. In the case history

[2] Dr. Henri Ellenberger *(12)* has noted that there was no sanitarium in Gross Enzersdorf. There was one in Inzersdorf, near Vienna. This fact, together with Jones's mistaking Gross Enzersdorf for Inzersdorf, causes him to doubt Jones's version of the Anna O story so far as the identity of Anna O and Bertha Pappenheim is concerned. I do not agree with Dr. Ellenberger and will discuss this problem in the concluding part of this paper.

Breuer relates: 'She derived much benefit from a Newfoundland dog which was given to her and of which she was passionately fond. On one occasion, though, her pet made an attack on a cat, and it was splendid to see the way in which the frail girl seized a whip in her left hand and beat off the huge beast . . . to rescue his victim. Later she looked after some poor, sick people, and this helped her greatly' *(5,* p. 31*)*.

But who was Bertha Pappenheim? She was born in Vienna on February 27, 1859, and was therefore three years younger than Freud and seventeen years younger than Breuer. Stefan Zweig *(38)* characterizes the Vienna of those days as a city where people knew how to enjoy themselves: they were connoisseurs both in a culinary and in a more subtle sense, very exacting and particular *(anspruchsvoll),* enjoying music, the theater, and conversation, behaving with good taste. And all this was cultivated as a special art even by the bourgeois *(gutbürgerliche)* family, as Freud mentions several times in connection with Anna O. As Dora Edinger has pointed out to me *(9),* Bertha Pappenheim came from an orthodox and rather closed Jewish milieu. Nevertheless it is obvious that she felt herself to be a Viennese. When visiting the house in Frankfort where she lived for many years, I was told about the beautiful furniture and ornaments that graced her rooms, which she had obtained from her brother in Vienna. According to her obituary *(1),* she remained a genuine Viennese in her appearance too, tastefully dressed, very elegant, and charming. She also shared the Viennese fondness for the theater. In travel letters she wrote:

> Last night I went with my niece to the Folk opera to enjoy the jubilant and liberating music of Fidelio; an additional joy was the youthful audience in the gallery whose excitement and suspense were really heartwarming. This naïve participation and such feelings for art on the part of the gallery audience are to be found neither in Frankfort nor in Berlin.
>
> [Later on] It is really odd to note how much better the human brain functions and thinks more in imagery when one listens to serious music *(28,* p. 8*)*.

Did Anna O's tense nervous system relax when she listened to music? Does it perhaps make it possible for her to think in a more three-dimensional way? We must remember that Bertha Pappenheim was not only a hard-working social worker but also that she moved in artistic circles. She introduced a child prodigy whom she discovered in Frankfort into artistic circles in Vienna and even paid for her education and much else. A friend with whom I talked in Frankfort said that many of her acquaintances could not understand her 'double life' as a hard-working leader of social institutions and a member of the elite artistic circle. Should she be considered primarily as a member of orthodox, austere circles, or as a liberal Viennese? Her father, said to have been very orthodox, founded a synagogue. While visiting a Moslem mosque in Constantinople, Bertha pondered what her parents might think about her: 'Now instead of being married as our old *Sedergast* (Passover feast guest) always hoped, their daughter, traveling, is occupied with ideas which had no place in the world of her parents. This often disturbs me, but they would not have been able to foresee my development' *(28,* p. 54*)*.

Sigmund Pappenheim,[8] Bertha's father, came from the Pressburg ghetto; he was a grain dealer, a respectable trade in the Jewish community. Her grandfather had inherited a large fortune and the Pappenheim family were considered 'millionaires' in the ghetto. The grandfather lived up to his new position and nobody could tell from his manner that he originated in a lower social class *(23,* p. 144*)*. Bertha's mother was a member of the Goldschmidt family of Frankfort which included many persons of culture, for example Heinrich Heine *(25)*.

[8] Richard Karpe (*21,* p. 23) draws attention to the similarity in names of Bertha's father and Freud and suggests that she may have transferred her feelings from her father to Freud, who might have stood for 'sexuality'. He also argues that she became a feminist and took up the fight against prostitution and white slavery in order to fight her father, her own sexuality, etc. Being a non-medical person, I cannot appropriately deny this, but in my opinion Bertha Pappenheim's work seemed to grow out of her experience and such an interpretation is perhaps unnecessary.

Bertha Pappenheim was interested in her family origins and with her brother, Wilhelm, and her cousin, Stefan Meyer, drew up her family tree, an unusual custom for Jewish families of that time. She found that she was related to Glückel of Hameln, a Jewish woman now well known because of her Memoirs. Dora Edinger states that she identified herself with Glückel *(10)* and some words written by Franz Kobler about Glückel might fit Bertha Pappenheim's endeavors:

> When Glückel of Hameln (born 1646 in Hamburg, died in Metz 1724) began to write her famous Memoirs, she was a widow and the mother of twelve children. Although she appears to have been a born writer and storyteller, it is fair to assume that this unique piece of Jewish literature would hardly have been written if its author had not felt a strong urge to open a mother's heart to her children, to give them an account of her life and to influence their conduct. . . . It is indeed the exuberance of her motherliness that makes itself felt in her devotion to these intimate and cherished details. There is, surely, no reason for surprise at the fact that the love of a Jewish mother has produced the loveliest and liveliest of Jewish memoirs and one of the most charming of all autobiographies *(22,* p. 128*)*.

In my opinion one can also assume that Anna O fought to realize herself and that this happens only when one feels on firm ground. She came from a Jewish milieu which in previous generations had shifted from a lower to a higher social rank. She belonged to the so-called *Höhere Töchter* (a sarcastic term for daughters of the upper classes), as she herself said, and was neither wholly Viennese nor wholly Jewish in her way of life. She attended a Catholic school. She was ill for some years but she had a surplus of vitality that needed to be spent on something to prevent her from running 'in circles'. Why not, then, translate Glückel, a blood-relation, by way of discovering herself? In the preface of her translation of Glückel *(25),* she quotes from the second book of the Memoirs: 'My dear children, I write this for you, and I write a brief account so that you may

know from whom you are descended when your own dear children and grandchildren . . . come to you and do not know their family'. One may guess that Bertha, as far as her own family was concerned, wanted to stamp out the image of a *'luftmensch'* (an 'airy human being') which for Jews who had been homeless for generations meant a plant that hovers so high in the air that its roots never touch the nourishing and lifegiving soil. An 'airy being' is thus a product of the rootlessness of ghetto life.

She apparently felt that she learned little in the Catholic school she attended in Vienna; in her later travels it often annoyed her that she knew little about geography, climate, trade, and the like. Like the daughters of most well-to-do families, she had a governess. Particularly mentioned in Anna O's case history is the fact that she hated her governess. Bertha Pappenheim spoke of a dear and kindly governess; this may have been someone else or she may have wanted to defend her governess after her history was published.

All in all, it is odd that Bertha Pappenheim officially began her social work career in 1895, the year that Anna O's history appeared, when she could read about herself if she wished. She did not like to read, however, and two years before her death she wrote:

> If I dare speak again about myself, I should say that my need for a daily newspaper is completely different from the ease with which I can do without books. What interests me and moves me in the daily papers is the inconstant, the emergent, the incomplete political, social, and economic possibilities in all their effects and intricacies. The book, rounded off and finished, usually intrigues me less. . . . I have an incurable respect for all the knowledge which I myself lack, and I believe precisely that my ignorance and lack of education make me fearful of facing a book. On the other hand, I also believe . . . that what I have become or not become can be blamed on this defective spiritual nourishment, I am almost tempted to say starvation (7, p. 103).

She was prone to suffer from spiritual undernourishment. This was the case too when she fell ill. The orthodox Jewish home was insufficient for Bertha's energy. Nor was she artistically gifted. During her treatment with Breuer she fantasied in fairy-tale style. She published a small collection of stories, *In der Trödelbude,* in 1890 *(2),* in all of which there is a dramatic element in their fairy-tale style that makes them exciting; the individual stories told by the rusty objects in the antique shop depict glimpses of human life and moods. These stories were published under the pseudonym P. Berthold, which means that once again her name has been turned up-side-down: A.O., B.P., P.B.[4] They round off, so to speak, her Vienna period and were probably finished before she experienced the atmosphere of her next home, Frankfort-on-the-Main.

Among other things, Frankfort was known for its disreputable ghetto, the *Judengasse.* Although famous Jews came from there, its disrepute arose from its misery, remarkable even for a ghetto. Goethe, in *Dichtung und Wahrheit,* describes the *Judengasse* as 'hardly more than a single street apparently squeezed in between the city wall and the moat. . . . The narrowness, the dirt, the throngs of people, the accent of a depressing language, all this together made the most unpleasant impression when you caught a glimpse of it in merely passing the gate.'

By the time Bertha Pappenheim came to live in Frankfort,[5] the ghetto walls had fallen and capable Jews were striving to improve the conditions of their co-religionists. Among the women there was a tradition of helping and we find Bertha working in this district. She is said to have been introduced to social work by a relative, but from what we know of her it

[4] 

[5] Her mother's name is registered in the Frankfort city archives for the first time in 1890.

would probably have been impossible for her not to apply her strength, ideas, and gifts to some task; if she had not, she might have fallen ill as she did in Vienna. Welfare work was an important field in Frankfort and this became her particular sphere. Her self-scrutiny probably helped her gain some understanding of the problem. She said of her upper class friends: 'These children, who grew up with veiled eyes, do not know the relationship between poverty, illness, and crime. They only know poverty in the shape of begging in the streets or in theatrical presentations, illness as something disgusting, and crime as a sin before which one has to make the sign of the cross in the moral sense' *(1,* p. 4*)*.

In 1895, she was appointed director of the Jewish Orphanage for Girls *(Jüdisches Mädchenhaus)*. Although such practical work was entirely new and foreign to one of her upbringing, she threw herself wholeheartedly into it and took it on herself to learn about the demands of the girls in the home and the requirements for administering a household, large or small. That housewives needed better education was her opinion, in opposition to the old Jewish rule that women should learn nothing even though they were expected to be the center of the home. She said: 'Our time makes the imperative demand: everything in the private households, the cells of the state, which the impoverished world needs, are recognized and nursed in order that it may recover from the damages of our time'.[6]

She recollected that like other young women, she had been forced to take piano lessons regardless of talent, and to go to tea parties with superficial small talk. She felt that Frankfort's upper-class girls might benefit by learning practical work and she set up a sewing school for them. She herself was accustomed to use her hands and to tat lace, an exercise she valued highly. Lace was apparently important to her; she collected it on her travels, urged others to tat, and in her will bequeathed her

[6] I emphasize her vision in regard to the position of women to balance Karpe's supposition that she devoted herself to the emancipation of women because of hate for her father, Freud, etc.

own collection to the Vienna Museum for Applied Art. Recently Dora Edinger told me that Bertha Pappenheim often was busily occupied during conversations and meetings stringing pearls. Lace, however, was a symbol for her:

> These wonderful varieties of shapes, the element of which is one single straight and fine cotton thread. If I were not an enemy of poetic comparisons and if all my metaphors were not lame, I should be tempted to say that from such a fine genuine material our life might also produce even and straight threaded interlacing traceries, whether simple or complicated. I long to lead such a life and I hate the coarse fingers that destroy beautiful patterned structures and tear and disturb the threads *(1,* p. *27).*

Anna O—Bertha Pappenheim—led such a life, and we are able to trace the fine threads running through all of it.

As director of the *Jüdisches Mädchenhaus,* Bertha Pappenheim retrained several older co-workers to carry out her ideas: to give the girls an opportunity to learn practical work, to instruct them in school subjects, including history, geography, and æsthetic appreciation. On Sundays she would take the children to her mother's home so that they could enjoy the art objects there. As she realized she could not have the same personal relationship to all thirty girls in her care and as she disapproved of superficiality in relationships, she chose to maintain a certain distance to them. She preferred justice to love. One of her mottoes was, 'To be severe is to be loving'. A nurse in Frankfort with whom I talked felt it was cruel that Bertha did not have central heating installed in the institution she founded in Neu-Isenburg. To a few friends Bertha Pappenheim said: 'The clientele of the home will never in life be able to live in houses with central heating. It is my task to accustom them to the sort of life they will lead later on, not to spoil them, as that would make their hard everyday lot even harder.'

Bertha Pappenheim had a gift for organization. In one of her many *Denkzettel,* which she seems to me to have used as a means of abreaction, she writes:

> I believe that a viable organization can come into existence only on the basis of an ethical or spiritual goal, observation of all details, the collection of all experiences that might lead to the goal, an incorruptible volition not to lose sight of the ethical background and above all, an on-going inspiring fantasy that keeps the work alive. . . . I make bold to maintain that without imagination it is totally impossible to organize anything at all, and I suppose that what has come alive in my work in the social fields and with an ethically religious content and background, has its parallel in the fields of technology, scientific research and commerce. Part of the talent for organizing expresses itself, at least in me, in a quick, sharply critical perception which is not manifest solely in the discovery of defects but also in finding ways and means of approval. In intercourse with people and in the work, the courage to express one's opinion freely is indispensible, which admittedly may create great difficulty. . . . The spiritual activity of organizing seems to me to contain an artistic element. For me as a human being, it means so much when it is successful that I necessarily react with hate against the disturbance or destruction of an organization that I have conceived and willed. It is the same way a printer or a sculptor reacts when he sees his work destroyed *(1,* p. 11*).*

But for Bertha Pappenheim one task was insufficient. In 1902 she founded a society called *Weibliche Fürsorge,* a welfare-care organization for women engaged in social work. In 1904 she founded another society, *Jüdischer Frauenbund.* And, as mentioned, she extended her work beyond the frontiers of her own country. An informant in Frankfort said that she was always ahead of her time, that she could clearly visualize future developments. Another woman said that she did not always stay 'down to earth'—perhaps the way her foresight impressed more earthbound souls. A gentleman who admired her greatly

spoke of her pronounced ability to treat all practical and ordinary work in an imaginative way. It was incomprehensible to the upper classes in Frankfort that she devoted most of her life to the fate of 'these ordinary girls'. However, people accepted her quaint ideas, perhaps because she was one of them, very lively, and elegant. She also led an active social life. She lived in a large, beautifully furnished apartment on Feldbergstrasse, traveling to and from the home in Neu-Isenburg by tram. One night each week she entertained her co-workers; she arranged the table decorations and cooked the meal. On such evenings she might converse far into the night. If someone remarked that 'we Jews have no living space', she would answer, 'We need no living space. We have a spiritual space and it is infinite' *(1,* p. 24*)*.

In 1900, she published a pamphlet, *Zur Judenfrage in Galizien* (The Jewish Problem in Galicia) *(4),* which she signed 'P. Berthold' but she inserted in brackets beneath the name, Bertha Pappenheim. On the sheet before the title page her little collection, *In der Trödelbude (2),* is mentioned as having been written by the same author and thus she first publicly acknowledged the authorship of the collection of fairy tales.[7] She had not yet personally witnessed the miserable conditions under which the Galician Jews lived but knew of them from Galician immigrants. In the pamphlet she stressed the importance of educating young Galician women. There was no discussion of prostitution. She first took cognizance of that subject

[7] We may recall that in 1895 she herself had been 'published' in a different manner—as Anna O. Did she aim to establish herself as an author and as someone publicly known as Anna O, a character about whom it was possible to read? Although it is always stated that Anna O's identity was unknown, it seems probable to me that a number of her contemporaries knew that Bertha Pappenheim was Anna O. Her father was a well-known grain dealer, known as the founder of the synagogue, 'The shipschool'. It is almost unthinkable that people who read the book, Studies on Hysteria *(5),* published by Breuer and Freud, and reviewed in a Vienna newspaper, and who remembered that for a long period this same Breuer, a well-known physician, visited the Pappenheim family every day, should not have guessed the connection between these visits and the case story, 'Anna O'.

on a journey as a delegate to Galicia in 1904 and discussed it in her report as it appeared against the social and cultural background *(34)*.

The problem of prostitution was of course well known in Vienna[8] although it is doubtful that it was known to Anna O. Brothels were common but their existence was denied. Once she became aware of it, Bertha Pappenheim was unable to ignore such a glaring contradiction. It seems unnecessary to regard her fight against prostitution as a sublimation of a personal fight against Freud and his teachings *(21,* p. 23*)*. As we know, Freud did not accept uninhibited sexuality; he merely expected his patients not to deny the fact of sexuality and to grant it a natural role. And this attitude we find in a report by Bertha Pappenheim after an official visit to a brothel.

> Today I found one of the most beautiful Jewish women I ever saw—in a brothel. A pity that such a proud flower should have been born is such surroundings, born for such a purpose in life. I can well understand that a man might commit a foolish act for the sake of such a woman, but I cannot understand this twenty-year-old person who offers for sale her most beautiful and best possession, her body. Has she no soul, then? In truth, she cannot write nor can she read *(28,* p. 40*)*.

Prostitutes at that time had no opportunity to free themselves, in contrast to those of our time. They had nowhere to turn in order to earn a living; they had no education and were unable to read or write. In her next letter Bertha Pappenheim went on to say that the young girl was so beautiful that she would probably dream about her that night, but the next day she wrote:

[8] Stefan Zweig gives an account of the prostitution problem in Vienna *(38)* and mentions it was as easy to buy a woman as to buy a cigarette or a newspaper, and he continues to say that this was the city, the society, which was shocked at seeing young girls riding a bicycle and which declared it to be a disgrace for the dignity of science when Freud in his calm, clear, and penetrating way asserted truth which one was unwilling to respect as truth. The very world which in such a pathetic way defended purity accepted this selling oneself and even profited by it.

> Of course I did not dream about Jolanthe, but last night I wanted to have my rubbers melted down because I found them too heavy. *Chalaumes,* my father would have said to me in a reproachful way. . . . Innumerable times during the day I am reminded of words, opinions, etc. of both my parents and of my Miss Hoffman. I recall these people who not only gave me life, as father and mother, but unknowingly filled it with valuable content *(28,* p. 41*).*

These letters, written to friends in Frankfort every day or two, were a kind of diary, and she commented that her letter writing was important for her as she could more easily rid her mind of problems and view them more objectively if they were recorded. The letters have given the feeling to the author that Bertha Pappenheim in her innermost being nourished the dream of daring to live out all her zest for life. She was stopped by the overpowering years of illness. She found a way of affirming life in giving help and this for her became the natural road to contact with the world. In the opinion of the author, it did not become a complex.

She spoke of herself as 'very chic and elegant' after riding in the same compartment with two Scandinavian ladies. During a boat trip she enjoyed the company of a group of gentlemen who were astonished to learn that she was fifty-one and not thirty. One of them invited her to spend a week with him and she wrote to one of her women friends: 'You can imagine how much quiet amusement this affords me and how much I still have to learn' *(28,* p. 91*).* In Warsaw she met a nerve specialist, Dr. N., who 'often goes to Heidelburg to keep up his scientific knowledge' *(28,* p. 157*).*[9] In St. Petersburg she wished to meet people less inhibited than those she had known. 'It seems to me that I shall not be able to get acquainted at the source with the representatives of Russian psychology who have given us so much to do' *(28,* p. 179*).* In Constantinople she was charmed by little gypsy children and wished to bring one

[9] Heidelburg was the site of Kraepelin's center for the study of nervous and mental diseases.

home with her. She wanted to find out 'whether and when, what is learned is defeated by what is inborn' *(28,* p. 50*)*. In the Jewish colony of Rechaboth she was circumspect in her speech for the colonists were sensitive to criticism, and Bertha Pappenheim found it hard to accept Zionism. But she could not be silent: when someone complained about the lack of street-lights, her answer was that if every home-owner would hang out a lamp the colony would be illuminated. 'You see, my disastrous brain always has to breed plans.' And so it did. In the view of the author there is at times something manic in her writings and actions although without the flight of thought and the lack of basic reality met with in real mania.[10]

Her travel letters reveal that she worked intensely every possible moment. Yet this work did not prevent her style from being effortless and easy. Her letters are bright but there is always a description of the heavy burden of work. 'I like the word duty; for me it means a salutary and necessary counterbalance, a counterpoise to my fantasy, which is tempted to run wild and would were it not for my duties. And, I may add, duties one takes upon oneself, like self-imposed laws, do not feel heavy' *(28,* p. 123*)*.

The letters were published in 1924, under the pessimistic title, *Sisyphus-Arbeit*. In an early paragraph she says they are being published because 'to know about injustice and to be silent makes one an accomplice' *(28,* p. 5). A second part of this book was published in 1929 *(30),* but the spelling in the title was changed to *Sysiphus*. Was this a purposeful 'play with spelling'? In any event the second part of the book contains wide-ranging correspondence about the decline of the birth rate, birth control, mixed marriages, eugenics, and suicide statistics among Jews.

The main thought Bertha Pappenheim expresses in *Sysiphus Arbeit* is again protection of the Jewish minority—to help the Jewish lower classes. With no state and no church to protect

[10] Dora Edinger, in a letter to the author *(11),* said that a second cousin 'was a clear case of a manic-depressive'.

him, the ordinary Jew was helpless; when he sought help he was easily seduced from his people by Christian missionaries, as Bertha Pappenheim described in her story, The Redeemer *(27)*. An illegitimate Jewish child was a pariah, not accepted by the Jewish community, and their religion forbade that he be supported. So if her institution at Neu-Isenburg was not given funds, the children would be taken away and turned over to the state-supported public welfare organization, that is to a non-Jewish institution where the child would not receive Jewish education and influence. Although her letters and appeals to various people about the fight against prostitution often remained unanswered, she succeeded in having a resolution sent to the League of Nations requesting the release of material on the complicity of Jews in white slavery. One who responded to her appeal and offered to sign the resolution was Albert Einstein *(30,* p. 48*)*. An unfortunate result of her efforts was that the Nazis used the facts gathered by Bertha Pappenheim against the Jews in their propaganda about 'racial hygiene'.

Altogether Bertha Pappenheim suffered many disappointments in her later years. Especially she could not tolerate that social work become a career job. She feared that the consequence would be that it might be performed with less energy and less personal warmth.

Bertha Pappenheim wrote a great deal besides the travel letters. In 1899 she translated Mary Wollstonecraft's book, A Vindication of the Rights of Women *(37)*. Mary Wollstonecraft, a remarkable and colorful figure of eighteenth-century England, dedicated her book to the proposition that a woman should be a man's companion, not his plaything. In the same year, Bertha Pappenheim wrote a short play, Women's Rights. According to Karpe *(21)*, the theme of the play is the woman's right to refuse marital relations with an unfaithful, unfeeling, and suspicious husband. Karpe says, 'Thenceforth Bertha Pappenheim took up the fight for the protection of the unmarried girls who also appeared to her to be the victims of men's sexual desires' (p. 16).

It is hard to find out at what particular time Bertha Pappenheim developed her interest in the fight against white slavery. (In her 1900 pamphlet [*4*], she does not mention the subject.) In any event I should like to suggest that a possible motive behind her fight against white slavery was her objection to a woman having as her life goal the offering of her body for sale, to serve as a plaything for a man, which is not identical with a fight against the male sex in general. Her ideas might be compared to those of Henrik Ibsen, whose social-problem plays were translated into German and other languages at this time. While Ibsen is often interpreted as an author who strives to throw a glaring light on the accepted 'lies' in society and marriage, he himself said that what is central is the fight for the independence of the personality. 'My task has been to describe human beings . . . for me then it has been a task to lift up my country and to put my people on a higher level' *(18,* p. xxxiv*)*.

A similar interpretation might be applied to Bertha Pappenheim's literary work during this period. In *Zur Lage der Jüdischen Bevölkerung in Galizien,* she speaks of the damage done if a woman, and her personality, are left undeveloped and uneducated.

In *Kämpfe (27),* a collection of short stories, she describes the life and fate of Eastern European Jews after their migration to Western European cities. The dramatic trilogy, *Tragische Momente (26),* describes the Russian pogroms against the Jews, the opposition to receiving exiled Jews in Western Europe, and especially the difficulty of transplanting Jews to Palestine. She quotes a young Jew: 'With a thousand threads I feel bound to the culture that has grown and was inherited through centuries in Western Europe, by which the collaboration of Christians and Jews has become common property. I need the books, the paintings, the stage, the newspapers, the struggle between opinions and interests, urban industry with its technical facilities. I cannot play the role of a peasant . . . I cannot, father.' Bertha Pappenheim clearly saw

this aspect of Zionism. Nevertheless she did her best to propagate Jewish culture by translating several works into German so that they might be read and appreciated by the Western world, ignorant of Yiddish.

Besides *Die Memoiren der Glückel von Hameln (25),* she translated from Yiddish the collection of stories, *Allerlei Geschichten, Maasse-Buch (31),* which she subtitled A Book of Sagas and Legends from Talmud and Midrash, together with Folk Tales in the Jewish-German Language, and The Women's Bible, *Zeenah u-Reenah, Frauenbibel (32).* In 1936, shortly after her death, the Union of Jewish Women published a volume of her prayers *(Gebete [33]),* which includes these lines:

> I am grateful that I can dam up
> As in a cool mill-pond
> Whatever power grows in my mind
> Unintentionally and unforced,
> Solely for my own pleasure.
>
> I thank also for the hour
> In which I found words
> For what moves me, so that I could
> Move others by them.
>
> To feel strength is to live
> —to live is to wish to serve.
>
> Allow me to . . . [19 July 1934]
> (author's translation).

A relative donated the funds that enabled her to found the home for young women 'who have been deprived of the safety of an upright way of life'. Homeless mothers and orphans were also cared for. The home, located in Neu-Isenburg near Frankfort and about which she wrote a report *(29),* rapidly expanded and finally comprised four houses. She wished to provide a home for boys, but this proved to be impossible for financial reasons; the First World War imposed many restrictions on her work. Regarding criteria for admission to the home, Bertha Pappenheim wrote that they might be 'as various as life itself, as reasons for rejecting an application . . . and

for short-term discharge the following have become established in practice: contagious diseases, spiritual and moral defects that might disturb and destroy the collective life, incapacity for being reared, and, as regards those who have finished ordinary school, a very violent admission into the home which cannot be overcome by kindly appeal'.

Dora Edinger *(7,* p. 12*)* and Richard Karpe *(21,* p. 22*)* have pointed out that she objected vehemently to the psychoanalytic treatment of children. I have found no reference to this attitude in her writings, but as the children in the home were poor and uneducated they were hardly well suited for the long psychoanalytic process. Edinger quotes Bertha Pappenheim: 'Psychoanalysis in the hands of the physician is what confession is in the hands of the Catholic priest. It depends on its user and its use, whether it becomes a beneficial tool or a two-edged sword' *(7,* p. 12*)*. With reference to Karpe's words about her antisexualism, the following passage in defense of admitting young nonmarried pregnant girls to the home is of interest:

> Characteristically the moral and religious feelings of otherwise intelligent and kindly women were wounded and they withdrew their support when unpleasant social facts demanded the opening of House Number Three. The unmarried mother, the fatherless child, the person no longer blameless sexually in their eyes, were pariahs, untouchables *(29,* p. 9*)*.

Bertha Pappenheim's wish for her institution in Neu-Isenburg was that it be 'not an institution for backward children in a legal sense, not a marble memorial of an institution with notices, regulations, votive tablets, corridors, dormitories and dining-halls of an elementary school, with dungeons and cells and a domineering director family; but a home, even though a substitute, for the desirable upbringing in a good family. It must be a home for children in danger of losing their morality, whether because of psychophysical disposition or external conditions' *(29,* p. 8*)*. She discusses the terms psychopathic or nervous:

> Here it seems fitting to say a word about the frequent misuse of the terms nervous and psychopathic. . . . Those who can be educated or trained only with difficulty are regarded as psychopathic, which in a certain sense is very convenient. Naturally there are genuine psychopaths, but they are probably far rarer than persons so named. Many children and youths who are classified thus—the children of the upper classes are more often called nervous—are educationally crippled by upbringing, tainted in the second and third generation with unreason *(29,* p. 13*)*.

The home at Neu-Isenburg is now used for mentally retarded children and also by a Froebel school. The buildings are still standing except for Bertha Pappenheim's private home, which burned down during a riot. An office worker in the town hall, where I went in the hope of finding material, remembered the extensive welfare work done in the home during his youth.

I have been told that Bertha Pappenheim's sensitivity and nervousness now and then became apparent, although hidden from most people. For example, the home often received gift packages from all over Germany and she usually found use for the many things received. But on one occasion she unpacked some worn rubber bands, became enraged and threw them on the floor. Early the next morning she phoned a co-worker to ask if the bands were still available; in the night she had had the idea they might be used for tying up laundry. Her colleagues laughed at her eagerness and recounted this story in her obituary *(1,* p. 14*)* to show that every trifle occupied Bertha Pappenheim's thoughts. This incident might also show us how a sensitive Anna O felt remorse for having unjust thoughts about another human being and had no peace of mind until she rectified her mistake. Here another poem from her prayers is appropriate.

Strongly and quickly beats
My heart up to my very lips.
It seems strength

Yet is weakness.
And when weakness wins
Let it yet have been strong [13 April 1928]
(33, author's translation*).*

Are Bertha Pappenheim and Anna O the same woman? As mentioned, Ellenberger is not convinced of the identity, and in a letter to me *(13)* expresses doubts about the reliability of Ernest Jones's version. However, the following considerations seem to me to furnish evidence that they are the same woman.

Bertha Pappenheim told Dora Edinger that she had been mentally ill. The name Bertha Pappenheim appears in Freud's letter of July 13, 1883. Her father, Sigmund Pappenheim, died on the same date as Anna O's father *(12).* The Mayor's office in Neu-Isenburg has a record that 'a citizen, the director of the Neu-Isenburg institution, Bertha Pappenheim, was born on February 27, 1859, in Vienna *(24).* Her parents were Sigmund Pappenheim and Recha, nee Goldschmidt.' And Breuer describes Anna O thus:

> She was markedly intelligent, with an astonishingly quick grasp of things and penetrating intuition. She possessed a powerful intellect which would have been capable of digesting solid mental pabulum and which stood in need of it—though without receiving it after she had left school. She had great poetic and imaginative gifts, which were under the control of a sharp and critical common sense. Owing to this latter quality she was *completely unsuggestible;* she was only influenced by arguments, never by mere assertions. Her will-power was energetic, tenacious and persistent; sometimes it reached the pitch of an obstinacy which only gave way out of kindness and regard for other people.
>
> One of her essential character traits was sympathetic kindness. Even during her illness she herself was greatly assisted by being able to look after a number of poor, sick people, for she was thus able to satisfy a powerful instinct. Her states of feeling always tended to a slight exaggeration, alike of cheerfulness and gloom; hence she was sometimes subject to moods *(5,* p. 21*).*

Is it possible to read this description of Anna O and compare it with the character of Bertha Pappenheim and not conclude that they were the same person?

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Victor Calef

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BOOK REVIEWS

INDICATIONS FOR CHILD ANALYSIS AND OTHER PAPERS, 1945-1956. THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD, VOLUME IV. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1968. 690 pp.

Individual psychiatry, frequently attacked in the past, is now being attacked as irrelevant by the same current of indictment as other contemporary institutions. For example, a recent psychiatric throw-away magazine[1] quotes the editor of the Journal of Psychotherapy, Dr. Stanley Lesse, to the effect that psychotherapies as practiced in the United States are anachronistic and out of step with the broad socio-economic and socio-philosophical trends of our rapidly changing society. From a different vantage point, a youth movement in the European analytical societies strives to change the organizational structures of their institutions with implications for a revolution in the practice of psychoanalysis.

Such expressions of ferment for a social psychiatry are condemned by many as uninformed and opinionated. However, little is done to determine the relevance of the theory of individual psychology for the theory and practice of social psychiatry. The Writings of Anna Freud, Volume IV, may well serve as a bridge between individual and community psychiatry. One of a series, it consists of thirty-five papers first published in the eleven years between 1945 and 1956, many of which are more than just psychoanalytic expositions and have intentions beyond the practice of individual psychoanalysis.

Though it is not yet time to enumerate and evaluate all of Anna Freud's contributions to science, psychoanalysis, and humanity, some of the qualities of her productivity are readily appreciated and have been acknowledged. A recent tribute[2] recognizes, among other things, Miss Freud's remarkable appreciation of the reciprocal relationship between phenomenology and theory. Her use of psychoanalytic theory and observation has produced a number of works considered as classic since their first appearance. Many of the papers in this volume qualify in that category, including

[1] Roche Report, Frontiers of Clinical Psychiatry, Vol. 6, No. 9, May 1, 1969.

[2] Lustman, Seymour L.: *The Scientific Leadership of Anna Freud.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XV, 1967, pp. 810-827.

the one which gives this volume its title. Another, published here in English for the first time, The Problem of Training Analysis, was first written and published in German in 1938. Even the non-German reading analyst is familiar with her thoughts on the subject, since the power and impact of her writings are such that most have heard her views from teachers and colleagues. In that sense, and that sense alone, there will be no surprises for the psychoanalyst in this volume.

We have grown accustomed to and take for granted the clarity of her papers and her ability to translate complex data and theory into easily understandable terms, providing new insights into the theory of analysis and potentials for the improvement and extension of the practical clinical tools. The many ways in which she describes the psychosexual phases of development are models for the psychoanalytic teacher. Her contributions to theory have become so familiar that we take them as our own, though that sense of familiarity does not prevent the reader from recognizing the complexities and originality of her work. Her observations as a clinician and research worker, her theoretical understanding, and her capacity to communicate what she does and what she understands cannot be overestimated. Her theoretical stance on the importance of the instinctual qualities for the development of object relationships, as she expresses it in the paper On the Mutual Influences of the Ego and the Id, stands as a bulwark against criticisms that attempt to discredit the quantitative factor in psychoanalytic theory. The distinction she makes between the needs of the infant and the object of satisfaction in psychogenesis in the paper, Problems of Infantile Neurosis, is one of the clearest statements of the analytic theory on the causes of illness, enriching the concepts of internalization and structuralization. Even the smallest details of her observations seem to have clinical as well as theoretical usefulness, as, for example, the observations that led her to differentiate between the projection of aggression and the displacement of hate onto strangers.

Her studies on developmental and maturational events have important consequences for the analytic concepts of disease processes, the choice of neurosis, the nature of the infantile neurosis, and the relationship of the infantile neurosis to the adult neurosis. The recognition of a wide variety of developmental and matura-

tional disorders which need not, and indeed cannot, be treated by psychoanalysis (they are not conceived as products of the same mental representations and elaborations as the neuroses) permits a greater depth to the concepts of fixation and regression and uncovers a new sequence of symptom formation. Prevention, guidance, advice, and education based on psychoanalytic theory become the treatment methods of choice. In this connection, the second paper of this series may prove to be historical, for in describing the psychoanalytic study of feeding disturbances in children, Anna Freud exposes a group of developmental issues which transcend the psychoneurotic feeding problems. The pregenital fixations she elaborates may well be the basis for, and the core of, the infantile neuroses and therefore a potential factor in the development of adult neurosis. Nevertheless, the infantile neuroses are considered and dealt with in their own right, separate and apart from the consequences for the mental ills of the adult.

The concentration on developmental processes and her treatment of infantile disorders as independent entities may be considered as paradigmatic, a demonstration of the method by which she uses the theory of psychoanalysis to reach into areas having important consequences for social and community problems.

Her description of developmental phases rests on the psychoanalytic knowledge of instinctual life. However, it would be an oversimplification to believe that she is only restating the story of the instinctual vicissitudes. In the paper, On Emotional and Instinctual Development, she says: 'The difficulties which arise before normal adult instinctual and emotional functioning is achieved are manifold. There seems little object in approaching their study in any other way than on the basis of an understanding of the *infantile development* (italics mine) of which they are the outcome' (p. 488). It is of more than passing significance that she reconstructs various phases of childhood development, restating what is well known to the psychoanalyst of instinctual life through reconstructions from the analysis of both adults and children. The wealth of deductions arises not only from data coming out of psychoanalytic observations. Many other avenues of observation are implied and the specific tool for understanding the data is the psychoanalytic theory itself, suggesting attitudes and behavior that would be appropriate to child rearing and prevention.

Miss Freud does not pursue applications for psychoanalytic theory blindly or unconsciously. She is quite deliberate. In the prefatory remarks she says specifically that the extension of her activities from private practice to clinical practice with children followed the creation of an organization which set itself the tasks 'to apply psychoanalytic therapy to disturbed children of all ages; to apply psychoanalytic thinking to the upbringing of normal and handicapped children; to increase the body of knowledge known as psychoanalytic child psychology; to train non-medical candidates in the techniques of child analysis, child guidance, parent guidance, and the diagnosis of childhood disturbances'. The majority of the contributions are deliberate efforts to unravel the developmental phases of the ego and its functions, both normal and pathological. The first paper owes its value (at least in part) to the fact that it describes the transitory nature of neurotic symptoms in children which precludes their use as reliable guides to the indications for psychoanalysis, while evidences of interferences in development serve as better indicators for analysis with children. When these papers are read chronologically, the emphasis on developmental processes becomes overwhelming, and the question becomes inevitable: whether the wealth of new observation and thought does not arise from the shift of focus from the psychoneurotic processes to developmental and maturational ones? In her hands psychoanalytic theory is in the process of enrichment, though the specific use of the psychoanalytic method of observation is not the only tool she uses for gathering data.

This random discussion of Miss Freud's wide-ranging interests is not intended to summarize or paraphrase that which cannot be condensed but to underscore the expansion of the methods of observation and the enrichment of theory which is important for individual psychology.

Future generations of psychoanalysts may decide that Anna Freud was, in her time, the chief metallurgist of psychoanalysis, finding ways and means to forge and apply new alloys to fields beyond, though never losing sight of, the 'pure gold'. Psychoanalysis developed out of attempts to understand and cure functional symptoms, i.e., the psychoneuroses. Freud's studies revealed, among other things, the multiple significance of symptoms that had specific mental content (mental representation) molded by certain

mental processes into recognizable shapes and structures and that could potentially be influenced and modified by psychological means, especially by interpretation. Certainly Anna Freud continued in that tradition when she wrote the classic, The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense. She has never left that tradition, and though the present volume contains nothing new about symptom formation in psychoneurosis, frontiers are developed toward understanding other mental illnesses.

The entire volume reflects an ever-increasing distance from clinical psychoanalysis; Miss Freud's field of observation is enriched by curiosity about 'normality', development, and the integrative functions, thus finding modifications and applications of psychoanalytic theory to education, to parent and teacher guidance, to research, to the understanding, control, and prevention of all forms of mental disturbances, including the psychoneuroses. She refers specifically to the gaps in knowledge of the relationship between the developmental processes and the functions of the ego, which she warns calls for cautious investigation by the psychoanalytic method and the individual approach. Nevertheless, she is not deterred by that gap; she is spurred by it to include other means of observation. In the natural experiment incorporated in An Experiment in Group Upbringing, created by the circumstances of the war, direct observation by numerous workers is extensively used to good purpose.

A group of children who had lost their parents and were brought to England were closely observed as they were reared in a group setting. Deprived of their parents, they used the sibling group situation as substitutes. The point is made that the absence of the early relationship to the mother did not necessarily disrupt ego functions to the point of deficiency, delinquency, or psychosis because the ego could use the objects to be found in the group as substitute stimulation for growth and development—a research that certainly needs confirmation by other workers, as the implications for prevention are vast if the deductions are correct.

That paper illustrates her research and methodology, which appears to adhere to the suggestion made by Glover[3] that psychoanalytic theory may be used as a means for research. Only a high

[3] Glover, Edward: *Basic Mental Concepts.* London: Imago Publishing Co., 1947, p. 1.

degree of sophistication about the theory and a great familiarity with the clinical facts of psychoanalysis will permit reliable research of this kind to avoid wild, inexact, and inaccurate applications of the theory. To this end we may require Miss Freud to detail, even more exactly than she already has, what permits such successful applications of the psychoanalytic theory to research. We need to be able to state more exactly the links between observational data and inferences drawn in order to emulate her dependably in the applications of the theory—a difficult and hazardous undertaking even for those most familiar with psychoanalysis as an observational and theoretical tool.

The Writings of Anna Freud will occupy reviewers, researchers, and psychoanalysts for years to come, and demand a comparison of her concepts on development with those of Heinz Hartmann on the ego as the organ of adaptation, and those of Erik Erikson on epigenesis. The variations in their concepts of aggression and defusion, in their descriptions of intrasystemic conflicts, in their views on adaptation, and the health and strength of the ego (not necessarily mutually exclusive) are not just academic. They contain the promise for the extension and adaptation of individual psychology to the psychological problems of society. Anna Freud is not adverse to stating the differences between her theoretical position and that of other workers (a facet of her writing I find provocative and instructive). For example, in The Mutual Influences of the Ego and the Id she outlines her view on object relationships as determined by a quantitative factor, namely a decrease in the urgency of the drives themselves, and compares it with Hoffer's concept, which stresses the transformation of narcissistic into object libido, and with Hartmann's concept of the neutralization of energy leading to object constancy.

Historians of psychiatry may place Miss Freud in the forefront of the movement now known as Community Psychiatry just because of her researches in development and her focus on prevention and education. For the moment it remains an open question whether the adherents of community and social psychiatry (though perhaps motivated by the same humanitarian ideals as Miss Freud) are involved in similar methodologies. Both attempt to apply psychological theory to a variety of problems. It seems clear that Miss Freud and some workers in the community mental health move-

ment have similar goals, though not all share her theoretical position or her sophistication as a scientific observer. Despite her caution and her warning, the question cannot be avoided as to whether the similarity of interests and goals tend to force our attention away from the treatment of individuals and away from psychoanalytic observation as a tool for research.

Printing errors scattered throughout this volume occur frequently enough to be distracting and annoying. To judge by the content, there will be a large demand for this volume. Its value for both the present and the future of psychoanalytic research will be increasingly appreciated not just by psychoanalysts but by all workers in the mental health sciences.

VICTOR CALEF (SAN FRANCISCO)

EXPERIENCE, AFFECT AND BEHAVIOR. PSYCHOANALYTIC EXPLORATIONS OF DR. ADELAIDE MC FADYEN JOHNSON. Edited by David B. Robinson, M.D. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. 511 pp.

This reviewer echoes the warm welcome of the writer of the preface, Dr. Stanislaus Szurek, to the publication of this collection of the writings of Dr. Adelaide Johnson, and congratulates the editor on his careful selection and arrangement of her writings.

Undoubtedly the theoretical and clinical work of Dr. Johnson which have added to our knowledge of human behavior and have achieved the most widespread acknowledgment are those concerned with delinquent and antisocial behavior. Dr. Johnson studied, in both children and adults, the unconscious parental nurturing of superego lacunae through unwitting nonverbal communication of reward for such behavior. Her expanding recognition of the role of this dynamic process, uncovered by her application of psychoanalytic theory and technique, emerges in its full scope in Dr. Robinson's well-chosen selections for this volume.

Adelaide Johnson's later studies on ego functions in schizophrenia, also included in this collection, make welcome rereading. Her psychodynamic interpretations of the genesis of paranoid delusional systems shine out among the literature on schizophrenic family interactions. She elaborates brilliantly Ferenczi's observations on introjection of parental sexual aggressiveness against the

growing child as a root in the evolution of later paranoid delusions, and supports her conceptualization with clinical data.

Her earlier work on psychosomatic disability is included in the first part of the book. It reflects the influence of Franz Alexander and Thomas French who had the good fortune to draw a younger generation with intellectual talents to the Chicago Institute; Dr. Johnson was one of the most brilliant. And her vitality, drive, sparkling and clear elucidation of psychodynamic forces in comprehending abnormal behavior in a wide range of psychopathologic entities emerges in the pages of this volume.

For all those in the field of psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and psychology with interest in a predictably powerful dynamic to explain a number of antisocial behaviors, this collection of Adelaide Johnson's writings under a single cover will be a valuable acquisition. Her students will cherish this volume as a memorial to their talented and admired teacher.

LAWRENCE C. KOLB (NEW YORK)

THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT. By Alfred L. Baldwin. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1967. 618 pp.

The author, Professor of Psychology at New York University, has surveyed in surprising depth seven major theories of child development. They are presented systematically in separate sections: Fritz Heider and Naïve Psychology, Kurt Lewin and Field Theory, The Theory of Jean Piaget, Sigmund Freud and the Psychoanalytic Theory of Development, Stimulus-Response Theories, Heinz Werner: The Organismic Developmental Point of View, and Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales: The Sociological Viewpoint.

The material has been well organized and is lucidly written. The weakest part of the book is the concluding chapter, Toward an Integrated Theory of Child Development—the price one must pay for eclecticism and scientism. However this does not detract from the value of the volume for the college student beginning the study of child development. It can also be recommended to the psychoanalyst seeking a reliable survey of nonpsychoanalytic theories, especially the work of Piaget which receives one hundred thirty-three pages, the longest section in the book.

Psychoanalytic theory receives the second longest treatment, which is a measure of the author's respect for the 'rich detail' in psychoanalytic theory. The author has read Freud carefully and with commendable objectivity. His exposition of the theory of infantile sexuality and character formation is excellent. However his critique of psychoanalytic theory reveals that his reading of post-Freudian freudians has been very spotty. He is oblivious of the importance of nonverbal information in psychoanalytic treatment and theory development, particularly in child analysis. He is unfamiliar with the work of psychoanalysts such as Charles Fisher whose researches have established strong viable links between psychoanalysis and clinical psychology, and experimental psychology and neurophysiology. His conflict about the 'completeness' of psychoanalytic theory might be resolved by greater attention to freudian critiques of freudian theory.

This is a good book, but its second edition could be better.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

THE DREAM IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Leon L. Altman, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 227 pp.

In the introduction to his book, Leon Altman states that an emphasis upon ego psychology has caused the dream to fall into disuse. He maintains that psychoanalysis which does not embrace the dream is inexact and incomplete, and regrets that the training of candidates in psychoanalytic institutes today frequently shows serious limitations in their experiencing of their own dreams and in their ability to integrate dreams with the problems their patients bring them. Altman aims 'to make good this deficiency and to complement the help offered in supervision by describing one analyst's method of working with the dream'.

The practice of sharing their experiences with candidates by reporting in continuous case seminars one of their own analyses has been followed by teachers of psychoanalysis in several institutes. This admirable method of teaching can be supplemented by Altman's book, not only in its consideration of the dream but because of the fact that Altman has broadened his discussion of the dream to compose a brief but comprehensive work on psycho-

analytic technique. In this sense, his book covers a wider range than does Ella Sharpe's Dream Analysis, of which it is reminiscent in its vivid clinical portrayals and technical understanding.

Altman's book itself is made up of two parts: the first consists of a summary of Freud's theory from The Interpretation of Dreams, to which is added a review of the structural theory as it applies to dreams. The second and major part of the book deals with specific topics which arise in psychoanalytic practice: Initial Dreams, Resistance, Transference, Anxiety, Aggression in the Dream, The Dream and Infantile Sexuality, Homosexual Libido and the Dream, The Œdipal Conflict, and Adaptive Ego and Superego in the Dream.

All of these clinical essays are of value to the student of psychoanalysis. The author reveals his reasons for making or refraining from interpretations; he distinguishes the interpretations for the analyst from those for the patient and shows how when the dream is used with a continued awareness of the patient's ego state and the nature of the therapeutic alliance, timely interpretation of the dream can deepen the analytic process, help to integrate past and present, and make the unconscious conscious. A concern for the total analytic situation governs all of Altman's therapeutic interventions.

Application of the structural theory to technical work is admirably demonstrated in the final chapter. Here the author shows how dreams reflect fluctuations in ego functioning during analysis: 'They may herald a growing capacity for the recognition of reality, for the containment of impulse, for the formation of fresh identifications. Their interpretation gives us insight into impending changes of function brought about by the nature and distribution of unconscious forces before we see changes in the clinical picture.'

In this excellent book Altman has fulfilled his aim of stimulating enthusiasm for and interest in the dream. He has demonstrated how the science of dream theory can combine for the good of the patient with the art and science of therapeutic technique, and he has placed a useful tool in the hands of all psychoanalysts who are engaged in the teaching of dreams.

DOUGLAS NOBLE (WASHINGTON)

FRAU LOU: NIETZSCHE'S WAYWARD DISCIPLE. By Rudolph Binion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. 587 pp.

A biography bearing such a subtitle with its hint of promiscuity or delinquency invites attentive reading; the knowledge that it concerns a woman whose bounty was matched by brain and beauty offers the promise of irresistible fascination. Indeed an attitude of anticipation is the natural response to the advent of a new biography of Lou Andreas-Salomé, a woman of unusual gifts who, during a lifetime spanning nearly half of the last and more than a third of the present century, succeeded in collecting—and nearly as often discarding—a most impressive array of eminent personages of both sexes. Heralded as a psychoanalytic study, Mr. Binion's book should carry an appeal beyond that evoked by the turbulence and razzle-dazzle of her peripatetic career that left in its wake an assortment of nervous wreckage including a few suicides. The fact that 'Lou' was one of the first of her sex to become a disciple of Freud should invite the expectation of a richly documented and psychologically sophisticated work. Unfortunately, these expectations are less than fully realized.

Richly documented it is, but like a goose intended to produce *foie gras* the book is stuffed to the bursting point. Footnotes and text are crammed indiscriminately with trivia and irrelevancies side by side with matters of genuine interest and value, giving the impression of an author who doesn't know wheat from chaff and is therefore reluctant to discard a single fact or trim a single quote. Hence, while such forced feeding may produce an exquisite pâté, no such gustatory delight awaits the reader to whom this ponderous and bloodless work may prove indigestible and its subject boring—itself no mean achievement in light of her life story and the reputed 'magic of her personality'. Psychologically sophisticated, moreover, it isn't, as will soon be evident.

Commenting on Lou's own fictional writing, a critic once complained that her books 'lacked the color of life', a formulation which is no less applicable to the present biography. But, when the same critic attributed this lifelessness to her 'excessive emphasis on psychological factors', he was surely in error, as any reader of Dostoevski knows. By the same token the application per se of psychoanalysis to biography, far from exerting a dampening

effect, may, in the hands of its skilled practitioners, endow the subject with an unusual vividness and convey a sense of excitement familiar to readers of detective stories. There is nothing dull or colorless in the biographic works, say, of Greenacre, Kris, or Erikson, who bring the same liveliness to this field as to their non-biographic writings. The conclusion would seem to be that, although some subjects are inherently of greater interest than others, the ultimate appeal of a given biographical work, analytic or not, is determined by a variety of qualities and qualifications residing within the writer. Needless to say in a psychoanalytic biography a fundamental qualification required of the author is a sound, sophisticated, and comprehensive knowledge of the field of psychoanalysis. Unfortunately, judging from both the thirty pages of bibliography and the five hundred-odd pages of text of Frau Lou, it would not appear that this is the case.

It is noteworthy, for example, that Binion's bibliography contains no hint that he is familiar with Kris's Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art, Greenacre's studies of Swift and Carroll, or Erikson's work on Luther. Indeed with the exception of Sigmund Freud the bibliography fails to include a single psychoanalyst, a strange 'how-de-do' in a psychoanalytic biography, for the omission of the contributions not only of these three writers but also of Hartmann, Loewenstein, Jacobson, Anna Freud, and many others would suggest that, as far as the author is concerned, nothing much, and surely nothing new, has been going on in this field in the last thirty years. In point of fact, it would seem that it is Binion who has stood still, a Newtonian in the age of Einstein, unwilling or unable to expand the boundaries of his knowledge beyond that which was understood by his subject, Frau Lou. That his grasp of psychoanalysis is indeed dated, rigid, and restricted is apparent not merely from the lacunae in his bibliography but from the text itself.

No later than the second page he unhesitatingly announces the cause of his subject's unhappy childhood: 'A craving for her father excited by excretion and attended by darkling visions of re-entering his bowel-womb to repossess his penis'. Now, aside from wondering what this sentence might mean, the reader may justly ask by what route did the author arrive there, for there is nothing in the text up to this point—thirty-one lines of the book so far—that

has conceivably paved the way for any conclusion whatever, let alone this rather extravagant one. Psychoanalysis is not an arcanum or an exercise in revealed truth; neither is it in the nature of its methodology, nor of any other scientific discipline for that matter, to initiate a study or an experiment with an unproven conclusion. Unlike the trial scene in Alice in Wonderland where the Queen declares: 'No, no. Sentence first—verdict afterwards', a scientific conclusion should flow naturally from the assembled data to the end that both the experimenter and his auditors are reasonably persuaded of the logic and validity of the ultimate conclusion.

Thus, misgivings about the author's qualification to venture upon psychoanalytic ground are compounded by others concerning the matter of his methodology. Apparently he himself ultimately had some doubts on this score, for at one point he describes himself as being in a 'methodological mess'. Unfortunately this point is not reached until some sixteen pages before the end of the book, a little late in the day one might think for him to suspect that something was wrong. It seems fair to say that an earlier recognition of the demands for methodological precision might have resulted in a far more valuable and readable book and surely would have discouraged such categorical pronouncements as the one already cited, as well as innumerable others generously sprinkled throughout the work, such as undocumented allusions to Lou's childhood masturbation and the cool but unsubstantiated declaration (in a footnote) that her penchant for telling lies was caused by penis envy. What is especially striking about these pronouncements is their resemblance to comparable utterances of Lou, as, for example, her informing her onetime lover, the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, that his nervousness was an expression of guilt over masturbation. This 'interpretation', apparently gratuitously sent to Rilke via the mails, seems no less formidable an example of 'wild analysis' than is Binion's linking Rilke's leukemia to a 'lifelong prepossession [sic] with blood'. Indeed it is not always clear in the present work whether the author is quoting Lou or offering his own opinions, an additional suggestion of a possible lack of differentiation of identity between author and subject. This concordance is particularly apparent in the matter of anality, a facet of development that seemingly holds comparable interest for both Binion and Lou.

Thus, after commenting on her need to channel her thoughts 'pen-and-inkwards—in voluptuous anguish', he appends a footnote beginning, 'Like most men so motivated, Lou suffered from life-long constipation', which leaves the reader in a state of bewilderment and curiosity concerning the sources of the author's knowledge of the gastrointestinal activity of unspecified persons.

Similar questions and perplexities arise from the author's allusions to 're-enactments of an old autoerotic anal fancy', 'anal romance', 'demand for anal renunciation', etc. Here again both the content and the lack of documentation are reminiscent of Lou's psychoanalytic writings. Thus in Anal and Sexual, she contrasted oral experiences as 'incestuous sunshine and blessedness . . . the prototype for later object cathexes and the basis for such piety as amounts to the assurance of being God's child . . . with the anal situation, in which the child and his parents are at odds and which becomes the source of all satanism and blasphemy'. The development of psychoanalytic theory and knowledge since Lou's day has indicated that things are not quite that simple, that oral experiences are not invariably 'sunshine and blessedness', and that toilet training, far from always denoting a submissive or rebellious conflict, may constitute a comparatively uneventful phase, the chief psychological feature of which may reflect a sense of mastery and individuation. That Lou was relatively innocent of ego psychology is hardly surprising, but there is little excuse for Binion to suffer from a kindred parochialism whereby he restricts his own psychoanalytic understanding to remain within the confines of hers.

Needless to say his failure to keep pace with developments in psychoanalysis in the last thirty years has been accompanied not only by a marked restriction in his psychoanalytic visual fields but by rather large and disabling scotomata. One of the more unfortunate aspects of the work is his seeming inability to distinguish the important from the unimportant in his wealth of material and to discern the often striking interrelationships residing there. Thus, on the same second page Binion discloses the arresting fact that in her early years Louise Salomé was called Lelia, a point not mentioned in Peters' biography, My Sister, My Spouse, and one which might cause any biographer, trained in analysis or not, to prick up his ears. For to bestow upon a little girl in 1861 or thereabouts the name of the heroine of a novel of that name

written by George Sand some thirty years before raises some interesting questions: who chose to call her by this name, her fifty-seven-year-old father or her thirty-eight-year-old mother, who had already borne him three sons, one of whom remained a bachelor and occasionally engaged in transvestitism? (Incidentally, Lou managed to convince Freud that she had not three but six brothers.) There is indeed something prophetic in the assigning to Louise Salomé the name of George Sand's heroine, not only because of the seeming androgyny and inconstancy in the love life of both authors, but because of certain remarkable similarities between the lives and personalities of the two Lelias. Like her fictional namesake, Lelia Salomé was adored by a poet, Rilke, who, like his fictional counterpart, was many years the junior of his beloved. Reminiscent of the complaint that Lou's fiction lacked the color of life is a comment made about the fictional Lelia: she 'is not a complete human being. What is she then?—a shadow, a dream, at best an idea. Where love is absent there can be no woman'; Nietzsche referred to Lou as 'a brain with only a rudiment of soul'. 'Cerebral, bewitching and heartless', she appears to have been hampered by a decidedly limited capacity for adult heterosexual love, selecting as objects particularly the lame, the halt, and the blind, which in specific terms included the emotionally unstable, the suicidal, the ambisexual, the Jewish, and the men young enough to be her sons. Her most constant devotion was toward dogs, and she once confided to her diary why this might be so. 'Perhaps as God I would torture my people', she wrote. 'But only the quite strong and perfect. Toward all others I would be overflowingly good—as to dogs and little birds.' To her poet-lover the fictional Lelia cries, 'I love to fondle you and gaze at you as though you were my child'.

Unlike George Sand, however, Lelia Salomé remained childless, although Binion provides evidence of two pregnancies caused by a man many years her junior, both of which were terminated by induced abortion. Here again, although he is in possession of some telling information, Binion appears unaware of its significance, and notably the importance of the context in which these two flirtations with motherhood took place. In both instances they seem to have succeeded closely upon her having sustained a loss; on the first occasion when the writer Richard Beer-Hofmann left her for

another woman; on the second after Rilke broke away from her to marry a woman he had evidently made pregnant. One would suppose that from these sequences Binion might have viewed these losses as a break in a mother-child union which she sought to reform by promptly becoming pregnant, despite her seeming aversion to the condition of pregnancy and motherhood and despite her fear of dying in childbirth, an activity she claimed, by the way, to be the most masculine of all feminine doings. What Binion thinks of this bisexual double-talk is a mystery; like his uncritical assertion that 'literarily [Lou] was most inspired during menstruation', it is not clear whether he is quoting, agreeing, or questioning.

One thing seems sure: he is not interpreting, for he seems to have paid as little heed to the possible ulterior meanings of these assertions as he has to the aforementioned sequence of events leading up to Lou's pregnancies. Indeed the role of motherhood and mothering in his subject's emotional make-up appears to have passed him by unnoticed. Like her he seems to have been so impressed by her preoccupation with her father and his numerous alleged successors that everything else becomes crowded into the background. Nothing so clearly illustrates Binion's scotoma for the importance of the mother than his comment that Beer-Hofmann's 'single sorrow was literally a *far-fetched* one: his mother's death five days after his birth' (italics mine). It is not surprising that a biographer so readily disposed to belittle the far-reaching effects of a mother's post-partum death would display no particular sensitivity in recognizing the nuclear importance of the maternal influence upon his own subject. It would seem probable that it is this that obscures from his view the ultimate sources of Lou's androgyny and her insatiable need to incorporate the brains and the brilliance of a bevy of distinguished men, among whom she flitted less, one suspects, on the wings of an œdipal fantasy than as a means of acquiring those masculine attributes that might serve to insure for her the enduring possession of an elusive mother.

A striking example of how Binion's preoccupation with the œdipal component blinds him to its historical antecedents is furnished by his summary of Lou's novella, *Eine Ausschweifung* (A Dissipation), which he considers a 'remarkable psychoanalytic portrait of a lady'. In this presumably quasiautobiographic work the ultimate masochistic cast to her adult sexual life is ascribed to a

'primal scene' in which the protagonist as a young child witnesses a woman being beaten by a man. What is mentioned by Binion but apparently unnoticed by him is the fact that the woman is a *wet-nurse,* a detail that imparts a new and significant dimension to the story, for quite clearly an allusion, albeit indirect, is now discernible to a fantasy of aggression against a nursing mother. The jealousy implicit here is hardly surprising in view of the childhood history of the author who turned to an aunt and to female family retainers in her search for the maternal warmth that apparently was not forthcoming from her own mother. (Was it a preconscious awareness of this problem or merely a humorous lapse of style that prompted Binion to assert that Lou regarded the female as a 'progenitress in her own right, who rears the embryo to boot'?) It is therefore not difficult to believe a statement quoted by Peters that Lou had an insatiable appetite for semen, the reception of which, she is supposed to have declared, was for her the height of ecstasy, an expression that is reminiscent of her allusion to the nursing situation as 'incestuous sunshine and blessedness'. True or not the alleged comment about semen suggests both a rather restricted response to sexual activity and a more gustatory than genital one at that. Peters also claims that once to appease her longing for an absent lover Lou ate a letter he had written her.

Needless to say there are more than a few hints of homosexual impulses, if not activities, in her history. Binion quotes a letter to Lou, then nearly fifty years old, from Ellen Key, the Swedish feminist, closing with 'I stroke your lovely hair', and another beginning, 'Ravishingly wild Lou', to which the latter replied, 'I could kiss you deaf and blind'. No less striking is the fact that this correspondence of May, 1909, occurred approximately two months after the death of another woman friend, Frieda von Bülow. June of the same year finds Miss Key presenting a dog to Lou and the latter asking Miss Key how she might commit suicide by means of a painless poison since she as expecting a 'horrid illness'. In a footnote the author suggests some relevance here to the recent death of Miss von Bülow, but otherwise he makes no logical connections between the various strands of the themes of birth and death that course throughout this material. (Nor does he comment on the likely sources of the name 'Loufried' applied to the home in which Lou and her husband lived in Göttingen for many years.)

Were the author more attentive to these several sequences he might have arrived at a better understanding of the nature of many, if not most, of her relationships, namely, that they dealt with 'objects' rather than with individuals, wherein each in turn took on the aspect of a replacement for another that had recently been lost or was about to become so. Thus, although Hendrik Gillot had been preaching in the same St. Petersburg church for about five years, it was not until her father's death that she became a passionate—and apparently seductive—disciple of the Dutch pastor. Once, while sitting on his lap, she supposedly fainted, but Gillot was disappointed if he detected in this eighteen-year-old girl a readiness for an adult love affair. Indeed he was the first of a long line of men who apparently made the same mistake. In Peters' words 'the mind of this passionate woman was encased in the body of a child'. Seen in this light many of her relationships seemed to possess the same temporary, expendable, and ultimately limited intrinsic importance that is accorded the edge of a blanket or a fetish. An acknowledgment of the essential imbalance of her love relationships may be discerned in her own paper on narcissism in which she stated that typical disappointments in love have their ultimate and inevitable basis in the fact that the 'object is put on trial . . . to prove that it is more than a living thing, and has to offer its uniqueness, for which it supposedly was selected, as proof of its real universality'.

In view of these several indications of the lopsidedness of her conception of love, it is surprising to read Binion's conclusion that 'she took little from others on the balance, and that little was as if properly her own', for a decidedly contrary impression flows from the material in his book. It is equally difficult to accept his assertion that in the course of her lifetime Lou had 'lived down having been caught copying at the Petrischule', an allusion to her having plagiarized an essay on Schiller at about the age of sixteen. Meticulous attention to the truth does not appear to have troubled her excessively even later in her life, and she was apparently never averse to engaging in what might be termed *retouching:* thus she eliminated the bangs in youthful photographs of herself and had the pictures retaken without them; for a while she posed as of noble lineage, namely as Louise von Salomé; and Binion offers numerous examples of her doctoring both her correspondence and her diary,

of which a noteworthy instance concerns a touching up of some communications she had had with Alfred Adler, apparently with the aim of depicting herself to Freud as a more vigorous opponent of Adler than she indeed had been. Binion also notes that she was fond of writing a large and impressive capital N on her notebooks, after Nietzsche. It is not remarkable that the latter's sister complained that 'the girl is not out to marry Fritz—she just wants to become famous through him'. On another occasion she declared that Lou was her brother's philosophy personified. Identifying herself with the pastor Hendrik Gillot she signed one of her books 'Henri Lou'. And as noted earlier she toyed with the idea of being God.

In sum, Lou emerges as a person of shifting and wavering identity, who by adding, erasing, altering, and engulfing was engaged in an unending search for a definable and coherent image of a self. While composing this review, I paid a visit to Mr. Franz Schoenberner, a gentleman of great charm and scholarship now living in New York. He was a cousin, once removed, of Lou and had known her well. During the course of our conversation I asked him suddenly, 'Tell me, what was she really like?' 'Ah,' he replied, 'that is a difficult question. I doubt if even she knew the answer.'

As if mirroring this shadowy contour of her identity, Binion's portrait of Lou seems to be continually coming in and out of focus, as if he cannot decide where to place either her or himself. If this is so, he is at least in good company; indeed he might be regarded as the latest in a parade of persons who either failed to understand her or sought to make of her an image of their own invention.

The resultant fuzziness of Binion's picture is compounded by certain unfortunate aspects of literary technique and style. Not only is the book several times too long by virtue of an insistent inclusion of easily dispensable data, but it has a jarringly unmusical ring caused by some irritating stylistic mannerisms. Thus, like certain news magazines, Binion invents inelegant words and phrases, like 'felicifically', and 'he epilogued'. An equally annoying allusion to journalese is his penchant for linking events and people with geographic sites, as if the latter were universally recognized as sharing an importance with Waterloo or Pearl Harbor. Thus reminiscent of headlines like 'Paris seeks accord with Belgrade' are Binion's arcane expressions like 'Lou's Jena tirade', 'post-Leipzig

Nietzsche', the 'Zoppot fiasco', the 'Grunewald fiasco', 'blundered to Basel', 'breaking with Naumburg', etc. Another source of alienation in the reader derives from Binion's fondness for clichés, e.g., 'an Oedipal four-and-three quarters', 'blazed his break', or 'to boot' which, as already noted, sometimes impart an accidental *double entendre* to the writing. Two howlers, compounded by some unintended humor of the typesetter can be found in the following sentences, reproduced as they appear in the book:

> She recoiled before what she all at once took to be his low designs on her behind his ecclesiastical front. . . . Lou's progressive self-identification with her father on top of her persistent denial of original separation from him.

Elsewhere the reader is utterly lost in a thick wilderness of prose where sentences virtually break in half:

> If Gillot and Nietzsche went together naturally enough in her unconscious, it took straining to conjoin duplicity vis-à-vis Ledebour with daydreaming vis-à-vis Gillot. [Or] This discrepancy between her practical deficiency and ideal sufficiency in love fell in with her alternation between daughterly hysterical extroversion among men (incidental mannishness notwithstanding) and fatherly-narcissistic introversion at home (incidental girlishness notwithstanding), a scheme rendered graphic after 1900 in her diaries . . . and one which was [the] sanest prophylaxis for a personality split.

More basic than these defects, which could have been eliminated or minimized, one suspects, by careful editing, are those that seem to arise from the author's relationship to his subject and which would appear to be therefore incorrigible. There is a sense of inappropriate distance between the two that seems to account for the reader's uncertainty about where one ends and the other begins and about whose ideas have been set down here and there—his or hers. As noted earlier both the writer and his subject have much in common, particularly a penchant for engaging in the wildest of wild analysis, and like other wild analysts Binion seems able to shuttle back and forth between latent and manifest content with the greatest of ease. Thus, while chiding Freud for taking 'whatever [Lou] said about herself—autobiographically or psychoanalytically—at face value', the often sceptical Binion does much the same thing from time to time, as for example when he discourses quite uncritically about her alleged 'heart trouble' and the worsening of it as a result of Russia's humiliation by Japan in

1905. Psychogenic or not Lou's various ailments deserve a greater degree of medical and psychiatric expertise than what he apparently possesses; his confusion about sexuality, for example, is underscored by his assertion that Lou's marriage was not consummated because of her *frigidity*. Here again it would appear that Binion is somehow prevented from surpassing Lou's intellectual limitations and in view of her background there is little reason to suspect that her knowledge of medical and kindred matters was more than fragmentary.

These several manifestations of a pervasive kinship between her and her biographer would appear to supply the key to the most fateful cause of the shortcomings of this work, namely, an excessive identification of the author with his subject. It is this, one suspects, that often cripples his capacity to utilize both his material and his intelligence, and prevents his writing an objective, critical, discriminating, and coherent biography. What he has written instead might be *her* autobiography, a task for which she too had few qualifications.

In a small volume entitled Literary Biography, Leon Edel has warned both the literary scholar and the psychoanalyst against venturing recklessly into the other's field without proper qualification. 'We have thus a common problem', he writes, 'that of certain individuals who are perfectly competent in their proper field but who seem prepared to blazon forth their incompetence on ground where they do not belong'. At an earlier moment in the history of psychoanalysis Freud called attention to the danger inherent in all biographies, namely, those resulting from the emotional relationship between the writer and his subject. In particular he warned against the temptation to create in their subjects an idealized reconstruction of significant personages in the writer's own early life. There is good reason to believe that both of these cautionary expressions have an appropriate bearing on Frau Lou.

BERNARD C. MEYER (NEW YORK)

PHOBIAS. THEIR NATURE AND CONTROL. By S. Rachman, M.A., Ph.D. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1968. 123 pp.

This book, one of a series of monographs called by the publisher, 'American Lectures in Living Chemistry', is a summary of the

work of those involved in behavior theory: Eysenck, Rachman, Wolpe, and others. Essentially the approach is to accept neurotic behavior as such, without concern for meaning. The etiology is explained by conditioning—that is, the connection in time between a so-called neutral stimulus and a painful, generally fearful reaction. According to the theory of conditioning, these 'anxiety reactions are subject to natural extinction' which accounts, the author states, for the large number of spontaneous remissions except in the cases that come for treatment where this has been prevented by the patient's avoidance of the noxious situation. The treatment, which goes back to the neglected work of Mrs. Jones in 1924 and 1925, is to inhibit the conditioned response by combining the fearful stimulus with an 'incompatible, antagonistic response'; soothing, affectionate feeding; a combination of muscular relaxation and what is called desensitization, recommended by the author. As 'desensitization' has evolved (developed by Wolpe as well as others in the field), it consists of muscular relaxation, imagining the fearful object or situation, followed by muscular relaxation meant to act as an inhibitory stimulus, and then onward to more vivid imagination. Both desensitization (dosed exposure) and the counteracting inhibitory stimulus are considered essential.

According to the author, this is a 'scientifically based therapy' because it leads to 'refinements of the techniques' and enables one 'to construct hypotheses on which to base further investigations'. These hypotheses are, first: 'Patients treated by means of therapeutic procedures based on learning theory improve significantly more quickly than do patients treated by other types of therapy', and second: 'Behavior therapy is able to achieve a higher rate of recovery than other types of therapy'.

In the final chapter additional techniques and modifications are reported. Two examples are: 'Assertive training' or 'Behavior reversal', in which the patient expresses 'genuine differences of opinion with other people rather than to simulate agreement', and 'the use of sexual responses', which are used to overcome fears, especially those associated with sexual activity. The patient is told 'to refrain from attempting any form of sexual activity unless he has unmistakable positive desire to do so; he is also told to engage in graded and gradual sexual activity when the positive desire is

present and when circumstances are propitious'. There are a number of additional ideas in the book that I shall mention but not elaborate upon, such as the role of heredity, the factor of confinement during the original conditioning fear experience, and the therapeutic usefulness of imitation.

For those analysts interested in this particular development of *modern* psychiatry, this book is an introduction. Chapter Six refers the reader to major publications and a bibliography refers him to the remaining publications, beginning with Mrs. Jones in 1924.

MANUEL FURER (NEW YORK)

REICH SPEAKS OF FREUD. Wilhelm Reich Discusses His Work and His Relationship with Sigmund Freud. Edited by Mary Higgins and Chester M. Raphael, M.D. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, Inc., 1967. 269 pp.

This volume is a collection of taped interviews with Wilhelm Reich, recorded in October 1952, as part of the Sigmund Freud Archives, and selections from Reich's correspondence and writings from 1920 to the 1950's. It was understood that Sigmund Freud Archives material deposited in the U. S. Library of Congress was not to be released for one hundred years. After Reich's death, among his papers was a copy of the transcribed interviews which were published without authorization, by the editors, Mary Higgins and Chester M. Raphael, M.D. The additional correspondence and fragments of Reich's writings seem to have been added as padding in order to fill out the volume.

The major issue raised by this book is the legal and ethical one of publication in the first place. Nothing is gained by its appearance, but damage is done. Most important, gossip about still living persons finds its way into print. In addition, those working on the Freud Archives are compromised. It is most curious that the editors could have imagined that Reich's cause might be served by the release of these tapes. For one who knows Reich's mind from the brilliance and tightly organized presentation of Character Analysis, the rambling grandiosity and contentiousness recorded here document his mental state later in his life. For example, on page one hundred twenty-five we read, 'But Freud, with his penetrating statement of a psychic energy principle touched upon the life en-

ergy in the organism as an actual concept. Now, that is where I come in. Is that clear? From there it developed right into the cosmic energy measurable on the Geiger counter, visible in the blue of the atmosphere. That is why it is important whether a psychoanalyst smears my name or whether he knows what I am doing. If he smears my name, he is just sick. There is thwarted life energy in him. . . .'

Although Reich disclaimed any interest in psychoanalysis at the time of the interviews, he obviously seized this opportunity to justify and proclaim himself to posterity as Freud's only legitimate heir and successor. Persecuted by former colleagues (who became MODJU—a name Reich coined for 'carriers of the emotional plague'), he insisted that he alone knew the truth about genitality and cosmic energy, from which Freud and his other followers shrank.

Reich parted ways with psychoanalysis almost forty years ago and continued his work in ever-increasing isolation from the psychoanalytic and scientific communities. Any history of psychoanalysis in the 1920's—when modern psychoanalytic thought had its inception —would have to include Reich's major contributions. Reich's ideas, particularly in the area of furthering sexual freedom and expression, are having reverberations in our contemporary social and cultural milieu. Much could be written about Reich's life and work. This book, however, adds nothing but calls into question the judgment and motives of the editors.

LESTER SCHWARTZ (NEW YORK)

PSYCHIATRY AND THE DEAF. Edited by John D. Rainer, M.D. and Kenneth Z. Altshuler, M.D. Washington, D.C.: U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1969. 160 pp.

Rainer and Altshuler are pioneers in the application of psychoanalysis and psychiatry to the problems of the deaf. They have had key roles in the development by the New York State Psychiatric Institute of a unique spectrum of services, including an inpatient service for deaf persons at Rockland State Hospital and a variety of outpatient services. In the process they have performed much fundamental research and have stimulated the clinical and research work of others.

The Workshop for Psychiatrists on Extending Mental Health Services to the Deaf reported in this volume was the first national conference of psychiatrists and their co-workers who work with the deaf. The report highlights the accomplishments and the vast unmet needs in the field.

The psychoanalyst will find much to instruct and challenge him in this slim volume. Among the most interesting contributions are those by several well-functioning and creative deaf persons, which provide sharp contrasts to those in the Rockland State Hospital case presentations. But it is encouraging to see that even among neglected state hospital deaf patients surprising therapeutic and rehabilitative progress can be effected: that is, if such patients are treated in a therapeutic milieu where personnel are dedicated and have mastered the technique of manual language, and if there is close liaison between the therapists and the patients' families, employers, etc. outside of the hospital.

Psychoanalysts who read this report will find that work with the deaf is a fertile field for research in ego development—particularly the cognitive functions—, superego development, and object relations. In short, psychoanalysis has as much to gain as to offer in the field of work with the deaf.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY. By Michael Shepherd, Malcolm Lader, and Richard Rodnight. Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1968. 306 pp.

This small volume admirably meets the needs of the psychoanalyst and psychiatrist seeking a concise scientific evaluation of the 'psychotropic' drugs from the standpoints of biochemistry, neuropharmacology, and epidemiological psychiatry. The authors, affiliated with the Institute of Psychiatry, University of London, have done a monumental job in gathering together the world literature on the subject: they cite 1,287 references, and provide an excellent index.

It is difficult to select what is most interesting in a work so readable and instructive. For example, the clinician will enjoy the systematic delineation of the known and unknown of the chief tranquilizer, anti-depressant, and psychotomimetic drugs. But

he might find equally interesting the discussion of laboratory and clinical research in pharmacology—its scientific requirements and the pitfalls besetting workers who ignore them.

The sober confrontation of the lacunae in our knowledge of brain function is a refreshing antidote for the all too frequent attribution of biochemical and topographic specificity to drug action that represents glib speculation rather than fact.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

COMPARATIVE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY, ANIMAL AND HUMAN. Edited by Joseph Zubin, Ph.D. and Howard F. Hunt, Ph.D. New York: Grune and Stratton, Inc., 1967. 350 pp.

This volume contains the proceedings of the fifty-fifth annual meeting of the American Psychopathological Association, held in 1965. It includes the text of fourteen papers and some brief discussions. The papers vary in nature and quality from experimental reports to occasional remarks or theoretical discussions. Some are new and interesting, others dull.

The subject of comparative psychopathology is an important one. From animal behavior we can learn of the more primitive homologues of the component elements of human behavior. Also, if there are true animal homologues of human mental illness—and there do seem to be some—they can be used for screening proposed therapeutic procedures. However, the data lend themselves to more than one interpretation so that different investigators come up with interesting explanatory principles, but unequivocally valid, novel, and undeniably effective therapies for human illness have yet to be derived from animal studies. The only possible exception is the application of conditioning procedures to humans for the purpose of alleviating specific phobic anxieties.

John Calhoun's paper demonstrates how much of social behavior among animals can be explained by ecological factors, and in fact, induced by experimental alterations of ecologic circumstances. William Etkin reviews some of the ethologically observed mechanisms by means of which individual animals coöperate to create an integrated and cohesive social organization. Benson Ginsburg, in an impressive argument, calls attention to the fact that the hetero-

geneity of the members of a social group provides for an appropriate distribution of roles and functions that society requires. He boldly points out that we must be careful to avoid the fallacy of assuming that all members of human society possess equal and similar potential. We are willing, he observes, to concede that different racial stocks are characterized by different distributions of blood types, but boggle at the suggestion that they are also characterized by different mental capacities. He contends that such illusions subvert the cause of human dignity and human rights.

Charles Stroebel tries to take the phenomenon of the circadian rhythm out of the class of the merely interesting and to consider how it might be applied therapeutically. He notes that it is not only spontaneous activity that exhibits this rhythm, but also responsiveness to various stimuli.

William Young establishes that the prenatal availability of hormones to the fœtus determines potential for sexual behavior as well as genital development.

Curt Richter, the old master of this field, is represented in this volume by his Hamilton Award Lecture, Psychopathology of Periodic Behavior in Animals and Man. This is, of course, a competent and interesting essay, but it contributes relatively little that is new. Perhaps this paper seems less exciting because Richter himself has taught us so much about this subject in the past.

Eugene Sachs calls our attention to the fact that animals conditioned under the influence of chlordiazepoxide or chlorpromazine show little evidence of this conditioning when they are tested without the drug, and conversely when they are conditioned without it, they seem to lose the conditioning under the influence of the drug. Then in a learned essay he offers some reasonable speculations about the roles of novelty, familiarity, attention, habituation, and acquisition of information in determining even the simplest behavior. Finally, Joseph Wolpe concisely describes his method of alleviating phobic anxiety by conditioning or 'desensitizing'. Again he confuses symptom with illness. I think it would clarify the discussion and be helpful all around if full case studies of representative patients treated by this method were made available.

Presenting a collection of diverse papers on the same general topic is a useful way of dissseminating psychiatric information.

This type of book is not as timely as a journal, but it has the advantage of covering a given field fairly well. Experimental papers, as most of these are, have a fairly short half life, perhaps three or four years. Clinical papers, if they are good, have a considerable longer half life. Collections of experimental reports could be issued as special numbers of journals, or separately in paperback form.

This book has two chief faults. In the first place, there are neither abstracts nor summaries. Given the large amount of material with which we each have to be familiar, it is only courteous of an author to tell us what his paper is about and what conclusions he reaches, so that we can know whether or not we want to read the paper. Second, some of the papers, and especially the better ones, are unnecessarily prolix.

The book certainly deserves some study. Every psychiatrist should know about these developments and more likely than not, he will find some of the papers interesting.

MORTIMER OSTOW (RIVERDALE, N. Y.)

THE MARRIAGE RELATIONSHIP—PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES. Edited by Salo Rosenbaum, M.D. and Ian Alger, M.D. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968. 366 pp.

This book consists of papers delivered at a symposium of the Society of Medical Psychoanalysts in 1965 and a number of papers subsequently written for this volume. The contents encompass perspectives derived from disciplines besides psychoanalysis, such as anthropology, sociology, game theory, communication theory, and the law. Many of the psychological formulations and treatment methods are not psychoanalysis even by strenuous stretching of the definition. The end product is a potpourri of disparate essays of variable quality.

The volume, poorly edited, does not group most of the twenty-four chapters according to topic or theoretical position. Marked divergencies in viewpoint are not highlighted by discussions or editorial summaries, which would have been useful. Some authors present data on marriage customs in various cultures, comments on our society, and summary correlations of psychosexual development with marital behavior. These overviews are often diffuse, superficial, and simplistic. An exception is a comprehensive article

by John Millet which is written in a graceful style and is both broad and incisive. Some of the essays at a clinical level provide interesting data and formulations, particularly the article by Sandor Lorand which presents the classical analytic viewpoint clearly and elegantly. Aaron Esman, discussing the effects of marital psychopathology on children, and Theodore Lidz, portraying the effects of children on the marital relationship, are scholarly and show a fine perception of the issues involved.

On the other hand, some of the papers suffer from a tendency to reduce complex issues to one-sided explanations. For instance, Alvin Goldfarb views marital conflict in the aged as based almost entirely on the vicissitudes of the dependence-independence struggle. Nathan Roth attributes impotence to the 'irrational expectation' of insisting upon full sexual gratification while avoiding the 'responsibility' of having children.

Several articles deal with variations from the traditional treatment approach, such as conjoint therapy in which the spouses are seen together; concurrent therapy in which they are treated by the same or a different analyst but not together; family therapy; and group therapy. It is beyond the scope of a brief review to consider the pros and cons of these methods. However, some of the underlying assumptions warrant comment. Ian Alger, for example, advocating the interpersonal approach, sees the marital partners together and emphasizes the communication processes between the spouses as well as between them and the therapist. He points out the pathogenic effects of covert, misleading, and contradictory communication. Though such clarifications can be useful, they appear to be regarded as the end rather than the beginning of treatment. Psychoanalysis has traditionally started at the surface, and so does Alger in his approach. But the importance of unconscious intrapsychic conflict, the role of the instinctual drives and ego defenses, and the significance of early events to the phenomena being studied are all left out of Alger's discussion and, one would assume, play a minor role in his treatment procedures. This criticism applies in varying degrees to other papers in the volume.

Analysts seeking a more profound understanding of the complexities of the marriage relationship will not find much illumination from this symposium.

ROBERT S. GRAYSON (NEW YORK)

THE DYNAMICS OF LITERARY RESPONSE. By Norman N. Holland. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. 378 pp.

Professor Holland, who is Chairman of the Department of English at the State University of Buffalo and an affiliate member of the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute, has written an extremely well-organized and informative book on the 'literary experience'. In attempting to explore the dynamics of the literary experience, the author displays a brilliant understanding of psychoanalytic insights and demonstrates an unusual versatility in applying this understanding to the varieties of literature, such as poetry, fiction, humor, pornography, and myth, in addition to theater and film.

His approach to the subject is multipolar with an examination of the literary production itself (content, language, and form), the exploration of the experience of the reader, and speculations concerning the creativity of the writer. In the first instance, he describes content as being oral, anal, urethral, phallic, or œdipal and draws from the literature to illustrate representations of these libidinal aims. Concerning orality, he comments: 'The kinds of images in a literary work that would make you expect you are dealing with an oral situation, are, naturally enough, almost anything to do with the mouth or with "taking in": biting, sucking, smoking, inhaling, talking and the like; or their correlatives, food, liquor, tobacco, and especially words, particularly curses, threats and vows, words which "bite" constituting a kind of action in themselves. A common defense against oral fusion and merger is putting something out of the mouth instead of taking something in; the something is usually speech, as in a great deal of Shakespeare's or Lawrence's writing, though it may be almost anything—in the Keats poem, it is the nightingale's "pouring forth thy soul abroad" that signifies the bird is "not born for death". Still another development of the oral phase has to do with seeing—"feasting one's eyes". We "take in" through our eyes, and, unconsciously, to look at is to eat, as when we "devour" books. Often this looking can become aggressive, as in various fantasies of the evil eye. Conversely, seeing secret things can bring down dread punishments, death, or castration, as in so many horror or gangster movies: "He's seen too much. Get rid of him." Characteristic of oral fantasies is either-or thinking; thus, absolute words often go with oral fan-

tasies; every, all, never, no, and the like, as in Marlowe. Such words create issues of fusion and merger as they both create and blur distinctions.' Concerning the 'anal' in literature, we quote the following: ' "Anal writing" is very striking, easy to recognize once one has met the type. Images of dirt are the essential clue. The oral fantasies of being engulfed or devoured become, in anal writing, fears of being enveloped by what is foul, dirty, or sordid. Realists (such as Jonson), tend to be anal writers. Often, though, the anal writer will escape the grimy reality that threatens to engulf him into idealism, frequently seen as a foggy, misty, impossibly pure other, as, for example, the sky or air or star Gerard Manley Hopkins so often refers to, or, in Gogol's Dead Souls, Chichikov's wishes for the governor's daughter, pure and bland "as a small newly laid egg".'

Holland further gives samples from the literature which represent the operations of the defense mechanisms and the primary process. These literary productions are compared with dreaming and the dream work which transforms the latent content into the manifest content. Throughout the book, one readily sees the significant influence of Ernst Kris's writings, which Dr. Holland duly acknowledges in his preface: 'There are at least two excellent books to which my indebtedness is far too great to be conveyed by mere footnotes: the late Ernst Kris's Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art and Simon O. Lesser's Fiction and the Unconscious.'

However, as Professor Holland also indicates, Kris's presentation was a more rigorous and technical inquiry, more closely geared to the application of the economic principle in primary process mentation, and to the concepts of drive discharge for the explanation of the æsthetic experience, and, therefore, directed more specifically to an audience of psychoanalysts. Professor Holland's treatise, which at no time significantly departs from orthodoxy in classical psychoanalytic thinking, attempts to broaden and extend the views of Kris by dealing more extensively with different varieties of literature and using numerous examples to analyze or study. Minor variations in terminology are at times noted, as, for example, the term 'literary experience' used by Professor Holland as compared with the broader term 'æsthetic experience' employed by Kris and others. Also, Holland applies Coleridge's term 'willing suspension of disbelief' to refer to the phenomena discussed by

Kris as the 'æsthetic illusion'. In his discussion of the 'willing suspension of disbelief', Holland presents one of his most profound insights, comparing this mechanism to the process operating in the analytic situation, to dreaming and even with greater parallel to the hypnotic situation, where 'we willingly suspend disbelief'. There is precedence, of course, for comparing the analytic process with the hypnotic process, as is noted in Ida Macalpine's paper, The Development of the Transference[1], wherein she comments that 'analytic transference manifestations are a slow motion picture of hypnotic transference manifestations'. But Holland extends these ideas to the literary experience (and the æsthetic illusion) wherein he comments 'Hypnosis is induced like our engrossment in a literary work, by restrictions of perception, thinking and motility. . . . We come to a literary work with two conscious expectations: first, that it will give us pleasure (of an oral, "taking in" kind); second, that it will not require us to act on the external world. The literary work thus finds in us a matrix reaching back through many, many experiences of gratification in fantasy to our earliest experience of passive satisfaction. That occurred prior to our recognition of ourselves as separate beings, and literature re-creates this undifferentiated self: we absorb and become absorbed into the literary experience.'

In developing his core ideas about the literary experience, Holland draws heavily also from the discussions of Gill and Brenman on hypnosis, in which they point out that the relationship between the two participants consists in 'mutual identification with oral wishes to devour and be devoured', just as many other psychoanalysts have also emphasized 'the mechanisms of identification and the underlying fantasy of oral incorporation'. However, for the reader to enjoy and experience the literary work, Professor Holland is not in full agreement with Bergler's thought that the ability to be a creative writer or reader stems from oral conflicts. Holland seems to admit this may play a role, but in general he would minimize the role of conflict in relation especially to the appreciation of literature.

Holland formulates an ingenious model which elaborates both the literary work and the literary experience, involving a movement from unconscious fantasy toward conscious, intellectual meaning, embodying the concepts of the primary process and secondary

[1] This QUARTERLY, XIX, 1950, pp. 501-537.

process elaborations, much like the dream-work, and involving drive discharge to explain both the creative process and the experiencing process by the reader.

He describes his model as an introjection model, and summarizes it well by stating 'the literary work acts out a psychological process which we introject. That process is the transformation of a central fantasy toward a central meaning. In everyday life, our minds in any given minute may be toying with half a dozen fantasies, transforming none of them toward a meaningful totality. The psychological process we take over from a literary work forces words and events into a far more orderly structure than our ordinary mental processes. Moreover, it orders not only the fantasy it embodies, but all of the related fantasies which we bring to it when we analogize. In short, we feel the ordering and structuring powers of literature (ultimately, of the writer) as though they were our own.'

This book is an elaborate extension and application to literature of psychoanalytic concepts, rich in its references to the many varieties of literary productions. The author supports the views of many psychoanalysts concerning the dynamics of the literary experience when he states that the pleasure in reading and writing of literature transforms our primitive wishes and fears into significance and coherence, and this transformation gives us pleasure, and also a meaning that is worth something to everybody. Thus, it is this actual transformation of primary process ideation into secondary process thought which creates the pleasure quality in literature.

I would commend Professor Holland's book most highly to psychoanalysts, and to those in allied fields, as representing an extremely valuable contribution to the study of literature from a psychoanalytic standpoint. For those in the literary field, it probably should be viewed as a standard reference for the literary critic.

BERNARD L. PACELLA (NEW YORK)

THE MASKS OF GOD: CREATIVE MYTHOLOGY. By Joseph Campbell. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1968. 730 pp.

Creative Mythology is the fourth and final volume of the series, The Masks of God by Joseph Campbell. The first three volumes,

Primitive Mythology, Oriental Mythology, and Occidental Mythology, comprise not only a gigantic exposition of the world's mythology but also the application to that subject matter of the most varied disciplines, e.g., anthropology, sociology, psychology, archeology, linguistics, history, etc. The present volume, Creative Mythology, shares with its sister volumes the same eclectic approach; however, it deals with a different order of mythological phenomena. The previous volumes dealt with 'traditional' mythology; the present, with 'creative' mythology. Campbell makes the distinction between the two in this way: 'In the context of a traditional mythology, the symbols are presented in socially maintained rites, through which the individual is required to experience, or will pretend to have experienced, certain insights, sentiments, and commitments. In what I am calling "creative" mythology, on the other hand, this order is reversed: the individual has had an experience of his own—of order, horror, beauty, or even mere exhilaration—which he seeks to communicate through signs; and if his realization has been of a certain depth and import, his communication will have the value and force of living myth—for those, that is to say, who receive and respond to it of themselves, with recognition, uncoerced.' Later, he states: 'Traditional mythologies, that is to say, whether of the primitive or of the higher cultures, antecede and control experience; whereas what I am here calling Creative Mythology is an effect and expression of experience. Its producers do not claim divine authority for their human, all too human, works. They are not saints or priests but men and women of *this* world; and their first requirement is that both their works and their lives should unfold from convictions derived from their own experience.'

Campbell provides numerous examples of the process of creative mythology, drawn from the whole of human history. He shows in them that previously integrated myths fragment into their thematic and symbolic components after crossing a 'barrier' or 'interphase'. That barrier may be temporal (from one historical period to another), anthropological (from one culture to another), political (from one regime to another), and even psychological (from one mind to another or, within one mind, from one developmental phase to another). This fragmentation allows for a regrouping of the themes and symbols, together with other 'alien' elements, into

a new, unique, vital production—i.e., into a 'living myth', one relevant to current life, current circumstances, current human problems. This process of 'creative' mythology, according to Campbell, occurs largely, if not totally, through the efforts of exceptional individuals, only sometimes recognized and celebrated.

Campbell, obviously a great admirer of Nietzsche, unfortunately adopts the latter's reverence for these exceptional individuals to the extent that he keeps their creative mythological activities inviolate from examination and investigation. The absence of any extensive treatment of the process itself, as it occurs within the creative individual, is the major flaw of this otherwise erudite book. It bespeaks a lack of psychological sophistication in an endeavor where the psychological dimension is of the essence. For it is within the mind of the creative mythmaker that the fragmentation and resynthesis of mythic elements take place. The personality of the creative mythmaker and his products are so intimately related that any scholarly treatment of the latter must include the psychology of the former.

Clearly Campbell recognized this to some extent. For he gives the reader a tantalizingly brief discussion of two of the greatest twentieth-century mythmakers, Thomas Mann and James Joyce, fitting choices since they exemplify creative mythology at its best and since much is known of them personally. Campbell's remarks on them are astute, but superficial. He does not explicate the relationship between these artists and the ancient myths they took up as modern mythmakers to render modern experiences to modern men. Nor does he delve into this crucial problem in any other instance of creative mythology.

Psychoanalytic research has provided a framework by which to understand the relationship of the mythmaker to the myth he fashions. Recently Arlow brought the myth securely into the realm of psychoanalytic investigation by defining it as 'a special form of shared fantasy, and it serves to bring the individual into relationship with members of his cultural group on the basis of certain common needs'. This definition allows the psychoanalytic insight obtained about fantasies to be applied to myths (a special category of fantasies). Arlow showed that myths (like conscious fantasies) have a basic instinctual wish whose expression is modified according to defensive and adaptive considerations: warding off feelings

of guilt and anxiety, adaptation to reality and the social group, crystallizing the individual identity and influencing the formation of the superego. The instinctual gratification inherent in the myth induces the populace to become more socialized in the manner characteristic of the group; while, at the same time, it diminishes the level of instinctual tension in the group to proportions manageable in a civilized society.

Campbell shows many historical circumstances where the myths of society no longer have relevance to the conditions of that society; i.e., where they no longer serve defensive and adaptive ends. It is at this point that the social function of the creative mythographer is so important. He, as an individual, is a member of a society in crisis and suffers its effects as do his fellows. Further, he has his own idiosyncratic history, his own personal problems and internal conflicts relating to defense and adaptation. He is drawn to symbols and themes of the outmoded myths, or to those of other cultures and also to various symbols and themes which have not yet been integrated into the prevailing myths. He is drawn to these not primarily in his role as a mythmaker but as an individual seeking relief from personal suffering through fantasy. If he integrates these varied ingredients successfully into a fantastic production that diminishes his personal suffering and aids his defensive and adaptive efforts, others like him may possibly derive similar comfort and benefit from his product. He may thus 'seek to communicate' his fantasy to his fellows.

Campbell is not explicit about why such an individual does this. Freud, however, benignly observed that the creative person presents the products of his fancy to his fellows to win love. History records the great love and rewards heaped on many creators of well-fashioned fantasies. The private creative fantasy is thus artistically constructed in a manner communicable and acceptable to one's peers. If the creative mythmaker is, in the deepest sense, an *un*exceptional man, typical of his time and place, his efforts to solve his individual problems through fantasy will have very personal relevance to many of his peers and their defensive and adaptive efforts. In this way, his fantasic vision will have what Campbell calls 'the value and force of living myth—for those, that is to say, who receive and respond to it of themselves, with recognition, uncoerced'.

These considerations help explain why the arts, in general, tend to flourish at precisely those times when the myths of a society, and the socially organizing values they embody, are incongruent with the conditions of that society, i.e., when there is a great need for and value put upon mythmakers who provide fantasies which will adequately serve defensive and adaptive functions. Campbell makes a very emphatic point that this is the situation in modern times and documents the corresponding shift away from the collective as a frame of reference to the individual and the idiosyncratic. He shows a timely appreciation of the potentials and pitfalls in such a state of affairs.

Even though Campbell's efforts along the psychological dimension leave something to be desired, his correlation of artistic-mythical phenomena with historical vicissitudes is magnificent. In these areas Campbell is a most erudite and creative scholar, providing the reader with an overwhelming array of the most varied materials and insights. Though their presentation is uneven and often contributes only minimally to his thesis they are never uninteresting. Indeed they are fascinating.

For instance, there is a lengthy discussion of Heloise (the mistress of Abelard) as the first modern woman in that she made love for a man the focal point of her life. Campbell, at another point, shows how the Byzantine Emperor Theodosius indirectly caused a sudden golden age of Hindu and Buddhist art, literature, and temple architecture in India after his antipagan edicts led to a mass exodus of the most creative people in his empire and their consequent repatriation in the Far East. He tells in exquisite detail of early Christian religious orgies of the most horrendous sort, and also of ironically twisted philosophical arguments in the Middle Ages due to faulty translations of philosophical tracts from Arabic into Latin.

Here Campbell is at his best and for this he should be read and studied. While he does not deal effectively with the psychological determinants of creative mythology, he provides exciting and informative reading to anyone with a humanistic bent.

LEON BALTER (NEW YORK)

THE ELEMENTARY STRUCTURES OF KINSHIP. By Claude Lévi-Strauss. Edited, with introduction, by Rodney Needham. Translated by James Harle Bell, Rodney Needham, and John Richard von Sturmer. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969. 541 pp.

This modern classic of anthropological thought was first published in France in 1947; the translation is based on the revised French edition of 1967. The book is heavily technical in places and addressed primarily to anthropologists, but a careful reading will reward any student of human behavior.

Primitive systems of kinship are so diverse and complex, and so different from our own, that their study has been described as the anthropologists' chess game. Building on the achievements of the great French sociologists Durkheim and Mauss, and refining the anthropological methods of Lewis H. Morgan and Sir E. B. Tylor, Lévi-Strauss has brought a rare lucidity into the jungle of kinship studies.

A brief summary can hardly do justice to this important book. Lévi-Strauss addresses himself to the kinship systems of scores of primitive societies, and also to those of China and India. Everywhere he finds structure, symmetry, and logic; and these, in turn, he relates to the underlying principles of exchange, reciprocity, alliance, and communication. As he sees it, the social recognition of descent and filiation, rather than incest avoidance, prevents the kinship systems (and other social structures) from returning to a prehuman state of nature. Since incest avoidance plays only a subsidiary and negative role in the author's thesis, the argument proceeds along the lines of a para-Marxism: woman is a 'scarce commodity', and the need for marriageable women touches off a series of reciprocal exchanges. (An emphasis on the means of production—in this instance, reproduction, child rearing, and mythopoesis—would restore incest avoidance to a central position, even if incest avoidance cannot be put into a one-to-one correspondence with the various and changing systems of kinship.)

The numerous kinship systems are differentiated by two basic methods of exchange. The direct exchange of woman for woman takes place between two social units, which may in turn subdivide into four or eight units. The indirect exchange of a woman for real and/or symbolic goods and services requires at least three

social units; but it permits a larger number of permutations and integrates larger populations. In each of the systems and subsystems, kinship terms and relationships—together with the related rules of descent, residence, inheritance, etc.—point to prescribed and proscribed marriages.

The *structural* analysis of kinship is scientifically valuable, and it has been carried into other areas: linguistics, mythology, ritual, symbolism, clothing and fashions, cooking, etc. In every instance the results, no matter how instructive, describe the rules of communication, but not its contents or dynamics. A structural analysis of the *rules* of baseball, or poker, will doubtless reveal an underlying system of exchange, reciprocity, alliance, and communication; but it will fall frustratingly short of what the game is all about to the participants and spectators.

And, inevitably, structuralism is limited to a demonstration of the bipolar opposites which it finds in every system, from mythology to cooking: society, nature; sacred, profane; hot, cold; wet, dry; cooked, raw. These typologies or dichotomies may be valuable as logical constructs and sorting devices, but they are both self-propelling and self-limiting.

The limitations of the method are most clearly seen in the problem of incest avoidance. To Lévi-Strauss, 'Incest is socially absurd before it is morally culpable'. The reverse can also be argued, and there is no reason to postulate an unbridgeable dichotomy. The incest taboos, by creating alliances between social groups, are socially beneficial, but these social benefits can also be seen as secondary gains, not primary determinants. Exchange and reciprocity have an important function, and especially in nonmarket economies. Man is a gregarious animal, but not all that social and rational. Lévi-Strauss emphasizes the positive, rational, and socially cohesive aspects of kinship; and he sees these as more important than the negative, if inevitably complementary, incest taboos. For all their symmetry and logic, the kinship systems—like this masterful book—derive from a vaguely metaphysical antagonism between society and nature.

This is an important and difficult book. Psychoanalytic readers with more than a casual interest in anthropology will find it challenging and rewarding.

S. H. POSINSKY (NEW YORK)

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Lawrence H. Rockland

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ABSTRACTS

International Journal of Psychoanalysis. L, 1969.

The Therapeutic Alliance. Lawrence Friedman. Pp. 139-153.

This paper traces the development of concepts of the therapeutic alliance, focusing on the paradox that while transference motivates the patient to struggle with his conflicts, it simultaneously furnishes the major resistance to resolution of these conflicts. Freud described a pact between the analyst and the patient's ego against the id. Sterba postulated an ego split, with one fragment allied with the analyst and analytic goals. Nunberg, on the other hand, felt that the basic aims of the analyst are opposed to those of the patient and the analysis would succeed only if the patient 'hypnotically' idealized the analyst; 'the analyst must use the patient's wrong reason to make him do the right thing . . . '. Recent authors (Loewald, Gitelson, Greenson) have swung back toward Nunberg, stressing nonrational factors in the therapeutic alliance. For example, Loewald feels that an important aspect of the analytic relationship is the patient's need to identify with his own growth potential as reflected in the analyst. Friedman stresses the notion that the therapeutic alliance develops as the patient is weaned from insistence on direct libidinal gratification; this movement brings him closer to the analyst and is perceived as an alliance. If the analyst looks for a therapeutic alliance early in the work, he is making an unrealistic demand on the patient and causing himself unnecessary frustration.

The Influence of Interpretation upon Schizophrenic Patients. Peter L. Giovacchini. Pp. 179-186.

Since schizophrenic patients are suffering from severe ego defects, how can interpretation and increased self-understanding be useful? The author attempts to answer this complex question by stressing the usefulness of 'linking interpretations' which establish connections between external events and transference phenomena. The goal is to help the patient more effectively separate external from internal reality. Schizophrenic patients tend to massive projections, and the analyst must help the patient to realize the intrapsychic origin and the adaptive value of his thoughts and feelings. When the analyst deviates from the analytic stance and offers support, the schizophrenic patient tends to become confused and to feel either that he is being offered omnipotent rescuing or is being assaulted and intruded upon.

The Cognitive Function of the Ego in Psychoanalysis: I. The Search for Insight. Maurie D. Pressman. Pp. 187-196.

Previous literature on the cognitive function of the ego has concentrated on cognition of external objects. Pressman extends this to the knowledge of the internal state and applies it to the psychoanalytic process. The 'cognitive style',

the patient's scanning of his words and feelings and integrating them into his view of himself, is critical for a successful psychoanalysis. The basic rule should be extended by urging the patient not only to say everything without reservation but also to 'listen to it, to reflect on it, and to use it to increase your knowledge of yourself and your problems'. The cognitive function at work in analyst and patient during psychoanalysis is extensively discussed.

The Manifest Dream Content and Its Significance for the Interpretation of Dreams. Jacob Spanjaard. Pp. 221-235.

Although there has been increasing interest in the manifest dream content, its importance has been generally neglected in the literature of dream interpretation. This began with Freud who associated enthusiasts of manifest dream content with dissidents from the psychoanalytic movement. However, in spite of theoretical statements to the contrary, Freud actually did pay serious attention to the manifest dreams. The author suggests that when the analyst takes into account all associations together with his knowledge of the patient, and views this against the background of the manifest dream content, he is then ready to construct an interpretation. In this manner, the analyst can identify the most superficial current conflict, that closest to the surface at the moment.

On the Clinical Provision of Frustrations, Recognitions and Failures in the Analytic Situation: An Essay on Dr. Michael Balint's Researches on the Theory of Psychoanalytic Technique. M. Masud R. Khan. Pp. 237-248.

From the bulk of Dr. Balint's writings, Khan focuses on those relating to the analytic setting and process. Each patient has within himself a 'basic fault', the result of a betrayal of his trust during childhood. This is experienced in the transference, in the later stages, as a wish for certain simple gratifications from the analyst, never going beyond mild forepleasure, i.e., hand holding. This is the 'new beginning', the capacity for unsuspicious, trusting object relation. It entails the relinquishing of the paranoid attitude and the acceptance, without excess anxiety, of some depression. It is a repetition of the stage of 'primary love' which Balint postulates in place of primary narcissism. (The infant is born in a state of intense relatedness to the environment.) Balint's 'ocnophilic' and 'philobatic' concepts are discussed, as are his three areas of the mind: œdipus complex; basic fault; and creation.

LAWRENCE H. ROCKLAND

Journal of the Hillside Hospital. XVII, 1968.

Sidney Tarachow Commemorative Issue.

Notes on the Written Dream. Harold P. Blum. Pp. 67-78.

The symptomatic act of writing a dream is considered from the genetic, structural, dynamic, and adaptive viewpoints. A clinical case is briefly presented to demonstrate that the writing of a dream and the presenting of it to the analyst

can be as 'autobiographical' as the dream itself. Re-enactment of an early learning disturbance, identification with the aggressor, fantasied loss and restitution, and infantile anal sadomasochism were determinants of the written dream.

Some Observations on Lying, A Derivative of Secrecy. Robert Dickes, Pp. 94-109.

Some of the literature on the secret and the lie is reviewed. The lie is considered both as a substitute for, and the attempt to conceal the secret. Clinical vignettes demonstrate the onset of the secret and lie in the anal phase. Identification with parents who were preoccupied with anality is highlighted. Phallic and œdipal conflicts become the content of fixated strivings whose conscious derivatives are the lie and the secret.

Problems of Communication between Therapist and Patients with Archaic Ego Functions. Margaret E. Fries. Pp. 136-160.

This paper offers a collection of practical examples in technique drawn from clinical work with patients suffering ego defects. The problems range from general considerations as to spatial arrangements of office furniture to particular words and phrases used by the analyst. The author promises that 'the transference, which is experienced as a living situation, will be dealt with in a future article'. Elucidation of the vicissitudes of the narcissistic transference in a future article should complement this rich, albeit anecdotal, clinical study from work with patients who are narcissistically vulnerable, basically under the influence of primary process, and fixated at a stage in separation-individuation.

The Theatre of the Absurd and Sidney Tarachow's 'Remarks on the Comic Process and Beauty' (1949). Martin Grotjahn. Pp. 161-164.

The creative process is a restitution of the destroyed mother. The artist makes the dangerous, the destructive, and the destroyed things of beauty to be loved. In using nonsense, the ego remains in control of the primary process and uses it to express hostility and rebellion against parental demands for logic and rational thinking. Like nonsense, the theater of the absurd is a sadistic, oral, devouring attitude, a cannibalistic feast. Unlike nonsense, though, there is not so much rebellion in absurd theater as there is an invitation to partake in the creative process. The artist of absurd theater takes risks in listening to and watching the creative process at work; he presents this process (rather than symbols) as something ugly, destructive, and restituted—a terrible and beautiful process to share.

Some Psychoanalytic Notes Concerning Music Appreciation. Louis Linn. Pp. 209-222.

Clinical examples are offered to demonstrate ways in which music fulfils a broad range of adaptational functions. The origin of melody is traced back to

a form of play wherein potentially traumatic words are rendered nontraumatic. The *Anlage* for this play that promises mastery is the early chaos of sounds traumatically experienced by the infant. The author hypothesizes that early bodily movements are traumatic in that they are concomitant with tension states. Repetition, mastery, and familiarity by way of rhythmic motor movements are traced through maturational stages. The link between melody and rhythm is at once primitive and an expression of the highest synthesizing function of the mature ego.

A Re-examination of Some Aspects of Freud's Theory of Schizophrenic Language Disturbance. Victor H. Rosen. Pp. 242-258.

Rosen examines the relationship between Freud's topographical model of the psychic apparatus and his hypothesis about the nature of schizophrenic language. Four major areas of ambiguity in Freud's formulation are presented and discussed. According to the author's revision of Freud's schema, the psychotic does not suffer a 'decathexis of things'. As a result of regression, the psychotic suffers a decathexis of the language code as a shared entity. The schizophrenic loses his wish to share his experience with others and to share in theirs. When a schizophrenic uses a word divorced from its lexical meaning, it is the referential category rather than the 'thing presentation' that loses its connection with the words. To postulate an 'unconscious thing presentation' is to suggest that thought develops before language. Regression of the psychotic individual returns that part of his mental life which is concerned with the encoding and decoding process of socialized verbal communication to its primitive state before the word had referential significance and before 'things' had symbolic representations.

The Smell of Semen. Leonard Shengold. Pp. 317-325.

Clinical material from three women in analysis is used to illustrate the importance of the smell of semen. The smell of semen is equated with vaginal odor so that both can represent the penetrative, castrative odor of phallic power. The excitement of smelling and the reaction formation against this was determined by traumatic experiences in childhood. The interchangeability of odors tends to deny what is furnished to the other senses—the difference between sexes and the irreversibility of castration. For men the smell of castration becomes the regressively debased smell of the vagina. For women there is a continuous active mastery of the danger situation and the excitement evoked in them by their own vaginal odors. This danger and excitement is displaced onto the smell of semen. All three patients experienced intense penis envy. In these women both castration and its undoing are expressed in terms of sexual odors.

DONALD J. COLEMAN

American Imago. XXVI, 1969.

Mythic Symbols in Two Pre-Colombian Myths. Charles Sarnoff. Pp. 3-20.

Two pre-Colombian myths from stone carvings and pottery designs encountered by the author in the course of extensive travels in Central and South America are

shown to share the same core fantasies as material derived from present-day patients in our own culture. These findings are evidence for the universality of the unconscious. The core fantasies are: 'fluid from the body of a special person brings fertility (to the earth)' and 'a snake gives birth'.

Patterns in Obedience and Disobedience. Sandor S. Feldman. Pp. 21-36.

Modern man lives in families and groups as did primeval man; his outer reality and his instinctual drives are essentially the same. Thus modern rituals have the same psychogenesis and the same unconscious meanings as those of the past. These assertions are supported by comparing anecdotal material relating to obedience and disobedience from biblical times through the centuries to the present day.

Psychical Reality and the Theater of Fact. Hilda S. Rollman-Branch. Pp. 56-70.

The Theater of Fact (The Inquest, The Deputy, Galileo, After the Fall, etc.) is a 'Theater of Everyman's Individual Responsibility' concerned with the conflict between man's ideal image of himself and the ruthlessness or cowardice he is capable of in the interest of his own survival. Accordingly it is entirely understandable that the Theater of Fact originated in Germany. The author feels the Theater of Fact can help make audiences aware of their own instincts for destructiveness, hatred, and selfishness, and of the objective reality of the existence and vulnerability of evil forces; if so, it contributes to the effectiveness of every man's responsibility.

The Personality of Belinda's Baron: Pope's 'The Rape of the Lock'. Jeffrey Meyers. Pp. 71-77.

The behavior of the Baron in The Rape of the Lock is shown to be entirely consistent with the psychoanalytic theory of fetishism as stated by Freud in his 1927 paper.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

Psychoanalytic Review. LVI, 1969.

Contributions on Parapsychology: Introduction. Marie C. Nelson. Pp. 3-8.

Freud compared the study of occultism to biting into a sour apple, a metaphor that becomes more profound the more one savors it. Marie Nelson refers to the refusal of psychoanalytic training institutes to bite into the sour apple and their rejection of any colleague who is interested in the occult, in contrast to the very active interest that Freud showed in the subject. Before commenting on the articles that follow, she makes some observations about the phenomena that are concurrent with the irruption (bursting in) of Psi. She herself had a vivid olfactory experience that accompanied her anticipation of the future.

Chronologically Extraordinary Psi Correspondences in the Psychoanalytic Setting. Jule Eisenbud. Pp. 9-27.

This author compares the study of Psi to a fisherman putting out nets; we don't know what we might catch or how to bait the net. Another metaphor, one that implies tragedy, is that we are like a Greek chorus that is powerless to enter into the action that has been foretold. Eisenbud states that participants in a psychoanalysis are ideally under continuous observation. He does not mean an experimental analysis viewed through a one-way mirror. Two examples are given that portray the way in which the analyst observes himself at the time of the reporting of Psi by the patient. The author claims that at this time the patient's dreams foretelling rejection, separation, or disaster mirror highly specific and similar material that the analyst is struggling to repress. The examples given are not convincing and probably cannot be within the limitations of the printed word; they seem to be laborious attempts at denying a very simple positive transference interpretation. This seems to be the fate of all psychologically minded people who see layers of hidden meanings emphasizing pathology, hostility, and death to the exclusion of eros.

Synchronicity and Telepathy. Berthold Eric Schwartz. Pp. 44-56.

This paper is a very readable account of four telepathic experiences which are quite convincing. All have to do with death, destruction, and hostile omnipotence. Another reason for not discussing or writing about telepathy is the very real damage that it can do to the people involved. Truth is, among many things, an emotional reality or telepathic awareness between two people.

Two Cures of 'Paranoia' by Experimental Appeals to Purported Obsessing Spirits. Walter Franklin Prince. Pp. 57-86.

Prince has written a detailed study of an experience with two patients possessed (or obsessed) by the spirit of a person, once known, who had died. The therapist exhorted the dead person in the presence of the patient and had the patient do automatic writing. Contact with the patient was over a period of one or two years and there was no relapse back into a feeling of being possessed. Other patients treated by the same technique did not respond with relief. The difference was that they felt possessed either by unfamiliar persons or by living persons and so the author calls their problem delusionary. No list of references is included.

Psychodynamics of the Peak Experience. William H. Blanchard. Pp. 87-112.

The peak experience in this article is most clearly described by Rousseau as a celestial fire that consumed him. It unleashed his creativity. He then reformed his habits and his dress to the simplicity he advocated. The author disagrees with Maslow who stresses that a peak experience is pleasant and occurs in mature, self-actualized people. Blanchard gives examples from Varieties of Religious Experience by William James where the peak experience is associated with uncanny terror. He also refers to Sartre and to Erikson's study of Martin Luther which portrays peak experience in the form of identity crisis.

On Mark Twain: 'Never Quite Sane in the Night'. Justin Kaplan. Pp. 113-127.

This is a valuable addition to our understanding of Mark Twain. For two years after the death of his daughter in 1890 he lived in a self-induced dream state and kept his house in mourning. He saved himself from madness by writing and the themes of the dream stories he wrote questioned whether external reality was more valid than dream reality. The hero in these stories was plunged into disaster. His hair turned white with a consuming need to beg forgiveness of wife and daughter, not knowing what had gone wrong or how to make amends. A few years later Mark Twain wrote larger and larger doses of indignation directed against larger and larger people or governments. There is an interesting footnote about dreams that occur in romantic literature.

Nandor Fodor: Analyst of the Unexplained. Allen Spraggett. Pp. 128-137.

Nandor Fodor turned from psychic research to psychoanalysis. In a tape recorded interview with Fodor it is stated that Freud, who definitely had mystical beliefs, showed an active and approving interest in Fodor's research into poltergeist. Fodor believes in a cosmic mind, sometimes called God, which we join after death, and that on rare occasions the dead communicate with some of us who are still in our earthbound kindergarten. God's laboratory on earth is the womb, says Fodor.

Precognition—or Telepathy from the Past? Andrea Fodor Litkei. Pp. 138-141.

Three months after her father's death and two days before she discovered her father's dream diary, the daughter of Nandor Fodor had a dream remarkably similar to one she found in her father's diary. She wonders if it was precognition and telepathy from the dead.

A Paranormal Dream. Herbert S. Strean. Pp. 142-144.

A passive analyst who only 'ohs' and 'ahs' will not develop and relate Psi material to analytic material including the transference. An example is given of a woman patient dreaming of another woman in almost the same way that became an actuality two weeks later. The patient used the dream to make her own significant analytic interpretation that she controlled people with telepathy.

STEWART R. SMITH

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic. XXXIII, 1969.

On Attention, Selective Inattention and Experience. Ernest G. Schachtel. Pp. 65-91.

In a long, metapsychological article the author draws on his own previous writings, as well as on Freud and post-Sullivanians, to discuss the differences in qualitative aspects of attention and their clinical implications. He differentiates allocentric interests from autocentric attention; the former is an ideal wherein

the motive for open attention to the object has no particular purpose other than the wish to relate to it, to know it as it is, out of interest in it. This interest does not want to use the object but rather to experience it. It implies that the subject is also open toward himself (nonrepressive). The obsessive-compulsive style suffers from a lack of allocentric attention because the attitude of the attention is narrow and in sharp focus toward the object for defensive purposes. The obsessive may scan his environment or the objects in it, but without the wide focus which is in the service of a global perception or knowing. This global perceptiveness is differentiated from the infant's global perceptiveness described by autocentric attention in that there is psychic structure and a motive—the desire to relate. In a lengthy section on perception and development, the author rejects the limitations imposed by Freud's pleasure-unpleasure principle and states that 'vital sensations' of the early infantile period have a qualitative rather than just a quantitative or psychoeconomic aspect, although the evidence he adduces for this is inconclusive. He does not develop his notion that consciouness is attached to sense organs directed toward the external world prior to the advent of the reality principle.

The author concludes with some thoughtful comments on how an unwonted isolating tendency pervades our lives and grows as part of our cultural heritage, leading to fragmentation and alienation. He sees the growth of sensory awareness training, 'encounter' groups, and the 'hippy' protest as reaction against this destructive tendency.

Thinking Styles and Individualism. Hans Falk. Pp. 133-145.

Falk's main hypothesis is that the century old terms, 'individual' and 'group', describe ways of thinking and acting which are inadequate for the design of social or psychological treatment. He reviews the thinking of social philosophers (Browne, Hobbs, Locke) as well as T. Parsons and posits that 'individuality' (not individualism) and 'groupness' (instead of group) comprise the qualitative characteristics of a person. The concern is with how people see themselves and how they are seen as part of their group, whether social, familial, or analytic. He then suggests that the question to be foremost in a therapist's mind is, 'How, in what manner, does this person demonstrate individuality-groupness?', rather than the 'hows' and 'whys' of what a patient tells him. This presupposes that we reject the notion of an idealized American individualism as a standard, as well as accept the patient-therapist dyad as a functioning group. The either/or problem regarding individuality-groupness leads to simplistic dichotomies and individuality has meaning only as part of one's groupness. He therefore questions the possibility of treating a single patient.

Interpretation as a Supportive Technique in Psychotherapy. Ira Miller. Pp. 154-164.

With three brief clinical examples, the author supports the thesis that the arbitrary nosology of 'supportive' and 'insight' therapies should be dropped, mainly because single interpretations can be supportive in high anxiety situa-

tions where reassurance, direction, or environmental manipulation cannot. A fifty-five-year-old widow with an agitated depression was helped to enter into fruitful long term therapy with an interpretation of masturbatory wishes expressed in a dream. A borderline graduate student, in therapy only briefly, immediately resolved an acute panic state with an interpretation of his passive feminine wishes as a defense against succeeding (passing an exam) and thus killing his therapist. A thirty-five-year-old married woman, previously in brief therapy, returned two years later with a paranoid delusion which masked a *folie à deux* with her psychotic sister, itself a defense against separation from her. Interpretation allowed for a completely realistic resolution with appropriate commitment for the sister as well as for a favorable marital readjustment.

Alcoholism and the 'Empty Nest'. Joan Curlee. Pp. 165-171.

A study of one hundred consecutive female admissions for alcoholism reveals that thirty could find a specific factor with which the start of alcoholism could be related. For twenty-one of them, it was related to the 'empty nest' syndrome wherein the trauma was a change in, or a challenge to, their roles as wives and mothers. The age range was forty-five to sixty-four and examples of precipitating causes were: loss of occupational position by the husband, menopause, divorce, marriage of children, etc. In each case the woman's adjustment to life had been in terms of her role as a wife and mother, the challenge to which had been disastrous. The author does not attempt to discuss what characterological factors made these common vicissitudes of middle age so disastrous to these women.

DANIEL FEINBERG

Psychiatry. XXXII, 1969.

Maternal Care and Infant Behavior in Japan and America. William Caudill and Helen Weinstein. Pp. 12-43.

Caudill and Weinstein report on their findings from the first phase of a transcultural study of maternal care and infant behavior, in which mothers and their normal firstborns were observed and rated according to the presence or absence of certain specified behaviors. The subjects were further controlled by including only middle class intact families. Although some of the assumptions and interpretations, such as that the Japanese are more sensitive to nonverbal communication, seem arbitrary or speculative, the findings support the authors' conclusion that maternal behavior results in significant differences in infant behavior when viewed cross-culturally, and these differences are clearly discernible in infants of the three to four month age range. This study extends our knowledge of the determinants of early maternal-infant behavior, and we look forward to the reports of the follow-up observations when the children are two and one half years old and again when they are six years of age, the data collection for which has already been accomplished.

Special 'Isolated' Abilities in Severely Psychotic Young Children. Albert C. Cain. Pp. 137-149.

This article attacks the special status among professionals enjoyed by the so-called 'isolated' abilities of some psychotic children, and attempts to view these abilities as ego operations developing in the context of the psychotic disruption. Closer inspection reveals that many of these abilities require the involvement of the very ego functions thought to be most defective. The author holds out the hope that investigation of the development of such special ego operations will contribute to our understanding of ego development generally. A good bibliography is included.

The Influence of Family Studies on the Treatment of Schizophrenia. Theodore Lidz. Pp. 237-251.

One must agree with the author's implication that intimate knowledge of the family enhances the psychotherapeutic work with schizophrenics, even while remaining sceptical of the formulations that imply the reported behavior of the parents has etiologic significance for the development of schizophrenia in their offspring. The author's discussion of productions of the patients is reminiscent of Freud's early belief that the memories of his patients regarding incestuous seductions were of events that actually took place. There is less attention to just how the parents interacted with the patient and influenced the development of his psychic functioning than one would like in order to feel confident about the formulations. These reservations in no way detract from the important contributions of this pioneer investigator to the understanding of schizophrenia, particularly in the family context.

JOHN HITCHCOCK

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Robert S. Grayson & Robert J. Sayer

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 28, 1969. TESTICULAR AND SCROTAL MASTURBATION. Jules Glenn, M.D.

Dr. Glenn feels that most analysts have neglected the importance of sensations arising from stimulation of the testicles and scrotum. Testicular and scrotal masturbation is of clinical significance in some individuals. After a review of recent literature on the subject, he presented clinical material from the cases of one adult and two children.

Fantasies accompanied by wishes for mastery or gratification are connected with testicular and scrotal masturbation. An eight-year-old boy not only tickled his testicles to produce pleasurable sensations but squeezed them, which caused pain. The painful act gratified masochistic fantasies of being a victim (related to alternating identifications with his combative mother and father): he became the one inflicting pain instead of the passive victim. It also represented an attempt to cope with a past trauma (an injury to his testicles) and a current threat of castration posed by a planned circumcision. To ward off penile castration, he displaced masturbation from the penis to the scrotum. Other patients reported the fantasy that the testicles produce urine. Bisexual symbolism was prominent in the clinical material; passivity and femininity were often equated.

Glenn discussed variations in the cathexis of the penis and the testicles and the castration anxiety related to both genitals. In most men anxiety related to penile castration is greater because of the association of the penis with activity and masculinity, and the association of the testicles with passivity and femininity. Several factors contributing to greater cathexis of the testicles and scrotum by some males, and their employment of those organs for masturbation, include displacement of cathexis from the penis, threats to the testicles in childhood or later, testicular stimulation in early life, threats to organs such as the eyes which are symbolically associated with the testicles, constitutional factors, and tendencies to passivity or masochism derived from other sources.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Howard Schlossman described the scrotal parts as transitional in development between the anal and phallic phases, and reported that two of his adult patients had fantasies of the testes being filled with feces. He pointed out that the definition of 'passivity' appears to describe the situation of the child before he begins to take active charge of his functions; one should therefore speak of passive-infantile attitudes rather than passive-feminine attitudes. In discussing castration anxiety, Dr. Schlossman noted the significance of how a male experiences the aggressive content of his sense of identity.

ROBERT S. GRAYSON

February 11, 1969. PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY AND THE NATURE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION. Emanuel Peterfreund, M.D.

This paper is an excerpt from Dr. Peterfreund's forthcoming book, Information, Systems, and Psychoanalysis, and supplements an earlier paper (1965) in

which the author delineated what he feels to be some of the basic difficulties in psychoanalytic theory. He extends his earlier objections to basic psychoanalytic theory, noting (a) the serious confusion of languages and the limited explanatory power of current psychoanalytic theory; (b) the primitive and confused nature of the concept of the ego and the tautological nature of explanatory statements which primarily depend on the concept of the ego; and (c) that the concept of the ego is based on a 'pre-Freudian view of man'. He objects to high level theoretical generalizations concerning the psychic apparatus subsumed under the concepts of the ego and sexual psychic energy. He presented a brief clarification of how scientific explanations operate; in general, scientific statements move increasingly toward universal statements which unite disparate phenomena in a simple parsimonious manner; by contrast, primitive scientific thought is distinctly anthropomorphic and tends to focus on subjective, qualitative human experiences. Modern science is rooted in empiric observations from which man abstracts theories. Clinical language is not an infallible guide to good theoretical thinking and it commonly employs anthropomorphisms for purposes of communication. Much of current psychoanalytic theory has low explanatory power and does not satisfactorily account for the phenomena it attempts to explain.

Freud attempted to free himself from the neurology and biology of his time by basing psychoanalytic theory on psychological grounds with a psychic apparatus as its basic theoretical model. Such concepts as the ego, psychic energy, neutralization, and fusion are characteristic concepts within this frame of reference. Dr. Peterfreund feels that this approach is limited and anthropomorphic. His objection is examined in detail in a discussion of the concept of the ego. He conceives the essence of Freud's discoveries to be that Freud discovered both the biology of the mind and that our phylogenetic and ontogenetic pasts profoundly influence all mental processes. Peterfreund points out that these discoveries are general biological truths, that all biological organisms are uniquely historical systems, and that the past influences the present in all phases of biology. It is important to view the mind of man as a part of evolving biological forms and subject to universal biological laws. The unconscious speaks with the voice of all evolutionary time and Freud, with others, forced man away from an anthropomorphic view of himself and lodged the understanding of mental processes in universal natural laws. In this sense, the ego as currently used in psychoanalytic theory is an archaic, anthropomorphic, pre-Freudian concept.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Morton Reiser agreed that psychoanalytic metapsychology has its weaknesses but objected to the implication that these weaknesses are primarily responsible for lack of interest in psychoanalysis as a choice of profession. Inadequacy of the theory to explain clinical phenomena may also be a reflection of the immaturity of psychoanalysis as a science. Dr. Martin H. Stein felt that 'deciding what level of discourse is to be employed' obviates much language confusion and scholastic dispute between theoreticians; tolerance of incongruities may lead to confusion and sterility of theory but also may be necessary for effective psychoanalytic work. He believes the solution may lie in recognizing and making explicit the apparent incongruities, such as Waelder attempted to do in The Principle of Multiple Function. Drs. Henry Edelheit and George

Wiedeman agreed that the author's wish to reduce psychoanalytic theory to a single model is a mechanistic, nineteenth-century approach to theory. Dr. Samuel Atkin felt Dr. Peterfreund did not take sufficient cognizance of the humanistic quality of psychoanalysis in his attempt to clarify analytic theory.

ROBERT J. SAYER

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

January 20, 1969. NARCISSISTIC FUSION STATES AND CREATIVITY. Gilbert Rose, M.D.

Dr. Rose believes that the prestructural point of view tends to equate creativity with psychopathology. But the evolution of psychoanalysis from a theory of the abnormal toward a general psychology of behavior makes it easier to recognize the mind's normal, garden-variety creativity. The data of ego psychology show that perception and memory are minor 'creative' events, that identity formation shapes reality and orients one within it, and that some dream imagery may be uniquely integrative and may illuminate connections which are not purely private. Because of this 'democratization' of creativity, it is necessary to distinguish between the regressively and progressively integrative aspects of the creative process. The dream and paranoid fantasies are examples of regressive integration; psychological growth and identity formation are examples of progressive integration. Narcissism refers to the original oneness of infant and mother. But even in adult life the boundaries between self and object-representations may remain fluid and interchangeable.

Narcissistic fusion states may contribute to creative imagination in two ways: (a) the traumatic degree of overstimulation inherent in the emergence from narcissistic states may stimulate the creative impulse by initiating repeated returns to narcissistic states in efforts at mastery; (b) the fluidity of early ego boundaries in narcissistic states may encourage development of imaginative forms by fostering the co-existence of multiple frames of reference. When the ego makes a reparative attempt to master the trauma of the birth of ego boundaries by returning to a narcissistic fusion state and the beginnings of reality, the integrative function of the ego attempts to harmonize the reactivated narcissistic state in the light of reality. Fluid boundaries between self and object-representations within the ego are subjected to the force of the integrative function and corrected by reality testing.

The major forms of creative imagination restructure reality into something it had not been before. The artist seeks increased apprehension of the nature of reality by dissolving ego boundaries and re-emerging from narcissistic fusion states. He invests his work with narcissistic libido. By making it serve as his proxy or transitional object, he can relive the primitive experiments of testing reality by repeated fusions and separations.

HERBERT J. URBACH

The Second International Symposium on Psychoanalytic Group Psychotherapy will be held under the auspices of *Deutsche Gruppenpsychotherapeutische Gesellschaft* in Paestum/Salerno (Naples) from May 15 to 20, 1970. For further information write: DGG, 1 Berlin 15, Wielandstr. 27-28.

Two Workshops in the Rorschach Method, conducted by Dr. Marguerite Hertz, will be held at Case Western Reserve University, June 15-19 and June 22-26, 1970. For further information write: Lelia Zamir, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 44106.

George H. Pollock, M.D., has been appointed Associate Director of the CHICAGO INSTITUTE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS.

Le prix MAURICE BOUVET 1970 has been awarded to Dr. Michel Neyraut for his publication, *Solitude et Transfert.*