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AMENHOTEP IV (IKHNATON)

A PSYCHOANALYTIC CONTRIBUTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF HIS PERSONALITY AND THE MONOTHEISTIC CULT OF ATON

BY KARL ABRAHAM

In the year 1880, near the Egyptian village of Tell el-Amarna, various tablets with Asiatic texts were found which, when deciphered, proved to be important historical documents disclosing certain facts of Egyptian history—particularly those concerning King Amenhotep IV and his reign—hitherto unknown. On the basis of these "Amarna-tablets" and some hieroglyphic texts of that period previously known, we are able to draw a rather full picture of the personality of the king. Various reference books and histories of Ancient Egypt containing an abundance of valuable information on the period in question have furnished the basic data for the considerations which follow. The works of Breasted and Weigall's excellent monograph on the life of Amenhotep IV [1] deserve particular mention in this connection.

The marked interest, even enthusiasm, Egyptologists have shown in the "Heretic King" who gave himself the name Ikhnaton—a title we will later explain—might appear strange, even incomprehensible, to the uninitiated. Three thousand and some hundred odd years *do* separate us from the Amarna period! But when an authority of Breasted's caliber characterizes the king as the most remarkable figure in early oriental history and is even inclined to accord him a unique place in the history of the world, our curiosity is aroused and we

[1] Breasted: *Ancient Records of Egypt,* Vol. 2. Chicago, 1906.—Breasted: *History of Egypt.* Chicago, 1905.—Weigall: *The Life and Times of Akhnaton Pharao of Egypt.* Edinborough and London, 1910.—Niebuhr: *Die Amarna-Zeit.* In: *Der alte Orient.* Jahrgang 1, Heft 2. Leipzig, 1899.—Sethe: *Urkunden der 18. Dynastie.* Bd. 4 der *Urkunden des ägyptischen Altertums.* Leipzig, 1906.—Flinders Petrie: *A History of Egypt,* Vol. 2. London, 1896.

naturally want to inquire as to the deeds or personal attributes of Amenhotep IV which have earned him such historical eminence.

A king of the eighteenth dynasty, Amenhotep IV lived in the fourteenth century before our era. Unlike so many of his forefathers he was neither a conqueror nor a diplomatic ruler. On the contrary, during his brief reign the young king remained a passive onlooker while the world empire which his predecessors had built up was falling to ruin. His greatness lay in another realm—in the realm of ideas. And one cannot help but be astounded at the richness of this short life which one perceives from only a few intimations.

Amenhotep IV ascended the throne when he was ten years old. He died at twenty-eight. In the few years intervening he wrought vast revolutionary changes in religion, ethics, philosophy and art. Everything we know of this intellectual revolution leads us to conclude that the king was far in advance of his time, a man whose ideas were of such maturity that they were recaptured, and this only in part, more than a thousand years later. The last direct scion of the eighteenth dynasty was master of thought in the same way as his predecessors had been masters of deeds—he was wholly the dreamer, thinker and idealist, the proponent of ethics and the exponent of æsthetics. He was the first great philosopher and religious thinker met with in the history of mankind.

Anyone who is accustomed to view the human mind in the light of freudian principles must feel challenged to make a psychoanalytic study of the life of Amenhotep IV. For such a study reveals, and with singular clarity, that a man living in even so remote a cultural past was ruled by the same complexes and that the same psychological mechanisms were at play within him, as those which Freud and his school have discovered in contemporary men and women.

It was under the eighteenth dynasty that Egypt became a world empire. Thutmose III, a direct forefather of Amenhotep IV, founded the empire and extended his realm as far

as the Euphrates. It required a repeated series of annual campaigns to consolidate the Egyptian conquests, and from these the energetic king, Thutmose III, always emerged victorious. His successor, Amenhotep II, was primarily occupied with the subjugation of the Asiatic people; he surpassed all his predecessors in martial spirit, savagery, and cruelty. His physical strength was notorious. No other man, it was told, was able to draw the king's bow. His son, however, had little physical strength and his rule was brief. Under the name of Thutmose IV, he was able to maintain Egypt's political power not so much through military ability as through his marriage with the Asiatic princess, Gilukhipa, daughter of King Shuttarna of Mitanni (Mesopotamia). Thutmose IV left a minor son whose mother acted as regent until he could ascend the throne as Amenhotep III. This regency introduced the Asiatic influence to the Egyptian court. Under the reign of Amenhotep III Egyptian power was already on the wane. Less of a warrior than his father, Amenhotep III was an enthusiastic hunter and in the same manner as his ancestors recorded their military campaigns, he chronicled the reports of his successes in the chase. At court he maintained a hitherto unknown splendor. Art was able to flourish during the long period of peace. A strong foreign influence made itself felt and this king, too, married an alien—a woman called Tiy. She was the daughter of a priest who apparently had immigrated from Asia and was in some way connected with the court. Since Tiy did not bear the king a son, he took a second wife, also an Asiatic. Tadukhipa, Princess of Mitanni, was the daughter of the then-reigning King Dushratta and a maternal cousin. However, his first wife, Tiy, later bore him the son who had been so ardently awaited and who was to become King Amenhotep IV.

In the years which followed, the reins of the government passed more and more into the hands of the queen; there was no important change in foreign policies, but a revolution of a religious nature came to the fore; the queen and her followers

attempted to push to one side the traditional cult of Amon in preference for the less popular god, Aton.

At that time Amon was the undisputed principal Egyptian god.[1] The palace of the Pharaohs at Thebes was the stronghold of his cult, and the Amon priests of Thebes were vested with extraordinary power and influence at the court as well as among the common people. The chief god of Lower Egypt, Re, had previously enjoyed the dominating rôle now accorded to Amon; but internal political changes had shifted the center of government and religion to the newer royal residence at Thebes. The worship of Re was by no means completely cast aside; as was characteristic of Egyptian religious ideas, attempts were even made to combine the two rival gods into one "Amon-Re". Many such combined deities existed in those days. The priest of a less prominent god liked to attach *Re* or *Amon* to the name of his deity in order to increase his prestige. Historians point now to the significant fact that the father of Queen Tiy was the priest of such a combined divinity, known as Min-Re. Min corresponded approximately to the Pan of the Greeks; Min-Re combined, then, the concept of the God of Fertility with that of the life-giving Sun-God. The worship of a similar deity, Adonis, was already established in neighboring Syria. Asiatic influence was beginning to percolate into Egypt and since the father of the queen was probably a priest of Asiatic origin, we may assume that with the worship of Min-Re Asiatic influence began to assert itself.

Inscriptions from the latter part of the reign of Amenhotep III frequently refer to the name of the god Aton—a deity which, together with Re, had long ago been worshipped in the Lower-Egyptian realm of the Pharaohs as sun-god. The similarity in sound between the two names *Aton* and *Adonis* is striking. Adonis was the god of the *setting* sun. The assumption that the ancient name Aton had become the carrier of the cult of Adonis, that it had, in fact, originated in Asia, thus suggests itself; even the most noted scholars make some reference to it.

[1] The Greeks identified him on this account with their Zeus.

After the death of Amenhotep III the cult of Aton assumed larger proportions. The accession of the minor king, Amenhotep IV (1375–1358 B.C.), occurred at this period of transition.

The young king was of frail, delicate constitution; he never attained sound health, and died at the early age of twenty-eight. It is recorded, too, that he suffered from "attacks", the more specific nature of which I was unable to establish, and that he also had visions. The opinion has consequently been advanced that he was epileptic, though this certainly is as little justified as in the case of other great historical personages. Epilepsy always leads to progressive mental deterioration. An individual who has distinguished himself through special intellectual endowments and has remained in full possession of those powers to the end of his life, can, on that ground alone, be freed from the suspicion of having been an epileptic. Amenhotep IV was, it would seem, an idealist and dreamer who faced, perplexed and inert, the important demands of life. Epileptic impulsiveness was foreign to his personality; the extent of repression in his instinctual life and the well-defined reaction-formations in his character remind us rather of the neurotic type. If we recall our actual clinical experience and bear in mind that individuals endowed with more than the usual imagination, such as poets and artists, always exhibit an admixture of neurotic traits, we will place Amenhotep IV in this group of individuals.

Granted that the young king was subject to some neurotic attacks of a greater or less severity, he certainly combined with them an unusually precocious, many-sided intelligence and a personality of rare warmth and range of feeling. We see in him a type which exists in our own time. Even today we often enough observe how energy and physical prowess degenerate in a family, and how in spite of that, the declining house puts forth one or another shoot which, though mentally superior, is hindered by a neurotic disposition from developing harmoniously in body and mind.

We need only glance into the history of a number of families to see how an individual can pull himself out of his milieu and

through his own activity strike out on a new path. The son of such an individual often inaugurates the decline of the family. Frequently he lacks the father's rugged constitution. But even if the son has inherited physical strength, he grows up in the shadow of too vigorous a personality and is consequently hindered in his free development. He carries on his father's work without extending his achievements. His craving for power shows itself, rather, in his increased demands on life and in his predilection for enjoyment and luxury. The succeeding generation than usually grows even weaker and less active, and shows a tendency toward intellectual over-refinement and sentimentality. Not equal to the demands of reality, it drifts toward neurosis.

Much that is comparable to this development is found in the course of the eighteenth Egyptian dynasty, from its early beginning in powerful men of action on through its decline in Amenhotep III and to its final eclipse in the dreamer and philosopher.

In our application of the psychoanalytic method to the study of the neurotic person, we are not satisfied with the knowledge of the patient's external life history and with a definition of the clinical picture which he represents; penetrating deep into the unconscious, we try to find what relations exist between the neurotic symptoms and the patient. In coöperation with him we try to reconstruct the history of his libido, i.e., its condition in childhood, the working of sexual repression, and we bring the repressed into consciousness. Every case we examine in this manner serves again to convince us of the significance to be attached to the attitude of the child toward its parents.

We have learned, however, that even the normal individual harbors the same motives in his unconscious as does the neurotic, that also in his case the unconscious attitude toward the parents forms the "nuclear-complex". We can observe again and again in each individual that the libido of the boy is first directed towards the mother, that his first hostile and jealous impulses turn against the father. The difference

FIGURE I

HEAD OF A STATUETTE OF QUEEN TIY

between the normal and the neurotic lies only in the fact that the normal man succeeds in sublimating those drives which, for social reasons, must be repressed and that he establishes a balance between instinct and repression, whereas the neurotic swings from one extreme to the other.

It would seem a wholly fantastic and futile undertaking to make Amenhotep IV the object of a psychoanalytic investigation, were it not for the fact that we have indisputable historical information concerning this very "parent-complex" of the young king. And the facts of the case—the discussion of which will follow directly—are striking in their far-reaching analogy to the phenomena observed during a psychoanalytic procedure.

In the union between his parents, King Amenhotep III and Queen Tiy, the latter without doubt played the dominant rôle. A woman of great intelligence and alertness, she gradually took over the reins of the government into her own hands. In energy, initiative, and practical sagacity she far surpassed her husband who, during the last years of his life, seems to have evinced little interest in government affairs. In the life of her son the mother's influence is everywhere clearly discernible. The boy must have been especially close to her from early childhood. His libido had fixed itself on the mother to an extraordinary degree, whereas in his relationship to his father an equally outspoken negative attitude is evident.

In addition to her intellectual superiority, we may mention yet another cause for the lasting fixation of the young king on his mother: that is, Tiy's beauty. We are able to reconstruct the living image of this remarkable woman—there exists, in a private collection, a small portrait-bust (the Berlin Museum also has a copy) which shows the queen as she must have been, a rare combination of beauty, shrewdness and energy (Fig. I). The bust is so stirringly alive that it can hardly fail to affect the beholder. And to the initiated it must seem very plausible that the high-strung, sensitive son should have had a fixation on just this mother.

So strong and lasting an attachment of the libido to the person of the mother has very definite after-effects on the erotic

life of the maturing or full-grown son. I have shown in an earlier paper [1] that such an attachment makes it difficult for the son, at the time of puberty, to disengage his libido from the mother and transfer it to new objects; not infrequently this transference fails completely. In most cases it succeeds to an imperfect degree, and the tendency develops to bind one's self monogamously to one person who then becomes a substitute for the mother. The transference of the libido once accomplished is usually final and irrevocable.

This monogamous tendency may be found to a marked degree in the young king, the vicissitudes of whose love life are easily related. Soon after the death of his father, not yet ten years old, Amenhotep IV was married. For a wife, he received an Asiatic princess who was as much of a child as himself. It is significant that now for the third time an Asiatic was made the future queen—future, since the government remained for the time being in the hands of the Queen-mother Tiy and her councillors. When the young queen reached maturity she bore a number of daughters but failed to give the king the coveted male heir to the throne. Amenhotep IV refrained, however, from taking a second wife as his father had done; he limited himself to Nofretete (Nefer-Nefru-Aton), whom he loved beyond everything else. This becomes the more conspicuous when one takes into account the fact that the earlier kings had, according to oriental custom, maintained a harem. Amenhotep IV, as Weigall justly emphasizes, is the first of the Pharaohs to live in strictly monogamous wedlock. He restricted himself to a single woman who, moreover, was married to him when he was still a child. He thus renounced for his entire life a personal object choice and attached himself to his wife with as much intensity as to his mother. Even after he had become of age he preferred to appear in public accompanied by the two women who, because of the king's

[1] *Die Stellung der Verwandtenehe in der Psychologie der Neurosen.* Jahrb. f. psa. Forschungen, Bd. I, 1909.—In this paper I particularly considered the frequent marriage between cousins. I refer, therefore, to the second marriage of Amenhotep III to a cousin on the maternal side.

support, were able to exercise an important influence on the government.[1]

Immediately after the death of Amenhotep III the queen-mother made it clearly apparent that she greatly favored the cult of Aton and that she intended to use her minor son as the instrument of plans for reform. Amenhotep IV received a very significant title upon his accession to the throne. To his name Amenhotep, which meant something like "beloved of Amon", there was added "High Priest of Re-Harakhte who on the horizon rejoices in his name: 'Fire which is in Aton' ". Thus the mother marked out, as it were, the path which, according to her will, the son was to follow.

Aton had now officially become Amon's rival. As yet nothing indicated that a few years later he was to be exalted to the position of sole god—a fact which occurred when the king reached his majority. As yet no one foresaw the new conception of the world, the center of which was to be occupied by Aton. Tiy was shrewd and discreet enough to avoid too sudden a change to the new cult and to refrain from going so far as to antagonize the adherents of the old religion. At that time, too, it would have been futile to undertake an immediate struggle with the priesthood of Amon. But even the first measures of her regency made it clear whither she was striving.

The first building constructed under the (nominal) administration of Amenhotep IV was the temple of Re-Harakhte-Aton

[1] One more seemingly negligible fact may be mentioned here. Among the objects which claim a child's affection and on which the neurotically inclined often become tenaciously fixed, the nurse frequently enjoys special precedence. It is common for a nurse to stay near the child after it has been weaned. The pleasurable memories of sucking at the nurse's breast are kept alive in the child through the special care which the nurse continues to bestow on it. In analyses of neurotics I have often enough been able to observe the after-effects of this love for the nurse. Stekel (*Die Sprache des Traumes*. Wiesbaden, 1911) has shown the meaning of the nurse in the dreams of adults. We learn now that the nurse and her husband played an important rôle at the court of Amenhotep IV. We have, for example, a relief which represents the king and the queen throwing gifts from a balcony to the priest Eje, the nurse's husband, and to the nurse herself. It may not be without some significance that the nurse carried the same name (Tiy) as the king's mother.

at Karnak. A sculptured work was also erected which pictured the king—in conformity with his name—worshipping the god Amon. The same piece of sculpture, however, contained also the symbol of Aton: a sun's disk in the heavens from which darted diverging rays, these ending in hands and encompassing the king. We may conclude that the king was thus placed in relationship to both gods in cautious deference to the priests of Amon. But Thebes, the capital and center of Amon worship, received a new name: City of Aton's Splendor.

At about the age of fifteen Amenhotep IV took over the government. Now embracing physical maturity, the youth's strong individuality soon became apparent and in time everyone had to recognize that the young king would go his own way. Nevertheless, the mother's influence remained unmistable as long as she lived. With all his youthful enthusiasm, the son continued the work she had begun. When one draws a comparison between this attitude and Amenhotep's efforts to free himself from his father, the mother-fixation becomes manifest in its full strength.

Taken as a whole, the conduct of the young king in the years which now follow stands as a symbol of his rebellion against his father, long since deceased. Unfortunately we are totally uninformed concerning the boy's relationship to his father during his early years, but his attitude during puberty and in later years corresponds fully to that of many individuals whom we can observe today: they unconsciously cleave to their fathers as in childhood, while as adults they seek to free themselves from this inner dependence. Outwardly it seems as if they were struggling against the person of the father; in reality it is the father fixation in the unconscious against which they rebel, the father image from whose rule they want to shake themselves free. Only thus can one account for the fact that the neurotic often carries on a struggle which, according to outward appearances, is directed against a dead person.

In the young king, then, there were too opposing forces—the conservative and the rebellious. Experience teaches us that such circumstances give rise to psychic compromises.

From all that has been reported about the young man thus far, we should expect that his rebellion against the father complex would not have taken a very violent form. And, in fact, it will be seen that the struggle against paternal power and authority was sublimated into idealistic striving—a striving which was indeed directed in a most decisive manner against tradition as represented by the father. But when in spite of this the violent, revolutionary tendency later succeeded in breaking through into full expression, we may infer from this fact alone with what vehemence Amenhotep IV's inner battle was being waged. And as we have said, the revolutionary worked against the conservative tendency. In the case of Amenhotep IV we observe a course of events which are well known to us from our study of neurotics. These reject the authority of the father in religious, political, or other matters, but replace it with another authority and consequently show that they have not actually lost the need for paternal control.

There are hardly more significant examples of compromises of this sort than those offered in the history of Amenhotep IV. Soon after his accession to power he breaks completely with religious tradition, breaks with Amon, the god of his father, and shifts his allegiance to Aton, whom he clothes with an authority and power hitherto possessed by no other god. He revives in a new form the ancient Lower Egyptian cult of the sun. But in going back to the cult of Re-Harakhte-Aton he follows the example of the earliest kings, who traced their origin directly from Re. To prove still more concisely how close he feels himself to the latter and how distant from his father, he always wears the crown of Lower Egypt, that is, of the more ancient realm—which conforms to his early preference for Lower Egypt. There are additional symptoms worthy of note.

About this time we come upon the first changes of style in art; these are especially characteristic. To one who knows Egyptian art certain peculiarities in the pictures of the king are conspicuous, distinguishing them at first sight from the works of the preceding period: the long drawn skull and neck,

the protruding abdomen, and the over-long hips and thighs. Scholars have tried to explain these deviations in various ways. They were inclined to assume that the king had some physical deformity corresponding with these pictures and sculptured works. But this hypothesis had to be abandoned when the king's mummy was found, for no deformities existed in the bones of the mummy at all comparable to the pictured representations of Amenhotep IV. Weigall has demonstrated very ingeniously and convincingly that the odd forms in the art of this period go back to *archaic prototypes*—in fact, to those prototypes from the period of the earliest Lower Egyptian kings. He presents in a table a very instructive juxtaposition of pictures from the earliest period of Egyptian art and from the period in which we are interested. The connection between the style of this later period and that of the archaic is perfectly evident.[1] Through the restoration of this early style of art the young king establishes an especially close relationship between himself and the early kings.

The meaning of these first changes in religion and art brought about by Amenhotep IV is very clear: the king does not wish to be son and successor of his father, but son of the god Re. He does not want to worship the god of his true father, but prefers to idolize his imaginary father, Re.

This will remind us of familiar phenomena which have been explained through the psychoanalytic investigation of neuroses—the so-called fantasies of one's origin—which have also been found to exist in normal persons.

The father is originally the symbol of all power and greatness for the child. When hostile impulses arise against him, the boy frequently sets his father on a throne by making himself the son of an imaginary king and apportioning to his real father the rôle of a mere foster father. One of the most common fantasies of a boy is that of being a prince. Among psychotics we find that such a rejection of the father often gives

[1] The history of modern art offers, in the Preraphaelites, an analogous example of this reverting to primitive models.

rise to the patient's delusion of his being of noble birth. Similar trains of thought are familiar to us in those myths and fairy tales which recount the story of the hero who, reared as the son of lowly parents, later takes over his right of sovereign power as befits his true origin. In various disguises, this type of myth expresses the age-old conflict between father and son.[1]

Amenhotep IV proceeds quite in this manner: he scorns descent from his real father and replaces him with a more lofty one. Since he was in reality a king's son, he could not exalt himself above his father through the fantasy of kingly origin usual in other cases. He must go a step higher—to the gods. One must take into account that the Egyptian king was at that time ruler of a world empire. No mortal existed who could have excelled him in power. There remained for his fantasy only the one possibility, to join his own existence with that of a supernatural being. The father rôle could not devolve upon Amon, for he was the god worshipped by Amenhotep III. The mother's influence pointed to Aton, or Re, who had, moreover, been considered the progenitor of the first kings of antiquity.

Thus the rule of Amenhotep IV began not with warlike deeds or other external political events, but with innovations in the realm of ideas. At first, to be sure, there were no innovations in any real sense, but rather a return to ancient, prehistoric traditions. The nearer the king approached manhood, however, the more he added to the old something that was new and his own. Several burial inscriptions of artists who carried out the king's building projects give incontestable evidence that the revolutionary change in art beginning at this time proceeded from the personal initiative of the king. It was customary in Egypt that the deceased should, as it were, personally relate the story of his life in his epitaph. It is well

[1] Compare here my article *Traum und Mythus* (p. 40), as well as Rank's *Der Mythus von der Geburt des Helden.* (English translation: Rank, Otto: *The Trauma of Birth.* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1929, pp. 106–116.) Both in: *Schriften zur angewandten Seelenkunde,* Vol. IV, Chapter 5.

known that we are indebted to these inscriptions, which have been preserved in great numbers, for no small part of our knowledge of Egyptian history. The royal architect Bek (whose work, the new capital, will presently be mentioned) reports in his epitaph that his majesty himself had instructed him. One might consider this mere court flattery meant for the king, were it not for the fact that such a conclusion would be unjustified. Even without such evidence, we are able to recognize the genius of the king in the plastic art of that time. For the painting and sculpture of that period are an embodiment of the ideals to whose cultivation the youthful enthusiast had dedicated himself with complete devotion. The constant emphasis on *truth* in his ethical doctrines and the corresponding realism, wholly modern in feeling, in the art of his epoch will be discussed later.

While his ancestors had aimed at an extension and consolidation of their political power, their descendant strove for a widening of the intellectual horizon. He directed his interest toward foreign art, alien religions and myths, and according to all appearances he succeeded in interesting the leading circles at the court in the questions which absorbed him.

Two years after his accession, when only seventeen years of age, he took a step which involved a principle of the greatest importance: he founded a new residence which received the name Achetaton—Horizon of Aton. He had this city built some 450 km. north of the existing capital Thebes, thus removing himself conclusively from the old Amon city and drawing nearer to the delta of the Nile (that is, to the earliest realm). The new Aton city was situated on the site of the present Tell el-Amarna, where the tablets mentioned at the beginning of this article were found. Palaces and temples of great splendor were soon built and, in addition, two new cities were founded, one in Nubia and one in Syria, whose names indicated that they were dedicated to the god Aton. Two years later—at the age of nineteen—Amenhotep IV definitely left Thebes and moved the royal residence to Achetaton. At the same time he

changed his name, calling himself thenceforth *Ikhnaton*, "Spirit of Aton", or "Well-pleasing to Aton".[1]

Meanwhile there arose serious conflicts with the priests of Amon who resisted the king's innovations. Ikhnaton carried through his plan with rigid consistency in spite of all odds. He evicted priesthoods hostile to Aton, and by combating the worship of all other gods he exalted Aton to the position of sole god of the land. Especially did he declare war on Amon. He directed his efforts to effacing all traces of the god for whom his father and he himself were named. The hated word was no longer permitted utterance. And he had Amon and the name of his father Amenhotep, erased from all inscriptions and monuments. In this strange purging the old, long-repressed or sublimated enmity of the son for the father breaks through in aggressive form. Thus the king's action appears as the consummation of an ancient oriental curse which carried the wish that all thought of the opponent should be completely obliterated. Ikhnaton sought to efface all trace of Amon and therewith of his father. Later, when his mother Tiy died, he continued consistently to carry out his purpose to its last implication. Tiy's body was not buried next to her husband's, but was put in a new vault near the Aton city where Ikhnaton himself wished some day to rest. On the inscription she is designated as the wife of "Nebmaara", a personal name of Amenhotep III, which, however, he had not used officially as king. It is still more significant that the word "mother" is not written with the customary hieroglyphic symbol of the vulture, but in letters. The vulture symbol signified not only "mother", but more specifically the goddess Courage who, however, was Amon's wife. The symbol would thus have implied an indirect but plain reference to Amon and for this reason it had to be avoided. Ikhnaton wanted in death to rest beside his mother, whom at last he would have separated from her husband. Even beyond the grave the son's rivalry with the father for possession of the mother was to find expression.

[1] The king's daughters received such names as "Merit-Aton" (Beloved of Aton) or "Beket-Aton" (Servant of Aton).

Thus Ikhnaton wrought on the dead what he had been unable to effect on the living. In this trait of character he reminds us especially of the attitude of neurotic individuals.

Just as ostentatiously as he avoided mention of his father, the king thenceforth used every opportunity to designate himself as *Aton's son.* The inscriptions from Achetaton show this with the greatest clarity. There, for example, in referring to the province consecrated to that god, the inscription reads: "This territory from . . . to . . . shall belong to my father Aton."

Hand in hand with the erection of the new residence and its sanctuaries went the further development of the new religion and its cult. Aton is Ikhnaton's father, but not in the same sense as Re was once considered the father of the first kings. The new god is an idealized father, and he is not only the king's father in the strict sense of the word, but the father of all living things, the creator of the universe. He is not—like Re or Amon—a god among or above other gods, but the one and only god, not a national god, but a universal god to whom all beings are equal.

Special emphasis is to be placed on the fact that Ikhnaton did not worship the sun as deity, but Aton as the personification of the warmth of the sun and its life-giving power. Breasted (*History of Egypt.* English edition, p. 360) rightly states: ". . . Under the name of Aton, then, Amenhotep IV introduced the worship of the supreme god, but he made no attempt to conceal the identity of his new god with the old sun-god, Re. . . . He thus attributes the new faith to Re as its source, and claims to have been himself the channel of its revelation. He immediately assumed the office of High Priest of his new god with the same title 'Great Seer' as that of the High Priest of Re at Heliopolis. But, . . . it was not merely sun-worship; the word Aton was employed in place of the old word for 'god' *(nuter),* and the god is clearly distinguished from the material sun. To the old sun-god's name is appended the explanatory phrase, under his name: 'Heat which is in the Sun (Aton)' and he is likewise called, 'Lord of the Sun (Aton)'."

Flinders Petrie looks on Ikhnaton as a forerunner of monotheism, but one may well go considerably beyond this view. Ikhnaton's doctrine not only contains essential components of Old Testament Jewish monotheism, but in many respects is in advance of it. Indeed, the same holds true when we compare Ikhnaton's ideas with those of Christianity which came some thirteen centuries later. And there is much to remind us of modern theories, which we evolved under the influence of the natural sciences.

The prayers and hymns of that time which have come down to us (the most important will be cited below) give a clear idea of Ikhnaton's conception of the essential nature of the only god. Aton is the loving, infinitely good Being who pervades time and space. Such goodness and kindness had been entirely foreign to the earlier Egyptian deities, just as these sentiments were foreign to the people who worshipped them. Aton knows no hatred, no jealousy, no punishment as did the God of the Old Testament. He is the Lord of Peace, not of war and he is free from all human passions. Ikhnaton does not picture his god in a physical guise, but imagines him to be a spiritual and impersonal being. He therefore forbids any pictorial representation of the god—which command becomes a forerunner of Mosaic law. Aton is the life-giving force to which all living things owe their existence.

Weigall points out that Ikhnaton's conception of God resembles the Christian more than the Mosaic. Especially pertinent is the following remark (p. 117): "The faith of the patriarchs is the lineal ancestor of the Christian faith; but the creed of Akhnaton is its isolated prototype."

Ikhnaton's whole world of ideas and his entire religious system show a unique tendency toward spiritualization. Not only is idolatry discarded but likewise everything that was formerly part and parcel of religion. The ceremonial of the Aton religion was extremely simple; everything aimed at the greatest possible spiritual intensification. There were no obscured mysteries, but the meaning of the new faith was presented in hymns composed by the king in a form both compre-

hensible and gripping. Furthermore, there was no sign of anything that could suggest flight from the world or asceticism. The gods of the dead and of the lower world were discarded; even Osiris lost his significance. The punishments of hell which formed an important part of the old faith were no longer referred to. Only one desire was ascribed to the deceased: to see the sun, that is, Aton's splendor, again; and from now on the prayers hewn in the tombstones reveal that the sole wish of the deceased was that their souls might see the light.

The great hymn mentioned above illustrates better than any description the religious ideas of Ikhnaton. For this reason it may be cited in full.[1] It reads:

THE SPLENDOR OF ATON

Thy dawning is beautiful in the horizon of heaven,
O living Aton, Beginning of life!
When thou risest in the eastern horizon of heaven,
Thou fillest every land with thy beauty;
For thou art beautiful, great, glittering, high over the earth;
Thy rays, they encompass the lands, even all thou hast made.
Thou art Re, and thou hast carried them all away captive;
Thou bindest them by love.
Though thou art afar, thy rays are on earth;
Though thou art on high, thy footprints are the day.

NIGHT

When thou settest in the western horizon of heaven
The world is in darkness like the dead.
They sleep in their chambers,
Their heads are wrapt up,
Their nostrils stopped, and none seeth the other.
Stolen are all their things that are under their heads,
While they know it not.
Every lion cometh forth from his den,
All serpents, they sting.
Darkness reigns (?),
The world is in silence,
He that made them has gone to rest in his horizon.

[1] Ibid. Breasted: *History of Egypt*, pp. 371–376.

Day and Man

Bright is the earth,
When thou risest in the horizon,
When thou shinest as Aton by day.
The darkness is banished,
When thou sendest forth thy rays,
The Two Lands (Egypt) are in daily festivity,
Awake and standing upon their feet,
For thou hast raised them up.
Their limbs bathed, they take their clothing;
Their arms uplifted in adoration to thy dawning.
Then in all the world, they do their work.

Day and the Animals and Plants

All cattle rest upon their herbage,
All trees and plants flourish,
The birds flutter in the marshes,
Their wings uplifted in adoration to thee,
All the sheep dance upon their feet,
All winged things fly,
They live when thou hast shone upon them.

Day and the Waters

The barques sail up-stream and down-stream alike.
Every highway is open because thou hast dawned.
The fish in the river leap up before thee,
And thy rays are in the midst of the great sea.

Creation of Man

Thou art he who createst the man-child in woman,
Who makest seed in man,
Who giveth life to the son in the body of his mother,
Who soothest him that he may not weep,
A nurse (even) in the womb.
Who giveth breath to animate everyone that he maketh.
When he cometh forth from the body,
. . . . on the day of his birth,
Thou openest his mouth in speech,
Thou suppliest his necessities.

Creation of Animals

When the chickling crieth in the egg-shell,
Thou givest him breath therein, to preserve him alive.
When thou hast perfected him
That he may pierce the egg,
He cometh forth from the egg,
To chirp with all his might;
He runneth about upon his two feet,
When he hath come forth therefrom.

The Whole Creation

How manifold are all thy works!
They are hidden from before us,
O thou sole God, whose power no other possesseth,[1]
Thou didst create the earth according to thy desire.
While thou wast alone:
Men, all cattle large and small,
All that are upon the earth,
That go about upon their feet;
All that are on high,
That fly with their wings.
The countries of Syria and Nubia,
The land of Egypt;
Thou settest every man in his place,
Thou suppliest their necessities.
Every one has his possessions,
And his days are reckoned.
Their tongues are diverse in speech,
Their forms likewise and their skins,
For thou divider, hast divided the peoples.

Watering the Earth

Thou makest the Nile in the Nether World,
Thou bringest it at thy desire, to preserve the people alive.
O lord of them all, when feebleness is in them,
O lord of every house, who risest for them,
O sun of day, the fear of every distant land,

[1] The other hymns frequently say, "O thou sole God, beside whom there is no other".—Breasted, p. 374.

Thou makest (also) their life.
Thou hast set a Nile in heaven,
That it may fall for them,
Making floods upon the mountains, like the great sea;
And watering their fields among their towns.

How excellent are thy designs, O lord of eternity!
The Nile in heaven is for the strangers,
And for the cattle of every land that go upon their feet;
But the Nile, it cometh from the nether world for Egypt.

Thus thy rays nourish every garden
When thou risest they live, and grow by thee.

The Seasons

Thou makest the seasons, in order to create all thy works:
Winter bringing them coolness,
And the heat (of summer likewise).
Thou hast made the distant heaven to rise therein,
In order to behold all that thou didst make,
While thou wast alone,
Rising in thy form as living Aton,
Dawning, shining afar off and returning.

Beauty Due to Light

Thou makest the beauty of form, through myself alone.
Cities, towns, and settlements,
On highway or on river,
All eyes see thee before them,
For thou art Aton of the day over the earth.

Revelation to the King

Thou art in my heart,
There is no other that knoweth thee.
Save thy son Ikhnaton.
Thou hast made him wise in thy designs
And in thy might.
The world is in thy hand,
Even as thou hast made them.
When thou hast risen, they live;
When thou settest they die.

For thou art duration, beyond thy mere limbs,
By thee man liveth,
And their eyes look upon thy beauty,
Until thou settest,
All labor is laid aside,
When thou settest in the west;
When thou risest, they are made to grow
. . . . for the king.
Since thou didst establish the earth,
Thou hast raised them up for thy son,
Who came forth from thy limbs,
The king, living in truth,
The lord of the Two Lands Nefer-khepru-Re, Wan-Re,
The son of Re, living in truth, lord of diadems,
Ikhnaton, whose life is long;
(And for) the great royal wife, his beloved,
Mistress of the Two Lands, Nefer nefru aton, Nofretete,
Living and flourishing for ever and ever.

The language of the above is so clear that it needs no interpretation, and we may confine our remarks to a few especially characteristic lines.

The introductory strophe refers to Aton's love which captivates all lands and all creatures. Here—probably for the first time in the history of the spiritual life of mankind—love is extolled as a world-conquering force. We shall come back to this when we deal with Ikhnaton's ethics.

The description of divine kindness which all creatures share equally is highly reminiscent of the Hebrew psalms. Breasted and other writers draw special attention to the surprising similarity existing between certain passages of the Aton hymn and the 104th Psalm. In particular, verses 20 to 24 and 27 to 30 show remarkable similitude:

Thou makest darkness, and it is night,
Wherein all the beasts of the forest do creep forth.

The young lions roar after their prey,
And seek their meat from God.

The sun ariseth,
They gather themselves together,
And lay them down in their dens.

Man goeth forth unto his work,
And to his labour, until the evening.

O Lord, how manifold are thy works!
In wisdom hast thou made them all:
The earth is full of thy riches . . . . .

These wait all upon thee,
That thou mayest give them their meat in due season.

That thou givest them they gather:
Thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good.

Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled:
Thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust.

Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created:
And thou renewest the face of the earth.

It is taken for granted that the 104th Psalm originated under the direct influence of Ikhnaton's poetry.[1]

Flinders Petrie emphasizes in his discussion of the Aton hymn that it is not only free from anything reminiscent of polytheism, but that it is also lacking in anything anthropomorphic in its conception of the only god. This statement, of course, is not to be accepted without reservation, but certainly is to a greater degree true of this than of any other monotheistic conception. One must consider that in its deepest sense the Aton cult represents the worship of a force of nature, an impersonal principle.

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[1] Weigall assumes that the 19th Psalm also owes its peculiar character to this influence. In verses 6 to 7 it says of the sun (whose gender is masculine in the Hebrew language):

"(the sun,) 5. Which is as a bridegroom coming out of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a strong man to run a race. His going forth is from the end of the heaven, and his circuit unto the ends of it: and there is nothing hid from the heat thereof."

Surely we may see here remnants of a hymn to the sun-god; whether they are of Egyptian origin remains open to question.

As already mentioned, Aton was not portrayed graphically. A symbol represents him: the sun's disk with each of its rays ending in a hand. The hands, however, surround a pictured representation of the king and with him his wife or even his children.

When the king looks upon Aton as his father, he is, strictly speaking, tracing his origin from an impersonal force. In this we are reminded of Christ's conception by the Holy Ghost. Only Ikhnaton is not begotten by Aton with a human wife (at least there are no references to any such concept), but Aton is at once father and mother.

Ikhnaton's religion must not be considered in itself alone; to understand its full scope one must also take into account the man's ethics which are the focal point of his interests as a whole, of his religious feeling, and of his conduct of life.

In his ethics Ikhnaton—like Christ many centuries later—rejects every expression of hate, every show of violence. He wants to rule through love, as it is said of Aton in the hymn. He is opposed to bloodshed in any form, and orders portrayals of human sacrifices to be everywhere effaced. The lusts of war are foreign to him: just as he worships Aton as the lord of peace, in his own realm he wishes to know nothing of war. It is particularly interesting to compare Ikhnaton with his predecessors in this respect. One has only to think of the cruel, fighting Amenhotep II, of whom it was told that, having captured the Syrian princes in one of his campaigns, he strung them up on his ship and so sailed in triumph up the Nile. And Ikhnaton's father, though less warlike than his ancestors, had still given some play to his aggressive passions in his zealous pursuit of the chase. The son suppressed practically every expression of cruel or aggressive tendencies, and his ethical principles rest primarily on an unusually far-reaching sublimation of the sadistic instinctual components. His rigid adherence to these principles was to result in the most grievous consequences for himself and for his realm.

Especially after the death of his mother, Ikhnaton sought to transform his ideals into reality without reckoning with the

obstacles that were certain to confront him. He wanted to bless his realm, which at that time implied the whole world, with peace. In this desire he completely overlooked the fact that his era was not ripe for the realization of such idealistic intentions, and the rôle that hatred, greed, and jealousy play in the lives of individuals and of peoples. He stood at the head of a powerful realm that was bound to disintegrate unless a strong hand held it forcibly together. But he attempted, in the manner he ascribed to Aton, to master the world by means of his love.

Ikhnaton not only disdained to extend or maintain his realm through force, but did not even wish to make use of his sovereign power during times of peace. Breaking with all court tradition, he made efforts to draw nearer to the people as a human being. Since time immemorial the Pharaohs had enjoyed an almost godlike reverence throughout the land. Ikhnaton presents a simple and unassuming appearance, without the slightest tinge of a royal pose. His portraits invariably represent him in a natural and human attitude, without the heroic gestures common to the old Pharaohs, and he shows himself to his people—we have this from various sculptured works—in company with his family. Time and again he makes known to the people that he is not the conventional, unapproachable and stern ruler, that he takes no pleasure in ruling nor in royal power, but only in beauty. He prefers to call himself "the king who lives in the truth".

This striving after truth needs special emphasis and evaluation. Centuries were still to pass before the leading civilized nations were to succeed in condemning falsehood. But Ikhnaton went beyond the ethical regard for truth, in that he exalted it even to a principle in art. As Breasted puts it, Ikhnaton taught the artists of his court "to make the chisel and the brush tell the story of what they actually saw". "The result"—he continues—"was a simple and beautiful realism that saw more clearly than ever any art had seen before. They caught the instantaneous postures of animal life; the coursing

hound, the fleeing game, the wild bull leaping in the swamp; for all these belonged to the 'truth' in which Ikhnaton lived."

Ikhnaton's sexual ethics require still further comment, although several related features have already been discussed. His monogamous fixation has been mentioned. All our available sources of information show with what fervent love Ikhnaton clung to his wife. He refrained from taking a second wife when the queen failed to give birth to a male heir, and used every opportunity to show himself to the people in the circle of his family. Nofretete bore the king four daughters whom he dearly loved. The happiness which Ikhnaton found in his family life was expressed primarily in the special emphasis he placed on his admiration for the queen in all public proclamations and inscriptions. He showered the queen with epithets such as "mistress of his happiness", and sought, in this manner, to make propaganda among the people for a new conception of marriage, for a changed attitude in the husband toward his wife. It has already been pointed out that under Ikhnaton's reign the women at court attained an influence hitherto unknown.

The tenderness of the relationship between the king and queen can best be seen in a relief, at present in the Berlin Museum: the youthful, almost girlish king is leaning on a staff and faces the queen who is letting him smell a bouquet of flowers. Nowhere in earlier Egyptian art does one find a representation that can be compared with this in content or conception (cf. the reproduction in Breasted's *History of Egypt,* 1905 English edition. Fig. II). A relief in the tomb of one of his daughters who died young is also characteristic of the tender attachment the king felt for his own. Never before had the grief of a family over a dead child found such expression. And what delicacy of feeling the Aton hymn betrays! We recall, for example, the description of the chick's creeping out of the egg.

Related to Ikhnaton's avoidance of everything brutal is his dread of the ugly, his need for beauty. The Aton hymn begins with a description of the beauty of the god. In addition to

FIGURE II

IKHNATON RECEIVING FLOWERS FROM HIS QUEEN

sponsoring the graphic arts, Ikhnaton laid out magnificent gardens where he could enjoy the flowers and animals, and he also took an especial interest in music. His longing for refined pleasures, his urge toward sublimation, thus found outlet in manifold forms.

Taken as a whole, Ikhnaton's religion, his outlook on life, and his ethics, form a structure which is astonishing not only in its lofty conception but also in its consistency. But in order to accomplish such comprehensive reforms in the life of the people, the king required not only great energy, but also a practical sense which would enable him to take into account the forces that were certain to oppose him. The young king who had inherited a world empire planned nothing short of establishing a new religion with a single, universal god. He lost his own sovereignty in attempting to establish that of his god.

It is clear that only through the preservation of his own prestige as king could Ikhnaton consolidate the realm of Aton. But the more he effaced, in his idealism, the distance between himself and the people, the more he antagonized the priests of the old deity; the more radically he sought to execute his reforms, the more he lost his influence among the people. At best, only a small proportion of the elect was ripe for his religion, whereas the new cult in no way took account of the needs of the masses. Weigall draws a comparison between the introduction of the Aton cult and that of Christianity, and comes to the conclusion that Christianity was able to achieve rapid and wide dissemination only because it allowed a certain scope to the need of the people for tangible and anthropomorphic objects of worship. In addition to the One God there was the figure of Christ, who was more on a level with man; there was the devil; there were angels, saints, spirits, etc. The belief in a single divine being who remained intangible would certainly never have permeated the masses. As Weigall rightly recognizes, this circumstance doubtless also explains the weakness of the attraction to Mosaic monotheism which, chronologically, soon followed the Aton cult.

Much as we know of the internal revolutions which occurred under the government of Ikhnaton, so little do we learn of the developments in foreign politics. Nothing was done. And because nothing was done, vandal tribes began to invade the frontiers of the empire. Simultaneously some of the Syrian vassal princes rebelled and attacked those who remained loyal. The latter turned to Egypt for help, but all their petitions for protection remained unanswered. The Hittites invaded Syria in the sixteenth year of Ikhnaton's reign, at a time when the king was already suffering from an illness which two years later was to carry him off. Opposed to armed interference of any sort, he left the severely menaced Asiatic provinces to themselves. About this time that strange correspondence begins which has been revealed to us almost in full in the discovery of the Amarna tablets. It consists of a large number of cuneiform tablets which were received from Asia in the course of the following years. They contain the ever more insistent complaints from Asiatic vassals who were unable to defend themselves against their rebellious adversaries and the invading barbarians. We quote here a characteristic passage from one of these calls for help which Breasted cites (according to Knudtzon's Amarna Letters) in which the elders of the town of Tunip ask for help against the disloyal Prince: "When Asiru invades Simyra, he will do unto us that which pleases him in the territory of our lord, the king, and despite all that our lord stays aloof from us. And now your city of Tunip is weeping and its tears are being shed, and there is no help for us. For twenty years we have sent messengers to our lord the king of Egypt, but no answer has reached us, not a single word."

The confusion in the provinces constantly increased, and one after another the most important cities and strategic points of Egyptian power were lost—Ascalon, Tyre, Sidon, Simyra, Byblos, Ashdod, Jerusalem, Kadesh, Tunip, the valleys of the Jordan and Orontes, and many other regions. Ikhnaton, however, remained passive in spite of these events, lived faithful to his ideals, and allowed the entire empire outside of Egypt,

founded with so much sacrifice by his ancestors, to go to ruin.

How unmoved the dreamer on the throne remained in the face of these exigencies was once more demonstrated during the last months of his life. Instead of repelling the danger that came from the outside, his only thought was to remove all traces of the earlier polytheism. The last important measure of his government of which we are informed was his order to obliterate the names of the old gods in all places where this had not already been done. Even the designation "gods" was expunged. Coming at this time, such a measure was the least needed. Inasmuch as the king's prestige was on the wane, no direct occasion for rebellion should have been given to the people, or rather to the priests who influenced them. Ikhnaton, however, made this mistake and it would seem that only his timely death, which came shortly after the order, saved him from witnessing the violent end of his rule.

Hardly had Ikhnaton died when the counter reformation of the Amon priests set in. They soon regained even their external power, for Ikhnaton's son-in-law, Sakere, was not the man to defend the work of his predecessor; moreover, he was destined to rule only a short time. Ikhnaton was branded a heretic, and his work was destroyed with the same thoroughness with which he himself had wiped out what had been handed down by his father. To his name fell the same fate that he himself had prepared for the name of his father and that of the god Amon—it was hammered away and the very vaults of his tomb were violated in order to obliterate the hated word which served as a reminder of Aton. Still not content, the people removed the mummy of Queen Tiy, which reposed near the remains of Ikhnaton, and buried it at the side of Amenhotep III. And just as Ikhnaton had once laid aside the name Amenhotep, so one of his successors—they followed in rapid succession—was forced to change his name Tutenkhaton to Tutenkhamon.

Ikhnaton was a revolutionist—though not, of course, in the usual sense of the word. He had sublimated to an astonishing degree his aggressive instincts, and had transformed them into

an all-encompassing love with the result that even the enemies of his realm were not confronted with violence. His strongest enmity was directed against his dead father. We are reminded here in a striking manner of certain neurotics who, too weak to proceed actively against the living, let out their hatred and revenge on the dead, for the most part, of course, only in fantasy or in the form of neurotic symptoms.

As has already been noted, in spite of his rebellion against the power of his father, Ikhnaton could not dispense with an authority representing the latter's might. Hence he made a new religion, designed for his own personal needs, which centered around a fatherly god whom he endowed with unlimited power, with the omnipotence that every child at first ascribes to his father; he made him the *only* god, in transparent reference to the "uniqueness" of a father. Thus he became the precursor of Mosaic monotheism, in which the "only god" unmistakably bore the features of the patriarch, the sole ruler in the family. Moreover, he ascribed to the new god infinite love and kindness—characteristics of his own person. Thus he created for himself a god in his own image in order that he might later—as men have so often done—trace his own origin from him. Ikhnaton himself, with all his personal characteristics, was thus mirrored in Aton. And when he designates Aton as his father—Aton, who was in reality a child of his own fantasy, spirit of his own spirit—we read in this nothing but Ikhnaton's wish to descend from a father who should have the same personal qualities as he himself. We know from the study of neurotics that in our own times, too, many individuals create for themselves their own individual religion, a few among them also a private cult. As psychoanalysis can often demonstrate, these are human beings who revolt in the depths of their unconscious against their fathers but who transfer their desire for dependence to a divine being, that is, to one who is even superior to their fathers. Not infrequently they feel themselves called upon to disseminate the ideas rooted in their father-complex, in which case they become founders of religions or leaders of sects.

In other cases the son tries to substitute for his real father an ideal father created by his imagination. This figure then, as one might expect, has all those qualities and characteristics through which the son thinks to excel his father. As the essence of these products of the imagination we find the desire to have begotten one's self, the wish to be one's own father. The hymn quoted above says of Aton, who to us is only an image of Ikhnaton endowed with a father's omnipotence and exalted to deity, that he had begotten himself!

While Ikhnaton's attitude toward his father may enable us to explain why he became the founder of a monotheistic cult and originated a religion of love, we are still faced with the question of why he placed Aton and not some other god in the center of the new cult. Several reasons have been given above, such as the spread of the Asiatic cult of Adonis, the preference for Aton on the part of the queen-mother, and the latter's influence on her young son. Yet these external reasons explain neither the fervor which appears for instance in the great hymn, nor the fact that Ikhnaton put his entire thought, his greatest strength, indeed, his whole life, into the service of Aton. Basing our analysis partly on psychoanalytic experience, partly on facts of ethnological psychology, we may try to give an inner justification for the attitude of the king.

As a result of recent research [1], our attention has been called to the special meaning of the sun as a father symbol. Evidence of this meaning is found not only in the psychology of neuroses and psychoses, but also in the ideas of the most varied peoples. The sun is especially suitable as a symbol of an only god because, in contradistinction to other planets, the sun pursues its path alone through the skies.

We have said that Ikhnaton did not worship the heavenly body itself but the warmth of the sun. In the mind of peoples

[1] I refer here especially to Freud's *Psychoanalytische Bemerkungen über einen autobiographisch beschriebenen Fall von Paranoia, sowie den Nachtrag zu dieser Arbeit.* Jahrb. f. psa. Forschungen, Bd. III. English translation: *Psychoanalytic Notes Upon an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia, also Postscript to Same.* Coll. Papers III, 387–470.

the solar heat assumes the meaning of a creative, life-giving force. This was also Ikhnaton's conception. But he adds—a sign of his unusually strong tendency toward sublimation—a second meaning: the warmth of the sun as the symbol of the all-embracing love of Aton. The first lines of the hymn express this clearly. The rays of the sun which encompass all countries are identified with Aton's love, by means of which he takes possession of all lands. This symbolism is well known from the dreams of both healthy and neurotic persons. Furthermore, sensations of abnormal heat and cold appear very frequently in the clinical picture of neurotics; these are for the most part obviously connected with the eroticism of the patient.

It is permissible to go one step further, although this takes us into the realm of sheer hypothesis. At the beginning of this article mention was made of the relationship between Aton and the Syrian god Adonis. Adonis was worshipped in the figure of a beautiful youth who died an early death [1]. If one now reflects that the young king had created in the god he worshipped merely a likeness of himself, the suspicion may be ventured that he had first identified himself in his imagination with Adonis. Weak and sickly from childhood on, with the destiny of an early death always before him, he might well have compared himself with Adonis. And what he sought was not virile action but a life in beauty.

In one particular trait Ikhnaton was in complete accord with his god Aton: he too was solitary. True, he had gathered about him a small following of admirers, but in spite of his efforts to approach the people, he was not in vital contact with them. Excessive sexual repression disturbs the emotional ties between one human being and his fellows and robs him of the touch with reality. In the case of neurotics, and often in the case of the most gifted individuals, this comes to the frequent autoerotic confines of personal wish-fantasies becoming the exclusive object of interest. The neurotic then lives no longer in the world of actuality, but in one created by his fantasy, and

[1] Compare with this the similar figure of Baldur in the legends of the Germanic gods.

he becomes indifferent to actual events as if they did not exist for him at all. Ikhnaton's conduct coincides fully with this description. Living wholly in the world of his dreams and ideals, in which there was only love and beauty, he had no interest in anything pertaining to hate and rancor, injustice and misfortune, which in reality are the ruling passions among men. In nature, too,—the hymn shows this clearly—Ikhnaton ignored the domination of the strong and the need of the weak; he saw all creatures skipping and leaping about, experiencing nothing but joyous gratitude, jubilant in the worship of their creator.

And so Ikhnaton closed his ear to the cries for help from his Asiatic subjects and was blind to the horrors that were enacted in his provinces. His eye saw only beauty and harmony while his kingdom went to ruin. "In Achetaton, the new and brilliant capitol, the magnificent temple of Aton echoed with songs of praise sung to the new god of the empire—but this empire no longer existed." (Breasted.)

From Greek mythology we have the story of the youth Phaeton, the son of Helios, who made so bold as to drive the chariot of the sun across the sky in his father's absence. He lost control of his steeds and plunging from the chariot, forfeited his life. The fate of this son of the sun can be taken as a parable. Ikhnaton also set out on his journey in keen flight of thought. Striving to attain the sun's height, he also let fall the reins which his father had held with a strong hand. His fate was that of so many idealists: Living in a world of dreams, they come to grief in the world of reality.

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THE HISTORY OF AN IMPOSTOR IN THE LIGHT OF PSYCHOANALYTICAL KNOWLEDGE

BY KARL ABRAHAM

The clinical material upon which the following essay in criminal psychology is based was not obtained from psychoanalytical treatment in the strict sense of the word. The subject matter is the story of a man about whom I had to make a report from a psychiatric point of view, as an army doctor, in the year 1918, and whom I came across again five years later in unusual circumstances. The limited time allowed for making an official report of this kind and the conditions in which work had to be carried on at the medical station did not permit of a regular psychoanalysis.

Nevertheless the life of this man presents some quite extraordinary features from a psychological point of view; for in recent years his social behavior underwent a reversal which was completely contrary to all psychiatric experience. But this element of the extraordinary—this contradiction of experience—can be satisfactorily explained if we take into consideration the familiar and well-grounded empiric findings of psychoanalysis. Again, the facts of this case seem specially well suited to prepare the ground for one of the future fields of application of psychoanalysis, i.e., criminology. I therefore hope that the unusual nature of the case will be held to justify its appearance in this psychoanalytical publication.

This man, whom I will call N., was twenty-two years old when he began his military service. He had already been convicted and imprisoned a number of times by civil courts in various parts of the country. He was sent into the army directly after his last term of imprisonment and there he received his military training. His superiors knew all about his former way of life; and yet the same thing happened there

as had so often happened before. In a very short time N. had enlisted universal sympathy, had gained the confidence of his comrades and was looked upon with special favor by his company commander. At the same time he began to abuse the trust that was placed in him. But just as his frauds seemed about to come to light he and a number of his comrades received their marching orders and went to the Balkan front.

As nothing was known in his field regiment about his previous life it was still easier for N. to win the confidence of the authorities by his astute behavior. As a professional draughtsman he soon found employment; but his demeanor also made him seem especially suited to carry out business transactions. And so he was entrusted with money and allowed to make purchases for his company in the towns near where they were halted. In the town of "X" he got to know two or three soldiers who were living there in great style; and he was at once seized with his old propensity (about which I will speak later). He, too, set up to be an important person and in four days he spent one hundred sixty marks of the money which had been given into his keeping. During a second expedition of the kind he found out that his defalcations had been discovered. So instead of returning to his regiment he moved on to a larger town. Here he put stripes on his uniform and passed as a corporal. He had also got hold of some railway passes and had them stamped while he was with his company, so that he would now travel anywhere he pleased. He returned to Germany. But here, and in Berlin especially, the military supervision was too strict and he met too many old acquaintances to be able to stay any length of time; so he set off for Budapest, having first donned the insignia of a color sergeant. From there he traveled to Bucharest, falsifying his passes all the time. Here the military police were so watchful that he returned to Budapest, where he succeeded in gaining the *entrée* into highly respected families. He was delightfully ready to help them to obtain food, and in this way be received considerable advances in money from them, which he used for his own purposes instead of procuring the food he had

promised. When things became too hot for him in Budapest he went to Vienna. There he was soon caught and sent back to his own garrison town. It may already be noted that N. could win over with the greatest ease persons of every age and class, men and women alike, and then cheat them, but that he never showed any great aptitude for evading the arm of the law. It was only after he had been captured that his ability showed itself once more. What happened was that he very soon lulled the suspicions of his captors and so made his escape without having to resort to any kind of force.

When N. had been in custody for two and a half months he had gained such an influence over his jailers, who were in all other respects conscientious and experienced men, that the gates, as it were, opened before him of their own accord. One of his jailers was called away while he was talking to N. in his cell and, being now quite unsuspicious, left his keys behind him. N. took them, unlocked the doors and was a free man. He wandered on till he be came to a small railway station, boarded a train and got off it at the nearest large town. Everywhere he managed to take the responsible officials in. He worked for three weeks as a painter in a warehouse. Then, being in danger of discovery, he had to leave the town. Armed with forged papers he traveled through the length and breadth of Germany. He once more masqueraded as a fine gentleman in one city and, setting up to be an art critic, got money on false pretenses from his new patrons and spent it right and left. After a period of this "civilian life" our hero was obliged to quit the scene of his activities. He spent a short time in Berlin and then returned to Budapest. There for the first time he put on the uniform of an officer. He went back to Germany as a "lieutenant" and lived for months on a grand scale in a number of watering places, all of the best kind. As a young officer he had access to the best company in all of them. His assured and amiable manner always made him the center of a wide circle of acquaintances in a very short time. As soon as the danger of being found out in his countless frauds became too great in any of those places he would vanish to a large

health resort in Upper Bavaria and then reappear after a time in another watering place. In the meanwhile he promoted himself to first lieutenant, which was the highest rank he could attain at his age. No one guessed the real facts about this young officer who was decorated with war medals and who related his experiences in such an interesting and modest fashion. Finally, however, he was arrested and once more taken to his garrison town.

The charges against him had assumed vast proportions. He had been guilty of desertion, had pretended to have a commission in the army, and had committed an extraordinarily large number of embezzlements, forgeries and frauds.

The military court which was enquiring into N.'s case showed a complete understanding of and interest in his psychological peculiarities, and as the presence of some kind of pathological compulsion in his behavior was suspected, a psychiatric examination of his condition was ordered to be made.

I saw N. on the first occasion in his detention cell. It was at once evident that his case was so complicated as to necessitate his being kept for a fairly long period at my observation station. But the latter possessed no adequate arrangements for preventing a prisoner—and such a clever prisoner—from escaping. At my suggestion the court ordered that he should be put in an attic in my hospital and kept under supervision there. Three especially reliable and intelligent volunteers were to mount guard over him. In order to prevent his gaining any influence over them they had strict orders not to go into his room and not to talk to him.

N. was accordingly taken to the hospital by his three guards. No difficulty was experienced in doing this. But ten minutes later, wishing to make certain that he was being properly looked after and guarded, I went up to his room and found to my astonishment that there was no guard outside his door—only two empty chairs. Entering his room I came upon an unexpected scene. N. was sitting at a table, drawing. One of his guards was posing as a model and the other two were looking on. It appeared that N. had already made friends with them

on the way to the hospital by telling them about his talents as a draughtsman and had promised to draw their portraits. During his stay at my station, which lasted for several weeks, N. made no attempts at flight and behaved perfectly well.

In order to be able to make a judgment about N.'s mental condition I had, first of all, to get to know his early history. Since he seemed to have a special talent for telling fantastic stories I had to be very cautious about accepting his statements about himself and to verify them from authoritative sources. But I may say at once that all that he told me about his past was in agreement with the official information on the subject. I could never discover that he had suppressed any facts or made false additions to them or altered them in his favor. On the contrary, he spoke of his delinquencies with the greatest frankness, as he did later on before the court. But he was unwilling to talk about his intimate feelings and thoughts.

I soon learned from N. that his transgressions dated from very early years. And his record at the reformatory where he had been sent for several years confirmed his statement.

N. was the youngest of a large number of brothers and sisters. His father was a minor official and the family was poor. There was no particular indication of any hereditary mental taint. But even as a small boy N. had, in contrast to his older brothers and sisters, shown an uncontrollable desire to be grand. When, at the age of five, he was taken to spend the mornings at a kindergarten he turned away from the less well-dressed children and would play only with the children of well-to-do families. As soon as he went to school he noticed with envy that many boys had nicer things than he, that they had decorated and varnished pencil-cases or colored pens. So one day—he was six at the time—he went to a stationer's near the school and pretended that he was the son of a general who lived in the neighborhood. He at once got the things he wanted on credit; and now he could proudly hold his own with the sons of the rich. This first fraud of his was of course soon discovered and he was punished. But his desire to be able to vie with his more fortunate fellows was unconquerable and

found expression in further misdeeds. One of his schoolmates possessed a large army of toy soldiers, whilst he had only a few. His longing not to be outdone left him no peace. He finally stole six or seven marks from his mother, bought some toy soldiers and showed his schoolfellows that he had as many and as fine soldiers as the other boy.

At school, N. was seen to be a talented boy from the very beginning. But it seemed as if his work did justice to his capacities only so long as he felt that he was being noticed or favored in some way by his teacher. He was constantly occupied with wild ideas of running away. On one occasion he got money from his teacher on false pretenses. On other occasions he used to borrow books from his comrades and sell them. An attempt was made to get him to go through a higher school; but this failed because he had not the necessary perseverance. The fantastic streak in him was continually cropping up. One of his teachers remarked that he seemed to be suffering from megalomania. His school career was therefore put an end to and he went into a commercial house as an apprentice.

Up till now N.'s wrongdoings had been almost entirely confined to school and family life. As an apprentice he soon proceeded to steal the postage money and was dismissed after a few months. He found another position, but he did not like it and left it on his own account after a few days. Next he was sent into a gardener's business; but he soon ran away from it, got into bad company and drifted about until he was finally put into a reformatory.

What was so often to happen to him later on happened in the reformatory. The director, recognizing N.'s artistic talents and his desire to rise in the social scale, tried to satisfy both these things along proper channels. N., as a favorite pupil, felt fairly comfortable here, and for some time there seem to have been no complaints about him. Through the director's good offices he was allowed, although still a reformatory boy, to go to a polytechnic in another town. But here he was without the steadying influence of his patron and after a little while he became involved in a criminal charge and had

to leave the school. When he came back to the reformatory he behaved as so many youths do in such circumstances. Having received some real or supposed slight he ran away, and during the short time in which he was at large, he was guilty of all sorts of misdemeanors.

At nineteen he turned up in Berlin and got a job there. But he did hardly any work, set up to be a gentleman and made bad debts. He managed to make his way into good society, as he had always wanted to do. The reformatory boy became a welcome guest in very exclusive student circles. In dress, mode of life and behavior he had become a member of the upper class. But the sources from which he obtained the means of doing this were distinctly shady, and in the end he had to take to his heels to avoid arrest. Now began a regular Odyssey through South Germany, the Tyrol and Switzerland. Everywhere he went he committed punishable actions by leaving debts unpaid and swindling in all sorts of ways; and everywhere he was prosecuted by the law. In Switzerland he spent a month in prison and then had to leave the country. Back again in Germany, he served a number of sentences for his previous derelictions. He wandered from court to court and from prison to prison. During his last period in prison he quickly gained the good will of the governor and was entrusted with the care of the prison library. After he had served all his sentences he was sent to the army, as we already know. This was in 1915.

I shall for the present give only the general drift of my report on N., and leave what I have to say about him from a psychological point of view to a later point. I could not discover that N. was suffering from any mental disorder in the usual sense of the word; nor was there the slightest sign of mental deficiency. On the contrary, he was a man whose intelligence was above the average and who had considerable artistic gifts. His deviation from the normal consisted solely in his social behavior. I assumed that there was a deep-seated disturbance of his emotional life which was responsible for his antisocial impulses. Even under the most favorable circum-

stances such impulses had been absent in him only for very short periods of time. They would very soon break out again with what was clearly an irresistible force.

The clinical description of cases like these uses the expression "moral insanity". But the law does not recognize the fact that an abnormal state of emotional life can render a man unaccountable for his actions. The military court, whose attitude to the prisoner was extremely humane and understanding, could not question N.'s responsibility and was obliged to pass a longish sentence on him in accordance with the letter of the law.

I may say that in my report on N. I stated that, according to general psychiatric experience, his condition was permanent and unalterable.

I heard nothing more of N. between the date of his conviction in August, 1918, just before the end of the war, and four or five years later, when I was asked by a civil court to make a fresh report on him. The circumstances were remarkable. It appeared that up till the spring of 1919 N. had been guilty of a series of offenses along the old lines. In the course of his examination before a magistrate—an examination which, for one reason or another had dragged on for years—N. had stated that he had committed those offenses under the influence of his old pathological compulsion, but that shortly afterwards his criminal impulses, which had existed since childhood, had completely left him. Since the last four years he had settled down and had stuck to his work and never transgressed the law.

If N.'s statements were true I had made a great mistake in my judgment of his case, especially in my prognosis of it. The first thing to do was to ascertain what his behavior really had been since his conviction five years ago. From what he now told me himself and from what I learned from official sources I was able to reconstruct the following story:

When the war was over, N. was set free under the terms of a very extensive amnesty. He at once proceeded to commit a series of offenses of the old kind. In the general upheaval

which took place after the war a clever person like himself found plenty of profitable opportunities. In spite of his long record of detentions and convictions, he was able everywhere to gain the confidence of persons in authority, only to abuse it sooner or later. At that time so-called "volunteer corps" and other military organizations were being formed. N. belonged to a number of these within the space of a few months. In each of them he was received with open arms, and his popularity was shown by the fact that he was invariably made treasurer. He would then embezzle the money, be obliged to quit the force, and begin his game somewhere else. On one occasion his assertion that he had been an officer in the war was believed and he was given a commission in the force and did in fact discharge the duties of an officer in it.

But the opportunities in this direction soon came to an end and N. had to return to civilian life. Between March and June of 1919 he behaved in the old way, stealing money, bilking his creditors and so on, and was wanted by the police in various places.

Then came the great change. There was no doubt, from the evidence before me, that since June, 1919, N. had not committed a single illegal action and had never been prosecuted or wanted by the police or any other authority. Reliable witnesses deposed that he had had a fixed abode and worked hard. His professional work was highly thought of. Two commercial men of good repute in whose business N. had had a position stated that they had found him absolutely loyal and dependable especially in financial matters, and this for several years. Both witnesses knew all about N.'s former life and had kept a sharp eye on him, but they had never discovered any cause for complaint. N. was married and led the life of a respectable middle-class family man. He was well liked and respected in the society of the town in which he lived although he now no longer sought, as of old, to impress his fellow men.

The evidence left no doubt whatever that N. had completely changed his mode of life. But such a change ran counter to all accepted psychiatric experience. If an individual exhibits

an asocial attitude at such an early age and has not adapted himself to social life by the time he is twenty-six, but has lived all along a life of fraud and imposture, as was the case with N., all that we know about such behavior obliges us to deny the possibility of a spontaneous cure. Nor did we know of any forces which could exert this unwonted effect. Very unusual circumstances must have come into play here—circumstances which we do not in practice expect to come across.

The solution of the problem was a psychological one. We will therefore first turn our attention to N.'s life and consider certain facts and experiences in it and his reactions to them. I may mention that while I was examining him in 1918 he was less inclined to talk to me on this subject. I was his military superior; and at that time his attitude to every representative of paternal authority was still too rebellious and defiant (why this was so we shall presently see), but when I saw him again in 1923 the impression he gave was that he quite accepted our relative positions. He felt that he was my equal in civil life and could tell me about himself without any of his old distrust. Thus our second meeting, although much shorter, furnished me for the first time with many important and even fundamental explanations of his social behavior in former days and gave the clue to his recent transformation.

As has been said, N. was the youngest of a large family in straitened circumstances. There was a long interval of time between him and his brothers and sisters who were half or quite grown up when he was born. As a small child and later he used again and again to hear his mother say how unwelcome he had been as her late-born offspring. While the elder children were already able to earn a little, he was merely another mouth to feed and he used often to hear unkind remarks about himself which showed that he was simply looked on as a burden on the family budget. Quite contrary to what is so often the case with late or last-born children, he felt that his parents and his brothers and sisters not only did not love him but were hostile to him. And, in the last resort, his social behavior was a reaction to this impression of his early childhood.

We need only call to mind the well-substantiated psychoanalytical observation that children gather their first experiences of love and, indeed, learn how to love in relation to their earliest *entourage*. Under circumstances such as I have just described a child cannot develop a satisfactory object-love. His first attempts to direct his libido on to the human beings around him must necessarily fail; and he will then be involved in a backward-flowing narcissistic cathexis of the ego, while at the same time he will produce a strong attitude of hatred towards his objects.

Seen from this angle, N.'s conduct in the kindergarten and at school becomes perfectly comprehensible. He scorned his parents as they had scorned him. He wanted to have rich parents who would not regard him as an economic liability. From very early on he showed his most attractive side to every person who could stand for his father or his mother or his brothers and sisters. Every teacher and every schoolfellow must be fond of him—must provide a perpetual source of gratification for his narcissism. But his identification of the people around him with his family went still further. He had to disappoint those who loved him so as to be revenged on them. That everybody without exception should be taken in by him afforded his narcissism additional gratification of an intense sort. We may call to mind a word that has entered into many languages and say that N., who had felt unloved in early childhood, was under an inner necessity to be "amiable", that is, "able to be loved", to all people, only to show that he was "unable" to deserve such a feeling. This method of behavior is reminiscent of the dichronous actions—i.e., actions consisting of two phases—of obsessional neurotics.

N.'s craving to be the center of a large circle of people deserves special attention. He told me himself that his greatest pleasure was to feel that "everything was revolving round him". Such a situation was in fact the direct opposite of his position as a child. It is true that N. invariably managed to put a sudden end to this glorious position. Obeying an irresistible compulsion to repeat, no sooner had he won

everybody's favor than he had once more to become an outcast. And then, one day, there came the still unexplained transformation.

In June, 1919, N. was wandering from one town to another and living from hand to mouth by obtaining false credit and by other fraudulent means. Then a piece of good fortune befell him, the importance of which for a man like him cannot fail to strike the psychoanalyst.

N. got to know a woman who began to feel an interest in him at their very first meeting. She was considerably older than he and was a partner in an industrial concern. As soon as she heard about his having no work and being destitute she undertook to help him. In her firm he found a field for his artistic talents which was well paid and brought him into contact with people of good standing. He entered into a more intimate relation with his benefactress, who was a widow with several half-grown-up children. Later on he married her, and rose to a place of responsibility in the business, which, incidentally, ensured him a very good social position. In this ideal situation of security and contentment he had only one worry—the various prosecutions which were still hanging over his head.

When I saw N. again in 1923 this situation of external happiness and, I think I may say, of internal peace had become stabilized in the course of a few years. Before that he had been obliged to give up every good position he had had from some pressing, unconscious need. Why had this not happened in this instance, and why had he been able to enjoy the fruits of his change of fortune and live on good terms with his fellow men?

A simple psychoanalytic proposition will provide the answer. All his former states of passing prosperity had only represented a momentary gratification of his narcissism. But a state of that sort carried within it the seeds of its own destruction. N.'s ambivalent impulses were far too strong to allow him to attain any kind of mental equilibrium. It may be, too, that a strong unconscious sense of guilt was attached to his tem-

porary "successes", which quickly put an end to his happiness, as an act of self-punishment.

I have already tried to show that in N.'s case his libido became fixed in a state of narcissism as a result of a regressive process, brought on by the severe disillusionment he had suffered in early childhood. In other words, N. had not, as a small boy, been able to extract as much pleasure out of his œdipus attitude as other children do (though in very varying degrees). He had not had enough love from his mother; and he had not had the possibility of elevating his father into an ideal figure. On the contrary, we see that he had very early been dominated by the wish to have a different father. Furthermore, he had not been able to identify himself with his brothers and sisters in his œdipus struggle against his father; for they and his parents together had formed a world of enemies around him. Thus his œdipus complex underwent no proper development, and as a natural consequence none of those processes of sublimation could take place which testify to a successful mastery of the œdipus complex and without which the individual cannot find his proper place in the organism of society.[1]

The transformation which took place in N.'s life in 1919 signified nothing less than a complete reversal of his situation at home when he was a small child: A woman, older than himself, takes a liking to him at first sight and showers proofs of her maternal solicitude upon him; and presently she shows that she loves him. No one stands in the way of this love between mother and son, for her husband is long since dead.

[1] We must not forget that the œdipal attitude, which we rightly regard as the source of serious and lasting conflicts in the mental life of the child and growing youth, is at first a source of real and imaginary pleasure. The child, however, learns gradually to give up the major and most important part of its wishes in this connection (that is, those wishes which are socially unacceptable) if it is granted a certain restricted amount of pleasure. Such a sum of pleasure seems to be essential in helping the child successfully to overcome its ambivalence towards its parents. If it receives no pleasure at all it will not manage to modify its œdipus complex properly and all its libido will flow back to its ego once more.

There are two sons who have a prior right to her love; but she prefers him, although he has appeared so late in her life, and marries him and thus puts him and not her own sons in the place of her dead husband.

Thus, apart from suddenly finding himself in comfortable circumstances both from a social and a financial point of view, N. obtained through this woman a complete fulfilment of all the childhood wishes that arose from his œdipus complex. When I alluded to the obvious significance of a mother that his wife had for him he answered, "You are certainly right. Very soon after I got to know her I used to call her 'little mother', and I still can't call her anything else." And as he spoke he showed strong feelings of affection and gratitude. These feelings showed that he was experiencing something more than the mere gratification of a narcissistic craving for love. I got the impression that he had achieved, later in life and in relation to a substitute person, something which he had not been able to achieve in his childhood—that is, a libidinal transference on to his mother. I do not, of course, mean to say that he had evolved a fully formed object-love, had completely overcome his narcissism; but simply that he had managed to effect some degree of progression of libido from its narcissistic fixation towards object-love—how much I do not know. Only a proper psychoanalysis of his case could tell us any more than this.

It may furthermore be pointed out that none of these fulfilments of N.'s wishes involved a sense of guilt. There was no father for him to put aside, since he was already long since dead. There was no need for him to make an attack upon the mother, since she came forward of her own will both as a tender mother and as a loving mistress. There were no brothers and sisters for him to combat, for they completely accepted his special position in the new family. Thus, for the first time in his life, N. was in a position to enjoy exclusive and, it may be added, irreproachable pleasures.

This attitude on the part of a mother-representative who lavished on him not only her maternal solicitude but her erotic

feelings had brought him a late fulfilment of those œdipus wishes which had remained ungratified in his childhood; but it had also drawn his libido away from its narcissistic adherence. And so for the first time he succeeded in transferring a certain amount of libido on to an object.

Such a complete psychological fulfilment of an infantile wish-situation as this must be regarded as an exceptional event. One can in no way reckon upon the advent of what did in fact happen, as if by a miracle, to N. Therefore I think that the pessimistic prognosis of my report was in general justified, although in this one instance it turned out to be wrong.

It was justified in another respect, too. When N. came to see me for the last time he himself laid stress on the fact that things were going well with him. But at the same time, being an intelligent man, he had certain fears. He said that he must admit to himself and to me that it all depended upon his relations to his wife whether the present situation would last. If that relationship should ever be undermined he was certain that his old proclivities would break out again; for, at bottom, his old, instinctual unrest was still there.[1]

We might be tempted to call N.'s case an instance of "cure through love", if we were certain that he really had been cured in the sense that his improvement was a permanent one. But be that as it may, so great a transformation in the social behavior of a man with such a history as N.'s is a remarkable phenomenon which can be understood only from the point of view of the psychoanalytical theory of the libido.

But from a practical point of view, too, this change deserves our fullest attention. The present case shows very impressively that we should not overestimate the part played by hereditary taint—by "degeneration"—in the origins of dissocial and criminal impulses. What the prejudiced eye of academic psychology still persists in regarding as innate and therefore

[1] I may refer the reader to the second report on N., in 1923, which showed that his last offenses were committed just before the great change occurred, so that they were on a par with all his earlier ones, that is, they were manifestations of an irresistible impulsion coming from unconscious sources.

unalterable in the individual we must consider as to a great extent acquired during the early years of life and must trace back to the operation of very early impressions of a psychosexual nature. This not only implies a revision of erroneous views; it gives us new possibilities, new points of departure and new angles of approach for the treatment of dissocial persons, especially adolescents.

I am glad to say that on this subject I find myself in complete agreement with Dr. Aichhorn, whose knowledge of this class of individuals is so comprehensive. Aichhorn's [1] writings have shown how important is the pupil's positive transference to the teacher in reformatory schools; and he has rightly made the establishment of such a transference the keystone of reformatory education.

If we bear in mind the magical effect that N.'s first successful transference had on him when he was already a grown man we can form some idea of the results that might follow from a properly established and well-directed transference in youthful individuals. As a reformatory boy N. had, it is true, been lucky in finding a humane and understanding teacher. But what this teacher did not succeed in doing, in spite of his sympathetic attitude, was to set up a lasting transference. This lack of a firm emotional tie allowed N. to relapse into his old ways and did not enable permanent instinctual sublimations to be formed. These sublimations were not achieved until his libido had been, for the first time, lastingly transferred to someone.

We practicing psychoanalysts in particular have often complained that our therapeutic work covers only a relatively small class of persons and that, although it penetrates deeply into each individual case, it does not extend over a wide class of cases. If we agree with Aichhorn's view that, generally speaking, the establishment of a transference is a sufficient basis for enabling dissocial youths to be influenced, whereas it is only

[1] *Verwahrloste Jugend. Die Psychoanalyse in der Fürsorgeerziehung.* Int. Psa. Bibliothek, Bd. XIX, 1925. Translated into English: *Wayward Youth.* New York: Viking Press, 1935.

those cases which are complicated by neurotic disturbances which require a regular psychoanalytic treatment, we should find opened to us a new field of activity in which the knowledge obtained by the analytic observation and treatment of neurotics would find ample scope. Aichhorn's thesis is a very promising educational advance which has been made possible by Freud's psychological discoveries. We cannot but admire the generous eagerness with which Aichhorn is endeavoring to push forward his educative work.

Let us take a last look at the life story of our impostor. In the psychoanalysis of neurotics we often come across the consequences of too much spoiling in early years, with the result that the child's demand for love has been unnecessarily encouraged. Among "dissocials" we shall, I think, more often find that the libido has undergone a different fate in early life. In them, it is the lack of love which, being, as it were, a lack of spiritual nourishment, is the first predisposing cause of the appearance of dissocial characteristics. It creates too great an amount of hatred and rage, which are first directed against a small circle of persons but later grow to include the whole social environment. Where there is a predisposing cause of this kind, the child will not naturally develop a character which can make good social adaptations. The existence of a narcissistic regression of the libido, such as was to be inferred in N.'s case would also point to an inhibition in the formation of character, an arrestation on a lower level.

In time, too, these findings of psychoanalysis will have to receive the recognition that is their due in criminological quarters. Quite recently Reik has made a comprehensive study of the sense of guilt [1] and has established an important line of connection between analytical research into the neuroses and criminology. There are two respects in which the theories of psychoanalysis can be of service to the knowledge of crime and the criminal. In the first place, analysis provides new psychological points of approach for an

[1] Reik, Theodor: *Geständniszwang und Strafbedürfnis.* Int. Psa. Bibliothek. Bd. XVIII, 1925.

understanding of the person concerned. In the second place, the treatment of young dissocial persons on psychoanalytic lines, or in harmony with those lines, seems to hold out hopes of preventing them from committing criminal offenses.

I hope that the present contribution will have added a little towards the establishment of a connection of this sort between psychoanalysis and the science of crime.

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The Problem of PsychoAnalytic Technique

Franz Alexander

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THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE

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The general principles of psychoanalytic technique, as formulated by Freud in his five articles between 1912 and 1914, have often been subjected to careful reconsideration by various authors. Yet, and it is remarkable, these authors have failed to make any important innovation or modification. Many of the authors in developing their ideas of technique do so with the honest conviction that they are suggesting radical improvements over the standard technique. Others, more modest, maintain that their discussion calls attention to certain principles developed by Freud but for some reason or other neglected by the majority of analysts in their practical daily work.

There is an obvious reason for this constant urge to improve upon the analytic technique. Psychoanalytic therapy is extremely cumbersome, consumes the time and energy of patient and analyst, and its outcome is hard to predict on the basis of simple prognostic criteria. The desire to reduce these difficulties and increase the reliability of psychoanalytic treatment is only too intelligible. The difficulties, the time and energy consuming nature of psychoanalytic therapy, are by no means disproportionate to its ambitious aim: to effect a permanent change in an adult personality which always was regarded as something inflexible. Nevertheless, a therapist is naturally dissatisfied, and desires to improve upon his technique and to have precise definite technical rules of technique in place of indefinite medical art. The unremitting search to reform the technique therefore needs no special explanation; what needs explanation is the frequency with which pseudo-reforms are presented by their authors, under the illusion that

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they are discovering something new. This illusion originates in the complex nature of the psychoanalytic method. Psychoanalytic technique cannot be learned from books. The psychoanalyst must, so to speak, rediscover in his own experience the sense and the details of the whole procedure. The complex behavior of the patient as it is presented to the therapist simply cannot be described in all details, and the understanding of what is going on emotionally in the patient's mind is based on an extremely refined faculty usually referred to as intuition. In a former article I tried to deprive this faculty of the mystical halo which surrounds it by defining it as a combination of external observation with the introspective knowledge of one's own emotional reactions.[1]

Freud's articles on technique were published between 1912 and 1914, at least fifteen years after he had started to treat patients with the method of free association and they may therefore be considered a resumé of at least fifteen years of clinical experience. These technical discoveries, for which a genius needed fifteen years, every student of psychoanalysis must recapitulate on the basis of his own experience. Though his study is now facilitated by general and simple formulations and by the precise description of those psychological processes which take place during the treatment, nevertheless the material which presents itself in every case is so complex and so highly individual that it takes many years for the student to achieve real mastery of the technique. Transference, resistance, acting out, removal of the infantile amnesia—these things he learns to appreciate only gradually. In consequence, he will be especially prone to emphasize those particular points of technique whose validity and importance are beginning to impress him. This alone can explain so many tedious repetitions and reformulations of the principles of technique—reformulations, moreover, that are usually one-sided and much less judicious and clear than Freud's original formulations.

[1] Alexander, Franz: *Psychoanalysis and Medicine.* (Harvey Lecture.) Jl. A. M. A. *96,* 1931, p. 1351.

The general principles of the standard technique are consistent adaptation to the psychological processes which are observed during treatment: the phenomena of transference, resistance, the patient's increasing ability to verbalize material previously unconscious and the gradual removal of infantile amnesia. In the procedures that deviate from the standard, either one or another of these phenomena is overrated from the standpoint of therapeutic significance and is dealt with isolated from the others. The controversy is always centered around the therapeutic evaluation of (1) *emotional abreaction,* (2) *intellectual insight,* (3) *appearance of repressed infantile memories.* Those who consider emotional abreaction as the most important therapeutic factor will emphasize all those devices that may produce emotional eruptions resembling the abreactions in cathartic hypnosis: certain manipulations of the resistance, or the creation of emotional tensions in the patient, for example by avoiding interpretation of content. Those who believe that the best permanent therapeutic result comes from the patient's complete insight into the nature of his emotional conflicts will stress technical devices which have this aim; they will concentrate upon the analysis of content. Finally those who consider the most effective therapeutic factor to be the removal of infantile amnesias will be inclined to stress the reconstruction of the infantile history. Now in reality all these therapeutic factors are closely interrelated and dependent upon one another. For example, the occurrence of infantile memories is often, though not always, connected with emotional abreaction; intellectual insight on the other hand may prepare the way for emotional abreaction and recollections; and emotional experience, if not overwhelmingly intense, is the only source of real insight. Without recollection and emotional abreaction, intellectual insight remains theoretical and ineffective. The close interrelation of these three factors is clearly recognized in Freud's papers on technique, and his technical recommendations are based upon knowledge of these interrelationships.

All innovations up to today consist in an undue emphasis upon one or another of these factors—an overemphasis which is based on an insufficient insight into the dynamics of therapy.

One can roughly differentiate between three trends in technique: (1) neocathartic experiments, (2) reconstruction and insight therapy, and (3) resistance analysis. It should be stated, however, that none of these innovations or technical procedures have ever found general acceptance, and I suspect that the actual technique used by most of the innovators themselves in their daily work remained closer to the original than one would assume from their publications. Most psychoanalysts expect progress in technique to come not from onesided overemphasis of one technical device but from an increasing precision in our knowledge, especially our quantitative knowledge of mental processes. Such greater knowledge should make possible a more economic procedure which will spare us much wasted time—the greatest weakness of our therapy. I shall try to evaluate critically some of these technical procedures in the perspective of the development of the technical concepts of psychoanalysis.

The therapeutic efficiency of abreaction of emotions in connection with recollection during hypnosis was the starting point of psychoanalysis both as a therapy and as a psychological theory. This led Freud to assume that the symptom disappeared because the dynamic force which sustained it had found another outlet in the hypnotic abreaction. The next step in the development of therapy was derived from the observation that emotional abreaction has no permanent efficacy, because the phenomenon of abreaction does not alter the constant tendency of the ego to eliminate certain psychic forces from motor expression. The state of hypnosis only temporarily created a situation in which such an outburst of emotionally loaded tendencies could take place, but this abreaction was dependent upon the state of hypnosis and the disappearance of the symptom depended upon the emotional relationship of the patient to the hypnotist. From this Freud came to recognize the phenomenon of resistance and discovered the technical device of free association. To eliminate one of the most important manifestations of the resistance he devised the basic rule, namely, the involuntary directing of the train of thought away from the repressed material. The last

step in the development of the technique consisted in the recognition of the rôle of the patient's emotional attitude toward the analyst. What appeared on the surface as the patient's confidence in the analyst revealed itself as the repetition of the dependent attitude of the child on its parents, which by correct handling allows expression of deeply repressed material.

The insight gained from experience with cathartic hypnosis and then later with the method of free association may briefly be summarized as follows: The mere expression of the unconscious tendencies which sustained the symptom is not sufficient to secure a lasting cure. The rehearsal of individual traumatic situations of the past during treatment is not as important as the building up of the ego's capacity to deal with those types of tendencies which it could not face and deal with in the pathogenetic childhood situations. The original repressions create certain repression patterns, according to which, in later life, tendencies related to the original repressed ones become victims of repression. The cure consists in a change in the ego itself, an increase in its power—one might say its courage—to deal with certain emotional problems which it could not deal with early in life. The expression, an increase in the courage of the ego, is appropriate; for as we know now, fear is the motor of repression and courage is the faculty of overcoming fear.

But another expression requires explanation. What do we mean by increasing the ego's capacity to deal with repressed tendencies? A symptom obviously is not cured by the fact that the tendency which produced it enters consciousness. The mere fact of its conscious appearance cannot be of curative value unless we assume that when the preconscious and ultimately unconscious content becomes conscious, the process of becoming conscious consumes the same amount of energy as was represented by the symptom itself. That this is not the case is clearly seen by the fact that to become conscious of the formerly unconscious content does not always or necessarily relieve the symptom. Gradually it became clear that the appearance of a repressed tendency in consciousness is only one

necessary condition of the cure; it opens a new outlet for the symptom-bound energy, namely, the outlet through voluntary innervations. Whether the process itself by which an unconscious tendency becomes conscious consumes at least a portion of the repressed energy-quantum is still an open question. The dynamic equation of the process of cure is that the energy bound in a symptom before analytic treatment equals the energy spent in certain voluntary motor innervations afterwards. It is possible that a smaller amount of symptom-bound energy is consumed in the process of its becoming conscious, that is to say, in the psychological processes which constitute conscious thinking.

The dynamic formulation that the energy which was bound in the symptom, after treatment takes up a new dynamic allocation needs further qualification. The new appropriation of energy, in voluntary innervations, must be in harmony with the forces already residing within the ego. If this condition is not fulfilled, a conflict is created within the ego which inhibits the free disposal of the formerly symptom-bound energy. This harmonizing or integrating function of the ego, however, is generally considered a faculty on which the analyst has to rely but to which he cannot contribute much by his therapeutic activity. This limits the indication of psychoanalysis to patients who possess an ego of sufficient integrating power, because the process of integration and its end result, a conflictless disposal of formerly symptom-bound energy, must be left to the patient himself.

Nunberg subjected this integrating or synthetic function of the ego and its rôle in therapy to a careful investigation and showed that the process of a repressed content's becoming conscious itself represents an integrating process in the ego.[1] I shall return to this problem later. It is certain that with or without the analyst's coöperation the formerly repressed energy, which during the process of the treatment becomes a part of

[1] Nunberg, Herman: *The Synthetic Function of the Ego.* Int. J. Psa. XII, 1931.

the dynamic inventory of the ego, must become reconciled and harmonized with the already existing forces in the ego.

The fundamental validity of this formulation of the process of therapy has been corroborated in particular by recent developments which have shifted the emphasis from the analysis of symptoms to the analysis of character or of the total personality. We have learned that apart from neurotic symptoms, in many patients an even more important expression of repressed tendencies takes place in so-called neurotic behavior. This is a more or less stereotyped automatically fixed and unconsciously determined way of behavior, which in contrast to voluntarily guided behavior is beyond the control of the conscious ego. There is even a group of neurotic personalities whose sickness consists mainly or exclusively in such impulsive or stereotyped behavior without any pronounced symptoms. Gradually it became an aim of our therapeutic endeavors not only to cure neurotic symptoms but to extend the ego's administrative power over this automatic and rigidly fixed expression of instinctive energies.

The aim of the therapy can thus be defined as the extension of conscious control over instinctual forces which were isolated from the conscious ego's administrative power, either as symptom or as neurotic behavior. We may now investigate by what means those who deviate from the standard technique hope to achieve this aim. In order to evaluate these deviations, we must consider the part played by the three therapeutic factors in the analytic process, *abreaction, insight* and *recollection.* We saw that abreaction without insight is insufficient. We understand now why. The process of integration, by which the repressed tendency becomes an organized part of the ego, does not take place without insight; insight is the condition—perhaps the very essence—of this integrating process. Equally obvious on the other hand, insight without emotional experience, that is to say, without abreaction, is of little value. Something which is not in the ego cannot be integrated into it, and emotional experience is the sign that the tendency is becoming conscious. Therefore theoretical knowledge of something which is not experienced emotionally by the

patients is perforce therapeutically ineffective, though it must be admitted that in certain situations a merely intellectual insight may prepare the way for abreaction. It is not advisable to think of these processes too schematically. Abreaction without insight and insight without abreaction are two extremes, between which in practice there are all degrees of combination and analyses do in fact consist of such differently graded mixtures of insight and emotional experience. Abreactions, small in quantity, take place throughout any analysis conducted by the standard technique and each successive abreaction is attended by more and more insight.

Whereas there is considerable agreement concerning the relation of insight to emotional experience, there is much controversy about the effectiveness of infantile recollections. The concept that the energy contained in a symptom can simply be transformed and absorbed by the process of recollection, is obviously erroneous. Nevertheless, recollection seems to be an indispensable precondition if a repressed tendency is to be thoroughly integrated into the ego-system, in that it is recollection which connects the present with the past. Although the direct therapeutic value of the process of recollection may be questioned, the removal of the infantile amnesia must be considered as a unique indicator of the successful resolving of repressions. Therefore the removal of infantile amnesia might be required as a sign of a fully successful analysis, even though a cure and the removal of infantile amnesia may not necessarily be directly causally related.

We see now that all three factors, abreaction, insight, and recollection, are required in order to obtain the goal of psychoanalytic procedure, which is, the removal of certain repressions and the subsequent integration of the formerly repressed tendencies which makes their ego-syntonic disposal possible. Whereas insight and abreaction are in direct relationship to the process of relieving repressions and of integration of the repressed forces, the importance of recollection may be a more indirect one. It serves as an indicator of the removal of repressions.

A brief survey will illustrate our point that the divergence from the standard procedure usually is a onesided overemphasis of one of these three factors. So far as one can reconstruct the evolution of analytic technique, Freud, after he gave up hypnosis, began to lay more and more stress on insight and the reconstruction of the infantile history. This was quite natural. He tried to reproduce in the waking state the phenomenon he and Breuer observed during hypnosis, namely, the patient's recollection of forgotten traumatic situations. The main goal became to make the patient remember during the process of free-association, and, so far as this was not fully possible, to complete the gaps in memory through intellectual reconstructions. Around 1913, however, when Freud first formulated systematically the principles of the technique as we use it today, we see that he was already fully in the possession of the above described dynamic concepts and considered analysis by no means a merely intellectual procedure. Yet once he had recognized the importance of the patient's intellectual insight as precondition of the integrating activity of the ego, in contrast to many of his followers, he never lost sight of its significance.

It seems that at some time between the introduction of the method of free association and the publication of the technical recommendations of Freud in 1912, 1913 and 1914, there must have been a period in which analysts overrated the importance of an intellectual reconstruction of the infantile history. This can be seen from the fact that even after Freud's publications on technical recommendations many analytic pioneers apparently persistently overintellectualized the analytic process, and stressed the interpretation of content and reconstruction of infantile history, overlooking the more dynamic handling of resistance and transference. This explains the joint publication by Ferenczi and Rank of *Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse,* which may be regarded as a reaction against this overintellectualized analysis.[1] Ferenczi and Rank, as I tried to

[1] Rank, O. and Ferenczi, S.: *Entwicklungsziele der Psychoanalyse.* Neue Arbeiten z. ärztl. Psa. No. 1, Int. Psa. Verlag, 1924.

show when their pamphlet appeared in print, went to the other extreme.[1] According to them the whole analysis consists in provoking transference reactions and interpreting them in connection with the actual life situation. The old abreaction theory began to emerge from the past. Ferenczi and Rank thought that after the patient had reëxperienced his infantile conflicts in the transference neurosis, there was no need to wait for infantile memories; they believed that insight was possible without recollection merely through the understanding of the different transference situations which are modeled upon the forgotten conflictful childhood experiences. Much of the originally repressed material they held had never been verbalized in the child's mind, and therefore one could not always expect real recollection of those situations upon which the transference reactions are modeled. Assuming that Ferenczi and Rank were right, and that one does not need to wait for the infantile amnesia to be dispelled, the obvious practical value of their concept would be a considerable abbreviation of the treatment. In this concept obviously the ego's integrating function is neglected, together with the corresponding technical device, the working through. The tedious task of helping the patient to bring his transference manifestation into connection both with the actual situation and with his former experiences plays a less important rôle in this technique. After the transference manifestation becomes clearly expressed and understood by the patient, even though the connection with the original patterns of the transference is not established, the analysis could be terminated on a date set by the analyst.

The further developments are well known. Rank more and more centered his attention on the actual life situation, and considered insight into the infantile history as merely a research issue with no therapeutic significance whatsoever. Ferenczi, however, soon discovered that the artificial termination of the analysis did not work out therapeutically, dismissed it from his technique and tried to enhance the effectiveness of the therapy

[1] Alexander, Franz: *Review of Rank and Ferenczi's "Entwicklungsziele"*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XI, 1925.

by increasing emphasis upon the abreaction factor. Though he did not return to the method of cathartic hypnosis, he frankly admitted that he considered abreaction, as it takes place during cathartic hypnosis, to be the really effective therapeutic factor, and he tried to reproduce it in the method of free association by creating artificial emotional tensions, at first through his active technique, later through his relaxation method.[1] With the help of the ingenious technical device of relaxation, in certain cases he succeeded in creating semi-hypnotic states, in which the patient in a twilight state repeated his infantile emotional conflicts in a dramatic fashion.

Both the joint attempts of Rank and Ferenczi and Ferenczi's later technical experiments can be classified as abreaction therapies, in which the element of insight, that is to say, the process of integration, is neglected. These technical reforms imply a regression back toward cathartic hypnosis with a reintroduction of all the therapeutic deficiencies of this period. They represent an emphasis of intensive transference analysis and neglect of the intellectual integrating side of therapy, the working through.

Another technical trend is represented by Reich's resistance and layer analysis.[2] According to Reich the aim of therapy is the transformation mainly into orgastic genitality of energy bound in neurotic symptoms and character trends. The discussion of this narrow theoretical concept does not lie within the scope of this study. Our present interest is his technical motto, the stress on certain hidden manifestations of resistance, which according to him are not recognized by most psychoanalysts, and his strict distinction between interpretation of resistance and interpretation of content. According to Reich certain hidden manifestations of resistance must first be analyzed and only afterwards can the analysis deal with the con-

[1] Ferenczi, Sándor: The Further Development of an Active Therapy in Psychoanalysis, in: *Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psychoanalysis.* London: Hogarth Press, 1926; *Relaxationsprinzip und Neokatharsis.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XVI, 1930; *Child-Analysis in the Analysis of Adults.* Int. J. Psa. XII, 1931; *Gedanken über das Trauma.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XX, 1934.

[2] Reich, Wilhelm: *Charakteranalyse.* Wien, privately published, 1933.

tent which the patient's ego is resisting. The important things are not the familiar open manifestations of resistance, but those secret manifestations which the patient expresses only in a very indirect way in characteristic behavior, for example, in pseudo coöperativeness, in overconventional and overcorrect behavior, in affectless behavior, or in certain symptoms of depersonalization. The emphasis on hidden forms of resistance is unquestionably of great practical value. Glover[1] mentions in his treatise on technique the importance of these hidden forms of resistance which one easily overlooks, and Abraham in one of his classical contributions described the pseudo coöperative attitude of certain patients as a specific form of hidden resistance.[2] Reich's emphasis on understanding the patient's behavior apart from the content of his communications is largely a typical example of the rediscovery of one of the many therapeutic revelations that every analyst encounters during his development, as he gradually becomes more and more sensitive to the less obvious, more indirect manifestations of the unconscious. However, Reich's distinction between resistance which is expressed in the patient's communications and that expressed by his gestures and general manner of behavior is quite artificial. All of these expressions complement each other and constitute an indivisible unity.

Reich's other principle of the primacy of resistance interpretation over content interpretation is based upon a similarly artificial and schematic distinction. As Fenichel has correctly pointed out, the repressing tendencies and repressed content are closely connected.[3] They constitute one psychic entity and

[1] Glover, E.: *Lectures on Technique in Psychoanalysis.* Int. J. Psa. VIII, 1927.

[2] Abraham, K.: *Über eine besondere Form des neurotischen Widerstandes gegen die psychoanalytische Methodik.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. V, 1919. (Trans. in *Selected Papers.*)

[3] Fenichel, Otto: *Zur Theorie der psychoanalytischen Technik.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XXI, 1935. As a matter of fact Fenichel mentions this argument as expressing not his own views, but those of the advocates of content interpretation, including Freud. He writes: "They [these advocates] think that because of the persistent interweaving of defensive forces and rejected tendencies, it is impossible to verbalize the ones without at the same time verbalizing the others." (Author's paraphrase.)

can only be separated from each other artificially. The patient's resistance, for the careful observer, always displays at least roughly the content against which the resistance is directed. There is no free floating resistance. At least the general content of the repressed can be recognized at the same time as the fact of the resistance itself. The more the analyst is able to help the patient to understand his resistance in connection with what it is directed against, the sooner the resistance itself can be resolved. Mostly the verbalization of what the patient is resisting diminishes the resistance itself. Strachey has convincingly described this reassuring effect of correct and timely interpretations, which can best be witnessed in child analysis.[1] It is true, as Fenichel states in his critical discussion of Reich's technique, that in the interpretation of the content the analyst can go only slightly beyond what the patient himself is able to see alone at any given moment. Yet every resistance should preferably be interpreted in connection with what it is directed against, provided of course that the content interpretation corresponds to the status of the analysis.

Reich's concept of layer analysis is similarly a product of his overschematizing tendency. That unconscious material appears in layers is a familiar observation. Freud operates with this concept as far back as the History of an Infantile Neurosis, and in Totem and Taboo he shows that the primary aggressive heterosexual phase is as a rule concealed by an overdomestication of these tendencies, by a masochistic passive homosexual phase. Following Freud's lead, I tried, in an early paper, Castration Complex and Character, to reconstruct the history of a patient's neurosis as a sequence of polar opposite phases of instinctual development.

The existence of certain typical emotional sequences, such as: early oral receptivity leading under the influence of deprivations to sadistic revenge, guilt, self-punishment, and finally to regression to a helpless dependence are generally known. The validity of such typical emotional sequences, which make the material appear in "layers", is sufficiently proven, and every

[1] Strachey, James: *The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis.* Int. J. Psa. XV, 1934.

analyst uses this insight as a useful orientation in the chaos of unconscious reactions. This, however, does not change the supreme rule that the analyst cannot approach the material with a preconceived idea of a certain stratification in the patient, for this stratification has individual features in different patients. Though certain general phases in the individual's development succeed others with universal regularity, the different emotional attitudes do not necessarily appear during the treatment in the same chronological order as they developed in the patient's past life history. Moreover, the pathogenetic fixations occur at different phases in different cases, and the fixation points determine what is the deepest pathogenetic layer in any given case. Often we find an early period of sadism leading to anxiety and covered consecutively by a layer of passivity, inferiority feelings, and a secondary outbreak of aggression. In other cases we see that the deepest pathogenetic layer is a strong fixation to an oral dependent attitude, compensated then by reaction formations of overactivity and aggressiveness, which in turn are covered by a surface attitude of helpless receptivity. It is not uncommon that a patient in the course of the first two or three interviews reveals in his behavior and associations a sequence of emotional reactions belonging to different phases of his development. As Abraham many years ago emphasized during a discussion in the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society, it is not advisable to regard the different emotional reactions as they appear during the treatment in a too literal, too static sense, as though they were spread out one layer over the other, for in the unconscious they exist side by side. During development, it is true, they follow each other in temporary sequences, one emotional phase being the reaction to the preceding one. During treatment, however, probably due to as yet unknown quantitative relationships, they do not repeat exactly their historical chronological order. I have often observed in more advanced stages of an analysis—sometimes even in the early stages—that patients during one analytic session display almost the whole history of their emotional development. They may start with spite and fear, then take on a passive dependent attitude, and end

up the session again with envy and aggression. The analyst can do no better than follow the material as it presents itself, thus giving the lead to the patient, as Horney[1] has again recently emphasized. Reich's warning against premature deep interpretations is correct, to be sure; Freud emphasized this point in his technical recommendations, and it is implicit in the general principle that interpretation should always start from the surface and go only as deep as the patient has capacity for comprehending emotionally. But in Reich's overschematic procedure, the danger resides in that the analyst instead of following the individual stratification of emotional reactions in the patient, approaches the material with an overgeneralized diagram of layers, before he is in a position to decide which emotional attitude is primary and which should be considered as reaction. The chronological order of the appearance is by no means a reliable criterion. An observation of Roy Grinker and Margaret Gerard in the Department of Psychiatry of the University of Chicago clearly demonstrates that the order in which the transference attitude of a patient appears is determined also by factors other than the chronological order in which it developed in the patient's previous history. As an interesting experiment they had a female schizophrenic patient associate freely for a few days alternately in the presence of a male and a female psychoanalyst; they observed that the patient's attitude was influenced by this difference of the analyst's sex. When the male analyst conducted the session, the patient was constantly demanding and aggressive; to the female analyst she complained and was more confiding, seeking for reassurance. This experiment clearly shows that the chronological sequence of transference attitudes does not follow rigidly a historically predetermined stratification of infantile attitudes, and is determined also by other factors.[2]

The slogan of the primacy of resistance-interpretation over

[1] Horney, Karen: *Conceptions and Misconceptions of the Analytical Method.* J. of Nerv. and Ment. Disease *81,* 1935.

[2] I wish to thank Drs. Grinker and Gerard for permission to refer to this interesting observation.

content-interpretation found its most consistent expression in an extreme distortion of the analytic technique, in Kaiser's resistance analysis, from which every interpretation of content is pedantically eliminated. The analysis is reduced to an extremely sterile procedure of pointing out to the patient his resistance manifestations.[1]

After Fenichel's excellent critical analysis of this technique, there is little call for comment. Its most paradoxical feature consists in the fact that Kaiser, who limits the therapeutic agent of analysis to dramatic abreactions entirely, reminding us of the latest experimentation of Ferenczi, attempts to achieve such abreactions by a merely intellectual procedure—namely, by convincing the patient of the irrationality of his resistance-behavior and resistance-ideas. This intellectual insight, Kaiser thinks, can break down the resistance itself and allow the repressed material to appear in a dramatic fashion. In order to create strong emotional tensions, he carefully avoids every interpretation of content and goes so far as to condemn every indirect allusion of the analyst to preconscious material, even if this is so near to consciousness that it needs only verbalization in order to appear on the surface. It is not the intellectual insight into the resistance, but the avoidance of all content interpretation, that creates in the patient such tensions as to provoke dramatic abreactions. The reassuring effect of verbalizing preconscious material, which encourages further expression of repressed material, has been mentioned above. To call the child by its name divests much of the patient's fear of the uncanny tension that comes from the pressure of preconscious material when it is merely felt as some unknown danger. The analyst's objective discussion of such material eliminates the infantile fear of the condemning parents and of their inner representative, the harsh superego. Verbalization of repressed content has for the patient the meaning of a permission; careful avoidance of it means condemnation.

Obviously here the fascination of the analyst by the fireworks of emotional rockets is what leads to such a distortion

[1] Kaiser, Hellmuth: *Probleme der Technik.* Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XX, 1934.

of the analytic technique, which is quite without logical justification and contradicts our dynamic concepts of the analytic procedure. The ideal of the standard technique is just the opposite—a permanent, steady, uninterrupted flow of repressed material, undisturbed by sudden dramatic advances that necessarily lead to new regressions, which often neutralizes the effect of many weeks' or many months' work. This steady flow can, however, only be obtained by a judicious economic use of resistance and content interpretations in such connections as they appear, by helping the patient connect the emerging material with the rest of his conscious mind and with his past and present experience.

Without attempting to advance any radical reforms or lay down new technical rules, I shall try in the following to investigate the question as to how far and in what way the analytic method aids the integrating or synthetic process in the ego, which, as Nunberg has correctly claimed, is an integral part of the analysis.

The process of the cure we described as the combination of two fundamental psychological processes, (1) the inviting of unconscious material into consciousness and (2) the assimilation of this material by the conscious ego. To the first phase our literature refers by different expressions: *emotional experience, abreaction, transformation of unconscious into conscious material;* the second phase is called *insight, digestion or assimilation of unconscious material by the ego* or *synthesis and integration.* Seen in this perspective it is obvious now that the technical reforms and innovations which we have been discussing in detail are all primarily concerned with the first phase and are reactions to an early overintellectualized period of psychoanalytic treatment, in which intellectual insight was overstressed, and in which reconstructions and interpretations were made by the analyst upon material which had not yet appeared in the consciousness of the patient. Ferenczi and Rank stress the emotional experience in the transference, and Reich's and Kaiser's main interest is focussed upon methods of mobilizing unconscious material by manipulating and interpreting the

resistance. In all these experiments with technique the first problem, the mobilization of unconscious material, is considered the crucial one; the assimilation of the unconscious material is left to the integrating powers of the psychoneurotic's fairly intact ego. The question is now in which way this ultimate aim of the therapy, the integration in the ego of the material previously unconscious, can be supported by the correct handling of our technique.

Nunberg's analysis of the process by which unconscious content becomes conscious clearly shows that this process itself is an integrating act of the ego.[1] The quality of consciousness in itself involves an integrating act: a psychological content in becoming conscious becomes included in a higher, richer, more complex system of connections. The preconscious material's becoming conscious has long been considered by Freud as the establishment of a new connection: that between object-images and word-images. Obviously what we call abstractions, or abstract thinking, represent again a higher grade of synthesis between word-images. Although we do not yet know much about its details, what we call conscious thinking consists mainly in the establishment of new connections between conscious contents. It must be remembered, however, that these new connections of higher grade cannot be established arbitrarily by the ego. The connections must be correct, that is to say, they must be in conformity with the results of the reality testing of the ego. Therefore generalizations, the establishing of connections between different conscious elements is permanently counteracted by the critical or distinguishing faculty of the ego, which it uses, however, only under the pressure of reality. Without the pressure of the reality testing functions, the synthetic function would run amuck as it does in many philosophical systems. Nunberg convincingly demonstrates all this and considers the delusional system in paranoia to be the result of such a faulty overstressed synthetic effort of the ego, by which it desperately tries to bring order into a personality chaotically disorganized by the psychotic process.

[1] Nunberg, Herman: *loc. cit.*

Nunberg also called attention to the fact that every neurotic system and most psychotic symptoms are synthetic products. In fact all unconscious material, as it presents itself to us during the treatment in its *status nascendi* of becoming conscious appears in certain synthetic units; fear together with guilt and hate, receptive wishes and dependence overreacted to by aggression appear to us as two Janus faces of the same unit. We discover the synthetic nature of the unconscious material also in such generalizations as connect or identify the objects of sexual impulses in the unconscious. The extension of the incest barrier over all individuals of the other sex is the simplest and best known example of this generalizing tendency of the mental apparatus. The process by which an unconscious content becomes conscious consequently consists in the disruption of primitive synthetic products and the reassembling of the elements in the higher synthetic system of consciousness, which is more complex, more differentiated and consequently more flexible. Thomas M. French's recent studies of consecutive dreams clearly demonstrate that during the course of the treatment a progressive breaking up of primitive emotional patterns takes place, together with a building up of new more complex relationships between the elements. This new synthesis allows behavior more flexible than the rigid automatic behavior which is determined by unconscious synthetic patterns. It is the ego's function to secure gratifications of instinctive needs harmoniously and within the possibilities of the existing external conditions. Every new experience requires a modification in the previously established patterns of instinct-gratification. The unconscious consists of psychological units, expressing more primitive, usually infantile connections between instinctual needs and external observations. These primitive units as we know are not harmonized with each other, nor do they correspond to the external conditions of the adult. Therefore they must undergo a new integrating process into higher systems: a new adjustment between instinctual needs and external reality must be accomplished, in which process the

ego plays the part of a mediator. The establishment of these new connections, however, necessitates the breaking up of the old units—in other words, of symptoms or fixed behavior patterns which correspond to earlier phases of the ego development. What must be given emphasis, however, is the fact that all unconscious material appears in synthetic units, which constitute certain primitive patterns that connect instinctual demands with the results of reality testing.

According to this concept the process by which an unconscious content becomes conscious corresponds to a recapitulation of ego-development, which also consists in a gradual building up of more and more complex and flexible systems of connections between different instinctual needs and sense perceptions.

We are now prepared to discuss the technical question: in what way does our technique contribute to the breaking up of the primitive psychological units as they exist in the unconscious and help their elements to enter into the new, more diversified connections in the conscious ego? The main function of psychoanalytic interpretations obviously consists precisely in the establishment of new correct connections and in the breaking up of old overgeneralized and more primitive connections. The effect of interpretation can most simply be compared with the process of the child's learning to connect and differentiate objects. At first, when the child learns the word "stick", it begins to call every longitudinal object a stick, and then gradually learns to differentiate between stick, pencil, poker, umbrella, etc. When a neurotic patient learns to differentiate between incestuous and nonincestuous objects, that is to say, to react differently toward them, he essentially repeats the same process.

In his current systematic study of patients' consecutive dreams during the process of cure, French subjects this learning process to a thorough investigation, from which we expect to learn much of the nature and details of this learning process. At present we know only its general principle, namely, that it

consists in a gradual establishment of new and more differentiated connections between the psychic representatives of instinctual needs and the data of sense perception.

What does this insight teach us with regard to our analytic technique? It is obvious that our interpretations must fulfil both purposes: they must break up the primitive connections and help to establish new, more differentiated ones that are in harmony with the reality with which the adult is confronted. The standard technique, as it was described in its basic principles by Freud about twenty years ago, still serves this double purpose better than any of those reform procedures, which neglect to give aid to the synthetic functions of the ego and take into account only the mobilization of unconscious material. What we call "working through" has the function of aiding the integrating process. Its therapeutic value is sufficiently proven by experience. My contention, however, is that every correct interpretation serves both purposes: mobilization of unconscious material and its integration into the system of consciousness. The *synchronization* of the two functions of interpretation into one act, inducing abreaction and insight at the same time, may be considered a fundamental technical principle, which I should like to call the *integrating principle of interpretation.* I disagree with every attempt which tries artificially to isolate these two processes, most extremely represented in Kaiser's technique, because the best means still of overcoming a resistance is the correct interpretation of its not yet verbalized background. The basis of the ego's resistance is its inability to master or to assimilate unconscious material. Everything which the patient can understand, that is to say, everything which he can connect with other familiar psychological content of which he already is master, relieves fear. In other words, every new synthesis within the ego, by increasing the ego's ability to face new unconscious material, facilitates the appearance of new unconscious material. The longer the patient is exposed to material which puzzles him, which seems strange, and appears to him as a foreign body, the longer the analysis will be retarded and the appearance of new uncon-

scious material blocked. The ideal we strive for in our technique is that whatever unconscious material appears in consciousness should be connected at the same time with what is already understood by the patient. This makes of the analysis a continuous process. Therefore, whenever it is possible interpretations should refer to previous insight. To be sure, as has already been emphasized, interpretation does not consist merely in the creation of new connections but also in the breaking up of primitive infantile connections. This can be done only if the material as it appears in its totality is exposed to the patient's critical judgment. Umbrella, walking cane, poker, lead pencil, must be demonstrated together in order to break up their faulty identification and generalization as a stick. The interpretations must point out these connections, formed by the mind in infancy as they appear in the presenting material. We know that these connections, as they occur in symbols, for example, often seem extremely strange to the mind of the adult, who has forgotten and overcome this primitive language of the unconscious. It is too much to expect that the patient will be able to recognize without help the infantile generalizations as something self-evident. I do not doubt, however, that after the old primitive connections are broken up, the patient, because of the integrating power of his ego, would in time establish the new syntheses alone. Here, however, is the place where the analyst can help and accelerate the integrating process. Interpretations which connect the *actual life situation* with *past experiences* and with the *transference situation*—since the latter is always the axis around which such connections can best be made—I should like to call *total interpretations.* The more interpretations approximate this principle of totality, the more they fulfil their double purpose: they accelerate the assimilation of new material by the ego and mobilize further unconscious material.

This principle of totality should not be misunderstood and used in a different sense than it is meant. Totality does not mean, for example, that all deep overdeterminations in a dream should be interpreted. Totality does not mean an unlimited

connection of material which though in fact related is still far from the surface. It means totality not as to depth but as to extension—the connecting with each other and with previous material of elements which belong together. It cannot be emphasized too much, however, that these connections should center around the emotionally charged material, usually the transference manifestations. Fenichel's formulation regarding the penetration of the depth is valid, to wit, that the interpretation can only contain just a little more than the patient is able to see for himself at the moment.

The supreme requirement for the correct handling of the technique, however, more important than any principles and rules, is the precise understanding in detail of what is going on at every moment in the patient. It is needless to say that all the formulations here given should be considered not as rules but as general principles to be applied always in accordance with the individual features of the patient and the situation.

The isolation of resistance and content in interpretation is not a desirable aim though at times it is necessary, in particular when the tendency against which the patient has resistance is not yet understood by the analyst. Probably the only effective way of permanently overcoming resistance consists in helping the ego to integrate, that is to say, to understand new material. Therefore in the long run all those technical experiments which aim at sudden abreactions of great quantities of unconscious tendencies fail. These techniques expose the ego not to a continuous flow but to sudden eruptions of new material and necessarily must cause new repressions, repression being a phenomenon which Freud has explained as resulting from the infantile weak ego's inability to deal with certain instinctual needs. The reproduction of such an inner traumatic situation in which the ego is exposed to overpowerful stimuli cannot be a sound principle of our technique. Many, not all, roads lead to Rome. In analytic therapy our main allies are the *striving of unconscious forces for expression and the integrating tendency of the conscious ego.* Even if we do nothing else, if we

do not interfere with these two dynamic forces, we will be able to help many patients, and if we succeed without therapeutic activity in aiding and synchronizing both of these two fundamental agents, we will increase the efficiency of our technique.

Nunberg's thesis that the psychoanalytic treatment is not only an analytic but simultaneously a synthetic process as well is fully valid. It has often been maintained that psychoanalysis consists mainly in the mobilization of unconscious material and that the integration of this material must be left to the patient's ego. The standard technique, as it is used since Freud's technical recommendations, consisting in interpretations centering around the transference situation, really involves an active participation of the analyst in the integrating process. Through our interpretations, without fully realizing it, we actually do help the synthesis in the ego. Doing it consciously and understanding this integrative function of our interpretation may contribute to developing the art of analysis into a fully goal-conscious, systematically directed procedure. Always keeping in mind the function which our interpretations fulfil in the treatment eventually will help to bring us nearer to the ultimate goal, the abbreviation of the psychoanalytic treatment.

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A Note on Pecking in Chickens

David M. Levy

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A NOTE ON PECKING IN CHICKENS

BY DAVID M. LEVY (NEW YORK)

The following observation on poultry, in line with previous studies [1] of the sucking reflex, may help to elucidate the principle of instinct satiation or instinct completion. Tensions in the oral zone are thereby explained as a result of incomplete discharge of the sucking (or, as we shall see, pecking) component of the feeding act. It is hoped through these studies, to which the reader is referred, to contribute further understanding of the erotogenic zone.

While in Hawaii I visited a school for delinquent boys. In touring the grounds I had a chance to observe the farm, and was struck especially by four well-grown chickens which were almost entirely denuded of feathers. The poultry man told me that these feathers had been plucked by the chickens pecking at each other. In every poultry yard it does happen that chickens will do this, but among his poultry the problem concerns every one of them. At any rate, it is necessary to put a steel brace on the upper beak of every chicken. This prevents their getting a good purchase on the feather, so that when a feather is pecked, it slips through.

The situation seems to me to be quite clear. The hundreds of chickens in this poultry yard are raised above the ground on a wire mesh. There are various practical reasons for this, including cleanliness, prevention of picking up parasites from the ground and of infections from contact with the droppings. All the feed is put in a trough and pecking from the ground is eliminated. As a result, there is no possibility of satisfying the pecking needs, as in a natural state. The chickens, therefore, peck each other, since they are the only peckable objects about. I witnessed some of this pecking. It seems to have no hostility

[1] *Fingersucking and Accessory Movements in Early Infancy: An Etiologic Study.* Am. J. Psychiatry VII, 1928.

Experiments on the Sucking Reflex and Social Behavior of Dogs. Am. J. Orthopsychiatry IV, 1934.

in it, judging by the demeanor of the animal, at least in the few instances noted. Whether hostility would evolve later on further experiments will show.

The analogy of this mechanism with the experiments on the sucking reflex is remarkable. In both cases there is a prevention of the necessary satiation of an instinct, of which the reflex act of pecking or sucking is its mode of expression. Just as in finger sucking we have excessive, or, if you wish, abnormal, sucking, as a result of the incompleteness of the sucking phase of feeding, we have in the case of the chickens an incompleteness of the pecking phase of the feeding act. In both instances, also, we can note a pleasure component isolated and yet intrinsic in the feeding act because the finger sucking, as also the feather pecking, no longer directly satisfies nutritional needs, but the instinctive urge for pleasure.

I should add that this method of raising chickens is common also in this country. As it happened, I observed in Hawaii what I later found I might have observed a few miles from my home in Croton. The poultry man was unable to answer definitely a number of questions which will require accurate observation: namely, how soon after birth the feather pecking begins, how long it is necessary to keep the braces on the beak, and how ordinary poultry yard chickens differ in their behavior from chickens brought up on the mesh.

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Unconscious Values in Certain Consistent Mispronunciations

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UNCONSCIOUS VALUES IN CERTAIN CONSISTENT MISPRONUNCIATIONS

BY KARL A. MENNINGER (TOPEKA, KANSAS)

A few years ago [1] I reported some psychoanalytic observations on the way in which letters of the alphabet are used by patients as symbols of multiple meaning. It is well known, for example, that certain individuals habitually omit certain letters in spelling or have difficulty in forming the capitals of certain letters. The following report deals with a somewhat similar type of inhibition with reference to the correct pronunciation of words.

In a paper read before the Chicago Psychoanalytic Society in November, 1933, Dr. Lionel Blitzsten, of Chicago, emphasized the importance of observing and investigating certain habitual mispronunciations made by analytic patients. This analysis of the specific meaning of such unconscious confessions is to be differentiated from the now somewhat "old fashioned" emphasis upon the overdetermination of incidental words, numbers, figures, etc. Speech is a characteristic expression of the personality and eccentric deviations can be clarified in some instances by analysis, just as are the symptomatic acts in and out of the analytic chamber.

An example of this has recently come to my attention; it is, I believe, quite representative and unusually clear. A woman near the end of her analysis repeatedly reported during her analytic hour the contents of long distance telephone conversations with her husband. Her return home was somewhat overdue and she felt quite guilty about her inability to bring the analysis to a close and return to her responsibilities, much as she consciously wished to do so. She had upon two previous occasions set dates when she hoped to finish, only in both instances to disappoint herself and those whom she had apprised of her intentions. For this reason she said she no longer told her husband just when she would come home, but "just told him it would be soon".

[1] Int. J. Ps-A. V, 1924.

After several such telephone conversations in the course of a month or two I was struck by the phrase she used in reporting them——"I will come home soon". The way in which she pronounced the last word was as if it were spelled "son" or "sun". Her attention was called to this pronunciation and she was asked for associations. Her first reply was, "That couldn't be an example of dialect because that isn't the way we pronounce the word at home. It is peculiar to me. Perhaps it does have some significance. The first thing that occurs to me is that I *will* go home if I can have a *son*. (She has three daughters, no sons.) I suppose that really means that I will go home if you will give me a son. (This wish had been brought to consciousness some months previously but had been ignored by the patient until now.) Rather, I guess it means that I'll go home if I can *be* a son." (She was the only daughter of her parents and was very much neglected by them in favor of her four brothers; at least so she believed.)

Essentially, of course, these several significances of "going home 'son' " were identical. There is, however, a still further overdetermination of the word. "Soon", as she pronounced it, has only one "o", that is, one opening instead of two. The word itself was thus changed by the patient from one corresponding to female anatomy to one more masculine. Significantly, at this very period in her analysis she had been indulging in much activity which could be regarded only as anal aggressiveness, as if to say, "I will use my rectum, but I repudiate (deny) my vagina. I will go home if I can be a man, but I cannot accept femininity".

The clinical importance of this interpretation lies in the fact that from this time on the patient began to take seriously the aggressive nature of her delay in ending her analysis. I cannot say that it was the turning point, but I do think it was the clearest indication to the patient of this phase of her resistance. Incidentally, she did *not* thereafter mispronounce the word.

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Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety

Sigmund Freud

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INHIBITIONS, SYMPTOMS AND ANXIETY

BY SIGMUND FREUD

Our verbal usage permits us, in describing pathological phenomena, to distinguish between inhibitions and symptoms, although without attaching very much importance to the distinction. If we did not encounter cases of which we are forced to say that they exhibit only inhibitions, without any symptoms, and if we did not wish to know the reason for this, we should scarcely think it worth while to demarcate the concepts "inhibition" and "symptom".

The two concepts are not rooted in the same soil. Inhibition relates specifically to function and does not necessarily denote something pathological; a normal restriction or reduction of a function may also be termed an inhibition of it. To speak of a symptom, on the other hand, is tantamount to indicating a morbid process. Thus an inhibition may also be a symptom. Our habits of speech are such, then, as cause us to speak of an inhibition when a simple reduction of function is present, of a symptom when it is a question of an unusual alteration of function or of a new modality thereof. In many cases it seems to be perfectly arbitrary whether one emphasizes the positive or the negative aspect of a pathological process, whether one terms its result a symptom or an inhibition. All this is of little real interest, however, and the way in which we have formulated our problem proves not to be a very fruitful one.

Since inhibition is by definition so intimately bound up with function, it is but a short step to the idea of investigating the various ego functions with reference to the forms in which disorder of these functions is manifested in the various neurotic affections. We select for this comparative study the following: the sexual function, eating, locomotion, and vocation.

(*a*) The sexual function is subject to a great multiplicity of disturbances, the majority of which have the character of simple inhibitions. These are grouped together as psychic impotence. The execution of the sex act presupposes a very

complicated sequence of events, any one of which may be the locus of disturbance. The principal loci of inhibition are in men the following: a turning aside of the libido at the initiation of the act (psychic unpleasure (*Unlust*)), absence of physical preparedness (non-erectibility), abbreviation of the act (ejaculatio præcox), which may equally well be described as a positive symptom, suspension of the act before its natural culmination (absence of ejaculation), the non-occurrence of the psychic effect (of the pleasure sensation of orgasm). Other disturbances result from the association with the sexual function of specific conditions of a perverse or fetishistic character.

We cannot long escape noting a relationship which inhibition bears to anxiety. Many inhibitions are an obvious renunciation of function, because the exercise of the function would give rise to anxiety. Outright dread of the sexual function is frequent in women; we catalog this with hysteria, as we do also the defensive symptom of disgust which arises originally as a reaction following upon the sexual act as passively experienced, but later appears in relation to the mere idea of it. A great many compulsive acts likewise plainly serve as a precaution and an assurance against sexual experience, and are therefore phobic in their character.

This does not add much to our understanding, however; one sees merely that the most varied means are employed to disrupt function, as: (1) the mere turning aside of libido, which seems most easily to produce what we call pure inhibition; (2) impairment of the execution of the function; (3) the rendering it difficult through the imposition of special conditions, and its modification through diverting it to other aims; (4) its prevention by means of precautionary measures; (5) its discontinuance by the development of anxiety, when the initiation of the function can no longer be prevented; finally, (6) a subsequent reaction of protest against the act and a desire to undo it if it has actually been carried out.

(*b*) The most frequent disturbance of the nutritive function is anorexia through withdrawal of libido. Increased desire to eat is also not infrequent; there is also a compulsion to eat,

motivated by a fear of starvation, which has been little studied. As a hysterical defense against eating, the symptom of vomiting is familiar. Refusal to eat as a reaction to anxiety belongs among the psychotic patterns of behavior (delusions of poisoning).

(*c*) Locomotion is inhibited in many neurotic states by antipathy to walking and weakness in walking; the hysterical disability makes use of motor paralysis of the motor apparatus or creates a specific suspension of this one function of the latter (abasia). Particularly characteristic are the difficulties of locomotion brought about by the interpolation of definite conditions as prerequisites, the non-fulfilment of which evokes anxiety (phobia).

(*d*) Inhibition in the field of occupation, which so often becomes a matter for treatment as an isolated symptom, is evidenced in diminished pleasure in work, or its poor execution, or such reactive manifestations as fatigue (vertigo, vomiting) if the subject forces himself to go on working. Hysteria compels the suspension of work by producing paralysis of organs and functions, the existence of which is incompatible with the carrying on of work. The compulsion neurosis interferes with work by a continuous distraction of the attention and by loss of time in the form of procrastination and repetition.

We might extend this survey to include still other functions, but we should not expect to profit by so doing. We should not get beyond a mere scratching of the surface in this way. Let us therefore decide upon a formulation which will leave the concept of inhibition with as little of the mysterious about it as possible. Inhibition is the expression of a *functional limitation of the ego*—a limitation which may have a large variety of causes. Many of the mechanisms of this renunciation of function, and its general trend, are well known.

In the case of certain particular inhibitions the trend expressed is rather easily recognized. When playing the piano, writing, and even walking are made the subject of neurotic inhibition, analysis reveals as the basis thereof an

excessive erotization of the organ involved in the function in question, the fingers and the feet. We have obtained the impression that as a rule the ego-function of an organ is impaired whenever its erogeneity, its sexual significance, is increased. The organ then behaves—if we may hazard a somewhat scurrilous metaphor—like a cook who refuses to stay in the kitchen because the master of the house has embarked upon an affair with her. If writing—which consists in allowing a fluid to flow out from a tube upon a piece of white paper—has acquired the symbolic meaning of coitus, or if walking has become a symbolic substitute for stamping upon the body of Mother Earth, then both writing and walking will be abstained from, because it is as though forbidden sexual behavior were thereby being indulged in. The ego renounces these functions proper to it in order not to have to undertake a fresh effort of repression, *in order to avoid a conflict with the id.*

Other inhibitions evidently subserve a desire for self-punishment, as for example not infrequently those in the sphere of vocational activity. The ego dares not do certain things because they would bring an advantage and a success which the strict superego has forbidden. Thereupon the ego renounces these activities also, *in order not to become involved in conflict with the superego.*

The more general inhibitions of the ego follow a simple mechanism of another character. When the ego is occupied with a psychic task of special difficulty, as for example by grief, a wholesale suppression of affect, or by the necessity for holding constantly mounting sexual fantasies in check, it becomes so impoverished with respect to the energy available to it that it is driven to restrict its expenditure in many places at the same time, like a speculator who has tied up his money in his various enterprises. An instructive example of such an intense but temporary general inhibition I was able to observe in a patient with compulsion neurosis who was overcome by a paralyzing fatigue of one to several days' duration on occasions which obviously should have provoked an outburst of rage. From this point of departure there must be found a path to the

understanding of generalized inhibition whereby we may characterize the depressive states and the most severe of these, melancholia.

One may therefore say of inhibitions, in fine, that they represent a limitation and restriction of ego functions, either precautionary or resulting from an impoverishment of energy. It is now easy to see wherein an inhibition differs from a symptom. A symptom can no longer be described as a process taking place either in or around the ego.

II

The general principles of neurotic symptom formation have long been studied and have been laid down in incontestable fashion, one may hope. Symptoms are supposed to be an indication of and substitute for an unachieved instinctual gratification; they are, that is, a result of repression. Repression proceeds from the ego, which, possibly at the command of the superego, does not wish to be a party to an instinct cathexis originating in the id. Through repression the ego accomplishes the exclusion from consciousness of the idea which was the carrier of the unwelcome impulse. Analysis frequently demonstrates that the idea has been retained as an unconscious formation. So far the matter is clear enough, but presently we encounter unsolved difficulties.

The description we have given heretofore of the process involved in repression has expressly emphasized the result it achieves in excluding something from consciousness, but has left other points open to doubt. The question arises as to the fate of the instinctual impulse generated in the id which strives for gratification. The answer has been an indirect one; it was to the effect that through repression the pleasure that was to be expected in gratification was converted into unpleasure (*Unlust*); whereupon one was confronted by the problem of how unpleasure can be the result of the gratification of an instinct. We hope we shall clarify the situation if we lay it down definitely that in consequence of repression the excitation arising in the id altogether fails of discharge: the ego succeeds

in inhibiting or deflecting it. Thus the riddle of the "transformation of affect" in repression disappears. But we have thereby conceded to the ego the ability to exert so far-reaching an influence upon the processes taking place in the id, and have now to learn to understand the way in which this surprising manifestation of power becomes possible to the ego.

I believe that the ego possesses this influence by virtue of its intimate relationship to the perceptual system, a relationship which determines its very being and has become the basis of its differentiation from the id. The function of this system, which we have labelled *Pcpt-Cs**, is connected with the phenomenon of consciousness; it is the recipient of stimuli not only from without but likewise from within, and through the medium of the sensations of pleasure and unpleasure which reach it therefrom, it attempts to direct all psychic activity in accordance with the pleasure principle. We like to conceive of the ego as powerless against the id, but when the ego struggles against an instinctual force in the id, it merely needs to give a signal of distress to attain its purpose through the aid of the all but omnipotent pleasure principle. If we consider this situation as an isolated phenomenon for a moment, we may illustrate it by an example from another field. In a given community a certain clique opposes a political measure, the passage of which would accord with the wishes of the majority. This minority then assumes control of the press, influences sovereign "public opinion" in this way, and thus succeeds in preventing the passage of the projected measure.

But this formulation gives rise to further questions. What is the source of the energy which is used to create the signal of distress? The answer is indicated by the notion that the defense against an involuntary endopsychic process might take place after the pattern of defense against an external stimulus—that the ego employs the same measures of defense against an internal as against an external danger. In the case of external danger the organism makes an attempt at flight; it first withdraws its libidinal cathexis from the perception of the danger; it later learns that a more effective measure consists in carrying

* See *The Ego and the Id,* chapter II.—TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

out such muscular activity as will make impossible the perception of the danger even when the danger is not denied—in other words, it learns to withdraw from the area of danger. Repression is the equivalent of an attempt at flight of this kind. The ego withdraws (preconscious) cathexis from the instinct representative which is to be repressed and utilizes it in the release of unpleasure (anxiety). The problem of how anxiety arises in repression is clearly not a simple one; but at all events one may justifiably hold to the view that the ego is the real locus of anxiety, and reject the earlier conception that the cathectic energy of the repressed impulse automatically becomes converted into anxiety. If I formerly so expressed myself, I was giving a phenomenological description and not a metapsychological statement of the matter.

From the foregoing there arises the further question how it is possible from an economic standpoint that a mere process of withdrawal or discharge, such as in the case of the retreat of the preconscious ego-cathexis, should give rise to unpleasure or anxiety, which according to our postulate can only be the result of an increased cathexis. I would reply that such a causation is not to be explained on an economic basis; anxiety is not created *de novo* in repression, but is reproduced as an affective state in accordance with a memory picture already present. With the further question as to the origin of this anxiety—and as to that of affects in general—we leave behind the undisputed field of psychology, however, and enter the borderland of physiology. Affective states are incorporated into the life of the psyche as precipitates of primal traumatic experiences, and are evoked in similar situations like memory symbols. I think I was not wrong in regarding these states as the equivalents of hysterical attacks developed later and individually, and in considering the former as the normal prototypes of the latter. In man and in creatures related to him the act of birth, as the initial individual experience of anxiety, seems to have lent characteristic features to the expression of the affect of anxiety. We ought not to place too great value upon this relationship, however, nor in its recognition overlook

the fact that an affective symbol for the danger situation is a biological necessity and would have been created in any case. I likewise consider it inadmissible to assume that in every outbreak of anxiety something occurs in the psyche which is analogous to a reproduction of the birth situation. It is not even certain whether hysterical seizures, which are originally traumatic reproductions of this kind, retain this charaacteristic permanently.

I have elsewhere stated that the majority of repressions with which we have to do in therapeutic work are instances of *secondary* repression. They presuppose *primal repressions* of an earlier date which exercise over the more recent situation their gravitative influence. But far too little is as yet known concerning this hinterground and these primary stages of repression. One easily runs the risk of overestimating the rôle of the superego in repression. At the present time it is impossible to decide whether the erecting of the superego perhaps creates the demarcation between primal and secondary repression. At all events, the first, and very intense, attacks of anxiety occur prior to the differentiation of the superego. It is entirely reasonable to suppose that quantitative factors, such as a stimulus of excessive strength, with the failure of the safety device protective against too powerful stimuli *(Reizschutz),* are the most direct causation of primal repression.

The mention of this safeguard reminds us that repression takes place in two distinct situations, namely, when an unwelcome instinctual impulse is aroused by an external perception, and when the impulse arises internally without such provocation. We shall return later to this distinction. Defense against stimuli occurs only against external stimuli, however, not against internal instinctual demands.

As long as we pay sole attention to the attempt at flight on the part of the ego, we do not even come close to the question of how symptoms are formed. Symptoms result from the injuring of the instinctual impulse through repression. If by means of a signal of distress the ego attains its object of completely suppressing the instinctual impulse, we have no inti-

mation as to how this happens. We learn something about it only from the cases in which repression is more or less unsuccessful. Then it appears, in general, that the instinctual impulse, despite repression, has found a substitute satisfaction, but one which is greatly crippled, displaced, or inhibited. It is not even any longer recognizable as a gratification. If a substitute satisfaction is achieved, pleasure is not experienced, but instead, the achieving of this substitute satisfaction has acquired the character of a compulsion. But in the degradation of the process of gratification to the status of a symptom, repression manifests its power in still another respect. Whenever possible, the substitutive process is kept from being carried out by the motor apparatus; and when this does not succeed, it must use itself up in an alteration of the subject's own body, without encroachment upon the environment; it is not permitted to be transformed into action. As I understand it, in repression the ego functions under the influence of external reality and therefore excludes the result of the substitutive process from this reality.

The ego controls the entrance into consciousness as well as the passage into activity directed to the environment; in repression it exerts its power at both places. The instinct representative experiences the one, the instinctual impulse itself the other, side of the ego's manifestation of authority. So it becomes pertinent to ask how this appreciation of the might of the ego harmonizes with the description which we outlined in The Ego and the Id of the position occupied by this same ego. We there described the dependence of the ego upon the id as well as upon the superego, and unmasked its impotence and apprehensiveness towards both, and also the superiority which it maintains so arduously. This point of view has since produced a number of reverberations in psychoanalytic literature. Many opinions have forcibly emphasized the weakness of the ego in relation to the id, of the rational against the demonic in us, and are on the point of making this pronouncement into a pillar of a psychoanalytic *Weltanschauung*. But ought not insight into the *modus operandi* of repression to restrain the

analyst, of all persons, from such an extreme of partisanship?

I am not at all in favor of elaborating *Weltanschauungen.* Let that be left to the philosophers, who avowedly do not find the journey of life practicable without a Baedeker of this kind, which supplies information about everything. Let us accept with all humility the disdain with which the philosophers look down upon us from the vantage point of their more elevated indigence. Since we too cannot disown our narcissistic pride, we will seek consolation in the consideration that all these "guides to life" quickly become obsolete, that it is precisely our shortsightedly circumscribed efforts which make new editions of them necessary, and that even the most up-to-date of these Baedekers are attempts to take the place of the old Catechism, so handy and so complete. We know full well how little light science has been able to throw upon the riddles of this world; all the bombinations of the philosophers cannot alter that fact, but only patient and unremitting work, which subordinates everything to the single demand for certitude, can at long last bring about a change in this respect. When the wayfarer whistles in the dark, he may be disovawing his timidity, but he does not see any the more clearly for doing so.

Translated by HENRY ALDEN BUNKER

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Karl Abraham's Contribution to Applied Psychoanalysis

Hanns Sachs

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KARL ABRAHAM'S CONTRIBUTION TO APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS

It is an enviable destiny to be among the first to take up and develop a great discovery, an advance in human knowledge, to derive from it new conclusions, new problems, and to fructify with it other fields. Needless to say such an advantage entails many dangers and one must possess considerable self-criticism and strength of character if one is to avoid exaggeration or the foolish pursuit of novelty. It was especially difficult for the small group that gathered around the newly formed science of psychoanalysis to find the correct approach to the problems of the arts and sciences. This group consisted almost exclusively of physicians trained in the natural sciences, whose interest, like Freud's, was derived most directly from the practice of psychotherapy, and which approached psychology from the direction of psychopathology. On the other hand Freud had not only pointed from the very beginning to cultural analogies, but had made it clear that it was one of the peculiarities of the new depth-psychology that it would be appreciated fully only if it included the investigation of the rôle of the unconscious in art and mythology:—the "age-old fantasies" *(Säkular-Phantasien)* of mankind. This rejection of one-sidedness provided psychoanalysis with its rich content and with its splendid *élan,* but made difficult demands on its first disciples.

It was fortunate, though undoubtedly far from fortuitous, that this small circle included a young physician whose inclinations and cultural background enabled him to meet those demands. Karl Abraham had acquired the richness of the humanistic education which characterized the currently so much vilified Liberal Era. In addition to his thorough training in medicine and the natural sciences he was equipped with a wide knowledge of cultural history and a lively interest in the arts and literature, which was reënforced by exceptional linguistic talent. In addition to many living tongues he commanded the classical languages well enough to be able to enjoy the Greek dramatists and Latin historians in the original. But far more valuable than these accomplishments was his crystal-clear intellect, his cool, unbiased judgment, and his fine personal integrity which made him serve the truth unswervingly. Every sentence in his writings reflects these characteristics

in the pithiness and absolute correctness of his formulations, which tolerate no ambiguities or exaggerations and convey neither more nor less than the writer has reasoned out and found correct.

It was inevitable that the first attempts to apply psychoanalysis to the arts and sciences should have to be made not by specialists in these various studies but by outsiders or dilettantes. It must have been difficult for Abraham to reconcile this fact with his strictly scientific way of thinking before he could engage in this pursuit, but the importance of the endeavor overcame all scruples. At the same time he would not content himself with a superficial application to his task. He read widely and studied conscientiously until he could establish his ideas on well-proven, scholarly foundations. He never embarked upon the quixotic speculations which are favored by the devotées of pseudoknowledge, but ventured forth with the utmost caution into the fields where he was not entirely at home, testing each step.

The content of his work cannot be summarized here, but it is possible to indicate its place in the history of applied psychoanalysis. The extraordinary breadth of his interests, unusual even in those pioneer years, enabled Abraham to stand in the front rank of those who contributed to the expansion of psychoanalysis, not in the sense of popularizing it—though he was successful in this endeavor too—but of extending it into a basic psychological interpretation of the highways and by-ways which have been and are still being traversed by mankind in its cultural development. Mythology, the history of religion and creative art comprise a goodly portion of cultural history, and Abraham devoted himself successfully, and in an exemplary manner, to studies in every one of these fields.

A basic motif in the pictures of Segantini, the painter of the Engadine mountainous world, is followed by Abraham through all its transformations and variations and is related to the life of the artist, and new light is thrown on the dynamic rôle of the unconscious in artistic creativeness. *Prometheus,* another study, brings to light the hidden significance of the myth of the Fire-bringer and creator of mankind, and explains the fate that befalls him like every other culture hero. The "heretic" King Ikhnaton is subjected to an analysis despite the intervening millenia and serves to illustrate in his hymn to the sun and his attempted reforms the significance of the œdipus complex on religious sublimation.

Since Abraham's time psychoanalysis has begun to devote itself to other problems. But Abraham's work is by no means antiquated today, in part because it presents with complete clarity the foundations of the new science, in part because his work contains a wealth of suggestions and hints whose possibilities still remain unexhausted.

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Joseph Jefferson Asch, M.D. 1880-1935

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IN MEMORIAM

Joseph Jefferson Asch, M.D.
1880-1935

Dr. Asch, one of the founders of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, died on August 15, 1935.

Dr. Asch was born in New York on May 30, 1880. He was brought up in the atmosphere of science and art. He was an excellent student and athlete at college and medical school. He was graduated from the College of Physicians and Surgeons in 1902, thereupon adopting urology as his specialty. In this branch of surgery he contributed much toward the conservative treatment of venereal infections. He was a pioneer in the field of cystoscopy, chief of Clinic at the Lenox Hill Hospital, consulting cystoscopist at that institution, and a member of the American Urological Society.

Dr. Asch was one of the first to see the tremendous importance of the liaison between clinical medicine and psychoanalysis. He studied with Freud in 1922, and was an attentive participant in every advanced lecture course and seminar on psychoanalytic subjects that was available.

His medical talents, in both the clinical and psychological spheres, were equalled by his talent for æsthetic appreciation. He was a fine musician, a keen connoisseur of many arts, an enthusiastic traveler and ethnologist, a superb raconteur, and above all, a master of the art of gracious living.

JOSEPH J. ASCH
1880-1935

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Mortimer Williams Raynor, M.D. 1879-1935

Gregory Zilboorg

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

MORTIMER WILLIAMS RAYNOR
1879-1935

IN MEMORIAM

Mortimer Williams Raynor, M.D.
1879-1935

Dr. Mortimer Williams Raynor died on October 5, 1935, at the age of fifty-six. His death is a loss which will be deeply felt by many even outside the circle of those who were bound to him by ties of personal affection and regard for his untimely passing interrupts a unique contribution to the development of psychoanalytic psychiatry in America.

Throughout years of valuable service in the New York State hospital system, Dr. Raynor preserved his intellectual resilience, his scientific open-mindedness and a rare degree of progressive idealism. From the State system he gained a knowledge of administrative detail and the capacity to "run things smoothly"; yet he was never submerged by authoritarian trends. He struggled against the custodial traditions of large, over-crowded hospitals, and was preoccupied constantly with the development of the therapeutic resources of modern psychopathology. It was in the State service, too, that Dr. Raynor developed his early interest in the phenomena of the unconscious. He studied hypnoidal states, experimenting with alcoholic amnesias, and succeeded more than once in uncovering in his patients forgotten events and emotions. This interest in the unconscious, and ultimately in psychoanalysis, was a part of his incessant search for new understanding and increased therapeutic powers. And it was this same quest that influenced Dr. Raynor in 1926 to leave his advanced rank in the State system hierarchy (i.e., the superintendency of the Kings Park State Hospital), to become the Medical Director of the Bloomingdale Hospital.

In his new post Dr. Raynor turned to a closer contact with practical psychoanalysis. The library of Bloomingdale Hospital, his favorite place of retreat, became the center of the scientific life of the hospital. Under his stimulus the library grew to be one of the most up-to-date reference libraries in any private institution. The classics of psychoanalytic literature as well as psychoanalytic periodicals took their proper places on its shelves and in the hands of the medical staff. During the nine years of his administration, a minimum of forty-five seminars were held each year, almost half of

which were devoted to clinical psychopathology and psychoanalysis. He opened two psychoanalytic treatment rooms (one on the men's and one on the women's service) and he was the first to appoint a full-time, trained psychoanalyst to his staff, whose sole duty it was to devote himself to the analysis of severe neuroses and psychoses. He was deeply interested in the problems of psychoanalytic education, scored eclectism in this field, and established in the Bloomingdale Hospital the standards of psychoanalytic education which were adopted by the International Training Commission of the International Psychoanalytic Association. Furthermore he arranged to have the Hospital subsidize, in full or in part, the psychoanalytic training of various members of his staff and stimulated others to secure thorough training, warning against superficial dabbling in the field. As a result, a unique achievement goes to the credit of the Bloomingdale Hospital: during the nine years of Dr. Raynor's administration, ten members of the staff have been analyzed and one is under analysis. Of the ten who completed their practical psychoanalytic training, two are now on the staff of the hospital and the others have gone into private practice; two have held the position of secretary of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, several have received teaching positions in medical schools, and others do creditable research work in the Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute and elsewhere.

The productivity of Dr. Raynor's leadership is seen in the following comparative figures: during the ten years between 1916 and 1926, twenty-four scientific papers were published by members of the staff of the Hospital, most of which were reports of a physiological and chemical nature; during the nine subsequent years under Dr. Raynor's directorship, nearly one hundred and ten original papers were published, most of which were clinical in nature and nearly all of which were written with consideration of the revolution which psychoanalysis had produced in traditional psychopathology.

Dr. Raynor was the type of father who wants his sons to grow and who lets them grow without frustrating them through paternal ambivalence. The unusual creative activity of the Bloomingdale Hospital during the past nine years would have been impossible without Dr. Raynor's adult joy in stimulating others to develop into a like but independent adulthood.

GREGORY ZILBOORG

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Lettre Sur L'Etiologie Et L'Evolution Des Psychoses Collectives, Suivie De Quelques Remarques Sociologiques Concernant La Situation Historique Actuelle.

Bettina Warburg

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ABSTRACT

LETTRE SUR L'ETIOLOGIE ET L'EVOLUTION DES PSYCHOSES COLLECTIVES, SUIVIE DE QUELQUES REMARQUES SOCIOLOGIQUES CONCERNANT LA SITUATION HISTORIQUE ACTUELLE. (A Letter dealing with the Etiology and Evolution of the Collective Psychoses followed by some Sociological Considerations concerning the History of the Present Situation.) By Robert Waelder (Vienna). Abstract from the French translation by Anne Berman in collaboration with Princess Marie Bonaparte, revised by the author. Letter from the Third Series *Correspondance* entitled L'Esprit, L'Ethique et la Guerre (Intellect, Ethics and War). Institut International de Coopération Intellectuelle. Société des Nations 1934. P. 85–150.

Dr. Waelder has selected the collective psychoses for special investigation because of their importance in provoking and sustaining war. He discusses the topic from the point of view of promoting an understanding of the causation and evolution of these collective psychoses, rather than with the hope of discovering a *sterilisatio magna* to prevent their future occurrence.

There is an apparent contradiction implicit in the term *"collective psychoses"*, since the outstanding characteristic of the psychotic is his withdrawal from collective human activities, and his partial or total lack of participation in the social life, the thoughts, and the feelings of other people. How then can a group be subject to a psychosis when the sufferers from this common malady not only do not lose contact with each other, but are the more closely bound to each other because of it? Such individuals are not, psychiatrically speaking, mentally ill, since they behave in quite a normal fashion so long as the boundaries of their collective psychosis are not infringed upon. On the other hand, the ideational content of a collective psychosis is impervious to logic, and is quite comparable to the systematized delusions of a true psychosis. It seems paradoxical that only normal people fall prey to a collective psychosis precisely because they establish contacts easily and seek to avoid a break with society. True psychotics, on the other hand, take cover behind their own narcissism, run no risk of being affected by collective psychoses, and rarely abandon their private world of fantasy in favor of the imaginary collective world of socialized man.

It is characteristic of the collective psychoses that they are transitory and dependent upon external etiological factors for their existence.

Particularly significant are the *conditions for the release* of aggression in wartime, that is, of the tendency to destroy and annihilate. Under other circumstances this drive gives way to the erotic or love instinct, favoring the conservation of life, or the creation of more highly organized entities. Normally the aggressive forces are not isolated, and do not manifest themselves in an actual destruction of the outside world. The Eros so modifies aggression that the latter is not exercised in a dangerous form. It is in the object libidinal relationship between man and woman that the aggressive instinct is rendered inoffensive and neutralized to the maximum extent. The aggressive component is then directed toward the possession of the partner, and is at that point so enveloped in eroticism that it no longer preserves its original aggressive form. The other manifestations of aggression are generally inhibited by education, and break through only under special conditions, as in criminal acts or in certain mental illnesses.

In a collective psychosis a part of the aggressive drive is set free and directed against the enemy of the moment. Since the inhibition of the aggressive instinct is perhaps the outstanding cultural achievement of thousands of generations, how is it possible that this release is permitted by that social conscience which has been developed throughout the ages, and which is recreated in each individual from the time of infancy?

In all collective situations a part of the function of the individual conscience is ceded to a leader. Each individual substitutes the personality of the leader, that is, a person in the outside world, for his superego. The leader takes the place of that external conscience which was represented by the parents in childhood. This is the binding link between the crowd and its leader. The individuals themselves are united by this common factor and identified with each other because of it. "If the leader permits aggression, or even orders it, the individual may give himself up to the instinctive act without restraint. This would perhaps be less acceptable if he were urged to surrender to his instinct openly, that is to say, to massacre his enemy. It is necessary to create an ideal so that men do not become conscious that their act is instinctive rather than moral." They are consequently urged to serve God, country, future social order, etc. "Aggression can be released for the greater glory

of an elevated concept. The conscience is reassured, and men may taste the joy of satisfying an instinct, usually so carefully restrained, and at the same time attain one of their ideals."

A review of the *domestication of the instincts* in the service of civilization follows, emphasizing the partial emasculation of the instinctive forces, and the resulting conflict between that irreducible minimum of aggression which is essential to the survival of the individual in reality, and the real demands of present day society which militate against the instinctive drives in their original form.

In the collective psychoses there is an *impairment of reality testing,* and it is here that the collective and the true psychoses most nearly approach one another. This alone justifies the term "psychosis". Paranoid delusions differ from simple errors precisely in that these erroneous concepts are in no way amenable to correction by actual facts. Mass psychoses are also characterized by the falsification of reality. In war time incorrigible delusional ideas are entertained about the enemy for a certain period of time. The psychological reasons for this invalidation of the sense of reality are two-fold:

1. Reality testing is a function of the superego. In so far as the superego of the individual is partly replaced by, or projected upon, the leader, the individual foregoes a part of his faculty of auto-observation which is a function of that portion of the superego which he has ceded. Consequently his capacity to separate his fantasies from the reality situation is also invalidated.

2. Normally, ambivalence results from the interrelation of the aggressive and erotic forces: a man may be considered as a colleague of the same profession, or as a competitor. There is a redistribution and dissociation of the aggressive and erotic drives in a circumscribed group subject to a collective psychosis. Love is exclusively confined to members of the group and hatred militates only against outsiders. This dissociation of love and hatred is like that found in true paranoia, where only a few intimate friends and relatives are considered as love objects, whereas all the rest are hated persecutors.

It appears then that although the *etiological factors* of the collective psychoses are numerous, reënforced aggression is of special significance. Necessity and want may add a powerful precipitating cause. It is generally known that man, forced to renounce his

desires both in simple and complex situations, responds to this frustration by aggression. A second situation arises, where the aggression, turned back upon the self, is intolerably strong, and is again turned outward to relieve the individual. Faulty educational principles are often to blame, since education disposes over certain means of attenuating the aggression of children: "If one is careful not to impose upon the child more restrictions than the exigencies of civilized society demand; if, when these restrictions are inevitable, one tries to offer the child a compensatory satisfaction by showing him a constant benevolence; if adults will acknowledge their own aggressive drives which frequently manifest themselves unconsciously at the expense of the child himself; and if they will learn how to control themselves, the aggression of the child can be maintained at that low level which remains useful and necessary in the struggle for life, leaving no dangerous excess. It is necessary to teach the child to adapt himself to reality gently, so that superfluous hostility will become a menace neither to the community nor to the individual in turning it back upon himself. In general adults do not behave toward children in this way. On the contrary, certain types of education in various countries and surroundings, tend to augment the aggression appreciably." It is this dammed up aggression which is released in the service of war.

The evolution of a collective psychosis of the type here under discussion, in which the aggressive drives tend to explode into the outside world, may take place in one of two ways: either before the damaging aggressive act or after the harm has already been done. In the first instance the aggression may dissipate itself either because a stronger external force "prevents the hostility from manifesting itself, and so to say shuts the man up in a dungeon with his aggression, or else because certain erotic drives are sufficiently powerful to interfere with the development of the aggression". The aggression is thrown against the solid wall of necessity, turns itself inward, and is transformed into remorse and depression, but the blind force of destruction is dissipated. "If the hostility has been acted out and the aggression satisfied, the erotic drive can recover its power." Reconciliation and repentance follow. This process is analogous to the first moral manifestations of childhood: "The aggressive tendencies of the child, face to face with an external object, for example a brother or a sister, sometimes find themselves checked . . . either by an external force which interferes with the realiza-

tion of the hostile wishes, or by the child's own ambivalence, if he also feels love and tenderness for the object of his hostility, which interfere with the expression of his aggression. In either case the hostility is turned inward and the child may beat himself because he wishes to beat others. The tendency towards self-punishment, the moral aggression against the self, makes its appearance. But if the aggression has not been interfered with before the undesirable act, if it has been acted out, then the interaction of friendly and hostile tendencies is modified by the satisfaction of the aggression, to the advantage of the erotic elements. The resulting regeneration expresses itself in contrition, in the effort made toward a reconciliation, and in the feeling of having contracted a debt toward the victim."

"But to what extent does the acting out of the hostility satisfy the aggression? How much harm must be done to appease the aggression and to allow the Eros to take its place? This depends upon the relative power of the aggressive and erotic drives." If we turn to history, we find that whenever less domesticated aggressive people have conquered more civilized ones, they assimilated the civilization of the vanquished, so that little by little they themselves became domesticated.

A Few Sociological Remarks: The present situation.

The present economic situation is discussed at considerable length and with great clarity. The problem of specialized production and its relation to periods of financial depression and inflation, as well as its influence upon a dense population which is of necessity driven into cities because of it, is shown to be the axis about which the present difficulties revolve. Comparing the situation today with that of the declining Greek civilization of the third century B.C. which survived the crisis, and with that of the Roman Empire of the third century A.D. which failed to do so, certain similarities become evident. In each instance capitalism was disintegrating, with the inevitable result that specialized production could not be maintained, and social conditions became completely disequilibrated. A new equilibrium had to be established with the tendency to depopulate the cities and recreate the dominance of the self-supporting villages. These represent the only stable form of society, since they have no need to rely upon the fluctuations of the currency. Economic interventions, which are harmless and easily con-

trolled at the level of one stage production, do not remain so when they pertain to specialized mass production. The problem of the immediate present lies in the fact that a complete regression to the status of the self-sufficient peasantry is for many reasons no longer possible nor desirable, and that inflation and devaluation of all currencies create a constantly shifting equilibrium which may, in the end, prove to be an insufficient means to avoid disaster.

Urban civilization, dependent upon specialized production, is subject to insecurity not only from the economic but also from the psychological point of view. At best, city dwelling predicates conditions of life which are contrary to the native desires of the individual and which constantly demand difficult psychic reorganization. Myriads of men are engaged in professions far removed from the soil and are no longer aware of the end product of their labor, so that the identification of the man with his work no longer exists. Further, when mass production fluctuates downward, as at present, the continual adaptation to a new equilibrium demands that a man pass from one stratum of society to another, and from one activity to another, so that he becomes *heimatlos* and uprooted. The consequence is that the conditions of life become more difficult, the standard of living is lowered, and certain desires must be renounced. "Following one of our most general rules, a rule already mentioned above, man reacts to renunciations with aggression. For this reason we may expect an increase of human aggression all along the line. At this point our train of thought rejoins the observations which were previously made in regard to the etiology of the collective psychoses: we know that one of the wellsprings of all augmented aggression is human misery and renunciation." "The growing aggressive drive may manifest itself in various ways: it may spend itself on the outside world, it may turn back upon the individual and disturb his internal equilibrium, or finally, it may alternately break out in the one form or in the other."

"The situation seems to be determined by the contradiction of the exigencies of external reality, and the psychological needs of man. External reality demands a division of labor, and that man constantly be subjected to reality in order to maintain the accepted bypaths of production." Man revolts against this mechanization at the expense of the ideals of human "existence". The question then arises, "Is it true that mechanization must necessarily entail the decadence of life, or is it necessary to realize certain psycho-

logical conditions so that life may come to its full expression within this complicated machine age?" Calling to mind that the nomad might have considered the village dweller's existence as sedentary, confined, and comparable to a sort of mechanization and decadence, Dr. Waelder concludes that perhaps today also the contradiction between mechanization and the psychological needs of man is only a matter of tension between the instinctive life and the adjustment to reality. "Then, for psychological reasons, men will again destroy that part of the reality created by previous generations which surpassed human capacity. But as the life instinct is powerful and irrevocable, when the number of men has been decreased and reality has been simplified, adaptation will come at last and man will be able to create an existence entirely in conformity with his dignity in the very heart of mechanization."

Occidental civilization has, for the most part, been alloplastic in character, and has developed such complexities "that man has had difficulty in adapting himself to it". Psychoanalysis could contribute a good deal toward the autoplastic changes required of the individual in adapting to reality.

BETTINA WARBURG (NEW YORK)

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Sex and Culture. By J. D. Unwin. London: Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press, 1934. xvi+676 p.

Henry Alden Bunker

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BOOK REVIEWS

SEX AND CULTURE. By J. D. Unwin. London: Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press, 1934. xvi+676 p.

This is a remarkable book, one which should make as strong an appeal as any work I know to those who are interested in the phylogeny no less than in the ontogeny of the human mind. It presents in great detail and with the fullest documentation the results of an inquiry which the author conducted, not, he assures us, with any idea of proving a thesis, for he had none to prove, or of establishing anything, for he had no idea of what the result would be, but solely with the purpose of testing "a somewhat startling conjecture that had been made by the analytical psychologists". This suggestion was "that if the social regulations forbid direct satisfaction of the sexual impulses, the emotional conflict is expressed in another way, and that what we call 'civilization' has always been built up by compulsory sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires". Is this conclusion, arrived at on quite other grounds, in any way substantiated, Dr. Unwin asked, "by a reference to cultural data"?—does a critical inquiry into the records of human societies reveal any correspondence between "limitation of sexual opportunity" and degree of cultural attainment, such as should be discoverable if it be true that cultural achievements are largely or wholly due to a substitution of non-sexual for sexual aims, to a displacement of sexual tendencies to non-sexual goals, to the "sublimation", as we say, of these tendencies? *

Now on the basis of Dr. Unwin's data the correspondence between the "limitation of sexual opportunity", between sexual frustration, on the one hand, and cultural condition (as he defines this), on the other, turns out to be so complete, its completeness so far beyond anything one could have dared imagine, as in itself

* Freud's own words (which the author quotes later in his volume) are: "We believe that civilization has been built up by sacrifices in gratification of the primitive impulses, and that it is to a great extent forever being recreated as each individual repeats the sacrifice of his instinctive pleasures for the common good. The sexual are among the most important of the instinctive forces thus utilized: they are in this way sublimated; that is to say, their energy is turned aside from its sexual goal and diverted towards other ends, no longer sexual and socially more valuable."

to induce the skepticism mandatory with regard to any correlation allegedly found in Nature which (as the statisticians would say) closely approaches the value of 1. This unavoidable skepticism at all events prompts a very careful scrutiny of Dr. Unwin's methods and conclusions; it is for this reason among others that I shall not hesitate hereafter to give the author's own words as fully as space permits.

For the purpose of his inquiry Dr. Unwin selected, from a much larger number originally assessed, eighty "uncivilized" societies regarding which the information available met his standard of adequacy quantitatively and qualitatively, particularly in point of apparent reliability of the observer, his employment of native terms instead of more or less arbitrary and inevitably inaccurate English renditions of these, his description of actual rites rather than of (often merely inferred or even misinterpreted) beliefs, etc.; thus the author was forced to omit many uncivilized societies originally intended for inclusion, such as the Australian aborigines and many Bantu and American Indian peoples. In this connection, it should be mentioned, the author considers it "inadmissible to speak of any society as 'primitive', or 'more primitive', or as 'civilized', 'more civilized', or 'less civilized', for all these terms lack precise meaning"; thus, according to his terminology—an admittedly "rough and arbitrary classification"—"civilized" societies refer only to the sixteen historical peoples which he then names, "uncivilized" to any not included in this list. Similarly, the sense of the word "culture" is so extensive and inclusive that "its application must be strictly limited before it can be said to possess any single precise meaning"; thus, "the cultural condition of a society in the sense in which the phrase is used throughout this treatise" is comprised in "the manner in which the powers manifesting themselves in the universe are conceived and the steps which are taken to maintain a right relation with them". For it is Dr. Unwin's fundamental postulate that "the conception of and reaction against the strange quality in anything unusual or beyond comprehension seems to be the basis of all human culture"; it seems to be part of the inherent nature of the human organism, that is, "to see in any unusual or uncomprehended phenomenon a peculiar power, a dangerous but powerful and therefore desirable quality, and to place offerings in an attempt either to ward off the danger manifest therein or to secure this power for himself" (pp.

89, 243, 338, 345). The common quality possessed by certain unusual, supernormal, uncomprehended natural phenomena was denoted by a word which cannot be translated into any civilized tongue, since its meaning is too comprehensive—a word used in a variety of contexts, as for example "it was applied to an unusual or uncomprehended sickness as well as to unusual natural phenomena; it was also used in reference to a corpse or the dead or ghosts or some ghosts; it was also applied to an unusual man, to a man in an unusual condition and to a man of unusual ability" (p. 89). (The ubiquity of "pervading personal spirits" (as "personified causes") which the theory of animism postulates is a false inference, the author holds, from the fact that the native word translated "spirits" had the widespread application just referred to; at the same time, it may be that animism means no more than that uncivilized peoples behave towards these dangerous powers—as by appeasement, bribery, and the like—as if they were fellow (but mightier) human beings whom they could thus influence and so perhaps rob of their power—which is very much what Dr. Unwin says.)

On the basis, then, of the steps taken by them to maintain a right relation with the power or powers in the universe, Dr. Unwin differentiates three classes of uncivilized society, and a fourth to which a few civilized societies have belonged. (1) If a society erected temples (a temple is "a roofed building, other than a grave-house, in which the power in the universe manifests itself and which is specially erected and maintained in order that a right relation may be preserved with that power, the building being such that a man can stand upright in it") in its efforts to maintain a right relation with the powers in the universe, that society was in what the author calls the *deistic* cultural condition. (2) Among those societies which did not build temples there were some which paid some kind of post-funeral attention to their dead. Such peoples were in what the author calls the *manistic* (Latin *manes;* but the word was also (first?) used by Frobenius, as the author is doubtless aware) cultural condition; it is the rites and ceremonies of manistic peoples that have often been termed "ancestor worship" in anthropological literature. (3) Some societies neither erected temples nor paid any kind of post-funeral attention to their dead; all such societies were in what the author calls the *zoistic* cultural condition. (Zoism is the word suggested by A. B. Cook as an alternative to the *animatism*

of R. R. Marett; while the latter term covers the beliefs of many zoistic peoples, its scope is not wide enough "to include the application to 'the dead' of the word which denoted (a) the power in the universe, (b) the source of magic power", although this use of the word is as important as any other.) Of the 80 uncivilized societies studied, 47 were in the zoistic, 21 in the manistic, and 10 in the deistic cultural condition; two were uncertain. It would appear that the principal difference, in the present reference, between manistic and deistic societies is one of degree: the recipients of the offerings made by the latter seem to have been the same as the recipients of the manistic offerings, namely, the ghosts of powerful dead men, but the difference is that by the deistic societies these were remembered and placated for a long time, while there was also a coincident elaboration and decoration of the places in which the offerings were made such as eventuated in the erection of temples in honor of these dead. It is less clear whether the difference between zoistic and manistic societies is of degree or of kind. On the one hand, manistic peoples remember their powerful dead for varying periods in the form of rites of tendance, whereas zoistic peoples forget them; on the other hand, the evidence is that these rites of tendance are identical with the payments made to living magicians, so that "whereas zoistic societies only make payments to a magician when he is alive, manistic societies continue to make payments to him after he is dead". Thus the post-funeral attention paid to the powerful dead characteristic of manistic (and deistic) societies, the rites which we call tendance, "seem to have developed from the payments which zoistic societies made to a living magician", these latter being identical in purpose ("as a defense against danger or as a means of securing help") and in kind with the offerings which they made to the power in the universe. "If, then", the author adds, "I am correct in tracing the development of the rites of tendance from an offering before the 'unusual', wherever manifest, we should expect some manistic societies to conceive of ghosts as existing in places where zoistic societies see only the strange quality manifest in anything unusual. The facts fulfil this expectation. In Africa large trees (especially fig-trees), rather than stones, were regarded as the residence of the power in the universe. . . . This is especially reported in reference to the Akamba, Lango, Wayao, and Baila; but between the ideas of these societies there was an interesting difference which supports my sug-

gestion. In these trees the Lango and Wayao beheld the power in the universe, *jok* and *mulungu,* respectively; the Akamba saw both *mulungu* and *aimu,* the power in the universe and ghosts; the Baila regarded the trees as the residence only of ghosts, *mizhimo"* (pp. 280, 282).

Dr. Unwin's next task is to classify these eighty uncivilized societies "according to the sexual opportunity which was afforded to their members", by sexual opportunity meaning "the opportunity which is afforded to a man or a woman to gratify a sexual desire". In no society known to us is there complete sexual freedom; in every known society there are always some women to whom a man cannot have access and some men who are denied to every woman; this minimal limitation of sexual opportunity is imposed by exogamic regulations, by a system of prohibited degrees, or by a combination of the two; "in all cases intercourse within the forbidden group was regarded with peculiar horror, being incestuous". Apart, then, from this basic and invariably present limitation, the eighty uncivilized societies were divisible, as regards their pre-nuptial sexual conduct, according as (1) their members enjoyed complete pre-nuptial sexual freedom, or (2) they were subject to regulations which compelled only an irregular or occasional continence, or (3) under pain of punishment and even death the women had to remain virgins until they married. The author classified no society under (3) unless that society demanded "that the tokens of the bride's virginity shall be visible on the nuptial mat", the occurrence of this demand being "the only admissible evidence that a society insisted on pre-nuptial chastity".

When, now, the eighty uncivilized societies investigated are tabulated according to the criteria described above, it comes out that a plus in the column "pre-nuptial chastity" coincides in every case with a D (deistic) in the column "cultural condition", the designation for irregular or occasional continence in the former column with an M (manistic) in the latter, and a minus (i.e., pre-nuptial sexual freedom) in the former with a Z (zoistic) in the latter. Thus, without exception, all the societies which permitted pre-nuptial sexual freedom were found to be in the zoistic cultural condition; and conversely, all the societies in the zoistic cultural condition permitted complete pre-nuptial sexual freedom. All the societies possessing such regulations as imposed an irregular or occasional sexual continence pre-nuptially were likewise societies

which were in the manistic cultural condition; and conversely, all the societies in the manistic cultural condition imposed only irregular or occasional pre-nuptial continence. Finally, all the societies which insisted on pre-nuptial chastity on the part of the woman were also societies which were in the deistic cultural condition; and conversely, all the societies which were in the deistic cultural condition demanded the tokens of virginity as proof that a girl was *virgo intacta* when she was married. (It might be added that this surprising correspondence between cultural condition, as defined, and pre-nuptial sexual opportunity permitted held good also even within the cultural group. The author placed six manistic societies on a scale according to the length of time during which they remembered and placated a powerful ghost. When he arranged the same six societies according to the extent to which they elaborated their sacred places, they fell into the same order as before. The two societies which exceeded the other four in these two respects also exhibited a compulsory pre-nuptial continence of greater intensity than that of their manistic neighbors.)

It remains now to see what Dr. Unwin has made of this strikingly complete correspondence between cultural condition (as defined) and limitation of sexual opportunity (as defined)—between, that is, the degree of post-funeral attention paid to the powerful dead and the degree of limitation of pre-nuptial sexual opportunity imposed. Briefly stated, he has, in the first place, equated the former of these two terms with "thought and reflection", "mental energy", "social energy", and thus the progressive increase in the post-funeral attention paid to the powerful dead exhibited by manistic societies as compared with zoistic and by deistic societies as compared with manistic is made synonymous with a progressive increase in "thought and reflection", "mental energy", "social energy" manifest in these societies. I should like to give the precise words in which Dr. Unwin states this rather surprising and I think quite erroneous equation, for they also show how narrowly he misses what would seem to be more probably the truth. The first great difference between a manistic people and a zoistic, he says, "was a consciousness of the past", for "the manistic people remembered and conciliated their powerful dead, while the zoistic people forgot and neglected them. . . . Thus when a society ceased to be zoistic and became manistic, one of the details of the cultural change seems to have consisted in the growth and extension of their

memory. Now it seems to me that this extension of memory cannot have been due to anything but a mental effort. Thus, so far as the memory of the 'dead' was concerned, the factor responsible for the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition must have been one that induced thought and reflection. It must have been absent in zoistic societies and present in manistic societies." Like zoistic societies, manistic societies "also regard the power in the universe as dangerous to touch, yet precious to possess; they also consult their magicians when they need help or protection; they also make offerings to the power and payments to the magicians, and for identical purposes; but whereas zoistic societies only make payments to a magician when he is alive, manistic societies continue to make payments to him after he is dead. And it is in this important detail that manistic behavior differs from zoistic behavior. . . . I have suggested that the first difference was due to thought and reflection. This seems to be the explanation of the second difference also. . . . In order to account, therefore, . . . for the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition, we must find a factor, present in manistic and absent in zoistic societies, which intensified thought and reflection". Similar reasoning is applied to the difference between the deistic and the manistic cultural condition, but in addition "my further submission is that the creation of altars and houses was an exhibition of social energy", so that "the factor responsible for the change from the manistic to the deistic condition seems to have been one which intensified social energy, and to have been the same as that which produced the change from the zoistic to the manistic condition. . . . The factor responsible for the difference, therefore, must have been one which intensified thought, reflection, and social energy—this factor operating to a greater degree in deistic societies than in any manistic society".

We already have the striking observation that coincident with certain changes and extensions within the area of the maintaining of a right relation with the power or powers in the universe (unfortunately equated by Dr. Unwin with intensified memory, thought and reflection, mental energy, social energy) there occurs an increased tendency to demand pre-nuptial continence, a progressive reduction in (pre-nuptial) sexual opportunity. When such a complete correlation between two groups of phenomena, A and B, is found to exist as is here indisputably demonstrated to occur

between the phenomena in question, three possibilities are present. One possibility is that A is the cause of B; a second is that B is the cause of A; the third, which I cannot find that Dr. Unwin has taken into account, is that both A and B are the effect of another factor, C—that the investigator who discovers a high correlation between A and B is in reality measuring the same phenomenon (C) in two different ways, by two different (and it may be unrelated) approaches. And psychology, not social anthropology, the author says, must answer the question whether there is "any causal relationship between the compulsory continence and the thought, reflection, and energy which produced the change from one cultural condition to the other"; but "one thing is certain: if a causal relation exist, the continence must have caused the thought, not the thought the continence". Since A cannot be the cause of B, is it possible that B may be the cause of A? "We consulted the appropriate psychological authorities"—namely, and somewhat heterogeneously, Freud, Rivers, van der Hoop and Trigant Burrow—"in order to discover if according to the results of their researches there was any relation between a reduction of sexual opportunity and the production or intensification of thought, reflection, and social energy. . . . We found that there was explicit, reliable evidence to this effect. Thus I suggested that the reduction of sexual opportunity was the cause of a cultural change"—that the reduction of sexual opportunity was the sought-for factor which, by intensifying thought, reflection, and social energy, was responsible for the difference between the deistic and the manistic condition and between the manistic and the zoistic.

We need hardly pause over the obvious fact that the steps taken to maintain a right relation with the power or powers in the universe, which Dr. Unwin has made his criterion of cultural condition, are a product of autistic thinking, devoid of any orientation to reality or reference to the Reality Principle. And this being so, it is not easy to see how the correlation between cultural condition in this sense and limitation of sexual opportunity, which the author has so ably demonstrated, substantiates "by a reference to cultural data" the suggestion of the analytical psychologists that "what we call 'civilization' has always been built up by compulsory sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires"; if it does substantiate it, then plainly we are equating with civilization the steps taken, in a qualitative and quantitative sense, to maintain a right relation with the

power or powers in the universe. In other words, establishing that the degree of post-funeral attention paid to the powerful dead is correlated in a surprising way with the enforcement of sacrifices in the gratification of innate desires is not the same thing as demonstrating that civilization has been built up by such sacrifices.

A more fundamental fallacy would seem to consist in this, that when Dr. Unwin deduces an increase of "thought and reflection" from increased memory of and tendance upon the powerful dead, and an increase of "mental energy" and "social energy" from increased effort in the direction of e.g. the erection of temples in their honor, what he is really talking about is unquestionably *anxiety*—the anxiety that is clearly implicit in the effort to maintain a right relation to the power or powers in the universe, and explicit in that "reaction against the strange quality in anything unusual or beyond comprehension" which Dr. Unwin calls the basis of all human culture and which consists in man's seeing in any unusual or uncomprehended phenomenon a peculiar and dangerous power, to be placated on the one hand or enlisted in his service on the other. Clearly this anxiety is of the sort that we often designate as the dread of losing love—to which the dread of aggression by an external power or authority is obviously tantamount. So what we actually have, as the outcome of Dr. Unwin's research, is this: the greater the limitation of pre-nuptial sexual opportunity, the greater the anxiety exhibited by the society enforcing such limitation; or, the greater the anxiety exhibited by a society, the greater the limitation of pre-nuptial sexual opportunity enforced by that society.

Is the anxiety the cause of the enforced continence, or is the enforced continence the cause of the anxiety? The answer might seem to be obvious enough: the anxiety is the cause of the enforced continence; the anxiety, the dread of an aggression by an external power or authority (the dread of which in the life of the individual we know to be later succeeded and to some extent replaced by dread of an internal authority, by a dread of conscience, that is, by a sense of guilt), impels the renunciation of instinctual gratification. But how account for the increased dread of an external power or authority (and/or of an internal authority) manifested by deistic societies as compared with manistic and by manistic societies as compared with zoistic, which thus leads to a progressive increase in the tendency among these societies to demand pre-nuptial con-

tinence? The answer, in the absence of any definite evidence *pro* or *con,* must be purely conjectural, and must rest on an appeal to a proposition which, as Freud has said, is peculiar to psychoanalysis and alien to ordinary ways of thinking. The psychoanalytic conclusion to which I refer is that not only is instinctual renunciation the result of conscience (originally, dread of external authority—dread of the loss of its love and/or fear of its punishment), but, also, conscience is the result of instinctual renunciation; in the words of Freud, "every fresh abandonment of gratification increases the severity and intolerance of conscience"—this severity, there is clinical evidence to show, being derived both from the continuation of the punitive energy belonging to external authority, preserved within the mind, and from aggressive energy originating in the self as a reaction to the thwarting of instinctual gratification by external authority, an energy not permitted outward expression against this inhibitory authority and therefore necessarily turned inward. In a word, renunciation (originally imposed by a dread of external authority, by the dread of losing love, the fear of punishment, the need to maintain a right relation, etc.) gives rise to conscience (by the internalization of renunciation-imposing authority), which then demands further renunciations. At all events, the fomulation, "every fresh abandonment of instinctual gratification increases the severity of conscience" would seem to fit Dr. Unwin's data, indicating as these do that a tendency to demand complete pre-nuptial continence increases *pari passu* with a heightened anxiety in regard to maintaining a right relation with the powers in the universe as evidenced by first the extension of the recipients of offerings from the living to the dead and second the progressive development of the cult of the dead in point of both duration and elaborateness. However conjectural this explanation of the phenomena described must remain, it is at least as applicable to them as the psychological mechanism which Dr. Unwin has adduced to account for them.

As for the demand for pre-nuptial continence, which it is my impression Dr. Unwin treats as though it were something irreducible, incapable of further analysis, not only does this continence constitute an instinctual renunciation, as is self-evident, but its enforcement by the *vox populi* (as compared with the partial to complete absence of such a demand) represents an infliction upon the adolescents of the rigor of the superego of their elders, to at

least a partial extent expressive, one may suppose, of the castrative intent of which initiation ceremonies are so undoubted an expression—at least, if one may hazard that the demand for pre-nuptial continence (as concerns the male) is an extension forwards to the time of marriage of that demand for continence during the actual period of initiation which is often so characteristic a feature of this rite, both demands being, after all, an extension and generalization of the incest taboo.

It is noticeable that whereas, with reference to limitation of pre-nuptial sexual opportunity, the three groups of societies defined by the author form a continuous series, this is true, with reference to post-funeral attention to the dead, only of the manistic and deistic groups; between these and the zoistic group there is a discontinuity in that the latter did not remember the dead at all—that is, they did not continue to make to the powerful dead (as did manistic and deistic peoples) the payments which they made to the powerful living, as for example to the magician, and/or the offerings which they made direct to the power in the universe. ("The American Indian who made a payment to a living man for the help of a magic 'bundle' was acting from the same motive as his brother who placed an offering before a *wakan* stone or before *wakan* in the sun. In each case the help of the power in the universe was being acknowledged or requested. Moreover, the character of the offerings made direct to the power in the universe was identical with that of the payments made to living men"; although the author omits to say that numerous offerings made to the power in the universe represent beyond any doubt a symbolic self-castration. "The identification by zoistic societies of the payment to a living magician and an offering to the power in the universe", the author continues, "has been obscured only because we have called the former a payment and the latter a 'sacrifice'. . . . The meaning of the Banks' Island *oloolo* shows clearly what I mean. It was applied both to payments made to living magicians and to offerings made to the power of the universe. . . . It denoted money paid for any exertion of supernormal power, whether the power was exerted by a stone, rock, animal, or living man".) So with the appearance of a demand for irregular or occasional pre-nuptial continence, in place of complete pre-nuptial sexual freedom, there appeared an extension of the payments made to the powerful living to payments to the powerful dead; "whereas zoistic societies only

make payments to a magician when he is alive, manistic societies continue to make payments to him after he is dead". Possibly, however, this is less of a discontinuity than at first sight it appears. For to the corpse, at any rate, of the dead magician was paid in zoistic societies the same special regard as was paid him during life—and as was also paid to the corpse of "a suicide, a twin, or anyone whose manner of birth, life or death had been supernormal", and in whom, therefore, the power in the universe was manifest. As for the magician himself, he is "fundamentally merely a supernormal man"; he possesses, or is possessed by, the power in the universe—as certain native terms literally state; he has various attributes that identify him very clearly as a father-figure—among them the highly ambivalent attitude shown towards him, his capacity as cause and healer of sickness, as one who dispels and brings back love, as rain maker, as promoter of fertility, his frequent association with a snake, especially both as cause and as healer of disease (cf. also Æsculapius), his capacity, as Róheim has shown very fully, as castrator.* By all of Dr. Unwin's societies for which the evidence is indisputable the same word is used to designate the magic power wielded by the magician as is applied to something unusual or beyond comprehension and to the power in the universe—*mulungu, atua, wakan, orenda,* as the case may be; to which may be added, as mentioned by Dr. Wolters in his recent Notes on Pliny's Natural History, that this same power of the sorcerer and medicine-man was known to the Romans as *virtus*—a word which by reason of its first syllable needs no comment. At all events, we are hardly surprised to learn that in some societies on the death of a magician "his bones became literally bones of contention", that "when a man who had possessed *haze* died, every one was anxious to secure some part of his person in order to possess some of the magic power which was inherent in every part of it. Would-be wizards contended for the eyes, the toe-nails, and the bones". Nor need we hesitate to regard this behavior as an attenuated form of an original oral incorporation—a trend which is here

* For this reason we should like further light on the word *fahe-gehe,* the Tongan word for priest, which Mariner, quoted by Dr. Unwin, says is from a root which meant "to separate from". Mariner thought the word signified a man with "a peculiar or distinct sort of mind, or soul, differing from the generality of mankind". This may be true, but it sounds a suspiciously anagogic interpretation.

aim-inhibited, but which in the case of innumerable well-known rites from the Omophagia of the prehistoric Greeks to the Communion has retained the aim but changed by displacement its specific object. Indeed, there are numerous other points of contact between the magician and oral trends, as Róheim has fully brought out; but it may not be irrelevant to mention an interesting illustration which Dr. Unwin cites. According to his authority, Hadfield, who writes of the Loyalty Islanders, it seems to have been the privilege of the magician who controlled the sun to proclaim a cannibal feast whenever he wished; at least he was often suspected of causing a drought so that people would die of hunger and thus furnish food for a cannibal feast. But "in order to prevent him from creating too much sunshine, it was ordained that whenever he exercised the prerogative, he must kill and eat his own son"—as happens symbolically in numerous initiation rites, and as Kronos did literally, and also Zeus, and likewise Tantalus (whose punishment too was of an oral character). It is rather as though the content of this curious theology of the Loyalty Islanders were to the effect that, by the talion principle, the father must eat the son because the sons have (unconsciously) eaten the father and indeed have actually (by a return of the repressed from repression, and with the connivance of the repressor) done so in displaced form; yet it would also seem that the magician is made at the same time a son-figure in that, like Christ, he becomes a scapegoat for the sins of the people—for, clearly, his sacrifice of his son is a vicarious atonement for their cannibalistic outbreak.*

* This authorization of a cannibal feast turns out to be, as one had suspected, in all probability a fantasy—this despite the fact that the Loyalty Islanders eat their enemies fallen in battle, and occasionally, it is said, children. The actual passage in Mrs. Hadfield's volume (Among the Natives of the Loyalty Group) reads as follows:—

". . . To him who controlled the sun whose oppressive heat caused them so much discomfort and fatigue, and even burnt up their plantations, they were ever ready to impute all kinds of evil motives. They even insinuated sometimes that he was trying to cause a famine in the land, so that many people would die of hunger, and thus there would be more human flesh for food—it was one of the prerogatives of this functionary to proclaim a cannibal feast whenever he wished to do so. There were, however, certain rules and conditions to be observed by him. . . . For example, he would be obliged to sacrifice his own eldest son. [Cf. Exodus xxii, 29: . . . "The first-born of thy sons shalt thou give unto me".] This, the first victim, he would be obliged to have cut

I have but sampled here and there in the foregoing the factual and other wealth of Dr. Unwin's volume, having made no mention at all of numerous matters which receive interesting discussion at his hands. I have not touched, for example, upon the author's further valuable excursions into the linguistic field, wherein he shows that in all the zoistic societies that could be investigated from this standpoint and in some manistic societies the same word was used to denote the 'dead'—or rather, as the author thinks there is the strongest evidence for believing, the ghosts only of powerful or unusual men—as was applied to the thing unusual or beyond comprehension, to the power in the universe, and to the source of magic power. Above all, I have made no mention, even, of the author's panoramic survey of his sixteen civilized societies, from the Sumerians onwards, his four types of post-nuptial sexual regulations (modified monogamy, modified polygamy, absolute monogamy (which no society has found more then temporarily endurable), and absolute polygamy), and the cultural effects of these, whence it appears that no society has exhibited "creative" as well as "expansive" energy except following a prior period of absolute monogamy, with the (partial) exception of the Moors in Spain.

Following this final chapter of 105 pages are the Notes and References, no fewer than 715 in number, which in certain respects contain much of the meat of the book. The volume concludes with a bibliography of the eighty uncivilized societies, covering eighteen pages, and a very adequate index.

That the entire research has been conceived and executed under the impulsion of a libidinal organization which will be recognizable by every analyst is not the slightest detraction, needless to say, of a valuable and extremely provocative work.

HENRY ALDEN BUNKER

into a number of parts [Cf. Osiris, Dionysus, Orpheus, the son of Tantalus, and, symbolically in the dividing of his raiment by the centurions, Jesus], corresponding with the number of districts in his chief's dominion; each portion would then be dispatched by a special envoy (maca) accompanied by the following message: 'This is part of the body of my own son'. [One notes, of course, that these words are almost the same, and with essentially the same reference, as the words of the Mass: *Hic est corpus.*] *It was then understood that the people were free to slay and eat each other*" (*l.c.*, p. 112; italics the reviewer's)—or, we may add, as the Book of Common Prayer expresses it, "Take and eat this in remembrance . . . and feed on him in thy heart by faith, with thanksgiving".

EMOTIONS AND BODILY CHANGES. A Survey of Literature on Psychosomatic Interrelationships. By H. Flanders Dunbar. New York: Columbia University Press, 1935. 595 p.

The wide applicability of psychoanalysis to the study of human behavior, normal or diseased, is in no small measure due to the sound biological foundation on which the science was established. The discovery of the rôle of instinct in psychic representations, and the furnishing of the key to interpretation, placed psychoanalysis in the vanguard of psychology. The degree of penetration made possible by such an instrument has naturally led, along with the rest, to exploration into the more rarefied ramifications of psychic life. The shift in this direction, and away from contact with the physical sciences, was fostered by the hostility of other medical disciplines, which urged the analyst to push rapidly ahead in a field that he could consider exclusively his own. There has on the other hand been a danger that analysis, due to this tendency, might become cut off from the main body of scientific progress to the detriment of both. Interchange of ideas between analysts and other groups of investigators has always been going on, but the time is now ripe for something more systematic through which somatic and psychological medicine can clear knowledge which will be of interest to both. A distinct contribution to the much needed liaison is Dr. Dunbar's book.

It is made up of two major divisions, text and selected bibliography. The text comprises digests and excerpts from the literature, together with a summary suggesting the significance of this material for therapy and further research. The bibliography is composed entirely of references, 2,251 in all. The material has been carefully sifted, and the author explains that extensive bibliographies were excluded, since they were to be found by following the references given. In the text each reference has the year of publication and number corresponding to the bibliographical list in the second section. In addition, both author index and subject index are cross-referenced with text and bibliography. The book is therefore not only valuable as giving a birdseye view of the whole subject when read entirely through, but has permanent value as a manual on psychosomatic relationships for reference use.

The subject of the first part of the book is Orientation and Methodology. The first chapter on Integration and Differentiation is one of the most interesting, and can be read simply for

itself, apart from the rest of the book. In it, the author by means of digests develops the "organismal" point of view. In place of worn out formulations of the mind-body problem through psychophysical parallelism, purely mechanistic or predominatingly idealistic concepts of the organism, one finds, aided by the skillful arrangement of material, a thoroughly modern viewpoint.

Contributions to this fundamental concept as it relates not only to the organism, but also to organism-environment interrelationships are gleaned from the fields of neuroanatomy, neuropathology, physiology, constitutional medicine, psychiatry, and psychoanalysis. Examples of this are Coghill's conclusions regarding the "intrinsic dynamics of the organism as a whole", Meyer's "psychobiology", Bleuler's formulations of the "psychoid", and Von Monakow's and Mourgue's "hormétères" and "noöhormétères". In summarizing Freud's contribution, the author writes: "Psychoanalysis affords a transition from the material contributed by the so-called pure scientists to the observations recorded by clinicians. To psychoanalysis we owe our first consistent picture of personality structure and functioning in terms of psychic mechanisms involved. To psychoanalysis we owe also a consistent well-defined method for investigation of the psyche. . . . At the present time it is difficult to say to what extent the development of our psychosomatic concepts is due to Freud's early discoveries. In his early works, concerned primarily with conversion hysteria, speculation concerning psychosomatic phenomena was for the first time replaced by scientific observations." And again, such headings as *Weltanschauung,* Cosmic and Geographic Conditions, and The Group, will give a further idea of the breadth of viewpoint considered.

The second chapter, entitled Acute and Chronic Illness, sketches the "organic bias" and the "psychic bias", and develops further the concept of psychosomatic unity (organismal point of view) as it applies more narrowly to the problem of illness. In this latter connection internists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts (Ferenczi, Groddeck, F. Deutsch) are quoted. The general medical or surgical practitioner or the specialist will find considerable light thrown on the archaic modes of thought generally used in dealing with the emotional factors operative in disease and its treatment.

The third chapter will be of particular interest to the investigator of psychosomatic relationships, because it deals with the problem of measuring emotions by instruments of precision. A critical

evaluation of results obtained with the psychogalvanometer, the advantages of the cardiotachometer and its usefulness for continuous measurement, X-ray, and biochemical methods are discussed. Common fallacies in the evaluation of results are pointed out, and the need of developing methods for "measurements of changes expressed in terms analogous to the 'second derivative' in mathematics" is suggested as offering a clue.

The second part of the book is made up of twelve chapters reviewing systematically pertinent literature on the psychosomatic functions of the various organ systems. This portion is largely given over to recorded observations and contains a minimum of speculation and theory. The medical or surgical specialist who has not time or inclination to read more than relates to his particular subject will find that by reading the one chapter and following its ramifications through the bibliographical section he can gain a concise impression of the present status of psychosomatic medicine in that particular field. It is enlightening to discover the paucity of reliable information in the general literature on emotional factors in, for instance, an organ of such outstanding psychological importance as the eye.

Special mention should be made of the chapter on cardiovascular disease, which contains presentation most significant for the psychosomatic problem as a whole. The heart is taken as a particularly good example of the indissoluble unity between soma and psyche. Fahrenkamp epitomizes this in his book, *Der Herzkranke:* "Fundamentally there are no purely mental diseases and no purely somatic diseases. *Immer begegnen wir einem lebendigen Geschehen in einem lebendigen Organismus, dessen Lebendigkeit eben darin besteht, dass er Seelisches und Körperliches als eine Einheit in sich vereinigt (Groddeck-Mohr).*" For this reason many clinicians are abandoning the distinction between organic heart conditions and cardiovascular neuroses. A neurosis may become structuralized to a degree that makes the reaction no longer reversible, i.e., it becomes what is commonly spoken of as an organic disease. Fatal cases of angina pectoris on the other hand often show surprisingly little at autopsy. In this chapter, on the basis of material cited, the rationale of cardiovascular therapy: preventive, curative, and palliative is summarized; it cites on the one hand Fahrenkamp's recognition of the value of psychoanalysis as a method of investigation in heart disease, and on the other its contraindications as a

method of therapy in certain serious cases, where resistances arising during treatment might lead to lethal issue. This is reminiscent of the problem which confronts the analyst also in the treatment of certain psychoses.

The third part of the text contains two short chapters. The first on Therapeutic Considerations summarizes material contained throughout the text and explains concisely the psychodynamic basis of therapy, physical and psychological, which will be particularly valuable for the general medical man and specialist, so few of whom have any clear concept of the scientific basis of psychotherapy, applied either consciously or unconsciously. The author's conclusions are worth quoting: "If we now, reviewing the literature surveyed, inquire into what has been the consistent clinical practice of physicians who have contributed most to the problem of the practical handling of psychosomatic interaction, we find in the first place that they have worked when possible with psychoanalysis, and in the second place, that their use of the psychotherapeutic techniques just listed has been in the perspective of psychoanalytic knowledge. This seems at first strange, in that the medical man is more familiar with the older methods, and more physicians have employed them. The reason for this, however, is that psychoanalysis is the one therapeutic technique which rests on definite knowledge of the mechanisms involved. Furthermore, other methods are more effective when used in the perspective of psychoanalysis, just as drugs and physiotherapy are more effective when used in the light of an understanding of the physical mechanisms involved. Finally, the analytically trained are better equipped to control the personality factor."

In the Conclusion, the author states that the time for a textbook on psychosomatic relationships has not come, perhaps never will come, as much of the material belongs with general medicine and should, increasingly, become an integral part of its literature. She rightly points out that by physiological and neurophysiological research alone we can merely increase our knowledge of physiological mechanisms. That so many organic changes are preceded by psychic and emotional changes demonstrates the importance of laying more stress on the psychological as the starting point. The reader is reminded that throughout the text the material presented offers suggestions for research. Especial emphasis is laid on the need of parallel physiological and psychological investigation over

prolonged periods of time gradually to fill the great gaps in our present knowledge. That psychoanalysis forms the most important instrument in our psychological armamentarium has been emphasized throughout the text and the literature quoted.

The book concludes with the following remark: "At the outset, the field of psychosomatic interrelationships was presented as a borderline problem between specialties. It has been pointed out, however, that this is much more than a borderline problem; it is the kernel and focus of all medical knowledge and practice."

The impression of essential unity which one gets from a complete reading of the entire text is noteworthy. The author has successfully avoided the danger of amassing interesting facts without perspective or of theorizing from a few. A purely eclectic presentation lacks the necessary focus, whereas the focus in this monograph is evident. This is not only brought about by most careful arrangement of the material, but by a thorough psychodynamic orientation leading back to its biological foundation. There is no attempt to compromise with other medical disciplines on the one hand, or with a popular or semipopular appeal on the other. The chief emphasis is on collected data, though there is no neglect of the philosophical basis which is fundamental for a comprehensive grasp.

Both general medicine and psychoanalysis owe thanks to Dr. Dunbar for having fashioned into one orderly volume a key to what is known and not known of psychosomatic relationships. One of the chief purposes of this work, which is spsnored by the Josiah Macy, Jr., Foundation, has been to clear the ground for more systematic research on interrelations vital to investigators in all branches of medicine, analytic and nonanalytic. As quoted by the author, Freud rightly demands that the analyst "resist the temptation to play with endocrinology and the autonomic nervous system, when the important thing is to grasp psychological facts psychologically". This should not, however, be taken as a warning against keeping one's self informed of methods and discoveries which can stimulate the analyst to coöperate with other investigators at the very point at which analysis had its origin, the psychophysical expression of instinct. Both analyst and investigator in the biological sciences have their special methods of approaching two aspects of what is actually the same problem, the parts of which, however, can never be put together until each group recog-

nizes the complementary segment held by the other. A striking example of this is quoted from W. Reich: "It is interesting, from the historical point of view, that whereas physiologists consistently opposed a psychogenic theory of the neuroses and sought in vain for their somatic basis, the medical *psychologist* Freud discovered the 'somatic kernel of the neurosis'."

GEORGE E. DANIELS (NEW YORK)

STAMMERING AND ALLIED DISORDERS. By C. S. Bluemel, M.A., M.D., F.A.C.P., M.R.C.S.(Eng.). New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935. vi+182 p.

The various current theories which have been promulgated to explain stammering, may be roughly divided into five groups, viz.: (1) Neurological (a disturbance of brain dominance); (2) Weak or absent visualization; (3) Auditory amnesia; (4) Psychoanalytic (a pregenital neurosis); (5) Partial or intermittent inhibition of the conditioned reflex of speech. It is to the last of these theories that the present volume is devoted.

According to the author, stammering may be divided into primary and secondary types. In the primary stammering of childhood, there is an increased susceptibility to speech disturbance because the conditioned reflex of speech has not become firmly fixed and therefore is immature and vulnerable. It is this vulnerability which produces inhibition from illness or emotional shock; this frustrates the conditioned reflex of speech thus producing stammering. Secondary stammering is the later period of sequelæ, an emotional conditioning in which the anxiety produced by association or associative inhibition has a selective influence upon words, letters, persons and situations. This latter viewpoint is open to serious objections. The conditioned inhibition with its selective influence on isolated words or letters is not physiological but is unconsciously motivated or the blocking of speech may be related to some phase or factor in the pregenital organization. Furthermore, in this discussion on primary and secondary stammering, both are referred to as if they were preëminently conditioned speech defects, whereas, on the contrary, as pointed out by the reviewer (in this QUARTERLY II), the beginnings of stammering in childhood are not of a psychoneurotic nature.

In order to reënforce his theory, the author prefaces it by a general discussion of conditioned reflexes, particularly as related to

language and speech. He considers speech as a fixed conditioned reflex and words as essentially conditioned signals by which thoughts and feelings are expressed. This conditioned reflex of speech is subject to inhibition and it is this inhibition which produces stammering. Such an assumption is very questionable, for in its broadest aspects, speech is a far more complicated mechanism than a mere conditioned reflex. It involves an anatomical substratum, a physiological reaction and a psychological mechanism. The latter is particularly evident in what may be termed the "internal language", as many of the studies in aphasia have demonstrated.

It is very doubtful if the inhibition of speech can produce stammering. Any such theory naturally opens up the entire concept of inhibition, which has not been completely clarified. There seems to be a confusion of symptom and inhibition in the author's approach to the question. The former is an indication of a disease process; the latter is an expression of functional limitation of the ego and certainly stammering has far deeper determinants than this latter.

In his earlier theory stammering was interpreted as due to a transient auditory amnesia; this particular mental process is now interpreted as associated with the psychological component of inhibition. Consequently, the author feels that this earlier theory is now clarified by the introduction of the "term" inhibition (the word *term* is the author's). This clarification is accomplished, not by an analysis of the deeper determinants of stammering, but merely by a shift in terminology. Furthermore, the impression is given as though there was only one single dominant conditioned reflex, whereas in fact there are several very complicated ones.

The author then enters into a discussion of some of the various theories of stammering. He rightly emphasizes that fear is not a primary cause of stammering but a secondary reaction. The reviewer had already pointed out in a previous publication that this causative fear has been emphasized to too great an extent; what is termed fear in stammerers is essentially an ego anxiety against being overwhelmed by the infantile libidinal past, that is, a resistance against sudden discharges of the repressed oral erotism.

The author is also very doubtful that stammering results from a conflict between the two hemispheres of the brain, a theory based

on the belief that left-handedness is common among stammerers and that stammering results when a left-handed child is compelled to use the right hand. With this viewpoint the reviewer is in complete agreement.

Of the various interpretations of stammering, psychoanalysis alone has penetrated the deeper determinants of the disorder in the total personality. While other theories are given a complete discussion in this volume, psychoanalysis is dealt with very briefly and in the bibliography appended to the book there is no reference to the literature on the subject.

In the treatment of stammering the reviewer is in agreement with the opinion of the author that the usual procedures of speech training are futile. In the treatment outlined in this volume, what is termed the neurophysiology of speech is emphasized, the therapeutic expedient being directed towards establishing a normal conditioned reflex of speech and so fortifying it, that stimulus and conditioned reflex may occur simultaneously. The details given, however, seem to be nothing but a variant of speech training, a procedure which the author has already criticized but which he now refers to as relieving inhibition. The unconditioning method described is likewise a form of speech training. Thus, so far as the therapy of stammering is concerned, the unconditioning and the strengthening of the conditioned reflex are but variants of the many phonetic exercises which from time immemorial have been used in the treatment of stammering. In contradistinction to this, psychoanalysis has not only opened up new vistas on the psychogenesis of stammering but has also developed a radical change in therapy. It regards the speech defect as symptomatic, emphasizing entirely the character traits and pregenital drives.

Of course such cases are very difficult to treat, not because of the inhibition of the conditioned reflex of speech but solely because of the narcissism of the stammerer and the dominance of his ego by pregenital activities. Some of the clinical data given in this volume could be clarified by the psychoanalytic approach. For instance, "baby talk" is not an inadequacy of the conditioned responses as claimed, but can be interpreted as a regression to early libido strivings. It is also a common observation that stammerers talk more easily to their mothers, not because they become conditioned to certain persons but on the contrary, because the stam-

merer finds unconscious oral gratification in the presence of his mother. Stammering rarely has its onset in adult life, not from any inhibition of a vulnerable conditioned reflex, but on the contrary, as it is in childhood that the pregenital organization exerts its most powerful force. On the whole, the volume represents a serious attempt to understand one of the most widely spread neuroses. Its chief defect lies in the absence of any endeavor to determine the character traits and the fixation of the stammerer on early libidinal activities; it is this defect which is responsible for the type of speech training therapy advocated.

ISADOR H. CORIAT (BOSTON)

MENTAL HEALTH. Its Principles and Practice. By Frank E. Howard, Ph.D., and Frederick L. Patry, Ph.D. New York: Harper Brothers, 1935. 546 p.

Dr. Howard is Professor of Education and Psychology at Middlebury College, and Dr. Patry is psychiatrist with the State Education Department, University of New York. This book, therefore, is a collaboration by psychology and psychiatry toward the common end—mental hygiene. From this alliance is brought together an enormous amount of theoretical and applied knowledge on the subject from the fields of psychology, biology, sociology, psychiatry and philosophy. Although the publishers have constructed a volume of moderate size, it is nevertheless in content a rather formidable work, with 540 closely written pages and innumerable charts, outlines, classifications and diagrams. Evidently the book has been prepared primarily for workers in the field of mental hygiene, and it is rightly claimed that such persons should avoid too great specialization and should bring sound and broadly based scientific and philosophical points of view to bear upon their subject.

Although not definitely stated, it may be assumed that Dr. Howard is the author of the first and more theoretical half of the work, and that Dr. Patry is responsible for the remainder. This second part is a comprehensive psychiatric treatise on mental deviations of the functional type, with special emphasis on problems of childhood and adolescence. The first part of the book reflects the classroom rather than the clinical field. Outlines, summaries and paragraph headings follow the conventional textbook pattern. Extensive bibliographies and a series of questions bearing on the text follow each chapter.

The second and clinical section begins with an elaborate presentation of the objective psycho-biology (Ergasiology) of Adolf Meyer, Dr. Patry's teacher and inspiration. This attempt by one of the world's leading psychiatrists to establish a basic and objective biological science of human personality deserves a wider audience than has ever been reached through purely technical channels. So far as the reviewer knows, there is nowhere else in the literature any such systematic setting forth of the Meyerian doctrine as is accomplished by Dr. Patry. It must be admitted that this makes heavy going for the average reader and is perhaps quite beyond useful comprehension by those not otherwise trained in this special approach. The following quotation, for example, must give pause to the most courageous:—"Thus ergasiology obligates us to grasp the essentials of physiology, biochemistry, physics, anatomy, general biology, neurology, sociology, mathematics, logic, philosophy and the factual contributions of psychology."

There follows a discussion of mental ill-health and methods of treatment, and the classification and clinical approach that have been taught by Dr. Meyer are closely adhered to. Well organized case material with histories, progress, notes, correspondence and so on, are included. This furnishes a profitable glimpse behind the scenes of the psychiatric clinic and gives a refreshing concreteness to counteract any oppression experienced from the bewilderment of theory which precedes.

Such a painstaking and all inclusive work by two men of high standing in their respective fields must be an important addition to the literature on mental hygiene. It seems, however, a fair criticism to say that the work suffers from superabundance and that quality is often overshadowed by quantity. There is so much brought together from all sources that the text lacks those unitary concepts helpful for clear thinking. One feels that the authors have left the reader to do much condensing which they might better have done themselves. Psychoanalysis is referred to frequently in a friendly fashion and with careful avoidance of many common misinterpretations. At the same time, those influenced in their thought by the Freudian teaching will be dissatisfied with the absence from the book of those dynamic concepts which psychoanalytic investigation has made possible.

This book has an unusual personal quality. Should these two able men give a systematic course in their subject, it would make

an excellent text. For general reading, and for use by other teachers, the book as it stands will be less satisfactory.

MARTIN W. PECK (BOSTON)

ASYLUM. By William Seabrook. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1935. 263 p.

The author, a well-known writer and an adventuresome traveler in remote countries, who was committed voluntarily to a high grade hospital on account of chronic alcoholism, tells the story of his seven months' sojourn. A vivid picture of the modern institutional management and treatment of mental disorder is presented. At the same time the patient-author, with his facile pen, spins a lively yarn of the humor, pathos and adventure within the restricted realm of hospital life. On the whole the book is fair and friendly. The light touch makes good reading, and a little banter at the expense of the psychiatrists will hurt no one.

MARTIN W. PECK (BOSTON)

KEEPING A SOUND MIND. By John J. B. Morgan. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934.

This well-meant book is "offered as a basal textbook for courses in mental hygiene" in colleges. It is based on the belief "that it is just about as easy to form the beneficial habits as it is to fall victim to the detrimental habits, if the person involved can be given a clear conception of their relative significance". Thus the prevention and cure of mental disturbances becomes quite simple. "It takes the work of the laboratory psychologist to formulate the principles of mental life and the clinical work of the psychiatrist . . . to show how the failure to apply the principles of mental health results in mental disease." The book purports to give the hygienic rules of the game. All the individual need do to avoid mental disturbances, including even the psychoses, is to follow these rules. They are: to achieve independence, not deceive yourself, bring your unconscious attitudes to awareness, keep your mental conflicts wholesome, master fear, avoid regression, and similar excellent but impracticable rules, surely born more of the library than of the clinic. The unconscious is acknowledged but represented as of no great importance, and as more or less easily accessible and changeable by the individual himself, if he cares to

face it. Thus the chief forces of the psychic life are damned with faint mention and the book thereby becomes little more than an intellectual exercise. The naïve concept of personality, the unconscious, the psychoneuroses and the psychoses, is a decidedly misleading oversimplification and a misrepresentation of modern psychiatric knowledge. The responsibility for mental disorders is thrown entirely upon the patient and the possibilities and indications for help are not even discussed. This is one of those very academic psychology books, with questions at the end of each chapter (Outline the procedure for choosing a vocation, etc.), sufficiently superficial to help discourage and misdirect any serious interest a student might have in the problems of mental life.

LEON J. SAUL (CHICAGO)

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

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Current Psychoanalytic Literature

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PAUL SCHILDER:	Psycho-analysis of Space.
C. P. OBERNDORF:	The Genesis of the Feeling of Unreality.
MELITTA SCHMIDEBERG:	Reassurance as a Means of Analytic Technique.
MARIE BONAPARTE:	Passivity, Masochism and Femininity.
R. LOEWENSTEIN:	Phallic Passivity in Men.
SYBILLE YATES:	Some Aspects of Time Difficulties and their Relation to Music.
PAUL SCHILDER & DAVID WECHSLER:	What Do Children Know about the Interior of the Body?

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Eugénie Sokolnicka (1884–1934).

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NOTES

THE FIRST TWO CHAPTERS of Freud's Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety are the initial instalment of a new English translation by Henry Alden Bunker of *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst,* first published in 1925 by the Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. Dr. Bunker's translation will appear serially in the QUARTERLY, and will be reprinted later as a monograph in the Psychoanalytic Quarterly Library series, published in association with W. W. Norton and Company.

THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE offers the following courses during the second trimester:

A. Micro-Analysis of Dreams by Dr. Sandor Rado (eight lectures).——Seminar for Advanced Case Study by Dr. Sandor Rado (eight sessions).

B. Case Seminar by Dr. Herman Nunberg, guest of the Institute (twenty sessions). The presentation of case material in this seminar will resemble the presentation of material in the course of a control analysis. The seminar will be open to members of the Society and to those students in training who have been admitted to practical work with cases.

C. A seminar on Special Technical Procedure in Special Analytical Situations by Dr. Sandor Lorand. (Details to be announced later on.)

D. A course of eight seminars on Psycho-Somatic Problems by Dr. Lawrence S. Kubie in collaboration with the following physicians as guests: Dr. Paul Dozier (N. Y. Neurological Institute) on The Phenomena of Cerebral Dominance in Relation to Speech and Language Mechanisms (Nov. 8); with Dr. Paul Dozier on The Phenomena of Cerebral Dominance in Relation to Special Motor Skills and Disabilities (Dec. 6); with Dr. Richard Brickner (N. Y. Neurological Institute) on Cortical Relationships to Emotional and Vegetative Disturbances (Jan. 3); with Dr. Harold Wolff (Cornell Univ. Medical School) on Neuro-Humoral Mechanisms (Feb. 7); with Dr. Dickinson W. Richards (Presbyterian Hospital) on Respiratory Physiology (Mar. 6); with Dr. Alexander B. Gutman (Presbyterian Hospital) on Calcium and the Parathyroids (Apr. 3).

E. Seminar on Paranoia and Paranoid Mechanisms (History and Present Trends) by Dr. Dorian Feigenbaum, in eight sessions: 1. Projection. Theoretical Aspects. Differential points in psychoses, neuroses, dream-life and normal behavior. 2. The Schreber case. 3. The Schreber case, continued. Supplementary material from the Autobiography, with special reference to "hypergnosis", schizophrenic, correct and creative thinking. 4. Depersonalization, hypochondria, and projection in the light of Victor Tausk's work "On the Origin of the 'Influencing Machine' in Schizophrenia". 5. (a) Analsadism and Superego—structure underlying the paranoidal delusion. Compulsion neurosis, depression and paranoid mechanisms. (b) Jealousy: mechanisms and clinical manifestations. Delusional

(paranoidal) and normal jealousy. 6. Critical survey of the post-Schreber literature on paranoia (1912–1935). 7. (a) Critical survey of the post-Schreber literature on paranoia (1912–1935), continued. (b) Cure of paranoia (case illustration). 8. Paranoid formations and their social implications: (a) The Paranoid Character; (b) the Paranoid Criminal; (c) the Paranoid Character and genius (illustration: Lermontov).

THE BOSTON PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE announces the following seminars and courses for the first semester of the academic year: (1) Clinical seminars, by Dr. Hanns Sachs (two seminars on alternate Monday evenings throughout the year—(a) a group control in which one case will be followed throughout the year; (b) presentation of case material by members of seminar group).—(2) Principles of Psychoanalytic Technic, by Dr. Ives Hendrick (eight sessions).—(3) The Psychoanalytic Theories of Instinct, by Dr. Ives Hendrick (eight sessions).—(4) Seminar on Freud's Case Histories, by Dr. Isador H. Coriat (six sessions).—(5) Problems of Adolescence, by Dr. John Murray (six sessions).—(6) Seminar on Psychoanalytic Psychiatry, by Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman (twelve sessions).—(7) Seminar on Dream Interpretation, by Dr. M. Ralph Kaufman (ten sessions).—(8) Problems in the Psychoanalysis of Children, by Dr. Eric Homburger (eight sessions).

THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will hold its mid-winter meeting on December 28th at the Hotel Statler, in Boston, Mass. The scientific program consists of papers by Drs. Isador H. Coriat (Humor and Hypomania), Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Migraine), Helene Deutsch (The Omission of Grief), Catherine L. Bacon (Envy of the Mother and the Wish to Take From Her), Karl Menninger (Psychoanalytic Aspects of Some Gynecological Disorders), and John A. P. Millet (A Case of Compulsive Masturbation).

THE INSTITUTE FOR SOCIAL EDUCATION of Los Angeles announces a course on Psychoanalysis and its Uses by Dr. Ernst Simmel during November and December, and a series of lectures on The Future of Mental Hygiene by Dr. Frankwood E. Williams.

THE EDITORS note with deep regret the death of Dr. George H. Kirby, formerly director of the Psychiatric Institute of the State of New York and professor of psychiatry in the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University. A man of vast experience in clinical psychiatry, though not an analyst himself, Dr. Kirby became a staunch sympathizer and supporter of psychoanalysis, and lent the weight of his influence to the appreciation of its teachings among psychiatrists. Dr. Kirby died on August 11th at Wentworth-by-the-Sea, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.

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