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REFLECTIONS ON THE PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION

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In this widely-ranging essay I offer a few thoughts about the concept that aggression, whether or not it is linked to the death instinct, is a primary drive, one of the poles of the dual-instinct theory. This is a concept which may too readily lapse into the state of comfortable assumption or even dogma. My approach to it is largely empirical, and deliberately naïve and, for the most part, is not based on the fundamental explanatory theory itself. I address myself rather to the phenomena which may give rise to theory.[1]

I view the phenomenon of aggression, and its psychological functions and representations, as the aggregate of diverse acts, having diverse origins, and bound together, sometimes loosely, by the nature of their impact on objects rather than by a demonstrably common and unitary drive. In psychic development, the indispensable components of wish, intention, or purpose are secondarily assimilated to the consequences. This does not mean that certain elements of aggression do not have an instinctual origin or affiliation; nor do I deny the existence of a latent drive to die (pragmatically considered), even if my view of such a drive and its relationship to aggression differs from that proposed by Freud.

Some writers, such as Bibring *(8)* and Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein *(54)*, have tended to examine the explanatory adequacy of Freud's theory more thoroughly than its empirically

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[1] Some of my suggestions in this paper may have previously been made by others. If so, I gladly yield priority. I do not attempt to summarize the work in this vast field, nor to review its literature, in either text or bibliography.

derived soundness, although they have explicitly recognized the importance of the latter. Moreover, the question of the death instinct or the polarity of Eros and Thanatos is often placed beyond psychoanalytic examination as a theory of the second order, as a biological or philosophical construct, as a dual biological tendency, or as a regulatory principle of the psyche to be set apart from the study and discussion of instinctual drives as such. This is even true of Waelder *(89)* whose critique of the theory of aggression is essentially empirical. In contrast to such methodological strictness, Federn in The Reality of the Death-Drive *(25)* sought to demonstrate the death instinct largely by the phenomenology of true melancholia—unconvincingly, but with imaginative grandeur and intuitiveness. Federn mentioned the tendency of analysts to ascribe the death instinct theory to Freud's entry into old age, as well as the delay due to Adler's original emphasis on aggression in 1908 (see also, Hitschmann *[57]*).

In my view, the explanatory value of a theory, its parsimony, and allied considerations, are only half the problem. Theory must also be adequately rooted in empirical observation and proximal inferences. Without this we could end up, for example, with certain theological principles which could comprehend and explain all observable phenomena. Bernfeld *(7)* remarks on the too-great convenience of 'physiognomic' classification of phenomena, and thus of conflict, as one of the undesirable by-products of the then new theory of the death instinct, substituting broad instinctual configurations for detailed psychoanalytic data.

One may object to the way Freud's theory of the death instinct has been intellectually 'kicked upstairs'. Freud took the Eros-Thanatos polarity seriously, explained important clinical and social phenomena by it *(43)*, and thought that revision of the basic concept of psychic conflict in this light might be in order *(45)*. It seems to me that when he described Eros and Thanatos, Freud may have had in mind their actual instinctual representatives rather than certain remote biological or even

philosophical principles. Brenner *(13)* has pointed out that the theory of the death instinct fulfilled for Freud what he had insistently sought—a source for a theory of instinctual drives originating in a discipline outside psychoanalysis (but see, Bernfeld *[7]*). However, in Freud's later thought it seems that the concept of primary aggression was inextricably bound to the idea of the death instinct, or primary masochism. Hence, it is imperative that we continue to examine the death instinct.

Bernfeld *(7)* notes that the difficulties of consideration of the nature of instinct were acknowledged several hundred years ago, and that modern biologists continue to be troubled by it *(4, 17, 73)*. But for practical purposes the definitions given by Freud and reiterated by him with some variations and amplifications from 1915 *(34)* until 1938 *(46)* are entirely adequate. In the Outline, Freud says: 'The forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are called *instincts*. They represent the somatic demands upon the mind. Though they are the ultimate cause of all activity, they are of a conservative nature; the state, whatever it may be, which an organism has reached gives rise to a tendency to re-establish that state so soon as it has been abandoned.' He continues '. . . we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, *Eros* and *the destructive instinct*'. He then equates the destructive instinct with the death instinct by way of its final aim 'to lead what is living into an inorganic state' *(46,* p. 148*)*. The essential questions, in my view, refer to the presumed inborn, primarily somatic origin of the urge, its spontaneous and continuing pressure, its seeking an object for its own purposes of discharge of tension, and the nature of its basic aim, in so far as these are demonstrable.

Human aggression has much in common with aggression in other species, yet in many respects it is distinct and unique. It is made so not only by facts of physical anthropology and neurophysiology but also by derived, yet autonomously powerful, factors originating in human social organizations. The relative stereotypy that characterizes much of the instinctual behavior

of animals does not characterize that of the human being; man's behavior, even when it palpably originates in 'drives', is of great range and variety—a fact which contributes to the growing preference for the term 'drive' rather than 'instinct'. Beres *(6)* has discussed these distinctions. Hartmann *(52)* pointed out that the ego in man bears a selective and directing relation to behavior which, to a great extent, is fixed by instinctual patterns in other species. The complexity of human behavior is determined by the obvious and far-reaching importance of the complex structure and functions of the human cerebral cortex; by the role of the hands; by the functions of speech and language; and, in my view, by the explicitly cultural but practically universal purposive use of fire *(84)*.

Aggression ranges far in psychoanalytic thought. It may include manifest bodily or verbal action; conscious or unconscious wishes and tensions; a specific qualitative type of psychic energy; and the final broad and inclusive idea of the death instinct,—Thanatos, whose struggle with Eros putatively determines all the manifest phenomenology of life. The idea of the death instinct is a much later development in psychoanalysis than that of the libido, and many who follow Freud closely in other respects do not do so with regard to the death instinct. But among the distinguished proponents of this view of the origin and nature of aggression are Federn *(25)*, Nunberg *(70)*, and Weiss *(90)*.

Aggression unquestionably exists and is only rarely ambiguous. However, it is less clearly demonstrable in its assigned position as a primary instinct than is the sexual instinct, at least in man; this is so whether it is studied as the death instinct or in its manifest, externally directed form. Aggression has no specific anatomico-physiological apparatus devoted exclusively or even primarily to its specific purposes, and there is no conclusive evidence of a universally occurring and discrete pattern of spontaneous urgency in aggression. It does not evidence one of the most important criteria for instinctual drives stated by Freud in 1915,—operation as a constant force *(34)*. Further-

more, the range and variety of processes which may be subsumed under the concept 'aggression', whether from the point of view of perpetrator or object, exceed the variety of processes that are subsumed under sex, or libido. (This opinion, of course, is contrary to some views of aggression as relatively fixed and rigid *[79]*.) There are varying degrees and varying forms of aggression: for instance, when a hoodlum shoots an enemy, when an overprotective mother refuses to allow her child to go swimming with his peers, when an inveterate Don Juan accomplishes habitual, loveless seductions, or when a person deliberately omits to greet an acquaintance. This great range and scope of expression, including the phenomenon of omission, also is found in the basic and original physical prototypes of aggression, although it is not self-evident that they are of a common derivation.

In our initial considerations, let us set aside the more remote psychic representations of aggression, its presumed role as a special form of psychic energy, the problem of the repetition compulsion, the theoretical role of aggression in the mechanisms of defense *(53)*, and the more intricate problem of self-directed aggression, to deal with the nuclear elements of the concept.

What do we mean by the word 'aggression', which we use so freely and frequently in psychoanalysis? In the Oxford dictionary, the definition emphasizes attack and the initiation of hostilities in the sense of the military paradigm. The Glossary recently published by the American Psychoanalytic Association *(69)*, generalizes the meaning, gives some suggestion of its variety of expressions, and places it in the dynamic psychoanalytic context. What Freud meant is not always unambiguous. In his earlier formulation of general conflict,—i.e., the ego instincts as opposed to the sexual instincts *(34)*—, the instinct of self-preservation included various separable grades or categories of impulse, including modalities of aggression. The participation of aggression in the manifestations of the sexual instinct, subject

to excessive development at times, was recognized very early by Freud *(29, 30)*. The shift of the function of self-preservation to the broad canopy of Eros was a major change *(37)*, although this function was still allocated to the ego. Later, aggression was separated from its original, largely instrumental place in the ego instincts and moved to a place of psychic origin in the id *(46)* as a separate primal instinct. In 1940, Loewenstein *(65)* offered a penetrating critique of the new theory and also made some suggestions to bring order to the new conceptual confusion. Certainly this structural transposition would require a better integrated and more coherent meaning for the psychoanalytic term and concept, aggression, than is now available. In his paper of 1924 on masochism, for example, Freud speaks of 'the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to power' *(40,* p. 163*)*. In 1937, in connection with the death instinct, he speaks of the instinct of aggression or of destruction, according to its aims *(45)*. These are not inevitably congruent ideas; they are not necessarily serial ideas, although this may be the case; as alternatives, they may diverge widely.

The presumptive factor that would permit linkage of such concepts as death, destruction, and the instinct for mastery would lie in the phenomenon of fusion, requiring varying degrees of admixture of libido *(39)*. However, as Waelder *(89)* points out, the impulse to master would be an inevitable part of ego function, whether or not derived from the putative instinct of destruction. Hendrick *(55, 56)* described a separate instinct to master as one of the 'ego instincts'. The Oxford dictionary notes an obsolete meaning of the word, aggress: 'to approach, march forward'. Greenacre uses this derivation, 'a *going at* or *towards,* an *approaching*' *(50,* p. 578), in relation to the pseudopodal activities of unicellular organisms, incidental to discussion of the embryonic precursors of aggression. One also notes this meaning in the sense that we think of aggression as one type of approach to an object, whether the object be in the outer world or in the self *(80)*. This, of course, is unequivocally opposite to flight, whether from fear or aversion. Flight, nearly

always a potential organismic alternative to aggression, finds little place in most theories of aggression, at least since the latter was detached from the function of self-preservation and placed in opposition to it.

Deliberately, habitually, or inadvertently we use the term, aggression, in psychoanalysis to cover the entire gamut of intentional or purposive harm[2] to the object, ranging from the inflicting of pain or humiliation to death or annihilation. I omit the benign meanings of aggression as we do not refer to them in our work except in specifying or implying sublimation, neutralization, fusion, or an allied mechanism. While such meanings are important, their relation to the central concept is no less unclear than that of mastery or the will to power. Elements in benign aggression (somatic or psychic) may be identical with those present in the destructive form, and may indeed have a common origin, but it is the specific impact on objects, and the evolution of such an impact as motivation, that gives rise to the ultimate and important distinction.

The idea of death as the final abolition of instinctual tension became central in Freud's later theory. Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein *(54)* mention that 'it has been said' that the aim of aggression is the total destruction of objects, animate or inanimate, subject to restriction; but they feel that the question of these aims cannot at this time be answered and do not feel that an answer is essential. They prefer to classify the aims according to the degree of discharge of aggressive tension which they allow and according to the means utilized in discharge. This seems to imply the primary assumption of the existence of a special form of psychic energy, presumably aggression, without intrinsic aim.[3] The doubt about empirical or logical support for such a concept underlies many of the considerations summarized below.

[2] I prefer this simple, inclusive, yet unambiguous English word to more technical ones. Buss *(15)*, for example, speaks of noxious stimuli; he also sets aside the problem of intent in a strictly behavioral approach.

[3] Brenner *(13)* has a different comment on this passage.

Certainly to inflict pain is a clear, outstanding, and unequivocal aggression in the mind of the young child. He learns this through his own experiences of pain, and he learns of his capacity to inflict pain by accidental or experimental behavior, for example biting himself or others.[4] Allied to pain in its ordinary sense are deprivation experiences such as suffocation, hunger, or thirst, enduring cold or wetness, or sheer aloneness. This negative aspect of the perpetration of suffering, this 'not doing' is a characteristic early parental aggression associated with power, and is in striking contrast to the violent aggression, or aggressive impulse, of infantile helplessness. And finally, we know that the emergence in the child's development of object love as something different from the simple need for satisfaction provides a whole new system of vulnerability to aggression.

Adults, whether aggressors or victims, know that aggressive actions often cause pain, loss of bodily integrity, or death, and that these are often closely interrelated or integrated. Does knowledge of this potential integration influence the original conceptual development of each component of the aggressive complex? We cannot assume that it does, unless we suppose that the primary aggressive drive is associated in the infant with some sort of innate awareness of these consequences, and their potential integration.

The conventional representation of the peak effect or purpose of aggression is death of the object. One may conceivably prefer to disgrace, dishonor, humiliate, or torture another individual or his loved ones, thus causing a result 'worse than death'. Yet to kill remains the continuing general conception of the ultimate aggression toward an object. I stress this because the very concept, to kill, has multiple origins, facets, and relations to the lesser aggressions, usually forgotten in adult semantics.

The fear of pain has an obvious basis in experience. Freud, who took nothing important for granted, sought to understand

[4] Hoffer *(58)* notes how seldom infants bite their own hands. I assume that this is a result of experience rather than a primary tendency. Also, see Spock *(83)* regarding early control of aggression.

the fear of death, calling attention to the fact that it is a remarkable instance of the fear of something that has no place in previous subjective experience. His suggestion (omitting the more complex reference to the ego-superego system) was that the prototypic basis is the experience of separation from objects and that fear of death is allied to the fear of castration in its broadest sense (*39*, pp. 58-59). Aside from the possible occurrence of extreme suffering in the process of dying, there are objective elements that contribute to the sophisticated dread of death: the 'passivity', 'vulnerability', 'helplessness' of the cadaver; the phenomenon of decomposition, including the presence of foul odors; the banishment of the cadaver by burial, fire, or more attenuated processes, paralleling the psychological disappearance from family, friends, and the living environment in general.

If we accept death in the sense of its biological finality for the victim, as the ultimate result of aggression, the question of the primitive motivation to kill and the immediate and remote meanings of the impulse are not clear and unitary. An oral incorporative urge, if it could be consummated, would mean destruction of the object without the slightest awareness in the infant of implications of death or killing. Even with gradually progressive awareness of what such incorporation must mean in physical terms, its real meaning to the object as empathically perceived by the subject would be long delayed. To a child or an adult, to kill may mean to remove or conclusively incapacitate another individual who is a rival or impediment in getting something urgently needed; or, similarly, to take from him in a definitive way what the attacker urgently wants; or conversely, to prevent permanently a similar attack upon the attacker. What is urgently needed may be air, water, food, territory, or a love object. One kills (in these hypothetically pure instances) in the service of a pressing or essential purpose. How one kills, and the consequences for the victim, may be unimportant (except as to efficiency of the method) or may be matters of intense guilt or anguished concern. Under primitive conditions, in

criminal behavior, or in the accepted conventions of tribal or national warfare, killing may be regarded as a realistic implementation of need—an ego function, so to speak—and the best way of protecting or advancing the interests of the individual or group.

Other important adult motivations for killing range from the complicated impulse toward vengeance (socially expressed in the *lex talionis),* through considerations of honor (for instance, the reaction to certain types of insults or other humiliations), to the desperate reaction to anxiety induced by the object (such as extreme castration fear). In contrast to these are, for example, an honest impulse to euthanasia in the presence of extreme and hopeless suffering, the obligatory killing of the soldier, or the professional killing of a criminal by an official executioner.

Let us now consider aggression in which the *object* of hopeless passion is killed instead of the *rival.* The mother is originally the person who decides whether her own love is to be given (for example in the form of bodily care of the child) or withheld; in this way she is herself the 'owner' of the object, and thus equivalent to a rival long before the father comes into his unique position in the phallic phase.[5] In the fantasy of active, especially murderous, rape, there is a regressed and dim though genuine adumbration of the œdipal striving, even though the differences are, of course, great. When the love object is dead, all hope of gratification is at an end save in fantasy. There is a kind of mastery in rendering the love object dead that lends itself to fantasies of permanent possession through incorporation, necrophilia, or more complicated acts of the imagination, which may be an important motive for killing. The loved one who is dead cannot turn away from the lover. No doubt the *Anlage* of this attitude lies in the oral phase. Freud reiterated this view of early 'erotic mastery' in 1920. 'During the oral stage of organization of the libido, the act of obtaining

[5] In this connection, note Bak's remarks in the Panel Discussion of 1956 *(72).*

erotic mastery over an object coincides with that object's destruction; later, the sadistic instinct separates off, and finally, at the stage of genital primacy, it takes on, for the purposes of reproduction, the function of overpowering the sexual object to the extent necessary for carrying out the sexual act. It might indeed be said that the sadism which has been forced out of the ego has pointed the way for the libidinal components of the sexual instinct, and that these follow after it to the object' *(37,* p. 54*)*.

Thus far we have viewed the impulse to kill largely in its adult or proto-adult significance—the impulse as it includes a relatively organized and reality-syntonic conception of death. It is important, therefore, to recall that the linguistic concept 'to kill', and to some extent the imagery it evokes, may readily be assimilated by earlier impulses and wishes that have no relation to the actual words or concept. Of course, under certain circumstances there may ultimately be genuine congruence instead of superimposition. To cause to vanish, to be nonexistent, readily finds expression in a death wish. Such a wish may be temporary and remain so even in adult consciousness, entirely apart from the sense of inappropriateness or the reproach of the conscience.

The earliest visual, auditory, and tactile impressions of absence are profoundly and poignantly related to the mother. The child, who is utterly incapable of a meaningful death wish, may fail to recognize his mother when she returns after a long absence; his oversimplified formula is 'If you are going to go away too long, don't come back!'. We may suppose that a negative hallucinatory satisfaction is achieved here, based on the experience that things can vanish and perhaps related to oral incorporative fantasies. This exclusion of painful situations or persons from consciousness is a not infrequent phenomenon in the adult patient; at times it is referred to as a 'psychological killing'.

Destruction and annihilation can apply to the inanimate, and thus are conceptually independent of a death instinct or of an impulse to kill. The dependence of life itself on destructiveness

—both in the inanimate sphere and in relation to living organisms—lends itself all too readily to paradox and *reductio ad absurdum* in relation to the dual instinct theory. However, the idea of the destructive energies in the service of the instinct of self-preservation (or Eros), by way of the devouring impulse, yet subject to regression to intestinal hatred, is given serious and challenging form in Simmel's 1944 paper *(81)*. The fundamental and concrete position of the oral urges in the concepts of destruction, annihilation, and death should be emphasized. Especially notable is the holistic quality of the oral urge; in it the life-preservative necessities, as well as aggression and libido, are tightly integrated. The oral-gastric sphere maintains a place of basic importance in mimetic expression, even in contrasting emotions, as noted by Darwin *(20)*.

It is important to mention the problem of modes of killing as expressions of the 'principle of multiple function' *(88)*. I have in mind the frequent importance of specific infantile motivations in adult aggression. Bernfeld, in his methodological essay of 1935 *(7)*, suggested that practically all instinctual manifestations, if classified by the 'psychoanalytic' criterion as opposed to the 'physiognomic' criterion, would show important connections with the erogenous zones. Choice of methods of killing such as poisoning, incendiarism, explosion, drowning, hanging, strangling, or defenestration may have important specific infantile and symbolic meanings as well as important aggressive motivations of specific genetic origin. The same elements are also important in suicide.

A radically different category of killing is the activity of a hunter who must kill animals for food. He does what the beast of prey does except that his activity is a conglomerate of all his ego functions in the service of his need for food, instead of a relatively stereotyped, largely hereditary series of sensory and muscular responses. Indeed, even with regard to these stereotyped responses we must bear in mind that Elsa, the lioness, had to be coached back into the 'frame of mind' and movements necessary for making her kill, so attached was she to the feed-

ing by her human foster parents *(1)*. In contrast to killing for food, winning or putting to flight has an important place in the animal kingdom, often ritualized and mutually accepted—for example, in sexual competition or in the all-important territorial conflicts that characterize certain species *(2, 24, 66, 91)*. This is also extremely important in human activities, even in war, where the concession of defeat usually ends physical conflict. It may well be that the exterminations that occurred in early human warfare were as often a result of appropriate ego functioning, in a primitive context, as of unbridled instinctual drive. Man recognized that the killed opponent does not challenge again. A similar phenomenon can occur as an expression of revenge, hatred, or psychopathological cruelty or destructiveness. As I mentioned, flight has been neglected as a subject for study. It is always an alternative to combat within a species or among different species, and this fact is in itself an a priori difficulty in the concept of a primary destructive drive.

We must also recognize that fighting itself has been regarded as an instinct. Surely, such a view is at least as reasonable as the view that death or destruction are in themselves instinctive primary goals. If one studies the behavior of schoolboys, as Bovet did *(10)*, one might establish such a conviction. But such fighting often serves a purpose and is likely to be reactive; moreover, it is in part a discharge of surplus sexual, especially homosexual, energy. For these reasons such a proposition seems dubious. Social requirements or sanctions are also important factors. I do not doubt that fighting as such provides important functional musculoskeletal pleasure; it involves certain combat patterns with strong phylogenetic background *(17, 19)*, or relief in the discharge of genetically determined and displaced hostilities, or pleasure in the secondary gain of applause and admiration *(10, 23)*. Athletics, like the aggressive play of animals *(75)*, provide similar functional pleasure with the additional incentives of winning, and of spontaneous admiration. Among certain primitive people *(68)* the actual waging of war for no significant territorial purpose becomes a sort of game

with minimal, yet sometimes lethal, casualties, short battles, and continuing hostility toward the enemy tribe. One may speculate that besides the individual functional pleasure of combat and the spontaneous general esteem for fighting prowess, there may be a nonexplicit or unconscious social purpose. Both primitive and more advanced peoples may need to keep alive the skills and high prestige of the warrior lest this ultimate form of decision-making elude the powers of the people should a critical need arise.

AGGRESSION AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE

Since human social structure has a decisive role in defining aggression and in administering it, some discussion of its relevant aspects is in order. I shall state without elaboration what I regard as certain salient and relevant features of the general topic.

1. In return for its physical protection of the individual, the State in effect arrogates to itself the exclusive right to physical violence as well as the exclusive right to punish the individual for transgressions in this sphere. Furthermore, it retains the right to conscript the individual for combat in its armed services when the governing agencies deem it necessary.

2. In becoming relatively pacific in everyday life, the individual delegates to the State, whether or not he is aware of it or actively wishes it, the protection or aggrandizement of his economic opportunity and certain primitive aspects of his narcissism, matters to which much of his energy would have been devoted in his 'brutish' past. With this, he similarly delegates to the State the primitive morality that once governed his behavior and continues to govern the behavior of states: the killing in warfare, spying, intrigue, dissimulation, and allied activities. These he may resume only in the service of the State and in case of war he may be forced to do so. A certain degree of psychopathology, reflected in national (i.e., official) attitudes, invites participation by the average relatively healthy individual in a sense not readily condoned in relation to other individuals.

From the primitive magical attitudes of the head-hunter to the relatively sophisticated rationalized, grandiose, or paranoid attitudes of modern states *(23, 79),* such tendencies may play a major motivating, facilitating, or overdetermining role in the initiation of war. The role of these facts in the mental life of the average citizen remains somewhat obscure and has been insufficiently studied.

3. While the prevailing social organization, be it a tribal or national state, is an outgrowth of human needs and conflicts, it becomes vis-à-vis the individual a dynamic external fact of his existence. The chauvinist or active pacifist cannot alone initiate or terminate the waging of war; this is a matter of governmental decision. Officers of government, although varying importantly in individual reaction, are themselves largely bound by the obligations of office and the forces of history. 'The king is the slave of history' (Tolstoi *[86,* p. 565*]*). While some individuals love battle, there are probably millions who fight only because they must, under legal or psychological coercion. Thus aggression can be obligatory, and the majority of men are happy to lay down their arms when allowed to do so.

4. The terrifying nuclear stockpiles are evidence of the growth of wealth and scientific manpower in the superstates, products of the same *Zeitgeist* that produced prodigious advances in benign areas of human technology. While their threat is a perennial and horrible emergency, and must be dealt with as such by appropriate and immediate methods, they are not, any more than the historical repetitiveness of war itself, evidences of innate destructiveness. Rather they are evidences of (a), the transition of the belligerent functions from the pitiful individual to the endlessly resourceful superstate; and (b), the persistence of nationalism as the last viable stronghold of primitive narcissism.

AGGRESSION AND NARCISSISM

Aggression may be construed as a pure accumulation of a special type of psychic energy without intrinsic direction (a 'scalar'

as G. S. Klein put it *[61]*). In becoming functional it must have a target, whether it be the subject's own ego (or self), or an external object, or the ego's projection. The phenomenon of narcissism, the lever for externalization of aggression, is thus critically important. It contributes decisively to the sense of differentiation of the self from the outer world and later,—in its balance and interaction with object love—, to the modes, directions, and degrees of externally directed aggression. In the second phase of Freud's dual instinct theory, beginning with the introduction of the concept of narcissism *(33)*, narcissism was thought of as the libidinal aspect of egoism, a concept that left its trace in a later (rare) usage: 'ego instincts and object instincts' *(41)*. In 1915 Freud emphasized the priority of indifference or hatred toward the outer world in the earliest neonatal period, with libido developing later, in its connection with crucial self-preservative phenomena *(34)*. Most striking and well-defined in this connection is the function of feeding in which physiologic need is obvious and the patterns that we designate as libidinal and aggressive respectively are clearly immanent. Indeed the infant's need for sucking will speedily demonstrate itself, strikingly when the nutrient flows too quickly to give him sufficient sucking time.

Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein *(54)*, in an effort to reconstruct speculatively the earliest provocation of aggression, invoke Freud's assumption that the neonate tends to project all discomforts and tensions to the outer world and to assign all gratification or pleasure to the self. In the evolution of infantile narcissism, the ego ideal is one of the acceptable repositories for surplus libido. In group formation this may be externalized in the person of the leader *(38)*. In any case, subject to the vicissitudes of individual human development, there is a persistent underlying feeling in the human individual—perhaps only latent, yet of remarkable range of intensity—that the self and its acknowledged extensions are a priori good and lovable and that others are bad, the objects of suspicion and potentially the natural objects of violent attack, especially if they create

tensions or fail to gratify. This feeling is, of course, largely mitigated by the development of object love, by autonomous ego functions especially in the perceptual sphere, and by the development of the superego. However, the fundamental role of this attitude in human psychology is not thereby uprooted, whether its manifestations be in the 'stranger anxiety' of infants *(82)* or the universal though variable xenophobia of adult individuals and groups.

We may reasonably assume that the process of being born represents a radical change in organismic economy in every sphere, even though the neonate is presumed to be biologically prepared for such change at term. This preparedness and the usually gradual transition from the uterus to the outer world *(48)* presumably combine to establish extrauterine viability. Still, the process of being born is a critical test for the neonate as well as the mother. The first moments of emergence from the birth canal produce gross environmental changes, including the substitution of an 'air and hands environment' for mucous membrane and physiologic fluids; usually unstable or at least inexact temperature-matching; a flood of shifting light-stimuli and sound-stimuli, and, most conspicuously, the need to breathe. This, with the germane first cry, must occasion a massive and unique flood of sensory stimuli. The occasional uncertainty as to whether an apparently healthy newborn will breathe indicates the delicate balance in which the claim of intra-uterine modes of adaptation and the necessities of extrauterine life are suspended. But certainly one may assume that infantile drive is at this point unitary and global whether expressed in motor activity, such as respiration, or in manifestly passive need.

The critical self-preservative requirements for air, water, food, and protection from cold are integral with the germane libidinal needs and with potential aggression. These are more critically urgent than the need for handling, body contact, warmth, odors, and the oral stimulation of sucking. Deficiency in these latter needs, however, can cause very serious disturbances and possibly contribute to the fatal outcome of various

infantile disorders *(78)*. Assuming the availability of the critical necessities, which substitute for those delivered automatically through the umbilical cord,[6] the striving also is to achieve as nearly as possible the gratifications of the stable and undisturbing amniotic milieu in the extrauterine environment. In this connection the various bodily contacts involved in the maternal care of the infant are important. However, lung aeration and respiratory gratification must be supplied by the infant himself. Proximity to the object may at times be an impediment: for example, when the nose gets buried in the breast. Pleasure in free movement is assuredly the infant's own initiative, if not impeded from the outside. Withdrawal into sleep, away from the congeries of external stimuli, is his own act although it can be pleasantly facilitated from the outside by rocking and lullabies, and is usually dependent on the precondition of adequate feeding. The infant can touch his own body; he can from the very beginning suck his thumb. (It is said that an occasional infant is born with thumb in mouth: indeed, it has been stated that thumb-sucking can occur *in utero [58]*.) It is certain that there are infants who show a primary inclination to reject the breast, so great is the attachment to an earlier 'way of life' *(64)*.

The wish to sleep, to withdraw from the maternal object before nursing, to reproduce by an antiphysiological tour de force an imitation of intra-uterine life, represents a tendency that is far from identical with a drive to die but does closely resemble and suggest such a drive. If not met with countermeasures, whether in infancy or in its resurgence in later years, it can bring about death. In this sense, it can be construed as an aggressive parallel to narcissism, perhaps to some degree a merger with it: the 'primary masochism' of Freud's later constructions *(40)*. When a biological hesitation to institute breathing occurs, one may at least speculate that the physiologic *Anlage* of the same attitude is involved. The panicky search for air in the case

[6] Many years ago a gifted patient with a severe oral-narcissistic neurosis had a fragmentary dream: a baby with a placenta in place of a head.

of external impediment, possibly with convulsive movements, or the hyperpneic effort that may occur if there has been excessive delay, must then represent the countervailing and saving aggressive impulse and, at the same time, the libidinal gratification of filling the lungs with air. Primitive efforts to avoid forced occlusion due to excessive bodily proximity may represent the extension of the same urge in direct connection with the mother's body. Note the later motor expressions of 'againstness' described by Greenacre *(50)*. The mother, of course, provides the gratifying and later reassuring smells of intimate bodily contact. These join the general stream of exogenous libidinal gratification.[7] In a sense, then, the vital function of respiration has in it the seeds of a dynamic narcissism and demonstrable aggression, and is conspicuously independent of the first object. In this context, I employ the concept 'narcissism' in an objective dynamic sense, including but extending beyond the idea of libidinal, purely psychic energy invested in the ego. This is similar to Greenacre's usage in certain of her contributions *(48)*. One can speculate that it is the earliest prototype of aggressive riddance of the object,—as distinguished from affirmative maturational and libidinal strivings toward the nonmaternal environment—, of the interest in 'open space', of 'room to breathe', of 'elbow room'. (Perhaps also one aspect of *Lebensraum*?).

[7] The traditional use of pungent smelling salts against fainting suggests the importance of respiratory-olfactory stimulation in establishing or restoring consciousness. No doubt the first postnatal inspiration is in itself a powerful stimulant. However, there is probably considerable individual variation here: smelling salts may operate chiefly as a repetition of this primordial stimulus, the first respiration; or they may be effective because they are like olfactory perceptions of the mother's body. In this connection, see Marcovitz's interesting contribution on addiction to cigarettes *(67)*.

Worthy of at least brief mention is the phenomenology of the epileptic convulsion with its profound disturbance of consciousness, frequent disturbance of respiration, traditional cry, primitive motor discharge, and at times, more elaborate motor automatisms. (See Freud's paper on Dostoevski *[42]*, and numerous other psychoanalytic contributions on epilepsy.) At a higher level of integration, closer to 'normality', but still a regressive ephemeral bid for narcissistic-aggressive omnipotence, is the tantrum of childhood *(47)*. Even more strikingly relevant is the sometimes equivalent phenomenon of breath-holding *(59)*.

The second great focal need, for food and water, can be met only from the outside, by the mother or her proxy. Here a different and more complex system of drives and proto-fantasies must be postulated for the understanding of subsequent development. In so far as the ministering person is at first not reacted to as separate from the self, the facts of occasional total separation and the frequent focal (oral) separations are reacted to as if they were castrations and indeed probably constitute the essential substratum for the decisive castration complex. If we assume that the infant has a strong narcissistic-aggressive predisposition and episodic or chronic deprivation is a significant trauma, he will have an urgent need to bring about a situation as close as possible to the prehistoric intra-uterine state,—that is, to restore once more the original unity. One can only speculate on the protopsychic processes involved in such urges. It may be assumed that striving toward oral incorporation of the object or part-object is latent or potential in these urges, or emerges from them. With the advent of teeth and growing awareness of the capacity to destroy food for more efficient ingestion, the primary destruction of the object becomes allied to the incorporative fantasy and with it, as an intermediate step, there is awareness of the capacity to cause pain (sadism and its inhibitions).[8] It should be noted, however, such fantasies reach their peak long before they are connected with the idea of death. Finally, by a complicated circular route, the destructive or annihilatory fantasy constitutes a fulfilment of a latent original urge to reject the object as an outside and separate entity. Thus narcissism, in its evident biological corollaries, is linked with aggression that includes in its ultimate form the impulse to destroy the object.

The narcissistic principle in human social organization and its relation to aggression have certain remote extensions which are connected with narcissistic object choice. Besides the functional, traditional, and legal ties that maintain the family as

[8] See Freud's pithy summary of 'erotic mastery' in the oral phase, quoted above.

the basic continuing group, the sense of physical resemblance and awareness of consanguinity are important in facilitating the first social displacement from relinquished individual narcissism. Intrafamilial hatreds, based essentially on sibling or œdipal rivalry, are originally of unparalleled intensity. But the cultural tendency is to displace manifest aggression outward, concentrically, to persons increasingly remote from the line of kinship or its complex psychic substitutes. Ultimately the violent forms of aggression become the exclusive prerogatives of the national state with which the individual is identified.

The sense of common national identity operates as a further extension of narcissism with aggression directed toward alien aggregates. Even within the nation there are innumerable peace-time group adherences which individuals require and use in the struggle to recapture lost narcissism. These carry with them varying degrees of hostility toward other groups. Freud's 'narcissism of small differences' *(38)*, however, has been largely submerged or lost in this century of homogenized mass communications and pyramiding armaments of great nation-states.

A countervailing consideration is the latent regressive tendency toward revival of murderous intrafamilial aggression. Civil wars, especially in nations homogenous as to language and race, are often noteworthy for their fratricidal ferocity. Also great revolutions appear to unleash a tendency to wanton vengeful slaughter, sometimes followed by the recrudescence of intense nationalism or even imperialism. The tension between internecine war and war with the foreigner sometimes seeks a combined target. In the Western world, the Jew of the Diaspora provides the ideal scapegoat in his identity as a citizen who can readily be viewed as alien. Thus he is especially liable to mass expulsion or slaughter. Those whose racial difference is more conspicuous, for example, the Negro, are more frequently subjected to chronic oppression and segregation than liquidation.

Except for such regressions, the tendency is to move the narcissistic barrier farther and farther from the self. To kill an

animal for food is not conventionally held to be an aggression except by vegetarians. Vegetarianism, however, is not widespread. Most men prefer to eat an animal, one somewhat like themselves, but not too close in resemblance or in the sense of emotional ties. This is connected with the taboo on incest by way of the totem feast *(32)*. Incest remains taboo, but miscegenation is also the subject of mild and variable, although diminishing, taboo.

There is a dialectical relationship between the immunities granted by kinship and the intense hostilities provoked by the prolonged intimacies of early life in the family. The former is allied to group narcissism and aggression, the latter to the proverbial 'wolf-like' relationship of man to man. However, it must be noted that in the present stage of organic and geologic evolution man is the only creature who can seriously and immediately rival his fellow man for the good things of the earth and therefore challenge him to the only conflict regarded as decisive. This principle, I think, must be added to the principle of 'domestication' stated by Von Bertalanffy *(87)* wherein the lack of interspecific danger permits the doubtful luxury of intraspecific murder:—war.

If thus far no evidence has demonstrated or supported the existence of a primary (i.e., unmotivated, noninstrumental) destructive or lethal drive, this cannot be offered as proof that such underlying drive or drives do not exist. Even when the aggressive activity seems clearly instrumental, it may still remain true that such putative drives in some subtle way motivate or facilitate these activities or the selection of aggressive techniques. We cannot, however, infer this solely from the phenomena for the aggression is often appropriate in its own context of technology and morality. Federn, who sought to demonstrate the reality of the death instinct *(25)*, set aside striking examples of impulsive childhood aggression,—for instance, the sudden killing of a small moving animal—, as nondemonstrative of primary aggression because these examples have other possible motivations. It remains necessary at least to examine certain im-

mediately relevant aspects of known human instinctual life itself in the further effort to understand the origin of aggression.

AGGRESSION AND HUMAN SEXUALITY

It is an interesting paradox that the sexual life of the human adult is the activity which most nearly resembles primitive combat between human adversaries. The intrinsic nature of coitus is similar to combat, and the small child's conception of the primal scene is often fraught with frightening violence, although such impressions vary with age and individual circumstances. This concept of the child's often has defensive elements, yet it still testifies to the important mechanical and physiological resemblances that facilitate the widespread illusion of violence. (The defensive element has been emphasized by Gero *[71]*.)

Defloration frequently involves actual pain and bleeding. This passing token experience of suffering, and the actual lesion, can, of course, have far-reaching unconscious implications. The fact that the infliction or suffering of some degree of pain can be part of the pleasure of foreplay and the sexual act for many adults testifies to the integral relation of proto-aggressive behavior to the consummation of love. One may include the elements of grasping, bodily pressure, violent thrusting, often biting, which are not perceived as pain or discomfort at all under the circumstances. However, it is clear that the motive is to gain pleasure and (under reasonably healthy circumstances) to give the partner pleasure. The point at which the partner feels distress or pain rather than pleasure, or suffers injury other than defloration,—manifest to the perpetrator as directly due to his acts—, is the point at which aggression in the true functional sense occurs. If the active partner experiences sexual pleasure in his partner's pain or distress, the process is sadism in its original sense. Complementary reaction of the passive partner is masochism. These phenomena, even the intrinsic motor elements of coitus itself, are ordinarily accounted for by the fusion of the two great drives, libidinal and

aggressive. However, the situation suggests more strongly the old, but still valid, instrumental view of aggression proposed by Freud, or else a deep intrinsic relatedness, perhaps continuousness, between what later must be regarded as two separate drives. Such profound relationship or continuum would give way to dichotomy with the growth of object love, structure formation, and the increasing perceptual awareness of, and empathy with, the fact of untoward impact on the object.

The coital cruelty of other male animals can be much greater than that of the human; hence we cannot regard this behavior as a human psychological quirk. One may also note that while Freud and others, including Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein *(54)*, emphasized the relation of aggression to the muscular apparatus, little attention has been given to the instinctual importance of the muscular apparatus in coitus although it is of equal or greater frequency than intraspecific aggression, even in primitive man. Inspired by Freud's remarks in the discussion of Little Hans *(30,* pp. 140-141*)*, one might ask what would remain of sex as an instinct if there were no body, no musculature, no aggressive movement to implement it? The movements of harmful aggression are in general much less stereotyped than those of coitus, and are more closely allied to ego activity. Saintliness, expressed in the withholding or suppression of aggression along with affirmative acts and tendencies, is practically always accompanied by the renunciation of sex. Biologically, there is more than fragmentary evidence of a correlation between excess or lack of male gonadal hormones and corresponding fluctuations in pugnacity *(3)*. Without explicitly stating this, Durbin and Bowlby *(23)* quote Zuckerman regarding the 'battle royal' among male baboons for possession of the females, noting the shocking number of females killed in the process. The number seems far too great to be accounted for by accidents or mistakes. The submissive—sometimes masochistic—element in male homosexuality, at times overdetermined by reaction against violent aggression, is another striking link between two apparently opposing drives. Among animals this may take the stark and

somewhat ritualistic form of the mounting of the defeated male by the victor *(60)*. Lorenz *(66)* described the 'pestering' of the victor by a defeated baboon, which continued until the victor carried out a perfunctory mount. The same author, quoted by Peto *(74)*, stresses the importance among animals of the ritual transformations of aggression as a bond more powerful than the sexual alliance itself. A conspicuous example is the 'triumph ritual' of certain wild geese. Lorenz generalizes: 'Thus intraspecific aggression can certainly exist without its counterpart, love, but conversely, there is no love without aggression' *(66,* p. 217*)*.

It must be borne in mind that in man, whose prolonged infant-mother relationship is biologically obligatory, close bodily opposition,—a type of violent 'clinging'—, is an intrinsic element in coitus and also in the most primitive (weaponless) forms of combat. One may infer that both have an important relation to infantile experience and the urge toward its renewal,—that aspect of sexuality which, as Freud and others have emphasized, is 'in the service of reproduction'—, but, like the conjugation of primitive forms, has its own independent functions. Again, it is refreshing to refer to the discussion of Little Hans for an early insight of genius in this connection *(30,* p. 111*)*.

The idea of the female as the original victim of male attack or coercion, an attitude embodied in certain cultural taboos *(36)*, leads us to germane problems of infantile sexuality, culminating in the œdipus complex.

AGGRESSION AND THE ŒDIPUS COMPLEX

Whether or not there is a latent primary aggressive drive, the prolonged helpless state of human infancy may be viewed as especially conducive to the mobilization of aggression. Certainly the prolonged dependency on a maternal object provides an inevitable prototypic target. The devouring fantasies that are early diverted to the prey in nonhuman forms, can only surge toward the indispensable object. Whether the immediate instigations of aggression are the repeated states of frustration in the

broad and inclusive sense of Dollard and his co-workers *(22)*, or chronic and acute traumatic states of helplessness, cannot be said with certainty. My own conviction is that aggression arises in the drive to master actual or threatened traumatic helplessness. In this sense, the objective awareness and conception of death as the ultimate state of helplessness achieves a special and terrifying meaning to be considered with the formulation proposed by Freud. If we pass over other infantile solutions for helplessness, largely in the sphere of pathological omnipotent fantasy, an important and consistently available alternative solution is found in specifically aggressive tension and fantasy.

Sophocles's version of the tragedy of Œdipus contains certain hidden or peripheral elements usually regarded merely as necessary devices in the ingenious plot. Essentially these are the details of his mother's abandonment of the hero to his presumed death in an effort to circumvent the dreaded prophecies regarding his patricidal destiny, an abandonment about which the hero exclaims his horror on hearing of his mother's participation. The emphasis is not only on the psychic continuity from earliest anaclitic need through hopeless sexual love, mastered in fantasy by parricide, but on the cruel and specific experience of infantile helplessness in abandonment and the murderous destiny thereby initiated. (I take the liberty, in interpreting the plot, of reversing the causal relationship between the abandonment and the parricidal destiny.) That the mother is the latent object of such aggression seems implicit in Sophocles's tragedy, and accords with the usual genetic facts I have inferred from analytic experience with adults *(85*, pp. 13-14, n.*)*.

There is reason to believe that all children experience, in varying degrees and with variations dependent on sex, the travails of Œdipus, from at times feeling abandoned to die to the ultimate tragic triangle of love. The murderous thrust originally awakened in the earliest experiences of helplessness may provide an *Anlage* of hostility, rage, and aggression resembling 'drive'. However, this cannot be drive in the inborn, constant,

autochthonous sense of psychoanalytic usage. In the boy's displacement of raw, unneutralized aggression to the father, the libidinal impulse toward the mother may be freed of all aggression save that intrinsic in normal sexuality, i.e., compatible with the preservation and pleasure of the object. In reversing this displacement in a more complicated process, the girl accomplishes an essentially equivalent developmental tour de force.

AGGRESSION AND SUICIDE

So far as we know, suicide is confined to the human species and is a not infrequent mode of death. One may speculate that its limitation to man is connected with: (a), the severe human sanctions against outward violent aggression in everyday life; (b), the great range and variety of possible symbolic gratifications that may be required by the human individual (see Von Bertalanffy *[87]*); and (c), the highly developed human capacity for introjection and identification. Thus one is often impressed with the existence of two, sometimes three, participants in the suicidal tragedy: the self as such, the introjected early object (usually the mother), and an implacable superego. In the strange phenomenon, 'running amok' *(14, 18)*, the players may be externalized. However, the psychological content does not vitiate the dramatic fact of literal self-murder, of the co-existence in one organism of the impulses 'to kill' and 'to die' in an apparent unitary drive,—this despite the great variety of motivations for the act which can be demonstrated or inferred *(63)*. It is, of course, theoretically conceivable that such drive exists as a truly unitary phenomenon prior to the participant self- and object-representations. Furthermore, it is known that the violence of the superego does not necessarily derive from actual parental behavior; more often it derives its energy from the individual's own infantile aggression, presumably inhibited from external conveyance against the parents who stimulated it.

While more suggestive than any other single phenomenon in the great spectrum of self-punitive and self-destructive behavior,

suicide is not convincing evidence of the existence of a death instinct or of primary aggression. It must first be demonstrated: (a), that the infantile motivations including specific phase and erogenous zone conflicts (for example, the drinking of phenol or other painfully corrosive and destructive substances) and the functional importance of the self- and object-representations are, in fact, secondary; and (b), that the phenomenon, suicide, is truly a variant or elaboration of a universal tendency rather than a pathologic qualitative deviation from usual behavior.

PSYCHIC REPRESENTATIONS OF AGGRESSION

Certain literal experiential representations of aggression in the mind, not the concept of aggression as a distinctive form of psychic energy, may be briefly outlined.

1. In relation to both sex and aggression, hallucinatory gratifications,—using the term in its broadest sense—, are readily available, both in endogenous form and as externally presented. The latter are abundantly present in the mass entertainment media as well as in the theater of current history. Since aggression, in contradistinction to sex, has no specific physiological apparatus and constant urge requiring specific physiologic satisfaction, it is thought that the degree of vicarious satisfaction attainable in the purely mental sphere is correspondingly greater. In the case of sex, while stimulation is often pleasurable, the remainder of the cycle must be consummated on a physiological basis to provide adequate gratification. The contrast in the entertainment media between the traditional prevalence of stark violence and the rarity and fragmentary character of primal scene presentations must be noted, despite the current cultural revolution. The average healthy person may not kill at his own initiative, or even fight too frequently, but he can usually establish adequate outlets for his sexual urges as an adult. It is true that curiosity about the sexual scene involving others often persists, and in some there is the special wish to witness perverse activities. To these wishes, as well as the general *Zeitgeist* of sexual freedom, the current

trend in the cinema responds. However, all but the severely perverse will seek full satisfaction with living partners; and it is said that the current trend in cinema is beginning to evoke boredom in those segments of the general public most consistently exposed to it.

2. The myriad and various conscious executions and potential executions of aggression, including subtleties and nuances, and omissions of action, are held to be connected with persisting unconscious representations of primitive aggressive acts or omissions to act. A simple paradigm is the failure to greet a neighbor which may be bilaterally connected with literal 'cutting' in the unconscious, as suggested by the widespread colloquialism. A failure to act in an emergency of uncomplicated and unequivocal nature may constitute an act of murder. Except in rare perverse instances, sexual satisfaction cannot thus be obtained.

3. The external accidents of life can provide vicarious but important aggressive satisfactions, notably disease of the object, sudden death (for example, automobile or plane crashes), or economic disaster. Hostile wishes of this character, often directed toward intimate objects, provide abundant chronic or transient symptom-formations, largely anxious reactions directed against such wishes. *Schadenfreude* is a more nearly ego-syntonic and exceedingly widespread variant.

4. The analytic transference occasionally provides striking expression in certain personalities of the preponderance of early omnipotent hallucinatory solutions, obviating manifest aggression. For example, the analyst is already castrated; he is stupid; his voice has been heard through the door, in a high-pitched falsetto; he is obviously and manifestly effeminate. Thus competitive envy and aggression may, to some degree, be obviated. Except by displacement to real objects, or in autoplastic solutions, or in the sphere of germane aggressive or self-punitive fantasies, literally sexual elements cannot be manipulated to fantasy consummation without, for example, masturbation.

5. These facts may contribute to the principle that whereas

violent aggression has been largely delegated to the state, at least in an 'official' sense, sex has remained,—with certain ritual exceptions such as the *droit du seigneur* or the *ius primae noctis*—, the right and commitment of the individual.

AGGRESSION AS EGO FUNCTION

Waelder in his Critique of 1956 *(89)*, outlines various motivations and purposes of aggression, including those derived from the ego, for example, 'the mastery of the outside world', or 'the control of one's own body or mind'. In the Panel of 1956 *(72)*, with other provocative questions, he asked if aggression were an ego function. Having long held certain quasi-convictions in this direction, I believe that this question should not be avoided.

In Freud's early classification, the ego instincts, as opposed to the sexual instincts, included the instinct of self-preservation. Aggression was assumed to be an integral part of the self-preservative complex. One might have to fight to preserve one's life, or to get what was necessary to sustain it. Moreover both the aggressive implementation of sex and the integration of aggression in sexuality were recognized. Indeed, in the same year (1909) in which he spoke of the importance of hatred in obsessional neurosis *(31)*, Freud, in refuting Adler's point of view, spoke of the indispensability of aggression for the implementation of any or all instinctual urges *(30)*. The ego is the essential executive organ of the mind. In the sense that Hartmann has emphasized the importance of the human ego for the implementation of instinctual drives,—not only for defense against them—, as opposed to the stereotypes of traditionally conceived and literal instincts, one must still think of aggression as playing an important role in the system of ego functions. The variety and plasticity of aggressive movement, in relation to purpose, are striking, as compared with the relative stereotypes of coitus. Certainly the ego aspect holds true if one speaks, as Freud did, of the instinct for mastery, *Bemächtigungstrieb (40)*, as a manifestation of primary aggression—that is, if one does not quibble about the *trieb* part of the word. The impulse

to mastery is an integral part of even the most complex ego activity, even in solving a problem in calculus. The alliance of such concepts to aggression, in its broadest sense, is tenable. This extends even to ideas of work as implementations of instinctual need. Greenacre *(50)* and Anna Freud *(27)* speak of the aggressive sucking of the infant. Bell, in the 1956 Panel on The Theory of Aggression, mentioned the latent aggression involved in the infant's respiration *(72),* albeit in a nondestructive sense. Such conceptualizations are independent of the pragmatic consideration of harm to the object.

These functions are, of course, devoted to living. To ally work or mastery with impulses to destruction as such, or, in the sense of the death instinct, with killing or dying as such, requires the tour de force concept of fusion or a bold view, like Simmel's *(81),* in which the instinct of destruction (if we except regression) is placed directly in the service of the life instincts. A somewhat startling and imaginative conception is that of Weiss *(90)* who conceives of his *destrudo* as providing much of the energy for the ego functions but susceptible to being withdrawn, leaving these functions weakened as, for example, when the destructive energy invests the psychic representation of a trauma. Rosen *(72)* mentioned the problem implicit in the different terminological constructions of the concept, 'aggression', in the Panel of 1956. The problem persists and transcends the purely semantic, for such basic concepts as destruction as such and death (or killing) are not even approximately congruent ideas in their original and essential meanings.

In any case aggression in its broadest sense can implement complicated ego strategies, whether by persuasion, or shrewd bargaining, or killing, and also a variety of frankly instinctual needs in the sense that these can only be mediated by the ego. It is an important question whether mastery is a tamed version of the impulse to death or destruction (waiving the difference, for this question), or whether death or destruction appear as regressive variants, when mastery or gratification, or both, falter

or fail. Empirically, the latter seems more probable. For an infant to experience the impulse to chew up and swallow a frustrating or rejecting object may be his only conceivable representation of mastery. This is also true of his simple need for the ingestion of food. Such impulses are later assimilated to the developing conceptions of death, killing, and destruction. Then, later in development, when current and appropriate modes of mastery fail, the primitive modalities, with their implicit destructiveness, may reassert themselves. Waelder *(89)*, Fenichel *(26)*, and Reich *(77)* have expressed similar views in connection with the question of aggression and libido (i.e., the shift in preponderance and in maturity of impulse), Waelder and Fenichel in specific relation to the question of 'defusion'.

It is also worth while to consider certain intrinsic elements of aggression, as ordinarily construed, in their role as primitive ego functions. There is no doubt that behind the barriers erected by progressive ego development, by object love, by the superego, there persists in most human beings a primitive urge toward prompt, self-decided, and summary solution. A great segment of aggressive behavior represents primitive or, in the civilized adult, regressive instrumental or adaptive function which, in its place and time, can be appropriate and effective. In an undeveloped state, either ontogenetically or phylogenetically, the 'straight-line-shortest-distance' principle of Euclidean geometry finds humble and understandable representation in behavior. You want something? Grasp and take it. It adheres to someone else? Bite it off, rip it off, cut it off. Increase the force, if necessary. A person is in your way? Knock him down, or push or kick him out of the way. You want his 'kill' or his woman? Stun him with a blow. The woman resists? Hit her on the head, pick her up, and carry her off. You are hungry: kill, tear off a piece, put it in your mouth. And so on, endlessly. That this tendency persists, often in highly developed adults, is easily verified, subject of course to the restrictions of object love and structural conflict. When frustrated, highly intelligent men can break off doorknobs if something in the mechanism is stuck.

Note the mechanically simplistic, and sometimes amusingly ineffective, behavior that may supervene when an individual tries to remove soap stuck in a dish. The same essential tendency may of course appear in the intricacies of personal relationships (man-wife, parent-child).

Looming large in the gamut of aggressive behavior is that element that reflects the direct effective musculoskeletal responses of the primitive ego. It is all too readily available in a regressive sense, but it is at times still appropriate. In an emergency a good sailor will sometimes cut a line rather than untie it. If one has a gun, one shoots an armed and immediately threatening assailant. Alexander apparently saved himself for a time by cutting the Gordian knot. However, in the light of steadily increasing cultural complexities and demands, and corresponding changes in psychic structure, it is the moral and adaptive nature of things to rely more and more on techniques equivalent to the untying of knots, Gordian or otherwise. That the quality of relationships with one's intimates and one's neighbors profits thereby goes without saying. That this may be at the cost of assignment of the right of individual aggression to the organized military activities of the State, should be recognized and accepted as a further problem.

THE DUAL INSTINCT THEORY AND AGGRESSION

The derivation of libido theory from known biological facts seems, on the face of it, reasonable, although some do not agree *(62, 73)*. The theoretical problem lies in the nature of aggression and its relation to the sexual instinct and to the now almost *déclassé* 'instinct of self-preservation', or, as currently preferred, the 'self-preservative instincts' or functions, and corresponding ego functions *(54, 80)*. Freud once assigned this instinct, or group of functions, to the ego, as pitted against the libido. In this self-preservative grouping, aggression (also flight) inevitably played an important role. In the later theory, the wish to live, and the wish that others live, became part of the vast complex of Eros, permeating all structures and functions to

varying degree, and opposed by Thanatos, the death instinct, whose turning outward via the muscular apparatus through the early intervention of the libido, constitutes aggression toward the outer world as we know it. In a minor paradox or inconsistency even primary masochism is viewed as bound in the organism as a remainder, through its fusion with libido. Thus, some of the basic impulse to die or, potentially, 'to die someone else', remains *in situ* in its own operational dynamics and provides the basis for erotogenic masochism.

My occasional use of 'to die' in a transitive sense expresses a semantic-conceptual problem of the death instinct theory which, I believe, has received little attention, probably because of the scalar view of psychic energy that obviates such a problem. While this view lends itself to elegantly facile metapsychologic manipulation, I am far from convinced that it meets adequately the problems of motive, object relations, conflict, and other decisive human considerations. When a pathologically aggressive child *(76)* receives tender care from a maternal woman, and shows some diminution of aggressiveness, one may imagine his using this supply of libido for fusion, in order to neutralize his aggression. Or one may think that being given what he has always needed, he is no longer driven to try to extort it, or punish the depriving woman, or even destroy her. I prefer the latter view, although I do not underestimate the resistance to enduring structural change *(5)*.

If we put aside the intellectual convenience of a manipulatable store of psychic energy, there is an additional problem: the nature of the transition from the immanent drive to die to the drive to kill. An immediate system of basic alternatives appears. Freud believed that this transition occurs first into musculoskeletal behavior (presumably fighting and, most primitively, the effort to kill). But what is meant? Is one merely 'dying' someone else, so to speak, instead of oneself,—projective identification, as some might have it? Or is one killing someone else so that one will not die, because one takes his food, or usurps the libidinal gratification that his woman provides?

There is a vast difference. Killing someone is the struggle to live and to seek gratification in living; 'dying' someone is a killing of oneself 'in effigy', employing the strange human capacity to merge or interchange or even confuse oneself and the object. Even where one is killing oneself 'in effigy', it is presumably so that one may live, at least in the sense of avoiding the biologic consummation of the drive to die. This would otherwise be merely a blind and purposeless shift of direction. What is the catalyst that initiates the change? Presumably the slight contribution of Eros. I say 'slight' because the difference must be postulated as being only this: that the object, who represents the self, dies instead of the actual self,—hardly a loving act except in a literally and biologically narcissistic sense. There are, of course, sudden apparently 'senseless' murders, which may be, or at least seem to be, of this type.

Waelder[9] *(89)* tends to regard such behavior, or parallel suicides, as indicative of the existence of 'essential' aggression. Without detailed understanding of the personalities of such pathological individuals, this remains unconvincing. Most human killing has discernible motivation of another sort. In the light of aggression theory one might still say that were this path not chosen the individual would die. But this is self-evidently not true. For example, countless soldiers go home after prolonged periods of active combat. On the other hand, I believe most direct observation would tend to sustain Freud's earlier idea that aggression, however derived, under certain conditions can be turned on the self, for a variety of reasons and through a variety of mechanisms. This idea, as a secondary mechanism, Freud never abandoned.

Whereas aggression was once thought to subserve other impulses such as hunger or sex, it was later viewed as an alternative or equivalent to the wish to die, and as consistently op-

[9] Waelder also refers to the behavior of remorseless tyrants like Hitler and Stalin. Again there is no consideration of the detailed personality data, the general importance to human beings of the 'symbolic universe' (see Von Bertalanffy *[87]*), and the correspondingly stupendous instrumentalities of destruction available to the individual who attains dictatorial power in a modern state.

posed to the wish to live, to unite with others, and to reproduce, and as opposed also to the theoretically adjacent or derivative impulses to love in a constructive way. In this very broad sense, to live and to try to live, and the corresponding affirmative attitude toward others, would be 'at war' with the impulse to die (thus kill) and its various derivatives. This conflict has also been conceptualized as the antagonism between the impulse to bring particles together in ever-larger units, versus the tendency to break larger units down into smaller units, most specifically to reduce living organisms to their inert elements.

It is, of course, explicit in the dual instinct view that the two drives are of separate origin even within the cell itself, that they often fuse in various contexts or situations, that they 'defuse' in other situations. This explains many clinical phenomena and provides metapsychological explanations for others. However, there is a special problem in the idea of fusion of two literally and radically opposed drives because one would expect that they would cancel one another to varying degrees. Especially in so far as destructiveness is thought to be comprehended in aggression, the concept of fusion offends imaginative logic (if one may risk such a rhetorical fusion!). Some technical concept nearer to a compromise would be more acceptable, and this would have to include quantitative concessions on one side or the other, not required by the concept of fusion. If a wish to kiss tenderly encounters a wish to bite painfully, one can imagine a compromise issue: a more gentle biting, or a more savage kissing. The issue becomes more difficult if one thinks of an underlying libidinal urge toward the lips (to gain and give pleasure, to be in apposition, etc.) versus an essential wish to destroy the lips (the ultimate destruction being, of course, annihilation). In any case the basic theoretical question would remain as to whether aggression is indeed a primary drive of separate origin, or whether it is, in its separate manifestation, an instrumentality (albeit one of primitive power and *élan*) subserving various functions including sex. Further, one must ask whether its frequently demonstrable and important rela-

tionship to sex—sadism, in the original sense—,is not necessarily a fusion but rather an original continuousness, subject to separation as an epiphenomenon of critical importance evoked by the conflicts of object relationship.

Freud based most of his final arguments on the grounds of fundamental biology *(37)*, although his starting point or inspiration for these arguments was a group of well-known clinical phenomena: the traumatic dream, the traumatic neurosis, the repetition compulsion independent of the pleasure principle, and allied phenomena. The relation of the latter phenomena to the death instinct, as proposed by Freud, has been dealt with in repeated clinical psychoanalytic or metapsychological critiques.[10] While these phenomena may have served to inspire an intuition of genius, they can in themselves be adequately or, in the view of many, better explained by more accessible and demonstrable mechanisms.

Nor is the theory of the death instinct, in its broad and inclusive sense, a pragmatically useful explanation of the clinical phenomena which, while often formidable, are not always relentless *(26)*. Freud relied heavily on the primary biologic tendency to reject outer stimuli; he then relied, in relation to more complex organisms where an essential stimulus is internalized, on the 'conservative principle' in instincts: the tendency to strive to restore an earlier condition, a state of reduced tension. This is clearly demonstrable in the sexual climax or in the satisfaction of hunger or thirst. It is much less clearly demonstrable in manifestly and unequivocally aggressive acts, except in the sense of physical exhaustion, most often experienced as disagreeable, or when a specific motive such as vengeance, implemented by the aggression, has been gratified. In the postulated death instinct, the fundamental drive is to reduce all tension to the ultimate state where the very capacity to develop tension disappears altogether (i.e., in death); here the direction is toward the breakdown of organic compounds into their constituent elements.

[10] See, for example, Schur's critique in his recent monograph on the id *(80)*.

The arguments are engaging and sometimes formidable, for they have a broad and general explanatory validity. However they do depart widely from the realm of observable human psychology and behavior and their position in this sphere is regarded as largely extrapolated from biology.[11] This last fact, as mentioned earlier, does not exclude, but rather obliges, further consideration of relevance in the new setting. In so far as ordinary observation establishes the fact that there is a tendency to die, that in fact all do die, one is impelled to infer that there is a biological 'drive' toward death. However, such drive would still not necessarily have an equivalent psychological derivative or parallel. And then the fact of regularly occurring, i.e., apparently inevitable death, does not necessarily mean a biological 'drive' toward death. We do not know how much of the tendency is essentially ecological or due to other factors, to which there are alternatives at least in principle. If air pollution were to continue to increase with predictable effects, I do not believe that these effects could be adduced in support of increased tension in the individual's death instinct. More mundane and accessible factors are obviously of critical importance.

Finally, there is the question whether any type of remote biological principle can be regarded as decisive, even in a metapsychological sense, unless subjected to exhaustive empirical testing. It seems a matter of common sense that the crucial evidence for a basic 'wish to die' (and thus 'to kill' as related to it), if taken seriously and not just as a theoretical abstraction, should come from the grand panorama of man's development and history, from his actual activities and expressions, and from the detailed and relatively controlled observations of his mental and emotional life afforded by the psychoanalytic situation. While both, in certain references, lend plausibility to Freud's views, neither establishes the fundamental validity of the postulated nature of aggression in either of the primary

[11] Note Bernfeld's interesting reservation *(7)* to the effect that Freud's theory is really an idea brought *to* biology rather than derived *from* it.

forms. Historical phenomena can be otherwise explained. The psychoanalytic situation can at times demonstrate accessible reasons (Federn's 'rationalizations') for, and mitigations of, suicidal impulses or outwardly directed aggressiveness. At times there may be drastic quantitative reductions of such phenomena and occasionally clinical abolition of their pathologic forms. But these are not always to be explained by fusion or defusion, although an increase in available object libido is usually concurrent. Resolution or reduction of anxiety, resolution of conflicts, increase in control and direction by the ego, and radical changes in motivation are more readily demonstrable.

I have mentioned some of the complexities and obscurities, sometimes fragmentary, and synthetic origins of the very concepts 'to kill' (or 'to die') or 'to destroy', in their genesis in human psychic life. These considerations can, of course, all be bypassed by assuming that 'to kill' or 'to die' are instinctually 'known' concepts in a global sense and correspond to their sometimes instinctive or intuitive recognition in primitive conditions of nature, or what has been so regarded *(66)*. In other words, the postulated primordial store of aggressive or destructive energy would have primary 'knowledge' of the varied and elaborate, sometimes contradictory or contingent directions of evolution of aggressive behavior or, in a somewhat less Platonic view, participate predominantly and decisively in their genesis. However, I do not see convincing evidence to this effect. This is not to exclude the possibility that, like other intuitions of genius, this theory may some day be established even in the light of empirical criteria. For some reason the 'instinct of self-preservation' is increasingly denied the type of innate 'knowledge' that is readily accorded the concept of primary aggression, at least by implication. I understand the critique *(54, 65)* of the former concept, and what is probably the legitimate empirical pluralism implicit in currently preferred terminology. However, the a priori claim of an 'instinct of self-preservation' to holistic organismic construction would surely be at least as impressive as that of an instinct of aggression, or destruction.

Whereas Freud originally viewed sadism and masochism in their descriptive and quite specific meanings, he departed from this ultimately and, in effect, spoke of sadism as the equivalent of aggression or destructiveness *(40),* and of masochism as the complementary tendency. True, he never ceased to invoke the fusion with some quantum of libido as a necessary condition of their functional existence, although he recognized the possible existence of quanta not 'tamed' by Eros *(40).* Freud continued to use the original meanings at times, sometimes mixing the two usages,—but the two words sadism and masochism have taken on a dual semantic significance as a result of his later theory. Furthermore, in the sense that we have spoken of several possible meanings of aggression which do not, in all instances, form a clear continuum, I think that there is at least room for doubt as to whether a *destructive* impulse, in the strict sense, is the *central* nonlibidinal impulse involved in sadism and masochism, although it does manifest itself as such, at least as a by-product, in the more severe forms of these perversions. The central issue is the causing or seeking of pain or of other forms of suffering as the necessary condition for sexual pleasure. This Freud specified.[12]

Pain is usually a threat to life, however remotely, apart from its immediate significance as experience. However in what is only a seeming paradox, it is also a guarantee of life to both sufferer and perpetrator. To state it as a truism: only the living can suffer. This is related to the frequent sadistic 'tying' fantasies, and impulses; the dead person does not require to be tied. Thus, there is something in sadism and masochism as perversions that tends to avoid death. But this could be ascribed to the admixture of libido, which is an essential ingredient. In other words, is the pleasure in another's or one's own pain or suffering a compromise, the acceptance of a way-station on the

[12] Freud speaks of the capacity of pain, with other varied experiences, to occasion sexual excitation in early development (mentioned originally in the Three Essays *[29, 40]*). He thought of this capacity as the probable physiologic basis for masochism.

path to destruction? Or is there a specific pleasure in the suffering, perhaps linked to coercion or mastery, which means life? Certainly, the inflicting of pain or its equivalents with the deliberate preservation of life, i.e., torture or threats of torture, is an old and traditionally powerful mode of exploiting living submission. One's theoretical position must certainly play a role in one's answer. It is quite conceivable that the sexual drive in its essential nature ranges from tenderness through active sexual impulses and behavior, through heightened sadistic or masochistic behavior, to violent destructiveness whose sexual component, as usually construed, is not clearly discernible. The entire series is based on the irredentist urge to re-establish primal unity with the object apart from the reproductive functions, or to establish whatever form of mastery most nearly approximates it, up to and including the killing of the object. The phenomenon of clinging, emphasized by Bowlby *(11, 12)* and by Bak *(71)*, would be an integral component of this tendency. Any recognizable component or phase of such series may of course be separable and capable of an independent functional existence, as they usually are in the lives of most healthy adults.

I mentioned earlier certain considerations regarding the profound physiological change involved in birth and suggested that the prototypes of all major strivings are, in that situation, incorporated in two great drives; to live under 'terrestrial' conditions and at the same time to restore certain features of intrauterine life, as nearly as the situation will allow. One route is by way of the executive instincts: to breathe, eat, evacuate, and thus to achieve 'repose'. The external amniotic aspects of this need would have to be provided entirely by the hands and bodies of others, primarily the mother. The other route is to refuse the instinctual 'challenge' without psychic representation of such refusal: not breathe, not suck, and thus, in effect, die. The difference in relation to the object with regard to the respiratory and nutritive functions, respectively, has been mentioned earlier.

In both instances a libidinal gratification is a corollary of the fulfilment of an urgent life need, aggressively implemented, the one (respiration) essentially narcissistic, the other (nutrition) object-related from the outset. In relation to both, there is evidence that the 'drive toward life' under new conditions is not always absolute, total, and unequivocal. This could well be a corollary or partial corollary of Freud's conviction that indifference, or hatred, toward the object antedates the libidinal orientation. In such prototypes may lie the first dim representations of an urge to die, later a wish to die. Even here, while death may result, the impulse is not clearly toward death as such except as one postulates the type of innate organismic 'knowledge' mentioned before. It is also true that over a much longer period, the failure of adequate over-all 'supplies' in the sense of holding, handling, voice, etc., can produce reactions which may represent remote parallels *(78)*. Here, however, there must be a specific etiologic factor, the external failure of a needed gratification which might re-awaken the drive to return to an earlier state where all was gratified automatically. At least, in the intrauterine state, no active effort is required; and the milieu is not full of shapes and forms and noises, changes in temperature, and other stimulating ephemeral or particulate phenomena. The mastery of this mass of sensory stimuli is another form of 'work', which under certain unsatisfactory conditions may excite the preference to relinquish consciousness, or to return to that relatively homogeneous stable condition experienced in a total organismic sense before birth.

Under 'normal' conditions such wishes play a cyclic role in everyday life. Sleep is both a physiologic and psychologic necessity. Days of rest and passivity and vacations play an allied role. But are these related to the wish to die? Perhaps, in the sense of some features of avoidance, or of relative control of stimuli and the cessation of active effort. These 'retreats' are an integral part of life rhythms whose enjoyment in great part depends on the assumption of continued or renewable consciousness; if we judge them to be manifestations of the wish to die, we postu-

late compromises with the forces of the libido. We cannot, with the data now at hand, convincingly establish that they are indeed such manifestations. If we view them hardheadedly, it is difficult to avoid the fact that, like the satisfaction of hunger, such 'retreats' are necessary to life. In any case, to view them as directed ultimately toward death, is no more or less convincing than our so regarding the tension-reducing end phase of any instinctual striving.

As to the question of aggression (as it is usually construed) in relation to the impulse to die or the acceptance of death, it is a fact of general observation that if a critical biologic balance is tipped, extreme tends to the opposite extreme. Note, for example, the agonal struggle, then death; mania and depressive stupor; catatonic excitement and catatonic stupor; the epileptic convulsion, then sleep; the intractable manic sleeping in a wet-sheet pack. The frequent defensive pattern of everyday clinical experience, in which activity or aggressiveness is a defense against excessive passivity, and vice versa, may well be a part of this general phasic pattern. It is not incredible that the decision to live may involve frantic aggressive effort—for example, when one is in a state of near suffocation—or that an agonal struggle in relation to death from disease may resemble combat, without discernible corporeal adversary. The 'death grip' of the drowning man may kill his rescuer without intention other than to save himself, if indeed even this wish is clearly experienced as such.

Do such struggles represent a critical and violent effort by Eros to divert the impulse to die into musculoskeletal behavior, —i.e., into 'dying others', or better, having others die instead of oneself? Or are they the archaic prototypic movements, from which the purposive efforts to wrest from the environment the wherewithal for life ultimately developed, augmented by the need to overcome a latent impulse to 'give in', to die? This is a critical theoretic issue. Certainly there is little if any empirical evidence to support the former supposition, although the theoretical formulation on which it is based has a certain elegance

that is intellectually attractive. The latter is, of course, in line with the clearly demonstrable role of aggression in the everyday lives of most human beings.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

I do not regard as proved, nor as pragmatically useful, the concept of primary or essential aggression. The same is true of the origin of aggression in a death instinct.[18] It is, however, my conviction, based on the fragmentary evidence appearing in occasional neonates, with subsequent clinical parallels, that the rejection of the instinctual obligations of extrauterine life can become, in effect, an inclination to die. This latent inclination may reassert itself in the future; for example in the severe psychotic stupors. However, both manifest aggression and libidinal striving represent the urge to live and to gain repose by satisfaction of instinct. Thus they are in effect directed against this inclination, as they are against threats to life and instinctual satisfaction originating in the outer world.

Unlike sex, in itself a primary and powerful motivating force, aggression is, with rare pathological exceptions, usually clearly and extrinsically motivated. Motivations are numerous and various. Aggression is often integrated with basic and unequivocal instincts such as hunger (where killing is archaically inevitable), and the various phases of sexuality; in addition it may bear a clearly instrumental or implementing relation to them. In this sense, as well as in its role in the primitive exploration, manipulation, and mastery of reality (not to speak of its occasional role in complex intellectual activities), it often serves as an important ego function.

Aggression can and does employ primitive preformed somatic and central nervous system patterns, including the powerful affect of rage[14] which confers on it a drive-like quality even when it remains essentially reactive; but it can also be executed

[18] See Fenichel's view regarding the usefulness of the new theory *(26)*.

[14] The presence of rage usually indicates the primitiveness of provocation and of response-tendency. It does not, in my view, disestablish the instrumental nature of the potential aggression. See, Buss *(15)*, for a different view. Nor do I separate predation from aggression in the human *(21)*.

in a planned purposive sense for remote and complicated ends. Indeed it can be carried out in its most primitive form under orders, as in war or in a legal execution.

Where origins, somatic and symbolic contributions, manifestations (including negative manifestations), and motivations are so numerous and complex, it is difficult to feel intellectually secure with a general and inclusive unitary explanation of individual aggression, assuming that one rejects the concept of a separately originating instinctual drive. Frustration *(22)* is surely of great importance, and strikingly so in the instinctual sphere. Beyond this, the concept can be adapted to almost anything. To me, the condition of actual or threatened traumatic helplessness, beginning in earliest infancy, seems of somewhat deeper and, in some references, more genuine explanatory value. The two concepts are not mutually exclusive. The conditions of traumatic helplessness include a range from the inner or outer threat of death or castration, or overwhelming instinctual or exogenously painful stimulation, to such complex matters as the experiencing of profound insult or humiliation and the need for vengeance.

The role of the drive toward mastery *(Bemächtigungstrieb)* merits separate and extended discussion. It is mentioned by Freud as one of the major alternative modalities of aggression. In my view, it lies close to the functional center of the aggressive complex in the sense of implementation of any form of wish, by whatever form or degree of force may be required. 'Negative' force, e.g., the withholding of food or water, may also be extremely effective and of prototypic significance for a vast category of aggressions equivalent in importance to direct and violent bodily attack. Whereas pain, death, and destruction can be, and too often are, the results of aggression, there is little reason to assume the existence of a primary drive to bring them about for their own sake. It seems rather that they represent ultimate efforts toward mastery. In some instances, where more complex and appropriate activities fail to secure gratification, aggressive solutions are clearly regressive. In others, they may be the outcome of considered judgment as to the most efficient

instrumental solutions of a problem. These may be regarded as the 'applications upward', so to speak, of the lessons learned from more primitive experience. Needless to say, the latter alternatives, except in a criminal sense, are now the exclusive prerogatives of the State.

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INFANTILE NEUROSIS AS A FALSE-SELF ORGANIZATION

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INTRODUCTION

In analytic writings, in spite of Freud's monumental case history of the Wolf-man *(4)*, the concept of infantile neurosis has not received the attention it deserves. Nagera has discussed this issue lucidly in his book, Early Childhood Disturbances, The Infantile Neurosis and The Adult Disturbances *(13)*. (Also see Greenacre *[5]*). It is my inference from my clinical work that we can distinguish three varieties of infantile neurosis in the personalities of the adult patients we treat. The first type is what I should call the 'average infantile neurosis'. Here, the strains and stresses that are inevitable in any human development as an infant and child cohere into a potential intrapsychic structure. This leads to average development, and one encounters it in persons who are by and large well adapted to life and manageably neurotic. Then there is the second type, in which the cumulative traumata disable the child from achieving that internalization of the experiences that leads to a structured potential infantile neurosis. Instead, the whole issue is, as it were, postponed into the future to be later elaborated and given structure. In this category come the cases that are called schizoid or borderline. In my experience these cases have a good prognosis, though they are extremely taxing for the therapist. But they do reach us in an open and undecided internal psychic state.

The third type is the one I shall discuss in this paper. Here the ego of the child has prematurely and precociously brought the traumata of early childhood under its omnipotence and created an intrapyschic structure in the nature of infantile neurosis which is a false-self organization, and which will hence-

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forth set up a rigidity of split-existence and defensive exploitation of pregenital instincts and archaic mental functioning, most commonly met with in obsessional neurosis. I consider Freud's Wolf-man to be the classic example of such a case. I shall draw attention to one comment of Freud's which set me thinking about this issue, and then I shall give my clinical evidence. Freud, discussing the initiation of the Wolf-man to religious issues and his extreme, subtle doubts about it, remarks:

> What he related to me as his recollection of his reactions to this initiation was met by me at first with complete disbelief. It was impossible, I thought, that these could have been the thoughts of a child of four and a half or five; he had probably referred back to this remote past the thoughts which had arisen from the reflections of a grown man of thirty. But the patient would not hear of this correction; I could not succeed, as in so many other differences of opinion between us, in convincing him; and in the end the correspondence between the thoughts which he had recollected and the symptoms of which he gave particulars, as well as the way in which the thoughts fitted into his sexual development, compelled me on the contrary to come to believe him. And I then reflected that this very criticism of the doctrines of religion, which I was unwilling to ascribe to the child, was only achieved by an infinitesimal minority of adults *(4,* p. 62*)*.

Freud has given us an exhaustive explanation of the infantile neurosis of the Wolf-man in terms of primal scene, seduction, and anal-sadistic libidinal conflicts. What I am underlining here is the significance of this piece of precocious mental functioning with which the child Wolf-man reformulated all the traumata of his development into a system of symptoms of his infantile neurosis.

This seems to me a typical instance of that type of precocious ego development that James has described so pertinently as one of the most pathogenic factors in early childhood maturation *(6)*. I am extending his hypothesis to include Winnicott's concept of the false-self *(15)*, and am proposing that in certain

children, given a certain proclivity and endowment for premature ego development in response to traumata, there can be a precocious structuralization of the developmental process by acute dissociation and splitting, leading to a false-self that we see retrospectively as infantile neurosis of an obsessional order. I have also seen, complementary to this, a rigid premature structuring of internalized primary objects and fantasies and a negativity toward all new experience and object relations. Thus through puberty and adolescence such persons experience little that enlarges or enriches them, and live in a shut-in, unreal world of their own concoction. It is this that alienates them not only from others but themselves as well. They live attached and dependent, but unreceptive and unrelating.

The following report illustrates an essential aspect of the formation of an infantile neurosis of this type (*cf.*, James *[8]*).

CASE HISTORY

I shall first give an account of the obsessional illness in a patient as he had reported it. The patient, a successful business executive in his early forties, had sought treatment because he felt that his life was totally without meaning for him. This he attributed to two causes: his obsessive performing of chores all day and the fact that when he was not busy in this way he was compulsively thinking in a paranoid way of how to settle scores with his various business partners and employes. This obsessive, querulous chatter in his head was threatening to intrude into his actual relationships at business. Hence he had no life he could call his own or which he enjoyed living, in spite of the fact that he had made a success in his business by his own efforts, had reared a healthy family of children, and was comfortably married to a devoted and kind wife. In his manner the patient was a cultured and gentle person.

During the first six months of his treatment, he gave a very vivid account of what he called his obsessive existence. It had started when he was six years of age and had been separated from his parents by the war. He was the eldest son of a well-to-do

businessman. He had been reared by nannies, of whom he had absolutely no recollection. As a child he had seen very little of his mother, and even less of his father. In fact, he had no memory of his life before six except for a few isolated traumatic experiences, such as catching his finger in a door and damaging it badly. He recalled it as a period of blankness and apathy. He was a docile child who did what he was told. Later we were able to see it as a long phase of suspended confusion in him during which he had no personal initiative or lively existence. Before being separated from his parents and left with his grandmother, little attention had been paid to any type of formal education. His grandmother, unlike his parents, was a deeply religious woman, and she introduced him to the Christian notions of an ideal life hereafter to which this life is merely a prelude. This caught the young child's imagination and suddenly his mind came alive with an intense preoccupation with the problem of how to prepare for this eternal life hereafter.

He learned to read quickly, and by seven years of age had developed an intense ritual of praying to earn his right to the eternal life. This ritual of praying occupied most of his waking life. It had two basic components: the order of words in the prayer, and the understanding with which they were said; and the cleanliness of his hands in the act of praying. At the same time he began to be haunted by a fear that he would die before he had perfected his capacity to pray in the right and ideal way. Every time he prayed some detail would go wrong and he would have to start afresh. During these religious rituals and preoccupations he evolved also an idealized image of both his parents; he thought of how they would be reunited to him after the war and they all would live ever after in an ideally happy state. He detailed in a great variety of ways the anguish and concentration with which he applied himself to these religious rituals and prayers. At school he made no friends and took part in no games. He did his studies in a perfunctory manner and passed the examinations. What obsessed and preoccupied him were these religious thoughts and their myriad rituals. One could see clearly the crys-

tallization of full-blown obsessional neurosis which became his basic identity and experience of himself. What impressed me most in his account was the sudden and intense emergence of a very specialized type of mental functioning. One could see only too clearly the role of manic defense mechanisms in the concoction of this private religious obsession with its emphasis on denial of contemporary reality, idealization, and projection. This infantile obsessional neurosis in the patient reached its climax a few years later when at his grammar school he encountered a teacher who was a fanatical follower of a certain religious sect that believed in personal union with Christ by prayer. The patient was converted and lived for a year in a state of ecstacy from this new possibility of happiness.

He also worked hard and obsessively and became a good and prominent student. Mixed with this religious fervor was another trend: if he became the best student his parents would return to him and there would be that ideal union he had imagined ever since they had left him. What tortured and contaminated the purity of these preoccupations was that pubertal sexuality had emerged, and the conflict of masturbation continuously sabotaged his attempts at an ideal concentration on prayer. He also became aware of his passion for a certain boy, which was largely romantic. This manic and obsessive state of religious preparation first began to crumble when he was called upon by his teacher to go out and convert other students. He found that he had no capacity to relate to anybody. He further noticed in himself an attitude verging on contempt for others, as his preoccupation with religious thoughts had given him a sort of high status in his own eyes. To include others seemed to make a crowd of what was to be a very private and ecstatic intimacy.

It was around his sixteenth year that his parents returned and his concocted world was shattered. He found his father very far from what he had imagined him to be. The father had returned a depressed, tired, and withdrawn person, and neither of the parents showed any interest in his scholastic achievements or religious preoccupations. On the contrary, they treated the latter

with some derision. A diffuse sort of depression set in and all his fervor and enthusiasm collapsed. His loss of personal confidence was also noticed by his teachers, and his sexual fantasies took on a distinct new turn. He was now obsessed with imagining how a woman feels emotionally and sexually, specifically through her genitals.

He started to read confessional novels, and he developed a keen interest, which took on a new obsessive intensity, of seeing photographs of female genitals and trying to work out mentally how these genitals behave and react. He thought himself an unworthy and unlovable person. He did go to a university, managed to pass his examinations, but lived in a continuous state of absence from himself. At the university he attempted another cure of his malaise through becoming a member of the Communist party, which both annoyed and threatened his father; the hostile intent in it was obvious even to himself. After qualifying at the university he went into business and got married, without passion or love, but wisely, to a girl who was motherly, undemanding, and kind. Once in business he applied himself with great rigor to achieve wealth and status, and he succeeded in both. He had been continuously 'plagued', to use his own word, by his obsessional interest in looking at female genitals and collecting photographic data about them. His relation to his wife, however, was potent and adequate. In intercourse, he always tried to identify himself with the position of the female and her experience of the act.

The patient had spelled out all this material very articulately during the first six months and was aware that what he needed was to be rescued from this existence. He had a distinct sense that from the age of six he had imprisoned himself 'in the head' with obsessional religious thoughts, to which, later on, certain sexual themes had joined in, but that he had never lived as a person. He often felt that suicide might be one way of ending this nightmarish tyranny over himself, in which, no matter how much he succeeded in his business, the fear of death, destitution, and a sense of alienation haunted him.

He had no friends and, though he was a kind father, he had little relation with his children. In fact, his way of living had ensured for him a total lack of personal satisfaction, and this he attributed to his obsessional thinking and performance of chores. He was fully aware that nothing in his personality had evolved, changed, or grown since the beginning of his obsessional mentation. All that had happened was that the themes and the situations had been replaced. His mental habits were the same, but in his adult life there was not even the nostalgic fervor of the religious cravings.

DISCUSSION

When I undertook the analysis of this patient, I had been dismayed and discouraged before by the long treatment of two cases of obsessional neurosis of a similar structure. In those two cases an enormous amount of interpretative work on a never-ending variety and complexity of psychopathological material and mentation had given the patients much insight but had brought about very little real change and growth in them (*cf.*, Khan *[9]*). Hence I tried to approach this patient in a different way. I was guided by Winnicott's discussion of Frankie. Winnicott said:

> In regard to the theory of obsessional neurosis I attempted to formulate a concept of a split-off intellectual functioning which I believe to be an essential feature of a thoroughgoing obsessional neurosis case. The conflicts belonging to the personality have become localized into this split-off intellectual area. It is because of the fact of this split that there can never be any outcome in the obsessional neurotic's efforts and activities. The best that can happen is that for the time being the obsessional person has arranged a kind of order in the place of the idea of confusion. This is a never-ending alternation and has to be contrasted with the universal attempt of human beings to arrange for the experience of some kind of structuralization of the personality or of society in defence against the experience of chaos *(19,* p. 143*)*.

I was impressed by the fact that in my patient the mental functioning had started belatedly at the age of six years, in reaction

to a specific event (separation from the parents), and then had precociously and precipitately established an internal psychic organization (the religious obsession), and that henceforth the autonomy and omnipresence of this internal mental organization had warped and distorted all object relating with his human environment. In terms of the transference what struck me from the start was a certain violence in the patient's conviction that he was going to get a cure out of me in analysis. I had little doubt that he had come to think of me as one from whom he could coerce a cure as he had tried to coerce a state of grace out of his God, through a most tyrannical manipulation of himself. The specificity of his type of object relating is important. He did not relate to anyone or let anyone relate to him. To use Freud's phrase, he was 'entrenched behind a respectful indifference'.

Within a few months one could delineate clearly the role he had attributed to me. In his mind's eye, I should be cold, critical, demanding the maximum of rectitude, unyielding in interpretative authority, without affection or compassion, all-knowing and unresponsive. His self-imposed task was to present himself in the worst possible light, feel humiliated and abjectly inadequate, and through my hostile, corrective, interpretative action gradually to arrive at his ideal state of cured self-sufficiency. In fact, I did not need to say very much to keep this sadomasochistic dialectic going. He mentally acted upon himself to improve himself in order to earn a cure from me. This was an exact parallel to his childhood relation to God through the obsessional religious mentation. This way of acting intrapsychically upon oneself to coerce the object is very different from ordinary object relating and is typical of obsessional neurosis, in my experience.

When this was pointed out to him he was profoundly discouraged as well as outraged. That I declared myself unable omnipotently to implement and effect his system of self-cure only proved, he felt, that I was no better than he. But my declaration had one rather salutary effect: the manic intensity of his mental efforts in analysis began to yield to depressive affects and depleted, inert quietude. This gave me some small advantage over

him. The real clinical problem remained as it was: namely, how to present myself to him as an object, whom he could begin to accept, perceive, and relate to as a separate and sympathetic person (*cf.*, Balint *[1]*, James *[7]*, Khan *[9]*, Winnicott *[18]*). The first task was to identify the exact nature of this incapacity and impasse in him. I am stressing here the *provision of the relationship* by the analyst in the analytic situation and the use the patient can or cannot make of it in contradistinction to the transferential projection or displacement onto the analyst of the patient's internalized real or fantasied objects from his environment of nurture *(11)*. Winnicott stated this issue pertinently:

> This interpreting by the analyst, if it is to have effect, must be related to the patient's ability *to place the analyst outside the area of subjective phenomena.* What is then involved is the patient's ability to use the analyst, which is the subject of this paper. In teaching, as in the feeding of a child, the capacity to use objects is taken for granted, but in our work it is necessary for us to be concerned with the development and the establishment of the capacity to use objects and to recognize a patient's inability to use objects, where this is a fact *(20,* p. 711*)*.

James *(8)* has given us specific examples of his way of handling this issue, and in this area the style of each analyst is most individuated and personal. (I am well aware of the fact that this is not a view shared by all analysts.) Anna Freud has stated the case from the other side with authoritative clarity:

> What strikes the observer first is a change in the type of *psychic material* with which the analysis is dealing. Instead of exploring the disharmonies between the various agencies within a structured personality, the analyst is concerned with the events which lead from the chaotic, undifferentiated state toward the initial building up of a psychic structure. This means going beyond the area of intrapsychic conflict, which had always been the legitimate target for psychoanalysis, and into the darker area of interaction between innate endowment and environmental influence. The implied aim is to

> undo or to counteract the impact of the very forces on which the rudiments of personality development are based. . . . There is, further, the question whether the transference really has the power to transport the patient back as far as the beginning of life. Many are convinced that this is the case. Others, myself among them, raise the point that it is one thing for preformed, object-related fantasies to return from repression and be redirected from the inner to the outer world (i.e. to the person of the analyst); but that it is an entirely different, almost magical expectation to have the patient in analysis change back into the prepsychological, undifferentiated, and unstructured state, in which no divisions exist between body and mind or self and object *(3,* p. 38*).*

It is precisely this 'darker area of interaction between innate endowment and environmental influence' that is my clinical concern in this paper. In my view, Miss Freud somewhat pessimistically overstates her case. In clinical psychoanalysis, as it is reported, we have not yet integrated the knowledge that has become available to us from the researches into mother-child relationship by persons such as Balint, Bowlby, Escalona, James, Mahler, Spitz, Winnicott, and others. These researches need to be aligned further with Hartmann's contributions to the understanding of how ego capacities are released and rendered autonomous by the maturational and environmental factors. It is only then that 'the essential *unity* between clinical and theoretical thinking', which Miss Freud so rightly diagnoses to be lacking and causing sterility at present, will be remedied (*cf.,* Kris *[12]*).

To return to the patient. After drawing his attention to my inability to cure him on his terms, I decided to focus attention on the fact of his suspended blank existence until he had separated from his parents. I believed that I was dealing with a child who had grown up in a familial environment that had little recognition of his needs and wishes and had allowed little scope for the spontaneous articulation of his maturational processes. He had been forced into a collusive and passive adaptation. In fact, I considered his separation from his parents a beneficial factor. It

allowed his endowment to have a say in his development. Had he grown up in the same environment he would have had a dulled intelligence and been merely a polite failure. The separation and a new human ambience, which were the equivalents of placement, gave him a chance. I did not regard his lack of memories from the preseparation period as mere infantile amnesia. I took it to represent the fact that little had happened to him that came from his own initiative and instinctual demand. It was a long period of suspended confusion and chaotic feelings that the nascent ego faculties had coped with by splitting and dissociation. He had dealt with a global threat to his being by a matching global passivity and compliance in a specialized way. In order to explain some of the data from the Wolf-man's childhood, Freud postulated: '. . . a child catches hold of this phylogenetic experience where his own experience fails him' *(4,* p. 97*)*. I am not convinced that we need to postulate phylogenetic mnemic inheritance to account for such data. Language and the human environment transmit it through nurture of the infant and child. What the most primitive states of self and ego emergence do inherit, however, are tendencies toward self-defense. Every infant brings with his endowment not only the expectancy of what Hartmann calls 'the average expectable environment', but also the modes of coping, no matter at what cost, when this expected environment fails or becomes distorted.

In my case we see a typical mode of dissociation and defense: namely, precocious and premature mental development. It is the bias of analytical thinking that all crucial psychic processes come into being in infancy. This is only theoretically true. My clinical experience guides me to believe that a primitive and early psychic process can be suspended and postponed. What determines the ***health*** of this process is not so much the time at which it begins but also the environment in which it begins, and the rate at which it establishes its character and function. In my patient, when the mental functions did belatedly emerge, they took over, as it were, the whole person of the child and militantly organized an internal mental world that henceforth was to be this person's

exclusive experiential frame of reference. Joseph Solomon has discussed this issue in the context of fixed ideas as internalized transitional object *(14)*.

Clinically, I could see that no social situation could have caricatured the ceremonialized, static, unresponsive ambience of this patient's childhood worse than did the analytic situation. He knew how 'to behave' and here was another setting where compliant behavior could easily replace that facilitation through a responsive and mutual relation to his potential, which is as essential in analysis as in healthy infant care. So I decided to be as much of a human, ordinary person in my presence as I could. We all know that an analyst can be a person in his presence, or a metapsychological oracle. In order to achieve this I consistently interpreted the ways in which he had replaced a *lacking* expectable environment by inventing a psychic structure of religious thoughts and rituals to which he could be *attached.*

Furthermore, I interpreted how he had tried to bring under his mental omnipotence, and thus to provide for himself, something to be attached to, something that was inherently outside his capacities to manipulate: namely, the provided care (*cf.,* Winnicott *[16]*). I am using the concept of attachment here in Bowlby's definition of it. I consider that Bowlby's researches in the area of attachment can be most fruitful toward understanding the transference of patients who undergo deep and almost interminable analyses without much change of personality. Bowlby postulates

> . . . that the child's tie to his mother is a product of the activity of a number of behavioural systems that have proximity to mother as a predictable outcome. . . . Attachment behaviour is regarded as a class of social behaviour of an importance equivalent to that of mating behaviour and parental behaviour. It is held to have a biologic function specific to itself and one that has hitherto been little considered. In this formulation, it will be noticed, there is no reference to 'needs' or 'drives'. Instead, attachment behaviour is regarded as what occurs when certain behavioural systems are activated *(2)*.

This is, of course, not the whole story of early psychic development and object relationships. But Bowlby does supplement sig-

nificantly the analytic researches in mother-child relationships. He helps us to understand clinically why, when the reciprocity of a true affective and instinctual dialogue between a child and his human environment is either lacking or very curtailed, it is still possible to find such intense attachment yearnings and behavior in the transference. One could argue that in the total matrix of environmental care in infancy, attachment promotes a sense of safety and security, whereas what Winnicott *(18)* calls 'holding' facilitates ego-id differentiation and articulation. I am here offering for consideration the idea that my patient, after he had *invented* his intrapsychic structure, became *attached* to it at the cost of reciprocal relationships with his new human environment and with a consequent loss of personalization. Hence his sense of alienation and futility at the end. He had no conception or experiential expectancy of a *given* and *provided* object relationship (from parents, teachers, or analyst) that could meet his needs and drives.

What of the specific anxiety that is at the root of this type of precocious mental functioning and character formation? The clues in this case came from the manner in which he interlaced the account of his developmental obsessional religious preoccupations with the paranoid querulous chatter 'in the head' with his coexecutives and employes in adulthood. This chattering was always lividly angry, bitter, and scathing with the sole aim of annihilating the resistance and opinion of the other person, so that only the patient's mental judgments were omnipotently valid. Gradually, we were able to ascertain, through the clinical process, the defensive and self-protective function of this way of scoring over others and annihilating them. Dreams in this period made it vividly clear that the patient was trying to reverse a very personal predicament: he was making others suffer and undergo in his fantasy what he had experienced and succumbed to in his relationship to his care-taking environment—annihilation and obliteration of emergent individuation and personalization. That the specific anxiety in his early childhood was dread of annihilation became progressively more clear to him through the analytic process. This was epitomized in a dream late in his treatment,

which the patient considered the most revealing and significant dream he had in his analysis.

> I am in a large gymnasium. I am all alone. Two corridors lead from this gymnasium to two different rooms. In one room judo is taught and in the other karate. I know I must learn one or the other for self-defense. I am sure my teachers will be Japanese, who are our enemies. I decide that I must stay where I am and teach myself. Then an awful anxiety grips me: trying out the various exercises alone, I could hurt my head and injure my brain. At this point, I wake up in panic.

The patient reported this dream on a Monday. On the Saturday before he, his wife, and children had dined with his parents. During and after the dinner his mother had continuously corrected him vis-à-vis his children and made him feel both inadequate and unloving toward them—which, he felt, could not be more untrue. He considered himself a devoted father; his children enormously enriched his life, he said, and made available to him what was utterly lacking in his childhood: mutuality of trust and play with a father. All the same, he had returned home dispirited. It was after this dinner that he had the dream.

One way and another, the analysis of the dream occupied us most of the following week. I report only the essential insights that this dream yielded. The clue came from his statement: 'After the dinner I had felt obliterated by my mother as the father of my children'. He now recounted a variety of small and seemingly insignificant episodes from his childhood in which he had initiated something, in play or in a socal ambience, and his mother, with the utmost propriety and firmness, would correct him back to the 'norm', which was always to stay compliant and still. And the patient himself had commented: 'In my case it was not the threat of annihilation, as you interpret it. The obliteration actually happened, as at dinner last Saturday.' I think there is a very significant and fateful issue at stake here. In the type of case I am talking of it is perhaps inaccurate to talk of a 'threat of annihilation'. In their developmental process such patients have actually experienced this annihilation in terms of their emergent

maturation toward autonomous differentiation and personalization. Ego-id capacities that should have been facilitated into fruition of identity and actual functioning have been 'obliterated' (to use the patient's word), but by some curious and benign factor they manage to postpone the phase-adequate realization of personal potential to a later date. The patients pay a heavy price for it, however, in an overvigilant self-protective alienation from their human environment.

The specific features of the dream the patient had stressed were: (a) the ones who could teach him self-protection were also his enemies, hence a threat; he had to learn from them how to protect himself against them; (b) if he taught himself, there was the danger of injuring his head and brain. It was not difficult to establish that he had cast his mother in the role of the Japanese teachers: the person who was solely responsible for bringing into being the emergent ego capacities for self-maintenance in his childhood was also their worst saboteur. What interested me most, however, was the second element because it seems so true of all schizoid-obsessional character types. The precocious mentation in self-care injures and distorts the true functioning of their minds, and usurps unto itself what in ordinary childhood development is a balanced interplay between ego functions and id potential.

I have emphasized the issue of the threat of annihilation as a specific anxiety experience in the etiology of this type of character formation because I feel very strongly that to subsume it under the concept of castration anxiety is to confuse the verity of developmental facts (*cf.*, Khan *[9]*, Winnicott *[15]*). Castration anxiety, as postulated by Freud, presupposes the achievement of what Winnicott has called I-AM status *(16):* that is, basic differentiation and personalization into a separate human entity. It is a threat to a *part* of the whole entity; a most significant part, but still only a part. That it jeopardizes the totality of the experiential potential of the whole self is a fact, but still the *whole self* is experienced as an established and coherent entity. In the type of childhood experiences I am discussing, the threat

of annihilation has been experienced as to the personalization and actualization of the whole self.

Clinically and diagnostically this seems to me to be a very important issue that we must be clear about in our handling and care of such patients. Their life task is to keep dissociated and encapsulated the breakdown in the developmental process caused by failure of environmental (maternal) provision. By attributing to such patients a maturity of selfhood they have not ever achieved, we become accomplices of their omnipotent defensive self-cure which alienates them from themselves and others. The dream of this patient indicates clearly that he had *done* something to his mind that had injured his intellectual functioning and that he had to do it because those who could have facilitated his true capacities of ego coverage to his own person were experienced by him as lethally threatening as well. Hence he had opted for a passive identification with the aggressor and stayed suspended and inert until he was separated from his parents.

I mentioned earlier in this case report that in the beginning of his analysis the patient had reported his childhood as 'a period of blankness and apathy'. Now we were gradually able to discern that this 'blankness and apathy' were global defensive attitudes against acute rage which he had felt thoughout his childhood but never dared express. If he had not adapted passively to the regime of child care that his mother had set up for him, he would have been annihilated. After separation, he had transformed the energy of this violent rage into the service of the manic and precocious mental functioning of his religious obsessions and nostalgia for the idealized parents. Love and libido played a derivative and secondary role in this reorganization of his dissociated selfhood. This transformation of affects is the crucial mystery of the schizoid-obsessional character formations.

Very closely linked with this issue of pent-up and dissociated rage is the whole problem that Greenacre has so succinctly stated:

> Mention should be made of one other set of conditions which is discernible in these cases of early disturbance with over-

> somatization of response and problems of identity, viz., the increase in the tendency to bisexual identifications, and the influence which this has in very much magnifying the castration problems and also in contributing to unusual complications in the superego development *(5,* p. 24*).*

I have briefly mentioned how, during adolescence, this patient had evolved an almost fetishistic and voyeuristic interest in seeing photographs of the female genitals, and has maintained it ever since. Here one sees another successful reversal of affects: the hated and dreaded object is turned into a desired and exciting one. This specific maneuver has saved this patient from homosexuality. This bisexual identification both neutralizes rage and accommodates to superego demands. And yet all this adds up to merely a contrived success, a false-self existence, for him.

Hence we see that in this patient an infantile neurosis was created through precocious exploitation of a mental function that aimed at establishing his security and maintenance in a world in which he felt threatened with annihilation. This is the obverse of personalization. His cure of the predicament led to a false-self organization that kept him distanced and alienated from everyone henceforth, including himself, and never allowed him to establish an identity.

SUMMARY

Three types of infantile neurosis are proposed as the possible variants of early childhood development. The argument is that Freud's concept of infantile neurosis connotes an intrapsychic structure that is the achievement of a satisfactory early development in the child. This argument implies by definition that the achievement is dependent upon and preconditioned by a complexity of factors that belong to developmental and maturational processes and their facilitation as well as realization by environmental provisions in the early stages of an infant's and child's growth. The classical analytic technique has largely concerned itself with the cases where infantile neurosis is given intrapsychic achievement. Today research into early mother-child relation-

ship and a deeper understanding of the role of the analytic situation enable us to treat cases where early disturbances have interfered with the intrapsychic crystallization of infantile neurosis and have led to a false-self organization.

In this paper clinical material from a male patient explains how maladaptive environmental care in his early childhood had engendered a specific anxiety situation. This anxiety, a threat to his emergent individuation and personalization, was that he would be annihilated; and it resulted in a compliant false-self organization. The paper further discusses the role of precocious mental functioning as a specific type of manic defense, leading to a schizoid-obsessional type of character formation.

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Unanalyzability and Narcissistic Transference Disturbances

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UNANALYZABILITY AND NARCISSISTIC TRANSFERENCE DISTURBANCES

BY KLAUS ANGEL, M.D. (NEW YORK)

In the best working analytic patients their neurotic suffering remains a motive and a relatively constant preconscious organizing factor for free association *(2)*. This includes the knowledge that transference fantasies are to be used as a tool in the solution of their neuroses. In this paper I will discuss some disturbances in free association of certain patients, as determined by their transference expectations and early object relations, and the relationship of these disturbances to analyzability in general.

Let me begin by giving some examples.

CASE 1

The motive of the associations is exhibitionism and the wish to gain the analyst's love for the patient's productions. This patient treats dreams as if they were a work of art of some sort, and makes the most dramatic associations possible to them; he deals with his entire neurosis in one dream. He thus hopes to gain the analyst's admiration and to deny his own helplessness and castration fear: he has no problems, no defects, provided the analyst admires him. What results is a type of acting out in the transference: he acts out his exhibitionistic wishes instead of discussing them. Another feature is his way of making decisions. For example, he has a conflict about sending his children to camp because he feels guilty about wanting to get rid of them to be alone with his wife, just as he wanted as a child to get rid of his younger brother and be alone with his mother. He waits until the deadline for sending in the application blank and discusses his conflict on that day. I give him some explanation or interpretation. He then sends in the application without

I am grateful to Drs. Charles Fisher, Edith Jacobson, Edward Kronold, and George Gero for their valuable suggestions and criticisms. Dr. Leo Stone deserves my special thanks for his advice.

difficulty because, as he tells me, if the camp were dangerous or his fears real and harm would befall the children there, I would undoubtedly have mentioned it. Furthermore, he is convinced from what I said that I send my own children to camp. He is therefore safe in sending his.

CASE II

The patient discusses his transference fantasies without much difficulty but he unconsciously expects them to be indulged or fulfilled by the analyst as a real person. The associations regarding transference are florid and full of meaning; but the knowledge that they are fantasies, that is, that they reveal the patient's neurosis, is lacking. The patient has confidence that he can expect fulfilment of these fantasies if only he stays in analysis long enough. This also results in a type of acting out in the transference. Nothing can convince the patient that the analyst is not the omnipotent, loving parent who will cure his neurosis by indulging his transference demands. The patient has difficulty in seeing these transference demands as unrealistic because of his belief in his own, and the analyst's, omnipotence.

CASE III

This patient also wants real love from the analyst as a real person but knows, contrary to the former patient, that the analyst is not going to fulfil these demands. The associations tend to remain factual, deal with reality problems, and avoid transference fantasies although their presence is blatantly evident from dreams. It is as if the patient were saying: 'I refuse to be frustrated and prefer not to mention transference demands if I know they are not going to be gratified'. In this instance acting out outside the analytic situation results where the patient can obtain gratification of these transference demands.

CASE IV

The patient cannot lose sight of his problems and the associations concern one problem after another. The associations

are motivated by an oral demand 'to get the answer right away'. There is a conscious wish to find out how the analyst performs certain tasks and makes certain decisions, and the patient thinks he can be cured by imitating the analyst. However, the transference fantasy that the analyst is an omnipotent parent who has all the answers is unconscious. Again, this leads to a type of acting out in the transference; the idea that the analyst has all the answers is acted upon as if it were a real fact.

CASE V

The patient believes that her childhood suffering has made her into a special person and has conferred upon her special rights. She continues to humiliate and torture herself with the expectation of receiving compensation from the analyst who, as an omnipotent parent, will cure the patient by giving her what she did not receive as a child.

Although these manifestations are all different, they have one transference fantasy in common: the patient wants real love from an omnipotent analyst. This process of magical cure is substituted for the real process of cure. The cure is thus not to be accomplished by the patient's own ego in its mastery of conflicts, but by the analyst's omnipotent love.

It seems to me that the above examples are clinical illustrations of a type of transference which is distinct from the transference neurosis and which has been called the primary transference by Greenacre *(5)*, or the primordial transference by Stone *(8)*. These two concepts, although having certain similarities, also have important differences. Space does not permit these to be discussed in detail. Greenacre's concept deals with a clinically observable reaction and is discussed largely as giving the analysis an affirmative push, except where the idealization of the analyst becomes excessive. Stone's concept is discussed largely as a resistance, only rarely clinically observable, but it is a primitive underlying force against separation, accounting not only for oral fixations but also for fixations on a higher level, such as

incestuous fixations. In the latter case there would be resistance against separating from the incestuous object. For the purpose of this paper I have drawn from both concepts.

The primordial transference is intrinsically and inevitably ambivalent *(8)* since its matrix comes largely from the mother-child relationship of the first months of life *(5)*. Its positive aspects give, as Stone puts it, 'a driving momentum and power to the analytic process' *(8)* and its attenuated aspects form one part of the therapeutic alliance—along with tender aspects of the erotic transference and friendly feelings of adult type. Greenacre makes a similar point when she states that the analytic situation has many characteristics of the early mother-infant relationship, and adds: 'This part of the situation with its progressively developing confidence forms the primitive basis of the therapeutic alliance' *(6)*.

In my patients we are dealing, however, with the negative aspects of the primal transference, i.e., those aspects that lead to a transference resistance. In her paper, Problems of Overidealization of the Analyst and of Analysis, Greenacre has shown how this aspect of the primal transference (although she does not call it that) can lead to formidable resistances in certain specific patients. She states: 'It is probably obvious that the transference relationship in analysis contains by its very nature the seeds for idealization of the analyst in its rootedness in the early omnipotent stage of the mother-child relationship' *(6)*. Stone has emphasized the presence of these negative aspects of the primordial transference in every analysis, as well as the need for their constant interpretation lest they lead to tenacious transference resistances. He states:

> The primordial transference only rarely appears as such in our clinical work. When it does appear, it leaves an impression not readily forgotten. This is the case when the underlying . . . transference of the psychotic patient appears, displacing his symptoms, if only transitorily, or at times, in conjunction with them. However, in the usual neuroses or character disorders with which we work, even in most so-called 'borderlines',

> this transference is in the sphere of inference, closest to the surface in the separation experience of termination, or in earlier interruptions, or in periods of extreme regression. It may be inferred at times in inveterate avoidance of transference emotion, in extreme and anxious exploitation of the formalized routines of analysis, or in inveterate acting out. . . . Only a type of psychological need (or rather, demand) which sometimes assumes resemblance to original anaclitic requirements (for example, to exhibit indirectly the wish—rarely, to state it explicitly—that the analyst, in effect, *think* for the patient) would seem not infrequent, and often demonstrably allied to the original struggle against separation *(8,* pp. 10-11*).*

It seems worth while to examine these manifestations of primal transference in greater detail and to raise the question whether they are related to analyzability in general.

A cursory review of the literature on analyzability does not throw much light on this question. Freud mentions certain women who fall in love with the analyst and insist upon the satisfaction of their erotic transference strivings. They listen only to ' "the logic of soup, with dumplings for arguments" '; they cannot be convinced that the transference is not real, and they cannot be analyzed *(3,* p. 167*).* Greenson mentions two women who insisted on gratification of their erotic transference wishes. Their erotic reactions to him represented a defense against falling into the abyss of homosexual love for the mother. He makes an interesting observation: 'In one of them there was an additional element which eventually came to light. Her extravagant reactions were also a massive denial of her growing awareness that she was losing contact with people in general. *There was loss of internal object representations' (7,* italics added*).* I shall return to the important topic of unstable object representations.

In my own experience, this insistence on receiving something real from an omnipotent analyst is not the exclusive province of women. As my case examples show, the same transference resistance takes a different form in men—or for that matter in women (Cases III and V)—who do not show an erotized transference.

The question arises whether this form of transference resistance, derived from the primordial transference, is responsible for unanalyzability, or whether it is merely a defense against the patient's underlying conflicts which are too frightening for him to discuss. In my first case, for example, the question would be: Is the patient so frightened of his aggression toward his children (or his brother in the past) that he uses this magical type of transference as a defense, or is he 'fixated' on this type of transference by virtue of early predisposition or traumata? This question is difficult to answer. Greenacre *(6)* in her discussion of overidealization as a resistance in certain patients tends to the latter view; she discusses various childhood constellations and traumata which seem to lead to this type of magical transference reaction. Stone seems to hint at the same view when he states: 'In any case, the degree to which there is actual deployment of cathexis from the original object to other environmental objects, including the inanimate, determines (inversely) the power and tenacity of the primordial transference and *probably has much to do with the basic predispositions to emotional health and illness, respectively (8,* pp. 14-15, italics added).

I have no definite solution to this question but wish to enumerate some factors that seem to me to be in favor of early fixation on this type of transference. 1, In most patients who are unanalyzable or barely analyzable such transference manifestations seem to present a great, if not the greatest, obstacle to successful analysis. 2, I have thoroughly analyzed the castration anxiety and œdipal conflicts in these patients as well as their connection to these regressive transference strivings, but often without significant change. I thus became convinced that, at least in part, these strivings have a source different from defense. 3, It is striking how these transference strivings, originally directed toward the early mother, persist even when the analyst is a male. The patient of course knows intellectually that the analyst is not the mother, but he wants the same things from the analyst that he wanted from his mother.

Manifestations of the primal transference—with clinging to the analyst and analysis, with the wish to stay in analysis forever, with expectations of magical cure from an omnipotent analyst—are present at some time and to some degree of intensity in the analysis of every patient. But what makes these reactions either so intense or so refractory to interpretation that analysis becomes difficult or impossible? Of the five cases mentioned, only Cases IV and V were clearly unanalyzable. The other three improved during their analyses although the transference reactions in question presented grave difficulties. The difficulties fall essentially into three categories:

1. The tendency toward magical transference cure, as exemplified by Case I. The patient dealt with other conflicts and decisions in a way similar to those described in the example; he felt fine while in analysis but had regular relapses during summer vacations.

2. The transference neurosis remains obscured due to the onslaught of the primal transference. An example of this is Case II. This patient came to analysis because, among other things, he suffered from periodic impotence, premature ejaculations, and had difficulty in making a meaningful relationship with a woman. He had postponed the writing of his Ph.D. thesis for several years and felt he could not do it.

Soon after entering analysis he fantasied that he should not have to pay me because he was giving me each day all of his interesting thoughts and feelings. In return for this he wanted to be adopted by me; I should take him with me on weekend trips and summer vacations. I was like a 'king', all powerful, and could teach him these powers if he were always with me and loved by me, and when he became powerful he would no longer be neurotic. He had numerous dreams in which he was adopted by a rich heiress, lived on her estate as a handyman, and in return could have everything he wanted. In one dream I was an enormous Buddha and he was very small. Attached to me by a rope, he tried to pull a short distance away but the Buddha could pull the rope close again by a wink of his eye. The main

difficulty with girls was that none of them could reach the sublime height and perfection of the analyst. Therefore he first criticized and later abandoned them. He felt he had been able to write his thesis only because of the strength he had gained from his relationship with me.

This patient improved considerably in analysis, but his transference neurosis remained obscure. The history of his impotence or premature ejaculations, with its infantile antecedents, did not appear in the analysis in a meaningful way. The picture of his father, who had played an important role in his life, remained vague; and his œdipal conflicts, although distinctly present, played a minor role in the transference for a long time. For example, when a girl stayed overnight at his apartment, he was petrified that her father would find out. He feared that her father would call her apartment, receive no answer, and then come to his apartment to beat him up, or demand that he abandon the girl, or threaten to ruin the patient's career. His associations that I disapproved of his girl made it possible for me to make transference interpretations of his œdipal fears, but these were frequently blotted out by his fantasies that I would protect him and support him by my omnipotence.

3. We now turn to the most serious difficulty: a transference deadlock. The patient cannot accept that these transference demands are unrealistic. Interpretation either has no effect or else leads only to more frustration and makes these demands more intense than before. This occurs if the transference illusion has disappeared and the transference has become real. There are few patients who do not know intellectually that the analyst cannot conceivably have the answer to every problem, that there is no reason why the analyst's real love would cure a certain conflict, or that imitation of the analyst's social or sexual behavior will not cure their shyness or impotence. However, such knowledge remains isolated and has no influence on their behavior in the transference. For example, patient IV, although knowing the reality of these issues, continued for several years to have keen transference disappointments whenever

these wishes were interpreted. The disappointments did not affect the persistence of his wishes. He would convert almost every interpretation into some specific advice or guidance, similar to Case I, or else feel angry, deeply frustrated, and disappointed. He wished that he could observe me having intercourse with my wife, or observe my behavior with a girl I had just met, or at a party. Indeed he had spent several years in his adolescence observing another couple whenever he could. He admired the boy in question and persisted in his belief that he would become as proficient in various activities as he thought the boy to be if he could stay close to him and imitate him.

To recapitulate, the question of the transference having become real involves the inability to distinguish whether the primordial transference demands can or cannot be gratified by the analyst. The patient not only *hopes* he has rediscovered his mother of early years in the analyst, as every patient does, he *insists* upon it (for instance, when he translates interpretations into magical advice), or else he rejects the analyst and analysis out of disappointment and anger.

In a previous paper (*1*) I tried to show that patients with true symbiotic object relationships do not suffer from separation anxiety. One can only speak of separation anxiety after the self and object representations have been separated. As long as they are merged, there cannot be recognition of the object as separate, and therefore there cannot be a fear of separating from it. The fear in patients with true symbiotic object relationships is panic of annihilation. The patient dimly perceives the other person as the 'giver of omnipotence' but not as a separate object. He is either omnipotent by participating in the object's omnipotence or becomes nothing by being abandoned. Such patients in their precarious intrapsychic state (merged self and object representations) must cling to a real object to prove they still exist.

I am not implying that all patients whose transference illusion disappears suffer from symbiotic object relationships; only that

they tend in that direction, i.e., their object representation is unstable. One cannot tolerate an illusion of a person, on the one hand, unless one is relatively certain that this person exists on the other hand; otherwise the illusion is in danger of becoming real, i.e., the person would cease to exist and become an illusion. Transference is only possible if a relatively stable mental representation of the original object is present. It is then possible to distinguish the mental representation of the object from that of the analyst. It is even possible to 'pretend' that the two are the same, as occurs in transference. To put it simply, these patients cannot pretend; at least they cannot maintain the pretending necessary for transference.

It is the thesis of this paper that one form of unanalyzability is closely related to the absence of the transference illusion in the primordial transference. The analyst and the transference demands must be made real in order to maintain the cathexis (and presence) of the original object representation. The presence of pregenital fixations maintaining these primitive transference strivings may be assumed. However, one must distinguish here between pregenital fixations of such severity that the œdipus complex is poorly cathected from the much more frequent situation in which the primal transference wishes obscure the œdipal features and the transference neurosis.

The degree of force and reality of the primordial transference strivings determine the degree to which they can be resolved, or at least displaced or integrated into some appropriate expression in everyday life. Stone states: '. . . it does appear that certain aspects of the search for the omnipotent and omniscient caretaking parent are, for practical purposes, inextinguishable' *(8,* p. 21*)*. According to Stone, these strivings are detached from the analyst, carried into some reasonably appropriate expression in everyday life, but usually retain a subtle quality that contravenes reality, one which derives from earliest infancy and remains to this extent a transference. Here again, it seems to me, the question of illusion versus reality is all-important. For instance, does a person feel happy at a certain vacation spot be-

cause it lends itself to the maintenance of the primal transference illusion, or does he feel constantly disappointed because the expectations are not fulfilled in reality and therefore he keeps looking for new panaceas?

The five cases described in this paper had the following in common: 1, their neurotic suffering failed to be a motive and a preconscious organizing factor for their associations (at least during long periods of time); 2, the transference fantasies were not used as a tool in the solution of their neuroses; and 3, the associations were 'for the benefit of the analyst', leading to acting out either within or outside the analytic situation.

I would suggest that one can expect transference difficulties of the type described here whenever this triad of factors is present. Moreover, such primal transference difficulties may be found to be the basic stumbling block when at first sight other factors seem to be responsible for unanalyzability. A brief example is that of a young woman who came to analysis because of marital problems. She had great difficulty in accepting interpretations. She told me a dream in which certain events took place in a certain subway station. When I made an interpretation, she said: 'What you say sounds perfectly reasonable except that it has nothing to do with me because in the dream it took place on the BMT line which I never take. I always travel on the IRT.' This attitude, which could be summarized by stating, 'Only what is real counts', proved to be related to an early profound distrust of her mother and constituted a defense against the fear of disappointment in her wishes for the omnipotent caretaking parent. This patient is an example of the transference being real in the sense that she could not imagine how I could have any meaning to her other than being an analyst.

Such patients are frequently described as lacking psychological grasp or psychological-mindedness, and as being unanalyzable for that reason. However, they might also fall into the category of the transference resistance under discussion. We are dealing here with a defense against the primordial transference wishes.

A variety of reasons have been given for the greater difficulty in analyzing patients with pregenital fixations. It may be that an important factor is the greater force which pregenital fixations lend in the transference to magical cure and concrete thinking, e.g., the loss of the transference illusion. In Analysis Terminable and Interminable, Freud *(4)* mentions five categories of cases in which analysis is extremely difficult, or impossible: 1, patients with negative therapeutic reactions; 2, irreducible penis envy in women; 3, the struggle in the male against his passivity or feminine attitude toward another male; 4, when the libido is 'too fluid'; and 5, when the libido is 'too sticky'.

These factors were present in my patients. Yet their difficulties in analysis are all manifested in the same way in the transference, namely, by the transference resistance under discussion. The question is therefore raised whether unanalyzability in general frequently manifests itself this way in the transference, irrespective of symptomatology and character. Freud's categories and the transference fantasy (and resistance) which I am discussing have something in common: in all the categories, the need to control the omnipotent parent to overcome a sense of weakness plays an enormous part. For instance, in Case III the need for a penis was so great because the patient felt that with a penis she could control the omnipotent parent. The masochism of Case V was used for control of the parents and acquisition of compensation. The stickiness or fluidity of libido could be regarded as attempts to control the analysis and the analyst, if considered from the point of view of the ego.

It is common knowledge that analyzability does not depend only on diagnosis, the severity of the illness, or the type of character; some neurotic patients are not analyzable whereas some borderline patients are. If the findings of this paper are correct, they would support this clinical observation since ultimately it would be the capacity to form a workable transference that would determine analyzability, and this capacity could be present or absent, independent of the severity or type of illness.

SUMMARY

Examples are given of five patients with widely different symptomatology and character. They have in common certain manifestations of the primal transference, leading to a transference resistance; they insist on being cured by receiving real love from an omnipotent analyst. This primal transference resistance is thought to be unanalyzable if there is loss of the transference illusion. The question is raised whether unanalyzability in general is due to an unanalyzable primal transference.

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Notes on Identification

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NOTES ON IDENTIFICATION

II. CLARIFICATION OF RELATED CONCEPTS

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It has become apparent in recent years that identification and its related processes are essential to the formation and growth of psychic structure. As closer attention is paid to these processes, we become increasingly aware of their complexity and of the widening sphere of their implications. Freud's thinking about identification underwent some radical changes as he saw more clearly the role of identification in structuralization. He finally designated it as the mechanism of structural formation. However, Freud was unable to carry his thinking about identification to levels which contemporary concerns with ego psychology would require. He evolved two basic models of identification, the hysterical and narcissistic. He attempted, particularly in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego *(10)* and in The Ego and the Id *(9)*, to extend these basic models to cover the necessary ground. The extension of these models provided important insights but it also left some glaring inconsistencies and a necessity for further elaboration and refinement *(26)*.

The present study will limit itself, therefore, to an attempt to clarify some of the concepts involved in the understanding of identification processes. We shall consider related concepts of internalization/externalization, imitation, incorporation, introjection/projection, as well as the forms of identification.

INTERNALIZATION/EXTERNALIZATION

Sharpening the focus on processes of internalization came at the hands of Heinz Hartmann. Freud had originally seen the im-

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portance of inner regulatory principles in the development and functioning of the ego. Following Freud, Hartmann emphasized that internalization was a fundamental biological principle which was in the service of an increasing capacity for adaptation, differentiation, mastery, and synthesis. In 1939 he wrote:

> The development of organisms, described here as a process of progressively increasing 'internalization', results in the formation of a central regulating factor which is usually referred to as the 'inner world'. This internal world is interpolated between the receptors and the effectors. We are familiar with it in human adults as a regulating factor in the ego. . . . The inner world and its processes together create a bipolar adaptation-relation: withdrawal from the external world is for the purpose of better mastery over it *(15,* pp. 386-389*).*

Increasing internalization, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, was seen as permitting increasing capacity for delay and detour, increasing independence from the pressure of immediate stimuli, and a more developed capacity for flexibility of response. Internalization, therefore, increases the organism's range of adaptive functions and thereby enlarges its resources for coping with environmental stresses. Hartmann's emphasis is on the aspect of internal regulation. The elaboration of more organized capacities for inner regulation decreases dependence on environment and increases the range of environmental conditions with which the organism can cope. Internalization is later defined in the same terms: 'We would speak of *internalization* when regulations that have taken place in interaction with the outside world are replaced by inner regulations' *(16,* p. 48*).* Internalization, therefore, comes to include those processes by which the inner psychic world is built up—presumably including incorporation, introjection, and identification. In transitory identifications, such as those found in children and 'as-if' characters, there may be identification without internalization. Beres sees internalization as a kind of final step in a process by which attributes of an object become the subject's own *(2).*

Internalization is more generally used to refer to the process itself. Schafer makes this clear by defining internalization as

> . . . all those processes by which the subject transforms real or imagined regulatory interactions with his environment, and real or imagined characteristics of his environment into inner regulations and characteristics *(31,* p. 9*)*.

Identification in this latter usage is a subclass of internalization; in Beres's formulation, identification precedes internalization.

The tension between the alternate uses of 'internalization' is resolved somewhat by the concept of degrees of internalization. Loewald presents the idea as follows:

> The concept of degrees of internalization is advanced. This implies shifting distances of internalized material from the ego core and shifting distances within the ego-superego system, as well as transformations in the character of the introjects according to the respective degrees of internalization *(25,* p. 503*)*.

Thus the superego is conceived as a structural pattern whose elements may be further internalized into the ego core or may be externalized in the direction of object representations. Schafer has underscored this concept in terms of activity and passivity *(32)*. The well-established identification, i.e., with the highest degree of internalization, resists the regressive pull toward the introject type of experience and has a characteristically subjective feel of intentionality, will, or activity. Where a greater degree of fluidity or externalization exists, there is greater passivity in subjective experience. Recently Schafer commented that,

> . . . it must always be borne in mind that internalization is a matter of degree: the degree to which external regulations have been taken over by the subject and stamped with his self-representations; the degree of influence exerted by the internalizations; and the degree of stability of the internalizations, that is, their resistiveness to being regressively abandoned and restored to the environment or lost altogether in

systemic dedifferentiations that involve primitive mergings of self and object representations *(31,* pp. 14-15*).*

The process opposite to that of internalization is externalization. The term is often used as the equivalent of projection—it is described as 'a term used to refer in general to the tendency to project into the external world one's instinctual wishes, conflicts, moods, and ways of thinking (cognitive styles)' *(28,* p. 39*).* Anna Freud uses externalization in a similar sense to refer to 'processes in which the person of the analyst is used to represent one or another part of the patient's personality structure' *(8,* p. 41*).* Brodey modifies this usage slightly in regarding externalization to involve a projection that is combined with a manipulation of reality in which only the reality which verifies the projection is perceived and the reality which does not is not perceived *(3).* So conceived, the mechanism is a crucial part of the structuring of the intrafamilial environment and the interactions between parent and child. Rather than use the concept of externalization as a modification of projection, it seems more exact to formulate it as the reverse of internalization. Thus externalization would refer to a process of transformation by which elements of the structure of the personality that function in more immediate relation to the core of the ego become less immediately related to the ego core and are modified in the direction of independently functioning personality structures or, with increasing degrees of externalization, in the direction of object-representations. Thus projections can be regarded as a special case of externalization in which externalized elements are transformed into object-representations and so perceived.

Although the analytic process can in part be thought of in terms of the re-externalization of internalizations and their subsequent exploration, analysis, and reintegration *(25),* it is more precise to distinguish between such externalizations and the transference. Re-externalization involves a distancing from the ego core in a way that makes the inner aspect of personality take on the quality of an object-representation. Inner conflicts become battles with the analyst, who becomes the bearer of

one side of the conflict. But such maneuvers do not represent the kind of object-relatedness and displacement of affect that is found in the transference. As Brodey sees it, externalization is a narcissistic defense and consequently the re-externalization in analysis limits the meaning of the therapist to the patient's expectations. This is different from the transfer of feelings in which the transference object has meaning to the patient beyond the transference itself *(3)*.

Thus the meaning of the balance of internalization/externalization has its reference point in the subjectively sensed and experienced identity with the inner self or ego core. If and as it is experienced, it is experienced as internally integrated and identified. Internalization is any process of transformation by which external relationships, interactions, and forms of regulation are made part of inner psychic structure and become part of the 'inner world'. By implication, internalization refers to the movement of structural elements in the direction of integration with that part of the psychic structure that is seen as most central to its inner identity—the ego.

One can speak of internalization or externalization as primary or secondary. In secondary internalization we refer to the internalization of something that was external and in secondary externalization we refer to the externalization of something that was antecedently internal. The secondary processes require the capacity for self-object differentiation and the recognition at least of what is internal and what is external. Without this capacity, internalization/externalization can only mean that internality and externality are being constituted by these fundamental processes. The primary processes are not, therefore, defensive operations but are rather aspects of differentiation that contribute to the establishment of the boundary between inner and outer, between self and object *(25)*.

IMITATION

In trying to clarify what is involved in the process of identification it is important to have clearly in mind what it is not. It is

also important to have clearly in mind what role such nonidentificatory processes play in identificatory schemata. One such aspect is imitation. Imitation is clearly not identification but it is very closely related to and involved in identificatory processes.

Imitation is most often conceptualized as a form of learning. Kagan, for example, speaks of imitative learning as 'the initiation and practice of certain responses (gestures, attitudes, speech patterns, dress, etc.) which are not subject to prohibition by the social environment and which are assumed to be the result of an attempt to imitate a model' *(21,* p. 296*)*. Imitation is one of the important ways in which one person can learn from another; one person provides a model for another to copy. Imitation says nothing about the quality of the relationship between them—the cathectic involvement may be minimal—and the model has no other function than to be the bearer of a specific pattern of behavior which the subject can imitate. Parsons and Shils *(29)* distinguish imitation and identification on these grounds. Imitation involves the acquisition of a specific behavioral pattern from a social object without any attachment to that object beyond the process of acquisition. Identification, however, involves the acquisition of generalized patterns of orientation (values, attitudes, beliefs) motivated by an attachment to such an object. They see imitation as a mechanism for the transfer of specific elements of culture, for instance, specific knowledge, technical skills, etc., while identification serves as the mechanism for transfer of broader and more general aspects of culture.

Imitation, nonetheless, plays an important part in the development of identifications. The child increases his repertory of acts and behaviors by imitating the adult and acquiring a behavior pattern as his own. The child becomes more like the adult and the grounds for an evolving identification are prepared *(5)*. Hendrick *(17)* has also called attention to the role of imitation in the development of early identifications. Early patterns of imitative behavior serve to initiate identification processes which contribute to the development of early partial functions of the ego. Where the patterns acquired through imi-

tation are integrated through subsequent identifications they provide important contributions to the development of partial functions which can later be built into more elaborate executant capacities.

Jacobson has modified this formulation somewhat by pointing out that since such primitive imitations arise from the close empathic relation of mother and child, they would seem to flow out of primitive affective identifications. She writes:

> The mother's interplay with the infant stimulates and prepares his awakening emotional life and his ego functions. We may surmise that the child's imitation of parental emotional expression arises on this basis and that early reciprocal affectomotor identifications between mother and child precede and usher in the child's imitation of the parents' functional activities *(19,* pp. 42-43*)*.

The question this formulation raises is whether imitation always flows out of a prior identification. Putting aside the question of whether the early reciprocity of affectomotor patterning should be called an identification, it seems clear that some patterns of imitation derive from prior identifications. It was Fenichel's position, however, that such was always the case. But because of the transitory and often superficial character of imitation he had to qualify the type of identification involved—he called it superficial, limited, capricious, employed for one definite purpose only *(7,* p. 222*)*. The position seems to overstate the case and really evacuates the meaning of identification. It seems more sensible to acknowledge that imitation and identification are closely related but can be independent processes.

Imitation does not imply internalization. Imitation remains in the arena of interaction between psyche and external world. Attempts to conceptualize identification in terms of modeling or imitative behavior capture only a part of the process. Imitation, whether conscious, preconscious, or unconscious, has an inductive influence on the identificatory process, particularly when it occurs in the context of a positive attachment to the object. This is strikingly clear in the case of the infant's relation to

the mother. Imitation can also derive from and reflect an internal psychic organization based on identification. In the clinical setting, clues to an underlying identification often rest on imitative aspects of the patient's behavior and pattern of life. The acquisition of a skill, however, which is a segment of learned, more or less permanent imitative behavior does not imply any internalization or modification of internal psychic structure *in virtue of the imitative process.* Consequently, clinical evidences of identification cannot include only behavioral parallelisms. Parallelisms suggest identifications but do not demonstrate them. The distinction should be drawn between behavioral and structural change.

INCORPORATION

In discussing processes of internalization we are dealing with relations between the inner psychic world and the external world of objects. The basic problem is to understand how it is that characteristics of external objects can be taken in and become operative parts of the inner psychic organization. It is not surprising, then, that the physical act of oral ingestion should become the primary model for such internalizing processes. The term incorporation refers to a psychic process that is conceived as analogous to the physical process.

Freud's original thinking about incorporation was linked to a developmental schema in which the sexual aim of the original oral phase was an incorporation of the object. This implied primitive wishes to be united to the object as well as primitive oral sadistic wishes to destroy the object cannibalistically *(11, 12).* Incorporation was thus proposed as the prototype of later identifications. In Freud's later developments of the idea of identification the role of incorporation was never made quite explicit, and Freud made no attempts to make its meaning more specific *(26).* The persistent question that needs resolution is whether incorporation is a specific psychic mechanism that has a phase-specific function in the psychic economy or whether it is an unconscious component of all internalizing processes.

Some attempts have been made to clarify this terminological confusion by restricting the use of incorporation to the oral instinctual physical activity of taking-in *(14, 30)*. The psychic counterpart of this process would be introjection. This usage would seem to remove incorporation entirely from the psychic realm, and certainly seems to deviate from Freud's usage. Closer to Freud's original formulations is that of Hartmann and Loewenstein:

> *Incorporation* we call an instinctual activity, belonging primarily to the oral phase. It is considered a genetic precursor of identification; and the latter is formed after its model. Clinically we often find incorporation fantasies connected with identification. And actual identification processes may through a kind of appeal to their genetic forerunners reactivate such fantasies *(16,* p. 49*)*.

A similar view is espoused by Loewald *(25)* who regards incorporation as referring to the specifically oral aspects of all internalization processes.

Other attempts have been made to specify and refine the meaning of incorporation. Fenichel saw incorporation as specifically aimed at the primary union with the object through primary identification. The equation does not seem so simple, however, since primary identification refers to symbiotic union prior to any differentiation of subject and object. Incorporative fantasies would seem to require at least that degree of differentiation sufficient to support the wish to reunite the object which is sensed, however diffusely, as separate. It is probably more exact to say that the incorporative fantasy expresses a wish to re-create the union implicit in the primary identification, rather than that it creates or produces the primary union as such. Incorporation in this sense would imply a regression to primary identification *(1)*.

In their discussion of incorporation, Brody and Mahoney *(4)* follow Freud's formulations on melancholia and propose that incorporation should be used to refer only to the alteration of the ego in melancholia and should thereby be distinguished

from introjection and identification. Incorporation is seen as a regressive reaction to the loss of an object by which the object is introduced into the ego. It has both defensive and adaptive functions and is associated with the release of undue amounts of unneutralized aggressions. Freud's formulation of the mechanisms of melancholia leans heavily on incorporative mechanisms and the analogy to oral incorporation provides insight into many aspects of the dynamics of the process. Freud's analysis of narcissistic identification is cast primarily in terms of introjection as the operative mechanism, even though incorporation serves as the model of analysis. Whether these mechanisms can be separated remains a moot question. Clinically, unconscious incorporative fantasies are frequently, if not invariably, a feature of depressive syndromes. The association of oral fantasies, however, does not indicate that incorporation is the mechanism of inner psychic alteration.

As Jacobson *(19)* suggests, frustrating experiences have a constructive influence on the discovery of distinction between the self and the loved object. The repetition of frustration and separation induces fantasies of total incorporation directed to re-establishing the lost unity. She suggests that this wish continues to play a role in the rest of our emotional lives and that the early incorporative fantasies of merging with the mother are a libidinal foundation on which all later object relations and identifications are constructed. Incorporation is, therefore, the primary and most primitive form of internalization related to primitive oral fantasies as an aspect of primary process functioning. The fantasies are unconscious or, when conscious, repudiated by nonpsychotic subjects. Incorporative fantasies may contribute to and be associated with more evolved forms of internalization, but this does not substantiate the conclusion that incorporation is the mechanism of internalization in more organized and elaborate forms of internalization, i.e., introjection and identification.

Incorporation, then, as a mechanism of internalization, involves a primitive wish for union with an object. It is dis-

tinguished by the totality and globality of the internalization of the object so that the object loses its function as object. The union is such that the external object is completely assumed into the inner world of the subject. The boundaries between the inner world and the outer world are decathected and dedifferentiated. Thus incorporation is operative in relatively regressive conditions in which object involvement and internalization are in question. The earliest primitive identifications with parental figures may be regarded as involving incorporation as a basic mechanism. Other cases are more doubtful. The internalization of the lost object in depressive states undoubtedly involves incorporative fantasies to a significant degree, but in the present view, following Freud, incorporation is not the basic mechanism. Otherwise, only in certain severely regressed psychotic states is incorporation unequivocal. Incorporation is, therefore, the most primitive, least differentiated form of internalization in which the object loses its distinction as object and becomes totally taken into the inner subject world. Incorporation stands at one extreme of internalization and is thus distinct from the less primitive and more highly evolved forms of internalization found in more mature identifications.

INTROJECTION/PROJECTION

One of the most important differentiations is that between identification and introjection. Freud adopted the term introjection from Ferenczi. He applied it originally in the analysis of depressive states and later extended it to the analysis of superego formation. These were forms of narcissistic identification and the mechanism of such identifications was introjection. The mechanism implied abandonment of an object relation and a preservation of the object intrapsychically by its internalization through introjection.

Analytic thinking about these processes has undergone a significant evolution. Based largely on an uncritical reading of Freud, there was an early tendency to regard introjection and identification as equivalent terms and to use them interchange-

ably. Fenichel *(6,* p. 105*)* uses it 'for the oral incorporation which represents the pathway of identification'. But there has been an increasing tendency to distinguish the terms and to regard them as separate processes. One of the earliest attempts to formulate the difference was that of Fuchs *(13).* He regarded introjection as a process of inclusion into the ego system by way of an instinctive pattern while identification was the fact or state of such inclusion. Introjection was thus a mental mechanism derived from the oral-narcissistic phase of the libido which takes place in the ego-superego system. When objects are to be abandoned, particularly ambivalently held objects, they are unconsciously taken in and become points of crystallization of ego and superego formations. Identification was therefore an 'ego-term' and introjection an 'id term' referring to overlapping aspects of the identificatory process. This formulation was extended by Knight later on:

> . . . identification is not a mechanism and is not synonymous with introjection. Identification is an accomplished fact, not an act, and may result from several different mechanisms acting separately or together. It may occur by displacement or substitution (with possible projection and introjection also) when we identify one object with another object (misidentification); it may occur mainly by projection as in the case of 'altruistic surrender'; it may result mainly from introjection; but in most instances, perhaps, complex interaction of both projection and introjection will have operated to produce the identification *(23,* p. 341*).*

As Fuchs saw it, introjection was simply a form of incorporation based on an oral impulse which later on in the developmental schema became a form of inclusion of object representations into the ego and superego respectively *(13).* Many theorists had difficulty in freeing introjection from the incorporative model, describing it as an incorporative wish, or fantasy, or equivalent *(17).* Thus Knight says:

> Introjection seems to be used regularly as an equivalent to and synonymous with incorporation, and may be defined as

> an unconscious inclusion of an object or part of an object into the ego of the subject. It is a psychological process based on a tendency of the id to incorporate an object according to an oral pattern *(23,* p. 334*)*.

Greenson *(14)* follows this formulation but adds the significant note that the purpose of the introjection of the object is to re-experience the gratification derived from the external object. Thus, introjection is primarily in the service of the instincts. The confusion is compounded by Koff's definition of introjection as 'a primitive and early unconscious psychic process by means of which an external object or individual is represented by an image which, in turn, is incorporated into the psychic apparatus of someone else' *(24,* p. 362*)*. Introjection is, equivalently, the incorporation of an object representation.

These overlapping usages reflect an ambiguity in Freud, but Freud reserved introjection for situations of object loss. This presumes some degree of self-object differentiation. The attempt to put introjection at the earliest level of primary object assimilation prior to the awareness of objects really only confuses terminology and obfuscates rather than clarifies Freud's earlier formulations *(4)*.

Along other lines, attempts have been made to clarify the distinction between introjection and identification. Greenson points out that in superego formation the child renounces much of his sexual and aggressive impulses toward the parents in favor of introjections *(14)*. The introjection, and following identification, serves actually to preserve and develop the child's object relationships. These early introjections, however, are more severe than the actual objects, suggesting that the process of renunciation and introjection are in the service of developing mastery over instinctual forces. The introjects thus become the vehicles for the binding of instinctual drives, and in the case of the superego particularly for the binding of aggression.

Early introjections have a more rudimentary, primitive, and

disorganized form since they are related to the more primitive levels of oral libidinal and aggressive stress. Thus the objects which frustrate the primitive instinctual demands mobilize the infantile rage which is both projected onto objects and introjected as bad introjects. Similarly, good, pleasure-producing objects are internalized as good introjects. At a primitive level the good and bad introjects remain separate and continue to undergo the vicissitudes of introjection and projection as described by Ferenczi, Freud, Abraham, and Melanie Klein. In the course of development the alternate cathexis of good introjects and extrusion of bad introjects is modified in the direction of forming composite introjects. The child gradually achieves a more ambivalent and differentiated representation of the object as well as a more composite and differentiated self-representation. Thus, Greenson describes a hierarchy of self and object representations. The earliest introjections are derived from primitive oral-sadistic instinctual drives while later more organized introjections derive from less primitive instinctual levels. Early introjects are gradually fused into more organized, more composite, and more highly differentiated introjects. In regressive states these composite introjects can become defused into more primitive component elements.

A similar line of thought is followed by Jacobson. She has noted the theoretical confusion in this area contributed by Kleinian formulations. They tend to cluster under the rubric of introjection-introjects a variety of phenomena including introjection of objects, constitution of object images, superego formation, and identifications, both precœdipal and more mature types *(18)*. Jacobson insists on the distinction between endopsychic object representations and external objects, a distinction that Kleinians gloss over. Thus she writes:

> . . . the terms introjection and projection refer to psychic processes, as a result of which self-images assume characteristics of object images and vice versa. The mechanisms of introjection and projection originate in early infantile incorporation and ejection fantasies and must be distinguished from them. . . .

> The small child's limited capacity to distinguish between the external and internal world, which is responsible for the weakness of the boundaries between self and object images and the drastic cathectic shifts between them, promotes the continuous operation of introjective and projective processes. Thus, it is quite true that during the first years of life the child's self and object images still have more or less introjective and projective qualities.
>
> But the establishment of realistic object and self-representations rests increasingly on the maturation of perceptive and self-perceptive functions, i.e., on reality testing, at the expense of projective and introjective mechanisms. However, while becoming more and more subtle and refined, the latter continue to play an essential part in the processes of identification and in the advance from primitive fusions to those selective identifications on which infantile ego and superego development rests *(19,* pp. 46-47*).*

Jacobson indicates that introjection/projection is found only where self-object boundaries are blurred or dissolving, as in early infantile object relations and in psychotic identifications.

It is probably too narrow a conception of introjection, following Hartmann, Sandler, and Schafer, to restrict it to these phenomena. Introjection has broader application than Jacobson would allow, particularly in the understanding of superego formation. Jacobson's notion of introjection hinges on the assimilation of object representation to the self-representations. Presumably such assimilations are not made when object and self-images are clearly differentiated, i.e., when object and self are clearly and realistically distinguished. It can be questioned whether such a representational formulation is adequate to describe the phenomena. The introject implies not only characteristics of the self-image but also a functional part of the inner organization of the self. The fictive and imaginative fantasies of the self as an idealized other (à la Walter Mitty) are not structuralizing introjects but are assimilations at the level of self- and object-representations. The functions of the superego, as a case in point, and their relation to the

self are of a completely different order. While Jacobson validly criticizes Mrs. Klein's failure to distinguish object and object image, it seems that Jacobson herself must be criticized for not adequately distinguishing self and self-image. Introjections are internalizations which effectively alter the inner psychic structure in significant ways. The structural modification is not adequately expressed in terms of restrictively cognitional and representational terms.

The approach to these concepts has been significantly revised by Sandler *(30)*. He points out that processes of introjection and identification require a degree of internal organization as well as the previous construction of a mental model of the object. He describes these processes of internal organization as *organizing activities* and ascribes to them the construction of inner models. Organizing activity is felt to flow from the synthetic function of the ego and is prior to and distinct from processes of identification or introjection. Organizing activities effect the structure and development of ego functions, both primary and, in part, secondary structures. The basic schemata of objects and the self is so constructed. Introjection is distinguished from such organizing activities but derives from them. Sandler tries to reserve introjection to the process of superego formation and to separate it from identification as a process of ego formation. What have been described as superego identifications he sees as a combination of introjection plus a corresponding ego identification.

In the process of superego formation, the child evolves, in virtue of his organizing activity, certain preautonomous superego schemata or models. These are closely linked to and based on parental models which have a limited objectivity and are colored by projective elements, particularly sadistic and aggressive elements that the child is unable to tolerate. Introjection forms the definitive superego constructs and crystallizes the superego from these elements. The introject gains the capacity to substitute in whole or in part for the real object as a source of gratification or aggression. The schema is

thus structuralized and acquires an autonomy which allows it to substitute for the object.

It seems that this formulation adds something more than mere representational assimilation. The preautonomous schemata are representational; introjection, as taken here, adds the important note of structuralization. Thus it does not follow, as Hartmann and Loewenstein *(16)* suggest, that introjection and identification can be distinguished in terms of the degree of integration of objects so 'taken in' or that the degree of integration is a matter of the degree to which self-representation has been substituted for object representation. Introjection is not a matter of representational confusion but involves a distinctive process of autonomous structuralization. The metapsychology of structuralization is obscure and demands clarification, but at this point I would only wish to stress that representational analogues do not do justice to the problem.

The introjects thus become structural components of the psychic system but enjoy a certain autonomy that distinguishes them from ego components. Loewald has described superego introjects as being 'on the periphery of the ego system' *(25,* p. 483*)*, and has introduced the concept of degrees of internalization to describe the peripheral character of introjects as opposed to the more central character of components of the ego system. Schafer *(32)* has clarified the description of such introjects in terms of activity and passivity. Introjects are imaginary, 'felt' presences by which the patient feels himself assailed or gratified and in relation to which he feels himself to be relatively passive. The passivity is not complete but stands in contrast to the activity and more purely self-originative quality of ego activities. The latter are 'well-established identifications' which appear regularly as self-representations and have a characteristic 'feel' of intentionality, will, or activity. Schafer has described the experience of introjects as follows:

> An introject is an inner presence with which one feels in a continuous or intermittent dynamic relationship. The subject

> conceives of this presence as a person, a physical or psychological part of a person (e.g., a breast, a voice, a look, an affect), or a person-like thing or creature. He experiences it as existing within the confines of his body or mind or both, but not as an aspect or expression of his subjective self *(31,* p. 72*)*.

The introject exercises a particular influence on the subject's inner state and behavior, and the relations between subject and introject are as varied as the relations between two persons. The introject is the inner presence of an external object. Such a presence can only be recognized when it becomes conscious but it may be active and effective when unconscious or subconscious as well. As a quasi-active presence, then, the introject provides a structural means for binding and mastery of basic instinctual energies.

In formulating a continuum of internalization processes, introjection stands between the primitive mechanism of incorporation and the more highly integrated and organized processes of identification. Introjection is not limited to superego formation, but superego formation is undoubtedly its most important application. In clarifying the notion of introjection, the status of object representation is of the utmost importance. Introjection involves a replacement of a relation to an external object by a relation to an internal object. While incorporation is a global internalization of the object in which the object loses its function as object and becomes totally part of the inner world, introjection preserves some aspect of the object's objectivity and relevance to the external world.

As Modell *(27)* has indicated, the transitional human object is one that stands midway between what is created by the inner world and what exists in the external world. The transitional object is in the environment but its separateness from the self is only partially acknowledged. It is a created environment, created by the subject in the sense that the properties attributed to the object reflect the inner life of the subject. The mechanisms by which the transitional object is created are introjection and projection. They create a fluid oscillation be-

tween what is attributed to the object and what is taken into the self. Modell writes:

> The transitional object is not a part of the self—it is 'something' in the environment. However, it is endowed with qualities that are created by the subject by the oscillation of introjection and projection. Therefore, the mode of transitional object relationships is one where the differences between the self and the object are mimimized. The object is not acknowledged as separate from the self *(27,* p. 37*)*.

Introjection and projection, therefore, are correlative mechanisms which organize the subject's inner world. The structure of the inner world is correlative with the quality of object relations.

Introjective processes involve the internalization of transitional object relations. Parental objects are transitional in so far as they are colored by the child's projections. Introjection creates a transitional internal object that replaces the external libidinal relation to the parent. The internalized object or introject retains its transitional character, however, even as it becomes part of the subject's inner world.

Introjection specifically involves a loss of the object, i.e., the object as transitional object. It preserves the subject's transitional mode of relation to an object but the object as transitional is abandoned. The child's œdipal relation to his parents is a form of transitional object relation. The parents cease to function as transitional objects as a result of the introjection, but the creative aspect derived from the child's inner world is preserved in the introject.

Thus introjection serves a very important function in the psychic economy. It provides an important mechanism for the mastery of instinctual forces and is closely tied to instinctual vicissitudes. This is particularly true of the economy of aggressive instincts, but also applies to libidinal instincts. The quality of the superego depends on the quality of instinctual elements projected onto parental objects and then introjected.

Introjection requires a higher degree of intrapsychic inte-

gration than is required for incorporation. While the incorporated object loses its object function in the subject's inner world, the introjected object retains its connections with the external world. Even as it becomes part of the inner world it carries with it the residues of object derivation. Like the transitional object it participates in both worlds. Thus it never becomes internalized into the inner core of the ego. It comes to consciousness as a felt presence, as something objectified within the reality of the self. Introjective processes cover a range of internalizing mechanisms which vary with the transitional character of the object. Those that are more primitive and more intensely endowed with the derivatives of the inner world are more clearly introjective. But as the contribution of the inner world becomes less apparent these processes come much closer to identificatory processes. They are distinguished, nonetheless, by their distance from the ego core when conscious and by their embodiment of instinctual energies, both libidinal and aggressive.

The implicit measure of development in internalization processes is the degree to which in taking in from the object the separateness of the object is preserved. Incorporation allows for no separation of the object. Introjection allows for some intermediate separateness of the object as described above. Thus a higher degree of internal structure and self-identity are required for introjection. In both incorporation and introjection, partial or total objects can be internalized; but their distinction rests on the quality of object relatedness. The object quality is lost in incorporation (after the model of oral engulfment), but in introjection it is preserved in part (as an internalization of a transitional object).

Further, introjection is a dynamic process. As Greenson *(14)* has suggested, there is a progression in the organization of introjects from the more primitive and instinctual to the more organized and composite fusions of introjects. The fusion of introjects follows what Kernberg *(22)* calls the active valence of introjects. Introjects of positive affective valence (libidi-

nally gratifying) become organized into good internal objects and, conversely, negative introjects (derived from aggression) become organized into bad internal objects. This progression is accompanied by an evolution of inner structure, becoming more elaborate, more organized, more integrated. Each level of structuralization permits further evolution of structure and internalization, and diminishes the degree to which the component of the inner world contributes to the constitution of object relations. The introject, therefore, serves important defensive and developmental functions in the mastery of instinct and the elaboration of inner systems of regulation. It achieves the relative binding of significant amounts of instinctual energy in forms of internal organization and regulation.

It is well, I think, at this point to be as explicit as possible about the structuralizing aspects of introjection. A merely representational view does not account for this aspect of introjection, although the assimilation of object representations to the self-representation is a part of the effect of introjection. The structural perspective adds that the introject becomes a source of intrapsychic influence and relative activity that can substitute for the object as a source of narcissistic gratification or aggressive impulse. As such the self is modified so that it acquires the characteristics of the internalized object functioning intrapsychically as a quasi-autonomous source of activity. The introject, therefore, serves as a center of functional organization, possessing its own relative autonomy in the economy of psychic functions. Because of their tendency to regression and their susceptibility to drive influences, introjects must be considered as more structuralizing than structured, more feeble, less stable, and more transient than the less instinctually derived, secondary process organization of identificatory systems.

Schafer has used the term 'primary-process presence' *(31)* to describe the subjective presentation of introjects. As in daydreams, for example, there is not a suspension of reality

testing so much as a change in what he calls 'reflective self-representation' (p. 91). There is a selective and specific suspension of reflective self-representation which is a form of splitting of the ego that permits the primary process presence to function. The introject involves an altered state of consciousness that involves a hypercathexis of complex fantasies and memories without a notation of them as fantasies and memories. The loss of reflective self-representation allows the individual to experience them not as vivid recollections, but as introjects. Moreover, the introject as a primary process presence is subject to the vicissitudes of drive-dependent influences. They are thus unstable, inaccurate in terms of the reality of the object, indeterminate in location, and unreflectively processed. Thus, the contribution of the subject's inner world continues to reflect a primary process influence even after the transitional type object representation is internalized. They represent fixation points of more or less primitive organization—more primitive in earlier phases of development. The capacity for regression is greatest where the organization of introjects remains at a more primitive level. Where higher order introjects are evolved and inner structure is further consolidated by identificatory processes, regression is less likely.

Another important aspect of the understanding of introjection is its relation to projection. There is a certain terminological advantage in keeping correlative terms like internalization/externalization or introjection/projection together *(16)*. As externalization can be viewed as the opposite to and reversal of internalization, projection can be viewed as the opposite to and reversal of introjection. As we use the concept of projection in these investigations, we are referring to a process in which attributes derived from the inner world are attached to real objects so that the object as perceived and experienced is constituted of qualities derived from both the environment and the subject's inner modification of the self. Projection is a modification of the object as transitional object. The parity is not altogether symmetrical since in introjection the self is struc-

turally modified, whereas in projection it is the transitional object representation that is modified or constituted. It is well to note that identification has no such correlative term.

The interplay of projection and introjection has important implications for the development of object relations and the organization of inner psychic structure *(20)*. At the most archaic and primitive levels, the attempts to purify the primitive pleasure ego by projection *(11)* involve almost purely oral-sadistic elements and aim at a primitive annihilation of the hateful object. Subsequent introjections and projections make matters more complex. Internally the inner structure is organized around successive introjects so that the capacity to bind, neutralize, or tolerate aggressive impulses enlarges. Concomitantly, the quality of projection is modified in the direction of ambivalence. Malevolent projective elements are modified as constituents of the transitional object in terms of the inherent qualities of the object itself. Sadistic projections are modified by an adequate maternal object in the direction of ambivalence. The subsequent introject is, therefore, less malevolent and its correlative projection correspondingly modified. The process moves increasingly toward the projection of more benevolent elements and with increasing structure toward a more mature capacity for object relationships.

Introjection and projection, therefore, serve important defensive functions in the economy and mastery of instinctual drives. The stabilization of an emergent capacity for inner regulation and relative autonomy from drive-dependent influences rests on the parallel structuralizing effects of identificatory processes in the ego. While introjection and projection are defensive ego functions, they become less susceptible to instinctual influences with the emergence of structure and its correlative strengths. Thus introjection and projection are modified in more realistic directions in the normal course of ego development. Conversely, the interplay of instinct and object, of inner and outer worlds, or introjective and projective mechanisms, are a necessary preliminary step in the metabolism of drive-

derivatives and relatedness to objects. Without that modification of instinctual intensity, the identificatory processes that promote ego growth would suffer significantly greater impairment.

In the light of these reflections, we can attempt a formulation of introjection. Introjection is a process of internalization through which transitional object relations are replaced by an internal modification of the self in the form of an introject. Introjects are thus primary process presences which enjoy a quasi-autonomous status within the self that permits them to substitute for the transitional object as sources of instinct-related and drive-dependent activity. Hence, introjection is more selective, more partial in what is taken in, preserves more of the objectivity of objects than its primitive counterpart, incorporation. If it tends to blur the boundaries of the inner and the outer worlds, it does not obliterate them. It represents a higher level of internal organization and capacity for object relatedness, which is intermediate between the primitive oral-narcissistic union of incorporation and the more highly integrated levels of identification and autonomous identity with their attendant capacities for mature object relations.

SUMMARY

The present analysis attempts to clarify some of the terminological and conceptual issues that Freud's evolving notions of identificatory processes and the development of intrapsychic structure have posed for us *(26)*. The focus of the study is on separating and conceptualizing some of the processes that Freud specified as related to and involved with identification, i.e., internalization, imitation, incorporation, and introjection. It is concluded that imitation is not a form of internalization but that it bears a complex relation to processes of internalization. Incorporation and introjection are described as internalizing mechanisms which serve phase-specific development and defensive ends that are correlative with the level of internal structure formation and the degree of object relatedness. Introjection, together with its correlative mechanism of projection, is

analyzed in terms of a transitional object model of object relatedness. Introjection is distinguished from identification by reason of its instinctual drive-dependence and derivation, its function in the economy of conflict and defense, the character of introjects as primary process presences (as quasi-autonomous sources of intrapsychic activity which maintain a relative distance from the subjective ego core), and by its susceptibility to projection and greater capacity for regression. Introjection, therefore, emerges as a metapsychologically distinct process which differs from identification economically, dynamically, structurally, genetically, and adaptively. The relationship between introjections as quasi-autonomous primary process presences that bear a structuralizing influence on intrapsychic integration, and identifications as drive-independent and autonomous secondary process structuralizations by which the internal structure of the ego is organized and stabilized, demands further analysis and clarification.

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SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF A PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATION OF MUSIC

BY MARTIN L. NASS, PH.D. (NEW YORK)

Listening and hearing, particularly in their relationship with music, have interested and puzzled man for centuries. The attracting power of music and sound has appeared in literature and mythology from very early times. Orpheus charmed the wild beasts and trees with his music; Ulysses followed the advice of Circe and had his crew stop their ears with wax to avoid hearing the song of the Sirens and thus be led to destruction, as he himself was lashed to the mast of his ship while he listened to the sounds and pleaded to be released.

Sound is an enveloping experience and fills an entire presence. It is more difficult to avoid the onslaught of auditory stimuli than visual ones. Closing one's ears is a more complex task than closing one's eyes. Thus, the quality of the auditory cognitive experience is of a different order in terms of its intensity and its ability to 'hold' its receiver. It narrows object distance and is more closely related developmentally to experiences of holding and experiences of touch *(25, 43)*. The more primitive, ambiguous nature of sound and its great capacity to encompass the totality of experience, as well as its formation into spoken words and language, have resulted in discussions in the literature of the role of sound in early development. Both Anna Freud *(13)* and Spitz *(60)* talk about sound as a line of communication between mother and child; Freud describes the superego as developing through the voice of the parent *(16)*, and the ear as an organ of reception both of sound waves and erotogenic stimuli has had a place in psychoanalytic literature *(1, 27)*.

The holding and immersing power of music often results

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in an ambiguous state of cognition in which the discrimination between inside and outside becomes less precise. The nature of the listening and hearing experiences facilitates and promotes this type of ambiguity and lends itself to greater imprecision than do visual sensory experiences. A distant object is brought in very closely since, unlike vision, the auditory perception is not precise in distance, although it can be precise in terms of direction.

The meaning of music in the life of man has been discussed by the philosophers as well as the romantic writers *(55)*. Psychoanalytic theorists are rather newcomers to this scene. Susanne Langer's writings in this area have highlighted the role of music as a vehicle for the expression of feeling *(36, 37, 38)*. She holds that music articulates forms and can reveal the nature of feelings in a manner which language is unable to approach. Langer believes that the logical explanations of music do not do justice to its sensuous value or to its sense of personal import. 'The real power of music lies in the fact that it can be "true" to the life of feeling in a way that language cannot; for its significant forms have that *ambivalence* of content which words cannot have' *(36,* p. 206; italics in original*)*.

Thus, music is experienced through a different quality of cognition than is the case with language. As Langer indicates, 'Artistic conception . . . is a final symbolic form making revelation of truths about actual life' *(38,* p. 81*)*. She adds that we may talk about them but their reality exists only through the artistic percept.

Elsewhere she states, 'Non-discursive form has a different office, namely to articulate knowledge that cannot be rendered discursively because it concerns experiences that are not formally amenable to the discursive projection. Such experiences are the rhythms of life, organic, emotional and mental . . . which are not simply periodic, but endlessly complex, and sensitive to every sort of influence. All together they compose the dynamic pattern of feeling. It is this pattern that only non-discursive symbolic forms can present, and that is the point and

purpose of artistic construction' *(37,* pp. 240-241*)*. Unfortunately, Langer's fundamental observations have not been attended to; much of the literature dealing with critical interpretation as well as psychoanalytic explanation have been moves toward rendering nondiscursive phenomena into discursive terms.

The history of the psychoanalytic interpretation of music and hearing parallels the history of interpretation and understanding in psychoanalysis and reflects its shifts of emphasis and broader applications. Where early psychoanalytic thinking reflected primarily an id psychology, the writers in the psychoanalysis of music focused mainly on the id derivatives of the meaning of music *(40, 41, 50, 56)* and related musical experiences to transformed screams, to anal sounds, and to primitive rhythmic roots. Ego aspects of the musical experience were not considered until recently. However, the role of hearing in the development of an adaptive style has not received careful consideration as has been the case with other perceptual modes *(18, 19, 20, 29, 30)*. It is one of the purposes of this paper to attempt such an extension. At the same time it must be emphasized that a study of the ego aspects of a given function of necessity assumes the existence of all which preceded it in the development of the idea, so that references to ego functions assume the operation of drive-related aspects of music and hearing. This fact has frequently been overlooked in criticisms of ego psychology *(*see, *39)*.

The relationship between music and ego functioning was initially discussed by Kohut *(33)* who presented a structural interpretation of music.[1] He related the ego function of music to the mastery of threatening sounds and then to the playful repetition of the original threat as a form of working through. The ego's function of mastery is seen as a means of gaining control over the originally threatening sound through the repetition so often seen in mastery through play. Kohut also con-

[1] For an extremely comprehensive review of the literature in this field the reader is referred to Noy *(44, 45, 46, 47, 48)*.

sidered the musical structure to be related to superego attention to rules and their need to be recognized and obeyed, and to the primitive release of id impulses. Kohut's paper is an important one in that it is a move toward applying a structural point of view to the musical process and the musical experience, whereas the literature up until that point did not concern itself with these issues. However, Kohut's attention to structure can be extended further into the sphere of ego functions and cognition so that the musical process can be understood in terms of contemporary ego psychology. Such an application has been made to other creative arts *(8)*, resulting in a new dimension of understanding of the creative process.

At this point, the central thesis of this paper may be stated: the early hearing and listening experiences may serve to develop a cognitive style used by the ego as a means of adapting to and mastering the outside world. These experiences may or may not be related to music. However, the art form of music provides a built-in vehicle through which this type of cognition may be developed and expanded. Hearing and music may be seen as attempts to employ early sensitivities and early pathways in the struggles of the infant and young child to relate to and master aspects of the world. Its early use may be as a channel of contact between mother and child *(13)* with its consequent employment as a vehicle of communication and hence increased musical sensitivity. This approach may also represent early attempts at adaptation and restoration in sensitive children *(4)*. It certainly seems to be related to a hypersensitivity to auditory stimulation as suggested by Niederland *(43)*.[2]

In his paper on early auditory experience Niederland discusses its genetic aspects and deals with the qualitative differences between early and later auditory experiences. He suggests that early experiences are concrete in nature and closely related to physical contact. Their influence is felt early in life and never

[2] Niederland *(43)* reports that the serious interest in music of one of his patients began at the time of an extended bombardment during his childhood when he was exposed to the sound of repeated gunfire over a long period of time.

stops. The infant, he feels, operating through contact perception may perceive the sound as a kind of contact. This postulation is quite consistent with Isakower's *(25)* statement relating the primitive organs of orientation in crustaceans and auditory perception. In fact, the physiological proximity between the organs of equilibrium and audition exist in man. Early sensorimotor acts involving sound and hearing are very close to body movement and body rhythm. The adaptive quality of a cognitive approach involving movement in relation to sound bears on this issue. In fact, Paul Hindemith suggests that early encounters with music result in the novice's search for 'sensations corresponding to those [known] as being caused by his own acts of motility' *(24,* p. 22*)*.[3]

Current ego psychology has provided room within its structure for variations in precision of cognitive states without recourse to psychopathological interpretation and within the normal developmental framework. Hartmann's *(23)* formulation of the ego as man's organ of adaptation heralded the formalization of the adaptive point of view and began to bring psychoanalysis much closer to general psychology. Defenses began to be seen as adaptations employed by the ego as well as countercathectic forces dealing with impulses. The adaptive aspects of sensory functions were considered *(29)* and in recent years the issue of cognitive controls has been a central one in psychoanalytic theory. Cognitive controls have been described as 'structures which are essential attributes of personality organization and control certain aspects of adaptive behavior. They are thought to guide the expression of drive in response to particular classes of adaptive requirement' *(18)*. While the various types of cognitive controls that have been identified need not be described here, they have been related to states of consciousness. In a significant contribution to the psychoanalytic theory of consciousness, Klein relates characteristic patterns of drive, defense, and control to varying levels of consciousness. He states that

[3] This is undoubtedly connected to body movements while listening to music, and to dance forms.

psychoanalytic theory provides us with the means for conceiving 'various parameters of awareness in terms of which it is possible to describe different *states of consciousness,* each definable as a distinctive *pattern* of experience, and each reflecting and vouchsafed by the existing balance among drive, defense, and controlling structures' *(31,* p. 17; italics in original).

One of the characteristics of listening to music is that it facilitates the emergence of less structured states of consciousness and thus provides experiences which may be easily connected with more fluid states of consciousness. The cognitive quality of the hearing experience is of necessity a more ambiguous one since the symbols used can reflect varying nuances of meaning and are experienced through the auditory sphere, an area that in itself is more easily transformed into ambiguous experience than is the visual sphere. In fact, the auditory experience can facilitate the ambiguity by the very nature of its less precise definition. Thus, the ambiguity may induce a more fluid state of consciousness, allowing more drive-related material to emerge. As Klein indicates, 'Since perception is a cognitive event, an elaboration by schema, it follows . . . that under certain conditions of release from reality contact, registrations may be recruited to conceptual realms quite different from those that ordinarily dominate waking attention; the forms given in perceptual awareness may owe much of their structure to more "primitive" drive schema' *(31,* p. 29). It is suggested that the musical experience allows less precise and more ambiguous states of consciousness to emerge together with their concomitant drive organization. It may be that the form of the music with respect to degree of structuralization has some effect on the level of ambiguity of the experience.[4]

The role of audition in personality development has not been extended into the psychoanalytic-cognitive area as has been

[4] This is true, of course, in more 'open' types of listening experiences analogous to free association. The issue of focused listening or listening with a particular set is not being considered in this discussion as it raises an entirely different area related to attention and set.

visual perception. The early forms of cognition that may arise out of a combination of unusual sensitivities and particular lines of communication between mother and child serve as a cognitive style and become part of the individual's character, resulting in his own particular orientation to the world.

The 'auditory style' serves a variety of functions. It enables the child to maintain the object at a distance. The infant or young child is able to keep some contact with his mother by hearing her footsteps approach or leave, by hearing her voice from another room, and by thus 'holding' the mother even when she is not visually present. At the same time, the auditory orientation tends to be ambiguous in that the precision that is possible in visual perception is not present in auditory cognition. Audition is more precise in the time dimension while vision has more spatial precision *(12)*. Thus, the flow of ambiguous imagery is fostered in this kind of cognition, which undoubtedly bears a relationship to early sensitivity *(4)*. Hearing is one sensory modality wherein ambiguous experiences and unclear perceptions may be tolerated and embellished through fantasy activity. Hypersensitive individuals who react to loud sounds as painful or to minute variations in musical pitch as a physical assault would reflect these qualities. One sees them in musicians whose orientation to the world is to a great extent through the auditory sphere.[5] That hearing is closely tied to superego development has been discussed in the literature from Freud's observations in The Ego and the Id *(16)*, through Isakower's classic work *(25)*, and in the initial differences in moral judgments between hearing and deaf children noted by the writer *(42)*.

One can observe the operation of the auditory style in the analytic situation in a variety of ways. The patient with auditory orientation will 'tune in' on the rhythm of the analyst's breathing, on his shifting in his seat, and on noises inside and outside the room. He may be more involved with the sound of the voice than with the content of the communication. One patient, hearing the faint sound of a bottle break in the street, recaptured two

[5] Noy *(49)* has recently made a similar observation.

early childhood memories of bleeding after being cut by broken and flying glass. Another re-experienced his mother's anger through the sound of a door slamming which recaptured her slamming of cabinet doors in the kitchen.

The behavior of the analyst with respect to listening to his patient reflects a similar operation of the auditory style and of the immersion in the flow of the patient's material. As in listening to music, one can follow the melody line, the obbligato, the counterpoint. The analyst is free to move from one line to the other, to hear them all simultaneously, and to intercede at the level of communication that is closest to the point of interaction between the patient and himself. One's attention may be drawn to a behavior that rings false with respect to the rest of the material and may thus be related to a defensive reaction.

The quality of the communication between analyst and patient is close to the quality of interaction among musicians in small ensemble playing. The attention to minimal cues, the anticipation of actions and reactions, and the subtleties of communication reflect the narrowing of object distance and the extreme degree of closeness so characteristic of the analytic experience. The parallel between the musical and analytic experiences can be drawn still further when one listens to the development of a new theme. Just as a theme in a musical composition may be introduced very tentatively and a bit at a time before its full impact is felt, so a new analytic theme may follow the same form. The attentive listener is able to pick this up early and follow its development closely. As it is allowed to develop on its own, it is seen as stemming from the patient's own creative flow. The analyst goes through the process in himself and experiences it with the patient as the sensitive listener goes through the processes of the performer and the composer in a work of music *(24)*. The theme will be played over and over again in a variety of forms and variations until it becomes an integral part of the composition. This type of auditory orientation seems to be related to the 'special gifts' of artistic individuals described by Greenacre *(22)* and to Bergman's and

Escalona's discussion of unusual sensitivities in children *(4)*. It becomes a part of the ego's cognitive repertory and serves as a major orientation to the outer world.

Prior to the linking of cognitive psychology with psychoanalytic ego psychology, ambiguous experiences and less precise forms of cognition were interpreted as regressive phenomena or in terms of archaic forms of functioning. Most frequently investigators in cognitive psychology were not familiar with psychoanalytic formulations, or attempted to reduce them to 'objective' terms. Most psychoanalytic investigators had not had direct experience with the findings of cognitive psychology in fields that affect psychoanalytic investigation. Thus, any indication of primary process thinking was regarded as regressive and most probably of a pathological nature. Ambiguous states and earlier perceptual modes were generally viewed as pathognomic signs. It now seems possible, however, to understand phenomena previously characterized as regressive or psychopathological as existing within the framework of 'normal' ego functioning. In this conceptualization, a different level of cognitive organization is operating within the ego. The conceptualization predating a structural point of view would describe the musical experience as bringing about the 'dissolution of barriers between self and outside world' *(62)*, or as 'an attempt to relegate oneself with the cosmic spirit from which man has been separated, and to reunite with the god, i.e., with the lost parents' *(56)*, without dealing with the ego states involved.

It is clear that these statements are references to regressive phenomena. A shift to a less precise cognitive organization does not of necessity demand ego disorganization by regression, nor the dissolution of boundaries. In fact, the ego state is closer to the analyst's 'evenly suspended attention' described by Freud *(15)* as requisite for the conduct of an analysis. A critique of the concept of regression in the creative arts has been made by Weissman *(64)* who argues for a 'dissociative function' in the ego which is subject to the ego's synthetic function and operates in the service of creativity. Thus, experiences related to early ego

states normally exist together with more highly organized, later experiences and are brought back into play through the re-experiencing of situations that recapture some of the early cognitive organization. As Brenner states, 'Later acquisitions in mental life do not supersede earlier ones. Often, they hardly seem to alter them. Instead, the two exist side by side' *(6,* p. 428*)*. The rhythm of a musical piece or the feeling of being surrounded by sound may recapture and call forth early cognitive states *without the dissolution of self-outer world boundaries,* and without the need to postulate regressive phenomena. Hindemith talks about music being related to sensations of early motility. He states, 'The baby's own crying, whining, and playful crowing is probably the primordial material which assumes a very primitive musical meaning after comparison with the already experienced feeling of general motion' *(24,* p. 38*)*. Sensorimotor theory has clearly shown that the infant's earliest encounters with the object are related to and indistinguishable from his own actions *(52, 65)*. It is this quality of experience that seems to be recaptured and relived in the music.[6] Nor is it necessary to refer the experience back to an earlier known content in order to make it meaningful. Such attempts may very often result in artificial transpositions from one form to another, which is of questionable validity.[7]

The capacity for shifts in ego states is most common among the creative, and the structural position makes such cognitive shifts part of normal functioning *(8)*. This view also presents an outlook different from that of Piaget, where completion of the attainment of a developmental stage appears to be an all-or-none phenomenon allowing for no possibilities of simultaneous levels of functioning. Once a given stage is attained, the child has

[6] An analogous point is made by Schachtel *(59)* in his critique of the concept of regression in the service of the ego.

[7] For example, Noy *(49)* attempts to relate attraction of the form of the fugue to the recapturing of the experience of a mother following her toddler from a distance. It is this type of approach in attempting to translate and equate creative activity with known, discursive-type experiences that results in both losing their intrinsic meaning.

passed through the previous level and no longer employs that particular mode of thinking. Thus, although he does not state so explicitly, Piaget's position would regard the continuation or reappearance of earlier forms of cognition as regressive or pathological in clinical terms and not as a more open mode of functioning. The author disagrees with this position. The expanding view of normal functioning provided by ego psychology makes possible the establishment of a closer link between psychoanalysis and cognitive psychology.

SUMMARY

This paper attempts to outline some of the salient issues relating to an extension of the psychoanalysis of music and musical-auditory experience to the sphere of ego psychology. In so doing it relates the meaning of the musical experience to early hearing experiences and to the adaptive use of the exposure to sound. The musical experience is presented as facilitating the emergence of less structured, ambiguous cognitive states and their concomitant drive organization. These phenomena are presented as early modes of ego organization whose presence does not necessitate the postulation of a regressive process and which bears a strong resemblance to the listening and hearing experiences in psychoanalysis.

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THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING

PIAGET'S CONTRIBUTION TO EGO PSYCHOLOGY[1]

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For nearly half a century, Jean Piaget and his co-workers have been studying the line of development in the child from simple perceptual patterns and stimulus-bound, automatic, rigid, unidirectional motor behavior to the mobile, abstract, hypothetico-deductive operations that characterize mature intelligent thought. They have been able to demonstrate, through a series of brilliant observations and experiments, that this developmental achievement occurs by means of a complex epigenetic sequence in which each developmental stage is derived from and represents the outer limit of equilibrium of the previous stage.

The emphasis in Piagetian theory is on progressive coördination and internalization of experimental actions so that they become increasingly reversible, mobile, and independent of the immediate perceptual field. The central role ascribed to action is, in fact, an essential feature of Piagetian theory. Piaget emphasizes that it is through his actions that the child relates to the world and comes to understand it. He has made an essential contribution to epistemology by demonstrating that intellectual development does not consist in differentiations and reorganizations in the perceptual sphere alone, which had been the prevailing view prior to his researches. He has shown that although dependent upon maturational and social-experiential factors and intimately connected with perception, intellectual development can be described in terms of step-by-step re-equilibration of action patterns that are progressively internalized, abstracted, and coördinated. He defines thought, as did Freud, as internalized, symbolic trial action.

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1 Inhelder, Bärbel and Piaget, Jean: *The Early Growth of Logic in the Child: Classification and Seriation*. New York: The Norton Library, W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969, 302 pp. (Originally appeared in French in 1959 with the title, *La Genese des structures logique elementaire: Classifications et seriations.*) English translation by E. A. Lunzer and D. Papert.

A brief summary of the over-all epigenetic sequence provides a contextual framework within which the work to be reviewed in this essay may be considered.[2]

The Sensorimotor Period (Birth to 18 months)

The earliest period, extending to the second half of the second year, is characterized, according to Piaget, by the acquisition of what he terms 'sensorimotor intelligence'. The infant who was able to approach the world at first only by way of minimally coördinated, reflex perceptual and motor behavior develops the ability during this period to utilize rapid, experimental displacement of internalized mental representations for exploring the world about him.

Piaget divides this first period into six stages, the first of which subsumes the initial few weeks after birth. The neonate is equipped with perceptual and motor apparatuses that function in close unison with one another and are organized along hereditary, reflex lines. During the first months after birth, under the rhythmic impulsion of instinctual need, he comes into passive and active contact with a world that is not yet differentiated from his own body. He is a long way from appreciating that the world consists of finite objects and identifiable phenomena, which he can comprehend, classify, and, to a significant extent, master.

During the course of his repeated and, in suitable circumstances, relatively consistent environmental contacts, sensorimotor habit patterns emerge (Stage 2) which, although they possess a certain degree of adaptive flexibility (accommodation), consist in relatively rigid, stimulus-bound, egocentric, repetitive actions, that show little capacity for successive variation. Through repeated practice, they are performed with increasing efficiency and skill (reproductive assimilation). As the elementary habit patterns evolve, they assimilate to themselves new experiential elements, so long as the latter resemble elements which are already familiar, and, at the same time, modify themselves somewhat so as to accommodate to these new elements. The habit patterns thus extend beyond their earliest objects

[2] In drawing this outline, I am largely following Piaget's summary presented in *The Psychology of Intelligence* (Paterson: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1960; first published as *La Psychologie de l'intelligence* in 1947). Relevant sections of John A. Flavell's *The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1963) provided welcome clarification of difficult or unclear points.

to embrace new ones as well (generalizing assimilation). Situations begin to be discriminated from one another (recognitory assimilation) via these partially exploratory actions, which are intimately associated with perceptual experience.

The third stage begins with the visual-prehensive (eye-hand-mouth) coördination that appears between three and six months, most often at four and a half months. The infant becomes able to deliberately repeat actions connected with interesting events, situated increasingly farther from his own body, in the attempt to stimulate their reproduction. Although it can be demonstrated that this attempt does not yet reflect true means-end behavior, but represents a kind of reproductive assimilation, it does connote increasing generalization, coördination, and expansion of the field of perceptual-motor activity beyond the near space surrounding the child's body.

The complex sensorimotor schemata of the third stage become capable, at eight to ten months of age, of coördination among themselves so that some can serve as means and others as ends. At this level, for example, a child for the first time will remove a screen placed before a desired object in order to retrieve the object. From this it can also be inferred that objects have acquired permanence of existence transcending their continuous availability in the immediate perceptual field. The child can now decide upon a goal before he has chosen the means for its attainment, which provides him with greatly improved mobility and generalizing ability in carrying out his sensorimotor investigations.

The fifth stage is marked by two related advances. First, the child's newly acquired investigative capacities are utilized for active experimentation, in which novelty is no longer merely tolerated accommodatively but is actively sought. In the second place, the child until now has only been able to apply familiar schemata to new objects, as though attempting to understand them by determining which schemata are applicable to them. For example, when presented with a new object, he might have grasped it, struck it, shaken it, bitten it. Now, however, utilizing his ability to coördinate means-end procedures for investigative purposes, he is capable of utilizing truly intelligent trial-and-error experimentation in order not only to apply familiar means but even to devise new means with which he might achieve his objectives. He might, for example, not only set aside a screen barring him from access to a desired object,

but draw the object to him by means of the base on which it rests or pull on a string to which it is attached.

In the final stage, reaching its equilibrial peak somewhere in the middle of the second year, the child becomes capable of internalizing his active experimentation so that he is less bound to the perceptual field. This achievement derives from the ability to manipulate symbolic mental images in place of the actual objects which they represent. The child is now increasingly able to solve problems by internal displacement of mental images rather than by trial-and-error procedures with actual objects. The speed and range of problem-solving maneuvers are enormously increased. An eighteen-month-old child, for example, who has not had prior opportunity to experiment with sticks as possible implements with which he can obtain otherwise inaccessible objects, quickly perceives that they can be used for such a purpose. This contrasts sharply with the younger child's inability to make such a discovery without actual trial-and-error experimentation with the actual objects.

Piaget is not able to account fully for the appearance of symbolic mental images at this particular point in the child's development. One factor seems to be the capacity for imitative analogy. Piaget describes, for example, a child who interrupted his unsuccessful attempt to widen a matchbox opening by random action, looked carefully at the opening for a while, and then imitatively opened and closed his mouth. He defines symbolic imagery (or at least its formal aspects) as internal imitation growing out of external imitation and symbolic play.

The Preconceptual Period (18 months to 4 years)

The availability of symbolic imagery contributes to the beginnings of language and ushers in the period of symbolic or preconceptual intelligence extending from about eighteen months to about four years of age. With the aid of mental imagery, the child begins to form notions of the things with which he comes into contact and attaches these notions to the words he is learning to use. His mental images are closely tied to the actual perceptual configurations they represent. There is little understanding of the immutability of objects and relations over time and space as the permanence of individual objects does not yet extend beyond the field of immediate action and as there is not yet awareness that individual

objects and phenomena exist in multiples and groups beyond his ken (egocentricity). To a two to three-year-old child, for example, it is not clear whether several objects of the same kind encountered during the course of a day are several individuals in the same class or a single individual that continually reappears. Objects appear to change their size and shape when they are viewed for a second time from a new perspective.

This period is characterized by perceptual collections rather than concepts. Reasoning, based on incomplete dovetailing, is performed by means of analogies rather than deductions. The child in this phase is midway between sensorimotor functioning and conceptual thought. As he collects and organizes his impressions and experiences into complex groups, he moves increasingly farther from empirical sensorimotor experimentation and closer to conceptual thinking based upon principles of generality, inclusiveness, and exclusiveness.

Intuitive Thought (4 to 7 years)

The period from four to seven years is a transitional one in which the rigid, unidirectional preoperational thinking described above becomes increasingly flexible, mobile, and reversible. The child is still bound to perceptual referents in his thinking, but there is an important advance. Whereas in the past the child was perseveratively bound to the perceptual aspect upon which his attention initially had been centered, he is now capable of correcting the distortions produced by that centration (all perception involves distortions emanating from centration errors) by shifting attention to other aspects. With this capacity to make serial adjustments or 'intuitive regulations', the child is increasingly able to consider multiple relations, a capacity necessary for the construction of stable concepts.

The child in this transitional phase, however, can consider multiple relations consecutively but not simultaneously. When he shifts his attention from one aspect to another, he frees himself from the centration error produced by the first focusing procedure but, in centering upon the second aspect, he becomes subject to the distorting effect of the second centration and cannot keep firm hold on the first aspect. With his lack of simultaneous access to multiple facets and relations so that he can reciprocally compare them, he still is not capable of conserving the whole set while working with

the elements contained within it. This leads to significant logical errors in his appraisal of the world.

These logical errors are demonstrable by means of simple experiments. The child is presented, for example, with twenty beads all of which, he acknowledges, are made of wood. Most of the beads are brown and the few remaining are white. When asked whether there are more brown or wooden beads, the child under seven almost invariably replies that there are more brown—because there are only a few white ones. He persists in this assertion even after it has been demonstrated to him that some remain after the brown ones have been removed, but that removal of the wooden beads leaves none behind. Piaget's explanation is that in centering upon the brown, the child in this age group irreversibly destroys the representation of the whole, so that only the white portion can be used for numerical comparison. Differentiation cannot be made between 'all' and 'some'.

Concrete Operations (7 to 11-12 years)

With the passage of time, the successive intuitive regulations utilized by the preoperational child eventually reach a point at which they suddenly become organized so that all the different viewpoints in a given system are coördinated reciprocally and reversibly. The child now has at his command a well-integrated, flexible cognitive system in which multiple relations can be considered simultaneously by means of mobile, reversible mental displacements and simple hypothetical deductive experiments that are free of the effects of perseverative, centristic distortion.

Thinking is decentered and organized into stable yet mobile systems, which are no longer dominated by the need for perceptual orientation. The 'whole' no longer ceases to exist while its constituents are being compared and manipulated. By means of 'anticipations and reconstitutions' (*The Psychology of Intelligence,* p. 142), the child can now compare a present configuration with what has come before and can use the two to some extent to aid him in planning future action. The child's thinking is no longer fragmented and contradictory. Two classes can now be combined into a superordinate one containing them and a large class can be subdivided into several smaller ones. Thought is free to make detours without

losing the original goal and the system is not altered by these detours. Nullification allows hypotheses to be tested and rejected, followed by a return to the original starting point.

Such mobile, reversible, systematically organized mental activities are termed 'operations' by Piaget. Such operations permit organization of objects and phenomena into orderly classes and groups. The child is now able to construct stable concepts of numerical relationship, time, and space.

The operations of this period, however, are limited in their range and scope. They can be applied only to the actual, concrete here-and-now. Problems involving displacements, transformations, and re-organizations of actual objects and phenomena can be solved and increasingly complex real life issues are mastered. But it is not until the next and final phase that the child will be able to apply his powers of reasoning not only to the real *hic et nunc,* but to go beyond it to contemplate the possible and potential. Furthermore, his grasp of properties and relations is not fully coördinated. The child, for example, who understands at seven or eight that the quantity of two identical balls of dough remains equal if the shape of one of them is modified, does not recognize until he is nine or ten that their weight remains identical or until the age of eleven or twelve that their volume has been unchanged by the modification in shape.

Formal Operations (adolescence to adulthood)

In contrast to the younger child who can only contemplate the real and actual, the reasoning of the adolescent, from eleven or twelve years on, is truly reflective, hypothetico-deductive, and propositional. The adolescent looks beyond the immediate to its potential implications. He does not confine himself to operations that organize elements in reality, but reflects upon the results of these operations so as to theorize as to the potential limits within which the actual elements exist. He no longer confines his mental activity to manipulating raw data of reality but, out of the results of his concrete operations, constructs higher order propositions (i.e., operations performed upon operations), the relations among which he can still further classify and examine. He has now freed himself from the perceptual links with actual reality to which he was formerly

bound and is able to reason theoretically and speculatively. He is in a position not only to understand but to master his environment.

THE EARLY GROWTH OF LOGIC IN THE CHILD

With this over-all outline in mind, let us turn to The Early Growth of Logic in the Child. In this volume, Inhelder and Piaget do not present anything that significantly departs from the basic Piagetian theory of 1947 that I have outlined. They do offer, however, a detailed, richly illustrated account of the steps through which the three to eleven-year-old child passes in his progress from preoperational to concrete operational thinking, as epitomized in the development of logical classification and seriation. The book consists of a brief sixteen-page introduction and an equally brief fifteen-page concluding statement, between which is an account of the experiments carried out over an eight-year period upon which the conclusions are based. A total of 2,159 children participated; with an occasional exception, fewer than a hundred subjects took part in any one experiment.

The authors advise that it is sufficient to read the conclusions to understand the book, the remainder serving as reference material. My own recommendation would be to read the introduction, conclusions, and intervening experimental data in that order. A careful reading of the account of the experiments that were performed is well worth the effort as it greatly clarifies and illuminates the multiple facets of the complex, fascinating developmental sequence that is the subject of the book. I recommend it also for the beauty and simplicity of experimental design, so typical of Piaget's approach. The discerning reader will also be interested in assessing for himself whether the data support all the conclusions and whether alternative or additional inferences can be drawn.

The central thesis of the book is that—although maturational, linguistic, and perceptual factors play a role—the essential factor in the development of classification and seriation is the development, through progressive organizational re-equilibration, of operational structures out of sensorimotor schemata. No attempt is made to study maturational and linguistic factors, and their importance is disparaged and even questioned, a matter to which I will return. The perceptual factor, too, is relegated to a level of secondary importance. In the introduction, for example, one finds such state-

ments as: 'The perceptual schema is never independent; right from the start, perception is subordinated to action. . . . Perceptions are no more than signals which enter into the construction of the schema (and they include proprioceptive signals). . . . In other words the subject does not perceive objects and his own movements separately; he perceives objects as things which are modified, or are capable of being modified by his own actions' (pp. 12-13). The area of inquiry is accordingly limited to the organizational aspects of classification and seriation. The results of the various experiments are interpreted in terms of progressive re-equilibrations in (progressively internalized) action schemata. Perception is depicted repeatedly as impeding progress and the need for thinking to free itself from perception is strongly emphasized.

Before proceeding to a critical evaluation of the book, I will summarize the authors' findings as to the stages in the development of classification and seriation (or at least of their formal, organizational aspect). Logical classification, they point out, depends upon differentiation between and coördination of the intension and extension of the members of hierarchically arranged groups or classes. Intension is defined as the properties common to the members of a class that set them off from nonmembers. Extension is defined as the set of individuals of which the group is comprised. Thus the former is a qualitative and the latter a quantitative factor.

Some appreciation of intension, based upon recognitive assimilation, is present from the start. The only kind of extension available before the age of five or six years, however, is that of spatial or graphic extension of a perceptual whole. Children in this age group, for example, when presented with figures of three shapes and three colors distributed variably among them, do not sort the figures in logical fashion. Instead, they make graphic collections or alignments according to spatial or temporal contiguity. There is apposition according to similarity but in successive, linear fashion and with fluid criteria. When an initially chosen criterion for apposition is exhausted, the child merely shifts to a new criterion of similarity in order to continue the alignment. The original criterion is forgotten, so that is ceases to influence the structure of the alignment. The linear alignment that is formed is, therefore, unstable. In an attempt to preserve it, there is a strong tendency to shift into the use of more than one dimension and to construct a collective or complex object.

The child may, for example, arrange the elements into 'a train' or 'a bridge'. There is oscillation between intension and extension which are neither clearly differentiated from nor coördinated with one another so that extension may determine intension.

Children from five or six to seven or eight years of age (Stage 2), however, shift from perceptually-bound, linear alignments to nongraphic collections. They differentiate small groups of elements according to similarities and differences and are increasingly free from graphic considerations as they do so. The key to understanding this development, according to the authors, is the progressive appearance of what they term 'hindsight and anticipation'. In constructing collections or collective objects, the Stage 1 child performs each step independently of or in simple assimilation to the previous step, but all steps earlier than the previous step are forgotten and no longer available for consideration. As the child becomes increasingly capable of remembering and harking back to the first step in a sequence, however, he achieves coherence between the beginning and what comes after and is able to return to what he has already done and alter it in light of what has come after it. He begins to be able to look ahead and anticipate the result of his actions so that he can adhere to a set plan as he performs a series of trial and error displacements. In this manner, the child's experimental actions achieve the permanence and coherence that allow them to be increasingly internalized. He can shift back and forth in comparing the elements in a given set as he constructs a series or collection. This primitive form of reversibility consists in a series of regulations that will eventually evolve into mobile, reversible 'operations'.

It is only when the child has achieved a sufficient degree of hindsight and foresight to adhere to a set plan in a series of displacements that he begins to construct nongraphic collections based on similarity rather than on spatial or temporal configuration, to which he formerly had been bound by his inability to consider any groups the members of which could not be perceived simultaneously. The transition from Stage 1 to Stage 2 is shown in the following illustration:

> However, once it has been constructed, the total series obtained by continuing an alignment may induce the subject to go back and inspect the figure as a whole. When this happens, the relations are seen simultaneously, and the alterations which follow now lead the subject to Stage II, i.e., the juxtaposition of a number of qualitatively distinct logical collections. In this

way, one of our subjects (Wal; 10), starts with a continued alignment involving a succession of different criteria (first a line of squares ending with a yellow square, then yellow figures ending with a semi-circle, then semi-circles of which the last is blue, and, finally, blue squares), but he then goes on to move the blue squares from the end of the row to the beginning. He therefore finishes with three homogeneous linear segments (squares, triangles and semi-circles). In spite of the linear arrangement, these are not far removed from non-graphic collections (p. 24).

There are two ways of constructing nongraphic collections, either of which may appear first but both of which are eventually employed. The child may start with small collections and combine them into larger ones with more general properties in common (the ascending method) or, alternately, he may start with larger collections and subdivide them into smaller ones (the descending method). What is typical of the Stage 2 child is that the ascending and descending series are not coördinated with one another. The construction of one type of series does not imply to the child that the reverse process is also possible. He carries out each process independently and does not appreciate their inverse relationship. The child at this preoperational stage can subdivide a collection, B, into two subcollections, A and A^1, but this does not lead to the realization that both A and A^1 are contained in B. For this reason, he is not capable of logical, hierarchical class-inclusion. The concepts of 'all', 'some', 'one', and 'none' are beyond his ken. There is greater accuracy and more precise grasp of relationships compared to the previous stage but intension and extension are not yet fully differentiated and coördinated. He has achieved hindsight and anticipation but can apply them only to simple sequences and not to transformations as a whole. If a child in this stage is confronted with multicolored beads, most of which are brown, or shown pictures of flowers, most of which are primulas, and asked whether there are more brown or wooden beads, or more primulas or other flowers, he makes logical errors because of false quantification of the predicate resulting from inability to define part/whole relations. This is the same experiment used earlier by Piaget to illustrate intuitive preoperational thinking.

As the child progresses in his ability to anticipate not only the static results of a unidirectional process, but to anticipate the stages of a sequence in reverse order as well, he moves toward Stage 3 (seven or eight to nine or ten years) which develops out of subdivisions of

nongraphic collections. It is characterized by a mobile equilibrium in which the child can shuttle back and forth within a total classificatory system. Such mobility provides him with ability to appreciate unions and subdivisions simultaneously. The ability to add and subtract simultaneously and to recognize that one is the inverse of the other enables him to conserve the whole while he is manipulating parts of it. He can shift criteria so as to examine multiple relations within a set or system without losing sight of the whole system and, accordingly, becomes capable of constructing a hierarchical system of class-inclusions that is logically ordered and correctly quantified. The problem involving multicolored wooden beads or multiple kinds of flowers described above is now solved immediately and correctly. The transition from Stage 2 to Stage 3 is exemplified in the following illustration:

> Pat (7; 3) still shows a trace of Stage II. 'Are all the red ones heavy?—*No, not all.*—Are all the heavy ones red?—*No, not at all, because all the red ones aren't heavy.*—Is it the same thing to say that all the red ones are heavy and that all the heavy ones are red?—*Yes . . . Oh no! Because all the heavy ones are red and all the red ones aren't heavy.*—Are all the blue ones light? —*Yes.*—Are all the light ones blue?—*No, not all, there are light ones there also* (pile of red boxes)' (p. 87).

The Stage 3 child is relatively free from the distorting effects of the perceptual set and, able to coördinate his experimental mental actions, is free to choose criteria of classification that provide order and permanence through time and adhere to these criteria despite potential distorting influences. Utilizing freely mobile mental operations, he can organize the world into logical, hierarchical classes and relations. Intension and extension are differentiated and coördinated.

The development of logical seriation follows a course roughly parallel to that of classification. The major difference is that classification is significantly re-enforced by the syntactical structure of language, while seriation is less affected by language development and more closely related to perceptual cues.

A CRITICAL EVALUATION

Inhelder and Piaget conclude their presentation by conceding that maturation and education, including language, do play a part in the development of logical thinking but that 'the key to its explanation lies in the concept of equilibration, which is a wider no-

tion than any of these and comprehends them all' (p. 292). They proceed to explain that their task has been limited to detailing the steps in the progressive coördination of actions that leads to operations, i.e., the organizational aspect of the development of logical thinking, and that they have not attempted to study the underlying forces that make such increasing organization possible. If this indeed has been their aim, then this reviewer's impression is that they have been brilliantly successful.

On the other hand, when I compare the introduction and conclusions and examine the book as a whole, I am forced to modify my appraisal. The aim given in the introduction is 'to elucidate the causal mechanism' (p. 1) of the evolution of logical structures and to assess the contributions of language, maturation, perceptual factors, and sensorimotor schemata. This goal has not been achieved. The relative importance of multiple factors cannot be assessed by examining but one of the factors.

Furthermore, a careful reading of the book leads to the impression that a polemic is contained within it. A hierarchical value system is constructed in which increasing organization of action patterns is placed in a position of overwhelming importance and all other factors are relegated to a level of minor significance. Memory, for example, is not even mentioned as a factor worthy of specific consideration. Perception, as I stated earlier, comes off particularly badly. It is repeatedly portrayed as structurally primitive, functionally subordinate to action, and serving to hinder progress by interfering with mobility of thought. The necessity for thought to overcome its dependence upon perceptual cues is repeatedly emphasized. A picture is not painted of a fluctuating balance of forces continually oscillating to and fro as it moves toward an increasingly stable dynamic state, but of an unceasing struggle on the part of action schemata to free themselves from the inhibiting effect of perception in order to realize their inherent disposition to increasingly organize themselves. The picture is of a struggle between a hero and a villain. Can it be that in concentrating on the sphere of action as the object of intense scrutiny Inhelder and Piaget have succumbed to a kind of centering error in which the relative importance of action schemata vis-à-vis other factors has been magnified and, hence, distorted? The experimental data presented in the book suggest, in fact, that perception and action are intimately connected and operate in a com-

plex and conjoint fashion. There appear to be qualities of each that facilitate progression and other qualities of each that hinder it. Their effects at times appear to be additive and at other times they appear to oppose each other.

The distorting and perseverative effects of perceptual centering, which necessitate that thinking free itself from its initial dependence upon perceptual cues, have been amply demonstrated by Piaget and by others. What has not been the subject of scrutiny, although allusion is made to it in this volume, is that sensorimotor activity also has a perseverative and distorting effect. The alignments that children construct in the course of their attempts to order the phenomena confronting them, as Inhelder and Piaget have shown, for a long time are relatively weak and tend toward dissolution. The data suggest that the tendency toward dissolution arises in part from the perseverative, fragmenting effect of reproductive assimilation which operates conservatively. Once the child has accepted the task of dividing a number of objects into subgroups based on similarity, he tends to continue the process unidirectionally. When the original criterion of similarity is no longer available, accommodation is made to the altered circumstances and the motor sequence of combining 'similar' elements is maintained by simply shifting the criterion of 'similarity'. Thus, once the process of dissecting the whole into parts has been started, it is no simple matter to terminate and reverse the process in order to restore to the objects their original existence as a whole. The dissolution of the whole puts an obstacle in the way of logical classification, which consists essentially in ordering part-whole relations.

From the experimental data adduced in The Early Growth of Logic in the Child, it would seem that several avenues are open to the child by which he can extricate himself from his dilemma. On the one hand, he can ignore some of the elements available so as to reduce the field to one of smaller proportions, within which the fragmenting effect of reproductive assimilation can better be contained. An alternative method is to utilize perceptual cues to delimit the margins of the alignment being formed and bind the whole together. Some children shift from alignment to construction of complex objects. Some of the younger children delimit the field by accentuating either end of an alignment, e.g., by placing a vertical rectangle at either end of a series of otherwise horizontally

placed rectangles. Some children utilize symmetry, invoke representational analogy ('that's a staircase'), or continually shift the direction of the alignment. They all seem to be utilizing perceptual aids in order to counteract the disorganizing effects of reproductive assimilation upon the whole set.

Such dependence on perceptual cues, however, subjects the child to all the distorting effects of perceptual centering. He must eventually devise a third means of preserving the whole, a means that will allow him to work with groups containing large numbers of members and that will not depend upon perceptual cues. This third means, of course, consists in hierarchical class inclusion through reversible mental operations. Until operational thinking has evolved, however, and, indeed, in order to facilitate its evolution, perception plays a critical role in maintaining the whole within which subgroups can be manipulated.

The importance of perception is repeatedly illustrated in the experimental data. Geometric shape, for example, is utilized as a stable referent for grouping long before color is made use of for that purpose (Table Ia, p. 64). Interestingly, this sequence resembles that of appreciation of conservation of quantity, a more plastic quality, before conservation of weight. (It would be interesting to repeat the experiments on classification of elements perceived by touch with the addition of texture to that of shape as an available criterion of differentiation.) Apparently geometric shape, which lends itself to perceptual definition in more than one dimension, is a more useful referent than color, which is unidimensional. It would seem that for a long time form—possessing multiple perceivable qualities, the coördination of which indicates its finite existence—tends to be given preference as a stable referent for class inclusion. Young children seem to have difficulty recognizing that a color is an identifiable 'something' apart from the geometrically definable objects to which it is attached.

Another example is the group of experiments reported in Chapter III. In these experiments the weight of an object must be identified as the determinant of the depression of the pan of a scale on which it is placed rather than its size or color (See Table III, p. 88). Most children before nine years of age regularly invert the question 'Are all the heavy ones red?' to 'Are all the red ones heavy?', which is attributed by the authors to false quantification of the predicate

(treating 'some' as though it were 'all'). The authors recognize that it is 'easier' (p. 88) for a child to think about a collection defined by color than by weight (which possesses even fewer graphic properties than color) and conclude that 'the development of understanding in relation to the true meaning of the quantifier "all" is very much bound up with imaginal properties in general' (p. 99). The data would seem to me to suggest the further possibility that the need for imagery may be related in part to the need to seize upon the most graphic criteria of differentiation possible, even at the price of loss of logical consistency, in order to protect the whole against the centrifugal effects of motor manipulations which have not yet achieved reversibility. The use of imagery, which provides graphic qualities to thought, regularly persists into adulthood as an aid to reasoning. We 'illustrate' our points, 'figure things out', construct diagrams and tables, etc.

In constructing matrices (Chapter VI), the child at first achieves success by way of perceptual orientation. Only later does he shift to operational means of achieving that same success. In solving the problems involving the primulas, the children tend to place the flowers 'together' or 'in a field' in order to visualize them in a cohesive group (see pp. 94-97).

The hypothesis which I have been developing is that the achievement of reversibility, the essential element of operational structures, can be viewed in part in terms of overcoming the fragmenting effect upon the whole of the perseverative influence of assimilation; perception appears to play an important part in facilitating this development. In order to perform a series of alternating (i.e., reversible) ascending and descending movements, the child must be able to terminate the action of dividing and shift to the new action of uniting, which action must then be terminated so that return can be made to the action of dividing. Until this capability has been achieved, perceptual cues are utilized to help hold the parts together into a whole while they are being manipulated.

In other words, perception, despite its inherent distorting effects, serves an essential role in facilitating the development of a self-regulated, mobile, reversible operational equilibrium. It is just as accurate, therefore, to speak of the important role of perception in facilitating advance from rigid, unidirectional, perseverative reproductive assimilation to mobile operations as it is to speak of the im-

portance of operational equilibria in freeing the child from the perseverative, distorting effect of perception. It would appear to me that exploration of the complex relations between perception and action is more fruitful than a tendentious discussion of the relative importance of one or the other.

Similarly, while the organizational aspect of intellectual development is undoubtedly of major significance, it is important also to study underlying and related factors and the relations among them. I would include among these: perception, motility, memory, education and other experiential influences, language, and, of enormous significance, drive energies and their vicissitudes, including sublimation. Defensive processes also deserve attention as they frequently exert a stimulating effect on intellectual development outlasting their period of activity. Multidimensional consideration of the mutual influences of multiple factors is as important for epistemology as is multidimensional consideration of the mutual influences of id, ego, and superego for psychoanalysis.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PIAGET'S WORK FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS

This brings us to a consideration of the relevance to psychoanalysis of the investigations of Piaget and his co-workers. Although Piaget does not address himself to the conflict situations that are the psychoanalyst's main concern, he has conducted careful research into an area of ego development that is of great theoretical and clinical import. His precise mapping out of the epigenetic sequences in the development of thought and cognition has made available to the psychoanalyst a collection of very valuable developmental data that deserves serious attention.

In the seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud indicated that the efficiency of the mental apparatus derives from the increasing capacity to substitute 'exploratory thought-activity',[3] utilizing small quantities of mental energy in a flexibly mobile way,[4]

[3] In addition, see Freud, *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning* (1911). Standard Edition, XII.

[4] See, Merton Gill's clarification of the differentiation made by Freud between the presumably neutral, flexibly mobile (*mobil*) energy available in the system *Pcs* and the freely displaceable (*frei beweglich*) drive energy within the system *Ucs* (Topography and Systems in Psychoanalytic Theory. In: *Psychological Is-*

for the imperative motor discharge of drive energies that is characteristic of the immature psyche. Considered from the economic and dynamic points of view, this shift consists in progressive taming and neutralization of drive energies by the evolving ego apparatuses, which then can utilize these energies for mastery of the drives in the service of adaptation to environmental demands, and for mastery of the environment in the service of gratification of the drives.

Considered from the structural point of view, this advance consists in the progressive differentiation, coördination, and organization of the various modalities that comprise the executive functions of the psychic apparatus. As Hartmann has pointed out,[5] there is a rank-order of ego functions with regard to the degree to which they serve the adaptational needs of the organism. Within this, it is the synthetic function of the ego, says Hartmann, that eventually provides it with that degree of independent assertive will that frees it from regulation either by primitive drive demands or by the external world. The synthetic or integrative function consists, in turn, in the coördination of various ego apparatuses that appear at varying rates, so that as time goes on there appears a succession of increasingly efficient regulatory groups of coördinated functions at various levels of maturation.[6] The most efficient of these, according to Hartmann, consist in rational regulations by intelligent thought processes that take into account means-end relationships, causal relations, objectivation, abstract generalizations, and so on. Study of the evolution of intelligence is a step toward understanding the

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sues, Vol. III, No. 2. New York: International Universities Press, 1963, pp. 13-14). Further on in his discussion, Gill reaches the following conclusion: 'It is probable that what Freud described as the function of the *Pcs* cathexis is what he later called the synthetic function of the ego. Presumably, most of the synthetic function is carried out by means of the "mobile" energy available to the ego, of which attention cathexis is only a part' (p. 74).

[5] See, Hartmann, Heinz: *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* (1939). New York: International Universities Press, 1958, particularly pages 48-73.

[6] Hartmann states, for example, that 'ego development is a differentiation in which these primitive [reflex] regulating factors are increasingly replaced or supplemented by more effective ego regulations. . . . Differentiation [of ego and id] progresses not only by the creation of new apparatuses to master new demands and new tasks, but also and mainly by new apparatuses taking over, on a higher level, functions which were originally performed by more primitive means' (*ibid.,* pp. 49-50).

manner in which the human organism frees itself from stimulus-bound automatic reactivity and acquires a position of mastery over the inner and outer environments.[7]

Psychoanalytic theory rightfully emphasizes the transition from primary process to secondary process functioning in the psychic development of the individual.[8] In the earliest form of mental organization the accumulation of tension to a threshold level leads to immediate discharge upon an available object, hallucinatory evocation of a memory of a past gratification, and/or an undifferentiated affective reaction that has protective, emergency discharge value as well as communicational value. The ideational and affective discharge channels provide the organism with the capacity to temporarily reduce the level of tension below the threshold level so as to delay discharge in the absence of a suitable object in the environment. They are of limited adaptive value, however, in that they substitute for effective action without preparing the organism for such action.

[7] Hartmann puts it in the following way: 'Freud states that the ego, by interpolation of thought processes, achieves a delay of motor discharge. This process is part of an already discussed general evolution, namely, that the more differentiated an organism is, the more independent from the immediate environmental stimulation it becomes. Freud described thinking also as experimental action using small quantities of energy, and thereby elucidated both its biological function and its relation to action. It appears that in higher organisms, trial activity is increasingly displaced into the interior of the organism, and no longer appears in the form of motor action directed toward the external world. With this advance in evolution, human intelligence has reached that high point at which it affords man, whose somatic equipment is certainly in no way outstanding, his superiority over his environment. Intelligence involves an enormous extension and differentiation of reaction possibilities, and subjects the reactions to its selection and control. Causal thinking (in relation to perception of space and time), the creation and use of means-end relations, and particularly the turning of thinking back upon the self, liberate the individual from being compelled to react to the immediate stimulus' (*ibid.*, pp. 59-60).

In the closing paragraphs of this monograph, Hartmann states: 'I stress again that no satisfactory definition of the concepts of ego strength and ego weakness is feasible without taking into account the nature and maturational stage of the ego apparatuses which underlie intelligence, will, and action' (*ibid.*, p. 107).

[8] A brief but clear description of this transition can be found in Engel, G.: *Psychological Development in Health and Disease.* Philadelphia: W. B. Saunders Company, 1962, especially pp. 221-236. For a fuller exposition, see Rapaport, D.: The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory. In: *Psychological Issues,* Vol. II, No. 6. New York: International Universities Press, 1960.

Further development leads to a shift from a mental organization dominated by the necessity for indiscriminate discharge according to the pleasure principle to one in which the accumulation of drive tension mobilizes structuralized control and delay mechanisms that include directed means-end activities to find a suitable object *in reality* upon which effective and efficient drive discharge can be carried out. This transition is mediated by the development of countercathectic mechanisms to impede drive pressures and the evolution of cognitive apparatuses which permit the individual to coördinate past and present perceptions and to anticipate, select, locate, and act upon objects in reality. Affect discharges become modulated, differentiated, and controlled by the developing ego apparatuses so that for the most part they are restricted to serving as signals for the mobilization of regulatory ego processes.

The central role of thought in facilitating the evolution from primary to secondary process functioning is highlighted by the persistent use of the terms 'primary process' and 'secondary process' not only to describe the ego's capacity to regulate cathectic discharge but also to define two different kinds of thought process. Many psychoanalysts apply the terms both to different modes of energic discharge *and* to different types of thinking, although there are those who adhere to the narrower view that they refer strictly to economic hypotheses.[9]

The countercathectic defense mechanisms employed by the maturing psychic apparatuses to impede drive discharge have been subjected to intensive study by psychoanalytic investigators. Although dynamic considerations have received the greatest emphasis, the sequence of appearance and shift in dominance of the various defense clusters (i.e., the developmental aspect) have been given increasing attention.[10] Although the progressive differentiation and taming of affects by the developing ego has been the subject of less

[9] The former opinion is exemplified in the dual definitions provided in Moore, B. E., and Fine, B. D., editors: *A Glossary of Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts*. New York: The American Psychoanalytic Association, 1967. For the stricter point of view, see Arlow, J. A. and Brenner, C.: *Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory*. New York: International Universities Press, 1964, pp. 84-102.

[10] Anna Freud has made important contributions in this area. See Freud, A.: *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense* (1936). New York: International Universities Press, 1946, and *Normality and Pathology in Childhood, Assessments of Development*. New York: International Universities Press, 1965. Her concept

intensive study, Engel, Jacobson, Mahler, Rapaport, Schur, and others have made important contributions in this area.

The development of the cognitive structures that assume increasing importance as regulatory agencies has been the subject of relatively little psychoanalytic attention, however. Although Hartmann[11] and others have called attention to the importance of the intellectual sphere, the actual details of its development have not attracted a great deal of interest among psychoanalysts.[12] The work of Piaget and his collaborators helps to fill the void. Their description of the stages in the development of logical thinking goes far toward elucidating the transition from thought organized according to primary process to that reflecting secondary process regulations. They have demonstrated, moreover, that the transition takes place very slowly, extending through most of childhood. In describing this transition in structural terms they add scope and dimension to the largely economic and dynamic formulations of psychoanalysis.

Their description of the thought of the preoperational child essentially approximates that made by the psychoanalyst of thinking organized along primary process lines. The thinking of Piaget's Stage 1 child is characterized by rapid, easy shift from one attribute to another as a criterion for association and categorization, condensation of elements into unstable, jerry-built images that loosely coördinate them, poor distinction between part and whole, simultaneous existence of mutually contradictory beliefs, and a highly fluid imagery that is close to concrete perception. Through progressive internalization of his exploratory manipulations in such a fashion that his thought processes can range increasingly widely and reversibly, the child gradually moves toward the logically organized, consistent and cohesive, reversible, mobile thought of Stage 3 that

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of developmental lines and comments about progression and regression in childhood are of particular significance.

[11] Hartmann's contributions are too numerous to list. In addition to the work already cited, most of the relevant papers can be found in his *Essays on Ego Psychology: Selected Problems in Psychoanalytic Theory*. New York: International Universities Press, 1964.

[12] A notable exception is Peter Wolff's thoughtful attempt to integrate Piaget's theories about cognitive development in the sensorimotor period (the first year and a half after birth) with the psychoanalytic theory of the early development of the psychic apparatus. See, Wolff, P.: The Developmental Psychologies of Jean Piaget and Psychoanalysis. In: *Psychological Issues*, Vol. II, No. 1. New York: International Universities Press, 1960.

approximates what analysts refer to as secondary process thinking. The equilibration reaches relative stability at about ten years of age. The detailed description of the evolution from Stage 1 to Stage 3 that Inhelder and Piaget have provided represents a rich source of information about the evolution of secondary process regulation and adds significantly to our understanding of the course of structuralization of the ego.

A familiar observation can serve as an illustration of the clinical relevance of Piaget's findings. I am referring to the utilization by an analysand of different modes of thinking during a single analytic hour. During part of the session, thinking occurs in the form of words. At some point a shift takes place to pictorial images which have to be described to the analyst. At times such a shift signals a heightening of resistive forces that threatens to impede analytic progress. At other times, however, it does not interfere with the analytic work but seems to facilitate it.[13]

The data provided by Inhelder and Piaget can enhance our understanding of these observations. The experiments tracing the evolution of multiplicative classification (matrices) indicate that there exists a discontinuous sequence in which children below the age of six years make use of graphic means, involving visual symmetry, to solve the problems with which they are confronted, while older children shift to an entirely different nonvisual, abstract approach that, nevertheless, leads them to the same results. There is a significant difference between the two methods. The initial graphic approach is an intuitive one that allows for considerable contradiction and illogicality. The abstract method, achieved through increased organization, demands consistency and adherence to logical order. Reversion from the more advanced mode to the earlier one involves an intrasystemic regression to a more loosely organized type of thinking that utilizes a more primitive form of logic. The aim of such a regression can vary. It is obvious that it lends itself well to the purpose of resistance. Shift is made to a mode of thinking and problem-solving in which contradiction and illogicality are permitted to prevail. The ego is enabled to reach workable syntheses and conclusions at the same time that it excludes from awareness details which it would rather not have to consider.

[13] I am grateful to Drs. Shelley Orgel and Jules Glenn for their helpful comments in discussion of this clinical phenomenon.

A shift from verbal to imaginal thinking during an analytic session does not always signal an increase in resistance, however. In fact more often it represents a regression in the service of the ego[14] that facilitates the forward progress of the analysis. What seems to be taking place in this instance is that the ego frees itself from the restrictions imposed upon it by the narrow bounds of logical consistency and reality-syntonicity by instituting a controlled, limited, reversible regression of some of its functions, by means of which it reverts to a more primitive mode of thinking that is intuitive and imaginative in nature.

When the regression is reversed and return is made to more highly differentiated and organized verbal thought, rules of logic and order are applied to the relatively free-ranging imaginative thoughts that emanated during the regressed state, which thus are integrated into the mainstream of thinking. It has long been recognized that this kind of oscillation between, and integration of, archaic forms of thinking and more highly differentiated and organized thought processes is an essential ingredient in fantasy formation, daydreaming, and creative processes in general. The data adduced by Inhelder and Piaget suggest that this kind of alternation between, and synthesis of, higher and lower forms of thinking plays an important role in certain kinds of problem-solving as well. It will be recalled that in the course of evolution of operational thinking, but before an operational equilibrium had been established, the Stage 2 children whom they describe continually reverted to more archaic graphic modes to aid them whenever they ran into difficulty in their struggles to solve the problems before them. It would seem that development (including that which takes place in the course of psychoanalytic treatment) depends in part upon the ability to temporarily suspend higher forms of functioning and revert to earlier successful modes of problem-solving. The degree to which the regressive movement facilitates development, rather than inhibiting it, depends upon the degree of mobility and reversibility with which the ego is capable of carrying out the regressive process.[15]

[14] See, Kris, E.: *On Preconscious Mental Processes.* This QUARTERLY, XIX, 1950, pp. 540-560.

[15] I have discussed this in another context in Silverman, M. A. and Neubauer, P. B.: The Use of the Developmental Profile for the Prelatency Child. In: *The Unconscious Today,* edited by M. Kanzer. New York: International Universities Press (in press).

It has long been clear that an essential feature of the analytic process is the recovery of repressed archaic memories and fantasies so that they can be subjected to reflection and judgment by a more mature ego than existed at the time the memory traces were established and the fantasies were elaborated. It is possible, however, to postulate an additional aspect of the therapeutic effect of psychoanalysis. In the process of repeatedly ranging back and forth between archaic fantasies and the more mature thinking processes with which they are coördinated in the course of the analytic work, the ego appears to take part in an exercise that has the effect of progressively increasing the efficiency of its synthetic or integrative functions. This takes place through increasingly flexible and controlled alternation between regressive and progressive movements, with increasing integration of the results of these movements. If this is so, then it cannot suffice for the analytic process to simply 'make the unconscious conscious'. It may very well be equally important to facilitate improvement in the various components of the analysand's synthetic function, i.e., to effect a change in the ego itself.[16] This is a question that deserves further consideration by psychoanalytic investigators.

Piaget's description of early structural development adds further dimension to familiar psychoanalytic observations of the earliest period of life. His demonstration, for example, that permanence of an object representation transcending the availability of the actual object in the immediate perceptual field, which appears at eight to ten months of age, contributes to our understanding of the appearance of stranger anxiety (which depends upon the ability to

[16] Hartmann states, for example, that 'the mere reproduction of memories in psychoanalysis can, therefore, only partly correct the lack of connection or the incorrect connection of elements. An additional process comes into play here which may justly be described as a scientific process. It discovers (and does not rediscover), according to the general rules of scientific thinking, the correct relationships of the elements to each other. . . . Clearly, I do not concur with the often-voiced idea that the unconscious basically "knows it all" and that the task is merely to make this knowledge conscious by lifting this defense' (*Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation,* pp. 63-64). An elaboration of this view can be found in Hartmann, H.: *Technical Implications of Ego Psychology.* This QUARTERLY, XX, 1951, pp. 31-43. A further discussion of the technical aspects of this point of view is available in Blanck, G.: *Some Technical Implications of Ego Psychology.* Int. J. Psa., XLVII, 1966, pp. 6-13.

discriminate between mother and other persons) at precisely that age. His observations provide an additional source of data to help us understand the phenomena of pleasure in functioning and mastery through repetition. A detailed examination of these issues, however, would take us beyond the scope of this discussion. I raise them to further illustrate the heuristic value of Piaget's researches for psychoanalysis. Even if it were not for the areas of direct confluence, however, Piagetian exploration and theory deserve attention for the light they shed on significant aspects of human development. A broad interest in the manifold aspects of development is essential in psychoanalysis, particularly if it is to aspire to the status of a general psychology exerting influence upon education, child-rearing, characterology, and so on.

Even in the therapeutic psychoanalytic situation, however, familiarity with multiple facets of the human process facilitates the analyst's complex and difficult task. In the dawn of psychoanalysis, Freud used the image of a passenger in a railway carriage who has only indirect access to the window to illustrate the navigational problem of the analyst. With his usual parsimony and wisdom, he etched for us in this metaphor the essential limitation to our powers of observation.[17] He was not dissuaded from pursuing the task, but devoted himself among other things to the study and explication of the instruments at the analyst's disposal.

In the roughly three-quarters of a century that has elapsed since the beginning of our discipline, scientific exploration in all fields has exploded geometrically. We possess a mushrooming body of data regarding human development that is too valuable to be ignored. At a time when the jet age is hurtling toward the past, the complexity of our navigational task is becoming increasingly evident. At the same time, we are moving toward ever greater precision and accuracy. It is in the realm of ego psychology (including mutual influences of ego and id) that the most stirring effects are being felt. In this regard, it can be said that the painstaking researches of Piaget and his co-workers have yielded data of inestimable value to the psychoanalytic investigator. In the complexity of space age navigation, the instrument panel grows wider and wider.

[17] See, Lewin, B. D.: *The Train Ride: A Study of One of Freud's Figures of Speech.* This QUARTERLY, XXXIX, 1970, pp. 71-89.

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Sigmund Freud as a Consultant: Recollections of a Pioneer in Psychoanalysis. By Edoardo Weiss, M.D. New York: Intercontinental Medical Book Corp., 1970. 82 pp.

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BOOK REVIEWS

SIGMUND FREUD AS A CONSULTANT: RECOLLECTIONS OF A PIONEER IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Edoardo Weiss, M.D. New York: Intercontinental Medical Book Corp., 1970. 82 pp.

This book contains the correspondence between Freud and Edoardo Weiss from the years 1918-1938. It not only shows us Freud as a consultant to a colleague thirty years younger than himself, but also makes us keenly aware of the change in psychoanalytic training and technique. Some of these letters have been published previously, but this book brings together the complete correspondence for the first time.

One is astounded to learn how uncomplicated it was at that period to become a recognized psychoanalyst. In 1908 Edoardo Weiss came from his native town of Trieste to Vienna to study medicine. Sincerely interested in the young science of psychoanalysis and troubled by some personal psychological problems, he went to Freud, was cordially received by the Professor, and advised to undergo a personal analysis if he intended to become an analyst himself. After the completion of his medical studies and a classical analysis with Dr. Paul Federn—for whom Weiss maintained a lifelong admiration and affection—he was made a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. He was twenty-four years old when admitted to the weekly Wednesday meetings. In 1918 Weiss established himself in Trieste which, after the first World War, had become a part of Italy. Freud was enthusiastic about his science taking root in a country he loved for its culture and beauty.

From that time on a correspondence developed in which Freud supervised—as we would call it today—many of Weiss's more difficult cases. Weiss would send long, detailed descriptions to Vienna and receive regular answers in which Freud's judgment and advice were expressed in the most gentle and encouraging manner. It was taken for granted that the analyst had consultations with the parents of patients and advised them, if necessary, how to deal with them. These patients were mainly young adults. In some cases, Weiss would travel with his patient, and at times with the parents as well, to Vienna for a consultation with the Professor. It did not seem to impair the analysis of the transference; at least there is no

mention of this. Freud emphasized that the analyst should feel free to handle a case in his own way even if it differed from his suggestions and experiences. 'I would do it this way but of course it does not mean you have to do it the same way.' Or: 'Do not feel bad about a patient who left in anger, or with whom you have been unsuccessful. It has happened to all of us.'

The opinion that Freud was only scientifically interested in his patients, lacking any humane concern—an attitude assumed, unfortunately, by some colleagues—is disproved in these letters to his student. His fondness for a patient, his interest in his cure, and his compassion for his suffering are openly expressed. 'Unfortunately we can cure so few patients that we have to console ourselves with having learned from every case.' When Freud felt that a patient was morally inferior, he lost interest in him. 'There has to be a certain conflict of suffering between his ego and what his drives demand . . . and a half-way normal ego which can coöperate with the analyst.' (We would call it today the therapeutic or working alliance.) Otherwise the patient was not suited for analysis and not worth the doctor's time and effort. One of Weiss's patients, whose father paid for his son's analysis, had told his father the fee was higher and had kept the difference for himself. Freud's prescription for such people was: 'Send them to South America, they may find their fortune and happiness there'.

Freud's opinion in a case of impotence is interesting. In the letter of May 26, 1922, he advised total abstinence with discouragement of masturbation which would block the normal access to women.

There was one case in which Weiss did not follow Freud's advice at all. Freud, after having seen in consultation the case of a young girl who suffered from hysterical seizures and severe acting out, had suggested to Weiss not to grant the patient special favors such as the right to sit up during sessions. Weiss not only yielded to her request, but walked with the patient down the street after her hour. The patient was cured and Weiss triumphantly proclaimed his liberation from the master.

Toward the end of their collaboration, Weiss asked Freud whether he would recommend that he analyze his young unneurotic son who wanted to study medicine and become a psychoanalyst. Here is Freud's answer: 'Concerning the analysis of your hopeful son, that is certainly a ticklish business. With a younger promising

brother it might be done more easily. With one's own daughter I succeeded well. There are special difficulties and doubts with a son. . . . I would not advise you to do it and have no right to forbid it.' Freud, who made us understand the Œdipus myth, perhaps relived another Greek myth, Pallas Athena springing from her father's head.

Weiss not only made analysis known in Italy, but had also the great merit of translating a number of Freud's works into Italian. Part of the correspondence concerns this subject. Weiss watched with anxious jealousy other Italian psychiatrists who undertook, not always correctly, the task of spreading analysis in Italy. One even formed a psychoanalytical society near Naples. Freud himself was much more lenient toward these colleagues. He wrote: '. . . your news about the Italian Society, of course, could have been more favorable. . . . After all, it happens frequently that the form appears before the content. . . . Let us hope that this form in time will be filled with content, and when this happens, it will be your accomplishment and to your merit.'

The correspondence ended abruptly in 1938 when Freud went in exile to London and Weiss found refuge in America. The wisdom expressed in these letters and Freud's elegant style of letter writing make this little book quite unique. The excellent translation by Etelka and Martin Grotjahn does Freud's style full justice, and the introduction by Martin Grotjahn is a helpful and valuable contribution to the book.

YELA LOWENFELD (NEW YORK)

SIGMUND FREUD. FOUNDER OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Agnes M. McGlashan and Christopher J. Reeve. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. 148 pp.

This is a short biography of Sigmund Freud that focuses on the interrelationship of his life and his theories. The authors, a psychiatrist and an educational psychologist, using accurate sources of information, have succeeded in presenting Freud's story in a clear, crisp style. It is one of a series of books, written primarily for readers aged fourteen and up, which are introductions to the lives of individuals (others are: Luther, Aristotle, Bacon, Curie, Darwin, and Mohammed) who have made significant contributions to civilization.

Freud comes through as a pioneer discoverer whose human sensitivity profoundly affected his work and theories. The book does not spare his weaknesses and mistakes; it gives him recognition for his discoveries and the impact they have made on mankind. This accent may leave the impression that the exigencies of an individual's life have a greater effect on the creative process than might actually be the case. Following an excellent presentation of Freud's scientific heritage, the authors state: 'Because his theory had a firm physiological basis, he constructed on it an elaborate theory of mental life'. It is misleading to assume that Freud's theories have a firm physiological basis, for it leads to confusion in interpreting and understanding such constructs as psychic energy and forces. These psychological concepts are metaphors that have different usage and meaning from their physical counterparts from which they are borrowed. The authors missed this opportunity for presenting an outstanding example in the history of science of the way established ideas and concepts can serve as models for new theory formation. Since the book is also a history of psychoanalysis, it is regrettable that the authors did not use their space more forcefully by bringing psychoanalytic theory up to date at least with some notation of the innovations in ego and developmental psychology. To have included such material would have been more in keeping with the high level of the book than the weak part of the section on psychiatry which tells of 'wealthy ladies' lying on psychoanalytic couches, instead of drawing room couches, discussing spa waters.

Despite these objections, I find that the book is one to be highly recommended to anyone—young or old—who wishes to get a brief introduction to Freud's life and theories.

CARL P. ADATTO (NEW ORLEANS)

DIFFICULTIES IN THE PATH OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. A Confrontation of Past with Present Viewpoints. By Anna Freud. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 83 pp.

In evaluating difficulties in the path of psychoanalysis, Miss Freud follows her father's precedent. However, as her subtitle indicates, she believes that now the main difficulties result from divergences among psychoanalysts themselves, not from outside resistances as was true in the past. That is not to say that external difficulties have van-

ished. Rather they have changed, and now they are more in the nature of seductive pressures toward conformity and conventional academic standards with the accompanying threat to the unique features of psychoanalysis.

In regard to clinical work, Miss Freud conceptualizes two general trends. One, with which she identifies herself, is the analysis of the defenses and of the ego. She does not believe that this required a major technical change and, particularly, does not place great weight on either the introduction of the structural model or on Hartmann's work which, she points out, was not intended to influence practice directly.

A second trend is radically different and not in accord with her views. This trend is based on the assertion of a number of analysts that they can analyze the events of the first year of life. Going beyond Freud's discovery that a neurosis in an adult was preceded by an infantile neurosis (that is, in childhood), they claim that this infantile neurosis, itself, is preceded by fateful interactions between the mother and infant in the first weeks of life, and that it is this archaic, preverbal phase which has to be revived in the transference and analyzed before the later infantile neurosis can be approached effectively.

This approach goes beyond the area of intrapsychic conflict 'which had always been the legitimate target for psychoanalysis and into the darker area of interaction between innate endowment and environmental influence' (p. 39). Memory cannot reach these early experiences, and repetition and re-enactment must replace remembering. The argument that the analyst-patient relationship resembles the mother-infant relationship overlooks the striking differences between them. The power of a quasi-delusional transference is presumed to allow analysis beyond the confines of ego function and to penetrate the very processes by which the ego was formed. Furthermore, it is implied that even the earliest of acquired characteristics is subject to influence analytically.

Another difficulty is the tendency to define metapsychology as theory which is unrelated to clinical facts. As such it becomes sterile speculation, a useless encumbrance to the clinician. In the past, metapsychology and clinical work were unified. While different aspects of metapsychology were not always equally emphasized, it was always understood that its purpose was to explain and systematize the clinical data, not to expand in a vacuum. Now, genetic

exploration—which is not the direct aim of analytic work but a means to understanding—has captured an undue amount of interest at the expense of other metapsychological factors.

Miss Freud's essay challenges the comfortable assumption that psychoanalysis is making progress. One is reminded of Waelder's warnings in the introduction of his Basic Theory of Psychoanalysis to the effect that it is important to conserve what we have inherited and that change may not mean progress. With her mastery of psychoanalysis and her gift for clarity, Miss Freud has formulated problems important to every analyst. She expresses her opinions with some circumspection and tact, but the blunt question is whether psychoanalysis, as we have known it, will survive, or whether it will 'progress' into a wonderland of therapeutic omnipotence and mystical theory.

SAMUEL D. LIPTON (CHICAGO)

BASIC PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS ON THE LIBIDO THEORY. The Hampstead Clinic Psychoanalytic Library, Vol. I. By Humberto Nagera, et al. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969. 194 pp.

BASIC PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS ON THE THEORY OF DREAMS. The Hampstead Clinic Psychoanalytic Library, Vol. II. By Humberto Nagera, et al. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969, 121 pp.

These volumes are the result of a coöperative effort by members of the Concept Research Group of the Hampstead Clinic. The editor hopes that they will be of special interest to students by offering summaries of Freud's writings on various concepts. The summaries consist of quotations or paraphrases from the Standard Edition of Freud's Psychological Works. Each reference is to title, volume, and page, so that 'the student can readily find his way back to Freud's work in order to pursue and become more fully acquainted with his formulations'. It may be noted that there are also frequent references in Volume I to Freud's letters to Fliess, published in The Origins of Psychoanalysis.

The concepts considered in Volume I are twenty-four in number. Their scope and diversity may be suggested by the following samples: Source, Pressure, Aim, and Object of the Sexual Component Instinct; Œdipus Complex; Latency; and Perversion. As a general rule, the authors have tried to indicate the growth of Freud's the-

ories, as well as the changes in them, if any. They were not always consistent in following this announced intention, probably for reasons that are inherent in the subject matter of the volume. The topic Libido Theory is an extremely difficult one to deal with in such an outline form. Freud rightly emphasized the interdependence of physical and psychological factors in the sexual life of man. At the same time, he was the first to recognize how incomplete his efforts were in that direction, and how uncertain and problematic must be many formulations concerning the relationship between the physical and the psychological until new methods of studying that relationship may become available.

Despite these difficulties, it was probably wise to begin the series with a volume on Libido Theory. It will serve to emphasize to all, not only to students, an important fact which tends to be overshadowed in these days of preoccupation with various aspects of ego psychology—the fact that one of Freud's major discoveries was that man is an instinctual animal to a far greater degree than was, or is, generally believed; the fact that sexual and aggressive wishes furnish the usual and by far the most powerful driving forces within the human mind.

Volume II presented the authors with a much easier task of organization than did Volume I. The concepts considered are roughly congruous with the major topic headings in Freud's The Interpretation of Dreams.

The format of both volumes is substantial and pleasantly readable. Each volume has an index as well as a list of the major concepts considered, the latter serving as chapter headings.

In works of this sort the accuracy of the references is important. A check of one hundred references selected at random from Volume I revealed three trivial errors, two that were likely to be troublesome (p. 93 for p. 98; p. 193 for p. 183), and one error of substance ('the work of mourning' is said to be achieved by 'identification or introjection'). Of one hundred references checked in Volume II, there were two trivial errors, one reference was not apropos to the text, and one was troublesome (p. 512 for p. 493). Curiously enough, all the errors found in Volume II were in the last six pages.

These volumes and their successors should serve many students well as a convenient road of access to Freud's writings.

CHARLES BRENNER (NEW YORK)

THE COURAGE TO LOVE. SELECTED PAPERS OF EDITH WEIGERT, M.D. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 421 pp.

These twenty-three papers—all but one published previously—span the years 1936 to 1967. The Introduction refers to Dr. Weigert's psychoanalytic training in Berlin in the late 1920's. (The Education Committee, by the way, included Drs. Alexander, Eitingon, Horney, Müller-Braunschweig, Rado, Sachs, and Simmel, and other teachers included Bernfeld and Fenichel.) By 1929 she was treating psychotic patients as Simmel's associate in the famous psychoanalytic hospital at Tegelsee. Migrating to the United States in the 1930's, she was greatly influenced by Harry Stack Sullivan and within a few years became a leader in the 'Washington-Baltimore Group' that included Louis Hill, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, William V. Silverberg, Clara Thompson, and Marjorie Jarvis among its pioneers. It is clear from her references that no point of view in psychoanalytic thinking has escaped Dr. Weigert's attention; and it is apparent too that she has been profoundly influenced by modern European philosophy, especially existentialism.

Part I of the book, entitled Facing the Human Condition, opens with The Psychoanalytic View of Human Personality, but after that it is heavily infused with philosophy and even mysticism revealing, nevertheless, great compassion for the plight of modern man. Part II, Psychoanalysis and Psychopathology, is on more familiar ground, with important contributions to the subjects of narcissism, identity, schizophrenia, and the affective psychoses. Part III, Theoretical and Technical Problems in Psychoanalysis, includes papers on dissent in the early years of psychoanalysis, flexibility of technique, the use of countertransference in therapy, and special problems of termination. Part IV, Ethology, Mythology, and Existential Philosophy, is explained by its title.

All psychoanalysts can learn from this book, I think; but many will disagree with large sections of it. Without attack or polemics, Dr. Weigert questions nearly every psychoanalytic term and concept. In a quiet, meditative way she asks, in effect: 'Is this really the basic problem in neurosis? Is there perhaps an added dimension here? Is this formulation truly consonant with the patient's affective experience and perceptions?' The effort to blend existential philosophy with psychoanalytic psychology presents the greatest dif-

ficulties for me. Striving to escape from the excessive intellectuality and sterility of psychoanalytic science (as she sees it), Dr. Weigert finds herself in a realm of faith, trust, love, and interpersonal interaction that takes on, for me, the flavor of a latter-day neo-Platonism transposed into the relationship of I and Thou. I fear that she has substituted equally impossible human aspirations for those from which she would free us.

The Courage to Love is in the tradition of Cardinal Newman's *Apologia Pro Fida Sua*—not as defense, but as affirmation. Under her title she unites a diversity of papers in at least two ways. One is the advocacy of courage to draw upon all available sources of wisdom for the understanding of human suffering, and the courage to be flexible in the application of whatever techniques are most appropriate and helpful to the person in distress. The title also suggests the plea to extend traditional notions of psychopathology to include concepts of existential anxiety and despair, and to expand therapeutic goals to the realization of existential trust and love. The degree to which Dr. Weigert's position is convincing depends, it seems to me, on one's view of the causes of alienation, not to mention more serious emotional difficulties, in contemporary life.

DOUGLASS W. ORR (LA JOLLA, CALIF.)

THE MECHANISM OF DENIAL; THE MANIFEST CONTENT OF THE DREAM. (Monograph III of the Kris Study Group of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute). Edited by Bernard D. Fine, M.D., Edward D. Joseph, M.D., and Herbert F. Waldhorn, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 113 pp.

Generations of students who have become bewildered in their efforts to differentiate between denial and repression may be relieved to find that their confusion is not due to obtuseness but to contradictory and muddled usage of the two terms in the psychoanalytic literature. Freud himself was partly responsible for this. In his 1927 paper, On Fetishism, he suggested that the term repression might be divided into 'denial' when it referred to a vicissitude of the idea, and 'repression' when it referred to a vicissitude of the affect. In his 1938 Outline of Psychoanalysis, however, he applied 'denial' to a defense against the demands of the external world and 'repression' to a defense against the instinctual demands of the internal world. In The Mechanism of

Denial, the first of two articles in this scholarly 'monograph' (or, rather, 'duograph'), the majority of the study group advocated a broad definition of denial, one in which the differentiation from repression remains elusive: 'Denial operates primarily against a danger. The danger can be an affect, an instinctual impulse, a superego command, or a percept, whether external or internal.' The minority preferred a usage similar to that in Freud's Outline.

The report proposes two differences in the dynamics of denial and repression: in denial there is a withdrawal of cathexis from that which is denied and the mechanism operates within the ego itself; in repression there is a countercathexis against the idea and the mechanism operates between the ego and the id. It is not clear whether these differences are applied to one or both definitions. If applied to the majority definition, it is difficult to understand how instinctual drives and superego commands can be included among the forces denied and still insist that the mechanism operates solely within the ego. If applied to the minority definition, the denial of external percepts which result in part from the externalization of repressed ideas is accompanied by loss of cathexes whereas the repressed ideas themselves are accompanied by countercathexes. This is heady ground.

David Rubinfine, one of the participants, postulated that denial is directed against painful percepts of objects that evoke aggression and hence threaten object loss as well as percepts that threaten narcissistic mortification, including castration threats. As such, he felt, it has a special role in the preservation of object and self-representations. The group as a whole preferred a somewhat modified point of view: '. . . the adaptive function of denial is the avoidance of painful affect evoked by percepts which arouse signal anxiety basically related to the continuum of threats encountered by the developing ego: danger of loss of object, danger of loss of love, castration, superego disapproval, and loss of self-esteem'. Denial leads to reconciliation of instinctual strivings and superego demands.

Early severe disturbances in object relations, including those due to prolonged pain or overstimulation, are the most significant genetic factors that stimulate the use of denial as a preferred defense mechanism. Others include identifications with parents or cultural institutions that favor the use of this mechanism. The report points to the difficulty in testing hypotheses because denial

is rarely seen in pure form. In nonpsychotic adults, at least, the group believes it is always used in conjunction with other defense mechanisms.

In continuing the discussion from the various points of view of metapsychology, the report also covers such topics as 'return of the denied' in symptom formation, denial as a prerequisite for all other defenses, and the use of screen affects and acting out in maintaining the process of denial. It suggests that the avoidance movements and the hallucinatory wish-fulfilment of infancy are early models for the defense. It points to the danger inherent in denial in threatening the maintenance of a sense of reality. It also refers to its adaptive role, as in the taming of affects.

It would be of interest to hear further from the group on the frequent use of denial (or what appears to be denial) in such everyday processes as the establishment of firm points of view in politics and religion (where one or more sets of ideas or percepts are discarded in favor of others), in love (where the lover is often blind to the imperfections of the love object), and in identity formation (where integration includes disavowing certain identity elements in favor of others).

In the second article of Monograph III, The Manifest Content of the Dream, a chapter of dream material forms the clinical basis for the individual reports that follow.

Walter Stewart discusses two types of unusual dreams: those containing overt references to incestuous, sadistic, or immoral wishes and those portraying traumatic childhood scenes. On the basis of these dreams, he criticizes Freud's explanation that anxiety dreams are due to a failure of dream work. At the same time, he commends Freud's alternate view, expressed in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, that the original function of the dream is to master traumatic stimuli. The first step in the effort to mastery, Stewart suggests, is a change from passive to active; later, the dream is re-edited on the basis of wish fulfilment. He contests the assumption that the manifest content is derived solely from the preconscious and current events: the unconscious and childhood, sources of the latent content, also contribute to it.

Milton Horowitz points out that the style of the manifest dream is a secondary elaboration contributed by the ego. This style remains unchanged throughout the course of psychoanalysis, although shifts in object choice may occur and wishes and feelings

may become clearer. One wonders if this reflects a similar inability of therapeutic psychoanalysis to produce basic changes in character. The group's attempts to correlate style with personality structure, however, were generally unsuccessful. It also found that the manifest content did not aid in diagnosis with the exception of bizarre, primitive dreams occurring early in analysis: in these, a psychosis could be suspected but not proved.

Bernard Fine states that disturbances of object relations, ego attitudes, defenses, and transference material are reflected in the manifest content, and believes that understanding them may be useful in clarifying the situation in waking life. He gives a passing nod of approval to Erikson for stressing the importance of the manifest dream content in The Dream Specimen of Psychoanalysis, but then cavalierly dismisses him because he structures dream elements into 'more or less latent'. In Monograph II, The Place of the Dream in Clinical Psychoanalysis, Erikson was ignored; here, he is depreciated without evidence that his significant contributions were comprehended.

In the last chapter Isidor Bernstein and Jules Glenn suggest that masturbation fantasies appear more often in the manifest content of the dream than is generally realized. A story form of a dream may indicate the presence of such a fantasy. Bodily sensations associated with masturbation may be projected into the dream, and motion in a dream may reveal its masturbatory character. Either conscious or unconscious fantasies may be inferred from the manifest content. Finally, the authors suggest that dreams and masturbation have similar functions related to the discharge of drives, to defenses, and to the mastery of traumatic events.

ALBERT J. LUBIN (WOODSIDE, CALIF.)

SLEEP AND DREAMING. Edited by Ernest Hartmann, M.D. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970. 444 pp.

This is a book for sleep researchers about the biology of sleep, and an invitation for more research. A less misleading title might have been The New Biological Findings in Sleep and Dreaming: Suggestions for Further Research. The dream is studied by means of its electrophysiological coefficients rather than from a psychological point of view. In the form of answers to cogent questions posed by the editor, thirty-seven contributors, mostly sleep re-

searchers, bear witness to the deluge of accumulated data pertaining to the electroencephalographic and neurophysiological properties of the sleeping and dreaming states. The editor's questions are more provocative than the answers are satisfactory.

In a compendium of this nature, some duplication and unevenness are inevitable. The tremendous and bewildering volume of data adduced here cries out for a degree of ordering and structure. None is available, a state of affairs which perhaps reflects the disorganization of partisan pioneers staking out claims in a brave new world. The book contains a comprehensive subject index, and copious references are appended to each chapter. It will be of value to those interested in the methodology of sleep and dream research as practiced in the laboratory today.

Perhaps the time will come when we may expect the correlation of neurophysiological processes and psychological events in sleep and dreaming. That time has not yet arrived. Carried away by enthusiasm for objective recording, 'hard' scientific instruments, and responses that can be verified and measured by their use, many investigators show a lack of regard for, and inability to deal with, the 'extraneous variables' of the subject's motivation. As one contributor notes with chagrin: 'The experimenter is at the mercy of the subject in this situation'. Too bad. Such a hardheaded preference fails to make a clear distinction between two related but not necessarily equivalent concepts, the biology of sleep and the psychology of dreaming.

I quote in their entirety both the editor's final questions and the response elicited:

> Knowledge is power. All power corrupts. Are there signs of corruption in this field of knowledge? Can knowledge from sleep-dream research be misused?
> No answers received. Silence.

LEON L. ALTMAN (NEW YORK)

DREAM PSYCHOLOGY AND THE NEW BIOLOGY OF DREAMING. Edited by Milton Kramer, M.D. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1969. 459 pp.

During the last fifteen years there has been a huge amount of research in a field now known as 'sleep and dreaming' or 'the

biology of dreaming'. The D-state (desynchronized sleep or REM sleep), the physiological state concomitant with most dreaming in man, is recognized as a distinct organismic or behavioral state probably present in all mammalian species. Its study has led to advances in neurophysiology and neurochemistry far removed from its relationship with dreaming. My own view is that this work, though currently chiefly chemical and physiological in its orientation, is immensely important for human psychology since hopefully it is studying the physiology of primitive or primary process thinking.

Along with this development, or perhaps despite it, there have existed a number of researchers whose interests lay in studying the dream itself rather than its biology—a perfectly natural interest, yet somehow these researchers have felt swamped, or left out, and have become increasingly defensive. It has become impossible to hear a paper from a member of this group without hearing a lengthy apology including either a quote from Seymour Kety, 'We may soon have a biology of thinking but not a biology of thoughts' modified to 'a biology of dreaming but not of dreams', or a quote from Allan Rechtschaffen, 'We are in danger of learning a lot of biology without knowing what it is the biology of', or both. Since this group of researchers is prominent among the authors of the present volume and the organizers of the symposium on which it is based, I approached the book with some trepidation, fearing that I would be reading a long, sincere, but totally unnecessary defense of an interest in studying the dream. Although there are hints of this attitude here and there, this collection itself turns out to be much more positive.

The book begins with the traditional physiological chapter, by Frederick Snyder. This is followed by a number of different viewpoints on the psychology of dreaming, including some seldom heard voices such as a culturalist view, a Jungian view, an Adlerian view, and an existential view. Carl Meier, in an article attempting to formulate a Jungian view of dreams, makes one excellent point that has concerned me and other sleep and dream researchers: if, as freudian theory suggests, censorship and repression together serve an important function in maintaining psychic health by keeping most dream material out of awareness through

forgetting, and distorting it so that even what does come into awareness is relatively harmless, then a subject repeatedly awakened during D-periods in the laboratory and asked for his dreams would be expected to find this a quite terrifying experience—a forcible violation, as it were, of his usual repressions. No such effects are seen, although the *anticipation* of a night of laboratory awakenings is sometimes quite anxiety-provoking. Possibly the subjects are flexible enough to use other defenses in place of the violated repression, or perhaps there is considerable distress in the procedure which we have so far not entirely appreciated; but it may be that the necessity of repressing dream material has been overestimated.

Both Adlerian and Jungian dream theorists seem to dislike the idea of the censor. Jung's notions on dreaming are summarized succinctly if perhaps too simply by Joseph Wheelwright who, in discussing Meier's paper, states that the dream, rather than being a distorted wish fulfilment, simply gives an account of how things are in a certain part of the basement (unconscious) at certain times. The Adlerian view, never precisely outlined by Adler, suggests a future orientation—the dream has a function in the preparation for waking life, a view also presented in this volume by Thomas French, Roy Whitman, and Richard Jones.

The second half of the book is concerned with problems of content analysis of dreams. The content analysis of dreams is just what it sounds like. Various categories and subcategories are formulated, dreams are methodically chopped into pieces according to predetermined rules, and each piece is assigned one or more categories and subcategories. The resulting quantitative data are then handled in all the ways numbers usually get handled. The categories can be either relatively 'close to the material' and simple-sounding as in the *humans, animals,* and *inanimate objects* of Calvin Hall's categories, or can be theoretically derived and 'higher level', such as Richard Jones's *zonal* and *modal* categories based on Erikson's epigenetic scheme. (As can easily be imagined, decent content analysis of even a single dream is an arduous task and there are numerous problems of reliability and so on.) Thus content analysis has up to now struck most of us as being so time-consuming relative to its possible value that we have grudgingly admitted it should be done, but at the same time heaved a sigh of

relief that someone else was doing it. It is heartening therefore to see a collection of articles whose tone is optimistic and whose general level of sophistication is high.

I found especially worth-while Dr. Jones's brief article which clarifies the important distinction between the *psychology of dreams,* i.e., the general process of dream formation, and *dream interpretation,* referring to the use of dreams in the therapeutic situation.

Bill Domhoff discusses the by now well-known finding that home dreams are more dreamlike and more exciting than are laboratory dreams. There are *caveats* here, but something close to this finding has been repeatedly described and again suggests that although repression may play a part in forgetting dreams, by and large it is the more emotional, bizarre dreams that are normally remembered and many dull ones generally lost unless resuscitated by such techniques as sleep laboratory awakenings.

Herman Witkin always writes lucidly and his chapter reads well despite its great length. Dr. Witkin is engaged in a large project involving the influence of presleep materials—specifically films—on dream content. The early results he presents are tantalizing, but I have read these in print a number of times by now, and I am extremely curious about what happens next.

Rosalind Cartwright provides a good discussion of and some evidence about dreams functioning in a 'continuity' rather than a 'compensatory' relationship to waking life; people who had a lot of hostile impulses during waking life also showed more of these during dreaming, etc. She suggests that this is more consistent with an Adlerian position of dreams solving conflicts than with the freudian position of dreams fulfilling wishes. I do not really believe that these data are relevant to either functional hypothesis.

In summary this is a worth-while and readable collection of articles. Though any collection deriving from a symposium suffers from some unevenness and wanderings off into byways, this one appears to have been carefully edited to avoid repetitiveness and errors of fact. Though the long-sought bridge between biology and psychology has not suddenly appeared, at least serious-minded workers can be seen sharpening their tools on both sides of the river.

ERNEST HARTMANN (BOSTON)

EGO AND INSTINCT. The Psychoanalytic View of Human Nature—Revised. By Daniel Yankelovich and William Barrett. New York: Random House, 1970. 494 pp.

This is an important book which psychoanalysts must debate intensively. It raises more questions than it answers, but the questions may lead to better answers to a number of basic problems. It is a good volume on which to base a fourth year seminar at a psychoanalytic institute on the conceptual and philosophical underpinning of psychoanalysis.

Ego and Instinct is the result of the collaboration of a social psychologist active in motivation research and a philosopher. The level of information and sophistication is very high. In the foreword the authors acknowledge their indebtedness to exchanges with a group of Boston psychoanalysts. As an account of Freud's basic conceptions, the first five chapters can hardly be surpassed in clarity of perception and statement. Most of the second part—the next five chapters—on Hartmann and Erikson are still exciting reading. Part Three, endeavoring a new philosophical start, Part Four, concerned with reconstruction, and chapter twenty-two, Beyond Psychoanalysis, are, to this reviewer, less successful.

Some of the authors' eventual difficulties are foreshadowed in the earlier part of the book when they seem to be preoccupied with the 'autonomy of the ego' rather than with the *relatively autonomous characteristics of certain ego functions.*[1] One can't really blame anybody too much for such a misconception because autonomy is one of the poorly defined concepts. It means, as I understand it: a, that certain functions are congenitally present in lesser or greater extent (e.g., intelligence, motor dexterity) and are not (primarily) the derivative of instincts; b, the customary use of 'autonomous' also implies that intelligence, motor functioning, etc., play their role relatively unaffected by drives in the well-functioning person; and c, the third meaning of autonomous was best stated, even for psychoanalytic use, by Allport[2] as the (secondary) functional autonomy of a motive (from its original drive source).

[1] Bellak, Leopold and Hurvich, Marvin S.: *A Systematic Study of Ego Functions.* J. of Nervous and Mental Disease, CXLVIII, 1969.

[2] Allport, Gordon W.: *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation.* New York: Henry Holt, 1937.

Unfortunately, the authors' nearly dereistic thinking of the ego and its autonomy leads them to a fourth and inappropriate meaning of autonomy as freedom of will. It is a short step from that misconception to a misinterpretation of Erikson and an overvaluation of existentialism. Erikson has made a substantial contribution by stressing what is best seen as certain *phase specific problems of adaptations.* He has justifiably and usefully stressed the importance of original basic trust. He has enriched our knowledge of the specific problems of the adolescent in finding new identity for his new body and new self. He has feelingly described the adaptive problems, strengths, and pitfalls of middle age and old age.

It is entirely true that psychoanalysis as a theory of general psychology has not taken cognizance of these areas systematically, nor of a number of other important facets of personality. (I, for one, am not aware of a discussion of self-esteem in psychoanalysis until Edward Bibring introduced it as part of the crucial processes in depression, and Annie Reich described some of the important pathological forms of self-esteem regulation.) That the authors are within the *Zeitgeist* in wishing to stress the experiential aspects of the self as well as in the psychoanalytic situation is evidenced by papers presented for the 1969 Congress in Rome, e.g., Levin,[3] and summaries and discussions in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (Vol. LI, 1970). The authors make a good point in stating that some aspects of metapsychology as a continuation of nineteenth century scientific thinking have accounted for an unduly mechanical view of the psychoanalytic process in therapy. The analyst as *tabula rasa* and projection screen was one of the resultant absolutist fictions, ignoring adaptive ego functions of the patient in the analytic situation. It took the Sullivanians, and later Erikson, to reintroduce Freud's early awareness of the therapeutic alliance. Though Sterba introduced the topic in 1934, it took nearly a papal bull by Gitelson to admit nontransference factors as legitimate subjects for discussion in classical analysis. On the other hand, the authors sound almost romantic in their view of the patient as a 'free' partner (p. 282)

[3] Levin, D. C.: *The Self: A Contribution to Its Place in Theory and Technique.* Int. J. Psa., L, 1969, pp. 41-51.

in the work of therapy. They immediately go on to make a common error for such otherwise extremely erudite people, and at excessive length take issue with Freud's assumption that psychotics could not form a transference relationship—a view which Freud held only briefly and revised himself as early as 1904.[4]

After that, the authors range wide and far—perhaps too far—into many issues of philosophy and psychology. Impressive as their font of information is, a good editor could have helped them condense a great deal of it and make their main points stronger. Unfortunately, while they overdo in some areas of philosophy, they lack information and understanding in the fields of experimental approach and operational definitions. From my own personal experience, I cannot agree with the authors that the metapsychological framework does not permit one to test hypotheses. They are perhaps not aware of work like that done by myself, Smith, and several analytic colleagues that made a reasonable case for the ability to verify, modify, or reject analytic hypotheses[5] or such work as the exploration of the oral triad with the Blacky test, or experimental work by Spence on oral fantasies.[6] They fall back on Sears's outdated account of experimental studies of psychoanalytic concepts published about a quarter of a century ago.[7]

Many of the authors' critical statements are acute and appropriate. For instance, their critique of the poor quality of propositions concerning a shift of cathexes is well taken. The energic concept per se has been the subject of exhaustive and learned but unfruitful discussion. Speaking operationally, however, there is little difficulty in defining cathexes as a matter of hedonic pref-

[4] Freud: Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. In: *Gesammelte Werke, Vol. V.* London: Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1942, p. 119.

[5] Bellak, Leopold with Smith, M. Brewster: *An Experimental Exploration of the Psychoanalytic Process: Exemplification of a Method.* This QUARTERLY, XXV, 1956, pp. 385-414.

[6] Spence, Donald P.: *Activation and Measurement of an Early Oral Fantasy: An Exploratory Study.* Paper delivered at New York Psychoanalytic Institute on April 20, 1965.

[7] Sears, Robert R.: *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts.* New York: Social Science Research Council, 1943; and Experimental Analysis of Psychoanalytic Phenomena. In: *Personality and the Behavior Disorders,* edited by Joseph McV. Hunt. New York: Ronald Press, 1944, pp. 306-332.

erence.[8] The process of shifting preference from one zone to another, from one mode or aim to another, or from one object to another, can be experimentally stated and verified. They are entirely right, however, in their complaint that too little has been done in any acceptable scientific way about accurate description of observable phenomena in psychoanalysis.

The authors' own attempt at restatement of psychoanalysis on new philosophical premises is predicated primarily on two principles: the ontological or constitutive principle and the regulatory or epistemological principle. One refers to description of content, the other to methodological strategies. They decided to follow Heidegger's proposition that ontology dictates epistemology, that is, that the nature of a subject determines how it should be investigated. This approach seems reasonable enough if one keeps in mind that music is hard to study with a microscope. They are still on very good ground when they discuss the need for laws of structure formation which are less simplistic than the pleasure principle. Their attempt to join a maturational schedule with a theory of learning and with one of structure formation is a matter deserving considerable thought, discussion, and trial and error.

The next step into ontology, however, takes the authors to the proposition that certain basic experiences, e.g., a neurosis, are a unique and discrete Gestalt and, for practical purposes, irreducible into component parts. They proceed from that misconception logically to the position that the term 'analysis' is itself a misnomer. As far as I am concerned, analysis in its strictest meaning implies indeed the breaking down of an apperceptive distortion[9] (e.g., seeing all females as castrating) into its many developmental perceptions. (A lack of stress on a perceptual view of personality is another of the authors' failings.) There is no reason why any analytic theoretician could not reduce an apperception or a behavioral configuration to a number of individual experiences. Overdeterminism is a cornerstone of analytic theory. Analytic theory, however, does not make it necessary to believe that all structural

[8] Bellak, Leopold: Psychoanalytic Theory of Personality: Notes toward a Systematic Textbook of Psychoanalysis. In: *Psychology of Personality,* edited by James L. McCary. New York: Logos Press, 1956, pp. 1-62.

[9] Bellak, Leopold: *Free Association: Conceptual and Clinical Aspects.* Int. J. Psa., XLII, 1961, pp. 9-20.

change is completed at age five, as the authors think. Those of us who have come to think of the self as a semi-open system have made ample allowance for change by interaction with the environment well after early childhood and, in fact, in any year of life.

Part of the authors' problem lies in fusing psychoanalysis with existentialism. Much of what they have to say, I think, pertains to *experiential* data for which no recourse to the whole non-rational cobweb of existentialism is necessary. If one really wants to stress the experiential factors in life in the psychoanalytic process, in distinction to an overmechanized conception of energy exchanges and other processes, there is ample ground for statements within a rational systematic framework.

The authors say (p. 342) that much of their book is 'concerned with dispelling the specter of "scientific materialism" '. In this attempt they range not only far and wide, but also reach some heights of sophistication. Unchecked, however, the authors' suggestions would lead from psychoanalysis back to description as the main level of discourse, and to a fuzzy existential neologism as a replacement for the set of interdependent hypotheses which have made psychoanalysis the first attempt at a scientific psychology of personality, as well as a rational therapy by personality restructuring.

It is to the authors' credit that they highlight areas of psychoanalytic theory which are more metaphysical than metapsychological. They have some ideas for substituting concepts which need and deserve trying out. It is a pity that they do not take account of Windelband and thus utilize the fact that idiographic data (e.g., ontological ones) can (and must be) part of nomothetic data, but that they are not a substitute for them.

Their new laws of structure formation may indeed be very useful. Regrettably, they give no catalogue of constitutive principles which would make it possible to examine them for their clinical and theoretical value. In fact, a decided general shortcoming of the book is that there is not a case history conceptualized in terms of the authors' theory—for one to get a better idea of what they have in mind. I strongly suspect that this is so because they themselves do not know clearly enough as yet what they have in mind so as to be able to take it into the consulting room.

On the other hand, I may be doing the authors some injustice. I

reserve the right to revisit this book—its criticisms and its new propositions—many times. I would not be surprised if many of us would learn from such readings and rereadings, and psychoanalysis could profit from such study.

LEOPOLD BELLAK (LARCHMONT, N.Y.)

THE LOGIC OF EXPLANATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Michael Sherwood. New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1969. 276 pp.

We are still in the midst of an unsettled debate, a debate that has existed at least from the beginning of the eighteenth century—whether there is a separate science of mind. It is possible to claim that man, unlike other animals, is a history-producing creature, one who creates his own environment and hence is not simply 'in nature' as are other animals. If this is true, is there a logic that separates the human sciences from the other sciences (human sciences include psychoanalysis as well as psychology, anthropology, and sociology)? Can a case be made for the existence of a 'separate domain'?

Michael Sherwood, a psychiatrist who has had training in philosophy at Oxford, has addressed himself to this fundamental question, but has approached it exclusively from the perspective of the Oxford school of linguistic analysis. He has chosen (perhaps wisely) as his text Freud's Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis—the Rat Man. The reader is presented with a careful and detailed paraphrase of Freud's case history. Later in this monograph he subjects specific sentences to a form of logical analysis of which the following is a typical example:

1. Lorenz (the rat man) hates his father and wishes to be unlike him, according to the way in which he, Lorenz, perceives him.
2. Lorenz perceives his father as being a spendthrift.
3. Therefore, Lorenz desires to be a miser, i.e., a 'nonspendthrift.'

For convenience we can drop the references to Lorenz's perception, since they make no difference to the logic of the argument, and we can adopt some obvious symbols to schematize the statements:

1. L. desires to be a member of class 'unlike-F.'
2. Members of class 'unlike-F' have property 'non-S.'
3. L. desires to have property 'non-S.'

The author's major observation is that 'psychoanalytic explanations were not of a unique variety, existing in a special domain

entirely separate from the causal language of the physical sciences'. As I am not a logician, I am not really qualified to judge whether Sherwood's assertion is true or false. But even if we grant that the explanation of physics and psychoanalysis share a similar logic, we cannot conclude, as Sherwood does, that this is an argument against the existence of a separate domain for psychoanalysis or the human sciences. For logic alone is much too slender a consideration upon which to base such a sweeping assertion. Indeed Sherwood's conclusion could have been predicted on the basis of certain assumptions of the Oxford school of philosophy which in part follows Wittgenstein who at one time proposed that there was no fundamental difference in the language of science and that of ordinary experience.

By remaining within the realm of linguistic analysis Sherwood does not at all consider what is for most philosophers of science the central issue for psychology: the relationship between the knower and the known. He does not deal with the Cartesian assumption that has plagued the human sciences, that is, the absolute separation of the objects of the material world *(res extensa)* from the psychological objects in the mind *(res cogitans)*. He therefore does not come to grips with the more fundamental issues of the epistemology of psychoanalysis.

There are chapters such as Movements and Actions in *The Concept of Motivation,* and Causes and Reasons in *Causation and the Law* that are almost entirely devoted to problems of formal logic, and as such make for quite difficult reading. Sherwood, however, does consider a problem of some current psychoanalytic interest, and that is the relation between description and explanation in Freud's case histories.

Sherwood's final conclusions are both modest and cautious, and if separated from his argument for a common logic shared between physics and psychoanalysis, would find widespread agreement among psychoanalysts. For example, he argues against what he calls a 'monolithic fallacy':

> . . . to claim that psychoanalysis as a whole is anything at all is misleading, for it is much too complex a field. We have seen that psychoanalytic statements include high level theoretical principles, rule-of-thumb generalizations, empirical hypotheses, metaphorical utterances, and even utterances which may function only therapeutically to bring about changes in a patient's behavior.

Sherwood's monograph is to my knowledge the first to address itself exclusively to the problem of the logic of Freud's clinical explanations. It is a serious and thoughtful book, and as such is a contribution to what one hopes will be a deepening examination of the epistemology of psychoanalysis.

ARNOLD H. MODELL (BROOKLINE, MASS.)

PSYCHOTHERAPISTS AND CHILDREN. A PROCEDURAL GUIDE. By Florence L. Swanson. New York: Pitman Publishing Corp., 1970. 145 pp.

The author describes and recommends procedures in practice at the Montclair-West Essex Guidance Center, Montclair, New Jersey, where she is the Clinical Director. 'The main purpose of this book is to alert the beginning therapist to a variety of situations that often occur in child psychotherapy, and to provide examples of how he might deal with them according to his own feelings, judgments and ability to follow through.'

Dr. Swanson considers her approach eclectic, 'following those concepts and methods which appear to be practical under particular circumstances'. She expects the young therapist to be equally flexible after having acquainted himself with various psychotherapeutic philosophies and having considered 'the techniques and procedures he can use most effectively' with his particular 'personality functioning'. Just how the young therapist is supposed to arrive at such decisions does not become clear.

A Rogerian trend is discernible in the description of therapy as 'providing the milieu that will stimulate the child and help him to replace the distorted and defeating aspects of his personality with the strengths that actually lie within him and his environment'. While many of the recommendations aimed at achieving a relationship with the child display good common sense, they are not necessarily helpful in establishing a *therapeutic* relationship. No distinction is made between an approach which might be useful with a psychotic child, while counterindicated with one who is neurotic. In some instances the games and activities suggested would be likely to interfere with, rather than promote, the establishment of a therapeutic alliance. There is no dynamic orientation by which the therapist might be able to decide on the appropriateness of a specific procedure in the instance of a particular

child. Moreover, the reader is left with the impression that if he can gain the child's trust, therapy will take care of itself. 'He doesn't "do" psychotherapy; rather he allows psychotherapy to occur.'

How is a therapeutic alliance developed? How is the child helped to relinquish defenses? How does a child learn to verbalize feelings in order to gain control over impulses and refrain from acting out? How and when are interpretations made? These questions and many others of equal significance are not dealt with. While there is a great need for a book such as Dr. Swanson has attempted, in the reviewer's opinion, hers does not meet that need.

MARJORIE R. LEONARD (STAMFORD, CONN.)

CLINICAL-COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY. MODELS AND INTEGRATIONS. Edited by Louis Breger. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. 299 pp.

The title of this book is not likely to attract the attention of the psychoanalyst, a misfortune that I hope this review may prevent in some measure. For several of its chapters are significant contributions to psychoanalysis and several others are interesting and thought-provoking to anyone interested in psychoanalytic psychology and the scientific problems with which it must deal.

The book itself is an attempt to point toward a rapprochement between clinical psychology and general psychology. With the (hoped for) death of behaviorism as the dominant American ideological position in psychology, the editor sees the possibility of an integration between clinical psychology—implying a concern with the behavior, both internal and external, of whole persons with reliance upon such methods as naturalistic observation and field and case studies—and cognitive psychology, implying the study of man's symbolizing functions. The hoped for result would be a psychology not lacking in rigor but able to comprehend problems of human significance. In pursuit of this purpose, the book is divided into two sections, the first of which includes sharply critical evaluations of the behaviorist paradigm and ideology by Michael Scriven and Louis Breger, and a very interesting survey of the influence of psychoanalytic theory upon American psychology by David Shakow. Part II attempts to show how a cognitive approach to traditional clinical concerns would look. This

section includes chapters by Jane Loevinger on theories of ego development, by George Klein on psychoanalytic drive theory, by Peter Wolff on Piaget's sensorimotor theory, by Louis Breger on an alternative to Freud's theory of dreams, and by Breger collaborating with Robert W. Zaslow to present a theory of autistic behavior in children and its treatment. While any number of other topics could easily have been substituted for those covered, the book hangs together rather better than the usual collection of contributed chapters. Several of the authors clearly have read each other's chapters and refer to them. The editor too comments in footnotes in which he points to interrelations among ideas of the contributors.

The major interest for psychoanalysts, however, is in the chapters by Loevinger and Klein. Loevinger spells out the requirements that a theory of ego development must meet and then surveys a number of such theories. She offers brief but scholarly treatments of most of the important contributions to this subject, including several within the broadly psychoanalytic area. Her treatment is fresh and enormously clarifying in its stress upon the principle of mastery through reversal of voice (from passive to active) as Freud enunciated in Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

Klein's contribution, titled Freud's Two Theories of Sexuality, is a major theoretical statement that will have to be grappled with by anyone interested in the psychoanalytic theories of drive and sexuality. Klein's thesis is that Freud's observations about sexuality and the importance of sensual experience to the growing child and adult are different from, and in many ways inconsistent with, the drive theory and postulates about energy that were later developed to explain them. He makes a strong case for discarding the drive (reduction) theory in favor of taking far more seriously the clinical theory in which the cognitive structuring of sensual experience is of essential importance. This article, which I believe is to be part of a larger work by Klein, is likely to be one of the more widely discussed psychoanalytic articles of this decade.

Louis Breger tries to account for dreaming in a way consistent with clinical psychoanalytic theory but without making use of the concepts of psychic energy. Breger's cognitive approach stresses the adaptive function of dreaming not only in some indirect sense, but also by providing a means of integrating previously unassim-

ilated information into existing cognitive structures during sleep. This is one of several recent attempts to reformulate the psychoanalytic theory of dreams and is worth a careful reading.

The editor has been successful in bringing together several authors who have something important to say on issues of concern to contemporary psychoanalysis.

HERBERT J. SCHLESINGER (DENVER)

THE DEFINITION AND MEASUREMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH. Edited by S. B. Sells. Chevy Chase, Md.: U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, 1968. 280 pp.

This book is based on ten lectures given in Washington, D. C., between January 1966 and January 1967. The series was sponsored by the National Center for Health Statistics. The panel was chosen from contributors to the mental health literature with representation among disparate disciplines—psychiatry, psychology, sociology, biometry, and epidemiology. The concluding chapter contains a summary, evaluation, and recommendations by Dr. Sells, moderator of the Symposium and editor of this volume.

The immediate purpose is to review theoretical conceptualizations of mental health and illness together with related measurement strategies. The ultimate objective is to assist the Center in its planning for national surveys of mental health. The ten presentations are structured in frames of reference that reflect the authors' contrasting viewpoints. Consensus of opinion was neither anticipated nor achieved. A wider divergence appears in conceptual issues than in operational data-collecting methods. The primary focus is on concepts of mental illness, concepts of mental health, the nature of the relationship between mental health and illness. The measurement approach relates to case finding and screening surveys of disability and effectiveness.

Two polar positions are presented. One involves a dichotomy of mental illness versus health within the scope of standard psychiatric classification. The other rejects a disease interpretation and emphasizes cultural, social, and economic determinants. Overlapping appears in an attempt to seek a solution within the domain of psychiatry and medicine with recognition of social responsibility in mental dysfunction. A degree of convergence is established in the

unanimous agreement among the contributors that environmental conditions cannot be disregarded. These contrasting orientations stress the complexity of these problems and the lack of simplistic interpretations.

This book provides significant information about theoretical formulations and research designs. The task is formidable; interdisciplinary conflicts are sharpened and barriers in communication are re-enforced by semantic differences. The dedication and skill of the contributors are visible throughout. The final chapter presents an excellent summary, but it also reflects editorial bias with reference to the internecine struggle among behavioral scientists. Attack on the 'psychiatric imprint', under which legislative authority and public support are enlisted, is unjustified. The human effectiveness group, approximately half of the contributors, are described as 'positivists', in contrast to the morbidity oriented psychiatrists. The arguments for stress on health and for further definition of normative functioning are indisputable. However, the psychiatrist is assigned a mythological status of isolation without regard for the cultural background of deviant behavior. The psychiatric focus on pathology and neglect of the adaptive potential creates a distorted image that is contrary to clinical experience.

There are shortcomings in this book and the chapters are of uneven quality. Nevertheless, a review of multiple perspectives suggests an attempt to overcome disciplinary divisiveness and sterile debate. More precise conceptual definitions and measurements of prevalence are required, yet this Symposium indicates a productive effort toward urgent reality needs, the establishment of preventive and therapeutic programs.

MIRIAM G. SIEGEL (NEW YORK)

BLINDNESS RESEARCH: THE EXPANDING FRONTIERS. Edited by Maxwell H. Goldberg with John R. Swinton. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1969. 544 pp.

This volume records the proceedings of the National Consultation Concerning Needed Research in the Behavioral Sciences and Humanities with Reference to Problems Related to Blindness, which was held from April 9 through 12, 1967. Like the title of the conference, the proceedings are not distinguished by a sparing of words.

It is therefore all the more disappointing that they include so little of a substantive nature. It is apparent that blindness in the adult is a vicissitude to which the victim responds according to his fashion. In the words of one participant, 'Those positively motivated for rehabilitation tended to reach out for and use services. . . . The others made few observable overtures to rehabilitation agencies.' In effect the consensus of the speakers appears to be that the state of blindness when it has its onset in the adult or older child is a particularly trying and stressful trauma, but nonetheless a trauma to be coped with according to the genetic history and ego resources of the particular victim.

The distinctive characteristics of congenital blindness and the effects of this affliction on the process of differentiation of psychic structure, a problem which is of interest to many psychoanalysts, receives scant attention. A few scattered references in the text were apparently not considered of sufficient significance to merit separate indexing.

On the whole there is little about this publication which is likely to be of interest to the psychoanalyst. His approach to the blinded individual whether as a consultant or a therapist is not likely to be affected by what he reads. He can only agree with the statement of H. R. Blank, the only analyst on this program: '. . . psychological principles and their psychotherapeutic use to prevent and treat serious psychogenic disability applies to any handicap. . . . [The] delineation of what is specific to a given handicap is hardly possible without knowing the generic predictables that can be anticipated in dealing with any person who has suffered a serious loss, and with his family.'

DAVID A. FREEDMAN (HOUSTON)

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Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CL, 1970.

Harold R. Galef

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ABSTRACTS

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CL, 1970.

The Artist as Person; Generalizations Based on Rorschach Records of Writers and Painters. S. Z. Dudek. Pp. 232-241.

The author makes an extensive and impressive attempt to characterize the qualities of the artist that contribute to his choice of the role of creator. The material is based on interpretation of the form and content analysis of Rorschach protocols. The ultimate basis of why the artist is motivated to create is left unanswered; there remains the choice between creativity as an attempt to deal with unconscious conflict, or as a basic urge that is a natural characteristic of being human.

Some of the generalizations include a high degree of originality in perception; heightened sensitivity and responsiveness to inner needs with a relatively poor ability to respond to external reality; great ease of regression coupled with the ability to return to more mature ego functioning; an attempt to find ego identity through creation; and an exhibitionistic need to be seen as a special person.

Effects of Different Types of Therapy on the Personality as a Whole. S. Z. Dudek. Pp. 329-345.

Dudek takes a very sophisticated approach to changes resulting from therapy. His study does not deal with matched groups; it is concerned with the direction of internal change following therapeutic intervention. This is contrasted with behavioral changes and the varying degrees of success of different forms of therapy. His measurement tool is the Rorschach, utilizing pretherapy records and records obtained at varying intervals up to eighteen years. The patients undergoing analytically oriented psychotherapy showed changes in the direction of a liberation of psychic energy, more awareness, and better reality adjustment. Patients receiving medical treatment, such as electric convulsive therapy and drugs, changed in the direction of better reality contact and social functioning, but this was accompanied by personality constriction. The third group, undergoing a regimen of maintenance and supportive measures, showed the least change and when it occurred, it was also accompanied by personality constriction. The author is quite explicit in evaluating his data and maintains that no mode of therapy necessarily produces more successes or is intrinsically indicated for a particular type of disturbance.

On the Relationship between Aggressive Activation, Symbiotic Merging, Intactness of Body Boundaries, and Manifest Pathology in Schizophrenics. Lloyd H. Silverman and Peter Candell. Pp. 387-399.

The technical basis for this study is the theory that when a drive-related stimulus registers subliminally, it makes contact with whatever congruent drive derivatives are active in the individual at the time. Previous work seems to indicate that the schizophrenic's type of ego pathology intensifies when aggressive impulses are tapped. The results of this work, which appear interesting but

hardly conclusive, point to the schizophrenic's response to the stirring of aggressive impulses by merging symbiotically with an object as a way of preserving it.

The Impostor and His Mother. Robert L. DuPont. Pp. 444-448.

This paper presents a case history of a prisoner (convicted for armed robbery) with a background of posing as a teacher. Although the psychotherapy appears to have lacked depth, it is of interest because of the paucity of such reports. The general findings include an ambivalently close and seductive tie to mother that prevented the patient from developing his own sense of identity, and the need to feign a mature, masculine identification he did not possess.

HAROLD R. GALEF

American Imago. XXVI, 1969.

Treason and the Traitor. Phyllis Greenacre. Pp. 199-232.

This study contains biographical sketches of Benedict Arnold, Quisling, Klaus Fuchs, Richard Sorge, and Oleg Penkovsky. Greenacre finds structural similarities in their life stories that 'suggest a certain degree of patterning of developmental attitudes'. These include superego defects and excessive craving for power. In all the cases there was evidence of prior identification with more than one national or political group, including (save for Quisling) the one in whose behalf the treachery was committed. Arnold had been a British subject; Quisling had 'dwelt much on the early connections of Scandinavia and Russia [and] may have gone to Russia with some deeply rooted and cherished dream of fulfilling his heroic destiny there'; Fuchs, born in Germany and a Communist at nineteen, was convicted of selling secrets to Russia; Sorge, Russian born to a Russian mother, was charged with espionage for Russia and was executed by Japan; and Penkovsky, executed by the Soviets for selling secrets to the West, was the son of a Czarist officer.

The Potential of Psychoanalytic Biography: Zeligs on Chambers and Hiss. Gustav Bychowski. Pp. 233-241.

Bychowski expresses admiration for Zeligs's Friendship and Fratricide: An Analysis of Whitaker Chambers and Alger Hiss. The relationship of Chambers to Hiss is understood in the book to have been determined by Chambers's ambivalent feelings toward his brother, Richard. Bychowski deplores the fact that Zeligs did not testify at the Hiss trial. Such testimony might have changed the outcome of the trial and in this way 'taken some of the paranoid wind out of the McCarthy era'.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

American Imago. XXVII, 1970.

The Prophet Jonah: The Story of an Intrapsychic Process. Joseph More. Pp. 3-11.

More interprets the story as one dealing with sibling rivalry; the city of Nineveh is symbolic of the mother, and its inhabitants, her children. Jonah is in conflict with God, the father, because he wishes God to deal more harshly with his siblings.

Ernst Mach: The Unconscious Motives of an Empiricist. Lewis S. Feuer. Pp. 12-40.

The author attempts to reveal the psychodynamic basis for certain central tenets of Mach's scientific philosophy. Mach's antipathy to atomistic hypotheses in science is traced to aggressive attitudes toward his father. The symbolic equation of atoms, stones, and testicles links father with atoms. His idea that 'cause' should be replaced by the concept of functional interdependence of phenomena was expressive of his wish to eliminate masculine dominance and to see the world as a flowing stream (feminine) of phenomena with no variable privilege in status; none of this was 'the cause'. His view that the world should be regarded as a complex of sensations, with rejection of the concept of things-in-themselves, is related to the erosion of his childhood narcissistic solipsism by adolescent heterosexual drives. Mach had arrived independently at such concepts as determinism, the unconscious, and the lasting influence of childhood experiences. He speculated that study of these phenomena might lead to increased knowledge of 'the primitive history of mechanism, and besides, might also lead to the founding of a general genetic technology . . .'.

Self-Destruction in Œdipus Rex. M. D. Faber. Pp. 41-51.

Faber contends that Sophocles's Œdipus reacts to the discovery of the truth about his past with the feeling that he had been betrayed by his mother. In a rage he rushes to her room to murder her, but finds that Jocasta had already hung herself. He blinds himself not only out of patricidal and matricidal guilt, but also as a defense against seeing his parents again in the afterworld. The argument is convincingly supported by the text of the play, consideration of self-aggression in Sophocles's work as a whole, and references to the literature on matricide and self-destructive behavior.

Dreams in Troilus and Criseyde. Helen Storm Corsa. Pp. 52-65.

Scholars agree that Chaucer's Troilus and Criseyde, a reworking of Boccaccio's *Il Filostrato,* has greater emotive force than its source. Chaucer's character portrayals underscore and enrich the œdipal fantasy; thus an ordinary tale of a woman's infidelity has been transformed into a work that evokes the nuclear experience of betrayal by the œdipal mother.

The Rags of Time: Ingmar Bergman's 'Wild Strawberries'. Harvey R. Greenberg. Pp. 66-82.

Isak's loneliness and isolation derive from his experiences with a cold mother and a distant father. The affection shown him by his maid, a young girl hitch-hiker, and his daughter-in-law in his seventy-sixth year have a healing effect that gives him a measure of serenity and comfort during his remaining days.

Discussion of Greenberg's Paper on Bergman's 'Wild Strawberries'. Sheldon Bach. Pp. 83-89.

This is not a discussion of Greenberg's paper at all, but rather Bach's own interpretation of the film. Œdipal triangles are repeated several times among the

characters, in different generations and in the past, present, and future. Isak is terrified of death because of his narcissistic isolation; by reconciling himself to the union of his parents, symbolically expressed by his offer of help to his daughter-in-law, he changes his internal perception of death from oblivion to a primal reunion with his parents.

Kafka's A Hunger Artist: The Ego in Isolation. Paul Neumarkt. Pp. 109-121.

This article illuminates themes in A Hunger Artist typically encountered in borderline personalities. Among them are regression to absolute passivity, asceticism, breakthrough of primary process, homosexual conflict, and heavy impingement on the psyche by pressures of current civilization.

Freud as Philosopher. Henry Walter Brann. Pp. 122-139.

The author cites a letter Freud wrote to Fliess to show that Freud's original ambition was to study philosophy. Through metapsychology he attempted to bring psychology back into the realm of philosophy. The Aristotelian, Franz Brentano, whose lectures and seminars Freud attended during his medical studies, appears to have strongly influenced him in the evolution of his metapsychology, particularly his death instinct theory.

The Rime of the Ancient Mariner: The Agony of Thirst. Mary Jane Lupton. Pp. 140-159.

Lupton reviews and evaluates the meanings of The Rime of the Ancient Mariner offered by literary and psychoanalytic sources. Her own feeling is that the albatross is a totem animal, that the Mariner has retreated from sexuality because of œdipal guilt, and is punished by separation and isolation from the human community. She feels the maudlin prayer that ends the poem on an optimistic note is a shallow cover for the Mariner's hostility.

Beyond the Reality Principle: Illusion or New Reality? Lillian Gordon. Pp. 160-182.

The author's central point is that the weakening of supports offered by stable traditions and sociocultural groups has produced separation anxiety, and with it longing for symbiotic fusion. This yearning has manifested itself in the theater, in the widespread use of drugs, the popularity of Zen, sensitivity groups, and student uprisings. This is a well-documented and convincing article.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

Psychoanalytic Review. LVII, 1970.

Some Thoughts on the Symbolism of Bullfights. Enrique Guarner. Pp. 18-28.

In earlier studies, bullfighting was regarded as a quasi-religious ritual in which the matador represents the leader of the primitive horde, who sacrifices the father (bull) to be devoured; as a passion play ending in a unity of attacker and defender, father and mother, parent and child; and as a feminine (balletic bullfighter)-masculine (bull) struggle resulting from a social structure in which

the father abandons the family. Guarner's paper suggests that the fight expresses narcissism, exhibitionism, aggression, anality, and genitality. The matador asserts his omnipotence through domination of the powerful animal representing the father and death. Guarner illustrates his thesis with reports of analyses of two bullfighters.

Activity and Reality. Gustav Bychowski. Pp. 29-46.

Inherently intense motor impulses in infancy may accumulate and, in the absence of opportunities for discharge, cause feelings of helpless rage and the experience of one's own impulses as dangerous. Similarly, frustration of inherently intense oral dependence may lead to unbearable stress, refusal to eat, and eventually to rejection of reciprocal relations with the world. Thus, the first active mode of receptive contact with reality, given this predisposition, can constitute the first rejection of reality. In such cases infantile narcissism with omnipotence and a sense of 'there is time for everything' may alternate with impotence, depersonalization, and enraged nihilistic withdrawal causing profound inhibition of thinking and sexual activity, and rejection of reality.

Symptoms, Insight, and Behavior Techniques by Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. Ivan Wentworth-Rohr. Pp. 47-59.

The literature of behavior therapy omits raw data that might indicate what changes in psychopathology may be caused by such factors as history-taking, discussion of problems, positive transference, rapport, behavior techniques, and insight. Three patients with phobic-like reactions had their fears deconditioned by exposure to a reading of a hierarchy of increasingly strong tension-producing descriptions, with interruptions and suggestions that they relax and think of something pleasant, as needed. Their spontaneous thoughts were welcomed. The author concludes that collecting and organizing the hierarchies required the patients to examine the facts of their lives and this examination, together with a positive transference atmosphere, invariably led to insights. The procedure was effective if the symptoms were of relatively recent origin and bound to easily identified external sources, but not if the symptoms were more complex expressions of historical experiences and laden with multiple derivatives of aggression and sexuality.

The Use of Guilt as a Defense against Anxiety. Richard A. Gardner. Pp. 124-136.

Guilt may be used to enable the patient to feel in control when he is actually impotent in the face of uncontrollable reality, as in aging, body deterioration, death, or loss. Guilt depends on the idea that the patient could have influenced the overwhelming event and thereby asserts potency.

Behind the Dream Screen. Ralph B. Little. Pp. 137-142.

A patient dreamed of white clouds and knew that a sputnik was behind them. The author feels that this is an example of a blank dream, in Lewin's sense, with the clouds as dream screen. Analysis showed that the dream gratified the wish for the breast and also acted as a defense against the penis of the

castrating sputnik father. The case illustrates that there can be something 'behind' the dream screen, and that the screen can be used as a protection.

The Role of Body Experience in Therapy. Milton P. Ehrlich. Pp. 181-195.

Schilder, Federn, and Reich emphasized the influence of body experiences on ideational content. Therapy should provide not only verbal insight but also bring about awareness of body sensations. Reich's followers, general semantics, and Zen also emphasize the importance of body awareness. 'In the same way that dreams and free association provide a key to unconscious material, total awareness of the body permits further scrutiny of repressed feelings.'

Freud's Theory of Conflicts. Humberto Nagera and Alice Colonna. Pp. 224-244.

The authors' purpose is to make a complete systematic historical presentation of psychoanalytic concepts. Their manner of doing so is exemplified in this paper by a description of the development of the concept of conflict. Sixty-four references quote Freud's writings from 1894 to 1937.

Freud, Leonardo and the Lamb. Durward J. Markle, Jr. Pp. 285-288.

Markle finds that the child in the Holy Family of da Vinci is releasing rage on the lamb in the picture. The lamb is tense and unbalanced because of the child's grip on its neck. Perhaps the picture portrays da Vinci as the child expressing his rage at his abandonment by his mother at age five. Freud's suggestion that this painting shows a blissful scene underemphasizes his observation that the lamb was 'maltreated'.

ERNEST KAFKA

Revista de Psicoanalisis. XXVI, 1969.

Psychoanalytic Study of Dorian Gray's Story. Eduardo J. Salas. Pp. 643-667.

This is an attempt to understand the character of Dorian Gray as representing a point midway between perversion and psychopathy. The theme is developed around the components of symbolic parents (Lord Henry being the father and Basil, the mother) fighting over the possession of the son, Dorian. There are implications about an idealized narcissistic ego image held by Dorian. The different aspects of denial, depersonalization, and depression are substantiated with the material of the story. Using the ideas of Aberastury, Rascovsky, and Greenberg, Salas considers superego elements occurring in three different intrapsychic conflicts: 1, fertility type of identifications with both father and mother as internalized objects; 2, symbolic imitative (gesture, mannerisms, etc.) type of identification; and 3, metabolic/digestive type of identification which leads to very primitive attempts at identification, but is actually an introjection.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA

Psychiatry. XXXIII, 1970.

Hospital Culture as Collective Defense. Stanley D. Rosenberg. Pp. 21-35.

Although this article fails to deal with the genetic aspects of hospital patients' defensive operations, or the genetic aspects of the institution's 'collective' defenses, the exposition of the interrelationships between individual and institution is constructive, and may well have broad applicability.

The Work of Wilfred Bion on Groups. Margaret J. Rioch. Pp. 56-66.

Dr. Rioch presents the formulations of Wilfred Bion regarding the operations of groups: every group is both a 'work' group and a 'basic assumption' group. The work group is that aspect of group functioning pertaining to the stated group task. The 'basic assumption' group can be subdivided into three types: dependency, fight-flight, and pairing. The operations of the 'basic assumption' group are unconscious; elucidation clarifies the fact that the group is experiencing difficulties operating as a work group. Individuals are seen as having more or less readiness to enter into combination with the group in making and acting on the basic assumptions. This readiness is called 'valency'. How one might use the 'basic assumption' group in the service of the work group seems worthy of further exploration.

Misgivings and Misconceptions in the Psychiatric Care of Terminal Patients. Avery D. Weisman. Pp. 67-81.

This is a useful discussion of the physician's typical avoidance of dealing with the dying person and his survivors. One would have liked to find the author developing his credible conceptualizations toward a format for education at the medical school, internship, residency, and consultation levels.

The Psychodynamics of Physicianhood. Ralph N. Zabarenko, Lucy Zabarenko, and Rex A. Pittenger. Pp. 102-118.

An interesting excursion, this paper is sobering in terms of the complexity of the topic the authors chose to explore. One wonders in what ways the dynamics of the physician-observers intruded into their observations and formulations. Also, the formulations may be less relevant to 'physicianhood' than to some other category, such as 'entrepreneurial vocations' for example.

Contributing Factors in Black Politics (A Special Issue). T. M. Tomlinson, Editor. Pp. 137-292.

This issue of Psychiatry is devoted exclusively to a consideration of changes in the attitudes and behavior of black Americans in recent times. A number of interesting and useful concepts are elaborated; for example, that blacks are interested in making the political system more responsive to their needs, in contrast to the white college population which would revolutionize the existing political system. All the contributions are by white authors, more or less youth-

ful, and the tone throughout is: look what we (you?) bad guys have done. The findings rest entirely on one-shot responses to questionnaire items such as, 'How well do you think the Black Muslims are doing?', with the researcher and reader left to guess what the response means. Researcher biases are unmentioned.

There is disappointingly little in this issue that relates to psychiatry regarding either content or methodology. If this is because the authors/editors believe nothing is known from such a vantage point, their efforts might have been spent looking into that. As it is, they have produced a 'social issues' work of some merit for general reading.

JOHN HITCHCOCK

International Journal of Group Psychotherapy. XX, 1970.

Eclecticism versus Sectarianism in Group Psychotherapy. S. R. Slavson. Pp. 3-13.

While extolling freudian theory, the author points out that narcissistic neuroses and reactive and character disorders respond only minimally to insight therapy. The classic psychoneurotic is becoming proportionately rare compared to other syndromes because of the increasing permissiveness of society. Consequently, new techniques, such as group psychotherapy, have been developed, many of which are unfortunately based on 'an accidental observation, a special feeling about a special development, or an idea derived from an isolated experience . . .'. It is disconcerting that 'partial and limited observation is hastily offered and labelled as though it were a proven total therapeutic technique'. Examining 'most of the suggested innovative procedures, one finds that their essence has been a part of good eclectic practice for decades'. These observations are illustrated by discussions of interaction group therapy, behavior therapy, paradigmatic therapy, and basic encounters. The author particularly deplores the 'free floating interaction' and 'unrestrained catharsis' in which 'some patients jump the inner restraining bound of reality'.

The Nature of the Co-Therapy Relationship. T. F. McGee and B. N. Schuman. Pp. 25-35.

The use of co-therapists of equal or comparable status is said to confound transference and countertransference reactions; to add unnecessarily to the complexity of the group situation; and to exaggerate the dependency needs of the therapists. There is a risk that unresolvable conflicts between the therapists may paralyze group momentum and the psychotherapy process. However, this practice has the advantage of ensuring the maintenance of the group despite the hazard of a therapist's absence; comes closer to replicating the original family situation of siblings and two parents; enriches the range and type of possible transference objects; and reveals additional facets of the therapists' personalities to the group. While all personality factors and professional affiliations of the therapists should be considered in pairing them, the ensuing relationship is formed in view of a future based on an ability to resolve stress. In the maintenance of this relationship, openness is a constant essential. Complementarity is also important while competitiveness is deleterious. Extra-group contact between the co-therapists must be viewed to some degree as related to the group.

Multiple-Family Therapy: Secrets and Scapegoating in Family Crisis. Norman L. Paul and Joseph D. Bloom. Pp. 37-47.

Intrafamilial disappointment, hostility, and guilt are inevitable, and in a healthy family the capacity to cope with such feelings depends on each member's ability to express his reactions. In an unhealthy family, members deny and repress these emotions until a crisis makes them unbearable; then they are projected onto another member, the scapegoat. The scapegoat's subsequent behavior is the expression of these projections and establishes a pathological equilibrium. An impending death severely strains the family emotions, especially when the dying person is unaware of his fate. Grief, helplessness, and resentment toward the dying cannot be ventilated and a myth, often unconscious, is engendered that blames the scapegoat for the family distress.

In multiple family group therapy, combining family and stranger therapy, each family empathizes with the emotional realities of other lives. Members of a different family act as co-therapists by offering analogous experiences. As hitherto hidden circumstances are exposed, members tell of their denied emotions, encouraged by witnessing similar guilt, rage, and resentment in other family units. Such ventilation fosters heightened self-awareness and self-esteem, while the behavior that results in anxiety is understood better.

The Compulsive Gambler and Spouse in Group Psychotherapy. W. H. Boyd and D. W. Bolen. Pp. 77-90.

Marital relations between pathological gamblers and their spouses were found to be chaotic and turbulent, indicative of frequent severe characterological problems. Two therapy groups were formed, each consisting of four such couples. The husbands tended to be bright, in their middle thirties, and mostly in white collar managerial positions. Half appeared sociopathic, the others passive, dependent, and schizoid. The wives, all housewives, displayed primitive defenses: projective, hysterical, and phobic. These unions were surprisingly enduring considering their chaotic nature and the fact that in most, gambling disasters and unresolved conflicts severed effective communication. There was a prevalence of histories of critical, authoritarian mothers and passive fathers, often alcoholic, and of the parents' encouraging and financing gambling. When husbands showed an increased assertiveness and a decrease of gambling and depression, wives became depressed, aware that the gambling was an offshoot of marital discord, and were no longer able to be martyrs to their husbands. At this point, the husbands regressed, threatened by the loss of support from their wives. Crises ensued, members quit, gambled, missed meetings, and discord erupted at home. The therapists' passive conventional approach was scrapped for more direct authoritarian intervention. After this, the group became cohesive, members related more authentically, displaying frankness, mutuality, and the capacity to perceive and understand each other's conflicts.

Progressive Phases in the Group Therapy of Exhibitionists. James L. Mathis and Mabelle Collins. Pp. 163-169.

Forty-five men arrested for exhibitionism were treated by mandatory group therapy over a three-year period. Individuals with mental retardation, organic

brain syndrome, or psychosis were excluded. Without legal pressure, denial of the significance of the symptom and inability to tolerate the anxieties of therapy made some leave treatment after a month or so. The progress of the others is seen in the following phases.

Denial: The shame, guilt, and remorse of self-exhibiting is denied and is re-enforced by the conviction that the act will not be repeated. At the same time, the act is considered a form of manliness. For the first six months of group participation, the patient remains isolated, though constant repetitious confrontations by more advanced group members, rather than contributions by group leaders, gradually weakens this isolation. The patient then involves himself voluntarily, instead of under duress. *Acceptance:* On realizing that his exhibitionism is immature and destructive, the patient recognizes emotional links with the other members, but he does so with difficulty. *Anger:* Anger is the emotion most dreaded by the exhibitionist because of fear of retaliation and of being overwhelmed by his infantile rage. Yet he equates rage and destruction with true masculinity. The most frequent objects of his rage are the important females in his life. He vents his anger in the group situation, however, on abstracts such as the law, social attitudes, etc. *Disappointment:* The patient's mastery of his fear of anger gives him a masculine identity, but he is disappointed because the old exhibitionistic urges still persist. He is then shown the fact that his impulses are now conscious—a sign of progress—and that they are easier to control. *Upward movement:* Exhibitionists are usually underachievers, but many make progress in their jobs during this phase of group therapy. *Separation:* For these patients, who may be jailed at the first recurrence of their symptom, the group represents safety and self-esteem. The therapists must counter the tendency to focus all the members' separation anxieties on the question of safety.

Group Psychotherapy with Violent Outpatients. John R. Lion and George Bach-y-Rita. Pp. 185-191.

Patients who complain of destructive urges, fears of loss of control and of injuring others, of repetitive outbursts, or violent seizures are diagnosed as having impulse character disorders, or as being borderline individuals with paranoid or psychopathic features. Frequently they come from lower socioeconomic strata, have experienced emotional deprivation, unstable job and marital histories, sexual dysfunction, and clashes with the law. Use of drugs and alcohol, ownership of weapons, and reckless driving contribute to their potential for harm.

A group of five such patients met weekly for an hour around a large table and in the presence of two psychiatrists. This arrangement was planned to establish an atmosphere of control. In addition, all patients received tranquilizers or anticonvulsive medication. Verbal rather than psychical expression of feeling was encouraged. It was often necessary to urge regular attendance, especially after such threatening issues as attitudes about homosexuality or childhood experiences had been mentioned, or unwonted intimacies had developed. Characteristic was the members' fear of a show of emotion as unmanly.

Anger at women and wives as well as at colleagues was common. Masculinity was related less to sex than to the need to be right. Much hostility was due to hopelessness about their condition and to discrepancies between their expectations and reality. The patients' sporadic attendance indicated that they used the group as an ongoing modality available in times of stress. Members reported that rage outbursts had decreased and interpersonal relationships improved. Social experience rather than insight seemed to be the operative factor.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Robert Kabcenell, Charles F. Hesselbach, Charles F. Hesselbach & Vivian Fromberg

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 13, 1970. PSYCHOANALYTIC SIGNIFICANCE OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA RELATED TO CONFLICT AND FORGETTING. Ernest Kafka, M.D.

Dr. Kafka described an experiment he devised to investigate the microscopic changes that take place in the mental apparatus, especially in relation to memory, forgetting, and repression. Experimental subjects, who were paid, sketched and titled ten images which they conceived as a situation similar to the analytic situation. Electrodes were attached to the subject's body in order to make physiologic observations. An experimenter, out of visual range, asked the subject to recall the titles of his pictures and to describe them; verbatim associations were recorded and notes were made of things that were forgotten. A record of the galvanic skin response (GSR) was kept for two hours; categories were in terms of high and low, activity variability associated with forgetting, open conflict, conflicting themes, paraforgetting, lowered level of consciousness, and degree of relation to the experimental environment. The data were then examined in clusters of coincident phenomena and to determine the relationship of clusters. Nineteen of the twenty-one subjects forgot at least one image. High GSR images were different from all other images as they were associated with the experimental environment; low GSR images, both remembered and forgotten, were not so associated. The question raised is: Are forgotten images with their associated thoughts psychically important to the subject, and what similarities in form and content do forgotten and conflicted images display? While one expects to find significant form or content similarities between the forgotten and conflicted images, and associations to them, the author stated that unusually high variable GSR and forgotten images shared the same theme in a significant majority of subjects. The data indicated that forgetting recent mental events is part of a complex adaptational process which tends to re-establish an optimal psychophysiologic state and signifies anxiety.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Charles Fisher agreed that forgetting occurs in highly conflicted situations in which the balance of forces have shifted in favor of successful defense. Although he felt that work with GSR might make possible investigation of more total organismic states, he warned that the intensity of the GSR may not be related to conflict but may be due to other factors inherent in an experimental situation.

Dr. Milton Horowitz raised a number of questions. 1, Does forgetting occur because of a lack of cathexis rather than a withdrawal of cathexis? 2, Do high GSR images reflect anxiety in the experimental situation itself? 3, What is the relation of the serial position effect? Finally, Dr. Kafka's conclusion that anxiety is a symptom of forgetting and a consequent defense, and not the motive for impelling defense, Dr. Horowitz feels is a return to the topographic model.

Dr. Robert Bak noted that Dr. Kafka's work is similar to that of Hughlings Jackson. The mental apparatus is put in a situation where the moment-to-moment functioning of available resources brings about a balance of forces. He recalled Sandler's recent model on functioning, which also relates to this moment-to-moment adaptational struggle. Dr. Charles Brenner felt that Dr. Kafka's conclusions in no way represent a return to the topographic model.

ROBERT KABCENELL

February 10, 1970. THE CONCEPT OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. David Beres, M.D. and Edward D. Joseph, M.D.

The authors define mental representation as an unconscious psychic organization whose nature, while not known, is capable of evocation in consciousness as symbol, image, fantasy, thought, or affect, which are the bases of all psychic derivatives and their modes of functioning in man. The significance of the concept of mental representation lies in its heuristic value.

Mental representation is based on memory traces of perceptual experiences. While memory is a function in all animal life, only man is capable of an evocation of memory in the absence of external stimulus. Perception involves external stimulation acting on sense organs which activates nerve impulses that are transmitted to the brain where a further synthesis results in a mental registration. In man, but not in lower animals, mental registration is the basis of a mental representation.

Freud defined instinct (id) as the mental representation of internal stimuli reaching the mind. It is the cathected and countercathected mental representations that are involved in intrapsychic conflict. Superego structuralization is the transposition of mental representations of the parental figures as regulating agents, to mental representation of the self as the regulating agent. Freud equated the binding of psychic energy necessary for delay with the secondary process. The authors suggest that it is the mental representations that bind the energy by countercathexis or by neutralization.

To acquire ethical beliefs requires the capacity to symbolize, to evoke the absent object, to anticipate the future, to conceptualize, and communicate by speech, all of which are explained by mental representations through identification with parental figures and internalization of their ethical standards.

Incorporation, the instinctual analogue of the taking in of stimuli, may be expressed in the fantasy of introjection. The introject is a mental representation formed by a complex interaction of ego functions. Identification is based on fantasies of incorporation and projection of object representations. Internalization is limited to mental representations of function related to self-representation and independent of object representations.

Cognition is dependent on the ability to form mental representations. The uniquely human capacity to evoke in consciousness an absent object is due to the high degree of organization of the mental representation that is available, perhaps through some type of continuous cortical activity.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Kenneth Calder questioned whether man is unique in the capacity to form mental representations. Dr. Charles Fisher described experimental evidence that animals do form mental representations, perhaps without Piaget's cognitive element. Dreaming in animals can be an example of evocative imagery without external stimulus.

Dr. John McDevitt spoke of the increasing degrees of autonomy of the mental representation of the mother in the developing infant. 'Recognition memory' is followed at about one year by the capacity to evoke a mental representation in times of need; by about fifteen months, the child is capable of evoking this mental representation regardless of need. From sixteen to twenty-four months, intrapsychic conflict is possible because both sides of the conflict are present as mental representations.

Dr. Beres stated that he and Dr. Joseph did not say that mental representations were sufficient for man's higher functions. Although mental representation may exist without object constancy, a stable mental representation is necessary. Dr. Beres was not convinced by Dr. Calder's arguments or by Dr. Fisher's material suggesting mental representation in lower animals.

CHARLES F. HESSELBACH

March 17, 1970. THE TRANSITIONAL OBJECT AND THE FETISH: SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ROLE OF ILLUSION. Phyllis Greenacre, M.D.

The transitional object represents not only the mother's breast and body but the total maternal environment as it is experienced in combination with sensations from the infant's body. It serves as a support and 'convoy' during that period of rapid growth which necessitates increasing separation from the mother. The infantile fetish, although related to the transitional object, is the product of marked disturbance in infancy and is a defensive measure in response to great need stemming from early inadequate object relationships. The fetish is more concretized in its form and use, and tends to be permanently incorporated into the individual's life, constricting further development of object relationships. The transitional object which arises at about the same time (the end of the first year and early in the second year of life) is chosen and created by the child as a 'faithful protective escort'. Its softness and pliability are useful at a time when the infant's perceptions and physical relationships with the outer world are changing and when speech is in the process of formation. Thus it lends itself to symbolic representation.

The transitional object plays a role in promoting illusion formation. By relating new experiences back to earlier ones, it lends illusory support to new experiences and helps the infant to investigate and widen his interests. The fetish represents a replacement of breast and penis and may gain anal-genital significance. By its solidity and durability of form, it may consolidate the illusion of maternal supplementation to the body in children whose early relationship to the mother has been 'not good enough'. The transitional object aids growth; individuation is delayed and incompletely achieved in infantile fetish-

ism. Dr. Greenacre then discussed illusion formation in relation to creativity in general and the gifted child in particular.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Robert Bak commented that the symbolic significance of the fetish corresponds to the pregenital phase and thus may represent breast-skin, buttocks-feces, female-phallus. He questioned the acceptance of the transitional object as a creative act or as a precursor of creativity. Dr. Philip Weissman felt that fetishistic and transitional objects were too sharply delineated and categorized. He suggested that 'transitional alternate' might be substituted for 'transitional object'. Dr. Melitta Sperling noted that what Winnicott described as the transitional object was really the infantile fetish. She also commented that whereas the infantile fetish serves precœdipal needs and represents parts of the mother or the mother *in toto*, in the adult the fetish invariably represents the mother-phallus. Dr. Judith Kestenberg questioned the use of some of Dr. Greenacre's terms, such as 'good enough mother'. She also asked whether non-hostile aggression referred to oral aggression with the transitional object, and hostile aggression to anal sadism and the fetish.

Dr. Greenacre re-emphasized the intermediate forms between transitional objects and fetishes. She believes in the terms 'good enough mother' and 'not good enough mother'; any mother may be 'not good enough' for her child.

VIVIAN FROMBERG

The NEW YORK STATE PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTE will celebrate its 75th Anniversary November 21-23, 1971. A Symposium on Seventy-five Years of Progress in Psychiatric Research and Teaching is planned.

Dr. Aaron Karush has been appointed Director of the PSYCHOANALYTIC CLINIC FOR TRAINING AND RESEARCH, Columbia University, to succeed Dr. George S. Goldman who will retire July 1, 1971.