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NOTES ON MOTIVATIONS FOR WAR

TOWARD A PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

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INTRODUCTION

Thirty-five years ago Freud, in dealing with the question, Why War?, applied his dual instinct theory. How does that question present itself today to a psychoanalyst? And how does he go about answering it?

As analysts our first inclination is to look for the instinctual sources of war. It is the study of man's aggressivity that immediately engages us, although we know that there have been cultures in which war, as organized social activity, did not exist. Still this particularly destructive variety of cultural expression persistently begs for an explanation in terms of drive theory, since we assume that the evolution of man's instinctual equipment goes very far back and that the resultant psychic organization must have remained essentially unaltered since the dawn of human history.

We are at once challenged by the fact that war is a social institution, rather than a direct, individual expression of man's aggressive drives. Psychoanalysis so far offers no clear-cut idea of the innate psychological factors that enter into the social behavior involved in the institution of war. Although we know that ultimately the locus of social action is in the individual mind, there are many factors in the group process—with its own laws, observable and definable by its own scientific methods—

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I am indebted to my colleagues in the Study Group on Aggression (Psychoanalytic Research and Development Fund), in whose deliberations I have participated since January 1969.

that may lie outside the realm of psychology. Whatever the psychological components that ultimately enter into war-making, we are dealing with a hybrid entity that does not lend itself readily to comprehension. The phrase, 'psychological motivations for war', remains a vague concept, thus far inaccessible to our psychoanalytic formulations. We must therefore attempt to split off from the larger problem of 'war motivation' those internal, primarily emotional factors that must ultimately bear on the individual's relationship to war. These are the psychoanalytically observable instinctual components that enter into what I call 'war readiness',—a term I have borrowed from Edward Glover *(22)*, but which I use in a different sense.

'War readiness' I would define as that state of mind, partly conscious but largely unconscious, that is genetically antecedent to the social and psychological behavior involved in the war institution. Being purely psychological, it is to be differentiated from war preparedness, which is an integral function of the war institution. It is also to be differentiated from war mindedness, which is the psychological response to the demands of war preparedness. The study of the unconscious roots of war readiness lies within our field, irrespective of the specific form and function of the war institution and of the stage in social evolution at which it makes its appearance. This same constellation of drives and motives may enter into many different forms of societal expression, of which—given other social conditions and other social determinants—war is not necessarily the most characteristic.

Although the focus of our interest in this paper is psychological, to comprehend the phenomenon of war requires, to begin with, an inquiry along the lines of political science. We must ask: 1, What is the form and structure of the social phenomenon of war? 2, How does the social institution of war fit into the functioning of the community organization as a whole? 3, How does this institution function in time of peace?

Two assumptions can be made about man's social institutions. One is that man has been existing in a community

with social institutions ever since the evolutional dawn which is lost in prehistory. The other is that the evolution of any particular social institution—the social institution of war is one example—can be very rapid and also of quite recent origin. This is an important distinction from the basically constant instinctual organization subsumed under war readiness.

Although probably there has always been some kind of warmaking, in accordance with the cultural patterns of tribal societies, some of it would bear only the faintest resemblance to war as we now observe it. The prevalent view is that war is not a ubiquitous expression of man's inherent aggressivity, a universal human activity. Benedict, in Patterns of Culture *(5)*, concluded that, although we are now in a state of perpetual warfare, from the point of view of cultural anthropology warfare is not the expression of an 'instinct of pugnacity' (p. 34). The cultural patterns of a community, as expressed in its institutions, determine the expression of the aggressive drive. And this expression varies in different cultures from a highly individualistic war activity (for instance, among the Plains Indians, the warrior is superior), to warring as a more organized group activity, to the pacifistic community, as among the Zuni. Benedict regards warring as an asocial elaboration of a cultural trait that traditionally runs counter to biological drives, a point of view elaborated by Kardiner *(27)* in his studies of the Alor.

The war institution as we now know it is a comparatively recent historical phenomenon. It began at that stage of civilization at which man emerged from tribal societies and proceeded to organize larger and ever more complex political units, eventuating in the modern autonomous and sovereign states. It was in these latter states that the war institution became a constant and inevitable factor. Within the political unit a relative peace prevailed among individuals as well as among the various social groups comprising the nation. Peace and law prevailed because the use of force was pre-empted by the state, or delegated to it.

But the sovereign state, in facing outward toward other sovereign states, dealt with them with guarded yet often unmitigated hostility, self-interest, and apprehensive vigilance. It established military organizations to run a military machine and to plan war strategy, while a diplomatic corps conducted its 'foreign affairs'—the understanding being that the alternative to the hostile suspense that was now called peace would be violent conflict, namely, war *(3)*.

Let us reduce this state of affairs to a simple formulation. A political unit is made possible only by the fact that men are united in their community under law as administered by the state, which has a monopoly on violence. Ordinarily not too great an amount of active violence has to be used by the state, since man by and large consents voluntarily to its demands. This is because: (a) man is a social being whose social functions are perhaps acquired by way of constitutional endowment, yet are certainly developed in the rearing process; and (b) the ties that bring men together into social entities are largely libidinal. Socialization promotes the displacement of libidinal forces onto social institutions. We find furthermore that the political unit (the nation, the autonomous and sovereign state) is invested with a 'collective narcissism' *(39)* of well-nigh megalomaniac proportions: patriotism, a sense of national glory, and a readiness for boundless sacrifice and for war. Toward the outsider there is apt to be hostility, or what is even worse, narcissistic indifference. We witness here the clean split of emotional ambivalence, with all the libido as centripetal and all the hostility as centrifugal.

THE POLITICAL UNIT

With the evolution of the political unit and the introduction of an advanced technology, most notably the sword, the Bronze Age ushered in the modern war institution. The political unit is defined by Raymond Aron *(3)* as 'a political collectivity that is territorially organized'; it is consistent and uniform in its diplomatic-strategic behavior, irrespective of its organiza-

tion, however varied. 'International relations are relations among political units, the latter covering the Greek city-states and the Roman and Egyptian empires as well as the European monarchies, the bourgeois republics or the people's democracies' (p. 4). In the development of the state since the Renaissance, the 'ideal political unit' is that nation in which the community of culture[1] and military order meet and coincide to create a state in which all individuals participate in citizenship and, more recently, in universal suffrage. 'It is completely sovereign and totally independent of the "external world" ' (p. 294).

The political unit, or the nation, is composed of a great variety of groups, organized in correspondence with the multitude of human needs, individual and social. These groups are biological (the family), cultural (religions), economic, æsthetic, and a host of other types. They may be either stable or transient. They may be coöperative or conflictual. In international relations, there is a complete split in ambivalence with all the libidinal components functioning within the group and all the aggression, hostility, competitiveness, and violent conflict directed outward. In contrast to this situation there are many social institutions in which both coöperation and competition are integral and are therefore essentially stable. An example is labor and management; they coöperate in production, yet have conflicts of interest.

In contrast to the overt aggressivity between political units, how is the peace within a political unit maintained? What of its intranational life? Freud, in Why War? *(8),* states that the community must be permanently maintained, with authorities to see that the laws are respected and to superintend the execution of legal acts of violence. The recognition of a community of interests leads to the growth of emotional ties (identifications) between the members of a united group of people. The ties are communal feelings that are the true source of their strength. Freud also speaks of ideals that 'give expression to

[1] Actually, the majority of nations consist of manifold cultures and historic groups.

important affinities between . . . members' (p. 208). He then goes on to remind us that 'the violent solution of conflicts of interest is not avoided even inside a community. But the everyday necessities and common concerns . . . bring such struggles to a swift conclusion' (p. 206) with a probability of a peaceful solution.

THE WAR INSTITUTION

To examine more closely the modern war institution, this organ of the national state may be backed by a military class, as in a dictatorship, or by the whole citizenry, as in a democratic nation, or by some variation of these. But irrespective of the political organization of the state, the war institution functions in the same essential manner and to the same ends.[3]

The two principal concepts of military strategy and of diplomatic conduct are, broadly speaking, offensive and defensive. But their political meaning is that of a political unit imposing its will on others and not letting the will of others be imposed on it; i.e., safeguarding its autonomy, maintaining its own manner of life, resisting subordination of its internal laws, or of its external action, to the desire of others. Of central importance is the absolute and unqualified principle of sovereignty in the relationship between states. It is the master theme in strategic-diplomatic activity and foreign relations and the reason for the potential of war.[4] The wish for equality is trans-

[2] I am indebted to Raymond Aron for most of the content in this section.

[3] The Dictionary of Social Science defines war as a uniquely human cultural phenomenon, a socially recognized 'deadly quarrel' between sovereign states, to be differentiated from more general 'deadly quarrels'. Without going into the matter, it should be underscored that our basic definition of war undergoes little qualification as to types of wars listed, the most important being interstate and imperial wars. When intergroup conflict attains the intensity of war, as in civil wars, the parties in conflict usually organize into states and assume for themselves the prerogatives of sovereign states.

[4] This bald fact has entered the discussion of war and peace only recently. Psychiatric publications as recent as the 1964 GAP Report *(21)* give faint recognition to the central role of sovereignty in determining international relations.

ferred to this absolute condition. The desire is for security and force, even when they are contradictory. Power and glory—the glory of the nation or the idea for which it stands—is ever sought for. Other ideas—cultural, linguisitic, religious, politico-philosophical—take a subordinate position to national sovereignty per se.

Nations that are autonomous and sovereign 'accept the plurality of centers of armed forces', and in international relations they assume 'the plurality of autonomous centers of decision . . . with the implicit risk of war', since 'each claims the right to take justice in its *own* hands and to be the sole arbiter of decision to fight or not to fight. . . . [International] politics, insofar as it concerns relations among states, seems to signify—in both ideal and objective terms—simply the survival of states confronting the potential threat created by the existence of other states' *(3,* p. 90*)*.

The primary characteristic of diplomatic-strategic behavior is that it occurs 'in the shadow of war and is therefore obliged to take the relation of forces into account' *(3,* p. 88*)*. This may be contrasted with economic behavior, which is based on value or utility. Economic motives, of course, figure in many wars but Aron, like many political scientists, does not give them a Marxian priority.[5]

Among analysts, Glover characterizes the emphasis on 'sovereignty' as being crucial to war motivation as 'dangerous rationalization'. 'Behind these reality relations are infantile interests and unconscious psychological factors to territorial aggrandizement' *(22,* p. 87*)*. Alix Strachey *(37)* recognizes the importance of the sovereignty factor, but only half-heartedly, since the cardinal realities of political organization and function are not seriously taken into account as a paramount reality. Both these analysts treat the state as 'a regressive group formation' [sic], as presumptuous, bumbling, and dispensible, expendable—in short, a nuisance. Glover recommends returning to the family as the sole social unit, an unlikely prospect, if not inherently impossible.

[5] Aron *(3)* finds no explanatory evidence for the evolution of modern war, either in reference to the social evolution of prehistoric man, of which we know practically nothing, or in the evidence of evolutionary changes since modern war came on the scene. He finds the causes for war here indicated as constant through historic time and quotes Richardson (p. 326) to the effect that wars have not increased from 1820-1945. However, Aron lists Quincy

The political scientist T. H. Pear *(33)* quotes Emery Reves: 'War takes place whenever and wherever non-integrated social units of equal sovereignty come into contact' (p. 26). Pear adds: 'Few will disagree with [the] tenet that . . . the main stumbling-block to peace is national sovereignty. . . . It is clear that belief in national sovereignty does not arise out of original "Human Nature", but is a very recent development' (p. 33). Although civilized people have abandoned the idea that their planet is the center of the universe, they do so regard their country and 'create an entirely false perspective'. The primitive method of observation is 'the only method admitted and used by [most] national governments' resulting in 'a hopelessly confused and grotesque over-all picture of the world' (p. 33). Every government constructs around its own center a mental pattern which is regarded as 'the only "real" one. . . . The citizens of every country will be at all times convinced—and rightly so—of the infallibility of their views [of the world and history] and the objectivity of their conclusions' (p. 34).

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND WAR

As we have noted, war is a social institution in which the factor of violence is socially and politically regulated. War is not a relation between man and man but between state and state, in which individuals are enemies only occasionally, as Rousseau said, 'not as men but as soldiers. . . . Individuals have no motives for hating each other. . . . Violence is limited to the clash of armies.' It is this gap between individual motivation and social behavior that must have puzzled Freud when he said that the psychological motivation for war was an obscure problem.

The relationship between individual psychology and social action constantly confronts us, yet the interfaces between these modes still mystify us. Freud *(8)*, in his dual instinct theory, assumed that the same forces and mechanisms which operated

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Wright's factors of bellicosity as contributory, i.e.: (a) habits of cruelty (as in religion, sports, etc.); (b) aggressivity; (c) influence of military morality; and (d) tendency to despotism and to centralization (p. 333).

in the individual generally held for the community as well. Freud's biological theory is so broad and general that the categorical distinctions between the sociological and psychological modes that are operative in war present no obstacles. It might even be suggested that Freud originated his dual instinct theory in order to be able to explain such destructive human activities as war. Yet that theory—a brilliant metaphysical device and sound metapsychologically—does not draw a clear psychological connection between man's aggressive instincts and the social institution of war.

Putting aside this problem in social psychology for the time, we shall confine our inquiry here to a consideration of the individual's war readiness, restricting this term to those emotional factors that operate in the individual and are psychoanalytically observable. War readiness is the unconscious psychological state of man in relation to the war institution—both preparation for war and war activity—as he consciously coöperates with, conforms to, complies with, resists, ignores, despises, or glories in it. War readiness is not to be confused with war mindedness, which is a conscious mental state of compliance with war activity; it is also a different dynamic concept from war motivation. War readiness is rather a psychological disposition or predisposition, attributable mainly to primitive psychological mechanisms that stem from a very early pregenital development. Superego psychology seems to figure very little in it. When we approach the more inclusive war motivation, on the other hand, we seem to be dealing with components deriving from a higher level of psychic organization. Here superego elements do enter prominently.[6]

Before proceeding with the psychology of war readiness, let us examine the phenomenon of the drastic and absolute boundary line that is drawn between the two contrasting emotional attitudes: the emotions invested in one's own political unit-sovereign state, and the attitude toward the outsider's political

[6] One example of this is to be found in the study of the war neuroses which, according to Simmel, Abraham, and Freud, are essentially transference neuroses *(25)*.

unit-sovereign state. Here is a clear-cut split in ambivalence. All the libido is directed toward one's own political unit and all the aggressivity against the foreign state—the stranger. What are the psychological factors that account for such ambivalence?

The degree to which psychoanalytic psychology, especially early developmental psychology, fits the political facts here is noteworthy. Standing out prominently is the fact of ambivalence —the existence of love-hate in relationship to objects, and the very possibility of such a complete split as manifested in the radical boundary described above.[7] Ambivalence, in its original diffused state, is a prominent feature of narcissism. Freud *(10)* describes the earliest state of narcissism as attributing all that is pleasurable and benign to oneself and projecting onto the external world all that is disagreeable, uncomfortable, tension-producing, and hostile. A narcissistic state that occurs even earlier than unpleasure is indifference. When this state occurs later in life, Freud calls it 'a special case of hate or dislike'. He also speaks of a narcissistic link with aggression, including destruction of the object.

The extreme self-centeredness underlying adherence to particular interests and points of view—the self-glorification, self-righteousness, and absolute conviction of right—also corresponds to a narcissistic state. Toward the outsider there is an apprehensive suspicion, a vigilant, suspenseful unfriendliness and, as noted above, in the absence of hostility, a callous indifference. This bears a striking resemblance to paranoia.

Stone *(36)* has written about the extension of the narcissistic principle into human social organization, and its relation there to the problem of aggression. Glover *(22)* writes of a projection, a psychic displacement that acts with great vigor in group relations, namely, an attempt to convert an inner psychic stimulus (an inner enemy) to an outer reality stimulus (an outer enemy). Within the political unit, man must learn to

[7] When this primitive psychological state manifests itself in psychopathology, it does so ordinarily in the form of a narcissistic neurosis.

master the hate component of his ambivalent relationship with regard to other members of his own society. 'Instinctual problems concerning love and hate can give rise to the most violent conflicts. One particular outcome of violent conflict is the loosening of destructive impulses—which in turn produces still further conflict, [necessitating] the inhibition of violence' (p. 206) —and its displacement to a group prerogative. 'The power lost as a private individual is regained through the group. The repressed hostility lends itself to projection to the outsider' (p. 206). To this can be added the tense, repressed aggression that is the individual's reaction to the frustrations, the self-sacrifices, and the renunciation of narcissistic gratifications that are required for his participation in social life.

The role of unconscious homosexuality is closely tied to narcissism and ambivalence. The intensification of the homosexual libido[8] in many group relations in the political unit, and certainly in the war institution, is suggestive. Glover *(22)* also thought that a strong homosexual fixation re-enforces narcissism and produces an accompanying 'anxiety readiness'. Anxiety readiness may be thought of as a predisposition to war readiness.

In contemplating the displacement of libidinal ties from the family to the social group, one is struck by the part that kinship plays in the splitting-off of aggression for projection outwards. Stone *(36)* refers to the dialectical relationship between the immunities granted by kinship and the intense hostilities that are provoked early in life. Ambivalent homosexual feelings, having been worked through, make possible powerful feelings of fraternal love as well as its sublimations. In group relations, there is bound to be a diffusion of instinct with resulting tension and floating anxiety as well as aggressivity seeking an object. This latter is generally directed toward the outsider. Freud *(11)* posits that hostility toward loved ones stems from ambivalence; aversion to strangers, from narcissism.

[8] Glover considered the homosexual component to be the most important finding in the war neuroses.

We must consider another important fact in modern civilization. In contrast to the conditions that prevail in the family group, most of the group relations in the large and complex political unit are within groups evermore distant from the individual. In most economic, political, and cultural groups the relationships are impersonal and may verge on the abstract. This is compensated by the usefulness of the functions of these institutions and the benefits they confer which give them stability.[9] This increasing remoteness of the institution from the individual—as well as the increasing distance between individuals within these institutions—removes these relationships from those libidinal and compensatory processes and the 'immunities granted by kinship' *(36)* prevailing between members at a closer distance, where sexual aims and aim-inhibited feelings are possible. We would expect an intensification of the aggressivity and ambivalence with the resultant pent-up aggression that seeks projection onto the stranger.[10]

Money-Kyrle *(31)* points out that, as a consequence of projection onto the outsider, reality testing becomes inoperative, while anal-sadistic fantasies have full play and are able to feed the flames of hate and alienation.[11]

To return to war readiness, depending as it does on the early development of the mental apparatus, we would consider it a fairly constant and fixed state. On the other hand, the degree of tension may depend not only on the internal, psychological situation, but may be altered by the external situation, such as war preparation, war propaganda, or the imminence or outbreak of war. We can conceive of a 'flash point', representing the culminating effect of those factors that precipitate war

[9] This may remain true even when these institutions develop features that are objectionable and even dangerous to the individual.

[10] These considerations enter into Glover's *(22)* recommendation, logically sound if unrealistic, that the national state (the political unit) be eliminated, and that the human race return to the family and the prehistoric clan in order to recapture the libido that is dominant in relationships within the family group. This is also implied in Strachey's discussion *(37)*.

[11] Aside from these unconscious effects the sheer effect of powerful aggression-laden emotions on the perceptual function and on judgment is demonstrable *(21)*.

readiness into war motivation or war mindedness.[12] This is a point at which the individual reacts, consciously or preconsciously, in a variety of ways. One might be the precipitation of a war neurosis;[13] another might be the arousal of traumatic feelings of helplessness about events in that strange world outside the individual's private world, over which he has no control. A reaction of violent aggression may be the defense.

One 'flash point' in the outbreak of war that Glover *(22)* singles out is the situation in which the tension in the unconscious hostility between males is touched off by an unconscious homosexual regression within the group. This results from social permission to let loose the repressed anal-sadistic drives connected with the sublimated homosexual bonds that had until then effectively reduced the rivalries between males. He asks, but does not answer, at what level of regression the 'flash point' occurs. A reaction-formation against this transition from war readiness to war mindedness may be peace mindedness—a state of mind closely related in its dynamics to war mindedness.

Let us not be misled by the extent to which so many essential manifestations of man's life resemble infantile mental states, and enter into psychopathological formations. In the most mature expressions of object love, such as romantic love, parental love, religious experience, patriotism, creative experience, etc., we find the essential participation of narcissism and such drives as enter into war readiness. The characterization of the war institution as a 'social psychosis' may very well be merely pejorative: superficial and scientifically unsound. The war institution may be regarded instead as a component of the political unit as it has developed historically in man's social evolution.

It is my conjecture that it is the defensive function of projection of aggression that makes possible the existence of the political unit. Also, the war institution is ego-syntonic and, in most

[12] Martin Wangh's theories about *when* wars break out may apply to this concept *(40)*.

[13] Jones *(26)* demonstrated that an outbreak of war neuroses occurred in Britain during the period of international tension preceding World War I.

instances, thoroughly acceptable to the individual's morality. For most, patriotism (the exaltation of the group) is a legitimate, acceptable, rationalized displacement of the individual's narcissism. The same legitimacy can be applied to the projected hate component of ambivalence, the most repressed and the most sacrificed to the civilizing group process. The war institution can thus be seen as a manifestation of the nation's will to survive and to maintain its character. The national self-consciousness and the self-esteem of the citizenry serve to integrate and strengthen the nation. There is much of value in the joy, pride, and glory for the citizens who share in this sense of national destiny. The shining flame of glory, as a virtue and a goal, has only recently been dimmed, and then only among some of the intelligentsia. In Why War? Freud wonders whether his and Einstein's pacifism is a '*constitutional* intolerance, . . . an idiosyncrasy' *(8,* p. 215*)* and thus presumably true of only a minority.[14]

Psychoanalysis has never flinched from observing the human condition for what it is, tragic though some of its aspects may be. An uninformed emphasis on psychopathology may tend to explain man away instead of explaining him. Can we expect man to live above his 'emotional income'? The ambivalence of human nature is a fact; also man's pregenital instinctual needs must be served. Only a small portion of the human situation can be subsumed under what is rational, or even what can at present be described and defined in psychoanalytic concepts. The emotional, irrational aspects of man's mental life also reach into the most highly integrated psychic functions. Even in his symbolic functions, and particularly in his language function, the 'emotive' category stands side by side with the symbolizing-categorizing faculty, the most prominent component of secondary process thought *(4).*

[14] In so far as conscience enters into warmaking, Freud, in New Introductory Lectures, says: '. . . as regards conscience God has done an uneven . . . piece of work, for a large majority [have been given an amount] scarcely . . . worth mentioning' *(12,* p. 61*).*

Since prognosis involves diagnostic concepts, it is interesting to consider some recommendations for the ending or amelioration of war. Einstein *(30)* naïvely recommended that to achieve peace, man must decrease as well as control his aggressive drives. I am afraid that this can be realized only by mutation, which was actually recommended by one desperate essayist as a cure for war.

The modern era can be described as the age of expanding communication between men in the civilized world—trade, navigation, empire, universal religions, as well as the written language and the printing press—, culminating in the almost instantaneous and universal intercommunication of the last century. Some writers—for instance, Money-Kyrle *(31)*, Strachey *(37)*, and the GAP report *(21)*—have suggested that increased communication between isolated peoples will advance peace. As a corollary, many others have expressed the belief that international education and enlightenment will achieve it. And yet one recalls the sense of shock and disenchantment that was occasioned by the instantaneous falling apart of the cosmopolitan community of enlightened spirits at the time of World War I, a collapse Freud wrote about in Thoughts for the Times on War and Death *(13)*.

Some writers, like Franz Alexander *(1)*, saw as a solution the replacement of autocratic governments by democratic, popular ones, since 'the people' are against war. Alas, the burden of evidence indicates that increases in democracy and civil liberties have had no such effect. One example, apart from the relatively recent civil wars, such as those in Russia, the United States, and Britain, is the Napoleonic wars of liberation. In the era of the greatest political emancipation, 1820 to 1945, there has been no decrease in the making of wars.

The most striking instance of *false* hope is the modern industrial state, a democracy with no discernible military class and no burning military ideals. The United States is the best example. It is ruled in its civic life and in its declared international relations by the same moral principles; as a result of

advanced technology, there is no demarcation between the production of civil goods and military goods. And yet, with all this, there is no abatement in the war potential. The entire citizenry, without marked distinction from the diplomatic-strategic organization that is still in power, is identified with the state in war preparation and warmaking. In this system, 'There is no damn thing you can do that can't be turned into war' *(2,* p. 16*)*.

The atomic age has introduced new angles and new horrors, but without altering the basic model. The strategy of atomic deterrence has only increased war preparation while adding a component of passive aggression in the nations that are opposing each other in the cold war and sputtering conflagratory sparks. All the old attitudes are still retained, with an increase in the mortal dangers. The vastness of the potential has been responsible for the introduction of a numbed incomprehension and a general civic passivity while people cheer the astronauts and get ready to throw missiles from space. The basic model remains: a 'sovereign political unit against the outside world', with the concomitant split in ambivalence and the constant war potential.

In line with the hopes for peace mentioned above, which were based on the belief that universal enlightenment and the 'growth of civilization works against war', let us dwell for a moment upon Freud's utopian hopes for the rule of reason to end war. In Why War? he writes of an 'ideal condition . . . a dictatorship of reason. Nothing else could unite men so completely and so tenaciously, even if there were no emotional ties between them' *(8,* p. 213*)*. This concept of ideas without emotional cathexis possessing the power to significantly determine human events is contrary to that which is basic and revolutionary in Freud's doctrine. In The Interpretation of Dreams he says, 'No influence . . . can ever enable us to think without purposive ideas' *(19,* p. 528*)*.

Are we really dealing here with contradictions within scientific thought? No. It is a clash between a scientific thought and a

philosophy of life, one bordering on faith. Every age has its own dominant world view. Freud lived in an age when 'enlightenment' (and the foremost place in it was given to 'science') bore a messianic mission. Arendt quotes Lessing as saying that 'the education of mankind would coincide with man's coming of age' *(2,* p. 25*)*. She reminds us that Karl Marx said that knowledge would free man from the economic determinism he postulated, equivalent to Freud's lapse in his psychic determinism. Prior to 1890 Freud was strongly influenced in his *Weltanschauung* by Herbert Spencer and Marx. Both predicted the withering away of the force of society against the individual and with it, presumably, 'the withering away of the state'. Early psychoanalytic ego psychology gives great prominence to the clash between the individual and society. Individualism was the most prized spiritual flower of Freud's age, almost the official religion of the times.[15]

Psychoanalysts are no different from other scientists in being able to deal objectively, unsparing of their narcissism, in their own sphere and then easily falling back into wishful thinking outside it, as in the realm of political thought.

The following is an illustration of how woefully far apart highly sophisticated men imbued with the most intense social idealism can get in their basic concepts and beliefs. I. F. Stone *(35)* expresses his faith in universalism in his plea against Jewish nationalism (Zionism), which he contemptuously calls 'a Lilliputian Nationalism'. He writes, 'Universal values can only be the fruit of universal vision' and he recommends these to the Israelis and to the Jews as well. 'But wouldn't it be better were the Soviet Union to wipe out anti-Semitism' so the Jews would not long for a national homeland, or the Israelis would not hold out a hand of welcome? These utopian longings are presented by him as opinions in the realm of practical solutions to desperately urgent human predicaments.

[15] It should be pointed out that much of contemporary writing on war contains similar utopian hopes and confidence in the final victory of man's reason over war—even when these conclusions fly in the face of the authors' own theses.

The opposite pole of the dilemma is expressed in Vladimir Jabotinsky's plea, A Jewish State Now *(24)*, an address to the House of Lords in 1937. He described the position of a people without a land, without a sovereign state, as a 'state of permanent disaster', facing 'an elemental calamity, a kind of social earthquake'. Unless the Jews could 'build up their own body social', he said, they would be faced with a 'xenophobia' of life itself. This he contrasted to the usual and inevitable prejudices against minorities, which he said could be endured. This is not reported as political propaganda but as the statement of a concept of nationality held to be organically rooted in an unavoidable, almost a biological, reality. Is it to these necessities that man reacts with his grand dreams of a universal society, of universal peace?

Let us consider further the effect of replacing the instinctual by the intellectual. 'Where Id was, Ego shall be.' It would seem that the balance is weighted for rather than against war. It is true that reason means delay, control, reality-testing, so that fantasy has less sway. But, as Freud *(14)* said, decathecting the drives in the civilizing process works counter to sex and pleasure, thus increasing frustration and the aggression-seeking discharge. The translation of objects into symbolic categories, which occurs in the thinking function, may serve as a degradation: a man becomes a category—'enemy'. Hence, 'kill the enemy', 'body count', 'vermin' (Stalin's class enemies). So the effect of replacing the instinctual with the intellectual may turn out badly.[16]

Lest we leave all hope behind, an optimistic, long-term view may yet be derived from my line of argument. As we have seen, war is a product of a recent historical evolvement, the sovereign political unit. I have already referred in my introduction to the transiency of social and political events, which

[16] In Moses and Monotheism *(15)* Freud explained the development of the highest religious and ethical ideas through the progression of internalized parental objects to symbolic entities.

may imply the transiency of the institutions they give rise to. Unpredictable political alterations deriving from economic, technological, geoeconomical or geopolitical developments may yet serve to break up the basic model.[17] These alterations may be facilitated by informed social action.

PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

In our investigation into the psychological motives for war, we have been unable to get very far beyond some insight into war readiness, that is, the individual's predisposition to war (and peace) mindedness and its variants. Some crucial questions arise here. Does the individual contain within himself motives and drives unfamiliar to us but which find expression in his social institutions? Society and culture being at one and the same time a historic continuum outside his person and his own issue genetically, how and to what extent does the individual become identified with his society and its institutions? In what way and to what degree is culture internalized? Has man a social psyche?[18] How does the individual implicitly and largely nonconsciously participate in the social institution of war? Here the unconscious would have to be something other than the repressed. What is there in psychoanalytic theory to help our inquiry and ultimate clarification?

Freud's group psychology takes a long step toward the comprehension we seek. Based on individual psychology and explaining a social institution[19] at the interfaces of the individual psyche and the group process, Freud's theory of group psychology was a breakthrough into sociology. It should have opened up an era of psychoanalytic social psychology. It did not. One wonders why psychoanalysts have not followed Freud

[17] States may reckon with the total untenability of the destructiveness of modern weapons and they may transfer war and combat to some other level of conflict *(6)*.

[18] Glover *(22)* says that the group psychology is a part of the individual's psyche. This may be a part of his ego nuclei theory.

[19] Freud dealt with the army and the church in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego *(16,* pp. 93, ff.).

into this realm and elaborated his sociopsychological model, applying it to other social institutions.[20]

It is not that psychoanalysts have been unaware of this need. Glover, following Freud, says that 'social psychology' starts in the eight-month-old infant *(22)*. Here, in the interaction between infant and mother, and others (e.g., stranger anxiety), is the interface in the communication process within which the culture is transmitted to the child. According to Hartmann *(23)*, the mother communicates and transmits the culture through a process which he designates as the 'social compliance' of the child, a process less obscure and more easily understood than the more familiar 'somatic compliance'. He says that a given social structure selects and makes effective specific psychic tendencies and their expression in certain developmental trends, with an effect on the id, ego, and superego, and ultimately is an essential approach to the genetic development of object relations. This socialization process takes place mainly in the preverbal period.

Hartmann's idea that the 'social situation' selects and affects specific psychic tendencies can be usefully reversed to the following proposition: that the psychic apparatus, in accordance with its individual and unique propensities and organization, responds selectively to the social situation or structure that impinges on it in the rearing process. Furthermore, the 'social situation' is ordinarily complex and many-faceted. The selection of the stimuli, or the selective response to stimuli, is a developmental and structuring process which results within this social context in a unique and characteristic cultural personality.

[20] Talcott Parsons, after criticizing individual psychologists as well as sociologists for making *ad hoc* extensions from their own theory to that of others, demonstrates the feasibility of focusing the sociological and the psychoanalytic theories on the same problem by giving a sociological description of the average American family alongside a psychoanalytic theory of intrafamily relationships *(32,* p. 377*)*. On the other hand, Van den Haag, writing on the relationship between analysis of individuals and groups, says: '. . . nor can psychoanalytic contributions account for behavior of individuals acting as group members' *(38,* p. 114*)*. Need we agree with either Van den Haag or Parsons as to the inherent limitations of psychoanalysis?

The response involves the whole reactive and participating gamut of defenses: nonresponse or primal repression, abandonment and flight into narcissism, negation, secondary repression, regression, isolation, turning into the opposite, etc. The resulting socially determined character formation might well be the *anlage* of this individual's subsequent response to and relationship or identification with the social situations encountered in the future. It would result in a great variety of attitudes toward any social institution or cultural entity, and toward society's demands on the individual in a particular social situation. The feelings attached to these attitudes and beliefs range from powerful emotional expression (e.g., self-immolation, burning of draft papers) to a quiescent acceptance or nonacceptance. On the whole, however, people tend to comply with the demands of the state, not to speak of obeying and responding to marching orders, and to coöperate in their economic and other activities, geared though they are to war.

I know of no theory and investigative method more suited than psychoanalysis—once it is amplified by a greater understanding of the socialization process and its result in unconscious social ideas and drives,—to explain the great variety of attitudes and perhaps even the basic attitude toward war and the war institution found among people and often within the same person.

Let us examine this interface further. When we look more closely at Hartmann's highly abbreviated term, 'the social situation', we glimpse a larger problem for our inquiry. In psychoanalytic study, we take cognizance of the fact that we are ordinarily preoccupied with and aware of only a fragmentary datum, abstracted from the 'social situation'. We study, for instance, sphincter control training, specifically, or feeding routines, or cleanliness training, or control of aggression in children, yet each instance is only one portion of a cultural cluster or gestalt. The sociological examination of this cultural constellation—that is, of this 'social situation'—together with the application of psychoanalytic explication (a simultaneous and

correlated sociological and psychoanalytic study of the interaction at the interfaces of the organism and society) would constitute the subject for study by psychoanalytic social psychology. And it could be extended into the psychology of the adult individual's participation in social action. This I have attempted to clarify in the form of a chart.

HYPOTHESIS OF THE SOCIALIZATION PROCESS

At the *interface:* Interaction between *mother* (embodiment and agent of the culture-society) and *child.*

In rearing activity:

MOTHER (applies cultural stimulus to)→CHILD

Stimulus = cultural datum, or fragment abstracted from larger cultural cluster

Child reacts selectively to stimulus by:

- A. Repudiation (primary repression)
- B. Internalization
  1. Acceptance and Integration or
  2. Defenses vs. Stimulus
     - a. Abandonment or Flight (secondary narcissism)
     - b. Negation
     - c. Repression
     - d. Regression
     - e. Isolation
     - f. Identification with painful stimulus, etc.

The selective response to the *culture* and its internalization and synthesis in its consequently *individualized and personalized form* goes into the development of the individual's *cultural character.*

Examples of attitude of individual toward war institution, or variety of attitudes toward war institution within same individual:

Conformity	and/or	*Nonconformity*
A. With assent		(Active-Passive or Passive-Aggressive)
B. Without assent		
1. Conscious participation		1. Conscious repudiation
2. Preconscious participation		2. Preconscious repudiation
3. Unconscious or nonconscious participation		3. Unconscious or nonconscious repudiation

Heretofore psychoanalytic theory has been applied mainly to the study of the family and has remained almost exclusively so preoccupied.[21] Its methodolgy works best in studying intra-family relations as seen from the point of view of the individual. The family as a component social group of the larger society has thus far received relatively little attention. This has led to the conceptual 'illusion' (to use the term as a metaphor) of the 'individual' as somehow being someone with an existence apart from society. Society is thus viewed as an external tyranny to which the individual is subject.[22]

Starting with the hypothesis of early man as asocial, Freud reconstructs the drama of the primal horde which puts man on the 'path' to culture and civilization. It is the union of peers of the primal horde, triumphing over the tyranny and violence of the father. The newly formed group—a society of individuals identified with each other—now becomes a civilized, law-governed community. Their union 'now represented law in contrast to the violence of a single individual . . . [and now] right is the might of a community. It is still violence . . . it works by the same methods and follows the same purposes' *(8,* p. 205*)*. In this theory the aggression (violence) of the individual is displaced onto the group, now newly integrated into a society by these prehuman individuals.

Thus far we have been looking at war unequivocally as a social institution. When participation in war is not foisted on the

[21] This conceptual stricture—the exclusive preoccupation with the family, as though it were the sole social group—has simultaneously enriched and limited psychoanalysis. The 'family drama' model has been almost exclusively dominant in psychoanalytic investigations in the area of the social sciences, except for Freud's formulation in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego *(16)* and his hypothesis of the birth of civilization in Totem and Taboo *(18)*. Religion as well as civilization is conceived of as a neurosis arising out of emotional conflict in the family setting in The Future of an Illusion *(17)*.

[22] The writings of Marcuse *(28)* and Fromm *(20)* are likewise a call to man to free himself from the tyranny of society, thus implying the same kind of dichotomy between the individual and society—a dichotomy genetic as well as existential.

individual by external compulsion, his participation in it takes place within the context of group formation and action. According to Freud *(16),* group participation is entered into through the identification of peers with each other, and in their common relation to the command of the leader and the social idea he represents. Furthermore, the internalization of social ideas and their social sanctions brings about the individual's identification with the culture and its values. Does this transpire with the war institution?[23]

Freud states that every individual is an enemy of culture, which is a heavy burden *(17,* p. 8*).* For Freud culture has an *otherness,* rather than an I-ness, or a Me-ness. May this not be the feeling of unreality, the remoteness from reality, that one encounters in many sensitive and often neurotic people? Or is there another explanation—a social-psychological one? The subjective factor may of itself contribute to this exaggeration of the illusion of 'individuality', accompanied as this image is by a convincing sense of concreteness and reality. The subjective factor may be objectified in psychoanalytic theory.

To make more concrete the possibility of an interdisciplinary approach that would bring psychoanalysis closer to a psychoanalytic social psychology, let us consider the behavioral sociology of George H. Mead *(29),* whose views were advanced in the first two decades of the twentieth century. His formulations are remarkably like Freud's in vital ways yet lead to a different conception—namely, that 'the essence of all human experience is social; hence perception and communication are social. The internalization of the "other", "taking the role of the other", is an intrinsic aspect of human thinking—the unit of the social system is not the "individual" but the dyadic role expectation, which involves expectations from the self and the other; this is the social "me" ' (pp. 173, ff). There is no 'self', no mind, no thought apart from the social process. Mead's

[23] J. R. Pitts *(34)* has pointed out that with the introduction of the concept of the superego Freud moved away from his early theory of the individual who is confronted or opposed by society.

concept of man, predicated on basic psychological functions, carries even further than psychoanalysis the implications of identification and internalization of objects. Synthesized with Mead's behavioral sociology, Freud's group psychology could be generalized and universalized so that it would apply to the individual's relationship to and participation in many varieties of social groups.

The most important medium of social communication, the reification of the social interchange, is language. There is no thought, no mind, no self, no 'I' without language.[24] In Mead's theory, man is encountered from the first as a social being equipped with language, mind, and thought; he is virtually unthinkable apart from his social organization. (We know practically nothing of the evolutionary transition to this social man.)

The 'other' in the dyadic relationship postulated by Mead is the keystone both of the individual psyche and of that social unit that is essentially the definition of the individual. Mead's 'other' may be regarded as crossing the conceptual path of Freud's alienated 'cultural-other'. We have here a crossroad of two theories, far apart, yet close together. Let us compare these two theories. The psychoanalytic group process consists of the identification by the egos of 'peers', and of the relationship of the peer group to the ego ideal as represented by the leader. Mead's theory is that the internalization in the ego is of social items, through the medium of language—items belonging unequivocally to the culture and to the group. Thus, identification between individuals, although not always specifically elaborated, is an inevitable result of the processes presented by both Mead and Freud.

One might attempt to apply this sociopsychological theory to the variegated relationship of the individual to the war institution. It is possible that the cultural items internalized and subse-

[24] The relative neglect of the crucial significance of language in human psychology can be correlated with the underestimation of this social function. *Cf.*, Atkin *(4)*.

quently introduced into the social act may be only parts abstracted from the context; the person responds to war's cruelty, or altruism, or economic inducements. The ego may identify itself with the national ideal (nationalism) on one level and at the same time react against militarism or war on another level. The ego may remain unaware of a portion of the 'whole' or may actually repress one part of the whole, or there may be other developments. The striking inconsistencies between the ideas people have about war and the actual roles they fulfil in war preparation and war activity may thus be explained. It is possible to see how comprehensive is man's connection with his institutions. It is more difficult and less productive to view the individual's relationship to his institutions as simply being compelled by external forces. Rather, we anticipate that the social institution (in this instance, the war institution) will prove to be obligatory for the individual to an extent that is much greater than a psychoanalyst might expect.

CLINICAL OBSERVATIONS

We have seen the limitations of the psychological method for probing into the psychological motives for war. Our device of separating war readiness—which we defined as the individual's predisposition for war activity and which lends itself to the methods available to us as psychologists—is an inroad into the problem; but the specific question of psychological war motivation still evades solution.

To tackle the problem another way, let us observe the degree and manner of the individual's participation in his social institutions. I propose the hypothesis that most *socially derived* activities are experienced by the individual as the pursuit of his *personal* needs. Ordinarily the individual becomes aware of society's demands and expectations for the assumption of roles only when these demands and expectations clash with his personal interests or where there is a conflict between social roles. Various forms of nonconformity, particularly those that generate conflict or guilt, would then become self-conscious.

The drives would also become conscious when the social action feeds into a direct gratification of a sublimated instinctual wish, as might occur in connection with religious feeling, patriotism, neighborly sentiment, etc. Aggressiveness that raised the level of intrapsychic conflict, or that increased interpersonal conflicts, might also bring the social-instinctual drives into consciousness.

Besides consciously assumed social activity, one would then expect that conformity with, and compliance to, social and cultural demands and expectations would ordinarily find expression in largely unconscious or nonconscious social drives and motives, acted out with little or no awareness. Where members share values, moral or other, there is little need for awareness; motives remain implicit and nonverbal. Where motives reside in the superego, it is a 'shared superego', shared with the like-minded members of the group.[25]

Before applying the pragmatic test of examining the behavior of patients in the psychoanalytic situation, let us first take a look at a 'mature' person as he would be perceived at the present stage of clinical psychoanalytic theory. On the one hand, he is concerned about his fellowman, is socially responsible, is sensitive to the concerns of the community, and is capable of social involvement. Stated in psychoanalytic terms, his libido cathects objects freely and fully, he has a well-developed superego, and he has undergone a comprehensive internalization in

[25] The 'shared superego' I am suggesting approximates Freud's formulation of the mutual identifications by members of a group and corresponds to the internalization of the shared culture. Examples of shared values in the psychoanalytic situation are the mutually shared ideal of health, the 'psychoanalytic contract' with its shared ethics and rituals, mutual obligations regarding time, money, manners, and the ideals of complete candor and scientific truth, etc.

The interplay between the analyst and patient, as it involves moral values in the psychoanalytic situation, is largely a silent process although it often becomes a dynamic one under certain conditions in the transference, leading to internalizations and identifications with possible therapeutic gains. I have found that analysts tend to underestimate their largely preconscious value system and to insufficiently take into account the shared superego with those patients who, by and large, do share the same culture.

his psychic development. On the other hand, this very man seems in many essential ways to be quite independent of external social reality. He is capable of retaining the integrity of his character even when extreme changes take place in his cultural environment. In psychoanalytic terms, he is autonomous, relatively free from the imperative to conform to social demands, and, if need be, to remain uninvolved with society.

In the last several years I have gathered some general impressions from patients in analysis that relate to this discussion of motivations for war. My most general observation is that analytic patients spend very little time talking about matters of social concern or about impersonal environmental realities. Very little that is not immediately and intensely personal is communicated. Although of course this varies with patients, to a lesser degree it varies with the eventfulness of the times. It is striking how little repercussion world-shaking events have in the analytic hours.

What are we to make of these observations? Are the patients sensibly making the best of the psychotherapeutic situation? Is this a specific effect of the transference on the patient's communications? At first glance these observations seem to confirm the classical psychoanalytic view that the culture has an 'otherness' in relation to the individual, in contrast to the 'I-ness' or the 'me-ness'. Perhaps something may be learned by comparing those patients who *do* talk and those who *do not* talk about the environment in general and political events in particular.

In examining the group who talk almost exclusively about personal matters, I found to my surprise that these were the patients with the strongest egos, with the highest development of a distinct and differentiated self, with rich object relations consonant with substantial internalization and secondary identification, and with fully formed superegos. The paradox is that the most mature and most socially engaged are the least articulate about culture and society in the analytic situation. They do talk on social themes where social values are idiosyncratic due to cultural differences between patient and an

alyst, or when there is conflict or guilt about values, or when actual anxiety is present due to current conflicts with society.

On the other hand, it is the asocial and narcissistically neurotic patient who is more communicative about impersonal reality and social concerns in the analytic situation. I have found that a great deal of talk about and preoccupation with the external environment is correlated with a poorly developed ego or severe pathology. The self is poorly differentiated; there is a defect in ego boundaries. The outside world is highly personalized. These patients have difficulty in differentiating less personal social roles from those roles pertaining to their family group membership. Notable is an impaired ability to play the multiplicity of roles inherent in the functioning of an adult. Social attitudes directed toward them are perceived as personal; in fact, they have difficulty perceiving the impersonal as such. In very sick patients, nothing can be conceived of as differentiated from their personal needs; they 'use' objects as described by Winnicott *(41)*. They consider themselves very sensitive and are offended or disappointed by quite appropriate social behavior on the part of others if it does not conform to their private needs.

On closer examination of the sicker patients one finds a poor cathexis of environmental entities and of objects. Reality keeps slipping away and constantly needs to be recaptured by dwelling on it, recalling and recapitulating it, and actively reorganizing and re-establishing it. When reality is frustrating or threatening, it must be reconstituted verbally to allay apprehension and anxiety. These delusion-like formations are usually evanescent and not organized into a larger gestalt. Denial, projection, intellectualization are readily called into use.[26]

[26] Anna Freud *(7)* has pointed out that where the superego is poorly formed, objective anxiety is experienced in place of guilt. Usually an aggravated aggressive component increases either guilt or objective anxiety. Contrapuntally, where there is minimal development of civic sentiments, analogous to poor object relations, there is also an analogous uncritical relationship to society and authority which makes for conformity and a poor differentiation of the self from the environment.

Clinical observations support my hypothesis that socially derived activities are subjectively experienced as the pursuit of personal needs. One would infer, then, that in the process of internalization there is a restructuring and a synthesis of the social, cultural, and moral ideas into the individual's ego and that they become a part of the 'me'. Therefore, they are not felt as something apart from the person and belonging to the social realm. They are integrated with the more exquisitely personal and are thus experienced. The portion of the culture not so internalized may be tagged with the 'otherness' implicit in many of Freud's statements on the individual's attitude toward his culture.

When the superego is highly developed, guilt is a personal datum, an inner fear or tension. The total effect then is that, unwittingly, when the person is talking about himself, he is simultaneously communicating something about his society which is part and parcel of his being. Still, I was surprised to find an objective examination of the communicative behavior of patients in psychoanalysis demonstrated that the more mature individuals, with good object relations concordant with comprehensive internalization, communicate least about social concerns and participation. They live out their social roles implicitly and mostly unconsciously. They act instead of talk.[27] They think, and speak, about their societal involvement only when frictions, conflicts, or problems arise. In other words, actions speak louder than words, or even thoughts, and this may hold for the attitude toward the war institution.

In contrast to these patients are those who talk much about the external environment and on social and cultural themes in their analytic hours. They are narcissistic patients whose development has been arrested at the pregenital level and who suffer from narcissistic neurotic problems. Their relative failure to internalize their environment, and to synthesize their socially determined drives with their more discretely personal

[27] This accords with the proposition, presented above, that socialization and acculturation begin in the preverbal developmental phases.

ones, leads to a blurring of the boundaries between what is perceived as the inner life and external reality. Those who spent the most time speaking of political events and problems were insecure and had difficulty in mastering their aggressive drives.

Among the articulate group I found three types.

1. Narcissistic patients with a poorly cathected reality world who constantly grope for an orientation to their environment. They personalize the environment and have a limited capacity to comprehend reality apart from an experience of frustration-gratification. Also they are incapable of differentiating social roles, even though they are usually able to function more or less adequately in a social role.

2. Better endowed narcissistic patients with a stronger ego, who also falsify and tend to personalize their environment because of a large aggressive component and prominent projective defenses, and suffer to a lesser degree from the defect of assuming and differentiating social roles.

3. Relatively mature personalities whose superego functions are external to them due to special circumstances of a social character. Among these there were three patients whose superegos were structured and ritualized for them by the church, and who consequently experienced weak religious sentiments and a paucity of self-conscious, affect-laden moral attitudes and ideas. There may be a corollary between this and the unconscious participation of the individual in the social institution of war which rules the individual's conduct in accordance with ritualized behavior.

CONCLUSION

With the advent of the advanced technology of the Bronze Age, leading to the emergence of the enlarged and increasingly complex political unit, the modern social institution of war was introduced. In Why War?, Freud applied his dual instinct theory to explain both the social action of warmaking by the community and the individual participation of its members. Thirty-five years later, his theory still brilliantly illuminates many

essential formulations of the political scientist about the war phenomenon. Still the theory is too general to deal with the categorical distinctions between the sociological and psychological modes inherent in modern war.

Psychoanalytic theory—with or without the dual instinct theory—does make comprehensible 'war readiness', that is, the individual's predisposition to war. However, it has failed so far to answer satisfactorily a host of specific questions about the individual's psychological participation in his social institutions in general, and in the war institution in particular. For example, we cannot account psychoanalytically for the phenomenon, documented by social anthropologists, that where warmaking is obligatory to the culture, motivations for war are obligatory in the individual. And conversely, where warmaking is not obligatory to the culture, motivations for war appear to be absent in the individual. Nor is there yet any proof that aggressiveness (combativeness) in the individual induces warmaking in the culture. What is needed is the building of a firm conceptual bridge between the sociological and the psychological—between man's culture and his instinctual drives.

I have pointed out the transiency of social institutions and have suggested that we might pin our hopes for peace on the possible transiency of the war institution, given certain unforeseeable conditions. This expectation would have to be tempered, however, by the degree to which the war institution succeeds in expressing directly the more fixed instinctual drives. Some crucial questions arise here. For example, how does the individual implicitly and largely nonconsciously participate in the social institution of war? This follows from the question, does the individual contain within himself motives and mental processes derived from the socialization process, hitherto unfamiliar to us, that find expression in his social institutions?

Focusing on these questions, clinical evidence seems to indicate the internalization of the culture and its synthesis in individual character formation. This developmental process seems to be correlated particularly with the capacity to form

object relations of constancy, and with the formation of the superego. It is also correlated with the capacity to assume social roles, to differentiate between them, and to live them out appropriately.

I believe that a sociological-psychoanalytical study of the interaction at the interfaces of the organism and society is essential if we are to understand man both as the creator and the creature of his social institutions, the most destructive of which is war. Studies in early child development can be a fruitful source for investigating the socialization process at the interfaces of the individual and his culture. In this essay I have also suggested that a comparative, interdisciplinary approach to man's social essence from the points of view of psychoanalysis and behavioral sociology might illustrate the possibility of broadening the scope of psychoanalytic theory into a psychoanalytic social psychology.

Some may ask whether dispassionate scientific inquiry into a political entity that is endangering our very survival at this time in history is not 'fiddling while Rome burns'. Let us remember that the tradition of psychoanalysis is the relentless pursuit of truth wherever it may lead.

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DEPERSONALIZATION AND THE MASOCHISTIC WISH

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In his discussion of explanatory concepts employed in regard to depersonalization, Arlow *(2)* observed that to attempt to explain depersonalization from the point of view of shifts in libidinal cathexes is only to describe it in different terms. He was referring, of course, to the greater understanding of symptom-formation afforded us by the structural theory. A number of early investigators who thought of feelings of unreality in libidinal-economic terms, however, recognized the defensive function as well. Freud *(10,* pp. 488-489*)* spoke of the dream within a dream as consoling the dreamer that what he feared was not real, and Nunberg *(19,* p. 231*)* and Schilder *(23,* p. 305*)* spoke of depersonalization as defense. But it was not until Freud's Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety *(12)* and the concept of the ego's renouncing its own functions in defense that we were provided with a basis for understanding the process of depersonalization as a defensive alteration of the sense of reality.

In this paper I will attempt to clarify a chief danger against which depersonalization defends and suggest something of the genetic determinants that lead the ego to choose this particular defense. Depersonalization is generally considered to be a defensive response to a variety of danger situations. It is my thesis, however, that depersonalization is most often found to defend against the danger of a masochistic wish; in addition it provides gratification, usually of a regressive, sadomasochistic œdipal impulse. Psychoanalytic clinical material will illustrate my thesis and provide a basis for discussion.

CASE I

A severe borderline patient began therapy at the age of nineteen when her parents were in the process of divorce. Her

mother, attractive and intelligent but quite unsure of her femininity, was intensely jealous of the patient. After the divorce her mother lived alone while her father remarried; several years later the mother committed suicide. The father, described as cold and demanding, teased the girl in suggestive ways and on one occasion exhibited himself to her. She always felt that he scorned her in comparison with her more successful older brother. 'My father would test me', she said. 'It went on all the time. He'd get insulting and derogatory and I was always found to be inadequate. I was humiliated, I'd feel unutterably confused and angry. But then I'd get a blind kind of confusion, a panic where all your faculties desert you, and the only way to handle the feeling of panic was by playing dumb. It wasn't far from there to the feeling I won't try, I won't respond.' She grew up believing that any attempt to express femininity would bring rejection by her mother and ridicule by her father and older brother. Thus by hiding her emotions, she had tried to avoid letting her father see that he could hurt her.

With increasing ego strength and ability to tolerate frustration her therapy evolved into a classical psychoanalysis. She developed an intensely sadomasochistic transference neurosis, showing a sullen, withholding hostility and expecting ridicule in response to any expression of warmth.

Many episodes of depersonalization occurred throughout the early course of her treatment, characterized by an emotional withdrawal and a seemingly stubborn resistance to external influence, together with the classical alteration in the feeling of reality about the sense of self. She described the absence of emotions as extremely disturbing and at times, early in her therapy, ended an episode by cutting her arms in order 'to feel again'. The depersonalization could be aborted, however, and the self-mutilation avoided by provoking her aggressive expression. Sometimes she was able to avoid the depersonalization itself by 'getting along on anger', as she termed it. Then she would deny any interpersonal need or vulnerability and withdraw into a cold, aloof hostility which was accompanied by a partic-

ular clarity of thought in contrast to the sense of numbness that encompassed her thinking and emotions in depersonalization. This was followed sometimes in a day or two by a mild depression, but more often it failed and depersonalization ensued. It must be noted that loss of, or disappointment by, a woman always led to depression rather than depersonalization. This was true even on the shocking occasion of learning of her mother's suicide. Episodes of depersonalization, however, were usually precipitated by an œdipal impulse. She was able to have a heterosexual affair without depersonalizing so long as she did not love the man and continued in her primary loyalty to her homosexual partner. On the other hand, a competitive dream involving attraction to her partner's husband could trigger an episode. As she worked through her œdipal conflicts and was able to take a more active role in her relationships, depersonalization became a rare and fleeting thing, and at last it disappeared entirely. Homosexuality was also abandoned.

The œdipal wish, which usually precipitated an episode of depersonalization in this woman, was experienced as an expectation of humiliation under the influence of both a sadistic superego and a masochistic ego. The humiliation in turn was defended against by depersonalization which ceased with the analytic resolution of the masochistic response to the œdipal wish. An aggressive response to œdipal disappointment, on the other hand, could prevent the development of a threatened episode of depersonalization, and an existing episode could be aborted if rage could be directed toward the disappointing object. The masochism and the sadistic superego had their genesis in the identification with the dead, martyred mother and in the childhood experiences at the hands of the taunting father. Of particular interest is the similarity between the depersonalized state and the childhood defense of 'playing dumb' in the face of her father's sadism. One is reminded of Oberndorf's reference to the depersonalized individual's 'playing dead' or 'playing possum' *(17);* we shall return to this concept in further discussion.

Turning now to an examination of individual episodes of depersonalization seen in greater detail, particularly to associative material, will demonstrate that when associations are elicited they point to masochistic fantasies.

CASE II

A twenty-year-old woman described her feelings in sexual intercourse.

> I'm terrified that if I displease [my boy friend] I'll lose him. He's very critical and I get it all. But I feel I have to submit. I'm terrified, but there's almost pleasure at pleasing him at my expense, showing how much I can endure. I feel like a thing in sex, being used. Maybe there's some gratification in that. Before you submit it's kind of a game in which the woman seduces the man or lets herself be seduced, and I'm aware of being desirable. But once you submit that's gone. Part of the gratification is in saying, 'Look at me, I'm free of my mother'. But in intercourse you're so powerless, I feel as though someone else is doing the driving. I feel as though there are two of me, one involved in the act and the other observing, or maybe one of me observing a shadow. There's a lack of responsiveness in every area and I can't wait until this is over. I have no feelings at all. I'm a shadow or like I'm made of cardboard. It's always a tremendous relief when it's over and I have my own identity again.

In association to her sexual anxiety she said that women 'writhing' in sexual movie scenes seem to be in pain; her mother had writhed in bed with a fever, talking about battles and killing; maybe orgasm would be agony. She thought of a dream of driving a machine over a crevasse: she doesn't know how to run the machine and she's going to die, she'll fall into the crevasse and be dead and there'll be all this heavy machinery she can't see on top of her. If she dies there'll be no one to hold onto, like Mother or Nanny.

Her depersonalization occurred almost entirely in sexual experiences. The first remembered episode was at the age of

eight when she was 'raped' by a boy of fifteen. The so-called rape was really a passive acquiescence in exchange for a ride on the boy's horse, 'a wild, frightening stallion'. At seventeen she had her first affair; after months of intercourse, apparently with little physical sensation, finding herself becoming sexually aroused and developing severe anxiety, she immediately broke off the relationship. At nineteen she submitted to a 'humiliating and degrading' sexual experience in which she felt reduced to an animal. She went knowingly into this experience, she said, in order to prove to herself that she could endure infinite mortification. Again she felt totally detached and unreal, but afterward she realized that she had searched out the experience 'in order to be loved or to be murdered'; then she developed frank anxiety attacks which brought her to treatment.

Her associations related the sexual experience to memories before the age of eight of seeing her father in a drunken rage. She thought his rage to be due to frustration by her mother who was an extremely competent professional woman with little apparent emotional involvement in the family. The patient was reared by a series of nursemaids. She spent much of her third year hospitalized for an apparent brain abscess and remembers delirium, pain, frequent injections by doctors, and the impression of rare visits by her mother who brought armloads of toys and left quickly. Her mother always worked, even when ill or in pain, without medical care, and was quite impatient about any of the patient's needs. Her father reportedly came near to suicide because of the extreme suffering which followed an injury, but said nothing to the family about his pain. These parental attitudes were the model for her isolation of affect and denial. She herself maintained a fierce stoicism in illness, in loneliness, in response to her older sister's ridicule of her in childhood, and ultimately in her sexual relationships.

Analysis dealt mainly with disappointed œdipal wishes and with her masochistic attempts at finding love. When she resolved her masochistic relationships and developed a more active role, she no longer experienced depersonalization.

Five of my women patients in psychoanalysis have developed transient episodes of depersonalization in early hours. In each case the episode signaled the emergence of œdipal transference wishes accompanied by an expectation of humiliation. The following material from one of these patients reveals the regressively stimulated sadomasochistic œdipal fantasy that led to depersonalization in response to a dream.

CASE III

A young woman reported an episode of depersonalization in the eleventh hour in relation to the first frank transference dream. In the previous hour she had related a dream in which she was in a cellar with a group of middle-aged women when a man with an ax began chopping them to death. She associated to this the brutality of her father and her hatred of her mother. In the next hour she began by saying she had no feelings, that she felt dead. Then she reluctantly reported the last night's dream.

> I had to see you. I ran from a girls' dorm bare to the waist, the housemother called after me to stay. I ran through the streets, a man grabbed me, laughing. I was angry. I got to you, but woke up so I wouldn't feel that horrible feeling I had when my father made me undress in front of him. I felt so dirty and humiliated. I wanted to die then. I thought I'd die when my breasts started to develop. I was so ashamed. Why am I so lonely? My parents treat me as if I'm dead. Why can't my feelings just stay dead, why do I have this stupid longing? Everything's wrong. I feel apart from everything. I'm just floating around. I feel it's all a play, I'm watching but I'm not part of it. Sometimes I feel annoyed when someone treats me as though I'm involved. I'm not there, I'm not real. I care about everything but I don't want to.

She had idolized her father as a very little girl, but after the age of six she remembered nothing but brutality. Apparently her sadomasochistic relationship with her father was so intense because she infuriated him by remaining impassive to his cruelty. She took pride in refusing to cry even when he black-

ened both of her eyes; instead she would lock herself in her room and hit herself in the eyes until the pain was unbearable. Sometimes, she said, the family feared he would kill her, but she remembered wanting to scream out, 'Daddy, love me!'. In adult life object choices were dictated by her masochism.

Other episodes of depersonalization followed in the course of her analysis, each also precipitated by a sense of unfulfilled longing to which she responded masochistically. Whenever the underlying rage was made conscious, however, and could be expressed actively, the episode ended.

It may be argued that I have chosen only cases which illustrate my thesis. The obvious criticism of my choice is that depersonalization is but one defense against the perception of dangers of many sorts, and that the particular danger in these patients *happens* to relate to their sadomasochistic œdipal fantasies. Laughlin *(16)*, for one, has documented a variety of stimuli known to lead to depersonalization. It has been my experience, however, that when associations to episodes of depersonalization were elicited in my cases, they pointed to underlying sadomasochistic fantasies. It seems possible, therefore, that the variety of emotional stimuli involving the threat of annihilation that can lead to depersonalization may be a reflection of the variety of expressions which the sadomasochistic œdipal fantasy may take. The following material is illustrative.

CASE IV

A young man in the second month of his analysis reported an episode of depersonalization that occurred while he was being interviewed for a position in a prestigious firm.

> I felt an air of unreality, a disbelief that this was really happening, a mental numbness as though, if I felt anything, I'd say something stupid or foolish or be insulting to them. I felt I'm not ready for it, that I couldn't handle it, that I'd forget everything I know. I feel I made a fool of myself with you last week, acting so desperate [about his need for analysis]. I feel you'll

doubt my sincerity, you won't believe me or help me. But I've wondered if you're good enough for me, but then I'm afraid you'll kick me out for being critical. If I compete with you I'll be rejected or retaliated against. My way of competing is to show the other guy up for a fool. When I was a kid an anti-Semitic kid fought me. I tried to get my pocket knife, I could have stabbed him, but I could have gotten hurt too. All those guys who were getting all the girls then, they're just working for their fathers now, I've gone much farther. But again I'm thinking I made such a fool of myself last week in here.

This patient, who incidentally had already far surpassed his father professionally, at the beginning of analysis revealed in his associations to the episode of depersonalization that the conflict was one involving œdipal wishes and castration fears. The sadomasochistic orientation was again central: 'I felt an air of unreality, a disbelief that this was really happening, a mental numbness as though, if I felt anything, I'd say something stupid or foolish or be insulting to them'.

To return to the discussion of the apparent variety of stimuli, a brief example of a transient episode of depersonalization occurring in another situation at a time of aggressive expression is seen in the case of a young woman 'telling off' her boss.

CASE V

The daughter of a sadistic, controlling father who had exercised extreme domination over the entire family, this woman had never rebelled directly because of the fear that if she did her father would die or reject her completely. He had spanked her so furiously that sometimes she feared he would kill her, but she bit her lip and refused to let him see her cry. As an adult she withdrew from men as soon as she found herself becoming involved, but in masturbatory fantasies her role was frankly masochistic.

When she entered treatment she refused anything more than weekly appointments for many months. At last she reluctantly accepted the necessity of analysis. In the second week

of increased visits she began an hour by saying, 'I'm having dinner tonight with Mr. G [an older man]. I'm afraid of it. It's another commitment.' Then she reported that she had told off her boss that morning. He had arbitrarily overridden a decision of hers and she had almost cried, but instead had launched into a 'fifty minute' accounting of all his faults and shortcomings. At first these had to do with his dictatorial qualities which, she said, were just like her father's. But it became clear that she was provoking him to action as well. He told her to be careful or she would be out of a job, and at one point a friend came into the office and signaled her to watch her step. Most of the time she felt in complete control of herself and unusually articulate. But she experienced several episodes of fleeting depersonalization during the moments when she felt herself going too far. It seemed then as though she were standing outside of herself hearing it all happen. 'It was as though I was hearing someone else in the office, and I'd say, "My goodness, what is she trying to do to herself, she'll get herself fired".'

Despite the seemingly aggressive role this young woman took with her boss, and in unconscious fantasy with her analyst (the fifty minute accounting), the masochistic tendency to relate to the object through submission reappeared from time to time in her harangue when she provoked aggressive response, and it was then that she experienced her brief episodes of depersonalization. These episodes occurred when her identification ceased to be sadistic and became masochistic, and they served in defense against the dangers of the regressively adopted masochistic position.

This distinction between the active and the submissive role is important in understanding the resolution of individual episodes. As we have seen in several of the previous cases, the development of an active role precludes the need for depersonalization as a defense. In like manner the transformation of passive submission into aggression, even though self-directed, results in the resolution of the depersonalized state, as the following clinical note will demonstrate.

CASE VI

A young woman with a hysterical character and masochistic object relationships developed a transient episode of depersonalization while in bed with a Negro.

> He was everything a man should be and his blackness made him more masculine. I knew he was crazy for he punched his boss in the face at his last job and tore up the office. But he was a complete man for he could be gentle too. I never took on such a masculine person before, and I don't just go to someone's apartment and hop into bed with them. My father is a very masculine man but he's a bastard; he has no gentleness, no kindness. All of a sudden I realized what I was doing and I died. I was terrified, I wasn't there. I tried to tell him I don't do this sort of thing. I kept looking in the mirror and saying, 'Look at my eyes'. They were dead and lifeless, it was horrible, like being inhuman. I was like suspended, not in the world, I had no feelings at all, none at all except the feeling of not being able to do anything, staying that way forever, like I imagine being dead is.

In further association to the incident she spoke again of the 'deadness' she usually feels in sexual intercourse.

> Men think they're so marvelous and that their pricks are so great, that they can possess you. . . . But then the pleasure is so marvelous it's frightening. I say what's he going to take from me, I say please stop and leave me with something, I have to hold onto something, I won't give it up, I won't have an orgasm, I'm terrified if I do I'll be all gone, he's smothering me, devouring me, killing me, he'll take all of me, I say leave me with something please. What would be left of me, how could I get up again, I'd never be free, I'm possessed enough now. . . . I asked him if he would like me if I were scarred. I remember when Mother came back from the hospital without the baby I wanted so much [when the patient was five years old]. She had a scar instead. It was repulsive. I hated her.

The masochistic surrender against which the depersonalization defended, the danger of castration in surrender, and the gratified sadomasochistic primal scene fantasy in the surrender are all amply illustrated in this material. Of additional interest

in regard to the problem of resolution is that in one particularly severe episode of depersonalization the patient decided to cut herself with a razor blade. 'As soon as I *knew* I was going to cut myself I was real again; I felt relieved.' The adoption of an active role, even though the aggression was self-directed, apparently was adequate to end the episode.

DISCUSSION

Sadomasochistic fantasies have occurred with such regularity in association to depersonalized episodes in my cases that I feel they must reflect the dynamic structure of a large portion of these episodes. I cannot conclude that the findings reported here are universally valid; but I have been impressed by the fact that whether the process of depersonalization seems to be stimulated by loss, narcissistic threat, or even gain or the promise of success, analysis of associative material usually reveals an underlying sadomasochistic œdipal fantasy.[1]

This conclusion would seem to be at variance with the findings of many investigators, however, for loss, or threat of loss, has entered into much of the thinking on depersonalization. According to Nunberg, '. . . depersonalization, whether of shorter or longer duration, appears almost always in consequence of a sudden loss of love . . .' *(19,* p. 134*)*. A number of authors consider the essential conflict to be an oral one. Bouvet *(4)* believes that the defense is directed against loss of object, and that the essential narcissistic trauma goes back to oral difficulties accompanied by disturbances in the normal process of introjection. Stamm *(26)* believes that the process involves a regression to an undifferentiated oral state and a yearning for a symbolic union with the mother. Sarlin *(22)* sees a regressive fusion of self and object in masochistic identification with the aggressor, transforming a passive abandonment by the object into an active abandonment by the self. Hunter *(13)* thinks

[1] In their study of regressive ego phenomena in general, the Kris Group *(15,* p. 93*)* concluded that the precipitating danger situation is most frequently one which stimulates an œdipal wish. Arlow *(2)* has pointed to the predominance of aggressive derivatives in conflicts defended against by depersonalization.

the symptom to be a defense against regressively activated oral needs which are recognized by the ego but not acknowledged by the mother, leading to a transient identification with the frustrator in depersonalization.

Oral conflicts undoubtedly exist in many patients who depersonalize; regressive ego states in general can be traced genetically to very early disturbances in object relations *(15,* p. 102*)*. Precœdipal conflicts, however, predispose the individual to experience the œdipal situation in particular ways and may reenforce the expectation of loss in the sense of œdipal disappointment and the choice of a passive-masochistic response to the œdipal conflict itself. In the young woman reported in Case I, for example, separation anxiety was an important dynamic factor, and it included the expectation of œdipal rejection as well. But for her, individual loss was followed by depression, while œdipal disappointment led to depersonalization. She defended against loss in the œdipal conflict by identifying with the degraded representation of the rival, and the object was seen as sadistic and rejecting. Her defensive use of depersonalization ended when the earlier maternal introjects were replaced in her superego by more permissive ones that allowed competitive impulses to be expressed without the threat of loss of maternal representations or the need for the defensive adoption of a masochistic role. Her masochistic œdipal identification was not motivated solely by conflict with the mother, however. It resulted in large part from an attempt to libidinize the sadistic assaults of the father.

The child who experiences repeated humiliation at the hands of the sadistic parent has little recourse but to libidinize the experience *(8)*, so that future shameful or painful experiences generate not only defense but also gratification. Stein *(27)*, in discussing altered states of consciousness occurring in the analyses of patients who, as children, experienced repeated painful surgical procedures, notes that they tended to view the œdipus in a sadomasochistic light. Turning painful experience into sexual assault consequently allowed both for

pleasure and for fantasy of control over the situation. In a discussion of beating fantasies, Kris *(15,* p. 58*)* suggested that the wish is not only to be loved by the father, as Freud *(11)* thought it to be, but to be loved sexually by the father as part of the normal wishes of both boys and girls, and that the child may conceive of sexual love as being beaten.

Of course the masochistic solution is only partially successful; as a means of maintaining object love it places the ego in ultimate danger of the object, and further defense is sometimes necessary. Annie Reich *(20)* has related shame to castration: for example, behavior which maintains a high degree of self-esteem may be used in warding off castration anxiety.

Of particular interest in the context of this study, however, is another defense, the blocking of affect in connection with emotional surrender. Anna Freud speaks of the fear of complete sexual passivity toward the partner, in which to love means to be mistreated, impoverished, tormented, possessed. Passive surrender to a love object may signify a regressive return to primary identification with the object, which implies a threat to the intactness of the ego. 'The individual fears this regression in terms of dissolution of the personality, loss of sanity, and defends himself against it by a complete rejection of all objects (negativism)' *(9,* p. 265*)*.

In discussing affect-blocking, Miss Freud was drawing from the experience of analyzing homosexual and impotent patients who alternated between states of negativism and complete emotional surrender. But her concept seems relevant to depersonalization, particularly in light of the common masochistic quality of associations to depersonalized episodes. The defensive significance of depersonalization may lie in the fact that it defends against the danger of surrender by a regressive retreat to an infantile negativistic state. The negativism defends against surrender by denying the wish to be loved, sexually, by the sadistic father. Recourse to negativistic defense appears in almost all of the above histories. The first patient said, 'I won't try, I won't respond', and protected herself from

her father by hiding her emotions. The second stoically suppressed all emotional need. Two refused to cry under their fathers' brutal attacks, and another defended herself by saying, 'I don't need anything . . . from a man and fat chance I'm going to give myself to him'.

The history of refusal to cry in response to punishment in childhood has been a common finding in the depersonalizing patients I have seen. This defensive stoicism is often seen in the analysis as well, where crying is thought to be a giving in to the analyst's supposed desire to dominate and control. Many of these patients express a sense of separateness, a difference from the rest of the family, which is in part a reflection of the way they felt themselves to be treated by the sadistic parent. But analysis reveals in addition that they have maintained this 'differentness' in defense against their own wish to surrender in order to be loved; further, it represents an underlying complex of castration fantasies which provide the ultimate motive force for the depersonalized defense when the submissive wish threatens to break through its repression. To be different or separate is to refuse surrender and thereby avoid castration.

Jacobson's account of depersonalization occurring in female political prisoners *(14)* would seem to be a classic example of defense against emotional surrender. One would expect that in itself the experience of being imprisoned would stimulate unconscious sadomasochistic œdipal fantasies, together with the impulse to master anxiety by masochistically submitting to the jailers in a fantasied control over the frightening situation. Jacobson speaks, in fact, of the 'sadistic-seductive parental attitudes of the guards, prison officials and cross-examiners' tempting the lonesome prisoner 'to enter into a highly erotized, sadomasochistic, and infantile-dependent relationship to his torturers' (p. 589).

Depersonalization not only defends against the wish to surrender in order to be loved sexually by the sadistic father, however; it gives expression as well to the passive wish and unconscious enjoyment of the masochistic elements in surren-

der. The various subjective descriptions of depersonalization given by our patients may be manifestations of unconscious sadomasochistic fantasies, ultimately expressing the child's ego state in his passive-masochistic relationship with the sadistic parent. It has been suggested *(15,* p. 96*)* that in regressive ego phenomena the patient may be showing a reactivation of states experienced in traumatic situations at an early age (frequently primal scene experiences); regression would then defend against a reactivation of the danger while discharging unconscious wishes which served as stimuli for the traumatic reaction.

I have mentioned Oberndorf's thought that the depersonalized patient 'plays possum' or 'plays dead' *(18).* Oberndorf drew from Searl *(24)* who spoke of infantile identifications with inanimate things which are not held responsible or punished by parents. Stein *(27)* and Arlow *(28)* speak of a defensive pseudostupidity. But Sarlin *(22)* recognizes the element of gratification as well, for he speaks of several of his patients who felt that they were treated like 'things' by a parent and reflected this feeling subjectively in their depersonalized episodes. My first patient, who 'played dumb' with her father, reflected precisely the role in which her father actively cast her. The young woman described in Case III expressed her warded-off œdipal wishes in the feeling of being 'dead' in depersonalization. In the dream to which she associated her father and mother, a man was chopping women 'to death'. In association to the episode of depersonalization and the dream that provoked it, she spoke of wanting to 'die' when she tried to hide her shape and her father made her feel so dirty; she thought she would 'die' with shame when her breasts began to develop; her parents treated her as though she were 'dead'; the family thought her father would 'kill' her, as a child, in his brutal attacks. Being 'dead' related her to her father in her fantasy of the primal scene, depicted in the previous dream of a man chopping women to death.

Few writers have discussed resolution. Jacobson *(14)* reports

that attacks of depersonalization subsided when the prisoners were not involved in masochistic brooding or sadistic attacking. Bouvet *(4)*, who thinks depersonalization is a defense against object loss, believes that episodes come to an end when the object is regained. Bird *(3)* too speaks of longing to be reunited with lost objects, particularly the mother; but his patient's episode came to an end with the mobilization of aggression toward the disappointing object representation. A young woman reported by Joseph *(15)* ceased to depersonalize when she developed 'more active forms of mastery' (p. 83).

If the symptom is formed, as I believe it to be, in response to the threatened emergence of a particular repressed passive-masochistic wish, we may assume that the need for the symptom will cease to exist with the analytic resolution of that wish and the development of a more active self-image, or, in individual episodes, through the transformation of passivity into activity. The example of the patient who ceased to be depersonalized when she *decided* to cut herself with a razor blade, even before the actual cutting, demonstrates the effect of activity upon the process of depersonalization, despite the fact that the activity was self-directed aggression. The anxiety of submission is mastered by taking an active role against the self-as-object. Sarlin *(22)* thinks that the process of depersonalization involves an identification with the aggressor, turning passively experienced abandonment into an active abandonment by the self. I suggest, on the other hand, that the identification with the aggressor leads to *resolution* of the episode.

The balance of activity and passivity can be deceptive, however. Brody speaks of 'behavior that has the appearance of activity but is . . . rather an aggressive quest of passive pleasure' *(6*, p. 147). An example is the young woman in Case V who depersonalized momentarily while telling off her boss, when her active attack became masochistic provocation. Depersonalization most often occurred in the prisoners described by Jacobson *(14)* when they engaged in wild sadomasochistic fantasied fights with their persecutors after cross-examination and then

provoked punishment by infringing prison rules. In preparing for cross-examination they often experienced a peculiar clarity of thought, as did my patient during the periods in which the telling off of her boss was self-serving. Both the patient and the prisoners became depersonalized, however, when the sadistic attack became a provocation of counterattack that threatened to put them in a degraded (castrated) position. It is interesting to note that Oberndorf *(17)* reported a patient of Federn's who developed depersonalization when passively homosexual, but who was capable of affective object relationships when either actively heterosexual or actively homosexual.

I do not believe it necessary to postulate a deep regression to the separation-individuation phase of development in order to understand depersonalization. This phenomenon is not necessarily peculiar to the borderline state, nor is it an identity disturbance per se, but rather a selective defensive regression of a particular ego function, that of the experiencing self. True, ego regressions occur where there is ego impairment *(15,* p. 100*)*, and a propensity to frequent involvement of autonomous ego functions in conflict is indicative of a greater degree of impairment, particularly where multiple functions are involved. But fleeting, transient episodes of depersonalization are found to be so common when one is alert to them that they probably can be shown to occur in some form and degree at some time or other in most people, just as depression is experienced in some degree and at some time by almost everyone.[2]

It seems probable, in the light of such frequent occurrence in clinical material, that the prototype of depersonalization is the negativistic response to punishment or humiliation in childhood, a defensive regression from a sadomasochistic œdipal danger. The ubiquity of sadomasochistic primal scene fantasies

[2] Roberts *(21)* reports that forty per cent of a series of normal subjects have experienced depersonalization. Dixon *(7)* reports an incidence of fifty per cent in a group of college students. Sedman *(25)* found seventy per cent in fifty normal subjects, and Bradlow *(5)* a twenty-five per cent incidence in patients seen in consultation at a family social agency. Arlow *(2)* believes that depersonalization may occur in patients with very mild as well as with severe psychopathology.

and of negativism in childhood may be related to the frequent occurrence of depersonalization in our patients.

It must be recognized that masochistic wishes are found in many patients, not all of whom depersonalize. Further studies are required to delineate other defenses against the wish to surrender. In this report I have attempted to demonstrate that associations to episodes of depersonalization often contain references to sadomasochistic œdipal fantasies, and that genetic material often suggests a negativistic response to punishment and humiliation in childhood. It is my thesis that depersonalization may result when a danger situation reactivates a masochistic œdipal wish which is defended against by further regression to negativism.

SUMMARY

The view is advanced that depersonalization is a regressive defense against the threat of masochistic surrender, derived from a negativistic response to punishment and humiliation in childhood; in addition to the defensive function, the regression provides gratification of a sadomasochistic œdipal wish. While recognizing that depersonalization can be precipitated by a variety of danger situations, it is suggested that in many cases these situations regressively reactivate sadomasochistic primal scene fantasies.

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Wrist Scratching as a Symptom of Anhedonia: A Predepressive State

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WRIST SCRATCHING AS A SYMPTOM OF ANHEDONIA: A PREDEPRESSIVE STATE

BY STUART S. ASCH, M.D. (NEW YORK)

In the past five to ten years we have been seeing an increasing number of young girls with what appears to be a new clinical picture that is almost rigidly consistent. They present two striking characteristics which set them apart from existing diagnostic categories: they complain of feeling empty or dead, and they have a proclivity for scratching or cutting their wrists, sometimes repeatedly. I believe this clinical state to be a primitive form of depression that has been called 'anhedonia' *(4)*, and that the wrist cutting is a specific response to recurrent episodes of depersonalization.[1]

Typically these girls, fourteen to twenty-one years of age, have histories of eating difficulties, feelings of intense loneliness or boredom, and inability to concentrate on school work. Although these are familiar and ubiquitous difficulties in adolescence, they appear with much greater severity in these patients. Promiscuity is prominent, and drugs are usually a very important part of their lives. Subjectively, they complain of boredom and feeling 'empty' or 'dead' inside. Although one would expect from their histories that there would also be a complaint of depression, this is often not so. For the most part, they are unable to experience much of any affect except recurrent episodes of severe anxiety. They float from one relationship, group, or place to another, unable to establish any lasting relationship

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[1] While much of this material has been obtained from office practice, some is based on experience in a psychiatric unit in a general hospital, where I have seen several dozen such girls in the past five years.

with an object. They are detached and lack pleasure in all relationships. It is for this reason that Glauber's term of 'anhedonia' seems particularly appropriate for this group.

CLINICAL PICTURE

The anhedonic girls have the appearance of dreamy, almost ethereal people, similar to many of the 'flower girls' of the 'hippie' movement. The oldest are in their early twenties, but look even younger. Their appearance and especially their manner is childlike, more appropriate to a prepuberty girl. The personality seems ingenuous, bemused, quietly passive, and quite appealing in its gentleness. If one did not listen to their fantasies, these girls would appear to be incapable of an aggressive thought or impulse. Certainly passivity and submissiveness are two of their outstanding characteristics. However, sporadic outbursts of violent and destructive rage do occur.

OBJECT RELATIONS

Object relations are poorly developed and they show many features of the symbiotic relationships described by Mahler *(8)*. Separation from important objects can produce severe panic and profound depression. They desperately need to maintain contact and closeness with their objects at any price. This, rather than any genital sexual need, is the basis for their characteristic promiscuity.

The most consistent requirement in the choice of object seems to be only that the object maintain some interest in them. While passivity and submissiveness characterize their object relations, the tendency is to attract aggressive and even sadistic men who take over and exploit them sexually and financially, often in overtly sadomasochistic relationships. These are curious and even bizarre thralldoms whose aims seem so contrary to the usual gentleness of the girls. The source of such masochism seems to derive from their attempts to ward off unacceptable aggressive thoughts and impulses by turning them against themselves.

AFFECTS

These patients do not consciously know what they feel despite their insistence to the contrary. Rather, they simulate an affect that they think is appropriate to the situation and try to convince both themselves and the observer of its validity. During an initial interview it is not unusual for them to simulate either an unconcerned gaiety or a quietly tearful, mournful appearance. However, each mood often fades and shifts to another as it is investigated. Usually, little valid affect can be uncovered and they are unable to explain or describe their feelings other than with the statements 'nothing', 'dead', 'empty'. Their façade of conventional affects of youthful gaiety or quiet mourning evaporates under examination and gives way to a bewildered manner that gradually becomes more pervasive.

Part of the motivation for this mood role playing seems to be a magical attempt at replacing, or even just masking, the emptiness they feel. The fantasy seems to be, 'I don't feel anything; maybe if I put on what I *think* is the appropriate affect, if I *act* as if I feel this way, I will somehow fill the empty space inside, somehow make myself into a feeling person'.

One girl, who had been hospitalized during a severely regressed period, improved sufficiently to be permitted to walk in the park with an attendant. She spent the time bouncing up and down on the grass barefooted, punctuating this with sudden movements, crouching down to smell the grass, impulsively hugging the trees and kissing them. When this exaggerated behavior was later discussed with her, it became clear that she had not actually experienced such euphoric feelings. Rather her behavior was an ingenuous caricature of what she felt one *should* feel when allowed outside the hospital. At this point in our interview, the denial of her 'emptiness' gave way and her distressed bewilderment reappeared.

These volatile split-second shifts from one mood to another resemble the mercurial mood swings of the overt schizophrenic. While the latter are often related to very intense, poorly neutralized or sublimated drives and feelings, the anhedonic pa-

tient's mood shifts tend to reflect more the doffing of one imitative façade for another.

Much of the symptomatology of these girls seems to represent specific attempts to ward off separation anxiety. As might be expected, anxiety, rather than depression, is the affect most often seen. Passivity and an acceptance or even yearning for death, although usually without an overt suicidal attempt, is common. Their frequent response to suggestions to examine something in treatment is a feeling of hopelessness: 'It is no use—it won't matter—it won't make any difference'.

ANHEDONIC AND 'AS IF' PERSONALITIES

It is especially in their labile affects that the anhedonic girls show their relationship to the 'as if' group described by Deutsch *(3)* and Ross *(11)*. Although there are many similarities and even shifting from one group to the other at different times, there are significant clinical and dynamic distinctions between the two groups.

The similarities in their clinical pictures derive from the failure of both groups to develop a stable object constancy. The actual presence of the object is required to avoid separation anxiety. The anhedonic is similar to the 'as if' category in that she too requires outside objects to provide value judgments, to regulate self-esteem, and even to provide reality testing. The failure for the anhedonic group to structure a stable superego is apparent in their lack of guilt reactions, their amoral behavior, and the infrequency of depression.

The inconstancy of the depressive affect in these girls is striking. Ross has also emphasized this quality in the 'as if' group *(11)*. The anhedonic girl too does not seem to be capable of the internalized conflict characteristic of the classic depressive. She does not react to loss by identifying with some aspect of the lost object. Objects and conflict remain externalized for the most part. Her problem has not developed past the more primitive one of separation anxiety. The extensive use of denial of aggressive impulses, through acting out of passivity, is a prominent fea-

ture of both anhedonic and 'as if' girls. Despite the extreme passivity which she shares with the 'as if' group, the anhedonic girl is not as successful in warding off angry outbursts. Aggression is often overt, although usually directed against the self.

Regression is much more pronounced in the anhedonic girls. Sudden outbursts of wild destructive rages can occur. They do not function as well nor relate as well to objects, even by imitation. The 'as if' at least *seems* to relate to objects, mainly by imitation and complete submission. The lability of the anhedonic's affects is not necessarily related to the imitation of a specific person, the characteristic form of object relations in the true 'as if' girls. It is not connected with an object, but rather is an intellectual concept of what they think one is expected to feel under the circumstances. The anhedonic girls tend to be isolated and not really involved.

Finally, the clearest distinctions between the two groups lie in the clinical phenomena: sadomasochistic object relations, recurrent anxiety, chronic states of depersonalization, and self-mutilation—all characteristic of the anhedonic girls.

DEPERSONALIZATION AND AGGRESSION

As one observes and listens to these girls, two features become increasingly apparent. They cannot be separated from objects without either experiencing severe anxiety or falling into a profound apathetic state; secondly, most of their behavior seems to consist of varieties of attempts to deal with violent thoughts and impulses that are threatening to break through.

One girl had recurrent images of stumps of arms or heads that had been chopped off. Another patient insisted on walking through streets at night in sections of the city known to be extremely dangerous. When I asked if she had considered the danger of these areas, she refused to discuss it, insisting that I was like 'those people' who saw the world as hostile and dangerous. Since *she* had no intention of hurting anyone, everyone would know this and no one would want to hurt *her*. The degree of her resistance to consideration of any angry thoughts or im-

pulses was impressive. The urgent need to deny any hostility in the outside world was part of her continuous and desperate attempt to repress and control her own violent impulses and fantasies. Anhedonic girls exploit object relations for this purpose. Their male partners tend to be sadistic and even impulsively violent men.

If the aggressive drives cannot be successfully warded off but become more intense and finally overwhelming, these girls exhibit the specific and characteristic defense mechanism of depersonalization. The various depersonalization phenomena seem to arise directly as a reaction to the threat of poorly controlled destructive impulses. These phenomena are fed from two sources. First, self and object representations are poorly delineated. Under the pressure of their volatile, massive, unneutralized aggression, ego regression from even their fragile distinction of self and object occurs, leading to further dissolution of these boundaries. Secondly, in attempting to defend against the massive affects of rage, denial and repression are called into play. Since a large part of the self-representation is derived from 'feeling', the repression of affect results in further confusion of the self-image. The cumulative effect of such attempts to deal with the aggressive affect and impulses is an increased tendency to depersonalization and derealization phenomena. This is the psychological basis for their frequent complaints of feeling 'empty' or 'dead'.

As they depersonalize, these girls do various things in order to 'feel' themselves again so as to cathect their body image, hopefully to recathect the rest of their self-representation in the process. It is no longer the Cartesian statement, 'I think, therefore I am'. These patients have the conviction, 'I feel, therefore I am'. Certainly, some of their dangerous thrill-seeking acting out seems to derive from just such attempts to 'feel'. These reassurances of *existing,* however, often last only as long as they continue to *feel* the immediate sensation since they seem unable to retain its memory. The experience of sensation does not alter the individual psychic structure. Some interference

with the process of internalization seems to be present with little evidence of either identification being made with objects, or of the development of a stable object constancy. The empty feeling soon recurs and new and more intense experiences are once again required, or the patient sinks into boredom, apathy, and sometimes suicide.

SYMPTOMATIC BEHAVIOR

Self-stimulating behavior and motility in the form of physical play, dancing, touching, etc., are common features of the anhedonic group. The increased proportion of narcissistic drive in these girls is only partly responsible for the tremendous amount of interest they direct toward their bodies. Phenomenologically, the main aim of their narcissistic preoccupation is physical stimulation rather than just passive adornment. The stimulation is directly related to the vagueness of self-representation which becomes even more diffuse at times, especially when aggressive drives are intensified. Mahler *(8)* has made a similar suggestion concerning children in the symbiotic psychosis group: '. . . the frequency of such self-stimulating and body defining activities as rubbing the body with sand, or head banging, as well as the wild aggressive outbursts, have led us . . . to speculate that this behavior has to do with the child's fear of loss of body boundaries and with his lack of capacity for binding aggression' (p. 163).

Because of their stimulative effect, promiscuity and varieties of drug taking so typical of the anhedonic girls are quite likely part of this picture. Anything that will help them 'feel' is sought out, although the hallucinogens are often more anxiety-provoking than reassuring because of their tendency to dissolve distinctions between self and object. The ability to increase sensation is one of the attractions of Methedrine, referred to as 'speed'. The amphetamines tend to stimulate awareness of the body, although not in the hallucinatory way that the LSD type drugs do, and for this reason may become a preferred way of life for the anhedonic. Actually, small doses of amphetamines

for a few days are often quite therapeutic for these girls during periods of empty, desolate states. It is the massive dosages, with or without 'shooting' of the drug, that is most dangerous to them.

Pregnancy occurs frequently with the aim of filling the emptiness. Once pregnant, however, anxiety almost always becomes manifest and intense, especially at about eighteen to twenty weeks when fœtal movements appear. The pregnant state often becomes intolerable because of the poorly controlled aggression that is both displaced and projected onto the fœtus. Rage at the pregnancy is sometimes experienced consciously. Abortion or delivery is followed by an even more intense emptiness, however, and attempts to restitute the self-representation now become correspondingly more sensation seeking. The phenomenon of wrist scratching often appears at this time.

WRIST SCRATCHING

Wrist scratching, cutting, and slashing is a specific sensation-seeking activity of anhedonic girls. While the phenomenon itself is not new, a new pattern of cutting has appeared in recent years. Several authors have made a similar observation *(5, 6, 9, 10)*, but for the most part they have been unable to explain its meaning. It is often possible to trace a specific sequence leading up to the cutting episode. First there is a feeling of being rejected and being an outsider. Thoughts and impulses of rage appear, followed by partial or complete feelings of depersonalization, 'being dead', or 'bored'. It is at this point that cutting occurs.

Such a sequence is illustrated in the following clinical vignette of an eighteen-year-old girl. An objective examination of her mother was being tolerated by the patient for the first time. She was beginning to allow herself to describe her mother as someone easily bored, with no personal interests, unable to read, etc. On the week end that immediately followed, the patient and another girl visited a married friend, 'who keeps a very clean house'. This house is the friend's only interest, and

when it is clean there is nothing left for her to do and she becomes bored. The afternoon after the visit the patient was talking with a boy on the phone, when he abruptly hung up on her. A short time later, her roommate left the patient at the dinner table and went off to talk with another girl on the phone: 'She never got off the phone'. The patient experienced these rejections as painful confirmations that people were able to recognize that 'I am lacking something inside, that there is nothing there'. It confirmed that she *is* like her mother, bored and empty.

She tried to deal with these feelings through her old techniques of withdrawal into 'numbness', into not feeling anything and not really being conscious. She lay down, felt numb, empty, and tried unsuccessfully to deaden herself with sleep. Feelings of rage began to emerge despite these measures and she now felt that she must do something, to squeeze something, to dig at her wrists with her fingernails, to smash something, to cut herself. She was not aware at the time how these aggressive impulses were also attacks on her mother, i.e., on those parts of herself that she thought were like her mother.

In a recent study of over two dozen cutting incidents, it was possible to delineate the remarkable and precise similarities of both the phenomenon itself and of the psychopathology. A paradigm of clinical observation, the study by Drs. Rosenthal, Wallsh, Rinzler, and Klausner at the Mount Sinai Medical Center *(10)* revealed that this sign was found *only* in girls who had already reached menarche[2] and rarely appeared after the early twenties. Surprisingly, the cuts, scratches, or slashes were never experienced as painful, although always done in areas that should have been extremely sensitive, usually on the ventral surface of the wrists but occasionally on the face or some other body part. The cuts were usually continued until the sight of

[2] Dr. David Shapiro has told me of an exception to this in a fourteen-year-old girl who has been cutting superficially for two years and whose menses have still not begun. Again her cuttings have not been accompanied by pain, and bleeding usually results in the relief of the acute anxiety.

the blood or of the gaping wound edges produced a relaxed, comfortable, even pleasurable passive feeling.[3]

The Mount Sinai study also supports the idea that cutting most often occurs during a period of depersonalization. It is important to stress that in the majority of instances the cutting is not suicidal. Rinzler and Shapiro *(9)* emphasize this point especially, and it has been confirmed by many other observers. The immediate aim of cutting is to do something to get rid of the terrifying depersonalization. In several instances a specific visual phenomenon was reported that seemed to represent this decathexis of intrapsychic representations. At least two girls described their surroundings as becoming drained of color and white. One patient, who was in the hospital at the time, explained, 'There was too much white, white nurses, white doctors, white sheets, white walls. It was such a relief to cut and see the red blood appear.'

It is specifically the bleeding, or in some instances the gaping of the wound, that is reassuring. Apparently, the cutting has as its main aim the recathecting of the depersonalized body image of the self-representation through trauma and through color shock. The amount of bleeding is usually not significant; it is the presence of the blood that is important. Although some of the girls continue to cut even after the blood flow has started, the majority stop and are relieved with the first sign of bleeding. The purpose of the cutting is not exclusively to undo depersonalization and the loss of distinction between self and object. While the depersonalization has the aim of warding off destructive impulses toward important objects, the cutting represents a return of the repressed. It is an actual acting out of these violent impulses, but with at least two modifications: the cutting is an attenuated version of the impulse, and the aim of the drive has been turned back onto the self.

The self-mutilation performed by one girl illustrates both

[3] By contrast, when wrist cutting occurs in boys, in a disparate ratio of about five girls to one boy, the wound is always quite painful. As a rule boys who cut are effeminate.

these qualities. She used a knife to scratch the letters 'LOVE' on her thigh, just deep enough for blood to flow. When I asked her to describe her feelings at the time, she said her impulse had been to cut deeply, down to the bone, and carve the letters out of her flesh. Her usually sweet and benign face became contorted with an almost palpable hate as she acted out the gesture of digging through her thigh with a knife. When I wondered at the choice of the letters 'LOVE', she confessed that her original impulse was to cut 'HATE' but that she had stopped herself 'because that didn't seem very nice'.

The only other technique of self-mutilation seen with any degree of frequency in these girls is burning. They will sometimes burn parts of their bodies, usually their hands, fingers, or wrists, with a cigarette or match. Again there is little if any pain. When burning does occur it is usually a secondary manifestation, since these same girls still prefer to cut.

Why is the specific act of wrist cutting used so consistently? The phenomenological data compiled by the Mount Sinai group provides at least two clues: 1, wrist cutting does not occur before menarche; 2, the cutting episode almost always appears during the premenstrual period. Some speculation on possible symbolic meanings of such mutilations is necessary since direct analytic confirmation is not available. One motivation seems to be an attempt to bring on displaced genital bleeding. The relief in seeing the gaping, open wound may similarly be a part of the re-creation, through an identification with the aggressor, of some conception of menstruation as a helplessly and passively experienced genital mutilation.

The sequence of events leading up to the cutting suggests a genetic explanation. It is the initial separation, the rejection, that sets up the sequence of rage, depersonalization, and cutting with final relief. Menarche signals the entrance into womanhood, and implies a double loss of the mother. The first loss is of the anaclitic mother-child relationship; the second is through the inexorability of the revived œdipus. Unlike the boy, the girl must now give up her mother and the object must then be

shifted from mother to father. The anhedonic girl's relation to objects is essentially narcissistic and to a great extent through identification. She cannot give up objects easily, and the maturational pressure at puberty to shift away from mother is a threat of loss of part of her own identity.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that it is this threatened loss of mother, in the difficult shift from mother to a new object at puberty, that seems to be the basis for the whole group of the psychopathologies we find at this age that are limited to girls, for instance, anorexia nervosa. Masturbation, which is much less frequent in the adolescent girl, is used more commonly by the boy to deal with his identity problems. The greater emphasis on an object relationship in female homosexuality is also quite different from the male counterpart where the orgastic discharge by itself is often the more urgent need.

I suspect that the anhedonic girl may be using wrist scratching to create a representation of the self as a bleeding person. Bleeding then could represent a magical attempt to regain the lost object, the bleeding woman, the mother, through identification. Such identifications are actually facilitated by their poor delineation of self from object representation. Heiman's claim that functional uterine bleeding is often a physiological manifestation of mourning, of the loss of the object (mother), supports this idea *(7)*.

The symbolic significance of bleeding can also be considered from still another direction. The archaic technique of bloodletting has the aim of purifying the body by allowing the 'bad blood' to be drained out. This was, after all, only one tangible translation of the magical removal of the 'dybbuk', which in turn is concretizing the analytic concept of the 'bad introject'. Getting the 'poisons' out of the body leaves a self-representation that is pure and good and now deserving of love. These are the slight self-mutilations that make the magically-minded feel purified. Styles change in all cultures and we now substitute dirt or feces for the more archaic demons that may possess us. The need for regular flushing out with laxatives and enemata are

our own culture's contribution to the varieties of tangible forms we give to exorcising our 'bad introjects' *(1)*.

It may be that wrist cutting serves a similar purpose. The blood-letting could be a concrete manifestation of one of the classical dynamics of depression, a little suicide, with the bleeding being an attempt to get rid of, to kill off, the ambivalently cathected lost object. Some of the girls who cut do fit such an underlying dynamic formulation. However, I have the impression that this may be truer for girls who show more of a depressed affect than those in the anhedonic group. Their suicide aim is more prominent also; they seem to fall into the group which exhibits the more classical dynamics of depression.

One such girl was filled with self-criticism and hatred and had the conscious thought of dying. She cut her wrists and lay back on the bathroom floor, sensuously enjoying the experience. She felt progressively euphoric and comfortable as the 'black blood' oozed out. Fortunately she was rescued, but not before she had been bled white, with her hemoglobin down to less than four grams. By then the depression and self-loathing were gone and she felt elated and full of plans. As she was transfused, however, the depression and self-criticism began to return and kept match with the rise in her hemoglobin. This case has been reported elsewhere in more detail *(2)*.

GENETIC AND PSYCHODYNAMIC CONSIDERATIONS

The clinical picture of anhedonia presented by these girls, especially the recurrent episodes of partial or complete depersonalization, emphasizes the instability of their self-representations with their fragile differentiation from object representations. The earliest object relationships seem to have been compromised, leading to some fundamental difficulty in internalization and identification with the object. The development of such pathology is understandable through Mahler's work *(8)*, especially those serious disturbances of individuation that are characteristic of the anhedonic's early maturation and development.

Most of these patients have a history of severe difficulties with mothers who are distant, unresponsive, and preoccupied. Direct observations of the families of some of the hospitalized girls often confirm the supposition that many of these mothers seemed unable to involve themselves in any affective give-and-take with their daughters. The impression is that, for one reason or another, these girls were never able to develop a reliable relationship with important objects. There is often a history of the mother's inability to respond affectively during the first year or two of life, while the father was unavailable or preoccupied. Some mothers gave histories that were consistent with a picture of postpartum depression following the patient's birth. By contrast, both Deutsch *(3)* and Ross *(11)* claim that mothers of the 'as if' girls *do* relate to their children, but mainly as narcissistic extensions.

The foregoing is intended to explain the extreme vulnerability to separation anxiety that the anhedonic patient exhibits. Threats of separation, constantly on their mind, are terrifying and release massive waves of aggression which flood the whole psychic structure, overwhelming their already weakened defenses. They regress and self and object representations become confused; they ward off the aggression, turn the drive onto themselves, go into a psychotic withdrawal, and use massive repression of the affect which further interferes with the image of the self. Episodes of depersonalization or chronic states of feeling empty and dead follow. I am suggesting that it is this repetitive sequence that is a motivation for the cutting.

SUMMARY

Anhedonic girls comprise an increasing group of nonfunctioning adolescent girls who complain of feeling empty or dead inside. Their most striking characteristic is a propensity for scratching or cutting their wrists. However, in contrast to wrist scratching in men or older women, this cutting is remarkably painless and is not suicidal.

The severe separation anxiety characteristic of these girls stimulates massive rage reactions, which result in depersonalization, both as a defense and as a result of a fragile self-representation. The suggestion is made that wrist scratching is a specific technique of dealing with both the rage and the depersonalization. The genetic basis of this disorder may be that the induced bleeding in the cutting is an attempt to undo the current separation by identifying with the bleeding woman (mother), symbolic of this mother-infant unity in the past.

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Teaching the Beginner

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TEACHING THE BEGINNER

'BAPTISM BY FIRE'

BY MARJORIE MC DONALD, M.D. (CLEVELAND)

Freud's analysis of examination dreams *(4)* marks the beginning of psychoanalytic interest in the educational process. Generally this interest has been focused upon the student, the learning process, and disturbances in learning. Examination anxieties, school phobias, and the vast spectrum of learning disorders have all been the subject of many psychoanalytic explorations. In contrast, the teacher, the teaching process, and disturbances in teaching have received little psychoanalytic attention. A recent article by Helen Ross, The Teacher Game *(16)*, reviews the psychology of both teachers and students, and their teaching and learning, as revealed in children's play. Miss Ross's interest in the psychology of teaching may have been stimulated by the extensive study of psychoanalytic education carried out by Lewin and Ross. In Chapter IV of their book they state:

> We know something about what is demanded of psychoanalysis, consciously and unconsciously, and we have some idea of the unconscious meaning of being a doctor. But there is little that is accepted as to the unconscious goals of education. It is regrettable that we have no formulation of the teacher game that would clarify the impulses at play in teaching *(11,* p. 52*)*.

A metapsychological survey of the aftermath of the child's teacher game, as it gains expression in the adult's profession of teaching, would be a valuable contribution to the psychology of the educational process. However, such an undertaking is beyond the scope of my experience. It is my intention to limit myself here to the presentation of one particular technique employed by some teachers in the teaching of beginning students. I shall illustrate this technique with several examples, and investigate it psychoanalytically by means of a case study. In brief,

the technique, manifestly intended as educational, consists of the teacher's unconscious attempt to subdue and control the new student by overwhelming him with some sudden, shocking experience.[1]

In the psychoanalytic literature Ella Freeman Sharpe *(17)* has also described this technique, as it is used in the telling of 'cautionary tales' to children. A shocking tale about the dangers of the external world is told to the child as a threatening educational measure, with the unconscious goal 'that fantasy can be used as an aid to instinct control'. The cautionary tale manifestly warns the child against *reality* dangers and their consequences. But the young child, who has yet to establish firm boundaries between external reality and internal psychological events, perceives his own instinctual impulses as dangerous fires, and so forth. Then he fantasies that instinctual expression, like external danger, can lead to physical punishments and death. Sharpe concludes:

> From this I have drawn an inference, that repression goes alongside the growing power on the part of the ego of an adaptation to external reality dangers, reaching its height at the passing of the Oedipus complex; that such reality adaptation is inseparable from the internal process of repression. The ego which institutes repression treats unconscious sexual and aggressive impulses as being as dangerous as the now known reality ones, and the energy the ego employs is drawn from the self-preservative instincts. This helps to explain some of the feeling of *mortal* danger associated with infantile sexuality, and some of the anxiety felt by the ego when during analysis the repression of actual infantile sexuality is threatened.

Through their intuitive understanding as artists, writers of fiction have also described this educational measure. A recent skilful portrayal appeared in a very brief story by Janet Frame in The New Yorker *(3)*.

[1] Such an experience is comparable to initiation rites, discussed later in this paper.

EXAMPLES

At the beginning of an academic year two psychoanalytic patients, very different in age and personality, related similar experiences in their everyday lives.

It was still September when a seven-year-old boy, new to public school, burst into his analytic session with the news that his first-grade class would make their first trip the next day—to the fire station. He barely had time to get himself ready for the adventure. Hastily he tried to convince himself that he was grown up enough for this first school trip, even to a place as exciting as a fire station. The next day, following the trip, he was full of news. All at once he tried to tell about both the exciting life of a fireman and the school rules that children must follow in order not to get 'burned up' when the school catches fire. In his state of excitement it was *when,* not *if,* the school burned. But that wasn't all. He told how his class had also made an impromptu visit to the police station, since it was next door to the fire station. There the children were given the chance to try out what it felt like to be closed in a jail cell. He bombarded me with all of this news, just as he had himself been bombarded; and like him, I too was reeling in a state of confusion. But I recovered when the child told me that he had refused to go into the jail cell. In the privacy of the analytic setting he spoke of what he had kept to himself at the jail. It would have made him 'feel too scared' to be closed in the jail cell. Two years of analytic work had made it possible for this boy, so often the passive and helpless victim of overwhelmingly frightening experiences, to actively defend himself against an unnecessary trauma.

Later I recalled a friend's account of what had most impressed and challenged his own first-grader at the beginning of school: the requirement of sitting still in the same seat for such a long time every day. I wondered whether any of my patient's first-grade classmates had held whatever ground they had gained on sitting still following the visit to the fire and police stations. And

if they could manage to sit still, did they have any energy left over for learning? I knew that at least one child had not been able to learn a sensible version of the school fire rules.

Several weeks later a first-year law student began his analysis, and very soon told of a similar school trauma. He was proud of the fact that his law school had decided to do something about the neglect and low status of criminal law in their curriculum. Many schools, he said, never taught the subject at all or gave it only a small place in the senior year schedule. In contrast, his freshman class had been greeted with a course in criminal law, and soon the students were knowledgeably reviewing the laws pertaining to the worst of crimes—rape and murder. The patient struggled to align himself with the attitude of his professors toward these crimes, which he interpreted as one of hardened affectlessness, befitting a proper professional detachment. In 'bull sessions' with his classmates he joined them in their imitations of the demeanor of their professors. When the students' defensive attempts at identification failed, boastful joking and punitive revenge broke out at the expense of either the criminal or his victim. Without any background in the law, the new students lacked the stabilizing influence which would allow normal affects, yet prevent the infusion of excitement and punitive retaliation into their efforts to learn. As this observant young man expressed it, 'One day we are supposed to be ordinary citizens, shocked at rapes and murders, and the next day we are supposed to be able to talk about tearing apart a vagina like it's just a piece of meat'.

Beginning analysis, especially with a woman analyst, had stirred the patient's long-standing anxiety about intercourse, an anxiety that became conscious only after more than a year of analysis. But the law school experience, although serving as a target for displacement of the early anxieties of analysis, was a real trauma and therefore a real and current source of anxiety. While his deeper anxieties were inaccessible in the beginning phase of analysis, his treatment was of some immediate help. It provided an opportunity for him to verify his own reality test-

ing, which had been thrown into confusion by the manifest behavior of his teachers and fellow students. He could verify that he had indeed experienced a shock *and* reacted with normal affects. With the return of certainty about both external and internal events, his struggle to acquire inappropirate defenses against his own affects came to an end.

The similarity of these two traumatic initiations of new students, in such different school settings, intrigued me and I wondered how widespread this introductory teaching technique might be. I recalled personal experiences, both as student and teacher. As a psychiatric resident I had been assigned two bizarrely sick, hospitalized neurotic patients as my first cases for intensive psychotherapy. My supervisor had often sent me off after our meetings with the dubious encouragement, 'You're being baptized by fire!'. I still wonder about how much I was burned and how much I learned.

As a preceptor for a group of first-year medical students, I attended a series of lectures aimed at assisting the new class with their first patients, healthy pregnant women. The students met these patients as soon as they entered medical school. There was great enthusiasm in the school for this new approach to teaching. It reflected the concern of sincere teachers, convinced that the student's first doctor-patient relationship should not be with a cadaver.[2] In the new program, anxieties aroused by this first professional relationship were generally well anticipated, aired, and relieved. Needless anxieties were spared the students. Thus early in the school year I was unprepared to enter the lecture room and see on the screen a gigantic colored slide projection of a 'thalidomide' baby, a newborn boy, limbless except for a tiny stump of an arm and hand. The picture of this grotesque monstrosity was left on the screen for a long time, though it was only briefly referred to during the lecture. The purpose

[2] The psychological significance of the cadaver as a patient, particularly a first patient, in a physician's professional development has been well documented by Lewin *(10)*.

of the lecture was to prepare the students for the experience of attending a healthy woman's delivery of a normal baby. In the preceptor sessions after the lecture, the students repeated the attitude of the lecturer, scarcely referring to the picture. In review sessions following the morning's lecture and preceptor group meetings, the faculty appeared uninterested in either the purpose or the effects of projecting the picture.

A graduate student in analysis often referred to his first lessons in abnormal psychology because they had precipitated the outbreak of his adult neurosis. His teacher had greeted the class with some vivid clinical accounts of schizophrenic symptomatology. For this student the most significant trauma in the lessons had been the teacher's story of a young schizophrenic who had castrated himself. Like the young law student, the graduate student attempted to align himself with the manifest attitude of his teacher and fellow students. He interpreted it as one of calm, detached, professional curiosity. But in an effort to both justify and simultaneously disown his mounting anxiety, he consciously scrutinized teacher and students for clues to their own underlying anxiety. If the others were anxious, then his anxiety would be permissible. But side by side in his consciousness he tried to maintain the contradictory attitude that *they* were the anxious ones, not he. Still unable to ward off his anxiety, he began to suffer gross anxiety attacks which led him eventually into analysis. His attacks were most severe in the classroom sessions with the teacher who had traumatized him, and sometimes he had to leave the room.

Later, when this student began his own teaching career, he was required to conduct a small student group on a tour of a general hospital ward. There he selected for the group's primary focus an acutely ill young woman, close to death.

Not every teacher/beginning student experience in life need take place in a formal academic atmosphere. Family relationships often require an older member of the family to function as the educator of the younger. An older brother, just entering seventh

grade in a new junior high school, wanted to welcome his brother to the first grade and did so by showing him his old sixth-grade classroom in the younger boy's school. The first-grader felt overwhelmed; he would never be big enough or smart enough to be in a sixth-grade room and do sixth-grade work. A mother, wanting to give her daughter some last-minute preparation for sexual experience in marriage, revealed for the first time her own traumatic experience during pregnancy with the daughter: hemorrhaging and prolonged threat of miscarriage had confined the mother to bed throughout much of the pregnancy. Another mother wanted to prepare her son for his first experience away from home at a camp that featured certain sports and usually took only adolescent boys. (Just entering puberty, her boy was in fact too young for the camp.) Ordinarily this mother found talking with her children about sexual matters very difficult. She denied and avoided any obvious need for it and tended to keep her children tied to her in a too-dependent relationship. But almost on the eve of her son's departure for camp she anxiously sought professional advice on teaching him about various perverts she expected him to meet and how to avoid their seductions.

TEACHERS, TEACHING, AND STUDENTS

The teachers, the teaching, and the students in these examples each demonstrate certain common characteristics. Let us first consider the teachers. In the consciousness of each of these teachers the desire to teach was evident. Moreover, they had proven themselves to be competent, sometimes excellent in their work. They had formed good teacher-student relationships and used them to foster learning. In general their students seemed to like them. In most cases shocking the new student proved to be uncharacteristic of their usual student relationships and teaching techniques.

Throughout the school year the first-grade teacher of the boy described above did not again shock her class. She neither catered to nor rejected this obviously disturbed little boy; rather

she successfully sought for and cultivated in him a learning capacity that everybody else feared he might not possess. Throughout his freshman year the law student spoke of his school's competent faculty and their interest in helping students with academic difficulties in order to promote their development into lawyers. The lecturer who had projected the 'thalidomide' baby was a kind, friendly man, a good lecturer, and a good teacher whom the students liked. The teacher who shocked the beginners with the case of the young schizophrenic later gave lucid and unshocking lessons on clinical subjects. The college teacher who shocked his students with the dying woman went on to receive special recognition for his effectiveness as a teacher. The boy who scared his young brother with a view of a sixth-grade classroom was an excellent brother. He loved his younger brother, played with him, and shared pride in his accomplishments. The mothers who wanted to prepare their children for camp and for marriage were conscientious mothers, devoted to their children.

Along with their conscious dedication to the task of teaching, all of the teachers presented themselves as being without conscious affect in the face of the shocking trauma they had thrust upon their students. This affectlessness seemed intended to exemplify the state of being adult or professional. Not only did the teachers appear unanxious, unexcited, unpunitive to their students but, as a rule, they did not present any other affective nuances ordinarily aroused by human traumas. Furthermore the teachers demonstrated no conscious awareness of the emotional response that their teaching technique might be expected to elicit in beginning students. The empathy of these normally accessible teachers was blocked. Unable to sense their own feeling, they were temporarily unable to sense feelings in their students.

It becomes apparent that it is not only the beginning student who experiences anxiety as he starts his studies. His teacher, too, can experience anxiety. Since the teacher is expected to be calm and in control, knowledgeable and ready to teach, the

anxiety brought on by this new relationship may be sensed as an interference. If it cannot be mastered, it must be defended from consciousness. But then the teacher's reactivated unconscious conflicts seek relief in discharge, a relief that is gained through the sudden shocking of the already anxious new student. By this action the teacher's consciousness and the ego functions needed for teaching are protected from an infusion by unconscious conflicts reawakened by the new student. Thus the unconsciously motivated action makes it possible for the teacher to teach.

Common to the introductory teaching technique which these examples illustrate was the sudden presentation of a shocking situation with little or no previous preparation of the beginning student. The effect of the trauma depended especially upon the sudden evocation of vivid visual imagery. For the first-graders, the excitements and punishments of the fire station and jail were not only roused in visual fantasy: they were seen and experienced in reality. The gigantic colored picture of the 'thalidomide' baby, a castrated monster, was an inescapable visual stimulus. The cachectic dying woman was another visual shock. My own first psychotherapy cases were bizarre not only psychologically but in physical appearance. Where there was no actual visual confrontation, the teachers depended upon a suspenseful, story-telling delivery to evoke frightening visual imagery in the minds of the students. The law students had a vivid picture of a torn vagina. The graduate student was tormented by picturing the castrated schizophrenic. The bride was forced to picture her mother's hemorrhaging and threatened miscarriage.

The beginning students, too, shared common characteristics. Just as the teachers were eager to teach, so were the students eager to learn. To varying degrees they probably all had a beginner's normal anxiety and sense of helplessness, and they trusted their teachers to guide them through this phase and to teach them. When confronted with the visually shocking ex-

perience, they reacted with bewilderment, anxiety, excitement, and guilt. They had hardly any conscious awareness that the trusted teacher had shocked them. As a result they lacked any certainty about either the real event or their own emotional responses to it. Their ability to appraise the shocking reality was gone, and their helplessness as newcomers was only increased.

Consciously or unconsciously the students tried to align themselves with the affectless states they observed in their teachers. To them, to achieve the teacher's affectless state meant to become adult and immune from shock, anxiety, painful affects, and especially helplessness. Thus through identification with the teacher's defenses, particularly denial, they tried to defend themselves by growing up all at once in order to recover from the damage to their reality testing and to escape their own affects. In some cases the defense accomplished its purpose. The medical school class seemed generally unaware of the anxiety aroused by the picture of the 'thalidomide' baby. Only their apathy, their absence of *normal* conscious thought and feeling about the picture, betrayed an unconscious defense at work. The first-grader at the fire station and the jail was not so successful in his struggle against his affects. His excitement, anxiety, and guilt all were in evidence, but he tried to copy his teacher's recitation of the school fire rules. He wanted to align himself with the teacher in his search for protection from the fire of his own feelings. His baptism by fire was, for him, all too real. The law student and the graduate student struggled consciously to achieve the scholarly detachment they saw in their teachers, and to find allies for their struggle in their classmates' reflections of the teacher's affectlessness. The confusion created in both of these professional students was apparent. The law student sensed a dishonesty to himself, as well as to his first clients—the criminals and their victims who were the objects of his studies—, in his efforts to rid himself of his own affects. The graduate student tried simultaneously to justify and to rid himself of his affects. Later, when he became a teacher, he was temporarily unable to notice and empathize with affects

in his new students when he shocked them with the sight of a dying woman.

Another common feature all of these beginners displayed was an inability to learn in the face of the visual trauma. For instance, the first-grader did not learn the fire rules, the graduate student did not learn about schizophrenia. The shock paralyzed the ego functions ordinarily needed for learning (perception, reality appraisal, memory, secondary process thinking, synthesis). Curiosity about the world, instead of being fostered, became frightening, exciting, wrong. In their shocked state the students looked to their teachers for protection rather than for teaching. In their need for a defense, they selected an identification with the teacher's defenses against affects, rather than identifying with the teacher's usual attitudes and affects about ordinary learning. The suppression of affects from consciousness then deprived the students of important incentives, guides, and rewards that should be an intimate part of the process of learning.

In summary, the dedicated and competent teacher, who seeks a relationship with a student that will foster teaching and learning, may feel anxiety upon meeting the anxious new student. This anxiety may be associated with unconscious conflicts reactivated by the new relationship. In order to ward off a breakthrough of these conflicts into consciousness, the teacher may unconsciously discharge the anxiety through a sudden visual shocking of the new student. It appears that the most obvious purpose of this action is to free the teacher to teach, and indeed the action itself is always rationalized as a teaching technique. Unfortunately this same action may make it impossible for the new student to learn. The teacher's action says to the frightened, bewildered student: 'This unknown world you have come to me to learn about is a shocking dangerous place. If you are curious and look at it, it might suddenly overwhelm you. So you need me to protect you and you must follow me if you want to be safe.' It appears that a second, less obvious motive in the teacher's action is to inhibit the new student's independent learning.

Thus the act which has *discharged* the reactivated cathexis of the teacher's infantile conflicts has *recharged* the infantile conflicts of the student. The teacher is the adult, free of conflict, and the student is the little child, overwhelmed with conflict. The boundaries between the generations, threatened by the activities of teaching and learning, have been reaffirmed.

PSYCHOANALYTIC FINDINGS

The most reliable insights into the unconscious conflicts underlying the teacher-student relationship and the functions of teaching and learning can be expected to come from direct psychoanalytic investigation. The graduate student who later became a teacher, and who was in analysis during both phases of his academic career, affords a unique psychoanalytic opportunity for such investigation.

As a student, this young man began to have free-floating anxiety attacks shortly after his teacher told him about the schizophrenic who castrated himself. Soon the student's attacks became confined to situations where he had to present oral reports in class or attend a conference or lecture. Often his anxiety forced him to leave the room. The confinement of the lecture or conference room made him feel a prisoner. However, if the lights were turned out to show movies or slides, his anxiety disappeared.

In childhood the patient had shared his parents' bedroom for many years. A brief period of sleeping in his own room failed because he developed severe anxiety attacks when alone in the dark. His mother then moved his bed back into the parental bedroom where he became a regular onlooker at parental intercourse. While pretending to be asleep he stared at the shadowy drama in a state of excitement and fearful immobility. He recalled feeling that he was viewing a fight and feared that one or both parents would die and float out the window to heaven after it was over. Afraid as he was, he dared not move or in any way reveal his state of heightened wakefulness. If discovered, he would lose his ringside seat at the exciting fight and be moved

back to his own room, where monsters would get him. After his parents had quieted down, and when the sound of their breathing reassured him that they were still alive, he would masturbate. Later in the night he would be awakened by the fear that a vampire would come in and exsanguinate him or that a monster would abduct and kill him.

The patient did not recover these memories through analysis. They had never left consciousness, and the task of analysis in relation to them was one of discovering and working through in the transference the defensive isolations between the memories and the symptoms of his adult neurosis. The conscious memories of the primal scene obscured any recovery of the earlier unconscious memories of it. Possibly two sets of memories, conscious and unconscious, were in content not distinguishable. Rather, what analysis restored to consciousness from the earlier period was the *effect* of the scene upon the very small child. As the frightened boy stared at the exciting fight he was unable to remain psychologically a member of the audience. Instead, the drama engulfed him and he lost a sense of himself. But he struggled to defend himself and to regain active control. To this end he reproduced the drama and played all of the roles in it, staging and restaging versions of the play in his masturbatory fantasies and activities. He identified himself with the sexual positions of both parents, and his own identity thus became thoroughly confused. He was alternately the aggressive father, the castrated father, the passive mother, the castrating mother. But in this fluid transformation of identities his real identity—a frightened little boy in the audience—almost got lost.

The fact that the usual daytime personalities of the parents seemed just the opposite of the child's usual nighttime impression of them added greatly to the confusion. The nighttime father was sexually aggressive: the daytime father was a phobic man who appeared castrated and dependent upon his wife for direction and protection. The nighttime mother was the attacked victim; the daytime mother was clearly the authority over the entire family. But there was one important exception. Although

his mother had been a teacher, it was his father who maintained an active interest in intellectual pursuits, for which the family greatly admired him.

It would seem inevitable that a child so concerned with adult sexual activities and so defensively out of touch with his own identity as a frightened little child would meet special problems in the œdipal phase. And that lacking the certainty of his own little-boy identity in relation to both his parents and his own sexual drives, he would find it difficult to locate and focus upon his particular position in the œdipal conflict. It would be all too easy to avoid being the œdipal little boy who must accept an œdipal defeat in relation to his parents. For this particular boy, being the unquestioned favorite of his daytime mother in a large household only added to a conviction that he was an exceptionally privileged person. Unlike everyone else in the world, he could circumvent the œdipal conflict and never have to suffer the inevitable œdipal defeat.

The patient's adult neurosis contained all the elements of the childhood primal scene trauma, expressed either as direct derivatives or defensively disguised as their opposites. The external realities of the scene could turn into their opposites just as easily as the sense of identity in the little actor could slip into and out of opposite roles. As a child he needed to be in the 'meeting room' and to have a dim light on near his bed as he watched the performing figures half concealed in shadow. As an adult he had to escape the imprisonment of the meeting room, or have the light out and the primal scene (the movies or slides) brilliantly lit up while he himself became the figure half concealed in shadow.

The most buried stratum of his neurosis dealt with identification with the mother whom the father castrated in the primal scene. The little boy loved his father very much, and with good reason for he was in many ways an excellent father. A hidden masturbatory fantasy was to be loved by his father as his sexual partner by being beaten as he imagined his father beat his mother during the battle of intercourse. In reality the kindly

father never beat him, but the child's passive longings and excitement led him to avail himself of every opportunity to be the onlooker at another scene: surreptitiously he often watched the father of his neighborhood playmate as he whipped his son. Of course this passive wish for his father's love caused him much anxiety but it was strongly defended against because its fulfilment meant acceptance of castration and forsaking his masculine identity.

To this patient, the schizophrenic who castrated himself (and handed his penis to his doctor!) seemed to be living proof that it was possible to yield to passive wishes for a father's love and voluntarily submit to castration in order to obtain that love. The teacher, who had shocked him when he described the castrated schizophrenic, was unconsciously equated with the student's exciting father. His inability to learn from this teacher, or to present oral reports to him, was to him evidence that his father had castrated him. It was especially his unconscious passive wishes that initially caused him to be so susceptible to the teacher's shock. But these wishes were soon obscured by other aspects of the primal scene conflict. He re-enacted them in fantasy, playing out every possible role in relation to the teacher, just as he had done as a child with his parents in their bedroom. At times he admired and was in awe of his teacher; more often he berated and ridiculed him. On an examination given by this teacher he behaved uncharacteristically by cheating. He felt no guilt, proclaiming his action a justifiable revenge for the neurosis (castration) which the teacher had caused.

In the transference this patient included me as one or another of the participants in the primal scene. The work of the analysis consisted of reproducing the drama on the stage of the transference and coming to terms eventually with the true and stable identities of all the performers in the play: himself as a child; himself in current reality as a student (later, a teacher), a husband, and a father; his nighttime and daytime parents as simply two people, his father and mother; his teacher (later, his students); and lastly myself, his analyst. Precœdipal conflicts—

most commonly an anal withholding resistance—entered the analysis both as defenses against and as regressive transformations of the œdipal conflicts embedded in the primal scene. Preœdipal aspects were especially heightened at times of separations in the analysis.

When the patient became a teacher he approached his first teaching assignments with considerable apprehension. Some of his anxiety was realistic and productive of good preparation for his new job. His attitude was an engaging blend of conscientiousness mixed with youthful enthusiasm and ambition. But under the conscious surface the new job was claimed as new territory for the redevelopment of his neurosis. In the days before he met his new students he became very anxious lest his own child, a healthy toddler, might be the victim of an accident. So real did this possibility seem to him that he wanted me to leave my telephone on during his hour so that his wife could call him if something happened to his son. He also developed an intense urge to move out of town and began considering various jobs which earlier had been of no interest to him.

The working through in the analysis of the patient's primal scene traumas had first come through the unconscious linking of himself as a shocked student and as a shocked little child. Now the same primal scene material was worked through again, this time through the unconscious linking of himself as an œdipal father and as a teacher. It was evident that becoming a teacher revived the patient's neurosis and led to ramifications of it in every aspect of his life.

Even events of early adolescence were brought out and were available for analysis. That is, he not only recalled this period; he re-experienced it in relation to his new students and in the transference. At puberty he had his first ejaculation during sexual play with his best friend, a boy a year younger. (Each was demonstrating his masturbation to the other.) He barely managed to conceal the event from the sight and knowledge of the younger boy. Vividly he described his state of confusion. He

had a sense of revelation at the miraculous event. He felt he had suddenly acquired a superior knowledge and ability not possessed by his companion. It was a feeling that at last he understood what life was all about, and an intense pride in his new-found adult masculinity. Yet at the same time he feared he had injured his penis and would never be able to have children. (This fear was not only an œdipal punishment but a wish that he could never be threatened by an œdipal rival.) He managed to resolve some of his confusion by projecting his self-doubts into the mind of the other boy: the younger boy did not know about ejaculations and if he discovered the patient's semen he would ridicule him for being unable to control his urine, which in fact had been one of the patient's difficulties as a child. The patient was indeed at that time, as Edith Jacobson has described the adolescent, a 'physically and mentally immature, unstable, half-baked creature between two worlds' *(8,* pp. 180-181*).* In his state of transition from student to teacher, the patient was once again the Janus-faced pubertal boy looking backward to his childhood sexuality and forward to his adult sexuality and parenthood.

Faced with his new students, the new teacher became uncertain of his own sense of identity. Would he be castrating or castrated? Weak or strong? Father or son? Would he be the passive damaged mother or the preœdipal controlling and coddling mother? Would he run out of the conference room altogether (his wish to leave town) or would he stay? If he stayed, would he produce semen (admired knowledge and intellectual skill such as his father possessed) or only urine? Would his students admire him? Fear him? Produce for him? Or would they ridicule him because he was just a vulnerable little boy pretending to be a teacher (and they were bright know-it-all students)?

The anxious new teacher took swift action to restore the disappearing boundaries that were so vital to his sense of identity. First, he shocked his new students with their first assignment—observation and study of a dying young woman. Second, he had intercourse with his wife. In the foreplay he kissed her

vulva, an act ordinarily avoided and repugnant to him. As he did so, he had the sudden feeling that his new students were in the room watching his performance. He felt surprised at their presence and equally surprised at the unexpected appearance of the following thoughts: '*They* wouldn't dare to do this . . . *they're* too chicken. . . . *That* will show them. . . . *THAT will separate the men from the boys!*' The analysis of these experiences led to his fear of the vagina as a castrating organ. In his fantasy he was the brave father risking castration, which the frightened sons never would be able to do. On a deeper level he was also the castrating mother, biting off the father's penis. The 'identities' of the erogenic zones, mouth and vagina, had become indistinct and interchangeable, just as had the identities of the participants in the drama. The dying woman reminded him of his parents in the primal scene, who died and went to heaven.

In the transference he repeated his pubertal masturbation conflicts in relation to the work of analysis. His attitudes toward me were determined by whether he regarded his own analytic efforts and productions as valuable semen or merely urine that he could not control. I might represent the father whom he could too easily surpass in his production of semen, or the father who excited him to wet himself and then belittled him for it. Or I might be the undiscriminating mother, so admiring of her child that anything he did suited her, even his bedwetting, about which she never complained. Sometimes he regarded me as an adolescent contemporary—the younger boy or the first girls he dated. Until these transference reactions could be analyzed, he remained unable to value the analytic work or to integrate it as an enriching insight into his life. When 'doing analysis' was bed-wetting, it was shameful and useless. When 'doing analysis' was ejaculating, it violated the taboo against incest.[3]

[3] During analytic work the main preoccupation is with the differential analysis of the component parts of the patient's psychopathology. But the sense of recovery within the patient is more closely allied with the integrating function

On a stormy winter week end the patient felt convinced that I was making a trip in my car. He persuaded himself that his wife wanted him to take her out for a drive to a nearby town. In a sullen mood he tried to shovel out his snowbound car, only to end up stuck in an icy rut in front of his house. Gradually it dawned on him what was happening. It was his own wish to make the trip, not his wife's. It was a wish, but even more a compulsion beyond his control, to be with me. He had to do what I did, whether he wanted to or not. With a great sense of relief he recognized that he was just himself, his own boss, and that he did not have to be doing whatever I was doing or be just like me. He and I could each take our independent trips whenever we chose. In a jubilant mood he abandoned his snowbound car and went inside to enjoy the comfort of his own home. He spoke in a friendly voice and with a manly assertiveness as he told me this experience. There was no trace of his old stubborn defiance or phobic avoidance.

In the analysis my trip represented the parental intercourse which he felt compelled to be a part of. As a little boy the disintegrating effects of the primal scene—the loss of awareness of both his own wishes and his own capacity for self-control—had been too great for his ego to resynthesize, and consequently he had always lacked any sense of his own stabilized identity. He was too vulnerable to the feelings and moods of others, and too ready to disown his own feelings and moods as the property of someone else. The analysis had made it possible for his ego to carry out, at last, the integrative task of identity formation

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of his ego. This integration of the differential work of the analysis is apt to proceed quietly and to escape the attention, and consequently the appreciation, of the analyst if he is too exclusively preoccupied with the tasks of differentiation.

Such was the case with this patient. I wondered why he did not show more improvement when he had exposed what seemed the core of his neurosis, the passive love for the father. I was impressed with our work, but he was not. His awareness that he had gained some release from the prison of his neurosis had to await an integrative process that required time for its completion. The completion announced itself in the patient's discovery of his own independent, realistic, stabilized identity.

leading to a stabilized adult identity. He could allow his parents to have intercourse without his own identity being disintegrated and he could have intercourse himself without threat to his parents or himself or his children. In the discovery of his identity he had achieved an awareness of a self-constancy, a 'capacity to remain the same in the midst of change', as Lichtenstein has characterized the concept of identity *(12,* p. 193*)*.

In The Teacher Game, Helen Ross writes about the 'interchangeable and mercurial' quality of the teacher-pupil role in the game:

> The young child is constantly on the border between object cathexis and identification with the object and this may lead even to merging with the object. . . . The teacher game uses both tendencies, cathexis of the object and identification, and it employs these psychic mechanisms interchangeably. Perhaps this helps to explain the ubiquity of the game. It follows the child's need for equilibrium between these trends. It allows for regression and progression *(16,* pp. 292-293*)*.

In the patient presented here, the traumatic confrontations with the primal scene repetitiously precipitated regression from object cathexis to identification with the objects. This regression blocked his integration of his own sense of identity. In his adult neurosis, both as pupil and as teacher, this same weakness in development along the line toward object relationship was revived. The work of analysis fortified him against a regression to identification with the object and thereby removed the block to the realistic updating of his sense of identity as an adult man.

UNCONSCIOUS CONFLICTS IN TEACHER AND STUDENT

Psychoanalysis can add an understanding of the unconscious conflicts recathected at the beginning of the teacher-student relationship. Since the conflict between the generations reaches its peak in intensity during the œdipal period, it is to be expected that œdipal conflicts will underlie the teacher-student stresses I have presented.

The œdipal taboo dictates that the child must not displace the parent through an incestuous sexual act. But if the parent feels insecure about his own œdipal development and his sense of identity as an adult, he will be too threatened by his child as an œdipal rival, capable of breaking down the taboo. Then the parent may try to find some means to reaffirm his parental authority and end the œdipal competition by reassuring himself that his rival is just a frightened little child, still in need of parental care. What better means can this anxious parent find than to shock the unsuspecting little rival with the very act threatening the parent himself? So the parent exposes his child to the primal scene. He demonstrates both to the child and to himself that *he* (or *she*) is the omnipotent, frightening parent, and that it is the *child,* not himself, who is little, frightened, and helpless when exposed to the world of adult sexuality. The generation gap is reaffirmed and may even become gelled into the configuration of powerful, unassailable parent and helpless, dependent little child.

Such a child is ripe for development of a phobia. Unable to discharge or control his heightened excitement and aggression toward the frightening parents, he feels helpless in the face of his own surcharged drives. Sexuality has been made taboo as an incestuous act, or even as a fantasied incestuous act discharged through his own independent masturbation. The confusing drama of the primal scene has given him a glimpse of the consequences of violating the taboo. His anxiety mounts and he has no recourse but to turn to his parents for protection. Defensively he tries to locate and avoid the source of his own anxiety as external, not internal. After all, was it not an external event, the primal scene, that precipitated his anxiety in the first place? If the child succeeds in displacing the source of the anxiety outside of himself, the target for displacement then becomes the phobic object or situation.

In his regressive retreat from the œdipal conflict, the child abandons his ambitions for sexual and emotional growth and falls back upon a preœdipal state of relatively helpless depen-

dency. Precœdipal conflicts reappear and gain momentum, especially if there is any threat of separation from the exciting, frightening, and yet protective parents. Separation would mean independence and progressive return to the œdipal phase dangers.[4]

If the teacher-student relationship revives the unresolved œdipal conflicts, then the acts of teaching and learning are unconsciously instinctualized. The teacher feels threatened that the new student—through the teacher's own educational efforts—will learn more than the teacher. The newcomer will catch up to and surpass the older generation. For the insecure teacher this is tantamount to an œdipal defeat, a defeat which was never experienced and accepted as an inevitable reality in the teacher's own childhood, and which cannot now be risked in adult life. Yet the teacher is expected to pass on to the child through the educational process the means, symbolized as knowledge and independent scholarship, that could bring about the teacher's own intolerable defeat. Similarly the parents are expected to give to the child the sanctions to grow up and establish his own adult identity, comparable to their identities, in the domain of grown-up sexuality and parenthood. The threatened teacher resolves the dilemma just as did the threatened parent. The very act of teaching, which threatens the teacher's authority, is used to shock the unsuspecting student into frightened submission. The boundaries—the contrasting adult and child identities—between omniscient teacher and ignorant student are thereby established, and learning now becomes permissible and safe to the student *provided* he accepts his identity as a helpless student in need of the omnipotent teacher. Independent learning becomes taboo.

That the shocking action of the teacher, rationalized as teaching, is equated unconsciously with exposure to the primal scene is borne out both by the content of the shock and by its vivid

[4] Often the traumatized child cannot bear to be left alone at night and is taken into the parental bedroom for maternal comforting of a regressive precœdipal quality. But in the bedroom the primal scene exposure is endlessly repeated and the child's phobia becomes increasingly tenacious.

visual quality. The shocking sights shown to the students demonstrate the consequences of violating the œdipal taboo and gaining victory over the destroyed parent. The consequences are punishment (the jail), castration (the rape, the severed penis, the 'thalidomide' monstrosity, the miscarriage), and death (the dying woman, the fire). In some examples it is clear that the fateful consequences extend not only to the participants in the incestuous intercourse but also to the product of this forbidden sexual union. The child born of this union must be a miscarriage or a deformed castrated monster, the 'thalidomide' baby shown to the medical students.[5] The consequences of masturbation with incestuous fantasies are also vividly displayed by the schizophrenic who castrated himself and 'lost his mind', i.e., his independent control and his ability to learn.

It seems unlikely that a single shock administered as a greeting by a teacher could be expected to have long-term paralytic effects upon learning. But if shock techniques of teaching were routine, they could promote a phobia about independent learning in the susceptible student. The phobic student might succeed in disguising his neurosis by attaining high grades and teacher approval, but he would never develop any capacity for independent, creative, intellectual performance. He might cling to the educational setting as a perpetual student or a frightened teacher, much as the phobic child remains in the parental bedroom. The suspicion is that both shocking teacher and susceptible student might have suffered *repeated* primal scene exposures in early childhood.

A comment must be added about looking. The instinctualization of this function under the influence of primal scene exposure interferes with the neutralized ego activity of looking, in the service of reality appraisal and the establishment of the boundary

[5] Among these first year medical students jokes and slips of the tongue about 'my mother', referring to their patients, were common. Also they were often afraid of their patients' husbands: they avoided them, could not function as observers in interviews with them, and misinterpreted their own disinterest and withdrawal as coming from the husbands, not themselves. The 'thalidomide' baby was indeed the incestuous baby, forbidden by their paternal teacher.

between external and internal reality *(5)*. The primal scene exposure 'blinds' the child in that it destroys neutralized looking. Looking becomes an incorporative, aggressive act and is no longer an adjunct to locating the external-internal boundary. If this boundary cannot be established, a sense of identity, so dependent upon comparisons and contrasts of oneself with others, cannot be synthesized by the ego.

TEACHING BY SHOCK—AN INITIATION

In selecting for a subtitle my supervisor's remark about baptism, I have hinted that shocking the new student is a special version of a ubiquitous human institution—the initiation rite. This rite, in its primitive and civilized (notably, religious and educational) forms, has long been a subject of interest to anthropologists and psychoanalysts alike *(1, 6, 7, 14, 15)*. In the field of education, the examination has been well analyzed as an initiation rite (see Flugel, [2]).

In its healthy intent the initiation rite represents the efforts of the older generation to master its envy and jealousy of the younger generation. Interfering hostile and ambivalent attitudes of the elder initiators are discharged in the ritual act. But in the same ritual the initiators assist the young initiates to overcome their fear and awe of the older generation and to enter a new phase of their youthful development. An equally important result of the rite is that members of the older generation also move on to a new phase in their own development.

In addition to the personal development of all of the participants, the initiation rite serves the preservation of society. Its successful outcome is a lowering of tensions between the opposing generations and a coming together in a societal union. These various functions of the rite suggest that the problem of identity is encompassed in initiation. In the formation and lifelong evolution of his identity the individual must maintain a sense of his own uniqueness as well as of his likeness to members of his social group *(8)*.

As Róheim *(15)* has written, initiation rites are transition rites. Drawing upon anthropological data, he stressed the significance of object loss and separation anxiety in these experiences, and the tendency for identifications to cover up object loss (p. 341). He described puberty rites as 'the rites of transition par excellence because puberty is the greatest biologically conditioned transition in human life' (p. 349). Róheim noted that psychoanalytic interpretations given prior to his own work focused upon the œdipus conflict and castration anxiety underlying the puberty rite. He offered the additional finding, based upon his exploration of certain primitive puberty rites, that the pubertal transition rite may also have an important root in the primal separation from the mother.[6] I would like to suggest that Róheim's work offers another reason why puberty rites are 'the rites of transition par excellence': puberty revives the transitional experiences from *all* of the prelatency phases of personality development.

An initiation rite assists the resolution of drive conflicts, both revived and newly experienced, at a particular point in time in a person's development, be he the initiate or initiator. In addition an initiation always contains the element of separation. Important relationships belonging to the developmental period coming to a close must be relinquished or transformed. The successful resolution of the drive conflicts and the successful relinquishing of old object ties lead ultimately to a natural evolution in the sense of identity. When the transition rite is unsuccessful because the initiate cannot bear the object loss, he may fall back upon primitive and conflicting identifications (or rebel against them) with the significant objects.

In its neurotic deviations the initiation rite works against development in both generations. The neurotic initiate, over-

[6] Ernest Jones *(9,* p. 160), quoting an early work by Reik *(13),* remarks that Reik regarded the fundamental task of the puberty rite as one of denial of birth by the mother. Reik interpreted this effort to disown the evidence of the blood relationship to the mother as a defense against œdipal strivings toward her. Today we would add the additional function of the denial as one of defending against the anxiety of the primal separation from the mother.

come by his fear and awe, fails the initiation and remains forever submissive to an older authority. The neurotic initiator, in capitalizing upon the opportunity to terrorize and torment, retains his queasy authority, but remains arrested in his narcissistic infantile omnipotence. In this climate the tensions between the generations are increased rather than decreased. Then the formation of a healthy society, where the generations come together and submerge their differences for the greater good of humanity, cannot proceed.

Shocking the beginning student can be viewed as a means of initiating him into the academic society. Through the ritual of the shock the teacher discharges interfering ambivalent attitudes toward the new intruder. The task of the new student is to absorb this shock, to withstand it, and thereby to earn a right of entry into the academic society. In this society the successful students, having recovered from the shock, are able to learn from their teachers. And the successful teachers, having abandoned the shock technique, are able to teach their students.

In this paper I have observed that the learning process and the student have been the subject of much greater psychoanalytic attention than the teaching process and the teacher. A personal impression is that the initiate, rather than the initiator, similarly may have claimed the center of attention in the initiation rite. In reality the initiation is as essential to the initiator as to the initiate, and the educational process is as essential to the teacher as to the student.

In the analytic case presented the patient was an acute neurotic victim of the initiation rite of teaching by shock. The analysis of his neurotic breakdown took him especially to the transitional problems of his puberty and the revival of his œdipal conflicts which had become so distorted under the influence of repeated primal scene exposure. That the analysis did not corroborate to any extent the root of primal separation from the mother (as discovered by Róheim) must be attributed, I feel certain, to a lack of depth in the analytic exploration. However, the analysis

did clearly demonstrate certain aspects of the problem of object loss and its relationship to the integration of a sense of identity.

In addition to the traumatic effect upon his drive development, my patient experienced the primal scene as an overwhelming loss of both of his parents. Not only did they exclude him in their instinctual activity, but as a result of it they died and floated up to heaven. They also abandoned him to the mercy of his own overwhelming excitement. The need to cope with this acute sense of loss during the primal scene exposures led the patient to a multitude of primitive and conflicting identifications with the primal scene participants. In the resulting confusion he lost all track of himself, of his own individual continuity, his own identity. Analysis enabled him to free himself of his restrictive and conflicting identifications with the primal scene parents, and to rediscover and update his lost sense of his identity. He felt like an adult, a father, and a teacher. Analysis decreased his vulnerability to shock, and he utilized his analysis to pass the initiation rites he had previously failed in life.

SUMMARY

In this article I have described and psychoanalytically investigated a common teaching practice of shocking the beginning student. The shocking is an unconscious act, defensively rationalized as teaching. It discharges anxiety and frees the teacher to teach, but it rouses anxiety in the student and inhibits his independent learning. The action reaffirms the different identities of teacher and student, and the boundary line that is to be maintained between them. Unconsciously the teacher is the threatened parent and the new student is the threatening œdipal child. The shock is a primal scene exposure intended to reaffirm who is the parent and who is the child. It discharges the parent's anxiety, rouses the child's anxiety, and forbids independent learning as an incestuous act. This introductory teaching technique of shocking the new student may be regarded as a special form of initiation rite required for admittance into the academic society.

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Freud's Gradiva: Mater Nuda Rediviva

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FREUD'S GRADIVA: MATER NUDA REDIVIVA

A WISH-FULFILMENT OF THE 'MEMORY' ON THE ACROPOLIS

BY HARRY SLOCHOWER, PH.D. (NEW YORK)

Freud composed Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva (6)* two years after he made the journey to the Acropolis which became the theme of his Open Letter to Romain Rolland *(7)* thirty-two years later, cited hereafter as The Letter. He devoted over ninety pages to a minor work which is almost unknown outside of the psychoanalytic community. In fact, nineteen years later, Freud himself refers to Jensen's novel as having 'no particular merit in itself', playing down characteristically a work of autobiographical import *(8,* p. 65*)*. Yet there is no other minor literary work to which Freud gave the detailed and affectionate appreciation he devotes here. And my paper will try to show that Freud's fascination with Jensen's *Gradiva* arises from a personal problem with which he wrestled at this time—a problem mobilized by the disturbance he experienced when he made the journey to the Acropolis two years before. In my paper, Freud's *Déjà Vu* on the Acropolis: A Symbolic Relic of *'Mater Nuda' (25),* I indicated that Freud sought a symbolic union with his mother on the Acropolis. But even the symbolic nature of this quest brought feelings of estrangement. And the point of this discussion is that in *Gradiva* Freud found the story of a journey which has striking parallels to his own—with this crucial difference: Jensen's story shows the hero's love object as *'rediviva'*, as 'dug out of the ruins again' *(6,* p. 39*)* and, at the end, they are reunited. This happy ending may have served as a counterpoint to and fairy-tale compensation for the disturbance of

I am indebted to Mark Kanzer, M.D. for several suggestions, especially for distinguishing between identification and identity.

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memory on the Acropolis. In Jensen's *Gradiva, mater nuda* is revived without the *'Entfremdungsgefühl'* which had seized Freud two years earlier.

In a letter to Jung in 1907 *(5, #124),* Freud expresses thanks for Jung's praise of his 'Gradiva', adding that 'it was written during sunny days and I derived great pleasure from doing it. Of course it doesn't contain anything new for us, but it allows us to enjoy our wealth [of insight].' *Gradiva* and The Letter belong to Freud's superior literary productions. But, where The Letter is enveloped by an autumnal atmosphere, *Gradiva* gives forth a springlike lightness and buoyancy.

The plot of Jensen's novel is briefly as follows: Dr. Norbert Hanold, a young archeologist, becomes enchanted with an ancient Greek bas-relief from an early Pompeian period which depicts a beautiful girl. Norbert gives her the name of 'Gradiva' and fantasies that she is the image of his childhood sweetheart, 'an echo of his forgotten childhood memories'. There follows 'a terrifying dream' in which Norbert visualizes that Gradiva was endangered by the eruption of Vesuvius. As he cries out to warn her, the figure turns her face toward him. But she continues to walk to the temple of Apollo, lays her head on one of the steps, and Norbert finds her 'like someone asleep, till the rain of ashes buried her form'. Driven 'by an inner restlessness and dissatisfaction', the young archeologist makes a 'spring-time journey' to Italy, traveling from Rome to Naples and from there to Pompeii. Here, among its ruins, he meets Gradiva and she confirms his fantasy that she had indeed been his childhood playmate. Thus is he freed from his delusion and, at the end, they make plans to go on a honeymoon.

Freud's Identification with Jensen

In *Gradiva,* Freud identifies with Jensen to an extraordinary degree. He follows the novelist, retelling the story in detail, 'almost entirely in the author's own words' *(6,* p. 43*)*—a method that Freud does not use with any other work of literature. In this connection I was struck by the fact that Freud re-

peatedly uses 'we'—again an unusual device for him—as though he and Jensen had collaborated in writing the novel. The identification extends to Norbert and, at one point, Freud even gives his own associations in place of Jensen's hero. 'Since . . . we cannot question Hanold, we shall have to content ourselves with referring to his impressions, and we may very tentatively put our own associations in place of his' *(6,* p. 73*).*

In my paper, Freud's *Déjà Vu* on the Acropolis *(25),* it was noted that once Freud reaches the Hill, he drops all reference to the fact that his brother Alexander is with him and the 'we' becomes an 'I', as though Freud and Freud alone had a right to 'see' and to 'remember'. Similarly, Freud writes in *Gradiva* that Hanold 'could almost have wished that the apparition [Gradiva] might remain visible to his eyes alone, and elude the perception of others; then, in spite of everything, he could look on her as his own exclusive property' *(6,* p. 25*).*

The correspondence between Norbert's quest and Freud's, as represented in The Letter, are indeed pervasive, as Lawrence Friedman has also noted *(17).* Freud has transposed much of his interest in life into 'excavations' of the antique unconscious; similarly, Norbert 'surrendered his interest in life in exchange for an interest in the remains of classical antiquity . . .' *(6,* p. 10*).* Both go south to find 'traces' of a youthful love: Freud of his mother in Athens, Norbert of Zoe, 'a German girl' of Hellenic origin. When Norbert addresses Zoe in Greek and then in Latin, she says to him: 'If you want to speak to me, you must do it in German' (p. 18). In Norbert's fantasy, Gradiva may have been connected 'with the temple service of a deity'. He gave her the name 'Gradiva', which he constructed 'on the model of an epithet of the war-god striding into battle—"Mars Gradivus" ' (p. 50). According to Greek legend, Athena, born from the head of Zeus, was in part warlike and had bisexual connotation. Norbert dreams that Gradiva is buried in ashes in Pompeii. In The Future of an Illusion *(9),* but not in The Letter, Freud speaks of the Acropolis as

'a ruins'. Like Freud, Norbert 'had no fixed plan or goal for his journey', and like him was driven by an 'inner restlessness and dissatisfaction' *(6,* p. 15*)*. As Freud found himself in Athens contrary to his plans, so Norbert finds himself '"contrary to his expectation and intentions" in Pompeii' (p. 15).

Thought-Transference and the Wish to Believe

In Psycho-Analysis and Telepathy Freud wrote that there was such a phenomenon as thought transference.

> It shows that an extraordinarily powerful wish harboured by one person and standing in a special relation to his consciousness has succeeded, with the help of a second person, in finding conscious expression in a slightly disguised form *(10,* pp. 184-185*)*.

Here he also mentions 'a dream (dreamt by another person), in which a prophecy was part of the subject matter. The analysis of the dream showed that the content of the prophecy coincided with the fulfilment of a wish' (p. 185).

In several places in *Gradiva,* Freud obliquely points to his own powerful wish impulses which led him to accept the phantasmagorical in Jensen's story.

> But the most important of all the explanatory and exculpatory factors remains the ease with which our intellect is prepared to accept something absurd provided it satisfies powerful emotional impulses *(6,* p. 71*)*.

A rational man, he goes on to say, 'may for a moment return to a belief in spirits under the combined impact of strong emotion and perplexity'. Freud then refers to himself directly.

> I know of a doctor . . . none other than myself . . . [who] could not help recognizing [a girl] as the dead one. He could frame only a single thought: 'So after all it's true that the dead can come back to life' . . . so I have a personal reason for not disputing the clinical possibility of Norbert Hanold's temporary delusion that Gradiva had come back to life *(6,* pp. 71, 72*)*.

Slumbering Erotism

In The Letter, the unconscious erotic memory is veiled or 'forgotten'. In *Gradiva,* Freud comments:

> There is a kind of forgetting which is distinguished by the difficulty with which the memory is awakened even by a powerful external summons, as though some internal resistance were struggling against its revival *(6,* p. 34*).*

On the other hand, in Freud's interpretation, Jensen's novel reveals the hidden, but central, role of the erotic. Norbert's scientific motivation, Freud states

> . . . might be said to serve as a pretext for the unconscious erotic one, and science had put itself completely at the service of the delusion (p. 52). . . . The ancient relief aroused the slumbering erotism in him, and made his childhood memories active (p. 49).

In *Gradiva,* Freud mentions that he once had under treatment a young man whose 'repressed sexuality broke through precisely in relation to his mother' (p. 36). Earlier, he refers to an etching by Félicien Rops in which an ascetic monk 'has fled . . . to the image of the crucified Saviour. And now the cross sinks down like a shadow, and in its place, radiant, there rises instead the image of a voluptuous, naked woman, in the same crucified attitude' (p. 35).

In The 'Uncanny' *(11),* Freud relates that as he was walking through the deserted streets of a provincial town in Italy he was drawn again and again to a red-light district. Norbert has a dream in which 'Apollo lifted Venus up, carried her out, and laid her down on some object in the dark which seemed to be a carriage or cart, since it emitted "a creaking noise" ' *(6,* p. 68*).* This dream suggests a primal scene experience.

Freud's Postscript to *Gradiva* mentions other works by Jensen that contain the incest theme: *Der rote Schirm* which deals with the inhibition of love 'as an after-effect of an

intimate association in childhood of a brother-and-sister kind. . . . Jensen's last novel describes the history of a man who "sees" a sister in the woman he loves' (p. 95). In Gradiva, Norbert discovers that what he thought was a brother-sister pair was after all 'a pair of lovers' (p. 27).

On the Acropolis, there transpired a partial return of Freud's repressed desire for his mother. The resulting conflict brought about a delusional *'Entfremdungsgefühl'*. Freud notes a similar conflict and delusion in Jensen's hero.

> Norbert Hanold's condition is often spoken of by the author as a 'delusion', and we have no reason to reject that designation. . . . A psychiatrist would perhaps . . . describe it as 'fetishistic erotomania', because the most striking thing about it was his being in love with the piece of sculpture. . . . What now took place in him was a struggle between the power of erotism and that of the forces that were repressing it; the manifestation of this struggle was a delusion (pp. 44, 45, 49).

Like Freud in The Letter, Jensen 'has omitted to give the reason which led to the repression of the erotic life of the hero' *(6,* p. 49*)*.

The Visual Image in the Two Journeys

On his seventy-fifth birthday, on the occasion of the unveiling of a memorial tablet on the house where he was born, Freud wrote to the mayor of Příboř-Freiberg: '. . . of one thing I am certain: deep within me, although deeply overlaid, there continues to live the happy child of Freiberg, the first-born of a youthful mother' *(5,* p. 408*)*. And in the passages added in 1907 to The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud noted: 'In my own case the earliest childhood memories are the only ones of a visual character' *(12,* p. 47*)*.[1] Here Freud also writes of the 'complicated . . . emotional impulses of which a child of some four years is capable', adding that these 'same for-

[1] For the relation of the visual image to the past, see Lewin's stimulating book, The Image and the Past *(21)*.

gotten childhood achievements . . . have exercised a determining influence for the whole of his later life' (p. 46). When Freud was four years old, he saw *matrem nudam.* (In a letter to Fliess, dated October 3, 1897, Freud inconsistently says he was two and a half years old at the time *(16,* p. 219*).* According to Jones, when Freud was three years old he was on a 'fateful' train journey from his home in Moravia to Vienna. As the train passed through Breslau, Freud saw gas jets for the first time which 'made him think of souls burning in Hell'. Jones further reports that Freud called 'the amber coloured columns of the Acropolis . . . the most beautiful things that he had ever seen in his life' *(18,* Vol. II, p. 24*).* Shengold wonders whether 'the sight of his mother's body as seen lit up by gaslight (amber-coloured?) did not provide an unconscious determinant for this æsthetic judgment' *(24).*

The voyeuristic imagery which pervades The Letter is also sounded in *Gradiva.* We are told that in Pompeii, among the relics of the past, one must 'look, but not with bodily eyes, and listen, but not with physical ears. And then . . . the dead wakened and Pompeii began to live once more' *(6,* p. 16*).* In his correspondence with Fliess *(16,* p. 194*),* Freud mentions a dream he had of himself in the streets of Pompeii. (This occurred during his self-analysis period.) A year after he journeyed to the Acropolis and a year before he wrote *Gradiva,* Freud visited Naples. In a subsequent letter he writes Fliess that he had obtained 'a fragment of a Pompeian wall with a centaur and faun', which formed part of Freud's collection.

Archeology: Freiberg, Athens, and Pompeii

In The Ætiology of Hysteria *(13)* and in Studies on Hysteria *(2),* Freud pointed to the connection between archeological excavations and the psychoanalytic process. Jones indeed speaks of Freud's work as that of 'resuscitation' *(18,* Vol. III, p. 317*).* Freud's characteristic method was to show the analogy between archeological and psychoanalytic images. In *Gradiva,* he reverses this approach and seeks for psychoana-

lytic meaning to explain the archeology of Norbert Hanold. He writes that Norbert's Pompeii fantasy suggests a combination of disappearance and of preservation of the past. Gradiva tells Norbert that he is looking at her 'here in Pompeii, as something that had been dug up and come to life again' *(6,* p. 32*)*. This then, Freud comments, constitutes 'the equation of repression and burial, and of Pompeii and childhood' (p. 85). In The 'Uncanny', Freud writes that being buried alive by mistake is 'a transformation of another phantasy which . . . was qualified by a certain phantasy, I mean, of intrauterine existence' *(11,* p. 244*)*.

In her paper, Freud and Archeology, Susanne Bernfeld connects Freud's interest in archeology, especially that of Greece and Rome, with the fact that the family left his birthplace, Freiberg, when Freud was three years old. 'The golden age of civilization', she writes, 'like the golden years of Freiberg, had vanished; it could be reconstructed, however, by the findings and interpretations of history' *(1,* p. 119*)*. And indeed Jensen's Norbert also makes 'his childhood coincide with the classical past' *(6,* p. 51*)*. In Bernfeld's formulation, 'Freiberg became Pompeii and [Freud] became its Schliemann'. The legends of Greece and Rome filled the void left by his renunciation of magic thinking. She observes further that 'Freud's interest in archeological facts and objects continues his early belief in resurrection of the dead, displaced on a different level. He can gratify his death-wishes and the preservation-wishes of his ambivalent love in aim-inhibited ways with the mechanism of symbolic substitution' *(1,* pp. 112-113*)*.

In a letter to Stefan Zweig *(5,* #258, February 7, 1931*)*, Freud writes that he actually read more archeology than psychology and that this interest led him to a lifelong friendship with Löwi, professor of archeology in Rome and Vienna. (Schliemann's excavations fall into Freud's earlier years.[2])

[2] *Cf.,* Niederland's An Analytic Inquiry into the Life and Work of Heinrich Schliemann *(22)*.

Jones tells us that on the trip to the Acropolis in 1904, Freud met Schliemann's scientific collaborator, Professor W. Dörpfeld, but did not dare speak to him. It may be that, as Schönau observes *(23,* p. 185*),* Freud was inhibited by the same *'Doppelgängerscheu'* which he expressed in his letter to Schnitzler 'from a kind of reluctance to meet my double' *(5,* #197*).*

Commenting on Jensen's formulation that Gradiva was the childhood friend who had been dug out of the ruins, Freud writes that here the author has presented us 'with the key to the symbolism of which the hero's delusion made use in disguising his repressed memory' *(6,* p. 40*).* The identification of the grave (the ruins of the Acropolis and of Pompeii) with the mother's womb and its restoration as the wish to return to mother are well attested.

The Uncanny and Psychical Phenomena

In his published writings, as Jones notes, Freud took a sceptical position toward psychical phenomena. But in a letter to Carrington in 1921 *(5,* #192*),* Freud wrote: 'If I were at the beginning rather than at the end of a scientific career, . . . I might possibly choose just this field of research, in spite of all difficulties'. And Freud tended toward apotropaeic acts 'to ward off evil'. He went along with Fliess's notion that the numbers 28 and 23 had a portentous influence. Freud believed that he would die at 61 or 62 and, on his way to the Acropolis, he was struck by the frequency with which the number 61 pursued him *(18,* Vol. III, p. 382*).*

According to Jones, it was Jung who directed Freud's attention to Jensen's *Gradiva* and his other novels. (Indeed, the two men were introduced to each other through Jensen's work.) And, in *Gradiva,* Freud comes close to Jung's attitude on the possible validity of premonitory dreams. In Syncronicity: An Acausal Connecting Principle *(20),* Jung writes that future events are experienced 'as psychic images *in the present,* as though the objective event already existed . . .'.[3]

[3] *Cf.* also, Jung's Man and His Symbols *(19,* p. 78*).*

Freud seems to go along with the notion of a 'Gradiva rediviva'. Jensen's novel lends verisimilitude to events which have a ghostly, uncanny character: 'When later on, at the "hot and holy" mid-day hour, which the ancients regarded as the hour of ghosts, . . . [Norbert Hanold] found that he was able to carry himself back into the life that had been buried . . .' *(6,* p. 16*)*.

In this context, Freud's essay, The 'Uncanny', forms a bridge between *Gradiva* and The Letter. The 'Uncanny' was written in 1919, that is, about midway between the two publications. In it, Freud dwells on the ambivalent meaning of the German term for 'the uncanny'—*'Das Unheimliche'*. He points out that its root centers in the ambivalent cluster of *'heimlich'* (familiar) and *'unheimlich'* (uncanny), and writes: 'What is *heimlich* thus comes to be *unheimlich' (11,* p. 224*)*. Freud notes numerous examples of such ambivalence found in other languages, called to his attention by Theodor Reik. Freud writes: 'From the idea of "homelike", "belonging to the house", the further idea is developed of something withdrawn from the eyes of strangers, something concealed, secret; . . . *Heimlich* parts of the human body, *pudenda* . . . a *heimlich* meaning, *mysticus, divinus, occultus, figuratus'* (pp. 225, 226). Twice Freud quotes Schelling: *'Unheimlich* is the name for everything that ought to have remained . . . secret and hidden but has come to light' (p. 224).

Freud associates the term, *unheimlich,* with blindness and castration: '. . . the feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand-Man, that is, to the idea of being robbed of one's eyes . . . often enough a substitute for the dread of being castrated' (pp. 230, 231). And Freud repeats the point made in The Interpretation of Dreams *(14)* on the connection between *déjà vu* phenomena and having seen mother's genitals. Freud adds: 'In this case too, then, the *unheimlich* is what was once *heimisch,* familiar; the prefix *"un"* is the token of repression' *(11,* p. 245*)*.

The 'Uncanny' formulates a principle which can be seen

as pointing both to the Acropolis experience and to *Gradiva.*

> Our conclusion could then be stated thus: an uncanny experience occurs either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed . . . these two classes of uncanny experience are not always sharply distinguishable *(11,* p. 249*).*

It was on the Acropolis that repressed infantile complexes were revived. In Jensen's *Gradiva,* the primitive belief in a premonitory dream is confirmed. A passage in The 'Uncanny' has bearing on this. Freud notes that in fairy tales

> the world of reality is left behind from the very start, and the animistic system of beliefs is frankly adopted. Wish-fulfilments, secret powers, omnipotence of thoughts, animation of inanimate objects, all the elements so common in fairy stories, can exert no uncanny influence here. . . . Thus, we see that fairy stories, which have furnished us with most of the contradictions of our hypothesis of the uncanny, confirm the first part of our proposition—that in the realm of fiction many things are not uncanny which would be so if they happened in real life *(11,* p. 250*).*

The Manifest and the Latent in Freud's Interpretation

In Part II of *Gradiva,* Freud writes that his original intention was 'only to investigate two or three dreams . . . in *Gradiva',* and wonders how it happened that 'we have been led into dissecting the whole story and examining the mental processes in the two chief characters'. He goes on to 'linger a little more over the story itself . . .' *(6,* p. 41*).* This lingering takes up another fifteen pages. As a matter of fact, more than half of the book's ninety pages is given over to the retelling of the story.

Now Freud approaches the novel, not as a product of an artist's imagination, but as though it were a clinical case his-

tory. He writes that he has no objection if *Gradiva* were described 'not as a phantasy but as a psychiatric study' and he himself observes that he is treating Norbert and Zoe 'as though they were real people and not the author's creations' (p. 41). In a Footnote, added in 1909, Freud wrote: 'I found by chance in *Gradiva* . . . a number of artificial dreams which . . . could be interpreted just as though they had not been invented but had been dreamt by real people' *(14,* p. 97*)*.

The examination of a character in literature as a clinical case history ignores the important differentiation Freud made throughout between the imaginary figure of an art work and a living person. Freud himself expresses puzzlement about his use of this method in *Gradiva,* adding that he is all the more puzzled 'since the author has expressly renounced the portrayal of reality by calling his story a "phantasy" ' *(6,* p. 41*)*. Yet, Freud makes no attempt to explain or justify his approach in this essay.

The premise of the story, so Freud states, 'on which all that follows depends', is Jensen's 'arbitrary decision' to invent the resemblance between the sculpture and the live girl. Another of Jensen's premises is that the young man meet the living woman precisely in Pompeii where Norbert's fantasy had placed the dead woman. Freud's sole 'explanation' is 'the fatal truth . . . that flight is precisely an instrument that delivers one over to what one is fleeing from' (p. 42). Freud allows Jensen these premises on the ground that 'access to the sources in the author's mind is not open to us . . .' (p. 43).

Commenting on Freud's attempted explanation, K. R. Eissler observes that here Freud turns something that is arbitrary into lawfulness. 'Thus in this instance explaining and understanding are disjoined. . . . Freud's suggested explanation did not have anything to do with any psychic process, but referred instead to an improbable coincidence of two physical events' *(4,* p. 155*)*.

Freud would have it that the identity of the physical appearance between the bas-relief and Zoe suggests 'a link with

reality', and he characterizes the uncanny paths by which Norbert is brought back to real life as 'perfectly logical' *(6,* p. 10*)*. Do such assertions, along with the fascination over Jensen's novel, stem from Freud's wish to believe in the possibility of 'a happy ending', which was denied him on the Acropolis? Did Freud see in Norbert a kind of 'double', but one who is vouchsafed a cure?[4] If so, may then *Gradiva* be viewed as Freud's 'poetic' attempt, via Jensen and Norbert, to temper the delusion he suffered on the Acropolis?

In *Gradiva,* Freud states that writers and analysts are valuable allies—the one reaching his conclusions from within, the other from without. In *Gradiva,* Freud's use of 'we' suggests that he would combine both approaches. He reaches his conclusions both as a 'writer' (Jensen's 'collaborator' in the sense I pointed out earlier) and as the psychoanalyst who examines the story and its dreams. The 'cure' in Jensen's novel is effected by two 'doctors'; Norbert Hanold who is referred to as 'Dr.' and Zoe who emerges 'as a physician'. Zoe's treatment 'consisted in giving him [Norbert] back from outside the repressed memories which he could not set free from inside' (p. 88). Did the novel—through the combined 'treatment' of Jensen-Norbert-Zoe—serve a similar function for Freud? Zoe, Gradiva's real name, means 'life'. In September 1907, Freud saw the original Gradiva relief. He was so delighted with it that he kept a reproduction of it on the wall of his consulting room.

The Wish to Overcome Death

Writing about the wish to overcome death in The Theme of the Three Caskets, Freud states: 'No greater triumph of wish-fulfilment is conceivable' *(15,* p. 254*)*. And I am suggesting that *Gradiva* may be interpreted as such wish-expression, as an attempt to master the death-like *Entfremdungsgefühl* which seized Freud on the Acropolis two years before.

[4] A 'double', Freud notes in The 'Uncanny', 'was originally an insurance against the destruction of the ego' *(11,* p. 355*)*.

In Jensen's novel, Norbert's wish-fulfilment becomes possible in that 'the censor' is kept in a shadowy background: Zoe's father is an elderly gentleman, engaged in 'foolish and strange purposes' of lizard hunting in Pompeii! Other father-figures appear in mythic guises: Jupiter and Apollo, Norbert standing beside 'the Temple of Jupiter' in his terrifying dream, and Gradiva walking to the Temple of Apollo. Zoe's father is a widower. But her attempt to turn her affection from the childhood friend toward her father was unsuccessful, as he devoted his energies to botany and 'had nothing left over for her'. In Freud's interpretation, when she met Norbert in Pompeii, she was able 'to find her father once more in her loved one' *(6,* p. 33*)*. As Friedman aptly observes, 'Gradiva thus represented a substitute for the desired mother' *(17,* p. 47*)*.

Epilogue

There is tangential indication in *Gradiva* that Freud felt some reservations about his method in this work. He nearly admits that his interpretation of Jensen's novel has more relevance to his own 'secret' than to Jensen and his hero. Freud wonders whether he had not 'slipped into this charming poetic story a secret meaning very far from its author's intentions?' *(6,* p. 43*)*, that was 'in fact only our own' (p. 83). And, toward the end, he muses:

> It may be that we have produced a complete caricature of an interpretation . . . and by so doing have shown once more how easy it is to find what one is looking for and what is occupying one's own mind . . . (p. 91).

In Jensen's *Gradiva,* the hero's delusion is conquered by 'a beautiful reality' (p. 39), which Freud may well have wished for himself. But, just as the author Dante had to return to earth after 'Dante', his hero, had been brought to Paradise, so Freud, the author of Jensen's *Gradiva,* had to return to his earthly reality. Freud himself notes the differences: the 'phy-

sician' Gradiva was able to return Norbert's love. But the psychoanalyst is a stranger 'and must endeavor to become a stranger once more after the cure' (p. 90).

Gradiva falls relatively early in Freud's life. His mother lived on until he was past fifty. In The Letter, Freud invokes threatening figures—both mother and father, Medusa and the Loch Monster, as well as King Boabdil and 'Monsieur notre Père'. This makes The Letter, in contrast to the lyrical quality of *Gradiva,* more of a dramatic poem with conflict in the center. This is somewhat foreshadowed in *Gradiva.* Norbert's hope that Zoe 'still existed and lived' is disturbed by castration threats. Norbert 'would have preferred to have been buried along with the rest two thousand years before . . . so as to be quite certain of not meeting Zoe-Gradiva again' (pp. 28-29).

That life and love were in part a burden and obligation to Freud is also suggested in *Gradiva* where he writes that the antique, marble sculpture warned Norbert Hanold 'to pay off the debt to life with which we are burdened from our birth' (p. 49). At eighty, Freud writes in The Letter of the final renunciation of wishes, such as may have been stirred in him by Jensen's novel. Shengold *(24)* draws an apt analogy between Œdipus at Colonos—Sophocles's 'last journey'—and Freud who wrote in The Letter that he had grown old and 'can travel no more'.

The triumph of Eros over Thanatos, which was a prayerlike hope in the concluding lines of Civilization and Its Discontents, is succeeded by the triumph of Thanatos. Father Chronos has the final word.

In Jensen's novel, Freud found a tale akin to Shakespeare's Tempest, in which Ferdinand is granted the union with his beloved that is denied to Shakespeare's Hamlet figures. Jensen's story suggests the possibility that Eros might gain mastery over Thanatos—not only in the wish-fulfilment of the primary process, but also as occurring in the life of 'real people'. Yet, both in The Tempest and in Jensen's novel, this takes place in a terrain where life is 'such stuff as dreams are made

on'. Nowhere in *Gradiva* does Freud even hint about his own delusion of two years earlier. It is as though the fairy-tale atmosphere may not be disturbed, and the wish to see *matrem nudam* could be poetically fulfilled from 'the outside'—by transferring it to Jensen's imaginative creations, Norbert Hanold and Zoe-Gradiva.

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Toward A Cool Look at Burning Issues

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TOWARD A COOL LOOK AT BURNING ISSUES

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY ON PROGRESS AND REVOLUTION[1]

BY LEO RANGELL, M.D. (LOS ANGELES)

It is central to the psychoanalytic method that the psychoanalyst strives for an objective position from which to view and judge passion-laden events. From the beginning, analysts have attempted to transcend the study of a single individual in analysis and to enter a wider sociological and historical field of observation. Such a transplantation of method requires that appropriate data be used and it calls for special skills and self-discipline in those who would venture into these more uncertain and less encompassable areas. In this psycho-socio-historical field few have deserved to attempt such a study on as wide a scale as Robert Waelder. His aim is to survey the global crisis to which the world is presently heading and to uncover its psychological underpinnings. The scope and depth of this work, and the universality of its applicability, calls to mind and makes it a worthy sequel to Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents.

This book, his last major creative work, is a monumental finale to the distinguished psychoanalytic career of Dr. Waelder. Published just two months before his death, it is no treatise on a small or localized subject, no treatment of any limited, discrete, or tangential piece of psychopathology, but applies the force, depth, and clarity of Dr. Waelder's disciplined way of thinking, accumulated over a lifetime, to 'the issues of our age'. His 'patient' is no less than mankind, and its illness a creeping moral decay, a universal amorphous anomie, and an internal rumbling and instability which, ominous and menacing, threatens momentarily to discharge its aggressive ferment over its external environment. The discontents of civilization seem to perch man on the tip of a volcano. The world is being increasingly polarized. Frustration and grievances are deep in the hearts of men,

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1 Waelder, Robert: *Progress and Revolution. A Study of the Issues of Our Age.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1967.

while satisfactions, where they exist, are often shallow, precarious, and suspect. The forces of eruption are gathering and are in danger of coalescence, while against these the forces of reparation and containment are on the defensive and riddled with internal dissension. The future, to say the least, is uncertain.

To understand these symptoms and to make this cauldron of conflicting forces meaningful is the goal of this book. Waelder roams broadly and deeply, in the true style of psychoanalytic genetic investigation, virtually over the history of man, penetrating with illuminating shafts of insight into the origins of each relevant area. One has the feeling that the entire path of man's development, from his Biblical origins, through ancient times, to modern history, along with the vicissitudes of his inner intellectual and emotional growth, are at Waelder's disposal, and all of it seems to flow effortlessly from his profound scholarship and store of information.

It is not an inappropriate analogy that, just as Archimedes is reputed to have said, 'Give me a lever and a place to stand and I will move the world', so Waelder has sought a platform from which to analyze the critical and precarious state with which man finds himself afflicted at this moment in his history. The platform from which Waelder surveys this field is the psychoanalytic stance, neutral, observing, understanding, and interpreting. Informing the reader beforehand that 'I belong neither to the Right nor to the Left, am neither a Conservative nor a Liberal', Waelder points to a basic dichotomy of our civilization, two different roots that have never fully merged, the Hellenic search for clarity and the Christian search for charity. For the panoramic view that he is about to lay out, Waelder sets out to achieve the former, without which the latter cannot be effectively pursued.

In a brilliant example of applied analysis, Waelder proceeds 'beyond the sociopolitical to the psychological', which for him is of course the psychoanalytic. Looking for 'some underlying melody' beneath the march of human events, he dips always into the substructure and the latent to explain the manifest. While psychoanalytic in its spirit and its way of thinking, the approach is mindful of its being 'applied', is aware of what can *not* be done, is devoid of inappropriate technical language, and does not misuse the nonanalytic situation as though it were indeed a patient in analysis. And in line with this, the connections he makes between the phe-

nomenological present, the historical past, and future trends usually produce the same 'aha' response and sensation of gain as occurs on those special occasions in the psychoanalysis of an individual.

The book is divided into three interwoven essays: Progress, Revolution, and The World Crisis of the Mid-Twentieth Century. Each is a copiously annotated and wide-ranging study in depth, with examples adduced from earliest to modern times while retaining a line of continuity and a central theme. In each, Waelder counteracts clichés and shibboleths, which turn out to include many of the automatically accepted 'facts' of our civilization. The book is in fact dedicated 'To all those who are not irrevocably committed to one of the current oversimplifications'. Adhering to what psychoanalysis is specifically designed to examine, Waelder's scientific approach focuses on the complexity, the ambiguity, and the contradictions inherent in each subject. While noting and documenting what is known, conscious, and acknowledged, Waelder applies what only psychoanalysis can add to the understanding of the whole, an explanatory commentary on aspects usually overlooked, the irrational, conflictful, and inconsistent which exist beneath the surface. It is very much as we have just been given to see, for the first time, the dark side of the moon. Only with this added dimension do we have the rounded picture. Incidentally, we see in this total study a reflection on a global scale of what Waelder has contributed to our knowledge of the intrapsychic process within the individual, i.e., a demonstration *in vivo* and on a mass scale of the individual 'principle of multiple function'.

The Content and Theme

I would like to give a skeletal outline of Waelder's argument, although only a thoughtful and diligent reading can deliver its full impact. Progress, which Waelder divides into the scientific-technologic and the moral-social-democratic varieties, has had in the course of history as many destructive as beneficial effects, as many victims as beneficiaries. Alongside of ever-spiraling achievements and 'the triumphal march of scientific and technological progress in Western civilization' has come continuous disillusionment and frequently shattering secondary effects. These have been of such magnitude and regularity as to have caused the microbiologist René Dubos to have

wondered 'whether men would have embarked on the Industrial Revolution if they had realized all the consequences', and the writer Evelyn Waugh to have said that he who would arrest the so-called progress of mankind deserved a monument.

Hard psychological facts are adduced and inconsistencies pointed out at every turn. Slogans are examined for the truths they hide as well as for what they intend to convey. Liberty and equality, coupled together in the slogan of the French Revolution, are, Waelder points out, incompatible and mutually exclusive in social and interpersonal relations. Liberty for all leads to an inevitable inequality, while 'an egalitarian order requires constant interference from the outside [and hence a curtailment of liberty] to forestall the establishment of a pecking order'. There is an inherent contradiction between the inevitable changes brought about by technology and the universal desire at the same time for stability in homes, roots, country, as well as in personal relations. It is indeed a gap in the rates of development in these two areas which has led to an ever-increasing disparity between 'the alloplastically more efficient' Western world and the Asian world 'with its greater autoplastic endurance and capabilities'.

Science has a Janus face and knowledge is a neutral tool that can serve any master. Whenever man influences the course of human, animal, or plant life he interferes with the balance of nature and its self-regulatory mechanisms. The advance of medicine has, as one of its consequences, kept alive the bearers of defective genes. Humanitarian tendencies, Waelder points out with an innumerable array of sober examples, can at times be carried to the point where survival is threatened.

Many people are not willing to face the consequences of their wishes, actions, and achievements. They want the advantages of industrialization along with the coziness of the farm, the pace of modernization along with the calm of the horse and buggy age, and 'the sweetness which life had in the ancient regime (for the wealthy)'. Inevitably the increasing frustration that accompanies continual progress and permits no illusions about easy solutions leads to a focusing on scapegoats. Waelder's chapter, The Scapegoat Movements, in which he enumerates with incisive detail the historical and current inconsistencies of a number of world-wide scapegoat movements of past and present, rises to a grandeur of argument and rhetoric and

is a highlight of the book. (I shall question below some aspects of his selection of data.)

None of this means, Waelder is careful to point out, that progress, scientific-technological, libertarian, or egalitarian is not worth while. It is more complex, however, than its devotees assume and has its costs, its dangers, and its victims.

Turning next to a study of the nature and genesis of revolution, Waelder considers first the development and structure of power. In human groups, as soon as a decision has to be made by some rather than all, the basis of a power structure has been born. This formula carries over as a basis of government. In exploring the various motives behind obedience, Waelder, in one of the few literal references to psychoanalytic theory, correlates possible underlying motives, such as fear and love, confidence, or allegiance, with the psychoanalytic structures, id, ego, and superego. A government exercises its rule by a combination of physical and spiritual power, of voluntary consent and physical coercion. The amount of coercion permitted depends on the existing technology of violence and the moral climate which determines what kind of force can be applied. Governments can be classified as free, authoritarian, and totalitarian systems, depending on whether or not they permit opposition to exist. As formulated by Thomas Jefferson: 'In a tyranny the people are afraid of the government, while in a free country the government is afraid of the people'.

The argument continues. Following a discussion of how physical power can affect psychic structure, or how Might makes Right, Waelder, in a self-designated Polemic Supplement, decries how many in the Western world, particularly in the United States, deny or underestimate the role of violence and rationalize away its existence. A belittling of sexuality has changed historically from the Victorian age until now and, he notes, the same mechanism is currently being repeated in the minimizing of the role of violence, practiced or potential, in human affairs. Nonviolent resistance, which goes along with this denial, has always had a futile and ineffective record in history, from martyrdom in ancient Rome to hunger strikes or other forms of nonviolent resistance in the present day. Here Waelder is clearly discouraged, deplores the fact that 'those who have never themselves met the fearful might of force' cannot imagine it, and chides those in the United States who take

for granted that tactics which they experience under conditions of fragmented power apply equally under conditions of total power, as in the Fascist and Communist dictatorships of our day. While force is shown to shape ideas, the reciprocal influence of ideas upon force also occurs. Waelder considers this, however, of limited scope compared with the reverse. We do not know basically why certain ideas 'take' any more than why they just as suddenly fade away, in religion, in morality, or even in a fad like the hula hoop.

From power Waelder turns next to examine the striving for utopianism which follows sufficient frustration. Here Waelder emphasizes its unrealizability and illusory nature. The Pavlovian and freudian views are compared, the former leading to possibilities unlimited while the latter imposes limits and liabilities to the remodeling and socialization of man. Utopian expectations have led to inspiration and the utmost in human exertions and sacrifices. They also, however, have their liabilities: perfectionism, an intolerance for flaws, and illusions about facts, which preclude a rational approach and which may, under cover of its high goals, unleash utter ruthlessness and cruelty.

Waelder's theme evolves into a description of A General Framework for a Future Comprehensive Theory of Revolution. Revolutionary action requires both a revolutionary impulse and an inadequate strength of inhibiting forces. With his usual wealth of documentation and analytic insight, Waelder examines the backgrounds and the detailed elements that comprise each of these prerequisites. Having drawn considerably throughout the book from the writings of Max Weber, Alexis de Tocqueville, and Bertrand de Jouvenel, Waelder quotes the latter. In the great revolutions of modern Europe, 'the cycle began with the *downfall of an inadequate Power* only to close with the *consolidation of a more absolute Power*'. Following a review of the components and course of revolutions in history, Waelder comes to the challenging and provocative conclusion that 'successful revolutions . . . are likely to replace an authoritarian regime by a totalitarian one'.

The book proceeds with a crescendo of argument and reasoning to culminate in a final section on the crisis facing the world in this mid-twentieth century. A modern revolutionary movement of immense momentum is advancing over the globe in the name of, but not necessarily in the service of, progress. Unlike revolutions that

aim merely at a changing of government personnel or at the redress of specific grievances, the quality of the present movement is such as to aspire to a total reconstruction of society or even to the creation of a new type of man. Its aspirations, however, of progress, rationality, and equality, weaken the forces of conservation and gradualism, divide their camps, and more importantly, divide the mind of each person in their ranks. What follows, Waelder avers, is a demoralization and disintegration of the ethos, which are themselves necessary to further swell the revolutionary ranks and to keep increasing their impetus.

Along with a change of goals, the character of modern revolutions has also changed, Waelder feels, from spontaneous explosions to consciously planned and centrally steered enterprises. Terrorist strategy, with the emerging of guerilla warfare, confronts a government with the alternatives of ruling despotically or abdicating. The gradualist and the traditional defenders of the status quo come to be ground down between pressures from the revolutionary Left and the counterrevolutionary Right, both of which are stimulated to equal revolutionary fervor and violence. The viability of a free society is threatened; there is no escape from this desperate dilemma, and if no effective answer is found, only a totalitarian or severely authoritarian society will be able to exist. Furthermore, revolutions, or internal wars, have become increasingly intertwined with international wars. The existence of nuclear weapons, however, and the fear of nuclear escalation attendant upon international conflicts, stays the hands of the status quo powers from resorting to military measures. This, in consequence, alters the power relationships in favor of the revolutionary totalitarian powers.

Waelder concludes by discussing separately the predicaments that this sequence of events poses for the several divisions of the world as he sees them.

The developed countries, which include the West, Japan, and the Soviet Union, in general face the dilemmas and internal inconsistencies that form the main argument of this book. 'The modern development', brought about by the conquest of nature and moral emancipation, 'has enlarged the area of Life and has forced the Empire of Death to contract'. But the undesirable consequences of this development have also run their relentless course. Particularly conspicuous are the spiritual malaise, increasing frustration and dis-

content, resulting in a search for scapegoats, an undermining of the ethos, and a political trend toward anarchy or despotism. There is a rising spirit of critique and the door is opened to revolution—and the counterrevolution. In this respect, however, there is an important difference, Waelder points out, between free or mildly authoritarian societies, and totalitarian or severely authoritarian ones.

The Western democracies face particular perils. As the seat of democracy and the birthplace of revolution in the modern sense, the West is wide open to subversion. Facing a world-wide anti-Western movement of revolutionary proportions, the West faces a simultaneous three-pronged attack, from the hostility of the Communist powers, the resentment of the Third World, and the censure of the moralists at home. The American Revolution, Waelder states, was different in character and quality from the modern revolutions in that it left the social structure virtually intact. What makes Communism a grave danger to the West is inherent in any struggle between free and totalitarian societies: every victory of the free society is provisional while every totalitarian victory is irrevocable, probably for generations. Civil disobedience, the right of citizens to disobey *tyrannical* authority, seems to be increasingly looked at as a legitimate political weapon within a democratic commonwealth against any state of affairs which is considered unjust or any decision of the authorities, however trivial, of which they do not approve.

The Communist countries, on the other hand, see progress as a universal law of life and nature, and declare egalitarianism in immediate and unambiguous terms. Such egalitarianism, however, is mixed with an extreme elitism and with a totalitarian system of complete controls maintained into the indefinite future. In the tension that inevitably builds up between theory and dogma on the one hand and continuing experience on the other, doctrine wins out over a sober view of reality. A zig-zag series of shifting compromises results, and discrepancies appear in all spheres of life, in political stances, in chronic crises of socialist economics, in agriculture, and in industrial management. The results of these on the power monopoly of the Communist Party are likely to continue but their directions are impossible to predict.

The predicament of the Third World, economically less developed and affluent than the West, stems from its passionate desire for industrialization and modern development, whether or not there

exists a favorable ethos or the necessary accompanying goals and cultural soil. It feels injured by the West and wishes to import nothing Western except its technology. The ruling elites, however, in addition to harboring a deep anti-capitalist feeling, are more power-oriented than welfare-oriented, and prefer 'to spend national resources on prestige projects such as a splendid new capital city . . . in the midst of a Biblical landscape, or an atomic reactor in a land of wooden ploughs'. Any degree of waste is preferred rather than to relax their political hold.

Whether the present unrest and global anticolonial revolution will result in a 'replacement of the weakened authority of the West . . . by the strong hand of a new master' is at present unknown. In the meantime a shaky stability is protected by big power rivalry. While the sociopolitical picture painted in the pages of this book appears to lead to a gloomy outlook, Waelder holds out a final hope in the upward strivings of man. 'The future need not be all that bad. . . . There is still the anonymous mass of common people . . . adjusting to currents and to storms as best they can, and forever building anew when the volcano has erupted and has destroyed their homes and gardens.' I would also recall at this point a statement made by Waelder much earlier in the book. Speculating about whether or not aggression and despotism are part of a universal law of nature, inherent in the nature of man, Waelder says, 'Even if this condition were universal, however, it would not prove that man cannot alter it: for man, though rooted in nature, can transcend it to a large degree. As Denis de Rougemont put it: "Man's nature is to pass beyond nature".'

Critique

So runs the argument. A deep and relentless study, it paints a sober picture of a serious reality. Told starkly and in summary, the observations made and the theme developed from them may seem arbitrary and selective, and the conclusions forbidding. No abstract, however, can do justice to the intricacies of the line of thought. The material dealt with is as complex and multiply determined as life itself. By any measure, however, Waelder has added a clinical dimension that fulfils what many have felt psychoanalysis should contribute and continue to contribute toward understanding the dilemmas of modern man.

Questions and challenges can, should, and no doubt will be posed at any point and in almost any direction. One cannot expect to deal with a subject so global nor venture interpretations as monumental without treading on ground that at best is sensitive and controversial, but more likely even explosive in the reactions which may be unleashed. To a considerable extent, this is intrinsic both to the content and the methodological approach. It may be expected, as Waelder himself predicted, that 'interpretations' offered under these conditions, while intriguing, thought-provoking, and acceptable to many, will be offensive to others. On both sides of the political spectrum, 'the search for truth is offensive to the engagé who marches on what appears to him as the road to salvation'. In fact, at each end the detachment necessary for an objective look appears as 'the sin of selfish aloofness and complacency'. One does not have here the conditions of an analytically controlled atmosphere, with a preparatory dissolution of defenses, a predictable receptivity, and a capacity for fine measurement of dosage and content. Rather there is the soil for predictable flare-ups, opposition, and hot denial.

Opposition on this basis does not, however, dispose of all possible objections, any more than resistance in individual analysis is to be used by the analyst as a cover for more realistic and justifiable concerns on the part of the patient. It does not detract from the power of this heroic explanatory survey to subject it to necessary corrections, amplifications, or even scepticism. I should like to offer a few such areas of caution as they appeared to this reviewer.

First, although Waelder was as close to 'The Renaissance Man' as we have seen among us in this last generation of analysts—and he has indeed been one of a small and rapidly diminishing group of such widely-oriented scholars—he must also on that very score be subjected to finer confirmation by specialized experts in many of the multiple fields into which he dips. Waelder addresses himself freely to a wide spectrum of subjects, from the biological to the humanities, roams copiously over every phase of history, to religion, philosophy, and the history of science, medicine, genetics, microbiology, and epidemiology, ethology, evolution, and animal psychology, animal and human ecology, physics and chemistry, political science, ethics, the law, and economic theory. While he speaks with consummate ease and with impressive authority in many of these areas, at least some of these excursions need to be confirmed or am-

plified by others. Waelder himself mentions the growing limitations of the generalist in the face of the knowledge explosion in science and technology, and the increasing and necessary specialization that inevitably results. We will need to hear historians discourse on his general 'theory of revolution' and his separation of the American Revolution from all others in motivation, spirit, goals, and effects. And on economic theory, upon which Waelder speaks at length, economists themselves question the validity of opposing theories. A dialogue among them on the economic bases of Waelder's reasoning would not be amiss.

However, in the psychological realm itself where Waelder's expertise in general is unquestioned, one must ask whether the complete objectivity he designated as the desideratum has been achieved in full. Waelder has again foreseen this difficulty, pointing out earlier that 'the detachment required by the search for truth' is relative and that 'the attempt of course is never fully successful'. Empirically speaking, and observing Waelder's own observations from as neutral a vantage point as one can achieve, one cannot avoid the impression that, although he had declared himself earlier as 'neither to the Right nor to the Left . . . neither a Conservative nor a Liberal', his shaft appears particularly harsh, particularly intense, and consistently so whenever it is directed toward the Left. Here a selectivity of material and examples occurs which does not always seem impartial. The appeal of the Left which attracts sufficient numbers throughout the world to deserve careful, even profound, study is given scant attention, and only the illusory aspects are stressed. Most importantly, it is only here that he resorts to 'observations' of questionable authenticity. While there is no minimizing his opposition to the tyranny from the Right, the fullest intensity of his wrath and scorn is directed against the likes of Lenin, Stalin, Mao, Castro, and Ho Chi Minh. One wonders, for example, about the 'fact' that Castro, during his victory march in Havana after he seized power, 'smiled with amusement' at the middle classes who were joining the cheering in the belief that he would support their cause. As Waelder says elsewhere of a certain Communist claim, 'One wonders how he could be so sure'.

It is mainly, however, in his chapter on scapegoats that this bias becomes most apparent. In addition to Jews, the groups he selects to best exemplify the world's scapegoat movements, to identify as the

special victims of displaced aggression, are the capitalists, the imperialists, and the whites. While within each of these unusual and unexpected choices he adds stimulating, informative thinking, one wishes that he would have made at least equal mention of their opposite counterparts, the Communists, the Blacks, and the ardent anti-imperialists, all of them victims of displaced aggression in contemporary history. No one whose mind was shaped during the years of Joseph McCarthy will fail to wonder how Communism, the original 'red herring', could have been omitted from a section on scapegoats. Or why earlier in discussing 'the devil theory of revolution', which he discards, he omits the attitude of the capitalist world toward Communism. One recognizes here that Waelder writes from his cultural past as a displaced Viennese intellectual.

A corollary of these choices is a uniformly positive attitude toward his adopted and beloved country. The United States generally comes out as the middle of the middle, the most rational, cleaner than all others, operating with greater 'goodness' and under loftier and more selfless principles. As to its many critics, it is again the contemporary American liberal, the intellectuals, 'the moralists of the Left' who come in for Waelder's most consistent, severe, and biting criticism. While this 'countertransference' trend, with its positive and negative splitting, needs to be taken into account, it does not obliterate the abundant insights in this area, as elsewhere. Many of the criticisms leveled against Americans, Waelder points out with pinpoint sharpness, are frailties of men, not of American men. 'If the Church Father who said the famous words: "Intra faeces et urinas nascimur" had been a contemporary American intellectual, he would probably have qualified his statement with the words: "in American culture".'

This same splitting exists in Waelder's general attitudes toward the East and the West. In searching for causes for the Soviet Union's mistrust of the West in the months before the outbreak of war in 1939, he fails to mention the words 'Chamberlain' or 'Munich'. Such consistent omissions do not strengthen Waelder's argument. Without them one might react more positively to his speculation that the attitude of the West toward the Soviet Union would perhaps have been different if the latter had not expropriated private foreign interests after 1917, and that recognition from the West might have come at once, as a result of which the Hitler ascension

years later might have been prevented. There are too many 'ifs' here, and historians of this period may well take issue.

As a result of what might be considered this Achilles' heel of Waelder's 'analytic stance', one is forced to hold in abeyance many of his general assertions of fact and content about Marxist theory. Rather than automatically granting them as the data upon which to build a psychological superstructure, his detailed excursions into Marxist economic theory and the Marxist 'theory of progress,' and his assertions about the ambiguity in the Marxian concept of law as compared with ours, would in all fairness need to be concurred in, or at least debated by an authoritative Marxist theoretician.

These qualifications, it cannot be overstated, do not detract from Waelder's purposes and goals, but indicate only that the latter are to be striven for more completely. One reason for his selective attitude may have been that given by Waelder himself when he observes that when revolution is on the march, which he feels to be the case now, the gradualists, among whom he counts himself, find themselves lining up with the conservatives. To swing over and 'defend' the Left would be an equal error in reverse; only from true neutrality can unconscious motives at both ends of the spectrum be objectively judged. Incidentally, more could have been said about the irrationalities of the middle position as well, about the roles of the *un*committed, the silent, or the compulsive compromisers. This point, or rather band, in the political spectrum is not impervious to analysis, and has itself too often been a major source of social mischief. Actually, however, in spite of these cautions and corrections, this reviewer feels that Waelder still achieves a remarkable success in standing astride and casting a clear light on the world events he sets out to examine.

There are many other special attributes of this book worth noting. For one, it proves to have a predictive quality, a characteristic which is always especially convincing to a psychoanalytically-minded examiner of events. Although this book was written about five years ago, Waelder could have been describing events which swept over college campuses across the country, from Berkeley to Columbia, a few years later. His descriptions of the problems of modern education, and his sections on the inconsistencies and built-in contradictions of the demands and expectations of college youth are no less illuminating and important than his similar observations with re-

spect to the broader public in relation to wider political movements—without detracting from the legitimate and rational aims spurring each group. There are references which anticipate by several years dilemmas that have since come about involving the police and law enforcement agencies. The double bind engulfing the quest for law and order is described here in advance. In a manner that derives from the psychoanalytic method, insights into the past intertwine with observations of the present and point predictive arrows toward the future.

As another bonus that comes about quite by serendipity, Waelder's description of modern man's social strivings, of his struggle for power, status quo, and his place in the pecking order, constitute a subsidiary essay on today's social structure and its hierarchy, and can be widely applied to suburbia, industry, academia, and even psychoanalytic societies. The range of his observations and of his search for causes is all-inclusive. There are even a few pithy sentences on the role played by 'luck' in the shaping of human affairs.

There are also throughout the book a plethora of useful quotes. These come either directly from Waelder's insights and formulations themselves: 'Strongly held opinions often determine what kind of facts people are able or willing to perceive'; or relevant and timely quotes from others: 'T. S. Elliot's elegiac question: "Where is the wisdom that was lost in knowledge? Where is the knowledge that was lost in information?" '.

A culmination of a dozen or so previous papers over a period of thirty years, this final integrated effort seems to have come tumbling out without the luxury or the time for fine or final polishing. Much is left for others to refine. The material was for the most part not looked up but lived with, sifted, categorized, worked through, and consolidated by Waelder's mental faculties over the course of a lifetime. The contents within its crowded pages are open-ended, and can serve as a foundation to keep a multidisciplinary study group busy for some years. Collaborative efforts among political scientists, historians, psychoanalysts, and a variety of present-day 'planners' can refine, correct, and extend what has here been laid down.

Whatever issue might be taken with individual contents, one cannot overstate the gain achieved toward understanding the complete picture of modern man when the motivations stemming from his psychological depth are added to it. The aims and the massive

contribution achieved in this work indicate what may be expected from applying psychoanalytic thinking to the psycho-social scene. Only by including this psychological dimension in all its complexity can we hope to exert an influence to avoid our continuing to be passive victims of pendular swings and oscillating backlashes, and of having these determine our sociopolitical lives. The outlook for such mastery is perhaps no more nor less gloomy than Waelder himself indicates, but this book might help give some impetus in the right direction.

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The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Volume XXIV. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 531 pp.

Samuel Atkin

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, VOLUME XXIV. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 531 pp.

This volume goes beyond an anthology of valuable psychoanalytic essays in the theoretical, clinical, and applied aspects of psychoanalysis. Its editors succeed in presenting an overview of psychoanalysis as a developing science. One is happy to note that if it is not burgeoning, it is at least very much alive. The elaboration, deepening, and synthesis of the concepts of early development are the most prominent themes. This accords with the currently ebullient activity in psychoanalytic research in child development. Since this psychoanalytic research commonly joins the disciplines of both psychology and sociology, the re-examination of the scientific methodology of psychoanalysis has now become a practical necessity.

William I. Grossman and Bennett Simon's Anthropomorphism: Motive, Meaning, and Causality in Psychoanalytic Theory is a brilliant epistemological essay. It should serve to bolster the faint-hearted who cower at the unfavorable comparisons sometimes made between psychoanalysis as a science and the natural sciences. The authors posit that psychoanalysis is inevitably and necessarily an anthropomorphic science, able to deal more with meaning than with causality. At present, psychoanalysis is in need of superordinate concepts to build a proper general psychology, since heretofore it has dealt with biological, sociological, and historical matters only through 'isomorphism'. The authors may be shortchanging the possibility of *extending* psychoanalysis into a psychoanalytic social psychology. Freud's group psychology based on the individual psychology of identification does explain a social institution at the *interfaces* of the individual psyche and the group process. This major breakthrough into sociology has already been recognized by sociologists.

Another example of psychological process at the interfaces, in this case expanding language theory, particularly the comprehension of the 'emotive' component of language, will be found in Phyllis Greenacre's speculation on the role of speech in early development in her article, The Fetish and the Transitional Object. In this impressive contribution, the role of the visual function is also eluci-

dated in the comparison of the *psychology* of the transitional object with the *psychopathology* of fetishism.

Selma Fraiberg, in Libidinal Object Constancy and Mental Representation, clearly demonstrates the value, perhaps the necessity, of using psychological theory to close gaps in psychoanalytic developmental theory. On strictly psychoanalytic criteria, that is, the state of the libidinous ties to the mother, Anna Freud fixes the establishment of object constancy at eight months. (Spitz concurs, dating it to the appearance of 'stranger anxiety'.) But some analysts agree with Piaget, who places the date at eighteen to twenty-five months. Utilizing Piaget's psychological method and introducing the ego factor of 'evocative memory', Fraiberg is able to convincingly reconcile this untenable time gap.

Much remains to be done to clear the confusion in psychoanalytic semiology. We encounter this disarray when Humberto Nagera, in The Imaginary Companion: Its Significance for Ego Development and Conflict Solution, reports the ubiquitousness of this fantasy but notes its relative rarity in reports of child analyses. Also we are left completely at sea as to how this phenomenon fits into the psychology of day dreaming in its various manifestations.

The harvest is often rich when analysts confine themselves strictly to the cultivation of their own garden. In a short and brilliant essay on separation, Anna Freud discusses infantile regression under various conditions of strain and trauma, which leads her to speculate on the possible psychogenesis of autism. (Film Review: *John, Seventeen Months: Nine Days in a Residential Nursery* by James and Joyce Robertson).

At the Plenary Session of the American Psychoanalytic Association Fall Meetings (December 18, 1970) Piaget paid homage to Freud by discussing repression in his address Affective Unconscious and Cognitive Unconscious. Many who heard him may not have realized that the repression he demonstrated in his experiments was essentially Freud's *primal* repression. We now have in this volume Alvin Frank's excellent critique on this subject in The Unrememberable and the Unforgettable: Passive Primal Repression.

Irving Steingart also advances psychoanalytic clarification in an area still full of ambiguities and contradictions in psychoanalytic discourse, in an article titled On Self, Character, and the Development of a Psychic Apparatus.

Clinical reports by analysts on drug taking by the young are much needed. Dora Hartmann presents such a report in A Study on Drug-Taking Adolescents. Another report, theoretical, is supplied by Herbert Wieder and Eugene H. Kaplan in Drug Use in Adolescents: Psychodynamic Meaning and Pharmacogenic Effect.

Limited space precludes discussion of many other worth-while papers by Rudolf Ekstein and Elaine Caruth, Andrew Peto, Eugene Pumpian-Mindlin, Michael D. Robbins, Milton Sirota, E. C. M. Frijling-Schreuder, Maurits Katan, Judith Kestenberg, Martha Wolfenstein, Joseph Goldstein, and James W. Hamilton.

SAMUEL ATKIN (NEW YORK)

PARENTHOOD. ITS PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY. Edited by E. James Anthony, M.D., and Therese Benedek, M.D. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970. 617 pp.

Broadly speaking, this book is a multiauthored study of the development, vicissitudes, and pathology of parenthood. The editors' particular focus is the special reciprocal, interpersonal relationship that is parenthood, and its concomitant impact on the intrapsychic structure and equilibrium of the involved persons. While the effect of the parent upon the psychic structure of the child has been studied very fruitfully, the reverse has not been true. Still any analyst who has analyzed a parent has noted the effect of children upon a parent's psyche.

The general introductory section opens with a fascinating chapter by Charles Kaufman on the biological basis for the development of parental behavior. (Kaufman's extensive bibliography is useful for further reading.) The next two chapters deal with the anthropological and sociocultural aspects of parenthood. The book's second section, written by Benedek, uses psychoanalytic developmental psychology as a base for a study of the transactional process between members of a family. The third section explores the developmental aspects of parenthood, delineating the phase-specific task of the child as a challenge to parental equilibrium and adaptation. The fourth section studies the pathology of parenthood, but unfortunately all of the chapters are focused on the mother. I believe the significance of the father deserves greater attention, particularly

since he plays two roles in parenthood: directly as a parent and indirectly as a support to the mother's parental role. The fifth and final section reports some studies on the actual field of interaction, using the intrapsychic correlates of both members.

In such a collection one can always criticize the repetitiveness and overlapping on the one hand, and the unfilled gaps on the other. This book is no exception. One substantive criticism I have is that parenthood was studied as though the family consisted only of two parents (often only mother) and one child. For most families, this is artificial; the impact of siblings on parenthood has been neglected in this volume.

One of the pleasures of a good collection is the complementary value of some of the papers. For example, I found it stimulating to read The Mother's Reaction to the Toddler's Drive for Individuation by Mahler, Pine, and Bergman, and Steele's Parental Abuse of Infants and Small Children, and then to reflect on the mutual illumination they provide. Nineteen of the twenty-seven chapters are newly written for this book.

I think the book achieves its objectives admirably. It certainly has renewed my own interest in the endlessly reciprocating relationship between the inner psychic life and the external object.

PETER BLOS, JR. (ANN ARBOR, MICH.)

THE YOUNG ADOLESCENT. Clinical Studies. By Peter Blos. New York: The Free Press, 1970. 252 pp.

This book is a very valuable supplement to Dr. Blos's previous writings. He presents the history and therapy of two preadolescents, a girl and a boy. Susan began therapy at the age of eight. Treatment was terminated when she was thirteen. Ben was twelve years old when treatment started. It terminated when he was fifteen. Previous to therapy both children had failed to achieve an adequate latency phase. With the resolution of inadequately solved conflicts at that level, it was possible to trace the psychological changes that heralded maturation to the next typical phase of growth, early adolescence.

In evaluating the material, Blos integrates the case-specific formulations with his theoretical concepts of maturational advancement into adolescence. The opportunity he thus provides to observe the multiple lines of development offers a clearer concept of progression

than would a series of vignettes related to several cases. The choice of a girl and a boy contributes an additional dimension, enabling the reader to discern more clearly Blos's formulation of the comparable aspects of this maturational process in both sexes, and also the different tasks faced by each.

The two cases were treated by social workers whom Blos supervised. They were seen in therapy only once a week. These facts can justify criticism by psychiatrists and particularly by psychoanalysts; such criticism, however, would ignore Blos's long experience and thoughtful study of adolescence. Those who do not consider the 'normal' adolescent phase of development as one of stress will evaluate Blos's presentation as another example of the utilization of a psychological disturbance as a basis for describing the normal. But in both these cases, because they were in therapy, material became available that undoubtedly would not have been readily recognized had not a therapeutic alliance been established. A careful study of the material makes it possible to differentiate what was related to unresolved early conflicts, and what was the task of the young person specific to his level of maturation. This opportunity to differentiate the two aspects of Blos's theory is one of the values of these two case studies.

The Young Adolescent should be extremely valuable to those who have followed Dr. Blos's conceptualization of the psychological growth that occurs during adolescence. For those less familiar with his previous writings, the book should stimulate an interest in further exploring his formulations. As he discusses the theoretical aspects of the cases, he provides references to his previous writings so that any lack of clarification can be corrected. A reader unfamiliar with his other writings will lose a great deal if he does not take advantage of these references.

IRENE M. JOSSELYN (PHOENIX)

THE THERAPEUTIC NURSERY SCHOOL. A Contribution to the Study and Treatment of Emotional Disturbances in Young Children. Edited by Robert A. Furman, M.D., and Anny Katan, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 329 pp.

This volume, the joint effort of a group of child analysts and analytically trained therapists working in Cleveland under the direc-

tion of Dr. Anny Katan since 1951, is an important contribution to the problems of diagnosis and treatment of the child under five years of age. Although the study originally undertaken was to be a follow-up of the graduates of their Nursery School program, it was found necessary to describe the treatment methods used and to derive diagnostic categories suitable for assessment purposes. These tasks were divided among and written up by different members of the group. There is, in consequence, some unevenness both in the organization of the presentation and the level of theoretical discussion, although the clinical material is uniformly superb.

The results of the follow-up study consisted of these findings:

1. The 'treatment via mother' method resulted in a favorable outcome in those children under five who had suffered from disturbances of greater severity than transitory developmental conflicts, but not a fixed neurosis or character disorder. (These children were last evaluated at the beginning of puberty.)
2. It was necessary to modify certain categories in Anna Freud's Developmental Profile for diagnostic use in children under five years of age.
3. The concept of motherhood as a developmental phase was found to assume central importance in the treatment of young children via the mother.
4. A separate diagnostic category was necessary in order to accommodate psychosomatic disorders of young children.

These findings establish this young age group as one which requires unique diagnostic as well as therapeutic approaches in contrast to older children, facts that must be taken into account by those attempting to plan and execute diagnostic and treatment facilities for the child under five years of age, and for his parents.

The remainder of the volume is devoted to a description of the treatment method itself and to a presentation of detailed clinical material which raises theoretical and technical questions.

The 'treatment via the mother method' was used with thirty-four of the sixty-two children who were the subject of the follow-up study. A nursery school program for the children constituted one aspect of this method, with particular emphasis on impulse control, offering avenues for sublimation and providing verbalization for actions and affect. This educational program was closely correlated with 'treatment of the child via the mother', in which the therapist helps the mother 'in her role as the child's educator' as well as in direct therapeutic intervention with her own child whenever conflict in the child is found to be present.

This reviewer was impressed with the effectiveness of the nursery not only as an educational experience, but as an important therapeutic setting for both mothers and children. It would seem that the mothers have substantial opportunities for new partial identifications and that both partners of the dyad experience physical separation under seemingly optimal conditions. It is interesting in this regard that the children showing the greatest improvement on follow-up are those whose mothers could become effective 'educators', probably on the basis of at least partial identification with the entire therapeutic staff. That the program offers considerable support for these mothers is indicated by the absence of serious depressions in them during the crucial years of early child-mother separation, although four became seriously depressed in later years.

The nature and effectiveness of the therapist's work with the mother is much more difficult to evaluate. The theoretical explanations of the work employ terminology frequently unfamiliar to the psychoanalyst; moreover, the stated aims and technical approach raise a number of questions. To begin with, the Cleveland group's utilization of the unusual flexibility of parents during the child's youngest years, as well as the mother's feeling of responsibility for the child and her capacity for identification with the staff, are all valuable therapeutic guidelines for others who would attempt similar work. However, in the 'treatment via the mother' method, no attempt is made to work with the mother's unconscious conflicts, and transference reactions are kept to a minimum. At the same time, the mother is expected to proceed from 'observation to interpretation of the child's defence mechanisms, from defence and anxiety to conflict, from present conflict to genetic origins', with the assistance of the therapist who simultaneously has to 'consider not only the disturbance of the child, but also the mother's strengths and weaknesses, the status of the "working relationship", the educational setting in the home, and the mother's wishes'.

This reviewer is puzzled by the apparent discrepancy between the depth of psychological understanding expected of the mother and the avoidance of working in depth in the therapeutic relationship between therapist and mother. Yet the experience and skill of the various therapists is clearly revealed in the richly detailed clinical material in Chapter 4 which is a remarkable collection of data dealing with the pathology of young children. For this alone we should be eminently grateful to the Cleveland group.

Chapter 5 contains a valuable review of the literature dealing with diagnostic assessment of young children as well as an interesting discussion of the diagnostic categories that were finally adopted by the Cleveland Nursery group. These will be of interest to others who are faced with the same problem.

Chapter 6 describes the follow-up evaluation. The research population varied in age from three to six years at the time of initial evaluation when they entered the nursery program. A second developmental profile was drawn up, retrospectively, covering the period when they left the program. At the time of the follow-up evaluation, they ranged in age from approximately seven to seventeen years. In the 'treatment via the mother' group, there were sixteen children who 'did not show a fixed neurosis and character disorder at the time of initial assessment, yet whose disturbances were of greater severity than transitory developmental conflicts'; these sixteen children had maintained their over-all improvement at the time of follow-up. In contrast to this group, eight children who were originally assessed as suffering from a fixed neurosis and character disorder were treated by the same method. All eight retained this diagnosis at the time of follow-up. It is clear, then, that treatment via the mother, which includes the therapeutic nursery setting, is effective for the particular group of children who suffer from more than transitory developmental conflicts, but without a fixed neurosis or character disorder. Direct psychoanalytic treatment is indicated with the development of these latter pathological conditions.

This volume contains much that is valuable, both because of the subject matter and the high caliber of the many years of work preceding its publication. It is the first extensive effort by psychoanalysts to tackle that most challenging and difficult area, the classification and treatment of psychopathology in the very young child.

ELEANOR GALENSON (BRONX, N.Y.)

WAGES OF NEGLECT. NEW SOLUTIONS FOR CHILDREN OF THE POOR. By Robert Coles and Maria Piers. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1969. 191 pp.

The authors have done the psychoanalytic community a particular service by providing this review of the major findings derived from several important studies of groups of children at risk. All the

children reported on had been exposed to severe but varying degrees of neglect, deprivation, and abuse, but they differed in their social, national, and racial backgrounds.

It has long been agreed that certain types of limitations and deviations observed in middle-class children result from intrapsychic patterns generated by specific parental behavior toward infants and young children in interaction with environmental circumstances encountered during later childhood and adolescence. However, there has been a tendency to attribute to 'socio-economic' factors the statistically commonest limitations and deviations found in children of the poor, especially the poorest of the poor. Insufficient attention has been given to the fact that these socio-economic factors affect children's psychological function *through* their effects on parents and that it is the parental neglect (or ignorance) and the family disorganization which affect the children so exposed, whether that neglect or family disorganization occurs in conditions of poverty or affluence. The authors state it this way:

> The children I saw in New Orleans ultimately had to be understood as children who lived in certain kinds of homes, who had certain kinds of relationships with parents and brothers and sisters and relatives and neighbors, and who, by virtue of these relationships, were strong or weak, capable or vulnerable. Their ability to survive severe external threats came from the internal strength they received from their parents and, indeed, from their entire social and psychological tradition. What I was seeing in New Orleans and Atlanta was not unlike what Anna Freud saw in London during World War II: Particular children meeting adverse circumstances—a confrontation which could be either useful and productive or extremely painful to a child, all depending upon who the child was.

Perhaps even more important is the authors' perception and articulation of the proposition that such limitations and deviations of development as are so frequently seen in the children of the urban and rural poor are amenable to modification or reversal by 'understanding', i.e., sophisticated care giving. They further make it clear that this kind of care giving is possible within the structure of a variety of social organizations and institutions, such as day care, schools, or appropriate parent education programs. This hypothesis is confirmed by the finding that Head Start programs which involve mothers in the educational program have greater effectiveness than those which do not.

Through the device of an opening chapter by each author, the two etiological theses of the book are expounded. Coles focuses on the family relationships as primary, whether the neglected child is rural or urban, black or white. Piers focuses on one aspect of the pathogenic family and its effects on the child—namely, 'uprootedness'. This element in the family's history causes or contributes, often disastrously, to the social disorganization of the poor family. This point was made long ago by Benjamin Malzberg in his study of New York State Hospital populations since the nineteenth century, in which the effects of uprootedness were reflected in the markedly higher rates of mental hospitalization for foreign-born than for native-born residents, with the rates decreasing for each ethnic group as the group became more 'native', i.e., less migrant.

As one reviews, through the authors' lucid reconstructions, Anna Freud's treatment of six children born and reared in concentration camps, Ilse Mattick's study of children of the 'rock-bottom' poor in Boston, and the experience of the Child Development Group of Mississippi in mobilizing mothers of poor rural Negro children to teach and learn with their children, an additional important point gradually emerges. Most workers in the field are aware that different kinds of neglect lead to different kinds of disturbances, and many are also aware that in the poor, learning disabilities, emotional neglect, and physical deprivation all lead the child in the same direction—down, to the social, vocational, and often physical incompetence that dooms him to live in the same conditions as his parents, or worse. However, while the results of these various types of 'neglect' are distressingly similar and widespread among all the poor, remedies are different and can vary widely in expense, availability, and feasibility if, and only if, the authors seem to be saying, the specifically effective remedy is applied early enough. If the 'neglect' comes in the form of maternal ignorance and fear of the school and all it stands for, mothers can be taught to become allies of the child's need and potential for learning; if the neglect occurs through maternal loss, then a truly effective *and* therapeutic substitute emotional relationship must be formed; if the neglect comes in the form of maternal failure to provide for a child's differentiation, supplemental but not rivalrous experiences must be made available early enough; if the neglect has been in the form of physical as well

as emotional deprivation—as when maternal loss is associated with or followed by physical cruelty and psychological torment, a long-term total and intensively therapeutic environment must be provided if the severest form of dehumanization is to be avoided. Fortunately, it is the very small minority of neglected children who have been abused in this hardly conceivable and inhuman way.

The principles of psychoanalysis underlie the capacity to make these differentiations and to supply the rationale for the relative effectiveness of various approaches to repair and prevent damage caused by various types of neglect. Psychoanalysts have much to contribute toward making effective application of these principles possible in the large public programs for remedial and preventive child care that so often fail for lack of the specific understandings which Coles and Piers suggest are the essential ingredients of success.

One problem presented by the selection of case studies is the implied suggestion that large numbers of highly trained, skilful, dedicated, and loving people would be required to remedy many of the consequences of parental poverty. The problem is that such therapists do not and probably will not exist in great numbers. Perhaps the true challenge is to find ways of raising to the level of relevant behavior in crucial areas the deep concern for their children which is at least unconsciously available in *all* parents. That this is possible for many parents is strongly suggested by results achieved by the Child Development Group of Mississippi and is supported by a number of other researches. A recent study in Santiago, Chile, of the effects of involving poor mothers in a program of nutritional education to improve their children's diet is reported to have led incidentally to raising the children's intelligence quotients to the level of those in a control group of middle-class children in the same city. From the public health viewpoint it is in such findings as these, which point the way to feasible mass intervention, that the 'pay dirt' lies. In both studies the participation of mothers in ways both appropriate and possible was the key factor. When intervention through mother-child relationship is not possible, remediation is inevitably limited to a pitiably small proportion of those who suffer the 'Wages of Neglect'.

ELIZABETH B. DAVIS (NEW YORK)

SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS, VOLUME XV. DYNAMICS OF DEVIANT SEXUALITY. Edited by Jules H. Masserman, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1969. 106 pp.

This fifteenth volume issued by the Publications Committee of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis reflects the thinking of that body on the subject of sexual perversion. There are eight original articles which range from the purely genetic (chromosomal) to the study of conscious masturbatory fantasies, an interesting contribution on identity formation in adolescent homosexuals by Malvina W. Kremer, an informative paper by Warren J. Gadpaille on homosexual activity and homosexuality in adolescence, a descriptive study of fetishism and sadomasochism offered by Paul H. Gebhard, a social psychologist and head of the Institute for Sex Research at Indiana University (erroneously designated as a physician in the table of contents), plus a unique study by Emasue Snow and Harvey Bluestone on fetishists who were unable to neutralize their aggressive drives through the use of the fetish and tragically unable to contain their murderous impulses. This article, though fascinating, is too abbreviated; it does not include what must be additional aspects of the phenomenon such as the presence of psychotic mechanisms and/or psychopathy for the enactment of homicide.

The preface by Dr. Masserman sets an unfortunate tone when he charges that classical psychoanalysis, in contrast to 'cultural psychoanalysis', is afflicted with dogmatism. He further declares that freudian psychoanalysis is responsible for patients presenting themselves for analytic therapy tainted and confused by a cultural 'lag' in analytic sophistication. We are asked to believe that this 'lag', apparently, is the fault of orthodox psychoanalytic theory and practice. To my mind, psychoanalysis can be kept scientific only by full attention to our methodology, transference, dream interpretation, and resistance, that is, by the proper use of long-proven psychoanalytic theory and technique. Modifications of psychoanalytic technique are continually made; such changes, however, must be predicated on a deep knowledge of the unconscious mental structure (*cf.*, Anna Freud, *Problems of Technique in Adult Analysis,* Bull. Phila. Assn. Psa., IV, 1954, pp. 44-70).

During its relatively brief history, classical psychoanalysis has always welcomed the informed and constructive theories of biologists, sociologists, ethnologists, etc., as material to be considered in the context of our knowledge of unconscious conflict as the main determinant of disordered behavior. In about half the papers in this book the emphasis is on sociocultural determinants instead.

An article by Edward Gendel, M.D., cytogeneticist at Metropolitan Hospital in New York, reiterates the problems of attempting sex 'reassignment' when he reminds us that 'it is generally accepted that at eighteen months to two years, or about the time of development of meaningful language, the individual's concept of himself or herself as male or female is firmly fixed and that efforts to alter this conviction of maleness or femaleness are productive of severe psychologic trauma'. He describes the dismaying circumstances when sex is assigned to an infant depending upon whether or not 'the phallus is sufficiently impressive to be considered a penis or so insignificant as to be disregarded. . . . If this initial decision is not changed at the latest by the age of two years, the child is pretty much unalterably oriented toward himself or herself as a boy or girl.' He correctly observes that 'the identification of individuals with anomalous chromosome patterns would be the first step in a long term prospective study of the ultimate fate of such persons'. They should be given regular psychiatric examinations, psychotherapy, family counseling, etc. There should be long-term studies of personality development, symptom formation, and the dynamics of unconscious conflict in order to better understand the special problems posed by sexual maladaptation. Those who would perform surgery, changing the anatomical sex of physically normal subjects before the *unconscious* motivations behind such importunate desires in so-called transsexuals are fully ascertained, should read this important paper prior to performing such mutilative, irreversible, inevitably partial 'correction'. (*Cf.*, C. W. Socarides, *A Psychoanalytic Study of the Desire for Sexual Transformation* ['*Transsexualism*']*: The Plaster-of-Paris Man.* Int. J. Psa., LI, 1970, pp. 341-349.)

One of the most illuminating papers in this collection is by Walter Bonime, Masturbatory Fantasies and Personality Functioning. Aggression is a common ingredient of the fantasy or its precipitating circumstances. Masturbatory fantasies, like dreams, reflect

personality and may play an important role in the analytic process. Bonime refers to the classical literature on the unconscious masturbation fantasy and its relevance for character structure, but in his particular frame of reference he focuses on *conscious* fantasies and their significance: 'They demonstrate the relationship between the individual's pathological strivings and the optimum circumstances for gratification, as expressed through fantasy during masturbation. . . . We may speculate that masturbatory fantasies provide an autistic solution of interpersonal conflict, and that the solution is a hostile overcoming of influence or a hostile achieving of power.' His study is especially worth while, in this reviewer's opinion, in explaining conscious fantasies and their meaning. What is omitted, and should be emphasized, is that the conscious fantasy really helps to keep something else in repression: the masturbatory fantasy is ego-syntonic, does not produce anxiety, and through allowing part of the infantile sexuality to remain in consciousness serves to keep in repression impulses that would prove more dangerous to the psychic organization (*cf.,* Hanns Sachs's mechanism).

Judd Marmor, in discussing the Bonime paper, states that it is of dubious validity to conclude that conscious masturbatory fantasies involve inferences of 'unconscious fantasies'. Marmor does not believe that masturbation may be an expression, even in part, of psychopathology and deems Bonime's conclusions as unwittingly reflecting a value system 'that disapproves of the masturbatory act and thus cloaks a moral judgment in the guise of a psychopathological diagnosis'(!). It seems that Marmor would have us do away with the entire concept of unconscious motivation in the causation of sexual disorders. He loses no opportunity to attack classical psychoanalysis because it regards perversions as a form of emotional illness, while he regards them as 'necessary and important adaptive maneuvers . . . in a sexually frustrating society like ours'. (Gebhard, in his remarks on sexual perversion, notably fetishism and even sadomasochism, also feels that severe sexual disorders may be due purely to social pressures extant in the environment.)

What, then, is the culturalist's psychoanalytic position? Marmor's answer—whether it concerns the pathological masturbatory fantasies reported by Bonime or is directed at those of us who view obligatory homosexuality as an emotional illness as shown by detailed psychoanalytic investigation (*cf.,* C. W. Socarides, ***The Overt***

Homosexual. New York: Grune & Stratton, 1968)— is encompassed in his statement:'I would say, rather, that [they] are efforts at adaptation to a society in which free access to sexual objects is not easily available and yet a society that is constantly titillating our erotic urges'. Has the psychoanalytic clinician to infer from this that unconscious motivations are not the main factor in the causation of sexual perversions?

Fortunately all is not lost, for in an article titled Homosexual Activity and Homosexuality in Adolescence, Gadpaille takes serious issue with Marmor's statement that '. . . there is nothing inherently "unnatural" about life experiences that predispose an individual to a preference for homosexual object-relations' (*cf., Sexual Inversion,* edited by Judd Marmor, New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1965). Gadpaille avers that 'homosexuality as a preferred mode of sexual gratification is pathognomonic of disturbed development. . . . the use of culture as a definitional basis for species normality is on very shaky anthropological footing: cross-cultural data readily yield endless examples of culturally sanctioned behavior which could only be considered pathological, regardless of whether evaluated on the basis of effect on self, others, culture viability, or species.'

CHARLES W. SOCARIDES (NEW YORK)

TRANSSEXUALISM AND SEX REASSIGNMENT. Edited by Richard Green, M.D., and John Money, Ph.D. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969. 512 pp.

This well-edited collection of papers gives a clear picture of current clinical and research work on transsexualism. The chapters are arranged in five parts dealing with various aspects of transsexualism: social and clinical, psychological, somatic, treatment, and medico-legal. The contributions in general are unusually comprehensive and instructive for a compendium.

The psychoanalyst will be reassured by the fact that in this country, unlike several centers abroad, the transsexual cannot obtain sex reassignment surgery on demand. Reassuring too is the waning enthusiasm of several contributors who, a decade ago, were 'gung-ho' for surgical conversion. Whether this surgery should ever be performed on an anatomically normal male remains highly questionable.

The surgery on the male is child's play compared with the mutilation necessary for transformation of the female transsexual: amputation of the breasts; hysterectomy and salpingo-oöphorectomy; and staged construction of a phallus and scrotum utilizing (in one technique) a lower midline tube pedicle flap, incorporating an inlay split-thickness skin graft as the urethra. Fortunately, the surgeon John E. Hoopes states in his final paragraph, 'Creation of the male external genito-urinary apparatus is not accomplished easily and is fraught with serious hazards'.

The Johns Hopkins Press has turned out an attractively designed and highly readable volume. I can recommend it for the psychoanalyst's reference library.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N.Y.)

MODERN PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE SCHIZOPHRENIC PATIENT. Theory and Technique. By Hyman Spotnitz, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1969. 234 pp.

The title of this book may be quite misleading, particularly the words 'modern psychoanalysis'. The implications are that the theory and practice of the author's technique are psychoanalytic and that they are of recent development, outmoding old, discarded theory and practice. Neither of these implications is necessarily valid.

The bases for the theories presented by Dr. Spotnitz would seem to be a mixture of excerpts from the psychoanalytic literature, including observations recorded by authors whose concepts or techniques are not fully accepted by many psychoanalysts. The author himself states: 'Rather than being original, the hypothesis integrates the partial theories, clinical observations, and assumptions of many investigators whose ideas make sense to me and have been corroborated by my own experience in treating schizophrenic patients.'

Numerous generalizations are made which at times are confusing: e.g., 'on the basis of successful clinical experience with patients on a higher level of emotional development, Freud postulated the need for a certain type of transference object and recommended a specific technique for overcoming resistance. *This is what led him astray* [italics added]. . . . Every schizophrenic individual is capable of some degree of object transference, but to develop it sufficiently to make him responsive to interpretation . . . is the crucial problem

in his treatment. Implicated in his illness are pre-feelings or early ego states experienced in the first months of life before the infant differentiates self from non-self. In some cases these undifferentiated feelings foreclose the transfer of feelings that developed for significant objects a few years later; one then observes what Freud referred to as the "will which brings us to a stop". The phenomenon is now described as narcissistic transference. Freud and his contemporaries did not recognize the presence of narcissistic transference as such, and they did not know how to utilize it for therapeutic purposes. Since their day it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the *narcissistic transference is therapeutically useful. . . . Now that we recognize and know how to explore narcissistic transference phenomena to revive symbolically very early clusters of experience implicated in the illness* and to exercise a more *powerful influence,* there is no justification for excluding the relevant working hypotheses from the theory of psychoanalytic technique' (italics added).

In discussing his basic theoretical concept of schizophrenia, Dr. Spotnitz quotes random comments from numerous sources including Freud, Adler, Reik, Herbert Rosenfeld, Melanie Klein, Zilboorg, and even John Rosen. But he concludes from all this review of the literature: 'Three [other] factors are primary: aggression, object protection and sacrifice of the self. These are the elements that combine to produce the schizophrenic nucleus of the personality.'

Dr. Spotnitz struggles with vague concepts of aggression, viewing it as a sort of energy charge which, under the impact of frustration, accumulates like an electrical charge in a condenser and discharges itself periodically. This rather simple, mechanistic concept concerning aggression was long ago modified significantly not only by Freud but by many other analysts. Drive theory and the concepts of the vicissitudes of the instincts have been developing over the years into a complex system of metapsychological thought which has not been adequately considered by Dr. Spotnitz in his theoretical formulations of the aggressive drive and its role in schizophrenia.

In describing the application of his theory to practice, the author states: 'The analyst's participation in resolving resistance is essentially one of providing communications which will enable the patient to verbalize freely all of his impulses, feelings, thoughts and memories. In the course of progressive language discharge, the inter-

neuronic structures whose repetitive activation to limit or delay discharge has served to block maturation are gradually deactivated. An intervention that resolves a blockage is therefore referred to as a "maturational communication". The term applies to all verbal feelings that are designed to liberate the patient from resistance.' As an additional element in treatment, Dr. Spotnitz includes the family in the 'psychoanalytic circle'. Certainly family therapy may be useful in the treatment of certain schizophrenics but it is difficult to understand how this can be termed 'modern psychoanalysis'.

It would seem that a misstatement in the book is the following. 'But I believe that "modern psychoanalysis" best indicates that the theory of treatment presented in this book is basically Freud's theory and Freud's method of therapy, reformulated on the basis of subsequent psychoanalytic investigation' (p. 9).

The book offers little to merit its serious consideration by the sophisticated reader and is to be avoided by the unsophisticated reader who is unprepared to deal with such highly speculative and questionable theoretical and methodological formulations.

BERNARD L. PACELLA (NEW YORK)

BLACK SUICIDE. By Herbert Hendin. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1969. 176 pp.

Statistical data reveal that suicide is twice as frequent among black men between twenty and thirty-five years of age as among white men of the same age group. Black homicide also reaches its peak at this period. In a previous book, Suicide in Scandinavia, Hendin's thesis was that suicidal patients succumbed to the pressures felt by everyone in that culture. Accordingly, in his present book he interprets black suicide as arising from the anger and frustrations of the black ghetto. The clinical material in the book includes the case histories of twelve men and thirteen women who made serious but unsuccessful suicide attempts. Hendin's presentation of the patients' life histories and personality traits is clear and convincing, and the material is organized to derive general significance from individual cases.

Patterns seem to emerge from Hendin's case histories. First, black suicide and violence in the community are related. Young sui-

cidal blacks vacillate between rage and depression. The experience with violence is so common in the black ghetto that violent death had significantly affected the lives of five of the twenty-five subjects in Hendin's study. Another characteristic pattern was a break with the mother preceding the suicidal attempt. The patients' violence often originated with feelings of maternal neglect and rejection. Hendin postulates, however, that maternal deprivation was only a link in a chain; the violence was set in motion by a series of events beginning with maternal frustration and ending with feelings of being trapped in an unchangeable life situation.

Hendin believes that the alternation between conscious and overt violence and self-destructive behavior in young blacks is a far cry 'from the unconscious hostility towards the lost love object' described by Freud. This view is based on the observation that patients fitting the picture Freud described are usually not openly destructive. Hendin seems unaware that while such patients may not have been overtly violent, their rage—conscious or unconscious—was demonstrable.

Four of the twelve male patients were homosexual. According to the author the black homosexual is often attracted to white men because he conceives of his blackness as dirty and wants to incorporate purifying whiteness. Self-hatred is responsible both for his seeking white partners and for his suicidal attempt. The typical family constellation of the black homosexual shows a violent father and a sexually unfaithful mother. Hendin contrasts this with the typical family of the white homosexual in which a nonviolent father and a nonsexual mother are more common.

Suicide in older black males is compared with that among older white males: older black men regard their failure more in moral terms; older whites, in terms of achievement. Hendin's case histories, however, do not seem to bear out his notion that the societal situation is the determining factor in black suicide attempts. In one case the precipitating factor was the patient's shame over public exposure of a sexual incident involving a nine-year-old girl. In another case the main conflict seemed to be the patient's resentment over the refusal of the woman he loved to marry him. A third case would have to be classified diagnostically as a depressive-paranoid personality. These suicide attempts can be explained in

terms of personal pathology; the explanation that they are a 'breakdown of a submissive, compliant adaptation' seems farfetched.

Hendin found that suicide attempts of the women he studied were intimately connected with guilt about their pregnancies and subsequent rejection of their children. These cases, he believes, demonstrate that the pressures on the black family are psychodynamically integrated by the women and passed on by them to the next generation. The women feared abandonment for having children. 'A man always leaves you when you have children', said one of the patients. Most of the patients' mothers had been abandoned by their husbands before or shortly after a child was born. A fearsome equation between pregnancy and abandonment was therefore far more frequently present in this group than in a comparable group of white women. Hendin admits that self-hatred because of failure to rear their children is also an important motivation among white suicidal women. However, he believes that the history of childhood rejection by father, followed later in life by abandonment by the fathers of their own children, is so much more common among black women that it is not surprising it plays a more important role in their suicide rate.

In his concluding chapter Hendin reviews the literature on the subject. He disputes Warren Breed who states in his book, The Negro and Fatalistic Suicide, that the black's feeling of contending with arbitrary authority plays a central role in many suicide attempts. Hendin argues that the black's fear of his murderous impulses is more crucial than his fear of police punishment. One can agree fully with this statement, but one must add that fear of murderous impulses and rage turned against the self are not restricted to blacks. Hendin also discusses a psychiatric study by Charles Proudhomme who concluded that race is not a factor in Negro suicide because the subjects involved did not attribute their suicide attempts to racial problems. In contrast Hendin emphasizes that in the lives of the young adult and adolescent patients in his study, the murderous rage and self-hatred marking their suicidal attempts are an integral part of their racial experience and express the burden of being black in America.

While the misery of life in the black ghetto is an indisputable fact, the problem still remains whether this fact explains suicide.

Is not suicide caused by a confluence of inner conflicts, often remaining the secret of the individual and leaving an unresolved mystery?

GEORGE GERO (NEW YORK)

PERSPECTIVES IN COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH. Edited by Arthur J. Bindman and Allen D. Spiegel. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1969. 718 pp.

Community Psychiatry has generated so much clinical and philosophical ferment, so much drama and heartache, that it is hard to believe this action has all taken place in less than a decade. It was only in 1963 that the Community Mental Health Centers Act was adopted, with far-reaching implications for the nation at large. Psychoanalysts provided outstanding leadership in this development. For those of our colleagues who have contended that Community Psychiatry is a mere fad I would like to say, to the contrary, that it has been responsible for crucial changes in health planning throughout the United States.

The basic concepts have become quite familiar. Community Psychiatry is a point of view that in most cases with reversible mental illness the treatment locale of choice is the community in which the patient resides. This deceptively simple proposition has a number of important corollaries. For example, continuity of care in the treatment of major mental disorders became possible for the first time; treatment became family centered; the concept of crisis intervention led to a new appreciation of the role of precipitating factors in emotional decompensation and the significance of ego strengths in restitution to normality.

A concern for early case finding and primary prevention has led compellingly to an awareness that mental health is inseparable from general health and that Community Psychiatry is a part of Community Medicine. An appreciation of the significance of social environment in health and disease has led to a commitment to regionalized care encompassing all aspects of health, education, and welfare.

Thus Community Psychiatry, in its brief presence on the national scene, has moved into successively new positions. Its growth and development are by no means concluded. Indeed, we are on the

threshhold of an extraordinary new development. I refer to the work of the Joint Commission on the Mental Health of Children. In April, 1970, the Commission published a volume summarizing two years of earnest deliberation. Once again psychoanalysts were in the forefront. The report is expected to provide a basis for dialogue between behavioral scientists and legislators as well as guidelines for new health laws of vital import.

All the foregoing is by way of introduction to the book under review. For those psychoanalysts not yet immersed in the mainstream of Community Psychiatry this volume offers suitable initiation. The authors have assembled a uniformly excellent group of articles, both in terms of content and extensive bibliography. Altogether it represents a valuable survey of the literature through 1967.

The book is divided into six parts. In Part One, What Does Community Mental Health Mean?, the contribution by Rossi appears particularly rewarding. Part Two, Elements of Planning and Development, includes informative discussions of finance and architecture. Part Three, Technique and Method, Part Four, Where Do Community Mental Health Activities Take Place?, and Part Five, Tasks, Roles and Training of Professional and Non-Professional Mental Health Workers, lead appropriately to the concluding part, Research and Evaluation.

For those psychoanalysts involved in the forthcoming plans for legislation concerning children this volume contains several interesting essays.

The book deserves a place in any reference library on Community Psychiatry and the editors are to be commended for their scholarship and judgment.

LOUIS LINN (NEW YORK)

LECTURES IN MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CARE OF PATIENTS. By Grete L. Bibring, M.D. and Ralph J. Kahana, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 289 pp.

In 1946, Dr. Grete L. Bibring presented a series of formal lectures to the students at Harvard Medical School. They were followed by discussion periods, combined with teaching rounds on hospital

wards, where the patients were interviewed. Their aim was to develop, with the help of clinical material and the theoretical framework of psychoanalytic psychology, a program of comprehensive medicine.

At the present time the family physician is a noble memory, particularly in urban centers. In suburban areas he is still extant but overworked, and in many rural communities no physician is available. Many people still cherish the myth of the all-wise, fatherly physician, as shown by the popularity of TV programs, particularly that of Dr. Marcus Welby who practically chases after the patient like a devoted mother after her child. Yet, when faced with a major illness, the patient will readily submit to the ministrations of the anonymity of the union health center, doctors in the group, or the assembly line technique of the Mayo Clinic and similar large teaching centers with the most advanced technology. In the twenty-five years since 1946 the doctor shortage has become so acute that many foreign physicians have been employed, their language and cultural barriers fragmenting even further the tenuous relationship between physician and patient. Medicine has been splintered into specialities.

When the surgeon, who is primarily interested in the logistics of the disease, finds that the patient presents emotional problems he will refer the matter to the internist on the case, and if the problem is relatively minor the internist 'handles' it; otherwise, he will refer the patient to a psychiatrist with the fervent hope that the patient will consent to the consultation. The skilled physician usually avoids delving into the dynamics of the patient's presenting emotional symptoms, and rightly so. This is one aspect that Dr. Bibring has insufficiently stressed in her advice to take a detailed case history of the patient's emotional background, for the inexperienced doctor with time on his hands is often tempted to do just this, sometimes with a genuine desire to help the patient, often with a conscious or unconscious attempt to solve his own problems.

Lectures in Medical Psychology emphasizes mainly the psychological development of syndromes most commonly encountered among hospital patients, such as the hysterical, masochistic, and compulsive. Dr. Bibring hopes that the doctor, by taking a detailed history, will recognize the patient's personality picture and on that basis enlist his coöperation in the treatment of the illness. Unfortunately in many large hospitals the family physician is no longer

in charge; the patient's care is supervised by the intern, the resident, and the specialist.

This book is written as though the intervening quarter century since the original lectures were presented had not elapsed. No consideration is given to change of values and disruption of the social and family equilibria, the problems presented by increased alcohol and drug intake, and the pill. The description of 'a nineteen-year-old girl, well brought up, from a nice family', evokes nostalgia.

Lectures in Medical Psychology has a good bibliography appended to each section. It may be useful as an introduction to further studies by the psychiatric nurse, the psychiatric social worker, the plastic surgeon, and the physician interested in psychosomatic medicine.

PAUL H. BRAUER (NEW YORK)

POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. Essays in Honor of Harold D. Lasswell. Edited by Arnold A. Rogow. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969. 455 pp.

Harold D. Lasswell is the most prolific of social science writers. His bibliography at present occupies thirty-six pages of print. During some forty years he has generated an optimistic view of the applicability of scientific method to policy making at every level of government. He was the first to state that the basic needs of political man cannot be described in terms of material needs alone, but must include such things as the desire for knowledge, power, respect, and deference. He was the first practitioner of content analysis, the attempt to objectify and quantify for purposes of prediction the details of material appearing in mass media. Content analysis connects with the broader topic of the manipulation of symbols in mass media, and hence with the subject of propaganda and other forms of myth making in politics. Content analysis continued longitudinally yields a 'developmental construct'—a concept at the core of Lasswell's system.

Lasswell has aimed at no less than scientific democracy on a world-wide, or even on a cosmic scale. His major works began with his Ph.D. thesis of 1927, titled Propaganda Techniques in the World War. In 1930 his well-known Psychopathology and Politics appeared and, five years later, World Politics and Personal Insecurity.

During World War II Laswell published a paper, The Garrison State, coining a term that has become common, and opening a grim vista of totalitarian possibilities which he nevertheless continued to feel could be put right by proper scientific methods. Lasswell is surely the first to claim that not only politics but politicians could be influenced by science. His own method for applying science begins with his passion for amassing 'data', which he evidently does with the aid of immensely superior intellectual equipment. And he has matched output to input. Lasswell has made major contributions to linguistics, history, sociology, psychology, education, and law.

The nonspecialist reader who hopes to grasp this contemporary titan will not get much help from the present volume, a *festschrift* by some fifteen of Lasswell's students, colleagues, and collaborators. The writers have not addressed themselves to the reader outside their own fields; they do not spell out key concepts and definitions even in a glossary. But the book is of interest to psychoanalysts because it gives many details of Lasswell's contact with psychoanalysis. We are told that Lasswell first read some Freud when he was fifteen and found it very sensible. He felt that it opened his eyes to the importance of 'trivia'. In his twenties, Lasswell went to Europe and had some analytic work with Theodor Reik. His subsequent informal analytic education was in the hands of the less classical analysts, notably Sullivan, Horney, White, Adler, Ferenczi, and Alexander. Back in Chicago, Lasswell conducted some 'free associative interviews' during which he recorded pulse rate, blood pressure, and body movements. The same penchant for collecting data led to his being the first to advocate the tape recording of analytic hours and the pooling of such records where they would be available for comparative studies.

Whatever we think of these clinical adventures, either scientifically or ethically, there are signs in Lasswell's theoretical work of important psychoanalytic influence. For example, he has consistently maintained that in analyzing any data, whether clinical, journalistic, or political, the latent content must be sought behind the manifest content. It is interesting also that this insight has generally been ignored by the field of content analysis as practiced by others who have had no analytic contact. A Lasswellian trait that one is tempted to ascribe to his analytic experience is this:

he is free to see that a small amount of observation of a significant detail may be followed by a sweeping vision of the unseen whole into which the detail must surely fit. This view has no doubt had some salutary effect upon social science in general, which has often demonstrated the fault of getting so attached to the 'facts' that perspective for placing them in a wider context was lacking.

One is grateful in this volume for the facts which show something of the influence of psychoanalytic thinking upon Lasswell's social science. This reviewer is left with the impression, however, that Lasswell never mastered analysis, nor had any extensive experience in it, even though he seems to have considered that clinical experience was desirable. One wonders what his social science system would be like had he experienced real clinical growth rather than having been content with a mere glance.

ALAN W. FRASER (NEW CANAAN, CONN.)

PERSONALITY. DYNAMICS, DEVELOPMENT, AND ASSESSMENT. By Irving L. Janis, George F. Mahl, Jerome Kagan, and Robert R. Holt. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1969. 859 pp.

Typically, textbooks written specifically for college 'personality' courses present the reader with the broad outlines of several major theories of personality. The usual contents include a précis of Freud's and Kurt Lewin's seminal ideas, a sampling of a behavioristic approach, and of one that emphasizes social determinants. The authors' own principal contribution in such books resides in their analysis of the methodological requirements for a theory of personality. The best of such texts remains the Hall and Lindzey Theories of Personality.

The present volume represents a different approach to the writing of a personality textbook. Here, aspects of personality development and functioning are considered from essentially one point of view: the psychoanalytic. The book is really four separate texts. The authors, each influenced in some significant way by psychoanalysis, are in their own right major contributors to the psychological literature. Part One, by Irving Janis, considers human behavior in situations of conflict, stress, and trauma. Part Two, by George Mahl, presents a summary of psychoanalytic ideas about drive and ego development, with a focus on conflict resolution and defense. Part

Three, by Jerome Kagan, is an exposition of developmental psychology with an emphasis on socialization, motivational shifts, and biological influences in childhood. Part Four, by Robert Holt, is an overview of personality assessment techniques including projective and nonprojective devices, their rationales, and a reasoned critique of such instruments.

Each author has done substantial empirical work in the area he writes about, which gives the book a solidity, authoritativeness, and depth often regrettably absent from most college survey texts. This work, moreover, has an encyclopedic quality and as such may be compared to Gardner Murphy's Personality, first published in 1947. Both survey the field from one point of view, but this text views personality development and functioning explicitly from psychoanalytic and related psychodynamic views. It also contains considerably more current research findings, particularly in the areas of its major concern: testing, child development, and stress.

Those seeking a well-written teaching text for a course on personality that views human personality functioning from the vantage point of psychoanalysis and that contains much empirical material to buttress its assertions, would do well to consider this textbook.

PHILIP S. HOLZMAN (CHICAGO)

SOCIOLOGY AND RELIGION. A BOOK OF READINGS. Edited by Norman Birnbaum and Gertrud Lenzer. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. 452 pp.

To judge by the anthology under review, the sociology of religion can boast of a glorious past. The giants of the social sciences of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are all represented here—Hume, John Stuart Mill, Tylor, Hegel, Marx, Wundt, Spencer, Robertson Smith, Weber, and Durkheim, to name only the most illustrious—by one or more excerpts from their major works.

The current practitioners of the sociology of religion, however, have fallen on harder times. The studies represented in this anthology deal with smaller issues, such as religious patterns of voting, church attendance, and the like. The reasons for this decline are only hinted at by the editors, who apparently write for students of sociology as well as theology. The sociology of religion in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was a weapon in the hands of free thinkers, who illustrated that religion serves all too human needs and is therefore dependent on and imbedded in a definite social order. By the end of the nineteenth century, this battle was won, at least among the intellectuals, and greater minds were attracted to other issues.

Psychoanalysis is represented in this anthology by excerpts from Freud's Totem and Taboo, and Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices, and an excerpt from Erikson's Young Man Luther. In the introduction we learn, to our astonishment, that Freud intended Totem and Taboo to be read as a metaphor reflecting current psychic life rather than as a historical event. It is not possible to get a picture of the psychoanalytic contribution to the understanding of religion on the basis of these short excerpts. There is no evidence that the editors have heard of the work of Róheim or Reik, or that they know of an annual, Psychoanalysis and the Social Sciences.

An anthology of this kind could be of value if the editors would take the trouble to explain the basis for their selections, or, better still, if such explanations were unnecessary. The usefulness of the anthology is further impaired by the absence of an index.

Nevertheless, some passages make stimulating reading. The reviewer was struck particularly by the extract from Nietzsche's The Origin of the Bad Conscience:

> All instincts which do not find a vent without, *turn inwards*—this is what I mean by the growing 'internalisation' of man: . . . . These terrible bulwarks, with which the social organization protected itself against the old instincts of freedom . . . brought it about that all those instincts of wild, free, prowling man became turned backwards *against man himself*. Enmity, cruelty, the delight in persecution, in surprises, change, destruction—the turning of all these instincts against their own possessors: this is the origin of the 'bad conscience'.

Nietzsche reached these insights in 1887—a generation before the publication of The Ego and the Id.

MARTIN S. BERGMANN (NEW YORK)

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Sara A. Bonnett, M.D. 1897-1971

Phyllis Greenacre

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OBITUARIES

SARA A. BONNETT, M.D.
1897-1971

In the death of Dr. Sara Bonnett on June 4th, we have lost one of our most beloved and valued leaders. Throughout the more than forty years of her membership in the New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute and the American Psychoanalytic Association, she had been steadfastly and actively interested in the development of our profession and the education of students and graduates. With her integrity, sense of fairness, her personal warmth, and a clear-minded capacity for organization, she became an outstanding and progressive educational administrator as well as teacher. A quality of indefatigability made her seem almost indestructable. Her loss is difficult to realize. Those who knew her well were aware that her tireless efforts to realize her ideals had grown out of a long and early period of struggling with adversity and personal handicaps which were surmounted with courage and great energy.

In her personal life she showed most of all a warmth and an outreaching toward people, with a tempered and not intrusive sympathy. At times she could be hurt by a betrayal of trust, but was tolerant and did not hold resentments. Her sensitivity and pleasure in sensuous experiences gave many facets to her life—a delight in her household, in her garden, in cooking, in entertaining, and in travelling. She lived more lives in one than most of us achieve.

When her husband, Dr. Earl Bonnett, retired they left New York to live in Ridgefield, Connecticut. With his death eight years ago, many of us who had regarded her as an urban person hoped that she would return to New York. But she had already rooted herself in the country, established a practice, and become a member of the Western New England Psychoanalytic Society. She was as attached to country life as she had been to the city, and her children and grandchildren were at hand. Gradually her home became a weekend gathering place for old friends who brought younger ones with them. It was often a meeting place for colleagues from both Western New England and New York. While she had suffered from chronic impairment of health, she remained so energetic and interested that her sudden death came as a shock to most of her friends.

PHYLLIS GREENACRE

SEYMOUR L. LUSTMAN, M.D.
1920-1971

Dr. Seymour Lustman of New Haven died on August 5, 1971, as the result of a sailboat accident while vacationing in Maine. A graduate of the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis, he was a member of its Education Committee and a training analyst. He held office in both the Institute and the Society, and had been Secretary of the Board on Professional Standards of the American Psychoanalytic Association. Dr. Lustman was Professor of Psychiatry and Child Psychiatry at the Yale Medical School. Shortly before his death he was appointed Master of Davenport College in Yale University; he had been the Acting Master during the 1969-70 year of student unrest when he distinguished himself by his wisdom, tact, and firmness of principle in a period of stress and potential danger.

Dr. Lustman was born in Chicago. An early interest in art lasted all his life; with his keen appreciation of painting, went an equal concern for contemporary artists. He received his Ph.D. degree in psychology at the University of Chicago, and his M.D. at the University of Illinois. In teaching psychiatry and psychoanalysis he applied the exacting standards that he also imposed on himself as scientist and practitioner, while ready to recognize and acknowledge his students' merits. We who worked as his colleagues were both taxed and inspired by his demands for excellence, and we were warmed by his kindness and humor. Dr. Lustman, who had been a consultant for the National Institute of Mental Health, was always ready to listen to the new in his field, but he was also highly sensitive in detecting the spurious, the propagation of which he opposed vigorously. The author of many articles on psychoanalytic theory and education, he was an editor of the Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association and The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.

Dr. Lustman was married to Katharine Ritman, co-director of the Nursery School of the Child Study Center at Yale. In addition to his mother and his sister, his wife and two children survive, a son Jeffrey, and a daughter, Susan Katz. His family, his friends, his patients, Yale, and the science of psychoanalysis have suffered the untimely loss of a good and stalwart man.

STANLEY A. LEAVY

ANNIE REICH, M.D.
1902-1971

Dr. Annie Reich died on January 5, 1971. She was born and educated in Vienna, and became a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society in 1929. Several years later she moved to Berlin with her husband, Dr. Wilhelm Reich, and lived there until 1933 when, because of the political climate, she moved to Prague. She was one of the founders of the Czech Study Group of Psychoanalysts. In 1938 she settled in New York and soon began teaching and training at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. For a time she was also on the staff of the Mount Sinai Hospital.

Dr. Reich took an active interest in psychoanalytic education and was twice elected President of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. She published many papers on a variety of clinical subjects, some didactic and some presenting well-known clinical problems in a new light. With her second husband, Thomas Rubinstein, a historian, she shared wide-ranging intellectual interests.

Annie Reich belonged to the second generation of psychoanalysts. She taught a succession of students, contributed to psychoanalytic science, and was an exemplary clinician. During a long illness she continued her teaching and clinical practice with her usual perceptive understanding of the needs of her students and patients. She is survived by two daughters, Dr. Eve Reich Moise and Dr. Lore Reich Rubin, a psychoanalyst.

EDWARD KRONOLD

EDOARDO WEISS, M.D.
1889-1970

Dr. Edoardo Weiss died in Chicago on December 15, 1970, at the age of eighty-one. Born in Trieste, he studied medicine at the University of Vienna where he received his M.D. in 1914. His psychoanalytic training was received in Vienna, and he was analyzed by Paul Federn; he was a member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. After serving as a physician in the Austrian Army in World War I, he returned to Trieste and was chief of the male service at the Psychiatric Hospital. In 1931, he went to Rome where he founded the Italian Psychoanalytic Society.

Dr. Weiss came to the United States in 1939 and worked at the Menninger Clinic in Topeka. He joined the staff of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis in 1941, and was staff member emeritus at the time of his death.

An active contributor to theoretical and clinical psychoanalysis, he published more than sixty papers and books, writing in German, Italian, and English. His 1922 paper on the psychoanalytic aspects of bronchial asthma was a pioneering contribution to psychosomatic medicine. Freud wrote the introduction to his *Elementi di Psicoanalisi,* published in Italy in 1932. Much of his writing and teaching was devoted to the work of Paul Federn, and he edited and wrote the introduction to Federn's Ego Psychology and the Psychoses. Weiss himself wrote The Principles of Psychodynamics in 1950, The Structure and Dynamics of the Human Mind in 1960, Agoraphobia in the Light of Ego Psychology in 1964, and Sigmund Freud as a Consultant in 1970. This last work includes Freud's letters to Weiss from 1919 to 1936.

Edoardo Weiss was a gentle man whose dedication to furthering psychoanalysis was evident throughout his entire professional life.

GEORGE H. POLLOCK

ELIZABETH ROSENBERG ZETZEL, M.D.
1907-1970

Elizabeth Zetzel died on November 22, 1970, while visiting her mother in New York. It was a special weekend—her mother's sixty-fifth wedding anniversary and what would have been her father's ninety-sixth birthday (the first such day following his death earlier in the year), as well as the weekend her book, The Capacity for Emotional Growth, first appeared. She had gone to spend a few days with her mother believing that the occasion would be an especially difficult one and hoping that they might share the pleasure of her book's publication. This act of thoughtfulness and sensitive understanding of another's need while at the same time appreciating her own worth as a professional person epitomizes Elizabeth Zetzel. She was a shy person but those who had the good fortune to get through her reserve were well rewarded. She was a warm and loyal friend.

Dr. Zetzel's psychiatric and psychoanalytic training was received in England. She returned to the United States, to Cambridge, in 1949 and became a member of the staff of the Massachusetts General Hospital. From 1950 she was a member of the Boston Psychoanalytic Institute. She was Secretary and later Vice President of the International Psychoanalytical Association. Many of her extensive contributions to the literature emphasized the effect of the early mother-child relationship on development and on the responsiveness to treatment of patients in analysis.

Psychoanalysis has lost a significant interpreter of our science, an original thinker, and, for those of us who knew and loved her, a true friend. She is survived by her husband, Dr. Louis Zetzel, a son, and two daughters.

FRANCES H. GITELSON

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Revue Française de Psychanalyse. XXXIV, 1970.

Jeremy Roger Mack

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ABSTRACTS

Revue Française de Psychanalyse. XXXIV, 1970.

The articles published in this issue were originally presented at the annual meeting of the *Société Psychanalytique de Paris,* which had as its theme the automatism of repetition.

Introduction to a Colloquy on the Repetition Compulsion. Claude Hollande and Michel Soulé. Pp. 373-406.

With regard to repetition compulsion, analysts tend to have opinions ranging from the extreme of regarding it as a functional mechanism to that of viewing it as a primary, irreducible need. Hollande and Soulé set before the colloquium the task of answering the questions: who repeats; what does the patient in analysis repeat; how does the ego use this drive, which appears most often as bound energy? In suggesting approaches to the answers to these questions, the authors survey theoretical and clinical studies, biological genetics, and ethology.

On Rereading Freud's Writings on the Repetition Compulsion: Clinical Theory and Philosophical Speculation. Colette Chilland. Pp. 407-418.

The notion of repetition was present in Freud's work from the very earliest writings on, for example, the concepts of transference, fixation, and the return of the repressed. It was only in later works that repetition became a metapsychological concept. The concept of the compulsion to repeat unpleasant phenomena appeared in 1914 and was associated with acting out. Not until 1920 was the repetition compulsion mentioned as the product of a metapsychological speculation; it would be inappropriate to term it merely philosophic speculation. This concept is more in continuity than in discord with Freud's antecedent ideas. Furthermore, repetition compulsion, the death instinct, and the principle of Nirvana do not simply constitute reformulations of each other. The repetition compulsion is the characteristic of all drives, not only of the death instinct. This latter drive is well named, since it conduces to suffering and psychic disorganization; however, it is also in the service of object relations.

The Same and the Identical. Michel de M'Uzan. Pp. 441-451.

The author sets out to study repetition compulsion from the viewpoint of the opposition of the 'same' and the 'identical'. He states that there exist two conceptions of the past: an 'interior rewriting' of experience and a statement of events without such editing. The first condition describes neurotics and 'normals' who establish a transference neurosis in analysis; repetitions in these patients merely approximate the antecedent events. Individuals using the second conception of the past, repeat the identical phenomena as if their memories had not been 'processed'. Their exactness of repetition is manifest in the identity of tone of voice, use of verbal stereotypes and tics of language, and in a tendency

to use strict reproduction and quotation in descriptions of others. In analysis there is no longer a situation of transference but of reports; the analysis can become interminable. Perhaps the organization directing this form of repetition is the principle of Nirvana and/or inertia.

The Automatism of Repetition. S. Nacht. Pp. 459-460.

The title poorly describes the contents of this article in which Nacht voices his often repeated conviction that patients repeat their conflict-ridden past in transference not to relive the trauma but in the hope of finding what they missed. If, at the outset of analysis, frustration is maintained by too long a neutrality, an irreducible transference neurosis is formed, resulting in the impasse of an interminable analysis. However, excessive gratification can also be clearly prejudicial to evolution of cure. The author insists that the patient's wish can be gratified only on a nonverbal level by an unconscious-to-unconscious communication of the analyst's deep attitude of welcome and encouragement. Termination in such a situation is acceptable to the patient because the analyst has offered not real gratification but the possibility of the patient's obtaining it, and because the analyst, as witness, can certify the reality of this possibility.

JEREMY ROGER MACK

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLI, 1970.

Identity Diffusion and the Transsexual Resolution. Elliott Weitzman; Charles A. Shamoian; Nikolas Golosow. Pp. 295-302.

The authors present an interesting and genetically well-documented paper. It traces the development of a thirty-three-year-old male through stages of feminine identification, homosexuality, and transsexualism, leading to an attempt at surgical resolution. It also contains an eighteen-month follow-up of the patient's current adjustment. The dynamic family configuration presents some variations from Stoller's formulation of such cases: a bisexual mother keeps her son too close to her body too long, creating an unending symbiosis, and a psychologically absent father fails to interrupt the process. The authors' central hypothesis is the regressive diffusion of the patient's fragile gender identity into primitive 'as if' and 'fusions of self and object' modes of infantile identification. The presentation is rich in concrete and human clinical details.

Dreams and Suicide Attempts. David L. Raphling. Pp. 404-410.

The manifest content of dreams of patients who attempted suicide are compared with similar data from acutely disturbed nonsuicidal patients. The comparison was made according to parameters of content analysis of manifest dreams derived from the schema of various authors. Two differences between the groups were found to be statistically significant: 1, explicit references to actual or threatened death, or dead persons; 2, themes of violence or destruction. Although oriented toward an area of general clinical usefulness, it seems that this type of study may be even more useful when specifically applied to suicide.

HAROLD R. GALEF

American Imago. XXVII, 1970.

Auditory Experience in Joyce's Portrait. Raymond Tarbox. Pp. 301-328.

Tarbox assumes that almost all individuals, particularly when young, have been exposed to disturbing sounds. He describes characteristic responses of sensitive individuals to unpleasant sounds: sound can be experienced as terrifying, humiliating, smothering. There may be the feeling that mother has betrayed the individual or failed in her function as a stimulus shield. Loud noises may be experienced as a beating object and be reacted to masochistically or by identification with the aggressor. Absence of sound may be felt as abandonment. References to sound in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man are discussed in relationship to these points, particularly to sound as representative of betrayal experiences. Tarbox concludes that Joyce's wife was a devoted woman who helped 'still bad ancestral voices'.

Mythopoesis and Psychoanalysis. John E. Gedo. Pp. 329-337.

Gedo discusses Slochower's book, Mythopoesis, in which Slochower makes a distinction between myth and mythopoesis, the creative utilization of an outworn myth by an artist so as to crystallize the current social and cultural situation of his people. Gedo agrees that Slochower has demonstrated a change in function of the myth when it undergoes mythopoesis, but he strongly disagrees that all mythopoetic works are reducible to Slochower's formula: the hero, having a nostalgic memory of Eden, goes on a quest resulting in homelessness and alienation, then returns home but, still not finding paradise, begins the cycle anew.

Nietzsche's Madness: Tragic Wisdom. Carl Paul Ellerman. Pp. 338-357.

In this mélange of biography, philosophy, and psychoanalytic theory, the author strives to disclose aspects of the relationship between Nietzsche's Dionysian philosophy and his psychosis. While the ideas in the paper are not well worked through, the reader gains a sense that Nietzsche attempted to master strong aggressive tendencies through philosophy, and that he failed.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Charles I. Feigelson & Robert J. Sayer

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

September 29, 1970. THERAPEUTIC PLAYBACK, SELF-OBJECTIFICATION, AND THE ANALYTIC PROCESS. Max M. Stern, M.D.

Dr. Stern presented a new, experimental technique that involves the taping of analytic sessions for use by the patient after the session or in the following session. The goal is to help the patient, by the taping and relistening, in self-objectification. Clinical material from cases where the analytic process seemed hampered by difficulties the patients had in their capacities to observe themselves while in the analytic session was presented. In each case the difficulty was overcome when the patient was able to relisten to the session in a state of detachment; in a state of relative independence from the analyst, he was able to objectify his behavior and to more efficiently integrate his insights. In the majority of cases where this technique was used, and the analytic process was not interfered with, the author cited examples when it aided the process.

Dr. Stern compared the objectification in use of playback to the child's attempts at mastery through play as opposed to attempts at mastery while under direct impact of instinctual interchange with mother. He discussed the relationship between achieving insight and reality testing. He felt that self-objectification was the main road toward gaining insight. While useful in certain cases, Dr. Stern cautioned that this technique is contraindicated in some, for instance, paranoia, and may be misused in others, such as certain narcissistic states.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Benjamin Rubinstein pointed out that objectification may be biased or unbiased. Thus cognition, which is contingent on objectification, does not preclude its being emotionally charged in the sense of appearing as something like a revelation or a blow to one's self-esteem. Consciousness, as well as objectification and insight, is achieved in the analytic situation mainly through free association and interpretation. When the process grinds to a halt or is in danger of faltering, any device that brings about a rejuvenation is welcome. Discussing Dr. Stern's results, Dr. Rubinstein felt the technique warranted further study, preferably under controlled conditions and with a sufficient number of analysts participating.

Dr. Hartvig Dahl emphasized that this technique was not a substitute therapy but that the playback enhanced the analytic procedure. However, he felt the paper suffered from a failure to share clinical vignettes. He quoted Philip Holzman who wrote that 'as a minimum requirement those who use the method [of playback] should specify precisely the ways in which it has been used, on which patient, and by what therapist. Before and after treatment, assessments by objective evaluations would need to be taken. Appropriate control or comparison groups would be necessary for definite evaluation.' Referring to Dr. Stern's point that maintaining confidentiality was necessary to the analytic process, Dr. Dahl said that an analytic process could go on in the absence of

confidentiality. He cited his own studies using computer content-analysis of detailed transcripts of analytic sessions where he felt there was evidence of an on-going analytic process.

CHARLES I. FEIGELSON

October 13, 1970. PSYCHOTHERAPY AFTER TRAUMATIZATION CAUSED BY PERSECUTION. E. de Wind, M.D.

The author reviewed the limited material concerning psychotherapy, including psychoanalysis, of concentration camp victims, and mentioned that even in this small sample treatment results varied. He felt there was undue pessimism on the part of some therapists who have worked with such patients. In studying the treatment of concentration camp victims there can be considerable elucidation of the degree to which massive adult trauma alone causes psychopathology; this can be contrasted to individuals in whom the psychopathology seems more determined by early infantile experiences and in which the concentration camp trauma is used as a defense against infantile, most usually œdipal, genetic childhood material.

Dr. de Wind sent questionnaires to psychoanalysts and other therapists who have treated concentration camp victims. Their responses emphasized the patient's difficulties in working through the actual trauma and the countertransference problems, as well as the trauma being the realization of an infantile fantasy. From these responses, Dr. de Wind reached several conclusions about the treatment of massively traumatized patients. 1. Massive adult trauma does not necessarily contraindicate psychoanalysis although there may be need for some modification of technique to get patients to re-experience the painful affect; also it may be necessary for patients too preoccupied with the trauma to undergo preliminary supportive psychotherapy. 2. It is important to distinguish between trauma in early life and later trauma: in the former developmental defects are seen; in later trauma such defects are not seen but the patient regresses, occasionally irreversibly. 3. Some patients are irreversibly traumatized and refractory to any treatment. 4. Patients cannot work through their problems when they see the therapist as the persecutor, have a marked negative therapeutic reaction because of survival guilt, see their death wishes as being omnipotent, have excessive guilt over sadomasochistic gratification obtained in concentration camps, use the adult trauma to ward off the childhood material, or if there is a countertransference problem. 5. The ability to mourn lost objects, as well as to express aggression, is essential for improvement.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Martin Wangh emphasized that physical impairment of concentration camp victims causes psychic impairment; the continued fear of danger to themselves after the experience can lead to psychic disorganization of psychotic proportions with ego dissolution. Dr. Wangh suggested that some psychiatrists need to deny the trauma because it is too painful to face or is too close to their own sadomasochistic impulses.

Dr. William Niederland emphasized the unique quality of the massive trauma undergone by concentration camp victims. These patients do not so much use the adult trauma to defend against the more primary infantile material but, on the contrary, often seem only too eager to discuss infantile material in traditional psychoanalytic ways as a defense against the overwhelming concentration camp experience, which must be avoided at all costs. He felt that the survival syndrome, a distinct clinical entity, can exist without pre-existing pathology.

In conclusion, Dr. de Wind, although he recognized the appropriateness of Dr. Niederland's discussion, felt that genetic factors were important even in concentration camp victims, and that the ability to handle oppression was an essential factor in the development of pathology as well as its treatment.

ROBERT J. SAYER

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

November 16, 1970. OF MUSIC, MAGIC AND MYSTERY: STUDIES IN ADOLESCENT SYNTHESIS. Henry Rosner, M.D.

Seventy years ago Freud first attempted to apply analytic treatment to an adolescent patient in his work with Dora. Yet, today, many theoretical questions and problems of management remain. In this paper, Dr. Rosner's focus was on the period when the adolescent upheaval is at its height: the subphase Blos calls 'adolescence proper' and Deutsch calls 'mid-adolescence'. Noting the controversy about whether analysis can take place during this period of development, the author presents his view that it is not only feasible but a necessity for many adolescents. He referred to the recent theoretical concepts of Geleerd and Blos that regression is not only a defense during adolescence but is an integral part of the working through of adolescence, and attempted to demonstrate by way of both clinical and literary material how such regression operates to enhance intrapsychic synthesis.

In the three clinical cases presented, common to all was the feeling of loss of inner synthesis. Rosner suggested that the transference manifestations reflect an attempt at synthesis in the form of 'fitting together', as described by Hartmann. In addition, as the adolescent grows older 'trial by action' and 'affective action', also described by Hartmann, can be an integral part of his way of life. This can place a strain on the analyst who may feel such actions as an attack on his moral or æsthetic way of life. Literary and analytic material was presented in an attempt to clarify the way of life of many of today's adolescents, the Hippies. What is stressed for all adolescents during this phase of development is their heightened sensitivity, introspection, and creative mental activity which contribute to the uniqueness of this phase.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Judith Kestenberg differentiated between integration and synthesis, stressing that there are differences in these organizational trends of early and middle adolescence which should be considered both clinically and theoretically. She discussed Dr. Rosner's clinical material from this point of view.

Dr. Peter Neubauer felt the author succeeded in highlighting the specific characteristics of this stage of development as well as the implication for the analytic technique. Dr. Samuel Abrams felt that Dr. Rosner had not only demonstrated that analysis in adolescence is possible but that the experience analysts gain in dealing with this phase can make analysis possible for more adults.

In conclusion, Dr. Rosner said that what he wished to stress under the concept of synthesis was the creativity of the adolescent, which is phase-specific. Regression in the service of development is not enough to explain that for the adolescent something new must be 'created'. All adolescents want to feel that they are alive and unique.

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