The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Ego Autonomy and Psychoanalytic Technique

Rudolph M. Loewenstein

To cite this article: Rudolph M. Loewenstein (1972) Ego Autonomy and Psychoanalytic Technique, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 1-22, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11926585

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11926585

EGO AUTONOMY AND PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE

BY RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN, M.D. (NEW YORK)

When asked to give a paper in memory of Heinz Hartmann, I felt that it would be redundant to present once again his theoretical contributions to psychoanalysis, for which he is most famous. I have chosen instead to speak about his ideas in the area of psychoanalytic technique, which are less well known. Indeed Hartmann published only a single paper on this subject, Technical Implications of Ego Psychology (1951), to which I shall refer further on. It is a highly important paper, based upon his views concerning psychic structure and particularly the structure of the ego. It reveals his unusual clinical acumen and his mastery of psychoanalytic technique.

Hartmann's theoretical discoveries and formulations stem mainly from a period in the history of psychoanalysis that started with Freud's renewed interest in ego psychology and especially with his introduction of the structural point of view. By this approach Freud resolved the dilemma arising from important clinical observations that could not be satisfactorily explained in terms of his topographical theory. That earlier theory had formulated conflicts between drives and defenses in terms of distinctions between the characteristics of preconsciousness and consciousness as opposed to the unconscious. What did not fit into this formulation was the clinical finding of unconscious resistances and unconscious moral demands. Freud had to choose between functional characteristics and qualities of consciousness or unconsciousness in a neurotic conflict. He decided therefore to describe the psychic apparatus in terms of structure and function, rather than in degrees of consciousness.

Presented at the Heinz Hartmann Memorial Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, October 21, 1971, and at a scientific meeting of the Boston Psychoanalytic Society, December 1, 1971.

The second important reformulation of psychoanalytic theory by Freud was his new theory of anxiety. He had formerly regarded anxiety as the result of prevented discharge of libidinal tensions. This 'toxic' theory of anxiety he replaced by that of a reaction of the ego to internal or external danger: a 'biological' theory, as it were, encompassing normal as well as pathological anxiety. The new theory included also a reconstruction of a ubiquitous developmental series of danger situations to which the child reacts with anxiety and defense. This well-known series comprises fear of loss of object, fear of loss of the object's love, castration anxiety, and superego anxiety. Here, for the first time, Freud described an aspect of ego development which, although it is involved in conflict, is not the result of conflict.

But it was Hartmann who, later on, referred to developmental characteristics of this type as autonomous ego development. Stressing that many of the functions involved in this autonomous development and in the 'conflict-free sphere' of the ego are relatively independent of drive-defense conflict, he described them as primary autonomous ego functions. Among these primary autonomous functions he included control of motility, perception, anticipation, thinking, reality testing, recall phenomena, object comprehension, and language.

Hartmann extended the study of ego autonomy to behavior that has become known as secondary autonomy: to certain strivings in man which we call ego interests, e.g., those concerned with social status, influence, power, professional status, wealth, etc. They can be traced back to their instinctual sources, such as the wish to be loved and admired, competitive tendencies, sadistic impulses, and narcissism. But it is characteristic for these strivings that, despite their instinctual genetic precursors, they come to be unquestionably in the service of the ego after the structuralization of the psychic apparatus has taken place. However, they are only a part of the ego, and it is very important to distinguish these secondary autonomous phenomena from other activities of the ego.

Other examples of secondary autonomy are certain character formations; thus the well-known traits of the so-called anal character, such as extreme punctiliousness, stubbornness, and orderliness, which are due, as Freud described, to reaction-formations against early anal erotic interests. These early instinctual precursors are observable in dreams and in neurotic and psychotic symptoms, as well as in the analytic treatment, but in general such character traits are independent of them. The degree of independence of these character traits, their relative irreversibility, is certainly a measure of secondary autonomy and mental health.

Hartmann's contributions widened the psychoanalytic understanding of the total personality. Besides looking at the human being from the point of view of symptomatology and neurosis, now we also pay greater attention to character, adaptedness, talents, and achievements. This approach has considerable influence on our clinical work. Hartmann added to our perspective the nonconflictual counterpart of conflict. He stressed, however, that conflict must not be equated with pathology, nor autonomy with health. They are not mutually exclusive.

I started by defining briefly the concept of autonomy in Hartmann's work. After the publication of Freud's The Ego and the Id (1923) and Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926), some authors tried to describe analysis in terms of the total personality. But only since the addition of the study of ego autonomy has it become possible to speak of analysis of the total personality.

The concept of ego autonomy has important bearing upon the theory of psychoanalytic technique. In every analysis the relationship between theory and technique is a very close one. Our technique is based, first of all, on understanding the patient's neurosis as well as the healthy aspects of his personality.

Anna Freud (1936) made the important statement that the patient's ego is the medium through which analysis takes place

and which permits us to observe with equal attention manifestations of his ego, id, and superego. Actually the specific medium through which we observe these three substructures of the mental apparatus is the autonomous ego of the patient. The interactions and conflicts in which we are interested take place not only between ego, id, and superego, but also within the ego itself. The requirement of the basic rule accentuates the conflict between autonomous functions and defensive functions of the ego. In addition, it accentuates certain autonomous functions—self-observation, verbalization—while inhibiting others, e.g., purposive thinking. Thus the basic rule influences even conflicts between drives and defenses. One can say that if the main (though not exclusive) interest of psychoanalysis is the study of conflict in man, the *tools* of this study are the autonomous functions. And last, but not least, *these tools themselves* become objects of the analyst's interest.

In his conceptualization of autonomous functions, Hartmann always tried to follow the most precise interaction not only of dynamic, economic, and genetic factors, but equally of functional and structural elements. These distinctions are particularly important in order to understand the formation of secondary autonomy. In conceptualizing these developments he introduced a biological term into psychoanalysis: 'change of function'. This concept is of great help in many different technical problems. The analytic situation is partly determined by a displacement of forces involved in various vicissitudes of conflicts. In such instances, the conflicts may present themselves in paradoxical sequences in which the resistance is determined not by the defenses of the ego but by drive derivatives.

Hartmann extended the concept of conflict from the well-known conflict between drive and defense to conflicts within the ego itself. The latter he called *intra*systemic, as opposed to *inter*systemic, conflicts. The question has been raised whether these two types of conflicts may be legitimately juxtaposed. It is true that the forces involved in them are not the same. But one can assume that the conflicts within the ego acquire a certain

import and intensity when they are linked to intersystemic conflicts of the ego with id or superego. The stimulus for this linkage, however, may originate either in the id or in the ego, or in their relations to each other, such as those elicited by compliance with the fundamental rule.

Ego autonomy enters the field of technique in still other forms. Only patients with some degree of integrity of the ego are accessible to psychoanalytic treatment. This means intactness not alone of some defenses, but also of autonomous functions. The very prerequisites of the analytic situation hinge upon them. The autonomous ego is the medium through which patients communicate to the analyst what they observe in themselves. We require the patient not to censor and not to omit certain thoughts, while placing him so that he cannot observe the analyst's reactions. These requirements lead to complicated shifts within the autonomous functions of the patient, which have significant effects on his free associations. The analytic setting contributes in a specific way to the patient's behavior. Some of his behavior and reactions are inhibited by the recumbent position on the couch. Moreover, the analyst does not respond to his patient's verbalization in the same way as ordinary interlocutors would do.

These peculiarities of the setting are designed to achieve a partial curtailment of action and perception of external reality, so as to foster processes of self-observation. But they also increase the mechanisms of displacement and projection, thereby shifting the patient's perception from the outer to the inner world. Besides, they encourage a relative increase of primary process thinking; and yet the basic rule also requires the patient to communicate all his resulting self-observations in a way that is intelligible, as only secondary process allows it. In brief, the patient is expected to perform these complicated processes entailing the temporary and partial suspension by the ego of some of its own functions and the sharpening of others, especially those of self-observation and communication to the analyst (Loewenstein, 1963, p. 458). By mentioning the psycho-

analytic 'setting' in such detail I merely take into account that it is one of the basic constituents of the psychoanalytic situation.

The patient's autonomous ego, whose alliance with the analyst is essential for the success of the treatment, enables him to overcome his unconscious resistances. Indeed, it is necessary that the patient have relatively intact memory, thinking, perceptions, reality testing, capacity for self-observation and for verbal expression. On the other hand, we know that our alliance with his autonomous ego would be precarious without the transference. It is in the analytic situation that one best observes how greatly some aspects of autonomous functions can be enhanced or, on the contrary, impaired by unconscious influences of the defensive organization and of the id.

In recent years some analysts have come to emphasize the treatment alliance as being in the forefront of analytic tools. Such an alliance is indeed indispensable for psychoanalytic therapy. But we must not forget that things are more complicated; autonomous functions may actually come to be used in the service of resistance. For example, some patients are very eager to coöperate with the analyst, to help him by presenting as much material as possible, and yet their behavior betrays that they are 'resisting against resistances'. There are periods when they struggle against the emergence of unwelcome transference reactions. Only when this apparently conflictless coöperation is disturbed and gives place to transference resistances, can a new step forward be made in the analysis.

Some aspects of autonomous functions act as a resistance in still other situations. A well-known illustration of conflicts within the autonomous ego is resistance by means of intellectualization, such as Anna Freud (1936) described in adolescents. Here the gradual development of the thinking function is used not only for analytic understanding, but also against it. We saw that Hartmann explained these shifts by formulating the concept of *change of function,* which is very important for the understanding of many puzzling aspects of psychic develop-

ment. As I mentioned, it also plays a considerable role in certain clinical and technical situations.

There are well-known phenomena in which changes of function chronically modify and impair the autonomy of thinking; they are among the best-known characteristics of obsessive-compulsive neurotics. These patients present obsessive forms of thinking and compulsive doubting, symptoms which also are stubborn obstacles to analysis. Their compulsive logic is used as a defense against fantasy and ambiguity in thinking, which the analytic process is designed to foster.

We assume that these impairments of the thinking process in such patients are due to the regressive influence of unconscious conflicts. In other words, drive derivatives, defenses, and superego demands have achieved a reinstinctualization of the thinking process. Inhibitions or disorders of autonomous functions exist in most neurotic symptomatology. But in some patients the deneutralization of autonomy manifests itself mainly during some periods of their analysis; it happens under the impact of the transference, and leads to regressive reactivations of drive derivatives as well as regressions of ego functions.

Every analyst has seen patients whose apparently willing coöperation in the treatment takes the form of using analytic terms, and we all know how difficult it often is to analyze the defenses which this behavior represents and conceals. These cases demonstrate the importance of speech in psychoanalysis, both for the patient and for the analyst. Sometimes a simple reformulation of the patient's analytic jargon into everyday language may have considerable effect. An example used in an earlier paper (Loewenstein, 1954) is particularly apt.

A patient described how when he brought home newly purchased books, he had to hide them from his wife. He said sadly: 'My wife is castrating me'. I reformulated this by suggesting that he actually doubted whether his wife loved him. As a matter of fact, the patient's own words were not without symbolic validity. But they were not in the right place psychologically, so to say, and by this pseudoscientific statement he

certainly avoided the expression of feelings. It was interesting that a few days later, he started a session by telling me that his older brother (who was suspected of having tuberculosis) had regularly been given cream to drink by their mother, whereas he himself (the youngest child) never got any. When he related this he burst into tears. He continued to sob throughout the hour, and ended by saying that he had never cried in his previous analysis.

The examples I have given show that there are complicated interactions among the autonomous functions as well as between them and the defensive organization of the ego.

Ego psychology opened up a new area of observation, which had been closed to us before; namely, the observation of speech in psychoanalysis.

Hartmann formulated the role of language in the analytic treatment in very felicitous terms; I therefore quote him at length.

'Freud found that in the transition from the unconscious to the preconscious state, a cathexis of verbal presentations is added to the thing-cathexis. Later, Nunberg [1937], already thinking along structural lines, described the role of the synthetic function of the ego in this process toward binding and assimilation. One may add that the function of the verbal element in the analytic situation is not limited to verbal cathexis and integration, but also comprises expression. I am referring to the specific role of speech in the analytic situation. This, too, contributes toward fixing the previously unconscious element in the preconscious or conscious mind of the patient. Another structural function of the same process is due to the fact that the fixing of verbal symbols is in the development of the child linked with concept formation and represents one main road toward objectivation; it plays a similar role in the analytic situation. It facilitates the patient's way to a better grasp of physical as well as psychic reality. Besides, the action of speaking has also a specific social meaning inasmuch as it

serves communication, and in this respect becomes the object of the analysis of transference. There is also, of course, in speech the aspect of emotional discharge or abreaction. Finally the influence of the superego on speech and language is familiar to us, especially from psychopathology. This is to say that the different aspects of speech and language, as described by psychologists and philosophers, become coherent and meaningful if viewed from the angle of our structural model, and that in this case actually all the structural implications have today become relevant for our handling of the analytic situation. In trying to clarify the technical aspects of the problems involved, we are actually following the lead of structural psychology' (Hartmann, 1951, pp. 149-150).

This general formulation permits us also to understand specific peculiarities of our patients' speech in the area of vocabulary, syntax, and grammar, which may reveal important unconscious reactions. I have commented on the misuse of analytic terminology, and also mentioned patients who are habitually or occasionally unable to express any emotional aspects of what they tell us: they can *describe,* but cannot *express.* We also see patients in whom the opposite prevails: who can *express* but not *describe.* A use of specific words, which are foreign to the speaker's subculture, may be very significant. For example, when a young patient of conventional Anglo-Saxon background, in analysis with a Jew, suddenly uses the Yiddish word *'shmuck'* to criticize a third person, it says a great deal about his unconscious attitude toward the analyst.[1]

While most distortions of free associations are resistances expressive of unconscious conflicts, there are some disturbing phenomena which may have to be explained differently.

From a paper I wrote some time ago, I should like to quote here a passage concerning the fact that children do not free associate in analysis:

[1] This incident was related to me by Dr. Milton H. Horowitz. Soon after, one of my own patients used the same word in a like way.

'The following explanations have been offered to account for the inability of children to associate freely in the same way as adults. The first two (in personal communications to the author) ascribed it to incomplete maturation or development of the autonomous ego in the child.

'Heinz Hartmann thought that some autonomous functions, in particular those entering the secondary process thinking, are still too unstable in the child when exposed to the inevitable impact of the primary process in analytic treatment.

'Elisabeth Geleerd suggested that in children, the functions of introspection and reflection upon oneself are still insufficiently developed. Instead, quite naturally, they [children] tend to play, to play-act, and to act out.

'Anna Freud [1965], referring to the child's inability and unwillingness to associate freely, ascribes it to the immature ego's need to keep defenses up more rigidly because it is insecurely balanced between pressures from within and without' (Loewenstein, 1967, pp. 802-803).[2]

In addition, one must also consider that children have a lesser ability than adults to postpone action, and therefore greater difficulty in replacing action by thought and speech. Delay of action is an autonomous ego function. It appears early in childhood, but takes years to become fully developed.

In my opinion, some obstacles to free association in adults arise from similar insufficiencies. These insufficiencies may be temporary. They interfere with free association in certain patients in the midst of intense transference reactions in which the regression of ego functions makes patients literally behave like children. They are unable to free associate because the developmental inability is reconstituted. The technical effort in such situations has to be directed toward the ego regression and not merely toward the 'resistance'. (*Cf.*, Stone, 1961; Loewenstein, 1963.)

[2] Similar explanations had been given earlier by Berta Bornstein (1951) in her paper, On Latency.

These and other observations confirm Hartmann's interesting idea that while analysis has used psychopathology for the study of normal psychology, the reverse can also be fruitful. As we have just seen, the knowledge of normal childhood development may explain pathological phenomena in adult disturbances of free association.

Hartmann approached the discussion of important technical problems from the side of psychoanalytic theory. The advantage of the structural theory from a technical point of view is that our understanding of the patient's psychological problems comprises the whole of the mental apparatus. The latter is seen as an integrated whole divided into centers of mental functioning, which allows a multidimensional approach to psychic phenomena. As far as technique is concerned, it has generally been accepted that the structural-functional approach is 'more useful in giving account of the dynamic and economic properties of mental life. In technique the concept of stratification proved very useful and still is, in so far as making unconscious processes conscious by way of the preconscious is clearly one main and constant factor responsible for our technical results. However, based on the concept of layers and on resistance analysis . . . the concept of historical stratification was developed by Wilhelm Reich [1933], and with it a picture of personality that is definitely prestructural, in terms of the development of psychoanalytic psychology' (Hartmann, 1951, p. 147).

Further on, Hartmann points out: '"Good" theory helps us to discover the facts (for instance, to recognize a resistance as such), and it helps us to see the connections among facts. This part of our psychology also gives a deeper understanding of the forms and mechanisms of defense, and a more exact consideration of the details of the patient's inner experience and behavior; corresponding to this, on the side of technique, is a tendency toward more concrete, more specific interpretation. This approach includes in its scope the infinite variety of individual characteristics, and a degree of differentiation which had not been accessible to the previous, somewhat shadowy knowl-

edge of ego functions. It also sharpened our eyes to the frequent identity of patterns in often widely divergent fields of an individual's behavior as described by Anna Freud' (*ibid.*, p. 149).

Unlike Freud, Hartmann in his writings made no practical technical recommendations. Rather, he followed Freud's example in employing analysis as a method of investigation. Psychoanalysis reaches its therapeutic goals and has achieved most of its scientific discoveries through investigating all aspects of the patient's mind. As Hartmann put it, the theoretical approach has the advantage of brevity. I think it has the further advantage of being applicable to many more concrete clinical situations than any practical recommendation can be. This bent in Hartmann's thinking accounts for the fact that he considered every psychoanalysis, aside from its therapeutic function, as a scientific investigation by both patient and analyst. He believed that analysis did more than merely reconnect what had been disconnected and distorted by defenses. Psychoanalysis, in some instances, leads to real scientific discoveries.

For example, when a patient finds out that some strange, anxiety-provoking behavior of his mother when he was three years old was due to a miscarriage she had at that time, this is a new discovery for him. In fact it is highly unlikely that a three-year-old child would know and understand his mother's early manifestations of pregnancy and, even less, the symptoms and nature of a miscarriage. This raises the very complicated question of how such a discovery is made in analytic treatment. It certainly has to do with the general problem of learning. Analytic theory does not include a theory of learning, but thanks to the concept of ego autonomy, we can understand a little better than before how a patient learns about himself in his analysis.

It has been assumed that he gradually does so through a process of identification with the analyst. This hypothesis may indeed explain the reliving in the transference of very early mental states of identification with the parents, through which the child acquired important developmental gains. But the

explanation of learning through identification with the analyst is not precise enough. Some consequences of such identification are the opposite of learning. They represent a regressive *imitation of the analyst's person* as the patient imagines him to be. If it persists, imitation solidifies the neurosis by crystallizing some aspects of the transference. What the patient learns from his analyst is to allow certain thoughts to become available to himself, and to look at them from a point of view acquired from the analyst. The analytic approach to his thoughts and feelings, by learning through identification with the analyst's *function,* leads to nonconflictual insight. Identification with the analyst *as a person* perpetuates conflict.[3]

Patients who use psychoanalytic terms instead of expressing their genuine thoughts and emotions imitate and often caricature an imaginary analyst. Such imitations serve not learning, but resistance through unconscious drive gratification and defense.

I now return to the example of a patient using a Yiddish word ostensibly to criticize a third person. This is relevant in the present context. The patient used the word to establish a libidinal link with his Jewish analyst, as well as to deny the aggressive character of the transference. What counts is not only the content of words, but how and when they are used. Here a specific word was used by the patient in an *imitative transference* context. He was not identifying with the analyst's *functioning.*

The clinical-technical differences between these two processes were beautifully illustrated by Ernst Kris (1956) in his paper, On Some Vicissitudes of Insight in Psycho-Analysis. Kris described three types of insight: 1, insight motivated by competitive transference; 2, an insight determined by a libidinal transference; and 3, insight in which transferential motivation is absent. In the latter, insight has risen to a successful identi-

[3] As Dr. Milton Horowitz formulated it in a recent conversation, the spectrum of regression in such identifications ranges from *learning* to *imitation.*

fication with the functioning of the analyst and is a shared 'understanding'. It has become a truly autonomous achievement of learning.

By applying our understanding of ego autonomy to certain malfunctions of the superego, we may clarify some puzzling features of self-punishment. I am referring here not merely to the symptomatology of certain forms of moral masochism, but also to occasional self-punitive acts.

In a patient whom I analyzed some time ago, I noticed a particular, striking absence of affect. After approximately a year of analysis, I mentioned to him that in my opinion he had more guilt feelings than he was aware of. He reacted by saying: 'I? Guilt feelings? If I had them, I would be a decent man.' This response alone was proof that he had them—and also a manifestation of moral masochism. Instead of conscious guilt feelings he experienced severe anxiety states. His feeling of guilt was not displaced to another context, as in isolation of affect; rather, it was warded off.

Such warding off of superego demands may take other forms as well. It is part of complex dynamic and structural connections in the relationship between ego and superego, which may have considerable consequences for psychopathology. I am referring here to consequences of the 'disregard of superego demands'. They may be neurotic symptoms, psychosomatic disorders, self-inflicted punishment, all of which enter into the symptomatology of moral masochism and in all of which the absence of conscious guilt feelings may be an important factor. (*Cf.*, Loewenstein, 1954.)

The functions of guilt feeling are not identical in childhood and in adults. In early childhood, guilt feelings are closely linked to expectation of punishment after the commitment of a forbidden act. After the formation of the superego, guilt feeling begins to appear also in connection with internal prohibition and punishment. And gradually it acquires the function of signaling and warning against future forbidden acts

and thoughts. *Signal guilt feeling,* like signal anxiety, elicits defenses at the mere anticipation of danger—in this case, moral danger. It is a secondary autonomous ego function. What Freud called 'superego anxiety' may apply to this form of warning before the act, as well as to remorse and guilt as punishment following the act.[4]

The warning function of the superego, however, presupposes a faultless anticipatory functioning of the ego. If the primary autonomous functions of anticipatory thinking and reality testing fall prey to instinctualization or regression, the results may include a defect in judgment. This can lead in turn to a situation of failure and punishment. Here we have a variety of mechanisms showing how some persons arrive at self-punishment apparently meted out by unforeseeable circumstances. In all these mechanisms the conflict is not only between superego and ego, but between all subsystems of the human mind.

The patient to whom I referred did not ward off guilt feelings alone. He was also unable to recognize in himself any feelings of jealousy or even the wish to be loved. His denial of these emotions resulted from repressing his resentment against his dead parents. Instead of experiencing these emotions he suffered from anxieties. An incident during the terminal phase of his very long analysis clearly illustrated the self-punishing mechanisms in this patient. He fantasied during a session that he would sit with me at an excellent meal, the table beautifully set, while he would sharpen his long carving knife, preparing himself with relish to puncture my abdomen in order to deflate me utterly. At this point of the fantasy he suddenly became aware that his knife was turned against his own abdomen. Assailed by a terrible anxiety, he stopped his daydream. He remained shattered for several days. In this patient, intense aggression against a rival—his father—turned against himself,

[4] Certain anticipated actions elicit a tentative punitive reaction in the superego, a *warning,* to which the ego responds in turn with a *signal guilt feeling* normally leading to a defense, e.g., stoppage or delay of such actions.

and his unconscious guilt feelings were replaced by overwhelming anxiety.

I should like now to present clinical vignettes of two other patients in whom warded-off guilt feeling was significant, and who made precipitous, potentially self-damaging decisions under its influence. The ego regression, however, was not identical in both cases.

In the first example, a patient remarked one day that he heard a very close friend had incurred severe injuries in a car accident. He was greatly worried whether the friend would survive his injuries, and also what impact his possible death might have on his wife and children. Suddenly the patient added, in a resentful tone, that his friend had frequently taken unnecessary risks while driving. He implied that the accident served his friend right for being foolhardy and showing poor judgment. I was struck by the fact that the patient manifested no guilt whatsoever, which would have attenuated the impression he gave of cold anger in talking about his friend. A few days later, he told me that he had made a rash and risky decision in his business, and that he felt intensely ashamed and anxious about the consequences of this decision. He could not understand how he, an experienced businessman, could have been so rash and impulsive. Fortunately his fears did not materialize, and he was able to redress the situation. Only some days later did he remember a similar angry reaction at the death of his mother several years ago. He felt resentment toward her for not having taken care of her health, and it seemed to him that she showed poor judgment in these matters. When she died he felt that she had abandoned him. Now, at last, the patient felt very guilty for having harbored such hostile thoughts about his mother. It became clear to him in the analysis that these three incidents were closely interconnected: his angry criticism first of his mother and then of his friend, followed by the same risky behavior of which he had accused them.

This patient was not really a moral masochist, although he was capable of intense sympathy and feelings of guilt. On the other hand, since childhood he had also tended to withdraw vindictively from those who hurt him by what he experienced as indifference toward him.

From the events just summarized we can see that his repression of guilt was linked to ambivalence toward both mother and friend. Therefore his guilt feeling and need for self-punishment remained unconsciously active, exerting a regressive pull upon his ego. Instead of feeling consciously guilty, he identified with the poor judgment of his mother and friend, thereby trying to punish himself.

I am indebted to Dr. Nicholas Young for the second clinical vignette. It lends itself to an illustration of mechanisms of self-punishment which, though similar, are unlike those described in the preceding example.

A young man wanted to buy some expensive sports equipment and thought of getting it at wholesale prices with the help of his aunt. He hesitated somewhat, in view of her generally uncoöperative behavior and unpleasant character. Nevertheless, he decided to ask her, and she reluctantly agreed to let him use her name in the matter. The order was filled incorrectly, but to return the merchandise he needed his aunt's signature. Afraid to expose himself again to her criticism, he precipitately forged her signature. He felt no guilt about it, although he had always been a scrupulously honest young man. One is reminded of a sudden naughty act of a usually well-behaved child. But he was crushed by the consequences when his forgery was discovered by the store and by the aunt.

In my opinion, this patient was not a moral masochist either. The poor judgment he exercised in this matter did not derive from unconscious guilt feeling to begin with, as in the previous example, but rather from an ego regression. It was the consequence of a conflict between his fear of the aunt and his regressively instinctualized wish to buy something immediately

and cheaply. This poor judgment led him to disregard or even ward off the anticipatory guilt feeling which would have prevented him from committing forgery and hence inviting punishment. Here too, the defect of judgment is seen as the consequence of a complex regression involving several psychic systems.

Both cases illustrate complex mechanisms by means of which some people arrive at failure and self-punishment in interaction with external reality conditions. They are not able to create these reality conditions, but can unconsciously utilize them in many subtle ways.

In the course of analytic treatment we do not expect our patients to exercise the same autonomous functions in the same way at all times. At first their free associations are geared to what Freud called 'calm self-observation' and communication to the analyst. It is only later that the patient takes a more active approach to the understanding of his feelings, thoughts, and memories. This leads gradually to an integration and restructuring of his self-knowledge in moments of analytic insight. During all these periods of the analytic process some other aspects of autonomous functions may be used as a resistance, as I have discussed before. We know that patients differ from each other in the use of particular defense mechanisms. The characteristics of their defenses impinge upon various autonomous functions and cause them to be impaired in the service of resistance. Certain forms of autonomous functions are more susceptible than others to being drawn into id-ego conflicts. They seem to be endowed with features that lead more easily to an alliance with the defensive organization of the ego. Conversely, some forms of autonomous functions, which play a role in creative talents, may facilitate healthy solutions of potentially pathogenic conflicts. These complicated interactions between various ego functions or even some of their particular aspects, at various stages of the analysis, have not yet been sufficiently explored.

At the end of his paper, Technical Implications of Ego Psychology, Hartmann makes a number of important remarks. He points out that the analyst who scrutinizes the patient's material, taking into account all psychic systems with equal attention, is able to distinguish situations where generally accepted technical principles may have to be modified. Hartmann states that analysts encounter situations in which even the familiar opposition of drive and defense loses 'much of its absolute character'. He alludes here to 'unexpected and sometimes highly troublesome quantitative or qualitative side effects of interpretation. . . . If such incidental effects occur, our dosage or timing may have been wrong. But it may also be . . . that we have missed some structural implications though correctly following quantitative economic principles. It may be that we have considered this quantitative aspect of a resistance only and have not considered precisely enough how the same quantity may involve the various functions of the ego and the superego in a different degree' (Hartmann, 1951, pp. 150-151).

Recognizing that psychoanalytic technique is somewhat lagging behind our theoretical knowledge, Hartmann points here to the technical problems presented by unexpected incidental reactions to interpretation. These reactions often transcend our immediate interest in the drive-defense area. He adds that in trying to account for these and similar observations stemming from various clinical sources, we can speak of a process set in motion by a stimulus; in this case, by an interpretation. This stimulus, according to him, 'produces not only . . . "local" reactions. It goes, beyond . . . , changing the balance of mental energies and affecting a variety of aspects of the dynamic system. The process activates or sets in a state of preparedness elements functionally and genetically connected with it' (*ibid.*, pp. 152-153). Further on, he notes that this 'principle of multiple appeal', as he calls it, has 'not yet been taken sufficiently into account by our theory or technique' (*ibid.*, p. 154).

Expectations of analytic results are now, paradoxically, more modest and yet more far reaching. Hartmann's widened view

of psychoanalysis has not so much enlarged the variety of conditions to be treated, but rather our understanding of the infinite complexity of the individual personality.

Freud's elegant dictum that where id was, ego shall be, must be prosaically modified to include: where there is conflictual ego, the autonomous ego should acquire increased control.

SUMMARY

An attempt is made to describe briefly the role played in psychoanalytic technique by primary and secondary autonomous ego functions, concepts introduced and developed by Hartmann. The analytic process takes place mainly within the autonomous ego. The method of free association hinges upon a variety of autonomous functions. Under the regressive pull of drives and defenses, however, some of these may become reinstinctualized so as to act in the service of resistances (e.g., intellectualization). Intersystemic conflicts between drive derivatives and defenses are complicated by intrasystemic conflicts within the ego and even between different autonomous functions. The study of ego autonomy has added new perspectives to our understanding of the human mind; e.g., the nonconflictual counterpart of conflict, the observation of speech in psychoanalysis.

Hartmann approached psychoanalytic technique from the side of theory. Compared to the descriptive approach, 'good' theory has the advantage of brevity as well as of applicability to a larger variety of clinical situations. To think in terms of autonomy versus conflict-laden phenomena allows a better grasp of the problem how patients learn through analysis. By identifying with the analyst's functioning rather than with his person, they achieve autonomous self-understanding as opposed to transference-laden imitation.

In conflicts with the superego the autonomy of ego functions assures favorable solutions, whereas repression of signal guilt

feelings may contribute to self-punitive behavior in moral-masochistic neurotics as well as to occasional self-destructive acts in others.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BLANCK, GERTRUDE (1966): *Some Technical Implications of Ego Psychology.* Int. J. Psa., XLVII, pp. 6-13.

BORNSTEIN, BERTA (1951): On Latency. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. VI,* pp. 279-285. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

EISSLER, KURT R. (1953): *The Effect of the Structure of the Ego on Psychoanalytic Technique.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., I, pp. 104-143.

FREUD, ANNA (1936): *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defense.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1946.

——— (1965): *Normality and Pathology in Childhood. Assessments of Development.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

FREUD (1923): *The Ego and the Id.* Standard Edition, XIX, pp. 12-66.

——— (1926): *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety.* Standard Edition, XX, pp. 87-172.

HARTMANN, HEINZ (1939a): *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958.

——— (1939b): Psychoanalysis and the Concept of Health. In: *Essays on Ego Psychology. Selected Problems in Psychoanalytic Theory.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1964, pp. 3-18.

——— (1947): On Rational and Irrational Action. In: *Ibid.,* pp. 37-68.

——— (1950): Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego. In: *Ibid.,* pp. 113-141.

——— (1951): Technical Implications of Ego Psychology. In: *Ibid.,* pp. 142-154. (Originally published in This QUARTERLY, XX, pp. 31-43.)

——— (1953): Contributions to the Metapsychology of Schizophrenia. In: *Ibid.,* pp. 182-206.

——— and LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. (1962): Notes on the Superego. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XVII,* pp. 42-81. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

KRIS, ERNST (1951): *Ego Psychology and Interpretation in Psychoanalytic Therapy.* This QUARTERLY, XX, pp. 15-30.

——— (1956): *On Some Vicissitudes of Insight in Psycho-Analysis.* Int. J. Psa., XXXVII, pp. 445-455.

LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. (1951a): *The Problem of Interpretation.* This QUARTERLY, XX, pp. 1-14.

——— (1951b): *Ego Development and Psychoanalytic Technique.* Amer. J. Psychiatry, CVII, pp. 617-622.

——— (1954): *Some Remarks on Defences, Autonomous Ego and Psycho-Analytic Technique.* Int. J. Psa., XXXV, pp. 188-193.

——— (1956): *Some Remarks on the Role of Speech in Psycho-Analytic Technique.* Int. J. Psa., XXXVII, pp. 460-468.

——— (1963): *Some Considerations on Free Association.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XI, pp. 451-473.

——— (1966): On the Theory of the Superego: A Discussion. In: *Psychoanalysis—A General Psychology. Essays in Honor of Heinz Hartmann.* Edited by Rudolph M. Loewenstein, Lottie M. Newman, Max Schur and Albert J. Solnit. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 298-314.

——— (1967): *Defensive Organization and Autonomous Ego Functions.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XV, pp. 795-809.

STONE, LEO (1954): *The Widening Scope of Indications for Psychoanalysis.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., II, pp. 567-594.

——— (1961): *The Psychoanalytic Situation. An Examination of Its Development and Essential Nature.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Early Object Deprivation and Transference Phenomena: The Working Alliance

Joan Fleming

To cite this article: Joan Fleming (1972) Early Object Deprivation and Transference Phenomena: The Working Alliance, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 23-49, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11926586

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11926586

EARLY OBJECT DEPRIVATION AND TRANSFERENCE PHENOMENA: THE WORKING ALLIANCE

BY JOAN FLEMING, M.D. (DENVER)

This paper presents a study of the therapeutic process as it was observed in the analyses of adults who had experienced object deprivation in childhood or adolescence. Because of this special factor in their developmental history, these patients provided clinical observations on the way in which early object deprivation may influence the development of an immature ego organization. These observations led to the conclusion that this immaturity persisting into adult life interfered with the establishment of a relationship between analyst and patient which would enable the therapeutic process to proceed. The clinical problem confronted us with the task of clarifying the elements of intrapsychic structure necessary for building a working alliance. It focused our attention not only on the patient's transference resistances but also on the responses of the analyst and how his communications influenced the process of psychoanalysis.

In his paper on controlled communication, Rado (1958) describes the effective therapeutic principle as the methodical use of human influence and emphasizes the responses of the therapist which must be in tune with the needs and hopes of the patient. He does not mean indiscriminate gratification but rather an empathic tuning in on the same wave length for a diagnostic understanding which allows the therapist freedom to choose responses in line with therapeutic goals appropriate for a given patient.

Empathic responses produce positive therapeutic results with many patients but, unless they are combined with an under-

Presented as the Sandor Rado Lecture to the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic for Training and Research and the Association for Psychoanalytic Medicine, New York, April 6, 1971.

standing of the developmental needs of the patient's ego organization, the structural changes hoped for from psychoanalysis may not come about. For this goal, the constancy of the analytic situation and the basic model for therapeutic interaction so ably described by Eissler (1953) are of great assistance. They provide a stable framework within which the analyst can become more closely aware of the patient's level of ego structure and adapt his technique accordingly. Once a diagnosis of the prevailing ego structure is made, technical responses can be correlated with the pattern of transference expectations and resistances and new levels of awareness and adaptive functioning can take place. Each step, as we study it, is capable of adding to our conceptualization of the analytic process.

In Chicago some fifteen years ago we began a study of early object deprivation with two patients who were in supervised analysis. The work has now been expanded to include some sixty patients who have been studied in varying depth by eighteen analysts. The patients were adults who had suffered a loss by death of a mother or a father, sometimes both. The age on entering analysis varied from nineteen to fifty-four years; the age at which the loss occurred ranged from six months to twenty years. In this group of sixty patients, thirty-one were males and twenty-nine females; the mothers of twenty-six had died, the fathers of twenty-nine.

The patients all sought help for some problem associated with a change in their way of life—a separation. They were having trouble moving from a situation with which they were familiar to a new situation, such as graduation from college, finishing an advanced degree, changing jobs, getting married, having children. Occasionally, the precipitating factor was an actual separation from a personal relationship, such as the suicide of a friend. But more often it was the pressure of events that might result in a separation experience which, if accomplished, would lead to more independence, more reliance on resources within themselves, and more intimate altruistic rela-

tionships with others, such as marriage and parenthood. These patients were unable to manage the developmental tasks of separation-individuation, of movement toward adulthood.

While the reasons they gave for seeking psychiatric help are not uncommon, their resistances to the usual course of psychoanalysis were very strong: it took longer than usual for a therapeutic alliance to be established. We gradually realized that resistances against a therapeutic alliance and against development of the usual transference reactions had their roots in the patients' attempts to cope with separations, either by trying to reproduce the preloss relationship with the analyst or by denying that the new analytic relationship had any meaning. As the data accumulated on each patient, an immaturity, incongruous with their ages, became prominent. In addition they seemed to give little significance to the parental loss: they denied any grief at the time of loss (no tears were shed) or of missing their parents currently (Fleming, 1963; Fleming and Altschul, 1963).

When our attention became focused on these phenomena of immaturity and absence of grief, we postulated that the actual loss had been experienced as a trauma that produced massive separation anxiety; that these patients had coped with the trauma by denying the reality of the loss and by reproducing the preloss relationship either in fantasy or in acting out with a living substitute. These observations led us to the hypothesis that they were using all of their available energy in protecting themselves against experiencing the pain of grief and that their resources for coping had kept them in an arrested state of development.

The most common explanation for the absence of grief (Deutsch, 1937; Furman, 1964; Rochlin, 1953; Wolfenstein, 1966) is the immaturity of the ego of the child. Wolfenstein goes so far as to say that only if development has proceeded to the level of adolescence, can the ego accomplish the integrative task of mourning work which Freud described. To finish this

task it is essential to decathect the internalized image of the lost object as well as the need for the actual object, thereby releasing energy for cathecting a new object and making it possible to move on, away from the past into the future. Wolfenstein feels that before adolescence the internalized representation of the significant objects of childhood has not been structured in such a way that the normal decathexis of mourning work is possible. She reports a study of forty-two children with parent-loss ranging in age from three and a half to nineteen years that confirms our findings of denial of reality and the pretense that the dead parent is still alive. One of her children said: 'If my mother were really dead, I would be all alone'. And, 'If I would admit to myself that mother is dead, I would be terribly scared' (Wolfenstein, 1966, p. 109). In one form or another our adult patients said the same thing.

The adaptive response on the part of a young child deprived of a parent is to try to restore the situation in which he was able to feel his parent was still there (Bowlby, 1960). This kind of hallucinatory wish-fulfilment is a mechanism found in the earliest development of that ego function we call tolerance for delay and for substitute gratification (Benedek, 1938, 1956; Spitz, 1959). Hilgard (1953) has described how in some parent-loss cases the memories are built into actual hallucinations and other dreamlike manifestations in order to establish contact with the ones who are not there—a common, though temporary, phenomenon in normal mourning. In our cases, this degree of primary process fantasy was not frequent, although our patients presented a picture of being in a dreamlike state in which the wish to feel the presence of the dead parent was built into a fantasy that depended on denial of the reality of death and a wishful (mythical) belief that the parent was still alive (Seidenberg, 1966).

This illusory, imagined relationship was often acted out in a game. A woman who lost her father suddenly at age six (Forman, 1966), remembered how each night before she went to

sleep she would play a game in which she carried on imaginary conversations with a doll that represented herself while she spoke the father's lines. During analysis, this patient went to a children's mass on Father's Day and was shocked to realize that she was playing at being a child when she stood up and realized that she was much taller than the children around her. Another way of maintaining a sense of presence was described by a man whose father died when he was eleven (Brockman, 1968). The father's ashes were kept in an urn on the mantelpiece, serving to provide a feeling of presence for many years. The patient decompensated with acute anxiety and depression when he was informed that the urn had been removed and the ashes thrown away. For him, the loss of this external reference point reproduced the experience of losing a supporting person when his father died.

All of these formations of fantasy serve to maintain a feeling of needed wished-for relationships. The need or wish is so intense that the actuality can be denied and make-believe can distort the normal perceptual and reality-testing functions. Hartmann's (1953) statement that objects are built or lost by ego factors has particular bearing on our understanding of the ego's efforts to preserve the image of the object lost by death and the sense of relationship with that object. The internalized image built through the various experiences in interaction with the parental object is needed by the child for security, self-esteem, and other narcissistic and libidinal supplies. To accept the 'loss' by death, an externally induced deprivation, is responded to by attempts to restore a sense of continuing relationship with whatever object representation had been successfully internalized up to that point. This fantasy of a continuing relationship with the absent parent persists as a preconscious fantasy in spite of good reality testing in most other areas. It operates as a guiding light or 'beacon of orientation', in Mahler's (1968) language, that influences many aspects of behavior, depending on the level of development of reality testing and object relations achieved before the loss occurred.

One of our patients demonstrated the existence of this persisting fantasy in the following way. He was a man in his thirties whose mother had died when he was eleven. He had been in analysis with two therapists, was married, had become a father, and had achieved good professional standing. On one occasion he visited his second analyst during a period of acute anxiety stirred up by rumors that the analyst was ill. During the consultation, the analyst remarked, 'But your mother is dead'. At that point, this grown-up man began to cry and in an angry tone replied, 'You tricked me when you said that'. The analyst had penetrated his defensive denial with a reality confrontation and at that moment he felt his mother had literally been snatched away from him.

The same kind of fantasy was revealed in a consultation with a woman in her late twenties who looked and dressed like an early adolescent. Her father had died when she was twelve. During the interview the analyst was inquiring about memories of her father. In a burst of angry tears, the patient said, 'All you want is for me to bury my father'.

In contrast to those described by Hilgard (1953) our patients were not psychotic, although they disavowed one sector of reality that was intolerable to them. They had encapsulated the fact of the finality of separation from the still needed object by inhibition of grief, denial in fantasy, and an arrest in self-object relations at the preloss level (Fleming, et al., 1958). This encapsulation of one sector of reality allowed other sectors to develop and the ego to function in fairly adaptive ways for many years until something in the immediate reality situation disturbed their make-believe. The conflict with reality was not internalized as a conflict prior to seeking therapy; it was experienced more as a frustration or deprivation of an expected response from the external world, a response which never came.

In his paper on two principles of mental functioning, Freud (1911) stressed the role of frustration in activating the reality principle and organizing behavior to overcome it by adapting to 'reality'. In our cases the activating frustration was not a

specific drive-related experience, but rather the deprivation of an essential auxilliary agent. Reality itself had changed and the adaptive task was not the simpler one of adjusting drive and affect to a frustrating, limit setting 'reality' but the much more complex task of adapting to a significantly changed reality, often suddenly. Even the 'normal' response to such depriving situations—the response of intense grief and the crying signal for help—was experienced as too threatening, too stressful in itself, and so grief was repressed or 'played at', pretended because others were crying, not because grief was being experienced.

This change in reality is the chief stress of every loss experience even if the loss is anticipated without regret. It is the change in reality that the ego is called upon to integrate in terms of separation from a supporting frame of reference. This task is involved in every developmental progression as well as in mourning and in therapeutic work (Wetmore, 1963). For a child the integrative work of this developmental task is hard enough by itself. With the death of a parent, his whole world of self-object reference points is disturbed and his orientation to reality is thrown severely off balance (Mahler, 1968).

In our cases, the ego's response was to turn away from the changed reality, but not to withdraw to the extent seen in psychosis. The withdrawal and disavowal were accompanied by a denial in fantasy and an attempt to maintain the pre-loss security by hypercathecting an already internalized relationship. The fantasy, in the service of restoring (Bowlby, 1960, 1961) the lost object, carried on in make-believe the pretense of the parent's continued existence. This pretense was isolated from reality testing and persisted as a fiction without the normal awareness of the corollary 'as if' in such situations.

Two dramatic instances of the abrogation of reality testing occurred during an analyst's vacation. In one case, the thirty-six-year-old patient's inner need for reassurance compelled him to walk by the office and look for a light in the window. The other patient, aged twenty-six, found himself looking up the analyst's name in the telephone directory, only half aware at

the time that this act reassured him against the dread that the analyst would not be found.

Most of our patients lived 'as if' in two worlds in terms of social relationships. In the external world there were fairly adequate current relationships, but with a simultaneous preconscious symbiosis with an internalized image of the lost parent. This world was described by one patient in these words: 'It is like my mother is suspended inside of me'. Another described the arrested state when she said, 'Time stopped for me when my mother died'.

As I stated above, our studies began with observations of behavior in the analytic situation that interfered with the normal unfolding of the transference. Only after some time did we connect parental loss in childhood and begin to correlate the observed immaturity in these adult patients, and their difficulties in object relationships, with the idea of a special form of adaptation to the object loss at an earlier phase of development. These phenomenological observations pointed in the direction of continued childhood object need regardless of the age of the patient or the age at which the loss occurred. Our patients differed in the way they coped with that need, and these differences were demonstrated in their behavior at the time of loss as well as their subsequent object relationships over the years prior to seeking help. But the most fruitful source of observations which led to an ego diagnosis was the way in which they related to the analyst in the initial stages of treatment.

Before proceeding to discuss further the problems of treatment, I would like to review some concepts of ego development that seem relevant. These concepts have to do with the significance of early object relations in building ego structure and have contributed a great deal to understanding the relationship between arrested ego development and the technical tasks confronting the analyst in the analytic situation.

Since Freud's (1923) early elaboration of structural concepts, there has been an increasing interest in how the early experi-

ences of responses from the environment, particularly from the care-taking object, have influenced drive regulation and the structuring of the ego's resources for adaptation (Hartmann and Kris, 1945; Kris, 1947). Early genetic theory seems to have been based primarily on observations concerning sequences and phases in libidinal development, leaning more on maturational forces and giving only partial significance to environmental transactions. The object was given more significance as the target of a drive than as an active factor in development. It was recognized that the object, primarily the mothering person, played a vital role in the early encounters with external reality and that experiences of gratification and frustration were influential in organizing internal resources, but how the responses of the object operated to assist in this structuring and adaptive effort was given little specific attention (Hartmann, 1939, 1956). Benedek (1938), Spitz (1945), and Mahler (1968) have made contributions to this question. They describe the reciprocal and progressively changing relationship between object need and object responses in the ontogenesis of an individual.

Benedek (1949) described the object relationship between mother and child as a mother-child unit. Experiences of gratifying responses within this relationship help the child to master the aggressive and regressive reactions to increased need tensions on physiological levels. Confidence in the presence of help from the outside is developed by repeated experiences of tension relief and gradually 'the biologic unity between mother and infant gives place to psychologic communication between them' (Benedek, 1956, p. 398). A representation of this motherly object takes shape as an introject and becomes allied with and is increasingly integrated as a part of the ego organization, having significant effects on the structuring of reality testing and other regulatory and integrative mechanisms of the ego. 'Confidence and hope maintain the ego through a period of waiting' (Benedek, 1956, p. 401) and bridge the many brief and temporary interruptions of symbiotic communication that occur daily in the life of an infant and small child. Anticipation of gratifica-

tion or receiving a compensatory substitute (Tausk, 1913) enables the ego of the child to repress or renounce unacceptable impulses and so to operate adaptively in both the intrapsychic and external worlds. Internal conflicts and external 'contests' are solved on a positive level as long as responses from the libidinal object permit the necessary internalizations of reality that supply the narcissistic reservoir and keep a positive balance of gratifying experiences in the sum total that includes so many frustrations.

The definition of an object need should be stressed here. Benedek (1938, 1956) believes that what is needed from the object are confidence-inspiring responses. She postulates that it is the quality and consistency of these object responses that initiates and later re-enforces and maintains the ego's regulatory functioning in the processes of integration and adaptation. The structuring work of organizing these experiences with objects begins with the mother, extends to the father, and to other objects as development goes on.

Spitz (1945) has consistently refined these concepts of object need, beginning with his observations on hospitalism. In The First Year of Life (Spitz and Cobliner, 1965), he re-emphasizes the significance of the object for achieving progress on the line of psychosocial development. He traces the movement from physiological to psychological need satisfaction and then to a recognition that the satisfaction is caused by an agency, the maternal object, who is already introjected in the form of many sensory registrations. The early organization of these registrations into a percept of mother remains in the shape of the feeding, comforting, protecting object for a long time. In other words, what is internalized is the function of the object as a symbiotic need satisfier, not as an individual with needs of her own. She exists only for the baby, although visually and in other sensory modalities, she becomes differentiated from other similar objects when the shape of her image is organized enough to stimulate the discrimination that manifests itself in 'stranger anxiety' (Spitz, 1959).

Mahler (1968) has directed her scientific curiosity and creative thinking to the same problems investigated by Benedek and Spitz. Like Spitz, Mahler's original questions were stimulated by observations of pathology. Her studies of psychotic children added to our understanding of the role of the object in normal development by trying to explain what went wrong intrapsychically to bring about the pathology she saw in autistic children. Her findings confirmed those of Spitz and Benedek. Good mothering had not been available to the children she observed and she concluded that when a mother dies, is ill, or is not able to provide the necessary symbiotic relationship in early infancy something goes wrong in the development of the child's ego, his body image, and his self-image. Her findings tell us again that a symbiotic transaction is basic for organizing the ego's mechanisms for regulating need tensions and for structuring response patterns that are the foundation for physical survival and psychological and social maturation. Optimal symbiotic experiences build trust and confidence in another person that is the *anlage* for later relationships in work, love, and social living. Mahler's choice of the term 'symbiosis' was a most happy one, since the word emphasizes the mutual value of the tie and the interactional, two-way quality of the communication.

From the basic experience of symbiosis, however, Mahler then proceeded to observe how the toddler, better equipped than the infant by virtue of his biological growth and his symbiotic psychological experiences, began to initiate separation experiences for his own purposes of mastery of both himself and his environment. Mahler formulated the positive value of dosed separation as essential for a 'hatching out' from the symbiotic relationship to a more independent state in which the child can tolerate for longer and longer periods of time greater and greater distances from his mother. Again the emphasis is on the significance of the exchanges in the object relationship, this time in terms of the meaning of separation experiences for normal development. Her concept also focuses on the way in which the two persons involved coöperate for optimal achieve-

ment. The child gradually but actively seeks separation in the service of his individuation and the mother permits and encourages it, all the while assisting in regulating the dose by being on hand when needed for 'refueling' and by preventing an overextension of the toddler's resources for the expansion of his horizons. This transaction with its inevitable limit setting may produce frustration but not a feeling of abandonment in the child and it re-enforces trust and reality testing; it lets the child know someone cares what happens to him, and stabilizes his intrapsychic object and self-images.

With her concept of the process of separation-individuation, Mahler underlines that even with a good symbiosis in the first eighteen months, if the stage of separation does not take place in optimal fashion, something goes wrong in the development of self-confidence, self-esteem, and pleasure in independence that is essential for a healthy adult. A mothering person must be present and serve as an auxiliary ego for organizing a reference point, and then this person must continue to serve as a reference point while simultaneously permitting increasing separations for the developmental task of individuation.

Separation may also be experienced as a trauma because of overwhelming need tension when the needed assistance from good mothering is unavailable. Many authors have described how traumatic separations in early childhood interfere with the normal developmental process (Altschul, 1968; Bowlby, 1960; Deutsch, 1937; Fleming, 1963; Fleming and Altschul, 1963; Forman, 1966; A. Freud and Burlingham, 1944; Hilgard, 1953; Rochlin, 1953; Seidenberg, 1966; Wolfenstein, 1966, 1969). A wide range of pathology has been described, including psychosis, psychosomatic disorders, delinquency and other sociopathic behavior (Steele and Pollock, 1968), and handicapping neurosis or character disorder.

According to Mahler, a child is vulnerable to subsequent separations if the stage of normal symbiosis has been deficient. Although our data did not reveal good evidence for a disturbance in the earliest symbiotic stage, it presented evidence that

parental objects, including a father, are significant for meeting normal developmental needs all through childhood. The detrimental effects of parental loss depend very much on the age at which the loss occurs, on the character of the preloss relationship, on the availability of a good substitute, and on the type of relationship maintained with the surviving parent.

Turning again to Mahler's concept of separation-individuation as a process which not only catalyzes the organization of the ego but also an independent, differentiated self-system, we see that development of a sense of self with its concomitant resources of self-confidence and healthy independence is not completed in early childhood. It develops over a long period of time and as a result of experiences with different objects who meet different kinds of needs and make different demands on the developing child. These experiences are organized in the intrapsychic representations of the perceptual images of the object and the positive or negative quality of the transaction with the self. In early childhood these structure-building experiences are basically with the parents who become 'beacons of orientation', to use Mahler's (1968) term, or 'coördinates' as one of our patients described them. A prolonged separation, withdrawal of attention, or in our cases loss by death disturbs the inner equilibrium which is for so long dependent on external objects for guidance and feedback of approval. These experiences of loss interfere with personal and social values, once entirely external in origin but which become internalized to build a self-sufficient self-system. Total self-sufficiency is probably never achieved. All of us depend less and less on external persons for our supplies and gratifications, but we are never completely independent of the need that a trusted, helpful person exists and could be called if necessary. The knowledge that such a person exists, however far away in actual distance, is enough for most of us to maintain a stable self-image and a balance of resources adequate to the stresses of living. Originally the person was a parent; later someone else; and eventually, we must

depend on our own identifications with internal images from many sources.

Our patients could not tolerate the loss of their 'coördinates'. They had no 'reliable frame of reference for checking back, perceptually and emotionally' (Mahler, 1968, p. 19), an experience essential for individuation. Instead, there was an arrest in development (Altschul, 1968; Nagera, 1970) and they remained frozen at the preloss level of self-object relationships.

Wolfenstein (1969), who has made intensive studies of parent loss in children and adolescents, offers her opinion that arrest and denial which block development are accompanied by regression to earlier phases as a reaction to loss. In our adults, this did not seem to be a common occurrence. Yet, a childhood object need was definitely present. I have tried to show that elements of such an object need persist in all of us throughout life as part of the internal resources for self-confidence stemming from the structuring of earlier orienting 'coördinates' in parental object relations. The infant's symbiosis with the mother is the earliest frame of reference, but later object relations structure aspects of the self-system (Jacobson, 1964; Leonard, 1966; Spiegel, 1959). In our cases, the immediate preloss level of object need was what was relived in current relationships until the analytic process could break through the resistances to the task of mourning. Perhaps the difference in Wolfenstein's and our observations lies in a difference in the symbiotic stage of object experiences in her cases. Those who showed regression in impulse control, expressed in severe rages and temper tantrums, seemed to have been deprived of a normal mother-child symbiosis in early childhood. They manifested an object need even more intense than our cases. It could be asked whether Wolfenstein's cases were not arrested at a more primitive level of self-object relations even prior to the loss of the parent.

Instead of completing the separation-individuation work of normal development, our patients constantly tried to reconstitute the longed-for coördinates and thereby to continue the

old relationship in fantasy or with a substitute object in the external world that would supply the responses they still needed from the parent at the time of loss. They were unable to accept the perceptual reality that the old relationship was over and should become only a memory. They could not shift their libidinal investment to a new image of self and object. These are the adaptive tasks of mourning described by Freud (1917 [1915]), and can be compared with the developmental tasks of separating from outgrown levels of self-object ties as a child responds adaptively to the increasing pressures from libidinal drives and social expectations (Bowlby, 1960; Pollock, 1961). Our patients seemed to be arrested in the second stage of mourning in which a reliving of the past relationship with the lost object is maintained by a hypercathexis of memories and a defensive denial of current reality.

Up to this point I have tried to define object need and some effects of object deprivation on ego development as we observed it in our parent loss cases. Mahler's concepts of symbiosis and separation-individuation experiences and Benedek's concepts of the roots of self-confidence are basic to our current theory of ego development (Hartmann, 1950; Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, 1946). Mahler, Benedek, and Spitz refer to early infancy and Mahler's toddlers are in the process of internalizing (Loewald, 1970) what, up to then, has been an actual external frame of reference. Our observations offer data on how this fundamental symbiotic experience is reproduced in the form of an object need at times of stress in later childhood and in the transference phenomena appearing in adult object relations (Greenson and Wexler, 1969; Loewald, 1960; Pollock, 1964). This persisting transfer of deep-seated need to re-establish a sense of external 'coördinates' can be seen in the all too familiar acting out of nontherapeutic transference relationships outside of analysis, as well as in the transference resistance to the establishment of a working alliance in the analytic situation.

Some of the transference phenomena observed in our cases

show how they derived from object deprivation. Without the development of a working alliance further therapeutic progress to an analyzable transference neurosis may never take place. Khan (1960) described the treatment of a patient who experienced some aspects of object deprivation in childhood and who in the early phase of the analytic work expressed intense object need which was strenuously resisted by reliving a fantasy. Analytic interpretations were rejected, but the responses the analyst gave her in several situations of crisis were effective in bringing the patient out of her dreamlike state of transference resistance and permitted the establishment of a more optimal working alliance. The reliving seemed to be focused on the need to reproduce the security and gratification provided by a mothering nurse who suddenly disappeared after being the significant symbiotic object during her first three years.

Much of this patient's 'petrified state of bliss' was relived without effective self-observation during the first year of analysis. It seemed to be followed by a separation-individuation phase which was based on experiencing a symbiosis with the analyst that remained inaccessible to the usual analytic work until her healthier ego could regain some confidence through the feeling that a functional relationship with her nurse had been restored. Interpretation had little effect on such an early ego state because interpretation, rather than the response of acceptance, would have confronted her with the traumatic perception of the real loss at age three. The patient needed, as a child does, to 'build up a real experience' of the analyst, before it could be analyzed or other regressive conflict states could be reworked within the frame of the analytic situation. Khan (1960) describes his developing awareness of his role in the analytic situation—'. . . to be *there,* alive, alert, embodied, and vital, but not to impinge with any personal need to translate her affective experiences into their mental correlates. I tried many experiments with modes of being still with her. If I was not all there in my *body-attention* she would register it straight away. I could never quite find out how she registered it, but I could

always sense it had happened by the change in the affective rhythm or a new slant of material emerging next day' (p. 141).

Initially as transferences appear, they are reactions to the failure of well-established coping mechanisms or to the frustrations of long-continued childhood fantasies that someday the child's hopes might come true. The analytic situation is designed to interfere with established defenses and the narcissistic myths of childhood. Such interferences, however, tend to upset a comforting balance and to re-create childhood anxieties and inadequacies. The analytic patient at this point feels alone and on his own, separated from his established sources of self-confidence. He experiences a need for return to the comfort of the early mother-child relationship, the relationship described in Erikson's (1959) term, basic trust, Benedek's (1938) 'emotional shelter', Greenacre's (1954) basic transference, and Stone's (1961) emphasis on humanness, all referring to a need for object responses that might restore security and comfort.

The concepts of the therapeutic alliance defined by Zetzel (1965) and the working alliance of Greenson (1967) refer to these object needs and are currently accepted as steps in the initial stages of the unfolding analytic process. The significance of the analyst's diatrophic attitude and empathically symbiotic responses, described by Spitz (1956) and Gitelson (1962), and Stone's (1961) elaboration of the 'contrapuntal' nature of responses in the analytic relationship, are more recent contributions to the theory of transference and psychoanalytic technique. These terms refer both to the object need which the patient experiences early in the analysis and to the way the analyst responds empathically to the patient's attempts to restore the sense of an auxiliary helper who was originally so necessary for developing an ego that could gradually separate and individuate a self-system. The patient comes to the analyst for help, as the child comes to the mother for 'refueling'. With this revival of a symbiotic need the analyst serves as an auxiliary ego and builds a working alliance. On that foundation, the patient is able to regress, re-experience childhood conflicts, and resolve them. On

that foundation, other defensive patterns are repeated and other childhood hopes and expectations in relation to childhood objects are released and the images of these childhood objects are externalized in the effort to restore the past. On the foundation of a working empathic symbiotic alliance, a transference neurosis can be experienced and worked through.

When the patient reproduces in the analytic relationship a semblance of the old 'beacon of orientation', it is often experienced by the analyst (or a stepparent or foster parent for children, a spouse or friend for adults) as a resistance against his efforts to help the patient. It operates as a resistance against a working alliance. The trusting and observing function of the ego appears to be out of reach (Khan, 1960).

The first technical task is to understand the patient's need to maintain the internal object world and how he strives to do it. In our cases this need showed itself in two ways. First, the patient resisted giving any significant meaning to the analyst; it seemed as if the analyst did not exist. This form of resistance we recognized as an effort to avoid decathecting the internalized image of the lost parent, as in connection with resistance against mourning. Sechehaye (1956) describes similar resistances in very sick autistic patients who protect themselves against being overwhelmed by frustration by denying the presence of the analyst. Her technique was to make the patient aware of the presence of the analyst by as active a confrontation as the patient could tolerate.

The patient who acted out the object need by fantasizing the analyst as a substitute for the lost object required a different approach. This second pattern more closely resembled a regression in reality testing and the defense of denial in fantasy that is often encountered in the regressed ego state of a transference neurosis. But, this degree of regression is not usually seen in the beginning of an analysis. This form of transference resistance to a working alliance is comparable to what Nunberg (1951) portrays in his classic paper, Transference and Reality. Each of the three cases he described resisted a working alliance

by insisting that the past should not be past and that the analyst should behave as the transference image had behaved, or as the patient wished him to. An observing ego was difficult to bring into operation.

Until these resistances can be overcome, no working alliance can develop and the analytic process is stalemated. When we arrived at an understanding of these patterns as ways of mastering the trauma of object deprivation by reproducing the preloss relationship, we were able to introduce technical interventions that interrupted the defenses so that a working alliance with a functioning observing ego could develop.

Richard Sterba (1934) in his paper on the therapeutic split of the ego has described some of the analyst's responses which facilitate the appearance of the ego's observing function. He says: 'Each separate session gives the analyst various opportunities of employing the term "we", in referring to himself and to the part of the patient's ego which is consonant with reality. The use of the word "we" always means that the analyst is trying to draw that part of the ego over to his side and to place it in opposition to the other part which in the transference is cathected or influenced from the side of the unconscious. We might say that this "we" is the instrument by means of which the therapeutic dissociation of the ego is effected' (p. 121). With our cases, this kind of participation in the analytic work by the analyst seemed to make the analyst's presence felt in spite of defenses against it. It established a feeling of 'coördinates', and assisted the operation of the patient's reality testing function and observing ego. An alliance could be effected when the analyst, recognizing the object need actively, behaved as an auxiliary ego (Gitelson, 1962).

The second line of technique in our cases was aimed at interpreting the avoidance of mourning work and the consequent arrest in development. This technique employed well-timed confrontation with the denial of a loss and an effort to help the patient recall memories about the dead parent. Talking about the parent assisted in the recognition that what was being re-

called was past and that actual separation was final. Talking about feelings for the deceased parent brought out ambivalence and guilt which could be relieved by interpretations of the transference nature of the feelings. Such interpretations effected a discrimination between past and present realities and re-enforced a working alliance in the present. These feelings, with their associated ambivalence conflicts, returned later in the analysis when a more classical transference neurosis appeared.

Several cases have been published on the treatment of children close to the time of the loss where the therapeutic efforts were directed toward correcting the feelings of responsibility for causing the parent to die (Weinreb, 1960). In our adults the same kind of problem existed. The patient needed help from the analyst in correcting this defensive distortion of reality and a long continued belief in magical thinking.

In the first case in our series, there was a double pattern of denial of grief and of acting out the preloss relationship with her father through her persistently adolescent behavior and fantasies of attachments to older men. This pattern of relating had existed for fourteen years before anxiety about graduating caused her to seek help. In another case, a stereotyped pattern of relating to authority figures had existed for thirty years. With each of these patients, the usual initial analytic attitude of expectant waiting was not enough object response to initiate a working alliance. If that tactic had been followed in the second case, a form of transference resistance would have resulted that would have permitted the patient to slip into a reliving of a preloss relationship which would have continued the denial of the father's death and blocked the analytic process.

With the second patient such a stalemate did occur during five years of work with another analyst. In this instance, the patient was adept at going through the motions of analysis without getting anywhere. He used the analyst as an extension of his own reality testing function but did not accomplish a detachment either from the lost father or from his analyst, the transference father. The paternal function of setting limits or

of distinguishing reality issues was assigned to the analyst. This gave the analytic relationship meaning and it gave security to the self while assisting the ego in control of drives. The patient unconsciously felt himself to be a middle adolescent. Everyday living had become unconsciously a 'make-believe'. Persistent interpretation of his denial of his father's death mobilized grief which had been absent at the time of death and for the most part since then. (There had been no tears or sadness at the termination of the relationship with his first analyst either.) His second analyst made his presence obvious with 'mmhms' and comments acknowledging the analyst's awareness of the patient's anxiety, struggle, frustration, etc., coupled with active encouragement to talk about his father. This technique activated the arrested mourning process and began a process of individuation that led to therapeutic regression and an analyzable transference neurosis.

Parent-loss cases behave like children in adult clothing and need to be treated that way in the beginning. They either ignore separation anxiety much longer than in the usual analysis or they demonstrate excessive separation anxiety. The reliving of childhood separation experiences in the therapeutic situation constitutes an important stimulus for the activation of the process of mourning. Separation by week ends, vacations, or cancellations tend in the beginning to be experienced as the original trauma was and if interpreted as such assist the patient to begin to struggle out of the past into the present. At this point in the therapeutic relationship, the patient knows the difference but is compelled to disavow the reality and to behave as if the therapist were the lost parent; for instance, the young man who was compelled to walk by the analyst's office building at night looking for a light to reassure himself that the analyst was still alive. Interpretation is aimed at the defensive denial plus the acting out of the need to feel the parent is alive. At the proper time this interpretation is coupled with confrontation of the make-believe self-image and of the cost

which his present-day self must pay to maintain the fiction that he is still the child he was at the time of loss.

These techniques have therapeutic value in that they bring into clear focus the defensive function of the reproduction of the past. However, the therapist must avoid the pitfall of indefinitely accepting the patient's transference expectation for purposes of meeting an early object need. Such a compensatory supply has value in the beginning, but indefinite acceptance fails to help the patient differentiate the past from the present and can re-enforce the state of arrested development in the ego and self-system. The compulsion to reproduce the past tends to make a therapeutic relationship interminable and can block the therapeutic process if it continues. This occurs in patients with other pathology as well, but in parent-loss cases the tendency must be given special attention by the therapist since the separation-individuation process, inherent in mourning work, becomes for these patients an essential therapeutic goal.

Treatment of children suffering from early object deprivation where the separations from parents were traumatic but often not final is of course pertinent to our study but can only be summarized here. It has usually involved quite young children, institutionalized or placed under foster home care. Sylvester (1945), B. Rank (1949), Pavenstedt and Andersen (1945), Beres and Obers (1950), and recently Solnit (1970) have reported on treatment efforts that included recognition of object need and a partial restoration of a symbiotic relationship to meet this primitive need before further development could take place. This kind of therapeutic relationship is easier and more frequently used with children than with adults. Alpert (1959) described a similar treatment technique and called it 'corrective object relations'. She explicitly tried to compensate for earlier deficiencies in emotional supplies with the hope that adequate supplies even at a later date would make up for earlier deprivation and so put the course of development on a normal track again. Only after such a symbiosis was established could a

change in the function of the therapist to limit-setting and to assisting the developmental process by frustration experiences and dosed separation take place.

SUMMARY

Two forms of transference resistance which operate against development of a working alliance in the analyses of adults who lost a parent in childhood are described. These resistances reflect the patient's ways of coping with the loss of external 'coördinates' before his childhood ego is able to organize object images and to individuate a confident self-image. Such internal organization of early symbiotic experiences provides resources to protect against later stresses of developmental separations and encounters with painful reality.

Object deprivation in childhood tends to perpetuate an intense and immature ego-object-need which distorts the reality of later object relations in the service of trying to restore a sense of the presence of the object needed for development. The parent-loss patient requires special responses from the analyst in tune with the level of object need to aid in the functioning of an observing ego and to interrupt the transference defenses against grief and mourning. The analyst's empathically symbiotic responses provide a temporary substitute for the 'coördinates', necessary for 'refueling' throughout childhood and adolescence, a diatrophic alliance for continuing growth that was prematurely interrupted by early parental loss.

The analyst's knowledge of the effect of separation experiences, with their potential for trauma but also for normal development, will enable him to recognize the problem of interrupted mourning work and facilitate its continuance to completion. On the basis of such an empathically symbiotic working alliance and a break-through of resistances against mourning work, the psychoanalytic process can proceed and patients suffering from childhood object deprivation can be helped.

REFERENCES

ALPERT, AUGUSTA (1959): Reversibility of Pathological Fixations Associated with Maternal Deprivation in Infancy. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XIV,* pp. 169-185. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

ALTSCHUL, SOL (1968): *Denial and Ego Arrest.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XVI, pp. 301-318.

BENEDEK, THERESE (1938): *Adaptation to Reality in Early Infancy.* This QUARTERLY, VII, pp. 200-215.

——— (1949): *The Psychosomatic Implications of the Primary Unit: Mother-Child.* Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., XIX, pp. 642-654.

——— (1956): *Toward the Biology of the Depressive Constellation.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., IV, pp. 389-427.

BERES, DAVID and OBERS, SAMUEL J. (1950): The Effects of Extreme Deprivation in Infancy on Psychic Structure in Adolescence. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. V,* pp. 212-235. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

BOWLBY, JOHN (1960): Grief and Mourning in Infancy and Early Childhood. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XV,* pp. 9-52. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

——— (1961): *Processes of Mourning.* Int. J. Psa., XLII, pp. 317-340.

BROCKMAN, D. (1968): *Report of a Parent-Loss Analysis.* Read at Parent-Loss Workshop, Chicago.

DEUTSCH, HELENE (1937): *Absence of Grief.* This QUARTERLY, VI, pp. 12-22.

EISSLER, KURT R. (1953): *The Effect of the Structure of the Ego on Psychoanalytic Technique.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., I, pp. 104-143.

ERIKSON, ERIK H. (1959): *Identity and the Life Cycle. Selected Papers.* Psychological Issues, I, No. 1, Monograph 1. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

FLEMING, JOAN (1963): The Evolution of a Research Project in Psychoanalysis. In: *Counterpoint. Libidinal Object and Subject. A Tribute to René A. Spitz on His 75th Birthday.* Edited by Herbert S. Gaskill. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 75-105.

——— and ALTSCHUL, SOL (1963): *Activation of Mourning and Growth by Psychoanalysis.* Int. J. Psa., XLIV, pp. 419-431.

———; ALTSCHUL, SOL; ZIELINSKI, VICTOR; FORMAN, MAX (1958): *The Influence of Parent-Loss in Childhood on Personality Development.* Read at Meeting of Amer. Psa. Assn., May, 1958.

FORMAN, MAX (1966): *Resistances and Defenses Against the Work of Mourning.* Read at Meeting of Amer. Psa. Assn., May, 1966.

FREUD, ANNA and BURLINGHAM, DOROTHY (1944): *Infants without Families: The Case For and Against Residential Nurseries.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

FREUD (1911): *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning.* Standard Edition, XII, pp. 218-226.

——— (1917 [1915]): *Mourning and Melancholia.* Standard Edition, XIV, pp. 243-258.

——— (1923): *The Ego and the Id.* Standard Edition, XIX, pp. 12-59.

FURMAN, ROBERT A. (1964): Death and the Young Child: Some Preliminary Considerations. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XIX,* pp. 321-333. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

GITELSON, MAXWELL (1962): *The Curative Factors in Psycho-Analysis: The First Phase of Psycho-Analysis.* Int. J. Psa., XLIII, pp. 194-205.

GREENACRE, PHYLLIS (1954): *The Role of Transference. Practical Considerations in Relation to Psychoanalytic Therapy.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., II, pp. 671-684.

GREENSON, RALPH R. (1967): *Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis.* London: Hogarth Press, Ltd.; New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

——— and WEXLER, MILTON (1969): *The Non-Transference Relationship in the Psychoanalytic Situation.* Int. J. Psa., L, pp. 27-39.

HARTMANN, HEINZ (1939): *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958.

——— (1950): Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. V,* pp. 74-96. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

——— (1953): Contribution to the Metapsychology of Schizophrenia. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. VIII,* pp. 177-198. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

——— (1956): *The Development of the Ego Concept in Freud's Work.* Int. J. Psa., XXXVII, pp. 425-438.

——— and KRIS, ERNST (1945): The Genetic Approach in Psychoanalysis. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. I,* pp. 11-30. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

———; KRIS, ERNST; LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. (1946): Comments on the Formation of Psychic Structure. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. II,* pp. 11-38. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

HILGARD, JOSEPHINE R. (1953): *Anniversary Reactions in Parents Precipitated by Children.* Psychiatry, XVI, pp. 73-80.

JACOBSON, EDITH (1964): *The Self and the Object World.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

KHAN, M. MASUD R. (1960): *Regression and Integration in the Analytic Setting.* Int. J. Psa., XLI, pp. 130-146.

KRIS, ERNST (1947): The Nature of Psychoanalytic Propositions and Their Validation. In: *Freedom and Experience.* Edited by S. K. Hook and M. R. Konwitz. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, pp. 239-259.

LEONARD, MARJORIE R. (1966): *Fathers and Daughters. The Significance of 'Fathering' in Psychosexual Development of the Girl.* Int. J. Psa., XLVII, pp. 325-334.

LOEWALD, HANS W. (1960); *On the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis.* Int. J. Psa., XLI, pp. 16-33.

——— (1970): *On Internationalization.* Read at Meeting of Amer. Psa. Assn., December, 1970.

MAHLER, MARGARET S. (1968): *On Human Symbiosis and the Vicissitudes of Individuation: Vol. I, Infantile Psychosis.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

NAGERA, HUMBERTO (1970): Children's Reactions to the Death of Important Objects. A Developmental Approach. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XXV,* pp. 360-400. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

NUNBERG, HERMAN (1951): *Transference and Reality.* Int. J. Psa., XXXII, pp. 1-9.

PAVENSTEDT, ELEANOR and ANDERSEN, IRENE (1945): The Uncompromising Demand of a Three-Year Old for Her Own Mother. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. I,* pp. 211-231. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

POLLOCK, GEORGE H. (1961): *Mourning and Adaptation.* Int. J. Psa., XLII, pp. 341-361.

——— (1964): *On Symbiosis and Symbiotic Neurosis.* Int. J. Psa., XLV, pp. 1-30.

RADO, SANDOR (1958): Psychotherapy: A Problem of Controlled Intercommunication. In: *Psychopathology of Communication.* Edited by Paul H. Hoch and Joseph Zubin. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., pp. 214-226.

RANK, BEATA (1949): *Adaptation of the Psychoanalytic Technique for the Treatment of Young Children with Atypical Development.* Amer. J. Orthopsychiat., XIX, pp. 130-139.

ROCHLIN, GREGORY (1953): Loss and Restitution. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. VIII,* pp. 288-309. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

SECHEHAYE, MARGUERITE (1956): *The Transference in Symbolic Realization.* Int. J. Psa., XXXVII, pp. 270-277.

SEIDENBERG, HENRY (1966): *Resistance in the Initial Phase of an Analysis: A Case of Childhood Parent-Loss.* Read at Meeting of Amer. Psa. Assn., May, 1966.

SOLNIT, ALBERT J. (1970): A Study of Object Loss in Infancy. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XXV,* pp. 257-272. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

SPIEGEL, LEO A. (1959): The Self, the Sense of Self, and Perception. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XIV,* pp. 81-109. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

SPITZ, RENÉ A. (1945): Hospitalism. An Inquiry into the Genesis of Psychiatric Conditions in Early Childhood. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. I,* pp. 53-74. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

——— (1956): *Transference: The Analytical Setting and Its Prototype.* Int. J. Psa., XXXVII, pp. 380-385.

——— (1959): *A Genetic Field Theory of Ego Formation. Its Implication for Pathology.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

——— and COBLINER, W. GEOFFREY (1965): *The First Year of Life. A Psychoanalytic Study of Normal and Deviant Development of Object Relations.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

STEELE, B. F. and POLLOCK C. B. (1968): A Psychiatric Study of Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children. In: *The Battered Child.* Edited by Ray E. Helfer and C. Henry Kempe. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, pp. 103-147.

STERBA, RICHARD (1934): *The Fate of the Ego in Analytic Therapy.* Int. J. Psa., XV, pp. 117-126.

STONE, LEO (1961): *The Psychoanalytic Situation. An Examination of Its Development and Essential Nature.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

SYLVESTER, EMMY (1945): Analysis of Psychogenic Anorexia and Vomiting in a Four-Year-Old Child. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. I.*, pp. 167-187. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

TAUSK, VICTOR (1913): *Compensation as a Means of Discounting the Motive of Repression.* Int. J. Psa., V, 1924, pp. 130-140.

WEINREB, JOSEPH (1960): *Vicissitudes in the Treatment of Patients Who Lost a Parent During the Active Œdipal Period.* Read at Meeting of Amer. Orthopsychiat. Assn., Chicago.

WETMORE, ROBERT J. (1963): *The Role of Grief in Psycho-Analysis.* Int. J. Psa., XLIV, pp. 97-103.

WOLFENSTEIN, MARTHA (1966): How Is Mourning Possible? In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XXI,* pp. 93-123. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

——— (1969): Loss, Rage, and Repetition. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XXIV,* pp. 432-460. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

ZETZEL, ELIZABETH R. (1965): *The Theory of Therapy in Relation to a Developmental Model of the Psychic Apparatus.* Int. J. Psa., XLVI, pp. 39-52.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Freudian Models and Clinical Stance

Samuel Abrams

To cite this article: Samuel Abrams (1972) Freudian Models and Clinical Stance, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 50-57, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11926587

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11926587

Published online: 10 Nov 2017.

FREUDIAN MODELS AND CLINICAL STANCE

BY SAMUEL ABRAMS, M.D. (NEW YORK)

This scene may be a typical one in many clinical case seminars. The presenting analyst describes material from a patient somewhat in this fashion.

> The patient omitted her customary darting glance as she approached the couch. She lay down and adjusted herself and her clothing with some difficulty. As she spoke she stroked an earring slowly and apparently without awareness. There was a depressive affective tone.
>
> She complained that she had been overlooked as a possible candidate for a higher position at her place of employment. She had been thinking about this the evening before and the tension it created had made falling asleep difficult. In fact, she remembered, this was an old chronic symptom. She recalled certain necessary night rituals, such as wrapping a blanket tightly about herself or checking to be certain that the bedroom door was firmly closed. A few days earlier she had thrown a boy friend out of her apartment after some pleasurable intimacies; she could not endure the thought of his spending the entire night at her place. She was aware of his stares and felt exposed and ashamed.
>
> She spoke of her propensity to assume façades. Then she remembered that her mother always could see through her as a little girl; there was just no way of keeping secrets from 'that woman'. She then complained about the value of her session. What good was freudian analysis anyway? She thought of a movie which depicted a psychiatrist with wild secret sexual escapades. She expressed concern about being duped by charlatans.
>
> After a moment's pause she described this: suddenly, she was

Read at the panel, Models of the Psychic Apparatus, at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, San Francisco, May 8, 1970.

From the Psychoanalytic Institute, Division of Psychoanalytic Education, Downstate Medical Center, Brooklyn, New York.

> mentally drawing triangles on the office wall; specifically, she found herself emphasizing the borders around the enclosed spaces thus formed and sharply distinguishing them from the remaining outside wall area.

At this point in the seminar, something in the cadence of the presenter's voice, or in his tone, suggests to his colleagues that the time has come for their participation.

The first member of the group assumes this posture in respect to the clinical material. There is a great deal of aggression building up in the patient. The resulting tension induces a disturbance in sleep and a depression. Her relationships in general are adversely influenced; for example, once her sexual need is discharged with her boy friend, her aggression takes over and she throws him out. She is so hostile that she cannot even look at the analyst. The presence of this impelling force intensifies her conflicts, strains her controls, and may induce altered mental states that may further impair her ability to coöperate and communicate verbally in the hour. Therapeutic progress requires *analyzing* the aggression so that it can achieve more direct expression.

The second colleague adopts the following stance. He is struck by the manifest hostility but sees this as obscuring the deeper latent unconscious sexuality. Shame and guilt are resistances, operating to interfere with the patient's conscious recognition of her erotic wishes. The evidence for this is her difficulty in adjusting herself and her clothing on the couch, the symbolic play with the earring, the obvious and subtle sexual references, the fussing with the bedroom door, and the reference to 'Freud'—always sexual—and wild psychiatrists. He speculates that her concern over invasion of privacy relates to a feared penetration and that the 'triangle' is a pictorial representation and projection of the female pubic area. She must be helped to know all this by *interpretation*: by translating the deep unconscious sexuality into her conscious awareness.

The third analyst has this perspective. He describes the sexual wishes as scopophilic and exhibitionistic; he believes there is

an oral admixture. Specifically, he notes the transference: her avoidance of looking, her comments about the wild psychiatrist with his erotic abandon, and her shame at being looked at. The absence of the father in her associations reflects repression. The central conflict, he suggests, is œdipal; hence the 'triangle' and her rage at being overlooked at her job. He expects emergence of references to the primal scene once a *reconstruction* of the infantile incestuous attachment to the father is made through analysis of the transference neurosis.

The fourth analyst takes note of the specifics of regression. He cites the patient's moving backward from her confrontation with her feared drive derivatives. A basic intersystemic conflict is being engaged on an old battlefield. She is wary of engulfment and uncertain of the boundaries between inner and outer, and self and object. He cites the following evidence for the existence of a fear of fusion: the sleep disturbance, the inability to tolerate the prolonged presence of a man, her mother's excessive attachment, the evidence of concern about analytic closeness, the issue of façades and duping, and the final emphasizing of boundaries in her pictorial projection. Treatment will require work in this area so that *structural differentiation and concomitant object constancy* can be stabilized to permit a total developmental movement in the treatment process.

Other stances may also emerge at clinical conferences. Invariably there is 'the guardian of nosology', who wonders about the possibility of psychosis, and usually there is a 'countertransference watchdog'. However, these four ways of addressing oneself toward what the patient offers, integrating and overlapping each with the other, characterize basic psychoanalytic attitudes in the therapeutic situation. It is possible to derive them from four distinct freudian models of the psychic apparatus: the entropic, the reflex arc, the genetic or Darwinian, and the neural integration hierarchies of Hughlings Jackson (Rapaport, 1960, pp. 20-24). These fundamental designs, and the concepts which cluster about them, serve to mold and encourage specific therapeutic points of view.

The entropic or energic model is derived from Freud's interest in build-up and release of energy. Rooted in hydrodynamic analogy and mechanics, it is a heritage of nineteenth-century physicalistic physiologists (Bernfeld, 1944; Ramzy, 1956). Out of this springs instinctual drive theory, fundamental 'principles', certain attitudes toward affects derived from 'catharsis', the theory that frustration leads to aggression, psychic determinism, and the rationale of the use of free association. Maxims arise: 'Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences' (Freud and Breuer, 1893-1895, p. 7) and depression is aggression 'turned round upon the . . . self' (Freud, 1917 [1915], p. 251). There appear also mathematical allusions to 'equivalents', 'conversions', 'mechanisms', or 'consequences of automaticity'. This model of the mind produces clinical explanations utilizing 'eruptions' or 'break-throughs', the traditional logistics in the management of acting out, part of the theory of working through (Freud, 1914, pp. 155-156), and the rule of abstinence. The analogy of a foreign body in living tissue (Freud and Breuer, 1893-1895, p. 22), its effects and the approach to management it necessitates, are vivid, and tend to make an indelible imprint upon the clinician.

The reflex arc or topographic model is fashioned after the neurological teachings of Ernst Brücke (Amacher, 1966, pp. 17, ff.) which led Freud (1900-1901) to write: 'Reflex processes remain the model of every psychical function' (p. 538). This design emphasizes the necessity of discharge but adds the required direction. Accumulating energy moves toward the 'motor' end of consciousness, but must pass through several layered 'agencies' or 'systems' (pp. 537, ff.). Psychopathology arises when there are significant resistances to energic disposal. The therapeutic task is to clear the pathways and thus free these noxious unconscious elements for harmless discharge. And in this model the intrinsic noxiousness of these elements is clearly alluded to by Freud (1913) originally as 'toxic' notions and later through specific images and analogies, such as 'riff-raff' (pp. 135-136, n.), or 'youthful delinquents' (p. 142),

and 'masked criminals' (Freud, 1925, p. 132). The preferential exit route for these unwelcome elements is knowledge; hence the motto for this model: 'making conscious what is unconscious' (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 435). Once the 'deep' elements are unearthed, they automatically decompose, much like the antiquities exposed by archeologists (Freud, 1909, p. 176). The pictures Freud (1900-1901) drew in The Interpretation of Dreams visually imprint the need for movement and the consequences of obstacles to such movement (pp. 537, ff.). These and concomitant analogies forge a formidable link between topography and the clinician. The analyst's attention is expected to be regularly on 'levels' and especially on the 'depths'. The picturesque images of below and above or 'upwards', of surface and depth, are to prove useful in the everyday logistics of practice (Freud, 1923 [1922], p. 111; Loewenstein, 1951). And out of this model is derived the ultimate pact between every analyst and every analysand: 'If we only *knew*'.

The third basic model is the genetic or evolutionary one influenced largely by the theories of Darwin and Lamarck (Ramzy, 1956, pp. 116-117; Rapaport, 1960, p. 20). This model comprises several elements: 1, the view of ontogenetic sequences and their tie to phylogeny; 2, the struggle between biological processes and their environment; 3, the insight that the present is largely determined in the past.

This model adds the following: the noxious pathogenic accumulations derive from the past, the product of ontogeny and circumstance. Hence the maxim, 'The child is father to the man'. The sexual drives as the source of species survival especially are a contribution of ontogeny. Thus, the libidinal phases specifically become central coördinates of psychological development. This influences the creation of pithy sayings such as 'Psychoneuroses are . . . the *negative* of perversions' (Freud, 1905[1901], p. 50); it evokes impressive images like 'dammed up' libidinal streams (p. 51) and stimulates the revision of all psychiatric nomenclature along oral, anal, and genital nodal points (Abraham, 1924).

Developmentally, infantile sexuality and its interaction with the parents achieves its ultimate significance in the nuclear œdipus complex, a repository of circumstance and fantasy. And all this appears clinically in the transference, which carries the coded messages of phylogeny, ontogeny, and experience. The careful arrangements about fees and scheduling, the procedural requirements of the hour, the limitations on extra-analytic contacts, the need for therapeutic indifference, and the waiver of ambition, are all natural outgrowths of the discovery of this process. The therapeutic aim becomes mastery 'of this new, artificial neurosis' (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 444), the 'field' of battle upon which the final 'victory' is won (Freud, 1912, p. 108). This brings biology and history into an awesome immediate present; and at the same time it stimulates development of technical aphorisms of somewhat dubious value (Brenner, 1969, pp. 347, ff.).

The fourth and final freudian model is that of hierarchically placed structures, fashioned somewhat after Hughlings Jackson's theories of neurological functioning (Amacher, 1966; S. Jackson, 1969; Jaffe, 1969). This model focuses on the progressive development of psychological structures, but notes that later ones dynamically inhibit earlier ones. Those earlier ones, however, continue to persist in potential. Of special importance are two matters: the progressive-regressive processes, and the concept of fundamental intersystemic antagonisms. These antagonisms are clearly portrayed in Freud's pictorial images (1923, p. 24; 1933 [1932], p. 78), his horse and rider analogy (1923, p. 25), his recommended therapeutic maxim, 'Where id was, there ego shall be' (1933 [1932], p. 80), and leave no doubt as to the sense of struggle as well as the hoped for outcome of the treatment. Descriptive images in the psychoanalytic literature of battlegrounds, armies, weapons, victories, and war censors (Freud, 1916-1917, p. 445; 1912, p. 104, n.; p. 108) facilitate the promotion of the concept of the centrality of conflict. This extends naturally to an interest in the intrasystemic functions of such structural antagonists as defenses, anxiety,

synthesis, and self and object relationships. The 'process' aspect, also explicit in the Jacksonian model, is reflected in certain clinical concerns about regression, such as adjusting the level, distinguishing controlled from uncontrolled, and isolating the special effects of impairments of individual functions. In addition there is a necessary attention to the process of progression, for example, in the theories of sublimation and secondary autonomies, in the achievement of genital primacy, and in assessing equipment available for the therapeutic alliance.

In brief, then, the traditional psychoanalytic positionings of our colleagues at the clinical case seminar derive from these prototypes: the entropic model emphasizes a commitment to forces and quantities, the reflex arc design introduces levels and the depths for use, the Darwinian construct highlights sex and the transference for implementation, and the Jacksonian view emphasizes structures in conflict and processes in action.

This brief review attempts to draw attention to models of psychic function as determinants of clinical stance. In Freud's (1940 [1938]) words, such models reflect the '. . . nature and limitation of our science' (p. 196). They are mere approximations, translations of an unknown reality 'back into the language of our perceptions' (p. 196). There are advantages and disadvantages inherent in them and in the attitudes they influence. Our work is so difficult, the existential realities of the mind still so distant from direct scrutiny, that these or any other models which permit us to formulate points of view and therapeutic strategem should be welcome.

Nevertheless, there is a danger. Models and stances are primarily designed to facilitate the transition from helplessness to mastery. However, some clinicians may continue to cling to them, even after their heuristic function is over. They may do so because of the power of tradition, the attraction of current fashion, or the lure of illusory success. Under such circumstances, models, and the postures they promote, may become simply fetishistic fascinations unto themselves.

REFERENCES

ABRAHAM, KARL (1924): A Short Study of the Development of the Libido, Viewed in the Light of Mental Disorders. In: *Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis.* London: Hogarth Press, Ltd., 1927. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1953, pp. 418-501.

AMACHER, PETER (1966): *Freud's Neurological Education and Its Influence on Psychoanalytic Theory.* Psychological Issues, IV, No. 4, Monograph 6. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

BERNFELD, SIEGFRIED (1944): *Freud's Earliest Theories and the School of Helmholtz.* This QUARTERLY, XIII, pp. 341-362.

BRENNER, CHARLES (1969): *Some Comments on Technical Precepts in Psychoanalysis.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XVII, pp. 333-352.

FREUD and BREUER, JOSEF (1893-1895): *Studies on Hysteria.* Standard Edition, II, pp. 3-305.

FREUD (1900-1901): *The Interpretation of Dreams.* Standard Edition, IV, V.

——— (1905 [1901]): *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria.* Standard Edition, VII, pp. 7-122.

——— (1909): *Notes Upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis.* Standard Edition, X, pp. 155-318.

——— (1912): *The Dynamics of Transference.* Standard Edition, XII, pp. 99-108.

——— (1913): *On Beginning of Treatment.* Standard Edition, XII, pp. 123-144.

——— (1914): *Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through.* Standard Edition, XII, pp. 147-156.

——— (1916-1917 [1915-1917]): *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis.* Standard Edition, XVI, pp. 243-463.

——— (1917 [1915]): *Mourning and Melancholia.* Standard Edition, XIV, pp. 243-258.

——— (1923): *The Ego and the Id.* Standard Edition, XIX, pp. 12-59.

——— (1923 [1922]): *Remarks on the Theory and Practice of Dream-Interpretation.* Standard Edition, XIX, pp. 109-121.

——— (1925): *Some Additional Notes on Dream-Interpretation as a Whole.* Standard Edition, XIX, pp. 127-138.

——— (1933 [1932]): *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis.* Standard Edition, XXII, pp. 5-182.

——— (1940 [1938]): *An Outline of Psycho-Analysis.* Standard Edition, XXIII, pp. 144-207.

JACKSON, STANLEY W. (1969): *The History of Freud's Concept of Regression.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XVII, pp. 743-784.

JAFFE, RUTH (1969): *Psychoanalytic Classification and Theories.* Israel Annals of Psychiatry, VII, pp. 145-157.

LOEWENSTEIN, RUDOLPH M. (1951): *The Problem of Interpretation.* This QUARTERLY, XX, pp. 1-14.

RAMZY, ISHAK (1956): *From Aristotle to Freud.* Bull. Menninger Clinic, XX, pp. 112-123.

RAPAPORT, DAVID (1960): *The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory. A Systematizing Attempt.* Psychological Issues, II, No. 2, Monograph 6. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

A Special Form of Survivor Syndrome

Stephen M. Sonnenberg

To cite this article: Stephen M. Sonnenberg (1972) A Special Form of Survivor Syndrome, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 58-62, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11926588

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11926588

Published online: 10 Nov 2017.

A SPECIAL FORM OF SURVIVOR SYNDROME

BY STEPHEN M. SONNENBERG, M.D. (WASHINGTON, D. C.)

CASE REPORT

A woman was first seen several months after her husband had died following cardiac transplantation. She had gone into mourning and cried freely at the time, but was indignant about the failure of the surgery. She felt her husband should not have chosen surgery knowing that there was a chance he would not survive and would leave her widowed; she had cared for him 'devotedly' during his nine-year illness. While she admired his intelligence and bravery in deciding to undergo 'experimental' surgery, she expressed anger about his selfishness as he could have lived for many years without surgery. Her husband and the surgeon had insisted that she give her permission for the operation. When it proved unsuccessful, she felt like 'a failure in the eyes of the world'—guilty and worthless as though she had 'committed a great crime'.

When first seen the patient was anxious and depressed; she cried constantly and spoke of suicide. After once-a-week treatment began, she brought out many past memories associated with feelings of guilt. An older sister, with whom she had migrated to the United States, died several years after they arrived; she had felt guilty at the time because she had not been close enough to her sister during the last years of her life. She also expressed feelings of guilt concerning the murder of her parents and younger sisters by the Nazis. When she discussed signing permission for her husband's surgery, she spoke of her sons whom she considered emotionally defective and incapable of separating from her, and blamed herself for the way they

The author wishes to thank Drs. William G. Niederland and Norman Margolis; both provided advice and assistance which brought clarity to the material presented in this paper.

had developed. Because of her chronic, severe feelings of guilt, the patient's experience with her husband was unusually painful and after his death her belief in her own worthlessness became even stronger.

A number of dreams revealed her ambivalent feelings toward her husband. In one dream a young girl plunged a knife into her husband's chest while the patient slept beside him in their bed. Her associations to this dream were that she wished he were alive, that he had survived the surgery. She went on to speak of longstanding resentment toward her husband and mother-in-law. As an immigrant girl she had longed for a close family and had missed her own mother, but instead of finding such closeness after her marriage, she was resented by her mother-in-law. In turn, she resented her husband's family and was angry that he did not provide the close relationship she needed.

In another dream she found herself in an oceanside 'paradise', a lush countryside all around her. She felt lost. Her associations led to anger at her husband for leaving her; she felt she could not function on her own and needed him to take care of her. Further, because she had signed for the surgery she felt like a 'murderer'.

Frequently as she dozed, awakened from a nap, or was just 'sitting around the house', she thought she 'saw' her husband standing by an open closet door. He had often expressed anger when she left doors ajar, and now in her vision he would repeat over and over again, 'You don't respect me . . . respect your husband!'. In this dissociated state she felt guilty but unafraid. She knew he was not there, but she could not understand how her mind could play such tricks on her. When her husband appeared in additional dreams, he was healthy and had not had surgery. Her associations to these dreams included happiness and she recalled that after he became ill, he needed her more and was more attentive to her. She enjoyed this attention and the new-found feeling of closeness in her marriage, and was able to feel pride in herself as a good nurse. But she then expressed

feelings of guilt because her life had become more enjoyable after her husband became a cardiac invalid.

Despite her recognition of the themes emerging from understanding of memories and dreams, this patient showed no symptomatic change during her treatment. She had always been an unhappy person, but after her husband's death she suffered unremitting depression and increased feelings of guilt.

DISCUSSION

Unlike the classic psychic structural state of depression described by Freud (1917 [1915]) and Jacobson (1953), this patient's self and object representations remained distinct and separate. The intersystemic conflict that produced the feeling of guilt had to be explained without invoking an identification with the lost object. The clinical picture might best be explained as a form of 'survivor syndrome', a term first used by Niederland.

In a symposium on psychic traumatization through social catastrophe, Winnik (1968) expressed the view that the survivor syndrome represents a fundamental psychobiological change which may be resistant to treatment. He added that the older individual may experience the worst, and least remediable, effect of the trauma. Simenauer (1968) noted that the *duration* of an intense traumatic experience is not the crucial determinant of a resulting psychopathological change. Jaffe (1968) noted that dissociative phenomena are frequently found in survivors, and explained these experiences in terms of a re-experiencing of the traumatic event, often associated with feelings of guilt. Niederland (1968) described the survivor syndrome as 'characterized by the persistence of multiple symptoms among which chronic depression and anxiety reactions, . . . personality changes, and . . . somatization prevail' (p. 313). He went on to describe psychotic-like experiences in this group of patients.

The decisive factor in producing the survivor syndrome appears to be the intensity of the external catastrophe experienced by the survivor. A severe trauma may produce untoward and

irreversible changes even in apparently mature individuals. Prominent among these changes is a lifelong feeling of guilt about the death of others, which is inaccessible to reality testing.

My patient appears to have experienced a survivor syndrome. Her husband's death following heart transplantation was an overwhelming trauma. (According to Niederland, many 'civilian' tragedies give rise to the survivor syndrome.) A dynamic source for her guilt was her unconscious dependency which led to her wish that her husband be ill. With his death, she not only felt guilt concerning him but she lost the opportunity to expiate her long-standing guilt by being a good nurse. In her unconscious, it was as if she had willed the suffering of her past loved ones in an effort to be close to them. Thus, guilt over past events became overwhelming. It would seem that this patient was a guilt-laden woman who lost a guilt-expiating object and at the same time underwent an experience that confirmed her past and present guilt. Signing for 'experimental' surgery was perhaps the final burden, and her obsession over it became clear in her treatment. While she insisted that her husband's good health had been her goal, she also felt that she was a 'murderer'. Depression was present when anger at the lost object was conscious and when identification with the lost object did not exist. It was the strength of her guilt that made her feel so hopeless and depressed, an observation consonant with Bibring's (1953) description of the dynamics of depression.

These observations suggest the possibility that those who develop the survivor syndrome are guilt-laden individuals who have lost objects which were the recipients of guilt-expiating activity. These objects were previously the subject of unconscious aggressive fantasies or wishes which come to coincide with real, external events. The ensuing increase in feelings of guilt then results in the survivor syndrome (Margolis, 1970).

The psychological response to new forms of surgery, both in patients and their families, should be examined from the point of view of the survivor syndrome. We must be aware of the par-

ticular stress that the family member undergoes when signing the permission for 'experimental' surgery.

REFERENCES

BIBRING, EDWARD (1953): The Mechanism of Depression. In: *Affective Disorders.* Edited by Phyllis Greenacre. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 13-48.

FREUD (1917 [1915]): *Mourning and Melancholia.* Standard Edition, XIV, pp. 243-258.

JACOBSON, EDITH (1953): Contribution to the Metapsychology of Cyclothymic Depression. In: *Affective Disorders.* Edited by Phyllis Greenacre. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 49-83.

JAFFE, RUTH (1968): *Dissociative Phenomena in Former Concentration Camp Inmates.* Int. J. Psa., XLIX, pp. 310-312.

MARGOLIS, NORMAN (1970): Personal communication.

NIEDERLAND, WILLIAM G. (1968): *Clinical Observations on the 'Survivor Syndrome'.* Int. J. Psa., XLIX, pp. 313-315.

SIMENAUER, ERICH (1968): *Late Psychic Sequelae of Man-Made Disasters.* Int. J. Psa., XLIX, pp. 306-309.

WINNIK, H. Z. (1968): *Contribution to Symposium on Psychic Traumatization through Social Catastrophe.* Int. J. Psa., XLIX, pp. 298-301.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Eugene O'Neill and Falling in Love

Joseph D. Lichtenberg & Charlotte Lichtenberg

To cite this article: Joseph D. Lichtenberg & Charlotte Lichtenberg (1972) Eugene O'Neill and Falling in Love, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 63-89, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11926589

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11926589

EUGENE O'NEILL AND FALLING IN LOVE

BY JOSEPH D. LICHTENBERG, M.D. AND CHARLOTTE LICHTENBERG, M.L.A. (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

The falling in love of late adolescence-early adulthood (the feeling state of intense attraction to, and desire and affection for, a highly valued love object) was an important phase in the psychosexual development of the playwright Eugene O'Neill. Seeking to synthesize 'the unsensual, heavenly love and the sensual, earthly love' (Freud, 1921, p. 112) so as to achieve 'the focusing of all desires upon a single object' (Freud, 1905, p. 200) became for O'Neill an ego-syntonic urge that exerted a positive influence on his life and his creative work. His first attempt in his late adolescent-early adult years, a romantic experience and brief marriage, was a failure which marked a significant turning point in his life. The conflicts that doomed this effort and hampered him in his two later marriages derived from traumatic residue to which O'Neill gave dramatic representation throughout his extensive career.

We have selected three plays whose underlying central motif is, as we hope to demonstrate, the theme of 'falling in love'. *Mourning Becomes Electra* is a modern rewriting of the myth of the House of Atreus, and is commonly regarded as an O'Neill masterpiece. *Ah, Wilderness!* is a charming, whimsical, light comedy of reminiscence and adolescence. *Days Without End* is a totally unsuccessful hodgepodge of marital infidelity, confession, and religious conversion. A major premise of this study is that while O'Neill could and did experience a strong sense of being in love heterosexually and while he could convey the urge for this affective state with dramatic effectiveness in his plays, per-

Invaluable assistance was given us by Drs. Sarah Tower, Ping-Nie-Pao, and Sidney Lytton.

sonal conflicts which he could not overcome barred his way to the fulfilment of falling in love; that is, to the development of a mature stable relationship with a love object. In *Mourning Becomes Electra,* he brilliantly dramatized the traumatic events and conflicts that can inhibit and destroy the most ardent urge to love and be loved. He wrote convincingly of the adolescent love state in *Ah, Wilderness!.* But when he attempted to portray a mature love relationship, and the difficulties that could arise within it, his conceptualization could not transcend the limitations of his personal experience (*Days Without End*).

Our choice of material—the known facts of O'Neill's life and what can be gleaned from his writing—presents several difficulties. There are the familiar ones of the risk of error implicit in all psychoanalytic studies conducted outside the laboratory of clinical experience. In this instance it is fortunate to have the Gelbs' (1960) factually detailed biography of O'Neill as well as the large body of his work written with almost no conscious attempt to disguise its relationship to his life. However, the inaccessibility of those details of the facts and fantasies of O'Neill's personal sexual life that in analysis confirm the interpretation and reconstruction of crucial psychosexual development leave our efforts more speculative than we would wish. A second difficulty arises when the life of a creative genius is used to illustrate a stage of normal development. As Greenacre (1957) has noted, the creative artist's response to a normal developmental stage expands to a much larger conceptual frame. An occupational choice of a highly original creative nature often does not evolve with the usual phase-specific timing (Shaw [Erikson, 1959], Luther [Erikson, 1958], Van Gogh [Nagera, 1967]). And O'Neill's life illustrates a similar period of painful postponement (psychosocial moratorium [Erikson, 1959]).

Mourning Becomes Electra, Ah, Wilderness!, and *Days Without End* were written consecutively when O'Neill was in his forties. There is a dynamic story in the sequence and timing of their writing. O'Neill wrote them at a time when his inner gaze was directed to the past by the successive deaths of his father

(1920), mother (1922), and brother (1923), and to the future by his efforts to consolidate his third and final marriage in 1929. He was attempting to face and reorganize his conflicts. He had given up smoking and drinking (except for occasional brief but serious drinking lapses) and made an effort to re-enforce his abstinence through a brief (three month) brush with psychoanalysis in 1924. We have chosen to refer only peripherally to O'Neill's childhood traumata and to his deep underlying struggle to resist the regression to his precœdipal ties to his mother, particularly to the fixation point of a symbiotic dream reverie. Thus, our emphasis is on the forward thrusts of the line of development of his object relations.[1]

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

'Love is a word—a shameless, ragged ghost of a word—begging at all doors for life at any price!' says an O'Neill adolescent hero in *The Great God Brown* (p. 266) as he attempts to buoy up his courage to profess his love to his girl. First, however, he must overcome his feeling of living 'in a cage like a criminal, defying and hating' (p. 264). This vacillation between guilt, defying, and hating on the one hand and trying to love on the other, characterized the years of O'Neill's marriages to Agnes Boulton (1917-1929) and Carlotta Monterey (1929-1953), his second and third wives. O'Neill 'demanded an all but impossible ideal of wife-mistress-mother-secretary; a foil for his self-determination; a woman who could understand and appreciate him and devote herself entirely to his artistic aims' (Gelb, 1960, p. 369). He treated both women cruelly only to experience afterwards intermittent bouts of guilt at their suffering. He attempted to compensate them by protestations of love—'the ghost of a dream' of the continuous romantic idyll he hoped marriage would be (p. 145). In spite of the great sensitivity to the relationship between a parent and child evidenced in his writings, he treated his three children with destructive neglect while he

[1] The opposite tendency in O'Neill, the backward pulls in his development, requires separate treatment.

lavished his feeling on the children of his artistic creations. During his years of marriage he engaged in numerous flirtations with women. In addition, his many bouts of drinking, during which he elicited care and nurture from men, gave indication of his passive homosexual attachments to his father and older brother.

The real-life O'Neill in his three marriages and the many alter-egos he created in his plays talk at length of love and try with a touching desperation to make loving succeed. Like many of his heroes and heroines, he could share a period of strong infatuation, but could not permit the relationship to mature beyond this phase without serious contamination by destructive conflictual elements. For O'Neill, husbandness (as Ezra Mannon states in *Mourning Becomes Electra* [p. 54]) 'never lived'. While O'Neill could sense and lament its absence in all his sustained relationships, he continued to swing unpredictably between vain, worldly egotism and shy, naïve helplessness; between drunken violence and gentle, exquisite sensitiveness; between good-humored comradeship and unfeeling exploitation. The dynamism of his paradoxical nature, his intense urge to face the truth about himself and achieve love and loving, was the force that gave power to dramas unprecedented in the American theater. But even in his art, as in his personal relationships, his unresolved conflicts proved a limiting factor.

O'Neill entered prepuberty after a childhood that filled him with feelings of pessimism and suspiciousness. During his first seven years he lived in hotel rooms and backstage in theaters as his mother and he followed his father, James O'Neill, on his continuous tours as the matinee idol, Count of Monte Cristo. Eugene's mother's highly romanticized image of her husband had undergone severe disillusionment and she felt torn between her dependence on him and her desire to be with her children. This was exacerbated when, three years before Eugene's birth in 1888, Edmund, her second child, died at eighteen months of measles contracted from his older brother. In characteristic fashion Mrs. O'Neill, deeply guilty at being away

from the children, accused Jamie, her older child, of murdering Edmund; and before long, the distressed child was exiled to boarding school.

Eugene's birth was a final blow and probably precipitated her becoming a morphine addict. While there is reason to believe Eugene enjoyed moments of great intimacy with his mother, her addiction made her frequently remote and inaccessible to him. Eugene suffered from frequent nightmares; and at the age of seven, when he was sent away to a Catholic boarding school, he was a lonely, isolated boy. Three important blows were to befall him in his prepuberty period, further upsetting his relationship with his principal family members: a paternity suit against his father received widespread publicity; Jamie, who was ten years older than Eugene and whom Eugene had idolized, became clearly alcoholic and was dismissed from college; and—most traumatic of all—Eugene discovered his mother's addiction to drugs by surprising her in the process of giving herself a morphine injection. His startled dismay was compounded by his mother's accusation that he was spying on her. Eugene's state of shock persisted until his father and brother finally informed him of the nature of her illness. Within the aura of blame and counterblame in the O'Neill family, one implied accusation haunted Eugene; it was his birth that 'caused' his mother's addiction. It is indeed likely that along with this guilt, Eugene unconsciously shared Jamie's guilt for Edmund's death.[2] Confirmation of this assumption is furnished by O'Neill's conscious autobiographic drama, *Long Day's Journey Into Night,* in which all of the male family members bear their own first name except himself, to whom he gives the name of the dead child, Edmund.

After the shock of seeing his mother taking morphine, he began to experience severe torments of faith alternating with

[2] Nagera (1967) has noted that 'analytic experience has shown that the second child born in a family where the first one has died, always manages to find himself responsible for it in phantasy even though he might not have been born at the time' (p. 178).

ascetic excesses which he described in *Days Without End.* This struggle eventually ended with total rejection of his Catholic faith. A period of relative calm and happiness began with his admission, at his insistence, to an academically excellent, nonsectarian boarding school, where he remained for four years, leaving at seventeen. There he received the disciplined method and intellectual freedom which his mind desperately needed. As a self-professed agnostic in search of redemption, he began his extensive reading of philosophy, poetry, and politics, preferring to explore most deeply those that took the most extreme positions. These years of relatively peaceful and intellectually productive development were achieved by a massive decathecting of both his religion and his family. Two major problems lay in abeyance: his affectionate desires for women and his choice of a career. He had few dates with respectable girls. Instead, he satisfied his sexual urges with prostitutes whom he romanticized as earth mothers who loved the unmasked idealistic youth exquisitely pained by the sordid world.

In 1906, at eighteen, he entered Princeton. Here, he reacted to the loss of the discipline of his prior school by failing to work academically, by drinking, experimenting with absinthe, and loudly exhibiting his fascination with Nietzsche and anarchism. Soon expelled, he adopted the occupation most available to him, to be an ineffectual, parasitic exploiter of his grumbling but compliant father (as were his mother and brother).

Just after his twenty-first birthday, living the life of a Greenwich Village Bohemian and supported totally by his father, he met, courted, married, and immediately abandoned Kathleen Jenkins, the first respectable girl with whom he had allowed himself contact. Within a few months after their courtship began, Kathleen became pregnant and Eugene announced to his family his interest in her. His father vehemently opposed the marriage, and immediately made arrangements to send Eugene off on a gold mining expedition. One week before he sailed, Eugene and Kathleen were secretly married. Kathleen saw him off, which was to prove their last meeting. Eugene returned

from his unsuccessful trip about the time his son was born. He made no attempt to get in touch with Kathleen, nor did he see the boy until he was twelve.

A dynamic formulation of what O'Neill was attempting in his ill-fated marriage to Kathleen can best be understood through Jacobson's (1964) description of the normal adolescent: 'especially after he begins to permit himself heterosexual genital activities, he will be ready to embark on more enduring and profound love relations, and to approach the problem of his future vocation in a realistic manner' (p. 192). O'Neill was thus attempting to effect a normal completion to his adolescence. That he was able, as is true of many gifted writers, to conceptualize and empathize with a normal development he did not himself experience is revealed in his delightful, sensitive portrayal of adolescent love in *Ah, Wilderness!*. However, O'Neill was unlike his young hero of *Ah, Wilderness!* in two significant respects: he had profoundly disturbing intrapsychic conflicts, and he was not at all close to approaching the problem of his future vocation in a realistic manner. Like all the characters in *Mourning Becomes Electra,* he was still too inextricably tied to his incestuous love objects to form an adult object relationship. In addition, his construct of love at this time was extremely self-centered, based on the bewitching 'romantic image of [Kathleen's] love for him' (Gelb, 1960, p. 132). While her love may have temporarily enhanced his self-esteem, his investment in her was extremely tenuous—more an attempt to attempt falling in love.

In this period of early adulthood, O'Neill had no concept of himself as an individual functioning in society; and his gold mining expedition ushered in a period of severe ego regression. Subsequently, he romanticized brief periods as an exultant transcendental experience during which he fulfilled his long-held dream to flee to sea. 'I dissolved in the sea, became white sails and flying spray;—I belonged without past or future, within peace and unity and a wild joy, within something greater than my own life, or the life of Man, to Life itself!' (*Long Day's*

Journey into Night, p. 153). With sailors he felt a comradeship which he attributed to their being free of the social hypocrisy for which he blamed his shyness. However, in his state of ego regression, it is apparent that what he felt compatible with was the aimlessness of the sailors' lives, their detachment from all objects save their symbolic mother—the ship and the sea, and their reality blurring use of alcohol.

It was to these consciousness destroying pursuits that O'Neill devoted himself more than to the sea during the next two years. Making actually very few voyages, O'Neill did his best to hit bottom, drinking continuously, living on park benches and in waterfront dives like the one depicted in *The Iceman Cometh.* The period of his psychosocial moratorium ended with his taking two opposite steps. He began to write poems that were accepted for publication and very near the time of his and Kathleen's divorce trial, in June 1912, he made a suicide attempt with an overdose of Veronal. After his suicide attempt, Eugene accepted his father's offer to take him home and to get him a job as a reporter. It was at this point that O'Neill, at the age of twenty-four, took two definite steps forward: he began to make notes for plays he planned to write, and he entered into a romantic affair with Maibelle Scott, the respectable girl who was to be the model for the young heroine of *Ah, Wilderness!.* This pivotal year (1912) in O'Neill's life ended with his admission for a five-month stay in a tuberculosis sanatorium. Within a year after his discharge, O'Neill wrote six one-act plays and one full-length play. He was to establish himself within an amazingly short time as America's most original playwright.

The years of seeming aimlessness between O'Neill's affair with Kathleen and the beginning of his productive career as a playwright were years of a psychosocial moratorium.[3] These

[3] Referring to a similar period in his life, Van Gogh wrote, 'As moulting time—when they change their feathers—is for birds, so adversity or misfortune is the difficult time for us human beings. One can stay in it—in that time of moulting—one can also emerge renewed; but anyhow it must not be done in public and it is not at all amusing, therefore the only thing to do is to hide oneself. Well, so be it' (Letter 133).

years are necessary for some creative artists during which it is impossible for them to accept a conventional family and society sanctioned career and marital choice. Instead, they must reorganize their drive cathexis, ego, and superego functions along the unconscious inner directed lines of sublimated creative goals. The outstanding fact about O'Neill is that he returned directly to the developmental problem he had held in abeyance along with his problem of career choice: that of achieving an affectionate and sexual relationship with a woman—taking up with Maibelle Scott (and a series of others) where he had left off with Kathleen. In spite of further periods of heavy drinking and being cared for as a helpless baby by men, he maintained a definitely heterosexual orientation which was especially consolidated by his second marriage. Throughout his career, in his dramas he explored with increasing skill the efforts of a multitude of characters to achieve personal identity and a love relationship.

THREE PLAYS

1. *Mourning Becomes Electra*

O'Neill's altered version of the tragedy of the House of Atreus conveys his view of the pursuit of romantic love and those conflicts which render its achievement impossible. The Agamemnon trilogy is transposed to a New England dynastic family, the Mannons, living at the time of the American Civil War. Each Mannon intensely desires to love someone he construes as a nonincestuous object (the father—his wife, the mother—a romantic sea captain, the son—a suitable young girl, the daughter—a suitable young man). However, for the father, his wife unconsciously stands for the nurse of his œdipal years, the person over whom the family feud began. His wife, shocked by his possessive lust mixed with his puritanic rigidity, turns first to her son, then to the sea captain. The latter turns out to be a Mannon using a pseudonym to gain revenge; and he, in turn, is trapped into love by the resemblance of the wife to his mother.

The son cannot love his girl because of his jealous possessiveness of his mother and then of his sister. And the daughter is drawn first to her father; falls fleetingly in love with her cousin, the sea captain, who is a physical double of her father and brother; and then has to fight off her brother's urges for her. Each regards his ancestral New England home as a 'temple of hate and death'. Each hopes to sail with his beloved to a beautiful South Sea island where love will be free of guilt, lust, incest, and internecine strife. Instead, the father and the captain are murdered, and the mother and brother commit suicide; the sister lives on, an isolated spinster.

In contrast to the Mannons, the young man and girl, Peter and Hazel, have a presumed normal background which has enabled them to be straightforward, guileless, and good-natured (like the Millers in *Ah, Wilderness!*). When Hazel confides how she has fallen in love with the son, O'Neill expresses the cause of the tragedy through the mother's lines: 'Why can't all of us remain innocent and loving and trusting? But God won't leave us alone. He twists and wrings and tortures our lives with others' lives until—we poison each other to death!' In O'Neill's play, it is not the god of the Greeks acting as an external fate that controls destiny but the tortured interrelationship of the characters (Weissman, 1965, p. 207). In spite of the contrived use of symbolism, shallowness of language, and complexity of plot, O'Neill's play is a compelling drama because the audience can identify with the Mannons as adults trying with desperate intensity to realize a love relationship. What is tragic is that each finds his incestuous object ties are unbreakable. In his frustration, each of the Mannons regresses to a primitive enactment of œdipal fantasies of incestuous love and murder.

While each of the characters represents different aspects of Eugene and his family, the character who carries the main weight of the play and of Eugene's unconscious identification is the daughter, Lavinia (the Electra of the title). Lavinia begins the play resisting the pull of her attraction to the sea cap-

tain, Adam. Struggling with all her vigor and determination against her femininity, carrying herself with the wooden, square-shouldered bearing of her father, she asserts in the first scene, 'I don't know anything about love! I don't want to know anything! [Intensely] I hate love!' She is living out her œdipal attachment to her father and defends against her sexual feelings for him by identifying with him. She rationalizes that her single-minded opposition to her mother is merely her desire to protect her father's interests. She dominates her younger brother and, with unremitting malice, compels the destruction of the lovers she cannot separate—Adam and her mother.

Temporarily freed from her infatuation for her father and her temptation with Adam by their murders, and finally triumphant over her mother by the latter's suicide, Lavinia is transformed, during a trip to a South Sea island, from the thin undeveloped soldier girl to a voluptuously attractive woman. O'Neill, however, leaves no doubt as to the nature of this metamorphosis. It is not a healthy maturation and development that can lead to happiness through a relatively stable identity, but it is an act of primitive incorporation, vulnerable to regression (Weissman, 1965, p. 205). When she asks her brother if she is as pretty now as their mother, he replies that little by little her soul 'grew like Mother's soul—as if you were stealing her—as if her death had set you free—to become her!'. Lavinia is now free to love, but her love is an undisciplined infatuation with passion, voluptuousness, and selfish demanding. While her dream is to marry Peter, to 'have children and love them and teach them to love life', she is beset with urges that undermine her adult hopes and which lead to the transformation of Peter. Peter had persisted in his romantic hopes for Lavinia, helping where he could in the troubles of the Mannons; and it is on his steady affection that Lavinia pins her hopes for happiness. At first he responds with pleasure to her falling in love with him, but is mildly shocked by her sexual boldness. However, as she struggles against her brother's jealous, incestuous passion, her tenderness fails her completely;

and against her will, possessed by 'an evil spirit', she goads her brother to suicide and attempts to press Peter into a precipitous marriage on the day of the funeral.

In the final climactic scene, caught in the terrible tension of Lavinia's attempt to force love and happiness, Peter is transformed into a bitter, suffering, suspicious argumentative person—in short, a Mannon (or an O'Neill). Lavinia tries, through love, to spare him the wound of the loss of his trust in life; but then, in frantic fear of abandonment, she gives full vent to her recognition of the change in Peter and the latent wish behind her passion and screams, 'Want me! Take me, Adam!' This breakthrough of her unconscious desire for the romantic sea captain, who is physically her father's double, profoundly shocks both Peter and Lavinia. It makes clear that Lavinia's groping for adult love has failed. She has not succeeded in decathecting her infantile attachments or in partially neutralizing the excitement that went with them. Peter leaves and Lavinia undergoes her final transformation—'With a strange, cruel smile of gloating over the years of self-torture' she, the last of her family, gives herself over to her inextricable guilt attachment to the love objects of her childhood. (At the time he wrote the play Eugene was himself the last survivor of the O'Neills. His father, mother, and brother had died in the same order as that in the play.)

This dramatic ending reveals a striking similarity of O'Neill's difficulty in fully falling in love with Kathleen to the difficulty which prevented Peter and Lavinia from consummating their romance. Lavinia discovered the infidelity of one of her parents; and the eleven-year-old Eugene had been confronted with his father's highly publicized paternity suit. Both Lavinia and the adolescent Eugene were disappointed by the weak ineffectiveness of a brother they counted on. However, O'Neill's major traumatic crisis in his adolescence—the discovery of his mother's addiction—is split in the play between Lavinia and Peter. Like Lavinia, O'Neill had lost the security of all his at-

tachments and family hopes. For Lavinia the final blow was her recognition that her love for Peter was destructive to him. This cemented her turning from object love and its hopes to a masochistic submission to guilt. For Eugene the discovery of his mother's addiction brought with it her accusation that his birth had caused her addiction. However unreasonable this claim was, it became for him the central motif of guilt. In his marriages and in play after play love, procreation, and closeness became for him the almost inevitable path to destruction.

After his affair with Kathleen, O'Neill had something further to feel guilty about; and he reacted to it as in the lines of his play: 'The only love I can know now is the love of guilt for guilt which breeds more guilt—until you get so deep at the bottom of hell there is no lower you can sink'. This he did in his self-destructive years as a waterfront bum. The role which is given to Peter (the lover, whose love, given with innocence, had turned to suspicious distrust) represents another strongly held self-image of O'Neill. We submit that the reaction ascribed to Peter at the end of the play in response to Lavinia's revelation of her hidden evil—'[. . . wincing as if she had struck him in the face, stares at her with a stricken look of horrified repulsion—with bitter broken anger.]'—is an abreaction within the drama of Eugene's traumatic encounter with his mother when he found her injecting her morphine.

In addition to representing his early adolescent traumata in *Mourning Becomes Electra,* O'Neill unconsciously expressed his feminine yearnings in the character of Lavinia. Lavinia cannot free herself from her attachment to two men: her father, the puritanical, materialistic overlord of the family (James O'Neill at home), and his physical double, the romantic, captivating Adam (James O'Neill in his theatrical self, the matinee idol, Count of Monte Cristo). Eugene's destructive dependency on his father is here coupled with his romantic attachment for him. While he is freer after James's death to express these homosexual longings, even in their disguised form they must lead not to gratification but surrender to a guilt-ridden mas-

ochism. Like Lavinia, O'Neill's mourning was less the affective experience of depression than a guilty brooding in which he was locked into a permanent painful embrace with the lost object. Feelings of depression appear less in the characters and more in the sad lonely sea chanty 'Shenandoah' that is sung throughout the play and in the mournful aspects of the stage settings.

2. *Ah, Wilderness!*

All that has been said about Eugene O'Neill's life helps to explain the projection of the conflicts of the O'Neill family in *Mourning Becomes Electra* and the brooding, tragic quality of his forty-five other dramas. However, it emphasizes the enigma of *Ah, Wilderness!*—a charming, successful comedy of love fulfilled, especially adolescent love. The plot of this unique departure into comedy can be taken very much at its face value as the portrayal of a normal family with a normal adolescent seeking heterosexual love. The hero, Richard, just out of high school, restless, defiant and shy, shocks his parents with his advanced ideas. He has fallen in love with Muriel, a love mirrored in its potential by the affectionate devotion of his parents. In frustration over a misunderstanding with Muriel, he engages in a touchingly funny encounter with a prostitute. At the play's end, the lovers effect a dramatic, breathless reconciliation, tenderly and excitingly kissing. The problem the play presents is not 'What is O'Neill trying to say?' but 'How was he able to create a play of "normalcy" and what does it mean about him that he did?'.

A second interesting aspect of *Ah, Wilderness!* is the mode of its creation. It was like a preformed burst from his unconscious. At the age of forty-three, O'Neill having just completed *Mourning Becomes Electra,* returned to the United States after two and a half years abroad with his third wife. Together they visited New London, where Eugene's family had had a summer cottage—the closest approximation to a home he had known. O'Neill jotted down a few notes for a play he was thinking of calling 'Nostalgia'. Over a year later, after the suc-

cessful production of *Mourning Becomes Electra* and while working with great difficulty on *Days Without End,* 'he awakened early one morning having dreamed a full-length play with each scene vividly etched in his mind. He sat down at his desk at seven in the morning and worked steadily until late afternoon, by which time he had written a detailed scenario of *Ah, Wilderness!*. Within six weeks, he had completed the play in its final version' (Gelb, 1960, pp. 761-762).

In this birthlike creation O'Neill brought together all of his charm and humor to produce a lighthearted, touching tale of adolescent love. This could only have come about through a constructive restructuring of his inner conflicts akin to that which takes place in the therapeutic process. It is a strong indication that in creating *Mourning Becomes Electra,* O'Neill, at least temporarily, worked through several important components of the traumata that had warped his adolescence. Describing the writing of *Mourning Becomes Electra,* O'Neill stated that never before had anything ridden him so hard (Gelb, 1960, p. 723); 'It's like an old man of the sea on my back' (p. 725). Having freed himself of this burden, O'Neill was able to remember the positive side of his family relationships. On the day of his *Ah, Wilderness!* dream, he recalled with fond amusement his father's parochial Irish hatred of the English and his own refusal to release Electra to an English producer. Thus he identified himself as the male heir of 'James O'Neill of Monte Cristo fame' (p. 762), establishing the tone of sympathetic understanding between father and son that characterizes the play.

For the play to have emerged almost fully formed, it must have drawn its origins from two sources: the family romance fantasies of Eugene's preadolescence (Freud, 1909 [1908]) and his adolescent daydreams of being rescued as a result of a change in external circumstances (Blos, 1962, p. 154). As in the typical family romance, Eugene's *Ah, Wilderness!* family discards the bad traits of the O'Neills and displays all of the idealized posi-

tive traits borrowed from a family he knew in New London during this period. The father and mother are devoted marital partners and parents, and the older brother is a successful college student. The family is filled out with a third child, a daughter. Eugene, as Richard, is the dead Edmund alive and hearty. The feminine aspects of the third child in the family (Eugene) are now happily ascribed to a biological daughter—leaving Richard (Eugene) free both of guilt and homosexual conflicts.

Processed through the organizing, integrating genius of the mature playwright, the whole play can be regarded as a rescue fantasy which states: If only I had a family like the Millers—a mother and father who, with genuine fondness, can say, 'Well, Spring isn't everything, is it? There's a lot to be said for Autumn. That's got beauty, too. And Winter—if you're together' (p. 298). Then, like Richard I could have loved with shy purity and rebellious gusto and it could have been said, 'I don't think we'll ever have to worry about his being safe—from himself again. . . . No matter what life will do to him, he can take care of it now' (p. 297). Unlike the internally troubled Eugene, Richard is an American Everyman version of Romeo who must cope only with parental opposition and comic/tragic misunderstanding before love wins out.

In its particulars Richard's falling in love with Muriel and their courting difficulties are similar to Eugene's affair with Maibelle, but they transfer back in time to a much earlier age. In this sense they even precede Eugene's affair with Kathleen and represent preparation for contact with a more realistically perceived love object that Eugene lacked in his ill-fated leap into marriage with Kathleen.

The self-images O'Neill projects in *Mourning Becomes Electra* and *Ah, Wilderness!* are opposites: a tragic, destructive, and masochistically self-defeating seeker of love in the former, and a witty, poetic Irish adolescent, fascinating to women in the latter. In his actual life, O'Neill oscillated between these two extremes. In his last two marriages, sadomasochistic regres-

sions became more and more prevalent. However, with both wives he would intermittently seek by poetry, dedication of his plays, and showers of affection to recapture the effects of falling in love—as the Mannons had hoped, through travel to the islands. In addition, in flirtations with many other women, with whom he could be captivating, he would escape the guilt and destructiveness of his marital relations. In these 'escape outings', he maintained many adolescent touches: the slang of his adolescent period, friendships based on rebelling and being unconventional, sloppiness of dress, and heavy drinking. In *Ah, Wilderness!* all of these tendencies are attenuated to present a picture of normalcy. O'Neill, therefore, demonstrates that he had a sensitive empathic feel for the less conflictual development that he had not experienced but which, in one unexpected side of his many-faceted being, he knew existed in a definable form. He chose for the timing of *Ah, Wilderness!* the period after the completion of high school before entering college, a period which closely approximated a time when his stresses were manageable. It is as though during the period of relative success at the nonsectarian academy, he was building up the images of an idealized alternate to the traumata to which he had been subjected. In *Ah, Wilderness!* the burning fire of the artistic, sensitive adolescent desperately in search of a means of self-expression is damped down to the conventional ambition of going to college and earning a living. The sea, O'Neill's symbol of the restless seeking for self-realization, does not appear in this play.

In the idealized restructuring of *Ah, Wilderness!* he repeats the falling in love which he achieved only in fantasy during his adolescence proper, and then sought unsuccessfully in reality with Kathleen as a late adolescent-young adult. While he was more successful in combining affectionate concern and sexual arousal with Maibelle, the full expansion of heterosexual fulfilment in marriage was beyond his grasp. Many serious problems, sidestepped in *Ah, Wilderness!* for Richard, remained for Eugene.

3. *Days Without End*

O'Neill, who had been laboring painfully over *Days Without End* when he dreamed the plot of *Ah, Wilderness!*, implies in the opening lines of *Days Without End* that it is meant to begin where *Ah, Wilderness!* leaves off and to pursue to an end the problems unresolved in the wish-fulfilment of Richard's romantic success. John Loving, a successful businessman of forty, who is writing his life story in the form of a confession novel, is represented by two masked figures: John, whose handsome American male face has a mouth with 'an incongruous feminine sensitiveness', and Loving, whose lips have 'a sneer of scornful mockery'.

> Loving: Surely, you don't need to make any more notes for the second part—your hero's manhood up to the time he [a sneer comes into his voice] at last finds his love. I should think you could remember that—only too well.
> John: [mechanically] Yes.
> Loving: [sneeringly] As for the third part, I know you have the most vivid recollection of his terrible sin.
> John: Don't mock, damn you!
> Loving: So it's only in the last part that you have to use your imagination. How are you going to end this interesting plot of yours? Given your hero's ridiculous conscience, what happens then? (p. 494).

The hero has found love, only to commit the sin of a single act of infidelity during his wife's absence and then, through some of the most stilted dialogue ever written, confesses to his foster father, a Catholic priest, both his sin and his lifelong torments about religion, drives himself and his wife to the point of suicide and winds up in a church in an ecstatic, mystic enrapturement with the crucified Christ. With the sneering Loving dead at his feet, he exclaims, 'Life laughs with God's love again! Life laughs with love!' (p. 567).

This play, universally regarded as one of O'Neill's worst, fails because the characters never come alive, remaining always

as props for an inner abstracted discussion of the author's effort 'to get at the real truth and understand what . . . evil spirit of hate' possesses him (p. 495). He describes in detail how he began with perfect faith in God, lost faith at his father's abandonment, prayed all the harder for his mother's recovery and then, totally disillusioned, abandoned religion altogether, exploring one philosophical system after another. Finally, he settled on his love for Elsa as the complete solution to his torment, only to have a hateful, frightening, vengeful stranger within him fill him with lust.

In this, O'Neill is openly describing his own adolescent disillusionment with religion and his pursuit of a substitute faith in philosophy. In the play, the hero's parents die during his adolescence; in O'Neill's case, their death was the internal one of a massive decathecting of their representations. In either case, the 'period of black despair' had a similar basis and, for each, O'Neill offered the same prescription: 'love'. O'Neill in the play calls on 'love' to do yeoman's work; it is to supply a substitute for his lost religious faith, the love object is to supply a complete replacement for all aspects of his decathected family, and the affect state of being in love is to remain at the level of high excitement and overestimation of the loved object appropriate to the state of full infatuation.

O'Neill has the scornful Loving chide John for his effort to replace his Catholic faith with 'love', only to begin immediately 'building a new superstition of love'. Love as a superstition supersedes love as an emotion felt between people. O'Neill's divided alter-ego struggles against his urge to surrender to the religious attachments of his youth. Marriage is described as 'a true sacrament . . . of faith' and 'a union of spiritual depth'. The play ends with a mystical fusing of life, love, and God, and with the hero's total submission to this redefinition of love in terms of religious ecstasy. Having struggled with his adolescent loss of faith through the characters of his play, O'Neill in real life rejected the solution he arranged

for his hero. He struggled on with his third marriage without a rededication to a religious passion.

Both Elsa and John are people who have been hurt—John, by the loss of his parents and Elsa, by her first husband's infidelity. Each is pledged to make up for all these wounds—he, as child, father, and husband to her and she, as their counterparts to him. On their total commitment to fulfil all these requirements rests the restoration of their trust in life, their perfect happiness. O'Neill seemed unaware of the pathological quality of this expectation. His uncritical acceptance of the premise of total interdependence permitted him to suggest that the temporary separation of the lovers was a stress sufficient to account for the lapse into infidelity of the 'abandoned' husband and for the irrevocability of the blow to the wife. This makes the play totally naïve.

O'Neill emphasizes that before their crisis, John and Elsa believed themselves to be 'as much in love' as when they married; that is, they have sustained the affective state of one who has fallen in love—excitement with and overestimation of the love object. This expectation that he could portray such an unbelievable and unrealistic state must have contributed to the painful struggle O'Neill experienced in the creation of *Days Without End.* We may postulate that the denial that would cloud the judgment of so sensitive a playwright lay in serious problems he could not resolve: his narcissism, his homosexual urges, and his guilt.

Freud (1914, p. 91) recognized that overevaluating the love object is the stamp of narcissism; that is, the libidinal cathexis of the self is shifted to the person loved, resulting in a hypercathexis of the object. This is a normal process which helps overcome the narcissistic resistance to object love, and it is a process which can easily go awry if the narcissistic tendencies of the individual are overly strong, as was so with O'Neill. In spite of all his efforts to ground himself in the basic realities of his fellow man, O'Neill remained shy, aloof, arrogant, and

self-centered. His second wife refused to bend to many of his demands. And his third wife, who did everything humanly possible to cater to him and aid his creativity, was rewarded with periodic abuse and impossible demands followed by guilty attempts to replace hate with love. After one such battle he wrote her, 'I am drowned in despair that dissension should have again sprung up between us. . . . With all my soul and body I love you—with all the strength of my spirit! There is nothing I would not do to make you happy. . . . You are my life and everything!' (Gelb, 1960, p. 692).

This conception of 'love' as it appears in *Days Without End* is best described by the literary critic De Rougemont (1956), in his extensive study, Love in the Western World. Speaking of the myth of Tristan and Isolde he states, 'Unhappiness comes in because the love which "dominates" them is not a love of each for the other as that other really is. They love one another, but each loves the other *from the standpoint of self and not from the other's standpoint* [italicized in the original]. Their unhappiness thus originates in a false reciprocity, which disguises a twin narcissism. So much is this so that at times there pierces through their excessive passion a kind of hatred of the beloved' (p. 52). Thus narcissistic people may hypercathect their love object, but they are not investing in an object representation as that object exists, but only in a self-representation projected onto the object. Furthermore the libidinal energy involved is not sufficiently neutralized, hence the passion; and the aggressive energy becomes defused and deneutralized, hence the hatred. John is obsessed with the thought of Elsa's death and drives her to illness and near suicide. O'Neill's relationship with his third wife was in later years to reach almost identical levels of discordance. Love of this sort is obviously extremely vulnerable, the least disturbance resulting in regression—drive regression with primitivization of the drive energy, and object regression from the genital level to an anal and oral sadistic relationship with the object, and even at times a tendency toward loss of the distinction between the self and the object.

Two detailed critical studies by De Rougemont (1956) and by Fiedler (1966) indicate that our literature clearly reflects a recognition of these processes. The tradition for the male heroes in literature who demonstrate devotion to extremes of romantic love is to be unconscious self-castrators (Fiedler, 1966, p. 49) and the women are 'monsters of virtue or bitchery' (p. 24). De Rougemont (1956) states, 'In the face of the assertion of [passion's] power the world dissolves; the other ceases to be present': the ecstasy of passion is 'a flight inward from all created beings' (p. 146).[4]

In *Days Without End,* O'Neill's self-centeredness colors the view of religion he presents. His ultimatum to God (cure my mother or I'll abandon You) is the counterpart to his romanticizing cult of himself as the artist to whose creative impulses all others, his wife and children, actors and producers, must bend or be abandoned. While the struggle for the saving grace of love between John and Elsa is overtly the dynamic conflict of the play, the relationship that conveys more believable feeling is that between John's two selves and his foster father/priest, who applies patient, persistent pressure to restore the paternal influence he had had over the troubled boy. The play is a reactivation of his attachment to his devout father, which Eugene alternately resisted and succumbed to all of his life. The multilayered structuring of O'Neill's conflict is apparent in the many versions of the ending he attempted (Rothenberg, 1969). In the first, John commits suicide in front of the Virgin; next, the hero again repudiates religion and curses God the Father; next both John and Loving die separately and unresolved, one accepting faith, the other continuing to deny it (Waith, 1961, p. 34); finally, he has John submit to the priest/father's devotion to the church with the cynic Loving dying in the process. In real life O'Neill remained an ambivalent holdout. The emphasis on passionate heterosexual investment in

[4] We shall reserve for another study a discussion of O'Neill's problem with the latter, deeper regression to a state of symbiotic dream reverie with his mother.

Elsa serves as a defense against the hero's total homosexual regression. O'Neill himself, after the failure with Kathleen and the subsequent regressive period, clung desperately to marriage, establishing himself with his third wife before parting from his second. His persistent belief that he would achieve marital perfection, maintained in spite of his obvious difficulties, helped to defend him against acting out the infantile closeness he had established with several men during the period of his 'bumming about'.

Passionate protestations of love were O'Neill's main antidote for guilt. All of the characters in *Mourning Becomes Electra* tried to escape their multileveled guilt by rededicating themselves to love and thereby pushing aside the tortured memories of their past. O'Neill was made to feel responsible for his mother's addiction and unconsciously for his older brother's death. However, another source of guilt was his closeness to his mother. The œdipal theme as it appears in *Days Without End* is that John has rescued Elsa from the cruel treatment of her first husband and must make up for all her prior hurts. This theme of rescuing the cruelly treated wife, derived from Eugene's childhood fantasy about his troubled mother, appears in O'Neill's very first play, *A Wife for a Life*. By the time of the writing of *Days Without End,* O'Neill had abandoned and cruelly treated two wives and three children and was having trouble with his third wife. When faced with guilt, he professed passionate devotion, and treated his departure from it as a bewildering 'ugly and mad thing' and 'utter insanity' (Gelb, 1960, p. 692). The crime he attributes to John—a single act of infidelity—is both curious in itself and unbelievable as the central pivot around which the play turns. While at one point the cynic Loving attempts some perspective, 'As for the adultery itself, the truth is that this poor fool was making a great fuss over nothing' (p. 538), John's compulsive need to confess dominates the play.

From clinical experience we can conjecture that the adultery of the play screens the underlying sin of early adolescent mas-

turbation with partially disguised œdipal fantasies. Sensitive youngsters with strict Catholic backgrounds such as O'Neill's often develop extreme fears of eternal damnation, wherein the God of 'Infinite Love' turns into 'a stern, self-righteous Being Who condemned sinners to torment'. The torments O'Neill writes into the play are less appropriate to a grown man in marriage than to a sensitive twelve-year-old who is humiliated at his inability to control his masturbatory urges and who attributes the tragedies of his family to his sinfulness. There is a possible confirmation of the connection between O'Neill's guilt and masturbation in his belief during the period of his final illness with a progressive, degenerative neurological disease that the cause of his inability to write was the shaking of his hands, making it impossible for him to hold a pencil. Youths whose extreme guilt pathologically inhibits their freedom to masturbate lose the opportunity to prepare for object relationships by fantasying sexual contact with a contemporary object during states of arousal (Blos, 1962, pp. 160-161). If this was so for O'Neill, his turning to prostitutes would have been less an intermediate step toward an acceptable object than a simple replacement for masturbation with the conflict surrounding the object unresolved.

Clinical experience also suggests that an adolescent who elaborates fantasies that prostitutes are purified earth mothers would also maintain extremely condemnatory attitudes about sexuality. Elsa's exaggerated repulsion, the total collapse of all her desire to live with John, may provide a clue to O'Neill's feeling about Kathleen. O'Neill had avoided contact with socially acceptable girls until he was twenty and then intercourse and a pregnancy came in rapid succession. It is probable that, considering the exaggerated and brittle idealism described in the play, his sexual contact with Kathleen turned them both into defiled objects in his mind; and this could account in part for his cruel neglect of her and his son. As he portrayed in Elsa and John, disillusionment with a love object may have been the stimulus for the near suicidal ego regression. For several years

ships and the sea became the only fit objects with which O'Neill could fall in love, while he treated humans as degraded objects to exploit for need gratification. At the same time he romanticized his own degraded state; and in the whole body of O'Neill's dramas there is a thin line between the oft-repeated intent of an individual's facing the truth and his excited public parading of his guilt. While the urge for confessing in public may have been a powerful incentive in O'Neill's choice of occupation, the sexualization of his personal guilt warped his relationship with a love object and limited the believability of some of his characters who are bent on arranging their undoing rather than accepting and enjoying the love that is available to them.

SUMMARY

In this paper we have attempted to relate two very complex subjects: love and creativity. Based on our analysis of the known facts of the life of Eugene O'Neill, and concentrating on three of his plays, we suggest that the forward thrust of his psychosexual development carried as far as the stage of falling in love, common to the late adolescent-early adult, but that persisting conflicts prevented him from forming a full adult object relationship. His artistic productivity was influenced in three ways:

1. Desiring to love and be loved acted as a repeated urge that supplied an important component to his inner pressure for self-expression. It became a major motif in his plays.

2. His own unresolved conflicts gave him a great sensitivity to all the factors that prevent the fulfilment of love, giving plays like *Mourning Becomes Electra* a richness and a ring of authenticity unique to the American stage at the time of their writing. In addition, in one rare exception, he wrote into *Ah, Wilderness!* the full poignancy and sentiment of adolescent love—emphasizing not only its frustration but its touching fulfilment.

3. His lack of personal experience with a mature object relationship caused him to founder badly in *Days Without End,* a play that attempts to portray a marital situation in crisis. In-

stead, the narcissism, the lack of gender identity, and attachments to incestuous objects intrude to a degree that ruin the artistic intent.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BLOS, PETER (1960): *On Adolescence: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation.* New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

BOWEN, CROSWELL (1960): *The Curse of the Misbegotten.* London: Hart-Davis.

DE ROUGEMENT, DENIS (1956): *Love in the Western World.* New York: Pantheon Books.

ERIKSON, ERIK H. (1958): *Young Man Luther. A Study in Psychoanalysis and History.* New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.

——— (1959): The Problem of Ego Identity. In: *Identity and the Life Cycle: Selected Papers.* Psychological Issues, Vol. I, No. 1, Monograph 1. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

FIEDLER, LESLIE (1966): *Love and Death in the American Novel.* New York: Stein and Day.

FREUD, ANNA (1965): *Normality and Pathology in Childhood.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

FREUD (1905): *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality.* Standard Edition, VII, pp. 130-243.

——— (1909 [1908]): *Family Romances.* Standard Edition, IX, pp. 237-241.

——— (1912): *On the Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love. (Contributions to the Psychology of Love II).* Standard Edition, XI, pp. 179-190.

——— (1914): *On Narcissism: An Introduction.* Standard Edition, XIV, pp. 73-102.

——— (1918): *The Taboo of Virginity (Contributions to the Psychology of Love III).* Standard Edition, XI, pp. 193-208.

——— (1921): *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* Standard Edition, XVIII, pp. 69-143.

GELB, ARTHUR and GELB, BARBARA (1960): *O'Neill.* New York: Harper and Brothers.

GREENACRE, PHYLLIS (1957): The Childhood of the Artist. Libidinal Phase Development and Giftedness. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XII,* pp. 47-72. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

JACOBSON, EDITH (1964): *The Self and the Object World.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

NAGERA, HUMBERTO (1967): *Vincent Van Gogh. A Psychological Study.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

O'NEILL, EUGENE (1913-1914): A Wife for a Life. In: *Ten "Lost" Plays.* New York: Random House, 1964, pp. 209-224.

——— (1925): The Great God Brown. In: *The Plays of Eugene O'Neill.* (Three Vols.) New York: Random House, 1941.

——— (1929-1931): Mourning Becomes Electra. *ibid.*

——— (1932): Ah, Wilderness! *ibid.*

——— (1932-1933): Days Without End. *ibid.*

——— (1939): *The Iceman Cometh.* New York: Random House, 1946.

——— (1939-1941): *Long Day's Journey into Night.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

ROTHENBERG, ALAN (1969): *The Iceman Changeth: Toward an Empirical Approach to Creativity.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XVII, pp. 549-607.

VAN GOGH (1958): *The Complete Letters of Vincent Van Gogh.* London: Thames and Hudson Ltd.

WAITH, EUGENE M. (1961): Eugene O'Neill: An Exercise in Unmasking. In: *O'Neill: A Collection of Critical Essays.* Edited by John Gassner. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964, pp. 29-41.

WEISSMAN, PHILIP (1965): *Creativity in the Theatre.* New York: Basic Books, Inc.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Does Psychoanalysis Have a Future in American Psychology?

Ernst Prelinger

To cite this article: Ernst Prelinger (1972) Does Psychoanalysis Have a Future in American Psychology?, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 90-103, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11926590

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11926590

Published online: 10 Nov 2017.

DOES PSYCHOANALYSIS HAVE A FUTURE IN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY?

BY ERNST PRELINGER, PH.D. (NEW HAVEN)

The question posed in the title of this paper cannot be answered without first investigating some of its implications. If we are interested in the future of psychoanalysis in American psychology, then what about its past and its present? If the question implies uncertainty or doubt about the future of psychoanalysis, then what are their sources? Since we are not concerned here with psychoanalysis in the narrow sense of a professional practice, what are its essential ingredients whose relationship to American psychology we wish to explore? I shall try to examine each of these issues briefly. Some of them have been discussed in much more detail by Eissler (1965) who makes many points relevant to the present topic.

The manner in which psychoanalysis has influenced American psychology in the past has been reviewed to some extent in the monograph by Shakow and Rapaport (1964). Between the World Wars, the psychoanalytic theory of personality found its way gradually into the psychological textbooks. It was usually described as one of various personality theories and was followed by a critique focusing on the lack of scientific, especially experimental, verification of its propositions and on the redundancy and the anthropomorphic quality of its concepts. Academic psychology in general absorbed little of the psychoanalytic orientation although some concepts, such as those of Jung's notions of introversion and extroversion, were

From the Division of Student Mental Hygiene, Department of University Health, Yale University, New Haven.

An abbreviated version of this paper was presented as a panel contribution to a symposium of the same title held at the Annual Meeting of Psychologists Interested in the Study of Psychoanalysis, Miami Beach, September 5, 1970.

interpreted as 'traits' and subjected to psychometric study. The rapidly increasing demand for psychiatric services after World War II and the development of the concept of the psychiatric team produced the profession of clinical psychology as we know it today. Theoretical foundations were needed for the work in diagnosis and therapy done by psychologists. Rapaport, Schafer, and Gill (1945-1946), guided by certain ego psychological considerations, developed a rationale for psychodiagnostic testing which later was elaborated by Schafer (1954) in his more specifically psychoanalytic approach to the Rorschach. Unless they followed Rogers's nondirective methods, psychologists relied in their psychotherapeutic work on analytic writers such as Alexander (1946) and Colby (1951) to develop skills in brief psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Insufficient training and therapeutic overeagerness led at times to misapplications of psychoanalytic technique and theory and resulted in various forms of 'wild' psychoanalysis.

Earlier years saw some more or less naïve attempts by psychologists to verify psychoanalytic propositions with the techniques of accepted social science (*cf.*, Sears, 1943). They ranged from efforts to test the construct of the œdipus complex by asking large numbers of school children which parent they preferred (a study which, not surprisingly, brought no conclusive results) to the studies by Sears (1936) on projection, Sears, et al. (1946) on aggression, and the demonstrations by Miller (1948) of displacement processes in the behavior of rats, as well as others. After approximately 1950, more sophisticated hypotheses were derived from psychoanalytic theory concerning phenomena such as 'perceptual defense' (McGinnies, 1949), 'vigilance', repression and forgetting, etc. They were tested in a series of experiments ushering in the so-called 'New Look' (*cf.*, Klein, 1951). This quite fruitful beginning led in a direct line of development to the investigations by experimenters such as Holt, Klein, Spence, Luborsky, and others, all of whom succeeded in developing hypotheses and experimental techniques conforming much more fully to the spirit and

the logic of psychoanalytic thinking. Although similar experiments continue to be done, they quantitatively represent a very small fraction of all the work published in experimental psychology.

While the investigators mentioned have pursued psychoanalytically guided research in the direction of studies concerned with increasingly molecular processes, psychoanalytic concepts and propositions have been applied in a highly molar and general manner by a number of social psychologists and thinkers about the philosophy of culture. Writers such as Fromm (1955), Norman O. Brown (1959), and Marcuse (1955) draw primarily on Freud's more speculative, culture-philosophical works to diagnose the ills of present Western society and to suggest reforms and utopias depending usually on a more or less far-reaching abandonment of ego restraints and a greater freedom for the expression of libidinal (but not aggressive) impulses. In the context of the present discussion one might feel inclined to omit reference to this last group of authors whose writings often approach 'wild' analysis. The fact, however, is that their theories are increasingly often taught, sometimes by charismatic teachers, under the general heading of 'psychology' and are often a major avenue by which students become acquainted with psychoanalysis.

It would be wrong to conclude that the influence of psychoanalysis upon American psychology is profound or flourishing at the present time. The contrary seems to be true as a quick scanning of the annual Convention Program of the American Psychological Association will confirm. Interest in psychoanalytic thought and utilization of psychoanalytic propositions and concepts are clearly waning. In therapeutic practice the development of behavioral approaches now holds the center of the stage and is being credited with a seemingly truly scientific nature.[1] The scope of behavior therapy is expanding

[1] In an earlier paper I tried to show that the internal logic of much behavior therapy is quite isomorphic to that of treatment by hypnotic suggestion; the analytic psychologist, thus, may discern a regressive element in the upsurge of behavioral methods.

rapidly. Yates's (1970) recent handbook is nearly comparable to Fenichel's (1945) classic work in terms of its coverage of treatment methods for a wide variety of disorders with, incidentally, the sole major exception of depression. Psychodiagnostic testing, similarly, is in a phase of recession; interest in it is declining and its practice waning. There have been no significant new developments in its field for a number of years. Holt (1967) has discussed this phenomenon and some of the reasons for it in considerable detail.

Introspection as a psychological method has been declining in American psychology since William James, especially under the impact of behaviorism. Indeed, the emphasis of psychological interest has recently moved away increasingly not only from the individual's inner experience but from the individual person altogether. The study of groups has come into the focus of attention and emphasis on social action tends to supersede the scrutiny of individual adaptation. Social and sociological conditions are more and more called upon to explain, and perhaps ultimately to alter, the behavior of the individual. In the course of such trends even psychoanalytic formulations are sometimes utilized, although with inappropriate emphases. In the case of Erikson's writings, for example, his adherence to and elaboration of the libido theory is sometimes disregarded while his formulations regarding psychosocial fitting-together and the historical and sociological setting surrounding individual development are one-sidedly utilized.

In consequence of all these trends, psychoanalytically oriented psychologists often find themselves in a discouraging position. Clearly they are not in the mainstream of American psychology and sense themselves estranged from their colleagues. While their own experience in research and practice maintains their not necessarily uncritical commitment to the major propositions of psychoanalysis, they are nevertheless beset by a sense of stagnation if not sterility of the field. In defending their orientation they may see themselves as fighting a rear-guard action rather than as representing a trend into the future. The fact that some medical psychoanalysts may feel

similarly in relation to the field of present-day psychiatry provides little encouragement.

How has this situation come about? Psychoanalysis has had to struggle with difficulties regarding its acceptance from the beginning. Freud (1917) has repeatedly referred to them as, for example, in his paper, A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, in which he explores the resistances against analysis arising from the threats to human narcissism emanating from its findings. In addition to unconscious resistances, a number of other factors makes the climate of American psychology intrinsically inhospitable to psychoanalysis. This climate is defined by a pragmatistic, simplistic view of human nature as a function of antecedent learning under the influence of external stimulation and of the resulting habits. There is a strong orientation toward and interest in the gaining of mastery over this human nature by means of prediction and control, an orientation that is part and parcel of a specific and rather narrowly defined philosophy of science.

The pragmatic orientation just referred to provides the background for one quite specific source of disillusionment with psychoanalysis; namely, the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory outcome data concerning the results of clinical psychoanalysis or psychotherapy. If psychoanalytic theories are correct, they ought to *work,* so the argument goes; tangible and specific improvement of the troubles that lead patients into treatment should be demonstrable. Eysenck's (1952) in many ways biased outcome studies have left their mark.

On the level of theory, the complexity of psychoanalytic constructs and the relative difficulty of transforming them into simple operational definitions for purposes of experimental manipulation are frustrating to anyone who attempts to construct experiments or even only tries to design observational studies. I would venture a guess that some of these difficulties correspond to important differences between analysts and experimental psychologists in terms of their views of what the essential concepts of psychoanalysis are. Heider's (1959) distinc-

tion between central and medial processes is relevant here. Be that as it may, I would contend that analytic concepts need not be testable within the rules of evidence preferred by and relied upon by most experimental psychologists. I will come back to this point later. Suffice it to say that the complexity and the frequent redundancy of psychoanalytic concepts, the latter of which cannot simply be justified as a manifestation of the principle of overdetermination, are a source of not a little trouble to psychoanalytic theorists themselves. Thinkers such as Hartmann, Rapaport, Loewald, or Schafer have had to spend some of their best efforts at clarifying only some of the relations between various important theoretical constructs of psychoanalysis.

A medical analyst might insist that the psychologist's frustration must be at least partly a function of his inability to have access to the 'real' data of psychoanalysis as they become available in classical analytic treatment, and that he is thus unable to comprehend the relevance of analytic concepts as they were formulated by Freud. By analogy one might ask whether the psychologist is not in the position of a chemist who never learned quantitative or qualitative analysis or of the microbiologist who is unfamiliar with electron microscopy. There is clearly truth in this argument. Psychoanalytic treatment, whether of the researcher in some form of training analysis or by the researcher in supervised or independent clinical work, is no doubt the optimal condition for becoming exposed to essentially psychoanalytic data. This is especially true in relation to transference, resistance, regression, and to manifestations of the contextual web of thought, fantasy, and dream. However, in a less concentrated, and most likely somewhat more ambiguous form, analytically relevant observations can be made by a receptive observer in everyday life, in child observation, through projective tests, in psychotherapy, and in experimental situations. Psychoanalytic theory, after all, aims to encompass human functioning in all contexts and not only in the therapeutic situation. The fact that relatively few analyt-

ically interested psychological researchers have exposed themselves to full psychoanalytic training and that they therefore search for analytically relevant data in contexts outside the treatment situation must be one cause for the particular interest in ego psychology often shown by such researchers.

Some of the special difficulties in developing psychoanalysis in a manner which would satisfy the scientific requirements of American psychologists must also be understood to follow from the nature of its data. These scientific requirements have been borrowed from the natural sciences, particularly physics and chemistry, whose success and rapid developments tend to dazzle the scientifically committed psychologists. New findings, insights, theoretical revolutions, and applications seem to occur in these sciences nearly every day. In contrast, the collection of analytic observations and the development of corresponding theory seem antiquated, slow moving, and cumbersome; some observers are gripped by a sense of stagnation. It is true that analytic theory is by now probably the oldest existing, still essentially unchanged scientific theory. In few other sciences do we rely on propositions nearly seventy years old.

Meaningful developments in human lives are the essential data of psychoanalysis. The rate of change implied in such developments is slow. The analyst studies phenomena whose time scale has a different relation to the time world of the observer than have phenomena in most other sciences, although the study of geological evolution may serve to exemplify an extreme position on the end of the scale. Particle physics investigates processes lasting milliseconds or less; learning trials in experimental psychology constitute units of minutes' or hours' duration; genetic studies depend on animals whose reproductive cycle takes only days or weeks. In contrast, the full development of regressions or transference neuroses may require months or years; a child's development into adulthood takes decades. To be sure, there are psychoanalytically meaningful events which occur within shorter time spans: the relation of a dream to the events of the previous day, a parapraxis and its

analysis, and so forth. But with regard to crucial developments in the basic material of our study, namely the complex living human being, we have the unique situation of observed events occurring on a time scale which matches the time scale of the observer's existence. To drive this point *ad absurdum* we might say that if a psychoanalytically relevant and significant process has a duration of, say, two years, the ratio of the duration of that process to the time of existence of psychoanalytic theory is 1:35. Compare this to the duration of a particle process leaving a trace in a cloud chamber as a proportion of the age of modern nuclear physics which is roughly twenty years. This ratio approximates 1:63 billion for a process lasting 1/100 of a second.

I need not dwell on another difficulty inherent in the special nature of psychoanalytic data, namely their cumulative nature and their intrinsic unreproducibility. The latter is a consequence of the relativity of the observational field in psychoanalysis. I stated before that the essential raw data of analysis are meaningful developments or, to put it differently, developing meanings which unfold in the *relationship* between patient and analyst. They are not independent meanings existing in an objective, that is nonrelative manner in, say, the brain or the mental field of the patient. They are relative meanings evolving out of the mutual attunedness of a particular analyst and a particular patient at a particular time. They add, in a cumulative manner, to the already existing meaning producing dispositions on both sides. Thus, both partners emerge changed from the interraction; a repetition of the process becomes impossible in principle. The physicist Schrödinger (1945) has addressed himself to this issue and concluded that the rules of inference in the biological sciences, in which cumulative processes are at issue, and which therefore are to an extent historical sciences, may have to be of a fundamentally different nature from those of physics.

To briefly refer to the insistence on prediction as a decisive part of scientific method, this insistence has sometimes led to

attempts at verifying analytic propositions by predicting an analysand's behavior from one analytic hour to the next. If predictions of analytically relevant events are to be made, events need to be chosen which are of representative complexity and duration. I would guess that long-range predictions of complex issues, such as developments of certain facets of a person's character, are more appropriate to the nature of psychoanalytic data and may also be made with much greater accuracy than predictions of relatively molecular events.

After this brief consideration of the past of psychoanalysis in American psychology and of some of the issues relating to its present, I turn to some thoughts concerning its future.

Undoubtedly much depends on the contributions which psychologists committed to the psychoanalytic point of view will be willing and able to make. To foresee the possible nature of such contributions, however, requires a brief scrutiny of what constitutes the essential and defining features of a psychoanalytic orientation.

In Freud's time an acceptance of the axiomatic notions of unconscious processes and of the theory of the libido was sometimes quoted as the criterion of a commitment to psychoanalysis. Indeed, so-called deviationism was on occasion defined as such when a theorist rejected significant aspects of the libido theory. I do not expect many of us to quarrel with the observations suggesting the operation of unconscious processes, the basic notions of libidinal development, and the particular suitability of libidinal motives for becoming transformed and elaborated into all manner of more complex progressive as well as pathological motivations. However, I doubt that the essence of the psychoanalytic point of view is exhausted by an acceptance of a particular content proposition of analytic theory. To put it somewhat frighteningly, the essential axioms defining the psychoanalytic orientation may have to be of a meta-metapsychological nature. In other words, it should be possible

to maintain a psychoanalytic stance in approaching relevant observations even while one changes, if this is found to be necessary, significant aspects of the metapsychology or of analytic theory in general. Does this mean merely adherence to a method, say the clinical method of observation based on the basic rule and the data of free association, as the defining criterion of an analytic commitment?

I think we require a set of propositions of a different order for defining what is 'psychoanalytic'. Further, I think that the future of psychoanalysis may depend on the translation into scientific activity of such a set of propositions. In the remaining paragraphs I will outline an attempt at a preliminary formulation of such propositions which, I am sure, will be modified and elaborated after further thought and scrutiny. Some of Rapaport's (1960) review of orienting attitudes toward psychoanalytic theory is of relevance to these.

1. The psychoanalytic orientation toward psychological data aims essentially at the observation and comprehension (not the prediction and control) of human lives and of the effects and products of human lives. The analytic orientation addresses itself not toward symptoms, responses, traits, etc., as such, but to the comprehension of their *meanings* in their subjective nature, development, interactions, conflicts, and integrations.[2]

2. Out of this orientation grows a particular observational method, or better, a stance. The inducement of free associations in an analysand is only part of that method and its indications and consequences are in themselves subject to theoretical psychoanalytic scrutiny. I think that what Freud taught about the required stance of the analyst or analytic observer is more essential. His diffuse, nonrationally focused, minimally active or interfering attitude is, I believe, one of the defining characteristics of the analytic approach. I intentionally omit any reference to a supposed freedom from prejudicial value

[2] The very important problem of what constitutes meanings, units of meaning, and related issues bearing on the question of the nature of psychoanalytic data cannot be pursued within the limits of the present discussion.

orientations in the analyst. Much discussion of this issue, to my mind, has forced the conclusion that 'freedom' from value orientations altogether is in principle impossible; one can only speak of freedom from some value orientations. A powerful value orientation toward maximally complex perceptiveness on the part of the analytic observer pervades, of necessity, the ideal analytic orientation. The specifically psychoanalytic observational stance as outlined above is not only limited to the clinical situation. This stance must be maintained in the design and conduct of experiments, in the study of children, in observation of groups and social processes, and in evaluation of results of individual or collective (cultural) productivity.

3. The psychoanalytic point of view orients itself to the *complexity* of human functioning, toward its cumulative, overdetermined, configurational aspects. It attempts to avoid the disruption and therefore the obscuring of the context that occurs with the isolation and experimental manipulation of dependent variables. This orientation toward complexity includes the continuous and consistent consideration of the fact that human beings function simultaneously on a multitude of levels: primitive and progressive, unconscious and conscious, narcissistically and object-oriented, etc. This orientation also implies a special emphasis on the essential importance of *central* factors in human functioning, factors motivating and directing the person that are remote and to some extent autonomous from immediate external stimulation. They include the unconscious and conscious subjective meanings that accrue as representations of aspects of biological maturation (libidinal and aggressive drives, body image, and others), the subjective meanings amounting to motivational aims whether adaptive or defensive, the meanings growing out of internal processes of differentiation and synthesis, and from the perception, internalization, and organization of externally derived stimulation and experience.

Other propositions may certainly be added to this list and many further issues can be raised. Here I would like only to

emphasize that the most important manner in which psychoanalysis can influence American psychology, and thus partake in its future, consists probably in providing such essential orientations and only secondarily in the teaching of particular results of analytic research or conceptual development.

This does not, however, imply that analytically oriented psychologists cannot themselves also make needed further contributions to the body of psychoanalytic knowledge even though psychologists tend generally to be consumers rather than producers of psychoanalytic observations and theory. Two particular directions come to mind immediately in which contributions may be attempted even by psychologists having no access to the possibilities provided by conducting full-scale analytic treatment.

One has to do with the utilization of opportunities available through clinical work in psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy. It is astounding how limited at present is the published observational and theoretical yield of the hundreds of thousands of psychotherapeutic sessions conducted every year in America alone. Freud's basic observations which led to a new theory of man resulted from no more than a few score of therapeutic hours. Eissler, (1965, p. 7), to be sure, raises the question whether anything fully new can still be discovered through the medium of the method of free association. His doubt may apply particularly to the pregenital phases of development and to processes corresponding to those levels. Still, can we be sure that nothing more can be learned about the latency period, adolescence, young adulthood, and the ego's integrative and adaptive processes during these stages from systematic collections of observations in the therapeutic context?[3]

Especially important is the need for further examination of the theoretical constructs of psychoanalysis. Some investigators such as Klein (1966) propose essentially an abandonment of metapsychology and a return to the 'clinical' theory of psycho-

[3] I shall not elaborate on the need for sustained longitudinal studies of development, most likely to be conducted by teams of investigators with long-term endowments, on account of the time scale problems mentioned above.

analysis. What is really needed, however, is a review of the essential nature of metapsychological constructs, of their actual denotative implications in order to clarify more definitely their relations to the kinds of data, namely meanings, encountered by the analytic observer. I believe it can be argued that concepts such as those of 'representation' or of 'structure' essentially refer to reproducible meanings and meaningful arrangements of meanings, each implying concrete contents. Other concepts, such as those referring to economic issues like that of 'cathexis' may, upon logical analysis, reduce themselves to relatively simple phenomena of, for instance, 'importance', 'degree of preference', and the like.

In conclusion I would like to suggest that the future influence of psychoanalysis on American psychology depends on the fruitfulness and fullness of its own development. Analytically oriented psychologists can contribute to this, particularly by collecting further observations and conducting more incisive conceptual analyses, and generally by the maintenance of a comprehensive view of man which must guide their observing, treating, and theorizing.

REFERENCES

ALEXANDER, FRANZ and FRENCH, THOMAS (1946): *Psychoanalytic Therapy*. New York: The Ronald Press Co.

BROWN, NORMAN O. (1959): *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.

COLBY, KENNETH (1951): *A Primer for Psychotherapists*. New York: The Ronald Press Co.

EISSLER, KURT R. (1965): *Medical Orthodoxy and the Future of Psychoanalysis*. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

EYSENCK, HANS J. (1952): *The Effects of Psychotherapy: An Evaluation*. J. Consulting Psychol., XVI, pp. 319-324.

FENICHEL, OTTO (1945): *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc.

FREUD (1917): *A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis*. Standard Edition, XVII, pp. 137-144.

FROMM, ERICH (1955): *The Sane Society*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc.

HEIDER, FRITZ (1959): Thing and Medium. In: *On Perception and Event Structure, and the Psychological Environment. Selected Papers*. Psychological Issues, Vol. I, No. 3, Monograph 3. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

HOLT, ROBERT R. (1967): *Diagnostic Testing: Present Status and Future Prospects*. J. Nervous & Mental Disease, CXLIV, pp. 444-465.

KLEIN, GEORGE S. (1951): Personal World through Perception. In: *Perception: An Approach to Personality*. Edited by Robert W. Blake and Glenn V. Ramsey. New York: The Ronald Press Co.

——— (1966): *Perspectives to Change in Psychoanalytic Theory*. Presented to the Psychoanalysts of the Southwest, Galveston, Texas, March, 1966.

MARCUSE, HERBERT (1955): *Eros and Civilization*. Boston: The Beacon Press.

MC GINNIES, E. (1949): *Emotionality and Perceptual Defense*. Psychol. Review, LVI, pp. 244-251.

MILLER, NEAL E. (1948): *Theory and Experiment Relating Psychoanalytic Displacement to Stimulus-Response Generalization*. J. Abnormal Psychol., XLIII, pp. 155-178.

PRELINGER, ERNST: *Structural Models in Hypnosis and Behavior Therapy*. Unpublished.

RAPAPORT, DAVID (1960): *The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory: A Systematizing Attempt*. Psychological Issues, Vol. II, No. 2, Monograph 6. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

———; SCHAFER, ROY; GILL, MERTON (1945-1946): *Diagnostic Psychological Testing. Vols. I and II*. Chicago: The Year Book Publishers.

SCHAFER, ROY (1954): *Psychoanalytic Interpretation in Rorschach Testing. Theory and Application*. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc.

SCHRÖDINGER, ERWIN (1945): *What is Life?* New York: The Macmillan Co.

SEARS, ROBERT R. (1936): *Experimental Studies of Projection. I. The Attribution of Traits*. J. Soc. Psychol., VII, pp. 151-163.

——— (1943): *Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts*. New York: Social Science Research Council.

———; PINTLER, MARGARET H.; SEARS, PAULINE S. (1946): *Effect of Father Separation on Preschool Children's Doll Play Aggression*. Child Development, XVII, pp. 219-243.

SHAKOW, DAVID and RAPAPORT, DAVID (1964): *The Influence of Freud on American Psychology*. Psychological Issues, Vol. IV, No. 1, Monograph 13. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

YATES, AUBREY J. (1970): *Behavior Therapy*. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Zehn Jahre Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut (Poliklinic und Lehranstalt) 1920-1930. (The First Ten Years of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, 1920-1930. Reissued in 1970 by the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute of the German Psychoanalytic Association.) Meisenheim, Germany: Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1970. 79 pp.

H. Robert Blank

To cite this article: H. Robert Blank (1972) Zehn Jahre Berliner Psychoanalytisches Institut (Poliklinic und Lehranstalt) 1920-1930. (The First Ten Years of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, 1920-1930. Reissued in 1970 by the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute of the German Psychoanalytic Association.) Meisenheim, Germany: Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1970. 79 pp., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 104-145, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11926591

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11926591

BOOK REVIEWS

ZEHN JAHRE BERLINER PSYCHOANALYTISCHES INSTITUT (POLIKLINIC UND LEHRANSTALT) 1920-1930. (The First Ten Years of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, 1920-1930. Reissued in 1970 by the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute of the German Psychoanalytic Association.) Meisenheim, Germany: Verlag Anton Hain KG, 1970. 79 pp.

This is an important and fascinating document in the history of psychoanalysis. The Berlin Institute, founded in 1920 by Karl Abraham and Max Eitingon, was the first Psychoanalytic Institute; its *Poliklinic* the first Psychoanalytic Treatment Center.

The fiftieth anniversary of its founding was celebrated in Berlin October 7 and 8, 1970, at a meeting where it was announced that the name of the Institute had been changed to the Karl Abraham Institute. In honor of the occasion the report on the first ten years was reprinted with a new Preface by Anna Freud (the Preface in the original is by her father). The corpus of the work consists of contributions by Ernst Simmel, Otto Fenichel, Carl Müller-Braunschweig, Hans Lampl, Karen Horney, Hanns Sachs, Franz Alexander, Sandor Rado, Siegfried Bernfeld, Felix Boehm, Eugen J. Hárnik, and Max Eitingon. There were greetings from abroad by Gregory Zilboorg and Ola Raknes of Norway.

The contributions are models of clarity and condensation. It is striking how much rich instructive detail the small volume contains. I was impressed particularly by the steadfastness with which the founders and faculty of the Institute adhered to its three aims: psychoanalytic training, psychoanalytic treatment services for those who could not afford private treatment, and psychoanalytic research. A high level of social consciousness and responsibility pervades the material; it is most assuredly not the work of an insulated classbound coterie. Neither is the work time-bound or archaic. In fact, the details of the curricula, the financial and administrative headaches, and the problems of referral, indications for analysis, supervision, etc., all have a 'modern' flavor. I doubt whether we are now coping with many of these problems any more successfully than the Berliners were forty-one years ago.

Most impressive scientifically is Fenichel's Statistical Report on Treatment Activities 1920-1930. To the best of my knowledge this is the first long-term statistical analysis of psychoanalytic treatment. The discussion is highlighted by eight tables, of which the following are most detailed and valuable for comparative research: Table V: Occupation; Table VI: Diagnoses; and Table VIII: Correlations between Diagnoses, Duration of Treatment, and Results of Treatment. Fenichel's incisive comments on the problems and pitfalls of statistical analysis still merit our attention. Who sought help at the *Poliklinic* during 1920-1930? A total of nineteen hundred fifty-five persons, a few more females than males, ranging in age from 'under five' to 'over sixty'. Their occupations covered practically the entire spectrum from unemployed to professional (Fenichel presents them in twenty-two categories). The reader will be surprised at the large number of unskilled and skilled workers, office workers, and business men—*petit bourgeois*—in the patient population. The high number of students, artists, and professionals is not surprising.

The *Zehn Jahre* deserves an excellent English translation. I hope the first ten years of the Karl Abraham Institute will be as productive as those of the Berlin Institute.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

RESEARCH AT THE HAMPSTEAD CHILD-THERAPY CLINIC AND OTHER PAPERS. 1956-1965. THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD, VOL. V. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1969. 575 pp.

This volume, part of the complete works of Anna Freud, has the assets and some of the liabilities of a compendium. It is uneven, consisting of productions written for various occasions and sundry purposes. Yet as a source book it is valuable: it reflects the energy and dedication of Miss Freud and her influence on the continued evolution of psychoanalytic practice, theory, and research.

It is in five parts. Part I comprises various statements of research projects from applications to granting agencies, not intended for publication but included as evidence of 'the author's thinking about and planning for research'. Part II is made up of formal psychoanalytic papers and discussions: these include appre-

ciations of Heinz Hartmann and of Ernst Kris. The remarks about Kris are centered on the interrelationship between child observation and prediction. Despite initial 'suspicion' of the term prediction, which carried connotations of prescience and infallibility antithetical to the tradition of careful psychoanalytic reconstruction, the author has come to the view that, in fact, clinical diagnosis merges into prognosis and faces one with the problem of forecast. It may be that the very contrast between expectation and an outcome, more often than not surprising, contributes importantly to new knowledge. (Benjamin in another context spoke of the 'heuristic value of incorrect predictions'.)

Part III is a collection of essays primarily for lay audiences dealing with such topics as child rearing, the interaction of school and guidance clinic, and answers to pediatricians' questions. Part IV contains brief pieces, largely introductions to papers of colleagues. Part V is Miss Freud's doctoral address at Jefferson Medical College, 1964, a modest and thoughtful discussion of some problems connected with lay analysis, giving autobiographical details of her own training in Vienna, less orthodox though far richer than that available today.

Research, a word highlighted in the title, deserves some comment. In the broadest sense of cumulative experience Miss Freud and her group have been pioneers in research in child psychoanalysis. Her own case vignettes consistently illuminate these pages. The studies she describes have tried to go beyond the purely clinical approach, with its inevitably idiosyncratic and anecdotal limits, in three ways. First, they have attempted to construct various comprehensive diagnostic schemes or profiles for both children and adults. Second, they have carried out pooled observational studies, not only of well-defined groups of subjects such as adolescents and borderline cases, but also of special groups which constitute 'experiments of nature', for example blind children. Finally, they have attempted a method that might be called systematic contextual sampling, using the Hampstead Index to collect clinical material categorized in various ways.

Of these approaches, the first is the least satisfactory. The complexity of human material leads to ever more fine-grained subdivisions without providing ways for distinguishing wheat from chaff. Miss Freud herself remarks, apropos of obsessional neurosis, on the

need to ascertain what is truly specific to the obsessional process. In this regard, the second approach, careful study of similar cases, is of help, but it often leaves one with a multiplication of the same bewildering complexity of material as does the individual case.

The third method, sampling of material with the Index, offers promise for singling out components of the field exposed in psychoanalysis for meticulous investigation. For example, Miss Freud asserts the classical proposition that certain defense mechanisms, particularly those relying on regulation of behavior by thought processes, are encountered in obsessional neurosis, and that when these are undone 'we always uncover anal-sadistic material'. It would be nice to see this well-known view tested by systematic examination of defensive processes during the course of treatment of several cases.

Such use of 'collective analytic memory' will have to await further studies of Miss Freud and her colleagues, particularly Sandler. These will encounter problems having to do with collecting data, with processing and interpreting them, and, deeper still, with the bases of scientific inquiry. We must sample real events, not second or third level inferences; categories must be unambiguously defined, so that independent observers can identify them reliably. Psychoanalysts generally have been more able to see the complexity of their field than to formulate alternative, operationally testable hypotheses.

To return to obsessional neurosis, Miss Freud discusses the many questions about it raised at a Congress in 1965, but seems unduly gentle, referring to the 'vivid picture of analytic problem solving, with its painstaking back and forth between observations of clinical data, abstraction and generalization, and reapplication of theoretical hypothetical thinking to the further elucidation of our patients' material'. Her own essay suggests more specific hypothetical questions—does obsessional disorder result from restriction imposed in advance of developing psychophysiological impulse organization, or from unusual strength of the impulses themselves, or from some particular fixations or regressions, anchoring the individual at a given level of development or forcing him back to it? These are intricate problems which, in the two thirds of a century since publication of the case of the 'Rat Man', have not

yielded to clinical inquiry alone. They are not likely to in the years ahead. Organized research effort will be required, combining child treatment and developmental observation within a multidisciplinary framework. The studies of the Hampstead Clinic represent a beginning toward such an approach.

PETER H. KNAPP (BOSTON)

SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION. ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MARGARET S. MAHLER. Edited by John B. McDevitt, M.D. and Calvin F. Settlage, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1971. 520 pp.

At a time when psychoanalytic theory is being questioned from several directions, the theoretical concepts arising from Margaret S. Mahler's research of the first three years of life stand out for their clarity, their firm clinical foundation, verifiability by others, and their usefulness in understanding normal and abnormal behavior of children. Her work inspired the writing of this volume.

Each paper is original and uses an aspect of her work as a starting point. The three areas most seminal for these papers are the symbiotic phase, the four subphases of separation-individuation, and her approach to the treatment of psychotic children. The wide range of stimulating topics covered attests to the impact of Mahler's teaching, research, and writing on her students, collaborators, and colleagues who are the authors of this *festschrift*.

Before Mahler's formulation of the normal autistic, symbiotic, and separation-individuation phases, the main conceptual framework of analysts viewing child development comprised the psychosexual stages proposed by Freud and enriched by Erikson. Mahler's conceptualizations are a major addition to the Freud-Erikson framework. This volume explains, applies, verifies, and expands Mahler's statements and therein rests the vital significance of the book.

It is not possible to give adequate coverage to each high quality contribution. After the Editors' Foreword and Ritvo's history of Mahler's professional career, the papers are divided into five sections. Part I consists of primarily theoretical papers. Topics are the capacity to love (Bergmann); the nature of thought in childhood play (Galenson), creatively discussed by Greenacre and McDevitt; the relation of organ-object imagery to self and object represen-

tations (Kestenberg); separation-individuation's contribution to psychic structure formation (Parens); some universal and individual differences in the separation process (Pine); and the libidinal aspect of early psychic development (Settlage). The last named paper contains the first of several superb accounts of child analytic treatment in the book. The case histories illustrate how multidimensional current child analysis is, how Mahler's findings contribute to understanding, and the importance of preœdipal factors in the genesis of infantile neurosis.

Part II has reconstruction as a theme. These papers portray a special type of symptomatic play (Arlow), aspects of ego psychology in analytic practice (Greenacre), and another outstanding child analysis case, stressing preœdipal disturbances (McDevitt).

Part III contains research studies on the role of the father in the separation-individuation process (an important contribution by Abelin), on *folie à deux* (Anthony), on the influence of constitutional factors on development (Fries and Woolf), and on separation-individuation processes at the time of the child's entry into nursery school (Speers, et al.).

Part IV concentrates on clinical papers: included are four excellent treatment reports of children with psychosis (Bergman, Elkisch, Kramer, and Kupfermann), an account of an acute psychotic episode (Harrison), an unusual dream (Greenson), and some original ideas about identity problems in prepubertal girls (Harley).

Part V offers a picture of Mahler's contributions: a description of the setting, procedures, and some key concepts used at the Masters Children's Center for intensive treatment of preschool psychotic children (Furer), the Child Psychoanalysis Training Program in Philadelphia (Kramer and Prall), and Mahler's bibliography (Prall).

Anyone interested in the development of the mind of the child will find this volume extremely rewarding.

JAMES A. KLEEMAN (BETHANY, CONN.)

ASPECTS OF INTERNALIZATION. By Roy Schafer, Ph.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1968. 254 pp.

The central thesis of this work is in the mainstream of psychoanalytic theory: that the process of internalization, and especially

identification, is the basic developmental mode of human experience. Dr. Schafer defines internalization generically as those processes by which regulatory characteristics of the other are taken over by the self with the adaptive aim of enhancing the capacity of control by the self. Inherent in this view is the concept of the adaptive regulatory aims of narcissism, that is, that structure-building identifications enhance both the self and object representations.

The explicit issues dealt with in the text concern the metapsychology of psychoeconomics and the processes of psychic internalization and structuralization. In addition, the broad problem of the philosophy of science is implicitly dealt with as this affects research efforts in psychoanalysis; Dr. Schafer is throughout concerned not only with the problems of data collection, but also how the data can be treated. This work emphasizes the dynamic perspective with the direct conceptual referents being data at Waelder's first level of abstraction—that of the immediate subjective experience.

The construct of psychoeconomics has received intensive discussion in recent years. Dr. Schafer's thoughts on this matter will be controversial in some quarters, but they are cogent and logical, and to my mind persuasive. Of the five metapsychological perspectives a case can be made that in psychoanalytic studies the economic perspective is treated *'primus inter pares'* and the question is why. The answer to this question lies in the referents of the term: psychoeconomics is the metapsychological perspective that is closest to actual experience. Upon introspection it is self-evident that the most immediate aspect of human experience is that of the 'strength' or 'weakness' dimension of what we are experiencing, be it thought, affect, or action. This fact is inherent in the very act of attention, whether on a waking or dreaming level of consciousness. Since the 'strength-weakness' experience is the essence of the daily experience of oneself, this is the viewpoint that most often presents itself to be explained in theory, and here the rub begins. The psychoeconomic perspective can be viewed theoretically in one of two ways, each of which is determined by the causal perspective that is tacitly assumed.

First, the psychoeconomics of experience can be viewed *teleologically,* wherein purpose is deduced from observations of a field of action. This teleological perspective leads to categorizing notions such as 'species survival', as contrasted to individual survival;

the 'evolution of the species', as contrasted to the self-experience of development, and the 'objective observation of behavior', as contrasted to the 'subjective', introspective report of experience accompanying the externally observed action. This of course is the perspective which comprises the main theoretical coin of psychoanalytic psychoeconomics; it began with Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology and is continued down through today in the writings of Hartmann and others. The essential construct here is that psychic energy has *quality,* not just quantity.

However, a second mode of categorizing the economic aspects of experience is possible. This mode would view psychoeconomics from the causal view of the agent (again using Aristotelian categories). The referent data here are the reported degrees of strength of the felt aims-wishes of the individual, that is, the subjective, psychological, empathic viewpoint. Schafer proposes a psychoeconomics which is consistent with his perspective; he proposes that psychoeconomics should be seen as an aspect of the *dynamic* perspective, so that psychic energy is not conceived of as having quality and an existence of its own. In this view psychic energy is not 'free' to be mobile or bound, but rather it is the expression of the degree of intensity with which any psychic experience is felt. It should be noted that this perspective is not new to psychoanalytic psychology. Indeed it comprises the initial view of psychoeconomics that Freud espoused in his earliest published psychologic studies of the 1890's.

To appreciate the potential benefits of this view of psychic energy as having quantity dimensions only, it is helpful to consider some of the theoretical problems arising from a teleological view of psychoeconomics. An energy which has quality also has the problem of energy 'transfers'. In metapsychology this is seen in the problem of energized representations, i.e., how to deal with the concepts of cathected representations, representations which distribute cathexes and the mechanism by which the cathexis of a representation produces an increase in ego cathexis for use in ego aims. Secondly, there are the problems concerned with the notion of change in the quality of energy when an attempt is made to explain the constructs of neutralization and deinstinctualization and how on the basis of change in energy quality these notions can be heuristically fitted into a dynamic schema of ego strength and human development. Finally, the psychoeconomic construct of an

energy that has quality leads to a reification of the notion of energy, the basis for the current metapsychological 'problem' of the notion of an ego reservoir of energy.

Conversely, Schafer proposes a psychic energy which is a dimension of the dynamic perspective, and is without quality. Cathexis denotes only the importance or strength of a given wish which allows for the 'difficult notions of neutralization and deinstinctualization' to be conceived from the dynamic perspective. In this view, these processes can be seen as aspects of internalization in terms of transformations and progressive hierarchal organization of wishes, mental representations and behavioral patterns, which result in a series of drive-derivative wishes that are the bases for ego aims and ego interests. Neutralization in this view would be used heuristically to connote any psychic process that results in progressively organized derivatives of originally nonregulated, primitively instinctualized wishes.

Not imputing quality to energy also allows for a coherent formulation of the problem of the relationship of mental representations to the construct of ego, i.e., the problem of 'energy transfers'. For if energy does not have quality, then mental representations do not theoretically have to be cathected by energy. It should be emphasized that Schafer avoids the tautologic and solipsistic pitfalls of Jung and Klein even though his constructs dispense with the notion of a cathexis of mental representations, for he operationally defines all mental representational experience in terms that are ultimately derived from perceptual experience.

The foregoing considerations are contained mainly in Chapter Three; one can disagree with these energic notions and still gain a richly rewarding experience from the rest of the book.

Chapters Four and Five are concerned with aspects of psychic structuralization. It is here that Dr. Schafer makes an original contribution to the theory of human development in his ideas about the psychological spatial referents of the developing structure of an infant. Dr. Schafer elaborates upon the construct Freud stated in Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, that the antithesis of ego is non-ego (external), i.e., subject vs. object (external) and also upon Mahler's developmental schema of autism-symbiosis-dyad as follows.

When objects are first recognized by the infant they have no definite location in psychological space, so that the original 'non-self', 'other', or 'object' experience has no spatial index. Therefore

the differentiation of objects from self is an event in its own right, without, in its most initial stages, having the additional experience of space, that is, of being external. Developmentally then, what is nonego, other, or object is not synonymous with the experience of 'externality'. Therefore the psychological location of an object in terms of inside or outside the self is a separate developmental event, and the recognized objects by the infant in the early symbiotic stage just exist. They appear and disappear. This construct allows for the concept of a developmental line of *internal* objects (internal to the self as place); objects which are utilized by id and ego drives in the developmental line of narcissism and which also form the basis for developmental lines of hostile and benign introjects. This view of the structure of the early symbiotic stage allows for the operational notions of self as agent, self as object, and self as place. These concepts have a nicety of construction that concisely eliminates the false issues raised by Bowlby and others concerning the genetics of the external object representation.

The remaining three chapters of the book deal extensively with the generic notion of identification and especially with the metapsychology of the œdipal identifications. Schafer asserts that the model of the boy's œdipal identifications as elaborated by Freud in The Ego and the Id is theoretically sufficient only if psychic energy is used quantitatively as part of the dynamic perspective. Using energy in this manner, Schafer offers convincing metapsychological explanations to questions such as: how do the œdipal identifications accomplish the accompanying desexualizations?; what is the source of the ego strength required to effect the œdipal identifications?; what is the place of aggression and deaggressivation in the œdipal identifications and the resultant increase in ego strength? Freud never described the process of this phenomenon. Schafer treats these and other important questions with patience and logic. Along the way he develops an exquisite schema of human development based upon the notion of the 'regulatory aims of narcissism', reaching the conclusion that to enhance the object is to enhance oneself and vice versa.

In sum, this is a rich, rewarding book that has parts some will take vigorous exception to but that never fails to command respect for its clarity and honesty of presentation.

WILLIAM J. PIEPER (CHICAGO)

AUTISTIC UNDISCIPLINED THINKING IN MEDICINE AND HOW TO OVERCOME IT. By Eugen Bleuler. (Translated and edited by Ernest Harms.) Darien, Conn.: Hafner Publishing Co., 1970. 218 pp.

Despite the degree of recognition it achieved in Europe and its selection by Rapaport for inclusion in his Organization and Pathology of Thought, this small volume has remained untranslated into English since its original publication in 1919. The appearance of the work in English is to be welcomed.

Bleuler describes autistic thinking as dominated by wish-fulfilment and analogous to that found in dreams and schizophrenia. Bleuler was familiar with Freud's ideas concerning the primary process, and he does not use the concept of autistic thinking as a synonym for it. He believed autistic thinking to be much more common in 'normal' adults than is usually accepted. He distinguishes between this form of thinking and the more malignant disturbance of thinking to be found in schizophrenia on the one hand and careless thinking on the other. He recognizes the drive character of autistic thinking and how it leads to conclusions that are unshakable because they are determined by, and fulfil, affective needs. Careless thinking also fulfils affective needs but to a lesser degree. Therefore its errors can be given up relatively easily, while autistic thinking leads to convictions which are firmly held, i.e., delusions. While primary process, autistic, and careless thinking may differ only quantitatively, they form a hierarchy or spectrum when included with the secondary process. The use of intermediate forms which do not belong either to the primary or secondary process makes a dichotomous variable better approximate a continuous one.

Bleuler attacks with much passion and justice a variety of medical practice reflecting undisciplined autistic thinking. While it may be reassuring to see that our current blunders have historical precedents, it only highlights the severity of the problem. If it were easy for men to abandon this form of thinking and to approach reality more rigorously, they would have done so to a greater degree over the last fifty years. In this sense then, the title promises too much since Bleuler does not really tell us how to overcome autistic thinking. The use of statistics, careful research design, and the attempt to impose rigorous methods in our thinking are to be praised. Yet

one would have to underestimate man's remarkable capacity for self-deception to believe that this approach is sufficient to the problem. Bleuler does not recognize that autistic thinking may have positive benefits. Rapaport suggests that innovation requires autistic thinking, although this reviewer would argue there are important dissimilarities between creative and autistic thinking as well. In addition, this form of thinking may serve as a socially acceptable outlet for drives which might otherwise manifest themselves in more dangerous forms. Clearly, these are speculations but it is highly probable that autistic thinking also serves adaptive purposes.

There are any number of examples in this small volume illustrating that Bleuler was ahead of his time. He anticipates Rosenthal's criticisms of Kallmann's findings in schizophrenia by pointing out that studies done on a very sick hospital population cannot be generally applied to a latent schizophrenic population. This is remarkable in light of the level of genetic knowledge of his day.

The translation is clear and quite readable. Unfortunately, the volume suffers from a large number of typographical errors. Nevertheless this minor criticism cannot detract from the enjoyment of a much needed translation that is in general well done.

ROBERT CANCRO (HARTFORD)

KINESICS AND CONTEXT. Essays on Body Motion Communication. By Ray L. Birdwhistell. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970. 338 pp.

Psychoanalysts have long known that nonauditory signal systems are important in the stream of communication between all persons, including the patient and his doctor. Examples furnished by Freud, Ferenczi, Reich, Adler, and many others during the early decades of psychoanalysis, and the more systematic studies of Felix Deutsch, Sandor Feldman, René Spitz during the 1940's and 1950's come readily to mind. Although some psychoanalysts claim that this body of learning was never lost sight of, there are many others who deplored the trend after 1930 to neglect detailed description, and they were emphatic in their teaching that eyes as well as ears should be used in clinical psychoanalysis and that good description was

the basis of sound interpretation (e.g., Drs. Ives Hendrick, and Lawrence S. Kubie).

Not a little of the credit for calling attention to body motion, posture, and gestures as highly organized cultural systems belongs to Ray L. Birdwhistell, who pioneered in these studies with his first publication in 1952. He came to body motion studies from the rich traditions of linguistic studies rooted in anthropology, and his work has been informed by L. Bloomfield, Edward Sapir, Kenneth Pike, H. E. Smith, George Trager, Norman McQuown, Charles Hockett, Margaret Mead, and Gregory Bateson. He himself cites twenty-two people who have influenced his thinking. He does not oversimplify the problem of studying visible interacting human behavior. He sees 'human communication as a process to which all participants in an interaction constantly contribute by messages of various, overlapping lengths along one or more channels (such as language, movement, and smell) whose elements are culturally patterned'.

This volume is a collection of essays, edited by Barton Jones, a colleague of Birdwhistell's, and the reader can get a good idea of the author's major contributions to concepts and methods. The collection is uneven and diverse in many respects, but the reader will welcome the originality even when he is aware of the controversial nature of some propositions. Readers who wish a broad view of current work in proxemics and body motion by linguists and experimental psychologists will find a review article by the experimental psychologist, Starkey Duncan, Jr., who worked with McQuown at the University of Chicago and published in the Psychological Bulletin (1969), very helpful.

These essays are too diverse in content and method to encourage brief abstracts. The author is aware of the problems confronting a reader of essays and gives ample warning. 'This book is not a journal of completed research. Nor is it designed as a textbook of kinesics. Neither is it a manual of instruction for those who would memorize annotational conventions, and, without further training, buy a tape recorder or motion analyzer projector and turn movies into scientific documents. It is a book about the study of body motion, communication, and the need for the location of natural contexts of occurrence in the study of human behavior.'

The ten essays that form Part I are principally concerned with examples from everyday life, especially illustrating how children

learn kinesic systems along with many others, and the intricate communication systems within families. These descriptions are excellent background for the more technical essays to follow and can be read with profit by any student of human behavior. The issues involved in developing scientific methods for studying the complexities of real communication are brought into the foreground.

Part II, titled Isolating Behavior, contains four essays which tell the reader much about Birdwhistell's approach to the study of human interaction and some theoretical concepts. Part III, Approaching Behavior, has four chapters reviewing the general principles of social contexts of communication and analyzing American movement. Part IV is a working section for other investigators. The title Collecting Data: Observing, Filming, and Interviewing describes the contents of seven chapters in this section and answers many of the questions about procedures that will be asked by serious students. The meaning of relevant time in a sequence of body motions is discussed in Chapters 22 and 23.

Part V, Research on an Interview, will be of particular interest to other investigators because it contains in Chapter 26, Body Motion and in Chapter 27, A Kinesic-Linguistic Exercise: The Cigarette Scene, an example of Birdwhistell's analysis of a natural history event. This material is adapted from the unpublished volume, The Natural History of an Interview (Editor, Norman A. McQuown), on material developed during 1956-1960. The advantages of the natural history method and the very real difficulties are well illustrated in these chapters.

There are also three appendices of technical interest on kinographs, kinesic recording, and a list of examples of body motions.

This book may be recommended to all psychoanalysts who are interested in the fields of proxemics, psycholinguistics, and linguistics. It is an early milestone on the long road to better understanding of human interactions, and points the way toward more controlled, formal, and quantified studies that will meet the canons of science, namely reliable recording of data which can be replicated and interpreted by other workers using various hypotheses. While incomplete, it is a desirable and relevant introduction to linguistic-kinesic analysis.

HENRY W. BROSIN (TUCSON)

PSYCHOLINGUISTICS: SELECTED PAPERS. By Roger Brown, et al. New York: The Free Press, 1970. 392 pp.

'It is now eighteen years since the Social Science Research Council brought together three linguists and three psychologists for an interdisciplinary conference that led quite directly to the creation of the field of psycholinguistics.' Thus in the preface to this collection of papers, the reader is given the impression that he can be 'in on' the history of a 'hybrid' discipline, and indeed the scope of the book bears out this impression.

The papers in the rich first section of this volume contain data and formulations on the early development of language competence. One may read of the relationship between imitation, comprehension, and productivity, or of the sequential differentiations observed in the acquisition of adult grammatical forms. Most of these papers grew out of a detailed study of the speech development of three children during the period of rapid speech acquisition. More important for analytic education, the papers show how a group of lively minds utilized the hypotheses generated by a seminar whose members reviewed data from naturalistic observations.

This first section not only acquaints us with the problems and recent history of applying linguistic hypotheses to the actual development of children, but provides psychoanalysts with some new data on the early phases of ego development. Concepts such as internalization and ego nuclei may be easily read into the text to make some of the propositions more familiar, or rather to put some developmental meat on the bones of our speculative models of ego structure and differentiation. The distinction between linguistics as pure philosophy, and psychology as a complicating human substrate for language acquisition, was never so clear. The section ends with a new paper by R. Allen and Beatrice Gardner on their attempt to teach language to a chimpanzee by using gestural iconic signs. Dr. Brown's discussion of this work temporarily puts the lid on the issue of where man's symbolizing capacity differentiates him from the 'beastes'.

The second part of the book covers the span of years since the conference and reflects the changing scene in linguistics. Such vital topics as linguistic relativity and phonetic symbolism are given experimental strength by the authors. Of special interest to

psychoanalysts is experimental work concerning 'tip of the tongue' (TOT) phenomena. One cannot but recall Freud's example of forgetting cited in The Psychopathology of Everyday Life as one reads the text. A review of Nabokov's Lolita should encourage psychoanalysts in the conviction that 'harder scientists' turn to and enjoy analysis when the job of interpreting a work of art is the task. Dr. Brown uses his linguistic skills in this piece in a fashion not unlike the analyst's applying his skill to a patient's productions.

The reviewer cannot sanguinely recommend this book to psychoanalysts as a *must* for their work. It is rather far removed from our daily concerns. It is detailed, scholarly, and tough going at times. However, for those interested in linguistics or child development it is a most stimulating compendium of papers. For those who would find a productive model by which we may set our educational house in order, this *is* a must, because it describes how a group of interested investigators and graduate students turned scholarly interest and naturalistic observation into testable hypotheses. For those who are stimulated by fields that overlap our own, this volume can provide many interesting slants on traditional problems which have become stale because of the overuse of old models.

THEODORE SHAPIRO (NEW YORK)

GIAMBATTISTA VICO: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM. Edited by Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Hayden V. White. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. 636 pp.

Psychoanalysts reading this book will ponder the passage (p. 245) where it is said that when the Danish writer, Tom Kristensen, asked for help with Finnegan's Wake, Joyce recommended a reading of Vico. 'But do you believe in the *Scienza Nuova*?', asked Kristensen. 'I don't believe in any science', Joyce answered, 'but my imagination grows when I read Vico as it doesn't when I read Freud or Jung'. It is unlikely that Freud ever heard of Vico or of Joyce's remark, although Joyce must have made it while living in Trieste (1905-1915), at that time an Austrian city and a crossroad for all kinds of ideas, including psychoanalysis. It was there, in fact, that Edoardo Weiss lived and practiced psychoanalysis for several years. Had Freud known about Joyce's remark, it would only

have increased his lifelong admiration for great artists who intuitively approach the level of the unconscious without having to go through the vicissitudes of analytic work.

To try to simplify and clarify Vico's thinking in relation to psychology and, specifically, psychoanalysis, represents a challenge. In an enlightening article in the New York Times Magazine (November 23, 1969), Sir Isaiah Berlin, a leading British historian, called Vico 'one of the boldest innovators in the history of human thought'. Vico virtually invented the idea of studying culture, comparative anthropology and philology, and anticipated modern notions on language, myth, law, symbolism, and the relation of social to cultural evolution. It is unfortunate that mainly because of the obscure style of his writings and of the unorganized way in which his immensely suggestive ideas are presented, Giambattista Vico (1668-1774), professor of rhetoric at the University of Naples for most of his life, remained forgotten by all but a few specialists, among whom the Italian philosopher, Benedetto Croce, stands out.

The present volume, published on the occasion of the tercentenary of Vico's birth, carefully edited by the Italian-American philosopher, Giorgio Tagliacozzo (formerly lecturer at the New School of Social Research), with the coöperation of several other scholars, offers the contributions of about forty representatives from the fields of the humanities, history, and social sciences from both sides of the Atlantic. The list of contributors, which reads like an international 'Who's Who', is most impressive and their chapters are of the highest caliber. Even a simple list of the topics covered would be beyond the scope of the present review. Particularly relevant to psychology are the chapters on Vico and Lévi-Strauss by E. Leach, on Vico's and Dilthey's methodology of the human studies by H. P. Rickman, on Vico and Cassirer and on Vico's structuralism and phenomenological encyclopedia of the sciences by E. Paci, and on Vico's pedagogical thought and that of today by M. Goretti.

In these chapters and in others, the fragmentary passages that have some relationship to psychology and psychoanalysis make even more noticeable the lack of a chapter on Vico's relevance to contemporary psychology, a major omission in such a comprehensive volume. No alternative is left, then, but to present some highlights of his thinking relevant to psychology and psychoanalysis. Central to his philosophy—mainly presented in his *Scienza Nu-*

ova, 1725 and 1744—is his differentiation between natural sciences (especially mathematics) invented by men (*'certum'*) and human sciences related to the development of mankind (*'verum'*). The first is the object of science, the latter, of 'con-science'; in other words, the first is subjected to exact methodology, the latter to empathic understanding. Vico's thesis is that the 'royal road' of approach to human sciences is through knowledge of the functioning of the human mind; that there is a correspondence between the development of the human mind from birth on and the development of human institutions, be these myths, fantasies, language, poetry, history, or law.

For Vico, development occurs in a holistic way (*cf.,* H. Werner) from global undifferentiation to hierarchic differentiation, not unlike the principles of genetic psychology outlined by Piaget. The concepts of egocentrism, realism (inability to separate subject from object), animism, and others are clearly described by Vico. Equally fundamental are his notions regarding language, which has progressed in history from the concrete motor (era of gods), to the imitative physiognomic (era of heroes), to the conventional level (era of men). The fact that different groups used different onomatopoeic sounds to designate the same things is explained by him on the basis of different perspectives of reality, in line with modern concepts of phonetic symbolism.

More specifically in relation to dynamic psychology, Vico considered concupiscence, aggressivity, and narcissism to be basic instinctual forces. He also hinted at the importance of projection, repression of instincts, and sublimation, and emphasized the prohibiton of incest throughout history. He devoted considerable space in his writings to the study of myths and poetry as the best method of understanding the concrete logic of primitive societies, and to the process by which instinctual forces are either repressed or channeled into constructive purposes.

Just the simple listing of these concepts should be sufficient to assign to Vico a permanent place among the great pioneers of dynamic psychology. Yet he was so much ahead of his time that he passed unnoticed, to be discovered from time to time and again forgotten. He himself appeared to have foreseen, perhaps unconsciously, his destiny. In one of his educational writings, On the Study Methods of Our Times (1708), he imagined time as a river which

submerges the heavier objects (the best authors) while it carries toward us on its surface the lighter ones (the superficial writers). The present volume would accomplish a lot if it encouraged those interested in the history of dynamic psychology to go back to Vico's original writings. Accessible to the English speaking world through fine translations (an exhaustive list is given in this volume), they may be a source of stimulation, not at the expense of Freud as Joyce implied, but for a broader comprehension of his message.

GEORGE MORA (POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y.)

THE LIFE AND DEATH OF MAHATMA GANDHI. By Robert Payne. New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1969. 703 pp.

GANDHI'S TRUTH. ON THE ORIGINS OF MILITANT NONVIOLENCE. By Erik H. Erikson. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969. 474 pp.

Gandhi continues to fascinate psychoanalysts. His political genius and accomplishments, his impact on world history and the consciousness of mankind have been unrivaled in their originality and power. Moreover, the violence occurring throughout the world today, with the certainty of the annihilation of man if the problems underlying man's violence are not solved, compels us to study and restudy the life of the man who forged the theory and practice of nonviolent political action. The psychoanalyst has a special interest in Gandhi's intrapsychic conflicts and his overt psychopathology as they relate to his creative accomplishments—and to his blind spots and failures.

It is therefore a pleasure to recommend the two books under review as valuable additions to our knowledge of the subject. They are complementary volumes, and there is no indication that either of the authors was aware of the other's practically simultaneous work. I have listed Payne's first because it is more comprehensive and objective. Reading it first will facilitate the reading and evaluation of Erikson's psychohistorical study.

Payne's biography is beautifully written, a model of selection and incisiveness. The events leading to Gandhi's assassination unfold with the spellbinding force of tragedy, and this is accomplished without novelistic trickery or dramatic flourish. Payne's most original contribution is the factual clarification of the conspiracy and

assassination, and the failure of government officials and police to investigate the conspiracy and provide Gandhi with the most elementary protection. One gets the harrowing impression that Indian officialdom simply went along with the Mahatma's expressed yearning for death by violence while practicing nonviolence.

Payne ably documents Gandhi's greatness, but also fulfils the promise in his introduction not 'to conceal the dark side of his nature, the thin black threads winding among the many-colored ribbons of his life. He was a bad father, a tyrant to his followers, and rarely made any effort to conceal the authoritarian streak he had inherited from his ancestors. He was fascinated by sex to the point of obsession, and long after he had taken a formal vow of chastity he would share his bed with women', saying that since all animal passion had died in him, he was behaving with perfect purity. 'Sometimes he believed in his own mahatmaship, and this was perhaps the most dangerous of all his beliefs. From his mother he inherited a profoundly religious temper, and his search for God was often at war with his search for earthly power and dominion. The contraries were mixed up in him. Though he proclaimed his humility, he was intolerant of criticism, and was more dictatorial and more self-indulgent than he knew. Though he was humble, he was very proud. He was the great innovator, but there was never a time when he was not enmeshed in tradition.'

As the years went by Gandhi proved to be woefully uninformed and 'naive' about the world outside of India. In May 1940 he said, 'I do not consider Hitler to be as bad as he is depicted. He is showing an ability that is amazing, and he seems to be gaining his victories without much bloodshed.' Gandhi 'found himself wondering why Jews so rarely loved their enemies. He was convinced that if the Jews in Germany had offered themselves to the butcher's knives and thrown themselves into the sea from cliffs, they would have aroused the world and the people of Germany. . . . It was not of course that Gandhi lacked sympathy for the Jews; it was simply that he did not have, and could not have, any imaginative conception of their plight. In the quiet of the ashram, the even greater quiet of the gas chambers was inconceivable.'

I thought, as I finished this profoundly moving biography that I would like to see a one-volume biography of Freud of comparable quality. This thought is most pertinent in reviewing Erikson's

book, for Erikson makes penetrating comparisons of Gandhi with Freud—another nonviolent seeker of truth.

Gandhi's Truth is not simply one more of Erikson's psychohistorical studies; it is a highly and frankly personal work. It presents a laboriously garnered case to support the thesis that one 'Event' was the most fateful crystallizing determinant of Gandhi's philosophy and career. The 'Event' was Gandhi's successful two-month Satyagraha (Truth Force) campaign in Ahmedabad in 1918 against the textile millowners' lockout of their workers.

The thesis simply does not gel with this reviewer. Gandhi was forty-eight at the time of the Event. He had already established a worldwide reputation with his successes as leader of Hindu and Moslem minorities in South Africa, in militant nonviolent campaigns to protect them from political and economic extinction. Here he had already formulated the basic principles of Satyagraha (Truth Force) and Ahimsa (nonviolence), and he was already irrevocably committed to opposing racial, caste, and religious discrimination.[1] He had already proven his courage, frequently having risked losing his life and liberty. He was arrested and jailed repeatedly, and was once almost beaten to death. In South Africa too, in 1906, when he was thirty-five years old, he took his vow of chastity. Moreover, back in India six months before the Ahmedabad Event, he had successfully resolved the serious problems of the indigo workers in Champaran.

After reading and rereading Erikson's evidence, I see the Ahmedabad campaign as only one in a long series of major successes for Gandhi and Satyagraha. But this disagreement with Erikson's thesis is not all-important; the book has much of stimulating psychoanalytic and historical interest, once one gets beyond the rather tedious introductory chapters. In his usual felicitous style Erikson gives us a clear picture of the interweaving of Indian history and culture with the familial and intrapsychic factors in the formation of Gandhi's character and career. Gandhi's adolescence proves to be a fertile field for the application of Erikson's concepts of identity crisis and ego identity formation. What Gandhi throughout his life referred to as 'the curse' appears to be the single most important

[1] *Pari passu,* in *Hind Swaraj* (Indian Home Rule), Gandhi documented his contempt and hatred for Western industrialization, education, democracy, medicine, and science, a neat epitome of his complexity and contradictions.

event in his bisexuality, foreshadowing his later renunciation of sexuality and his acting out of a maternal role. Gandhi and his wife Kasturbhai were married when both were thirteen years old (not unusual for the time and place). He embarked on a most vigorous sexual life, very much the dominating husband. As his beloved father lay dying, Gandhi left his bedside to have intercourse with his then pregnant wife. Urgently recalled, he found his father already dead in his uncle's arms. This was the curse that plagued him all his life. Erikson goes into the complex ramifications of this curse: 'While Gandhi's Autobiography pictures him as a child and as a youth totally obsessed with matters of guilt and purity and as a failure in the ways of the world, he, of course, somehow acquired at the same time superior powers of observation as well as an indomitable determination. But I believe that just because Mohandas was early (if only darkly) aware of the unlimited horizon of his aspiration, his failure to preside mercifully over his father's death and thus to receive a lasting sanction for his superior gifts was, indeed, the curse of his life. But this, as we saw, is (typically) a shared curse, for if "carnal weakness" was to blame, it was the father's weakness which had become the son's. The father married Gandhi's mother when he was forty, she eighteen [and this was his fourth marriage].'

Only a few direct questions can convey the unique flavor of Erikson's writing. In discussing the vicissitudes of the instinctual drives, Erikson succinctly differentiates *instinctive* from *instinctual*: 'Here it must be conceded that even Gandhi's fanatic attempts to simplify his tastes, however moralistic in their scrupulosity, do contain a truth which was, at the same time, made accessible to insight by Freud. If the nutritional instinct, for example, guides the animal in finding and devouring an adequate amount of the right kind of food, this is very different from the oral-incorporative instinctuality which may make man spend a greater portion of his resources on alcohol and soda pop, on tobacco and coffee, than on the schooling of his children.'

Erikson's final words about Gandhi and Freud cannot be paraphrased: 'Gandhi's and Freud's methods converge more clearly if I repeat: in both encounters only the militant probing of a vital issue by a nonviolent confrontation can bring to light what insight is ready on both sides. Such probing must be decided on only after careful study, but then the developing encounter must be permitted

to show, step by step, what the power of truth may reveal and enact. At the end only a development which transforms both partners in such an encounter is truth in action; and such transformation is possible only where man learns to be nonviolent toward himself as well as toward others. Finally, the truth of Satyagraha and the "reality" of psychoanalysis come somewhat nearer to each other if it is assumed that man's "reality testing" includes an attempt not only to think clearly but also to enter into an optimum of mutual activation with others. But this calls for a combination of clear insight into our central motivations and pervasive faith in the brotherhood of man.'

These quotations from Erikson will give the reader some idea of the book at its best. But he is often not at his best. Erikson gives a brilliant account of Gandhi's pre-eminent contributions—Indian independence and the creation of a new sense of Indian national identity. However, he deals inconsistently with Gandhi's personal problems, at times tending to play down Gandhi's sadism and preoccupation with death, particularly as they vitiated his character and object relations. We get no clear picture of the man's intolerance of intellectual competition, his near inability to delegate responsibility, and his increasing inflexibility during the last twenty years of his life. Examples are his persistent contempt for science, birth control, mass education, and industrialization; and his failure to incorporate civil defense measures in his program in order to protect Hindu and Moslem minorities against the slaughter of the forties that was predictable in the twenties.

Erikson makes much of Gandhi's exhortations and personal campaigns against filth, but how effective could these be with illiterate, starving, and superstitious people? They were as effective as asking them to be sexually abstinent, or expecting them to go beyond their primitive identification with Gandhi to a deeper abiding understanding of Satyagraha. A dozen Gandhis can scream against the horrors of the caste system, and the degradation of the untouchables will remain in India, in spite of its illegality, as long as mass poverty remains substantially untouched. One cannot expect an orally fixated and frustrated individual to exhibit higher ego and superego functioning, especially if he is illiterate and his life is actually in danger. When this is the state of the bulk of the population, it cannot be expected to sustain nonviolent political activity. I believe

that here psychoanalytic insight establishes a vital link between group psychology and political science.

To what extent Gandhi's blind spots, contradictions, and blunders contributed to the persistent poverty and bloodshed that still plague India today is conjectural. What is not conjectural is that the viability of Indian democracy is dependent on the solution of its problems of scientific development, birth control, mass education, and industrialization. Fortunately these are priority items with many of Gandhi's successors—priorities they did not inherit from him with his legacy of Indian independence.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

ROUSSEAU AND THE SPIRIT OF REVOLT. A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY. By William H. Blanchard. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967. 300 pp.

REVOLUTIONARY IMMORTALITY. MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. By Robert Jay Lifton. New York: Random House and Vintage Books, 1968. 178 pp.

THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY. LENIN, TROTSKY, GANDHI. By E. Victor Wolfenstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. 330 pp.

The three books reviewed here deal with revolutionary leadership. The three authors come from diverse academic disciplines though they are all sufficiently acquainted with psychoanalytic psychology to apply it in their investigations. Their work shows, on the one hand, how psychoanalysis has become—for better or worse—common property in the social sciences and, on the other hand, how important it is for psychoanalysis to develop an adequate theory of group psychology in order to become useful to the various disciplines in the social sciences.

An example of this need is E. Victor Wolfenstein's The Revolutionary Personality. Wolfenstein is a political scientist and his aim is to derive empirically the psychological qualities of a revolutionary by studying the biographies of Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi. Because of his choice of material, he, in effect, studies the characteristics of revolutionary *leaders,* and not merely revolutionaries. He uses Erikson's epigenetic developmental schema as the basis upon

which to compare and contrast these men. Unfortunately his use of this schema is, at best, mechanical and, at worst, naïve. In his hands it becomes a kind of developmental check list by which these men are rated. Using the method that he does, it is not surprising that he reaches the conclusions that he does. He finds that the choice of revolution as a life's profession is a form of resolution of the adolescent identity crisis. In the case of the potential revolutionary leader this crisis specifically involves œdipal issues within the individual and a political context outside the individual which make the externalization of this kind of inner conflict feasible but not criminal. The intensity of the adolescent œdipal conflict must be very strong and the rigor of its solution extreme. This produces in the revolutionary leader his dedication to revolutionary action.

Robert Jay Lifton also explores a revolutionary leader in Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution. But Lifton, in contrast to Wolfenstein, takes up the leader's following. Lifton is a psychiatrist with extraordinary erudition about East Asia, its history, its culture, and its problems. In this work he seeks to explain the recent baffling events in China called The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-1967. He argues that Mao Tse-tung sought to lead a second revolution in China, only this time against the 'pragmatists' in the communist regime who would introduce and extend technological expertise and bureaucracy at the expense of peasant purity of action and mind.

Lifton's main concern is to demonstrate the ubiquity, if not the universality, of man's need to deny the inevitability of personal, biological death. He suggests that the aging and perhaps ill Mao felt himself and his revolution to be dying and sought to mobilize the population, particularly the youth, to overthrow again the established oppressive, exploitative authorities. Thus he and the masses would experience immortality; for the revolution and its perpetuity would be the symbolic negation of biological death. Lifton cites many quotations from the writings of the Chinese revolutionaries during this period to substantiate the prevalence of this theme. However, he is too concerned with symbolic death and immortality to give sufficient attention to the peculiarly Chinese qualities of Mao and these cataclysmic events. Lifton indicates he has the ability to do so, for he does insert a rather long discussion of the use and meaning of *words* to the Chinese through the ages and particularly dur-

ing the Cultural Revolution. But he never develops this or other leads. Such a treatment of the subject would have given much insight into China and the Chinese because previously masked but nevertheless essential cultural qualities emerge in stark relief when social structure is shaken. Further, one might have understood the relation of Mao to the Chinese people in greater depth.

Whereas Wolfenstein and Lifton direct their attention to leaders in revolutionary action, William Blanchard, in Rousseau and the Spirit of Revolt, investigates a man who became a revolutionary leader posthumously. The French revolutionaries chose the recently deceased Rousseau as their ideological leader and raised him to a near divine status. Blanchard attempts to explain not only how this came about but also what there was in Rousseau that made him a rebel and, more generally, what there was in him that exists in all rebels. He demonstrates from a vast array of Rousseau's writings a strong and only vaguely acknowledged sadomasochistic tendency. He traces its development from the overt erotogenic masochism of Rousseau's childhood to the moral masochism of most of his adult life. He also shows the plausibility of an unconscious and very sensual feminine masochism. Blanchard argues that the inherent sadism and masochism together with the conflicts around them produced in Rousseau and other rebels of all sorts their defiance, their idealism, their need to dominate others as well as their need to fail. Thus the choice by the French revolutionaries of Rousseau rested much more on their common 'spirit' than on any of the often self-contradictory theoretical statements Rousseau wrote.

The above brief sketch of these three books hints that a psychoanalytic group psychology might productively contribute to the subject of leadership and, as a special case, revolutionary leadership. Indeed the psychoanalytic work done in group psychology has tended to use leadership as a central concept to explain group behavior. Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego is the first and greatest effort in this direction. And Arlow, Bion, Foulkes, and Redl have made important extensions of the ideas set down in that monograph.

The most general statement about the leadership condition is by Arlow. The would-be leader is a person who presents a fantasy of action to other people. That fantasy, by definition, embodies an id wish. If the others make that fantasy their own, i.e., derive gratifi-

cation of the id wish in the context of sharing the fantasy, they become a group, and the presenter of the fantasy their leader. Thus, Blanchard was quite correct in looking for the instinctual drive inherent in Rousseau's ideas and discerning that as the basis of his appeal to the French revolutionaries. This same consideration points up a serious omission in Lifton's thesis that Mao roused the Chinese masses around the fantasy of immortality. For he does not make clear how the fantasy of immortality embodies a particular id wish. If this fantasy did have the organizing and mobilizing force Lifton attributes to it, it would be extremely important to know just what, in *instinctual* terms, its appeal was.

A leader may present his action fantasy in two ways. One is by setting forth a *program,* as did Rousseau, Karl Marx, and Theodore Herzl. The other is by embodying the fantasy in his very being (*charisma*), as did Alexander of Macedon, Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Adolf Hitler. Most often leaders evince varying degrees of both types of fantasy presentation; for example, the leaders in Wolfenstein's study: Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi. In studying leaders, it becomes important to note whether the fantasy of charisma and the fantasy of the program are identical—as Lifton asserts is the case with Mao in the Cultural Revolution. When they are identical, the programmatic and charismatic elements of leadership tend to form a 'complemental series'.

This view of leadership indicates how complex the vicissitudes of the leader-follower relationship can be. The follower of a charismatic leader achieves without delay an indirect and vicarious gratification of the leader's fantasy through the concrete presence of the leader; but also, through the example of the leader, he has a greater tendency to act and achieve direct gratification. The follower of a programmatic leader anticipates a delayed gratification of the leader's fantasy, but that gratification is conceived as direct and his own. The delay in gratification, i.e., frustration, may lead to a renunciation of the leader. On the other hand, the action fantasy of a charismatic leader disappears when the leader does; that of a programmatic leader may endure long after he is gone.

The above considerations thus imply that leadership is definitely a two-sided condition. It is not based solely on the qualities of the leader but rather on the quality of the interaction between him and his followers. The tendencies within the latter, how they act

and react to the leader, are just as crucial as the personality of the leader himself. This is probably the basic weakness in Wolfenstein's study. Even though he acknowledges the importance of a facilitating environment for the revolutionary leader, his emphasis is on the psychological ontogeny of the revolutionary leader himself, quite divorced from his following. Yet Wolfenstein is not unaware of the intimate transactions and rapport between leader and follower. Indeed, of all these three books, it is his which contains the most vivid description of the effect of followers upon a leader. He quotes from Trotsky's autobiography, My Life:

> At times it seemed as if I felt, with my lips, the stern inquisitiveness of this crowd that had merged into a single whole. Then all arguments and words thought out in advance would break and recede under the imperative pressure of sympathy, and other words, other arguments, utterly unexpected by the orator, but needed by these people, would emerge in full array from my subconsciousness.

Wolfenstein sees the profound theoretical implications of Trotsky's radically revealing description. He writes in a footnote: 'Trotsky here provides us with material for an important supplement to Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, which views the leader of just such crowds as these, rather as an unmoved mover. Trotsky's description gives us an insight into how much the leader responds passively to and is controlled by the crowd's activity.'

Being aware of this, it would have been more appropriate for Wolfenstein to study Lenin and Trotsky in light of revolutionary Russia and Gandhi in the arena of colonial India rather than mainly in terms of their respective childhood and adolescent developments. For it was only within the context of the cultural and historical processes of the Russian and Indian peoples that these men could become leaders. Lifton does make some effort in the direction of showing the uniquely Chinese rapport between Mao and the Chinese people but, as mentioned above, does relatively little with it. Blanchard correctly puts Rousseau squarely in the stream of French culture and history and shows him to be a true psychological forerunner of the French Revolution. Unfortunately, Blanchard would extend his conclusion to all rebels in all ages in all countries.

Thus in the very dynamic transaction which occurs between a leader and his followers, the leader not only actively presents an action fantasy, he may also passively serve to catalyze the collective

expression of tendencies within his followers. And it would seem that the choice of a leader is the most facile way a group can express a collective fantasy. Usually the true leader acts somewhere between the purely active and passive extremes noted here. Arlow, writing of those fiery revolutionary leaders, the Hebrew prophets, states: 'The true prophet is one who correctly devines and expresses the emergent, but still inarticulate dreams and aspirations of his people'.[1]

Accordingly, the group psychology of revolution and revolutionary leadership becomes extremely paradoxical. For the revolutionary leader must present and/or represent the fantasy of destroying a parental figure (the old leadership). He must do this within the revolutionary organization he leads and, if successful, in the new revolutionary regime. This state of affairs leads to the mobilization of considerable aggression but now directed toward the revolutionary leader, either latently or overtly. The handling and mishandling of this aggression, i.e., the aggression inherent in the revolutionary fantasy, becomes crucial in the personality of the revolutionary leader and within the revolutionary organization and regime.

Wolfenstein takes up this issue in terms of tolerance of œdipal guilt within the successful leader (Lenin and Gandhi) and intolerance of it within the unsuccessful leader (Trotsky). He argues cogently about the developmental factors in these leaders concerning the handling of œdipal guilt. However, this and related issues are much more complex. Individuals as well as groups use mechanisms other than failure to succeed or just plain tolerance to handle the burden of guilt. Scapegoating is one.

Certainly the vicissitudes of the guilt reaction over the revolutionary fantasy and its acting out are important. Blanchard inadvertently proposes one. He presents masochism as the essential psychological quality of the revolutionary. However, it may make more sense to view the masochism of the revolutionary as representing a regressive development in the revolutionary fantasy of destroying the parent. In this way Wolfenstein's œdipal thesis and Blanchard's masochistic one may be more congruent than they seem at first sight. Such a correspondence of the two would help to explain such glaring paradoxes in revolutionary history as the be-

[1] Arlow, Jacob A.: *The Consecration of the Prophet.* This QUARTERLY, XX, 1951, pp. 396-397.

havior of Danton and Robespierre in the Terror; and also that of Stalin and the Old Bolsheviks during the Great Purge and the Moscow Trials.

Obviously these and similar speculations can be proved or disproved only by rigorous and truly psychoanalytically informed work in psychobiography, history, and all the other social sciences. These three books on revolutionary leadership, with all their flaws, show how great is the need for such work and how great is the potential for it.

LEON BALTER (NEW YORK)

THE WISH TO BE FREE. SOCIETY, PSYCHE AND VALUE CHANGE. By Fred Weinstein and Gerald M. Platt. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1970. 319 pp.

This volume is the product of the collaboration of a historian from the State University of New York and a Harvard sociologist. Their thorough familiarity with psychoanalytic literature adds a dimension to this historical study of the changing values in modern man's striving for autonomy and freedom. An attempt is made to synthesize sociologic theories and psychoanalytic conceptualizations, thus correcting what the authors consider Freud's biological bias—the cause, they believe, of the neglect of his work by sociologists.

Weinstein and Platt try to develop a general theory to explain the commitment of modern man to the principles of autonomy. Armed with a thorough knowledge of the pertinent historical and philosophical material, they present the reader with a penetrating analysis of the French Enlightenment, Rousseau as the 'ambivalent democrat', and Robespierre with his 'retreat to authority'. In presenting this material the authors provide us with important insight into the historical and psychological processes preceding the French Revolution and the emancipation of the individual. At the same time they explain, in terms of psychoanalytic concepts, the inevitable setbacks and regressions that occurred. In this connection one wishes that they had supplied data to account for Robespierre's turning from the struggle for freedom to the advocacy of terror. They describe this ominous development inadequately as 'a failure of the ego to deal with its own demands, to deal with anxiety aggravated by chaotic external circumstance'.

In a novel approach the authors construct a parallel between the development of the psychic and the social structures. This parallel provides a basis for the psychoanalytic understanding of political doctrines and social philosophies. The individual's struggle for autonomy is discussed in the perspective of conflicts of mental systems, in particular the internalization of the demands of parental authorities. The authors also offer pertinent and original comments upon what they call 'the introspective revolution', exemplified by Freud and a series of writers. They devote most penetrating pages to the sociopsychological analysis of Franz Kafka, whose works they correlate with those of Freud's, examining them in the context of the social structure of their epoch. I am particularly impressed by the correlation they establish between the changes in family structure and the shift from œdipal to preœdipal motifs.

Some of the statements of this generally impressive study are, of course, subject to criticism. I would single out for challenge their contention that revolutionary changes in the form and content of authority should not be viewed as successive attacks on œdipal authority. They argue that 'œdipal authority did not exist in traditional systems'. While one must agree with the authors that it would be simplistic to explain revolutionary movements exclusively in terms of an œdipal rebellion, it would be equally wrong to exclude this factor from our consideration.

GUSTAV BYCHOWSKI (NEW YORK)

BOUNDARIES. PSYCHOLOGICAL MAN IN REVOLUTION. By Robert Jay Lifton. New York: Random House, 1969. 113 pp.

This brief 'discussion' is based on a series of radio talks the author gave over the Canadian Broadcasting System. In it he attempts an always difficult synthesis of philosophical reflections and psychological material. It was based on the six months' research he conducted in Hiroshima in 1962.

The series of interviews Dr. Lifton held in Japan with survivors of the first civilian atomic bomb explosion naturally made an unforgettable impression on him. On the grounds of that indelible experience he has, over the past decade, published a variety of works.

At this time he writes especially of man's requiring a sense of

immortality 'as man's way of experiencing his connection with all human history'. In one essay titled 'Self', Lifton suggests that threats to the self and the symbols of such a menace are associated with or may be taken to suggest some sort of breakdown connected with 'identity problems'. To support his argument, he cites Saul Bellow, notably for the 'Protean' man created in his novel, Adventures of Augie March, and parallels in the writings of Jean Paul Sartre that make him 'an embodiment of twentieth century man'.

The book, in short, attempts to blanket too much of contemporary life with skimpy and threadbare references to profound questions. Perhaps as radio lectures for general audiences Dr. Lifton's remarks would seem less polemical than they do in reading. In any case the lectures, more frustrating than interesting, may have spread a smattering of knowledge to the listener but offer no enlightenment to the reader.

GREGORY ROCHLIN (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MENTAL HEALTH CONSULTATION. By Gerald Caplan. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. 397 pp.

Gerald Caplan has done it again. This tenacious innovator of community mental health services has now evolved a psychoanalytically based theory and practice of mental health consultation. In keeping with an increasing tendency of modern psychoanalysts to help community agencies, Caplan describes work in which the analytically trained consultant assists school teachers, nurses, and agency directors. All the psychoanalytic skills used when guiding parents in dealing with a family are brought to bear in guiding consultants to deal with their clients. Of special interest to psychoanalysts is the relationship between transference phenomena and consultant-consultee phenomena.

Caplan considers a mental health consultant task which until recently has been almost completely alien to most psychoanalysts: participation in the field of social forces. He suggests the consultant may have a role in the mediation between political action groups and mental health agencies. The consultant may also play a creative role by encouraging and even facilitating the expressions of persons whose beliefs require the destruction of existing social orders. While not taking a position as to whether such an alternative

is most desirable or appropriate, Caplan opens the door for legitimate inquiry regarding the possibility that the mental health consultant may have a revolutionary role. The scope of applied psychoanalysis is indeed widening!

One of the most intriguing aspects of the book is Caplan's application of psychoanalytic theory to an assessment of mental health consultation effectiveness. Using a scheme not unlike one independently developed at The Center for Preventive Psychiatry, Caplan has introduced a statistically manageable judgment index. Using a modified Hampstead profile of instinctual manifestations, Caplan has independent judges rate the contents of consultation interviews according to the consultee's psychosexual theme level. Caplan further assumes that variation from this theme indicates that the consultation process has introduced a desirable degree of open-mindedness and flexibility on the part of the consultant in approaching his client's problems. While this inference is somewhat distant from clinical operations with the client himself, which would be a more valid measure of consultation effectiveness, the method is a valuable and practical contribution.

This book covers principles of a much needed practice of applied psychoanalysis, one infrequently utilized and often involving a blurring of the analyst's personal identity. Caplan points the way for psychoanalysts not only to maintain their professional integrity and identity but to act more powerfully because of a respectful application of their most special roles and most profound insights. The reviewer emerged with increased certainty that the consultation process is a timely challenge at the frontiers of applied psychoanalytic theory and technique.

GILBERT KLIMAN (NEW YORK)

MARRIAGE IN LIFE AND LITERATURE. By Robert Seidenberg, M.D. New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1970. 307 pp.

Seidenberg states in the Foreword that he writes in the spirit of science and attempts to label frankly some of the social issues and forces of mating and other human affinities. Nine of the fifteen chapters have appeared elsewhere in various journals. There is some repetition and unevenness, but basically the book is well written by an analyst who admires the novelist's skill. In essence, Seidenberg

offers some interesting vignettes blending comments from his practice and from belles-lettres. He does not attempt an over-all analytic or sociological view of the developmental stage of marriage. Seidenberg feels that man has yet to gain the maturity to live more happily and effectively in the marital state. At each step of psychosexual development, the psyche has a new chance for further integration and growth, as well as for chaos and regression. The material presented in this book highlights pathology and an inability to master the task of marriage.

A weakness of the book, as I see it, is that Seidenberg presents a polemic, but with humor, of what he believes to be the degraded and exploited state of women. He writes as if he were a member of the Women's Liberation Movement. 'The inequalities in what is advertised as the ecstasy of love lead not only to the degradation of the victim, but to the inevitable corruption of character of the dominant male who gains ascendancy and power through inheritance and custom, rather than earned worthiness. This corruption erodes morality in the same manner that white racism has corrupted Caucasians.' Seidenberg gives credit to Freud for his basic contributions, but he feels that analysts, at least 'mainstream analysts' as he says, are antifeminine. He does not make it clear, or seem to appreciate, that analysts, as well as analytic theory, do not view the female as inferior, but as different. Castrated or not castrated is the way the child at the phallic phase views the sexes. At the resolution of adolescence, a clear, realistic appreciation of both sexes should have been achieved with a feeling for the equality, uniqueness, separateness, and definite differences between the sexes. Without this, the chance for a successful marriage is greatly diminished. In a brief review it is not possible to discuss analytic views of femininity and female development, but it should be noted that the view Seidenberg presents is incomplete. Our analytic clinical material and especially the material Seidenberg so beautifully presents, shows that castration anxiety and penis envy (genital trauma) are still bedrock.

I enjoyed the book and recommend it, but with the understanding that many of the analytic interpretations and formulations could be profitably broadened and deepened.

STANLEY S. WEISS (DENVER)

HUMAN SEXUAL BEHAVIOR. VARIATIONS IN THE ETHNOGRAPHIC SPECTRUM. Edited by Donald S. Marshall and Robert C. Suggs. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. 302 pp.

Growing out of several anthropological symposia and sponsored by the Institute for Sex Research (the Kinsey Institute), this anthropological collection attempts to establish 'comparative similarities and differences and then to develop a number of generalizations about cultural, social, biological, ecological, and psychological forces as these influence human sexual behavior'. Of the eight essays, seven are by anthropologists, one by a sociologist. The cultures surveyed range from Polynesia and Africa to England and Ireland. The breadth and diversity of human sexual experience are indicated, but not much else; each essay, like the foreword, prologue, epilogue, and appendix, manages to be disappointing or unpleasant in its own way.

Psychoanalytic terms are used abundantly, but the contributors reveal little if any knowledge of, or interest in, psychoanalysis. Freud is mentioned several times in passing, at least twice with frivolity. Apart from a cursory reference to Devereux, the other leaders of psychoanalytic anthropology in this country (Róheim, La Barre, Muensterberger, et al.) appear not to have existed at all, and Devereux's name is misspelled by two of the writers, each with his own unique misspelling. Most of the nonpsychoanalytic anthropologists of the past and present are dismissed as prudish, unscientific, or wrong. Several, including the late Ralph Linton, are ruthlessly dealt with in a curious display of intellectual (and dyspeptic) cannibalism.

This is, in brief, an aggressive, hard-shelled, and 'liberated' anthropology which runs the gamut from Masters to Johnson, with a backward glance at Kinsey. For all its vaunted and aggressive modernity, much of the book is quite traditional in theory and method, and its half-baked scientism and behaviorism can even be described charitably as old-fashioned.

S. H. POSINSKY (NEW YORK)

THE DYNAMICS OF PERSONALITY. By Lewis R. Wolberg, M.D. and John P. Kildahl, Ph.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1970. 322 pp.

This book is an ambitious attempt to delineate the development of human personality. A listing of the criteria for the healthy per-

sonality is given, and the various developmental life stages are then described with their respective tasks and requirements from the environment, as well as the influences that make for maladaptation. There is a presentation of conflict, defense, and symptom, eclectically conceived but essentially drawing on classical dynamic concepts. The authors attempt to explain some pressing current, socially expressed problems, such as violence, the disaffection of the young, and the sexual revolution.

For the lay reader, eager for quick solutions and uncomplicated 'understandings' the book is enlightening and reassuring. It gives explanations that are persuasive; it gives the feeling that these matters, individual and social, are understood and can be influenced. The tone is optimistic. The authors provide guidelines: for parents at each stage of parenthood; and for the individual's progress toward greater maturity: self-observation of causes for anxiety and lowered self-esteem, and in interpersonal relations; study of one's own dreams and of one's own resistances to the insights acquired. Even with the obvious limitations that these suggestions carry—which the authors mention—they will surely be welcomed by the lay reader. The authors unmask the lifelong 'deprived' whiner, and reassure the 'guilty' parent.

The professional reader, however, will have many reservations. Mainly, there is a frequent gap between the dynamics one can easily infer on the one hand, and what is offered as understanding and explanation of the illustrative case material on the other. For example, in the case of Roger (pp. 113-114),—where the patient's symptoms of passivity, homosexual fears, tendency to ingratiation, and discomfort with women appear to be products of guilt over his wish for (and contribution to) his mother's seduction of him and over his obvious œdipal triumph in joining her in his father's extrusion—his symptoms are explained as products of the mother's pressure for attainment and the father's neglect. The passivity and ingratiation are explained as 'the passive pattern he had used to please his mother'. In brief, this, the authors imply, is how he had been molded, so this is how he is. External handling is everything; instinctual motivation and intrapsychic conflict are absent. Along the same lines, one finds: 'Persons devalue themselves because they are "taught" to do so, most likely by insecure parents or siblings who needed to belittle those around them in order to enhance their own status' (p. 290). Again the external handling is all; conflict

and guilt are not mentioned. In the same direction there is much leaning on sociology, with many references to 'this generation' and 'the middle class', and the effects of advertising and other social influences.

However, the general reader will find this book sensible, 'educational', and heartening, and in these senses very useful.

MILTON MALEV (NEW YORK)

SHAKESPEARE, MEDICINE AND PSYCHIATRY. AN HISTORICAL STUDY IN CRITICISM AND INTERPRETATION. By Irving I. Edgar, M.A., M.D. New York: Philosophical Library, 1971. 382 pp.

Dr. Edgar is a practicing psychiatrist with literary interests and has lectured on the history of medicine. The essence of this book formed his master's thesis in English literature at Wayne State University in the 1930's, when portions of it also appeared in the periodical literature. There is much new material in this published version, in particular sections dealing with the psychoanalytic approach to Hamlet and Lear.

It is not his intention to add 'to the ever-increasing deluge of Shakespearean criticism'. He visualizes 'the spirit of Shakespeare' laughing 'hilariously up his sleeve' at 'the mountainous literature' his plays have already produced. On the contrary, he hopes to stem the tide by saving his hero from false adulation. In his own words, 'by demolishing the foundations of bardolatry in the fields of medicine and psychiatry, we fervently hope to diminish the possible future flow of commentary in this area of Shakespearean criticism'. This he has attempted to do by setting Shakespeare's medical lore in the background of his time. From Dr. Edgar's treatment Shakespeare emerges not 'an all-pervading, all-comprehensive, all-knowing God-man' (sic), but a superbly gifted Elizabethan playwright who merely used the knowledge available to the intelligent layman of his day.

There is no doubt much shoddy Shakespearean scholarship, and doctors who knew too little about Elizabethan drama and civilization as well as literary critics who were insufficiently informed in medical history, have contributed largely to the lore. The fault has been chiefly in the direction of idolatry, crediting Shakespeare with insights and foresights he did not and probably could not possess.

Did he know of the circulation of the blood before Harvey? How is it he knew so much of medical practice and practitioners? Whence his remarkable acquaintance with the stirrings of the heart and the springs of human action?

These are some of the questions to which Dr. Edgar addresses himself, and he provides a salutary corrective for reading more into the plays than there is. In doing so he has also tried to provide coverage of major and minor medical Shakespeareana. Unfortunately printer and proofreader have let him down badly: 'Sir William Harvey' (laudable but incorrect); 'Sir Harry Maudsley' (for Dr. Henry Maudsley); 'Dr. Eaustus' (for Faustus); 'Tyvum' (for the notorious Tyburn); 'Sussana' Hall (with two other variations) for Shakespeare's daughter Susannah; Dr. John Cotta's The Triall of Witch-craft appears as 'The Troll of Witch Craft'; the first edition of Burton's Anatomy of Melancholy, 1621, is dated 1612 and quoted from a variety of nineteenth and twentieth century editions not always identified. Add to such mistakes statements like 'a French charlatan named Theodore Mayerne' who was in fact probably one of the greatest physicians of the seventeenth century and certainly in England the most influential; that King James enacted a witchcraft statute in 1541 which was no less than a quarter of a century before he was born; that Sir Thomas Browne was a contemporary; and that inmates of asylums were exhibited for amusement and an admission fee (a reference to an eighteenth century Bedlam practice)—such statements throw grave suspicion on whatever else may be credible in the book. One gets the impression that the author has been defeated by the magnitude of his thesis, a feeling not diminished by his repetitiousness. One leaves it as one does so many commentaries on that other great observer of mankind, Charles Dickens, with gratitude for having been allowed to read so many quotations from the works.

IDA MACALPINE (LONDON)

EGO BOUNDARIES. By Bernard Landis. Psychological Issues, Vol. VI, No. 4, Monograph 24. New York: International Universities Press, Inc. 1970. 177 pp.

Based in large measure on a New School for Social Research dissertation and on postdoctoral work in psychology at New York

University, this monograph falls into two parts: 1, a description and assessment of ego boundaries in terms of permeability and impermeability by means of a Rorschach scoring system devised for the purpose, and 2, an examination of the relation between ego boundary attributes and the boundary properties of a person's intrapsychic tension systems, a gestaltist concept of Kurt Lewin. Permeability is defined as a relative openness between ego and nonego and an expansiveness toward the world; impermeability is defined as a relative closedness between ego and nonego and a degree of seclusiveness from the world. (These characteristics, later in the study, were found to have no bearing on a person's mental well-being.)

A population of twenty-five married couples was divided on the basis of Rorschach ratings into predominantly open or closed, corresponding to more permeable and to more impermeable boundaries. The monograph then examines whether a person's inner tension-system boundaries possess the same net permeability or impermeability as his outer ego boundaries. The subject is given a task, interrupted midway, then given a substitute task which he completes. If the ego boundaries are predominantly permeable the substitute task should discharge the tension of the interrupted task; if the boundaries are predominantly impermeable the residual tension of the first task would remain unreleased by the substitute and the subject would resume the interrupted activity. The result of these experiments was that impermeability and permeability of ego boundaries were consistent with impermeability and permeability of tension-system boundaries but that 'central motivational factors' were significant and that they interacted with the boundary qualities in question in some unclear manner.

Central motivational factors are seen as adding to boundary qualities so that both 'jointly influence a person's coping'. It would seem to this reviewer that looking at boundaries as additive to central factors rather than functionally integrated with them is something like discussing a country's protective tariffs apart from that country's economy and geopolitics. Perhaps this shortcoming is due to an absence of a developmental viewpoint. Ego boundaries are not treated as arising from, intimately related to, and reflecting the ego. Nor is there any mention of the emergence of ego boundaries from primary narcissism, the role of the stimulus barrier, the sig-

nificance of transitional phenomena (Winnicott), or of the symbiotic phase (Mahler). Similarly beyond the ken of this study is the role of the ego's integrative function, reality testing, or early identifications in determining boundary qualities. It would not have been out of place, however, to register some cognizance of the importance to ego boundaries of these present-day ego psychological concepts.

To study ego boundary permeability apart from ego functions is tidy but simplistic. A person should be sensitive yet strong, empathic but not overly suggestible. A boundary should be permeable in respect to receptivity of stimuli but impermeable enough to resist fusion and the undermining of the sense of identity. On the next to the last page the author reaches a similar conclusion, proposing 'the additional concept of (optimal) boundary resilience—which might, perhaps, be manifested in some qualitative combination of permeability and impermeability'. A final footnote quotes Wilhelm Reich on the importance of a stable identity which allows a person either to open-up or close-up to life situations as he deems fit. This 1949 truism would seem more appropriate in an introduction to a contemporary study of boundaries than in its conclusion.

In a final summary the author concedes that the Rorschach 'may not do justice to the complexity and flux of boundary structure'. However, he then proposes 'the construction of a questionnaire to gauge a person's experiences of openness and closedness under different interpersonal and impersonal conditions'. Does he suppose that such an instrument will do justice to the subtlety, complexity and, above all, mobility of the forces involved? One may doubt that prolonging a scientistic exercise, however carefully, will prove any more illuminating than the present work.

GILBERT J. ROSE (ROWAYTON, CONN.)

FUTURE SHOCK. By Alvin Toffler. New York: Random House, 1970. 505 pp.

Psychoanalysis has represented itself as a value-free science and its practitioners have sought, in applying their knowledge clinically, to reduce value judgments to a minimum. Nonetheless assessments of health and illness, of clinical progress and regression, of adapta-

tion and maladaptation have always rested and continue to rest on a valuative base that, often implicit, makes up part of what I have called 'the culture of psychoanalysis'. Many of these values derive from the historical rooting of psychoanalysis in the industrial culture of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Western society. They include delay of gratification, the normative status of long-term, stable, monogamous, heterosexual love relationships, the crucial importance of work, a defined occupational identity, and the clear definition of male and female roles as well as personality characteristics.

Although the rate of social and technological change in the fifty years between Freud's first psychoanalytic efforts and the end of World War II was rapid, even spectacular, it did not begin to have the explosive quality that we have seen in the past twenty-five years. In this book Toffler seeks to extrapolate the ways in which the future will be characterized by even more kaleidoscopic changes that will lead to major revisions in social organization and cultural norms. It is evident that such changes will reflect on the values inherent in our assessments of 'mental health' and 'mature' personality functioning, and therefore on some of the underpinnings of clinical psychoanalysis, if not of its basic theory.

Toffler's position, briefly stated, is that humanity is confronted by contemporary technology with a pervasiveness and rapidity of change whose consequences are precisely akin to Freud's definition of trauma, i.e., an overloading of the nervous system with stimuli that cannot be integrated or discharged. It is this condition that he calls 'future shock', and he suggests that many of us are now its unwitting victims and that all of us will be susceptible in the near future. In the process all of the values cited above will be subject to serious challenge and, probably, to extensive revision.

The classical psychoanalytic view of monogamous heterosexuality as norm and ideal in adult love relationships is already under considerable strain and will suffer even more serious tests in the future. It has been estimated that fifteen to twenty per cent of American married couples have engaged at least once in group sex. More and more homosexuals are coming 'out of the closet' and militantly demanding nondiscriminatory treatment. What Toffler calls 'serial marriage' grows steadily in extent as divorce becomes easier and more commonplace; young couples no longer wish

to commit themselves to marriage vows that bind them 'till death do us part', but rather 'as long as we dig it'. Communal living styles are replacing the nuclear family among many groups of young adults, including young professionals.

In such a context the clinical judgment of sexual maturity and the formulation of analytic goals becomes infinitely more difficult and uncertain than in the good old days of the stable conjugal union and 'genital primacy'. Indeed, a number of analysts (Ross, Sarlin, Lichtenstein) have questioned the value of 'genitality' as an index of psychic maturity. It seems clear that the aim and object of the libido are less likely to serve us as such indices in the future than is the affective quality of the relationship to the object.

As with love, so with work. Firm commitment to a career goal and sustained engagement in productive employment have long been considered reliable indices of maturity in a world of bureaucratic structures and slow technological evolution. The present situation in the aerospace industry foreshadows, however, what Toffler calls 'adhocracy'—the predominance of short-term projects requiring highly specialized skills. Workers will shift from one project to another, requiring frequent retraining, geographical mobility, and a lack of firm commitment to a single organization or a single skill. Toffler suggests that the 'mature' man of the post-industrial future will be the one who can most successfully cope with mobility, change, transience, and uncertainty.

Future Shock is a popularization and suffers from many of the ills of its genre. Toffler employs a journalistic style that is occasionally irritating in its slickness. Serious students of 'futurology' may find his treatment of complex technical issues superficial and glib. But for the psychoanalyst who is not *au courant* with present-day projections of the technological prophets, and who is concerned about the future of his own science, this book will provide provocative, and at times disturbing, reading. At the very least, it deals with issues that we can only ignore at our peril.

AARON H. ESMAN (NEW YORK)

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. VIII, 1970.

M. Donald Coleman

To cite this article: M. Donald Coleman (1972) Israel Annals of Psychiatry. VIII, 1970., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 146-154, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11927575

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11927575

Published online: 10 Nov 2017.

ABSTRACTS

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. VIII, 1970.

A Clinical Study of the Role of Hostility and Death Wishes by the Family in Society in Suicidal Attempts. Joseph Richman and Milton Rosenbaum. Pp. 213-231.

Richman and Rosenbaum report on interviews with suicidal patients and members of their families, followed by family interviews. A control group of patients (and families) with other psychiatric diagnoses was similarly interviewed. The results of the study lead the authors to believe that the rejecting attitudes or death wishes of the family and society play a large role in the genesis of suicide. The therapist is enjoined not to participate in these attitudes. While the authors attempt to give due consideration to other aspects of a multiply determined chain of interacting forces, the impact of the article is to place emphasis on the family's or society's malevolent wishes rather than on intrapsychic causes of aggression that might stem from other more complexly interrelated factors.

Stages of Religious Experience and the Path of Death Psychology. Eric Neuman. Pp. 232-254.

Originally a lecture given in 1943, Neuman's paper is a description of the 'levels' through which a Jungian analysis passes. The orientation of the author is religious and mystical. His article illustrates very effectively that the word 'analysis' in this context has almost no relationship to our use of the term. While there may be some idiosyncratic elements unknown to this reviewer, the paper does appear to be a highly instructive presentation for anyone looking for a condensed statement of the operational aspects of Jungian therapy.

M. DONALD COLEMAN

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. IX, 1971.

Stress and Strabismus. Morris L. Beckwitt. Pp. 11-29.

The author feels that there is justification for considering the strabismus syndrome a psycho-physiological distortion, part hereditary and part environmental in genesis. He suggests it may be one of a variety of responses to emotional stress in the mother-child relationship. Evidence for this is presented in seven brief histories in which strabismus appeared during emotional upheaval. Convergent strabismus is conceptualized as taking objects to the mouth, while divergent strabismus is a denial or thrusting away. Much of the data presented suffers from *post-hoc-ergo-propter-hoc* logic, but some of the cases convey important support for the major thesis.

Suicide Proneness. S. T. M. Neuman. Pp. 39-51.

Neuman presents the results of a statistical survey on thirty-eight suicides representing all suicides known to have occurred in the operation of a psychiatric

hospital. Nineteen of the suicides took place during hospitalization and nineteen afterward. Of particular interest is the evidence that more highly educated and/or European Jews appear much more likely to become suicidal than the less educated and/or Oriental Jews. The article attempts to explain this discrepancy in various ways, including a reference to goals and ideals in the different groups, but fails to elaborate on the role of differing superego development in the two groups.

Psychopathology of Children Raised in the Kibbutz; A Critical Review of the Literature. Atara Kaplan De-Nour; Raphael Moses; Joana Rosenfield; Joseph Marcus. Pp. 68-85.

The studies examined by the authors of this comprehensive effort to review the literature on Kibbutz child rearing are often characterized by widely ranging observations on the same phenomenon. Hence one study claims that Kibbutz children look and behave like Spitz's institutional children, whereas the next study finds that they do not differ from other children. Different child-rearing practices in various Kibbutzim and favorable or unfavorable bias on the part of the researcher contributed to this confusion. Several of the studies cited indicate that the œdipal conflict loses intensity, as does sibling rivalry, leading to adults who are more group oriented in their strivings, and less inclined toward envy, selfish demands, and intensive, acquisitive drives. The authors note that the only observation all researchers agree on is that there are hardly any marriages between people who have grown up in the same group—almost analogous to a self-created incest taboo.

M. DONALD COLEMAN

Cuadernos de Psicoanálisis. VI, 1971.

'Ecocide' in the Myth of the Deluge. Fernando C. Cesarman. Pp. 3-9.

In the Biblical deluge there is a clear relationship between the ecological disaster and man's feelings of guilt because of his aggressive fantasies. Man's actions precipitated the disaster; he was unable to control his aggression and God meted out justice. In Sumerian literature the gods (who had human needs and impulses) destroyed the earth because they could not control their 'ecocidal' drives. In a recent novel by G. Garcia Marquez, *Cien Anos de Soledad,* man is destroying the earth to protect immediate economic interests. In all cases there is a lack of development of ego functions, especially reality testing. Man controls his behavior poorly in relation to the eco-system and when he recognizes the consequences, it is too late to repent. The author concludes that mythology and the novel suggest the existence of 'ecocidal' fantasies: man with destructive impulses toward his own milieu.

Suicide and Its Relationship to Projective Identification. Antonio Mendizabal. Pp. 17-21.

The author defines as suicidal any person who wishes to commit suicide, who has attempted it, who threatens to do it, whom we fear can do it, or who has

consummated the act. He is convinced that negative feelings in a near relative of the suicidal person have a triggering effect. The successful suicide mobilizes such guilt and mourning in the relatives that these obscure the aforementioned negative feelings. The author conceptualizes his clinical data on the basis of Melanie Klein's theories, citing as an example a family in which the mother was impelled toward suicidal behavior by the projective identification of the husband and children. Immediately after the gesture, the family was pained and saddened. A few days later, however, the husband was angry because she had not succeeded. His negative, aggressive, and cold behavior induced her to tell him that his lack of support, his coldness, and anger were his way of suggesting she kill herself. The husband then became depressed and wanted to kill himself. This is the same process, but inverted; that is, there is a reciprocal play of projective identifications. Mendizabal views suicide as the final act in a long and complicated process between two or more sick people. The person who commits suicide is the one least resistant to the projective identifications, but the whole group is affected by the influence of the suicidal person. The author reminds us that when we treat the suicidal person or his relatives, we will also be the object of projective identifications.

Reflections on the Theory of Dreams in the Light of New Investigations Regarding Sleeping and Dreaming. Luis Morena Corzo. Pp. 29-34.

After briefly summarizing the findings of experimental sleep and dream studies, the author remarks that the psychoanalytic theory of dreams has remained essentially as Freud proposed it, based primarily on the topographic model. As far as he knows, there has not been any serious and systematic attempt to reformulate the theory on the basis of the structural model, the dual instinct theory, or ego psychology. Nor has it been confronted with recent experimental findings. He suggests it is high time to do both. The function of dreaming includes more than preserving sleep and attempting to fulfil infantile sexual wishes. During the REM phase man is most in contact with his inner world, and this periodic regression toward internal objects is as vital and indispensable as is contact with the external world. This has been demonstrated by the sensory deprivation experiments. Dreaming is a period during which we reprovision psychically and gain contact with our impulses through the imagery of the dream. Dreaming is not the protector of sleep, but both dreaming and sleeping permit the occurrence of organic and psychic phenomena which are indispensable to healthy mental functioning.

The Feeling of Loneliness as the Motive for Rage. Hector Prado Huante. Pp. 35-38.

The feeling of loneliness appears at all critical moments of psychic development, especially in the transition from childhood to adolescence. The adolescent distances himself from previous attachments, tries to be alone, and searches for an only friend—a friend reflecting himself, like a mirror image. Even when together adolescents cannot avoid the feeling of loneliness, and they constantly

provoke situations in which they are rejected. This helps them rationalize the feeling of loneliness which leads to rage. Neurotic parents are offended by the sudden lack of affection and draw incorrect conclusions, further alienating the youngster. Adolescent regression seeks a resolution of infantile dependencies that are irreconcilable with mature object relations. The adolescent develops passionate transitional object relations which should be considered a defense against loneliness. The farther away he moves from his parents, the more he trusts the friend, the guide. The feeling of loneliness impels him to impose his rage on others. This is manifested in adolescent stubbornness, bellicosity, manner of dress, bragging, attack on teachers, tendency to accidents, etc. These youngsters need to feel that they are needed and it is wise to give them some responsibility.

The Lie in the Transference. Marco Antonio Dupont Munoz. Pp. 45-51.

The author hypothesizes that the appearance of the manifest, purposeful lie in the transference indicates a regressive phenomenon of psychotic quality that corresponds to the concept of psychotic transference or illusory transference. In such transferences the patient eludes by various means any realistic attachment to the therapist who serves only as a screen on which are projected inner contents—the ones the patient is psychotically relating to. Consequently, the suspicion of the lie in the transference can be considered the harbinger of the emergence of psychotic contents. A detailed clinical example is given to demonstrate this problem.

ALBERTO DE LA TORRE

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic. XXXV, 1971.

Treatment of the Adolescent with Borderline Syndrome. James F. Masterson. Pp. 5-18.

A specific developmental arrest at the separation-individuation stage is used as a working theoretical framework for approaching diagnosis, dynamics, and treatment of the borderline syndrome in adolescents. The syndrome evolves along the following lines. The mother, often suffering from a borderline syndrome herself, cannot support and encourage the child's separation-individuation and evokes feelings of abandonment and depression in the child as he achieves some separation with growth. He thus clings to the mother and produces pathologic defenses to protect against awareness of such feelings. These defenses intensify as further separation demands confront the child, either through external experience such as loss of important objects, or through the renewed maturational demands for separation-individuation at prepuberty. The case of an acting out adolescent is used to illustrate this thesis. Treatment is divided into three phases: containment of acting out behavior in a hospital setting, during which the patient tests the therapist's capacity to understand and care for him; the subsequent establishment of a therapeutic alliance with words replacing actions as a means of working

through abandonment depression; and finally, working through the eventual separation from the therapist.

The Clinical Management of the Nonpaying Patient. Linda Hilles. Pp. 98-112.

After becoming the therapist of a hospital clinic patient who had never previously paid her clinic bill, Dr. Hilles chose to proceed with therapy while interpretively dealing with the nonpayment as a resistance. The unpaid bill and its meaning became a major focus of treatment. Nonpayment represented to the patient, a woman of borderline character structure, a means of avoiding fusion (the therapist might eventually terminate treatment in anger, or the patient leave out of guilt), as well as binding the therapist (the patient's value to the clinic would rise in proportion to her debt). Over the course of two years the patient became more successful in managing significant areas of her life, including her extratherapeutic financial dealings, though the clinic debt was never made good. Treatment was judged a 'qualified success'.

The Ideal Psychoanalytic Institute: A Utopia. Anna Freud. Pp. 225-239.

Underlying many of Miss Freud's recommendations for the 'ideal institute' is an emphasis on the broadening and flexibility of selection policies, teaching methods, and teaching aims. Students with varied backgrounds and training relevant to psychoanalysis would be selected so that they might enrich each other's thinking and—ultimately—the future development of psychoanalysis. Less than 'ideal' personal qualities need not disqualify applicants; important contributions to psychoanalysis have often been made despite, or because of, diverse personality characteristics. Reliance would be placed on the metapsychological Profile as a tool for assessment of the applicant's personality. Full-time residencies would replace part-time training, allowing intensive study and time to pursue independent interests. Salaried senior staff should be available for teaching. Training in child analysis, now a technique in its own right, would accompany that in adult analysis, and candidates could begin clinical work in either, according to individual background and preference. Theoretical courses should largely guide the candidate toward independent reading, while theoretical workshops, formed on the basis of joint interests, would allow for group investigation of more complex issues. The curriculum would also include training in diagnostic evaluation, observation of children and adults outside the consulting room, and applications of psychoanalysis to allied fields.

These are but highlights from a provocative description of a model which, though seemingly utopian, has, to this reviewer's understanding, become operational in many respects at Miss Freud's own Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic.

ELLEN ROTHCHILD

Psychoanalytic Review. LVII, 1970.

The Enmity between Generations. Konrad Lorenz. Pp. 333-377.

Lorenz presents a number of ideas relating to and explaining current social unrest involving conflicts between generations. He writes: 'We cannot help feeling that organic systems are the more valuable the more highly integrated they are. . . . There is no human vice which is anything less than the excess of a function which, in itself, is indispensable for the survival of the species. . . . There is no path to the peaks of bliss except through the valley of sorrows, and modern man is so pampered and coddled that he shrinks from paying even the moderate toll of discomfort that nature has set as the price for all earthly joy. . . . I believe that humanity has just now reached the critical point at which the changes in social norms of behavior demanded within the time period between two generations has begun to exceed the capacity of the puberal adapting mechanisms.'

The Problem of Generations. Karl Mannheim. Pp. 378-403.

Individuals are members of a 'generation' by virtue of the fact that they are 'in a position to experience the same events and data', especially if the experiences impinge upon a similarly 'stratified' consciousness. By similarly 'stratified' Mannheim means having had similar experiences during the course of development. There is a continuous shift in objective conditions and a continuous shift due to the appearance of new generations. New impulses originate in new organisms and are modulated by reciprocal influences with older generations. A 'generation style' may appear as a 'realization of potentialities' if triggered by the social and cultural process. 'It must be admitted that biological data constitute the most basic stratum of factors determining generation phenomena; but for this very reason, we cannot observe the effect of biological factors directly; we must, instead, see how they are reflected through the medium of social and cultural forces.'

Œdipal Elements in Student Rebellions. Robert Endleman. Pp. 442-471.

For this study of campus activists, the author examined commission reports, diaries, clinical case studies, and other sources. He found student activists to be high academic achievers, concentrating mainly on the humanities and social sciences, with upper middle or upper class professional family backgrounds. The parents were unusually highly educated and frequently Jewish or agnostic. The issues over which crises developed varied, were 'capriciously changeable', and often 'patently pretexts'. Generational struggle involving irrational as well as rational elements was a latent factor. The typical childhood pattern of the activist showed a dominant mother, a successful father, and unconscious resentment against the father who did little to counteract the dominance of the mother over the son. Activism expresses wishes for punishment, destruction of father, possession of mother, assertion of masculinity, and interest in real issues.

Campus Disorders: A Transactional Approach. John P. Spiegel. Pp. 472-504.

Spiegel describes 'the phenomenology of campus disorders', examines 'the psychological processes which lead individuals to join one or another of the contending groups', and explores the interplay between social and psychological factors. A 'premonitory phase' involves mounting student anger over curriculum, public policies, and the student's right to influence institutional policy. Perfunctory administration responses lead to hardening of student attitudes; student disillusionment then leads to disruptive acts. 'Dove', 'hawk', and 'temporizing' attitudes appear in the administration. Negotiations begin in a crisis atmosphere and factions appear among the students. Some sort of resolution occurs. Students' premonitory phase ambivalence about authorities gives way to a view of the authority as oppressor. The libidinal component is attached to the student group. Faculty 'doves' envy the students' aggressiveness while 'hawks', who have usually struggled up from humble origins, feel threatened in their positions and identify their fate with that of the institution. Value conflicts are forced into the open as in a therapeutic situation. Hopefully, constructive resolution of the differences may result.

Self-Reconstitution Processes: A Preliminary Report. Theodore R. Sarbin and Nathan Adler. Pp. 599-616.

A number of elements are common to 'self-reconstitution processes' such as religious conversion, brainwashing, Synanon and Alcoholics Anonymous experiences, psychotherapy, military indoctrination, and hypnosis. These elements include symbolic death and rebirth, a relationship with a group and its esteemed representative (teacher, oracle), ritual behavior that allows the acolyte an active role, special bodily stimuli (kneeling, lying, hunger, etc.), and 'triggers', which are special events that stimulate conversion. Such conversion procedures involve 'a physical and psychological assault (symbolic death); a developing confusion about self and other beliefs . . . surrender and despair (becoming a nonperson) and . . . a working through, active mastery, re-education or adaptation process (the rebirth experience)'.

ERNEST KAFKA

American Imago. XXVIII, 1971.

Freud's Literary Style: Some Observations. William G. Niederland. Pp. 17-23.

This article is an appreciative review of Walter Schönau's 1968 book, *Sigmund Freuds Prosa: Literarische Elemente Seines Stils,* published in Stuttgart. Niederland is convincing in his contention that Schönau's study of Freud's phraseology, metaphors, imagery, choice of language, and expository style is '. . . based on careful research and meticulous attention to detail, executed with scholarly knowledge and genuine devotion'. Schönau poses the interesting theory that Freud's clear and stylistically rich prose may have contributed to the resistance to his writings among German professors by arousing envy.

More's Utopia: Confessional Modes. David Bleich. Pp. 24-52.

Using biographical data and other commentaries, Bleich argues with considerable success that Utopia reveals in More severe conflicts over strivings for power and authority.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

Archives of General Psychiatry. XXIV, 1971.

Adaptive Integration of Psychiatric Symptoms. Jules V. Coleman. Pp. 17-21.

The subject of this essay is the social employment of psychiatric symptoms and their adaptive integration in ego regulation. Symptom socialization illustrates an adaptive function of the ego in achieving social-ecological balance at all times. Distress occurs when the person's inherent attitude of unquestioned confidence in social belonging and in the protectiveness of the group is undermined.

Protean Man. Robert Jay Lifton. Pp. 298-304.

Lifton examines a set of psychological patterns contributing to a 'protean man' in contemporary society. He posits a break between man and his traditional symbols. A second contributing factor is the flooding of imagery produced by modern cultural influences. The protean style of self-process is characterized by an interminable series of experiments and explorations. The explorations require a symbolic fatherlessness. Protean man can embrace, modify, let go, and reembrace many idea systems and ideologies. With these experiments goes an inner sense of absurdity; death and the threat of the contemporary apocalypse are mocked. Patterns of anxiety, sense of unworthiness, and the ambivalence toward change itself are pointed out by Lifton.

Theoretical Hierarchy of Adaptive Ego Mechanisms. George E. Vaillant. Pp. 107-118.

Vaillant proposes a hierarchy of adaptive ego mechanisms based on his impressive thirty-year follow-up study of thirty men. From a larger sample of two hundred and sixty-eight college men, thirty were selected for study. These men were contacted every two years by questionnaires, autobiographical questions, and occasional interviews. Episodes of behavior, called 'vignettes', were judged by the author to represent a life style and/or ego mechanism of defense. Each vignette was classified by the author according to his list of eighteen mechanisms of defense. An independent rater classified and scored the thirty subjects on an adjustment score, using the questionnaire answers regarding health, marriage, and occupation (position and income). 'Neurotic' defensive styles such as repression, isolation, and displacement were frequently used by all of the men. Vignettes illustrating 'immature' mechanisms were noted nine times less frequently among the eight men with the 'best' adjustment as among the ten men

with only 'fair' adjustment. For twelve, vignettes reflecting 'mature' mechanisms comprised forty per cent or more of the vignettes recorded. Their average adjustment score was 6.5 (range, 5 to 8). Examples of the life histories are presented by Vaillant. Fixed defensive styles persisted for decades in some individuals. Dynamic shifts and evolution of ego mechanisms appeared in others. Mature choices of ego mechanisms appeared to be clinically correlated with the more successful life adjustments. A glossary of defense mechanisms is provided as well as a useful bibliography.

DONALD J. COLEMAN

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Wayne A. Myers, Theodore Jacobs & Stephen K. Firestein

To cite this article: Wayne A. Myers, Theodore Jacobs & Stephen K. Firestein (1972) Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 41:1, 155-160, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1972.11927576

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1972.11927576

Published online: 10 Nov 2017.

NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 12, 1971. GOD THE FATHER AND HIS SONS. Howard H. Schlossman, M.D.

Dr. Schlossman examined a recurrent theme in Genesis of competing brothers where the younger emerges triumphant. Frequent references to Jehovah as the opener of the womb point to a special relationship between the child-bearing woman and the phallic God, a residue of an earlier matriarchy. As the fate of the first-born son was frequently sacrifice, he did not share in his father's inheritance. References to sexual union with a god and to child sacrifice were later obscured but survived in the saga of the victorious younger son. In folklore, Isaac is sacrificed and subsequently resurrected, paralleling the story of Christ. In the Biblical version, the lamb is substituted for Isaac and Jehovah rejects the child sacrifice practiced by his predecessor, El.

Excerpts from the analyses of two 'triumphant' younger sons were presented. The first patient's guilt led to the dibbuk myth: he fantasied his older, stillborn brother's spirit seeking to take possession of his body. The second patient fantasied that his older brother was sacrificed to God by being sent to the Yeshivah; he feared that he too would be sacrificed.

In the evolution of social organizations, Schlossman sees the Hunter Gatherers (primal horde) as the earliest level. Castration and death were deterrents to incest. In the later agricultural matriarchy, the mother-goddess shared power and religious mysteries with her son after the father-god had been murdered. The son's œdipal triumph led to guilt; in the totemic incorporation of the father, we find archaic superego formation. Population growth led to social conflict and the evolution of a warrior class. The œdipal mother and father attained equal stature, and in the homosexually charged relationships of war, the ego ideal developed. The final triumph of the new patriarchal religion involved a rewriting of the old myths to obscure the power of women and the rite of child sacrifice.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Milton Malev presented anthropological and clinical data to refute the supposition that matriarchal societies had actually existed. He contended that women desired to have their aggressivity controlled by men. In his experience, feminine aggression toward men is related to the castration complex and to the perception of the turning inward of their aggression in order to be loved, with subsequent need for vengeance. He feels that the persistence of the legend of prior matriarchal rule is attributed in women to a wish for 'what is now absent and once was present', and in men to a past punishment for present aggression as well as a reassurance of the ability to withstand a loss of activity and control.

Dr. M. Donald Coleman focused on the defenses against the aggression shown by God/earthly father toward the first-born son. In Carthage, the hostility remained unneutralized and the first born was sacrificed. The Hebrew God was ambivalent, first demanding the sacrifice and then relenting; His covenant with the Jews led to masochistic trends when He failed them. In Christianity, the

defensive elaborations more thoroughly eliminated the murderous wishes toward the son; these were projected onto the Jews and the old God in order to achieve the idealized image of a new God with an unambivalent love for His son.

Dr. Gustav Bychowski spoke of the story of Esau, where the father's hostility to the first born was projected. Dr. Milton H. Horowitz referred to a paper by Reik on couvade where the father's aggression toward the son was dealt with by identification with the childbearing mother.

WAYNE A. MYERS

January 26, 1971. UNPUBLISHED DISCUSSIONS OF SIGMUND FREUD. Richard F. Sterba, M.D.

In his introductory remarks, Dr. Sterba drew a vivid picture of the milieu of the famous Wednesday evening meetings at Freud's home at which a selected group of Viennese analysts met for the purpose of scientific discussions. Between 1928 and 1937, approximately twenty such meetings took place. Dr. Sterba reported on Freud's discussions at four of these meetings.

On December 9, 1928, Theodor Reik reviewed Freud's Future of an Illusion. The major portion of Freud's discussion was devoted to a differentiation of several *Weltanschauungen* or world views. As he saw it, the scientific *Weltanschauungen,* although inevitably fragmentary, incomplete, and defective, was nevertheless honest. The mystic view was the most dangerous in that its essence is the high esteem of the irrational. To Freud it was the one real enemy of the future as science was powerless against it. In Sterba's view Freud's attitude with regard to mysticism was greatly influenced by his unhappy experiences with Carl Jung.

At a meeting held either in 1929 or 1930, Wilhelm Reich presented his ideas concerning a Russian experiment in child rearing in which children were to be separated from their parents and raised in special centers. Reich was enthusiastic about this idea because he felt that it would abolish the œdipus complex, the major inhibiting factor in achieving full orgasm. Freud was sharp in his criticism of Reich both for his overzealous therapeutic ambition and for his single-mindedness in focusing on genital conflicts as the only ones in neuroses.

In March of 1930, the topic of the meeting was Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents. Freud was highly critical of his own work, calling the structure of the book dilettante because upon an unusually broad and diffuse foundation a narrow superstructure was erected. He was also critical of the group for not noticing a significant omission in the book, namely that no mention is made of the only certain pathway to happiness: that of absolute narcissism. At this meeting, Freud also spoke of Otto Rank, describing him as a highly gifted individual who had turned against psychoanalysis. It was at this time, too, that Freud defended himself against the charge that his uncovering methods were damaging. He stated that he sought only the truth and that no damage could be done as mankind inevitably remained untouched by it.

The final meeting reported on was that of January 31, 1930, when Sterba himself presented a paper. In it he attempted to resolve a conceptual difficulty which

he detected in Freud's writings on sublimation. In the ensuing discussion Freud became somewhat defensive, seemingly not taking notice of the fact that the paper primarily concerned itself with the solution of the contradiction. It was at this meeting that Freud spoke of the origin of the concept of sublimation, which he developed after hearing the story of a young man who liked to cut off the tails of dogs and who later became a famous surgeon. Alluding to the presentation of the evening, he also spoke of the need for 'scientific tact', concluding with the remark to Sterba that 'This is a sermon of old age to you'.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Olga Knopf spoke of the sexual morality of Vienna at the turn of the century, and emphasized Freud's great courage in bringing forth his ideas in a climate of such intense hostility.

Dr. Gustav Bychowski spoke of his experiences at the Wednesday evening meetings some years earlier. At these meetings, Freud was unfailingly courteous and kind to those who presented papers, and his summaries were a model of lucidity. On one occasion, he advised Bychowski not to read his papers, likening this process to a man riding in a horse-drawn coach while his listeners are forced to run along behind him. On another occasion, at the beginning of World War II when Bychowski visited him, Freud expressed the view that psychoanalysis could not as yet change the essential character of man. However, he had hopes that the insights gained from analysis might do so some day.

Dr. Otto Sperling recounted his experiences at two of the Wednesday evening meetings. On one occasion, Wilhelm Reich presented his views on the analysis of resistances, stressing the need for the analyst to pay close attention to the negative transference as it arises. Freud was opposed to focusing on any of the patient's material in such a specialized way. He preferred a less biased and more open method of listening to what arose. At another meeting he was cautious about the analyst adopting too passive an attitude in the analysis. Such a posture, he felt, was not conducive to the best results.

THEODORE JACOBS

February 9, 1971. PANEL ON CONFIDENTIALITY. Nathan N. Root, M.D., Chairman.

Dr. Root stated that this Panel discussion was an outgrowth of a meeting of the Board of Directors of the New York Psychoanalytic Society concerning a test case being litigated by Dr. Joseph Lifschutz, a member of the San Francisco Psychoanalytic Society. Dr. Lifschutz argued the right of the psychotherapist to maintain the confidentiality of a patient's communications, even when the patient waives that right in court.

Dr. Jay Katz defined three terms central to the discussion. 'Confidentiality' in the physician-patient relationship means that the patient may assume that there will be no passing on by the physician of information communicated to him by his patient. 'Privileged communication' designates a legal right belonging to the patient and not to the physician; it means that the physician may not testify concerning anything imparted to him by his patient unless the patient has given his specific authorization to do so in court. The legal concept of 'privacy' as a

right of an individual has to do with invasions of privacy by the news media either through unreasonable intrusions or unreasonable publicity.

Dr. Charles Brenner observed that the function of the Committee on Standards of the New York Psychoanalytic Society was related to the code of standards to which all members of the society are expected to subscribe. There is no codified standard of behavior with regard to confidentiality that the Committee could employ as a guideline.

Dr. Edward Joseph spoke of the particular problems involving confidentiality encountered in psychiatric units of general hospitals. The Department of Mental Hygiene of New York State had promulgated a regulation that for every psychiatric admission, the treating facility had to supply considerable information concerning diagnosis, treatment, marital and racial status, and so on. The chairmen of the psychiatric divisions opposed these breaches of confidentiality, fearing that the submission of such information to computer memory bank storage had the potentiality of breaches of confidence in the future; a compromise resolution was worked out. The danger of unpredictable breaches of confidence through the operation of computerized memory banks will increase, Dr. Joseph continued, especially in instances where a third party, such as an insurance company, is paying a substantial sum for a psychoanalytic treatment.

Dr. Jacob A. Arlow focused on problems of confidentiality pertaining to relationships within the professional environment of psychoanalysis. He inquired as to the amount of information drawn from an ongoing psychoanalysis that can be discussed, and the circumstances under which such a discussion may take place. Correspondingly, he asked how much information needs to be communicated in making a referral, or in reporting on the progress of a candidate in his training analysis. The growth in recent years of research programs employing recording of the sessions of an analysis poses special problems of management of the records to safeguard confidentiality. Dr. Arlow observed that many training institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association subscribe to the trend in the direction of separating the training analysis entirely from other aspects of the educational program. He suggested that on occasion the formal system of nonreporting has been supplemented by informal reporting which, if suspected by candidates, nullifies any advantages of attempting to sequester the training analysis. With regard to the use of psychoanalytic data for publication, he noted that even with the most careful attention to disguise the identity of the person being reported upon, there remains a question as to what limits are required.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Katz commented that there was considerable disagreement about the argument which Dr. Lifschutz wished to sustain. In connection with the influence on the transference of testimony by the physician, he observed that whether or not the analysis has been terminated, there will be transference reverberations to the fact that one does testify or refuses to testify.

Dr. Jerome Ennis raised the issue of pressures upon the analyst to communicate information in connection with a patient's application for public employment. He considered that if a governmental agency has obtained the patient's authorization for release of information, the physician is then under obligation to comply. Dr. Oscar Sachs stated that the issue of confidentiality involves not

merely what the patient tells about himself, but the fact that he is in treatment at all. Dr. Aaron Esman referred to other requests for information that redound to the patient's benefit, such as letters to Selective Service, some of which may have the result of a patient's being excluded from the military draft. Dr. Root remarked that when requested to write such letters, he would not only obtain the patient's authorization but also discuss the text of the letter with the patient before transmitting it. Dr. Bernard Brodsky mentioned that he had written letters concerning analysands and that no effect on the further course of the analysis could be discerned by him. Dr. Everett Dulit added that it is difficult to write a Selective Service letter for a patient in the 'grey area' if the letter has a pessimistic tone. Such a letter may later make mischief in the treatment when the therapist wishes to tell the patient that the therapist believes the patient can in fact function more effectively than he may be doing.

Elaborating on his prepared discussion, Dr. Arlow expressed his opinion that at times what occurs in the meetings of student committees at various training institutes constituted distressing breaches of confidentiality. Dr. Martin Wangh proposed that analytic data about candidates in training should be altogether omitted from discussions at student committee meetings because such discussions contribute to a trend which can continue indefinitely, each new generation of committee members in turn perpetuating actively what they themselves as candidates suffered passively. Dr. David Kairys believes that the candidate should have the same protection during his training analysis as any other patient has during psychoanalytic treatment. Dr. Katz added that perhaps another way of dealing with this difficulty is to notify the candidates at the outset of their training analyses of the limits of the confidential relationship during training, and also to discuss the details of the report to the students' committee with the candidate as part of his analysis.

Dr. Kenneth Calder stated that the analyst has obligations not only to his patient, but also to his psychoanalytic society and institute and to the country of which he is a citizen. Dr. Katz felt that breaches of confidentiality for reasons of social purpose will readily lead to abuses on the part of those who commit these breaches.

Dr. David Beres addressed himself to the considerable problem involved in sending reports to referring physicians. Considering that the referring physician has a different relationship to the patient, the confidentiality of the transmitted material may very well be impaired. Dr. Arlow commented that he would tell little or nothing to the referring physician if that physician were not himself a psychoanalyst.

In conclusion Dr. Root underscored the maze of difficulties involved in our efforts to protect our patients and at the same time be responsive to obligations in other directions.

STEPHEN K. FIRESTEIN

The Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held April 27-May 1, 1972, at the Adolphus Hotel, Dallas, Texas.

THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND ALLIED PROFESSIONS will hold its eighth congress July 29-August 2, 1974, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The subject of the congress will be 'The Vulnerable Child'. Inquiries should be directed to the Secretary-General, Albert J. Solnit, M.D., 333 Cedar Street, New Haven, Connecticut, 06510.