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RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN
AN APPRECIATION

BY CHARLES BRENNER, M.D. (NEW YORK)

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly has a very special pleasure this month. It is to convey to Dr. Rudolph M. Loewenstein on the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday the good wishes and affectionate greetings of his many friends and colleagues.

Dr. Loewenstein is still so energetic both physically and mentally that it is hard to believe that he has been an active member of the psychoanalytic community for the past fifty years and one of its leaders for most of that time. He decided to become a psychoanalyst during his student years in Switzerland, and moved to Berlin as soon as he was able in order to complete his medical studies and to get training in the newly founded psychoanalytic institute there. Two years after he had graduated from the Berlin Psychoanalytic Institute, he was invited to Paris, where he was one of the founders of the first psychoanalytic society in that city. There he remained, busily engaged in psychoanalytic practice, training, and research until Germany invaded Poland. He served in the French army with distinction till France fell. Then he went with his family to the south and eventually, like many others in those tragic days which now seem so distant, they made their way to New York, where he has lived ever since.

It was in New York that Dr. Loewenstein began his close association with the two colleagues with whom his name is indissolubly linked in our minds, Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris. The three became the closest of friends, the most intimate of associates. They met at least weekly for an evening of discussion and collaborative authorship. They often spent parts of summer holidays together as well. After Kris's untimely death in 1957, Loewenstein and Hartmann continued their close collaboration until the latter's death in 1970.

Some of the fruits of the years of collaboration have been published. One may guess that there were equally important results which are less apparent to the public eye. A number of the published papers were collected for easy reference in 1964 in one of the volumes of the series of monographs called Psychological Issues. Even now, a decade or two after their original publication, they are of major importance to every serious student of psychoanalysis.

As one would expect, Dr. Loewenstein's contributions to the psychoanalytic literature began long before his arrival in the United States. His first published paper appeared in 1923, and by 1940 he had published a dozen major psychoanalytic papers in addition to numerous reviews in psychoanalytic journals. He also wrote several articles, as a psychoanalyst, for French medical periodicals other than the *Revue Française de Psychanalyse*. Since 1945 he has published more than twenty psychoanalytic articles, a book, Christians and Jews, which is the most important psychoanalytic contribution to the problem of anti-Semitism in the Christian world, and has been an editor of two jubilee volumes, the one for Marie Bonaparte, his colleague in Paris, the other for Heinz Hartmann, his colleague in New York.

In his lectures as in his published articles, Dr. Loewenstein has dealt with nearly every aspect of psychoanalysis, both practical and theoretical. He taught psychoanalysis for fourteen years in Paris and for the last thirty years in New York. In both institutes he was considered to be an outstanding teacher and clinician by students and colleagues alike, all of whom have consistently sought his help or participation in every possible way. Moreover, his abilities and personality are such that he has been as eagerly sought as an administrator. He was president of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute from 1950 to 1952, of the American Psychoanalytic Association from 1957 to 1958, of the New York Psychoanalytic Society from 1959 to 1961, and vice-president of the International Psycho-Analytical Association from 1965 to 1967.

When a man is fortunate enough to become fascinated for a lifetime by a field of endeavor for which he has great talent to begin with, he cannot fail to excel. So it was with Dr. Loewenstein, and so it is that he has long been one of the outstanding leaders in the field of psychoanalysis. If anyone today is a dean of psychoanalysis, it is surely he. He is truly, in January 1973, *honorum et annorum plenus, ter quaterque beatus,* a man whose every honor was fairly won, whose every year is lightly borne!

Speaking for psychoanalysts everywhere, we send our best on this birthday and for many more to come to Dr. Rudolph M. Loewenstein, psychoanalyst, friend, and teacher.

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Bibliography of Rudolph M. Loewenstein (1923–1972)

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The Primal Scene and the Sense of Reality

Phyllis Greenacre

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THE PRIMAL SCENE AND THE SENSE OF REALITY

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In this paper I present some aspects of the influence of the primal scene on the development and functioning of the sense of reality. These become evident in certain circumscribed distortions of external reality and especially in the creation and persistence of specific illusions. My conclusions are based on my own clinical experience, supplemented by the clinical reports of others and the findings of many colleagues who have done systematic work in studying the behavior of infants. Finally, I shall refer to and give excerpts from three sources: first, the account of the Wolf-man, whose infantile neurosis was published by Freud in 1914 and its later developments described recently by Gardiner (1971); second, case material from my own practice; and third, some reflections on the life and work of the painter, Piet Mondrian.

I

The term 'primal scene' is not always used with precisely the same meaning. However, it is generally agreed that the primal scene in one way or another has to do with the child's developing ideas, or fantasies, about the nature of parental intercourse.[1] The term was first used to refer to the actual witnessing, through seeing or hearing, of the sexual relationship of the parents or their surrogates. It was recognized that while the primal scene was not clearly remembered by the young child, it combined with impressions from related experiences, giving rise to various infantile sexual theories. Subsequently, the emphasis was most

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[1] See, Moore and Fine (1967): *Glossary of Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts.*

often on the power of fantasy of the primal scene rather than on the actual experience. The term was then shifted to refer especially to fantasies, whether or not the actual experience had occurred.

I shall use the term, however, in the original sense—of the witnessing of parental intercourse or of some clearly related sexual event, such as birth or miscarriage. I believe such experiences to be ubiquitous, and the starting point of potent fantasies. The conditions at the time of the experience often influence the reactions to later events and so shape the theories that gradually develop throughout childhood. The direct, seemingly unelaborated memory, if presented at all, is usually updated to a later time. On analysis it proves to be a screen memory with distortions and discrepancies. If it is held to with great vehemence and thin rationalizations, it becomes an illusion, often in striking contrast to the individual's good sense of reality in the ordinary affairs of life. It is dislodged by analysis against great resistance. Derivative parts of the original experiences usually appear in the dreams, screen memories, behavior and symptoms of later life, and especially in the fantasies associated with masturbation.[2]

The exposure of the young child to adult sexual intercourse is not limited to congested living conditions, but occurs also in families of much higher social and economic status. In the majority of my analytic patients who came from relatively secure and intelligent family backgrounds, the greatest effects from early exposure to parental intercourse occurred in first, only, and youngest children. The parents of only children showed a tendency to keep the child in the parental bedroom,

[2] One wonders whether the present plethora of stage and screen demonstrations of a variety of primal scenes may not be a contagious revival, in a literal acting out, of these previously deeply buried and puzzling memories. The present background of an almost universal arousal of aggression would furnish a favorable medium for such a revival since sexual and aggressive drives are closely related in early childhood. It is interesting that masturbation is rather infrequently presented on the screen, perhaps because it would stir conflicts of a later time and more definite form.

sometimes in bed with them, over a much longer time than was true in families where there were several children. Further, these parents often romped and played with the infant in an affectionately rough manner. This intermittent acceptance of the child into the parental bed was often prolonged into the fourth or fifth year, or even later, unless the situation was interfered with by the arrival of younger siblings. This indulgent acceptance of freedom of bodily contact in the parental bed might be in striking contrast to the times when the child, awakened by unusual sounds, seeks haven with the parents only to be ejected summarily or directly punished for the intrusion.

In some affluent families where the children are early put in charge of a nurse, with whom they may also be left while the parents are away from home for considerable periods of time, the exposure to intimate sexual behavior of adults may occur when the child becomes the third member of a clandestine relationship, consummated either in the nursery itself or when he is taken to visit the nurse's home. Such a situation is described in Marie Bonaparte's (1945) article on the primal scene, and is implied as the earlier background of the two children in Henry James's The Turn of the Screw. In that eerie novel the peculiar dramatic effect of the tale arises from the pervasive uncertainty induced in the reader concerning exactly what has happened and when. When children have a very close relationship with pets or when their early childhood has been spent on a farm, the strongest impressions of sexuality may be derived from the witnessing of animals copulating, giving birth, or being castrated. Such impressions become agglomerated with real or imagined experiences regarding parental behavior, and it is difficult to determine which came first. One has only to see the extreme excitement and eagerly anxious participation of young children in the drama of birth of puppies or kittens to realize how intense and expanding is the stimulation of such a domestic event.[8]

[8] The Kinsey Reports (1948, pp. 667-678; 1953, pp. 502-509) indicated the frequency of farm children's involvement in sexual experimentation with animals during latency and under the pressure of puberty and adolescence.

The witnessing of the primal scene seems to leave an especially strong impression when it occurs early, especially before the third year. The impression left at this age cannot be readily communicated to and shared with the parents, who are in the very nature of things unusually inaccessible to the child at this time. In addition, since speech is a relatively recent and imperfect achievement, both communication and responsiveness are still largely dependent on various body contacts and nonverbal expressions. The impression of the primal scene must be deposited more in the physical components of the emotional reactions than would be true at a later age. These early body memories may be absorbed into later symptoms and often reappear in direct or converted forms in the course of treatment. They may also be absorbed into, and fixated in, peculiarly distorted forms by traumatically experienced revisions, notably in the phallic phase and especially in prepuberty. The phallic phase, with its peak in the fourth year of life, has long been recognized as the time of most sensitivity to external genital stimulations of whatever nature. Exposure to the primal scene, witnessing the birth of a sibling or the occurrence of a miscarriage, or even injury to a pet, may then have a fateful influence on the child's developing conception of the nature of sexuality. This is of special importance as occurring when the œdipus complex is already close to its height. The impression of the sexual relationship as being a sadistic act and the fear of castration have long been emphasized as significant misinterpretations which might complicate the child's later sexual development (*cf.*, Fenichel, 1945).

When such experiences occur before the third year, however, they have been considered of lesser import as it was felt that if they came from a preverbal era (at least from the time when speech was inadequately developed), they did not emerge in a conceptualized form and could have little specific neurotic content. It was also considered that while very early experiences of the primal scene may occur, any direct coherent memory representations of them could scarcely be recovered in the course of analysis, which depends so much on verbal com-

munication and is mainly limited to work with the neuroses. I cannot thoroughly accept the point of view that what is verbalized is the only communication useful in analytic work, even with neurotic patients. The body participates in various ways in all communications at all times, especially in emotional states. If the analyst is himself sensitive to and interested in what these accessory communications are expressing, he finds that much more is accessible to verbal representation than he might anticipate. But he must be patient and ready to make tentative, exploratory interpretations rather than depend on the very neat ones which are so satisfying as a finishing touch.

The first year of life is the time of the infant's greatest exposure to the parents' sexual behavior and it is usually assumed that the baby's reaction cannot then be clearly determined. Bernstein and Blacher (1967) have reported, however, that a specially traumatic experience may be registered explicitly even in the first six months. It is probable that except in cases where the stimulation is strong, clearly delineated, and often repeated, intense external stimulation is reacted to with increased restlessness and signs of discomfort, showing little or no differentiation between genital reaction and that of the general body activity of infantile rage. That some genital responsiveness is latent, and can be elicited even in these first six months by exceptionally strong stimulation, has been observed.

In the first half of the first year relative constancy of object representation in regard to the mother is being established; subsequently it is extended to the father and others habitually in the environment, including inanimate objects and pets. In other words, in the first year the infant has a moderate range of fairly reliable expectations from a number of external objects. Separation is going on with a good deal of uncertainty and ambivalence. At least in the first half of the first year, auditory, kinesthetic, and tactile responsiveness may be equal to or more important than vision. Within a few weeks after birth, focusing of vision occurs and is first directed toward

the mother's face, as we know from the work of Spitz, Mahler, and others. This soon begins to coöperate with hearing, which elicits reactions to stimuli not immediately at hand. The reaction to parental intercourse may blend with any other arresting excitation, whether from noise, rough handling, or heightened motion. But there is a gradual increase in the pressure to *see*.

During the second year there is definite increase in the vulnerability to genital stimulation, and the excitation caused by exposure to the primal scene, or related experience, may be intense. This takes place during a period of momentous maturational change. Walking and talking are being accomplished and increase the child's range of stimulation and reactivity. Heightened bodily invigoration is evident and frequently associated with the appearance of infantile masturbation. There is a sensitivity to both general and genital excitation, and a susceptibility to genital excitation as a special responsiveness to sexual activity in others as well as situations suggesting bodily damage.[4]

The rise to the upright position in walking causes the child to see objects from new and varying angles. This occurs while the still active rate of bodily growth is such that his size in relation to the external world is rapidly changing. Freeing of his hands for exploration increases his range of manipulation and brings him into a different visual and tactile relationship with his own body as well as with the outside. The totality of these experiences contributes to the very beginning of conceptualization. In this period, too, the excretory functions are settling down into a more definite rhythm, probably largely due to sphincter maturation, while the upright position in walking and the need for ease in movement bring new elements into the infant's concern with his own excreta. They are no longer comforting quasi extensions of his body but be-

[4] This has recently been demonstrated in the infant observations of Galenson and Roiphe (1971). While it is possible that this excitation is somewhat increased under the conditions of the nursery observations, yet its intensity and the uniformity of its appearance are very convincing of its significance.

come impediments to be disposed of. There is a gradual shift in his emotional attitude toward them. My point here is that these bodily conditions, extensions of those that have been developing in the first year, also contribute endogenous factors to the young child's perception of what is going on in the external world and influence later conceptualization as well.

New experiences are constantly multiplying in the child's second year, and old ones are being experienced from so many new angles that reconciliations between past and present experiences are continually needed. Similarities and differences are the source of much infantile comparison, and sometimes of anxiety. Substitutions and contrasts are frequent in the developing need to establish practical dependable realities in a world that has suddenly enlarged. The seeming variability in external reality due to progressive changes in size, mobility, and posture of the child during his second year may contribute further to his recurrent need to return to the home base of the mother for repeated reassurance during his sallies into the world around him (*cf.*, Meyer, 1936). This is conspicuous as earlier he seemed to relish some independence from the mother and largely to have overcome his anxiety with strangers. This is the stage demonstrated by Mahler and McDevitt (1968) and Mahler (1972) in their observations, and designated by Mahler as the period of *rapprochement.*

When speech, with its incomparable organizing potentiality and its furtherance of communication, has not been firmly established, there is a kind of rampant fluidity of sensory impressions afloat, and misunderstandings jostle for place with surprisingly acute observations. It is a time of natural ambiguity when the sounds of words may also lend themselves to what appears to be punning, but is probably uncertainty as to the distinctive meanings of words of similar sounds. At this time also transitional objects become the reliable convoy in the absence of the mother and function as an emotional stabilizer when the infant is in need. However, simple conceptualization, which accompanies the emergence of speech, has begun. Multi-

form similarities and differences may later become the source of rich symbolism. The infant is beginning to think as well as to observe, but is not yet clear 'which is which'. He does not differentiate his dreams from what goes on in his room at night, and his crib may become a kind of cage later to be compared with, or represented in dreams as, an animal cage or prison.

Later, when parents habitually close or lock their bedroom door at night and train the child not to intrude, the problem is not entirely solved. The child's curiosity may even be intensified and he will progressively develop his own theories about what is going on. He may use accessory experiences as substitutes for what he has tacitly been prohibited from seeing. Inevitably he will react in accordance with his libidinal phase of development at any given time. Even with an increased opportunity for investigation, it is improbable that the young child gets a very clear view and idea of the exact nature of the primal scene. This depends on the actual conditions in the parental bedroom at the time: how much light is in the room, the position of the parents, how much of their bodies is covered, and, especially, from what angle the young invader approaches the bed. One might think, as many parents do, that the child sees practically nothing before being hustled back to his own bed, and that he soon forgets it. What he does see, hear, and sense may certainly be confusing to him. He may be aware of the parents in an unusual position, an impression which is later the substance of the monsters and strange animals that lurk in dark corners and reappear in night terrors. He may also get the impression from stertorous breathing, moaning, or groaning sounds that an intense struggle is going on, or that one parent or the other is sick. The many and varied impressions depend on how this experience combines with others in the infant's current and earlier life, as well as the state of his bodily comfort or discomfort.

It has impressed me, however, that even when the real event is not explicitly seen, the child frequently gets some feeling of the sexual nature of the activity, though he may sense it

largely as a fight. I have thought that some vague awareness that the genital area is involved brings a responsive stimulation in the child's own genitals by a process of primary identification or 'mirroring'. In the second year, when there is already a susceptibility to genital arousal, this is probably associated with anal and urinary sphincter maturation and the rise of a preorgastic rhythm of response. In the fourth year, the response is greater and is associated with the genital maturation of the phallic phase.

There is a marked discrepancy between the probably almost universal witnessing of the primal scene and the widespread lack of *any* recollection of the event later on, even when other experiences of the third and fourth years may leave some clear, though usually distorted, relic in memory. The need to isolate and grossly distort the experience was conspicuous in the case of a nurse reported in my study of screen memories (Greenacre, 1949). Soon after having asserted that the parents' sexual life stopped with her own birth, this patient rather abruptly, and without realizing the inconsistency of her account, said she remembered that at age eight she had intruded on her parents when they were having intercourse, and she had been intensely frightened by the ugly look on her father's face. This was actually a screen memory for awareness of the male genitals. According to her official memory, it would have been impossible for her to see either the face or the genitals. In fact, there had been considerable sexual play with boys and she had seen a schizophrenic cousin of her father masturbating. This man had the same name as the father. The sight had frightened and fascinated her, and also excited her envy. Thus while the primal scene could not be readily acknowledged, it could not be completely repressed and broke through in an incongruous and isolated way which was inconsistent with the general alertness and intelligence of the patient.

While the first experiencing of the primal scene is probably by auditory and kinesthetic sensations, these are gradually transformed into visual scenes and pseudo memories through three

routes; first, by displacement in time; second, by attribution to others than the parents; and third, by progressive modifications so that the disturbing sexual content is obscured. If the experiences are very frightening they may be repeated as nightmares or acted out in states of somnambulism. As material relating to the experienced primal scene begins to emerge in analysis, the analysand frequently complains of headaches, bursting head sensations, and visual disturbance.[5] The content of the analytic hour is usually immediately lost, whether much or little has been interpreted. On the following day, it may seem to have been dismissed as promptly as the original experience. This is repeated a number of times before the material is assimilated. If there has been a somnambulistic episode, no memory remains in the morning and knowledge of it has come from what has been told by someone else. (Such an episode resembles a small traumatic neurosis.) The deep and tenacious repudiation of the original memory is apparent also in the high degree of resistance with which any real reconstruction of the experience may be met.

This leads us to consider the phenomenon and nature of defense by denial as it joins with repression in relation to the the perception of reality, and to reality testing. The very aim of denial is the banishment of intolerable external stimulation by obliterating or erasing the source from which it came. This method of changing the unwelcome environment has always been recognized as very primitive, and its persistence beyond early infancy was first regarded as ominous, indicating a psychotic development or a severe character disturbance (*cf.*, Freud, 1924 [1923], 1927; A. Freud, 1936).

Denial was first conceived of as a modification or elimination of some part of external reality in favor of the acceptance of instinctual wishes. It was then considered as an indication of psychosis. Freud (1924) soon realized, however, that there might be a division or split in the functioning of the ego so

[5] The symptoms may resemble those accompanying the memory of an early anesthetic experience.

that the falsification of perception might exist in obsessional states side by side with the realization of the actual reality situation. This proved even more striking in cases of fetishism where the misperception—limited to the genitals due to severe castration anxiety—might coexist with a keen objective sense of reality. Such topical or focal denials might create strong illusions and be contrasted with the rather massive denials of reality which are sustained with delusion formation in the overt psychoses.

Denial as a defensive maneuver cannot be sustained alone except by the young infant. He may eliminate the external world by turning his head and eyes away (*cf.*, Spitz, 1957), by screaming to shut out noise, or by withdrawing his body or body part from offending external stimulations. Later, denial becomes an introductory step furthering repression and associated with isolation, rationalization, and displacement. The very term *denial* has been somewhat expanded and is now used with much broader basic connotations; we speak of denials of conflict, of body feelings, of superego-determined anxieties, etc.

When the very young infant cannot shut out unacceptable sound by screaming, he sometimes falls asleep from exhaustion, thus eliminating the intruding noise. As soon as he is able to focus his vision, sounds may stimulate an effort to see and he then reacts in various ways to what he sees. Strangeness is disturbing; the establishment of familiarity is a step in the direction of acceptance of reality (*cf.*, Ferenczi, 1916).

Throughout the first part of the first year, vision is the dominant factor in extending and binding together impressions from the various senses and in determining impressions from touch, handling, and hearing. Hermann (1934) emphasized the importance of skin and muscle reactions as well as internal body sensations in determining the way in which a young infant responds to stimulation from outside; he felt that these reactions may predominate over vision in the formation of the infant's later perceptions of the outer world. Bak (1953),

too, has indicated the importance of body reactions and sensations in the genesis of perversions. This formulation seems obvious when one realizes that the infant has a small and inconstant margin of differentiation between what is inside and what is outside. In the second year, locomotion (walking and climbing) equals and sometimes surpasses vision in the gratifications and anxieties of new experiences.

The earliest infantile reaction to the primal scene may be due to its strangeness and unfamiliarity, as the infant is used to seeing the parents in a totally different and usually responsive position. This may be complicated by a feeling of loneliness if there is no parental response to the infant's crying. At least in the latter half of the first year, the infant may show a primitive pregenital type of envy or jealousy if he becomes aware that the parents are in close bodily contact of which he is deprived. Or he may react with fear. The former reaction is not unlike what some pets show when a new baby is being fondled while they are neglected. This infantile jealousy may lead to exhaustion from crying or the infant may turn his attention to substitute, autoerotic comforts, such as sucking his hand or whatever happens to be nearby. In such a situation, the denial of the external stimulation may relieve the inner pain of jealousy. This unrelieved arousal of primitive jealousy, combined with loneliness and helplessness, may be the dominant cause of denial of the primal scene or related sexual situations, sometimes giving rise to negative hallucinations. Lewin (1950) described the influence of the primal scene and the associated denial in the genesis of states of elation approximating hypomanic episodes in the course of analysis.

We turn our attention next to the functioning of reality testing. It evolves from and follows the development of the sense of reality, and, in turn, interrelates with perception and eventually with conceptualization. I would consider here the everyday practical form of reality testing which attempts to determine what is reliable, expectable, and at least relatively constant in the external world. This does not include various

other types of reality appreciation as, for example, those of the artist, the inventor, the philosopher, or the mystic. The exact timing of the appearance and the essential nature of reality testing are not easily determined.[6]

Anna Freud (1965), quoting observations made by Anny Katan (1961), considers that reality testing occurs only after the development of verbalization, which to her also marks the beginning of the superego. I see a less clear line of demarcation. It seems to me that any extensive verbalization is attained with varying degrees of speed after thinking, reality testing, and the most rudimentary conceptualization have definitely begun. There are children who appear to understand and respond more or less appropriately to much that goes on

[6] In discussing reality testing, Moore and Fine (1967) make a distinction between *psychic reality* and *external reality*. They define psychic reality as the totality of a person's mental representations of his physical-instinctual life together with the mental life or dreams, thoughts, memories, fantasies, and perceptions, regardless of whether or not these accurately reflect or correspond to objective reality. External reality is understood as the sensing of the outside world of persons and things, involving time-space and causal relationships. The authors see this awareness as progressing and being organized in accord with the development of the ego and as depending on discrimination between inside and outside with the setting up of ego boundaries.

While this is a helpful schema for reference and organization of data, it does not cover some of the significant nexuses of problems of reality testing. The implication is of an absolute or at least an unchanging reality of the outer world. This may be true, but it cannot be determined as such since its sensing is ultimately dependent on human means. The latter always contain subjective elements of individual experience, relics left over from childhood which unconsciously affect the registration from the senses. In other words, we are always influenced by perceptions. We attempt to correct the individual perceptive distortions by measuring them against the perceptions of others. Still this may lead in various ways to erroneous conclusions. Group interpretations, even in groups of two, are notoriously influenced by the subjective relationship between the members. Larger groups are often even more susceptible to suggestion. Further, although the sensory stimulation may proceed in a normal manner, a temporary set of mind, even sometimes immediately environmentally determined, may influence individuals separately or together in similar or opposing directions. None of the conclusions may prove in the end to check with further experience. The question of the inevitability of the subjective intrusions into the evaluation of external sensory stimulations is one of the problems of validating human experience and scientific findings.

around them before verbalization has progressed sufficiently to be a main channel of communication. The clear attainment of verbalization is a landmark, to be sure, as it increases the facility and speed of responsive communication, supplementing the increase in range of independent exploration achieved in the success of walking. I would think, however, that the synthetic and integrative functions of the ego are implicit potentials at birth, probably depending on the degree of fineness of certain organizations in the central nervous system. Some recent observations by Janet Brown (1970) at the James Jackson Putnam Children's Center in Boston strongly suggest that difference in ego functions may be detected even within the first week after birth in infants who later appear to be especially gifted children. In one case which had been followed throughout childhood, it was significant that from the beginning the child seemed unusually independent of the mother.

In our everyday life we have to proceed with practical, approximate guidelines for reality testing. These become habitual and take their place in the second nature of common sense. In general, after the first years of childhood, reality testing proceeds first from an implicit comparison of any experience of an individual with his previous experiences; second, from a comparative checking with experiences of others; and third, from assessing whether a given experience fits into the contiguous elements in a total situation.

There is one area of common experience in which reality testing is particularly fallible and open to misperceptions and so to misrepresentations in the internalized image. This is in the appreciation of one's own body. Here internal and external stimulations may be felt in varying blends and proportions, with the body surface and special senses acting as mediators between external reality and what is internal. In the development of the sense of identity—which is a special segment in the appreciation of reality—the comparison of the appearance of one's own body with that of others is important, as this is assessed in terms of external visible attributes, i.e., size, shape,

coloring, and so forth, in relation to external objects, human and otherwise. The sense of identity is further influenced by the physical sensations and the subjective attitudes and wishes of the individual. The two body areas which are most likely to suffer such distortions of perception are the genitals and the face, since they are seen less clearly on the self than on the other. In addition, they are the most complexly differentiated external parts and are more changed by highly charged emotion than is true of the body in general.

With its multiple developmental body changes and increasing experience in the outer world, the second year of life is obviously a time of heightened primitive and spontaneous reality testing. This is accomplished mostly through behavior itself, by trial and error, and through the merest beginning of rational testing which will accompany secondary process thinking. Walking itself probably promotes an appreciation of space and time in relation to the child's own activity, rather than by dependence on others. All this is then supplemented by the admonitions of parents which contribute to the beginning of superego formation.

In this developmental situation exposure to the primal scene may set in motion a widening set of reactions influencing perceptions of reality in contiguous related experiences. The consolidation of awareness of one's own body strengthens the process of separation and individuation, while the earlier primitive mirroring reaction gives way to the first wishful, imitative identifications, leading to illusion formation. From analyzing adult patients I have come to believe that the inception of an illusory phallus in girls may emerge at this time, and that it may be strengthened or corrected in the course of the later development of œdipal problems.

The situation with the boy is less clear, since the denial of the concrete possession of the phallus is more complicated and seems to require a more energetic process of denial than occurs in the reciprocal positive fantasy of phallic possession by the girl. This is probably due to the fact that the phallus is handled as well as seen when urinating. Still little boys of two

may imitate girls by assuming their dress or activities. When they begin to approximate the girl's appearance by concealing the penis between the legs, is less clear; my impression is that this behavior is influenced by the observation of contemporary girls, although it actually occurs later. There is little doubt, however, that enemas given repeatedly in the first two years cause confusion about the body image in either sex.

There are, of course, other aspects of the infant's experience and the ultimate impact on him of the primal scene. The reaction to strangeness which has been so generally noted at certain times in the first year may later provoke some pleasurable excitement mixed with fear. This leads to the spirit of adventure in later life. However, when the child or adult meets a situation so strange that he has nothing with which to compare it, the stimulation is overwhelming and a shock reaction occurs. The intensity of the shock depends on the degree of helplessness and the availability of external aid; the reaction may be flight-fight, or freezing.

Some primal scene experiences are of this nature to the young child. The parents are seen or heard in so grotesque a way as to be only faintly recognizable, their appearance and behavior contrasting markedly with that ordinarily seen by the child during the day. In the first two years the infant may be overwhelmed by this situation. But in the second year, when there is a more complex and differentiated psychic and bodily response, the reaction may be flight in the direction of what is familiar (e.g., touching the mother), or immobilization with some change in the state of consciousness, such as confusion, or partial or total rapid denial of the experience. Although these reactions may occur at any time in life in response to overwhelming situations, they are more frequent in childhood when experiences in the night, and the dream, are not easily separated from daytime experiences. At night everything is more confusing, and bodily reactions participate even more in perceptual disturbances.[7]

[7] The economics of situations of overwhelming loss were described succinctly by Fenichel (1945).

II

There is a special form of denial which, with such accessory defensive paraphernalia as repression, isolation, and displacement, becomes so strengthened that it forms a wall, illusory, yet built as though for permanence. It presents itself in various proportions, symptoms, and character traits, and is usually more or less accepted by the patient. Not many patients directly complain of it although the sense of restraint and lack of spontaneity may be somewhat troubling. Although it arises out of the fear of being externally overwhelmed, it fundamentally serves the function—of which the individual is not much aware—of keeping him from being overcome by his own primitive instinctual drives, both aggressive and sexual.

This wall has usually been built in gradual stages from early childhood, and sometimes marked by crises. The original shock reactions are related to, and sometimes combined with, experiences of awe, but often have arisen out of more painful experiences in which anger has been more specifically aroused. The primal scene itself may have been associated with a shock reaction, or less severe reactions may have become confluent with severe responses to other traumata. Here there are two general categories: those which have involved estrangement from or loss of one parent or the other very early; and those which were associated with overwhelming violence to the infant's own body. Among the latter I would include operations, whether with or without anesthetic, febrile illnesses with deliria, and even the attacks on the infant's body through the use of repeated enemas.[8] Certainly the strongest walls of denial are those that have been re-enforced by operation on, or induced painful manipulation of, the genitals themselves, even when undertaken for therapeutic reasons.

[8] Looking back over my own early cases, I have been impressed by the frequency of tonsil- and adenoidectomies without preparation and especially the severe reactions to mastoid operations requiring frequent and painful dressing. Fortunately, many of these situations have been ameliorated through the use of antibiotics, as well as by the understanding of the need for special maternal care throughout such periods.

Actual primal scene experiences and related actual traumatic events in the first two or three years of infancy seem to furnish the nucleus or foundation of denial. One suspects that this foundation may rest upon an externalization of the stimulus barrier. There is a fear of wildness (or violence), sometimes associated with fear of psychosis, which is not justified by other elements in the character formation. Such wildness seems also to represent the content of masturbatory fantasies, which have been isolated largely out of fear of castration. The basic foundation of the wall is re-enforced by later crises, which bring with them superego re-enforcements at different times throughout childhood and even into adolescence. In the cases I have seen there has been a history of severe provocative tantrums mostly in the third or fourth year.

The nurse-patient mentioned above had earlier developed a firm illusory retaining wall which began to crumble under the impact of her hospital training. At the beginning of analysis she presented a dream and then sometime later brought in a sonnet she had written early in her nursing career. In the dream she was going in and out of places in Rockland County and questioned whether she would stay and work there. Her associations were to whether or not she should stay in analysis since she had already attempted it unsuccessfully with another analyst, or whether she might prefer to live in the country as her friends did. At the time I did not recognize the masturbatory confession in the dream, or her fear of wildness and psychosis, as this was later revealed in her memory of the schizophrenic cousin's masturbation. This memory had been amalgamated with the primal scene experience and deposited, as it were, in the distorted, ugly expression of the father's face.

In the sonnet the patient described her wall: 'I built a wall of thoughts in even row / Like bricks they were to be, so firm and strong / Protecting me from laughter and mad song / And echoes of a fear that would not go.' The rest of the sonnet expressed the incipient failure of this defense and her need

to find a new vision and hope in her life.[9] As in other patients with early primal scene experiences and a propensity for wall-building, there were severe tantrums, remembered as occurring around the age of four, associated with such prolonged breath-holding that the child appears to be on the verge of losing consciousness.

The Wolf-man's wall was of lighter weight. It was an illusory veil that enveloped him when he came to Freud for treatment at the age of twenty-four (Freud, 1918 [1914]). Practically immobilized by his obsessions and compulsive rituals, he summed up his complaints by saying that the world was hidden from him by a veil. This had only once been torn—on the occasion of his passing a bowel movement as the result of an enema, and for a time after this he could see the world clearly. The idea of a veil had not always been disturbing. He had been born with a caul and on Christmas Day, facts which marked him as a special child of good fortune.

On his fourth birthday, however, his neurotic troubles had emerged in an anxious dream. His window opened suddenly revealing seven white wolves outside, seated in a walnut tree and staring fixedly at him. The spontaneous opening of the window was a dream projection and repetition of opening his eyes on awakening; the staring of the wolves similarly reflected his own staring gaze at his parents involved in sexual, animal-like behavior so strange that it induced a feeling of alienation. The opening of the window was related, too, to the tearing of the veil by the defecation which permitted him to see better. This temporary clearing of the vision resembles the brightened effect of repressed emotion in a screen memory. The veil was being restrengthened, as subsequently it seemed to hide him from the world as well as the world from him.

The original reality of the caul, which had become a symbol, joined with the actuality of the nuclear primal scene experi-

[9] The clinical details of this case are given in my article on screen memories (Greenacre, 1949).

ence which had occurred when the patient was an infant of about one and a half years. This first experience, dormant but fairly well constellated in the infant mind,[10] was given a new stimulus and significance when at the age of three and a half the little boy was seduced by his sister who was two years older. She may have exposed herself; at least he wished to investigate her body as well as his own. It seems probable from a dream which occurred in the course of his analysis that the *veil* then took on the added meaning of representing both his own foreskin (as it had his eyelids) and his disturbed vision of his sister's genitals. He spoke of wanting to tear off her coverings or *veils*. At this time he was already under the influence of castration threats and fears connected with his masturbatory activity. Subsequently he developed rages, at times quite severe, which continued until the age of eight. These states may have contributed to the feeling of the veil, since such rages culminate, like masturbatory states, in a condition of a glazed blurring of contact with the external world.

The veil, as such, disappeared during the first period of treatment by Freud; or perhaps more accurately, it was so diminished as to be no longer complained of. The patient was generally better but he still suffered from anxiety which appeared to him as a fear of 'losing his reality'. By this he seemed to mean a possible breakthrough of wildness in behavior or violence in thought. In general, through the years that followed his treatment by Freud, he seemed steadied so long as he had at least some supporting contact with Freud or, in later years, with Dr. Brunswick and Dr. Gardiner. Without this, his veil might have thickened into a retaining wall, as a protection and a restriction. Its main protection was against his own inner primitive instinctual drives.

His pursuit of women and his marriage itself appear more as efforts to give structure to his life than as well-developed love

[10] In 1923 Freud offered a tentative revision: 'Observation of his parents copulating or observation of them together' occurred at one and a half (Gardiner, 1971, p. 262,n.).

relationships. They were apparently hedges against loneliness, the nagging urge to masturbate, and disturbing masturbatory fantasies. Though he genuinely missed his wife after her suicide in 1938, and grieved for her in a prolonged obsessional way, he seemed to feel this loss largely as a threat to the maintenance of his sense of reality, which was more than ordinarily dependent on viable relationships.[11] At this time, the time of the *Anschluss,* he was also bereft of the possibility of contact with Freud, who had given him emotional lifeblood. Freud had also been an extraordinarily satisfactory replacement for his own father, who had died a short time before the Wolf-man first sought psychiatric help.

His obsessive-compulsive condition had improved greatly after his first period of treatment with Freud from 1910 to 1914 and the veil was not then a matter of complaint. Two subsequent periods of disturbed behavior did occur, as he had always anxiously anticipated. The first of these came in 1926. A visit to Freud, in which he saw his benefactor in a depleted state after his first mouth operation, may have added to other circumstances in precipitating the disturbance, essentially a severe panic with increasing obsessional preoccupation with the condition of his nose. It was clearly a reactivation of a morbid concern with the pimples on his nose in adolescence. But now his obsession was more severe and unremitting, and led to the illusion that one of the pimples had broken leaving a hole which might be incurable. He carried a pocket mirror with him and was constantly examining the 'hole'. He also developed a paranoid-like attitude toward one of the doctors

[11] He expresses this clearly in his later written account. 'The question kept hammering away in my mind: How could Therese do this to me? As she was the only stable structure in my life how could I, now suddenly deprived of her, live on? It seemed to me impossible.' He had met her a year or two before he first consulted Freud. She was a nurse in a sanitarium when he was under Kraepelin's care. Their mutual ambivalences had made for a painful and rather dreary love affair. His own ambivalence, due in large measure to his struggle with his passive feminine attitude, had been helped by his treatment with Freud, which had allowed him to take a more decisive attitude. (See, Gardiner, 1971: *The Wolf-Man,* pp. 49-65, 74-80, 122.)

whom he had consulted and whom he now felt was persecuting him.[12] The hole was an illusion, probably of an anus vagina, and may be considered as the male equivalent of the development of an illusory penis in the female. Both are severe distortions of body reality but are not necessarily indicative of psychosis.[13]

This period of illness was treated by Dr. Brunswick and a diagnosis of paranoia was made. The patient was angry with Freud for seeming to desert him and at first presented Dr. Brunswick with a wall of unyielding silence. Once this was penetrated, the symptoms yielded to five months of treatment. His condition later on indicated that these ideas had not been truly delusional but rather parts of his extreme anger and depressive need for punishment.[14] It is significant, however, that this paranoid-like panic had been preceded by a considerable period in which the Wolf-man, always interested in painting, had undertaken to do a self-portrait. He had then spent many hours looking at himself, especially his face, in a mirror. This almost surely rearoused old problems of blurred staring in connection with the primal scene, and especially of looking at his sister's genitals and comparing them with his own, which

[12] In consideration of the question of paranoia in the Wolf-man's case, one should remember that his favorite uncle, who had played with him most in his childhood, had suddenly disappeared after an acute paranoia had developed. After a period of hospitalization he had been sequestered on his Crimean estate. Although he was supposed to be living comfortably there, in 1909, just at the time the Wolf-man was seeking help for himself, he heard of this uncle's lonely and gruesome death, his body actually gnawed by rats that infested the place. A fearful identification with this uncle may have colored the Wolf-man's symptoms at this time.

[13] Jonathan Swift, whose *Gulliver's Travels* betrays so clearly the author's preoccupation with both genital and general body changes in size, was repeatedly troubled by the size of the pores in the skin. He was a great showman himself who hid parts of his life behind a series of veils so adroitly that he created mysteries which have never been solved. In the fading state of increasing senility, he stood repeatedly before a mirror as though studying himself and saying, 'I am who I am!'.

[14] The full account of this appears in A Supplement to Freud's 'History of an Infantile Neurosis' in *The Wolf-Man* (Gardiner, 1971, pp. 263-311). It was originally published in the Int. J. Psa., IX, 1928, pp. 439-476.

could only really be seen clearly in a mirror. This became evident in his second break-through of wildness.

This disturbance was not nearly so severe as the first one had been and occurred in 1951 at sixty-five when his wife had been dead for thirteen years. He was retired and was beginning to feel the greater impact of loneliness without work and with a mother rather than a wife at hand. He again turned to painting as an expressive outlet. Actually, the break-through consisted of only an episode and had the quality of a piece of acting out, but it was still vivid in his mind when he related it to Dr. Gardiner some five years after its occurrence.[15] On a certain day he awoke with a headache and despite his mother's cautioning that he should remain at home, he felt impelled to go out and paint. He must already have been in an altered state of consciousness, related to somnambulism, for without realizing what he was doing, he wandered into the prohibited Russian zone in Vienna. Overcome by thoughts of his childhood, he did not realize that this was forbidden territory. As the light of day changed from bright to somber, he shifted his position and sat painting a picture of a house which 'really consisted of only a wall in which one saw black holes instead of windows', completely bombed out (Gardiner, 1971, p. 329). As he sat there lost in dark romantic feelings, he was overtaken by Russian soldiers who took him into custody under the suspicion that he was spying. He was held for two and one half days under conditions which sound like a milder version of Kafka's account of The Trial. He was then released without any realistically alarming sequelae.

His mother repeatedly referred to this incident as an 'act of madness which no one can understand'. He himself felt that it was similar to other brief periods of depression, especially to the time of his nose problems. He felt that he had lost control of himself and lost his hold on reality in acting in this dangerously mad way, and for weeks afterward he was filled with

[15]See, The Wolf-Man's Description of the Episode of the Painting in *The Wolf-Man* (Gardiner, 1971, pp. 331-334).

self-reproach. To me it seems pretty clear that this episode was an acted-out condensation of the primal scene and the seduction by his sister, which were combined in the early wolf dream at the age of four and played so large a part in his prolonged obsessional frenzy twenty-two years earlier. After the episode was over, he realized that it had occurred on the anniversary of his sister's suicide. At the time of her death he had been unable to mourn, but later he had had a displaced acting out of his grief when he impulsively visited the grave of a well-known poet and found himself weeping copiously. His sister had been an aspiring poet.

The intensity of his self-reproach and his guilt feelings, with the need to flirt with punishment, may be an indication of the persistent strength of his curiosity, jealousy, and rage at being the less effective, the diminished one in both experiences. At the same time his need to repeat and master through painting the horror of the blacked-out windows represented the castration threat involved in what he saw dimly but elaborated and imagined as his mother's and sister's genital orifices, and possessed himself in his own unseen anus.

The walls of defense founded on early infantile denial may take on various forms and textures as they progressively incorporate new ingredients from the experiences which go into their construction, not only in infancy but throughout childhood and adolescence. The first patient, the nurse, had built a wall of brick and stone. The Wolf-man had a tenacious veil as his wall, at one time extended into a wall of stubborn silence. Another of my patients had an illusion of being enclosed in a lucite cube through which she could see but not be touched. Still another managed an even more illusory wall by automatically unfocusing her eyes, very much like the closing of a shutter on a camera (Greenacre, 1947). This reminds us also of the Wolf-man's original dream in which the opening of the dream window was the externalization of his opening his eyes. When the experience is overwhelming, early, and often

repeated, the wall foundation is likely to be the more intractable. But the wall, in whatever form, is built to restrain wildness, to hold in check impulses felt as though of murderous rage, or nearly uncontrollable sexual impulses. These, probably generally, are more explicitly expressed in masturbation fantasies, which are in turn feared.

The life and work of Piet Mondrian present another form of the wall, modified in an extraordinary way in accord with the demands of this talented artist. We have no carefully documented psychoanalytic case study, but the man himself has provided revealing records: the paintings he left; his own autobiographical sketch written at sixty-nine and published posthumously under the title, Toward a True Vision of Reality; and his essay, written at forty-seven, Natural Reality and Abstract Reality. Although these are so impersonal as to seem aseptic, they are very revealing. Supplemented by the monograph of his friend, Michel Seuphor (n.d.), they give facts pertinent to this study.

Mondrian decided to become an artist at fourteen and from then on pursued his course with a single-minded devotion to the goal of purifying his vision, to free it from all subjectivity of emotion. He started out as a realist, painting landscapes, houses, a single church or windmill outlined against the sky. He even did a few portraits. But he passionately hated motion of any kind and found people in action the most disturbing of all. They soon were omitted. Even immobile cows in flat meadows were sacrificed. He loved flowers but they must appear singly and not in 'ensemble', i.e., in relation to each other. He turned to trees, painting them at first usually singly, stately, and dignified. Later, they appeared with twisted, tortured limbs as though arrested in a state of agonized motion. He experimented with the effects of light, painting the same scene either by the strongest sunlight or by moonlight. Fascinated for a time by the ever-changing sea and sky, he found that they too suggested more motion than he could tolerate.

He stated that he saw with realist eyes past beauty or (ordinary) reality of man, and that pure reality must be painted without the infiltration of *any* subjective feelings or conceptions. Since particular form and natural color evoke subjectivity, he felt he must reduce his pictures to the elements of form and primary color alone. Ultimately he felt that the only really constant relationship is expressed in the right angle; that the two fundamental forces of nature are expressed in the horizontal and the vertical meeting in the perfect right angle. (Parenthetically one wonders here whether he was making an effort to harmonize night and day.) Space, uncluttered, was the background on which he could create the equivalence of these two factors. He was clearly eradicating the family circle and any of the comforting rounded forms of life and human contact. It is not hard to see that he must have felt the danger of an overwhelming force of aggression in himself and the need of strong containing walls both in life and in his painting.

He began to paint walls themselves, first of rather warm reddish brick in patches, perhaps the indistinct walls of a house in the half light in which the right angle of the joinings of the bricks stood out like small right-angled crosses, sometimes embraced by incomplete ovals. Later, the texture of the brick faded and the ovals disappeared while the little crosses became prominent in irregular patterns as though spattered in space, still suggesting motion and emotion. Next, the crosses extended their linear arms to join each other to create rectangles of varying sizes and distribution, each enclosing its own primary color. He is said to have spent hours arranging and rearranging these to form a pattern which would have absolute balance, in which nothing would be loose or open-ended. This search for perfection in both expression and strong containment of the primordial forces progressed through various stages until it reached the compositions of infinitely precise rectangular forms, for which the painter became famous in his later years. In fact, in the end his painting barely escaped disappearing into the eternal harmony of a pure white unmarked space.

Surprisingly enough, in the last two or three years of his life, these purified architectural forms began to break up again. His last two paintings showed varied linear groups of small imprecise forms of assorted colors jostling each other in obvious motion and were labeled by their author, Broadway Boogie Woogie and Victory Boogie. These were painted at the age of sixty-nine in New York in 1941 or 1942.

His paintings seemed to reflect, to an unusual degree, what was going on in his own attempt to live. There was an increasing effort to extricate himself from particular personal relationships and to live in a perfectly balanced cosmic harmony. This seems another form of the rebel's search for a utopian existence. He insistently fled from motion and emotion as though these were the devils of darkness. His studio, bare and painted white, appeared more suitable for a monk or a surgeon than a painter. He could not stand even the intrusion of books.

Mondrian was a rebel in a life-long struggle with his father, who is described as a sententious tyrant, a Calvinist schoolmaster who wished his son to become a teacher. The boy's determination to be a painter came with puberty, but he succumbed to his father's will to the extent of qualifying to teach drawing. His further decision at twenty to go to the Academy of Fine Arts alienated him from his parents and his home, to which he never returned voluntarily except for the briefest visits.

During the next few years at the Academy, and after, in order to earn his living, he did copies of pictures, illustrations for scientific books, some portraits, and occasional teaching. He was an amiable, friendly young man, markedly shy with women. His appearance was arresting partly because of his large and luminous dark eyes, which are conspicuous in his photographs and in a series of self-portraits. He was then obsessionally worried about possible blindness and according to his younger brother, he tried to deal with this anxiety by ridiculing himself in regard to it.

In this general period there were two break-throughs of wildness in behavior, both of which were symbolically self-destructive. On one occasion while visiting in Cornwall at the invitation of one of his women students, he leaped into the sea from a high overhanging rock. He succeeded in swimming ashore, but fatigue and the immersion brought on a severe attack of pneumonia, from which he recovered slowly. The other eruption of wildness was repeated several times. He painted a number of self-portraits which required his studying his face in the mirror. But when the portrait displeased him, as it usually did, he would destroy it by shooting it with a pistol. A fellow painter who participated in these acts saved one of the offending portraits and wrote on it a quotation which translated means: 'So I take the risk of thrusting myself into the world, and I wait calmly until destiny, which eternally pursues us, lifts my desire to the point of self-confidence'.

In his journey away from home, Amsterdam had been the first stop and Paris the second. He was then in the stage of seeking relief from the varying shades and combinations of color in nature by adopting the use of primary colors alone. He was also seeking an intellectual style which would be loved for itself alone and eternally. In 1914 he was summoned home by the illness of his father but this visit was lengthened to the duration of World War I, which broke out just at this time.

Perhaps the pressures of the time accelerated the changes going on in him. At this time his renewed interest in the sea brought out the idea of horizontal and vertical forces as the basic and eternal principles of life. As soon as the war was over, he returned to Paris where he remained until 1938. This was the end of the period of the first great changes in his painting.

Throughout these years, he had lived a generally ascetic life, but he made a number of friends, began to publish articles, and to take a definite place in the world of painters. He knew many women, some of whom had been his students. He suffered compulsive infatuations which never lasted. He was in-

tensely fond of dancing and felt it a treat to be taken to a well-known dance hall. Otherwise, he danced alone in his studio with his small red painted phonograph. A friend who watched him considered him ridiculous, was embarrassed, and understood why women did not wish to marry him. When he was approaching sixty and had begun to take dancing lessons, he would pick out the prettiest girl on the dance floor, but was as stiff as a ramrod, attempting only vertical and horizontal movement. He was bitter that his country had banned the Charleston; if this ban continued he would never set foot in Holland again. He thought the Charleston was a 'sporting dance', contrasting it to erotic dances. Since the partners always kept a certain distance from each other and spent so much energy in doing and keeping track of the steps, he was assured they would have no time for thoughts of sex.

He had planned to come to the United States, but stopping too long in London en route, he was caught by the Second World War and did not arrive in New York until the fall of 1940. Here his paintings underwent another radical change. The precise black lines, enclosing rectangles of pure color, melted away and were replaced by thicker lines of a succession of small segments of various colors. These were the Broadway Boogie Woogie and the Victory pictures. Whether the Victory was for life or for death is hard to say for he died soon afterward of pneumonia.

Obviously, this is the story of a talented man who had from childhood struggled against both sexual and aggressive drives. Nor is this strange when one considers that probably from his earliest years he suffered from extreme stimulation. For he was the oldest of five children born to the sternest of Calvinistic fathers, who was a headmaster in the school. The children came in about ten years and there was every chance that this oldest child had multiple primal scene experiences as well as awareness of the birth of the younger siblings, certainly a situation which inevitably would compound œdipal jealousy, and sibling jealousy and envy. His symptoms themselves bespoke the

extremest sensitization to movement and noise; his infantile anger was expressed in his wish to keep all objects, whether animate or inanimate, separated from each other. Not even flowers should be seen with intertwined stems. He seemed to have taken into his body the multiple and unorganized as well as rhythmic motion around him, and to have attempted to convert it into a cosmic rhythm which would be perfect and eternal, and to project this in his painting. His fascination with dancing with his whole body in a state of stiff erectness proclaimed, unknown to him, the displacement of genitality to the total body self. He was ultimately unable to live according to the art form he had created, in which motion and emotion would be walled safely into rectangles. But he had only a brief period of freedom before he died.

CONCLUSION

The primal scene and related experiences have pervasive effects on a child's later life and character, especially in shaping the manifestations of both sexual and aggressive drives. The effects are powerful in the first months of life when the infant's separation from the mother is scant and the primal scene is apt to be a most intimate and repetitive experience. At that time sexual and aggressive responses are not differentiated, and other uncomfortable stimulation from any source may initiate a lasting tendency to respond with action.

Disturbances in the sense of reality are more specific and differentiated during the second year when rapid maturational changes produce drastic shifts in the infant's contact with the outer world, resulting in disturbances and contradictions in his perceptions. The primal scene may then be an overwhelming experience in its strangeness, arousing infantile reactions of loneliness, alienation, or of feeling overwhelmed, accompanied by changes in the state of consciousness. Under other, less severely bewildering conditions, it excites acute and primitive jealousy to the point of infantile rage.

Defense by primitive denial is then set in motion, followed by repression and isolation and, at a later time, by rationalization. Denial, however, is both strong and insidious, and tends to be a widening and inclusive defensive maneuver which infiltrates many other relationships in later life, permitting opposing perceptions to endure in juxtaposition. Together with the defensive mechanism of isolation, denial forms the basis of tenacious walls of containment which both support and restrict the developing character of neurosis.

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Concepts of Self and Identity and the Experience of Separation-Individuation in Adolescence

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CONCEPTS OF SELF AND IDENTITY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION IN ADOLESCENCE

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INTRODUCTION

Margaret Mahler (1968) describes the process of separation-individuation as consisting of two sets of interdependent changes. The differentiation of self- and object representations changes in degree and in stability. This set of changes we may call representational differentiation. Independent activity in the object world at large also changes in degree and flexibility. This set of changes we may call behavioral differentiation. These two differentiations are interdependent; yet it is representational differentiation that must be the core of the separation-individuation concept.

Self and identity are the superordinate representational terms for the elements that become separated or individuated from the object or, more exactly, from the subjective, relatively unarticulated mother-infant matrix that exists at the time of birth. We must therefore be as clear as we can about these two terms.[1] We must also remain alert to context when considering the use and usefulness of these concepts. During the past several decades freudian analysts have made increasing use of self and

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[1] My discussion overlaps earlier critiques by Glover (1966) and Leites (1971), though in ways too complicated to specify here it does not share many of their assumptions. See also, Ryle (1949, especially pp. 186-198).

identity concepts in a number of other contexts—specifically, in the study of adolescence (Erikson, 1950, 1956; Spiegel, 1958), psychosis (Winnicott, 1958), narcissism (Kohut, 1966, 1971; Levin, 1970), and ego functions (Spiegel, 1959). Since the relations of these contexts to each other have not been worked out, we may not assume that self and identity retain the same meaning in each context. For example, with regard to self or identity during adolescence, representational *cohesion* seems to be at least as important a connotation of these terms as representational *differentiation* from an object.

The main discussion of this paper will develop—in a necessarily incomplete way—a stringent critique of the terms self and identity. This critique is concerned less with careless usage of the terms, common as that is, and more with some of the fundamental conceptual and empirical ambiguities and misrepresentations that these terms seem to embody. I shall be drawing upon, though not following exactly, the fundamental contributions of Freud (1905), Anna Freud (1936, 1958), Helene Deutsch (1944, 1945), Erikson (1950, 1956), and Blos (1962, 1967), to mention only a handful of investigators.

Before we proceed, two special problems must be mentioned. (1) Although sometimes it is 'the ego' that is mentioned in discussions of what it is that undergoes 'separation-individuation', on close examination it appears that 'the ego' is being used in the sense of self or identity rather than in its customary sense of a more or less neutrally energized organization of relatively homogeneous functions. (2) Strictly speaking, the giving up of relations to infantile objects does not constitute 'individuation'. *Logically,* only an already individuated entity can be said to have 'relations', however diffuse and unstable these relations may be; *psychologically,* only an already highly individuated person is capable of giving up his infantile relations to others (actually, of modifying these relations greatly, as through personal analysis). One finds instances of confusion between 'individuation' and 'giving up infantile objects' in Jacobson (1964), Blos (1967), Mahler (1968), Kohut (1971),

and other analysts who have recently contributed to the analytic literature on the phases of mental development.

ADOLESCENT 'DETACHMENT'

In one of his succinct and seminal discussions of adolescent development Freud (1905) wrote:

> At the same time as these plainly incestuous phantasies are overcome and repudiated, one of the most significant, but also one of the most painful, psychical achievements of the pubertal period is completed: detachment from parental authority, a process that alone makes possible the opposition, which is so important for the progress of civilization, between the new generation and the old. At every stage in the course of development through which all human beings ought by rights to pass, a certain number are held back; so there are some who have never got over their parents' authority and have withdrawn their affection from them either very incompletely or not at all (p. 227).

That Freud was not disposed to be so absolute about these distinctions and achievements as might appear from this discussion soon becomes clear: after referring to the tendency of some young people to fall in love with older people who 're-animate pictures of their mother or father', he added, 'There can be no doubt that every object-choice whatever is based, though less closely, on these prototypes' (p. 228). Which is to say that the detaching he spoke of cannot be completed. We know too that usually there is another aspect—a fond, mutually supportive, and continuous aspect—of parent-adolescent relations; our present discussion, however, concerns the aspect of detachment rather than family solidarity. And it must be borne in mind that the process we are concerned with is more apparent in some adolescents than in others.

Let us now examine this struggle for detachment. Perhaps the outstanding manifestation of the adolescent's separation-individuation difficulties is his totalistic effort to 'stamp out' his parents' influence on him. By means of considerable uncon-

scious projection, which, ironically, only further limits his uncertain differentiation from his parents, the adolescent in his conscious awareness locates the parental influence mainly in his actual parents as they are today. For this reason he avoids them, and when with them he acts aloof, indifferent, secretive, touchy, surly, and contemptuous.

Unconsciously, however, his situation is quite different. His inordinate fear of parental influence usually is based on three main factors: 1, his defensive regression from rearoused incestuous œdipal tendencies, a regression induced by heightened castration anxieties or fantasies, and fears of loss of love and love objects; 2, his own persisting wishes to remain close to his parents, or even merged with them, expressed in wishful fantasies of their being in and around him, both as the raw materials of his own being and as presences or introjects acting on him in a variety of ways; 3, his tendency to inflate his parents with his grandiose infantile conceptions of them, a tendency in keeping with the primary dynamic importance of his persisting unconscious attachment to his infantile objects.

His unconscious situation therefore makes it impossible for the adolescent to solve his developmental problem by avoiding or overwhelming his actual contemporary parents, though to a degree and in some respects such moves may be necessary and beneficial; the present actual world is not irrelevant, of course. But what he needs most urgently is to transform his so-called inner world, particularly his archaic infantile world. Projective expulsion, fight and flight, and iron control do not accomplish this transformation: resort to these devices assumes a basically unchangeable predicament and serves to perpetuate it. Genuine emancipation seems to be built on revision, modulation, and selective acceptance as well as rejection, flexible mastery, and complex substitutions and other changes of aims, representations, and patterns of behavior. These changes are necessarily slow, subtle, ambivalent, limited, and fluctuating. I do not think we yet have a good empirical grasp of these directional, representational, and behavioral differentiations from

the parents of infancy: we know that they occur, and something about why they occur and their consequences, but not so much about how they occur.

We understand the struggling adolescent's totalistic view of emancipation to be in large part a consequence of his fear of his own wishes—of their strength and their unconscious influence, which he feels to be insidious. It is this influence that makes him so vulnerable and easily played upon—controlled, overstimulated, put off, or put down by his elders and his contemporaries. Not only must he be on the alert against himself, it is himself that he must 'stamp out', as in the asceticism described by Anna Freud (1936) and the radical experimentation with limits and with negative and strange 'identities' described by Erikson (1950, 1956).

PRIMARY PROCESS THINKING ABOUT 'DETACHMENT'

In carrying on this struggle, the adolescent will make a number of fateful primitive psychological assumptions about the nature of feelings, self, identity, and his relations with other people. These assumptions are usually unconscious and exemplify primary process thinking; that is to say, the assumptions are the same as those we see expressed in dreams, neurotic and psychotic symptoms, slips, and symptomatic acts. These assumptions center around the idea that mental processes are substances, that they have such properties of matter as spatial extension and location, weight, quantity, and inertia. For example, feelings are substances, often fecal substances (Brierley, 1937) which, accordingly, may be withheld or expelled and gotten rid of or destroyed; or they may fill one up and either explode or leak (or spill) out. Or perhaps they are oral substances (milk, poison, vomitus) or other psychosexual things (urine, semen, babies). Feelings for other persons are like ties that may be cut (like umbilical cords or like the sadist's chains), or the feelings *for* others and *of* others may be engulfing, suffocating, poisonous, paralyzing, and soul-murdering. The idea of detachment is itself concretistic. In primary process thinking, these are not

metaphors but actualities (Freud, 1915, 1925), though they are also the basis of corresponding metaphors in everyday language.

In his struggles to detach himself, the adolescent will be unconsciously working over these concretized feelings and influences. Sometimes he will hide, conserve, perhaps protect what he values by keeping it inside. Often he will unconsciously imagine that he is expelling threatening feelings and influences into his parents' minds and bodies; in his fight or flight, his blocked reincorporations, and his hypervigilance, he will think of himself as guarding against the poisons, prisons and other perilous spaces, places, and substances in the outer world. And, along with his fantasy of ridding himself of his dangerous substances, he will think of himself as being emptied out, disconnected, and perhaps as having lost or thrown away something he calls a self or identity.

Clearly, this way of thinking cannot be acceptable in any objective, secondary process appraisal of psychological situations and processes and of the changes they undergo. Even though such archaic thinking is widely used as metaphor in the adaptive communications of everyday life, it cannot be used for exact clinical description and interpretation or for rigorous theoretical conceptualization. Objectively, we do not (at least we should not) ascribe substantiality to what is mental. We work, or should work, instead to develop conceptions that describe changes in one or another aspect of mental processes. In this regard, for example, we think of changes of aim and object, and of defensive restriction and revision of those thoughts, feelings, and behavioral acts that seem to bring about situations of danger.

CLINICAL EXAMPLE

Let us consider a clinical illustration of these archaic assumptions about mental life. The connection between this example and issues of self and identity will emerge shortly.

A young man began an analytic hour with some ruminations about having exposed himself to a 'rip off', owing to his

having left his car keys in the jacket he had left hanging in the unattended waiting room of my office. He went on to talk about his increased awareness that he had been blocking enthusiastic feelings about recent accomplishments in his work, in his self-awareness and self-regulation, and in his personal relationships. He said that he did not share his feelings, that he was not really sharing them with the analyst right then and there while mentioning these accomplishments and good feelings. He then had the following fantasy: he was standing in front of a vault in which his feelings are stored; he opens the door to take out a little and then locks it again to safeguard his feelings.

This is an analysand whose infantile history is epitomized by his having been toilet trained before the age of one. Particularly during his first year of life, he had been handled in such a controlling way as to predispose him to develop convictions later in childhood that he had been robbed of his motility, affectivity, will, and initiative. Thus, especially during the early years of his analysis, he could not experience feelings of desire as his own for very long; instead, soon after noting some desire, he would be thinking of it angrily as a demand, usually as one coming from other people, such as the analyst, but sometimes from the desire itself or from some organ connected with the expression of the desire, such as the penis. It appears that besides a relatively austere, over-controlled, and physically undemonstrative mother, he had had during his first year of life a harshly methodical nursemaid who did the dirty work of prematurely 'domesticating' the baby boy in the privacy of the nursery.

Considering his fantasy of the vault together with his history, his preceding concern about being 'ripped off', and his comments about enthusiasm, it appeared that he expected to be robbed of his feelings if he did not keep them safe in the vault; he implied, of course, that the analyst would be the immediate robber. There is another implication—that he *wished* to be robbed of his feelings—which I shall pass over here. One may say that this

fantasy expressed particularly his having unconsciously equated feelings and feces (as money in the bank) and feelings and phallus (as car keys that will be 'ripped off'). Feeling is substance—contents and organs of the body. As substance it can be shared or stolen, unless, of course, it is hidden or locked away inside. The 'inside' pertains to the self, which is similarly substantialized as a place of limited access (a vault). In actual fact, however, feeling is not substance; enthusiasm is not material; and self has no location and no locks. And so we must go on to consider how we may put into the language of the secondary process the ideas of shared or stolen feelings, and of the self as a lockable container.

I suggest that what the analysand called not sharing a feeling or keeping it in a vault is best expressed in objective language as his not allowing himself to feel a certain way, or to feel that way beyond a certain point, or to let it be perceived by others that he is feeling that way. These processes are mostly unconscious. Similarly, being robbed of a feeling can objectively mean one of two things: either others act in such a way as to interfere with his continuing to feel as he does, or he interferes himself. If he feels enthusiasm, others may interfere because enthusiasm is too threatening to the maintenance of *their* inhibitions; or he may himself interfere because he feels guilty about the triumphant œdipal aspects of *his own* enthusiasm or is afraid of its grandiose and manic potential. In either case, to feel enthusiastic is to create a dangerous situation; consequently he must defend himself against feeling that way. We recognize that ultimately it is he who is the robber and that he is robbing himself and others, including the analyst, not of substance but of opportunities to feel, act, and interact in certain ways. As for the vault, it refers to preventing and being secretive or private rather than to containing and locking.

Our examination of the fantasy of the vault has illustrated the notions of substantiality of feeling and of self. Moreover it has shown how these notions play an important part in misconstruing one's own psychological situation: they support

the illusion that mental processes may be dealt with as though they were things, as though they had the properties of things. The illusion is culturally as well as ontogenetically ancient and pervasive, and has entered into many theories of mind, including the psychoanalytic, where it appears in a number of forms. In one form it appears as dammed up, bound, transformable, displaceable, and dischargeable quantities of psychic energy. In another form—now mostly discredited though still quite prevalent—the concretistic illusion appears in the form of the personified psychic structures (id, ego, superego) interacting like the members of a close-knit and turbulent family. We speak not only of psychic energy and psychic structure in this way, but of self and identity as well.

SELF AND IDENTITY: SUBSTANCES OR ABSTRACTIONS?

These considerations help us understand better the adolescent's experience of emptiness, deadness, and desolation. Almost inevitably, this experience accompanies the adolescent's struggle against emotionality, against identification (Greenson, 1954), and against relations with certain people who have become and have remained both emotionally significant to him (constant objects in Mahler's sense) and practically important (especially the contemporary parents with their real powers). Thinking unconsciously that feelings, identifications, and relationships are substances, the adolescent attempts to smash, cut, befoul, shrink, and obliterate them, and certainly to expel them by means of real as well as imagined separation; and so, with his feelings and identifications and relationships cast out and destroyed, he comes to think of himself as empty and dead and of his world as desolate, and to feel and behave accordingly; that is, he comes to adopt the dropping-out, rock-bottom, non-negotiable mode.

Similarly and concurrently substantialized and placed somewhere in space is the adolescent's notion of who he is—what we and he might call his self, his identity. Thus, he may lose or be searching for an identity; boundaries may dissolve; and one self

(a false self) may cover another (a real self) which has been stunted, fragmented and concealed. Erikson (1950, 1956), Laing (1969a, 1969b), and others will seem to the introspective adolescent to be talking specifically *about* him, if not *to* him.

All of this is subjective experience based on ordinarily unconscious primary process thinking. It is of the greatest clinical importance to explore these adolescent phenomena, and it is of theoretical importance to conceptualize them. But surely the exploration should not validate the substantialization of mental processes, and the theory should not use the experiential terms that are to be explained in the explanation itself. Self and identity are not things with boundaries, contents, locations, sizes, forces, and degrees of brittleness. And yet have not these terms been used as if they refer to things with these properties? Consider for example the following quotations from some recent publications. '. . . during the quasi-prehistoric phase of magic hallucinatory omnipotence, the breast or the bottle *belongs to the self* . . .' (Mahler, 1968, p. 12). 'The modification of the archaic idealizing cathexes (their taming, neutralization, and differentiation) is achieved by their *passage through the idealized self-objects* . . .' (Kohut, 1971, p. 43). 'The self . . . is a very individual and originally a very narcissistic structure, whose boundaries can expand and contract more or less at will' (Levin, 1970, p. 175). And 'the lifelong struggle for dominance between ego and self . . .' (*op. cit.*, p. 176).

With the help of Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein (1964), Rapaport (1960), Gill (1967), Holt (1967), and others, we have learned not to reify id, ego, and superego. But it seems we are reluctant to stop reifying our abstractions. One might go so far as to paraphrase Freud in this regard: where 'the ego' was, there shall 'the self' or 'identity' be.

Does it make sense for us as observers and conceptualizers to use formulations like these, or to say that someone 'has' a self or an identity, as if each is a thing that may be had or possessed? Is either self or identity even a consistent phenomenological datum? Is either a fact that may be discovered? My answer to

each of these questions is, 'No'. Self and identity are not facts about people; they are ways of thinking about people. They are not outside of and above the realm of self-representation and object representation; each is merely one type of representation or one way of representing. For example, the sense of self-sameness that Erikson emphasizes in connection with identity formation is, in this view, a certain kind of representation, an idea one has about one's being, a way of organizing and giving more meaning to one's ideas and feelings, a conception of continuity based on recognition or familiarity—and yet empirically self-sameness is usually a rather inconstant idea in that it can change markedly in content with a significant change in mood and circumstance. There is, I submit, a claim to unity and stability of self-representation in the way terms of this sort are used or understood that is not supported by observation (*cf.*, Spiegel, 1959, especially pp. 85-88, on self and self-feeling).

Self and identity themselves are changeable. This changeability consists, however, not of alteration of an empirically encountered entity; rather, it consists of the observer's changeable purposes in using these terms. It is the kind of changeability that derives from the fact that self and identity are not names of identifiable homogeneous or monolithic entities; they are classes of self-representations that exist only in the vocabulary of the observer. The self-representations in this class are quite varied in scope, time of origin, and objectivity; many are unconscious (for example, self as phallus and self as turd) and many remain forever uncoördinated, if not contradictory. When I speak of the changeable observer, I include the changeable self-observer, for at different times he too may speak of his self or identity for different reasons and consequently from different vantage points.

Also to be considered in this regard are the many different senses in which 'self' words are used to define experience. For example: I hit myself; I hate myself; I'm self-conscious; I'm self-sufficient; I feel like my old self; I'm selfish; my humiliation was self-inflicted, and I couldn't contain myself. Self does

not mean exactly the same thing from one of these sentences to the next. It means my body, my personality, my actions, my competence, my continuity, my needs, my agency, and my subjective space. Self is thus a diffuse, multipurpose word; like the pronouns 'I' and 'me', of which it is after all a variant, self is a way of pointing. In other words, it is a way of saying this or that. Consequently, one has always to decide, on the basis of the situational and the verbal context in which the word self is being used at any moment, which aspect of a person is being pointed at.

We must also note that whatever the situation and context, many people use self to refer to some conscious or preconscious idea, and for the most part to an unthreatening idea as well. The case is the same with identity. I think that Hartmann was correct to avoid using self and identity as metapsychological concepts. (For Hartmann 'the self' meant 'the person'.) Neither logical analysis nor careful psychoanalytic observation supports or comfortably includes their use as descriptive or systematic terms.

SEPARATION-INDIVIDUATION AS A MATTER OF REPRESENTATIONS

If we dispense with self and identity, can we still talk about separation-individuation? Certainly we can. With regard to *representational* differentiation, we can say that, as normal development proceeds, self-representations are differentiated more often, more sharply, and more stably. And we can say that the subject may organize these differentiated representations into groups; he may give them more or less abstract names, such as trait names or even person names; he may maintain more or less strong and consistent feelings toward them, such as love and hate; and he may endow them with more or less stability of organization and content. Of course many of these changes and many instances of nonchange will remain unconscious.

If we restrict ourselves to formulations of this type, that is to say, formulations at some remove from the primary process, we

remain both logical and close to observation. We do not use primary process to observe, explain, and formulate propositions about primary process. We do not, for example, use anal theories to explain anal fantasies. And we do not foster those illusions of natural, rightful, and conscious unity of being that tend to be suggested by the terms self and identity. These illusions are precious to many adolescents; in some ways they may even be useful aids in their reordering of psychosexual priorities and exchanging psychosexual objects. But they are not the terms of sound theory.

SELF AND IDENTITY IN FREUDIAN THEORY

Why have self and identity become so popular of late among freudian analysts?[2]

1. There has always been a tendency toward reification and personification of terms in freudian theorizing. With the curb on treating id, ego, and superego in this way, this tendency has been reasserted, like a return of the repressed, in self and identity concepts.

2. The emphasis on self and identity is a logical development within modern ego psychology in that ego psychology brought the concept of representation to new prominence and importance. It did so in the investigation of child development and psychosis, and, more generally, in the study of object relations and the new regard for 'external' reality and narcissism entailed by the careful conceptualization of those object relations.

3. With self-representation and object representation legitimized and ensconced in theory along with considerations of ego autonomy and such ego functions as aim setting and rank ordering (Hartmann, 1939, 1950, 1964), a need developed for some concept that would serve two purposes: it would stand for the adaptive, executive, undriven regulating of one's being, and, at the same time, it would not reintroduce the personified ego of earlier theoretical times.

[2] I am not referring to the place of these terms in the broad history of ideas and culture, a topic that deserves a long discussion in its own right.

4. In recent decades particularly, there has developed among psychoanalysts increasing dissatisfaction with the apparent remoteness, impersonality, and austerity, as well as inordinate complexity, of modern ego psychology. As a result there has appeared on the scene a heightened and insufficiently critical readiness to accept and use theoretical concepts that seem to be closer to subjective experience and actual clinical work. Self and identity appear to be such concepts.

5. There now exist a number of worthy attempts to introduce self and identity concepts into traditional metapsychology. Identity is prominent, for example, in Jacobson's (1964) The Self and the Object World, and self is central to Kohut's (1966, 1971) studies of narcissism. These are attempts by analysts not associated with the overextended psychosocial and ego-autonomous emphases of such authors as Erikson. But these more orthodox freudian authors seem not to recognize that once they go beyond self-representation and object representation—once they begin to speak of self or identity as a structure, as a dynamic or forceful psychic organization, as a determinant of behavior and fantasy and feeling—they are in theoretical trouble. Either they are being redundant in that they should be making the traditional psychic structures and the principle of multiple function (Waelder, 1930) do the work they are assigning to self and identity, or they are entering a new realm of discourse in which they will have to abandon the particular natural science model of psychoanalytic theory.[3] In the latter regard, the natural science model will have to give way to an altogether different model—a historical, experiential, intentionalistic, and action-oriented model; that is to say a model in which concepts like force, energy, function, structure, and apparatus will no longer be useful or appropriate.

That kind of model for freudian analysis has not yet been developed, though a number of authors in recent years have been laying the foundations for it (*cf.*, Home, 1966; Rycroft,

[3] Kohut (1971) does show some awareness of this problem but does not attempt to deal with it head on.

1966, 1968; Apfelbaum, 1966; Guntrip, 1967, 1968; G. S. Klein, 1967, 1969; Hayman, 1969; Grossman and Simon, 1969; Applegarth, 1971; Leites, 1971; Schafer, 1968a, 1968b, 1968c, 1970a, 1970b, in press, a, in press, b). I believe the important work of Kohut, Jacobson, Mahler, and others on the representational world will prove to be transitional to these altogether new theoretical models.

I suggest, in other words, that the popularity of concepts of self and identity is symptomatic of a fundamental shift toward a modern conception of theory making and a modern psychological concern with specifically human phenomenology and concepts. Freudian analysis can only benefit from such a shift.

SUMMARY

The terms self and identity are quite ambiguous owing to their having been used variously by different authors. Nevertheless, these two terms now play a large role in general theoretical discussions of object relations and self-representations, and in specific discussions of separation-individuation. In these discussions, rather than their being viewed as *types* of representations, self and identity are commonly treated as motivational-structural entities on the order of 'the ego', in which regard they suffer the same reification as all structural concepts. Thus, self and identity have been spoken of as though they are spaces, places, substances, agencies, independent minds, forces, and so forth.

In connection with separation-individuation during adolescence—what Freud called detachment from parental authority —and with the help of a clinical example, it is argued that adolescents think about self and identity, and the emotions and relationships they imply, in infantile concretistic, substantialized, or primary process forms. To some extent under the heading of self or identity, psychoanalysts have imported archaic experiential reports into their general theory to the detriment of not only their explanatory propositions but their descriptive or phenomenological endeavors as well. On the basis of recent psychoanalytic enthusiasm for self and identity concepts, it is

contended that more and more the particular natural science model of traditional psychoanalytic theorizing seems to be inadequate to deal with contemporary theoretical and empirical concerns; other models are beginning to be developed in its stead. The current usage of self and identity concepts marks a transitional phase in the development of psychoanalytic conceptualization.

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THE EARLIEST EGO DEVELOPMENT, PRIMITIVE MEMORY TRACES, AND THE ISAKOWER PHENOMENON

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We do not yet know how the human personality begins, nor do we understand the earliest basic patterns of normal emotional development. This lack of fundamental knowledge means that clinical and investigative work in the human behavioral sciences is based on models and theories of emotional structure and growth that are largely speculative. Present-day techniques of observing and recording the very young infant are still relatively unreliable due to the lack of observable emotional patterns from the earliest psychological stages and to the inadequacy of measuring instruments for this period.

At the same time, in research, very little use has been made of the human ability to remember the earliest stages of life. For a long time it was doubted whether the human mind was capable of remembering back into infancy. It was unclear whether any experiences in infancy were meaningful enough to be remembered and it was questioned whether any early memories could be recognized by either the subject or an investigator. Because breast feeding occurs in all cultures and the role of the participants is clear and the purpose of their interaction obvious, the recollection of being fed at the mother's breast is undoubtedly the infantile memory that would be most easily recognized by adult observers and researchers. Other experiences of the same age period are not universal with respect to all infants and to all cultures, and the interactions of each person involved are not so readily recognized in the later remembrance. Holding, changing, dressing,

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and other activities with infants are influenced by different social and family mores. Hence, memories of these events in infancy are more liable to be unique to the subject and less easily recognized in later life by him or by an investigator.

In 1938, Isakower described in his patients a complex of remembered perceptions that recapitulated the early experience of nursing at the breast. His findings have since been confirmed and extended by many observers. Characteristically the subject remembers or re-experiences the feeling of a large, usually round, dark mass coming closer and closer to his face. This mass is sensed as being doughy, bulky, or even lumpy. Frequently he sees, or feels that he perceives in some indistinct way, brownish or purplish shapes like the circle of the breast areola and the protuberant nipple. Eventually the large mass seems to wrap around him and he then feels a ridged, sometimes rough, firm sensation in his mouth and on the skin around his lips. On his tongue, or at the back of his throat, he may begin to sense a milky or salty taste. He feels that his being is tending to merge with this enveloping mass and his sense of self becomes more and more fluid and indistinct. Typically, these memories come when the subject is falling asleep or just awakening but they can occur in almost any situation that allows contemplation. Once these memories are recognized, they can be brought to mind more readily, often with recall of additional details.

Lewin (1946, 1948, 1953), Rycroft (1951), and Stern (1961) have shown that the dream screen, blank dreams, and blank hallucinations are modified manifestations of the Isakower phenomenon. The experience of nursing at the breast has also been remembered with memories superimposed from later developmental stages (*cf.*, Garma, 1955; Sperling, 1957; Stern, 1961) or reported as a regressive defense against other disturbing recollections (Fink, 1967). These additional observations are all valid and therapeutically useful in specific instances but they tend to obscure the more significant and basic importance of Isakower-type memories.

As Spitz (1961) points out, the Isakower phenomenon is so far the one recognizable primitive memory trace of the infantile experience of the 'I' and the 'Not I'—of the early realization of ego boundaries and of a personal ego. Many papers have mentioned a patient's recollection of the baby bed, the blanket, and other things 'out there'. These reports are further indications of the child's early awareness of 'I' and 'Not I'. They show how the very young child begins to cope with this recognition of separateness and of a personal self. The significance of these early memory traces is obvious, but research observations must be developed much further. By such study, insight may be gained into the earliest development of the human ego and ego rudiments.

Certain subjects are more apt to have Isakower-type memories and thus are more suitable for research. Isakower himself, and several authors since his original work, have mentioned that these primitive memories are reported more frequently by children, adolescents, and young adults. From what we know of personality development at these stages of growth, it would seem that such observations could have been expected, but this area of investigation has not been developed further. Childhood and adolescence are the developmental periods when ego boundaries normally are relatively diffuse and have to be constantly redefined and re-emphasized by the growing child. At this stage, depersonalization occurs as a normal temporary growth process: depersonalization, definition, and repersonalization.

The newly independent teen-ager has a unique ability to look at his ego from outside and is acutely sensitive and often most verbal about his rapidly changing body image and self-concept. Frequently the young adolescent will tell how, in quiet moments, he has experienced the sensation of being outside himself, of observing and judging himself, of relearning his emotional and his physical being. The preadolescent child has probably even greater ego fluidity than the adolescent but usually does not have this ability for independent obser-

vation. With the natural age-specific ability for ego introspection of the adolescent and with the normal ego changes that occur in preadolescence, it is understandable that the young child and the adolescent should also have the capacity for and be more subject to the profound remembering that is necessary to experience the Isakower phenomenon—the recollection of the earliest establishment of ego boundaries and the initial development of the self.

In the psychoanalytic literature, it is shown that normal healthy people—and the references seem to indicate adult subjects—have also experienced the Isakower complex of memories. Several authors mention that 'colleagues' have reported these primitive memories; it would appear that many of these colleagues have been adults who were in analysis or who had been analyzed. However, this ability to remember the earliest developmental stages in life occurs also in non-analyzed adults. For instance, I have seen two residents in training recognize some aspects of Isakower's description and then go on to tell of other parts of this phenomenon from their own personal experience. Also, in a friendly social discussion, a middle-aged colleague in another medical discipline spontaneously told how he repeatedly experienced these primitive memories while falling asleep. Even though normal healthy people are able to remember in this fashion, no extensive research has been done with these potential subjects.

In his original paper, Isakower states that these memory traces are more often recognized in febrile patients. We do not see feverish states as commonly now in our clinical practice but we have an even richer pool of comparable remembering in those people we treat during or after drug experiences. Increasingly during the past decade, adolescents and young adults have reported the Isakower phenomenon, in part or in whole, as occurring during their more pervasive drug-induced experiences. Again this finding could have been anticipated. Very commonly, hallucinogens will produce the sensation of being outside and of observing one's

own body. During the drug experience, all body perceptions may be hypercathected and are perceived through multiple perceptive modalities—sounds are seen and felt, words are tasted, and bodily touch is heard. During this time, the body ego boundaries and the body image are often the focus of an almost total and intense emotional cathexis. The subject feels deeply about his body and his body boundaries and he remembers the feelings and the perceptions on which these emotions are based. At this time, memories from the distant past and from forgotten experiences may flow slowly or may flash suddenly through the subject's awareness. These people undergoing drug experiences may 'trip' not only through their present and sometimes their future but often back into their past—and this past may include the remembrance of nursing at the breast.

When they recall such drug experiences, these adolescents and young adults often remember very clearly and quite specifically having had then the feeling of being nursed at the breast. They may recognize directly that they have been perceiving once more the sensations that they once had while they were being breast-fed. Often they can recall in vivid detail not only the phenomenon that Isakower describes but they can add to this complex of the remembered sensations. As they remember what they experienced under the effect of the drugs, they may be able to tell how the milk tasted and how much they drank. They may recognize the few straggling hairs on the breast mass around and above them and they remember the smell of the maternal sweat. Sometimes they recall only part of the nursing experience; frequently they recall the whole memory but only in a very fleeting fashion and often almost lost in the tumult of other vivid memories from their past lives.

I

A seventeen-year-old young man was being seen in psychotherapy at the insistence of his parents. He was the only son of

an alcoholic father and a policewoman mother. The parents fought constantly with one another and with the young man, verbally and physically. During times of intense family stress the father went on alcoholic binges and the mother resorted to investigating everything about her husband and son. They brought their son for treatment because he had been taking a wide selection of hallucinogenic drugs since about age twelve.

The patient himself maintained that he did not need to come for any kind of treatment but nevertheless he came to each appointment and was polite and friendly: he talked mostly about his continuing drug experiences. One day he was describing one LSD trip after he had had about a hundred such trips. In a rather dreamy, relaxed fashion he began to say that he had had the feeling of floating, swirling around 'out there'. Then he went on:

> I was sucking. Sucking. Sucking at mother's breast, I suppose. I had her big tit in my mouth and it felt like a cushion over my face. I could smell her stinking sweat. It was tickling my nostrils. Still it felt good. It was peaceful. . . . And then I was floating, swirling. Floating all over the universe. I was all over. Not happy, not sad. Just being—all over.

Most patients describe Isakower-type experiences under drug influence as a state without anxiety or awe though the Isakower phenomenon is tinged with different emotions for different people. As other reports in the literature indicate, some subjects have felt pleasure and satisfaction, others have experienced these memories with anxiety, frustration, or near panic. This emotionally tinged recall is based on understandable individual differences. All memories are re-enforced by the quality of the past experience, negatively re-enforced and imprinted more forcibly by frustration, positively re-enforced and fixed more strongly in the memory by gratification, or in the Isakower situation, by oral pleasure or oral frustration. This difference in the emotional quality of the Isakower

memory has been reported by children, teen-agers, and adults, drug users and non-drug users.

It should now be possible to use the relatively easily recognized Isakower complex of memories as a way to investigate the earliest ego state. Already it has been reported many times that these subjects describe other memories experienced at the same time as the Isakower phenomenon. These additional early memories must be evaluated much more closely as they may represent other memory traces from this same developmental stage or they may be primitive memories from an even earlier time of personality development. Isakower, and others following him, tell how their subjects also experienced sensations of floating, whirling, and giddiness along with memories of nursing at the breast. These feelings may very well be more primitive memory traces that come from the developmental period even before the child understands an 'I-Not I'; that is, from the psychological growth stage before there is a firm enough ego nucleus around which perceptions can be stabilized.

The seventeen-year-old patient reported above reacted with annoyance when he was asked what exactly was the quality of the whirling, swirling, floating sensations he described. He seemed to feel that the psychotherapist should know intuitively what these experiences represented. In his words they were 'being, just being. . . . Being—don't you understand?'.

In the development of the very primitive ego during earliest infancy, it can be postulated that there first exists in the experiencing mind, mere floating, turning, whirling sensations, sensations of 'being' in some fashion. These may represent the initial inner awareness of physical existence.

II

Michael is the youngest of three sons of professionally successful parents. Both his mother and his father are prominent lawyers and his two brothers are outstanding academically. He was very close to his mother until early adolescence when

he became a 'rebel'. For the next few years, he was involved in a series of minor delinquencies which periodically resulted in his being kept overnight in the city jail. His parents felt that he was 'beyond their control'. He was seen by a succession of psychiatrists and psychologists for brief periods of treatment without obvious therapeutic benefit. In spite of his behavioral difficulties, Michael maintained excellent grades in high school and graduated in the top ten per cent of his class.

During the two years after high school graduation, Michael spent one semester in three different colleges. In each college he experimented with a wide range of drugs and tried a Bohemian life style but still managed to keep A or B grades. Eventually, because of what he described as 'loneliness', Michael swallowed thirty-six barbiturate tablets in an impulsive suicide attempt. He vomited the tablets within a matter of minutes and then decided that he should return home. He gave up drugs without any hangover effects. After he had been at home for a week, he found he was too anxious and unsettled to leave the house. Even the thought of going back to college filled him with panic and a kind of vague sadness. He asked then to see a psychiatrist and psychotherapy sessions were set up on a three-times-a-week basis.

During his fifth psychotherapy session, Michael had his first Isakower-type experience. He started off this hour by talking rather generally about things at home. He had described this kind of general conversation as his way of 'just being together' with the psychotherapist. After about ten minutes, his talking trailed off. He sat slumped in his chair, looking ahead with a slight flush on his face, which took on a much younger appearance. During the next forty-five minutes, the young man sat still with only an occasional slight rocking back movement of his head. He seemed to be almost unaware of the few comments or questions made by the psychotherapist but twice he stated that he felt 'wonderful' in response to a question. Toward the end of this session, he said he was 'floating, swirling around and around'. At the

end of the hour, he seemed to awaken, as if from a trance, slowly, languidly, and he commented then that what he had just experienced was 'fulfilment'.

In the following psychotherapy sessions, Michael tried to describe in detail what he had experienced. Throughout most of that hour he had had the feeling of floating, floating free, floating on a cloud, floating with a slight turning, slow motion. His feeling had been that of absolute relaxation, total contentment and, in the word he used repeatedly, 'fulfilment'. Some time about the middle of this experience, he had begun to sense something 'out there', a large rather heavy, vaguely lumpy mass which came nearer and nearer to his face. He could make out a darker middle area in the mass and what appeared to be a circle or a partial circle of dots or 'little lumps' surrounding this dark center. Next he had the feeling of a firm, large rubbery object in his mouth and the sensation of drinking or swallowing. His face now seemed to be enveloped in what felt like a firm pillow. These sensations seemed to last for only a brief period and yet for a very long time—'for a lifetime'. Then, without realizing that the experience had really changed, Michael once more had the feeling of floating, swirling, and gently turning until he was 'awakened' by the psychotherapist at the end of the session.

One week later, Michael again experienced the Isakower sensation but this time it occurred at home as he was almost falling asleep. From that time he was able to re-experience the Isakower phenomenon at will and add to his experiencing. He now realized that the center mass had a brownish-reddish color. He could tell that he was drinking a slightly salty liquid. He could feel a rather stale, 'almost sweaty' smell. Only for fleeting moments, however, did Michael re-experience the sensation of floating or swirling. Somehow he was unable to recall any feelings voluntarily because, as he said, 'They were too far away. They just slipped out of my fingers. I could not hold on to them.'

As this young man remembered and re-experienced this floating, swirling, turning, he may have been recalling very

early sensations of being, of his being before he was a separate, discrete 'I'. It is possible that he was describing how it was to sense before he had an ego nucleus on which to focus, to anchor, and to integrate his perceptions. However, he could not experience both the awareness of ego separateness, of 'Not-I'—the Isakower complex of memories—and also the feeling of being before he had even a primitive integrated ego nucleus and an appreciation of separateness necessary for Isakower-type perceptions. The establishment of an integrated ego nucleus and the recognition of this established ego made it impossible for this patient to remember or re-experience sensations that were present before he had established this psychic core. Patients who recall these twirling, floating sensations from their normal remembering or from drug-induced remembrances frequently describe these memories as 'being' or 'just existing'.

III

During a diagnostic interview, a twenty-three-year-old man was relating what he had experienced during an LSD trip just one week previously. Without anxiety he told how, early in that experience, he had felt that he was sucking at a breast, probably at his mother's breast and then he added '. . . and I had something down there around my butt. It was itchy like sand. But it was not me, it was separate.'

This young man seemed to be recalling an awareness of a very primitive ego, not yet integrated, with an oral focus and also an ano-genito-urinary focus. Much of the Isakower complex of memories seems to represent an awareness of an oral ego focus. The subjects talk about themselves as if they remember their existence only as a mouth, as lips and a throat. The ego, physical awareness, and the body ego may have developed from such foci.

In response to repetitive, relatively consistent stimuli the infant may begin to have an awareness of focal areas of the body, of a physical boundary between 'me' and 'not me'. The

mouth is of course the prime area of repetitive stimuli but repeated perceptions of wetness and dryness may begin to give the young child the first body image of his ano-genito-urinary body, a self-representation that initially is separate from the oral ego nucleus which is developing at the same time. Repetitive skin surface stimulation, especially the perceptions that come from being held and touched, may well provide the perceptions that integrate the separate ego nuclei to form the first integrated ego state, separate from the external world. The psychotogenic effects that come with lack of mothering, handling, and nurturing may be due in large part to the persistence of separate ego nuclei which never have been integrated by necessary loving handling.

The ability to recall requires the specific ego capability of observing and registering. We do not understand to what degree the human being has a specific innate ability to remember, or whether remembering develops only in response to repeated usable stimuli. Clinically it does appear that some very disturbed children have never developed an integrated ego; their sense of self is always fragmented and stays fragmented. The rhythmic, repetitive behavior of many young psychotic children may be their effort to produce repetitive, stable body sensations in the hope of acquiring an integrated body state. Children who suffer from the syndrome of familial dysautonomia live in a world where their perceptions change constantly because of an innate constitutional defect. These children are much more liable to suffer from severe emotional difficulties, often of a psychotic nature.

Other children and adults who have developed integrated personalities may later decompensate during an emotional illness to that stage where their personalities again become fragmented—where they revert to the primitive ego state of separated ego nuclei. It could also be postulated that there may be some very disturbed patients who never develop fragmentary ego nuclei and who continue only at the level of merely sensing the experience of the moment without any

ability to remember or to integrate perceptions. These people would exist in a world where they experienced only 'whirling', 'turning', 'floating', as recalled by some of the patients mentioned in this article. This total personality fluidity may of course be incompatible with continued life.

In this investigation of early personality growth and development, it must be emphasized that the Isakower complex of memories is at present the most readily recognizable early memory trace. When subjects report this memory complex, it should be possible to learn from them other remembered sensations and perceptions from this developmental period. If, in this fashion, we can extend our knowledge and understanding of what is remembered about this beginning stage of ego growth, we may come to know much more about the foundations of human personality and the factors that predispose to health and to illness.

SUMMARY

The Isakower phenomenon, the memory of the experience of nursing at the breast, is readily recognized. This paper illustrates that this primitive memory trace is being reported more frequently and in a wider range of subjects. It should be possible to investigate other memories around the Isakower experience to discover additional remembered perceptions from the same developmental stage or from an even earlier period of ego development. In this fashion, investigators can gain information about the origin and the growth of the ego nuclei in early infancy.

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OBJECT LOSS AND EARLY SEXUAL DEVELOPMENT

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In an earlier paper describing observational research on toddlers, Roiphe (1968) suggested that children of both sexes between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four months regularly show a marked increase in the manipulation of their genitals, including frank masturbatory behavior, and curiosity about and reactions to the anatomical difference between the sexes. It was proposed that this sharp upsurge in genital interest results from the rather sudden increase in endogenous genital sensation experienced by children of this age. This sensation is probably caused by a change in bowel and bladder functions, unrelated to any efforts at toilet training, in the early months of the second year. Early sexual interest and activity in children normally serve to consolidate the representations of self and object and to establish a primary schematization of the genital outline of the body. This early sexual development seems to be without œdipal resonance.

It was found that some children who had already given evidence of this sexual arousal developed moderate to severe castration reactions after observing the anatomical difference between the sexes. These castration reactions appeared to de-

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velop only in children with two kinds of past history. One group had undergone experiences that interfered with a stable schematization of the body, such as severe illness, birth defect, or surgery. The other group had suffered experiences that interfered with a stable object schematization, such as loss of a parent, neglect by the mother, or the occurrence of depression in the mother. Some of the children suffered both kinds of experience.

Over the past four years this sexual development in the second year of life has been studied in our research nursery at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine in thirty-five normal children.[1] These children attend the nursery with their mothers four mornings a week throughout the second year of life. The nursery is set up as a large indoor playground where the children can easily see and go to their mothers. Each mother-child pair has its own observers, who follow the child's development throughout the year. The developmental records include data from the mother obtained from direct questioning by the observers, direct observations in the nursery by the staff, and home visits and videotapes.

Billy was a sturdy, smiling little boy of eleven months when he came to the nursery. He crawled everywhere, babbling as he went, investigating his surroundings and toys, showing relatively little anxiety over the strange setting and the many strange children and adults.

He was the first-born and only child of parents in their late twenties. The pregnancy was uneventful and the birth normal. His development during the first year seemed to be excellent except for a disturbance of sleep that continued throughout his second year of life. Except for occasional nights, he woke at least once and not infrequently three and four times each night. When Billy was only four weeks old and could hardly have been expected to sleep through the night, his mother had

[1] Our research methods are based on those developed by Mahler (1963, 1968) at the Masters Children's Center (*cf.* also, Pine and Furer, 1963).

been disturbed and even anxious over his night waking. Unfortunately, though we learned much about this family, the boy's persistent sleep disturbance was never understood. Undoubtedly what we needed was information about the fantasy life of the mother, which is often lacking in studies based on direct observation. Analysis of young mothers of infant children with early developing and persistent sleep disturbances has rather often revealed in the mother conflicts over separation. Billy's father's work required regular and frequent absences throughout Billy's infancy, and both parents expected the father to be inducted into the army sometime during Billy's first year. When Billy was nine months old, his father did enter the army and he remained away from the family until shortly before Billy's second birthday.

When Billy first attended the nursery, he had been without his father for two months and had not, to the best of our knowledge, shown any direct reaction to his father's absence. Shortly after his first birthday he began to walk and at thirteen months of age he began to evidence mild but quite definite signs of separation anxiety, which became increasingly prominent in the next few months. Although he had formerly been left briefly from time to time with a relative or neighbor without becoming anxious, he now began to show decided uneasiness and apprehension at such times. It was particularly notable that when so left by his mother he reacted with distinct anxiety to certain noises, such as a loud television set or the buzz of the doorbell.

At this point Billy's mother reported that she had decided to leave the bathroom door open whenever she used the toilet in order to familiarize him with its use. Before this she had regularly closed the door when she used the bathroom. Upon closer questioning it was apparent that Billy became anxious and could not tolerate this separation from his mother. (We were surprised to learn how commonly parents of young children with no regular domestic help leave the door open when they use the toilet.)

A particularly instructive description of Billy's reactions to separation when he was around fourteen months old was afforded us when one of his observers, a young woman with whom he was quite familiar, was asked by his mother to sit with him in their own apartment while she ran some errands. Immediately after she left, Billy made for a plant in a corner of the living room and had to be restrained. He then wandered into his mother's bedroom, dreamily looked out the window, and called for his mother. After being comforted by the observer, he darted for an open bookshelf and began to tear one of his father's books. He was restrained from doing this with some difficulty. (Both activities were consistently forbidden Billy by his mother; usually a verbal restraint sufficed but occasionally she slapped his hand when he was particularly persistent, as he was on this occasion.) After a short while he walked to his mother's night table, looking back at the observer who did not stop him. He put his hand toward the drawer, looking back at her, and then pulled it out a little, again looking at her. Becoming aware that this must be forbidden activity, she stopped him.

What did this behavior mean? Parents frequently must resort to sharp verbal prohibitions early in the child's second year, either to protect him or because they require an orderly house. Such admonitions can produce remarkably persistent inhibitory effects; children often evidence well organized memory and self-observation. One nineteen-month-old girl, angry because another child took a toy from her, was heard to voice her mother's admonition: 'Now it's Suzy's turn, soon it will be yours. Don't pull Suzy's hair, make nice' (Roiphe, in press). Meanwhile the child petted Suzy's head but with her rage mounting, the petting became rougher and rougher until her fist closed around a handful of hair. This tiny conscience demonstrates the self-observing function of the ego and it speaks to the ego in a restraining fashion. Its transitional nature is reflected by its concrete tie to the object; that

is, the words are the mother's very own words and its structure closely parallels the character of the object representations as its integrity is still very much influenced by the vicissitudes of drive tension.

More playful examples of such defiance of the mother's prohibitions in her presence were displayed by Billy, and most of the other children, on a number of occasions. For instance, Billy once reached for an electric wire and then coyly and expectantly looked at his mother. When the expected 'no' was spoken, he chuckled and then, in high spirits, approached the forbidden bookcase, again looking archly back at his mother,—and so on.

This commonplace, playful, defiant behavior reflects the toddler's maturing strivings for independence modified by his still intense infantile dependence on his mother. Such behavior seems to imply that the youngster has a will of his own and can act even in opposition to the mother's wishes. The child is maturing, for he is behaving in a way that looks forward to his becoming relatively autonomous. But he still expects and invites his mother's disapproving response, thus showing that he still needs closeness and mutuality with her.

Billy's defiant behavior when he was left by his mother in the care of our research observer, however, was more complex. His mother's absence caused him to feel a profound sense of inner depletion and a longing for reunion with her. In his defiant behavior, which both anticipated and required her response, we believe that Billy attempted to evoke the presence of his mother by magical-omnipotent means. He might have sought to evoke her presence in a number of other ways. But he was angry with her for leaving him and therefore chose to behave in a way that defied her prohibitions and elicited her disapproval. This behavior served to express the child's independent strivings at a time of enhanced longing for his mother. By it he denied his longing through the implicit assertion that he was independent of her and did not need her. This is an impressive display of the richly textured

and multidetermined character of even a fourteen-month-old child's response to an experience of separation.

On this same occasion after the incident with the night table drawer, Billy became very cranky. The observer picked him up but he was not really comforted by this. At his insistence he was placed in his crib where he quickly found a hidden pacifier and put it into his mouth. He was then taken out of the crib, but after a few moments the observer remembered that his mother did not like him to have the pacifier outside the crib and removed it from him. He became enraged and inconsolable until it was returned to him; then his mood changed and he lay down on the couch next to the observer. He began to play with the pacifier, taking it out of his mouth, chuckling, and putting it back again, chewing on it and then spitting it out with his tongue; he continued thus for about five minutes until his mother returned. The earlier behavior had shown Billy attempting to deal with the separation by calling forth his most advanced independent repertory of behavior. When this effort failed, there was a sharp regression as evidenced by his resort to the pacifier. Unable to call up the image of his mother in a magical-omnipotent fashion by behavior that implied reciprocal interaction with her, he turned to the pacifier to evoke a fantasy of his mother's presence in a more primitive and concrete way. In his removal of the pacifier and chuckling, it was he who abandoned the object rather than being abandoned; in his chewing and spitting out of the pacifier, his angry rejection of the object was clearly demonstrated.

During the next two months numerous incidents reflected Billy's conflict over separation. On several occasions at the end of a nursery session, he looked intensely apprehensive as he saw another mother and child leave the nursery, and ran crying to the open door. Under ordinary circumstances Billy could of course discriminate between his mother and the other adults in the nursery. However, as he became anxious over separation he sometimes reacted to some other woman's departure as if she were his own mother.

When Billy was a little older than fourteen months he developed, in the nursery and at home, a series of games which involved his ears, eyes, and mouth. At first he very frequently cupped his hands over his ears, then removed them, as if he were exploring the role of the ear in hearing. This activity, which produces a rush of sound like the 'roar of the ocean' one hears when holding a conch shell to the ear, has two startling effects. One is a marked withdrawal of attention from the outer world and a centering of it on one's own body. The other is a feeling of pressure and fullness in the ear with a distinct sense of the body-rind as a demarcation between the outside and the inside. It seems as if the rush of sound were coming from inside the ear rather than outside as we ordinarily hear sounds. After three weeks Billy stopped doing this, but began to put his finger deep into his mouth and after a brief while to withdraw it. This was followed by a third repetitive activity: a rapid up and down oscillation of his index finger very close to his eye, brushing against his eyelashes. The finger placed deep into the mouth elicits a gagging response and a feeling of nausea arising deep within the body; similarly, the rapid oscillation of the finger close to the eye produces a flickering effect and the sense that the visual locus is inside the body.

These effects produced on himself by Billy have several important characteristics in common. All dramatically shift attention from its usual locus outside the body to one inside and produce a particularly sharp sense of the body-rind as a distinct demarcation between inside and outside. All produce the illusion that sensation essentially evoked outside the self (though by the self, acting on the self) comes from within the self. A child in the midst of a struggle over separation (as were Billy and most children his age) is acutely aware of a deficiency, an emptiness within the self; he is aware of an inner longing which can be satisfied only by the mother, a figure located outside the self. Billy's experiments with his own body were probably an effort to master the sense of inner emptiness and depletion and the acute awareness that the

nourishing center of his being was located outside the self. This sense and this awareness are brought into sharp focus by the reactions to separation so common in children of this age. In this connection we recall Bishop Berkeley's famous paradox about perception and psychic reality (*cf.*, Fraser, 1871). The rose we gaze at is outside in the garden, but our perception of it involves processes within our bodies. This paradox is a real problem in the child's development of a body schema, and is resolved only through varied and circuitous routes, some of which have been demonstrated to us by Billy. We must emphasize how difficult it was for us to empathize quickly with such behavior as Billy displayed in his repetitive games. For some time we felt sure the behavior was significant, but we were baffled by it. It was not until we tried out his actions on ourselves that their significance became apparent.

During Billy's struggle with separation and self-definition, his mother left him, at age sixteen months, in their own apartment in the care of his paternal grandmother while she joined her husband on his leave for two weeks. During this period, he continued to attend the nursery and there was very little observable change in his behavior except that he seemed somewhat subdued and absolutely refused any milk. Before this he had taken many bottles of milk, particularly when he awoke at night. At the same time his grandmother reported that he ate solid foods well, perhaps even voraciously. When his mother returned, he showed immediate recognition of her and expressed genuine pleasure at seeing her again. Except for the first twenty-four hours when he resumed drinking his milk, he continued his refusal of it in spite of extraordinary efforts by his mother. She tried mixing the milk with chocolate syrup and with a variety of vegetable colorings until she hit upon a mixture of orange juice and milk which he accepted, curds and all. This continued for some three months before he once again drank plain milk. With his mother's return, he ate even less solid food than he

had before she left and this continued throughout the remaining time that we followed this child. The bottle of milk that Billy formerly took on falling asleep and during his night wakings, besides its nutritive function, seemed to be a transitional phenomenon,—a representative of the object that he used to soothe himself to sleep (*cf.*, Winnicott, 1953, 1965). Except for the first twenty-four hours after his joyous reunion with his mother, he refused milk for three months out of anger because he had been separated from his mother. It seems probable that this anger was split off and externalized and the partial image of the bad mother projected onto the bottle of milk, which was then rejected.

Within a very few days after his mother's return, Billy's separation reactions seemed to increase in intensity. He appeared chronically apprehensive and unhappy, and seemed little able to involve himself with things or people, children or adults. Earlier he had a pleasurable, babbling curiosity about everything in the nursery; now it was difficult for him to get involved in any sustained activity. The other children his age were by now developing more or less elaborate symbolic play (Galenson, 1971) and at times a surprisingly rich social involvement with adults and other children, while Billy's development seemed quite impoverished in these respects.

Billy now kept an anxious eye on his mother in the nursery. If he lost sight of her or she left for even a brief period, he broke into an anxious, miserable sobbing and was inconsolable until reunited with her. At the end of the nursery sessions, he often burst into tears and attempted to follow a mother and child who were leaving, although he had shown no particular involvement with that pair during the morning. During this period he developed a close relationship with the young woman who served as one of his observers. If she was already there when he came into the nursery in the morning, he insisted on being held in her arms for at least five minutes. He especially could not tolerate her departure from the nursery, even for brief periods. For some months,

when hurt he often went to her in preference to his mother. After about three months when these acute separation reactions had largely diminished, Billy distinctly avoided this preferred closeness to his observer.

About one week after his mother's return, Billy was in the bathroom along with all the other children, playing with the toilet flush and seat cover and with the water. A group of observers had gathered outside the door to watch. One by one all the other children wandered out leaving only Billy. He crowded into a corner between the toilet and the wall and bent over slightly, touching his abdomen and pelvic area with his hands and gazing fixedly at the floor for about a minute or two. He then covered his eyes with his hands and squatted. This tense, almost manneristic withdrawal was highly disturbing to the adults, and the observer nearest him held her arms out to him. He cringed but then allowed himself to be picked up by his own observer. In this instance Billy's acute and profound withdrawal seemed rather clearly to be a reaction to the large number of adults in close proximity observing him. However, during the next week or so he interrupted his activity from time to time and lay prone on the floor with a rather dreamy, abstracted expression. We could determine no consistent context for this behavior.

We believe that after his increasing separation reaction, which was much enhanced by the two-week-long actual separation, Billy developed profound ambivalence, dealt with by him in part by splitting the good and bad objects. His reaction to the adults in the incident in the bathroom probably resulted from projection of the bad object-image onto the observing adults. His strong attachment to his own female observer, often in preference to his own mother,—for example, when he hurt himself and went to her rather than to his mother,—suggests how much the relationship to the maternal object was marred by ambivalence.

Billy's reaction to separation was also shown by his response to noise. When he was thirteen months old, he became moderately apprehensive when the doorbell buzzed or the tele-

vision blared. This sensitivity to sound had not been noted earlier and first appeared only when his mother was away. After his mother's return from her trip, he was extraordinarily sensitive to sound whether or not his mother was present. Some sounds, even the doorbell in a neighbor's apartment, threw him into a paroxysm of apprehension, probably because such sounds were at least symbolically associated with coming and going. Most of the sounds that provoked an anxious reaction can only roughly be characterized as loud and sudden. We can state with confidence that Billy's reaction to sound was quite ordinary before and that his later profound sensitivity was a variant of separation anxiety. As might be expected, along with this anxious sensitivity to sound Billy seemed to develop an unusual interest in and discrimination of distant and barely audible sounds. He would stop in the midst of the general din of the nursery, repeat a sound to himself, and be satisfied only when he could identify its source. These sounds—the hum of a neon bulb, the roar of a jet airplane, the whir of a cement mixer—not only were not heard by the adults in the room until Billy drew attention to them, but even then they could often be identified only with difficulty and after utmost concentration.

This displacement of anxiety to the auditory sphere has clearly been a manifestation of anxiety in the presence of strangers in many of the children,—though not all,—in whom we have observed it. For example, an infant boy of eight months would break into almost inconsolable paroxysms of screaming which, with considerable difficulty, we found to be provoked by the high-pitched, barely audible sounds of a garbage truck or jet airplane. Just before the appearance of this sound sensitivity, the little boy had shown a very transient stranger reaction that disappeared and seemed to be replaced by the anxious reaction to sound. The appearance of sound sensitivity occurs, according to our experience, much less commonly in acute separation reaction than it does in stranger reaction.

It is difficult to explain this phenomenon. If we consider the external perceptual indications by means of which the infant builds his image of the mothering figure, it is clear that the tactile and kinesthetic are sensors in close proximity and consequently are most immediate. The olfactory clues are intermediate; they permit some distance and may even linger after the object disappears. The visual and auditory spheres clearly permit greater distance. Hearing cannot be much focused in one direction or another and does not delineate the object so clearly. And the auditory sphere stands alone: it offers the slightest and most ephemeral sensory indication of the object, for the object may be heard in another room giving no other sensory indication; this is not regularly true in any other perceptual sphere. Perhaps this is why anxiety is shown by auditory behavior in these two early normal crises,—separation reaction and stranger reaction,—as the infant tries to establish an internal representation of the object. Winnicott (1953) described the infant's babbling when alone —his hearing himself produce sound—as a transitional phenomenon. Moreover, in adult analysis memories of sounds in another room at night often evoke only a rather isolated though vivid association of an anxious feeling of loneliness and being left out. This is usually, and we believe correctly, interpreted as an early residue from the reaction to the primal scene. We suggest that the anxious involvement of the auditory sphere in the separation reaction may serve as an additional important determinant in such auditory memory residues from early childhood.

Finally, it seems probable that these considerations may illuminate hallucinatory phenomena in adult schizophrenic patients. At times the psychotic ego is flooded with unneutralized aggression and there occur concomitant regression and deterioration in object representation. Many ego functions, such as sharp delineation of inside-outside, deteriorate and introjective-projective mechanisms become prominent. We propose that the ensuing object loss anxiety and fears of dissolution of the self may

evoke the primitive mechanism we have described in these children: the anxiety becomes manifested in the auditory sphere, in hallucinations of sound. In the separation reactions and stranger reactions of normal children we may speculate that the implicit strain in the relation with the object evokes a disruptive quantum of aggression which is dealt with by this primitive forerunner of defense—the somatization of aggression in the auditory sphere.

A contributing factor in Billy's relatively marked separation reaction may be that his mother, whose husband was away for an entire year, suffered greatly from loneliness and consequently became too close to her little boy; she may have resisted his maturing tendency to grow away from her. Mahler and Gosliner (1955) and later Greenacre (1966) pointed out the importance of the father in the whole process of separation-individuation. The major developmental thrust at this period is separation from the infantile symbiotic relationship to the mother, in the process of which the child leans increasingly heavily on his father. With the absence of support from his father in this process, Billy was much more threatened by his maturing independent strivings.

At fourteen months when his separation reactions had been clearly established for several weeks, Billy showed increasing interest in his genitals. Until this time both our own observations and his mother's reports showed that Billy handled his genitals only casually and infrequently during changes of diaper and in his bath. But from fourteen months through the remainder of the time we followed him, we have consistent reports that at virtually all changes of diaper and during baths he handled his penis, squeezing and pulling it, in a concentrated and persistent fashion. Erections were observed only irregularly. (We have found that erections occur regularly in little boys at this age,—as contrasted with the first year of life,—only when some degree of bladder control is attained.) Billy did not handle his scrotum and testicles

until he was seventeen months old, at which time there were a number of reports of scrotal manipulation with testicular retraction (*cf.*, Bell, 1961).

At about this time Billy began to show a remarkable fascination with the toilet, as did most of our children. In the nursery, as at home, he would spend long periods flushing the toilet, putting paper in and watching it disappear with evident glee. He did not seem to show this interest in the flushing of his own stool; it was not until he was eighteen months of age that he displayed manifest anxiety with the flushing of his stool. His mother showed no interest in training Billy when he first displayed interest in the toilet at fourteen months. In fact, she made only the most desultory and inconsistent efforts to train him when he reached eighteen months. When he failed to learn, she dropped it altogether. She permitted him to come into the bathroom to watch her use the toilet, offering the rationalization that she wanted to familiarize him with its use: this seemed more a response to his intolerance of separation than the beginning of any consistent training effort.

When Billy was between fifteen and sixteen months old, his mother several times reported that he would, with a concentrated expression, clutch his penis for a minute or two, his whole face would flush, and he would strain as if with a bowel movement. This interesting behavior, which was observed over a two to three week period only, tends to suggest how indistinctly differentiated the genital sensation is from the anal, at least early in development. During this same period on numerous occasions Billy was observed to clutch his penis when frustrated in an activity or angry with his mother. These observations led us to infer that his burgeoning separation reaction evoked a much greater than ordinary degree of hostile aggression, which may have led to a precocious sado-masochistic phase.

At fifteen months Billy developed an interesting ritual on going to sleep which persisted throughout the ensuing months. Holding his bottle pressed against his penis, he would lie

down and fall asleep this way. The ritualized holding of the bottle suggested a transitional phenomenon, the bottle standing for the object. The appearance of a transitional phenomenon at this time in Billy's life does not come as a surprise since he was clearly struggling with a moderately severe separation reaction with the underlying threat of object loss (*cf.*, Mahler, 1968). However, his clutching his penis suggests a concomitant castration reaction. On numerous occasions he had seen his mother exposed. Moreover, he had many times been observed to clutch his penis when frustrated or angry with his mother. In an earlier paper Roiphe (1968) commented on the relation between fear of object loss and castration anxiety:

> The major thrust of development up to this point has been the differentiation of the self from the object and the internalization and solidification of the object representation . . . . there is the developmental precipitate of the early genital phase, which opens the channel of genital arousal. At this juncture, the specific anxieties of the contiguous phases, object loss and castration, are indissoluble. The later castration anxiety of the phallic phase is genetically linked to that of the early genital phase, and by virtue of this, has a direct developmental connection to the anxiety of object loss. . . . Nevertheless, the castration anxiety in the phallic phase no longer has the direct and immediate resonance of object loss . . . since in the intervening period the object representation has become further solidified so that the constancy of the representation is to a large extent insured (p. 357).

From the age of sixteen and a half months when Billy was at the height of his separation reaction, he also began to masturbate frankly and openly. Several times he lay on a ball or some other toy, hands tucked underneath in the genital area, and rocked back and forth in a concentrated and withdrawn manner. This preferred masturbatory posture was similar to his ritual on going to sleep. That ritual served to comfort the child in the face of the anxieties over object loss

and dissolution of self with which he was struggling. (His fears of dissolution already included anxiety over castration since he was experiencing genital arousal with concomitant increased narcissistic investment of the penis.) Perhaps, then, the underlying masturbatory fantasy during this early period of genital interest and activity is entirely preœdipal and is concerned with the consolidation of object representation and self-representation (Roiphe, in press). As to self-representation, we believe that during this early phase of genital arousal, a primary genital schematization takes place. We should make clear that when we speak of masturbatory fantasy at this stage in development, we mean a feeling state, a 'feeling fantasy', so to speak, rather than a coherent thought or visual fantasy. (It is probable that the several occasions on which Billy was observed in the nursery to interrupt his activity and lie prone on the floor with a dreamy and withdrawn expression represented a masturbatory variant.)

On a number of occasions Billy straddled his mother's leg and rubbed himself back and forth. She seemed largely oblivious to the meaning of this activity, explaining that he liked to play rocking horse on her leg. However, she was alarmed when on one occasion, while she was changing a diaper and applying lotion to the whole perineal area, Billy took hold of her hand and placed it directly on his penis. On another occasion, while his mother was playing with him and tickling him under his arms and chin, he again took her hand and placed it on his penis, beginning to rock back and forth in a state of excitement. This latter incident suggests that the general erotization of his body surface was already becoming centered in penile sensitivity, something we should have expected only in a much older child.

In Billy we observed the development of an unusually clear pattern of erotic masturbation. This intensification of the early infantile masturbation seems to have been related to the exploding separation reaction which followed on his mother's two-week absence. We have already pointed out

that the severe separation reaction in this child evoked a much greater than ordinary degree of hostile aggression; this in turn may already have led to a precocious sado-masochistic phase and thus to an intensification of the pattern of sexual arousal usually characteristic of this age. It may be argued that Billy's mother, who was without her husband for the entire year, suffered sexual deprivation and in some way stimulated her son's open masturbatory activity, thus acting out her own sexual impulses. This is an acceptable variant of the more general hypothesis we suggest.

Some time ago Billy's family moved to another part of the country. Reports we have received suggest that at age three and one half Billy shows marked evidence of a persistent and pervasive separation conflict. He not only continues to be profoundly intolerant of being left by his parents but also reacts with anxiety even when friends of his parents who are relatively strange to him leave the house or are seen off at the airport.

SUMMARY

Our experience leads us to believe that there is an endogenously rooted phallic sexual current which, by the middle of the second year, becomes increasingly influential in a child's development. We believe that the developing object relationship and body schematization give shape to this emerging sexual current and the primary genital schematization that takes place at this time in the child's life. We have in this paper offered some evidence to suggest that the underlying 'feeling fantasy' of this sexual arousal involves the consolidation of the object representation and the self-representation. Early experiences that tend to challenge the child unduly with the threat of object loss and body dissolution result in a faulty and fluctuating genital outline of the body at a time when the genital schematization normally undergoes a primary consolidation.

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PLATO AND FREUD

THE MIND IN CONFLICT AND THE MIND IN DIALOGUE

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In The Ego and the Id, Freud (1923) writes: 'The ego represents what may be called reason and common sense, in contrast to the id, which contains the passions. All this falls into line with popular distinctions which we are all familiar with . . .' (p. 25).

The 'popular distinctions' to which Freud refers are, I believe, those which first entered and became articulated in Western thought with Plato's philosophy. My task here is to outline and expand this notion of the mind as divided into one portion that represents reason and another that represents the instincts, and to demonstrate the implications and some consequences of viewing the mind in this way. I propose that this particular division is the fundamental one in Plato, and a very important one in Freud, though for Freud it is only a first step in his theory.

The comparison between Plato and Freud has a long history. Freud, apart from a few scattered remarks about Plato in his earlier writings (particularly, The Interpretation of Dreams), did not make the comparison until 1920 in the introduction to the fourth edition of Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1905).

> And as for the 'stretching' of the concept of sexuality which has been necessitated by the analysis of children and what are

This is a version of a paper presented to the Boston Group for Applied Psychoanalysis, February 14, 1972. I am particularly indebted to Professor T. Irwin, Department of Philosophy, Harvard University, for his critique of the work. Dr. William Grossman (Albert Einstein College of Medicine) read and discussed versions of this work over several years and contributed substantially to the evolution of the ideas therein.

> called perverts, anyone who looks down with contempt upon psycho-analysis from a superior vantage-point should remember how closely the enlarged sexuality of psycho-analysis coincides with the Eros of the divine Plato (Cf. Nachmansohn, 1915) (p. 134).

Indeed, the majority of the references to Plato in Freud pertain to some aspect of the similarity between Eros and libido. The essay cited by Freud, the first extended discussion of the comparison, takes proper note of the methodological difficulties involved in attempting such a task. Nachmansohn first attacks Jung's overly extended definition of libido, and then argues that Plato's notion of Eros is remarkably close to Freud's version of libido. He emphasizes that some notion of *sublimation* is implicit in Plato's characterization of the properties of Eros.

Pfister (1922) makes some extensive claims for the similarity between Plato and Freud, calling Plato a forerunner of Freud. In his paper, perhaps also written with one eye on Jung, Pfister tries to enhance the plausibility of Freud's theories by arguing that a great thinker of the past had notions similar to Freud's. He compares Plato and Freud on Eros and libido, on the idea of the unconscious, and in respect to views about harmony and health. On the whole uncritical, the discussion makes a few interesting observations.

A book by Georgiades in 1934, deliberately titled *De Freud à Platon,* emphasizes a particularly important methodological issue in such comparisons. Georgiades points out that Plato may be a forerunner of Freud, but in addition to being construed as a protopsychoanalyst, Plato has been taken as a Christian, a mystic, a liberal humanist, a fascist (or communist) political theoretician, and a protoeugenicist. In fact, he writes that because of our interest in Freud, and because of issues raised by Freud's work, we turn back and take a fresh look at Plato, and then see similarities. Georgiades then moves on to a detailed discussion of the divisions of the psyche in relation to Freud's concepts of ego, id, and superego; he compares the horse and rider image in The Ego and the Id to the Phae-

drus, where the soul is depicted as a charioteer with two horses. He makes numerous other points of contrast and similarity, including the arguments that there is some notion of the unconscious in Plato's work, and some idea of repression.

More recently, there have been valuable contributions by Lain-Entralgo (1970), Amado Lévy-Valensi (1956), and Leibbrand and Wettley (1961), calling our attention to the issues in Plato of the difference between dialogue and dialectic, and its implications for comparisons with psychoanalytic dialogue.

The works reviewed suffer, more or less, from a failure to ascertain whether sufficient congruence between the over-all configurations of the theories of these two men exists to warrant a meaningful 'compare and contrast' approach. If we consider that there is a central underlying notion or structure common to both thinkers, then the comparison is justified. That underlying notion is that man is a creature in conflict, that within himself he is split, and that he is split into a higher, rational part, and a lower, desiring part. To the extent that this assumption is valid, and to the extent that the two bodies of theory are congruent in regarding the study of man in conflict as a central task, then it is useful and meaningful to speak of similarities and differences.

How much of Plato Freud knew, and how he utilized that knowledge in his own thinking, has no immediacy in this argument. Plato can hardly be considered as an important proximal source of Freud's thinking, and Freud was probably not particularly steeped in Plato. It can be taken for granted that the impact of Plato on all subsequent Western philosophy and psychology is profound, but I do not wish to focus on the issues of historical continuity and transmission of ideas. What is in focus is the task of outlining certain similar structures or forms in the theories of the two men and 'bracketing', so to speak, the historical issues.

The final justification for such an inquiry must come from the results. For me, at least, this investigation has been a way of sharpening the issue about what is original or radical in Freud. The schema of conflict, the 'model', that is spelled out

in Plato is present in Freud as one building block or module. Outlining its contours allows one to see more clearly the other components of the edifice. Even more important is that this type of examination highlights certain problems that are entailed in the notion of the mind as divided. These problems were not satisfactorily solved within Plato's thinking and, similarly, an examination of Freud's changing thought over the years suggests that he too struggled with a variety of possible solutions. To anticipate the later discussion, a few of these issues are: the place of affect; the problems subsumed under the term 'sublimation'; the question of whether or not a conflict psychology can speak in process terms that are not ultimately anthropomorphic; and the issue of what kind of therapy (dialogue) is needed to change an individual.

THE PLATONIC MODEL OF THE MIND AND THE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE MIND[1]

By way of background, it is necessary to sketch some details of the intellectual and cultural heritage that was available to Plato. The way in which he worked within these traditions while simultaneously attempting some radical transformation and reformulation of them, a fascinating and important chapter in the history of Western thought, can here be only briefly summarized. Socrates, Plato's master, and the principal speaker in all the Platonic dialogues, was born about 470 B.C. Plato was born in 427 B.C. and was twenty-eight at the time of the trial and execution of Socrates. About a century or so before the birth of Socrates, a heterogeneous group of thinkers who were later called the 'pre-Socratics' or the 'pre-Socratic philosophers' became active. This group included Anaximander and Anaximanes, Thales, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and others.[2] The main features of their activity were:

[1] For a more detailed discussion of the material on Plato, see Simon (in press) which also contains a more extensive bibliography.

[2] Anaxagoras and Parmenides were older contemporaries of Socrates, and are not pre-Socratic in a chronologic sense.

1. They began to develop the basic abstract and definitional vocabulary of all subsequent philosophical, psychological, physical thought.

2. They characterized 'mind' or 'mental' (in fact, first began to define the terms) as that which organizes, plans, and *abstracts* the general from the particular.

3. They distinguished two modes of thinking and of discourse, in terms of dichotomies such as 'physiological' versus 'mythological', 'awake' versus 'asleep', and 'true being' versus 'being born and perishing'.

4. They asserted the superiority of the first kind of thinking (which might for the moment be called 'rational abstracting').

5. They asserted the superiority of those who think abstractly, (later to be called 'philosophers').[3]

Along with the work of these thinkers, Plato was very much in touch with the intense concerns about moral and political problems that permeated all of the cultural creations of fifth century Athens. Issues of moral judgment and moral responsibility, individual and collective impulsivity versus restraint, and of man's potential for self-deception and self-destruction were very much in the air. Greek tragedy, debates about law and justice, and the teachings of the Sophists repeatedly and often poignantly raised these issues. The political behavior of Greece as a whole, including chronic fratricidal warfare, the sequence of civic upheavals in Athens in 411 and 404, and the subsequent execution of Socrates in 399, not only form the background of Plato's work, but seem to provide much of the observational data for his theories of human nature and human motivation.

Plato, then, worked with these two streams in Greek thought —the effort of the pre-Socratics to crystallize and define abstract, rational discourse and thinking, and the pressing ethical and moral issues of his day. In a most schematic way, we can look at Plato as the one who defined the abstract and the rational as equivalent to the moral good. He equated self-

[3] This exposition is derived largely from the work of Eric Havelock (1963) in *Preface to Plato* and other of his works.

knowledge with self-restraint, argued for an abstract conception of both knowledge and virtue, and then proclaimed that knowledge *is* virtue. In addition, he equated all these terms (knowledge, virtue, etc.) with sanity, and proclaimed that ignorance and the irrational were moral evils, and hence madness.

The discussion that follows presents a highly condensed version of Plato's thought. In reality, his thought underwent considerable changes over the years, and each student of Plato must form his own judgment as to what is central and essential in Plato.

The term that I am translating as 'mind' is psyche. No one English word does it justice, largely because it did not have one unambiguous meaning in Plato. It is fair to say that much of Plato's philosophical activity was involved in the task of defining and characterizing the psyche (despite the impression one might get on a first reading of the dialogues that he clearly knows what psyche is and takes it as a given for purposes of further argument). The range of meanings denoted and connoted by psyche is: 'soul', the immortal part of the man, some sort of spiritual essence of man; something essentially intellectual and knowing ('mind'); and the person himself. (Freud's term, 'mental apparatus', is also a connotation of psyche.) Be this as it may, for Plato, the important features of psyche appear to be:

1. It is a structure—though not material, it is a 'something' that is stable, and is composed of parts functioning in relation to each other.

2. Psyche is described with a vocabulary of activity, rather than passivity (e.g., susceptibility to influences from the outside and moved by outside influences—the characteristics of mental life in Homer).[4] One of the terms that suggests this activity is 'autokinesis'—psyche is self-moving.

3. Psyche has executive functions, takes command, organizes,

[4] *Cf.*, Simon and Weiner (1966).

and assimilates. Thus (Theatetus, 184 D), psyche exercises control over incoming sensations, digests them, determines their fate inside the mind. Otherwise, the mind would soon be filled up with sensations, as if it were a Trojan horse full of warriors. In one description (Republic, 353 D), the rational portion of psyche is in charge of 'management, rule, deliberation, and other such tasks'. (It can be seen that this usage is very much one sense of 'ego' in the structural theory.)

4. That which mind apprehends is nonphysical (or, at the least, that which the unique and immortal part of psyche apprehends is nonphysical). A notion of mental representation, or varying degrees of representation, is implicit here. The mind deals with a range of representations of the outer world from almost literal and pictorial to verbal, ideational and propositional (Philebus, 38 C; Sophist, 261, ff; Theatetus, 190).

5. Also implied throughout Plato, or, more accurately, what Plato's dialogues allow us ultimately to say, is that psyche *knows* in a distinctive way—it dissects, abstracts, and defines (i.e., mind performs the operations of *dialectic*).

6. The psyche is divided. Although the particulars of the division of mind may vary from dialogue to dialogue (Plato is aware that his schemata of division are tentative), there is one consistent theme: a split between a higher and a lower part. In brief, the higher part is more 'mental' and the lower part is more 'somatic'. In the Phaedo where Plato treats the psyche as a whole, it is viewed as divided from (and in conflict with) the body as a whole. It should be emphasized that the divisions imply, on the whole, conflict, but that the need for *coöperation* between the parts frequently emerges as an issue.

In the scheme in The Republic, probably the most famous, the division is basically between a rational (*logistikon*) and an appetitive (*epithumetikon*), 'the desiring part'. The third element is an affective, or 'spirited' portion, and each of the other two parts tries to enlist this 'energic' part as its ally. Plato constructs an image, or physical model, to convey his sense of what these parts are: 1, 'A manifold and many-headed beast' that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts that can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all

such growth (corresponding to the appetitive); 2, a lion (the 'spirited' or 'affective' portion); 3, a man, though much smaller than the lion (the rational) (Republic, 588).

These three portions have different functions, and, in fact, different relationships to the real world. In general, throughout Plato, there is the assumption that the baser portions of the psyche are suited to apprehend the baser portions of the world and have different aims: e.g., the appetitive part apprehends sensory perceptions, concrete, particular, mortal objects, and its aims are sensory and sensual gratification. The rational portion is equipped for and is capable of knowing the most general and the most abstract, the timeless, the nonbodily, as epitomized in phrases such as the 'forms' (Ideas) (*cf.*, Timaeus, *passim*; The Republic, *passim*; Phaedrus, 247 C). 'Becoming' versus 'being' is another expression of this contrast.

The contrasting attributes of higher and lower forms of mental activity that can be extracted from the dialogues can be summarized:

Baser Parts of Mind	Versus	*Higher Parts of Mind*
Appetitive		Rational
Somatic		Psychic
Being born and perishing		True being
Opinion *(doxa)*		True knowledge *(epistēmē)*
Pictorial, illusory		Ideational
Shadow		Sun
Asleep, dreaming		Awake
Childish		Adult
Imperative		Delays
Imitation *(mimesis)*		Abstract understanding
Flux		Stability
Conflict		Harmony
Heterosexual		Homosexual–Asexual

Here, it seems to me, we have the fundamental model of the mind in conflict. The model, which entered the mainstream of Western thought with Plato, is the basis for the

divisions within the mind that Freud uses in a clinical context. One part of the mind *thinks,* and thinking includes assessing reality; the other part *desires* and lusts. The part that thinks is stable, adult, civilized; it is human and is organized according to rational assessment of possibilities, means, and ends. The other part 'thinks' in a completely different sense, in the language of desire and need, in pictures, and with feelings more than with words and propositions, and is shifting, changeable, and tumultuous.

We have here also the fundamental distinction that Freud describes with the terms secondary and primary process thinking, and modes of *discharge.* In fact, the notion of 'bound' versus 'mobile' cathexes may be an articulation of an image found in Plato (*cf.,* Meno): 'Impressions' (opinion, sensory impressions, nonabstract kinds of thoughts) run all over the place, like little mechanical windup men. The higher portion of the mind, through the operation of 'recollection' (a schematizing and classifying activity) ties up, or *binds,* these freely roaming mental contents, and can convert them into *epistēmē* (abstract, organized knowledge). Thus, the higher portion of mind tames, civilizes, and trains the unruly, uncivilized parts of the mind. It is not enough to divide the mind and stop there; the parts still live within the same house, and must reach some *modus vivendi.* Plato's ideal may be domination of the lower by the higher, but this still involves a certain measure of coöperation.

In general, the contrast and conflict in Plato is between some variant of reason and some variant of appetite. Each has its own aims, interests, and characteristic way of thinking. But Plato, especially in The Republic, is at pains to point out that the issue is not reason versus emotion, even though emotion somehow seems to have the stamp of appetite rather than reason. The conceptual problem that Plato has to contend with is inherent in dividing the mind—the need for some energic term, something that drives the whole thing, that makes it work. For Plato, the language and images are

more nakedly anthropomorphic: what would make the higher part, the reasonable man within the manifold beast that is man, what would make him *want* or desire to function in a reasonable way? Or, in the more covertly anthropomorphic language of machines, what drives the mental apparatus?

The Republic is the dialogue that emphasizes the need to posit an affective, spirited, or energic part of the mind (the lion in Plato's analogy). Also, it is this dialogue that is so much involved with issues of how to get men to want to seek the truth, to want to use the higher portion of the mind—in short, the problem of education. This is the dialogue that gives the first outline of a curriculum in the Western world. It is a curriculum that has a clear progression from bodily learning to the most abstract kinds of mental learning.

In other dialogues, most notably the Symposium, built around the theme of Eros, or love, and the Phaedrus, built around the theme of how to *persuade* men, we see that *Eros* fills a theoretical position comparable to that filled by the *thumoeides,* the spirited-affective portion. In the Symposium particularly, Eros is the energic force for all human activity from the base to the sublime. Eros drives us to love and lust, it drives us to want to procreate both children and other forms of posterity (institutions, governments, works of art, and poetry), and to create. It also drives us to want to know, to learn, and to approach the forms of the true, the good, and the beautiful. What is the origin and nature of this love? Is it originally from and of the bodily, or is it from the higher spheres and has become corrupted? In Socrates's part of the discourse on Eros, he invokes a number of mythlike and allegorical statements about Eros, which all point to the *intermediate* and *mediating* nature of Eros. It is neither human nor divine; it is the child of Plenty and Poverty. These statements signify that Plato does not wish to assign this energic force as clearly originating either in the mental or the somatic, in the higher or the lower, but rather wishes to leave it as an energic term, sharing in the operations of either

and both. But, and the dialogues do not provide an entirely satisfactory answer, exactly how is the love of abstract wisdom (*philo-sophia* = philosophy) related to appetitive loves and lusts? It is now apparent why Freud so readily picks up the suggestion (*cf.*, Nachmansohn, 1915) of the similarity between Eros and libido. For Freud, libido is first and foremost bodily, but one of its vicissitudes is sublimation, including sublimation into seeking and curiosity. Thus, Freud discusses the relationship between scopophilic instincts and 'the instinct for knowledge', and the child's need to know about the mysteries of copulation and birth.

We can now begin to see how much is in fact entailed in the model of the mind as split into a higher and a lower part. For both Plato and Freud, it is not so much that this split is specified as the starting point of theory construction; rather it is that the split is a configuration that underlies their formulations. From time to time, it surfaces in relatively explicit form, as in Freud's statement in The Ego and the Id, quoted at the beginning of this essay. If we delineate the several attempts that Freud made to construct a theory compatible with and useful for clinical purposes, we find groupings of motives and functions along the lines of the split. Sometimes the language is more openly of motives and aims, sometimes more in terms of mode of functioning. Thus, in the distinction of conscious versus unconscious (as in The Interpretation of Dreams) rationality, reality testing, delaying, thinking, verbalizing, and being awake are aligned with the conscious. Desiring, impulsivity, immediate gratification, the pictorial, and being asleep are aligned with the unconscious. The distinction between secondary and primary process, referring both to thinking and modes of discharge, embodies similar distinctions, though focusing more on mode of function than on aim and motive.

In Freud's (1950 [1895]) Project for a Scientific Psychology, we find the ego characterized as an organization of the mind

that binds, delays, filters, and transmutes the impulses that are associated with relatively unstable neuronal systems. This ego, among other tasks, makes memory possible by converting perceptions into fixed memories. This view of ego in the Project, and the discussion of the development of thought by way of the hallucinated absent object in The Interpretation of Dreams, addresses the issue of how bodily impulse and desire become transmuted into thought, judgment, and other higher mental activities. Later, in 1910, Freud articulated the distinction between ego instincts and sexual instincts. The term instinct itself already carries with it a connotation of a mixture of mind and body. The distinction between ego instincts, more survival oriented and adapted to reality testing, and sexual instincts, aimed at pleasure and gratification, is another form of allocating to different parts of the person different classes of motives. The later distinction between ego and id makes a more formal structural distinction between these two classes of functioning.

Similarly, the issues to which the terms 'sublimation', 'neutralization', 'regression in the service of the ego' are addressed should be seen in the context of this underlying split. Questions such as whether or not ego originates from id (versus ego and id having separate origins from an undifferentiated matrix), and whether or not there are separate energies for the ego, also arise organically out of the need to understand the modes of interaction of the divided parts of the mind. The psychoanalytic terms are useful because they have made explicit issues which are not fully articulated in the Platonic discussions of how the different parts interrelate. Though these terms hardly constitute adequate answers to the problems, they do define the questions; they serve as a framework and as a set of directives for examining in detail some important aspects of both normal and pathological functioning. This split is not the only, or the major, determinant of Freud's theories, but rather acts as a kind of constraint, pos-

sibly a limiting condition to the types of formulations that can be made.[5]

The language and major metaphors that attend the mind are highly anthropomorphic.[6] The process terms are those of the interaction of human agents; the various parts will and wish, contend, coöperate, scheme and feud, and attempt to outdo the other. Plato was attuned to this problem, though he did not wish to be taken too literally; 'master of oneself' does not really mean there are two people within the person. Yet, he provided no alternate way of speaking. Recurrently in the history of psychological theories, including psychoanalysis, we find attempts to purge theories of anthropomorphic language. But, as has been argued elsewhere (*cf.*, Grossman and Simon, 1969), when analyzing the person for purposes of discussing moral issues, conflicts of wishes, and social controls, anthropomorphic language creeps back in. (Like the proverbial devil, you can expel him with a pitchfork but he keeps coming back.)

It was suggested to me by Professor Irwin that one should consider Plato's divisions of the soul as basically divisions into different classes of motivations; i.e., the divisions do not so much analyze the functioning and functions of mind but rather outline the spectrum of motivations that drive human behavior. This way of looking at Plato (and at Freud) is basically correct, provided one takes into account that the different kinds of motivations may carry with them a characteristic mode of functioning. The result is that the division of the mind using the anthropomorphic language of conflicting aims and motives is also a division of the mind into persons who have different styles of operating.

Anthropomorphic language is ineluctable because the Platonic model relies heavily on introspective data, and intro-

[5] *Cf.*, Grossman (1967), and Grossman and Simon (1969) for a discussion of 'bridge concepts' in analytic theory.

[6] In *The Republic*, of course, where the divisions of the mind are compared to the divisions of the state, the term 'sociomorphic' is also appropriate.

spective data about behavior, conflicts, decisions, and quandaries is in the form of an inner dialogue. (Plato's definition of thinking is of a conversation within.) In turn, the data of introspection are much like a dialogue, both because the method of investigation of the mind relies on dialogue between two or more people and because in normal *development* the establishment, awareness, and definition of an inner life is heavily dependent upon dialogue with others (*cf.*, Grossman, 1967). To summarize, the Platonic model is of a division between a rational and an irrational, or appetitive, part of the mind. The model is found in Freud in both his early and later formulations of conflict; namely, conscious versus unconscious, secondary versus primary process, ego instincts versus sexual instincts, and ego versus id.

With regard to the third term in Freud's tripartite model, the superego, Freud, for clinical reasons, gradually came to constitute the superego as a separate agency. In his earlier writings, e.g., The Interpretation of Dreams, on the whole moral functions are grouped with the rational, structured part of the mind—that part which thinks and represents to the person the claims of reality. Reality is described as a combination of physical and social reality, including the general moral and ethical standards of the culture. The 'censor' of dreams is at first not set up as a separate agency. For Plato, this equation of moral good with true reality is not so casual as it is for Freud. It is a foundation stone of Plato's thinking: there is an absolute truth, the forms of the true, the good, and the beautiful; moral good and the truth are inseparable.

DISTURBANCES OF MIND: WHAT IS SICKNESS? WHAT IS MADNESS?

Although the Platonic and the freudian views of sickness and madness are not identical, I wish to emphasize some important similarities of Plato's notions to *some* of Freud's formulations on sickness.

First, madness and frenzy were far from alien to the consciousness of fifth century Athenian life; Greek tragedy is full of scenes of the hero in conflict and the hero who finally goes mad. Euripides is probably most prominent in this respect, but Aeschylus (Io in Prometheus Bound) and Sophocles (Ajax) are certainly involved in the dramatic portrayal of madness. Law and medicine, from a different perspective, had to deal with extreme forms of madness, and in the fifth century the doctors, for example, began to talk of madness in more naturalistic and morally neutral terms. These trends are part of the background of Plato's discussions of 'madness' and 'sickness of the psyche'. The latter term, though not coined by Plato, was certainly used by him far more than by any other classical writer. Both terms, however, are frequent in Plato in a variety of contexts, madness and its variants being used quite matter-of-factly. But Plato effected a transformation of the notions of sicknesses of the soul and of treatment of those sicknesses that went far beyond anything in the culture of his day. In brief, what is unique to Plato is that sanity becomes equated with the highest abstracting and rational activities, while madness becomes identified with the bodily, the appetitive, and their associated forms of thinking (*cf.*, p. 98). 'Seeming', shadow, lust, and being out of control are all madnesses. Plato uses the term 'opinion' or 'seeming' (*doxa*), for the thinking of the lower portions of the psyche. This also corresponds to ordinary, everyday thinking; there is correct *doxa* (well established empirical knowledge and common sense) or bad *doxa,* but *doxa* is always inferior to *epistēmē*. *Doxa* also seems to denote the equivalent of 'hallucination' or illusion in other Greek authors.

Plato, like other Greeks of his time, equated health (and sanity) with harmony, and disease and madness with lack of harmony between the parts. This principle is inherent in Freud's thinking about the balance between impulse and restraint, wish and prohibition: too far one way, we have unrestrained barbarism; too far the other way, we have neurosis.

Plato, I believe, took a rather 'un-Hellenic' view of where the balance should lie, in the direction of abstract reason being the ruler and of passions being dominated and tamed.

Certainly Freud had a more positive view of the value of instincts, and was more clearly impressed with the dangers of excessive instinctual suppression. Nonetheless, the struggle between instinct and reason, and this struggle in association with the notion of sickness and malaise, reverberates throughout Freud's writings. 'Where Id was, there shall ego be' is one version of the goals of therapy. Analogously, in discussing the malaise of civilization and its discontents (in The Future of an Illusion and in the first chapters of Civilization and Its Discontents), one sees the same model: culture demands that men renounce instinctual gratifications, and men are resentful and ever ready to throw off the yoke of civilization. Culture must offer something to coat the bitter pill.[7]

But there is another aspect of Plato's definition of madness and sickness of the psyche that is related to something very fundamental and central in Freud, namely, the importance of 'ignorance'. 'Ignorance' in Plato is not accidental, or something easily corrected by supplying knowledge, but is profound and maintained by the vested interests of the person. (A common Platonic term is *aphrosune,* 'folly', a mixture of ignorance and madness.) For example, in an earlier dialogue (Hippias Minor), Socrates asks his colleagues to 'heal my psyche, for you will do me much greater good by putting an end to the ignorance of my psyche, than if you put an end to an affliction of my body'. 'Know thyself' and 'the unexamined life is not worth living' are epitomes of Socratic values. Less well known is Xenophon's summary of the Socratic position: 'Madness he called the opposite of wisdom, though he did not go so far as to equate ignorance with madness. Nevertheless, he did think that not to know one's self and to imagine that one knows things that he knows he does not know, this is the nearest thing to out-and-out madness' (Memorabilia III, ix, 6).

[7] The second part of *Civilization and Its Discontents* introduces a radically new version of the problem, involving the disguised operations of guilt.

Over the course of the dialogues, one sees a shift from the Socratic emphasis on self-knowledge to the Platonic emphasis on knowledge of the forms, the absolutes of truth and virtue. But I believe this is only a difference in emphasis. From both viewpoints, ignorance is caused by, maintained by, or equated with, the temporal, the illusionary and shifting, and the appetites gone wild. Excess passion, narcissistic pride, the drive for power, all of these may interfere with knowledge (e.g., self-knowledge) and are in themselves varieties of madness. This notion of 'ignorance' is an important analogue to the kinds of 'ignorance' of self discussed by Freud (e.g., hysteria—not knowing because of not wanting to know). The importance of this comparison becomes even more striking as we move now to a discussion of the treatment necessary to remove the ignorance and replace it with knowledge. The notion of how much work is involved and how much resistance there is within the person to relinquish his blindness and ignorance is common to both thinkers.

Thus Plato and Freud came upon the importance of 'ignorance' in their working setting: Freud, in the analytic dialogue, and Plato, in the philosophic dialogue. But this seems to follow inevitably from splitting the psyche, or seeing the person as split. One party within the person will deal with the other, utilizing all the tricks he knows to keep the upper hand—threats, persuasion, bribery, and, finally, out-and-out deception, a deception appearing in the guise of ignorance.

TREATMENT

In the Phaedrus, Socrates listened politely for a moment as his companion discoursed upon the beauty of the setting in which they were walking and detailed some local mythology. He gave naturalistic explanations of these myths, having expected Socrates to approve of his dismissal of magic and divine hocus-pocus as a way of thinking that befits a rational man and a philosopher. Socrates, however, exclaimed:

> Now I have no leisure for such enquiries; shall I tell you why: I must first know myself, as the Delphian inscription says; to

> be curious about that which is not my concern, while I am still in ignorance of my own self would be ridiculous . . . am I a monster more complicated and swollen with passion than the serpent Typho, or a creature of a gentler and simpler sort? (Jowett, 1937, Vol. I, p. 235.)

But what is the method by which a man can come to know himself, or know the realm of 'ideas' and of 'true being'? The method is at first *dialogue,* but gradually moves into *dialectic.* In this transition from dialogue to dialectic, which can be documented within Plato's writings, we can again find an essential point of comparison to the kind of dialogue that evolved as the psychoanalytic method. What is common to the two, above and beyond the surface comparison of people talking with each other, is the kind of *problem* encountered in the course of one man trying to make another understand something which he ought to be able to understand but cannot.

For Plato dialogue is a conversation or exchange between two people (or a few people). In the earliest Platonic dialogues, where we probably have best preserved the picture of Socrates at work, we find Socrates adducing logical proofs for his arguments and trying to lead his companion with him on the path to truth and understanding. It is equally obvious that he charms, persuades, and seduces, not to mention that he ridicules, confounds, and forces his opponent (or friend!) to feel most uncomfortable. His words are 'magic charms', 'healing herbs'—all in the venerable tradition of the poet, story teller, sorcerer, and shaman, as a healer of hurt and bringer of truth. Socrates is also the gadfly and an electric eel. Thus what we see is the *beginning* of a general philosophical method, but even more, the portrayal of 'Socrates questioning'. The method is the man-at-work.

As one moves to the middle and later dialogues, one sees Plato developing and refining a general method of inquiry, the dialectic. Dialectic involves dialogue, but it is a method of questioning and answering; dividing, defining, categoriz-

ing, and abstracting. Certain ground rules seem to determine the form of the inquiry. Questions are posed to allow, optimally, for only a 'yes' or 'no' answer. Often there is a *reductio ad absurdum* at the end of the argument, and one man in the argument yields to the other. Its aim is to arrive at a certain fixity and clarity, to define the various and changeable aspects of the phenomenal world, the world of 'becoming'. Dialectic is a tool by means of which one can construct bridges between the world of being born and dying and the world of true being; the realm of 'what seems' and 'what is true'. Dialectic differs radically from dialogue in that the latter relies heavily on various 'rhetorical' emotions: persuasion, seduction, an appeal to identification with the speaker, and, at its worst, a pandering to irrational fears. Dialectic aims to uncover and fix what is true, not to cajole. 'Eristic', the art of verbal contending in order to win (a variant of the gymnastic contests of which the Greeks were so fond), is alien to the spirit of dialectic. In short, Plato attempted to define an interactional method of seeking truth which would bypass and exclude the kinds of wishes more characteristic of the 'appetitive' parts of the mind: the wish to conquer, to seduce, or to humiliate.

But if dialectic is to operate without these ordinary motives that men have to engage in argument, is it to operate without any emotion at all? Here we are back at the problem of what drives the higher portion of the mind. The emotions involved in dialectic are, for example, surprise, frustration over a knotty problem, shame at not knowing, a sense of impasse (*aporia*), and the discomfort that comes from discovering contradictions within one's own beliefs. The pleasure that comes with solving a problem is an allowable emotion. But are not these 'academic' emotions a bit too pale, too refined? Perhaps, but anything stronger interferes, and anything weaker will hardly suffice to produce the turmoil within the soul that is necessary if the soul is to seek the truth. It is not a passive process, but it must produce discomfort. Dialectic is not soothing as are the mellifluous songs of

the poet, or the rhetoric of the gifted orator; it is disruptive and irritating. Plato's hope is that when men are truly involved in, and committed to, the dialectical process 'they grow angry with themselves and gentler towards others'. The myth of the Cave, in The Republic, spells out most clearly the *ideal* that the discovery and sight of truth is as uncomfortable as the cave dweller coming out into the bright sunlight.

Dialectics is not an early form of psychoanalysis, or its precursor. Only in some very general sense is this so, and one can focus on the similarities or the obvious differences at will. One of the important differences is the degree to which Plato values one extreme end of the spectrum of different admixtures of thinking and feeling, namely, *epistēmē,* abstract, general, and dialectical kinds of thinking. But both Plato and Freud feel the need to come to terms with the mixture of intellectual and emotional forces that are stirred up in the attempt through dialogue to 'know thyself'. The common problem is how to devise a method, a tool, that while not independent of the personality of the person using it, can in principle be taught and used in the hands of many. The other common problem is to properly channel emotions and impulses, both because they are needed to give an impetus to the inquiry and because they are needed to provide a sense of conviction about the truth. 'Only dialectic writes in the hearts of men' summarizes the Platonic ideal, and the Platonic problem. Both dialectics and analysis need to bring together, and to bring into greater harmony, the conflicting parts of the person.

An integral part of the conception of both dialectics and analysis is the split between the two members of the dyad. Interestingly enough, this split, between doctor and patient or between teacher and student, is constructed along the lines of the splits within the psyche. For Plato, the philosopher is to the rest of mankind as the rational part of the psyche is to the appetitive. In Freud, we similarly detect a trend to equate the

doctor with the ego, and the patient with the irrational, or the id. In discussing the transference, Freud (1912) writes:

> This struggle between the doctor and the patient, between intellect and instinctual life, between understanding and seeking to act . . . (p. 108).

Note the equation implied here: doctor is to patient as intellect is to instinct. Both analysis and dialectics seek to reduce this gap, to bridge the gulf. The student or the patient should ultimately learn to do for himself what at first he was able to do only with the aid of the teacher or the doctor.

Thus, the experience of the participants in the dialogue is intimately related to the theoretical framework of a split within the mind. The theoretical model of the mind is the model of the *minds of men as they appear in dialogue.* The working setting of a dialogue provides the most vivid and immediate instances of the problem of reason versus emotion, rational versus irrational, and thought versus action. In the process of dialogue, impediments and resistances arise to the seeking of truth. Plato speaks of *aporia,* impasse; participants in the Platonic dialogues become dismayed, confused, or even embarrassed and blush. Though the conceptualization and method of exploring these blocks are quite different in Freud, the observation that they exist is common to both. There is a man within the man, who is working at cross purposes to the man himself.[8]

[8] A good case can be made that, at least for some of the dialogues, especially *The Republic,* the structure of the dialogue—i.e., the parts played by several participants in the dialogue—parallels the divisions of the mind. This view, most recently argued by Alan Bloom (1968) in his translation and commentary on *The Republic,* has much merit, if one does not attempt to hold Plato to it too literally. Thus, Thrasymachus, who argues that justice equals that which the most powerful can do and get away with, represents (or better, illustrates) the operations of the appetitive part of the psyche. Glaucon is 'erotic', or passionate; always eager and enthusiastic, he must be gently led and trained rather than subdued or tamed. Looking at the dialogue in this manner, one can then see that there is an *isomorphism* of the parts of the psyche, the parts of the state, and the participants of the dialogue. This view of the dramatic

To sum up, my thesis is that the similarity in model in Plato and Freud involves the following interrelated factors:

1. Each comes to see the study of man in conflict, and especially in self-destructive conflict, as central to his working task. When man is in conflict, two parts of him are in opposition to each other.

2. The nature of the working situation, a form of dialogue seeking to establish truth, confronts the participants with the facts of man in conflict with himself and with another.

3. Both thinkers draw upon introspective data, the data of internal dialogue which seems to confirm the existence of conflicting portions within the mind.

4. In each case the theory is developed from the perspective of the leader in the dialogue, and tends to construct the split within the dialogue along the lines of the split within the mind.

5. Plato's theories of mind are accounts of the mind as an instrument that can engage in dialectic. Freud's theories are accounts of the mind that can engage in psychoanalysis, either as patient or as doctor.

These two thinkers approach the world with a certain schema: everywhere they see conflict, within the mind, among men, in the political world, etc. Their schema also involves a sense of a higher and a lower order, each of which seeks dominance over the other. Where should we begin to look for the 'source' of this outlook? What is the 'model' for the 'model'? One interesting answer, more obvious for Plato than for Freud, is that the prevailing forms of political organization provide the basis of the divisions of the mind. This view would lead us to suggest that the divisions in Greek society, especially those between master and slave (or among the social classes), provide the model. One could argue that

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structure of the dialogue leaves another question unanswered: is this conscious artifice on Plato's part, or is it largely unconscious? I find the latter more appealing, but both are possible and compatible with the belief that Plato wrote dramas in his youth, before he came under the influence of Socrates (Randall, 1970).

The Republic presents a somewhat idealized picture of the social structure of a Greek state, especially one such as Sparta.[9] Where is the political or social framework apparent for Freud? In fact, it is ubiquitous in Freud, and appears in a variety of forms. In The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis, Freud (1925 [1924]) says:

> Human civilization rests upon two pillars, of which one is the control of natural forces, and the other the restriction of our instincts. The ruler's throne rests upon fettered slaves. Among the instinctual components which are thus brought into service, the sexual instincts, in the narrower sense of the word, are conspicuous for their strength and savagery. Woe, if they should be set loose! The throne would be overturned and the ruler trampled under foot (p. 219).

This passage is preceded by a paragraph in which Freud approvingly compares Plato's Eros with his notion of libido. Second, even The Interpretation of Dreams, most famous for its mechanical and physical models of the dreaming process, is replete with a number of political, social, and economic analogies. For instance, the dream censor operates like the postal censor (Freud, 1900-1901, pp. 142-143, n.). Psychic agency (*Instanz*) is an agency, in the sense of a government agency or bureau. Also throughout his career Freud devotes much attention to the question of the relationships between mind and human society, and mind and human history.

This line of argument is an interesting one and might deserve further investigation, particularly in the case of Freud. But it is misleading to think of the political structure as the basic model for the structure of the mind primarily because the 'political structure' itself is a product of a mind, or minds that are structuring and construing the facts of social life in terms of a particular schema.

Another likely source of this model of mind suggests itself: the relation between child and parents. The parent is the ra-

[9] *Cf.*, Gouldner's (1965) *Enter Plato*, which makes a strong case for this kind of argument.

tional and the child the appetitive. At times they are in conflict and at times coöperating. But here, too, it is obvious that this is only *one* version of parent-child relationships and is undoubtedly a reflection of, or a product of, a particular cultural attitude toward children, albeit a widespread attitude.

We are forced into a verdict of *non licet*. For, all we can say is that there is a complex interplay among three kinds of structures: (a) the structure, or model, that exists in the mind of the theory maker and that he imposes upon the phenomena he studies; (b) structures, or models, that are widely held within a culture, and by means of which that culture construes and constructs the world around it; (c) structures that in some way or another may 'actually' exist (i.e., it is possible that some models of the phenomenal world do correspond to structures inherent in the phenomena).[10]

For Freud, particularly in his earlier writings, the dominant view, though not the only one, is that the *structure* of the mind is a given, and the schema of the divisions of the mind (not just the contents of mind) are projected onto the outer world and are reflected in the cultural creations of man, e.g., in myth, religion, and philosophical systems. This notion, particularly as it appears in relation to Freud's concept of *endopsychic perception,* has been discussed in Grossman and Simon (1969). In The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, Freud (1901) argues that it is the task of psychology to translate 'metaphysics into metapsychology' (p. 258), i.e., to read out from the philosophical creations of man's mind facts about the actual structure of the mind. This position may be true, for all we know, but the main objection to it lies in the way it has been used. In Freud, for example, if one follows this notion up to about 1920, one sees several different versions of what is the actual structure of the mind, and accordingly several different versions of which schema of the mind we ought

[10] For some clarification and analysis of these issues, see Piaget's (1970) *Structuralism,* especially his discussion of Lévi-Strauss (pp. 106-119).

to be looking for in the creations of culture (e.g., the distinction between conscious and unconscious; the division between ego, id, and superego, etc.).[11]

The schema of conflict is in the mind of the thinker, and we do not know how to give a definitive account of how that schema got there. Tangentially one can consider what may be common to the personal psychology of men who have this sensitivity to the existence of conflict and are prone to see it everywhere in their world. I will venture a rather speculative hypothesis, based in part on Freud's own account of how, in his self-analysis, he came to discover the importance of the œdipal conflicts.

For Freud, it was important that there was an unusual configuration, two much older stepbrothers, the children of his father's previous marriage, and a father who was old enough to be his grandfather. For Plato we have precious little reliable biographical and autobiographical material, but it is generally accepted as true that his father died sometime in his youth, that his mother remarried (her mother's brother), and that from that union came a younger half brother, named Antiphon. Plato's stepfather, Pyrilampus, had an older son by a previous marriage. Plato's own mother and father had three other children: two sons, Glaucon and Adeimantus, and a daughter; the birth order of the children is not known.[12] Plato, of course, did not explicitly know of and label the œdipal conflicts, but throughout his dialogues there are repeated references to parricidal and incestuous wishes, both explicitly stated and in disguised form (e.g., such as the myth of Gyges in The Republic: Gyges becomes invisible, sneaks into the bedchamber of the Queen and seduces her, slays the king,

11 Recently a line of argument similar to Freud's has been presented in an intriguing paper by Devereux (1970) on *The Structure of Tragedy and the Structure of the Psyche in Aristotle's Poetics*. Though his observations are valid and quite fascinating, this conceptual framework is open to question.

12 *Cf.*, Taylor (1952), pp. 1-2.

and steals the kingdom).[13] It is also of interest that although Plato himself never appears in the dialogues (his name is mentioned only twice; once to explain that he was ill and could not be present at the death of Socrates!), his *brothers* appear as principal speakers in The Republic, the dialogue that proposes eliminating the family! His brothers and his half brother appear again in The Parmenides, a dialogue which deals, at the level of problems in logic, with the complexities of relations among the forms, including issues of similarity, relationship, and identity.

I suggest that for both Freud and Plato some atypical feature in the family constellation, perhaps centering particularly around œdipal conflicts, served as a kind of *catalyst* to their awareness of conflicts of wishes and desires as a ubiquitous feature of human life.

Another feature of the style of thinking and of viewing the world that characterizes both men is the thinking in schemata, or rather searching for similar schemata in diverse phenomena. One might call this arguing by analogy, or seeking to discover by analogy, such as comparing the soul to the state, or comparing the history of the Jewish people to the developmental sequence of the human child, but the term 'analogy' is not quite adequate. I referred above to the 'isomorphism', i.e., the assumption that there exist similar configurations much as if there were similar triangles that had to be matched. In Freud, more than in Plato, we also see the notion that contemporary patterns in the life of the adult have a history, and that history consists of earlier versions of the pattern. If one sees an inexplicable piece of behavior in the adult, seek out an infantile configuration that will illuminate the adult one, seek out the œdipal triangle which explicates the current adult triangles, etc. Both for Freud and Plato, the method of

[13] Compare Plato's account with that of Herodotus (Bk. I, 7), who tells the story engagingly and with some psychological acumen which Plato may have picked up. *Cf.*, Rosenbaum and Rossi (1971): *Herodotus: Observer of Sexual Psychopathology.*

deducing the structure of the unknown from a structure of the known, and then moving back and forth between the two, is fundamental and far-reaching. Is there some intrinsic connection between their readiness to see a schema of conflict, and their readiness to seek out schemata? Did the experience of the somewhat atypical family constellation for each catalyze not only an awareness of conflict but also an awareness of configuration? I can only offer this point as a suggestive lead, without promising that it will lead anywhere.

SOME COMMENTS ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PLATO AND FREUD

To this point, I have emphasized what I consider the core of commonality between Plato and Freud: their use of a certain model of mind with its attendant definition of conflict. Further, each of these men came upon a core of similar problems, namely, those issues arising from the split between instinct and reason. Thus, though similar problems have to be dealt with, the proposed solutions and resolutions may be quite disparate.

First, let me reiterate the obvious. Freud is first and foremost a clinician, and his most original and enduring contributions are not those to be found in his philosophical statements, in his *Weltanschauung*. From this perspective there is simply no way to meaningfully compare and contrast the two thinkers. The method of free association and *interpretation* stands at the heart of Freud's work. The concepts of derivatives, vicissitudes of the instinct, and the notions of defense, as well as the central role of interpretation of the transference, go far beyond what any of his clinical, philosophical, or poetic forebears had devised. However, assuming some significant degree of 'commensurability' between the two, one should try to pinpoint some of the profound differences.

The most profound difference is in the attitude that each has toward conflict. As mentioned above, both thinkers are characterized by an unusual sensitivity to the existence of

conflict, contradiction, paradox, irony, etc. For Freud, this is the basic given of our existence; although one can do better or worse in the handling of one's conflicts or one can yearn for utopian solutions, the likelihood is that conflict is inevitable, as is some measure of unhappiness. One of his early statements about the 'cure' of hysteria is that we must assist our neurotic patients to surrender their exotic sufferings and accept the everyday unhappinesses in life.

Plato recognizes the ubiquitous nature of conflict but he is not prepared to accept it. He not only has a wish and great yearning to eliminate conflict, but he also has a plan. For Plato, the solutions of many different kinds of difficulties cluster around the notion: eliminate contradiction, ambiguity, and conflict. Justice is each person doing one thing and not several; justice is each class of the city performing only one function. The myths that the Greeks loved so dearly, and which they used as bedtime stories and fairy tales for their children, had to be eliminated: they fostered contradiction and disharmony. Harmony in Plato sometimes suggests a harmonious arrangement of conflicting forces, but more typically it conveys a sense of each element kept separate and distinct, and then, in some way, harmonized (e.g., Symposium, 187). For Plato, in the ideal city state of The Republic, rivalry, contest, and all the emotions that attend them must be minimized or eliminated. Men and women should be equalized; biological differences must be played down. His most far-reaching suggestion for reform of the city involves *eliminating the family,* at least, the family of the guardian class. Let no man know who is the biological mother or father or sister or brother; let the definition of these relationships be bureaucratized—the *polis* is the mother from which the children spring. Though this is not spelled out explicitly in Plato, implicitly the family is the seat of trouble. I have stated elsewhere (Simon, in press) that one can find in Plato the imagery of a combative *primal scene fantasy,* and that this imagery is what attends his definitions of evil and madness (*cf.,* Bradley,

1967). It is as if Plato argues that if man is engendered in a setting of a confused, combative, nighttime madness, how can we expect anything better of him? Hence, we see in Plato expressions of a wish to find a better way to engender children than through intercourse.

Plato's objections to Homer and to Greek tragedy rests in part on a subtle awareness of the great poets' reliance upon and exploitation of multiple identifications, and shifting and fluctuating roles of the players.[14] Plato, in this respect, is very un-Hellenic in his antagonism to conflict and ambiguity. For Plato conflict is very much tied up with that which the body demands and requires, and his antagonism to conflict goes hand in glove with his downgrading of the body.

From these considerations about two antithetical attitudes toward conflict, we may take a look at what I consider a conspicuous absence in Plato. I refer to some notion of a superego, or conscience, that can be in conflict with the *ego,* not just with the id; the idea that man might suffer from guilt and that a moral agency within the person can act as a fifth column which can destroy the person. Plato is not to be faulted for failing to discover and articulate such a concept; in fact, he probably could not have accepted this idea very easily even if he had read Freud. The theme of suffering from irrational guilt was very much 'in the air' in Plato's day, particularly in Euripides, and Plato needed to ignore it.

The notion of the inevitability of conflict derives from the idea of the indestructibility of the infantile wishes and the objects of those wishes. This already carries with it the sense of internalization of the objects as experienced by the child in the course of development. As the moral, controlling, frustrating, and approving aspects of these objects are represented internally, the representations are attended by the mixture of love and hate, aggression and libido, etc., that the child experiences in relation to the parents.

[14] *Cf.,* Havelock (1963), *Preface to Plato.*

Plato seems to recognize that early moral upbringing can be riddled with every kind of ambivalence, but he is horrified by this fact and has a tremendous need to get around it, or to do away with its consequences. Freud's ideas about superego require an agency *within* the mind that can harbor both love and hate toward the person himself. Plato sees the ultimate sources of moral values as exterior to man, as the Forms of the True, the Good, etc. They are untainted by hatred and aggression. These negative affects are relegated to the body and its demands; the ambivalence is split.

In conclusion, this essay can only be a beginning comparative study of these two thinkers. Much in the complexity of Plato has been ignored, and much in Freud has to be understood within a framework of philosophies that go far beyond the Platonic. Here the work of Paul Ricoeur (1970) is extremely intricate and illuminating. But perhaps the method of seeking for similar forms, despite some heavy handedness in the way that I have applied it in this paper, can stimulate others to a more extended and richer understanding of Plato and Freud.

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The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality. The Application of Freud's Theory of the Ego to the Neuroses. By Franz Alexander, M.D. (Authorized English translation by Bernard Glueck, M.D. and Bertram D. Lewin, M.D.) College Park, Md.: McGrath Publishing Co., 1970. 176 pp.

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE PSYCHOANALYSIS OF THE TOTAL PERSONALITY. The Application of Freud's Theory of the Ego to the Neuroses. By Franz Alexander, M.D. (Authorized English translation by Bernard Glueck, M.D. and Bertram D. Lewin, M.D.) College Park, Md.: McGrath Publishing Co., 1970. 176 pp.

The precise etiology of the neuroses has not as yet been discovered. The recognition that libidinal conflicts, elaborated genetically, were at the core of the neuroses never completely satisfied many psychoanalysts, who then sought and found other explanations. Some of these explanations de-emphasized the sexual etiology in varying degrees. Theories like the one postulated by Rank on the birth trauma and the one stated by Adler on organ inferiority were among those which attempted to erase the importance of sexual conflicts. Many of these efforts represented, and finally led to, open breaks with Freud and the mainstream of psychoanalysis.

Only partly in contrast, the contribution by Franz Alexander reviewed here (an adaptation of lectures he gave in Berlin during 1924 and 1925)[1] makes the repeated claim that he is but following the lead initiated by Freud in placing the 'death instinct' at the etiological core of the neuroses. It would appear, judging from his frequent references to Freud as the source and originator of his thesis, that he wished to elaborate the then most recent findings of psychoanalysis and to avoid controversy. Moreover, his *stated* goals are relatively modest. They include: 1, the exposition of the primary goal of the superego (especially the gratification of the need for suffering) in symptom-formation; and 2, the demonstration of the clinical validity and value of Freud's last dual instinct theory (especially the death instinct) as the dynamic and causal core of the neuroses.

This book is but rarely referred to, although Alexander was one of the first (if not the first) to respond to the newly formulated

[1] First published in 1930 as Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph No. 52.

instinctual and structural concepts.[2] The pretentious title, perhaps justified at the time the lectures were given, belies the stated goals; this, in turn, partially hides the extent to which theory is modified. The text is filled with admitted and blatant anthropomorphisms in an unabashed, literal rendition of structural theory. The author's vision of the so-called death instinct appears to be concrete and perhaps explains why his efforts have been almost forgotten, although he was among the first to try to grasp the subtleties of the functions of the superego and to believe that the aggressive forces might be used to explain the development of symptoms. Much more meaningful and sophisticated work on the functions of the superego has been done since the first publication of this volume. Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, Isakower, Lewin, Sandler, Joffe, Schafer, Loewald, and Stein are among the many contributors to theory, while T. Reik's Masochism in Modern Man stands out in my memory as the most vivid clinical description of the superego's participation in the neurotic constellations. None of these efforts have as yet demonstrated unequivocally whether aggression plays a primary or secondary role in symptom-formation. Nor have the exact relationships of guilt and anxiety to aggression and libido been elucidated, although Hartmann, et al., clearly placed aggression as parallel and equal to libidinal drives in initiating symptom-formation. Alexander was among the first to recognize the clinical importance of aggression even though his view was an exaggerated one. In his last two lectures he states most clearly his revision of theory when by tortuous, labored reasoning he arrives at the conclusion that the cause of the neuroses is the turning in of the death instinct, with consequent defusions and fusions of Eros and Thanatos. His point is not presented without giving due respect to the roles of libido and œdipal conflicts; nevertheless, the effort constitutes a major revision of theory. The libido (œdipal conflicts and attendant castration anxiety) is assigned a secondary role to the inversion of the death instinct in the formation of the neuroses.

In so far as these lectures explore the multiple facets of superego

[2] In a personal communication, E. F. Alston has informed me that in his course on superego functions he uses more than several hundred references. Among these the only mention of this book is a reference by Philip Weissman in *Ego and Superego in Obsessional Character and Neurosis*, This QUARTERLY, XXIII, 1954, pp. 529-543.

functioning and expose the ways in which symptoms develop into complex resistances against the recognition of repressive forces, out of the need for suffering, the first of Alexander's goals is fairly well achieved. However, even in this endeavor he elevates the essentially secondary gains of illness to a far more prominent place in the causal chain than they deserve, although there is no doubt about their importance (as powerful resistances) for the technical tasks of therapy. In this connection Alexander does portray the caricature some patients can make of analysis in the need to maintain their suffering.

The author's clinical material, by which he hoped to bridge theory and clinical observation, is sparse. More importantly, since the clinical observations are not presented per se but rather offered on the first level of abstraction, they are not always convincing. It is perhaps primarily for this reason that he falls short of his second goal. In the process he perpetrates a strange feat of logic. Although it is well known that Freud regarded the ego as the repressing agency, Alexander repeatedly equates the latter with the superego. He tells us in his introduction that Freud warned him against a premature expression of opinion about the role of the superego in symptom-formation. Convinced that he had heeded Freud's warning, Alexander proceeded to describe the corruptibility of the superego which accepts punishment to permit instinctual gratification. He believed that it was the tricky, corruptible, paradoxical functions of the superego that led Freud to warn of the danger of a precipitate view of the superego in symptom-formation. It seems much more likely that Freud was concerned with whether the superego could be considered the sole instigator of defense, since he had frequently hypothesized that the ego itself was not only the executor of the defensive operations, but also made the initial demands for defense. In Alexander's view (which equates the moral faculty with the repressing agency) the superego becomes the sole instigator and executor of the defensive operations, and thus almost the sole mechanism of the neuroses. This view may be consistent with his ideas about the primary role of the death instinct as the cause of the neuroses, but it is not consistent with clinical observations which show that repressions are accomplished at the behest of the ego itself (though many of the ego demands for repression might be considered as precursors of the superego). In this connec-

tion, Alexander decides that since the phobias do not possess the same quality manifested so prominently in the other neuroses, namely, the need for suffering, they are incompletely formed neuroses. He thus resolves an apparent clinical contradiction to one of his major theses.

It is only with difficulty that one can appreciate the full import of Alexander's written words. As with so many other psychoanalytic theorists, he tends to give lip service to concepts, then modifies them in the creation of new theory which is no longer compatible with the original theory. Thus in this volume, while the author appears to accept the theory of repetition compulsion and the defensive functions of the ego, he stresses the superego as the factor which disguises the instinct and is the important force that makes it possible to gain gratfication, that is, the need for punishment. The plan of neurosis is thus made the removal of instinct inhibition by satisfying the need for punishment. As a consequence, Alexander denigrates the importance of the repetition compulsion (strange for one who takes the death instinct so literally) and at the same time seems to overlook completely the capacities of the ego to change its aims and its objects by means other than gratifying the need to suffer (see p. 128, for example). The ego's capacity to disguise—defensive operations apart from those in which the superego participates—becomes, in Alexander's view, of less importance than the corruptibility of the superego in the form as well as in the formation of symptoms.

It is questionable whether this theoretical view that promotes the superego into such prominence leaves room for deficits in the ego and superego which might arise from sources other than the one postulated by Alexander. His thesis seems to reduce sublimations to the same dynamic constellation as the neuroses, as identical modifications of impulse (see pp. 25-26, for example). An additional question must be raised as to whether his concept could contain 'healthy' superego functioning, in view of such statements as: 'In the construction of the personality the destruction instinct manifests itself most clearly in the formation of the superego. Its effect within the personality is definitely to produce a disintegration' (p. 159). Although such passages are quoted here out of context and without the various modifiers and qualifiers that run through the lectures, they nevertheless show that his views permit

him not only to justify the anthropomorphic splits in the personality, but also to disregard known clinical and theoretical aspects of sublimations and superego functioning in health.

It would be relatively easy to relegate this work by Alexander to the library shelves as a historical museum piece which is concrete, stilted, repetitive, and now grown stale. It seems replete with unproven assertions, exaggerations of theory, overdrawn analogies, and even wild psychological deductions concerning society at large (see pp. 27-28) and organic disease in particular (pp. 141-142). And yet, through it all shines the genius of Alexander, the genius that immediately grasped the historical impact of Freud's The Ego and the Id and understood the corruptibility of the superego, the significance of dream pairs, the development of the neurotic character, the power of repression and regression and their importance to the technical tasks of therapy. The origins of Alexander's later attempts to modify analytic therapy may be clearly seen here in his concerns with the dangers and strength of regression and the need to control it. As one of the originators of the thought—which has lately become more popular—that the aggressive instinct is a primary factor in symptom-formation, he deserves more frequent reference, both because it may well be that aggression *is* a primary source of symptoms and because his overvaluated and probably incorrect view of the death instinct permitted him to draw some questionable theoretical and technical conclusions. The latter may be of interest to psychoanalytic theorists and technicians as a paradigm of the abuse of theory.

VICTOR CALEF (SAN FRANCISCO)

JAMES JACKSON PUTNAM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS. Letters between Putnam and Sigmund Freud, Ernest Jones, William James, Sandor Ferenczi, and Morton Prince, 1877-1917. Edited by Nathan G. Hale, Jr. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 384 pp.

FREUD AND THE AMERICANS. The Beginnings of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876-1917. By Nathan G. Hale, Jr. New York: Oxford University Press, 1971. 574 pp.

Although these two books are in many ways quite different in character, they have a logical continuity. The first volume, entitled

James Jackson Putnam and Psychoanalysis, centers around the correspondence between Putnam and Freud. Putnam's similar but less important communications with James, Jones, Ferenczi, and Morton Prince during this period help to delineate the viewpoints of these important figures and their respective roles in the development of psychoanalysis. The book gives an excellent intimate picture of Freud and Putnam, a picture almost autobiographical in character.

The second volume, Freud and the Americans, is a lengthy, detailed, and complete study of American psychiatry after 1870 and of the social milieu, ethics, and scientific attitude prevalent in 1909 when Freud delivered his lectures at Clark University. The book describes the primitive roots of the psychoanalytic movement in America, the origins of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and the New York and Boston Psychoanalytic Societies. It includes an enormous amount of data about the people involved as well as their 'somatic styles' and their various psychotherapeutic approaches, including hypnosis, suggestion, and Meyer's psychobiology. This volume, with its mass of historical data, is often redundant and difficult to read. It is a thorough and detailed piece of research but, unfortunately, poorly assembled.

I recommend the first book highly. The many personal and intimate letters between Freud and Putnam reveal the essence of these two brilliant and humane men who were truly interested in understanding each other as they tried to peer more deeply into the psychic life of man, within the context of Freud's early findings: his recognition of childhood sexuality and the significance of dreams and free association. Many of us have only a fleeting knowledge of Putnam; in this book we gain awareness of his brilliance and courage. Putnam was born in 1846 and died in 1918. He had a continuing relationship with Freud from 1909 until 1916 when their correspondence was terminated by the difficulties of communication attendant on the first World War.

Putnam was in accord with Freud's scientific findings and in May, 1910, publicly proclaimed his support. He thereby played a major role in helping to establish psychoanalysis in the United States. He felt, however, that there was a need for further understanding of man's morals and ideals which were not explained *in toto* by the libido theory and the theory of repression. He per-

sistently raised questions concerning four factors that he felt accounted for man's higher nature: his conscience, his religion, his philosophy, and his sense of social obligation. Putnam stated: 'All I contend for is that natural science does not and cannot give us a true picture of . . . the truth that must lie as a background behind all of the phenomena of life' (p. 161). In another letter Putnam clearly differentiates between '. . . my views on psychoanalysis on the one hand, and Weltanschauung, on the other hand' (p. 178). While Putnam saw as a possible goal a complete sublimation of infantile drive derivatives, Freud stressed the marked limitations of this possibility. In one of his letters Freud states: '. . . that psychoanalysis has not made the analysts themselves better, nobler or of stronger character remains a disappointment to me' (p. 163). In another letter he states: '. . . when I asked myself why I have always striven honestly to be considerate of others, and if possible, kind to them, I have no answer. It simply was not the sensible thing to do. Nor did I feel any special ethical bent in my youth. You might almost cite my case as proof of your assertion that such ideal impulses form an essential part of my nature. Why I—as well as my six adult children—are compelled to be thoroughly decent human beings is quite incomprehensible to me' (pp. 189-190).

It would seem quite possible that the interchange between Freud and Putnam played some role in Freud's later development of the concept of the superego as well as in certain of his early ruminations on the ego, as expressed in The Ego and the Id.

A. RUSSELL ANDERSON (BALTIMORE)

LA CONSTRUCTION DE L'ESPACE ANALYTIQUE (The Construction of Psychoanalytic Space). By Serge Viderman. Paris: Éditions Denoël, 1971. 348 pp.

This volume by Serge Viderman is based on his extensive clinical experience, on a thorough study of the original classic sources, and on a profound epistemological analysis of basic psychoanalytic concepts. While the complex premises hardly make for easy reading, the study of the book, with all its difficulties, proves rewarding.

The author puts his 'cards on the table' in the very first pages. He discusses the theory of the psychoanalytic cure and the role played by the countertransference of the analyst in analyzing the

resistance. Viderman feels that there is a risk of countertransference becoming counter-resistance, and that this makes the analysis of the patient's resistance highly subjective. In the opinion of this reviewer, the subtle reasoning of the author is vitiated by his somewhat apodictic pronouncements. For example: 'Resistance is always considered an evil, a malice opposing the allegedly beneficial effect of his [the analyst's] actions; an evil effect which ought to be stopped as soon as possible'. As he goes further, Viderman continuously overestimates the element of subjectivity in the interpretations and other interventions of the analyst. He asks: 'When the analyst tries to break penis envy in a woman patient, what is the source of greater resistance and possible distortion of the patient's history? Is it the latter or rather stories which the analyst tells himself? . . . . The psychoanalytic space is magnetized by two opposite forces which unite to render uncertain the history of the subject.'

In later chapters Viderman discusses the 'diffraction' of the analytic milieu determined by perturbations originating in the transference-countertransference situation. He then proceeds to a subtle discussion of the role of language—verbal interpretation in particular. With the interpretation aiming at the deepest layers of the unconscious, the analyst can offer only what he divines of his own unconscious, beyond any possible proof. Timidity or the struggle for truth paralyzes the analyst. 'The analyst should learn to do without proofs.' Viderman uses the concept of structural linguistic analysis and the theory of modern semantics (theory of signs) to demonstrate the relativity of every analytic interpretation. He applies this to the interpretation of neurotic symptoms.

He goes on to say that the dream itself cannot be isolated from the transference situation: it has no unequivocal meaning; the meaning is revealed only in the context of the total situation. The psychoanalyst labors under an illusion when he believes that the reflection in the mirror of transference may recover an undistorted fragment of the patient's history. 'There is no such thing as Beethoven as such', we are told. 'The musicologists affirm that there are different Beethovens: Beethoven-von Karajan, Beethoven-Toscanini, etc.' To prove his point, Viderman goes over Freud's classic case histories, supplementing them with his own vignettes and observations. According to the author, the introduction by Freud of

his own associations and of his phylogenetic speculations does not add to the cogency of analytic reconstruction. In our reconstructions, the future explains the past rather than being determined by it. Viderman agrees with de Saussure that the thought is structured by the language and feels that this holds true for the thinking of the psychoanalytic interpretation. Hence, it is not surprising that Viderman does not perceive any essential differences between the conceptualizations of the freudian and the Kleinian analysts.

†GUSTAV BYCHOWSKI

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF SPACE IN THE CHILD. By Monique Laurendeau and Adrien Pinard. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1970. 465 pp.

This book contains an account of the authors' attempt to replicate Piaget's investigations into the evolution of spatial concepts in children, utlizing larger numbers of subjects and a more rigorous methodology than had been employed in Piaget's original studies. Other investigators pursuing the same task had reached conclusions quite critical of Piaget, but Laurendeau and Pinard found themselves dissatisfied with the research designs and the manner in which the data had been interpreted.

The results of the study reported in this volume quite conclusively confirm Piaget's theses. The complex, abstruse reasoning and intricate statistical operations that the authors have had to employ, however, illustrate the enormous difficulties encountered in statistical studies of human developmental sequences involving multiple complex variables. Comparison of their fastidious research design and thorough reasoning with that of the investigators whose critiques of Piaget had stimulated their work, highlights the fact that oversimplification and relative lack of investigative and statistical sophistication can lead to erroneous conclusions which nevertheless carry the weight of *apparent* statistical proof. The problems involved in statistical verification of scientific theories derived from the investigation of complex human functions in a small number of individuals are quite familiar to psychoanalysts.

The book contains a detailed account of the transition from the practical, sensorimotor apprehension of spatial configurations that develops by about two and one half years to the intuitive stage

based largely upon topological considerations that reaches fruition at about four and one half, and then to the operational, truly conceptual stage that crystallizes between six and eight years. An appreciation of the intricate interweaving of multiple lines of mental activity that takes place during this progression can be obtained only by reading the book in its entirety. Although the compressed style and the richness of detail with which each individual test is described make for rather heavy reading at times, the reader is well rewarded for his efforts.

To psychoanalysts who feel that ego psychology offers a pathway to a broader understanding of human development and therefore to a closer approximation of psychoanalysis to a general psychology, this book will have a special appeal. It adds dimension, structurally as well as developmentally, to such issues as the evolution of body image, including the child's shifting conceptualization of the female's unseen, internal genital organs and of the male's penile and testicular movements.

A number of questions are stimulated by the material presented in this book. What is the relationship between the development of the ego's mastery over spatial relationships and the processes of self-object differentiation and separation-individuation? What is the effect of defective perceptual-motor coördination—as in the child with minimal brain dysfunction—upon the ego's capacity to orient itself to the animate and inanimate world and to develop the capacity for independent mastery? With the widening of the scope of psychoanalysis to embrace the investigation of ego disturbances and borderline phenomena, such issues become increasingly relevant. It is self-evident that the practice of psychoanalysis as a therapeutic modality and as a research tool is facilitated by as precise an understanding as possible of the complex developmental and maturational sequences involved in the hierarchical organization of mental functioning.

MARTIN A. SILVERMAN (MAPLEWOOD, N. J.)

THE SAVAGE GOD: A STUDY OF SUICIDE. By A. Alvarez. New York: Random House, 1972. 299 pp.

The Savage God is an impressive attempt to join approaches of literary criticism, intellectual history, biographical sketches, and

psychological explanations, especially psychoanalytic ones. It includes a moving personal memoir of Sylvia Plath; a lucid review of attitudes toward suicide through the ages, focusing on literary figures and their works; a thumbnail review of psychological explanations of the phenomenon; a penetrating essay analyzing the ubiquity of suicide among literary artists in the twentieth century; and a final chapter describing the author's own suicide attempt some ten years ago.

The form and personal tone of the book suggest that it is an attempt at self-analysis, and the last chapter is better seen as a preface. The author's need to understand the obsessional temptation in order to contain the desire for self-extinction, and then to exhibit these discoveries to as wide an audience as the mass media enable him to reach, has an analogy in the analytic situation. Thinking something, saying it out loud, and then knowing someone is listening—are three stages toward giving the thought real existence and binding truth.

To estimate the success of the book, then, requires a judgment of the depth of self-knowledge achieved; of Alvarez's ability to apply adequately formulated psychoanalytic explanations contributing to this self-knowledge; and his use of this introspective understanding in giving insights into the biographical, sociological, and literary material he has chosen. I feel that in spite of his extensive literary and sociological knowledge, the hoped-for comprehension of the painful psychic state of the person who wishes to take his own life is often missing—whether the artist discussed is Sylvia Plath, Thomas Chatterton, or himself.

It is appropriate to begin a review of the book with the crucial last chapter, since the denials and evasions of expected conclusions permeating much of the rest of this multifaceted study begin here. Alvarez demurs, understandably, about many facets of his own case history. Yet, since he courageously offers the reader a glimpse into some of the most agonized moments of his life, he grants us the right to judge the validity of his explanations. He tries to impress us with the meaninglessness of the suicidal gesture when it is finally performed, and at the same time he describes it as a foreordained culmination of a daemonic drive whose roots he barely explores. He realizes that these roots go back to his childhood, and gives data which invite interpretation from analysts,

but he fails to draw certain inevitable messages from his own account. For instance, his parents both told him as a child that they 'had half-heartedly put their heads in the gas oven'. To him this means that they planted an intriguing seed in a child who, he properly notes, cannot understand the fearful meaning of this action in adult terms, but unfortunately he also fails to comprehend the experience in an age-appropriate manner. To a child, he says, to put one's head in an oven, 'like the Sunday roast joint', seems 'more ludicrous than tragic . . .'. With such a facile simile he denies the terror implicit in the witch's oven in Hansel and Gretel, and all the other destructive maws that a child conjures up out of adult-inflicted traumata and the child's own projected oral-sadistic fantasies.

Although Alvarez has clearly read some Freud and devotes a section of the book to an account of freudian and Kleinian contributions to his subject, in writing about others as well as himself he fails to clarify the importance of screen memories, the primal fantasies associated with psychosexual phases in the development of children, the implied disturbances in parents who *do* such things and then *tell* such tales, the meaning of unconscious communication between parents and children, the compulsion to repeat, and so on down a long, familiar list. To explain the suicidal impulse in general, he falls back on his version of the death instinct but he virtually equates the abstract concept of the death instinct with the desire for self-extinction. He also fails, as many have done before him, to distinguish the theory of behavior determined by forces 'beyond the pleasure principle' from concepts which define the pleasure-unpleasure series in terms of energy discharge and the relationship of the latter to the experience of pleasure and pain as subjective affect states. He can therefore quote Freud's use of the term 'satisfaction' in describing the melancholic's behavior, and in the next sentence replace the word by 'pleasure'. Alvarez's exposition of the dual-instinct theory and of the theory of aggression, particularly, are often inexact and superficial. Therefore we have reason to question his statement that, 'the closer the theory gets to the fact of any case, the more complex it becomes and the less the act is explained'. This statement has a glibness typical of many of his generalizations when he deals with psychoanalytic psychology. It is certainly true

that any case has complexities which existent theories fail to explain. At the same time, the existent theories have complexities that the author fails to appreciate. Characteristically, he gives the simplification of the theory, and then criticizes *his* version for its defects in explanatory value.

The intellectual history of suicide, with special focus on literary figures and movements, is fascinating however and makes available raw material for many insights. The opening section on his friend Sylvia Plath is particularly valuable to readers of Plath's poetry and novel. This section, an examination of Plath's life in relation to her poetry, is the most moving part of The Savage God. The emotional core of the chapter is a public apology to her for failing to heed the hints of impending danger in her work and her contacts with him as a friend. While Plath gave him private hints that could be ignored out of anxiety and ambivalence, he gives public notice to millions, assuring himself perhaps that *someone* will listen, that the danger he survived once and appears to have conquered must never be ignored.

For it is Alvarez's main thesis that the tendency toward suicide is the underside of the creative sensibility: the literary artist lives on the thin edge of self-destruction. In our time particularly the artist must take upon himself, like a scapegoat, and in a sense temporarily internalize, the disorganized, often meaningless violence and intolerable sense of disaster of his society. As the world exists on the edge of extinction through technologically developed machines of violence, the artist must experience, and then externalize in æsthetically organized forms, this chaos beyond despair. The experience of death itself must be comprehended subjectively so that it can re-emerge transformed into a contemporary art that expresses the absurdity of unnatural, premature death. The artist of our time strains to find a language through a 'testing out of his own death in his imagination'. As the rendering of the extremes of subjective experience has become more and more permissible, expecially in poetry, the artist's work has more and more represented *himself* at the extremes of experience. The work itself then may no longer purge, or enact a 'love affair with the world', but may become a murderous object demanding his death. Kafka, by asking that his writings be burned posthumously, attempted to turn his premature death into a suicide. He is tell-

ingly quoted: 'The books we need are the kind that act upon us like a misfortune, that make us suffer like the death of someone we love more than ourselves, that make us feel as though we were on the verge of suicide, or lost in a forest remote from all human habitation—a book should serve as the axe for the frozen seas within us'.

In the course of reviewing the historical background of the relationship between suicide and literature, Alvarez surveys the role and meaning of self-destructive fantasies and acts in the history of literature and in some of its major figures. There are chapters on Greek, Roman, and early Christian views of suicide. He describes the partial shift from the moral condemnation of suicide in the Middle Ages as illustrated in Dante's epic to the new attitudes wrought in the Renaissance by the glorification of the individual's right to choose even death to affirm his identity. From here, he briefly discusses the eighteenth century rationalists, including Thomas Chatterton. The material beautifully supports Greenacre's views on the role of the family romance in Chatterton's special gifts and destiny, but Alvarez fails to use his data illuminatingly. The main issues are evaded, it seems to me, in such homilies as: he 'poisoned himself not out of any excessive feeling, but because he was unable to keep himself alive by writing', (i.e., financially). The denial of unconscious motive is briefly lifted, to be sure, in the concluding sentences on Chatterton which explain that death may have meant rejoining the father who died three months before his birth. The chapter on the Romantic period suggests that the nineteenth century quest for passionate feeling required a yearning for death as one of the necessary stimulants to the Romantic imagination. In the twentieth century, the concern of art became the self, and the destruction of the self, 'the ultimate concern of art'. From here on the boundaries between the art and the artist become blurred, and the artist's life is not only the source of his art but his own identity, conveyed in his way of life and manner of death, becomes inseparable from the art itself, as the above quotation from Kafka shows.

Alvarez differentiates two types of art in which this phenomenon of creating literary works that represent objectively the inner state of mourning may occur. In what he calls *Totalitarian Art,* the artist creates, and risks his life to create, a human perspective

for the dehumanizing process of the totalitarian society. The price of maintaining traditional values of art in such a society is, Alvarez states unequivocally, 'suicide—or silence, which amounts to the same thing'. In the second category, *Extremist Art,* the writer—Becket, for example—creates a world that God has abandoned. The artistic discipline attempts to control the nihilism of our violent societies by exposing the raw material of dreams, of private chaos, directly and in full consciousness. In this sense he feels Sylvia Plath had to tackle her own death in her work.

I found this thesis sensitively and knowledgeably elaborated. It becomes especially disappointing, therefore, that our further expectations of a meaningful link between Plath's creative life and her suicide—as well as such connections in the lives and deaths of Berryman, Thomas, Pavese, and others—are so frustrated. Why do some artists commit suicide at the height of their powers and productivity, and others seemingly as reactions to their decline? Alvarez concludes with the double negation: 'Yet her [Plath's] actual suicide adds nothing to her work and proves nothing about it. It was simply the risk she took in handling such volatile material.' Sylvia Plath's father died when she was eight. In her poem, Daddy, she invents a father figure who represents the primal scene father as the Nazi beast ravishing the Jewish mother, against whose destruction of herself by identification she struggles as against a daemonic force to which she ultimately succumbs. Her description of her impulse reaches a height in the statement, 'Every woman adores a Fascist'. All this is denied in Alvarez's strikingly worded conclusion, even though some intellectual attention has been paid in an earlier section (labeled 'Theories') to mourning, introjection of love objects lost in childhood, etc. The two parts of the book are isolated from each other by the main historical section. One is impressed here with the familiar superficial intellectual acceptance of still repressed ideas in the absence of true conviction.

Finally, the reader who wishes to feel he has acquired knowledge of this secret subject is allowed to finish the book safely with a relatively comfortable feeling of curiosity satisfied. On the last page we are told that '. . . sexual permissiveness is no longer an issue', that 'the real resistance now is to an art which forces its audience to recognize and accept imaginatively . . . not the facts of life, but the facts of death and violence . . .'. To those who

believe both on a theoretical basis and from the facts of our time that sexual 'explicitness' is inseparable from aggressive explicitness, that both reflect the consequences of processes in which the regressed ego and superego are overwhelmed by the reinstinctualization of defused aggressive and erotic drives, this artificial separation of derivatives of two instincts in any psychic phenomenon is untenable. With Plath's extraordinary clarity she recognizes intuitively that massive reinstinctualization does not effect one drive while sparing the other. The regression to omnivorous orality is depicted memorably in the luncheon sequence at the beginning of The Bell Jar. The heroine's raging appetite for all the food she can gobble up, even steal, her food poisoning as a consequence, her collapse and rescue from near death, mark the beginning of her inevitable descent to a suicide attempt by swallowing an overdose of pills. One senses the 'rightness' of this conjunction both æsthetically and psychologically.

The Savage God is ultimately disappointing because it fails in its intention to link its interpretations and understanding about the 'artist' and 'art' with a penetrating psychological study of the individual who is also an artist. Thereby we miss the painful recognition of the deepest truths about the artist whose special gifts enable his work to show us ourselves.

SHELLEY ORGEL (NORWALK, CONN.)

THE SHEPPARD & ENOCH PRATT HOSPITAL, 1853-1970. A HISTORY. By Bliss Forbush, LL.D. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1971. 266 pp.

This book is an excellent, well written, thoroughly documented, informative yet short review of the founding, growth, and development of one of the outstanding psychiatric institutions in this country. The author, who has been associated with the Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital since 1957, as president of the hospital since 1960, has used as source materials for his work hundreds of hospital reports, minutes of meetings, essays, reprints, and newspaper accounts preserved in the hospital files. In 1853 the founder, Moses Sheppard, a single, wealthy Quaker from Baltimore set up a trust for an asylum for the insane that 'would combine every feature that vision and experience might indicate as requisite or desirable to minister to the greatest possible advantage of the pa-

tients'. With an additional bequest from one of his friends, Enoch Pratt, ground was purchased and the buildings were erected over a period of thirty years. The first Physician-in-Chief, Dr. Brush, set a standard of patient care, occupational therapy, and record maintenance, followed and expanded by Dr. Ross M. Chapman who introduced psychotherapy in the hospital. Among the most famous psychiatrists who worked, studied, and taught there, Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan spent seven years in the treatment of young male schizophrenics and from his research published many of his early papers on schizophrenia. Later, Dr. Lewis B. Hill, Dr. Lawrence Kubie, and Dr. Samuel Novey participated as directors of training. Expansion of the facilities and services included new buildings, the Social Service Department, and the Psychiatric School of Nursing. The most recent developments comprise a Children's Day Program, an Adult Day Care Center, a Psychiatric Emergency Clinic, and a Crisis Intervention Clinic. Many statistical tables concerning patient population, diagnosis, improvement rate, financial statements with operating income and expenses are listed, underlining the growth of the institution at various times.

Two minor criticisms are suggested. First, more personal anecdotes would have helped liven and lighten the reading. Second, one senses that shortcomings and temporary failures have been somewhat understated. Behind the dry statistics, however, one perceives the continuity which has been preserved by the administrators in maintaining a tradition of excellence, while remaining responsive to the pressing needs of rapidly changing times. An appendix listing trustees and staff as well as a convenient index are added. A brief but apt foreword by Dr. Kubie serves as introduction. The book is highly recommended as a valuable contribution to an important phase of the history of American psychiatry.

ALBERT E. DREYFUS (BALTIMORE)

HUMAN SEXUAL INADEQUACY. By William H. Masters and Virginia E. Johnson. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1970. 467 pp.

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN SEXUAL INADEQUACY. By Fred Belliveau and Lin Richter. New York: Bantam Books, 1970. 242 pp.

Masters and Johnson's first sentence contains an essential aspect of their therapeutic approach: '. . . there is no such thing as an uninvolved partner in any marriage in which there is some form

of sexual inadequacy'. They consider neither the dysfunctional member nor the marital partner the real patient; the patient is 'the marital relationship'. It was therefore almost inevitable that the therapist evolved into a 'dual-sex therapy team'. The 'dual-sex patient' treated by a dual-sex team represents in the view of this reporter a significant modification in the treatment of sexual difficulties. The treatment goal is *'the reversal of symptoms of sexual inadequacy in psychoneurotic patients'* (reviewer's italics). This limited goal does not compete with the broader goal of patients in psychotherapy.

The first two days of a couple's treatment are spent in history taking and in sexual abstinence. On the third day, following complete physical and laboratory examinations, the two therapists and the two patients sit together for the first 'roundtable' meeting. At the meeting the couple is confronted with an objective presentation of their sexual problem by the co-therapists. They then receive 'authoritative' instruction 'regarding sensory appreciation' of sexual feelings, beginning with touch and called 'sensate focus'. One partner, the 'giving' one, is instructed to touch and fondle the 'getting' partner, but genitals and breasts are off limits at this time. This approach gives the partners an opportunity—perhaps for the first time—to 'pleasure' each other without concern for 'end-point release'. For many couples this closeness is a new experience in 'giving', 'getting', and taking turns in performing these roles. In my opinion, it is the most important part of the treatment. At the roundtable discussions the misinformation, unrealistic expectations, communication failures, and destructive behavior patterns are presented to the marital partners in an objective and nonjudgmental manner. One can imagine how difficult this is to accept for patients who had participated in a one-to-one psychotherapeutic situation prior to entering the Masters and Johnson treatment. On the fourth day the partners are instructed that breasts and genitals are now to be included in the sensate pleasure, but orgasm is still to be avoided. The co-therapists' instruction gives the couple permission to enjoy sexual foreplay to the fullest. Touching and masturbating each other (without so labeling it), the couple can be young again and carefree and—if successful—guilt-free.

The first specific sexual problem taken up by Masters and Johnson is premature ejaculation. Considering the difficulty in treating this dysfunction in psychotherapy, Masters and Johnson's treatment appears simple and successful: only four failures among one hundred and eighty-six patients (two per cent). The treatment is based on the 'squeeze technique' which brings ejaculatory control within two to three days. The wife squeezes the penis hard just below the glans, between thumb and first two fingers, as soon as full erection is achieved. This successfully inhibits ejaculation. Since Masters and Johnson believe that early heterosexual experiences performed in a hurry 'imprinted' this rapid ejaculatory pattern, the treatment is based on reverse conditioning.

The authors treated almost two hundred and fifty impotent patients, thirty-two of them suffering from 'primary impotence', defined as the complete absence of successful intromission with either sex. In almost sixty per cent the symptom was reversed within two weeks. Masters and Johnson define as 'secondarily impotent' a man who has succeeded at least once, but has had erective failure in at least twenty-five per cent of his sexual opportunities. In those instances where treatment is successful (in secondary impotence, seventy-four per cent), the man is soon able to have an erection, moves on to successful intromission, and finally to coitus. Thirteen women served as 'surrogate' partners for forty-one single men with various sexual inadequacies. Symptoms were reversed in thirty-two of the forty-one men.

Masters and Johnson see 'the major source of woman's sexual dysfunction' in the 'sociocultural influence [which] more often than not places [her] in a position in which she must adapt, sublimate, inhibit, or even distort her natural capacity to function sexually in order to fulfill her genetically assigned role'. The authors do not discuss repression in the analytic sense when they enumerate the various defenses (adaptation, sublimation, inhibition, and distortion) causing orgasmic dysfunction. They do, however, describe how 'residual repression of sexual responsibility' leads to 'I don't feel anything'. They conclude that for most nonorgasmic women repression is the 'initial . . . influence in failure of sexual function'.

'Primary orgasmic dysfunction' is a lifelong nonorgasmic condition. Even if a woman with this dysfunction experiences or-

gasm in her dreams (as did two women in this study), she is still considered primarily nonorgasmic. Masters and Johnson make the interesting comment that a woman who is able to fantasy to orgasm is also orgastic in reality. Therapy for orgasmic dysfunction derives from two sources of material reflecting 'the female's prevailing sexual attitudes, receptivity, and levels of responsivity'. The first source is the history taken during the first two days which makes it possible to identify the erotically significant expectations and experiences evoked in the course of the sexual exchange with the husband. It is the function of both therapists to identify all of these expectations, especially those which exist only in fantasy and lead to a rejection of even the best efforts of the husband. The second source of material which 'characterizes this particular mode of psychotherapy' develops 'from the daily discussions following each sensate-focus exercise'. Perhaps the most important contribution given in these discussions is the 'permission by the therapists to express herself sexually', i.e., respond sexually to her partner. One of the interesting forms this guidance takes is the encouragement the therapists give to the wife 'to think of the encompassed penis as hers to play with, to feel, and to enjoy', to assure her that once the penis is inside her vagina, it 'belongs to her just as the vagina belongs to her husband'. To verbalize for their patients this particular aspect of sexual relations indicates to me the extent to which Masters and Johnson are able to translate complicated concepts into practical application.

The chapters on the sexual inadequacies of aging men and women are important for many reasons, not the least being the medical profession's lack of accurate information about the physiological changes of sexual patterns in later life. As far as the aging male is concerned, the physician needs to know (as does the patient) that it will take longer to achieve erection and that the erection will not be as hard, at least not initially. By accepting this change as part of the aging process, the patient will be less anxious. Once erection has been established, the older man has certain advantages over the younger one: his ejaculatory control is greater, i.e., he can and often wishes to maintain the erection without ejaculating. In addition, the first phase of the ejaculation process is absent, the expulsion of semen is less forceful, the amount of semen is reduced, and the erection will be lost imme-

diately after ejaculation. In the aging woman there is a corresponding slowing up of her sexual response. Just as it takes longer for the older man to achieve erection, so it takes the older woman between two and five minutes to establish lubrication compared with fifteen to thirty seconds in the younger woman. A reduced elasticity of various parts of the genital apparatus (vagina, labia) accounts for a modified physiological reaction. Also, as in the older male, the orgasmic phase is shortened. The older the couple, the greater the incidence of dysfunction in both partners. The over-all failure rate among the older group, males and females, is thirty per cent.

The final pages of the book are devoted to one of the saddest commentaries regarding professional persons, namely, those professionals who have sexual relations with patients. The authors call this misconduct a 'tragic psychotherapeutic malpractice' of which no segment of the helping profession is free. The dual-team set-up presents a 'built-in mutual protection and defense for both patients and co-therapists'.

In summary, Masters and Johnson report on their observations of five hundred and ten couples in which either or both partners were sexually dysfunctional in seven hundred and thirty-three instances. Adding the unmarried patients brings the total to seven hundred and ninety. For a variety of reasons they represent a highly selected population; for instance, in eighty-nine couples either husband or wife, or both, were physicians. Among forty-three of these eighty-nine couples, at least one of the partners was a psychiatrist. Furthermore, four hundred and thirteen individuals had prior or concurrent psychotherapy, a 'mixed blessing' according to Masters and Johnson. The failure rate upon completion of the two-week treatment course was one hundred and forty-two of seven hundred and ninety cases, or eighteen and nine-tenths per cent. For the five-year follow-up, a total of three hundred and thirteen cases treated between 1959-1964 were used. During this time only sixteen individuals reported a reversal of cure. Therefore, the over-all failure rate after five years is twenty per cent.

A paperback companion book, Understanding Human Sexual Inadequacy by Fred Belliveau and Lin Richter, was published by agreement with Masters and Johnson's publisher and is the only book for the layman 'exclusively authorized and endorsed by

Masters and Johnson'. In a foreword to the book Masters and Johnson make the following comment: 'Their [Belliveau and Richter] dual approach carries through an important concept of our own. If a dual-sex team treats couples for sexual dysfunction, it is appropriate that a man and woman writing team explain how couples are helped to overcome their sexual difficulties.'

After a brief survey of the men preceding Masters and Johnson —Havelock Ellis, Freud, van de Velde, Dickinson, and Kinsey— the authors trace the life history of Masters and Johnson and then describe the development of Masters's research in reproductive biology beginning in 1953 at the Washington University in St. Louis. His research program was supported for ten years by public and private funds. In 1964 Masters and Johnson formed their own Reproductive Biology Research Foundation. Their staff has grown from three to thirty people and the Foundation now includes a fully automated chemical-biological laboratory. The work of the Foundation ranges from basic research in the physiology of conception to the investigation of the 'psychology of human sexual response and its applications in the treatment of human sexual inadequacy'.

While Masters and Johnson had expected objections and criticisms from many quarters (for instance, a respected colleague in obstetrics and gynecology walked up to Masters and said, 'I want to tell you that you sicken me'), and had decided to proceed at their own pace, it was one attack by a psychoanalyst in Washington which they took more seriously. Concerned that 'an avalanche of unfavorable publicity might bury their work', they decided to proceed with the publication of their first book, Human Sexual Response, earlier than originally intended.

Belliveau and Richter devote one chapter to a condensed version of this first book to aid the lay reader in understanding Masters and Johnson's approach to therapy. Lay and professional people, however, may read with profit the chapter on the reaction in the news media and in the medical press to this publication.

The second part of the book presents in simple, nontechnical style (both authors are editors at Little, Brown & Co.) the content of Human Sexual Inadequacy. The same drawings as in the original book are used. By simplifying, condensing, and omitting the

case histories, Belliveau and Richter have done an excellent job of bringing this difficult subject matter to the general public.

MARCEL HEIMAN (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOLOGICAL CUES IN FORECASTING PHYSICAL ILLNESS. By Samuel Silverman, M.D. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970. 403 pp.

Silverman presents detailed material from the intensive psychoanalytic treatment of eight patients who were physically healthy at the start of analysis, each of whom developed physical symptoms during analysis. He observed a number of psychological manifestations preceding the onset of the physical symptoms, which he considers cues for the forecasting of physical illness. Ten such cues are listed and discussed. Among these, 'exposure to critical psychological stress in an individual who in the past may have responded to psychologic stress with physical dysfunction' appears as an important characteristic.

On the basis of his findings Silverman suggests that persons exposed to critical psychological stress 'should seek medical consultation even if no gross somatic signs or symptoms are evident following such exposure'. If there are suggestive psychological manifestations even in the absence of somatic disease, such an individual should be followed from the 'physical standpoint' at frequent intervals, and limited goal type psychotherapy for relief could be instituted.

It appears to this reviewer that Silverman has unduly limited the goals and the potential for such research. To demonstrate the role of psychologic stress in the precipitation of physical illness and to direct attention to certain psychological manifestations as early signs of impending illness are certainly important achievements. Silverman, however, has not fully utilized his own material or the potential of psychoanalysis as a method for research (in depth psychology). Nor has he sufficiently cited relevant contributions of other investigators in this particular area of research.

Reports on similar phenomena—i.e., physical symptoms occurring during analyses of patients with character disorders—have

recently appeared in the psychoanalytic literature.[1] These reports deal with aspects of great interest and significance but apparently have not received Silverman's attention. The authors of the reports have found that the physical symptoms occurring in such patients during analysis represent a special type of transference reaction which develops in a very dependent and insufficiently analyzed (mother) transference. The psychological manifestations preceding the onset of the physical symptoms observed by Silverman would thus be useful not only for the prediction of physical symptoms but, even more importantly, as a cue for analyzing the transference and countertransference and possibly preventing this undesirable development.

It seems to this reviewer that Silverman considers a patient's disposition to react to specific traumatic situations with physical symptoms as if it were an unchangeable constitutional factor. He refers to it as a 'life style'. Numerous reports in the literature indicate that certain patients in certain situations can switch from manifestly disturbed behavior to physical illness. In some patients overtly disturbed behavior and physical symptoms can co-exist at times. This shift may occur spontaneously or during treatment. In the latter case we have an opportunity to study the conditions under which such a shift in symptoms takes place. Silverman's cases provide such an opportunity because, except for one patient, all had had physical illness at one time or another in their lives prior to analysis and at the beginning of analysis were physically healthy. The physical symptoms they developed during analysis were recurrences of the very symptoms they had in the past and were not really a *de novo* development. That development of specific physical symptoms occurs in a particular traumatic situation—a situation which has a specific unconscious meaning to the patient—, is therefore not unexpected but rather a predict-

[1] *Cf.*, Atkins, Norman B.: *Acting Out and Psychosomatic Illness as Related Regressive Trends.* Int. J. Psa., XLIX, 1968, pp. 221-223; Savitt, Robert A.: *Transference, Somatization, and Symbiotic Need.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XVII, 1969, pp. 1030-1054; Sperling, Melitta: *Acting-Out Behaviour and Psychosomatic Symptoms: Clinical and Theoretical Aspects.* Int. J. Psa., XLIX, 1968, pp. 250-253; Wilson, C. Philip: *Psychosomatic Asthma and Acting Out. A Case of Bronchial Asthma That Developed De Novo in the Terminal Phase of Analysis. Op. cit.*, pp. 330-333.

able event. Our efforts in treatment can thus be directed more to prevention than to prediction.

Just as in the analysis of neurotics, in which we expect to resolve the infantile neurosis that serves as a model for the patient's later neurosis, so too in the treatment of some character disorders we would expect to recover a childhood tendency to develop physical symptoms under certain traumatic conditions. One such condition may be a regression to a dependent, somatic type of symbiotic relationship during analysis. Silverman does not give enough emphasis to the defensive aspects of physical illness in these patients. In a situation where there is danger of a break with reality and of suicidal, perverse, or psychotic impulses, physical illness may serve as a quick and legitimate 'way out'.

More emphasis could also be placed on the depressive aspects of physical illness in these patients. The usual experience in psychoanalysis is a decrease in the patient's need for physical illness as a consequence of the decrease in guilt feeling and the need for punishment and suffering. Depression and an increase in masochistic feelings increase the patient's need for physical symptoms. Silverman mentions among his ten criteria the turning inward of aggression in such patients, but he does not deal sufficiently with this phenomenon as a transference vicissitude. The aggression originally directed toward the analyst in the transference may turn abruptly against the self and may be associated with physical illness. While the rage against the analyst is turned inward and dealt with somatically, the patient may at the same time become even more submissive and dependent upon the analyst.

Silverman's cases are fascinating; his case reports contain a wealth of analytic information. For this alone the book is worthwhile reading. It is a valuable contribution to an area of research of great importance to all who treat sick people.

MELITTA SPERLING (NEW YORK)

MYTHOPOESIS. Mythic Patterns in the Literary Classics. By Harry Slochower. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970. 362 pp.

Slochower's basic thesis is presented in the first section of this volume. The chapters that follow are devoted to an examination of the Book of Job, Greek mythopoesis, The Divine Comedy, Don

Quixote, Hamlet, Faust, Moby Dick, The Brothers Karamazov, Pelle the Conqueror, Gide's Theseus, Camus's Sisyphus, Sartre's The Flies, and Mann's The Magic Mountain and Doctor Faustus. One cannot put down this book without a feeling of admiration for the author's wide-ranging scholarship. Yet it seems to me that the author's basic argument is questionable.

In his preface Slochower declares: 'The machine and leisure in themselves cannot be held responsible for our spiritual "malaise". It is true that the corruption of our economic-social-political relations contributes to the corroding of our motives, to the reigning attitude of "what's in it for me?". However, on a deeper level, the difficulty is nurtured by our obsession with the immediate present. . . . It has no future because—and this anticipates the argument of the book—it lacks the vision of values created in the past by our living mythic tradition. Without such a basic platform, the satisfactions of technology are not humanly adequate. We remain restless, nervous, irritable' (pp. 13-14). I fully agree with Slochower that 'our obsession with the present . . . lacks the vision of values created in the past by our living mythic tradition'. But I would argue that this state of affairs is irreparable. Even when these values are embedded in books they have little effect. Studies of reading show that most people, including college graduates, read few books and gravitate toward books of poor quality.

The people who read the kind of books Slochower discusses are a tiny minority. Curiously, however, the very shortcomings he mentions do, I think, have some positive if slight impact on reading in general, for the frustrations and deprivations we suffer in our experience are for a number of people a powerful motive for reading books in general and fiction in particular. This is not an *ad hominem* debater's point; it is a view developed at some length in my book, Fiction and the Unconscious.[1]

Slochower describes mythopoesis as follows: 'It examines those myths which have seized the imagination of our classical writers who then transformed the various mythological accounts into a single, unified work of art. Mytho-*poesis* . . . *re*-creates the ancient stories. And, while mythology presents its stories as if they actually took place, mythopoesis transposes them to a symbolic mean-

[1] Lesser, Simon O.: *Fiction and the Unconscious.* Boston: Beacon Press, 1957; Vintage Books, 1962. Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXVII, 1958, pp. 270-271.

ing' (p. 15). To the extent that the first statement is valid, I believe it is due to the fact that the authors Slochower deals with have subordinated most of the mythical material impinging upon their work, and have created characters and developed their dramas and novels in the light of their own literary intuition. There is little if any residue of the earlier versions of the Hamlet story in Shakespeare's Hamlet. In contrast, the plague that grips Thebes at the beginning of Œdipus the King is doubtless a facet of a myth. But I suspect that only relatively sophisticated readers recognize it as such and that it has little extra emotional resonance for them. There is a larger component of myth in Œdipus at Colonus, but in both dramas the action arises from the personality of the characters—to a remarkable extent from Œdipus himself. In an article in College English (Vol. XXIX, December, 1967)[2] I tried to demonstrate that Œdipus the King is a drama of character, not fate nor, to any considerable extent, myth. Kanzer goes me one better on the importance of character as a determinant of action by pointing out that Laius's exposure of his newborn son stems from 'renascent memories of his own infantile œdipal strivings'.[3]

The unity that creates the emotional impact of a great literary work arises from the fact that a great author has put his stamp upon it, departing from the myth and mythical characterizations to whatever extent suits his purpose. For example, in Œdipus the King, Sophocles creates the character of Œdipus in a way that permits an analytically oriented reader to understand not only his actions but his speeches—and even his slips of the tongue and other errors. Sophocles does not hesitate to characterize the older Œdipus of Œdipus at Colonus in a somewhat different way. Creon of course is treated differently in each of the three Theban plays.

Slochower seems to me to overvalue the extra-literary as well as the literary power of myths. He writes: 'The fateful import of the myth for our day stems from the fact that it is pivotal to the idea of One World. It can determine whether this world is to be

[2] Reprinted in somewhat revised version in Bentley, Eric, Editor: *The Great Playwrights*. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1970, pp. 123-152.

[3] *Cf.*, Kanzer, Mark: On Interpreting the Œdipus Plays. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society, Vol. III.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1965, pp. 26-38.

one of unity and totality or one of uniformity and totalitarianism, whether the powers of man are to be freed or shackled' (p. 16). This is a noble but probably unrealistic hope. Since myths are less well known today than in earlier ages and have less impact, it seems unlikely that they can contribute as much toward achieving the goals mentioned as the United Nations, the spread of English, and transportation and communication achievements that bring the peoples of the world closer together—not that such things as these have accomplished enough to permit us to view the world scene without anxiety.

Later Slochower declares: 'On the historic level, each mythopoeic work is viewed as the center which unifies the multiple cultural forms of its era, organizing its art, psychology, philosophy, religion and social currents' (p. 22). He feels that a universal pattern is intertwined with the historic one. Though in agreement with this statement, I suspect that it is recognized by relatively few readers. On the other hand nearly all of the books Slochower discusses have a universal and enduring significance and appeal for readers with the requisite sensibility.

Slochower develops a structure for the works he later discusses. Each work, he maintains, has a similar unity by virtue of being a drama in three acts, followed by an epilogue. In the first act there is a 'communal harmony', and man seems to be in a state of blissfulness which may be called Eden or Paradise, among other things. 'In mythopoesis, however, this first act no longer exists, but is only a nostalgic "memory" ' (p. 23). In the second act 'harmony is disturbed by the emergence of the hero who sets out on his *Quest* . . .' (p. 22). This involves challenge and revolt, even crime. Only through such attitudes and acts can the hero *'become a creative agent of his community'* (*ibid.*). The quest or journey 'is a central experience in all the great myths' (p. 23). The third act includes homecoming, but in the modern myth both the journey and the homecoming are relatively indefinite. Homecoming may also involve self-punishment and self-questioning. The latter 'holds the promise of the hero's transformation' (p. 24). He can 'recast the function of his demon and realign himself with the wider interests of his group' (*ibid.*). The epilogue involves 'tragic transcendence', not the resolution of all problems in an unbelievable happy ending but 'the successful *tempering* of the conflicting

relations' (p. 25). Though this scheme is developed with care, some forcing is required to apply it to some of the works discussed.

Most of the remainder of the book is given over to analyses of individual works. By far the best, it seems to me, is the analysis of The Divine Comedy. Here Slochower finds a number of references to Dante's inner emotional life which, so far as I know, have escaped Dante scholars. In contrast, the analysis of Hamlet is one of the weakest in the book. Five pages into the chapter Slochower summarizes Ernest Jones's excellent exposition and amplification of Freud's insightful comments about Hamlet in The Interpretation of Dreams. But before and after this part of Slochower's discussion, he makes statements about the play that are incompatible with the Freud-Jones interpretation and, in a few instances, of doubtful accuracy. For example, though he notes that Hamlet 'is the only one both to see and talk to the Ghost' (p. 156), he does not consider the possibility of viewing the Ghost as largely a projection of Hamlet's feelings and surmises. (This despite Hamlet's 'O my prophetic soul!' when the Ghost tells him that Claudius was his murderer.) Nor is it altogether true that Hamlet 'believes that there *are* objective norms of right and wrong but does not know which action corresponds to these norms' (p. 157). This certainly does not hold for the central 'action' of the play, Hamlet's unqualified acceptance of the task of avenging his father. Hamlet knows very well what deed he has promised to undertake, and lashes himself again and again for postponing it. Nor is he so confused about norms as to be incapable of basing judgments and courses of action upon them. His downgrading of Ophelia and heartless treatment of her comprise a case in point. In part his conduct is an overflow of the misogyny he feels because of his disgust at his mother's behavior, but in perhaps greater part it is a judgment on Ophelia for spying upon him for her father.

Though I would like to discuss some of Slochower's other analyses, space does not permit this. But there is one facet of Slochower's scholarship that I feel merits thought, discussion, and even a certain amount of what might be called action. This is his almost complete reliance on the work of psychoanalysts and people from fields other than literary study, for example, mythology, philosophy, and history. When he does bolster his argument by

referring to what students of literature have to say, he tends to rely on relatively conventional critics such as A. C. Bradley and J. Dover Wilson, or a more recent example, Ihab Hassan. Though Mythopoesis is a heavily footnoted book, I found only one reference to a work by an analytically oriented teacher of English, Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare (1964) by Norman Holland. Since Slochower is himself analytically oriented, I suspect he would find the work of colleagues who share his approach of special value. But there is no indication in Mythopoesis that Slochower is acquainted with Holland's more recent Dynamics of Literary Response (1968) or his articles, the work of Louis Fraiberg and Robert Rogers, or Frederick Crews's articles and his fine 1966 book on Hawthorne. Many other professors of English and works of literary criticism could be mentioned. That Mythopoesis suffers from the lack of references to some of these scholars re-enforces my long-held belief that the most fruitful exchanges psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically knowledgeable teachers and critics in the humanities can have is by getting to know each other's work better. Analysts with their comprehensive knowledge of psychoanalysis kept green by their daily use of it are likely to come up with insights and formulations that might elude their campus colleagues. On the other hand, analytically oriented teachers of the humanities may sometimes equal or exceed analysts who are students of literature in literary sensibility and thus also have valuable insights to offer. Moreover, they may have more training and, hence, proficiency than their analytic colleagues in bringing out all the more telling evidence in a literary work which supports a given interpretation.

How can the gap between the two groups be bridged? I can only make some offhand suggestions. Perhaps analytically oriented teachers should try more often than they now do to publish some of their articles in analytic journals—and analysts try more often to publish in literary journals. People from universities might participate more than they now do at analytic meetings, and analysts might be invited more often to speak at universities. It seems certain that if the people comprising the two groups are reasonably flexible they can learn an immeasurable amount from one another.

SIMON O. LESSER (AMHERST, MASS.)

INTRODUCTION TO STRUCTURALISM. Edited by Michael Lane. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. 456 pp.

The British title of this volume, Structuralism—A Reader, fits better than the current title. Essentially a compilation of articles illustrating the applications of structuralism, the papers are loosely grouped into linguistics, history, mythology, mathematics, science, and literature. There are no section headings, but the book contains an excellent bibliography and good notes.

The definition of structuralism as used in this book varies with the discipline to which it is applied, in accord with intrinsic characteristics of the discipline. In general, the definition concerns the concept that 'there is in man an innate, genetically transmitted and determined mechanism that acts as a structuring force'. This 'determines the limits within which the structure of all types of social phenomena can be formed' (p. 18). Social structures are 'genetically rather than socially or culturally determined' (p. 31). Specifically, in psycholinguistics Chomsky has suggested that there may be a genetically determined fixed schema which provides 'the mould in which language itself is cast' (p. 29). There is 'a sort of innate grammaticality, a genetic code "which in its turn, determines the semantic interpretation of an undefined group of real phrases" '. This structuralist theory, based on clinical research (see p. 57), seems akin to the psychoanalytic concept of universal symbols. In brief, structuralism is the study of the effects of a postulated genetically determined innate structuring mechanism which guides, shapes, and limits the creative efforts and characteristics of man in society. Both psychoanalysis and structuralism explain observed phenomena with concepts and theories expressed in abstractions of a high order. The concepts of one cannot be easily translated into the abstract conceptualizations of the other, but many areas of research interest are shared in common. In the present collection, individual papers have observational material germane to psychoanalysis. This review can merely point to some of these pertinent articles.

In the historical section Ferdinand de Saussure (1878) is described as the method's founding father to whom all current workers acknowledge allegiance. The author would have done well to have given some thought to the contributions of S. T. Coleridge of whom it was said: 'His great object appears to be to

exhibit in poetry . . . the laws of our intellectual nature which form the basis of social existence' (London Times, November 19, 1811).

On the Nature of Language by de Saussure offers insight into concepts related to time and auditory signifiers (i.e., spoken words) that are of interest to psychoanalysts. The paper describes the initial stages in the development of the structuralist method for the analysis of human behavior. It uses the schema of the idea of the 'word' and the idea of the 'thing' similar to that used by Freud. The following critique of the paper, to which I can add little, is quoted from Rulon S. Wells (p. 85): 'It strikes the reader as very often obscure in intention, not seldom inconsistent with itself, and in the main too barren of detail to be satisfying'.

Imitation and Structural Change in Children's Language by Susan M. Ervin is a clinical study of the development of language in children in which factors of maturation and development are clearly differentiated. De Saussure's System of Linguistics by Rulon S. Wells is an extended exposition and clarification of the basic work from which modern structuralism is derived. The reader must be cautioned that the heart of this paper is written in a technical French distinguished by an idiosyncratic vocabulary for which translation is only occasionally provided. The Semantics of Style by Seymour Chatman presents a matrix for the understanding of temperamental and unconscious influences on styles in speech and written narrative. Historical Discourse by Roland Barthes gives psychiatrically pertinent data relating to styles of anamnesis through reflections on the structure of historical narration. Structural Anthropology and History by Marc Saloreau deals with the concepts of Lévi-Strauss. The subconscious mind (in the sense of the French *subconscient*) imposes form on content. This form imposes principles that link all cultures, ancient and modern. By studying these principles, similarities and relationships between cultures can be explained.

Other sections of the book include the structural analyses of myths, poems, and writings of Russian, French, Scandinavian, Old Testament, Ceylonese, Marxist, and mathematical origins.

This is a highly technical book that presents structuralism uncompromisingly to the reader. Psychoanalysts interested in studying other systems for the understanding of cultural evolution will find much of interest here.

CHARLES A. SARNOFF (GREAT NECK, N. Y.)

GAUGUIN'S PARADISE LOST. By Wayne Andersen with the assistance of Barbara Klein. New York: The Viking Press, 1971. 371 pp.

Gauguin's life has as much claim to psychoanalytic interest as that of any other great artist, yet he has received relatively scant attention in the psychoanalytic literature. For example, he is not mentioned in the subject index of Grinstein's Index of Psychoanalytic Writings, whereas there are five listings under van Gogh. I am therefore especially pleased to report that Andersen, professor of History of Art at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has produced an original, beautifully written work of major interest to psychoanalysts. It is a penetrating analysis of the interrelations between Gauguin's life experiences, his severe conscious conflicts, and his artistic creations. The development of the artist's pervasive use of symbolism is strikingly delineated. The persistent romantic myth beclouding Gauguin's life is thoroughly dispelled; Andersen convincingly demonstrates that Gauguin was the creator of this myth. I have no serious fault to find with the author's psychoanalytic insights; his use of their concepts is exemplary.

My only major criticism of the book is artistic. The superb text deserves far better illustrations than the one hundred thirty-eight black and white photographic reproductions bundled together in back of the book. This might not detract too much from the enjoyment of the reader familiar with Gauguin's work; Andersen explicitly assumes such familiarity. I would however recommend the supplementary use of a good set of color reproductions which are readily available for optimal pleasure and instruction.

H. ROBERT BLANK (WHITE PLAINS, N. Y.)

SANCTIONS FOR EVIL. Edited by Nevitt Sanford and Craig Comstock. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc., 1971. 387 pp.

This important study of the social and psychological forces enabling one group to harm another is an unusually successful collaboration. A well-conceived organizing structure evolved from a symposium focused initially on the My Lai massacre. This enabled the seventeen authors of diverse disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and political science) to familiarize themselves with preliminary versions of each chapter and integrate their observations. Another unifying force was a shared

view of motivation and behavior incorporating principles of psychoanalytic psychology.

The eighteen chapters are organized in four sections. The first, Destructiveness as Social Process, examines forces permitting breakdown of humane controls. Those operating on the soldiers in Viet Nam are described in Conditions for Guilt-Free Massacres by Troy Duster and Existential Evil by Robert Jay Lifton. Irving L. Janis writes a chapter called Groupthink Among Policy Makers. The ambivalent sanction given by citizens at home, as complacent members of a silent majority reluctant to know the truth, is documented by Edward M. Opton, Jr., in It Never Happened and Besides They Deserved It.

The second section examines psychological dynamics in greater detail. Viola W. Bernard, Perry Ottenberg, and Fritz Redl describe a composite of defenses which create dehumanization, both self-directed and object-directed. In Failures of Identification and Sociopathic Behavior, Bernard L. Diamond implicates the sociopath's narcissism and defective object relationships in the treatment of people as meaningless things that can be destroyed at will. Nevitt Sanford brings findings from The Authoritarian Personality up to date in Authoritarianism and Social Destructiveness. In a later chapter, Going Beyond Prevention, he speculates on the possibility of modifying child training and education to promote opposite personality trends with acceptance of diversity in people.

The last two sections, The Nature of Evil and Resistance to Destructiveness, consider the personal and social forces which strengthen moral supports. In Evil and the American Ethos, Robert N. Bellah describes a puritanical America, projecting rejected impulses, then inflicting aggression on the allegedly evil group. Sexuality, aggression, dirtiness, and sloth become the stereotype for Negroes. 'Godless Communism' is attacked to defend against dependency needs. Bellah exaggerates the American aspect of this projective mechanism since it characterizes inquisitions, crusades, massacres, and wars throughout history.

This study will foster much thought. It should be read by those concerned with the sanctioned destruction of humanity in both international and domestic policies.

HENRY L. ROSETT (BOSTON)

THE THREAT OF IMPENDING DISASTER. Contributions to the Psychology of Stress. Edited by George H. Grosser, Henry Wechsler and Milton Greenblatt. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971. 335 pp.

This is a reprinting of a group of essays prepared for a 1962 symposium organized in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis and held under the auspices of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the American Psychiatric Association, through the latter's Committee on Research. Stress reactions are described through the methodology of general systems theory, perceptual sets, collective responses, and stimulus configuration. One section describes the fear of nuclear attack as related to attitudes toward the construction of fall-out shelters, reactions of psychiatric patients to the missile crisis, and responses of victims to the Hiroshima bombing. A brief section studies astronauts' handling of danger situations. Experiences of concentration camp inmates, prisoners of war, people living under enemy occupation, and dying patients, are studied by various authors from the particular vantage points of their own fields of expertise.

Reissue of this book arrives at a propitious time—the American Psychoanalytic Association, American Psychiatric Association, and the American Association for the Advancement of Science as well as other scientific groups have lately organized programs of study aimed at understanding violence and aggression. Our own country has undergone an unusual degree of turmoil during the last several years: assassinations, riots, escalation of drug abuses, alienation of youth, increasing violence in the community and on the TV screen, a seemingly endless purposeless war. And in the background there is a chronically unstable international environment and the ever-present possibility of unheralded total nuclear extinction.

How have we changed under this perpetual and particular threat of impending disaster? There has been a spate of articles, journals, societies, and conferences related to the study of death and dying. Perhaps the time has come for a symposium which would not confine itself merely to the 'psychology of stress' but which would recognize the fundamental bases of all thought and behavior. Such a symposium might direct its attention to the

covert responses to the threat of nuclear destruction, assassination, and public violences in general. Included could be studies related to the roles of the endocrine apparatus in stress, biochemical reactions related to perception of and reaction to stress, stress conditioning and deconditioning, and genetic factors.

Psychoanalysts, working daily with violent fantasies, their consequences, and fancied impending disasters, should be helpful particularly in identifying in longitudinal studies types of normal and abnormal defenses against stress, subtle chronic responses to stress, and in aiding other scientists in formulating a holistic theory of stress. Perhaps then the academic disciplines can truly serve usefully in helping the leaders of the world avoid what is apparently a road to oblivion.

A dramatic decade has followed the original symposium, a decade replete with social upheaval, international conflict, and radical social change. So soon after its original publication, this book now appears dated, parochial, and evokes nostalgia for simpler times. It is hoped that future wide-ranging studies will throw light on the effects that the perpetual subliminal and overt stress of impending disaster have and have had on contemporary human existence.

PAUL E. KAUNITZ (WESTPORT, CONN.)

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Ernest Kafka

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ABSTRACTS

Psychoanalytic Review. LVIII, 1971.

The Benefits of Poor Communication. Charlotte Olmsted Kursh. Pp. 189-208.

A popular current view is that 'lack of communication' explains the ills of the world. The author feels that, in fact, lies, distortions, selective reporting, and ambiguous statements are necessary in interactions where differences are advantageously concealed. For example, such statements are designed to transmit requests or demands in personal situations of conflict; to allow 'consensus by misunderstanding' and thus permit political action; and to protect individuals and groups from those who may have power over them. Lack of communication is a consequence of conflict and differences.

Artistic Form as Defensive Adaptation: Henry James and 'The Golden Bowl'. David Bleich. Pp. 223-244.

The content of art expresses wishful fantasies. A work's form, its organization, and harmony function as a system of defense that conceals and adapts the fantasy content, making it acceptable and conflict free. In the illustration, James's oral wishes are sublimated into art as religion. Oral incorporation is transformed into a created world, providing an outlet and a defense against unacceptable impulses.

The Genesis of Obsessional Phenomena. David A. Freedman. Pp. 367-384.

Cases reported by Seitz, Fraiberg, and Sterba demonstrate that obsessional states are present in two- to three-year-old children. In these patients, ritualized behavior aims at an illusion of retaining a primary narcissistic experience. Since certain traumata are incomprehensible, given the cognitive position of the anal stage child, obsessional magical means are used in an attempt to induce an external agent to fulfil narcissistic wishes. Freedman proposes that there is a developmental phase between eighteen months and three and a half years when 'pressure towards autonomous gratification of instinctual needs, the particular introjects already formed and cognitive limitations . . . yield a state of "obsessional primacy". . .' .

Objections to Involuntary Admission to Mental Hospitals. New York Civil Liberties Union. Pp. 385-394.

Present New York law authorizes persons to be committed for their 'welfare' as others perceive it for them. This report points out that even if commitment were in the best interests of the mentally ill person—if hospitalization helped him

rather than making him worse—we do not force physically ill individuals to act in their best interests. Nor does police power justify involuntary admission of the allegedly mentally ill. Other potentially dangerous groups, former felons for example, are not singled out for preventive detention. Involuntary admission should be authorized only if there are no less drastic alternatives available. The charge that a person is a danger to himself and others should require proof beyond reasonable doubt, and other safeguards should be instituted.

Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. Helen B. Lewis. Pp. 419-438.

Shame and guilt both reflect superego functioning but they differ phenomenologically and dynamically. Women tend to be 'field dependent' and prone to shame while men tend to be 'field independent' and prone to guilt. Shame relates more to the sexual drive, is connected with awe and unrequited love, is frequently associated with autonomic activity, and is experienced in terms of an ideal other. Guilt relates to the value system and is connected with silently functioning, internalized, threatening figures. In shame, the self is passive; in guilt, active. Shame and mortification as well as guilt are implicated in neurotogenesis.

An Empirical Investigation of Freud's Theory of Jokes. George W. Killings. Pp. 473-486.

College students in this study rated the funniness of magazine cartoons. Cartoons with sexual, aggressive, and death content were funnier than those without; those with children, animals, other races, or subhumans were funnier than those with only Anglo-Saxons as main characters. Finally, cartoons with short punch lines were funnier than those with long. The results are felt to be consistent with Freud's theory that jokes express unacceptable impulses in disguised form and should be short.

Some Social Uses of the Forbidden. Aurelie Oksenberg Rorty. Pp. 497-510.

The author feels that social norms are not only oppressive to instinctual behaviors, but also encourage and foster them, sometimes without requiring symbolic transformation. Police work, war, and certain sports are examples. A certain degree of sexual gratification between parents and children is necessary. Society defines the contexts, intensity, and tone of desirable instinctual expression.

Incest and Culture: A Reflection on Claude Lévi-Strauss. Richard Scheckner. Pp. 562-572.

Lévi-Strauss defines and distinguishes between nature and culture. Marriage rules establish culture by creating social organization based on exchanges of women. The incest prohibition affirms 'the pre-eminence of the social over the natural' (i.e., over incestuous wishes), and is the most focused part of the social systems of exchange. Marriage and initiations resolve the parent's as well as the child's incestuous problems. The child passes from the parent to the social orbit; in return, the parent is entitled to someone else's child.

ERNEST KAFKA

International Journal of Group Psychotherapy. XXI, 1971.

The Seelsorger in Rural Vermont. Harold S. Boris. Pp. 159-173.

In The Question of Lay Analysis, Freud reaffirmed his conviction that the analytic process need not be restricted to the medical situation, but offered the alternative of the 'Seelsorger', a secular, nonreligious lay pastorate in which an analyst assists his neighbors in the tending of their psychic life. Boris describes his experiences when he undertook such a role in a depressed Vermont village under an NIMH grant. He realized that he could not expect the villagers to become patients because of his presence, nor could he expect them to conclude that what was amiss in their lives could be rectified or to believe he could make them willing to change.

He succeeded in organizing groups with members from all levels of the community that met weekly for an hour and a half. The task he hoped to accomplish in the first session was to reassure the members of his intentions and thus lower their resistances, confront their wishes for benefit with their internal resistances, and interpret inner conflict in a meaningful way. The members were essentially depressed and the author saw the need to reactivate the conflicts that had resulted in this mood. Otherwise, narcissistic issues and introjective solutions would rob the sessions of personal meaning. He interpreted their problems in terms of anxiety and impulses. After the session, the members lingered to organize a collective response to the experience—to find a means of facing the next encounter without shame, anxiety, and guilt. They considered themselves not as patients, but rather as citizens seeking proficiency in self-understanding, especially of their life situations.

Laughter in Group Psychotherapy. Martin Grotjahn. Pp. 234-238.

The group therapist should feel free to laugh with his patients, since laughter indicates freedom from fear of losing control, while his sense of humor prevents infantilization of the group. Interpretations in the form of jokes bypass resistances and can be accepted. Exaggerated amusement, though, often indicates something the patient dare not say directly. Telling jokes, especially anecdotal jokes, can be a form of resistance, particularly in the individual who feels he must entertain instead of reveal himself. Laughter indicates the release of repressed hostility, especially the laughter of superiority when the unconscious is inadvertently revealed.

Some Reflections about Contemporary Group Psychotherapy. Curt Boenheim. Pp. 239-243.

Surveying many years of private and hospital practice, the author quotes Slavson on the changes in patient material during that time. The present extreme permissiveness and violence demand new approaches. Boenheim feels that transference is less dynamic as one grows older: the mature and rational take over the infantile and irrational. He deplores the weakness of insight when will power and self-discipline are lacking as they so often are today. He extols the effective-

ness of doing rather than talking in therapy, nonverbal communication, and the involvement of an entire family in treatment of a patient.

Working Through in Analytic Group Therapy in Relation to Masochism as a Refusal To Mourn. Martin S. Livingston. Pp. 339-344.

Working through can be viewed as the process of mourning idealized parents who never existed. Through repeated planned presentation of less and less distorted derivatives, the patient is confronted with the necessity of relinquishing illusions of omnipotence and ties to introjected protectors and providers. The multiple interactions in the group provide opportunities for repeated confrontations of defensive patterns, especially the masochist's refusal to mourn his lost objects. Since mourning is traditionally a shared experience, it appears useful to employ a group setting to implement the working through of separation from illusions and introjected objects.

Analytic Supervision in Group Psychotherapy. H. Glatzer. Pp. 436-443.

Group supervision of group psychotherapists demonstrates group dynamics: reactions to fellow supervisors are used as equivalents of free associations and reveal intragroup transferences, multiple resistances, and interlocking ego defenses. Demonstrations of underlying negative reactions to each other heighten awareness of uneasiness in group patients due to fear of exposure and to competition for and with the supervisor. Analytic techniques are used to illustrate the group in action rather than to work out individual problems and conflicts. Since countertransference is a major source of difficulty in group therapy, the author helps her supervisors overcome their timidity in revealing their overinvolvement with their patients. She dilutes their defensiveness by defining countertransference as the therapist's unconscious reactions to the patients' material, to his own uncontrolled needs, and to neurotic projections. As the supervisor reacts to the revelation of neurotic entanglements as an expression of confidence and a valuable contribution to learning, the supervisee will feel less criticized. Psychoanalysis is not only a psychotherapy but a body of knowledge that can be used most effectively in teaching and supervision, lending itself dynamically to group supervision of group psychotherapy.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG

Seminars in Psychiatry. III, 1971.

The Psychotherapy of Exhibitionists in a Court Clinic Setting. Thomas P. Hackett. Pp. 297-306.

The treatment of exhibitionists referred by the court is described in this paper. The patients were in general sexually inhibited and had fewer heterosexual contacts than would normally be expected. Most came from backgrounds requiring suppression of anger. As a result of his understanding that effective treatment focused on conflicts having to do with the awareness and discharge of anger, Hackett was able to complete treatment successfully in a period of six months. The problem of the return of the desire to expose was handled with the sug-

gestion that in doing so, patients caused themselves pain. Avoidance of acting out of the wish leads to revelation of the underlying dynamic which the author feels to be anger. Alternative means of expressing anger were encouraged. Hackett emphasizes that apparently treatment must be forced upon the exhibitionist even though once involved, he will usually coöperate actively. Finally, he suggests the use of hormone therapy to decrease the desire to exhibit.

The Psychology of Rapists. Murray L. Cohen; Ralph Garofalo; Richard Boucher; Theoharis Seghorn. Pp. 307-327.

The authors studied two hundred and forty men found to be sexually dangerous as defined by the Massachusetts Act of 1958, which allows a person so found to be incarcerated from one day to life under civil commitment. Rapists are classified by the authors according to the predominance of aggression or sexual aim present in the motivation. In the first group the primary aim is aggressive, and anger is displaced onto a woman who is a complete stranger. A striking number in this group had suffered a prepubertal or postpubertal trauma with an older woman, sometimes the mother or another relative. They tended to view women as either the ideal mother or the unfaithful prostitute, and to set up relationships with undependable women who sooner or later were unfaithful to them. Members of this group responded to treatment better than those in the other two groups.

The second group is characterized by activities that are predominantly sexual rather than aggressive. The typical history of the offender in this group includes a remote but not necessarily absent father and a repressive, controlling, and infantilizing mother. The mental life is replete with perverse, homosexual, and passive tendencies. The rape is committed both as a defense against passive wishes and, according to the authors, as an attempt to deny the feeling of being passive and impotent. These patients responded well to psychotherapy, but generally required long treatment. In the third group, characterized by sex aggression diffusion, the offenders seem not able to experience sexual pleasure without some degree of accompanying violence. These men are similar to the psychopathic character in experiencing no guilt, having no stable object relations, and in not having had a latency period. The history of members of this group usually includes a sadistic father and an excessively giving and forgiving mother. As distinct from the aggressive first group of rapists, the sadistic rapist needs violence for excitement and will cease aggression following intercourse. Members of this group represent the greatest risk in terms of recidivism and are generally unresponsive to psychotherapy.

Learning Theory Approaches to the Treatment of Criminal Behavior. Ralph K. Schwitzgebel. Pp. 328-344.

This is a disagreeable paper for those who feel that respect for patients is a necessary concomitant of the process of psychotherapy. The author summarizes the various learning theory approaches to behavior modification currently contemplated. These include classical conditioning, aversive suppression, observational learning, operant conditioning, and electronic monitoring. Of these only

classical conditioning in its application to alcoholism and homosexuality has produced statistically significant results. In one study, fifty-one per cent of more than four thousand alcoholic patients were abstinent from two to five years following conditioning. With regard to homosexuality, approximately forty to sixty per cent of patients so treated showed some improvement during follow-up periods of one year or longer. The author presents the argument that electronic monitoring of criminals can decrease the necessity for prisons. The monitoring systems have been used in connection with classical conditioning techniques.

The Delinquent as a Poor Loser. Hans Toch. Pp. 386-399.

Toch sets out to question the theory enunciated by Aichhorn: that delinquency is characterized by ego defect. He reviews the work of Freud, Hartmann, and Alexander and states that nothing written about ego psychology enables one to draw the conclusion that the delinquent's ego is defective. On the contrary, he sees the delinquent as having developed an ego which is adapted to a particular environment, termed the 'low probability environment', characterized by crisis, instability, and social disorganization. Therapeutic assumptions based on development of an ego in a high probability environment are not useful in dealing with delinquency, which is a problem secondary to environmental disruption. Efforts at change must involve reorientation of the person as one converts his environment into a more satisfying and rewarding form.

Behavioral Effects of L-Dopa in Man. Frederick K. Goodwin. Pp. 477-492.

The use of L-Dopa in Parkinsonism resulted from the discovery of a deficiency of dopamine in the brains of many patients suffering from this disease. Of the patients studied here, approximately twenty per cent have had psychiatric side effects. Most studies indicate that mental changes represent the third most common side effect, following abnormal movements and gastrointestinal symptoms. Psychiatric side effects, in order of frequency, are: confusion, depression, psychosis, hypomania, and hypersexuality. Disorientation, sometimes progressing to delirium, is the most frequently noted side effect. When psychosis occurs, it is usually paranoid in nature, with visual or olfactory hallucinations. Hypomania has been seen in approximately eight per cent of patients reporting mental changes. Whenever hypersexuality has occurred, it has almost always been in association with hypomania. In a trial administration of L-Dopa to a small group of men having primary psychogenic impotence, transitory improvement was noted in half the group. Stress is placed on the variability of response to the administration of this drug.

JEREMY R. MACK

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXVIII, 1971.

Dream Recall. John Trinder and Milton Kramer. Pp. 296-301.

Trinder and Kramer present a laboratory study of factors influencing the recall of dreams from the standpoint of 'classical memory theory process'. The

variables studied were: 1, position of the dream in the night; 2, length of the dream report; 3, the number of recalled dreams during the night; and 4, the intensity of the dream report. Results showed that: a, the last dream of the night was more likely to be recalled; b, longer dreams were more readily recalled in the morning; c, dream recall was better if fewer dreams were reported in a night's sleep; and d, dreams of greater dramatic intensity were more easily recalled. Analysis of manifest content and recall showed no relationship between thematic content (sexual, aggressive, etc.) and probability of recall. The recall of dreams appeared influenced by principles included in 'classical memory theory'.

Although this study contains no important revelations regarding dream function for the analyst, it does serve to remind us that the recall of dreams may be influenced by certain 'conflict free' functions which are maintained by the dreaming ego, in addition to more apparent dynamic factors.

Psychoanalytic and Behavioristic Approaches toward Depression: A Synthesis? Wallace Wilkins. Pp. 358-359.

Wilkins attempts to define briefly a common ground between the two theories of human behavior, using depression as the phenomenon studied. He establishes parallels between the psychoanalytic understanding of depression in the concepts of object loss, loss of self-esteem, and lack of gratifications on the one hand, and the behaviorist's 'removal of reinforcing stimuli' and 'alteration of reinforcement contingencies' on the other hand. The article is an interesting exercise in 'comparative theory' but, unfortunately, the omission by the author of the role of aggression in the formation of depression renders the seeming parallels between the two theories highly questionable.

FREDERICK M. LANE

Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry. XI, 1972.

Books in the Playroom: A Dimension of Child Psychiatric Technique. Carmen R. Goldings and Herbert J. Goldings. Pp. 52-65.

With clear discussion and a series of illustrative vignettes, the authors present their views on the uses and limitations of books in therapy. The uses described include assessment of language abilities, reading as 'sedative play', reading for active mastery of anxiety, application with the inhibited and withdrawn child, and reading for information. Limitations are dealt with in terms of cautioning against overreliance or defensive use. The bibliography includes suggested titles for playroom use.

Adolescent Girls Who Lack Functioning Ovaries. Ellen Rothchild and Ruth P. Owens. Pp. 88-113.

A group of eleven girls suffering from congenital ovarian insufficiency (Turner's syndrome) presented this psychiatrist-pediatrician team a unique opportunity to explore the complexities of the hormonal role in the psychology of female

adolescence. As always, a multiplicity of variables—such as multiple hospitalizations, other somatic problems, and immature appearance and stature—muddles the methodology of 'experiments in nature'. Growth-impairing defenses are described and an attempt is made to separate those common to chronic illness generally and those specifically related to this arrested sexual development. The younger girls predictably coped less well than the older group. Once treatment had resulted in perceptible somatic changes, adolescent psychological movement became evident. However, it remained laggard and incomplete. A brief but excellent discussion of genetic and hormonal factors in 'drive endowment' makes vivid the uncertain state of current knowledge.

Anorexia Nervosa in Children: Outpatient Management. John B. Reinhart; Marita D. Kenna; Ruth A. Succop. Pp. 114-131.

Of interest in this paper is the success of a therapeutic philosophy and its resultant management tactics that differ diametrically from the more usual approach. Rather than 'we won't let you die', the theme is 'though we are concerned we can't stop [you]'. The results achieved are at least as good as other reported series and would appear to demonstrate that a crucial variable is not in- or outpatient management, but a therapist capable of remaining unthreatened 'by the possible death of the patient'.

Gender Identity: The Problem of a True Hermaphrodite. Nancy A. Roeske and Anthony G. Banet. Pp. 132-155.

This is an extraordinary and detailed case report of a teen-aged, psychotic hermaphrodite, with severe psychosocial pathology in child and parents. The paper makes the point that clear gender assignment before the age of two is crucial to successful development of stable gender identity.

Body-Image Changes in Physically Ill Teen-Agers. Richard V. Kaufman. Pp. 157-170.

The fantasies, 'explanations', and drawings of seven patients' versions of their illnesses (four cases of diabetes, one cystic fibrosis with pneumonia, one laceration of an arm, and one severe asthma) comprise the data in this study. All patients experienced the illness as an insult to or imperfection in a previously intact body image. In every instance actual body changes were trivial in comparison to those depicted by the patients. This was most striking in diabetic patients whose illness affords no 'perceptual localization'. After a discussion of the evolution of body image, the author describes the complex character of its graphic representation. Children's reality knowledge and prior information about anatomy and illness are used in their drawings much as day residue is used in dreams. The further back one goes developmentally, the less probable it is that visual memories correspond accurately with original bodily experience. Kaufman warns against the common tendency toward direct correlating of graphic representations and actual experiences, or direct correlation of drawings of body

parts with libidinal zones. Drawings thus are viewed as showing 'a synthesis of underlying images, based ultimately . . . on symbolism of the sensory aspects of relationships which become part of a hierarchy of maturing mental conceptualizations used to portray the infinitely varied guises of the self in mental life'.

Considerations on the Effect of Multiangular Relationships on the Initiation of Child Analysis. Martin Roschco. Pp. 212-229.

Despite its focus on child analysis this paper has much interest and relevance for adult analysis. Although somewhat loosely organized, it is a rich and comprehensive consideration of the dynamic interplay between child, parents, and analyst during initiation of treatment. Pre-existing attitudes are the main focus. Most children approach treatment with negative attitudes and already formed fantasies about treatment and analyst. Thus many pretransference and early transference positions that often shed light on observing ego capacities can be anticipated. The child's fantasies of the impending relationship are influenced not only by intrapsychic and developmental factors, but by the parents' and analyst's ideas about their relationship with one another vis-à-vis the child. Conscious and unconscious parental anticipations are discussed, as are those of the analyst toward the parents. (Although not considered in this paper, parallels to the situation of the adult analyst's countertransference to the unseen parents of his patients are thought provoking.) A thoughtful discussion of the accompanying problems in confidentiality in this tripartite situation is included.

Attachment and Exploration: A Systematic Approach to the Study of Separation-Adaptation Phenomena in Response to Nursery School Entry. Kato van Leeuen and June M. Tuma. Pp. 314-340.

This study attempts systematically to appraise separation readiness and adaptation of children entering nursery school. Excellent preliminary discussion precedes presentation of method and data. Using concepts evolved from primate research, the authors describe two observable and scorable sets of behavior: ('A'—movement toward the mother) and exploratory behavior ('B'—movement from the mother toward the environment). Sixteen children (seven boys, nine girls) and their mothers are the subjects. Ten pairs were intensively studied three to six months before entry; all were studied at and after entry. Pre-entry scores ranged, as expected, from low to high. Upon entry all showed increased 'A' and decreased 'B'. When divided by age (younger than three years, two months; older than three years, three months), a marked difference emerged. Contrary to expectation, the older group had higher 'A' scores prior to entry. Reversal of this difference after entry was due to the rise in 'A' scores of the younger group.

The authors report the following conclusions and implications. 1, Regardless of prior attachment to mother, nursery school was a stress. Established object constancy did not alter this; children could 'visualize mother but still need her'. Factors other than object constancy need elucidation. 2, If the mother is adequately responsive to the child's increased libidinal demands, this interference

in the individuation process is transient. 3, Social age, with a turning point around three years, three months, appears to be highly relevant to readiness. 4, Separation distress on entry is age appropriate behavior. 5, It appears that we tend toward premature nursery school placement. 6, Teachers should encourage rather than discourage the adaptive turning toward mother that occurs.

Developing Community Programs in a Child Guidance Clinic. David van Buskirk. Pp. 270-278.

Using a psychodynamic family model, the author describes staff problems encountered and largely resolved over a period of years as his traditional child guidance clinic moved into new modes of community involvement. The following three principles emerged. 1, Professionals' acquired skills become invested with narcissistic libido, making the professional vulnerable to the same dangers perceived by a very young child. 2, Sibling rivalry is the paradigm for competition between new and traditional methods of intervention. 3, 'The economic principle for prevention of conflict' should govern planning of the distribution of clinic energies.

Family Styles of Fatherless Households. Joan L. Kogelschatz; Paul L. Adams; Daniel McK. Tucker. Pp. 365-384.

This study of one hundred and two fatherless families in a Florida mental health clinic cogently demonstrates the need to avoid oversimplification. Poverty was found to be far more destructive than fatherlessness per se. The authors point out that these two factors are often found together and then not separately evaluated. Fatherlessness due to death must be distinguished from fatherlessness due to desertion or divorce as its impact on the mother and the children is quite different. The adaptive capacities of these households is often underrated. Facile lumping together and discussion of 'fatherless families' is rightly decried.

ALICE KROSS FRANKEL

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Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Israel Zeifman

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NOTES

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 25, 1972. LIBIDINAL OBJECT CONSTANCY: SOME DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS. John B. McDevitt, M.D.

Following Mahler, McDevitt places the child's beginning attainment of some degree of object constancy between twenty-five and thirty-six months. The chief criterion is the child's ability to tolerate brief separations from the mother as a result of the intrapsychic availability of the mental representation of the mother. Using selected film sequences from the research study of the separation-individuation process, the author examines the development of libidinal object constancy during the first three years of life. He suggests that the differences among writers over the concept of object constancy might be reconciled if it is defined as primarily the contribution of the ego to the gradual development of object relations throughout childhood and adolescence, rather than as a distinct developmental stage. The development of object constancy would then be seen as determined by the changing nature of the libidinal and aggressive cathexis of the love object, the progression of complex levels of memory organization and mental representation, and the emergence of such aspects of ego development as anticipation, intentionality, etc. The meaning of object constancy as well as the criteria for it would therefore change as the child progresses from one phase to the next. The first three years of life would be most crucial for its attainment.

Longitudinal observational study of normal mother-child pairs provided the material from which inferences are made as to the changing state of mental representation of the mother. Separation experiences were built into the experimental design of the study. The typical course of a child passing through the various subphases of separation-individuation are described. By three to five months a 'recognition memory' of the mother exists. By eight months the infant begins to show characteristic distress responses to brief separation from the mother, indicating that permanent libidinal attachment has been formed and persists regardless of frustration or satisfaction. However, such a memory, which depends on the infant's 'need state', is unstable and cannot sustain him during the mother's absence. In the practicing subphase the infant becomes more aware of the relation between his mother's absence and his own distress and to a limited extent seems able to recall the more differentiated and stable image of the mother to sustain him during her absence. Other behavior during this subphase, such as symbolic play and verbal evocation of the mother in her absence, indicates beginning representational thought and the advance of identification. But the increased separation distress which appears in the rapprochement subphase, i.e., after eighteen months—the range set by Piaget and most analytic authors—takes

place when evocative memory and representational thought become part of the ego equipment. Not until the third year does the toddler become more constantly able to tolerate his mother's absence for long periods of time. Thus, while the autonomous sequences in cognitive development are necessary for the gradual attainment of object constancy, the essential determinants are the cathexis of the mental representation of the mother and the quality of this representation, which should be able to convey to the child a sense of security just as the actual mother had. By the end of the third year, depending on the child's tolerance of separation and his ability to function reasonably well in the mother's absence, a sufficient degree of object constancy has ordinarily been obtained. Other equally important developmental achievements, i.e., the child's progress from self-centered behavior to ego-determined object relations that become apparent in the third year, may also be used as criteria of libidinal object constancy.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Peter Neubauer raised several questions. What are those aspects of the developing mental representation of the mother that make for stable representation? If the establishment of libidinal object constancy is understood as the result of processes of differentiation and ego formation with particular emphasis on the libidinal component, how are we to understand the stable structure formation that is supposed to emerge from it? To what extent do aggressive strivings contribute to the development of libidinal object constancy?

Dr. Fred Pine stressed that the base-line timing of libidinal object constancy should not deflect attention from the functional significances of its achievement. To the increase in the child's autonomy and the development of a unified concept of the mother, both good and bad, which result from the internalized object representation, should be added the gradual shaping of the internalized image and its eventual merging into the introjected parents. He considered that the internalized object representation is more than a contribution of the ego; it is a product of the total experience of the infant in the earliest years.

In response Dr. McDevitt agreed that the child's ability to use nonhostile aggression in the rapprochement crisis would contribute to libidinal object constancy. He also agreed with Dr. Pine that libidinal object constancy should be defined as the consequence of the infant's total experience.

ISRAEL ZEIFMAN

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

November 15, 1971. SYMBOLS IN SHADOWS: A STUDY OF SHADOWS IN DREAMS. Charles A. Sarnoff, M.D.

The psychoanalytic literature is devoid of clinical studies of shadows in dreams and the author attempts to elucidate this lack. Shadows should make excellent symbols. They share a number of characteristics with human forms; they have

many characteristics (variable size, insubstantiality, ominousness), which could be used to represent latent dream content. Symbolic representation is usually established through such links of similarity; for instance, literature, myths, and superstitions abound in such shadow symbols. However, shadows rarely appear as dream symbols, and when they do, they often fail to cover latent meaning. The dream work finds them ineffective in masking latent content and probably displaces further to a more effective symbol. Direct visual representations of shadows do not help preserve sleep.

In literature, shadows can be effectively used as a verbal symbol. In art and in dreams, a shadow as protagonist invites the observer (the art viewer or the dreamer) to project aggressive and ominous meanings onto the shadow. As the totipotency for representation implicit in the visual imagery of the shadow defeats the goals of psychoanalytic symbol formation, shadows are rare in dreams.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Leonard Shengold pointed to the paper's valuable exposition of the meaning of shadows in art but disagreed with the psychoanalytic implications of the paper. He felt that the author extended the concept of symbol use beyond that of early psychic activity to a level where metaphor is possible, a representation that can be either conscious or unconscious. In considering shadows in dreams, Dr. Shengold felt that they may frequently appear as part of the 'taken for granted hallucinated dream reality' and are mostly unnoticed unless they have special significance. He noted, however, that he had no instances of shadows in dreams to report and used an 'inferred' shadow from one of Freud's dreams—the one about Rome. Dr. Shengold said that shadows offer multiple possibilities for symbol representation and have the ability to hide latent meaning, as would any other dream element. Therefore he could see no theoretical reason for their sparseness in clinical reports.

While agreeing with Dr. Sarnoff's observation of the infrequent appearance of shadows in dreams, Dr. Renato Almansi differed with his conclusion that the shadow symbol represents an aggressive, threatening feeling. He felt that many other elements in the dream left too many questions to establish such an exclusive relationship. Dr. Jan Frank noted that all dreams are shadowy and that in schizophrenia shadows often are persecutory in meaning. Dr. Bernard Fine spoke of the frightening associations to shadows and felt that a good deal might be learned about this in the study of children's games where shadows are used to represent danger.

In response Dr. Sarnoff said that he specifically referred to cast images as shadows; suppositions without using this basis would not be pertinent to his thesis.

HARVEY B. BEZAHLER

At the Ninth LATIN-AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC CONGRESS held in July 1972, the following officers were elected to the Executive Council of *Comité Coordinador de las Organizaciones Psicoanalíticas de America Latina:* President, Dr. David Zimmerman (Brazil); Vice-President, Dr. Tufik Meluk (Colombia); Secretary,

Dr. Inaura Vaz Carneiro Leão (Brazil); Treasurer, Dr. Armando Barriguete (Mexico); Training Coordinator, Dr. Guillermo Teruel (Venezuela). The Council plans to develop a scientific interchange between North and Latin America as well as between European and Latin American Psychoanalytic Societies.

The Fiftieth Anniversary Annual Meeting of the AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION will be held May 29-June 1, 1973, at the New York Hilton and Americana Hotels, New York City. For further information write: Dr. Marion F. Langer, Executive Director, 1775 Broadway, New York City, 10019.

The 1973 Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held May 3-7, 1973, at the Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Anna Freud will deliver the *Twentieth Annual Freud Memorial Lecture* of THE PHILADELPHIA ASSOCIATION FOR PSCHOANALYSIS on April 27, 1973. In addition, Miss Freud will participate in panel discussions on *Child-Care Programs and Psychoanalysis* and *The Child, the Law, and Psychoanalysis* on April 26, 1973; and on *The Ego and the Mechanism of Defence: A Review* and *Advances in Psychoanalytic Technique* on April 28, 1973.

For further information write to: Homer C. Curtis, M.D., Chairman, Freud Memorial Lecture Committee, The Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis, 15 St. Asaph's Road, Bala-Cynwyd, Penna. 19004.

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