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Edward Glover 1888–1972

EDWARD GLOVER

1888-1972

Dr. Edward Glover died in London on August 16, 1972, in his eighty-fifth year. During his terminal illness, the vigor of his mind remained undimmed, and he was able to work until the last few weeks. Even when confined to bed, he continued to write 'reviews and so on, to keep from being bored'. An eminent psychoanalyst and an exceptional human being, Edward Glover belonged to that group of pioneers who charted the course of the psychoanalytic movement in Britain, and who left their imprint on the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. This QUARTERLY remembers him with affection as a member of the Quarterly 'family'; he will be missed by us not only for the quality of his contributions but for the humor, kindliness, and warmth which enlivened his correspondence.

Edward, the youngest of three boys, was born on January 13, 1888, in Lesmahagow, a small town near Glasgow, where his father was schoolmaster. The Calvinist background, which both parents shared, was tempered by the wide scope of his father's scholarly interests and his Darwinian agnosticism. Something of the Lowland Scottish accent remained with Edward Glover all through his life, as did the rather deliberate mode of speech, the occasional pithy Scotticism, the love of old ballads and literary lore. He attended his father's school and then the University of Glasgow, where he graduated in 1909 at the age of twenty-one, M.B., Ch.B. with commendation. In 1915, he was granted the advanced M.D. degree, also with commendation. Glasgow University conferred an Honorary LL.D. on him in 1956.

The university years were a happy time which Edward Glover often recalled in later life. The prescribed studies came easily enough, so that there was ample time to 'rub off the Presbyterian edges', as he put it, and take an active part in the social and political ferment of the turn of the century. While retaining a lifelong concern for social issues, he was primarily involved in the years that followed in broadening his medical knowledge and experience in hospitals in Glasgow, London, and Birmingham where he specialized in diseases of the chest and learned careful research methods. By 1920, when a promising career in medicine was opening before him, he reached a crossroad. After eighteen months of marriage, his

wife died. He had already begun to experience a growing dissatisfaction with a purely organic approach to medicine. The years of the First World War had led him to inquire into the connection between crime and war, and he had made his first contact with freudian thought in the course of his reading. A renewed close association with his elder brother, James, who had recently given up opthalmology for psychological medicine, was a further factor which led him to change his course. In December 1920, Edward Glover went to Berlin and began his training analysis with Karl Abraham.

In Abraham he found a kindred spirit, an inspiring teacher, imaginative, erudite, and of great scientific and personal integrity. The relationship between training analyst and analysand in those early days was a less formal one, which Glover described as 'more of an apprenticeship'. He also attended meetings of the Berlin Society. He returned from Berlin with an abiding commitment to psychoanalysis, an enthusiasm and feeling of fulfilment which lasted all his life. In addition, his experience with the undisciplined range of psychoanalytic thought in Berlin at that time, to quote his own assessment, 'was largely instrumental in shaping my future interests. . . . What seemed essential to correct extravagances, was a common ground of asserted theory with the controlled system of technique.'

Edward Glover and his brother, James, joined the young British Psycho-Analytical Society, first as associates, then as full members, training analysts, and teachers. A stimulating professional relationship developed with his brother, which was terminated by James's untimely death in 1926. During the next two decades, Edward was actively concerned in every aspect of the work of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, with the Institute from its founding in 1924, and with the London Clinic for Psycho-Analysis. He worked with Ernest Jones in the long negotiations with the British Medical Association, which led to the official recognition of the British Psycho-Analytical Society by the British Medical Association, and to the legal definition of the term 'psychoanalyst' in Britain as applying only to those professing freudian theories and practices, and recognized by the British Psycho-Analytical Society. He served as Director of Research at the Institute, and as Assistant Director, then Director of the London Clinic for Psycho-Analysis. He was Scientific Secretary of the British Psycho-Analytical Society, Chairman of the Training

Committee of the Institute, and Acting Chairman of the Society, positions which he held throughout World War II until his resignation in 1944. He also served as Secretary of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. During the years leading up to World War II, he was a most effective and self-effacing force in the efforts to help European colleagues escape Nazi persecution.

The history of the Kleinian controversy within the British Psycho-Analytical Society and its effects upon the training policies of the Institute are well documented and need to be mentioned only as they affected Edward Glover's position. As Chairman of the Research and Training Committees, he emphasized the effects of the 'training transference' in perpetuating a situation 'where the error of the teacher becomes the gospel of the pupil'. Glover felt that he could not accept the compromise that was arrived at by the Institute as it was, in his eyes, damaging to the students and to psychoanalytic education in Britain. Psychoanalysis as conceived by Freud was not compatible, in Glover's view, with Kleinian theories. Accordingly, he withdrew from the British Society in 1944 and was shortly afterward granted honorary membership in the American and Swiss Societies.

As Edward Glover was both literate and articulate, with a subtle humor and unusually fine command of the English language, he was much in demand as a speaker, on the platform and on radio and television programs. With a gift for lucid exposition and an ability to express complex abstractions without scientific jargon, he was able to present psychoanalytic concepts to a wide audience among lay, scientific, and academic circles. His small volume, War, Sadism and Pacifism (1933), the expansion of essays originally delivered in 1931 to the Federation of the League of Nations Societies in Geneva, is among the most popular and effective of this genre. But the same lucidity marks his scientific work. He contributed more than two hundred scientific papers and five major books to psychoanalytic literature. Reference should be made to the excellent bibliography published in This QUARTERLY in 1969, pages 532-548, and, for further biographical material, to the perceptive article by Lawrence Kubie in the same volume, pages 521-531.

Within the wide range of Edward Glover's contribution to psychoanalysis, two areas are of paramount importance—technique and early development. His distrust of undisciplined speculation, already

apparent in the early days in Berlin, was re-enforced in London during the time of the Kleinian debates. Initially, Glover had been impressed by Mrs. Klein's formulations as they seemed to promise to fill some of the gaps in our knowledge of pregenital and early ego development. However, it soon became apparent to him that the new theoretical concepts showed distinct anti-Freudian trends, and that Klein's uncontrolled theoretical speculations were devoid of clinical basis. Glover believed that a scientific approach to the early development of the ego can only be determined by metapsychological considerations, in structural, dynamic, economic, and developmental terms. The Birth of the Ego (1968) is largely an amplification of earlier papers on the theory of the nuclear structure of the primitive ego and its progressive integration; that is, that a relatively synthetized ego is a result of a gradual and progressive integration of originally independent loculi—'ego nuclei'—associated with different impulse-object systems.

Mention must be made of Edward Glover's interest in problems of crime, dating back to 1911 when he had some contact with an enlightened prison medical officer and, a few years later, himself served as locum tenens for a visiting prison medical officer. This interest resulted not only in the essays which form The Roots of Crime, Selected Papers on Psychoanalysis, Volume II (1960), but also led to the founding of the Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency and, in 1933, to the establishment of the first Psychopathic Clinic in the world for the treatment of delinquency. Psychoanalysts and students of the London Institute of Psycho-Analysis were among those who gave their voluntary services to this clinic. (In 1948, it became a part of the National Health Service.) Glover was Chairman of the Scientific Committee of the London Institute of Criminology, became its Director in 1963, and continued active association with both institutes until his death. The influence of his psychoanalytic insights on problems of delinquency and criminology in Britain can hardly be overstated.

Uncompromisingly outspoken in matters of scientific principle, Edward Glover had little patience with those he referred to as 'mugwumps'. Those who knew him as a friend had a gentler picture of a warm human being, without a trace of pretense, who was never too busy to give help—whether to a baffled student, to a colleague seeking advice, or to an ex-patient fallen on hard times. He showed

a quiet dignity, a blend of wisdom, inner strength, and tolerance toward human fallibility; he not only recognized what he described as 'the dangers of being human', but had the fortitude to endure them.

Edward Glover was predeceased by his second wife, Gladys, who died in 1966 after a long illness. He is survived by an only child, the retarded daughter to whose upbringing at home both parents devoted so much patience and affection.

ALEXANDER BROMLEY, M.D.

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Perspectives on Aggression in Human Adaptation

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Panel on the Role of Aggression in Human Adaptation

PERSPECTIVES ON AGGRESSION IN HUMAN ADAPTATION

BY JACOB A. ARLOW, M.D. (NEW YORK)

It would be hard to imagine a more appropriate subject toward which those working in the fields of psychiatry, sociology, and the humanities should bend their efforts. In our age, aggression and its role in human affairs have become part of the crisis of man. Out of his staggering capacity for adaptation, man has developed instrumentalities of violence that could put an end to the history of this planet. The issues involved have been drawn with such clarity by Daniels, Gilula, and Ochberg (1970) in their recent book, Violence and the Struggle for Existence, that I quote them directly.

> Violence is unique to no particular region, nation, or time. Centuries ago man survived primarily as a nomadic hunter relying on violent aggression for both food and protection. Even when becoming agricultural and sedentary, man struggled against nature, and survival still required violent aggression, especially for maintaining territory when food was scarce.
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> Then in a moment of evolution man's energies suddenly produced the age of technology. Instead of adapting mainly by way of biological evolution, we are now increasingly subject to the effects and demands of cultural evolution. Instead of having to adapt to our environment, we now can adapt our environment to our needs. Despite this potential emancipation from biological evolution, we retain the adaptive mechanisms derived from a long history of mammalian and primate evolution, including our primitive forms of aggression,

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This Panel on The Role of Aggression in Human Adaptation was sponsored jointly by the American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Section on Psychology, at a meeting on December 26, 1971, in Philadelphia.

> our violence, bellicosity, and inclination to fight in a time of emergency. Where these mechanisms once responded more to physical stress, they now must respond more to social, cultural, and psychological stresses, and the response does not always produce adaptive results. Where violent aggressive behavior once served to maintain the human species in times of danger, it now threatens our continued existence.

I would like to introduce a few general observations to emphasize the special focus of this Panel. The society into which each individual is born is the product of a long process of interaction between biological and cultural evolution. The newborn comes equipped only with those endowments resulting from the biological process of change. Accordingly, in every generation each individual in the space of a few short years must be civilized and acculturated. He must learn to adapt to a structured human environment that has developed over several thousand years. That this process of civilization succeeds as often as it does is truly astonishing. That it frequently fails should come as no surprise. In Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud (1930 [1929]) expanded on the inherent contradictions that inevitably supervene between the individual and his society. Thus, in addition to the question of adaptation to the environment, human and natural, our discussion must consider the inner equilibrium, the capacity to maintain a harmonious, integrated psychological identity capable of coping with the innumerable subtleties of orientation and conflict which are part of the human condition.

While the human being is remarkably adaptable, he is not infinitely malleable. It is impossible to tear him out of his context in time and space in order to subject him to psychological and social engineering. Nor can we expect that in so alien a setting he will develop anything recognizable as human nature. This kind of environmental manipulation was tried by Harlow and Harlow (1962) with monkeys. The results of these experiments are well known. The behavior patterns—may we say personality structure?—that developed in these experimental ani-

mals were totally unsuited for social and sexual adaptation, or for purposes of defense and aggression.

Every culture defines the limits of aggressive behavior acceptable in the individual. The range of permissible aggressive behavior is a precipitate of the group experience and it articulates the values the group has come to prize. In the broadest sense of the term, educational measures represent institutionalized experiences brought to bear on the emerging generation with the goal in mind of fashioning personality types that will reflect the functions and values of the group (*cf.*, Anna Freud, 1935). In the course of individual development, the external environmental pressures are largely replaced and augmented psychologically by internal controls and compulsions. To a large measure, the macrocosm of society is established within the microcosm of the individual. Social structure, cultural history, and group values, including the attitudes toward aggression, thus find representation in the psychology of each individual. One can appreciate, therefore, that our Panel discussion would be one-sided if we failed to engage participation from the fields of sociology and the humanities.

According to many authors, theories of aggression may be categorized under three headings:

1. Biological-instinctual theory: Such a view tends to regard aggressive behavior as representing an intrinsic, inherent component of man's nature, the result of the process of natural selection. In psychoanalytic terms, the instinct is defined as a stimulus activating the mind by virtue of its connection with the body. The two views are not really the same. Patterns of aggression may be adaptive or nonadaptive, but in any event, the influence of the aggressive drive is significant in all stages of maturation and development.

2. Frustration theory: This view maintains that aggressive behavior evolves from interference with ongoing processes and/or gratifying behavior. Supporters of this view are quick to add that the response to frustration is often a learned response.

3. Social learning theory: According to this theory, aggressive behavior results from the nature of child-rearing practices and other vicissitudes of socialization and group integration processes. Evidence for this point of view is organized from data gathered by sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists oriented toward learning theories.

While the biological-instinctual theory of aggression is usually identified with psychoanalysis, such a connection is not entirely accurate. The psychoanalytic view of aggression emphasizes the predisposition or the need for discharge through activity of an aggressive nature, but it must be emphasized that this need is modified by experience, especially by the earliest interactions of the individual with his environment. A fairly wide range of experiences may enhance or inhibit the discharge of aggression in keeping with or, as happens on occasion, beyond the range of permissible expression of aggression. It is impossible at this point to exclude the significance of social learning even though psychoanalysts may express the relationship in concepts closer to the realm of their clinical practice, for example, identification with important primary objects, response to anxiety, etc.

There are, furthermore, a number of observations regarding aggression which are obtainable only by the special type of observation possible within the psychoanalytic situation, for instance, how patterns of aggression may become linked to the idea of danger: inner or outer danger, real or imaginary danger, conscious or unconscious danger. The various ways one learns to cope with danger modify the quality and the form of aggressive behavior. Clinical and observational data emphasize that the experiences of the earliest years are decisive in this process because they establish not only the quality of aggressive patterns but also the predisposition to conflict in general. This applies to both inner conflict and conflict with the environment.

For many reasons it would appear that the frustration theory begs the question. In the last analysis, it fails to account for aggression as a response to frustration. Further, it seems to omit whatever inner symbolic meaning or associational significance

the particular situation of frustration conveys. Knowledge of the individual's experience in time deepens our insight into the problem of aggression.

The data obtained from psychoanalytic research led Freud to the conclusion that aggression has to be considered one of the two primary sources of stimulation to mental activity. This conclusion was dictated paradoxically by psychological findings of phenomena which had in common the element of aggression directed against the self. Examples of these come from studies of depression and suicide, syndromes of self-punishment, self-induced failure, individuals wrecked by success, criminals who commit crimes out of a sense of guilt, and paradoxical responses to insight commonly referred to in analytic experience as the negative therapeutic reaction. What is so striking is the fact that the operation of these tendencies in human psychology is subtler and more often unconscious than the corresponding tendencies of the sexual drives.

Analytic reflections of the problem of aggression in human nature have been unduly and unfavorably influenced by an attempt to base the understanding of aggression primarily in terms of biology. At the twenty-seventh Congress of the International Psycho-Analytical Association, Anna Freud (1972) suggested that analysts have attempted in too rigid a fashion to apply the biologically based concepts of sexuality to the concept of aggression. For many years now Brenner (1971) has pointed out that in psychoanalysis the evidence for postulating an inherent aggressive drive in human nature derives almost exclusively from clinical data. Of course, conclusions from clinical investigation must be brought in consonance with observations from related disciplines. The conclusions from analytic data have in recent years been buttressed by physiological experimentation, studies of primate behavior, and longitudinal developmental studies of child observation. The correlation of the conclusions from these different disciplines raises many problems of methodology.

Despite the various difficulties of method, it is clear that psychoanalytic investigation has a special contribution to make

to the study of aggression and its role in human adaptation. The central position in psychoanalysis of communication by speech furnishes data about human experience which no other method of investigation can offer. Introspection, which is uniquely human, provides data leading to inferences not possible by any other method of investigation. Such inferences allow us to reconstruct and understand the omitted, i.e., unconscious, processes and motivations which are indispensable for any grasp of the totality of the human experience. They bring into focus the role of anxiety and danger which all too often serve to overwhelm the coping or adaptive mechanisms, leading to primitive, indiscriminate assaults upon the environment or upon oneself. Thus psychoanalysis has a special body of data that adds to our understanding of observable behavioral phenomena.

Let me cite one example that demonstrates the contribution psychoanalytic studies can make to the analysis of primate behavior. What Hamburg and other observers have described as the phenomenon of redirected aggression in primates can, on the basis of what psychoanalysis has learned about certain patterns of aggressive behavior in children, be understood as a form of defense against fear, i.e., the well-known mechanism of identification with the aggressor. This represents a form of learning through imitation. At the same time, the inner dimension which analysis elucidates lends insight into the origin of such behavior and its adaptive value. Psychoanalysis elucidates the specific motivation for such behavioral patterns in addition to defining the dangers, the conditions, the specific developmental phases that influence the selection of preferred behavioral responses. Implied in all of this is another factor psychoanalytic studies have brought to light, namely, how close manifest aggression is to covert fear. These examples illustrate what psychoanalysis can contribute to our understanding of the roles of socialization and learning in aggression and human adaptation.

Students of primate behavior emphasize how observation, imitation, and practice lead to modification of behavior in both humans and animals. In this process psychoanalysts emphasize

the mechanism of identification. While this is relevant, it is not sufficient. The fact is that neither men nor primates copy all the observable patterns of behavior which the important models present. If we would draw conclusions for normative modification of behavior, discussions such as ours should direct some attention to this finding. Ritvo and Solnit (1958) and their coworkers at Yale, studying longitudinal development from the psychoanalytic point of view, have already posed this question in connection with children. How can they be influenced to copy the appropriate traits? A complementary study from primate zoology would be very valuable. The fact is that in both fields we are only at the beginning of such understanding. Even within psychoanalysis, we know much less about the development of aggressive patterns, their influence on ego formation and the evolution of the sense of self than we do about the comparable influences of sexual drives.

We are thus only at the beginning of our concern with some of the most important problems of human adaptation and, to quote Hamburg, 'It is difficult to imagine a more important area for future research'.

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An Evolutionary and Developmental Approach to Human Aggressiveness

David A. Hamburg

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Panel on the Role of Aggression in Human Adaptation

AN EVOLUTIONARY AND DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO HUMAN AGGRESSIVENESS

BY DAVID A. HAMBURG, M.D. (STANFORD, CALIF.)

It is a privilege to take part in an interdisciplinary symposium on the topic of aggression; it is inherently an interdisciplinary topic (Gilula and Daniels, 1969). My discussion will focus on the aggressive behavior of chimpanzees in their natural habitat, and the application of such observations to the evolution of human aggression.

Why should one study other animals if one is primarily interested in understanding man? Principally to obtain an evolutionary perspective in which we attempt to reconstruct how man came to be the way he is, and to search for subtle legacies of his ancient past that may have been transmitted both through biological and social channels. Such studies should attempt to delineate broad trends in evolution, asking whether certain characteristics of vertebrate, mammalian, and primate organisms are maintained as we draw closer to man. Building on these broad evolutionary trends, we pay special attention to the behavior patterns of man's closest relatives, such as the chimpanzee. If a behavioral trend of primate evolution is strengthened in these closely related species, it should orient us to investigate these characteristics as possible underlying components of human behavior. Psychoanalysis has long been concerned with the ways in which man's basic nature might reflect his evolutionary heritage, as transmitted both through genes

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and through customs. Questions have been asked about what can be reconstructed of the aggressive tendencies of early man and how such tendencies might be reflected in the orientations of contemporary man.

There are a number of ways of gaining some insight into human evolution. One method, which has received more attention in the past ten or fifteen years, is the study of nonhuman primates in their natural habitats, comparing observations there with observations in experimental situations. It is, of course, particularly valuable to focus attention on those primates who are most closely related to man by various biological indices: chromosomal, immunological, and biochemical. Studying chimpanzees in their natural habitat has been made possible as the result of the pioneering work of the English ethologist, Jane van Lawick-Goodall (Goodall, 1968, 1971, 1973). I have been most fortunate to have the opportunity of collaborating with Dr. Goodall and her staff in recent years, including five study visits in the period 1968-1973. At the Gombe Stream Research Center in Tanzania, Stanford students are working under our joint supervision, along with students from other universities, in long-term studies of aggressive behavior in chimpanzees and baboons under natural conditions.

We are here focusing on aggressive behavior in chimpanzees, first attempting to describe their patterns of threat and attack, mainly in relation to each other but also in relation to other species such as baboons. We are also interested in the patterns of submission which tend to ameliorate the aggressive encounters, and the patterns of reassurance which are given by aggressive animals to submissive ones. We are especially interested in the circumstances in which chimpanzees tend to threaten and attack each other, or other animals (Hamburg, 1971a).

The Gombe habitat is a moderately dense forest; high on the mountain slopes it is fairly clear but at the lower level it is a dense forest.[1] The chimpanzees move through this habitat cov-

[1] When this paper was presented, the author showed slides of the habitat and of the behavior patterns of the animals described below.

ering miles each day, covering more ground than any other nonhuman primate. They make a new nest every night. They do not move together in a tight formation like a baboon troop but rather in a loosely patterned social organization. There are about fifty chimpanzees in this community that van Lawick-Goodall has studied for over twelve years, and typically one will encounter in the forest two to eight animals, and various subgroups within the community. These subgroups change in membership from time to time, but they all know each other well and respond in distinctive ways to each other. Vivid threat patterns are evident in the adult males. Their hair stands out in times of excitement, making them appear almost twice their real size; their shoulders hunch outward. Walking on two legs, they sway from side to side in a pattern called the bipedal swagger. This same behavior is often used to initiate copulation with a female during her period of sexual receptivity.

Another type of threat is commonly observed—the charging display. We have photographed adult males with hair bristling, racing one to two hundred feet, brandishing ten-foot palm fronds which they drag along, swing in the air, or pound against a tree or the ground. One of the most striking characteristics about threat displays in chimpanzees as well as gorillas is the remarkable elaboration of their bluffing or intimidation patterns. The charging display might be called an intimidation display; it does not usually lead to physical attack although it may do so.

One of the circumstances under which such intimidation displays may be seen is when strangers meet or, to be more accurate, when relative strangers meet. We have observed an adult male who has been away from a subgroup of six animals overnight putting on such a display when he reappears in the morning. In general, the longer the period of absence, the greater is the tendency toward charging displays on reunion. However, some reunions are characterized by apparently fond embraces. The factors determining different responses to reunion are currently being studied by Harold Bauer at Gombe

and Stanford. The most serious fighting observed in any chimpanzee research occurred when strangers were introduced into an experimental group (Wilson and Wilson, 1968).

In the Gombe community, a chimpanzee called Mike was for five years the most dominant male. He was photographed charging toward a large can which had been left in the area, then smashing it down a hillside for several hundred yards. At great speed and keeping the can rolling in front of him, he then lost his footing and somersaulted, landing on his feet. He continued pounding the can as he went down the slope, making loud noises. The effect this behavior had on a young male could be seen in the expression of fear on his face. He swiftly climbed a tree and in a moment was forty feet up, where he remained for about ten minutes. All the animals in the area went up trees or into the bush when such a display was made. This display illustrates a crucial feature of Mike's behavior which facilitated his rise in the hierarchy: he often used human materials—novel materials from the chimpanzee's point of view—in his aggressive displays. In contrast to other but similar dominance transitions that have been observed at Gombe, in Mike's aggressive displays there was minimal actual fighting. By creating exceptionally vivid displays, he was able to win without fighting. When he no longer had access to cans, he showed ingenuity in using other materials, such as a bucket, some polyethylene, and roofing material. This technical ingenuity was helpful to him vis-à-vis the other animals. Dominance is not just a question of size and strength; indeed, Mike was one of the smallest adult males.

On many occasions, he was observed beating a female with his fists and forearms, sometimes stamping on her back as well. During one period of several weeks, he focused these attacks on a female with a ten-month-old infant clinging to her who, one would have thought, would be immune to such an attack since infants are usually treated with great tolerance. But when clinging under the mother, the infant was treated as a part of her. The context of this display was competition over food in which the mother was not directly engaged. Rather,

Mike was competing with other high-ranking males, but broke away from them and attacked the much weaker and more vulnerable female. This is an example of what ethologists refer to as redirected aggression.

Animals with similar dominance status rarely fight. More commonly they break off threatening encounters and attack a vulnerable animal—the small, weak, or relatively immobile. This is true not only of chimpanzees but of many of the non-human primates. The mother-infant pair referred to above was beaten by Mike three times in a week and once knocked out of a tree from a height of thirty feet. We are not sure whether preferences for certain targets endure more than a few weeks; these chimpanzees do not appear to bear grudges over a period of years.

Submission and reassurance patterns of chimpanzees are particularly interesting. For example, a chimpanzee who has been excited and aggressive in competition over bananas may encounter an experienced female who knows him well; she backs up to him in a lowered body posture, rump first, and 'presents' to him. This is not necessarily a sexual posture. The male then may put his arm around her waist and hug her. Another typical pattern of submission on the part of the female toward an excited male in a competitive, premium food situation, is her lowered body posture with her forearm out, palm extended, a 'fear-face' expression, and making a distinctive sound called the 'pant-grunt'. She may make an ambivalent approach, three steps forward, two back, three forward, two back, and over a period of one to several minutes works her way to the male. At this point he is likely to reach out and pat her on the head, or hug her around the waist. He is not likely to give her the banana, although he might let her have a small piece. Such sequences may be considered as reflecting aggression-submission-reassurance.

In another sequence of this sort, we have observed young males bowing before high-ranking males, in a pattern similar to human bowing. After repeated bows, the dominant male may

reach out and pat the subordinate on the head. These are only a few of the many ways in which chimpanzees manage aggressive encounters. They are exceptional among nonhuman species for the variety of ways in which they control or regulate aggressive interactions, especially through these aggression-submission-reassurance sequences.

Chimpanzees are hunters (Teleki, 1973). We have observed coöperative behavior in hunting and killing small, young animals: baboons, Colobus monkeys, bushbucks, bushpigs. For example, in one instance, we saw a hunting formation of four adult males, one in front and three behind. The lead male went up a tree where a young baboon had been isolated. The others surrounded the base of the tree to prevent escape and to chase off any adult baboons who came to defend the infant. Sometimes these back-up males will cover possible escape routes from other trees. It is a rather complex, well coördinated hunting pattern which may extend over a quarter mile of space and last some minutes.

When there is a kill, there is intense excitement. However, in a few instances freshly killed animals have been made available and the chimpanzees did not show similar excitement, but rather cautious investigation. This raises the question whether the process of hunting and killing engenders excitement, both in participants and observers. Often, observing animals come to beg for meat, and there is some food sharing, though most of the meat goes to the hunting participants. Altogether, the extent of coöperative and sharing behavior in hunting and meat-eating is exceptional for nonhuman primates.

We can also report on interactions between baboons and chimpanzees. With their huge canines which are quite capable of killing other animals, adult male baboons can readily threaten chimpanzees. But the adult male chimpanzees are not necessarily alarmed unless such threats are sustained. The two species have an established transaction based on each species' learning intimate details of behavior patterns in the other. Mike, responding to the threat of a baboon who is about two

feet away from him, will go on eating his bananas even when a second adult male baboon comes up and a third is nearby. Occasionally the baboons will try to grab a banana, and if they succeed Mike will reach out with an arm and take a swipe at them, much as a human might do. They promptly jump back. Although chimpanzees are generally dominant over baboons, baboons will keep up steady pressure in an effort to get a premium food such as bananas.

When several adult male baboons sustain their pressure over an hour or so, even high-ranking chimpanzees appear to become tense and protective of the premium food. Typically, one of the baboons, still not having got any bananas, breaks away and attacks a smaller chimpanzee—e.g., a young, though fully grown female. In this circumstance, the female is not usually protected by other chimpanzees, and such protection does not appear to be necessary. However, if such an attack is directed toward an infant it will elicit counterattacks from the mother and perhaps from other chimpanzees.

Chimpanzees make use of weapons. One low-ranking male, possibly in response to frustration vis-à-vis other chimpanzees, was a frequent threatener of baboons and an accurate rock thrower. In a typical sequence, upon failing to get bananas from higher ranking chimpanzees, he would throw a rock at a baboon. This sometimes immediately precipitated an attack by the bruised baboon on a lower ranking baboon, a sort of chain reaction. Such sequences appear to reflect redirected aggression, both within and between species. It is a common feature of primate aggression that it is directed downward in the dominance hierarchy.

Another example of the use of weapons was observed in a four-year-old chimpanzee. Swinging a ten-foot palm frond against an adult male baboon, he hit him and the baboon ran off. The young chimpanzee had learned to use this weapon through observation and imitation. From age two to four, he had watched two older siblings using a frond or tree limb as a weapon. He imitated them, very clumsily at first, but prac-

ticed the behavior in his play even when they were not around, and eventually perfected the motions that could be used to drive off a dangerous animal. Thus, he learned early in life how to use a weapon skilfully. This sequence is an important one in the development of adaptive behavior by nonhuman primates: observation-imitation-practice.

Grooming, notably prominent in nonhuman primates, has a variety of functions but an important one appears to be a relief of aggressive tension. For example, when bananas are available the grooming sessions of adult male chimpanzees tend to be particularly intense and prolonged, and to ameliorate aggressive interaction.

Some years ago, van Lawick-Goodall arranged for the provision of bananas as a dietary supplement in a small cleared area of forest. This situation has now been systematically studied over a period of years during which the availability of bananas was raised to a higher level and then decreased to a low level where it is presently maintained (Wrangham, in press). The findings clearly reveal that the attractiveness of the bananas drew unusually large aggregations of chimpanzees into this small area, some of whom probably had relatively little contact with each other in other circumstances. During this period, there was a high frequency of aggressive interactions among chimpanzees and also between chimpanzees and baboons; observations of the sort I have been sketching above were common during that period. With the decline of banana feeding in the past few years, there is less crowding, two subgroups of adult males have largely withdrawn from each other, and aggressive interactions have become less frequent.

On a shorter time scale, similar observations have been made in other parts of the forest untouched by man—e.g., when fig trees are in season, since figs are another premium food. These observations are similar to several other studies of nonhuman primates (Southwick, 1972). The availability of premium food in concentrated or short supply tends to elicit relatively frequent aggressive interactions. The high density evidently accen-

tuates patterns of interaction that occur in less severe form at lower densities. Indeed, the crowding of strangers in the presence of valued resources appears to be a circumstance of practical significance that increases the probability of serious aggression among nonhuman primates (Hamburg, 1971b). Since other conditions also increase the probability of aggressive behavior, it may be useful to summarize what is known of such eliciting conditions at present.

Aggressive patterns common to a variety of primate species, such as chimpanzees, gorillas, and baboons, seem to be similar in some respects to those found in man. Present evidence permits at least an approximation of the conditions under which aggressive patterns are likely to occur.

1. In daily dominance transactions.
2. In redirection of aggression downwards in the dominance hierarchy.
3. In the protection of infants, most often by females.
4. When sought-after resources, such as food, or sexually receptive females, are in short supply.
5. When meeting unfamiliar animals.
6. In defending against predators.
7. In the killing and eating of young animals of other species.
8. When terminating severe disputes among subordinate animals.
9. In the exploration of strange or dangerous areas.
10. When long-term changes in dominance status occur, especially among males.
11. When an animal has a painful injury.
12. When there is crowding of strangers in the presence of valued resources.

Territoriality, in the sense of defense of a fixed area over a long period of time, has not been included. There are some behavioral distinctions between familiar and unfamiliar terri-

tory, but territoriality in this sense has so far not been found in those primates most closely related to man. However, the subject is a complex one and deserves further study.

In the circumstances listed above, the probability of overt threat and fighting is higher than it is in other contexts of primate life. However, we must remember that primates spend much of the day in peaceful activities; they are both peaceful and aggressive. Our purpose is to clarify the conditions under which they are likely to threaten or attack and these can largely be put into two broad, general categories: 1, defense, 2, obtaining access to valued resources. In each of these broad categories, a variety of activities may be involved. Behaving aggressively in the contexts listed probably has given selective advantage to primates in the long course of evolution, over millions of years. In general, these behavior patterns have been effective in enforcing adaptive requirements and in helping these animals meet the problems they have had to face in order to survive as a species in the habitat in which they lived. However, the adaptability of aggressive behavior in past environments is no assurance that similar behavior would pertain in the environment of contemporary man.

The human species has, in many respects, a biological heritage of its vertebrate-mammalian-primate history (Young, 1971). This clearly includes some features of brain and behavior (Washburn, 1972; Washburn and McCown, 1972). It may well include some anlage of aggressive tendencies, transmitted genetically yet requiring environmental stimulation for full development (Hamburg, 1972). One reason for giving serious consideration to this possibility is that the studies I have been sketching here have delineated a good many similarities in basic elements of chimpanzee and human aggressive behavior: in the forms of threat, attack, submission, and reassurance; in the contexts and eliciting conditions of aggressive behavior; in the role of coöperation in facilitating aggression; in the tendency to make status differentiations; in the tendency to redirect aggression toward weaker

or lower status individuals; in the adolescent male aggression spurt (currently under intensive study at Gombe and Stanford, especially by Anne Pusey). These similarities are at the level of individual and small group behavior. So far, there has been no observation of behavior remotely similar to human warfare.

In any event, aggressive behavior between man and man, between man and animals, and between human groups has been a prominent feature of human experiences for a very long time (Bigelow, 1972). Such behavior has been easily learned, practiced in play, encouraged by custom, and rewarded by most human societies for thousands of years. Surely it is reasonable to keep an open mind to the possibility that such behavior may be shaped in our own species by both social and biological transmission. But the mechanisms of transmission, especially at the biological level, remain for the most part for future research to determine.

One line of inquiry that seems especially worthwhile is to determine whether the human organism early in life is 'primed' to acquire certain elementary behavior patterns with relative ease. Is there a special facility for learning in directions that have been adaptively valuable for the species over a very long time in the course of its evolution? For any species, some patterns of behavior are easy to learn, some difficult, and some impossible. In general, it seems likely that learning in such adaptively-significant spheres as behavior oriented to food, water, and reproduction would have high biological priority; and aggression can serve in the implementation of these adaptive requirements. So it is plausible that the inherited 'wiring diagram' of the brain would in some way reflect the long-term selective advantage of facility in learning such behavior (Hamburg, 1968). For example, simple preferences on the part of the infant or young child might draw his attention to a certain class of stimuli, or reward his engagement in a particular kind of activity. Once drawn in this direction early in life by an inherited preference, a great deal of complex learning could

ensue, fully taking account of cultural instructions. This line of inquiry may in future years link evolutionary and developmental approaches toward the understanding of human aggressiveness.

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Panel on the Role of Aggression in Human Adaptation

AGGRESSION REDEFINED—ITS ADAPTATIONAL ASPECTS

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Psychoanalysts in their clinical work are often confronted by varying manifestations of aggressive impulses that cause difficulty in the lives of their patients. We are accustomed to dealing with these problems as manifestations of wishes or fears (and defenses against such wishes or fears) of doing harm to important people in the patient's environment. By and large, the psychoanalytic literature has been primarily concerned with such aspects whether the urges or impulses involved are directed toward other individuals or toward the person of the patient himself.

There has been a long debate over whether the primary instincts or drives can be subsumed under the two headings, libidinal nature and aggressive nature. Freud (1920), in his formulations in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, felt that there was a basic life instinct linked with libidinal drives and manifested in varying aspects of Eros. In contradistinction to this, he postulated a basic instinct or drive toward a return to an inanimate state, which he called a death instinct. Derived from this latter were a variety of aggressive manifestations, all serving the purpose of a return to an inanimate state, a state of death. Freud's concept of a death instinct as a basic biological tendency was much debated in the literature of the 1920's and 1930's. By and large, few analysts have felt it necessary to accept this basic concept of Freud's but have felt rather that it was possible to consider an aggressive drive as a basic component of the mental apparatus, having in its varying manifestations certain

This paper was also presented in modified form at meetings of the Atlanta Psychoanalytic Society, the Cleveland Psychoanalytic Society, and the New York Psychoanalytic Society.

hostile, destructive aspects that cause a great deal of conflict and arouse a need for a variety of defenses.

It is the purpose of this paper to examine whether this concept is complete, or whether analysts have tended to emphasize one aspect of aggressive tendencies—the hostile and destructive —while overlooking other manifestations of equal or perhaps greater consequence that play important adaptive roles in both human mental development and human interactions. To anticipate the argument advanced later, it may be that a preoccupation with clinical problems has precluded an adequate overview of all forms of aggressive activities considered in a broader sense. Leo Stone (1971) in his Brill Lecture stated this idea in a succinct sentence: 'I view the phenomenon of aggression, and its psychological functions and representations, as the aggregate of diverse acts, having diverse origins, and bound together, sometimes loosely, by the nature of their impact on objects rather than by a demonstrably common and unitary drive' (p. 195).

It might be well to begin with a common-sense definition of the word, aggression. It is a composite word derived from the Latin, with the first part being the preposition, *ad*, meaning 'toward' or 'to', while the second portion of the word is derived from the verb *gradior* meaning 'to go' or 'to move'. Consequently, the meaning of the word would be 'to go forward' or 'to approach'. In the short Oxford English Dictionary (1964), the verb 'aggress' is defined as first of all 'to approach'; its use as an intransitive verb then is defined as 'to make an attack on'. On the other hand, aggression is defined only as 'an unprovoked attack, the first attack in a quarrel, an assault'. Thus, within the two definitions there has been a change in terms of meaning only to go toward with intent of attacking, that is, with intent of inflicting some harm upon.[1] The American Heritage Dictionary (1969) defines aggression only in the latter terms of the Oxford Dictionary—that is, the act of commencing hostilities, or invasion and assault. The American Heritage Dictionary

[1] Etymology, of course, is not definition since words change in meaning with usage, but it does indicate the original direction of the meaning.

also includes as the psychoanalytic definition of the term, a hostile action or behavior.[2] It might be pointed out that the definition in the American Heritage Dictionary does indicate that aggression is derived from the Latin words meaning 'to approach', 'to go toward'. The definition in the American Heritage Dictionary may be derived from the Glossary of Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts (Moore and Fine, 1967) published by the American Psychoanalytic Association in which aggression is defined as meaning attack or hostile action. Given such a definition in a psychoanalytic publication, any behavior that involves an approach to or toward another object or activity that is not with the intent, conscious or unconscious, of doing harm would have to be considered a different form of activity: a sublimation of essentially aggressive drives. Yet, it seems this definition is too narrow and does not allow for a number of situations that occur in ordinary life, in which an 'approach to' is a necessary part of the continuation of life, the attainment of pleasure for either the self or the object, or the achievement and satisfaction of a variety of ego interests.[3] I will illustrate these points with several brief clinical vignettes.

CASE I

A young man in his early twenties was in analysis because of an inability to proceed in his chosen field and because of problems in relating to the opposite sex. He was an only child of successful parents who were engaged in related professions. He had gone to good schools and an Ivy League college, and had been an excellent student. He had a number of good friends but never had been able to become involved romantically or sex-

[2] That this definition derived from psychoanalysis is included in a modern dictionary is proof of the point made before that analysts have tended to emphasize only one aspect of aggressive behavior at the expense of the total picture.

[3] In the discussion that follows, the role of hostile, destructive urges will be assumed, and the more neglected aspects of the problem will be emphasized. This is not to underplay the destructive components which may serve to bring a patient into treatment in the first place.

ually with a woman. One other area of deficiency during his prep school and college years had been his relatively poor athletic ability. In spite of an excellent physical frame, he had not been able to do well in athletic events of any sort.

Toward the end of a particular week in his analysis, much of the material centered about his feeling that he was not able to equal the business and professional successes of either of his parents. He expressed his very marked resentment that they seemed to expect that he would at least be as good as they or perhaps surpass them. Many incidents were recalled from his childhood, and an intense feeling of hostility directed toward his parents and connected with the incidents of earlier years emerged.

After the weekend, at the start of the Monday session, he said that much to his surprise he had had a very good weekend. He had thought, in view of the almost forbidden feelings he had expressed in the last session, that he might have been a little down in spirits and certainly not able to face his parents. However, he had spent the weekend with them and had found himself playing a game of tennis that was far above the quality and level of anything he had played before. He had played with his peers, finding that he was hitting the ball with more vigor, stroking with firmer and surer touch, so that he had greater control over the placement of his shots. Attempts to analyze this phenomenon further were nonproductive: he could only repeat that he felt somewhat freer and easier and more sure of his handling of the racket and placement of the ball. It was tentatively suggested to him that, in view of the content of the sessions just before the weekend, he might have had fantasies of an intensely hostile nature and may have been symbolically displacing certain fantasies and feelings toward his parents by means of the tennis racket and ball. No evidence was forthcoming at that point in the analysis to validate this conjecture, nor did any material in subsequent sessions serve to elucidate this possibility.

What remained was an unexplained phenomenon that could be passed off as the partial removal of an inhibition toward any

expression or activity of a forceful nature, but certainly there was no evidence that this was an aggressive act involving hostile or harmful fantasies. One could wonder then whether the inhibition had been of a 'normal' forward or forceful activity rather than a connection of this forceful activity with forbidden and unacceptable destructive fantasies and wishes. It seemed evident at the time that in the successful execution of a sport, it was necessary for the patient to engage in certain forceful activities, but was it always necessary to assume that behind such activity were unexpressed, destructive tendencies? There is no question, of course, that a sport, as a ritualized competitive activity, can serve as a suitable vehicle for the discharge of otherwise forbidden, murderous, destructive impulses (*cf.*, Whitman, 1969), but need this always be necessarily and exclusively true?

CASE II

A thirty-seven-year-old lawyer entered analysis because of marital problems and frequent outbursts of rage directed primarily toward his wife. He was of Irish Catholic origins and was the oldest son in a family of four children. His parents, who had come to this country from Ireland, were poorly educated and forced to work at various nonskilled trades. However, they were ambitious for their children, particularly for the patient as the oldest. Throughout his school years, he was a brilliant student and his parents, especially his mother, gloried in his outstanding performances. He worked hard, achieving a high degree of success, rising rapidly for a young person because of his ability to organize legal data and to function in courtroom trial situations. He met and married a woman outside his faith and had a moderately successful marriage until the tragic illness and death of one of his children. After that, the marital relationship deteriorated and it was at this point that he came into treatment. Without going into further details of this case, there is an observation relevant to the current discussion.

After a number of sessions in which his driving ambition unfolded as a reflection of, among other things, a desire to please his parents, particularly his mother, and a fear that any success

would be taken away from him and be regarded not as his accomplishment but hers, it was possible to interpret to him that behind this lay fears and concerns about his own masculinity. This could then be related to his current relationship with his wife; it was pointed out to him that much of the anger expressed in his episodes of rage with her was a substitute for the anxiety he felt in her presence, an anxiety derived from his concerns about his masculinity.

It was then necessary for him to miss a session because of a scheduled court appearance. In the next session he reported that the court appearance had gone well: in the courtroom he had suddenly realized that in his presentation he had been performing in a way not true of him for quite a long period. He described his sense of effortlessness at organizing his material and at presenting it in a way that was pleasing to him. By contrast, his court appearances over the previous year had often been an effort. He felt he had to force himself to perform; although he could do it, it was at the cost of a great deal of inner tension and energy. This courtroom appearance seemed without effort and represented the type of behavior and success in the courtroom that had earned him rapid advancement.

There are several components involved in the phenomenon reported by this patient, and they can be explained in a number of theoretical ways. But what is pertinent here is the fact that together with relief of anxiety, there had been a lowering of the level of inner tension: the more overt and common expressions of hostility and aggression had been replaced by a forceful and evidently productive use of his talents in the furtherance of his chosen work. In the usual psychoanalytic terminology, this would not be considered aggressive. Yet it is possible that an activity involving an adversary calls for the use of certain forceful and active tendencies which certainly could be subsumed under a heading of aggressivity.

A clinical observation such as this is best explained in the terms Hartmann used to describe energic changes in the mental apparatus in order to account for the activity of certain ego

functions. To use Hartmann's concept in this case, one can say that the variety of ego functions which were active in the furtherance of the patient's work (thinking, organizing, and synthesis, as well as language, memory, and perception) had all been invaded by conflict between hostile urges derived from conflict over masculine strivings. One might say that these functions that were invaded by conflict were then cathected by more instinctualized drive energies. With a degree of insight and interpretation, a less instinctualized and more neutralized energic investment of ego functions was possible. This, however, is a theoretical construction that attempts to account for the clinical phenomenon described. What is of importance here is the fact that this type of activity could be more freely used either in lieu of, or after resolution of, underlying conflicts that had previously precluded their freer expression.

A number of similar clinical examples could be cited, but it might be more valuable to turn to the consideration of normal developmental processes.

Even before the infant reaches the stage of attempting mastery of the many aspects of his environment, he has, of course, experienced hunger, gratification of this feeling, sensations of satiation, pleasure, and unpleasure. He has had the experience of satiation accompanied by the appearance and disappearance of whatever provides the gratification. He has gradually begun to learn and to go through the stages of development leading to differentiation between self and nonself. He develops in the direction of the constancy of objects: even those that disappear can reappear and are not, in fact, destroyed. The actual food in the form in which it is given is, of course, destroyed in the service of satiation and growth. The needs of the human are such that, like any predatory animal, he will seek the sources of his necessary food and gratification. This seeking behavior, as in the rooting reflex of the nursing infant, can be regarded as the prototype and beginning of forceful movements in an adaptive role which could certainly come under the head-

ing of aggressive activities, i.e., forceful activities directed toward the very important aspect of providing for food intake and survival. This is not to imply that the newborn infant in such an action[4] has any conscious thought or desire that motivates him in this direction. Rather, it is an instinctual and instinctive activity which by its very nature is necessary for the infant to feed and derive nourishment. It is, however, a form of going forward or toward the source of this nourishment and, as such, could be considered an aggressive act. That later on these actions become associated with experiences of an unpleasurable nature and, as is well known from the analysis of both children and adults, can be connected with fantasies of a revengeful, hostile, and destructive nature does not in any way rule out the fact that the initial activity is not necessarily accompanied by hostile or destructive fantasies.

Followers of Melanie Klein, of course, would not accept this statement, but would feel that there is essentially an inborn or innate attitude toward the maternal, feeding breast—certain innate fantasies of a hostile, revengeful, destructive nature directed toward that breast. As Edward Glover (1947) pointed out in his perceptive monograph on basic concepts, it is not in keeping with basic psychoanalytic concepts to assume the transmission of innate or inborn fantasies. Rather these are acquired in the course of development as various ego functions mature and as experience in its broad sense plays a part in the production of such fantasies.

Margaret Mahler (1968) in her papers on separation-individuation has divided the behavioral manifestations of this very important developmental process into a number of stages ex-

[4] The going toward or the *not* going toward would be equally forceful acts. *In*action would come under the heading of activity as considered here. The seeming inactivity of the analyst in the analytic situation is as assertive and valuable as the periods of active participation marked by some intervention or interpretation. I am indebted to Dr. Justin Krent for pointing out this ambiguity in his discussion of this paper at a meeting of the Cleveland Psychoanalytic Society.

tending from six to thirty-six months of age. There will be no attempt here to delineate all of the various stages she describes. Of pertinence to this discussion is the fact that, as the child develops and the process of separation-individuation goes on, the eighteen- or twenty-month-old child will venture forth or bravely proceed into the outer world away from the parent, but will periodically come back to check and make sure the parent is still there.[5] If these movements might be called active, they might also come again under the heading of aggressive steps in the development of a complete sense of one's own self and of one's independence or freedom from the maternal figure.

It is commonplace to see a child, seemingly intrigued by a particular toy or activity, ceaselessly playing with that toy or repeating the activity until he can do it quite easily and effortlessly. This phenomenon can apply equally to the acquisition of a new skill or learning procedure, such as tying a shoe or buttoning a shirt, and to the conquering and control of a toy or some other object; it is seen even in the repetitiveness of an action designed to overcome an unpleasant experience.[6] All of these various activities are subsumed under a heading of attempting to master and could be put in a category of actions that are of an aggressive, forceful nature but not necessarily connected with destruction or assaultive intentions.

The literature of the early 1940's was filled with discussion of Ives Hendrick's (1942, 1943) proposed category of an instinct of mastery. Observations such as those described above led in part to Hendrick's postulation. While the general decision among psychoanalysts was that it was not necessary to posit an inherent instinct to mastery analogous to libidinal and aggressive drives, such repetitive activity on the part of the developing child was left unexplained unless, of course, it could be considered a diversion of aggressive tendencies in the service

[5] See, in this regard, Harlow (1959) and his work.

[6] Anna Freud (1936) described a child who repeated with a doll the active role of a dentist with a patient after having suffered the passive experience of being a patient in a dentist's office.

of learning, experience, maturing ego functions, and so forth—that is, in adaptation to the child's environment.

A little later in development, the child reapproaches the maternal figure in a manner that is certainly not directed toward destruction or doing harm. Rather it is an expression of positive œdipal libidinal feelings,[7] having as a goal certain types of sexual activity or union with that maternal figure—if only in fantasy. Such approaches to a love object, of course, occur later on in life and are an important aspect of sexual relationships between individuals, leading to sexual union which certainly involves forceful, forward approaches on the part of one or the other partner, or both, without *necessarily* any desire or fantasy of a destructive, harmful nature. Again, one might ask whether such forceful approaches and behavior, either of the œdipal child or of the adult in seeking sexual gratification, are to be considered as anything else but forward moving and aggressive in an adaptive sense. That such approaches can also contain elements of a hostile, destructive nature is, of course, well known to analysts and is often of importance in the analysis of a variety of sexual disturbances. However, in terms of total adaptation to the interrelationship between male and female, such active, forceful approaching behavior is necessary on the part of one or the other individual and is conducive to a good relationship between them. This would be a valued use of aggressive behavior without any destructive, hostile component necessarily being involved.

To follow one aspect of the relation between people, it seems that except for Rangell (1963), the concept of friendship is one that the psychoanalytic literature has not considered in its fullest possibilities. Friendship has usually been described as a form of aim-inhibited libidinal relationship in which the sexual component has been repressed or defended against by either isolation or reaction-formation. There may often be a

[7] The role of libidinal impulses in leading to progressive or assertive behaviors will not be considered here, but belong to a study of motility as an ego function. Dr. Justin Krent made this same point in his discussion (*cf.* footnote 4).

sublimated homosexual attraction when the friendship is between individuals of the same sex. The role of aggressive feelings in friendship has been neglected, except when certain aspects of friendliness have been analyzed as reaction-formations against hostile or destructive fantasies. However, friendships may be based upon a variety of common interests between individuals: shared experiences that tend to build libidinal bonds but also allow for the expression of forceful, directive, assertive behavior in relation to the other person without a destructive or hostile element necessarily being involved. In fact, many friendships do depend upon this degree of active approach on the part of one or the other of the comrades, without its being possible in an analysis to discover any of the theoretically aim-inhibited, possibly homosexual libidinal ties (*cf.*, Lorenz, 1966; Radomisli, 1968).

To return to the development of various ego functions, one of the very human attributes is the interposition of thinking between a stimulus, its perception, and a response (*cf.*, Beres, 1968). Thinking has been called by Freud (1900-1901) a form of trial action and serves to provide an economical way of testing a variety of possible appropriate responses. To the extent that any action can be considered to have a forceful and aggressive dimension, thinking, in its role as a trial action, would partake of this quality. In so far as thinking might represent an aggressive equivalent, it provides an economical expression of possible responses and at the same time often precludes, in its more advanced levels of development, the necessity of any overt response to the environmental stimulation. Borrowing from René Spitz (1969), one might postulate that the energy utilized by the thinking process is derived from basic aggressive instinctual drives, whatever their nature may be. This would be a form of 'normal' progressive, adaptive ego activity that gives rise to many of the finer and higher accomplishments of the human being (*cf.*, Kleinschmidt, 1967). That thinking processes can become invaded by conflicts and regress to more primitive forms after their development is a well-known

clinical phenomenon. Apparently, just such a situation occurred in the case of the lawyer whose behavior in the courtroom was described earlier. There can, of course, be much further regression of the thinking functions, leading to the type of thinking disorder found in schizophrenics.

Society today, and for a long time, has been concerned with outward manifestations of violence and has tended to use the same concept for violence and aggression. It is valuable and important to distinguish aggressive manifestations from violent ones, using the latter term to involve aspects of doing harm or destruction to another object or thing. Whatever the origins of violent action may be—whether social failures, inner conflicts that are acted upon, or organized and socially acceptable violence in a so-called police action, such as the one that took place in Attica prison—they are all manifestations of destructive, harm-producing behavior prevalent in the current social situation.

Ethologists have, in their studies of infrahuman species, offered evidence that this type of violent behavior is common between species, but has been somewhat tamed in various ways between members of the same species. This does not mean that animals do not attack, harm, or kill others of their own species, but over the evolutionary eons of time, there seems to have developed certain intraspecies behavior which serves to inhibit or preclude the full carrying out of a violent, destructive action. These types of behavior in the infrahuman species studied are apparently either of an instinctive origin or learned very early in life through a variety of conditioning experiences. It is dangerous to draw an analogy between infrahuman and human species, since the human has the advantage of a greatly enlarged cortex and the capacity for thinking, for symbol formation, for language development to provide for the transmission of learned experiences from one generation to another, and for the possible evolution of a variety of different reactions interspersed between stimulus and response. Lorenz (1966) in his book, On Aggression, speaks of the ritualization of responses,

which tends to preclude a violent, destructive outcome in intra-species struggles. By analogy, many analysts and others have considered that certain competitive sports activities in human society allow for the ritualized discharge of violent, destructive urges. There is no question that many sports do lend themselves to this, and that some of the interest in football derives from the destructive potential existing at any moment in the game. Tinbergen (1968) had this concept in mind in his excellent review of aggression.

However, it is possible, particularly if aggressive behavior is considered in the broader sense proposed here, to see that there are many avenues of activity that permit of aggressive responses without violence and destructiveness. One of the greatest of these would be the capacity for thinking developed in varying degrees by the human being. Thinking offers the possibility of an intense and useful substitute activity that precludes violent, destructive actions. That the product of the thinking process may be utilized in the service of destructive tendencies is quite evident, as witness the leashing of atomic energy to a destructive purpose, but this is not the fault of the thinking process as much as it is a misuse of its products. The same, by analogy, applies to many of the thoughts individuals have that subserve useful, aggressive activities, without a destructive component necessarily involved. That thoughts can also be of a destructive nature, considering thought in its broadest sense of actual thinking at various levels (fantasies and dreams), is again a well-known phenomenon.

The relationship of superego activities to the other functions briefly described above has not been considered as yet. By and large, most analytic literature deals with the interrelationship between superego activity and ego activity in terms of the hostile, vengeful, destructive components that often cause distress to a patient. Little attention has been paid to the more benign and equally forceful manifestations of harmony between superego and ego activities. It is a common experience to have patients report the glow of pride or satisfaction upon fulfilling

some aspects of their moral or ethical demands. Whatever method of theoretical formulation is utilized to explain such a glow as representing metaphorically the approval of the superego as a parental overseer vis-à-vis the self-representation, it would seem that this glow of satisfaction represents a forceful utilization of an aggressive interrelationship between the various levels of mental activity.

Many of these phenomena have been described to this point in other than the usual terminology of psychoanalytic metapsychology. To use such terminology, what has been described is the utilization of autonomous ego functions in the service of so-called ego interests. This latter is a less well studied area of ego psychology, but includes such concepts as success, which has id and superego aspects as well as ego-related aspects (*cf.*, Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1951), ambitious strivings, relations with the community, creativity, and so forth. All of these are served by the activity of the various ego functions which, in the furtherance of these interests, operate best at an autonomous level. Hartmann's (1939, 1950) concept of autonomy of ego functions extends psychoanalytic psychology to a general theory accounting for many aspects of human behavior. Briefly, this concept states that many ego activities are not always and invariably involved in conflict, but may operate outside of conflictual situations. Some ego functions exist as part of the givens of the mental apparatus and have a primary autonomy (e.g., perception, memory, control of motility and the ability to think, symbolize, and acquire language). These functions mature and develop outside the areas of intersystemic or even of intrasystemic conflict, although they may be drawn into conflictual areas and their development affected by such conflict. Other ego functions arise out of conflict but may go on to develop and operate outside of conflict; this is a level of secondary autonomy that may dynamically be reinvaded by conflict situations. These extensions of Freud's basic theory expand psychoanalytic psychology from a conflict theory of

human behavior to a more general one applicable to the understanding of nonconflictual mental activity.

Similarly, Hartmann expanded the energic concepts of metapsychology beyond Freud's ideas of fusion and defusion of instinctual drive energies to allow for more gradations and for the vicissitudes of the aggressive drives. Hartmann was attempting to explain the difference in the levels of functioning—for example, as in the case of the lawyer, when his thinking and performing processes were invaded by conflict and when they were free of it. Hartmann's explanation would be that these ego activities were cathected by more instinctualized aggressive energy while invaded by conflict, and more de-aggressified energy while functioning freer of conflict. If one follows such energic postulates, it is possible to explain the other phenomena described in terms of more or less aggressified energies being involved in the given ego or superego activities. Whether the aggressified or de-aggressified energies are of the same order, or represent different and changed quanta of energy, is open to speculation. This economic explanation provided by Hartmann has a useful heuristic value in attempting to explain processes, the nature of which is not known. However, it does provide explanations of one unknown in terms of another, however reasonable and logical the postulates of the energic unknown may appear.

SUMMARY

This paper represents an attempt to broaden the definition of the concept of aggression to include behavior and activities, mental or otherwise, which are more than destructive or harmful to others. Using the original definition and etymology of the word aggression, an effort has been made to include all forceful behavior and activities that involve approaches to or going toward an object. Clinical examples have been cited to demonstrate this, and various ego functions and other phenomena of a developmental and more mature nature have been

described. It is true that analysts often ignore the more conflict-free activities of the patient and concentrate on those involved in conflict, which produce trouble and difficulty for the patient. To the extent that psychoanalytic psychology and understanding of human behavior can be more comprehensive, it is possible to study activities of a less conflictual nature.

This effort to expand the area of aggressive manifestations from destructive aspects only to a wider range of phenomena, if successful, would lead to what Anna Freud (1972) called considerations of the manifestations of aggressivity, regardless of the form, at all levels of human development.

Finally, nonhostile, nondestructive thought can be a useful channel of aggressive behavior in the broader sense of the term, aggression, and certainly one that leads to important adaptations in the interrelationships between an individual, the objects in his environment, and the total environment. It allows for the sort of changes in his environment that make an alloplastic modification of the outside reality in which an individual exists.

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Aggression and Utopia

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Panel on the Role of Aggression in Human Adaptation

AGGRESSION AND UTOPIA

A NOTE ON WILLIAM MORRIS'S 'NEWS FROM NOWHERE'

BY LIONEL TRILLING (NEW YORK)

William Morris's great Utopian romance, *News from Nowhere,* is a work I once knew quite intimately but had not re-read for something like a decade. Recently, however, I turned to it again. My latest experience of the work was surprising in that it was marked by a mild distress, a degree of anxiety. When I tried to discover a reason for this, I seemed to find it in the book's attitude toward aggression. A salient element of *News from Nowhere* is its certitude that aggression can be rooted out of human nature. And when I went on to ask why this latest reading of the book should produce untoward feelings which had not occurred on any of my several previous readings, the answer that proposed itself was that a recent development of our culture had made this a different book from the one I formerly knew. It had changed the relation which the book's fantasies bore to actuality. Over the last decade many people, young people especially, have come to share Morris's certitude about the feasibility of extirpating aggression and this circumstance presumably gave it a new immediacy and force when I encountered it in the book. I was therefore led to the supposition that my disquiet was the result of confronting the possibility of a life in which aggression plays no part.

I shall begin my discussion of *News from Nowhere* by saying a word about its author. The peculiar power and charm of William Morris are suggested by the deep admiration in which he was held by two great writers of the generation after his own, William Butler Yeats and George Bernard Shaw. The dissimilarity of these men is legendary. Yeats was committed

to the idea of an archaic class-bound society which alone, he believed, made it possible for life to be instinctual, significant, and beautiful. Shaw in his day was the exemplary exponent of the reorganization of society on rational lines. Antithetical as they were in their hopes for life, both men acknowledged Morris as master. The young Yeats was encouraged in his dreams of an authentic existence by Morris's celebrations of the old cultures of Northern Europe. In the socialism which was the central concern of Morris's later years, Shaw found confirmation of his own vision of a society that would be the perfection of rational order and peace.

Of all the great Victorians, Morris came closest to being a happy man. His adaptation to life and the joy he took in it are almost unique in modern times and are deeply inspiriting. Whatever he put his hand to, he did well and to his own satisfaction, and with entire absorption and no strain. How he did so much is a perpetual wonder. He was a poet, a writer of prose romances, a translator; he was a brilliant designer and the most influential theorist of design of his time; he was an efficient businessman; he was a great printer and publisher; he was a tireless and cogent lecturer on social questions; he threw himself into political activity with passionate energy. The master doctrine of his thought, that work must be a joy to the worker, had been formulated by Ruskin, whose influence upon him was decisive, yet we cannot doubt that Morris derived it in the first instance from his own experience.

There was, to be sure, one discernible ground for unhappiness in his mature life—his wife, who was famous for her beauty, was indifferent to him and gave her affection to his close friend, Dante Gabriel Rossetti, with whom for many years her relation was most intimate although probably not adulterous. While this was a cause of great pain to Morris, and although he was capable of terrible outbursts of rage, he responded to the situation with restraint and amenity. I mention this circumstance because it bears upon one aspect of the ethical program of *News from Nowhere*—that which gives expression to Morris's explicit

and intransigent antagonism to the Victorian sexual code and his insistence on freedom in the erotic life.

Even from this brief description, it is evident that Morris was a man on a very large scale indeed. His thought was large, was ultimate: its informing idea was the goodness of life, and its end in view was nothing less than making that goodness universally apparent and universally accessible. As much as anyone ever did, Morris really believed that this end could be brought about and he was ready to go to all lengths to do so; his revolutionary faith was entire. And perhaps not the least revolutionary element of his program was his willingness to jettison an assumption which is integral to high Western culture: that man's nature and destiny are fulfilled not through his success in achieving pleasure but through setting himself goals which are beyond pleasure—though not, of course, beyond gratification—and pursuing them with unremitting energy, with ceaseless devotion in the face of defeat and frustration. It is from this 'effort and expectation and desire'—the phrase is Wordsworth's—that man's highest value to himself is commonly thought to derive; that is to say, his sense of his largeness of spirit, his dignity, his transcendent significance. *News from Nowhere,* which may fairly be taken to summarize Morris's social creed, wholly repudiates this assumption. It is overtly hostile to conceptions of largeness and dignity. It rejects the line of thought which connects transcendence with the putting forth of superlative effort and with the risk of defeat and frustration that this entails. Its conception of man's nature and destiny is informed by what might be called a calculated modesty.

This principled limitation of ambition had characterized Morris's thought from the beginning. The most decisive step in his life was taken when, disgusted by the domestic furnishings commercially available in his day, he designed cabinets, tables, and chairs for his own home and then went on to make the designing of objects for daily use his profession. By his furniture, by his marvelous wallpapers and printed fabrics, he in-

tended an assault on Victorian taste. He did not take the badness of that taste to be adventitious: he believed it to be the expression of deprived and therefore morally sordid life, of personal existences deteriorated by a society based upon commerce and industry. The ugly and vulgar objects made to gratify the æsthetic preferences of well-to-do Victorians were not merely indices of depraved sensibility but also the agents of its perpetuation: their deadness made fullness of life less possible.

This was the rationale of what Morris called 'the lesser arts', those arts which shade imperceptibly into what we call crafts, the making of charming and beautiful things for use and decoration rather than for the more momentous purposes commonly attributed to the high arts. Morris's feeling for the lesser arts went along with a measured but strong antagonism to high art. We cannot quite say that he preferred the craftsman to the artist, but certainly he preferred the modest and anonymous artist to the artist of unique individual genius. This preference accounts for his animus against the Renaissance and his admiration for the Middle Ages. He took a dim view of the great individual artist and of the pains and crises of creative striving.

In one of the several arts that Morris practiced, this doctrine served him ill. When, as a young man at Oxford, his friends praised his first attempts at poetry, he said, 'Well, if this is poetry, it is very easy to do'. He found it easier and easier to do, and although nothing that he wrote is without interest and charm, his later poetry cannot be highly rated. If he had realized this, he would not, I think, have changed his method of composition. It has been said, I believe correctly, that Yeats had Morris in mind when he wrote the famous last stanza of *Among School Children* which begins, 'Labour is blossoming and dancing where / The body is not bruised to pleasure soul', which is to say, labor is blossoming and dancing where ego is not bruised to gratify superego. To the cruel demands that the superego makes in the psychic economy of genius, Morris offered a principled opposition. He believed that these demands went

along with the externally directed aggression of genius, with its impulse to be pre-eminent and dominant which, in his view, put the nature of genius all too much in accord with the ruthless ethos of capitalist competition. There are no geniuses in *News from Nowhere.*

The book appeared in 1890, seven years after Morris had openly declared himself a socialist. The word 'nowhere' has been translated into Greek by St. Thomas More to yield the word we commonly use for ideal societies, and Morris translated 'Utopia' back into English in the title of his peculiarly English imagination of an achieved perfection of human existence. Although only an Englishman—perhaps only an Oxford man!—could have written this enchanting romance of summertime and river parties, of sweet meadows and great trees and houses that are as natural as trees, of frank, hearty fellowship, the quality of the book is by no means wholly encompassed by its particular national, and class, tone. It is a deeply moving book for it embodies an ancient and universal dream.

The people of *Nowhere* are certain that they have realized, and now momently experience, the goodness of life. The violent, but not especially bloody, revolution which led to this condition had brought private property to an end. This entailed the abolition of industry and the factory system, as a consequence of which the environment—a matter of great concern to Morris—is once again rural and everlastingly clean and beautiful. The Thames, whose pollution was notorious in the Victorian era, runs fresh and bright and salmon-thronged. Money is unknown and, indeed, there is no system of exchange: there is plenty of everything and the maxim of distribution is to each according not only to his needs but according to his desires, even his whims, which can be depended on not to go against the good of all. Because economic necessity no longer takes its physical and psychic toll, the people become beautiful in face and form, a state of affairs which makes it easy for the individual to love mankind. Longevity, though not extreme, is yet considerable and youth lasts beyond what we call

middle age, with the result that life is lived without urgency and without anxiety. It is lived for itself alone, for its own delight in itself. In the life of each individual, the past now exercises no tyranny and the future is not exigent. The present is all, and it is all-satisfying.

The particularities of life's goodness under the new dispensation are easily enumerated. First, there is the consciousness of one's own being, of one's physical and emotional endowment and its adequacy and appropriateness, the experience of its appetites, all of which are innocent, and of their gratification. Cognate with this is the consciousness of one's fellow beings, the sense—the sensation—of community with one's neighbors and the confidence of their regard. Then there is love for a person of the opposite sex. (The sexes are equal but markedly different.) This emotion can be quite intense and it is recognized as a source of pain if it is not reciprocated: in the general felicity it is the only source of pain. It is also the unique basis of aggression that the people of *Nowhere* comprehend. They are grieved but not appalled when it leads to actual violence: it is not unknown that a man should be overcome by jealousy and kill his rival in love. Such acts are not dealt with punitively because it is certain that the murderer, as we should call him, will be moved to deep remorse and will never repeat his act. Punishment, it is believed, can serve no useful purpose and can only make its object resentful and hostile.

Then there is the pleasure of work. Morris, who read Marx and was influenced by him, could not, of course, have known the now famous early manuscripts in which Marx dealt with the alienation of the worker from his work and, in consequence, from his own being. But Morris's views on the subject are in close accord with Marx's, and his feelings no less intense. In *Nowhere* there is no alienated or alienating work. Some work is necessary, such as building, weaving, harvesting; some is wholly gratuitous, such as mathematics and scholarship. However, the line between the two is thin, and many people alternate between necessary and gratuitous work. Everyone does some sort

of physical work; no one does work he does not like; hopelessly unpleasant and dehumanizing work is relegated to a certain few highly sophisticated machines which have a kind of secret existence, and there is no residual necessary work that someone does not find pleasure in doing. Even garbage removal gives gratification to some people. One such person figures in the story; he is an engaging man who also writes novels. Certain kinds of work, like harvesting and road building, are referred to as 'easy-hard' work and are thought of as we think of sports. The most highly cherished kinds of work are those which require a combination of manual skill and æsthetic taste, such as ornamental stonecutting, ceramics, and the making of decorative metal objects.

No work is represented as offering difficulties of either conception or execution, or as making a demand upon the worker's reserves of energy and will. No situation requires the putting forth of more effort than is immediately and consciously enjoyable. It is never suggested that gratification is something to be postponed or that it will follow upon an end which is achieved despite, and through, frustration. No one conceives a situation of obduracy or intractability, let alone proposes that such a situation might be of peculiar interest. In short, no value whatever is assigned to that expression of will which we call aggression—that is, the expression of the will which is directed outward upon resistant or challenging objects or situations.

The state having withered away, there are no politics with their inevitable implication of personal aggressivity. Such questions of policy as do exist—for instance, where a bridge shall be built—may arouse debate, but never a passionate commitment to one's own views. Although conversation is not in short supply, there is no intellectual activity as we would define it: the world is an æsthetic object, to be delighted in and not speculated about or investigated; the nature and destiny of man raise no questions, being now wholly and finally manifest. The prophecy that Trotsky was to make, that when all the problems of necessity have been solved, men would attach their strong

emotions to ideas about art, has not come to pass: in Morris's vision of the future, the judgment having once been made that grandiosity in art is not conformable with happiness and that Sir Christopher Wren had exemplified radical error in designing St. Paul's, the race has settled upon a style for all its artifacts that is simple and modestly elegant, and no one undertakes to surprise or shock or impress by stylistic invention.

Perhaps by now you understand the discomfort to which I referred, and perhaps have even begun to share it. Morris was by no means unaware of the possibility of his readers' being made uneasy by the representation of a felicity that depends upon the eradication of virtually all impulses of aggressivity. Indeed, he takes quite explicit cognizance of it as the one possible ground for some discontent with the redeemed life. At three points in the narrative this discontent is expressed, mildly by two well-disposed persons, more vehemently by a person whose disaffection with felicity amounts to an aberration. One of the well-disposed persons is the garbage-removal man who is also a novelist. He performs his public duties in a beautiful costume of his own devising; it is elaborately embroidered in gold and for this reason he has been given the nickname of Boffin. Mr. Boffin, you will recall, is one of the chief characters in Dickens's novel, *Our Mutual Friend*; he is referred to as the Golden Dustman because he has made a fortune out of his great piles of refuse, which the English call dust. Dickens was quite conscious of the symbolic equivalence of dust, or excrement, and money. This foul element, with all the anomalies and unhappiness of which it is the cause, has been eliminated from the existence of regenerated man. But so has Dickens. Neither the characteristic subject of his art, the personal fates of those who resist or endure the anomalies of society, nor that competitive aggressivity of his genius which led him to refer to himself as 'The Inimitable' is compatible with the perfection of communal happiness which Morris envisages. That poor Boffin of Nowhere emulates his great master and writes what

his friends call 'reactionary' novels about people who have fates through suffering, but his books can at best be 'antiquarian'. He has no material for his art from his own experience and observation, and when he tries to learn about suffering from a visitor from the unregenerate past, he is genially mocked and interrupted by his friends who think that his concern with the 'interesting' is a foolish idiosyncracy. Morris takes it with a degree of seriousness, yet he is at one with Boffin's friends; he means to say in effect that human felicity does indeed entail the surrender of that ideal upon which the humanistic tradition puts so high a value—the imaginative will of genius in aggressive adversary relation to the world as it is, shaping the intractable stuff of error-laden and suffering humanity into high art.

Midway in the tale, the idea that regenerate life yields no interesting subjects for art is uttered again by a sweet young woman named Clara. She gently complains that the people of the present are never represented in contemporary art—'I wish', Clara says, 'we were interesting enough to be written about or painted about'. And as the story draws to its end, the complaint is uttered with a quite bitter force and is met with an explicit and impassioned resistance. An old man praises the former time—which is of course our time—for the good effects which adversity and competition had upon the human character, doing so with a querulous energy which justifies his being severely dealt with. His own daughter is among his opponents in the extended dispute and she ends her argument with a statement of ultimate momentousness: 'I love life better than death'. To which the father replies, 'O, you do, do you? Well, for my part I like reading a good old book . . . like Thackeray's *Vanity Fair*. Why don't you write books like that now?'

It is with this petulant, small-minded response that Morris ends the debate and seeks to bring into contempt an idea which is definitive of the high culture of humanism: that a chief value of life lies in its ability to make itself, and especially its various

forms of aggressivity, the object of its own admiring contemplation. Keats formulates the idea memorably in one of his great letters: 'Though a quarrel in the streets is a thing to be hated, the energies displayed in it are fine; the commonest Man shows a grace in his quarrel'. And he goes on: 'This is the very thing in which consists poetry. . .'. In the humanistic tradition, the aggressive energies, even when they are defeated, constitute the ground of man's dream of his transcendence, of his projection of his being into the permanence of the future, into what he calls 'immortality' and 'glory' or at least 'dignity', which is to say 'worth'.

Morris rejects this ancient and compelling idea partly because he is acutely aware of its corruption in the ethos of the capitalistic enterprise, partly because in its uncorrupted form it is not accessible to the mass of mankind, nor conducive to its well-being. He replaces it with an ideal of life which, in my description of it, I have chiefly referred to as felicity, a word chosen to emphasize the immediacy and simplicity of its hedonism. Morris himself characterizes it in two ways which are more particular. Both ways suggest his consciousness of the boldness of what he is doing, the extent of the defiance he offers to accredited cultural assumptions. And both lead us to understand a little more precisely why *News from Nowhere* might generate a degree of anxiety. Morris says of the new dispensation that it is the regaining of childhood, and he says that it is the epoch of man's rest.

Childhood and rest. Not maturity and activity but childhood and rest are represented as making the ideal condition of man. It would scarcely become a layman to explicate to this audience the ambivalence with which these two states of being are regarded, the attraction they have, and the anxiety the attraction generates.

As I said earlier, the anxiety had not been in evidence on my previous readings of the book. As I recall my response to *News from Nowhere* some ten years ago, there was in it a large element of genial condescension:—What a very pleasant dream!

As an ideal of life certainly not appropriate to a fully developed member of Western culture, but as an afternoon's dream how very pleasant is this ancient imagination of the golden age, the pastoral tradition before Milton spoiled it with all that business about fame, and laborious days: life being what it is and must be, how natural and salubrious a dream to have.

So one might speak of the book a decade ago, but at the present moment it is not only a dream, it is also an active ideal. Even if B. F. Skinner had not published *Beyond Freedom and Dignity,* we could not fail to be aware of the deep animus against the presuppositions of the humanistic tradition that has established itself in our culture. By something of the same logic that moved Morris, hostile aggression, the aggression of man against his fellow, has been assimilated (perhaps not without reason) to that manifestation of aggression which presumably goes into creative achievement. The day has passed when William James's project of finding a 'moral equivalent to war' can be warmly responded to. James hated war but he loved the idea of fighting: 'If this life be not a real fight', he said, 'in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a fight.' To an increasing number of people the moral life not only does not feel that way but ought not to feel that way. That special kind of fighting in which, as Keats puts it, consists poetry—in which consists high art in general—is now looked at with a sceptical eye; the pre-eminent genius is less likely to be thought of as having gained something for the universe and is now open to the charge of having sequestered for his own purposes the creative force of the race, of being an illicitly dominating figure. I think it can be said that there is, in general, a tendency to identify with the aggression imputed to nationalism and capitalism that element of 'fighting' which, in the cultural tradition of the West, has been thought essential to the artistic life, the intellectual life, and the moral life, and thus to reprobate and reject it.

Whether this tendency has for its end a regenerate peaceableness or a new and ingeniously clandestine mode of aggression, will scarcely fail to be a subject for future speculation and study. To suggest the likelihood of the second alternative, I refer you to Skinner's book.

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Aggression in Human Adaptation

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Panel on the Role of Aggression in Human Adaptation

AGGRESSION IN HUMAN ADAPTATION

BY ELI MARCOVITZ, M.D. (PHILADELPHIA)

What is the point of discussing aggression? We are forced to face the unprecedented fact that humans have now the capacity to destroy all civilization, and perhaps all life, on this planet. Even if this statement were an exaggeration, it is near enough to reality to frighten us into trying to understand the forces or tendencies in ourselves which make such destructive use of this power possible.

In scientific discussion, 'aggression' is a term that is used to denote forms of energy, various types of drives, and a wide range of motivation and behavior. In clinical work, we find that different types of aggressive behavior are judged and reacted to, certainly by patients and sometimes by analysts, as if they were the same. For purposes of clarity in our thinking, in our communications, and in our clinical work it seems important to distinguish phenomenologically among various forms of object-related behavior which are commonly called aggressive. I believe it is justified to include all such behavior under the same heading because they have all been labeled 'aggression' and each is intimately related to biologic, psychologic, and social phenomena.

As Dr. Joseph has indicated, the term 'aggression' derives from the Latin *ad gradi,* meaning to go toward by steps. But the term has not been changed to mean 'attack'. The original meaning was based on the battle tactic of the Roman legions, to attack *ad gradi,* by stepping forward in a solid line or phalanx. Yet I agree that approach toward an object constitutes the basic element in aggressive behavior.

Professor Trilling has defined aggression as 'the expression of the will which is directed outward upon resistant or challenging

objects or situations'. In my opinion this is a much better definition than the usual one of 'instigation of an attack', but I would omit the adverb 'outward' since we know that aggression is also directed inward against various aspects of the self.

I think of aggression as an 'umbrella' term covering a hierarchy of behavior in relation to objects, specifically to other persons. Here I shall attempt to organize a kind of spectrum of the various aggressive activities and relationships that the other members of this panel have discussed.

First is alertness, *curiosity,* and the activities of attention *and exploration.* While these are unknown in William Morris's *News From Nowhere,* they can be observed in infants even at two months. René Spitz (1965) has said, 'We speak often enough of the aggressive drive [but] it is rarely spelled out that the aggressive drive is not limited to hostility. Indeed, by far the largest and most important part of the aggressive drive serves as the motor of every movement, of all activity big and small and ultimately of life itself' (p. 106). But this spontaneous activity toward the world is not only aggressive. It also serves libidinal gratification as well as learning and mastery of the world and of our developing functions. This initial undifferentiated state in which behavior serves simultaneously libidinal gratification, aggression, and mastery of the self and the world, seems to me to be the paradigm for all later behavior. No matter how differentiated a piece of behavior may seem to be, it always contains elements of these three aspects. Even if it were considered desirable, I do not think it possible to eliminate any one of them and still have a viable human being.

There have been a number of descriptions of isolated cultures which seem to be free of aggression. The Saulteaux Indians of Canada were one such group until Hallowell (1940), an anthropologist from the University of Pennsylvania, went up and lived among them. He found them to be ridden with hate and terror. All misfortunes were attributed to the evil magic influence of their neighbors and each person attempted to gain control of magic powers to use against others. Yet on the

surface everything was serene and peaceful. Other nonaggressive groups have managed to exist only as long as they were protected by geographic isolation. I wonder if Dr. Trilling's disquiet on rereading *News From Nowhere* may have been related to the uncanny feeling one gets on reading about Zombies, mythical beings in human bodies, that are not really humans.

The second form of aggression is *self-assertion.* Essentially this consists of efforts to establish, maintain, and expand one's boundaries, the limits one sets against intrusion. This process never occurs in a vacuum but always at the interface of opposing forces which are always experienced as limiting gratification and growth and/or as threatening injury or destruction. Asserting one's own boundaries is a basic mode of affirming continued existence. Self-assertion begins with the establishment of the boundaries of the body, perhaps beginning with the first tightening of the lips against the intrusion of the nipple. Then it includes possessions or territory, knowledge and skills, other people or ideals, whatever one calls one's own.

The next form is the assertion of *dominance*—the establishment of position in a hierarchical system. Dr. Hamburg has described his observations of this process in chimpanzees and baboons: rank is gained by beating or bluffing an antagonist, sometimes just by making the most noise. Delgado (1963) at Yale has implanted into the brains of monkeys electrodes that can be activated at a distance. Stimulating certain areas at the base of the brain increases aggressive behavior. Stimulation which inhibits these areas in the brain of a monkey who is the leader of a group will be followed by changes in the behavior of other monkeys toward him. They begin to encroach on his personal area, take his food, no longer treat him as 'the boss'. A few moments after this inhibitory stimulation ceases he is again the leader and the others show him their usual respect. Apparently a constant state of activity in the 'boss' monkey gives cues to the others that he will retaliate if they encroach on his prerogatives. If these messages of readiness to fight are inhibited, he loses status and respect (p. 271).

The next category is *exploitation*—using others for one's own purposes. This is not necessarily destructive because, in order to serve one's purposes, the object usually has to be preserved. But there is also the constant threat that if one resists being used, he will be hurt or destroyed.

The next category may be termed *hostility*—the intention to hurt or destroy an object. Here various types must be differentiated. For example, first there is the type called 'instrumental aggression' by social psychologists, which is characterized by the need to hurt or destroy in order to accomplish some other goal. Living things must be destroyed in order to eat and survive. Second, there is the intent to hurt or destroy whatever frustrates any goal-directed activity. However, this intent may cease as soon as the object ceases to be frustrating. Even in war, when an enemy surrenders the firing usually stops. Third, hostility is aroused by any object that inflicts or threatens any form of trauma, physical or psychic. This is defensive hostility. Here also, when the object is no longer perceived as threatening, hostility may cease.

Hostility may be aroused whenever any of these categories of aggression is challenged—curiosity and exploration, self-assertion, dominance, or exploitation. Yet if unchallenged they may be without hostility, without the intent to hurt or destroy.

Combat for food, possessions, territory, mating, status, or warfare can be included under hostility. In all of these, including warfare, there are always goals other than destruction itself, and when the goal can be attained without complete destruction the hostility ceases. This is true even in the case of deliberate terrorization of a population.

However, there is a different kind of hostility in which the aim is the injury or destruction of the object—the condition of *hatred*. Hatred does not necessarily accompany any of the types of aggression or violence mentioned so far. I can think of only a few basic reasons for hatred. First is the betrayal of love or trust, the feeling of betrayal which turns love into hate, and the feeling of betrayal which turns enmity into hatred. There

is a basic assumption that enemies will fight under certain rules. The purpose of atrocity stories in war is to prove that the enemy has betrayed the rules, deserves no mercy, and should be destroyed.

Being shamed or humiliated is a second reason for hatred. Sometimes this is experienced as being dishonored. These feelings accompany a narcissistic injury that exposes some weakness, and the most effective way to recover honor and dignity is to destroy the offender. This is why revenge is so sweet and in many cultures is even mandatory.

A third reason for hatred is envy or jealousy. The feeling is, 'But for you, I would have the means of pleasure or power' or, 'But for you, I would have the loved one'. Such hatred is always accompanied by a feeling of righteousness, that one has been deprived of what rightfully should be one's own. Hence, it may be looked upon as a variant of the situation of betrayal or narcissistic injury.

In Dr. Trilling's description of William Morris's utopia, the only source of pain in the general felicity is the lack of reciprocation of love for a person of the opposite sex, and the unique ground for aggression that the people of *Nowhere* comprehend is a man's killing a rival in love because of jealousy. Apparently women are assumed to be incapable of such emotions or actions. My impression is that Morris was describing a society which he felt was not only an ideal but was possible for mankind to attain. He was, of course, unaware of Konrad Lorenz's dictum that object-constancy in matings occurs only in species with intraspecific aggression. In Morris's nonaggressive society there could be no love such as he depicted.

Fourth, there is the hatred of an object to which we attribute our own repudiated unconscious impulses, the object of our projection, the scapegoat. This is hatred of the devil, the embodiment of evil, which must be destroyed in order to annihilate the threat of evil in oneself. Such hatred is the chief component in ideological wars, in the elimination of heretics and witches, and in genocide.

Most of the everyday destructive aggressions, including homicide, are within these categories. They are usually the expressions of hatred motivated by the experiences I have listed: betrayal, humiliation, envy or jealousy, narcissistic injury, or projection onto a scapegoat. These are also the chief motivations for the most unforgiving and hateful group violence.

There is still another use of hostility—its use for the direct attainment of the pleasure in it. The extreme form, the injury or humiliation of an object for one's sexual excitement and pleasure, we call sadism.

We used to think that certain functions or attributes separated humans from all other species, including other primates: the use and making of tools and weapons, language, sadism, masochism, suicide, and superego functions. Now we are discovering that chimpanzees can make and use tools and that they are capable of learning and communicating with humans through the sign language of the deaf, as well as through reading a sign language. It will be interesting to learn if there is evidence of sadistic or masochistic perversions among the primates.

Whether or not one agrees with Freud's concept of externalized aggression as a manifestation of a death drive, there is no question that some expressions of violence against others are means of protection against self-injury or suicide. Clinical experience illustrates repeatedly that interference with the expression of aggression against others may turn into illness, accident, or depression, and conversely that the recognition or expression of aggressive impulses may relieve illness or depression.

Pleasure, aggression, and the processes of mastery of the self and of the environment are inseparable at every stage of libidinal and ego development. We may deplore violence but we cannot deplore aggression. Without aggression there would be no survival, no active drive toward learning, nor to the mastery of our own inner drives and of the challenges of the world around us. The inner drives toward various forms of aggression, whether nonhostile or hostile, or even violent, can

come under the control of the learning processes so that an infinite variety of manifestations is possible.

It is our empathy with others, a beautiful human quality, which permits us to refine our tortures in ways that would otherwise be unimaginable. But it is possible also to learn methods of expressing aggressive impulses and reactions that may be effective without violence and destruction. We can learn to talk, to negotiate, to bargain, to compromise, but some people can more easily learn to fight. Aggression can be expressed in a glance, in silence and immobility, or in omission of action as readily as in the most violent destruction. I have found it useful in therapy to differentiate the various forms of aggression in order to help a patient recognize that self-assertion does not necessarily mean the destruction of another person, or that repudiation of destructive violence need not require renunciation of curiosity or rivalry, or of other forms of aggression.

Because our propensity for aggression may lead to violent destruction, it may seem that we should make every effort, through learning or even through genetic changes, to eliminate aggression from human behavior. Philosophy, religion, the old and new so-called 'mind-expanding' techniques with or without drugs have been tried in the past and are being advocated now. Part of the motivation for the use of hallucinogenic agents or for the attainment of states of satori seems to be to eliminate aggression: yet in all descriptions of these states there is a feeling of union with and mastery of the universe and all its forces that is the epitome of aggression in fantasy. Hamlet said, 'I could be bounded by a nut shell and count myself a king of infinite space, were it not that I have bad dreams'.

Since I believe that aggression, libidinal gratification, and mastery and learning are inseparable, I think any attempt to eliminate aggression from either the human constitution or behavior is absurd. William Morris was right that human dignity depends on aggression. A healthy feeling of one's own worthiness depends on the ability to meet the difficulties, obstacles, and challenges that are inevitable in the process of living.

In the absence of such a feeling about oneself, we find feelings of helplessness, dependence, anxiety, and depression which we know lead inevitably to varieties of ineffective, inappropriate aggression which are usually more destructive and self-defeating than unconflicted aggression would be.

Of course I do not mean that aggression is the only necessary mode of adaptation. In our repertory of behavior we need also the potential to renounce aggression. We usually think of fight or flight as the two possibilities of defense against attack. We forget a third type, which sometimes is the most effective,—submission even to the point of 'playing dead'. Passivity is a mode of experiencing and a mode of adaptation which is part of our innate biologic potential and, along with activity and aggression, it warrants a place in our thinking, learning, and behavior.

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Sociology and Aggression

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Panel on the Role of Aggression in Human Adaptation

SOCIOLOGY AND AGGRESSION

BY EMILY MUMFORD, PH.D. (NEW YORK)

Professor Trilling's luminous description of a utopia as he contrasts it with the authentic, often painful, sometimes creative adult life, commands renewed interest in the positive force of aggression. Dr. Hamburg's studies of chimpanzees and baboons and situations that elicit aggressive behavior intrigue us with analogies between these primates and ourselves. Dr. Joseph's discussion of the more life-giving, creative origins and potentials of aggression in the individual is a promising direction.

Reconsideration is timely in light of the popular tendency to equate origins and motives with outcome to the point that we seem embarrassed over the notion that aggression is or could be a positive force—for the individual, or for society. I agree with Dr. Joseph that the psychoanalyst's work, and his responsibility to treat pathology, partly explains his profession's emphasis on the dark origins and consequences of aggression while tending to gloss over the relationships between love and aggression, or between goal-directed activity and aggression. However, some other factors also contribute to our present tendency to use the term in a pejorative sense.

A similar phenomenon appears in sociology when it becomes occupied with a static model of social systems to the point of assuming that lack of consensus and that conflict necessarily threaten the social system. Dahrendorf (1965), among other sociologists, complains that we have tended to do little justice to the essential—the associational and adaptive force of aggressive pursuit of conflicting ideas and ways of life. Perhaps we tend to give only lip service to change as the essence of social systems because it is easier to cope with a static model of society. Perhaps also we like to carry in our heads a dream of community untroubled by struggle, by necessity and tension—in short a system in a state of suspended animation, a *Nowhere*.

We do note that conflict often serves to re-establish order and stability. Solidarity and consensus within a group increase when it is threatened or in conflict from outside its boundaries, or when the group addresses itself to superordinate goals and competes with other groups for those goals.

Dr. Hamburg's description of the evolutional functions of aggression among primates provides interesting background for some of the work of Simmel (1955) and Coser (1956) on the functions of social conflict in human societies. We need to go still further in analyzing positive functions of change, of conflict and aggression, since it is perhaps more a necessity than a nuisance of social systems.

The utopian model of social structure risks viewing society as isolated in time and place, held together by value consensus and essentially unchanging unless something happens to it. This is a lifeless butterfly in plastic. Change, life, movement, lack of consensus, indeed conflict, are part of the dynamic that creates society. Aggressive striving to live, to meet, to be acknowledged, to feel, to know, as well as to attack and fight in the face of obstacles real or imagined, are essential to development of human societies at the same time they are potential sources of difficulty and distress (*cf.*, Lorenz, 1966).

Society, as a dynamic, always changing association of living and dying individuals, generates the forms of conflict, and probably the incidence of violence in aggressive acts. Experimental studies of the impact of conditioning, of crowding, and of aversive stimuli on fighting response in animals are suggestive (*cf.*, Ulrich and his co-workers, 1966, 1970). The Sherifs' (1964) studies of boys' gangs, in which experimental structuring of rewards were reflected in changes in aggressive behavior of members and groups, provide evidence of the ways structure can influence what people do with aggressive impulses.

While there is mounting evidence of the impact of chromosomal structure on individual propensity to violence, there is also evidence of the impact of the social milieu on the types of individual aggression most frequently encountered and the means and modalities most likely to be taken in group conflict

over goals. The potlatch of the Kwakiutl was one way. Men, competing for power and esteem, made war with goods. They burned belongings and sometimes slaves, went on head hunts, gave excessively—with excessive interest expected—in order to shame a competitor. They settled conflict for the moment, only to have to burn again.

Burning energy in competition over the personal and social rewards of scientific discovery is another way. Aggressive pursuit of discovery at the sacrifice of immediate comfort, and sometimes closeness of family and friends, is not unusual in our society. Bernice Eiduson's (1962) study of forty contemporary scientists characterizes them as oriented to the happiness of pursuit rather than the pursuit of happiness.

In the scientific community, conflict over authorship or discovery can be intense, impassioned, and bitter. Men join together in endeavors, and men in universities are in conflict over ideas as well as space, curriculum time, and budgets. The convergent and the antithetical go together and they are fundamentally distinguished from the merely indifferent.

New ideas, creativity, and advances in technology and the science of medicine are impelled by aggressive force and generated in conflict over perspective and in competition over socially defined rewards. We are fascinated at the description of chimpanzees who develop considerable technical ingenuity through aggressive display. Yet we seem to deny or decry the aggressive component and conflicting commitments in men. The popular tendency to cleanse any taint of aggression from the good people of the past is an example.

We idealize the friendly old family doctors, who often could do little more than watch at the bedside. Many of them were not so friendly, old, and passive as portrayed. We decry the contemporary physician without noting some of the end-benefits of his aggressive pursuit of medical achievement. Tending to deny aggression, we pay little attention to the direction in which the physician's energies and the goals he aggressively pursues are systematically channeled by the structure of his

training and work. What is made most visible, what is subject to reward and to negative sanctions in the community? It is no accident of nature that advances in the science of medicine have not been accompanied by comparable advance and creativity in the delivery of care to more people, particularly to the inarticulate.

Florence Nightingale, a very aggressive, intransigent lady who forced changes in hospital care, is pictured as floating through the wards of Scutari with nothing to offer but a simpering expression and a flickering lamp. The nurse today who makes demands on behalf of her patient is 'put down' as aggressive. Yet the opposite of such aggression is not caring enough to struggle when there are few social supports available.

Fear-filled denial of the significant positive force of aggression and of conflicting social action perhaps does violence to more than history. It leads us to try to do away with it, which is an impossibility. But more important, since men act on their definitions of situations, the fiction that conflict and aggression are only evils to be overcome may increase the incidence of what Professor Trilling so cogently terms 'clandestine aggression'.

We would do better to consider the reality of aggression and perhaps also social conflict as necessary forces, and move on to consideration of how we can structure the goals and modalities of their expression in society, and with what consequences.

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Philosophical Antecedents to Modern Theories of Human Aggressive Instinct

Leonard S. Zegans

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PHILOSOPHICAL ANTECEDENTS TO MODERN THEORIES OF HUMAN AGGRESSIVE INSTINCT

BY LEONARD S. ZEGANS, M.D. (NEW HAVEN, CONN.)

Man has long been fascinated by the problems of evil and aggression. Once he turned for explanations to the philosophers and theologians, but in an age when science has attained almost godly status it is scarcely surprising that the speculative thoughts of behavioral scientists should be most prized. Yet, oddly enough, the flurry of criticism that surrounds the work of Freud, Lorenz, or Ardrey on aggression is often a reflection of the critic's evaluation of the moral rather than the scientific implications of their ideas. Consider these words by Ashley Montagu (1968):

> . . . when books such as those of Ardrey and Lorenz appear they are welcomed with all the fervor of a sinner seeking absolution for his sins. Ardrey and Lorenz stand in a sort of apostolic succession to those who with millennial ardor have sought to restore the wicked and unregenerate to the true faith (p. 13).

Montagu believes that the myth of man's early aggressiveness, like the myths of 'the warfare of nature' and of 'original sin', diverts attention from the true causes of human violence, the debilitating social conditions in which man lives.

Ardrey (1966), however, sees his critics as deluded by a 'romantic fallacy' based upon Rousseau's conception of man as originally good and free from inherent sin. He detects in the argument of the primacy of culture over inheritance an effort to disavow man's rootedness in an animal past, a fundamental attack on the very concept of behavioral evolution.

The moral aspect of theories of aggression cannot of course be ignored, but such considerations ought not to blur an objective appraisal of their scientific merits. Past quests to under-

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stand human aggression inevitably probed basic assumptions about the nature of man and God and continually encountered accusations of heresy. Although in science moral attacks have basic limitations, each scientist or writer grows up within a cultural milieu and has allegiance to certain ideas and values that may affect his interpretation of evidence. To evaluate what in contemporary formulations on aggression is based on reasonable deduction from scientific evidence, and what is instead an interpretation and selection of evidence colored by philosophical or religious points of view, requires more than a thorough knowledge of the scientific data; it demands an understanding of those earlier traditions that have influenced contemporary thinkers. An examination of these ideas with special attention to the work of Freud and Konrad Lorenz is the subject of this paper.

Early man lacked scientific information about the origins of his violence and so wove his observations and speculations into myths. Paul Ricoeur (1967), the French philosopher, has described three basic myths that laid the groundwork for later philosophical theories. Each myth is associated with a different phase of ancient civilization. The earliest was the 'drama of creation' or *theogonic* myth in which evil was regarded as inherent in nature from the beginning of time. Aggression was embedded in the chaos against which the gods struggled while creating universal order. This primitive explanation was common in the theology of early agricultural societies of the Middle East. In the theogonic Babylonian tale of creation the god Marduk gives structure to the chaotic violence unleashed by his enraged mother, Tiamat. Tiamat and her consort, Apsu, are the primordial parents. Apsu, disturbed by the demands of his offspring, plots to kill his children but is slain instead by a son. Angered, Tiamat creates a bevy of evil monsters to exact revenge on her children but Marduk wages war against his mother, destroys her, and from her dismembered body creates the physical universe.

> Thus the creative act, which distinguishes, separates, measures and puts in order is inseparable from the criminal act that puts an end to the life of the oldest gods, inseparable from a deicide inherent in the divine. And man himself is born from a new crime: the chief of the rebel gods is declared guilty, brought to trial, and slain; from his blood Ea, on the council of Marduk, creates man; man has now the task of serving and nourishing the great gods in place of the vanquished gods. Thus man is made from the blood of an assassinated god (p. 180).

The Persians later rejected the idea that all the gods participated in parental murder. Their Zoroastrian religion focused all the evil and destructive impulses of the older gods onto the single, malignant figure of Angra Mainyu (Ahriman). All righteous men were obliged to strive against this cosmic enemy as allies of his twin Ahura-Mazda, god of Light and Truth. Man reflected this cosmic dualism in the division of his nature between its capacities either for creative growth or for destruction (*cf.*, Campbell, 1968). The myth was carried westward to the gates of Athens with the armies of Darius and Xerxes.

Greek metaphysics had by then moved away from its primitive pantheon of gods and violent Titans. With the growth of Ionic philosophy, speculation over matters of ultimate Being moved out of the realm of ritual and myth and was approached through logic and direct observation.

Xenophanes expressed belief in a unity of all things, whereas for Heraclitus[1] the essence of nature is logos, universal reason, which demands the obedience and respect of man and state. The divine is immanent in the material: 'From everything One is made and from One everything'. Yet this unity is in constant flux. Things are forever coming into being, then passing into something new. The process of transformation of matter is never complete and strife is essential to the process of

[1] Heraclitus is cited several times by Lorenz (1966) in *On Aggression;* his notion of constant change regulated by a universal reason is incorporated into the biologist's metaphysics.

change; 'war', Heraclitus declared, 'was the father of all things' (*cf.*, Zeller, 1955, pp. 57-60).

Then from Lydia came a dynamic new cultural force centered on the frenzied figure of Dionysus. An embodiment of all that the intellectual Ionians had left out of their philosophy, this god inspired spontaneous creativity, lust, and the abandonment of reason, and focused on man's need to experience himself through emotions. A strong mystic cult, Orphism, grew out of this tradition. It insisted that man and nature are not a unity but that all creation is an expression of the division between matter and soul. The Orphic myth of the origin of man was both theogonic and dualistic. Man's character reflects the dual nature of his origin. His body inherited from the Titans is pervaded by their jealous, violent impulses, but his soul born of Dionysus is godlike. The body imprisons the soul and condemns it to a long cycle of births and deaths (*cf.*, Jaeger, 1960).

Orphic teachings left a profound impact on Empedocles and Plato, two philosophers who were to become favorites of Freud. Freud found in Empedocles a sympathetic figure whose life and ideas had a certain similarity to his own. The Greek had tried to construct a philosophy which reconciled reason and conflict within a unified theory of nature. He fought to maintain intellectual rigor in the face of the sensual pulls of Asia and found a place for these new ideas in his syncretic philosophy. He had a rough evolutionary theory: the unification of substances is slowly brought about by love, and through that unification creatures gradually progress toward a more perfect state. His metaphysics was based on the idea that earth is composed of the four elements: fire, air, water, and earth. Motion is produced in the basic elements by the action of the two fundamental natural forces, love and hate. Love strives to achieve an agglomeration of particles into a single unity, while strife seeks to separate matter. Echoing Persian theology, Empedocles saw the universe as experiencing alterations between the ascendancy of these two dominant forces (*cf.*, Zeller, 1955, pp. 70-76).

Freud (1937), struck by Empedocles's doctrine that the dual principles of love and strife govern the universe, came to conceive of these forces as instincts.

> The two fundamental principles of Empedocles [love and strife] are, both in name and function, the same as our two primal instincts, *Eros* and *destructiveness,* the first of which endeavors to combine what exists into ever greater unities, while the second endeavors to dissolve those combinations and to destroy the structures to which they have given rise. We shall not be surprised, however, to find that, on its re-emergence after two and a half millenia, this theory has been altered in some of its features (p. 246).

Freud also gave considerable attention to the writings of Plato. Plato believed that misery is created by earthly impulses; the body and its wishes are the cause of all human evil. The 'correct' philosopher should strive for death to detach himself from earthly dross and enable his soul to attain a state of highest knowledge and purity (*cf.,* Jowett, 1937). The dualist ideas set forth in the Symposium most interested Freud (1933 [1932]).

> According to our hypothesis human instincts are of only two kinds: those which seek to preserve and unite—which we call 'erotic', exactly in the sense in which Plato uses the word 'Eros' in this *Symposium,* or 'sexual', with a deliberate extension of the popular conception of 'sexuality'—and those which seek to destroy and kill and which we group together as the aggressive or destructive instinct (p. 209).

Freud wondered if we should not follow the hint of Plato and venture the hypothesis that living substance at the time of its coming was torn apart into small particles which have since then been striving to reunite by means of the sexual instinct. Man is divided in nature even before the creation of his body; all nature conspires in the attempt to form into a blissful organismic whole. Man's violence stems from the basic instability of physical nature. The Persians had accounted for that in-

stability by positing a dualistic universe. Freud clearly had no use for a belief in the 'evil principle' and transmuted this idea into his 'aggressive instinct'. He traded theology for a rather speculative biological theory that made no moral judgments about the value of the basic instincts (Freud, 1920, pp. 57-61).

Orphic and Platonic ideas survived the decline of Greek power and have played a continuing role in Western philosophy. Gnostic and Manichean sects of the Dark and Middle Ages believed with Plotinus that:

> We cannot be, ourselves the sources of Evil; Evil was before we came to be; the Evil which holds men down blinds them against their will. So we are evil in that we are attached to matter . . . (*cf.*, Tsanoff, 1931, p. 28).

In the nineteenth century we find Schopenhauer echoing Neoplatonic ideas. He describes material existence as an endless bout of humiliation, brutality, and pain. Joy is the sublime melancholy of the ascetic who accepts a desireless path leading to death. Freud (1920) acknowledged his influence: 'We have unwittingly steered our course into the harbour of Schopenhauer's philosophy. For him death is the "true result and to that extent the purpose of life", while the sexual instinct is the embodiment of the will to live' (pp. 49-50).

With his sceptical mind Freud could not accept the final victory of the good creative forces of nature over evil and hate. Though his thinking was philosophically linked to that of the Neoplatonists, he lacked their faith in transcendental salvation. He attached no particular theological significance to the idea of the death wish; the self merely strives for its own dissolution into an inorganic silence. Life is aggressive at its core; violence is not mythologically comprehensible nor a force of evolutionary or moral purpose.

Freud (1920) annulled his earlier 'frustration' model of aggression. Anger and aggression were not seen as mere outbursts of a frustrated psychic 'accountant' railing against the debts and losses of the ego. The pleasure principle was now seen as the

servant of the death instinct, helping to guard against stimuli from within and without. Freud placed human aggression beyond the pale of original sin. There was no fault, no special human fallibility that introduced violence into the world and no new social or economic arrangements could eliminate it. Only Eros—strong love relationships or emotional identifications—could hold in check the urge toward aggression. This starkly 'biological' view both denied spiritual redemption and debunked social change. Freud was aware that it was a most pessimistic and unpopular theory. Yet in the closing words in his controversial essay, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, he reminded us that acceptance of a 'scientific' theory too often depends upon the metaphysical beliefs of its critics.

> Only believers, who demand that science shall be a substitute for the catechism they have given up, will blame an investigator for developing or even transforming his views (p. 64).

To the end Freud's thought offered little solace for those who needed to interpret history as a steady progression from bestiality to reason. He held out the slim hope that when men share common interests their community of feelings will dilute their natural destructive urges. Another path to the control of violence was more rigorous and open to but a few; Freud speculated that aggression can be limited by personal self-discipline. He advised the strengthening of intellectual life and the acceptance of internalization of aggressive impulses with all its consequent advantages and perils. With their intellectual rigor and unflinching sacrifice, Empedocles and the Stoic Zeno perhaps served Freud as models of men who were willing to check their own aggressive urges even at the cost of life.

Freud's stark pessimism contrasts sharply with the views of Ashley Montagu (1968), in whose sanguine view man is 'characterized by supremely highly developed generalized capacity for learning, which principally constitutes his innate hominid nature' (p. 15). Man learns about his human nature from the human environment and the 'culture that humanizes him'. Cut

loose from the imperatives of innate sin or animal aggressiveness, he struggles to learn how to build a stable, humane world order. If evolution has programmed anything into this cunning primate it is *not* his capacity for fighting but a premium on intra- and intergroup coöperation. Montagu plays a modern Pelagius to Freud's Mani; both categorize aggression according to the tenets of a personal belief-system, but buttress their 'theology' with selective evidence gathered from professional experience.

In the fifth century A.D., Pelagius, an Irish monk, set about attacking the Gnostics and Manicheans for their insistence on man's satanic wickedness (*cf.*, Tsanoff, 1931, p. 39). He declared that men use the notion of a daemonic trait as an excuse for their dissipation. Men give in to their evil impulses because they are too weak to resist. Pelagius preached that man has absolute freedom of will and must assume total responsibility for his acts; no reference to a 'prince of darkness' can change this fact. Adam's fall left no curse upon our race; sin is not in our nature. God's grace bestowed upon man the ability to distinguish right from wrong and choose accordingly. 'If I ought, I can', he insisted. Pelagius's great theological antagonist was St. Augustine who had earlier abandoned his Manichean creed to adopt orthodox Christianity. He remained perplexed by the question of human evil and the challenge it offered to his cosmology, which centered on a beneficent and all-powerful God.

Augustine had no patience for prattle about demiurges or free-willing men. He squarely believed in what Ricoeur calls the *'Adamic'* tradition of the origin of evil. Adam was made with perfect holiness in the image of God. There was never an inherent evil nature. Adam sinned and through his sin was estranged from God, losing his power to do good and bequeathing his degeneracy to future ancestors. Man's turning away from God was the source of congenital evil: it was provoked by his desire to gain power through knowledge. Augustine taught that it is not the beast, but only the wicked man, who is beastly. An animal's nature is good, but in man it is a vice. Man can en-

slave himself to lust and brutality but the freedom to liberate himself is beyond his powers (*cf.*, Fremantle, 1954, pp. 23-52).

Ricoeur (1967, pp. 232-278) has commented that 'only the "Adamic" myth is strictly anthropological'. The etiology of this myth clearly related the origin of evil to an ancestor of the human race whose condition 'is homogeneous with ours'. Before the ascent of man nature is depicted as having been harmonious and good; the disruption of the cosmic order is laid to the disobedience of man. The purpose of the 'Adamic' myth is to dissociate original sin from primordial goodness; God is exonerated from the violence his creature man performs. It is this theme of the balance of nature disrupted and destroyed by man's misuse of reason that underlies the writing of Lorenz and Ardrey. Freud did not blame man for his aggressive instincts; he saw man and all nature united in their common urge toward destructiveness. Montagu completely absolves man from any biological responsibility for violence, claiming that it is our social conditions rather than our instincts that impel us to kill.

Ardrey, in defending his 'Adamic' position, found that like Augustine he must discredit both the dualistic theories of Freud and the social doctrines of Montagu. The Pelagian heresy of Montagu is dealt with not so much through argument as cynicism. Ardrey (1961) ironically inquires: 'Are we unique, separate, and distinct creatures from animal kind? Did our bodies evolve from the animal world, but not our souls? Is man sovereign? Are babies born good? Is human fault to be explained successfully in terms of environment?' (p. 18). Apparently he considers the mere voicing of these questions a self-evident basis for the refutation. He turns on the spokesman for 'New Enlightenment' because of his insistence that man creates society or, in the Marxist version, that 'man is the work of society'. It is a fable that poverty begets crime, imperialism fosters war, or 'early emotional relationships beget later unfriendly disposition'. He finds it necessary to remind the social reformers that there is more to man's nature than his environment and early libidinal attachments.

In unabashedly florid prose he argues: 'We stand upon creatures lost in pre-Cambrian slimes. Our genes still reflect their ambitions' (p. 32). The reader might conclude that there is really little difference between Freud's gloomy biology and Ardrey's African genesis. Ardrey considerately points out that Freud did not have his advantages of learning at the 'zoo' and on the 'savannah' about the most recent theories of ethology and paleontology. Yet he is sure that it is a gap in information rather than a fundamental difference in ideology that separates his view of aggression from Freud's. If we substituted concepts such as 'dominance' and 'territorial defense' for the more misty notion of 'thanatos', then, he believes, many apparent theoretical differences would disappear. Ardrey strikes a distinctly theogonic tone when he states:

> If man is part of the natural world, then he possesses as do all other species a genetic inheritance from an ancestry as long as life itself. The territorial urge as part of that inheritance, may in the human species be wrong or right, bad or good, destructive, wasting or conservative (p. 160).

He heaps scorn on the Marxists who imagine that simply the elimination of private property could possibly erase man's competitive, aggressive urges. If men did not have things to fight over they would destroy each other just to establish an order of dominance. By consigning aggression to deep-seated genetic impulses, Ardrey cuts the ground from those who emphasize social improvement as the primary means of eliminating human strife. He agrees with Freud on this point since both doubted the 'fuzzy' thinking of romantics who placed all the blame for human aggression on environment and class exploitation.

Freud (1930[1929]) regarded communism as a sort of Pelagian delusion because of its insistence that man is wholeheartedly good and 'friendly to his neighbor'. He was sceptical that one can alter human strivings by changing economic relationships.

> In abolishing private property we deprive the human love of aggression of one of its instruments, certainly a strong one,

> though certainly not the strongest. . . . Aggressiveness was not created by property. It reigned almost without limit in primitive times, when property was still very scanty, and it already shows itself in the nursery almost before property has given up its primal, anal form; it forms the basis of every relation of affection and love among people (with the single exception, perhaps, of the mother's relation to her male child) (p. 113).

A new means of redistributing income would leave unchanged individual differences in personal power and influence that would inevitably be used by the aggressive instinct for its own purposes.

Freud's hint that aggression rather than love serves as the basis for affiliative ties was independently developed by Lorenz into a cornerstone of this theory of aggression. Both Ardrey and he differ sharply from Freud in their insistence that aggression in man is a radical departure from the 'agonistic' behavior of lower animals that helps preserve the balance of nature. It is in this sense that Ardrey calls us 'Cain's children', unique predators genetically programmed to kill with weapons. This is our original sin. The sudden addition of our enlarged brain to the carnivorous ways of early hominids laid the groundwork for our addiction to intraspecies aggression.

Ardrey never quite explains, however, why we turned our aggressive weapons against our brothers instead of developing into more efficient and ruthless predators. Unfortunately he tries to explain human aggression by bundling together predation, dominance strivings, territoriality, and rationality. J. P. Scott (1967) colorfully refers to the product as 'a sort of intellectual pizza pie, tasty tidbits of information embedded in a mass of partially baked ideas'. Scott, like most critics, tends to label Ardrey or dismiss him as a pseudobiological dilettante rather than systematically refuting his arguments.

One excellent critical essay evaluating Ardrey's views on aggression, however, was written by the British biologist, J. H. Crook (1968). Ardrey's thesis that aggression arises from 'an innate and ineradicable force demanding expression' is chal-

lenged by Crook. He criticizes Ardrey for overemphasizing the role of territoriality in primates while neglecting the importance of early learning and 'culture' in shaping their social habits. Crook does not believe that aggression is touched off by the accumulation of instinctual energies but rather that it is triggered by aversive stimuli; when such stimuli are withdrawn, the aggression ends. He leaves open the possibility that innate influences may determine for each species those particular stimuli that will be apperceived as aversive. Crook doubts that Homo sapiens revived the attenuated territorial behavior of apes, and recent studies of primitive human hunting societies seem to confirm this scepticism. While successfully popularizing the fascinating discoveries of modern paleontology and ethology, Ardrey seems to leave the scientific community unconvinced that his speculations are founded upon any deep understanding of the complexities of human development.

The scientific community, however, has had a more difficult time dismissing the contributions of Konrad Lorenz to a theory of human aggression. A respected zoologist who has made important discoveries in the field of animal behavior, he is also a persuasive writer. Still there is a temptation among critics to pay due homage to his unique abilities and then cast him into the same boiling pot with Ardrey. Boulding (1968) writes:

> If the names of both antiquity and of science can be drawn upon to legitimate our behavior, the moral uneasiness about napalm and the massacre of the innocent in Vietnam may be assuaged.
>
> Dr. Lorenz, I am sure, who is a gentle, human soul, still, one would judge living in the afterglow of Franz Joseph, would be horrified by this suggestion. Nevertheless, one cannot altogether absolve even Dr. Lorenz (to whom I owe some of the most delightful hours of my reading life), from the sin of using the prestige of one science to jump to unwarranted conclusions in another and hence to bring the weight of scientific authority behind essentially unproven propositions (p. 89).

Lorenz shares with Ardrey an 'Adamic' emphasis on the burden of mankind's inherited aggression while also reflecting

what Ricoeur (1967, pp. 211-231) calls that 'tragic vision' of evil. The tragic vision is noted in the myth that deals with the rebellion of Prometheus. The vengeful Zeus, as depicted by Aeschylus in Prometheus Bound, displayed the same satanic and divine qualities as the Persians had divided between their competing deities. A unity is restored to nature by referring all phenomena to a single generative force, either the mythical Zeus or (later) the philosopher's 'logos'.

Lorenz, like the Greek dramatists, is troubled by the appearance of disorder and senseless violence in a world supposedly governed by universal law. The ancient tragedians laid this paradox at the door of Prometheus who, in giving reason to man, endowed him with a precious but dangerous gift. Through his knowledge man felt capable of defying and altering the immutable flow of destiny. This arrogance placed him at odds with the hierarchical order of nature. Although evil was accepted by the 'tragic myth' as inherent in creation, it was only when men attempted to substitute their own systems of flawed reason for the wisdom of the logos that self-defeating violence was unleashed in the world.

Lorenz also is repelled by senseless violence and substitutes the laws of evolution for the Greek logos. Aggression is neither a remnant of 'theogonic' chaos nor an artifact of learning, but rather a tool of selection by which the balance of nature is maintained. Inherent rituals of threat and defense maintain the level of destructive fighting in animals to a necessary minimum, but in man these devices are vitiated when the innate patterns of behavior are abandoned for the uncertainties of reason.

Lorenz (1966) develops his argument like an old church scholar exposing Pelagian heretics. Persons like Montagu who reject biological determinism are said to fear that 'insight into the causes of earthly phenomena should expose man's free will to be an illusion'. These defenders of human freedom are revealed as cowards who 'flee in claustrophobia from causality'. Man is no mere plastic bauble to be pounded and shaped by the random stimuli that come his way. Learning theory implies

that all men can be made more equal by appropriate conditioning and environmental manipulation; Lorenz's theories of innate programming and spontaneous central nervous system action set limits upon the capricious malleability of humanity. Freedom, to Lorenz, is not the right of the individual to do as he pleases; rather it is the right of all men to fulfil the moral laws that reside within them. Such a belief, he recognizes, is not likely to be popular in a mass, egalitarian culture:

> Increasing knowledge of the natural causes of his own behavior can certainly increase man's faculties and enable him to put his free will into action, but it can never diminish his will. If, in the impossible case of a utopian, complete and ultimate success of causal analysis, man should ever achieve complete insight into the causality of his earthly phenomena, including the works of his own organism, he would not cease to have a will but it would be in perfect harmony with the incontrovertible lawfulness of the universe, the *Weltvernunft* of the Logos. This idea is foreign only to our present-day Western thought; it was quite familiar to ancient Indian philosophy and to the mystics of the Middle Ages (p. 232).

The mystical, medieval thought commended by Lorenz had fused the 'Adamic' sense of original sin with the tragic view of evil. It tried to understand the world by seeing purpose everywhere. It discovered rational intelligences at play in all phenomena and 'found the ultimate reason for the universe in the will of God, which, however inscrutable in its details, at least gave the promise of rationality and meaning to things' (*cf.*, Randall, 1940, p. 28). This is the framework of theodicy on which Lorenz builds his elaborate and imaginative theory of aggression.

Though sharing with Freud the belief in an innate human aggressive imperative, Lorenz does not conceive of it as rampant self-destruction projected and turned loose upon the world in never-ending opposition to the life-binding and organizing forces. A universe bent on a lingering self-immolation and returning to the ultimate chaos of nothingness is clearly

not what he and the 'logos' have in mind. Freud did not conceive aggression as a progressive, evolutionary force leading men or beasts to closer, coöperative bonds. It was for him the eternal counterpoint to the organizing, the systematizing, and erotic. Where Freud emphasizes the sensual instincts as the basis of affiliation, Lorenz substitutes aggression. Though Freud acknowledged the possibility and potential value of a fusion of the two drives, he remained both a dualist and a pessimist, predicting the death instinct as ultimately and immutably triumphant. The life force merely wards off danger and preserves life so that the organism can die in its inherently natural way. Freud (1920) sounds an unmistakable threnody for the illusion that there is in the organic universe an instinct toward higher development and organization:

> The hypothesis of self-preservation instincts, such as we attribute to all living beings, stands in marked opposition to the idea that instinctual life as a whole serves to bring about death. Seen in this light, the theoretical importance of the instincts of self-preservation, of self-assertion and of mastery greatly diminishes. They are component instincts whose function it is to assure that the organism shall follow its own path to death, and to ward off any possible ways of returning to inorganic existence other than those which are immanent in the organism itself. We have no longer to reckon with the organism's puzzling determination (so hard to fit into any context) to maintain its own existence in the face of every obstacle. What we are left with is the fact that the organism wishes to die only in its own fashion (p. 39).

Freud accepted aggression as part of the theogonic chaos at the root of creation but Lorenz, in defense of the logos, had to explain how irrational human violence reveals the 'incontrovertible lawfulness of the universe'; with an Augustinian ingenuity and literary facility he made an attempt to resolve this dilemma.

In the third chapter of his book, On Aggression, after charming the reader with a delightful Prologue in the Sea and a

stroll through his laboratory, Lorenz approaches the central question of what aggression is good for. He makes an important distinction between predation and aggression. Fighting between species is not important to evolution. The important Darwinian struggle is between 'near relations'. It is not trial by battle that eradicates a species but the development of a more profitable invention through heredity by some members of species that makes them more successfully competitive within an ecological niche. It is intraspecies aggression that commands Lorenz's attention for the rest of the book. When he asks the question, 'What for?', he looks over his shoulder at 'dualistic' freudian thought and says: 'Many people will not see the obvious justification for this question, and those accustomed to the classical psychoanalytical way of thinking will probably regard it as a frivolous attempt to vindicate the life-destroying principle or, purely and simply, evil' (Lorenz, 1966, p. 29). He chides the analyst by asserting that we cannot control or improve something if we merely accept it as being 'metaphysical and inevitable'. The value of aggression derives from the danger of an overabundant species exhausting the available supplies within an available 'biotype' and thus starving itself into extinction. This can be obviated, however, by a 'mutual repulsion acting on the animals of the same species, effecting their regular spacing out, in much the same manner as electrical charges are regularly distributed all over the surface of a spherical conductor' (p. 31). This, Lorenz tells us, is the most important survival value of intraspecies aggression. It functions to insure the even distribution of the animals of a particular species over an inhabitable area. This explanation, however, does not exhaust the biological benefits of aggression to certain species. Bison, antelopes, and other ungulates do not fight over territory, and their food supply is bountiful. Yet the males of these species are violent and pugnacious fighters. The selective boon from this behavior arises from the fact that the stronger males will sire other sturdy and courageous defenders of the family, the herd, and thus the species.

The selective value of aggressive drive, courage, and physical strength can, however, be overdone and evolution may produce a species in which aggressiveness can 'become exaggerated to the point of the grotesque and inexpedient'. Here Lorenz makes a sweeping, provocative, and unsupported statement explaining human aggression.

> Above all, it is more than probable that the destructive intensity of the aggression drive, still a hereditary evil of mankind, is the consequence of a process of intra-specific selection which worked on our forefathers for roughly forty thousand years, that is, throughout the Early Stone Age. When man had reached the stage of having weapons, clothing, and social organization, so overcoming the dangers of starving, freezing, and being eaten by wild animals, and these dangers ceased to be the essential factors influencing selection, an evil intra-specific selection must have set in. The factor influencing selection was now the wars waged between hostile neighboring tribes (p. 42).

Lorenz emphasizes that the 'warrior' virtues are evolutionary advantages only when they are directed against extraspecies predators for the defense of the family or herd, but that they can become biologically harmful if they foster needless competition and tension among closely ranking males.

Lorenz later clearly delineates the differences between his biological monism and the psychoanalytic dualistic atavism.

> . . . we find that aggression, far from being the diabolical, destructive principle that classical psychoanalysis makes it out to be, is really an essential part of the life-preserving organization of instincts. Though by accident it may function in the wrong way and cause destruction, the same is true of practically any functional part of any system (p. 48).

Having established the essentially beneficial role of aggression, Lorenz acknowledges that even an adaptive innate behavioral mechanism can be distorted by unexpected environmental changes. Here, a moralistic finger is wiggled at man. 'Inability

to adapt quickly to such changes may bring about the destruction of a species, and the changes which man has wrought in his environment are by no means insignificant' (p. 49). Thus, like Augustine before him, Lorenz casts a stone directly at man for abusing, through misused intelligence, his God-given natural gifts and perverting them to ends for which they were never intended.

Conceptual thought, the pride of man's civilization, reveals itself to Lorenz as the very serpent that wrenched man from his adaptive paradise and thrust him into a frenzy of unnatural fratricidal killing.

> All the great dangers threatening humanity with extinction are direct consequences of conceptual thought and verbal speech. They drove man out of the paradise in which he could follow his instincts with impunity and do or not do whatever he pleased. There is much truth in the parable of the tree of knowledge and its fruit. . . . Knowledge springing from conceptual thought robbed man of the security provided by his well-adapted instincts long, long before it was sufficient to provide him with an equally safe adaptation (p. 238).

Man's rapid cultural evolution, the product of his cognitive and linguistic abilities, changes his environment more rapidly than his social instincts. Lorenz assumes that man's precultural social inheritance included a tendency toward fierce intraspecies aggression. He indicts cultural evolution for weakening the innate inhibitory mechanism that modulated and ritualized this dangerous tendency in proto-man. Lorenz advances a crucial neurological argument supporting the notion of the aggressive spontaneity of man.

> The fact that the central nervous system does not need to wait for stimuli, like an electric bell with a push-button, before it can respond, but that it can itself produce stimuli which gives a natural, physiological explanation for the 'spontaneous' behavior of animals and humans, has found recognition only in the last decades, through the work of Adrian, Paul Weiss, Kenneth Roeder, and above all Erich von Holst. The strength

> of the ideological prejudices involved was plainly shown by the heated and emotional debates that took place before the endogenous production of stimuli within the central nervous system became a fact generally recognized by the science of physiology (p. 51).

Suggesting that conclusive experiments exist which demonstrate that endogenous brain rhythms play an important role in the regulation of behavior, Lorenz denies the necessity of a provoking stimulus in the elicitation of aggression. Yet he does not even provide the reader with the bibliographical references to the works of the authors cited in this critical paragraph. One searches fruitlessly for any specific citation of the works of Weiss, Roeder, and Adrian. The reader is asked to accept on the strength of Lorenz's scientific reputation a physiological fact (which is indeed a rather questionable proposition) without being provided with any guideline for review of the relevant literature. This is especially surprising considering that the 'spontaneity' argument lies at the heart of Lorenz's thesis.

Lorenz provides no solid evidence that suggests there is a periodic neural mechanism in man or any other mammal triggering the spontaneous build-up of aggressive motivation which demands overt or ritualized expression. Despite Lorenz's authority in the area of submammalian animal behavior his spontaneity argument is no more scientifically based than were the theological speculations of a Pelagius or Augustine. All the incidental anecdotes about animals that Lorenz knows so well will not establish as fact that aggression is innate in the creature he has not studied scientifically, Homo sapiens.

Lorenz postulates that during a state of chronic instinctual damming, a suboptimal or inappropriate stimulus will provoke instinctive behavior. Pacifistic behavior, far from building up tenacious nonviolent habits, induces an animal to react aggressively to stimuli that ordinarily would be ignored. Increased sensitivity to subthreshold stimuli is accompanied by a state of general unrest in the organism. It actively searches the environment to bring it in contact with the appropriate releas-

ing stimulus. The searching activity, called 'appetitive behavior', can include both random search as well as investigation of the highest order of learning and insight. Lorenz illustrates these mechanisms by reference to the courtship behavior of doves, the aquarium aggression of cichlids, and by a somewhat oblique reference to a cranky, servant-baiting aunt in the golden days of old Franz Joseph. Thus, with a few animal tales and a bit of nostalgia, the reader is lulled into an acceptance of the biological ubiquity of the consequences of instinctual damming. Ultimately Lorenz leans upon his own intuition to provide the 'evidence' for his conclusions:

> . . . I know from personal experience, all aggression and intra-specific fight behavior undergo an extreme lowering of their threshold values. Subjectively this is expressed by the fact that one reacts to small mannerisms of one's best friends—such as the way in which they clear their throats or sneeze—in a way that would normally be adequate only if one had been hit by a drunkard (p. 55).

Throughout the book Lorenz suggests links between 'lower' and human behavior by means of delightful tales and personal reminiscences but consistently fails to provide the reader with the mammalian and primate evidence necessary to demonstrate a progression of instinctive mechanisms from aquatic and avian species through to man.

Even if we tentatively acknowledged that aggressive energies do motivate certain behaviors in fish and birds, there would still be scant reason to accept, on Lorenz's authority, that a similar innate mechanism survives in man. Lorenz is a Darwinian and recognizes the need to postulate a selective advantage that would accrue to the species inheriting such a dubious legacy. Ingeniously he resolves this dilemma by declaring: 'A personal bond, an individual friendship, is found only in animals with highly developed intra-specific aggression; in fact, this bond is the firmer, the more aggressive the particular animal and species is' (p. 216). His biological and philosophical beliefs fuse in this

maneuver; the evolutionary 'logos' of nature is preserved and a rational explanation provided for our innate aggression, while academic environmentalism is brushed aside.

Lorenz differs from Freud in his rejection of aggression as simply a universal smoldering urge that erodes the organic unity of life. He heralds aggression as an adaptive, constructive force, essential to the affective binding of mates, parents, and children. Though aggression does surely exist without love, Lorenz assures us that 'there is no love without aggression'. Love is denied primacy as a drive, it is a derivative force; biologically, there is no irreducible urge that emotionally binds people to one another. Personal bonds arose in the course of evolution as ritualization of redirected attack- or threat-behavior. Later they came to assume an autonomous status vital for mediating brood-tending activities. Human aggression resulted from the schisms which the misuses of reason created between man and his instinctual protective mechanisms. Man's pride in his symbolic ability and his lust for material possessions eroded his capacity for the ritualization of aggression and diluted his ability to form broad, affiliative ties. Yet Lorenz believes that man can transcend his destructive arrogance through sincere efforts at self-sacrifice in the interest of species discipline, submission to the needs of the group, mutual aid in the face of danger, and a more universal extension of the bonds of friendship. Such were the aims also of early Christian communities and more recently nonviolent sects such as the Mennonites and the Dunkers. Lorenz's biological credo, in fact, is very much permeated by the classical Christian belief in the wholeness and harmony of creation, man's violent fall and the redeeming power of love. He affirms with Augustine that '*Amor appetitus quidam est*' (love is a basic appetite of humanity). This skilful wedding of ethological theory with an old and powerful moral theme has both stimulated popular interest and evoked critical suspicion. By finding that love is dependent upon aggression, Lorenz befuddled those who thought they had long settled the score with evolutionists who

kept insisting upon the destructive imperatives of nature. Long before Lorenz had written about the 'bond' they combed the zoology journals to find countless instances of animal coöperation (*cf.*, Montagu, 1952). When the Austrian ethologist came along to tell the world that this very behavior is based upon redirected attack impulses, it is little wonder that they became critically aggressive.

Freud (1921) also could find no evolutionary evidence for an innate drive forging basic trust and coöperation between animals. He claimed that what is called love is really a derivative of the sexual drive. The same erotic attraction uniting men and women could be found in the dynamics of group formation: '. . . a group is clearly held together by a power of some kind: and to what power could this feat be better ascribed than to Eros, which holds together everything in the world?' (p. 92). Freud, however, also recognized that there is an essential aggressive component in affiliative relations. 'The evidence of psycho-analysis shows that almost every intimate emotional relation between two people which lasts for some time—marriage, friendship, the relations between parents and children—leaves a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility, which only escapes perception as a result of repression' (p. 101).

The differences between the social origin theories of Freud and Lorenz are really slight since both appear to agree that the few pitiful strides that man has made toward civil and family harmony rest upon altered instinctual energies. People seem to use one another solely as objects for the channeling of their libidinal or aggressive energies or as appropriate 'releasing stimuli'. Freud (1930 [1929]) saw social man as a hermetic being, lacking any basic longings for affiliative ties with others for the sake of their mutual closeness and common humanity.

> The element of truth behind all this, which people are so ready to disavow, is that men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked; they are, on the contrary, creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful

> share of aggressiveness. As a result, their neighbor is for them not only a potential helper or sexual object, but also someone who tempts them to satisfy their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his capacity for work without compensation, to use him sexually without his consent, to seize his possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and to kill him. *Homo homini lupus.* Who, in the face of all his experience of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion? (p. 111).

Freud's pessimism is the sentiment of an old man, weary from countless frustrating battles and stoically bearing the ravages of incurable cancer; still it reflects his philosophical distrust of 'mankind'. Such misanthropy found its scientific support in his 'biological' theory of innate aggression.

By insisting upon man's innate aggressiveness and the derivative quality of his love bonds, both Freud and Lorenz challenged the philosophical touchstone of modern liberal thought. Psychological unmasking of the smug duplicity of Victorian morality was one thing, but an assault upon the intellectual foundations of the Enlightenment was quite another. How differently from Freud's somber notes do the optimistic sentiments of Bishop Butler echo from the flow of the 'Age of Reason'.

> There are as real indications in human nature, that we were made for society and to do good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take care of our own life and health and private good . . . (*cf.,* Randall, 1940, p. 368).

The ideals of the Enlightment shaped the destiny of our own country and rattled despotic bonds throughout the world. A tenet of that belief system was confidence in the perfectibility of mankind through education. Ignorance and exploitation rather than original sin had thwarted the attainment of a worldly utopia. Concordet spread the glad tidings that:

> . . . there is no limit set to the perfecting of powers of man; that human perfectibility is in reality indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power

> that might wish to stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us (*op. cit.*, p. 383).

Against this dream of reason and progress stand Freud and Lorenz shaking their heads at exorbitant dreams of brotherhood and insisting upon the animal roots of man's morality. Not only is aggression rooted in the seed of humanity but the very rationality philosophers extol is indicated as the paramount threat to our survival. Lorenz stands social philosophy upon its head when he proclaims that human coöperation springs from aggression and that culture and reason are mankind's greatest dangers.

If Lorenz sees culture as a cause of much of man's overt aggression, Freud deems culture as a necessary bulwark against aggression. Civilization is constantly threatened with disintegration because of man's innate hostilities. Freud (1930[1929]) denies that common interest can hold men together because the impetus of their instincts is too overpowering. 'Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by psychical reaction-formations' (p. 112). The social bond, like the neurotic symptom, is a compromise device in which instinctual gains and possible punishments are balanced. Freud's *homo naturae* emerges as an egoistic being who turns to others in a defensive and calculating manner. 'Human life in common is only made possible when a majority comes together which is stronger than any separate individual and which remains united against all separate individuals. The power of this community is then set up as "right" in opposition to the power of the individual, which is condemned as "brute force" ' (p. 95).

Freud offered little hope for man except the advice to be aware of his ambivalent strivings, endure life, and prepare for death. Lorenz, however, manages to end with an 'avowal of optimism', confessing that like Faust he has something useful to teach mankind. He sees a 'new science' of human behavior emerging which promises to show us the safest route for channeling our aggressive urges. Ethology is already busy exploring all 'possibilities'

for the discharge of aggression into substitute objects, while psychoanalytic studies are advancing our knowledge of sublimation. Most important, he advises, is for the world to learn how to divert the militant enthusiasm of youth into constructive channels such as the Olympic games, and to promote personal acquaintances and friendships among individual members of differing ideologies and nations. He holds acquaintanceship to be the strongest obstacle to aggression. This leaves unexplained the fact that individual acts of violence are often inflicted upon family members and neighbors and not against total strangers.

Granting the importance of affiliative bonds one wonders how Lorenz imagines this spirit of universal brotherhood will take root in a world so pocked by poverty, exploitation, and racism. In On Aggression, he offers no challenge to the privileged to act upon their sense of brotherhood and to sacrifice and share so that the wretched of our species can live with dignity and self-respect. The hope that he offers is for some future genetic mutation that will endow our heirs with stronger inhibitions against their urge to violence. Ultimately Lorenz's optimism rings hollow because his descriptions of the social complexities of jackdaws and geese are more engaging than his portrait of man. Homo sapiens emerges from his pages as a mechanistic, colorless abstraction driven by the furies of an atavistic energy to perform acts of senseless aggression and ritualized love. Man remains the lonely, cursed son of Adam, no longer burdened with the sin of evil born of rebellious curiosity but with an innate destructiveness given greater license by the inventiveness of his mind.

Lorenz, like Freud, attempted to write an objective examination of human aggression. Instead he has offered a personal theodicy cloaked in the language of behavioral biology. Though he shuns atomistic explanations in the understanding of animal behavior, Lorenz achieves philosophical clarity by approaching the problem of human aggression with reductionistic simplicity. By dichotomizing genetic and learned influences over the development of human behavior he has perpetuated the ancient

sterile debates over the existence of innate sin or free moral choice. His promised 'new science' must free itself from such philosophical rigidities of the past and the temptation to use fragmented data to champion a parochial system of belief. Yet Lorenz is intuitively correct when he links the problem of human aggression to the vicissitudes of the development of personal affiliations. Whether human beings can develop satisfying and lasting affective relations with other individuals and groups will have a profound influence on the expression and control of their aggression.

I too believe that a new science of man is emerging, one that combines the study of the problems of interpersonal bonds, social organization, and the pathology of communication. This science possesses exciting possibilities for viewing man not as an abstraction but as an active agent in exploring, changing, and even destroying his environment. It is learning how to apply the theories that deal with open systems (cybernetics and information theory) to the observations of ethology, psychoanalysis, physiology, and developmental psychology. It studies the mutual influences of both heredity and learning on the plasticity of human behavior (Zegans, 1971). Of course such a science of behavior leans heavily upon the pioneering basic discoveries of our two 'metaphysicians', Freud and Lorenz.

CONCLUSION

Ours is a sceptical age where the echoes of past theology such as are found in the writings of Freud and Lorenz are certain to provoke negative reactions. Critics have probed the work of these men not only to test the soundness of the scientific evidence but to weigh the very traditions of thought upon which they build their theories. It is natural that the exotic mixture of Asian and Greek philosophy compounded with psychoanalytic speculation that resulted in Freud's theory of the death instinct should strike most Western readers as foreign and rather suspect. Through his ideas of primal theogony Freud rejected the more familiar myth of man's fall and redemption. He considered the

Christian striving after moral perfection to be at best an illusion and more likely an unrealistic provocation of guilt. He angered both Christian and radical social theorists by debunking the possibility of a peaceful society built on the pillars of love and coöperation. He was viewed as a political conservative who believed that only in the structure and restraints imposed by a civilized state could man's destructive urges be effectively shackled.

Today many writers reject completely the mythological and philosophical biases in both Freud's and Lorenz's work. For them the causes of man's violence lie not in the seeds of creation nor inside his genes but in the political, economic, and technological institutions which are his own invention. Yet the ideas of both these Austrian physicians serve as a bridge that links the broad philosophical traditions of our past with the more fragmented 'radical' and existential theories of our day. The problems they wrestled with—the conflicts between love and power, egotism and altruism, logic and instinct—remain fundamental to any thinker who attempts to learn what impels men to kill and injure each other.

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Tobias Brocher

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BOOK REVIEWS

JAHRBUCH DER PSYCHOANALYSE. BAND VI, PROBLEME DER PSYCHOANALYTISCHEN TECHNIK. (Yearbook of Psychoanalysis. Volume VI, Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique.) Berne: Verlag Hans Huber, 1969. 189 pp.

The coöperation of psychoanalysts within the European Federation at the biennial Congress of the German-speaking section is reflected in the contributions of this volume, which deals mainly with problems of technique. E. and G. Ticho's (Topeka) discussions of the working alliance clarify the differing directions of psychoanalytic techniques in the United States and Europe. Indications of a deficient therapeutic alliance are discussed in some detail. These include interruption of treatment, the so-called pseudotherapeutic alliance, the eternal analysand, and the 'all too reasonable' analysand. The authors demonstrate the importance of a cross-cultural international exchange. Theirs is an excellent contribution clarifying technical problems in psychoanalysis which have been neglected for a long time because of the interruption of psychoanalytic education in Germany in recent decades.

F. Morgenthaler's (Zurich) paper compares technique and analytic experience in relationship to the analysts' characteristic patterns of analyzing. He emphasizes the necessity of formulating the therapeutic relationship in structural terms. For example, the problems arising when the analyst becomes a superego representation for the patient are discussed. Since these individual differences are often denied by analysts, Morgenthaler tries to focus on their impact on the therapeutic relationship, encouraging the young analyst to consider his unconscious impulses and defenses that influence his work with the patient.

W. Kemper (Berlin) contributes a condensed version of a 1966 paper given at the Second Pan-American Congress, dealing with transference and countertransference. Quotations from Freud covering forty years elucidate different issues such as 'interpretation of transference', risks and errors, neglect of the important formal aspects in transference, and the overlooking of 'suggestive factors'.

J. Cremerius (Giessen) attempts to systematize all categories of the patient's silence as well as the silence of the analyst from the

viewpoint of different psychoanalytic concepts. He describes silence as a general tool of the analytic process.

L. Rosenkoetter (Frankfurt) discusses the problem of narcissism and libidinal cathexes. He feels that in many cases of narcissistic disorders, special technical considerations are required, including affect-regulating and ego-structuring interpretations. Treatment vignettes demonstrate his concern about the possible hidden narcissistic gain of patients despite the rule of abstinence.

In two different articles H. Argelander (Frankfurt) and W. Loch (Tubingen) report on their experiences with general practitioners, using M. Balint's group technique. Examples show the kind of work done by the general practitioner and how these new methods are used for the detection and analysis of resistance phenomena occurring within the group. Loch stresses the necessity of training general practitioners to recognize hidden unconscious motives in the patient's pathogenic behavior.

J. Berna (Hamburg) focuses on the problems of transference, countertransference, and 'transference mirrors' in child analysis. He deals with the problem of aggressive children, and considers the use of aggression as a defense against fear. The varied opinions of analysts on such basic topics as contact with parents, or activity versus passivity, demonstrate clearly that child analysis is still in an early developmental stage in Germany.

The appendix gives detailed reports on activities and developments within the five Psychoanalytic Training and Research Institutes of the German Psychoanalytic Association. Reviewing the first five volumes of these reports, one is struck by the growth in organization and concentration of psychoanalytic education in Germany through the past years despite considerable resistance from universities and the official psychiatric establishment.

TOBIAS BROCHER (TOPEKA)

CURRENTS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS. Edited by Irwin M. Marcus, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1971. 393 pp.

This collection of essays by twenty-one distinguished psychoanalytic educators celebrates the twentieth anniversary of the New Orleans Psychoanalytic Institute and bears witness to the time and perseverance involved in the growth of a small study group into a fully

developed autonomous training center. The volume begins with an article by Helen Ross on psychoanalytic education. In it she emphasizes a topic that is continually on the agenda of education committees for review and elaboration: the current attitudes toward the relationship of training analyst and candidate within the framework of an institute. Miss Ross's paper traces the development of psychoanalytic education from the informal meetings conducted by Freud to the present-day organized training centers.

Joan Fleming refers to the dilemma that often faces the analyst. Shall he be teacher or healer? The question implies that the two roles are incompatible in the same person. She wisely points out that the psychoanalyst performs as physician-educator and as physician-healer in conducting a training analysis, the 'foundation on which further development of a young analyst is built'. In particular, it offers the student an opportunity to work through transference-countertransference reactions far more completely than the self-analysis Freud had advocated in the days before formal training institutes were created.

The second part of the book is devoted to essays on childhood and adolescence. One deals with Anna Freud's invaluable diagnostic profile. In this section there are particularly cogent commentaries on the phases of psychic development by Peter Blos, David A. Freedman, Albert J. Solnit, and Van Spruiell.

The third section, on dreams, offers one of the clearest reviews of the investigators of the past decade on the biology of sleep and dreaming. In his paper Jay T. Shurley remarks that although Freud's original concept of the function of the dream as the guardian of sleep is under attack, it is noteworthy that 'so many of Freud's observations and theories foreshadowed or at least remain compatible with recent findings' in studies of the psychophysiology of the dream. Additional papers by Herbert F. Waldhorn, Douglas Noble, and Melitta Sperling offer a wealth of pertinent information for the clinician as well as the theoretician.

Next, in a series of papers on psychoanalytic theory, Henry Miles takes issue with those behavioral scientists 'who imply that fundamental concepts of psychoanalytic theory have been rendered obsolete and untenable by newer developments in ethology, cybernetics, neurophysiology etc.'. He emphasizes the continued value of collecting clinical impressions and empirical data. Papers

by Charles Brenner, Eugene Pumpian-Mindlin, Edward D. Joseph, Robert S. Wallerstein, and Harold Sampson offer current thinking on the instinctual drives, infantile omnipotence, perception, and research on the psychoanalytic process.

The final section, on clinical practice, includes lucid essays on therapeutic interpretation, character perversion, transference neuroses, and character disorders associated with object loss, by Victor Rosen, Jacob Arlow, Carl Adatto, and Irwin Marcus respectively. Nearly each essay merits a review in itself, and the entire collection does ample justice to the title, Currents in Psychoanalysis.

It is pertinent to close with Fleming's sage remark: 'We need to integrate the aims and techniques of treating and teaching, a philosophy of education for an analyst which includes Freud's original ideas and also makes use of the advances in theory and technique of both therapy and learning'.

ROBERT A. SAVITT (NEW YORK)

INFORMATION, SYSTEMS, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS. AN EVOLUTIONARY, BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY. (Psychological Issues, Vol. VII, Nos. 1/2, Monographs 25/26.) By Emanuel Peterfreund in collaboration with Jacob T. Schwartz. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1971. 399 pp.

This is a provocative book that applies information theory to psychoanalytic thinking. However, acceptance of the author's contribution may be difficult because he assumes untenable and dogmatic positions regarding the relation between mind and brain.

Peterfreund has a noble vision of science as a set of universal ideas, a science in which psychoanalysis has its respected place. In this work his sharp criticisms of current psychoanalytic theory seem designed to bring psychoanalysis into closer congruence with the natural sciences. Peterfreund sees the concept of the psychic apparatus and of psychic energy as the greatest impediment to this ideal unified view of science. It would seem that Peterfreund agrees with the criticism leveled against the model of the psychic apparatus that has become familiar through the work of Robert Holt and the late George Klein. But this is only a superficial similarity, for Peterfreund departs radically from these other critics. Where Holt had criticized Freud for using a model borrowed from an

antiquated neurophysiology—implying that psychoanalytic theories should rest on their own feet—, Peterfreund proposes to return to a neurophysiological model, but one that is more up to date: a model provided by information theory.

He takes a radical position concerning the relation between mind and brain, viewing the data of psychoanalysis as completely isomorphic with neurophysiological events. In other words, psychological events (in the mind) are mere epiphenomena to events in the brain. Peterfreund believes that the concept of mind itself is superfluous, as is the concept of ego. Carried to its logical conclusion, there would not be any special science of psychoanalysis; it would be simply a branch of biology. And this is what Peterfreund essentially proposes. This is a philosophic position that very few psychoanalysts can accept. I find this to be a retrogressive step, reminiscent of Freud's struggle in the Project for a Scientific Psychology, a struggle which caused him to state later that psychoanalytic theories have no reference at all to events in the brain. The neurologizing that was expressed in the Project was something that he disavowed and, as we know, he did not attempt to have this work published. Peterfreund's position can be stated by quoting as follows:

> In brief, I am abandoning any attempt to theorize about psychological phenomena from a psychological standpoint, as is the role in current psychoanalytic theory. And I am abandoning the idea implicit in much of current psychoanalytic theory that the mind is an entity with an independent existence, capable of interacting with the body (p. 148).

This philosophical position leads him to the sort of conceptual confusions he himself deplores in other sections of the work. For example, the concepts of self- and object representation are at best heuristic devices, yet Peterfreund speaks of 'the narrow systems, patterns, or circuits in the associated programs which correspond to those experiences called self object representations, superego representations, and so on' (p. 156). This is simply an exercise in the reification of mental constructs, which, if taken seriously, would lead us to utter confusion.

Despite his quixotic attack on ego psychology and his unfortunate philosophic position, I believe Peterfreund has convincingly shown that the model of information theory may be of great potential value to psychoanalysis. In the section entitled An Information

Systems Theory for Psychoanalysis, Peterfreund attempts to apply information theory to a broad variety of areas; these include ego functions, motivations, learning and structure formation, dreaming, sleep and waking, and the psychoanalytic process.

It is in the clinical area of the psychoanalytic process that I found Peterfreund to be most convincing. Here he reveals himself to be a gifted clinician and presents us with excellent vignettes illustrating various facets of the psychoanalytic process. I agree with Peterfreund that the model of information theory is more consonant with the interactional process that occurs between the patient and the analyst than is the model of the mental apparatus where the influence of the environment (the analyst) is not acknowledged. Further, and perhaps even more important, information theory describes information storage, that is, memory, which is at the heart of the psychoanalytic process both for the analyst and for the patient. Peterfreund suggests the intriguing possibility that information theory may eventually replace our ideas concerning mental associations. The concept of free associations may be given depth and a new dimension.

Peterfreund has shown that information theory does have a place in psychoanalytic thinking as a model—that is, as a heuristic device—but by his insistence that it is something more than a heuristic device he has detracted from his own contribution. This unfortunately is an uneven book.

ARNOLD H. MODELL (BROOKLINE, MASS.)

DIARY OF MY ANALYSIS WITH SIGMUND FREUD. By Smiley Blanton, M.D. New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1971. 141 pp.

Smiley Blanton, who died in 1966, visited Freud regularly from September, 1929, to June, 1930, and made occasional visits in later years. The diary of his 'analysis', found among his manuscripts, has now been published by his wife. Mrs. Blanton, a good writer, has included her own biographical notes and commentaries. They are informative and charming, and bring back fond memories for many of us who knew her husband.

Blanton came from the middle South and was a deeply religious man of simple, direct, and uncomplicated views. Over the years he developed a rough and tough individualism. When he tried to

convince Freud that escape from Austria was necessary and Freud refused to acknowledge this, he called Freud a stubborn old man, a characterization equally true of Blanton. A year before Freud's death when Blanton visited him in England, he asked Freud whether he had formed a better opinion of Americans now that they had helped rescue him from Vienna. Freud hesitated, and then said 'No'.

This book is to be read not as a historical document nor as a report of a freudian analysis but as the story of an encounter between Sigmund Freud and a man from the middle South, still preoccupied with the history of the South and the Civil War. There are many touching and beautiful scenes in these encounters, which amounted to ninety-nine hours distributed over ten years. At the start Freud was seventy-one years old and Blanton was forty-seven. Blanton always paid in advance and Freud accepted the money with the proviso that his daughter would return it in case of Freud's death. And Freud never protested when Blanton followed his habit of tightly winding his handkerchief around his eyes to keep them closed for better concentration. Many times the conversation was informative and instructive, almost like a private seminar. It assumed the form of an analysis when dreams were discussed and analyzed. Incidentally, it is amusing to compare Blanton's description of being late to his first hour with Lionel Blitzten's story. Blitzten reported being late for his first—and last—visit to Freud. With Blanton, Freud passed on to other subjects; with Blitzten, a hostile deadlock developed.

On one occasion Freud presented Blanton with his collected works, a gift that promptly led to complications in the transference. The complications were analyzed with the help of several revealing dreams, all detailed in this report. Blanton, who later became the founder of the American Foundation for Religion and Psychiatry and a co-author with Norman Vincent Peale, tried to discuss his home-grown religious beliefs and his interest in the miracles of Lourdes[1] with Freud. It is not recorded in detail what Freud thought about the subject; apparently he limited himself to some sceptical remarks.

The short book is easy to read, especially for one who has known

[1] *Cf.*, Blanton, Smiley: *Analytical Study of a Cure at Lourdes.* This QUARTERLY, IX, 1940, pp. 348-362.

Smiley Blanton, and it is a valuable addition to the growing library of books on Freud the man.

MARTIN GROTJAHN (BEVERLY HILLS, CALIF.)

SIGMUND FREUD. By Richard Wollheim. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1971. 292 pp.

WILHELM REICH. By Charles Rycroft. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1972. 115 pp.

These two books are components of a series of books called Modern Masters. The editor writes, 'By Modern Masters we mean the men who have changed and are changing the life and thought of our age. The authors of these volumes are themselves masters, and they have written their books in the belief that general discussion of their subjects will henceforth be more informed and more exciting than ever before.' The 'Modern Masters' already published are Albert Camus, Frantz Fanon, Herbert Marcuse, Che Guevara, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Ludwig Wittgenstein, George Lukacs, Noam Chomsky, James Joyce, Marshall McLuhan, George Orwell, William Butler Yeats, and Mohandas Gandhi. Judging from these two books, the authors aim to condense into a single volume both essential biographical information and the central thoughts of each Modern Master. For the psychoanalyst who would like some reasonably reliable, digested information about the life and work of someone outside his field, some of the other volumes in the series might be of interest; but for his own field he can hardly rely on second-hand information. The books on Freud and Reich can offer him mainly a review and an occasional new viewpoint.

Rycroft has the easier task. Reich's main contributions, well known to analysts, are summarized in this short volume. For the rest—what Rycroft calls Reich's 'tormented, persecuted, and futile' life—one might now let him rest in peace. For those whose curiosity impels them to further inquiry, Rycroft offers both additional information and speculation.

Wollheim, a professor of philosophy, has undertaken the far more difficult, if not impossible, task of summarizing the life and work of Sigmund Freud in a single volume. He believes that Freud's views have become obscured and that his evolution as a thinker has not been recognized. This challenging criticism will

come as a surprise to psychoanalysts who thought that they had indeed studied his views and did recognize the evolution of his ideas, but, unfortunately, Wollheim does not elaborate on this premise. I think there is truth in it but the generalization is difficult to support. At any rate, on this premise, Wollheim attempts to summarize what Freud said and to trace the chronology of Freud's ideas.

His method seems to have been to plough straight through the Standard Edition from beginning to end in an effort to connect Freud's ideas of various periods, to clarify what he considers obscurities, and to correct what he considers misunderstandings. While the task is done with good will, the protracted series of condensations become heavy going, like reading borrowed lecture notes. I think that Wollheim places too much emphasis on the 'Project', that he relies too heavily on Strachey's translation, and that he introduces occasional obscurities of his own. However, all in all, the book is reliable and might be of interest as a review and a stimulus to check and refresh one's recollection.

Unfortunately both Rycroft and Wollheim refer to Roazen's Brother Animal as a reliable biographical source. Eissler's Talent and Genius has certainly discredited Roazen, but even without that documentation, there never was a reason to give that book credence, let alone recommend it.

SAMUEL D. LIPTON (CHICAGO)

THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF CURRENT PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY AND PRACTICE. VOL. X, 1959. Edited by John Frosch, M.D. and Nathaniel Ross, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1971. 429 pp.

Volume X of The Annual Survey of Psychoanalysis, which was published in 1971, deals with the psychoanalytic literature that appeared in 1959. As with previous volumes in the series, this book provides carefully prepared abstracts, grouped under nine general headings, by a number of contributors who are identified under each citation in the bibliography at the back of the book. The general headings form the basis of nine chapters, each of which deals with a specific topic and incorporates into the discussion the abstracts of the relevant literature. The author of each chapter has

organized the material in a very readable fashion, providing an introduction and also a conclusion that summarizes the trend for the year in the particular subject area.

In their survey of the psychoanalytic literature for 1959, the editors have covered thirty-one journals, three annuals, and five books which are listed in the bibliography. The journals include those which may be regarded as the basic psychoanalytic journals: American Imago, Bulletin of the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Psychoanalytic Review, and The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, all in English. In addition, there are the *Revue Française de Psychanalyse* in French, *Revista de Psicoanálisis* and *Revista de Psicoanálisis Argentina* in Spanish, and *Samiksa,* the English language publication of the Indian Psycho-Analytical Association. A conspicuous omission is the Italian *Rivista de Psicoanalisi.* The remaining twenty-one journals, among which are the Archives of General Psychiatry, The British Journal of Medical Psychology, International Journal of Social Psychiatry, Psychosomatic Medicine, *Psyche* (Heidelberg), and *Zeitschrift für Psychosomatische Medizin,* are in the parapsychoanalytic field.

This coverage provides the reader of The Annual Survey not only with summaries of articles in English with which he may be familiar, but also with information about articles in other journals, both domestic and foreign, to which he probably does not have ready access. One may note that the current volume with its coverage of thirty-one journals has almost doubled the coverage of Volume I, which surveyed only seventeen journals, indicating that the current survey is indeed more comprehensive.

While the number of publications surveyed is impressive, this reviewer again finds himself wondering, as he did in reviewing Volume VIII of this series,[1] about the *degree* of coverage of a particular publication. While the survey of the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, and The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child is again complete, the number of omissions from other major journals is puzzling. For instance, seven out of twenty-six articles in American Imago are omitted; five out of seven in

[1] *Cf.,* This QUARTERLY, XXXVI, 1967, pp. 601-603.

the Philadelphia Bulletin; twenty-two out of thirty in Psychoanalytic Review; fifteen out of twenty-nine in *Revue Française;* eleven out of thirty-four in *Revista de Psicoanálisis;* four out of seven in *Samiksa;* three out of ten in *La Psychanalyse;* and twelve out of twenty-five in Science and Psychoanalysis.

The editors of any work have, of course, the privilege of including and excluding whatever material suits their over-all design. Their purpose is best served, however, when the reasons for inclusion or exclusion, as the case may be, are clearly presented to the reader. In the volume under discussion, the reasons for the omissions are not clear since a number of omitted articles are significant contributions to the literature, and their omission would seem to contravene the policy of The Annual Survey to include comprehensively all psychoanalytic articles. The omission of articles from the survey is important since a generalization concerning trends for the year under discussion cannot be regarded as valid when based on a seemingly arbitrary selection of articles dealing with the particular subject.

The question of criteria for selection becomes even more significant when applied to the coverage of books for 1959, in as much as only five were selected for summaries in this volume. These are Thrills and Regression by Michael Balint, The Mysterious Leap from the Mind to the Body by Felix Deutsch, Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy edited by Sidney Hook, The Concepts of Sigmund Freud by Bartlett H. Stoodly, and Group Psychoanalysis by B. Bohdan Wassell. One concedes that the inclusion of all the important psychoanalytic books published in 1959 would be a practical impossibility. But it would be helpful to the reader to know why the editors regarded these five as the *most* important.

It is unfortunate that the time lag between original publication and the completed Annual Survey for that year seems to be getting longer and longer. The current volume deals with the literature that was published twelve years ago. One can only hope that some way will be found to deal with the mechanics of this formidable editorial task so that future volumes of the survey can be more current.

In spite of this and the other limitations indicated above, there can be no doubt that this publication with its increasing and ex-

cellent coverage is a valuable contribution to psychoanalytic literature, and is to be recommended to all who are interested in the field of psychoanalysis.

ALEXANDER GRINSTEIN (DETROIT)

SCIENCE AND PSYCHOANALYSIS, VOLUME XIX. DREAM DYNAMICS. Edited by Jules H. Masserman, M.D. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1971. 194 pp.

The reader of this volume will discover in it an exposition of Freud's aberrations with regard to the process of dreaming, his unsound reasoning on the dynamics of the dream, and the unfruitfulness of his emphasis on the unconscious. Beneath the headings of Dream Thoughts and Theories, The Dreams of Childhood, and Clinical Applications followed by a Dream Symposium over twenty contributors present their views under the aegis of the Scientific Proceedings of the American Academy of Psychoanalysis. The contribution of Roger Bastide, Professor of Social Anthropology at the Sorbonne, on Dreams and Culture is learned and of some interest.

Since the account most of the authors give of the dream and its place in the psychoanalytic process differs so widely and so fundamentally from Freud's, one wonders why they are not equally emboldened to change the name of the discipline under which they operate.

LEON L. ALTMAN (NEW YORK)

THE SCHIZOPHRENIC SYNDROME: AN ANNUAL REVIEW, 1971. Edited by Robert Cancro, M.D. New York: Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1971. 791 pp.

This volume consists of fifty of the most significant papers on schizophrenic disorders published between January 1, 1969 and July, 1970. The new annual serves an important function since it has become virtually impossible for anyone to keep abreast of the many articles on the subject scattered throughout the ever-increasing number of psychiatric and psychological journals.

It is disappointing that there are, strictly speaking, no psychoanalytic papers in this volume even though there are contributions by at least a half dozen psychoanalysts. Their absence is probably

not so much a matter of selection as a reflection of what psychoanalysis currently contributes to advancing the understanding of schizophrenic disorders. However, there are a number of papers of interest to psychoanalysts, and rather than try to review the entire volume, I shall confine my attention to these papers.

An article by Edward Sachar and his co-workers, Psychoendocrinology of Ego Disintegration is one of the few significant new contributions. A biochemical study that carefully considers the patients' clinical states, it contributes both to the study of anxiety and schizophrenic states through its correlation of psychological and physiological mechanisms of defense. During the initial period of psychotic turmoil, urinary corticosteroid excretions mount to levels far beyond those seen in anxious, normal persons; with the development of a paranoid restitutive state, the level returns to normal but may subsequently rise as the patient goes into a period of anaclitic depression. Other patients show progressive diminution of corticosteroid excretions as they move through stages of partial ego reintegration before recovering.

David Shakow's On Doing Research in Schizophrenia is a scholarly, thoughtful, and wise reflection on the years the author has spent carrying out and fostering research with schizophrenic patients. Laing's Models of Madness, by Siegler, Osmond, and Mann is a perceptive critique of what the authors term Laing's conspiratorial theory of schizophrenic disorders that has gained such great popularity among young persons who like to blame parents rather than recognize the parents' emotional problems. Y. O. Alanen, one of Europe's leading investigators, provides a summary of his studies comparing the families of schizophrenic and neurotic patients. E. James Anthony's A Clinical Evaluation of Children with Psychotic Parents presents some of the findings of his studies of the influence of psychotic parents on their children, an area that has been in need of study, particularly since so many tranquilized schizophrenic parents are now living with their families. David Feinsilver has documented the severity of the communicative disorders in parents of schizophrenic patients by using a very simple new technique that demonstrates their difficulties in properly encoding descriptions of ordinary objects.

An article by Louis Gottschalk and his co-workers demonstrates the usefulness of his technique of studying samples of speech in pre-

dicting change in patients. Roy Grinker's An Essay on Schizophrenia and Science, which offers his reflections on the current status of research in the field, disappointed the reviewer because he fails to bring any theoretical coherence to the work. He neglects the many studies that have focused attention on the familial nature of the disorder: the highly important twin studies carried out by Tienari, Kringlen, Pollin and Stabenau, and others that have greatly modified Kallmann's findings; the studies of the family milieu including the disordered communication in these families; and the various studies aimed at differentiating the genetic and family environmental factors being carried out in Denmark and the United States by investigators associated with the National Institute of Mental Health. Talks by two stalwarts of schizophrenia research, Gabriel Langfeldt and Manfred Bleuler, that were presented when they received the Dean Research Award of the American College of Psychiatrists in 1969 and 1970 respectively, are included.

This reviewer has some qualms about the inclusion of a few papers that he believes should never have been published and certainly should not have been republished. He also laments the paucity of younger active investigators on the International Advisory Board. On balance, however, the first volume of the new annual review is to be enthusiastically welcomed.

THEODORE LIDZ (NEW HAVEN, CONN.)

SEXUALITY AND HOMOSEXUALITY. A NEW VIEW. By Arno Karlen. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1971. 666 pp.

Karlen, a freelance journalist and magazine editor, states that the purpose of his book is to bring together the two sexual revolutions, the social and the scientific, 'by focusing on homosexuality as a case in point'. He has produced a highly readable and fascinating report on the history of sex. The book traces the major changes in attitude toward homosexuality and other perversions from the cradle of culture in the eastern Mediterranean, through ancient Greece and Rome, into the Dark Ages, the Renaissance, and up to the present time. It is an ambitious project and, for the most part, it comes off beautifully. While not attempting to equate its scientific merit with Zilboorg's masterpiece on the history of psychiatry, I feel that it can be compared to it in terms of its own theme.

Zilboorg, of course, did not deal only with sexual behavior but with the entire range of psychiatric knowledge through the ages.

Once Freud opened the doors of the medical consultation room to the homosexual and described the unconscious psychodynamics of perversion, the claim of an innate or inborn condition lost all validity. While Karlen covers some of the major points of Freud's contributions, his single brief chapter does not do justice to this monumental turning point in our understanding of sexual deviation.

In praising Kinsey's volume on the sexual behavior of the male (rightly so for its statistical material; not so for its interpretations), Karlen remarks that psychoanalysts protested the methodology of Kinsey, but when invited to join him, they declined. Unfortunately, this gives a false impression. Karlen does not make clear that the freudian method of investigation, the study of unconscious motivation to comprehend sexual behavior, is antithetical to that of any research project devoted *exclusively* to the statistical method. He makes it seem simply that freudians declined out of pique. Furthermore, he does not make clear that the Kinsey study of frequency was used as a new rationalization for the 'normalcy'—in effect, the innateness—of homosexuality. He fails to recognize that the over-all statistics did not reflect the crucial psychodynamic difference between those with one or a few homosexual contacts in a lifetime and exclusive, lifelong homosexual practices. Because no one on Kinsey's staff was qualified to derive data on the basis of free association, the meaning of homosexuality to those subjects reporting it as well as to the investigators was never considered.

Karlen's discussion of post-Freudian contributions omits significant developments regarding precœdipal causation, already hinted at by Freud in 1938 in An Outline of Psycho-Analysis. Had he familiarized himself with these contributions, he would have better understood homosexuality as a developmental failure and, therefore, amenable to correction by analytic therapy and educational techniques.

Although the book is subtitled A New View, it is instead a masterful survey of sexual behavior in dramatic detail. Karlen documents his finding that in ancient Greece 'homosexuality was considered a deviation; it was given positive value only by a minority of homosexuals, bisexuals and apologists. Neither did its

presence in Greece have any relationship to social, artistic or political health' (p. 38). This finding is in accord with W. K. Lacy's outstanding research on the classical period, The Family in Ancient Greece (Cornell University Press, 1968).

Karlen's book has a quality of on-the-spot reporting that makes it lively and interesting. This is achieved by his interviews with a great many individuals who speak from widely differing perspectives. He asks succinct questions and receives no less trenchant replies. For example, one of the world's leading experts on animal behavior, Frank Beach, comments: 'I don't know any authenticated instance of males or females in the animal world preferring a homosexual partner . . . [in its] mounting behavior. It's questionable that mounting in itself can properly be called sexual' (p. 399).

The book can inspire humility. If we tend to feel superior about our sophisticated approaches to resolving sexual problems these days compared to some of the atrocities vented upon men and women in past centuries, we have only to read Karlen's descriptions of clitoridectomy at the turn of the century and so-called transsexual procedures currently practiced: 'The transformation of a woman to a man requires a complex, three-stage course of surgery that takes at least six months to a year. The breasts and internal sex organs are removed. A scrotum is made from labial tissue and filled with plastic "testicles". A penis is created in stages; a skin graft from the abdominal wall is built into a tube that hangs down to enclose an artificial urethra. Finally, the *clitoris is embedded in the artificial penis,* so that capacity for orgasm is retained. At best, the penis is not very large or realistic, and it cannot become erect; to penetrate a vagina, it must be given artificial support' (p. 375, emphasis added). Herein lies the weakness of Karlen's otherwise admirable work. Being a layman, he cannot meaningfully comment on the basis of personal training and experience in relation to such complex phenomena. The creation of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley's Frankenstein monster pales in comparison to this spare-parts, 'tinker toy' type of surgery practiced on living, suffering, and needy human beings as therapy for what is a purely psychological disorder.

Karlen appropriately asks for an 'enlightened' attitude toward homosexuality. He also asks that it be separated from the other perversions. But homosexuality fulfils the definition of a perversion;

its mechanisms are the same and, in my opinion after twenty years of study, the original conflict from which all perversions arise is the same. The common nuclear core is the fear of engulfment by the mother, with the result of a flight into perversion. If the perverse act is not carried out, intolerable anxiety can ensue.

There are a few technical errors in the volume, one of which concerns this reviewer's book, The Overt Homosexual. It is attributed at one point to another author, with the contents erroneously described. The mistake is not repeated in the bibliography, authorship is restored, and the contents cited as 'probably the best-written analytically oriented book on homosexuality'. Another error occurs when Karlen states: 'In *most* cases, the male transsexual is physically normal, without disorders of the genes, gonads, hormones or sex organs' (p. 372, emphasis added). The word *most* is intrinsic to the confusion surrounding transsexualism. By definition, *all,* not most, persons who are transsexual are normal physically; a person is either a male or a female or an intersex and it is not the latter we mean when we refer to transsexualism. Every transsexual is anatomically normal but suffers from the semidelusional conviction of being a person of the opposite sex, fervently hoping for a magical surgical solution to severe psychopathology.

Karlen has brought us a remarkable book—full of well-known as well as little-known facts—that presents a broad sweep of history and describes exacerbations and remissions of public hostility toward homosexuals and others with sexual problems, reflecting the idea that the area of sexual behavior has been the witch's cauldron of mankind through the millenia.

CHARLES W. SOCARIDES (NEW YORK)

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, VOLUME XXVI. New York/Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971. 616 pp.

It has become an unnecessarily stated truism that each new volume of The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child meets the expectations created by its predecessors. Volume XXVI maintains the high level of contributions to both child psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Both old and new themes and concepts are included in this latest volume. Reworking of earlier concepts in the light of newer information resulting in additional depth, highlights the section on

psychoanalytic theory. Anna Freud, among others, contributes her current thinking on genetic and dynamic considerations in infantile neuroses, while Kurt Eissler brings his thinking up to date on the death drive, ambivalence, and narcissism. Hans Loewald writes on motivations and instinct theory.

In the section covering aspects of normal and pathological development, a most important new contribution is The Baby Profile, by W. E. Freud. This report applies the Hampstead assessment schema to the earliest stages of life. Applying the Hampstead profile to the field of early child development will be useful to a number of investigational and clinical programs ranging from developmental psychology to pediatrics, child psychiatry, and the emerging approaches to infant day care. In addition, this section has outstanding papers by Samuel Ritvo, James and Joyce Robertson, Ernest Kafka, Sheldon Bach, Marian Tolpin, Eleanor Galenson, and Herman Roiphe.

The clinical and applied psychoanalytic contributions in this volume include authoritative reports on separation, decision making, blind children, problems of reconstruction, and adolescent antitherapeutic maneuvers, as well as a psychoanalytic consideration of Joseph Conrad and The Conflict of Command.

Volume XXVI of The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child represents an appropriate start to the second quarter of a century in the life of this series which has become an indispensable part of the library of anyone working with the emotional problems of children and youth.

REGINALD S. LOURIE, M.D. (WASHINGTON, D. C.)

ANXIETY AND EGO FORMATION IN INFANCY. By Sylvia Brody and Sidney Axelrad. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1970. 422 pp.

The research described in this book is based on theoretical formulations that arose from Sylvia Brody's 1956 study, Patterns in Mothering.[1] In the volume reviewed here the authors present their recent concepts and the results of longitudinal observations of one hundred and twenty-two mother-infant pairs, designed to test those concepts.

[1] Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXVI, 1957, pp. 421-423.

Central to their thinking are the propositions that 'the emergence of the affect of anxiety and the beginning of ego formation take place in conjunction with one another, and that the two events flow out of a joint process . . . physiological *arousals* promote the exercise of perceptual and motoric structures, and . . . perception of the tension-states thus aroused, is reacted to with affect. . . . Anxiety is one of the principal affects with which the ego is ushered into being; as the infant organism perceives some dystonic condition in his own body and perceives as well his own immediate, involuntary response to the condition, the ego is born and exercises a primary function' (p. 9). The primary organization of primary observations and the consequent control of function constitute essential mental processes that later will be absorbed by the ego: '. . . a psychic structure linked to behavior through the control of behavior'.

The degree of tension experienced by the infant is believed to promote or detract from his future optimal development. 'Optimal degrees of tension sufficient to motivate activity through which tensions may be discharged economically and pleasurably' are contrasted with 'unusual stress, with hypercathexis of pain, sensory discomforts, or a sensory confusion'. The former promotes sensory explorations, attainment of gratifications, and the development of curiosity while the latter cause a reduced readiness to perceive external stimuli and to organize perceptions. These propositions have particular bearing on the later described mother-infant relationships in which the mother's ability to keep tension at an optimal level is one of the paramount considerations.

Brody and Axelrad have included a detailed review of the literature as well as their own point of view and their conclusions on neonatal sensory development, imprinting-like phenomena (socialization), the role played by the protective shield (stimulus barrier), and anxiety preparedness and signal anxiety in relation to the development of the ego. It is unfortunate that the language of their presentation is often so obtuse and convoluted that even after repeated reading, it is difficult to be certain of having clearly understood all the authors intend to convey. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to present the central thrust of this laborious and carefully devised research.

The development of the affect of anxiety is traced from birth

through the first year of life as it evolves as a reaction first to physiological sensations and responses, then to conscious perceptions and organizations, with control of these percepts by the ego. The threat of psychic disorganization is considered the basis of all anxiety. Anxiety preparedness is presumed to be present at six weeks of age. It is defined as 'an adaptive reaction to penetration of the protective shield (stimulus barrier) occurring in active and passive accommodation to stimuli; and an emerging tendency to appeal for help, operative when stimuli become excessive'. Thus anxiety preparedness appears to mean what is usually described as frustration tolerance: the ability to tolerate moderate distress and not be overwhelmed by external or internal (visceral) stimuli; an awareness that help comes before the point of extreme distress. This is achieved through optimal degrees of experience in pleasure and unpleasure. 'Consciousness of the experience may set into motion the development of rudimentary ego function, may inaugurate or literally substantiate anxiety preparedness' (p. 88). This is one of the confusing points in their theoretical concepts. What is 'consciousness' if not an ego function? Are they not saying that an ego function (consciousness) promotes the development of rudimentary ego function? Earlier the authors summarize their review of other studies on the neonate with the statement that 'there are structures available to the very young infant for the recognition of sensations, for the assimilation of sensation into perceptions and for the organization of percepts into engrams' (p. 24). On the following page they speak of 'larval elements of an archaic form of mentation present in the neonate and young infant'. They do *not* state that the term 'consciousness'—or 'cognition' which is also used in connection with this phase of development—is intended to designate 'an archaic form of mentation', although presumably this is the case.

Signal anxiety (a cry for help) gradually emerges when stimuli become excessive. 'This is seen in evidence that physiological stress has been converted to psychological stress, and in the capacity of the infant to marshal inner resources, or to appeal in a directed fashion for external help, to relieve the stress' (p. 253). 'As the signal of anxiety is triggered by affect, the triggering is a function of the ego.' The authors' use of the term 'signal anxiety' is confusing. They use it literally, not as customarily—a product of normal ego

functioning, alerting the individual to the danger resulting from an unconscious conflict.

The early relationship to the mother is viewed in terms of imprinting-like phenomena (socialization). 'Visual fixation upon the human face presented at very close range and especially when reinforced by the human voice, plus pursuit movements, may be the human equivalent of following among animals. Human infants do have only sensory means of locomotion in the first weeks of life' (p. 34).

The authors link the specific imprinting of the mother with the concomitant development of the rudimentary ego and the affect of anxiety. They point out that the period at which imprinting to the mother as an individual takes place coincides roughly with Mahler's normal symbiotic phase, which attains a peak at five or six months of age. While Mahler indicates that experiences of frustration bring about an awareness of separateness, of 'me' and 'not me', the authors state, 'An essential quality of the cathexis of the mother would include awareness of the possibility of her absence, and a normal preparedness for comfort loss and the affect of anxiety' (p. 89). In the presentation of their observation of mother-infant pairs, their particular perspective becomes clearer: their focus is on maternal behavior and the ability of the mother to promote normal anxiety tolerance in the infant, as contrasted with Mahler, who is primarily concerned with the infant's developing awareness of separateness.

Stranger discrimination, ending the critical period of socialization (imprinting) in humans, parallels the ending of the period of imprinting in animals with the onset of fear. The authors conclude their theoretical presentation: 'Our purpose in construing these links is to make as discrete as possible the relationships that may inhere among the earliest forms of object cathexis, the dystonic affect of anxiety, and the development of the ego'.

Having prepared the reader with the theoretical framework and the hypotheses they hoped to prove in their observational study, the authors describe the selection of the mother-child pairs and the setting in which the observations were made. Contact with one hundred and twenty-two mother-infant pairs was made before delivery and during confinement. The first infant examination occurred between seventy-two and ninety-six hours after birth to

determine the suitability (i.e., normality) of the neonate. Through the use of sound film, tape recordings, and direct observations, the mother-child pairs were studied at intervals of six, twenty-six, and fifty-two weeks when the mother came to the project office with her baby. The study was focused on the mother's handling and feeding of her baby, since these activities had proved, in Brody's earlier work, to be the best indices of the mother's total relationship with the child.

A five point scale was used to rate the mother's behavior on three variables—Empathy, Control, and Efficiency—and for the degree of Consistency in each of these qualities, making six variables in all. On the basis of these ratings, seven types of maternal behavior were statistically differentiated during all three ages observed. Only four mothers in the total group showed such childish, inept, or stereotyped behavior that they could not be classified. Types I and VI showed the most adequate maternal behavior, Type I being the most empathic, Type VI the most efficient.

Assessment of infant development was based on thirteen sets of signs of disturbance (SDi) and nine sets of signs of favorable development (SFD). These were assessed solely from the examination of the records of interviews and direct behavioral observations, and were used to estimate the balance of manifest physiological and psychological strengths and weaknesses that the authors presume exert influence on ego formation during the first year of life.

The judgment that the mothers of Types I and VI were most effective in the handling of their infants was confirmed when the SFD and SDi of infants of those mothers were compared with those of the total of the other groups of mothers. For example:

> At six weeks, the greater emotional stability of infants of Type I mothers [confirmed by the significantly lower frequency of crying states than in all other cases] is a direct result of the more adequate and consistent handling by these mothers. . . . Energy otherwise consumed in disturbances of affect and in efforts toward tension reduction are free to flow in more profitable channels, such as perceptual cathexes (p. 199).

> At six months the differences between the poorly mothered and the well-mothered infants are more visible. The well-mothered infants give the impression of having laid down the basis for more stable physiological, perceptual, and behavioral states, more solid cathexis of animate and inanimate objects, more positive affective responsiveness, and more adequate adaptive and cognitive behavior (p. 212).

> At one year of age, the advanced development observed in the most adequately mothered infants at six months continues in every area of development (p. 213).

As far as the poorly-mothered infants were concerned, the authors state that they were usually at their best at the six-week observation, after which the curve of disturbance increased.

The findings of this study appear to substantiate the authors' claim concerning the interrelationship between anxiety and ego development. It was clearly demonstrated that inadequate mothering retarded the development of anxiety preparedness (frustration tolerance) and later of signal anxiety. Energy which would have been utilized toward progress in ego development was consumed in disturbances of affect and in efforts at tension reduction.

The reader cannot help but be impressed by the relatively high number of inadequate mothers (two thirds of the total) in what was considered a normal population. Yet the authors assure us that despite the manifest disturbances described, the significant landmarks were reached: at six months all infants had attained the second phase of socialization and at one year all had developed signal anxiety. Moreover, the developmental quotients were adequate in all instances.

It seems questionable whether it was advantageous to classify the mothers under seven types. Between the two groups of adequate mothers and the one group of definitely inadequate mothers, there are four groups which are difficult to distinguish from one another. The authors themselves feel that follow-up studies will be necessary to clarify this. It would also be interesting to know whether it may be found necessary to alter the group placement of some of the mothers. Will some good mothers become less adequate as their infants move into childhood and others be able to relate better? The authors contradict their own stated conviction that the mothers showed no change in the basic mode of response in spite of the changing needs of the infant (p. 351): 'Mothers who were very active, even exuberant in the handling of their very young infants . . . later quite clearly lacked tenderness or empathy . . . . when their infant's ability to initiate activity increased, the mothers acted as if they felt abandoned, and reacted with resentment' (p. 358).

A study of this nature wherein observations are limited to the 'laboratory' setting must of necessity omit many factors that play a

part both in the mother's capacity to relate to her infant and in the infant's development: for example, interaction with the father, the grandparents, and the siblings as well as the marriage relationship itself. Although some information was gathered concerning these relationships and included in the case reports, no effort was made to evaluate their influences. From the point of view of clinical application of the findings of this study, the omission is significant.

Not even a review as long as this can do justice to the abundance of ideas encompassed by this study. The reader whose special interests may lead him to give particular attention to one or another of its many aspects will find the authors' assessments of their observations stimulating and thought provoking. It is unfortunate, however, that no attempt was made to bring together in any organized way a complete summary of those assessments. The summarizing statement that 'it is the interplay between the maternal personality and the specific biological constitution of the infant which molds the behavior of the normal infant' is a surprisingly modest and meager claim for a study to which a monumental amount of effort and time must have been devoted.

MARJORIE R. LEONARD (STAMFORD, CONN.)

CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN ISRAEL. Some Mental Health Perspectives. Edited by Arie Jarus; Joseph Marcus; Joseph Oren; Chanan Rapaport. London and New York: Gordon & Breach Science Publishers, 1970. 634 pp.

This book, the third in a series of reports by the National Institute for Research in Behavioral Sciences (formerly the Henrietta Szold Foundation for Child and Youth Welfare), is a compilation of twenty-three papers originally presented to the Seventh Congress of the International Association for Child Psychiatry and Allied Professions. The approach of the authors, who are psychiatrists, educators, and anthropologists, is 'transactional': an interdisciplinary approach that maintains it is a 'complex network of processes rather than an individual personality or even a group that determines behavior'.

The book is divided into three sections. Part One, The Scene, gives a comprehensive picture of the child rearing and educational

practices in Israel. The consequences of traumata to people uprooted by catastrophe, war, immigration, and rapid integration into a new society composed of many diverse elements receive the main attention in this section.

Part Two, Target Groups, deals with topics of general interest, such as child welfare, the handicapped, the socially deprived, and juvenile delinquency. Israel has outdistanced most Western nations in dealing with her socially deprived population. But juvenile delinquency has increased and, as might be expected, is greater among the recently arrived, culturally backward Afro-Asian immigrants. The use of hashish is on the increase. Violent crime, however, is almost nonexistent.

In Part Three, Ways and Means, the status of psychiatry in Israel is discussed. Voluntary organizations of mental health facilities are preponderant. Kinship, 'a Jewish compulsion', has led to the establishment of many institutions by *Landsmannschaften.* Although psychoanalysts are in charge of many of the leading mental institutions, the psychotherapy practiced by most of them is eclectic. Community psychiatry fits the needs of the nation and is encouraged. In 1970 the Israeli Psychoanalytic Society, founded by Max Eitingon in 1933, had twenty-five full members, six associate members, and twenty trainees. In 1920 Dorian Feigenbaum was the director of the first mental hospital in the country. (He was later a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute and a founder and editor of The Psychoanalytic Quarterly.)

Israel is a pluralistic society characterized by the great adaptability of its social and economic institutions—a hallmark of high civilization—despite the great heterogeneity and diversity of cultures. Immigrants in Israel have, according to Margaret Mead as quoted by L. Miller in The Mental Health of Immigrants in Israel, the advantage of 'a common sense of identity'. She warns against making generalizations about immigrant groups and erroneous distinctions between them. The enlightenment, the emancipation, and the secularization of Jews in the West have obscured the fact of the Jew's national character, the reality and force of which is attested to by the creation and the success of Israel. Once historical dynamisms are recognized, the Israeli achievement in spite of its great diversity of peoples becomes comprehensible. Research, however, is needed into historical causes, i.e., into underlying forces operating

in the phenomenon of the survival of the Jews throughout the ages and their eventual return to Israel.

Almost a third of the book is devoted to the child and the family in the Kibbutz. The Kibbutz is the most original contribution to society of the Jewish people since its Return. M. Kerem in an essay titled The Environment, calls the Kibbutz 'the vanguard of the Jewish national rebirth'. One may consider it an example of the Jewish character, the messianic mission of the Jewish people projected into modern social reform. In some respects it may be regarded as Israel in microcosm: a demonstration of modern Israel in a simplified, readily observable and researchable form. Scientists everywhere have regarded the Kibbutz as a living laboratory of social science. (And the Kibbutzniks can talk back!) The Kibbutz, to quote Kerem, 'unlike the kind of South Sea community studied by the classical anthropologists, is not a passive community that has developed unconsciously over the ages. It is rather a deliberate effort made by educated, sophisticated people who have consciously chosen it as a positive alternative to modern society' (p. 238). It is in no way, however, escapist or sectarian. Judged by many criteria, the Kibbutz is a successful experiment. Eighty-four per cent of the second and third generation stay in the Kibbutz despite the opportunities to prosper outside it. The family, although a 'companionship' or 'colleague' family, is stable and divorce is uncommon. Militant feminism has diminished in recent years, a development, curiously, that is general in Israel, particularly among the Sabras.

Perhaps the most psychologically fascinating experiment in Kibbutz life is 'collective education', described in Infancy and Early Childhood by G. Levin. From birth children are reared in Children's Homes by a coöperating team composed of the Metapelet, a child care worker, and the mother, thus combining professional expertise and maternal loving care. Increasing daily participation of the child in family life is gradually intoduced. Of the two maternal relationships, the child's emotional attachment to the mother is the more intense. There is little evidence of attenuation of the parent-child relationship. Levin and others attribute the greater share of emotional development, character formation, and particularly neurotogenesis to the child-mother relationship: '. . . the interaction of children with the Ego ideals of the community itself (the children's house—the peer group) alongside their interaction with their

parent [is] a basis for Superego building and Ego enhancement' (Kerem, p. 244). Bettelheim's observation that a 'collective Ego' replaces an 'individual Ego', with consequent emotional shallowness, less creativity, and blurred identity, seems refuted by the facts. S. Nagler in a paper titled Mental Health, reports that by adolescence there is no specific Kibbutz personality, as measured in I.Q., anxiety, achievement-need, aggression, sex, and over-all adjustment. Moreover, the Kibbutz youth is distinctly superior in leadership ability.

M. Segal, in a paper titled School Age, notes that in spite of the great changes that have taken place in Israel in sixty years, the stability of the Kibbutz culture is inherent in its educational, economic, and cultural health. Second Generation by M. Alon notes changes in the new generation that seem to counter the ideology of the Kibbutz. Indifferent to Kibbutz ideology, they are more self-assertive and put a greater stress on individual needs, family life, and personal friendships. This may appear 'regressive' from the point of view of Kibbutz culture. Are these contradictions, or are they, on the contrary, the two aspects of a healthy society that has done well in the maturation of its members? Elsewhere[1] this reviewer has offered a hypothesis that may help solve the paradox. He believes that in the process of internalization there is a restructuring and synthesis of the social, cultural, and moral ideas into the individual's ego. They are then experienced as exquisitely personal rather than as 'outside' and belonging to the social realm.

All of the essays are well written and packed with facts and ideas of wide application and interest. There are fascinating reports on the Asian and African families, the Israeli Arab Muslim family, and other 'exotic' groups. Many interesting questions are raised. For example, marriage is universal in Israel and the divorce rate has dropped from five and three-tenths per cent in 1936 to eight-tenths of one per cent in 1967. One wonders why. And the question is raised as to whether Israel is rearing a more violent generation. What will the future Israel be like? The book makes most interesting reading; it is unequivocally recommended to psychoanalysts and others concerned with the mental health of children, their families, and the community.

SAMUEL ATKIN (NEW YORK)

[1] *Cf.*, Atkin, Samuel: *Notes on Motivations for War: Toward a Psychoanalytic Social Psychology*. This QUARTERLY, XL, 1971, pp. 549-583.

MENTAL IMAGERY IN THE CHILD. A Study of the Development of Imaginal Representation. By Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. 396 pp.

Modern psychology has paid scant attention to the field of the image. Piaget and Inhelder in this volume make significant amends for this omission. This is not an easy book to read; for the material to be alive and flowing, the reader must be familiar with Piaget's terms—e.g., mental operations, preoperational thought, conservation, assimilation—and his special definitions of imitation, intelligence, and image. The authors' definition of 'image' in this study is limited to geometrical and spatial imagery in childhood and does not deal with other aspects of imagination and fantasy in the child. The extensive experiments used to develop his conclusions about images are the hallmark of Piaget's genius. The experiments are detailed and numerous but become exciting if the reader tries some of them on six and eight year olds.

The complexity of the material subsumed under the headings—static and kinetic reproductive images, kinetic anticipatory images, reproductive images of transformations, anticipatory transformation images—is rendered considerably more comprehensible by the Conclusion section of each chapter, and the whole work is pulled together by the General Conclusion at the end. Though a few pithy sentences cannot do justice to the richness of experiment and carefully worked-out conclusions of this volume, I shall enumerate a few of their key points.

The mental image is considered an internalized active imitation, not merely a direct derivative from perception. The kinetic reproductive image, formed only by virtue of a reconstruction involving anticipation, is not attained until the level of concrete operations has been reached (seven to eight years). This is because these images are a function of the intellectual complexity of the relations in question, and not of the degree to which the child is perceptually familiar with them (which was not self-evident before Piaget and his collaborators undertook this work). Therefore the nature of the image is an initiatory symbolization representing notions, not a direct prolongation of perception. The image constitutes a symbolism vital to thought. In defining the general stages of the image's development, there are two decisive moments: 1, the appearance

of the image, which, according to Piaget, probably occurs at the same time as the formation of the symbolic function (about one-and-a-half to two years); 2, at about seven or eight years (the level of operational thought) when the anticipatory images (kinetic and transformation images) arise. All images before this (preoperational period) remain essentially static. The evolution of the image cannot be considered autonomous, since it depends on external contributory factors: firstly, action as a whole; and, secondly, the operations. In turn, the operations come to depend on the image. The image is an indispensable auxiliary in the functioning of the very dynamism of thought.

This volume is not 'must' reading for all psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. It is not a book the average psychoanalytic practitioner should pack in his bag for casual reading on a dune in Wellfleet, but for serious students of Piaget, epistemology, perception, imitation, cognition, or imagery it is a worthwhile addition to the truly remarkable body of knowledge inspired by or evolved from the mind of Piaget.

JAMES A. KLEEMAN (BETHANY, CONN.)

ADOLESCENCE. A Report Published under the Auspices of the Joint Commission on Mental Health of Children. By Irene M. Josselyn, M.D. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1971. 213 pp.

This report on adolescence is addressed to lay and professional people. Irene Josselyn, an experienced psychoanalyst, uses her knowledge of psychoanalytic theory, her experience as a consultant, observational data, and common sense to present a comprehensive view of adolescence. She divides adolescence into an early phase, marked by the abandonment of childhood patterns of adjustment, and a later phase, focusing on structuralization of what will become adult patterns of problem solving.

The bulk of the volume is devoted to psychodynamics, patterns of problem solving, symptoms, psychosocial problems, and therapy. Although Josselyn basically adheres to psychoanalytic concepts, she does not insist that the reader accept psychoanalytic theory. For instance, she states: 'If one accepts the theory of the œdipal stage of development, the œdipal conflict is reactivated in adoles-

cence. If one does not accept the theory of the œdipal phase, it must still be recognized that the most meaningful people in an individual's life until adolescence are his parents' (p. 24). She then describes adolescent behavior so that a person unfamiliar with psychoanalytic theory can understand something about the œdipal conflict. Throughout the book she goes from psychoanalytic abstractions to observations about the behavior of adolescents that anyone can verify. Clinical and observational vignettes are used freely to illustrate her points, thus making it clear that her views essentially spring from empirical data about adolescents.

The section on juvenile delinquency can be considered a blueprint for anyone interested in the adolescent who comes into conflict with society. Josselyn's depth of experience becomes evident as she describes the multiple factors contributing to the problem of the delinquent. Adolescents, parents, and society are all treated with empathy.

Some analysts may disagree with certain concepts, such as 'ego exhaustion' as an explanation for a type of adolescent problem. However, the psychoanalyst will find that the principles of psychoanalysis are presented and interpreted with accuracy, skill, and tact. This book is highly recommended to the educated lay person and allied professional people who are interested in the inner workings of the adolescent in today's world.

CARL P. ADATTO (NEW ORLEANS)

TEACHING AND THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND. By John C. Hill, M.Sc. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1971. 165 pp.

This book is a compilation and condensation of Hill's papers on education, dating from 1924. It reveals his extraordinary talent as a teacher of young children and as a teacher of teachers of young children. The volume describes his pioneering efforts to develop the Activity Method of teaching and provides an exquisite example of the application of psychoanalytic principles to fields other than psychoanalytic therapy. In Anna Freud's foreword she gives credit to Hill for having gone 'to the heart of the matter' in his selection of psychoanalytic theorems. In his introduction, Rudolf Ekstein notes that Hill writes in language characteristic of Freud's earlier concept of the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious.

In the first chapter, the author describes the Activity Methods and one is struck by his intuitive understanding that the ego and its defense systems, including sublimation, are part of the unconscious even though his methods were developed prior to the elaboration of the structural theory. He cautions that the Activity Method has an aim; i.e., a means of learning. Later, he cautions: 'The basic subjects, reading, writing and arithmetic, are all things that need doing whether one feels in the mood for them or not. A child has to learn to face up to the difficult things of life and must put forth his whole effort, but if by using Activity Methods of teaching and learning, we can get "drive"—the impetus from the child himself—it is a far better way than by dragooning him into doing something in which he is not interested and of which he will retain little' (p. 28).

The second chapter is devoted to class management. Repeatedly one becomes aware of Hill's more than intellectual understanding of the strength of the *drives* and the child's need for the adult as an auxiliary ego to help cope with his drives. He states: 'Free methods do not mean that children should waste half their school time in gossip and mischief' (p. 33).

In Chapter Three, titled The Unconscious Mind, one finds the influence of the topographic theory in Hill's concepts. Chapter Four is devoted to early education and begins with a section on education in the home. His admonition to allow as much instinctual gratification as possible, protecting the child from undue stimulation, and interfering with instinctual gratification on important issues at appropriate times, remains the basic model for good home education and child rearing. He makes a plea for half-time nursery schools of good quality at about age three, and full-time for the next year or two before entering infant schools. In an excellent description of Activity Methods, he asserts that the environment, including the teacher, facilitates the activity of children (play, exploration, talking, running, etc.) whose learning drives are not to be interfered with but rather assisted. At the same time, the necessity of harnassing the uncivilized strivings in order that the child may truly become boss of himself, is aided and abetted.

In the section on the nursery class, Hill speaks of the four- and five-year-old child's appetite for movement which must be satisfied. In the section on infant schools (six to nine years), he asserts that

the child at this stage is aware of his smallness and lack of abilities, yet yearns for power; the Activity Method is geared to this need through the attainment of essential skills. The techniques for teaching the basic skills of reading, writing and arithmetic are well described. In the junior schools (nine to eleven years), the Activity Method continues, but emphasis is placed on the fact that this is the practical age, the age of reality, and the age when the group plays a dominant role.

Throughout the book, the author cautions that the teacher must begin with the more formal methods of teaching and only later take up Activity Methods. He warns that Activity Method teaching requires much more from the teacher than formal methods, and reminds us that children will test the limit-setting capacities of each new teacher. Finally, he tells us that sequence in learning is of far less importance than many educators believe; that none of us learned what we now know by sequences but rather learned what we wanted to learn and forgot what we did not wish to know.

Other chapters include discussions of secondary education; the actual techniques used in the Activity Method teaching of art, music, speech, composition, mathematics, geography, history, physical education, and handwork; and, finally, discussion of some general problems such as discipline, the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the limitations of intellect, and educational therapy. The appendix is titled, Freud's Influence on Education, and here the author draws on poetry, literature, dreams, slips of the tongue, and jokes to further illustrate the relevance of the concepts of the unconscious mind to education.

From the reviewer's six years of experience in two preschools and one elementary school using the Activity Method, and one preschool utilizing traditional preprogrammed conditioning techniques, I warmly endorse Hill's book for all those interested in childhood education. It is gratifying that his many years of experience have confirmed his early 'knowing' that psychoanalytic theory has an important place in education.

REX W. SPEERS (PITTSBURGH)

ART AS THERAPY WITH CHILDREN. By Edith Kramer. New York: Schocken Books, Inc., 1971. 234 pp.

Edith Kramer's Art as Therapy with Children is itself a work of art: concise and subtly integrated in form, expressive of a wide

range of honestly experienced feelings, and enormously evocative of the reader's response. The author starts with the raw materials of our society's resistance (rigid, defensive stereotypes and chaotic emptiness), explores individual avenues to artistic expression, describes the internal and external obstacles encountered and, with the sure simplicity of the sensitive artist, develops our understanding of what art is all about. She allows us to participate in the creative process and to share in the satisfaction of the completed product. The book skilfully envelops numerous verbal and pictorial illustrations of the children's work and gives them continuity, structure, and depth of feeling.

Art as Therapy with Children is, however, more than a work of art. It is an excellent textbook on art education, a joy and a help to any teacher who shares Miss Kramer's Socratic approach to teaching and her humane respect for the personalities and sensibilities of her charges. She does not spell out educational dicta but, characteristically, allows her pupils to teach us how to work with them. Her detailed examples imply that she never selfishly imposes herself on a child but supports the child's own groping for mastery and furthers his chances for achievement. Neither a martyr nor a saint, she feels frustrated and angry when a youngster provocatively destroys his work and is happily involved with the efforts of those who strive for artistic expression. She does not shy away from telling us how she copes with the troubles and pitfalls that confront her in the art room—spilled paints, fistfights, swearing, teasing, and artistic failure. There are indeed many failures but Miss Kramer understands that certain stages in an individual's development, certain types of personalities, and particular conflicts preclude artistic synthesis and interfere with artistic expression.

Throughout Miss Kramer maintains her integrity as an artist and exudes her love of the artistic process. Perhaps out of modesty, she underestimates the power of her attitude and the enormous influence it exercises on her relationship with her students. Identification surely plays an important part in their efforts as it does in the genesis of all sublimations. For herself, Miss Kramer is mindful of the value of a professional relationship: the book is dedicated to 'Friedl', whom I assume to be Friedl Dicker-Brandeis. In my own memories of her, Mrs. Brandeis was an unassuming person whose intense love of art and gift for teaching inspired many to creativity. Miss Kramer's approach to art education re-

sembles Mrs. Brandeis's so closely that I sensed their common background and bond, born possibly of the seeds of identification.

By intent, Art as Therapy with Children is of course neither a work of art nor a textbook on art education. Rather it is a book that gives the reader an opportunity to become acquainted with the methods and aims of art therapy with disturbed children and with the profession of the art therapist. The author's long years of experience encompass work with children of all age groups, with varying forms of emotional illness and physical handicaps. In several institutional settings she coördinated her therapeutic efforts with those of staff members from other disciplines. Recognizing that art therapy has its limitations and must be used selectively, she frequently stresses the contributions made by others in helping the children.

The book's descriptions of individual patients are most vivid. Miss Kramer utilizes her psychological insight into the children's personalities and conflicts to understand their attempts at artistic synthesis and to determine the manner and extent of help art therapy can offer. Possessing a psychoanalytic understanding of art, of patients, and of the artistic process, Miss Kramer has that rare intuition and sensitivity which enable her to assist each patient in the right way at the right time. One child needs a specific suggestion; for another it would constitute an interference. One needs stacks of materials; from another, materials have to be withheld. One child has to be excused from other classes and activities to continue his work in the art room; another needs to be removed from the art work for several days.

It seems to me that Miss Kramer's scientific understanding and intuitive handling are so effective because they are rooted in the special relationship she offers and the model for identification she provides. This aspect is neglected in the book and needs to be considered in an evaluation of the children's progress and of the function of the art therapist. The author addresses herself to the therapeutic chances of the artistic endeavor itself. If I understand her correctly, she feels that artistic symbolic expression can serve to integrate certain conflicts at a preconscious level and to enhance the ego's means of mastery. She is careful to delineate the conditions and limitations of success but perhaps understates the great gains to the individual who experiences the supreme pleasure of creating and achieving.

I agree with Muriel M. Gardiner who, in her thoughtful introduction, suggests: 'This is a book no person interested in therapy or education should miss'. I doubt that anyone could fail to enjoy it and profit from it.

ERNA FURMAN (CLEVELAND)

SHAME AND GUILT. A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study. By Gerhart Piers, M.D. and Milton B. Singer, Ph.D. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1971. 112 pp.

This concise and delightfully written book was first published in 1953.[1] The authors and publisher have deliberately decided to republish it without revision because of its historical precedence in emphasizing the difference between shame and guilt. The authors do promise further publication of new material to bring us up to date on relevant developments in both anthropology and psychoanalysis.

Gerhart Piers sets himself the task of differentiating between shame and guilt on a metapsychological level, and of developing clinical examples to highlight the importance of this differentiation in psychoanalytic treatment. He reviews the literature and borrows concepts from many authors. Of particular interest are Franz Alexander's theories regarding the guilt and shame cycle. According to Alexander, guilt arising from sexual or aggressive drives is defended against by inhibition which, in turn, leads to shame for socially abnormal inhibited behavior. This shame then leads to acting out of the original impulse and thus to renewed guilt. Many conditions are described and explained by Piers in terms of this mechanism. The book also contains descriptions of how character is formed by the predominance either of shame or guilt conflicts in the psychic constellation. Piers ends his essay by describing the mechanisms of both guilt and shame that are built into our culture.

Part II, by Milton B. Singer, deals with anthropological aspects of shame and guilt. He shows the many interrelationships between the fields of psychoanalysis and anthropology, and the need for each to understand the other's theories. Singer was one of the first anthropologists to criticize the concept prevailing in 1953 that there

[1] *Cf.*, review by Sydney G. Biddle in This QUARTERLY, XXIV, 1955, pp. 131-134.

are shame and guilt cultures, and that shame is predominantly the result of external pressures while guilt represents pressures from internalized structures. He also takes issue with the concept that developed countries are able to forge ahead because of their 'Protestant ethic', which represents the internalized superego, and forces Western people to constant achievement while Eastern and underdeveloped people live in shame cultures and therefore do not have pressure to achieve. Singer also gives some examples of the misuse, or only partial use, that anthropologists have made of Freud and depth psychology in their studies of primitive cultures. He warns that anthropological techniques do not lend themselves easily to studying the individual unconscious and that 'culture' is more than a collection of individual unconsciousness, a point that is currently being debated.

The book makes for eminently worth-while reading. With its good clinical examples, it would serve as a useful teaching device, especially for psychiatric residents. On the other hand, psychoanalysts with more theoretical interests might take exception to some of Piers's theoretical constructs. Shame is described as a conflict between id or ego and the ego ideal, while guilt is described as an unconscious conflict between id and superego. In order to follow this model consistently Piers is forced into a narrow definition of the superego and, according to Edith Jacobson,[2] a too rigid split between the concepts of superego and ego ideal. Thus the superego is thought to be formed by the introjection of only the threatening aspect of the parents and when its barriers are transgressed, it acts by threat of mutilation but never threat of loss of love or self-esteem. These are left to the realm of the ego ideal which is thought to originate with the introjection of the positive and kind aspects of the parents. Shame, then, is the consequence of a fear of loss of love when the person does not live up to the standards of his ego ideal. Also, guilt according to Piers is evoked in response only to 'aggressive and sadistic drives', while shame takes over when 'passive drives' are activated. However, clinically Piers separates the reactions of shame and guilt very well.

This theoretical confusion might spring from several sources. First is the lack of emphasis on the role of the genital drives in

[2] *Cf.*, Jacobson, Edith: *The Self and the Object World.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1964.

psychic development. Thus Piers does not see the superego as a massive introject at the time of resolution of the œdipal conflict due to castration anxiety, despite his emphasis on the mutilating threat of the superego. This leads to conceptualization of a much earlier and more primitive type of introjection at which time, Piers apparently thinks, the child has separate good and bad parent imagoes. Second, he also has great difficulty in integrating into his discussion Freud's and Fenichel's views of shame arising in relation to conflicts over exhibitionism. A third theoretical confusion concerns his formulations about narcissism. Piers does give a very interesting description of the general functions of the ego ideal, and stresses the role narcissism plays in its formation. However, newer concepts of narcissism and the role of imperfectly formed self and object representations would make possible a separation of shame from other narcissistic problems.

When Piers writes his projected essay, it is hoped that he will clarify some of these points. Nonetheless, as it now stands this book is a milestone in the discussion of the role of internalized structures in creating feelings of shame, and is a helpful contribution to both clinical practice and the study of culture.

LORE REICH RUBIN (PITTSBURGH)

PERSONALIDAD FOBICA: APORTACIONES CLINICAS (Phobic Personality: Clinical Contributions). By Edgardo H. Rolla, M.D. Buenos Aires: Ediciones Kargieman, 1970. 334 pp.

Encompassing a bibliography of one hundred ninety-one authors, Rolla's book describes extrapyramidal movements which correspond to the posture and automatisms that pertain to a person's relationship to his own body ego as well as his interpersonal relationships. The phobic, hysterical, and psychopathic organizations are considered. In the phobic organization, for example, proper motor coördination appears to be based on pyramidal and extrapyramidal control, and there is a better balance between auto- and alloplastic adaptation. But the patient with a phobic organization is always alert, constantly fearing the loss of such coördination which is motorially sufficient but is fantasied as a paralysis. His anxiety is in great part related to the feared return of a hysterical passivity. In the psychopathic organization, on the other hand,

there is an excessive control of the pyramidal center for motor coördination. Therefore, such people show epileptoid aggressive behavior with all interpersonal love objects.

This neurobiological formulation is in part metaphorical, a model of psychological expression, but it has a very true objective reality. According to the author, in a hysterical personality we may find a biological schema and elements of a body image directly and completely expressing interpersonal relationships and using external objects to control anxiety. The corporeal schema of phobic personality does this partially. In a psychopathic personality practically all the elements of the bodily schema are in relationship to a system of *internal* control of anxiety. In other words, a hysteric will survive at the expense of the world; a phobic partially at the expense of the world but also partially at the expense of himself; a psychopath ignores the existence of the world, of the 'others', and lives in an autistic world very near to the reconstructed world of a schizophrenic.

Looked at developmentally, however, the reverse order of primitiveness is noted. The author states: 'I can say that the hysteric organization is at a more primitive level than the phobic, and that the phobic is at a more primitive level than the psychopathic'. He believes that the psychopathic organization is obtained primarily at the age when a child should be socialized, and may be related to the so-called latency period that has been mishandled. The obsessive organization of the personality develops from construction of counterphobic rituals because, in the obsessive character, a tremendous amount of control of the internal psychological anxiety can be obtained. However, all the counterphobic rituals can be used to re-enforce the psychopathic attitude also. In other words, the psychopathic personality may use both the obsessive instrument of the counterphobic ritual and the mechanisms of projective phobic systems. Therefore, he can obtain the reduction of the anxiety when he deals with the 'others', like the *obsessive,* and at the same time he may show ***hysterical*** attitudes of seduction and complacency.

Although parts of the book are difficult to understand, and seem contradictory at first glance, this work is worth the careful reading it requires.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA (NEW YORK)

ELEMENTOS DE PSICOLOGIA Y PSICOPADOLOGIA PSICOANALITICA (Principles of Psychology and Psychoanalytic Psychopathology). By Edgardo H. Rolla, M.D. Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1971. 566 pp.

In essence, Rolla defines his concepts of 'psychosis' and 'neurosis' in quantitative terms. Any person at a given moment in life faces difficulties that may threaten his established identity feelings, his ego organization, and the behavioral reactions to the milieu in which he lives. Different people will regress to different types of behavior that were utilized adaptively in previous situations before the ego was fully organized and shaped to control the demands of life. This regression includes not only the defense mechanisms but all other ego functions, autonomous or not, as described by Hartmann. The observer may see this behavior as inadequate, or as using elements not appropriate to the particular time of observation. For the patient, however, his behavior signifies some kind of waiting period in which he will retreat from contact with what we now call external reality. He is going through a period in which he is in more lively contact with his own internal psychic reality and in which the object representations allow him to reorganize his ego structure and function because of their meaning to his personality in a previous stage of his life. Internal love objects also represent a constellation that operates on the basis of processes predominantly in the area of memory. Hence, they relate not only to the present moment but are object constellations that belong to previous fantasies.

Rolla considers this phenomenon as 'regressive' because the person is operating according to fantasies that were appropriate in previous times. This type of regression, therefore, is a way by which the ego is provided with a sure basis of becoming secure, thus gaining the impetus for being reorganized. The regression is considered as the primary 'defense phenomenon' in the face of difficult current situations, and is usually accompanied by other defensive elements including projection, introjection, and utilization of more complex means to communicate the patient's confused messages. The aim of these defense mechanisms is to provide a view of the self that can re-establish control over anxiety. The primary fear is uncontrolled separation anxiety, or inability to modify the present situation. The predominant anxiety might be 'paranoid and persecutory',

but may be combined with 'depressive anxiety' in relation to the loss of attachment to milieu objects, to the loss of communication with these milieu objects, and, more threatening still, to the loss of 'self-esteem and a feeling of adequacy'. The author illustrates this complex affective phenomenon with clinical cases.

If this first step of regression proves to be inadequate in producing the feeling of regaining internal control of anxiety, with the prospect of regaining communication and effective use of current objects, the regression will continue to search for more primitive, earlier object constellations. If the self is very labile, the difficulties will be intensified and the regression will be furthered. Also, there will be more complex and rigid defensive combinations. The longer these phenomena last, the more prolonged will be the disconnection from the here-and-now and from the reality attachment to the objects in the present, thus deepening the regression. Finally, if the patient regresses to a very primitive state, his behavior will be totally inadequate and asynchronous with the present moment. His behavior will become increasingly bizarre until it will appear to lack any significance to the observer, at least in the manifest content; the patient is then said to be at a psychotic level of regression.

The author does not use the expression 'mental disease' as he feels it is semantically inadequate and simply an analogical expression,—that is to say, the product of a universal codification applied to a particular case. In reality, the term does not have any significance unless we accept the fact that it describes a disturbance of behavior operating in very primitive levels of organization. While psychoanalytic thinking of thirty or forty years ago did not allow for any therapeutic intervention for a psychotic patient, classical training of psychiatrists today equips them merely to prescribe medications that rarely work. A true therapeutic approach requires observation of psychotic individuals, an attempt to understand the motivation behind their strange behavior, and an effort to obtain 'a psychotic transference and countertransference'. Some authors conceptualize the latter as the 'understanding of the psychotic parts of the personality'. Such an attempt is greatly needed because this is one of the most difficult areas of human conduct to understand. The possibility of communication between patient and psychiatrist may utilize the same basic mechanisms as sublimation. Transformation of instinctual forces may give rise to pleasure in communica-

tion. The reconstructed ego is used to communicate needs verbally rather than as an instrument for direct gratification of the need for nourishment and sexual satisfaction, as well as gratifications of destructive wishes that are opposed to the obtaining of these primitive desires.

Rolla refers to the works of so-called classical psychiatrists whom he considers neither classical nor psychiatric: such authors as Kraepelin, Janet, Charcot, and Bleuler. Rolla also reviews the work of some modern authors, for instance Jurgen Ruesch on communication and Gregory Bateson on the social matrix in communication. He feels that the formulations of Clara Thompson, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and David Rapaport misread the clinical clues given in pathological communication. In his opinion, little recent work has added substantially to the pioneer formulations of Freud and some of his early followers, such as Karl Abraham, Melanie Klein, Heinz Hartmann, Robert Waelder, and Bertram Lewin.

In his conclusion, Rolla proposes a diagnostic profile freed from the rigid categories of classical psychiatry. His 'diagnosis' includes nine reference points: 1, diagnosis of the phenomenological presentation; 2, communication diagnosis; 3, diagnosis of the anxiety; 4, diagnosis of the acuteness of the disorder; 5, transference as well as countertransference diagnosis; 6, specific aspects of the crisis; 7, diagnosis of the personality; 8, clinical diagnosis; and 9, prognosis and recommendations, including whether the patient should be treated by a male or a female therapist.

GABRIEL DE LA VEGA (NEW YORK)

COMPREHENSIVE GROUP PSYCHOTHERAPY. Edited by Harold I. Kaplan, M.D. and Benjamin J. Sadock, M.D. Baltimore: The Williams & Wilkins Co., 1971. 911 pp.

Ponderous though this compilation is, its scope and specificity could hardly have been attained in fewer pages. The practice of group psychotherapy has proliferated into such various forms and is so widely used that the term 'group therapy', unqualified, may denote any one of many procedures, each based on contradictory concepts. The origins of these procedures in theories of psychodynamics under particular historical circumstances are set forth in an introduction. Here E. James Anthony looks back to Le Bon

and Trotter who observed their fellows as a 'herd', and to Freud who commented on their observations. Freud himself, we read, experienced group interaction at first hand as he conducted gatherings of ardent pioneer psychoanalysts in Wednesday evening meetings.

In the first section of the book, Edrita Fried defines phenomena unique to group therapy and ubiquitous in every variety of the practice. Hyman Spotnitz offers a kaleidoscope of simplified glimpses of different schools of thought at work: the freudian replacing resistance with insight, the Adlerian and Sullivanian correcting maladaptive behavior, the Horneyan encouraging the development of maturity, the existentialist focusing on immediate experience, Eric Berne with his games, J. L. Moreno's histrionics, and Carl Rodgers's avoidance of direction, not to mention those to whom spectacular experiments take precedence over theoretical understanding.

In this section the writers show tolerance as well as criticism of methods alien to their own thinking, but in the second part of the book, originators of a procedure often express themselves with unqualified enthusiasm. Their descriptions are full and definite enough to serve as directions on how to conduct a particular brand of group therapy, or as a reference to explain a patient's behavior in that procedure. The reader should treat each of these articles as a unit and leave an interval between reading them. Concepts described in the same terms by different authors have overlapping but not identical significance, and to carry a set of ideas from one article to another may confuse and mislead.

Among topics of special interest to analysts are discussions of the validity of considering psychoanalytic concepts, such as transference and resistance, in a setting not dyadic, and the multiple transference reactions that a number of individuals evoke concurrently. The merits of structuring or not structuring the conduct of a session are weighed, and the extravagances of exhibitionism as well as more acceptable behavior under the aegis of psychoanalytic group therapy are revealed.

The varied procedures of group therapy discussed include family therapy, laboratory movements, psychodrama, and multiple therapists. With intrafamilial emotions recognized by many as the matrix of individual pathology, inclusion of close kin in treatment has seemed indicated and procedures of family therapy have been

evolved. A survey of three hundred family therapists by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry found that the majority, especially the younger therapists, use individual techniques with some infusion of the family members, while the senior therapists think more in terms of emotional fields and systems.

Participants in a laboratory movement procedure make unusual physical contacts with each other and thereby feel they gain awareness of emotional reactions previously not fully recognized. This process, allegedly designed for normal members of organizations, has frequently included poorly adapted people as well. Though the laboratory movement provides stimulating experience, it is doubtful if benefit from this experience endures.

Even more spectacular, with dynamics more obscure and fluid, is psychodrama, a procedure in which a patient's inner conflicts and outer frustrations are portrayed by human actors, including the patient himself.

Finally, the benefits of having more than one therapist work with the patient at one time are reviewed in various situations beginning with the classic treatment of Little Hans by Freud and the boy's father.

In the third part of the book, there are reports on the results of treatment with different kinds of patients:

1. In one study, forty per cent of the homosexuals in treatment were shown to have made a satisfactory heterosexual adjustment.

2. Children and adolescents communicate and associate with each other by means of active play and dancing. Group procedures are especially suitable for foster children who have had many homes and for those with physical handicaps.

3. Some authors feel that group therapy is a method of choice for neurotics and psychotics alike because group behavior reflects the members' mechanisms of defense and makes them a ready target for analytic interpretation.

4. Patients with chronic psychogenic impairment of every system, some postsurgical and others menopausal, respond to group therapy somewhat better than to individual psychotherapy.

5. Group therapy with concomitant medication has not been found to influence the personality of addicts.

6. Organizing therapeutic groups for the aged in institutions does not necessarily improve their functioning, but has been found desirable in that it reveals clinical aspects previously overlooked by the staff.

7. The striking success of Alcoholics Anonymous testifies to the fact that the brand of group therapy evolved by that organization is uniquely suited to its members.

8. Unstable marriages are treated with a variety of combinations of therapists and patients.

The persevering reader, having discovered what group therapy is, how it is done, and what to expect of it under differing conditions, is likely to join the ever-growing body of mental health professionals who wish to attain expertise in this field. Here Martin Grotjahn describes the maturity required if one is to succeed in the role of group therapist by enumerating the qualities shown by such a person. The editors follow by warning of the dangers inherent when someone temperamentally unfit and poorly trained attempts this function. They cite their own experiences and list the institutions where applicants are presumably screened, given theoretical instruction, and provided with practical experience.

The editors have succeeded in justifying their use of the adjective 'comprehensive' in the title by covering the topics already mentioned and adding a glossary and chapters on diagnostic criteria and psychopharmacology for good measure. Here are answers to questions concerning all phases and schools of group therapy—procedures that aspire to be all things to all men.

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ABSTRACTS

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXVIII, 1971.

The Psychiatrist and the Violence Commission. W. Walter Menninger. pp. 431-435.

This is the lead article of a special section on aggression and violence which is recommended in its entirety. The section includes sociological, anthropological, psychoanalytic, and learning theory studies on aggression. Of particular interest is this honest and revealing report from Dr. Menninger of the resistances he encountered and the contributions he made while serving as psychiatrist on a Presidential fact-finding commission on violence in 1968. Since psychoanalysts are increasingly involved in today's political and cultural flux, we may readily benefit from this report.

Particular difficulties were encountered in the group's expectation of the psychiatrist's omniscience about human behavior; the nonpsychiatrists were occasionally angered and disappointed when Menninger disclaimed omniscience in explaining all factors involved in violence in the culture. His attempts to understand motivations were seen as condoning crime and violence, and his reluctance to judge was seen as amoral. His contributions occasionally aroused anxiety in the other members, for instance, when he called for self-reflection upon rigidly held attitudes and when his introduction of multiple factors and overdetermination of behavior interfered with certain members' need for closure. His contributions included de-emotionalizing issues in order to see them more clearly, identifying emotional factors rather than answering and resolving them (an analytic stance), and above all, reminding his nonpsychiatric colleagues of the importance of concern for the individual. The frankness and instructive nature of this paper may prove helpful to analysts participating in community discussion and action.

Some Remarks on Slaughter. William Barry Gault. Pp. 450-454.

Gault explores some factors involved in the slaughter of unarmed civilians by young soldiers in Vietnam. Essentially, they consist of phenomena enhanced by group interaction, which provoked the following intrapsychic shifts: 1, all objects beyond the soldier's own unit were perceived as potential aggressors, including children, elderly persons, etc.; 2, the enemy and all Orientals in the area were depersonalized and viewed as less than human; 3, perceived guilt was diluted via a 'shared', externalized superego that extended vertically up the ranks; 4, impulse behavior was encouraged by establishing a 'pressure to act' and by the disparagement of passivity, while the normal delay function of the ego was eliminated from the group ideal as much as possible; and 5, the impulse-ridden, antisocial character had a natural dominance in the group, especially under combat conditions where the psychopath is 'in his element'. Viewing the soldier's psyche structurally, one can infer that alterations may

occur in the ego-superego-ego ideal equilibria which facilitate indiscriminate aggressive discharge in men formerly free of such behavior.

FREDERICK M. LANE

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. X, 1972.

On Mourning and Anniversaries. G. H. Pollock. Pp. 6-39.

Pollock attempts to show that religious rituals and ceremonials regarding death facilitate the intrapsychic work of separation in time and space from the lost love object. Study of Jewish mourning ritual indicates that the first stage of grief involves some identification with the deceased, while later states involve other intrapsychic mechanisms, and different ritual behavior is prescribed.

Developmental Groupings of Pre-School Children. D. Flapan and P. B. Neubauer. Pp. 52-70.

Fifty-two children were observed in a community nursery school over a three year period. The children ranged from four to six years of age, and attempts were made to rule out obvious pathology in a 'normal' middle class population sample. By the fourth year of the study, only four children out of forty-five were felt to have maintained progression in their development. The others, it was found, had some degree of significant pathology. The authors speculate about the possible explanations for this astonishing data, and suggest that we may need to review our developmental model for the first six years of life. They advise caution, however, in making revisions.

Holocaust Survivors in Kibbutzim. H. Klein. Pp. 78-91.

This paper describes a follow-up study of twenty-five kibbutz couples who were survivors of the holocaust. There have been numerous observations that survivors who chose to live in kibbutzim show considerably less morbidity than those who chose more conventional social organizations. Klein provides clinical data and the theoretical basis for these observations. During the years immediately after their liberation, these people had all undergone profound depressive reactions, with six out of the fifty having made suicide attempts. None sought psychiatric help. Living in a kibbutz permitted a reinvestment in the community, particularly by giving substantial reality to ubiquitous rebirth fantasies and by providing mechanisms for transforming 'survival guilt' into a virtue. The reality of the need to defend themselves helped to avoid internalization of aggression. Klein stresses the sense of historic continuity that the survivors developed, and believes that the kibbutz offers more continuity with the past life and ideals than is generally realized.

M. DONALD COLEMAN

Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic. XXXVI, 1972, Nos. 1/2.

Psychotherapy and Psychoanalysis. Final Report of the Menninger Foundation's Psychotherapy Research Project. O. Kernberg, E. Burstein, L. Coyne, A. Appelbaum, L. Horwitz, H. Voth.

This double issue of the Bulletin, which has also been published in book form, is the final report of the Menninger Foundation's Psychotherapy Research Project that began in 1954 to study the process and outcome of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.

The study was based on forty-two adult patients, half of whom were in psychoanalysis; the remainder received psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapy. Only patients diagnosed as having neuroses, character pathology including borderline conditions, and latent psychosis were included. Until treatment ended neither patients nor therapists were informed that they were being studied. Data on each subject were obtained and organized for three points in time—pretreatment, termination, and follow-up, within three general categories of variables—patients, therapy, and environment. One major quantitative approach to handling these variables was the method of 'paired comparisons': patients were ranked as having 'more than' or 'less than' one another in terms of key variables. Within the limitations imposed by small sample size and a large number of variables, hypotheses concerning the outcome of treatment were then statistically tested. Later in the project another method of analyzing the same quantitative data was found in a technique termed Multi-Dimensional Scalogram Analysis, a computerized geometric means of representing groups or categories of data. Based on 'facet theory', a system by which complex concepts or variables are broken down into simple sets of elements or 'facets', this technique allows the most relevant variables to be singled out from a large number, although conclusions cannot be stated in probability terms.

Some major findings and conclusions derived from both these approaches to the data pertinent to the diagnostic entities studied include the following: 1, high initial ego strength (defined in terms of patterning of defenses, anxiety tolerance, quality of interpersonal relationships, and severity of symptoms) implies a good prognosis regardless of treatment modality, though psychoanalysis may bring about the highest degree of improvement in such patients; 2, patients with low ego strength (borderline patients in this study) improve with psychotherapy if that therapy is supportive-interpretive and focuses especially on transference phenomena; 3, psychotherapy that is exclusively supportive is not helpful to patients with low ego strength, nor for long-term treatment of patients with high ego strength; 4, a highly skilled therapist contributes significantly to the improvement of patients regardless of whether treatment is interpretive or supportive, while a less skilled therapist contributes more effectively to improvement if the treatment modality is interpretive; 5, as a corollary, the skill of the therapist is especially important to improvement of very sick patients while it is not greatly influential in improvement of 'stronger' patients; 6, a high level of manifest anxiety prognosticates well for treatment; 7, initial motivation for change is not prognostically significant; and

8, the pretreatment characteristics of the environment (including its stress and conflict-triggering aspects) are not significant as predictors of treatment outcome.

Much of this long and detailed report of a complex and monumental research effort, complete with nine appendices, deals with problems of research design and interpretation that arose along the way. The reward to the reader rests as much in following the unfolding of an intriguing and important methodologic approach to problems of prediction in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis as in the clinical applicability of the findings.

ELLEN ROTHCHILD

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research. I, 1972.

Segmentation of Input in Simultaneous Translations. Frieda Goldman-Eissler. Pp. 127-140.

Parallel visual records of the 'input' speech and the interpreter's rendition were used to investigate the length and nature of the language segment the interpreter needs to begin the encoding process in his second language. Translation segments from English, French, and German were studied. Significantly longer 'chunks' of speech were necessary in translating from German into French or English than either English-French or French-English translations. The author concludes that the verb is the main determinant of meaning. She quotes another study to the effect that 'the verb defines the plot, the subject of the sentence merely indicates one of the actors'. The results also suggest that the lexical and grammatical aspects of the text as well as the interpreter's subjective organization of the material interplayed with the linguistic factors in a systematic fashion.

Rate and Pause Characteristics of Oral Reading. R. S. Brubaker. Pp. 141-147.

The findings of this study are consistent with an obvious assumption: there is an increase in reading rate and a decrease in the number of pauses as uncertainty about the meaning of the material being read decreases.

Pause Time and Phonation Time in Stuttering and Cluttering. R. W. Rieber; Stephen Breskin; Joseph Joffe. Pp. 149-154.

This study has clinical implications. Stuttering and cluttering are defined by the authors as communication disorders characterized by disturbances of rhythm and rate of speech. The two aspects are often confused. Stuttering involves blockings, repetition, and prolongations in rhythm. Cluttering is characterized by a rapid rate of speech accompanied by repetitions, additions, inversions, omissions, and distortions of sounds, syllables, words, or phrases. Using tape recorded segments of reading which were analyzed for various rate and rhythm factors, the authors conclude that automated analysis of 'on-off' speech patterns provides some basis for a diagnostic differentiation between stuttering and cluttering.

Information Theory Measures of Grammatical Goodness of Fit. Wilbur A. Hass and Joseph M. Wepman. Pp. 175-181.

Hass and Wepman present a technical discussion of the reasons for the decreasing use of information theory in the study of generative grammars. They make some suggestions concerning the continuing relevance of information theory in some areas of psycholinguistic research, especially research into novel grammatical phenomena.

The book review section of this issue (No. 2) is especially interesting because of two reviews of the same book, Language and Mind by Noam Chomsky. Presumably Chomsky will respond to his critics in a future issue. Both reviews raise the question of the relationship of Chomsky's political activity to his language theories.

Pair Discrimination for a Continuum of Synthetic Voiced Stops with and without First and Third Formants. Roger D. Popper. Pp. 205-219.

This is a highly technical and complex study of the difference in auditory and perceptual strategies in discriminating between speech and nonspeech sounds.

A Vocabulary Usage Test. James E. Nation. Pp. 221-231.

A vocabulary usage test for children from thirty-four to sixty-three months of age is described. The test allows direct comparison between vocabulary comprehension and usage. Administration procedures, scoring forms, and tentative normative standards are presented.

Voice Recognition by Matching to Sample. Donald G. Doehring and Ruth W. Ross. Pp. 233-242.

Voice recognition was assessed by a matching procedure in thirty right-handed adults with normal hearing. The authors are interested in the problem of whether voice recognition should be classified as a type of verbal (dominant hemisphere) ability, or whether it is the type of nonverbal auditory ability associated with the nonspeech hemisphere.

Diversity of Word Usage as a Stress Indicator in an Interview Situation. Marijka Höweler. Pp. 243-248.

Two different experiments in which diversity of word usage was tested (type-token ratio) confirmed the hypothesis that in an interview situation a positive relationship evokes more differentiated word (noun) usage than does a negative relationship.

Personality Traits Associated with Voice Types. Norman A. Markel; Judith A. Phillis; Robert Vargas; Kenneth Howard. Pp. 249-255.

Speech samples were obtained from one hundred and four college students and rated for loudness and tempo. Four voice profile types were identified: loud-fast, loud-slow, soft-fast, and soft-slow. A distinctive personality profile is said to correlate strongly with each voice profile type. There were very few personality traits, however, that would not be easily discerned in forms of behavior other than voice type in the rather sketchy personality profiles elicited (using the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory).

Factors of Style and Personality. Ernst Moerk. Pp. 257-268.

In an attempt to find relationships between psychological and linguistic variables, style samples of short stories were analyzed according to formal criteria and the results were correlated with scores on personality tests. A close examination of style factors led to the tentative differentiation of a basic language factor as resulting from grammatical constraint and several elements of subjective style in individuals. Some of these latter factors were found to have enough 'loading' on personality variables to 'permit cautious psychological interpretation'.

Minimal Cues in Vocal Communication of Affect: Judging Emotions from Content-Masked Speech. Klaus R. Schreger; Judy Koivumaki; Robert Rosenthal. Pp. 269-285.

The results of experimental study suggest that a minimal set of vocal cues consisting of pitch level and variation, amplitude and variation, and rate of articulation may be sufficient to communicate the 'evaluation, potency and activity dimensions of emotional meaning' when content is not present as an alternate clue.

Definability as an Index of Word Meaning. Brian J. O'Neill. Pp. 287-298.

A sample of two hundred and seventy-seven nouns was scaled for definability and pronunciability. Intercorrelations were computed among the following variables: definability, pronunciability, imagery, concreteness, associative meaningfulness, familiarity, and Thorndike-Lorge frequencies. The pattern of correlations bears out Paivio's distinction between higher order and lower order meaning. Two experiments were conducted to test the relationship between the word attributes and recall of word labels with dictionary definitions provided as retrieval cues. The positive effect of definability on label retrieval was independent of the imagery values of the defined words, but the effectiveness of imagery on retrieval was dependent on word definability.

Early Judgments of Semantic and Syntactic Acceptability by Children. Peter A. deVilliers and Jill G. deVilliers. Pp. 299-310.

Transformational linguists take as their primary data the acceptability and the grammaticality of sentences. This study shows that two and three year olds are better at correcting semantically anomalous than syntactically anomalous sentences. The importance of semantic as opposed to syntactic factors in children's judgments of the acceptability of sentences is stressed.

The Use of Interrogative Forms in Verbal Interaction of Three Mothers and Their Children. Mathilda Holzman. Pp. 311-336.

This is a study of the interrogative form in children who are in the two word and four word sentence stage of language development. It reveals that children at this stage use the interrogative form analogously to their mothers. An analysis of the development of this capacity based upon the concept of the 'speech act' is given, which leads to the conclusion that it is the embeddedness of verbalizations in a particular personal relations-action context that fosters this development.

Two Studies on the Process of Negative Modification. David Salter and Valerie Haycock. Pp. 337-348.

The properties of words with a negative affix were investigated in two studies. The paper is highly technical and uses an information theory approach in studying the development of the concept of negative verbal modification.

VICTOR H. ROSEN

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLIV, 1972.

The First Trip: Life Crisis and the First Experience with Hallucinogenic Drugs. Herta A. Guttman. Pp. 453-456.

The author discusses the symbolic significance of the use of hallucinogenic drugs. Her impression is that in certain cases the person takes drugs during a critical life situation because he is afraid he will fail to meet its new and frightening demands. At such times the unconscious wish may be that he will be permitted to regress to a more immature and dependent level of functioning without feeling guilty, irresponsible, or inadequate. This does not exclude other motivations, such as a wish for euphoria and attempts to satisfy oral, dependent cravings, to alleviate anxiety, or to deal with feelings of depression. Guttman postulates that beyond the first 'trip' the experience may be repeated because of secondary gratifications rather than because of a need to solve an acute conflict.

HAROLD R. GALEF

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLV, 1972.

The Effects of Subliminal Drive Stimulation on the Speech of Stutterers. Lloyd H. Silverman; Herbert Klinger; Lynn Lustbader; Jacqueline Farrell; Albert D. Martin. Pp. 14-21.

The experimental method employed for this study of the effects of unconscious conflict on psychopathology consists of presentation of drive-related and neutral pictorial and verbal stimuli at a subliminal level and observing effects on ego functioning. The subjects were stutterers; the aim was to explore the psychoanalytic proposition that the symptom of stuttering includes a regression to areas of conflict involving anal and oral-aggressive impulses. The authors conclude that stutterers manifest an increase in their speech disturbances when anal drive derivatives are triggered without their awareness. A weaker but similar claim is justified: that oral-aggressive derivatives are implicated in intensifying stuttering. It is wisely pointed out that such conditions may be necessary but are not sufficient. Additional requisite conditions would include a high level of drive activation prior to external stimulation, a current state of ego weakness, and sufficient superego pressure.

HAROLD R. GALEF

American Imago. XXIX, 1972.

The Genesis of Magical and Transcendent Cults. René A. Spitz. Pp. 1-10.

This article originally appeared in volume ten of Freud's *Imago* under Spitz's former spelling of his name: R. Spiez; it was translated by Hella Freud Bernays.

Spitz distinguishes between magical and transcendental thinking in the origin of religious cults. Magical thinking implies a view of the deity as being equal in kind, and attempts to influence the deity through empirical modes. Magical rituals are seen as related to the act of intercourse and the relationship between mother and child—phenomena which are directly apprehended. Transcendental religious thinking is associated with the relationship between father and child, which was less tangibly apparent to ancient peoples on the basis of experience. Consistent with these ideas is the finding that the mother figure is central in the fertility religions which are directed toward the physical, ie., agriculture, while the father figure is always central in strongly metaphysical religions.

***Moses and Monotheism:* Guilt and the Murder of the Primal Father.** Stephen Reid. Pp. 11-34.

The author is in essential agreement with the central arguments of Moses and Monotheism. However, two criticisms that have been raised deserve consideration: 1, there is scant relationship between the Aton religion and that of

Moses or subsequent forms of Judaism; 2, Moses, although a father imago, must have been very different from the primal father postulated by Freud. Reid meets the first criticism with the observation that the critics and Freud as well failed to distinguish between the origin of the Mosaic religion and the inevitable alterations it underwent when forced upon a chosen people. In response to the second criticism, Reid concedes that there were differences between Moses and the primal father, and then goes on to explain aspects of Jewish history and religion on the basis of these differences.

God the Father and His Sons. Howard H. Schlossman. Pp. 35-52.

The Book of Genesis contains the recurrent theme of two brothers in an adversary relationship—e.g., Cain and Abel, Esau and Jacob—wherein the first born is eliminated and the younger inherits the power and title of the father. The author suggests that this motif is the censored residue of the custom of sacrifice of the first born in a matriarchal religion which existed before the monotheistic Hebrew religion.

Coleridge's *Kubla Khan:* The Living Catacombs of the Mind. Eugene H. Sloane. Pp. 97-122.

Kubla Khan is an elaboration of the dream of birth experienced by Coleridge while under the influence of opium. It was stimulated by an unwelcome pregnancy of his wife. Sloane argues that the poem recaptures the poet's birth experience and that its magic derives from its power to evoke elusive memories of prenatal experience.

A Parapraxis of Freud's in Relation to Karl Abraham. Leonard Shengold. Pp. 123-159.

Shengold adduces divers œdipal themes to explain Freud's failure to mention Abraham's paper on Ikhnaton in Moses and Monotheism; Abraham had clearly linked Ikhnaton with the monotheism of Moses.

***The French Lieutenant's Woman:* The Unconscious Significance of a Novel to Its Author.** Gilbert J. Rose. Pp. 165-176.

Consideration of the content of The French Lieutenant's Woman in relation to the novelist's notes on writing the book leads Rose to feel he has found confirmation for the idea that through creative work the male author is able to sublimate his wish to be reproductive like females. On a more primitive level the artist is able to restore the lost unity with his mother.

Leonardo and Dante. Charlotte F. Johnson. Pp. 177-185.

Johnson contends that passages in Cantos IV and V of Dante's Inferno served as the 'heretofore undiscovered literary model' for Leonardo's vulture fantasy; the ultimate source was a long-harbored memory of oral trauma.

Dracula: Prolonged Childhood Illness and the Oral Triad. Joseph S. Bierman. Pp. 186-198.

Bierman traces details in Dracula and in two autobiographical stories from an earlier book for children to events in Stoker's childhood and adult life. The material is understood in terms of Lewin's concept of the oral triad.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

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Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Robert J. Kabcenell & Carl T. Wolff

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

June 8, 1971. SELF-PITY, SELF-COMFORTING, AND THE SUPEREGO. David Milrod, M.D.

After examining self-pity and self-comforting in both normal and pathological situations, the author drew attention to these affective states as a resistance which is often formidable, and may account for some analyses ending in failure. Self-pity is described by Milrod as a state in which there is a combination of pain and pleasure, in which the self-representation is hypercathected with libidinal energy. When a patient's self-esteem is diminished, when he is wounded, and when he does not live up to his moral demands, he often withdraws into a state of self-comforting in which he mulls over his pain and savors the gratifications of comforting and consolation that he lavishes on himself. The gratification of the self-comforting often surpasses the experience of the pain itself: 'this unique bitter-sweet gratification can become so important that it may appear as a rigid pattern of behavior not unlike an addiction'. Such patients act both as the injured child and as the loving, comforting parent. Narcissism is a prominent feature of this behavior pattern.

Several clinical cases were cited by the author. A young woman who consciously found her states of sadness pleasurable, would try to re-create the mood; a happy event might be unwelcome as she hated to give up the sadness. Even after she married and had less occasion to feel lonely, she missed the periods of self-pity. Another patient, a lonely woman, spent many of her analytic sessions complaining about the terrible burdens that had been placed upon her; each structural arrangement in the analysis was felt to be a burden. The relationship of guilt to states of self-pity and self-comforting was seen in another case. There was alternation between guilt and self-reproaches, and narcissistic and omnipotent fantasies. An unstable self-image is characteristic of these patients; also, self-pity and self-comforting may provide a defense against depersonalization.

Self-pity and self-comforting may cause powerful resistance to analysis. The gratification of self-pity involves the rewarding function of the superego. 'To some degree . . . it is a universal experience to feel a heightened self-esteem and to expect love and approval with deprivation and pain'. As analysis leads to giving up pain and deprivation, it becomes a deprivation and difficult to accept. To give up the defensive protection of self-pity then exposes the patient to the self-directed violence contained in his guilt reactions.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Edith Jacobson spoke of the narcissistic nature of these patients. She felt that people with the problems described by Dr. Milrod are borderline patients, with more problems of ego defect than we usually see in analytic patients. The patients who feel and experience these states also manage to struggle with their environment and turn much of their aggression away

from themselves and onto their objects. She wondered about the paranoid trends in such patients, and if the libidinization of the self-representation might not help them to ward off paranoid attitudes.

Dr. Martin Stein classified states of self-pity and self-comforting into two types: 1, there is the affective state of self-pity which is a transient response and occurs in almost everyone; and 2, there is a state of self-pitying and self-comforting which is not transient but is a conspicuous character trait. The transient form is often related to the wish to elicit some sort of comforting, consideration, and pity on the part of the analyst, or may be a specific response to the analyst's lack of understanding of his patient. Where self-pity is a conspicuous character trait, self-indulgence is prominent and one gets the impression that the patient is actually enjoying it. Narcissistic attitudes are prominent and there is often frank paranoia. In this second type, one finds enormous hostility. Dr. Stein did not agree with Dr. Milrod's emphasis on the role of the superego, especially its rewarding function, in this type of behavior.

ROBERT J. KABCENELL

November 9, 1971. CROWDS AND CRISIS: PSYCHOANALYTIC CONSIDERATIONS. (Nunberg Memorial Lecture.) Phyllis Greenacre, M.D.

Dr. Greenacre discussed historical factors which have contributed to the current importance of activism and crowd phenomena, and briefly reviewed the concepts of Le Bon, Trotter, and Freud concerning man in crowds. She distinguished between crowds and groups in terms of their degree of organization. The previously held distinction between 'psychological' crowds, gathered for a special purpose, and spontaneous crowds is not clear-cut; both can show the phenomena of increasing tension, tendencies to irritability, and emotional contagion.

Conditions within the crowd may be used to promote activism. Crowds work through a process of conversion rather than reasoned consideration, and in an atmosphere of excitement and intense emotional pitch. There is a high degree of sensual stimulation with many people in close bodily contact which leads to strengthened moods and increased body tensions with an intensified pitch for activity. Speech becomes more primitive; there is a progressive loss of the sense of self-boundaries and a feeling of powerful oneness with the crowd which approaches the feeling of primary narcissistic omnipotent expansion ordinarily seen in the psychoses or religious fanaticism. There is also a sense of alienation which, if shared with the crowd, may lead to the paradoxical illusion of being in the majority. This extensive but partial regression resembles religious revivalism and the state in infancy when individuation is still somewhat insecure. Introjective-projective reactions and primary identifications are typical of the revolutionist's aggression in the crowd. The nature and degree of regression make understandable the whole gamut of pregenital activity mobilized to express hostility, including the use of bodily excretions and of vulgar and lewd speech.

Dr. Greenacre then turned to the importance of producing lasting change in the members of the crowd for revolutionary success. Such change depends not only on intellectual conviction but also on the extent to which the mass-induced regressions are related to earlier, even infantile disturbances that are rearoused, augmented, and displaced from the family onto society. Individuals may be 'sucked in' to the beliefs of the crowd not only by primary identification and the introjective-projective mechanism but also by further regression to the process of 'mirroring', which aids in weakening the sense of individual identity. This prepares the crowd for or creates the demand for forceful leadership.

The sense of reality is susceptible to alteration, particularly by the intensity of emotion in the crowd. The force of revolutionary activism arises from dual sources: old intrafamily conflicts and current social/economic grievances. Reality testing is impaired by the unanimity of the crowd, by the rejection of the family and its standards, and by depreciation of the past. Extreme changes in superego systems are required. There must be obliteration of individually determined and socially re-enforced criteria of behavior, usually both aggressive and sexual. The one-for-all all-for-one attitude of revolutionary crowds extends to the sexual affiliation of members as well. The ideal of group sharing of sex is rationalized by idealistic principles, such as, 'Make love, not war', but may be rooted in regression to pregenital levels. Jealousy and envy are repressed or projected, but may break out among members. The impression is of a general but inevitable regression to pregenitality. Genitality is used in the interest of narcissism and associated with polymorphous perverse impulses and acts.

In her concluding remarks, Dr. Greenacre considered the requirements of the crowd for leadership and control. She reviewed the contrasting views of Le Bon and Freud on the nature and function of crowds, and pointed out that neither could anticipate the effect of technological developments on crowd formation and revolutionary movements.

CARL T. WOLFF

DEUTSCHE AKADEMIE FÜR PSYCHOANALYSE has announced that an International Symposium on Analytic Group Therapy will be held from August 1 to 7, 1973, at the Day-Hospital for Intensive Group Psychotherapy, Stelzerreut in Kumreut near Passau in the Bavarian Forest. For further information write to: Peter Moldenhauer, Deutsche Akademie für Psychoanalyse, Wielandstrasse 27-28, 1 Berlin 15.

Dr. John Romano, Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Rochester School of Medicine, has been named recipient of the WILLIAM C. MENNINGER MEMORIAL AWARD for 'distinguished contributions to the science of mental health'.

The INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY will hold its Eighteenth International Congress in Montreal, Canada, from July 28 to August 2, 1974.

LE PRIX MAURICE BOUVET for the year 1973 has been awarded to Madame Joyce McDougall.

ERRATUM: In a paper by Owen Renik, *Cognitive Ego Function in the Phobic Symptom,* This QUARTERLY, XLI, October 1972, page 549, footnote 7, there is a misleading use of quotation marks with regard to an article by Charles A. Sarnoff, *Symbols and Symptoms,* This QUARTERLY, XXXIX, October 1970, pp. 550-562.

Dr. Sarnoff has written us: 'Dr. Renik's reference to the interchangeable use of the terms "symbolism" and "abstract thinking" are unfounded since the term "abstract thinking" does not appear in my article. . . . "Confusion" is attributed to this alleged use, and then blamed for my "misappreciation of the part played by abstract thinking in the phobic symptom". I personally can conceive of no logical circumstance in which the terms "symbolism" and "abstract thinking" could be used interchangeably [and] nowhere in my paper, *Symbols and Symptoms,* does the . . . term "abstract thinking" appear.'

Dr. Renik has informed us that he used quotation marks to identify 'symbolism' and 'abstract thinking' as terms, and did not intend to indicate a direct quotation of these terms from Dr. Sarnoff's paper.

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