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Panel on The Ideological Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis

THE HUMANISTIC WELLSPRING OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

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In his 1969 Nunberg lecture Peter Blos said: 'Psychoanalysis has always held firmly and passionately to the humanist tradition. Nothing remains more valued and worthy of our endeavor than the harmonizing influence we can exert through our science on the life of man' (Blos, 1971).

Though one may have doubts whether modern psychoanalysis can still hold passionately to the humanist tradition, it is certainly true that its founder and its original foundations were deeply influenced by humanistic ideas and ideals. How could it be otherwise since the educational system which formed Freud's spirit and intellect during the later years of his childhood, in his adolescence, and in his early maturity was dominated by the ideology of humanistic culture.

Humanism is a philosophy and value system which developed during the Renaissance. It is the result of cultural currents which began to influence the minds of the leading Italian intellectuals in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and which extended all over the Western world, and it persists as an important factor in the Western culture of our time. Here I shall try to demonstrate how humanism had a determining influence on the founder of psychoanalysis and therefore on its underlying philosophy.

It was in two ways that humanistic ideology and mentality expressed itself in the *Weltanschauung* and value system which underlie both the theory and the therapy of Freud's psycho-

The Panel on The Ideological Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis, was held at the meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Miami Beach, May 1969. It was chaired by Jacob A. Arlow, M.D.

analysis. The first is an outgrowth and continuation of an ideological current that began when at the end of the Middle Ages the confining domination by the Church was gradually lessened. The causes of the change of outlook and the decline of the value system which in the Middle Ages had dominated the mentality of man, manifesting itself in asceticism, antihedonism, and spirituality, are beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice to say the discovery of new and distant territories on this planet and the increased contact of people with a different philosophy of life are certainly prominent among these causes.

The predominant *Weltanschauung* of the Middle Ages was based on religion and controlled by the Church and its teachings. It was basically anti-instinctual and inimical to worldly pleasure since it considered life on earth to be only a preparation for the hereafter, with eternal reward for being good and equally eternal punishment for being bad. According to this value system, sin and pleasure were in many respects identical. In contrast to this fundamentally religious philosophy of life, the humanists propagated the right to *'hēdonē'*, to the enjoyment of life. Lorenzo de' Medici, *'il Magnifico'*, the great Maecenas of the Florentine renaissance, in whose court the most important Italian humanists of the period were active, expressed this newly found freedom and privilege to enjoy life in the famous verse:

Che vuol esser lieto sia
di doman non vi è certezza.[1]

This outlook is in complete contrast to the antihedonic, hereafter-directed ideology of the Church during the Middle Ages. And this throwing off of the restricting fetters of the religious establishment at the time of the Renaissance permitted the extensive studies of the writers of classical antiquity. They became the great source of knowledge and wisdom and began to rank equally with the religious writers, who until the Renais-

[1] 'He who wants to be joyous should be so for there is no certainty about tomorrow.'

sance had almost exclusively provided the permissible reading material. Thus the worldly outlook of the ancient writers began to influence the value system and conduct of the educated.

With the rise of humanism the knowledge of Latin and Greek and of the writers of classical antiquity became the foundation of higher education. There was no *'uomo di cultura'*, no cultivated individual without this basic knowledge. This 'cultural must' extended over the following centuries, even into my youth. One could consider oneself as belonging to the cultural and intellectual elite only if one was well versed in the Latin and Greek authors. Many of the quotations, particularly from Latin authors, any educated person was supposed to know by heart. A good example is to be found in the second chapter of The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (Freud, 1901) which deals with the forgetting of the word *'aliquis'* in the hexameter from Vergil's *Aeneid*. When the young man mentioned there is unable to remember the complete verse Freud immediately helps him out by quoting the whole hexameter: *'Exoriar(e) ALIQUIS nostris ex ossibus ultor'* (p. 9). An educated individual had to have such classical quotations at his finger tips. This knowledge was acquired in the humanistic *Gymnasium* which one attended from age ten to eighteen, from prepuberty to beginning maturity, that is, at a time when the foundation of a philosophy of life—a *'Weltanschauung'* and a value system—is in the process of developing and becoming entrenched.

The principle studies in the *Gymnasium* were the classical languages, Latin and Greek, and the important literary works of antiquity in these two languages. To Latin were devoted eight hours a week for eight years, to Greek six hours a week for six years. In order to present as complete a picture of Freud's classical studies as possible I asked a friend of mine who is professor of philology in Vienna to try to obtain the curriculum of Freud's studies of the classical languages in the *Gymnasium*. He was lucky enough to find the yearly reports on Freud's studies at the *Gymnasium*, which were deeply

buried in a depot in the basement of the University of Vienna, and he sent me a copy. The extent of Freud's classical reading material is very impressive.

AUSZUG aus den JAHRESBERICHTEN von FREUDS Gymnasium 1868-1873

WIEN II.

(Freud entered 1866 when ten years and four months old.)

1868: Sigmund Freud, *3. Klasse.* Vorzug und Schulpreis (honor role, prize for the best scholar)

1869: Sigmund Freud, *4. Klasse.* Vorzug (honor role)
Lectionsplan: Latin: Livius I und XXI. cap. 1-20
Ovid, Metamorphosen No. I 163-415
Ovid, Metamorphosen No. II 1-366, III 511-733
Ovid, Metamorphosen No. V 294-572, 642-678
Ovid, Metamorphosen No. VI 146-312, VIII 613-724
Ovid, Metamorphosen No. X 1-77, XI 1-84
Lectionsplan: Greek: Xenophon, Anabasis I-V. Kyrupaedie, chapter I
Homer, Ilias I, II, III.
Latin-test every two weeks, Greek-test each month.

1871: Sigmund Freud, *6. Klasse.* Vorzug (honor role)
Lectionsplan: Latin: Sallust, Bellum Iugurthinum
Cicero, orations against Catilina I, II, III, IV
Vergil, I. and V. Ecloge. Aeneis I.
Lectionsplan: Greek: Homer, Ilias III, IV, V-50; VI. IX. X. XVI. XVIII. and XXII. book
Herodot, Liber VII.

1872: Sigmund Freud, *7. Klasse.* Vorzug (honor role)
Lectionsplan: Latin: Cicero, Pro Roscio Amerino; Pro lege Manilia.
Vergil, Aeneis, III, IV, V, VI.

Lectionsplan: Greek: Demosthenes, Olynthische Reden I-III.
Sophocles, Aias.
Homer, Odyssee I-III.

1873: Sigmund Freud, *8. Klasse.* Vorzug (honor role)
Lectionsplan: Latin: Horaz, 50 Odes, 4 Epodes, 1 Satire, 1 *Epistel.*
Tacitus, Historia lib. I-Agricola.
Vergil, Aeneis lib. VI.

Lectionsplan: Greek: Platon; Apologid and Kriton.
Sophocles, Antigone
Homer, Odyssee IV. V.

Besides this obligatory curriculum students of such excellence as Freud were given what was called *'Privatlectuere'*, i.e., the Professor suggested further reading material of classical authors in Greek and Latin. In Freud's case, no record exists of this, but I assume that Seneca was among the authors.

I return now to the hedonistic trend of humanism with its emphasis on the right to worldly pleasure which permeated the Western world. This hedonistic trend expressed itself in the loud affirmation of the right to enjoy life. The famous humanist, Ulrich von Hutten, friend and supporter of Martin Luther, emphasized this right and called out the famous exclamation: *'Es ist eine Lust zu leben!'* ['It is a joy to live!']. The humanists of this period felt so exuberant about the newly developed attitude toward life that they compared it with being reborn. The term *'rinascimento'* [renaissance] which they coined for this new cultural period referred not only to the rebirth of classical antiquity but also to the newly found feeling of liberation, of the joy of living with all its sensual pleasure.

This emphasis of the right to enjoy, however, met with strong resistance by reactionary forces. Savonarola, the hell-fire and brimstone preaching monk of San Marco followed Lorenzo de' Medici as a virtual ruler of Florence. But in Florence, as well as in all Western territories into which humanism penetrated, the right to the enjoyment of life and its worldly grati-

fications was accentuated and fortified; it could no longer be prohibited.

The struggle between the pleasure-affirmative tendencies and the pleasure-denying—or at least pleasure-restricting—forces that became accentuated in the Renaissance was not a new phenomenon. It goes back to the beginning of the humanization of man. In his paper, The Acquisition and Control of Fire, Freud (1932 [1931]) traced this first and perhaps most important cultural achievement back to the suppression of a primitive instinctual pleasure. However, with his libido theory and with his efforts to make Western man realize and accept his instinctual nature, Freud entered this combat between affirmation and denial of man's right to sensual pleasure on the side of drive-acceptance and drive-liberation, thus following the trend which was promoted by the humanists of the Renaissance. It is my impression that Freud's recognition of the importance of the libido and his struggle for its recognition was stimulated in part also by his acquaintance with the writings of classical antiquity. In a footnote added in 1910 to Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, Freud (1905) says: 'The most striking distinction between the erotic life of antiquity and our own no doubt lies in the fact that the ancients laid the stress upon the instinct itself, whereas we emphasize its object. The ancients glorified the instinct and were prepared on its account to honour even an inferior object; while we despise the instinctual activity in itself, and find excuses for it only in the merits of the object' (p. 149, n.) Freud could have made such a statement only on the basis of an extensive knowledge of the literature of classical antiquity. We have no knowledge on what authors or literary works he based the above observation. I assume that Ovid's *Ars Amandi* and Catullus's love poems were among his bibliography on the subject.

Hand in hand with the anti-asceticism of the humanistic movement there started a long and arduous process of secularization, a process that has not yet ended, as is well known. The irrational forces that find their expression in religion try continuously to combat this secularization. Freud's genetic investi-

gation of religion in Totem and Taboo, in The Future of an Illusion, and in Civilization and Its Discontents is an extremely important contribution in this struggle for secularization. The basic incompatibility of science and religion was clearly and repeatedly stressed by Freud. It results in what Freud called 'the waning power of religion', which in turn leads to an ever-increasing secularization and corresponds to similar tendencies in humanistic ideology.

However, the age-old conflict between desire and restraint which was accentuated by the spirit of humanism is at the same time contained in the humanistic *Weltanschauung* itself. For humanistic ideology which is in favor of drive—or at least of pleasure-liberation—emphasizes at the same time the *'ratio'*, i.e., reason as the guiding principle for man's behavior, as the *'biou kybernetes'*, the governess of life's conduct. Freud conceptualized this in his reality principle. Here again he could draw on the writers of classical antiquity, particularly some Latin writers and their philosophy. I do not know of any more concise and precise expression of the reality principle than the Latin hexameter, *'Quidquid agis prudenter agas et respice finem'* ['Whatever you do, do it with prudence and consider the consequences']—a prescription of conduct which every *Gymnasiast* knew by heart so much was it a *locus communis* of the humanistically cultivated person. The *'ratio'* as guiding principle dominates Freud's own philosophy of life, his therapeutic goal and his vision, or perhaps rather his illusion concerning the future of mankind.

Freud's ideal therapeutic goal consisted in the lifting of repression so that drive desires, made acceptable by maturational changes and by the therapeutic influence on the defensive system, could be incorporated and integrated. This is an eminently humanistic goal. The result striven for is thus a harmonization between the different divisions and structures of the psyche which were in intersystemic conflict. Harmonization plays an important part in humanistic ideology which considered the establishment of equilibria as the highest achievement.

In his second lecture at Clark University in Worcester, Mas-

sachusetts in 1909, Freud gave a wonderful though simplified illustration of the therapeutic process, comparing the disturbing repressed drive with a rowdy who had to be ejected from the lecture hall. The ejection of the fellow to which Freud compares the repression of the undesirable drive-demand does not bring about the result of elimination of the disturbance. Freud says: '. . . he is no longer among us; we are free from his presence, from his insulting laughter and his *sotto voce* comments. But in some respects, nevertheless, the repression has been unsuccessful; for now he is making an intolerable exhibition of himself outside the room, and his shouting and banging on the door with his fists interfere with my lecture even more than his bad behaviour did before. In these circumstances we could not fail to be delighted if our respected president, Dr. Stanley Hall, should be willing to assume the role of mediator and peace-maker. He would have a talk with the unruly person outside and would then come to us with a request that he should be re-admitted after all: he himself would guarantee that the man would now behave better. On Dr. Hall's authority we decide to lift the repression, and peace and quiet are restored' (Freud, 1910 [1909], pp. 26-27).

Such moderation and control as the outcome of therapy is a typical humanistic ideal. The strengthening of the ego—this main distributor of mental forces—was and still is the aim of the psychoanalytic treatment. Therapy is supposed to bring about firm repression, or unyielding renunciation dictated by reason, as well as whole-hearted gratification of permissible drive desires, and has as its goal a harmonious equilibrium which corresponds very much to the idealistic aims of humanism. Freud's concept of sublimation contains the idea of the ennoblement of the *homo animalis* to the *Homo sapiens humanus et cultivatus*. In his fifth lecture at Clark University Freud said: '. . . the work of psycho-analysis puts itself at the orders of precisely the highest and most valuable cultural trends, as a better substitute for the unsuccessful repression' (Freud, 1910 [1909], p. 53). But from all of Freud's writings

we know that for him these 'highest and most valuable cultural trends' corresponded to the humanistic values. In my Nunberg lecture of 1968 I pointed out that such a humanistic ideal of harmonization is hardly achievable in our technical and scientific era in which the old humanistic value system is breaking up rapidly (*cf.*, Sterba, 1969).

I come now to a final point, although its elaboration is mainly speculative. Although at the time of adolescence the basic character structure is already laid down, idealized figures help to shape, fortify, and elaborate the ego ideal. With this they contribute decisively to the value system of the growing individual. I am not able to prove anything definite concerning the influence of humanistic studies on certain of Freud's character traits. However, it strikes me that his values as well as his attitude and behavior seem in many features to be shaped according to what the Romans designated as *'virtus'* (*cf.*, Curtius, 1944). *'Virtus'* comes from *'vir'*, the Latin word for man designating masculinity, referring to personal emotional fortitude, self-discipline, endurance in defeat, and restraint in victory. But the Roman *'virtus'* is more than this. Its essence is the devotion to a cause far beyond one's personal interest. For the Roman citizen of antiquity, *'virtus'* implied before anything else the devotion to the Roman state, the public cause, the *res publica*. It was this devotion which expressed itself in the *'constantia'*, a main feature in the complex of attitudes comprised by the term *'virtus'*. This *'constantia'* contributed very much to the greatness of Rome. What strikes me is that Freud's devotion to his cause, his *'res'*, the scientific edifice which he built, is comparable to the *virtus* of the Roman expressed in his devotion to the *'res publica'*. Nothing demonstrated better how all-important his *'res'* was to Freud than the fact that in his autobiographical sketch he hardly speaks about his personal life. His presentation is almost exclusively dedicated to the *'res'* for which he lived his long, arduous, and eminently productive life. It is most characteristic in this connection how Freud repeatedly termed psychoanalysis in his

letters to his close collaborators. Again and again, he calls psychoanalysis *'die Sache,'* a direct translation of the Latin *'res'*. On Jones's fiftieth birthday he wrote: '. . . that he cannot think of Ernest Jones, even after his fiftieth birthday, as other than before: zealous and energetic, combative and devoted to the cause [*und der Sache ergeben*]' (Freud, 1929, p. 250), devoted to the *'res'*.

It was Freud's own devotion to his *'res'*, his 'public cause' which enabled him to endure all that descended upon him when he tore from the world of our culture the mask of self-deception and demonstrated the Acheron within ourselves. When the storms of indignation and aggression broke loose, when friends turned into enemies, acceptance into rejection, love and admiration into bitter hostility, no one knew better how to follow Horace's advice: *'Aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem'* (Odes II, 3, i) an admonition which one could well translate nowadays: 'Keep your cool if things get tough'. It is this endurance and *'constantia'* that we admire so much in Freud. In this he followed the great examples of antiquity which his humanistic education had made alive for him. His *'virtus'*, for which he found the model through his humanistic education, contributed in no small way to the success of Freud's science in our Western world.

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The Impact of Darwin on Freud

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Panel on The Ideological Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis

THE IMPACT OF DARWIN ON FREUD

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As a formative influence on Freud, Darwin is alluded to by several authors (Brosin, 1960; Jones, 1953; Nunberg, 1962; Rapaport, 1960; Veith, 1960) and by Freud himself (1925 [1924]). For Freud, Darwin was 'the great Darwin' (Freud, 1901, p. 148, 1915-1917, p. 76). Freud referred directly to Darwin and his work more than twenty times and always very positively (*cf.*, Ritvo, 1963); these references range from Freud's earliest psychoanalytic writings in Studies on Hysteria (Breuer and Freud, 1893-1895, pp. 91, 181) to his last completed book, Moses and Monotheism (Freud, 1939, pp. 66-67, 80, 130-131). He took with him to London nine volumes of Darwin—some in English, some in German—which he had acquired between 1875 and 1883.[1]

Biology in the era when it was being revolutionalized by Darwin's work was originally the field of Freud's earliest scientific interest; when he left it, he continued to base his work on it, even assuming that 'for the psychical field, the biological field does in fact play the part of the underlying bedrock' (Freud, 1937, p. 252). Of the five metapsychological viewpoints, the genetic, or Darwinian (*cf.*, Rapaport, 1960, p. 22), has always been present in Freud's writings, albeit never explicitly; the most recent, the adaptive, is also indebted to Darwin. Nevertheless, the influence of Freud's early interest in Darwin and of his training in evolutionary biology has not been examined in the same historical detail as have, for example, the influences

This paper is an excerpt from *Darwin's Influence on Freud* (Ritvo, 1973 [1972]).

[1] For titles and Freud's inscriptions in his Darwin volumes, see Ritvo, 1972, p. 278, and 1973(1972).

of Herbart and Fechner (Dorer, 1932), the 'Helmholtz school'[2] (Bernfeld, 1944), Brücke and Meynert's neurophysiology (Amacher, 1965), and Charcot (Andersson, 1962).

'I was already alive when Charles Darwin published his work on the origin of species', Freud reminded an audience seventy-five years after the historic event (Freud, 1933[1932], p. 173). Sigmund Freud was born in Moravia on May 6, 1856, two years before the theory which bears Darwin's name was announced jointly by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace[3] to the Linnean Society of London in July 1858. The lives of Darwin and Freud overlapped by more than a quarter of a century until Darwin's death in 1882; Freud's life coincides almost exactly with the onset of what is commonly referred to as the 'Darwinian revolution'. Growing up in Vienna, Freud came under the influence of Darwin's theories during his years at the *Gymnasium*. In his Autobiographical Study, he notes early influences in his life which he considered relevant to his development of psychoanalysis, among them 'the theories of Darwin'.

> Under the powerful influence of a school friendship with a boy rather my senior who grew up to be a well-known politician, I developed a wish to study law like him and to engage in social activities. At the same time, *the theories of Darwin, which were then of topical interest, strongly attracted me, for they held out hopes of an extraordinary advance in our understanding of the world;* and it was hearing Goethe's beautiful essay on Nature read aloud at a popular lecture by Professor Carl Brühl just before I left school that decided me to become a medical student (Freud, 1925[1924], p. 8, italics added).

[2] Dr. George Rosen has called to my attention that the 'Helmholtz school' as used according to Bernfeld had little to do with Helmholtz; it refers to three of his friends who continued primarily along physiological lines: Carl Ludwig, Emil Du Bois-Reymond, and Ernst Brücke, Freud's professor.

[3] Alfred Russel Wallace (1823-1913) was an English naturalist who from his study of comparative biology in Brazil and the East Indies independently arrived at a theory of evolution similar to Darwin's. To avoid any problem of priority, friends arranged for them to announce the theory jointly.

It is interesting to note that Brühl's popular lecture was on comparative anatomy, one of the fields infused with new significance by Darwin's theory.

Freud's *Gymnasium* years, 1866 to 1873, coincided with the popularization of Darwin in the German-speaking world, particularly by Haeckel, as well as with the German publication of two of the three Darwin works referred to by Freud in his psychoanalytic writings, The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication and The Descent of Man. Second only to Haeckel's voluminous work in popularizing Darwin was a small, superbly scientific book which utilized and quoted in support of Darwin's theory the Copepoda research of the man with whom Freud would undertake his own first research, Carl Claus. From Fritz Müller's (1864) *Für Darwin,* Freud could have known before enrolling in the Medical Faculty of the great reputation as a Darwinian of their new professor of zoology. At the age of seventy-one, in the perspective of a long life devoted to psychoanalysis, Freud listed 'the study of evolution' as essential to 'a scheme of training for analysts' (Freud, 1927). 'The study of evolution' was an important part of Freud's own medical education. His evaluation of its importance for psychoanalysis may be contrasted, as Freud actually does, with his view that the training most suitable for an analyst

> is not the training prescribed by the University for future doctors. What is known as medical education appears to me to be an arduous and circuitous way of approaching the profession of analysis (*ibid.,* p. 252).

Freud's emphasis on the value of the study of evolution in the training of psychoanalysts warrants examination of the nature of his own studies in evolution as a medical student. Two of his professors taught aspects of Darwin's work which were crucial to Freud's later psychological work. Claus's prolific scientific writings, textbooks, and *Autobiographie* reveal that Freud's four years of intensive zoological studies, which

included his very first research, were with a man who was deeply involved in the issues and teaching of the new Darwinian biology and for this reason had recently been received by Darwin at his home. Contrary to what has been assumed from Freud's ontogenetic and phylogenetic researches in Brücke's laboratory, it was not Brücke but Claus from whom Freud obtained his evolutionary orientation in science.[4] There is a striking consistency in the views maintained by Darwin, Claus, and Freud on aspects of Darwin's theory which were controversial at the time or subsequently became so. Some, like the genetic, are fundamental to Freud's work. Others have been discredited scientifically but survive in Freud's writings as vestigial remains of what is now antiquated about Darwin's theory.[5]

Amacher's 1965 work, Freud's Neurological Education and Its Influence on Psychoanalytic Theory, points out that Meynert's psychiatric lectures took issue with Darwin's Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, specifically with Darwin's definition of instinct as inherited learning. (Inasmuch as Brücke and his assistant, Exner, subscribed to Meynert's neurophysiological ideas, they, too, were critical of Darwin's definition of instinct, without thereby intending to question the possibility of inheritance through use and disuse per se.) The positive contributions of Darwin's Expression of the Emotions are also present in Meynert's 1884 publication, *Psychiatrie.* During Freud's lengthy association with Meynert, his professor of psychiatry and cerebral anatomy had come to appreciate from Darwin's Expression of the Emotions the value of expressions as clues to the inner workings of other people's minds. Meynert at this time also began to teach the two principles from The Expression of the Emotions which Freud explicitly uses in Studies on Hysteria—the first, of associated serviceable habits, and the third, which attributes the overflow of excess

[4] For the details of Claus as Freud's professor, see Ritvo (1972).

[5] One of these I have discussed at length in *Darwin as the Source of Freud's Neo-Lamarckism* (Ritvo, 1965).

nerve-force (or excitation) to an inherent mechanism of the nervous system.

The ideas now considered most basic to Darwin's theory have turned out to be basic to Freud's theory too. Aspects of Darwin's theories discarded with time may have seemed essential to Freud for his speculations in applied psychoanalysis but are no loss to his scientific structure. It is difficult to assess with any precision the exact amount of each specific influence to be assigned to Darwin. No claim can be made for Darwin as the *exclusive* source of any one of Freud's ideas. Darwin's achievement was the convincing synthesis of an enormous quantity of essential observations which threw new light on *old* ideas. It is the cumulative effect of these ideas as a consequence of Darwin's work that is impressive. It is probably also psychologically inaccurate to assume that any influence is exclusive for, as Freud points out, psychological phenomena are multiply determined.

Natural selection comes closest to being original with Darwin's theory. He had difficulty finding predecessors to acknowledge for the idea when he announced jointly with Wallace in 1858. However, by the third edition of On the Origin of Species, Darwin (1861) was able to include Patrick Matthew's 1831 recognition of 'the full force of the principles of natural selection' which Matthew 'estimated . . . as à priori recognizable fact—an axiom requiring only to be pointed out to be admitted by unprejudiced minds of sufficient grasp'.[6] Wallace, who arrived at the principle of natural selection independently, is mentioned by Freud only once, half a century later and in connection with Darwin. From Freud's point of view, it was 'Darwin's theories' which inspired him to a life of science. In applying the idea of natural selection or survival value, as in the Project, Freud thought of himself as 'pursuing Darwinian lines of thought'. Natural selection operates by eliminating the less fit; that which survives is useful or was at one time. The idea seems simple enough but was a difficult one for many scien-

[6] Matthew, Patrick: *Letter to Gard. Chron. May 12th,* quoted in Darwin's *On the Origin of Species,* third edition, p. xv.

tists at the time. Darwin applied it to psychology in his first principle of expression, which Meynert taught and Freud utilized in Studies on Hysteria. Freud would already have learned from Claus that 'it would be rash to claim', as Nägeli was doing,

> that the so-called 'morphologic characteristics' which now seem useless and hence *appear* unimportant for the struggle for survival were of absolutely no value even at the time of their occurrence (Claus, 1876, I, p. 67).

Both Darwin and Freud recognized that even the most minute detail must have meaning in terms of its function for survival and that, if it could not be found in terms of the present, its meaning had to be sought in the past. Freud extended the study of the expression of the emotions to include hysterical symptoms and verbal expressions; he paid attention to such seemingly meaningless phenomena as parapraxes and dreams. Symptoms could no longer be considered meaningless inherited characteristics or arbitrary productions of the patient. 'All these sensations and innervations' in the hysterical patient 'belong to the field of "The Expression of the Emotions", which, as Darwin [1872] has taught us, consists of actions which originally had a meaning and served a purpose' (Breuer and Freud, 1893-1895, p. 181). During Freud's formative years, Darwin and his supporters acknowledged that it was yet to be determined how great a role in evolution should be attributed to natural selection. The progress of science has proven it to be not only Darwin's most original but probably his most significant contribution; its conceptualization in his first principle of expression is in itself a clear, direct, and significant contribution of Darwin to Freud.

None, least of all Darwin, claimed originality for the idea of evolution. It had been discredited as *Naturphilosophie* and met with silence by German scientists in the era up to Darwin's announcement. But for Freud and his generation of schoolboys,

Darwin was the inspirational source of the idea. 'Evolution was the key to everything and could replace all the beliefs and creeds which one was discarding' (Goldschmidt, 1956, p. 35). Haeckel proclaimed that the historical approach which Darwin had used to find a scientific solution to the problem of species was the key to every problem. Freud's application of this key or clue to the problems of the neuroses is basic to psychoanalysis and provides the genetic or Darwinian viewpoint. Fritz Müller's application of the genetic approach in his testing of Darwin's theory led to a remarkable discovery, two distinct male *Tanais* with only a single female form. Classified traditionally as two species, they were identified by Müller as developing from the same *Nauplius* form. Claus confirmed this exciting finding with his own observations on the Copepoda of Messina and Nice. Applying the same approach to his observations of human behavior, Freud was able to recognize the genetic relationship of infantile behavior and two distinct classes of adult sexual behavior, normal and perverse. Even Claus, who was more cautious than Haeckel, reported that 'genetic questions attained prominence in all branches of biology' in the wake of Darwin's 'successful final victory over the hypothesis of creation' (Claus, 1888, p. 4). Freud worked with success on genetic questions in his own researches in Brücke's Institute of Physiology and in Meynert's Institute of Cerebral Anatomy. Recently Anna Freud commented:

> There never was any doubt about psychoanalysis as a *genetic* psychology. The genetic point of view had a recognized existence from the moment when psychoanalytic exploration turned from the neurotic problems of adult life to their forerunners in childhood and demonstrated the impact of early on later happenings and patterns [i.e., from the moment Freud made this turn] (A. Freud, 1969, pp. 50-51).

She points out that at present the genetic viewpoint 'for the moment outstrips most other interests, and it may take some

time until the other metapsychological aspects catch up again with the genetic one which has strayed ahead' (*ibid.*, p. 52).

Darwin, Claus, and Freud were all dedicated to development by gradation, or a continuum. Darwin wrote that it gave him 'a cold shudder to hear any one speculating about a true crustacean giving birth to a true fish!' (*cf.*, F. Darwin, 1887-88, II, p. 334), as the British geologist Murchison was doing. In Germany, evolution by such huge jumps was seriously proposed and known as Kölliker's theory of heterogeneous generation. It was favored by such great scientists as von Baer who conjectured that the sudden flowering of past types such as trilobites without apparent transitional stages could be accounted for, possibly in analogy with his embryological observations, by the greater plasticity and modifiability of newly arisen types which have become rigid with the passage of time. Because of its identification with development by gradation, Darwin's theory was considered moribund at the turn of the century. Even Darwin's great champion, Huxley, criticized Darwin for his adamant insistence that *'natura non facit saltum'*, an ancient concept, and one with which Freud would have been familiar from reading Goethe before encountering its application to development in Haeckel's popularizations, Darwin's own writings, Claus's teachings, or the controversies aroused over it by Darwin's theory. Haeckel credited Goethe with 'guessing' at the unity of nature but gave Darwin the credit for establishing it scientifically as a continuum from the inorganic through the plant and animal kingdoms to the highest organic form. Darwin gave Lamarck credit for his 'conclusion on the gradual change of species'. Claus taught that modern geology also supports the idea. 'Lyell has proved in a convincing way on geological ground . . . that the past history of the earth consists essentially of a gradual process of development' (Claus, 1884, I, p. 166).

In defending himself against some of Haeckel's criticisms, Claus had to point out that classifications were still useful even though the reality was a continuum without breaks. Fifty years

later, Freud felt the same need to call to the attention of his listeners that his psychosexual stages were merely convenient divisions of what he regarded as a continuum from the beginning. He did not regard the continuum as obvious to the audience at his Introductory Lectures although he was devoted to it in his own thinking just as Darwin had been. Neither Claus nor Freud seemed inclined at any time to join Huxley, von Baer, Kölliker, Murchison, de Vries, etc. in accepting the possibility of development by mutation; they were in complete accord with Darwin on the issue of development by gradation.

Darwin's concept of evolution differed from Lamarck's on two essential points little thought of today: the roles of 'will', or 'volition', and of an inner orthogenetic force. Lacking the mechanism of natural selection, Lamarck introduced what Darwin called 'the Lamarck nonsense of the slow willing of adaptation' (*cf.,* F. Darwin, 1887-88, II, p. 23). In 1903, T. H. Morgan tried to correct what he considered a long-standing misconception of the importance of the role of 'will' in Lamarck's theory and to relegate its function to exercise or 'use'. Morgan's success may be responsible for the identification today of the term 'Lamarckism' with the belief in 'use-inheritance'. Although today Freud's insistence on use-inheritance has him labeled as Lamarckian, his own association with the name of Lamarck is the older one of 'volition'. In the second decade of this century Freud sought out Lamarck's *Philosophie Zoologique,* apparently for the first time, in hopes of finding a biological basis in evolution for the concept he was developing of the ego as the organ of adaptation capable of will and volition. Nothing came of it.

Darwin (1861[1859]) also criticized what he called 'Lamarck's law of progressive development' (p. xiii). It was revived with Darwin's theory by Nägeli, von Baer, and others who preferred an inner orthogenetic force toward perfection rather than the blind operation of natural selection on chance variations. Even Bronn, the first German translator of Darwin's works, found it easier to comprehend. Freud, with but one exception, was

never enough of an optimist to believe in inevitable progress. The best he could hope for was the reassertion of Eros in the eternal struggle with Thanatos. Darwin's theory, unlike those based on an inner orthogenetic force toward progress, allowed a backward as well as a forward direction in development, regression as well as progression, and also fixation. Freud himself drew an analogy in 1915 between what he termed 'fixations' and his earlier evolutionary research.

> . . . when as a young student I was engaged under von Brücke's direction on my first piece of scientific work, I was concerned with the origin of the posterior nerve-roots in the spinal cord of a small fish of very archaic structure. . . . But in this small fish the whole path of the migration [of nerve cells] . . . also shown by their evolutionary history . . . was demonstrated by the cells that had remained behind (Freud, 1915-1917, p. 340).

Freud's analogy was to the possibility that 'in the case of every particular sexual trend some portions of it have stayed behind at earlier stages of . . . development, even though other portions may have reached their final goal' *(ibid.)*. A return to such an earlier stage also could occur and this Freud called 'regression'. The model for Freud's highly sophisticated theories of regression has rightly been seen as Hughlings Jackson's hierarchy of neural levels. Jackson's evolutionary views derived from Spencer, not Darwin. Freud's early and deep involvement with Darwinian biology may account for his unusually early receptivity in On Aphasia (1891) to Jackson's evolutionary ideas at a time when Jackson was otherwise almost unnoticed. More specifically, Darwin had developed in The Expression of the Emotions a corollary to his first principle suggestive of the hierarchical view which Jackson developed a decade later. He wrote: 'Some actions ordinarily associated through habit may be partially repressed through the will and in such cases the muscles which are least under the separate control of the will are the most liable to act, causing movements which we recog-

nize as expressive' (Darwin, 1872, p. 28). Darwin, of course, was aware that the involuntary muscles were an earlier development than the voluntary, and Freud, too, would have known this from his reading of Darwin.

Darwin's theories created a *Zeitgeist* which gave greater emphasis than did Darwin himself to 'conflict' and to the role of environment. 'Conflict' dominated Freud's thinking throughout his life as it did the thinking of many German biologists of that era. After Freud's death, Hartmann (1939) introduced the concept of the 'conflict-free ego sphere' and demonstrated that conflict was not the complete story for psychoanalysis any more than it was for biology. Bernfeld (1944) had earlier traced Freud's predilection for two opposing forces to the views of the so-called 'Helmholtzian school' taught by Brücke. The reenforcing effect of two such important influences may account for Freud's single-minded devotion to 'conflict'. It proved extremely useful for him throughout his life even if it kept him from enunciating Hartmann's concept to himself.

The experiential receded in Freud's theoretical formulations from a position of prime importance to its proper place as part of the complemental series. Darwin, like Lamarck, Goethe, Haeckel, Claus, and, later, Freud, saw a role for both environment and heredity. Lamarck's 'volition' and 'law of progressive development' focused attention on internal causes for evolution so that his view of the role of environment was little noticed. Darwin's theory of natural selection led many to assume incorrectly that environment was replacing the Creationists' heredity as an exclusive explanation. Freud replaced the heredity-taint etiology of hysteria which he had learned from Charcot with an environmental etiology: childhood seductions. When he realized that these seductions were fantasies and innate, he speculatively pushed the environmental or experiential back into the history of mankind (*cf.*, Benjamin, 1961).

Fortunately Freud's use of the now discredited ideas of recapitulation and the inheritance of acquired characteristics were not crucial to his scientific theory. They were used almost

exclusively in connection with his speculations in applied psychoanalysis. In this regard he also utilized Darwin's primal horde theory from The Descent of Man, the idea in The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication introduced into biology by Darwin from the experiences of pigeon breeders that 'too close interbreeding is detrimental to the species', and an observation Darwin had made concerning the behavior of savages. Freud agreed with Darwin that the incest taboo was not innate in man.

Darwin loaned his great name to the revival of the theory of recapitulation, i.e., ontogeny repeats phylogeny, which in its nonevolutionary form of parallelism had been discredited by von Baer, but was supported by Agassiz, an opponent of evolution. Haeckel, Claus, and Fritz Müller all contributed to and re-enforced this idea. The critical Claus was completely uncritical of the idea of recapitulation. Freud would not have learned from either Claus or Darwin that anyone questioned it. It survived as a respectable idea in biology even longer than use-inheritance.

Neither was inheritance through use and disuse questioned while Freud was still a biologist. Darwin did not see it as a distinction between Lamarck's theory and his own. Nor did he credit it to Lamarck, as Lyell did. In the Variation, Darwin proposed a tentative hypothesis of heredity by pangenesis specifically intended to account for inheritance through use and disuse. Claus taught that the inheritance through use and disuse was the only physicochemical principle for evolution as yet known. He assumed it was essential as the source of the variations on which natural selection operated. Like Darwin and Lamarck, Claus considered repetition essential for an experience to be inherited. And this is the form in which we find it in Freud. Freud even thought that the killing of the father in the primal horde would probably have reoccurred enough times in human history to account for its survival in man's unconsciousness as the œdipus complex.

Natural selection and not use-inheritance was in question

when Freud was involved in biology. Haeckel and Claus both felt it was up to each individual to determine how much he thought should be attributed to natural selection. Darwin more and more disclaimed his bias for natural selection and assigned a greater and greater role to use-inheritance. Meynert, in attacking the applicability to man of the inheritance of learning, taught that it was one of Darwin's doctrines. Freud did not know until late in life, when Jones called it to his attention, that it was no longer an acceptable scientific idea. He died before recapitulation had suffered a similar fate. Freud's speculations with these now antiquated biological ideas did no harm to his theory. They may have led those who have read only his later speculative writings on applied psychoanalysis to underestimate his scientific contributions.

Darwin used for his third principle of the expression of the emotions the idea of the overflow of excess excitation which he attributed to Spencer and others. Freud used it in Studies on Hysteria, as Meynert did in his Psychiatry, with attribution as Darwin's principle. Freud first used it to establish the 'constancy principle' as the foundation of his theoretical formulations in Studies on Hysteria. Later in 1920, he attributed the constancy principle to Fechner. Schur and the author have proposed that a recently developed principle of evolutionary biology, Schneirla's biphasic theory of approach and withdrawal, is more suited to serve as the biological foundation for Freud's pleasure and unpleasure principles than the one available to him in his lifetime, the constancy principle (*cf.*, Schur and Ritvo, 1970a, 1970b).

The relationship of Freud's use of 'antithetical ideas' in close juxtaposition with Darwin's other two principles of expression in the case of Frau Emmy von N raises the question of the relationship, if any, of Darwin's second principle, that of antithesis, to Freud's discovery of the role of antithesis in mental functioning. It suggests further historical study of the concept of antithesis, particularly in nineteenth century Germany.

The effect of Darwin's work on Freud's appears to have been

massive and primarily of a positive nature. Darwin's errors appear in Freud's writings but they are not seriously damaging. The overemphasis on 'conflict' in the Darwinian *Zeitgeist* coupled with the 'opposing forces' of the 'Helmholtz school' carried Freud far. But it also blinded him to the nonconflictual.

The excitement over Darwin's theories played a significant role in Freud's career choice. Freud studied zoology at a time when Darwin's accomplishment was having a revolutionary impact at the University of Vienna. Claus had just arrived to bring the Zoology Department into line with the new biology. Even a conservative, cautious German scientist like Claus taught and provided examples for such revolutionary ideas as 'the need to make modification in the traditional conceptions . . . with new progress of experience'. Claus also discussed all the different objections to, and misunderstandings of, Darwin's theories so that Freud might have experienced a *déjà vu* when his own theories encountered the same objections. Freud wrote about Darwin as an example of the fate of a scientist and his theory. He saw his own theory as adding the *psychological* blow to the *cosmological* and *biological* blows to man's narcissism dealt by Copernicus and Darwin, which Haeckel had called attention to in Freud's youth.

In 1938, shortly after his arrival in London as a refugee from the Nazi invasion of Austria, Freud was invited to sign the book of the Royal Society. He did not fail to note that he was thus entering the company of Newton and Darwin. He expressed his pleasure in a letter to his friend Arnold Zweig on June 28th, in which he mentions the many callers he had been receiving.

> The most pleasing was the visit of two secretaries of the Royal Society who brought me the hallowed book of the Society to sign, as a new pain [a bladder disturbance] prevented my going out. They left a facsimile of the book with me, and if you were at my house, I could show you the signatures from I. Newton to Charles Darwin. Good company! (E. Freud, 1968, p. 173).

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Panel on The Ideological Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis

THE MEDICAL ORIGINS AND CULTURAL USE OF FREUD'S INSTINCTUAL DRIVE THEORY

BY JOHN C. BURNHAM, PH.D. (COLUMBUS, OHIO)

Freud's instinctual drive theory is counted as one of his most important and distinctive contributions.[1] In the late nineteenth century when he began to formulate what ultimately became psychoanalysis, the idea of instinct was conspicuous in Western scientific thinking. Yet Freud did not utilize his contemporaries' biological and psychological work; instead he drew on an independent and distinctive medical tradition for his conceptualization. Although his thinking was insulated from the lively interest in instinct that developed in biology and related disciplines around the turn of the century, his teachings survived other theories because his contributions to the science of man fitted the needs of the new century's social organization.

Freud began theorizing at a time when his practice in Vienna had brought to his attention human sexual phenomena in their many manifestations.[2] As his letters to Wilhelm Fliess (Freud, 1887-1902) and his papers of the 1890's (e.g., Freud, 1898) show, Freud was at first concerned particularly with the ways in which somatic conditions influence sexual phenomena (*cf.,* Stewart, 1967). His description of the anxiety neurosis (1895[1894]) involved, in an explicit way, purely physical concomitants of

The author is grateful to Dr. Robert R. Holt for his helpful suggestions.

[1] In 1924 Freud (1905b) added a footnote to *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality:* 'The theory of the instincts is the most important but at the same time the least complete portion of psychoanalytic theory' (p. 168, n.).

[2] For general material on the development of Freud's theories, see Jones (1953-1957), Andersson (1962), and the editorial notes throughout the Standard Edition.

sexual phenomena. And in his early work on hysteria, Freud took pains to explain that a memory that is sexual in nature could have profound effects, both physical and mental. Then when he had formulated the concept of the wish, Freud tended to abandon physiological levels of explanation and to try to think in terms of logically consistent, purely psychological explanations (*cf.*, Strachey, 1966, p. 291). By 1900 he had developed his ideas sufficiently to set forth a relatively complete human psychology (*cf.*, Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams). There he characterized the wish as a mental representative of internal somatic pressures upon the organism. Although he pictured the organic re-enforcement of the unconscious wish as the energizing of the primary process (the dynamic unconscious), not until 1905 in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (Freud, 1905b) did he describe explicitly the somatically based instinctual drive in the form in which it has had such profound effects upon Western thinking.

In Freud's works subsequent to the Three Essays, the concept of instinctual drive encompasses the only area in which physiology impinges directly upon psychology. Freud was aware of the fact that most physiological characteristics are presumed to be inherited. He and his contemporaries considered instincts to be necessarily a part of a person's heredity because they are physiological phenomena. An examination of Freud's conceptualization of instinctual drive, combining physiology and heredity, therefore permits an extension of the work of Amacher (1965) and Ritvo (1965) upon these two aspects of his thinking. Amacher has examined the neurophysiological beliefs of Freud's teachers upon which the founder of psychoanalysis was able to draw, and Ritvo has called attention to aspects of Freud's assumptions concerning hereditary givens. These two lines of inquiry need to be brought together in connection with other scientific and medical writings of Freud's time to indicate what Freud contributed and how his work was understood.

By the last decades of the nineteenth century, the concept

of instinct had been refined into several models.[3] The most common scientifically acceptable, that is, parsimonious, definition was 'compound reflex action' (Spencer, 1880, p. 432). Instinctive action was believed to consist of a series of patterned responses to a stimulus. Such a definition was essentially physiological or even materialistic without necessarily involving, for example, either biological or social purposiveness. Liddell (1960) and others have shown how the conceptualization of reflex developed in that century and grew steadily more sophisticated as neurophysiological knowledge increased. Freud (1895) in his Project and, implicitly, in his general psychology drew upon both this reflex concept and the association psychology that paralleled and re-enforced it. By 1900 his teachings embodied an essentially reductionistic reflex model of the psyche in which he took account of endogenous stimuli that he later designated 'instinctual drives'. Rather than discussing reflexes on a physiological level, Freud utilized the psychological equivalent, association (although, as Holt [1965] points out, the neurophysiological model contained elements that continued to show up as contaminants in Freud's psychological writings). Until Freud's time it had been customary in science to include all behavior and thinking within association psychology, a psychological schema that, as should be emphasized, the neurophysiological model (at least until the end of the 1890's) paralleled and re-enforced. 'All behavior and thinking' included even that which Freud pictured as growing out of endogenous stimuli. His contribution, indeed, was to suggest how those stimuli are integrated into association processes.

Although the Englishman, Alexander Bain (1884), and other associationists occasionally discussed aspects of motivation and always took up the feelings, association psychology itself ostensibly had no need of instinct beyond the reflex (*cf.*, Cardno, 1958). Many associationists nevertheless tended to employ some common-sense system of instincts for explaining aspects of both

[3] The best general discussion of the various models of instinct up to the early twentieth century is in Bernard (1924).

human and animal behavior, without regard for theoretical consistency. When Freud, then, transformed the primary process and began to speak in terms of endogenous instinctual drive, *Trieb,* as such (*cf.,* Strachey, 1966, pp. 291-292), although still an associationist he became entangled in all of the conceptions of instinct current at the time that did not depend upon the reflex concept.

The various conceptions of instinct that survived even a few years into the twentieth century included both the scientific and the traditional. On the continent, common-sense instinct theory tended to be Aristotelian—a hierarchy of passions and appetites sufficient to explain any behavior. French science and medicine, for example, were so dominated by Aristotelian thinking that a more reductionistic or environmentalist (that is, sensationalist) psychology could not flourish there (*cf.,* for example, the well known work of Ribot, 1875.)[4] In Enlightenment times, the human (as opposed to animal) passions had been fairly well defined for all of Europe, but they were social in nature—pride, love of power, and the like (*cf.,* Lovejoy, 1961). It was this culturally derived scheme of explanation for human behavior that most association psychologists utilized even as they taught that all conduct could be interpreted in terms of a mechanistic series of associations initiated by external stimuli.

Any approach to applying the idea of instinct to human beings was complicated by the fact that since antiquity animals in particular were understood to be guided in their actions by instincts. Rather generally in the nineteenth century instinct was therefore understood to be not only physiological and inherited but animal rather than human. In English the word was ambiguous. German-speaking scientists such as Freud, however, were able to distinguish between *Instinkt,* instinct in animals, and *Trieb,* drive in humans, the latter word having the connotation of impulse and involving at some point, at least, thought processes, rather than being purely automatic

[4] As late as 1910, for example, Charles Debierre, in a respectable French academic treatise included as a major source Prosper Lucas's 1849 classic on heredity.

or reflex in nature. Freud, like most nineteenth century scientists, in his writings reserved the mechanical *Instinkt* for animals and very seldom equated *Trieb* with *Instinkt* (*cf.*, Strachey, 1957).[5] Those using traditional categories to describe mental processes, such as sensations and feelings, tended to restrict human appetites and impulses to those which could be classified under the general heading of will, that is, susceptible of conscious control.

Freud's care to use *Trieb*, and the care of others (such as the classic historian of instinct, Wilm [1925]) to restrict 'instinct' to animals, reflects in general the difference between a psychological and a biological level of discourse. One of the strengths of Freud's work was his attempt at logical consistency, noted above, in dealing with the psychological without confusing it with biological or physiological points of view (although he was, of course, vividly aware of the latter and, as has been noted, not always able to exclude it).[6]

All of the nice distinctions between human and animal, biological and psychological, however, were breaking down just when Freud was working out his psychology, and many of his contemporaries did not maintain them. For example, W. T. Preyer (1884a, chap. 11), professor of physiology at Jena whose famous work on the developmental behavior of infants was

[5] At one point Freud (1915b) spoke of 'inherited mental formations . . . in the human being—something analogous to instinct [*Instinkt*] in animals . . . ' (p. 195). Clearly he was thinking of highly patterned specific responses of the reflex variety as opposed to more general impulse and drive [*Trieb*].

[6] Holt (1972) has pointed out the extent of inconsistency in Freud's writings, and especially the way in which scientism often gave way in his thinking to humanism, and vice versa, without logical reconciliation. While such dilemmas are to be found in Freud's own work, his followers were not sensitive to the difficulties. It was they who particularly read into Freud's teaching logical consistency and saw in his writings the 'purely psychological' level of discourse. Those born later than Freud were more at ease than he with 'fictions' (Freud, 1900-1901, p. 598), that is, hypothetical models, the scientific constructs familiar in twentieth century scientific work. (See, for example, Margolin, 1965, pp. 135-136.) Thus Freud's *effort* to maintain a purely psychological level of discourse was more important than his actual performance in doing so.

known to Freud (e.g., 1887-1902, p. 75), utilized the term *Instinct* in connection with children. Preyer explicitly compared the instincts of animals with those of children. And, to cite another instance, Freud's teacher, Sigmund Exner, whose thinking paralleled Freud's in the 1890's, also used the term *Instinct* in connection with a neurophysiological explanation of human behavior and thinking (Amacher, 1965, p. 51). In short, in a period of Darwinian thinking, the identification of human attributes with those of animals had become common. Sometimes the theorists simply assumed that man is another animal. At other times the theory of recapitulation was invoked, that is, the belief that man in his various developmental stages duplicates the stages through which his ancestors went as they evolved from single cells into primates. Although Freud resorted to animal parallels and recapitulation theory markedly less frequently than his contemporaries, still he did share with them the tendency to view man in terms of an animal nature (*cf.*, for example, Freud, 1917, pp. 140-141).[7]

At the same time that the distinctions between human and animal instincts were breaking down in those years around the turn of the twentieth century, a new interest in man's instinctual drives developed (*cf.*, Cravens, 1969), the interest that ultimately gave currency to Freud's ideas on the subject far beyond any interest in psychoanalysis. This renaissance of instinct derived not from physiological knowledge or psychological theory about instincts but from the fact, alluded to above, that instincts and instinctual tendencies were understood to be hereditary in nature. The precipitating event was the advent of Weismannism, the first step in the development of modern genetics. August Weismann, himself a distinguished German cytologist until he turned to biological theorizing in the 1880's, taught that the germ plasm is passed on unchanged from generation to generation and is not affected by the life history of any particular individual organism transmitting the plasm. It

[7] For a brief systematic discussion of recapitulation in psychoanalysis, see Jackson (1969, pp. 760-761).

was Weismann who effectively challenged the prevailing idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, called at the time Neo-Lamarckianism (*cf.*, Sturtevant, 1965; Churchill, 1968).

All through the late 1880's and the 1890's and even after, there raged in the world of biology and science in general a debate over whether or not Weismann was correct (*cf.*, Cravens, 1969, Cravens and Burnham, 1971, Stocking, 1962). The stakes in this scientific controversy were high, for if Weismann prevailed, every major theory of social improvement was affected fundamentally. As Karl Pearson (1892) wrote in his famous Grammar of Science concerning the implications of Weismann's theories: 'Strange as it may seem, the laboratory experiments of a biologist may have greater weight than all the theories of the state from Plato to Hegel!' (p. 28).

The opponents of Weismann, the Neo-Lamarckians, maintained that it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish between the factors of heredity and environment, especially in the case of man, whose will and training were supposed over the years to modify his inherited tendencies and habits anyway. Neo-Lamarckian beliefs basically were that the life history of an organism would by means of inheritance be reflected in the native givens of descendants of the organism. What was inherited, then, was only a generation or two previously (the number of generations and other circumstances varied with different writers) not inherent, but, on the contrary, environmental. Man, in the Lamarckian view, was of such a protean and idiosyncratic nature that studying him scientifically was either hazardous or entirely out of the question.

Weismann, by contrast, opened the door to the scientific study of man by suggesting that constant and observable, specifically human traits are carried from generation to generation unaltered and therefore are suitable objects of research. In the aftermath of the impact of Weismannism, writers such as the English biologist C. Lloyd Morgan (1896) and especially the American psychologist James Mark Baldwin (1896) began to differentiate two problems: social heredity, or culture

(civilization it was often called in those days), on the one hand, and, on the other hand, inherited human nature. The quest to ascertain the latter, man's inherited nature, was the chief source of the renaissance in human instinct theory in Freud's time: the instincts represented the most important of the eternal human traits. Before Weismann, instincts were seen to have their origins in the habits developed by one's ancestors; afterward, each instinct was assumed to be a distinctive and stable biological racial trait.

The renewed inquiry in the wake of Weismann's assertions brought forth a number of attempts to define just what those traits might be. The resulting lists of human instincts that various thinkers compiled were almost invariably traditional and very often circular. Mostly the instincts were used to explain the existence of recognized social institutions. The best known such inventory was that of William McDougall (1909), who on empirical grounds postulated, for example, an instinct of pugnacity, which explains war and other combative behavior. Man was often known to be pugnacious in his conduct, and the existence of an instinct for pugnacity—an unchanging hereditary trait—could therefore not be doubted. Needless to say, sooner or later, beginning especially in the 1910's, this type of instinct theory became discredited. Hard-headed young professionals, such as the social psychologist L. L. Bernard (1924), applied devastating logic to the instinct literature of the post-Weismann period, and the entire concept became untenable in science for some time *(cf.,* Krantz and Allen, 1967; Cravens, 1969; Cravens and Burnham, 1971). Only with difficulty did a single theory of instinct survive the debacle: the instinctual drive theory of Freud.[8]

[8] Lashley (1938) asserts that the anti-instinct campaign was aimed primarily at the positing of imaginary forces that were supposed to explain behavior. In the course of the battle, genetic acquisitions of all mental determinants got destroyed too. Freud obviously escaped better than most theorists the onus of postulating imaginary forces because his theorizing was thought to be internally relatively consistent and because his basic model was familiar and accepted.

Freud therefore presents a paradox: he was, as Ritvo (1965) has shown, a convinced Lamarckian to the end of his days. Yet in a scientific world dominated by Weismannism, the instinct theory that survived best was his. Two questions have therefore to be separated. One is the origin of Freud's ideas and how he articulated them into a system. The other, and independent, question is the uses that his audience made of his ideas.

It should be noted that over the years Freud frequently confronted and rejected Weismannian ideas of inheritance. In 1908, for example, Ehrenfels brought the subject up at a meeting of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society over which Freud, as usual, presided (*cf.*, Nunberg and Federn, 1962-1967, II, p. 93). Indeed, as late as the World War I period Freud proposed to Otto Rank that they collaborate in writing a vindication of Lamarckianism, a project that ultimately came to nothing (Ritvo, 1965).[9] Weismannism also came to Freud's attention specifically in his reading on the question of instincts. Through the student of Weismann, zoologist H. E. Ziegler, the eminent Swiss psychologist Karl Groos (1896, 1899) came to the conclusion that instinctive reactions are species specific traits transmitted unaffected by environmental influences.[10] Freud early knew Groos's work, if not Ziegler's. He cited Groos, for instance, for the instinctual drives *(Triebe)* that lead to children's discovering in the course of play the pleasurable economy of psychical energy derived from repetition of the similar or familiar (Freud, 1905a, p. 128).

[9] In 1913, Freud spoke of the biological 'conception of an immortal [*unsterblichen*] germ plasm' and added: 'It is only this conception which enables us rightly to understand the part played by the sexual instinctual forces in physiology and psychology' (p. 182). He was arguing the importance of sexual instinctual drives in life by suggesting their biological importance as well as by showing their many facets and transmutations. Since the statement was contemporary with his expressions of strongly Lamarckian views, it seems likely that he had in his mind somehow reconciled the germ plasm idea with the idea of inherited traits that could nevertheless be changed from generation to generation.

[10] For details about the relationship between Weismannism and instinct theory in German language science, where the issues were connected with the vitalism controversy, see Burnham (1972).

In spite of his exposure to Weismannian ideas of inheritance and instinct, Freud clung stubbornly to his Lamarckian beliefs. His interest in maintaining the validity of the phylogenetic nature of inborn acquired characteristics was connected primarily with his concern that civilization and cognate repressive forces be understood to be phylogenetic. His successors and interpreters tended to accept Weismannism and did not find the hypothesis of phylogenesis necessary for advocating and explicating psychoanalysis. Freud (1918 [1914], p. 97), it is true, urged searching for ontogenetic factors in a clinical case before attempting to invoke the phylogenetic. And what his followers found essential in both theory and clinic was the organic basis of the human instinctual drives. Nor was their reading particularly strained. Even Freud (e.g., 1905 [1901], pp. 112-114) pictured as the irreducible physical-hereditary factors in psychoanalytic theory only faulty function (as opposed to content) of the nervous system, and somatic determinants of instinctual drives (*cf.*, Ritvo, 1965). Neither factor necessarily committed a freudian to either Weismannism or Lamarckianism. He could treat the instinctual drive as a representative of the somatic without getting involved in biological questions.

Freud's teachings about human instincts, as a matter of fact, had an origin independent of biological theory such as would have become involved in the Weismannism-Lamarckianism controversy. Freud as a physician had available to him from the literature of medicine an alternative view of heredity, a view more directly relevant to human instinct theory than that growing out of theoretical and experimental biology. Physicians, whatever their systematic speculations about heredity, had always tended to assume that traits persisted from one generation to another and that those traits were generally manifested in entire races. The medical men, whether or not Lamarckians in the abstract, in practice had to adhere to the old dogma, 'Like begets like'. From ancient times inherited defect and familial tarantism were known, and the study of hemophilia, color blindness, and other such diseases was accelerated as clinical and familial statistical studies were ac-

cumulated during the nineteenth century (*cf.*, for example, Lauder, 1887).

Particularly were specialists in nervous and mental diseases interested in inheritance. Since the etiology of most of these illnesses was at best unclear, studies that showed tendencies of such afflictions to run in families suggested to clinicians that they were dealing with patients suffering from an inherent defect. Because of the social implications of such inheritances, late nineteenth century medical writers devoted a great deal of attention to the inheritance of defect, disease, predisposition to disease, general physical weakness, and all kinds of mental and moral tendencies. Most of these physicians tended to speak of Daltonism and brachydactyly but in fact were basically preoccupied with mental illness, inebriety, and criminality. Thus even in medicine in this period social questions preconditioned the channeling of scientific energies. (For a typical example, see Dietrich, 1902.)[11]

For the Aristotelian physicians of that day, 'mind' could in some metaphysical way be inherited. But for those like Freud, tending to physicalistic explanations of life and even of human phenomena, it was the inheritance of organic weakness of the nervous system that explained the failures of a patient to react in normal ways, especially under unfavorable circumstances when the physical vulnerability could be expected to show up. These hypotheses of native infirmities of course applied as well to tubercular patients, whose malady could be shown to run in families, as to nervous patients, where a similar ancestral taint could likewise often be detected. Such inheritances were viewed sometimes as inherited traits, sometimes as a loosely defined, more or less inherited degeneracy, that is, a defect in the function of the process of endowing progeny with traits (and often a slipshod empirical version of Lamarckianism). Freud throughout his life believed that his patients suffered from congenital neuropathic constitutions, although he also held that the derivation of the individual patient's tendency to fall ill is of little consequence in the clinic except as it might suggest to the

[11] For an annotated bibliography of this literature, see Brodmann, 1896-1897.

physician how to shape a therapeutic regime (e.g., Freud, 1905 [1901], p. 113).

Yet Freud and other physicians were led to posit and deal with one piece of inheritance that appeared regularly in practice: it was the sexual instinct, and in medical treatises, whatever the author's ethical-social stance or psychological theory, this instinct was admitted to be general, inherited, and human as well as animal. Conceivably, medical writers could have used psychology or biology to explain the generative instinct away, for example in associationist or Lamarckian terms, as other instincts were diluted or ignored.[12] But in medicine the sexual instinct was dealt with directly. Furthermore, by the turn of the century specialists in nervous and mental diseases had already undertaken substantial investigations of the clinical manifestations of this instinct.

Since Freud's experience with patients in the 1890's had already convinced him of the overwhelming importance of libidinal strivings in the psychical apparatus, he was of course familiar with psychiatric-neurological writings on sexuality. It was only natural, therefore, that in his general psychological theory he employed the familiar sexual instinct as the paradigm for instinctual drive.[13] Indeed, in the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality in which the instinctual drive concept was introduced as such, Freud (1905b) in his first footnote mentioned that he expected his readers to be familiar with his ideas: 'The information contained in this first essay', he wrote, and he might have included large parts of the other two essays, 'is derived from the well-known writings of Krafft-Ebing, Moll, Moebius, Havelock Ellis, Schrenck-Notzing, Loewenfeld, Eulenburg, Bloch and Hirschfeld, and from the *Jahrbuch für sexuelle Zwischenstufen* . . .' (p. 135, n.).

[12] As Preyer (1884b, p. 202) and others recognized, in any individual the truly instinctual is very hard to separate from life history, except for sexual behavior. The conventional medical view of instinct in the abstract was no different or better than that in biology (see Littré, 1878, pp. 817-818).

[13] Bibring (1941) and Sterba (1942) recognized the importance of this model to Freud's thinking, and as early as 1913 Freud spelled out why sex had to be so important (pp. 179-182). See also, Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1953.

By the time of his essay, Instincts and Their Vicissitudes, Freud (1915a) had made his conception more systematic. He listed there four aspects of an instinct: its pressure (presumably quantitative); its aim, that is, satisfaction by reducing stimulation; the object of the instinct through which satisfaction can be gained; and the somatic source of the instinct. This model of an instinct is distinctive in two important respects. First, unlike biological or simple reflex models, it tends to avoid the stimulus-response pattern and, instead, to introduce one much more useful for the explanation and exploration of both normal and pathological behavior. Second, the basic components—pressure, source, aim, and object—were already well worked out in connection with a specific instinct.[14]

The great psychiatrist, Krafft-Ebing, serves as the superlative example of writers on whom Freud could and, as he said explicity, did draw for his conceptualization of a human instinct (see, for instance, Freud, 1887-1902, p. 234). Krafft-Ebing was professor at the University of Vienna and an academic sponsor of Freud for some years. He was also a leader in the scientific study of human sexual phenomena. In his monumental Textbook of Insanity (1883, originally published in 1879), Krafft-Ebing noted that there are two kinds of instincts *(Triebe)* known from physiology: self-preservation and sex *('einen Erhaltungs- und einen Geschlechtstrieb')* (*cf.*, chap. 4, especially p. 77). In the clinic, he said, one can see these instinctual drives increased, decreased, and perverted. As he developed the place of instincts in abnormal behavior, Krafft-Ebing discussed the pathological deflections from the aim and object of the sexual instinct *(trieb)*, and in this classic text and elsewhere

[14] The present paper does not include a discussion of the economic viewpoint of instinctual drive theory; such exposition would in any case serve merely to confirm the points presently under discussion. See, for example, Strachey, S. E., I, pp. 394-397, and Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1949. According to Rubinstein (1965, especially pp. 44, 49), 'Sexual excitation and its discharge through coitus are paradigmatic for the economic viewpoint'. Somatic and psychical models or levels of discussion became confused, particularly in the concept of psychical energy, and recent thinkers have suggested abandoning the energic construct in psychoanalysis (*cf.*, Kubie, 1947).

he made it clear that the instinct had an organic basis existing antecedent to any possible external stimulus.

Within the field of medical sexology, Krafft-Ebing was and is best known for his *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1892, first published in 1886), a descriptive work giving the details of various sexual perversions and classifying them. In his descriptions, Krafft-Ebing included some theoretical discussions incidentally, and it was such material that Freud assumed that his readers were acquainted with. From the standard sexological literature of the day, Krafft-Ebing incorporated the idea of actions symbolic of sexual deeds, the notion of erogenous zones, and other concepts (such as moral masochism) that were frequently known in later years from the writings of Freud rather than from the original body of science and scholarship with which Freud, as he said, started.

Krafft-Ebing is only one example; one can find similar ideas in other authors who wrote on sexual subjects before 1900 and who were cited by Freud. The works of standard general psychiatric writers, such as Emil Kraepelin, are of particular importance to illustrate how well known such thinking was in medicine. Kraepelin (1899, p. 227) explicitly spoke of transformations of the sexual instinctual drive *(die Umwandlungen des Geschlechtstriebes)* comparable to the vicissitudes of the drive *(Triebschicksale)* described by Freud, and suggested that such variations belong to the realm of compulsive actions. Kraepelin and most of his colleagues utilized a psychiatric psychology consonant with traditional academic psychology—he was, after all, a student of Wilhelm Wundt—; that is, he conceptualized psychical operations in terms of cognition, feelings, and will. But virtually all of the medical writers whom Freud was likely to have read, like Kraepelin, treated the sexual instinctual drive as a special case of one kind or another. They spoke of its quantitative strength and weakness, its aim or means of satisfaction as plastic and changeable, and what were appropriate and inappropriate objects.[15] (*Cf.*, for example,

[15] Hunger was dealt with often in a parallel way, and perversions of it taken up systematically but not as extensively and clearly as in the case of sex. Freud

Clouston, 1884; Kirchhoff, 1892; and Amacher's 1965, chapters 2-3, discussion of Freud's own immediate teachers.) Krafft-Ebing was simply the most comprehensive and consistent of the medical writers before Freud.[16]

Ellenberger (1970, e.g., pp. 291-303, 502-510) and others have, therefore, not surprisingly found many nineteenth century anticipations of Freud's systematic teachings about sex, and especially about the instinctual aspects of sexual phenomena. To a large extent such critics miss the significance of their own data: namely, that which Freud really did contribute can be sorted out from that which was familiar. He did not discover the perversions, for example, or even childhood sexuality, although he did effectively suggest that infants' behavior was essentially sexual in nature (*cf.*, Kern, 1970).[17]

What Freud did do was to articulate a well-known model of instinct into a reductionistic association psychology—a feat his teacher Meynert (1884, pp. 169-170) thought impossible—and into a concomitant well-developed theory of psychopathology. Eventually, especially in 1920 and thereafter, Freud, while still following the basic paradigm, carried the concept of instinctual drive much further, utilizing, of course, refinements suggested

(1905b) himself opened the *Three Essays* by observing: 'The fact of the existence of sexual needs in human beings and animals is expressed in biology by the assumption of a "sexual instinct", on the analogy of the instinct of nutrition, that is of hunger' (p. 135). The fact remains that psychiatric writers who tried to discuss the instinct of hunger did so in terms of the model of the aims, objects, and perversions that had already been worked out for sex. Freud (*cf.*, Nunberg and Federn, 1962-1967, Vol. I, p. 86) in 1907 recognized this fact in a discussion of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society when he asserted that 'the comparison of hunger and love will remain unproductive until we know more about the sexual instinct . . .' . The use of the hunger example for expository purposes (e.g., Freud, 1916-1917, p. 313) tends to obscure the fact that the original model was the sexual instinctual drive.

[16] After a number of years, even Freud (e.g., 1923 [1922], p. 255, and editor's annotation) forgot how commonplace were the ideas that he was using and tended to remember single, outstanding sources of his concepts.

[17] Maudsley (1868, pp. 324-325), for instance, described cases in which very young children had manifested sexual behavior—'the instinct of propagation'—but he denied to the instinct in those so young either aim or object.

by Karl Abraham and others (*cf.*, Bibring, 1941).[18] But even in the earlier years Freud contributed important components to the instinctual drive theory, most notably the concept of repression and its corollary sequelae.

Freud could never have made such contributions had he not sharpened the instinct model that he adopted and adapted from the medical literature. Krafft-Ebing and his congeners talked about sexual drive *(Trieb)* in descriptive and functional terms—how people felt and what actions the drives led to, and what subjective feelings were involved. Freud tried to speak in psychological terms—how the mental apparatus operated to give instinctual drives expression (*cf.*, fn. 6 above). The result was a shift of emphasis. Where Krafft-Ebing and others tended to think of sexual pathology as the instinct somehow changed or gone wrong, either because of heredity or environmental influence, Freud pictured pathology as the result of malfunctioning in the psychic apparatus through which the drive passed (not malfunctioning of the drive itself) so that aim or object, for instance, not the drive, was abnormal or inappropriate. Etiology and treatment in the freudian schema, therefore, could center on the psychical apparatus rather than having to involve an unpredictable, changeable instinct. The result was both a psychology and a psychopathology that lent themselves to rational control and prediction on the presumption of a fixed structure (the psychical apparatus) and mechanical reactions, however complex and complicated.

Although Freud drew on a well-established medical tradition for his instinctual drive theory, most of his contemporaries and successors saw his work in a different context, as ordinary scientific instinct theory. Yet for them, too, familiarity with the literature of psychiatry and medical sexology made it easier to understand and accept Freud's formulations. The psychoana-

[18] Even after 1920, Freud (1923, especially p. 65) continued to suggest that the instinctual drives existed within the entire being of the person, before the ego and id could be differentiated. Those latter structures, and also the superego, he pictured as both logically and chronologically subsequent to the existence of instinctual drives. A practical summary of the later history is in Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1953, pp. 30-35.

lytic instinctual drive concept was therefore largely familiar; all that was necessary to assimilate it was to extend the concept to drives other than sex. Freud, indeed, soon subdivided the 'sexual' instinctual drive into a number of component drives.[19] Other writers to a remarkable extent believed that the freudians thought that man is motivated by only one instinct, sex. Still, given the familiarity of intellectuals of the early twentieth century with the medical concept, it is little wonder that they confused the original operational model with other varieties of instinctual drives. This very familiarity with a model, however, furthered the influence of Freud when other investigators, too, endeavored to find a workable conceptualization of the whole range of human instincts. Even in contemporary discussions (such as Dahl, 1968), the libidinal instinctual drive remains central and modal and presents grave intellectual problems for those who attempt to fit aggression, for example, into the original pattern (*cf.,* Brenner, 1971).

Freud is best viewed, then, not so much as an innovator in instinct theory as a creative transitional figure who stood midway between the sexologists and later instinct theorists such as the ego psychologists of our own time. He took an existing concept of instinct and refined it so that it would serve both psychology and psychopathology. But in the process he shifted the emphasis within the customary conceptualization.[20] As Wettley and Leibbrand (1959, p. 79; see also, Freud, 1905b, p. 149, n.) point out, Krafft-Ebing and the sexologists emphasized the sexual object, the person's ultimate behavior, but Freud emphasized the sexual aim. For Freud and the twentieth century, the focus of interest and investigation became the operation of the instinct itself, but only as it passed through the psychical apparatus.

Freud's teachings about instinctual drives fitted the needs of other thinkers of the new century in many ways. That he himself was not touched by new scientific thinking after 1900

[19] *Partialtriebe;* see Freud, 1905b, pp. 166, 168, n.; 1908a, pp. 170-171; 1908b, pp. 187-188.

[20] Again, quantitative and energic dimensions are being avoided here.

and that he worked independently of most contemporaneous writers on instinct theory, is of course irrelevant to the logic and actual process of the dispersion of his ideas. Up to then the amount of confusion engendered by the instinct concept rendered it useless in scientific explanation. Albert Moll, for example, the eminent physician who was himself working to refine sexual drive theory, complained in 1898 of the 'confusion' about *Instinct* in the psychological literature (p. 225). At that time most instinct theory was teleological in nature, emphasizing the adaptive or survival value of any given inherited reaction or tendency, which was consonant with the equating of human drives with animal instincts noted above. When, then, Freud continued to try to maintain a purely human psychological model in discussing instinctual drive, he showed how to avoid many of the problems that conventional conceptualizations generated, particularly evolutionary purpose (*cf.*, Hartmann, 1948).[21]

By 1915, Freud (1918 [1914], pp. 119-121) could acknowledge that his Lamarckian, phylogenetic explanations of the repressive force of civilization were not essential to his paradigm of an instinctual drive. Other thinkers could and did utilize his model of an instinct in a Weismannian context simply by assuming that society by environmental influence gave form to the repressive forces. Perhaps the most striking evidence that Freud's ideas could be adapted to non-Lamarckian theory is the fact that Freud's own teachers, with whom he shared many basic assumptions, to a surprising extent found their work compatible with a Weismannian view of instincts. Ziegler (e.g., 1910, p. 48), for example, cited both Carl Claus, with whom Freud studied biology, and Theodor Meynert as examples of eminent scientists who were early sympathetic to Weismann's arguments. Meynert is of special interest because it was his work that Ziegler (1892, pp. 134-135) cited to show the com-

[21] Freud (1913) spoke of his 'efforts to prevent biological terminology and considerations from dominating psycho-analytic work', but he again characterized the instinctual drive (*Trieb*) as a phenomenon of 'the frontier between the spheres of psychology and biology' (pp. 179-182).

patibility of the idea of fixed, inherited instincts with a radical physicalistic reductionism (see also, Meynert, 1884, p. viii). Other of Freud's contemporaries, such as the Vienna-trained Swiss psychiatrist-biologist, Auguste Forel (1899, p. 25, n.; 1937, p. 164), showed a similar affinity for Weismann's viewpoint. (Groos, 1896, p. 51, has a long list of eminent converts to Weismannism, notable for the large proportion who dealt with psychological and instinctual topics.)

There was, after all, no necessary connection between the sexologists' idea of sexual instinct and the Weismannism that led to the early twentieth century interest in instincts in general. Freud's consistent Lamarckianism provides an excellent example. Still another striking instance is found in Moll's work. In 1898 he devoted an entire book to the nature of *libido sexualis*. There he cited Weismann extensively on cytology and the process of human generation. But in discussing the question of how much and how the sex instinct *(Trieb)* is inherited in both men and animals, Moll explicitly rejected Weismannism and argued that conscious sexual choice has been inherited (pp. 101-102, 214-225).

Yet increasingly thinkers of the day showed that Weismann's views could well accommodate ideas about instinctual drives that were modeled on the 'sexual instinct' as known from medicine. The most dramatic instance is provided by Orschansky (1903) who discussed the sexual instinct specifically as a human trait inherited according to Weismannian principles. He then went on to suggest incidentally that all human instincts were inherited, unmodified by any Lamarckian factors, and that they operated like the sexual.[22]

Such thinkers as Orschansky raise the question as to why their works fell into obscurity and why those of Freud did not. Initially it is obvious that Freud's instinctual drive theory was

[22] Orschansky (see also, 1894a, 1894b) was preoccupied early by the problem of identifying traits and followed Weismann's teachings to try to solve the problem. He did not refine the concept of instinct as Freud did. For another example of the increasing compatibility of the sexual instinct model and Weismannism, see Groos (1896, p. xxii).

subsequently extremely important in the arena from which it was derived, medicine. Freud's teachings helped psychopathologists turn their attention to the workings of instinctual forces within the patient's mind, typically the mechanisms by which drives gain symbolic expression.[23] In broader biological and social theory, Weismann's teachings created a need for a model of instinct that was similarly useful. When the first endeavors to identify a series of instincts in the human species failed, Freud's work provided the model that was useful. Many writers, without making a distinction between drive and instinct, borrowed freudian instinctual drive as a convenient equivalent to concepts and conceptualizations with other origins. As noted above, both familiarity with the old medical concept of human sexual instinct and the care with which Freud worked out his concept contributed to the pragmatic way in which writers used his work (and often ignored more unfamiliar material). Freud's later structural refinements included an impressive portrayal of a combination of a person's adaptation to both reality and instinctual drive, a *tour de force* that further strengthened the intellectual appeal of freudian formulations (*cf.*, Rapaport, 1959, pp. 10-11).

Wilfrid Trotter, Ernest Jones's brother-in-law, provides an explicit example of the kind of need that Freud's instinctual drive concept met in Western culture. In his book, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War, Trotter (1919) spoke about his belief that psychology, 'especially when studied in relation to other branches of biology, . . . is capable of becoming a guide in the actual affairs of life and of giving an understanding of the human mind such as may enable us in a practical and useful way to foretell some of the course of human behaviour' (p. 6). Trotter hoped that a 'scientific statecraft' would develop to bring about permanent social progress. 'Such a statecraft', he said, 'would recognize how fully man is an instinctive being . . .' (p. 252). And instincts Trotter believed to be hereditary units. It is hardly to be wondered at that Trotter adopted

[23] Once again, discussion of economic and energic points of view is being omitted.

Freud's model of instinctual drive to suggest the way in which instincts operate among humans.

Trotter's suggestion that knowledge and manipulation of human instincts could be made the basis of a new societal order represented an unusually clear statement of the social usefulness of a viable instinct theory in the early twentieth century. Many thinkers, especially in England and America, quickly perceived the implications of Weismann's suggestion that the biological basis of human behavior is fixed from generation to generation. And as the new century progressed, the urgency of understanding men's actions increased.

Max Weber and many of his successors have pointed out that Western European and American society more and more in the *fin de siècle* period was becoming industrialized and bureaucratic. Human beings in this bureaucratic society became extremely dependent upon one another, and the behavior of a person therefore took on momentous consequences because he could affect the lives of so many others. Managers of such societies had to put great premium upon the predictability and control of human conduct.[24] As Pearson and Trotter and many others saw, Weismannism promised hard information about the traits of the people who had to be controlled. It was in this context, then, that Freud's instinctual drive theory with psychical structures became part of the knowledge by means of which the social managers thought that they could anticipate and limit the behavior of men. Under these circumstances Freud's theory, which had the advantage of being both familiar in part and very well thought out, was widely disseminated, and segments of his thinking became familiar to most well-read members of Western society.[25]

[24] The development of such a society is best worked out in specific historical material by Wiebe (1967). The relationship of psychological ideas to such a society is described in Burnham (1968).

[25] In the late 1960's, a number of thinkers attacked the validity of ideas of instinctual drives and other hereditary aspects of human personality. Such writers as Robert Jay Lifton (1961, 1968) emphasized the changeable, 'protean' nature of man and raised doubts as to whether or not libidinal instinctual drives or any other more or less specific inherited determinants could survive as fundamental concepts, even in a psychiatry that was supposed to be psychoanalytically oriented.

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The Concepts of the Pleasure Principle and Infantile Erogenous Zones Shaped by Freud's Neurological Education

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Panel on The Ideological Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis

THE CONCEPTS OF THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE AND INFANTILE EROGENOUS ZONES SHAPED BY FREUD'S NEUROLOGICAL EDUCATION

BY PETER AMACHER, PH.D. (SANTA YNEZ, CALIF.)

Freud acquired a complete education in neurology from his teachers in Vienna. Their neurology was as ambitious as Freud's metapsychology in that they related it to the whole range of human activity: their writings describe the 'nervous' events happening during suicide, the development of homosexuality, and even the appreciation of the play, Œdipus Rex. The usual interpretation of Freud's intellectual development is that he gradually departed from this neurological approach (*cf.*, for instance, Jones, 1953). My view is that Freud's metapsychology remained entirely compatible with the neurology he had learned in Vienna (Amacher, 1965). Some of his theories—on repression most notably—were unaffected by his adherence to orthodox neurology. Others were restatements of orthodox neurology in metapsychological terms. Still others resulted from fitting his clinical findings into the inherited neurological scheme. This last will be discussed here.

Fortunately for the historian, the three teachers with whom this paper is concerned all wrote full expositions of their neurological ideas. Ernst Brücke's lectures in physiology were recorded and published as a book in 1876; the lectures were recorded during the term that Freud attended them as a medical student. Theodor Meynert published his Psychiatry in 1884 when Freud was working in Meynert's laboratory. Sigmund Exner was a teacher and long-time acquaintance of Freud. His Introduction to a Physiological Explanation of Psychological Phenomena was published in 1894, the year before Freud wrote his most explicitly neurological treatise, Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895).

In this paper I will switch back and forth from psychological to neurological terminology in describing the ideas of Freud and his teachers. This is their own style and it avoids the awkwardness of describing an event twice—as viewed psychologically and as viewed physiologically.

Two specific ideas show the influence of Freud's neurological education on his metapsychology. The first of them is the hydraulic reflex idea. (This is my term, not that of Freud or Freud's teachers.) Freud's teachers assumed this to be the basic functional principle of the nervous system. In Freud's work, it became the idea that all function was reducible to the pleasure principle and that primary processes are wish-fulfilment processes. The second idea is that of infantile erogenous zones. Freud's teachers were of the usual medical opinion that sexual excitation began at puberty. While accepting the hydraulic reflex idea, Freud had clinical evidence that was not in accord with it nor with the orthodox view on sexual excitation beginning with puberty. So he dropped the orthodox view on puberty but not the orthodox view on the hydraulic reflex.

The hydraulic reflex idea views the nervous system as quite similar to a complex of tubes through which something rather like a fluid—something quantitative, called excitation or nerve energy—flows under pressure. The pressure is generated by the sense organs when they are stimulated, in proportion to the amount of stimulation. The fluid flows through the tubes, through the nervous system, and is discharged at the motor end of the system—primarily in the contraction of muscles. The quantity of fluid remains constant in its transit through the system so that the amount of motor activity is proportional to the amount of stimulation. The more painful the stimulation of a limb, the more motor activity is exerted to remove the limb from the painful stimulus. The more hunger—and here the sense organs are internal rather than external—the more active the individual is in seeking food.

At the time of Freud's neurophysiological education, one could find experimental support for this concept. Electrical recordings from sensory nerve tracts showed an increase in

voltage when the strength of the stimulus increased. The voltage recorded was assumed to be proportional to the amount of excitation passing. That this was the result of bringing into function more channels—or neurons—was not realized. Consciousness happened when the excitation, on its way from sense organs to motor organs, passed through the cerebral cortex. In spinal reflexes, excitation passed through innately determined channels. It resulted in motor acts which brought about the end of the inflow from the sense organs. The painfully stimulated limb is flexed. In the cortex the channels are opened up during the life of the individual. This happens in learning. Learning, or the opening of new channels, takes place when the innate channels do not serve to end the pressure of excitation from the organs.

Both Meynert and Freud took a baby's learning to nurse as a paradigm of the opening up of cortical pathways. Meynert did so in his Psychiatry (1884, pp. 169-176), Freud in the Project for a Scientific Psychology (1895, pp. 379-381, 390), in the theoretical discussion in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900-1901, p. 565), and in his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905, pp. 180-187). When excitation enters the nervous system—the concomitant of hunger—, the infant's nervous system first channels it through innately determined pathways. The baby kicks and screams, but these acts do not stop the inflow of excitation from the internal sense organs. Then the mother turns the baby's mouth to her nipple, the baby sucks, and the inflow from the sense organs ceases. The next time the baby is hungry, the excitation passes through the cortical channels which have been opened up—those which serve the turning of his head to the nipple. There is no transfer of excitation through innate or learned pathways until the sense organs are stimulated. There is no nervous function without stimulation. As Meynert (1884) put it: 'The brain does not radiate its own heat; it obtains the energy underlying all cerebral phenomena from the world beyond it' (p. 160). In Freud's metapsychological terminology, this became the pleasure principle, the tend-

ency of the psychical apparatus to function so as to discharge the excitation which impinges upon it.

Freud fit his clinical findings into this hydraulic reflex concept. When he and Breuer wrote Studies on Hysteria[1] they theorized that the intense and long-lasting nervous and mental activity manifested in hysteria resulted from excitation flowing in from the sex organs. Breuer wrote that 'in the first place' among the causes of the increases of excitation were the 'organism's major physiological needs and instincts: need for oxygen, craving for food, and thirst'. Their patients, however, were not oxygen-deprived, nor hungry, nor thirsty so that the sex organs were 'undoubtedly the most powerful source of persisting increases of excitation (and consequently of neuroses)' (Breuer and Freud, 1893-1895, pp. 199-200). Since excitation was passing through the nervous channels in quantity, the hydraulic reflex idea necessitated a sensory source for it and the sex organs were the obvious choice.

Freud's theory that dreams are wish-fulfilment processes was a part of his concept that all mental processes are wish-fulfilment processes. In the Project for a Scientific Psychology, he stated that he meant by 'wish' the cortical pathway which had previously been opened up to discharge excitation flowing in from the sense organs. The hungry baby wished for the mother's nipple because a cortical channel representing the nipple had been part of the complex of channels opened up when the baby first stopped the inflow of hunger excitation. In the simplest case, a slightly hungry baby would dream of the nipple because there was a slight inflow of excitation from the hunger sense organs. If there was too much hunger excitation flowing in, the baby would wake up. Freud thought that excitation inflows of low quantity were a condition of sleep.

Freud did not give much attention to the interpretation of dreams until after he had arrived at the theory of their wish-fulfilment nature. He made this momentous theoretical advance while he was writing the Project for a Scientific Psychology in

[1] Breuer is listed as the author of the theoretical section, but there is every reason to assume that the theory was shared by Freud.

the summer of 1895. The first dream he interpreted in detail was one dreamed that summer and reported in the Project. Thereafter, interpretation of his own dreams became the central part of his self-analysis. It was while engaged in his self-analysis that he arrived at his theory of infantile erogenous zones. The influence of the neurology of his teachers is again shown in the development of Freud's theory of infantile erogenous zones. When he interpreted his own dreams in his self-analysis, he found evidence of intense mental activity related to sex in his own infancy. There is no detailed record of these dream interpretations, but the results of them are in his letters to Wilhelm Fliess. In a letter of October, 1897, Freud (1887-1902) wrote that when he was two, '. . . libido towards *matrem* was aroused; the occasion must have been the journey with her from Leipzig to Vienna, during which we spent a night together and I must have had the opportunity of seeing her *nudam* . . .' (p. 219). 'Libido' was intended in the sense he was to use it in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, where he described it as the sexual counterpart of hunger. In his next letter to Fliess, Freud described his love of his mother and jealousy of his father, called this a 'general phenomenon of early childhood', and related it to the Œdipus legend (p. 223). The letter after that described infants' 'longing' for 'sexual experiences' that they had already known (p. 226).

Because he held to the idea of the hydraulic reflex, Freud had to assume that the infant must have a source of considerable excitation in order to have 'libido' aroused or 'sexual experience'. By the next month, November, 1897, Freud had identified the source. He wrote Fliess, 'We must suppose that in infancy sexual release is not so much localized as it becomes later, so that zones which are later abandoned (and possibly the whole surface of the body) stimulate to some extent the production of something that is analogous to the later release of sexuality' (p. 232). The nervous system does not run unless excitation is streaming in. New channels for transmission of excitation are not opened up unless the innate channels will not serve to end the influx of excitation. Freud did not need

to suppose anything about sources of excitation to make the generalization that infants have sex-related mental activity. But to save the hydraulic reflex theory, which he had incorporated into the substantial beginnings of his metapsychology, he needed to postulate infantile erogenous zones. His later theory of psychosexual development, as in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, is an elaboration of the ideas in his letters to Fliess. In the letter just quoted he mentioned the anal and the oral regions as sources of excitation. Freud's concern with the sources of excitation that power the developing apparatus shaped his theory of the phases of psychosexual development.

Crucial parts of Freud's metapsychology—the theories on the pleasure principle and on infantile erogenous zones—were shaped by his neurological education. Other parts of it—repression, and I might add transference—do not seem to have been much influenced by his teachers. But these, and other parts of the metapsychology, did not conflict with the neurology he had learned. Freud challenged any number of orthodox views in his intellectual career, but his metapsychology was built on and shaped by orthodox neurology.

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The Ego and the Unconscious: 1784-1884

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Panel on The Ideological Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis

THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: 1784-1884

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In a panel on the topic, Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis, we are well advised to distinguish between the wellsprings for which the historical evidence is speculative or presumptive and those for which the evidence is authenticated. Hypnosis is one of the roots that lies in the latter category; it is authenticated and well documented. As a result of the recently completed Standard Edition, it is now possible to begin with Volume I and trace Freud's beginnings in private practice with hypnosis, his attempts to perfect himself in its techniques and conceptualizations, and his abandonment of it in favor of his newly invented psychoanalysis. This was followed after two and three decades by his later reflections, acknowledgments, and perspectives on hypnotism in its various aspects.

Thus he wrote in 1923, 'It is not easy to over-estimate the importance of the part played by hypnotism in the history of the origin of psycho-analysis. From a theoretical as well as from a therapeutic point of view, psycho-analysis has at its command a legacy which it has inherited from hypnotism.' Thanks to the work of Liébeault, Bernheim, Heidenhain, and Forel, 'the genuineness of these phenomena was recognized'. Two important lessons could be drawn from hypnotism. Freud continued: 'First, one was given convincing proof that striking somatic changes could after all be brought about solely by mental influences, which in this case one had oneself set in motion. Secondly, one received the clearest impression—especially from the behaviour of the subjects *after* hypnosis—of the existence of mental processes that one could only describe as "unconscious". The "unconscious" had, it is true, long been under discussion among philosophers as a theoretical concept; but now for the

first time, in the phenomena of hypnotism, it became something actual, tangible and subject to experiment. Apart from all this, hypnotic phenomena showed an unmistakable similarity to the manifestations of some neuroses'[1] (Freud, 1924 [1923], p. 192).

The Standard Edition, however, does not include Bernheim's often neglected historical work rewritten in translation from French to German by Freud. The would-be historian therefore misses a necessary supplement to an understanding of some of Freud's perspectives. It is true that Freud's talents as a writer were acknowledged universally even as early as his letter to Emil Fluss in 1873 at age seventeen (*cf.*, E. Freud, 1960, pp. 3-6). But his writing talents as a translator of the works of others, such as John Stuart Mill in 1880 and later Charcot and Bernheim, are less well known to the English-speaking public.

Following a trip to Nancy, the acquisition of some Bernheim memorabilia, and a rapid survey of the library at the medical school of Nancy, it occurred to me that much of the tradition so well known to Freud the translator was unavailable to us. I therefore prepared a motion picture in 1966 of visual materials available for the century 1784 to 1884, Centenaries of '84. The century spanned by these two dates included the critical examination of Mesmer's theoretical and therapeutic system by two royal commissions appointed by Louis XVI from among such scientists as Lavoisier, Benjamin Franklin, Bailly, DuJussieu, and physicians such as Guillotin, LeRoy, and others in 1784. It included as well the steady although apparently discontinuous progress of controlled research into what came to be known as hypnosis until its substantially psychologic character was established in Bernheim's book, *De la suggestion,* in 1884. It was the 1886 enlarged edition that Freud translated. As translator, he undoubtedly pondered, correlated, and considered carefully the works cited as refer-

[1] Tuke (1884) had also been impressed with the first point. See also, Bernheim, 1888, p. 188.

ences; in Chapter 7 of his translation Freud provides us with a brief but excellent summary of the history of hypnosis.

With the course thus charted by Bernheim and Freud, it is possible for the modern student to delve into the contributions of the multilingual literature written by each of the authors cited. When these are studied individually one sees steady progress yet continuing bafflement with the theoretical questions posed by hypnotic phenomena. Thus Freud might explain his later abandoned method of re-enforcing memory by putting pressure on the patient's forehead as 'momentarily intensified hypnosis', but follow this with the statement that 'the mechanism of hypnosis is so puzzling to me that I would rather not make use of it as an explanation' (Breuer and Freud, 1893-1895, p. 271).

As we know, Freud devised instead the method of free association to circumvent the subject's 'will', i.e., resistance. Later this was formulated as the system of ego defenses against 'pathogenic ideas', the forerunner of ego psychology (*cf.*, Hartmann, 1956). In 1894, therefore, Freud was no longer concerned with the baffling framework of hypnosis but had a new tool to approach the unconscious by way of the ego. It is a matter of speculation as to how many more decades or centuries the hypnotic erosion of the ego would have been used as a therapeutic and research tool by classical hypnotists without further advance had Freud not grasped the analogy and invented the psychoanalytic method for reaching the unconscious. The history of that era tells us of other physicians-turned-writer, such as Chekhov. But as pointed out elsewhere (Serota, 1967), here for the first time was a fiction-free writer-turned-physician for whom the minute mental contents of the unconscious inner life were of such overriding importance that his talents rapidly turned the hypnotic analogy into a new technique to approach the necessary mental state with the participation of the conscious ego. This was precisely formulated much later as the 'therapeutic split' in the ego (*cf.*, Sterba, 1934).

To return to Bernheim-Freud's *Die Suggestion und Ihre*

Heilwirkung, from the various historical references cited in Chapter 7 (and one in Chapter 8), one may, in the pursuit of continuities, trace Mesmer's writings to still earlier works. Thus Mesmer's thesis of 1766 bears out his indebtedness to the first 'space physician', Sir Richard Mead (1725), who carefully formulated and mathematically expressed effects of planetary gravity on the human body. This form of attraction was later further formulated by Mesmer as the effect of one body upon another or as animal gravity, and twelve years later as animal magnetism. In Mesmer's twenty-seven propositions of 1779, Historical Précis (1781), and Memoirs (1779), he described his theories. At the time of the aforementioned hearings of the Royal Commission in 1784, a wealth of literature for and against Mesmer's theories—some four hundred books and pamphlets—left no doubt about the existence of a newly defined healing principle which one human being could exercise upon another.

According to de Puységur (1784), Mesmer's illustrious disciple, the therapist must be a man of good will and healing intent, with confident presence and strong will. This gentleman, scientist, and lay magnetist said that the patient had but to 'believe and will' and in return would experience at first hand the influence of Mesmer's magnetic fluid. In treating his own peasants and neighbors at his estate in Buzancy, he observed the phenomenon he called *somnambulism* and clearly delineated the therapist-patient roles, a code of therapeutic ethics, and even the libidinal aspects of the relationship. He also discussed the problem of medical and lay magnetism.

In the hands of de Puységur, de Montravel, and others, including the Marquis de Lafayette, this new therapeutic tool was investigated but, even more importantly, its research value and necessary controls came to be appreciated. The first of Freud's two 'lessons' noted before were clearly demonstrated. First with his peasant, Victor, and later with others, de Puységur found that he could split mental processes under somnambulism, transpose sensory impressions, and induce somatic reac-

tions such as epistaxis and hypnotic hallucinations. These discoveries, baffling and unbelievable though they were, were the psychological equivalents of Lavoisier's recently published chemical analysis of oxygen. Mental states could now be created as well as dissected. It was to take a long while and many detours, however. The French Revolution intervened and, although de Puységur remained alive and active, he could no longer speak with any authority other than that of a citizen.

When we turn our attention to the relevant formulations of the 1784 Royal Commission on Mesmer's animal magnetism, we find that they attributed his undoubted results not to his hypothesized physical force but rather to the psychological ones of his patients and to human contact, imitation, and imagination. I do not wish to burden the reader with the details of an emerging hypno-psychology and its freeing itself from the non-scientific community of healers, phrenobiologists, electrobiologists, zoists, etc. They may be found in some references cited in the aforementioned Chapter 7 (see also, Chertok, 1968).

In his review of Forel, Freud (1888-1892) wrote: 'Three fundamentally different theories have been set up to explain the phenomena of hypnosis. The oldest of these, which we still call after Mesmer, supposes that, in the act of hypnotizing, an imponderable material—a fluid—passes over from the hypnotist into the hypnotized organism. Mesmer called this agent "magnetism". His theory has become so alien to our contemporary mode of scientific thought that it may be considered as eliminated' (p. 97).

I now return to the second of Freud's 'lessons'.

Evidence for 'the existence of mental processes that one could only describe as "unconscious"' arose from the discoveries of Deleuze,[2] Bertrand, and of Braid, who discounted the magnetic fluid; from the work of Abbe Faria and Azam (1887), who wrote on double consciousness, later quoted by Freud; and finally in 1866 from the work of Liébeault and his pupil, Bernheim. In

[2] Deleuze also delineated erotic elements in the magnetic rapport (*cf.*, de Saussure, 1943).

the course of the conceptualization of the somnambulic state, the nearly discredited workers with hypnosis constantly sought refuge in the epistemology of the philosophers of the academic community. Private practitioners such as Liébeault were automatically suspected, especially by physicians, of being non-scientific, well-meaning charlatans who duped their credulous patients. Thus Liébeault sold only one copy of his *Du sommeil* (1866). I will not consider here the views held by various philosophers from some of whose writings came the frame of reference by which the phenomena of hypnosis were squeezed into a Procrustean bed. The material studied in the unravelling of clinical medical problems did not concern them. When it came to formulating the moment to moment happenings of the hypnotic-magnetic situation, there were actually no satisfactory guidelines before 1784. The therapeutic value of hypnosis, coming as a brilliant discovery, had left philosophic man without conceptual 'tools'. Retrieval of face was long in coming.

A brief summary of Chapters 7 and 8 of the Bernheim-Freud work gives us the following historical landmarks en route from the 'alchemy' of animal magnetism to the scientific hypnosis of Bernheim's time.

In 1820 DuPotet did experiments with mesmerism at *La Salpêtrière*. Foissac in 1825 asked for a medical and scientific review of his own work by the Academy. In 1837 Husson and his committee responded with a report. They observed that physical contact put the magnetizer and the subject in rapport, and contact was no longer necessary upon repeated experiments.[3] Such phenomena as total concentration of attention on the magnetist, exclusion of external distractions, absence of pain, and other insensibilities occurred. In some subjects the somnambulism of de Puységur was seen. Husson's report was ignored and not published. Next came the report of academician Dubois on the experiments of Berna claiming to transfer sight. This resort to the miraculous resulted in adding the element of ridicule to that of scepticism, thus ending

[3] Freud was to rediscover this hypnotic data in *Studies on Hysteria*.

the era of animal magnetism.

The psychological aspects of the phenomenon were highlighted by the Portuguese, Abbe Faria, who claimed that the causes of somnambulism lay in the subject, not in the magnetizer, and that sleep could not be produced against the subject's will (a possible forerunner of the transference concept). He could produce sleep by suggesting it to the subject. Bertrand claimed that the effects were due to the mesmeric fluid, but General Noizet, a disciple of Abbe Faria, claimed the effects were psychological and lay in the imagination and convictions of the subject. In 1826 Bertrand described ecstasy as a condition characterized by loss of consciousness, moral inertia, loss of memory upon awaking, instinctive knowledge of remedies, thought transmission, sight without the use of the eyes, and exalted imagination. He remained a mesmerist, however, as did General Noizet.

The recognition of suggestion as the dominant force in these phenomena came from Dr. James Braid of Manchester in 1841. He totally discounted the theoretical mesmeric fluid in his definition of hypnosis. His use of concentrated gaze on a brilliant object and his production of self-hypnosis in subjects showed that 'the imagination becomes so lively that every idea spontaneously developed or suggested by a person to whom the subject gives this peculiar attention and confidence has the value of an actual representation for him'. Braid became trapped in his phrenological experiments, touching various areas of the scalp to produce corresponding images, passions, mental states, imitations, etc., and ignoring the elements of suggestion in these phenomena. The scene next shifted to America. Braid's The Power of the Mind over the Body (1843) had its counterpart in the work of Grimes and his electrobiology. This in turn returned to England as another derivative of the concept of mesmeric fluid.

In France these experiments were unknown. Durand de Gros (Dr. Philips) in 1855 tried to prove that the Braid doctrine of

concentration of attention and thought obtained by a fixation of the gaze had certain physiological counterparts. Thus sensibility required thought processes. If the latter were suspended, insensibility resulted. He proposed a succession of states. The first was a hypotaxic condition in which the arrest of general 'innervation' results in facilitated and excessive 'local' innervation. Next was the phase of ideoplastic innervation in which an '*idea* becomes the determining cause of the functional modification to be induced'.

Charpignon in 1862 wrote on the role of mental *(morale)* medicine in treating nervous maladies. His studies on hypnotic suggestion and suggestion in the waking state received for the first time an honorable mention at the Academy of Medicine. He brought attention to the use of hypnosis as anesthesia, citing the work of Cloquet, Loysel, and Joly.

In 1866 Liébeault wrote *Du sommeil et des états analogues*. He was, of course, the major exponent of suggestion before Bernheim. His conception resembled that of Durand de Gros. As quoted by Bernheim, Liébeault stated:

> The concentration of the mind on a single idea, the idea of sleep, facilitated by the fixation of the gaze, brings about the response of the body, the deadening of the senses, their isolation from the external world, and finally the arrest of thought, and an unvarying condition of consciousness. Suggestive catalepsy is the consequence of this arrest of thought. . . . His thoughts concentrated, the subject remains in relationship with the person who has put him to sleep. He hears him and receives impressions from him.
>
> Ordinary sleep does not differ from hypnotic sleep. The one is, like the other, due to the fixation of the attention and of the nervous force upon the idea of sleep. The individual who wishes to sleep, isolates his senses, meditates, and remains motionless. The nervous force concentrates itself so to speak at one point of the brain upon a single idea, and abandons the nerves of sensation, motion and special sense. . . .

> *But the ordinary sleeper is in relation with himself only.* The impressions conducted to his brain by the nerve of sensibility or of organic life may awaken diverse memory-sensations or images, which constitute dreams. Then dreams are spontaneous, that is to say, suggested by himself. By comparison, the *hypnotized subject* falls asleep with his thoughts fixed, *in relation with the hypnotizer;* hence, the possibility of the suggestion of dreams, ideas and acts by this foreign will.
>
> The loss of memory on waking from deep hypnosis comes from the fact that all the nervous force, collected in the brain during sleep, diffuses itself anew throughout the whole organism when the subject wakes, and this force, diminishing in the brain, makes it impossible for the patient to recall what he was conscious of before (Bernheim, 1888, pp. 138-139, italics added).

It is of great interest to the student of The Wellsprings of Psychoanalysis to see the theorizing that Freud had to translate from the French to his German edition of the Bernheim work. There are so many tantalizing analogies and unravelled edges, such as the analogy of sleeping and dreaming with the hypnotic state and suggestion. The problem of consciousness and unconscious mentation in both called for further formulation.

The next section, that on animal hypnosis, describes Czermak's work of 1873 with immobilization and the cataplectic state so familiar to medical students in the physiology laboratories. The earliest known experiments in this area were of course those of Athanasius Kircher in 1646. Preyer attributed this cataplectic state to fear.[4]

Bernheim refers to Charcot's work in 1878 and 1881, in which somnambulism was induced in hysterical patients, thus duplicating neurotic catalepsy with anesthesia. By fixation upon a bright light, the phenomenon of suggestion—that is to say, the underlying attitude impressed on the limbs—reflected itself in

[4] As psychoanalysts know, Ferenczi was later to propose two routes by which hypnosis could be induced: through an erotic relationship and through fear of the hypnotist.

the expression of the physiognomy (smiles, prayers). The sudden disappearance of the light replaced the catalepsy with a sleep with relaxation or lethargy; finally, the friction of the head transformed the lethargic state into somnambulism, with the possibility of walking and answering questions.

Bernheim then speaks of Hansen, the itinerant Danish hypnotist of 1879, who also impressed Freud, as we know from his autobiography. There is next a rapid survey of the works and psychophysiological theories of Preyer, Schneider, Berger, and others—emphasizing neurological and physiological factors (blood flow, reflexes, etc.)—and at greater length, the work of Despine.

One of the consequences of Bernheim's (1884) first work was that between 1885 and 1887, Bottey, Beaunis, Binet and Fere, and Gilles de la Tourette considered in their volumes such moral issues as civil rights and criminality under the influence of hypnosis. Delboeuf, Azam, and others wrote on hypnosis and psychophysiology, while Voisin, Forel, and others wrote on the therapeutic applications of this state. There are some thirty citations within a page to give the reader an excellent review of the concentrated work being done on the subject even as Freud's translation of Bernheim's book was in preparation.

Along with Bernheim's work on hypnosis, the year 1884 witnessed the publication of Meynert's Psychiatry, which set up a model of ego functioning totally devoid of the consequences of thinking through the problems of hypnosis. Hartmann (1956) considered the Meynert work the 'wellspring' of Freud's ego concept. It is well, therefore, to examine in detail this nonhypnotist viewpoint in order to compare it with a different ego concept quoted at length by Bernheim and attributed to Despine, who worked with somnambulism.

Meynert (1884), not being troubled with an acceptance of hypnosis as a useful tool, spoke of the term 'individuality', by which he implied the 'firmest associations . . . well nigh inseparable; the aggregate of "memories" forming a solid phalanx, the relation of which to conscious movements can

be defined with mathematical precision. This unequal activity of the forebrain, constituting individuality, varies as to content and degree with each person; it is also designated as the character of the individual' (p. 168). From this primary acceptance of a conscious ego, he then proceeded to the 'primary conception of the *ego* which is based on the perceptions of the body's circumference'. Instinct alone, Meynert felt, could not explain the connection between conscious and reflex movements. 'Hunger alone cannot account for a child's activities. *A nipple has first to be inserted to create the needed associations.* Hunger is but pain. Considering the *ego* in totality, it is a group of firmly fixed associations' (italics added).

Following a detailed discussion of function attributed to localized cerebral areas, Meynert returns to the 'phenomenon of the *ego* involved by the cortex cerebri and its medullary mass. . . . Suppose . . . there be a primary ego, a nucleus of individuality, defined by the limits of infant's body' coinciding with the mental concept of the body: there will be, as it were, a nucleus of the individuality. But the most frequently repeated perceptions of the outer world as well as those of the most frequently revived memories, and particularly those joined to the emotions, will enter into firm associations and will constitute the nuclei of a secondary individuality. Such memories will be more readily reproduced and will exert a greater psychomotor influence than transient impressions. And yet the substance of this secondary individuality lies beyond the circumference of the body itself and is made to include much of the external world. Meynert appears to be an exponent of Herbart's associationism as defined and reviewed by Ola Andersson (1962). He continues:

> The primary *ego* expands . . . by association; so that intimately related persons, property, skill obtained by constant practice in any art, science, a fondly cherished aim in life, convictions, patriotism and honor become part of the *ego.* That from among these component factors of the ego, the

> primary ego should be consciously endangered by surrendering one's own body, can be explained by assuming that component factors of the secondary *ego* have attained such a psychomotor intensity in the play of associations, as to become more effectual motives than the original motive of self-preservation. In fact, the very person who sacrifices his life believes that, in so doing, he preserves his own individuality which now includes so much beyond his own physical self . . . . in all the actions of man, be they ever so complicated, problematic, or incomprehensible, the avoidance of greater pain is the determining motive (pp. 175-176).

One wonders how much this last paragraph would have been altered had Meynert made room for the lesser surrender involved in ceding this 'individuality' in that regression in the service of the ego which we know as hypnosis. He too had a concept of the unconscious, as we read in small print in his Appendix, but basically it referred to the physiognomically visible expressions of emotions as illustrated by Darwin's (1872) work on the subject. Motivations and unconscious psychodynamics are not in that category.

Let us now examine the ego theory of a physician-hypnotist, Prosper Despine (1880), whom Bernheim quotes in his book. Bernheim says that the theory in part parallels the work of Herbert Spencer as well as his own clinical work with many aspects of somnambulism. It does stress the unconscious. Despine, as quoted by Bernheim (1888) stated:

> There exists an automatic cerebral activity which manifests itself without the concurrence of the Ego, for all central nervous centers possess, in accordance with the laws which govern their activity, an intelligent power, without any ego, and without personality. In certain pathological cerebral states the psychical faculties may manifest themselves in the absence of the ego, of the mind, of consciousness, and may give rise to acts similar to those which are normally manifested through the agency of the ego. This is automatic cerebral activity. That which manifests the ego on the contrary, is *conscious* cerebral activity.

> In the normal condition, these two activities are intimately bound together, they are but one, and manifest themselves conjointly; in certain pathological nervous states they may be separated and act alone. . . . Somnambulism is characterized physiologically, by the exclusive exercise of the automatic activity of the brain during the paralysis of its conscious activity. Hence the ignorance of the somnambulist of all that he has done in the somnambulistic condition does not arise from forgetfulness, but from the non-participation of the *ego* in these acts (pp. 116-117).

Bernheim later indicates that this is too mechanistic an explanation of complex behavior; that it makes of the somnambulist 'a decapitated frog'. Yet all of these writers were so perplexed by the phenomenon itself and so fascinated by the phenomena of unconscious mental activity that they missed the potentialities of the dynamic mental content available to them and, unlike Breuer, they failed to realize what could be done with catharsis. In fact, Bernheim, who claimed for himself the title of 'father of psychotherapy', in his 1910 Jubilee Address to his colleagues was increasingly pessimistic as he took issue with Despine, saying: 'In the realm of psychology the cause and essence of phenomena escape us'. Later he espoused suggestion alone without hypnosis, completely neglecting the unconscious.

Bernheim's theories were similar to those of prior decades when he spoke of acts in everyday life which 'occur automatically, involuntarily and unconsciously'. In this category he included vegetative phenomena, circulation, respiration, nutrition, secretion, excretion, peristalsis, and bodily chemistry. Reflexes and spinal neuronal integrations and automatism were easy to comprehend. One might even say they were 'instinctive'. 'Spinal memory supplements cerebral memory', said Bernheim. Then he quoted Despine:

> The most remarkable of these [automatic] acts are those which manifest facial expression, gestures, and bodily attitudes, imitative acts, which habitually are associated with various

> and indistinct feelings which are carried out by everyone, although they have never been learned. . . . Hate, anger, pride, cunning, admiration, etc., bring about in all persons who experience them the same muscular contractions, and consequently a similar expression (Bernheim, 1888, pp. 127-129).

Because of the gradual development of white brain matter (beginning at the end of the first month in the occipital lobes and in the fifth month anteriorly, although not completed until the ninth month), automatic acts as defined above always follow naturally developed patterns and characterize the ordinary impulsive, reflex activities of childhood. 'The automatic phenomena always persist and recur in all acts of life, sometimes isolated after being dominated and modified by consciousness. It often happens in the most enlightened, self-controlled man that a perceived impression is so intense that it is transformed into an automatic act before the moderating influence on consciousness has had time to prevent it.' (The more sophisticated psychopathology of everyday life seems unknown to Bernheim.)

As did Freud later on, Bernheim refers to Alfred Maury's work on hypnagogic hallucinations that occur briefly when 'the attention is distracted when the mind, losing distinct consciousness of the ego, becomes subject to the play of visions evoked by the imagination'.

In a similar category of imitative suggestion (later to be called identification?) is urinating or yawning at the sight of others doing the same. 'Some people are very susceptible to these sensory suggestions. They are endowed with lively imaginations, that is to say, they have a great aptitude for mentally creating an image of the suggestions induced by speech, vision and touch.' What was later to be called phantom limb was in this category as were Maury's hallucinated dreams. Bernheim states:

> These considerations . . . are sufficient demonstration of the fact that the normal, physiological state shows, in a rudimentary

> manner, phenomena analogous to those which are observed in hypnotism; that nature does not contradict herself and that there exists in our cerebro-spinal nervous apparatus an *automatism* by which we accomplish certain highly intricate acts, unconsciously and involuntarily, and through which we submit to a certain extent to orders which are given us, to movements which are communicated to us, and to sensory illusions which are suggestion. They also demonstrate that the condition of consciousness intervenes to modify or neutralize automatic actions, and to rectify or destroy false impressions insinuated into the nervous centers. . . . Suppress consciousness, suppress voluntary cerebral activity, and we have somnambulism. Such at least is the opinion of P. Despine (Chapter 8).

Bernheim, however, states that 'somnambulism is characterized physiologically by the exercise of the automatic activity alone of the brain, during the paralysis of the conscious activity, which manifests the *ego*'. His objections to Despine's idea regarding the nonmemory of the somnambulistic state arose from the facts that such forgetting did not always occur and that posthypnotic suggestion relieved it so that events could be recalled.

Bernheim points out that Chambard, using Maury's schema, relates sleep and hypnosis in the following succession. Sight first disappears; the other senses are at first exalted, then extinguished, taste being the last to disappear. The intellectual functions, being more active for a moment but no longer distracted by sensory stimuli, finally dissociate. Coördination, decision, and direction disappear, to be followed by will, attention, and judgment; finally memory gives way. The imaginative faculties, the faculties of suggestion and impulsion, are the only ones to persist for a while. Thus the brain is accessible to dreams, hallucinations, and 'curious conceptions'. These are obliterated in turn. 'For an instant, the *ego* alone watches over the intellectual faculties and the deadened senses; then it suddenly vanishes'.

It is interesting for the psychoanalyst to return to these

observations and theories about the hypnotic dissociation of the ego prior to sleep and hypnosis, and to understand some of the precursors of topography and dream psychology. Little of the French eighteenth and nineteenth century literature on hypnosis has been translated. One is struck by how often Bernheim, too, comes close to important formulations and then retreats. For example: 'The study of hypnotic phenomena makes the existence of latent memories, I do not say unconscious memories, evident. Impressions are stored in the brain during hypnotic sleep. The subject is conscious of them at the moment he receives them. This consciousness has disappeared when he wakes.' The memory is latent but may be restimulated by a variety of devices; for example, by association of idea memories, the transfer of a reflex and its re-arousal by posthypnotic suggestions, or by simple affirmation in the posthypnotic state. There is even a possible mechanism for screen memory formation in the kind of attention focused in depth and distinctness at the expense of a feeling of continuity. In childhood, most subjects are hypnotizable and memories are easily stored in credulous, impressionable minds. Such memories are deeply etched and easily recalled, which is less and less true with advancing age.

Bernheim noted that memory may be effaced in one state to be revived in another on command. 'Perhaps in reality there are neither one nor two states of consciousness but infinitely varying states. All degrees of variation may exist between the perfect waking condition and the condition of perfect concentration which constitutes somnambulism.' Our minds are peopled with memories which have been stored there since childhood. All these memories are latent and may be restored only when the appropriate state of consciousness is again induced.

The somnambulist is in a state of consciousness other than that of wakefulness. For example, a posthypnotic suggestion may result in the subject's no longer remembering that it is a memory upon which he is acting but believing that the idea

is newly formed. While Beaunis believed that there is unconscious cerebration, Bernheim took issue with him, saying that 'there are latent ideas, but there are no unconscious ideas'. There is no evidence that Bernheim was interested in more than the mental state itself and the therapeutic and experimental work he could do with it. In Freud's (1888-1892) preface to Bernheim's book, we get a portent of how Freud would have to break with the limiting tradition set by Bernheim. He is critical of the latter's conception of consciousness or attention and introduces his own, including the problem of the psychological versus the physiological in hypnosis. The editors of the Standard Edition note his repeating these ideas in his 1915 paper, The Unconscious.

The next major steps that were taken are, of course, to be found in the Studies on Hysteria of Breuer and Freud (1893-1895). Not only catharsis but the dynamic motivations of man could be studied in the verbalization of his instinctual life during hypnosis. Then in rapid order came a whole new look at mental dynamics and motivations: the findings that even the most obscure psychological phenomena have a meaning and causation; the definitions of intrapsychic conflict; the pathogenic nature of symptoms; the etiological importance of sexual life, infantile sexuality, and the œdipus complex; that major discovery, the translation of the language of dreams into a usable language; and the metapsychological body of knowledge which included a description of mental structure from an economic viewpoint as well as a genetic one (once associated with memory functions in hypnosis and, later, in the psychoanalytic situation). Regarding the therapeutic situation itself and the contrast between the therapist-linked results of hypnosis and the independence of the psychoanalytic patient, we well know the role of the analysis of the transference. Chertok's (1968) recent study spans the century with additional references to the libidinal element in the transference. The Royal Commission in its report made overt this element in the relationship of therapist and patient.

However, it was not until Freud experienced it and solved it that the nature of transference love and transference neurosis could be understood. By then the study of mental contents had finally become the possession not only of men of letters but also of those who would treat neuroses. The new science of psychoanalysis, which bridged physiology, psychology, the humanities, and even some of the social sciences, had at last been born out of the matrix of the unconscious: the unconscious as elaborated by Freud from psychoanalytic data, no longer the disputed one of Bernheim's somnambulists.

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ORIGINS OF TIME

A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE ONTOGENETIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENSE OF TIME BASED ON OBJECT-RELATIONS THEORY

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The notion of time is the result of the integration of two general areas of psychological development: rudimentary ego functions allowing for the perception of space, i.e., the grasp of spatial relations—movement, simultaneity, and succession; and primitive motivational states conceptualized as internal object relations. To begin with, time as a psychological entity is predicated on the development of consciousness: the awareness of the self as an internal image or representation separate from object images or representations.

TIME AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Beyond its reality as a concept and perception, time is a matter of experience or sensibility, what Minkowski (1933), after Bergson (1911), has referred to as 'lived' time. Psychoanalysts, beginning with Freud (1915), describe time as a modality of consciousness.

For the consciousness of time to grow, it is necessary to acquire the consciousness of two elementary aspects of physical reality: the consciousness of movement, i.e., the awareness that objects about oneself move or change; and the consciousness of objects as unique, continuous, relatively stable. As William James (1890) said, 'Awareness of *change* is . . . the condition on which our perception of time's flow depends' (p. 620). Such awareness defines what has been possible within the so-called

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'specious present', a phenomenon which he described as follows: 'Objects fade out of consciousness slowly . . . the lingerings of the past dropping successively away, and the incomings of the future making up the loss. These lingerings of old objects, these incomings of new, are the germs of memory and expectation, the retrospective and the prospective sense of time' (p. 606).

According to James, the phenomenon of the specious present accounts also for the sense of duration or what he called the 'primary memory'—the overlap between fading impressions and fresh ones. He pointed out that the length of the specious present and the number of discernible gradations within it, including the degree of vividness of the experience, can be altered by such factors as fatigue and drugs. Indeed, mystics and users of psychedelic drugs report a widening of consciousness, an intensification of the sense of present that creates the illusion of eternity or timelessness. In contrast, a condition of extreme fatigue or somnolence tends to narrow the field to the point that, while one may be aware of what he sees and hears, he loses this awareness so fast that if he tried to respond to what he hears he might sound unintelligible or mechanical, as when dealing with a word or phrase out of context. This seems to be typical and permanent in Korsakoff's psychosis.

The idea that time is a modality of consciousness has been an integral part, if not an outgrowth, of the psychoanalytic theory of the unconscious as a dynamic psychological structure that operates outside of the rules of Aristotelian logic. According to Freud (1915), 'The processes of the system *Ucs.* are *timeless*; i.e., they are not ordered temporally, are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all' (p. 187). A rich elaboration of this assumption was worked out by Bonaparte (1940) in her essay, Time and the Unconscious.

A landmark in its own right, Bonaparte's contribution is especially valuable as it contains a comprehensive account of Freud's ideas on the origins of the sense of time. She summarized his ideas as follows: 'The sense we have of the passing of time . . . originates in our inner perception of the passing of

our own life. When consciousness awakens within us we perceive this internal flow and then project it into the outside world' (p. 466). She also reported that, after reading her paper and presumably her description of his 'views' on the subject of time, Freud added: '. . . the attention which we bestow on objects is due to rapid but successive cathexes which might be regarded in a sense as quanta issuing from the ego. Our inner perceptual activity would only later make a continuity of it, and it is here that we find, projected into the outside world, the prototype of time. . . . The upshot of all this would be the equation "attention = perception = time" ' (p. 467, n.).

Bonaparte's report corresponds closely to two almost identical references Freud made to the origin of the concept of time several years earlier. Pointing to the Kantian assumption that time is an intrinsic characteristic of the human mind, he wrote: '. . . our abstract idea of time seems to be wholly derived from the method of working of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* [perceptual consciousness] and to correspond to a perception on its own part of that method of working' (Freud, 1920, p. 28). And, a few years later, trying to explain the process of memory: 'It is as though the unconscious stretches out feelers, through the medium of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.*, towards the external world and hastily withdraws them as soon as they have sampled the excitations coming from it. . . . I further had a suspicion that this discontinuous method of functioning of the system *Pcpt.-Cs.* lies at the bottom of the origin of the concept of time' (Freud, 1925[1924], p. 231).[1]

[1] It is interesting to note that Freud's ideas concerning the psychological origin of time, especially as quoted by Bonaparte, are remarkably similar to those of William James as he developed them during the latter part of his life. According to Eisendrath (1971), James came to believe that 'perceptions are in quanta', and that the concept of time as duration develops out of ' "incessant pulses of voluntary reinforcement" in maintaining attention with effort. . . . In his last work [James] says that experience comes in quanta and that the intellect only makes it continuous' (pp. 264, 143). While it is conceivable that Freud was aware of James's speculations, it is more probable that his ideas on the subject were influenced by a common background of nineteenth century psychological theories, stressing the role of active attention and will in the appreciation of

Commenting on the sense of timelessness that characterizes the experience of elation, Arlow (as quoted by Taketomo, 1971) attributed it to 'the diminution of self-consciousness'. In Arlow's view, the time sense—more specifically the awareness of time's flow—is switched on and off according to the prevailing level of self-consciousness. Self and consciousness being central in their discourse, it is not surprising that the subject of time is treated similarly by phenomenologists, beginning with Hegel (1807).

TIME AND THE PERIODICITY OF HUNGER

Early psychoanalytic writers made frequent references to the subject of time but, like Freud, in passing and usually in connection with the dynamics of obsessional neurosis (*cf.*, Freud, 1909; Abraham, 1923; Jones, 1923). Harnick (as quoted by Schilder, 1942, and by Doob, 1971) suggested that the awareness of the flow of time has its origin in anal erotism—the frequency of defecation, its intervals, the length of the process, how long it may be postponed successfully, and so on. But he also implicated the experience of hunger, speculating that unconsciously time stands for the introjected, 'devoured' father who has become fecal matter. Fenichel (1945) pointed out that anal-erotic experiences are not exclusively responsible for the development of the concept of time. In his view, internal biological rhythms, like breathing and pulse, convey kinesthetic sensations that are even more basic in helping the child to differentiate time intervals and to acquire the concept of time in general, while anal experiences are responsible for the development of schedules that help the ego to master reality. In an earlier paper about time and its relation to reality and purpose, Oberndorf (1941) also felt that anal experiences are mainly responsible for the development of schedules that help the ego to master reality.

time as duration, and by newly advanced ideas in physics—relativity and quantum theories. It may be also mentioned that Freud's views are congenial to long-standing and still current biological and physiological theories holding that the time experience derives its origin from some sort of internal 'time base', described as 'a pulse-dispensing mechanism which delivers internal time signals . . . [and] is identified either with a specific periodicity . . . called a "time quantum" or with a specific bodily process called the "biological clock" ' (Ornstein, 1969, p. 25).

The idea that the infant acquires the meaning of time during intervals between feedings was advanced first by Hanns Sachs (as quoted by Bergler and Róheim, 1946). Yates (1935) wrote about patterns of body rhythms that during the oral stage of psychosexual development become associated with the periodic frustration and satisfaction of the infant's needs, especially the need to be fed, thereby providing the basis for the development of the sense of time. Likewise, Meerloo (1954) assumed that the sense of 'time and expectation' develops out of the infantile experience of hunger. A related but broader view was advanced by Erikson (1956) when he wrote: 'The experience of temporal cycles and of time qualities are inherent in and develop from the initial problems of mounting need tension, of delay of satisfaction, and final unification with the satisfying "object"' (p. 97). In a similar vein, Gifford (1960) postulated that the emergence of the ego as an organized structure and the acquisition of the sense of time come about as the infant learns to adapt his sleep-awakefulness pattern to the diurnal periodicity of maternal attention to his needs. As he put it, 'This early adaptation to the outer world is transmitted to the infant as a function of time' (p. 26).

TIME AND AFFECTS

Repeatedly, Freud (1914, 1920, 1933[1932]) ascertained that the concept of time and its genesis are inherent in the organization and function of the ego. Hartmann (1964), referring to the ego functions of motility and perception, made the following suggestions regarding the development of the ability to experience time: 'Many aspects of the ego can be described as detour wishes; they promote a more specific and safer form of adjustment by introducing a factor of growing independence from the immediate impact of present stimuli. In this trend toward what we may call internalization is also included the danger signal, besides other functions that can be described as being in the nature of anticipation' (p. 115). In this connection, Hartmann referred his readers to Freud's thoughts about the relation of the ego to time perception.

Hartmann's allusion to the danger signal and the mental function of anticipation as precursors of the time sense finds ample correspondence in the psychiatric and psychoanalytic literature. Arieti (1947) explicitly attributed the evolution of anxiety and of symbolic processes to expectancy and anticipation. He defined expectancy as 'the capacity of the subject to anticipate certain events while a certain external stimulus is present'; and anticipation as 'the capacity to foresee or predict future events, even when there are not external stimuli which are directly or indirectly related to those events' (p. 471). He conceived of these two mental processes as being ontogenetically contiguous, the latter growing out of the former. Phylogenetically also, according to Arieti, the process of anticipation is antedated by that of expectancy, which may be identified in subhuman, even very primitive species, while the process of anticipation is to be found only in man. According to Spitz (1972), anticipation as a psychological process evolves out of the neonate's conditioned reflex activity, which 'forms the first bridge between somatic neural physiology and psychic activity' (p. 727). Rapaport (1945) pointed out that the notion of anticipation is intimately related to time experience and, in particular, to time perspective. After reviewing the literature in the natural sciences as well as in philosophy and history, Fraser (1972) concluded that 'anxiety and the sense of time are mutually generated modalities of the mind' (p. 119).

The view that time is an intrinsic aspect of affects has been implicit in the writings of psychoanalysts and academic psychologists alike. Quite specifically, Spitz (1972) has indicated that affect is the element responsible for the acquisition of the notion of time as duration, which in turn makes the function of perception meaningful. In his words, 'The percept can only acquire existence after affect has endowed it with duration, with biological time' (pp. 733-734).

As I suggested in a previous paper (1972), the development of the sense of time seems to determine, and in turn to be determined by, the transformation of primitive affective dispo-

sitions (defined broadly as pleasure and unpleasure) into specific affects like anxiety, depression, boredom, elation, and so on. Unfolding with the maturation of the ego apparatus in its perceptive-cognitive functions, the self's awareness of the continuum of time is predicated on the perception of its efficacy regarding some adverse or challenging reality, within or without. It is the inefficiency of the self, in terms of experienced tension or unpleasure that cannot be mastered immediately, along with a growing awareness of the possibility that relief from the 'good' object will soon come, which gradually establishes the sense of time, first as the notion of duration or protensity[2] (experienced as the passive process of waiting in anticipation), and then as temporal perspective in its rudimentary form of intentionality (experienced as the active process of expectation). Such a formulation is consistent with Piaget's (1937) understanding of the roles of anticipation and expectation in the development of the notion of causality which, along with that of space (encompassing the notions of velocity, simultaneity, and succession), constitute in his theory the necessary psychophysical determinants of time.

TIME AND OBJECT CONSTANCY

According to psychoanalytic object relations theory, the capacity to anticipate need fulfilment protects the infant from the traumatic experience of helplessness that frustration of urgent needs and flooding of the ego with excitation would create. The capacity to anticipate need fulfilment is giving rise to a putative hallucinatory experience that involves the memory of the 'good' breast or 'good' mother—an experience that, according to Freud (1925), marks the beginning of the thinking process and, according to Erikson (1956), 'contributes temporal elements to the formation of basic trust' (p. 97).

Such a sequence of events may be reconstructed as follows: As tension rises and the mother is not yet there, the 'good'

[2] The term *protensity* is said to have been invented by Titchener to match the word *extensity*. It was adopted by Boring (1933), who defined it as 'the temporal dimension of consciousness' (p. 127).

object image or representation emerges protectively in fantasy and unites with the self-image in a need-fulfilling hallucinatory experience; but if the mother's arrival is further delayed, it begins to fade away rapidly. As the infant tries to hold onto it and unpleasure increases, the uncertain 'good' object image begins to turn into a 'bad' one. It is the effort to hold onto the 'good' object image and to expel the 'bad' one that presumably creates the ability to anticipate the future; and, while tension is still tolerable, the situation is experienced as anxiety. As tension continues to rise, however, the 'bad' object image tends to prevail over the 'good' one; anxiety gives way to fear, and, as Erikson (1956) put it, 'impotent rage . . . in which anticipation (and with it, future) is obliterated' (p. 97). If the mother's arrival is delayed further, the infant becomes flooded with excitation, his mental state regressing to the level of an undifferentiated 'bad' self-object image—an experience of catastrophic dimensions. Such an experience would be timeless.

Eventually, and as object constancy develops, the early hallucinatory process is replaced by the ability to anticipate need fulfilment, i.e., by the awareness of the possibility that the 'good' object will arrive, even though its internal representation is uncertain, having become fused with the 'bad' object image. As the fused 'good' and 'bad' object image becomes internalized into a stable, realistic object apart from the self, the trustful, rather passive ability to anticipate a 'good' outcome is employed in the cathexis of the environment, which is projectively experienced as continuous—i.e., as possessing the attribute of time as duration. At the same time the anxious, rather effortful, ability to anticipate a 'good' outcome is employed in the projection of the self-representation beyond the confines of the immediate environment, the whole situation acquiring the quality of time as perspective and, more specifically, as future.

In the 'specious present' of the infant, tension or need is presumably experienced as rising and falling, as growing in urgency and then, if satisfied, as dying away rather than as merely experienced and then not experienced. Yet a need does

not have to be satisfied in order to be experienced as receding, for there is a built-in rhythm to the excitability of the organism, regardless of the continuity of the stimulation. When the tension becomes too persistent and relief is not forthcoming, the 'specious present'—or experience of duration—tends to become shorter, the number of discernible gradations within it become fewer, the perception of time's flow slows down and then stops; in other words, the perception of time as duration disappears along with the perception of change. The same would obtain if the need were met with satisfaction. Once satiated, the infant ceases to perceive change, his perception of time as flowing by slows down and he falls asleep or passes into a state of pleasant timelessness.

Speaking of need and tension generically may suggest alimentary functions—as, indeed, a number of psychoanalytic writings do when referring to the origins of time. Yet it is known that, after the first days of postnatal life, the infant may remain awake and alert without being necessarily hungry or in any perceptible way uncomfortable. And, in this state of alertness, he can perceive movement or, in general, change in his environment other than the coming and going of his mother. Apparently ontogenetically determined, there is something like a behavioral preference to contour and movement, an unlearned orientation to change that, according to Kagan (1970), 'is clearly adaptive, for the focus of change is likely to contain the most information about the presence of his mother or of danger' (p. 828).

That an orientation to movement or contour alone might be responsible for the development of the concept of time seems, however, unlikely. Object-relations theory assumes that for the infant to experience time as such, he should go through a motivational process involving his mother as a need-fulfilling as well as a frustrating object. And Piaget (1966), who has tried to establish a psychophysical parallelism regarding the concept of time, holds that the experience of duration develops as a function of a wishful state of waiting. In Piaget's own words, 'It appears that, psychologically, the time which im-

presses the child the most at the outset is the time of the events which surround him. The child's attention is centered more on things going on around him than in his own introspection. Yet sooner or later the child will experience waiting for a longer or shorter time for the fulfillment of a desire' (p. 211). Or, as another experimental psychologist put it, 'In our opinion, the young child has intuitions not only of speed and distance but also of duration. He sees the latter in the elementary form of an interval which stands between him and the fulfillment of his desires' (Fraisse, 1963, p. 277).

Pointing out that the experience of 'felt-anxiety', which characterizes the more mature organism, develops along with the ego's capacity to anticipate and predict, Benjamin (1961) described a contributory or perhaps necessary condition for the development of time sense: the 'maturational organization of aggression as such into object-directed hostility and anger, with the resultant marked increase in fear of object loss' (p. 662). Besides the implication that aggression is a contributory factor in the emergence of time perspective, Benjamin's point underlines the significance of the development of object constancy. Jacobson (1964) also has pointed out that it is object constancy which determines the concept of the self as an entity with continuity and direction, making it capable of experiencing time and specific affects.

Rudiments of the sense of time should begin to develop along with the process of differentiation of self from object representations, a development that, according to object-relations theory, may date as far back as the third or fourth month of life (*cf.* Kernberg, 1971). But the establishment of the notion of time as duration and perspective has to wait until the second half of the first year of life, when the existence of object constancy begins to become evident. According to Spitz (1957), such evidence may be inferred in the phenomenon of 'stranger anxiety' observable at the age of eight months. Others, following Piaget's criteria for object permanency (a concept that may not correspond to the psychoanalytic concept of object constancy [*cf.*,

Fraiberg, 1969]),[3] do not see such evidence until sometime in the second year, which, according to Piaget (1937), is also when the child acquires a generalized understanding of time.

MEMORY AND TIME AS PERSPECTIVE

In considering the development of temporal perspective, the importance of memory as it represents past experience is obvious. But memory, whether conceived as conditioning, as long-term information storage, or as mental representations and internal object relations, is not necessarily accompanied by the sense of 'pastness.' A stored sensory experience is not equivalent to the memory of something that has happened, something in the past. For memory to acquire the quality of 'pastness' it is necessary to perceive the fact that the recalled experience can no longer be altered, either by the subject's own action or, passively, by some intervention from the outside. For the infant to have any sense of time, he should be in a state of relative need-tension. So long as he is able to maintain a trustful expectancy of mother's presence (in her absence), time is experienced as duration—the equivalent of the adult normal experience of time passing. But unlike the adult experience of duration which normally 'seems most keyed to remembrance of things past—to retrospection' (Ornstein, 1969, p. 22), in the infant's 'specious present', memory as long-term storage plays no part, except in so far as it may potentiate a hallucinatory experience. The hallucination of a satisfactory experience—the mother's need-fulfilling presence—activated by a current need, is conceivable only as an event that evokes the sense of present, not past. The moment that the need-tension rises again, signifying that the hallucinatory experience is becoming impotent,

[3] Also, according to Piaget (1962), his fellow countryman and psychoanalyst Charles Odier maintains that object permanency 'is related to the discoveries that the baby makes about the permanence of the object when this has disappeared from the baby's visual field. Odier maintains that this schema of the permanent object is caused by feelings and object-relations. In other words, the affective relations of the child with the mother-object, or other persons, are responsible for the formation of a cognitive structure' (p. 129).

the self begins to feel threatened. Anticipating the worst, helplessness and disintegration (a trauma), the infant experiences now anxiety—a 'basic affective response' (Joffe and Sandler, 1965), containing a rudimentary sense of future.

As Piaget (1927) has pointed out, 'memory recalls or anticipates' (p. 2). And, paradoxical as it may seem, anticipation must occur in memory before recall. According to Fraisse (1963), 'In all . . . initial instances of temporally organized behavior it is the past which gives meaning to the stimulus, turning it into a signal, but the signal gives rise to behavior which is oriented toward the future' (p. 154). A memory is located in time and space. but it is first experienced as anticipation, as future satisfaction or frustration. To use Heidegger's expression, 'The future . . . presupposes the past, but only the sense of past if there is a future' (quoted by Fraisse, 1963, p. 158).

If, indeed, the sense of time begins as the ego becomes able to differentiate between present need and future fulfilment—in other words, if the sense of future develops before that of past, as a number of authors (for instance, Stern, 1924; Schur, 1953; Whitrow, 1961) besides Fraisse are inclined to believe—then at what point does the sense of past develop? When does the past enter the child's awareness of time as a dimension of experience?

In discussing the growth of the mind in terms of object-relations theory, Kernberg (1971) assumed the following sequence of events: At a certain point, the infant comes to realize that the self as a subject of gratifying affective experiences with the mother is the same as the self interacting with mother under the influence of frustrating anxiety or rage producing experiences. Presumably, out of the integration of these opposite 'bad' and 'good' self-representations and, more specifically, at the junction of the development of the self-concept as an independent reality in the ego, there develops the awareness or acknowledgment of the past as a dimension of experience. The infant is now able to accept 'bad' past rather than deny it; to acknowledge a narcissistic hurt as a fact, unavoidable but not

catastrophic, a mitigated, less-than-total defeat. And the whole 'schema', to use Piaget's term for a cognitive-affective structure,[4] constitutes a mental state typical for the age—what Melanie Klein has described as the depressive position. Winnicott's (1948) observation that such a developmental phase makes possible the affective reactions of guilt and concern may be elaborated as follows. The infant feels guilt to the extent that he feels that his aggression has happened and cannot be renounced; and he feels concern for the object that has been, in the infant's fantasy, hurt by the aggression but remains 'good', i.e., present and loving rather than lost or hating.

According to Kernberg (1971), the ego does not emerge as a separate structure apart from the id until the mechanism of repression is established, somewhere in the second year of life. As the ego and the id become differentiated from their common matrix, repression becomes the main defensive operation of the ego, replacing primitive, psychotic-like mechanisms, such as splitting, projective identification, and isolation. It would be reasonable to assume that this is the point at which the sense of time and its differentiation into future and past becomes consolidated, appearing in the child's social awareness and language. Evidence from experimental literature seems to support such an assumption. Thus, in studying the verbal understanding of time concepts in young children, Ames (1946) found that 'time' words and their use become meaningful in a fairly uniform sequence, which is approximately the same for all children. Her subjects were able to respond to 'soon' as a time concept connoting the future, by waiting, at eighteen months; and to use it in a phrase at twenty-four months. However, they were not able to verbalize spontaneously the word 'tomorrow' until thirty months, and only after they were able to use the word 'today'. Mastery of the word 'yesterday' came last, at thirty-six months.

[4] More accurately, 'A schema is a representation of experience that preserves the temporal and spatial relations of the original event, without being necessarily isomorphic with the event' (Kagan, 1970, p. 827).

Even though the understanding and use of words connoting time provides a fairly reliable means of assessing the child's ability to orient himself temporally, it is by no means the earliest indication of his ability in this regard. For, as Werner (1957) and Werner and Kaplan (1963) have pointed out, the very young child expresses his temporal values in terms of affective language and goal-oriented behavior, a temporal reference being implicit rather than identified as such in his words. At first, a temporal perspective is implied in purely inferential one-word ('monoremic') expressions fused with particular events and affects; then, with experience, temporal meaning is more and more carried by action words (verbs), now increasingly differentiated from thing-words (nouns). The mastery of temporality in terms of future, present, and past is eventually facilitated by the learning of adverbs and other words that indicate tense.

THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TIME

In contrast to the ego, where rudiments of time are inherent in the forerunners of basic functions such as perception, motor control, and memory, the id or dynamic unconscious starts out absolutely timeless (Freud, 1901, 1915, 1933[1932]; Bonaparte, 1940). In terms of object-relations theory, the original timelessness of the id corresponds to an early stage of mental development during which the frustrating mother is experienced as absolutely 'bad' or as a 'bad' fused self-mother representation. But, gradually, a sense of time builds up in the id, too, as successive layers of dissociated and repressed object relations establish a history in the unconscious. For defensive purposes, however, the unconscious eliminates or distorts time—as can be seen in dream work (Schneider, 1948; Gross, 1949) and in borderline or psychotic conditions (Scott, 1948)—so that the eventual timelessness of the unconscious is but a regression to the level of its original absolute timelessness.

An important determinant of time is to be found in the integration of self and object representations, whereby completely

independent perceptions become identified with the same object; in other words, when an object can be experienced in different ways at different times and still remain the same. Such an accomplishment becomes a measure of the ego's strength and reflects its ability to move comfortably along the dimension of time, making it thus possible to explore the consequences of one's acts, real or imaginary, and thereby to arrive at a prediction of change on the basis of one's own effort. Carried out first by the ego, this ability later becomes a superego function—inasmuch as future rewards or punishment are superego functions—and powerfully re-enforces the sense of time. Indeed, the emergence of the superego as an autonomous system of the mental apparatus contributes significantly to the organism's adaptive, or maladaptive, conceptualization of time, influencing the ability to endure stressful experiences, to schedule decisions, and to wait, to be punctual, and to synchronize one's activities with those of associates, to procrastinate or to ignore completely the patterning of time, future or past (*cf.*, Bender, 1950; Jacobson, 1964; Spiegel, 1966).

The observations of early psychoanalytic workers with regard to the influence of the anal phase of psychosexual development on the formation of the concept of time would still be valid in so far as the later evolution of the concept is concerned, in particular its involvement in neurotic symptoms, characterological traits, and sociocultural styles. Such derivatives of the œdipal phase as the fear of death, incest taboo, and the attraction toward an unattainable object that characterizes romantic love are inherently related to the experience of time and its conceptualization as fate or as progress, as the inevitable or as the eternal (Kafka, 1972). Eventually, as the child's mind unfolds in its maturational schedule, the emergence of the ability for abstract operations will make it possible to deal with time as a measurable entity, as a standard of reference in terms of clocks and calendars—as a universal rather than as personal, self-centered reality.

SUMMARY

Object-relations theory, supported by empirical and experimental evidence, suggests that the development of psychological time depends on the integration of internal representations of self and object on the one hand, and of elementary ego apparatuses and functions on the other. An essential prerequisite is a felt change in perception, which depends on the perception of phenomenal change or movement. This ability may be available quite early, but acquires temporal significance as it becomes associated with the perception of the infant's own changes in need-tension. Specifically, a primitive sense of time emerges out of the awareness of change as experienced during the interval of suspenseful waiting that is defined by the perception of rising inner tension and the arrival of a wish-fulfilling object.

A feeling of positive expectancy, underlying the anticipation of a 'good' object, and the anxiety that develops as a 'bad' object threatens to take over from inside, promote the differentiation of self from object representations, establishing a generalized sense of time—the sense of duration. With the development of object constancy and the establishment of repression as the ego's major defense, the sense of time consolidates itself as temporal perspective, future and past. It seems that the sense of future, as a function of the experience of anxiety, develops before the sense of 'pastness', which grows as a function of subjective memory and the sense of guilt or concern. The growing influence of the superego, along with the development of language and of symbolic logic, enables the child to use the concept of time in an increasingly adaptive way, as an objective, conventional frame of reference.

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SYLVIA PLATH: FUSION WITH THE VICTIM AND SUICIDE

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When the attempt to maintain stable aggressive cathexes of object-representations differentiated from self-representations fails, there results a preponderance of primitive identifications that may cause the ego to be overwhelmed by unneutralized aggressive energies. The life and poetry of Sylvia Plath illustrate what I have termed 'fusion with the victim,' (*cf.*, Orgel, 1973), a regressive vicissitude of identification with the aggressor.

I

Sylvia Plath was born in Boston on October 27, 1932.[1] Her father came to the United States at age fifteen from a town in the Polish Corridor. He was the author of a well-known scientific treatise, Bumblebees, and was further distinguished for his work in ornithology and ichthyology. Her mother was born in Boston of Austrian parents and met her husband while studying for a master's degree in German. At Sylvia's birth, Otto Plath announced, 'All I want from life from now on is a son born two and a half years to the day'. And on April 27, 1935, a son, Warren Joseph, was born. Sylvia and her brother grew up in the seashore town of Winthrop, Massachusetts. Her childhood was filled with sea memories—gathering shells, making toys from objects picked up on the beach, collecting starfish in jars and watching them grow back lost arms,[2] dreaming of Spain

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[1] Most of the factual material about Sylvia Plath used in this paper comes from the excellent collection of essays, *The Art of Sylvia Plath,* edited by Charles Newman (1971).

[2] Note her later preoccupation with observing fetuses in bell jars.

on the other side of the Atlantic, believing in mermaids, observing the ferocity of a hurricane when she was six. She later recalled, 'My final memory of the sea is of violence—a still unhealthy day in 1939 [*sic*], the sea molten, steely thick, heaving at its leash like a broody animal, evil violets in its eye'. She seems to have identified the sea as a sadistic œdipal father.

Otto Plath died in 1940 after a long hospitalization for a circulatory disease. Sylvia Plath's fears, expressed in The Bell Jar (*cf.*, Plath, 1971b), of being permanently abandoned by her mother in a hospital are probably related to a memory of her father's death, as is her panic about going to a hospital to stop a hemorrhage, an episode described in the recollections of her college friend, Nancy Hunter Steiner (1973). After his death her mother supported the family by teaching shorthand and typing. The family left the seaside and moved to Wellesley, Massachusetts, where the maternal grandparents lived with them. 'My father died, we moved inland' (*cf.*, Newman, 1971). They attended the Unitarian church although Otto Plath had been a Lutheran. During the evening the family sometimes read aloud and one evening Sylvia's mother read Matthew Arnold's poem, The Forsaken Merman, a lament by a father who dwells at the bottom of the sea. His little daughter has left him for the land, for human life, and resists his calls for her return by her steadfast attention to her prayer book and her devotion to the church. On moonlit midnights the merman returns to the land to gaze at the town where his lost child lives. The poem ends with the merman sadly returning after his vigil, singing

> There dwells a lov'd one,
> But cruel is she.
> She left lonely for ever
> The kings of the sea.

Sylvia Plath remembered her reaction to hearing the poem: 'I saw the gooseflesh on my skin. I didn't know what made it.

I was not cold. Had a ghost passed over? No, it was the poetry. A spark flew off Arnold and shook me, like a chill. I wanted to cry; I felt very odd. I had fallen into a new way of being happy.' Later, at about age nine, she began to hide short poems in her mother's dinner napkin or beneath her butter plate.

Through Arnold's poetry, her father had reached her. Her mother's reading of the poem had given permission for this reunion and the sea in which the father dwelled called her back all her life. One of her most chilling poems, Suicide Off Egg Rock, concerns a man's feelings as he is about to drown himself (Plath, 1968); and in The Bell Jar there is a description of her attempt to drown herself as she seeks to be reunited with the absent father, an attempt which follows a minor male character's telling her that his father lives overseas. Both the poem and the novel, written several years later, contain the repetition of the words 'I am, I am, I am'—marking the still-beating heart after the uncompleted attempt. To thwart the longed-for reunion in the ocean with the father as primal parent, as well as the œdipal consummation with the later father, she turned in her poetry to the preœdipal mother for aid in repressing these instinctual longings. Like the child in Arnold's poem she remains untouchable as long as she focuses on the holy book, worships in the church, and is enclosed in the living family at the dinner table. Sylvia Plath reproached her mother for abandoning her father's religion with its strong repressive superego cast and regarded Unitarianism as little better than no religion at all. Moonlight (a time when father as the merman is close) is a constant symbol in her writings; it represents death in its sterile whiteness, absence of color, and borrowed light that turns everything into stone (*cf.*, Annette Lavers in Newman [1971]).

In Lady Lazurus (Plath, 1966), the subject of the poem refers to a possible suicide attempt at age ten. 'The first time it happened I was ten./ It was an accident.' It is interesting that, although Sylvia Plath's father died when she was eight, the speaker says in Daddy (Plath, 1966), 'I was ten when they buried

you'. Possibly the suicidal 'accident' at age ten, surely psychically real even if it did not actually occur, marked the first real burial of her father. In The Bell Jar the heroine reproaches her mother for not allowing anyone to express clear grief at father's death, and just before her suicide attempt at age twenty she visits his grave and weeps over him for the first time. Always in the novel loving thoughts of an abandoned and victimized father are associated with suicidal impulses. These episodes are interspersed with sequences in which relationships with men are imagined or acted out in violent sadomasochistic terms that enforce differentiation of self and object and provide 'the core of a person's identity' (Pao, 1965, p. 258).

Sylvia Plath's adolescence was a time of great academic and extracurricular accomplishment. She produced skilful drawings and was proud when these were approved of by her mother. She remembered herself in these years as a 'gawky mess with drab hair and bad skin'. She tried to look and act like a typical student of the 1950's.

At eighteen, after she had submitted manuscripts forty-five times to the magazine, Seventeen, her first story was accepted. In 1950, she entered Smith College on a scholarship endowed by Olive Higgins Prouty, the author of Stella Dallas. In The Bell Jar, Olive Prouty's fictional counterpart is one in the series of idealized mother-figures who are sought for their ability to offer loving responsiveness and counterpressure when a real mother is unresponsive. For instance, she drives the heroine to a hospital against her wishes and in the 'mother's' presence the heroine 'feels' prevented from making another suicide attempt. The book describes in similar terms Jay Cee, the editor of the magazine where the heroine works as an apprentice; although the editor appreciates her gifts, she warns her against too much self-confidence and advises her to work harder. Dr. Nolan, the woman psychiatrist in the novel (Sylvia Plath's actual psychiatrist at the time was a man), is the only really loved and respected figure in the book. Dr. Nolan does not promise to spare the heroine the feared shock therapy, but

agrees to warn her in advance and to be present when it is administered.

In college Sylvia Plath used her father's red leather thesaurus to write poetry on a regular schedule whose precision recalls her father's compulsive 'perfect' timing. She was brilliantly successful, winning every possible prize. At this time her identification with her idealized father was evidently in conflict with her feminine sexual feelings, and she tried to reconcile what she called 'the life-style of a poet-intellectual and that of a wife and mother'. Now she first used the image that became a central theme of her novel ten years later, saying, '. . . it's quite amazing how I've gone around for most of my life as in the rarified atmosphere under a bell jar'. Here she was referring to her intellectual isolation, but later the simile became enriched with allusions on many levels: the creature under the bell jar refers to a fetus in the womb, to claustrophobic feelings, to seeing the world through distorted eyes, to dead babies pickled in jars (these preserved specimens presumably were derived from her father's interests), to her poetry like rows of dead objects being collected. Finally, also, the bell jar implied re-breathing her own breath; for she felt cut off by an invisible veil from the outside world when she could not sharply sense the flux of mutually invigorating object relationships in her life.

She idealized doers. (Several psychoanalytic writers [Greenacre, 1960; Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, 1949; Spitz, 1965a] have shown that gratification of aggressive drives promotes differentiation of self from object, increases pleasure in functioning, and furthers the development of both libidinal and aggressive object constancy.) She admired those who could make things run or were athletes or who understood the functions of the body and natural phenomena, who could grow vegetables, who could repair machinery, and who are at the same time expert in 'the greater areas of philosophy, sociology, literature, and all the rest'. (These qualities she found in the 'family romance' parents of a friend who became the model for Buddy Willard in The Bell Jar.) In her brief life Sylvia

Plath accomplished most of those things. The women she selected as idealized surrogates for mother also had these desired attributes. In contrast, she wrote contemptuously of those who—like her mother—make up 'little fairy worlds like pink cotton wool'.

After her junior year at Smith, she won a magazine's (Mademoiselle) scholarship to work and live in New York for a month. This period, which culminated in her suicide attempt (the second) at age twenty, is described with painful honesty and art in The Bell Jar. But within six months she returned to college, was graduated, and continued her studies in German and poetry. Her honors thesis as an undergraduate was to be on the double personality in Dostoevski's novels; later she turned instead to 'the twin' in James Joyce's writings. These choices of subject suggest further elaborations of her conflict between dual identities—poet and female, aggressor and victim—, and of her tenuous differentiation between self and object, ego and superego.

The next few years included her early publications and a trip to Europe. In Paris she had a splinter removed from her eye while 'fully conscious, . . . I was babbling frantically about Œdipus and Gloucester getting new vision by losing their eyes, but me wanting, so to speak, new vision and my eyes too.' She meant that she wanted to keep her inner poetic vision while remaining alive and whole in relation to the outside world. This wish is expressed in an early poem, The Eye-mote (*cf.*, Plath, 1968). In this poem, the poet looks at horses running; the scene is clear, each object held rooted by the sunlight. As she takes in the scene with her eyes, a splinter 'flew in and struck my eye,/ Needling it dark.' As her physical vision is destroyed by the invasion of the tiny splinter and she becomes merged with the now blurred and unrooted scene, her poetic vision flourishes, creating mythical allusions.

> Abrading my lid, the small grain burns:
> Red cinder around which I myself,
> Horses, planets and spires revolve.

She becomes one with Œdipus. Yet she longs to return to her former self, to see as before; the original moment and original scene, though, can never be recaptured in their actuality.

Most of the usual themes of her later poetry are here as well. One may note particularly the self-orienting attention to the experience of localized pain and the representation of the loss of distinction between self and object and among objects (the horses, trees, and spires suggesting phallic qualities on which it is forbidden to look). It is as though the desire to come closer and closer, to see more and more, creates a blurring of the outer world while it frees and enriches the inner world of the imagination at the cost of admitting a minuscule bit of death. (One is reminded of how the world must look to the very young infant or to the child as he brings his face closer and closer to his mother's, until landmarks are lost.) The mote gives way to an itch, as it refuses to come out, and she wears 'the present itch for flesh'. In other words, what was once a foreign body is now a part of her own flesh, a representation of impregnation, and a reversal of the process of birth.

She desired a combined inner and outer vision, and she achieved it only when in pain or when she was enduring physical challenge in a struggle with other life that would neither kill nor be killed, in particular during pregnancy and childbirth, or in the brief moments of labor on her poems—before the potential became actual. Perhaps these are alluded to in the quotation about Œdipus and Gloucester. Several friends have described her as happiest during her pregnancies, and her poems confirm the contrast between pregnancy and the early days of motherhood with the completed poetic conception. The poems 'are dead, and their mother near dead with distraction,/ And they stupidly stare, and do not speak of her' (Stillborn, in Plath, 1971a). An additional level of meaning is suggested by Kanzer (1950) in his paper on the Œdipus Trilogy: the blind Œdipus 'presents an unmistakable representation of re-birth' (p. 565). Sylvia Plath wishes to be reborn in her father's image, as a male, without having to die first, to give birth without having

to bleed to death. In one of her last poems, Kindness (*cf.,* Plath, 1966), she condenses it all unforgettably in three brief lines.

> The blood jet is poetry,
> There is no stopping it.
> You hand me two children, two roses.

In 1956, she met and married Ted Hughes. In 1957-1958 she taught brilliantly for a year at Smith College. In 1958-1959, the couple lived in Boston where she met George Starbuck and Anne Sexton. She and Miss Sexton would meet once a week, drink martinis, and hilariously discuss imaginative ways of committing suicide.

In December 1959, the couple returned to England. Sylvia was pregnant with their first child, Frieda Rebecca, who was born on April 1, 1960. Soon after the birth of the child, she was 'seized by fearsome excitement' and began writing The Bell Jar which she thought of as a comic novel. She describes the book as 'an autobiographical apprentice work which I had to write in order to free myself from the past'. The next year she had a miscarriage, then an appendectomy, and then again became pregnant. In the summer of 1961, they moved to the country. She loved the 'millions of birds' (her father was also an ornithologist). She taught herself to ride bareback, once clinging to the horse's neck after it threw her off its back while it galloped two miles home. This accomplishment shows how thin is the line between self-destruction and heroism. The attempt actively to master, to challenge, to keep hold on a dangerous object, is part of an attempt to live, to resist the temptation to surrender herself passively as victim of a loss of identity, to avoid returning to the undifferentiated state of 'perfection' she described in Edge (*cf.,* Plath, 1966), one of her very last poems.

> The woman is perfected.
> Her dead
>
> Body wears the smile of accomplishment,
> The illusion of a Greek necessity

Flows in the scrolls of her toga,
Her bare

Feet seem to be saying:
We have come so far, it is over.

In her last year, she engaged with typical intensity and efficiency in bee-keeping, onion-stringing, and potato-digging. In June 1962, her son Nicholas was born; she blissfully describes nursing him by candlelight. That summer she suffered repeated attacks of influenza accompanied by high fever. A few days before Christmas 1962, she separated from her husband and moved with her children back to London, feeling that it was miraculous that she accidentally found an apartment Yeats had once lived in. Here she achieved her greatest creative output.

In January 1963, The Bell Jar was published in England under the pseudonym, Victoria Lucas. In the bitterly cold winter of 1962-1963, she worked on the Ariel poems in the pre-dawn darkness before her children woke, working feverishly, sometimes producing two or three poems a day. Perhaps there was a return to the sleeplessness that she described in the pre-suicidal period in The Bell Jar. I disagree with Alvarez's (1972) contention that this frenetic creativity was the source of danger to her life. Rather, like the challenging of nature in riding and childbirth and other activities, it was a way of warding off death by creating objects that could be used to externalize her aggression and serve as a path to object relationships that could be internalized to build ego structure. The poems failed to allow a relatively constant investment of narcissistic libido, or aggression; they did not remain as stable transitional objects. That they did not do so is evidence that they were not invested with sufficiently neutralized energies; their loss in the aftermath of creation was like a series of deaths. But the aim of her creative impulse was, I believe, to rescue herself and to make living possible. Alun Jones says pertinently: 'The poet exercises his traditional power in using the beneficent passion of poetry to

expel the malignant forces of private suffering' (quoted by Dyson, 1965).

In her last days she made plans for the Spring, expecting visitors from the States. She was under the care of a doctor, although she apparently received little more than sedatives. On February 11, 1963, in the early morning, after preparing some food for the children, she put her head in the gas oven and ended her life.

II

As was stated earlier, this paper illustrates, in the examination of a poet who wrote about and committed suicide, a series of assumptions concerning the relationship between the failure of the defense of identification with the aggressor and a tendency toward self-destruction. This hypothesis was explored in some detail in my paper, Fusion with the Victim and Suicide (*cf.*, Orgel, 1973); hence, in the present paper the theoretical assumptions are only outlined.

One of the main justifications in using Sylvia Plath's works to understand her psychoanalytically lies in the almost perfect continuity and agreement between her direct statements about herself and the descriptions of events and feelings of her fictional heroine in The Bell Jar and the personae in her poems. Naturally, where there is disagreement, we may look for signs of conflicts and defenses, and, most important, we confront the creative originality of an artist.

The theories and observations of Anna Freud (1972), Jacobson (1964), Greenacre (1960), Mahler (1965), Solnit (1970, 1972), Loewald (1962), and Spitz (1953, 1965a, 1965b), among others, support the hypothesis that when the mother in her relation with the child from the sixth to the fifteenth month fails to supply adequate aggressive dialogue (*cf.*, Spitz, 1965a), the child is impeded in developing the capacity to externalize aggressive drives, to fuse aggression with libido, and there is a defective maturation of identificatory processes. Primitive identifications involving the fusion of self and object images

cannot be overlaid by true object identifications in the ego (and later, the superego) at a safe distance from the ego core.

The neutralization of both drives requires an omnipotent idealized object who offers appropriate counteraggression. Where the primary need-satisfying object has failed to supply adequate aggressive 'dialogue' with the infant, the infant cathects himself as a narcissistically idealized 'victim' who represents both the infant's own ego overwhelmed by aggressive energies and the poorly differentiated object of his relatively unneutralized aggressive drives. These energies tend to become directed against the self, and in particular against the bodily self, because the pain barrier is not adequately formed when there is no stable early aggressive object. (This follows the model of anaclitic depression which may be the earliest prototype of suicide [*cf.,* Spitz, 1965b] in the sense of letting oneself die.)

In later life, under the threat of the loss of narcissistically cathected objects, regression toward fusion of self and object may occur because identification with the aggressor fails partially to externalize excessive quantities of unneutralized aggression away from self-representations back onto the object world. A suicide attempt is thus a desperate attempt to consummate an active identification with the object as an aggressor; but projection, which requires externalizable aggression, cannot be used (*cf.,* A. Freud, 1936). The aggression is turned against the self in a manner that suggests a precursor of superego-ego relations on an even more primitive level of ego and drive maturation than that postulated for identification with the aggressor. The suicidal act simultaneously kills the aggressive self and the object who imposes aggressive (as separate from libidinal) frustration, and makes the subject an idealized victim like the original object. This tendency is increased in the absence of the other œdipal object (the other parent) during the œpidal and early latency period.

Permanent re-fusion of subject and idealized victim in death may be sought as a kind of tragic quest, or it may not be resisted by an overwhelmed ego. Or it may be defended against

progressively by attempts to establish sadomasochistic or 'hate' relationships, using the mechanism of identification with the aggressor, or paranoid defenses; or it may be defended against *regressively* in melancholia, or by using such somatic defenses against fusion as insomnia and anorexia. All these are demonstrable in the life and works of Sylvia Plath. Since we lack certain facts about her early life, we can only speculate about the presence of the infantile origins of the mechanisms we have postulated.

This hypothesis points to a relation between proneness to suicide and particular aspects of artistic creativity. Greenacre (1957) has postulated that the retention of primitive identifications provides the basis of empathy in later life and, by implication, of the kind of poetic gift found in Sylvia Plath.

The role of the aggressive drive in Sylvia Plath's often-noted ability to become *one* with both animate and inanimate objects, to conquer the otherness of the *Other,* seems to me inadequately explained by the death instinct theory and by the process of renouncing self-interest in 'altruistic surrender', in which life itself may be threatened in the interests of narcissistic love (*cf.*, A. Freud, 1936). The present hypothesis suggests that primitive identification (or fusion) with an idealized victim-object creates a failure to project the released unneutralized aggressive cathexes away from self-representations. These aggressive cathexes then are unavailable to energize the self-protective enforcing functions of the superego, to promote countercathexes, and to build ego and superego structure.

Further, my hypothesis links suicidal behavior, 'Christ-like' empathy for victims, and poetic sensibility. While identification with the aggressor makes for greater differentiation of self and object in the still-instinctualized relationship to the powerful parents, and prevents premature massive internalization of aggressive forces, the projective aspect of the mechanism also creates a distance from the inner nature of objects. There is loss of the precious sensitivity and vulnerability of early childhood that only a few gifted people retain. Sylvia Plath is an

example of such a creative artist in whom relatively unneutralized aggressive energies may supply simultaneously, or in alternation, energy for creative activity and for self-destruction.

This occurs particularly if the created works are used as intermediate objects for the substantial discharge and investment of these aggressive energies. The creation of a poem then represents in a displaced form the killing of a hated part of the self in a partially externalized representation which partakes of qualities of both self and object. In her essay, The Barfly Ought to Sing, Anne Sexton wrote: 'Suicide is, after all, the opposite of the poem' (Newman, 1971, p. 175). The more the work can be cathected as a stable object for the creator, the more its creation can serve to discharge aggression outward. The world of the poet's vision then becomes a partial substitute for the real world and offers a route of escape from it, and from the self-directed rage that threatens to destroy the ego in the absence of living objects in a trauma-inflicting world.

The poetry of Ted Hughes—for instance, the poems in Crow (Hughes, 1971)—may be an example of the successful externalization of rage through the creation of poetic objects, and Sylvia Plath's selection of him as her husband may be profitably explored in this connection. However, if the creation is experienced as a loss of the narcissistic self, and the poem-object is cathected with primitive defused aggression, the creation is felt to be destroyed in the aftermath of the creative activity. This rouses rage against the self, rage that is experienced as a primitive form of guilt demanding a life for a life. The need to make restitution may energize the kind of treadmill of creative activity ending in self-depletion and self-destruction that marked the last six months of Sylvia Plath's life.

III

Annette Lavers (*cf.*, Newman, 1971) says of Sylvia Plath: '. . . Subject and object, torturer and victim are in her poetry finally indistinguishable, merely lending the depth of their existence to all-powerful entities and symbols.' She adds in a

footnote: 'The theme of adultery, for instance, seems to transcend all possibly biographical sources; if sometimes the writer takes up the position of the victim, at other times she assumes that of the guilty one, guilty of a lover's involvement with her baby or her father, or death itself.'

We can see the origins and vicissitudes of the simultaneous identification with the torturer and victim suggested by Lavers most clearly in Plath's writings, especially her poems. The interrelationships between identification with the chronically ill, then dead œdipal father, and the more primitive identifications involving fusion of self and object representations with the preœdipal mother (parent) need to be considered. The later identification with an idealized œdipal father makes death the equivalent for her of the sexual consummation in which both partners die. The bee stings in one of Sylvia Plath's poems symbolize this danger of death equated with castration through oral-sadistic penetration. It is a danger both to the aggressor (the bee loses its stinger and dies) and to the victim (who swells like a pregnant woman but may be destroyed by the venom). The theme is repeated in the many kinds of attack on the body so prevalent in her poetry. The simultaneous representation of the characters in her poetry as both the guilty one and the aggressor, rather than as one or the other, also shows that she has only partially internalized self-critical ego and superego components, —components segregated by countercathectic energies from the self and object representations in the ego. These structures require a relationship with the post-œdipal father in order to be stabilized in their vulnerable early stages, and the death of Sylvia Plath's father during her early latency period must have been of considerable importance in this failure of internalization (*cf.*, Loewald, 1962). That the œdipal mother and the preœdipal mother were unavailable as aggressor imagoes with whom to identify may be deduced from her writings.

Often, in her poetry and in The Bell Jar, Sylvia Plath expresses a need to have mother rise up from the position of collapsing victim and avoider of confrontation so that her

daughter may find boundaries and limits and may safely 'exercise' her aggression against mother on oral, anal, and œdipal levels. This creation of fantasied aggressor-parents, —which leads to manifold attempts to confront the most dangerous possible aggression she can find in the natural world—, is necessary to shift the balance from Sylvia-as-victim, like the mother and father representations, to Sylvia-as-aggressor. The more neutralized aggression may then be internalized to give strength to her own superego and to help to protect her own life.

In the poem Daddy (*cf.*, Plath, 1966), we find the wish to bring father temporarily back to life, not as the merman (equivalent to the tempting but fatal muses and the Lorelei of other poems), but as the primal scene aggressor who can be hated, like the Nazis, as the devil who can be warded off and killed permanently for the sake of her own survival. To resist the longing for fusion with the dead father, she needs to find a way to turn her aggressive wishes outward. One way is by imaginatively creating a 'hating' sadomasochistic relationship to father, and to her husband, who, in Daddy, are given identical Fascist brute images.

> I made a model of you,
> A man in black with a Meinkampf look
>
> And a love of the rack and the screw,
> And I said I do, I do

Defensively establishing such a 'hating' relationship, however, could deprive her of enriching identifications with her father which helped her achieve independent accomplishment in work that bears some relation to his. Her conflict between writing and femininity would be intensified. She was excited to hear a woman lecturer discuss D. H. Lawrence, and called her 'my salvation' because 'she seemed to prove that a woman no longer had to sacrifice all claims to femininity and family to be a scholar!' Moreover, keeping her father alive in her imagination provided a vital supply of content and imagery

to her poetry. The keeping of bees is compared to the writing of poetry.

> A third person is watching.
> He has nothing to do with the bee-seller or with me.
> Now he is gone.
>
> In eight great bounds, a great scapegoat.
> Here is his slipper, here is another,
> And here the square of white linen
> He wore instead of a hat.
> He was sweet,
>
> The sweat of his efforts a rain
> Tugging the world to fruit (Stings, Plath, 1966).

The last line makes clear that the passage describes the silent omnipresent father, the source of her life and her poetic 'fruit'.

She longed for a kind of mother depicted in The Bell Jar in the 'transference figure' of Dr. Nolan, —a competent professional woman who can simultaneously be mother and replace father, who controls her, who orders shock therapy, but who stays with her during the feared procedure. But this relationship works against the creativity: submitting to the 'therapy', which means surrendering herself in fusion with the symbiotic mother, destroys that part of her mind that contains the roots of her talent and she is afraid after her shock therapy that she will never write again.

If, however, her father is idealized as helpless victim (killed by a circulatory disease, having a leg amputated, castrated in the primal scene by the phallic mother), then identification with him detaches narcissistic libido from self-representations and turns this libido toward him at the expense of the self, bringing a longing for passive reunion and death.[3] The frag-

[3] When I pointed out to a patient whose father died when she was four that she did not really hate her father and wish him dead as she claimed, she became depressed. She wished to believe the contrary because to feel that he was bad and that she really wanted him to die helped to prevent cathecting the loved father by her ego and identifying with him.

ment below suggests more than many biographical essays:

> I was seven, I knew nothing.
> The world occurred.
> You had one leg, and a Prussian mind
> (Little Fugue, Plath, 1966).

The title of an early poem, The Colossus (Plath, 1968), refers simultaneously to herself and to her father. In the poem she is attempting to 'glue' herself together, to create poetry out of her fragmented self and the clamorous noises in her head. At the same time she is attempting to put her father back together, to give him a voice through her poetic self. The reconstruction of fragments of ruins in the hope that they will return to life through her art is to reverse the processes of decay and disintegration in herself in identification with her dead father. (The theme is repeated in the argument with Buddy Willard in The Bell Jar over whether poetry is immortal or dust.) At the end of the poem, she compares herself, in an allusion to the Oresteia, to Electra waiting on the shore for Agamemnon. It is impossible to separate the poet from the poem, or either of them from the absent father. Yet she saves herself at the end. She says she is 'married to a shadow'; she will no longer wait for 'the scrape of a keel/ On the blank stones of the landing. Condensed in this is the wish to renounce a life of waiting faithfully and endlessly for her father to return from the dead; when he does, he will ultimately be killed again and take her with him. This early poem foreshadows the defiant poet of Daddy. The ending in both poems affirms the necessity of renouncing the impossible quest to reunite with the father (across the sea). The failure to put together the Colossus is a renunciation of the incestuous consummation which would bring death to both of them; it alludes also to the failure to achieve 'perfection' as a poet. In the Introduction to Nancy Hunter Steiner's memoir (1973), George Stade comments that the poem shows that no living man could measure up to the Colossus but that only living men partook of his quality, no matter how far they fell short. And Robert

Lowell in his Foreword to Ariel (Plath, 1966) says: '. . . her art's immortality is life's disintegration'. The perfect Colossus, the perfect merging with the dead father, the creation of the perfect poem from this merging, are equivalent to her own death.

In many poems and in her novel, Sylvia Plath depicts a daughter's rage toward the mother-character pounding against an empty unresisting, unresponsive space. The mixed feelings of longing and frustration inspire dazzling poetic bursts. But the rage is inevitably turned in a self-destructive direction after the poem is completed, and the object, in the form of the poem, is once again silent and unresistive. Her identity as a woman is disturbed as she struggles against identification with her mother, the hard working 'victim' of life, the plaster saint.

In Plaster (*cf.*, Plath, 1971a), a transitional poem, deals with this theme. In the poem, Sylvia Plath describes the plaster cast covering the broken leg of the 'I', 'squint-eyed old yellow', as another self, a plaster saint. Her description of the plaster-other-self is like the striking poetic rendering of the same unresponsive mother who lies asleep next to the sleepless heroine in The Bell Jar.

> I hated her, she had no personality—
> She lay in bed with me, like a dead body.
> And I was scared, because she was shaped just the way I was.
> I couldn't sleep for a week, she was so cold.
> I blamed her for everything, but she didn't answer.
> I couldn't understand her stupid behavior!
> (In Plaster, Plath, 1971a)

In the poem, the plaster self begins to develop a personality, 'a slave mentality'. The poet then describes other attributes of the plaster cast—calmness, patience, 'holding my bones in place so they would mend properly'. The plaster's firmness is associated with love. Its absent-mindedness, letting in drafts, fitting more loosely, leads to thoughts about the plaster's wanting to leave her. Roles are reversed, and the poet becomes aware that she cannot live outside the symbiosis. The cast develops a soul,

an itch for adventure; it becomes like the work of art and the child, wanting to soar into light. The poet is now a 'half corpse' as the cast (representing the poem and the poetic self) takes on its own life. It drains away the life and strength of the writer who is 'quite limp', like a mummy in a case. Living with the cast is compared to 'living with my own coffin'. Images of life and death are fused, reversed, and condensed in the images of the relationship between the plaster cast and the poet. Near the end of the poem, there is the line: 'Now I see it must be one or the other of us'. Sylvia Plath will cast off the cast (the mummy case) and the cast will 'perish with emptiness then, and begin to miss me' —a threat of suicide but with a saving defiant hostility. Differentiation through aggression is predicted. The poem returns to the imagery of mother and child assuming separate identities and the fusion that threatened death is resolved.

Using In Plaster as a point of reference, George Stade writes: 'The persona speaking out of any given poem by Sylvia Plath, then, may be either sulphurous old yellow, or the plaster saint, or a consciousness that sometimes contains these two and sometimes lies stretched between them. In the course of a given poem, especially if it is a later one, any of these personae may dissolve, re-form, take on novel shapes, fuse with whatever it is not, or reverse its charge, so that the plaster saint becomes a queen bee, a comet, God's lioness. The outer shell of consciousness may be completely or dimly aware of the chthonic [underworld] presence within: it may feel itself a puppet jerked by strings receding into an interior distance where a familiar demon sits in possession, or it may try to locate the menace outside of itself, among shadows, thin people, reflections in water, ghostly presences glimpsed from the corner of the mind, but always with a sense of *déjà vu*' (*cf.*, Steiner, 1973, p. 9).

For Sylvia Plath the process of writing poems and a novel only temporarily externalized the rage that turned against her when the work was completed. Each poem seemed rapidly to fade into a silent reproach against its creator.

> . . . worse
> Even than your maddening
> Song, your silence (Lorelei, Plath, 1968).

These lines are addressed to father's representatives beneath the sea, the Lorelei, who are identical with the three Muses in The Disquieting Muses (Plath, 1968). The poems may be regarded as attempts to create transitional objects evoking the illusion of unity of the self with representatives of the absent unempathic mother and lost father. But they also serve as vehicles for drive-discharge, becoming 'prime targets of aggression in the process of denigration of self and object' (Kestenberg, 1971). With their destruction, the rage returns to the self, threatening to make their creator their victim. At the end of Sylvia Plath's life, the only resolution appears to have been a suicide that regressively re-established the 'perfect' self through fusion with images of the idealized victim. She finally surrendered to the silent seductive 'death' figure which so often appeared in her poems, the death that waited side by side with that other death so often seized and struggled against, that announced its evil intention and thus promoted heroic struggle and differentiation. Many of her poems appear to be temporary structures for the expression of her instinctual drives. Perhaps this accounts for the uneasy pleasure one feels when reading some of them.

Sylvia Plath's ability to feel for, to become one with, all men and women, all animate and inanimate objects, both as aggressor and as victim, pervades all her writings; and it claimed her life in the end. The universality of her empathy is like that of the psychotic patients described by Jacobson (1965) who develop delusional images of the projected object which they never attach to definite external persons, or who develop delusional images of themselves through introjection of early infantile object images which hardly resemble any past or present realistic external objects. Sylvia Plath differs from such psychotic individuals; having the ego of an artist, unless she became merged with her poetic personae, she estab-

lished distance and control over their images, even as she lived within them in the process of creating or re-creating them. It is remarkable that the personae of so many of her poems (of those, at least, until the very last week of her life) are depicted observing herself: fusing or fearing to fuse with a reflected image and ultimately wrenching away from drowning in her vision; or giving birth to a new idealized self in pregnancy fantasies that deny the necessity of union with a man for procreation. (See, for example, her poem Wuthering Heights [Plath, 1971a]). A. E. Dyson in Newman (1971) says, 'In Sylvia Plath, it is as though the poet finds in personal experience a depth of derangement, but then, in the magnificent sanity of creation, transmutes this into a myth for her age'.

In almost all her poetry Sylvia Plath achieves distance from the personal experience by exploring symbolic and mythical potentialities; after this there is a more or less tentative return to the individual self from which the poem started. Many poems seem like a journey to the borders of a death which is always there as a threat, the body always vulnerable to attack. The mind has the alternative of safe, prosaic lifelessness, or turning to the writing of poetry with the risk of madness in loss of self. The outside world is let in warily, but then threatens to incorporate her into itself and to replace the body and mind it feeds on, like the 'dybbuk' so strikingly described in The Bell Jar (Plath, 1971b). In fact, the precarious balance and dialogue between life and death is the major theme of her poems. According to Annette Lavers (*cf.*, Newman, 1971) life is 'color, pulsating rhythm, noise, heat, radiance, expansion, emotion and communication'. Death, the other pole, is represented by 'darkness, stasis, silence, frost, well-defined edges and the hardness of rocks, jewels, and skulls, dryness, anything self-contained and separate, or which derives its positive attributes from some other source, instead of generating them freely—for death is absence, nothingness'.

Reading the poems in chronological sequence one sees the balance shift until, in the last poems, the struggle against the forces of death weakens and dies. And yet each force that attracts by its lifelike qualities and becomes drawn into the persona of the poet becomes the bringer of death. Lavers's reading of the recurrent symbols, although very helpful in 'decoding' the poems, fails to distinguish between the death that attracts and the death that menaces and repels. ('Two, of course there are two.') To one the poet is 'red meat', but as for the other, 'He wants to be loved' (Death and Co. [in Plath, 1966]). There is a constant search to recognize the hidden death in all that she wishes to take hungrily into herself without resistance, to make into herself temporarily as part of the process of creation, and to rid herself of in the completion of the poem before it destroys her from inside.

> The bees found him [father] out,
> Moulding onto his lips like lies,
> Complicating his features.
>
> They thought death was worth it, but I
> Have a self to recover, a queen (Stings, Plath, 1966).

Her wish to live drew her to those objects and people who clearly bare their fangs, who show their true colors, who offer a counterforce against which she may struggle to neutralize her own aggression as well as theirs. But to write poetry, to produce life, she herself had to be impregnated with potential death, heroically never knowing if what she produced would be a living child or a voracious monster. She suspended her personal identity to become voluntary victim to a world waiting to eat her up, to let that world disappear inside her in order to create a perfect merging of aggressor object and victim. From this merging,[4] her identity as a poet was born, but the 'im-

[4] This merging is illustrated in Ariel (Plath, 1966). Her mother's name was Aurelia.

minent volcano'[5] was there too. The continual attempt to re-externalize these dangerous materials, at least temporarily, in the form of poems after letting herself *become* them, by passively accepting the 'gift' of her creativity, constituted her labor. In Who (Plath, 1971a), the poet, fallow after a season of harvest, waits for inspiration.

> This is a dull school,
> I am a root, a stone, an owl pellet,
> Without dreams of any sort.

Then comes the wish:

> Mother, you are the one mouth
> I would be a tongue to. Mother of otherness
> Eat me.

Kindness (Plath, 1966) fuses all these themes in a remarkably condensed way that summarizes the creative life of Sylvia Plath. In it she uses elements of a radio play by Ted Hughes about a man who runs over a hare with his car, sells the dead animal for five shillings, and with the blood-money buys his girl two roses. The poem is written from the point of view of the receiver of the roses; they are equated with her two children. The roses, presumably blood red, like the tulips in an earlier poem, are a sweet gift—and 'Sugar can cure everything, so Kindness says'. The gift of roses, like sugar crystals, is ironically supposed to silence the crying of children, the rabbit, or to anesthetize the pinned butterfly with which the rabbit is equated. But the giver enters the room 'with a cup of tea wreathed in steam', conjuring up the image of a witch. And the receiver of the gift is simultaneously the crying child, the crying rabbit, the pinned butterfly. The poem is about being

[5] Ted Hughes, in Newman (1971), wrote: 'The opposition of a prickly, fastidious defense and an imminent volcano is, one way or another, an element in all her early poems. The earlier the poem, the more powerful the defensive forces.'

killed by Kindness, which is personified as Dame Kindness and is another of the disguised bringers of death to be guarded against because she disarms the victim; there is no fighting her off in her seductive ambience that offers the sweetness of poetic inspiration at the price of surrender to her.

Kindness was written shortly before Sylvia Plath's death. In Tulips (Plath, 1966), written earlier, the menace of the sweet flower is recognized and warded off as a danger comparable to the salt sea.

> The tulips should be behind bars like dangerous animals;
> They are opening like the mouth of some great African cat.

The poet is made conscious of her heart, her blood. The hypercathexis of the living body as self-object, in Kohut's (1968) sense, mobilizes the wish to live, revives life-saving narcissism.

> And I am aware of my heart: it opens and closes
> Its bowl of red blooms out of sheer love of me.
> The water I taste is warm and salt, like the sea,
> And comes from a country far away as health
> (Tulips, Plath, 1966).

The climax of Kindness is in the last three lines:

> The blood jet is poetry,
> There is no stopping it.
> You hand me two children, two roses.

The poet equates herself with the murdered animal; out of the wounds spurts the life blood which is the poem itself. The creative urge is as irresistible as the wish for her children, the gift of roses, the pin of the entomologist fixing the butterfly, the car that bears down on the small animal, the figure of death, represented as a female bearing sweets. Death through surrender to the beloved murderer is risked, is foretold, in the acceptance of the 'gift' of poetry. Kindness, written in the

last week of her life, ends with a passive acceptance. The two children, the two roses, and the poem are 'given'—by Kindness, Dame Kindness, the 'Mother of otherness'—at the price of allowing the poet to 'bleed' out her poems to the death.

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A Psychoanalytic Essay on Sleuth and the Royal Hunt of the Sun

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TWINS IN DISGUISE

A PSYCHOANALYTIC ESSAY ON SLEUTH AND THE ROYAL HUNT OF THE SUN

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It is typical of the creative writer that he has undergone, in especially intense form, particular experiences that are universal, or nearly so. The artist's accentuated responses may stem from an inborn intensity of perception (Greenacre, 1957). In addition, the special circumstances of his life may lead to marked vividness. Albee, for instance, having been adopted, has repeated the theme of adoption in his work (Blum, 1969).

Of course, it is not surprising that writers produce literature which is autobiographical in the sense that one or more of the personae have the character structure and play out the fantasies of the author. These characters may be fairly accurate and consciously drawn self-portraits, as in Mann's (1903) *Tonio Kroger* or in Thomas Wolfe's novels. But more frequently they are markedly disguised and the author himself is not aware that he is describing aspects of his own character. In Greenacre's (1955) study of Swift and Carroll, she remarks that Carroll and Alice are essentially interchangeable and states that '. . . it seems obvious that an artist—as in contrast to a reporter—reveals in one way or another his own unconscious stresses and strivings' (p. 11).

Nonetheless, the writer's reactions, unique though they may be for the individual artist, are not foreign to the audience. Rather, the author's creations demonstrate certain of the audience's fantasies, reviving derivatives of unconscious wishes and conflicts in exaggerated form. Mobilizing these and associated emotions is essential to the æsthetic experience.

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In this paper, I shall examine two recent plays by twin brothers, *Sleuth* by Anthony Shaffer (1970) and *The Royal Hunt of the Sun* by Peter Shaffer (1964).

I

In *Sleuth*,[1] Andrew Wyke, a mystery story writer, invites his wife's young lover, Milo Tindle, to his home in order to punish him for the affair. Pretending to be friendly, Andrew outlines a plan to Milo. The two should coöperate in stealing Wyke's jewelry; Milo would then have money from the sale of the jewels while Andrew would collect the insurance money and also be rid of a wife of whom he has tired. Milo is at first mistrustful but finally agrees, and they go through a run-through of the burglary. Andrew then reveals that his plan is complete: he intends to shoot Milo as a thief. Milo, terrified and humbled, begs for mercy as Andrew first attacks him verbally and finally pulls the trigger.

The second act opens on a scene of surprising calm. Andrew is alone in his study; it is revealed that the bullet had in fact been a blank and that Milo had not been shot but had run off after being sadistically humiliated. It had, in fact, all been a game. A third character now appears, a broadly comic police officer, Inspector Doppler, who claims that he is investigating the disappearance of Milo. He exposes enough circumstantial evidence to prove that Andrew murdered Milo before revealing that he is actually Milo in disguise; he has returned to get even with Andrew, to frighten and humble him.

Andrew's admiration for Milo is great. He points out that Milo's methods are the same as his; when he had tricked Milo '. . . . [I] wanted to get to know you—to see if you were . . . my kind of person'. Milo asks, 'A games-playing sort of person?' and Andrew agrees, adding that such a person is 'a complete man' (p. 101). An attachment between the two men is further hinted at. Milo asks, 'Where would you find homosexual wood-

[1] The summary of the plot used here is based on the play (*cf.*, A. Shaffer, 1970), not on the movie released in 1972.

worms? In a tall boy' (pp. 100-101). A poor example of wit, perhaps, but suggestive of Milo's growing affection. Complimenting Milo as his sort of person, Andrew reveals, 'At bottom I am a solitary man. . . . I've never met a woman to whom the claims of the intellect are as absolute as they are for me' (p. 102). The relationship once acknowledged, however, it is also repudiated. Milo says, '. . . your game was superior to mine. . . . My only duty now is to even our score. That's imperative' (pp. 103-104). Andrew claims that they are indeed equal, 'It's one set all', but Milo is adamant; he will even the score further.

This scene of confrontation and delineation of relationship is the core of the play. Like two ferals saluting one another, the lover-opponents recognize one another and go on to more game-playing and to the final denouement. Milo exacts further vengeance, again through a charade. He claims that he has strangled Tēa, Andrew's mistress, after making love to her. He convinces Andrew that Tēa is buried in the garden and that he has evidence which will incriminate Andrew. The police are about to arrive, he says, and Andrew's only hope is to discover this evidence by means of riddles which Milo gives him. As Andrew rushes about trying to find the evidence, the sadomasochistic element in their relationship is highlighted.

> Milo: The thought that you are playing a game for your life, it is practically giving you an orgasm (p. 113).
> Andrew: You sadistic bloody wop (p. 114).

When Andrew retrieves the evidence just as the police are supposedly about to arrive, Milo reveals that this too is a hoax and that he has sadistically tricked his opponent once more. In his mind things are now squared. Andrew agrees; his love for Milo is great and he asks him to stay rather than go off with his wife. He begs Milo not to 'waste it all on Marguerite. She doesn't appreciate you like I do. You and I are evenly matched. . . . I just want someone to play with' (p. 120).

But Milo insists on leaving and thus unbalances things again;

he will now have the older man's wife. He gets her fur coat and says goodbye. For him the game is over. But Andrew is enraged at Milo's leaving as well as at the inequity; he shoots him. He has achieved the revenge he played in the first act. The actual arrival of the police tips the balance again, however, and Milo's dying words, 'Game, set, and match' reveal that he feels he is the winner, although in truth each has destroyed the other.

Characterization in Sleuth

The two characters in this play are engaged in an intense ambivalent relationship; extreme hate and profound affection alternately appear. Milo tries to take Andrew's wife from him, and Andrew retaliates cruelly in the first act. Thereafter, Milo repeatedly strikes back, identifying with and imitating his opponent as he tries to make things equal, 'to even the score'. Although he is first presented as a rather dull young man, Milo is transformed into a person capable of playing Andrew's intellectual game. As the play proceeds, the affection between the two men becomes more apparent. The attacks have a sadistic quality, and stem from love as well as hate. The games of the two protagonists of the play are like games of a sexual nature played by children living at close quarters. A latent homosexual attraction is hinted at in their relationship—in their sharing of two women and in Andrew's attempt to exclude women from their lives. Clearly Andrew prefers Milo to women; he explicitly asks him to stay with him rather than go off with Marguerite. Despite his boasts, it is revealed that Andrew is not potent heterosexually. Rather his energies are directed to games, and Milo appeals to him because of his abilities in this area.

The attachment of the two men to the same women has a homosexual determinant but the positive œdipal theme is apparent as well. A younger man attempts to win the wife of an older man and the two rivals struggle to destroy each other. The fact that the two women do not appear on stage and that

their personalities are not developed by the author contributes to their representation as precœdipal sources of sustenance for which the men compete. Andrew's attachment to Tēa, whom he describes as a goddess, is sadistic rather than tender or genital in the psychoanalytic sense. So too his relationship to his wife is immature and is not genital. He states that 'sex is the game and marriage the penalty'. Milo appears to function on a more mature level but soon becomes caught up in the gamesmanship with Andrew.

Milo and Andrew use identification and imitation as prime means of attaining their love object as well as for defensive purposes. Not only do they copy each other but each enjoys imitating other characters. Andrew acts an old woman being robbed, a cleaning woman coming upon him after he is in fantasy tied up by a thief, an inspector discovering a crime, and a criminal in a story he has written. Milo's imitations of Doppler and later of another policeman are dramatic peaks in the play.

In their struggles to win games, the two men are continuously reversing roles, changing from passive to active, playing now the aggressor and now the victim. They alternate between male and female as well. These identifications with the aggressor serve to reverse matters so that the victim attempts to master a situation in which he may be harmed. In addition, the pronounced use of identification suggests a poor distinction between self and object representations. And there is a libidinal element: the identification signifies a type of pleasurable union of the two, a union which may succeed in quelling hostility through the triumph of affection. Further, identification may diminish mutual antagonism by keeping things equal; the pressing need to establish equality is a motivating force behind the behavior of both Milo and Andrew.

There are many references to halves and doubles in the play. Milo's father is half-Jewish and Andrew jokes that 'some of my best friends are half-Jews' (p. 21). One of the clues planted by Milo for Andrew contains the phrase, 'For any

man with half an eye' (p. 110) must see what stands before him. A second clue, referring to a pair of shoes, begins, 'Two brothers we are/Great burdens we bear' (p. 113). When Milo selects a name for himself as the Inspector, it is 'Doppler', meaning double or *Doppelgänger,* which Milo translates as 'double image' but is more accurately translated as 'double'.

The preoccupation with equality suggests a fantasy of being half a person and an attempt to make up for this deficit by remaining near another, by having close contact through the types of activity engaged in by children, including story telling and games which may be, as with children, overtly sexual. Each character feeling like half a person may be compelled to steal to regain the missing part. The protagonists in *Sleuth* are preoccupied with theft. Robbery is a significant theme in the play. Andrew plans his revenge because Milo has stolen his wife; Milo, at least in fantasy, steals Andrew's mistress; the two men plan a theft in the first act, while the final encounter between them involves the feigned theft of a fur coat. Andrew, of course, is well prepared for illegal activity since he earns his living inventing and solving crimes. In a direct reference to twins, Andrew imagines himself an identical twin accused of having committed a crime.

Interrelationship of Characters in Sleuth

Andrew and Milo seem to be acting out a number of different and varying relationships with each other. The first and most apparent is a father-son relationship with an œdipal conflict implicit in their vying for the possession of a woman who belongs to one of them (Andrew). However, this relationship alternates and the father-son roles seem to be interchangeable. In contesting for the female object, they develop an interest in each other which suggests a homosexual linkage that is of a more intense and serious nature than the ostensible possession of the woman. In acting out this conflict they take alternating active and passive roles; they play an interchangeable sadomasochistic game much of which is in the service of main-

taining an equality with the other so that neither one gains an advantage over the other. This sort of game-playing suggests the relationship of two young children who replace their sexual interest in each other with a variety of games (the essential action of the play). In the course of their games, Andrew and Milo also display changing and alternating identities, one with the other. They also assume various other roles, the unmasking and revelation of which are in the service of maintaining the love-hate relationship that becomes an increasingly prominent feature of their games as well as their relationship. Further, by maintaining the equality and the homosexual linkage, they deprive each other of possible success and the possible attainment of the woman whom they are seeking. Thus they both are deprived of her, or mutually deprive each other of her, and maintain their common bond, their game, and their state of equality with each other.

The various conflicts, fantasies, and wishes that seem to be acted out in the differing roles the two characters play are highly suggestive of the complicated interrelationships that exist between two males whose development proceeds simultaneously in respect to each other and to precœdipal and œdipal objects. This occurs most frequently in twins who grow and develop together. In identical or fraternal twins, individual differences may not be great enough to separate one from the other. Hence, many of the conflicts, wishes, and fantasies displayed by Andrew and Milo in *Sleuth* resemble those described in the studies of twins by many authors.[2] Most important in the psychology of twins is the feeling on the part of each that he is not a complete individual without the presence or existence of the other; without the accompaniment of his twin, he is only half a person. As pointed out above, Andrew and Milo make many references to 'half'.

[2] *Cf.*, the psychoanalytic studies of twins by Arlow (1960); Burlingham (1952); Glenn (1966); Glenn and Glenn (1968); Joseph (1959), (1961); Joseph and Tabor (1961); Karpman (1953); Lacombe (1959); Leonard (1961); Maenchen (1968); Orr (1941); and Peto (1946).

As the two characters in the play, *Sleuth,* suggest the type of psychological conflict found in studies of twins, it is of interest that the author, Anthony Shaffer, is one of a twin pair. His twin brother, Peter Shaffer, is the author of *The Royal Hunt of the Sun.* It seems worthwhile therefore to examine the brother's play and the characterizations developed in it.

II

Peter Shaffer's (1964) play, *The Royal Hunt of the Sun,* has more characters than *Sleuth* but the essential story is of the interrelationship between Pizarro, the Spanish conquistador, and Atahualpa, the Sovereign Inca of Peru. On a philosophical level, the two main characters represent two societies with different outlooks. Pizarro has come to Peru to seek the gold possessed by Atahualpa, who is God, the son of the Sun. Although the two men are alike in many ways, they also have opposite attributes. Pizarro represents a society of hope but also one of greed, dishonesty, faithlessness, destruction, and hypocrisy, and a society in which joy is sinful. Atahualpa represents an honest social structure in which man has no faith but hope and whose world is totally organized and joyless. As the author says, 'Both in a deep sense denied man' (p. viii).

Atahualpa is a stylized picture of a man; Pizarro is a more complex and convincingly realistic person. Pizarro is part of Western culture but is sceptical of it and rejects much of it. He recognizes the hypocrisy of using religion as a mask to justify greed and murder but nevertheless flagrantly engages in such acts. His personality, although not typical of the European Christian, represents it. Nor can Atahualpa be considered a typical Incan—he is God—, but in the play he represents what the author views as the ideas and attitudes of the South American. In the course of the play, Pizarro is won over by the Indian god, grows to admire his ideals, and becomes more like him.

Whereas Anthony Shaffer uses the relationship between his two characters as the basis for an exciting intellectual thriller, Peter Shaffer's play makes a philosophical point. It seems that he

reaches into his repertoire of personal experiences to dramatize his condemnation of European ideology and to embrace certain admirable aspects of the Inca *Weltanschauung*, the religion of the primitive man.

Pizarro comes from a deprived background and is illegitimate. He says: 'I . . . did not know my mother . . . she left me at the church door for anyone to find' (p. 101). He spent his youth in a filthy village in Spain. 'For twenty-two years I drove pigs down this street because my father couldn't own my mother' (p. 25). But he will compensate for these deprivations by achieving fame and acquiring gold. He tells De Soto: 'You inherited your honor—I had to root for mine like the pigs' (p. 26).

Atahualpa is also illegitimate. 'His father was the great Inca Huyana who grew two sons, one by a wife, one by a non-wife. At his death he cut the kingdom in two for them. But Atahuallpa[3] wanted all. So he made war and killed his brother' (p. 35). This twinlike behavior, retrieving the lost half, has a parallel in Greek mythology when Œdipus's twin sons, unsatisfied with reigning alternately, each half the time, battle for sole control of the kingdom. The Inca God justifies his behavior on the grounds that his brother '. . . was a fool . . . his head was of a child'; his brother was '. . . fit only to tend herds, but [Atahualpa was] born to tend people' (p. 100). Pizarro identifies himself with the brother, saying, 'That was my work long ago. Tending herds' (p. 100).[4] This clue to latent twinship, which the playwright unconsciously depicts, is re-enforced when the Incan calls Pizarro his 'brother'.

The plot of *The Royal Hunt of the Sun* is relatively simple. Pizarro comes to Peru with a small group of men to wrest treasure from the large Incan empire. When the Spaniards are

[3] Peter Shaffer misspells the Inca God's name in his play, using two 'l's'. It is interesting to speculate if the doubling of the 'l' is a manifestation of the twinning in that it puts two in the place of one, or if it is to make the spelling more like Shaffer, with its two 'f's'.

[4] I am indebted to Dr. Milton Jucovy (1972) for the observation that 'Shaffer' is the German word for shepherd. Apparently the author has identified himself with the two characters he has selected as protagonists in the play: Pizarro tends herds, Atahualpa tends people.

sighted, Atahualpa believes that they are gods come from the East, and Pizarro, who has anticipated this, carefully plays the role of a god, much to the horror of the Catholic prelates accompanying him. The conquistadors and their horses hazardously climb the Andes until they meet a group of Incans who put down their arms before the supposed gods. The Spaniards thereupon slaughter the Indians accompanying Atahualpa and capture him, the Inca God. Atahualpa agrees to supply Pizarro with a roomful of gold in exchange for his life.

Captor and captive get to know and respect each other. Pizarro had already acted like Atahualpa in pretending to be God. Now they compare their lives and, despite contrasts, find themselves strikingly similar. With contact, they imitate each other and become even more similar. Pizarro clumsily attempts an Indian dance; Atahualpa learns to fence in the style of a European and succeeds in besting the Spaniard in this game. In an affectionate gesture, Atahualpa places one of his earrings on Pizarro, making them similar. The Spaniard's main acquisition from the Inca God, however, is the knowledge of the importance of honor.

When Atahualpa lives up to his part of the bargain and gives the conquistadors the gold, he expects to be released. But his refusal to spare any Spaniard other than Pizarro leaves the Spanish leader in a quandary. Should he adhere to the principles of honor, or resort to his usual treachery and find a way out of the agreement? His affection for and identification with the Peruvian wins out and he decides to spare him despite the danger to his men. As he is making the decision to save him, he ties Atahualpa to him with a rope, but at the same time torments him cruelly, threatening him with death.

The decision is nullified as Pizarro's men kill Atahualpa, thus facilitating their escape from Peru with the gold. The Spanish leader, grieving for his lost friend, identifies with him. 'You're so cold', he says to the corpse. 'I'd warm you if I could. But there's no warming now, not ever now. I'm colding too. There's a snow of death falling all around us. . . . We'll be put into the same earth, father and son in our own land' (p. 148). His

identity with the dead man manifests itself in another way as he shouts, 'Cheat! You've cheated me! Cheat . . .' (p. 137). Yet it was Pizzaro who did the cheating.

Characterization in The Royal Hunt of the Sun

The twin characteristics of the two protagonists in *The Royal Hunt of the Sun* show many interesting similarities to those found in *Sleuth*.

Pizarro and Atahualpa, despite differences, are remarkably similar. For instance, they are both illegitimate. But as they compare their personal histories, they note differences as well, including Pizarro's having been a pig herder as was Atahualpa's brother but not the Inca God himself.

The two men develop an affection for each other, so much so that Pizarro, out of character for a soldier, weeps at the other's death. They play a game (fencing) together and while the element of game-playing is not as blatant as in *Sleuth,* its presence is significant. Their affection appears alongside of and blended with antagonism; there is a sadomasochistic relationship demonstrated by Pizarro's cruel treatment of Atahualpa whom he has tied to himself.

Each man feels that he has been cheated and takes steps to undo the loss through stealing. Atahualpa stole his brother's half of the empire from him; Pizarro stole the gold from the Incans, a division of goods which is nicely symbolized when he takes one of Atahualpa's pair of earrings. Each was like Jacob, the Biblical twin who stole his brother's birthright. (It is noteworthy that Jacob's theft was accomplished by his imitating his twin.) The characters in *The Royal Hunt of the Sun* share a superego deficiency with those in *Sleuth* and with Jacob.[5]

[5] Twinship which interferes with the resolution of the œdipus complex may be a factor in superego deficiency, but we see more clearly the effect of feeling like an exception. I have observed that twins, fantasying themselves deficient and cheated, feel justified in bypassing the moral code that others abide by. Paradoxically, they may also feel like exceptions because of their imagined superiority. (*Cf.*, Glenn, 1966.)

The importance of identification for both Pizarro and Atahualpa has been pointed out. Atahualpa goes further in trying to make the other assume a likeness to him. But it is significant that as Atahualpa dies, Pizarro not only feels like him but actually will also die soon. This is an enactment of a twin fantasy that the two being one, what happens to one happens to the other; as one twin dies so will the other half. To achieve this sense of emotional and physical unity, the author had to alter the historical facts, as Kanzer (1973) has called to my attention. Actually Pizarro died eight years after Atahualpa. (In *Sleuth,* the two men are destroyed by the death of Milo.)

There is a reference in *The Royal Hunt of the Sun* to the protagonists as father and son which indicates the presence of an œdipal motif in addition to the twin theme. But there are no women in the play, and the competition for gold seems to imply the struggle for supplies from the mother rather than œdipal wishes.

Unconscious unification of personal and public symbolism gives emotional impact to an artistic creation. Such condensation occurs in the play when Pizarro ties Atahualpa to him with a rope. On the personal level, this may refer to the need to be close to his 'brother' to prevent him from escaping his ambivalent grasp.[6] On the public level, there is an Inca myth to which the vivid scene may refer.[7] Hiram Bingham (1948), the archeologist who discovered Machu Picchu, found high in the city a stone called the *intihuatana* (the place to which the sun is tied). In a caption to a picture in his book, he describes the *intihuatana* as '. . . the place where the High Priest of the Sun God succeeded in tying him up on the occasion of the winter solstice when it seemed likely to the unfortunate Indians that the Sun who made life bearable in the high Andes was leaving them'.

[6] In discussing this paper, Arlow (1971) pointed out the twin fantasy of being tied together in the womb, as by an imagined umbilical cord.

[7] This myth was brought to my attention by Sarnoff (1971).

Interestingly enough, the author of *The Royal Hunt of the Sun* apparently was unaware of either the private or the public symbolism involved.

III

There are many literary works about the interrelationships and character structures of twins.[8] We might use language from the study of dreams and say that while the manifest content of a novel or play contains no twins, they sometimes appear in the latent content. In *The Prince and the Pauper* (Clemens, 1882), Mark Twain wrote about two boys of identical appearance who substituted for one another, just as twins often do. In *A Tale of Two Cities* (Dickens, 1859), Sidney Carton takes the place of his double, Charles Darnay, so that the latter is rescued from death at the guillotine.

That Anthony and Peter Shaffer have produced plays in which the protagonists manifest personalities typical of twins, leads us to speculate on the effect of the artist's fantasies on the audience. Twinlike doubles appeal to audiences, a fact that I plan to discuss in another communication. Here I will merely outline a few impressions.

Creative artists seek to express their thinking as it is influenced by their experience and unconscious fantasies, conflicts, and wishes. They do so in a manner that disguises them but in a manner that appeals to an audience. The audience accepts the literary production at both a manifest and latent level, recognizing and empathizing with the content offered. To do so requires resonance within the audience with the fantasies and conflicts being portrayed. To many, the fantasy of having a twin has been part of their early experience. Hence, a masked portrayal of such a fantasy is comprehensible and acceptable, even if not consciously expressed.

[8] For example, Shakespeare (1592, 1601), Wilder (1927), Mann (1905, 1955, 1960), and Barth (1967).

SUMMARY

An analysis of two plays by twin brothers, Anthony Shaffer's *Sleuth* and Peter Shaffer's *The Royal Hunt of the Sun,* reveals that the protagonists in the plays manifest the personality characteristics and interactions of twins even though they are not represented as such. Among these traits are mutual identification, role reversal, intense rivalry and affection, as well as a desire to keep things 'even'. Authors of novels and plays often express many of their own characteristics, tensions, and conflicts in their creations.

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The Discovery of the Unconscious. The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry. By Henri E. Ellenberger. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. 932 pp.

Samuel Abrams

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE DISCOVERY OF THE UNCONSCIOUS. The History and Evolution of Dynamic Psychiatry. By Henri E. Ellenberger. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1970. 932 pp.

Historical accounts may be characterized by the mass of facts they present, by the quality and form in which they render these facts, or by the fresh perspectives from which they view past events. A few are characterized by the fundamental hypotheses they propose; in such instances the text merely serves to promote these proposals. Henri E. Ellenberger's book, The Discovery of the Unconscious, requires judgments in all four respects.

To begin with, it is surely a book of facts: the volume has nine hundred thirty-two pages and twenty-six hundred fifty notes and bibliographic references. One frequently stumbles over several numbered annotations while trying to negotiate a single sentence. The book sags under the weight of traditional scholarly research. We find here the origin of the term 'rapport'; the truth about Anna O.; the delightful tale of the exorcist priest, Gassner; Freud's hitherto unrevealed military service records. The abundance of such material is a measure of the author's perseverance and of his meticulous search for data.

With this collection of data, Ellenberger attempts a synthetic and sequential exposition of the emergence of contemporary psychology in the past century or two. He explores the lives of the players in his restricted drama; he examines the theories and systems they helped create; and, finally, he presents both narrow and sweeping hypotheses to bring formal order to these elements.

His synthetic and sequential exposition is a striking tour de force. Chapter 10 attempts an almost year by year compilation of seemingly disparate events between 1882 and 1945. In the description of 1889, for example, Ellenberger concerns himself with the sensational deaths of Prince Rudolf and the Baroness Maria Vetsera, Boulanger's success in the general elections in France, Nietzsche's psychosis, the Universal Exhibition in Paris, and several International Congresses, complete with abstracts of comments by observers such as Bernheim. The panorama of the year is sprinkled with people, publications, and places—and the psychologic is distilled from all

of it. There cannot be many scholars equipped to attempt, much less achieve such a synthesis with any success.

Ellenberger is also adept at short biographic sketches. Mesmer, Fechner, and other lesser and more celebrated figures emerge sharply, each within his contemporary social existence. However, Ellenberger's exploration of theories and systems is somewhat less impressive. He frequently is forced to use such devices as graphs, tables, and numbered summarizing sentences in an attempt to simplify his rendering. On occasion, such sections come perilously close to resembling college outline texts. Perhaps this is in the spirit of pedagogy, or it may reflect the wide range of readers the author and his publishers anticipated.

The hypotheses Ellenberger creates to encompass his work span vast areas. There are comments on the struggles between Stoicism and Epicurism throughout history, views on the opposition between the Enlightenment and Romanticism, and the influence of such movements as these on modern scientific psychology. There are limited reflections as well on the influence of organizations and 'schools' in inhibiting progress. The central thesis of the book, however, is the author's answer to the question: What accounts for the fact that men of equal talent receive vastly different judgments of history? Ellenberger's preferred metaphor for this question contrasts those 'favored by Lesmosyne, the goddess of oblivion, rather than by Mnemosyne, the goddess of memory'. His specimen illustration compares Champollion and Grotefend. Champollion deciphered Egyptian hieroglyphics and won everlasting fame; Grotefend deciphered the ancient Persian cuneiform script—presumably an equivalent achievement—and remains all but unknown.

On the psychoanalytic scene, this thesis links hundreds of pages. Freud is cast as the unaccountably favored, while Janet and Adler are the unaccountably forgotten. These men, their times, and their ideas and systems are discussed in detail, and facts are assembled and interpreted in an attempt to explain why Ellenberger regards this as an unjust verdict.

The validity of the author's questioning this verdict is predicated on five interlocking requirements. First, he must show himself to be qualified to assess accurately the quality of the scientific achievements of the different men. For instance, one of his arguments, implicit in the title of the book, is that the psychoanalytic concept

of the unconscious evolved naturally, almost inevitably, out of the prevailing *Zeitgeist*. However, there are others who see Freud's contribution as a remarkable *individual* accomplishment, something more than merely the result of a natural conceptual evolution. Second, the author must demonstrate that the heritage left to scientific psychology by each of these men really is of equivalent value. Ellenberger himself declares that the most original aspect of Freud's work was his creation of the psychoanalytic situation—a new mode of dealing with the unconscious. Is there anything in the legacy to mental sciences by 'equivalent' contemporaries comparable to this? Third, the text's discussion of these men and of their times must be reasonably depicted and interpreted. For instance, this book asserts that Freud's career was only slightly hampered by anti-Semitism; legend and myth, according to Ellenberger, have exaggerated the actual current of feeling toward Jews which prevailed in Vienna at the end of the last century. Surely there are some social scientists who would challenge this latter viewpoint. A fourth requirement is that the author plausibly account for the alleged unjust verdict. When Ellenberger, in a summarizing table that seeks to do so, seriously bothers to compare Freud and Adler in terms of good looks and numbers of servants, he strains the credibility of his position.

Lastly, the author's personal viewpoint concerning the relative weights of exogenous and endogenous determinants of man's achievements must be so well-balanced that it will not seriously bias his appraisal. Yet it seems that Ellenberger is inclined too much toward the exogenous and hence limited in his ability to judge the full impact of unconscious forces and individual efforts in influencing and directing accomplishments. One illustration of this limitation occurs in his discussion of Janet, who is described in the text as a remarkable example of the way in which fame and oblivion are unequally distributed among scientists. Summarizing his own explanations for the miscarriage of history in this instance, Ellenberger lists these external events as significant: three serious waves of attacks by Janet's enemies; working at an isolated teaching post and hence having restricted influence; the poor timing of publications; and, because his death occurred during a newspaper strike, the loss of an obituary notice. Since this book is so rich in data, however, the reader is afforded the opportunity to consider certain

additional possibilities and, especially, endogenous determinants. It is noted in the text with striking, almost strange examples, that Janet showed an excessive zeal for anonymity where his patients were concerned. This passion continued even beyond their deaths and his own; according to the requirements of his will, five thousand case histories were burned upon his passing. Such a temper of feeling would arouse the curiosity of any psychologist, but the author provides us with even more material for reflection. There is a touching childhood memory of Janet's, a poignant scene in which the great man pictures himself as a little boy trying in vain to attract the attention of his father. The boy goes back and forth, kicks at the door, but the father sits 'placidly looking on'. Perhaps some œdipal issue with a characterological embellishment asserts itself as an additional component in Janet's fate. Has he managed to achieve the same relationship with history which he perceived as having existed with his father? To be sure, this speculation has only limited probability of truth; but in a listing of determinants, it seems at least equally worthy of consideration as does the fact of the newspaper strike.

In brief, then, Ellenberger's The Discovery of the Unconscious is polemic and encyclopedic. The author's strength lies in that personal perspective which permits him to see and synthesize the influence of societal events and sequential patterns and hence to underscore the importance of the surroundings in the development of men and of ideas. That strength, however, leads him into the realm of exogenous determinism and limits his capacity to fully grasp, appraise, and utilize the psychoanalytic concept of the dynamic unconscious, the purported central subject of his book.

SAMUEL ABRAMS (NEW YORK)

LE NARCISSISME. ESSAIS DE PSYCHANALYSE (Narcissism. Essays on Psychoanalysis). By Dr. Béla Grunberger. Paris: Payot, 1971. 350 pp.

In this collection of articles written between 1956 and 1967, the author describes the central contribution of narcissism to various aspects of analytic practice and of mental functioning. The analytic process, countertransference, oral and anal object relations, the

meaning of the phallic image, depression, and suicide are studied from the point of view of narcissism.

Grunberger suggests that narcissism should be considered independently from the drives and from the vicissitudes of id, ego, and superego. In fact, narcissism should be granted the status of *instance,* a word that cannot be translated but is equivalent to the word 'structure' as it is used to designate id, ego, and superego. He suggests the term *soi* (self) to designate this *instance* but, strangely enough, he does not take advantage of the differentiation he thus establishes between ego and self, and keeps referring to the ego when one would expect him to use the word *soi.*

One of the crucial points Grunberger attempts to make is that a continuous dialectic interrelation exists between narcissism and drives; that narcissistic pleasure is different in quality from drive pleasure and that the search for the former often outweighs drive-pleasure seeking activities. Drive pleasure is often used to compensate for the lost initial narcissistic pleasure. A crucial task of development is the synthesis of narcissistic and drive pleasure; this is also the task of the analytic process.

Narcissism is defined in terms of the model of fetal life: narcissistic pleasure is preverbal; it is characterized by autonomy, a sense of infinite grandeur with spontaneous functioning, and a deep sense of elation. There is a sense of cosmic communion: Federn's *Ich-Gefühl* is often referred to. Birth first, then the birth of the ego, of drive needs and of dependence on the objects constitute a series of severe narcissistic injuries from which man never quite recovers. Man's civilization, the vicissitudes of his drives, and the psychoanalytic cure are three modes by which the individual seeks to recapture this initial state of well-being. The narcissistic injury is the basis of all neurosis; drive frustrations (even the œdipal situation) are used—as displacements—to cover up the 'real' trauma, i.e., the original narcissistic hurt. There is a constant yearning to return to a supposed blissful prenatal state. One is hard put to say whether Grunberger proposes that we actually bear some *memory* imprint of prenatal life and of the initial narcissistic injury, or whether he suggests that prenatal bliss is to be conceived of as a *model* of narcissistic fulfilment.

The most interesting aspects of Grunberger's thinking have to do with the analytic situation and the process of the cure. Accord-

ing to him, what pushes people into analysis is the desire to recover their narcissistic integrity (represented in the unconscious by the image of the phallus). This explains a clinical finding which he calls 'the syndrome of the session's end'. At the onset of treatment, many patients describe a feeling of dizziness, disorientation, and elation at the end of the session; this is a manifestation of narcissistic regression that reproduces the prenatal state. This narcissistic regression is *not* a transference manifestation; it is 'preobjectal', preambivalent, and nonhistoric. It is a phenomenon due to the setting of the analytic situation itself, which is so designed as to procure maximum narcissistic gratification for the patient. In fact, a continuous narcissistic gratification is a *sine qua non* of psychoanalytic treatment; it is in the realm of drive vicissitudes that the analyst must frustrate the patient.

According to the author, this basic narcissistic aspect of the analytic situation cannot be analyzed and yet it may be its most potent therapeutic agent; certainly it is its source of energy. During the treatment, as in normal development, the patient slowly enters into an object-related relationship with the analyst which allows him to restructure his narcissism through an admixture with drives.

Interestingly enough, no mention is made by the author of the problems of primary versus secondary narcissism, nor are the problems of self-nonself differentiation discussed. What remains the thread throughout Grunberger's work seems to be the notions of an eternal yearning for a blissful, prenatal state, the severe impact of the initial narcissistic injury—with a view of the remaining development as a defense against it—, and the dialectic interrelation between narcissism and drives.

BERTRAND CRAMER (GENEVA)

THE VOICE OF THE SYMBOL. By Martin Grotjahn, M.D. Los Angeles: Mara Books, 1971. 224 pp.

It is refreshing to read an author who is still preoccupied with symbols. The reviewer shares Grotjahn's opinion that symbolism and dreams have been neglected in the recent psychoanalytic literature. The author is to be congratulated for his attempt to be uninhibited in putting down exactly what he thinks and feels about symbolism and a wide range of related subjects.

The book comprises ten loosely connected chapters, extending from Symbolic Communication and Its Failure in Television to The Future of Man in the World of Symbol Integration. The reader would do well to begin with chapter eight, The Symbol in Psychoanalytic Theory, which gives a comprehensive review of research in symbolism. Grotjahn attempts to synthesize such divergent points of view as those of the Kleinians and classical freudians. However, this reviewer questions the author's conclusion that the work of Spitz confirms the hypotheses of the Kleinians. No mention is made of this reviewer's research establishing 'stone' as the earliest ontogenetic symbol and dating it to the time of weaning. Such an assumption is not in agreement with the Kleinians, who postulate symbol formation at three months of age, at the time of the so-called paranoid position.

Other chapters include an interesting study of the life and work of the relatively neglected psychosomatic pioneer, Georg Groddeck, and a fascinating though greatly condensed psychoanalytic appraisal of the symbol in medieval Christian art which concentrates largely upon Hieronymus Bosch's painting, The Millenium.

The author's definition of symbol is confusing. At times he seems to use 'symbol' in place of the unconscious and confuses it with other psychoanalytic constructs. For example, in a chapter, The Symbols of Contemporary American History, he states that in marriage the infantile past of both partners is transferred into the present of both. He then explains that the analyst as well as the married partner represents many different people at different times to the patient, and that this transfer is established 'with the help of the symbol which can assume many different and always changing forms; images of the infantile mother and father, of siblings and many other people, of things and of childhood events. The material for these symbols lives in the unconscious.' Here Grotjahn seems to confuse early self and object representations, identifications, and repressed memories with symbols.

Basing his conclusions in part on the work of Herbert Marcuse, the author expresses the hope that through educational and artistic advances, a cultural utopia can be achieved, apparently bypassing the fact that adult neurosis is rooted in infantile neurosis, the development of which can only be reconstructed and its resolution worked through in individual analysis. Consistent with these views,

Grotjahn at times seems to attribute a major role in the etiology of neurosis to external dysfunction in the environment, such as inferior television programming and an overabundance of labor-saving devices. This concern leads him into polemics which over-emphasize the dangers of these machines, to the neglect of intra-psychic phenomena. Most analysts certainly would share Grotjahn's negative view of television and his disappointment in the quality of its productions. However, one can hardly agree that watching television is always 'a passive oral regressive experience'. The psychic state of the viewer varies immensely in the same and in different individuals. There are compulsive patients who feel extreme guilt at any pleasurable experience, including television. In the course of their analyses, the ability to relax and watch television may be a sign of progress. Artists and athletes may turn the passive experience of watching television into an active learning one to improve their skills. Machines may be used for either neurotic or for healthy purposes.

Nor can I agree with Grotjahn that television 'monsters' are harmless in contrast to the 'monsters of mythology, folklore and fairly tales'. Adult and child patients can be as terrified by television 'monsters' as by reading a ghost story if the show arouses unresolved œdipal and preœdipal conflicts. The author gives examples of 'television dreams' but it seems to me that his strong aversion to machines leads him to overvalue and misinterpret the associations and the dreams.

At times a naïve optimism appears which is exemplified in a chapter on marriage which depicts 'the creative marriage of the future. . . . Guilt-free sex will be quite different from the loud, demonstrative display of today. Sex outside of the monogamic rule will not be forbidden nor will there be a need to recommend it; it will exist like worldwide traveling will exist. Sex will be free from taboo, restrictions, and repressions, and therefore it will be less often used as an expression of nonsexual aims, as for instance, aggression, rebellion, protest against dependency, acting out of criminal trends. Pregenital sexuality will be enjoyed to the fullest and without guilt.' This optimism seems again to reflect a belief that if 'the voice of the symbol' can be made completely conscious, people will be free of guilt and anxiety, which was an early misunderstanding of Freud's findings that resulted in wild analysis.

In conclusion, this book is a very personal one, replete with the author's opinions. It challenges the reader to answer for himself the questions raised. Grotjahn's optimistic enthusiasm is contagious and rare in an experienced clinician. The chapters on the symbol in medieval art and on Georg Groddeck are of great interest, and are the least controversial. Other chapters reflect conclusions that, to this reviewer, are not fully substantiated, or are presented in insufficient depth.

C. PHILIP WILSON (NEW YORK)

PLAY AND DEVELOPMENT. Symposium with Contributions by Jean Piaget, Peter H. Wolff, René A. Spitz, Konrad Lorenz, Lois Barclay Murphy, Erik H. Erikson. Edited by Maria W. Piers. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972. 176 pp.

This stimulating and interesting book contains contributions at a symposium held on the occasion of the Loyola University Centennial celebration. Each of the authors is well known and has influenced or created his own field. Erikson, the last speaker, sums up beautifully what Piaget, Spitz, and Lorenz had to say, and adds his own ideas. In her epilogue, Maria Piers discusses the contributions of Peter Wolff and Lois Murphy, and concludes with her own thoughts about how to bridge the gap between science and theory, on the one hand, and clinic and education, on the other.

Piaget describes himself as follows:

> The truth is, I am neither a maturationist nor a neobehaviorist. I am an interactionist. What interests me is the creation of new thoughts that are not preformed, not predetermined by nervous system maturation nor predetermined by encounters with the environment, but are constructed within the individual himself, constructed internally through the process of reflexive abstraction and constructed externally through the process of experience. . . . [Piaget considers it essential] that in order for a child to understand something, he must construct it himself, he must re-invent it (p. 25).

This construct of Piaget's is of a purity that only rarely exists. The ability of the child to use his intellect with such freedom is based upon what Spitz calls 'fundamental education', i.e., the development of certain functions at optimal times. It presupposes an undisturbed mother-child relationship. It also requires that the child be

free of emotional disturbances which might inhibit his development, as Maria Piers points out. Nor can the child be living under the poor socioeconomic conditions which Lois Murphy describes. Murphy ascribes the lack of a time-space-play sequence in children of deprived families to lack of play between mothers and babies in the first half year of life. She says,

> Active mutual mother-baby play is a prerequisite for the development of cognitive structuring which can carry play beyond primitive sensory motor stages to a goal-oriented symbolic and constructive stage.

It is rather depressing to think how rarely all these conditions are fulfilled in order for a child to re-invent, i.e., to learn, according to Piaget's formulations. We are relieved to be reminded by Peter Wolff that alternative routes of development can come into play when the usual pathways are blocked through pathological developments. He illustrates this clearly with clinical examples, and suggests that we explore these findings further and consider them as alternate methods of education.

Lorenz discusses the integration of conceptual thought and tradition as a property of man which is as important as the inheritance of acquired characteristics. He considers the problem of the generation gap as a pathological phenomenon. From this supposition, he asks: What is the survival function of the process here disturbed, and what is the nature of the disturbance, and, in particular, is there an excess or deficiency of the function in question? He finds the nature of t he disturbance in the disequilibrium of the pleasure-displeasure economy and its remedy in the ideas that Tacitus in his book, *Germania,* prescribed for the re-education of the degenerated and effeminate Romans. However, Lorenz considers it possible that disintegration of society is caused by 'genetic disintegration of its elements' which would remove man from the influence of education. Education begins with the play between mother and baby through which identification with the mother is started, and with it the transmission of cultural tradition. The lack of mother-child contact in infancy and the ensuing lack of identification is the cause for the enmity between the generations which, according to Lorenz, led to the development of pseudospecies in mankind. In other words, the young consider themselves a separate species from the old. Another reason for the generation gap as seen by him, as

well as by Toffler in Future Shock, is the change which technology has brought upon us and which Lorenz thinks exceeds the ability of youth to adapt.

Lorenz's advice regarding education is somewhat questionable: his human and cultural biases interfere with his observations as an ethologist. For instance, he says,

> tired Pa coming home from his office . . . does not want to discipline a naughty child even when Ma—with full justification—thinks it necessary to do so; . . . [that mother] is in fact the lowest ranking creature within the child's horizon because she is evidently rank-inferior to the charlady (p. 108).

Obviously this is a class and culture-bound concept which only works for those people who use charladies. Finally Lorenz believes that

> an increased emphasis on teaching biology, in particular ecology and ethology, . . . would help enormously to make young people understand the real predicament of mankind . . . [because he found] a positive correlation between the rebellious students, knowledge of biology, and the constructiveness of their demands (p. 117).

Would it be possible that the transference of the students to an admired teacher, and his countertransference, might play a part in this mutual understanding?

Erikson's chapter, Play and Actuality, starts with the description of play constructions of four to five-year-old children and the conclusions that can be drawn from them. The topic has been controversial since Erikson published his paper, Configurations in Play, in 1937.[1] It caused a rift between him and Anna Freud which was bridged only many years later. Erikson has maintained his interest in this exploration of configurations in play and has validated and expounded it. He coördinates Piaget's idea of re-inventing as a condition of learning with his own idea of 'leeway of mastery', i.e., free movement within prescribed limits. The beginnings of such play and inventiveness he sees in the early mother-infant interplay, as Spitz has described it. But Erikson also points out that all adult play, such as drama and art, has its beginning in that particular period of life. He links what he calls interplay with Lorenz's ideas about the problem of ritualization, which Lorenz considers as the

[1] *Cf.*, This QUARTERLY, Volume VI, 1937, pp. 139-214.

basis for socialization and transmission of culture. Erikson illustrates this with a most interesting analysis of the behavior and rituals of the Black Panther party. Their rebellion is not directed against the fathers, but against the Establishment. (One might argue that it is a condition of all meaningful rebellions that they transcend the individual.) Erikson agrees with Lorenz that the generation gap is the result of a 'misdevelopment of evolutionary proportions brought about by changes that exceed the capacity of the pubertal adapting mechanism'. The transitions from play to reality—but only the reality which is actual—are the critical points in human development. Only in ritualized actuality, which is play, can man remain creative. The scenarios of government, law, religion in their palaces, courts, and cathedrals, are cited as examples. Erikson says: 'In adulthood an individual gains leeway for himself as he creates it for others: he is the soul of adult play'. In this adult play, like Lorenz and Spitz, Erikson sees the possibility of closing the gap between generations and of ending the dangerous warfare between pseudospecies which might lead to the destruction of mankind.

Maria Piers's epilogue fills in the gaps that Erikson leaves. She discusses Wolff's and Murphy's papers dealing with clinical entities. Wolff points out that learning can be done in more ways than one, as we can see from the alternate routes which deficient children use, while Murphy sees the deficiencies of development caused by socioeconomic circumstances. Maria Piers shows ways to implement the research and theoretical findings in practical education. She is aware that to do so would call for socioeconomic changes which would amount to a revolution.

I cannot close this review of a very important book without calling attention to Johan Huizinga's book, *Homo Ludens,* published in 1938. Huizinga had proposed in his writings since 1903 that civilization arises and unfolds in and as play. In his annual address as Rector of Leyden University in 1933, he took this as his theme under the title, The Play Element of Culture. Finally he published his famous book, *Homo Ludens,* adding the concept of Homo ludens to that of Homo sapiens and Homo faber. Huizinga, a historian, wants to avoid psychological explanations. However, his material speaks for itself. Starting with child play and animal play, he pursues play into communal play; he points to its civilizing functions, its expressions in law, war, science, poetry, religion, phi-

losophy, and art. In his summary of the formal characteristics of play, he says among other things:

> It [play] proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner.

How closely this is related to Erikson's formulation of 'leeway of mastery' in a set of developments or circumstances! Erikson discusses the German word, *Spielraum,* connoting free movement within prescribed limits, and says, 'where the freedom is gone, *or* the limits, play ends' (p. 133).

Huizinga, in his discussion of law, quotes Plato:

> The gods out of pity for the race of men born to sorrow, ordained the feasts of thanksgiving as a respite from their troubles and gave them Apollo, lord of the Muses, and Dionysus, to be their companions in the feast, that by this divine companionship at feast-tide order might always be restored among men.

EDITH BUXBAUM (SEATTLE)

THERAPEUTIC CONSULTATIONS IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY. By D. W. Winnicott. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. 410 pp.

This volume contains twenty-one vignettes of brief encounters between Winnicott, his child patients, and at times their parents. It reflects the author's ease with children as well as his confident expectation that he could count on parents to help in the psychotherapeutic endeavor. Winnicott's empathy, intuition, and thorough knowledge of children come through on every page.

The book, a delight to read, is deceptively simple. Winnicott himself was aware of the dangers of this simplicity and repeats throughout that the basis of his work lies in his knowledge of child development, in his analytic training, including his personal analysis, and in the many years he practiced orthodox child analysis.

He demonstrates the use of his 'squiggle game', a technique which he used with great ease and which encouraged his child patients to become involved with him. But he cautions those who might be tempted to emulate him by using the 'squiggle game': the 'squiggle' drawings were only a means to an end, not an end in themselves. The games were part of the communicative medium of Winnicott.

However, the clinical demonstrations of the use of the 'squiggle game' are by no means all that this book contains.

In his biographical note, M. Masud R. Khan says that the book deals with clinical rather than theoretical material. I think it is also important that the reader know Winnicott's work on transitional object phenomena, understand his concept of 'good enough mother', and his formulations on play and space. Ideally the reader should be sophisticated enough to understand the concepts of regression, ego splitting, and fixation, as well.

Winnicott used the 'squiggle game' as an easy and comfortable way to establish revealing psychological communication that could help the child discover his own areas of conflict. As he says, 'In a vast majority of cases, the general atmosphere is favorable and if one is able to give a little help to the child or to the ill person in the family or social group, the clinical improvement ensues by the forces of life and of the developmental process' (p. 42).

Over and again Winnicott emphasizes that he did not usually make interpretations until the essential features of the child's conflicts had been revealed; then he talked to the child about the essential features. But he points out to the reader that the psychotherapeutic agent was not what he said as much as the fact that the child had reached something. Throughout the book, Winnicott illustrates how the interview showed him the way to guide the family doctor and the parents to do what was necessary. He says: 'I made no interpretation and waited for the working of the process which had been set up in the child' (p. 230).

Winnicott is candid in disclosing why the therapeutic consultative encounter was all that he offered. In some instances his own busy schedule precluded a more intensive therapeutic endeavor; at other times, he feared further disrupting an already fragmented family. Problems of fee and distance were additional practical reasons for Winnicott to attempt to do so much in so very few therapeutic consultations.

At times Winnicott used the family, the child's school, and the family doctor as co-therapists; they all understood that Winnicott was always available to help them. His 'co-therapists' must have needed courage for such an undertaking as some of the children were very disturbed. The families were often informed of the core of the problem and were then supported by Winnicott to allow the patient

to regress therapeutically. What great confidence the patients and their parents had in Winnicott! Was it this confidence that enabled them to persevere through the uncertainties they faced? Winnicott says that he returned a changed child to the parents, but such a change could lead to significant intrapsychic shifts and developmental gains only if the parents accepted a supportive and even therapeutic role, and they often did.

The many years of follow-up of some patients verify that this work was very effective. It would be extremely helpful to child analysts if Winnicott's colleagues could answer some questions, particularly about the evolution of the technique of brief therapeutic consultations and, more importantly, about case selection. For instance, I should like to know whether the method came about because of limitations of time in Winnicott's practice and factors of distance and availability of treatment, or whether he set out to evolve an effective brief consultation-treatment technique. Is there a parent-child constellation for which the therapeutic consultation is appropriate? In the last case Winnicott describes in the book, therapeutic consultation was not effective. He writes: 'There is a vast number of antisocial cases which I would not hope to change in the way that I am describing in this series'; and about the 'squiggle' technique he says, 'This was obviously a case where the squiggle technique could not be used' (p. 161). Such statements might suggest that passive and inhibited children are amenable to such therapeutic consultations, whereas those with pervasive anxiety and hyperactivity, or delinquency, are not.

Also, I should like to know to what degree the technique of therapeutic consultations is usable by others. There have been other masters of psychoanalytic applications—for example, August Aichhorn—whose technique could not be emulated by others but whose artistry seemed to stem from the combination of their unerring knowledge of psychoanalytic theory and technique, together with a particular magnetism, intuition, and uniqueness that was theirs alone. Is it possible that this, too, was an instrumental factor in Winnicott's magnificent and extremely successful use of therapeutic consultations? I feel the intense positive transference to him on the part of the parents, and even on the part of the child patients—some of whom had dreams about Winnicott before their first consultation with him—, must have been a powerful force in over-

coming parental resistance and distrust, and in permitting the child to give Winnicott the revealing communications that were so important in his work with the child.

Winnicott shines through the book as a humane, compassionate man whose vast knowledge and experience enabled him to achieve amazing psychotherapeutic results in a brief time. It is a beautiful and moving book. It should not be used as a handbook of child psychotherapy but rather as a guide to the philosophy and knowledge of a very great man.

SELMA KRAMER (PHILADELPHIA)

PLAYING AND REALITY. By D. W. Winnicott. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971. 169 pp.

This book, the last published before Winnicott's death, allows us to see the workings of a great mind. It is honest and warm, revealing the qualities that so endeared Winnicott to his pupils, his colleagues, and his patients.

His 1953 paper, Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena, is reprinted as the first chapter. Succeeding chapters focus on transitional phenomena and their applications to object relations theory, to the purpose and meaning of children's play, to creativity, to cultural and religious life, and to psychotherapeutic experience.

Winnicott describes an 'intermediate' area of human experience, neither inside the individual nor outside in shared reality, which is part of the continuum of the child's experience as he proceeds from the original state of oneness with his mother to the eventual achievement of separate and independent functioning. It is a 'third area' which is never completely given up, even by the mature adult; it includes the babbling of the infant and later his songs, stories, and play, and continues into creative thinking in adults as well as into religious life, philosophical thinking, and cultural heritage.

Careful study of this book will elucidate such illuminating concepts as the 'acceptance of the paradox: the baby creates the object, but the object was there waiting to be created and to become a cathected object' (p. 89); the mirror role of the mother and family in child development; how male and female elements apply to object-relationships and to personality formation; and the relation-

ship between cross-identification and projective and introjective mechanisms and its significance in therapy.

In his description of the intermediate area that exists between therapist and patient, Winnicott reveals his ability to perceive his patients' experiences and to share his deeply personal responses with them. It is obvious that he was able to treat very disturbed patients because of his tremendous capacity for empathy. He was not afraid of his patients' severe regressions nor of their insatiable needs. Winnicott used his countertransference as a delicate therapeutic tool. His background in pediatrics also contributed to his understanding of and compassion for mothers and children.

Winnicott's contributions to child development add another dimension to the theories of Mahler, Spitz, and Jacobson, each of whom has delineated and clarified early infant and toddler development. He dared to step into the world of the preverbal child, and to make observations and to draw conclusions that are of immense importance to the understanding of normal processes and pathology in children and adults.

In many ways ahead of his time, Winnicott lived to see his ideas accepted by his peers and used by them in building further contributions to developmental psychology.

SELMA KRAMER (PHILADELPHIA)

LANGUAGE LEARNING AND COMMUNICATION DISORDERS IN CHILDREN. By Gertrud L. Wyatt. New York: The Free Press, 1969. 372 pp.

Although this work has received recognition and acclaim from many in related professions, psychoanalysts appear to have overlooked it in spite of the author's basically psychoanalytic orientation. Because there has been a recent increase in interest among psychoanalysts in early cognitive development, a review seems pertinent despite the lapse of time since publication.

Using numerous clinical vignettes, Wyatt shows how normal language development cannot occur without the existence of a need-satisfying mother-child relationship as well as consistent mother-child interaction. The progression from earliest vocalizations to sentence production parallels the infant's maturation from imitation, to identification, to object relationship with his mother.

The importance of the role of the mother, or mother substitute, is emphasized throughout the book. Not only does the child imitate his mother, but the mother imitates the child, encouraging the child's vocalizations in what frequently develops into a mutually enjoyable game. Thus the child is provided with what the author considers a necessary acoustical and psychological 'feedback'. When the child discovers that certain sounds bring about a desired result —for example, when 'ma-ma' causes mother to appear—the beginning of symbolic speech takes place. Obviously, here too the mother's readiness to respond is crucial. As the child begins to put together two or more words in the typical 'telegraphic' style, the learning of syntax is furthered by the mother's 'feedback', which in this instance means the repetition of his words, often filled with the appropriate connectives.

Two aspects of the mother's interaction with her child are especially emphasized. In the first place, her response must be appropriate to the stage of development the child has reached, that is, it must be 'matched'. Matching, on the mother's part, necessitates a regression in speech production. If she were to speak as she normally would with adults, she would flood the child with an overabundance of information and verbiage; as Wyatt puts it, she would be 'overloading the system'. When this occurs the child becomes confused because it is 'impossible for [him] to perceive and filter out the configuration of simple sounds and of sequences occurring in single words' (p. 12), with the result that his speech may be incomprehensible.

In the second place, the mother must be a 'good speech model': she must provide the words the child lacks. When the child points, or is only able to produce the first consonant or syllable of the word, the mother must supply the whole word and when possible, accompany action with words. Giving the child that much individual attention is often impossible for mothers with large families. Thus, while a good mother-child *relationship* may exist, there may be inadequate mother-child *interaction*. This important point is illustrated by the author in a description of a little boy of four years who was one of five children. 'The mother was neither an ideal provider of specific verbal feedback nor a good speech model' (p. 11). The child's speech was immature in articulation, vocabulary, and sentence structure. '. . . The learning of the "mother tongue" is an intensely emotional experience for the young child; and like

all emotional learning, it is through the process of conscious imitation and unconscious identification. Learning to speak, like all primary learning, is influenced, therefore, by the child's relationship to the mother' (p. 17).

Two detailed case histories involving disturbed speech development are presented. The first case, Debby, is a child who had spent her first three years in a Viennese hospital. While hospitalism in Spitz's sense did not develop, there was nevertheless severe retardation in her use of language: it was 'strikingly poor in vocabulary and grammar, and her articulation of words was severely defective'. The author describes her method of working with Debby to increase her vocabulary; the other adults and the children in the hospital quickly comprehended and thus augmented the little time she could spend with the child. When arrangements were made for Debby to go to England to foster parents, the author travelled with the child and facilitated the transition. Debby rapidly acquired the new language, which in a sense then became her 'mother tongue' because of its association with the only mother she had ever known.

From this experience Wyatt draws the conclusion that identification with the love object plays a critical role in the child's acquisition of language. In Vienna, where many people had been taking care of her, Debby had no opportunity to establish a close bond. 'The learning of speech is not only a cognitive but also a deeply emotional experience for the young child. . . . The development of a strong permanent relationship with a significant adult, her foster mother, was of primary importance . . .' (p. 39).

The second 'case', Nana, is the author's daughter who, at the age of twenty-seven months, began to stutter. Prompted by her interest in language acquisition, the author had kept (and reports here) detailed notes describing the progress from the earliest vocalizations to somewhat precocious speech ability at age two, commenting on each phase with frequent reference to observations and generalizations of other researchers. Despite her own distress when the child began to stutter, Wyatt continued to take notes and presents them in her book with extraordinary courage and candor. The reader is thus acquainted not only with the child's symptoms and their cure at thirty-five months, but is also privileged to learn at first hand the mother's feelings of guilt, helplessness, and anxiety aroused by those symptoms. The author does not side-step her painful recognition of the errors she had made during toilet training and other

disciplining of her daughter, nor does she shrink from describing what she considered faulty timing of those measures which later appeared to have exacerbated the speech disorder. She emphasizes the role played by the child's aggression and rage, as well as the anal libidinal derivatives in the speech disorder. However, the precipitating factor seemed to have been an unavoidable separation: 'The onset of Nana's stuttering occurred at a time when her mother, because of acute illness, had become inaccessible to the child'.

As a result of this personal experience, Wyatt is convinced that stuttering results to a large extent from emotional crises, especially in instances which interfere with the mother-child relationship. She also makes clear the importance of the stage of speech development the child had reached when the symptom first appeared. 'Nana's use of language was still half-way between communication with others and ego-centric monologue. Words still represented primarily subjective internal images . . . rather than concepts which are general and communicable; . . . . Nana's early infantile thought processes were reflected in her infantile anxieties: fear of loss of the mother, fear of being left alone and empty, fear of being attacked and overwhelmed, fear of losing autonomy, fear of devouring and being devoured, fear of one's own anger, rage and destructive impulses' (p. 94). Separation at that particular stage in her speech development made her particularly vulnerable; it caused her to be overwhelmed by the anxiety aroused either by her own rage, or by that expressed by her mother.

A research project on stuttering was undertaken in which twenty stuttering children between the ages of five and a half and nine and a half, with an I.Q. of ninety or above, were contrasted with twenty nonstuttering children matched as to age, sex, and intelligence. The study indicated that conditions similar to those which had caused Nana's stuttering existed also for other stutterers. This led to the formulation of three propositions important for therapy:

1. The mother of the stuttering child must be included in the therapeutic process.
2. Therapy with a stuttering child should be initiated as soon as possible after the appearance of compulsory repetitions.
3. Therapeutic techniques have to be specific and must be different for children of different ages and in different stages of stuttering (p. 117).

Therapeutic methods based on these principles were then developed and tested. The remainder of the book describes the results

of application of these methods and their use with preschool children in the Wellesley School District. The reader cannot fail to be impressed by the high degree of success achieved with stuttering and other types of communication disorders, including poor articulation, cluttering, multiple motor-perceptual and language disabilities, and 'children in need of compensatory language training'. This last category refers to children whose home environment offers inadequate language stimulation and includes those commonly referred to as 'deprived children', as well as children from well-to-do families whose parents delegate their care to paid (and often temporary) help. Wyatt points out that inadequate speech proficiency hinders the child's over-all capacity to learn. For this reason, part of her efforts have been directed toward educating teachers in special methods of improving language skills and comprehension before they attempt teaching mathematical concepts and social studies. Without this preliminary help, such studies remain incomprehensible to the children.

Under the author's tutelage, other therapists were trained in the use of her method of instructing mothers in how to help the child overcome his speech disability. It is important to stress that this method never becomes a language 'drill', that is, corrective exercises which in the author's experience only exacerbate stuttering and faulty articulation. Instead, mothers are shown what is meant by 'matching' and repetition (a purposely regressive approach based on the normal small child's way of language learning) and 'feedback' (the repetition of the child's own words with appropriate syntax supplied by mother or therapist). There is no direct attempt to deal with the child's anxieties and aggression although these are recognized as the core problem. It is felt that involving the mother in therapy by teaching her how to help her child and supporting her efforts to be a 'good parent' achieves two goals: the child gains the closeness to his mother he had been craving, thereby reducing both his anxiety and need to express hostility; and the mother-child relationship improves as frustration on the part of both mother and child is reduced to a minimum.

While psychoanalysts may be sceptical that such methods, without involvement of either the mother or the child in psychotherapy, can produce lasting results, Wyatt's follow-up studies show that a large percentage of children thus treated not only lose their symp-

toms but remain symptom-free after five or more years (*cf.*, Appendix X, p. 314).

It has not been possible in this review to do justice to all dimensions of this comprehensive work. Dorothea McCarthy's foreword aptly describes it as 'a gold mine of dynamic interdisciplinary information about the whole child'. The emphasis in this review on the role of affect and object relationship in the development of language reflects the reviewer's bias more than that of the author. Language development is viewed by Wyatt from the perspective of the child's development as a whole—emotional, cognitive, and motoric—and each aspect is documented with references to the opinions of others. For example, as she sets forth her theory concerning the child's transition from naming objects to using words as symbols, she refers to opinions expressed by Sapir, C. and W. Stern, Langer, Werner, and Erikson, pointing to areas of agreement or disagreement. Presenting her own point of view, she states: 'During the early naming stage, the child discovers the magic quality of speech signs, their power to revive images of the past (memory images) and of absent love objects . . . . During the early symbolic stage . . . object, movement, image, and verbal symbol are experienced as one entity.' This transition is illustrated with a delightful excerpt from her notes on Nana (p. 53).

Considering the significance Wyatt attributes to the effect of separation from the mother during the early stages of language acquisition, the omission of any reference to Mahler's studies on separation and individuation seems surprising. Mahler's point of view in many respects supports Wyatt. Using the observations of both, it might be possible to find answers to such questions as: What determines the choice of the symptom of stuttering? Under what circumstances is separation from the mother a major determinant?

Wyatt's book is valuable both for the questions it raises and those it answers, and no doubt will stimulate further research.

MARJORIE R. LEONARD (STAMFORD, CONN.)

HANDBOOK OF CHILD PSYCHOANALYSIS: RESEARCH, THEORY, AND PRACTICE. Edited by Benjamin B. Wolman, Ph.D. New York: Van Nostrand-Reinhold Co., 1972. 645 pp.

In the reviewer's opinion, this volume is more than a 'handbook'; it is an important, thoroughgoing, systematic, and objective ac-

count of the current state of knowledge in the areas of child psychoanalytic theory, research, and therapy. Classical freudian concepts are given an honest and penetrating critical re-examination, while other psychoanalytic models, principally those representing the 'neo-freudians', are put into contemporary perspective.

It was Wolman's specific interest in this volume to promote, through his own contributions and those of others, the integration and, indeed, the synthesis of variant and controversial psychoanalytic theories relevant to social change. He has sought to examine how psychoanalytic models can be utilized in therapeutic operations that are responsive to the emotional and psychological needs of children in the 'here and now'. For example, Wolman considers the role of classical psychoanalytic psychiatry in the everyday life experiences of the disadvantaged, affectively starved, lonely, isolated, and frequently cognitively bankrupt 'street kid'. He asks, too, what are the practical implications of psychoanalytic psychology for the newly emancipated, though still struggling, 'brave new world' adolescent coming from the suburbs. And Wolman and his contributors seem to be asking: How can psychoanalysts widen their impact and begin to move beyond their traditional roles, which frequently seem only to inhibit them from fulfilling innovative, bold, and useful positions in society? Wolman attempts to bridge the gaps between those who are perceived as the 'helpers' (clinicians) and those who are in need of 'help' (patients).

There are some very solid, provocative, and original contributions included, which attempt to be responsive to the questions raised. This is not a collection of previously published papers; all of the chapters have been specifically drafted for inclusion in this anthology. There are important contributions by Sally Provence, Hanna Segal, Humberto Nagera, Peter Neubauer, Peter Blos, Paul Kay, Nathaniel Ross, and others. In the contributions, the work of Hartmann, Erikson, Escalona, and Mittelman is carefully reviewed. It has been the collective aim of the editor and the contributors to begin to broaden both the research and the therapeutic horizons of psychoanalysis. This has been accomplished by each of the authors, largely through their amalgamation of long-standing conceptual, clinical, and experimental research approaches to important psychoanalytic issues.

Part I of the book surveys a wide range of contemporary theoretical and clinical concerns, and reflects upon such issues as develop-

mental problems in the first year of life, the consequence of early social and affective syndromes of cognitive deprivation, and their implications for later personality development. Part II deals with advances in the psychoanalytic theory of therapy, offering a systematic account of contemporary clinical methods. These are assessed in connection with the treatment of a host of developmentally connected disturbances of infancy, latency, postlatency, and adolescence. Part III considers the diverse psychoanalytic approaches developed since Freud. In this section, there are penetrating analyses of the work of Melanie Klein and Anna Freud; the theoretical differences between these two psychoanalytic innovators are discussed by Hanna Segal in a chapter which this reviewer found cogent and incisive. The last section of the volume presents a discussion of current issues in the sphere of prevention and research, and includes an important contribution by Wolman on the prevention of psychopathological disorders of childhood.

Wolman has presented us with a solid and comprehensive review of basic psychoanalytic concepts and the current state of child analysis. The quality of scholarship and the breadth of experience reflected in the contributions to this volume are high indeed. One wonders, however, at the omission of Anna Freud from the list of illustrious contributors. Although mention of Miss Freud is made in the preface to the volume (she has contributed to the anthology as advisor), it is regrettable that she has not been represented by any of her own writings. The book remains, however, an important basic reference source on the combined literature in the areas of developmental pediatrics and child psychiatry.

R. D. BECKER (FOREST HILLS, N. Y.)

CHILD PSYCHIATRY IN THE SOVIET UNION. Preliminary Observations. By Nancy Rollins, M.D. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. 293 pp.

This graceful book is based on a four-month solo field trip to the Soviet Union in 1969. Dr. Rollins does not tell us how she managed to carry off such a feat, nor where she mastered the language. Her book is much more than an account of philosophies, facilities, and people in Soviet child psychiatry. She takes on the question of how cultures, child-rearing styles, and mental health policies interdepend, and her discussion is worth careful study.

The Marxist-Leninist principles on which Soviet society is officially established hold that economic relationships are the most important in human affairs; that human beings are inherently perfectible; that there is a rational solution for all problems; that work is inherently ennobling and pleasurable; that any entity, whether individual or social, is more than the sum of its components; and that the collective is of more consequence than the individual. The trend in Soviet child psychotherapy is to restore the sick child to useful work in the collective as rapidly as possible. This is often done by giving the child a respite from everyday life in the form of 'tranquillizing' therapies, or by means of a brief sojourn in a part-time or full-time institution. Relief of pressure and the promotion of tranquility are goals throughout Soviet psychiatry, in contrast to the American tendency to utilize conflict and emotion in psychotherapy. There is a deep Russian tolerance for inner emotional states, but a reluctance to express them. Prevention of emotional illness receives more attention than in the United States, Dr. Rollins finds. There is also a more intimate connection between physical medicine and mental health. Certain physical conditions such as rheumatic fever are considered to have lasting residues of psychopathology.

Dr. Rollins describes the long-standing rejection of freudian psychoanalysis by the Russian intelligentsia. Freud's postulation of unconscious irrational forces, his pessimistic view of humanity in general, his acceptance of an aggressive drive on a biological level, and his view that work is a necessity rather than a pleasure, all conflict sharply with Marxist-Leninist principles. Russia is not a child-oriented culture, and Freud's views on infantile sexuality and on the importance of the mother-child duality met with more opposition in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Dr. Rollins feels that the American mother has been for some time in more intimate daily contact with the child than has her Russian counterpart and that those portions of child sexuality which are accessible to macroscopic observation are more known to the American mother and more accepted by her. In Dr. Rollins's opinion, the configuration of American culture made it just as inevitable that analysis be accepted here as the configuration of the Russian culture made it inevitable that it be rejected there. The cherished American possession of free speech made it easy to accept in principle the free expression of oneself to an analyst. Likewise, the free-talking bois-

terousness of American politics makes it easy to participate in an adversary proceeding in analysis. No such acceptance of conflict came out of the Russian Revolution. Rather there was and is a submission to authority which precludes anything remotely resembling the acts and fantasies of American transference.

This author makes the point that acceptance or nonacceptance of a set of psychological ideas by a culture has nothing to do with 'the truth' contained in them. In so doing, she appears to imply that one set of ideas might be just as close to truth as the other. But is such a conclusion justified? Surely the freudian ideas have had more widespread psychological application by adequately prepared scientific minds than have Marxist-Leninist ideas. And this application has certainly been more fruitful for clarifying psychology and for stimulating other fields of inquiry. Fruitfulness must have some bearing on the amount of 'truth' contained in a theory. Indeed, as Dr. Rollins points out, the Soviets have not contributed to group psychology even though their society is officially established upon groups. Marxist-Leninist theory seems to be rigid and sterile in the very realm of its chief interest.

ALAN W. FRASER (NEW CANAAN, CONN.)

CHILDREN OF MENTALLY ILL PARENTS. Problems in Child Care. By Elizabeth P. Rice, Miriam C. Ekdahl, and Leo Miller. New York: Behavioral Publications, 1971. 269 pp.

The authors undertook a study to appraise community services available to children of mentally ill parents and found that such services, although well-intentioned, sophisticated, and dedicated, were 'fragmented, time-limited, crises-oriented, and uncoordinated'. With financial support from NIMH and encouragement from the Department of Maternal and Child Health of Boston and the Health and Welfare Commissioners of Massachusetts, they investigated families with a mentally ill parent to determine a number of points: the nature of child care problems; the problems already existing in these families and the effect of the mental illness in creating or influencing the problems; the needs that were being met normally through community resources; how to find the most effective ways of applying community health and welfare services to the families and children during the crisis period and subsequent to this period when the ill parent requires re-assimilation into the

family and the community. By determining the latter point, it was hoped that the severe psychological stress and trauma upon the child, caused by illness and/or separation of the parent, could be reduced and appropriate measures taken to prevent long-term effects on the child's development.

The conclusions arising from the studies are perhaps already well-recognized and generally implemented in most health facilities and service agencies throughout the country today. However, validation of generally accepted ideas and practices and renewed emphasis on the need for these practices are always highly desirable. In their summary, the authors express the opinion that an ideal organizational plan would be 'the development of community centers that would be equipped to provide, within the center itself, comprehensive health and social services. The center would provide over-all planning, unified services and continuous evaluation of the effectiveness of the program. Thus, the family would have one place to go for help with its health and social problems and would see the center as the place to turn to as soon as needs arise, rather than delaying until the problems are acute or so chronic that services are ineffective.'

This is an important concept in the planning of community health centers today. The authors have performed an important service in stressing the necessity for the development within the same facility of varied and integrated services directed to the total care of the whole family. At the same time, the mere establishment of such centers does not necessarily create a utopian temple which supersedes other aspects of mental health action: e.g., the services of the local physician; the importance of utilizing a close friend or relative who already has a significant relationship with the family and children; the utilization of local religious institutions. Of course, the community center is usually well aware of these resources and may direct its actions along these lines and coördinate them. But in the official routine of carrying out organization policies, these features are not always sufficiently recognized.

Although there is an interesting historical chapter describing some past references in the literature to a series of related topics—such as children separated from parents, family functioning, children of mentally ill parents, psychiatric services, and social service functioning—and a body of interesting statistical data derived from the authors' projects, there is not a great deal of new or significant

information for the psychoanalyst or the average psychiatrist. The one major point which the book brings across very clearly is the importance for the professional to be aware of the fact that a sick parent is devastating to the members of the family; the children in particular must receive adequate care in all respects and beyond the crisis stage. If the book performs only this task for physicians, it is well worth considering as reading material.

For social workers, psychologists, educators, and others in the mental health field, it is highly recommended as a significant contribution to the field of community mental health action. Perhaps some elimination of redundant and repetitive material might have made the book more readable and concise.

BERNARD L. PACELLA (NEW YORK)

DISADVANTAGED CHILDREN. HEALTH, NUTRITION AND SCHOOL FAILURE. By Herbert G. Birch, M.D., Ph.D. and Joan Dye Gussow. New York: Grune & Stratton, Inc., 1970. 322 pp.

The late Dr. Birch was a psychologist who became a pediatrician and a notable contributor to the field of pediatric neurology. Many psychoanalysts will know of him from his collaboration with Chess and Thomas in their longitudinal studies of temperament and behavior in children. There is a strong emphasis on constitutional and other organic factors in development in his work and the present book, written with Joan Gussow, is no exception. The authors state early in the book: 'Not failing to acknowledge the reality of "cultural disadvantage" we would assert that it is but a fragment of the threat which a poor environment offers to the intellectual development of a child; and that the poor, from conception until death, are also at differential risk with respect to a whole spectrum of physical hazards any one of which may be productive of intellectual deficit and educational failure' (p. 6).

Most of the book is a masterful compilation of an enormous amount of research data on the prenatal, perinatal, and postnatal factors related to a higher rate of developmental deficit among the children of the poor, especially the nonwhite poor. The studies are well digested and carefully organized to provide a powerful and closely reasoned brief for the authors' thesis. They begin by reviewing the relationship of social class and ethnic variables to infant mortality, arguing convincingly that the increased infant death rate

among the poor is only the most noticeable element in a continuum of reproductive casualty. Turning to prematurity, they explore its increased incidence among the disadvantaged and the direct relationship of low birth weight to various neurological handicaps.

The next four chapters deal with maternal factors in the increased risk. It is shown that poor mothers, especially if nonwhite, start having their children younger, have them more often, and continue having them at an older age than middle class mothers. Each of these circumstances is then linked to increased reproductive risk. This greater risk among mothers whose own growth environments have been poor is then broken down to a consideration of the effect of suboptimal diets during pregnancy added to a lifetime of poor feeding, and poor medical care during pregnancy after a lifetime of poor medical care. The next three chapters document the prevalence of nutritional deficits and poor medical care among poor children once they have been born. The authors argue persuasively, though with less direct research data, that these circumstances affect intellectual and emotional development adversely. The final chapter challenges those who advocate genetic explanations for the educational failure of socially disadvantaged children. The authors consider such arguments absurd in the face of the evidence for physical as well as psychological environmental factors in the developmental deficits of these children. They conclude with a plea for social action to bring about environmental equalization.

The book accomplishes the aims of the authors very well. They succeed in convincing the reader of the major role of physical health and nutrition in intellectual and emotional development, especially as mediated through maturation of the central nervous system. Psychoanalysts, particularly those working with disadvantaged people, are likely to welcome the information as far as it goes. They are also likely to regret the omission of any serious consideration of the psychological and emotional factors in the etiological series of developmental risk factors among the children of the poor.

ROY K. LILLESKOV (NEW YORK)

TWELVE TO SIXTEEN: EARLY ADOLESCENCE. Edited by Jerome Kagan and Robert Coles. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1972. 355 pp.

It is disquieting that the editors of this volume do not make explicit in their separate prefaces that the essays collected therein were,

with one exception, presented at a conference sponsored by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and subsequently published in Daedalus (Fall, 1971, Volume 100, Number 4) at a cost of $2.50 per copy. And shouldn't the editors have expended some effort in an attempted synthesis of these diverse essays? Translation of different professional languages, separation of latent and manifest content, differing frames of references, assessing form versus content, are, for example, tasks that might have rendered this volume into a cohesive book. Critical questions might have arisen by the juxtaposition of the material which could lead to further study or research. Are they really describing the same phenomena? The parable of the blind man examining the different parts of the elephant comes to mind.

Sampling the contents, we find that J. M. Tanner discusses the physical changes that occur in early adolescence and we note that, although not new, his material is still important. Peter Blos, Sr., presents a concise summary of his psychoanalytic formulations on the subject of the early adolescent and briefly attempts to place this developmental stage in the context of what went before and what comes after. It is interesting to note that these two were the only contributors to explore explicitly sex-linked differences. It is true that John H. Gagnon, in his essay, The Creation of the Sexual, approaches the differences. But his approach is more in terms of sociological description and data from questionnaires. His material fairly cries out for a bridge to the intrapsychic; without it, the material appears to this reader as superficial and descriptive. Edward C. Martin writes of his personal observations of this age group as seen through the eyes of the junior high school teacher and sympathetically describes the early adolescent's volatile, shifty, 'twitchy' state. Confusion, as he puts it, is not all there is and, indeed, interest and passionate enthusiasm can be aroused by a skilled teacher. But clearly the basic junior high school structure, social and educational, is not designed for the specific group it is to serve.

Phyllis La Farge, the writer, and Thomas J. Cottle look back some twenty years and write about their own experience as early adolescents. The sketches are of interest if for no other reason than to demonstrate that this time of life need not be completely blotted out nor rendered flat and emotionless. It has been said that in analytic work with adults, recall of the years between twelve and

sixteen is frequently barren. Perhaps more data from this time can be obtained of we only look with greater care, spurred on by valuing its relevance.

Tina DeVaron, whose paper is the one added to the book, is a sixteen-year-old writer observing herself and her peers. She writes with competence and unself-consciously conveys a mixture of perceptiveness, pseudo maturity, and that particular naïveté and earnestness we see when adolescents write or speak about themselves. David Bakan presents an interesting historical essay on the 'invention of adolescence in America'. His thesis is that in the latter half of the nineteenth century a second childhood was added to the first as a response to social change and the needs of the 'new urban-industrial society which developed so rapidly following the Civil War' (p. 74). Joseph Adelson presents a summary of his group's work on the development of political imagination in adolescents. They studied the developing capacity for 'complex political discourse', and pinpointed a single factor, age, as being the predominant variable while sex, intelligence, and social class count for little. The shift which begins at the onset of adolescence is essentially completed by fifteen or sixteen and is characterized by change in cognitive mode, a sharp decline in authoritarian views, and the development of the capacity for ideology. In the other six essays, demographic, sociological, cognitive, and cultural factors are taken up with skill if not distinction.

Perhaps the problem with Twelve to Sixteen is that although the simple, declarative title suggests a definitive work, the book itself leaves untouched much of the mystery and most of the confusion of the early adolescent years. In fact, what we are given here are essentially position essays, not new ideas, each representing a particular research experience or professional point of view. One imagines that these papers must have served admirably as springboards for discussion, which indeed was their purpose. It is precisely the failure to distinguish these conference proceedings from a book, and thereby to utilize the unique properties of one or the other, that undermines the over-all effectiveness of the present volume.

PETER BLOS, JR. (ANN ARBOR, MICH.)

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M. Donald Coleman

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ABSTRACTS

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. X, 1972.

Children of Survivors from Nazi Persecution. Judith Kestenberg. Pp. 311-323.

On the basis of published data and a questionnaire it was noted that only a few children of the survivors of the holocaust have been analyzed. The author speculates that the analyst's resistance to uncovering the horror combines with that of the survivors and their children to explain the infrequency of analysis. Dr. Kestenberg presents clinical material from one of the few cases accepted for analysis. It was found that the analyst shared in the 'conspiracy of silence' of the child and the survivor-parents, and the author suggests this may be common. She suggests, too, that this concealed knowledge should be dealt with directly with the child and the parents as a special parameter to be used in the analysis of children of survivors of the holocaust. Dr. Kestenberg cites the various ways in which the traumata of the survivor-parents are passed on to the next generation. She urges a special effort to collect more data on this group of patients whose disabilities (and their genesis) appear to have been relatively neglected.

M. DONALD COLEMAN

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. XI, 1973.

The Child of Two Survivors: A Report of an Unsuccessful Therapy. Marvin Lipkowitz. Pp. 141-155.

This clinical study of the therapy of a child of two survivors of the holocaust can be viewed as corroboration of Dr. Kestenberg's earlier article. The case material underscores the hypothesis that survivors have generally been scarred in ways that will have noxious effects on the development of their children. The desire to deny the dehumanizing experiences of the extermination camps exists in parents and children alike, leading to further pathological developments. Often the symptomatology resembles that of schizophrenia, a distinction which must be made carefully not only for obvious scientific reasons, but because a diagnosis of schizophrenia would imperil indemnification.

Drawing on his own case material and a clinical report available in the literature, the author cites the survivor-mother's inability to tolerate the separation-individuation necessary for further growth as the greatest developmental conflict between herself and the child. Lipkowitz feels that his therapeutic zeal to accomplish this separation in his adolescent patient caused resistance from the parents and the patient, leading to termination of therapy. He recommends careful inclusion of the parents in a treatment plan for such cases, and he predicts that the noxious sequelae of the concentration camp experience will, unless carefully treated, extend over numerous generations.

M. DONALD COLEMAN

International Journal of Group Psychotherapy. XXIII, 1973.

A Model for Exploring Intra- and Interindividual Process in Groups. Ada Abraham. Pp. 3-22.

The individual is conceived of as an open self-system with permeable boundaries, linked with the self-system of others in a dynamic group matrix. Durkheim stressed the interdependence of the two systems; to him, collective beliefs and general social currents—such as waves of optimism, pessimism, or even suicidal tendencies—are illustrative of the impact of the collective consciousness on the individual's. With exact methods of exploration of such variables as group atmosphere, patterns of communication, norms, shared goals, and values on the conscious level, it is shown that the collective unconscious has the strongest impact on the individual. Foulkes and others recognize that all structures of the individual psyche have analogues in the group structure. Often all group members appear to the clinician to share a fantasy or display an emotion as a result of an identification process. In this study, group members were asked to describe themselves by giving a list of traits arranged in a given number of ranks to portray different aspects of themselves, such as the actual self, the ideal self, or the public self. The actual self is the individual's perception of himself which he is ready to admit. The ideal self expresses how the individual would like to be. The public self describes how he is perceived by others. The group, too, has what is called a trans-self—a dimension open to direct observations by its members, the perception of itself which the group, for the use of its members, allows itself to develop. There is also the ideal trans-self or group superego.

Sex Education Discussion Groups in a Medical Setting. Pearl Rosenberg and Richard Chilgren. Pp. 23-41.

Noting the physician's need to understand his own and others' sexual problems, the University of Minnesota Medical School initiated group instruction in sex, on an emotional as well as a factual level, for medical students. The objectives were: demythologizing of sexual behavior, desensitization to hasty response to sexual stimuli, and an increase of gentle, humanistic, and professional understanding of sex. A two-day presentation for some eighty persons—medical students and their sexual partners—ensued. The assembly was divided into groups of a dozen people each, led by a male and by a female. Emphasis was on sharing cognitive awareness of emotional reactions. The sessions started with audiovisual presentation of erotica with humorous comments on the enjoyment of sex. Content and comments gradually became more serious. Portrayals of various kinds of coitus were shown to a point of saturation. This was followed by technical suggestions and comments on current sexual mores. The members at first showed resistance, often expressed by boredom, but gradually, encouraged by others' examples, they told of their responses to the subject. The most dynamic aspect of the proceedings was the small group discussion.

A Groups Member's Suicide: Treating Collective Trauma. Howard D. Kibel. Pp. 42-53.

Every patient in some sense is a suicide risk. When a member of a therapeutic group takes his life, this traumatizes the other members and the therapist. The ability to master such a trauma depends on the strength of the ego, the extent of environmental support, and the significance of the trauma to each individual. Conditioning by past experience may better enable the ego to deal with present excitation, while fantasy and anticipation help the individual resolve the trauma. The trauma produces a sense of helplessness, and passive dependence ensues with an exacerbation of oral traits. Thus in a psychotherapeutic group when a suicide has occurred, dependence on the therapist increases. Old symptoms reappear along with a loss of ability to accept interpretations. The therapist, although aware of his group members' potential as suicide risks, tends to react to the event as a personal failure, a sign of professional inadequacy, as well as with personal grief. Examination of the countertransference may reveal latent hostility to the victim, leading to more guilt. As a consequence—and in defense—the therapist may feel a recrudescence of archaic fears of death, magical thinking, fantasies of retaliation, and the compulsion to help other patients. Similarly, the patients' defenses may include an objective and intellectual attitude toward the occurrence or resistance shown by silences, absences, and digressions, although identification with the deceased and fear of contagion may, at the same time, lead to increased willingness to accept deeper interpretations. Since the suicide expressed hostility and revenge, each group member sees it on a primitive level as directed against himself and has guilt feelings over his own hostility, similar to what a child feels at the birth of a sibling.

Group Treatment of the Mother-Daughter Relationship. Monroe G. Gottsegen and Margaret Grasso. Pp. 69-81.

Difficulties in the relationship between mother and daughter lead to the daughter's maladaptation to internal and environmental pressures. A useful modality for treating this early adolescent difficulty is a mother-daughter group. When a group consisting of four mothers and their daughters was formed, the pattern of resistance prior to the group's coalescence typified the fourteen-year-old girl's struggle with her mother over independence and separation. During the sessions, both parent and child showed ambivalence toward breaking their ties, with accompanying guilt and anxiety and denial by mutual clinging. As each dyad merged with the group, its inner struggle lessened. There was, however, a pseudo coalescence between dyads—a resistance to confrontation. Mothers frequently hindered their daughters' independence because of their own emotional needs. The daughter's problem was often a disguise for the mother's, and her disturbed behavior a support for the mother's inadequacy. In the group, as one pair began to face its conflict, other pairs gained the courage to look for their own pathological interaction and to search for personal growth.

The Experiential Group and the Psychotherapeutic Enterprise. Hans H. Strupp. Pp. 115-123.

The traditional psychotherapeutic enterprise is on the decline because the moral and philosophical values implicit in its theoretical formulations are no longer in keeping with the prevailing view of man and his place in society. Conversely, the experiential group faithfully mirrors the aspirations, values, and needs of a growing number of people and seemingly offers solutions which the traditional therapeutic enterprise has failed to provide. The author says that with neurosis viewed as a medical rather than a moral problem, psychotherapy can be considered as a reparative endeavor to restore the patient to a hypothetical state of health.

Strupp contrasts the freudian approach—which respects the complexities of personality development, psychopathology, and therapy—with currently fashionable group-therapeutic attempts that cater to the demand for rapid, inexpensive cures. Encounter groups replace long-range personal goals with immediate experiences, deny the uniqueness of individuality by group members' anonymity, and disparage the role of reason in undertaking interpersonal operations. A strong affect is considered valuable per se. Long-standing interpersonal relations are suspended in favor of superficial affection from strangers, and the experience of strong affect is considered an antidote to a mechanized dehumanized society. Both behaviorist and encounter group therapy depreciate the inner man, the privacy of the individual, and the role of reason.

The Significance of Utopian Fantasies in Small Groups. Graham S. Gibbard and Jahn J. Hartmen. Pp. 125-147.

A group of university students and teachers meeting to study interpersonal behavior were impressed by a constellation of expectations they described as utopian. They distinguished both œdipal and preœdipal themes underlying this constellation. The group as a whole appeared in a maternal role and it offered both good (nurturant and protective) as well as bad (abandoning and destructive) aspects. With the latter, the group members dealt in fantasy and kept their libidinal and aggressive impulses from consciousness. The group as a large totality of unknown power conjured up a harsh, preœdipal mother image and primitive fantasies about the contents of her body. On the other hand, the individual's emotional investment satisfied a need to belong—the uncomplicated sense of acceptance and well-being found only in an exclusive union with the mother. The equation of group with mother also catalyzes feelings of attraction and repulsion. It is assumed that intrapsychic and interpersonal conflict can be replaced by unconditional love, nutrients, and security. Negative aspects are defended against by splitting. These postulations and their therapeutic handling are illustrated in descriptions of groups which met forty times for fifty-minute sessions three times a week.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG

Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry. XII, 1973.

Youth Who Use Drugs: Psychodynamic Diagnosis and Treatment Planning. Stephen Proskauer and Ruick S. Rolland. Pp. 32-47.

From the Roxbury Court Clinic in Boston, the authors offer a psychodynamic classification of youthful drug users, designed to aid in planning of interventions. Their thinking often parallels and draws upon the work of Wieder and Kaplan (*cf.*, The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XXIV). Three groups are discussed: experimental, depressive, and characterological drug users. The authors stress that the last group is the 'tiny minority', a view not in agreement with many workers in the field. The experimental users are more or less normal adolescents reacting to common pressures, internal and external; drug need is not a meaningful motivation. With the exception of the potential school dropout, most of this group can be dealt with by educating their parents and teachers. The depressive group, numerically large, use drugs in response to multiple factors—intrapsychic, familial, and social. For them, our familiar therapeutic modalities are indicated: psychotherapy, rehabilitation, community based goal-directed group activity, etc. The characterologic diagnosis should be made with extreme caution, as many of the depressive group at first seem to fit this category. These are the ego impaired, with histories of severe developmental trauma and pathology. For them, drug use serves both gratification of regressive needs and, temporarily, to 'prop up' ego functions. Treatment for this group requires prolonged protective settings of the self-help Synanon type. Methadone is a possible alternative.

Treatment of Two Silent Adolescent Girls. Stuart L. Kaplan and Philip Escoll. Pp. 59-72.

Two interesting cases essentially of elective mutism in adolescents are described in terms of intrapsychic and intrafamilial conflicts and therapeutic tactics. Excessive œdipal stimulation from the fathers, separation conflicts relating to the mothers, and familial prohibition of expression of anger were characteristic of both families, as was a past history in one parent of silence as a coping response to anger. It was recommended that the silent patient be excluded from family sessions to prevent scapegoating. This brought to the fore the family separation problems. In individual treatment the goal of understanding the patient rather than eliciting speech was stressed, with the therapist, in briefer but more frequent sessions, doing most of the talking.

Dream Conception and Reality Testing in Children. Richard C. Evans. Pp. 73-92.

The relationship between ego defects and poor reality mastery is explored, using as the tool the sequential development of the dream concept (following Piaget, and Laurendeau and Pinard). A regular sequence of dream concept development, moving from an external and material concept of dreams to

internal and nonmaterial, is demonstrable in normal children. Three diagnostic groups of children were examined: 1, behavior disorder; 2, borderline; and 3, psychotic. The first group differed strikingly from the other two in failing, or showing great difficulty in correctly conceptualizing the origin and location of dreams. All three groups correctly grasped the 'unreal' and nonsubstantial nature of dreams. The author discusses the meaning, in terms of learning theory, of this evidence of disordered boundary formation in children who have symptoms of inadequate reality testing. He supports Kohlberg in a position midway between a purely 'unfolding' theory and a totally environmental (stimulus-response) theory, espousing a 'cognitive-developmental' view of the growing child as part of an interactional system within his surroundings.

Some Uses of Dirty Words by Children. Lawrence Hartmann. Pp. 108-121.

The author presents a case in which the dynamics of swearing and its richness as therapeutic material are vividly demonstrated. His discussion of swearing, its definition, history, anthropology, and psychology is rich and interesting.

Juvenile Manic-Depressive Illness. Clinical and Therapeutic Considerations. Sherman C. Feinstein and Edward A. Wolpert. Pp. 123-136.

After an excellent review of current thinking on adult manic-depressive illness, the authors examine the problems of its nature and the recognition of it in childhood, especially early childhood. It is their speculation that manic-depressive illness may have a quite specific behavioral equivalent in childhood which is infrequently recognized. The fact that it fails to meet many of the adult criteria obscures accurate diagnosis, fails to take into account the impact of affective instability in the developmental process, and results in delayed effective treatment with lithium. Postulating that manic-depressive patients have genetically determined vulnerability of affective systems and supporting their view with a detailed case presentation, the authors state that 'rapidly shifting emotional states in children, which do not seem appropriate to the reality stress, should be carefully evaluated as the possible manifestation of a bipolar affective illness, especially if these states tend to remain prolonged and refractive to therapeutic contact'.

Primary Transitional Objects. Fred Busch; Humberto Nagera; Judith McKnight; Guillermo Pezzarossi. Pp. 193-214.

Using data from observation of twenty-seven out of forty children (aged two to five) in a psychoanalytic study group's nursery school and interviews with their mothers, the authors point out that there are really two separate types of transitional objects—attachments forming either before age one or after age two. They define the early type in detail. In addition, they describe the characteristics of the object and the child's relationship to it. Children become attached to 'primary transitional objects' in the first year of life, usually by six months, and the attachment lasts at least a year. (In the population studied,

only three children were 'weaned' at the time of study.) The object soothes (rather than excites as do fetishes), is 'created' by the baby (rather than offered by the mother, as with pacifiers), is not a direct need-satisfier such as the bottle, and is not a part of the baby's body. Typically it is a blanket or a diaper. It is used characteristically at bedtime, at times of stress, in periods of 'inactivity', and on trips. When needed, it cannot be substituted for by the mother's presence; 'mother is not enough' for the infants at these times.

Observations on Follow-Up Contacts with Former Child Analytic Patients. Ehud Koch. Pp. 223-246.

Noting the literature's striking inattention to follow-up practices of child analysts, the author suggests areas of further exploration, stimulated by the responses to a questionnaire concerning twenty former patients of twelve child analysts. The data essentially demonstrated that the most explicit, planned, and analyst-encouraged follow-up visits took place in situations where: 1, termination was developmentally determined rather than on the basis of optimal conflict resolution; 2, significant early ego disturbances existed; and 3, the families were inadequate in supporting growth. Further exploration is urged in the following areas: the relation between specific childhood disturbances and/or specific environmental conditions and the analyst's felt need for greater follow-up effort; comparison of follow-up practices dealing with other patient groups, such as adult analytic patients and child psychotherapy patients; and the analyst's interest in follow-up, not in terms of countertransference but of attitudes, values, and aims regarding child analytic work.

ALICE KROSS FRANKEL

Journal of Psychiatry and Law. I, 1973.

The following abstracts are summaries that appeared in the Journal of Psychiatry and Law and are reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

The Psychoanalytic Anatomy of a Crime. Stuart S. Asch. Pp. 145-165.

A psychiatric study is presented of a man arrested on a charge of buying a car with a forged check. Using psychoanalytic principles, it was possible to delineate not only the current psychic conflict that provoked the criminal act, but also the specific childhood psychological determinants. The data are used to discuss the merits of various legal dispositions possible in this case. The suggestion is made that similar studies of criminals and criminal acts may offer more guidance for both psychiatry and jurisprudence.

Police Behavior: Part I. Daniel Cruse and Jesse Rubin. Pp. 167-222.

Police and citizen behavior occurring during radio patrol activities was studied in Miami. Four specially trained policemen-observers rated behavior of

twelve observed patrolmen interacting with fourteen hundred citizens during one thousand separate contacts. Police behavior was found to be predominantly controlling in nature. Citizen behavior was predominantly coöperative and nonviolent. Stress was perceived by patrolmen in seven per cent of calls and altered police behavior in one and a half per cent of calls, a small but significant amount. Surprisingly, neither citizen behavior nor types of neighborhoods affected the police behavior. Inactivity on patrol increased both police controlling behavior and police fatigue. Recommendations are made regarding police research training and operations.

Judicial Use of Psychiatric Reports in the Sentencing of Sex Offenders. Carol Bohmer. Pp. 223-242.

Use of psychiatric evidence within the court system has increased recently. This study investigates the psychiatric pre-sentence reports ordered by judges in sentencing sex offenders. The findings indicate that although the judges are ostensibly assisted by these reports, further probing makes it clear that in fact they are ambivalent about their value. It also concludes that in actuality understanding and communication between psychiatry and law has not increased and also that however much a judge may want to use the material contained in the reports, he is constrained by the legal system and other external factors from doing so.

Can Comprehensive Mental Health Care Be Provided in an Overcrowded Prison System? Edward Kaufman. Pp. 243-262.

This article deals with the efforts made in a fifteen-month period to provide mental health services in a large, antiquated, overcrowded prison system. The role of altered public sentiment engendered by recent prison riots and rising suicide rates in making available funding and personnel is discussed. The mental health services which are provided are described in detail as well as their relationship to the correction and criminal justice system. Plans for viable alternatives to the present system are discussed. The risk that such services can be a perpetuation of a nonfunctional system that prevents needed radical change is explored.

Psychiatric and Legal Aspects of Statutory Rape, Pregnancy, and Abortion in Juveniles. Moisy Shopper. Pp. 275-295.

Although the law has taken cognizance of the psychological immaturity of the female minor by passage of statutory rape laws, it has failed to protect her from adverse psychological consequences related to unwanted pregnancy. An exploration of the concept of 'compulsory pregnancy' shows that harmful psychological effects result from requiring the adolescent female to carry the unwanted pregnancy to term. The law should permit the adolescent to personally consent to an abortion without obtaining parental consent.

Prison: Punishment, Treatment or Deterrent? Edward Kaufman, Pp. 335-351.

The author describes his personal experience as a psychiatrist and psychoanalyst working in prisons and how the despair of prisoners can blind one to the utility of such institutions to the individual and society. The historical relationship of psychoanalytic theory to societal institutions for modifying criminal behavior is discussed. The function of prisons in our society as institutions providing punishment, treatment, and deterrence facilities is carefully examined. Punishment is reviewed as to society's need for retribution and its function as a modifier of behavior. Several treatment methods and specific treatment programs designed to treat criminal behavior are described. The question of whether any treatment can be done in such settings is discussed as well as what techniques and conditions can lead to successful treatment with offenders. The many factors which minimize the deterrent functions of our criminal justice system are reviewed.

Police Behavior: Part II. Jesse Rubin and Daniel Cruse. Pp. 353-375.

Intercorrelations among MMPI scores, behavioral rating scales, and paired comparisons for twelve radio patrolmen showed that one of the characteristics responsible for much variability in the data was time in service, or experience. Radio patrolmen tended to fall into two distinct groups having specific characteristics. An individual patrolman in either group might be rated a high quality policeman. As a group, the observed patrolmen have a normal MMPI profile. The policeman's psychological development is discussed in terms of his need to cope with several role conflicts and his relative lack of job mobility. Two important fantasies concerning himself as a community service agent and as a crime fighter are observed to play an important part in these conflicts. Success in conflict resolution depends on mastering the problems. Failure results from fending them off and viewing them as external demands which lead to further job problems.

American Imago. XXIX, 1972.

The first four articles in Issue No. 4 are commentaries on K. R. Eissler's Discourse on Hamlet and 'Hamlet'.

Caviare to the General. John E. Gedo. Pp. 293-317.

Eissler describes the psychoanalytic approach to literature as an equation of literary characters with living human beings in an attempt to determine the unconscious motivations of the characters. However, he recognizes that characters in a literary work represent part objects and, as such, cannot be considered representations of real persons. He strives to demonstrate that the hidden theme which has made *Hamlet* so dominant a work is that of the Prince's transformation from a stunted personality, dependent on external guidance, to an autono-

mous hero. Gedo discusses this theme from the point of view of Kohut's theory of the development of the self. Gedo is critical of Eissler's views on genius, particularly his assertions that geniuses are vulnerable individuals in danger of becoming psychotic, and that their creativity depends on their capacity to forego intimacy with libidinal objects. While Eissler recognizes that the psychological significance of great art may not always be of prime import, he claims that only those works with a psychological message will endure. Gedo regards this view as extreme; he asks: 'Is architecture less meritorious than the psychological novel?'.

Hamlet and *Ressentiment*. By Richard Weisberg. Pp. 319-337.

Weisberg takes issue with Eissler's view that Hamlet's actions in Act Five represent the fulfilment of a struggle to become a forceful existential hero, ready to act whatever the consequences. Weisberg's argument, buttressed by numerous citations from the text, is that Hamlet's actions are explained by *ressentiment,* a concept of Nietzsche, which denotes an attitude arising from cumulative repressions of feelings of hatred, revenge, and envy, leading to a sense of impotence. Unlike rebellion, *ressentiment* does not lead to an affirmation of different values because a person imbued with *ressentiment* secretly craves the values he publicly denounces.

The Victim and the Victimizers. M. D. Faber. Pp. 338-352.

Faber feels that the major purpose of Eissler's Discourse is to advance realistic criticism, which involves the equation of characters with living persons, as opposed to phenomenologic criticism. Faber declares that both are essential and faults Eissler for being one-sided. He also criticizes Eissler for arriving at judgments with insufficient evidence from the text.

Reflections on Eissler's Concept of the Doxaletheic Function. Donald M. Kaplan. Pp. 353-376.

Kaplan pursues several issues raised in Eissler's appendix, which discusses the relevance of positive audience responses and the doxaletheic function, the process by which reality testing of the artist survives a temporary loss of distinction between internality and externality. Eissler feels the genius requires certain positive responses from his environment to protect him from a breakdown of his mental functioning. Among the points that Kaplan makes is that in the artist's audience there is at work a remnant of a creative gift, too weak in most instances to produce a work of art, but sufficiently functional to enable a complex response to an art object.

The Journeys in *King Lear*. Ann L. McLaughlin. Pp. 384-398.

The journeys in *King Lear* are symbolic of madness and death. Trapped in a greedy, amoral world, for which he is partially responsible, and aware that

his death is near, Lear, wanting some magical change, reaches frantically for Cordelia. When she is unable to solace him, he angrily breaks the bond between them, having already broken the bond with his people. This action precipitates a desperate, irrational mood, a sharp increment in his mental distress. McLaughlin feels the psychological truth Shakespeare presented was that man experiences a sense of nothingness when separated from his natural order and transcendent peace when reunited with it, as Lear was at the play's end.

JOSEPH WILLIAM SLAP

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Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Henry Nunberg

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NOTES

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

November 14, 1972. PERSPECTIVES ON MEMORY. (Brill Lecture.) Hans W. Loewald, M.D.

Memory is not a discrete, sharply defined intellectual function. Rather it must be conceived of in terms of memorial processes which are at once influenced by, and have influence upon, all the major functions and organizations of the psyche. Dr. Loewald uses the term 'memorial processes' to replace 'memory' in order to emphasize that memory is made up of cathectic processes of varying intensities, with different aims, drawing upon a variety of sources. Unlike the system described by Freud in The Mystic Writing Pad, no part of the process of memory is passive: the distinction between an active system Pcpt-Cs and a passive system Ucs does not hold. The revivability of memory implies that these processes are invested with 'low-key cathectic processes' which are revived by new cathexes (e.g., in recall) and themselves become repatterned through the recathexis. Just as the unconscious wish determines the character of the manifest dream, so does unconscious reproductive activity 'determine the character of present experience. This applies throughout the psychic system, including mnemic images themselves.'

Instincts are not energies within a closed system seeking discharge but rather are 'relational phenomena, arising . . . from a psychic matrix constituted essentially by the mother-child unit'. Dr. Loewald considers them as wholly psychic forces, with the biological roots put to one side for such purposes. As psychic forces, they are defined as the 'most primitive' psychologically motivating forces. From the mother-child matrix, instinctual cathexes differentiate into narcissistic and object cathexes. The former are the cathectic currents within the individual; the latter, the currents between the ego system and the environment. To clarify what Freud left vague, narcissistic cathexes are subdivided into those which cathect the 'totality of the personality' and those which are 'intersystemic' cathexes; the latter give the psychic systems their organizational character and are employed in the genesis of memory. Parallel to the differentiation between narcissistic and object cathexes is the evolution of cognition-conation through differentiation in early psychic life of memory and perception.

In the prestructural era of the infant's psychic life, memory and perception, narcissistic and object-libidinal cathexes, all constitute an identity of instinctual activities. It is only through experiences of satisfaction that differentiation into component functions takes place. Thus, a minimum of experiences of object-libidinal interactions is necessary for the development of psychic structure, and even for the development of an indestructible unconscious. The first experiences from which the indestructible unconscious emerges are hallucinatory wish-fulfilment states, in which the functions of perception and memory are first exercised; instinctual activity and further instinctual stimulation occur simultaneously. Thus, 'memory would basically be an instinctual, narcissistic activity modulated and patterned by interactions with environment . . . to

become preconscious or conscious requires periodic reinforcement through perception which "revives memory". . . . If memory is that aspect of our activity which links events and phenomena together . . . then there [are no] perceptions, as organizations of stimulation events, without memory.'

The act of remembering takes two forms: the enactive and the representational. The enactive form is closer to primary process and to the primary memorial system. It is present in acting out in analysis, in intense affective states and moods, and in many other behavioral manifestations. It is dynamically and descriptively unconscious since it partakes of the timelessness and lack of differentiation characteristic of the primary process. Enactive remembering conveys no sense of past; there is no 'inner distance' between the subject and his memory. The primary memorial system, of which it is a direct expression, is the 'aggregate of the identifications and internalizations which enter into the organization of id, ego, and superego'. The representational form of remembering belongs to the secondary process, to the system Pcs. It is a secondary memorial system that arises out of the primary system 'on the basis of [and as a result of] the organization of the ego'.

All of the processes concerned with memory are the result of internalizations originating in 'interactions within the mother-child psychic matrix. Internalization is not a process involving the representation of objects and object relations but, . . . in Freud's language, their dissolution or destruction.' In identification, the object is either not yet established (as in early childhood), or 'a process of dedifferentiation of subject and object' takes place and 'the former object relation becomes a dynamic element of the reorganized ego'.

Secondary process develops through the active mirroring by the parents of the child's activity and the encounters between parent and child become part of the child's 'inner reflexiveness'. The parents mirror more than the child presents which brings about a 'mirroring hypercathexis' of his psychic processes, thus leading to development of secondary process. Therefore, secondary process leads to the possibility for 'different psychic elements [to] encounter and know each other'.

With this viewpoint, the problem arises of the status of unconscious ideas and fantasies. Comparing them to latent dream thoughts, they must be combinations of Ucs and Pcs elements, of primary and secondary memorial systems. In and of themselves, unconscious fantasies and ideas are not in the primary memorial system except in potential form. In order to become an idea or fantasy, the potential must be subjected to de-repression, bringing the material back into the secondary process. The process involves a dynamic loss to the unconscious which may be the source of id resistance as the loss is 'fended off by the compulsion to repeat'. Thus, mourning and memory are shown to be intimately related.

'The highest forms of memorial activity make us create a history of ourselves as a race and as individuals as well as . . . of the world in which we live. . . . This is the thrust of psychoanalysis, of the endeavor to transform unconscious or automatic repetitions . . . into aware and re-creative action. . . . In such memorial activity . . . we are on the path of becoming a self.'

HENRY NUNBERG

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

December 18, 1972. THE SELF-REPRESENTATION AND ITS ROLE IN NEUROSIS. Alan Eisnitz, M.D.

Dr. Eisnitz presented two clinical vignettes which illustrated the importance of attending to the contents and stability of the self-representation of each analysand and the maneuvers employed to protect it. The organization of the ego is likened to a gestalt in which certain function-complexes are more highly cathected than others and exert an organizing influence on other function-complexes of the ego. When the stability of the self-representation is threatened, defensive activity to effect repair is set in motion. The ego activity maintains the stability of the self-representation in part by shifting cathexis from one aspect of the self-representation to another and also by shifting energies attached to the self-representation to faculties which carry out ego activity aimed at guarding it against threats to it or bolstering approved views of the self. In this manner a narcissistically acceptable, stable self-representation is maintained.

Disturbances involving the self-representation are much more common in the neuroses than is generally recognized. This is especially true when the superego directs large amounts of aggressive energy against some aspect of the self-representation and when its stability is faulty to begin with. In the latter case, various narcissistic disturbances such as fusion fantasies, fetishistic denial, conversion symptoms, and obsessional doubting are often seen.

Dr. Eisnitz reviewed the development of self and object representation within the processes of self-object differentiation, the development of object relations, and the evolution of superego structure. His own material confirms the observations of others who have studied the connections between intense castration anxiety warded off fetishistically, early disturbances in object relations, and the instability of the self-representation.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Mervin Hurwitz agreed that the self-representation is an important clinical phenomenon but maintained that the concept remained a very broad one which is technically difficult to employ. He described it as including certain conscious and unconscious aspects of an individual's view of himself. While the self-representation appears for the most part as an ego phenomenon, it also contains superego and id aspects. Dr. Hurwitz cautioned against subordinating all psychic problems to disturbances of the self-representation, and questioned a too broad conceptualization of the self-representation and overemphasis of its significance in mental life and in the functioning of the ego. He would prefer to restrict the concept to that set of shifting images of the self that reflect current personality organization.

Dr. Nathaniel Ross cited Hartmann's comments about the complexity of human psychic structure, and emphasized the contributions of ego psychology to analytic technique. He agreed with Dr. Eisnitz that the self-representation seems to organize psychic functioning. However, he cautioned investigators not to become so enamored of particular aspects of psychic functioning that their observations become distorted by unconscious biases.

In conclusion, Dr. Eisnitz agreed that the concept of the self-representation is complex. His emphasis had been on the concept as an intrapsychic function for regulating internal cathectic shifts. Its usefulness derives from our understanding of the integrated interplay among the various dimensions of the personality and the intrapsychic cathectic shifts which take place.

MARTIN A. SILVERMAN

The Eighth International Congress of the INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND ALLIED PROFESSIONS will be held in Philadelphia, July 28 to August 2, 1974. Participants will include Serge Lebovici, Paris; Tol Asuni, Africa; Alan D. B. Clarke, England; Reimer Jensen, Copenhagen; Joseph Marcus, Israel; and from the United States, Bruno Bettelheim, Peter Blos, Rudolf Ekstein, Erik Erikson, Margaret S. Mahler, Peter Neubauer, Fritz Redl, and John Spiegel. For further information write: Herman D. Staples, M.D., Secretary-General, International Association for Child Psychiatry, P. O. Box 1974, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19105.

ERRATUM: Dr. Edgar L. Lipton has called to our attention that there was an error in the report of his paper, *The Relevance of Recent Psychoanalytic Child Development Research for the Practice of Clinical Psychiatry*, on page 162, This QUARTERLY, Vol. XXLIII, No. 1. The fifth sentence of the first paragraph should read: 'The psychiatrist must be alert to the patient's narcissistic sensitivities and to the patient's desire to keep information about the disability out of the treatment.'

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