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IMRE HERMANN'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO PSYCHOANALYSIS

AN INTRODUCTORY NOTE

BY FRANK R. HARTMAN, M.D.

Imre Hermann's scientific productivity is indeed remarkable: he has published over seventy original papers, more than fifty before 1939, as well as numerous reviews. His clinical papers are carefully linked to theory, and his theoretical papers—often linked to mathematics, logic, or basic neurology—are rich in clinical detail. Although a summary of Hermann's thinking, *L'Instinct Filial* (The Archaic Instincts of Man), was published in France in 1972, his work has seldom been translated. Hence it is not surprising that those who know it best frequently find his contributions 'rediscovered' in other works.

In *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation,* Hartmann (1939) cites Hermann's 1920 paper, *Intelligence and Thought in Depth,* when he postulates that adaptability is not proportionate to intelligence. Hartmann added that Hermann 'has made many valuable contributions to the psychoanalytic theory of thought processes'. Rapaport (1951) concurs. Among Hermann's contributions to the study of thinking and logic are *Psychoanalysis and Logic, Intelligence and Qualitative Differences in Thinking,* and *The Ego and Thinking: A Psychoanalytic Study.* Hartmann also noted another of Hermann's early contributions to ego psychology: 'Hermann (1922) assumes that the repetition compulsion develops into "orderly repetition" ("ordinance").'

Hermann's contributions to the study of special talents are found in his papers of 1922, 1923, 1926, and 1930. And five papers on the psychology of primates from the psychoanalytic point of view were published in 1923, 1926, 1931, 1933, and 1936. His first paper on developmental psychology, written with his wife, A. Hermann-Cziner, appeared in 1923: *On the Developmental Psychology of the Handling of Objects.*

The 1929 monograph, *The Ego and Thinking*, deserves special mention. Among its contributions is Hermann's conceptualization of the primitive forms of identification derived from the mother-child dual union. The first of these is the 'flowing over' (into the other or 'merging') identification corresponding to the dual union, and the second is the 'introjective' identification related to the dissolution of the dual union.

Imre Hermann first became interested in psychology while studying medicine in Budapest.[1] There he studied experimental psychology with Géza Révész, whose disciple and friend he became. This training continues to influence his psychoanalytic thought. In 1911 he met Ferenczi who drew him into his circle of friends and became the second major influence on Hermann's career. Ferenczi later became his supervisor and teacher. However, after graduating from medical school in 1912, he did not immediately commit himself to psychoanalysis. He first acquired a year's psychiatric experience and then gained further knowledge and experience during his military service in World War I. He joined the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society in 1919. Elisabeth Révész Rado was his first analyst, and later, in the 1930's, he was analyzed by Vilma Kovacs.

During the First Commune (the Bolshevik revolution of Bela Kun in 1919), Ferenczi was appointed to the first university professorship of psychoanalysis, and Hermann was appointed first assistant to Révész. But under the reactionary regime of Horthy both were soon forced to resign their positions. This did not hinder Hermann's career in psychoanalysis. In 1922 he became Secretary of the Hungarian Psychoanalytic Society, then in 1936 its Vice-President, and over the years an increasingly important member of its training program.

Imre Hermann and Alice Cziner were married in 1922. Dr. Cziner, who had also studied with Révész and was a training analyst, has made extensive contributions to the literature in the field of education.

[1] The biographical data used in this note were supplied by Dr. Hermann.

After narrowly escaping death at the hands of the Nazis during World War II, in 1945 Hermann resumed his private psychoanalytic practice as well as his training analyses and teaching. From 1946 to 1948 he was a Docent on the faculty of medicine at the university in Budapest. On the occasion of his eightieth birthday in 1969 he was presented a medal, The Golden Degree of the Order of Labor, by the Hungarian Government. He remains active in psychoanalytic groups and still sees ten patients a day.

Clinging—Going-in-Search is Hermann's best known paper. In introducing it to the readers of The Quarterly, I believe that two recent comments citing Hermann are of interest. Mahler, Pine, and Bergman (1975) state: 'The normal neonate is born with reflex equipment such as the sucking, rooting, grasping, and the *Anklammerung* (clinging) (see Hermann, 1936) probably related to, and complementing, the Moro reflex' (p. 42). Greenacre (1966) writes: 'It is my impression . . . that in early psychoanalytic theory, anchored too strongly on the libido theory, there was too exclusive an emphasis on orality in the first phase of life, and that the importance of clinging (Hermann, 1936), touch, smell, vision, and kinesthetic stimulation was insufficiently appreciated' (p. 194).

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Clinging — Going-In-Search

Imre Hermann

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CLINGING—GOING-IN-SEARCH

A CONTRASTING PAIR OF INSTINCTS AND THEIR RELATION TO SADISM AND MASOCHISM

BY IMRE HERMANN, M.D.

Translated by Margaret Nunberg and Frank R. Hartman, M.D.

During the course of the past dozen years, I have more than once availed myself of the opportunity to point out the significant role that is played in man's psychic structure by his desire to cling to the mother's body. There is now sufficient material on that question to permit me to bring together what has until now been scattered in several different places, to supplement it, and to show the position of the pertinent facts within the structure of psychoanalytic theory. Here in Budapest, we have tried several times to arrive at an understanding of these phenomena and of what follows from them. Along with my own studies, there is the well-known conception of the female castration complex, as put forward by Mrs. K. Rotter (1934), as well as Mrs. Balint's (1933) description of the anxiety situation in early infancy: of being dropped [out of someone's arms]. Very recently, Róheim made a broad ethnological presentation of the same range of problems on whose psychic variations Mrs. Rotter threw light by way of new clinical material.

Two sets of data, from different sources, have served as the point of departure for this paper. One set consisted of clinical observations confirming the *erogenicity of the hand* (Hermann, 1922, 1923, 1925, 1926a); the other set had to do with the mother-infant relationship among apes (Hermann, 1923, 1926b, 1933).

This paper appears here for the first time in English. It was published in part in the Magyarorszagi Pszichoanalitikai Egyesület, January 18, 1935, and presented in part at the Four-Country Conference on The Death Instinct and Masochism, in Vienna, June 7-10, 1935 (later published under the title, *Sich-Anklammern, Auf-Suche-Gehen*, Int. Ztschr. f. Psa., XXII, 1936, pp. 349-370).

Erotogenicity of the Hand

Freud (1905) recognizes the hand as an erotogenic zone when he speaks of the '. . . excitation . . . to another erotogenic zone—to the hand, for instance, through tactile sensations . . .' (pp. 209-210). Surely every one of us knows instances of pleasurable sensations of the hand. One patient, for example, is able to recall how, as a boy, playing with his fingers during holy services and crossing one finger over another, he would obtain the sensation of an 'erection' of his fingers. Another patient was capable of achieving pleasurable sensations in his hand during the analytic session by stroking his fingers.[1] These pleasurable sensations, as well as the whole matter of the erotogenicity of the hand, might however be secondary in nature, and thus have no essential significance for [human] development. A further step in our consideration of this question therefore was necessary; it involved the direct observation of the role played by the hand in the infant' slife. In addition to observations that I made on my own children, I had the opportunity to observe infants in a nursery while they were sucking, eating, and finger sucking. From these observations, I drew the following conclusions.

1. There is a specific behavior that invariably makes its appearance among infants, whether sooner or later: while they are sucking, the fingers of both hands (or, of the one hand that is not being used for grasping) enter into a state of extreme tension. If one tries to bend back one of these fingers, at once it takes up again its tense position—a position, incidentally, that the toes also may assume. The image presents itself of a tension-charged body; one can hardly avoid making a comparison with an erection.

2. During the time of finger sucking, one or more of the other fingers engage in tactile contact with the face, leaning on it, or clutching it. These modes of behavior, which Lindner (1879) has described among older children as well and illustrated pictorially

[1] The same patient during a session associated to Haeckel, whose works he had previously read, 'an ape who holds on fast with one hand'.

in his study, appear to be a component of sucking that is just as integral to it as are the actual sucking motions.

Clinging and Grooming Among Apes

The second set of facts that have served as a point of departure tell us that apes spend the earliest months of their extrauterine life *on the mother's body,* clinging to her fur with all four extremities.[2] The significance of this behavior is revealed later on, as I see it, in the game of 'grooming' (described, erroneously, as 'delousing'), which is so important in the social life of adult apes.[3] Sleeping positions that are maintained after early infancy also permit us to conjecture that the urge to cling has not ceased to be active: infant apes embrace one another, or express by the position of their arms the desire to cling.[4]

Clinging in Man

If we combine these two sets of facts—on the one hand, the erotogenicity of the hand in the adult human and the human infant; on the other hand, the clinging of the ape infant—, we come to the conclusion that, in terms of his instinctual anlage, the human child is torn from his mother's body prematurely perhaps, among other things, as the consequence of an egotistical act on the part of the primal father. The urge to cling, therefore, continues to exist, reflecting a yearning for the primal state in which mother and child constitute an undivided dual unit. The fulfilment of that yearning is thwarted by a trauma, in actual fact by a series of traumata, repeated over and over again (see, Hermann, 1924).

[2] Comprehensive information can be obtained from Zuckerman's two books: *Social Life of Monkeys and Apes,* 1932, and *Functional Affinities of Man, Monkeys, and Apes,* 1933.

[3] A new study by Yerkes presents a comprehensive comparative psychology of 'delousing': *Genetic Aspects of Grooming, A Socially Important Primate Behaviour Pattern,* J. of Soc. Psychol., IV. Reviewed by I. Hermann in Imago, XIX, pp. 430-432, 1933. It is pointed out, in this review, in what aspects of human modes of behavior it is that the phenomenon of grooming reappears.

[4] Pertinent illustrations are found especially in R. M. Yerkes and A. W. Yerkes: *The Great Apes,* 1929.

The urge to cling manifests itself in the specific hand movements that have been observed during the sucking process. It is in that sense that one has to understand the statement made by a three-year-old girl who was sleeping by herself and gave as her reason for not succeeding in giving up her nocturnal grasping-sucking that she 'cannot fall asleep when she is alone'. Psychologically, this situation is the same as in the case of another girl who would dare to go to sleep in her bed only if the mother held her hand. Just as in instances of finger sucking the finger that is being sucked stands for the mother, so too, in regard to clinging, the object that is being held by the clasping finger stands for her. The child 'deserted' by his mother fantasies himself in a state of clinging as *both* mother and child.

The infant's typical *sleeping position* is described by Peiper (1928). 'The specific sleeping position of the infant has been noted for some time. There are difficulties, however, if one seeks to explain it. The view that has been accepted until now cannot be correct—namely, that it is to be regarded as a continuation of the intrauterine position. The fetus, which is pressed together on all sides by the pressure of the uterus, shows quite a different picture in the mother's womb. . . . It could be a question of symmetrical tonic reflexes of the neck' (pp. 49-50). What *is* revealed, however, by the position of the two hands, which the infant holds at shoulder level, is the position of the child on *the mother's body*. Every analyst must have noted that just as the desire of a patient to reach for his hand manifests itself quite often in the analytic session, so too does the position of the arms that is characteristic of the sleeping infant: it indicates a regression to earlier *urges to cling*.

It is not difficult to see where these trains of thought lead: to begin with, to an analytic understanding of *'the grasping instinct'*. We have confirmed its working by furnishing evidence for an urge to cling; moreover, we have equipped it with an aim—the object. We therefore have to deal more closely with this supposed 'component instinct'.

Freud (1905), following Lindner, also refers to a 'grasping instinct'. 'In this connection, a grasping-instinct may appear and may manifest itself as a simultaneous rhythmic tugging at the lobes of the ears or catching hold of some part of another person (as a rule the ear) for the same purpose' (p. 180). In my view, however, the genetic sequence is rather the other way around: the grasping instinct seeks first of all to operate on another person. Bernfeld (1925) attaches great importance to thorough awareness of the grasping instinct. 'From birth on', he writes, 'the arms are organs of active discharge phenomena. They make "impulsive motions", when the infant is frightened, when he is sucking or screaming, or for "internal reasons" that we are unable to identify closely. The closing of the hand when a stimulus touches the palm can likewise be observed from birth on. One therefore has reason to speak of a grasping reflex. We must not permit ourselves, however, to be misled by this designation, which is valid only in reference to the earliest beginnings of manual activity, and [we] must not take an incorrect view of later grasping phenomena. The weight with which the newborn is capable of dealing, by way of the grasping reflex, is quite considerable: according to Watson, it is almost equal to his own body weight. There is no increase in this physical strength during the first three weeks of life. This earliest stage of movements of the arm and the hand goes on throughout life, from birth onward, manifesting itself in the background of all later changes and developments. Strong affects have a specific effect on arm movements; in a situation of danger (particularly when there is a danger of losing balance, but symbolically in other danger situations as well), or in a state of the most intense anxiety, our hands clutch convulsively at the air' (pp. 130-131). The second stage of hand movements can supposedly be described as pleasurable poking and waving. Bernfeld continues: 'The nature of this pleasure will not be hard to determine . . . these actions convey the sense of pleasure that has been aroused by a tactile stimulus, they are actions stemming from the sexual instinct' (p. 131).

This passage also provides us with grounds for answering the question: is it indeed possible for the human infant—even if he is given some assistance by the mother herself—to develop the strength that he needs for clinging to the mother's body? In dealing with this question, one ought not forget that from the very start of his life the human infant is being kept from this specific application of his strength. In my opinion, this is contrary to his natural predisposition: he is condemned, as it were, to the atrophy of inaction. To this, the neurologist may counter: in the infant, the pyramidal tracts and other pathways have not as yet been myelinated; how then can one speak of central processes and their transmission, which is the precondition for a drive?

Let us then give ear to an expert.

Peiper (1928) has described the special sensitivity to touch that one finds in the palm of the infant's hands and on the soles of his feet: 'If a longish object is placed on the hand of the newborn, he clasps it so tightly that one can lift the entire child (Robinson). Infants are sometimes capable of dangling that way for a minute, or even longer, before their strength begins to flag. Isbert and I found this reflex to be invariably present in newborn infants; during the course of the second quarter of the first year, it gradually becomes less frequent; it is only toward the end of the first year of life, however, that the reflex disappears. It seems to be the activity of the cerebrum that stands in the way of the reflex's appearance, for Watson saw it even in a human monster, who had no brain, while Karplus and Kreidl, as well as Magnus, observed it in Thalamus apes, as soon as these had recuperated from the surgical removal of the rest of the brain' (pp. 32-33). It is sometimes asserted, by the way, that the human newborn can be referred to as a 'pallidum-creature', since in his case the pyramidal system works only as far up as the pallidum, 'even though the parts of the brain that are working are not, of course, so strictly separated from those parts that are not yet capable of working, as they are in the case of animals on whom experimental operations have been performed' (p. 59). Peiper refers to the work of F. H. Lewy, according to whom animals that possess nothing but an extrapyramidal system are capable only

of reacting to stimuli; for him, therefore, it is the extrapyramidal system that chiefly determines making possible instinctual acts' (p. 156). In this context, I should like to call to mind Morgan's well-known definition that instinctual action shows the presence of subcortical nervous activity while an act of volition indicates cortical nervous activity.

Peiper (1928), by the way, cautions against our being influenced inordinately by considerations of nervous structure. We are not yet able to judge on the basis of a nerve's structure whether it is able to function. 'Rather, psychological experimentation has shown that every sensory nerve in the newborn, quite independently of its degree of myelinization, is already capable of conducting excitation toward the center' (p. 62). According to recent investigations, the grasping reflex as such may be assumed to start in the caudal section of the brain stem, and in the upper cervical cord, while the apparatus that inhibits it operates by the way of the fronto-rubrospinal pathway (Kroll, 1929, pp. 176-315).

In my opinion, the grasping reflex is based on the grasping instinct, and the latter, in turn, on the instinctual drive to cling to the mother's body. Pertinent neurological data are not able to refute this view. On the contrary, according to modern theory, a reflex always involves the organism as a whole (see, Goldstein, 1934); it is only following artificial intervention that a reflex operates as a machine does. In the organism as a whole, however, there does not exist either a grasping reflex or some undefined grasping instinct; what does exist is the clinging instinct which drives the organism toward an even more complete entity (the mother-child unit).

Having clearly established the neurological justification for our view, we now have to bring together those phenomena that provide a better understanding of this view.

Fright, Anxiety, Castration Complex

There are, to begin with, the *fright reactions* of early infancy. Let us once again quote Peiper (1928): 'The whole body jerks. The arms first fly apart and then, half-stretched from the elbow,

they move toward each other. The fingers are first spread apart, then brought close together. In fright reaction, the movements are the same as they are in Moro's "clasping reflex". Whereas the latter can invariably be elicited by shaking the child's head as often as one wishes, at short intervals, without a refractory phase setting in, that is not possible with fright reaction. We regard the clasping reflex as a reaction originating in the semicircular canal. . . . Moro pointed out that the clasping reflex persists longer in idiots. But even in healthy adults, it is not altogether absent. The "startle effect" is its last vestige. Phylogenetically, far back in time, any vibration would threaten the infant who was holding onto the mother's body. The ensuing movements by the infant have become, during the course of development, the general fright reaction . . .' (pp. 4-5).

Two things need to be emphasized here. The first has to do with the position of the fingers. To some extent, the same phenomenon is to be seen here as we described in relation to sucking—that is, the spreading apart of the fingers. *The same movement*—at least the same in outline—*is found accompanying both pleasure and anxiety*. In both of these emotional states, there is something one wants of mother: she is to give *more*, either more pleasure or more attention.

The other point has to do with the analytic conception of *anxiety*. Basically, anxiety is the feeling of having been abandoned at a time of danger; the expression of it is at the same time an appeal for help, a search for the mother. Anxiety has its origin in a situation of abandonment, or when there is a danger of being separated from the mother; the stimuli of vibration suggest this latter danger. Anxiety *develops* in the direction of an urge to cling.

I have more than once described a model of *castration anxiety* resting on this connection. I had in mind that what we see in the infant's urge to cling to the mother's body is the instinctual feeling he has that only together with her is he whole. Child and mother are said to be fused, after birth, in a dual unit—not symbolically, but in reality. In any manifestation of the castra-

tion complex, I regard object loss—that is, separation from the object—as the primary factor; the secondary factor, at the genital stage, is the fear of loss of the genital that stands for the object.

In addition to fright reaction in general, anxiety, and the castration complex, there are other contexts in which we encounter variations of the urge to cling.

Masturbation Fantasies, Screen Memories, Wish to Separate, Wandering Instinct

Patient I, to whom I referred earlier, displayed constant hand movements. He wanted to take hold of something; in superficial 'interpretation', what he wanted to do was to count money, to masturbate. Yet, even while his hands were already on their way, they were clearly in search of other places to go to. This restless threshing about without definite, clear goals characterized his entire life. He searched about for a vocation, he searched for a love object (among both sexes, but mainly among women), yet he did this in such a way that even after he had made a definite choice of sex, he remained attached to several women at one and the same time. He was also engaged in 'rummaging' among possible life principles: should he, for example, enter 'Heartstreet', where a grandmother of his lived, who from the sixth to ninth year of his life had provided him with the model for his image of God? Or should he be interested in money alone, should he be seeking only money (in Hungarian, the expression for 'making money' is *penzt keresni*—'looking for money').

Behind this character trait of constantly 'taking a fresh start in the game' of constant moving back and forth, stood his childhood attitudes toward his parents. To his father, money had indeed been 'the supreme law'; yet he had been more good-natured and tolerant than the mother. The mother had been perpetually intent on 'bringing up' the patient; she placed a high value on the external forms of social interaction and, by way of her maiden name, reminded him to be at all times 'on guard'. Should he cling to a mother of this sort? Or should he

take hold of the father's beard, his mustache, his penis? His mother, he feared, might try to destroy him; besides, he found her odor repugnant. If he were to turn to the father, then women would not love him. It would be best to be like mother; in that case, father would love him.

When he was twelve or thirteen, his masturbatory fantasy contained the image of the hairy lower leg of a man or a woman, as well as the hairy chest of a strong workman; there was also the image of a hair-covered hand grasping his penis. The image of the workman evoked the odor of sweat, which provided a special stimulus to sexual excitment. (Even today, he likes to kiss a woman on the shoulder; in that way, the odor from her armpit rises to his nose.) His coming to know that with puberty man becomes hairy contributed to these fantasies. Moreover, he himself observed at that time, during swimming lessons, that hair was growing abundantly on the shinbones of many young men.

A dream that he had, during the course of his analysis, throws light on what has been said thus far: father and mother are lying as if they were dead (in fact, both had died within a short space of time); he is rubbing his calf against mother's genitals in order to rouse her, but without succeeding in doing so. When he tears hair from father's toes, the latter regains consciousness.

Patient II, a female, is referred to here because of her screen memory. She remembers having sat on a staircase as a very small girl with her arms about the neck of a large dog, which was her friend. As an adult, she would do the same thing whenever she nestled affectionately against a man. She kept her son 'tied to' herself, cleaning him with her own hands, even in his sixth year, after he had relieved himself. She would also straighten his blanket over and over again while he was sleeping. She complains of feelings of dizziness, since she is 'lonely and has no one to cling to'.

Patient III, also a female, suffered from a dual attitude in her love life; although she found it distressing, she was unable to give it up. After quarreling with one man, she would turn to a

second, only to end up not long after with the first. Until her fourteenth year, she slept most often in her mother's bed, clinging to her with arms and legs. Sometimes she would sleep in that position with her sister; later, she regularly slept in like manner with her husband. Her love fades fast when the beloved is absent. Her ideal is the life of a man because he is firmly anchored in life, unlike the women of her native land who do nothing but sit at home, cut off from life. It is always necessary for 'something to happen'—otherwise, life is empty. Her fear of losing a beloved person is linked completely with images of physical separation. With horror, she imagines her nails being torn out, her eyes being jabbed out of their sockets. When her father came home from work, the child would embrace him, cling to him. Every night, the mother would have the children scratch her back. The patient too likes that; moreover, she likes to squeeze the pimples on other people. As to her own wounds, she does not let them heal but scratches off the scab; this evokes pleasurable sensations. When she was a child, she would misbehave in order to get a beating from her father, whom she loved passionately at the time; later on she hated him. His fits of anger were, to her mind, the agitations of love; his beatings, distorted caresses.

The dreams of this patient often had as the sole remembered content: 'I was going. . . '. She had wanted to be an orphan: as a child she had wanted everyone in her immediate surroundings to die, and indeed had waited for this to happen. Once a wealthy stranger expressed the wish, probably jokingly, to 'adopt' her; she took this quite seriously and does so to the present day. Often she had felt the desire to walk, even in rain and storm, without any destination—a desire that she sometimes carried out with great pleasure.

What is there to learn from these three cases? The extent to which the postulate of an early infantile urge to cling helps us to understand the connecting links among certain aspects of the patients' lives, guides us close to the œdipus complex (Patients I and II) and the castration complex (Patient III). There is, how-

ever, one complication to be noted. In the same cases in which the urge to cling is predominant, something else can also become operative—something that is, as it were, the opposite: a striving for *detachment,* for *separation*, or a continuous *search* for an object to cling to even when such an object is already accessible. Among patients suffering from agoraphobia (according to Freud, the fear of being tempted), I have seen two cases in which I found, in one instance, an intense urge to cling—the desire for a hand that would hold the patient's hand—and, in another, a yearning to run away from home (which could be traced back to childhood), side by side with a fear of standing still (expressed symbolically in the symptom: fear of the heart stopping).

Before attempting, however, to account for this linkage between *clinging* and *separating, running away* and *searching,* I should like to draw attention to a peculiarity in the first patient: the fantasies centering on hair. This is certainly not an isolated phenomenon. Another patient (IV—a woman) is able to recall a masturbation fantasy that goes back to her seventh year: a man pulling out a woman's pubic hair. I also know of adults who have members of their family scratch around in the hair on their heads. Pulling out hair, by the way, is in certain respects akin to the 'delousing' among apes.[5]

Up to the present time, the view has been held in psychoanalysis that 'finger, and hair secondarily, take over the repre-

[5] See, Hermann (1923).

See also, a section in a paper by K. A. Menninger (1935) that seems anomalous: 'Dr. Burrows has reported a case of infantile trichotillomania in which a three-year-old child wet its fingers, plucked out a hair, examined the plucked hair and threw it away. He had continued this conduct over a period of fifteen months. Dr. Maitland Jones, who saw the patient, was of the opinion that the child was suffering not from a disease but from a defect of conduct. Dr. Burrows wrote the superintendent of the Zoological Society Gardens inquiring if the habit was present to any extent among the higher apes or monkeys and received the reply that nothing of the same nature had been observed among the primates. The child in this case sucked his thumb. It is recorded that he seemed mentally normal but was rather restless' (p. 457). Seen with analytic eyes, however, what apes methodically do with one another's hair (pulling it out, looking at it, placing in their mouths the meager results of their pulling) comes quite close to this habit of children.

sentation of breast and penis' (see, Abraham, 1924); Róheim (1921) has said: 'In the case of hair, what is chiefly involved, in addition to olfactory pleasure (anal eroticism) are castration fears: hair and nails are body-parts that are growing (like the penis, during erection); they are regularly and repeatedly subjected to being cut off, to castration. Hence an attitude of anxiety, an element of passivity and magic, is predominant in relation to hair and nails' (pp. 33-34). Among other things, Róheim mentions the Indonesian custom of the man not having his hair cut during his wife's pregnancy, and not until forty days after the birth of the child.

Stoll (1908) gives a similar description of considerable interest to us. Among the Incas, it was customary to arrange a great feast on the occasion of the weaning of a first-born son. The weaning from the mother's breast took place from the second year of the child's life on, and at that time the boy's hair, untouched until then, was given its first cutting. At the same time, the child was given the name that was to be his (p. 128). In other regions, too, the second or third year of life—that is, the termination of the suckling phase—is said to be the time when children's hair is cut for the first time (p. 133). The covering of hair on the body of a man is reported as being often linked with the notion of strength and virility (p. 224).[6] In Indonesia, permitting the hair to grow, whether on man or on child, can readily be interpreted as a representation (by way of emphasis on the portion of the body to which one can cling) of the wish to be in a state of clinging. The earliest hair cutting not only signifies displaced castration; at the same time it signifies detachment from the mother as the object to cling to (giving the child his own name further emphasizes his separation from the dual union).

In order to understand the psychology of separation as shown in these instances, it is necessary to keep in mind that it is a question here of separation in a situation of clinging, real or imagined. This can be seen in the fact that active (even self-

[6] The man took over the woman's role, especially as provider of food,—the second wet nurse, as it were.

damaging) manifestations of the urge to separate make their appearance on two body parts—the *hand* (Hermann, 1936) and the *skin-scales*, or, as the case may be, the *hair*—that is to say, in the loci of *active* or *passive clinging*.

In other case histories of ours, what appears in addition to the urge to cling and the desire to separate, is even more clearly the drive to *search*.

Patient V, for example, when she feels lonely also feels some convulsive process going on in her body. Frantically, she scratches at wounds on her hair-covered scalp; she has to find someone to fasten on to with her nails.[7] Especially when she is being haunted by ungratified sexual desires, she is in a state of such tension that she has to pace up and down. She feels the urge to 'go out' in order to be able to attach herself to someone. Feeling 'at loose ends'[8] she wishes to run. At the same time, she has the feeling of someone 'tearing her apart', as it were.

Patient VI permits greater insight into what lay behind his frequent 'roaming'. At times, particularly following a quarrel with a love object, he would feel an incomprehensible, slowly intensifying urge to 'get out', a drive for something—a feeling that was marked physically by sensations of pressure in the stomach area. In states of this sort, even though not without genital gratification, he felt himself strongly compelled to roam about through alleyways, finally stopping at a prostitute's. Sometimes it happened that he simply paid the prostitute, without having engaged in any sexual activity, and went back home. Analysis of a dream brought to light the recollection from his childhood, at the age of six or seven, of sneaking out of the nursery and going through the hall to the cook's room, where he would pull the slippers out from beneath her bed and smell them.[9]

This recollection turned the patient's thoughts to the odor of

[7] The German *ankrallen* means literally, 'to hold onto with one's claws'.

[8] The German *haltlos* means literally, 'without a hold'. It clearly conveys the idea of 'holding on to', 'clinging', that the writer wishes to stress.

[9] Let me hark back, at this point, to the role that smelling played in Patient I. *Smelling* is simply a prominent sense-activity of *searching*.

his own sweaty feet, and from there to a moment when he was lying next to his aunt and very hesitantly touched her foot with his. Then he recalled those olfactory sensations that had been stimulated in him by his mother's bedroom (she was, by the way, a person who kept herself carefully groomed). Thus, the analytic sessions led to an accumulation of material about the mother, and about body odors and his cautious 'walking about'. On one occasion when the patient, who was already in analysis, did not yield to the urge to roam, the walking was converted into diarrhea (in Hungarian, *hasmenes* ['belly-going']). The patient then recalled that, as a very small child, he used to play in bed with his mother's hand and go to sleep on her arm. It had a traumatic effect on him when his father, upon coming home, once shook him off as he was trying to embrace him. It became clear, from what has been said above, that in his 'roaming' he was in the final analysis *searching* for the mother.

Here we may postulate two component instincts of the libido: the urge to *cling* and the drive to *search*. Patient VI provides an easy transition to cases of the drive to roam. It has been established that 'tearing oneself away' per se, for example in the wake of disappointment, may be accompanied by feelings of pleasure.

A woman patient (VII) reported that whenever she suffered from depression called forth by jealousy, eerie voluptuous feelings would be awakened in her. At such times she would want to 'go far away'; then she could 'feel herself', feel that she existed. Her obsessional symptoms and her compulsive preoccupation with the same subject over many days, however, indicate that actually she was repressing her urge to seek a new love object.

Rank (1924) has a simple view of the drive to roam: the urge to run away owes its existence to the trauma of birth; the 'roaming instinct' can be traced back to 'nostalgia', to the desire to return.

In a monograph Stier (1913) deals with this question from the standpoint of the neurologist. He arrives at the following conclusions: the closer one gets to puberty, the more numerous be-

come the factors that, on physiological grounds alone, can give rise to a child's roaming—the desire to get to know the outside world, the gradual detachment (internal as well as external) from the parents and from the family; often dim sexual urges driving the child toward a goal that he does not yet clearly recognize; the pleasure of discovery, and curiosity.

In explaining ill humor and the urge to 'get away'—especially in those who are mentally retarded—one has to take into account the sexual drive, since this dim, dark urge toward the opposite sex is known not only in man during the pubertal stage of his development but also, to judge from their migrations, among the males of the higher animals (see, Stier, 1913, p. 73). Even though instances of an independent 'roaming instinct' are not quite as numerous as is commonly assumed, nevertheless such instances have to be reckoned with. This is also suggested by the fact that they make their appearance in families where there is no chance of imitation (*ibid,* p. 104).[10]

In a recent study on the roaming instinct, Mayer (1934) characterizes it as an 'urge to move out of close quarters and into wide open spaces, from confinement to freedom'. Several times, the point is made that love for one's native country, for the family, 'attachments to home and relatives' stand in the way of the urge to roam. The German word *wandern*—'to wander, to migrate'—is, according to Hofmüller, a secondary form of *wandeln*—'to take a walk, to amble'—and a derivative of *winden*—'to wind, to twist'. Thus, going along straight roads is not wandering. The wanderer avoids the high road, he loves winding paths.

Last but not least, some people in the arts are said to lead a migratory life. It is especially among circus performers and variety hall artists that one encounters people of this sort, but one finds them among painters and actors as well. In view of the marked hand-erotism among painters and acrobats, this is of particular interest within the context of our study. Someone who is

[10] In thirteen of Stier's thirty cases, by my compilation, note was taken of much nose picking, nail chewing, or tearing off of skin.

in the grip of the roaming instinct is unable to tolerate permanent ties; he cannot withstand the enticement of a high road, nor of an engine's whistle. This is further proof to us of an instinctual attunement to 'seduction on the part of an object'. Many lesser vagrants roam about, but only within their own home town or in its vicinity.

Mayer describes a girl of eighteen who displayed unbelievable wildness: 'before the very eyes of her governesses, she would climb trees like a cat, and leap nimbly over hedges and fences'. He mentions an innate capacity for changing easily as a psychological precondition for a life of wandering: 'In someone for whom it is very difficult to detach himself from people or places he has come to love, or to change his attitude according to changed conditions, in such a person there is not likely to arise an inclination to wander'.

Mayer also mentions Goldbeck who, using a quotation from Spranger, speaks of the adolescent's 'mystical loneliness'. According to Goldbeck, this loneliness is combined with an inner restlessness which in its turn—motorically, as it were—is expressed as an urge to wander. The link between puberty and the urge to wander, as well as that between sexuality and the urge to wander, especially in female wanderers, is recognized also by Mayer.

A boy who walked in his sleep was analyzed by Graber (1931). He believed the most important basis for the symptom to be the intense yearning for the mother, which was suffused with the œdipal wishes and castration anxieties. As the analysis of the symptom was merged in this case with the analysis of the boy's entire psychic development, we are here provided with an opportunity to either confirm or refute the validity of the links we have postulated.

Our attention is immediately drawn to a story of something that took place in the boy's early life. When he was newborn, it is said, the midwife dropped him into the water while bathing him, and reference to this incident in the family story-telling may perhaps have made an impression on the boy.

Hand-erotism in this patient is evidenced by his predilection for drawing on the one hand, and on the other, by his description of his sleepwalking: 'I get up in my sleep, walk to mother's bed, and press my fingers lightly onto her hand'.

Staying by himself often came about as the result of his own intention. He had a dream that he was in a desert all by himself. When other children were playing, he would stand in a corner and watch what they did, thereby giving evidence of the first step toward *the wish for separation.* However, he would also suddenly start to run; thus the second step, the *going-in-search,* became visible. Taken in isolation this symptom had the appearance of a perversion.

The *urge to cling* can be seen in the way in which the child lay next to his mother (he would draw his knees up to his chin), as well as in his dreams. The first dream he reported in his analysis, for example, was about a dog coming at him with glowing chains; the dog had long, shaggy hair, gleaming teeth, and, on its feet, iron claws. In another dream, there was an eagle circling above him, which then swooped down upon him, grabbed him by the throat, and carried him off to a nest where its own little ones were huddled together; the eaglets then began to pluck at him—he could feel the sharp claws taking hold of him.

He reported that his younger brother, with whom he strongly identified, would often spend as much as a quarter of an hour twisting the hair above his forehead into a small braid. The brother had also expressed the wish to cut off a dog's head, then skin it and wear the skin. The patient himself told a number of stories about hair-covered animals, and spoke often about the hairy body of his father. In addition, he brought out a recollection of two dogs coupling; they had had to be separated.

The *urge to roam,* therefore, even without analytic exploration has been viewed as lying close to the sexual drive; the existence of an independent 'migratory instinct' has also been taken into account as a possibility. The *urge to cling,* we can recall, was also acknowledged to be one of the few innate drives of the human infant (see, Alverdes, 1932).

It is our task now to define an attitude toward these questions from the standpoint of the analytic instinct theory, and to attempt to fit the drives that have been discovered into the structure of analytic doctrine.

What would be the hallmark of an instinct, aside from its active (not reactive) nature, which is often difficult to establish?

1. An instinct has to be capable of being shown to be a general phenomenon in the natural history of the *species*—which is why we so often had to turn to the comparative psychology of the primates. If the universal appearance of the urge to cling among primates is recognized, and if in the 'delousing' activity born out of their anlage, one sees at one and the same time clinging, searching, and separation, then we have a serious basis for discussing the problem of incorporating this drive into the analytic structure.[11]

2. A drive must also have an object of a biologically determined character. The object of clinging biologically is the mother who, during the course of development, can be replaced. At the same time, however, the mother is the earliest love object, the libido's first object. The extent to which clinging and libido are connected with each other, even in the infant, is clear, not only from the observations of the infants referred to above and analytic experience (Patients I, III, VI), but also from observations of apes which have shown that clinging may turn very early into attempts at having intercourse.

But what is the object in the process of 'going in search', in the so-called 'migratory instinct'? Rank (1924) correctly says that here too, in the final analysis, the object is the mother (see, Patient VI). We are not speaking here, however, of the object in that sense; for us at this point, the question is: what is the *immediate* object of the drive to search?

Let us now consider the vicissitudes of the object libido, as delineated by Freud (1905): object libido, he says, may be kept suspended, in special conditions of tension (pp. 217-218). A con-

[11] The clinging instinct is found not only among the primates; it appears also in bats, spiders, and lobsters.

dition of that sort, with regard to the object libido, may make itself apparent, for example, in 'being ashamed' (Hermann, 1934a)—and obviously in the search for an object as well. Perhaps it is the similarity between these two states that is responsible for the fact that it is humiliation, specifically, that so readily preconditions an individual for pathological 'running away'. Wandering is, therefore, a search carried on in a state of suspended object libido—sometimes interrupted, perhaps, by narcissistic states of intoxication (Patient VII presented a picture of that sort).

3. An instinct must have an *aim*—that is to say, it has to call forth a series of anlage-determined actions. It is indeed the aim-directed action to which 'clinging' owes its name. As to 'searching', inasmuch as it comprises 'going away' and the specific goal of 'finding' (preferably by way of olfactory perception, Patients I and VI), it implies a series of anlage-determined actions.

4. An instinct, being nourished by the inner life of the id, must display in its course a *vortex-like* development of strength. What do we mean by that?

Notes on the Vortex Theory of Instincts

Depressive patients in particular show that the pace at which they fall under the domination of emotional change is slow at first, and then speeds up later on. One consequence of this is that in the earlier stages the patient is still able, with the aid of analysis and the will to recover, to extricate himself with comparative ease from the internal noose, while later on he is able to do so only with incomparably greater effort. What is nourished by the instinct develops, speaking figuratively, in a vortex-like fashion —that is to say, *it has an attractive power that reaches a series of peaks at several different levels, a power that increases constantly as it comes closer and closer to the power center.* This vortex-like character becomes apparent in the sexual drive when it takes on the form of being in love, or carries the individual along in the performance of the sexual act with the drive bringing to life, by way of the mechanisms of forepleasure, ever-new sources of pleas-

ure. The vortex of masturbation is well known: the masturbator abstains from it until, for one reason or another, because of some frustration he once again becomes addicted to it. For some time thereafter, he finds himself without the strength to break away from it.

The *instinct to eat* shows the same pattern. It is obvious, we read in Katz (1932) who has made a special study of hunger and appetite, that satisfying one's appetite can be achieved at different levels; satisfying the earliest hunger for fat, for example, does not mean satisfying the fat hunger of the organism as a whole. The quenching of thirst takes place similarly, by a series of steps (pp. 66-67). Observations that have been made of creatures (human beings and experimental animals) during the process of fasting have shown that the feeling of hunger, the intensity of the drive to eat, is at its greatest during the first days of fasting, after which it may almost disappear—only, of course, for a while (p. 48). I myself have observed a patient (VII) given to obsessional fasting. If, after days of fasting, she took only a few bites, she was able to go back to her fasting; but if, yielding to the drive to eat, she ate more than that she was unable to bring her greediness for food to a stop.[12]

As far as clinging is concerned, we can see the vortex in the urge to take possession, with ever-increasing firmness, of the mother's body—in the fact that the clinging becomes convulsive and in the attempts to push on to coition. With regard to 'going-in-search', the vortex-character is made evident by the fact that the search goes on even after the internal causes for it have ceased to exist—for example, the dimming of consciousness in cases of pathological 'running away'. It also manifests itself in the tendency of the urge to roam to make its appearance again and again, once it has emerged. It shows itself, finally, in a tendency inherent in anyone with a mania for wandering—the tendency to 'rapid moral deterioration, once the wheel has started to turn' (Stier, 1913, p. 82).

[12] Compare Hermann (1935). There is also a description of Patient VI in this paper.

I therefore feel justified in assuming that *clinging* and *going-in-search* are manifestations of an instinct—that is to say, they are component instincts of the libido.[13] Going-in-search is actually a precursor of the sexual drive; it is a beginning that has gone on to a life of its own. The fluctuating between various positions, which is regarded as characteristic of the development in early infancy (see, Klein, 1932), already reveals the turning of this component instinct onto the infant's own body. In this respect, the urge to cling corresponds to a tendency toward self-preservation—the tendency on which rests the libidinal drive to cling.

Separation, tearing oneself away, on the other hand, seems to be a reactive activity, in the same sense that cleanliness, for instance, is to be regarded as a reaction-formation to anal erotism.

Considering the contrasting nature of the aims of the two component instincts described above and, on the other hand, their co-existence in case histories, we may assume that we are here dealing with a contrasting pair of instincts, analogous to sadism and masochism. It is not only because of this analogy, however, that sadism and masochism are brought in at this point. Rather, in one of their facets, they belong in this context essentially.

Sadism

Those writers who wanted to arrive at a thorough understanding of sadism turned their attention to the role played by the hand. 'It may be assumed', said Freud (1905), 'that the impulse of cruelty arises from the instinct for mastery and appears at a period of sexual life at which the genitals have not yet taken over their later role' (p. 193), and, further, that the preference shown for the hand in the male infant's masturbation reveals

[13] These two component instincts are in a certain sense related to the two basic drives postulated by Buytendijk (1933): the urge to separate, *Befreiungstrieb*—drive for liberation—and the urge to unite (pp. 100, ff.).

the importance of the contribution to male sexuality that the instinct for mastery will later make (p. 188).

Federn (1913) regarded both weapon and walking stick as a strengthened hand: '. . . the hand is actually the weakest penis-symbol and, for that reason, the one most widely used in the normal person's sadism—a fact that obtains ample expression in gestures and bad habits. The symbolic meaning of the hand is, of course, often insignificant as compared with its use as an auxiliary sexual organ, or as the most easily reached tool of aggression. In fantasies, however, the hand is often employed as a symbolic substitute for the penis' (p. 39).

Sadger (1921) presented more concrete individual material on the basis of evidence from the *Scupinian* diary. As early as in his sixth month, the little boy supposedly displayed tendencies that were clearly sadistic: he hit out at his mother, clawed his tiny hands into her nose and pulled it. In his eighth month, he tugged delightedly at his father's beard. When he was only two days old, his grandmother, who was tenderly bending over the child and talking to him, received several scratches from him. His tiny fingers had dug so deeply into her that she cried out in pain. On the same day, a finger that touched his small hand was at once tightly clasped, and let go only after the arm made a jerking movement. At three and a half months, the boy's fingers took tight hold of a stick, and did not give it up. All this, said Sadger, was to be classed with the drive to gain possession—which, however, 'unfortunately is just as little explored psychologically as are all ego-component instincts' (pp. 35, 228).

Sadger's earliest clinical contribution to the question of sado-masochism dealt with a woman who, when walking with a man she liked, invariably felt a desire to hook her arm into his (p. 273). In his fourth case, we learn the following: as a very small child, the patient would nestle into her mother's naked soft body, but in a way that was not so much a nestling, but rather a sort of entwining (p. 306).[14]

[14] This is the same patient described by Sadger (1914) as being the only case of sleepwalking and 'moon madness' that had been fully analyzed. In the states re-

Thus, in considering concrete details, we do after all find rather clear evidences of the urge to cling as well as of the contrasting urge to go-in-search; this supports the view that in our theoretical thinking, the function of the hand and the ego's instinct of mastery should be replaced by the urge to cling.

I believe I can trace the possessive instinct in its aggressive form directly back to an exaggerated sort of clinging and the *regressive cathexis of it.* The attitude of 'If you are unwilling, I shall use force' makes nowhere as much sense as it does in the urge to cling. The mounting sadism that wishes to take possession of the inside of the mother's body (Klein, 1932) makes its way directly through this intensified clinging.[15] From this, however, I am inclined to infer that clinging per se does not as yet signify aggression, just as it has not as yet become true love. It should be kept in mind that it is not a question here of ambivalence, but rather of a *pre-stage that is common to both love and aggression.* The softening of clinging into caressing and touching is brought about by tender love. The developmental path of universal human sadism is determined, one would guess, by the *frustration* and *the regressive intensification of the earliest desires to cling.*

Masochism

The role of the skin surface in masochism had already been brought to our attention by Freud (1905) and Sadger (1921). The latter stressed, among other things, the special predilection many masochists have for cats and their soft fur; Masoch himself is said to have suffered from marked fur fetishism (p. 237).

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ferred to, the patient seemed to be looking for something: chamber pot and bed, as they had been placed in her first apartment. She would be found sitting in front of the chest of drawers, looking for something she had used the previous day and had intended to take out the following day.

I should like, in this context, to give expression to my conjecture that the very first perception of the gleaming in eyes is an essential factor in the hypnotizing-fascinating effect of light (see, Hermann, 1934b). Graber's (1931) case supplies data supporting this hypothesis.

[15] The connection between aggressivity and the drive to cling comes to light also in a case analyzed by Nunberg (1936): '. . . up to his eleventh year he slept in the same bed with his mother and held on to her with his right hand' (p. 161).

In Krafft-Ebing's *Psychopathia Sexualis* (1898), there are several case histories, some portions of which are pertinent here. The masochist's hand-and-foot erotism is quite clear in Baudelaire's sexual life. 'To a very beautiful woman he expressed the desire to see her hanging by her hands, and to be allowed to kiss her feet. This passion for the naked foot appears as well in one of his feverishly passionate poems, as an equivalent to sexual enjoyment' (p. 106). According to Krafft-Ebing, it is quite evident that the shoe is a masochist's fetish, because of the relation between the clothed female foot and the notion of being stepped on (p. 117). (My own belief, however, is that we cannot ignore other relations, such as the transfer of erotogenicity from the foot onto a piece of leather.) The masochist described by Krafft-Ebing, 'hit upon the original idea of buying a lady's shoes that he had taken a liking to. . . . He would kiss these shoes several times a day, and then ask himself: "Why is it that I have an erection while kissing a shoe, which is, after all, nothing but a shaped piece of leather?" ' (p. 115). A more detailed autobiography of a masochist provides insight into the predilection for velvet and fur (p. 82); another patient had a weakness for cats (p. 87), while a third became so excited by reading Sacher-Masoch's *Venus in Furs* that he had an ejaculation (p. 111).

The next three cases deal with being alone, with being torn away. Mr. X's fantasy: if he has not carried out one of his mistress's commands to her complete satisfaction, or whenever she wishes, he is locked by her into a dark lavatory, while she goes out in search of amusement (Krafft-Ebing, 1898, p. 88). 'Every three months, a man of about forty-five would appear at a prostitute's. . . . She had to undress him, and then pull down the shades. Then she would have her guest sit on a couch, tie him, and leave him by himself in this helpless condition. Half-an-hour later, the woman was to return and untie his bonds' (*Ibid*, p. 101). 'One of Tarnovsky's patients had a confidant of his rent an apartment for the duration of his attacks, and had him instruct the servants (three prostitutes) in precisely what was to be done with him. He would put in an appearance from time to time, be undressed, masturbated, and beaten, as he had ordered.

Apparently, he would offer resistance and beg for mercy, and then, as he had directed, he was given something to eat and permitted to sleep. But he was also to be kept in the room, despite his protests, and to be beaten when he was disobedient. That would go on for several days. When the attack subsided, he would be released and return home to his wife and children, who had no idea of his illness. The attack recurred once or twice a year' (p. 91).

In order to understand masochistic pleasure, one has to recognize that it is quite closely interwoven with the castration complex (Sadger, 1921), but behind this link is the reaction-formation to the urge to cling—namely, the drive to separate oneself. At this point, we have to go far back to early development. Our guess is that the emergence of the process of separation out of the mother-and-child dual unit constitutes a prestage of narcissism and painful masochism; normal separation goes along with normal 'healthy' narcissism (Federn, 1913).

My question is: are there any facts to be ferreted out by way of analysis—facts that can shed some light on the origins [*Motivgestaltung*] of masochistic impulses, yet have not hitherto been taken into account in that connection? If there are any facts of that sort, what can we learn of their historical position? Does interpretation show them to be rooted in historically earlier or older strata of the psyche, as compared with the impulses so far recognized?

One group of phenomena that is relevant here can be understood, along the lines of Ferenczi's (1926a) thinking, as having arisen from a healing tendency that is inherent in the depths of the psyche.[16] For instance, in the quite common depressive-masochistic fantasy of 'feces in the mouth', the latter is to be understood as waste matter thrown out from within and toward

[16] The effect of a healing tendency has been disregarded in psychoanalysis—in my view far too extensively—although it plays the same role in pathological states as does the wish to sleep in the formation of dreams. We have learned from *The Interpretation of Dreams* that we must not lose sight of this wish to sleep if we want to understand dreams.

the periphery—thrown out so that the narcissistically most highly valued soul-ego (self) may be protected against decay. The agony of jealousy is projected onto the periphery in the same way, where it is felt as a pressure on the heart. Part of the body is given up to pain in order that the self may be saved from a dreaded internal ruin. Sufferance of pain of this sort constitutes one instance of the acceptance of unpleasure (Ferenczi, 1926b) in the sense of choosing the lesser evil.

It is likewise probable that, by way of the sensation which in itself is only painful, there is elicited (as Ferenczi assumed) an erotized attention, as well as an influx of libido, which both accompanies and effects recovery. Hence, the basis for an explanation of masochistic feelings seems to lie in the healing tendency and its utilization as an economic factor. Pain takes the place of a greater evil, while the 'sore spot' is erotized.

Another group of observations, however, points toward the historic-traumatic root of these symptoms—the root that, in terms of interpretation, is most decisive.

The closest access to these symptoms is probably given in the tendency to *self-mutilation* which can frequently be observed in tugging on one's nails, pulling on cuticles, or biting one's fingers, as well as in pulling out one's hair or tearing off one's scabs.[17] It is a separation that is being effected in these actions; as has been proven in our arguments by way of the most diverse evidence, this has the meaning of a separation from someone who was formerly part of the ego. Now that he has become alien, he has turned into an evil stranger, he has to be severed from the ego. Following this fantasied personification and alienation of one part of the subject's own body, the tendency to autotomy,

[17] In Sadger's (1921) fifth case connected with the topic of sado-masochism, the patient has the habit, from childhood on, of tearing off scabs forming on minor sores, which affords him sexual pleasure. In several cases of self-mutilation reported by Menninger (1935), one can detect the mechanism that we have described of substituting self-mutilation for a painful separation. In one case, the patient even tore out her own flesh, mainly on two days when her husband was deathly ill. Another patient was grabbed by the hair and beaten by his father; he cut off chunks out of his hair.

this primitive form of the healing tendency, prevails. How can this be demonstrated?

In the case of such common conduct, one has to look for a universal-historical prototype. We found it in the forced break of the primordial *mother-infant relation.*

In terms of those parts of his epidermis that can be separated from it or are already almost detached from it, the individual is indeed in a state of dual unity, corresponding to the original state. Small cracks in the skin, scabs, nails, hair are already alien, in a minimal way, to the living ego. In the forced, often bloody detachment of this minimally alien object, a familiar motive is asserting itself (a motive emphasized by Freud and by Ferenczi): the ego's striving to experience the trauma—in this case, detachment, not traumatically imposed from outside, as was the case with that prototype of all separation, the detachment of the clinging child from the mother, but as a *self-intended,* self-apportioned action by a free 'adult'. The pain that arises with these beginnings of self-mutilation is an incentive to carry out the final separation; and at the same time, it is a sign of that liberation which may, as we learned before, make itself felt in a state that can only be described as narcissistic intoxication. As such, this liberation may enter consciousness as an emotion, in an eerily pleasurable feeling. Thus, in this group of phenomena, pain arises in connection with the *separation that is striven for,* while its *successful accomplishment* brings pleasure.

Patient IV, referred to above as habitually tearing at her nails since her seventh year, has had the masturbation fantasy of 'a man tearing out a woman's pubic hair'. During her analysis, she had the following dreams at short intervals:

1. She is grabbed by two men, and is to be hanged. One of the two, who is bald-headed, wants first to cut off her hair; this causes her greater suffering than her impending assassination. She tears herself out of the hands of the two men.

2. Her father is dancing with her, pressing her close to his body.

3. The piece at the neck is missing from her fur 'boa'; she is searching for it.

At the time she was having these dreams, she was afraid she would be deserted by her lover. The fact was that her father did not let go of her.[18]

Just as pain encourages separation, so too does a partner's aggression. Accordingly, our analytic experience tells us that aggression by another person—in transference on the part of the analyst—is provoked with the unconscious intention of enabling the patient to set in motion a longed-for separation.

The general healing tendency thus becomes particularized into this motivation, and implies being cured of the threatening influences of persons close to the subject by way of active detachment and through acquiring practice in a self-regulated 'good' separation. In this exercise, either a former love object or an obvious enemy—or, as a result of their being transformed, the subject's own ego, or even conflict as such—may serve as the object of the tendency to detach oneself.

In masochism as a character trait, the reactive desire for separation as a way of repeating the trauma is the dominant factor. One not only becomes more infantile in masochism, as we have learned from Freud; at the same time there exists a *hidden* striving, following the masochistic act to become an 'adult', an independent individual. To be free, according to Kant, means to be dependent only on oneself. Quite consistent with this view is Reich's (1932) observation that the masochist's need for love is based on the fear of being left alone, a fear that in earliest childhood was felt with particular intensity (p. 321). However, Reich has no answer to the question of why it is that bodily contact with a beloved person has the effect of resolving anxiety; he does not recognize the urge to cling as a component instinct of the libido.

The *beating fantasy,* that was understood by Freud (1919) as being an important part of the picture of masochism, came my

[18] I believe I have found, in several analyses of dreams, that the desire to cling-separate is symbolically represented in dreams by the lack of hair, by diseased fingers, by being suspended above the earth's surface. Further observations will be necessary to prove the general validity of these symbols—their second meaning, in addition to the familiar ones.

way in the case of an obsessional-neurotic masochistic female patient who had genital-masochistic sensations (Patient VIII). The fantasy turned out to be of service to both the strivings we have been discussing: bodily contact with the father and, at the same time, separation from him and the mother—from the 'family unit'. Her conflict, which was rooted in the œdipus complex, was this: 'I cannot fall in love with anyone, for Father's heart would break if I did; but neither must I fall in love with Father himself'. It was from this dilemma that she was trying forcibly to extricate herself. Mother was the one who put a sudden end to her erotic game with father (she would throw herself upon him 'like a wild animal', bite him, roll around with him); mother succeeded in frightening the girl by way of threatening admonitions, such as, 'You are going to get cancer'.[19] Yet it was the mother who did not permit the door to be closed between the parents' bedroom and that of the children. As a result, the child was a constant earwitness to the parents' intercourse and her mother's subsequent douchings. In extreme anxiety, she would often crawl in under her blanket. The same urge to separate that was reflected in her beating fantasy is mirrored in her efforts to achieve isolation when she tries to keep God apart from her 'behind', or from dirty words coming forward accidentally or compulsively— that is to say, from herself.

It is obvious that our interpretations of sadism and masochism —as regressive intensification of the urge to cling and the separation conflict, together with a healing tendency—do not include any judgment on the correctness or incorrectness of postulating an instinct of destruction. A weak point of this hypothesis lies in the fact that it can neither be verified nor disproved, both because the instinct would be concealed behind phenomena, and because of its general abstract nature. One merit, by comparison, could be conceded to our derivation: it is closer to what can be

[19] Before the patient's most severe symptom broke out, her mother was operated on because there was a suspicion of cancer.

perceived, and thus the suppositions on which it is based can be checked.[20]

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[20] It might also be possible to assume that the instinct of destruction is dependent on the phenomena of clinging.

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LESSONS FROM WATERGATE
A DERIVATIVE FOR PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY LEO RANGELL, M.D.

Periods of social upheaval, by revealing aspects of behavior ordinarily repressed, provide an opportunity for deepening our insights into the nature of man. The searing experience of Watergate is viewed not as the psychopathology of a man, or the group psychology of forty men under the ex-President, but as reflecting psychic processes at the base of the population pyramid. The people supported Nixon for a quarter century during which his character traits were known, and were in collusion with the cover-up to the end during the two and half years of Watergate. The theory is advanced that this was due to an identification with Nixon based on the universal wish to triumph over the superego. Ego-superego conflicts are as ubiquitous and ongoing in mental life as the struggle between ego and id. The latter results in neuroses, the former in compromises of integrity. The 'syndrome of the compromise of integrity' is on a par with neurosis in human affairs.

Our country has just undergone a convulsive emotional upheaval from which it is in the stage of recovery. During this period the wounds are being healed and the conflicts which have been aroused are receding and losing their intensity.

During such a recovery phase there is a natural and universal tendency to pull the covers over the old disturbing events and to deny, forget, and repress, or to get one's self to feel that one has just awakened from a bad dream and that it was not reality. 'The long nightmare is over', the new President assured us as he took over his office and started his new duties. It did not happen; we had been asleep.

Presented as the 25th Freud Anniversary Lecture of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, Academy of Medicine, New York City, April 15, 1975.

This paper is a spinoff of a book in preparation on *The Mind of Watergate. An Analysis of the Problem of Integrity.*

But this is not the way to master psychic trauma, certainly not to advance from it. Even during the stage of recovery, uncovering and understanding of the conflicts at the center is the path toward resolution and, if possible, prevention. There are lessons to be learned from Watergate. The mere ending of the affair is not enough.

The country has been deluged during these eventful years with opinions and explanations from multiple sources—journalists, historians, social scientists of various persuasions. But psychoanalysts have been conspicuously silent. This is the more notable since irrational behavior abounds and so much of the observed and contradictory data during this turbulent period speak for an unconscious origin of the surface manifestations.

Frank Mankiewicz (1974), one of those who from the beginning saw Nixon's characteristics for what they are, writes after Watergate that an indignant public and a relentless press proved that the system works. In this Mr. Mankiewicz joins a chorus of voices who, in this post-Watergate mourning stage, look understandably to see something good, hopefully even noble, rise above the rubble. Many thoughtful commentators, eminent scholars among them, see moral principles to have triumphed and legal and constitutional processes as having demonstrated their supremacy. Henry Steele Commager (1974), for example, writes that in the end Americans saw the larger principles involved and demonstrated their sophistication and maturity.

In this version of a final evaluation, even many who did not succumb to the regressive submission which Nixon invited join the great majority who all along met Watergate with denial and distortion. While the facts to which they point are partial truths, they fail to sustain the full reality which Watergate exposed, beyond Nixon to the system and behind it to the people upon which any system stands.

The fact is that the truth came out by a series of freak occurrences which would have been considered fanciful from the most imaginative writer of fiction. From the original detection, to the later exposure, to the denouement—the details of which

are too voluminous to document in a short presentation and by now can be assumed to be public knowledge—, the course of events was a chain of improbable links, any one of which could have broken the sequence and made the Administration secure. With all of this somehow staying glued together the American system of justice worked. This included the accused carefully collecting and ultimately providing the total evidence against him, although he had covered up and lied about so much else. Nothing other than this was actively sought. Nixon was never asked about anything which was not on the tapes. And only the cover-up of a crime was looked into, nothing about his role in the crime itself.

Without these adventitious circumstances, and the evidence which fell of its own weight into view, there is little doubt that the most disgraced individual in the country today would have been John Dean, and that Richard Nixon would be safe at home. Hence, self-congratulations are not in order.

Restricting the etiology to the evil of a man is a micropsia. As a screen memory in an individual history, it hides more than it reveals. The effects and therefore the unconscious goals are the same in both, but in this case it is less efficient; the sizes of the issues involved are more monumental. While a screen hides a scene, this is a dot attempting to cover a globe.

Public indignation played no role. Outrage and pursuit of the truth was not, during this scandal any more than others in history, the people's way. From a careful study of unfolding events, it would be more accurate to say that the people moved from apathy and denial to a belated and begrudging acknowledgment of evidence whenever this could no longer be denied. Increasing time and distance will tend to obscure this fact more and more. While in the service of objectivity distance in the recording of history is considered an advantage, there is also an advantage, as will be evident here, in having been a participant observer.

In a very real and tangible sense the people participated in the cover-up. Such a collusion took place not only during the two

years from the Watergate break-in to its crashing finale, but in a more subtle but equally detectable way in a long and chronic prehistory, during the quarter century of joining Nixon and preparing and shaping him for his final chapter. And it was extended later from another direction. The pardon delivered by Nixon's successor was the final and official seal that the cover would be forever.

There is one other glaring characteristic of the system; and the fact that it too is generally overlooked is another datum indicative of the magnitude of the object of this study. As the first President in our history to resign was in the process of being dislodged, he was also the first to be given the privilege of naming the next President single-handedly. This was after his previous Vice President, members of his Cabinet, and most of the staff which he had also chosen were themselves facing criminal indictment or had already been convicted.

This is not a comment on the present President of the United States but on the method by which he came to office. This is absorbed; nothing is now being said about it. It does not arouse comment. It is too big. In fact, it is even bigger: we are looking into a slice of the nature of man.

As with the more typical psychoanalytic paper, this presentation will consist of observational data, in this case akin to direct developmental studies, a running psychoanalytic commentary on these, and finally implications of these for psychoanalytic theory and practice. Every clinical study makes use of psychoanalytic theory and has the potential of adding to or modifying it. The extent to which the latter is done depends on the nature of the material and on the readiness of the analyst, and also of his audience, to extract this significance from it. The present widely shared material lends itself, in my opinion, to a historic advance in psychoanalytic theory and practice. I propose to address myself to and utilize these implications.

The subject of this clinical study is not an individual but a couple, not Richard Nixon but the long marriage and mutuality

between Nixon and the people. This is not the psychobiography of a man. There is still something to be said for Freud's original objection (see, McGuire, 1974) when he learned of the first use of the new young science in the political arena—an article by Morton Prince against Theodore Roosevelt when the latter was running for a comeback term, which appeared in the New York Times on March 24, 1912. The present study is an analysis of a national experience, of events in the public domain, which not only permit but, in the service of survival, require an understanding in depth. As an interaction between a leader and the led, it has, moreover, a universal significance.

Watergate did not begin in June of 1972 any more than an outbreak of any symptom is looked at by an analyst as the beginning of its cause. One can even discover here, as with any other breakdown, not only the precursors but a full outbreak of the present symptoms which had been glossed over and its significance denied. 'I am not a crook' was not spoken by Richard M. Nixon for the first time in the fall of 1973. It was said before in the famous, or is it now infamous, Checkers speech in 1952, against similar charges—a slush fund, illegal political contributions, and tax deductions. The people accepted it then. There were no tapes to force them not to. Nixon was not yet important enough, in reality or even in his own mind, to have instituted such a system. Nothing was investigated. In response to his denial and counterattack, the people, in an immediate outpouring of support and approval, flooded him, Nixon (1962) writes proudly in his *Six Crises,* with 'the greatest response to any radio or television speech in history'.

Not that his record had been clean until then. 'Dirty tricks' had already become a stamp of Nixon and of Nixon politics. But the necessary receptive state on the part of the public, with a dampening of normal critical judgment, had already been established and this incident developed it further. What the people 'knew' was held in cognitive suspension, separated from action or even reaction. They would go with him for what they could get out of it.

I have been by serendipity a Nixon watcher since the beginning of his political career. Both of us came to Southern California from the war in 1946, he back to Whittier from where he had come, and I by way of the Army from New York and from my candidacy in the New York Psychoanalytic Institute. It seems to me that I noticed Nixon immediately when he appeared out of nowhere to contest and subsequently to unseat a respected young liberal incumbent, Jerry Voorhis, the Congressman from the 12th Congressional District of California. What struck me at once and became a factor which would have to be reckoned with in American politics for the next quarter of a century was not just the look of the man but the look on the faces of the people as they were listening to and accepting him.

What I saw from the beginning was a gap between the appealing surface—there was always a clean American Frank Merriwell look—and something shining up from below which spelled disbelief, and reciprocally his electorate watching this and, instead of questioning or being turned off, being drawn to him specifically, I felt, for this quality. There was something in this discrepancy, in the distance which was allowed between inner and outer, which encouraged an identification by giving those who supported him a promise of a similar facility. This was a subliminal conclusion which I believe I came to as a young analyst drawn to watching group behavior, observing back in 1947 what I felt to be a compelling and important interaction.

Prior to that, in his first interview with the committee of Republican leaders who looked him over from the point of view of running him for his first campaign, Nixon responded instinctively to their questions about his political philosophy that he had talked to men in the foxholes and that they did not want doles or a government handout. The committee accepted him at once. There is no record of Nixon having been near a foxhole. He certainly never took a poll there and knew nothing of the men's socioeconomic theories, if they had any. This was Nixon from the beginning. He had found the formula which would take him to the top. The banal cliché, the palatable untruth, the

promise, the appeal, and the lack of a target to question or pin down. Every half-truth came fast and spontaneously, false enough to entice and true enough to throw off the scent. No one ever checked anything. The shadow of two faces was already there.

My first entry of the Nixon phenomenon into the psychoanalytic literature was before the Watergate break-in. In my Presidential Address at the Vienna Congress (Rangell, 1971), following the publication of the Pentagon Papers by Daniel Ellsberg, I referred to the lack of credibility and sincerity which filtered down from the Chief Executive to the bottom of the population pyramid of our nation. At the following Congress in Paris, when Watergate had just begun to be looked into, I suggested that the syndrome of the compromise of integrity be added to our psychoanalytic and psychiatric nosology (Rangell, 1973). Following that Congress the Watergate events became my seven-day-a-week patient. The Nixon years had come to their full fruition.

To return to the beginning, and to jump with a few large leaps over the years, I can here give no more than a few small samples to try to give the flavor of the history which followed.

Establishing a new brand of politics, Nixon did not just defeat Voorhis; he ended his political life. Voorhis was never willing to run again.

His next victim, Helen Gahagan Douglas, was smeared and lost but was forever endeared to many. In 1974, a 'victory' celebration was held for her at which there was not a dry eye and at which participants wore lapel buttons stating, 'Don't blame me, I voted for Douglas'.

Between the two campaigns Nixon was on the McCarthy stage, which was made for him. He was immediately the second lead in this first 'nightmare', the last previous shame in our nation's history comparable to the Watergate which we would like to forget. In Hollywood the second lead is often groomed for the top role in the next production of the same genre and goes on to be the super hero in his own version of the next extravaganza. It is

ironic and perhaps not accidental that the man who clawed his way up by tenaciously pursuing a typewriter, with no regard for the victim it destroyed, should later have provided a tape recorder as the means to his own destruction.

Although the tastes and mood of the public had changed between the fifties and sixties, and the name McCarthy was now in eclipse and a source of deep embarrassment, his chief prosecutor was lifted to the top during this same period by an electorate which forgot and remembered what it wished. Nixon's training and credentials were never held against him. McCarthy had one face only, and rose and fell on it. Nixon, however, was developing further his trait of having two. He could rise on one, change it at the top, and continue upwards on the other. For Joseph McCarthy to have gone on to a détente with Communism was unimaginable; he would rather have died first.

Not Nixon. Just as old characteristics become more deep-seated with age, so with every rise to a higher level did Nixon's characteristics become more typically Nixon. As President, to any rational critic Nixon would have seemed to have painted himself into a corner. Everything he did which was good was what his opponents had been for all along and what he had always opposed; not only on the international scene, with détente and the ending of the Vietnam war, but in domestic affairs as well. Increases in social welfare benefits, the institution of price controls when the economic spiral started its upward rise, policies which had previously been anathema to his personal and political philosophies, were executed as though they had always been exactly what he had stood for.

But this was not offensive, not even unwanted by middle America, the large silent majority in the center of the bell curve of the population which determines the outcome of every election. They had long since fused their aims and goals with the ways of Richard Nixon. Only a 'hawk' could end the war. Only the most virulent anti-Communist could suddenly announce a visit to the Chinese mainland, or rapprochement and a summit meeting with the Soviet Union without a fear of reprisal and

with instantaneous approval assured. No one else could have done it, not with Richard Nixon on the sidelines ready to point a finger, and with his approving audience behind him. No one openly espousing these causes in 1968 or 1964 or 1960 would have gotten off the ground. Many a political career—think of Governor Romney—was cut off at once by an anti-Vietnam War remark, let alone a pro-Soviet one.

Historians say that every country deserves its own history. Joachim Fest (1974), in his massive study of Nazi Germany, points out that Hitler was not imposed upon his age but was part of it; he was not different from but typical of the people he led. The major Nixon mechanism, which turned a small minority into what became known as 'Nixon haters' but which drew to him the majority he always needed, was the two (or more) faces of Nixon. People did not vote for him in spite of this but, in my opinion, because of it. There was a deep identification with this psychic trait which attracted his audience from the very start, and which grew with increasing crescendo into national proportions as he reached up to the Presidency of the United States. The ambivalent attraction felt toward him mirrored the ambivalent look of an individual into himself. The ability to change faces as the weather changed, to come out with contradictory behavior without a trace of conflict, is a wish but not a capacity generally attained. People, those in the middle that is, watched in a state of increasing awe and fascination, like people witnessing a juggler or a trickster in a circus. Who would not like to be able to do the right thing for the wrong reasons, to do the wrong thing and be cheered, to say one thing and do another, to get credit for what others have proven is right and you have always opposed? It is an intrapsychic dream come true.

Nixon's cynical and daily reversals, while they did not inspire confidence, did nevertheless increase his following. It is an interesting phenomenon that during this period the most popular and commercially successful motion picture was one whose advertising theme read, 'Being in love means never having to say

you're sorry!'. This need not be restricted to being in love; Nixon permitted it to apply to all.

Flexibility, the capacity to change, to reassess reality, or to adapt to the opinions of others are desirable ego attributes sought after and appreciated when they are found at any level of human functioning or responsibility. But such flip-flops as these, such somersaults of action without any previous change of principle to accompany or justify them, are not of this type. There was no prepared soil upon which they could take root and from which one could feel they grew naturally. A cartoon in the New Yorker magazine showed two men in a bar, one saying to the other, 'Look, Nixon's no dope. If the people really wanted moral leadership, he'd give them moral leadership.' Harry Truman, who was noted not for his diplomacy but for his straight talk, said of Nixon, long before Watergate, 'I don't think that the son-of-a-bitch knows the difference between telling the truth and lying. . . . He's one of the few in the history of this country to run for high office talking out of both sides of his mouth at the same time and lying out of both sides' (Miller, 1974, pp. 135, 179).

What was lost and given up, by collusion and common consent, was sincerity, that difficultly held trait of modern man noted and written about by Lionel Trilling (1969-1970). Sincerity is a measure of the distance between inner and outer dialogues. The two never coalesce; there is always some distance between them. Indeed a complete fusion would result not in sincerity, nor in frankness, but in cruelty. An optimum distance and a working relationship is normally sought which, if achieved, elicits confidence, credibility, and a cementing of object relationships.

There is a constant ongoing tension between these two levels of functioning in every human being in his moment-by-moment contact with his fellow men. The degree and quality of the connections between them, determined largely by the strength or weakness of the superego, is a measure of the sincerity of a man. The traits of Nixon offered surcease from this tiring work. The

inner dialogue could be left to its own and action taken in response only to outer opportunity. The two no longer needed to be tied together in a coherent but laborious way.

Reaction formation, which ordinarily is a mechanism in symptom-formation, could be extended freely to social action. Just as in another orgy of national character in recent world history paranoid thinking was borrowed by a people from its leader, in our recent stained history transformation into the opposite became a nationally condoned mode of action and insincerity became a trait held up for voter acceptance. For a long time the country supported these. For the mass there was a spurious gain, a certain release from mental work. They were encouraged to think less.

I will refer to only one more 'event' of this longitudinal history before moving on to its implications for psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Richard Nixon was re-elected by the second greatest landslide in history six months *after* the Watergate break-in! And one month *after* the Washington Post had announced that those caught and arrested for the act extended into the White House itself. No amount of rationalization can ever substitute for the explanations which can come only from a view into the unconscious of the public that went into the voting booths on that November 7, 1972. The 'mandate' to which the President kept referring for the next two years spoke not so much *for* the President as *against* the people who had made it history.

A review of that fateful month between the Washington Post announcement on October 10 and Election Day on November 7 is a biopsy of the Nixon era in politics, and of the interacting behavior between the leader and the led which made it possible. After nearly four years of his first term in the White House, with the Vietnam War which he had been elected to end still raging, Nixon sent Kissinger traveling on October 8, two days before the Washington Post article appeared on the streets. In the next three weeks Henry Kissinger, who began at that time his pattern of moving fast and visibly during periods of crisis of his chief,

crisscrossed from Paris to Hanoi to Saigon to Washington in a dizzying series of marathon trips (the reason given was that Hanoi had softened its attitude just at that moment) and arrived in Washington for a statement summarizing the situation a week and a half before the election.

On election eve, 1972, by the most felicitous coincidence in modern history, the long awaited moment had just come. Peace was at hand. But, Kissinger explained in a historic news briefing on October 26, one more negotiating session of three or four days was needed. This could come 'in weeks or less'! Of course this could be carried through only by Richard Nixon. When Kissinger was asked one cautious question by a member of the press as to whether this timing could have anything to do with the coming election, he replied dryly, 'We have conducted these negotiations for four years and have brought them to this point with considerable anguish. We cannot control if people choose to assert that this is simply some trick.'

No further questions were asked; also none about what private agreements might have been made to bring about this miraculous timing. The public acquiesced. The Watergate scare was forgotten. The 'mandate' took place as scheduled. The irony was that Watergate was so unnecessary. Nothing else was needed to assure Nixon's re-election. The question of the President's morality was matched only by that of his judgment. It is difficult to say which is a more serious defect in a President.

'Three birds were killed with one stone.' To put it more accurately, two hawks used one dove as a decoy. The ending of the war, which had been demanded with mounting pressure, the deflection of the gnawing news of Watergate, and the re-election of Richard Nixon were all achieved in one sweeping motion.

The people 'knew'. Unconscious knowledge does not consist only of perceptions, memories, fantasies, and fragments of ideas. It also consists of cause and effect relationships, of sentences, paragraphs, whole essays on cohesive facts. It is just as people have 'known' for a long time about the Central Intelligence Agency, up to and including asassinations. That is why there is

no outcry to what seems to be a newly emerging fact, no matter how shocking one would expect the reaction to be. It is always already known and has been accounted for and relegated to the unconscious. Events which should cause outrage but which would be met by helplessness are especially muted, absorbed, and rendered ego-syntonic. This renders them beyond protest.

As inner is separated from outer, the past from the present, and the ego and its decisions from the superego and its requirements, the virtue of consistency is gradually excluded from the armamentarium of moral values. As a final move in this cynical process, the value of living up to one's values, a superego value intrinsic to all the others, is abandoned, by an unconscious mutual pact and common consent. But a price is paid for these appeasement processes and temporary gains. With the loss of integration comes an erosion of integrity, of the unity and cohesion of the human self.

Much was heard during the time of Watergate of 'the sick society'. Opinions traversed the spectrum from those who, following Toynbee and Spengler, recalled the 'rise and fall' of Roman, Greek and Byzantine empires, to Yale's President Brewster, who in a more sanguine mood spared the American public by preferring to see corruption as limited to business life, even more specifically to salesmen who were intent only on selling their products.

The 'sickness' label so often used consisted of a melange of streams. Some were appropriate reactions to disturbing events, not sick at all; the absence of such reactions was sometimes more sick. Some were individual neuroses, idiosyncratic points of sensitivity triggered by external events. And many were group neuroses, pathological responses of the reacting public in a collective sense. In its regressive characteristics these were not unlike the infantile neurosis as this unfolds in the developing child under the impact of impinging traumatic events. More than once the public condition was not far from the pseudoimbecility de-

scribed by Mahler (1942) as occurring in childhood, the ultimate defense against an unassimilable surround.

Rationalization was often too high a level to explain the distortions which were so rampant and common. Irrationalization, a term I first heard used by Arlow (1955) many years ago, applies more accurately to the situation which became chronic. The covering of an irrational act by a cover which was itself irrational was more the order of the day as people accepted the absurd nonsequiturs offered as explanation by Nixon—that he was saving the country, the Presidency, everything but Nixon by his series of actions and evasions.

There was another aspect of the universal pall which settled over the country. As ubiquitous in its presence as neurosis, though not in the official family of 'sickness', it was no less disturbing in its effects. I am referring to corruption, the exposure and spreading of this trait from the top. Partly this was an increased awareness and partly, by contagion, an increased occurrence. But mostly the depressed, guilty, and somber mood was due to a release from repression and an emergence into consciousness of the normal amount of compromise of integrity intrinsic to human behavior, part of the psychology, and psychopathology, of everyday life.

As in other areas of psychopathology, the abnormal processes in conflicts of integrity are normal processes gone awry. Ambition, power, and opportunism, which I have called the three horsemen of the syndrome of the compromise of integrity (Rangell, 1974), create havoc when out of control although they are desirable qualities in normal human growth and development. We wish our children to avail themselves of opportunities and are concerned if they grow into youths without ambition. The power which comes with mastery is an ego achievement sought after and for which children are trained in tasks of coping and problem solving.

But any or all of these can become malignant. Ambition unbridled, mastery which expands to an insatiable quest for power, and opportunism which results in the ruthless seizing of advan-

tages without concern for the consequences to others, are the three ingredients of 'the syndrome of compromise of integrity' (Rangell, 1973). From the time that man has become organized into a social fabric of any degree of complexity, it is these traits which have been at the center of tyranny and destruction in human history.

Nixon brought all of these with him full-blown on his way up. There was an interesting parapraxis which appeared after John Dean's revelation that he had told Nixon there was a cancer growing on the Presidency. This statement was variously quoted in different ways in different places, some saying 'on' and some saying 'in' the Presidency—an important difference, no matter whose slip it was, relating to the defense of distancing. Was the malignancy brought in from the outside and implanted upon the White House, the staff, the Presidency, and finally on the person of the President himself? This is what many wished to believe and for a long time fervently hoped was the case. Or did it grow and develop within the President and extend outward from there? This is what history shows. The malignant seed came with the President from Whittier to Washington, and from him invaded all whom he touched.

The actual Watergate break-in was a quantum jump which passed from the immoral to the illegal. That was Nixon's fatal mistake which was to lead to the crisis from which he would never escape. It was this which crossed the line of ego-alienicity and lost him the mass which had gone along with him up to that point. Until then the amount of deception they were asked to approve could be managed as ego-syntonic.

Jeb Magruder was asked on a TV program, after he was released from prison, why it was that there had been such a continuous attack on the President as a result of Watergate. It seemed to the interviewer that ordinarily there might have been some uproar or accusations, but that by then the intensity would have let up. The answer Magruder gave was that many people hated Nixon.

This was true. But the larger answer was that many, in fact

more, had identified with him and merged their interests with his. With either one alone, the pre-Watergate history without Watergate, or Watergate without the twenty-five-year raked up soil which preceded it, Nixon would have made it. With the break-in alone, he would have stirred up another crisis but survived it, and added a seventh notch on his belt. And with the long and tortuous background without the actual affair of Watergate, he would certainly have sailed through and even, in the minds of many, emerged a hero.

But the two together pushed over the dam. Their weight was too much. He had betrayed the people's trust, used up his margin and gone beyond what they could accept. Even after this final step the separation was a slow and painful process. The identification had been long and strong, and a crisscross seam had been tightly built joining Nixon and the people. But their faith had been broken, and the split, however long delayed and put off, finally had to occur.

'From good to evil', writes Solzhenitsyn (1974), 'is one quaver. If it were only so simple. If only there were evil people somewhere insidiously committing evil deeds and it were necessary only to separate them from the rest of us and destroy them. But the line dividing good and evil cuts through the heart of every human being. And who is willing to destroy a piece of his own heart?'

So much for the 'clinical' data. This is all I can dip into in this brief version from what has become a voluminous source. Akin to an individual history in depth, this is no less than a chapter in the history of a nation. I will turn now from the account of these data to theoretical considerations.

Scientific advance comes about when social pressure and the readiness of science meet. Freud discovered the sexual instincts in the sexually repressive Vienna of the Victorian age. The instinct of aggression was added following the holocaust of the first World War. And the role of the ego was defined during the twenties and thirties when expansion was rampant, impulses were running wild, and the need for controls was in the air.

Our present society presents for theoretical assimilation an aspect of man no less important, the problem of integrity. Just as with the hysterical Viennese female at the turn of the century, so does a study of the corrupt American male of the seventies, who has just had his turn on the surface of history, lead to insights into the timeless and universal nature of man.

The greatest 'lesson of Watergate' will not be any immediate practical application of the experience, no matter what reforms are instituted by the American Bar Association or written into our Constitution about Presidential succession or procedural aspects of Presidential elections. Such an important lesson could be a slow and steady accretion of knowledge, which is possible only if the sluices to insight are kept open.

The syndrome of compromise of integrity is on a par with neuroses in the life of the human mind. While a conflict of interest in the external world may dissuade an individual from participating in action, an internal conflict of interest exists in all of us. The ego, as is well known, maintains its vigilant stance and wages its perennial battle on two internal fronts, not just one: toward the id and toward the superego. Among the multitude of solutions possible, sacrifices can be exacted from either direction, from the id in the neuroses and from the superego in compromises of integrity. Clinical and life experiences amply demonstrate and support the view that both coexist, and there is no reason to suppose that one is more common than the other. Many syndromes which are called neuroses may well be problems of the integrity of character or at least combinations of the two.

There is a borderline other than the one commonly thought, new in concept but not newly occurring. A borderline patient need not be automatically between neurosis and psychosis but can with equal frequency be on the border between neurosis and compromise of integrity, demonstrating features of each. A chronic obsessive patient over the course of a lifetime has tortured others as much as herself. After many years the secondary gains have won the ascendancy, and it becomes difficult to say

what the primary purpose of the syndrome has been. Moral questions accrue which were not present in the incipient stages. This is not an exception but a common occurrence.

In compromises of integrity, in conflicts and solutions between ego and superego, I am speaking of unconscious as much as conscious mechanisms, and preconscious as well—the same topographic distributions as in the neuropsychoses. In the military psychiatry of World War II psychoanalytic psychiatrists, confronted with the differential diagnosis between neurosis and malingering, underplayed or even ignored the latter, as if it did not exist. It took two subsequent wars, in Korea and Vietnam, to teach us that all levels may be involved. In today's national situation the lesson is reversed and conscious elements are exclusively stressed; this time it is the unconscious roots of the widespread reactions which have been largely ignored. But unconscious conflicts play a part as a background cause of compromise of integrity as much as they result in neuroses or neurotic character behavior.

The Watergate complex is more than a group of buildings in Washington. On a par with another universal and equally buried psychic complex, the œdipal, it is a complex deep in the minds of men. Nixon, who brought it to a head in its overt and exaggerated form, now typifies it, just as Œdipus exemplified openly what existed in other men's minds more subtly and obscurely. The Watergate drama is to the superego what the Œdipus myth is to the instinctual drives. It is even as classic, extends from the present to the most distant past, beyond ancient history to the beginning of man.

From the smallest devious transactions between men to the most sophisticated and newsworthy examples, problems of integrity span an arc as wide as that of the neuroses. In the wake of Watergate the public was bombarded by the universality of its occurrence, beyond politics to business, commerce, professional life and into the halls of academia. If we think of intellectual dishonesty we can sense how much volume we add. At every socioeconomic intellectual level no one, no class, no calling is

exempt; certainly no political party, no matter from where the stimulus came this time. Conservative, liberal and radical, the terms are irrelevant on the scale of the compromise of integrity, both with respect to those who succumb and those who rise above it. Sixty-five percent of business executives polled felt they would have gone along with Nixon as did the other men of Watergate. Archibald Cox also worried, 'Would I have done better? I hope so, but in all honesty I cannot be sure.'

There are major and minor Watergates of everyday life alongside of the more conventional types of psychopathology. Parapraxes are as much a result of a bending of the superego as they are due to pressures from the id. A patient noted ruefully about a woman he was interested in that all her 'imprecisions' were consistently in one direction, to show her as better than she actually was. Her distortions of facts were all in favor of what she thought he wanted to hear. This, however, was minor compared to his routine ways of life.

The structural view is a tripartite not a dualistic one. The analyst sits equidistant not just from the ego and the id but from all three psychic structures, observing equally objectively and with equal valence the forces which move among the three. The conflicts in 'all the President's men' were between the 'self'-interests intrinsic to ego functioning and the opposing dictates of superego values. Narcissism is the enemy of integrity. 'Self-ish' and 'ego-tistical' are semantic usages which reveal the ego origins of these hypertrophied motivations. In addition to this intersystemic conflict, however, there were also intrasystemic conflicts at work, such as between ego goals or between superego values themselves. Which was to take precedence, for example, between personal or national interests? And among guiding principles did loyalty have priority over the truth?

In centering on the interaction between ego and superego with equal attention as between ego and id, there are two opposite poles to the duality which are imbued with new significance. One is the role of the superego itself. Brought to the fore scientifically by the national experience culturally, we should be at

a threshold in this respect on a par with the heralding of ego psychology by Hartmann in 1939. A new dimension has been opened up, has been pointed to with violent force, and should at least command our attention and study.

But a qualitatively new significance can also be seen to emerge from the ego side of this interacting pair. While Hartmann (1939), in his major addition to psychoanalytic theory, added the adaptive aspects and Anna Freud (1937) a few years earlier had added and clarified the defensive aspects of ego functioning, both of these were in their essence adaptive, i.e., reactive to other forces, from the id (Anna Freud) and from reality (Hartmann). In this sense both followed the role emphasized by Freud (1923) when he added the psychology of the ego to that of the id in the early 1920's. What I have just emphasized is not a reactive but an *initiating* process within the ego itself.

The difference is a profound one, with far-reaching implications for psychosocial theory. Impulses from the ego—an explanation of the power drive in man—can become as relentless and peremptory in psychic motivation as the force of instinctual drives. And these can operate for the good or the bad, toward ego achievements which only man can attain on the evolutionary scale, and toward the capacity for destruction and social disaster also reached only by man. Psychoanalysts participated a few years ago in a symposium in Israel on the causes of war (Winnik, et al., 1973). The application of psychoanalytic understanding can be even more appropriate to the milder problems of social integrity, just as on the other side of the intrapsychic scale psychoanalysis applies more centrally and directly to neurosis than to psychosis. While war may be related to the instinct of aggression, social divisiveness, more subtle and pervasive, can be a product of the developed ego itself.

I have reached a point in this presentation where I wonder as I think of the classic monographs which represent previous Freud Lectures—by Spitz (1959), Stone (1961), and many others —how these authors were able to present their ideas within the

confines of an evening lecture. For me, I have decided that in the remaining time I will state in sentences what later must become chapters in order to indicate the scope of what this subject has provided. I will merely indicate now some headings of what I hope to enlarge in the future into a more expanded work.

1. All of this is not a crusade nor a call for the imposition of morality from cosmic heights. I can see many areas here which can be misunderstood. What I am advocating is a scientific, not a moralistic, attitude toward morals—the same attitude psychoanalysis always has—but one which includes a more complete range of psychic forces. The superego is involved in intrapsychic conflict. To neglect its role is to render one-third of patients' problems incomplete.

2. The scientific study of the superego elicits more resistance than that of the id. There is a greater resistance, both individually and collectively, to insight into a moral break than to an instinctual breakthrough.

3. The psychoanalyst is not without a value system, a misunderstanding which has led to a great deal of confusion among analysts and public alike. Freud separated himself from transient, culture-bound neurosogenic values, not from the timeless values of civilized man. Analysis has values intrinsic to its task, such as rationality, the search for truth, freedom from neurosis. Neutrality does not include an abandonment of values nor of the role they play in the determination of final pathways in mental behavior.

4. A harsh superego is generally analyzed but lacunae or seducible aspects less so. Analysis may quite appropriately result in a patient experiencing more guilt rather than less. This might correctly counterbalance the often noted criticism that following analysis patients become more tolerant toward themselves but meaner toward others.

5. There are special technical difficulties and areas of sensitivity in superego analysis, but the method is the same—an objective analytic interpretative stance.

6. Countertransference in this area of interpretation can take

two opposite forms, (a) a moralistic one and (b) in reaction to this, equally common and equally conducive to incomplete results, a fear of and therefore avoidance of superego analysis.

7. The analyst is not an arbiter among changing value systems nor between controversial or alternative life styles. It is the patient's own values which are uncovered and their roles in intrapsychic conflict exposed; his own ego choices then determine which values are to be retained. The analyst's values are not imposed any more than his ego style or his preferences with regard to libido or aggression.

8. All of this does not necessarily call for increased optimism but for realism and a continuous process of clarification of goals. Neurosis and compromise of integrity fortunately are usually intermeshed, which makes for anxiety, ego alienicity and therefore treatability for both. Analysis aims for an honest man as well as freedom from neurosis. Neither is achieved in an absolute, but both can be in a relative sense.

9. The analytic method aims at psychic 'straightness'. Defenses are inner deceptions. Psychic integrity, the inside aim of analysis, is a prerequisite for interpersonal integrity, the outside aim. The latter is not possible without the former, although the former may be present without necessarily being applied to outer objects.

Finally, some closing thoughts which are also to be developed further at a later time:

Ferenczi (1930) once stated that psychoanalysis continues to turn up new veins of gold in old abandoned places. I believe even more that analysis can discover a whole new mine in an area where analysts have walked every day.

Kurt Eissler (1969) poses an 'irreverent' question: whether the free association method may not have already explored its subject to the fullest extent possible, and whether the supply of new data can only come from outside the analytic situation proper. I would say that while the analytic method remains firm, its subject material is bottomless.

How often, as an example, does an analyst analyze to a degree which is satisfying the patient's behavior in a group, his capacity to resist the effects or aura of a charismatic—or one step further —a demagogic leader? 'Man in a group' is a different entity from man alone or a group as a whole or even the patient in the analytic dyad. And material about these different and separate aspects of a patient's feelings and behavior comes regularly into every analytic session.

How often does an analysis attend to the quality of courage? Among the thirty or forty of Nixon's men only one, Hugh Sloan, Jr., said 'no' to what was happening and left the group. Perhaps the same ratio would filter down to the general population. I recently listened to the action of a patient who recalled with pride and anxiety how, while sitting the day before as the youngest member of a high-powered committee, he had acted spontaneously as a minority of one. It was worth it not only because he had influenced a few people at the time, but because it led to a fruitful analytic hour from which we both learned about the genetic background of such behavior.

This subject is invaluable in the analysis of candidates and is crucially applicable to the fate and future of psychoanalytic group life. While it has become fashionable to assume that training analysis is less of an analysis than that of an ordinary patient, and that a candidate's 'real' analysis must await a second time around, I have found that the reverse is often the case. And along with all other elements of conflict and neurosis the superego aspects of behavior can be dealt with as much in analytic candidates as in anyone else, with propitious effects both for the individual and for the analytic group.

From the results of its studies, psychoanalysis has much to offer the people in the way of light and understanding, not in an academic but in a vital and practical sense, and the area of superego functioning is very much a case in point. A long time ago Senator Thomas Eagleton was prohibited from serving his country at the highest level because he was discovered to have suffered depression—which analysts know to be due to a strong,

even harsh superego. Instead, a man named Spiro Agnew was swept into that office almost uncontested and by a landslide. His pathology and that of his superior turned out to be a superego which, in contrast, was soft and lax. While the first condition does not guarantee integrity, the second does assure its absence. There is an important lesson here for the American people that can have pragmatic application.

It is a wide span from Watergate to psychoanalysis. But Richard Nixon closed that gap. His men invaded our space and brought Watergate in direct touch with the psychoanalysts' terrain. We might as well get something out of it. Nothing can be better than an advance in knowledge.

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Notes on Shamelessness

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NOTES ON SHAMELESSNESS

BY HENRY LOWENFELD, M.D.

The effect of the decline of the sense of shame on the individual and on society is discussed. It is postulated that when the element of shame is changed in relation to instinctual drives, the later power of shame in preserving social cohesion is weakened, and a regression in some important functions of the ego results.

In the psychoanalytic literature there have appeared a number of important and excellent papers on the problem of shame. Piers and Singer (1953) have contributed to the distinction of guilt and shame. Jacobson (1964), Grinker (1955), Feldman (1962), Lynd (1958), S. Levin (1967, 1971), and others have explored the problem. Many clinical papers, however, have pointed to the fact that shame has not received the attention that it deserves in the analysis of many patients.

The following is an attempt to explore the problem of shame from a different angle. Shame has been an ingredient of paramount importance in shaping character structure in harmony with the standards of civilization since the beginning of man's history. The experience of shame is, far more than the feeling of guilt, a social phenomenon, depending on one's status, class, or group. As the environment plays a decisive role in this experience, shame has an important function in upholding the structure of society. Developments and changes in the contents of what causes shame have far-reaching effects on civilized life.

Shame originates in the instinctual life of early childhood, but its later manifestations in man's character can be far removed from its instinctual beginning. There is a question how independent of its origin the sense of shame in this wider sense can become. This question appears particularly important at the present time when we witness a decisive cultural change in the

reaction to shame in relation to the instinctual drives from which it originates. Has this development also influenced the sense of shame in its wider meaning in the life of present-day civilization?

In the early psychoanalytic literature we find important papers on the history of shame and its response to nakedness and to the pregenital and genital drives. These papers amplify Freud's writings on this subject.

Otto Rank (1913), in a remarkable essay, *Die Nacktheit in Sage und Dichtung* (Nakedness in Legend and Fiction), traces the drive 'to show' and 'to look' from the time of the Creation and other Biblical stories, of Homer and Herodotus, and of writers and poets of later periods, to contemporary writers. Abraham (1913), who was also interested in folklore ('folk-psychology') added clinical examples in his paper on scopophilia. The sexual curiosity of the child is aimed, above all, at looking at the genital organs. Abraham maintained that the wish to learn and know allows us to assume a restriction of the desire 'to look'. He also felt that the healthy child's pleasure in looking is, to a certain degree, repressed and sublimated, as Freud had also assumed; in other children it leads to neurotic disturbances. The child wants to see from where he has come—his own birth.

Shame develops as a defense against the pregenital, mainly anal, drives. But the core of Rank's and Abraham's studies is the fate of the exhibitionistic and scopophilic wishes in the genital period. As the essential aim of the desire 'to look' is to see the genitals of the mother and the father, the development of shame is the strongest defense and protection against this wish. Myths and legends express the same attitude toward nakedness: the breakthrough of the forbidden drive for pleasure in 'looking' and 'showing', and the punishment for it—being blinded or castrated. These prohibitions become part of the œdipus complex; the sense of shame receives its power from the solution of this complex and the incest taboo.

Abraham (1913) points to the proscriptions in the Mosaic Law: 'among all the many prohibitions it is not *intercourse*

between blood-relatives which is forbidden, but it is said that the man must not "uncover the shame" of this or that woman' (p. 213). This restriction means a larger extension of the simple prohibition of incestuous intercourse. The taboo against making an image of the Lord is part of the same restriction. Thus shame has been at the root of civilization.

The genesis of shame in childhood as a defense against pregenital and genital drives is easily observable. The linguistic root of the term means 'to hide', 'to cover up'. From this original meaning the term changed to a figurative one: shame encompassed immoral acts, or lack of control of one's instinctual urges, or actions which show weakness or inferiorities. Masturbation was an important link in this development: guilt for the forbidden drives and shame for the weakness and inability to control them, the common denominator being the wish to hide one's failings from other people.

In the development of the sense of shame from its defense against the infantile instinctual drives to its later general meaning, we have a conspicuous example of the 'change of function and content' described by Hartmann (1939), a concept, he wrote, that he borrowed from biology. Shame acquires a 'relative functional independence, despite genetic continuity' (Hartmann, 1951, p. 41). But under special conditions this development can become reversible. In this respect it is of interest that Freud (1905), and others after him, assumed that '. . . this development [of shame] is organically determined and fixed by heredity, and it can occasionally occur without any help . . . from education. Education will not be trespassing beyond its appropriate domain if it limits itself to following the lines which have already been laid down organically and to impressing them somewhat more clearly and deeply' (pp. 177-178). Freud's remark about the organic nature may be an explanation for the blushing (*Schamröte*) which seems as much a physiological reaction to deep shame as cardiovascular reactions are to anxiety (*cf.* also, Levin, 1971, on shame anxiety).

The change of content of shame toward thoughts and actions,

far removed from nakedness and sexual drives, becomes understandable if one remembers its origin and its consolidation in the superego as an inheritance of the œdipus complex. Thus, as pointed out, the core of shame is the incest taboo. But we have to face an unexpected and disquieting result of this change: that the interconnection of shame in its original, physical and sexual meaning with its wider, seemingly remote, social and moral meaning is still effective. Shame, although changing function and content, has not acquired a safe independence. Even our defenses and sublimations show a genetic vulnerability, and what happens in later life to the defense against the original drives may influence its function in the adult's character structure.

Because shame impels the individual to conceal some of his urges, fantasies, and deeds from other people, it easily leads to hypocrisy. Freud objected vigorously to the many effects of the cultural shame of his time and emphasized honesty and openness. He hated the 'conventional secretiveness and insincerity' (Freud, 1905, p. 151). In 1925, he wrote: '[Psychoanalysis] proposes that there should be a reduction in the strictness with which instincts are repressed and that correspondingly more play should be given to truthfulness' (p. 220). These and similar remarks express the true feeling of a man for whom the striving for truth was one of the main goals in life. But there were other moments when Freud, as the observer of life and civilization, expressed doubts about the possible consequences of this attitude: '. . . as regards conscience . . . a large majority of men have brought along with them only a modest amount of it or scarcely enough to be worth mentioning' (Freud, 1933, p. 61). 'It is undeniable', he wrote, 'that our contemporary civilization favours the production of this form of hypocrisy to an extraordinary extent. One might . . . say that it is built up on such hypocrisy. . . . Thus there are very many more cultural hypocrites[1] than truly civilized men—indeed, it is a debatable point

[1] This translation of Freud's *Kulturheuchler* in the Standard Edition is imprecise. The literal translation 'pretenders of culture', i.e., those who make a pretense of being cultured, is obviously the meaning Freud had in mind.

whether a certain degree of cultural hypocrisy is not indispensable for the maintenance of civilization . . .' (Freud, 1915, p. 284).[2]

Freud pointed out on a number of occasions that civilized society is kept together more by social anxiety—which is partly fear of punishment but more often anxiety about being shamed —than by the superego's moral standards (*cf.*, Levin, 1967, 1971). The honesty of the merchant class was above all maintained by the power of shame and disgrace to which a failing member of a group was subjected. Different groups had different codes of honor—the military, students, scholars, etc.—and their members had to live up to their codes in order not to fall into deep disgrace.[3]

The cultural attitude toward the indulgence of nakedness and of exhibitionistic and voyeuristic drives has undergone a tremendous change since the time of Freud's papers and also of Rank's and Abraham's studies in 1913. There is no need for a long review of this development.

An excellent and still interesting case history by Editha Sterba, published in 1928, *Nacktheit und Scham* (Nakedness and Shame) may serve as a good illustration of cultural changes and their wider effects. She reported the analysis of a twelve-year-old girl who was brought to her for treatment because of some small thefts, inclination to lie, and other signs of lack of morals. She soon found that the child's main symptom was her strong exhibitionism. The child seemed to have no sense of shame. Reading this case history today leads one to think that this bright little girl might not be conspicuously different from many children of the present time. Small thefts and imitation of the grownup's permitted exhibitionism is not unusual in many groups of modern children. Sterba's young patient probably would not be brought for treatment today.

[2] La Rochefoucauld (who died in 1680) wrote in his maxims: 'Hypocrisy is a homage vice pays to virtue'.

[3] The tragic history of duels shows the power of social shame and disgrace. Geniuses like Pushkin, Lermontov, Lassalle became its victims.

At the time of Sterba's report, the climate of shame demanded a suppression of exhibitionistic and voyeuristic drives. Even on the beach women had to be completely covered; their swimming costumes (shapeless, antierotic gowns) disguised their forms. Nowadays even the bikini is often replaced by a thin string. Where formerly patients, even in analytic treatment, had severe inhibitions about speaking of their masturbatory fantasies and overcame their shame only against strong resistance, now lovers chat with each other about their masturbatory practices. Specially manufactured vibrators are displayed in the windows of reputable drugstores. 'Porno' literature and movies of polymorph-perverse practices, once checked by shame, are now devoured by civilized people. The use of obscene language, mocking old-fashioned feelings, has become quite general.

It is certainly desirable that the hypocrisy, the 'cultural insincerity' which Freud so vehemently decried, give way to a more honest and open acceptance of one's human nature. It has led to a genuine liberation of women, freeing them from an unnatural social pressure and the immoral discriminatory double standard of morals which society had inflicted on them. The former conventional insincerity led to inhibitions of thinking in some children and to a sometimes lasting lack in the growth of their intelligence. Freud observed this effect particularly in the development of girls as such hypocritic attitudes were more strongly enforced in their upbringing. These consequences seem to be much rarer today.

But, on the other hand, it would seem that the loosening of the shame barrier destroyed the dam that shame had built against the pregenital drives, which forced the growing child to develop gradually a civilized love and sex life. Frustration of the child's instinctual wishes stimulates sublimation which 'consists in the instinct's directing itself towards an aim other than, and remote from, that of sexual satisfaction' (Freud, 1914, p. 94). Shame restrains man's regressive trend toward one's infantile polymorph-perverse fantasy life. Now exhibitionistic and voyeuristic drives are considered healthy by many people and are

directly indulged, diminishing the urge to satisfy these drives in sublimated activities and pleasures. Infantile sexual curiosity seems to have returned frequently in its simplest form: a kind of dissolution of a sublimation, a regression to former stages of genetic development and of the ego's integrating function. The interest in history and the cultural past is a mature sequel of the child's sexual research on a sublimated level. The lack of interest of many young people in the cultural tradition may be related to the decline of shame. Yet the present craving for the mysterious may be a longing for childhood's mysteries which have been lost.

Some patients in analysis have little resistance against acting out their infantile drives which, in a different climate, to a certain degree, were checked by shame. In some patients such acting out dilutes the experience and the effect of analytic interpretations.

Havelock Ellis (1897) in *The Evolution of Modesty* (he used modesty and shame or sense of shame interchangeably) gathered an abundance of material and arrived at the conclusion that though the forms of the feeling of shame change, 'it is yet a very radical constituent of human nature in all stages of civilisation' (p. 79). He continued: 'While common to both sexes the sense of shame is more peculiarly feminine, so that it may almost be regarded as the chief secondary sexual character of women on the psychical side' (p. 1). Ellis emphasized Stendhal's (1822) remark: 'Modesty is the mother of love'. 'It is perhaps the only law resulting from civilisation', Stendhal wrote, 'which produces nothing but happiness'. He thought that without modesty we would have only sensual love of the coarsest kind. Freud also spoke of the magnificent reactive achievement of sexual shame.

Was Stendhal, who had such brilliant insight into our unconscious life—he described his own œdipal wishes with complete awareness—, right in assuming that modesty (shame) is the mother of love?

The decline of shame in the attitude toward sex, while it confused the lives of many people and endangered the quality of

love, also enriched life and freed the libido from unnecessary chains. In all other (nonsexual) respects, shamelessness can hardly be seen as anything but a decline in civilized living. It is not necessary to elaborate in this brief paper the growing shamelessness in the nonsexual sphere: the uninhibited greed, the corruption on all levels of society. Crime itself has lost all shame. People steal pennies from the tin cups of blind beggars, administrators of nursing homes fill their pockets from the feeble and defenseless aged, and so forth.[4]

Shame, of course, asserts a tremendous social pressure on the individual. Once this pressure is loosened, the wish to shake off its paralyzing shackles becomes powerful. Shame, if consciously experienced, serves as a deterrent to behavior that might be condemned by society. But if a shameful act is committed, there are few effective defenses against the painful remembrance. To cope with guilt, humankind has developed many defenses and reactions—projection, repentance, atonement, punishment, confession, and even forgiveness—in order to re-establish a disturbed equilibrium. Shame can also be counteracted by neurotic reaction-formations and denials. But for the most part we try to forget shameful experiences, to repress them and to hide them from others, although a sudden remembrance may bring back the former mortifying experience. Thus our psyche has no satisfactory and effective way of dealing with the sense of shame, and the current spread of general shamelessness is felt as a tremendous liberation.

However, shame, so weakened in reaction to moral standards, is still experienced when a person's narcissism is involved. Failure is still considered a disgrace. And failing a test, for instance,

[4] While this paper was being drafted, two articles with the theme of shamelessness in society were published. Eric Hoffer in an article titled *Long Live Shame* wrote: 'We have become a shameless society . . . the loss of shame threatens our survival as a civilized society' (The New York Times, October 18, 1974). In *Man Ashamed,* a study of the feeling of shame from Hesiod to Nietzsche, Professor Erich Heller found the Greek Goddess of Shame (Aidos) to be the source of dignity, decency, and good manners; any offense committed against her called forth Nemesis, her avenger. He quoted Nietzsche: 'If shame were destroyed, man as such would be abolished' (Encounter, February, 1974).

is often concealed. A young girl, who in other times might have been ashamed of offending moral standards if she had lost her virginity, may today feel ashamed if she is still a virgin; shame permits her to hide this failure.

Two brief clinical examples, patients from different generations (analyzed by Dr. Yela Lowenfeld), may serve to illustrate the change in attitude toward shame.

About twenty-five years ago, A, a young girl, came for treatment for an all-encompassing phobia that had necessitated her leaving college. She had not been able to go any place without an accompanying mother figure and had complained of being both panicky and depressed. A temporary solution had been to buy her a car so that she would not have to remain a prisoner in her own home. But her depression deepened, and she was referred for analytic treatment. While in analysis she fell in love with a young man and was able to travel by subway from Manhattan to Queens for their sexual encounters without difficulty. However, the young man did not marry her, left town, and vanished from her life. A short time later she married on the 'rebound'. Before her marriage her only fear was that on the wedding night her fiancé might find out that she was not a virgin. She felt ashamed and, to avoid the disgrace, on the wedding night managed with the aid of a safety pin to produce the expected blood on the sheet.

B, a young girl in analysis at the present time, had the following dream. She and her mother were in the bedroom with a faceless man. She was afraid he would choose her for love-making; she felt overwhelming shame as he would then discover that she was inexperienced and clumsy in love-making. The day residue for this dream was an experience where she was asked to lead a discussion in a seminar. Suddenly she felt stupid, clumsy, and tongue-tied. Her associations led to the memory of how ashamed she had felt in college because she was a virgin. She had eventually ended that embarrassing state by breaking the hymen with a shampoo bottle. In the past the main insight into the unconscious meaning of this patient's shame would have been

the experience of the forbidden sexual wishes for the father. In the present instance, competition with the mother had led to B's feeling of shame for her inadequacy.

Formerly religion, with its tenets of hope for reward as well as fear of punishment, helped to maintain the structure of society. Since its decline, however, social anxiety with its painful affect of shame has become more important for the maintenance of a civilized society than the individual's conscience. Once the sense of shame is dissolved or diluted, the cement that keeps the structure of society from falling apart tends to disintegrate.

We face a historical change of tremendous consequences to our civilization because of the freer attitude toward instinctual drives. The environment in which we live and our children grow up is transformed. Many factors have contributed to this development but it seems likely that one important component is the general loosening of the incest taboo (*cf.*, H. Lowenfeld and Y. Lowenfeld, 1970). The new environment demands a new and different kind of adjustment and control of instinctual drives. A build-up of moral standards on a higher level may be necessary to save love and social cohesion.

SUMMARY

Shame has been an integral part of man's history. From its origin as a defense against infantile pregenital and genital drives, it became relatively independent in the life of civilization, preserving social cohesion probably more effectively than do genuine moral standards. As the origin of shame is the root of the later affect of shame in social behavior, sexual liberation has weakened the power of shame in wider areas of civilized living and contributed to a growing 'shamelessless' in our society. The development of the sense of shame in its cultural context is an example that, in character structure, reaction-formations to original drives and sublimations of them are vulnerable and reversible, and may be influenced by the fate of those original drives. Under certain conditions mature development is given up and is replaced by the original drives.

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Object Orientedness: The Person or the Thing

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OBJECT ORIENTEDNESS: THE PERSON OR THE THING

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Infant observation indicates that there is an individual variation in development characterized by orientedness either toward the animate or toward the inanimate world. These variants, which are manifest as early as the second month of life, influence the surrounds, the continuing developmental processes, and certain aspects of character formation. Each variation in orientedness evokes a preferred way of processing percepts and situations.

I

One obstacle in psychoanalytic developmental research is the difficulty in integrating data derived from infant and child studies with the conceptual discoveries arising out of adult introspection and reconstruction. Hence it was felt that a set of special categories which could coördinate observational findings on the one hand with distinctive psychoanalytic concepts on the other, might well be useful in bridging the two perspectives.

The goal of this paper is to delineate one such category: the disposition toward human-orientedness and thing-orientedness. Such leanings are readily observable in infants and children; at the same time they find their way into psychoanalytic theory by way of the conceptual route of mental representations. We believe that the developmental sequences of such issues can further the understanding of some of the correlates between analytic

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process and the various analyst-analysand relationships. Hence, an examination of the beginnings, thrusts, and influences of such orientations serves observational, theoretical, and therapeutic interests.

At the outset, the propositions of this particular category may be stated as follows:

> Infant observation establishes the finding of an individual variation in development characterized by an inclination in orientedness either toward the animate or toward the inanimate world. This variant becomes manifest as early as the second month of life. It casts its impressions on the surrounds, on the continuing developmental process, and on certain aspects of character formation. Such variations in orientedness have this influence because each necessarily evokes a preferred way of processing percepts and situations.
>
> The data support the hypothesis of the existence of a common pool of predisposition out of which emerge currents of relatedness to persons and things. A reciprocal complementarity exists; hence an enhancement of one current compromises that which is available for the alternate stream of engagement.
>
> Evidence from this and other studies supports the view that the tendency toward preference originates in the early caretaker-infant interaction. This interaction is a product of both congenital and environmental determinates.

II

Interest in the dimension of human-orientedness and thing-orientedness has found its way into the scientific literature, although the interest has been scattered among various disciplines and frequently obscured by related issues. Two broad categories exist: research and conceptual. The *research* literature includes findings related to sex differences, activity patterns, twins, the cognitive field, linguistics, and neurology. In addition, relatedness to things and people is an acknowledged central *conceptual* theme on the general psychologic scene, especially within Freudian and Piagetian frameworks.

RESEARCH

Maccoby (1966) describes various studies which suggest that girls and women show a greater *social* propensity than do boys and men (pp. 330-332), thus implying preferred dispositions. Bardwick (1971), in a summarizing review of the object-issue vis-à-vis sex differences, specifically reflects the polarities of 'thing' versus 'human'. She notes, for example, that, 1, boys of six months of age show a 'better fixation response to a helix pattern of lights' while girls at the same age show a better fixation to the human face; 2, female infants have a 'greater responsiveness to social stimuli' and in general are judged as having 'more social orientation'; 3, at thirteen months, males possibly have a better figure-ground differentiation while females continue to show a greater responsiveness to people; and 4, older boys are more inclined to base their self-esteem on achievements, while girls seem more oriented to conformity (p. 94). Bardwick hypothesizes that culture may re-enforce certain fundamental sex-linked tendencies. Her summarizing reflects that thing-orientedness may be more characteristic of males, human-orientedness more characteristic of females, and that each tendency has a continuing influence, although her reviews are neither conceptualized nor grouped precisely along those terms.

Escalona (1963) notes that more active babies need less of a social stimulus to evoke a response than do less active ones. In addition, her data suggest that the more active infants tend to be absorbed more exclusively either with things or people, while the less active ones develop an earlier capacity for coördinated involvement with both kinds of objects. This study suggests that levels of inherent activity may correlate with 'intensity' of human- or thing-object engagement.

A leaning toward humans as opposed to the inanimate world frequently polarizes in monozygotic twins, apparently irrespective of sex or activity type. Allen, Pollin and Hoffer (1971) specifically assert that identical twins can be differentiated from each other within the first year of life by, among other traits, 'a

greater person-orientation (sociability) in one twin and a greater object-orientation in the other' (p. 1601). This study points to the possibility of intra-uterine developmental influences. In discussing their published work, Gifford (1971) confirms and extends such observational data. Illustrating his experience with a pair of identical twin girls, he notes that at age eleven one 'preferred to practice beautiful calligraphy while her talkative sister was more interested in spoken language' (p. 1604). In an earlier, more extensive report, Gifford, et al. (1966) cited distinctions characteristic of this dimension in even greater detail. In the first three months of life, one twin, for example, showed 'an unusual interest in gazing for long periods at nearby inanimate objects, her hands and feet, a design in the crib, and a mobile which she learned how to set in motion at will around 8 weeks' (p. 263). The other twin, during the same time-period, was described as having excitedly discovered her sister. The influence of parental attitudes was offered as one hypothesis to account for the developing differences. In a discussion of this paper, Spitz (1966) commented on the potential advantages and limitations of each emerging trait. He also postulated that such emerging characteristics would have certain specific influences on the subsequent experiencing of life events. It impressed him that the smiling response—a developmental landmark—appeared at the same time in both, despite the different dispositions.

Cohen, et al. (1972) do not confirm the regularity of such findings in certain other sets of monozygotic twins. One conclusion of their work is '. . . overall competence, coping, assertiveness, and language and social skills' characterized one twin, while fearfulness and dependency characterized the other. However, Apgar and FES (first-week evaluation) scores suggest that the children studied may have had wide 'constitutional' variations. Paranatal factors could be implicated.

Stern (1971) noted different dyadic interactional patterns in a pair of fraternal twins at three and a half months and postulated developmental implications. He suggests that psychodynamic determinants in the mother adversely influenced the

quality of social contact in the second of these twins. Stern highlights the influences of the environmental input.

Cognitive research studies have also reflected these variations in orientedness. Thus, Coates, et al. (1974), in a nursery school setting, found that field-independence (as determined by PEFT scores) and analytic cluster were negatively correlated with social participation. In reviewing other works, they noted a regularly recurring correlation between field independence and responsiveness to nonsocial task-related stimuli on the one hand and field dependence and responsiveness to social stimuli on the other. (See also, Fitzgibbons and Goldberger, 1971; Goldberger and Bendich, 1972; Goldberger, 1973.)

The linguistics literature addresses itself to the two leanings. During the initial learning of a language, Nelson (1973) notes that there are some children who seem to be learning to talk about 'things' while others learn to talk about themselves and other people. She writes: 'One is learning an object language, one a social interaction language' (p. 22). And, apparently, such differences continue to persist into later life.

Finally, in the neurological literature, there are reports of rare focal cerebral lesions characterized either by an inability to name and recognize animate beings while retaining a capacity for recognizing and naming inanimate ones or by the precise opposite (Nielsen, 1942). Nielsen writes: 'From the standpoint of cerebral localization, it is necessary to distinguish between recognition of animate and inanimate objects because one function is not infrequently lost without the other' (p. 114).

CONCEPTUAL

From the conceptual point of view, in the psychoanalytic literature a preoccupation with human 'objects' is as time-honored as is instinct theory itself. Indeed, Freud's very definition of 'instinctual need' encompasses this as an essential constituent of its meaning (e.g., Freud, 1915). A recognition of the cathectic states of object representations is an integral part of Freudian propositions. The minute developmental sequence of

human object relations has been carefully outlined over the years. A. Freud (1965), summarizing this sequence, uses it as a prototype of her concept of developmental lines (pp. 64, ff.). She also attends to the ontogeny of thing-relations, but in quite a different line, which she labels 'From the Body to the Toy and From Play to Work' (pp. 79, ff.). She notes that the pleasures in achievement exist in 'very young children' linked only secondarily with object (i.e., person) relationships.

Winnicott (1953) spawned a special sector of psychoanalytic literature interested in the 'transitional object'. He hypothesizes a movement of interest within infants from their bodies toward their possessions. He, too, hints at the existence of other possible origins of thing-relatedness, although his primary focus with transitional phenomena is in their use as externalized representatives of significant human personal relationships.

The Piagetian literature on cognition is deeply immersed in the *inanimate*-object world, i.e., toys, blocks, coins, etc. The inanimate 'object concept' is of fundamental importance to Piaget's theory of cognitive development. Six stages in the movement toward 'object constancy' are postulated in his theory, with the resultant achievement of a new capacity for mental representation. The ontogenetic relationship to things and emerging cognitive capacities are intimately fused (see, e.g., Flavell, 1963, or Ginsburg and Opper, 1969). Cobliner (1965) has offered an integrated summary of the 'object' of academic psychology, of Piaget's 'permanent object', and of Freud's 'libidinal object'. Decarie (1966) has approached the problem of relating the development of the 'concept object' and of 'object relations' by a cross-sectional study of infants reared under different conditions. Fraiberg (1969) has attempted to place the Piagetian concept of 'object constancy' within a psychoanalytic frame of reference.

III

The propositions and hypotheses to be offered in this presentation have been derived from a systematic longitudinal study, which contains multiple facets and aims. One sector of the study,

especially relevant to this investigation, is geared toward the initial and continuing assessment of a group of infants destined for adoption. The assessments encompass both general and highly specific physical and psychologic information, accumulated from diverse sources which include multiple and frequently simultaneous direct observational data, records of interactional contacts with the children, and detailed analyses of sequential film samplings. There are reports of interviews with various caretakers or foster parents prior to adoption as well as process interviews with the adoptive parents. Lastly, there are regular periodic psychologic test records.[1]

Information is collected every few months in the first year of life, semi-annually after that until latency, and somewhat less frequently thereafter. The data is then subject to a summarizing synthesis and organization by a staff of researchers who, for the most part, do not themselves have direct contact with the children or their families. The systematic synthesis of data is undertaken primarily within the perspective of the propositions of psychoanalytic metapsychology.

Groupings of observationally-derived data are thus established, and offer opportunities to compare and contrast children at many cross-sectional junctures as well as in a longitudinal span. The influences of 'nature and nurture' can be weighed, functional correlates noted, and the developmental process itself can become a target of specific research focus.

As the study proceeded, it became evident that several special descriptive categories were asserting themselves in the data. Some had been anticipated in the established groupings and thus were built into the original design. However, the category of early and persisting orientedness toward persons or toward things had not been anticipated; it precipitated naturally out of the accumulating information.

To illustrate the variation, longitudinally selective compara-

[1] The Cattell Infant Intelligence Scale was used to age twenty-seven months; the Stanford-Binet to age six years; and the WISC thereafter. Additional tests including projectives were given at ages past three years.

tive observations covering two boys, Alan and Benjamin, will be offered. Features of their growth will be tracked from age four and a half months to six years to demonstrate similarities and differences in the kinds of findings which characterize each respective object leaning. The comparative alignment of data at different developmental time periods permits not only the demonstration of continuity or discontinuity and of the existing functional correlates, but provides the opportunity of discerning subtle shades of differences which might otherwise be obscure. Alan showed an early and definite 'thing-preference' in his object-orientation, Benjamin a 'human-preference'. In these two boys, the movement from disposition to strategy and from strategy to character appears particularly well defined.

Although the data on Alan and Benjamin are described here as beginning at rather a 'late' age (four and a half months), these two boys seem especially suitable as illustrations because of the clarity of the accumulated information and because of the opportunity they offer of demonstrating the feature of continuity over a considerable period of time. Other children in the study set up similarly as matched samplings reflect data of the same sort, some of which have been derived from much earlier time periods, e.g., five weeks of age.

IV

Four and a half months:

This systematic evaluation of Alan and Benjamin occurred while each was with caretakers, awaiting adoption. Even during this early period, it was clear that Alan had a wider range of interests. He would play with his cradle gym, reach for and secure the dangling rings, and readily pull firmly on them. He was inclined to clutch at his own clothing or at anyone else's clothing which might be close at hand in a manner which gave the impression of curiosity and exploration. He could sustain interest in some inanimate item for as long as twenty minutes and caretakers noted that it was possible to distract him from a

state of 'fussiness' simply by offering a new setting or locale where he could explore.

During a comparable period, Benjamin was described as a more difficult child, apparently chiefly because he required a good deal of sustained personal contact. When other infants were about, Alan was inclined to ignore them; he would play with his bib or his clothing or reach for nearby toys. Benjamin in such a setting, on the other hand, was more likely to reach for one of those other infants; he regularly took the initiative in activating any interactions with other infants. Almost all observers emphasized this disposition in Benjamin which in one way or another they described as his 'sociableness', while Alan's strength seemed to lie in his motor capacities—his deftness and his power.

In the initial intelligence testing, Alan's score was 111 while Benjamin's was 90. Those who examined the film sequences of this period had the impression that Benjamin's focus on the psychologist's face during the testing might have interfered with his ability to attend to the inanimate objects offered during the examination.

Five and a half months:

This observation was made in a foster home setting. Placement was nearing for both children. According to his foster parents, Alan was continuing to show a wide range of interests; Benjamin's interests seemed limited to people. When a child was removed from a playpen which he shared with Benjamin for the moment, Benjamin would react and begin to cry; he could be calmed by being picked up by another person with whom he would then become involved. In a similar situation, Alan would merely persevere in whatever activity engaged him at the time, apparently unmoved by the sudden disappearance of the other child.

Alan was noted to show little preference between strangers and his new foster mother—even after some weeks. Benjamin, although pleased by the attention of newcomers, clearly pre-

ferred his foster mother's interest. Alan's vocalizations seemed to produce pleasure in their own right, whereas Benjamin preferentially responded vocally to the sounds of other people—especially to the tones of other infants who might be nearby or the voice of his foster mother. Alan's greater motor capacity persisted and the test difference remained: Alan, 111; Benjamin, 86.

Seven months:

Alan and Benjamin were each formally adopted into different homes before the seven-month observation. In their new settings the patterns which had been established in each persisted. Alan was viewed as only 'moderately' sociable by the visiting observers, although he did seem to be somewhat more responsive to people than he had been in prior observations. He still appeared to differentiate little among persons. The psychologist noted that he made no effort to purposively restore visual contact after his head was covered with a cloth. His newly adoptive parents, however, felt that he was attracted equally to nonhuman and to human objects.

Benjamin, on the other hand, continued to be strongly responsive to people. He 'danced' in his mother's lap, sat in his father's, and in general seemed interested in visitors. He distinguished his new sister with special excitement after a relatively short contact. His parents offered the view that other children seemed to interest him especially. He even proved friendly to the pediatrician while being examined with a fever of 104°. As for the inanimate world, everyone offered the opinion that he was less interested in things than he was in people. He was inclined to quickly mouth new objects or toys after only the briefest initial curiosity, in a manner which suggested more mouth pleasure than item contact. According to the psychologist this impaired his I.Q. test: Benjamin scored 90 while Alan continued with his 111.

Nine months:

At nine months the I.Q. results for both children were reported to be the same: each scored 99. Both lost points they

might have achieved: Alan because of his preoccupation with his pincers grasp and Benjamin because of his continuing propensity to mouth objects. Both were described as responsive to strangers and both made distinctions among visitors. Each expressed a special interest in an older sibling and by this time each regularly turned to his mother for comfort. On a comparative basis, however, Alan was clearly not as interested in people as he was in his own motor activity and in inanimate objects. For Benjamin the human face continued to have its distinctive lure; in general, he interacted more intensively in the social area. He enjoyed being near older children, for example, and in fact was especially taken with a chasing game which developed with a same-age cousin who visited regularly.

During this period, he showed a specific aversion to his maternal grandfather as well as to certain male visitors in general. Summing up her observations of Benjamin, the psychologist wrote: 'Nothing that I could offer him to play with had anything like the valence that the human face had . . . he would much rather inspect me or follow his mother about with his eyes than attend to the cup, rattle, or so forth'. The psychologist's view of Alan, on the other hand, was summed up as follows: 'Though advanced in the visual-motor area, he is rather less so in the personal-social and language areas. . . . In contrast to [his] very moderate development of interest in persons is his intense reaction and interest in things. The hidden string of beads . . . was instantly and purposively retrieved; and having found it, he paid no attention to the vocal applause of his parents. . . .'

Twelve months:

At the one-year observation, both children reflected an enhanced human orientedness which tended to make Alan's behavior a bit more even and incline Benjamin more toward people. Alan's mother reported that on occasion he pounded fiercely at a door that separated him from her; she felt her son was wary of strangers, especially of male strangers. Both boys

were described as tolerant of surrogates during the absences of their parents for short periods and each of them was reported as strongly responsive to his respective sister.

Benjamin developed what was described as a 'violent' attachment to his mother's housekeeper whom he seemed to prefer sometimes over his mother. He was exceptionally clinging and affectionate to his father after a one-day absence. Alan showed no comparable phenomena. It was noted that Benjamin was content to stay in his playpen if there was merely another human being within his view; he was, however, not willing to stay by himself. Alan took a bottle to bed with him; Benjamin preferred a cloth or blanket edge along with his nighttime bottle.

Alan screamed and burst into tears whenever a child took one of his toys; his mother said that he would bang his head when he was unable to retrieve a specific item he coveted. Benjamin tolerated a toy being removed from his area of interest, especially if another was readily available as a replacement. During the psychological testing, it was noted once again that Alan had a 'tremendous interest in the test materials' while Benjamin was not especially interested in them. The I.Q.'s continued to be virtually identical, nevertheless: Alan had a score of 103 (evenly distributed subtests); Benjamin had a score of 105 (more unevenly distributed).

Fifteen months:

At the fifteen-month observation, both boys scored 111 in their testing. The psychologist noted of Alan: 'A quality of deftness and decisiveness is characteristic—except in the interpersonal area'. Of Benjamin she reported an improvement in his motor coördination but remarked how entirely absorbed he was with a photographer's assistant who was present during the testing.

In general, neither of the two boys was noted to have a strong aversion to strangers: both were reported as being inclined to inspect new people without intense reaction. Each was able to stay with surrogate caretakers and each enjoyed play with older

children. Both preferred a strip of cloth to help them fall asleep during this period.

Their thing- and human-proclivities appeared manifest in subtler fashions and along more sophisticated routes. For example, although both showed a quality of persistence while attempting to master a task, the following differences were evident. Alan would stay at it for a while, leave it, and return later in an attempt to complete the task. Benjamin persevered as well, but, when matters became difficult, he regularly called for assistance—seeking the help of another person. The films of this period also emphasized their dispositions. Alan would show an intensity of feeling when some *thing* was taken from him; Benjamin would react when some *one* left. Alan could be distracted from his discomfort with an object and Benjamin by a person.

And finally it was noted that each boy could say exactly five words at age fifteen months. Alan's were Mommy, Dada, hello, goodbye, and *this*—a word he applied to a variety of different inanimate objects. Four of Benjamin's five words were 'people' words: Momma, Daddy, his sister's name, the maid's name, and *no*.

Twenty to twenty-four months:

Both children continued to have similar total I.Q. test scores.

In general each was reported as being attached to his father but nuances of difference were evident. Alan was described as 'sensing' the return of his absent father; in addition, it was reported that he showed a preference for him when both parents were around. Benjamin's attachment to his father was obviously quite intense; he would waken at the mere sound of his father's voice and seemed very sensitive to being even mildly reprimanded by him.

Alan was said to be able to play by himself 'for hours' in his room or in his sister's room. Benjamin, on the other hand, could only play by himself if he was with a group of other children. Alan would respond selectively to his mother's leaving; Benjamin would be upset if any of the four principal characters in

his life would leave. Both could be calmed in their distress: Alan by being distracted by some specific activity, Benjamin by being permitted to be the one to push the button that summoned the elevator for whomever was preparing to leave the apartment.

Alan's language reflected an increasing interest in the naming of objects: his expressive language, however, was below average. Benjamin's expressive language was above average.

Alan's mother described some evidence of his having developed a budding sense of right and wrong. She explained that when he was scolded appropriately he would merely sulk, but if scolded unfairly he would protest loudly. Benjamin's mother described a different process: her son seemed to be developing in the direction of a responsiveness to shame, reacting directly to being caught as well as to a reprimand by another person.

And finally, by the twentieth month, Alan was said to have developed a definite bed ritual involving touching his blanket and mouthing his fingers; Benjamin still liked his cloth at bedtime.

Twenty-seven to thirty-two months:

By now Alan required two plushy bears and a blanket before retiring at night. Benjamin still liked his blanket or cloth, but he began to insist on hugging or kissing his mother as part of a nightly ritual.

The special attachment that each boy showed to his father persisted. Both were increasing their contacts with their sisters and the friends of their sisters. Alan seemed more wary of strangers at this time, while Benjamin was reported as freely going to different people and obviously enjoyed being with them. Observers noted that Alan was 'more engaged with the inanimate' and also 'more organized and independent'. Alan's pleasure in mastery was evident during his play with *things;* Benjamin's was evident in his capacity to divine differences among *people* and use this knowledge to have them do things for him.

When asked about the existence of masturbatory activity during this period, Alan's mother replied, 'I should say not!'. Ben-

jamin's mother reported his playing with his penis in her presence. During this time Alan became preoccupied with riding a bicycle which he preferred to any other toy or activity; Benjamin was said to like any object with moving parts, e.g., a vacuum cleaner.

In the psychological tests, Alan continued to be impressive in his engagement of the materials used in the test; Benjamin showed a special ability to successfully name the various body parts of human figures. Their net scores were the same.

Thirty-six to forty-two months:

Both children were completely toilet trained by forty-two months, although it had taken Alan a few months longer to master urinary control. The description of the training period of each was quite striking. Alan's mother said that he had become fascinated by the task of getting his penis out of the opening of his trousers to make his 'weewee'. Benjamin, during his toilet training, initially wanted everyone present to watch and admire him and his achievements; later, however, he became shy about his toilet tasks and would only permit his father in the bathroom.

Alan appeared to be engaged in a wide variety of exploratory endeavors during this observation period and was described as developing an intense solemn concentration while doing practically anything. Benjamin's mother reported areas of intensity with his human relationships, especially as they involved his sister and his cousin.

Alan would fight with other children over possessions; with peers he was viewed neither as 'follower' nor 'leader' but rather as a 'loner'. Benjamin was actively involved in peer relationships and was thought to be a 'leader' by his mother. He would frequently be engaged in elaborate make-believe games, assuming the role of baby, or mother, or father while participating in 'play-house' games. It was noted that he frequently dramatized the actions of different characters while being read a story. Alan, on the other hand, was described by the psychologist as a 'very

prosaic and reality-oriented little boy whose fantasy life, such as it is, must be quite bare'. The two tested the same in gross total scores.

Alan's mother re-asserted her view about his developing an internal sense of right and wrong. And Benjamin's mother continued to describe him as responsive to shame and filled with apologies.

Forty-seven to fifty-two months:

Observers reported what they described as a 'stunning' change in affect in the two boys: they both appeared more charming and in general showed a greater freedom in affective expression. By fifty-two months each was described as having a 'girl friend'. Film analyses were in agreement with the impression of enhanced emotional mobilization.

Other observations, however, continued to reflect the specific *thing-human* dispositions within each boy. Alan, for example, was described as having only two friends; Benjamin was reported to have a wide circle of peer relationships which were sustained despite rifts. Alan was described as more task-oriented and more oriented toward specific concrete endeavors in the outer world; Benjamin appeared more involved in fantasy and in his inner world. Alan's interactional system seemed restricted; he appeared to be in a constant and intense struggle with his mother. Furthermore, most observers were of the opinion that he seemed to have internalized many of her standards. He seemed to be afraid of her and was prone to act in the ways she anticipated of him even in her absence. Benjamin's interactional system was described as more widespread. He seemed able to evoke more responses from people and seemed freer in his emotional-affective interplay.

Fifty-six to sixty-two months:

Alan scored 121 on his psychological test. It was noted that he showed a greater discomfort with the more abstract verbal material, but his interest could be regained with more structured tasks. Asked to portray a figure, Alan drew 'a seventeen-year-old

female pumpkin' with a big head, big eyes, and especially prominent teeth. 'She is hiding something in back of her from her Daddy', he said. 'Something she got for him. A piece of candy and a box of cigarettes.' Other than this example evidenced in his psychological test, restriction in Alan's fantasy life and in his capacity for symbolization continued to be noted.

Benjamin scored 121 on his psychological test. He was described as very coöperative. 'Even between the items', the psychologist wrote, 'he made an effort to keep the interaction between the examiner and himself going. . . '. Asked to portray a figure, he drew a large figure with a diamond-shaped head, no facial features, and a long skinny rectangular-shaped neck and body. He put two sticks on for legs, but the arms were totally omitted. 'He is my cousin', Benjamin said, 'who is laying down in bed 'cause his father shot him. . . '. In reply to a question, Benjamin added that he did not know why the father had shot the boy; then he hastily noted that this was an 'imagination' and not something that really happened. He then thought about his cousin and remarked spontaneously, in an attempt to quickly establish differences, 'I'm just a little baby and I am lighter than him. . . '.

Alan's varying characteristics were summed up as follows. He was reported as having one friend and of having remarked sadly that he was a lonely boy. He tended to reserve his physical affection for animals, especially his dog; he appeared to be in a continuous and persistent power struggle with his mother; he seemed interested in cars and a specific highway game, and he showed a special interest in policemen. All observers felt that Alan seemed to be very much like his mother. Some expressed concern for the direction of his fundamental sexual identifications. And finally, it was noted that he had difficulty in unstructured and spontaneous conversations, frequently replying 'I don't know' or 'Nothing' to the questions of peers or adults.

Benjamin's traits were described in this fashion. A boy with wide peerships who shows a variegated and differentiated interactional system with different people; he fights with his mother

but shows genuine affection for her as well; he is inclined to be actively involved in daydreams. Observers felt that Benjamin appeared to be more like his father. He was also worried about physical injuries; at times he would come indoors to take off his trousers to inspect himself to see if he had been damaged during play. He also showed a sophisticated capacity to empathize with his friends and to attempt to understand their motives. At about this time, Benjamin's parents reported that he had begun bed wetting.

Seventy-two months:

At age six, Alan's WISC score was 99 and Benjamin's was 107. Alan did better on the performance part and showed weakness in verbal abstraction. Benjamin's scores were more even although he did somewhat better in the verbal section. In the subtests, Alan scored significantly higher in object assembly. Benjamin held up well especially in the categories of information, comprehension, and picture arrangements. The two were equivalent in arithmetical abilities, block design, and coding.

The human figure drawings markedly favored Benjamin. The drawings dramatically reflect the differing capacity of each boy to conceptualize and portray the human figure at six years of age. (See, Figures I and II.) However, it was noted that Alan's drawing of a house was more advanced than was Benjamin's.

In the TAT, although both told stories of twosomes and threesomes, Alan seemed more involved with descriptions of dyadic relationships and Benjamin with triadic ones. For example, Alan's responses to Cards 5 and 6 were these stories:

> 5. Two bears in a cave . . . resting and one of them has his head up. The big one is laying down with his eyes shut. . . . (?) Thinking about the other bear . . . his relatives. (?) I don't know.
>
> 6. Two other bears in a crib. . . . Sleeping and looking at each other . . . holding hands. . . . The relatives of the other bear. Living in a house.



Fig. 1: Alan's Drawing



Fig. 2: Benjamin's Drawing

Benjamin's replies were these:

5. Cubs and a mommy bear and a daddy . . . in a cave. They're sleeping except for the baby bear . . . (?) sees a stick and a leaf . . . they make noise! [What kind?] I don't know.

6. Baby in a crib . . . mommy and daddy . . . baby bears . . . mommy and daddy still up . . . not in the room with the babies, talking. (?) let's go out the window. (?) Want to go out to play.

On the Rorschach, the two gave equivalent numbers of responses. Alan showed a greater interest in details and was involved with 'holes' and spaces. Most of his responses were animate but he had at least four inanimate ones and two anatomical responses. Benjamin showed many more popular responses than did Alan; all but one were animate. He showed an interest in protruberances, e.g., tails and noses. Alan's responses to Cards II and VI, for example, were:

II. 1: (turns card) I don't know . . . inside of a throat.

2: water dripping down (red at bottom).
VI. 1: some kind of bug . . . I don't know . . . crawling.
2: A pipeline going down here.

Benjamin's responses to the same cards were:

II. 1: Looks like something like in your body . . . a face of bones . . . looks like a nose.
2: Little bugs going across there and things sticking out here.
VI. 1: A funny bug or a wild cat. . . . Four legs and whiskers . . . a nose . . . killed or a stuffed one on the floor . . . laying down and feet out . . . doesn't look alive.

V

The discussion of this data will engage four issues: 1, general hypotheses about the category itself; 2, a description of other categories which appear to cluster regularly with either human- or thing-leanings; 3, a description of traits which appear to emerge quite apart from animate or inanimate object-disposition; and 4, notes on the influence of each orientation on evolving phases and functions.

HYPOTHESES

The hypothesis is offered that human-orientedness and thing-orientedness are reciprocally complementary characteristics. It is likely that an initial increase in one stream reduces the current available for the other. Each particular attribute seems to have its own developmental potentials. The implication is that each is equivalently adaptive providing neither is of an extreme degree. For example, the natural scientist and the social scientist each pursues his interests; the pleasures, rewards, and successes are contingent on many features other than merely the fundamental direction implied in each endeavor. The value of different milieus are such, however, that within any specific setting a tendency toward one leaning or another may be regarded as more worthy.

A second hypothesis may be stated as follows. When such a leaning appears, it may emerge as a variant relatively independent of the libidinal or aggressive strivings of infants and children, or of characteristic conflicts occurring at different developmental phases. Therefore if it does not exceed limits, the variant may be understood as influencing merely the channelization of drive expression and the experiencing and resolution of phase conflicts. No definite impression arises that such leanings are derivatives of shifts from body attitudes or are direct reflections of caretaker-child interactions. Thus, in this study there was no certain evidence that either disposition was imposed on infants by a specifically oriented milieu. In a particular foster home it was as likely that one leaning might occur as the other; similarly no clear correlation between adopted mothers and their children existed concerning these dispositions. If anything could be inferred at all, the method of matched samplings appears to have added further evidence to accumulating research data which suggest such leanings may have important congenital elements. The evidence of influence through the genetic code can be inferred from the literature on sex differences (Maccoby, 1966); the evidence of an intra-uterine determinant can be inferred from the work on the frequently recurring differences noted within sets of monozygotic twins (e.g., Allen, et al., 1971); in addition, there is evidence that paranatal factors may also play a role (Cohen, et al., 1972). Work in linguistics and certain neurological findings, cited earlier, add further weight to the 'constitutional' argument. Naturally, this in no way diminishes the possible influence or importance of situational factors in the development or accentuation of such leanings (see, Stern, 1971).

CLUSTERING OF FUNCTIONS

Other functions or tendencies of the personality appear regularly to cluster about an orientedness. It is still uncertain whether this is a result of chance, mutual influence, or some as yet unrecognized superordinate interlacing variable. A correlation exists, for example, between thing-oriéntedness and evi-

dence of early motor skills and strength. Thus, on a comparative basis in this study, thing-oriented children appear to be somewhat heavier and stronger than their 'person' counterparts, especially during infancy. Such gross motor differences seem to fade by the end of the first year of life. Fine motor abilities are generally equivalent. The infants more prone to thing-orientedness give the impression of a preference for sensory modalities of a distal sort, (e.g., vision, hearing) while those more human-oriented show a proclivity for proximal stimuli (e.g., touch, proprioception). Similarly, thing-oriented infants appear to carve out a wider span in space, visually at first and in their travels when they begin to crawl about, while the human-oriented infants show a narrower spatial frame of reference. Hence, and perhaps as a consequence of all of this, the former give the impression of outer-directedness while the latter—despite their attentiveness to persons—give an impression of an inward-directedness, at least in the beginning.

INDEPENDENT FUNCTIONS

Other attributes emerge and co-exist independent of either leaning. For example, certain basic physiological processes reflected in eating patterns and sleep cycles appear to have no correlations with either variance. Also, early developmental landmarks (such as the smile) occur at similar times in both, although maturational landmarks (e.g., motor development, teeth eruption, establishment of cerebral dominance) may vary considerably. To the degree that it is possible to assess it by the means employed in this study, the expressions of libidinal and aggressive striving appear equivalent in each grouping, albeit frequently channeled differently.

In addition, affective dispositions seem unrelated to either inclination; orchestration, intensity, and range of affect vary similarly within the two sets observed. However, while a member of the first may show a profound affective engagement with possessions, someone in the second may show it with people.

Certain cognitive proclivities emerge at similar times, al-

though here, too, they may be deployed differently. One is the function of differentiation; it may reflect itself in a greater ability to distinguish assorted items in the first group, while the second is developing a firmer competence in distinguishing the subtleties of affective meanings in the human face.

The capacity for situational adaptability also moves in its own autonomous direction, although a thing-oriented child may be more readily diverted by a variety of stimulating circumstances which permit the expression of his curiosity while his person-oriented counterpart is more reactive to human contact. Both may be active initiators of the object world, but while the one is more active in respect to the exploration and the manipulation of items and possessions, the other initiates more exchanges with people while assuming what is frequently described as a 'passive-receptive' relationship to them.

And finally transitional phenomena appear as often in each disposition as do interests in the nonhuman animate world of pets; apparently a plushy teddy bear or the family dog can be a bridge not only from 'outside' to 'inside' but from either orientation to the other.

TRANSFORMATIONS AND INFLUENCES

When more complex functions evolve, the earlier leanings continue to cast their influence on further development in clear, at times even dramatic fashion. Although certain cognitive capacities appear similar at first (albeit deployed differently), consistently the more thing-oriented infants move forward toward a surer development of certain conceptual abilities, while human-oriented infants deploy toward interactional skills. Similarly, although the separation-individuation phase may unfold parallel in both, a more human-disposed child usually shows a slightly earlier onset, a more specific and direct responsiveness, and greater evidence of practicing during the separation experience. The more thing-oriented child shows a greater freedom in exploration and a giftedness in coördinating activities and in play with toys which seems to make him more capable of en-

gaging functional procedures toward the goal of effecting individuation. However, the final achievement of the separation-individuation process appears equivalent in both.

When affects which presage functions of regulation and inhibition become differentiated, the child with thing-oriented leanings seems more involved with struggles in self-control; he may have a tendency toward an earlier internalization of rules and standards. The child with human-oriented leanings may be more responsive to the affect of embarrassment; his controls appear to be built more on the products of relationships.

Training issues are characterized essentially as 'tasks' for the more thing-oriented child; for the human-disposed infant, they are characterized as acts in the spectrum of approval or disapproval. Task-orientation and achievement-orientation soon move on toward still further proclivity for exploratory preoccupations and work interests in the first group along with an apparent enhancement of certain cognitive traits involving coördination, assembly, concepts of inside and outside, as well as other conceptual skills; the second group becomes more involved with situational activities replete with role assignments and thrusts toward fantasy. Playing 'house' typifies the latter. In effect, a preoccupation with processes and functions occupies the first group; imagination and interactions, the second.

Speech also is clearly and regularly influenced by such leanings—an early trend toward thing-naming in the first, an early drift toward people-naming in the second, together with a greater interactional speech. And, the more thing-oriented child is inclined to show earlier evidence of the establishment of cerebral dominance as manifested, for example, by the assertion of handedness.

If earlier impressions were that the more thing-oriented children are more outer-directed, by the third year of life they appeared more inclined to be motivated by inner determinants and resources, a distinction which seems to persist thereafter.

Thing-orientedness and human-orientedness also cast their impact on the surrounding milieu. As parents adapt themselves

to the proclivities of their infants, quite early the parents of the first group discover that 'fussiness' can be diminished and distractions achieved by offering 'things' for inspection and engagement; parents of the second group, on the other hand, discover that they need to offer themselves. When seeking to assert their authority or impose controls, each parent group knows precisely what affective string to pluck and what kind of threat to pose. The dispositions of infants are re-enforced in the milieu, as implements in evolving strategies are cycled back into the psychologic system, and thus inevitably emerge as traits of character.

SUMMARY

This paper describes individual variations of inclinations either toward the human-world or toward the inanimate-world. Because the material is based on an intensive longitudinal study involving only small numbers, despite more than a decade of systematically accumulated data our impressions must still be regarded as preliminary. The fate of these variations appear diverse. 1. A continuous influence of one leaning or the other may make itself known directly by a persistence of orientedness reflected in style, symptoms, or traits of character. 2. The inclination may also make itself known indirectly, through impact on other involving functions, e.g., task-orientation and enhanced cognitive development on the one hand, or interactional skills and a propensity for the imaginative on the other. 3. Later phase organizations and concomitant reintegrations and transformations of functions and processes may erase or shift the dispositions altogether because of adaptive, defensive, or developmental pressures, or as a consequence of environmental insistence.

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Spoken Words in Dreams

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SPOKEN WORDS IN DREAMS

A CRITIQUE OF THE VIEWS OF OTTO ISAKOWER

BY CHARLES FISHER, M.D.

In 1974 Baudry confirmed Isakower's original and important concept that the spoken word in dreams may be a manifestation of the superego, but found that this is not always true and that there may be important contributions from drive and defense, according to the principle of multiple function. The particular type of dream speech most emphasized by Isakower—that characterized by a portentous, ominous, threatening, awe-inspiring, oracular tone—is extremely rare in dreams but may be observed in certain waking phenomena, e.g., psychotic delusions of self-observation or situations of life-threatening stress.

During a ten-year period from 1938 to 1948, Otto Isakower (1938, 1939, 1954), wrote three papers which have become psychoanalytic classics. These papers were original and imaginative, written in an elegant and spare style, with a rich use of metaphor and analogy. Isakower never used an unnecessary page, or, for that matter, an unnecessary word, the length of these three remarkable papers coming to a total of only twenty-eight pages and representing his entire published work.[1]

In his first paper (1938) on the pathopsychology of phenomena associated with falling asleep, he described the symptom complex which has become known as the Isakower phenomenon. Isakower was primarily interested in those ego and superego regressions that occur on falling asleep but also in processes of structural reintegration during waking from sleep.

This is a slightly expanded version of the discussion of a paper by Dr. Francis Baudry presented at the New York Psychoanalytic Society, February 11, 1975. The paper had been published previously in This QUARTERLY, XLIII, pp. 581-605 (see, Baudry, 1974).

[1] A paper written in 1945 on Johannes Mueller has been published posthumously (Isakower, 1974).

In his second paper (1939) on the exceptional position of the auditory sphere, Isakower suggested the following formula: 'just as the nucleus of the ego is the body-ego, so the human auditory sphere, as modified in the direction of a capacity for language, is to be regarded as the nucleus of the super-ego' (pp. 345-346). He believed that this aspect of the superego comes to light in certain circumstances: for example, 'when the integrity of the personality is threatened from within, the super-ego reveals both its history and its genesis . . . [and] also of what its nucleus consists' (p. 346). He gave the following examples.

First, delusions of observation, which originally suggested the concept of the superego to Freud, consist of 'alarming experiences in the realm of hearing: a keen awareness of cadences in the speech of the people around, an importing of deeper meaning into what is heard, falsifications of auditory perception and finally auditory hallucinations' (p. 346).

Second, he described a schizophrenic patient who experienced what he called 'self-talking' in critical situations during which 'he was obliged to repeat aloud over and over: "I am Max Koch from Alland" ' (p. 346). When the ego of this psychotic patient was threatened with disruption, it affirmed its existence by a magic formula. It was the speaking aloud in this patient that led Isakower to believe that he was dealing with a regressive superego manifestation.

In a final third example, Isakower noted that in situations of sudden danger to life, a deeper insight into the nature of the superego can be obtained. He quoted an experience described by Freud (1891) on the two occasions when he felt his life endangered. In both instances there was a sudden perceptual experience accompanied by the thought, 'Now it's all up with you'. In the moment of danger Freud heard these words as though someone were shouting them in his ear. Isakower remarks on the superego character of these words, 'which sound like the pronouncement of judgement by a powerful authority' (p. 347). It was this sort of oracular pronouncement of the superego that especially fascinated him.

In a striking and characteristic passage he summarizes the linguistic phenomena associated with both falling asleep and waking up.

> One might say that going to sleep itself is a case of 'crossing the frontiers of speech'. . . . [There is a] flaring-up of linguistic activity . . . a bright flickering-up of the auditory sphere before it is completely extinguished. Perhaps all this is only another aspect of the fact that before the 'censor', whom we know so well, withdraws, he seizes the opportunity of making his voice heard once more very forcibly. What we see here is not so much *content* that is characteristic of the super-ego but almost exclusively the tone and shape of a well-organized grammatical structure, which is the feature which we believe should be ascribed to the super-ego.
>
> At the moment of waking up, the linguistic auditory phenomena present themselves in a much briefer and more succinct form. It often happens in this way that a word or short sentence still reaches a dreamer, while he is waking up, like a call, and this call has very often a super-ego tinge, sometimes threatening, sometimes criticizing—words for which the dreamer, as he wakes up, feels an inexplicable respect, although they are very often a quite unintelligible jargon (Isakower, 1939, p. 348).

In his third paper on the spoken word in dreams, Isakower (1954) made the formulation that *'speech elements in dreams are a direct contribution from the superego to the manifest content of the dream'* (p. 3). But I wish to emphasize that he gave only a single example of speech in dreams and noted that it was an atypical one. It was the dream of a thirty-year-old man whose 'extramarital escapades caused him a lot of trouble. He was very fond of housemaids and Wagner operas' (p. 3). He had attended a performance of Lohengrin the night before. The early part of the dream contained a direct speech: ' "How much this Lohengrin is costing me already!" '. This mildly self-critical speech was interpreted as a manifestation of the superego. *But after waking, while recalling the dream,* the dreamer *half heard,* half *said to himself* the phrase, ' "Your swinish love life . . . shall yet come into the open" '. Immediately he saw this was nonsense.

Isakower selected this example, I believe, more for the second part, having to do with the waking experience, than for the earlier dream speech. The former is an example of the recrossing of the barrier of speech from sleep to waking. The two speech elements differed in character but had the same meaning, namely, guilt over his 'swinish' love life and fears of exposure. The first speech was integrated with the rest of the dream; its meaning was disguised, and it had been subjected to secondary revision. The second speech was undisguised, straightforward, emphatic, blunt, threatening, vindictive.

Isakower ended this third article as follows: 'I am aware that a renewed approach to the structural problems of the dream theory, like the one which is herewith briefly introduced, calls, in turn, for still more far-reaching suppositions regarding the nature of the superego' (p. 6). What these suppositions were we never learned because the sensitive and articulate voice of Otto Isakower fell silent for the last twenty-five years of his life, except for the following personal communications to Baudry (1974), reported in his recent paper on the spoken word in dreams.

1. The superego affixes its stamp on the dream during the process of secondary revision, not before.
2. The spoken word is accompanied by partial awakening and the re-establishment of the censorship.
3. Any spoken words, even those that do not manifestly imply a judgment or evaluation of the dream, are considered evidence of the functioning of the superego.
4. The dream takes place on an optical level; the appearance of the spoken word implies a shift in level of consciousness toward the waking state.
5. Linguistic phenomena originate solely in the superego; the principle of multiple function is not applicable since drive and defense contributions are simply extensions of superego activity.

Baudry has effectively subjected most of these formulations to critical examination and I shall comment on the others shortly. He is to be commended for undertaking this first systematic investigation of Isakower's hypothesis about the spoken word

in dreams and for his successful application of the principle of multiple function in this analysis. He does confirm Isakower's original and important contribution that the spoken word in dreams *may be* a manifestation of the superego. But his data also clearly indicate that this is not true of all spoken words and that there may be important contributions from drive and defense.

Baudry also confirms my own impression that examples of the particular type of dream speech that so intrigued Isakower—namely, those with the portentous, ominous, threatening, awe-inspiring, oracular tone—are extremely rare or perhaps do not belong to the dream at all. He noted that words in the hypnagogic and hypnopompic phases of sleep are more likely to have a superego tinge than those words safely tucked away in the beginning or middle parts of dreams.

Both hypnagogic and hypnopompic phenomena generally arise out of nondreaming (NREM) sleep. Sometimes, however, spontaneous awakenings from REM dreams may involve hypnopompic superego speech phenomena with the ominous quality stressed by Isakower, but he gives no examples of this. A dream reported by Baudry in which there was actually breaching of the speech barrier is the nearest thing we have to this. The subject shouted, 'No! No!', grabbed her husband's thigh, then awakened. In this instance a primitive superego injunction was evoked, namely, the incorporated parental 'No! No!'. However, this was an atypical example which involved actual sleep talking.

It seems to me that Isakower somehow went astray in his analysis of the spoken word in dreams because he tried to apply to this analysis his formulations about certain superego manifestations that actually took place during waking, not during sleep or dreaming. For example, the postdream experience of the patient with the 'swinish' love life actually occurred while the patient was *awake and trying to recall the dream*. Although its content was related to the preceding dream it was a *waking phenomenon*. Other supporting examples involved altered states of psychotic waking consciousness, e.g., delusions of self-observation or the incident, 'I am Max Koch from Alland', or certain

highly stressful situations, as in Freud's experiences when he believed his end had come. Isakower's contention that speech phenomena of dreams not infrequently have a portentous, awe-inspiring character and tone, peculiarly reminiscent of 'oracles', is not supported by Baudry's data nor by my own experience. I believe it is true that the crossing of the speech barrier in the reverse direction from sleep to waking may be the situation in which the superego speaks in its loudest and most ominous tones because it is during the waking process that it becomes more thoroughly re-established in its censorship function, and to this extent Isakower may be correct. But this formulation may not be applicable to the spoken word in dreams. However harshly the superego may express itself in dreams in other modalities—for instance, the visual—in relation to the spoken word, its voice is rather muted. It must be remembered that it is the essence of dreaming that in the regression of sleep there is relaxation of the censorship so that drive derivatives find an outlet for discharge.

I believe that Isakower attempted to utilize the paradigm of the crossing of the speech barrier from sleep to awakening as the model for the spoken word in dreams and to this end made the formulations noted in his communications to Baudry. In my opinion, some of the formulations are tendentious and open to serious question. Isakower insisted that the dream takes place on an optical level, the appearance of spoken words implying a shift in consciousness toward the waking state. Indeed, he seemed to imply that spoken words are not part of the dream at all, that the real dream is purely visual. I would emphasize that dreaming represents hallucinatory activity in *all* sensory modalities: visual, auditory, linguistic, kinesthetic, and tactile. There is no evidence from recent research in the field of REM sleep that the hallucinated spoken word is any closer to waking than hallucinations in visual or other sensory modalities. Although REM sleep is a state of marked activation it is, paradoxically, one of the deepest stages of sleep. It has been shown that there are physiological concomitants of audio-linguistic phenomena in dreams in the form of movements of the lips and external laryngeal mus-

cles and contractions of the tensor tympani and stapedius muscles of the middle ear, but this physiological activity no more induces arousal than the eye movements which accompany visual dreaming. All that can be said is that dreams are almost continuously visual, hallucinations in other sensory modalities being discontinuous and less frequent. Finally, Isakower (1939) did make an important contribution which has not been followed up by other investigators: namely, that special kind of superego manifestation of speech in which the words have a portentous, emphatic, threatening, vindictive, oracular tone, that special 'tone and shape of a well-organized grammatical structure' (p. 348) which he believed to be the striking feature belonging to the superego. But this phenomenon is not characteristic of dream speech.

Isakower's data suggesting that the superego speaks in its most intense tones during NREM hypnopompic states finds some support in my own recent observations on night terrors. These are actually examples of crossing of the speech barrier from the deepest stage of NREM sleep to waking and they may be associated not only with bloodcurdling screams and cries, but with a considerable amount of more or less *coherent sleep talking*. The night terror is acted out in a dissociated waking state, which arises out of Stage 4 NREM sleep and is not associated with REM sleep (Fisher, et al., 1973, 1974). Baudry mentions that the vocalization in such night terrors is not subject to analysis but this is not strictly true. Many of the night terrors have verbalized content revolving around threats to life or fears of dying and, in a good many instances, of being alone and abandoned. There are frequent calls for help, sometimes to mother, and often a direct pleading. One subject, for instance, cried out in a terrified and anguished voice and repeated several times, 'Oh, Oh, I can't, I love you, please Mommy, please Mommy, I love you'. During this speech her heart rate doubled. I suggest that in these night terrors the ego is responding to the fear that the superego will be angry with it, punish it, or cease to protect

or love it. Freud (1926) stated, 'The final transformation which the fear of the super-ego undergoes is . . . the fear of death . . . which is a fear of the super-ego projected on to the powers of destiny' (p. 140).

The sleep talking of the night terror, the self-talking of Max Koch from Alland, and the auditory phenomena reported by Freud when threatened by death, are susceptible to an explanation other than in superego terms. Edelheit (1969) has suggested that talking to one's self in situations of stress is due to the dependence of the sense of identity on the self-monitoring of speech, a primitive mechanism that persists throughout life. With regression of the ego under great stress, as in night terrors, threats to life, or psychotic disintegration of the ego, this auditory feedback mechanism is re-activated and *one talks to one's self out loud.*

Freud (1900) stated that invariably he was able to relate the spoken word in dreams to actual speeches or written material of the day before. Baudry's inability to do this except in a single instance is in accord with my own experience. I have pondered the question at some length and suggest the following.

As part of his genius, Freud had extraordinary powers of perception and memory; there is evidence that he was probably eidetic. He remarked on two occasions that he possessed a 'phonographic' or photographic memory. The first was when he wrote out the second half of the 1916-1917 Vienna Lectures and later delivered them without text, word for word (Freud, 1933, p. 5). On the second occasion he related that he had no time to prepare for his medical examinations but, 'In the period of tension before my final medical examination I must have made use once more of what remained of this faculty, for in some subjects I gave the examiners, as though it were automatically, answers which faithfully followed the words of the textbook that I had skimmed through only once in the greatest haste' (Freud, 1901, p. 135).

I believe that it was because of this eidetic memory that Freud was able, much better than most of us, to remember precisely

what he said to the patient or what the patient said to him or to recall written material, and that this was of great help in tracking down verbal day residues. Another possible explanation is that many spoken words in dreams are derived from either subliminally heard or read material, or from that type of indifferent impression that Freud (1900) spoke about, namely, something briefly noticed but from which attention cathexis is quickly withdrawn; such impressions are not retrievable. It is also possible that Freud had a special capacity for recovering subliminal and indifferent impressions and possessed a pathway from registration to consciousness more permeable than the ordinary run of humanity (Fisher, 1957).

SUMMARY

Isakower's formulation that speech elements in dreams are direct contributions from the superego to the manifest content of the dream appears to be a partial truth. Baudry confirmed Isakower's contention, but also showed that speech in dreams has multiple functions involving important contributions from drive and defense. In his paper on the subject Isakower gave only a single, atypical example of speech in dreams—the speech occurring during waking while the patient was recalling his dream. The particular type of speech that intrigued Isakower—that in which the words have a portentous, emphatic, threatening, vindictive, oracular tone—appears to be rather rare in dreams, and the examples that Isakower gives were associated with psychotic phenomena, such as delusions of self-observation or instances of life-threatening stress. Baudry suggested that speech emanating from the superego is more likely to be related to hypnagogic and hypnopompic phases of sleep. I believe that Isakower went astray in his analysis of the spoken word in dreams because he tried to apply to this analysis his formulations about certain superego manifestations that actually take place during waking. Isakower's utilization of the paradigm of the crossing of the speech barrier from sleep to awakening as the model for the spoken word in dreams does not appear to be tenable.

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Gilbert's First Night Anxiety

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GILBERT'S FIRST NIGHT ANXIETY

BY LEON E. A. BERMAN, M.D.

W. S. Gilbert, librettist of the Gilbert and Sullivan operas, suffered from such extreme anxiety at the opening night performance of his plays that he was unable to remain in the theater. This paper explores the dynamics behind Gilbert's first night anxiety, utilizing his literary works as well as biographical and autobiographical sources.

INTRODUCTION

W. S. Gilbert's current fame rests mainly on the fourteen Savoy Operas set to the music of his collaborator, Arthur S. Sullivan, but these represent only a fraction of his works. He also made other significant contributions to the English theater—musical pieces, melodramas, burlesques, pantomimes, farces—and wrote verses and short stories. Although he has been extensively studied by Victorian scholars and biographers, in a review of the psychoanalytic literature I found only one published psychoanalytic study: *The Fantasies of W. S. Gilbert* (Brenner, 1952). In this paper, Brenner describes the inconsistencies in Gilbert's character and makes some important observations on the themes that dominated his literary works.

Among the many interesting facets of Gilbert's personality, one is of particular psychoanalytic significance. He had what some of his biographers describe as a 'phobia' for opening nights. As curtain time approached, he would become so overwhelmed with panic that he could not remain in the theater and would spend the night in a pub or walking the streets of London. Cellier and Bridgeman (1927) describe Gilbert as suffering from 'an attack of nervous debility' on the first night of *Gretchen*, one of his early plays, produced in 1879. He spent that evening walk-

Earlier versions of this paper were read before the Michigan and Denver Psychoanalytic Societies.

ing the streets, returning only when the last members of the audience were leaving the theater, and timidly asked a stranger, 'Is the play over?' (p. 134).

Miss Jessie Bond, quoted in Baily (1966), describes Gilbert at the opening night of *Yeomen of the Guard:*

> Before the curtain went up I sat down by my spinning wheel ready to sing. Gilbert rushed on very agitated. 'Is everything right, Jessie?' he asked. 'Is everything right?' I told him it was and off he went. Within a few seconds he was back again. 'Are you sure you're all right, Jessie?' 'Yes, Yes!' I stammered, anxious only to be left to myself. 'I'm quite all right.' With that, he kissed me, danced about the stage in a sort of panicky excitement and vanished again. But once more he came on, and there were more kisses, more dances, and more inquiries. All this time we could hear the orchestra on the other side of the curtain and knew that the overture must soon be finished. The fussing interference became intolerable. At last I simply had to insist that he should leave me. 'Please go, Mr. Gilbert', I demanded. 'Please go.' In another minute he had left the theatre and my song had begun (p. 317).

This symptom is particularly striking in Gilbert because it stands out against a brilliantly successful career. His plays were enormously popular and earned him a fortune. He was acclaimed as one of England's most beloved playwrights. Yet throughout his long and illustrious career, he could seldom witness the opening night of one of his plays. Goldberg (1928) quotes from The Manchester Guardian: 'he belonged to that small portion of the British public who never saw a public performance of a Gilbert-Sullivan opera' (p. 65).[1]

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

William Schwenck Gilbert was born in London in 1836, seven months before Queen Victoria ascended to the throne. His mother, Anne Morris, was the daughter of a physician. His

[1] This is an exaggeration; Gilbert saw a number of his plays produced after the opening night.

father was a Naval surgeon who, after receiving a sizable inheritance, retired and spent the remainder of his life traveling and writing. W. S. Gilbert thus spent most of his childhood traveling on the continent with his parents and three younger sisters.

Gilbert's biographers mention virtually nothing about his mother, but his father was well known. William Gilbert senior was an irascible, opinionated eccentric who was constantly quarreling and involved in controversy. After his son began to make a name for himself as a writer, the father decided to do the same. He produced ponderous novels and biographies, three of which were illustrated by his son. He wrote children's fairy stories and tales of the supernatural; his favorite subjects were insanity and murder. His works were never considered noteworthy, but the elder Gilbert took them very seriously. An example of his explosive temper occurred when he destroyed all the copies of one of his novels because the proofs had been carelessly corrected.

The son's personality was a carbon copy of his father's. In school he was domineering, highly competitive, and generally unpopular. After taking his bachelor's degree, he spent four boring years as a government clerk. His tedious clerkship came to an end when he inherited some money from an aunt, which he used to finance his admission to the Bar. He practiced for four years as a lawyer without success, mainly because of his anxiety when speaking in public and his uncontrollable temper. Earlier, at about age twenty, he had left home. His father's home had become intolerable. His parents constantly quarreled and eventually separated. Gilbert's sympathies were usually with his father, with whom he was so closely identified.

Even as he rose in stature as a playwright and made significant contributions to the English theater, Gilbert's personality won him another kind of fame. He was a tyrant at rehearsals. He would fly into rages, resort to biting sarcasm, and often bully the people with whom he worked. Yet at other times he could be kind, sympathetic, and remarkably patient, repeating lines over and over until the actor read them perfectly. He was obsessed

with precision, and demanded that every word be spoken and every movement executed just as he had written it. Although this caused the actors many hours of anguish and they lived in terror of his whip-like tongue, they greatly respected him for it. His efforts led to the replacement of mawkish, undisciplined troupes of actors by well-drilled companies and brought a high standard of excellence to the English theater. Toward the young women in his company, he showed a protective, fatherly concern, and he enforced a strict moral code. He was instrumental in changing the image of the actress from that of a near prostitute to a respected professional who could be received in Victorian drawing rooms.

Gilbert's relations with others were marked by bitter quarrels which often became prolonged feuds. He was quick to take offense and always felt himself the injured party, but was usually the first to apologize. He had a strict, ironclad sense of fairness which could not abide the slightest compromise. His letters are filled with long lists of grievances demanding redress, while protesting his own innocence. He was an astute businessman who amassed a fortune; he demanded, and usually got, every penny he felt was due him, but would not think of taking one penny more. He could not tolerate what he experienced as injury or insult. Like his father, he wrote seething letters to all manner of persons and agencies, complaining about everything from the noise made by his neighbor's servants to the quality of the postal service, usually ending with the threat to 'place this matter at once in the hands of my solicitor'.

His collaboration with Sullivan not only produced one of the greatest theatrical successes in the English language but also an enormous financial success. However, their relationship was continually marred by quarrels and misunderstandings. Their personalities could not have been more opposite. Gilbert tended to be cantankerous and offensive; Sullivan was charming, ingratiating, and well liked. Gilbert was serious, overly conscientious, and driven by a boundless energy that often kept him working all night; Sullivan was easygoing, pleasure-loving and somewhat

lackadaisical toward their work. He considered himself a classical composer and looked upon the operas as trifling and a prostitution of his talent in spite of the real enjoyment they brought him. Gilbert was the innovator and the catalyst who drove the team forward, often having to inspire and encourage his partner. When the final break came between them, it left in Gilbert a wound that would never heal. There has been much speculation about the causes of this rift, but whatever the reason, it is a sad irony that this partnership, which produced the plays many have called the perfect union of words and music, should itself end in such bitter discord.

Gilbert married at the age of thirty-one. In his relationship with his wife can be seen the soft side of his personality that he shielded so effectively from the outside world behind his bristling hostility. His bride was seventeen when they married, and he treated her like a fragile child. His letters to her express great tenderness and a parental concern for her well-being. They lived quite happily together for forty-three years, until his death. They had no children. Gilbert however was very fond of children and famous for the elaborate children's parties he used to give at his country estate.

In contrast to his relation with his wife, the letters Gilbert exchanged with his parents are remarkably cold and formal. They are mainly concerned with his acting as intermediary in the parent's quarrels and attempting to negotiate financial arrangements following their separation. He usually sided with his father, and his letters to him suggest some reserved filial affection and loyalty. But with his mother he was stiff and aloof. Their letters read like a correspondence between lawyer and client, and are utterly devoid of feeling.

Gilbert mellowed somewhat in his later years. He traveled extensively, then settled down to the life of a country squire and sat as Justice of the Peace. In 1907 he was knighted by Edward VII. He died in 1911 at the age of seventy-five. He had invited two young ladies to his home to teach them to swim in his pond. One of the girls got beyond her depth and called for

help; Gilbert plunged in to help her, and died of a heart attack in the attempt.

THE THEME OF THE DIVIDED MAN

One of the characteristic themes that run through Gilbert's literary works is the theme of the divided man. One meets characters with divided attitudes, allegiances, affections, and even bodies. The theme is best illustrated by the character of Strephon in the opera *Iolanthe*. Because his mother was a fairy whereas his father was a mortal, Strephon is a combination: fairy down to the waist, but with mortal legs. Thus, he complains, although his fairy upper half can creep through a keyhole, his mortal legs must stay behind. An earlier version of this theme appeared in a musical piece, *Ages Ago,* which Gilbert wrote thirteen years before *Iolanthe*. In this play, portraits come to life and leave their frames to walk about the stage, except for one who was painted half length; because he has no legs he cannot leave his frame.

In other operas one can detect variations of this theme. The Gondoliers, Marco and Giuseppe, reign as one individual. No one knows which one is the rightful king who was betrothed in childhood. Since they are both now reigning as one individual, only one half of them has been betrothed and they complain of having been 'bisected' in marriage. The theme is also expressed in the Gilbertian characters who combine two roles within a single person. Ko-Ko, in *The Mikado,* is both executioner and victim, since he cannot cut off another's head until he has cut off his own; and the Lord Chancellor in *Iolanthe* must apply to himself for permission to marry his own ward. These are characters divided against themselves.

Scholars have related the divided man theme in Gilbert's works to a popular literary motif of the times: the symbolic representation of the dual nature of man—the physical and the spiritual. But a psychoanalytic study of this theme suggests a more personal origin.

To trace the roots of this theme, it is appropriate to begin with that literary work giving clearest expression to Gilbert's unconscious fantasies: *The Bab Ballads*. These are a series of 'nonsense verses', one hundred thirty-seven in all, published between 1862 and 1884 in the comic journal Fun. The name 'Bab', short for baby, was Gilbert's childhood nickname, and the name he chose to sign to the little cartoon illustrations he drew to accompany his verses. On reading through *The Bab Ballads* one is impressed by the themes of bloody murder, assassination, torture, and cannibalism with which they abound. Nevertheless most students of Gilbert have continued to cherish them as 'delightful nonsense'. The 'nonsense' label has granted them immunity from being taken seriously, and this was obviously Gilbert's intention when he subtitled them, 'much sound and little sense'.

Among the many ballads that describe all manner of bloody killings, the theme of a man being decapitated or cut in half occurs with striking regularity. The Ballad of the Phantom Head tells of decapitated heads seeking new bodies to which to become attached. The Ballad of Annie Protheroe describes her love for a public headsman:

> She loved a skilled mechanic, who was famous in his day—
> A gentle executioner whose name was Gilbert Clay
> (Gilbert, 1862-1884, p. 200).

When the headsman learns that his tomorrow's victim is a former rival, he plans to revenge himself by slowly lacerating the neck of his victim with a dull hatchet. The ballad goes on to describe vividly how he prepared his instrument:

> He chipped it with a hammer and he chopped it with a bill,
> He poured sulphuric acid on the edge of it, until
> This terrible Avenger of the Majesty of Law
> Was far less like a hatchet than a dissipated saw (p. 201).

While decapitation was a popular subject in the grisly Victorian literature, the idea of a man being cut in half was not, and yet it appears even more frequently in *The Bab Ballads*. The Ballad of Thomas Winterbottom Hance describes a cele-

brated swordsman who practices his skill by slicing things in half. A ballad set in Scotland sings the praises of a famous piper, Clonglocketty, whose pipings fascinate a pretty Colleen but irritate a visiting Englishman who draws his sword and divides him at the waist. An accompanying cartoon vividly depicts the lower half of Clonglocketty separated from his trunk, while the Englishman strolls off with his girl. Another variation on this theme appears in The Ballad of the Captain and the Mermaids. The Captain displays his shapely legs to an admiring school of mermaids, but this makes the mermen jealous, so they cut off the Captain's legs and replace them with a tail.

One of the most bizarre ballads is that of A. and B. the Sensation Twins. These twin brothers are caricatures of masculinity and femininity. One is tall and thin, with a huge nose, and completely bald. The other is short, stout, with no nose at all, and long, curly hair. To those who ridicule their strange appearance, the twins reply:

> If you complain we're badly planned,
> Why all you've got to do,
> Is add us both together and
> Divide the sum by two! (p. 124).

A Turkish armourer then appears on the scene who takes the twins at their word, and divides them both at the waist with one mighty smite of his sword. The ballad ends with a bizarre attempt at restitution.

> Perhaps they lived in severed bliss—
> Perhaps they groaned and died—
> Perhaps they joined themselves like this,
> And gave their legs a ride (p. 125).

Gilbert's accompanying cartoon shows the upper halves of the twins' bodies, the masculine and the feminine, rejoined at the waist to form a monstrous bisexual figure (Fig. 1).

The Ballad of Gentle Alice Brown tells of the lovely daughter of a robber who exchanges winks with a handsome stranger.



FIGURE 1

This so enrages her father that he decides to get his wife to chop up the young philanderer:

> He took a life preserver and he hit him on the head,
> And Mrs. Brown dissected him before she went to bed (p. 168).

Mrs. Brown's calm dissection introduces a further aspect to the origin of Gilbert's divided man theme. As the theme is crystallized out of *The Bab Ballads,* what emerges is not just the idea of a man being cut in half at the waist but a deliberate, surgical amputation.

In The Ballad of the Haughty Actor, a vain actor refuses to play a part he considers beneath him. That night he dreams that he goes to see a surgeon for a cut finger:

> To Surgeon Cobb he made a trip
> Who'd just effected featly
> An amputation at the hip
> Particularly neatly (p. 241).

The surgeon in the dream is as haughty as the actor and refuses to bandage the finger, insisting he only performs amputations:

> When in your hip there lurks disease
> (So dreamt this lively dreamer),

Or devastating caries
In humerus or femur,
If you can pay a handsome fee,
Oh, then you may remember me,
With joy elate I'll amputate
Your humerus or femur (p. 241).

The moral is clear enough: the dream, or rather the nightmare, is punishment for the actor's vanity. He wakes with a start and resolves that he will play the part after all. But in the construction of this ballad, for no apparent reason, Gilbert makes repeated references to amputation at the hip.

In The Ballad of Annie Protheroe, mentioned earlier, the headsman is referred to as a 'skilled mechanic', and sounds more like a surgeon than an executioner. The word 'operate' is used twice in the ballad to describe his technique, and if this is not sufficient, his dulled instrument is described as looking 'far less like a hatchet than a dissipated saw'.

An analysis of *The Bab Ballads* suggests that the divided man theme is based not merely on a literary motif but on Gilbert's own peculiar castration and mutilation fantasy: a surgical amputation at the hip. The ballads clearly show the amputation as a punishment for forbidden sexual impulses. For having wooed the sweetheart of an executioner, a man almost gets his neck sawed in two. When Clonglocketty thrills the girls with his piping and the Captain dazzles them with his shapely legs, they are cut in half. And when a passing stranger dares to wink at a robber's daughter, he ends up being dissected. These are variations on Gilbert's œdipal fantasies, in which the identity of the saw-wielding executioner, that skilled operator, points to his father, the Naval surgeon.

GILBERT'S OEDIPAL CONFLICT

Discussing Gilbert's ambivalent relationship with his father, Brenner (1952) mentions the variety of authority figures Gilbert took delight in lampooning. He also cites the casual references to 'a medical man' scattered throughout his literary works. Of

more direct œdipal significance, he points to the theme of marriage punishable by death or purchased at the cost of one's life, which appears so regularly in the Savoy Operas. He mentions Gilbert's imitation of his father but suggests it was based more on rivalry than on identification. Brenner concludes: 'on the whole, it seems that Gilbert did not get very far in solving—or perhaps even in developing—his œdipal relationships' (p. 395).

Gilbert's biographers know little about his childhood and have nothing to say about his early relation with his father. The elder Gilbert retired from the Navy several years before his son's birth. We have no information as to what Gilbert was aware of during his childhood regarding his father's profession. His father was well known for his bizarre, often grisly, stories, and Gilbert was very familiar with his writings. The father may indeed have had a special interest in, or fascination with, amputations at the hip. One of his books, for no apparent reason in terms of its story, contains two references to this operation (Gilbert, Sr., 1864). Father and son have been described as good-natured rivals when Gilbert was a young man. It was only after the son had begun to make a name for himself that his father decided to become a writer. 'I think the little success which had attended my humble efforts certainly influenced my father. You see, my father never had an exaggerated idea of my abilities; he thought if I could write, anybody could, and forthwith began to do so' (Browne, 1907, p. 9).

Although the son far surpassed the father in literary success, he was plagued throughout his career by fear of failure, and most particularly by incurable opening night jitters. As the opening approached, Gilbert would ruminate about the success of the play and have dreadful forebodings. There would be a flurry of last minute changes and deletions, from which Sullivan would have to restrain him gently and tactfully. At the opening itself, Gilbert was impossible. We have seen how he agitated players and managers by his last minute instructions, and that he had to leave the theater by curtain time. Gilbert describes how he spent his opening nights as follows:

> What I suffered during those hours, no man can tell. I have spent them at the club; I once went to a theatre alone to see a play; I have walked up and down the street; but no matter where I was, agony and apprehension possessed me (Pearson, 1957, p. 122).

One brilliant success after another had no effect on this anxiety.

What was there about an opening night that represented so great a danger that it caused Gilbert such anxiety and suffering? In a brief autobiographical article, he mentions this anxiety and recalls the opening night of his first dramatic piece. He was so full of confidence that he planned a dinner party for what he was sure would be a success. It was; but in looking back on this incident, an experienced Gilbert remarks that he would never again have such audacity. 'I have since learnt something about the risks inseparable from every "first night", and I would as soon invite friends to supper *after a forthcoming amputation at the hip-joint*' (Gilbert, 1883, p. 55, italics added). This striking figure of speech illuminates an aspect of Gilbert's unconscious, and makes a connection between his first night anxiety and the theme of the divided man. The first night carried with it an intolerable threat of castration. What were the determinants of this castration anxiety and how did they come to be associated with the opening night of his play?

Gilbert's earliest recorded creative work was a poem written in his early teens, while he was still a school boy at Ealing. He was convalescing in France from an attack of typhoid fever which left him weak and emaciated and necessitated the shaving of his head. After watching Napoleon III and the Empress Eugenie pass in procession up the street, he composed a verse which described *their* reactions upon observing *him:*

To the Emperor she said
'How beautiful the head
Of that youth of gallant mien,
Cropped so neat and close and clean
Though I own he's rather lean.'
Said the Emperor: 'It is!

And I never saw a phiz
More wonderful than 'is.' (Pearson, 1957, p. 15).

Here, in adolescence, Gilbert could utilize his literary talent to allay, by narcissistic self-aggrandizement, feelings of castration and humiliation. His poem creates a new reality, in which his shaved head becomes, in the eyes of royalty, the most wonderful head they have ever seen.

His phallic-exhibitionistic strivings are expressed both in the content of the poem and in the act of writing it. An insignificant bystander to the procession, he wanted to share the spotlight with the royal couple. In his poem they not only notice him, but he becomes the focus of their admiration, as the writing of the poem itself would bring attention and admiration to him from his family.

Twenty years later, as an artist at Fun, Gilbert illustrated a satirical commentary in verse on this same royal couple—Napoleon III and Eugenie—then living in exile in London. He drew a comic valentine in which caricatures of the Emperor and Empress kneel with their hands clasped together. Between them rises a bizarre caricature of Hymen, the god of marriage, portrayed as a thin, emaciated boy with his head completely bald and his arms extended over the royal couple in blessing (Fig. 2). The valentine revives earlier feelings Gilbert experienced toward this royal couple who embody his original œdipal wishes. The thin, bald (castrated) boy repeats the wish to share the spotlight with his parents—to get into the act. In the act of blessing their marriage he comes between them, and his aggression toward his œdipal rival is expressed in the caption:

Beauty and the Beast I jine
In this agreeable Valentine

The wish to watch the royal couple and get into the act relates to voyeuristic impulses of the œdipal period. These impulses may have played an important role in determining Gilbert's behavior on the first nights of his plays. The result of his overwhelming anxiety was to send him fleeing from the theater. He

FIGURE 2

could not bear to remain and watch the opening night performance. For him the 'first night' may have unconsciously represented the *prima noctus*—the nuptial night. Watching the first night from out front gratified the forbidden childhood wish to view the primal scene.

His anxiety regarding the outcome of the first night was determined more by conflicts around phallic-exhibitionistic and competitive impulses. Here Gilbert could find no safety; he was as frightened of success as of failure. A theatrical success gratified his exhibitionism but also represented a literary triumph over his author-father. It placed him in the same position as the Piper

and the Captain in his ballads whose performances impressed the girls, and his anxiety was in anticipation of sharing their fate —of being cut in half or castrated. Gilbert was the Haughty Actor in the ballad: the punishment for his vanity, his creative ambition, was a nightmare of a surgeon who performs amputations at the hip.

There is evidence to suggest that Gilbert was preoccupied with surgeons and hospitals throughout much of his adult life. A letter written to his cousin following her surgery in 1906 reveals his fearful, intense preoccupation:

> I am—we all are—greatly relieved to learn that the operation has been so successfully performed, and that the invalid has borne it so well. I've a hideous way of identifying myself with incidents of the kind when I know they are going to take place, and at 9-10-11 I couldn't help fancying—now the surgeons have arrived—now they are unpacking their devilish instruments, and so on . . . I wished I hadn't known when it was going to take place (Dark and Grey, 1923, p. 178).

Another example is a dream he recorded around 1900, which is preserved among the Gilbert Papers in the British Museum. This is a nightmare from which he awoke early in the morning and carefully wrote down on the back of a picture of the Bushey Cottage Hospital, of which he was honorary secretary at the time. He titled it, A Singular Dream. It is too long to record here in detail, but the manifest content can be summarized as follows. The dream takes place in King's College Hospital, where the dreamer is 'horrified' to discover a corpse lying in the basement. He attempts to find various doctors, including 'the assistant surgeon', to help him dispose of the body. When he finally locates help, he is surprised to find it to be a physician who has 'a horror of corpses'.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The tremendous castration anxiety that prevented Gilbert from witnessing the opening night performance of his plays can be traced to exhibitionistic and voyeuristic conflicts of the œdipal

period. It seems to be the dramatist's equivalent of stage fright, that frequent affliction of actors.

Gilbert was himself a frustrated actor. In his early teens, he left school and attempted to apprentice himself to Charles Kean, the noted actor. As soon as he discovered the boy was William Gilbert's son, Kean promptly sent him back to school. Later in his career as a dramatist, Gilbert took a part in a pantomime and, on rare occasions, acted in some of his own plays. While he was usually shy and nervous when speaking in public, there is no mention of his having suffered from stage fright.

What can be said of the difference between Gilbert's anxiety and the actor's stage fright? The most significant distinction seems to concern responsibility for exhibitionistic impulses. Bergler (1949) points out that since actors do not create the characters they impersonate, but merely act them, they have an excuse that diminishes their guilt: 'The author is guilty, not I' (p. 316). Fenichel (1954) described an actress-patient who was severely inhibited except when she was *on* the stage. Only there could her exhibitionism express itself 'under the conditions that she actually did not show herself, but some other character created by the author' (p. 353).

But this distinction does not always succeed, since the same exculpation can be used in reverse to suit the dramatist's superego. If acting in front of an audience comes too close to the original exhibitionistic impulse, it can be further sublimated by writing a play which others will perform. This, then, becomes the dramatist's exculpation: 'I may have written it, but they did it'; and in Gilbert's case, 'I wasn't even there when it happened'.

Gilbert's shyness, his discomfort in relationships, his quickness to take offense and feel himself the injured party, and his perfectionism, all attest to his narcissistic vulnerability. Because a direct exposure to the audience was too threatening, he retreated to a secret fantasy of wielding great power over the audience. His name first appeared in print in 1858 for a translation of the laughing song from *Manon Lescaut,* and Gilbert describes his reaction to this event as follows:

> I remember that I went night after night to those concerts to enjoy the intense gratification of standing at the elbow of any promenader who might be reading my translation, and wondering to myself what that promenader would say if he knew that the gifted creature who had written the very words he was reading at that moment was standing within a yard of him. The secret satisfaction of knowing that I possessed the power to thrill him with this information was enough, and I preserved my incognito (Gilbert, 1883, p. 52).

An actor's stage fright and Gilbert's anxiety are basically the same in origin, but two elements distinguish them: the degree and quality of sublimation of the original exhibitionistic impulse, and a particular narcissistic character structure that cannot tolerate direct exposure but instead retreats to the gratification of a secret, invisible power to thrill the audience from afar.

Finally, most actors are able to overcome stage fright through the activity of the performance. This is not possible for the playwright. Once the last rehearsal is over, the play has a life of its own and all he can do is wait for the reviews. 'Do just whatever you like', Gilbert told one of his actresses on opening night. 'The rehearsals are all over, and I am now at your mercy' (Cellier and Bridgeman, 1927, p. 133).

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Perceptual Registration of the Analyst Outside of Awareness

Stanley Friedman

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PERCEPTUAL REGISTRATION OF THE ANALYST OUTSIDE OF AWARENESS

BY STANLEY FRIEDMAN, M.D.

Although the role of subliminal registration in the formation of dreams is well known,[1] analysts rarely have the opportunity to analyze a dream which they know in advance refers to their patient's perceptual registration of them outside of awareness in an extra-analytic setting. This brief note describes such an incident.

The events that provided the day residue are as follows. The analyst and his wife attended a recital of chamber music in a very small auditorium. By chance, their seats were in the first row, center, of the mezzanine, overlooking the orchestra seats. Two other relevant details are that the analyst's wife has red hair and that an external event forced them to leave the recital during the intermission.

The patient, a forty-year-old single man, began his next analytic hour by reporting a dream. Following a brief introductory section that had water as a theme (it had rained heavily the preceding evening), the dream continued:

> An old couple was living in the building instead of a crazy old woman. The crazy old woman may still be somewhere in the back. There are formal introductions. The man introduces his wife and himself. Then he points up towards the ceiling, saying that this is so-and-so, maybe Lisa,[2] perhaps his child. I assume that there is an attic there with the girl present but I don't look up there. Then there is another vague section. It was as if I left and came back and the girl had fallen or jumped down. It may be that she was killed.

[1] An example of such dreams in an experimental setting is reported by Fisher (1954). His subjects subliminally registered peripheral elements in the laboratory environment and incorporated them into their dreams.

[2] The patient's mother's name, we shall say, is Sally, and he frequently dreamed of and even dated women whose names were primary process transformations of her name, such as Elsie, Lucy, etc.

The patient began his associations by stating that he had gone to a recital the previous evening and had noted the presence of a number of psychoanalysts, especially an elderly married couple. It soon became quite clear that both the analyst and the patient had attended the same recital and neither had consciously seen the other. The patient's seats had been far down in the orchestra section and his date had begun to look around the auditorium because she expected that many of their acquaintances would be there. The patient had felt very reluctant to do this, although he could think of no reason for his attitude. In fact, he had found her behavior irritating. This was even more remarkable since he too often tended to look around for acquaintances and there had been no reason for him to be irritated with his date. He had experienced a special reluctance to look toward the mezzanine—again, without knowing why. During the intermission he had gone to the lobby where he had exchanged a few words with a psychoanalyst. He had no further thoughts about the dream.

The analyst then informed the patient that they had attended the same recital, that he was seated in the first row of the mezzanine with his wife, and that the patient had registered this without conscious awareness and had dreamed about it that night. The girl in the attic, Lisa, seemed to be the patient's condensed representation of his mother and of the analyst's wife. Having the girl fall and die was his expression of a death wish toward the two women. Furthermore, the analyst and his wife had left the auditorium during the intermission, which probably accounted for the absence of the girl in the dream when he returned after having left.

The patient found this to be of great interest, although he noted that its fascination had a strong intellectual quality that was regrettable. He then recalled that he had had a fantasy about the analyst during the last part of the recital following the intermission. In it, he was seated with the analyst instead of with his date and was explaining to him the subtleties of the musical piece being performed. The analyst commented that

the fantasy was a further reflection of the patient's wish to do away with the analyst's wife and his mother so that he could be the one most loved by the analyst-father. Finally, in the context of the overintellectual quality of the dream interpretation related to its emphasis on the day residue, the analyst asked if the patient had any other thought about the girl who fell. The patient was surprised and baffled because he thought of another patient of the analyst who was of little interest to him and whom he had not seen for a long time. All that he could remember about her was that she had red hair! At this point, the analyst added the last detail—namely, the color of his wife's hair—to what the patient had registered outside of awareness the previous night and then had incorporated into his dream.

It is likely that the incomplete perceptual registration worked both ways. As the recital had begun, the analyst had had the sudden thought that the cellist of the chamber group bore a strong resemblance to the patient in this report. A second glance had convinced him that this had been an error and he had then wondered why this patient was in his thoughts. The beginning of the next day's analytic hour revealed the probable cause.

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A Note on Silent Gratifications

Joseph W. Slap

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A NOTE ON SILENT GRATIFICATIONS

BY JOSEPH W. SLAP, M.D.

Analyses are likely to contain silent gratifications even when they are being conducted with orthodox technique. Such gratifications most often become manifest when termination is contemplated; when the patient faces the loss of the secret gratifications, derivatives appear which finally unmask them. In the incident to be related, however, a silent gratification made itself known at a time when there was no thought of termination; its appearance was precipitated by an adventitious event.

The health insurance provided by the large corporation for which her husband worked paid eighty per cent of the cost of the analysis of a woman in her late twenties. The remaining twenty per cent, in part a tax deduction, represented a trivial expense for this couple who each had come from a comfortable background.

The patient detested being a woman. As she was a college graduate and highly intelligent, however, she considered herself 'the best of an inferior breed'. She was angry with her obstetrician for putting her to sleep during the delivery of her two children, both of whom were boys. She said, 'For once in my life I wanted the feeling of having something male down there'. At the time of the incident to be described, the analysis was well advanced and the patient's phallic strivings had for a long time been recognized, acknowledged, and worked over.

One day the patient announced that the insurance plan was to be changed so that it would no longer cover the analytic fees to such a generous degree. She wished to know what I would do about it. I explained that my fee had not been based on the fact that this insurance was available to her and that, therefore, there was nothing for me to do.[1] She became angry and there ensued

From the Hahnemann Medical College and the Philadelphia State Hospital.

[1] She later learned that the change in the policy would not apply to treatment already in progress.

a series of dreams in which men, other than the analyst and her husband, befriended her by giving her food, providing transportation, and doing various other favors for her.

Initially, I assumed that the patient was expressing in oral terms her feeling of being phallicly deprived. However, the men in the manifest dreams were without a trace of erotism or aggressiveness, unlike those who had previously served in her dreams and fantasies as phallic suppliers. (John Kennedy and John Wayne had been prototypes.) I concluded that the material of the analysis had shifted to an oral level. It seemed to me that while the greater part of the patient's analytic expense was covered by insurance and tax refunds she felt like an infant for whom everything is provided with nothing asked for in exchange.

At this point I recalled that during the initial interviews three years previously, she had told me that she had never known her maternal grandmother as she had died shortly after the patient's birth. Following this lead, I hypothesized that the patient's mother, mourning her own mother's death, had been depressed during the patient's infancy and this had contributed to an oral fixation. The patient worked through derivatives of her deprivation during the oral phase, a date was set for termination, and the analysis came smoothly to an end.

Some weeks after the last appointment I received a letter from the patient in which she related that she had had a serious viral infection which had necessitated hospitalization. Her mother had come in from her home in a distant city to take care of the children and to help out during the convalescence. The letter went on: 'My mother . . . babied me (and I let her!) and we got along better than ever before. And where she got it, I'll never know, but she said . . . "You know, I used to weep over your crib when my mother died, and my milk went bad, etc.,—and do you think that affected you?" When I picked up my teeth, I told her she wasn't responsible, etc.'

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Serge Lebovici

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BOOK REVIEWS

JANET, FREUD ET LA PSYCHOLOGIE CLINIQUE (Janet, Freud and Clinical Psychology). By Claude M. Prévost. Paris: Petite Bibliothèque Payot, 1973. 211 pp.

The quarrel between Freud and Janet is well known in the history of psychoanalysis. In France, the adversaries of psychoanalysis have often used it because Janet carefully recorded those occasions when he judged that Freud had used his (Janet's) ideas.

Claude M. Prévost, who wrote a paper on Pierre Janet's 'psychophilosophy', recounts quite accurately the circumstances that brought Janet into opposition with the founder of psychoanalysis. Freud arrived at the Salpêtrière in 1885, and in 1889 attended the International Congress of Hypnotism and the Congress of Physiological Psychology. Janet was one of the organizers of the former while the latter was chaired by Charcot. In a 1961 paper, Chertok speculates that Janet and Freud could have heard a communication by Bourru and Burrot on the cathartic treatment of traumatic memories.[1] However, their meeting at this time would acquire significance only through the reconstruction and interpretation of what was later to become rivalry and conflict between the two men.

Janet's *L'Automatisme Psychologique* had been published in 1889, before Breuer sent the story of Anna O to Freud. In this work, Freud may have read Janet's conception of the dynamic unconscious: the importance of unconscious motives in understanding the effects of post-hypnotic suggestion. However, Freud realized in addition that the effects of this suggestion could be understood only in terms of the factors that resist it.

Janet never recognized the importance of unconscious conflict, the foundation on which psychoanalysis was built, but he claimed priority for his description of the dynamic unconscious, a claim which Freud did not dispute. Janet also claimed priority for his descriptions of the curative effects of the evocation of traumatic memories. If this debt is to be measured in the context of French thinking on psychopathology, Freud owed more to Janet than he did to Charcot. On the other hand, Freud's publications in Vienna did not escape

[1] Chertok, L.: *On the Discovery of the Cathartic Method*. Int. J. Psa., XLII, 1961, pp. 284-287.

Janet, who quoted them more than once in his papers on medicine and psychology.

Janet later declared his opposition to the psychoanalytic theory of a sexual etiology of anxiety neurosis, and there was a vehement session in 1913 in London at a congress of medicine. Freud and Janet had both been invited to discuss psychoanalysis in the Section on Psychiatry of the congress. Freud let himself be represented by Jung, with whom he was about to break and who was later to adopt some of the theoretical ideas of Janet whose classes he attended in Paris. At the congress, Ernest Jones defended the Freudian doctrines; Janet attacked them violently.[2] Even though he was harshly questioned in London, and was even accused of dishonesty because of his inadequate study of Freud's writings, Janet published the report he presented at that congress, a publication that brought on the final hostility of Freud's disciples.

Nonetheless, Janet continued to commit himself to the defense of psychoanalysis. He commented favorably on the first systematic exposition of psychoanalysis published in French in 1914, a book by two military physicians, Regis and Hesnard. Later, his son-in-law, Edouard Pichon, a member of the Psychoanalytic Society of Paris, provided a link between Janet and psychoanalysis. However, Freud did not receive Janet who appeared in vain at the Berggasse in 1937. Freud explained this inhospitality in a letter to Marie Bonaparte, telling her that he could not forgive Janet for not having disavowed the French authors who accused him of plagiarism.

In one of his last works, a preface to a thesis entitled *Neuroses and Pierre Janet's Dynamic Psychology,* Janet insisted again on the therapeutic value of 'reminiscences'. He was still thinking in terms of a quite primitive version of psychoanalysis but he did not evoke Freud's name.

In *Janet, Freud et la Psychologie Clinique,* Claude Prévost attempts to reunite Freud and Janet in the name of clinical psychology —that is, in the study of cases. Prévost believes that the structural theses of psychoanalysis are not very different from the conceptions

[2] At that time, Janet was amalgamating the 'moral psychotherapy' of Dubois, an authoritarian form of psychological treatment, with psychoanalysis which he thought too systematic. Strangely enough, Janet had just been ousted from his laboratory at the Salpêtrière by Déjerine, the new chief of service and a defender of Dubois's 'moral psychotherapy'.

of Janet who, however, gives greater importance to real frustration.

For the American reader, the story of this conflict is particularly interesting for on his first visit to the United States, where he gave five lectures on the occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of Clark University, Freud alluded to what separated him from Janet in his second lecture.

> The great French observer [Charcot], whose pupil I became in 1885-6, was not himself inclined to adopt a psychological outlook. It was his pupil, Pierre Janet, who first attempted a deeper approach to the peculiar psychical processes present in hysteria, and we followed his example when we took the splitting of the mind and dissociation of the personality as the centre of our position. You will find in Janet a theory of hysteria which takes into account the prevailing views in France on the part played by heredity and degeneracy. According to him, hysteria is a form of degenerate modification of the nervous system, which shows itself in an innate weakness in the power of psychical synthesis. Hysterical patients, he believes, are inherently incapable of holding together the multiplicity of mental processes in a unity, and hence arises the tendency to mental dissociation. If I may be allowed to draw a homely but clear analogy, Janet's hysterical patient reminds one of a feeble woman who has gone out shopping and is now returning home laden with a multitude of parcels and boxes. She cannot contain the whole heap of them with her two arms and ten fingers. So first of all one object slips from her grasp; and when she stoops to pick it up, another one escapes her in its place, and so on. This supposed mental weakness of hysterical patients is not confirmed when we find that, alongside these phenomena of diminished capacity, examples are also to be observed of a partial increase in efficiency, as though by way of compensation. At the time when Breuer's patient had forgotten her mother tongue and every other language but English, her grasp of English reached such heights that, if she was handed a German book, she was able straight away to read out a correct and fluent translation of it (Standard Edition, XI, pp. 21-22).

Although he acknowledged that Janet too had talked of the unconscious, it is obvious that Freud had a very different conception of it. Janet could see only the consequence of the dissociation between unconscious and conscious. Freud was already aware of the existence of the unconscious mental process, the pervasive strength, manifestations, and disguises of which his whole *oeuvre* was to describe.

It is noteworthy that an adversary of psychoanalysis, Percival Bailey, used Janet against Freud, as recently as 1956,[3] in an Ameri-

[3] Bailey, P.: *Janet and Freud.* Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry, LXXVI, 1956.

can publication. And that J.-B. Pontalis[4] could write, with some pertinence, that at the end of the last century, Freud was closer to Janet than he was to Breuer. Such is the historical interest created by this controversy that it is still used from time to time against psychoanalysis.

We are therefore grateful to Claude Prévost for having patiently retraced the details of the controversy (with only a few chronological inaccuracies) and for having demonstrated its futility.

SERGE LEBOVICI (PARIS)

Translated by Anne Ménard

THE PRIVACY OF THE SELF. Papers on Psychoanalytic Theory and Technique. By M. Masud R. Khan. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1974. 339 pp.

The author of this volume was a student of Winnicott whose work he carries forward in these studies of disturbances in the 'self experience' which date from 1960 to 1972. Khan not only develops some of Winnicott's key ideas, but shares with him a sensitive perceptiveness that leads to unexpected, novel clinical observations.

Khan's writings represent work that in many ways parallels Kohut's studies on narcissism. The same terrain is explored and the same landmarks can be clearly seen. However, although the point of view is similar and the conclusions often identical, one has a sense of fragments of clinical experience and theoretical work that have not been fit together into a larger synthesis, perhaps because of a parochialism that prevents free exchange between psychoanalytic groups in different countries. Khan's work has been too little noted in the United States and, conversely, although these papers extend to 1972, there is no reference in this volume to current American studies of narcissism. It would be useful to have Khan's views about the specific clinical phenomena of idealizing and mirror transferences, for instance, as systematized vicissitudes of the analytic situation with patients whose self-experiences are seriously disturbed. The concept of self-object is approached by Khan, but is not as specific as it is in Kohut's work.

In *Dream Psychology and the Evolution of the Psychoanalytic*

[4] Pontalis, J.-B.: *Après Freud*. Paris: Gallimard, 1968.

Situation (1961), Khan wrote about certain patients whose disorders can be explained by 'disturbances of the primitive stage of ego-differentiation and its emergence from the ambiance of infant care in a self unit'. In these cases, the 'transference idiom of the analytic situation changes into a more primitive and primary mode of experience, very much in the nature of the infant care situation'. Khan's central early work was his theoretical paper, *The Concept of Cumulative Trauma* (1963) in which he elaborated Winnicott's idea of the function of the mother as a 'protective shield' vis-à-vis the infant's needs. Here the mother's role as an auxiliary ego (a 'narcissistic self-object', one might say) is stressed, apart from her position as a libidinally cathected object. Citing Greenacre's concept of focal symbiosis, Khan examines those chronic subtle barriers to full differentiation which lead to selective ego disturbances, dyssynchronies in maturation, and a variety of narcissistic disorders.

In a later paper, he outlines the use of the analytic situation to reconstruct and study these ego distortions, utilizing in particular those countertransference self-observations arising when the analyst assumes some of the protective shield functions (again as a 'narcissistic self-object') with regressed patients. In several other later papers, he explores situations in which traumatic disruption of magical symbiotic ties between mother and child lead to internalization of idealized self-object images culminating in a state of perpetual self-absorption. Phobic and counterphobic mechanisms serve as defenses against the loss of these inner states, and myths of being 'special' are regularly observed in these cases. Self-esteem regulation depends entirely on this internal, idealized self-system—not at all in relation to external objects. In *On Symbiotic Omnipotence* (1965), Khan describes transferences in which a special idealized 'self' of the patient is made the exclusive focus of both patient and analyst. Here Khan stresses the importance of the therapist's aggression: 'A passive endorsement of the patient's omnipotence is not what is required, rather an aggressive distance, but one that allows for the patient's experience of omnipotence as necessary'.

A beautiful paper in this collection, *Montaigne, Rousseau and Freud* (1970), examines the role of crucial, idealized friendships in the crystallizations of self-experiences. In early Western culture, the idea of God served as an ideal in relation to which one's self-experience could be actualized; later, this experience became possi-

ble only in human terms. In a relationship strikingly like that of Freud and Fliess, Montaigne two hundred years earlier internalized his relationship with La Boétie, a slightly older idealized friend, into 'a new form of self-knowledge'. Freud's idealization of Fliess as a transference figure in his self-analysis is well known, but his use of this idealization as a form of self-actualization has received less attention.[1]

The second part of Khan's book contains a series of detailed clinical studies, cases which would be considered borderline or severe narcissistic personality disorders. A reviewer cannot hope to convey the richness of this clinical material. I am aware of no issue in the current literature on narcissism that is not illustrated by these case studies. A cluster of papers (in particular, *Ego Ideal, Excitement and the Threat of Annihilation*) describes patients whose regressed, phobic, perverse, or obsessional façades cover a secret grandiose self, which serves as a primitive ego ideal. Exposure of this treasured perfect being would lead to its explosion and annihilation. Underlying excitement connected with the patient's omnipotence has to be warded off in various ways, including avoidance of object-directed activities in which he might become absorbed. Here one sees the typical fear of release of an encapsulated archaic grandiose self, expressed as terror of incipient madness. Khan, like Kernberg, sees this grandiose self as a fusion of ideal self and ideal maternal object which protects both self and mother from the usual disillusionments of the human condition. Experience of the 'ideal self' also threatens to release intense narcissistic rage, dreaded 'death of the self experience', and an overwhelming sense of helplessness.

There is particular emphasis in these papers on the use of the analytic situation for experiencing hitherto dissociated aspects of the self. Like Winnicott and Stone, Khan conceptualizes the therapeutic situation as a 'holding' in a space-time framework allowing for certain experiences of 'being'. In *Vicissitudes of Being, Knowing, and Experiencing in the Therapeutic Situation* (1969), he differentiates between interpreting which may lead to knowing and 'sensitive uninterpreting' which may help the patient to experience his 'being'. Here the analyst is used as part of the environment, or as a narcis-

[1] Sheldon Bach, in a recent paper on narcissism, has written on the subject as a special case of idealizing transference. (Bach, S.: *Narcissism, Continuity, and the Uncanny*. Int. J. Psa., LVI, 1975, pp. 77-87.)

sistic object. Again following Winnicott, in *Infantile Neurosis as a False Self Organization* (1970), Khan describes instances in which a premature precocious ego development used in the service of omnipotence leads to an early obsessional system (the Wolf-man is cited). The threat of annihilation of an ideal self is again stressed and is differentiated from castration anxiety. According to Khan, castration anxiety presupposes the existence of a coherent sense of the self as a 'whole entity'; threats of annihilation occur when the 'experience of personalization' threatens to disappear altogether.

Khan presents novel concepts of the use of space-time in the analytic situation as parameters in promoting experiences of self-actualization. In *The Role of Illusion in the Analytic Space and Process* (1971), he writes about the incapacity to sustain illusion, leading to breakdowns in the therapeutic situation. A case is presented in which a patient required another's speech as something to cling to. Before she could begin to speak in analysis, she required that a literal distance be maintained between herself and the analyst. She had to be allowed gradually to create that space in which her privacy was respected and at the same time, space in which an illusion (in Winnicott's terms) could develop which she could share with the analyst. Only then could symbolic exchanges begin. In this case study, as in others, this reviewer was put off by Khan's viewing clinical phenomena as if they were literal repetitions of early infantile experiences and not subjecting them to analysis, even in retrospect. The issue of 'distance between the analyst and patient' might, for instance, raise questions of underlying destructive fantasies. In fact, in his later papers, issues of aggression do become more prominent.

In *Dread of Surrender to Resourceless Dependence in the Analytic Situation,* Khan, like Kernberg, describes patients whose destructive envy leads them to negate whatever the analyst can supply. Also in reviewing his earlier work, *Symbiotic Omnipotence,* Khan now sees the phenomenon of the ideal self as a defensive one, primarily against sadism and rage.

Some of the conceptual difficulties involved in dealing with disturbances of the 'self' are outlined in a later paper, *The Finding and Becoming of Self* (1972). Here, Khan writes of the symbolic forms by which a patient knows his 'self'. These he calls 'notions of self'. Khan considers that no one has yet succeeded in defining 'self-experience'.

Utopian ideas of the pristine self (even Winnicott's 'true self') are rejected as romanticizations.

'My clinical experience inclines me to believe that sometimes "notions of self", quite illusional and delusional . . . can establish themselves in a person. This leads to illness in the self system' (p. 303). There is, for Khan, a sense of 'wholeness of the self' which is subject to various pathological distortions. Certain 'holding' experiences in treatment predispose to refinding that sense. Two different types of relating by therapists are required. One leads to interpretative work necessary for resolving intrapsychic conflicts; the other—providing a matrix to the resolution of pathological self-experiences—leads to the formation of a coherent sense of self. Gedo and Goldberg in their recent monograph[2] provide a framework for conceptualizing the indications of these approaches.

The papers in this book suggest much to ponder and study. One's clinical work will, I believe, be influenced by a careful reading of it. Khan's work complements Kohut's. The latter's synthesizing concepts and systematizations of the narcissistic transference, however, add a dimension lacking in these exciting and imaginative papers.

LESTER SCHWARTZ (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOANALYTIC INVESTIGATIONS: SELECTED PAPERS. By Therese Benedek, M.D. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1973. 542 pp.

Therese Benedek, a pioneer in psychosomatic research, personally selected the twenty-one papers included in this volume; all but the last five, which are concerned with psychoanalytic training, demonstrate her lifelong concern with the interrelationships between mind and body. She was committed to the study of psychosomatic problems from the very beginning of her career. Her first published paper, omitted from the present volume, is a report of a case of erythrophobia.

Introductions precede each paper in the volume and give an interesting perspective on the paper in question and on Dr. Benedek's

[2] Gedo, John E. and Goldberg, Arnold: *Models of the Mind. A Psychoanalytic Theory*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973. Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XLIII, 1974, pp. 674-677.

more recent thinking. The discussions which follow the papers are equally valuable.

The first five papers in the volume belong to what may be termed Dr. Benedek's European period. They represent the work of her early years in Germany, the time when she worked with Karl Abraham, Hanns Sachs, and members of the Berlin psychoanalytic movement. One of the analysts who early recognized the significance of Hitler's rise, she and her family came to the United States in 1936, settling in Chicago.

Her productiveness and interests continued and she began a collaborative research project with Boris Rubenstein which culminated in the monograph entitled *The Sexual Cycle in Women,* published in 1942. The monograph is not included in this volume but the two preliminary reports included here anticipate the data and conclusions of the later monograph. These record one of the earliest collaborative attempts between analysts and scientists from different disciplines. We read in the introduction to these papers that Rubenstein, then in Cleveland, received daily vaginal smears which enabled him to 'date' the time of ovulation and the other phases of the ovarian cycle. Benedek, in Chicago, made her own predictions of the time of ovulation. Later, the two compared notes. Much to their surprise, almost complete congruence was noted. At first Benedek did not know why she had made her prediction. Later she discovered that she had determined the time of ovulation by the occurrence of relaxation in the patient. Further work led Dr. Benedek to decide that the consistent interpretations of dreams and affects provided the most reliable index to the timing of ovulation.

In *The Psychosomatic Implications of the Primary Unit: Mother-child* (1949) Benedek wrote that her discussion would deal with the *psychodynamics of the symbiosis* (italics hers) which exists during pregnancy, is interrupted at birth, but remains a functioning force between the mother and child. The term symbiosis had not been previously used. Benedek's conception of symbiosis involved a concept of primary narcissism based on psychodynamic processes accompanying ovulation and pregnancy. This approach differs from Freud's concept. The term symbiosis, however, has been taken up by Mahler and others and greatly extended in scope. Another contribution noted in this paper is the idea of a regression in the service of development, an idea akin to Kris's concept of regression in the

service of the ego and to Anna Freud's later articles on regression as a principle in mental development.

The work of the late 1930's involving the ovulative and postovulative phases of the sexual cycle became an anchor in much of Benedek's later work and remained a permanent factor in her thinking. As she stated: 'From the time I began to analyze women's emotions in response to the ovulative and postovulative phases of the sexual cycle, I had struggled to put into words the unconscious communication between a would-be mother and the not-yet-existent infant, as expressed in dreams and fantasies and in the behavior of sexually mature, ovulating women'. This approach led to the viewpoints exemplified in a number of the later papers in which emphasis is placed on the interrelationships between biology, emotional response, and behavior. For example, she wrote in *Toward the Biology of the Depressive Constellation* (1956) that the depressive constellation is universal, and that the origin of the constellation lies in the psychobiology of the female procreative function, in motherhood, and motherliness. She indicated that the increasing receptive-retentive tendencies necessary to maintain pregnancy create a severe physiologic and psychologic stress that could lead to a defusion of neutralized psychic energy, and, therefore, could free aggressive energy and lead to anxiety, guilt, and aggression which could be turned against the self. Benedek stresses that regression to the oral receptive phase is regularly seen in each phase of procreative growth and this regression is characteristic for the depressive constellation. Procreative growth includes the lutein phase of the menstrual cycle, pregnancy, and lactation. There is, therefore, a repetitive regression to the oral developmental period during the menstrual cycle which Benedek believes prepares the woman for later functioning in pregnancy and in mothering. Psychological importance is given to the early relationships of the woman to her own mother and her identification with her. Male depression is also related to the earliest dyadic interaction.

Her points of view concerning hormones and psychodynamic patterns are reiterated in the paper, *The Organization of the Reproductive Drive* (1960). Benedek uses the term 'sexual cycle' to refer to the ovarian hormone cycle and its drive organization. As she views this cycle, estrogen is considered the hormone of preparation whose function is to stimulate the growth of secondary sex characteristics and to maintain the uterus in readiness for changes imposed by the *cor-*

pus luteum. An active object-directed, psychodynamic tendency characterizes the sexual drive at this time of estrogen ascendancy and is related to an unconscious motivating tendency to bring about contact with the sexual object and achieve gratification through coitus. Progesterone production and ovulation lead to receptive and retentive psychological tendencies. These phase out if pregnancy does not occur. A moderate degree of ovarian deficiency then occurs and the woman enters the premenstrual phase.

Benedek's reports are based primarily on the study of the patient's dreams and emotional states, and estimates of hormonal levels as indicated by their effects on the target organ, the vaginal mucosa. The estimates are confined to estrogen and progesterone levels, and no statements are made concerning androgens which are known to affect female sexual behavior. As early as 1938 Udall J. Salmon and Samuel H. Geist were reporting on the effects of androgens and G. L. Foss (1951) stated that the administration of androgens to women suffering from carcinoma of the breast dramatically increased sexual desire and activity even if the women were seriously ill and debilitated. Many other studies are now available which confirm these findings. Conversely, androgen deprivation has been shown to diminish sexual motivation in women. Thus, some modification of Benedek's past thinking concerning the role of sex hormones on female sexual behavior is in order and consideration must be given to the androgens. Such work, developing in the future, may well be based on the original coöperative model set by Benedek and Rubenstein. Careful attention should be given to fully reported actual sexual behavior, a lack in Benedek's reports.

Very little is said about aggression and the menstrual cycle in any of these selected papers. It is now known that acts of violence and suicide are more common during the premenstrual and menstrual phases (*cf.*, K. Dalton, 1964; A. and M. Mandell, 1967). It has also been reported by R. J. Moos, et al. (1969) that anxious and aggressive feelings are high during the menstrual phase: anxiety was highest on about the twentieth day; aggressive feelings were noted to be at their peak on the eighteenth day, therefore in the postovulative phase, and then decreased steadily to the end of the cycle. This report by Moos is to be compared with Benedek's report of relaxation and receptivity following ovulation. Moos, et al., reported their findings on the basis of standardized self-rating scales which are consid-

ered to be reliable and easy to administer, while Benedek's results are derived from selected associations based on the analytic method. The two methods are directed, therefore, to different aspects of the mind and can produce differing results.

The analyst's selective attention to certain associations in preference to others poses a problem in validation since it has been claimed that this approach lacks scientific objectivity and improperly slants the results. Analysts can and sometimes do overlook appropriate data, and *may* arrive at incorrect or incomplete conclusions. Our methodology, however, allows other analysts to study their own patients' associations and produce their own conclusions. A high degree of probability can be reached via studies by separate analysts who reach agreement in terms of data and inferences derived from the data. The probabilities are enhanced by consecutive reports that are in agreement. Unfortunately, no corroboration of Benedek's studies of unconscious motivation and hormones has appeared. In part, this may be due to the difficulties noted in complicated studies involving separate disciplines and in part because of general agreement with the findings. Up to the present no analyst has published findings that are in disagreement with the Benedek and Rubenstein data and conclusions. Yet the omissions I have mentioned concerning aggression and the more recent work with hormones, such as the androgens, point to a more complex patterning than originally postulated. These comments are not meant to be critical of what was a new and significant beginning. My intention is to point out the need for further collaborative studies by analysts and scientists from different disciplines. The field of investigation relating to hormones and behavior is still developing.

Benedek also has long been known as a distinguished teacher of psychoanalysis and the last five articles in this volume reflect this interest. Much of the material in these articles indicates her concern with the training analyst's functions and the training analysis. Several points may be noted. She proposes that the training analysis be divided into two parts and indicates that the first part, the preparatory analysis, should be aimed at readying the student for the task of supervised analysis. The second part should begin after a period of freedom from supervision and before the assignment of a third case. The student would then resume his analysis and continue to completion. This suggestion of a divided analysis has not been acted upon,

but Benedek feels this could be a useful modification of the present system.

She also devotes much attention to aspects of countertransference; she considers the question of the anonymity of the analyst in a discussion of countertransference, and the role of the classical attitudes in maintaining this supposed anonymity. Anticipating Leo Stone, she points out that the analyst is seldom an unknown to the patient who '. . . bores his way into the preconscious mind of the therapist and often emerges with surprising evidences of empathy—preconscious awareness of the therapist's personality and even of his problems'. She is aware that the therapist's blind spot against recognition and being reacted to as a real person often creates complications in analysis, and she makes the point that the analyst's countertransference may be responsible for the severity of the transference neurosis. In fact, Benedek considers the countertransference as one of the most important motivations for intense transference neurosis. Her definition of a training analyst is, interestingly, someone who has had enough practice in handling his own countertransference.

I wish, finally, to call attention to the fact that many of the papers show more or less extensive revision, a fact duly noted by Dr. Benedek. The book does not include the original text, but shows only the final up-to-date revision. Anyone wishing to know Benedek's original thinking must therefore return to the primary publication. It would have been very helpful to have this primary text published along with the revisions in this one volume.

ROBERT DICKES (BROOKLYN, N. Y.)

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM. By Juliet Mitchell. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974. 456 pp.

In contrast to many feminists who denounce Freud's views on women, Juliet Mitchell believes that Freud's analysis of the psychology of women contributes importantly to the understanding of the status of women in our patriarchal society. Without such understanding, she feels, it is not possible to challenge the social role of women effectively. And unlike feminists who claim that Freud believed women inferior, passive, and submissive, Mitchell repeatedly asserts that Freud was describing his observations of women and not offering a prescription for the role they should have in society.

Much criticism of Freud is based either on unfamiliarity with or misunderstanding of his work, according to Mitchell. To demonstrate the relevance of psychoanalysis to the struggle of women in contemporary society, she presents a thoughtful and perceptive review of many of Freud's basic concepts. However, her presentation of the psychoanalytic view of femininity is limited because her discussion of Freud's work is incomplete and because she does not adequately consider the work of his followers who emended and extended his ideas.

In developing her thesis that patriarchy is responsible for the oppression of women, Mitchell stresses Freud's contributions which highlight the role of the father. She accepts uncritically some Freudian tenets that have rightly been questioned. Thus she states that children do not distinguish between the sexes before the œdipal period. She also accepts without emendation the concept that the girl views herself only as a damaged boy and that because she is already 'castrated' she, unlike the boy, does not identify with the active, castrating father. Instead, she becomes passive and this is institutionalized in her weaker superego. Since the superego is the vehicle for the transmission of culture, men transmit the laws of society which women passively obey.

While Mitchell acknowledges the effect of culture on personality development, she is critical of those who attack Freud for his failure to be more cognizant of social reality. Such a position, she asserts, overlooks the essence of the contribution of psychoanalysis. She illustrates this in her analysis of the work of Reich, Laing, de Beauvoir, and others, as she demonstrates their misunderstanding of the concept of the unconscious, their confusion of reality and psychic reality, and their tendency to offer reductionistic and utopian solutions.

Mitchell agrees with Freud's views on the origin of patriarchy but she feels he did not go far enough. She therefore turns to Lévi-Strauss to further bolster her views on patriarchy. Although she acknowledges that Lévi-Strauss's work is controversial, she accepts his thesis that women in all societies are used as a medium of exchange to maintain kinship relationships and guarantee exogamy. This arrangement, which perpetuates the oppression of women by men, may

have been necessary in earlier societies, but is outmoded in a technological society like ours.

This book only partially fulfils its promise to demonstrate the relevance of psychoanalysis to feminism. Although some of Mitchell's observations are cogent and astute, her presentation is at times difficult to follow. Her discussion of feminism is flawed by her excessive focus on the role of the father and her failure to adequately consider the importance of preœdipal issues in determining gender role for both women and men. The solutions she offers are as simplistic as some of those she criticizes. She advocates the overthrow of patriarchy but neither her reasons for this recommendation nor her suggestions for its implementation are clear. Her alternation between psychological and sociological issues is contradictory and confusing. On the one hand, she refers to the 'eternal unconscious' in which patriarchy has its roots. On the other hand, she suggests that a different organization of society would change unconscious representations. She advocates major social and economic revolutions that will establish a society in which economic exploitation will disappear and patriarchy will have no place. In the unconscious of children growing up in such a society, she asserts, there will be no representation of patriarchy and, therefore, women will no longer be oppressed.

The author's wishful solutions neglect many important issues, including one of special interest to psychoanalysis. She does not come to grips with the reason for the dominant role of men in society. Is it the unconscious symbolic representation of the penis, in both males and females, as a source of power and strength that accounts for the dominant position of men in society, or can this phenomenon be attributed to biological and social factors such as the superior physical strength of males and the necessity for women in the past to devote so much of their energy to homemaking and child rearing? We do not yet know the relative strengths of unconscious factors and social forces in determining the respective roles and the relationship of men and women. Though Juliet Mitchell does not adequately deal with these and other matters, her book is a useful addition to the literature on feminism as it points up some of the contributions of psychoanalysis to the understanding of women and it raises questions for further exploration.

REBECCA Z. SOLOMON (HARTFORD, CONN.)

FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY. By Karen Horney. Edited by Harold Kelman, M.D. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1973. 269 pp.

Karen Horney is known to psychoanalysts for her rejection of basic Freudian concepts, such as regression and fixation, instinctual forces, and the genetic point of view. She substituted for these concepts a formulation of blockage of growth, and considered conflicts to occur in an 'actual situation' rather than arising out of infantile conflicts. On the subject of female sexuality she is best known for her sometimes angry rejection of 'penis envy' and her frequent reference to cultural forces in the formation of psychological problems in women. For these reasons Horney is seldom read by Freudian analysts. This makes for a great loss to the general understanding of female psychology, to which Horney brought much clinical experience and some unique points of view that should be re-examined.

In this recent paperback, Harold Kelman has selected fifteen papers on female psychology written by Horney over a span of fifteen years (1922-1937) and has added an introduction covering her differences with Freud, and some comments on these papers. Unfortunately Kelman's overview of the development of Horney's thought lacks sufficient historical perspective. He stresses, as do all her followers, her differences with Freud but not the basic agreement with psychoanalytic theory which she held for many years and evidently began to question only in the late 1930's. In this book she still refers to infantile conflicts and fixations and to infantile fantasies which have resulted from a complex interweaving of life experiences, especially œdipal rejection, body sensations, and anxieties.

Horney's work on female psychology, then, disagrees with Freud's in a much narrower range than has been generally assumed. It should be remembered, too, that Freud's ideas on penis envy and his concept of a libidinal phase in girls (called the phallic phase and evolved late in his thinking) were discussed very actively when he propounded them. Horney's papers were part of this discussion. Curiously the debate about female sexuality stopped abruptly in the 1930's, without resolution of some basic issues, and was not generally taken up again. This may be related to the hostile reception of Horney's contribution and to the unwillingness of some of her colleagues to express their reservations to Freud. It is only in the last few years—and probably as a result of virulent criticism from the

feminist movement—that attention has been paid to this gap in the development of psychoanalytic theory.

Horney's approach to penis envy seems to be misunderstood by her own followers. This is not surprising because at times she became exceedingly sarcastic about the phallocentricity of egotistical male analysts who generalized their own infantile fantasies of the importance of the penis into a theory applicable to both sexes. But Horney must be read more carefully. Actually she agreed that penis envy exists and that many women suffer from a 'masculinity complex' and frigidity based on the wish for a penis and identification with the male. However, she viewed the original penis envy as a mild narcissistic phase in girls, comparable to the envy boys may have of motherhood. Further, she believed that continued or troublesome penis envy and masculine identification with the father are not the cause, but the result of conflicts in a young girl, particularly conflicts dealing with œdipal rejection. This was her response to Freud's paper on the consequences of the anatomical differences, in which he makes penis envy the leitmotiv in female life. When Freud the theorist felt the need to integrate his ideas on penis envy into his general psychology, he added the concept of a biological phallic phase in girls. Horney, taking issue with this, presented some valuable ideas on the importance of the vagina and vaginal sensations, anxieties over injury to the female genital, and the biological drive for motherhood.

The reader may be put off by superficialities in two areas. One weakness seems to be in her understanding of Deutsch and Rado on feminine masochism. She treats the subject more in terms of the usual definition of masochism—as aggression turned inward and pleasure in real pain. Secondly, her introduction of cultural variables into the discussion of female psychology and sexuality is minimal, more lip service than serious discussion. Significantly, cultural factors are not mentioned in her case material.

Inevitably, these fifteen papers, published over a long period for many kinds of audiences, are uneven and repetitive. The reader is jarred by her occasional sarcasm and ironic bitterness which probably reflected the bitterness of the verbal debates with her colleagues that we are not privy to. Above all, there are the frequent shifts between superficial and depth psychology. Only if one reads these papers with a certain dedication to understanding female psychology

will it become apparent that she made some very important contributions. Harold Kelman's introduction is helpful in elucidating Horney's general theoretical changes and her differences with Freud. But when he tries to illustrate the contents of her various papers he emphasizes and quotes those sentences which stress her later theoretical drift as well as her polemical irony. This might offend people who wish to investigate the validity of Horney's disagreements with Freud as well as of Freud's disagreement with Horney.

It is this reviewer's opinion that Horney's work on feminine psychology should be known to all psychoanalysts and that sections of it should be integrated into general theory.

LORE REICH RUBIN (PITTSBURGH)

SPLITTING. A CASE OF FEMALE MASCULINITY. By Robert J. Stoller, M.D. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1973. 395 pp.

Stoller had known Mrs. G as a patient for fourteen years and had treated her for seven. In the first of over twenty hospitalizations, she appeared to be a psychopath 'with a touch of anguish'. As psychotherapy diminished her impulsivity and denial, Mrs. G developed repeated, acute, transient, nondeteriorating psychotic episodes. When Stoller learned of her delusions of possessing a penis, she was included in his researches on women with gender disorders and sessions were audiotaped.

With clarity, candor, and courage, Stoller decribes his methodological and theoretical position and his goals: to 'report on progress in a study of the psychological origins of masculinity and femininity; examine the problem of reporting data in clinical research; upgrade the value of the single case studied in depth; open analytic theory up so that social learning theories and research can enter our understanding of infant development; amplify object relations theory (minus "death instinct", "psychic energy", and a libidinal zone fixation theory of neurosis), especially by emphasizing the power of parental fantasies in creating personality structure; study issues in the causes and treatment of splitting, such as female homosexuality, multiple personality, and hysterical psychosis; and shed some light on the roots of evil' (p. xvii).

Stoller holds that early or core gender identity—the sense of male-

ness or femaleness—is present at age two, and practically irreversible by six. Conditioning or learning processes in response to parental attitudes form this core. Intrapsychic conflicts become a factor in shaping gender identity only later, after the development of memory, fantasy, and self-object differentiation.

Decrying his impression that 'there is not a single psychoanalytic report in which the conclusions are preceded by the data which led to them', the author presents his data, organized logically and chronologically and clearly demarcated from his theoretical inferences. Beginning with the patient's delusional penis and her hallucinatory male voice, 'Charlie' (both were present since age four), Stoller traces the origins, development, and vicissitudes of Mrs. G's bisexuality. As the result of therapy, she no longer takes defensive recourse in splitting mechanisms, and her bisexuality is manifested in less pathological forms.

The author's self-described 'simple . . ., colloquial, unprofessional, undignified' stylistic breeziness does not obscure the seriousness of his intent. Reading the book is like auditing Stoller's sessions with Mrs. G, followed by informal, stimulating, and provocative conversations with him.

This is an important book for psychoanalysts, not only for the author's research and theories in the sphere of psychosexuality, but also for his astringent critique of data gathering and theory making in psychoanalysis.

EUGENE H. KAPLAN (GREAT NECK, N.Y.)

ABSTRACTS OF THE STANDARD EDITION OF THE COMPLETE PSYCHOLOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD. Edited by Carrie Lee Rothgeb. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1973. 572 pp., plus Subject Index, 189 pp.

A few years ago, all members of the American Psychoanalytic Association received from the U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare a paperback book entitled *Abstracts of the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud.* The foreword to the book, by Bertram S. Brown, Director of the National Institute of Mental Health, stated that the National Clearinghouse for Mental Health Information had collaborated with the American Psychoanalytic Association in 'a pioneer effort to abstract

the *Standard Edition of Sigmund Freud'*. There was also a preface by Bernard D. Fine, Chairman of the Committee on Indexing of the American Psychoanalytic Association, and an editor's preface by Carrie Lee Rothgeb, Chief of the Technical Information Section of the National Clearinghouse for Mental Health Information.

This introductory material was followed by the abstracts of Freud's works in the order in which they appear in the *Standard Edition,* printed two columns to a page. There was an appendix in which the works were arranged according to the numbers in the Tyson-Strachey *Chronological Hand-List of Freud's Works* and cross-references to the volume and page numbers of the *Standard Edition.* This was followed by a lengthy Subject Index in the form of a computer printout all in capital letters of small size so that it is rather difficult to read.

This work has been reprinted and published by International Universities Press in a hard cover format. The preface by Fine has been somewhat rewritten, the editor's preface has been shortened and is unsigned, and the foreword by Brown has been omitted. Overall, the format of the hard cover book makes a pleasant physical impression. It is a more convenient size than the paperback and the Subject Index which has been completely reset is much easier to work with. The cost of the International Universities Press edition is $20.00. Recently a paperback reprint of this work has become available for $4.95.

The editors of the ABSTRACTS were well aware of the formidable difficulties involved in their task.

> It should be understood and appreciated that any attempt to abstract the extraordinarily literate, closely reasoned writings of Sigmund Freud—who, it will be remembered, received the Goethe Prize for literature—with their clear, relevant, often vivid clinical examples, is a difficult and challenging task. . . .
>
> The experienced and serious student of Freud's writings and concepts will certainly see gaps and areas of incompleteness in some of the abstracts. These resulted partly from the intrinsic difficulties just mentioned and partly from the requirements and rigors of a complex computerization project seeking to limit each abstract to a maximum of 350 words. The abstracts in their present form should nevertheless be enormously useful to those who are interested in an initial understanding of the major concepts of psychoanalysis, seen in a historical context, as developed by Sigmund Freud (p. vii).

There is no doubt that the labors of the people involved in the preparation of this work were arduous and difficult. They have clearly approached their task with conscientious dedication and a sincere appreciation for the inherent difficulties. The preparation of these abstracts was very different from the usual abstract of a book or an article, however. Getting the essence of such a publication is generally simpler than presenting the nuances and the flavor of Freud's writings, apart from the inherent difficulty of summarizing his 'closely reasoned' arguments.

To appreciate fully the extent of the problems involved in these abstracts, one must carefully compare the abstract with the original paper. This is a formidable task for any reviewer. Such a study reveals a wide discrepancy in the quality of the abstracts: many are good; some are adequate; some are poor. All too many abstracts, unfortunately, rely on the technique of quoting Freud without quotation marks and deleting sentences, expressions, or qualifying phrases that the abstracter deems unnecessary or superfluous. The result at times is a jumble of inaccuracy and misrepresentation: meanings both gross and subtle are torn asunder and certain impressions are given which were not in Freud's original text. One has but to read one of the sterile abstracts and compare it with the richness of Freud's text to be impressed by its poverty of content.

Rather than using one of Freud's long or theoretical papers to compare with the abstract, I want to call the reader's attention to the following brief examples. In the ABSTRACTS, on page 513, we find 'Preface to Richard Sterba's "Dictionary of Psychoanalysis" (1936)', listed as 1936B 22/253. The abstract reads:

> Freud wrote a preface to Richard Sterba's *Dictionary of Psychoanalysis.* The *Dictionary* gives the impression of being a valuable aid to learners and of being a fine achievement on its own account. The precision and correctness of the individual entries is in fact of commendable excellence. . . .

The abstract is actually a quotation, without quotation marks. The text, found on page 253 of Volume XXII of the *Standard Edition,* however, contains in the title the added information '1936 [1932]'. The actual text shows that it is a *letter* with a date, 'July 3, 1932'—and a salutation—'DEAR DR. STERBA'. It reads 'Your *Dictionary* gives me the impression. . . '. Strachey, in his editorial comments, calls attention to the fact that Freud's letter was 'printed in facsimile as frontispiece to the first instalment (*"Abasie"* to *"Angst"*). . . '. He

also adds that Freud's letter was written when the 'work had only just been started and when Freud had only seen a sample of it'.

We see that in the course of abstracting a half page of the *Standard Edition,* three errors were made: omitting from the title the year when the letter was written; not indicating that it was in fact a *letter;* and omitting the word *me.* The abstracter writes: 'Freud wrote a preface'. The fact is that Freud wrote a personal letter that was used as a preface. Since so much of the first few lines was quoted, why did the abstracter choose to omit the word *me?* Or was it a typographical error? Obviously there is a meaningful difference in implication between the general 'gives the impression' and the personal 'gives *me* the impression'.

As a second example, on page 514 of the ABSTRACTS, listed as '1935C 22/255, To Thomas Mann on his sixtieth birthday (1935)', the abstracters write: 'In Freud's letter to Thomas Mann on his sixtieth birthday he wrote that wishing is cheap and strikes him as a relapse to the days when people believed in the magical omnipotence of thoughts'. The relevant section of what Freud actually wrote was:

> MY DEAR THOMAS MANN, Accept as a friend my affectionate greetings on your sixtieth birthday. I am one of your 'oldest' readers and admirers and I might wish you a very long and happy life as is the custom on such occasions. But I shall not do so. Wishing is cheap and strikes me as a relapse into the days when people believed in the magical omnipotence of thoughts. I think, too, from my most personal experience, that it is well if a compassionate fate set a timely end to the length of our life . . . (*Standard Edition,* XXII, p. 255).

The abstract of this part of the letter hardly seems to me to capture Freud's meaning.

The abstracters of this brief letter continue with the following: 'In the name of a countless number of Mann's contemporaries, Freud expressed their confidence that Mann will never do or say anything that is cowardly or base, for an author's words are deeds'. For some strange reason, the abstracters turned around the one sentence among several that they chose to use. Freud had written: 'In the name of a countless number of your contemporaries I can express to you our confidence that you will never do or say—for an author's words are deeds—anything that is cowardly or base' (*Standard Edition,* XXII, p. 255). The abstracters have, moreover, omitted the final sentence of Freud's letter which again casts a different implication

on what he meant to convey in his letter. He wrote: 'Even in times and circumstances that perplex the judgement you will take the right path and point it out to others' (*ibid.*).

Freud's commendation of his friend and his belief that Mann will be the leader of others is completely missing in the abstract. Why just those particular sentences are quoted, and again without quotation marks, is not clear.

The presentation of abstracts of sections of books and articles in the sequence in which they appear in the *Standard Edition* does indeed provide a bird's eye view (or rapid overview) of the development of Freud's thought. So far so good. Apart from the problems indicated above which continue throughout the work, the summaries of Freud's major ideas in a section or paper are adequately done in a general way. However, if one studies the abstracts of *The Interpretation of Dreams,* for example, for some details, then we have another problem. The abstracters have dealt with the problem of Freud's dreams and his associations to them by omitting them completely. For instance, the abstracts of the section *Infantile Material as a Source of Dreams* contain no reference to Freud's personal history. It may be thought that this material was omitted because it was so difficult to summarize, although there are some attempts to do so as in the summary of the associations to the Irma dream. When dealing with the dreams of his patients, e.g., Dora and the Wolf-man, however, these dreams and the associations to them have been given, albeit incompletely. The rationale for this is difficult to comprehend. In view of the stated attempt to derive an understanding of the major concepts of psychoanalysis from a historical context, one would think that more attention would have been paid to Freud's own dreams and his associations, especially since many of his early theories were derived from this material.

One may assume that the abstracters were aware of the deficiency in their approach since they point to the existence of gaps. But it is a serious question whether, by presenting Freud's material incompletely or inaccurately, they have performed their stated service of providing an 'initial understanding of the major concepts of psychoanalysis seen in a historical context'. I doubt the value of an incorrect initial understanding that must later be corrected by a careful study of the original text. It is unfortunate that so much labor

should have been expended on a project of questionable scholastic value.

The abstracts are followed by an *Appendix*. 'This cross-reference list relates the Tyson-Strachey "Chronological Hand-List of Freud's Works" to the volume and page number of the *Standard Edition* and is arranged by Tyson-Strachey number' (p. 561). In the latter system, when the year of publication is different from the year of writing, the latter is given in brackets, e.g., 1936B[1932]. The editors of the ABSTRACTS were free to choose how much of this information to use in their list. Since they use only the *year* of publication, e.g., 1936, it is incorrect to designate this as the 'Tyson-Strachey number'.

In the Preface, Fine writes: 'This volume also fills a long-felt need for a secondary reference and index to the *Standard Edition*' (p. viii). Since the final volume of the *Standard Edition* had not yet been published at the time the ABSTRACTS were in preparation, a subject index in one comprehensive volume would indeed have been most welcome. The headings are arranged alphabetically, followed by the title of Freud's publication, the year of publication according to Tyson-Strachey, and the reference to the abstract given as volume and page number in the *Standard Edition*. The abstracters relied on modern techniques of indexing to compile the Subject Index. Key words 'machine generated' were selected and used as the basis for the Subject Index. The only qualification is given on page S-1 following page 572. 'The spelling of words in the titles of abstracts has not been changed; hence, two spellings of the same word may appear in this index—for example, BEHAVIOR and BEHAVIOUR.'

This method of preparation is highly commendable in principle, and probably would be so in fact if carefully edited by someone with psychoanalytic knowledge. Because of the methods used in the preparation of the abstracts, however, errors and omissions in listing and abstracting are carried into the Subject Index listings. Headings using the modifier alone stand out in capital letters in bold face type. Selecting but a few at random, we have such Subject Index categories as: ACUTE, ARTIFICIAL, BIOGRAPHICAL, BLISSFUL, BUNGLED, CHRONIC, COMBINED, CONSTITUTIONAL, CYNICAL, DANGEROUS, DEPENDENT, EMOTIONAL, FAULTY, FREE, etc. Some headings are words out of context from the title: ABSURD, ACTION, ADVANCE, COMBINED, COMPARISON, CONDITIONS, CONSEQUENCES, COPES, DEPARTURES, DIFFICULTIES, DISSECTION, DISTINGUISHES, EXAMPLE, EXCITATION, etc. These words

are derived from words in the titles of Freud's papers or of sections of his publications. For example, under the heading FREE one finds one reference: 'Analysis Terminable and Interminable. Constitutional Variables in Ego, Libido and Free Aggressiveness'; under the heading FOND: 'The Interpretation of Dreams. The Material and Sources of Dreams [the title of Chapter V]. Typical Dreams. Dreams of the Death of Persons of Whom the Dreamer is Fond [subheadings of Chapter V].'

When it comes to the nouns, the major problem lies in the rather striking incompleteness. Under AGGRESSION there are only two references—both to *Civilization and Its Discontents:* 'Security at the Cost of Restricting Sexuality and Aggression' and 'Arguments for an Instinct of Aggression and Destruction'. Under AGGRESSIVENESS, only one—'Analysis Terminable and Interminable. Constitutional Variables in Ego, Libido and Free Aggressiveness.' Not listed are others that may readily come to mind such as *Beyond the Pleasure Principle, The Ego and the Id, The Economic Problem of Masochism, The Outline of Psychoanalysis,* etc.

The heading AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL includes among other things references to 'An Autobiographical Study' but omits Freud's autobiographical references in The Interpretation of Dreams and in On Dreams.

There is only one reference under CASTRATION and that is to 'From the History of an Infantile Neurosis. Anal Erotism and the Castration Complex (Wolf Man)', and there is no heading for CASTRATION COMPLEX.

There are two references under COMPULSION. The first reference—'Notes upon a Case of Obsessional Neurosis. Instinctual Life of Obsessional Neurotics, and the Origins of Compulsion and Doubt'—is to only *one* section of that work. The other sections, although abstracted, are not mentioned, nor is the reference to the original record of the case given. This reference is listed under the heading ADDENDUM! The other reference under COMPULSION is to 'Psychopathology of Hysteria; Hysterical Compulsion; The Genesis of Hysterical Compulsion.'

Under the heading DREAM-INTERPRETATION there is one reference: 'Papers on Technique. The Handling of Dream-Interpretation in Psychoanalysis'. This despite the fact that the title of Freud's classic

work is *The Interpretation of Dreams* and is listed under other DREAM headings!

Under ID there are seven references to 'The Ego and the Id' and one to 'Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety—Relation of Ego to the Id and to Symptoms.' There are no other references.

Under METAPSYCHOLOGY, one finds the expected six papers but one does not find *The Economic Problem of Masochism* or some of Freud's other papers using a metapsychological approach.

Looking under RESISTANCE, we find references to 'Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Fifth Lecture; Transference and Resistance; Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. General Theory of the Neuroses. Resistance and Repression; Analysis Terminable and Interminable. Bisexuality is the Strongest Resistance to Analysis.' Under RESISTANCES we find 'the Resistances to Psychoanalysis. Appendix: Extract from Schopenhauer's The World as Will and Idea; The Resistances to Psychoanalysis; Letter 72 (Resistances Reflect Childhood).' The section (Part IX) from *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,* however, in which Freud deals specifically with the five types of resistances, is not mentioned.

Under TRANSFERENCE are 'Five Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Fifth Lecture. Transference and Resistance; Papers on Technique. The Dynamics of Transference [and] Observations on Transference Love. (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psychoanalysis). Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis: General Theory of the Neuroses. Transference; Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Transference Neurosis Is a Repetition.' But the paper on the Dora analysis, *Fragment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria,* where Freud first discussed transference, is not mentioned. Incidentally, one will not find DORA as a heading, although FRAU PJ from Draft J is given.

Apart from a few such characteristic examples of omissions, there are various conspicuous errors in arrangement. The heading ANALYSIS is followed by ANALYST, ANALYTIC, then returns to ANALYSIS. Another, under LETTER, gives a reference entitled 'Letter from Freud'. This turns out to be to Einstein on *Why War?* The letter to Richard Sterba is omitted under LETTER but *is* under STERBA.

The Subject Index is probably of central importance to most people who are interested in research. The general impression, however, is that it was carelessly and thoughtlessly done. Considering its importance, this is a pity, for its use will engender a good deal of

frustration for one familiar with Freud's writings and will lead to gross misinformation for the uninformed. Perhaps people's needs would have been better served had the compilers of the ABSTRACTS used their computers to combine the indexes of the twenty-three published volumes of the *Standard Edition* into a single index for all the volumes.

The over-all effect of the entire book follows fairly closely our survey of the Subject Index. With the effort, energy, and expense that has been devoted to it, one would have expected a good deal more. The work is very disappointing. There is, after all, no royal road to scholarship! Perhaps the entire undertaking is a reflection of today's plastic computerized society in which we may find Shakespeare's *The Tempest* indexed under STORM(S)!

ALEXANDER GRINSTEIN (BEVERLY HILLS, MICH.)

THE LANGUAGE OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. By J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis. Translated by D. Nicholson-Smith. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1973. 510 pp.

The authors of this volume have deliberately and successfully chosen to discuss and analyze the conceptual equipment of psychoanalysis—concepts that have gradually evolved—to account for its discoveries. Originally conceived by Daniel Lagache in 1937, the plan was carried to fruition by Laplanche and Pontalis in 1967. As described in the Foreword, the book deals not with everything that psychoanalysis seeks to explain but rather with the tools it uses in doing so.

Each of the more than five hundred entries offers a definition and a commentary. The definition seeks to sum up the concept's accepted meaning (or meanings) as elaborated from its strict usage in psychoanalytic theory. The commentary presents the origins and development of the term; it also contains a critical portion and attempts to explicate the essence of the concept (including a thorough review of the references in the Standard Edition and the *Gesammelte Werke*). The authors describe their method under three headings: historical, structural, and problematic. They particularly emphasize a historical approach, discussing the origins of each concept and the basic stages in its evolution; this, in turn, illuminates and clarifies the fundamental meanings, linkages, and interrelationships between the terms. Indications of structural relationships and interpretations

also contribute vital links in the evolution and transformations of these basic psychoanalytic concepts. This often leads to a clearer picture of problematic areas where the various ambiguities and contradictory aspects of certain terms are noted.

The authors' particular emphasis on the genesis of the chief concepts of psychoanalysis inevitably and obviously led them to take Freud's pioneering work as their basic frame of reference, although the terms introduced by several other authors, especially Melanie Klein, have been included. Their attitude to their contribution is reflected in their call for comments and criticisms so that the book will become not only a tool for psychoanalytic study and research, but also a record of work in progress.

To review and evaluate an alphabetical compendium or dictionary of major and minor psychoanalytic concepts is a difficult and, at times, even an onerous task under the best circumstances. However, Laplanche and Pontalis offer a reviewer the most favorable circumstances. Their book is a well-written, carefully thought-out and researched study of most of the terms that analysts use in their professional papers, teaching, conferences, and study groups, as well as in their private theoretical deliberations. To be able to refer to a concept briefly and succinctly and then to be able to follow this with a comprehensive discussion of the genesis, development, and current meanings of the term (usually within two to four pages for the major concepts) makes the task of a reviewer, as it will for a reader, a delight. Furthermore, the volume may be extremely helpful in clarifying some persisting conceptual ambiguities. The listings of the Standard Edition and the *Gesammelte Werke* references are specific and comprehensive. Briefly, this is a superior work which generally achieves the major goals of the authors and of its original sponsor, Daniel Lagache.

However, there are some deficiencies which should be noted. Here the reviewer runs into particular difficulties. How can one best generalize about the areas one would like to see improved, and how demonstrate specific lacks? Generally, concepts such as aggressiveness, binding, cathexis, complex, fantasy, principle of constancy, topography, and transference are presented and discussed very clearly and cogently in this work. However, terms related to structural theory suffer from the authors' failure to include (or accept) recent conceptual modifications and clarifications. For example, *Ego* is discussed in thirteen pages, while only two short paragraphs refer

to the work of Heinz Hartmann and other outstanding theoreticians. The reader is left with an extensive knowledge of the earlier meanings and usage of the concept, but many recent advances are omitted or referred to only glancingly (*cf.*, pp. 131, 142). Terms such as *Self, Ego Function,* and *Narcissistic Character Disorder* are completely omitted. Other concepts which seem less than adequately defined and clarified are *Borderline Cases, Latency Period, Over-determination, Metapsychology, Pleasure Ego/Reality Ego, Psychical Conflict, Psychical Representation, Splitting of the Ego, Reality Testing,* and *Wish.*

While terms introduced by Melanie Klein are included, as they should be, and there are interesting terms (relatively unknown to the reviewer) from prominent French analysts—*Foreclosure* (*Repudiation*) by Lacan; *Working-Off Mechanism* by Lagache; as well as *Neurosis of Abandonment* by the Swiss analysts Guex and Odier —, there are many omissions of outstanding Anglo-American contributors. Theoreticians and clinicians with significant contributions to the literature, such as Hartmann, Kris, Loewenstein, Erikson, Greenacre, Jacobson, and Mahler among others, as well as the many concepts (e.g., separation-individuation, the self, conflict-free ego sphere, ego defect, ego functions, separation anxiety, identity, structural theory, regression in the service of the ego, etc.) which they have introduced or elaborated during the last twenty or thirty years, are omitted from the major references.

Occasionally there is some 'stiffness' in the verbal flow. Whether this is due to the translation or whether it appears in the original French, I do not know. But at times it does impede conceptual clarity. Some of the discussions also seem to have sophistic overtones, which stand out because of the authors' much more usual standards of objectivity. While these flaws on occasion are a hindrance, the basic over-all distinction of the authors' contribution remains unmarred.

In sum, this is an excellent conceptual dictionary and compendium for both candidates and graduate analysts, as well as for students of the psychological sciences. The only significant caveat, as noted above, is that a number of structural concepts deserve either inclusion or more thorough description, and additions to their meanings in the psychoanalytic literature since 1940 deserve further evaluation and possible modification.

BERNARD D. FINE (NEW YORK)

PLAY, GAMES, AND SPORT. THE LITERARY WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL. By Kathleen Blake. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974. 216 pp.

That Lewis Carroll's works were the expression of the genius of the Reverend Charles L. Dodgson is an almost indisputable historical fact.[1] The 'Alice' books have been translated into more foreign languages than any other book in the English language, except the Bible. Although this would seem to testify to their immense, almost universal appeal, many of Carroll's greatest admirers are not very clear as to the significance of this appeal or the meaning of the work's content, and the sharpest disagreements have arisen about the interpretations that have been offered. To me it seems that this wide appeal rests on the fact that the Alice books are expressions in vivid verbal collages of the fundamental intricacies of human nature. It is an indication of Dodgson's genius that through Carroll he touches such a wide range of his readers' unconscious feelings even more than their consciously reasoned reactions.

The present volume by Kathleen Blake, an Assistant Professor of English at the University of Washington, deals only with play, games, and sport. It is based on her study of *all* of Carroll's literary works, including his stories, journals, notes, and documents, as well as the letters to his little girl friends which contained a variety of games and puzzles. She does not mention his drawings or his attitudes toward the artists who illustrated his books. Her general thesis, which in her estimation can be applied to all of Carroll's work, is that play is a pleasurable expression of practice derived from the primary urge toward mastery, originating in oral incorporation, and that games are extensions and diversifications of this. Both play and games are considered to be without any significant animus or hostility and to belong to the innocent world of childhood. Hostile aggression emerges, then, only in those sports which are cruel and unacceptable.

Blake's approach is in the language of a student of literature and philosophy. When she undertakes a psychological critique as well, she is obviously not thoroughly at home. Her psychological vision is

[1] Perhaps this is not quite indisputable: recently I heard of a book, soon to be published, which is intended to prove that Queen Victoria was the real author of *Alice in Wonderland*.

correspondingly restricted. Moral overtones are evident in the degree of her bowdlerization and rationalizing interpretation of what Carroll actually wrote. At times one gets a feeling that she is herself playing a philosophical game with the material. Having set up a model, she must fit the pieces into it. When the pieces cannot readily be fitted into the model, she makes new rules to contain or exclude them in a fashion which she has described as occurring in some games of chess which get out of control and go on indefinitely.

In her introduction, the author makes explicitly clear that she is not concerning herself with the man, Charles Dodgson, who occupied the same body as Lewis Carroll. Thus she avoids the psychological questions involved in the separation that the man himself made between Charles Dodgson and Lewis Carroll, a separation much stronger than merely that of citizen identity and nom de plume. She seems intimidated by the problems of identity, since some early psychiatric writers had considered these as indicating possible schizophrenia. Some of the illustrations of 'games' quoted from Carroll's letters are classical examples of defensive maneuvers against the nagging plague of obsessional doubting (p. 78). The mapping out of games which might be played in the mind without doing anything concrete and active was clearly an effort to obtain relief. The game thoughts then substituted for the troublesome obsessional ones. This is clearly stated by Carroll himself. One suspects that a further line of defense was mustered when he sent the accounts of his games to his little girl friends.

In her presentation, Blake determinedly and almost completely separates the mind from the body. She considers love and aggression in Carroll as the mental aspects of emotional states without any physical components. Muscular activity and anything connected with genital sex are conspicuously missing. She states emphatically that what Charles Dodgson *did* was less interesting than what Lewis Carroll *wrote*. Thus Dodgson had the body while Carroll held the pen from which the fantasy flowed. Blake also discards any version of Carroll which would take account of Dodgson's 'strait-laced ways' and liking for little girls (p. 12).

To me it seems that Carroll was the mental incarnation that Dodgson's genius demanded. Through his writing as Carroll, Dodgson found some relief in the externalization of his struggles with sex and aggression. This muted anguish is expressed in fanciful ways

which reach and unconsciously move others, adults as well as his little girls. The appeal of his work may be compared to that of fairy tales which contain all the important themes of human development. The fact that there were elements of self-therapy in his writing certainly need not detract from its importance and value.

The book pays scant attention to the functions of play other than that of attainment of the pleasure of mastery: first self-mastery, then mastery in social relations. Accordingly, play and games are seen as arising from the primary need to 'feed the mind'. There is no emphasis on other channels of incorporation in infancy nor any conception that some hostile aggression is inevitable in the struggles of life. The author mentions Carroll's ambivalence, but does not recognize its flowering into a richness of ambiguity which lends almost unlimited versatility, volatility, and liveliness to the imagery of his writing. She carefully sidesteps any concern with Carroll's need to confide his games and puzzles to little girls only.

In general she seems to shy away from problems of identity and identification, which are rampant in the Alice books. This is accomplished by the deletion of Dodgson. Thus problems of gender are disposed of. There is in fact a general aversion to matters having to do with the body. Blake also wishes to avoid any implication that Carroll might be an escapist alter ego for Dodgson. She explains that her approach is not psychoanalytic but psychological, since she considers Carroll's literary output as psychic impulse—that is, as play. She avowedly dislikes 'Freudian interpretations of Alice's growth process' and is sure that they are incorrect. There are, she says, 'no phalluses, toilets, cannibals, wombs or amniotic fluids in the *Alice* books: there are [only] games' (p. 13).

This erudite book may be useful to those who have a special interest in the theory of games. It contributes less to any psychological understanding of Carroll and deals with him chiefly as an extraordinary game player toward whom the author appears to feel a protective guardianship. There is an extensive bibliography concerning Carroll's life and works. Unfortunately, its usefulness is impaired, as the great body of references is allocated to footnotes throughout the book. The index includes only those whose authors give some support to Blake's thesis.

PHYLLIS GREENACRE (NEW YORK)

THE UNSPOKEN MOTIVE. A Guide to Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism. By Morton Kaplan, Ph.D. and Robert Kloss, Ph.D. New York: The Free Press, 1973. 323 pp.

Kaplan and Kloss have written a text for undergraduates with the ambitious aim of establishing an alliance 'between depth psychology and literary criticism'. They are enthusiastic warriors in the cause of Freudian analysis, *'in partibus infidelium'* as Freud liked to say—in this case the vast lands of *Academie* of the English Departments. Enlisted in so good a cause, this reviewer regrets that he cannot recommend the book without reservations.

The authors assume that their readers have no previous knowledge of psychoanalysis. Kaplan, therefore, introduces the topic with a dictionary of elementary concepts, such as the primary process, the dual instinct theory, the ego, and even the œdipus complex. If this scanty preparation seems sufficient it is because the examples cited do not rise above what is self-evident. Faithfully following Freud's 1908 essay, *Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming,* Kaplan demonstrates with six examples that every work of fiction embodies a basic fantasy. These fantasies are so poorly disguised that psychoanalysis can be presented to students as a kind of master key unlocking every door with the aid of a few basic tenets.

A section, *The Development of Psychoanalytic Literary Criticism,* by Kloss, is addressed to a better informed audience and will be of greater interest to the reader of this journal. Beginning with Freud and moving on to Rank, Jones, Sachs, Reik, Bonaparte, Kris, and Kanzer, the contributions of each of these authors to the psychoanalytic understanding of works of literature are summarized, each in a short chapter. In keeping with the idea of an alliance between depth psychology and literary criticism, there are also short chapters summarizing the work of literary critics who wrote under the influence of psychoanalysis. These cover a wide range from the now all but forgotten Albert Mordell, whose *The Erotic Motive in Literature* appeared in 1919, and received Freud's praise, to contemporary critics like F. C. Crews and N. N. Holland. To judge from these summaries, psychoanalytic literary criticism is a flourishing branch of applied psychoanalysis.

There are some notable omissions. No Kleinian author is mentioned, not even Ella Sharpe. Greenacre and Eissler are mentioned

in the bibliography, but curiously enough were not judged worthy of a chapter of their own. One could hardly expect the authors to convey more than elementary knowledge of psychoanalysis, but lapses in literary scholarship are harder to explain. To cite only one example, would any competent literary critic agree that the tradition of the troubadours reached its zenith in Petrarca or Dante (p. 247)?

The authors' *bête noir* is the tendency of psychoanalytic writers to proceed from a psychoanalytic analysis of a character in fiction to a comparison with other works of fiction by the same author, and from there to inferences about the author's own unconscious problems. Even Freud escapes their censure only because he committed this transgression in the Leonardo, and not in the Gradiva, and Leonardo as a painter stands outside of literary analysis. However, the recently published correspondence between Freud and Jung shows how interested Freud was in Jensen's other writings, and with what delight he speculated about the biographical basis of the Gradiva. One may agree with the authors that the kind of deductions that Bonaparte made from Poe's tales to his neurosis were hazardous, that artists do not simply put their own life on paper, at least not the great writers, but this does not mean that biography does not deepen an understanding of a work of literature. Kris was right to point out that great writers go beyond autobiography, but there is wisdom also in Nietzsche's aphorism, 'Man can stretch himself as he may with his knowledge and appear to himself as objective as he may; in the last analysis he gives nothing but his own biography'.

In this book, Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* is analyzed as 'a fantasy of paternity and a *Doppelgänger*'. Frankenstein's unconscious is analyzed as dominated by a 'particular Oedipal obsession—the question of where babies come from'. The monster is also seen as a representation of his creator's id; as such it is rejected by his creator, representing the conscious ego. The interpretation is plausible but would apply equally well to Rabbi Loewe and his *Golem* or to such a book as Stevenson's *Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde*. What is unique and so appealing in Mary Shelley's creation is the monster's lifelong craving for love and the tragedy of his rejection at first sight. Here, as elsewhere, the authors display no knowledge of psychoanalysis beyond the œdipal level.

If contrary to the authors' advice we turn to biography we learn

that Mrs. Shelley's mother died when she was ten days old. Fortunately for our purposes, her father, William Goodwin, the author of *Political Justice,* was a prominent proponent of rationalism. We know, therefore, that in one of his books, *The Spirit of Rationalism,* he argued that the job of the upbringing of children should not necessarily be left to the parents. 'The mature man', he writes, 'seldom retains the faintest recollection of the incidents of the first two years of his life. Is it to be supposed that that which has left no trace upon the memory can be in any eminent degree powerful in his associative effects?' His correspondence also survived. We know, therefore, that he felt himself to be totally unfit to rear the baby, Mary. He took her into his household only when he remarried, when she was four years old.

Frankenstein's biography cannot unravel the secret of the monster's need for love, but Mary's biography can. The book is dedicated to William Goodwin. She, herself, probably did not know that it represented her unconscious accusations against her father. To shun biography when data are available is like preferring to analyze dreams by symbols when the associations of the patient can be obtained. It is a pity that a dogmatic point of view withholds this knowledge from students.

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ABSTRACTS

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. XII, 1974.

Two Unpublished Letters of S. Freud. H. Z. Winnik. Pp. 3-9.

Winnik presents two brief, almost terse notes written in 1934 and 1937 as answers to a criminal lawyer's request for psychological information about two clients charged with sexual offenses. They reveal little of consequence about Freud, except his magnanimity in attempting to answer difficult questions posed by a man unknown to him during this most trying period in his life.

Bull Fighting and Bull Worship. R. E. Pollock, Pp. 53-59.

This article contains a valuable review of the various forms of primitive bull worship in which the bull represented the god's virility and potential for destructiveness. The bull fighting games that emerged in various ritualized forms are seen as symbolizing the son's œdipal revolt against the father in which he must kill or be killed, castrate or be castrated. Pollock attempts to deal with so many other symbolic representations of this ritual that these concepts appear less vivid in the resulting confusion.

M. DONALD COLEMAN

Israel Annals of Psychiatry. XIII, 1975.

A Recently Recovered Letter of Freud. H. Z. Winnik. Pp. 1-3.

In this short note written in 1931 to a philosopher who had asked him about Spinoza's influence on his work, Freud acknowledges his 'dependence upon Spinoza's doctrine'. By this he means that his discoveries were achieved in an atmosphere created by the great philosopher, not that they were the direct result of systematic study. Freud's philosophical interests made him particularly concerned about his own discoveries being presented without 'deformation, prejudice and preconceptions'. Citing the danger of becoming guided by a philosopher one studies, Freud states that he denied himself the study of Nietzsche because he knew he would find insight there similar to that of psychoanalysis.

This note adds to our knowledge of Freud and should be available to future biographers.

Children of Psychotic Parents Reared Away from Home. Rita Landau; Yakov Daphne; Clara Iuchtman; Vardit Aveneri. Pp. 48-58.

Children of psychotic parents were studied in two groups. In one group the children had been reared by their parents; in the other group, they had been removed from their homes before three years of age and reared in foster homes or institutions. Both groups were compared with a control group of children having nonpsychotic parents. Although its methodology is open to considerable

question, this study is of some interest in its suggested conclusion that 'adequate stable surroundings could have a mitigating influence on a handicapping genetic heritage'. It might therefore be of value to those who wish some crude quantification of the possible ameliorating effects of environment on hereditary factors.

M. DONALD COLEMAN

Psyche. XXVIII, 1974.

The following are edited versions of the English summaries that appeared in Psyche and are published with the permission of the editor of the journal.

Problems of Interaction in the Practice of Psychosomatic Consultation. Michael Rotmann and Reimer Karstens. Pp. 669-683.

The authors are psychoanalytically trained internists who worked for fifteen months as psychosomatic consultants in a clinic for internal medicine. They report on the extraordinary difficulties they encountered in trying to convey to their psychologically untrained medical colleagues an appreciation of the psychological problems of patients. The physicians reacted with a variety of defenses to the suggestion that they take psychological phenomena into account. The consultants found it necessary to pay close attention to their responses to these reactions so that they would not aggravate the problems.

Comments on the Indication for Psychoanalysis for Felons. Walter Goudsmit. Pp. 684-705.

Goudsmit discusses the special difficulties as well as the potentials of offering psychoanalytic treatment to those who have been imprisoned for committing major crimes. He evaluates the relevant literature on the basis of his own experience in the Dutch penal system. While Goudsmit emphasizes the psychological requirements of convicts and therapists if treatment is to succeed, he does not neglect formulating the necessary institutional conditions which would make such experiments meaningful. Such conditions prevail in very few institutions today.

Combined and Group Therapy with Schizophrenics. Raymond Borens. Pp. 706-718.

The central disturbance in schizophrenics is of ego functions. Within the clinical setting, psychoanalytic therapy is rarely possible. A combination of individual and group therapy enables the patient to regress, to slowly emerge from this 'symbiosis' with the therapist, and to begin an individuation process. Boren deals with this essential phase for the formation of the ego, as described by M. Mahler in 1968.

Verbalization during Psychoanalytic Interpretation. Charlotte Balkányi. Pp. 786-798.

Departing from Freud's differentiation between matter and words and in accordance with Chomsky's psycholinguistic theories, Balkányi postulates that syntax

and affects both originate from the infantile relation to the primary object (verbalization as a normal symptom of restitution). This relationship enables split off affects to become conscious through verbalization. To illustrate her thesis, the author describes the critical phase of a psychoanalytic treatment which led to the decoding of infantile neologisms hiding a lifelong defended aggression.

A Method for Speech Analysis (On-Off Pattern) in the Psychotherapeutic Process. G. Overbeck; E. Brähler; P. Braun; H. Junker. Pp. 815-832.

A method for analyzing speech, developed at the Psychosomatic Clinic of the University of Giessen, is applied to a psychotherapeutic treatment. After a brief account of the method, the authors raise the question of whether automatic speech analysis can be used as a convenient instrument for the assessment of psychotherapy. A detailed case description is offered to enable the reader to relate the results of the speech analysis to the patient's personality structure. It becomes apparent that the data obtained yield valid generalizations pertaining to the interactive aspect of the therapy, as well as diagnostic, therapeutic, and technical considerations. The authors conclude with a critique of the method's deficiencies; further research might answer remaining questions.

Wittgenstein's Language-Game Concept in Psychoanalysis. Alfred Lorenzer. Pp. 833-852.

Lorenzer points out that psychoanalysts, who operate on the basis of a comparatively unified therapy-theory system, encounter difficulties when undertaking an interdisciplinary dialogue with the many heterogeneous language theories current today. He then demonstrates how the unreflective acceptance of Wittgenstein's language-game concept can buttress positivistic misinterpretations of the psychoanalytic method. In contrast, an extended conception of the language-game provides the opportunity for connecting the psychoanalytically oriented exploration of socialization processes and the structural analysis of societal systems. Psychoanalysis is not a language-game; rather, it is aimed at the revision of language-games.

On Psychoanalytic Competence. Hermann Argelander. Pp. 1063-1076.

The psychoanalyst's empathic understanding has two functions. First, it concerns the patient as he is known to himself and as he increasingly becomes known to the therapist. Second, it concerns the patient's unconscious personality structure which is alien to the patient himself. The experience of the 'known other' is conveyed through colloquial communications while the experience of the 'alien other' must first be explored through a hermeneutic procedure *sui generis* which does not take the communicated material at face value.

The Position of the Perversions in Metapsychology and Technique. Fritz Morgenthaler. Pp. 1077-1098.

Referring to two case examples and to a tribal ritual of the Yatmul of New Guinea, Morgenthaler develops a metapsychological interpretation of the perversions which is relevant for psychoanalytic technique. He regards them chiefly as compensatory acts of the ego. Perverse drive satisfaction is subject to change

of function. It fills—somewhat like a dental filling—a cavity in the regulation of self-esteem acquired in childhood. A defective distinction between self and others results in an unresolvable contradiction between reality and fantasy. The perverse gratification 'resolves' this contradiction periodically. The goal of therapy is not the disappearance of the perversion but the substitution of a narcissistic for a sexualized transference. Restructuring of the transference dynamic can enable the patient to build up a genuine love relationship within the perverse structure.

International Journal of Group Psychotherapy. XXIV, 1974.

Utilization of Nonverbal Exercises in the Group Therapy of Outpatient Chronic Schizophrenics. Portia F. Bowers; Muriel Banquer; Harold H. Bloomfield. Pp. 13-24.

The need to provide more effective intervention for chronic psychotics led the authors to institute nonverbal exercises by which their patients could express their feelings and enhance their interpersonal competence, their self-acceptance, and their self-esteem. Characteristically, these chronic schizophrenics feared their own emotions and inhibited their expression since interpersonal encounters aroused in them an intolerable degree of anxiety. These patients interacted in a manner that expressed emotion by the exercise of as many of their senses as possible: by special sitting arrangements, by pushing, by backing out of a circle, by hitting inanimate objects, by hugging, etc. After two and a half years, the patients became willing to discuss their emotions and problems, to care for each other, and to participate in the group. Phone calls to the therapists and demands for medication became less frequent.

Variations of the Group Process across Cultures. Vasso G. Vassiliou and George Vassiliou. Pp. 55-65.

The group process varies according to the cultures of those participating. Thus, a Greek perceives survival as dependent upon the support of his ingroup. His personal actualization is achieved within the context of the group; his goals are syntonic with its goals. The American views the basic unit of society as the individual and his goal of personal achievement as an independent one. He sees his goal as gained by hard work and planning; self-confidence and happiness ensue. For the Greek, the antecedents of success are patience, will power, courage, and coöperation. The results are interdependence and love of others. The Greek matures through feelings, the American through deeds. Americans acknowledge that there is conflict within their ingroup but feel this does not weaken it; with this the Greek disagrees.

Does Woman's New Self-Concept Call for New Approaches in Group Psychotherapy? Edrita Fried. Pp. 265-272.

Nowadays many women seek therapeutic groups with which to integrate current concepts from the women's liberation movement. They wish to achieve a

female role awareness, a sense of equality but not identity with the male, acknowledgment and open pursuit of sexual desires, and social acceptance. These women feel that they are handicapped by cultural factors rather than by anatomical lack and they resent their secondary occupations. They frankly seek a male partner but not necessarily a marital relationship. They are active, purposeful, and well informed, although many are confused about sexuality and the achievement of orgasm. They insist on being seen as open and trustworthy with each other.

In group therapy it is seen that in order to obtain love the female must take risks. The women's complaints of fear of male associates are viewed as a resistance to talking about sex. They realize that in marriage and child rearing, difficulties arise from their lack of self-esteem. The new female self-concept helps diminish woman's anxiety, narcissistic isolation, and self-depreciation.

Discussion. [Women's Role and Group Psychotherapy.] Henriette T. Glatzer. Pp. 281-287.

The author cites Freud's saying, in effect, that men disparage women for being castrated; Brunswick's concept that 'the little girl frees herself from her mother with greater hostility than a boy does'; and Evans's statement that 'the boy's liberation is not from a weak, œdipal castrated mother, but from the omnipotent and preœdipal mother'. The liberation movement for boys as well as girls begins at the breast. Women involved in the liberation movement may use group therapy nontherapeutically to rationalize their problems. Discussion of women's rights becomes resistance to confronting intrapsychic conflicts. If the drive toward equality with man is so intense that it constricts and leads to chronic rage instead of healthy competition then it may well be due to unresolved rivalry toward the preœdipal mother. Penis envy can be part of a deeper resentment: 'I have been deprived'. As patients work through their passivity and their defensive anger against passivity—their pseudoaggression—they realize that what they believe is society's dictum that they must have a man in order to feel whole is an expression of their infantile dependence on their mother. With this realization comes dynamic change.

The Role of Content in Intragroup Interaction. Howard B. Roback. Pp. 288-299.

The development of a therapy group necessitates interpersonal interaction characterized by the disclosure of personal problems and emotions. Thus, traditional group therapists consider that the use of impersonal topics indicates resistance. The author quotes Coons, who asserts that interpersonal interaction is fostered by a warm, accepting social environment which is the essential factor in the therapeutic process. The content is important only as a means of maintaining patient interest. Yalom holds that conditions for change in group therapy are interpersonal learning, group cohesiveness, social techniques, altruism, corrective recapitulation of a family group, imitative behavior, and instillation of hope. Others say that the capacity for group therapy depends upon a sense of belonging, control, rewards and punishment, definition of reality for the patient, the induction and realizing of feeling, and the distribution of power and influence

to many individuals. In this context Marmor has pointed out that psychotherapy conditions clients to offer material relative to the therapist's theory.

Clinical Impressions of an Experimental Attempt to Prepare Lower-Class Patients for Expressive Group Psychotherapy. James B. Heitler. Pp. 308-322.

Lower-class patients, relatively unsophisticated and uninformed, are apt to be confused and suspicious and therefore resistant to psychotherapy. The author, working in a Veterans Administration Hospital ward with an open-ended therapy group of some seven members, found that preliminary interviews concerning the nature of psychotherapy and the members' expectations of it resulted in deeper participation and increased benefits for those involved. Such interviews, though, did not make the participants any more socially acceptable.

Rehabilitating the Stroke Patient through Patient-Family Groups. Judith Gregorie D'Afflitti and G. Wayne Weitz. Pp. 323-332.

'It is often difficult for patients and their families to adjust their lives to a chronic disability, especially when it is time for the patient to come home from the hospital.' With this observation, the authors organized patient-family groups in which the patients: 1, had had a stroke; 2, were mentally and physically competent to participate in the group; 3, had a relative waiting to join the group; and 4, were returned to their homes after hospitalization. At first all members mourned for the lost physical functions, independence, self-esteem, and previous life style of the patients. They showed shock and denial at what had happened. These feelings turned to anger, first against fate and then against the demands the invalid made. These reactions were somewhat assuaged by reminiscence and practical plans for the future. Through ventilating their negative feelings, members became less threatened by them. Staff participants gained new insight into the effect their care had on members and their families.

A Group Method to Facilitate Learning during the States of a Psychiatric Affiliation. Roy Lacoursiere. Pp. 342-351.

This is a study of emotional reactions shared by ten student nurses during ten weeks of training. Reactions in a group are often hindrances to learning. For about two to four weeks students showed hopeful expectations, fears, and anxiety. Concern about possibly hurting the patients was interpreted as covering anxiety about their own safety. For six to eight weeks the students were depressed and angry because of difficulties in acquiring knowledge and because of ungratified fantasies about help with their personal problems. They blamed their teachers. Then they became more realistic and attuned to the psychiatry in which they participated. There was general sorrow at parting from each other and from the program. The topics during this experience served as metaphors for the students' feelings.

GERALDINE PEDERSON-KRAG

Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences. XI, 1975.

Perversions Ancient and Modern: Agalmatophilia, The Statue Syndrome. A. Scobie and A. J. W. Taylor. Pp. 49-54.

Agalmatophilia, or love of a statue, is differentiated from pygmalionism and fetishism. Eighteen examples are cited from classical, clinical, and modern literary sources. The condition, once not too uncommon, is not mentioned in modern works on erotomania and psychiatry. The perversion may have been eliminated from the sexual repertoire of modern man or it may now be more conveniently satisfied by the genius of the plastics industry.

A Note on Sumerian Ki-Ag and Territoriality. Noel W. Smith. P. 87.

Speculation is invited by the fact that the Sumerian word for love, *ki-ag*, means 'to measure the earth'. One idea is that it may derive from the expansive feeling of love (*cf.*, Elizabeth Browning's *How Do I Love Thee?*). The other possibility is that ancient man's intimate knowledge of animals and their defense of the family and its realm, coupled with his identification with them, led to an association of love with territoriality and possession.

The Interpretation of Dreams: Early Reception by the Educated German Public. Hannah S. Decker. Pp. 129-141.

Freud's complaints and Jones's echoing of them that the reception by the German public of Freud's dream book was scant and unfavorable is not sustained by investigation. Freud did not appreciate the extent to which the work was reviewed in Germany. The discovery of additional references in lay periodicals by Giessler, Jentsch, Korn Lubarsch, and others shows that Freud was either unaware of or unduly deprecated the attention paid to his dream studies.

Psychoanalytic theories have always faced resistance because of their sexual content and because of Freud's Viennese Jewish background. But in addition, the unconscious reservations of reviewers, the scientific climate that discouraged lay interest, and Freud's initial reluctance to court intellectuals with literary interests delayed acceptance of the dream theories. Yet it was the latter group which produced some of Freud's most devoted supporters and practitioners. Decker's splendid researches show the general disapproval of Freud by German medical circles and his acceptance by the literati, similar to the phenomena noted by Hale so far as the Americans were concerned (*cf.*, N. H. Hale, Jr.: *Freud and the Americans. The Beginning of Psychoanalysis in the United States, 1876-1917*. Oxford University Press, 1971). But the similar reactions have both similar and some important different motivations in the two countries.

NORMAN REIDER

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLIX, 1974.

The Use of Feedback Electroencephalography to Assess Levels of Attention and Motivated Interests in Paranoid and Nonparanoid Schizophrenics. Thomas J. McLaughlin; Leonard Solomon; Robert Harrison. Pp. 422-432.

The interest of this paper lies in its attempt to verify psychological and psychoanalytic hypotheses with the aid of more objective neurophysiological data.

It is based on work which has shown that EEG response to visual stimulation can be used as an index of the emotional significance of perceptual stimuli. The hypotheses to be tested were: 1, the Freudian position that the regressing schizophrenic has withdrawn his interest from the environment; 2, the position of Shapiro and others that the paranoid is attentively vigilant to the environment; and 3, the view that the paranoid experiences a need for power. Methodology and technique are described in great detail. The results appear consistent with Freud's statement that the regressing schizophrenic has withdrawn his libido from the environment. In the basic discussion dealing with the issue of primary and secondary process thinking, the authors seem to infer that primary process ideation (fantasies, intrusive thoughts, and hallucinations) compete with the perceptual input to capture the attentional cathexis. While such a premise has been a classical one and continues to conform to logic, it leaves a much more complex area of understanding these phenomena still to be explored.

HAROLD R. GALEF

British Journal of Psychiatry. CXXV, 1974.

Overinclusive Thinking in Mania and Schizophrenia. N. J. C. Andreason and Pauline S. Powers. Pp. 452-456.

'The concept of overinclusive thinking has been used to describe or account for the thought disorder observed in schizophrenic patients. This is usually defined as an inability to preserve conceptual boundaries perhaps based on a cerebral input dysfunction which causes difficulty in filtering stimuli. This leads the schizophrenic to make remote associations and to overgeneralize or overabstract.' Recently the concept of overinclusiveness and its theoretical underpinnings have been criticized and the question raised as to whether thought disorder and even Schneiderian first rank symptoms may be observed in manics as well as schizophrenics.

The authors set out to test the hypothesis that in view of the symptoms of flight of ideas, euphoria, and grandiosity, overinclusiveness would be equally common in carefully defined manic and schizophrenic samples. In their study, manic patients tended to demonstrate more overinclusiveness than schizophrenic patients—to a significant degree not due to greater fluency or responsiveness. Comparing their study with one by Paine and his associates, in which the schizophrenic group had a significantly higher degree of overinclusiveness, they comment that his group was not well defined and tended to fall into the schizoaffective good prognosis category. The authors conclude that overinclusive thinking is probably not specific to schizophrenia. Since it has been noted in patients with mania and acute schizophrenia, or perhaps schizoaffective disorder, it may be more closely related to affective disorder than to schizophrenia.

Antibody Levels to Herpes Simplex Type 1, Measles and Rubella Viruses in Psychiatric Patients. P. E. Halonen; R. Rimon; Katve Arohonka: V. Jäntti. Pp. 461-465.

This study indicates that a considerable number of patients with psychotic depression have unusually high levels of neutralizing antibody to herpes simplex

type 1 virus. These findings have recently been confirmed in another laboratory: a higher prevalence of complement fixing antibodies to the herpes group of viruses was found in patients with depressive psychosis and in patients with dementia than in controls. The fact that neither measles nor rubella antibody viruses are increased in psychotic depression rules out the possibility of a general change in circulating antibodies in these patients. Increased levels of neutralizing herpes simplex antibody were found in schizophrenia and a group of other psychiatric diseases (neurotic syndromes, personality disorders), but were less marked than in the depressed group. (Diagnostic criteria for the various categories are not presented.) It is suggested that attention be directed to a possible relationship between slow or latent virus infections in the central nervous system and psychiatric disorders as it has been in many neurological diseases of unknown origin.

The Gestation Period of Identity Change. James Mathers. Pp. 472-474.

'Some kinds of critical change in a person's life experience bring about a change in his sense of identity which is not subjectively recognized and acknowledged until one or two years after the critical event or initiation of the critical change.' Mathers first formed this impression as an army psychiatrist when interviewing expatriate soldiers in India in 1943. Soldiers experiencing a 'failure to adapt to the stress of expatriation' had usually left the United Kingdom twelve to fifteen months before being referred to him because of low morale. In the first years after the war, the author was surprised to meet a number of men who had been satisfactorily resettled with the help of the authorities and who, after about eighteen months, had given up good jobs or occupational prospects and sought jobs of their own choosing. 'It seemed that subjectively even when the experience of resettlement went smoothly, this amount of time had to elapse before some men had regained enough self-confidence to reassert their autonomy as individuals.' Mathers presents supportive evidence from studies of bereavement, offenders in psychiatric prisons, and students at universities for his hypothesis of this critical time period of one or two years. He points out that 'if accepted this hypothesis has significant implications for those programs in education and therapy from which personality change commonly results and suggests that the effectiveness of such programs cannot be adequately assessed less than eighteen months from their initiation'.

Social Aspects of the Battered Baby Syndrome. Selwyn M. Smith; Ruth Hanson; Sheila Noble. Pp. 568-582.

The parents of one hundred thirty-four children under five were studied in detail over a two-year period and compared with a control group, in order to assess the importance of various social stresses and to separate factors typical of low social class from those specific to baby batterers. Lack of family cohesiveness as an important factor was suggested by the findings. Absence of the father from the home was common to one third of the cases. Factors associated with marital breakdown—such as marriage of the mother before age twenty, premarital conception, disagreement or disharmony in child rearing practices—were all common to index cases, as were neuroses among the mothers and personality disorders

among the fathers. The support of parents and other relatives, an important factor in stabilizing early marriages, was minimal in index cases. A rejecting attitude toward the baby and failure to adapt to the parental role were also more frequent among baby batterers. Ineffectiveness with and distrust of contraception, including abortion, by these parents suggest that various birth control measures are unlikely to be effective in reducing the prevalence of battered babies. Social isolation is common, and use of social support through community services uncommon among these parents. The isolation appears to reflect the unhappy childhoods and poor relationships of the mothers with their own mothers. When adjusted for social class, dirty and untidy homes and cramped sleeping accommodations were not significant, nor was unemployment among fathers. The authors caution against the assumption that improved housing or economic aid will diminish baby battering as personality disorders among the parents 'are more important than environmental factors in contributing to child abuse'. 'Treatment can be supportive only and true prevention must lie in effective education of the next generation and in possible changes in the laws relating to child care.'

ROBERT J. BERLIN

Psychiatric Quarterly. XLVIII, 1974.

The following abstracts are from the Psychiatric Quarterly and are published with the permission of the journal.

A Modular, Community-Oriented Treatment Program. Richard S. Galin. Pp. 26-49.

This paper outlines current inadequacies in hospital-based treatment programs for chronic psychotic patients. The author then describes the structure and organization of an innovative new program in which the basic elements include: interpersonal and resocialization emphasis; a thoroughly humanistic and therapeutic milieu; individualized and psychosocially-based treatment in a three-stage, two-setting design; an implemented continuity of care extended into the community satellite aftercare center; and expanded and enriched roles in the team approach of the staff. Finally, Galin offers six interesting suggestions for research and evaluation which might demonstrate wide applicability of the program.

Legal Responsibility for Suicide. Paul F. Slawson; Don E. Flinn; Donald A. Schwartz. Pp. 50-64.

Suicide is a frequent basis for malpractice actions in psychiatry. A review of pertinent court decisions between 1927 and 1962 showed a distinct trend toward greater accountability for both doctors and hospitals. Recent cases in California support this trend. Stricter liability may thwart treatment by compelling a conservative posture with primary emphasis on safe custody. Court decisions which threaten or punish the agency of treatment may do so at the patient's expense.

Psychiatric Disability Determination under Social Security in the United States. Kurt Nussbaum. Pp. 65-73.

The Social Security Act provides disability benefits to those insured who are prevented from working by a severe medically determinable impairment. Under the Act, psychiatric impairment is assessed on the basis of demonstrable clinical manifestations including mental status examination and, where needed, standardized psychological tests yielding quantifiable results. The total function of the person in daily living, both in the social and work spheres, is taken into consideration in the assessment process. Efforts at obtaining further progress in the classification of psychiatric concepts and arriving at greater objectivity in psychiatric decision-making are described.

A New Approach to Disturbed Children: The Medical College School Program. Stanley M. Zupnick. Pp. 74-85.

A description of a treatment-oriented day-school program for emotionally disturbed children, structured according to the principles of behavioral theory, is presented. The daily routine, types of children served, and the results are described. A program of working with parents, utilizing traditional psychotherapeutic principles while concurrently teaching parents the use of behavioral techniques for the home, is detailed. The paper concludes with a case example illustrating the principles and procedures of the program and a discussion of its future course.

Undergraduate Marijuana and Drug Use as Related to Openness to Experience. Jan Carl Grossman; Ronald Goldstein; Russell Eisenman. Pp. 86-92.

Tests measuring creativity, authoritarianism, anxiety, social desirability, and acquiescence were administered to three hundred and sixteen college students who also reported their use of marijuana and other drugs. All reports and tests were anonymous. With increased frequency of marijuana usage, creativity and adventuresomeness scores increased significantly, while authoritarianism scores decreased significantly. Males were significantly heavier users than females, and Jews were heavier users than Protestants or Catholics.

Understanding Persons as Persons. Irwin Savodnik. Pp. 93-108.

American psychiatry has tended to divide into two camps—one seeking to understand persons as bodies and the other seeking to understand them in terms of a mechanistic mental life. Both these approaches, while rewarding in certain respects, fail in the quest of understanding persons as persons. Since psychiatry is rooted in this type of understanding, it is unfortunate that the division within its ranks should be along lines which confuse the major issue of psychiatry and obstruct the development of a systematic understanding of persons which is the major task of psychiatry.

Predictions of Outcome in Psychoanalysis and Analytic Psychotherapy. John J. Weber, et al. Pp. 117-149.

The written records of one thousand three hundred forty-eight patients treated at Columbia University's Psychoanalytic Clinic and the responses of

therapists to a follow-up questionnaire were studied to relate clinical change and predictions of outcome made at the time of admission. Predictions were associated with the type of treatment offered, with the function of the observer, and the completion of long-term analysis.

Stopping the Revolving Door—A Study of Readmissions to a State Hospital. John A. Talbott. Pp. 159-168.

With readmissions comprising 60% of all admissions, the Meyer-Manhattan Psychiatric Center took a hard look at one hundred consecutive readmissions. It was judged that eighty-four might have been prevented and that almost half of these might have been prevented with minor improvements of existing services, necessitating no additional expenditure of money. Five brief case studies illustrate the various types of preventable and nonpreventable readmissions.

Sexual Acting Out as an Abortive Mourning Process in Female Adolescent Inpatients. Jeffrey Binder and Alan Krohn. Pp. 193-208.

The development of psychologically healthy means for coping with sexuality is particularly difficult for disturbed adolescents who need residential treatment. One of the clearly definable psychodynamic constellations that underlie sexual acting out—an abortive mourning process in response to separations or losses suffered by female adolescent inpatients—is discussed. John Bowlby's theory of the mourning process is emphasized in understanding the immediate reaction to loss. Case material is presented in support of the hypothesis that in some disturbed female adolescents heterosexual acting out wards off a regressive wish, kindled by object loss, to reunite symbiotically with the precedipal mother. Suggestions are given for milieu management and psychotherapy in such cases.

Organizing Treatment around the Family's Problems and Their Structural Bases. Harry J. Aponte. Pp. 208-222.

One of the great challenges (and rewards) in treating children is the frequent discovery that the patient is not really sick at all, but simply reacting to pathology in the family constellation. The author conceptualizes treatment in structural terms of the family. He describes a therapeutic process in which the therapist helps members of a family system to *agree on the problem* they need to solve, to *identify the participants* in the family structure to whom the problem is related, and to *make pledges* to work on changing the structural basis of the newly clarified problem.

The Activity Period in Group Psychotherapy. Anthony A. Pelosi and Howard Friedman. Pp. 223-229.

The authors describe their experience with the use of athletics immediately preceding group discussion. They see the activity period as an aid to the display of emotion, an outlet for aggressive energy, and a valuable route for the therapists to here-and-now interaction with the group. Such a technique also capitalizes upon the talents of nonpsychiatric personnel and gives the recreational facilities of the mental hospital added usefulness in the treatment of patients from the surrounding community.

The Return of Suggestion. N. William Winkelman and Steven D. Saul. Pp. 230-238.

Suggestion, a form of treatment considered outmoded around the turn of the century, now plays a considerable role in general medicine and all contemporary psychotherapies—including psychoanalysis, behavior therapy, and group encounters. The dramatic return of suggestion is seen in the community mental health movement, in which centers dispense brief therapy, help, and advice to large portions of the population previously unreachable. In spite of the ubiquity of suggestion and the large literature that developed at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, very little is actually known as to how it 'works', if and when it does. Considerably more research is needed on this subject which stands out as a basic riddle of the behavioral sciences.

Perinatal Differences: A Comparison of Child Psychiatric Patients and Their Siblings. Elaine L. Mura. Pp. 239-255.

In this study of child psychiatric inpatients who were compared to their own nonpsychiatrically disturbed siblings, it was found that the mothers had experienced more pregnancy and delivery complications with the patients than with the siblings. Analyses of groups by sex suggested that most of these differences involved the male patients rather than the female patients. No perinatal differences among the patients were found when patients were divided by diagnoses.

Suicide Linked to Homicide. Matti Virkkunen. Pp. 276-282.

This study from Finland shows that over a fifteen-year period the rate of suicide directly linked to homicide was the same in rural and urban areas. The rate proved to be no higher in underdeveloped areas than elsewhere. Only 17.5% of the offenders had undergone psychiatric hospital care. Schizophrenia and other paranoid psychoses appeared most frequently in the diagnoses.

Varieties of Depression in One Patient. Samuel R. Lehrman. Pp. 283-294.

In the course of twenty-five years one woman presented different types of depression: reactive depression, periodic depression, and agitated depression during menopause. She was treated at various time with E.C.T., psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, drugs, and a combination of the latter two. She responded favorably to each modality of treatment. A brief review of the theories of the causes of depression and of its medical treatment is presented, followed by a detailed case report. The author's thesis is that all depressions are overdetermined psychosomatic diseases with both psychic and organic causes; and that different varieties of depression necessitating different therapeutic approaches may occur in a single patient under different conditions.

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Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

John Pareja

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NOTES

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

April 16, 1974. DISTURBANCES OF THE SENSE OF TIME. Freud Memorial Lecture. Jacob A. Arlow, M.D.

Dr. Arlow examined disturbances in the subjective sense of time, focusing on four elements that shape the time experience: the sense of self, affect, unconscious fantasies, and ideas concerning death. Arising from childhood impressions of physiologic duration connected with intervals between need and gratification, time becomes the representative of realistic necessity; frustrations experienced at subsequent developmental levels intensify the connection between time and reality. Hearing that time flies, heals, can be saved, wasted, or even killed reenforces the child's metaphorical and concretistic notions of time. In fantasy, time may be dealt with as a substance extended in space or as a being with human attributes. As a substance, it may serve as a derivative representation of objects specific for the various phases of psychosexual development: milk, the fecal mass, the paternal phallus producing an endless stream of fluid. The child's grasp of causality and counting introduces the concept of a unidirectional and unalterable flow of time as well as the awareness that each moment has a specific and unalterable number in the history of eternity.

The developing sense of self carries a time dimension; each present moment is experienced by the self in terms of past memories, fantasies, and future anticipations. Clinically, as in depersonalization and *déjà vu*, alterations in sense of self and in experiences of time often occur concomitantly. The child's concrete concept of life as a fixed amount of time extending into space leads to the concept of life as a journey through time toward death at a fixed point where time and space converge. As death to the child is unconsciously understood as being killed (or unloved), there arises the fantasy of the inevitable confrontation with the angel of death at the appointed place in future time. Fantasies of missing the inevitable 'Appointment in Samarra' give rise to neurotic behavior toward time.

Portions of two analyses were presented. One involved an ecstatic feeling of timelessness experienced by a gifted musician while performing. This was accompanied by the fantasy that light from a vaulted window entered her body and was directly transformed into music. Her experience of timelessness derived from an unconscious identification with the Madonna. The penetration of the body by light and its transformation into music represented simultaneously impregnation and birth, a gift from the God-father image. Concerns about death and neurotic attitudes toward time demonstrated the unconscious wish that this blissful state should have no end, that she and father be timelessly united. In this patient, fusion with the object typical of experiences of timelessness and mystical, oceanic feelings referred to fusion with the God-father image rather than the mother.

In the second example, a patient made no realistic plans or commitments; he lived as if a limitless amount of time were available to him. He had mild but

persistent feelings of depersonalization and preferred to think of himself as a historical figure rather than as existing in the present. Analysis of his attitudes about time uncovered a severe examination anxiety and fears of death. Pleasant sensations of timelessness were induced by fantasies of living in old cities, or in cities of the distant future. These experiences represented a denial of the forward progression of time, which implied death and a retreat to a fantasied blissful, eternal union with the protective mother of his infancy. Disturbances of the experience of time are seen as special forms of affective experiences, pleasurable or unpleasurable; the specific quality of the experience is determined by the nature of the underlying conscious or unconscious ideational content.

The paper closed with observations on the theme of romantic love as expressed in literature and life. In writings, such as Brigadoon, Lost Horizons, Faust, the theme of attraction toward an unattainable object, doomed to frustration, is given a dimension in time as the hero moves backwards in time, or into a world where time is suspended, to find love and happiness. These representations make possible loving union between members of different generations; the barrier interposed by realistic time is a special form of the incest taboo. Inevitably, in literature as in life, the spell is broken, the magic world vanishes, and the world of time, reality, and death is inexorably re-established.

JOHN PAREJA

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

February 25, 1974. THE ROLE OF PRIMAL SCENE AND SADOMASOCHISTIC FANTASIES AS PRECIPITANTS OF ASTHMA ATTACKS IN AN ADOLESCENT GIRL. Cecilia K. Karol, M.D.

Dr. Karol described the analysis, over a period of four-and-a-half years, of a thirteen-year-old girl who had suffered from asthma since age four. Throughout the analysis, sadomasochistic fantasies and dreams were revealed, and sadomasochistic behavior at home and in the transference were evident. Several years after beginning treatment, the patient recalled observing parental intercourse at age four, shortly before her first attack of asthma.

The patient's fantasies and associations as well as the quality of her object relations illustrated the pervasive influence of magical thinking and sadomasochistic fantasies on the subsequent attempt at resolution of her œdipal conflict. The asthmatic attacks, with wheezing and fear of suffocation, were seen to be at the confluence of a variety of impulses, including identification with both the victim and the aggressor—intercourse was perceived as a sadistic attack; displacement from the genitals to the respiratory apparatus; separation anxiety stemming from her own unacceptable aggressive impulses.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Renato Almansi commented on the rich clinical details reported, especially the profusion of oral and anal conflictual material. He recalled that Max Schur felt that aggression, primary process thinking, and unneutralized energy must all be present in psychosomatic illness, and that Dr. Karol's patient displayed them all. The primal scene experience obviously served to revitalize the

early fantasies of sadism and the patient's intense separation anxiety.

Dr. Ira Mintz mentioned Melitta Sperling's findings of the alternation of phobia, psychosomatic illness, and aggressive impulsivity at various times in the same patient. He emphasized that sexual conflict, aggression, and separation anxiety appear in all psychosomatic patients.

Dr. Henry Schneer described a female patient whom he treated for stuttering. She had asthma from age eight to thirteen which terminated abruptly when she first viewed the primal scene. The difference between this girl and Dr. Karol's patient was age and level of psychosexual development; for Dr. Schneer's patient, the primal scene was a trauma that spurred growth.

Dr. Jan Frank pointed out that we all have experienced primal scene trauma, in reality or in fantasy, and emphasized the importance of consideration of the level of ego development at the time of the trauma. Dr. Anita Bell spoke of the pregenital aspects of the trauma in one of her asthmatic patients; she had difficulty in developing the ability to master her own body from earliest infancy. The child was unable to master and to achieve a sense of independence and individuality. Dr. C. Philip Wilson emphasized the importance of dealing with sadomasochism in asthmatics. In such patients sadomasochistic oral and anal phase conflicts and fantasies predominate.

HENRY KAMINER

The Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held at the Baltimore Hilton, Baltimore, Maryland, May 5-10, 1976.

The Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital in Philadelphia has announced the appointment of Anna Freud as Visiting Professor of Child Psychiatry.

The Second Rochester International Conference on Schizophrenia will be held at the University of Rochester Medical Center, Rochester, New York, on May 2-5, 1976. For further information write: Mrs. Joyce Yutzy, Executive Assistant, Department of Psychiatry, University of Rochester, Rochester, N. Y. 14642.

The Eleventh European Conference on Psychosomatic Research will be held in Heidelberg, West Germany, on September 14-17, 1976. For further information write: Prof. Dr. med. Walter Bräutigam, Chairman, Psychosomatische Klinik der Universität, D-6900 Heidelberg, Voss-Str. 2, Germany (W).

The Institute for the Medical Humanities at the University of Texas Medical Branch is offering Fellowships in the History and Philosophy of Mental Health for the period from July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1978. For further information write: H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., M.D., Institute for the Medical Humanities, University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, Texas 77550.

ERRATUM: It has been called to our attention by Judith L. Kantrowitz, co-author of *Methodology for a Prospective Study of Suitability for Psychoanalysis: The Role of Psychological Tests,* This QUARTERLY, Volume XLIV, 1975, page 391, that the first reference was incorrectly attributed. A. Appelbaum was the discussant of the paper by Kantrowitz, Singer, and Knapp presented at the 1973 American Psychoanalytic Association meeting. Ideas for the discussion were drawn from an unpublished paper, *Psychotherapy, Before and After,* by S. Appelbaum.