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IMAGINARY COMPANIONS, FANTASY TWINS, MIRROR DREAMS AND DEPERSONALIZATION

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Illustrative case material is presented to demonstrate genetic linkages between the presence of imaginary companions or fantasy twins and extensive mirror play in childhood and early adolescence, and the appearance of mirror dreams and depersonalization in later adolescence and adulthood. The defensive splitting of the self-representations observable in these phenomena is viewed as a means of warding off castration anxiety and anxiety about object loss, anxieties which arise because of conflicts primarily centering on intense aggressive drive derivative wishes. Formulations about depersonalization are discussed.

In his paper on depersonalization and derealization, Arlow (1966) noted that regressive reactivation of function from four early phases of ego activity seemed genetically related to later experiences of depersonalization. These are: 1. Dreaming, where the split into observing and participating self-representations and the sense of estrangement from bodily organs is similar to that experienced in depersonalization. 2. The phase of the transitional object, where self and non-self are not clearly demarcated. 3. The relationship of the child to his own fecal matter during the anal phase, when the fecal matter, once extruded into the outside world, is still seen as connected to the self. 4. The phase of the discovery of one's self before the mirror when the 'self-image may be treated as an object existing in the external world' (p. 476). Arlow observed that this latter phenomenon is characteristic of the psychology of twins, of the double, and of the imaginary companion and noted that in two of his cases, this

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mechanism was of considerable significance for the later development of depersonalization.

In this paper, I will present material from the case histories of four young women who had imaginary companions or fantasy twins and extensive mirror play during childhood and early adolescence, and who, in late adolescence and adulthood, experienced mirror dreams and depersonalization. In so doing, I will attempt to demonstrate that these early and later manifestations of defensive splitting of the self-representations are genetically linked.

CASE MATERIAL

I

Miss A entered analysis at the age of thirty because of anxieties aroused in recalling her mother's terrifying psychotic rages toward her during childhood and adolescence. When she mentioned these memories to her grandparents, who had witnessed some of the episodes during her adolescence, they denied the reality of her recollections and she perceived them as looking 'strange and hazy', as if she were viewing them 'through a sea of amniotic fluid' (derealization). She also described an upsetting feeling of 'numbness' in her body and mentioned the sensation of being 'split into two people', with the major focus of her attention being concentrated on the observing portion of her self-representation (depersonalization).

As a child, Miss A always conceived of herself as a disappointment to her mother. Memories of struggles over wearing clean white dresses and over clearing up the clutter in her room came to be understood as screens, masking the severe struggle with her mother over toilet training. Though the patient maintained an idealization of her father well into the analysis, one could recognize that he, too, was able to invest only those aspects of her self which coincided with his interests. Even this minimal attention to her lessened after the birth of her brother when she was three years old.

As she began to become aware of her rage at her parents during the analysis, she had a nightmare in which she was stabbed by an adult figure of indeterminate sex. Her associations led to the recall of a terrible fight between her parents when she was six, in which the mother had threatened to kill the father, the patient, or herself with a carving knife and was only prevented from these attacks by the father's violent exertions. This was followed by the further recall of walking into the parents' bedroom, also at the age of six, interrupting the parents during intercourse and being ushered from the room by the angry father. As she recounted these memories, she once more felt the unpleasant 'numbness' and experienced the splitting into the roles of observer and participant described before. It is of interest to note that Hunter's (1966) patient with depersonalization recounted similar memories of a knife attack involving the mother and primal scene observations.

Following the emergence of this material, Miss A recollected how she had turned to the family's black maid for love and comfort after these experiences. In addition, she had created three imaginary companions, twin black girls and her twin, a white girl, all her own age. In her play with them, they never fought with the maid-mother and they shared adventures that 'only boys could have'. In this way, she achieved the desired genitals (the three companions) of the favored brother. In writing stories about the companions at that age, she would look into the mirror in her father's dressing room and imagine herself as united with the companions in the depths beyond. In her longing gaze, she acted out the wished-for adoration from the black maid-good mother. In her play, she imagined being reborn from the mirrored womb as the idealized phallic self-representation, the œdipal brother who would be acceptable to both parents.

Although the patient attempted to gloss over her angry feelings even in the fantasied adventures she wrote about the companions, the black color of the twins seemed to relate, in her associations, to feces and to the anal rage she had experienced

in the toilet training struggle with her mother. This rage had to be split off and projected symbolically onto the companions, in a manner similar to that of one of Arlow's patients with depersonalization, whose fecal matter still retained a sense of connection with her self even when extruded from her body (see Arlow, 1961, 1966).

The active fantasies about the companions ceased in early adolescence and episodes of depersonalization began shortly after her menarche, when the patient was subjected to the mother's increasing physical and verbal abuse. In the observing of another aspect of her self, which she experienced in the depersonalization, and in her relationships with certain active, 'alive' female friends whom she idealized, she saw a continuum with her earlier fantasies of the imaginary companions as viewed in the mirror. The active, phallic, participatory companions, the later friends, and the experiencing self-representation seemed far away from her, something she could only wish for. Her wishes, however, terrified her, because to draw closer to realizing them meant coming closer to her terrifying rage toward her mother and to both her sexual desires for and anger toward her father.

The anger toward her father was manifest in fantasies of devouring his phallus, as she had earlier fantasied devouring her brother *in utero* and of re-emerging as a phallic child. In addition, to actually experience her wishes exposed her to the intensity of her feelings of being castrated. The castration was seen as a punishment by the mother (the knife attack) for her œdipal desires to have a baby (the brother-imaginary companions) by the father, and as the father's retaliation (the primal scene attack) for her wishes to castrate him.

II

At age thirty-five, Miss B began an analysis, lasting five years, for chronic depression and compulsive eating binges. Her parents had separated before she was born and she lived with her mother and the mother's parents. The mother spent little time with the patient and we later learned that the mother

suffered from chronic delusional ideas about her face being bloated and ugly. She remarried when Miss B was four and the patient became attached to her stepfather, although she felt that she could never measure up to his perfectionistic standards.

At age six, Miss B's half-brother was born and the stepfather shifted his attention from the patient to his son. The half-brother was placed in the patient's room and Miss B felt that her privacy was invaded—a parallel to earlier invasions of her body by the mother, who had regularly administered enemas to the patient when she was 'naughty'.

Shortly after the half-brother's birth, the real father reappeared for one last visit and then disappeared for good. Following this desertion, the stepfather was hospitalized for several months with tuberculosis. After his return home, the patient underwent the first of several terrifying hospitalizations for surgical procedures under ether anesthesia for a mastoid condition. During her recovery period at home, she entered the parents' bedroom and found them engaged in intercourse and was angrily asked to leave. The final shattering event from this period was another primal scene observation involving the family's black maid and her lover.

As the analysis progressed, periods of separation led to massive depression and rage. Dreams in which I was seen as a surgeon or as the primal scene stepfather mutilating her led to painful sensations, on awakening, of unreality about her thoughts and perceptual changes in her face and limbs. During hours such as these, she also visualized herself as split into observing and participating selves.

There were a number of mirror dreams. In one, she chastised her mother for putting a hand into a dirty, roach infested crevice in a bathroom wall, the scene being reflected in the bathroom mirror. Her associations led back to her anger at the mother for the enema violations and for having given birth to the 'roach' half-brother, as well as to the patient's guilt over latency and adolescent masturbatory fantasies.

In another mirror dream, she saw her face receding into the

depths of the mirror and becoming very small. This led to the recall of her mother's having given her a book, following the half-brother's birth, about a girl who had a dollhouse inhabited by a tiny human creature. The patient, at that time, created an imaginary companion, patterned after the tiny creature who resided in the dollhouse. The creature in her fantasies was an only child and was adored by both parents. Miss B made papier-mâché dolls, to which she attributed characteristics of both sexes in the likeness of the tiny creature she envisioned, and played with them before the mirror.

After reading about Alice's adventures through the looking glass, she began a lifelong fantasied attempt to will herself through mirrors into a better world. There she would be beyond all bad judgments of herself, an exception to the œdipal rules (as in the dethroning of the Red Queen-mother), and after having devoured the fetal half-brother, she would be reborn as the phallic imaginary creature she felt her parents desired her to be.

In the depersonalization episodes, the participatory self-representation often appeared to her to be tiny and far away, like the imaginary creature in the dollhouse and in the mirror dream. When she felt closer to this aspect of her self as the analysis progressed, she would engage in self-destructive acts in her work or in her relations with men in order to disavow the rage and to punish herself for the incestuous feelings she saw reflected in the analytic mirror. Her disavowal of her feelings took the form of fantasizing herself as a medium, expressing the mind of an antimatter twin version of herself. Once again the splitting seen in the early fantasies about the imaginary companion was evident. She saw this antimatter self as hopelessly evil, a cancer that would eat her up, which was ultimately linked to her fears of retaliative destruction by the fetal half-brother whom she wished to devour *in utero*.

One depersonalization-derealization episode was triggered by looking into a mirror in a semidarkened room and imagining that her face resembled that of her mother. This is reminiscent of Peto's (1955) experiences with certain patients. She saw her

participatory self-representation receding off into infinity, passing beyond the boundaries of the mirror image of herself into a void which she likened to an astronomical 'black hole'. In conceptualizing these black holes, she imagined an 'agonizing entry' into one of them, with a tremendous condensation of her matter in size and a re-emergence as different and as 'purified' matter on the white side of the hole. In associating to this description, she saw the condensation of her matter as yet another representation of the tiny imaginary creature aspect of her self. Having been re-impregnated by the father-stepfather-analyst's penis entering into the black hole (a condensation of the pubic hair of the mother-black maid, as witnessed in the primal scene, and of the anus and feces of the enema violations), she would now be reborn whole, with the desired phallus and unlike the castrated mother-self whom she saw reflected in the mirror.

As these fantasies were gradually worked through, her episodes of depersonalization became much less frequent.

III

Miss C had three older sisters, two of whom were fraternal twins. Two younger brothers were born when she was age four and six. She felt intense rage toward the brother who was four years younger and who was favored by the parents; and she felt abused by the twin sisters, whom the mother preferred to her. During the mother's pregnancy with the brother who was six years younger, the patient created three imaginary companions, twin girls her age and a younger sister. In her fantasies about them, there was no rivalry or anger and the imaginary parents loved all the girls equally. In another fantasy from this time, Miss C developed a loving feeling about a tree branch outside her window, hoping intensely that it would never fall off the tree, wishes that spoke of her intense fears of separation, of castration, and her illusory penis fantasies.

A compulsive counting ritual during this period was based on a need to make numbers end in an odd digit—preferably three (the male genital number utilized in the imaginary companion

fantasy) or five (the ordinal position of the hated male sibling rival) but never with four. In her association, four symbolized the four castrated sisters, her own ordinal position in the family, and the age she was when the hated phallic rival was born.

Her later episodes of depersonalization began with her menarche and usually occurred during the premenstrual period or when she was abandoned by a desired man, as she had been by the father at the time of the younger brother's birth. She would refer to the observer-observed self-representations in depersonalization episodes as twins. By adding her normal self to the twin depersonalization selves, she once more perceived herself as the phallic threesome, the number from the compulsive counting-imaginary companion era. In addition, the painful feeling of distancing from the participatory self-representation in the depersonalization reminded her of her feelings of being left out of things by her three sisters (especially the twins) and of her compensatory fantasies of the loving twins and the other sister of the three imaginary companions, thus providing a link between the early imaginary companion fantasies and later depersonalization.

IV

Mrs. D, a ghost writer, entered treatment because of depression. She was the oldest of three children. A younger sister, favored by the mother, was born when she was two and a younger brother when she was five, at which point the father turned his attentions from the girls to the preferred male child. The sisters fought to maintain his interest by competing in horse shows at a very early age, but engaged his attention only when they jumped their mounts particularly well.

At age six, the patient developed a fantasied twin version of herself. The idealized twin had a thinner (more phallic) body and was a championship horsewoman whose jumping exploits won the admiration of all, especially the fantasied father of the loving imaginary family of the twin. Some years later, shortly before her menarche, the patient embellished her creation by

adding an older brother for the twin. He was both Clark Kent and Superman (another twin representation) and only she knew his true identity and of his ability to fly and jump. The illusory penis in erection—the phallic quality of the horse—which the patient longed to possess would obviate her feelings of rejection by the parents and her intense sense of castration. These fantasied creations faded after her menarche and episodes of depersonalization appeared, again usually premenstrually.

In general, experiences of depersonalization were preceded by mirror dreams in which she saw a thinner version of herself raging at her sister or parents and from which she would awaken feeling split into observer-observed self-representations. In waking episodes of depersonalization in late adolescence and in adulthood, feelings of rage toward people whom she saw as depriving her of something—i.e., castrating her—were warded off. In these experiences, she would perceive herself as split, with the observing self-representation imagining she was watching the participating self-representation in the mirror. Associations to such episodes, and to her ghost writing (she usually wrote for powerful men and was the 'only one' who knew the secret of their leaps to literary success, at which point they often unfeelingly severed their ties with her), led to connections between her later mirror dreams and depersonalization experiences as well as to the earlier idealized phallic representations seen in the twin fantasies.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Imaginary Companions

Svendsen (1934), in a series of forty cases, noted that most imaginary companions were of the same sex and that only a few children created multiple companions. Bender and Vogel (1941), in observations on fourteen children with imaginary companions, felt that unsatisfactory parent-child relationships contributed to these fantasies. Anna Freud (1937), in speaking of imaginary animal companions, saw such fantasies as serving the

avoidance of painful realities by a mechanism of denial in fantasy. She notes: 'Thus the "evil" father becomes in phantasy the protective animal, while the helpless child becomes the master of powerful father-substitutes' (p. 85). Fraiberg (1959), commenting on animal and human imaginary companions, describes the projection of unacceptable feelings onto such companions (clearly seen in the rage projected by my patients onto the companions) and ascribes to them a role in early superego formation.

Sperling (1954) described a boy in the late anal stage whose fantasied companion was perceived of as possessing the 'superman-like' virtues of his father, thus serving as a prototype for early ego-ideal formation—a mechanism seen in the companions of all of my patients. Nagera (1969) speculated that once having played a developmental role in superego formation, the need for the imaginary companion is obviated and memories of it are rarely recovered in adult analyses. In line with this, the obvious lacunae in the superegos of my patients may very well have to do with the continuing importance of the companion fantasies in their mental lives and subsequently with the recoverability of these fantasies in the analyses. Nagera also saw the companion as a representation of the ego ideal, especially in rejected children who 'by endowing the companion with all the attributes the child lacks . . . can . . . participate in the companion's loving relationship with the parents' (p. 182). He further observed, as did Murphy (1962), that several children developed companions after the birth of a sibling, as was true in my cases.

Bach (1971) also saw the imaginary companion as a primitive ego-ideal precursor related to projected anal-sadistic impulses. In his analyses of two female adults with imaginary companions in childhood, unresolved conflicts with the precœdipal mother were seen as leading to difficulties in the later acceptance of their feminine identity. In this regard, he observed: 'In both cases the imaginary companion came to represent an envied and idealized [introjected paternal] phallus, and was used defensively to perpetuate a regressive, narcissistic solution of the œdipus conflict' (p. 160). Bach's idea of the companion as an idealized phallic

self-representation is borne out by my findings, as is his conceptualization of the creation of the companion in response to a narcissistic blow in order to contain aggressive impulses.

Schwartz (1974), in a paper on narcissistic personality disorders, discusses the analysis of an adult male who fantasied a companion after the birth of a sibling. The companion was seen as a representation of both the paternal phallus and the phallic mother. In a personal communication, Schwartz (1975) informed me that this patient experienced depersonalization, at which time the companion was equated with the observing self-representation monitoring the aggressive feelings of the participatory self.

In my patients, imaginary companions were created in response to a variety of narcissistic blows—abandonment by one or both parents, the birth of a male sibling, and profound œdipal disappointments which led to intense feelings of castration. The companion serves both to displace unacceptable impulses and feelings (primarily rage) and as an idealized phallic self-representation. The pervasive bisexuality seen in my patients' companions, and in some of the companions reported in the literature, speaks to the intensity of the patients' perceptions of themselves as castrated.

Twin Fantasies and Fantasy Systems in Twins

An area akin to imaginary companion fantasies is that of the fantasied twin. Burlingham (1952) likened the fantasy of having a twin to family romance and animal companion fantasies, with the twin (idealized self-representation) defending against œdipal castration anxiety by a fantasy of duplication of body parts. Her emphasis on castration anxiety is similar to that seen in my cases.

Arlow (1960), in his paper on fantasy systems in twins, presented a case of a twin who suffered from depersonalization after his brother's death. His retrospective fantasies of being alone in the womb and emerging as a solitary individual meant devouring the sibling *in utero* and incorporating the rival twin's phallic strength. This fantasy was apparent in all of my patients, although they were not actually twins, and was referable to their

male siblings. Arlow also sees the twin and mirror image as a defense against castration. In Arlow's (1972) article on the only child, he adds that the fantasy of having devoured potential rivals *in utero* leads the only child to fear a retaliatory devouring from within by the destroyed embryos. A similar finding was seen in several of my patients: their overeating represented both impregnation fantasies and a defense against the feared devouring from within. Glenn (1966), in writing of opposite sex twins, notes that they fantasize coming from a single egg, with an uneven split of male and female parts, leading to feelings of incompleteness (castration). This parallels the fantasies my patients had about themselves and their male siblings.

Brody (1952), in writing of the appearance of twins in dreams, sees this as a representation of the mother-child dyad. This seems rather an incomplete explanation to me, as it ignores the prominent castration feelings.

Mirror Dreams and Mirror Phenomena

A number of authors have noted the parallel between depersonalization and the observation of the self before the mirror (*cf.*, Almansi, 1964; Arlow, 1966; Burlingham, 1952; Eissler, 1967; Elkisch, 1957; Hunter, 1966; Myers, 1973; Peto, 1955). In addition, several authors have concerned themselves with mirror dreams.

Kaywin (1957) described a dream wherein his patient's image in the mirror turned into an ugly monster as one in which '. . . the idealized self-image was covering . . . a very negative self-image' (p. 300). Eisnitz (1961) saw such dreams, and an imaginary companion one of his patients had in childhood, as defenses against 'narcissistic mortification from the superego . . ., the analyst . . ., or reality. Often it [the mirror dream] represents the defense against a castration threat resulting from œdipal conflicts centering around primal-scene fantasies' (p. 477). This was quite evident in my patients. Eisnitz described a splitting off and projection onto the mirror in the dream of a threatening parental superego imago, which is then mastered

by omnipotent voyeurism and safely reintrojected. Such splitting is typical of the mechanisms I have described in the imaginary companion-twin fantasies and similar to the splitting off of the aggressive drive derivatives seen in the later depersonalization and in my patients' mirror dreams. Kohut (1971) visualized mirror dreams as a reflection of the mirror transference, with the self as observer and the analyst as the observed representing an aspect of the grandiose self.

In an earlier publication (Myers, 1973), I described a patient with chronic verified primal scene exposure and depersonalization. The splitting of the self-representations into observer-observed roles, in the manifest content of certain dreams, was seen to be related to conflicting wishes emanating from the earlier primal scenes and to the presence of a mirror in the parental bedroom. I conceptualized the exciting episodes predisposing to later depersonalization. In addition, the patient had a fantasy of a twin (idealized) self-representation as a movie star whose life was being filmed, which also served as an idealized phallic self-representation. Isay (1975), in reporting on the analysis of an adult male, whose adolescent behavior had been profoundly influenced by early primal scene exposures, described mirror dreams which derived from wishes to be both the observer and the participant in the primal scene.

Feigelson (1975) saw mirror dreams as related to primal scene exposure and as representing 'a regressive partial reunion with the protective mother to allay guilt and reassure against object loss in response to aggression mobilized by an object conflict' (p. 355). He postulates a defense mechanism in these dreams which he calls duplication. He defines this as seeing the world in terms of the self and views it as a warding off of anxieties about object loss and castration. He then likens this to the phenomena of imaginary companions and twin fantasies. I am in agreement with many aspects of his formulation, although I do not think that all mirror dreams involve regression to a 'me-not me' stage of ego development. I, too, see such dreams and the idea of duplication as warding off castration anxiety.

In addition, the self as admiring observer, looking into the mirror at an idealized self-representation may, by way of a denial in fantasy, ward off anxieties concerned with the loss of the object. Shengold (1974) in writing on the metaphor of the mirror points up the denial in fantasy use of the mirror—'it's only a reflection, it doesn't count' (p. 101)—and speaks of the mirror's use in splitting of self and object representations, which he also relates to primal scene material.

Depersonalization-Derealization

It would be beyond the scope of this paper to attempt an extensive review of this complex field, so I will limit myself to comments on certain articles before discussing my own findings. Fenichel (1945) and Nunberg (1948) attempted economic explanations of depersonalization. They reasoned that object loss(es) led to the withdrawal of the libidinal cathexis from the object(s) and to a consequent narcissistic investment of the mental processes. The heightening of the narcissistic cathexis in the ego was held to be responsible for the feelings of unpleasantness and estrangement seen in the syndrome.

Another group of authors conceptualized depersonalization in terms of conflicts over identifications. Oberndorf (1933, 1934, 1939, 1950) saw the conflict as one wherein the predominant identification in the superego was incompatible with the physical body in which it was housed (as, for example, a feminine superego in a male) which led to feelings of estrangement. Jacobson (1959) saw the conflict as taking place within the ego, leading to the need to repudiate an identification with a degraded object image by a defensive splitting of the self-representations. Greenson (1954) spoke of a struggle against an identification with a single hated parental figure as leading to depersonalization, while Sarlin (1962) visualized a struggle against identifications with equally unacceptable parental figures, necessitating a regression to a state (depersonalization) antedating the identifications. Rosen (1955) saw his patient's

derealization as resulting from a narcissistic regression precipitated by an identification with a degraded object.

Arlow (1966), in his critique of some of the aforementioned views, notes that the cathectic explanations simply restate the phenomena in different terms, without delineating which ego functions are affected or why such cathectic shifts result in depersonalization as opposed to grandiosity or hypochondriasis. He also views the explanations involving conflicting intrasystemic identifications as actually representing intrasystemic conflicts, as the ego and superego are built up of many identifications which only become dynamically significant when 'specific identifications represent derivatives of an id or of a superego demand' (pp. 459-460). Arlow sees the core experience in depersonalization as '. . . a dissociation of two ego functions which ordinarily operate in an integrated fashion, the function of self-observation and the function of experiencing or participating. The participating self (and the instinctual wishes displaced onto it) are . . . partially . . . repudiated . . . by dissociating oneself from the self-representation or from reality or by considering the participating self or reality alien and estranged, or both' (p. 474). In other words, by a denial in fantasy, the threatening drive derivative wishes, which he sees as primarily aggressive in nature, are displaced onto the external world and then disavowed. Arlow speaks of an impairment in the sense of reality in depersonalization, while reality testing remains intact. He also does not see in his patients the regression to a total loss of personal identity, on which other authors, such as Stamm (1962), have commented.

Stewart, in an unpublished monograph on this subject, follows Federn (1952) and Schilder (1953) in defining depersonalization-derealization in terms of a feeling of a lack of familiarity with what should be familiar, meaning one's own body or objects in the outside world. He differentiates this from what he refers to as pathological objectivity, which he defines as a marked increase in self-observation at the expense of the registration of affect, and which he sees as the core experience in the definition

of depersonalization employed by many authors, such as Arlow (1966). In his view, pathological objectivity does not contain either the sense of unfamiliarity with the familiar or the feelings of mental anguish he associates with true depersonalization. Stewart further notes that most articles about depersonalization deal with the presumed nature of the underlying conflicts, whereas he views the crucial problem as one involving the choice of depersonalization as the particular form of the solution for such conflicts. In his conceptualization, he expands upon a suggestion of Bird's (1957) and sees the denial of the affectual impact of the outside world as being achieved by a hypercathexis of the function of consciousness, with a consequent overemphasis on the apperception of perception. He additionally hypothesizes that the underlying predisposition to depersonalization is generated by repeated episodes of a lack of the expectation of satisfaction from the early objects, without which the investment of the body and of the external world is devoid of emotional meaning. Thus a variety of later stimuli, which trigger visual and aggressive memories and which might re-evoke the original early traumatic experiences, are defended against by the defensive withdrawal of the depersonalization.

DISCUSSION

In my own clinical experience, as illustrated by the cases presented in this paper, patients with depersonalization and derealization complain of both the painful feeling of the unfamiliarity with the familiar and the splitting of the self-representations into observing and participating aspects, although one or the other complaint may predominate at any given time and both need not be present at the same time. Schilder (1953) also observed this when, in addition to pointing out the feelings of estrangement from the familiar, he noted that depersonalized patients felt a sense of dividedness within themselves during their continual self-observations, which served to negate their present experiences (p. 306). The focusing on the function consciousness, which Stewart speaks of, at the expense

of registration of outer or inner visual experiences also seems to me to be another form of describing a splitting experience.

Stewart's paper raises a question about the developmental levels at which the traumas occurred which predispose the individual to later depersonalization. His early dating of such experiences differs markedly from the experience of Arlow who, though he included the transitional object in his prototypical splitting experiences, did not find relevant data in his case material.

While I would agree with Stewart's suggestion that the early interaction with the mother, as seen in my case material, may fail to libidinally cathect fully certain aspects of the self and object representations, aggressive cathexes of such experiences are generated and are likely split off or isolated from the more weakly libidinally invested aspects of the self- and object representations. Such early splitting may be implicated in later depersonalization, but in my experience the associative material offered by patients to the regressive alteration of their ego functions in depersonalization does not appear to refer consistently to this early period. In their histories, and in their associations to specific episodes of depersonalization, they seem to refer most frequently to anal and œdipal traumas. These later traumas undoubtedly organize the earlier preverbal ones, but the predominant anxieties I have observed in such patients are castration anxiety and the fear of the loss of the object, rather than the fear of the extinction of the sense of the self.

In depersonalization, primarily aggressive drive derivative wishes, which threaten to arouse the aforementioned anxieties, have to be warded off. The distancing from the participatory self-representation by the denial in fantasy and the heightened observation of the self, in which the observed self-representation may be equated with the phallus, serve to ward off the recognition of the participatory self-representation as bad, degraded, or castrated. The duplication of self-representations additionally serves to defend against castration anxiety.

Primal scene exposure, in which conflicting wishes are

aroused—to be both intimately involved in, yet distanced from the exciting/terrifying scene—, enhances the predisposition to the later splitting of the self-representations seen in depersonalization. Surgical and anesthetic experiences, which lead to distortions of the body image and to feelings of being separated or distanced from some aspect(s) of the self-representation, also may predispose to the later splitting seen in depersonalization. In this latter regard, three of the patients mentioned in this paper, as well as others I have seen, underwent surgery during the œdipal, latency, or prepubertal periods. In their descriptions of specific episodes of depersonalization, as when one patient described the sensation of feeling 'drugged', the phenomenological description of the experience itself referred back to the early anesthetic experiences.

The splitting phenomena included in this paper also serve to ward off anxiety over the threatened loss of the object. In the imaginary companion phenomena, an attempt is made to maintain the object tie by one of two mechanisms—either by a disavowal of the rageful aspect of the self or by the companion's being seen as an idealized phallic self-representation. In both instances, the self then becomes acceptable to the parents. The identification with the aggressive, abandoning parents seen in the splitting described in depersonalization is demonstrable in the indifference to the participatory self-representation, which parallels the earlier indifference shown by the parents. Through the identification implicit here, the object tie is maintained. This mechanism, of course, may also represent a regressively expressed incestuous union with the parent and may further serve as an ancillary defense against castration anxiety. In mirror play and mirror dreams, the duplication involved may serve to ward off castration anxiety, and the self-as-observer admiringly gazing at the self-as-observed symbolizes the wished-for tie with the disappointing parental objects and defends the patient against anxieties in this area. In certain severe instances, this mechanism may be employed to defend against a feared extinction of the sense of self.

In childhood, the mechanisms of the imaginary companion and the mirror play may be sufficient to ward off the aforementioned anxieties. In adolescence, however, when the woman becomes aware of the increased possibility for actual incest and when her menarche enhances her sense of castration and the attendant rage, the additional distancing from these unacceptable impulses is accomplished by way of mirror dreams and depersonalization. The similar upsurge of sexual and aggressive drives seen in males is dealt with in like manner. Thus the splitting mechanisms are seen on a continuum: the early ones link with the later ones in the manner Arlow so explicitly indicated in his 1966 paper on depersonalization and derealization.

SUMMARY

Material is presented from the analyses of four women who had imaginary companions or fantasy twins and extensive mirror play during childhood and who in adolescence and adulthood had mirror dreams and depersonalization. These mechanisms were genetically linked by way of a defensive splitting of the self-representations, and served to ward off anxieties about castration and object loss which arose because of intensive aggressive drive derivative wishes.

While their disturbed interaction with pathological mothers provided difficulty in libidinally cathecting their own bodies and the objects in the outer world, the patients' associations to the splitting mechanisms were rooted primarily in anal and œdipal traumas. During the œdipal period, the turning away of the father, after the birth of a preferred male sibling, was a narcissistic mortification that enhanced the patients' sense of castration and led to the creation of imaginery companions and fantasy twins. These served as idealized phallic self-representations as well as a means for disavowing rage toward the parents in order to maintain the needed object ties. The need for an object tie is also seen in the identification with the indifferent, abandoning, aggressive parents in depersonalization. There an indifferent abandonment of the participatory self-representation is

used to ward off the sense of castration and the rage toward the parents. In all of these splitting phenomena, duplication of the self is seen as a means of warding off castration anxiety.

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WAYS OF FEMALE SUPEREGO FORMATION AND THE FEMALE CASTRATION CONFLICT

BY EDITH JACOBSON, M.D.

Freud (1925) has repeatedly expressed the opinion that on the average, the female superego, compared with that of the male, is organized rather weakly, is unstable, and has no independence. In his last work on *Female Sexuality* (1931) he again expresses the same opinion. Convincingly, he explains the imperfect formation of the female superego by referring to the different development of the female castration conflict. The little girl does not develop real 'castration fear', which is the strongest causal factor in the overcoming of the œdipal conflict. Since the fear of loss of love does not have the same dramatic significance as the boy's castration fear, her œdipal wishes are only slowly and incompletely given up and do not leave behind a stable superego as the heir of the œdipus complex.

Studies of the female personality and clinical analytic experiences with female patients appear to confirm this view. We know, for example, about the greater frequency of compulsive narcissism in men and of hysteria in women. However, we have to question why the illness which is characterized by the merciless cruelty of the superego, the melancholic depression, occurs so predominantly in females.

Even more surprising is the fact that in the treatment of women whose superego appears to be weak and anaclitic, whose moral judgments seem to vacillate and to depend on those of the environment, the patients may suddenly show eruptions of cruel

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Translated by Paula Gross.

This is the first English translation of *Wege der weiblichen Über-Ich-Bildung* which was originally published in the International Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse, XXIII, 1937, pp. 402-412. It complements the author's paper, *On the Development of the Girl's Wish for a Child,* This QUARTERLY, XXXVII, 1968, pp. 523-538.

superego demands which had been formerly warded off. Such cases compel us to suspect that the formation of the female superego is much more complicated than we commonly assume.

Similar to the neuroses in general, we can also observe in the course of the last decades a change in the psychic structure in women at all social levels. This finds expression in their love lives as well as in the organization of their egos and superegos.

We may question how far the frequency of female frigidity has decreased. But there is very clearly a trend toward an expansion of the formerly rather limited female love life and the onset of the growth of an ego that is richer in sublimations and of a more independent and more stable, but by no means stricter, superego.

Of course, these developments have their roots in sociological changes whose discussion is not within the scope of this paper. These processes do not take the same course and do not present the same values in all countries. In any case, the liberation of women from old ties must result in a characteristic new form of feminine nature, which we cannot simply conceive of in terms of a 'masculinization' of females.

Certainly we may say that the modern woman would like to have the privileges of a more expansive sexuality; that having entered professional life, she aims at cultural sublimations which at an earlier time were left to men; and that she acquires a critical judgment and ego ideal of her own, which were uncommon in women of earlier times. To be sure, the emancipation of women in what Marianne Weber (1917) called 'heroic types' first produced a generation of 'masculine' women. However, we question how far feminine progress actually aims at a phallic development. I should regard such an interpretation as faulty, at least in many cases.

We recall in the paper by Sachs (1928), *One of the Motive Factors in the Formation of the Superego in Women,* that the oral type with *unsuccessful* superego formation, which he describes, was found very frequently among women of former generations. His other case, in which an independent superego

had developed, was a modern career woman, but not unfeminine and with a healthy feminine love life.

At any rate, in examining the female superego we must keep in mind the lack of uniformity in the female personality of our time.

If we want to probe more closely into the ways of female superego formation, we shall first have to deal with the problem of female 'castration fear', which is crucial for the understanding of superego formation, as stressed at the beginning of this paper. This seems to be at variance with the fact cited by Rado (1933), in *Fear of Castration in Women,* that in the mental life of women one can observe only derivatives of 'castration fear'. Also, I cannot share Rado's opinion that the castration fear of women reflects exclusively the fear, projected outside, of masochistic instinctual danger. The study of adult women, as well as observations of young children, has convinced me that, as already shown by other authors, for instance, Horney (1926), the little girl, too, has an original fear of bodily, especially genital, impairment. This fear, unlike the boy's, is not dictated by the œdipal relationship but develops during the preœdipal relation to the mother and undergoes certain modifications during later stages of development.

Melanie Klein (1929) has advanced the opinion that the most profound fear of the girl is that of 'destruction' of the inside of her body, a talionic fear based upon destructive impulses directed against the mother's body. This finding, however, can only be made fruitful by a close examination of the vicissitudes of the content of the fear during infantile instinctual development.

The fear of being robbed of the inside of the body occurs—in the boy as well as the girl—in the first years of life, in which pregenitality prevails. To the degree that the genitality of the little girl is exercised in clitoris masturbation and phallic strivings toward the mother, her fears of punishment are likewise concentrated on the genital organ, reaching their highest point with the discovery of the difference between the sexes. This

discovery generally leads the little girl, although by no means directly, to the simple horrifying conclusion: 'I am castrated'.

This traumatic experience is, of course, usually more diffuse and differentiated and extends over a much longer time. The painful discovery is often followed by greater preoccupation with the genital, and frequently by a period of increased masturbation. The terrified little girl, who begins to doubt her normal genitality, first tries to continue believing that everything is still all right and to prove it—for example, by masturbation and genital exploration. She grasps at assumptions and consolations of the same kind the boy uses in trying to fend off the impression of the female genital: the penis is merely too small as yet, it will surely grow bigger, and, above all, it may merely be hidden inside the body and it will surely come out.

This notion of an inner, invisible penis, which is linked to introjections connected with wishes and fantasies concerning the inside of the mother's body, seems to occur regularly and is fused later on with fantasies of pregnancy. Thus in female patients at a corresponding stage of treatment we may understand a demonstrative protrusion of the abdomen, not only as a miming of pregnancy but also, at a deeper level, as an exhibition of the penis lodged inside the body (see, Weiss, 1924). The fantasied displacement of the penis inside the body, in its turn, changes the castration fear into a fear of destruction of this internal genital. It further enhances phallic and urethral as well as exhibitionistic strivings. The little girl tries desperately to force out the imaginary inner penis with the jet of urine; in that way she will be able to show it. For example, a patient preoccupied with masculine illusions hoped that at least after her death the autopsy would finally reveal her hidden penis.

The assumption of an inner organ can, however, also be a favorable preparation for the development of normal genitality. I shall come back to this later.

For the time being, the little girl is roughly in the anxious situation of a person who concludes from certain symptoms that he is afflicted by an ominous illness. The fear of impairment of

the illusional inner penis combines with pregenital fears of damage to the body. I could find no characteristic difference in this reaction of the female when compared to the inner situation of the male neurotic who experiences, besides castration fear, anxieties lest he already be castrated. Such female 'castration fear' may well provide the motive for giving up masturbation; the little girl now makes efforts in this direction, sometimes after a phase of intensified sexual activity. These efforts are strongly supported by the increasing devaluation of the genital, corresponding to her narcissistic injury (Freud, 1931).

It often takes a considerable time for the anxious excitement of this period to turn into a depression indicating the final conviction of having been robbed genitally. Only then does the aggressive rebellion of the child fully set in. Vengeful impulses and wishes to recover the organ snatched away by the mother arise, the frustration of which leads to a final disappointment with the mother and to her derogation. Turning away from her, the child approaches the father, but with great ambivalence. This is the beginning of the œdipal relationship.

I cannot share the opinion of Melanie Klein (1932) that the wish for a penis accompanies the female œdipal wishes a priori. Neither the early infantile equation of the penis with the breast nor the regular occurrences of fantasies of getting the paternal penis out of the mother's body are to be disputed. But Klein's conception does not do justice to the influences exerted on the development of the female œdipal situation by the preceding narcissistic blow due to the trauma of being castrated.

The child's relation to her own genital during the ensuing period is marked by a derogation of the genital organ which predisposes her to frigidity and, in cases where it leads to a distinct reactive narcissism, may even threaten the establishment of object relations to men. The narcissistic wound will be healed with the help of the libidinal displacements to other parts of the body or to the body as a whole. Narcissistic compensations are initiated, such as the development of feminine virtue or the cultivation of feminine beauty, described by Harnik (1923); or

the impaired self-esteem may be relieved by the development of 'masculine' distinctions in other physical or mental areas.

What is decisive for the sexual vicissitudes and the recovery of genital self-esteem and feeling, however, is whether and how successfully the love relationship to the father develops. It must help the girl gradually to renounce her aggressive-masculine desire, to resign herself to the lack of a penis, to overcome the oral impulses to acquire the penis forcibly and to transform them into vaginal desires.

If female development proceeds in this way, we usually describe it as normal; in a certain percentage of cases, although it allows a healthier feminine future to the woman than if she were phallicly fixated, there is no greater capacity for sexual enjoyment. Helene Deutsch (1930) has aptly described this type of frigid but otherwise quite normal feminine woman. Such sexual frigidity is undoubtedly so prevalent, it is not surprising that Freud, too, assumes that in some cases frigidity may be due to an anatomical-constitutional factor (Freud, 1933). I am convinced, on the contrary, that the frequency of frigidity is determined experientially—i.e., given the typical current nature of causative experiences, it is socially determined. Influenced by contemporary values, such as fears of pregnancy, frigidity is generally the result of inadequate solutions of the castration conflicts which, aggravated by the œdipal prohibition, lead to a regressive fixation on phallic or pregenital positions.

Indeed the little girl's situation after the castration trauma is not designed to restore her healthy self-esteem. No amount of helpful explanation convinces the child of the existence of a fully valid female organ of pleasure; the hope for a future child is insufficient consolation in the present, and the higher social valuation of the male sex is not conducive to a healing of the narcissistic injury.

Thus I also found in patients who had reached a relatively normal feminine position that the vagina, even though libidinally cathected later on, had not become fully equivalent to the sexual forces preceding the castration trauma. This was due to

the fact that the female sexuality had been diverted into masochism by the castration trauma. The warding off of the revived oral-sadistic wishes for incorporation had led to a renunciation not only of the penis but of the patient's own genital organ. The phallus was yielded to the man—in expiation, as it were; on him it could now be loved, preserved intact, and only received in the sexual act, over and over again, like the maternal breast at an earlier time. Although with this development, the vaginal zone had begun to be erotized, at first the narcissistic compensation for the devalued genital became not the vagina but the paternal penis, or the entire love object equated with it, i.e., the father. The narcissistic cathexis had been displaced from the woman's own genital to the love object, and was reflected in a change of anxiety contents: following acceptance of their own castration and establishment of the œdipal relationship, the castration fear could be regressively equated with the fear of the loss of love. Fear of loss of the penis had been replaced by fear of losing the phallic love object, thus establishing an orally determined, narcissistic and often masochistic attitude toward the latter.

Not all women with such a sexual organization are frigid. As already mentioned, a displacement of the oral libidinal cathexis can cause the vagina to become the organ of pleasure in their later love life. As long as they feel secure in the possession of the man they love, these women are capable of vaginal pleasure and orgasm, but they react with frigidity, vaginismus, and pathological depression to any danger of losing the love object to whom they cling anxiously. It is striking, moreover, that although such women experience vaginal pleasure in coitus, they are often completely inhibited as far as masturbation is concerned, as I was able to observe in four cases. Lacking 'a genital of their own', they are absolutely dependent on the partner's penis for sexual excitement. Thus even though they experience pleasure in coitus, their genitality is really a sham since they experience the partner's genital as belonging to their own bodies. Such love relationships are marked by a narcissistic identification with the

man and his penis. The further the masochistic mastery of oral aggression against the man has gone—i.e., the stronger the impulses to rob him of his genital—the more complete the frigidity; erotization of the receptive organ, the vagina, thus may become totally impossible.

With necessary caution we may say that the mechanisms here described were almost regularly found in the normal married women of the last generation. But nowadays we observe—beside many phallic types, with which I shall not deal here—the beginnings of a development that is healthier from the libidinal-economical point of view.

The castration conflict then is resolved as follows. Renunciation of the penis is made possible by the more rapid and direct discovery of the female genital, and the child's female self-esteem is restored with the belief that she possesses an equally valuable organ of her own. The libidinal cathexis of the vagina likewise takes place directly and not merely through displacement of oral strivings. As I indicated above, the fantasies about an internal penis provide a bridge in the formation of the symbolic equations, penis=vagina and penis=child, since her belief in the hidden organ can spur the little girl to energetic investigation of her genital, leading to satisfactory knowledge about the vagina and vaginal masturbation. This is particularly successful in cases where masturbation is not prohibited and suitable explanation of the difference between the sexes furthers the process. Characteristic for women whose female genital feeling grows out of the assumption of a penis inside the body is a stronger fantasy of erotization of the deeper parts of the vagina, as well as of a general participation of the uterus in genital excitation and orgastic satisfaction.

Once female development has been set upon this path, it will also place the relation to the love partner on a different basis than exists in the type I have described. This relation is not oral, narcissistic, and masochistic but active-genital. It permits a choice of the 'anaclitic type' (Freud, 1914) and vouchsafes a certain independence of the love object since it is less influenced

by the fear of loss of love. Rather it is influenced by a fear of vaginal injury (analogous to the male's castration fear), as Karen Horney (1926) has stressed. In so far as this fear refers also to the inner, deep-seated parts of the genital organ, Melanie Klein's opinion that the deepest female fear is a fear of destruction of body contents would again apply.

The complex character of female instinctual life, due to the peculiarity and depth of the castration conflict, of course affects female ego and superego formation as well.

For the sake of clarity I may remark that I do not share Melanie Klein's (1932) view that the earliest introjections of the parental figures should be regarded as the beginning of superego formation. Although the early identifications and anxieties are the foundation of the later superego and are therefore especially important for the understanding of superego formation, the fact that the formation of the superego as a distinct part of the personality is closely connected with the dissolution of the Œdipus complex should not be obscured. We should speak of a superego only when a uniform, consolidated structure becomes observable (*cf.*, Fenichel, 1926). To be sure, this comes earlier in the little girl than in the boy—approximately at age three, precisely in the phallic phase in which the castration fear, intensified by her beginning doubts as to the normal character of her genital, drives the child to struggle against masturbation and detachment from the mother.

Thus one might describe the first stage of the female superego as 'heir of the negative Œdipus complex'. With the passing of the precœdipal tie to the mother, the nucleus of the female superego—and to a certain degree also of the male superego—is 'maternal-phallic'. After all, during the first years of life the mother takes precedence in all respects; she takes first place as the object of love and identification. The spur to superego formation persists—at first becomes even stronger—when the little girl can no longer avoid the fact of being 'castrated'. At a time when the greatest demands on her psychic strength are

made, one can observe the development of intense efforts to be good and to build up the ego ideal of a modest, gentle, obedient, clean little girl, perhaps in opposition to an unruly, cheeky, dirty little boy.

The content of this first, typically feminine ideal of virtue is determined, of course, by the experience of 'castration'; it militates particularly against the revived oral-sadistic and phallic-aggressive strivings toward mother and father, as well as against the anal devaluation of her own and the mother's genital organs. We also see here the substantial contribution of orality to female superego formation, which Sachs (1928) pointed out. Not only the features of resignation, which he cites as characteristic of the female superego, are shaped at this time, but all the cardinal female virtues of bodily and mental purity and of patient resignation are ideals which the woman acquires through the usual course of her castration conflict.

During the next period of development, however, the organization of the female superego does not progress with the same intensity. The little girl's moral efforts seem to be so exhausted by her acceptance of castration that we observe instead a retrogression in her superego formation. The inhibition is closely connected with the child's relation to the paternal penis. A comparison with male development is relevant here: the process of superego formation in the boy might be characterized by saying that instead of taking possession of the paternal penis (in order to have intercourse with the mother)—i.e., instead of 'castrating' the father—, he incorporates certain phallic qualities of the father. The female superego formation proceeds analogously at first, with the mother as the object of identification. However, the situation changes in the little girl when the castration conflict is resolved and her relation to the father begins to flourish. He now replaces the mother as the center of object-libidinal as well as narcissistic strivings. In the struggle between them, the phallic narcissism of the girl gives way to object libido, while the boy sacrifices his œdipal wishes in order to preserve his penis.

Incidently, this characterizes the peculiarities of male and female narcissism. The latter merges into object love, finding its expression in it; the former takes precedence over object love.

Thus, if the girl adopts the female position, the castrative wishes directed at the father are not warded off with the aid of phallic partial identification with the father in a superego, but by an elaboration of object relationship in which the possession of the father as love object—ensured by reception of the penis in the sexual act—compensates her for giving up the genital. The projective process furthering this development, in which one's own genital is renounced and the narcissistic genital cathexis transferred to the father, also results in a projection of the superego (equated with the desired phallus) upon the love object which is thereby elevated to serve as superego. From then on the female anxiety of conscience becomes to a certain extent a secondary 'social anxiety'; above all, the opinions and judgments of the love object become decisive and—like his penis—can always be taken from him again. On the other hand, from the libidinal-economical point of view, the superego's projective dependence on the father provides relief to the little girl's ego which was overtaxed by her castration conflict.

A brief example may illustrate the process of such superego projection. A patient asserted at the beginning of treatment that she was a typical case of social anxiety. She stated that she had no value judgment of her own, but adopted the values of her current environment. The patient seemed to be right. Notwithstanding outstanding intelligence, in her judgment and behavior she displayed a striking dependence on her love objects. But in the course of her treatment it became clear that her assertion of lacking any value judgment meant to her lacking a penis, being 'castrated'. This open admission of her deficiency was intended to deny her wishes to introject the penis—her fantasy of having one of her own. She then revealed the masochistic elaboration of her vehement, aggressive incorporation impulses toward the father's phallus and, respectively, on a deeper level, toward the mother's body. To her love object she surrendered

not only her 'penis' and all the genital activity, but also her superego. In spite of her cleverness, she developed an infantile-oral attitude toward her lovers who had to confide their love experiences to her—i.e., share their riches with her—and also to dictate every step of her life. Only after understanding these connections did the patient reveal the desire not only for a genital organ and a sexual life of her own but also those manifestations of her superego which she had denied, repressed, and warded off by projection.

This mechanism, which was unusually obvious in my patient, seems to be typically female. Thus the development of a female-masochistic and orally determined attitude to the object leads in many cases to warding off the superego, and especially to a projective dependence of the superego on the father as well as on the mother when, as rival, she again becomes the object of identification. This process is contrary to the further development of an independent female superego. To the woman's sexual dependency on the love object is added the female tendency to love the embodiment of her own sacrificed ego ideal in the man, or to acquire his superego through her love. This is illustrated by Sachs (1928) in his description of the oral type of woman who depended upon the opinions and standards of her former lovers—i.e., she required the real incorporation of the penis for her development of a pseudo-superego.

It is not surprising that women with such libidinal organization may become melancholic despite an apparently weak superego; indeed they are predisposed to it by their orality. A later prevalence of introjective mechanisms causes the projection of the superego to be withdrawn again, and the repressed early infantile superego makes a cruel reappearance, flooding the ego with archaic fears.

The formation of the superego is much more successful when the vagina is accepted as a fully valued genital. The more genital the attitude of the little girl is during the œdipal phase, the more analogous is her ego and superego development to that of the male.

Castration fear has its counterpart in the female fear of injury to the genital. An independent ego ideal is formed in which traits of the father are included when the maternal model is insufficient, but this would not necessarily be described as a 'male superego'. Under the influence of heightened female self-esteem and a better organized superego, the ego of course is also expanded and enriched. The objection may be raised that the ego and superego development outlined here would be characteristically 'phallic'. The decisive difference, however, lies in the different libidinal organization, which finds expression in the lack of rivalry with the man, in healthy social and love relationships, and in the development of an ego and superego qualitatively different from the male's. I refer once more to the second female character described by Sachs (1928), which he defines as normally female.

To this translation of my 1937 paper, I now add a note. The difficult delimitation of the 'masculine woman' can be explained by the fact that the image of a 'truly feminine' woman is rooted in traditional standards. Furthermore, the female 'vaginal' character with an independent superego, a strong, effective ego, and healthy expansive sexuality—historically originating from the oral-narcissistic and masochistic woman by way of the phallic woman—is only beginning to prevail. Hence a 'future female type' remains even now, forty years after this paper was written.

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PROVERBS AND PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY DALE BOESKY, M.D.

Proverbs have much to teach the psychoanalyst. The purpose of this paper is to illustrate the clinical usefulness of viewing certain proverbs as analogous to typical dreams, to discuss some implications of the affinities between proverbs, riddles, and typical dreams in the context of applied psychoanalysis, and to view the proverb as stemming from the same common matrix as dreams, myths, symptoms, and folklore.

> '. . . I speak to them in parables; for they look without seeing, and listen without hearing or understanding'
>
> Matthew XIII: 13

There is no satisfactory definition of proverbs (Champion, 1938; Taylor, 1931). The Oxford Dictionary definition—'A short, pithy saying in common and recognized use'—is inadequate, but as we shall see it is in the very nature of proverbs to elude precise understanding. A hint from etymology throws some light on the problem. The Greek word '*gnome*' meant a moral aphorism or proverb; anthologies of these aphorisms were called *gnomologia* and were used in instructing the young. The modern counterpart is gnomic verse (Encyclopedia Britannica, 1970). We gain additional understanding of proverbs by recalling that this very word '*gnome*', which was used to define them, was also used to describe the legendary trolls, the little, shriveled old men who inhabited the interior of the earth and acted as guardians of her treasure. So we learn by etymologic allusion that proverbs contain buried treasure in the form of ancient wisdom and that the protective device which conceals the secret is shriveled—a

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concretized allusion to the condensation and terseness of proverbs and also to the fact that in each proverb there is a concealed or buried secret.

From etymologic study of the history of the word 'proverb' in other languages, we also learn of the crucial importance of metaphor in the structure of proverbs. One Hebrew word for proverb is *mashal*, a resemblance; the Latin *proverbium* indicates that a figurative expression is used in place of the plain word, *'pro verbo'*. In Malayan, Arabic, Moorish, Persian, and Swahili, the word for proverb connotes the use of a metaphoric similarity, a parable, or an allegory. In other languages, the etymologic roots of the word for proverb connote either frequency of repetition in Italian, Japanese, and Spanish, or ancient usage in Greek, Turkish, and Polish (Champion, 1938). In view of the universality of proverbs it seems surprising that the only psychoanalytic paper on proverbs available in English is a brief vignette by Ferenczi (1915).

Another problem in defining what we mean by a proverb is that the word is used in both a generic and specific sense. For the purposes of this paper, we will exclude from our consideration the maxim, apothegm, adage, epigram, and aphorism. For example, in Valéry's observation, 'consciousness reigns but does not govern', we can see the aphoristic compression of volumes of psychoanalytic literature. But the aphorism is an aristocratic literary genre not to be confused with the earthy proverb whose roots go back to the oral traditions of racial prehistory. The language used by most aphorists is abstract and deliberately avoids metaphor and visual imagery.[1]

The relation of metaphor to unconscious fantasy thinking in the ensuing discussion is important. The contribution which modern ego psychology can make to the study of proverbs depends on a careful study of the hierarchical integration of unconscious fantasy thinking in the service of defense, adaptation, and integration. Topographic reductions from the manifest

[1] There are certain notable exceptions; for example, see Auden's (1971) brilliant discussion of the imagery used by the modern French aphorist, Chazal.

content of certain metaphorical proverbs would be very misleading. Similarly, although all proverbs have an instructional function in a social context, an adage or maxim such as 'live and learn', which is called a proverb in the wider, generic sense, is very different from the classic proverbs to be discussed here. Unconscious fantasy thinking, regression, symbolism, and metaphoric representation are the organizing features of only the narrow group of proverbs which contain sensory imagery and elements of primary process activity. It is also important not to make artificial distinctions between 'true' symbols and metaphors in the sense of insisting absolutely, as did Jones (1916), that metaphors could not discharge dynamically repressed ideas from the system *Ucs.* (see also, Noy, 1973; Rosen, 1969; Segel, 1961; Voth, 1970). Topographical insistence on consciousness as a defining criterion contributed to Jones's insistence that simile was a precursor of metaphor; in my opinion, this is erroneous. There are good reasons for believing that the reverse is sometimes true from the point of view of the structural hypothesis.

There is a special variety of proverb—the proverbial phrase—which is also included in this study because of the prominence of metaphor and symbolism in its structure. A proverbial phrase originates in the same manner as the ordinary proverb, e.g., 'to kill two birds with one stone' (Taylor, 1931). Certain proverbial phrases, such as 'sour grapes' or 'cry wolf', represent condensed allusions to well-known fables in the Aesopian tradition. There are many important affinities between fables and proverbs which are again expressed etymologically. The Latin *fabula* is 'a thing said', and in Greek, Hebrew, and the Aramaic languages there is one word that means fable as well as proverb. A large scholarly literature is devoted solely to the transitions from fables to proverbs in folklore. The fable with its concrete, pointed moral and animal characters has affinities with the beast ethic (e.g., *Reynard, the Fox*) and also with the more complex Biblical parables; the fable stands in relation to the parable as the proverb to the aphorism. Proverbiologists find in many cases that it is hard to tell which came first—the fable or its con-

densed proverbial form.

The proverbiologist uses syntactic, dialectal, metric, or linguistic aspects of the proverb to study its origin, spread, and evolution (Taylor, 1931); many specialists in the field consider that it is almost impossible to trace the origin of proverbs to their roots because they date back to the oral tradition of racial prehistory (see, for instance, Arewa, 1970; Hart, 1937; Nyembezi, 1954; Winstedt, 1950).

Another issue in the study of the evolution of proverbs to which psychoanalysis can contribute is whether proverbs have a polycentric origin or a monocentric origin with diffusion (Boyer, 1975). Obviously they have both when viewed in the context of shared unconscious fantasies and the universal distribution of symbols (Jones, 1916). But, as we know, psychoanalysis can also shed light on the disappearance and extinction of certain proverbs and myths. It is often impossible for the proverbiologist to establish whether there is historical truth to the attribution of certain proverbs to some specific source. Just as in every other area in which the nonanalytic observer studies a manifestation of unconscious fantasy, there are almost as many classification systems of proverbs as there are students of the subject. Our stock of proverbs is always in a state of dynamic flux: new proverbs appear, other proverbs disappear.

The contribution which psychoanalysis can make to the study of proverbs is elucidated by Arlow (1961) in his study of mythology: 'Shared daydreams and myths are instruments of socialization' (p. 379). The proverb like the myth must be remembered and repeated. This externalization of fantasy bolsters social adaptation by supplementing the nightly abrogation of instinctual renunciation in dreams. In any such consideration of the analogy between proverbs and typical dreams, we must of course be aware of the important differences in structure, function, history, and mode of observation between dreams and proverbs. However alike they may be, it is the function of the dream to organize periodic regulated discharge of unconscious fantasy in the intrapsychic domain while it is the function of the proverb

to instruct in a cultural and social context. Yet psychoanalytic research has shown us that we might expect rich yields from careful study of the affinities of dreams and folklore. Let us then first consider the function of proverbs to see the light this will shed on their origin and their similarity to dreams.

DREAMS AND PROVERBS

The universality of typical dreams in widely varying societies has become a generally accepted observation (see, Epstein, 1973).

Freud (1900-1901) noted the important affinities between proverbs and dreams. He wrote: 'In view of the part played by . . . proverbs in the mental life of educated people, it would fully agree with our expectations if disguises of such kinds were used with extreme frequency for representing dream-thoughts' (p. 345). He defined typical dreams as follows: 'It would be possible to mention a whole number of other "typical" dreams if we take the term to mean that the same manifest dream-content is frequently to be found in the dreams of different dreamers' (p. 395). The typical dream according to Freud was somewhat analogous to a complex symbol[2] in that 'the dreamer fails as a rule to produce the associations which would in other cases have led us to understand it, or else his associations become obscure and insufficient' (p. 241). He stressed that although the manifest content of typical dreams, such as examination dreams, dreams of flying, of falling, of being naked, etc., might appear similar or stereotyped, they had different meanings, perhaps in every individual case (pp. 273; 393-394). Freud noted that symbolism was not peculiar to dreams but was characteristic of unconscious ideation, particularly in folklore, myth, legend, linguistic idiom, proverbial wisdom, and jokes (p. 351). To prove that dreams are wish-fulfilments, he used a proverb:

[2] Strachey (1962) has observed that Freud, in his 1895 paper, *The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence*, used the phrase 'typical phobias' to distinguish 'phobias having a psychical basis and those (the "typical" ones) without any'. This distinction was thus 'linked up' to Freud's later distinction between the psychoneuroses and the 'actual neuroses' (p. 83).

> I do not myself know what animals dream of. But a proverb, to which my attention was drawn by one of my students, does claim to know. 'What', asks the proverb, 'do geese dream of?' And it replies: 'Of maize.' The whole theory that dreams are wish fulfilments is contained in these two phrases (pp. 131-132).

Freud felt that dream symbolism was separate from the dream work and was a characteristic of unconscious thinking (primary process thinking) which provides the dream work with the material for condensation, displacement, and dramatization.

Typical dreams resemble proverbs. Both are present in societies of widely varying cultures. In both typical dreams and proverbs we find clear evidence of the importance of symbolism and unconscious fantasy. Both typical dreams and proverbs utilize the poetic devices of metaphor, simile, synecdoche, and metonymy (see, Sharpe, 1937). Both utilize components of the dream work: condensation, displacement, and plastic representation.[3] Among the obvious differences between proverbs and dreams, one is crucial. Proverbs are usually intended to instruct, often to exhort, but always to communicate; dreams are exquisitely noncommunicative. Freud (1915) used a Chinese proverb to illustrate this distinction and to show the difference between the indefiniteness of certain proverbs and the ambiguity of dreams (p. 231).

WISDOM AND PROVERBS

The collective weight and force of traditional wisdom distilled from countless earlier generations is expressed particularly in the proverbs of the Chinese. The custom of expressing standards of Chinese ethics in proverbial form predates Confucius. The Chinese use proverbs to settle arguments in a manner similar to the invocation of precedent in the Western tradition of common law. They have proverbs to deal with all important nat-

[3] Dr. Peter Knapp, in his discussion of this paper, suggested that an alternative description of the resemblance of proverbs to typical dreams would be to view proverbs as examples of repetitive nondiscursive symbols. Noy (1973) notes Susanne Langer's division between discursive and nondiscursive symbols.

ural events—health, disease, child-rearing, marriage, business, loyalty, death, and the eternal concerns and mysteries of mankind. But a proverb does not survive only if it expresses some pieces of wisdom. 'It must embody the experiences of the people among whom it originates, must express the real group consciousness, and must have the sanction of long usage by the multitude. Furthermore, a proverb in order to survive must possess such a vigorous principle of life that it can hold its place through centuries of a people's existence. *And it must have the capacity of detaching itself from particular occasions, be capable of various applications . . .*' (Hart, 1937, italics added).

In this capacity for detachment from the particular, the multiple potential meaning of the proverb becomes amenable to psychoanalytic study because at this point the proverb represents a metaphorical displacement. It is for this reason that no single application of any proverb exhausts its meaning (Taylor, 1931). Proverbs are so intimate and true a reflection of the attitudes of a society that one can only agree with Francis Bacon: 'The genius, wit, and spirit of a nation are discovered in its proverbs'. Most scholars agree that proverbs reflect the language of the common people; they are replete with puns, homonyms, alliteration, similes, metaphors, rhymes, and other poetic devices (Sharpe, 1937; Taylor, 1931; Winstedt, 1950). For centuries proverbs were the peasant's library; their essence was not only governed by ethical considerations but also by what was true in an adaptive sense.

The proverbs of any era or place always contained contradictions: 'trust in God', but 'God helps those who help themselves'. They reflected contradictory advice because mankind has always struggled to live with an eternally elusive reality. The proverb gives counsel and offers arguments which have the weight and authority of custom and tradition. Chinese proverbs have acquired the power and the sanctity of unwritten law from which there is no appeal (Hart, 1937). In fact, the sayings of Chairman Mao have had to be buttressed recently by an official Communist party attack against the reactionary, conservative influence of

old proverbs that argue for passive submission to prevailing social conditions, such as, 'The protruding part of a beam rots first', or 'A shot hits a bird with its head peeping out'. The anthropologist uses the proverb as an investigative tool in his study of small societies because proverbs are known to validate and reflect accepted values, criticize nonconforming behavior, offer rules for successful living, and to be a continuing commentary on daily life (Foster, 1970).

Proverbs are designed to teach. They express the hard-won experience of our ancestors, the distilled wisdom of the past.[4] *Wisdom Literature* is the title given to certain ancient Oriental writings of which those of the Hebrews are most widely known. The Book of Proverbs, Job, Ecclesiastes, and certain other brief passages are the *Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament.* In the Apocrypha, the great Wisdom Books are *The Wisdom of Solomon and Ecclesiasticus.* The Wisdom tradition dates back to almost 3000 B.C. in Egypt. In the days of the Judges (1200-1050 B.C.) wise men used fables and riddles to instruct. Wisdom books, as we know them, date from about 400 B.C. to early Christian times. There are very important differences between the sorrowful wisdom of Job and the optimistic and practical wisdom of the Book of Proverbs, but there are more crucial differences between the view of redemption through wisdom in the Book of Proverbs and redemption by faith, magic, and revelation in the five books of Moses. The great themes of the promise to the patriarchs, the deliverance from slavery, the covenant of Sinai, tell the story of God's *revelation* of himself and of his *choice* of Israel. Here the revelation of God is in the order of creation, but in the Book of Proverbs, the wise and righteous are contrasted to the foolish and wicked. One must learn to follow the wise path. Even proverbs could not save a stupid man: 'A proverb in the mouth of a stupid man dangles helpless as a lame man's legs' (Proverbs XXVI: 7). The revelation of God was now a matter of hard work, renunciation of

[4] In the ensuing discussion of *Wisdom Literature* I draw from articles in the Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, 1970.

pleasure, and redemption by wisdom rather than magical creation. 'A sensible man will take a proverb to heart; an attentive ear is the desire of the wise' (Ecclesiasticus III: 29), and 'In wisdom's store are wise proverbs' (Ecclesiasticus I: 25).

METAPHORICAL PROVERBS AND COGNITION

Cultural anthropologists have relied on the cognitive and adaptive aspects of proverbs in some of their studies (Fernandez, 1972; Foster, 1970; Zenner, 1970), and the analysis of metaphor has been observed to lie at the heart of anthropological inquiry. Fernandez (1972) states: 'However men may analyze their experiences within any domain, they inevitably know and understand them best by referring them to other domains for elucidation'. A proverb '. . . says that something much more concrete and graspable than a rolling stone—a bird in the hand—is equivalent to the essential elements in another situation we have difficulty in grasping'. (This, of course, is the basis for the use of proverbs as a psychiatric test of abstract reasoning; massive regression of a variety of ego functions prevents the schizophrenic from allowing the stone to roll to other connotations than his idiosyncratic concretized reference.)

In clinical psychoanalytic work we are accustomed to expect useful access to unconscious fantasy by careful attention to metaphorical expression (Aleksandrowicz, 1962; Arlow, 1961; Freud, 1900-1901; Sharpe, 1937, 1940; Voth, 1970), and the analogy of metaphor to the dream has even included the postulation of a 'metaphor-work' (Rohovit, 1960). We are also accustomed in theoretical discussions to emphasize the primary process aspects of metaphor, the displaced representations as the opportunity for discharge, and the proximity of metaphor to conflict and unconscious fantasy. All these issues can be observed clearly and to great advantage in our daily psychoanalytic work, as I hope to illustrate in my clinical examples.

At this point, however, my emphasis is on the cognitive, autonomous, and adaptive functions of metaphorical proverbs in the well-known but still incompletely understood context of the

cognitive line of development which begins with simple comparisons and ends in useful generalizations. The rediscovery of the familiar in novel situations is a way station on this developmental line in which metaphor plays an important role. The presence and use of metaphor in all new insight has been widely recognized by psychoanalysts (for instance, Lewin, 1971), as well as by psychologists, historians of science, philosophers, and linguists.[5] The metaphorical aspect of proverbs can be meaningfully connected with important adaptive and cognitive issues when considered from the standpoint of the ego and adaptation, as distinguished from discharge, regression, and primary process. These cognitive aspects of metaphorical expression have been discussed by Rubinstein (1972) from the standpoint of superordination and subordination of two classes having the same name. Rubinstein also comments on the way in which metaphor extends the reach of language and facilitates concept formation by establishing linkages.

We are taught from a very early age to learn by comparing two objects, two situations, or two experiences. Discriminating and comparing are inseparable. To recognize the familiar (the family), to learn how this is like what we already know, are cognitive tasks closely integrated with the diacritic task of separating, sorting, and differentiating. The proverb offers such a tool—a verbal, cognitive bridge facilitating mankind's universal tendency to achieve mastery and to build psychic structure by establishing linkages. In this sense the proverb is a flexible and useful tool to the extent that it is portable across widely varying new situations, but its multiplicity of applications depends also on its relevant ambiguity just as in art (see, Kris and Kaplan, 1952). Ambiguity and proverbial imagery allow for externaliza-

[5] I am indebted to Dr. Terrence Tice for providing the following incomplete list to merely indicate the breadth of recent scholarly interest in this problem: Susanne Langer, Alfred North Whitehead, Max Black, Michael Polanyi, R. B. Blackmur, and Thomas Kuhn; and also for calling my attention to the book *Proverbs: A New Approach,* by William McKane (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1970).

tion, regression in the service of the ego, and inexhaustible interpretations.

It is the relevance of the metaphorical expression which so intrigues the cultural anthropologist. No proverb from any society can be understood outside the context of its indigenous use any more than a dream can be understood from its manifest content. The forest life of the African Fang culture gives special contexts to slashing and cutting metaphors which obviously lose meaning as modern roads appear. In this sense proverb parodies shed light on original proverb forms (Bauman and McCabe, 1970). As Fernandez (1972) says: 'The vitiation of metaphor through drastic change in the domains of activity of a people is an aspect of acculturation that has not been fully explored'. Certain ancient proverbs are meaningless to us because the metaphorical base of the proverb has become irrelevant or extinct. New proverbs form in shifting contexts. There is no final interpretation of any proverb or dream. As we shall see, the vitiation of metaphor leads to the death of the proverb; the deliberate suppression of a part of the metaphor creates a riddle.

Ferenczi (1913) and Jones (1916) dealt with these issues, but Jones in particular raised the question of whether the symbol played an important developmental role in the formation of the future realistic idea that would subsequently replace the analogical symbol of primitive thought. Jones described the tendency of a child to note resemblances, not differences, as one of the most fundamental and primordial attributes of the mind. The whole meaning of comprehension, he said, is the referring of the unknown to the known, a concept that dates back to Freud and the pleasure-discharge aspects of perceptual identity. Jones stressed that the 'true' symbol actually delayed this cognitive development.[6] In terms of ego psychology, however, we would now say that fantasy thinking is dynamically related to

[6] Pederson-Krag (1956) has also discussed the progressive and regressive aspects of analogical-metaphorical thinking in the history of our own psychoanalytic theories.

the persistent cathectic potential emanating from the pressure of the instinctual wishes of the id (Arlow, 1969).

I suggest that metaphorical proverbs offer mankind a valuable adaptive tool for the cognitive development of the capacity for abstract thinking because they afford an opportunity for partial, regulated discharge and, at the same time, a capacity to establish linkages and make comparisons. The manner in which proverbs facilitate partial discharge by establishing linkages to shared unconscious fantasies facilitates the painful task of renouncing instinctual pleasure, which is essential to all learning. The proverb is a communally shared, a culturally sanctioned, and an ancestrally approved relief from the unmitigated instinctual frustration required by the demands of reality adaptation.

FANTASY AND PROVERBS

We can better understand the universal appeal and persistence of proverbs when we see that their social and cultural utility as the vehicle for the transmission of ethical precepts and social adaptation is closely related to their proximity to universally shared unconscious fantasies. It is a simple matter to document the existence of almost identical proverb forms in dozens of widely varying societies. The manifest metaphorical expression which is meaningful in the context of a local culture or time is what varies. For instance, the Zulu might say: 'The beautiful stick is obtained from distant places', rather than 'The grass is greener on the other side of the fence' (Nyembezi, 1954). The seacoast proverbs of the Malaysian peninsula draw on a series of metaphorical allusions quite different from those of the inland matriarchal tribal cultures (Winstedt, 1950). Of course, one can make no glib assumption from the manifest proverb about its origin or meaning. The proverb 'A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush' has dozens of manifest variations (Taylor, 1931); out of its metaphorical context, the proverb is as impossible to interpret as is the manifest dream without associations. We might view the proverb as somewhat analogous in its function to Freud's (1900-1901) explanation of the famous dream of

Maury (pp. 496-497). The proverb is a preformed fantasy template, and as such it is ready at hand for adaptive purposes. Just as Maury could respond instantly to the stimulus of a falling object hitting him in his sleep with a complex dream in the brief second that it took him to awaken—a dream element that actually existed in his memory as a highly organized prior fantasy—, so in the same way is the proverb ready at hand for instant adaptive utilization as a preformed fantasy structure.

RIDDLES AND PROVERBS

We have noted the use of riddles by wise men in the days of the Judges. There is a section in the Book of Proverbs which has close affinities with the riddle, and riddles were common in the Wisdom material of the ancient Near East. 'If the wise man listens, he will increase his learning, and the man of understanding will acquire skill to understand proverbs, parables, the sayings of wise men, and their riddles' (Proverbs I: 5-6). Samson, whose legendary strength centered in his hair because of his vows as a Nazarite, was also known as the father of riddles because of the riddle which he proposed at his wedding feast: 'Out of the eater came something to eat; out of the strong came something sweet' (Judges XIV: 14).[7]

Freud (1905a) spoke of '. . . the peculiar negative relation that holds between jokes and riddles, according to which one conceals what the other exhibits' (p. 67, n.). He called riddles the counterparts of jokes (p. 215) and clearly placed them in the same relation to unconscious ideation in mankind as dreams, parapraxes, and folklore. He was deeply moved to receive the medallion on his fiftieth birthday commemorating his famous solution of the riddle of the Theban Sphinx,[8] and at several

[7] The fascinating parallels between Samson's wife pestering and teasing him to divulge the secret of his riddle foreshadows his better known defeat by Delilah, but the rich implications of Samson's riddle in the stormy chronicle of the book of Judges would require a separate study.

[8] The Theban Sphinx was a monster who terrorized the Thebans. She had the head and breast of a woman, the body of a lion, the wings of a bird, a serpent's tail, and would eat those who could not solve her riddle: 'What goes on four

points in his writings he referred to the riddle of the Sphinx as a concealed expression of the child's universal curiosity to learn about the riddle of procreation and birth (Freud, 1950b, p. 195; 1907, p. 135).

Riddles, which have numerous complexities of form and history, are considered here only in connection with their relation to proverbs and metaphor. Aristotle cautioned that excessive use of metaphor would result in a riddle (see, Rohovit, 1960). In the typical riddle there is one general element and one specific element which is to be understood metaphorically; for example, 'What grows bigger the more you take from it? A hole.' The dynamic implications of the connections between proverbs, jokes, riddles, and metaphors are captured in the etymologic connections between the precursors of the riddle as enigma and riddle in the sense of 'riddled full of holes', since this relates to the 'ryd(d)le' in Late Old English as a coarse meshed sieve, used for separating chaff from corn. In the riddle we deliberately let something come through in order to keep something else out. It is a perfect example of a screening process in the double sense of screening as a sieve and screening in the true psychoanalytic sense of screen function (Boesky, 1973) wherein a partial discharge is obtained by displacement.

This is where we can find the answer to the problem of the function of the proverb on the level of intrapsychic observation as distinct from its cultural and societal functions. The proverb affords the opportunity by way of regression in the service of the ego for displacement and partial discharge, hierarchically organized on a continuum of primary to secondary process integrations. And so does the riddle. Both riddle and proverb facilitated the organization of important adaptive and cognitive tasks as mankind acquired ever-increasing capacities for abstract thinking, and they have served a similar function in ontogenetic

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feet, on two feet, and three, but the more feet it goes on the weaker it be?' (Evans, 1970, p. 1025). For a discussion of the riddle of the Sphinx, see, Shengold (1963).

development. Both proverbs and riddles are used to master the novel and frightening in terms of the pleasant and familiar—the one by instruction, the other by playful puzzles. Proverbs and riddles aid us in our eternal effort to learn to understand the similarity in difference as well as the difference in similarity.

PROVERBS AND CLINICAL WORK

When it became apparent to me that careful analysis of proverbs could be clinically useful, it was necessary to anticipate the well-known adverse reactions that inevitably complicate the research interests of the analyst. One could readily predict that undue attention to proverbs might evoke an epidemic, or in some instances a reduction in their natural pattern of frequency. I was therefore cautious for the most part to simply note how often proverbs were used spontaneously, how varying they might be in content, whether certain patients were more prone to use them than others, and to watch for clinical opportunities to pursue isolated examples with the same tactical approach one would use with a dream.

In the course of a little more than three years I observed one hundred instances of proverbs occurring as a spontaneous inclusion in the patient's stream of association. They occurred rather regularly, a few times a month and were used by most of my patients, by some more than others. All of the patients were in analysis. One patient never used proverbs, for which I have no explanation.

For the most part the patients used common proverbs, such as 'Birds of a feather'; 'If the shoe fits'; 'Penny-wise and pound-foolish'; 'Neither fish nor fowl'; 'You can lead a horse to water'; etc. Very few proverbs were used more than once by any patient. An occasional exception was a proverb such as 'To cut off my nose to spite my face' which was repeated many times by a patient with particularly severe separation-individuation conflicts. Since my office is in a glass-enclosed building, I became accustomed to the response of a few patients to a particularly difficult interpretation which might cause narcissistic injury that 'people

who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones'. In general there was no way to understand the meaning of a patient's use of the proverb from its manifest content and since the clinical requirements usually precluded a request for direct associations, I understood only a small number of the proverbs in any meaningful psychoanalytic sense.

The three clinical examples which follow are from one patient who was somewhat more prolific in his use of proverbs. They are chosen not only to simplify the presentation of the material but to illustrate the underlying unity in the fantasy theme which was represented in three quite different proverbs.

The patient was a young man who came for analysis because he had never been able to have intercourse. He complained also of intermittent insomnia and feelings of inadequacy with women. He was an intelligent person who was tormented by conflicts about whether to become a high-powered businessman like his father or to pursue the scientific interests of his older sister. It became apparent that this issue related to much deeper conflicts about his parents. His mother was experienced as an overwhelming, selfish person; his father as an arrogant bully in his business dealings but very passive with the mother, catering to her every whim. As an adolescent the patient had suspected that his father was impotent. When he and his father were moving some furniture under the harsh commands of the mother, his father whispered in complaining tones to the patient: '. . . and with that attitude how can she expect me to make love?'.

Screaming fights were typical in his earliest memories. His mother believed in 'modern, emancipated' behavior and everyone in the family was expected to accept nudity as natural. His father neglected a lucrative business when the patient was a child in order to gamble for high stakes at the country club which was the center of the family's social life. The patient grew up in a swirl of luxury, servants, and pretension; he repeatedly witnessed his mother's flirtations and developed a wide variety

of defensive means to preserve his denial of her seductiveness with him. He often witnessed her melodramatic fights with his father and sister. His father repeatedly teased the patient in a cruel way about his allowance and other financial matters and repeatedly 'forgot' to give the patient money promised him or gave him less than he had promised. The father regularly called the patient a jackass. His mother infantilized him, did his homework for him, insisted on making decisions for him, exhibited herself naked in front of him, and repeatedly belittled his father. As a consequence, the patient suffered from severe castration anxiety, identified with the phallic mother, and sought in his fantasies to incorporate his father's phallus orally and anally. At about the time he started to masturbate, the patient began to steal small sums of money from his father's wallet.

In his fantasy life this patient engaged in two complicated, ongoing, continuously absorbing fantasies which he repeatedly elaborated. In one fantasy, he acquires 'seed money', either from his father or from a father surrogate, and by gambling, or investing, or both, he runs the initial sum up to an amount large enough to use in arranging a lavishly grandiose and complex business deal that results in great wealth, which he then shares with his entire family. In the other fantasy, which occurs during masturbation or in masturbatory sex play with his girl friend, he thinks of two lesbians: one is innocent and passive, the other aggressive and knowing. The most titillating aspect is the moment of seduction in which the resistance of the passive girl is overcome and she yields to the aggressive woman; this is excitingly expressed by her flicking her tongue against the tongue of the other woman. It took considerable analytic work for the patient to recognize that the 'seed money' fantasy had been isolated from the consciously sexual fantasy of the two lesbians, and that together these fantasies expressed the core of his childhood neurosis: his unconscious fantasy of identifying with the phallic mother who orally and anally incorporated the father's phallus. As the analysis progressed the patient gradually became aware that he was one of the two women in the lesbian fantasy.

He used a variety of shifts in identification to avoid the consequences of this fantasy: sadistic damage, overwhelming retribution, and castration. In the working through of these defensive shifts in identification, his references to certain proverbs as though they were dreams proved useful.

Just prior to the session in which he referred to the proverb: 'The grass is always greener on the other side of the fence', he had been working on derivatives of a traumatic memory from about age four or five in which he saw menstrual blood trickling down his mother's thigh. At the time, he spoke of drinking a Bloody Mary for lunch, his disgust about his girl friend's menses, and 'sneaking a peek' at his examination grade on the instructor's desk. He also recalled an incident which occurred when he was about twelve: he had become so upset when he forgot his key to the front door that he pushed his hand through the glass storm door and cut himself badly.

The session in which he reported the proverb began with his presenting me with a check erroneously made out for a sum three dollars less than the amount due. In this session he spoke about arranging to have the furnace repaired at his apartment. He had found it very gratifying to become less dependent on his mother; he had made his own arrangements for this repair job. It was his apartment. It was good to move out of his parents' house. He then experienced the sensation of teeth gnawing all around his head—not chewing him painfully but gnawing at the top of his head. He wondered about his need to exaggerate—for example, overstating the seriousness of a minor collision while with his girl friend or inflating his bowling score. He had ogled a waitress while in the restaurant with his girl friend. Later some fellow called his girl friend for a date. Maybe she would leave him the way she left her other boy friend for the patient. Maybe he looked at the waitress because he can't stand to look at his girl friend's genitals. She had been so exciting to him until the first time he saw her naked. Maybe he would not be scared of the waitress's genitals. Then he said: 'I guess I just want to go where the grass is greener'. He then remembered that years

ago he had a masturbation fantasy about a girl—she was so beautiful and sophisticated he couldn't even attempt anything sexual; he was in awe of her.

In my discussion I have omitted various aspects that would occur to any experienced analyst, just as I have been highly selective in which details of the prior history I have included, in order to preserve the clarity of the patient's use of proverbs. In this instance, the defensive reassurance of the use of grass as a symbol of the phallus can be observed. When it is cut, it grows back, the same reason that hair is often a phallic symbol. The 'other side of the fence' represented his conflicts over which identification would be less dangerous—male or female. He had begun the session with a symbolic act of castrating the analyst by providing him with a check for three dollars less than he owed and, in so doing, identified with his castrating mother as well as with his teasing, retentive father. To render this identification safe, the mother had to be equipped with a healthy growing patch of turf—not pubic hair matted with blood. One might speculate that 'green' had to do with money or feelings of envy but there were no direct associations that he could offer to the color. Because of the pressure of forward movement in the analysis, he was struggling to give up his defensive need for the projective identification with a castrating and castrated mother. But the proverb contains the wisdom of prior experience. Although consciously he dismissed the tempting waitress in favor of his castrated girl friend, he was unconsciously warning himself: 'Stay where you are. You only think that your lot would improve if you left your present defensive position.' The proverb, with its manifest warning of the follies of envy, condensed his fantasy of incorporating the father's phallus, denial of his mother's castration, and assertion of the presence of her phallus.

Sometime later and just before the session in the next example, the patient had been reflecting on the pleasure of working at a summer job for his father because he did not have to make up time that he missed from work to come for analytic sessions. It was then possible to show him how his attitude about

working at his job and in the analysis at certain times and in his studies was identical to the way he 'humped' his girl friend; i.e., he was only going through the motions. In the next session he felt hurt when I asked about his practice of getting his gasoline tank filled at his father's gas pump whether or not he was using the car for business purposes or at other times in the year when he was not working at all. He became silent for a few moments and then said, 'The cat's got my tongue'. When I inquired, he replied that this made him think of eating 'pussy'. Earlier in the day while driving in a delivery truck with a fellow worker, he saw an elderly couple in the car ahead of them. The woman was driving and the man was close to her with his arm around her when suddenly his head disappeared. His friend said, 'He's eating her out'. The patient continued, 'So old, it's revolting—like a couple of teenagers—well, you see all kinds of things when you drive a truck!'.

In this example we can observe that the day residue (to elaborate the analogy to the dream work) for the use of the proverb was the interpretation in the prior session of an important resistance in the analysis—the passive feminine 'humping' and 'going through the motions' in the analysis. This led in the opening of the next session to new information about a derivative of the fantasied oral and anal incorporation of the father's phallus; that is, having his tank filled at the father's pump. The castration anxiety aroused by my threatening questions about his rationalizing this practice led to the silence and then the proverb: 'The cat's got my tongue'. The story of the elderly couple made it clear that the sadistic and orally and anally devouring fantasy of incorporating the phallus was now linked to primal scene derivatives.

In the following example which occurred about one year later we can see a particularly interesting example of a proverb occurring in a dream. At this point in the analysis the patient was preparing to take the last and most difficult of his final examinations in graduate school. In the hour prior to his dream we dealt with his picking a fight with two fellow students about

where to celebrate after the day of graduation. His bitter complaints about misplacing his trust in these ingrates, whom he had wined and dined at his father's swimming pool, were a projection of his own parricidal anxieties about graduating, now greatly exacerbated by his father's recently developing a potentially serious illness. He began the next session with the following dream:

> I am at a theater or auditorium with Y and Z [two of his instructors]. I'm sitting in the first row but also on the stage, participating. Z's former teacher is there also and Z is eager to meet him. Y is complaining that they are delaying his graduate degree [which he actually already possesses] and making him wait two or three months while the faculty considers something. Then Y leaves—it was unclear whether he left in the middle or the end—but now I realize that the auditorium is in the synagogue where I had my Bar Mitzvah. They are out in the parking lot now and I shouted out after Y: 'What's good for the goose is good for the gander!'.

The patient then complained bitterly of the irony that Y, of all people, should complain about having to wait, since he had kept classes waiting nine to ten weeks for their grades after examinations. The patient, who was tortured by examination anxiety, had suffered needlessly because of Y's delays. Further, his father often kept him waiting for his allowance. Z, on the other hand, had arranged a job interview for the patient and seems eager to help him. The patient admires Z and may want to specialize in Z's field. Then he thought of applying for a new job after graduation. In the first interview he will not mention his need for leaving work to come to analysis sessions. That would spoil his chances. One of his cats will be spayed today. She's in heat too often—it's almost like she has worms. In sympathy, his other cat won't eat either. He feels guilty about their not eating. He needs a haircut. The exam isn't that important. He must get a job. He was nauseated last night worrying about the job. He wonders why. He has a good chance. Maybe he is scared of success. It's a prestige job. He doesn't

want to be subservient to some big shot. But this job won't be as good as the one he lost out on last month. The final exam will be coming soon. If he gets this job and makes so much money, can his father still claim him as a dependent on his income tax? There is even insurance that would pay for analysis on this new job he is going to try to get so he could be completely self-supporting. The synagogue reminded him that Y's name is Jewish. Was the play in the sanctuary or the social hall? Now he remembers the fun of all the social activities at the synagogue—he met his best girl friend there and became the president of their group.

He went on to say that usually he just babbles and I do the analyzing, but he sees now how this is beginning to connect with yesterday and the theme of friendship. It makes him feel like an amateur saying this to me. The saying 'What is good for the goose' is one of his favorite expressions—when someone gets his well-deserved punishment. But he uses this saying to excess. He drives it into the ground. Then he thought, 'Good for the goose' is alliteration. At that point I asked about his omission of the word 'sauce' which is commonly used in this proverb. He felt annoyed. He always said it that way—he couldn't think of any examples—after all, using a saying wasn't the same thing as an event like a Bar Mitzvah. He thought of how proud his father was at his Bar Mitzvah and how the Bar Mitzvah was just like examination anxiety is now.[9] In both situations he was so well prepared—he knew the material cold—yet he was frantic. He then added the crucial association that professor Y's father now works for professor Y in a menial position. The man at whom he angrily shouted in his dream expressed his yearning for this too long delayed triumph over his father and the analyst, as well as the dreaded retribution.

The patient's use of this proverb in his dream illustrates Reider's (1972) idea that metaphor serves the defensive function of allowing the patient to keep at a safer distance from conscious

[9] This was a spontaneous confirmation of Arlow's (1951) observation.

awareness, thereby facilitating closer linkages to the representation of the analyst. Much prior analytic work indicated that the 'goose' in the proverb was an allusion to the entire negative œdipal constellation through a linkage to being 'goosed' anally and teased by his father.[10] The use of the proverb within the dream seems to be analogous to the dream within the dream in that it affords the double denial of reality. The proverb itself clearly conveys a superego component in which the patient justified his parricidal wish by reminding the father surrogate that he richly deserved to be punished (see, Isakower, 1954). The context of the proverb in the dream is in this sense close to the *lex talionis:* 'An eye for an eye'.

There were further defensive functions of this use of the proverb. To quote from the proverbial lore of his forefathers in the context of the religious association to the synagogue and his Bar Mitzvah placed the patient in identification with the wisdom and righteousness of the rabbis of old, whom he was ambivalently deriding at the same time (see, Arlow, 1951). Moreover, a proverb is really very much like a cliché in one respect.[11] It has been repeated so many times that the affective component is defensively reduced in the sense described by Stein (1958). This may relate to the patient's feeling that he had used this old saying so often that he 'drove it into the ground' (a metaphorical allusion to the phallic implications of penetration of the earth). The spoken proverb in the dream represented a reversal to reassure him against the dangers of retribution and punishment by Y, a father surrogate. The imago of the father was divided into the good father, Z, and the evil father, Y. The spoken words in this dream clearly have more than just superego components (see, Baudry, 1974; Fisher, 1976).

[10] As long ago as 1670, John Ray in his *Collection of English Proverbs* described this proverb as a *woman's* proverb (Smith and Wilson, 1970).

[11] In this connection it is of some interest that Freud (1900-1901) stated that 'Only one writer on the subject seems to have recognized the source of spoken phrases occurring in dreams, namely Delbœuf . . . who compares them to clichés' (p. 184, n.).

In these clinical examples I have chosen three manifestly different proverbs in order to illustrate their common relation to the almost universal fantasy of acquiring the father's phallus by devouring or incorporating it. Hopefully the similarity to the mythic variation on this theme in Arlow's (1961) examples of Jack and the Beanstalk, Moses, and Prometheus will extend and confirm the usefulness of the structural hypothesis in the methodology of applied psychoanalysis.

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Idealization and Grandiosity: Developmental Considerations and Treatment Implications

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IDEALIZATION AND GRANDIOSITY: DEVELOPMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS AND TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS

BY FRANK M. LACHMANN, PH.D. and ROBERT D. STOLOROW, PH.D.

Analysis of patients with narcissistic pathology offers an opportunity to study the development of specific distortions of self and object representations. Two cases are presented illustrating the development of idealizations and grandiosity. For one patient these were manifestations of a developmental arrest; for the other, defenses against object-instinctual conflict. Differences in the function of idealizations and grandiosity in the two patients are attributed to the role of aggression and to the degree of separation-individuation attained. Treatment implications with references to the works of Kohut and Kernberg are considered.

In an earlier article (Stolorow and Lachmann, 1975) we attempted to clarify the concept of denial by placing it within a developmental framework. We proposed a distinction between the developmental inability to register and affirm the reality of an event and the defensive denial of an event. The developmental inability to register and affirm an event may be regarded as a prestage of denial and comes about when the internal structures necessary for accurate perception and integration of an event (such as early object loss) have not yet evolved. In an effort to comprehend such trauma, for which the child is developmentally or structurally unprepared, phase-specific explanatory fantasies are elaborated consistent with the existing level of psychosexual development, cognitive capacities, and wish fulfilments. In contrast, the concept of denial proper is reserved for those situations where the ego structure necessary for accurate perception and integration of an event may be expected to have matured sufficiently to acknowledge a reality, but it is not done because of conflictual meanings, associations, or impli-

cations linked with the perception. In denial proper, earlier explanatory fantasies may be utilized and retained, but they now function as true denial fantasies. These are consolidated into a static defensive system which functions to ward off perceptions of reality associated with anxiety and instinctual conflict.

In the present paper we shall attempt to extend this developmental framework to a consideration of the nature of idealizations and grandiosity. Idealizations may be viewed as a special category of failures to perceive reality accurately. When the self or an object is idealized, real qualities of the self or object are not accurately recognized or acknowledged (*cf.*, Schafer, 1967). Analogous to our work on denial, we propose a distinction between idealizations which are based on a developmental inability to register and affirm the real qualities of the self or objects, and idealizations in which there is a defensive denial of the real qualities of the self or objects. We will follow the convention of referring to idealizations of the self as grandiosity.

When idealizations based on a developmental inability to register and affirm the real qualities of the self or objects appear in an adult, they are indicative of structural deficiency and an arrest in ego development, whereby adequate self-object differentiation and self and object constancy have not been attained. An example would be the narcissistically disturbed individual whose ego development has remained arrested at the level of primitive, prestructural narcissistic self-object configurations (*cf.*, Kohut, 1971; Stolorow, 1975a, 1975b). In contrast, with regard to idealizations involving defensive denial, sufficient differentiation and structuralization have occurred to make possible the accurate recognition and acknowledgment of real qualities of the self or objects. However, the archaic, prestructural idealizations are retained and consolidated into a static defensive system which functions to ward off perceptions of the real qualities of the self or objects which are associated with anxiety and instinctual conflict. An example would be the individual who reactively idealizes himself and/or objects lest recognition of their real qualities evoke dangerous conflicts over aggressive

drive derivatives (*cf.*, Jacobson, 1964; Kernberg, 1970).

Two cases will be described which illustrate the distinction proposed above. We shall examine the treatment implications of this distinction and attempt to show that the proposed distinction offers an opportunity to reconcile opposing views that have arisen about the nature and treatment of narcissistic disturbances (Kohut, 1971; Kernberg, 1974b; Spruiell, 1974).

Idealizations and Grandiosity Based on a Developmental Arrest

At the time Jane began her five-year analysis she was twenty-seven years old. Although her primary complaint was her inability to complete her Ph.D. dissertation in American literature, a long history of complaints soon emerged which had a difficulty in self-esteem regulation as a common core. Even in the writing block, so frequently a culmination of an œdipal conflict (which was not absent), a narcissistic conflict could be ascertained.

At the start of her analysis, Jane used her inability to complete her dissertation as clear evidence of her essential inadequacy: she was made of 'flawed, unredeemable goods'. The exploration of this material led to several interrelated lines of association. First, there was a conflictual relationship with her mother who, during the patient's latency years, never fulfilled her own writing aspirations in deference to her duties as a mother. Furthermore, an intense symbiotic-like attachment still remained between mother and daughter, in which the patient received instructions from her mother on how to 'fix' situations that were troublesome. Generally, the mother emphasized some behavioral change so that an appearance of acceptability could be maintained. Independent experience by the patient therefore carried with it a threat of separation and had to be undone. Jane would report important events of her life to her mother which would become real to Jane only in the telling. The mother's presence was needed to validate Jane's experience.

A second line of associations led to an analysis of the work problem. In this context the patient described the meaningless-

ness of work for her. She recalled that when she was an adolescent, her parents had decided that she and her younger brother should 'do chores' in the house. Her assignment was to place the salt and pepper shakers on the table before dinner. If by chance the housekeeper had already set them on the table, they had to be removed so that Jane could fulfil her assignment.

While there were earlier prototypes for the meaning of work, the implications here were apparent. Work was inconsequential and unnecessary. These associations led, in turn, to an explication of her identification with and relationship to her father. She recalled that her father's expressed attitude had always been great satisfaction that he could provide so well for the family financially, and that he could spare them the struggles which characterized his climb up the corporate ladder. He told both children that he wanted to spare them 'from having to grovel at the foot of the mountain' and wished to 'whisk them up to the top of the mountain by helicopter'. Realistically, both children could indeed have lived comfortably on trust funds without having to work for a living.

An event that became a focal point for Jane's psychopathology occurred at age seven when she was sent to ballet class to 'cure' her of her 'overweight' and to give her 'grace'. She returned home from the class one day in her leotards and looked forward to showing her father how delicately she could float across the living room. When her father returned home that evening she immediately performed for him. He let slip the comment, 'Nothing helps'.

The impact of this experience was profound. It accelerated a social withdrawal with trancelike fantasy states used as a buffer against both realistic success and anticipated failure. Her exhibitionistic, narcissistic urges were depleted by the traumatic disappointment interfering with her self-esteem regulation, while grandiose expectations were repressed. The experience served to strengthen the regressive tie to the mother, while an implicit 'contract' was made with the father: she would suppress all evidence of anger, disappointment, criticism, or general dis-

pleasure with him if he would refrain from verbalizing how disappointed he was in her appearance.

These themes can be described as containing aspects of the work block which are based on object-instinctual conflicts: the fear of surpassing the mother by triumphing in an area of painful failure for her and the wish to please the father by maintaining him in the position of financier. They also shed light on the origins of her narcissistic vulnerability. It is in the latter context that the material which proved crucial to the analysis of the work block will be considered.

At the age of fourteen, Jane had spent the first of several summers in a camp where she was among the 'attractive, brilliant, artistic, sensitive, slender, graceful people' anyone of whom she felt her parents would have preferred as their daughter. The friends she made there and retained were endowed with idealized qualities she could never attain. Through nearness to these friends she hoped to be included in their 'glow'. Her idealization of them gave her the feeling that though she was unacceptable, at least her values were ennobled. Even if she could not compete in their 'league', at least she was in the 'right ball park'. She had a keen sense of being included on a trial basis and attempted to ensure her tenuous inclusion through self-devaluation and ingratiation. Her self-esteem clearly fluctuated with every nuance of reaction by these friends. She was subject to profound states of humiliation and depression which were covered socially with a forced 'bonhomie' and a brilliant wit, and privately by overeating and the trancelike states which were filled with dreams of glory. The relationships formed here embodied crystallizations of archaic idealizations and repressed grandiosity.

The analytic exploration of the manner in which Jane attempted to work on her dissertation brought to light the specific deficiencies that produced the work block. To write her thesis required an 'immersion' in work which threatened the tie to her idealized friends. The 'hot-line' to them, either in person or by telephone, warded off a dreaded disintegration of her self-

representation. When these contacts were disrupted as in periods of work, she would become depressed, eat compulsively, sleep excessively, and become preoccupied with her body—its appearance and weight. Fantasies and memories of slights and humiliations plagued her and re-enforced the conviction that she was 'basically unredeemable'. Renewed contact with her friends could momentarily rescue her from these oppressive feelings and reinstitute a self-image which gained a more positive tone—'gilt by association'. However, the rise in self-esteem was precarious because it was accompanied by self-devaluation for being dependent on and vulnerable to others. So long as the regulation of self-esteem was in the hands of others—substitutes for missing internal self-regulating structures—independent solitary work was not possible. To be alone threatened her self-representation with disintegration.

The dissertation itself was drawn into the narcissistic conflict as well. It had become the heir of the grandiose 'ballet' fantasy of childhood. The repressed exhibitionistic wishes of childhood reappeared in her vain hope of redeeming herself by writing 'The Great American Dissertation'. The archaic nature of the grandiosity showed itself in the majestic and unbridled nature of the thesis plan. The grandiose expectations defied fulfilment and enforced a constant confrontation with her 'inadequate abilities'.

The history and the dynamics described permit a conceptualization about the role of idealization in Jane's life. Throughout her childhood, she never felt an absence of love from her parents, but rather a lack of admiration and respect and a very specific failure of empathy. In addition to the overtly dependent relationship that she maintained with her mother, the mother functioned as an external self-object whose presence was necessary to validate, judge, and 'fix' her experience. The mother's role or capacity to perform this function was never challenged. Although geographical separation from the mother was accomplished, the mother's role as a substitute for missing psychic

structure was relegated to various surrogates. Their presence gave her life meaning and her self a momentary sense of cohesion and positive affective coloration (*cf.*, Stolorow, 1975b).

Since the patient had been referred for analysis through one of her idealized friends, the halo was quickly placed upon the analyst. The transference which evolved absorbed the symbiotic tie to the mother. Telling the analyst her experiences gave them meaning. The fact that the analyst offered neither judgments nor reparative advice (what the patient described as her mother's 'cosmetic suggestions') served as a sufficient contrast against which to explore her need for her mother as a structure-substitute.

While on the surface both parents appeared as competent, outgoing, independently functioning people, leaders in their respective fields of interest (the father in business, the mother in the arts and politics), the enduring impression in the family was quite different. The father was largely 'uninvolved', hiding behind his newspaper at night, a romantic but mysterious figure who knew the world, believed no one in his family could survive in it, and prided himself on his ability to shield his 'loved ones' through his power and wealth. The mother was seen as unfulfilled and forever currying favor—'a popularizer of ideas' who espoused liberal causes and views but covered them by couching them in terms that would not offend anyone. Differences within the family were glossed over and feelings of anger, when evoked, were not acknowledged.

Jane consciously remembered feeling a lack of admiration, an 'essential humiliation' within the family, prior to the ballet incident. This incident did not stand alone, but was typical of experiences which suppressed the grandiose self prematurely and conveyed empathic failures which, in turn, helped preclude the internalizations which are a prerequisite for autonomous self-esteem regulation.

Jane was able to assuage the resulting feelings of inadequacy and worthlessness, her 'basic unacceptability', with signs of acceptance from her idealized friends or a 'good' conversation

with her mother. Analytic exploration of this method of restoring self-esteem led to the uncovering of her 'lying': glossing over or withholding differences of opinion and values from these friends or voicing feigned agreement with them in an attempt to remain in their good graces. She was afraid of being alienated from them if she said 'no' to their demands or appeared 'ungraceful', and she accepted a 'slave' status in order to bask in their artistic aura. Feelings of resentment or annoyance were quickly rationalized, so that any 'unpleasantness' was her 'fault'.

Through her associations in the analysis Jane recalled a 'religious' period between ages eleven and thirteen. It was preceded by feelings of envy of her mother's attractiveness and angry feelings toward both parents. When Jane learned that a neighboring couple was killed in an automobile crash, she became fearful that her parents, too, would be killed in this manner. Thereupon she made a deal with God: if her parents would return home safely that evening, she would become a devotee. Their safe return ushered in an intense, ritualistic, religious period which ended, however, as abruptly as it had begun. Jane asked her mother if she believed in God. The mother hesitated before responding, which Jane interpreted as 'no'. Thus, when her obsessive-compulsive defense against hostility toward and envy of her mother threatened to become divisive, it was quickly relinquished, and Jane began to emulate her mother's atheism. Clearly, the need to sustain the symbiotic-like attachment to the mother far outweighed both Jane's hostility and her defense against it. The symbiotic-like, confessional relationship continued into adulthood and was given additional impetus each time a new developmental task threatened to interrupt it. For example, in college when Jane was attracted to a young man, she sought and received her mother's blessings to have sexual relations with him. In the analysis, Jane's assertion, 'When my mother gets hurt, I feel it', gave testimony to the extent to which self-object differentiation had been arrested.

The transference revived the specific period following her

disappointment in her father (ballet incident). A therapeutic alliance was painstakingly formed, but at times this was indistinguishable from the transference of the close relationship to the mother in which boundaries were obliterated and all 'secrets' were confessed to the mother. This transference, derived from the latency years, obviously contained also the preœdipal attachment to the mother, and its revival occasioned phase-appropriate strivings for separation and individuation. In the treatment situation this was manifested in Jane's wish to know more about the analyst, especially his views on certain current political and social issues. She claimed that she had to know where he stood to be able to trust him. Until that point, she said, she was grateful he had not intruded his opinions into her life as her mother had done, but had given her a nonjudgmental counterpart to her own tendency toward harsh, self-critical views. What looked like a frequently encountered resistance was actually, at this point, in the service of separation: the request that the analyst assert his individuality reflected the emergence of a developmental step. The burden of separation, however, was still placed on the analyst rather than on herself. When this was interpreted to her she took it as evidence of respect for her individuality. The analysis continued and the initial request did not need to be fulfilled.

The revival of her feeling that she was fused with, engulfed by, and defined by her mother was accompanied by a sense of hopelessness and discouragement about the slowness of the analytic process. During this phase the transference began to shift from a predominantly narcissistic one to a predominantly object-instinctual one. She began to see the analyst as the uninvolved father whom she might seduce into admiration of her. Early in this transitional phase she described a vignette from her work as a teacher: interviews with two of her students, both of whom were personally very troubled about their poor academic work. Against the background of her complaints about the lack of help she was getting in her analysis, she described the help she was able to give her students in a half-hour inter-

view with each one. The analyst's response here required an assessment of the extent to which a narcissistic transference still held sway, because an empathic failure by the analyst might repeat the 'ballet' trauma in the treatment situation. The analyst therefore reflected back to Jane the pride and pleasure she took at having helped her students—and stopped at that. At a later point in treatment she was able to return to this incident and deal with the implicit competitive aspects.

Jane reacted to the uncovering of the repressed grandiose expectations regarding her dissertation with shame at her grandiosity and self-criticism of her unrealistic expectations. She saw her 'narcissism' as 'immoral' and herself as a 'spoiled, demanding, gluttonous child'. To avoid the embarrassment of another humiliating 'ballet' performance, she concluded that the only alternative would be to settle for thoroughly pedestrian work. She now saw the analysis as a process which would force her to accept her 'hopeless, inadequate, flawed self' and relinquish all aspirations for admiration. The 'vertical split' in the ego, described by Kohut (1971), is exemplified here, and the therapeutic approach began by spelling out the dilemma: how to maintain the creative aspects of her original grandiose plan and to attempt to form a partnership between the grandiosity and the more realistic perception of her limitations, thereby harnessing the grandiosity in the service of realistically feasible and gratifying goals. Spelling out this dilemma avoided the dangers of moralizing about her narcissism and viewing it as pathology that had to be eliminated (a 'cosmetic solution'). Spelling out the dilemma as to how such a partnership could be formed also enabled her to arrive at an acceptable compromise in which she added certain limitations without yielding on the novel aspects of her contribution.

The transformation of the archaic narcissistic configurations both within the transference and as they pervaded her life was seen most clearly in the changing relationship to the writing of the dissertation. With Jane there was a specific identification with the analyst and a gradual internalization of the process of

analysis as a model for work. Gradually, the validation and evaluation of experience, which had been the prerogative of external self-objects, became an internal function. She could begin to reject and accept ideas even though the elimination of an idea filled her with anxiety. The defenses against repeating another narcissistic humiliation gradually weakened, so that work took on the usual gratifying and frustrating features.

In Jane's case the idealizations of others, devaluations of herself and the repressed grandiosity were remnants of an arrest in development in which archaic narcissistic configurations failed to become internalized, tamed, and transformed. The ballet incident and its consequences, as has been described, consolidated the feeling of inadequacy while maintaining the grandiose self, in its archaic form, intact and repressed. The symbiotic-like attachment to the mother and idealizations of her had gained additional strength through the disappointment in the father and from his empathic failure. In turn, this placed further barriers in the path of Jane's developing autonomy, self-assertion, and separation from the mother. The vicissitudes of the grandiose self, the idealizations of the mother and her surrogates, as well as the symbiotic-like attachment to the mother, which were observable in Jane's life from early childhood on, suggested that developmental arrests in the process of separation and individuation contributed a major share to the genesis of her psychopathology. The inability to perceive the real aspects of herself and others was a by-product of these developmental failures. The process of treatment, while reviving the significant object relations of her past through the transference, also brought into focus the extent to which objects were used to substitute for missing psychic structures—specifically in the area of self-esteem regulation.

Idealizations and Grandiosity Based on an Object-Instinctual Conflict

When Reginald began his analysis he was twenty-two years old, single, and had graduated from college six months earlier.

He did not have a job, nor had he sought one since graduating. Working for a living was not a necessity for him, since he, like Jane, was adequately supported by a trust fund set up by his parents. He had numerous acquaintances and a roommate, but no close male or female friends. He complained of feeling lonely, adrift, aimless, and directionless. Nothing seemed worth while or meaningful to him. Nothing—no activity, no job possibility, no female acquaintance— could evoke enthusiasm or excitement in him and this made him feel disturbingly empty and hollow inside. He expressed reluctance to commit himself to any pursuit or person on the grounds that such a commitment entailed giving up all other possibilities. Yet he felt discontented with the tedium of his isolated, detached, and routinized existence.

Reginald was the youngest son in a wealthy, aristocratic New England family. His father, who was ten years older than his mother, was already in his late fifties when the patient was born. The father was described as 'formal' and 'fragile'. Reginald feared that any affectively charged situation 'might break' his father. The mother was described as 'vivacious', 'infantilizing', 'domineering', and 'castrating'. 'She was always on my back. . . . Everything had to be her way. . . . I was beaten down verbally. She could be incredibly sneaky and vicious, knows how to get you in your soft spots.' The mother was 'indestructible', the 'control tower' of the family, either overwhelming the patient with verbal torrents or manipulating him by being easily hurt and playing the wounded martyr in the face of any opposition to her wishes. While his brother, who was four years older, was closer to his father, Reginald was more tied to his mother. In the course of his analysis he recovered childhood impressions that the mother used him as though he were an extension of her. Specifically, he became aware of feeling that she required his accomplishments to provide her with the glory she sought and the penis she missed. When he began treatment, the patient still maintained a thinly disguised dependent attachment to her.

Reginald described his parents as continually relating to each other in 'stylized formalities', which seemed to him like a foreign

language from which he was excluded and which aroused his envy. The father invariably sought to keep the mother pacified by meeting her insatiable demands and soothing her easily hurt pride, while enjoining the patient to do the same. Hence, the parents were a 'united front', and the father provided no help to the patient in dealing with his mother. Reginald did find an ally in his brother whom he admired because of his ability to deal aggressively with their mother through caustic humor. When the brother left for boarding school, Reginald felt terribly alone and overwhelmed by having to face his parents without his ally.

In the early analytic sessions the patient discussed his shame at still being a 'virgin' and his fear of entering a sexual situation with a woman, lest he expose his lack of knowledge of sexual matters and appear 'incompetent, clumsy, and silly' in the woman's eyes. He avoided sexual experiences, anticipating a humiliating confrontation because of the gap between his fantasies of perfection and his actual 'inexperience'. He also feared the consequences of intense sexual excitement. Such immersion would entail a dangerous relinquishing of control and render him helpless and vulnerable in relation to his partner who, in his fantasies, took on the qualities of the vicious, domineering, castrating mother. Exploration of these fears enabled him to enter several tentative, mildly satisfying but short-lived sexual involvements, which in turn paved the way for an investigation of his object relations. He inevitably sought women who were strong, aggressive, and 'difficult', and his investment was not primarily in finding sexual satisfaction, but rather in achieving a triumphant conquest by winning the woman's respect. His aim was not so much to use these women to enhance his self-esteem, but rather to attempt to reverse the old defeat at the hands of his mother by triumphing over them. Having gotten the upper hand, Reginald would become fearful of being swallowed up by the woman's demands, as had been the case with his mother, and he would terminate the relationship.

Regarding his male acquaintances, it became clear that

Reginald sought out men whom he perceived as superhuman, in possession of incredible strengths and intelligence, qualities which the patient hoped to acquire by imitation. Gradually he revealed his need for an idealized analyst, whose omnipotence and omniscience he could borrow and incorporate. In relation to the analyst Reginald was at first distrustful, guarded, controlled, and compliant. Above all he wanted to preserve harmony with the analyst in order to insure against any friction. He expressed an impelling need to experience the analyst as perfectly in tune with his feelings and wishes, lest a breach in unity evoke frustration and dangerous feelings of hostility.

The patient's dreams began to reveal his rage at both of his parents and at parent surrogates, most notably the analyst. The dangers of asserting oppositional and angry feelings were explored within the transference. Alternately, the patient feared that the analyst would paralyze him with overwhelming verbal onslaughts or respond with hurt martyrdom as his mother had, or would crumble and break in the face of his aggression as he had imagined his father would. Furthermore, Reginald was in terror of the disruptive, disorganizing force of his intense rage. His compromise solution in the face of these anxieties was to vent his hostility through passive resistance, withholding, spiteful withdrawal, and detachment.

Along with the affects of anger and rage, Icarian themes began to appear in the patient's dreams: images of rising to great heights and plummeting down to disaster. The imagery coincided with the unveiling of Reginald's grandiose self. He revealed his secret conviction that he possessed some special talent that had not yet blossomed but the existence of which he never doubted. He envisaged that he would become a creative writer or painter, although his actual accomplishments in these areas were negligible. He believed that he possessed an extraordinary imagination and was fascinated and amazed by the workings of his mind. He derived immense enjoyment from the random trains of verbal associations and images that would parade before his mind's eye during his many idle hours. Indeed, he

was infatuated with an inflated image of himself as an imaginative genius. Furthermore, he felt that his extraordinary imagination elevated him above the common folk, of whom he was contemptuous, and entitled him to special privileges and exemptions: his specialness entitled him to magic success and satisfaction and to exemption from the necessities of sustained effort and committed struggle. He was above the rules by which others have to play. In short, his grandiose self-image served to justify his 'splendid isolation' and detachment.

Toward the end of the second year of treatment the patient had a spontaneous, 'incidental' insight which illuminated the function of his self-aggrandizement and object-devaluation. He noticed that whenever he saw an attractive woman on the street he would immediately devalue her in his mind and find reasons why she was not good enough for him. He suddenly realized that by so elevating himself and diminishing the woman he was protecting himself against feeling an intense longing for her as a highly idealized figure who in turn would evoke frustration and rage.

Shortly thereafter the function of his grandiosity within the analytic transference was clarified. The patient phoned one evening and informed the analyst that he would miss his session the following morning and asked if he would have to pay for it. The analyst reminded him of the policy, to which the patient had agreed, that he would be charged for missed sessions unless sufficient notice was given. When Reginald appeared for his next session he coolly expressed his 'annoyance' at having to submit to the rule. Although a recent dream had clearly indicated his growing dependence on an idealized image of the analyst as a kind of 'guardian angel', he now felt that he should not have to pay at all for his analysis, since he viewed the analyst more as a 'friend' than as a doctor. Analysis was 'fun' and 'enjoyable', but he did not really *need* the analyst's help. Next the patient produced the following dream:

> I could fly. I was flying around inside a beach club, near the ceiling. I was the only one who could fly. Everyone else was on

> the ground. Then I was swimming in a swimming pool. I realized I didn't have any bathing suit on. At first I was embarrassed. I didn't think not wearing a bathing suit was wrong, but I thought others would think it was wrong, and so I was uneasy. Then I lost my power to fly and was on the ground. Then I meditated for a while and concentrated on being able to fly again, and I could fly again. I enjoyed the flying, and especially feeling that other people were envious of me. There was another part of the dream, very vague. Something about being down on the beach, at the ocean, and a big storm coming in.

Associations to successive elements in the dream emphasized his feeling of being independent and not bound by the rules and conventions that govern ordinary people, since his imaginative capacities put him above others. This defensive insistence on his overevaluation of his mental powers led to his hatred of being brought down to the ground by having to submit to the expectation that he pay for missed sessions like any other patient. Such a necessity challenged his defensive grandiose self-elevation. Toward the end of the session he was able to link his nascent narcissistic rage, of which he was becoming aware, with the dream image of the big storm coming in.

Analysis of the storm image led, in the course of several sessions, to a further understanding of the function of Reginald's grandiose self-image and his impelling need to sustain it. The storm represented the danger he would face in coming down from his lofty heights and involving himself with others on the ground—the danger of stormy and disruptive affects associated with the mobilization of instinctual conflict. Specifically with regard to the analyst, if the patient were to view him as a doctor whom he needed rather than as an envious, admiring friend, he would have to face his dependent longings and their frustration as well as his hurt, rage, and envy of the analyst. As described earlier, the activation of aggressive drive derivatives raised the spectre of highly dreaded danger situations associated with imagoes of the 'overpowering' and 'martyred' mother and the 'crumbling' father. Hence, Reginald protected himself and the

object by 'flying above' both the analyst and the impending affective storms.

In Reginald's case there was little evidence that the idealizations and grandiosity were rooted in structural deficiency or an arrest in ego development. In contrast to Jane, he did not reveal a history of severe narcissistic decompensations. Nor did he show any marked tendency toward self-object dedifferentiation in the analytic situation, despite the occurrence of transference 'storms'. His grandiosity was retained primarily to ward off perceptions of real aspects of the self which would have evoked dangerous affects (dependent longings, envy, rage) associated with instinctual conflict and dreaded imagoes. Hence, in this case the classical technique of confronting, clarifying, and interpreting the defensive function of the patient's grandiosity and idealizations within the analytic transference was sufficient to elicit further meaningful associations and to promote therapeutic movement.

DISCUSSION

To highlight the differences between Jane and Reginald with respect to the roles that idealizations and grandiosity play for each, their apparent similarities will be considered first. From a descriptive, diagnostic standpoint, both patients would qualify for inclusion in either Kernberg's (1970) or Kohut's (1971) conceptualization of narcissistic personality disorder.

Conforming to Kernberg's (1970) description, both patients present 'a great need to be loved and admired . . . a very inflated concept of themselves and an inordinate need for tribute from others. . . . They envy others [and] tend to idealize some people from whom they expect narcissistic supplies . . .' (p. 52). For Kohut the crucial diagnostic criterion is the spontaneous development of a narcissistic transference in which the analyst serves as an idealized self-object or as a mirror for the patient's own grandiose wishful self. Jane and Reginald both established narcissistic transference with idealizing and mirroring components for prolonged periods in their treatment.

Both patients exhibited a pronounced vulnerability in their self-esteem. In turn, relationships with people were burdened by an ever-present fear of rejection or humiliation. While Jane romanticized her friends and analyst, endowing them with an aura of perfection, Reginald alternately idealized and devalued both his acquaintances and analyst. For both, the real qualities of objects were thus obscured behind idealizations and devaluations, just as the real qualities of the self were obscured behind an archaic, grandiose self-image. For both, the inflated self-expectations, with respect to work, for example, precluded a realistic perception and utilization of abilities. On a more superficial level, both patients came from affluent backgrounds, had trust funds to support them and demonstrable pathology in their relationship to work. Both complained of the meaninglessness of work and were convinced of the necessity of 'keeping one's options open'. For Reginald the fear of a confrontation between the grandiose self and the actual self operated primarily in the area of his sexual life. His avoidance of sexual relationships was understood as stemming from a need to protect his grandiose expectations of sexual prowess from confrontation with a feared defective performance. Jane, too, protected her grandiose self by avoiding her dissertation, thereby averting a comparison between her expectation of writing 'The Great American Dissertation' and her feared defective product.

The similarity in family constellation is also striking. Both patients sustained an attachment to an 'intrusive' mother and recalled a 'distant' relationship with the father. There is, of course, an obvious difference between the two patients—in their sex. However, it seems to us that this difference per se was not decisive in promoting their respective psychopathologies.

It is our impression that the decisive differences between these two patients with respect to their narcissistic pathology are found in the role of aggression and in the degree of separation and individuation from the mother (*cf.,* Mahler, 1968). Both patients described their mothers as 'intrusive', obstructing the process of separation and individuation. For Reginald, however,

the mother evoked considerable reactive aggression which, for better or worse, fostered separation. Her intrusiveness carried with it a castrative threat, and he responded by a spiteful withdrawal from her. He defensively retreated into his 'splendid isolation' and compensatory fantasies of triumph over her. The fact that the mother became a castrative threat insured her position as a predominantly libidinal-aggressive object rather than as a source of self-esteem regulation. Hence he achieved a degree of separation from the mother, although at the price of perpetuating severe conflicts over aggression and the pathological narcissism that evolved to defend against them, as exemplified in the dream and the transference crisis to which it referred. Jane's mother, though obstructing the process of establishing self and object boundaries, never became so great a threat or source of frustration and hence never evoked overwhelming anger. Jane's mother remained idealized and a source of narcissistic sustenance. As shown in Jane's religious period, the derivatives of and defenses against aggression paled in the face of her need to maintain the mother as an idealized external self-object, a need to which her later narcissistic pathology became heir. At those rare times when Jane did oppose the mother and her surrogates, it was in a context that never threatened the symbiotic-like attachments.

As a consequence of these developmental differences, dependency feelings played a different role for each. Reginald defended himself against experiencing the vulnerability of his self-esteem, while for Jane the vulnerability was both accepted and despised as a syntonic aspect of her self-representation. Jane devalued herself for her dependence on others while Reginald devalued others in his attempt to deny his dependence on them and his vulnerability to their reactions.

Differences could be noticed in the topographical aspects of the grandiose self and the idealizations of others. For Jane the grandiose self was repressed (implicit in 'The Great American Dissertation') and its uncovering in the analysis evoked shame. For Reginald the grandiose self was consciously kept secret and

its uncovering in his confrontation with the rules of payment in analysis evoked anxiety, rage, and an exacerbation of his imperious manner. Behind Reginald's grandiosity was his oral envy and rage rooted in his exclusion from his parents' united front. Jane's grandiosity was a re-emergence of phase-appropriate exhibitionism, prematurely repressed.

Jane's idealizations of her friends were conscious and, to her, justified. Their deidealization within the analysis was a gradual process. Certain of Reginald's idealizations were uncovered through the analysis of his fantasies when he saw attractive women. These idealizations had been repressed, lest awareness of them confront him with the enormity of his need for these women and his fear of falling embarrassingly short of their 'inordinate' expectations.

While Jane's grandiosity was a remnant of an arrested development in which her self-representation was traumatically deflated, Reginald's grandiosity was compensatory and defensive in nature. It served to deny his vulnerability and his realistic limitations. Furthermore, it shielded him from the intrusions and 'onslaughts' of his mother and her transference displacements and from his own highly conflictual reactive aggression. For Jane the idealization of others was a perpetuation of the idealization of the mother as an external self-object, and actual contact had to be maintained with them to preclude fragmentation of ego functions. The presence of these idealizations thus signaled a specific failure in separation and internalization. For Reginald the idealizations of others were an expression of a conflictual need for them and warded off rage and envy toward others as replicas of the precœdipal, castrative mother.

We are suggesting that two apparently similar narcissistic personality patterns can be arrived at by different developmental pathways. We believe that this justifies the postulation of two distinct types of narcissistic personality disorders requiring different treatment approaches: narcissistic pathology which is the remnant of a developmental arrest and narcissistic pathology resulting from defenses against object-instinctual invest-

ments. We are also suggesting that the criticism directed against Kohut (*cf.*, Kernberg, 1974b)—that he has neglected the role of aggression in the formation of narcissistic pathology—may be a consequence of the specific type of narcissistic pathology he described: a subgroup of patients (like Jane) for whom aggressive drive derivatives were never sufficiently aroused to counter their symbiotic involvements. The merger-like attachments of these patients were more sustaining than they were threatening to their autonomy. Anxiety for these patients is aroused when they are threatened by phase-appropriate separation.

Patients in both subgroups have suffered a traumatic depletion of their narcissistic attachments. However, for the subgroup of patients in whom narcissistic pathology is defensive (exemplified by Reginald and the cases described by Kernberg), rage plays a more pronounced role. They seek safety not in merger but in flight and isolation. Self-object boundaries are not obliterated but defensively fortified. Anxiety for these patients stems from a fear that their defenses against their need for others will be ruptured.

In narcissistic pathology rooted in a developmental arrest, idealizations and grandiosity reflect a failure to attain adequate self-object differentiation and an inability to register and affirm the real qualities of the self and objects. In defensive narcissistic pathology, idealizations and grandiosity serve to deny real qualities of the self and objects which could be perceived but which are associated with instinctual conflicts.

There is no evidence to indicate that the formation of defensive narcissistic pathology is preceded by a phase during which arrested developmental aspects predominate. Our observations are that the genetic and dynamic formulations of Kernberg (1970) and Kohut (1971) have validity for different patients and that the treatment approaches which grow out of these divergent formulations address themselves to predominantly different areas of pathology.

For Kohut, the treatment approach aims at permitting the arrested narcissistic configurations to unfold as they would have, had the process not been prematurely, traumatically interrupted.

In turn, the archaic narcissism can be transformed into more mature forms of self-esteem regulation. For Kernberg, the treatment approach aims at exposing the defenses against dependency, rage, and oral envy, specifically in the transference. In turn, with an acceptance of the need for others, guilt for hurting them and gratitude for what is received from them can develop. The character traits of haughty isolation, contempt, and grandiosity would then become superfluous. Aggression could then become better integrated and contribute to mature object love (Kernberg, 1974a).

SUMMARY

Our earlier work explicating the developmental and defensive aspects of denial has been extended to the study of idealizations and grandiosity. Idealizations and grandiosity based on a developmental inability to register and affirm the real qualities of the self and objects are distinguished from idealizations and grandiosity in which there is a defensive denial of the real qualities of the self and objects. Two cases of narcissistic disturbance which illustrate the proposed distinction are described. It is suggested that apparently similar narcissistic personality patterns can be arrived at by divergent developmental pathways, with crucial differences in the role of aggressive drive derivatives and the degree of separation-individuation attained. Hence, two distinct types of narcissistic personality disorders are postulated: narcissistic pathology which is the remnant of a developmental arrest, and narcissistic pathology resulting from defenses against object-instinctual conflicts. It is argued that Kohut's genetic-dynamic formulations and treatment recommendations have validity for patients of the first type, whereas Kernberg's approach is applicable to patients of the second type.

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HOUDINI: THE MYTHMAKER

VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF THE FAMILY ROMANCE

BY BERNARD C. MEYER, M.D.

This component of a more comprehensive study of Houdini focuses on the unusual reification of his family romance fantasies, their endurance well beyond the usual boundaries in time, their kinship with mythological themes, and their infusion with the ambivalence that is often addressed toward the true parents.

'Pretending is a virtue. If you can't pretend, you can't be a king.'

Luigi Pirandello (*Liola*)

One day toward the end of January 1901, in the course of his triumphant English debut, Harry Houdini, rising star in the firmament of magic and entertainment, noticed an elegant gown displayed in the window of a London shop. When he stepped inside he learned it had been designed for Queen Victoria, but she had died a few weeks before it was finished and hence had never worn it. Seized by a sudden inspiration, Houdini persuaded the shopkeeper to sell it to him, after agreeing to the condition that it was never to be worn in Great Britain. He then promptly wrote to his mother in New York, inviting her to join him in Europe where she might bear proud witness to his growing fame and where he also planned to have her participate in a private little drama of his own invention. A few weeks later she was in Hamburg to watch her magician son perform to a sold-out house.

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At the conclusion of that engagement they traveled to her native Budapest. There, in the Palm Gardens of the Royal Hotel, which Houdini had booked for the occasion, his mother held court wearing the gown designed for the Queen of England, while her son stood proudly at her side. 'How my heart warmed', he wrote, 'to see various friends and relatives kneel and pay homage to my mother, every inch a queen, as she sat enthroned in her heavily carved and gilded chair'. 'That night', Houdini recorded, 'Mother and I were awake all night, talking over the affair, and, if happiness ever entered my life to the fullest, it was sharing Mother's wonderful excitement at playing queen for a day'. To capture the full flavor of this tasty vignette it should be pointed out that not only was Houdini married at this time but that his twenty-four-year-old wife, Bess, was a member of the happy party (*cf.*, Kellock, 1928, p. 149).

What is arresting about this mock levee is not that Houdini, like so many others, entertained the fantasy that his simple Jewish mother was a royal personage but that, at nearly twenty-seven years of age, he experienced so little difficulty in translating that fantasy into a public spectacle. No less remarkable—or revealing—is the realization that his mother seemingly offered no strenuous objection to participating in this childlike charade and that she was more than willing to be cast in the role of 'queen for a day'. Together they had enacted a family romance *à deux*.

It will come as no surprise then to learn that in fashioning the Houdini myth his mother was more than a passive collaborator. Concerning the circumstances of his birth, as well as the events preceding it, she was the perfect mentor for this future illusionist, for she tinkered with truth and fiddled with facts in a manner that bespoke a rich and fertile imagination. Like her son she was able to erase with ease the thin line separating daydreams from reality.

It is indeed this intricate pattern of myth and make-believe that is the hallmark of the Houdini story which, from its very beginning, was woven out of the commingled strands of fact and

fancy—a not surprising chronicle, come to think of it, for the life story of a conjurer who died on Halloween. For Houdini, the Handcuff King, was no ordinary magician like a Thurston or a Dunninger. 'He was not an entertainer', wrote Zolotow. 'He was playing Prometheus. He was playing Christ. He was playing allegorical charades in which he died and was resurrected' (Zolotow, 1946).

Take, for example, his extraordinary adventure within the belly of a 'sea monster'. When a huge marine creature, described as 'a cross between a whale and an octopus' was washed ashore on a Cape Cod beach in the fall of 1911, it was brought by truck to the theater in Boston where Houdini was playing. Responding to a challenge, Houdini allowed himself to be shut up inside the beast, handcuffed, and then sewn into this strange prison by heavy chains fastened by padlocks. Presumably, because the carcass had been treated with preservatives, its cavernous interior reeked of fumes that were said to have made him 'sick and dizzy', and at one point, choking and in a near panic, he supposedly tried to kick his way out.[1] Then he composed himself, and a quarter of an hour after he had entered the monster's belly, he was once again free (*cf.,* Kellock, 1928, p. 228).

To be sure, there are those who would ridicule the idea that this dramatic experience contains either symbolic or mythological significance. No need to seek deep meanings here, it might be argued, for all that drove Houdini's inventive genius was a passion for fame and a hunger for money—goals that this master showman knew quite well how to attain. From the moment that he discovered that the public thrilled to the enactment of a hair-raising escape, he knew he had hold of a good thing, and as his career unfolded and his fame grew, he went on to create evermore ingenious variations on that theme.

Yet for those who would dismiss his adventure with the 'sea monster' as mere 'show business', it should be pointed out that

[1] Despite the explanations given for his behavior, there is reason to suspect that he may have been suddenly threatened by the emergence of a latent claustrophobia.

here—inadvertently perhaps—Houdini had enacted in pantomime an ancient drama that was familiar to many civilizations throughout the history of the world. It was told of the Greek hero Heracles, who rescued the king's daughter, the beautiful Hesione, from a sea monster sent by Poseidon. When the monster opened its vast jaws Heracles leaped fully armed down its throat and, after spending three days in its belly, cut his way out and left the monster dead. It is the theme of the Biblical tale of Jonah[2] and of the story of Little Red Riding Hood. Symbolically, it may be discerned in the destiny of Jules Verne's Captain Nemo. Campbell (1949) mentions other versions of it among the Eskimos and the Zulus and in the legend of the Irish hero, Finn MacCool, who was also swallowed by a monster (p. 91). In poetry Longfellow depicted it in *The Song of Hiawatha:*

> Mishe-Nahma, King of Fishes,
> In his wrath he darted upward,
> Flashing leaped into the sunshine,
> Opened his great jaws and swallowed
> Both canoe and Hiawatha.

More recently it has been re-enacted in the novel and the film called *Jaws.* Symbolically, such myths and stories are generally held to represent death and resurrection, intrauterine life and rebirth—themes which, unintentionally to be sure, attained varied forms of expression in Houdini's dramatic art.

Not uncommonly the impulse to engage in mythmaking is abetted by the unseen complicity of the subject himself. This was surely true of Houdini, who allowed dramatic falsehoods concerning his history to flourish with the same flamboyance with which, in later years, he designed and decorated his

[2] Like Heracles, Jonah remained in the belly of the whale for three days and three nights, after which he was regurgitated. 'Out of the belly of hell cried I, and Thou heardest my voice.' To the early Christians his deliverance after that same interval served as a foretaste of the later story of Christ's resurrection after three days in the tomb. On Holy Saturday, the day between the Death and the Resurrection, Jesus too is described as residing in 'the Belly of Hell'.

prospective tomb. Note, for example, the variations he composed on the story of his leap from the Belle Isle Bridge into the Detroit River toward the close of the year 1906. As far as can be determined, it took place on November 27th, a cold day but well above freezing. Locked in two pairs of handcuffs, Houdini jumped from the bridge into the river twenty-five feet below, soon rose to the surface and, triumphantly waving the unlocked handcuffs to the cheering crowd, swam safely to a waiting boat.

Never one to overlook the possibilities for sensational elaborations, Houdini in time subjected this experience to some highly imaginative revisions. To begin with, he shifted the date of his leap to December 2nd and lowered the thermometer to zero. Then he claimed that the river was frozen solid, despite which he dismissed any idea of canceling the performance, calmly insisting that a hole be cut in the ice so that he might plunge through it into the frigid waters below. This he supposedly did, but now he was beset by new troubles because, after freeing himself from the handcuffs and rising to the surface, he was unable to locate the precious hole in the ice. Soon, after swimming about vainly in search of it, he began to need air, but luckily he did not panic. He let himself come up gently and between the surface of the water and the undersurface of the ice, he found a small space of trapped air 'about half an inch wide. Now by lying on my back and poking my nose into this gently I could fill my lungs.' Finally, after what seemed like an hour of swimming about in circles, he found the opening and escaped from his icy prison. Like an inspired troubadour, Houdini related this experience with considerable flexibility: sometimes he shifted the locale to Pittsburgh (*cf.*, Christopher, 1969, pp. 101-102). It need hardly be emphasized that the entire event is strongly suggestive of an accouchement, an impression that was hardly lessened by the scenario writer of the 1953 Tony Curtis movie about Houdini, in which it was alleged that it was by listening to the voice of his mother—a latter-day Ariadne—that Houdini was ultimately guided to the precious aperture.

It is not surprising that symbolic depictions of birth or rebirth can be discerned in many of Houdini's celebrated exploits, as well as in the motion pictures he created. An artist's depiction of Houdini seemingly incarcerated within the so-called milk can from which he was to effect a miraculous escape possesses an unmistakable obstetrical stamp. That the great 'escapologist' himself recognized, at some level of awareness, the element of parturition in his exploits is suggested by a letter he wrote announcing with pleasure the birth of a canary: 'Since it broke out of the shell, we called it Houdini'.

Of his outdoor stunts, no less spectacular than his fearless plunges from high bridges were his bold underwater escapes from submerged crates and boxes. Under the heading 'Daring Dive' a poster announced that 'securely handcuffed and leg-ironed, [Houdini] will be placed in a heavy packing case, which will be nailed and roped, then encircled by steel bands [and] firmly nailed. Two hundred pounds of iron weights will then be lashed to this box containing Houdini. The box will then be thrown into the river. Houdini will undertake to release himself whilst submerged under water.' In the performance of this stunt, proclaimed as 'The Most Marvelous Feat Ever Attempted in This or Any Other Age', a tugboat, hired by the magician, would come alongside the pier and hoist the packing case containing Houdini over the water by means of a crane swung out from the ship. Then, amid the growing excitement of the crowd, the crane would slowly lower the box until it was submerged. After an anxious moment or two, the crane would begin to move again, now to lift its burden, and when the box would once more come into view the incredulous spectators would thrill to see Houdini sitting jauntily on top.

What the amazed public failed to realize was that while his escape could hardly be accomplished by his pushing out the walls of the crate, by means of a concealed hinge one of the sides of the box could swing *inward,* thus permitting him to escape, swim out between the ropes and bands, and draw the

wall closed behind him. This done, he would then mount the top of the packing case and be lifted with it as the crane brought it out of the water.

What neither his cheering crowds nor Houdini himself realized, in all likelihood, was that the drama just unfolded was a twentieth century version of a legend as old as recorded human history: the deliverance of the hero from a box or an ark immersed in water. Characteristically, this often repeated story concerns the unusual circumstances surrounding the birth of a hero and, as Rank (1909) demonstrated in his classic work, *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero,* it can be found in widely separated cultures. In one version of the story of Œdipus, for example, the child was not exposed by his father on a mountain but *locked in a chest, which was lowered into the sea from a ship.* 'This chest drifted ashore at Sicyon where Periboea, King Polybus' queen, happened to be on the beach, supervising her royal laundrywomen. She picked up Œdipus, retired to a thicket and pretended to have been overcome by the pangs of labour. Since the laundrywomen were too busy to notice what she was about, she deceived them all into thinking that he had only just been born' (*cf.,* Graves, 1955, p. 9). Similar themes occur in the myths of Osiris, Dionysius, Perseus, and Moses.

Until comparatively recently, neither the country nor the date of Houdini's birth had been firmly established, for his mother had doctored both of these salient details. Ostensibly to provide him with the emotional security implicit in being of American birth, she let it be known that like the two brothers who followed him, Theodore and Leopold, he had been born in Appleton, Wisconsin. (Many years later a daughter was born in New York.)

But it was not so. Ehrich—for such was Houdini's given name—was born in Budapest, like his older brothers Nathan and William, the first two sons of Rabbi Mayer Samuel Weiss and his wife Cecilia. According to official documents he was born in 1874 on the 24th of March, not, as his mother later

asserted, on the 6th of April (*cf.*, Christopher, 1969, pp. 10-11). Presumably it was not long after his birth that he was brought to America by his mother and brothers, but there are no available details concerning the far journey to a European seaport, the long, and presumably, incommodious voyage across the sea, and the final rail trip to middle America, where in Appleton there were some old acquaintances from Budapest.

Counterpoised against these vague and inauspicious beginnings of the life of this future celebrity was an event of such dramatic magnitude as to satisfy the most exacting criteria of a proper family romance: because a nobleman had slandered him and his religion, Ehrich's father had challenged him to a duel and killed him. To escape arrest and the vengeance of the family of the dead aristocrat, the Rabbi was forced to flee the country. Ultimately he arrived in Appleton, where, reunited with his family, he became the leader of a small synagogue (*ibid.*, p. 10).

Despite the admitted appeal of this tale of derring-do and its suitability for inclusion within the fabric of the family romance, it cannot be denied that it imposes something of a strain on one's credulity. Not only does the image of a smoking pistol in the hand of Rabbi Weiss seem somewhat out of character, but the notion that a nobleman would have deigned to engage a rabbi in an affair of honor seems quite alien to Hungarian customs of the day.

Many years later Houdini's sister Gladys added her own embellishments to the family saga by asserting that so great had been the Rabbi's fame in Budapest that the 'Kaiserin Josephine' used to stop at his home, when she was on one of her frequent visits to a nearby orphan asylum, to pay her respects to the distinguished man. The fact that there was no Kaiserin Josephine and that under any other name it is doubtful that Her Royal Highness, traveling from Vienna, would have bestowed such favors on an obscure Hungarian rabbi merely attests to the infinite reaches of Gladys's imagination. Nor did it stop there.

Seeking presumably to establish proof of Houdini's American birth, she claimed that he had been named for another baby,

named Ehrich, who was born in Budapest and had died suddenly after a fall. In support of this apocryphal tale she noted that 'in the Hebraic custom, newborn children are named for the departed' (see, Houdini Birth Research Committee). In this, however, she was only partially correct; for while it is customary to name children after deceased family members, the deceased relatives are always adults, frequently grandparents, but never dead siblings—a fact that was undoubtedly known to Rabbi Weiss.

Finally, it should be noted that there is reason to question the significance of the title 'Rabbi' which has been assigned to Houdini's father, for there is no evidence that he was ever formally ordained.

In truth, the impression of his father that is gained from biographies of Houdini is not that of a victorious combatant on the field of honor, nor of the object of an empress's reverence, but of a depressed and ineffectual man who after a few years lost his position and with it his annual salary of seven hundred fifty dollars. In time the family moved to Milwaukee where, presumably to keep ahead of the rent collector, they had at least five different addresses during the years 1883-1887. Toward the close of the year 1885 an additional blow befell them when Herman, the Rabbi's twenty-two-year-old son from his first marriage, was stricken with a rapidly advancing pulmonary tuberculosis and died. This misfortune, which was to be repeated some years later when another brother succumbed to the same disease, was destined to leave an indelible impression on the eleven-year-old Ehrich and undoubtedly contributed to a life-long preoccupation with health and physical fitness. It may also be suspected that the menace of lung disease promoted those exhibitions of the triumph of respiration like the alleged drama enacted under the ice of the Detroit River. (Parenthetically, it is tempting to speculate that analogous motives may have prompted his brother Leopold to become a roentgenologist.)

Whether it was Herman's death or difficulties in school or his generally miserable life, young Ehrich, evidently troubled and

restless, ran away from home on the eve of his twelfth birthday in 1886. Little is known of his movements during the ensuing months. There is no record of a Bar Mitzvah; instead, ironically, the Rabbi's son acquired a bullet in the palm of one hand that remained there for the rest of his life (*cf.*, Christopher, 1973, p. 340). In time he settled in New York where he was joined by his family and where his father, having forsaken his eminent calling, shared the bench with his fourteen-year-old son as a cutter in a necktie factory.

Confronted by so humiliating an example, it is no wonder that the son embarked early upon a quest for a heroic model of a father. Once during his Wisconsin days, as he was shining the shoes of a well-dressed gentleman, he chanced to look up and presumably recognized the governor of the state. Some forty years later, while waiting for his act to begin on a stage in Albany, New York, he peeked through the curtain, hoping to catch a glimpse of Governor Al Smith, who was said to be in the audience. His seemingly insatiable craving to hold communion with great and famous men was bound by neither time nor place. When he bought a family burial plot in the Machpelah Cemetery on Long Island, he was pleased to note that not far away was the tomb of a magician who had once performed for President Lincoln. Indeed, just as a dress designed for a queen might confer regal attributes upon his mother, so it would seem he sought to acquire a new and glorious self by surrounding his person and embellishing his history with the presence, the trappings, and the memorabilia of real and figurative kings. Such a one was Jean Eugène Robert-Houdin, the French 'King of Conjurers', who was to provide young Weiss not only with a new birth, but with a new name.

In the face of the generous mixture of fact and fancy that fills out his personal narrative, it is difficult to document accurately the genesis of young Ehrich's involvement with magic and show business. Although in later years his father was said to be disappointed that his son was seeking to become a magician, it was

he who had originally introduced the boy to this unsavory world by taking him to the theater in Milwaukee to see a traveling magician named Dr. Lynn. According to his billing, the doctor cut up a man at every performance, a feat which made a lasting impression on young Ehrich. 'I really believed that the man's arm, leg, and head were cut off', he confided to his diary many years later (11 June, 1914). It is not difficult to imagine the boy's horror as he saw the diabolical conjurer brandishing a frightful butcher's knife and hacking away at his helpless victim, nor his immense relief when the man reappeared and, as if by a miracle, with all his appendages intact (*cf.*, Kellock, 1928, pp. 29-30).

Some forty years after this spine-chilling experience, the playbill of the National Theater in New York, announcing the program to be presented by Houdini ('The Greatest Necromancer of this Age—Perhaps of All Times', the *Literary Digest* called him), included one act titled *Paligenesia or Taking A Living Man to Pieces and Restoring Him by Installment,* an invention of a celebrated Dr. Lynn, which had been performed by him 'all over the civilized world'. To be sure, Dr. Lynn's vast itinerary had included Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where one day during the 1880's the audience had contained a wide-eyed small boy named Ehrich Weiss and his father.

Yet despite the lasting impression created by Dr. Lynn's butchery and repair, it is doubtful that it led young Ehrich to an immediate decision to become a magician. The initial steps in that direction began somewhat later, it would seem, when, during his adolescence, his brother Theo taught him his first coin trick. Soon he began to try his hand at other tricks, to learn some of the mysteries of locks and keys and to study the methods and techniques of other magicians. This was the setting in which the decisive influence upon his future burst upon him in his chance discovery of a second-hand copy of an English translation of *The Memoirs of Robert-Houdin.* The excitement resulting from this encounter between the work of the renowned conjurer and the young novice was electric. 'From the moment I began to study the art', Houdini would write later, 'he became

my guide and my hero. I asked nothing more of life than to become in my profession like Robert-Houdin.' In pursuit of that cherished goal nothing could have been more logical than to follow the advice of a friend to appropriate the great man's surname, which he erroneously took to be 'Houdin', and to add an 'i' to it. From now on, there was to be no further question about either his vocation or his identity. At the age of seventeen, Ehrich Weiss, the Rabbi's son, abandoned his name and gave up his job in the necktie factory. He had his eye on greater things and, under a bright banner emblazoned with the name Harry Houdini, he stepped boldly into the profession of conjuring.

Despite his high hopes, what followed were long years of frustration and disappointment, during which he appeared as a virtually unnoticed performer in cheap 'dime museum' shows and traveling circuses or as a medium in phony spiritualist seances. After seven years of struggling he was so far from success that he began to toy with the idea of giving up his seemingly fruitless dreams of glory and of contenting himself with a steady job in the prosaic world of commerce.

And then, slowly at first, mainly through his ingenious escape stunts, Harry Houdini began to attract attention. Intuitively aware of the strategic uses of publicity, he visited numerous police stations and jails, challenging the officials to devise restraints that could contain him. By the summer of 1899, the once obscure magician was drawing such huge and enthusiastic crowds by his spectacular and daring escapes from handcuffs, leg irons, straitjackets, and other apparatus that he found himself engaged by the Orpheum Theater in San Francisco for the amazing fee of one hundred seventy-five dollars a week. Now decked out in the glittering titles of 'The Undisputed King of Handcuffs', 'Monarch of Leg Shackles', and 'Champion Jail Breaker', this virtuoso of 'escapology' found his foot planted securely in the stirrup of fame. On the 30th of May, 1900, he embarked for England and the Continent, where he was soon destined to become a sensation.

It was during the following spring that his mother journeyed to Europe in response to his urging to witness his spectacular triumphs in Germany and later to participate in the mock coronation ceremony in her native Budapest. Not long thereafter, while he was in Paris, Houdini visited the Théâtre Robert-Houdin and then went on a pilgrimage to Blois to place a wreath on his hero's grave. All in all, it had been but a little more than ten years since the course of his life had been decisively altered by the chance discovery of the great Frenchman's *Memoirs,* whose works he 'read and re-read until [he] could recite passage after passage from memory'.

Yet a perusal of the book causes one to wonder whether its great attraction for young Ehrich Weiss arose entirely from its presentation of the history and practice of the art of magic. Even more appealing, I suspect, were the autobiographical sections of the work, notably the dramatic account of the rescue of the author as a young apprentice watchmaker when he was found lying unconscious on the highway by the celebrated magician Torrini. Nursed back to health, he was virtually adopted as a son by the famous conjurer, who then initiated the youth into the secrets of necromancy. No less romantic was Torrini's disclosure that in truth he was not an Italian, but a French nobleman, Comte de Grisy by name, a physician who had forsaken his career to become a magician (*cf.,* Robert-Houdin, 1858).

Little difficulty stands in the way of discerning typical features of the family romance and related fantasies in the foregoing narrative. Here, in the Torrini chapter of the *Memoirs of Robert-Houdin,* is the classical story of the rescue of a stricken youth by a personage of noble lineage, who treats his protégé like a son. Here too is the presentation of a variant of the fantasy that has proved to be a characteristic ingredient in the early history of the creative artist. Citing the reputed discovery of the unknown shepherd boy Giotto by the great Cimabue as an example, Ernst Kris (1952) pointed out that this chance discovery of an obscure but talented youth by an established

master, who becomes the young man's mentor, is a recurring and characteristic formula in the biography of many artists, even those whose well-recorded histories exclude the possibility of the occurrence of such an incident.

The Torrini episode is also a remarkable anticipation of the chance discovery of the *Memoirs of Robert-Houdin* by the young amateur magician, Ehrich Weiss, who was soon to transform the great French conjurer into his hero, his guide, and, indeed, his demigod. Not only did he adopt the Frenchman's name, choose his profession, and copy his tricks, but even in fashioning the details of his life, he seemed often to be treading in the very footsteps of the master.

Even Houdini's funerary monument—an exedra which, although dedicated to his parents, is crowned by his own sculpted head—seems to have been inspired, at least in part, by an example associated with the memory of Robert-Houdin. On the 6th of December, 1905, the French Society of Magicians celebrated the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Robert-Houdin at the Théâtre Robert-Houdin in Paris. Among other events a poem in honor of the Master was read, at the close of which a bust of Robert-Houdin on the stage was crowned with a wreath of laurel. Kneeling below Houdini's bust in the Machpelah Cemetery is a Pietà-like figure, holding in her hand a chiseled laurel wreath. (Indeed, as an expression of that limitless effrontery known as *chutzpah* and as an exercise in magical ingenuity, Houdini's success in negotiating the admission of his chiseled likeness into a Jewish graveyard after his death must rank with the most spectacular escapes he effected during his lifetime.)

In the light of his fanatical devotion and worshipful reverence toward the Frenchman, it is startling to discover that a time would come when, riding high on the crest of his ever-growing fame, Ehrich Weiss, now known as the Great Houdini, would lash out at his former idol and namesake and, showing neither mercy nor justice, seek to topple him from his lofty throne and cast him disdainfully into the mud.

Neither the cause nor the precise timing of Houdini's violent about-face toward his revered spiritual father can be stated with certainty. According to one view, it was the result of a series of disappointments he experienced while seeking to pay homage to his idol during his visit to France in 1901. The long anticipated visit to the Théâtre Robert-Houdin turned out to be the beginning of a parade of misadventures and disillusionments, for the place where the Master had once held sway had lately been converted into a motion picture house in which little of its glittering past remained, save for its anachronistic name. Nor did Houdini fare any better when he sought to establish contact with other traces of his hero. Although he journeyed to Blois to place a wreath on the grave of Robert-Houdin, neither the daughter nor the daughter-in-law of the famous Frenchman evinced any interest in meeting him.

According to his biographer Gresham, Houdini reacted to these alleged rebuffs with an angry outburst in English garnished with Yiddish. 'The nerve of those stuck-up fakers', he supposedly screamed. 'I'll fix 'em. I'll do 'em something. They won't forget Houdini. They want to play dirty, so I'll play dirty! He stole other men's inventions. The great Robert-Houdin! He was nothing more than a common thief! The old *gonif* [crook] never invented nothing and I can prove it. I'll write a book exposing the old fraud, the old *mumzer* [bastard.] His book is full of lies!' (Gresham, 1959, pp. 80-81).

Since no witnesses are mentioned, nor sources cited, there is some reason to question the literal authenticity of this scene. Be that as it may, it is clear that at some point following his miscarried pilgrimages to Paris and Blois in 1901 his attitude toward his one-time 'guide and hero' underwent a profound and radical change, which culminated in 1908 with the publication of a three-hundred-page book bearing the sinister title, *The Unmasking of Robert-Houdin.* Denouncing the Frenchman for his 'supreme egotism and utter disregard for the truth' and his claims as 'farcical', 'flagrant' [sic], and 'unscrupulous', Houdini accused him of 'purloining tricks and laying claims to having

invented tricks long the property of mountebanks as well as reputable magicians'. He continued:

> Today, after a century and a half of neglect, the laurel wreath has been lifted from the brow of Robert-Houdin where it never should have been placed and has been laid on the graves of the real inventors. . . . The master magician, unmasked, stands forth in all the hideous nakedness of historical proof, the prince of pilferers. That he might bask for a few hours in public adulation he purloined the ideas of magicians long dead and buried, and proclaimed these as the fruits of his own inventive genius. . . . But the day of reckoning is come. Upon the history of magic as promulgated by Robert-Houdin, the searchlight of modern investigation has been turned. Credit has been given where it belongs, to those magicians who preceded Robert-Houdin and upon whose abilities and achievements Robert-Houdin built his unearned, unmerited fame. The dust of years has been swept from names long forgotten, which should forever shine in the annals of magic (Houdini, 1909).

Despite these claims, the book not only failed to achieve its purpose, but actually boomeranged both by adding luster to the fame of its intended victim and by leaving the author open to the charge of committing many errors of fact and reasoning. It is noteworthy that some thirty years after Houdini's allegedly earth-shaking 'unmasking', magicians still alluded to Robert-Houdin as 'The Great Master' and acknowledged that it was to him 'that all of us owe our start' (*cf.,* Hugard, 1939). Indeed, many of the accusations which Houdini leveled against Robert-Houdin were more properly applicable to himself. He accused the Frenchman of theft and plagiarism, for example, but an entire paragraph on the subject of skeleton keys appearing in Houdini's book, *Handcuff Secrets,* is, word for word, identical to an article on locks in the *Encyclopedia Britannica.* Indeed, in the opinion of Maurice Sardina (1950), a French historian of magic, Houdini's *Unmasking of Robert-Houdin* provides evidence of itself having been ghost-written. When, in reference to Robert-Houdin, Houdini contended that 'the truth was not in

him', wrote Sardina, 'Houdini must have been looking in a mirror' (p. 90).

But unquestionably, the most compelling feature of Houdini's attempted literary assassination of his deposed idol is not the recording of a catalogue of baseless charges, which often prove to be childish projections of Houdini's personal 'hanky panky', but his failure to recognize a glaring flaw in the *Memoirs*—namely, that the entire Torrini story, consuming more than a fifth of the book, is sheer fantasy! A meticulous investigation by the eminent historian of magic, Milbourne Christopher, has failed to reveal any evidence for the existence of either a magician named Torrini, or a French count named de Grisy (*cf.*, Robert-Houdin, 1858, p. 326).

The fact that in unleashing his literary 'haymaker' Houdini unaccountably spared the only vulnerable target in his victim's armor, suggests that despite his professed antagonism, he chose to believe the romantic Torrini story. Perhaps he blinded himself to its spuriousness because it so closely resembled his own cherished family romance fantasies; perhaps, like a bombardier flying over his enemy-held native village, he was too fond of it to destroy it; perhaps, too, like Robert-Houdin, he craved to be rescued and instructed by a Torrini. Whatever the explanation might be, the very fact that Houdini was 'taken in' by the Torrini episode and thus lost a golden opportunity to administer the *coup de grâce* to his supposed adversary, argues against the belief, held by many, that his stunning change of heart was caused by the rebuff he fancied he had suffered at the hands of the surviving members of the family of Robert-Houdin.

It is true of course that Houdini was possessed of an immense vanity that brooked no rivals and tolerated no frustrations. He was an unblushing egomaniac whose photograph adorned his stationery and his bank checks, who likened himself to Alexander the Great,[3] and who, like Napoleon, signed his name imperially with a single word. It is by no means unlikely that

[3] Houdini made this comparison in a memorandum he wrote to O. S. Teale. The memorandum is in the Houdini Collection of the Library of Congress.

Houdini, flushed with his growing success, believed his star was visible to all and that the whole world would rise to its feet and cheer as he passed by. Most particularly, he would have expected to be received with open arms by his 'adopted' family, the survivors of his childhood hero, and that they would celebrate his 'return' by killing a fatted calf amid general rejoicing. Alas, if these were his secret expectations, he must have been profoundly crushed when virtually no one in his hero's family paid him the slightest attention. Surely, this was more than he could bear; surely, this would have fanned the flames of revenge.

Plausible as this hypothesis may seem at first, on soberer reflection it seems too simple. No matter how vindictive he might have felt at the time, it is difficult to believe that a mere want of hospitality on the part of two elderly French ladies, who had probably never heard of him, could have been responsible, after a lapse of nearly seven years, for his aggressive outburst.

More important is the fact that this explanation fails to take into account the observation that the publication of *The Unmasking of Robert-Houdin* was not to be the only blast he would fire at someone he had once loved or esteemed. Some ten years after the publication of this work, he was to repeat that performance in the treatment of his youngest brother, Dr. Leopold Weiss who, allegedly for having married the divorced wife of an older brother, became the hated object of Houdini's undying wrath and led to his ostracism not only from Houdini's world in life, but from his placement in the Machpelah Cemetery plot in death. Nor did this conclude his pitiless punishment, for he was subjected to symbolic decapitation when Houdini lopped off his head from a family photograph with a pair of scissors. Unlike Dr. Lynn, he never restored it.

A third stunning example of Houdini's repudiation of an old attachment appeared in his relationship with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, whose friendship Houdini had once proclaimed as a 'sacred treasure'. Fifteen years his senior, a British knight, and the creator of the most celebrated sleuth of all times, Doyle possessed all the requisite qualifications for a family romance

father. Yet, ostensibly over the issue of spiritualism, Sir Arthur, like other bright stars in Houdini's firmament, came crashing down to earth, an object of Houdini's scorn and contumely. Indeed, still smarting from the magician's ill treatment of himself and Lady Doyle, Sir Arthur discerned that they had become victims of a personality trait that Houdini had displayed before. 'It was the same queer mental twist', he wrote, 'which caused him first to take the name of the great Frenchman and then write a whole book . . . to prove that he was a fraud' (Doyle, 1930, p. 39).

From these examples it would appear that Houdini's sentiments and especially his affections often teetered nervously on the edge of a lethal aggression. Seen in such a light it seems unlikely that the rejection he fancied he had suffered from the family of Robert-Houdin could have unleashed so swollen a torrent of abuse, had not the wellsprings of invective lain dormant in his uncertain heart.

DISCUSSION

Nurtured in a forcing bed so rich in fabrications and so fertile in falsehoods, it is no wonder that young Ehrich Weiss grew up harboring a shadowy sense of reality and a pronounced susceptibility to illusion and magic. What commands attention in the various manifestations of Houdini's family romance fantasies is their remarkable viability and endurance well into adult life, as well as his unblushing willingness to treat his reveries as reality. Together with a pronounced disturbance in the establishment of object relationships, a wavering sense of personal identity, and a patent blunting of the superego, these characteristics conform closely to the constellation of traits that Greenacre (1958) and others have identified as typical of the mental make-up of the impostor.

It is not surprising that in the eyes of a number of observers he invoked comparisons with the arch impostor of all times, Giuseppe Balsamo, the notorious Sicilian who went by the name of Count Alessandro Cagliostro. In a fictionalized biography of

Houdini, Maurice Zolotow (1946) named his protagonist 'The Great Balsamo', while *The New Yorker* magazine referred to Houdini as 'Cagliostro redivivus'. Conan Doyle (1930) also compared his erstwhile friend to the notorious Cagliostro—and interestingly, too, to that prince of transvestites, the Chevalier d'Eon (p. 53). But the most impressive example of this sense of kinship between the celebrated charlatan and Houdini came from Houdini himself who, in a short story presumably written by himself, named his fictional self-portrait 'The Marvelous Balsoma'.[4] It is noteworthy that he owned a large collection of memorabilia of Cagliostro, took photographs of the latter's home in Paris, and appeared almost obsessively attentive to small details in the latter's career. It seems probable that Cagliostro was incorporated in Houdini's family romances via Robert-Houdin, who himself was greatly fascinated by the famous imposter.

Like Cagliostro, who was called 'divine' by some of his admirers and who was said to have claimed a personal acquaintanceship with Jesus, there are hints that in the composition of Houdini's family romance fantasies he perceived himself as standing in a quasi-filial relationship to a divinity. His escapes from fetters may be viewed not only as desexualized derivatives of the perversion known as bondage, but as a re-enactment of the *Akedah* or the binding of Isaac.

As the son of a rabbi he was surely familiar with the story of the youth who was miraculously spared from being sacrificed by his father through the intervention of a merciful God. Indeed it may be suspected that the story of the binding of Isaac played a role in the genesis of the games of rope tying and escape in which he and his brother Theo engaged as children. 'Never in all the history of the Weiss family', wrote Houdini's biographer Gresham (1959), perhaps with unconscious intuition, 'had anyone senselessly allowed himself to be tied up with

[4] This alteration in the name is undoubtedly an example of Houdini's notoriously faulty spelling, which, as in the case of Balsamo-Balsoma, sometimes resulted in a change in gender.

clothesline' (p. 15). Further, it should be noted that in seeking a cemetery for his family Houdini chose one bearing the name Machpelah, for Machpelah, the oldest burial ground mentioned in the Bible, is the name of the cave purchased by Abraham for the interment of himself and his wife Sarah and in which Isaac too was buried.

There is also some reason to suspect that he may have identified himself with Christ, the Son of God. Some scholars, according to Theodor Reik (1961), deny the apparent incompatibility between the myths of the *Akedah* and the Crucifixion and view Isaac as the precursor or harbinger of the Savior, and the arrested sacrifice as a preformulation of the death of Jesus on the cross and his later Resurrection (p. 195).

It is noteworthy in this connection that one of Houdini's stunts, called 'The Crucifix Trick', consisted in his making an ingenious escape from an apparatus that is identical to the Christian cross. By the same token, his escape from a grave six feet below the ground carries an unmistakable, albeit unconscious, allusion to the Resurrection. Once, while commenting on his escape from manacles, Houdini himself likened his performance to an episode in the life of Saint Peter after he had been thrown into prison by King Herod in Jerusalem and was bound with chains ('And behold, the angel of the Lord came upon him . . . and he smote Peter on the side, and raised him up . . . and his chains fell from off his hands') (*cf.*, Christopher, 1973, p. 347).

Finally, it should be noted that despite his violent conflict with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle over the issue of spiritualism, the major theme in Houdini's motion picture, *The Man From Beyond*, is resurrection and life after death.

Both in his marriage to a Catholic girl and his erratic religious practices, Houdini revealed himself to be a most inconstant Jew, whose observances and apostasy seemed to reflect a profound ambivalence toward both his convictions and his heritage. It would appear that the conflicting sentiments that young Ehrich

Weiss felt toward his real father were later displaced upon the adopted ones. This is especially evident in his relationship with Robert-Houdin.

Standing on the threshold of personal glory in the full gaze of his adoring mother, exulting in the drama of her enthronement in which he beheld her wearing a gown designed for that same Queen Victoria before whom Robert-Houdin had more than once performed, it is certain that Houdini believed his hour had come; the son had become the equal of the father and now the moment was at hand when he might uncoil and strike. It is not surprising that a fellow magician accused him of committing the sin of Ham, for in his attack, he wrote, 'Houdini publicly mocked at his spiritual father's nakedness, and tried to show him up as not much different from other vainglorious members of the craft' (*cf.*, Hilliard, 1938).

Conversely he caused some of the sheen reflected from the brilliant image of the fantasied parent to appear to emanate from the real one. In the dedication of his 'parricidal' book, *The Unmasking of Robert-Houdin,* Houdini wrote:

> This book is affectionately dedicated to the Memory of my father, Rev. M. S. Weiss, PhD, LLD, Who instilled in me love of study and patience in Research.

Here, to be sure, was a touching display of filial piety, but it contained withal a concealed petard, for there is no known evidence that Houdini's father possessed either of these impressive degrees—or any other, for that matter. At the very moment when Houdini, bestriding the seesaw of his ambivalence, was casting his spiritual father into the mire, poetic and psychologic justice bade him rescue his true father, raise him to a lofty pedestal, and there deck him out with titles and honors he had never won.

In the end, even his scornful repudiation of Robert-Houdin was erased, for he was said to have come to regret writing the diatribe against his deposed hero and when he learned in 1919

that the tomb of Robert-Houdin was in a state of neglect, he wrote to the Mayor of Blois, offering to assume the cost of restoring it.

It was as if he were heeding the words of a dying king, chiding his son, Prince Hal, for his impatient seizure of the crown:

> Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought:
> I stay too long by thee, I weary thee.
> Dost thou so hunger for mine empty chair
> That thou wilt needs invest thee with mine honours
> Before thy hour be ripe? O foolish youth!
> Thou seek'st the greatness that will overwhelm thee.

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Rudolph M. Loewenstein, M.D. 1898–1976

Martin H. Stein

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RUDOLPH M. LOEWENSTEIN, M.D.

1898-1976

When Rudolph Loewenstein died on April 14, 1976, we were sadly reminded that another great figure was lost to the psychoanalytic world; even more, that so many of us had suffered a great personal loss as well.

He had been widely admired among us for his contributions in writing, many of them in collaboration with Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris, and for the time and devotion he had given as a member and officer of psychoanalytic organizations. These, as well as the facts of his early history, were admirably summarized by Charles Brenner on the occasion of Dr. Loewenstein's seventy-fifth birthday in 1973. This tribute was published in This QUARTERLY, XLII, 1973, pp. 1-3, together with his impressive bibliography, compiled by Paula Gross (*ibid.*, pp. 4-10).

It seems more appropriate at this time to remind ourselves of his qualities as an analyst, teacher, and friend, roles in which so many of us remember him with the deepest affection and respect. As an analyst, one who devoted himself to the difficult yet fascinating task of achieving the deepest understanding of individuals, he was superb. Patient, understanding and discreet, devoted to the unending search for the roots of human conflict, of character, and of symptoms, he stood out as a particularly humane and tolerant analyst, flexible yet in no way inclined to compromise psychoanalytic principles. In addition, he was possessed of excellent common sense, which he did not disdain to use.

In his teaching, these same qualities were of the utmost value. Although his command of metapsychology was formidable—of the same order as his distinguished collaborators, Hartmann and Kris—he was notable for his grasp of clinical theory, especially the theory of technique. To hear him present an account of a case gave one the impression of somehow being within the

analysis itself, while a dynamic process of understanding was opening up before us. He had a particular gift for transmitting a view of the patient as a unique, knowable being, worthy of respect, study, and help. His ability to convey this attitude to students and younger colleagues made him a great teacher, one who stimulated thought and conveyed information with skill and clarity, with a minimum of bravura, confidently and modestly at the same time. He was never overwhelming yet always effective, so that we left his classes remembering the subject and the principles we had discussed, rather than the presentation of them.

He was, of course, very good company, with the remarkable trait of seeming as young as we wished him to be. He was not inclined to show off the breadth of his knowledge, which was remarkable. Fluent in English, German, and French, he read widely in a variety of fields; he had a wide-ranging interest in history, especially that of the Jews. Best of all perhaps to us, his younger colleagues, he was an interested and devoted listener to whatever we had to say to him. If he did not suffer fools gladly, he was certainly very courteous about it.

Toward the end of his life he began work, in collaboration with Dr. Milton Horowitz, on what was to be a definitive work on the theory of psychoanalytic technique, which he had taught so successfully for many years. We wish he could have been spared to finish what would have been a work of the greatest value to all of us. We miss him very much.

MARTIN H. STEIN

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Norman A. Cameron, M.D. 1896–1975

Hans W. Loewald

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NORMAN A. CAMERON, M.D.

1896-1975

Norman Alexander Cameron, eminent and widely known scholar and teacher in the fields of psychiatry and psychology, died on August 4, 1975, in solitude and melancholy, at the age of 79 in New Haven, Connecticut. He was born in Canada of Scottish ancestry, spent some of his childhood years in London, and later in New York. His family was poor and he had to interrupt his high school education. He never finished high school, later remarking that he was a school drop-out many years before this became fashionable. Nevertheless, he eventually was able to get a college education and to obtain his Ph.D. in psychology at the University of Michigan in 1927. Because of further interruptions in his educational career due to pulmonary tuberculosis, he did not receive his M.D. degree from the Johns Hopkins Medical School in Baltimore until 1933. His psychiatric training was at the Phipps Clinic of the Johns Hopkins Hospital, then under the leadership of Adolph Meyer. After serving as Chief Resident at the Phipps Clinic in 1936, at the age of forty, he taught at the University of Wisconsin, published a monograph, *Reasoning, Regression and Communication in Schizophrenics* in 1938, and was appointed Professor and Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Wisconsin Medical School in 1947. His work in psychopathology during those years brought him into frequent contact and lively exchange of ideas with some of the Gestalt psychologists who had emigrated from Germany, among them Koehler and Koffka. In 1953 he accepted an appointment as Research Professor of Psychiatry at Yale, where he was able to devote most of his time to research and writing.

Already in his early fifties, while still in Wisconsin, he began his psychoanalytic training at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis. When he moved to New Haven, he continued his

training at the Western New England Institute for Psychoanalysis. He became a member of the American Psychoanalytic Association and of the International Psycho-Analytical Association in 1959. In earlier years, according to his own account, he had been indifferent if not hostile to psychoanalysis. It was characteristic of him that he was ready to make decisive changes in his point of view and in his life and career, regardless of the success and position previously achieved, when he felt that his personal and intellectual development required them.

I first met Norman Cameron with his wife Eugenia, a well-known child psychiatrist who also had joined the Yale faculty, during the 1954 meetings of the American Psychoanalytic Association in New York. I was impressed and delighted with his infectious good spirits and straightforward personal cordiality, his sense of humor, and with his great intelligence and vast range of interests. When I moved to New Haven in 1955, he was in the process of completing his psychoanalytic training and asked me to supervise him on one of his analytic cases. This was no easy task for me. He was ten years older than I, an admired figure in academic psychiatry and psychology, and a man of personal weight and stature such as one does not often meet. I had been a training analyst for only four years and was used to supervising colleagues considerably younger and less experienced. I certainly had not supervised anyone who clearly was a very experienced clinician and psychotherapist as well as teacher, albeit of limited psychoanalytic experience. We hit it off well, due to his unassuming openness and spontaneity, his utter lack of pretension, his eagerness to learn what he could about psychoanalytic technique, methodology, and theory, and his self-knowledge and psychological acumen.

We soon became friends and later neighbors in a rural town near New Haven. Our families grew close and during those years our friendship had some characteristics of a congenial extended family. Although a series of illnesses again burdened Norman's life and limited his professional activities to an unexpected extent, he was able to write a major book on psycho-

pathology from a psychoanalytic point of view: *Personality Development and Psychopathology. A Dynamic Approach* was published in 1963. Earlier books were *Psychology of Behavior Disorders* (1947) and, with Ann Magaret, *Behavior Pathology* (1957). He contributed the section on *Paranoid Conditions and Paranoia* to Arieti's *Handbook of Psychiatry* (1959), and the section on *Paranoid Reactions* to Friedman and Kaplan's *Textbook of Psychiatry* (1967).

Norman Cameron's strongest interest lay in the area of psychosis and borderline disorders. His paper, *Introjection, Reprojection, and Hallucination in the Interaction between Schizophrenic Patient and Therapist,* published in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis in 1961, stands as a classic case study, showing the depth of his theoretical thought, his great gift for clinical description and illumination of the therapeutic process, and his skill as a therapist. A projected book, based on the work with this patient, which extended over several years and proved highly successful, could not be brought to completion because of his failing health during the last few years.

During a long married life, Norman and his wife had been very close and her sudden death in 1972 was a blow from which he never recovered. She had been his devoted companion, protecting his rather fragile constitution and providing the warm and sheltered atmosphere which he needed for his work and his emotional equilibrium, as well as actively sharing his intellectual and artistic interests and his scientific and professional life.

When not plagued by physical ailments and depressed moods, Norman Cameron's *joie de vivre* and his keen interest in people, the arts, the world of ideas and public life, drew others to him. At such times his sparkling personality, his wit and a certain histrionic quality—ironic, sophisticated and childlike all at once—could be irresistible. Although often formal and reserved, in a congenial group his animated conversation, his undogmatic and nonmoralistic appreciation of human beings and of the vagaries of human foibles, frequently made him the center of attraction. There was a lack of guile in him which was most

endearing. But he also could be quite intolerant and contemptuous of signs of artifice and duplicity in others.

It can be said of Norman Cameron that he was one of those few creative men who during the course of his life went through a number of adolescences—crises which were not merely periods of emotional turmoil but which led to reorganizations of his intellectual life and work. This capacity for change, transformation, and new beginnings made for a certain turbulence and unsteadiness in his life, but at the same time it was the source, or manifestation, of his creative power.

HANS W. LOEWALD

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William A. Console, M.D. 1912–1975

Alan J. Eisnitz

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WILLIAM A. CONSOLE, M.D.

1912-1975

William Console died on June 23, 1975, several days after a massive myocardial infarction. Until the time of his fatal illness, he had been in good health. He was a person of unusual modesty and integrity. Completely genuine and ingenuous, he established uncompromising, even harsh standards for himself, yet was an enthusiastic and encouraging supporter of others.

After graduating from Cornell University and the Long Island College of Medicine, he studied psychiatry at the University Hospital in Charlottesville, Virginia and the Institute of Living in Hartford, Connecticut. Following service in the Naval Air Force during World War II, he began his psychoanalytic training at the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, graduating in 1952. He joined the faculty of the Department of Psychiatry at Downstate Medical College (then the Long Island College of Medicine) in 1946. There he exercised a most important influence in shaping the psychoanalytic orientation of the Department of Psychiatry and was a significant contributor to making the Downstate Residency Program one of the foremost developing grounds for future psychoanalysts. He believed strongly in the importance of educating medical students and doctors to be aware of the emotional needs of their patients and throughout his career he maintained contact with undergraduates. For years he met evenings with groups of medical students interested in psychiatry and psychoanalysis. His dedication to his field, his integrity, and his respect and empathy for patients made him an ideal model.

When the Downstate Psychoanalytic Institute was founded, Bill Console naturally became a vital member of its faculty. He served as Secretary of the Institute, Secretary and then Chairman of the Education Committee, Associate Director, and, from 1966 to 1969, Director of the Institute. He was a training and

supervising analyst and an outstanding teacher, particularly of clinical courses.

As a Fellow of the Board on Professional Standards of the American Psychoanalytic Association and as Chairman of the COPE Study Group on Selection, he helped develop methods and principles of selection of candidates for training. He also developed methods of follow-up studies on applicants who applied to more than one institute. His work led to the practical result of strengthening selection procedures of the institutes of the American Psychoanalytic Association and encouraged institutes to take more of a chance in training applicants who, although they had pathology, were talented and motivated. His greatest interest was always in the discovery of those with potential and in the development of their talents.

Dedicated to his work, Bill nonetheless found time for an abundance of interests. Nothing, however, had prior or greater call on him than his love for his wife and children. He is survived by his wife, the former Dorothy Jones, his daughter, Madame Heloise Seailles, and his son, Dr. David Console, a medical resident in Alberquerque, New Mexico.

The best of psychoanalysis has been enriched by Bill Console and diminished by his death.

ALAN J. EISNITZ

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The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant. Symbiosis and Individuation. By Margaret S. Mahler, Fred Pine, and Anni Bergman. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975. 308 pp.

Samuel Ritvo

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BIRTH OF THE HUMAN INFANT. Symbiosis and Individuation. By Margaret S. Mahler, Fred Pine, and Anni Bergman. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1975. 308 pp.

In this book, a study of normal babies and their mothers, Margaret Mahler and her collaborators substantiate the hypotheses she developed in her earlier studies on infantile psychotic syndromes: 'the universality of the symbiotic origin of the human condition, as well as the hypothesis of an obligatory separation-individuation process in normal development'. The extended study which is the main focus of the present book was undertaken in order to check the validity of the additional hypothesis of four subphases of the normal separation-individuation process.

The psychological birth of the infant occurs during the separation-individuation phase which Mahler places in the period from the fourth or fifth month to the thirtieth or thirty-sixth month. The concept of separation designates the child's emergence from a symbiotic fusion with the mother. Individuation comprises those developmental achievements which mark the child's assumption of his own individual characteristics.

Mahler counsels attention to the effects of imbalances in development. For example, precocious locomotor development may enable a child to separate physically from the mother and may lead to a premature awareness of separateness before the internal regulatory mechanisms necessary to cope with this awareness are developed. Or an overprotective, infantilizing mother may retard the development of the child's self-awareness despite normal cognitive, perceptual, and affective functions. The concept of the separation-individuation process applies only to the intrapsychic achievement of a sense of separateness in early childhood and not to every new separation or revised feeling of self at any age.

In relation to psychoanalytic theory Mahler sees her work as bearing especially on adaptation and object relationships. The outcome of the separation-individuation phase for the personality and mental health of the child hinges on the quality of the mutual adaptation of mother and child. In the sphere of object relationships

Mahler's work concerns the development from infantile symbiosis or primary narcissism to the object libidinal tie to the mother by way of the achievement of separation and individuation. It also relates to the development of ego functioning in the matrix—first, of the narcissistic tie, and later, of the object tie to the mother.

Mahler faces squarely the difficult problems inherent in drawing inferences about the inner life of the young child from direct observation of the preverbal period. She believes that coenesthetic empathy with the infant plays a central role. She and her co-workers 'study phenomena of the preverbal period that appear (from the outside) to be the kinds of experience that match up with what patients are only later able to report during analysis, in their verbalizable recollections, that is, free associations, without at that point being aware of their origins'. Her studies use the same principle of free-floating attention in following 'the usual and the expectable, but more particularly the unexpected, surprising, and unusual behaviors and transactional sequences. As the psychoanalytic instrument, especially the ear . . . , functions during analysis, so, in psychoanalytic infant observation, the psychoanalytic eye lets itself be led wherever the actual phenomenological sequences lead'.

Mahler states that a major basis for making inferences from nonverbal behavior is an appropriate awareness of the significance of the kinesthetic and motility functions in the growing child. She stresses that 'the observation of motor, kinesthetic, and gestural (affectomotor) phenomena of the entire body can have great value. It permits one to infer what is going on inside the child; that is to say, the motor phenomena are correlated with intrapsychic events. *This is particularly true in the first years of life.*' She believes the observer can make inferences from motor behavior to inner states because the behavior is the end product of inner states. For safeguards against error in these inferences, the researchers relied on the multiple, repeated, and consensually validated nature of the observations. Whatever safeguards are employed, the limitations of research relying on direct observation of preverbal behavior for the investigation of psychoanalytic hypotheses are self-evident and inevitable. This is reflected in the metaphorical titles—symbiotic, hatching, refueling—given to the various steps in the separation-individuation process. It is not possible to know with certainty what happens intrapsychically in the child, but from the observable behavioral phe-

nomena we can say what these processes most resemble in our everyday experiences in the world.

Nevertheless, the identification of the steps in the process, their correlation with the other dynamic currents of the child's development, the individual styles and range of variation of interaction between mother and child, comprise essential information for psychoanalysis. Such information is important for analysts of adults as well as of children. The full value of this knowledge will be realized as it stimulates analysts to integrate these new dimensions into the understanding of the origins and persistence of qualities of the mental life and conflicts of their patients. For example, the exploration of the relationship between the basic mood and gender identity has rich possibilities for clinical exploitation. The findings point to fundamental psychobiological relationships between gender, physical and psychological maturation, and the phases of the separation-individuation process.

The book contains a helpful glossary of terms which are extensively employed in this book and in Mahler's other writings. A chronological table of the subphases of the separation-individuation process with capsule summaries of the main features of each subphase would have been an additional help to the reader.

Besides performing the great service of bringing the essence of the research and the ideas of Margaret Mahler and her collaborators to the reader in one volume, *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant* brings to the psychoanalyst all the seminal ideas of a pioneer in the field of psychoanalytically oriented and guided observation of children.

SAMUEL RITVO (NEW HAVEN)

THE INFANT'S REACTION TO STRANGERS. By Thérèse Gouin Décarie. In collaboration with Jacques Goulet, Martine Darquenne Brossard, Sandra Rafman, and Ruth Shaffran. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1974. 233 pp.

The normal developmental phenomenon termed 'stranger fear' which appears to a lesser or greater degree in eight-month-old children contains more puzzles than was originally assumed. Observation shows that there is a time lapse between the infant's ability to differentiate the familiar from the strange face and his fear responses:

visual differentiation appears as early as four to five months, whereas the fear appears only three to four months later.

Décarie asks whether the time lapse might be due to the progressive development of object relations, or whether one must assume the development of new perceptual capacities. She finds that neither of these assumptions offers sufficient explanation. Piaget's finding, however, that concept formation develops independently of perception does, according to Décarie, shed light on the surprising discrepancy. At about eight months, Décarie assumes, the previously perceived stranger has acquired a new *cognitive* meaning for the young child. This theory, it seems to this reviewer, is entirely compatible with the psychoanalytic theory of object relations, according to which strangers acquire new *affective* meaning. At some point they simply become people-whom-one-must-mistrust. What is phenomenologically novel is precisely the 'unfriendly', unhappy behavior which the child displays vis-à-vis people he does not know intimately. It appears at first to be an affective progress rather than a perceptual one. It is not that we are dealing here with an either-or proposition; the mutual interdependence of affect and concept formation is, after all, what analysts deal with daily. Nor is Décarie negating such an interdependence. It is rather a question of primacy. What comes first, the more mature feeling tone, or the more mature concepts? Spitz's 'organizer' which assumes the coalescent maturation of several bodily and affective and cognitive functions seems eminently useful in this context.

Décarie gives credit to Spitz for having drawn our attention for well over twenty years to the existence of stranger fear, but she also points to the work that still needs to be done. We do not as yet have the precise indices of stranger fear, which all infants in this stage have in common. Even the description of such indices, i.e., the facial expression and body language, are, as Décarie points out, missing. ' "The infant is fearful" means next to nothing', she says.

The volume is a conscientious, learned, and sensitive collection of heretofore unpublished papers on an important aspect of early socialization. It does not claim to have all the answers. Apparently the exact and detailed exploration of affects and their developmental lines is one of our new frontiers. Epistemologists, psychoanalysts, ethologists, and social psychologists all indicate that this area must be researched next. The vantage points of all these experts vary, of course.

There is an old Indian legend, according to which a number of Jain were given the task of defining an elephant. Depending on their vantage point, they came up with the description of the floppy ear, the whitish tusk, the creased skin, etc. Not a single Jain grasped the (whole) gestalt of the elephant. The painstakingly detailed approach to living things, though it is eminently necessary, is often in danger of doing likewise. I hope that the fate of the Jain will not befall the various schools now approaching the development of affects. Décarie's superb and modest book demonstrates that this need not happen if each school takes into account the research of other disciplines.

MARIA W. PIERS (CHICAGO)

CHILDHOOD DEPRIVATION. Edited by Albert R. Roberts. Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1974. 209 pp.

This book is about 'the identification, treatment and prevention not only of the serious problems of physically battered children but also the less-noticed deprivation of emotionally battered children'. In his *Introduction* and in Chapter One the editor states: '. . . the primary objective of this volume is to bring to the attention of the public the knowledge that *many different types of childhood deprivation exist*. . . . The primary focus of this book is to review the available studies of the impact on both infants and children of *extreme* social isolation and emotional neglect. . . . It is this author's earnest anticipation that the issues and ideas integrated in this volume will stimulate further research.'

It is too much to expect that in a dozen disparate chapters by as many different authors, this brief volume could educate the public, review the literature, and stimulate research. The layman will find some chapters too condensed and technical, and the professional will find others too superficial and anecdotal. But the book does contain some worth-while contributions. For instance, *The Abused Child* by E. Lord and D. Weisfeld, is an informative account of the history and present state of affairs regarding the battered child, and *Separation and Object Loss: The Plight of the Foster Child* by C. Walker includes a good review of selected analytic literature on this subject.

This reviewer found Chapter Nine, *Effects of Deprivation on Speech and Language Development* by W. Neal to be the most re-

warding, particularly in its presentation of the 'deficit or difference' dilemma. There are those who regard the primitive speech of deprived (especially black) children as 'deficient' and those who regard it as 'different' but equal in value to 'standard English'. The author suggests that 'the issue of "dialect-fair" scales of speech . . . may become as significant in the future as that of "culture-fair" tests of intelligence has been in the past'. The observation is made that the 'different' speech serves the child's social relationships well but 'he does not learn how to use language for obtaining and transmitting information, for monitoring his own behavior, and for carrying on verbal reasoning. In short he fails to master the cognitive uses of language.' An analyst would say that he is therefore deprived of secondary process thought development and consequently of certain aspects of ego functioning. Labeling primitive speech as 'different' (but not inferior) implies a denial of the ego deprivation it imposes. The danger that elicits this denial seems to be that labeling the *speech* as 'deficient' could be misunderstood as prejudicially labeling the *child* as inferior. But in fact the denial itself is dangerous if it denies the superiority of standard English and then undervalues the importance of providing deprived children every possible opportunity to learn it.

This is an interesting book on an important subject, but its editorial shortcomings limit its value. Its lack of integration is reflected in an overlapping of reviews of the literature, an inconsistency of bibliographical styles, a haphazard index, and especially in an uneven quality of writing.

MARJORIE MC DONALD (STONEHAM, MASS.)

THE EFFECT OF THE INFANT ON ITS CAREGIVER. The Origin of Behavior Series, Volume I. Edited by Michael Lewis and Leonard A. Rosenblum. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1974. 264 pp.

This book will offer little of value either to the serious student or to the sophisticated reader interested in any aspect of the infant-caretaker relationship. From the title, the reader expects to find meaningful data which would add to our understanding of the earliest stages of infantile development. Unfortunately, what is offered instead is a series of articles selected from a conference sponsored by the Education Testing Service.

For the most part the papers are behavioristic and emphasize statistical validation. There are no references to dynamic or analytic concepts. In an inaccurate statement the editors declare their justification for the volume:

> For many years workers in development have neglected the significance of the interaction between mother and infant and in a sense the subtle contributions that each makes to the other in shaping their ongoing dyadic behavior (p. ix).

This statement ignores entirely the work of A. Freud, H. Hartmann, M. Mahler, R. Spitz, M. Fries, S. Brody, and M. Klein, to name just a few. It is not that the contributors have not heard of nor had contact with analytic thinking. One of the editors, Rosenblum, previously was a co-worker of Kaufman in a number of primate studies based on analytic principles. In the present volume, Rosenblum, in his paper titled *Developmental Changes in Compensatory Dyadic Response in Mother and Infant Monkeys* (co-authored by Youngstein) attempts to reduce the complexities of the dyadic interaction to mathematical formulae based on 'Gaussian decay function of the general form $A_1E^{Azt^2}$' (p. 159). He asks if it is not somewhat pretentious to do so. I would agree that it is.

Other articles are generally no better. The titles are so general that it is not possible to be sure what the authors are attempting to study. For example, Brazelton, Kaslowski, and Mary Main in their article, *The Origins of Reciprocity: The Early Mother-Infant Interaction,* observed mothers and infants by way of special mirrors for twenty weeks. Their profound conclusions were that mothers and babies have to learn to live together: 'Each member seemed to need to learn the nuances of behavior patterns of the other member of the dyad' (p. 73).

Superficiality and naïveté mark many of the articles. In Korner's paper, misleadingly titled *The Effect of the Infant's State, Level of Arousal, Sex and Ontogenetic Stage on the Caregiver,* her findings are essentially a recycling of the work of others. A typical conclusion from her experiments is that 'it is the vestibular-proprioceptive component entailed in interventions providing contact comfort that is the more potent ingredient in calming the infant than contact per se' (p. 114). Her mechanistic approach to the love relationship that exists between mother and infant is found in this comment:

> More remarkable perhaps is the fact that, while soothing the infants, these interventions evoked various levels of visual alertness in them. We were struck by the implications of this, for it suggested that by soothing an infant a mother inadvertently provides him with visual experiences (p. 115).

This sterilization of the dyadic gestalt is also evident in Stern's paper, *Mother and Infant at Play,* when he writes that 'play between mothers and infants has been chosen because it consists mainly of social interactions; there is no other "task" at hand except to interact' (p. 189). Interestingly, Stern notes at one point in his conclusion:

> The most qualitatively important event that is difficult to explain in these terms is the occurrence of a special type of mutual gaze, the long 'loving' mutual looks between mother and infant during which little else occurs in the way of facial or vocal behavior on either side (p. 209).

Essentially then, the articles in this volume are Skinnerian in approach, with the apparent aim of reducing infant development to the level of laboratory animal research.

It is only in Selma Fraiberg's article, *Blind Infants and Their Mothers,* that we finally gain a picture of the complex emotional intimacies that exist between infants and their mothers. Her paper describes a longitudinal study of ten blind babies. The results of this study have been reported previously in the analytic literature, especially in *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.* In this article she again stresses the need to learn to read the hand language of the blind child if one is to appreciate the deficiency in ego development created by the absence of sight.

Dorothy Burlingham's work with blind children at the Hampstead Clinic has also clarified for us the devastating effect both on the infant and on the mother when blindness is not detected and the mother becomes depressed. Both Burlingham and Fraiberg stress the need for very early detection of blindness in the child and prophylactic work with the mother if the child's ego deficit is to be reduced to a minimum. Fraiberg correctly emphasizes the need for an intensified vocal dialogue between the mother (or her substitute) and the child. It is also true that one may have to spontaneously devise substitute procedures to assist the ego in its growth. I recall a blind child of eight at the Hampstead Clinic who, by touching, found my tape recorder. When I demonstrated it to her by recording her voice, she became entranced and played her tape endlessly.

At the same time she would say, first pointing to herself, 'I'm Joan'; then pointing to the tape recorder while it played her voice back, she would say, 'This is Joan too'. In this way the recorder replaced the mirror in helping to distinguish and fuse the 'me and not me' for her ego.

Fraiberg reports that as a result of the intervention of her research team, her group of ten babies compared favorably to sighted children in their development: 'As milestones in human attachment during the first two years of life, these achievements compare favorably with those of sighted children' (p. 232). From this statement one might conclude that developmentally at the end of two years a blind and a sighted child's egos are indistinguishable. Fraiberg's and Burlingham's work has shown that this, of course, is not the case. Fraiberg's conclusion refers only to the emotional tie to the mother. Here too, however, while there may be a strong bond, there are qualitative differences. Even under the best of circumstances, a blind child's ego, though it may be enriched through hard therapeutic work, is qualitatively and quantitatively different from a sighted child's.

HENRY ROSNER (NEW YORK)

SEPARATING PARENTS AND ADOLESCENTS: A Perspective on Running Away, Schizophrenia, and Waywardness. By Helm Stierlin, M.D. New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1974. 204 pp.

Since it does not allow for interpersonal or 'ecological' formulations, psychoanalytic object relations theory has been found wanting by the author of this slim volume. Similarly, systems theory has been found inadequate to conceptualize the interactions within a family. Stierlin proposes, as an extension of both, a relational dialectic deriving from the Hegelian master and slave relationship. Thus the process of adolescent-parent separation-individuation is conceptualized on a transactional basis.

This book is an attempt to examine the interchange among individual family members—the push and pull of psychological forces between active and contributing persons, with the emphasis on the parental contribution. The push and pull are represented as centri-

petal and centrifugal forces which summate to create transactional modes. These modes describe 'the intergenerational interplay . . . [and] the covert organizing transactional background to the more overt and specific child-parent interactions'. The major modes are *binding, delegating* and *expelling.*[1] These concepts are used to explore certain aspects of schizophrenia and waywardness or sociopathic personality.

Stierlin's data are drawn from his clinical work in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, and from a six-year NIMH study of underachieving adolescents and their families. In the course of his work, the author became interested in youngsters who ran away, their siblings who did not, the youngsters who seemed to elect to remain within very trying families, youngsters who seemed to wander off intermittently and at a very early age, and the parents of all of these children. Modalities of treatment included couple and family therapy, and individual and residential treatment for the adolescent.

This is a difficult book to evaluate. A warm and sympathetic stance toward both parent and adolescent is evident; one interesting chapter describes the adolescent and his parents in terms of 'intensification of drives, the growth of cognitive skills and the shift of loyalties'. The conceptualizations are clearly stated (although the examples seem thin and unidimensional) and there is a useful bibliography. But the reviewer must ask, 'For whom is this book written?' The style is that of a semi-popular work, while the book would seem to be aimed at the professional. As a treatise on a way of looking at certain phenomena occurring in families, it seems loosely reasoned to this reviewer. Transactional examples flow too easily from case illustrations to groups of people such as the poor, the blacks, or the German students who went to work in Israel to atone for their parental generation's murder of the Jews. There is no differentiation of the effect of sex difference on the manner, style, or content of the transactional communication, and there is no acknowledgment of a difference between reality and actuality. That adolescents act out parental unconscious wishes is not new, nor is it new that children will activate certain unresolved conflicts in their parents when critical life stages are reached.

[1] The heart of the conceptual idea is presented in the author's article, *Interpersonal Aspects of Internalizations,* Int. J. Psa., LIV, 1973, pp. 203-213.

In summary, Helm Stierlin has presented us with a transactional conceptualization of certain phases of the life cycle, emphasizing the confluence of the adolescence of children with their parents' middle age. I find it disappointing that the author has failed to expand object relations theory and has seemed to lose touch with the intrapsychic processes, structure, and content as they apply to his material.

PETER BLOS JR. (ANN ARBOR, MICHIGAN)

ADOLESCENTS IN GROUP AND FAMILY THERAPY. Edited by Max Sugar, M.D. New York: Brunner/Mazel, Inc., 1975. 286 pp.

The proliferation of literature on the subject of adolescent therapy betokens the increase of casualties of the developmental process in these chaotic times, as well as the frustrations of those who seek to use classical psychoanalytic methods in the treatment of today's troubled young people. The psychoanalytic treatment of adolescents has had a checkered history, its recent status delineated by Anna Freud's 1968 comments about the 'young of today [who] . . . look . . . upon [it] as a procedure devised to deprive them of originality . . . and induce them to adapt and conform to existing conditions . . .'.[1] Indeed, even in 1958, she spoke of the special difficulties in the analysis of adolescents that had led to 'many alternative forms of treatment for adolescents [being] evolved and practiced, such as manipulation of the environment, residential treatment, the setting up of therapeutic communities, etc.'.[2]

The present volume reports on some additions to Miss Freud's list. Here we find a collection of papers describing aspects of the application of group and family treatment methods to work with adolescent patients. The papers vary widely in their relevance to psychoanalysis, as well as in their intrinsic quality. Vann Spruiell's discussion of the phenomena of adolescent narcissism as they emerge in and have their impact on group therapy is in the best tradition of applied psychoanalytic thought: it shares this level of excellence, though not its conceptual orientation, with Helm Stierlin's scholarly

[1] Freud, Anna: *Problems of Psychoanalytic Training, Diagnosis, and the Technique of Therapy. 1966-1970. The Writings of Anna Freud, Vol. VII.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1971, p. 134.

[2] Freud, Anna: Adolescence. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XIII.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958, p. 263.

and imaginative reflections on countertransference issues in family therapy with adolescents. Stierlin, as well as R. Shapiro and his associates at NIMH, couch their discussions within the framework of Bion's theories of group process, an approach which may be unfamiliar to many American analysts but which does represent an imaginative expansion of psychoanalytic concepts to group phenomena.

Unfortunately, there are other essays that do not attain this level of theoretical sophistication or literary quality. In this reviewer's opinion, the group therapy section fares far better in these respects than does the section on family therapy. Perhaps this reflects the relative newness of the latter field, or perhaps it has to do with what D. Offer and E. Vanderstoep, in their valuable paper, *Indications and Contraindications for Family Therapy,* define as the contentious split between the psychoanalytic and the systems theorists in family therapy. The editor's several contributions tend to remain on a 'how-to-do-it' level, with varying degrees of theoretical support.

In any case, the psychoanalyst looking to this book for an expansion of his intellectual horizons or a conceptual support for his efforts to apply new technical approaches to the psychotherapy of adolescent disorders will have to pick and choose carefully. If he does so, he may find the book useful.

AARON H. ESMAN (NEW YORK)

AN ELEMENTARY TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. Revised Edition. By Charles Brenner, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1973. 280 pp.

In 1955, when the first edition of Brenner's *An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis* was published, psychoanalytic theory and therapy were the dominant forces in American psychiatry. In the post-World War II era, interest in psychiatric training and research expanded rapidly in the United States. Departments of psychiatry in medical schools and in general hospitals were developing, and the discipline was moving out of state and mental hospitals and was increasingly identified with the mainstream of medicine and medical education. The military and subsequent civilian experience had

been that psychoanalysts, with their understanding of normal as well as psychopathological conditions, had more to offer than other then-current modes of psychiatric thinking. The confluence of these forces led to a vast expansion not only of specifically psychoanalytic education and training for therapy, but also of the application of psychoanalytic thinking in the general psychiatric residency training programs in this country. As these residency training programs expanded at a rapid rate, psychoanalysts fulfilled an important teaching role. Equally rapid was the growth of the lay public's interest in the apparently broad explanatory value of psychoanalytic understanding in its applications to a variety of social, cultural and generalized human phenomena.

In that era the main reference sources for the general lay public and the mental health trainees were either Freud's *Collected Papers* or Fenichel's *Psychoanalytic Theory of the Neuroses*. The latter was a highly condensed and encyclopedic compendium of the literature of psychoanalytic understanding and theoretical postulates which was extremely difficult for the beginner in mental health sciences or the layman to understand.

In this setting Brenner's *Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis* filled a major void and served a very important function. In a simplified form and in a readable and logically developed fashion Brenner put before the psychoanalytic novice a general synthesis of the basic psychoanalytic theory and thinking of the mid-fifties. Beginning with the concepts of psychic determinism and of unconscious mental functioning, he developed and elaborated a historical approach to the exposition of then-current psychoanalytic propositions. He explained the basic concepts of the structural model of the mind, describing the understanding of the psychic apparatus and its maturation from the infantile and early childhood roots of psychic functioning. He demonstrated its application to such issues as parapraxes and wit, as well as the clinical theory of dreams and dream formation, ending with a generalized conceptualization of the psychoanalytic theories of psychopathology and symptom formation.

The book fulfilled its goal with notable success. Since the original publication it has also appeared in paperback editions, and has been translated into ten different languages. More than five hundred thousand copies of the book have been sold and, with the possible

exception of some of Freud's more important writings, it is probably the most widely read treatise on psychoanalysis ever written.

The current revised and expanded edition keeps the original essentially intact throughout the first eight chapters, with only minor corrections and changes from the earlier text. Brenner has added a chapter intended to develop the concepts of psychoanalysis as a general psychology by applying its understanding to various aspects of normal mental functioning such as character traits, vocational and marital choices, mythology and religion, politics, superstition, the generation gap, and the understanding of art and artistic creativity.

The new final chapter, entitled *Psychoanalysis Today* is, in this reviewer's opinion, a somewhat over-optimistic personal opinion by the author of the importance of the role which psychoanalysts and psychoanalysis play in the general understanding of man and his functions in today's world. In this chapter Brenner ignores the resurgent attacks upon psychoanalysis, as well as the development of alternative methods of therapy and modes of understanding which in today's world are increasingly competing for the interest and attention of the mental health professional as well as the lay public.

With the exception of the last two chapters, the book is essentially a second printing of the first edition. It remains primarily an exposition of the basic concepts of Freud and a statement of his classical psychoanalytic theory. In the references listed in an appendix, only fifteen new papers and two new authors have been added to the first edition.

The reader might reasonably question the appropriateness of considering this a textbook, inasmuch as it presents only a strict classical view of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory. It avoids controversy, the exposition of other points of view, or newer researches and it is not a broad presentation of the complexities of the subject. It cannot serve as a resource book to the field, and it continues to rely most heavily upon the writings of Sigmund Freud with relatively little reference and exposition to the elaborations and developments of those ideas made by successive generations of psychoanalytic clinicians and theorists. The emphasis is primarily on the findings from the clinical therapeutic situation, and there is virtually no critique of some of the currently discussed limitations, inconsistencies, or difficulties in the use of psychoanalysis in its

present theoretical form. There is no mention of the approaches of such writers as Klein, Erikson, and Bowlby, to say nothing of the various experimental and research approaches to theory and therapy. In the application of psychoanalytic thinking to issues and problems of normal mental functioning, its approach is narrow and overly simplified, and no attempt has been made to interdigitate findings from the psychoanalytic observation of individuals with the sociological, anthropological or sociocultural factors learned from other scientific disciplines.

However, the book remains a useful simplified presentation of some of the general concepts of classical psychoanalytic thinking. As such, it is likely to continue to be successful as an introduction to these ideas for the beginning professional in the mental health fields, as well as for the interested lay public. It does provide a nucleus of psychoanalytic understanding upon which those who wish to go further can build and modify a more accurately comprehensive study of the nature of man's mental life.

PAUL A. DEWALD (ST. LOUIS)

THE FEAR OF LOOKING OR SCOPOPHILIC-EXHIBITIONISTIC CONFLICTS. By David W. Allen, M.D. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1974. 134 pp.

The purpose of this modest volume 'is to illustrate the importance of scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors in neuroses, in everyday life, and in the treatment situation. A secondary purpose is to examine some of the implications of the scopophilic-exhibitionistic cathexes for creativity' (p. 1).

Allen's scholarly monograph is divided into six chapters, the titles of which outline the areas that he covers. In Chapter One, entitled *The Role of Freud's Scopophilia-Exhibitionism in the Development of Psychoanalysis,* 'the historical background of scopophilia and exhibitionism in analysis, including personal experiences and characteristics of Freud that were touchstones in the development of a workable psychoanalytic technique' (p. 5) are detailed by the author. Chapter Two, *Facts and Concepts about Scopophilia and Exhibitionism in Psychoanalysis and Related Sciences,* presents an interesting and informative review of the relevant analytic literature in relation to these themes. Pertinent findings from other fields, such as ethology and neurophysiology, round out the presentation.

The next three chapters comprise the clinical portion of the book. Here Allen's experience and tact as a seasoned psychoanalytic practitioner are evident. By highlighting the scopophilic-exhibitionistic conflicts as they appear in an analysis, knowingly separating them from the other partial instinctual contributions to neurotic symptoms and pathology, Allen correctly directs our attention to a ubiquitous area of neurotogenesis that is easily overlooked. He feels that the correct technical management of scopophilic-exhibitionistic derivatives is essential in overcoming resistances that stand in the way of 'ego-serving' regression and ultimately in resolving the transference neurosis. He also feels that the improper handling of scopophilic-exhibitionistic features can lead to interminable analyses.

In the last chapter, *Some Comments on Scopophilia and Exhibitionism in Creativity,* Allen lists what he considers the significant factors in creative thinking. He feels that a person becomes creative 'only if he possesses that unintimidated, bounding scopophilia that sees beyond the immediate focus of learning' (p. 109).

Scopophilia is defined in this monograph as 'sexual pleasure derived from contemplation or looking. It is a component instinct and stands in the same relation to exhibitionism as sadism does to masochism' (p. 1). Exhibitionism has a more extensive definition: 'The act or practice of behaving so as to attract attention to oneself: extravagant or willfully conspicuous behavior'. Further, 'This impulse . . . may be progressively displaced from the genital zone to the body as a whole, to the oral zone (the pleasure of speaking), to clothes, to dramatics, to the possession of material assets, etc. Or, it may be expressed in terms of reaction-formation, that is, there may be aversion to display of any kind' (p. 2).

It can be seen that these definitions are somewhat at variance with the way scopophilia and exhibitionism are defined by the American Psychoanalytic Association: '. . . a wish to look at (scopophilia) and to have the genitals seen (exhibitionism)'.[1] The author has made note of this difference, and one consequence is that this monograph does *not* deal with the perversions of voyeurism or exhibitionism. Allen is concerned with 'the neurotic disturbances of seeing and showing and with the fate of the scopophilic-exhibition-

[1] *Cf.,* Moore, B. E. and Fine, B. D., Editors: *A Glossary of Psychoanalytic Terms and Concepts.* New York: The American Psychoanalytic Association, 1967, p. 76.

istic impulses within normative life styles' (p. 3). In his clinical examples, the *derivatives* of these impulses and their subsequent fate are what the author is interested in tracing.

Allen emphasizes four observations that involve his emendations to analytic technique.

1. The necessary regression cannot occur in psychoanalysis unless scopophobic defenses in the transference are adequately resolved.

2. The reversal from regression to progression in analysis occurs at a specific point or phase in the looking-showing transaction between analysand and analyst. This is the point at which the analysand 'knows that he has revealed himself to his analyst as fully [and] as completely as he consciously can. That is, his scopophobia has been revealed and resolved in the transference' (p. 100). Scopophobia, as used by the author, means 'a fear of looking as well as a fear of being looked at' (p. 6).

3. 'In the analytic situation, the patient's fear of looking at the analyst is a kind of epitomizing phobia revealing the nuclear conflicts in the neurosis' (p. 106).

4. The scopophobic patient may have to be confronted with his phobic situation in actuality as well as through interpretation.

A salient feature in the author's modification of technique is suggested by the following:

> To speak to the scopophobic patient vis-à-vis for a moment after he arises from the couch, or to invite his attention to something in the office, may momentarily increase his anxiety and mobilize his defenses; or such action-interpretations may deprive the defense of its effectiveness and subsequently diminish the anxiety. If well-timed, a face to face action has, like any correct and correctly timed interpretation, the effect of resolving instinctual conflict. Thus a redeployment of the defense-bound energies is permitted. . . . The analyst must be able to use his actions appropriately, as he would any other correct nuance of a correct interpretation, to make conscious for the patient what is preconscious (pp. 107-108).

All of Allen's patients with prominent scopophilic-exhibitionistic attitudes had been thwarted in their efforts to establish a gratifying relationship with their mothers. The relationship was strongly ambivalent: there was great resentment which could not be openly expressed because of the need for her and because she was seen as potentially rejecting or castrating. 'In addition in each of these cases there was at least one exceedingly vivid traumatic incident, usually in the phallic or latency phase, in which the childish looking and

showing were severely reproved by the mother who threatened the child with losing her love' (p. 40).

The 'action interpretations' of the author have proven to be effective in furthering the analysis of the scopophilic-exhibitionistic conflicts of this group. Due to the poor early relationship with their mothers, these patients may have an even greater need to be assured of the physical presence of the analyst than other analytic patients who had the benefit of a less ambivalent tie to their parent. It can be suggested that with this type of patient, 'trauma' may have been experienced considerably earlier than the phallic or latency phase. Thus the involvement with the analyst as a 'real' rather than a transference object, may be furthered by Allen's 'action interpretations'. The effectiveness of his approach may be enhanced, in turn, by the early deprivation that can be inferred from the histories of these patients.

In its contribution to an area that has been lacking in adequate exposition, this book is a welcome addition to the analytic literature, It can be read with equal profit by the most experienced clinician and the more modestly advanced student of psychoanalysis.

AUSTIN SILBER (NEW YORK)

STRATEGIC INTERVENTION IN SCHIZOPHRENIA. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TREATMENT. Edited by Robert Cancro, Norma Fox, and Lester E. Shapiro. New York: Behavioral Publications, 1974. 326 pp.

Two of the most perplexing problems that psychiatrists have to face are those of the choice of neurosis and the origin of schizophrenia. These enigmas which have acquired a mystique of esoteric proportions make us wonder if the questions we construct are part of a frame of reference that belongs to the past—a traditional approach that may have to be discarded. Perhaps a model of the mind will evolve that makes such questions meaningless. The psychoanalytic frame of reference, even now, does not include concepts which relate to processes relevant to fundamental origins. Still, even though we may not know exactly what schizophrenia is, some analysts believe that some schizophrenics can be treated psychoanalytically. Thus the discussion of the psychoanalysis of schizophrenics would be our chief interest in a book such as this one.

The book, however, traverses a wide spectrum: chapters by different authors discuss such subjects as psychoanalytic formulations, family and behavioral therapy, somatic and pharmacological treatments, preventive approaches, and education, as well as various innovations in the hospital setting. It is an ambitious and well-written book. The editors, in their beginning chapters and introductions to the various papers, provide continuity, while raising cogent questions of their own which could have been independent topics of investigation. All of this is very valuable.

To return to the analyst's concerns, two chapters, one by Otto Will and the other by Jay E. Harris, deal with the individual treatment of schizophrenia. Both these men are skilled and humanistic clinicians, and they touch on many theoretical and technical issues. Will gives an over-all description of the syndrome and a scholarly summary, and concludes that a 'human relationship'—that is, a person-to-person relationship—should be given 'a real trial as a therapeutic instrument' (p. 31). Using an interpretive approach, Harris discusses specific aspects of technique and demonstrates what and how he interprets in specific clinical situations. He describes the difficulties created by the transference psychosis and states that an essential aspect of the therapeutic task is that the patient is learning to recognize the intrapsychic sources, the internal imagoes behind his symptoms. He emphasizes the various traumatic aspects of the mother-infant fusion that lead to specific types of psychotic symptoms and distortions. Technically, he stresses the structuralizing effects of interpretation and the structuring of the sense of self which reaches back into the past.

One can disagree with some points. I would, perhaps, put less stress on management but, on the whole, both authors make much good sense. For the experienced clinician, however—someone who has struggled to treat such patients, more or less successfully, for a period of years—these chapters are too general and not particularly helpful. No mention whatsoever is made, for example, of Boyer, Kernberg, Modell, or Searles in the United States or of Guntrip, Khan, Melanie Klein, Rosenfeld, or Winnicott of Great Britain. One feels that the primitive and complicated transference projections and the often paralyzing and painful countertransference reactions which are so often experienced in the treatment of psychotic patients could have been discussed in more detail. The

editors, however, did not intend to limit themselves to psychoanalysis and, as an introduction to the subject, the chapters by Will and Harris are excellent. Furthermore, the limitations that trouble this reviewer may be inherent in the topic. Those who treat schizophrenics may experience special difficulties and consequently hope for definitive answers, since the therapeutic experience, in view of the deep regressions and often amorphous self-representations, can bring the therapist face to face with the most primitive and inchoate levels of his own psyche. We need all the help we can get and, as is so often true with the schizophrenic patient, our expectations may be grandiosely unrealistic.

The remainder of the book is informative; the authors are obviously experts in their fields. Their approaches and goals are different from ours, but one should not dismiss them because of this. The behavioral approach, however, I find difficult to accept because no matter how it is propounded, it invariably aims at extinguishing personal autonomy and ignores the adaptive potential of symptoms. In contrast, the chapter on pharmacology is, I believe, especially interesting; it summarizes considerable information which would require a laborious exploration of the literature to obtain. In addition, much about dynamics can be gleaned from the section on family treatment.

These latter chapters have not been dealt with in any detail here since our interests as analysts would be concentrated on chapters relating to individual therapy. Those therapists who believe that some psychotic patients can and in some cases should be treated analytically find that their most basic information comes from the study of transference-countertransference projections. Observations of these processes do not come easily and insights from them are often very slowly and laboriously acquired.

PETER L. GIOVACCHINI (WINNETKA, ILL.)

FREUD AND HIS FOLLOWERS. By Paul Roazen. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1975. 615 pp.

Paul Roazen's fourth book on the topic of psychoanalysis confronts us with a new phenomenon: the emergence of a scholar without formal psychoanalytic training who nevertheless devotes the major effort of his academic life to the study of our discipline. As a com-

munity, we are bound to respond to this development with ambivalence: on the one hand, it attests to our achievement of intellectual respectability; on the other hand, it projects into the public arena views allegedly identified with our cause that most of us find alien, distasteful, or even bizarre.

Roazen's *Brother Animal* [1] aroused a storm of indignation from psychoanalysts because he used our reconstructive tools in a clumsy and tendentious manner to make a case against Freud for his dealings with Victor Tausk. Roazen stretched his evidence to paint a portrait of Freud that struck many serious students of the history of psychoanalysis as a piece of character assassination. Written by an author with Roazen's record, a book focused on the topic of Freud's relations with his followers can only arouse trepidation.

As it turns out, however, this volume will create hardly a stir. Roazen writes smoothly, he has been industrious, and he recounts the familiar events with competence. Readers who recall the previous work of Jones, Schur, and Ellenberger and the book titled *Psychoanalytic Pioneers* [2] will find little that is new here. In fact, Roazen follows these sources so closely that for long stretches one tends to lose track of the rationale for pouring this old wine into a new bottle. One can only regret that, while he went about summarizing the biographical data on Freud and his circle, Roazen failed to consider a substantial body of recent work on the subject in the periodical literature of psychoanalysis.

The author's explanation for having undertaken his study seems disingenuous. He had spent a great deal of time and energy in interviewing Freud's surviving patients and students, and he had gained access to Ernest Jones's working papers related to the great 'official' biography of Freud. The actual material from these sources that has found its way into this book is exceedingly meager, however; it is difficult to believe that the presentation of these crumbs would have impelled anyone to write a study of this magnitude.

At any rate, as a testing ground of the value of oral history, this book is a striking cautionary example. Even if we overlooked our

[1] Roazen, P.: *Brother Animal. The Story of Freud and Tausk*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969. Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXXIX, 1970, pp. 631-633.

[2] Alexander, F.; Eisenstein, S.; Grotjahn, M., Editors: *Psychoanalytic Pioneers*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966. Reviewed in This QUARTERLY, XXXVI, 1967, pp. 595-598.

doubts about Roazen's own reliability as a recorder of private interviews, the bits of gossip he purveys for us here defy evaluation. Although they are always attributed to specific informants, their publication merely serves as an open invitation to careless or credulous readers to initiate a process of myth-making about persons unable to present their own version of events. It has never seemed proper to accept the accounts of analytic patients about their treatment as unvarnished truth, and similar caution might be in order about the stories of friends and relations.

Historical evidence of any kind will only have value if used with good judgment, and Roazen's occasional discoveries will have to be weighed in terms of his over-all rating on that score. For this reviewer, his performance does not inspire confidence. To begin with, Roazen seems unaware of the limits of his expertise; e.g., he makes ex cathedra pronouncements about complex issues involving the theory of psychoanalytic technique, and he plunges into wild speculation about the unconscious motives of various behaviors. Questions might also be raised about Roazen's candor: although his current version of the Freud-Tausk relationship is significantly toned down from the claims made in *Brother Animal,* Roazen nowhere acknowledges that he is, in effect, retracting some of the more outrageous statements in his previous work. Finally, the author seems utterly lacking in the capacity to identify his own emotional biases, so that he repeatedly draws illogical conclusions from his own data.

The principal instance of his bias is Roazen's insistence on viewing Freud as overconcerned about priority of discovery and unable to tolerate disagreement from his followers. Although Roazen reports numerous contrary instances, he dismisses these as exceptions. In those cases where disagreements led to personal difficulties, Roazen blandly omits widely reported and copious data about the responsibility of some of Freud's students for these consequences. Thus he does not mention Adler's remarkable provocativeness or Jung's paranoid accusations—signs which suggest that they, rather than Freud, had been unable to tolerate a difference of scientific opinions.

In general, Roazen has little empathy either for Freud's position as the lonely genius creating a new field of intellectual endeavor or for that of his ambivalently worshipful students. Nor does he grasp the vast gap that separated the isolated valuable insights contributed by one or another follower from the systematic and integrated

evolution of psychoanalysis that was taking place through Freud. In my judgment, among Freud's students, Jung alone proved himself capable of major creative accomplishments outside of Freud's stimulating ambience. Ultimately, the separation between Freud and Jung was good for both in permitting each to develop in his own authentic manner, without interference from the powerful influence of the other. But these complexities of the intellectual history of psychoanalysis seem out of the author's reach; Roazen does not demonstrate an understanding of the processes of discovery in clinical science.

In spite of these multiple shortcomings, psychoanalysts would be ill-advised to ignore Roazen's book. In the welter of unwarranted accusations against Freud, we may discern a grain of truth that deserves serious attention. Roazen's account suggests that Freud's mantle as the sole creator of psychoanalysis has been passed on to a narrow circle of friends and 'apostles', and that the wider community of psychoanalysts has more or less passively assented to this unreasonable state of affairs. If, indeed, we have unwittingly allowed personal proximity to Freud to determine the leadership of psychoanalysis—if our discipline has literally become a Freud family affair, a *cosa nostra*—we have been guilty of betraying the actual heritage of Sigmund Freud.

JOHN E. GEDO (CHICAGO)

PSYCHANALYSE DU GÉNIE CRÉATEUR (Psychoanalysis of Creative Genius). By Didier Anzieu, Michel Mathieu, Matthew Besdine, Elliott Jacques and Jean Guillaumin. Paris: Éditions Dunod, 1974. 280 pp.

This book consists of five essays on the broad theme of art and psychoanalysis. Two of the articles were originally published in English: *Death and the Mid-Life Crisis* by Elliott Jacques which appeared in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (Vol. XLVI, pp. 502-514); and *The Jocasta Complex, Mothering and Genius* by Matthew Besdine, which appeared in Psychoanalytic Review (Vol. LV, pp. 259-277). This review will therefore be concerned only with the original French articles: *Vers une métapsychologie de la création* by Didier Anzieu; *D'une improbable esthétique: Essai sur les théories psychanalytiques de l'art* by Michel Mathieu, and *La création artistique et l'élaboration consciente de*

l'inconscient, avec des considérations particulières sur la création poétique by Jean Guillaumin. The first and last are short essays, but the middle one is one hundred thirty-seven pages and so will receive a more detailed treatment.

In considering the French contribution to psychoanalytic studies of the creative process, it is worth bearing in mind the fact that among published English-speaking analysts, there are no professional writers. In France, however, there are novelists and poets who are also analysts. Because of this conjunction, writers, painters, sculptors, and analysts got together for five days in 1962 at the Chateau de Cérisy to discuss the relationship between the arts and psychoanalysis. André Berge, a participant who is both a novelist and a psychoanalyst, in his essay *L'art et la psychanalyse*[1] noted that: 'The artist is too curious about all aspects of the world—both the external world and the internal one—to be indifferent to the discoveries of psychoanalysis . . . and the psychoanalyst is too curious about all manifestations of the world of emotions [*la vie affective*] to be indifferent to artistic activity' (reviewer's translation).

In the present work, Michel Mathieu, true to this orientation (he is a child analyst who is also something of an art historian, a literary critic, and a poet), shows a very wide acquaintance with painting, music, poetry, and European literature in general and attempts to use this knowledge in his psychoanalytic thinking. It is refreshing to observe this awareness of a world of learning outside of psychoanalysis, upon which psychoanalysts such as Mathieu can draw to their advantage. Mathieu's essay on dreams and fantasies of flying is a fine piece of work, containing many interesting ideas. However, despite the charming qualities of this essay, the longest one in the book, the book as a whole is disappointing. The authors do not seem to have used the scientific literature to the extent that one might expect of writers in this field. For example, there is no reference to the important works of Kubie, such as his book, *Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process*. Similarly, Lewin's valuable study on elation, a work which contains a host of brilliant observations on art is not mentioned, nor is Eissler's study of Goethe. Perhaps there is a special effort in these essays to be contemporary,

[1] *Cf.*, Berge, A., et al., Editors: *Entretiens sur l'art et la psychanalyse*. Décades du Centre Cultural International de Cérisy-la-Salle, Nouvelle Série 6. Paris: Mouton, 1968. For Berge's essay, see pp. 6-23.

for it is not only the classical English writings (e.g., Glover) that are ignored, but also such well known French classics as Marie Bonaparte's study of Poe, or René Laforgue's pioneer work on Beaudelaire.

For most American analysts this book will, I believe, prove difficult. Psychoanalysis is used here in obscure ways that seem unfamiliar. Anyone who has read Jacques Lacan is aware of the formidable syntactic problems long before substance is reached: it is difficult to know just what he means at the most literal level. The same is true of many passages in this book. One must read it several times, and even then one is not sure he has grasped the meaning of the sentence. But my difficulty with the work may simply be that it is so totally oriented toward the school of Melanie Klein and, as one who is not steeped in this literature, I feel disoriented. I believe there is something inherently obfuscating in the Kleinian orientation (though Klein herself is always interesting to read even when one is certain she is being 'fantastic'). The greatest use is made of what is surely a genuine insight on Klein's part, her notion of artistic creation as an act of reparation toward ambivalently cathected lost objects. (This has been the subject of a separate essay in a book by another French writer on psychoanalysis and aesthetics.[2]) But beyond this initial insight and its clinical use, it is hard to see how one can say much more without becoming very obscure or absurd. This is precisely what Anzieu does, in a typically Kleinian fashion when he suggests, on page 13, that Einstein's double theory of relativity can be understood in terms of the paranoid and depressive positions! It is interesting to note that, like another poet, W. H. Auden, Mathieu makes use of Groddeck, a writer who was more artist than scientist and who was willing to speculate wildly. The problem with wild analysis is that it has a certain attractive passion to it, a certain exciting enthusiasm. (In applied analysis, this is evidenced in Róheim's work, which, predictably, Mathieu employs.)

In saying that the French writers of this work are steeped in the Kleinian tradition, I do not mean that they are unaware of ego psychology and in particular of Kris's concept of 'regression in the

[2] *Cf.*, Chasseguet-Smirgel, Janine: *Reflexions sur le concept de 'réparation' et la hierarchie des actes créateurs.* In: *Pour une psychanalyse de l'art et de la créativité.* Paris: Payot, 1971, pp. 89-103.

service of the ego'. Unfortunately, however, in contrast to concepts like the mechanisms of defense that Freud listed in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety,* 'regression in the service of the ego' is often misused by analysts in the service of unfounded speculation rather than empirical observation. Paradoxically, though it may seem to lie on the opposite end of the spectrum from Kleinian analysis, I believe there are similarities between this concept and Kleinian theories. This book can be cited as an example of the effort to amalgamate the two conceptions.

Reading this work *does* bring one face to face with a number of interesting and important questions. Why was psychoanalytic literary criticism so much richer in the 1940's and the 1950's and so relatively impoverished now? Why were so many good writers of past decades, such as Thomas Mann, passionately interested in psychoanalysis, whereas today writers seem to be either Jungians, or indifferent and hostile to Freud and his successors? Finally, why does so much psychoanalytic writing today seem so culturally impoverished? This book, if it does nothing else, at least reminds us of these issues.

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Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLX, 1975.

Harold R. Galef

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ABSTRACTS

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLX, 1975.

Deprivation in the Childhood of Depressed Women. Shirley Jacobson; Jean Fasman; Alberto DiMascio. Pp. 5-14.

Longstanding hypotheses have placed the basis for depression in the frustration of primary object relationships. The authors attempt to study this issue by surveying types of childhood depression and correlating them with a range of pathology. Significantly, they focus on aspects of the child-rearing process which may be emotionally experienced as loss or deprivation. Thus the qualitative aspects as well as objective events, such as death, parental leave-taking, and parental illness, are brought into consideration. Their findings show limited association of adult depression with overt childhood loss events. However, the evidence supports an association of adult depression with child-rearing processes that involve deprivation. There is also a relationship between the degree of these latter experiences and the severity of the adult illness as measured by hospital status. Further discussion of the factors involved deals with the parental illness or personality disturbance which may have interfered with the parents' child-rearing functions. Although the conceptual bases and over-all findings are hardly novel, the study appears useful in considering a breakdown of variables in the area of childhood deprivation.

Student Suicide: Death as a Life Style. Herbert Hendin. Pp. 204-219.

This is an interesting and fresh approach to the problem of suicidal patients in a college population. Hendin considers such frequently mentioned factors as the competitive strain of college life, but he goes well beyond such issues. While he found that a significantly high proportion of seriously suicidal students had actually lost a parent, he emphasizes as crucial the quality of feeling between student and parents while the parents are alive. Hendin's basic thesis is that these students were drawn to death as a way of life, as an ongoing part of their adaptation. They saw their relationships with their parents as dependent on their emotional, if not their physical, death. At college the meaning of suicide and depression lay in the student's encounter with experiences that might unleash his potential for freedom. The students Hendin studied came from families in which the relationship between the parents and family life as a whole were essentially dead. Being happy meant giving up the past and the more secure part of themselves. To maintain a parental bond, feelings had to be extinguished. An invitation to freedom would constitute an irreparable separation. Depression thus prolonged the students' ties with their parents, warded off the intensity of their rage, and avoided a new life with its consequent anxieties.

The concepts Hendin presents deserve serious consideration, although it is quite possible to interpret the clinical data differently.

HAROLD R. GALEF

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLXI, 1975.

Cinematic Neurosis Following 'The Exorcist'. James C. Bozzuto. Pp. 43-48.

Although there has been much discussion about the possibility of harmful psychological reactions to films, we have very little meaningful data. Bozzuto presents four cases which suggest a significant hazard in viewing the film, *The Exorcist*. He compares the mechanism to one that Freud discussed in *A Seventeenth-Century Demonological Neurosis,* which was published in 1923. The mechanism Freud described appeared to be the retention of a part object in the face of a loss as a partial solution to that loss. The principal psychological themes in both Freud's report and the recent film seem to be the loss of a parent, depression, and the psychological attempt at restitution by retention of a part object in the form of the Devil. Bozzuto's case material is interesting, although the therapeutic contacts in each case were limited. Moderate to severe disorganization occurred after viewing the film. The author views the precipitant as an increase of stimulus too powerful to be dealt with or worked off in the usual way. In each case, anger and hostility toward an ambivalently cathected object was experienced, which resulted in fears of identification with the Devil. Intense guilt over aggressive feelings then followed. In addition to these considerations, Bozzuto discusses his therapeutic approach, which appears to have been quite successful.

Integration and Sealing-Over as Recovery Styles from Acute Psychosis: Metapsychological and Dynamic Concepts. Steven T. Levy; Thomas H. McGlashan; William T. Carpenter, Jr. Pp. 307-312.

The authors develop the concepts of integration and sealing-over, which refer to a patient's style of coping with stressful events, conflicting ideas, and disturbing affects during acute psychosis. The two processes, in some ways overlapping and in other ways rather opposite, are discussed in metapsychological and dynamic terms, with the operating principles viewed in terms of ego function. Sealing-over describes a process by which psychotic experiences and symptoms are isolated from nonpsychotic mental events and then made unavailable by both conscious suppression and by repression. Integration refers to a process in which a continuity is recognized between thoughts and feelings experienced during psychosis and those of prepsychotic and post-psychotic mental life. Although integration would appear to be preferable to most psychoanalysts, sealing-over may have advantages for some patients. Clinical examples are given to illustrate both types of adaptation.

HAROLD R. GALEF

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXXII, 1975.

The Madness of Art. Leon Edel. Pp. 1005-1012.

Edel traces a common thread in the works of James Joyce, Henry James, and Frank Kafka, among others. He finds the term 'tristimania', which was applied

by Dr. Benjamin Rush to an agitated form of depression, useful in describing the 'depression in art—for nothing is more chronic among writers than sadness. Turn where we will, we find them writing elegies upon the passing of time, of glory, of life.' A brief abstract cannot do justice to the rich material, scholarly observations, and the conclusions in Edel's paper. The psychoanalyst will find this rewarding reading.

Persecutory Delusions: A Cybernetic Model. Frederick T. Melges and Arthur M. Freeman. Pp. 1038-1044.

Persecutory delusions stem from the threat of loss of personal control over the self and others and from the attempts to prevent this loss of control. Using cybernetic concepts, the authors trace and identify four stages in the formation and maintenance of persecutory delusions. The maintenance of such delusions is an attempt on the part of the individual to regain control by transforming previous anger about future possibilities into resentment about what has supposedly happened, giving the patient a present-time new focus—the goal of resisting this persecutory influence. The authors also give a short discussion of Freudian and Sullivanian ideas of persecutory delusions, examining similarities to and differences from their cybernetic model, along with implications for treatment and research.

Psychotherapy of Borderline Patients: The Influence of Theory on Technique. Henry J. Friedman. Pp. 1048-1052.

The author compares treatment based on object relations with treatment based on ego psychology. Essential to the object relations approach are three basic assumptions: 1, that borderline patients are particularly sensitive to abandonment and defend heavily against this fear; 2, that long-term hospitalization is more helpful than either short-term hospitalization or avoidance of it altogether; and 3, that therapy conducted with the borderline patient is ineffective if disruptive outbursts are kept to a minimum. Treatment based on these assumptions leads to chaotic, destructive regressions, and from a clinical viewpoint, the burden of proof lies with the advocates of long-term hospitalization and regression-promoting psychotherapy, compared to a more active, limit-setting, insight oriented technique. Psychoanalytic technique is not applicable to borderline patients: they are not able to use a fully developed transference relationship, since they do not defend against infantile drives in the same manner as do neurotic patients. The following treatment recommendations are made. 1. An early positive rapport must be established at the outset of treatment; if the initial reaction is indifferent or negative, and cannot be resolved, a change of therapist should be recommended. 2. No active mobilization of the negative transference should be made. 3. Limit-setting techniques are suggested whenever the patient begins to lose sight of the rational goals of treatment, which is often signaled by a preoccupation with how the patient feels about the therapist. 4. The therapist should encourage the patient's conscious understanding of the fact that the main purpose of treatment is to increase self-awareness through insight. 5. Countertransference reactions in response to

disturbed behavior should be a warning to the therapist that adequate limits had not been set earlier in the treatment.

Controversy in Medicine and Psychiatry. Lorrin M. Koran. Pp. 1064-1066.

Koran finds that a number of medical students today reject a career in psychiatry because 'the field is so marked by controversy'. In this short article, he outlines factual and ethical controversies common to all branches of medicine in the hope that increasing medical students' tolerance of uncertainty will not only help them become better physicians, but will also remove one of the reasons for their disinterest in psychiatry.

Borderline and Schizophrenic Patients: A Comparative Study. John G. Gunderson; William T. Carpenter, Jr.; John M. Straus. Pp. 1257-1264.

This carefully controlled study demonstrated a highly significant absence of thought disorder in the borderline sample. Over-all, the borderline patients showed significantly fewer psychotic symptoms than the schizophrenic patients, and anxiety was higher in the schizophrenic group than in the borderline group. The authors compare their findings with those of Drinkers' earlier study and find agreement that both anger and intense dissociative experience may be useful symptoms in discriminating between the two groups. A surprising and important finding was that despite markedly different admitting symptoms, the two groups had similar prognostic and outcome characteristics. These results may support suggestions from genetic research and psychodynamic formulations that borderline patients are very similar to schizophrenic patients.

Prediction of Performance of Psychiatric Residents: A Three-Year Follow-Up Study. Henry Kandler; Robert Plutchik; Hope Conte; Barbara Siegel. Pp. 1286-1290.

Ratings based on interviews prior to acceptance in a Residency Program had relatively low to almost no predictive power. However, year by year supervisory ratings consistently discriminated in certain areas between Residents rated high and those rated low in each year. Items that were most important in the ratings included the Resident's ability in the clinical management of patients, expertise in one-to-one psychotherapy, ability to understand psychodynamics, and general knowledge of clinical psychiatry. Qualities such as sensitivity to others, appropriate reaction to criticism and response to supervision, openness, lack of anxiety, and self-awareness were also considered in discriminating between high and low performance. The authors conclude that the initial interview functions more as a means for exchanging information to insure congruence between the attitudes and expectations of the applicant and those of the department, rather than as a predictor of future performance.

WILLIAM ROSENTHAL

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXXIII, 1976.

Countertransference: A Neglected Subject in Clinical Supervision. Marcia Kraft Goin and Frank Kline. Pp. 41-44.

Using videotaped meetings of supervision affecting Psychiatric Residents in training, the authors attempted to ascertain the degree of discussion of countertransference. They define countertransference broadly as the therapists' conscious and unconscious reactions to and feelings about their patients. Only four of the twenty-four supervisors observed talked about countertransference to a large degree. Twelve avoided the subject completely and the rest talked about it only indirectly. Nineteen of the twenty-four supervisors were candidates in or members of psychoanalytic institutes; the other five had dynamic psychotherapy as their primary theoretical orientation. Most of the supervisors believed that discussions of countertransference were equated with therapy and that therapy had no place in supervision. The authors interpret this behavior as phobic avoidance on the part of the supervisors and as an inadvertent betrayal of their educational responsibilities. This presents a dilemma: relieving anxiety, providing support, and establishing a positive relationship, while characteristic of therapy, should not be avoided in a supervisory situation. The authors feel that confusion between the roles of therapist and educator was undoubtedly involved in the case of those supervisors who were willing to talk only indirectly about countertransference. Although countertransference interpretation to the Resident could be used as a weapon by supervisors, either in a competitive struggle with the Residents or in the search for narcissistic gratification, this should not frighten supervisors away from discussing the Residents' countertransference reactions.

Overview: Ethical Issues in Contemporary Psychiatry. Fritz Redlich and Richard F. Mollica. Pp. 125-136.

In an excellent survey article, the authors discuss many of the ethical problems confronting psychiatry today. Psychiatric intervention is justified only with the patient's informed consent, except in rare instances. The article deals with the right to treatment, the right to no treatment, the rights of patients in general, commitment procedures, various aspects of behavior control, the issues of privacy and confidentiality, and the place of psychiatry in the ever-changing moral structure of the society. Included is a most useful bibliography.

Cluster Analysis Profiles of Suicide Attempters. Ari Kiev. Pp. 150-153.

Profile types were correlated with six outcome variables. Included in the profiles were data regarding the seriousness of the suicide attempt, the social setting, interpersonal conflicts, judgment about over-all functioning, and observations of 'significant others'. Particular emphasis must be given to the views of significant others regarding the patient's symptoms and need for treatment, the presence of interpersonal conflict, and the discrepancy between the attitudes of the patient and his or her significant others. At highest risk of suicide were patients who were suffering from psychoneurotic illnesses with depressive or anxiety symptoms while they were involved in interpersonal conflicts, and patients with long-standing

characterological problems. The third group comprised those socially isolated patients who tend to disappear from follow-up studies, thus representing an additional high-risk group.

WILLIAM ROSENTHAL

Journal of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry. XIV, 1975.

Ghosts in the Nursery: A Psychoanalytic Approach to the Problems of Impaired Infant-Mother Relationships. Selma Fraiberg; Edna Edelson; Vivian Shapiro. Pp. 387-421.

In this beautifully written paper, the defense of identification with the aggressor is explored. Through detailed accounts of two patients, in which 'ghosts of the parental past take possession of the nursery' (the mothers reared their infants in a repetition of the pathological and traumatic parenting they had suffered as infants), a key question and a thoughtful hypothesis are presented. The focal question raised is what 'determines whether the conflicted past of the parent will be repeated with [her] child', since it is well known that not every traumatized child becomes a traumatizing parent. The authors pose the hypothesis that the essential difference is in the nature and content of the defensive repressions. The parent who has successfully isolated and repressed the affective components of the trauma seems doomed to repeat the pathological parenting through identification with the betrayers and aggressors. Those who, for reasons not understood and warranting further study, consciously retain the affects of their painful past are better able to spare their own children that same experience.

Intrapsychic Conflict, Interpersonal Relationships and Family Mythology. Mary San Martino and Morton B. Newman. Pp. 422-435.

The authors undertake in this interesting and useful paper a task they conceive of as a major one for child psychiatry: 'to integrate concepts of intrapsychic process in a child with formulations about the effect of interpersonal relationships in the family'. They begin with a brief but remarkably well integrated and summarized overview of the early phases of individual development. The concept of family mythology—the family's 'drama' and its assigned roles as expression of family needs, conflicts, and hopes—is elaborated and then used to link the child's intrapsychic system and the family's interpersonal system. The child's assigned role in the mythology becomes a major factor in the secondary identifications the child builds upon previously established primary identifications. Failure to synchronize the family assigned role with intrapsychic development will result in various pathological adaptations. A clinical example is presented.

The Effects of Parental Divorce: Experiences of the Preschool Child. Judith S. Wallerstein and Joan B. Kelly. Pp. 600-616.

This paper reports a segment of a larger study of the children of divorcing parents, seen at the time of the marital breakup and again one year later. It describes the nature of the responses of young, middle, and older preschool

children. The critical finding presented is that fifty per cent of the sample showed significant disturbance of functioning in the one-year follow-up. This is particularly noteworthy because the sample is of children previously judged developmentally adequate, and conservative standards were used in determining maladaptive functioning. The paper is of special interest to analysts, since they deal with so many patients in the process of divorcing and are in a position to observe and have impact on the children involved.

ALICE KROSS FRANKEL

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research. III, 1974.

The following abstracts appeared in the Journal of Psycholinguistic Research and are reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

Child and Adult Learning of Surface Structure Cues to Deep Structure Using a Picture Card Technique. Richard F. Cromer. Pp. 1-14.

An experiment requiring the learning of 'new' (nonsense) words replacing the words 'eager' and 'easy' in the linguistic structure 'John is eager/easy to please' showed that only adults and higher-IQ children could perform better than chance on the new words. Contrary to prediction, children showed no differential learning ability on two types of words to be learned. However, an analysis of the strategies used gave evidence of a language-specific learning ability in children but not in adults. It is proposed that the inability of lower-IQ children to learn the words, as well as the lack of differential learning of the two types by higher-IQ children, was due to the nature of the task—being more like that used in concept formation experiments than like natural language.

The Cartesian Frame of Reference: A Structure Unifying the Description of Dyslexia. Graham Richardson. Pp. 15-63.

It is shown that six phenomena often associated with dyslexia may be attributed to the lack of a visual, Cartesian frame of reference. These phenomena are: 1, reading errors due to letter reversal, inversion, or rotation; 2, form recognition of all classes of mono-oriented objects which is independent of the figure's egocentric orientation; 3, defective visual sequential scanning, resulting in confused letter and word order; 4, poor visual balance performance; 5, the failure to acquire nonspatial ordering relations, including temporal relations and tenses; and 6, the characteristic intellectual profile of severely retarded readers, namely, PIQ/VIQ greater than 1, where PIQ is the performance IQ score and VIQ the verbal IQ score on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC). The latter phenomenon is dependent on 2 and 5 above. A strategy for further research is outlined.

Polysemy and Memory. Charles A. Perfetti and Robert Lindsey. Pp. 75-89.

The degree of ambiguity of words with multiple meanings was estimated by the semantic uncertainty (U) of a word as measured by word association and sentence generation tasks. Ambiguous words defined in this way were as well remembered

in a recognition memory test as control words. When words were first presented in sentences that would determine their encoded sense, it was found that successive encodings of an ambiguous word converged more when the word appeared in its primary sense than when it appeared in its secondary sense. However, given convergent encodings, recognition was more likely if the word had first occurred in its secondary sense. An explanation in terms of semantic focus is offered and related to the general relationship between recognition and frequency.

Developmental Study of the Comprehension and Production of the Pronoun 'It'. Harold H. Chipman and Catherine de Dardel. Pp. 91-99.

Forty-two English-speaking children aged 3.3 to 7.0 were asked to act out instructions of the type 'There is clay on the table, give it to me', where the pronoun 'it' occurs in object position and refers to a collective noun, or to a count noun, or to a noun ('chocolate') which can be either. They were also asked to describe actions performed by the experimenter and to repeat the experimenter's instructions. A hierarchical pattern of behavior emerged and unexpected errors were noted. The results do not appear to be interpretable from the purely linguistic point of view; it is argued that analogous observations have been made in problem-solving tasks and that therefore cognitive development in general must play an important part.

Changes in Verbal Child-Mother Interactions with Increasing Language Skills of the Child. Ernst Moerk. Pp. 101-116.

Protocols of language interactions between mothers and children are analyzed. The children ranged in age from 2.2 years to 5.0 years. Systematic changes in the interactions were found with the increasing level of language skills of the child. Mothers generally proved to be very sensitive measuring instruments of the language capacities of their children and they adapted their verbal utterances to these capacities. The syntactical forms as well as the communicated contents of the message were changed with increasing language skill. Nonhuman environmental influences on the language behaviors were studied in part and changes in the use of these situational resources by the mothers were observed. Individual differences in the teaching methods of the mothers as well as in the reactions of the children are discussed.

The Naming of Objects and Symbols by Children and Aphasic Patients. Howard Gardner. Pp. 133-149.

Three studies of naming in children and in aphasic patients were conducted in order to determine the kinds of errors made in the naming of objects, parts of objects, and various kinds of symbols, and to evaluate the contribution of operativity to the ease of naming such elements. Operativity refers to the extent to which elements can be transformed and involved in a variety of sensory and motor schemes. It was found that operativity of depicted elements makes a significant contribution to ease of naming for both groups of subjects. However, children and aphasic patients made different types of naming errors. In the case of naming of symbols, the categories easiest for aphasics to name proved the

most difficult for children to name. It is suggested that the partial loss of an acquired ability can produce a different clinical picture from the partial acquisition of that ability in the normal child. The concept of operativity may be a less useful concept in the relatively figurative domain of symbols.

Electrographic Correlates of Lateral Asymmetry in the Processing of Verbal and Nonverbal Auditory Stimuli. Helen Neville. Pp. 151-163.

Averaged evoked potentials (AEP) to verbal (digits) and nonverbal (clicks) auditory stimuli were recorded from left and right temporal leads in ten right-handed subjects. With dichotic presentation, there was no significant difference in accuracy of report of the clicks heard in each ear, but significantly more digits were identified correctly from the right ear than from the left. Dichotic verbal stimuli elicited AEP whose early components were of greater amplitude, and whose later components were of shorter latency, from the left hemisphere than from the right. No consistent latency or amplitude differences were observed between AEP from the left and right hemispheres when clicks were presented dichotically.

The Development of Figurative Language in Children. Marilyn R. Pollio and Howard R. Pollio. Pp. 185-201.

Children in the third, fourth, and fifth grades were asked to do three different tasks in an attempt to determine their ability to use figurative language. Results for a Composition task showed that children produced a greater number of frozen than novel figures and that the absolute level of such usage decreased over grades. Results for a Multiple Sentences task revealed that children produced more frozen than novel figures and that both showed a marked increase over grade. Results for a Comparisons task indicated that figurative language increased over grade, and that for this task children used more novel than frozen figures. Taken in conjunction with earlier work, these data suggest that children are able to use figurative language well before they can explain the exact nature of the relationship linking elements of the figure. In Piagetian terms, this implies that children use figurative language in the stage of concrete operations but cannot explain such usage until the stage of formal operations.

The Identification of Structural Components of an Unknown Language. James A. Wakefield, Jr.; Eugene B. Doughtie; Byong-Hee Lee Yom. Pp. 261-269.

Adult subjects attempted to identify structures (words and constituents) in sentences of a language they did not know. They heard each sentence twice—once with a pause interrupting a structural component and once with a pause separating different structural components. They were asked to choose the version that sounded more natural. An experimental group of subjects who had been previously exposed to a spoken passage in the same language as the test sentences was more successful in identifying structures of the sentences than was the control group with previous exposure to another language. This result was interpreted as demonstrating that language structure may be partially acquired during a brief exposure without reliance on meaning. It was also noted that the experimental group identified constituents more accurately than words. This result

suggested that constituents, more than words, function as acquisitional units of language.

On the Preferred Form of the Double Object Construction. Carol Waryas and Kathleen Stremel. Pp. 271-280.

Two groups of fifteen adults participated in two preference rating tasks for written sentence forms. Pairs of sentences were presented to the subjects which differed only in the grammatical form used to express the double object construction (one which has both a direct and an indirect object). Several hypotheses were formulated regarding the nature of subjects' preferences for various combinations of grammatical form and pronominalization. Results indicated that adults show clear preferences for one grammatical form in most instances and that rules can be formulated for these preferences. The relevance of these results for the examination of current language assessment tests and the development of language training programs is discussed.

Voice Quality Analysis of American and German Speakers. Klaus R. Scherer. Pp. 281-298.

Six phoneticians rated the voices of twenty-six American and twenty-two German speakers on nine voice quality parameters which were discussed and illustrated by tape-recorded examples before the rating sessions. A reliability analysis showed highly significant interrater agreement on most parameters. Intercorrelations of the expert ratings and correlations with lay ratings of voice are reported and discussed. In concluding, empirical voice-personality relationships are reported and the role of sociocultural and attributional factors in this area is discussed.

Effects of Nonlinguistic Knowledge on Language Production. Richard J. Harris. Pp. 303-310.

In Part 1 of the experiment described herein, subjects wrote descriptions of the second panel of two-panel cartoons. Half of the cartoons were immediately preceded by the appropriate first panel and half were not. In Part 2, subjects described single-panel cartoons for one of two types of readers: 1, a person who could not see the cartoon or 2, a person looking at the cartoon with the subject but not 'getting it'. Both manipulations gave the predicted results. Subjects who saw panel 2 after panel 1 and subjects who could assume common perceptual information with the reader wrote shorter descriptions and used fewer definite articles than subjects who saw panel 2 only and subjects who could not assume common perceptual information. Results are used to argue against linguistic-object theories and for an interactive theory of the higher mental processes.

The Comprehension of Relative, Absolute, and Contrastive Adjectives by Young Children. Katherine Nelson and Helen Benedict. Pp. 333-342.

Three types of adjectives---relative, contrastive, and absolute—were presented in standard and comparative contrasts to preschool children in a picture-choice

paradigm. Proportion of errors in picture choices showed the predicted effect of greater difficulty for comparative than for standard terms. Latency data showed that the responses to comparative forms of absolute and contrastive adjectives were significantly slower than responses to their standard forms, and were also slower than responses to the comparative forms of the relative terms which did not differ from their standard forms. These data support the interpretation that the classes of relative, contrastive, and absolute adjectives are processed differently by young children. Factors of cognitive complexity that influence the order of difficulty are considered.

A Pragmatic Description of Early Language Development. John Dore. Pp. 343-350.

Language acquisition involves more than learning the abstract structures of linguistic competence. The child also has to learn how to use linguistic structures appropriately. In this paper, the speech act is proposed as the unit of analysis for studying the pragmatics of early child language. The results of a study of children's uses of single-word utterances are reported, and the data are analyzed in terms of 'primitive speech acts'.

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Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Donald L. Miller

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NOTES

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

November 26, 1974. THE FALL OF MAN. (Abraham A. Brill Memorial Lecture). K. R. Eissler, M.D.

Confronting the 'anguished mood of desperation that has settled over the whole world', Dr. Eissler does not equivocate: 'Mankind's future is doomed'. In search of deeper explanations of man's failure, he looks to the biological matrix out of which man arose.

With the origin of life, the principle of *strict invariance* that governed the physical universe gave way to a momentous evolutionary innovation: structural differentiation. This, in turn, made possible a process of *regulated variance* by mutation, heredity, selection, etc. 'This state of regulated variance ended with anthropogenesis, when the organic evolution in man switched to cultural evolution, which is regulated by essentially different principles.' Dr. Eissler dates the 'fall of man'—the moment at which 'man stepped out of nature'—from the emergence of a new principle: *unregulated variance*. He ascribes this crucial shift to the 'fundamental innovation in the structure of the psychic apparatus that occurred with anthropogenesis . . . the breakdown of instincts as the main and exclusive organizer of animal behavior and their degradation to drives in human behavior'. He goes on to say: '. . . whereas the instinct programmed in the genetic structure of the animal determines not only its urges but also the ways in which these urges will be gratified, in man these ways are supplied by the ego'. In the absence of sufficient cortical mutations to enable man's ego to cope adaptively with these choices, the unregulated variance of *cultural evolution* has supplanted the harmoniously regulated variance of *organic evolution*.

Dr. Eissler illustrated some qualitative and quantitative distortions in the process of natural selection attendant to this evolutionary 'misstep'. He pointed out how destructive many cultural innovations heralded as progress have been. Though 'physically fittest is not culturally most fit, and vice versa . . . instances can be documented which show the survival or dominance of the culturally unfit at the expense of the fit'. And with the development of cities and an accelerating rate of cultural change, variance in styles, political institutions, class distinctions, customs, language, beliefs, etc. has 'run wild'. In Dr. Eissler's view, 'the compulsion to repeat continues to rule so long as the cultural process remains at a standstill'. Unchecked by selection, variance 'makes the cultural process chaotic, transforming human history into pandemonium'.

Turning to some of the psychological consequences of the replacement of instincts by drives, the author stressed the following. 1. The freeing of 'enormous quantities of freely disposable surplus drive energy which . . . makes possible behavior that is no longer in the service of the optimal welfare of the species'. 2. The growth of aggression 'made possible by the change of the oral instinct in animals to the oral drive in man'. 3. 'A definite limit to which sublimation and

neutralization are possible.' The excess is used for the cathexis of the self, manifesting itself clinically as narcissism. At the time of anthropogenesis and the dawn of culture, 'love, aggression, and narcissism worked harmoniously together for the sole purpose of biological survival'. Now, a vast extension of man's psychological *greifraum* 'has become necessary if man is to survive, but this demand and this necessity exceed his potentiality'. 4. Man's heightened ambivalence, 'the first consequence of excess in aggression and narcissism'. There are certain antinomies intrinsic in the human condition which lead him to believe that 'the structure of man's psychic apparatus makes ethical behavior impossible'. 5. The 'uncanny alliance between aggression and narcissism. Through the operation of a basic law of psychic economy, aggressive discharges are without exception correlated with an increase in narcissistic cathexis. . . . Aggressive discharges cause a narcissistic increase and narcissism favors aggressive discharge.'

In closing, Dr. Eissler addressed himself to an ultimate antinomy—the contradictory sense in man of both free will and bondage—and the matter of suicide. He sees 'the potentiality of suicide as an essential characteristic of man's state', while finding it 'undeniable that man is the result of chance and necessity and that the much vaunted autonomy of the self is an illusion'. The author concludes that given man's nature and the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, our time has run out. 'Man was released from his bond of nature prematurely, prior to having reached an evolutionary stage that would have made it possible for him to solve the problems of his existence and, accordingly, to organize his behavior. . . .'

DONALD L. MILLER

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

January 21, 1974. THE ADOPTION THEME IN EDWARD ALBEE'S 'TINY ALICE' AND 'THE AMERICAN DREAM'. Jules Glenn, M.D.

Albee's *Tiny Alice* encompasses fantasies with which many adopted children are preoccupied. It is postulated that Albee unconsciously used his personal experiences as an adopted child in a highly adaptive way to give intensity and special character to his artistic creation. The protagonist, Brother Julian, is caught in a situation similar to that of many adopted children. An arrangement is made to hand him over to Miss Alice, a millionairess, in return for a large sum of money. When Julian discovers this he rebels and is shot. As he dies, he awaits being enveloped by a woman he planned to marry, an unseen Alice, for whom Miss Alice is merely a surrogate. The unseen Alice is confused with God and is seen as the mother of the Christ-like protagonist.

In the course of the play the presence of surrogates and doubles, including parent symbols, are confused with one another. Glenn suggests that this derives from the adopted child's dilemma stemming from his having two sets of parents, the biological and the legal. Julian is also concerned with loyalty and identity, and has other preoccupations common to the adopted child. He is fearful of

desertion. The dangers of incest with someone who may be forbidden appear in disguised form.

Adoption is treated more overtly in Albee's *The American Dream*. In this play, a materialistic, bickering couple and the wife's mother crassly refer to the couple's deceased, adopted son as if he had been their inanimate possession. After 'buying him' from an adoption agency, they soon gouged out his eyes and amputated his hands and penis because of minor transgressions. The only emotion expressed about his subsequent death is resentment: they had paid for him and now he was dead. They attempt to get their money back from a Mrs. Baker from the adoption agency. Young Man appears; he believes he was an illegitimate child whose mother died soon after his birth. Unknowingly he is manipulated into replacing the couple's dead, adopted son who is perhaps his identical twin brother. At the end of the play, Mrs. Baker announces that she will bill the family for the second adoption.

In this play, adopted children are presented as possessions to be bought and disposed of, or mutilated, if they object to their situation. Parental evasiveness and doubling are prominent themes, as they are in *Tiny Alice*. Young Man's family romance fantasy is that his parents were unmarried, that the father deserted them, and that his mother died. Adopted children's belief that their biological mother is dead may lead to self-destructive attempts to reach the lost mother.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Paulina Kernberg observed that in her experience both child and adult patients who have been adopted often have severe character pathology. Such patients have infantile, impulse-ridden personalities with generally poorer prognoses than those reared by biological parents. Their superego defects and pathological narcissism may be encouraged by the adoptive parents' lies about their having been especially chosen for adoption and by the adoptive parents' need to use them in an attempt to repair narcissistic wounds resulting from their own sterility and other dissatisfactions.

Dr. Kernberg commented that the role and feelings of the professional who arranges for the adoption is suggested in Albee's plays; the professional may be unconsciously perceived as one who humiliates and deceives, yet is sanctioned by law and the church. She also noted references in *Tiny Alice* to the adoptive mother's envy of her child's intimacy with another woman (the biological mother). The adopted child, fearing his sterile parents' envy, may submit to their prohibitions and renounce his own genital strivings. The unique developmental task of an adopted child is to accept the facts of adoption—namely, awareness of being the natural child of unknown biological parents as well as emotional acceptance of the parent-child ties with his adoptive parents.

Among several goals Dr. Kernberg recommends in analyzing adopted patients are: 1, full exploration of identifications with adoptive and natural parent images; 2, increasing the patient's tolerance of ambiguity without disturbing the sense of identity; 3, understanding the patient's feelings about being adopted at each stage of the transference; 4, working with the adoptive parents' needs to deny the adoption.

Dr. Henry Rosner made two cautionary observations: 1, many adopted chil-

dren cope quite well and do not require treatment; 2, any study in applied analysis, such as Dr. Glenn's of Albee's plays, is uncertain because free associations are lacking, and also many themes of writers are psychically overdetermined. The question remains whether one can detect from his plays how Albee felt about being an adopted child. Dr. Rosner offered an answer based on his work with adoption agencies and adopted children, as well as study of Albee's plays. He noted that at the time of Albee's adoption in 1928, agencies openly advised that adopted children be told that their mothers died in childbirth. Not all children, especially when they reached adolescence, could accept this explanation. However, Dr. Rosner thinks that Albee may have been a child who believed he was responsible for his mother's death.

Dr. Jan Frank related the fantasy of abandonment of the adopted child to a current social phenomenon: the abandonment of parents by their adolescent children. Although he agreed that not all adopted children grow up to be emotionally disturbed, he noted that they often have greater difficulty than others introjecting their adoptive parents' images.

Dr. George Wiedeman posed several questions. 1, When should an adopted child be informed of his adoption? Informing him during the œdipal period may produce severe distortions of the resolution of the œdipus complex, but doing so later may be traumatic. 2, How does the absence of pregnancy and childbirth effect the adoptive mother's early relationship with the adopted infant, especially in terms of the progression through the symbiotic and separation-individuation phases?

MARVIN A. NIERENBERG

At the Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION, May 1976, the following officers were elected: Herbert S. Gaskill, M.D., President; Kenneth T. Calder, M.D., President-Elect; Rebecca Z. Solomon, M.D., Secretary; Alex H. Kaplan, M.D., Treasurer.

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