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ON BEING TOLD OF ADOPTION

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Clinical data from the analyses of three adoptees document the deleterious effect of telling children under three years of age about their adoptive status. The knowledge, as well as the experiences, of being an adoptee imposes the need for defensive reactions which affect developmental process, cognitive function, object relationships, and fantasy life.

INTRODUCTION

Adoption, as a practical societal solution, is a humane attempt to meet the needs of a relinquished child and barren couples (Bernard, 1953). The Curtis Report (1946) asserts that most adoptions can be viewed as socially successful, but other statistics and clinical reports (Clothier, 1939; Frisk, 1964; Goodman, et al., 1963; Kendrich and Wieder, 1974; McWhinnie, 1969; Peller, 1963; Rohman, 1970; Schechter, et al., 1964) reveal a fifteen to thirty per cent incidence of adoptees in the psychiatric population, which far exceeds the two per cent incidence in the general census. Even if this disparity is somewhat skewed, the figures indicate a vulnerability of adopted people to emotional illness.

In view of the statistics and the wide professional interest in these children, it is surprising that psychoanalytic studies of them are sparse in the literature. Even the Panel on Adoption at the 1966 American Psychoanalytic Association Meeting (Schechter, 1967) included the analysis of only one adopted child. All authors agree that adoption should take place as early as possible, ideally at birth. Most recommend the disclosure to

I wish to thank my colleagues of the Great Neck Study Group for their stimulation as well as their critiques of this presentation. I am indebted to Drs. I. Bernstein, H. Blum, J. Glenn, M. Jucovy, E. H. Kaplan, and H. Waldhorn.

the child of his adoptive status by age three (see, Knight, 1941).[1] Although some authors (see, Blum, 1969; Glenn, 1974) discuss adoption as a forceful influence on personality development and behavior, psychoanalytic case studies of the pathogenicity surrounding the meaning and experiences of being an adoptee are lacking.

This report attempts to fill a void in the analytic literature on adoptees. It focuses on the consequences of disclosure about their adoption to children under three years of age. Excerpts from the analyses of a child of nine, an adolescent of seventeen, and an adult of twenty-seven adumbrate certain sequelae validating the assumption that early disclosure was disruptive to ego development.

CLINICAL DATA

To separate the effect of being told of adoption from the many and varied influences on development, I have purposely chosen to describe patients who had been living with their adoptive parents from the first postnatal week and who had learned of their adoption by age three. These criteria, I believe, best satisfy what is considered optimal circumstances in the literature. Children adopted a few months after birth, and especially at later ages after foster care, have had actual and traumatizing experience of loss and change of objects which becloud the impact of the adoption story itself (see, Kendrich and Wieder, 1974).

I

Pete started analysis at age fifteen after two years of psychotherapy. His early development had been without apparent complications or behavioral difficulties until he was fifteen months old. At that time a second child, Andy, was adopted. Pete's initial reaction was to cry if the baby was picked up; otherwise he ignored him. Up to age two, according to the

[1] Notably, Peller (1963) and Schechter, et al. (1964) question the advisability of this early communication.

adoptive mother, she was oversolicitous and was unable "to let Pete cry and feel he wasn't loved or wanted."

From the age of two, Pete, a bright and verbal child, gradually received information about his being adopted, in accordance with agency advice. He was told: "Mother and Father wanted a baby very much but something was wrong with Mother's insides and she couldn't make a baby. Another Mother bore you. She was a young girl who made you with a soldier. They couldn't take care of you. We found you through a doctor who helped your Mother, and made arrangements for us to take you home." These thoughts were communicated over a three-year period.

Following the disclosure, Pete could not tolerate the adoptive mother's being out of his sight. He cried pitiably in her absence, became timid, avoided Andy completely, and had difficulty falling asleep. He could not relax unless the adoptive mother was present. Mother and child interacted—her oversolicitous ministering was a response to his fears of her absence. Pete never fully recovered his equilibrium.

When he was sent to nursery school at three and a half years, his fears and intolerance of separation led to a temporary removal for six months. Still timid on his return, he managed to remain but his anxiety continued into kindergarten, where he still cried for his mother and isolated himself from other children. Treatment of Pete had been advised from his fifth year but the adoptive mother would not permit it. Not until age thirteen, when he was in danger of failing in school and had no friends, did she agree to his going into therapy.

From the first through the seventh grades, he did poorly both socially and academically, although testing revealed high average intelligence. Pete's relationship to his adoptive mother remained overdependent, and with her overprotective behavior a symbiotic-like attachment was perpetuated (see, Mahler, 1968). After two years of psychotherapy with Dr. A, in conjunction with transfer to a nearby boarding school, his worsening anxiety led to a re-evaluation and he was referred to me for analysis.

The analysis began with expressions of his fears and concerns about being an adopted person who could, at his adoptive mother's instigation, be transferred, given away, or "gotten rid of" for actual or fantasied transgressions. His complaint about the previous therapist "for sending me away, probably for doing something wrong" introduced a belief, held since childhood, that his biological mother "got rid of me because I was no good to begin with." Through his anger at his adoptive mother for "taking me from Dr. A and giving me to you," he revealed his feelings and confusion about his adoptive history and his fantasies of why and how he was adopted. His ready equation between his adoptive history and treatment experiences underscored his pervasive preoccupation with adoption themes.

An excessive dependency on his adoptive mother, as well as awe of her power symbolized through her money, had developed over the years. He expressed insecurity about being given away or sold for money by an untrustworthy parent. His fears of being abandoned—"gotten rid of like so much shit"—had been aggravated and confirmed by his transfer to the boarding school. He had reacted to the transfer of schools ("sent into exile") and of therapists with the belief that "my worst fears had come true—being gotten rid of for being no good." His fear that bad behavior threatened abandonment was accompanied by anxiety about whether a legal adoption could be undone. A need to test the analyst's steadfastness to him in the treatment alliance reproduced his testing of the adoptive parents' devotion to him. Although he had never been severely chastised, let alone abandoned, he reacted as if they were omnipresent threats. "I've never been without my mother, yet I've built up a big story about being given up because I once had been."

Analysis of this attitude revealed that Pete believed he had been literally cast out to die by the biological mother until found by the savior, the adoptive mother. This fantasy distortion of what he had been told added an increased intensity of "real" to the ubiquitous fantasies of loss of object and love, making them seem actual. Thus, resulting in part from the

literal, concrete quality of childhood linguistics, the distortion influenced fantasies at all levels. "If I was abandoned once, anything could happen." Fantasy had the added valence of "real" and, supplemented by denial, contributed to an altered sense of reality.

Pete had to cope with the problem of having two sets of parents as models for identification and constantly confused the images. Doubts about his parents' sincerity, motives, or trustworthiness revealed his confusion when he used the terms "mother," "father," or "parents." When these terms were verbalized spontaneously and without qualification to signify either biological or adoptive, it was frequently unclear to which parent he referred. He remembered that even from age five he was bewildered by knowing he had two sets of parents. He remained unable to resolve the confusion of having "a real mother here, and a real mother who is not my real mother somewhere else." To add to his confusion, "not real mother" also meant not blood, or adoptive, mother just as it also stood for the imagined other woman, or the biological mother.

Reactions to learning about his adoption came out in different ways. While talking about childhood fears of other children, he had a "flashback" to nursery school days. The analyst reminded him of his mother talking about adoption. "She was saying 'you're adopted, you're adopted' like she was accusing me of being bad. It makes me feel like a no good bastard, like shit." He had experienced the communication as a scornful, contemptuous declaration of his worthlessness, as a hateful rejection by the adoptive mother. He also experienced a confusion wherein "adopted" seemed to mean "abandoned."[2]

The insult to his self-esteem was of crucial and permanent significance to his evolving self-image which remained at a self=baby=feces stage. Hate for an unreachable, abandoning, hateful mother was directed toward the available adoptive mother, eventuating in a severely ambivalent relationship: the adoptive mother was both hated as the imagined abandoning

[2] Adoption is a two-step process: a relinquishment followed by a taking in.

mother and revered as the savior upon whom his very existence depended. "Without my mother (or her money) I'm nothing—so I better be good, no one wants a bastard around." This belief motivated passivity, his idea of "being good."

Although he had been told he was "chosen and special," he felt his adoptive parents did not want him. He was not able to enjoy birthday parties. They reminded him, as his brother's or other children's presence did, that he was adopted, despised, different. Even though he was told of Andy's adoptive status, Pete believed Andy was his parents' "real" child. In his need to defend against the hate, fear, and shame evoked by reminders of being adopted, Pete made excessive use of denial, isolation, fantasy, and avoidance. He avoided all reminders to his thoughts and fantasies about his biological parents. Fear of facing the facts of his adoption increased into a generalized fear of knowing, which produced a major handicap to learning in school. Not listening or learning represented the avoidance of an imagined repetition of getting "bad news" facts.

When he was six, the word "bastard" implied to him "unwanted, different, hated." When he later learned it meant illegitimate, his shame and rage at his biological parents quickened. Adolescence, fueling the fires of aggression and sexuality, regressively revived sadistic sexual fantasies in which distortions and elements of his ideas of adoption were interwoven. The sadistic fantasies contained his wishes for vengeance against the fantasied image of a young girl-whore who enticed men to have sex and then got rid of them or the bastard baby. He feared and hated all women for being sexual and abandoning, as well as for their being a potential "sister or my mother." Incestuous fears characterized his fifth to seventh years when he had been allowed and even urged to share his adoptive mother's bed "to cuddle" before going to sleep. He remembered thinking: "This is not my mother, my mother is someone else." The implication was that incest was possible—"I could be her boyfriend."

His incestuous thoughts, combined with sadistic fantasies and

felt as potentially realizable, aggravated his fear, guilt, and passivity. He fantasied "cutting up a girl-whore into small pieces to make shit out of her." This was the reverse of another idea: "I could have been an abortion. That means cutting up the baby into pieces." Living in proximity to other adolescents further aroused his fearful fantasy life, into which themes from adoption were always interwoven.

His fantasies led him to believe he must be like the imagined biological father—"a stupid killer type, interested only in rape and destruction." For Pete, sexual urges were associated only with the images of the degraded biological parents. To be like them, or of them, filled him with shame and fear. He believed his adoptive parents lived completely nonsexual, ethical, moral lives. Repudiation of all sexual and aggressive urges, fantasies, and behavior seemed necessary to ensure his remaining under his adoptive mother's protective strength.

Since all active strivings elicited the specter of separation, he exaggerated the passive mode. He constantly strove to maintain union with the powerful savior-adoptive mother. Derived from that relationship, in the transference his dependence on me was reflected in the fantasy that I would save his life if his adoptive mother cast him out. Object relationships, like learning, represented threats to his attachment to the adoptive mother and were rejected. By rejecting before being rejected, he turned the passive experience into the active achieving of an illusory mastery over feelings of being worthless. Inherent was the fantasy, "I rejected my mother [biological]," reversing the actual history. Approaches to people, as with exposure to information, activated the thoughts of once having been given away; he would then retreat from more mature, active behavior.

II

Jim sought analysis at age twenty-seven. He attributed his difficulties in life to being an adopted person. Problems in establishing and maintaining a relationship with a woman, unreasonable hostility to his adoptive parents, feelings of lone-

liness and "not being in touch with my feelings" were, in addition to a feeling of confusion about his life, his principal complaints.

Upon completion of army service at age twenty-five, he consulted with a psychiatrist for about a year. "I was always afraid if people knew what was on my mind they would despise me." Behind these thoughts were pervasive feels of humiliation and debasement, and the feeling that being an adoptee made him different. He also longed for a close, loving attachment to a woman. As with Pete, Jim felt adoption as rejection and humiliation.

Starting at the age of two and a half, he had been told that his biological mother, a young girl living near a military base, had been impregnated by a naval officer. The biological father was sent overseas and the mother was unable to care for her baby. The adoptive parents, trying unsuccessfully to have a child, searched for a baby when the father's sterility—"he couldn't make a baby"—was diagnosed. They finally found Jim and took him home from the hospital. Later his adoptive mother would read books to Jim about adoptions and tell him again about his own history. He hated those moments and would run from his mother's lap and scream.

In analysis he associated his reactions to being told of adoption to material dealing with his not listening to lecturers at school, rejecting unpleasant ideas, and feeling jealous of his sister's marriage. The sister had been adopted when Jim was three years old. He had tried to ignore her presence. He remembered thinking: "Maybe they are trying out a new baby and are getting rid of me." He had felt that she was a threat to his remaining in the family. He recalled an image "like being food in a supermarket" that would appear to him when his adoptive mother read to him. Frightened, he would run away from her. From age three his "secret" was that he had categories of stories representative of "good feelings" or "bad feelings." He hated *Miss Muffet, The Wizard of Oz,* and *The Three Little Pigs* because they expressed "scaring away, breaking down

homes, and displaced person" themes. Suggestions of separation were unbearable. *Snow White* and *Dumbo* were "good" because "someone was bringing together or making families."

A question that preoccupied him, dating back to preschool days, was "Why did my mother give me up?" This conscious question was embedded in his angry thoughts at the injustices and immorality in the world. As a child he had theorized that his biological mother may have been a whore, or that she had married and that both parents had been killed, or that she was too young to rear him. As he grew older he reasoned that other blood relations, "aunts and grandparents," could have taken him in. That no one did underscored his sense of being unlovable or unwanted. The only answer he could accept evolved from a childhood baby=feces fantasy. "I had been dumped on the world like so much shit. The only reason a mother can have for giving up a baby is that a baby is so much shit to her." He developed the idea that he had been flawed and damaged from birth.

According to his adoptive mother, up to age two and a half he had been an alert, contented, "easy" baby who progressed rapidly. After disclosure of his adoption, he became unfriendly, slept poorly, "couldn't sit still," and ran away. He could not tolerate being reminded of the actuality of babies being given away; he rejected people, information, and reminders of adoption. Jim, like Pete, also needed to repudiate facts and knowledge, and eventually had academic and relationship problems in school. Although he continued to yearn for good feelings and lasting relationships, anything that reminded him of his "difference" as an adoptee still filled him with "shitty" feelings. Analysis, like relationships, though offering good feeling reminded him of the opposite and had to be rejected. The childhood prototype of his fear of abandonment was the rejection of the adoptive mother and sister.

The damage to his self-esteem could be traced through his attitudes about himself and his body as projected onto his car: he planned to fix the dents and paint his car so "I won't be

ashamed of it." Feelings of shame about acne on his back, "which I cover with a coat of tan," led to ideas of having been flawed at birth and a "shame to my mother" (biological). At age ten, he had been sent for group therapy because of persistent sleep disturbance, hyperactivity, and poor academic achievement. The sessions became intolerable when he met a boy in the group who had a withered arm. "My parents are giving me away too for being damaged," was his thought.

Jim often remarked on his "crazy" way of thinking, acknowledging his distortion and repudiation of factual data. His "craziness" reflected his inability to resolve the confusing adoption history, and the defense erected against it. His style of thinking, like Pete's, eventuated from the conflicts engendered. The conscious hostility to the adoptive mother masked his great attachment to her, which was derived from a belief that his life had been literally saved by the adoptive mother "who found me and nursed me back to health." In this regard, Jim and Pete demonstrate a similar fantasy distortion of the adoption theme. Rage at the biological mother was displaced to the adoptive mother. Because they had two mothers, two sets of parents, linguistic interchangeability seemed to be at the center of the confusion.

Jim's confusion found a sublimated expression in model building. The models, total miniature geographical areas, were patterned on some actual known place. The new world he created was identical to, yet different from, the existing one; the "real" and "imagined" worlds were interchangeable. When models fell short of his expectations, or had flaws, they were destroyed. Model making also contained an identificatory link with the artistic, adoptive mother, as well as with his wish to "model" himself after his adoptive father.[3]

From the beginning, elements from his fantasies about adoption were grafted onto ideas about analysis. The first psy-

[3] This activity bore a remarkable resemblance to parts of the play, *Tiny Alice,* by Edward Albee, himself an adopted child. Glenn (1974) identifies the role of an existing mansion and a doll-house model of it and other paired replicas in the play as symbols of two mothers.

chiatrist "was just out for money, didn't care about me, even fell asleep. He made me feel like I was nothing. This treatment scares me, it's too close, and makes me think about things I hate. But I feel safer, as if you cared." This reflected the difference between the imagined bad, abandoning, materialistic, unfaithful biological mother (first doctor), and the care-taking, nurturing adoptive mother (the second doctor). His feeling of attachment and dependence then initiated his attempt to repudiate the close feeling he wanted and the sense of belonging for which he had always yearned. Fear of losing the adoptive mother or me motivated his attempts at rejection. Although he appeared overtly rejecting, he was inwardly compliant, trying always to be a "good boy" to protect against abandonment. Feeling like a "mother's boy," he tried to reverse the image by belying any behavioral similarity or attachment to her. He used a caricature of independence, e.g., isolation and aloofness, to deny the intense dependence he felt.

The images of his biological mother were reflected in his sexual choices, fantasied as "cheap whores who treated people like shit." He was particularly angry at married women who slept with him. Sexual women were debased, and he would "use them and then get rid of them, like a hit and run lover." By reversal, he dramatized his fantasy of, and revenge for, having been given away as damaged and worthless. His hostility to women also related to an obsessive idea, "My sister [adoptive] could really be my sister—who would know?" His hostility to his mother and sister served as an exaggerated defense against the possibility of an incestuous fulfillment. All women carried this possibility, and especially whores.

The different images of his mothers contributed to an obsessional conflict about which branch of the service to select. "Should I become a medical corpsman and save lives [adoptive mother]; or a combat commando who kills? [biological mother]." He also recognized that his sexual behavior was an enactment of how his biological father might have behaved toward the biological mother. He had found it extremely

difficult to come to terms with his sexual impulses which he identified with the amoral, hateful image of the biological father and mother. He experienced confusion in deciding between two ideals of manhood, and tried to resolve his conflict by enacting first his fantasy of the biological father, then of the adoptive father. His identification with "father" contained the dilemma: "If I am like my father [adoptive], I'll be asexual and sterile; if I'm like my father [biological], I'll be promiscuous and use women." Neither alternative completely satisfied him.

He divided his life between weekday and weekend behavior: on weekdays he was moral, not sexually active, diligent, and ethical; weekends represented his enactment of sexual urges and his fantasies of the life of his biological parents. He seemed to have polarized sex, aggression, and activity into the bad world and life of the biological parents as he fantasied it to be. In order to achieve normal gratifications and expression of urges that his polarization had cast as abnormal or bad, he had to leave the ethical world of the adoptive parents and go to the "bar world" for satisfactions.

III

Jeannie, age nine, was referred because of poor academic performance, telling fantastic stories which she would insist were true, and alienating classmates by bullying them.

Adopted at birth, she was brought to the adoptive home when she was eight days old. The first two years were without difficulties and she was described as "a pleasant, cuddly baby who ate and slept well." Bright and verbal from fourteen months, she was easy to train and tolerated separations from the adoptive mother if the maternal grandparents were available.

At age two and a half, her adoptive parents began to inform her about her adoption. She was told "the lady who bore you had died, and no one was available to raise you. Mother and father had wanted a baby very much but were unable to make one. They had been searching for a special baby and found

Jeannie through a friend. We took Jeannie home and made a new family."

At first Jeannie did not react to the story which was continued, augmented, and kept in the foreground through stories and talks. Within a week or two Jeannie started to ask questions. "Why couldn't you make me?" "Something was wrong with Mommy's insides," was the answer. "Why did it take so long to find me?" "We had to search for a very special person." "Why don't you get another baby?" "It takes too much money."

Following these early questions, the parents noted a change in Jeannie's behavior. Her sleep became disturbed and she complained of "bad dreams with houses burning down and earthquakes." She required her mother's constant presence, had trouble going to sleep, and demanded food. Whereas she had formerly been able to stay with the grandparents while her mother shopped, she would now cry and withdraw from them. By her third birthday, though still verbal and with a bright intelligence, she was clinging, irritable, easily moved to tears, and intolerant of other children's presence.

In nursery school, at four years of age, she expressed her marked dependence through her crying for mother, daydreaming, and withdrawal from the other children. Apparently suffering from a loss of self-esteem and feeling undesirable, she complained to her mother, "I'm fat, ugly, no one wants me."

In kindergarten, after the family moved into a new neighborhood, she became more disruptive in class. From age three to nine Jeannie demonstrated marked hostility and ambivalence toward the adoptive mother. Jeannie would accuse her of starving her; complain that she had no siblings. Her disruptive behavior in school led to placement in a special class through the third grade. In that year, she was allowed to spend more time in "regular class" in the hope she might enter the regular fourth grade classes.

Her attitude to her school experiences, which dominated many months of analytic sessions, represented her ideas, theories, fantasies, and attitudes about adoption. These emerged

in the following manner. I remarked to Jeannie that I was not always sure to which class she was referring—"Perhaps having two classes is as confusing to you as it is to me." Her next remarks indicated how school and teacher were the vehicles for the omnipresent adoption theme. "I don't know why the regular teacher sent me away. I hate her for that. I didn't do anything wrong, but she said I did. Anyway I like special class, it's great. You can do anything you want to, and don't have to do what regular kids do."

Her anger and confusion as to why she was "sent away" were accompanied by a feeling of humiliation. "The only thing I don't like about being in special class, it makes me feel different and sometimes the kids tease me about being bad. If I was in regular class I wouldn't feel like I was punished or no good."

The hurt of being in a special class related directly to her feeling about being adopted, and she defended against her feelings by denial, isolation, and fantasy formation. "I know I had other parents, but I don't want to hear or talk about adoption. I never had other parents—well, I know I did, but it makes me so angry to think about it I could break down this house."

The confusion of her life history and fears of separation from her adoptive mother came to light in sessions when she was talking about how she felt about moving. Not consciously aware of the pertinence of one of my questions and its ability to touch on and release such a full set of ideas, I asked where she had moved from. "I don't really know. I am adopted and don't know where I came from. My mother is adopted, and so was my grandmother [distortions of her biological biography]. You know if you have a baby you can die and the baby is given away. I don't want to die or give a baby away. So I'm going to stay home with mommy and daddy. I'll grow up but stay a baby, then I won't have to die." She told me she was confused by the stories she had been told about her birth, and this confusion was reflected also in her interchangeable use of the terms "mother" and "father" (like Pete and Jim) to signify the biological or adoptive set of parents.

Her conflicting ideas about two sets of parents were revealed in many sessions of play acting and story telling. She told stories of three little chicks (and she knew the term "chicks" denoted sexual girls) who almost starved to death because "mother wasn't there to feed them." The chicks searched for mother and went into a grocery store. They were in danger of being sold and eaten, but were rescued by a nice lady. She went on to describe mothers "who don't take care of their chicks" as bad people. These are aggressive and sexual people, to whom babies are unimportant. "Sometimes I think of who made me and I hate being given away. My Mommy [adoptive] wouldn't give me away, she saved me." The abandoned chicks, the Jeannie who wouldn't feed her cat, and all sexual images represented Jeannie's fantasies about her bad biological mother.

In another story, a kangaroo mother had to go and buy food. As soon as she left the house, the baby kangaroo ran wild. This story revealed Jeannie's fear of separation from her adoptive mother, underlying her disruptive school behavior. The baby kangaroo, representing Jeannie, was afraid that the mother (adoptive) was going to leave her to starve and die, as Jeannie had imagined her biological mother did by dying. In contrast to the "bad mother," the "good mother" nurtured, fed, and stayed with the baby, and was not involved with sexual or aggressive activities.

Jeannie's behavior demonstrated the identification with the adoptive mother—verbal, proper, acting in accordance with being good. This behavior alternated with that of an aggressive, sexual, bad girl who had urges to hit and destroy, which represented the behavior derived from identification with her fantasies of the biological mother.

Jeannie, as Pete and Jim also demonstrated, had the idea that for a period of time before being found and saved by the adoptive mother she was abandoned to die. Circumstances of leaving or being left were felt as the same—feeling abandoned and wanting mother. Jeannie hated her adoptive mother for leaving her the way she imagined the biological mother did.

DISCUSSION

Within their spectrum of personalities and symptomalogy, adopted people reveal many similarities in constellations of conscious and unconscious preoccupations, fantasies, strivings, and defense (see, Schechter, et al., 1964; Glenn, 1974). These are intimately related to the adoptee's knowledge of his or her adoptive status. This knowledge—a burden blood kin are spared—acts as a forceful pathogen in the mental life of young adopted children.

My clinical data underscore the deleterious effect on the adoptee's developmental processes, object relationships, cognitive function, and fastasy life. The initial reaction of severe separation anxiety and confusion produced a disorganizing regression and change of behavior. Unlike transient episodes found in children of similar age, their reactions were prolonged and left an indelible stamp on their personalities and intellects. Extreme dependence, manifested in clinging, underlay their sleep and eating disturbances, crying, and temper tantrums, and interfered with their play. Exaggerated dependence and passivity persisted through all phases of their development.

As the children listened to the story of their adoptions, they felt the adoptive mothers were "getting rid of" them as shameful, disgusting, or bad. Marked feelings of shame, worthlessness, and being unlovable remained as persistent attitudes that contributed to feeling lonely and unhappy. The idea of being "gotten rid of" carried an unmistakable anal connotation. The patients revealed a self = baby = stool image of themselves which also contributed to their tenuous level of self-esteem. Though not specific for adopted children, and unquestionably multidetermined, the anal debasement of the self appears to be characteristic in adoptees (see also, Daunton, 1973).

My patients also held the distorted belief that their biological mother had cast them out to die, and that they were "found" by the adoptive mother. This distortion depended on the literal interpretation of words characteristic of young children. The adoption story contributed a reinforcing quality of actuality to

pre-existing fantasies of loss of object and love. The actual story was then transformed into fearful fantasies about abandonment, which contributed to disorganizing anxiety and confusion. The element of truth in their fantasies influenced a persistent belief in the probability of fantasy fulfillment at all levels.

Defenses were mobilized to stem separation anxiety. While on the one hand clinging to the adoptive mother for their survival, the children also turned away from or rejected her and refused to listen to her explanations. An extremely ambivalent attitude developed. Dependence upon the "savior" mother was counterbalanced by hatred toward the abandoning mother. As the bearer of bad news, however, the adoptive mother also received the hatred felt for the abandoning, unreachable mother. The children's rejection of the adoptive mother served as an illusory reversal of the actuality of the history.

Hatred and hostility toward women were derived from fantasies about the biological mother, coupled with real life disappointments at the hands of the adoptive mother. Split images of good and bad mother representations were reinforced by the knowledge of having two mothers, facilitating the ambivalence. The relationship to the adoptive mother became the model of the adoptee's attitude toward other people as well. A conscious attitude of anger and hostility was belied by rejecting behavior. Viewing the adoptive mother as an all-powerful mother who will abandon a bad child, adoptees have difficulty in trusting her or others who come to represent her.

As reminders of their actual history evoked hatred of the biological mother, as well as shame and fear, denial or isolation of data limited what they could accept intellectually. When the children's defense against the distress occasioned by the adoption story was applied to other areas of their lives, a more generalized disturbance also developed. Denial established an estrangement between what could be generally known and the degree of affect considered tolerable or admissible. As a principal defense, denial severely affected reality testing, cognitive func-

tioning, and object relationships. A phobic attitude toward and avoidance of reminders of the thoughts and affects eventuated. Aloofness from relationships and learning situations was a persistent aspect of defense.

Cognitive disturbances were seen in a tendency toward illogic, a confusing use of terms, a literalness in language, and the belief in the "probability" of fantasies. The literalness and belief in fantasies were symptoms of fixation. The illogical ideas that the adopting mother was the abandoning mother or that adoption meant abandonment were related to the confusing use of terms such as "mother," "father," "parents." These disturbances in reality testing and style of thought were related to the confusion which resulted from knowing there were two sets of parents but experiencing only one set in actuality and having feelings of hatred toward the unreachable, fantasied biological set.

Their fantasy life had some unique features occasioned by the knowledge of being adopted. The sense of "real" was accentuated. As products of anxiety, fantasies also became a further stimulant to anxiety, thereby impairing their palliative function. The knowledge of actually having two mothers added a feeling of "real" to the ubiquitous fantasy of having a "good mother" and a "bad mother" (the split representation of the maternal image). Fantasies about the biological mother were grafted onto the "bad image" of the nurturing mother. The "bad," anal mother image became the representation of the fantasied biological mother; the "good" mother image was the representation of the idealized adoptive mother. The self-image, still incompletely separated from the maternal image, also had double representation as "good" or "bad." With self and object poorly differentiated, displacement of hatred to the self contributed further to feelings of worthlessness and shame.

Knowing one has two sets of parents produces conflicts of identification. Two distinct influences on the ego and superego are discernible. The first is the normally expectable, necessary incorporation of and identification with the nurturing or adop-

tive parents. The second is an artifact, a consequence of the knowledge of being adopted. Another set of images has been derived from fantasies about biological parents. Structured on meager, secretive, and inherently socially derogating information, these fantasies are continually subject to elaboration as the child develops. Sadistic, aggressive cathexes of the images imbue them with the characteristics of killers, immoral people, freely perpetrating sexual and social crimes. All "bad" feelings, such as those evoked by normal sexual or aggressive urges, are associated to the images of the biological parents. By identification with these images, the adoptee also feels himself to be "hateful" and dangerous. Satisfaction of his urges are deemed possible only by identifying with the image of fantasied corrupt or hateful people.

My clinical data unequivocally demonstrate the traumatic effect of the early communication and its participation in anxiety, confusion, regression, and their sequelae. Most of us realize that preschool age children are not equipped developmentally to comprehend and master information that might be called "painful facts of life." Since being told of adoption has been reported as disturbing by many others (see, for instance, Barnes, 1953; Bernard, 1953; Curtis Report, 1946; Clothier, 1939), why have adoptive parents been advised to tell children of their adoption as soon as possible after age two?[4] One might suppose the advice was based on documented and extensive experiences, but this is not true. Furthermore, the dearth of psychoanalytic studies has permitted opinion to stand as fact.

The patients described in this paper demonstrate that the needs and development of a child of two or three years are not

[4] A search for this rationale led to a paper by Knight (1941). The reasons for telling children of their adoption as soon as possible after age two were, he wrote, "to avoid [a] condition of continuous dread (in the *parents* that the child under six may hear of [his] adoption from a third party) and especially to avoid the eventuality that the child may discover the fact and confront his parents with it, with a resultant loss of faith in their word. . . . A child should probably be told he is adopted as soon as he can comprehend the statement. *Very likely he will think little of it and forget about it*" (p. 70, italics added).

well served by revelation of his adoptive status. Rather than "forgetting" the story, my patients continued to be obsessed with the theme. Though being told of adoption is upsetting at any age (see, A. Freud, 1972), a distinction must be made between "upsetting" and "traumatizing."

Many analysts with whom I have discussed adoption found the adoptee's responses to disclosure to be secondary to other trauma. It is true of course that adoptees have other problems and that their responses to learning of adoption may be a defense against anxiety from other sources. However, my clinical data indicate that the adoption theme ran through the children's lives, influencing their later development in special ways. This is not to say that disclosure is the only traumatizing influence, but that it is an additional and perhaps mutable one in a toddler's life. While all adoptees do not encounter the same difficulties, or to the same extent, I believe that trauma eventuates from early exposure. There appears to be no escape from chronic damage to self-esteem, which remains a persistent theme (see, Kris, 1956).

Clinical studies are needed to assess whether the consequences of a deferred communication are as disruptive to psychologic development as early and repeated exposure is. Both Pete and Jim would have preferred hearing of their adoption at later ages. Pete thought it would have been "easier to take and I'd have believed whatever my parents said"; Jim said, "I didn't understand it anyway. I wish I never had to be told, but the later the better."

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ANALYSIS OF A CONGENITALLY BLIND MUSICIAN

BY MELVIN BORNSTEIN, M.D.

During the last two decades the unique developmental difficulties of blind children have been the source of important psychoanalytic investigations and have enriched our clinical and theoretical understanding of the ego in both sighted and blind children. In this paper I describe insight gained from the analysis of a congenitally blind musician.

CLINICAL PRESENTATION

Michael, a blind Dixieland band musician, was twenty-six years old when he entered treatment. He suffered from generalized anxiety, feelings of unhappiness, emptiness, and lack of interest in living. These complaints as well as the urging of his mother seemed to be the reasons for his beginning treatment.

He had been a premature baby who soon developed retrolental fibroplasia. His mother told me that during his first year of life she had great difficulty taking care of him: every time she held him, he vomited. A nurse was needed to help with his care. He responded more readily to the nurse who remained in attendance for the first year. In addition, Michael suffered from frequent respiratory infections and occasional convulsions. The convulsions ceased by the time he was two years old; the recurrent respiratory infections and vomiting did not completely disappear until he was five years old. During this period,

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his mother had episodes of depression which were incapacitating.

At the age of three, Michael began showing great interest in music. He spent considerable time with a grandmother who was a singer and also spent long periods listening to music on the radio and phonograph. From the age of five, he could listen to a symphony and have complete recall of the score as well as the sounds and errors from the individual instruments. He said: "I recall sitting and listening to a symphony on the record player. I would be able to hear all the instruments playing in the symphony and be able to pick out the mistakes. I could tell if they were off or not. I don't know how. I just could." He was given piano lessons; however, at age seven "when I heard Louis Armstrong play Dixieland on his trumpet, I knew immediately that the trumpet was my instrument. From that time on no other instrument had much importance to me. I knew that I would devote my life to the trumpet."

During the course of his treatment, he repeatedly said that without trumpet playing, "Michael would not be Michael": playing the trumpet was the only means by which he could fully feel like himself. His interest in music quickly became exclusively centered around Dixieland; playing Dixieland on the trumpet was the most natural way that he could express himself. "I play other music," he said, "but no other music can permit me to express feelings and ideas the way Dixieland can." When asked to put these feelings and ideas into words, he answered, "No, I can't put these ideas into words. There are no words. The words are the music. It's like a language—the only language that is really important to me." His parents encouraged him to develop his musical interests. They gave him music lessons and did not interfere when he spent many hours playing the trumpet.

Michael entered school at the age of seven; he had been considered too sickly to begin earlier. However, he had already begun to learn Braille. He had no unusual difficulties in mastering the use of Braille for reading, but he has never been able to use it for learning music. He said that it would take him two

weeks to learn a page of music with Braille reading, compared to two minutes to learn by listening to the music. Thus, for Michael, touch alone, as a perceptive modality, was inadequate for musical learning.

From the age of ten, he was provided with various companions who helped him get around. They would pick him up from school when necessary, take him to music lessons, and help him with caring for himself. This continued through adolescence and into adulthood. His relationships were restricted to his parents, brother, companions, and several musician friends. At the age of seventeen, when in the last year of high school, he had two grand mal convulsions for which he was hospitalized. No specific cause was found for the convlusions and there have been no further attacks.

His father is a professional man with a great interest in art, an interest which Michael's brother, two years older, also developed. Both parents adequately cared for Michael's physical needs. However, the quality of their object relationship with him had serious deficiencies. The most poignant example of this was his father's description to me of Michael. He said that Michael had always been like a computer. "He will do and think whatever you tell him. We try to make him comfortable, but what else can be expected of him." His mother has suffered from periodic swings of hypomanic and depressive states throughout her life.

Tendency toward Regression and Anxiety over Loss of Control

Various authors have noted the tendency toward regression and disorganization in blind children. Fraiberg (1971) observed severe regression in several normally developing blind children under stress. She outlines the perilous situation during the second and third years of a blind child's life. During this period object constancy is not yet established, although sighted children have developed object constancy by their first year. Without a concept of permanence, blind children are reduced to helplessness and panic when they cannot verify their mother's existence.

Nagera and Colonna (1965) have observed that, in marked

contrast to sighted children, blind children remain strongly fixated to prephallic phases of drive development. They suggest that blindness can so interfere with finding new means of gratification, both in drive discharge and ego activities, that any form of gratification once experienced is not easily abandoned.

Omwake and Solnit (1969) stated that one of the difficulties of a blind child they treated was the disorganizing effects of memories of painful experiences from her first to third years of life. They felt that her lack of vision and the relative understimulation of her other perceptual capacities made it impossible for her to develop psychic images which were necessary for the development of the forerunners of repression.

Fraiberg (1968) described the problems of blind children in dealing with aggression. During their second year they are robbed of two primary modes of defense because they have not yet been able to develop an object concept. The first is the identification with the mother. "To possess the stable picture of the mother and human protectors," she writes, "is equivalent in psychic terms to having the loved person within the ego and, by identification, to experience 'protection' as the magical consequence of possessing and evoking the picture of the protector" (p. 296). The second is the lack of patterns of motor discharge for aggression. She states that without a concept of something to strike at out there, there are insufficient stimuli for the development of these patterns; instead blind children are left only with regression and a tantrum-like disorganized discharge of their aggression.

Burlingham (1961), describing how blind children are handicapped in their ability to conceptualize the significance of their aggression, states that the blind children she studied revealed a prevalent fear of their own aggression. Since they were unable to check the consequences of an aggressive action, their imagination at times led them to believe that what they had done had had catastrophic results, a belief which may be strengthened either by the exclamation or by the silence of the person attacked.

Very early in his treatment, Michael began repeating the theme of his fear of ending up in a state of disorganization that would result in the destruction of himself and others. This was experienced in different ways, but the underlying danger situation remained the same. For instance, he frequently spoke of musicians who destroyed themselves by taking drugs. He told of how very early in his life he decided that he would never drink alcohol, which could destroy a person. He knew people who while drunk would get into a car, not know where they were going or what they were doing, and end up destroying themselves and everything around them. He recalled one time his father gave him what he thought was a soft drink. When he drank it, it felt like fire; he couldn't catch his breath; he was terrified.

The material in the following sessions occurred during an early period of his analysis as he began dealing with his anger toward his mother whom he experienced as depriving and demanding.

Upon arrival for one session, he said that he always felt that he should never lose control of his senses. He had felt that way from an early age. Playing the trumpet had helped him a lot. He was doing something that he felt good about. It was natural for him. He had decided never to drink or smoke. It could kill him. He remembered a woman next door. She would get drunk a lot. One time she had had an argument with his brother. They both swore a lot. Mother and father never got tanked like that. He and his brother were always so well disciplined, himself more than his brother. One time his brother told his parents that he [the brother] smoked marijuana.

He made out a check and dated it a week ahead, something he had never done before. That scared him. It was like not knowing what he was doing. In the band he was strict about drinking. He would hear the other fellows saying that they could drink and never show it. But they ended up not knowing what they were doing. They would get into a car, drive fast, smash up themselves and other people. If they had con-

centrated more on their music, it would never have happened. They didn't seem to care.

In another session during the same period, he began by stating that he went to a club one night where a rock-and-roll band was playing. It nearly scared him to death—it was so loud—it was just noise. When he left and he was in the car, he suddenly became terrified. He wasn't sure where he was. It was like the walls were falling in. That's how it felt when he was listening to those musicians. "I hate it. They don't care what they do. I always dress in a suit. They just dress in anything. They are poorly disciplined. Couple of them were drinking and smoking. One of them wants my job, he just wants to take everything. In my band I would not tolerate anything like that. My players play Dixieland. No smoking or drinking."

In sum, the early history (which includes the mother's difficulties in handling the infant, her depressions, the patient's convulsions as well as his blindness) made it difficult for the child to establish adequate ego mechanisms and made him vulnerable to regression and feelings of loss of control over his own dysfunctiveness. He used his music to sublimate his aggressive drive, to enhance the synthetic function of the ego, and to adapt to the world outside.

Problems Concerning the Instability of Self-Representation

From his experience with blind children, Blank (1957) has pointed out that there is a delay in the development of ego functions having to do with the differentiation of external objects from each other and differentiation of the self from others. Along these lines Fraiberg (1975) has stated that in blind children there is a significant delay in their ability to establish a permanent self-representation. Beginning with the premise that the constitution of a self-representation is the subjective correlate of the constitution of an object representation, she infers a self-representation from the capacity of the blind child to confer psychic permanence to objects and things.

She then demonstrates the delay by utilizing Piaget's Stage VI for object permanency. This test requires the child to search for a screened toy in single and multiple displacements. When the children at Stage VI conduct a sustained search for a screened toy which has undergone multiple and random displacements, they demonstrate their belief in an object whether or not it is perceived by them, and we now can speak of the constitution of an object world—a degree of permanency of object and self-representations. In addition, the use of "I" as a stable and flexible self-reference pronoun and the capacity to represent their "I" in play, infers a level of ego organization that signifies a momentous step in the organization of a self and object world. With this use of "I" children demonstrate that they are an "I" in a universe of "I's"—that is, an "I" to themselves—and an awareness that every "you" is an "I" to himself. For blind children there is a significant delay in this accomplishment. Fraiberg emphasizes that sight functions as a unique organizer of stimuli which assists in the development of a permanency of self-representations. Thus, blind children are under an enormous handicap for which they must compensate if psychological development is to progress.

Turning back to Michael, he would spend eight to ten hours each day playing the trumpet. This pattern had begun in his early adolescence. He practiced during the day, then worked as an entertainer for four hours during the evening. On returning home he would go over the music of the evening for another two or three hours before he could feel satisfied enough to go to sleep.

The content of most of his analytic sessions, frequently repetitive, was related to musicians or to aspects of his experiences with Dixieland music. On several occasions during his treatment when his resistances were high, he would say that he would like to reduce his visits because he was not spending enough time practicing. There were numerous descriptions of how vital playing the trumpet was to him. He would often

repeat: "Michael would not be Michael without playing the trumpet." He gave me an autobiography which he entitled *Wrapped Around a Trumpet.* It was limited to his experiences with the trumpet and Dixieland music. As he was describing a period during his teens when his mother threatened to take his trumpet away because he was doing so poorly in school, he yelled out, "What did she want to do, kill me, destroy me so that I couldn't live at all?" The following clinical material illustrates this. The hours described occurred during a period in which we were dealing with his feeling of self-deficiency.

He is able to understand what a musician is like by the way the musician plays. That's why he listens so closely. He would like to meet Al Hirt. Al plays with such warmth and compassion. He has always felt that the trumpet is an extension of one's voice and what a person is. You can't fool anyone with the way you play. When he plays music that he doesn't like, he is Michael playing but he is not Michael. Music has always been his life. In fact, he remembers when he first started with the trumpet when he was seven. He played all day. In fact, he didn't want to go to sleep. This went on for days. The other day his companion, Tom, said, "Why don't you take some days off from playing?" He has never thought of that. In fact, when he does stop, music still goes through his mind. He begins worrying whether he is going to play the music correctly. He feels that he may not play it correctly. It won't sound right, he doesn't feel like Michael. He doesn't feel secure with himself. Music has been the thing that really got him through high school. It made him feel like he belonged. It's like a stream that comes out of him. He is able to feel like himself when that happens.

The following session occurred a week later:

He never did understand why they didn't teach jazz trumpet in school. All they taught was piano by Braille. So, he just learned trumpet and jazz on his own. The period between the second to the sixth grade in school was terror for him because

all they taught was Braille piano. He couldn't learn. No ideas would come to his mind. He couldn't improvise and express himself. The only way he could learn to play the trumpet was with tapes. Playing the trumpet is the only way that he can express himself. It's like without it he loses his ability to think. In fact, in the morning, immediately after he wakes up, he plays the trumpet. Sometimes he puts a tape on and accompanies the musicians. That makes him feel good and secure. He is really able to express himself. He feels complete, like he is with things. He is Michael.

Masturbatory Conflicts

The infantile masturbatory conflicts were of a major significance. In his treatment there was little manifest sexual content. However, the latent content of his free associations pointed to significant conscious and preconscious sexual conflicts. Frequently, in the material, the use of his trumpet reflected a displacement of phallic masturbatory activity. Playing the trumpet as much as he did put him in danger of having it taken away and broken by his mother. He explained that he did not have much interest in girls during high school because he derived sufficient pleasure from his trumpet. He had to protect himself and his trumpet; he could not stick it out toward the audience because it might be banged, which would ruin his instrument and his lips.

The following clinical material occurred as he began for the first time to express some heterosexual interests:

He said that in high school he realized guys liked to "rev up" their cars. It was a status symbol for them. They would make a lot of noise in the parking lot. But he experienced far more satisfaction in playing his trumpet. His father had three partners. He got rid of them because they were dishonest. Al, one of father's old partners, died. He had cancer for a long time. Michael remembers one time he drove a car for a few minutes. People drive and end up as drunk drivers. They show off. He was talking to Tom. Tom said he wouldn't drink because he wouldn't want to wake up in the morning without his head on.

That reminded him of the time that he heard the rock band, it was like the walls were falling in.

Several years ago Sam had asked him to be his best man. In fact, Sam decided to have their wedding on his birthday. It was the biggest thrill of his life. He knows for his wedding he would have Sam as his best man. He met Marilyn at Fred's house. He is going to speak with her again tonight. Someday, he hopes to marry someone like Marilyn. For his wedding he would just have his Dixieland band. He would only have musicians whom he cared about. After the wedding, he imagines, Marilyn would wait for him. She would load up the car and they would go to New Orleans and live there. If the acoustics in their apartment were no good, they would move. Paul, the band leader who fired him last year, would call and tell him to take over his band. He would get rid of all the musicians he didn't like.

The following material occurred several months later.

He said, "Something happened at the club that had never happened before. Two couples got into a fight. Bill went to break it up and he had his glasses broken. Jim told me to pack up my trumpet so that I would not get hurt since the fight seemed to be coming toward me. The floor was hard. If anyone dropped to the floor, they could get hurt. . . . One time some boys were fighting outside. I got close to them and fell. I hurt my knee. One time it was slippery; I fell backward. That was terrible. The room seemed to be going around for the next hour."

He remembers how he would love to listen to boxing. "Some of the blows really knocked the boxers down. My father taught me boxing. I wanted to be a boxer, trumpet player, or sportscaster when I was small. I remember my parents would drink. They would get into arguments in the bedroom. It would seem like they were slugging it out. You know it's crazy, I used to think they were knocking each other's heads off."

This material reflected Michael's use of the trumpet as a phallic displacement; his phallic competitiveness around masturbatory excitement; his desire to seek revenge against his

father for being excluded; his fear of excitement, and the fantasy that contains castration and the destruction of his physical being (walls falling down) in an oedipal relationship.

One tangential comment is that dreams and other regressive material were rarely brought directly into the analytic work. The transference that could be observed generally represented early relationships with his demanding and rejecting mother and competitiveness toward his brother and father. Also, there was a suggestion of the mobilization of a pathological narcissistic transference containing a grandiose self in the self-centered repetitive material having to do with his music and trumpet. Since this was never brought into the work of the analysis, it could not be confirmed. One might speculate that this structure was crucial for his psychic equilibrium and had to remain untouched by the analysis.

DISCUSSION

Viewed from our current understanding of ego psychology, the clinical material lends itself to a number of theoretical considerations pertaining to Michael's musical involvement. It seems likely that as Michael played, he was creating his own sensory nutriments in order to maintain ego autonomy. Two basic psychological activities occurred in his playing. The first was one of motor discharge, the other of perception through tactile, auditory, kinesthetic, and locomotor experiences. The idea of sensory nutriments for maintaining ego autonomy was proposed by Rapaport (1960). This term, based on a concept of Piaget, essentially means that ego structures require perceptual stimulation in order to maintain psychic integrity. Rapaport showed that there is independent evidence available indicating that it is the development and maintenance of psychological structures rather than a special kind of motivation which prompts the organism to reach out for stimulation. Sensory deprivation and hypnosis are the most outstanding examples of

situations where the stability of psychological structures suffers as a result of a lack of perceptual stimulation.

For a sighted individual there is a continuous flow of sensory stimuli as long as his eyes remain open. This, of course, is not true for the blind individual. Unless stimuli are being created either by someone or something outside of himself, the only way he can obtain sensory stimulus is to create it himself. In blindness there appears to be an effort to create sensory stimulation. One of the determinants in Michael's playing may well have been a highly adaptive activity to create sufficient sensory nutriments to reinforce ego autonomy.

The utilization of the mouth, hand, and hearing in Michael's playing seems to represent an almost perfect integration. Fraiberg and Freedman (1964) described how for all blind persons the mouth retains some of its functions as a leading discriminating perceptual organ throughout life. Villay (1930) wrote that even as an adult, he relied upon his mouth, and particularly his tongue, to make the finest perceptual distinctions. For the hand to take on the function of a perceptual organ so that blind infants can relate to a world "out there"—a world that they can reach and touch—they must make an elaborate detour which involves the shift of cathexis from the mouth to the hand as a prime perceptual organ. Sighted infants are virtually assured of a smooth passage in this cathectic shift; they have the picture of something "out there" for which they can use their hands to reach and grasp. Blind infants, however, retain the mouth as a leading discriminating perceptual organ, in part because of the difficulty in establishing the cathectic shift from mouth to hand. It seems likely that Michael's use of mouth, hands, and hearing in his trumpet playing represents a creative solution which makes possible the deflection of oral, anal, and phallic drives in a way that is acceptable to ego, superego and society.

Another determinant in Michael's driving need to play the trumpet seems to be the mirroring function of his playing. He would frequently play as soon as he wakened in the morning,

before showering and dressing, in the same manner that one looks into a mirror as the first act upon awakening. For Michael, the trumpet was an extension of himself, a part of his body image; and the act of playing, like hearing his voice, had a mirroring function. It would be a way to perceive himself in externalized form and assist synthesis of his self-representations.

An obvious fact displayed in this case is that for a complete understanding of Michael's adaptive solutions, one must take into account the manner by which the primary and secondary autonomous functions involved in his musical abilities have influenced and shaped his developmental and conflictual problems. Until recently, the psychoanalytic approach has only emphasized the reverse relationship, that is, how developmental and conflictual problems have influenced and shaped primary and secondary autonomous structures and functions.

Hartman (1950) refers to this issue. He states: "The autonomous factors may also come to be involved in the ego's defense against instinctual tendencies, against reality, and against the superego. . . . But it is of considerable interest not only for developmental psychology but also for clinical problems to study the converse influence too: that is, the influences which a child's intelligence, his perceptual and motor equipment, his special gifts, and the development of all these (autonomous) factors have on the timing, intensity, and mode of expression of these conflicts" (p. 123).

G. Klein (1962), in his discussion of Solnit's and Omwake's work with their blind patient, expresses the same idea—that the effects of blindness might be determined by how autonomous organizational functions impose their own organizational rules on the maturation of personality and adaptation to the blindness. Finally, Nagera (1968), in discussing the somatic psychological ego apparatuses, states that by obscuring the links between their development and the rest of the ego, we deny ourselves a better understanding of what we call the ego organization, how it is established, how it acquires its special qualities that characterize it as a special product. Further, by

depriving ourselves of an understanding of these processes of interaction throughout development, we place out of our reach the possibility of learning how we can favorably influence the process or at least prevent detrimental influences.

Thus, if we use Michael as a frame of reference, it would seem that in order to answer the theoretical question of how the blind child manages to solve many of his developmental problems solely on nonvisual experience, it would not be sufficient to follow the development of self and object representations, defense mechanisms, drive maturation, and the use of autonomous functions simply as replacement for the absent perceptive modalities. It would also be important to understand the interaction of autonomous structures and functions with all other structures and functions in the psychic apparatus—that is, how these autonomous structures and functions contribute their particular stamp to the development and character of defenses, drives, and cognitive structures involving thinking and concept formation, as described by Rapaport (1957).

SUMMARY

From the analysis of a congenitally blind musician, I have described how his intense involvement with his trumpet and Dixieland music helped him to deal with 1, his tendency toward regression and unconscious fantasy of the loss of control of his destructiveness; 2, his problems concerning the instability of self-representations; and 3, his masturbatory conflicts. In addition, I have suggested some further determinants of his playing: the establishment of sensory nutriments; the integration of the hand, mouth, and hearing as leading perceptual and executive organs, and a mirroring function.

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Dream Mirrors

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DREAM MIRRORS

BY DAVID A. CARLSON, M.D.

The mirror is not so rare a dream element as has been thought; and its appearance may mark a critical point in an analysis. Intact mirrors with clear images are reported when the dreamer has made a creative integration of previously threatening material, while mirrors that are shattered or multiplied or without reflection are accompanied by evidence of terror and a lower level of psychological organization. Study of mirror dreams can further clarify the nature of the dream screen and the role of illusion in early interactions and development.

Psychoanalytic literature contains few references to dreams containing mirrors, despite the frequency of references to the analyst as a mirror since Freud's (1912) suggestions on technique. The most extensive treatment of the subject is by Eisnitz (1961), who, from his own practice and from that of colleagues, collected twenty-five dreams in which the subject saw all or part of himself in a mirror. Eisnitz used three of these dreams, each from a different patient, to illustrate his view of the mirror as the protector of narcissism. He suggested that the paucity of papers on the subject might be partially explained by the rarity of the dreams themselves. In this he anticipated Kohut (1971) who refers to "dreams during the analysis which portray a relationship (of the self) with someone who is seen as through a mirror (the analyst as the reflector of the grandiose self)" and says that they occur "only very rarely . . . . undisguised fantasies of looking at oneself in the mirror do not seem to be produced by analysands even at the peak of the reactivation of the grandiose self. Such fantasies may not occur because the situation can be enacted and rationalized easily as the patient's looking at himself in the mirror in reality" (pp. 116-117).

I wish to thank Dr. Hans W. Loewald for his valuable suggestions.

Of previous writers, only Milton Miller (1948) has spoken of mirror dreams as being at all common. He concluded that mirrors appear in dreams at turning points in the analysis, when the integrative functions of the ego have become strong enough to deal with the anxiety aroused by the emergence into consciousness of major repressed conflicts. He also contrasted mirror dreams with what he called "catastrophic" dreams, which occur when the ego is overwhelmed by the conflict being mobilized, and which portray an overwhelming danger from which the dreamer awakes in fright. Miller felt that "catastrophic" dreams represent a rationalization for retreat from danger, and that they signal the possibility of a flight from analysis.

My interest in mirror dreams was aroused by a male analysand's report of a dream in which he compared his body in a mirror with that of a woman, and by my inability to account for the necessity of the mirror, since the mirror's contents can be, and usually are, represented in dreams without the appearance of the mirror. Over the next four years this patient produced five more mirror dreams and many "mirrorlike" dreams; another analysand produced three mirror dreams; and a third reported one. In addition, an eleven-year-old girl, on being told I was interested in mirror dreams, immediately volunteered two which I have included as illustrative of such dreams in childhood.

This examination of an entire series of mirror dreams in the context of ongoing analyses reveals that in addition to dreams in which the dreamer reports having seen his own reflection, sometimes with a companion, there are other dreams in which no reflection is reported. The former type of dream appears to mark a successful assimilation, while the latter type is accompanied by persistent terror and signs of a lower level of ego functioning. Further, "no reflection" mirror dreams are frequently paired with dreams that fit Miller's category of the "catastrophic." I have been unable to find any previous discussion of dream mirrors in which the subject does not see

his reflection, even though the loss of one's reflection was a popular nineteenth century literary subject which survives in "horror" movies.

With remarkable frequency colleagues who learn that I am interested in mirror dreams respond that they have very recently encountered the only such dream they recall having heard, or a few weeks later report having noted one soon after our discussion. This, along with the nine mirror dreams in my practice in four year's time, suggests that mirror dreams are more common than has been reported and that they may be overlooked or forgotten by analyst as well as by dreamer.

CLINICAL MATERIAL

CASE I

A, a young journalist, entered analysis because of difficulty in finishing work, self-consciousness in groups when he was called upon to assert leadership, hypochondriacal concerns, and feelings of sexual inadequacy. He first sought treatment, in fact, after his wife had completed six months of analysis and had begun to express sexual interest and excitement more openly than she had before. His masturbatory fantasies of making love to a woman always stopped before penetration; and he reported never having ejaculated until age sixteen, an inhibition which reappeared transiently and was analyzed late in analysis, after it had been shown to be related to an inability to bring all sorts of events, including important parts of his work, to a climax. These inhibitions were consistent with his essentially obsessional character structure and with a series of early events that had focused anxiety on his genitals and on what it might mean to be a man.

In the course of our work it emerged that A had suffered throughout infancy from severe testicular colic, as one testicle tended to stay in or above a tightened inguinal ring. Throughout the first seven or eight years of A's life, his genitals had been the focus of regular anxious inspection by his mother, whose

concerns were heightened by A's first cousin, of almost exactly his own age, who is described as a pseudohermaphrodite. At times his mother and her sister took turns inspecting first one child and then the other. There were many indications that these inspections were in part pleasurable and that A struggled to avoid an erection and to conceal considerable passive satisfaction he derived from his mother's contemplation and manipulation of his penis.

When A was seven his father abruptly developed grand mal epilepsy and, in fact, had his first attack when A and his two younger brothers were alone with him. His father's irascibility, unreliability, and poor memory, together with a tendency toward boastfulness and cheating, were crucial in A's extreme disillusionment with his father. Later A's equation of ejaculation and climax in general with possible death and definite head damage proved central to a number of his symptoms.

The early focus on A's genitals, his helplessness in the face of colic, which had been alleviated only by mother's rushing him into a warm bath, the restraint he exercised to ensure that she did not break off her attentions, and the equation of male climax and epilepsy appeared in association to A's mirror dreams, as did the terminal illness of his paternal grandfather when he was nine. A had often been taken by his father to visit the old man in a hospital where he had undergone the amputation of a leg for complications of diabetes. Only A's father, of all the grandfather's children, visited him; the rest openly denounced him for his sexual infidelities which were blamed for having made him sick. On some of the visits A saw old men in oxygen tents whose partially reflective sides appear in connection with some of the dreams: A himself was briefly hospitalized at eleven for a mild pneumonia and is uncertain whether he was placed in such a device.

A second type of material that accompanied the mirror dreams had to do with a preoccupation with, and avoidance of, women's genitals. A's pseudohermaphrodite cousin P, for instance, was mentioned for the first time in the sixth analytic

hour, when A said that at age seven he and P had forced two girls to let them lie on the ground and look up their skirts. A then left the office, went home, and performed cunnilingus on his wife for the first time in over a year, and subsequently reported a temporarily much improved sexual relationship.

In his seventh session, A spoke for the first time of his father's epileptic attacks (he remained amnestic for the early, most frightening ones until much later) and of his concern about brain damage. He related his fear that he might be brain-damaged to several head injuries to which he had reacted dramatically as a child. At the same time he began to discuss three hallucinatory episodes he had experienced after smoking marijuana; and his thoughts led back and forth between these episodes, looking up the girls' skirts, and hypochondriacal concerns. One hallucinatory episode had occurred at a party after a woman had tried to seduce him; he had retreated to another room with a male friend, smoked marijuana, and hallucinated "a large red opening flower." A's first description of the red flower hallucination was followed by a dream in which someone was looking into his mouth and said there was a hard part and a soft part, and the hard part was cancer. On one level this dream directly represented his most marked conscious hypochondriacal concerns, which focused on his mouth because of prolonged thumb-sucking and a sharp orthodontic device installed to discourage it when he was twelve. The dream also related to his having used the bathroom outside my office the day before—the day on which he reported the red flower hallucination—and thinking that he had smelled my feces. This marked the beginning of a concern about the intactness of a fecal penis, which later became much clearer and more open.

In the first months of A's analysis, there were several references to mirrors having to do with his anxious inspection, especially of his mouth, for signs of cancer, a daily ritual accompanied by long periods of time spent combing his hair to achieve the exact effect he wanted. On one occasion he described a

severe headache (another recurrent symptom that related to his father's epilepsy), the onset of which had been just after he had stared at himself in the mirror for several minutes. The headache, like several of the mirror dreams that were to follow, came on the day after A had compared notes about analysis with H, a friend and colleague who had begun analysis with someone else at about the same time.

Dream 1

The first mirror dream A reported came after I had for several weeks focused on pointing out repeated instances of his avoidance of excitement, and he had responded with expressions of curiosity and jealousy about my treatment of women patients. Then in a few days he was presented with several unexpected instances of professional recognition and opportunity, while simultaneously his two brothers got into separate difficulties and three acquaintances suffered severe misfortune, one being killed by a terrorist's bomb. On the day before his dream A again recalled having looked up the girls' skirts, but now he recalled that the girls had been older and stronger and had forced him and his cousin under their skirts; and I commented that he had abruptly interrupted his account. That day he again sought out H, who told him something about his own analysis.

From that night he recalled two dreams:

> I had intercourse with S [the girl whose advances had preceded the open red flower hallucination]. I go to her apartment to take her to work and she's dressing while I sit there. Someone comes to the door and gives her a letter. She asks me to zip her up while she reads the letter. I unzip her and have intercourse with her aggressively.

The second dream:

> I'm with T [a young woman in his own profession whom he had described as attractive and seductive] and we're both naked

in her apartment. I compare my height and thinness with her in a mirror. I see her breasts and vagina.

A first remarked that he had never before let himself be so aggressive in a dream and had never experienced a dream or masturbatory fantasy that proceeded through consummation. It had seemed funny to compare himself to T: in another dream, he said, he might compare himself to another man. He went on to say that he wanted me to know that he was working on things even when it might not be evident during the analytic sessions; seeing the breasts and vagina of T and having intercourse in the dreams reminded him of my comment in our last hour that he broke off his account of the skirt incident each time before saying what he had seen. He then indicated for the first time that on the previous day he had realized that his abrupt termination of masturbation fantasies was similar to his inability to bring all sorts of events to climax in social and work areas as well as in sexual areas.

This mirror dream, like some of those to follow, is one of a pair of dreams and marks a time of particularly great stress. At this time, A was struggling with the emergence of his envy of what a woman might obtain from me and of what he feared as a result of feminine identifications. In the first dream he achieves a successful masculine approach by following another ("Someone comes to the door and gives her a letter") in a clearly triangular relationship. His persistent identification with the woman is expressed, and denied, most vividly in the second dream ("I compare my height and thinness with her in a mirror. I see her breasts and vagina").

This dream pair was presented when A was especially intent on pleasing me; and the wish to please me by facing what lay under the girls' skirts facilitated his picturing the second girl's genitals and achieving his first remembered dream consummation on the same night. At the same time A's accomplishment in forming a new generalization about his reluctance to seek climax eased the anxiety of the confrontation.

"Mirrorlike" dreams sometimes occur; for purposes of illustration, I include one that occurred at this point in A's analysis. He continued through the week after his first mirror dream to seek my approval or reassurance while often treating me as a woman to be handled seductively. He then recalled an earlier dream, the events of which he had seen through a window, and went on to thoughts of the shiny, transparent oxygen tents at grandfather's hospital and of a glass door through which he had pushed his cousin. After that hour he again compared notes on analysis with H. That night he had two dreams: "The upper half of my body. I admired it or somebody else admired it, as though in a window"; and second, "I exchanged signs of approval with a boy." The associations to the boy ultimately led to his pseudohermaphroditic cousin. He thought of demands others might make on him—his boss for stories or his wife for sexual gratification—and associated the window to windows and doors through which he had seen the action in several earlier dreams, especially one near the beginning of the analysis, in which he had seen a bandit and two women and had thought, "me, myself, and I."

This dream occurred at a time when A had been describing most fully his mirror behavior: he spent up to forty minutes a day before a mirror either searching his mouth for lesions or adjusting his hair; and on the day of the dream, as so often happened before his mirror dreams, he had compared experiences with H, the friend who had begun analysis at the same time and in whom he found similarities to himself. A increasingly presented H in terms of A's own warded-off impulses. Their conversations, in other words, had a "mirroring" quality. Apart from A's descriptions of mirror behavior before and in association to the first mirrorlike dream, a further indication that such dreams are related to "true" mirror dreams is the association to his cousin, who in the course of the analysis had appeared only in connection with the girls' skirt incident, the comparison of his genitals with A's by their anxious mothers, and immediately before and after mirror dreams.

At this point it should be noted that screens on which A saw things as if they were not entirely from within were particularly important to him. He insisted that movies were just as important as family life in shaping the crucial attitudes of his generation. A closed his eyes in most hours and often reported that he saw "a movie screen" when he did so; and in the late phases of analysis, at moments of increased resistance he reported a stream of passively experienced reverie-like images. He explained, "I press my eyes to make images come; they don't really come from me."

Dream 2

A second true mirror dream occurred thirty sessions after the first. On the day before the dream he had again recalled his cousin's sexual ambiguity and reported a dream that clearly indicated his identification with him. In several ways during the hour he expressed an eagerness to see that my other patients "got as much" as he did from treatment, and when I commented on this he acknowledged that he had always been reluctant to say that he had "more" than his cousin. That night he dreamed:

> I was at the apartment of a couple who are good friends and a girl named F was there too. A corridor led to a spare room. I recommended a film but the others complained it was too intellectual. I sat on a couch next to F and said, "You'd like *My Night at Maud's.*" Then I went into a bathroom and saw a woman from the television program, *Room 222,* who taught sex education to a high school class. [Actually, he said, the woman he saw was a younger substitute who had replaced the elderly regular teacher who taught rigidly from notes; and in the episode he had seen recently, the younger woman had rapped freely with the class about sex.] She sat on the toilet. I faced the mirror and masturbated and she didn't react. At the same time I could see the beads of sweat on my own shoulder blades.

A said that it had been while looking at the mirror that

morning that he had recalled the dream and that he had felt filled with shame at the thought of masturbating while looking into a mirror; it seemed such a narcissistic thing to do. F, he said, was the sort of woman about whom he never had a sexual fantasy. Then he recalled that after he masturbated, the woman got up and left the office: he caught himself at this point and said, "bathroom." When I inquired about the slip he said he had been in analysis six months and thought maybe nothing was happening, that I was permitting him just to masturbate. Then he spontaneously repeated the dream, omitting the mirror and all references to feelings.

In this mirror dream, a woman is again present with him, and the sight of himself in the mirror bolsters his faltering denial of a feminine identification which he betrays by the description of his own shoulder blades and by the woman's leaving the office/bathroom. Even less successfully, he attempts to deny the intensity of his involvement in the analysis ("just masturbating"). On another level, and much more clearly than in the first mirror dream, the analyst is also represented as a woman, sexual longings toward whom can be denied and whose approval, or at least lack of disapproval, is essential to his sexual performance. Of special interest in view of the previously reported paucity of mirror dreams is the omission of the mirror, his feelings, and, of course, the slip in the retelling of the dream.

Dream 3

Almost two hundred more sessions passed before A reported another mirror dream. His wife had been pregnant for two months and had passed through a threatened miscarriage. In connection with this A had recovered memories of death wishes toward his mother and brothers and the disappointment and neglect he had felt after the brothers' births. He had once more recalled the red flower hallucination. After I commented that he seemed to seek a recurrence of it through his frequent heavy marijuana smoking, he recalled that his grandmother's

name had been similar to that of a red flower, and that he had been her favorite until her sudden death around the time of his youngest brother's birth, when A had been four. There were indications that after his grandmother's death he had turned to his father for affection and approval, as in these hours he increasingly did to me; and I had commented on his wish for tenderness and approval from me. In the hour before the dream he again reported having "compared notes" on analysis, this time in a lengthy discussion with his wife that revolved around a comparison of their analysts.

On the evening of the dream his wife had told him that her gynecologist had said it would be all right to resume intercourse, from which they had abstained at the time of the threatened miscarriage. His wife had also observed that since starting analysis A seemed freer to play but that his work inhibitions did not yet seem much changed, a comment he took as a bitter reproach. On television he watched the film, *Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner,* in which the working-class hero fell back when he could have won a race from an upper-class boy. A recalled that his brothers had called him the family success and that in fact he was the first successful man in his family.

Again the dream is one of a pair:

> I'm in a great underground hall. It's formal with long mirrors. A bent old man takes me over to a table where there are six or seven men and one woman and introduces me to them counterclockwise. I shake hands with the last one on my right, and he says that from my handshake I must be an unusually fine and sensitive reporter.
>
> I'm with a boy or girl in a cave. A monster comes over the horizon that has claws that pick you up and can eat you or throw you down. The other person is caught. Sliding doors open and enable me to escape into a vast space. There's a man pushing a strange cart. The people there are strange and I'm alien.

He awoke in fright and was unable to sleep for some time.

Formal places reminded him of weddings and bar mitzvahs, places where he felt least comfortable. "Counterclockwise" reminded him of the difficulty he had in learning to distinguish right from left, and that he had been unable to tie his shoes until he was twelve. Subsequently he recalled that he had always done very poorly on spatial visualization tests, performed "like a moron" on parts of IQ tests, and had been unable to master trigonometry. The monster reminded him of a dream several months earlier, in which he had hidden in a pit from a monster. When asked for associations to mirrors, he seemed not to have heard the question, but complained for the first time of twitching, which he had first noticed that morning. The twitching recurred for several months, was most marked during his analytic hours, and ultimately disappeared after a fuller recall of his father's convulsions could be related to masturbatory concerns.

The dreams of this night combine many of the features seen in other dreams of this series. A was coping with a threatening interpretation: again, on the day before the dreams, he had compared notes on analysis, this time with his wife; and again, he had been seeking approval from the analyst and from others, a quest in which his wife had disappointed him the night before with her observations on his freedom to play but not to work. There is also an unequivocal confrontation with a female, in fact maternal, genital both in dream content and in his pregnant wife's announcement of the night before.

A had been struggling with his emerging murderous wishes toward his younger brothers and mother and had especially sought, and failed to find, praise from his pregnant wife and from his analyst. The birth of his youngest brother, accompanied as it was by the death of his grandmother, had been a time when an occasion for the greatest rage was accompanied by reason for belief in the fragility of his objects. The pathogenic quality of the event lay not only in his struggle with impulses but in the abrupt loss of his heretofore steadily approving grandmother just when his mother's attention was withdrawn.

Subsequent material showed that the withdrawal of his mother's attention was even greater: she had been plunged into a fairly severe depression by her mother's death. These dreams, then, commemorate a major narcissistic crisis and A's failure to obtain needed reassurance.

This dream pair illustrates and permits an extension and modification of Miller's (1948) observations on mirror dreams as indicators of the successful integration of an emergent insight and "catastrophic" dreams as an indication of a severe threat to the analysis. In this mirror dream, in contrast to the first one described, there is a relative failure of integration and of the quest for assurance. The warm approval directed toward the dreamer by the older man represents part of the preceding interpretation and the unacceptable wish for the analyst's affection and approval. The second dream deals with the monster that then emerges. The mirror as dream element, then, is not invariably a sign of successful integration and reassurance, or at least it may at times represent only a very transient success in that regard. At this point we can observe that in A's first two mirror dreams he described his reflection in the first and the act of looking into the mirror in the second. In this "unsuccessful" dream the mirrors are only described as lining the hall.

The failure of integration and reassurance represented in the first of this pair of dreams is accompanied by multiple blank mirrors. That the dreamer does not see his reflection, but rather seeks the approval of another person, signifies that the reassurance of the mirror has failed. In fact, the arrangement of men at the table reminds A of his humiliating failures to tie his shoes and to perform other simple mechanical tasks as a boy. Grandmother's death and mother's depression are represented as a multiplied, in effect broken, mirror.

In the second dream, the attempt to find safety in merger with the mother and her genital is a representation of what several later dreams in this series suggest is successfully managed in other mirror dreams. But the attempt fails here: A is

confronted by the sexual ambiguity of an occupant of the womb and of his own wishes, a matter close to his waking concern about the sex of his unborn child. This, in turn, touches on masturbatory fantasy and his father's head damage, a change that made his father, and threatened to make of A, a monster, "because of what he did to himself." The second dream also conveys a clear picture of depersonalization and derealization: the crisis has resulted in a retreat to autoerotism; and from this point of view the monster is clearly a restitutional product.

Dream 4

That assertiveness in any "manly" area would lead to a damaged head was a recurrent theme. Through much of his analysis, A conducted a series of struggles with me over the fee, the hours, etc., in which he always assumed the position of a child pleading an exception or "getting away with something." For instance, when faced with his having previously been told about fees and their payment, he characteristically complained that I had imposed the arrangement on him, or that I was making a struggle out of nothing. Very gradually he began to acknowledge that if there was a struggle he at least made a contribution to it. Then in one hour late in the second year of analysis he announced that he had decided to give up the fight. He explained that the decision came to him as he looked into a mirror and saw that he was growing older and getting lines like his father's. To struggle, to experience conflict, meant to get old like father and like the analyst.

Two months after A's decision to abandon struggling with me, when his fears of assertiveness had again come into focus and had been subject to partial interpretation in the transference, he nearly had an accident that might have produced head damage. After telling me about the near-accident, he went into a reverie that included painful images of submitting to anal intercourse with a "bearded Zeus." The image of his father kept erupting and he described a mirror exercise that he had

conducted regularly as an adolescent and often still performed, designed to make his face less like father's and more like mother's. This seems to have been part of his mirror "secret" and it may be significant that the subject of termination first came up after this hour as a subject hinted at and at first disowned.

Months later, following the further interpretation of anal masturbatory derivatives and anal receptive wishes, and most directly following my having pointed out evidence that despite his denials he was thinking of stopping analysis, he said that he had felt upset at the end of the previous hour. Then he reported a fourth mirror dream:

> You were leaning casually on your arm, slouching. I leave and stop at a mirror on the wall and look in my eyes. Below them are lines. You appear wearing no jacket, tie, shoes, or socks. Have you come then to delay my leaving? You seem to be in a vacation mood. Your feet seem pink and too small, turned in and effeminate, and infantile.

His first thought was that for some time he had been researching an article on psychotherapists and had wanted to include a section on what the experience of termination was like, from a therapist's point of view. Lines reminded him of deadlines for papers and of the end of health insurance benefits some months hence, and of deterioration as opposed to maturation or change in a good way. Slouching reminded him of "louse," his father's word for his own father and brothers, who were selfish and egocentric. He did not refer spontaneously to the mirror this time, and I did not find a suitable occasion in the hour to ask about it. Here, despite the partial displacement of passive, feminine, and infantile wishes to the analyst, in the mirror A saw evidence of unwelcome conflict in the lines under his eyes, as he struggled with recently emerged anal masturbatory fantasy and its accompanying passive homosexual and feminine wishes, now accentuated by thoughts of ending analysis.

There followed through subsequent hours much fuller

accounts of A's reluctance to accept conflict and of his feeling that his increased awareness of it was a deterioration, rather than progress due to analysis. Then came the much more vivid recall of his father's epileptic attacks, and finally insight into A's association of head damage with ejaculation.

Dream 5

A's equation of full orgasm with convulsions, his prolonged adolescent avoidance of ejaculation, and his subsequent sexual inhibition were interpreted in a series of hours which in large part revolved around his wish that I, as a woman now, should admire and expertly manipulate his penis as his mother and aunt had done, while he controlled the flow of thoughts and excitement to prevent ejaculation. Around this time, A reported a fifth mirror dream:

> I met my brothers in a sidewalk cafe in Paris. A couple who reminded me of the parents in *400 Blows* came in looking for their daughter. I walked out alone through the exciting structures of the city and passed a Negro man standing outside his pool hall. He reminded me of my father. I was approached by two Puerto Ricans who cut the top of my head. I went home to try to tell my wife and went into the bathroom, where I lean over, looking into the mirror, and see the gash. My head is down and blood is running all over, so I go to see my wife.

He said his wife had never believed how cruel his parents had been and that now she didn't "believe in" his illness and disapproved of his analysis. The Puerto Ricans reminded him of his less favored younger brothers, each of whom had reason to resent him. *400 Blows* reminded him of the mother in it, a seductive Parisienne. The cut head he immediately related to brain damage and a fear of being attacked. Again there was no explicit association to the mirror.

Once more, a mirror dream represents the integration of a previous interpretation with which A had been struggling. In

fact, from the time of his ready equation of the cut head with brain damage he seemed more open about his feelings as a father. At the same time the dream clearly portrayed the father and brothers who threaten and attack him because of his favored relation with a seductive mother, representing his wife, who urged him to leave his relationship with me. The dream also portrayed me as the analyst who had recommended that he remain with me: his shift in the dream account from past to present tense, as he describes looking into the mirror, highlights the use of the mirror as a representation of the analyst and the analytic relationship.

The mirror in A's dreams seems to have served some of the same purposes that it did in his mirror-gazing in waking life: it permitted him to assume the guise of a woman (making his face look like mother's) who submitted to father, while it simultaneously showed him that he remained a man whose head was undamaged. A's dreams suggest further that the mirror specifically helped him stare down his fear of the female genital. A used the mirror as a semihallucinatory screen, much as he sought such experience with marijuana: the mirror, like a hallucinogen, helps one feel in touch with realities that cannot otherwise be seen, and it strengthens denial, particularly of castration, through a reminder that things unseen can be there too. In this way the image in the mirror may in itself represent an illusory maternal penis, the plausibility of which is increased in states of intoxication. At the same time the plain "blank" mirror is well suited to represent female genitals. The mirror also represents a comforting witness, such as A sought in his wife late in the last dream. The ability to represent salient parts of a threatening interpretation in a mirror dream, seen especially in A's first, second, and fourth dreams, seems to mark a triumph of integration, as opposed to the terror of the third dream with its multiple empty mirrors.

CASE II

B had been reared by an exhibitionistic mother who left much of his care to a sister who was only three years older than

he. Like A, he had concluded in childhood that a woman (in B's case the older sister; in A's his mother) was much more intelligent than any man in the family. Each had special reason to fear head injury and each had been beaten, sometimes on the head (B by his sister), a history shared by one of the patients described by Eisnitz (1961).

B's mirror dream occurred when he was struggling with an interpretation of his identification with his sister, which I had made some hours before and which he had sought to reject. On the day of the dream his girl friend had left for a vacation without him in circumstances that reflected his implicit invitation to her to resume an affair with a somewhat older, much wealthier man. This was a repetition of part of an earlier marriage in which his wife for some time carried on an affair which he denied, and of an earlier phase of the transference in which he had presented his then-wife to me in tantalizing terms. On the day of the dream his sister had unexpectedly presented him with information about her own sexual activities that he had witnessed as a teenager and had successfully repressed.

He reported:

> I dreamt that I was looking into a mirror and had shaved off my beard and moustache, only I was able to feel with my hand that the beard was still on my face.

Later he indicated that feeling his beard with his hand had not been simultaneous with looking into the mirror.

On the next day he reported: "I dreamt things in our first house were hitting me on the head and that I screamed, 'Mommy!' or 'Momma!'. I can't remember the name for the stuff thrown out by a volcano. When I awoke I wasn't anxious although I was terrified in the dream."

There followed more information his sister had given him on the day preceding the mirror dream, intermixed with thoughts about her ability to upset everyone around her while staying calm herself. This material could be related to his alarm at my unwelcome interpretation, to memories of his sister beating him dangerously on the head, and to his early envy of her seeming

immunity and fearlessness. B then recalled further details of what his sister had recounted on the day before the mirror dream: that mother had always walked about the house naked till B was fourteen and had left her used menstrual tampons unwrapped in a heap beside the toilet. Over the next few hours he recovered memories from age three of terror inspired by his sister's having beaten him on the head in a life-threatening manner.

B's marijuana smoking repeatedly emerged through the next few weeks as a secret, alongside unmistakable references to a maternal phallus—for instance in a dream in which a policeman sought contraband in his mother's fur coat.

The power of marijuana here is the creation of illusion, if not of hallucination as in the case of A, and the mirror serves as the guardian of illusion. The mirror repeatedly proves that one can see what is not there, in the sense that the child tries to grasp a mirror image with his hand, only to encounter glass. Such mirror play may have been a predecessor of A's and of B's searches for enlightenment through mystical, hallucinatory, and toxic experiences. B's mirror, like those of A's early mirror dreams, serves a faltering denial of a feminine identification. But in this case the dreamer's reflected image provides only transient reassurance. It heralds the terrifying dream of the next night, possibly because the dream deals with severe traumatization by his mother's genital exhibitionism and his sister's murderous assault.

Five months later B described a mirror-gazing episode similar to the last one reported by A. It was the end of a summer vacation, during which he had not consciously felt any regrets about my being away. He was in a barber shop and learned that the young barber was about to marry. He thought how young and naïve the barber seemed; then he observed lines under his own eyes and thought it felt all right to be growing older if one was wiser and had learned to face the complications of life.

CASE III

One of my patients who described the process of analysis in mirror terms was a woman, C, who likened the first hours to being on one side of a one-way mirror window. Subsequent associations to the mirror included a fear of being tricked: a psychiatrist had shown her a nursery school class through such a window and she had thought it an underhanded and inconsiderate thing to do to the children.

In the thirty-seventh session C reported a dream: "I was examining my own external genitalia through a miracle or mirror for monilia." Her dream appeared as she began to indicate great difficulty in tolerating her curiosity about the analyst and how he viewed her. She had recently developed monilia as the result of another physician's treatment, in which she had taken antibiotics prescribed for a urinary tract infection. It is doubtless relevant that her mother had died when C was eighteen months old as a result of uncontrolled uterine bleeding following delivery, and that as a child she had pictured her mother in heaven watching her. The mirror seemed to affirm C's identification with a mother who had afflicted genitals, and it affirmed the miracle of feeling sustained by the presence of the invisible analyst and by the integrative effects of self-scrutiny. Apart from its *Klang* quality, her "mirror-miracle" association echoes the two words' common derivation from the Latin *mirari,* to wonder or admire.

Over two hundred sessions later C reported a second mirror dream:

> I awoke to face the mirror over my bed. It has a dark oval frame. It was a trapezoidal solid with the top and bottom parallel to each other but not to the floor so I couldn't see what was behind me in the room and had to turn over. It was like a box reaching out to me.

And two weeks later a third mirror dream was reported:

> I saw the mirror at the foot of my bed with its big oval gold

frame. A cushion from the back of the couch was hanging in front of it at a forty-five degree angle. The cushion was split in the middle as though a section had been cut out.

Two other dreams followed: "There's a man on my bed and I'm aroused and jump on him and make love. Another man jumps on me and I turn from being on my side to being on my back to fight off the second man"; and, "I'm having oral-genital sex with another woman." She awoke from each of these dreams terrified.

These dreams followed a time in the analysis in which her unusually long silences had begun to yield to an awareness of their active nature and then of her fear of passivity, which she equated with being overwhelmed by desires. She had also begun to speak more openly of her fear of attack by men, along with numerous indications of homosexual temptation provoked by a young woman friend who had recently begun to share her flat.

In each of these dreams the mirror represents an important waking residue, as it does in some of A's dreams. C had lived alone for several years and had suffered intense dread of attack, using not only locks and deadbolts on her door but barricading it each night as well; and when she woke she faced a mirror so positioned as to command a view of the door. When asked about "mirror" she associated each time to this one. Her stress in each dream on the angles led to no associations, but it suggests an after-image effect, or at least a poorly integrated perception from anxious searching of the mirror during a fitful sleep. Also marked in this case is the genital symbolism of the mirror as a blank oval with accentuated rim, of the cushion with a center piece cut out, and, finally, of a box that threatens to reach out and engulf the dreamer who struggles with homosexual temptation. These last two are not mirror dreams of reassurance: and the first of the two, like the multiple mirror dream of A (Dream 3) contains no reflected image. In contrast to the dreams described before with more or less intact single mirrors, all of which were from men, there is no evident masculine imagery.

CASE IV

The eleven-year-old daughter of a medical colleague, on being told that I was interested in mirror dreams, immediately volunteered that she remembered two from a few years before.

> I dreamed I was in France in a long room with many mirrors and was turning into an ogre. First my toes were turning green, then my fingers. An ogre was there like this [arms spread threateningly] but I looked away, didn't want to see it.

Three years before, she had been taken through the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Her reaction to a later question about ogres was another arm-and-shoulder gesture that included a peculiarly disjointed shrug and lateral rotation of the extended forearm coupled with a facial expression of amused eyes and a mouth and remaining facial musculature registering disgust.

Her second dream was: "I was looking into a mirror and could see my heart beating and all my guts [coordinated and consistent facial, arm, and torso expression of disgust]. It was after I read one of Daddy's medical magazines with illustrations." D's subsequent talk about the second dream was conducted with consistent gestures and expressions.

Poorly integrated actions again, as after A's third mirror dream, appear in the recounting of the first of these dreams which, like A's dream, contains multiple mirrors and takes place in a cavernous space. Further, as in A's dream and the two terrifying mirror dreams of C, the dreamer is not explicitly described as reflected. The search for reassurance fails and, as in A's dream, the dreamer is threatened by a monster which, in this case, the dreamer is clearly in danger of becoming. The girl's poorly coordinated gestures, her seemingly mixed affect, the fragmenting or multiplication of the mirror, and the color change suggest a regression to a primitive state of part-object relations or, from another point of view, a regression from narcissism to autoerotism (*cf.,* Freud, 1914b). This may indicate that D's ogre and A's monster are restitutional products.

In contrast, in the second dream the girl looks directly into the mirror, confronts what sounds like a much more realistically frightening image and describes it in a more mature, coordinated way. In this instance a reflective mirror again holds together; affect and image remain intact and clear; and self- and object representations retain a consistency and durability lacking in the multiple-mirror and mirror-with-no-reflected-image dreams.

DISCUSSION

The data assembled here suggest that mirror dreams represent an important psychological landmark, a point of narcissistic peril and opportunity when either a major therapeutic and integrative advance or a retreat toward psychotic or hypochondriacal functioning and unintegrated action may be imminent. Such dreams in the relatively healthy analysand may also point to an area in which some of the interrelationships of creativity and psychosis can be studied. More generally, they indicate a clinical area in which a crucial coherence of ego and superego functions is shaped and tested.

The ancient belief that mirrors possess great power is echoed in C's report of her first mirror dream, with its "mirror-miracle" association, and in the legendary mirror which enabled Perseus to face and ultimately overcome the otherwise fatal reality of Medusa's stare. "Crystal-gazing" has been similarly employed in hypnotherapy; there are reports that it makes possible the recovery of terror-laden memories which are not accessible to other "short-cut" devices (*cf.,* Erickson and Kubie, 1939). At the same time, the thought that a mirror's action may sometimes depend on its capacity to mediate or reinforce illusion, rather than merely to reflect a given reality, is conveyed by the phrase, "doing it with mirrors."

The examples presented here support and extend the conclusions of Miller (1948) and Eisnitz (1961) that dream mirrors reassure against castration and protect narcissism, that they "tame the threat coming from the ferocious part of the super-

ego, or reality, and . . . extract from it loving reassurance" (Eisnitz, 1961, pp. 472-473). Their views in this respect can be seen as a partial application to the mirror as dream element of Freud's (1919) comments on the theme of the double in "The 'Uncanny' ":

> The fact that an agency of this kind exists, which is able to treat the rest of the ego like an object—the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation—renders it possible to invest the old idea of a 'double' with a new meaning and to ascribe a number of things to it—above all, those things which seem to self-criticism to belong to the old surmounted narcissism of earliest times (p. 235).

It was Ferenczi (1921) who first elaborated on the mirror as the site for a struggle between narcissistic omnipotence and "facing reality," and who dealt with the closely related theme of the double as a penis and a reassurance against castration. And it was Lewin (1948b) who first spelled out the equation of the reality to be faced with the female genital. Bak (1968) wrote of the importance of "being hidden but being there" in primary perverse fantasy and may have further elucidated the mirror's function in dreams when, in writing about transvestitism, he reported that in the rituals of one patient, "even the angle of the mother's mirror fixed to a wardrobe door had to be reproduced exactly. I was informed that this practice is not infrequent . . ." (p. 25). The mirror offers the hope of recalling what the viewer wishes to be "hidden but there" for perhaps several reasons. As Greenacre (1958) points out, the face and the genitals are two highly differentiated areas of the body which cannot be fully seen without a miror; and it would follow that the everyday experience of mirrors confirms the viewer's possession of an anatomic feature he cannot see. Even as he beholds himself in the mirror as a well-dressed woman, the transvestite may be reassured about his penis, not only as B was in the dream in which he felt his beard even though he could not see it in the mirror, but also by the mirror itself as a regular

reminder and confirmation of the existence of things otherwise unseen.

B's mirror dream occurred during a period in which he complained that there was "nothing in the analysis." It was followed by a dream in which his marijuana smoking was linked to hallucinatory drugs and in which a policeman searched for marijuana in his mother's furs. Soon afterward he recovered memories of her extreme exhibitionism and his vivid conviction of the existence of a fecal phallus. Thus in the mirror, as in mother's pubic hair, he permitted himself to see something that was not there. Similarly, C's dreams vividly convey the picture of the mirror's rim as the outline of female "empty" genitals.

The nature of reflection sometimes endows the image seen in a mirror with a phallic "aura," i.e., in the absence of artificial illumination the usual light source is more or less behind the viewer and a brighter light may surround the viewer, recalling Greenacre's (1947) description of the halo effect around the penis and the contrasting darkness associated with the female genital (the dark rim of C's dreams).

Interestingly, despite the primal scene qualities and associations that are common in most of these dreams and their important place in the emergence of masturbation fantasies, the extensive recovery of primal scene material in the analysis of both A and B did not occur in immediate or clear relationship to any of their mirror dreams.[1]

Dreams featuring windows or doors are more common than mirror dreams. Some of them, as illustrated in Case A, appear in contexts of, and with some associations encountered in, mirror dreams themselves. Such dreams, notably that of the Wolf-man (Freud, 1914a) were cited by Lewin (1948a) as illustrations of the dream screen. Freud had agreed with the Wolf-man's opinion that the open window stood for the opening of his eyes on waking; and Lewin concluded that the closed

[1] Since the completion of this paper Feigelson (1975) has reported the emergence of masturbatory ritual in relation to mirror dreams.

window was an instance of the dream screen and represented the wish to sleep. Even without a link through mirrorlike dreams, a dream mirror seems to be a special instance of the dream screen. In this regard, our consideration of dream mirrors is consistent in its findings with Kanzer's (1954) attempt to demonstrate that the dream screen might represent the breast only regressively, covering underlying fantasies of a maternal phallus, and that the oral interests associated with such dreams were probably an upward displacement from "the dreaded but fascinating maternal vulva."

Observation of small children using mirrors demonstrates the role of mirrors in illusion. Small children will smile and reach toward their image repeatedly, only to encounter glass, which must be a nearly universal experience of seeing something that "isn't there" but *is*. Lacan (1949) directly related infants' perceptions of themselves in mirrors to the earliest stages of ego development, which he described as consisting of an anticipatory identification with the image of another, a "mirror phase" which enables infants to experience themselves as a whole after first experiencing unity with the entirety of another. Similarly, Shengold (1974), in a case study focused on an adult's use of a mirror, has described the mirror as at once a metaphor for the mind and a maternal symbol, an image whose power ultimately derives from the narcissistic period "when identity and mind are formed through contact with the mother" (p. 114).

Winnicott, whose transitional object has been related to the mirror experience or mirror relationships by more recent authors (*cf.*, Eisnitz, 1961; Kohut, 1971) noted: "In some infants, during thumb-sucking the fingers caressing the upper lip, or some other part, may be or may become more important than the thumb engaging the mouth" (Winnicott, 1953, p. 90). And more recently, in "Mirror-role of Mother and Family in Child Development," a paper that provides some examples of Loewald's (1960) more comprehensive formulations on the introjection of the mother's image of the child and the integra-

tive aspects of psychoanalysis, Winnicott concluded that the precursor of the mirror was specifically the mother's face. He pointed out that a nursing baby tends to focus not on the breast but on mother's face; and that she in turn mirrors what she sees in the infant's face, coupling this with an expression of love and approval—"mother's role of giving back to the baby the baby's own self." He cited the case of a woman whose depression was daily assuaged by "putting on her face," that is, getting maternal approval from a mirror. Winnicott's comment on the analyst as a mirror is pertinent: "Psychotherapy is not making clever and apt interpretations; by and large it is a long-term giving the patient back what the patient brings. It is a complex derivative of the face that reflects back what is there to be seen" (Winnicott, 1967, p. 117).

Most recently Southwood (1973), who explicitly regards early maternal communication as causative rather than merely facilitative of ego development, has elaborated Winnicott's thesis in terms of the mother's attempt to "catch the baby's eye" and generally to place and keep herself in the central focus of the baby's visual field. He stresses the simultaneity of imitation and approval. "Concomitantly with the baby's proprioceptive registering of his own facial movements and sounds, there are visual and auditory registerings of his own facial movement and her sounds. Thus . . . she gives back part of what the baby is doing . . . and . . . something of her" (p. 238).

Kohut (1971) describes "mirror transference" as "therapeutic reinstatement of that normal phase of the development of the grandiose self in which the gleam in the mother's eye, which mirrors the child's exhibitionistic display, and other forms of maternal participation in and response to the child's narcissistic-exhibitionistic enjoyment confirm the child's self-esteem and, by a gradually increasing selectivity of these responses, begin to channel it into realistic directions" (p. 116). This concept extends Freud's (1914b) description of a mother's regard for her infant to a mirroring situation: "Thus they are under a com-

pulsion to ascribe every perfection to the child—which sober observation would find no occasion to do—and to conceal and forget all his shortcomings. (Incidentally, the denial of sexuality in children is connected with this.)" (p. 91).

Fenichel's (1935) remarks on enchantment (in which the victim is required to imitate the magician's movements) and on similar patterns in several children's games, and his report of the child who believed in head pregnancies because he could see a child in his mother's eye, are clear partial anticipations of the concept of a maternal face-mirror, as is Brody's (1952) conclusion from another direction that twins in a dream represented a pregenital fusion with the mother.[2]

In terms of technique the mirror dreams reported here are understandable as attempts to deal with previous interpretations. More specifically, they represent a crucial early stage in the process of working through as it affects self-representations. An aspect of the therapeutic alliance or of the transference is portrayed: the patient puts himself in place of the watching analyst and assures himself that he, as the analyst, will benignly accept the acknowledgment of the part of himself revealed in the preceding interpretation. This recalls views of the therapeutic alliance by Loewald (1960), Stone (1961), Winnicott (1967), and others who have stressed that Freud's (1912) advice to be like a mirror does not suggest coldness or a feigned indifference on the analyst's part. Loewald (1960), in fact, suggested that a "psycho-dynamic understanding of the mirror as it functions in human life may well re-establish it as an appropriate description of at least certain aspects of the analyst's function" (p. 19, n.).

Some of the mirror dreams I have described, notably B's, highlight the difference between what one sees of oneself in the mirror and one's general coenesthesia—a bodily and visual analogue to the distinction between thought and spoken (and

[2] Feigelson (1975) has concluded that "the mirror dream represents a regressive partial reunion with the protective mother" and a defense against object loss.

heard) words. Freud's (1911) distinction between having heard and having experienced something, and Loewenstein's (1956) suggestion that hearing one's own thought plays a part in neutralization, have a parallel in those mirror dreams in which seeing one's reflected image leads to, or accompanies, successful integration of a threatening insight. In Eisnitz's (1961) study, the dream mirror as an approving witness was likened to the mirror Perseus used to protect himself from the stare of Medusa and later from that of her severed head which he employed as a weapon, the stare being considered a representation of superego threat. However, Medusa's power must also be regarded as resting on the oral-sadistic and incorporative impulses projected onto her. Through the mirror, Perseus experienced most of the phenomena we have encountered in these dreams: a woman who threatened castration, who was endowed with illusory phalli, and whose stare reflected in a mirror gave him great strength, a strength that may reflect not only mother's approval but the successful integration of Perseus's own aggressive impulses.

Many of the interpretations that preceded my patients' mirror dreams had to do with immediate actions of the analysand. A's dreams were regularly foreshadowed by acting out in the form of "comparing notes" and usually in other forms as well, suggesting—as do A's twitchings after his third mirror dream and D's uncoordinated gestures after the recounting of her reflectionless multiple mirror dream—that the mirror image plays a role in the integration of action. Kohut (1971, pp. 118-119) has described "forced actions" seen in the regression to autoerotism as an attempt to consider the experience of self-fragmentation; but such action may also plausibly be seen as unintegrated actions that re-emerge during the regressive transition from narcissism to autoerotism. That "screenlike" phenomena can be involved in the control of motility was long ago demonstrated in Kepec's (1952) description of a waking screen analogous to the dream screen which interposed itself between his patient and the wish to act.

In vampire stories, a soulless man of evil deeds has no mirror image; and Sarnoff (1972) has noted that in the works of E. T. A. Hoffmann a mirror image is regularly associated with mature ego functioning and its lack with impulsivity. It would be interesting to know whether the inventor of this literary convention had experienced such "no-reflection" mirror dreams, which seem not to have been studied previously in the psychoanalytic literature, but which in my patients are so closely related to the experience of horror.

If mirror experiences during normal development play a part in the integration of action, one would expect to find defective, or at least different, styles of action integration in the blind. Burlingham (1965) reports that workers with blind children deal routinely with "blindisms"—motions that are performed repetitively and are difficult to suppress. Certainly mirror play is common at and before the toddler stage, at which time there is generally said to be a shift from total body expression to more discrete facial expression. Fenichel (1935) in particular noted the children's game of advancing toward and retreating from a mirror. Such play dates from the toddler period, as does the child's mirror play, observed by Freud (1920), that dealt with separation from the mother, while Lacan (1949) vividly described mirror play in infants too young to stand without support.

Intense wishes for my understanding and approval were often expressed just before my patients' mirror dreams. A number of reasons to believe that the mirror itself conveys reassurance have already been discussed. In these dreams, that reassurance does indeed seem like the desperately sought "gleam in the mother's eye" that has been described in other contexts (*cf.,* Kohut, 1971) as essential to the attainment and maintenance of new, vulnerable levels of mental organization: its reflective presence in these dreams indicates an integrative capacity which is essential for the working-through process and for the use of insight at especially stressful times, as for instance in dealing with the bisexual identifications of masturbation fantasy. The mirror

dreams with no reflection usually contain restitutional/hypochondriacal material. They are terrifying and lead to waking, followed by hypochondriacal concerns and persistent, observable, poorly integrated motor phenomena, including twitches, fasciculations, and awkward gestures. These no-reflection dreams are more than punishment dreams, in that the dreamer afterward functions at a lower level of psychological organization.

Mirror dreams occupy a mental territory close to that of Pious's (1961) nadir event: the integration of affect, action, perception, and the maintenance of coherent self- and object representations are at hazard unless a creative integration of new insight can be effected. At the same time both mirrors and the more common mirrorlike screen elements in dreams, of which one example has been described in the case of A, are, like manifestations of the dream screen, easily overlooked and hard to account for in the interpretation of dreams. One can speculate that the dream mirrors, and perhaps mirrorlike and screenlike phenomena as well, represent an evocation of early events in which the infant came to "see himself" in interaction with a suitably attentive mother. In such interaction illusion promotes the development of instinct and ego patterns while providing a precursor of superego functioning, but serious lapses in this interaction produce, at least temporarily, a massive dissolution of newly formed psychic structure and the experience of primitive horror.

SUMMARY

Mirrors appear in dreams more frequently than has previously been reported. They appear at times of crisis, characteristically after a threatening interpretation. There is a continuum between mirror dreams in which the subject sees himself in the mirror and emerges from the dream reassured and with integration of new insight, and mirror dreams in which a distorted reflection or no reflection at all is seen in the mirror (or multiple mirrors). The latter type of mirror dream is followed

by terror and sometimes by dreams of monsters, by hypochondriacal concerns and the emergence of poorly integrated motor activity. It is suggested that mirror dreams are an important psychological landmark and that they afford an exceptional opportunity for studying the development of integrative capacities from early interactions.

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On Dreaming at Sleep Onset

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ON DREAMING AT SLEEP ONSET

BY JOSEPH W. SLAP, M.D.

The position that dreaming occurs exclusively during REM sleep, which has its first onset after sixty to ninety minutes of nonREM sleep, has been effectively refuted in sleep laboratories but remains uncorrected in the psychoanalytic literature. Examples of hallucinatory activity occurring during the sleep onset period and during a brief nap are shown to have all the characteristics of dreams, including latent content related to repressed material from childhood.

In 1965 Fisher published a lengthy article on the new research on sleep and dreaming. He noted that none of the extensive literature on dreaming (REM) sleep and nondreaming (NREM) sleep had been cited in the psychoanalytic literature, with the exception of a few brief abstracts and an article by R. M. Whitman. Believing that this research had important implications for psychoanalysis, he undertook to review and summarize the major findings. Fisher (1965) described the dream-sleep cycle as follows:

> As the subject becomes drowsy the waking EEG (alpha rhythm) attenuates and quickly passes into Stage 1. This initial period of Stage 1 persists for only a minute or two and is not associated with REMs. It is . . . functionally and physiologically different from the later REMPs. It is considered to be a period of hypnagogic imagery rather than of hallucinatory dreaming. . . . . There is next a rapid progression through Stage 2 and 3 to Stage 4, the latter generally persisting for thirty to forty minutes. Usually coinciding with a body movement, there is abrupt change to Stage 3 or 2 followed by the emergence of the first Stage 1 REMP. Thus, the first REMP begins about sixty to ninety minutes after sleep onset. In the majority of instances it is terminated by one or more gross body move-

> ments and followed by a rapid progression into nondreaming stages until the onset of a second REMP. A cycle is comprised of a REMP and the NREMP that precedes it (p. 201).

Although Fisher thus divided sleep into dreaming and nondreaming periods, later in his paper he devoted a section to reports of dreaming during the NREM periods (pp. 210-212). He cited Kremen, who indicated that except for sleep onset, dreaming is unlikely to occur during NREM periods, and Monroe and his co-workers, whose study "tended to dispel doubts about the relationship between REMPs and dreaming" (p. 210). He acknowledged the work of Lehmann and Kuhlo which "suggested that gradual changes from classical hypnagogic hallucinations to fragmentary dreams occur at sleep onset" (p. 212). Fisher also mentioned other studies whose findings ran counter to his strict division of sleep into dreaming and nondreaming periods, but he tended to discount their significance.

The impression produced by Fisher's article a decade ago was reinforced among psychoanalysts by a recent monograph by Ernest L. Hartmann (1973), who has done extensive work in sleep research. He writes: "To my mind the evidence suggests that the experience of dreaming *always* occurs during D-sleep [REM sleep], although of course it is sometimes forgotten, and that this experience does not typically occur during S-sleep [NREM sleep], although some form of continuing mental activity during synchronized [NREM] sleep may well be present" (p. 27).

It is my impression that Fisher and those who share his views on mentation at sleep onset have taken a position that runs counter to the structural theory, especially to its corollary, the principle of multiple function (Waelder, 1936). In dismissing hypnagogic hallucinations as imagery different from that of dreams, they imply that hypnagogic hallucinations are unrelated to the concerns which are the subject of the dreams of later sleep. The principle of multiple function holds that any psychic product is the result of the impact of forces emanating

from the id, ego, and superego, and of the repetition compulsion—that is, a compromise formation determined by these vectors of mental life. To hold that hypnagogic hallucinations are not dreams is to imply an exception to this principle; that is to say, to maintain that repressed material makes no contribution to such images.

A very different impression is imparted in a survey article by Foulkes and Vogel (1974), entitled "The Current Status of Laboratory Dream Research." These authors indicate that while the earliest studies of NREM sleep suggested that it was rarely accompanied by dreams, later studies showed high rates of NREM dream reporting and led to an increasing reluctance on the part of researchers to consider NREM dream reports as mistakes. Pooled NREM dream recall frequencies ranged as high as seventy-four per cent in the studies Foulkes and Vogel surveyed and from fifty to sixty-five per cent in their own studies. In the mid-sixties Foulkes and Vogel (1965) and Vogel, Foulkes and Trosman (1966) reported on studies of sleep onset. They divided sleep onset mentation into four consecutive electroencephalogram/electro-oculogram stages: (1) continuous alpha EEG with rapid eye movements; (2) alpha EEG with slow eye movements (drowsiness); (3) descending Stage 1 EEG (drifting off); and (4) descending Stage 2 EEG (drifting off or light sleep). They found the incidence of dreams in these four stages to be thirty-one per cent, forty-three per cent, seventy-six per cent, and seventy-one per cent respectively. Later investigations confirmed the high incidence of dreamlike mentation at sleep onset. Foulkes and Vogel (1974) state:

> These findings, of course, presented a new, and more dramatic, embarrassment for the hypothesis of an exclusive correlation of dreams with REM sleep. The sleep onset researchers noted that [their subjects'] reports often were long, vivid and bizarre in quality. Comparisons with REM reports of the same subjects showed no significant differences in length of report or in sexual or aggressive content, hedonic tone, and dreamlike fantasy . . . . trained judges given the task of dis-

> criminating sleep-onset and REM reports could do so significantly better than by chance, but they called fifty per cent of REM reports "sleep onset" reports and twenty-five per cent of sleep onset reports "REM reports" (p. 11).

The idea that dreaming in the usual psychoanalytic sense occurs exclusively during REM sleep thus appears to have been refuted in the sleep laboratories, but the concept remains uncorrected in the psychoanalytic literature. The purpose of this paper, then, is to present material from the analysis of a patient who had hallucinatory experiences during what might be called the hypnagogic phase; on analysis, her experiences corresponded in every detail and from every conceptual point of view to dreaming.

CLINICAL CASE

A middle-aged woman, in analysis for three years, reported dreams she had had while falling asleep on two consecutive nights and a third such dream six days later. She had entered treatment because of anxiety and multiple psychophysiologic problems. Phallic themes appeared early in the analysis and surfaced from time to time, interspersed with derivatives of anal and oedipal conflicts and vexing reality situations. The hypnagogic dreams, together with dreams later in the night, occurred at a time when there seemed to be a crumbling of the repressive barrier: important events from the patient's third year were being recalled or convincingly reconstructed.

One of these events was a visit to a doctor prompted by her parents' concern that she was not talking; she had been slow to walk as well. The doctor said that she might not develop normally; "You never can tell with preemies." The patient recalled sitting in an armchair, very upset after this visit. A housemaid defended her to her mother, saying, "It is not the poor girl's fault." The maid was dismissed soon thereafter. The patient had the idea that she had been punished by her father or her mother for not having developed normally. It

may have been at this time that her father had screamed at her, "Stupid! Stupid! Stupid!" She was most disappointed about her inability to remember the details of the punishment. I remarked that it was characteristic of her to complain that she was not a capable analysand, although she was actually quite adept. That night, as she was falling asleep, she dreamed:

> I was a little girl sitting in an armchair, thumbing through a catalogue. It was black and white, indistinct, over-inked and blurred. My mother came up from behind me and startled me. She said, "Why not leave well enough alone?" I saw her disappear around a corner.

In association to the dream, the patient recalled looking in the newspaper for a review of a show she had seen the night before (the review was not there) and watching a late night talk show on which the host had read letters children had written to a department store Santa Claus; one boy had listed the items he wanted from a catalogue.

The interpretation mutually arrived at was that the patient, who identified herself with the boy, wanted something, a phallus, but was told by her mother to resign herself to not having it, to leave well enough alone. The black and white catalogue in the dream referred both to the newspaper from which the review was missing and to the catalogue mentioned in the television program. It also referred to her mother's genital, the connection being black pubic hair in contrast with white skin.[1] The blurred, indistinct character of the catalogue seemed to represent a defense against the horrifying sight of her mother's genital during a primal scene experience, to which she was alluding in her mention of the show and the television program.

[1] In a brief communication, Tarachow (1961) reported two cases in which interest in color contrast was found to be derived from the contrast between white abdominal skin and female pubic hair. The dream symbol of black and white had appeared in several of my patient's previous dreams and was understood to have had that meaning.

The mother's statement in the dream was in part derived from the previous analytic hour. When the patient had expressed annoyance over the gap in her memory, I had told her in effect that she was doing well enough as it was. One element of the manifest content of the dream was acted out during the hour in which she reported the dream: she had been startled and claimed that my voice had suddenly become louder as I had shifted in my chair.

That night, she again had a dream as she was falling asleep:

> Two coffins, one containing a king dressed in black lamé, the other a queen (who looked like my mother) dressed in white lamé and wearing a wimple, were orbiting wildly about one another, but not touching. They were dead. There was also a tiny coffin with a baby in it. The baby was asleep, not dead. The baby was wearing a locket with a cameo my mother has on its cover. The baby was swaddled around with white, pink, gauzy material. I was afraid the larger coffins would hit the baby's coffin. Somehow, at the same time I was preoccupied with the plural of beef . . . beeves, dwarf . . . dwarves.

No day residue was found for the second dream, save for the analytic hour during which the first dream had been considered and the issue of her having witnessed her parents in the sexual act had been discussed. The lamé apparel of the figures in the coffins was found to refer to the costume of the corps de ballet of the show she had seen two nights before. The opening number, a "stunner" according to the patient, had the women dressed as witches in black lamé with long lengths of cloth streaming from their hats. The baby, she felt, referred to herself, asleep. The locket reminded her of the locket held by the blind girl in the classic film about two women trying to survive during the French Revolution, *Orphans of the Storm*. Since coffins had often appeared in her dreams and this dream seemed to derive from a traumatic primal scene experience, I started to ask if her parents' bed could in any way be likened to a coffin. The patient interrupted my sentence to volunteer that

her parents' bed was a gloomy, Empire affair with a large squarish footboard and headboard. The sideboards were prominent as well and the bed did look like a coffin. The top of the footboard and the headboard were curled in such a way as to remind her of coffin handles.

The patient remembered that many years ago she had come upon the word *beeves* in something she was reading and was puzzled by it. When she looked in the dictionary and found that it was the plural of beef, she felt "so stupid." The idea of a dwarf seemed to relate to deficiencies, especially her failure to talk and her "stupidity," to the blind girl, her mother's genital, and other details from this period of treatment.

Six nights later the patient had another hypnogogic experience:

> As I was dozing off, that photograph of the girl kneeling over the student who was shot at Kent State, screaming, her arms outstretched, came very strongly into my mind. In this image she was kneeling beside a closed coffin; I have no idea who was inside. While in the Kent State photograph the prominent thing was the outstretched arms, in my image it was the gaping, oval mouth. The girl was screaming a silent scream. The image was very vivid and real. I couldn't get it out of my mind and I turned over to get rid of it.

The "vivid and real" quality of the third dream indicates that it is expressive of a real event.[2] The patient felt that the silent, screaming girl was herself watching her parents' sexual activity and that the gaping, oval mouth represented a mental image of her mother's genital. The photograph in reality portrayed a young woman screaming in horror over the body of a male student who had been shot by a National Guardsman. Its appearance in the dream is consistent with the notion that

[2] Kubie has said: "In such states of partial dissociation, in which the individual is partly awake and partly asleep, he seems to relive shattering experiences with extraordinary sensory and emotional precision just as the [person with a] traumatic war neurosis lives over his most painful experiences again and again in dreams and fantasies and symptoms" (Kubie and Margolin, 1942, p. 138).

the patient had unconsciously believed that her mother's genital opening had been created by a violent assault during intercourse.

The hypnagogic experiences of my patient appear to contain the usual characteristics of dreams: manifest content of a visual hallucinatory experience, latent content, day residue, and connection with repressed material from childhood. Operating under the assumption that sleep onset is "a period of hypnagogic imagery rather than of hallucinatory dreaming" (*cf.*, Fisher, 1965, p. 201), I expected that the first dream my patient said that she had while falling asleep would prove to be an example of the "autosymbolic phenomenon" described by Silberer (1909). This phenomenon occurs in the hypnagogic state when there are competing tendencies, equal in strength, to fall asleep and to stay awake. The wish to sleep derives from fatigue, the effort to stay awake from interest in an intellectual problem or from a physical discomfort. The phenomenon is a hallucinatory experience that puts forth symbolically what is thought or felt at the moment. Silberer claimed "that the translation of thoughts into pictures in the hypnagogic state occurs in relative isolation from the other dream-forming factors" (p. 197). It soon became apparent, however, that this was not the case with my patient. Freud (1900), in fact, suggested that the examples provided by Silberer were "cases of overdetermination, in which part of a dream which has derived its material content from the nexus of dream-thoughts is employed to represent *in addition* some state of mental activity" (p. 505).

A further contradiction to the view that hallucinatory activity during sleep onset and early sleep does not constitute dreaming is the common experience of dreaming during naps too short to permit descent into deep sleep and the shift to REM sleep. Several psychoanalysts who occasionally take brief naps have assured me that the dreams they have during these naps are not concerned with current, real problems, as described by Silberer, and that they can discern no differences when they analyze and compare these dreams to their night dreams.

For example, a psychoanalyst in his late thirties journeyed with his wife to a distant state to settle matters concerning the business and real estate interests he had inherited from his father. He was intrigued with the idea of being a successful businessman and entertained the notion of combining his profession with managing business enterprises. During negotiations with lawyers and other principals he took a hard line. A man whom he regarded as a "crook" exploded, saying "You're a bigger son-of-a-bitch than your father ever was." At this, the psychoanalyst felt a surge of elation.

At his hotel later in the afternoon he took a nap which lasted not more than twenty minutes. During this nap he dreamed that he was "walking around looking for the doctor and was not able to find him." There was no anxiety in the dream and it was not clear who the doctor was. From the time of his admission to medical school, however, his father had referred to him as "the doctor." He told the dream to his wife, who remarked that he had better get rid of "the businessman." She had taken the dream to mean that he had assumed the identity of his father and was denying his identity as a physician. She was worried about his fantasies of becoming a businessman, which she regarded as grandiose and potentially destructive to their security and happiness. He accepted her interpretation as valid and concluded that he was indeed acting out a facet of his oedipus complex. He soon thereafter relinquished his ambition to become a businessman.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The case of an analysand who reported three dreams from the hypnagogic period within the space of eight days is described. Her dreams were shown to have the characteristics of dreams reported from later sleep: their manifest content was primary process in nature, there was latent content, and there was reference to repressed material from childhood. In addition, one dream contained a demonstrable reference to transference, and

part of the manifest content was acted out on the day following the night of the dream.

Fisher's characterization of hallucinatory activity during the sleep onset period as "hypnagogic imagery" implies that it is uninfluenced by repressed material. Such an assumption constitutes an exception to the principle of multiple function, which holds that mental phenomena are the result of forces contributed by the id, ego, and superego, and by the repetition compulsion; i.e., they are compromise formations determined by these vectors of mental life.

A further challenge to the current understanding of the relationship of dreaming with REM sleep is the recognition that dreams during brief naps are extremely common. Analysts in the habit of taking naps too brief to allow a descent into deep sleep and a shift to REM sleep claim that they have dreams which are indistinguishable from their night dreams and are not examples of Silberer's "autosymbolic" phenomenon.

The following conclusions are suggested:

1. Dreams may occur during light sleep, both at onset and during REM-NREM cycles which follow. The impression that dreams do not appear until REM sleep occurs (after the descent into deep sleep and the shift to REM sleep) is attributable to the usual rapid descent that quickly carries the sleeper into deep sleep upon going to bed at night.

2. What is required for dreaming is that attention be withdrawn from the external world, permitting an escape of repressed material in primary process form. With further depression of brain centers, this material becomes unavailable.

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A Psychoanalytic View of Mental Health

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A PSYCHOANALYTIC VIEW OF MENTAL HEALTH

SAMUEL PEPYS AND HIS DIARY

BY MARTIN H. STEIN, M.D.

It has been difficult to illustrate specific criteria for mental health, largely because of the lack of adequately documented examples. The Diary of Samuel Pepys *is a unique source of data about a man who was not only exceptionally interesting, but was relatively healthy as well.*

It has come to be asserted almost as a matter of course that everyone in Western society is "sick," that all of us suffer from neurotic illness, if not some more serious psychopathology. This assumption bears an uncanny resemblance to what may well have been its ancestor: the Christian doctrine of original sin. That too was a matter of faith and was about as useful in eliminating evil as the doctrine of universal psychopathology has been in eliminating neurotic illness.

Although such a point of view is by no means accepted by most analysts, we do bear some measure of responsibility for its propagation. While we speak with authority of what went wrong and how, and are experts in describing and giving examples of psychopathological disturbances, our conceptions of mental health are all too often based on negative and vague criteria. Is mental health simply the absence of neurotic illness? That would make it a distinctly boring condition, which would be a pity.

This difficulty cannot be ascribed to the pioneers of psychoanalysis. While their interests were first and naturally aroused

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The Abraham A. Brill Lecture presented to the New York Psychoanalytic Society, November 27, 1973.

by patients with complaints that could best be understood in terms of psychopathology, they were impelled to make a number of contributions to the subject of mental health. These have been admired and occasionally quoted but have failed to exert the impact we might have anticipated on the basis of their intrinsic value as scientific hypotheses. The first influential work was that of Karl Abraham (1925) who, in "Character Formation on the Genital Level of the Libido," described an ideal of mental health in terms of psychosexual development. This ideal was linked to the dominance of genital libido and the development of object relations as determining factors in the individual's capacity to deal with the world at large in a healthy fashion. Abraham's statement was carefully phrased and is worth quoting at length.

> The final stage of character-formation shows traces everywhere of its association with the preceding stages. It borrows from them whatever conduces to a favorable relation between the individual and his objects. From the early oral stage it takes over enterprise and energy; from the anal stage, endurance, perseverance, and various other characteristics; from sadistic sources, the necessary power to carry on the struggle for existence. If the development of his character has been successful the individual is able to avoid falling into pathological exaggerations of those characteristics, whether in a positive or a negative direction (p. 415).

He emphasized that it was possible to "steer a middle course" between the pathological extremes of one or another type of behavior, and that such exquisite control might be taken as an index of genital dominance or, in other terms, the achievement of maturity and mental health. Such a brief summary of Abraham's ideas may suggest that he has accomplished no more than a banal rewriting of the Greek ideal of the golden mean, but this hardly does him justice, for his theoretical analysis, expressed in terms of the dominance of the latest phase of

psychosexual development, is by no means obsolete or lacking in value.[1]

Freud (1931), writing some eight years after his formulation of structural psychology, continued to support the view that "the libidinal situation will have a first claim to serve as a basis for our classification [of psychological types]" (p. 217). He indicated that the erotic, obsessional, narcissistic and various mixed psychological types "must comprehend all the variations which according to our practical judgement fall within the limits of the normal" (p. 217), suggesting as an "ideal" a perfect mixture, an erotic-obsessional-narcissistic type, "no longer . . . a type at all; it would be the absolute norm, the ideal harmony" (p. 219).[2]

Further contributions to the subject were made by Fenichel (1945), Glover (1939), Jones (1931), and Waelder (1936). Their work, while constituting valuable extensions and elaborations of Freud and Abraham, were overshadowed by the more sweeping and original contributions of Heinz Hartmann in a group of papers published between 1939 and 1960. These were part of his attempt to establish psychoanalysis as a general psychology, to encompass all of the adaptive, nonpathological operations of the personality, as well as those pathological disturbances which had been included in the past.

Hartmann emphasized several points, which can be reviewed only briefly. He made it clear that "conflicts are part and parcel of human development, for which they provide the necessary stimulus" (1939b, p. 315). Further, he insisted that "a healthy

[1] Abraham's (1925) work contained another concept for which he has not often been given credit: ". . . we consider the character of a person to be the sum of his instinctive reactions towards his social environment" (p. 408) and, "We should be inclined to consider as normal in the social sense a person who is not prevented by any too great eccentricity in his character from adapting himself to the interests of the community" (p. 413). To do Abraham justice, I doubt that he was thinking of *passive* adaptation to the "community" which would have been as inappropriate in Weimar Germany as in the world today.

[2] Somewhat paradoxically, Freud added, ". . . we might expect that mixed types would provide a more favourable soil for conditions leading to a neurosis" (p. 219).

ego should be able to make use of the system of rational control and at the same time take into account the fact of the irrational nature of other mental activities. . . . The rational must incorporate the irrational as an element in its design" (1939a, pp. 313-314). This echoed Freud's (1932) aphorism concerning the goal of psychoanalysis: "Where id was, there ego shall be" (p. 80)—taking into account the desirability of the dominance of secondary over primary process thinking, without implying at all the elimination of the latter. A cold, controlled intellectuality was for Hartmann and Freud by no means an indication of mental health.

Accordingly, Hartmann emphasized that successful adaptation may be achieved not only by progressive development, but by regression as well, a process described by Ernst Kris (1934) as "regression in the service of the ego," a phrase which has suffered the undeserved fate of becoming a cliché. One of Hartmann's warnings strikes us as especially relevant today. "By skilful conjuring with these kinds of standards [ethical, aesthetic, and political], it becomes easy enough to prove that those who do not share our political or general outlook on life are neurotic or psychotic" (1939b, p. 317).

A notable contribution was Hartmann's emphasis on the multiple role of defense. He wrote, "the same process of defense quite commonly serves the twofold purpose of acquiring mastery over the instincts and of reaching an accommodation with the external world" (1939b, p. 320). In some sense this was an echo of Waelder's "Principle of Multiple Function" (1936), but Hartmann went further to describe in developmental terms the phenomena of secondary autonomy, according to which a defense, previously employed to master instinctual drives, becomes less and less bound to its origins, taking on a less conflictual, more adaptive function (1939a, 1950, 1955).[3]

[3] This was part of Hartmann's attack on what he termed the "genetic fallacy." Most simply expressed, this was equivalent to an assumption that psychic processes could be regarded as pathological, purely on the basis of their origins in primitive conflict, e.g., that a personality trait could be traced to sources in the oral or anal phase or to an archaic stage of ego development, which would

Returning to the subject in 1960, Hartmann, again without relinquishing his primary emphasis on intrapersonal dynamics, discussed the vital role of the individual's experience within his sociocultural milieu and its effects on superego development. He referred to "the integrative function of the moral codes" which have been derived, at least in part, from society at large. Here Hartmann brought together two of the senses of the term "character," first as a mosaic of stable modes of thought and behavior and second as possession of an effective set of ethical standards.

But even Hartmann, who was so comfortable with abstract concepts, felt the lack of a specific clinical instance to illustrate his theoretical discussion of mental health. "It is clearly essential to proceed on purely empirical lines, i.e., to examine from the point of view of their structure and development the personalities of those who are actually considered healthy instead of allowing our theoretical speculations to dictate to us what we 'ought' to regard as healthy" (1939b, p. 312).

That psychoanalytic concepts of mental health, such as Freud's, Abraham's, and Hartmann's, have not achieved the influence they deserve is to a great extent the result of the lack of the kind of specificity and vividness which can be afforded only by well-documented clinical examples. For psychopathology, we have such cases as Dora, the Wolf-man, and others to illustrate the author's ideas and to lend a sense of conviction about their usefulness. For the state of mental health, we have up to now no such example.

The reasons for this deficiency are obvious. Our richest source of clinical material is derived from the analyses of patients and colleagues, as well as our own. Such information is generally unsuitable for the purpose of establishing criteria for mental health. For one thing, people who engage themselves in a serious effort at analysis are not likely to be free of substantial

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constitute sufficient justification for labeling it pathological. This has become a myth *about* psychoanalysis, rather than part of psychoanalytic theory, having been disavowed by virtually every major figure in psychoanalysis from Freud and Abraham to the present, perhaps most effectively by Hartmann.

neurotic conflict and suffering. This is also essentially true of those who engage in training to become analysts. Beyond this, the requirements of discretion are so demanding that full case presentation outside the limits of a clinical conference becomes virtually impossible, especially when publication is considered. It is no longer acceptable, for example, to consider a case presentation complete when matters of class, religion, and especially occupation are omitted. Vignettes may of course be employed for demonstration, but even these must be limited in their coverage and are often disguised, i.e., distorted, to prevent identification of the subject. We have been criticized, often scornfully, for our failure to present "scientific" evidence of our clinical results, e.g., detailed case reports. To this, our answer must rest on humanistic and moral considerations.[4]

The latter objection—the requirements of discretion—need not apply to the use of biographical sources, at least with regard to historical figures; but the subjects are rarely if ever notable for mental health, often the contrary. This is especially true of the group of very useful studies by such analysts as P. Greenacre, K. R. Eissler, B. C. Meyer, W. Niederland, and others. Autobiographies, memoirs, and diaries, especially the latter, constitute another potential source. They vary enormously in quality and it is rare to find one which satisfies our requirements.

Just recently, we have gained access to a work which is ideal for our purpose: *The Diary of Samuel Pepys, Vols. I-VIII,* edited by R. C. Latham and W. Matthews (1970-1976). The editors claim that "No one else has composed so brilliant and full an account of an actual man as he actually was" (Vol. I, p. cxiii). In the course of reading the first seven volumes and

[4] For the long term effects of being a "famous case" see F. Deutsch's (1957) follow-up of the Dora case and M. Gardiner's (1971) of the Wolf-man. Freud's contributions to knowledge more than justified his publications. But it is noteworthy that he wrote no detailed case reports after 1918. And most analysts, including those who have made massive contributions to clinical theory, have confined themselves largely to unidentifiable excerpts and vignettes.

with access to proofs of Volume VIII and IX (by courtesy of Mr. Robert C. Latham), it appeared to me that we might at last have discovered a full and thoroughly documented account of a man who could be described as relatively healthy for a large portion of his adult life, and an individual of great interest in his own right.

Pepys began his *Diary* on New Year's Day, 1660, during a period of intense political upheaval. For nine and a half years he recorded entries for virtually every day, often but not always before retiring for the night (Latham and Matthews, 1970-1976). He wrote chiefly in shorthand, employing a system which had been published in 1626. By no means a secret code, it ensured some degree of privacy since few people, least of all his wife and his colleagues at the Navy Office, possessed sufficient knowledge or application to read it.[5]

Much of the text consists of factual observations dealing with every aspect of his life and work; these are so closely interwoven with personal experiences, opinions, thoughts, and feeling as to suggest from time to time the kind of associative data we are accustomed to obtain in an analysis. As a result, it is often possible to make inferences based not only on the content of the text, but also on the order in which details are presented.[6] Some entries have the characteristics of "night thoughts," less guarded and more loosely organized than the rest. Quite a few dreams are reported, some at length. Several such entries include the day residue, the dreamer's reaction to his dream, the nature of his sleep, and the content of his waking thoughts.

All this gives the *Diary* the quality of immediacy which makes it a fascinating study for the psychoanalyst and the student of character as well as for the historian and critic, not to mention the general reader. While we must be cautious in

[5] One friend, Sir William Coventry, was told of its existence, but was given no details (*Diary*, March 9, 1669).

[6] The new edition is especially valuable in that it supplements the text with records of Pepys's own errors and corrections.

interpreting the text as if it were the record of an analysis, it does furnish us with one of the richest sources of psychological data we are likely to find, at least before the advent of Freud and the great novelists of the nineteenth century. And the portrait presented is very much that of a healthy man.

Pepys discontinued his *Diary* in May, 1669, stating that his vision had become too poor to allow him to make entries without severe discomfort; nor could this kind of material be entrusted to a secretary. It is probable that he suffered from astigmatism with increasing presbyopia, which could not be corrected by lenses then available.

There has naturally been much speculation about why Pepys wrote the *Diary* and preserved it. Did he have an imaginary reader in mind? Himself perhaps? Posterity? By nature and endowment an excellent recorder and collector, possessed of a keen historical sense, he may well have anticipated that he was to make an important contribution to the history of his time. He had witnessed a destructive civil war, the decapitation of Charles I, the establishment and subsequent collapse of the Puritan Commonwealth and the chaos which followed. He was soon to take part in the restoration of the monarchy and to live through the Plague and the Great Fire. He was to become an integral part of a rapidly changing social and economic structure, still small enough to retain a considerable degree of intimacy.

But the *Diary* must have had more than a historical meaning for him. He was a man in conflict, especially with respect to moral issues, having been profoundly influenced by the puritan value system of the Commonwealth under Cromwell, and exposed now to the extreme permissiveness of the Restoration under Charles II. His awareness of intrapsychic conflict was sufficiently acute to justify the editors' description of him as "both the observer and the observed, the penitent and the priest, the patient on the couch and the psychiatrist, the man on the street and the behavioral sociologist" (Latham and Matthews, 1970-1976, p. cix). Perhaps the very transcribing of

his days' thoughts helped him to deal with his conflicts and the anxiety which accompanied them. If so, it was remarkably effective.[7]

Pepys was naturally unwilling to have his *Diary* read by his contemporaries, for it would have been both embarrassing and dangerous. He was evidently not disinclined to have it studied by posterity, however, for he had it bound in leather, the six volumes being placed among the three thousand books and manuscripts which made up his excellent library. He left this collection to Magdalene College, Cambridge, with meticulous directions for its intact preservation. It was not until 1825 that the *Diary* was brought to light and a small fraction of it published. Only now for the first time, is it being brought out in an uncut, faithful, and properly edited version. Most of the material omitted from the earlier editions consisted of exactly those details which are essential for a full knowledge of Pepys's personality.

Among his many virtues as a diarist was his remarkable capacity to listen, in which he rivaled Boswell himself. But his range was broader in terms of social interests, for he enjoyed the confidence of a great variety of people, including actresses, musicians, lace-sellers, shipwrights, scientists, politicians, contractors, naval commanders, and a host of others, from innkeepers to royalty. He enjoyed them all, one way or another. His contacts with these people are recorded fully and with considerable accuracy, allowing for the writer's personal biases, which could be strong but generally not entirely unfair. When his statements are checked against other contemporary sources, serious distortions of fact and interpretation are found to be relatively uncommon (Latham and Matthews, 1970-1976). His skill in perceiving and evaluating external reality must have been highly developed and closely related to his capacity to observe, discriminate, and record the workings of his own mind (see, Stein, 1966, 1972).

To acquire an adequate impression of the *Diary* as a source

[7] For a discussion of Pepys and other diarists see, Fothergill (1974).

of information about Pepys's character, it is advisable to read it in its entirety, rather than to skim it. It is never dull, even when it deals with the details of Pepys's personal life and thoughts, including conversations, meals, walks, sexual adventures, marital disputes, gossip, political news and events, parties, music, dreams, and internal conflicts—all that made up the daily life of an active, competent, and pleasure-loving man, who was at the same time a person of increasing importance in his own milieu. Aside from its value as a personal document, the *Diary* is generally accepted as a literary and historical document of the first rank.

Samuel Pepys was born in London in 1633. His father was a not very successful tailor. The fifth child of eleven, he was to be the oldest of the four who reached maturity. He may have been the best loved son—at any rate, he was to be by far the most successful. He was fortunate enough to have a number of well-placed relatives on his father's side, including a distant cousin, Edward Montagu, who as Earl of Sandwich and naval commander became his patron. Pepys received a degree at Magdalene College, Cambridge, without having achieved any special honors; there was one recorded reprimand for being drunk and disorderly.[8]

After leaving Cambridge, he was employed by his cousin Montagu to take care of the latter's properties in London. Soon afterwards, although still in very modest circumstances, he fell in love and married the fifteen-year-old daughter of an improvident Huguenot refugee, Elizabeth St. Michel. A year later, through his cousin's influence, he obtained a minor position in government service.

In 1658, when he was twenty-five, he became seriously ill with a bladder stone "which was as big as a tennis ball" (Evelyn, June 10, 1669 [see, Francis, 1963]). This was removed sur-

[8] We know very little about his early life, and the *Diary* refers to his childhood on only a few occasions (May 12, 1667; January 1, 1668). Genetic inferences, so far as they can be made at all, will be at best highly speculative.

gically, probably by a perineal approach, a procedure which must have been both painful and extremely hazardous under seventeenth century conditions, but it was evidently entirely successful. For years afterwards, Pepys celebrated the anniversary of this event by giving a dinner party for friends, very much as if it had been a birthday. His surgery was recalled nine years later in a dream (June 29, 1667).

In 1660 Charles Stuart, then in exile in Holland, was recalled to England to assume the crown as Charles II. Pepys was invited by his cousin who commanded the naval convoy to accompany him as his secretary, thus being afforded a precious opportunity to meet the King and the Duke of York, and to see much else that was new and exciting aboard ship and in Holland. It was then that he remarked about himself that he was "with child to see any strange thing" (May 14, 1660), a fair description of his insatiable curiosity, one of his more conspicuous character traits.

A few months later, through the influence of his cousin, now an influential member of the Court, Pepys received an appointment as Clerk of the Acts to the Navy Board, to be in effect an executive secretary and a member of the Board, although he was much the junior in terms of age, experience, and rank. Instead of confining himself to purely clerical duties, he set about learning everything he could about the Navy. He became an expert, probably the only one of his time, not only on naval history but on every aspect of naval administration. Within a short time he was by far the best informed, and soon to be recognized as the most effective, member of the Navy Board.

For two decades (1660-1679) his rise was virtually uninterrupted, due to a fortunate combination of lively intelligence, administrative skill, a fine political sense, and an extraordinary capacity for hard work. The last would have been conspicuous in any age, but was especially so in the government of Charles II. He received a setback in 1679, but five years later he was restored and promoted to Secretary for Admiralty Affairs, becoming the effective administrative head of the Navy (compara-

ble to Secretary of the Navy in the United States). He held this post for five years when another political upheaval occurred. Pepys, identified with the previous administration and by this time well into middle age, resigned to enter into a characteristically active private life.

Having amassed an important collection of books, prints, and manuscripts, of which the most precious of all was his *Diary,* he lived quietly until his last illness at the age of seventy.

Surveying his life and career, we may regard him as a successful and happy man, a judgment supported by his contemporaries, by nearly all those who have written about him since, and by Pepys himself. Not only was he highly respected and at least moderately prosperous, he was also a loyal and beloved friend of many people of talent and distinction, including John Evelyn, the other great diarist of the period. Highly regarded by both Charles II and James II, he was rewarded by some material considerations, praise, and whatever moral support they were capable of giving.

As a public servant, Pepys had a distinct and positive influence on the future course of British history. The records of the seventeenth century Navy are studded with references to him, and he has been credited with the transformation of that service from a most haphazard collection of ships and seamen into a well organized and effective fighting force. His administrative innovations remained in use until well into the nineteenth century (see, Aiken, 1960; Bryant, 1933; Lloyd, 1968; Ogg, 1934; Ollard, 1974). He may also be considered the first of a long line of British civil servants derived from the middle classes, rather than the aristocracy.

In this brief sketch, I have given some of the reasons why Pepys should be regarded as not merely an entertaining writer but as an effective and important individual as well. We have, moreover, not only the extensive information derived from the *Diary*, but access to a mass of documents, including letters, official records, and other sources which, while less vivid and immediate, confirm and supplement the *Diary* and extend our

knowledge into the years after Pepys discontinued his daily entries.

Having met the need for adequate documentation, we are now obliged to satisfy our second essential requirement—that our evidence is sufficient to indicate that we are dealing with a reasonably healthy man. I shall try to demonstrate this by presenting a small fraction of the available evidence which tends to support the thesis that Pepys was relatively free of serious neurotic symptoms and defects of character and that he qualifies in positive respects as well. This view has been held generally by his biographers and by historians[9] who are virtually unanimous, even though some have been highly critical of his sexual behavior[10] and inclined as well to look askance at his ethical standards in the conduct of his official duties.

To begin with the simplest criterion of mental health, Pepys had few neurotic symptoms, and these were generally mild and self-limited. During the ten years of the *Diary,* distinct phobias, obsessions, compulsions, and conversion reactions were insignificant or absent. His level of anxiety varied a good deal, but it never interfered with his working nor with his search for pleasure, and only rarely did it disturb his sleep (e.g., *Diary,* February 23, 1668). The same may be said with reference to his concerns over physical illness, in an era in which conditions such as smallpox, typhus, and typhoid were endemic and very often fatal, and medical care largely ineffective, although perhaps not so detrimental as it was to become during the next century. Even in good years, when there was no epidemic, the mortality rate was appalling, especially among children.[11] And most adults died young, including both of Pepys's brothers who had reached adult life.

[9] See, Bryant (1935); Emden (1963); Heath (1955); Latham and Matthews (1970-1976); Ogg (1934); Ollard (1974); Tanner (1924); Wilson (1959).

[10] See, Braybrooke (1825); Ponsonby (1928); Wilson (1959).

[11] ". . . I was mightily taken with a little girl [Betty Gysby], the daughter of the maister of the house which, if she lives, will make a great beauty" (*Diary,* August 19, 1665).

At the age of forty-four, well into middle age by seventeenth century standards, he composed a document which he called *The Present Ill State of My Health* (see, Bryant, 1933, Vol. II, pp. 406-413). He listed a group of symptoms which must have been quite familiar in England at the time; many of them still are. He noted recurrent colds and chronic catarrh, symptoms of urinary stone, some mild arthritic pain, indigestion, and "wind." It has been suggested that he may have suffered from nervous indigestion of the type supposed to be common in high-pressured executives today, but my reading of the *Diary* does not support this. These abdominal symptoms may have been largely the result of his diet, composed for the most part of meat, often in a doubtful state of preservation, with relatively little in the way of fruit, vegetables, and cereal. The taking of "physic" was in any case a regular practice among Pepys's contemporaries. All this yields little evidence of neurotic ill health, or of those somatic illnesses usually associated with chronic anxiety.

Finally, neither documentary evidence nor the opinions of contemporaries gives us the least reason to suspect any degree of thought disorder. Pepys was, if anything, noted for his fine grasp of reality and his ability to deal with highly charged and complex situations.

When we turn to a detailed evaluation of Pepys's character structure, the picture appears more complex, but again there is little to contradict our over-all impression of an essentially healthy man by any of the psychoanalytic criteria we employ (e.g., Abraham, 1925; Fenichel, 1945; Freud, 1931; Glover, 1939; Hartmann, 1939a, 1939b, 1950, 1955, 1960; Jones, 1931; Kernberg, 1970; Stein, 1969; Waelder, 1936). For the sake of organization, I shall employ the structural model of the psyche, since it is the most familiar and perhaps the most readily adaptable to the analysis of character traits. I shall not resist entirely the temptation to draw inferences about Pepys's unconscious mental life; too much caution would be as little in

the spirit of Samuel Pepys as would a tendency to rash conclusions.

His physical and mental energy were phenomenal. He worked a long day, often rising at daybreak (which might be 4 a.m. in summer) and getting to bed at midnight. Thus, in spite of his devotion to a wide variety of other activities, he was able to complete his official duties without too much pressure. Both energetic and efficient, he was very soon recognized to be an outstanding administrator and executive, many of whose accomplishments may be fairly regarded as innovative, if not actually creative.

Pepys's achievement occurred during a period in which government administration was characterized by bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, in which hardworking officials were rare, and during which the financial affairs of the government were chaotic, to say the least (see, p. 103). His success required not only high intelligence and zeal, but also considerable understanding of and ability to deal with individuals and political groups. In terms of character, therefore, we may infer a very highly developed capacity to understand and to deal actively with the external forces which impinged upon him. Not only was his perception of reality excellent, but he was aggressive enough to influence events without lapsing into impulsive behavior or grandiose attitudes.

Nor was his work impaired by those traits which partook of the obsessional, e.g., his tendency to record and classify; rather, the latter became subordinated to and was an essential component of his administrative skill. His interest in amassing and counting his personal funds was similarly transformed into a successful effort to establish sound methods for raising and administering funds for the Navy. These changes may be traced in his *Diary* entries between 1660 and 1669, and confirmed by the evidence to be found in later official records.

A man who understood and valued power, he managed ultimately to acquire a good deal. It would appear that he used it well, again subordinating a source of narcissistic gratification to the needs of the Navy and the nation.

Pepys was insatiably curious as well as ambitious. He explored a great many fields of learning, becoming a well qualified amateur in several and an expert in a few. Beginning with the multiplication tables (apparently not part of the curriculum at Cambridge), he mastered the elements of shipbuilding, the measurement of lumber, and the testing of cordage for ships' rigging. He was an expert, possibly the only one of his day, on naval history, financing, and personnel policy. Fascinated by science, he became a member (an amateur, it is true) and eventually President of the Royal Society, his name appearing on the title page of Isaac Newton's *Principia.*

But work and learning were not to be entirely subordinated to the search for less puritan pleasures. His addiction to the theater, for example, was so extreme that he feared it would threaten his official career. His attempts to control his impulse by self-enforced contributions to the poor-box appear to have benefited the poor but only intermittently interfered with his attendance at every play on the boards, often more than once.

The most important influence in his search for pleasure was related to what he described as his "strange slavery to beauty" (September 6, 1664). Although he was a connoisseur of the graphic arts, it was the beauty of music and of women that affected him most deeply. On one occasion he wrote: "Here was the best company for Musique I ever was in in my life, and wish I could live and die in it, both for music and the face of Mrs. Pierce and my wife and Knipp, who is pretty enough . . ." (December 6, 1665).

After attending a performance of a play, he made the following entry: ". . . but that which did please me beyond anything in the whole world was the wind *musique* when the *Angell* comes down, which is so sweet that it ravished me; and indeed, in a word, did wrap up my soul so that it made me really sick, just as I have formerly been when in love with my wife; that neither then, nor all the evening going home or at home, I was able to think of anything but remained all night transported, so as I could not believe that ever music hath that real command over the soul of a man as this did upon me; and makes

me resolve to practise wind-music and to make my wife do the like" (February 27, 1668).

Expressing so vividly the association between the ecstasy of musical experience and that of sex evinces a remarkable freedom of thought and affect. Nor was it confined to these spheres, for he was capable of deriving the keenest enjoyment from activities as diverse as observing a scientific experiment at the Royal Society or walking in the country.

We may ask to what extent he was capable of genuine object love, of developing attachments to individuals for their own sake. About his regard for himself, we need have no doubt at all. His persistent self-criticism did not seriously impair his good opinion of his own abilities; he was aided further by numerous signs of respect by others, including superiors and employees. In view of such efficient regulation of self-esteem and an almost entire absence of either grandiosity or depression, it is difficult to regard his "narcissistic" features as signs of pathology.

Toward his parents and other close relatives, he was benign and often generous, although by no means lavish or sentimental. He was especially fond of his father; toward his mother, who had become senile and querulous, he was at least tolerant and when she died he experienced genuine grief.[12] His rather difficult siblings he treated with considerable forbearance, and he took a good deal of responsibility in seeing them established in the world. By the age of thirty, he had already become the supporting figure and the leader of the family, having been at least, to paraphrase Winnicott, a "good enough" son and brother.

It is sufficient to note that as a husband he was appreciative, loyal, and loving, very much after his own fashion; but this is a complicated question which I shall enlarge upon later.

To others, he was a faithful friend or, if an enemy, not usually an implacable one. To show open support for his

[12] His dreams of March 25 and June 29, 1667, are of special interest in this connection.

friends when they were in disgrace took considerable courage, but he did so openly, all the while recording privately his fears of risking career and livelihood. While some commentators have regarded him as a physical coward, based on expressions of anxiety confided to his *Diary*, the record of his actual behavior offers the best evidence to the contrary. London was noted for the violence and unpredictability of its mobs, especially during periods of political unrest; assault and robbery were fairly common; and traveling was especially risky, whether by foot, on horseback, or by water. But the greatest peril and the most difficult to avert was that of epidemic infection.

In 1665, London suffered a terrifying outbreak of bubonic plague. The Court and the Navy Office were moved to Greenwich, but Pepys's duties often required him to be in London. The atmosphere was a grisly one, the city largely deserted except for the carts full of corpses and the lonely quarantined houses. Whole families might be wiped out in the space of a week. Pepys was a member of a committee to rule on matters of quarantine, a task he found heartrending. One entry reads: "Among other stories, one was very passionate methought—of a complaint brought against a man in town for taking a child from London from an infected house. Alderman Hooker told us it was the child of a very able citizen in Gracious-street, a saddler, who had buried all the rest of his children of the plague; and himself and his wife now being shut up; and in despair of escaping, did desire only to save the life of this little child; and so prevailed to have it received stark-naked into the arms of a friend, who brought it (having put it into new fresh clothes) to Greenwich; where, upon hearing the story, we did agree it should be [permitted to be] received and kept in the town" (September 3, 1665).

Yet he often managed to be "merry" in the company of friends; sometimes he found a young woman willing to console him in bed (August 8, 22, 23, September 2, October 5, 1665, etc.).

On August 14, he ended his entry for the day: "Great fears

we have that the plague will be a great Bill this week." The entry for the next day begins: "Up by 4 a-clock and walked to Greenwich,[13] where called at Captain Cockes and to his chamber, he being in bed—where something put my last night's dream into my head, which I think is the best that ever was dreamed—which was, that I had my lady Castlemayne in my arms and was admitted to use all the dalliance I desired with her, and then dreamed that this could not be awake but that it was only a dream. But that since it was a dream and that I took so much pleasure in it, what a happy thing it would be, if when we are in our graves (As Shakespeere resembles it), we could dream, and dream such dreams as this—that then we should not be so fearful of death as we are in this plague-time" (August 15, 1665).

It was not accidental that Pepys should have recalled his dream at the moment of seeing Captain Cockes in bed, for the word "cock" had already, in 1665, taken on the meaning of penis (see, Partridge, 1961). It is reasonable to assume that the dreamer had experienced an erection during the course of such an erotic dream, and thus the associative connection took place.

Lady Barbara Castlemaine, whom the dreamer had embraced with such rapture, was at the time the favorite mistress of the King, the mother of five of his children. While Pepys did not admire her character, he was entranced by her beauty, taking every available opportunity to gaze at her. Almost certainly this was accompanied by sexual arousal to some degree. For him she was that most exciting of women, combining ultimate desire with absolute prohibition, and as such a likely surrogate for the expression of deeply repressed oedipal fantasies.[14]

The reference to Shakespeare is doubly relevant. Pepys, the ardent playgoer, was very familiar with *Hamlet,* the most frankly oedipal of all the plays. Here he refers to the soliloquy

[13] From Woolwich, the town to which he had moved his wife and the maids to protect them from the plague.

[14] Oedipal fantasies appeared in other dreams which occurred during periods of stress (e.g., March 25, June 29, 1667). His other dreams are to be discussed in a future study of Pepys's character structure.

in which Hamlet thinks upon sleep and death, a passage which Pepys had committed to memory:

> . . . ; 'tis a consummation
> Devoutly to be wish'd, to die, to sleep;
> To sleep; perchance to dream; ay, there's the rub;
> For in that sleep of death what dreams may come,
> When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
> Must give us pause; . . . (III, i).

Hamlet, impelled toward suicide, fears that death would be no solution for it might lead only to a perpetual sleep disturbed by terrifying dreams. Pepys, on the contrary, is not in the least suicidal, nor does he have much belief in an afterlife. He plays with the idea that death may indeed be only a dream, but no nightmare; rather an exciting, sexually gratifying, ultimately oedipal dream. The plague need no longer be so terrifying, for the death it brings may be embraced with joy. Most remarkable is that this seventeenth century dreamer interpreted his dream so skillfully as to recognize its function in protecting sleep by alleviating anxiety. It was the dream of a highly imaginative rationalist.

A year later, the plague having abated, the City of London was virtually destroyed by a fire which raged for five days and came within yards of engulfing the Navy Office and Pepys's dwelling. This second brief but terrifying event brought out all of his capacity for effective action in an emergency. He moved swiftly to protect both his personal possessions and the Navy Office (September 2, 1966). His entries for each of the five days of the Great Fire are the most accurate and vivid accounts we possess. It says much for his ability to deal with anxiety that he could act to protect himself, his family, and his community, and at the same time produce a moving literary and historical account of a major event.

Pepys's capacity for aggressive behavior in the service of self-protection again became evident in the face of two major political threats. During the Second Dutch War, in 1667,

Admiral de Ruyter attacked and largely destroyed the English fleet as it lay at anchor in the Medway. It was not long before Parliament sought scapegoats in the persons of the Commissioners of the Navy. Although a junior member and an inexperienced speaker, it was Pepys who was chosen to defend the Navy Board. At the cost of some sleepless nights, he prepared a detailed and masterfully organized defense of his colleagues and himself, averting further attacks on their administration, enhancing his own reputation considerably in the process.

In 1678, he was exposed to an even more dangerous threat when, in the course of a thoroughly nasty political battle, Pepys was accused of high treason. The evidence against him was clearly perjured, but even so it took him years to clear himself of the charges. He established his innocence by amassing volumes of evidence proving that his accusers were notorious criminals and professional perjurers. Charges were dropped before trial, but we may suspect that Pepys would have enjoyed his day in court, had his enemies been rash enough to take the risk. He capped this episode in a very Pepysian fashion, collecting all the documents in the case, having them bound and incorporated in his library, where they are now to be seen.

So far, Pepys seems to have met most of our requirements. But two aspects of his life in particular call for more searching consideration. These are, first, whether his conduct in office revealed a serious defect in his moral character, and, second, whether his sexual behavior should be considered a sign of serious psychopathology.

The first question is easier to dispose of. Pepys did accept gifts from job seekers and contractors, and once nearly got into trouble over the irregular disposition of a naval prize. Some earlier writers were inclined to regard him as corrupt, and on this basis expressed serious reservations about his moral character, which they felt fitted in all too well with the reprehensible quality of his sexual habits.

Pepys gives a number of candid examples in his *Diary*. One

of the more diverting is an early entry: ". . . I met Captain Grove, who did give me a letter directed to myself; I discovered money to be in it and took it, knowing, as I found it to be, the proceed of the place I have got him, to have the taking up of vessels for Tanger. But I did not open it till I came home to my office; and there I broke it open, not looking into it till all the money was out, that I might say I saw no money in the paper if ever I should be questioned about it. There was a piece in gold and 4 l. in silver" (April 3, 1663).

Any attempt to evaluate the psychological significance of an individual's ethical standards must take into account the cultural milieu in which the latter are developed and applied. Pepys spent his youth in a country rent by civil war and violent social change, with all the uncertainty and shifting of values inevitable at such times. Virtually all of his official career coincided with the Stuart restoration, which was marked by a pronounced reaction against the moral rigidity and self-righteousness of the Commonwealth.

Government financing was in a state of chaos, making it difficult for us today to understand how the state survived at all. Public employees, such as Pepys, were paid on a scale which was based on the assumption that they would find other sources of income. It was taken for granted that expediting a contract, arranging for official payment, finding some individual a job, would be rewarded by a fee or a gift of value appropriate to the service rendered. Most official positions were openly bought and sold, as were Army commissions, a usage which lasted well into the nineteenth century. Practices which would today be classified as extortion and bribery were generally accepted as proper, so long as they remained within "reasonable" limits.

Pepys's behavior must also be viewed against the background of the Court of Charles II and its ideal images, such as they were. The King himself accepted substantial subsidies from Louis XIV of France, a monarch and a nation profoundly distrusted and feared by the English. John Churchill, the rising young military leader and future Duke of Marlborough,

acquired a small fortune by his services as a lover to one of the King's mistresses, a fact widely known at Court and almost certainly by the King himself. This made for juicy gossip, but it was not universally condemned at the time.[15]

Historical evidence supports the thesis that Pepys's progression was not, as in the case of so many other public officials, from minor to major peculation, but rather toward increasing personal integrity. This development was accompanied by his largely effective efforts to set up more adequate fiscal procedures for the Navy. Having started as a thievish puppy, he grew to become a reliable watchdog. This gives us little reason to infer a major defect of character in this area.

More complex are the questions which have been raised concerning Pepys's sexual behavior. Earlier editors of the *Diary* felt obliged to censor portions of the text they regarded as unprintable (e.g., Wheatley, 1893). Even Bryant (1933), who was very fond of Pepys, found this aspect of his behavior offensive enough to write: "like a dog, he returned to his vomit" (p. 295).

A more complete understanding of his sexual behavior requires some picture of his marriage. When he met Elizabeth, he was an ambitious but impecunious young man of twenty-two. She was fifteen, the pretty daughter of a penniless Huguenot family. It was beyond doubt a marriage for love, since they had little else to offer one another.

Very much a child bride, Elizabeth was never able to match her husband's intellectual growth. Pepys was always inclined to seek out other women for their conversation as well as for sexual diversion, while she reacted by becoming querulous and provocative. She was constantly having trouble with her housemaids, who were generally close to her own age; she would

[15] Winston Churchill (1933) in his biography of Marlborough commented with ironic emphasis: "Securely established upon the rock of purity and virtue, ceaselessly cleansed by the strong tide of universal suffrage, we can afford to show tolerance and even indulgence toward the weaknesses and vices of those vanished generations without in any way compromising our own integrity" (p. 13).

accuse them of lying or stealing, often on evidence her husband found unconvincing.

Pepys was undoubtedly "houseproud," and Elizabeth, while she worked very hard by modern standards, was not often able to meet his exacting requirements. One entry in 1660 describes a typical dispute: "At night to bed; and my wife and I did fall out about the dog's being put down into the Sellar, which I have a mind to have done because of his fouling the house; and I would have my will. And so went to bed and lay all night in a Quarrel. This night I was troubled all night with a dream that my wife was dead, which made me that I slept ill all night" (November 6, 1660).

It is easy to sympathize with both parties. This brief quarrel was typical of the marriage which, being fundamentally stable, survived a good many storms. In spite of Elizabeth's frequent disabilities—painful menses, a genital abcess, possibly even a perineal fistula—they seem to have had a reasonably gratifying sexual life together. In 1664, after a busy day at the office, they spent a merry evening watching a friend's dog trying to mount their own. He wrote: "going home, I found the little dog so little that of himself he could not reach our bitch; which I am sorry for—for it is the finest dog that ever I saw in my life—as if he were painted, the colours are so finely mixed and shaded. God forgive me, it went against me to have my wife and servants look upon the while they endeavored to do something, and yet it provoked me to pleasure with my wife more than usual tonight" (March 22, 1664). Theirs was a close, interesting, and complex relationship, unmarked by persistent dislike, hatred, or desperation; they were fundamentally loyal to one another.

When in turmoil over the approaching parliamentary investigation in 1668, it was to Elizabeth that he confided his anxieties, and she who comforted him in this as well as other crises. That year he remarked to his friend Coventry: "[I] thanked God I have enough of my own to buy me a good book and a good fiddle, and I have a good wife" (February 18, 1668). His friend could not say the same for himself.

It was nevertheless impossible for him to resist the temptation to engage in extramarital adventures, which were frequent throughout the period covered by the *Diary*. They were recorded in a curious mixture of Spanish and French, with occasional phrases in other languages, including Greek. Generally however, they are not difficult to follow. One example—after a day of conversation and a dinner party: "Thence home, and there comes my Lady Pen, Pegg and Mrs. Turner, and played at cards and supped with us, and were pretty merry—and Pegg with me in my closet a good while, and did suffer me a la besar mucho et tocar ses cosas upon her breast—wherein I had great pleasure, and so spent the evening; and then broke up, and I to bed, my mind mightily pleased with this day's entertainment" (November 28, 1666).

At first, he confined his efforts to kissing various young women, but he soon became more daring and successful, fondling their breasts and inducing them to handle his penis. Increasingly often he was able to achieve "all" he wished. Some of these opportunities arose when applicants for positions in the Navy brought their wives to meet him. He was ready enough to accept what was so freely proffered, usually a few kisses and some fondling. Once or twice, however, such meetings resulted in lasting intrigues.

Nevertheless he showed few of the traits we associate with the typical Don Juan character. While he nearly always explored the ultimate possibilities of a sexual encounter, he had a true admiration for women and enjoyed their company and conversation, whether or not they yielded. There is little evidence of sadism in his treatment of women, nor does he seem to have used them for advancement, which was common enough in Court circles.[16]

Most of his sexual adventures occurred while on the way to or from work. He seemed most concerned about his reputation as a hardworking civil servant, and in spite of his puritan up-

[16] There is relatively little evidence of concern about homosexuality, latent or otherwise.

bringing, he does not appear to have undergone any profound moral conflicts. His anxieties, in any case, interfered with his pleasures only rarely.

These adventures remained casual for the most part until the period 1665-1668, when he experienced a progressive increase in the intensity and frequency of his sexual impulses. By 1668, the *Diary* entries suggest a driven, almost desperate quality. He would seek out more than one woman during the same day (e.g., February 1, 1668) and sometimes managed two or three sexual adventures with different women in one week (February 16, March 20, 1668).

In October, Pepys became even more impulsive and careless, having become infatuated with Deb Willett, a young girl employed as a companion to his wife. One of Deb's regular duties consisted of combing her master's hair as he prepared for bed. He was unable to resist the temptation to make advances, and one evening as he was fondling her breasts and genitals, his wife discovered them in the act (October 25, 1668). Elizabeth understandably refused to accept his assertion that he had done no more than hug the girl. Having induced Deb to confess that matters had indeed gone much further, she proceeded to revenge herself first by claiming (to Pepys's horror) that she had secretly embraced Roman Catholicism and then by insisting that his secretary accompany him everywhere out of her sight.

On another occasion, her behavior became more extreme. He had gone to bed after a quarrel. He writes: "At last, about one o'clock, she came to my side of the bed, and drew my curtains open, and with the tongs red hot at the ends, made as if she did design to pinch me with them, at which, in dismay, I rose up, and with a few words she laid them down . . . and about two . . . came to bed, and there lay well all night, and long in bed talking together, with much pleasure, being I knew, nothing but her doubt of my going out yesterday, without telling her of my going, which did vex her, poor wretch! last night, and I cannot blame her jealousy, though it do vex me to the heart" (January 12, 1669).

Pepys had already begun the process of reconciliation with Elizabeth by consoling her sexually, on one occasion writing: "and there je did hazer con ell to her content" (November 19, 1668).[17] His wife's jealousy was never completely resolved, nor did she cease to have some justification. He did become less driven and more careful, and he had learned his lesson: that he could comfort Elizabeth by sexual attentions. He could be most artful, as we observe in the following passage: ". . . and so home, where my wife mighty dogged, and I vexed to see it, being mightily troubled, of late at her being out of humor, for fear of her discovering any new matter of offense against me, though I am conscious of none; but do hate to be unquiet at home. So, late up, silent, and not supping, but hearing her utter some words of discontent to me with silence, and so to bed, weeping to myself for grief, which she discerning, come to bed, and mighty kind, and so with great joy on both sides to sleep" (January 21, 1669).

By May of 1669, when increasing difficulty in reading forced Pepys to end his *Diary,* he writes that there "cannot be much" which requires such privacy, for "my amours to Deb are past" (May 31, 1669). After Elizabeth's death of an acute fever (possibly typhoid) the following year, he seems to have led a quiet personal life. He established a liaison with a young woman of good family, who became his housekeeper and almost certainly his mistress, living with and caring for him until his death in 1703. Her family seem to have accepted the situation, and Pepys left her a generous bequest in his will. Whether he ever sought out Deb Willett again, we do not know. There is no evidence that he did.

We may agree in general with one evaluation of Pepys as "a normal, reasonably healthy male animal, ruled, as all men are, by passions and appetites. He gave way to lechery because of his innate love of beauty and pleasure, because of the temptations of an easy-going, loose-moraled society dominated by a libertine

[17] His use of the *lingua franca* to describe marital intercourse was not usual; for the most part it was employed to record his extramarital adventures.

King and Court, and because of tensions which developed between him and his wife" (Wilson, 1959, p. 4).

The statement is correct as far as it goes, but it fails to give sufficient weight to the character and intensity of Pepys's sexual behavior during the years 1665-1668. The latter must be regarded as symptomatic, even though self-limited. For a time, he was quite out of control, not at all his usual self. He nearly wrecked his marriage to Elizabeth whom, notwithstanding his intermittent neglect and complaints, he loved dearly, and he incurred the risk of causing irreparable injury (as he saw it) to a young, probably virginal girl. The *Diary* reveals intense conflict and some remorse, but even so, it took months before he could overcome his yearnings for the girl and acquire a reasonable degree of control over his own behavior.

Such a dramatic outbreak of irrational behavior is perhaps to be classified as an episode of acting out, although it occurred in an individual not ordinarily characterized by any such tendency.[18] We are faced with a single, well-defined incident during which his ordinarily excellent integration of pleasure seeking and reality perception broke down, so that he acted "out of character," impulsively and carelessly; a significant phenomenon, even though limited to only one area of his life and to a relatively brief period.

It is likely that this was a response to a series of threats to his psychic integrity, of which the most important was a progressive deterioration of his vision, which gave him every reason to fear that he was becoming blind. To him, who was "a slave to beauty," a playgoer, a voracious reader, a superb writer and keeper of records, such a prospect was appalling, threatening the total loss of his career and most of his pleasures.

Other factors exerted considerable influence; for instance, the plague, the death of his mother, and the parliamentary investigation. It seems likely that the threat of blindness played an important role in exacerbating castration anxieties which had been stimulated originally by the surgeon's invasion of his

[18] In this connection, see Stein (1973).

genital area ten years before. His intense anxiety over his vision could very well have resulted in limiting the range of adaptive devices ordinarily available to him, thus facilitating this outbreak of uncharacteristically irrational behavior in the late 1660's. Aside from his work, the most effective device remaining readily available was indulgence in sexual fantasy and activity. Sexuality then became not only a source of pleasure but a means of defending himself against castration anxiety and fear of death. This was brilliantly demonstrated during the plague, in his dream of Lady Castlemaine.

It would be easy to choose illustrations to prove that Pepys possessed a number of distinctly undesirable, even pathological traits of character, that he could be lecherous, venal, acquisitive, hypocritical, self-righteous, vain, and petty. No doubt the list could be extended. We could, if we wished, emphasize the oral and anal elements in his personality structure and thus establish a more or less plausible psychopathological diagnosis.

This would be, in my eyes, far too narrow an approach, and a potentially misleading one as well. A more thorough study of the *Diary* itself, correlating it with the many other sources available, justifies a different conclusion, based upon recognition of larger patterns of thought and behavior and seen in the light of sociocultural data. By this means, we become aware of Pepys's progressive development over the years, during which traits such as those listed above were controlled and modified, their component elements now directed toward productive rather than primarily defensive or frankly narcissistic ends. And we begin to see him more clearly in the context of his own society, subject to its influences, and eventually himself becoming one of those who exerted a significant influence upon that very society.

We can make a case, therefore, that the Pepys we know from the *Diary* and other sources satisfies nearly all the criteria formulated by Abraham, Freud, Hartmann, and other psychoanalytic writers (e.g., Fenichel, Glover, Jones, Waelder). At

least, he does so more convincingly than any other well-documented historical figure.

It is not necessary to go on with a recital of details, function by function, although such a study might well be feasible. It is sufficient for the purpose to point out that Pepys's capacity to love, to be loved, and to maintain a wide range of stable object relations would have satisfied Abraham's criteria for the establishment of genital dominance; that he approaches very closely Freud's fantasy of the ideal character type, combining the erotic, obsessional, and narcissistic in more or less equal proportions; and that he seems to have fulfilled most of Hartmann's requirements, based upon the orderly development and integration of ego and superego functions and the quality of adaptation.

The latter may be summarized very briefly as they apply here. Pepys's capacity for reality testing and rational control of behavior was combined with a ready ability to employ such regressive phenomena as the dream, fantasy, and direct sensual pleasure for adaptive purposes. His ability to work, and for that matter to love, was relatively invulnerable to stress—a reliable index of well-established autonomy of ego functions and evidence of a strong libidinal organization.

With increasing maturity, he demonstrated remarkable proficiency in transforming or replacing maladaptive and inefficient processes by more suitable ones, for instance, by sublimation. As for superego functioning, his ethical standards, conscience, and ideals developed in parallel with the maturing of his ego processes, achieving about as complete an integration as we are likely to find in healthy, if imperfect, human beings. Finally, the aggressive components of his personality appear to have been put to good use, neither severely inhibited, turned against the self, nor expressed in violence.

Citing Pepys as an instance not of neurosis but of mental health implies that our concept of the latter is necessarily an approximation to an ideal, not the ideal itself. We have seen that Pepys did develop occasional neurotic symptoms and on one occasion at least behaved inappropriately under stress. But

such clearly pathological manifestations were self-limited in scope and duration; and they were not followed by constrictions of character but quite the contrary. As for the moral aspects of his personality, while he never became, nor aspired to be, a paragon of virtue, civic or private, he did demonstrate a lifelong tendency toward increasing integrity and consistency of behavior without the lash of remorse.

A number of questions inevitably remain. First, why should a presumably healthy man have recorded his daily activities in such intimate detail? Does this in itself not constitute evidence of some distortion of personality? We may see in this phenomenon signs of Pepys's notable passion for order, a good deal of exhibitionism, a need for confession, the wish to achieve immortality, and so on; but none of these necessarily constitutes evidence of psychopathology. With more justification, if may be claimed that the *Diary* was the result of a largely successful attempt to resolve a series of internal conflicts; thus it was the very opposite of a neurotic solution. In this respect, Pepys differed sharply from such major geniuses as Goethe, whose productivity was closely related and even dependent upon his psychopathology (Eissler, 1963).

A second question is raised by an almost complete lack of knowledge of Pepys's childhood experiences. A few facts are available, e.g., the dates of birth and death of his many siblings, but there are only a few innocuous references in the *Diary* itself. This is indeed a serious limitation of our ability to understand his development in a psychoanalytic sense. Yet we are not limited to a static picture. We possess an exceptionally complete and vivid picture of his development over ten crucial years of early adult life and a good deal of information about his middle and later years. His life after age fifty-five was one of forced retirement from public responsibility due to political disfavor. He was plagued by ill health, including a urinary fistula. Nevertheless he remained cheerful and active. His extensive correspondence reveals intense mental activity and wide-ranging curiosity almost to the day of his death. His interest in

people—for instance, Mrs. Skinner, his housekeeper-mistress-nurse, his nephew and heir, John Jackson, and his old friends—remained unimpaired.

A final question is more difficult, especially in these days of shifting cultural values. Is it possible to establish criteria for determining the state of mental health apart from social considerations? Obviously not. Yet we can conceive of certain standards which may be broadly applied, at least to cultures with which we are reasonably familiar. These would correspond generally to what Hartmann (1960) has called "health values." They include such traits, already cited, as the capacity "to face reality at all costs"; the predominance of rational thought processes and control over behavior; ready access to fantasy, dreams, and imagination; the capacity for pleasure and comfort in sexuality and object relations; a feasible combination of ethical standards with a life-preserving code of conduct. It is difficult to conceive of cultures in which these would not be useful if not altogether necessary, although they would take very different forms, depending upon the time, place, and sociocultural circumstances. From this point of view, Pepys represented the ideal product of a fusion of Puritan and Restoration influences, deriving from the former his devotion to hard work, self-improvement, and introspection; and from the latter, his love of pleasure, tolerance, and saving humor.

We cannot say with any confidence how he would have managed today, although the stable character traits he possessed would have stood him in good stead. The lively, bawdy, corrupt, and dangerous London of his day strikes some chords which echo down to us. But it was a more intimate world; men in public life, even if thorough villains, were at least a more colorful lot than we are faced with today. Perhaps there was more scope for the expression of the individual character in the world of Pepys.

We may leave Mr. Pepys on this philosophical note: "The truth is, I do indulge myself a little the more pleasure, knowing that this is the proper age of my life to do it, and out of my

observation that most men that do thrive in the world do forget to take pleasure during the time that they are getting their estate but reserve that till they have got one, and then it is too late for them to enjoy it with any pleasure" (March 10, 1666).

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An Unconscious Irony in Plato's *Republic*

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AN UNCONSCIOUS IRONY IN PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

BY CHARLES HANLY

This study of some psychological themes in a classical philosophical work, Plato's Republic, *is an exercise in applied psychoanalysis that attempts to formulate an integrated psychoanalytic and philosophical understanding of certain ideas to be found in that work. It contains an interpretative study of a legend introduced by Plato at a crucial point in the development of the philosophical argument of the* Republic. *It is hypothesized that his use of this legend can be traced to an unconscious conflict in Plato, which when identified and interpreted can broaden our understanding and appreciation of the humanity of this work.*

THE LEGEND OF GYGES THE LYDIAN

The story of Gyges the Lydian was first set down by Herodotus (*Herodotus,* I, 8-13). Plato's version, as we shall see, differs significantly from that of Herodotus. According to Plato, Gyges is a shepherd. One night, during a violent storm, a chasm opens in the earth. Gyges descends into the chasm, where he finds a bronze horse with the huge body of a man in it. From a finger of the body, Gyges removes a ring which he subsequently discovers to have the power to render him invisible whenever he turns the bezel inward to the palm of his hand. He arranges to be sent to Court, where he demonstrates the magical power of his ring to the queen, seduces her, and conspires with her to murder the king and take the throne. Plato tells the story initially in the context of developing an argument concerning the nature of justice. He uses it again, in greater detail, further on in the *Republic,* to illustrate the thesis that should anyone have the opportunity to perpetrate injustices without any

danger of retribution, he would do so without restraint (*Republic,* II, 359-360).

Let us now compare Plato's version of the legend with that of Herodotus. In Herodotus' account, Gyges, a courtier, is required by a narcissistic king to view the naked charms of his queen secretly so that the king can have his boasts about her beauty corroborated to his retainers. Gyges does so against his better judgment. The queen detects the intruder in the bed chamber. She does not let the king know that she has discovered his plot but, acting on the demands of an ancient code of modesty, presents Gyges with the alternatives of killing the king or being killed himself. Gyges reluctantly conspires with her to murder the king and take his place. Eventually, he is exonerated by an oracle upon the condition that retribution will occur in the fifth generation of the dynasty that he has established.

The Platonic version differs from that of Herodotus in several important respects. In Plato's account, the provocations of the king and the queen are replaced by the force of spontaneous, internal motivation in bringing on the murder—instead of being the victim of circumstances, Gyges becomes a self-appointed regicide. In the Herodotus story, exposure leads to the crime; in Plato's account just the opposite happens: secrecy, the ability to go undetected, is its condition; the acquisition of the power of invisibility leads to the crime. According to Herodotus, the woman involved, the queen, is prompted by a moral code to seek revenge on her husband, the king. Plato, on the other hand, portrays a woman who is susceptible to the sexual seductions of the man who wears the ring. Her sexual hunger for him quickly alters her loyalties and makes her a willing co-conspirator in a plot to murder her husband. Plato's version omits any reference to the confirmation of Gyges' reign by the Delphic oracle or to a revenge to be carried out by descendants of the murdered king in the fifth generation of his dynasty. Finally, the mysterious circumstances under which Gyges acquires the ring, as well as the ring itself, are absent from Herodotus' version of the story. Thus a number of new

themes are brought into play in Plato's version of the legend: the storm, the cave, the body in the bronze horse, the ring with its mysterious powers, and the sexually dangerous woman. The element of retribution is absent in his version.

Plato had philosophical reasons for wanting these changes in the legend, reasons which easily can be inferred from the context of its introduction in the argument of the *Republic*. Plato wanted to illustrate Glaucon's thesis that justice is a compromise between what we most want—i.e., to do injustice with impunity—and what we least want—i.e., to suffer injustice without redress. Herodotus' version does not serve this purpose: Gyges is portrayed as a reluctant regicide incited to act by force of circumstance and by the wish to preserve his own life. Plato needs a hero who is internally motivated to murder a king, and he needs a device, the ring, to protect the criminal from retribution through secrecy; no one but Gyges and the queen can know who has committed the regicide. Plato has to modify the legend in order to make it suitable for his philosophical purposes. Only with these modifications can it be used to advance the view that every man will so act were he to have Gyges' ring, that every woman will so cooperate if she were to be so seduced.

But, of course, Plato rejects this view philosophically. Plato assigns to his Socrates of the *Republic* the idea that committing injustice makes the miscreant miserable, while the just life is a happy one despite social and personal misfortune. Therefore, Plato needs to alter Herodotus' version in one further respect. The Gyges of Herodotus, having killed a king and married his queen, nevertheless is exonerated by an oracle and is able to found a dynasty. He appears to have a happy life, his crime being excused by the gods. Such a conclusion is contrary to Plato's view of the connection between the just life and happiness. He not only omits it, but in doing so he provides a different reading of Gyges' life consistent with his own views. In making the omission, Plato commits what we might term the moralistic fallacy. He derives the proposition that those who

commit injustices are miserable from the moral premise that those who commit injustices ought not to be happy.

Although Plato's argument as such remains fallacious philosophically because it attempts to derive a factual statement from a normative statement, it embodies an important psychological insight. Individuals who commit evil acts are punished for them by the anxiety (guilt) they arouse within themselves even when their acts go undetected and unpunished by external authorities. Shakespeare illustrates this mechanism when Macbeth and Lady Macbeth begin to suffer the consequences of their crime long before they are punished for it. Although the theme of retribution is absent from the Gyges legend as it appears in the *Republic,* I believe that this absence is psychologically significant and paves the way for its reintroduction in another context.

The foregoing provides an analysis of the philosophical reasons Plato had for modifying the Gyges story. But no account of the philosophical reasons, however exhaustive, can provide a sufficient understanding of the story itself. The philosophical reasons require a hero who has his own motive for committing the crime and a means to avoid retribution. The significance of all the details in Plato's version are left unexplained. These details lead to a second, psychological, layer of significance in the legend. I am referring to the mysterious circumstances under which Gyges acquires the ring and which set him upon the path that leads through seduction and murder to the throne.

It is at this point that one must have recourse to psychoanalytic interpretation and construction if one is to proceed further. The need for an apt illustration of a philosophical idea seems to have stimulated Plato's powers of imagination to rework the legend of Gyges the Lydian into a form suitable for his philosophical purposes. But did unconscious ideas and fantasies also play a part in motivating Plato to alter the legend in the precise manner which he chose?

The legend is made up of a series of elements and episodes which, if they occurred in a dream, could be interpreted as having unconscious significance. Knowledge of dream symbolism can be used to interpret the alterations that Plato made in the legend. To be sure, the Gyges story is not a dream. It is a waking poetic fiction. But it can be assumed that, as in other poetic fictions, unconscious processes contribute to its formation just as they do in the production of manifest dreams.

Thus in Plato's version the cave can be taken to symbolize the womb. Gyges' descent into it might then be understood as representing his birth.[1] What then could it tell us about Gyges' birth? In the cave, Gyges comes upon the massive body of an unidentified man from whom he takes the magic ring. The massiveness of the body and its entombment in the bronze horse suggest the majesty of a regal person—indeed, none other than the king. His ring, falling into the hands of Gyges, could symbolize Gyges' acquisition of the king's potency as well as its sexual object—the queen.[2] These symbolic elements might tell us that Gyges was the prince—the son of the king—whose birth was accompanied by the prophecy that he was fated to murder his father and marry his mother. In terms of ancient dream lore, this event in Plato's version of the legend can be construed as a symbolic pre-enactment of the future course to be followed by Gyges. The storm and earthquake, which set the atmosphere of the story and cause the rending of the earth, seem to confirm that we are being presented with the account of a royal birth. The animistic world of folklore has nature reverberate with storms and quakes at such births. Shakespeare exploited this association when he had the Welsh rebel Glendower in *King Henry IV, Part I,* express his pretentiousness by claiming:

[1] In a dream reported to me a woman with a penis was seen emerging from a cave. Behind this dream image was the unconscious infantile fantasy that women are *born* with penises and are made into women by suffering their removal.

[2] Dodds (1963) has discussed the symbolic, phallic significance of the ring in Greek culture in connection with Aristides' dream prescriptions (p. 116).

> . . . at my birth
> The frame and huge foundation of the earth
> Shak'd like a coward (III, i).

I propose that the content of the legend as presented by Plato is a symbolically disguised version of the Oedipus story. Even Plato's making Gyges a shepherd points in that direction. The infant Oedipus was abandoned in the rough countryside to die, only to be found by shepherds who saved and raised him. Rank (1909) has shown that in folklore the theme of identity disguised by reversal of social status is recurrent. Altering Gyges' status from that of a member of the king's bodyguard, as it had been in Herodotus' version, to that of a lowly shepherd can be viewed as effecting such a disguise by way of opposites. Further, the ring's magical power of invisibility[3] makes it possible for Gyges to hide his criminality and to escape retribution. Thus, Plato's version of the oedipal theme differs significantly from that of Sophocles. The parricide and incest go undetected and unpunished.

In Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex,* Jocasta counsels her son against pressing his inquiry into who is guilty of the murder of Laius.

> Nor need this mother-marrying frighten you;
> Many a man has dreamt as much. Such things
> Must be forgotten, if life is to be endured (p. 52).

But Oedipus did not heed Jocasta. In contrast, Plato's Gyges is spared the self-righteous arrogance followed by fearful self-doubts that led Oedipus to seek out his true identity. The ring that makes Gyges invisible to others makes his true identity invisible to himself. Thus Gyges can be seen as a prototype of the kind of person whose character and life have been shaped by an oedipal triumph in childhood—an individual who has "dispatched the king" and has gotten away with it.

[3] The ring with the magical power of invisibility occurs in association with oedipal material in other cultures. A charming variant occurs in an ancient Indian play *Avimaraka* (see, J. L. Masson and D. D. Kosambi, 1970, p. 92, ff.), in which the invisibility induced by a ring is used to commit a forbidden libidinal sin.

Such an individual may have had parents who cooperated with his oedipal strivings. The father may have been a weak, unsuccessful man and the mother a dominating woman who made no secret of her dissatisfaction with her husband and placed her hopes for fulfillment upon her son. Or the father may have died at a time when the son was still living in an animistic world and could not be realistic about his rivalrous hostility toward him. The death of the father would enhance the son's belief that he had vanquished his father, leading to the formation of an identificatory alliance with his mother and to the possible development of homosexuality. Such individuals can develop a profoundly derogated image of their fathers which enables them to deny the father's importance in their lives and, at the same time, to deny their anxiety (guilt). As a further defense against their anxiety, they can develop the fantasy that they do not owe their origin to the debased and vanquished father but rather to some other, more perfect being who guides their destiny.

Let us now turn to Plato's self-revelations in his philosophical writings. In an early dialogue, the *Charmides,* Socrates' homosexual attraction to the youthful soldier Charmides is vividly described. Plato has Socrates report how he was "caught on fire" by what he saw "inside his [Charmides] cloak" and how he felt quite beside himself, scarcely able to speak (*Charmides,* 155.D). In the middle dialogues, the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus,* homosexuality is still preferred to what Plato takes to be the meanest form of loving, heterosexuality, although it is given second place to its sublimation in intellectual pursuits and mystical experience.

In the *Phaedrus* the idea is developed that a blissful celestial afterlife awaits those who, having been consumed by a homosexual passion, suppress their desires for sexual gratification and intellectualize their love in philosophical pursuits (*Phaedrus,* 254-257). The source of the anxiety that motivates the partial sublimation is intuitively grasped by Plato: the threat of sadistic

aggression toward the homosexual partner, which is the cause of the instability of such relationships (*Phaedrus,* 239-241). As one might expect, Plato's idea of intellectual activity seems to be shaped in part by repressed conflicts. In these dialogues and others, we find descriptions that suggest displacement of the procreative urge from a psychophysical organization into intellectual life. Plato grounds his philosophical dialectics in a partially sublimated, homosexual relationship between mentor and pupil. His favorite metaphor for this relationship compares it to procreation. The older man makes the youth pregnant with his brain children, i.e., his ideas; Socrates is portrayed as a midwife who helps the ideas to be born. A passage in *Epistle VII* seems to refer to just such a grounding by Plato of philosophical activity in sublimated, homosexual intimacy: "For this knowledge is not something that can be put into words like other sciences; but only after long-continued intercourse between teacher and pupil, in joint pursuit of the subject, suddenly like light flashing forth when a fire is kindled, it is born in the soul and straightway nourishes itself" (*Epistle VII,* 341).

We know little of Plato's life. His father, Aristo, who is said to have been descended from the kings of Athens, died when Plato was still a boy. Plato's mother remarried (her uncle, Pyrilampes), but Plato may not have accepted him. In any case, it was Socrates, whom he met at about the age of twenty, who became the ruling influence in his life. Plato had two older brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon. It is to Glaucon that Plato attributes the telling of the story of Gyges in the *Republic* and who is made the advocate of a concept of justice that Plato rejects. It is possible that disavowal is at work: "It is not I but my brother who invents such tales!"

We then come to an unconscious irony in the *Republic.* The philosophical argument seeks to justify a severe censorship of literature and the exile of the poets from the ideal state. Concerning censorship, Plato says:

> Well, firstly, the poet, who told the greatest falsehoods of the greatest of being, told a falsehood with no beauty in it, when he said that Ouranos did what Hesiod said he did, and that Kronos took vengeance on him. And as for the deeds of Kronos, and what he suffered at his son's hands, even if these stories are true, I should not think we should so lightly repeat them to the young and foolish. It were best to be silent about them or if they had to be told, it should be done under the seal of silence to as few hearers as possible, and after the sacrifice not of the mystic pig but some great and almost unprocurable victim, so that very few would hear the story (*Republic,* II, 377-378).

Finally, in the concluding arguments of the *Republic,* Plato advocates the banishment of poetry from the well-governed city (*Republic,* X, 572). Plato apparently wants to believe that the ideas contained in Hesiod, Homer, and Sophocles take root in the minds of men only by transplantation from other minds.

The irony is that Plato himself in the Gyges story introduces into the *Republic* a poetic fantasy, telling a disturbing psychological truth in disguised form. He unconsciously breaks his own rules of censorship. It is necessary for Plato to refer to these forbidden stories in his arguments on behalf of censorship, but he is not constrained by logic or the explicit subject matter of his argument to embellish, with a fantasy, Glaucon's defense of a concept of justice that is introduced only to be rejected.

It can be assumed that Plato's views on the censorship of literature were formed in part by the work of his superego. The argument of the *Republic* is based upon an analogy between society and self. How does the material of the Gyges story avoid the inner censorship of the author of the *Republic*? First, the manifest meaning of the story is ego-syntonic; it is suited to Plato's conscious philosophical purpose. Second, the manifest meaning disguises in symbols the latent meaning of the story. Third, Plato's dramatic method enables him to transfer the telling of the story to Glaucon with whom he does not consciously identify.

The notion of an *unconscious* irony has been used to differentiate it from the deliberate and conscious use of irony that characterizes Plato's Socrates. In the dialogues, including the *Republic,* Socrates frequently simulates ignorance to encourage others to express their ideas in order to expose the inherent contradictions contained in them. This dialectic is followed by a statement of Plato's own views. When Glaucon recounts the legend of Gyges, he does so in response to conscious Socratic irony. But it is Plato who has drawn the character of Glaucon and has him recount the tale. In this displacement to Glaucon, we come upon the unconscious irony. Plato says, without knowing that he has said it, what he states should never be said.

The irony, however, is not yet complete. Plato seems to know unconsciously that the psychological truths contained in the legendary material described by poets has universal application. At a later point in the *Republic,* he has Socrates assert the existence, as revealed in dreams, of a class of "terrible, fierce, and lawless desires" (*Republic,* IX, 572) in every man, even in those with every appearance of being decent. The intense anxiety aroused by this insight, which leads to denial, is evident in the pessimistic cast of Plato's choice of words. It suggests a belief on Plato's part that the instinctual wishes cannot be escaped merely by having their cathexis withdrawn from them. The mental construct used by Plato to effect the denial is that of the philosopher king. This perfectly just, wise, courageous, and temperate man presumably is the individual whose decency is real, not only apparent. The question can be raised as to how Plato thought that the purified virtues of the philosopher king could be wrested out of the base desires that exist in every man. Plato's conscious thoughts on the subject have long been the subject of detailed philosophical analysis. The unconscious thoughts which we can infer lie behind them are the focus of attention here.

If our conclusions are correct, we should expect to find the

latent theme of Plato's version of the Gyges legend appearing elsewhere in Plato's work. Also, following a suggestion by Arlow (1961), we might expect to find a second version of the theme that conveys the elements of Plato's attempt to resolve the unconscious instinctual conflicts involved in it. If our hypothesis that Plato's Gyges legend represents a homosexual's oedipal fantasy is correct, we can expect to find the recurrence of at least five themes: the sexually dangerous woman, paranoia, castration anxiety, rebirth, and narcissism.

The theme of the dangerous woman appears again in Plato's theory of political decay. It is to the destructive influence of women that Plato attributes the deterioration of the timocratic city into the oligarchic, a fall precipitating a succession of deteriorating psychosocial systems through democracy to tyranny.

> [The son] hears his mother complaining that her husband is not one of the rulers, and that in consequence other women are set above her. Then she sees that her husband does not trouble himself much about money, and does not fight and wrangle in law-suits or in the assembly but takes all these matters very calmly, and she perceives that he is always attending to himself, treating her neither with marked reverence nor marked disrespect. All these things make her angry, and she tells her son that his father is unmanly and utterly casual, and treats him to all the many varied complaints which women love to make on such matters (*Republic,* VIII, 549-550).

Plato has drawn a portrait of the kind of woman whose behavior might facilitate a conviction in her son that he has achieved an oedipal triumph. The additional feature in this portrayal is the value attached to wealth, which is appropriate to the context of Plato's sociopolitical analysis, but, from a psychological point of view, also suggests regression to an anal-sadistic level of organization. The son seeks to win his mother's approval, outdoing his father and fighting to retain and increase the family wealth.

Some women, of course, do answer to Plato's description. The problem is that it must apply to a very large class of women if women indeed are to have the effect upon social systems attributed to them by Plato's argument. It is not likely that there could have been so many women in ancient Greece angry at their husbands and willing to encourage their sons to defeat and destroy them. To be sure, Plato's analysis of the psychological underpinnings of various sociopolitical systems is an abstract model rather than a historical description. But the philosophical adequacy of the model depends upon the plausibility of its underlying assumptions. Plato's ideas about the role of the contribution of women to political decay are unrealistic and appear to stem from unconsciously determined, distorted attitudes toward them.

Following Grunberger (1956, p. 202), the concept of the dangerous woman can be interpreted as a projection of the bad (castrating) mother. Such an interpretation can shed light upon the "seduction" by Gyges of the queen, who then helps Gyges murder the king. It is not a genital sexual wish that Gyges seeks to gratify in the seduction, if we look upon it in this way, but rather an anal-sadistic wish to castrate the king (father) and thereby gain possession of his power. Grunberger has pointed out the operation of such a preoedipal wish in the dynamics of masochism. Plato's puritanism probably derived in part from moral masochism, as indicated by his negative attitude to even the vicarious gratifications afforded by the aesthetic experiences aroused by classical tragedy.

The themes of punishment and paranoia re-emerge in the context of Plato's political theorizing. In *Republic,* VIII-IX (544-581), Plato formulates a theory concerning the connection between political constitutions and the characters of those who are assigned by them to exercise political power. Each constitution is correlated with a specific character type. The ideas concerning the dangerous woman discussed above are drawn from this context. In the argument of the *Republic* as a whole, this analysis of constitutions and characters plays a crucial role.

In *Republic,* II, in which the Gyges legend is presented, the claim is made that the best man is happiest and the worst man is most miserable. Plato's philosophical analysis of constitutions and characters is designed to establish this fundamental point. A central psychological issue upon which Plato's philosophical analysis focuses is the identification of the son with the morally good father; the failure to achieve such an identification is a major factor, according to Plato, in the development of flaws in the character of the son and the decline from the timocratic to the oligarchic constitution and ruler.

According to Plato, constitutions can be ranked in descending order from aristocracy (rule of a communized intellectual elite), through timocracy (rule by a military elite), oligarchy (rule by the wealthy), and democracy (rule by the people) to tyranny (rule by a parricidal despot). A detailed examination of the psychology of Plato's political ideas lies beyond the scope of this paper. Only the theme of punishment and paranoia, as they find expression in Plato's account of the tyrant, will be examined here.

There are three significant features in Plato's account of the tyrant. First, it is in this context that Plato makes his famous reference to the impulses underlying dreams. He has Socrates assert that "a terrible, fierce, and lawless class of desires exists in every man, even in those of us who have every appearance of being decent people. Its existence is revealed in dreams." And in the same context, "when the rest of the soul, the reasoning, gentle, and ruling part of it, is asleep, then the bestial and savage part, when it has had its fill of food or wine, begins to leap about, pushes sleep aside, and tries to go and gratify its instincts. You know how in such a state it will dare everything, as though it were freed and released from all shame or discernment. It does not shrink from attempting incestual intercourse, in its dream, with a mother or with any man or god or beast. It is ready for any deed of blood, and there is no unhallowed food it will not eat. In a word, it falls short of no extreme of folly or shamelessness" (*Republic,* IX, 572).

Second, the essential character of the tyrant, according to Plato, is that he does in waking life what once he only dreamed of doing. "Once they [forbidden desires] were let loose in sleep when he dreamt, in the time when he was still under the laws and a father. . . . But when Love established his tyranny over him, he became for always, and in waking reality, the man he used occasionally to be in dreams. And now he will stick at no frightful murder, no unhallowed food or dreadful deed, but Love dwells tyrannically within him in all lawlessness and anarchy" (*Republic,* IX, 574-575). The tyrant as conceived by Plato appears to me essentially as an oedipally motivated criminal.

Third, Plato describes the tyrant as one who is constantly tormented by fear. "He has the nature we have described, full of thronging and diverse fears and lusts. He has a greedy soul, and yet he is the only man in the city who may not travel or go to see the things which all free men want to see. He lives hidden away in his house for all the world like a woman . . ." (*Republic,* IX, 579). Even there he is unsafe because what he has done to his father, any soldier in his bodyguard may do to him.[4] Here again, we find evidence of the presence of an anxiety-provoking unconscious conflict that makes its way into Plato's philosophical thought under the license provided by a moral condemnation of the figure (the tyrant) who is made the bearer of the theme.

The often repeated remark that in every delusion there is a kernel of truth can be extended to projection as well. Projection is able to achieve its aim of making an idea and its intrapsychic significance unconscious by selecting an object which has, in itself, a real element of fittingness. But the personal element in Plato's idea of the tyrant comes into view once we realize that tyrants in ancient times were not always the criminals Plato makes them out to be in the *Republic.* Herodotus' Gyges was

[4] Plato's tyrant is not significantly different from the great and wretched god Cronos who, having castrated his father with his mother's help, lived in terror of his own progeny lest one of them follow his example, thus creating the conditions in which he too becomes the victim of a son (Hesiod).

himself such a political figure. Other Greeks, among them the classical tragedians, did not share Plato's view of them and, in an aside, Plato cites this fact as an additional reason for them to be banished from the city (*Republic,* VIII, 568). Plato's tyrant has all the trappings of opulence, but he is in reality an impoverished beggar who cannot enjoy his own wealth. He accumulates wealth and power only to make himself secure by impoverishing and weakening others. He is a man, we might interpret, who is in the throes of severe castration anxiety; he castrates in order to protect himself against castration. The personal element that I see contributing to Plato's concept of the tyrant (the element which deprived him of the capacity to take a more objective look at the characters of men who were political tyrants in ancient times) was his need to ward off projectively his own castration anxiety.

Plato makes the brilliantly perceptive remark concerning his tyrant that he is a man who when he "cannot master himself, must try to rule others" (*Republic,* IX, 579). What is Plato's concept of the psychology of self-mastery? Here again the theme of castration makes its appearance. In the *Phaedrus* Plato elaborates a metaphor of the human psyche, in which he likens it to a charioteer driving two horses. The horse on the left is an unruly brute who represents the appetites; the one on the right is a fine, domesticated animal amenable to the guidance of the charioteer (intellect) who represents moral will or spirit, as Plato identifies it in the *Republic.* The unruly brute is nourished and grows strong on sensual gratification; it threatens to carry off the charioteer into moral danger. When approaching the loved object, the sinister horse "lowers its head, elevates its tail, takes the bit in its teeth, and pulls shamelessly." The charioteer must have recourse to severe measures; "he jerks back the bit even more violently than before from the teeth of the wanton horse, bespatters its malicious tongue and jaws with blood, forces its legs and haunches to the ground and causes it much pain" (*Phaedrus,* 254). It is my contention that Plato is describing homosexual drives, although he consciously con-

sidered heterosexual drives to be even more dangerous to the welfare of the soul. The symbolism of Plato's metaphor suggests that self-castration is the psychological means by which self-mastery is acquired.

Grunberger (1956) in his study of the psychodynamics of sado-masochism calls attention to a significant characteristic of moral masochism: "Suffering ennobles and purifies. He who suffers is entitled to veneration, for he is virtuous. Indeed, pleasure being assimilated to castration of the father, it follows that suffering, i.e., being the castrated instead of the castrator, is a proof of innocence and a shelter against the accusations of the superego while, at the same time, permitting introjection at a deeper level" (p. 200). In my opinion, Grunberger's account of moral masochism applies to the psychogenesis of one of Plato's major philosophical formulations in the *Republic.*

The other vantage point that is useful is Arlow's (1961) idea that myths contain two expressions of a single unconscious instinctual derivative, one representing its "raw" form and the other the form it takes after it has been subjected to the defensive operations of the ego involving sublimation and identification, i.e., its connection with the superego. The Gyges legend seems to be representative of the first type in Arlow's classification and the allegory of the cave of the second type.

THE ALLEGORY OF THE CAVE AND THE PHILOSOPHER HERO

The themes of the cave and of rebirth reappear in the *Republic* in the allegory of the cave, through which Plato seeks to give an imaginative account of the psychogenesis of the philosopher king, the man of justice who is fitted to rule the ideal state because he is beyond temptation. The allegory has been subjected to thorough philosophical analysis by Plato scholars, but its psychology has been insufficiently explored. Plato pictures men living in the depths of a cave. On the wall of the cave they see the shadows of objects that move along a parapet behind them. Beyond the parapet a fire burns, which causes

shadows to be cast. They take the shadows to be real. One of them manages to turn around and, although blinded at first by the fire, he learns that what initially he had taken to be real were but the shadows of more substantial objects. Proceeding then to the mouth of the cave, he realizes that the objects in the cave themselves are only replicas of the entities that make up the real world illuminated by the sun. The philosopher, for such he is, is at last able to look directly into the sun.

Philosophically, the objects and the fire in the cave represent nature and the natural sun; nature and the natural sun in the allegory represent the world of the forms and the Form of the Good (God). From the psychological point of view the allegory can be seen as describing a far-reaching transformation affecting the philosopher's sense of reality and his values. Plato's description of this transformation is as follows: "It is just as if the eye could not turn from darkness to light unless the whole body turned with it, so this faculty and instrument must be wheeled round together with the whole soul away from that which is becoming (nature), until it is able to look upon and to endure being and the brightest blaze of being and that we declare to be the good" (*Republic,* VII, 518). Whereas before the world of nature seemed real and the abstract ideas used in constructing knowledge of it seemed to be only representations of it, now it is the abstract ideas that seem real and the objects of nature appear to be only their replicas. Whereas before physical gratifications were valuable, now they are demeaning distractions from the pleasures of the life of the intellect and the austere virtues which protect it. Whereas before life was of primary importance, now death and the preparation for immortality take its place as evidenced by the myth of Er which concludes the *Republic.*

The allegory of the cave appears to me to reflect a reconstitution of Plato's superego, or a far-reaching modification of it, under the pressure of the conflicts involved in his homosexuality.

Three features of Plato's account are of particular interest.

The light of the fire and then of the sun in the allegory are blinding even while illuminating. The philosophical illumination produces a debilitation of the physical sense of sight. Having emerged from the cave, the philosophical hero is destined at last to undergo a blinding intellectual vision of the ultimate source of things—the Form of the Good, symbolized by the sun. This vision supposedly yields intellectual power, but it also produces debility.

> Then do you think it at all surprising, if one who has come from divine visions to human miseries plays a sorry part and appears very ridiculous when, with eyes still confused and before he has got properly used to the darkness that is round him, he is compelled to contend in law courts or elsewhere concerning the shadows of the just or the images which throw those shadows, or to dispute concerning the manner in which those images are conceived by men who have never seen real justice (*Republic,* VII, 517).

The vision of the Good damages the physical senses and impairs the capacity of the philosophical hero to adapt successfully to the realities of social life. He will appear ridiculous and inept when confronted by the demands of the world. The price that the philosophical hero must pay for his intellectual vision of reality is an impairment of natural vision. Reliance on the physical senses must be abandoned in favor of pure thought, for the eyes are corrupt and they are corrupting of knowledge and virtue.

This interpretation leads us to the psychogenetic roots of Platonic antiempiricism. Unlike Oedipus, the philosopher hero does not have to put his eyes out physically; he puts them out psychologically. It is this act of psychic self-mutilation that Plato believed, without knowing consciously that he believed it, would legitimize the philosopher hero's exercise of power by making him proof against the temptation to abuse it. Psychic self-mutilation is the specific form of suffering that ennobles and purifies in the Platonic scheme of things.

The superego, it seems to me, is formed of a further internalization of an identification with the parent. Stated otherwise, it is formed by a shift of cathexis from an image of the object of a relationship to the image or idea of that object which is already part of the self. The identification with the Form of the Good—Plato's deity—is evident, since the philosopher king is to bring order and harmony to the city just as the Form of the Good is the source of order and harmony in the cosmos. But the Form of the Good bears a divine characteristic that betrays the impulse—the wish to castrate, against which the superego is organized. The Form of the Good is without personality. It does not create; its efficacy is limited to controlling, ordering, organizing. It is an abstract principle—a being beyond being. As such it is proof against Gyges, Prometheus, Cronos, Zeus, and Plato. Plato's concept of being shares this feature of the concept of being that had been elaborated by his predecessor Parmenides (see, Hanly, 1970, pp. 184-185).

Accordingly, it can be said that Plato's allegory of the cave represents in disguised form a life history that has failed to resolve the oedipus complex; one that has been obliged in its stead to erect defenses against it through modifications of the ego and the organization of its functions. The dialogues that follow the *Republic* bear the consequences of these changes. They become increasingly abstract and devoid of the rich human content of the early and middle dialogues. The conversion of object libido into narcissistic libido can be inferred from Plato's substitution of abstract entities for real things, his conviction of his own immortality (the substitution of the Form of the Good for his earthly parents), his belief in his preexistence, which is derived from the same idea, his sense of superiority over ignorant earth-bound mortals, and his conviction that only he or someone like him is qualified to rule.

The narcissistic idealization of the self which we have been considering did not stop Plato from carrying on a productive philosophical life. It did not break down his contact with real-

ity, as in serious narcissistic disorders (e.g., schizophrenia) but preserved his contact with life and reality. The *Weltanschauung* that he created, when it was synthesized with Christianity by Augustine, came to dominate several centuries of thought in Western civilization. Consequently, I cannot agree with the view advanced by Brès (1968) that Plato's thought was psychotic in nature. Kris (1952, p. 105) differentiates between the effects of primary process activity on an incapacitated ego and its effects upon an ego that has retained its basic strengths. Perhaps Coltrera (1965) is correct in postulating the existence of unique narcissistic vicissitudes in creative people, which would be destructive to average minds but which are contained and utilized for creative purposes by the unusually gifted. Perhaps Coltrera is also correct in insisting that "not all motivated processes which produce deviations from veridicality are ineffective from the standpoint of adaptation" (p. 670).

However, we know that Nietzsche's creativity did not spare him in the end. My surmise is that it was a sum of unsublimated and repressed, or only partially sublimated, homosexual object libido that helped Plato's ego to remain attached to the real world of people and things and made of his metaphysical world a consolation for lost and abandoned gratifications in life rather than a delusional system. The evidence for this construction is to be found in the practical regulations the philosopher king, working under the guiding spirit of his vision of the Form of the Good, would impose on society: the censorship of literature to remove all traces of oedipal themes; the destruction of the family; the removal of any social differentiation between men and women; the opportunity for male rulers to fulfill parental roles, both male and female, for selected offspring who are taken at birth from their mothers and placed in state "rearing-pens"; the control of procreation by means of a rigged lottery that would enable the rulers to decide who should mate during state nuptial festivals; and the selection of breeding seasons according to magical astrological calculations. These are some of the extraordinary provisions Plato

considered necessary for the ideal state. The force of an extreme oedipal anxiety, the need to create opportunities for partially sublimated homosexual needs (parenting without procreation) and regression to magical thinking are evident.

Popper (1966) has commented on the political totalitarianism of these ideas and has shown the connection between Plato's ideas and similar elements in modern totalitarian ideologies. One need not comment here on their obvious psychological destructiveness. The regressiveness of Plato's social thought is evident in a specific reversal of values. Plato feared individuality. He wanted to create a society of persons which would function as a collective individual; i.e., he wanted to bring about a social regression to tribalism. Citizens must all rejoice and grieve at the same time over the same thing. Individual gain or individual loss must not be experienced. It must be acknowledged that his provisions for life in the ideal state are well calculated to achieve this end.

Following Coltrera, it can be said that there is a veracity of a kind and an adaptiveness of a kind in these ideas. They project a social world in which a group of unconscious libidinal, aggressive, and narcissistic gratifications can be achieved. There is an ingenious adaptation of means to these ends. But they cannot be said to be the products of a mind that is well adapted to the needs of individuals or to the needs of society. They are ideas that defend against the derivatives of unconscious conflicts and which, in order to accomplish their defensive function, have to make substantial concessions to the demands of the instinctual drive pressures contained in them. Kris (1952) stated that the establishment of certain sublimations can lead to a regressive reactivation of instinctual wishes, the indulgence of which may be permitted. This idea raises the difficult question of what might be the conditions under which such reactivation and gratification can occur and the form that they would take. In the case of artistic works and aesthetic responses to them, the gratification seems to be controlled by the aesthetic experience itself, which provides the condition for the gratification. In the

case of philosophical ideas which aim at a real alteration in individual and collective life, the issue may be a more serious one.

The question whether or not a significant degree of neutralization can occur in sublimations which do not rest on the resolution of the oedipus complex is, in my opinion, a real one. Kris (1952) points out that "the degree of neutralization may be low" and yet we may nevertheless "be dealing with secondary processes" and that "while fully under the control of the ego, fully bound, the energy may still have retained the hallmark of libido and aggression" (p. 27). I believe that this formulation applies adequately to Plato's philosophical thought except that the hallmarks seem to be very prominent and produce identifiable distortions in the secondary process. What is at issue is the nature and extent of the control the ego is able to exercise in the face of the compromises the ego must make with id demands in the absence of the resolution of the oedipus complex. There can be no question that Plato developed a highly idealized superego and qualified on that score for the full encomium of Kohut's (1966) praise for the man of wisdom who views the rabble of common men with disdain (p. 265). But these narcissistic vicissitudes and the idealized superego with which they are connected also bore in Plato the hallmarks of unconscious libidinal and aggressive aims when it came to the crucial task of setting out practical rules for individual and collective life.

Perhaps one can find a second layer of irony in Plato's thought which relates to the one identified above. Plato did not think that his ideal society would ever exist and he recommended that his followers should only attempt to apply its provisions in their personal lives. When an opportunity arose for Plato to try to make a philosopher king of the tyrant of Syracuse, his attempt ended in a disaster from which Plato narrowly escaped with his life. Plato also had doubts about his attitude toward the poets and he called for someone to show why they should be admitted to the just society or be given a place in the life of just men: something that Aristotle eventually

did in his *Poetics*. Perhaps, the part of Plato that dreamed, that conceived of an imaginative variation on the life of Gyges, that struggled with the severity of his superego, and that found the narcissistic gratifications it afforded him a poor substitute for fulfillments lesser men enjoyed, wanted us to wonder at but not imitate his remarkable intellectual Odyssey. Such ironical reservations would, more than any of Plato's explicitly formulated philosophical doctrines, locate him in a tradition of thought that eventually led to Freud.

PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY AND APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS

The oedipal connotation of the legend of Gyges the Lydian has also been mentioned by Simon (1973, p. 115). In another context (Simon, 1972/1973, p. 396; 1973, p. 98), he identifies Plato's association of homosexuality with harmonious mental functioning, the spiritual, the ideal, and the rational; and of heterosexuality with mental disharmony, the physical, the unreal, and the irrational. Simon's purpose does not lead him to consider either of these dialectical groups in Plato's thought in detail, nor does he investigate the relationship between them. Yet it is surely puzzling to find in a philosophical system of thought such a crucial and exalted role assigned to homosexuality in the life of the intellect. Simon's characterization of Plato's ideas in this respect is correct. But for that very reason one wonders why Simon was able to persuade himself that he had found so many basic similarities between Plato's and Freud's psychologies.

It can be pointed out, of course, that the interest in the logical relationship between psychoanalysis and philosophy that guides Simon's work is different from the one I have taken in this paper. Whereas Simon examines Plato's philosophy and Freud's psychology in search of the similarities between them, I have attempted to use psychoanalysis to illuminate certain features of Plato's philosophical thought. The difference can be simply stated: Simon's aim is comparative and mine is psy-

chogenetic. The one exception to this basic difference is Simon's (1972/1973, p. 403) agreement with Bradley (1967) that the myth of the origin of the sexes (put in the mouth of Aristophanes by Plato in the *Symposium*) represents a primal scene fantasy, an interpretation that Simon extends to Plato's description of the prisoners chained in the cave in his allegory of the cave (*Republic,* VII). However, Simon does not consider the implications of the influence of such unconscious fantasies on the formation of Plato's ideas concerning the nature of various aspects of reality.

Simon finds a number of similarities between Freud's and Plato's approaches to mental structure. These similarities, in his view, reside in the recognition of conflict and in the organization of the conflict into two mental agencies. These mental agencies can be called, for the sake of simplicity, instinct (Freud) = appetite (Plato), and ego (Freud) = reason or intellect (Plato). They vie with each other for dominance over internal psychic life and behavior. Simon goes on to compare appetite, as Plato understood it, with primary process and the unconscious in psychoanalytic theory; and intelligence, or reason, in Plato, with secondary process, consciousness, and ego functioning. Plato believed that the influence of the appetites could be, if not eradicated, at least nullified and rigorously suppressed by means of controlling the stimuli that activated them. More precisely, Plato wanted to believe this, despite intuitive glimpses that it was not so. This belief dominated his philosophical formulations. It was for this reason that he was able to recommend the radical suppression of all classical Greek literature in his *Republic.* Plato achieved remarkable, if sporadic, intuitive insights into the desires to be found deep within the human breast, but he was moved toward flight from rather than investigation into them.

In view of this, is Simon's belief that Platonism is an anticipation of psychoanalysis in error? This question, it seems to me, must be decided by what Plato was able to do with his insights. Plato used his insights to arouse a sense of moral anxiety con-

cerning the dangers of not adopting the rigid asceticism which he advocated. Sartre (1953) refers to a knowledge that is implicit in an act of flight from the self. Although Sartre's notion of the motivation of inner-flight or inner-evasion is itself distorted, in my opinion the phenomenon to which he points is a real one and is one that can be discerned in Plato's thought. Plato "knew," in Sartre's terminology, in order to take flight from what he knew. There is a subtle yet profound difference between knowing about the manifestations of unconscious desires in dreams in order to condemn them morally, as Plato did, and making them the object of curiosity while recognizing their threat to morality, as Freud did. Plato constructed a "moralized" psychology. Freud built a scientific psychology. My own impression is that there are too many incongruities between Plato's and Freud's conceptualizations of the mind to locate psychoanalysis in the Platonic tradition of thought. A full explication, however, would take us far beyond the main focus of this paper.

My criticism of Simon's conclusions concerning the relations between Freudian and Platonic thought leads me to a brief consideration of an issue raised by Kohut and Eissler concerning applied psychoanalysis. Kohut (1960) states that "ideally, the worker in applied analysis should be proficient in two fields" (p. 569). It is rare for psychoanalysts who are medically trained also to have achieved expertise in a field of the humanities or of the social sciences. The vitality of applied psychoanalysis must of practical necessity depend heavily upon the work of scholars and social scientists who have obtained training in psychoanalysis (see, Eissler, 1965). At the same time it could, in my opinion, be detrimental to the development of applied psychoanalysis if medical analysts were deterred from venturing into areas of applied analytic inquiry in which they are not themselves expert. There are numerous excellent works in the field by medically trained analysts. Also, partial insights, new perspectives, and limited or incomplete explanations are

useful—as Beres (1957) has pointed out—even when they require completion, modification, or extension by a scholar or scientist who is an expert in the applied field.

There is also a danger in applied psychoanalysis of a reductionistic claim that a group of philosophic ideas, for example, are *nothing but* the disguised products of unconscious fantasies. Kohut (1960) and Coltrera (1965, p. 655) have addressed themselves to this problem. Kohut points out that Freud's study of Leonardo da Vinci was "not primarily a contribution to the comprehension of Leonardo's personality and the vicissitudes of his creativity; it was a medium for the presentation of a particular form of homosexuality" (p. 572). Nevertheless, despite certain scholarly inadequacies in Freud's account, his study of Leonardo leads to useful ideas about certain vicissitudes of Leonardo's creativity, such as the conflict between his scientific and artistic interests and the psychological significance of the smile that hovers enigmatically over the countenances of several of his major portraits, both male and female.

Currently there is a tendency among some psychoanalysts (for instance, Coltrera, 1965; Giovacchini, 1960; Kohut, 1959, 1960; Wangh, 1957) to minimize the importance of an interest in the contributions of primary process thinking to the conscious determinants of cultural productions in favor of an ego psychological approach that stresses the autonomous, adaptive, and integrating functions of the ego and the contributions of narcissism to intellectual or artistic creativity. Coltrera (1965), for example, insists that modern cognitive theory has "demonstrated that not all motivated processes which produce deviations from standards of veridicality are ineffective from the standpoint of adaptation" (p. 670). And Kohut (1959) claims that "what we experience as freedom of action, as decision, and the like, is an expression of the fact that the I-experience and a core of activities emanating from it cannot at present be divided into further components by the introspective method. They are, therefore, beyond the law of motivation, i.e., beyond the law of psychic determination" (p. 482). Coltrera speaks of the "unique

narcissistic vicissitudes" of creative people and Kohut (1971, p. 220) postulates the occurrence of higher forms and transformations of narcissism, the products of which (cosmic narcissism, wisdom) are not proper objects of analytic scrutiny.

Scholars who are indifferent or hostile to psychoanalysis will find these amendments to classical psychoanalytic work in applied psychoanalysis congenial, just as many humanists have welcomed Jung's reformulation of the sexual theory. But at issue is a fundamental theoretical question: are certain functions of the mind, such as the intellectual activity of the philosopher and the creativity of the artist, independent of the laws of psychic determination? I am in agreement with Brenner's (1955) view concerning the fundamental place of psychic determination in mental life. Ego psychology and its use in applied psychoanalysis does not entail *per se* any abridgement of the principle of psychic determination. Arlow (1961), for example, has used ego psychology to differentiate two forms of a myth: one which represents an unconscious wish by means of the distortions (displacements, condensations, and symbolizations) peculiar to primary process itself, and one which represents the work of defenses (e.g., sublimation and identification) and the consequent changes in ego structure and functioning that are wrought by them. He links the two forms of the myth to different stages of psychological development, the first emanating from an instinctual conflict as it is organized in the oedipal stage and the second emanating from that same conflict as it is organized at the stage of its resolution during and after superego formation. (I have used this concept earlier as a useful aid in studying the psychogenesis of some of Plato's ideas.) In both forms of the myth, Arlow sees the ongoing effect of primary process functioning and unconscious, psychic determination. Hartmann (1966), also, has formulated a schema for studying the feeling of freedom within a deterministic frame of reference.

In my opinion, it is not reductionistic to trace the influence of unconscious processes, whether they be of the ego or the id,

in the conscious thinking and imagining of philosophers, poets, artists, or prophets. One must be careful to assign to the ego and its activities what properly belongs to it; but one can only enrich one's understanding and strengthen the basis of one's evaluations of philosophical ideas by bringing into perspective the personal meanings with which they are implicitly invested by the unconscious life of their creators.

In applied psychoanalysis, as Eissler (1965) has put it, one "is dealing with a petrified record. The material at his disposal is in its final form" (p. 165) so that interpretations cannot be validated through free association (see also, Kohut, 1960, pp. 570-571). Nevertheless, as Greenacre (1955) has stated, certain artistic works provide "material as usable for psychoanalytic investigation as the dreams and free associations of the patient" (p. 13). This statement holds true for Plato's dialogues, which are rich in revelations of the personality, beliefs, imagination, and emotional investments of their author. The methodological limitation does not make the acquisition of knowledge impossible, but only sets a limit to the degree of certainty that can be claimed.

Constructions in applied psychoanalysis are limited to the status of more or less probable hypotheses. Their degree of probability depends on the richness of the material available and the extent to which the theoretical concepts required to make the constructions can be clinically validated. There is, however, a logical procedure one can follow in assessing the probability of an intepretation. Having discovered some psychoanalytically significant material (e.g., a legend) we can formulate a construction of its possible meaning by bringing established knowledge to bear upon it. We then can test the construction in terms of what else we should expect to find in the works of the author should our construction be valid. To the extent to which our "predictions" are confirmed, we are able to claim probability for the correctness of our original construction. It is this procedure that has been utilized in the present study.

One last methodological issue needs to be considered. This

is the use of a freshly created or, as in the Gyges legend, a specifically adapted and altered imaginary account of an episode in the life of a historical or mythical person as material for a psychoanalytic construction of the unconscious dynamics at work in the life of its author. Freud (1907) drew attention to the relationship between dreaming and daydreaming and between daydreaming and artistic creativity in literature, noting the specific contributions of the ego to the psychic processes that form daydreams and contribute to the formation of literary works. The most elementary type of this formation occurs when an unconscious identification (or a conscious identification which is unconsciously determined) is formed with a figure in a story, something that probably is indispensable for the deepest aesthetic responses to literature. Children have a remarkable and often charming capacity to invent imaginative episodes through which they can form imaginary identifications to be enacted in play. In the analytic treatment of patients these formations frequently occur. For example, a patient fantasied that the owner of the company for which he worked was ruining his business through mismanagement and reluctantly, but desperately, awaited a le.ter from the patient which would provide a solution. The patient's rage at the folly and ingratitude of his employer for firing instead of promoting him upon receipt of the letter scarcely obscured the unconscious aggression that lay behind the fantasy.

Such formations (Kris [1956] called them personal legends or myths) offer useful avenues of access to unconscious activity in the minds of our patients, just as the fantasy-organized play of children reveals the stage-specific conflicts with which they are struggling. In the same way, identifications which provide psychological access to the world of literature and organize our emotional responses to its characters and events can reveal unconscious facets of our personalities. It is therefore reasonable to suppose that when a philosopher creates an imaginative, new adaptation of a historical account so as to make it useful for a philosophical argument, unconscious thought processes within him will be revealed.

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BOOK REVIEWS

MINUTES OF THE VIENNA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY. Volume III: 1910-1911, 367 pp.; Volume IV: 1912-1918, 357 pp. Edited by Herman Nunberg and Ernst Federn. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1974, 1975.

The history of psychoanalysis is the history of an idea. We are today close enough to the origins of psychoanalysis to be involved and biased in our judgments, yet far enough away to have some degree of objectivity about some basic questions. How far have we progressed from the early pioneers of psychoanalysis? Which questions have been answered and which remain unresolved? Which hypotheses and theories have been validated and which remain unproven?

Psychoanalysis is basically the study of unconscious mental function. Has the approach to this study changed over the years? Scientists, historians, and sociologists make observations, collect data. Their earliest formulations are speculations which they hope will lead to useful hypotheses and theories that can be validated by further observation and experimentation. This applies as well to psychoanalysts. Speculation is the beginning effort to codify and organize the accumulated data in order to make clinical application and further conceptualization possible.

The pioneers of psychoanalysis, through their speculations, gave vitality to their wealth of observations. But not all discerned the difference between speculation—*recognized* as such—and premature theorization—*defended* as such. Freud not only recognized this difference; he also emphasized it.[1] To what extent are psychoanalysts today also prone to premature theorization? Which unanswered questions raised by the early analysts are today still being met, not with an admission of our limitations, but by futile logomachy that fills the pages of psychoanalytic journals? Freud commented on the tendency to be dogmatic without adequate evidence in his discussion of a presentation by Sadger. He said then: "If one wishes to render definite what he [the author] has left indefinite,

[1] For Freud's comments on scientific methodology, see *Standard Edition, Volume XIV,* pp. 77, 117, 190 and Lecture XXXV in *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, Standard Edition, Volume XXII,* pp. 158-182.

it must be done by means of completely new material and not merely by way of concept formations" (III, p. 248). When Hitschmann proposed to write a brief compilation of Freud's theories, Freud recognized the value of such an undertaking. He was "not only ready to assist that person with his experiences and counseling, he would also give such a work his authorization." But he added: ". . . certain conditions would have to be observed. For instance, one would have to turn aside from the temptation to offer a closed system. . . . Also, one would have to draw explicit attention to the limits of our knowledge . . ." (II, p. 210).[2]

There are some early speculations that have since been validated and have become established components of current psychoanalytic concepts and practice. Even the contributions of the dissidents of the early years of the century have influenced later developments, a fact recognized and acknowledged by Freud.[3]

The Vienna Psychoanalytic Society was formally established in 1908. The meetings of the previous two years had been held at Freud's home as the "Psychological Wednesday Society." Paul Federn, whose son Ernst is one of the editors, guarded the *Minutes* left to him by Freud in 1938, thus making later publication possible. Until 1915, the *Minutes* were recorded by Otto Rank, whose dedicated effort is evident in their meticulous detail and in his uncensored reports of discussions, even when his own papers were severely criticized.

Only toward the end, especially during the years of World War I, do the reports become less detailed and sometimes missing. There are sections which are difficult to understand, to which the editors draw attention. Another difficulty is that many presentations are listed only by title, and the discussions which follow leave the reader without a frame of reference. To make up for this lack, the editors supply the bibliographical reference wherever such pres-

[2] The publication of the final two volumes of the *Minutes of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society* affords the opportunity to review not only the activities of the period covered in these volumes, 1910 to 1918, but also the years covered in the earlier volumes, 1906 to 1910. I shall take advantage of this opportunity although Volumes I and II have already been reviewed in this journal. For review of Volume I, see This QUARTERLY, XXXII, 1963, pp. 249-252; for review of Volume II, see XXXVIII, 1969, pp. 473-478.

[3] See, for example, Freud on Stekel's contribution to the significance of symbolism (*Standard Edition, Volume V*, p. 350).

entations were subsequently published. This affords an unusual and excellent source of bibliographical reference to early psychoanalytic publications.

The editing of the *Minutes* has been carried out with consummate care. The footnotes (obviously written by Herman Nunberg) are valuable in relating the significance of various discussions to current psychoanalytic thought. An Introduction by Nunberg, dated May 1959, appears in Volume I. Nunberg participated in some of the later meetings, and one gains from his Introduction a sense of the vitality, the enthusiasm, the mutual stimulation which characterized the free exchange of ideas and experience. He also indicates the limitations of some members, their resistances to the ideas developed by Freud, their ambitions, and their jealousies. Of Freud he says:

> He praised where praise was deserved, he disapproved where criticism was necessary . . . . There were, it is true, instances in which Freud was a very sharp critic, but on the whole he was mild and forbearing, patient and lenient. He tried to mediate in the conflicts of ideas and personalities. He was extremely tolerant of the convictions and ideas of others . . . . As long as it was not absolutely clear to him that the divergent ideas threatened his *basic* doctrines, he did not interfere and did not oppose them. Only when it was evident to him that the edifice of *his* analysis was threatened, he was inexorable (I, p. xxiv).

The reader who studies the *Minutes* will find these statements confirmed.

Most impressive is the freedom of discussion—the open criticisms which sometimes bordered on acrimony. In this regard Freud stands out for his moderation, his constructive comments, and his efforts to find what might be of value in the presentation of others.

Freud clearly dominated the meetings but not by exercising his authority. His early writings were available and undoubtedly familiar to the others, but he was often misunderstood and vigorously opposed. It must be remembered that only some of the participants had been analyzed, and even these members only minimally by today's standards. That resistance to psychoanalytic concepts is to be found in persons who call themselves psychoanalysts is as true today as it was in the time of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Freud was clear on this point; he did not question the right of others to disagree with him, but he did

question their claim to present their ideas as psychoanalytic. The controversy with Adler is an example of Freud's tolerance, his readiness to consider new ideas, and his firm insistence that the basis of psychoanalysis is a psychology of unconscious mental activity.

Freud acknowledged the value of Adler's emphasis on the role of aggression and of an "acutely observed ego psychology" (III, p. 148). But Freud "resented the fact that [Adler] talked about the same things as he did, but without . . . making any effort to establish any relationship between his new terms and the old ones" (III, p. 145). I would ask at this point whether this criticism is not applicable to some of the "new" approaches in current psychoanalytic theorization.

Freud insisted on the incompatibility of his ideas and Adler's, as indeed Adler did also, although other participants tried to deny this (III, pp. 178, ff.). When Freud found in Adler "surface psychology" and an "antisexual tendency," he said, "This is not psychoanalysis" (III, p. 146). He broke with Adler not because he disagreed with him, but because he found Adler's ideas a danger to the development of psychoanalysis. I have entered on this extended discussion of the Adler controversy to emphasize that Freud's position was based on his theoretical convictions, not on personal factors.

To list all the topics discussed in the *Minutes* would be to list most of the issues that fill the pages of current psychoanalytic journals and books. It is, of course, impossible to deal with all these topics in detail. Future studies, however, will find the *Minutes* invaluable in tracing the development of psychoanalytic concepts to the present, beyond what the study of Freud's writings allow us. What stands out clearly now is that psychoanalysis is not a closed system. The questioning—the doubts, the search for data and more adequate explanation—is as evident today as it was then. I have noted earlier that Freud warned Hitschmann, who was to write a compilation of Freud's theories, to avoid the temptation to offer psychoanalysis as a closed system. Why, then, is there the repeated criticism that "orthodox" Freudianism is a closed system resistant to change, intolerant of new ideas? Today, as in the past, we find that critics of psychoanalysis have not troubled to base their criticism on available facts.

Of the many topics in the *Minutes,* I have chosen several for more detailed consideration. These examples are chosen to illustrate the development of issues which today are of continued interest and are aspects of psychoanalysis that are frequently misunderstood. The topics are: 1, symbolism and fantasy; 2, creativity; and 3, psychoanalysis and social issues, the third including the role of women in society and in medicine.

In a footnote Nunberg comments that "Freud maintained that the problem of symbols is not a psychoanalytic problem. Psychoanalysis makes use of symbols for the interpretation of certain unconscious psychological processes" (I, p. 323, n.). This does not mean that Freud failed to recognize the importance of symbolism and fantasy in human psychic functioning from his very early writings to his last.

At an early meeting, Freud said: "After all, we did not invent symbolism; it is a universal age-old activity of the human imagination" (II, p. 50). In his discussion of Rank's *Myth of the Birth of the Hero* Freud offers a cogent critique as well as an extended commentary on the role of myths. In this passage are to be found precursors of a number of later publications by Freud, including *Moses and Monotheism* (II, pp. 68, ff.).

In the 1925 edition of *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud states that he recognized the presence of symbolism in dreams from the very beginning, but it was under the influence of Stekel that he "arrived at a full appreciation of its extent and significance." He supported a suggestion made by Stekel at the Nuremberg Congress in 1910 to carry out a joint investigation of the symbol (III, p. 250). Later Freud notes that "in general, one can say that fantasy plays a greater role than experience in the formation of neurosis . . ." (IV, p. 287). The significance of symbol and fantasy in dream and symptom is evident in numerous comments by Freud and others.

The controversy between organic etiology and purely psychogenic etiology of the neuroses raged in the early discussions. Although Freud continued to defend his theory of the toxic effects of masturbation (IV, p. 93), he also described masturbation as *"an executive of fantasy"* (IV, p. 94). Before this he had said that he is "more and more inclined toward the view that it is not masturbation that—as the patients assert—is the source of all these neurotic sufferings; the essential factor is what lies behind masturbation—

namely, the primitive masturbation-fantasies" (II, p. 229). To this, Nunberg says in a footnote: "I would like to call attention to this contribution to the discussion. It contains, in a nutshell, the whole problem of masturbation."

Interest in the psychology of creativity, so evident today, was also a frequent subject at the meetings of the Society. Artistic works as well as artists were subjected to analytic scrutiny, often with wild interpretations which Freud tried to temper. The relation of the creative act to the life of the artist was from the beginning a central issue. Freud consistently questioned the equation of artistic creation to pathology, a concept which nonetheless is to this day attributed to him. He rejected Stekel's view that all poets are hysterics and named Schiller as an example of the fact that "we find even healthy persons among the poets" (II, p. 103).

A hitherto unpublished paper, "Methodology of the Psychology of Poets" by Max Graf, a musicologist and a member of the Society, is translated in the *Minutes* (I, p. 259). In this paper Graf says: "The creative process of all artists discloses kindred features, and the ultimate goal of the analyses of artists, it seems to me, is finally to reach a 'theory of artistic creation'" (I, p. 264). He poses here a problem still to be solved.

In comparing Ibsen and Hauptmann, Freud makes the keen critical observation that "Ibsen with his self-containment, unity, and simplification of problems, along with his art of concentration and concealment is a great poet, whereas Hauptmann is the neurotic who portrays himself alone" (II, p. 194). In this distinction Freud has recognized one element that separates the great artist from the mediocre: the one speaks to all people, the other to himself.

Federn added in a later discussion that "neurosis is always an impediment to the artist, and it was a terrific creative gift that enabled the poet to produce his works, not his neurosis" (II, p. 222). Freud also said: "But we forget too easily that we have no right to place neurosis in the foreground, wherever a great accomplishment is involved" (II, p. 391).

The interest of these psychoanalytic pioneers was not only in mental illness, as these discussions indicate. Contrary to the widely-held view that Freud ignored adaptive capacities of the individual, we find him saying, "Some day one should investigate how infantile impressions influence great achievements, and not only how they

influence later illness" (I, p. 361). Art is not the product of neurosis; it is the expression of conflict which the artist shares with all human beings. It is clear that Freud knew this, although other participants at the meetings saw only pathology in the artist.

Criticism of Freud and psychoanalysis, now enjoying quite a vogue, often centers on the alleged neglect of social and cultural issues. It is refreshing to find in these *Minutes* how unwarranted this criticism is: from its earliest days psychoanalysis was concerned with both society and culture. As early as 1906 Stekel reported plans to form a "scientific-humanitarian committee for the purpose of fighting the 'homosexual' paragraph of the penal law" (I, p. 18). Later Freud commented on the sociological aspects of vagabondage: "The nonsensical treatment of these people in prisons (in so far as they are demented) is only a part of the general neglect of duty in the field of the care of the poor" (I, p. 108). He indicated the importance of studying the child's development of concepts of justice and causality (I, p. 150), subjects which Piaget later took up from a different point of view.

When Wittels took a strong antifeminist position by opposing the study of medicine by women, his position was attacked by Federn and Hitschmann (I, pp. 195, ff.). Freud said during the ensuing discussion: "Woman, whom culture has burdened with the heavier load (especially in propagation) ought to be judged with tolerance and forbearance in areas where she has lagged behind man" (I, p. 199). He said further that "the sexual problem cannot be settled without regard for the social problem" (I, p. 200). But he is also reported as saying that ". . . it is true that woman gains nothing by studying, and that on the whole woman's lot will not improve thereby." Freud himself would have questioned this last statement, as his regard for female psychoanalysts and their contributions makes evident. Adler notes in a later discussion that "women are only just beginning to lead their own independent lives, apart from their family, and to develop their characters" (I, p. 307). When Sadger opposed in principle the admission of women to the Society, both Freud and Adler disagreed. In the subsequent vote only three out of eleven votes supported Sadger.

In a later discussion Rosenstein raised the question "why it is only the lack of a penis that should come to be of account in the genesis of this feeling of inferiority [in women] and not all the other

social advantages that fall to the boy's share as well" (IV, p. 129). Freud's answer was that "the social factor simply does not exist, as far as the child is concerned; these factors come to be added later on" (IV, p. 130). I suggest that later developments do not support this position. Freud certainly recognized the role of social factors in the degradation of women and he was not unsympathetic to their problems. That his clinical studies related to the *effects* of the social factors does not make him antifeminist. Freud believed that the influence of sexuality in the process of human evolution was not sufficiently recognized and that economic factors were overrated "as far as their potential significance is concerned" (I, p. 351). This, however, does not mean a neglect of social and economic factors.

Adler's efforts to elucidate the psychology of Marxism (II, pp. 172, ff.) was met with interest, but Freud found no "evidence of our line of thought in Marx" (I, p. 175). He nevertheless encouraged Adler to continue his work on the topic.

Another application of psychoanalytic interest to a social problem was evident in the discussions on education, both in general terms and specifically in relation to sexual enlightenment. A paper by Furtmüller evoked an animated discussion (II, pp. 353, ff.). The emphasis on the child's development—the sexual elements, the need for love, the role of parent and teacher—foreshadows the more recent elaborations on this topic.

It is difficult to summarize the impact of these four volumes. There is some of the feeling of reading old diaries found in an attic. One discovers that one's ancestors were quite human. They had admirable qualities—dedication, loyalty to an idea, search for understanding, willingness to face adversity and deal with the contempt of others. They also had qualities not admirable—jealousy, excessive ambition, readiness for personal attacks, prejudice, misunderstandings.

The tendency toward unwarranted generalization is frequently evident. We hear Sadger say that "in certain races (Russian and Polish Jews) almost every man is hysterical" (II, p. 44). Even Freud, who repeatedly warned others of the danger of generalizations, states: "The secret of women's physiological imbecility [*sic*] lies in its being a result of sexual repression. If they have been forbidden to think about what is most precious to them, then

thinking in general has no value" (III, p. 249). Or, his remarks that "good cooks are always severely abnormal" (I, p. 46).

On the other side are the numerous comments, often stated in passing, that have since become basic concepts, both clinical and theoretical, in psychoanalysis. Many of these had, as we know, already appeared in Freud's publications, but the informal repetition and discussion give them added significance. Some examples:

FREUD (March 6, 1907) in discussing a case presented by Adler, notes that "the contents of the symptoms have the nature of a compromise" (I, p. 145).

FREUD (March 6, 1907): ". . . we do not really have true recollections from early childhood. All of them are constructed later. For this, the individual takes up his own childhood recollections and weaves into them the material gained from the observation of small children. Whenever we are dealing with a fantasy of infancy, we are always faced with the question at which time the fantasy was formed" (I, p. 143).

REITLER (April 24, 1907): "Anxiety is something decidedly psychic" (I, p. 177).

FREUD (April 24, 1907) offers a technical note "that when the patient does not want to talk, he leaves the material aside and first attempts to remove the resistances" (I, p. 180).

FREUD (November 6, 1907): "Which drives are to be classed as male and which female is a matter of agreement" (I, p. 236-237).

FREUD (October 21, 1908): "Indeed we are more and more inclined to believe that it is only one complex that causes man to become ill, and that this complex is always in the sphere: father-mother. Each and every neurosis can be traced to this complex" (II, p. 20).

FREUD (June 2, 1909) "himself conceives of the neuroses as substitutive formations for the repressed libido and explains their differences in terms of their different mechanisms of the repression and of the return of the repressed" (II, p. 268).

FREUD (November 17, 1909): "It is a question whether everybody has not shown a kind of elementary neurosis in childhood; whether the relationship is not a much more intimate one than we envisage—i.e., that not only the elements but even the patterns stem from childhood; whether the later neurosis is not merely an enlargement of something like a neurosis into a characteristic creation of later or middle childhood" (II, p. 322).

FREUD (October 30, 1912): ". . . there are cases [of women] in which no trace of penis envy can be found" and "as the result of the castration complex, there develops in the man almost regularly the wish to be a woman" (IV, p. 109, 110).

FREUD (April 23, 1913): "Narcissism is a normal phenomenon; it is only the

fixations and the excessive forms that are to be regarded as pathological" (IV, p. 192).

The final meeting of the Society was held on March 20, 1938, when, in the presence of a representative of the Nazi Party, Freud, as chairman of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, proposed to ask Dr. Müller-Braunschweig, as representative of the Berlin Psychoanalytic Society, to have the latter take over as trustee the rights, obligations and assets of the Vienna Society.

Psychoanalysis did not die with this surrender. The future of psychoanalysis does not depend on societies, institutes or associations. It depends on continued adherence to basic tenets of science—accumulation of data by observation or experimentation, theorization based on the data, and validation. Psychoanalysis is a member of the family of science. George Barton in *A History of Science* asks, "What is science?" and answers: "May we not say that whenever the attempt to solve a problem is made methodically according to a predetermined order or plan we are witnessing the very growth of science?" Surely this applies to psychoanalysis.

We can only follow Freud when he wrote to Charles Singer, the British historian of science, "I have spent my whole life standing up for what I have considered to be the scientific truth, even when it was uncomfortable and unpleasant for my fellow man."

DAVID BERES (NEW YORK)

THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD, VOLUME I. Introduction to Psychoanalysis. Lectures for Child Analysts and Teachers, 1922-1935. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1974. 200 pp.

Volume I, which covers papers from 1922-1935, is the last book published of the series, *The Writings of Anna Freud*. The contents are divided into three parts. The first part is titled "Four Lectures on Child Analysis"; the second, "Four Lectures on Psychoanalysis for Teachers and Parents"; and the third, "Early Papers," which includes three presentations. In addition, this volume contains an important Introduction which reviews the history of child psychoanalysis and Anna Freud's activities over many decades. Miss Freud explains that some of the material has been rewritten and some is presented in the original form.

Reading these papers again, one gains a historical perspective of child psychoanalysis—its beginning in Vienna, the analysts who participated in its early days, and the difficulties that were encountered in making child analysis acceptable, not to the outside world but to analysts themselves. This is a problem which has not yet been fully overcome. In addition, we read about the history of Anna Freud's personal work and the continuation of her activities after she had left Vienna for England.

There are many papers which apply psychoanalytic knowledge to the field of education, and each addresses itself to teachers and to parents. Anna Freud's experience as a teacher and as a psychoanalyst permits a creative interplay between these two fields.

In the group of papers on the relationship between pathology and normal development, we see the beginnings of the focus on the study of developmental processes, the beginning contribution to the psychoanalytic theory of development which later led to an increased interest in considering the developmental approach as one of the basic psychoanalytic dimensions.

A 1922 paper on the analysis of a fifteen-year-old girl with beating fantasies and daydreams, based on Freud's 1919 paper, "A Child is Being Beaten," explores this fantasy in relationship to elaborate daydreams. It further exemplifies one of the contributions of child analysis, in that these fantasies are studied as they were elaborated during successive stages of development.

The paper, "Preparation for Child Analysis" (1926), still serves as a springboard for the continuing discussion of this topic. In the Introduction, Anna Freud refers to the changes which have occurred since the time this paper was written. "What used to be effected by a prolonged introduction or preparatory phase to the treatment proper is now almost invariably brought about by the scrutiny and analysis of the patient's defensive mechanisms and maneuvers." Miss Freud refers then to the role of transference phenomena in child analysis. This paper has renewed significance because of the recent expanded use of analysis for a wider variety of disorders.

Volume One of this series should not only be read for historical reasons or for the continuous enjoyment of Anna Freud's lucid formulations and seminal analytic ideas and their application to education. These early papers also demonstrate the continuity which led to the monumental contributions of Anna Freud's work, to the

ever-increasing significance of psychoanalytic developmental theory, and to an appreciation of the consistency of findings. Thus these papers laid the groundwork for later exploration; at the same time they confirm the internal consistency of Anna Freud's work and, with it, the reliability of long-standing psychoanalytic investigation. This view of the development of Anna Freud's psychoanalytic contributions will give evidence of the application of her creative mind from the beginning on and will renew the reader's trust in the foundation of psychoanalytic work.

PETER B. NEUBAUER (NEW YORK)

EGO AND BODY EGO. Contributions to Their Psychoanalytic Psychology. Volume II, Psychoanalytic Series. By Robert Fliess, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1972. 390 pp.

SYMBOL, DREAM, AND PSYCHOSIS. Volume III, Psychoanalytic Series. By Robert Fliess, M.D. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1973. 435 pp.

In the *Psychoanalytic Series,* a trilogy[1] clearly intended as a *magnum opus,* Robert Fliess undertakes to present his "original findings made over more than three decades of fascinating experience" (Vol. III, p. 411). If Fliess found his analytic work fascinating, the reader will find his report of it equally so. Fascination, however, is a very incomplete description of one's reactions, since reading these books is really an exercise in affective polarities. This reviewer found that he moved back and forth between fascination and boredom, delight and vexation, enlightenment and confusion, and conviction and disbelief.

Because of the historical interest which the name Fliess holds for analysts, and because the author's personality so obviously shaped his work, it seems best to begin with a brief picture of Fliess the man.[2] Robert Fliess, of course, was the son of Wilhelm, the Berlin otolaryngologist who played such an important part in Freud's life.

[1] Although this review focuses upon Volumes II and III, much of it applies as well to Volume I.

[2] Much of what follows is gleaned from three sources: the biography of Fliess by his wife Eleanore (*Robert Fliess: the Making of a Psychoanalyst.* Croydon, England: Roffey and Clark Ltd., 1974); the first volume of Jones's biography of Freud; and the *Psychoanalytic Series* itself.

Wilhelm is described by Jones as a fascinating and brilliant man with an unrestrained fondness for dogmatic speculation. The family life was rigorous, dominated by a dynamic father

> . . . who however charming to patients and acquaintances was a tyrant at home. His children were second class citizens, from diet to schooling. The mother, intelligent and quite efficient, would appear to have been more impressed with her husband's off-beat (and quite unsubstantiable) physiologic theories than with her parental responsibilities (Eleanore Fliess, p. 10).

As might be expected, Robert's relationship with his father was evidently not a good one. In a somewhat cryptic footnote in Volume I of the *Series,* Fliess implies that his father was one of those psychotic parents who, as we shall see, play such an important role in these volumes: "In the first volume of his biography Jones gives a description of my father that enables the psychiatric reader to make his own diagnosis."

Like his father, Robert was unconventional, not only in his early medical work, in which he made extensive use of a therapy consisting of a species of "Swedish massage" combined with hydraulic gushes, but in the many unusual psychoanalytic propositions with which these volumes are peppered. Wilhelm was an otolaryngologist; Robert had a special interest in the lymphatics of the nose and throat. Even his father's fascination with numbers occasionally appears:

> On the strength of the last year's results I had no doubt about the immediate outcome [of the analysis of an adolescent girl]. I was merely afraid that when she became 23 years of age the organic process might worsen precipitately and wipe out what I had been able to achieve. I had observed long ago that this age (more accurately the period between 22 and three-quarters and 23 and one-half years of age) is a critical one for individuals of her type (Vol. III, p. 409).

Fliess's attitude toward Freud was undoubtedly shaped in part by his father's feelings. Wilhelm Fliess had met Freud in Vienna in 1887, but their friendship, as indicated by regular correspondence, did not begin until 1893, two years before Robert was born. "The really passionate relationship of dependence" (Jones, Vol. I, p. 287, n.) began in 1895, the year of Robert's birth, and extended until their clash in 1900, when Robert was almost five. Subsequently, Wilhelm maintained an overt animosity toward Freud which bordered on paranoia. In the *Psychoanalytic Series,* Robert's attitude

is manifested as a combination of conscious apotheosis and unconscious iconoclasm. Consciously, Fliess idealized Freud; statements about Freud's genius are to be found everywhere. The unconscious depreciation, however, is just as ubiquitous:

> In view of the early date of Freud's publication, when analysis as we know it did not as yet exist, I hope that one will not object to my objecting to practically all of his comments (Vol. II, p. 142).

> Freud was too great a man ever to be rash or apodictic; he never indulges in unwarranted generalizations; he is always tentative where the matter calls for withholding judgment, and he mitigates dogmatic statements with qualifying adverbs to the extent that it is difficult to contradict him head on. Nevertheless, his treatment of the female genital requires correction (Vol. II, p. 275).

Although Fliess's identification with his father determined only a small portion of his complex personality, I have presented it in some detail because it seems to be the source of many of the features of the *Series* which I found objectionable.

Turning now from the man to his writings, we find a trilogy which, though marred by serious flaws, makes for instructive and enjoyable reading. In order to encourage others to read these volumes, I wish to end with praise, but I must begin with criticism. Unfortunately, the *Series* inspires this all too readily. Fliess's sweeping generalizations, his dogmatism, and his claims for the universality of specific dynamics all provoke skepticism. At times this hardens into incredulity, a fact which is due, I think, to the mistaken impression Fliess creates by his almost arrogant freedom with psychiatric and psychoanalytic terminology. This is bad enough when Fliess generates a neologism, a penchant for which he freely admits. At least, when one encounters such terms as "demi-institutions" and "pleasure-physiologic body ego," one recognizes that something new is in the wind. What is really confounding is his use of common psychiatric terms to mean something quite idiosyncratic. Many of these special meanings become clear only toward the end of Volume III, but by then, we have stopped taking many of the ideas denoted by this terminology seriously. At least some disbelief can be obviated by defining the two most important of these terms: "delusional" and "psychotic."

Fliess uses "delusion" to mean any emotional conviction running counter to reality, whether or not the individual is intellectually

aware of the real situation. For example, a certain patient entertained the following "delusion":

> He was convinced that the analyst was an elderly homosexual and "kept a whole stable of younger men" who, posing as analysands, were actually his "slaves"; he being their "master." Sexually they did his bidding which, in particular, was a demand for fellatio (Vol. II, p. 96).

The patient knew that this was not actually so, but since "the cathexis of the reality is much weaker than that of the delusion and the patient is often ready to act upon the latter instead of on the former," Fliess called this a delusion. The patient objected vigorously to this designation, and most of us, thinking of the transference fantasies we have encountered, would agree with him.

If "delusion" does not mean what we expect it to, neither does "psychotic." This is a key part of one of Fliess's most persistent themes (the pathogenicity of psychotic parents) and it probably accounts for much of the incredulity which the books inspire. In view of the real contributions in the *Series* and Fliess's personal hurt as indicated in the postscript of Volume III, this is saddening, particularly since it could have been avoided if he had only clarified the way he uses "psychotic" or, better still, used some other term. In essence, those parents whom Fliess calls psychotic do not seem to me as impaired as the term commonly implies. This becomes clear as Fliess's criteria for pychosis gradually emerge:

> . . . if an adult sleeper wets or soils, he is, with negligible exceptions, psychotic. (Vol. III, p. 159).

> I recall a professor of psychiatry, student in analysis, whom I gradually recognized as a psychotic, although our contact was confined to supervisory sessions. When he once asked me for a pencil and then promptly put it into his mouth, I felt constrained to communicate my observations to the Chairman on Students of an Institute (Vol. III, p. 394).

And finally, he states with sincerity:

> . . . during the last few years of our life in New York, one could obtain as household help on a part-time basis only maids with short tenure from bonded service. They were, it would appear, without exception, overtly schizophrenic (Vol. III, p. 414).

Granted that all of these quotations are taken out of context, that Fliess is trying to call our attention to the ambulatory psychotic whom we often overlook, and that many of Fliess's patients were

severely disturbed, his picture of a world peopled by psychotics evokes an incredulity which fades only after one recognizes the special way in which he uses the word.

Fliess's more abstract metapsychological excursions in Volume II have been painstakingly condensed and criticized by other reviewers,[3] and I shall do no more here than give the reader a glimpse of the areas covered. Whenever possible, I use Fliess's words with no attempts at exegesis. According to Fliess, the ego is composed of two demi-institutions, the introject and the partial subject. The introject develops out of identifications with the group and is proximal to the superego. When studiable, it is the exponent of aggression more or less completely defused. The partial subject centers around an erogenic zone and is the subject of a particular set of instinctual strivings (oral-erotic, oral-sadistic, anal-sadistic, etc.). It is therefore that part of the ego close to and serving the id and is essentially the exponent of sexuality and/or aggression. Normally, the two are indistinguishable because of their smooth synergistic working together. In pathology they become recognizable in consequence of a split of the ego into its two constituent parts which oppose each other (as in depersonalization, e.g., "*I* do not feel *myself*"). Each of the demi-institutions may be projected. Certain ego functions, such as reality testing and the consummation of the (subjective) identity of a person, are better understood if one describes them as functions of the demi-institutions and their interaction instead of merely ascribing them to the ego. Both demi-institutions can contain an identification. Their development occurs in the second anal phase, at a time earlier than the establishment of the superego. Compulsion, conversion, and anxiety-hysteria are all better understood in terms of the demi-institutions, as are certain aspects of the psychology of the experience of time.

Another set of psychic phenomena are best conceptualized as composing the Pleasure-Physiologic Body Ego (PPBE). This is a preconscious psychic formation which consists, roughly speaking, of the totality of the mental representation of the erogenic zones. This, however, is subject to the following qualifications: 1, there is a constant libidinal cathexis and decathexis corresponding to a libidinization of elements of the body ego, which thereby become descrip-

[3] See reviews of Fleiss's *Ego and Body Ego* by Edward Glover and by Sylvan Keiser, Int. J. Psa., XLIV, 1963, pp. 238-245.

tively conscious or unconscious respectively; 2, since any part of the body can become an erogenic zone in consequence of its temporary sexualization, the number of elements of the PPBE is indefinite and varies from one moment to another; and 3, the mental representation of erogenic zones in the PPBE is inseparable from the representation of their function. Fliess describes the role of identification in the formation of the PPBE, the entry of elements into the PPBE, and the projectability of elements of the PPBE into the outer world. Two elements, the oral mouth and the female genital, are discussed in particular detail.

The above presentation, of course, is not fair to Fliess. It simply lists in the sparsest way the hypotheses that Fliess explicates and clinically illustrates at length, and any theoretical presentation can be made obscure if sufficiently condensed, particularly if the author has a bent for neologisms. Nevertheless, I believe that the obscurity of this condensation reflects the impression generated by a quick reading of Chapters 2 and 3 of Volume II, which contain the heart of Fliess's metapsychology. Assiduous study *did* make Fliess's theoretical ideas clear to me, even if such clarity all too often resulted in either disagreement or the recognition of friendly old ideas in outlandish new clothes. Even if the reader is not theoretically inclined, he or she should at least search about in these two chapters, as they are full of clinical and literary treasures.

In presenting his clinical material Fliess writes in a frank, unabashed, somewhat opinionated style that I find a delight. He is an outspoken man who knows how he feels about things and does not hesitate to tell us. His opinions, positive and negative, are strong: ". . . [a patient's] lover was presented as 'terribly intelligent'; I, by chance knew the man and considered him something of an ass" (Vol. III, p. 404). With his patients, he was very tactful. Others, however, (particularly difficult parents, their friends, and colleagues who miss the point) might well beware:

> The second dream, here only summarized, stems from the so-called reanalysis of a patient who had previously been with someone untouched by analytic knowledge (Vol. III, p. 176).

To his credit, Fliess is as hard on himself as on others:

> Upon being jilted, she talked of suicide, but she heeded my rather fatuous admonition that one did not kill oneself in "analysis" since one is bound by

> an agreement with the analyst to let oneself be helped and if possible to get well (Vol. III, p. 404).

In terms of their content, one of the most attractive features of these volumes is their richness of vocabulary, their literary allusions, their advice on technique, and their clinical examples. Almost every page contains vignettes, at times inserted almost casually, which not only enthrall but attest to Fliess's clinical virtuosity. In these, we get not just a glimpse, but a real feeling of Fliess's work. Clinical presentations are becoming increasingly scarce in our literature, and, with a few notable exceptions, the working analyst is a shadowy figure. The technical precepts that analysts advance often give only a vague idea of what they actually say and do. It is our good fortune that Fliess comes through loud and clear.

Fliess presents his ideas on technique in two ways. At times we are given specific counsel—technical prescriptions which Fliess found useful and which he wishes to communicate. These begin with the introduction to Volume II ("On Some Addenda to Psychoanalytic Technique"), in which he describes a number of typical resistances. While I must take issue with his statement that they have been "hitherto not described," Fliess always adds something new. The first typical resistance is projection, which exists side by side with the transference and is equal to it in importance. It is often difficult to decide whether the distortion of the representation of the analyst is transference or projection, since in both cases an important object from childhood is involved.

> The difference: in the case of transference, the analyst acquires the traits of the object directly; in the case of projection, the patient has acquired them as a child through identification and endows the analyst with that part of his neurotic ego that is the seat of the identification (Vol. II, p. 5).

Fliess is describing here a phenomenon which the Kleinians have discussed at length as "projective identification." He makes an important technical point, however, which is obscured by his idiosyncratic use of the word "delusion." In essence, he feels that distortions due to transference are illusions. The patient's picture of the analyst "is changeable according to what is transferred and corrigible through analytic work." In projection, "delusions" result. That is, the distortions are "rather unchangeable and often incorrigible or corrigible only through prolonged and enlightened effort." We are all familiar with the difficulties involved in changing some

of our patients' distortions of us. Fliess's claim that the transference-projection differentiation is an important factor in this difficulty is well worth further investigation.

Other resistances described are hypnotic evasion, ego splitting, reintrojection, and "the mother's injunction not to tell." The latter is particularly important when the patient has been sexually abused. In analysis it is frequently obeyed as an injunction "not to remember." As we shall see later, analyzing it is an important step in removing early amnesias.

Resistances on the part of the analyst are countertransference, counteridentification, and denial of the ambulatory psychosis in the patient's parent. The latter obviously touches a raw nerve. Fliess encountered great disagreement from his colleagues concerning the incidence of ambulatory psychosis, and he devotes several pages to substantiating its wide occurrence and pointing out the countertransference difficulties which he feels prevent most analysts from observing it.

In the last three chapters of Volume III, Fliess presents "Notes on Technique." He emphasizes that he is not giving a didactic presentation, but rather is describing those of his observations which are either original or need emphasis. The result is a smorgasbord of technical tidbits, some familiar, some unbelievable, but all worth sampling.

A typical example is his discussion of the analyst's insistence upon the rule of abstinence when necessary. By this, Fliess seems to mean not only abstinence from gratification of infantile wishes in the treatment session, but abstinence, invoked by the analyst, from any behavior which impedes the analysis. In one patient who used hypnotic evasion to remain unaware of her sexual fantasies on the subway to and from the analyst's office, he ". . . opposed the abstinence rule to her resistance, and she agreed to remain awake at all cost on her way home. The result: She became orgastic twice during one single ride" (p. 351).

Transference can become one of the main resistances, particularly when the patient symbolically re-enacts the "horrible perverse" experiences he or she suffered at the hands of his or her psychotic parent. The problem is made more difficult because:

> If the analyst has not so far repeated the mother's behavior, he will. . . . [He] actually "does" something to the patient that invites the transference

> upon him of the damaging mother: he offers the patient the opportunity to abuse the analytic situation for a repetition of the morbid passivity originally called for in the child by the mother in the course of her exploitations (Vol. III, p. 357).

How this differs from the opportunity that analysis offers to re-enact *any* transference constellation is not clear. In any case, this type of transference resistance is unavoidable, and all depends on the analyst's recognition of the abuse. I have already mentioned Fliess's feeling that analysts have many resistances to such recognition. Among the most important are the analyst's failure to believe in the reality of these experiences; his inability to suspend empathy (which, although it seems contrary to good analytic technique, is necessary, since our own intact psyche makes it so difficult to empathize with these severely ill patients); countertransference; counteridentification; and the hypnotic evasion of the analyst.

Chapter Six of Volume III is entitled "Toward the Technique of Amnesia Removal." Fliess's successes in this area are apparent throughout the *Series* and are often astounding. However, he quickly dispels our hope that he will reveal some special technical magic. At one point he stated to a colleague: " 'There is no special technique for such a removal; I don't do anything to achieve it' " (Vol. III, p. 366). He does, however, feel that two technical abilities, free-floating attention and the distinction of memory from fantasy, are particularly important, and he discusses both of them, the latter at some length.

Chapter One of Volume III ("On the Symbol") begins with an extensive discussion and elaboration of Freud's work on symbols. It is one of the best I have come across. It is followed by a description of particular symbols which quicken the imagination, even if some seem farfetched. For instance, I had never noticed the color blue as a symbol of things anal, nor have I been able to recognize it during the six months since I read Fliess's description. My interest remains, however; I shall keep looking. Chapter Two in Volume III ("On the Dream") begins with a rather unsatisfactory theory of dream hallucination, but continues more clinically with an informative discussion of the spoken words in the dream, typical dreams, the topographical analysis of the dream, and delusions in dreams. The *Series* contains no specific section on fantasy, but all three volumes are

replete with useful descriptions of a wide variety of fantasies and Fliess's approach to interpreting them.

The many illustrations of Fliess in action are as stimulating as the overtly stated technical precepts. One finds (as I am sure is the case with most good analysts) that he does a great deal more than simply interpret. Interpretations, of course, are the core of his activity, but he shrinks from nothing that will enhance the analytic process. Intensely interested in details, he questions extensively. When he deems it necessary, he advises, persuades, even condemns. Above all, within the bounds of his analytic intent, he is himself. When this leads to unfavorable consequences, he accepts it and proceeds with the analysis:

> I wish I could juxtapose verbatim the words of the patient who snared me once by asking, "What do you think my mother did after having masturbated on the rocking chair?" I promptly fell into the trap: "Well, I guess she got up, put her dress down, and went about her business." From memory I can only paraphrase the patient's response, which amounted to telling me in no uncertain terms and without a trace of politeness that I was an unmitigated ass. Her amnesia for what had actually happened had meanwhile, without my knowing it, been removed. The mother, instead of doing what I had "innocently" surmised, had actually put the child on the chair and masturbated her. The patient vividly recalled their delight (Vol. III, p. 362).

For Fliess, anything that leads to the understanding and overcoming of resistance, the development of a transference neurosis, and its final resolution is good analytic technique. The *Psychoanalytic Series* is a summary of one man's lifetime of psychoanalytic experience. It is sometimes obscure and frequently controversial, but always interesting. I recommend it.

SYDNEY E. PULVER (PHILADELPHIA)

KINDER BEIM ANALYTIKER. ERZIEHUNGSPROBLEME UND THERAPIE (Children at the Analyst's. Problems of Rearing and Therapy). By Jacques Berna. Munich: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1973. 223 pp.

Jacques Berna's book is divided into two parts, one titled "Early Techniques," and the other, "Ego Psychology." The two sections could be said to correspond to "before" and "after" Berna's "conversion." He characterizes the change in his approach as follows:

> At the beginning of my child analytic activity I used to play and act with the child, often acting the role of the clown, the clumsy adult who founders on the malice of the object. This attitude of mine has been almost fundamentally changed. I do not need to interfere actively in the play any more but can instead follow the fantasies of the child with the free floating attention of the analyst. I can watch the child's play and behavior, can concentrate upon the verbal communication and connect the analytic material, i.e., prepare the work of interpretation. The production of the child is not influenced by my role any more, the transference reactions are less disturbed than previously when I was the partner in a magic, extraverbal fantasy world (p. 169).

Ruefully Berna says at one point, "Today we have lost much of the verve and confidence with which the pioneers did analysis" (p. 125).

Part I of the book, describing the techniques Berna used before becoming acquainted with ego and defense analysis, is amusing, interesting, and written in a sort of combative tone. He debates Anna Freud, at times in a somewhat quixotic way. However, this section is original and imaginative; it is obvious that working with children was as amusing for the author as it is for us to read about it,

All that is gone in the second section. Berna has become a good, obedient follower, an ardent student of Anna Freud, Erna Furman, and Anny Katan; he does all the right things and has the satisfaction of doing just that. But one is inclined to say in the manner of a friend, "You are well analyzed now, Berna, but pity! you lost your charm! Also, you were not as bad as you think. You did some good work and you and the children had fun doing it. It's no sin to have fun, and you don't need to repent." It is reassuring to find that despite Berna's "professing to adhere to a passive attitude and sitting position" (p. 179), he allows that "it is a personal matter whether the way toward exploring the underlying motives of the child should be an active or a passive one." He thinks that "there may be a risk in too much or too little, and which risk to take has to be individually decided. The recommendation that the analyst should remain immobile is taken over from the technique of adult analysis. It seems that it does not always do justice to the child's modes of expression and attitudes and puts the verbal activity into the foreground" (p. 179).

The risks of too much or too little are noticeable throughout the book. While Berna in Part I rejects everything Anna Freud said, he accepts everything she and her students say in the second part. Of

course he made mistakes in his early work with children when he was, as he describes, largely self-taught. However, what we are doing in the era of ego analysis is also not foolproof. It would have been interesting if Berna had elaborated on the cases where he felt he had to change his newly acquired method, whether this was because of his personal preference or the type of patient involved.

An amalgamation of Berna's own personal approach and what he learned from others probably contains some of the creative spirit which is so provocative and refreshing in the first part of his book, but which he rejects in the second part. Yet perhaps he does not reject it as much as he says; after all, it is half the book!

EDITH BUXBAUM (SEATTLE, WASH.)

SEXUAL IDENTITY CONFLICTS IN CHILDREN AND ADULTS. By Richard Green, M.D. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974. 327 pp.

Given our present appropriate preoccupation with the phenomena of identification and identities, this book, which probes the formation of gender identity through a detailed investigation of adult transsexuals, is particularly timely. The phenomenon of transsexualism is especially fascinating to analysts in its apparent contradiction of analytic ideas about development. In Stoller's studies, for instance, male to female transsexuals seem to be reflecting an identity source more influenced by imprinting than by conflict solution, sublimation, oedipal precipitates, or more mature loving identifications.

While Green's book is not primarily a psychoanalytic study, it nevertheless makes a worthy contribution to the study of the early origins of identity formation: the exploration of sexual identity as an entity is particularly useful, since its phenomena provide a relatively easy means of investigating the processes of internalization.

Starting with a historical and cross-cultural survey, Green delineates the psychological theories and the recent biological studies which throw light on transsexuals. In addition to investigating the men themselves at some length, the study follows boy friends and husbands of male-to-female transsexuals. Similar work was done with women who wish to become men.

Verbatim interviews occupy at least half of the book. These are bolstered by information that could shed light on developmental factors gleaned from significant involved persons, documents, and

early home films. From the protocols there emerges a fairly consistent picture of the childhoods of the transsexual people studied.

In order to compare his reconstructions with direct childhood data, Green has studied another group comprised of young boys and girls whose histories appear to approximate closely those given by the adult transsexuals. Unfortunately, this assumption of concordance adds a note of experimental uncertainty to his conclusions.

Treatment, which Green perforce undertakes with the feeling that the entity is not yet well elucidated, has something of the character of behavior modification and directive psychotherapy, although he is aware that there are compelling unconscious forces in child and parent that contribute to cross-gender identification. These include parental efforts to sabotage what is seemingly in the best interests of their cross-gender-identifying child.

The work is a worthwhile study for analysts interested in glimpsing a world that so few have an opportunity to investigate firsthand, and it supplies necessary background for attempts to further our theoretical understanding of identity formation.

ROBERT ZAITLIN (LOS ANGELES)

MASKED DEPRESSION. Edited by Stanley Lesse, M.D. New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1974. 369 pp.

This is a compilation of articles on the ubiquitious problem of the recognition, diagnosis, and treatment of the clinical symptom complex we define as depressive reaction. However, Lesse and his associates are concerned with the development of a greater awareness of those covert expressions of this symptom complex which he calls "masked depression." Lesse notes that the average clinician may be aware of those combinations of subjective symptoms and objective observations that, taken together, substantiate a diagnosis of depression. Some may also be aware, according to Lesse, that many cases of actual depression are veiled by physical complaints or behavioral problems. However, Lesse makes the point that this collection of clinical papers goes far beyond the usual description of psychosomatic disorders and hypochondria that mask depression. He notes that the clinical papers presented here show that depression may also be disguised by forms of acting out such as explosive sexual behavior, compulsive gambling, active homosexuality, temper out-

bursts, sadistic or masochistic behavior, antisocial acts, delinquency, accident proneness, and histrionics. He also includes other behavioral substitutes for frank depressive affects, such as alcoholism, narcotics addiction, barbiturate habituation, and the use of psychedelics and stimulants. In addition, Lesse points out that depressive reactions obscured by such behavioral masks may vary according to age, sex, ethnic or cultural background, socioeconomic milieu, and iatrogenic overlay, as well as the type and intensity of treatment.

The concept of masked depression may be defined in two different ways that must be carefully distinguished. In some cases, masked depression means that signs of depression, although present, may be overlooked either because they are not specifically evaluated as such, or some other phenomenon has taken precedence. Such a concept is useful because it permits the hypothesis that depression exists where it was not at first seen and encourages the search for objective evidence to substantiate it. In other situations the construct of "depressive equivalent" has been formulated to indicate that even though none of the objective signs of depression are present, a particular affect or action is in some way the same as depression. Here evidence is required to support the claim that the "equivalent" is the same as depression.

The book has a varied group of contributors. They differ in professional training, development, and clinical research activities, as well as in their conceptualizations of personality development and functioning. The book is divided into three parts. Part I consists of eight articles about such "depressive equivalents" as hypochrondriasis and psychosomatic disorders, anger, acting out cultural variations, apparent depressive remissions, and the relationship of such masked depression to work, pleasure, and sexuality. The articles in this section are mostly of good quality and are generally carefully detailed clinical descriptions which are informative and useful to the psychiatrist.

Part II contains a series of articles on masked depression or depressive equivalents in children and adolescents. All are interesting, enjoyable, and informative. One example is J. Toolan's article entitled "Masked Depression in Children and Adolescents." Toolan notes that only recently has the subject of depression in youngsters been discussed at all. He notes that A. Beck in an exhaustive monograph on depression does not refer to depression in children and adults, while G. Klerman, in a recent review of clinical research on

depression, does not cite a single paper on the topic. H. Rie in a review of the literature on depression in children concludes that prior to the end of latency, children are incapable of the primary affect characterizing depression, namely despair or hopelessness. Toolan, however, emphasizes that even though the clinical picture of depression as we know it in adults is rarely encountered before mid-adolescence, it is seen disguised and masked by various depressive equivalents. He quotes Sandler and Joffe to conclude that the infant who suffers physical or psychological deprivation before object representations have been adequately structured may show a depressive response to the loss of psychophysical well-being. Toolan concludes that one can understand the vicissitudes of depressive reactions at various ages if one accepts the thesis that depression is a reaction to loss, either of an object or a state of well-being, with a feeling of diminished self-esteem and hopelessness. Although he does not mention it, current thinking in child psychoanalysis tends to focus on the problems of the establishment of object constancy—on the vulnerability to such a dynamic disturbance in any child who has not established object constancy and the psychological correlates attendant upon this.

There is a particularly good article in this section by J. Masterson, entitled "Masked Depression: The Essence of the Borderline Syndrome in Adolescents." Masterson reviews psychoanalytic concepts of symbiosis and the role of separation-individuation in the development of abandonment depression. He notes the difficulties that develop between the ages of eighteen months and three years when the developmental push for individuation and autonomy is met by the withdrawal of the mother's emotional support which this growth requires. Feelings of depression, rage, fear, passivity, helplessness, and emptiness are handled by the defense mechanisms of ego and object splitting and denial. The splitting and denial are further reinforced by other defense mechanisms such as acting out, reaction formation, obsessive-compulsive mechanisms, projection, isolation, and withdrawal of affect. Masterson then notes that these defenses block full development through the stages of separation-individuation to autonomy. Such a developmental arrest produces severe defects in ego functioning with a persistence of the splitting defenses, a failure to achieve object constancy, and the development of a negative self-image.

Part III consists of six articles in which the association of masked

depression with such conditions as accidents, atypical facial pain, alcoholism, psychedelic drugs and opiate addiction is explored, along with one article by Lesse on the treatment of masked depression by psychotherapy in combination with antidepressant drugs. The conclusions concerning the relationship of depression with these various entities are not necessarily uniform. In "Accidents as Depressive Equivalents," N. Tabachnick and N. Farberow conclude that there are important correlative links between depression and accidents, but that there is little indication that depression is a general factor in many or most accidents. On the other hand, Lesse concludes that the vast majority of instances of atypical facial pain syndromes are of psychogenic origin and are classic examples of masked depression. In another article in this section, M. Hayman concludes that to the extent that depression is associated with alcoholism, it is likely to be unconscious until the breakdown of denial which is the main defense mechanism of the alcoholic. Finally in the article, "Opioid Addiction as a Masked Depression," H. Wishnie concludes that depression is a primary issue in narcotics addiction, but what is of greater significance is the fact that the depression may be useful in therapy and rehabilitation.

In summary, psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, social workers, and mental health specialists will find *Masked Depression* a worthwhile compendium of the symptomatic and clinical manifestations of masked, atypical depressions or depressive equivalents in both children and adults. Although the articles are somewhat uneven in quality, they are generally of a reasonably high order, and their dynamic and theoretical content justifies a careful reading.

STEVEN HAMMERMAN (PHILADELPHIA)

PERSONALITY DEVELOPMENT AND DEVIATION. A TEXTBOOK FOR SOCIAL WORKERS. Edited by George H. Wiedeman, M.D. and Sumner Matison, M.A. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1975. 523 pp.

This introductory textbook for social workers and those in allied professions grew out of the psychiatric curriculum at the Columbia University School of Social Work: Wiedeman, who is the Chairman of the Columbia program, felt the need to have in one volume a

coherent presentation of the theoretical and practical issues which confront those engaged in the field of social work. The contributors, most of whom have participated in the program, are well known. While interested in theoretical issues, they have also had extensive clinical experience.

The thesis of the book is that despite other attempts to understand human behavior, the Freudian perspective is the most valuable and fruitful. The frame of reference of all the contributors is established in the first three chapters by the editor's outline of the main points of psychoanalytic theory. The chapters that follow can be divided into several groups. A series of chapters deals with normal and pathological development from infancy to senescence. There is a group which discusses symptom formation and one concerned with personality disorders, including drug addiction, sexual deviation, psychosomatic difficulties, and problems of the borderline patient. Psychoses of children and adults are discussed as are learning disorders, mental retardation, psychological testing, and community psychiatry.

Although the orientation is psychoanalytic, the emphasis on the intrapsychic is supplemented by the inclusion of other pertinent matters. The effects of constitutional endowment, neurological deficit and dysfunction, and social factors on personality development and behavior are appropriately considered. A variety of treatment approaches is suggested and the importance of interdisciplinary cooperation is stressed.

This volume accomplishes its task of presenting a comprehensive view of the understanding and evaluation of behavior. It will be of value to persons who work with individuals, groups, and communities. It is a welcome contribution, especially at this time when there is a tendency to dispense with consideration of fundamental issues in favor of action which may promise results but often falters because basic factors are overlooked. Inevitably, in a book that covers as much ground as this one does, the discussion of some issues is superficial and controversies are bypassed. However, as the editor states, this book is an introduction. For those seeking a more thorough understanding of the subjects with which it deals, there is a useful bibliography.

REBECCA Z. SOLOMON (HARTFORD, CONN.)

MORAL EDUCATION. A STUDY IN THE THEORY AND APPLICATION OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATION. By Emile Durkheim. New York: The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1961, 1973. 288 pp.

This series of lectures was first published in 1925. Its recent reappearance in a new translation reflects the increasing interest in the French moral philosopher, Emile Durkheim.

Durkheim was born two years after Freud, but had a shorter life span, dying in 1917. Initially a Rabbinical scholar, he early turned his philosophical talents to supporting the goals of the collective good against the trend toward individualism which swept Europe in the nineteenth century. Durkheim carried his thesis to extremes, proposing that society could mold the individual (and therefore society itself) in any way it chose. Society should foster the "morality" of the collective good, and science should be the one true guide to moral development. There is something either optimistic or ominous here, according to one's view of the corruptibility of human nature. At any rate, it is probably the extremism and the oversimplification (which give rise to hope or alarm, as the case may be) which have generated numerous book length commentaries on Durkheim in the past twenty years.

Freud read Durkheim, and in *Totem and Taboo,* he credited him with independently noting the relationship between totemism and the prevention of incest. But there is no indication that Durkheim ever read Freud, or indeed that he was aware of his existence. In consequence, the individuals about whom he writes appear as robots, devoid of any instinctual pressures which cannot be controlled by education, exhortation, or by threatening their exclusion from the group. Durkheim not only believed that individuals are completely controllable by social devices, but that their reactions throughout life can be fully explained in terms of their response to the society surrounding them. In his 1897 monograph on suicide, he used statistics from various nations to "explain" self-destruction exclusively in terms of the relation between the individual and the demands of his culture.

Durkheim is of interest to psychoanalysts in that he is an example—perhaps an extreme one—of those social scientists who ignore the whole range of psychoanalytic thought. Such men invariably come to an upside-down position. They assume that culture makes

the psyche, and they fail to note the fact that there are instinctual forces which transcend culture.

Instincts and their vissicitudes are not born of culture. They use culture as means of expression, discharge, and defense. In the process, culture is generated and evolves. The basic instinctual forces go on timelessly; culture only affords variety to their expression. Culture is not only the controller of instinct (to use Durkheim's term) or the repressor of instinct (to use Freud's term), but is always the result of compromise between the expression and control of instinctual forces. Culture is the symptom formation of groups.

ALAN W. FRASER (NEW CANAAN, CONN.)

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Emmett Wilson

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ABSTRACTS

Revue Française de Psychanalyse. XXXVIII, 1974.

Novel-Psychoanalysis. Catherine B. Clément and Bernard Pingaud. Pp. 5-24.

Bernard Pingaud, author of the novel, *La voix de son maître* (*His Master's Voice*), and Catherine B. Clément discuss the problem of the analytic novel. Their purpose is to determine whether there is such a genre and what its characteristics might be. They consider the claim that psychoanalytic writing is replacing the classical novel, even though analysts may not as yet be aware of their functioning as writers. The analyst utilizes the experiences of others, while the novelist utilizes his own experience, but the unconscious speaks in both instances. The unconscious fantasies of patients, which are unavailable to the patients by themselves, become evident as the analyst listens and writes about them in his case reports. Perhaps it is the psychoanalyst now, rather than the novelist, who sounds out the depths of the human heart. In an essay heavily influenced by structuralist themes, Clément emphasizes that the analyst has now assumed a function which was in times past delegated to other practitioners, such as the shaman, the sorcerer and the madman. Pingaud stresses the parallel development of the novel and psychoanalysis in cultural history, suggesting that analysis would not have been possible in a society which had not developed the novel with its own particular view of psychological reality.

The Double and the Devil. The Uncanniness of The Sandman. Sarah Kofman. Pp. 25-56.

Kofman discusses the novel by E. T. A. Hoffman, *The Sandman*. She takes issue with Freud's analysis (in his essay, "The 'Uncanny' ") of the origins of the effect of strangeness in the novel. Although she believes Freud correctly criticized traditional aesthetics for its neglect of the uncanny, she feels that his emphasis on the themes of castration and the return of the repressed in this novel does not fully explain its uncanny effect. His thematic reading erroneously economizes the complex structure of the novel.

In reviewing the structure of the novel, Kofman develops the theme of the imaginary and the real and the theme of the animate versus the inanimate, the latter a theme which Freud had dismissed. Emphasizing the use of doublings in the novel, she notes the ambiguity and uncertainty about these doubles. In contrast to Freud, who believed that the loss of vision was a symbolic castration, Kofman understands the theme of vision to be symbolic of a creation by mimicry, rather than real procreation. The hero of the novel is a victim of illusions, who preferred an inanimate double of life (the doll Olympia) to life itself. The hero preferred artistic creation to life—creation by way of the eyes and illusion, rather than by genital procreation. Loss of vision for the hero would have been symbolic not of castration but of the recovery of sexuality and of real life. The author marshalls much evidence for her interpretation of *The Sandman* and attempts to show how these elements contribute to the novel's uncanny character.

From Writing to Inscription, or the Scribe of the Unconscious. Jean Cournut. Pp. 57-73.

In the field of psychoanalysis, which involves a relationship based on verbalization and silence, why do so many analysts as well as patients turn to writing? Even Freud, a prolific writer, criticized writing. Cournut investigates concepts about the function of writing from Egyptian mythology and from Plato. Plato distinguished between *hypomnesis* and *mneme*—between writing which serves to weaken and corrupt memory and to diminish the access to truth, and writing which serves truth. An example of the detrimental use of writing in analysis would be a patient's written record of a dream which hampers free association and access to the unconscious. In contrast, there is authentic or scientific writing which aids in the search for truth. The negative attitude toward writing, evident in both Plato and Freud, developed because of its potential for subverting truth and simulating memory. On the other hand, writing can be used for the expression of scientific laws and for interpreting universal myths. These two seemingly contradictory functions of writing in psychoanalysis are explored.

The Voice: Between Body and Language. Guy Rosolato. Pp. 75-94.

The fantastic and artificial character of operatic works is an essential outgrowth of vocal music because of the nature of the voice itself. Unconscious fantasies connected with the voice and with song are examined by Rosolato. He relates these fantasies to the early development of object relations and body image, to attitudes toward the magical and mysterious, and attempts to show the distortions of developmental processes which occur, for example, in auditory hallucinations. The experience of the voice in song evokes dynamic experiences of the body, experiences which have their roots in early infancy. The voice may be considered as an emanation from the body and as a manifestation of excitation. Rosolato discusses the voice as an instinctual derivative, as part object. Further attention is given to the voice as a preparatory vehicle for introjection and identification. The author reviews the various relationships and permutations of artistic production ranging from the visual to the musical and to song. He suggests that in vocal music there is an element which runs counter to the use of language for communication. It is this more primitive element which provides the source of pleasure in vocal music. A structural topology of the voice is attempted by the author, detailing its somatic characteristics, the communication system involved, and the object-relational aspects.

Metropolis. Mother-City—Mediator—Hitler. Roger Dadoun. Pp. 101-130.

Dadoun considers Fritz Lang's film, *Metropolis* (1926), and its relation to the values and concepts of National Socialism. The purpose of his article is to illustrate the necessity and pertinence of psychoanalytic concepts for the study of the film. Lang's film is a futuristic tale of the city, Metropolis, where the masters live in skyscrapers, with workers in the lower depths of the city enslaved to the rigors of mechanical productivity upon which the city depends. One of the psychological themes of the film is splitting, as illustrated both in the division of the city into upper and lower and in the division of the heroine, Maria,

into a true or good mother and a false robot imitation, the bad mother. Dadoun also reviews various oedipal themes occurring in the film.

Hitler admired this film greatly, apparently because of his national socialist view of national and cultural harmony going beyond class distinctions. Dadoun, however, dismisses this as a reason for Hitler's admiration of the film. The ideological allusions and references of the movie are insufficient to give it the privileged historical and political position it holds. This position is due instead to the unconscious material in the film, to its richness of instinctual cathexes and to its fantasy material. The author suggests that a new sort of anthropological discipline is needed for such a socio-politico-psychoanalytic study. However, he attempts to correlate certain themes in the movie with psychoanalytic data from Walter Langer's work, *The Mind of Adolph Hitler* (New York: Basic Books, 1972). Dadoun also finds certain similarities between Lang, the film's director, and Hitler in their backgrounds and early development.

A Literature without Writer or Texts. Christian David. Pp. 131-135.

David comments elegantly on the resistance and counterresistance involved in the impulse to capture the events of an analysis in some written or recorded fashion. Given the uniqueness of the analytic process, he feels it is not possible to experience the same session twice by means of some recording process. Hence the most mechanical of analysts is forced into the role of a poet. The impulse to record is felt by both analyst and patient, and yet such recording ignores the creative effort of verbalizing the train of conscious associations. The analytic dialogue cannot be transcribed. The creative effect of the analytic process comes from the double psychical participation via the spoken (not the written) word. The spoken word is the instrument of the slow metamorphosis which takes place in analysis.

The Wound and the Knife. The Ambiguous Writing of Jean Genet. Serge Viderman. Pp. 137-151.

Viderman reviews some themes relating to narcissim, aggression and the death instinct, and the development of object relations, as these are reflected in the writings of Jean Genet. Though at times Viderman is insightful, these themes need greater development than provided in the confines of this brief article, and should perhaps be dealt with in a longer work.

EMMETT WILSON, JR.

Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences. XI, 1975.

The following abstracts appeared in the Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences and are published with the permission of the journal.

The Hero as Madman. L. D. Hankoff. Pp. 315-333.

Episodes of malingering [involving] mental illness are ascribed to five individuals in history before 500 B.C.—Odysseus, David, Solon, Kai Khosrau, and Brutus. The five ancient accounts follow a general pattern. All five heroes early in their careers, before achieving anything like their ultimate renown, were confronted by life threatening situations, and [feigned] mental disorder to escape

the death threat. Following the incident all five went on to extraordinary careers, in no way deterred by their past aberrant public behavior. The [feigning] of mental disorder stands as a nodal point in their careers, presaging brilliant accomplishments and functioning as a self-renewal, perhaps symbolizing the hero's rebirth.

Scientists and Sectarians: The Case of Psychoanalysis. George Weisz. Pp. 350-364.

The early pioneers of psychoanalysis often behaved more like followers of a religious sect than like scientists. The author attempts to view sectarian tendencies as a behavioral pattern that tends to emerge among scientists under certain types of conditions. First, the early psychoanalytic movement is used to isolate the specific factors that encourage scientific groups' sectarian tendencies. Then, the history of the movement is analyzed in terms of the effect of these tendencies. The author argues that certain unique features and events in the history of the movement resulted from the interaction and conflict between sectarian characteristics, the norms of science and the institutional imperatives of scientific life.

Anticipations of Dream Psychology in the Talmud. Moshe Halevi Spero. Pp. 374-380.

Various statements throughout the Babylonian and Palestinian Talmuds with reference to dreams, their nature, validity, and analysis are explicated in terms of modern understandings and theories of dream psychology. Contrary to the more unsystematic categorizations of some earlier writers on the topic, the data, when carefully analyzed, imply a highly advanced conception of dreamwork. Such notions as wish-fulfillment, distortions, repression of threatening material and some salient features of commonly accepted dream-analysis theory are found to be anticipated by the rabbis of the Talmud. The Talmud is also shown to have a more eclectic view of the reality of dreams as opposed to older, more mythologized and spiritual views.

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Meeting of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Leon Balter

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NOTES

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 13, 1976. ON THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF AGING ON THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. K. R. Eissler, M.D.

The author discussed the psychological effects of growing old upon the psychoanalyst and his working relations with his patients.

Aging produces an accretion of narcissism. If it concentrates within the superego or ego-ideal, the analyst becomes more rigid, compulsive, and intolerant in his practice (and subject to involutional depression). If the narcissistic accretion concentrates in the analyst's ego, he will expect the patient's admiration, awe, and respect. Obviously, both attitudes will interfere with the patient's analytic work and the analyzability of his transference. If, however, the narcissistic accretion is evenly distributed over the personality (and aided by diminution of id pressure and thus, of conflict), superego and ego will be more harmonious. This will allow the analyst greater toleration of the patient's illness, reduce therapeutic ambition, and produce greater acceptance of the patient's humanity.

Aging decreases a tendency toward activity and increases desire for knowledge and insight. This brings about a more proper analytic stance toward the patient's resistances—particularly when successful analysis reaches a deep paranoid level in the patient. As aging produces increased recall of childhood, the aging analyst may have more empathy for the childhood of the patient as it returns in the analysis.

With aging, death becomes a problem of life. If the analyst has integrated death as a necessity, he will be able to handle inevitability as a factor in the patient's life and will also be better able to help the patient analyze his or her death wishes and fears. However, one should be careful about appearing too heroic to the patient, as this reduces self-esteem and provokes guilt reactions. The death of contemporaries comes with aging. This may lead to a greater investment in the patients, which may or may not be beneficial to the quality of their treatment.

The weakening of memory which accompanies aging cannot be completely compensated by note-taking. Also, aging diminishes therapeutic effectiveness. However, for various reasons, analysts as a group tend to weather this better than most. Being a woman psychoanalyst is more advantageous than being a man in bearing the rigors of aging—probably because women have integrated passivity more successfully into their personalities.

Growing old presents two technical analytic problems. 1. Because the analyst has a greater possibility of dying during the patient's analysis, counseling of the patient is necessary about what to do or to whom to turn, in the case of the analyst's death. Tact and timing are important here, as well as analyzing the patient's reactions. 2. The analyst may be slowly dying during the patient's analysis. Under such circumstances, a heroic posture by the analyst is not beneficial to the patient. It is better to discuss the reality situation with the pa-

tient, continue the analysis for a time so that the patient will have time to express his feelings and fantasies, and then transfer him to a colleague as soon as the initial reactions have been analytically discussed. It is extremely important that the patient continue his treatment with another analyst while his previous one is still alive.

LEON BALTER

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

February 24, 1975. THE BOOK OF THE "IT" REOPENED: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOSOMATIC MEDICINE (First Annual Melitta Sperling Memorial Lecture). Peter H. Knapp, M.D.

After reviewing the development and growth of psychosomatic medicine, Dr. Knapp suggested that we attempt to integrate the concepts of learning theory with psychoanalytic concepts in order to understand the conundrum of psychosomatic symptoms. The contributions and ideas of Groddeck were considered, particularly Groddeck's emphasis on the body's symbolically expressing psychological conflict and on illness as having a purpose—"to resolve conflict, repress it or punish sins." Knapp then pointed out that in the "dual Freudian heritage" ("meaning" and "force"), *meaning* deals with the symbolic aspects of behavior while *force* focuses on the energies assumed to be inherent in the organism and problems of release and management, especially in conflictual states. The concept of "meaning," Knapp feels, was developed by Freud to explain conversion symptoms, while "force" led to the *Aktualneurose*. The symbolic manifestations of the purpose and conflict in psychosomatic illness are illustrated in several clinical vignettes which pinpoint psychological factors as causative in physical illness.

Knapp then postulated that the appearance of psychophysiologic manifestations of selective learned dysfunction "represents a symbolic learned reflection of an individual's past experience or the expression of learned and planned future intentions." The two major paradigms in learning theory are the Respondent (also known as Pavlovian, classical, or Type 1) and the Instrumental (also known as operant, Skinnerian, or Type 2). In respondent conditioning, "the stimulus precedes the response; it is initiated by the environment and follows as an automatic, quasi-passive response by the organism." In instrumental conditioning, "the response precedes the stimulating or reinforcing event; it is initiated quasi-actively by the organism."

Clinical examples, previously viewed according to the respondent paradigm, suggest that the instrumental paradigm fits the clinical data more convincingly. The timing and localization of the symptoms "suggest their use as instruments to avoid continued pain of some sort, invoking a response which was in some way rewarding." Animal and human experimental laboratory data are presented

to support this hypothesis. The instrumental paradigm is also important as a basis for therapeutic interventions.

L. NOAH SHAW

The Editors of *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* are interested in publishing more Brief Communications and Clinical Vignettes. We invite our readers to submit such contributions.

The 1977 Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held April 27-May 1, 1977, at the Quebec Hilton, Quebec, Canada.

The 1977 Annual Meeting of the AMERICAN PSYCHOSOMATIC SOCIETY will be held March 25-27, 1977, at the Fairmont Colony Square Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia.

The INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND ALLIED PROFESSIONS will hold its Ninth Congress August 19-26, 1978, in Melbourne, Australia. For further information write: Peter B. Neubauer, M.D., Secretary-General, 59 East 73rd Street, New York, N. Y. 10021.

The INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON SUICIDE PREVENTION AND CRISIS INTERVENTION will be held in Helsinki, Finland, June 20-23, 1977. For further information write: Finnish Association for Mental Health, Unioninkatu 4, 00130 Helsinki 13.

A post-graduate course in *Psychosocial Care of the Dying Patient* will be held June 3-4, 1977, at the University of California, San Francisco. For further information write: Charles A. Garfield, Ph.D., University of California School of Medicine, San Francisco, California 94143.