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WORK COMPULSION—A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY

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There are no published reports of a case of work compulsion. Such a case is described. The patient's history, the course of his analysis, and metapsychological formulations concerning the unconscious and complex meaning of work for this patient are presented. The case is discussed in relation to the relevant literature.

INTRODUCTION

Although psychoanalysts have begun to turn their attention to various aspects of work, most analytic contributions to date are addressed to its abstract and theoretical aspects (Hendrick, 1943; Holmes, 1965; Jacques, 1960). In the limited clinical literature on work, the data presented are sketchy (Bergler, 1947; Hatterer, 1960; Horney, 1947, 1950; Oberndorf, 1951; Robbins, 1939). Only two contributions (Bunker, 1953; Savitt, 1959) provide a sufficient amount of clinical evidence to allow the reader to understand the meaning of work and its disturbances. Both are cases of work inhibition.

As distinct from the papers cited, this report concerns a patient who suffered from a work compulsion.[1] His analysis, which lasted more than three years, offered an unusual opportunity to

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[1] Reich (1960) presents clinical material from the case of a compulsive writer, which is relevant to my case. Although Reich's focus is on pathological modes of self-esteem regulation rather than on work pathology, her formulations are very useful and will be discussed below. It should be noted, however, that my patient differs from Reich's patient in that the latter presented the clinical picture of a cyclothymic character disorder.

trace and specify the multiple functions and meanings of work for this patient, as well as the early conflicts from which these derived, for his symptom was neither wholly dystonic nor wholly syntonic. This naturally led both to an exploration of his character structure and to repeated analysis of the symptom throughout treatment, and generated much data from which the metapsychological formulations relating to work and the patient were derived.

CASE REPORT

Mr. A, a thirty-nine-year-old industrial designer, married and the father of a son and two daughters, was referred for treatment by an analytic colleague. At the first interview, Mr. A mentioned several things which had led him to feel the need for treatment. However, he tended to underplay the importance of these complaints, as if they were mere annoyances rather than serious problems for him. His first complaint was, "I can't seem to relax." By this he meant that he was constantly undertaking new assignments and that these were quite beyond what he really needed for financial success or professional recognition. He was unable to let up on his overfull schedule and frenetic pace.

This problem seemed related to his second complaint. He asserted that although he loved and appreciated his wife, their relationship was strained and they had frequent arguments. His wife resented his heavy schedule which frequently took him away for several days at a time or forced him to work late or on weekends. He admitted there was some justification for her complaints, but he felt, too, that she was jealous of his professional life and of his relationships with colleagues.

As the analysis began, further evidence started to emerge about the reasons for his seeking treatment at that time.

1. Apparently Mrs. A had become sufficiently disturbed by the patient's frequent absences from the family to threaten him with separation if he did not consult an analyst about these problems. This threat seems to coincide with an increasing

awareness on his part of the justice of his wife's complaints.

2. He had a nightmare which made a deep and disturbing impression on him. He was standing in a primordial morass of slime and ooze and holding his penis. As he urinated, it began to grow longer and longer and was suddenly like a snake with a will of its own; it was out of control and turned on him, about to bite or hurt him. He awakened with a feeling of intense anxiety. This dream occurred several weeks before his call to me.

3. The approach of his fortieth birthday and its connection in his mind with his father's sudden death from a heart attack at the age of forty-seven, along with his perception that he was "overworking," "couldn't relax," and felt constantly "under pressure" produced some conscious anxiety about his own early death. Morbid preoccupations concerning early death, though present since adolescence, had decreased considerably during his adulthood, only to return recently.

Early in analysis an increasingly clear picture of the patient's major symptoms emerged. His love life and work life were both burdened by serious conflicts that will be described in detail later.

Mr. A was a man who exuded energy and assertiveness; he was always busy writing or sketching when I found him each morning in the waiting room. He was decisive in manner and wore ultramasculine clothes, as if to say, "I'm rough and I'm tough and I'm outside the herd." On the couch he was very active, full of energy, constantly in motion. He was rarely moody, depressed, or conscious of anxiety, but underneath a humorless, somewhat businesslike manner there were signs of strain and tension behind which lurked explosively hostile and anxious feelings. His response to any sensed threat was immediate belligerence. His most comfortable posture was to be active and challenging.

Background and Family History

Mr. A was the youngest of three children and the only son of a lower-middle-class Italian family. He was born during the

depression, and money was always scarce in his family: life was hard and there were few luxuries. His father had finished a year of college, his mother, only high school. During the first four years of his life, the family lived in a large city. His father then got a secure civil service job in a rural community and the family moved to a small farming village where they were the only Catholics. It is at this point that Mr. A's most vivid early memories begin. He attended a one-room school and began to have a strong sense of being different because of his religion—a feeling of being an outsider which has persisted throughout his life.

Mr. A's father continued to work even after he suffered a serious heart attack when the patient was about thirteen years old. By the time he was fourteen, his father was well enough to start a small mechanical repair service as a way of supplementing the family income. With the establishment of the repair service, Mr. A became an increasingly useful and important member of the family. Much of the time that he was not in school, he worked for his father.

After graduation from high school, he went to college with the idea of entering into the family business when he graduated. During his first year at college, his father suffered a fatal heart attack. At that time, the patient decided to leave college and take over the family business despite his wish to continue with school. However, his mother soon decided to liquidate the business and move back to the city, which enabled Mr. A to return to college and complete his education. The mother appeared in the analysis as a simple, hardworking woman who took for granted her husband's dominant role in the family. Mr. A felt that his mother was partial to him, while his father adored his next older sister. He was always jealous of this sister; to this day he dislikes and avoids her. Mr. A's relationship with his father was biphasic. In the early period of analysis, the father was remembered as a powerful man who ruled the family tyrannically and was capable of furious and frightening outbursts of temper.

Several important memories in connection with his father emerged during the course of the analysis. Mr. A remembered that when the family first moved to the country when he was four, his father would shoot river rats with his rifle and Mr. A would have to retrieve them and throw them into the river. At about the same time, he observed his father slaughtering chickens on the farm by chopping their heads off with an axe. When he was seven or eight, he went fishing with his father one hot day. When he became bored, his father suggested he take a swim in the pond. The boy replied that he did not have a bathing suit. His father suggested that he swim in his underwear. He was afraid to go into the slimy ooze of the pond for fear of being bitten by a snake, but he did not dare to tell his father he was afraid.

Throughout his early childhood, Mr. A yearned for his father's affection and admiration; he worked hard to achieve it, but always felt unsure of it and driven. Working was his mode of winning his father's affection, and during the early years this meant doing housework, such as scrubbing floors, and other chores.

As Mr. A entered adolescence, his relationship with his father took on a more strained, competitive, and defiant quality. One important example of this occurred when he was twelve. He indicated that he would like to work as a field hand on one of the local vegetable farms during the summer, as some of his classmates were doing. His father told him that the work was too hard and that he would not be able to last out a single day. The boy took the challenge and, though he found the work exhausting in the heat, he continued through that summer and the following one until his father actually forbade him to work on the farm any more. He then felt relieved and exultant that he had triumphed over his father. There were many other smaller quarrels in which Mr. A tried to force his father to "give in," but which usually ended with his mother imploring him to "make up."

During high school he longed to be accepted by the most

popular group and the most attractive girls, but he tended to shy away from socializing in general and girls in particular. His sexual life during this period was quite inhibited. He made some clumsy attempts at masturbation during his early and middle adolescence, but without success. It was not until he was a freshman or sophomore at college that he successfully masturbated one night while his roommate told him stories of his sexual prowess. After that, he frequently sought out prostitutes or lower-class girls and could not wait to return to the dorm to tell his friends. From the beginning of his heterosexual activities, while in college and thereafter, he tended to suffer from premature ejaculation. On a number of occasions, this became the source of experiences of profound humiliation. Sexual performance and its unreliability became a focus of his attention. It is not surprising, therefore, that when he was in the Orient during his military service and became more familiar with fellatio and cunnilingus, these became his preferred modes of satisfaction.

When he finished military duty and returned to civilian life, he found his sexual life more complicated and solved the problem by becoming a Don Juan. He formed many superficial attachments for short periods lasting no more than a week; each time, he became bored and tired and finally cast the woman aside. The women he tended to choose were extremely passive and submissive, often neurotic, and he usually treated them rather shabbily.

From the time of his marriage, his love life was characterized on the one hand by feelings that his wife was an inhibited, inadequate, "up-tight" sexual partner, and on the other hand by a feeling that perhaps there was something wrong with himself as a lover. But as these latter doubts were uncomfortable, he did not dwell on them. He consistently needed to have a second girl in his life and perhaps even a third one, as he put it, "on the back burner." These women, with each of whom he had affairs lasting a number of months, were usually physically attractive but clearly felt to be his psychological, social, or eco-

nomic inferiors. Often they were his secretaries. They usually had submissive characters and were treated largely as instruments of his pleasure and convenience. He would take them on business trips where they might have to wait for hours in a car while he took care of business. Then he would take them to the hotel for sex and afterward wish they would disappear. Often he would prefer fellatio with them.

Work History

As we have seen, Mr. A's experiences in connection with work began early in his life. Born during the depression and raised in a family in which frugality and work were an ever-present necessity, he learned early the seriousness of these matters. Most of his early memories of working were in the context of pleasing his father and getting some acknowledgment from him. He remembered that when he was nine years old, during a period in which his mother was ill with gall-bladder trouble, he often cooked the dinner and scrubbed the floors at home. Work at that time was one of the most reliable techniques he had of competing with his sister for his father's love and admiration. During these years he found he could draw and sketch well enough to elicit approval from his family, especially the warm and accepting aunts on his mother's side. This was something he not only excelled at, but in which he could easily surpass his sister.

When he reached puberty, work began to take on the significance of rivalry with his father and was also a sign of masculinity. His frequently quoted anecdote, describing how his father challenged him regarding his capacity to endure working on a truck farm as a hand laborer when he was twelve, was told with feelings of pride and a sense of triumph. After that experience he felt increasingly compelled to take up every challenge which came his way.

His education did not prepare him directly for his present work. After graduation and army service, he took a job as a draftsman, and after several years he decided to try some indus-

trial designs of his own. He struggled and worked hard at selling himself, and apparently his work showed promise. He began to develop a small reputation and was given a chance to design a special project, which earned him an award. After that, his reputation advanced rapidly. He was often asked to participate in panels at professional meetings, and he was finally given a university appointment.

A number of patterns of behavior in connection with his work stood out.

1. He felt like an impostor even though he was acknowledged as one of the best in his field and had long since been accepted by his professional "establishment." His rationalization for his feeling of imposture was that he lacked a professional degree. He felt that he had gotten into the field "through the back door." He was hypersensitive about who was an establishment member and who was not.

2. This was related to the consistently antitraditionalistic-maverick position he adopted professionally in all public appearances: he often behaved in an abrasive and pugnacious manner which frequently made unnecessary difficulties for himself.

3. He was acutely aware of rank in his field and felt compelled to "lock horns" with and measure himself against all of the "big boys," the "heroes."

4. When he felt he had mastered a field, he turned to a related or contiguous profession and began to try to break down the barriers of that profession and to get recognition from the established professionals in it. When he felt he had mastered the challenge of the new field, he then began to feel bored and burdened with it, wanting to leave it for another one. During the analysis he began breaking into the fields of social design and social engineering by lecturing and trying to write books on these subjects.

5. Although he was excited by the idea of being an intellectual, he disliked working ideas out in detail and so tended to spread himself too thin and to be superficial in his thinking. Yet he

always worried whether his ideas were "profound enough." At times he would get his assistants to work out the details of the project. At other times, when he had to do the details himself, he did so laboriously and with procrastination.

6. He felt demeaned and degraded when he had to solicit business and believed that the "big boys" in the field had it easier: their commissions just magically poured in and they didn't have to degrade themselves.

7. He ruminated constantly about getting rid of his business, selling it, or having it acquired by a larger company which would relieve him of the responsibility of soliciting business and taking care of administrative details, and would allow him to "play" with his ideas.

8. His main source of gratification from his work came from the fame, glory, and publicity he was able to get, and he never turned down an opportunity to appear in public or in print. He often felt disappointed if an article about him was not as long as he expected it to be.

9. Although his income was very good—more than adequate for all his needs—he still felt financially insecure. However, he just as often felt guilty about the fees that he charged his clients.

The Course of the Analysis

The conscious and manifest content during the first year of the analysis was eliptical in shape, so to speak, with two primary focuses of the patient's attention: the discontents of his work life and of his love life.

On the one hand, his "motor was always running." He was always on the alert for new opportunities, new challenges, new engagements, ready to run here or fly there, to appear on this panel or write that article. Then, when he had overcommitted himself, he would complain of his inability to relax and of feeling burdened, trapped, out of control. He then ruminated obsessively about whether to contract his interests, sell his business, and retire to the country to "do his own thing"—that

is, play around with designs and important social ideas and, of course, give up a luxurious and financially secure life—or have his piece of the pie and be miserable. On the other hand, when his professional life, for one reason or another, was relatively quiet, he was restless and bored and felt that he was not occupied with anything "really important."

Parallel with his professional dilemma was the conflict he felt in his love life. His sexual "motor" too was "always running." He was constantly on the alert for new sexual adventures and challenges, always judging his chances with this woman or wondering whether he could "make it into the sack" with that "chick." For the most part, his romances remained imaginary. When he did have an affair, it was certain that the woman would be both good-looking and "safe"—that is, either masochistically inclined or in reality his subordinate, for instance, his secretary.

As the analysis unfolded and the superficial layer of the patient's feelings about work and people was uncovered, what emerged was a profound lack of interest in the content of his work and in mature relationships. He got little if any pleasure from his work even though he wished he could be genuinely interested and gratified by it. His major interest and source of pleasure was the recognition he got from his colleagues or from publicity. Everything he did professionally was in the service of this narcissistic aggrandizement. Although he paid lip service to professional and social values and issues, his deeper emotional investment was in glory.

His relationship to his wife was characterized by a deep-seated wish to dominate and control her, to have her available to service him when he needed it—to be interested in *him*, share *his* interests and take care of *him*. Any wish on her part to have him share *her* life and interests was met with superficial compliance and deep resentment, together with the feeling of being trapped, burdened, and "hassled." If she rejected his sexual advances or did not share in his enthusiasm to the degree he expected, he became furious and sulked for days, justifying to himself his affairs with his secretary.

His need for both his wife and his mistress was based on several factors: his need to feel independent of any single person; reassurance that he was a "superstud" and could have more than one woman, and a young, good-looking "WASP" at that; a need to split his choice of sexual object into one whom he could possess solely and unconditionally—and with whom he could gratify pregenital sexual fantasies in a relatively guilt free way—and one who would gratify his need to be looked after and taken care of.

Secretly he wanted only love and adoration from everyone, most of all, from the male colleagues whom he admired. But these relationships were so fraught with anxiety that he had to keep them tenuous and "at arm's length." His favorite fantasy was to become an "Easy Rider" and roam alone around the countryside on a motorcycle. And indeed he did buy a "bike" which he rode in an enactment of an adolescent omnipotence fantasy whenever his relationships became too tense and intense or when he needed reassurance.

As the analysis progressed, there was increasing evidence that a transference had been mobilized which was based on his highly ambivalent relationship with his father. In his dreams the analyst was a powerful, intrusive, swarthy Sicilian who tried to force his way in to rob and threaten him with a sharp, hooked razor; or the analyst was depicted as a big black man sitting on a motorcycle with a long seat, motioning to him to sit up front passively as he is about to take him for a "wild ride." At other times the analyst was seen as a cool, detached "WASP"; unresponsive, omniscient and wealthy, but rigid and ungiving, ready to exploit and cheat him at any opportunity.

These feelings were largely unconscious, and those he was minimally aware of were often suppressed since *any* explication of his feelings toward me made him acutely aware of the inequality of the analytic situation: I knew his feelings about me but he did not know "how he stacked up" with me. He had a formidable array of defenses against *all* transference feelings. These included isolation and dilution of the intensity of the analysis by frequent intermittent absences which were ration-

alized on the grounds of "important business" in other parts of the country. Often important material of an anxiety- or guilt-laden nature appeared just prior to his absence of three or four days, which allowed isolation and repressive mechanisms to supervene. Indeed, he distracted or diluted himself as much in the analysis as he did in his work life and his love life. Displacement and acting out with family, colleagues, or strangers often played an important part in helping him conceal his feelings toward the analyst. On one occasion after receiving a bill from me, he went to a "posh" restaurant. He was surprised and angry at the amount of the check and felt put upon and taken advantage of. Then, on the pretext of a mislaid coat, he provoked an argument with the head-waiter, who he felt was cold, disinterested, and unresponsive. He "pummeled" this man verbally and "brought him to his knees."

Another characteristic set of defensive maneuvers which were utilized generally in warding off all feelings (save those of anger)—especially feelings of shame—were denial and minimization. All feelings remotely related to inadequacy of any sort, most markedly in relation to sexual inadequacy, gave rise to intense embarrassment. To admit these feelings of inadequacy or even embarrassment to me multiplied the shame and had to be avoided. This was done by a combination of elaborate circumlocution, rationalization, and denials, such as, "I was much better yesterday about such-and-such," or, "sex with L last night was beautiful," when what he really meant was that he managed to be potent.

The transference neurosis which appeared was distinctly paranoid in its flavor. As indicated previously, the patient's first line of character defense was a counterphobic, reactive hypermasculinity. This was expressed in his "rough, tough, top dog" style generally, and in the transference by his trying to equalize or get control of the situation. This was exemplified in a fantasy he had at the time he was provoking a confrontation between us. In it, he fantasied that he would threaten me with quitting the analysis. I would back down, and he would be victorious—

an exact re-enactment of dozens of confrontations with his father during his adolescence and with many men since. Warded off by this thinly veiled and intense hostile competition with me were his paranoid fears that I would use him, humiliate and hurt him. These paranoid fears emerged whenever he felt diminished in the slightest, or felt that he was losing control, or was in a passive position. He would get angry and feel I was toying with him if he began to feel he was floundering around in the session. At other times he felt that the analysis was causing his impotence or his lack of productivity.

Mr. A's feelings and attitudes about work expressed themselves repetitively in the analysis and in the transference. Two predominant patterns emerged: one centered around "working in the analysis" and the other centered around the way he used his outside work in the analysis. The former was characterized by his persistent feeling of "being pressured" in the analysis which was mixed with his feeling of having to work in the analysis. This was expressed in many subtle behavioral ways which resulted in a palpable sense that the patient was exerting major effort during the analytic hour and a feeling of relief on the part of the patient and the analyst after the session was over. At other times he felt that after he had worked hard for a period of time in the analysis, he wanted to "coast." At these times he would become aware of resentment toward the analyst because the analyst had been "coasting," and now it was time for the analyst to do some work. He deeply resented having to work hard in the analysis and in life, and reproached both his wife and the analyst for being lazy and not sharing the work load—for making him do all the work.

It was clear from the clinical material that he experienced the analyst as a tormenting slave driver who would treat him sadistically for his laziness (his passive, dependent wishes) and exploit him because of the analyst's own laziness. The projection of his own laziness would in turn call forth his reproachful and sadistic wishes toward the analyst. Work inside the analytic situation was therefore used in the transference both as an

expression of and a defense against his passive, feminine, and dependent yearnings and his unconscious guilt.

A second important manifestation of his attitudes relating to work as they occurred in the transference was his use of outside work to impress the analyst with how important and powerful he was. This was often expressed, as indicated above, by his need to subordinate the analysis to various business activities. Whenever he took one of his frequent business trips, he felt guilty about being away from the analysis and thought the analyst would criticize him. He steadfastly refused to allow any discussion of his business trips as analytic material; instead he had a need to "tell" the analyst that he was going away lest he feel that he was asking the analyst's permission.

FORMULATION OF THE METAPSYCHOLOGICAL MEANING OF WORK

Dynamic-Genetic Point of View

One of the most important uses of work for Mr. A, as suggested above, was as a defense against his unconscious passive homosexual wishes. Over and over again he demonstrated his need to be "top dog," "boss," "the authority." Almost all of his professional energy was devoted to eliciting admiration and awe from everyone he met, especially "the big boys." His greatest satisfactions came from the glory of having performed impressively before a group of important colleagues. He longed to speak with "incontestable authority" and to perform heroic feats, such as "beating down doors" professionally or smashing traditions. His need to strive constantly in his external work life to achieve a state of inner equilibrium contributed to his chief complaint: "I can't relax." If he were to relax, he would immediately have become aware of being the underdog; the little, weak, helpless creature who is at the mercy of and who will be abused by "the big boys." He would have felt like and have been treated like a castrated being—a woman. The repressed homosexual wishes returned in two forms, namely, in

the feeling he had that all of his activity was "hustling," prostituting and degrading himself. Another common metaphor he used in connection with his work was, "I've got a tiger [or a bull] by the tail." In this resonating bisexual image, as in the snake nightmare which precipitated his search for treatment, he was barely in control of overwhelming phallic forces which were about to turn on him, beat him, gore him, rape him, and devour him.

Closely related to this was a complex of feelings centering around his fantasy of being an outsider. This fantasy was acted out in a reactive way in the role he played as the maverick. Beneath this defiant façade he constantly yearned to be accepted by the professional fraternity establishment: he fantasied scenes in which tall, slender, handsome "WASPs," impeccably white-trousered, blue-blazered, and silver-tongued, chatted amiably and fluently with each other about the beauty of pure design as they nodded approvingly at each other's degrees from Harvard and Princeton, looking up only to snicker and smile derisively, while he, the grubby little "wop" with dirty pants and fingernails, banged impotently on the door, shouting the truth about social relevance.

This feeling of alienation represented a condensation of his feeling of inferiority and his feeling of being unloved and unlovable, and referred genetically to his rivalry with the sister whom he felt his father favored. In connection with these feelings, he often talked of "struggling against odds," always starting from a "bad beginning," having had an "uphill fight," to demonstrate to his father that he was as good as his sister and as deserving of his father's love as she. In order to win his love he felt he had to submit and be a good little boy and work hard doing his house chores. Work, then, became a disguised gratification for his feminine masochistic wishes. One would suspect that behind his disappointed love for his father there was a prior oedipal rivalry and disappointment. He often said bitterly that "the big boys" of the establishment "get everything," "they don't have to hustle," "their commissions are

just handed to them on silver platters." Consciously he resented having to work for recognition and love; unconsciously he felt that only love freely given would make him lovable and adequate. He compulsively worked for love and recognition, which he felt were undeserved; this "work" was the unconscious equivalent of stealing. In this sense, work was a punishment for his oedipal greed and murderous fantasies, a sign of his shameful castrated state, and a way of warding off his passive dependent wishes.

Related to Mr. A's feeling of being an outsider was his sense of imposture. He often felt surprised at his own success or that others acknowledged him as a first-rate industrial designer. He feared exposure in public because, although he "masqueraded" as an industrial designer and often took public positions that bore on design in general and even social design, he had no professional academic degree and felt that he did not "know enough." Behind this feeling lay two important factors: first his unconscious homosexuality, that is, his wish to be treated as a silly castrated female; and second, his oedipal guilt: "I don't deserve to be treated as a successful, effective man." This also explained his need to be superficial and to overextend himself professionally. By leaving things fragmented and unfinished, he was able both to rebel against the superego command for commitment and responsibility and to avoid the anxiety that would come from depth and success.

Because work and the acquisition of money were preconsciously equated with power, freedom, and independence, and unconsciously equated with murderous wishes toward his father and the acquisition of the omnipotent paternal phallus, every success which made his business bigger gave rise to feelings of guilt, partly conscious (in the form of feeling that he did not really deserve such high fees) and partly unconscious. This in turn excited his masochistic defenses in the form of feelings of tension and pressure from behind ("This business has me by the balls") and fantasies that he would die at an early age from the tension, just as his father had. The fantasy continued that

what he really should have done was to contract his business and retire from the race. Work and his business in this sense represented his projected harassing superego which he compulsively had to comply with or struggle against and escape from (by way of marijuana, television, and trips). This sadistic superego was based on the introjection of the mental representation of his father as a powerful, cruel, oppressive tyrant who murdered and symbolically castrated small, weak animals, such as rats and chickens.

Finally, one can see that he used work to control and punish people, as he did in his struggle with his father and as he did with his wife and the analyst. He made his work the unquestionable, supreme arbiter of his family and analytic life. He was able to demand anything on the grounds of his work. It was his castle fortress into which he could withdraw from those with whom he was angry, thereby punishing them and controlling himself; or in which he could isolate himself when he found a relationship overstimulating either sexually or aggressively, or when he felt too many demands were being placed on him.

Structural Point of View

Instinctually, work expressed, on the preconscious level, sadistic impulses used to control and punish the patient's love objects. Unconsciously, work expressed his greedy and murderous oedipal wishes, as well as his feminine masochistic impulses.

With respect to the ego, work was used as a defense against his destructive impulses, as well as his unconscious, dependent, and passive homosexual wishes. His frustration tolerance was interfered with by his castration anxiety: when he had to delay gratification of his impulses, his unconscious fantasy of omnipotence became threatened and this threat was defended against by a shift of attention and his use of action. This latter defense also had adaptive value and probably accounted for much of his financial success. His other major defenses—projection and object avoidance—burdened his capacity for performing in his

work roles, which were heavily oriented toward service and interpersonal relationships.

With respect to the superego, work unconsciously signified castration and shame: an act of submission to a highly critical, sadistic superego. It was also experienced as a projection of his superego, that is, the work had him in its control ("has me by the balls"). In addition, work was a punishment, a sign of his unlovability and his guilt for his murderous and envious oedipal wishes.

A. Reich (1960) has described a pathological type of self-esteem regulation which is based on a primitive ego ideal that remains unintegrated and persists into adult life. The discrepancy between the individual's self-representation and his grandiose, exaggerated, and unrealistic ego ideal is so great and fraught with such anxiety that it compels an incessant search for grandiose satisfaction. Reich's formulation is helpful here. Mr. A was at first aware only of his desire to be a "socially-conscious" professional. Much lip-service was paid this ideal, and indeed he even succeeded in a number of creative efforts along this line which resulted in his gaining a reputation among his colleagues for being the kind of professional he thought he wished to be. This reputation and these achievements never satisfied his deepest desires and always left him feeling discontented and empty after the initial celebration wore off. This was because his most powerful yearnings centered around a primitive, wishful self-concept expressed in his snake nightmare and, earlier, when he was an adolescent and longed to have a powerful physique, wear a leather jacket and gloves, and "tool" around all alone on a roaring motorcycle. This primitive megalomanic fantasy was acted out during the treatment when he drove on his "bike" one night at high speed in a heavy downpour from his country house to the city. During this experience he was at one with his fantasy; he felt omnipotent, heroic, impregnable, alive, and excited.

The archaic ideal of being a tall, powerful, "super-stud" with beautiful "WASP" women was expressed in his profes-

sional life as well. Every design and presentation had to have an awe-inspiring, dazzling impact on his audience. There was never a moment in the presence of anybody when he was not "on" and trying to impress them with his power. Naturally, the strain, pressure, and effort involved in satisfying this grandiose ideal was very wearing and often could be relieved only by social withdrawal.

Reich (1960) suggests that such persistently infantile, crudely sexual, and aggressive ego ideals find their origins in unbearable castration fears. This hypothesis appears consistent with the evidence in Mr. A's case. His desperate desire to be "top dog" left no doubt that he feared he would end up on the bottom, underneath, passive, weak, helpless, and "screwed." In moments of greater awareness he felt that he was a dirty, ugly little runt. It seems likely that the magical denial expressed in his grandiose fantasies which formed the core of his ego ideals—"I am the greatest, biggest, strongest, fiercest, etc."—warded off his latent feminine identification.

Adaptive Point of View

Mr. A worked in two separate but related occupations: 1, he was the chief executive of a firm which employed twenty to thirty people; 2, he was a key member of the faculty in a university. From the material which emerged in the analysis, it was possible to determine at least some of the mental operations that were necessary for the efficient functioning of these occupations and what may have disturbed them.

The first occupation mentioned above, that of chief executive of his firm, entailed essentially four distinct integrated operations: (a) getting commissions; (b) creating the design; (c) executing it; and (d) presenting it to the client. The first of these operations, getting commissions, required smoothly functioning, flexible, and subtle object relations. This involved functioning in both passive feminine and active masculine modes. In order to get commissions, Mr. A either had to apply for them directly, or stimulate interest in his firm so that

clients sought him out. Although these activities required active and assertive behavior, they also required some capacity for behavior that was winning and accommodating to his colleagues and empathic to the needs of his clients. To the patient such behavior unconsciously symbolized being passive and feminine. However, both of these libidinal positions were burdened with significant amounts of castration anxiety, which inhibited his assertiveness, on the one hand, and made any passive behavior too threatening, on the other. Thus, the first occupational operation, which required smoothly functioning object relations, was interfered with by the patient's severe, defensive hypermasculinity.

There was only a relatively small amount of clinical data that pertained to the second set of operations necessary for him to perform his role of "creating the design." Perhaps the fact that there was so little data implies that there was relatively little conflict involved in these operations. As far as I was able to tell, the main ego functions entailed (besides those included in making available the repertoire of technical experience to his consciousness) were his capacity to concentrate, pay attention, and isolate himself. Although he did not complain that these functions were interfered with, he did worry that his capacity to design was unreliable—the same as he felt about his phallic potency. I suspect that what was involved here was that his fear of passivity interfered with his controlled regression in the service of the ego. In addition, every design he produced had to have stupendous impact on "the big boys," his colleagues, just as every sexual act had to be a "super fuck" or it resulted in the feeling of unmanliness and humiliation. This was a burden that the art of industrial design was not meant to carry.

Mr. A usually used his staff for the further "execution of the design." In order to do this he had to depend on and trust his employees. Here again his faulty object relations hampered him. His anxieties connected with his passive and dependent wishes were often mobilized in his working relationships with

his staff. He was overly aggressive and controlling with them and felt betrayed and exploited if they made a mistake or did not live up to his expectations. He would then bully them and subsequently feel remorseful.

Finally, in his capacity as industrial designer, he had to be able to present his design to his clients forcefully and persuasively, and yet be able to be flexible, understanding, and accommodating to the clients' ultimate wishes. In this capacity he was torn by the same conflicts mentioned earlier. Understanding the needs of his clients required consideration for the object, and a noncompetitive, sublimated homosexual libido, which was threatening to his defensive omnipotence fantasies.

As a key faculty member of an industrial design program in a university, his second occupation, he was again required to perform ego activities which tapped underlying masculine and feminine positions in a flexible and integrated manner. His role in this situation optimally called for assertiveness in what must be taught and the strength to maintain standards of excellence and to be guilt free enough to criticize constructively. Yet he also had to be passive enough to accept free expression of dissent and experimentation, and sensitive to the needs of individual development in his students and colleagues. This, of course, was very difficult for him, just as it was difficult for him to behave appropriately as a father to his son and as it had been for him to behave appropriately as a son to his father. He had to compete with his colleagues and constantly impress them. At first, he thought he would be comfortable in the role of teacher, a situation in which he felt he would be "top dog." However, just as he dreamed that his penis became a monster which turned on him and as he felt that in his business he had "a tiger or a bull by the tail" (and as he enacted this with his dog, wrestling with it, teasing and overstimulating it, with the accompanying fantasy that it was biding its time, getting stronger and more powerful, until it could turn on him and become "top dog"), so he consciously and unconsciously overstimulated and excited his students to be rebellious

until they turned on him. Then he would feel threatened and become autocratic and threatening in return. In this way his basic conflicts invaded his ego functions as he performed his teaching work.

In summary, one can see that some of the defenses which Mr. A used to attenuate his anxiety—avoidance (of both objects and competitive situations), projection (of aggression and guilt), hyperaggressivity and defiance—burdened his work capacity. However, his defensive hyperactivity appeared to have a double edged effect: on the one hand, it contributed to his tendency to be superficial, which in the long run was maladaptive; but on the other hand, this same characteristic, which worked hand in hand with his counterphobic defenses, clearly contributed to his successful tactic of *hedging* his "professional bets," that is, investing his energies in a sufficiently large number of projects, so that some of them were certain to be "winners."

DISCUSSION

Through the detailed analysis of this case, I have tried to suggest the complexity of the psychological meaning of work and its disturbance. It is inappropriate, I think, to try to speak too generally from the facts and interpretations of this one case. A few comments might be in order, however, in regard to the relevant literature on the subject, fragmented and limited as it may be.

Both Robbins (1939) and Horney (1947) discussed "the compulsive passion for work" within the context of Horney's theories. They both tended to interpret this kind of behavior in terms of "neurotic" grandiose aims and ambition. Horney (1947) wrote: "He is consumed with having to prove his unlimited powers and unlimited excellence and is enslaved by these drives" (p. 20). Although no clinical evidence was presented to support this conclusion, virtually all behavior of this type was understood as defensive maneuvers to ward off narcis-

sistic injuries and feelings of low self-esteem. There was no attempt on the part of these authors to suggest more complex dynamic and genetic factors. The case of Mr. A would tend to support their conclusion as far as it goes, since he did in fact unconsciously utilize work in part to ward off various feelings of diminished self-esteem. But that, of course, would represent only a part of the highly overdetermined meaning of his behavior.

Oberndorf (1951) presented a clinical vignette about a patient who bears some resemblance to Mr. A: "a highly successful businessman . . . interested in his work to a pathological degree . . . [who] expended most of his energy in work" (p. 81). Oberndorf suggested that "with this patient the ego ideal (super-ego), mainly work, work, work, had assumed a dominant feminine tinge which made him incompatible with masculine strivings. . . . this excessive reaction to work happened only when he was overcome by the need to be superlative—to make bigger, more spectacular transactions" (p. 82). It is difficult to infer from Oberndorf's highly condensed dynamic explanation to what extent his patient's behavior was motivated, as was that of Mr. A, by castration anxiety related to his unconscious homosexual fantasies. Unfortunately Oberndorf did not elaborate.

Jacques (1960), in a highly theoretical contribution pertaining to disturbances in the capacity to work, made an interesting suggestion in the form of a psychoanalytically-oriented definition of work. Based on some empirical but nonclinical observation of workers in industry, he concluded that psychic effort in work "is entirely concerned with the discretionary content of work," as distinct from the prescribed content of work. "To conform to rules and regulations and other prescribed aspects of work requires knowledge; you either know or you do not; but it does not require the psychic effort of discretion and decision with its attendant stirring of anxiety" (p. 357). He further defined work as "the exercise of discretion within externally prescribed limits to achieve an object which

can be reality tested, while maintaining a continuous working through of the attendant anxiety" (p. 357).

Jacques's formulation is ingenious but in view of the facts of the case I have presented, it requires some qualification. I would tend to agree with him that psychic effort involves the working through of unconscious anxiety. Jacques, however, links this anxiety primarily with "discretionary" work, that is, work which entails responsibility and decision on the part of the worker. From my observations of Mr. A, I would suggest that certain of his activities seemed like work to him if they involved psychic effort and that these activities were closely connected with his most poignant conflict. Sometimes this involved discretionary activities but at other times the activities were felt by him to be routine—what Jacques would call "prescribed content." For Mr. A such routine activities made him feel unconsciously like a woman and generated considerable castration anxiety. I would suggest that Jacques's definition of work would have more power and application if it were reformulated as follows: "Work, or the subjective experience of a psychic effort, involves the performance of a group of activities within externally prescribed limits to achieve an objective which can be reality tested while having to work through unconscious anxiety from whatever source."

The analysis of the meaning of work in the case of Mr. A suggests that such common and every-day activities are almost always highly complex psychologically and can best be studied, at least at this stage of our understanding, within a clinical and analytic context. This would generate the desirable matrix of detail that would provide theoreticians of normal and abnormal phenomena the necessary data with which to work. Theories pertaining to work at the present time tend to be too simple and too fragmented to do justice to the richness of the observed phenomena.

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WORKING WITH A BORDERLINE PATIENT

BY L. BRYCE BOYER, M.D.

A summary of the treatment of a borderline patient illustrates (1) that psychoanalytic therapy with such patients is feasible within the framework of the structural hypothesis and (2) that the results of such treatment are influenced materially by the analyst's use of his emotional responses to the patient and her productions.

INTRODUCTION

For more than twenty-five years I have been engaged in the outpatient care of individuals who suffer from disorders which were long considered untreatable by psychoanalytic therapy. My therapeutic procedures have involved minimal use of parameters (Eissler, 1953) and have excluded the use of supportive and nonanalytic procedures such as those advocated by Federn (1952) and Nunberg (1932). It has been my good fortune to have worked with some thirty patients whose diagnoses have ranged from clearly schizophrenic to what are now labeled borderline personality and severe narcissistic personality disorders. For the same length of time I have supervised residents, the majority of whose patients had similar personalities. My work has involved the application of the intermediate position regarding object relations delineated by Kernberg (1976a) which stems especially from such theoreticians as Erickson, Jacobson and Mahler (within the ego psychological approach) and from the work of Bowlby, Fairbairn, Klein and Winnicott (within the so-called British schools of psychoanalysis).

Whereas in previous communications I have focused prin-

This is an amplified version of a presentation made before the American Psychotherapy Seminar Center, New York, December 1975, the Los Angeles Psychoanalytic Society and Institute, May 1976, and other groups.

cipally on the articulation between theory and technique (Boyer, 1956, 1961, 1971, 1976a, 1976b), in the present article I shall emphasize technique and my own experience while treating a difficult case. It is possible to do this with some degree of accuracy because, like Greenacre (1975), I take notes during each session. I record the general theme of the patient's productions and often note some elements in detail, particularly dreams, fantasies and nonverbal communications; I note my own emotional reactions and fantasies, whether they remain private or are in some manner communicated to the patient. The fragment of a case history which follows involved culling through some two thousand pages of handwritten notes.

I have found my recording rarely interferes with the patients' communications, and such interferences are generally easily nullified by relevant interpretations. My method is beneficial to patients in two ways: it helps them to believe their communications are valuable and enables them to develop a sense of objectivity about their messages.

A large majority of my patients have benefited from our work. This is confirmed by follow-up information of up to twenty years. Nevertheless, I have found it difficult to assess what in the therapeutic situation has led to successful results.

I grew up suspicious of the words of others and with a deep need to determine realities by personal observation and research. When I reviewed the development of Freud's thinking and that of his followers pertaining to what were called the narcissistic neuroses (Boyer and Giovacchini, 1967, pp. 40-142), I became certain that the treatment of such disorders within the framework of the structural hypothesis was feasible, and I undertook their treatment on an experimental basis while still a candidate. Initially, I was disheartened by my mentors in my then ultraconservative training institution. They deemed my efforts to be wild analysis and motivated principally by rebelliousness and counterphobic tendencies. Yet what I was doing seemed to me to be logically consistent and to benefit my patients; so I persisted. Given my need for external ap-

proval, I was encouraged by the responses of North Americans who were similarly engaged in such searchings, notably Bychowski, Giovacchini, Hoedemaker, Lewin and Searles and by Europeans and Latin Americans, especially Eicke, Garma, Rosenfeld and Rolla, and by the appearance of literature which supported my thinking, such as the contributions of Arlow and Brenner (1964, 1969).

On the basis of my research, I have reached some general conclusions. In agreement with Giovacchini (1975a; Giovacchini and Boyer, 1975), Grinberg (1957), Kernberg (1975a, pp. 146-149), Langs (1975), Racker (1952, 1957), and Searles (1958a), I am convinced (1) that failures in the treatment of such disorders are often iatrogenic, resulting from problems in the countertransference or the therapist's failure to use his emotional responses adequately in his interpretations; (2) that the success of treatment depends on accurate, empathic and timely confrontations, interventions and reconstructions which lead to relevant genetic interpretations; and (3) that success also depends on the rectifying emotional and cognitive experience of the patient's development of new object relations with the therapist (Dewald, 1976; Garma, 1977; Green, 1975; Loewald, 1960; Viederman, 1976). With adequate treatment it is possible for the patient to replace archaic and sadistic ego and superego introjects and identifications with more mature ones, to develop higher level defense mechanisms and adaptations, and to progress from regressed positions and developmental arrests.

I have found with the Ornsteins (1975), Rosenfeld (1966) and many others that premature oedipal interpretations preclude the re-creation of the preoedipal transferential states. The latter must be worked through before character modifications can proceed. These are the states which Freud deemed unanalyzable (Boyer and Giovacchini, 1967, pp. 40-79).

I find that my handling of transference interpretations is in accord with the principles recently set forward by Kernberg (1975b): (1) the predominantly negative transference is systematically elaborated only in the present without initial efforts directed toward full genetic interpretations; (2) the patient's

typical defensive constellations are interpreted as they enter the transference; (3) limits are set in order to block acting out of the transference insofar as this is necessary to protect the neutrality of the therapist; (4) the less primitively determined, modulated aspects of the positive transference are not interpreted early since their presence enhances the development of the therapeutic and working alliances (Dickes, 1975; Kanzer, 1975), although the primitive idealizations that reflect the splitting of "all good" from "all bad" object relations are systematically interpreted as part of the effort to work through these primitive defenses; (5) interpretations are formulated so that the patient's distortions of the therapist's interventions and of present reality, especially of the patient's perceptions during the hour, can be systematically clarified; and (6) the highly distorted transference, at times psychotic in nature and reflecting fantastic internal object relations pertaining to early ego disturbances, is worked through first in order to reach the transferences related to actual childhood experiences.

I consider the understanding and pertinent interpretation of the unfolding transference to be of the utmost importance. I have come to contemplate each interview as though it might have been a dream and material from recent interviews as part of the day residue.

CASE REPORT

This report deals with the treatment of a patient whose presenting life pattern and personality included almost all of those elements which are commonly considered to carry a poor prognosis and to contraindicate psychoanalytic treatment, except that there was no evidence of ego-syntonic antisocial behavior. Much of the following history was obtained during the first two vis-à-vis interviews.

History

Fifty-three years old when first seen, Mrs. X was a twice-divorced Caucasian, friendless, living alone and almost totally

impulse-dominated. She looked and dressed like a teenage boy. She had been a chronic alcoholic for some twenty years and had been hospitalized repeatedly with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. She had been jailed many times, and while in the "drunk tank" had masturbated openly, smeared feces and screamed endlessly. She had lived dangerously, having on various occasions provoked sexual assault by gangs of black men in ghettos. In the last twenty years she had had many forms of psychiatric care (excluding shock therapies), but without effect. She had lived for about a year in a colony designed for faith healing, led by a guru. There appeared to be but two redeeming features when she was first seen: (1) She had concluded that her problems were based on unconscious conflicts and wanted an orthodox analysis. (Various respected analysts had refused her.) (2) Having been told by the most recent therapist of her psychotic son that her interactions with him kept him sick, she wanted very much to stop contributing to his illness.

Her forbears were wealthy aristocrats and included Protestant religious figures. The males all graduated from prestigious universities, and the females, products of noted finishing schools, were patrons of the arts. Her parents treated those who were not their social peers as subhumans. Her bond salesman father's chronic alcoholism resulted in the loss of his and his wife's fortunes during the patient's late childhood. From then on her nuclear family lived on the largesse of relatives.

Her mother was highly self-centered and throughout the patient's childhood and adolescence remained in bed during the daytime for weeks on end, depressed, hypochondriacal, and unapproachable. She vacillated between two ego states. In one, she lay with her aching head covered by cold cloths, moaning and complaining about mistreatment by all, but particularly her husband. In the other, she lay in reveries, reading romantic novels. Much later in treatment the patient remembered that when her mother was in such a dreamy state, she permitted the child to lie with her and perhaps to fondle her mother's genitals, manually and with her face. The mother's withdrawals seemingly could be interrupted only by the

temper tantrums of two of the sisters when parties were being planned for social lions or when she was planning to take the grand tour alone. She often left unannounced for her annual European jaunts but sometimes she would confide in the docile Mrs. X that she was leaving and swear her to secrecy, assigning her the task of tending the other children, who voiced their objections dramatically when they knew of their mother's impending departure.

The patient was the second of four sisters, born three years apart. All were reared by a senile woman who had been the mother's nursemaid. The oldest remains a frequently hospitalized alcoholic spinster. The younger two are vain, childless divorcees who live on generous alimony and who continue to have a succession of young lovers. All five females were contemptuous of the father, whom the mother divorced after the patient was married. Thereafter, the mother gave up her depression, hypochondriasis, and withdrawal and became a spirited woman. She had platonic affairs with young male authors whom she sponsored. The father married a warm woman, became abstinent, and returned to work. After many years, he regressed to serious depression and committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a train. This was one year before the patient first saw me. She had had no contact with him since his remarriage and thought of him only with contempt. When she heard of his death and burial, she felt totally detached. At the beginning of therapy, she indiscriminately idealized her mother and devalued her father.

When she was less than three years old, an incident occurred on board an ocean liner. Something happened in a stateroom which frightened the child so that she fled crying to her mother, who was breakfasting with the ship's captain. Her mother ignored her anguish, but a black waiter comforted her, holding her and giving her a cube of sugar. The patient explained to me that she felt the outcome of her treatment hinged on the recall of that memory and on my capacity to accept what she had to tell me without disgust, anger or anxiety.

Before attending school she was an avid reader of fairy tales,

and in her first year she did well. But during the second, she became incapable of learning. She read unwillingly and with great difficulty and was unable to learn the simplest mathematics. She never passed a single test during her grammar or finishing school years. This was unimportant to her parents; they taught her that her obligation to the family was to be charming, to exploit her beauty and wit, and to get a rich doctor as a husband who would support the family.

During the second year of schooling she became sexually involved with a swarthy chauffeur who wore black gloves, but she did not reveal their frightening activities, believing that risking death was somehow in the service of her sisters' getting parental love.

During her latency period, she was exceedingly docile and well-behaved. She had a severe obsessive-compulsive neurosis and believed that her family's lives depended on her thoughts and actions. She was a religious martyr who projected onto her parents the wish that she die so that her sisters would be the recipients of all her parents' love. In this way the sisters would become less disturbed.

When she was eleven she was sent away from home for the first time to attend a finishing school. She soon lost her previous nighttime terrors of attack by something vague and unvisualized, and gave up her endless nocturnal rituals. While there, she became enamored of a popular girl who seemed perfect, although she knew of her hypocrisies and manipulations. She was content to be one of an adoring coterie of this popular girl so long as the girl's attentions were equally divided among her worshippers. When the patient was sixteen, however, her idol became enamored of another girl and the patient went into a catatonic-like state. She was sent home from school, and for the next five years she remained passive, felt mechanical, and went through the motions of living.

She never had any boyfriends and was awkward at parties. She wistfully reveled in her mother's attractiveness as a hostess and vaguely wished that she would someday be her mother's social equal.

While she was in her teens, her father, an outcast at home, spent much time boating. The patient, in her role of family protector, willingly went with him, taking the helm while he got drunk in the cabin. She believed her parents wanted her dead and that she should be killed. She went with her father not only to look after him but to make it easy for him to murder her for the good of her sisters.

When her older sister was able to get a rich medical student to propose marriage, the patient was galvanized into activity and got him to choose her instead. Once married, she was sexually passive and anesthetic. On their honeymoon her husband became so infuriated by her sexual passivity that he sought to murder her, being thwarted only by chance. She felt no resentment and never told anyone, thinking his act had been further evidence of the validity of her being destined to be the savior-martyr.

She lived with his parents in one city while he continued medical school in another. He sent her occasional letters in which he depicted his affairs with sensual women. She was vaguely disappointed. His senile father, a retired minister, considered her passivity to be the result of her having been possessed and sought to exorcise her by giving her enemas while she was nude in the bathtub. This was condoned by her mother and her husband. She felt neither anger nor excitement. She wondered at times if he were getting some sexual or sadistic pleasure from his actions and fantasized seducing him or committing suicide in order to humiliate him by exposing him—all for the good of others.

Following his graduation, her husband joined the military and they moved to another part of the country, whence he was shipped abroad. She was utterly without friends or acquaintances. His letters were rare and included accounts of his affairs with uninhibited women. She bore him a defective daughter and could not believe she was a mother. She feared touching the baby, leaving her care to maids. She felt the baby's defect to be her fault which was somehow associated with her actions with the chauffeur. She began to drink in secret. On leave, her

husband impregnated her and she bore another daughter who again she could not believe was hers and whom she could not touch. She began to frequent bars and to pick up men to whose sexual demands of any nature she would submit, always with total subsequent amnesia. She learned of her actions by having them told to her by the children's nurses. Then she bore a defective son who became an autistic psychotic. She was totally helpless in the face of his unbridled hyperactivity and feces-smearing. He was hospitalized after about a year and remained so until his early adolescence, rarely acknowledging her existence in any way. Her husband divorced her, her daughters were sent away to institutions, and she lived alone.

For twelve years and periodically later her life was occupied with bar activities and sexual encounters for which she continued to have amnesia. She would pick up black men and submit to their manifold sexual abuses. She passively assented and at times encouraged them to take her money and jewelry. One of her many therapists suggested that she would feel less worthless if she were to prepare herself for some occupation and stop living on what amounted to charity. She managed to complete a practical nursing course and then worked in various psychiatric hospitals where she felt she was of some use because she could understandingly care for psychotic and senile patients. She was fired from a number of such positions for being absent and for appearing on the job while intoxicated or hung over.

In one of the hospitals where she worked, she met a male patient who was her physical counterpart, even to the color of her hair and eyes. They were so alike she wore his clothes. He was addicted to various drugs, including alcohol, and totally dependent on his family and welfare. She soon began to live with him. She adored him as she had her mother and the girlfriend of teenage years. She knew of his many faults but totally idealized him. She felt complete and rapturous with him and at times believed they were psychological and even physical continua. They were married, and the idyllic fusion persisted. Periodically, they bought whiskey and went to bed where they

remained for days, engaging in polymorphous sexuality to the point of exhaustion, occasionally lying in their excreta. While she never had an orgasm, she felt complete. Such episodes were especially pleasant to her when she was menstruating and she and her partner were smeared with blood, which she sometimes enjoyed eating. After some nine years of marriage, he divorced her for reasons which she never understood, particularly since she supported him financially. Then she became a mechanical person once again and resumed her pursuit of men in bars.

A year before treatment began, she obtained an undemanding job as a file clerk where her superiors tolerated her lateness and incompetency. She lived on her meager salary and placed no value on material possessions. She believed that she had never had a hostile wish and that throughout her life she had invariably sought to help others.

Course of Treatment

Over the years, I have gradually come to accept for treatment almost solely patients whose activities are apt to influence the lives of others, such as educators, physicians, and professionals who work in the mental health field. Yet it did not occur to me to refuse her request to try psychoanalytic treatment. I found appealing her determination to undergo for predominantly altruistic purposes a procedure which she well knew would be painful. And I felt comfortable with her.

She was seen at what she knew to be reduced rates three times weekly on the couch for about five years, payments being made from a small endowment from a deceased family friend. After a trial six-month interruption she resumed treatment on the couch twice a week for two more years, making a total of over eight hundred interviews in seven and a half years.

Before analysis is undertaken with such patients, I tell them that our work is to be cooperative and of an experimental nature and that we cannot expect to set a time limit; that they are to make a sincere effort to relate aloud whatever comes

to their minds during the interviews and to report their emotional states and physical sensations; that I do not send statements and expect to be paid what is owed on the last interview of the month; that they will be charged for cancellations unless their scheduled interviews are filled by another patient; and that I am away frequently for short periods and one long period during the course of each year and will inform them of the expected dates of absence as soon as I know of them. When an occasional patient inquires what is to be expected of me, I state that I shall keep the scheduled interviews and be on time; that I do not give advice unless I deem it necessary; that I see my role as seeking to understand as much as I can about the patients and will tell them what I have learned when I consider them ready. I explain that I expect to be wrong at times and that the final validation will depend on the patient's responses and memories. For these patients I have found such specific conditions offer needed ego and superego support.

As is common with patients with borderline personality disorders (*cf.*, Gunderson and Singer, 1975), during the first two structured vis-à-vis interviews, Mrs. X's productions were but slightly tinged with primary process thinking. However, there was a periodic affective disparity which confused me; I was undecided whether it constituted *la belle indifférence* or schizophrenic dissociation.

During her third interview she eagerly lay on the couch, her speech promptly became heavily influenced by primary process thinking and she was at times incoherent. Her verbal productions were highly symbolic and her language was often unusually vulgar. She made tangential references to fairy tales, fusing elements of *Beauty and the Beast, Cinderella, Hansel and Gretel* and *Snow White,* and told a story which involved a good witch who transported children through a magical opening into a paradisiacal world in which the protagonists fused and became perpetually indistinguishable and parasitic, needing no others for their constant bliss. She also alluded to a white elephant and a spider.

She did not seem frightened by her productions or her style of presentation. There was some embarrassment about her foul language but her principal reaction was one of mild curiosity as to why she talked so strangely. My own reaction to her behavior was one of mild surprise at the degree of such prompt regression, of empathy with her embarrassment, and of detached intellectual curiosity.

I felt at ease with this patient. As a result of idiosyncratic childhood experiences, I have long comprehended unconscious meanings of primary process thinking and have been able to use its contents in synthetic manners. I have also devoted many years to the study of folklore (Boyer, 1964, 1975, 1977; Boyer and Boyer, 1967, 1977) and know most of the psychoanalytic literature dealing with the fairy tales to which she referred, as well as that dealing with the spider (Barchilon, 1959; Freud, 1913; Graber, 1925; Kaplan, 1963; Little, 1966, 1967; Lorenz, 1931; Mintz, 1969-1970; Róheim, 1953; Rubenstein, 1955). I believed that I understood from her behavior and verbal productions that her conflicts pertained especially to attempts to master early primal scene traumata and fusions with aspects of various people, oral and anal sadism, and intense sibling rivalry. I thought that the actual, affect-laden recovery of primal scene memories would be crucial in her treatment and assumed that her vulgarity indicated that they had occurred in connection with the period of cleanliness training or had become attached to experiences which occurred then. I attributed some of her easy regression to a toxic alcoholic brain syndrome and was dubious about the oft-repeated diagnosis of schizophrenia.[1]

I had the uncanny feeling that she had talked to me in a distorted childish language as though I were an actual loved figure from her early life. Retrospectively, I regret not having validated my hunch. Had I done so, I might have been aware that she had globally identified me with the only person of her child-

[1] In a subsequent contribution I shall deal more specifically with the articulation of the products and functions of primary and secondary process thinking in the treatment of such patients.

hood whom she could trust (her maternal grandfather); and my added comprehension would both have made her progress in treatment less mystifying to me and perhaps precluded a near-disaster.

In the fourth interview she came to the office drunk, although I had the impression that she was less intoxicated than she seemed. Her lips were painted black and there were white streaks on her face. She was dressed in garish, revealing clothes which exposed filthy underpants. She screamed and cursed and threatened to attack me with outstretched claws. I felt as though I were observing a puppet show. There was an obscure reference to my being a vampire. She threw harmless objects, aimed to narrowly miss me so that I felt unthreatened. She then picked up a heavy stone ashtray and menaced me with it. I felt no anxiety, but sat still and remained silent and observant. When she found me unafraid, she cried and threw herself on the couch, spread her legs apart and partially bared her tiny breasts. When I remained passive and silent, she sat at my feet, hugged my legs and eventually touched my penis. She seemed surprised that is was not erect. I then removed her hand and said it was unnecessary for her to express her conflicts physically and advised her to tell me her problems with words. She reacted with rage and tried to claw my face. It was easy to fend her off; I effortlessly held her at arms' length. If she had chosen to do so, she could have easily kicked my genitals as she threatened to do. Her strange behavior and dress seemed to be designed to test the level of my tolerance of what she felt would be anxiety-provoking or disgusting. I viewed her allusion to me as a vampire as indicative of splitting and projective identification.

I have come to understand the operational functions of projective identification in rather simple terms. I agree with Kernberg's (1976b) view that that which is projected remains to a degree unrepressed and that the patient maintains some level of continuing to feel what he seeks to project onto the therapist, thereby continuing to be preconsciously aware of what

he imagines the analyst to experience. Patients' initial aim when they project hostile wishes onto the therapist is to control their potency by defending themselves from the imagined hostility of the therapist and controlling the latter's actions. The therapist is used as a repository for projected internalized objects and attitudes which make patients feel uncomfortable, and they believe they have succeeded in locating them within the analyst. Patients fear that their hostile wishes or thoughts may result in the destruction of the therapist or retributive damage to themselves (Gordon, 1965; Grinberg, 1965). Once they believe that such hostility is a part of the analyst, they watch the analyst's behavior. Over time, effective interpretations, combined with patients' observations that the projection's alleged presence within the therapist has not proved deleterious, enable the patients to reintroject them gradually in detoxified form and to integrate them into their evolving personalities. Some patients fear that their love is destructive (Searles, 1958b) and project it onto the therapist for safekeeping; similarly, with treatment these patients come to view love as not dangerous (Giovacchini, 1975b).

Discussants have often wondered about my relative lack of fear of attack by psychotic patients. Empirically, I have never been actually attacked, although I have been frightened at times. In my own past, one of my important love objects suffered from a borderline personality disorder and periodically regressed into acute paranoid psychotic episodes. That person was impulsive and violent; and as a young child, I learned to judge the degree of physical danger and to stay away from potential murderous attacks.

In the fifth interview, Mrs. X remembered none of what had happened. When I told her what she had done, she was aghast. She vowed spontaneously not to come drunk to the office again. Most of the interviews of the first year, however, took place with her either mildly intoxicated or hung over.

For several months many interviews included periods of

incoherency which were at times grossly vulgar and talk which was obviously symbolic of early primal scene observations. Periodically, I inquired whether her interview behavior was designed to test my level of tolerance, to determine whether she could disgust or anger me or make me uncomfortable. Such queries usually resulted in a temporary cessation of her blatant vulgarities and "crazy" talk.

At times she ascribed her speech content or immodest behavior to my will, and from the outset I used such material to help her learn about her splitting mechanisms and projective tendencies and their defensive uses. An example follows.

The physical set-up of my consultation room is such that a shared waiting room has a sliding door which separates it from a tiny hallway that has three other doors, one opening into my office, one into my private lavatory and one to an exit. Mrs. X had the first interview of the day, and it occurred at an hour when I had to unlock the office building. I generally arrived early enough for other activities before seeing her. She customarily arrived for her interview just on time, making enough noise so that she could be heard entering the waiting room, although the sliding door was shut. One morning when I emerged from the lavatory some ten minutes before she was expected, I noted that the sliding door was ajar, but I assumed I must have left it so. At the time her appointment was to begin, she buzzed to announce her presence. Since I had not heard her before the buzz, I suspected some acting out had transpired. During the first few minutes of her hour, her talk dealt manifestly with hostility-laden events in her office on the previous day and included the interjection "Oh, shit" and the phrase "He pissed me off." I then assumed that she had been repeating spying activities of her childhood pertaining to adults' uses of the toilet, but that she did not choose to direct my inquiries to the past. Instead, I asked how long she had been in the waiting room before she buzzed, and I obtained some previously withheld information. It had been her wont to arrive some minutes before I opened the building and to park where she could

watch me unseen. On that particular morning, she had noiselessly followed me into the building, entered the waiting room, opened the sliding door and eventually heard the toilet flush.

Discussion of her behavior and its motivations on that day occupied several interviews and the analysis of some dreams. It developed that she had contradictory views of me. In one, I was a sadistic voyeur who had become a psychoanalyst in order to spy on the "dirty" activities and thoughts of my patients, to titillate myself and to learn how to frustrate patients by determining precisely what they wanted of me, so that I could torture them by refusing to accede to their desires. I "got my jollies" by means of subtly exhibitionistic behavior which excited in my patients those wants that I frustrated. At the same time, I had had a traumatic childhood and had undergone much suffering because of exhibitionistic and frustrating parents and wanted, as a psychoanalyst, to relieve my patients of their misery. It was as if I were two people. I was at times totally hateful, bad and hurtful and at other times solely loving, good and helpful, and my alternating personalities determined my totally unpredictable behavior. It was my will that she observe my every act so that she could become exactly like me and arrive at social and professional success, but it was also my will that she should not embarrass me by letting me know that she had read my mind and was following instructions.

When I indicated to her how she had ascribed to me precisely the qualities which she had previously described as her own, she was impressed, and for a time she could more clearly contemplate her self-view as all good and all bad and her projective tendencies. It was then possible to review the events in the office on the day that preceded her acting out and to delineate ways in which her behavior with me and her ascriptions to me had been in the service of defense against anxiety and guilt over behavior and wishes related to people in her work setting. She had acted toward me as she felt her co-workers had acted toward her. I suggested that she had sought to master a feeling of helplessness through identification with the aggressor, and I

postulated that this behavior constituted a lifelong pattern. I did not have sufficient cathected data to make a more specific statement.[2]

At times she was flirtatious in her dress and actions and sought to entertain and amuse me, imitating, as it developed, her mother's party behavior and obeying her parental injunctions about how to "hook" a rich doctor. At the same time she had fused sensations of urinary or fecal urgency and, despite a hysterectomy some years before treatment began, felt blood on her legs and expressed the wish to smear me with it. Sometimes there was vaginal itching. Occasionally, she spread her legs and began to undress, meantime rubbing her pubis. When I asked her about her thoughts and feelings, it became apparent she was unaware of her actions. On a few occasions, she wondered whether I felt lonely and wanted my face in her crotch. When I commented that she seemed to believe she had put part of herself into me, she recalled what she believed to have been early childhood and latency experiences of lying with her mother and palpating her mother's genitals with her hands and face; she remembered the feeling of pubic hair on her nose and cheeks. In her sober interviews, she was often largely withdrawn and "headachy" or had other somatic complaints, which we came to understand as her imitating one part of her mother's periodic daytime bed behavior. I also focused on her primitive wish to fuse with me as a representative of her mother.

For many months she picked up men at bars and submitted to their sexual demands. When I tried to show her that these men were father figures, she regularly corrected me, making me aware that they represented the phallic and nurturant mother

[2] It will be noted that my inclusion of a genetic interpretation was tentative. While I believe the inclusion of genetic aspects of interpretations is essential from the outset, I hold that genetic interpretations are meaningful to patients only after they have become well acquainted with their uses of various primitive defensive mechanisms and with the current reasons for their appearance. This is in marked contrast to the technical approach of many Kleinians who, from the outset, seek to interpret unconscious motivations in terms of the id rather than of the ego (Boyer and Giovacchini, 1967, pp. 111-114).

with whom she sought to fuse. However, she gradually became cognizant that her conscious contempt for her father covered rage at him, and with amazement she slowly recovered memories of boating with him. During one session she misinterpreted a noise to mean I was masturbating behind her. I remarked that perhaps there had been a time when she had seen her father masturbate. Over a period of weeks, she recovered the memory of her actions with the chauffeur, which included his placing her hands on his erection, while he wore black gloves. Then she gradually recalled with much embarrassment that during adolescence on the boating excursions with her father, she had watched him masturbate in the cabin; she slowly became aware of her anger that he had preferred masturbation to using her sexually.

In the interviews that followed, material continued that involved nighttime dreams and overt or covert themes of mutilations, murder, and desertion. There was obvious blurring of ego boundaries. My interpretations, as always, were transferential and as genetic as I deemed advisable and aimed at reinforcing previous interpretations of the defensive use of splitting. She gradually became aware that she had much anger which she had denied and uncritically projected onto policemen and other establishment figures. Now she began to be more critical of her automatic devaluation of them as parental representatives. Later she would be able to comprehend a pattern of projection of aggression and reintrojection of aggressively determined self- and object images and the subsequent use of splitting operations.

In this early period, I delayed focusing on the fusion of anal, vaginal and urethral sensations, judging that data pertaining to this evidence of lack of structuralization of drives would be remembered at a later time when interpretations would be more meaningful. I believed that the content of her primary process thinking during the third interview had already heralded the fact that primal scene traumata were partial organizers of her particular ego structure. Periodic interpretations of her wish

to fuse with me were gradually understood and elaborated by her. For example, she often responded that she wished to be taken into one or another of my orifices, even including my pores, and to circulate in my blood, to lodge in my brain and govern all my activities, while secretly spying on my actions to learn from them how I handled those elements which she had projected onto me. Only much later, after she had reintrojected detoxified versions of those projections, did she see this fantasy as self-destructive. She then strove to clarify actual differences between us.

About five months after Mrs. X was first seen, she learned that I had an interest in anthropology and asked to borrow a magazine from the waiting room which included an article on stone-age humans. She had lost her capacity to read easily and with comprehension after the first grade; and I suggested that she wanted permission to learn to read understandingly again and to develop herself as a person rather than to follow the assigned role of dumb-blond doctor-seducer. She promptly enrolled in high school, then college, and slowly developed the capacity to read and write with comprehension. During the following years she received only A's in her extension division college courses.

After she had been in treatment for about six months, I left for a period of six weeks. She had known of my planned absence from the beginning of her sessions and I had thought her anxiety about the separation had been well understood before I left, since we had dealt extensively with her reactions to her mother's European jaunts. However, immediately after my departure, she attempted suicide by taking an overdose of pills, which I had not known she possessed. She was rescued, so far as could be determined, by chance. It was noted in her hospital chart that she had mentioned her mother's father. During my absence she had no remembered thought about me until the day before her scheduled appointment; and when she appeared for her interview, she seemed surprised that I was alive. She had not died, therefore I must have. When she entered the room, she looked everywhere for something but when I inquired what

she was trying to find, she declined to tell me. Much later, I found out that she had sought a white elephant.

She had hoped that her death would result in my professional destruction. She now viewed her father's drunkenness and affairs as ways of risking death in the hope that he would thereby get even with her mother for her contemptuousness. She also recalled the Oriental custom of committing suicide on the doorstep of the wronging person.

Soon after my return, poignant memories of her early relationship with her mother's father emerged. Apparently, her relationship with that loving man was the only consistently dependable one of her childhood. It formed the basis of the element of basic trust which enabled her to develop psychologically as far as she did. He had held her on his lap, listened to her seriously, and was always considerate of her needs. One time, when she was envious of one of her sisters' having received a soft, stuffed animal as a present, she told her grandfather that she wanted a similar toy which she could care for as though it were a baby. He responded by telling her the story of an orphan baby elephant in India which was adopted by a boy whom it loved and always obeyed, no doubt a variant of Kipling's "Toomai of the Elephants." He promised to get her a white elephant for Christmas. She believed he meant a living animal rather than a toy. In fact, he gave her another white stuffed toy, but she retained the belief that he would eventually give her the living pachyderm. When she was almost seven years old, he died; but she had the set idea that when she got a white elephant someday, she would also find her grandfather and once again have a dependable, loving relationship with a kindly person who did not misuse her.

She had apparently entered a satisfactory early latency period adjustment, but the death of her grandfather caused her to lose her capacity to learn and to use fantasy constructions in an adaptive manner (Sarnoff, 1976). She had not been taken to his funeral where she might have viewed his corpse and thus been confronted with the reality of his demise. Her loss of the capac-

ity to learn had been based on her wish to deny having learned of his death; she would never again learn anything if she had to accept this learning.

I shall now turn to an example of how my coming to understand my emotional response enabled me to change an impasse into a beneficial step. When her son as a young child had come home from the hospital for brief periods, she had taken men home with her and in a drunken state performed fellatio and submitted to sodomy before him. She had no memory of her actions, but would be informed by the nurses. Sometimes, when she was unwittingly angry with me, she would return to her shameful feelings on being told by the nurses what she had done. I gradually noted that I began to respond to such recitations by irritation and sleepiness; and I found myself being subtly punitive toward her. For some weeks there was a therapeutic stalemate, during which her acting out increased and our rapport all but disappeared. I regretted having accepted her for treatment and wondered why I had done so. I fell into a brief trance-like state during an interview with her and when I became fully alert again, had repressed the content of my reverie. That night I had a dream which reminded me of my own past. I had learned in prior periods of personal analysis that I had become an analyst with an unconscious motivation of curing the important but psychologically disordered and dangerous love object to whom I have alluded previously. Analysis of my dream made me aware of another reason: I had sought to protect a younger sibling from the love object. I then knew that I had accepted Mrs. X in treatment to effect changes not only in her but in her psychotic son. Then I became aware that I had identified myself with her abused child and was expressing my anger by withdrawal and by refusing to recognize her, as she had previously reported her son to have done. Such knowledge permitted me to regain my objectivity. Finally, I could interpret her wish to provoke me to abuse her. She responded by remembering dreams and hypnopompic fantasies in which she was forced to watch women being raped anally or having

huge phalluses shoved into their mouths. Three years later I was able to interpret her behavior as an attempt to master her terror and her feelings of dissolution when she had watched the sexual activities of her parents.

Soon she began to experience choking sensations during the interviews. Analysis of dreams showed her use of the body-phallus equation and her wish that I would force her to reintroject both good and bad aspects of herself, which she had projected onto me. Affect-laden memories of her experiences with the chauffeur appeared. Following her grandfather's death, she had turned to that black-gloved man (whom she partly confused with the Negro who had comforted her during the shipboard experience) in an effort to regain a loving relationship with a man who would take her on his lap, as her father refused to do. He had forced his phallus into her mouth, causing her to choke. She had concealed their activities, rationalizing that she was supposed to die through choking in her effort to provide her sisters with their parents' finite love. She also now remembered nightly efforts to determine whether her parents were alive by checking to make sure they were breathing while they were asleep. The choking conversion symptom disappeared.

She now recalled with emotion nightly rituals during her latency period. Her family's house was very old. While electrical contrivances had been installed in her third-story bedroom, there remained a gas jet. At night it was permissible to have illumination from the jet but the lights were not to be used. She was terrified that a vague, never visualized something would attack her from the dark. She feared even more that leaking gas would poison her. She engaged in endless prayers for her own salvation and for the other members of the family. She engaged in counting rituals which were supposed to influence God to save them. She used the rituals to stay awake, believing that she was safe from attack so long as she remained alert. She had a collection of dolls and stuffed animals which covered most of her bed, and she tenderly put them to sleep with caresses and cooings. She endlessly repeated, "Now I lay me

down to sleep, I pray the Lord my soul to keep," applying the theme to her dolls and consciously equating being asleep with being dead. While doing so, she sometimes believed she was Christ, grandfather-God's protector of children, and felt her pubis repeatedly to determine whether she had grown a penis. She had to check many times to be sure the window was tightly locked, because if she were to fall asleep with it open, she might throw her babies (dolls) and herself into the snow on the ground below. Her own death would have been acceptable because of its altruistic motives; but to have murdered her babies would have made her a sinner and unsuitable to rejoin her grandfather and have God keep her soul.

Her treatment had begun just before a Christmas separation, and her reactions to my first absence had not been decipherable (Boyer, 1955). As our second Christmas separation approached, she returned to thinking of her mother's departures for the grand tour of Europe. Now those memories became cathected with feelings of rage and then with loneliness. She sought to remove the loneliness by joining a singles group and resuming the drunken activities with men she picked up. For the first time, she could remember what she did with her partners. She was exceedingly aggressive, insisting on assuming the superior position. She demanded that the man be passive while she pumped up and down on his erection, at times believing his penis was hers and was penetrating him. I interpreted this behavior as representing a continuation of her efforts to save me from her anger at me for deserting her like a parent.

The following summer when I left her for another extended period, she went on a prolonged drunk and behaved so crazily that she was jailed. She requested hospitalization and rejoined her second husband whom she knew to be in the hospital. There she entered a fusion state with him. She had no conscious thought of my existence until the week before our scheduled appointment. Then she arranged her release and met me on time.

She explained that in her rage at my leaving her she had

wanted to humiliate me by killing herself or getting murdered; but she protected herself by getting hospitalized and joining her husband. Thus she deemed her behavior to have been adaptive and was pleased with herself. She now valued her contacts with me above all else.

Throughout her treatment until this time, there had been rare contacts with her mother, sisters, daughters and their young children whom she had never been able to touch, fearing she would kill them. When the third Christmas came, she was able to spend more time with her mother and sisters and feel less uneasiness than before. She also had one of her daughters bring her family to visit for the holidays. She found herself infuriated with the excited pleasure and selfishness of the young children. Now she recalled with intensity childhood Christmases which had been immensely frustrating for her, not only because she felt her sisters got more than she, but particularly because she did not turn into a boy or get a penis so she could be Christ, the martyred favorite son of all mankind. She began to realize that her fears of harming her own babies disguised a wish to kill them, as they represented her siblings. Then she became closer to her daughters and enjoyed holding their children. Also her relations with her mother and sisters improved. She invited her son to visit her periodically on leave from a distant psychiatric hospital. Over the next few years during subsequent visits they developed a calmer and mutually affectionate relationship.

She now eschewed alcohol for long periods and only occasionally had sexual relations with men. Her interests were limited to job, school, and analysis. She was gradually promoted at work. There was a growing interest in the lives of her female bosses, and fantasies pertaining to them I interpreted as displaced fantasies about my life. The previous flirtatiousness with me resumed as did the pattern of coming to the office in altered ego states; the fusion of vaginal, urethral and anal sensations reappeared. I suggested that her childhood pattern of checking on her parents' breathing was the result of her having been disturbed by noises in their bedroom which she assumed to have

occurred during their sexual activities. She then recalled that during preoedipal years, her bedroom was separated from theirs by a bathroom in which her mother's douche tip and bag, which she believed to have been used to give her enemas, hung on the wall and that sometimes mother's bloody menstrual rags were in a bucket of water. Then I guessed that she had repeatedly observed their activities and had experienced excitement which she discharged with urinary and fecal activities during the night. My ideas were accepted with equanimity. She gradually recalled with much feeling repeated childhood observations of their sexual actions which included sodomy, cunnilingus and fellatio, always accompanied by her mother's groaning protests. She had interpreted their actions in anal-sadistic and oral-fusional terms and had thought that each had a penis like a sword which could kill the other. She had reacted with fused oral, anal and vaginal excitement and had sought to interrupt her parents by noisy bathroom activities.

In the fifth year of treatment she gradually repressed the primal scene memories and the observations of father's masturbating on the boat. She did well at work and school, had occasional dates and developed the capacity to have mild orgasms during nonfrantic intercourse. During my summer absence she briefly re-entered a relationship with her second husband, now devoid of its fusional aspects. He was ill, and she cared for him considerately. She began to have vague and emotionally uninvested fantasies about me. Therapy appeared to have reached a plateau in which she was functioning well but retaining a primitive idealization of me, interpretations of which had no effect. She was quite cognizant that I made mistakes and assumed that I had secret faults which she could not verify, but I remained an idol like her mother. I decided to use the parameter of a trial separation in an effort to dislodge the primitive idealization. Accordingly, I recommended that, beginning with my summer absence six months thence, we remain apart for six months and resume treatment just after the following Christmas. She was gratified but apprehensive because she had not recovered the shipboard memories.

She decided to have an earlier trial separation by making a hiking trip with an organized group in the Himalayas and returning to treatment a month before I was to leave for the summer period. During her preparation for the trip, she began to have occasional dates with a black gardener who, she thought, had previously been a chauffeur, her first contact with blacks since she began treatment. She recalled that she had turned to the swarthy chauffeur at the age of seven after her grandfather's death in an effort to replace him with another sustaining object. Before her trip to India she had passing thoughts about seeking a white elephant and wondered whether she might be seeking a magical reunion with her grandfather. En route to the Himalayas, she went for the first time to the site of her father's suicide and could cry and miss him. She also visited with her mother, sisters, children and grandchildren and had warm interchanges with them. After her return she said she had seen her family to say farewell, since she expected to have some accident and die while in India, hoping thereby to be reunited with her grandfather.

On the journey, she was very happy. However, she took fragments from shrines and worried that she had desecrated the dead. She bartered with Tibetan women for their jewelry and felt she corrupted them by buying their religious objects, one of which included a white elephant. When she came back to treatment, we discussed her wish to return to the loving relationship with her grandfather, but she experienced little affectual release.

In the last interview before our trial separation, she had a fantasy of using the stone fragments as a memorial stele for my grave. Thus she would have me near her and available for her alone; she would commune with me in time of need.

She did not contact me after six months as we had planned. In January I wrote a note inquiring about her progress. She was intensely gratified and requested further therapy. She had not made the memorial shrine and had again forgotten my existence, being sure that I had died.

Her relationship with the black man had intensified. Over

Christmas she had the delusional conviction that her visiting mother and a sister had sought to take him from her. She was furious and tried to hurt them in various ways. When she got my note, she partially decathected her delusion and viewed it as a subject for investigation.

During the next eighteen months, the vicissitudes of her jealousy were worked through fairly well. The death of her grandfather and her subsequent seeking to join him in the Himalayas were cathected, but true mourning did not take place; unconsciously, she still did not accept the fact of his death (Wolfenstein, 1966, 1969).

She had earlier been unaware of fantasies during masturbation or sexual relationships and had focused solely on the physical seeking for orgasm. Following a reported episode of masturbation, I asked her to visualize what she might have fantasied were she able to shift her attention from the physical experience and her fear that either she would not have orgasm or that if she did, she would convulse and explode into fragments. She closed her eyes and saw oblong geometric forms. During subsequent interviews the forms became rounded and unified as a hand and an arm, tearing at her vagina. She revealed that for years she had awakened at night, clawing her perineum. She was sure she continued to have invisible pinworms from childhood. When stool examinations were negative, she understood the fantasized oblongs in terms of projected sadistic part objects. She now revealed that she kept her apartment like a pigsty and ate her meals standing up when she was alone. She also found it interesting that she had never learned to wipe herself and always had feces on her perianal hair and underpants. When she deemed this behavior to reflect a continuing wish to be totally taken care of, she felt humiliated and began to straighten up her apartment and keep herself clean.

During an interview in which she recalled the fantasy of the fragmented geometric, dehumanized hand-arm symbols, she returned to the terrifying experience on board ship. She had gone to the head and seen her father having intercourse *a tergo*

with a nursemaid. She had been shocked and she felt that her face had become wrinkled and flat and had then slid off her head, to lie on the floor like an emptied breast (Isakower, 1938; Lewin, 1946; Spitz, 1966). She recalled also that her father had seen her watching him and looked aghast. His face seemed similarly to disintegrate. She had thought both of them were dissolving. Now she remembered early childhood episodes of watching her father's masturbation and having experienced a halo effect (Boyer, 1971; Greenacre, 1947).

She dreamed that she was being decapitated as she was in danger of being swallowed by huge waves. These she equated with her mother's vaginal labia. Her remembered seekings to get into her mother's vagina face-first were recathected. Dressed like a teenage boy, she lay rigid on the couch. She feared she would vomit, ejaculate with her whole body, and that I would cut off her head in retribution for her ambivalent wish to render me impotent by making her treatment a failure. Soon she saw these ideas in terms of an early wish to demasculinize her father as her mother's behavior had effectively done. She became intensely aware of having identified herself with her father's phallus and was both stunned and relieved. She had the fantasy that if she could supplant her father's sexual role with her mother, then her mother would need no one but her and they could live together in an idyllic symbiotic union. On the other hand, such a situation would be dangerous because a fusion with her mother would mean a destructive loss of personal identity.

When she did not regress during my summer absence, she decided to terminate before the annual Christmas separation. During the final six months, she continued to function well, except that she eschewed relationships with men other than the black lover from whom she was detaching herself. She recathected her jealousy of women at work, mother and sister surrogates, but her behavior remained appropriate and her murderous wishes were confined to fantasies. She became relaxed in her relationship with me, which essentially became

that of an old friend. While my behavior remained strictly analytic with her, I shared her feelings and her fantasies that when we were apart, we would miss each other and wish each other well.

Just before termination, she brought me a tiny bonsai tree, representing herself, and in the pot was one of the Himalayan shrine stone fragments. She wanted to remain with me, to have me continue to help her mature. She planned to return in another six months, to sit and talk with me as old friends, and perhaps then we would tenderly hold one another. She understood that this wish included an element of finally telling her father she loved and missed him.

During the last interview, she sat on the couch, looking at me through much of the interview, saying she now securely felt herself to be a separate and real person and could view me as a real person. At its end, she hugged me and kissed my cheek. Then she told me she had to touch me during the drunken interview, to be sure I was not the product of her mind, but had some separateness from her.

By the end of treatment she was a vastly changed woman, capable of warm, responsible, calm relationships with the members of her family. She drank socially, had progressed in her work to a position of authority and was on the verge of obtaining a baccalaureate. She was very proud of herself and happy. However, she had not developed the capacity to have lasting mature relationships with men and had neither completely worked through her idealization of me nor truly mourned the death of her grandfather.

A year after termination, Mrs. X requested follow-up interviews because she was uneasy about the Christmas season. She had renounced her relationship with the black lover, had begun to have dates with men who were more eligible for marriage, had lost much of her idealization of me and appeared to have satisfactorily mourned her grandfather. She no longer felt compelled to get her baccalaureate, which she now deemed to have been a goal set with the idea that by achieving it she would

be more pleasing to me. Rather, she now took courses solely for her own pleasure. She announced her intention to return for interviews early in the holiday season each year until she felt more secure with her emotional responses to Christmastime.

DISCUSSION

The discussion will be limited to three issues: the diagnosis, the effects of the therapist's absences, and the question of the influence of the therapist's personality on the outcome of treatment.

Diagnosis

I view the classical psychoanalytic technique to be the model for the psychological treatment of psychiatric disorders; and the purpose of evaluative interviews is to work out which variations of that technique are necessary for the individual patient. But the early establishment of a diagnosis may tend to predetermine the nature of treatment and to reduce the therapist's plasticity. In my opinion, the therapist should assume that underlying the presenting symptomatology are untapped ego strengths and a capacity for maturation which might allow a working alliance and the development of a technical approach close to the analytic model.

There have been continuing efforts to refine diagnostic categories, which might lead to more suitable therapeutic procedures. Kernberg's (1975a) dynamic definition of the borderline personality disorder is a particularly useful contribution. When the term is used as he advocates, it ordinarily makes the nature of the characterological dysfunctioning more easily comprehensible. His recommendations concerning the modifications of psychoanalytic technique are sound, although, in my opinion, fewer deviations are necessary than he advocates.

The establishment of a diagnostic label for Mrs. X continues to plague me. It may be that her having been diagnosed as schizophrenic predetermined to some extent the nature of her treatment before I saw her and resulted in her having been denied the opportunity to undergo the therapy which

would have led to her improvement. To be sure, there were good reasons to apply that label to her. Her reaction to our first prolonged separation was to try to kill herself so that I would continue to exist. Her surprise that I remained alive although she had not died was dramatic evidence that the self-representation of being a martyr was delusional. She underwent a catatonic-like regression during her teens when she felt deserted by her primitively idealized girl friend and lived in a withdrawn, almost machine-like state for six years. After her first marriage she passively accepted her husband's attempt to murder her. And later she accepted enemas from her father-in-law. The seriousness of her subsequent regressive behavior, however, was complicated by a toxic brain state from chronic alcoholism.

In Mrs. X we have a very complicated concatenation of ego structures. She apparently retained from very early childhood split maternal introjects which she then sought to project onto various people in her environment, as evinced by her primitive idealization and devaluation (Volkan, 1976). There remained an ego-syntonic drive to fuse with loved ones whom she could equate with the good-mother projection, and her self-worth was enhanced by her self-view as martyr. We can suppose that the persistence of the goal to fuse represents a wish to regain the mother of the symbiotic phase (Mahler, Pine and Bergman, 1975). Her self-identification as martyr may be considered as an attempt to be at one with a primitive ego ideal, a phenomenon which Kernberg (1975a, pp. 227-262) views as evidence of pathological narcissism. However, she retained an internal bad-mother introject which she sought to externalize.

Her actual life models served to reinforce her primitive split internalized object relations. Her parents served predominantly as bad models with whom to identify in contrast to her grandfather who, before me, provided her sole consistent good model. The imposition of traumatizing primal scene experiences and her comprehension of those events at

the level of her psychosexual maturation (oral-aggressive, fusional and anal-phallic-sadistic) served as an ego organizer, determining the manifest nature of her need to adjust to the retained split introjects. One root of her faulty sexual identity and ego-syntonic striving to become Christ lies in her striving to achieve a sense of intrapsychic unity and wholeness.

But, although it was easy for her to identify with her autistic son, Mrs. X did not become an autistic psychotic. She had the capacity to develop a hierarchy of defenses, including rationalization and repression, and object relationships which varied in their levels of maturity.

A case could be made for schizoaffective psychosis, with masked depression stemming from the incomplete mourning of her lost grandfather, combined with cognitive regression. Her fundamental characterological pathology may have had its roots in her relationships with mothering objects in the latter half of her first year of life.

To conclude, the course of her life and transference responses seem to me to indicate the diagnosis of borderline personality organization. Before the introduction of that label I would have said she suffered from a severe hysterical personality disorder with schizoid, depressive and impulsive trends.

The Absences of the Therapist

Separations imposed by the therapist are generally thought to be detrimental to therapy with regressed patients. The topic has been touched on by various writers who usually focus on its adverse effects (Federn, 1952), but also on the possibility of useful interpretations resulting from countertransference experiences (Langer, 1957) and on the setting of a termination date as an impetus to analysis (Orens, 1955).

During all the years of my research in treating regressed patients, I have imposed separations frequently, being absent as a rule at least ten times yearly for periods of a few days to ten weeks at one time. This procedure resulted initially from my involvement in other research, but then I learned that such

imposed absences were generally helpful. However, many colleagues feel that emergency contacts between interviews by telephone or actual meetings are necessary. They hold the view that the therapist's role includes "real" good parental caretaking to substitute for the presumed poor past-life experience of their patients (Azima and Wittkower, 1956; Federn, 1952; Nunberg, 1932; Schwing, 1954). But I have not been readily available for emergency contacts; and it is my view that the best substitute parenting one can afford the patient is to hew as closely as possible to the classical analytic model (Giovacchini, 1970).

Before the analytic contract has been reached, I inform the potential patient of my planned absences, a move which motivates analysis of reactions to impending separations and their involvement in the transference. From the outset the issue of being deserted is an implicit or explicit focus of investigation. Although most patients respond with anxiety, the forms of which and defenses against which can be studied and used integratively, I have found almost regularly that the patient has heard another message to which he responds with conscious or unconscious encouragement: that the therapist does not consider him to be as helpless as he deems himself.

Not infrequently, soon after a patient has been informed of my planned absences, his anxiety takes the form of overt or veiled requests for permission for emergency contacts. In general, it suffices for me to make an interpretation that he wants to be reassured that the therapist still exists. Patients have not usually telephoned me after this interpretation has been made. When such calls have occurred, I have listened long enough to determine whether an actual emergency has arisen; only rarely have I considered the patient in danger of engaging in some harmful acting out which might warrant overt limit-setting, or undergoing such a regression that intramural care might be indicated.

In the instances in which I have deemed no true emergency

to exist, I have simply asked whether the patient did not feel it would be better to wait until the next interview to discuss the matter in question. This maneuver has regularly occasioned relief and gratitude.

There have been, however, as in the case of Mrs. X, suicide attempts which have been associated with separations. In no such instance had the patient sought telephone contact. The suicide attempt of Mrs. X came as a total surprise to me and caused me concern and self-searching. I still wonder whether, if I had checked my hunch after the third interview that she had been speaking to me as though I were an actual loved person of her past, material pertaining to the death of her grandfather might have emerged and been subject to analysis. This might possibly have averted her attempt by self-destruction to unite with him and keep me alive.

The Personality of the Therapist

The quantitative study of the outcome of the Psychotherapy Research Project of the Menninger Foundation (Kernberg, et al., 1972) stressed the importance of both the therapeutic technique and the skill and personality of the therapist in the treatment of patients with serious ego weaknesses and the need of a "fit" between therapist and patient for a successful outcome.

It has never been established whether a combination of a satisfactory personal analysis, adequate training, and experience are sufficient to enable a therapist to work with seriously regressed patients in a manner which approaches the psychoanalytic model, or whether preconditioning, idiosyncratic life experiences provide an indispensible extra element. For us to know would require publication of confidential information. This is unlikely to happen since it would have to come from training analysts who disclosed confidential data or from a large number of personal autobiographical accounts. I can only speculate.

Early in my psychiatric and later psychoanalytic experience I became aware that I had an unusual capacity to understand primary process products and simultaneously to retain a degree of objectivity which made me feel comfortable with seriously regressed patients and able to behave in such a manner that they benefited from our contacts. At that time, knowing of my special past, I seriously entertained the idea that reasonably successful survival of a potentially pathogenic childhood might be a prerequisite for such an aptitude.

My subsequent intimate contacts with others who have done successful psychoanalytic work with such patients, combined with extensive teaching experiences, have changed my view. It is my more mature opinion that such an individual past may make the early efforts of trainees less discomfiting and more effective; but a good personal analysis, subsequent training, and experience are entirely adequate as prerequisites for the successful work with borderline and psychotic patients.

SUMMARY

Psychoanalytic treatment with seriously regressed patients is feasible within the framework of the structural hypothesis. Poor results in such treatment can often be traced to the failure of the therapist to use his emotional responses to the patient in his formulations. Success results not only from accurate, empathic, and timely maneuvers which lead to genetic interpretations, but also from the development of the patient's new object relations with the therapist.

Details from the successful seven-and-a-half year analysis of one patient with a borderline personality disorder are used to illustrate the interaction between the therapist's internal reactions and technique.

While idiosyncratic early life experiences contribute to the relative ease with which some therapists deal with such patients, successful personal analysis and adequate training and experience suffice to prepare the motivated psychoanalyst.

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A VIEW OF THE BACKGROUND OF FREUDIAN THEORY

BY LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, M.D.

A major concern of nineteenth century scientists was to delineate the objective units or entities with which science deals. While some philosophers of science abandoned the search as futile and tried to redefine science, investigators in the biological sciences and the sciences of man attempted to discover new entities upon which to base their disciplines. A new understanding of hypnotism gave Freud the opportunity to isolate objective entities within the mind and to found a psychology on that basis.

My purpose in this paper is to describe the problems and opportunities out of which Freudian theory grew. I hope thereby to make clearer why it was formulated, what it contributed, and what we might learn from it about the development of scientific hypotheses.

I believe that the basic psychoanalytic hypothesis, already present in *Studies on Hysteria* (Breuer and Freud, 1893-1895), is that within the mind there exist elements which can be traced through many changes and can be described sometimes in physical, sometimes in ideational, and sometimes in affective terms without being completely encompassed by any of them. These parts of the mind can be thought of as "things" which, like ordinary objects, show themselves in various ways. Thus one may be observing the same thing in a hysterical symptom as one observes in an abreaction. The "thing" may be called an idea, a fantasy or a wish. What is important is that it is not just an aspect of mind, but a real entity having multiform effects of its own.[1]

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[1] Although it used to be a cliché that psychoanalysis began with "the discovery of the unconscious," commentators have long realized that the un-

Of course, no single formula can comprehend the significance of a theory. For instance, in postulating an entity within the mind, Freud was defining a part of a whole. His theory, therefore, had to alternate between seeing the part as a separate thing and seeing it as an aspect of the whole mind. The development of psychoanalysis can thus be characterized as guided by a mixed allegiance to part formulas and whole formulas. In addition, part-entities within a single whole may be in conflict. When Freud recognized that the thing he was studying was not just a piece of the intrusive, traumatic, outside world, but part of the mind itself, he was drawn to a theory of conflict of parts of the mind.[2] But if there is indeed one mind, conflicts must be capable of resolution. Freud therefore had to complement his conflict theory with a theory of synthesis of the whole mind. One can describe Freud's genius as an alertness to conflict within a theory that accounts as well for synthesis.

There is also another aspect of Freud's approach. A thing that constitutes a part of the mind is "treated" or "handled" in varying ways by the mind. Therefore, psychoanalytic theory has to refer to things and also to process. Moreover, since the thing is a part of a whole mind and not just an intrusion upon it, it is itself a part of a process, as shown by its origins,

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conscious per se was by no means a new idea. Ellenberger (1970) summarized the evidence for the fact that the unconscious is not specifically a psychoanalytic discovery. I am certainly not the first to regard variably expressive entities as the real psychoanalytic discovery. Rapaport (1944, pp. 187, ff.) considered the hallmark of Freud's theory to be the quest for intrapsychic continuities. Ricoeur's (1970) profound study of the Freudian system reveals it to be built upon the postulation of an unknowable instinct representative straddling biological and mental worlds. Such an unknowable referent I regard as the sign of any real entity or thing under investigation (Friedman, 1976). Wyss (1966) holds that the point of departure for Freudian theory was the postulation of an idea with displaceable, quantitative affect. Stewart (1967) suggests that the basic idea of psychoanalysis which was present from the beginning was the "repression of an idea and the displacement of its energy onto a substitute."

[2] Hartmann (1956, p. 277) regarded conflict (and defense) as the key to understanding Freud's theory. Ritvo (1974) holds that conflict dominated Freud's theory from the beginning.

development and fate, and it must be described at times in terms of process rather than in terms of things. Conversely, in describing the mental state that causes a certain clinical event, the process involving the whole mind must be broken down into static units. The theory thus has to be a fluctuating mixture of a thing theory (static, phasic, like a snapshot, structural, institutional, etc.) and a process theory (cathectic processes, discharge processes, energic transformations, and over-all directions of mental movement).

Freud's initial step was to identify entities in the mind, the fate of which could be correlated with symptoms and behavior. In doing that he explained how we can look at the mind as a whole and as a collection of parts, as a synthesis of wishes which are also in conflict, and as a flowing process in which we can discern discrete configurations.

I believe that these terms—part and whole, entity and process, conflict and synthesis—can be useful in examining the intellectual history, the relationship to scientific restructuring, and perhaps the future of psychoanalysis.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

In one form or another, these terms refer to logical or philosophical problems inherent in any system of thought. They have been of concern at least from the time of the pre-Socratics and possibly from the time of the first "primitive" intellectual systems. At any rate, there seems to have been some special form of crisis involving these problems during the nineteenth century, a crisis manifested by a troubled effort to specify natural entities.

According to Lester King (1975, pp. 290-291), seventeenth century medicine was a field divided between retreating Galenists, iatrochemists, and corpuscularians. From his account it would appear that the theoretical issue was how much abstract conceptualization is needed to understand phenomena. It seems that the Galenists took a realist or rationalist stand in favor of essential abstractions, the chemists a nominalist or empiricist

position in favor of particular descriptions, and the atomists occupied intermediate ground.

Evidently, the victor was an empiricism even more radical than that of the chemists. Discussing the lethal tendency of eighteenth century physicians to group diseases into irrelevant classifications, Paul Bernard (1975) says:

> Part of the trouble was that eighteenth-century medicine, like the other sciences, was largely dominated by the taxonomic spirit that characterized the age. Medical theorists concentrated their efforts on arranging diseases in categories and, having done so, did not trouble to reflect that the basis of classification had been external symptoms and not the *causa* or the *sedes morbi*. Thus common colds, dysentery, diabetes, a tendency to miscarry chronically, and gonorrhea were all held to be different manifestations of the same disease (p. 200, n.)

Possibly what happened later was that the pendulum of favor swung so far from reason to observation that by the nineteenth century the very idea of a natural category became problematic. Instead of debating rival categories, thinkers argued the skeptical question: What is one looking for when seeking the essence of an illness or the subject of a science? That is a question that can be addressed alike to Galenists, chemists, corpuscularians, taxonomists, and, later, to physicists and psychologists.

Commentators on Freud have customarily placed him in either a mechanistic age (when examining his theory) or a humanistic setting (when examining his method) (e.g., Peterfreund [1971] and Gedo and Wolf [1976] respectively). Nineteenth century Materialism (in the form of Mechanism) may have been a reaction to Romanticism (in the form of Vitalism). But both currents shared a common concern about what a natural entity was and a new uncertainty about what entities could be studied. The successes of post-Newtonian physics had encouraged scientists to think in terms of forces (*cf.*, Amacher [1965] on the Helmholtz school). Forces could be represented by laws or rules. But forces act on things, and force itself was sometimes thought of as an entity subject to laws and rules.

(Popper [1974, p. 1120] states that forces and dispositions refer to unobservable entities, of which they are manifestations.) Therefore forces do not dispose of the problem of natural entities.

Underlying the science of mechanics is the implicit assumption that simple bodies of matter are the ultimate entities. But it is also assumed that aggregates of bodies are natural entities and that the naturalness of those derivative entities is assured by the forces inherent in the supposedly simple components. From the time of Newton, it became necessary to attribute to the ultimate atoms of matter occult powers which natural laws were supposed to make unnecessary. De Santillana (1941, p. 21) states that "against Newton's better judgment, and with much hesitation on his part, atomism was drifting back toward explanations through inherence"—a reversion to the despised Aristotelian notion of entelechies. De Santillana points out that by the beginning of the nineteenth century, a mechanicist physicist, Poinsot, had already realized that mechanics is not fundamental, that its principles have to be founded upon another science, which must rest upon another in an infinite regressive series.

Since even the successfully formalized science of mechanics could not finally encompass entities in its own terms, some nineteenth century empiricists abandoned mechanism, materialism, and atomism, and began a long march, continuing to our day, in quest of a proper subject of science that would *not* be an entity. The project was to explain the unification of knowledge brought about by scientific laws without attributing it to common underlying natural entities. Reacting to the nineteenth century perplexity about entities, this school would henceforth deride entities as "metaphysical."

The first and traditional empiricist proposal was to say that what the laws correlate is sense data. This seems to designate sense data as primary things.[3] And if laws represent forces, such a formula comes perilously close to the tenet that the

[3] Avenarius opted in favor of substantializing sensation, with considerable effect upon later academic psychology (*cf.*, Titchener, 1929, pp. 115-118).

world is made out of mind. That is not a congenial statement for those who wish to confine themselves to enunciating empirical laws. To avoid this impasse, the empiricists renounced not only entities, but forces as well. A conventionalist interpretation of laws crept into empiricism. Mach suggested that scientific theories are simple or useful or economical arrangements of "experience" and portray neither natural entities nor a natural order. For Mach, the knowing mind is not to be thought of as a receptor, but rather as a biological strategy. It adjusts its contents in a pragmatic fashion that is continually modified by experience (*cf.*, Joergensen, 1951, p. 7).

As for what seemed to be natural entities, these "things . . . appear to be merely relatively constant complexes of so-called 'qualities' which Mach identified with our sensations and called 'elements' " (Joergensen, 1951, p. 8). Joergensen states that for Mach, "every scientific statement is a statement about complexes of sensations, and beyond or behind these there are no realities to be looked for" (p. 9). Clearly, Mach had not succeeded in disposing of natural entities. He had unwittingly made sensations again into natural entities (*cf.*, Cassirer, 1957, pp. 25-30). Moreover, the naturalness of entities which he wished to dispense with had simply been replaced by the mystery of what in the objective world makes certain arrangements of experience simple and economical.[4] But by neglecting the objective referent of laws in favor of their convenience, he seemed to have abandoned science to a kind of arbitrariness, even though that arbitrariness had a rule of its own. This tendency undercut the promise of empiricism, offered by its very name, to promote statements determined by objective fact. According to Mandelbaum (1971, pp. 19-20), it ironically made other, less rigorous intellectual currents seem more serious and scientific.

For empiricism and mechanism had no monopoly on thought. The nineteenth century was far from a purely mechanistic

[4] For this reason, Wittgenstein (1922) later reinstalled the outside reference of propositions and theories, simply abandoning any attempt to say anything about it.

age. Mandelbaum (1971) has described a dominant concern with organicity, that is, the shaping of elements by their collectivity, the whole of which is more than the sum of its parts. Obviously, the whole which is more than the sum of its parts is a proper entity and not an artificial or arbitrary collection we chance to make on observation. The parts of such a bona fide individual are entities whose fate is influenced by the inherent direction of the whole, a notion that must have been reinforced by Darwin's theory. It follows that if you find the proper whole, you will understand why the parts behave the way they do. And if you correctly observe the functioning of real parts of an organism, you will witness the principles of the organism's development. The nineteenth century interest in evolution and history is well known. What I wish to stress is that a concern with evolution and history is also a concern with the identification of natural entities. (Mandelbaum [1971, pp. 45-46] points out that an emphasis on progress or development presupposes a substance or entity which is developing.)

BIOLOGY

It is sometimes said that mechanism and materialism flourished in the nineteenth century. Such a view ignores what we have seen to be a great dissatisfaction with the attempt to reduce physical phenomena to natural forces and material entities. It ignores even more blatantly the fact that the successes of Newtonian physics did *not* include a Newtonian explanation of biological phenomena. Galaty's (1974) important study shows that members of the so-called Helmholtz school gave up in despair their efforts to find entities common to nonorganic and organic worlds and settled instead for a Kantian common principle of explanation, according to which the mind could conceive of change only in terms of the motion of matter and the motion of matter could be explained only in terms of forces of attraction and repulsion.

Current critics of psychoanalysis who hold these "mechanists" responsible for what they regard as Freud's philosophical naïveté

would be amazed to find Gilbert Ryle's modern critique of mind explicitly formulated by the very "mechanists" themselves:

> The definition of force as the cause of motion . . . is a comfortable figure of speech which we cannot easily part with and which is still of service to us. . . . As soon as one probes to the basis of events . . . one recognizes that neither force nor matter exists. Both are, from different points of view, adopted abstractions of things as they are (Du Bois-Reymond, as quoted by Galaty [1974], p. 305).

Where the Helmholtz school differs from the current revisionists is in their Kantian recognition that there can be no understanding without entities of some kind.

Transposing the problem of the unity of knowledge from the physical to the biological realm, the Helmholtz school offered an alternative solution to Mach's problem. It was neither a materialist nor a conventionalist solution and, insofar as it influenced Freud, it was extraordinarily fruitful because it permitted natural entities to be located on several levels (*cf.*, Quinton, 1972, p. 72).

In physics and chemistry, despite these theoretical difficulties, atomic mechanism had been highly successful. Natural entities in biology were more difficult to come by. Zilsel (1941) states: "Whereas in physics . . . most classifications are elementary and, therefore, can be followed rather soon by causal research, the vaster variety of objects in the fields of zoology and botany is much harder to survey" (p. 74). Nevertheless, by the time of the nineteenth century a great deal of work had already been done on the question of what the lawful entity is that underlies organic development.

Some eighteenth century workers, such as Bonnet, maintained that the female germ contains in preformed miniature all the offspring that would follow its line (*cf.*, Nordenskiöld, 1928, p. 245). This supposes an original multiplicity of beings rather than a common identity. The thesis was opposed by Erasmus Darwin, who held that the male germ "filament" was essentially the same throughout time and originated from a common

stock, with additions made to it by the female and by the environment (Nordenskiöld, p. 295). The idea of a continuous, self-identical entity underlying endless generations and innumerable forms of historical individuals was expanded by Geoffroy, who saw (largely imaginary) resemblances between the structures of all animals, vertebrate and invertebrate (Nordenskiöld, p. 297).

Cuvier recognized that, on the contrary, there were specific differences in organization between several classes of animals, each with its own separate, internal logic (Nordenskiöld, p. 340). Then Richard Owen managed to bridge the gap between Cuvier's divisions by establishing organ analogies and common functional problems, one or the other of which all animals share, suggesting that apparently disparate organisms might have a common origin and physiological function (Nordenskiöld, p. 415). Owen considered life as a fixed entity designed by the Creator, who had also endowed it with an "innate tendency to deviate from parental type," thus providing for the variety of forms that we encounter (*cf.*, Fothergill, 1953, p. 97).

Lamarck tried to specify further the unitary principle that accounts for the multiplicity of forms. He postulated a preprogrammed, serial order of life moving toward progressive complexity. To this he added one further constant, inherent principle: a striving for adaptation that accounts for different lines of development in different environments (Eiseley, 1958, pp. 50-51). But Charles Lyell recognized that organisms were endowed with different and limited degrees of adaptability (Nordenskiöld, 1928, p. 456). Thus the environment is not only an elicitor of superficial variety, as Lamarck maintained, but serves also as an analyzer of intrinsic differences among organisms.

One current of thought, then, (exemplified by Erasmus Darwin, Geoffroy, and Lamarck) suggested a single essence for all organisms. Another (represented by Cuvier, Owen, and Lyell) proposed fixed entities underlying several groups of organisms. Looking over these alternatives, one might reflect that in earlier times, the plan of the Divinity designating the

individual forms or types of organism might have served as the fundamental entity. Order and understanding, and regularity and lawfulness could be derived from that plan. All particulars could be unified by reference to that plan (*cf.*, Eiseley, [1958, pp. 6, ff.] on the "Scale of Being").

To the extent that the Enlightenment had made a Divine entity an unsatisfying explanation of the whole variety of life, another entity had to be found. The new entity was represented by Lamarck as a goal-directed substrate.[5] Cuvier, however, was unable to find such a single entity. For him, the varying species were separate entities, and the history of life was determined by an unexplained initial assortment of forms. Lyell, on the other hand, recognized another biological entity underlying the diversity of organisms. The form taken by an organism, he indicated, reflects its species' intrinsic scope of adaptability. Species are the proper entities, and they are manifested by specific adaptive resources. The historical variety within a species is a manifestation of this single entity. But the species themselves are not manifestations of any other entity.

To Alfred Wallace, however, each species was a kind of abstraction representing the outcome of a competition among varieties. (Bowler [1976, p. 24] says that "Wallace's starting point remained the permanent varieties.") Going even further, Charles Darwin found an entity underlying even the several varieties. Varieties were therefore imposed upon a vast continuum of forms. Animal breeding experiments convinced Darwin that the selection of chance advantages explained the apparent grouping of varieties and species.[6]

[5] This substitution resembles that which de Santillana (1941) found in the eighteenth century encyclopedist, D'Alembert: "D'Alembert thought he had cut the ground from under metaphysics; actually, he had replaced the divine Will with a not-too-clear entity called the nature of things. . ." (p. 11).

[6] Later, Darwin was persuaded to back off a little and to visualize the mechanism of selection as operating upon an omnipresent *range* of natural variation rather than upon single, unusual developments in individuals (*cf.*, Bowler, 1974). Modern evolutionists, I believe, are more likely to take populations rather than individuals as part entities. Even after Darwin, some uncertainty continued about whether the proper parts of evolutionary entity were individuals or groups.

Thus, in the eighteenth century, several natural entities underlying the various animal forms were gradually defined within the science of comparative anatomy, and ultimately Darwin replaced the over-all whole entity of the "Divine Plan" with an over-all entity of Life, characterized by the property of adaptation. Life is an over-all entity because the defining property of adaptation attaches to Life and not to individuals. (In assessing the influence of Darwin on Freud, Ritvo [1974] referred to Haeckel's dictum that Goethe guessed the unity of nature, but Darwin proved it.)

The species of the comparative anatomists are not the atoms of which the body of organic life is made, according to the Darwinian system, because they are not programmed as entities by a "Divine Plan." They are thrown up by the evolutionary entity, rather than adding up to it. Although they are not entities in their own right, the species and varieties are not mere concocted groupings, as Lamarck believed (*cf.*, Fothergill, 1953, p. 69). Lamarck regarded them as artificial because he saw them as moments of passage in a slide toward inevitable and uniform perfection. Differences among creatures, if not simply the result of unequal evolutionary maturity, reflect the common effort to adapt to uncommon surroundings and no more mark off one form from another than the color of a chameleon on a leaf distinguishes its type from that of its brother on a twig. In Darwin's system, on the other hand, biological groupings are entitled to be treated as natural part entities, because they reflect not only what is common to life processes, but also the real differences, *not* arising out of a common direction, that are selected as advantageous by different habitats and are thus transformed from accidental variations into defining essences.[7] Although we tend to think of

[7] Foucault (1971) tells this story as though it amounted to an arbitrary shift of principles of explanation, in the course of which categories defined by visible characteristics were replaced by categories justified by the specialness of internal structure. I think it is possible, however, to read all of his evidence as arguing for an uninterrupted hunt for unity in diversity, which in my terms amounts to a search for natural entities underlying phenomenal variety.

Lamarck as an environmentalist because he believed in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, the environment for him was simply the clay out of which life's uniform purpose works its will. For Darwin, on the other hand, the environment was not a challenge to be answered in a preordained fashion, but a variable, independent standard that surviving organisms have chanced to incorporate as their own. It was Darwin, not Lamarck, who funneled the environment into the very essence of life's subtypes, thereby separating them from each other in reality and not just for purposes of classification. In this way he produced a proper whole with proper parts.

THE HUMAN SCIENCES

The problem of what laws were laws *of* was never a life-and-death matter for most sciences—certainly not for physics and not really for biology—because the entities with which these sciences work—the items and instruments they deal with in their laboratories and researches—have always had an unquestioned authority at the primary level, and have never needed credentials. That there is some sense in which an animal or a plant or a microscope or a steel ball is a thing has never been in dispute.

Such was not the case with the specifically human studies. Common sense and accepted opinion in that field do not provide clearly demarcated entities to study and relate. Once the "City of God" had lost its justification, the nature of man's collective life was harder to understand.[8] What remained of the collective life, and in particular its variety and development, ceased to illustrate any obvious underlying truths. Eighteenth

[8] As with the Freudian revolution, the incentive for a new science is sometimes described as an ethical or esthetic problem. Nisbet (1966, p. 19) has shown that sociology arose as a disgruntled critique of the atomized society that the Enlightenment had substituted for the medieval *communitas*. However, the social discomfort was not the only wound inflicted by the transition. It created intellectual problems as well.

century notions provided only the relatively static and, in principle, uniform entity of man's intellect. History demands an entity that will allow a focus on differences as well as uniformities.

Ranke clearly described the new historical approach: ". . . our task is to present the characteristic, the essential in the individual, and the coherence, the connection in the whole" (*cf.*, Krieger, 1975, p. 13). For historians like Meinecke, who emphasized the first part of Ranke's task, any alleged over-all historical processes were artificial constructs; the true entities of history were what was novel and creative. Others, like Marx who emphasized the reverse side of Ranke's task, tended to see over-all human history as the entity under study, with novel part-entities related organically to that whole. For Treitschke, only the State was a true individual to be profitably studied in a social science (*cf.*, Mauss, 1962, p. 32). According to him, other data were not inherently interconnected, and their relationships were fortuitous and unedifying. Herbert Spencer, on the other hand, managed to combine a belief in society as an organic individual with a respect for the individual person as another such (Mauss, pp. 18-19). Comte did not believe that the state was an entity, but neither did he regard the individual person as one. Society was the scientific entity, he argued, and it was precisely because previous generations had failed to see society as an entity that they had not been able to derive the laws of man's development (*cf.*, Mandelbaum, 1971, p. 65). According to Comte, the individual person was only a recent abstraction from Humanity. Humanity, not the person, was the unit that exhibits regular behavior capable of study. "Society," he wrote, "is not more decomposable into individuals than a geometric surface is into lines, or a line into points" (*cf.*, Nisbet, 1966, p. 59).

But even the new sociologists who regarded the basic scientific human entity as larger than the individual person and broader than the state remained uncertain as to what kind of

unit it was. Ward's social unconscious resembles Freud's, inasmuch as it is the result of conservative and reproductive forces pitted against each other and against institutionalized moral and esthetic forces. The "creative synthesis" of opposing forces to which he attributed social structure (Mauss, 1962, p. 66) was taken from Wundt and parallels Herbart's dynamics and Freud's ego. (It is instructive that objectifying culture as an organism can lead to such a theory of an unconscious.)

Emile Durkheim thought he perceived a *social fact* that was supraindividual. This kind of entity, which could be studied by statistical analysis of large groups, was distinguishable from its mere manifestations within an individual. Within the individual a sociopsychology might find a distorted reproduction of the pure social fact which influenced the individual because it existed outside of him. Mass emotions were not simply a common denominator of individual sentiments (Durkheim, 1895, pp. 7-13). Religion, for example, was a creative synthesis from the meeting of many minds in the community and stood apart from individual creations (*cf.,* Mitchell, 1968, p. 182). The social fact was "independent of the individual forms it assumes in its diffusion [among the members of society]" (Durkheim, 1895, p. 10). It was "found in each part because it exists in the whole, rather than in the whole because it exists in the parts" (Durkheim, p. 9). As Mitchell (1968, pp. 79-80) says, the "conscience collective . . . is a determinate system having a life of its own." According to Mauss (1962, p. 79), Durkheim regarded history and the state as too abstract for study: only groups were concrete. In other words, Durkheim regarded the social fact as an actual object of study, and Julien Freund (1968, p. 11), representing the viewpoint of Max Weber, takes him to task for treating a hypothesis as a fact, much as later critics will complain that Freud reified such concepts as the superego.

Georg Simmel, on the other hand, according to Mitchell (1968, p. 110), "saw no unity that may be called *society* . . .

he regards only the individual as real. . . . To describe society is merely to describe the social interactions of individuals; society only *seems* real." It would be a mistake, however, to say that Simmel regarded the individual as an entity. For, as Mauss (1962, pp. 76-77) points out, he took as his subject the abstract form of human relations as found in institutions such as state, church, and the economic system, and it seems to me that the entity he chose as the subject of scientific study is the pattern of group interaction, the behavior of dyads, triads, etc. (*cf.*, Mitchell, 1968, p. 110). From our contemporary viewpoint, he would seem to have approached his subject as a transactionalist, in a fashion similar to some current schools of family therapy, with which he shares a preference for a patterned structure as the studied entity and a tendency to regard both the individual and the larger society as distracting factors.

Max Weber took a far more sophisticated, but also more equivocal, position on the entity under study. He did not believe in free-standing social facts or in a collective unconscious. And because he was not swayed by the hegemony that History exercised over prevailing German thought (Mitchell, 1968, p. 86) , he did not visualize society as a developing organism in its own right (Freund, 1968, p. 76). This distinguished him from many other important social thinkers of the time, such as Spencer and Marx, who proposed an evolving entity underlying human society. Unlike them, Weber is said by Freund (1968, pp. 111, ff.) to have taken the individual person as the underlying entity to be studied. The specific subject of Weber's studies was goal-oriented action (Mitchell, 1968, p. 88). All the human sciences were perspectives on this conceptually neutral entity, each perspective selecting its way of categorizing the unit of study according to its own value-orientation. Out of the fluctuating and continuous web of social phenomena, Weber said, a specific social science picks out its proper entity by abstracting various "ideal types," which are clear pictures

that exaggerate some regularity in social relations—for example, the ideal type of the modern capitalist or the bureaucrat.[9]

Although Weber wished to avoid postulating any natural entity other than the individual person and accordingly developed a philosophy in which sciences did not have proper, natural entities as their subject, in the last analysis it seems to me that he actually worked with an entity similar to Durkheim's, namely, a social fact (for instance, the Protestant ethic) that gave meaning to the individual's actions. Indeed, it is this entitization of spirit that embroiled him in posthumous controversy over whether the Protestant ethic was an entity or an epiphenomenon (*cf.*, Tawney, 1926). Weber was aware of the ambiguity of his analysis and explicitly warned against interpreting his use of such an entity in a causal fashion. But he may not have been able to carry off his relativistic philosophy in practice as well as he thought. Mauss (1962) says that "Karl Löwith has shown that through all these ideal types runs the theory of the over-all social process."

Despite the disagreement among sociologists about the sociological entity and the unhappiness that many, like Max Weber,

[9] An argument could be made that Charcot's "typical case" was a Weberian "ideal type." Certainly, Charcot's medical values helped select the subject that would eventually become the concern of psychoanalysis. Freud's enemies among academic psychologists resembled Weber's sociologist antagonists in their insistence that only a perspective-free, natural entity was truly scientific, even though it would have to be both nonconceptual and nonarbitrary. Because of his therapeutic value-orientation, Freud looked to them like a "rough-and-ready" technician (*cf.*, Heilbreder, 1973; Titchener, 1929).

I think there is another important similarity between Weber and Freud. Weber recognized that all science fluctuates between the intuited individual and the general regularity of laws (*cf.*, Freund, 1968, p. 39). Freud and Weber kept both regularized structure and single-event process in their systems. Those who could not accept this uneasy combination of arbitrary and nonarbitrary, static and dynamic definitions—such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche (*cf.*, Mandelbaum, 1971, p. 346), and the contemporary existentialists and experientialists—could never stomach that equivocation. The difference between Freud and Weber in this regard is, I believe, that Freud claimed a special dignity for the psychoanalytic perspective as being one in which the value-orientation was selected by the subject rather than by the observer (*cf.*, Friedman, 1975).

would have felt about such a formula, I think Durkheim (1895) summed up the quest most bluntly:

> . . . social phenomena are things and ought to be treated as things. To demonstrate this proposition, it is unnecessary to philosophize on their nature and to discuss the analogies they present with the phenomena of lower realms of existence. It is sufficient to note that they are the unique data of the sociologist. All that is given, all that is subject to observation, has thereby the character of a thing. To treat phenomena as things is to treat them as data, and these constitute the point of departure of science (p. 27).

I shall argue that psychoanalysis was the culmination of a similar point of view in psychology.

PSYCHOLOGY

If students of mankind were agitated by a lack of clearly demarcated entities in an age when substances were no longer defined by tradition, students of the mind were even more desperate. It is characteristic of the times that a Wundt or a Meynert began his labors with the painful acknowledgment that psychology or psychiatry had been altogether too subjective a discipline, and some way had to be found to fasten it on to an objective referent.

Of course psychology did not have to start from scratch. There was a philosophic tradition to draw on. For instance, Locke's discrete ideas seemed to be reliable entities for psychology to deal with. But ideas were not the only entities in Locke's psychology. There was also the individual mind, characterized by the activities of association and imagination, which linked, distorted, and rearranged ideas. Locke's psychology portrayed mind as both a collection of ideas *and* a system of operations. Since Locke wanted to show how much of thought depended on experience, he called especial attention to the collection of ideas (which he felt could be traced to sensation). Hume and Kant, who were interested in the ways that thought did *not*

depend on experience, preferred to discuss what the unitary mind brought to the accidents of sensation. Although this debate bore more on the philosophy of science than on any particular science, it served to remind fledgling psychology that the mind was not composed simply of Lockean ideas and that inasmuch as Locke's ideas were the *result* of a unitary mind working on outside stimuli, such ideas could not be considered the *elements* of the mind.

Those who, like Kantor (1969, pp. 120, 238), see in this development a naturalistic, individualistic British atomism suffocated by a theologically conditioned German unitary-mind theory, overlook the fact that, at least as regards the development of psychology, both trends were already present in Locke and any simple atomism was permanently ruled out by Hume. Perhaps the elaboration of these trends was influenced by the German fondness for abstruse theorizing. But it is clear that Locke had already postulated a unitary mind and that ideas, as he defined them, did not begin to account for its behavior. In effect, Locke's ideas were the burden of the mind: they were carried and rearranged by its current. For ideas to be explanatory units that would account for the functioning of the mind they would, unlike Locke's ideas, have to possess some kind of permanence and effectiveness.

That is precisely how Herbart's *Vorstellungen* differed from Locke's ideas. Unlike Locke's ideas, Herbart's composed the mind, at least partially. The whole mind was a result, or at least a *resultant,* of those parts and was not just their editor. They had continuity, a life history of their own, and a tendency toward self-conservancy, as one might expect of a regular entity (*cf.,* Ribot, 1886, pp. 25, 38, 42). They were not food for the mind to digest, nor data for a unitary mind to process, but parts of the mind itself, involved in the digesting or processing. (Brett [1953, p. 532] says that Herbart made the elements do their own work.)

Squeezing a multiplicity into a unity generates paradoxes (*cf.,* Boring, 1950, p. 254; Kantor, 1969, p. 238). As Kantor

disapprovingly notes (*op. cit.*, p. 141), all theories that recognize a unified mind underlying its diverse elements must have recourse to a mysterious unifier in the shape of apperception or else a pure ego as a common stage for all events (see also, Andersson, 1962, p. 150); or, in later psychologies, a supremely governing function of attention. (Or, we might add, a metapsychological energetics.) After we have described entities underlying a process, we are still always left both with entities and with process.

Nevertheless, Herbart indicated what kinds of entities might be the subject of a science of the mind. Andersson (1962) and others have shown that Freud was exposed to Herbart's ideas throughout his education. Perhaps Herbart's anatomy of mind helped Freud to construct his own. Herbart's (1891, p. 90) dynamic entities appeared to be striving and fighting, very much as Freud's ego, id, and superego often appear to behave. Herbart's influence might account for the fact, noted by Hartmann (1956, p. 278), that Freud replaced the "ideas" of traditional psychology with "purposive ideas." Hartmann (*op. cit.*, p. 273), however, minimized Herbart's influence on Freud. Perhaps he underestimated the usefulness of an abstract, nonclinical perspective. On the other hand, Hartmann may be right: it is possible that many of the striking parallels between Herbart and Freud are more a matter of convergence than influence. It may be that any picture of a unified mind with real parts will necessarily look something like Herbart's. For example, it may be that such a theory will necessarily be a theory of conflict. Herbart himself seemed to think so, when he wrote that "without . . . antagonism, all the representations would constitute only a single soul" (*cf.*, Ribot, 1886, p. 31). And, as I have suggested elsewhere, any theory that treats parts of the mind as entities will perforce ascribe to them the self-conservancy that characterized Herbart's *Vorstellungen* (Friedman, 1976).

Whatever influence on or anticipation of later psychology we can find in Herbart, he himself remained within the area of

speculative philosophy because there is really no way to identify empirically the parts into which he divided the mind. Parts that cannot be identified independently, but whose sum equals the mind as we experience it, amount to a giant tautology. Toward the specific task of discriminating an objective psychological unit, Herbart contributed only the aspect of bare, unmeasurable magnitude (*cf.,* Ribot, 1886, p. 27). But he did show what a theory that includes real parts in a whole mind might look like.

After Herbart had sketched his prospectus of how mental parts might function, what was still needed was to find some actual parts that actually did function within an actual, unitary mind. Objective entities still had to be discovered—items that were not arbitrary designations.

Fechner found one by comparing stimulus intensity with sensation. His discovery was naturally very welcome to Wundt, who, like others we have discussed, had been troubled by the arbitrariness of psychological terms (Wundt, 1873, p. 249). Fechner's entities—sensations, as they appear to introspection—could be real entities for study and not arbitrary perspectives on an amorphous matter of mind. But if the data of experience are already entities rather than manifestations of an entity, they have to be presented in and of themselves in a closed, defined system, without the aid of intellectual concepts. Wundt (1894, p. 128) was perceptive enough to realize that this approach was not to be found in any other science. Psychology was the only science that would not study an underlying something by means of its appearances. For psychology, the appearance would constitute the something studied.

This gave Wundt the entities, but with them came a number of difficulties.[10] Many aspects of mind are not directly intuitable with that immediate definition and delimitation that make subjective sensation appear to be objective. Feelings,

[10] Behind all the difficulties was the logical problem of nonconceptual definitions. Titchener (1929, p. 100) later pointed out that it is insoluble and tried to make Wundt into a perspectivist instead.

in particular, seem to form an amorphous and inexhaustible continuum (Wundt, 1896, p. 126). What is worse, feeling and volition seem to blend without objective borders into the whole of experience (*cf.*, Brett, 1953, pp. 483-484; Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 126), which suggests that all apparently separate entities of experience, including sensation, are merely arbitrary abstractions from a unified, unduplicable, constantly shifting panorama. This contradicts the notion that sensations are given in an immediate and nonconceptual fashion.

Moreover, Wundt realized that the study of the mind required *something* underlying appearances that would be illuminated by psychological studies (*cf.*, Ribot, 1886, p. 191). If everything was blended together and in constant flux, the underlying something had to be a process. Accordingly, Wundt offered a process theory, which made use of apperception and creative synthesis as unifiers (*cf.*, Brett, 1953, p. 485; Wundt, 1894, p. 128). As a result of Wundt's fidelity to the incompatible demands on his system, a confused picture emerged of a small aspect of mind composed of entities (sensations), which could be studied experimentally, and a large, overarching aspect of mind, which was not composed of entities and could not be studied experimentally.

Clearly, the entities that Fechner had discovered and Wundt had elaborated were in jeopardy as soon as one made an attempt to correlate them with the mind as a whole. Thus when members of the Würzburg school picked up the process aspect of Wundt's psychology, they were able to show that attitudes and set could alter perception, that judgments were arrived at without introspectively available sensory evidence, and that the examination of sensation did not enjoy any particular advantage over the cumbersome examination of any other aspect of mentation.

In the light of renewed attention to the whole mind process, mind "parts" again began to look artificial. Once more it was hard to find a respectable mental entity to study. For example, Titchener (1929) attacked the intentionalists and act psycholo-

gists on the grounds that their discriminations were arbitrary, which was, in effect, Wundt's complaint about the Würzburg school. The problem is that the man who sees the mind as a set of frozen sections can always be shown to have arbitrarily carved them out of a flowing process. He, in turn, can always retaliate by pointing out that the words and categories of his rival, the process theoretician, are just as arbitrarily imposed upon a fluid subject.

To save the "thing-ness" of sensations, Külpe sacrificed their supposed immediacy and proposed as the subject of inquiry an underlying something that had outside physical and internal mental determinants (*cf.*, Titchener, 1929, pp. 127-128). After all, that *was* what Fechner had been dealing with. The logical implication of Külpe's view was that psychophysics *uses* sensations as an appearance or outward sign of an underlying mental entity, which I think we could call a sensation-processing-disposition. The challenge then was to integrate that entity with other mental entities. But other mental entities, as Wundt had realized, were a lot harder to define and would have required something more than psychophysics to discover. Wundt (1873, p. 250) hoped that these undefinable aspects could be studied by their reflection in social forms, as in anthropology, presumably because, unlike mind itself, *products* of mind are objectively definable in terms of entities and can be studied like the data of any other science. To us, that hope appears misplaced, in view of the very similar difficulties we have already seen to afflict the more objective social sciences in their own field when they have to justify their proper units, i.e., their objective entities.

But the fact that even physicists were hoping that sensation could be made into objective entities for all sciences probably encouraged psychologists to keep looking to psychophysics for entities. Not only was Fechner's discovery an unrivaled success, but, because of the influence of positivism, it seemed peculiarly scientific. Psychologists thus suffered from a prejudice about where entities could be discovered (*cf.*, Titchener,

1929, p. 138). Medical men suffered much less from this prejudice. Their freedom was viewed with a kind of envious condescension by those who lacked it. Titchener (pp. 250-259), for instance, regarded practical psychologies as popular, technological contaminants of the proper science of psychology. Heilbreder (1973, p. 250), while acknowledging the fruitfulness of Freud's theory, attributes its successes to a lack of concern for scientific protocol. In fact, what Heilbreder is referring to in this passage is simply the freedom medical people have enjoyed to look for mental entities wherever they could be found. Ultimately, Freud left Fechner's entities to Wundt and the academicians, borrowing only Fechner's process theory, and proceeded to look for entities of his own.

Before him, others, such as Meynert (1885, p. vi), tried to use brain anatomy as a basis for nonarbitrary discriminations about the mind. Meynert thought that the unified mental experience which had defied a consistent analysis in Wundt's scheme could be differentiated in terms of spatial location of brain site and passage of nerve-excitation (*op. cit.*, p. 153). The entities that Meynert proposed consisted of subcortical patterns of connectedness among cortical sites. Those patterns represent what is constant in the mind, which he called individuality (*op. cit.*, pp. 16-18).

Except for a few oversimplified examples, Meynert (1885) did not empirically correlate these entities with known mental events. In fact, he did not believe it possible to establish them as empirical entities, since "one cannot estimate how closely an image is tied into the others" (p. 172), as would be necessary if one were to predict the empirical (behavioral) consequences of the patterns. Thus, he called individuality an artificial concept (p. 172). It is true that Meynert's terms and examples, as well as derivative theories of aphasia which Freud criticized, often make him sound like an atomic associationist. In fact, however, Meynert despaired of finding entities within the mind and ended up instead elaborating upon the whole-mind entity. In other words, what he offered was a process theory. According to

Meynert, the brain functioned along the path of least resistance to discharge (p. 194). In terms of emotion, mental events proceed in such a way as to avoid pain (p. 176). (Equating these two principles, he was forced to the strange conclusion that winning a lottery causes pleasure because it increases association pathways [p. 194].) But ease of discharge alone does not ensure pleasure. In fact, it can cause pain if the discharge is not along patterned channels (p. 190). We must regard Meynert's formula for the direction of mental process as the building of more and better discharge patterns.

By correlating psychological with physical events, Wundt had made one part of the mind (sensation-processing) observable, leaving the over-all mental process in a shroud of mystery. Meynert made no such correlation: his "associations" were purely speculative and thus were not marked off in any precise, nonarbitrary fashion. He himself called them "artificial." His only real correlation was between brain functioning as a whole and mind as a whole. The only entity he focused on for study was the *process* of mind, fundamentally represented by a selective, self-regulating process of brain nutrition guiding association pathways and manifesting itself in the resulting structured discharge of nervous impulses.

Like so many subsequent process theories, including Janet's (and Piaget's), this theory was a statement that the mind worked by differentiation and integration. For Meynert (1885, pp. 144, 159), as for Wundt, the wish was a successively modified reflex. In this respect, Meynert anticipated Freud's primary and secondary processes (*cf.,* Amacher, 1965, pp. 38-39), which incidentally shows that Freud's originality did not lie, as Jones (1953) believed, in the formulation of these processes. Andersson's (1962, p. 81) theory that Freud repudiated Meynert's system because it arose at a time of enthusiasm for brain anatomy while Freud was under the sway of more modern physiological concepts ignores the fact that, for all his anatomical diagrams, what Meynert had presented was a physiological theory. If Freud had stuck with Meynert, he would not have

developed a brain mythology, but a Janetian psychology. As it was, Meynert provided a formal model of mind process, just as Herbart had provided a formal model of mind structure. What remained to be found was a part entity which could make investigation of the whole mind as empirical as Fechner's discovery had made investigation of sensation processing.

Freud's criticism of Meynertian aphasiology was as much a logical critique of his units as it was an empirical refutation of his physiology, and, in fact, the criticism had been anticipated by Herder (*cf.*, Cassirer, 1957, pp. 32-33), who had noted that associations were not intrinsically separable from what they associated. Indeed, it seems to me fairest to say that Freud did not repudiate Meynert's theory at all, but recognized that a process theory without delimited part entities did not offer a foothold for empirical investigation. Meynert's theory was refined to describe the needed process aspects of the mind. But some empirically identifiable elements had to be added for the process to work on.

HYPNOSIS

The quest for these elements was vastly aided by a new understanding of hypnosis.

Mesmer grew up under the sway of Newton (*cf.*, Walmsley, 1967). He wrote his dissertation on the influence of the heavenly bodies (sun and moon) upon animals. It early seemed to him that just as the moon affects the tides by gravitation, a similar influence must work on animate bodies. He pictured that influence partly along the lines of mineral magnetism, but mainly in the fashion of gravitation. He proposed a physical medium through which the force worked and gave it the same characteristics as Newton's fluid, since, like Newton, he could not accept the notion of action at a distance. Both Newton and Mesmer sought a mechanical causality, and neither was satisfied by a bare Law, although Newton was finally content to enunciate a bare Law and became a god of science, while

Mesmer could not hide his causal imagery and is today an object of ridicule.

Mesmer's theory preceded his practice: his theoretical interest was primary, utility secondary. Human cyclic phenomena gave early support for his theory (*cf.*, Walmsley, 1967, p. 52), and he later used episodic aspects of disease to demonstrate an ebb and flow within people. Only after witnessing a demonstration of "magnetic healing" did he embark upon a practical career as a therapeutic magnetist. What he always hoped to attain was recognition as the Newton of biology.

But though the motion of the moon can explain a tide, whole-mind motion is not the sort of thing that can explain a change from sickness to health. While Mesmer's main model had been gravitation and gravitational fluid, his theory of effects on human beings, especially on the nervous system, came to be based on mineral magnetism (Mesmer, 1779, p. 32). He had to develop a rudimentary part-theory of the mind, drifting away from Newton, who did not need to dissect gravitational bodies. Mesmer's picture of the uniform alignment of magnetized parts was an early model of adaptation. (It is the precursor of the synthetic function of the ego. One can also compare Mesmer's two forces, the responsive and suppressive principles, to Freud's two instincts.) As I understand it, animal magnetism is primarily something within the animal that orients his parts, but it can be secondarily charged, depleted, and communicated to other animals. Mesmer (p. 31) maintained that animal magnetism was the property of an animal that rendered it *liable* to the action of heavenly bodies. Sensitivity of the parts of the body to the synthesizing influence of the heavenly bodies was provided so that the harmonious functioning of the animal was not left to chance (Mesmer, p. 32).

Although a vague image of tidal flow within the nerves accompanied the gravitational model, Mesmer did not ask what the elements were that could be harmoniously or discordantly oriented by animal magnetism. Therefore, his explicit theory was a whole-mind theory, or a process theory. Synthesis de-

pended on outside stimuli plus responsiveness to those stimuli. Implicitly, when the organism was not tuned to its governors, there were unspecified parts which could become disorganized.

Benjamin Franklin headed a French Royal Commission of eminent scientists that investigated Mesmerism. The Commission has often been criticized for stubbornly refusing to recognize the theoretical challenge and promise of what it observed. A study by Quen (1976) is useful in this regard, since it focuses on the problem of the inertia of scientific theory when confronted with palpable opportunities for advancement.

That this blindness was no simple prejudice is shown by an examination of the report of the Franklin Commission (1785). The Commission decided that it would be impossible to evaluate Mesmerism by studying claimed cures. It has often been faulted for this crucial exclusion without sympathy for the fact that at the time, etiologies were poorly established and accurate diagnostic criteria were minimal. One can only admire the Commission for recognizing that the natural course of illness was largely unpredictable, especially among the as yet undefined "nervous" diseases for which Mesmerism was chiefly used. Indeed, the Commission was able to call in support Mesmer himself, who fully recognized the weakness of proof by cure and claimed to have much better evidence for his discovery.

The Commission did examine therapeutic effects if they were immediately evident. What they begged off from was evaluating long-term benefit. But the Commissioners readily acknowledged as well known that the mind can influence the body, and they cited in evidence what we would now call autonomic effects as well as healing of illness. They then set about reproducing Mesmeric effects by simple suggestion, which acquits them of the charge of ignoring the phenomena after discrediting the theory. Their final criticism was not that Mesmerism was ineffective, but that, besides being based on an invalid theory, it used the powers of the mind in an unhelpful and potentially dangerous fashion. That conclusion, of course, was

presumptuous in view of the fact that long-term outcomes had been excluded from the study. The Commission judged a priori that violent treatments such as Mesmeric convulsions should be used only sparingly, and in this respect they sound like some recent ethical critics of electroshock. Furthermore, one can raise an eyebrow at a science that countenanced extensive bleeding and purging but shrank from a convulsion that leaves the body intact. Nevertheless, one can scarcely consider as a scientific blunder a well-reasoned report establishing Mesmerism as a manipulation of imagination and of the nervous centers that can affect somatic processes and the course of illness through specified psychosomatic mechanisms, and warning that it could be dangerous if used without caution.

The Commission worked with the limited concepts available. Its members could speculate about the influence of concentrated "attention" on bodily processes and sensations and could even imagine how that influence, acting on the diaphragm, could produce a convulsion. But they had no appropriate disease entities in view, no definition of states of consciousness regularly related to each other, no notion of mental constants whose variables could be manipulated by experimentation. Their field of observation was a common-sense continuum of thoughts, feelings, and actions.

The members of the Royal Commission were in need of entities to examine. On witnessing the chaos of group Mesmerism (accompanied by piano!), they wisely observed that "too many things are seen at once for any of them to be seen well." When they came to experiment upon themselves, they tried to separate at least autosuggestion from Mesmeric influence, and for this critics have chided them, saying that it destroyed the suggestibility required by the technique, as though it would have been possible to investigate, or even to think about, something so ill-defined that it was at once an imposed influence and a spontaneous activity, a perception and an illusion. People had always known that the mind influenced behavior and had long known that it influenced the body. What the Commission showed was that the Mesmerists had

offered nothing new to work on. The only new units to think about or to correlate with one another were the operator and the subject, considered as fluid-communicating bodies. Those were the allegedly real entities presented to the Commission; and since they were fictions, it is hard to see what its members could have done with them except to dismiss them.

The profitable study of hypnosis began with a shift of focus from the act of hypnotism to the hypnotic subject, for the purpose of dissecting the mind. Puységur adhered to the fluid theory, but he specified that it acted specifically on the mind and more specifically on thought and will (*cf.*, Walmsley, 1967, p. 146). He further isolated a state of mind in which those components were altered, which he designated as "artificial somnambulism" (*cf.*, Ellenberger, 1970, p. 71). Puységur had more confidence in a mental theory because his experiments dealt with a multitude of phenomena that could all be seen as manifestations of a somewhat familiar state of mind.

The Abbé Faria shifted the focus even further toward the hypnotic subject. He did not accept the fluid theory, chiefly because he wanted to pay attention exclusively to the subject's attitude, his receptivity (*cf.*, Goldsmith, 1934, p. 181). The shift was from a two-person theory to a one-person theory. Some recent theoreticians have deplored that shift (e.g., Wolstein, 1976). But it was a necessary step toward the localization of a psychological entity (as opposed to the sociological entity of a hypnotist-subject pair). The receptive and nonreceptive attitudes postulated by the Abbé paralleled Mesmer's responsive and suppressive forces. But the Abbé was looking for an explanation of them within the organism, a shift that corresponds to Freud's shift from the traumatic memory to a repressed wish.

Bertrand, on the other hand, illustrates how Mesmer's theory would otherwise have evolved after the inevitable obsolescence of the fluid theory. Bertrand placed the emphasis on the magnetizer's will. He continued Mesmer's two-body theory in the form of an interpersonal psychology. But he also carried Mesmer's inquiry further into the anatomy of the subject by

implying that in the normal person finer variables could be studied than just total synthesis (health) and disorganization (disease).[11] The price paid for dispensing with Mesmer's pseudo-physics was that as an influence, a Will is a vaguer concept than a fluid. (Schopenhauer [1847] seized upon it precisely because it was such a general concept.)

Elliotson, a clinically minded physician still believing in the fluid, defined the target of Mesmerism specifically as the brain (*cf.*, Goldsmith, 1934, p. 205). The patient's will was affected by the influence of the fluid on the brain. The hypnotized subject was now dissected, explicitly isolating the brain and implicitly implicating whatever in the brain was held to be responsible for will.

James Braid tried to find those parts of mind that were pertinent. The power of suggestion was the external force, but there was no longer a mechanical causation (which horrified Elliotson). Braid did not have to rest there, as the Royal Commission did, because he was able to construct a hypothetical system within the subject. The problem of the two-person system was no longer his concern. Hypnotic phenomena revealed not "a physical cause from without but a mental delusion from within" (Braid, 1846, p. 191). (Again, this parallels Freud's shift from the seduction theory to the fantasy theory of hysteria.) Braid characterized hypnosis as essentially a state of concentration of nervous energy on an idea, and that continued as the paradigm for hypnosis right through to Janet and Breuer.[12]

[11] Mesmer's student, d'Eslon, had told the Royal Commission that "there is but one nature, one distemper and one remedy" (Franklin, et al., 1785).

[12] Braid (1846, p. 191) also noticed that in hypnosis body and mind interact. It is interesting that this skeptical medical man could respect hypnosis only if it fit into a chain of causation between mind and body. If he did not care much about the nature of the external force involved (it was just something that concentrated the attention), he cared very much that there be a series of successive translations from idea to physical outcome, so that, for instance, hypnosis could be thought of as applied to phrenological capacities, and suggestions should be designed to alter a known physical function which could take proximal credit for the cure (*cf.*, Bernheim, 1884, p. 112).

Braid's contribution, then, was more than a careful and critical examination of the effects of hypnotism and a demonstration of its dramatic use for anesthesia. He also ventured to elaborate a rough theory of the mind, emphasizing ideas as parts and a flux of energy that could be more or less invested in those ideas.

This theory was then elaborated by Durand de Gros (*cf.*, Bernheim, 1884, p. 114). Durand's prophetic theory was that afferent nerves required not only tonic central innervation, but also specific attentional impulses. When hypnosis removed those attentional impulses by concentrating nervous energy via a simple, homogeneous stimulus, he postulated, most of the nervous forces accumulated in the brain. When impressions entered such a brain through the half-open door of hypnotism, they released a tremendous amount of pent-up energy which could awaken a dormant part of the brain and lead to an exaggerated physical response. In this way, Durand concluded, a suggested idea concentrated available nervous energy wherever the hypnotist desired.

Still working on the processes of the mind, Liébeault elaborated upon the desynthesizing effect of hypnosis. He suggested that what happens in hypnosis happens because associations are in the hands of the hypnotist (Bernheim, 1884, p. 117).

Durand's theory, boldly, and Liébeault's, more subtly, were theories of parts of the mind interrelated by what a Freudian would call varying amounts of cathexis. The emphasis, however, was on the latter energetic *processes*.

It is instructive to reflect upon these beginning stages of dynamic psychology. It is so much easier, when confronted with a complete, complex "machine" like the Freudian system, to picture it as a simple copy of mechanical or electrical models than to trace its evolution out of a specific problem. The early medical hypnotists had to find some way of describing a situation in which acuity could be deliberately enhanced or suppressed—in which people could be deliberately made to use the whole of what they potentially know, think, and will, or alterna-

tively, only a portion of it. That the whole-mind process can be concentrated or dispersed is a very modest, low-level theoretical transcription of the observed events. And yet, the formulation is already a metapsychology; it is already an account of the fate of a limited fund of energy. It all seems to follow from the assumption that the brain, or at least the nervous system, or perhaps simply a mind, underlies hypnotic phenomena.

Process, however, is only half the lesson of hypnosis. Despine paid attention not just to the predominance of a suggested idea, but also to the peculiar kind of activity that it manifests. He held that all nervous centers possess, in accordance with the laws that govern their activity, an intelligent power without ego and without consciousness. He also concluded that in pathological states, such as hypnotism, these centers might be responsible for acts similar to those ordinarily initiated by the ego, whereas in normal states automatic and conscious centers are bound together and act conjointly (Bernheim, 1884, p. 122).

To this vertical split, Bernheim opposed a hierarchical distinction: lower levels of the mind, he said, tended to react to evidence automatically with belief and evoked sensation, and hypnotism freed such automatisms from the review and control of higher, more skeptical centers (Bernheim, 1884, p. 137). (This is the theoretical line that Janet followed.) Bernheim also allowed that in the ordinary course of their lives some people, whom we would now call suggestible, were less governed by higher processes of mental review than others.

Up to the time of Bernheim's work, the evolution of thought about hypnotism was something like this: the variables were gradually accepted as psychological rather than physical (at least by those who did not regard them as mystical). The terms involved came to be seen as the hypnotizer's will and the subject's trust or credulity. The focus of theory then shifted from the interpersonal to the intrapersonal, and the phenomenon of hypnosis became usable as a tool for conceptually analyzing the mind. The mind was seen as working in two ways, not necessarily sharply distinguished from one another (Bernheim, p. 149).

The analysis of the two ways the mind worked varied somewhat. Primarily, a distinction was made between a completely synthesized mind and a fragmented one, i.e., one in which not all of the mind's powers or stores of information were applied at once. (This was the tradition of Braid, Durand, Liébeault, and Janet.) This distinction implied the existence of real parts of the mind, which could be summoned up or ignored. At first, the main debate was whether the distinction was vertical or horizontal. Either the whole mind was vertically split by hypnosis, with higher functions concentrated like a movable spotlight on only a few items of mentation (Braid, Durand), or else automatic levels of the mind were freed by hypnosis from higher ones (Despine, Bernheim, Janet). In either case, the nature of the entities that were encompassed (automatisms or exaggerated, conscious emphases) was only vaguely described, and the main explanation was in terms of types of mental processes or functions.

The major empirical problem that these theories faced was the phenomenon of amnestic suggestion for delayed, organized response and the hypnotic teaching of segregated, complex abilities. Braid had remarked that a second language could be buried in a hypnotic level. Clearly, such a thing as language was neither primitively organized nor restricted in focus. A structure as complicated as normal thinking was separated here from ordinary use.

Despine, especially, realized that there were theoretical implications of the fact that organized activity of the sort we associate with purpose and intention could be elicited by hypnotic suggestion without a whole mind (conscious) purpose or intention. Therefore, in Despine we find not just a new kind of mind process, but two new kinds of entity in the mind, namely, a segregated, effective, variably expressive purpose and an active and intelligent part-mind "center." Despine thought of the center as a lower form that normally was fused with a higher, conscious one. Bernheim, on the other hand, pointed out that automatic activity could be just as sophisticated and, indeed, as temporarily conscious as any other form.

An important issue was at stake. Bernheim could have allowed for different modes of processing, but he was not comfortable with a division of the mind into actual entities, that is, into parts which had their own semi-independent, effective activity. A memory could be latent, but it could be effective only when it became actual, i.e., only when it joined the whole mind, however narrowed the whole-mind process might be at the time. Therefore, even when suggestion blunted critical faculties, the whole mind, including consciousness, was seen as functioning when it was functioning at all.

But then Bernheim was confronted with another major empirical puzzle—posthypnotic suggestion. Here an intention seemed to be active on its own and without reference to the intention of the whole mind. To get around this, Bernheim was forced to adopt a strained hypothesis, namely, that a person carrying out a posthypnotic suggestion keeps dipping into his somnambulistic, automatized state in order to consciously sample the buried instruction, and emerging quickly out of it again so as to give the appearance of being unaware of the suggestion. Beaunis quite rightly dismissed this as begging the question (*cf.*, Bernheim, 1884, p. 157).

Bernheim's quandry was not unique. Even today an analyst such as Roy Schafer (1973a, 1973b) finds it difficult to allow for the existence of part-mind entities, probably for the same reason as Bernheim: they seem too anthropomorphic. In the spirit of Bernheim, Schafer will not allow for what in Freud parallels Despine's unconscious but intelligent centers. He wants the whole mind to be responsible for its actions, and he echoes Bernheim in describing deeds as actions taken by the whole person.

Charcot's great service, albeit an inadvertent one, was to pick up the emphasis Durand and Despine had placed on the *action* of a split-off piece of mind (which the Nancy school had neglected in favor of the process that accounts for splitting). Durand had tried to account for suggested ideas in terms of pent-up nervous energies. Despine had postulated intelligent

centers that were uncovered by hypnosis. Charcot, precisely because of his exclusive and rather dogmatic identification of hypnosis with pathology, elaborated on the effects (both physical and mental) of a hypnotic type of idea. He thought he had circumscribed a configuration of effects in terms of a disease, which put him in a position to study this new kind of idea as an agent having its own special kind of effect. Thus we can see that Bernheim's appreciation of the normality of suggestion was not the only reason for his disagreement with Charcot. Bernheim was also prejudiced by his process orientation, which was so far from being empirically based that he had to strain the data in order to uphold it. Charcot's blindness to the universality of suggestion, on the other hand, although it may have distorted both his theory of hysteria and his understanding of mental processes, allowed him to recognize a *part* of the mind as a thing to be studied and to begin to trace its natural history.

As soon as observers began to think in terms of part-entities and whole-entities of mind, hypnosis became an experiment that could fasten psychological terms to objective fact (*cf.*, Freud [1924, p. 192], who said that hypnosis made the unconscious for the first time subject to experiment).

As regards the whole mind, exemplified in its process, hypnosis (like Fechner's psychophysics) offered a quantitative discrimination: the degree of "dissociation." The mind could be more or less unified. "Attention" was an extremely controllable and, therefore, objectively variable function in hypnosis, unlike Herbart's and Meynert's predominant mental aggregates, which were merely pseudonyms for the mind's unity or net outcome. Herbart's apperceptive unity was a way of imagining parts of the mind being held together. Meynert's pleasure-pain principle was a definition of an invariant mind process. But in hypnosis, the mind, on the one hand in a state of attending to something in itself and, on the other hand not attending to it, diagrammed radical differences in mentation, each with a rich empirical outcome. These states were visible variations of some underlying, constant process. The phenomenon of disso-

ciation, which spelled out a graduated process of synthesis, was the discovery that inspired Janet.

By the same token, if one had empirical evidence that the mind is more or less holding something together, one perforce had empirical evidence of what is or is not being held together. Now the opportunity at last arose to find real parts of the mind, that is, parts that were not arbitrarily defined.

While the Nancy school used hypnotism and suggestion to demonstrate varying degrees of mental synthesis and a bundle of mental entities that were dealt with by that synthesis, Charcot's study of hysteria characterized the synthetic process more sharply and the mental entities more subtly. In the first place, Charcot added another dimension to mind process by distinguishing between pathological and normal processes of synthesis and establishing regularities in their consequences. Freud (1888a, p. 42) acknowledged this contribution when he said that Charcot had picked hysteria out of the chaos of nervous diseases. Adding to Bernheim's universal personal categories of sleeping and waking and the interpersonal categories of the power of suggestion which had been anticipated by Braid and Bertrand, Charcot supplied the personal variables of hysterical and nonhysterical minds as a device for studying the synthetic process.

This particular category brought medical respectability to the study of hysteria.[13] What is more important, Charcot's work suggested that it might be possible to *describe* the synthesizing process, i.e., the *medium* through which ideas were handled, an opportunity that Freud (1888b, p. 80) was quick to grasp.[14] Furthermore, by correlating them in a medical fashion with

[13] Jones (1953, p. 227) said that Charcot made hysteria a medical matter. Boring (1950, p. 698) noted that Charcot obtained medical acceptance of hypnosis by "mislabeling" hypnotizability as a hysterical symptom.

[14] The Nancy school's skepticism of Charcot's findings repeated the general attitude of the Royal Commission toward hypnosis (*cf.*, Ritvo, 1970, p. 203; Stewart, 1967, pp. 25-26). The Royal Commission reduced mesmerism to "contact, imitation and imagination." Although both Bernheim and the Commission had grounds for skepticism, they allowed their interest in interpersonal factors to distract them from the opportunity to explore the intrapersonal.

variables in the patient's life, Charcot was able to give the mind-parts—the ideas—a more definite and elaborate history than was available to those who simply engaged in suggestion.[15] This further served to establish the parts as real entities.

Charcot's most important contribution, however, was to demonstrate the variety of expressions an idea could display when handled in various ways by the mind process. Specifically, ideas could be manifested in obviously goal-directed behaviors, general somatic status, and ideational awareness. Charcot thus laid the groundwork for an entity that was not just a conscious idea, a latent conscious idea (an unconscious idea), or a force determining a resulting idea, but something that could take the form of an ordinary idea *or* some other form altogether. In other words, he pointed to an entity underlying "ideas." Another way of putting this is that Charcot provided a least arbitrary discrimination of data based on a relationship between physical and ideational phenomena, just as Fechner had done for sensation.

This initial separation of physical from conscious aspects of an "idea," triangulating an underlying entity, was the starting point of psychoanalysis.[16] (Even the Breuer and Freud depiction of an idea as a foreign body in the mind—a parasite—was anticipated by Charcot [*cf.*, Andersson, 1962, p. 54].) To integrate those part-entities into the whole-mind entity and to amalgamate structure with process was to be the path of de-

[15] Andersson (1962, p. 58) points out that Freud and Charcot both saw that suggestion uses the *patient's* meanings, while Bernheim saw only the meanings imposed by the hypnotist.

[16] See, Freud (1924, p. 193), Jones (1953, p. 397), Stewart (1967, pp. 25-26), Wyss (1966, pp. 49, 450). Despite this agreement about its importance, commentators sometimes miss the significance of the detachment of an idea from its physical expression in hysteria. Wyss (pp. 61, 83, 102) believes that Freud simply borrowed from physics the theory of a body with a quantitative charge and transposed it to the realm of ideas. Stewart (pp. 25-26) regards the physical-mental correlation in hysteria as a first problem for Freud to resolve, rather than as a technique for isolating a natural entity. Although Jones (p. 397) regarded the notion of a quantity separable from an idea as an original contribution that psychopathology had made to psychology, he believed that the cornerstone of Freud's theory was the distinction between primary and secondary process, thus identifying Freud's hypothesis more with its account of process than with its structural elements.

velopment of psychoanalysis (*cf.*, Friedman, 1977). Freud's theory is distinguished from others by abandoning neither process nor structure aspects.

SUMMARY

Nineteenth century thinkers were concerned about the problem of natural entities. They had difficulty describing the achievements of physics in terms of real objects and difficulty describing that science without reference to entities. Biology pursued the quest for natural entities and was rewarded with Darwin's theory, which made life a kind of organism, with species its part-entities. Sociologists had far more difficulty, but made numerous attempts to confirm the objectivity of some particular unit.

Psychologists experienced the greatest difficulty in establishing empirical entities. Locke's ideas were not sufficiently substantial; Herbart's representations were not sufficiently empirical; Wundt's sensations were not sufficiently representative of mental processes; Meynert's mental process was not sufficiently dissectable. But Herbart did offer a model of mind parts, Wundt, a model of empirical parts, and Meynert, a model of the processing of mind parts.

What these models needed was an empirical device that would analyze the whole mind into parts. It was only gradually realized that hypnosis was just such a device. By the time of Charcot, students were no longer preoccupied with the relationship of hypnotist to subject and used the phenomenon to make various kinds of distinctions about the contents and process of the mind. It remained for Charcot to find, through hypnosis, parts of the mind that were entitled to be treated as genuine entities because they had ideational, volitional, and physical manifestations and a life history of their own. The stage was set for Freud to relate them one to another, trace their life history, and systematize the process which handled them.

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A Defense of the Use of Metaphor in Analytic Theory Formation

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A DEFENSE OF THE USE OF METAPHOR IN ANALYTIC THEORY FORMATION

BY LEON WURMSER, M.D.

This study of psychoanalytic theory formation is based on the epistemology of Cassirer and Langer. It postulates the need of all sciences to operate with symbols of various levels of abstractions, including, in a very prominent way, metaphors. There is not just one scientific method. The current wave of criticism against psychoanalytic theory from within and without, and especially of its use of metaphor in theory formation, is based on a philosophy of radical empiricism which cannot do justice to the science of psychoanalysis.

> The Lord whose place of oracle is at Delphi, does not speak nor does he hide, but he hints in symbols.
>
> HERACLITUS

PREFACE

No form of scientific enterprise can move ahead without a recurrent inquiry into its epistemological foundation—into the basic premises presupposing practical method as well as theory. Epistemology, the exploration of how to gain knowledge (epistéme), is of course a philosophical task implicitly or explicitly underlying science, but often it is not easily visible or even accessible to practitioners or theorists of a science. Psychoanalysis cannot do without such a continuous examination of its

This paper owes its origin primarily to discussions with Dr. David Beres and to a number of scientific and philosophical works of his and of others to which he drew my attention. Drs. Peter Hartocollis and Nathan Schlessinger discussed an abbreviated version of it when it was presented at the Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, Los Angeles, May 1975. Drs. Robert A. Rounds and Ellis Feer Devereux gave me very valuable suggestions for this final version. I express my gratitude to all of them.

philosophical presuppositions, particularly in times of crisis such as many believe we are passing through at the moment.

This essay is part of a larger work which will present a philosophical reassessment of psychoanalysis. Many such efforts have been made in the past half century, almost exclusively with the tools either of a radically empiristic, positivistic philosophy (*e.g.,* Home and Schafer) or of an epistemology based on phenomenological and existentialistic philosophy (most prominently by Binswanger and Ricoeur). My current investigation, however, endeavors to explore and clarify some philosophical problems raised by psychoanalysis with the help of a rarely used instrument: the Neo-Kantian approach as represented and reshaped in this century mainly by Cassirer and Langer. I think that this instrument is particularly well suited to shed light on some of our most baffling problems: to order the enormous wealth of empirical data, to put the hierarchy of theoretical propositions into a proper perspective without destroying what has proven useful, and in various layers of abstraction, but also to examine critically where these theoretical presumptions may have gradually changed into unquestioned, even dogmatic, certainties. Thus, it steers a course between a naïve empiricism—which usually ends up in nihilistic skepticism (as well-disguised as this may be)—and an equally naïve dogmatism treating our theories as nonmetaphorical absolute truths and palpable facts.

In this inquiry several topics and questions emerge as foci for separate treatment and will be taken up later. One is the relationship of psychoanalysis to philosophy, the multiplicity (not uniformity) of scientific method, and examination of theory formation in connection with the hierarchy of abstractions. Another is the productive, potentially even regenerative, power of the multifaceted current crisis of psychoanalytic theory, as well as practice. A third important issue is the nature and place of psychoanalysis as a science; it will be postulated in later papers that it has to be seen as a separate, autonomous field of "symbolic forms"—as a field of theoretical knowledge other

than the natural sciences and the so-called humanities (the "cultural sciences," the *"Geisteswissenschaften"*). The topic of this paper, however, is a fourth cardinal issue: the use of metaphors in scientific theories as applicable to psychoanalysis. While the first three topics will be touched upon, their full discussion will be reserved for subsequent articles.

THE CRITICISM OF METAPHOR AS A TOOL OF THEORY FORMATION

The definition of metaphor is "a figure of speech involving the transference of a name to something analogous." One of several signals of the crisis through which we are passing at present emanates from the equation of much of analytic theory with metaphorical statements. We face a double-edged attack upon psychoanalytic theory from two opposite corners, both disparaging its metaphorical nature. Both are radically empiristic, one with a neurophysiological and mathematical orientation, the other with a phenomenological orientation. The problem was noted by Else Frenkel-Brunswik (1954): "While the psychoanalytic system comes closer to a truly scientific theory than most observers realize, psychoanalysis still contains many metaphors, analogies, and confusions between construct and fact which must in the end be eliminated" (p. 226).

Kubie (1966) attacked specifically the "topological," "economic," and "structural" metaphors "which are regularly miscalled 'hypotheses'" (p. 191). Psychoanalytic literature, he added, "has become stereotyped repetitions of verbal clichés" (p. 197). He suggested as a central focus the relative roles of the "three concurrent systems of processing and sampling, and their interplay": conscious or symbolic processes, unconscious processes, and above all, "the continuous and remarkably rapid stream of preconscious processes" ("coded signalling") (1960, pp. 502-503). Instead of the aforementioned metaphors, he proposed a psychoanalytic language based on cybernetics, information theory, and neurophysiology (see also, Kubie, 1947, 1960, 1962). But is a statement referring to "the characteristics

of behavior in which preconscious processing flows freely, dominating the psychic stream and furnishing a continuous supply of processed experience for symbolic sampling" (1960, p. 503) in any way less metaphorical than the points of view, the metaphors and models, attacked by him? Langer (1972) speaks of "the currently fashionable computer jargon," the "engineering metaphors of 'automation' and information theory" (pp. 50, 263), and of the "cult of borrowed mathematical terms," emphasizing that the "emulation of physical science naturally leads to premature attempts at mathematical expression of known or presumed regularities in behavior" based on the faith that "the dress of mathematics bestows scientific dignity no matter how or where it is worn" (1967, pp. 38-40). The criterion is, as we shall note later, how stimulating for research, how fruitful such a new conglomerate of metaphors ordered around the key concepts of "coded signal" and "symbolic process" will prove to be.

H. J. Home (1966) attacks psychoanalytic theory from the second angle. His thesis is essentially that mind is the *meaning* of behavior. ". . . Freud took the psycho-analytic study of neurosis out of the world of science into the world of the humanities, because a meaning is not the product of causes but the creation of a subject" (p. 43). Science asks the question "how does a thing occur and receives an answer in terms of causes, whereas a humanistic study asks the question *why* and receives an answer in terms of reasons"; its mode of thought is "interpretation." Home accuses psychoanalysis of having applied "metaphors" to "meaning," of understanding these metaphors literally and thus creating "a metaphysical fact" (p. 46). It has become a kind of new religion with new dogmata, that is, basically all of our higher level abstractions are seen as metaphysical statements. "If mind is not a thing then each time we speak about it as if it were a thing we are speaking metaphorically. . . . If . . . we suppress or repress our consciousness of the metaphor and speak literally about the mind as a thing then we have created a metaphysical fact" (p. 46). Psychoanalysis "reifies the concept

of mind and elaborates a scientific type theory in terms of causes. To reify is to deify. . ." (p. 47). We should restrict ourselves to "why" questions in terms of meanings and reasons and avoid the "how" questions of science.

Roy Schafer is the most eloquent and radical protagonist of this view. In a number of articles published in the last three years he discards most of the theoretical superstructure and all of metapsychology as metaphorical constructs which have become concretized, reified, anthropomorphized, and have therefore lost any claim to scientific dignity. He states that much of psychoanalytic conceptualization is based on metaphors about substance (including quantity) and space; that because of our concretizations, we confuse observation and theory; and that "once embarked on metaphor, we tend to develop a sense of obligation to be metaphorically consistent, and involve ourselves in extravagant niceties of formulation" (1972, p. 435). "It has never been helpful to *systematic* explanatory thinking or teaching to resort to these anthropomorphic, spatial, and mechanical metaphors, although I would not question that it has been helpful to *preliminary* explorations, like Freud's, or that it has been comforting to all of us to have them readily available like old friends or dependable escape hatches" (1973b, p. 181). He comments that Lewin in his 1971 paper "was encouraging conceptual acting-out instead of analyzing" (in regard to the two room and manikin model of the mind). Schafer (1973a) writes that recognition of these metaphors should lead us to an ametaphorical theory, "a radical reconceptualization of psychoanalysis" (p. 259) based on an "action language," avoiding the "implicit archaisms of the substantive approach" (p. 261) (or, of course, the spatial metaphors like "inside," "internal," etc.). A new theory more "native" to psychoanalytic method and observation is suggested: ". . . the analyst's real commitment is not to determinism in a universe of mechanical causes, but to intelligibility in a universe of actions with reasons. The action language is the native, but neglected tongue of psychoanalysis" (p. 267). "Thus the four terms—meaning, action, reason and situation—are aspects of

the psychological mode of considering human activity, and they co-define or co-constitute each other. In contrast, the other four terms—cause, condition, determinant and force—when used in psychology, express a subhumanizing or dehumanizing mode of considering human activity as though it were the workings of a machine" (p. 269). As Schafer (1975) states in a recent article, his profound criticism would sweep away all of metapsychology and most of our clinical theory and erect a new theory based on psychoanalytic phenomenology. His criticism is based on two premises: first, that metaphors derived from direct experience become concretized and therefore are dangerous, indeed ultimately evil; and second, that it is possible to form a theory of psychoanalysis based strictly on functional correlations which have shed all metaphorical impurities, and that he has found a key to build such a nonconcretized, nonreified theory.

Most thoughtful analytic theoreticians of the last twenty years have shared Schafer's first concern: that analytic theory is built up from metaphors which have been made into *res,* into things (*c.f.,* for instance, Beres, 1965; Hartmann, 1964). They have tried to make that giant but indispensable step which Cassirer has seen and described in the development of all scientific thinking—the step from "substance" to "function" (*c.f.,* especially, Cassirer, 1910). The crucial change, already perceived by Plato in *Phaedon,* is the dissolution of "things" into logical connections and correlations, and lastly into mathematical functions and processes—a change which has accompanied all scientific progress throughout the last four centuries.

Thus Schafer's intent is in line with traditional epistemological criticism. He sees throughout psychoanalytic theory the process of *substance-finding instead of functional thinking,* which has been a death trap time and again to scientific progress. But Schafer goes beyond this accusation of substantialization; he condemns metaphor if it becomes the building block of theory. Thus he eradicates metaphor wherever he finds it in theory. G. Klein (1973a, 1973b), Holt (1975), and Turbayne (1970) have raised similar though less radical objections.

This brings us to a Socratic "aporia," an insoluble dilemma:

how can we formulate, order, organize, systematize, put in increasing layers of abstractions, the new discoveries in a field for which no language exists without using metaphors and other analogic concepts? Freud was faced with this aporia from the beginning. How he dealt with it will be taken up shortly.

Looking back over this part of my discussion of the present state of our science, I am tempted to agree with Lewin (1968) who wrote: "I should say that we have accumulated 'inductive' proof, if I had not read recent logicians on the topic of induction. On this matter I take my cue from Mother Jocasta, who said life is easier if one does not bother too much about certain things" (p. 57). But as we know, Oedipus *had* to know; and we *have* to question.

THE PLACE OF METAPHOR IN SCIENCE

Metaphor, as we know, assumes a central place in clinical work as a guide to unconscious meaning—not unlike dreams, parapraxes, or symptoms. In Arlow's words (1969a): "Metaphor constitutes an outcropping into conscious expression of a fragment of unconscious fantasy" (p. 7). There are a number of excellent articles on this clinical tool, the analysis of metaphor: Arlow (1969a, 1969b), Caruth and Ekstein (1966), Sharpe (1940), Voth (1970), and particularly, Lewin (1968, 1970, 1971). This paper focuses instead on the place of the metaphor in theory formation and theory formulation.

No science can operate without metaphors. Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894), who tried to derive all of physics from the three basic concepts of time, space, and mass, was particularly explicit. In his view, "the basic concepts of every science, the means by which it poses its questions and formulates its solutions, appear not as passive copies (*Abbilder*) of a given being, but as self-created, intellectual symbols." According to Hertz, we form "inner pseudo images (*Scheinbilder*) or symbols in such a way that the consequences of these images according to thought necessity (*denknotwendig*) are always the images of the consequences according to natural necessity (*naturnot-*

wendig) of the copied objects. Thus these symbols allow us to predict the consequences in the external world" (*cf.*, Cassirer, 1923a, pp. 5-9; 1940, pp. 103-109).

The connection between symbol and fact is solely this functional relation: not any similarity, but a means to predict consequences. Even "mass" and "force" are such "*Scheinbilder*": pseudo images, metaphors, mediating presentations.

Freud was acutely aware not only of the difficulty but also of the imperative need to use well-known expressions and metaphors to symbolize hitherto unknown events, "facts" and their order, in general terms. For instance, in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams,* he introduces the triple metaphor of a "mental apparatus," composed of various "agencies" (*Instanzen*) or "systems," arranged in spatial order, and resembling a microscope or telescope (the triplicity of the metaphor I see in its instrument character, in its "locality," and in the personification in the form of agencies). Freud (1900) explains this need for metaphors (*Gleichnisse*):

> I see no necessity to apologize for the imperfections of this or of any similar imagery. Analogies [*Gleichnisse*] of this kind are only intended to assist us in our attempt to make the complications of mental functioning intelligible by dissecting the function and assigning its different constituents to different component parts of the apparatus. . . . We are justified, in my view, in giving free rein to our speculations so long as we retain the coolness of our judgement and do not mistake the scaffolding for the building. And since at our first approach to something unknown all that we need is the assistance of provisional ideas, I shall give preference in the first instance to hypotheses of the crudest and most concrete description (p. 536).

Lewin (1968, 1971) repeatedly referred to Freud's famous metaphor illustrating repression, the systems unconscious and preconscious, and the process of consciousness. Freud (1916-1917) summarized the metaphor as follows: "I should like to assure you that these crude hypotheses of the two rooms, the

watchman at the threshold between them and consciousness as a spectator at the end of the second room, must nevertheless be very far-reaching approximations to the real facts" (p. 296). The higher level abstractions for this metaphor are the concept of the two systems, the censorship, the structure of the mental apparatus as a whole, and the nature of consciousness as an inner sense organ—but even these higher level theoretical symbolizations are still strongly metaphorical, though more abstract. Both levels of metaphorical formations are useful, helpful, and justified as teaching devices (*cf.*, Lewin, 1965), as auxiliary constructs in therapy, and as the only way to translate experience into theory ("the only way" principally, not in the concrete choice of metaphor or higher level construct).

Langer (1942) refers to the same problem:

> Where a precise word is lacking to designate the novelty which the speaker would point out, he resorts to the powers of logical analogy, and uses a word denoting something else that is a presentational symbol for the thing he means; the context makes it clear that he cannot mean the thing literally denoted, and must mean something else symbolically . . . (p. 123). We conceive the literal meaning of the term that is usually used in connection with a fire [she refers to the metaphor: "the king's anger flares up," fire thus being used as symbol for anger] but this context serves us here as a proxy for another which is nameless. . . . In a genuine metaphor, an image of the literal meaning is our symbol for the figurative meaning, the thing that has no name of its own (p. 124).

The origin of such metaphors lies, as just quoted, in "presentational symbols." In contrast to the discursive mode of language with its permanent, precise, clearly defined units of meaning, presentational symbols speak directly to the senses (p. 89): "The abstractions made by the ear and the eye—the forms of direct perception—are our most primitive instruments of intelligence. They are genuine symbolic materials, media of understanding by whose office we apprehend a world of things, and of events that are the histories of things" (p. 86). These

presentational symbols are used as metaphors for experiences for which we lack discursive symbols. Eventually concepts are generalized, faded metaphors. Langer (1942) continues:

> Metaphor is our most striking evidence of *abstractive seeing,* of the power of human minds to use presentational symbols. Every new experience, or new idea about things evokes first of all some metaphorical expression. As the idea becomes familiar, this expression fades to a new literal use of the once metaphorical predicate, a more general use than it had before. It is in this elementary, presentational mode that our first adventures in conscious abstraction occur. . . . One might say that if ritual is the cradle of language, metaphor is the law of its life. It is the force that makes it essentially *relational,* intellectual, forever showing up new abstractable *forms* in reality, forever laying down a deposit of old, abstracted concepts in an increasing treasure of general words (p. 125). [In the development of science] anthropomorphic metaphors are banned. . . . Meanings become more and more precise. . . . Speech becomes increasingly discursive, practical, prosaic . . . (p. 126).

A detailed study of Langer's further thoughts about how our "fabric of meaning," our world view today is a texture of "facts" and "symbols" is beyond the scope of this paper, but another excerpt is pertinent.

> The warp of that fabric [of meaning] consists of what we call "data," the *signs* to which experience has conditioned us to attend, and upon which we act often without any conscious ideation. The woof is symbolism. Out of signs and symbols we weave our tissue of "reality". . . . But *between the facts* run the threads of unrecorded reality, momentarily recognized, wherever they come to the surface, in our tacit adaptation to signs; and the bright, twisted threads of symbolic envisagement, imagination, thought—memory and reconstructed memory, belief beyond experience, dream, make-believe, hypothesis, philosophy—the whole creative process of ideation, metaphor, and abstraction that makes human life an adventure in understanding (pp. 235-237).

Even such a radical critic of psychoanalytic theory as Nagel (1959) is not principally opposed to its use of metaphor, but rather to its allegedly undisciplined use:

> I am not objecting to the use of metaphors *per se* for I am fully aware of the great heuristic values of metaphors and analogies in the construction and development of theories in all departments of science. My point is the different one that in Freudian theory metaphors are employed without even halfway definite rules for expanding them, and that in consequence admitted metaphors such as "energy" or "level of excitation" have no specific content and can be filled in to suit one's fancy (p. 41).

In his book, Nagel (1961) defends the use of analogies and models in theory formation but adds, ". . . a model may be a potential intellectual trap as well as an invaluable intellectual tool" (p. 115).

More unequivocally Danto (1959) defends the use of images, models, metaphors:

> There is a sense in which any important theory is a picture, but not every picture is a portrait. And it is here that Freud's models, brilliant as they often are, can be misleading. But since psychoanalysts often identify the issues of adequacy and ontology, this might go a long way toward explaining why our discussion so frequently resembled a debate between believers and nonbelievers (pp. 316-317).

In words resembling those of Heinrich Hertz he states:

> . . . such models are largely heuristic; and the theory applies to the world only to the degree that some set of semantic rules relates these crucial terms to experience in some way which will effect a confirming relationship between sentences in the theory and sentences whose truth is decided by direct test and experiment (p. 314).

We now draw the following conclusions from these quotations.

What is crucial is that our science, like any other science, is

woven of the warp of observations and held together by the intricate woof of symbolism, of many layers of abstractions, of stark and faded metaphors which "interpret" for us ("explain" to us) the "direct" facts which, as we know, are really never direct. Since Kant we have known how "facts" and experiences are formed by our own inner categories of understanding, by our systems of symbolic constructing ("representations," "*Vorstellungen*") and by our layering of metaphors from the crudest, most direct layer of immediate presentation—what we see, hear, feel—to the highest level of desensualized, generalized metaphor. The *misuse* of metaphor is one thing, and Schafer is right in criticizing the rampant use of metaphorical expressions as if we were dealing with the actual things. But the *use* of metaphor is another. *All science is the systematic use of metaphor.* Its critical, self-conscious use as symbolic, not concrete, reality is an inevitable necessity of the scientific process. Thus Schafer is wrong if he thinks his own theoretical construct is free of metaphors. They may be paler, but they remain metaphors. The words he uses and sanctions: "reasons," "problems," "meaning," "actions," "situations" are also metaphors—and not necessarily on a higher level of abstraction. For instance, he replaces the polarity of "external" and "internal" with "public" and "private." He discards other spatial metaphors, such as "levels," "underlying" factors, "hierarchies," "depth" psychology. Instead he uses terms throughout like "facts," "concrete," "fantasy," "concept," "theory"—all of which are metaphors too, directly derived from the presentational symbols of seeing, grasping, and making.

A few less well-known derivations are pertinent. "Fantasy" in Greek means an inner or outer image as well as a dream image. For instance, Xerxes' haunting dream to conquer the Greek West, "to bring all mankind under our yoke," (*cf.*, Herodotus VII, Cap. 15) can be translated literally as "a dream appears as an image to me." Only later, in Aristotelian psychology, did fantasy come to mean "representation" (*cf.*, Cassirer, 1942, p. 68) and thus assume a more abstract meaning.

"Theory" originally meant a viewing, a spectacle, a festive procession—finally, an intellectual viewing and contemplation, culminating in the highest life value for both Plato and Aristotle, the "theoretical life," a life passed in "contemplating" the eternal being and value, the attempt to view the highest laws of existence as being identical and united with the highest values. Thus "theory," like "idea" and "fantasy," are originally visual terms. A "problem" ("*próblema*") in Greek is "something thrown in front of one's feet," an obstacle over which one stumbles; "process" ("*processus*") in Latin is the abstract noun of "moving on," "going forward"; "concrete" means "grown together," "congealed like cheese or cream cheese." These are all metaphors with rich historical and sensory connotations. They are part of the medieval *collegium trilingue,* the triangular culture composed of Jewish, Greek, and Latin intellectual products (*cf.,* Momigliano, 1975), of the immense spiritual heritage our language treasures. Psychoanalysts try to unlock, with the keys of all kinds of metaphors and symbols based on this heritage within our language and indeed our experience, the gates to the rich stream of inner life which we fathom in ourselves and our patients in the therapeutic endeavor. And it is out of the richness of these metaphors that we construct our "ideas," our "theories," and our "views" of what this inner life really means.

THE PROBLEM OF NEW METAPHORS

At the outset I said that psychoanalysis is in a period of crisis. Crisis for us means: Will we *grow* as a science and as an art (or technique)? Or have we become stagnant, are we slowly dying, as many nonanalytic critics assert? Crisis for us means: Do we grow only by accretion, busily accumulating more confirmatory details into the bigger concepts handed down to us in order to refine or reset in smaller details the structure of our science? Or are we able to generate new forms? Generative thoughts and new theoretical formulations are risky, as we have often seen in the past; they have been used in ruthless efforts

to dismantle and discard the older, richer concepts and theories (*e.g.,* from Jung and Adler to Sullivan and Schafer).

1. *Hierarchy of Abstractions*

Rather than destroy what has served us so well in our understanding for the last fifty years, perhaps we should find a philosophical view that might open up new vistas. It is, of course, true that all analytic theories are symbolic constructs, metaphors of various levels of abstractions. Waelder (1962), in his brief essay, "Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy," delineated various levels of psychoanalytic conceptualization: (1) The lowest level is that of *observation* in the analytic situation. (2) These data of observation are woven together in accordance with their interconnections and relationships on the level of clinical *interpretation.* (3) From such data and interpretation, clinical *generalizations* (about type of symptom, illness, or character) can be made. (4) The next higher level of abstraction is that of *clinical theory:* theoretical concepts, such as defense and regression, can be used to order the lower level data and abstractions. (5) "Beyond the clinical concepts there is, without sharp boundaries, a more abstract kind of concept such as cathexis, psychic energy, Eros, death instinct. Here we reach the *level of metapsychology"* (p. 620). (6) Beyond metapsychology are *philosophical* considerations: for example, Freud's rationalistic value philosophy and his empiricist metaphysics.

Waelder is emphatic in ascribing to the ascending levels of abstraction a decreasing importance for psychoanalysis. In his paper, *On Narcissism,* Freud (1914) wrote:

> It is true that notions such as that of an ego-libido, an energy of the ego-instincts, and so on, are neither particularly easy to grasp, nor sufficiently rich in content; a speculative theory of the relations in question would begin by seeking to obtain a sharply defined concept as its basis. But I am of opinion that that is just the difference between a speculative theory and a science erected on empirical interpretation. The latter will not envy speculation its privilege of having a smooth, logically

> unassailable foundation, but will gladly content itself with nebulous, scarcely imaginable basic concepts, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are not the foundation of science, upon which everything rests: that foundation is observation alone. They are not the bottom but the top of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damaging it . . . (p. 77).

But it was in 1932 that Freud gave his philosophical verdict about the theory of instincts and actually, with it, about all of metapsychology (level 5 in Waelder's construction):

> The theory of the instincts is so to say our mythology. Instincts are mythical entities, magnificent in their indefiniteness. In our work we cannot for a moment disregard them, yet we are never sure that we are seeing them clearly (p. 95).

If we look beyond our science of psychoanalysis, we encounter the same hierarchical structure of natural laws (*cf.*, especially, Cassirer, 1910, p. 268).

2. *Precedents*

It is my opinion that not only does level 5 in Waelder's model (metapsychology) blend into metaphysics—that is, into Freud's philosophical *Weltanschaauung* as the above quote indicates (instinct theory="our mythology")—but that Freud used "myths" and metaphorical systems in his highest level concepts, just as four of his greatest predecessors did in anticipating so much in the formulation of man's inner world: Plato (*cf.*, Simon, 1973), Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe. These four never tired in their search for new comprehensive metaphors, myths, and symbolic constructs in order to find a new language for the immense discoveries opening up to them in their inner life and the inner lives of their fellow men.

We know in particular how deeply Freud was influenced in many ways by Goethe, how often he quoted him, how frequently he used similes and examples from this great searcher, poet, and philosopher. Yet much of Goethe's philosophy is condensed in

the one sentence at the end of the second part of Faust: "*Alles Vergängliche/Ist nur ein Gleichnis. . .*" ("Everything transient is merely a metaphor. . ."). The world of facts and data, our "reality," can be comprehended only with the help of metaphors and symbols. There is no seeing without interpreting; there are no primary givens, only symbolically structured visions. In Cassirer's (1940) words:

> It was his [Goethe's] firm conviction that the particular and the universal are not only intimately connected but that they interpenetrate one another. The "factual" and the "theoretical" were not opposite poles to him, but only two expressions and factors of a unified and irreducible relation. This is one of the basic maxims in his view of nature. "The highest thing would be," he said, *"to realize everything factual as being itself theoretical.* The blue of the sky reveals the fundamental law of chromatics. Look not only for something behind the phenomena, for these are themselves the theory." Experience must swing one way toward the idea, and the idea [swing] back again toward experience if any knowledge of nature is to arise. There is no question which of the two is of greater value, or whether one is superior or subordinate to the other. Here a perfectly *reciprocal* determination holds. "The particular always underlies the universal; the universal must forever submit to the particular." The relation between the two, according to Goethe, is not one of logical subsumption but of *ideal or "symbolic" representation.* The particular represents the universal, "not as a dream and shadow, but as a momentarily living manifestation of the inscrutable." For the true naturalist, one "pregnant instance," not countless scattered observations, exhibits the "immanent law" of nature (pp. 145-46, italics added).

Before leaving this topic of the general, epistemologically justifiable need for various levels of symbolic representation and, in particular, for metaphors which are a crucial part of inductive inquiry, we should include a fifth predecessor of psychoanalysis whose influence on Freud's development has been little studied—Immanuel Kant. I do not know to what

extent Freud studied Kant, but for our purposes this is irrelevant—just as it is not important for our purposes that the scientific atmosphere of the German speaking world has been and is still today permeated by the Kantian way of thinking. Suffice it to note that Helmholtz was described by Freud in a letter to his bride as one of his idols (Jones, 1953, p. 41). Yet he was also "one of the first to raise the cry 'Back to Kant'" (Cassirer, 1940, p. 3). For the most part the group around Helmholtz (among them Freud's teacher, Brücke) combined a sober, empirical attitude with the critical stance of Kant himself (unlike the rampant speculative, metaphysical extravaganzas of Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Hegel).

However, our focus here is not on the history of psychoanalysis but on its epistemology. More specifically, our interest is *whether and in what forms and on what levels we choose symbolic representations* for the specific experiences gained by the psychoanalytic method and the scientific inquiry based on this method, and to what extent the Kantian way of thinking may be of assistance to us. Kant used metaphors most sparingly, and symbolic conceptualizations only in the most rarified, scholastically faded versions. Yet it was he, especially in his later critical analyses, who saw the "possibility for all experience," for all scientific insight, all knowledge, all comprehension of "truth" as based in the mind and "constituted" by the nature of our reason. In his introduction to the second edition of *Critique of Pure Reason,* Kant wrote that the great discoverers of the laws of nature (and he refers particularly to Galileo)

> learned that reason only perceives that which it produces after its own design; that it must not be content to follow, as it were, in the leading strings of nature, but must proceed in advance with principles of judgement according to unvarying laws and compel nature to reply to its questions. . . . Reason must approach nature with the view, indeed, of receiving information from it, not however, in the character of a pupil, who listens to all that his master chooses to tell him, but in that of a judge, who compels the witnesses to reply to those questions which he himself thinks fit to propose.

Kant states that reason itself dictates its law to nature—*"der Verstand . . . ist selbst die Gesetzgebung für die Natur"* (Kant, 1781-A, 126).

In this context we must consider what Cassirer (1920) described as Kant's *"methodological dualism between ideal and factual* which at the same time is a pure methodological reciprocity" (p. 377). This is the methodological dualism that serves as a justification for *the disciplined use of symbols and metaphors* in the construction of a new science. Metaphors, taken literally, are unscientific. Metaphors, understood as symbols, are the only language of science we possess, unless we resort to mathematical symbols. In his epistemology, Cassirer (1907) refers to Leibnitz's conviction that our ideas of truth are not direct images ("copies") but are symbols of reality. Many of the rational insights of mathematics and mechanics are still only "a metaphor" (*"ein Gleichnis"*) (p. 174). For Cassirer too—as does Schafer now, following Ryle (1949)—rightly emphasizes that it is crucial that we take these analogies, these metaphors, as "functions," not as "substances."

3. *Cassirer's Four Criteria of Science*

It was only in his last works (especially in *The Myth of the State*) that Cassirer, no friend of Freudian theory, began to recognize not only the value of some psychoanalytic concepts but the deeper kinship between some of his findings and those of Freud. However, his concept of scientific method may be of considerable value to us.

In his examination of the epistemological revolution wrought by Einstein's and Planck's theories, he compares radical empiricism and positivism with Neo-Kantian idealism. In the former "laws are treated like things whose properties one can read off by immediate perception" (Cassirer, 1921, p. 426). By contrast

> idealism urges against the standpoint of "pure experience" as the standpoint of mere sensation, that all equations are results of measurement; all measurement, however, presupposes

> certain theoretical principles and in the latter certain universal functions of connection, of shaping and coordination. We never measure mere sensations, and we never measure with mere sensations, but in general to gain any sort of relations of measurement we must transcend the "given" of perception and replace it by a conceptual symbol, which possesses no copy in what is immediately sensed (p. 427).

In this context Cassirer refers to the crucial role "thought-experiments" play in physics and adds, " 'Thought-experiments' of such force and fruitfulness cannot be explained and justified by the purely empiristic theory of physical knowledge" (p. 428).

We might ask here: What is the equivalent in "force and fruitfulness" to such "thought-experiments" in psychoanalytic theory? I postulate it can be found precisely in the *richness of metaphorical, analogical systems* which we superimpose upon our direct experience, our own "purely sensatory founding," our own "rhapsody of perceptions" (to use Kant's felicitous expression) and that here we find the theory's "positive fruitfulness," that is, the "founding of experience" (Cassirer, p. 432). This leads us back to the question: What has been most *fruitful* in analytic theory formation? One has only to read the works of Freud and a few other analytic theoreticians to discover that it was the richness and the systematic, coherent use of metaphorical constructs that added so much to our knowledge. Thus, when one of the *criteria for physical theory becomes "fruitfulness"* (or, equivalently, for us "clinical relevance"), in addition to *clarity, lack of contradiction, and absence of equivocation* (*"die apriorische Forderung der Klarheit, der Widerspruchslosigkeit und der Eindeutigkeit der Beschreibung"*) (Cassirer, 1906, p. 6)—we have to ask ourselves whether the same four criteria can be applied in our field. We realize at once, however, that they need modification as to content if transposed from physical theory into other sciences.

This leads us to the *fundamental opposition of scientific criteria in the natural sciences and the cultural sciences* (as exemplified by history). Cassirer (1944) wrote:

> In all its single branches physics tended to one and the same point; it attempted to bring the whole world of natural phenomena under the control of number. . . . Science no longer speaks the language of common-sense-experience; it speaks the Pythagorean language. The pure symbolism of number supersedes and obliterates the symbolism of common speech (pp. 214-215). . . . A great scientist, Max Planck, described the whole process of scientific thought as a constant effort to eliminate all "anthropological" elements. We must forget man in order to study nature and to discover and formulate the laws of nature. In the development of scientific thought the anthropomorphic element is progressively forced into the background until it entirely disappears in the ideal structure of physics (p. 191).

To the contrary and in stark contrast, history

> can live and breathe only in the human world. Like language and art, history is fundamentally anthropomorphic. To efface its human aspects would be to destroy its specific character and nature. But the anthropomorphism of historical thought is no limitation of or impediment to its objective truth. History is not knowledge of external facts or events; it is a form of self-knowledge. . . . In history man constantly returns to himself; he attempts to recollect and actualize the whole of his past experience. But the historical self is not a mere individual self. It is anthropomorphic but it is not egocentric. Stated in the form of a paradox, we may say that history strives after an objective anthropomorphism . . . (p. 191).

The aim of the "science of culture" is the "*totality* of the *forms* in which human life is realized." Its tools are concepts of form and style (Cassirer, 1942). It tries to fulfill the scientific criteria of objectivity, clarity, etc., largely by *formal* instead of by the *numerical* and *functional* means of the natural sciences.

Clearly, psychoanalysis is neither a subform of history (*cf.*, Hartmann, 1964, p. 324) nor of language and linguistics. Nor is it simply a subform of the natural sciences. Its scientific criteria and method are, in my opinion, independent from both branches of science, autonomous, "*sui generis et sui iuris*";

yet they are and have to be "objectively anthropomorphic"—put in "human form." The means or tools by which it fulfills these criteria of science may very well turn out to be concepts of basic *polarities* in the form of *metaphors* which, in turn, are mostly derived from nature or culture.

4. *The Energy Concept in Natural Science and Psychoanalysis*

The economic point of view has become the bugaboo of critics of psychoanalytic theory, especially of metapsychology. Perhaps there is more heat than light in this controversy if we examine carefully what "energy" means to physicists and what it can mean to us. What is the concept of energy in physics?

> . . . it appears that energy in this form of deduction is never a new *thing,* but is a unitary *system of reference* on which we base measurement. All that can be said of it on scientific grounds is exhausted in the quantitative relations of equivalence, that prevail between the different fields of physics. Energy does not appear as a new objective somewhat, alongside of the already known physical contents, such as light and heat, electricity and magnetism; but it signifies merely an objective correlation according to law, in which all these contents stand. Its real meaning and function consists in the *equation* it permits us to establish between the diverse groups of processes (Cassirer, 1910, pp. 191-192).

The economic model in psychoanalysis is an attempt not to add yet a new physical content to those physical equivalents but to establish metaphorically, by analogy, *a similar system "of quantitative relations of equivalence"*—some novel form of lawful correlation between emotional phenomena. A good example is the process of displacement (including transference): the oedipal rage at father lived out with equal archaic intensity in a professional rivalry with a superior. Or a step further, when reaction-formation and undoing intervene, the intensity of obsequiousness and submission to the unconsciously hated authority is equivalent in experienced strength to the hatred and rivalry. Pre- and post-diction of symptom formation as

well as (microscopically) of decision-making rests on the comparison of such intensities. "Energy" and "quantity" are felt, but not measurable (*cf.,* Kubie, 1947); they can be observed in oneself or empathically in others, but not objectivated as in physics. In my opinion they are *perfectly acceptable metaphorical* concepts, not only because they resemble so closely similar laws of relations in physics, and not only because we would have great trouble finding equally usable metaphors and abstractions, but because the very physical notions of "energy" and "quantity" are themselves of anthropomorphic origin, are themselves metaphors and abstractions. The only difference is that physics eventually succeeded in translating these metaphorical concepts, which originated in Aristotle's empiricism, into numerical relations (beginning with Galileo) which can be largely objectivated (although not fully; see, for example, Heisenberg's principle of "uncertainty relations" and his own references to Anaximander's *Apeiron,* the "Unlimited" [*cf.,* Edwards, 1967]).

Shope (1973) is probably right when he states that Freud saw the concept of energy not as metaphor, but as explanatory construct (p. 296); this should not hinder our re-evaluating it critically—accepting it as useful in the former, as most dubious in the latter meaning.

5. *Law as Metaphor*

It might be a rather amusing addition and digression at this point to note that even the basic scientific and philosophical concept of "law" is originally and lastly a metaphor. In a recent article, the French philosopher Eric Weil (1975) writes about the connection of spiritual and intellectual breakthroughs with political empire formation comprising multinational groupings:

> *The omnipresence of the concept of law* points in the same direction. Wherever we find unification and universalization, even on a limited scale as in Mesopotamia, Egypt, and China, the concept becomes central; it is a concept *whose origin in*

> *the political sphere is evident.* In the astral fatum in Babylonia, in the divine order in Egypt, in the decree of God in Israel or of the Heaven in China, in the physis of the pre-Socratic philosophers—everywhere we encounter the idea of a *universe ordered according to law,* to which man has only to conform to obtain salvation and happiness. The Stoics have left us with the best formulation of this fusion of moral and cosmological thinking in a concept whose political origin is patent: they defined the world as the "City of Men and Gods" expressing more clearly than others what can be brought to light everywhere, but only after some digging. The type of security sought is that which can be provided by a well-ordered state; the possibility of such a state is metaphysically guaranteed by the *transposition of a political concept into a cosmological, moral, and theological one* (p. 32, italics added).

The end point of this development of the concept of law is the scientific law and principle. "A 'principle' . . . is never directly related to things and relations of things, but is meant to establish a general rule for complex functional dependencies and their reciprocal connection" (Cassirer, 1921, p. 359). The whole course of the development of physical theory is from "substances" to "principles" to "unity of principles":

> Since the middle of the nineteenth century . . . there appears in place of this "physics of materials," ever more definitely and distinctly the physics that has been called the "physics of principles." Here a start is not made from the hypothetical existence of certain materials and agents, but from certain universal relations, which are regarded as the criteria for the interpretation of particular phenomena. The general theory of relativity stands methodologically at the end of this series, since it collects all particular systematic principles into the unity of a supreme postulate, in the postulate not of the constancy of things, but of the invariance of certain magnitudes and laws with regard to all transformations of the system of reference (Cassirer, 1921, pp. 403-404).

In Freud's (1932) words, laws are "observations of uniformities in the course of events," as the Standard Edition translates

"Beobachtungen von Regelmässigkeiten im Ablauf der Geschehnisse" (p. 172). However, a more precise translation of *Regelmässigkeiten* would be "regularities"—a functional, relational definition and a hint at its metaphorical nature ("which it dignifies with the names of laws"). Laws and principles are for psychoanalysis—though of a nonnumerical nature, of course —of a similar nature as that just quoted from Cassirer: "general rules for complex functional dependencies and their reciprocal connection."

Briefly, the concept of "law" is originally metaphorical and becomes eventually functional, relational, and, in some sciences, mathematical. In psychoanalysis it operates with metaphors and higher level symbols.

THE NEED FOR METAPHORS IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Language and art are rich in metaphors. Natural science uses metaphors as lower level building tools in its march toward higher and higher abstraction. In Robert Frost's words: "Poetry is simply made of metaphor. So also is philosophy—and science too . . ." (Forrest, 1973, p. 269). And in Forrest's own words: ". . . all names, all words, all language is metaphor" (p. 266).

We have seen how Freud consciously used anthropomorphic and physicalistic metaphors on various levels of abstraction. Hartmann (1964) also defended the scientific use of metaphor. He mentioned that even the basic notion of *function* (underlying the structural model) is borrowed by Freud from physiology (although we have seen that it has a far wider epistemological basis throughout all sciences). In accordance with the scientific criteria mentioned before, Hartmann continued:

> The value of such borrowings or analogies has, of course, to be determined in every single instance by confronting their application with tested knowledge (data and hypotheses). Physiological models (also occasionally physical models, as is obvious, for instance, in Freud's concept of a mental apparatus)

> have been used also by other psychoanalysts (see, for example, Kubie, 1953) in order to illustrate certain characteristics of mental phenomena or to suggest a new hypothesis. The use even of metaphors need not of necessity lead into muddled thinking once their place in theory has been clearly delineated (p. 323).

On the other hand he also points out the risks of metaphorical formulation:

> An occasional lack of caution in the formulation of its propositions, or Freud's liking for occasional striking metaphors, has led to the accusation against analysis of an anthropomorphization of its concepts. But in all those cases a more careful formulation can be substituted which will dispel this impression (p. 344).

Beres (1965) expresses a similarly balanced view:

> Freud has himself added to our difficulties. As a master of language he has given to psycho-analysis elegant metaphors which if understood in their context have unquestioned heuristic value, but which too often have been used by others as clichés or even jargon. I could give many examples from current psycho-analytic writings of this fallacy, which Reichenbach describes as the "substantialization of abstracts" . . . (pp. 55-56).

Yet there is a particular question which remains to be answered. Is metaphor perhaps in a peculiarly deep sense the rule of "our science"? The Greek word *metaphorá* means etymologically and literally "transference," *"Übertragung"* (*metá*=*trans*=*über*=beyond; *phorá*=*ferre*=*tragen*=the carrying). As Aristotle defines it in *The Poetics,* "Metaphor is the application of a strange term either transferred from the genus and applied to the species or from the species and applied to the genus, or from one species to another or else by analogy." He adds later on that "the greatest quality of a tragedian is his use of metaphor . . . it is the token of genius. For the right use of metaphor means an eye for resemblances."

The art of psychoanalysis rests in a very large sense on the ability to perceive, understand, and skillfully interpret "transference" in its broadest sense; from past to present, from inner life onto therapist, from one object to another object. May it not be that this same central role of "transference" in a logical sense may be necessary in the formation of analytic theory? Why this would be so I am not sure, but it is possible that the answer lies in Kohut's (1973) thoughts: "In most sciences there exists a more or less clear separation between the area of practical, empirical application and the area of concept formation and theory. In analysis, however . . . they are merged into a single functional unit" (p. 25). If indeed *metaphorá* in its broad meaning is crucial "from below," it may—because of the special scientific nature of psychoanalysis—be equally crucial "from above" (*cf.*, Lewin, 1971, p. 7), from the realm of theory. But I must leave this idea as a puzzling coincidence; perhaps with further thinking it will be possible to be more definite.

To return to the original question: How can we deal epistemologically with the problem of metaphor as part of the current crisis in psychoanalysis? I submit the following thoughts which summarize much of what I have presented in this paper:

1. Metaphors (unless reified, concretized, treated as if they were visible, measurable, audible, touchable reality—as if they were "substance," not "function") are indispensable for scientific generativity. They are not evil and to be shunned; they are to be sought and applied. They are part of the hierarchy of abstraction needed for all theory formation. They are low level symbols.

2. We do not have too many metaphors in psychoanalysis; we have too few. We should not eliminate parts of our theory because they are too metaphorical; we should respect them as such and enlarge them.

3. The generativity and creativity in the form of new metaphors enlarging our field theoretically and practically has to emanate from the lower levels of abstractions. In particular, we need new, rich, comprehensive metaphors for Waelder's

levels 3 and 4 (clinical generalization and clinical theory). I believe any good clinician already couches his clinical interpretations (level 2) in those metaphors—concrete, anthropomorphic, reified as they might and should be (*cf.,* for instance, Caruth and Ekstein, 1966; Reider, 1972)—which are most sensible for his individual patient at a given moment in the analysis.

4. Such metaphors may be anthropomorphic. I am in full agreement with Grossman and Simon (1969) (*cf.,* also, Simon, 1973). They start with Freud's 1906 observation that "it is not at all necessary to outgrow it [anthropomorphism]. Our understanding reaches as far as our anthropomorphism" (p. 78). And they add (to select just some of the more salient points of their cogent article): "It is not necessary to 'purge' the clinical theory of anthropomorphic language. . . . Anthropomorphism per se is not 'unscientific'. . . . Its value lies in providing process terms for explanation according to motives. So long as the only processes of which we speak are wishing, intending, and needing, and their defensive counterparts, there is no other language available" (pp. 102, 108, 109).

5. The most useful metaphors employed by Freud and other analysts in their writings were not only anthropomorphic but, more specifically, they replicated body processes (including of course "energy"), as well as family relations, social structures, religious ideas, some of the great myths of mankind, political institutions and conflicts, military similes—in short, a vast array of metaphors derived from external human relations. A particularly fruitful source of metaphors was gained from classical literature, especially from drama (*cf.,* Eissler, 1971). A few others, as Grossman and Simon described, were theriomorphic (metaphors from animal life—down to the lowly amoeba), and some were on the face of it physical-mechanistic metaphors—disguises (*cf.,* Grossman and Simon, 1969, pp. 108-109) for well deserving anthropomorphic metaphors (energy, forces, resistance, cathexis).

6. Middle level metaphors add specifics and colorfulness to

our theoretical language, but their free presentation has, I believe, been hampered by two serious obstacles. It may seem surprising to find that one of these obstacles might be the problem of confidentiality. New metaphors, especially on low levels of abstraction, need the richness of the analyzed individual case without the clichés of the high level abstractions. This makes it almost impossible to present cases without so much identifying colorfulness and so many specifics that confidentiality may be violated. The second impediment is trivial. It is always much easier to converse on high levels of abstractions. Everyone seems to know what one means. Unfortunately, this keeps us stuck in what everyone already knows and thus adds to a sense of stagnation and closure. At the same time it keeps us painfully removed from the problems with individual patients.

To sum up, if psychoanalysis is the art and scientific study of interpreting our inner life, especially those parts disguised and hidden from ourselves—that is, if it is a form of symbolically connected, meaningful wholes, patterns, strands, sequences of experience—then the science of analysis has to describe and develop as many comprehensive "models," "frameworks," "myths" (metaphors) as are practically useful and theoretically consistent, coherent, and integrated. It needs designs for how to proceed from the specific conglomerates of phenomena to some theoretical structures, or orders, to the weaving together of meaningful patterns which prove their clinical usefulness.

We already have many guidelines on how to proceed from specific to general and back again to the discovery of new specifics. We have greatly systematized suprastructures, but their validity or fertility—their philosophical soundness or their accessibility to research strategies—has recently been particularly strongly challenged in what I describe as a current crisis. Thus, the poignant scientific questions are: Do we possess enough in the suprastructures? If not, where could we start other than with the direct data and their metaphorical reordering? And, of course, a caveat: we do not need arbitrary

new connections, but connections of lawful nature that make sense clinically as well as theoretically and articulate—though they need not coincide with—already well-tested conceptualizations.

In the present climate of antithetical polemics and fervor it appears appropriate to end this essay with Kant's famous statement: "Concepts without intuitions are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind."

SUMMARY

In contrast to the frequent attacks on the use of metaphors in analytic theory formation, it is postulated that: 1. *Metaphors* (unless reified, concretized, treated as if visible, measurable, audible, touchable reality) are *indispensable* for scientific generativity. They are to be sought and applied. 2. We have too few metaphors in psychoanalysis. We should not eliminate parts of our theory because they are too metaphorical, but should enlarge upon them. 3. The generativity and creativity in the form of new metaphors enlarging our field theoretically and practically has to grow from the lower levels of abstractions. We need, in particular, new comprehensive metaphors for clinical generalization and clinical theory. 4. Such metaphors may be *anthropomorphic*; lawfulness of mental phenomena is by definition of "human form." 5. The most useful metaphors employed by Freud and other analysts in their writings were not only anthropomorphic but, more specifically, they replicated body processes (including energy), family relations, social structures, religious ideas, some of the great myths of mankind, political institutions and conflicts, military similes—in short, a vast array of metaphors. 6. Middle level metaphors add specifics and colorfulness to our theoretical language. 7. All sciences use a hierarchy of symbols; metaphors are symbols of lower and middle level abstraction and of particular necessity in ordering the phenomena encountered in psychoanalysis. 8. It is postulated that psychoanalysis cannot be subsumed under any of the large areas of human symbolic activity. It does not belong to either

the natural or the cultural sciences, although it shares more with these two areas of science than with other fields of symbolic forms. Psychoanalysis is a symbolic form of theoretical knowledge *sui generis* and *sui iuris*: of independent origin, nature, lawfulness, criteria of validity, and structure of theory.

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POETRY AS AFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION

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The poetic experience is approached as an act of affective communication. Through analysis of a part of The Waste Land *by T. S. Eliot, factors that contribute to the empathic communication between poet and reader are examined. It is suggested that the capacity for flexible language behavior of the participants in the poetic experience makes possible this empathic communication. The relationship between language and expression of affect is emphasized. Implications for affect theory are presented.*

Poetry has been defined as the "transfusion of emotions" (Housman, 1933) or as the "spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings" (Wordsworth, 1876). In agreement with Beres (1957), I believe the transmission of emotion to be the most human kind of communication. Poetry offers one instance where this communication can be achieved.

The bond between the artist and his time has been compared to the "umbilical cord that connects mother and child" (Seferis, 1966, p. 195). One aspect of this bond consists of universal fantasies derived from the universally shared early experiences of mankind: "Thus poet and audience respond to similar but not necessarily identical unconscious fantasies, though neither of them is aware of the infantile, instinctual fantasy roots of his emotions" (Beres and Arlow, 1974, p. 46).

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Furthermore, the poet and his reader also share a common language, with all its inherent representational and expressive potential.

The thesis of the present paper is that a poem is primarily an act of affective communication. This communication represents the more developmentally advanced version of "the primordial sharing situation," the ontogenetic paradigm from which human communication and symbolization emerge, according to Werner and Kaplan (1963). These authors attempt to explicate the process of symbol formation from a developmental point of view that is compatible with psychoanalytic theory. They consider four components from which symbol formation emerges: an addresser and an addressee (mother and child in the primordial sharing situation), and the referent and the symbolic vehicle. The distancing or polarization between each component in relation to the others transforms the world of the child from a world exclusively inhabited by "things of action" to a world which includes "things of contemplation" as well. This transformation, implying the development of a contemplative attitude toward the world, marks the beginning of representation and symbol formation.

Both the creation of a poem and the aesthetic experience of reading a poem can be viewed as partaking of several features of the primordial sharing situation. In the first instance, the presence of an addressee, the reader, and, in the second instance, the presence of an addresser, the poet, can be implied. The vehicle will then be the poem, and the referent will be primarily the emotions transfused between poet and reader.

The main difference between the primordial sharing situation and the creation or reading of a poem (both to be referred to as "poetic experience") is the degree of distancing between the four components included in both situations. The poet and his reader are unknown to each other and are never present together in actuality, although the imaginary presence of the

other is always implied. Moreover, the poet, as addresser, is also distanced from the referent because the emotion transfused is emotion "recollected and contemplated in tranquility" (Wordsworth, 1876, p. 96). The same is true for the reader who has a similar but rather greater distance from the referent than the poet.

What gives the poetic experience its unique quality are some features of the vehicle, or poem, and the relationship of the poet and the reader to this vehicle. The poem is language in written form, and the words used have different degrees of distancing between their inner form, or connotational dynamics, and their external written form. In some instances, the inner form is almost fused with the external form, as at the primordial levels of language development; in other instances, the connotational dynamics are carried by "inner gestures, imagery, postural-affective sets, etc." (Werner and Kaplan, 1963, p. 238). The poet and his reader share a particular affinity of language in which a number of previous steps in their language development are available to both and can be used for communication. Developmentally they are both capable of flexible language behavior (Werner, 1940). Flexibility, a dynamic developmental feature, generally characterizes the mental functioning of poet and reader and gives to the poet the ability to bring "the whole soul of man into activity, with the subordination of its faculties to each other" (Coleridge, 1817, Vol. II, p. 12). The poetic experience can then be viewed as a glorious moment in which communication of emotion and symbolization—the two preeminent human qualities—are made real through the full use of the expressive and representational potential inherent in language.

To support this thesis and to explore the means by which poetic experience, as an act of affective communication, is realized, I shall use a part of *The Waste Land* by T. S. Eliot.

What the Thunder said [1]

After the torchlight red on sweaty faces
After the frosty silence in the gardens
After the agony in stony places
The shouting and the crying
Prison and palace and reverberation
Of thunder of spring over distant mountains
He who was living is now dead
We who were living are now dying
With a little patience

Here is no water but only rock
Rock and no water and the sandy road
The road winding above among the mountains
Which are mountains of rock without water
If there were water we should stop and drink
Amongst the rock one cannot stop or think
Sweat is dry and feet are in the sand
If there were only water amongst the rock
Dead mountain mouth of carious teeth that cannot spit
Here one can neither stand nor lie nor sit
There is not even silence in the mountains
But dry sterile thunder without rain
There is not even solitude in the mountains
But red sullen faces sneer and snarl
From doors of mudcracked houses

If there were water

And no rock
If there were rock
And also water
And water
A spring
A pool among the rock
If there were the sound of water only

[1] From "The Waste Land" in *Collected Poems 1909-1962* by T. S. Eliot, copyright 1936 by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc.; copyright (©) 1963, 1964, by T. S. Eliot. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

Not the cicada
And dry grass singing
But sound of water over a rock
Where the hermit-thrush sings in the pine trees
Drip drop drip drop drop drop drop
But there is no water

Eliot's poetry was selected because the poet states in an essay, "The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked" (Eliot, 1950, pp. 124-125). Seferis (1966), an eminent Greek poet and a Nobel laureate, commenting on *The Waste Land,* writes: ". . .The feeling Waste Land runs through all the poetic expression of our times" (p. 172). (*The Waste Land* was written in 1922, between the end of the First World War and the beginning years preceding the Second World War.) According to Seferis, the poem can be described as "an epic of the decline of the world in which we are living. . . . The fertile element is water, the sterile element is dryness, and the purifying element is fire" (p. 132). For Eliot, Seferis writes, "the element which makes mankind alive is the struggle between good and evil. He sees a world that is losing its principle of existence, that is dying out just because this struggle is sinking down into apathetic vulgarity. From this feeling comes the symbol of 'The Waste Land', and those going to and fro there . . . are the people who never lived, because they denied both good and evil. Refused even by Hell, they cannot pass over Acheron; they are dead and neutral to the end of time" (p. 154).

The "feeling Waste Land" is a complex affective state, but hopelessness is its central feature. The part of the poem quoted here from Part V, "What the Thunder said," lines 322-359, can be treated as a unit since the affect conveyed—hopelessness—is the central feature of the complex affective state

"Waste Land." [2] Three stanzas have been chosen. The first expresses succinctly what is elaborated in the next two, and the key lines are the last two: "We who were living are now dying/With a little patience." The situation in which somebody is "dying/With a little patience" is the "objective correlative" of the affective state to be expressed. The poet describes briefly the events that culminate in this affective state. There was struggle, "He who was living is now dead," and "We . . . are now dying/With a little patience."

Eliot describes a sequence of struggle-loss and helplessness-hopelessness. At the same time he establishes the primordial sharing situation. To paraphrase, the poet says, "You and I, my reader, after these events are dying/With a little patience." At the end of the first stanza poet and reader share a common affective state induced by the same sequence of events. "He" who died could be anybody, provided that he was a significant other who was experienced as a helper. His presence gave meaning to the struggle, and the hope connected with him kept the struggle alive. The poet decreases the distance between himself and his reader by assuming the role of the mother in the primordial sharing situation. He is the teller, he who speaks; and he induces in his reader a contemplative attitude toward the same aspects of the state of the self and the world. He can be effective in so doing because everyone has had a significant other, and the sequence of struggle-loss and helplessness-hopelessness is universal. The poet is at the same time a mother and a sibling in this present edition of the primordial sharing situation.

After the establishment of the affective communication with his reader, in the second stanza Eliot moves into the descrip-

[2] The variety of linguistic resources used by the poet to represent and convey his inner affective state, as well as the prosodic qualities and the "music of language" (Edelson, 1975), will not be considered in this presentation. The analysis is confined to a semantic level; structural linguistic aspects are considered only to provide examples for the hypotheses presented.

tion of the state of his and his reader's self and a view of the world that they both share. He describes rocky, dry land where he and his reader are—a land that is so dry and inhospitable to life and where the state of the self is so diminished that "one cannot stop or think" . . . "can neither stand nor lie nor sit." The self is in such tremendous need of "water" that the imperativeness of the need does not even permit a contemplative attitude. The need is crying to be acted upon. The affect for this state of affairs is "the objective correlative" and has the quality of the infant's helplessness, the infant whose capacity to anticipate the gratification of his needs has not even developed. In this situation the poet begins to assess the probability of gratification. In the last lines of this second stanza, the probability of helpers, or human objects, is assessed at a zero level. The transfusion of the affective state of helplessness becomes effective because the poet decreases the distance between himself or the reader and the referent through the affect of helplessness. From something to be contemplated, this affect becomes something that has to be acted upon immediately. The self is relating to the world with an affective, sensorimotor mode which is a syncretic predifferentiated ego state.

The third stanza contains the systematic probability assessment of the hope for the re-establishment of a sense of well-being. The hope is represented by the presence of water and the absence of rock. In this stanza the sentence structure deteriorates; what is hoped for becomes minimal: "If there were the sound of water only." This minimal hope is contrasted with an idyllic scene expressed in an elaborate way, and in the next line there is no coherent sentence structure. Instead, two primitive onomatopoeic words are repeated, and hopelessness is absolutely established: "But there is no water." In this stanza the distance between the poet or the reader and the vehicle, the language of the poem, is diminished. Sentences and words which belong to previous stages of language development are used side by side with autonomous language.

DISCUSSION

Poetry is defined in this presentation as being primarily an act of affective communication. This is in agreement with Beres and Arlow (1974) who write: "The interaction between audience and poet . . . is an empathic one based upon the communicability of unconscious fantasy" (p. 46). They further state that in the poetic experience, it is the poet who creates "the frame of reference" that evokes in his readers unconscious fantasies similar to his own. Beres and Arlow's study focuses primarily on the therapist's empathic understanding of his patient's productions in the psychotherapeutic situation, and they draw analogies between the aesthetic experience and the psychotherapeutic situation. What deserves closer study is what gives the poet the ability to create "the frame of reference" and what accounts for the communicability of unconscious fantasy so that the poet and his reader can contemplate with comfort congruent derivatives of their unconscious fantasies.

In the case of poetry an attempt can be made to explore these questions for two reasons. First, poet and reader are never both present in actuality, and nonverbal communication is not included, as in the psychotherapeutic situation. Second, language in written form is the vehicle through which poet and reader share whatever processes are conveyed. This second reason led Edelson (1975) to approach poetry as a linguistic object because "poetry seeks to exhaust the possibilities of language, to make the most concentrated use of all the resources of language" (p. 70). For Edelson, much of the empathic understanding between poet and reader must be attributed to their internalized linguistic and semiologic competence. In my opinion, while linguistic competence is a necessary minimal requirement for the communication between poet and reader, it cannot account for the aesthetic experience in poetry without postulating another factor. What is missing from Edelson's approach to poetry is a holistic frame of reference that would permit correlation of the elements of his detailed analysis with a meaningful whole, according to their relative significance.

The process of artistic creation is a complex one, but the poem can be considered a product of the poet's unconscious fantasy activity in its reciprocal relationship with the data of sensory registration and formal synthesis in a public vehicle (see, Arlow, 1969a, 1969b). As unconscious wishes or fantasies emerge, they are enveloped within an affective tone. This affective tone has to be expressed in the poem by the use of the resources of language. The poem, as a sensory impression, will subsequently reactivate or facilitate the emergence of unconscious fantasies in the reader. Since the fantasies activated in the reader must be similar but not identical to the poet's for the aesthetic experience to ensue, the emotion transfused must provide the matrix for the communication between poet and reader.

In a previous study (Siomopoulos, 1976), the "primordial sharing situation" (Werner and Kaplan, 1963) was considered the situation from which not only symbol formation and language emerge but also our ability for affective communication. In this context it was postulated that the mother, an integrated sender-receiver of affective messages, transforms the infant, a potential sender-receiver, into a human being capable of affective communication. Early infantile autism provides an instance of defective establishment of the primordial sharing situation with its well-known disturbances in language and affect development. Even in the very few cases where an autistic child develops the capacity to attend college successfully, what is characteristically lacking is affective development and the ability for empathy (see, Eisenberg, 1956; Eisenberg and Kanner, 1956; Rutter, et al., 1967).

The relationship between language and affect development has been alluded to in the literature. Verbalization in early childhood has been considered important for the taming of affects and can be exploited defensively against affects (see, Katan, 1961). In their study of the beginnings of language development, Werner and Kaplan (1963) implicate affective sensorimotor schemata created in the context of the primordial

sharing situation. From these schemata, through an "inner dynamic schematizing activity" (p. 18), objects are given meaning, structure, and form, and their symbol—the word—develops. The affective aspects of these schemata are carried by the external form of the word at the initial stages of language development. At the level of onomatopoeic words, the inner and external forms of the word are fused; also onomatopoeic words have been justifiably considered affective words (see, Sharpe, 1940). In his study of the function of interpretation and naming, Shapiro (1970) clearly demonstrates the relationship between language and affect, particularly in the fourth example he cites where "the facilitation of the path to affect" (p. 414) finally leads to connotative associations. This close reciprocal relationship between language and affect development permits the poet to establish affective communication with his reader.

One may speak of the "genetic and developmental wisdom" of the poet. The "genetic wisdom" is exemplified by the sequence struggle-loss and helplessness-hopelessness which makes the transmission of the prevalent feeling of hopelessness more effective. In a study of the developmental aspects of hopelessness (Siomopoulos and Inamdar, 1976), the relationship between helplessness and hopelessness is examined. It is suggested that hopelessness emerges out of helplessness through a process of distancing between the individual and his significant others. Further, it is suggested that probability assessment and ability to relate to the future are necessary determinants of hopelessness. The "developmental wisdom" of the poet is exemplified by the use of a frame similar to the primordial sharing situation in which he communicates with his reader. This wisdom is further illustrated by the manipulation of the distance between the four components included in the poetic experience. In this dynamic frame, there are multiple combinations of distancing between poet and reader, poet or reader and emotions transfused, language of the poem and emotions transfused. These combinations permit the communication of affects which en-

velop emerging unconscious fantasies, facilitate their emergence, and make their communication possible.

Controlled regression in the service of the ego has been considered by many authors the hallmark of creativity and has been implicated as a process which permits the enjoyment of art. In current ego psychology, regression in the service of the ego is applied to inspiration but not to elaboration. Weissman (1967), studying ego functions in creativity, suggests that "repressed id content can re-enter the ego for inspirational creative purposes without ego regression" (p. 41). He postulates that "the ego in creativity utilizes its dissociative function in the service of the synthetic function" (p. 45). This same dissociative function in noncreative individuals serves the integration of "maturer development in new undertakings" (p. 45).

The language of the poem provides an example where different levels of language development are used side by side with autonomous language in the service of affect communication. The poet and his reader do not have to regress in order to become capable of a flexible language behavior. Flexibility is a dynamic feature characterizing high differentiation and hierarchization in development (see, Werner, 1940). A stage of rigid subordination of previous developmental levels to more recent ones is less advanced developmentally than a stage of flexible subordination that will permit the adaptive use of elements belonging to previous levels. Indeed, such adaptive flexibility is necessary to healthy functioning which permits human beings to partake of art, science, love, intimacy, and technical skill—when each is necessary and appropriate.

IMPLICATIONS FOR AFFECT THEORY

The poet and his reader share the universal experience of the primordial sharing situation in which their humanness emerges. In this context they have their needs acted upon and develop the capacity to anticipate and contemplate their gratifications or frustrations. They develop fantasy, communication, symbolization, language. Poet and reader build their psychic organiza-

tion and their representational world in a similar context and through similar steps. Their development obeys the same principles, and they both arrive at a stage of high structural differentiation and hierarchization characterized by flexibility. When one takes into account all that the poet and his reader share, one can easily understand the identification in their empathic communication.[3]

When poet and reader meet within the poetic experience, they bring all the similarities implied in the developmental history of their humanness into the service of affect communication. A current edition of the situation from which they emerged as human beings is reproduced. All active elements from their psychological past are utilized in the poetic experience. Both poet and reader entertain in the present a sense of mastery that has diachronic dimensions extending from the present to the remotest past. The affect associated with this sense of mastery has qualities similar to the basic affective tone that prevails in a well-functioning primordial sharing situation, an affect which provides the common background of all experiences to the growing infant. In a dynamic interaction with this background affect, the individual creates initially his "self and object affect representations" (Novey, 1959, 1961). The ideational contour develops gradually around these affect representations for purposes of "suitability of representation" (Novey, 1961, p. 23). This is the development that Krueger (1928) had in mind when he wrote: "Emotion is the maternal origin of all other types of experience and remains their most effective support" (p. 99).

In a study of a disturbance of affectivity in schizophrenic adolescents, I defined two domains of affectivity from the point of view of affect expression: a social conventional level of affectivity shared and consensually validated, and an individual level of affectivity related to the individual's private world (see,

[3] Transient identification is considered to be an important element in empathy (see, Beres and Arlow, 1974; Shapiro, 1974).

Siomopoulos, 1976). It was postulated that aspects of the latter level can be expressed and shared in intimate love relationships. The poetic experience offers another instance where affects belonging to the core of the individual level of affectivity can be expressed and shared.

Most recent authors writing about affect distinguish between affect experienced and affect expressed. Pulver (1971, 1974) notes a revision of Freud's opinion that we cannot speak about unconscious affects. A minority of authors (see, for instance, Shibles, 1974) tend to equate affect expression with the experiencing of affect. They postulate that before the expression there is nothing that deserves the term "affect." In my opinion, it is possible to systematically study affect experiencing and affect expression separately until we know enough to study their relationship.

The study of affect expression seems the more promising, and its ontogenetic development can be approached systematically. A holistic-organismic developmental approach similar to the one applied to language development by Werner and Kaplan (1963) may prove valuable for the study of the development of affective communication. Such an approach would have the following advantages.

1. Interesting correlations could be made between stages in language development and the development of affective communication, since language is the primary means for affect expression.

2. The study of nonverbal affect expression could be facilitated because some of the means utilized in prestages of speech are used for affect expression as well. Later in development these same gestural components serve affect expression primarily and their representational function is taken over by speech.

3. The development of the referent and its expressive vehicle is the result of dynamic schematizing activity, a manifestation of organismic activity (Werner and Kaplan, 1963). The systematic step-by-step study of the vehicle for affect expres-

sion could shed light on this dynamic schematizing activity in its relationship with the development of affect experiencing.

SUMMARY

The poetic experience, an act of affective communication, may be viewed as a developmentally advanced edition of the primordial sharing situation. In this context, the poet, in order to convey his emotions to his reader, manipulates the distance between the four components of the primordial sharing situation—the poet, the reader, the affects to be conveyed, and the language of the poem. The availability to both poet and reader of previous stages of language development, closely related to affect expression, makes feasible the empathic communication between them.

When they meet in the poetic experience, poet and reader bring together all active elements from their psychological past. In such an atmosphere, which is not necessarily regressive, they share in the present a sense of mastery that extends from the present to their most remote psychological past. Implications for the ontogenetic development of affect expression, similar to symbol and language development, are suggested.

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Transference and Countertransference: The Roots of Psychoanalysis

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TRANSFERENCE AND COUNTERTRANSFERENCE: THE ROOTS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

BOOK REVIEW ESSAY ON THE FREUD/JUNG LETTERS[1]

BY HANS W. LOEWALD, M.D.

By necessity, my discussion of the correspondence between Freud and Jung is one-sided: I am incomparably more familiar with Freud's work and personality than with Jung's. In particular, I have not read Jung's later writings, with the exception of *Memories, Dreams, Reflections,*[2] put off, in part, by what Freud has called Jung's hiding behind a "religious-libidinal cloud" (298F, p. 485).[3]

Toward the end of his life Jung wrote about Freud as follows: "Freud was the first man of real importance I had encountered; in my experience up to that time, no one else could compare with him. There was nothing the least trivial in his attitude. I found him extremely intelligent, shrewd, and altogether remarkable. And yet my first impressions of him remained tangled; I could not make him out" (*Memories,* p. 149). "He remained the victim of the one aspect he could recognize ["mere sexuality" or "psychosexuality"], and for that reason I see him as a tragic figure; for he was a great man, and what is more, a man in the grip of his daimon" (*op. cit.,* p. 153).

The correspondence started in 1906 with a letter by Freud in which he thanked Jung for sending him the first volume of *Diag-*

[1] McGuire, William, Editor: *The Freud/Jung Letters. The Correspondence between Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung.* Translated by Ralph Mannheim and R. F. C. Hull. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974, 650 pp. (German edition: *Sigmund Freud–C. G. Jung, Briefwechsel.* Edited by William McGuire and Wolfgang Sauerländer. Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1974, 722 pp.).

[2] C. G. Jung: *Memories, Dreams, Reflections.* Recorded and edited by Aniela Jaffé. Translated from the German by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Pantheon Books, 1963. Cited hereafter as *Memories.*

[3] In both the American and German editions, the letters are numbered consecutively; F behind the number indicates that the letter was written by Freud, J that it was written by Jung. Except in special instances, I cite only the page of the American edition.

nostische Assoziationsstudien, a work that acknowledges the importance of Freud's writings and Freud's influence on Jung. Freud was almost fifty and Jung close to thirty-one. They met for the first time less than a year later when Jung, invited by Freud, came to visit him in Vienna, accompanied by his wife Emma and a young colleague, Ludwig Binswanger. Their last meeting took place at the Psychoanalytic Convention in Munich in September, 1913. The correspondence ended with Jung's resignation from his post as President of The International Psychoanalytical Association in 1914, except for a brief letter of 1923 in which Jung referred a patient to Freud. The actual break in their relationship, proposed by Freud and accepted by Jung, came in an exchange of letters in January, 1913 (*Correspondence,* pp. 539 and 540); Freud was fifty-six, Jung thirty-seven.

Both had been conscious of the intensity and, in some respects, intimacy of their friendship, of the emotional and intellectual demands they made on each other—demands that in the long run neither of them could tolerate, so that passionate mutual rejection became inevitable. There was nothing lukewarm about them. For Freud the rupture followed his break with Adler and Stekel; for Jung it came in the wake of his disillusionment with and estrangement from Bleuler. But Adler and Stekel never were as personally close and important to Freud as Jung was, and Bleuler apparently was a man too reserved and remote to engage in the kind of friendship with Jung that existed for some years between Jung and Freud.

The years between 1906 and 1913 were of singular importance for the organization and growth of psychoanalysis as a worldwide intellectual movement, as a new psychological science, and as a revolutionary approach to neurotic and psychotic illness. To a considerable extent, Jung's enthusiastic efforts and verve and his close contacts with academic psychiatry were responsible during those years for psychoanalysis becoming known in academic circles as a force to reckon with and for its being organized in the forms of local societies, in The International Association and through the publication of periodicals. This could hardly have been accomplished at that time by the diffident Freud and his Viennese followers alone. Considering the prejudices and parochialism then prevailing in the academic life of Austria and Germany, Bleuler's

prestige as professor of psychiatry at the Zurich Medical School and as director of the famous Burghölzli was most valuable to the young psychoanalytic movement. In the academic atmosphere of those times in Austria and Germany, Freud was well aware of the meaning of the fact that neither Bleuler nor Jung were Jewish.

Furthermore, in those years both Freud and Jung widened their horizons, grew intellectually, developed their ideas at an accelerated pace, in part by virtue of the influence they exerted on each other and the resulting elaboration and crystallization of their respective positions. If one considers the revolutionary changes occurring during that period in other sciences, especially physics, and in the arts, these were altogether remarkable years, ushering in the world of today. All this ferment—all these changes in values, ideas, perspectives and sensibilities—was followed by the outbreak of the first World War in 1914.

After 1913 Freud and Jung went their separate ways without, as far as is known, ever meeting again, although both reached ripe old age. (Freud died in 1939, Jung in 1961.) Their intellectual and personal differences had become irreconcilable. Each followed his own path with single-minded devotion and persistence, apparently paying no further attention to the other.

It takes no psychoanalytic acumen to recognize that the relationship, seen in its most personal dimension, foundered on the rock of the "father complex." Both men, from the beginning to the end of their friendship, were intensely aware of that tie which brought them emotionally so close and which they were at last compelled to tear to shreds, although they tried to find resolutions or accommodations before the final break. The initial youthful straightforwardness and vigor, the enthusiastic—although not unqualified—support, the respect, admiration and tenderness, coming from a younger man whom he loved for the qualities of his mind and character, were immensely attractive to Freud. In Freud's letters it comes through again and again that he almost desperately tried to see in Jung the spiritual son and heir who would put his life's work on a firm footing and carry it forward—a son who seemed freer, more radiant, less somber and diffident than himself and who would be faithful to him and to the common work. Such hopes seldom come true: the demands implicit in such expectations and idealizations too often carry their own death sentence within them.

Jung never was and never saw himself as that kind of son. He was, when he met Freud, already his own man and had, it seems to me, a rather inflamed sense of his own destiny, as much as he loved and admired Freud. It also appears that he was a far more troubled spirit than Freud thought in the beginning and than Freud himself was. If Jung was in search of a father, he was looking for an older man to admire, from whom he could seek wise counsel but who would let him go his own way.

Jung had a religious-mystical bent that he cultivated. In contrast, if Freud had such inclinations he fought against them, in himself and others, with all the vehemence of an heir of the Enlightenment, of a man who had to subdue such tendencies in himself for the sake of his work as he saw it, for the sake of lucid rationality. Jung might have been right in believing that Freud was driven by forces which in a deep and nontechnical sense could be called religious. We must think here also of the still unfathomed subterranean links and affinities between religion and sexuality, which both men explored in their different ways. But Freud, in my view, was right in profoundly distrusting the undisciplined mystical-visionary inclinations that led Jung into nebulous regions of alchemy, astrology and the occult, regions from which it is hard to return with a clear mind. To Freud, this smacked too much of obscurantism and of an evasion and hypocritical embellishment of the "exigencies of life," man's troubled existence—an attitude that Freud abhorred. The emerging marked differences between the psychoanalytic and the Jungian approach to therapy—Freud's concentration on the unconscious of the individual, Jung's focus on the collective unconscious, archetypes and the imaginative life of the race—show the gulf between their deepest motivations and convictions.

Freud was engaged in what Max Weber has called the disenchantment of the world (*die Entzauberung der Welt*). He saw it as a necessary step, for the individual and for humanity as a whole, in the development toward greater maturity and sanity, although he did not proclaim it as the end of all wisdom. He repudiated any mystical claims for the unconscious, or any claims that psychoanalysis was a consoling *Weltanschauung*. In fact, he rejected consolation. Jung, on his part, was in search of enchantment, a Holy Grail, a healing vision which could undo or compensate for the

ills of the world, for all the ugliness, misery and triviality of human life and human weakness.

Both men come alive in their letters as passionate and very moving human beings. They loved each other for a time, although never without reservations. They could at times be direct and uncompromising in the exchanges of their feelings and views. At other times they were somewhat devious and politely accommodating in the interests of their own privacy and of maintaining their precariously balanced friendship, as well as for the sake of the common cause. In the end, the balance was utterly destroyed; pent-up feelings of mutual distrust and disillusionment erupted into open hostility and bitter accusations on both sides. Freud's coldly detached rage and carefully measured words were no less wounding than Jung's more direct and defiant, often vicious attacks and recriminations. In their late letters, both were in a fury, "hitting below the belt" in their analytic interpretations of each other's behavior, telling each other truths that ceased to be true as all caution was thrown to the winds and all proportion lost. As astute analytic observers they all too easily recognized each other's weaknesses, unconscious motives, defensive rationalizations—in the manner in which analyst-friends (or foes) may come to know each other, and sometimes analyst and patient if the analytic process goes deep enough. In such moments it may no longer be clear who is the patient and who the analyst.

Jung's merciless frankness in his last personal letters to Freud became cruel and disingenuous; his intention was not to enlighten Freud by the interpretations he offered, but to hurt and humiliate him. Jung's pride was hurt, and his self-esteem—apparently far more vulnerable than Freud's—was endangered and shaken by Freud's increasing disapproval of his views and of the direction of his interests and research. As Jung saw it, Freud's repeated protestations of fatherly concern were masking his growing withdrawal and disaffection. Jung came to see these expressions of Freud's continued interest in him as efforts similar to the attitude of a physician who has given up on his patient but wishes to be "kind." He chided Freud for treating his pupils like patients, that is, continuing to analyze them. At this distance it is difficult to assess that accusation. Freud denied it, but it stands to reason that Freud, as

the father of psychoanalysis and for a time the only analyst, could hardly have been altogether immune to that temptation.

Jung, as the younger of the two, less experienced and less emotionally secure, understandably felt the need to insist on his independence, rather than remain the analysand or faithful son. I also believe that as a man of a different generation, he was less fenced in by the particular scientific tradition of radical rationalism in which Freud had grown up. He had intimations of the positive, nonstupefying, creative side of religion that Freud did not have or did not wish to explore—whatever one may think of the ways in which Jung pursued and used them therapeutically. Freud, on the other hand, not only felt deeply hurt by what to him was his chosen son's and successor's disloyalty and betrayal. More objectively, he considered Jung's deviating theories and orientation—with much justification as the future would prove—as challenging and negating many of his own most profound and original discoveries and insights.

The correspondence, taken as a whole, has qualities of a poignant drama, at first joyful and in the end deeply disturbing, displaying some of the grandeur and the pettiness of human affairs and human passions. Two dedicated men, endowed with exceptional gifts, devoting their lives to the understanding of the unconscious, to the higher development of the mind and of their own and their patients' and students' emotional-intellectual life, came to a love-hate impasse which they could not resolve other than by complete and final disruption of their friendship. But—as the editor of the correspondence points out—neither was shattered by the experience, and "each derived creative values from the inevitable break."

Freud and Jung—Ferenczi should be included here—were the early explorers of transference. Did they know too much, and yet still too little, about transference? They could not leave each other alone at the right moment. They could not maintain a proper balance of closeness and distance—sustain the critical temperature, so to speak—that seems essential for preserving love and friendship. As originators of the exploration of transference and under the spell of its powerful forces, at the time of their relationship they appeared not yet able to distinguish clearly enough between an analytic and nonanalytic relationship, and between the requirements and proprieties of analysis and those of a teacher-student

relationship in analytic training. Jung, in one of his last letters (338J, p. 534) accused Freud of just that, only to turn the tables by playing the analyst-father to Freud, with motivations no less suspect than those he blamed Freud for.

To this day there remains some blurring of the roles of psychoanalytic patient, apprentice of the art of psychoanalysis, and student of psychoanalytic science. This is not altogether to be ascribed to human error and inexperience, nor to neurotic tendencies in analyst, student, or patient. The vital originality and ambiguity of a new venture of the human spirit, such as psychoanalysis was and still is, defies a strict confinement within precise categories and compartments—be they science versus religion or art, education versus therapy, sanity versus madness. Despite Freud's strong disclaimer, I dare say that even the dividing line between priest or shaman and physician or investigator is less than neatly fixed in the case of psychoanalysis. This is not to deny the need for or the importance of such distinctions and the dangers of disregarding them and of fostering ambiguity. In the early days of psychoanalysis the division of labor between training analyst and psychoanalytic instructor or supervisor was not yet possible. Some of the early pioneers may have derived some benefit from that fact, but there is little doubt that few, if any, escaped its troublesome consequences.

Freud's "splendid isolation" came to an end with the growing recognition he found at the Burghölzli where Bleuler, Jung, Abraham, Binswanger and some others, later well known in the psychoanalytic movement, worked in the early years of the century. From 1905 on Jung "took up the cudgels" for Freud in his writings and in presentations and discussions at psychiatric congresses. This is the brief and apt characterization that the editor of the *Correspondence*, William McGuire, gives of the course of their relationship: ". . . the gradual warming of mutual regard, confidence, and affection, the continual interchange of professional information and opinions, the rapidly elaborating business of the psychoanalytic movement, the intimate give-and-take of family news, the often acerb and witty observations on colleagues and adversaries, and at length the emergence of differences, disagreements, misunderstandings, injured feelings, and finally disruption and separation" (p. xix).

Only in one respect should this description be amended: differ-

ences, if not disagreements, in theoretical views were already apparent in the very first letters they exchanged in October, 1906 (2J and 3F, pp. 4, ff.) They refer to crucial matters—"delicate theoretical questions" as Jung put it—as the future was to show. It is the centrality of sexuality in the genesis of neurosis and in the therapeutic transference that Jung, in his very first letter to Freud, singled out as not easy for him to accept without reservations. And Freud replied: "Your writings have long led me to suspect that your appreciation of my psychology does not extend to all my views on hysteria and the problem of sexuality, but I venture to hope that in the course of the years you will come much closer to me than you now think possible. . . . I continue to hope that this aspect of my investigations will prove to be the most significant." Speaking then of Aschaffenburg, an early critic, Freud continued: "Like so many of our pundits, he is motivated chiefly by an inclination to repress sexuality, that troublesome factor so unwelcome in good society. Here we have two warring worlds and soon it will be obvious to all[4] which is on the decline and which on the ascendant." (p. 5, n.) He hoped "that all those who are able to overcome their own inner resistance to the truth will wish to count themselves among my followers and will cast off the last vestiges of pusillanimity in their thinking" (p. 6)—a clear challenge to Jung. In subsequent letters each made some concessions to the other's point of view but in essence maintained his own. At the same time both were aware of the complexities of the issue of sexuality as well as other issues related to it, such as the confluences and differences of certain cases of hysteria and schizophrenia and the question of the psychogenesis of the latter.

One can detect Jung's influence as Freud broadened his concept of sexuality, especially in regard to the problems of psychosis and "autoerotism." The latter term, during the time of their correspondence, still encompassed what Freud eventually called narcissism. The concept of narcissistic libido (versus object libido)—although the term was not yet used—was taking shape in Freud's thinking. In a letter of May, 1907 (25F), correcting a misunderstanding of Jung's, Freud made it very clear that in dementia praecox,

[4] The American translation omits the clause *"wer im Leben steht,"* following "obvious to all" in the German text. It might be translated as: "who live in the real world." See German edition, p. 6.

according to his view, the libido does not withdraw from the real object to throw itself on a substitute fantasy object. This, he explained, would not be truly autoerotic (today we would say "not truly narcissistic") libido, since in that case the libido still has an object, albeit a fantasy object. Instead, in dementia praecox the libido withdraws from the object representation altogether; thus freed, it "would somehow manifest itself autoerotically as in childhood" (p. 46); i.e., it becomes narcissistic libido. The fundamental status of sexuality was saved (against the objections of Jung and Bleuler) by giving up the equation, sexuality=object libido, and Freud adumbrated the concept of primary narcissism. In a letter of the same period (April, 1907) entitled "A Few Theoretical Remarks on Paranoia," Freud explicitly stated: "The sexual instinct is originally autoerotic, later on it lends affective cathexis, object love, to memory images."[5]

The two letters from which I quoted (22F, 25F) contain a remarkable discussion of projection. They also discuss the difference between perceptions of external reality, characterized mainly by "quality," and experiences from within (sensations, *Empfindungen*) which are instinct manifestations characterized mainly by "quantity" (affective cathexis), and finally the various vicissitudes of these exogenous and endogenous experiences under the influence of repression in neurosis and psychosis.

The crucial importance to Freud of sexuality and therefore of the libido theory has some aspects that are not sufficiently appreciated today. Here I shall single out only that aspect which is

[5] The sentence reads as follows in German: *"Der Sexualtrieb ist ursprünglich autoerotisch, später erteilt er den Erinnerungsvorstellungen von Objekten Affektbesetzung, Objektliebe."* The translation omits *"von Objekten"* and should read: ". . . to memory images of objects." *"Vorstellung"* is here translated as "image." The usual translation is idea, presentation, or representation. It should be noted that the two sentences following the above quotation contain an error—due to erroneous transcription from the German manuscript—that was discovered too late to be corrected in the American edition (see, German edition, p. 42, n. 2a). In the American edition the sentences read: "A wish fantasy such as that presupposed above is to be regarded as a libidinal object-cathexis, because it must be subjected to repression before it becomes conscious. This can occur in various ways. . ." (American edition, p. 39). This clearly does not make sense. The text should read: "A wish fantasy such as that presupposed above is to be regarded as a libidinal object-cathexis; *if it can be subjected to repression before it becomes conscious,* this may occur in various ways. . . ."

especially relevant to his controversy with Jung. Freud's insistence on the centrality of sexuality vis-à-vis Jung was in good part a fight against the religiously and theologically tinged, moralistic separation of and opposition between the sacred and the profane, between earthly body and sexual lust versus heavenly spirit and divine love or, in more secularized terms, between instinctual life and spiritual life. It was a fight against what Freud saw as a religious or philosophical escapism in the face of the human condition. In terms of the development of civilization, especially in the form of the Judeo-Christian tradition, this dichotomy was seen by him as the expression of a defensive-repressive movement against the bodily-instinctual nature of man, which in its excesses had led to the hypocritical cultural norms and to the neurotic misery he saw in his consulting room and elsewhere. Jung quoted Freud as saying to him: "My dear Jung, promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark." The bulwark was to be erected "against the black tide of mud . . . of occultism." What Freud, according to Jung, meant by occultism was "virtually everything that philosophy and religion, including the rising contemporary science of parapsychology, had learned about the psyche" (*Memories,* p. 150).

In Jung's view, sexuality for Freud "took over the role of a *deus absconditus,* a hidden or concealed god." "The lost god had now to be sought below, not above." (Compare this with Freud's motto for *The Interpretation of Dreams: Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo.*) Jung continued: "The problem still remains: how to overcome or escape our anxiety, bad conscience, guilt, compulsion, unconsciousness, and instinctuality" (*Memories,* pp. 151-152). Later, in the same chapter on Freud, Jung speaks of his own quest for the Holy Grail, "of the world of the Knights of the Grail and their quest—for that was, in the deepest sense, my own world, which had scarcely anything to do with Freud's. My whole being was seeking something still unknown which might confer meaning upon the banality of life" (*op. cit.,* p. 165). It is precisely this quest, this wish to escape instinctuality by seeking something unknown to confer meaning upon the banality of life, that Freud was compelled to combat.

In reflecting later on Freud's quest, Jung came to feel that Freud

basically "wanted to teach . . . that, regarded from within, sexuality included spirituality or had an intrinsic meaning.[6] But his concretistic terminology was too narrow to express this idea. He gave me the impression that at bottom he was working against his own goal and against himself . . ." (*op. cit.*, p. 152). Jung was strongly impressed by "the fact that Freud was emotionally involved in his sexual theory to an extraordinary degree. When he spoke of it, his tone became urgent, almost anxious, and all signs of his normally critical and skeptical manner vanished. A strange, deeply moved expression came over his face, the cause of which I was at a loss to understand. I had a strong intuition that for him sexuality was a sort of *numinosum*."[7] (*op. cit.*, p. 150).

I have quoted rather extensively from Jung's memoirs here because these sentences vividly illustrate the different ideological attitudes and commitments of the two men. But one cannot simply dismiss Jung's impressions and "intuitions" in regard to Freud's deep concern with sexuality as nothing more than expressions of Jung's own preoccupations and inclinations, granted that they colored his perceptions.

Freud *did* attempt to develop, as it were, spirituality out of the biological-archaic roots of man's existence. And he went much further in this direction in the years after the break with Jung. How else can we truly understand his increasing concern with primary narcissism and primary masochism, with the problem of internalization, and with death, guilt, conscience and cultural development? How else can we account for the emergence of the superego concept, for the structural theory, for his conception of ego development ("where id was, there ego shall be") and the concept of sublimation; finally, for the last instinct theory in which Eros and Thanatos become, in Jung's terminology, numinous powers? It is precisely for that reason that the majority of psy-

[6] The German text reads: ". . . *dass . . . Sexualität auch Geistigkeit umfasse, oder Sinn enthalte.*" A more correct translation would be: "sexuality encompassed spirituality or had meaning."

[7] *Numinosum:* term "for the inexpressible, mysterious, terrifying, directly experienced and pertaining only to the divinity" (*Memories,* Glossary, p. 385). It contains the idea of the sacred, including its awe-inspiring quality. Jung borrowed the term from Rudolf Otto, a German scholar of the philosophy of religion who wrote a book titled *The Idea of the Holy* in the twenties.

choanalysts part company with Freud when it comes to his "unscientific" conception of the life and death instincts, uncomfortably aware that with these concepts he explicitly oversteps the boundaries of positivistic or rationalistic biology and psychology and postulates powers that are both overreaching and immanent in man as finite being.

Jung, a man of a younger generation, was less confined by the positivist philosophy that constricted the idea of science and its very scope during the period of Freud's scientific training. He found it easier to recognize that by the very fact of positing the unconscious as a subject for scientific research, psychoanalysis as a new science implicitly eroded the boundaries of positivist science. He also did not share Freud's rationalistic prejudice against religion.

Still, what Jung labeled Freud's concretistic terminology and personalistic view of the unconscious manifests Freud's awareness that authentic transcendental experiences and insights ("spirituality") are anchored in the individual's personal life history and its instinctual roots. Psychoanalysis, I believe, shares with modern existentialism the tenet that superpersonal and transcendental aspects of human existence and of unconscious and instinctual life (so much stressed by Jung) can be experienced and integrated convincingly—without escapist embellishments, otherworldly consolations and going off into the clouds—only in the concreteness of one's own personal life, including the ugliness, trivialities and sham that go with it. It would seem that Jungian psychology and psychotherapy jump all too readily from the here-and-now of individual life, from concrete-personal experience, to the collective unconscious, myth, archetypes, religiosity and "spirituality"—as refuge and healing visions to cling to, leading easily to evasions and hypocrisy instead of to genuine transcendence or, in psychoanalytic terminology, to sublimation and true ego expansion.

Included in the volume are seven letters from Jung's wife to Freud, four of which, written in the fall of 1911, are among the most moving letters in this collection (pp. 452-453, 455-457, 462-463, 467). In them Emma Jung gave voice to her growing concern about the beginning estrangement between the two men. Unfortunately, Freud's replies are not available. Mrs. Jung showed herself to be a most perceptive and sympathetic observer of their conflicts. As a

woman—wife, mother, in a daughter-relation to Freud, and troubled by her own feminine conflicts—and as one not directly involved in the men's struggles, she had a perspective on the situation, inspired by her love for both of them, which was not granted to the men themselves. She also had the courage to overcome much timidity and self-doubt, in order to confront Freud with some of his own defenses and countertransference problems in a manner much in contrast to Jung's later defiant attacks and accusations. Judging from the allusions to Freud's replies in her letters and from some brief quotes from the replies, Freud apparently was more eager to analyze her motives for writing what she did and to reject observations she made than he was to take them to heart, or at least to let her know if he did so. A few remarks of hers concerning his family life—in response to things he had told her in a personal conversation—have the ring of truth. One can read between the lines that Freud had difficulty in hearing such truths from her. He clearly misinterpreted, out of anger, some of her comments about the father-son relationship (see letter of November 14, 1911, pp. 462-463). However, in a few letters to Jung himself during that period, there are indications that Freud kept some of her ideas in mind. But it seems to me that he adhered to the letter rather than to the spirit of what she had written.

The translation is probably as good as any translation can be when personal style of the original counts for so much. A certain stiffness of expression, absent to an admirable degree in both letter writers, unavoidably creeps in. Something of the spontaneity and personal flavor, the wit, the warmth mixed with reserve, the sharp or overly formal tone in the late letters, gets lost in translation. Occasionally there are inaccuracies that could have been avoided. For example, there are two in Emma Jung's letters: the German *erfreut* should have been translated as *pleased,* not *overjoyed* (German edition, p. 504, next to last paragraph; American edition, p. 456, last paragraph). Mrs. Jung was not given to hyperbole. *Verkappte Huldigung* is not a "*blessing* in disguise"; *Huldigung* means *homage* (German edition, p. 512, end of letter; American edition, p. 463). I have mentioned earlier the translation of *Vorstellung* as *image.* This is not necessarily inaccurate, but it is at variance with the standard translation as *idea, presentation,* or

representation, and tends to be confusing for that reason. These, however, are minor points that do not detract from the general excellence of the American edition which in many ways is a model of thoughtful and meticulous editorship. The same goes for the German edition. William McGuire's introduction, printed in both editions, is a superb, balanced account of the complex vicissitudes and negotiations that made this invaluable document available at this time rather than many years hence.

In my opinion, all of us who care about psychoanalysis and the history of the psychoanalytic movement are greatly indebted to Freud's and Jung's surviving children for permitting and encouraging the publication of the *Correspondence* at the present time, despite Jung's own misgivings and vacillations about it before his death. It is safe to assume that Freud would not have approved its publication, reticent as he was about his own personal life and his personal relations with others. To him, what belonged in the public domain was his work, and that is as it should be. For those coming after him and living in a world so greatly influenced by his work, it is a different matter.

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The Selected Papers of Ernst Kris. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1975. 537 pp.

Phyllis Greenacre

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BOOK REVIEWS

THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ERNST KRIS. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1975. 537 pp.

To review these *Selected Papers of Ernst Kris* requires, to my mind, not only a thoughtfully appreciative scrutiny of their content, but a measure of historical perspective as well as some knowledge of the man himself. Anyone reading the book with its dust jacket still intact is greeted by a charming picture of Kris looking obliquely downward as if he were about to join the reader's reading. It is a pity that this picture is not reproduced in the book itself as it may be lost sight of when the jacket is worn out and has disappeared. An impression of animated alertness is at once conveyed by the eyes, or the area around them (for the eyes are not clearly seen), and by the tension of the mouth and the tightly clasped hands.

In the 1930's the return of many American students previously in psychoanalytic training in Europe, together with the gradually increasing number of more experienced European analysts fleeing from Hitler, brought increased interest and concern among all analysts here. Soon, formalization of activities in psychoanalytic societies occurred, and training was more clearly defined and organized in associated institutes. Between 1930 and 1933, five institutes were established in the Eastern half of the country. By the end of the 1940's, this number had doubled, and authorized training had reached as far West as California. The general atmosphere among American analysts at this time, as I remember, was one of sympathetic and anxious excitement under the stress of the increasing war threat, together with gratification in being able to help these colleagues and a sense of enrichment in having so many experienced and well-known analysts among us, sometimes mingled with a feeling of guilt that we should profit by others' catastrophe. There were rough spots, too: tensions due to differences in cultural backgrounds and mores, seeming too trivial to be recognized at a time of crisis but operative in unexpected ways. Even the geography of the country was strange and somewhat forbidding to many. If we idealized them and considered them authorities, they were inclined to agree. Inevitably, some degree of mutual disillusionment followed. This was tempered, however, by the realization of the enrichment in training and vision that had been granted us.

The Kris family had gone first to England, only later coming to the United States in 1939 or 1940. Although Ernst was part of the circle very close to Freud in Vienna and knew the theory and literature of psychoanalysis very well, he had not long been a practicing analyst. In the first years of the war he had worked with the B.B.C. on problems of mass communication, and later he carried on similar work here. With a widely ranging curiosity and vision and an unusual liveliness of mind, he was soon also concerned with helping to organize a study program at the New School for Social Research. Later, he was active in developing courses in the Extension School for Applied Psychoanalysis at the New York Institute. Ernst Kris did not come as a stranger to New York as many of our European colleagues did. As an Assistant Curator of the Vienna Art Museum, he had been in charge of their collection of gems and cameos, and as a young man he had come here in 1920 to aid in cataloging a similar collection at the Metropolitan Museum. He was on excellent terms with the English language, finding pleasure rather than a burden in its use. By 1942, Kris had become a guest lecturer, and by 1944, as a guest instructor, he had become one of the most stimulating teachers on the faculty at the New York Institute. In the next fifteen years until his untimely death in 1957, he was active not only in the formal training but in all aspects of psychoanalytic education and research.

The period of the 1940's and 1950's was an unusually fertile and expanding one in the development and recognition of psychoanalysis throughout this country. This was due largely to the fact that training in psychoanalysis had proved itself as an invaluable aid in the handling of health and morale problems in the many situations accompanying military service. Although analysis as a technical therapeutic procedure was clearly impossible during the stress of war conditions, yet it was recognized that, as a rule, psychoanalysts were more effective in handling the many mental and emotional disturbances of the time than were those psychiatrists who were unaware of the importance of unconscious factors in determining behavior. Consequently, in the last half of the decade of the 1940's, there were many more applications for training than the then-existing institutes could handle.

Kris played an important part then in ways that others might not have thought of. His enthusiasm for new ideas and observations

and his delight in pursuing them opened up new and unexpected vistas of exploration. With a real gift for discerning what dilemmas were germinating in the minds of students and co-workers, he brought them into open group discussions. Thus he often enriched and extended clinical vision which did not always comply with current theory. Always respectful of theory, he was never Procrustean in its application.

As a guest instructor not burdened with administrative duties, he started a group research study of gifted adolescents, was the leading spirit in establishing a longitudinal study of infant development, and frequently was a catalyst in group discussions with colleagues at Yale and Columbia in allied fields of psychology, anthropology, and sociology. From 1953 until his death in 1957, he gave courses in conjunction with Heinz Hartmann and Rudolph Loewenstein on technique and ego psychology, as well as stimulating and carrying on a regular program of postgraduate study with group seminars dealing with psychoanalytic theory in relation to clinical problems.

Twenty-four papers are included in the volume, arranged in four groups: psychoanalytic child psychology, problems of memory, history of psychoanalysis, and applied psychoanalysis. Within each group, the individual papers are placed according to the time of their publication. All were published as much as twenty years ago, and one dates back to 1938, now almost forty years ago. As stated in Anna Freud's foreword: "These papers, reflecting an unremitting commitment to theory-building based on empirical observation, present a rich and stimulating conceptual view of how people express themselves as individuals and in groups." The papers on ego psychology, resulting largely from the collaboration with Hartmann and Loewenstein, are not included here.

Students of psychoanalysis may reread these papers, not so much to reach an authoritative or final statement, but to enjoy the vivid, lively presentations which sometimes use or imply observations beyond the stricter boundaries of psychoanalysis. Kris was never dull and seldom arbitrary. On the other hand, much of what is written or that was stimulated by the work expressed in these papers has been incorporated into the accepted psychoanalytic thinking of our day. The underlying ideas, especially in the papers on child psychology and the few on ego psychology, were very

important, stimulating, and provocative. Further, the discussions which led up to these, or followed them, brought a new awareness and added perspective to interpretation of clinical findings. One has only to look at the list of Kris's other publications to realize how far-reaching and rich was his psychoanalytic vision.

PHYLLIS GREENACRE (NEW YORK)

AUS FREUDS SPRACHWELT UND ANDERE BEITRÄGE (Freud's World of Language and Other Contributions). By K. R. Eissler, S. Freud, S. Goeppert, and K. Schröter. Bern, Stuttgart, Wien: Verlag Hans Huber, 1974. 186 pp.

Since Freud remains a focus of fascination for scholars, it is commendable that on the occasion of publishing some newly discovered Freud juvenilia, the editors have graced this little volume by bringing together four thoughtful and perceptive contributions to the growing *corpus* of Freud scholarship. The core of this book consists of the earliest extant literary productions of the fifteen-year-old Freud: five aphoristic sentences, Freud's "Absent-Minded Thoughts" *(Zerstreute Gedanken).* The editor does not tell us whether the title is his or Freud's. This is not a trivial question when one considers the psychological similarity between "absent-minded thinking" and "free associations." Did the title prefigure Freud's later preoccupation? The *Zerstreute Gedanken* were first published on the last page of the *Musarion,* a school newspaper produced by the sixth form of the high school Freud attended. (Next to nothing is known about the *Musarion,* but it is intriguing to notice that during the same year, Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy* was published by the Musarion publishing house. Were Freud and his schoolmates imagining themselves to be like the publisher of Nietzsche's radical new insights?)

K. R. Eissler's lucid commentary on the five sentences analyzes the adolescent's moral vexations as they are reflected in Freud's aphorisms and as they became transformed and embedded in Freud's mature *opus.* Eissler's erudition combines with his mastery of the details of Freud's life and work to yield brilliant insights, some speculative, others firmly based on the available evidence.

A second paper by Eissler examines Freud's friendship with Fliess

and considers certain aspects of Freud's adolescence in an appended rebuttal of the view of some other students of Freud who see Freud's adolescence as relatively free of turmoil. The issue is complex. Was the young Freud's apparent equanimity—even his mocking disdain —merely a defensive mask to hide the intense inner struggle over a passionate love for Gisela Fluss, as Eissler posits, or was it the result of the self-confident achievement of a life-plan that expressed his ambitions and ideals? Perhaps these are not mutually exclusive but complementary views.

Eissler illuminates Freud's idealization of Fliess whom Freud at first mistook for a genius. Of great interest is Eissler's explanation of the mystery of Freud's fleeting beguilement by Fliess's grandiose-fantastic conception of a mathematical periodicity which determines the course of life. Eissler demonstrates Freud's life-long interest in such games with numbers and documents it with a letter by the seventeen-year-old Freud to his friend Silberstein, in which Freud creates a fantasy world of a nation peopled by numbers who are born, die, marry, etc. But in pointing out how a mutual interest in systems of numbers linked Freud, for a time, with Fliess (that is, Freud found in Fliess's system a concretization of a fantasy of his youth), Eissler misses a decisive difference. Freud used numbers to pictorialize human relationships, to create a world of personal relationships out of impersonal ciphers. Fliess, on the other hand, pictures human beings acting out mathematical relationships; in *his* fantasy he dehumanized life by casting it into the sterile mold of mathematical relations. There is an object lesson here for the proper employment of technology in a world which increasingly threatens to turn men into ciphers.

Freud's 1891 monograph *On Aphasia* is critically examined in a contribution by Sebastian Goeppert. Many of the concepts which later characterized psychoanalysis—for example, transference, projection, cathexis, overdetermination, regression, word- and thing-presentations—are traced by Goeppert to roots in this prepsychoanalytic work. A brief exposition of then-current linguistic theories provides a useful background for the study of Freud's linguistic conceptualizations.

A final chapter by Klaus Schröter is a philological tour de force. Schröter attempts an encompassing survey of all the literary in-

fluences on Freud and he mentions no less than twenty-eight writers from ancient Homer to Zola. Most influential were Shakespeare, Cervantes, and Goethe; the latter two are presented in depth. Cervantes was a model not only in his stylistic realism but also in showing the way to reality by overcoming illusion. Schröter sees Freud in an inner struggle between determinism and metaphysics, a struggle which Freud resolved by substituting a dialectical-materialist *method* for a *system* of mechanistic thought. According to Schröter, Freud followed Goethe and found insights for his studies of hysteria and dreams in the Walpurgis Night of *Faust.*

This is a rich volume full of new data, discernments, and fruitful speculation. It is marred only by the absence of an index. The reader interested in the intellectual history of psychoanalysis and of its creator will not want to miss it.

ERNEST S. WOLF (CHICAGO)

EARLY WRITINGS. VOLUME I. By Wilhelm Reich. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975. 332 pp.

The trustees of the Wilhelm Reich Infant Trust Fund plan to publish Reich's papers from the years 1920 to 1938, except those, such as *Character Analysis,* already available in English. This, the first volume, contains twelve papers written between 1920 and 1925. The titles are: "Libidinal Conflicts and Delusions in Ibsen's *Peer Gynt*" (1920); "A Case of Pubertal Breaching of the Incest Taboo" (1920); "Coition and the Sexes" (1921); "Drive and Libido Concepts from Forel to Jung" (1922); "Concerning Specific Forms of Masturbation" (1922); "Two Narcissistic Types" (1922); "Concerning the Energy of Drives" (1923); "On Genitality: From the Standpoint of Psychoanalytic Prognosis and Therapy" (1924); "Psychogenic Tic as a Masturbation Equivalent" (1925); "Further Remarks on the Therapeutic Significance of Genital Libido" (1925); "The Impulsive Character: A Psychoanalytic Study of Ego Pathology" (1925); "A Hysterical Psychosis *in Statu Nascendi*" (1925). About half of these are listed by their German titles in the bibliography of Otto Fenichel's *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis.*

Psychoanalysts will view these papers within the perspective of psychoanalytic history. Some were written before Freud's *The Ego and the Id,* some after. The latter are clearly influenced by that work as well as by Alexander's writings as summarized a few years later in *The Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality.* The paper entitled "Two Narcissistic Types," as an example, is in response to Alexander's delineation of the "neurotic character." The types described by Reich are still seen clinically. Today they might be called "narcissistic personality (depressive)" and "narcissistic personality (paranoid)."

The 1925 paper, "The Impulsive Character," is of special interest. It begins: "At present we have no psychoanalytic theory of character that is even partially systematic" (p. 237); but on the following page Reich says: "Psychoanalysis has long ceased to be merely symptom therapy; on the contrary, it is constantly developing into a therapy of the entire character." How many analysts today recall that character analysis dates from more than fifty years ago?

There is a contemporary ring to Reich's efforts to probe the roots of ego formation. He says:

> At present . . . we may accept as valid the postulate that man in the first two years of life experiences more, with greater consequence, than at any time thereafter. The child enters the critical oedipal phase with attitudes which, in broad strokes, are generally, even if not conclusively, established. The subsequent Oedipus complex then appears as a prism in which the rays of the drive impulses are refracted (p. 275).

"The Impulsive Character" reflects the extent to which *The Ego and the Id* shook the psychoanalytic world of 1923 and after. Reich is forced here to reconsider not only the metapsychology of his day but also the theory of neurosis, early childhood development, female sexuality, the roots of criminal behavior and a variety of other matters. This is, perhaps, the historically most significant paper in these early writings.

It must be said, in all fairness, that this volume of Reich's early papers was not brought out as a gift for psychoanalysts. The foreword by Chester M. Raphael states:

> Publication of Reich's early writings at this time is not merely to provide evidence that established him as a pioneer in psychoanalysis but primarily to enable the serious reader to become familiar with studies which form the essential links in the evolution of his work from psychoanalysis to orgone biophysics (p. vii).

Later, Raphael says: "Viewing his work retrospectively, as we are now in a position to do, it is easy to see the logic of its development from psychoanalysis to sex-economy and finally, to orgone biophysics" (p. xi). The central thesis here is that Freud was in error in turning away from his original biological orientation, whereas Reich retained the "red thread": "The theme of the bioenergic function of excitability and motility of living substance" (p. xi).

Whatever the merits of this point of view, Reich remains—for psychoanalysts—an important member of the Vienna group after World War I. All of them were attempting to assimilate and enrich Freud's outpouring of thoughts. Reich was exchanging ideas with Jung, Federn, Abraham, Alexander, Horney and others, and he was filling his articles with clinical material through which to seek solutions for problems of psychopathology and nosology. Psychoanalysts will be rewarded if they become familiar with this volume of Reich's early papers, and the volumes to come.

DOUGLASS W. ORR (LA JOLLA, CALIF.)

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE CHILD, VOLUMES I-XXV. ABSTRACTS AND INDEX. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975. 414 pp.

When I was a freshman in college I had the kind of experience only freshmen can have, an experience that brought acute embarrassment at the time and nostalgic amusement later. My high school education had been narrow and did not encompass scientific articles; it was not until college that I was exposed to footnoted documents for the first time. In my reading for my college courses I noted that one particular reference cropped up again and again, and I began to picture a comprehensive compendium of knowledge containing something from every conceivable field. The enormous encyclopedia I imagined covered several walls in the library and was called *Ibid.* One day, in an especially expansive mood, I tried to discover where I might find this wondrous collection. What I found in the card catalog, spelled out in red ink to match my heated embarrassment, was: "*Ibid*: this is not a book."

It was only later that I could appreciate why I had formulated *Ibid.* in that way. My religious upbringing had led me to expect

such omniscient compendiums, although I would have denied such repressed longings were I confronted with them at the time. My penchant for seeking omniscience did not stop with *Ibid.* I was a "setup" for seeing psychoanalysis in just this way, so that in the early fifties when I heard about *The Collected Papers* of Freud, I set out to read them from cover to cover. Again, in the early sixties, when I was not allowed to begin child analytic courses until I had finished my adult work, I approached the subject in the same vein. I knew *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* was to child analysis what *The Standard Edition* was to psychoanalysis as a whole. Consequently I sat down to read all the volumes of *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child* in sequence. I found there all the major contributors to child analysis and at their very best. It was an annual of such unparalleled and sustained excellence for anyone wishing to understand child analysis, psychological development, modern ego psychology, or the integration of child and adult technique that, in effect, I had at last found my *Ibid.*

We are all indebted to the Review Committee of thirty-four analysts (with George Klumpner as chairman) who are responsible for producing the *Abstract and Index,* an excellent compendium of abstracts of the first twenty-five volumes of *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child.* Using the *Abstract and Index,* one does not have to read the volumes cover to cover in order to grasp their contents. The foreword by Bertram S. Brown, the Director of the NIMH National Clearinghouse for Mental Health Information, is followed by Albert J. Solnit's preface reviewing the history of the journal to which he himself has contributed and continues to contribute so much. A short chapter then describes how to use the *Index.* The table of contents of each volume of *The Study of the Child* is to be found in the next section with page reference to the abstract of each article listed. The next section, the main body of the book, comprises the article abstracts, ordered alphabetically by author, permitting the browsing reader to see at a glance all contributions to these volumes of a given author. These abstracts are carefully and succinctly written and are worthy of the volumes themselves and of the editors and contributors. The last section of this reference contains the subject index. The total organization permits readers to gather as much or as little material from this incredibly rich source as their needs may dictate.

MORTON SHANE (LOS ANGELES)

PSYCHOTHERAPEUTIC APPROACHES TO THE RESISTANT CHILD. By Richard A. Gardner, M.D. New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1975. 384 pp.

Gardner's book conveys that he is, above all, a fine and enthusiastic educator who utilizes his psychoanalytic knowledge in a particular type of educational child therapy. In his general discussion he stresses the fact that many youngsters' maladjustments stem from an insufficiently developed or ineffective conscience, as well as from inadequate means of ego mastery. His many clinical vignettes show how he alerts them to these shortcomings, advises them on more appropriate moral and reality-adapted ways of coping with difficult situations, and encourages them to "incorporate" his "messages." Like any good teacher who is faced with disinterested and recalcitrant pupils, Gardner uses every possible device to libidinize this learning process or—as he puts it in Gilbert and Sullivan's words: "When they're offered to the world in merry guise, Unpleasant truths are swallowed with a will, For he who'd make his fellow, fellow, fellow creatures wise, Should always gild the philosophical pill!"

His devices include a number of especially designed games, dramatizations, videotaping of sessions in the form of television shows for an imaginary audience, recording interviews so that patients can replay them at home for themselves and their families, and encouraging parents and siblings to participate in the therapy sessions. These tools provide various forms of gratification for the children and are intended to encourage and reward their cooperation. They also provide the therapist with an opportunity to get across his advice in a palatable, repetitive manner.

It seems to me, however, that Gardner's many successes with patients are not due to his devices but to two other factors. First is his personality as a teacher. His mature mutually respectful relationships with children and parents, his excellent reality testing and honesty of feeling, his genuine wish to help others toward a more realistic adaptation (devoid of sentimentality and balanced by his own healthy narcissism), and the model he offers of himself as a man who thoroughly enjoys and masters life are qualities which are admirable and "catching." They spark our enthusiasm and our wish to be like him. Identification with such a teacher-therapist is an important gain for patients and their families.

The second important factor is selection of patients. Gardner does not offer metapsychological diagnosis of his patients' disturbances.

His intuition and clinical experience serve him well in knowing which patients he is likely to help. The case examples suggest that the children's personalities function largely at or above the oedipal level, without major preoedipal arrests or regressions. Their symptoms appear to be caused by external conflicts or developmental stresses. There are some neurotic manisfestations but no crystallized neuroses or character disorders. By and large, these children are therefore able to relate age-appropriately, and their progressive maturational drive is not seriously impaired. Their healthy ego and superego areas can be strengthened and assisted in integrating additional identifications. These gains often enable them to struggle against impulses, to counteract inner conflicts, and to effect a more appropriate adaptation.

While Gardner actively focuses on ego and superego "strengthening," he discourages the emergence of id material. He foregoes attempts to explore and understand with the patient the unconscious interactions of the different parts of the personality and the genetic origins of the pathology. He teaches his patients a great deal, but they do not get a chance to learn with him about the individual workings of their minds. Most therapists would agree with Gardner on the therapeutic importance of developing ego and superego strengths and pointing the way toward mastery. However, many would feel that it is most valuable for patients to gain conscious access to their psychic reality so that they can learn to meet and to harmonize inner and outer demands. This takes courage and effort. The sugared pill in this task is the patient's feeling of being understood and of mastering through understanding.

The danger in Gardner's methods lies in the chance that some therapists will adopt them for their own sake, without developing within themselves the master's personality attributes and without sufficient theoretical and clinical know-how to select the right patients.

ERNA FURMAN (CLEVELAND)

PSYCHOTHERAPY OF SCHIZOPHRENIA. Edited by John G. Gunderson, M.D. and Loren R. Mosher, M.D. New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1975. 441 pp.

There has been a long and close relationship between psychoanalysis and the psychotherapy of schizophrenia. Despite Freud's reservations

about the efficacy of psychoanalysis in psychosis, a number of outstanding workers have devoted a major portion of their professional efforts to the psychological treatment of schizophrenia. The esteem in which many of these colleagues are held has obscured our view of the utility of psychotherapy as an intervention. The dedication to the individual patient required for this kind of work and demonstrated by colleagues such as Fromm-Reichmann is so inspiring that it makes it difficult for the observer to be objective about the method as opposed to the practitioner. Furthermore, it becomes an easy matter to describe the method as nongeneralizable, unteachable, and unique to a particular person.

With the advent of the psychopharmacologic era in psychiatry, the intensive psychotherapy of schizophrenia fell into increasing disuse. The ambivalence with which the great psychotherapists were viewed became manifest. While the reality of their clinical work was not denied, the merit and utility of their accomplishments were rejected. Many critics argued that psychotherapy was both expensive and ineffective. The defenders of the treatment were few in number, and they tended to retreat within institutional settings which were committed to its practice. This book does much to bring some visibility and perspective to the role of psychotherapy in the treatment of schizophrenia.

A number of notable workers describe their approaches and methods in this volume. The detailing of method with clinical material is an essential pedagogic technique for transmitting information concerning the psychotherapy of schizophrenia. This is one of the few volumes which undertakes this necessary task. Not all of the contributors believe in psychotherapy as a treatment and their points of view are presented as well. The controversies raised by the authors serve to enhance the value of the book. An effort is also made to study research in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia and to identify unanswered as well as unanswerable questions. There is a genuine and successful effort on the part of the editors to bring rationality and coherence to the topic.

The volume is multiauthored and suffers from the problems of all such efforts. There are very well written as well as less well written chapters. There are balanced statements as well as an occasional pointless polemic. Nevertheless, the rewards are unusually excellent for any reader interested in the psychotherapy of schizophrenia. The article by D. Feinsilver and Gunderson is an excellent

example of a balanced review of the pertinent literature. Unfortunately, M. Wexler, in his comment on the work of P. May, becomes more polemical in tone. This reviewer was particularly moved by the contributions of O. Will, Jr. and B. Foster. The essential humanity of their approach cannot be concealed from the discerning reader. This volume is an outstanding contribution to the literature and should be studied by all concerned about the topic.

ROBERT CANCRO (NEW YORK)

HITLER'S IDEOLOGY. A STUDY IN PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIOLOGY. By Richard A. Koenigsberg. New York: The Library of Social Science, 1975. 105 pp.

"The present work," states the author, "constitutes the foundation of a new science: the science of psychoanalytic sociology" (p. vii). He intends to give in this work "a foundation of definite knowledge, a base which is solid, and upon which a true science of human ideas, beliefs and values may grow and flourish" (p. ix). These ambitious aims demand a critical assessment.

The author develops the hypothesis that the death of Hitler's mother from cancer was "a major determinant of the nature of the phantasies which Hitler projected into the social reality" (p. 4). The whole book aims to prove this point. Other inner or outside influences and reality factors are granted only minor significance in the development of Hitler's ideology.

At the age of thirteen, Hitler lost his father, with whom he had a very ambivalent relationship. His mother, who was twenty-three years younger than her husband, died when Adolf Hitler was nineteen years old. All his biographers mention that he loved his mother deeply and was severely shaken when he lost her. Three other children had died in early childhood, and she obviously had given anxious care to her son, yielding totally to his wishes. The author's assumption, therefore, that her love, her long suffering and her death had a strong influence on Hitler's life is believable. For many years after her death he had no real emotional ties with anyone and lived to a great extent in fantasy. Even many years later his only love was a daughter of his older half-sister.

The author's basic method consists of listing "those statements of belief which contained primary process imagery," in order to extract from them "his [Hitler's] beliefs regarding social reality" (p. 3). Koenigsberg gathers a wealth of quotations from Hitler's book and from his innumerable speeches. But he neglects the fact that all languages have expressions which are derived from the human body and its sensations and have become part of the vernacular. Hitler employed images which, in fact, are used universally in all languages and are understood by everybody. For example, Koenigsberg sees a special significance in the fact that Hitler compares the country to a mother and its population to a living organism, that he speaks of a "sick" society, of a disease from which Germany is suffering. But such images point to the well-known similarity between the structure of a social organization and that of a family. In Russian novels Russia is often called by the affectionate diminutive, Mother Russia. United States society these days is called sick, and George Washington is called the father of his country.

"Insofar," writes Koenigsberg, "as the country is a living organism, the belief that it is necessary for a nation to protect the rear may be viewed as a response to the perceived danger of anal-rape" (p. 77). This refers to Bismarck's repeated warnings to his successors to avoid by all means a two-front war. (The "rear guard" in English is not even exactly the same as the German *"Rückendeckung"* which refers only to the upper part of the backside.) The nation, Koenigsberg suggests, represents a collective solution to the problem of separation from the mother, a denial of separateness; it "reflects the wish that persons might be fused together within the mother body" (p. 89). "Hitler's effort to prevent Germany from disintegrating may be viewed as an effort to render inoperative the death instinct" (p. 12). As Freud mentioned, there is a grain of truth even in "wild" psychoanalysis. But how can a psychoanalytic effort to study an ideology be of value if it concerns itself only with primary process imagery? The word "sublimation" is only mentioned as a footnote. Ego and superego concepts are not considered. Economic, social, political conditions, cultural and traditional influences, are not mentioned, as if Hitler's ideology grew directly out of unconscious fantasies about his mother. The reality of Hitler's own four years in the army and the catastrophic postwar unemployment should

certainly be taken into account in considering the origins of the Nazi movement.

Koenigsberg's emphasis makes the horrible but nevertheless very interesting and complex figure of Hitler rather uninteresting. That the oedipus complex, its specific experiences and its solutions have a guiding influence on the development of one's character and on one's ideals, and that it influences the adolescent in relation to society when new important experiences shape the picture of his world is certainly understood by any psychoanalyst, but it can hardly be called a new scientific result of the author's studies. We all go through the experience of the oedipus complex; rescue fantasies are universal and are often transferred from the mother to other women and to society, or find expression in one's work and one's ideals. The split between love and hate of the father is typical for almost every boy's adolescence. Even a superficial attempt to throw some light on Hitler's thinking must consider not only his mother's sad death but his dismal failure in school and the awful four years which he spent in late adolescence in a miserable "home for men" in Vienna, among drunkards, outcasts, the rejects of society, while his applications to the Academy for the Fine Arts were twice rejected. While he was in this state of humiliation, unable to accept his own failings, his paranoid belief that the Jew was the enemy grew to monstrous psychotic dimensions in the fertile soil of Viennese anti-Semitism. This paranoid delusional conviction gave him power over his political opponents who approached the chaos and despair of the country with reason. Those whose vision is wider than a focal delusional idea sometimes can only suggest doubtful solutions to complicated problems. Hitler, with uncanny intuition about mass psychology, seemed to sense and could exploit the parallel between himself and the defeated and helpless country and the feeling of humiliation that unemployment meant for the millions who had to live on the dole.

Koenigsberg treats Hitler's speeches as if they were nothing but direct expression of his unconscious. His speeches were, however, conscious manipulation of the psychology of the masses. He repeatedly said that to win the masses you had to turn them against *one,* and only one enemy. Propaganda, Hitler said, has to be on the level

of the dullest among the hearers and must not be based on reason, but has to work "to rouse, to whip up and incite their instincts." He called himself the "greatest actor Europas." He consciously used his "unrivaled political cunning."[1] Hitler spoke as if he understood that under certain social conditions the remnants of the oedipal problems can be manipulated. These are situations in which people, despairing of rational solutions for their needs, regress toward infantile attitudes.

There exists a great temptation to apply psychoanalytic interpretations outside of the psychoanalytic situation. Such interpretations do not have to face the checks and balances required in careful analytic work with patients. This book contains a disappointing mixture of correct statements, half-truths, self-evident remarks and "wild" analytic interpretations. Unfortunately, the text can be easily used as material by scurrilous critics of psychoanalysis to attack the basic ideas of our science.

HENRY LOWENFELD (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY. By Reuben Fine, Ph.D. New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1975. 198 pp.

This book has an ambitious title and, in the preface and conclusions, indicates its aim to be an attempt to integrate all meaningful psychologic data into one comprehensive theory which will make psychology and psychoanalysis intelligible to a wide variety of students from many disciplines. It certainly is an open question whether our present theory of psychoanalysis is still able to integrate all of the empirical data of analysts and nonanalytic investigations, while continuing to retain its essential form; or whether we have stretched the existing theory and must await a new and better umbrella of explanation. Clearly, Fine is of the former opinion, and in Kuhn's terms, he would be involved in the "mop-up" work of increasing the match between the facts and the predictions of

[1] See, Hitler's outstanding first biographer, Konrad Heiden: *Der Fuehrer*. New York: Lexington Press, 1944. See also, Joachim C. Fest: *Hitler*. Frankfurt: Propylaens Verlag Ullstein, 1973.

a new (i.e., Freudian) paradigm. As with all such efforts, certain parts of the area seem to have been missed by the mop, and certain other parts seem more obscured than tidied.

Rather than give a detailed listing of the many items that most psychologists, many psychoanalysts, and some psychiatrists would take issue with, it may be easiest to note but a few. Certainly a wide disagreement would be expected from the listing of anxiety as an instinct (p. 31); from the statement "Schizophrenia is obviously a disorder of communication" (p. 88); and from completely dispensing with the contributions of Piaget (in a book proposing to cover the field of psychology), save for two references in an article published in an analytic journal which are not directly applicable to cognitive development.

It seems clear that this book is intended for giving beginning students of psychology some overview of psychoanalytic theory. In that respect, it is quite clearly and simply written. It is, however, by no means a textbook of psychoanalysis and it falls far short of being the comprehensive theory to which it lays claim. The major criticism, once these limitations are clear, is that it is uncomfortably idiosyncratic.

ARNOLD I. GOLDBERG (CHICAGO)

LIFE HISTORY AND THE HISTORICAL MOMENT. By Erik H. Erikson. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1975. 283 pp.

This is almost entirely a collection of already published occasional pieces—book reviews, discussions for *Daedalus* Conferences, invited addresses, a contribution to a collection of essays, plus two new stock-taking essays. They serve not so much to extend Erikson's earlier contributions as to explain, amend or defend them. Judged from the standpoint of the clinical psychoanalyst, their quality is variable. The review of Freud's "Fliess Letters" is a gem. The methodological discussion of psychohistorical evidence is simultaneously dialectically tough-minded and seductively question-begging. The autobiographical essay, despite the interesting information it contains, is unsatisfactory in that it promises more than it delivers. It is so highly selective and even questionable in some of what it tells or suggests that it cannot serve as a reliable psychohistorical

introduction to the interrelations of the man, his work and his times. The other chapters, such as the one on "inner space" in the psychology of women and those on the psychosocial problems of youth in a violent and prejudiced world, and the two new essays, are essentially reworked versions of earlier contributions.

Some of Erikson's best qualities are represented in these essays, but they must be sorted out from a good many *ex cathedra* pronouncements and ethical exhortations. (Erikson would, no doubt, reject the distinction made here.) To a psychoanalyst, he is likely to be judged at his best when he has in hand a definite person, such as Freud or Ghandhi, for this is when he has a psychoanalytically informed method by which to portray, in his inimitable empathic way, a life history in historical perspective. It is, moreover, a method about which, and by means of which, he has many things to say that illuminate the nature of psychoanalytic interpretation and the problems of the psychoanalytic profession. But, for all his clinical understanding and social science sophistication he has no clear method when he gets to subjects like youth, women, ethnic groups and the social world generally. Therefore, he comes across too often as the humanistic wise man making fuzzy generalizations, unconvincing teleological readings of the past and not quite testable forecasts of the future.

Directly or indirectly, Erikson's original thinking has enriched the work of many psychoanalysts. In view of his stature in contemporary thought, all of his work should be readily accessible. It is, therefore, fitting and useful to have these essays gathered together in one volume. But his contribution to modern psychoanalysis is not to be assessed on the basis of these essays alone.

ROY SCHAFER (NEW YORK)

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Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLXI, 1975.

Harold R. Galef

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ABSTRACTS

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLXI, 1975.

Hysteria, Hypnosis, Psychopathology—History and Perspectives. Léon Chertok. Pp. 367-378.

In this elegant survey of the history and extent of our knowledge regarding hysteria and psychopathology, Kubie is quoted with agreement: "Hypnosis is the cross-roads for all levels of physiological and psychological organization." The phenomenon of hypnosis, about which Chertok concludes we really know almost nothing, is seen as central to our understanding of all those mysterious gaps that operate in both directions between mind and body.

Although Charcot clearly demonstrated the psychological etiology of hysteria, an area which was greatly expanded by Freud, the origin of this psychic "dysfunction" remains obscure. Chertok considers the concept of an innate neurophysiological disposition and includes discussion of the work of Marty, Nemiah and Sifneos, and Pavlov. For all these workers, hypnosis, neglected after Freud discarded it for therapeutic reasons, constitutes an important experimental instrument for understanding psychopathological mechanisms. Freud has furnished us with an outline of the "why" of such phenomena as conversion, dissociation, and splitting, but "how" they come about remains the mystery. The author's own postulation is that there is a "fourth organismic state" in addition to the waking state, sleep, and dreaming. This is explained as a natural potentiality or inborn mechanism which is then markedly influenced by the individual's specific psychoaffective development.

A Clinical Application of Subliminal Psychodynamic Activation: On the Stimulation of Symbiotic Fantasies as an Adjunct in the Treatment of Hospitalized Schizophrenics. Lloyd H. Silverman; Peritz Levinson; Eric Mendelsohn; Roseann Ungaro; Abbot A. Bronstein. Pp. 379-392.

This is a carefully designed study of a potential clinical application of subliminal stimulation. It is based on the observation that schizophrenics often manifest a reduction in their ego impairment upon establishing a relationship that fosters a symbiotic fantasy. In such a fantasy there is a partial loss of differentiation between self- and object representations that can serve simultaneously to gratify libidinal wishes and as a defense against aggressive wishes. The technique of treatment used involves an assessment of the degree of ego impairment before and after the experimental manipulation. In this study, the verbal message, "Mommy and I are one," was presented to one group, and a neutral verbal stimulus was presented to a control group. The results were a significant reduction of ego impairment in the experimental group.

The authors also discuss their concern about the ethics of subjecting people to subliminal stimulation designed to affect their behavior. As in any such work, it is very difficult to separate and distinguish the effects of mere passage of time, the drug treatment going on concurrently, the general treatment regime, and the experimental procedure. In addition, the authors attempt to delineate the crucial

element in the fantasies. There are obviously other questions which remain to be answered, such as the duration of any therapeutic gain and the price paid by patients.

HAROLD R. GALEF

American Imago. XXXIII, 1976.

Sigmund Freud and Romain Rolland: The Terrestrial Animal and His Great Oceanic Friend. James Fisher. Pp. 1-59.

Freud's relationship with Rolland began in 1923 when Freud was sixty-seven years old; Rolland was ten years younger. Freud admired Rolland but his exchanges with him were marked by personal frictions which the author attributes to Freud's inability to separate people from their ideas. Their controversies over religious sensation, mysticism, and psychoanalysis derived from differences in personality and from divergent cultural backgrounds. Freud was central European and Jewish, influenced by nineteenth century evolutionary and rationalist traditions; Rolland was French and Catholic, a historian, musicologist, artist, novelist, and biographer of epic heroes. Five unpublished letters from Freud to Rolland, which the author discovered in the course of his research on the Frenchman, add special interest.

Freud and Michelangelo's "Moses." Rudy Bremer. Pp. 60-75.

Freud erroneously assumed that Michelangelo's *Moses* was related to the first ascent of Mount Sinai. Consequently, he was confronted by numerous problems about which he advanced solutions so tendentious that his final interpretation bore little relevance to the statue which, as Bremer persuasively argues, portrays the second ascent. This episode, in which Moses became the only human being ever to see God's posterior parts, represented Moses at the acme of his career. The details of the statue are consistent with this interpretation. In addition, Pope Julian would not have agreed to having a Moses at the nadir of his relationship with God (breaking the tablets) on his tomb, but would have welcomed being identified with Moses at his supreme moment.

Jean Cocteau's "Beauty and the Beast." Dennis De Nitto. Pp. 123-154.

De Nitto argues that Cocteau's *Beauty and the Beast* portrays the transformation of a virgin attached to her father into a mature female no longer afraid of her sexuality.

Synge's Ecstatic Dance and the Myth of the Undying Father. Jeanne Flood. Pp. 174-196.

Critics have accepted the idea that Synge's transformation from a severely limited aesthete to the vigorous creator of a new Irish drama resulted from his visits to the Aran Islands. Basing her argument on autobiographical writings and other notes, Flood attributes this transformation to Synge's reaction to a lymph node biopsy performed under ether anesthesia in 1898. Prior to this experience Synge had fantasied that the womb was a dangerous organ and that his birth was

the result of the incorporation and destruction of his father (who had died during Synge's infancy) within the womb; accordingly, Synge defended against fears of his own engulfment and dissolution. The surgery had the unconscious significance of a death and rebirth and gave rise to an alteration in his womb fantasy: there was added an element of immortality in which the man who dies is reborn as his own son. Synge made his first of five annual trips to the Aran Islands the following summer, where he entered into filial relationships with old men who were the repositories and transmitters of ancient poems and narratives. Synge utilized this material for his new drama. As the contemporary repository and transmitter of the ancient literature, Synge united with generations of fathers stretching back into antiquity.

Freud and his Literary Doubles. Mark Kanzer. Pp. 231-243.

Freud classified himself as a scientist while denying the magnitude of his creative and literary talents. At the same time he expressed, albeit with some ambivalence, great admiration for such writers as Schnitzler, Rolland, and Mann. Kanzer feels that these artists were transference figures for Freud's brother Alexander. Freud's yielding the field of literature was symbolic of his acceptance of his replacement by Alexander as his mother's favorite son.

John Donne's "The Good-Morrow." Dennis Grunes. Pp. 261-265.

In "The Good-Morrow," a poem which describes the morning after their wedding night, Donne proclaims the oneness and immortality of the couple's love. Grunes analyzes the speaker's underlying fear of separation and loss in terms of Donne's own infantile relationship with his mother.

The Stones of Madness. John J. Hartman; James G. Ravin; Sarah M. White; Gerald P. Hodge. Pp. 266-295.

This paper discusses a series of Netherlandish paintings and engravings from the fifteenth through the seventeenth century, which depict quack doctors removing stones from the heads of patients as a cure for madness. While speculations about the psychoanalytic meanings of the stones are not conclusive, the paper is interesting for the material studied (there are plates of five of the works) and for the discussion of the late medieval society in which it was produced.

JOSEPH W. SLAP

Revista de Psicoanálisis. XXXIII, 1976.

Changes in the Theory and Practice of Psychoanalysis. David Liberman. Pp. 421-438.

Liberman uses communication theory, as well as other auxiliary sciences, to study changes in psychoanalytic theory. He uses two metaphorical images chosen by Freud to illustrate the nature of analytic communication, the telephone and the chess game, to conclude that psychoanalysis has a second investigative task, the analytic dialogue and the study of psychoanalytic processes. The first task, although it is not specifically defined, must refer to the study of the unconscious.

The author believes there has been a change in the analytic population. The analysands, who consider themselves ill and view the analytic experience as medical help, are disappearing and being replaced by what Liberman calls "quasi-colleagues." These patients regard the psychoanalytic process as another ingredient for their narcissistic structure and perverse activities. The author emphasizes the importance of the fundamental analytic rule in dealing with these formidable characterological defenses. Liberman's views on a changing type of psychoanalytic patient may reflect the nature of his own professional experience, rather than being a generalized phenomenon.

Submission to the Superego in the Theory of Narcissism. Angel and Elisabeth Garma. Pp. 637-651.

The authors point out that Freud defined narcissism as the state in which libido is located in the self. This concept was based on observations of schizophrenia, hypochondriasis, organic disease, overestimation of children by their parents, and individuals who create their ego ideal. The Garmas then proceed in a very methodical way to the main point of the paper, the individual's masochistic submission to the superego while renouncing heterosexuality. This concept is opposed to Freud's view of the withdrawal of the libido from the object in megalomania as well as in other narcissistic conditions. These theoretical concepts, rather than being contradictory, may well be complementary structural viewpoints.

JORGE STEINBERG

American Journal of Psychiatry. CXXXIII, 1976.

Do Dreams Have Meaning? An Empirical Inquiry. Milton Kramer; Robert Hlasny; Gerard Jacobs; Thomas Roth. Pp. 778-781.

Three judges with varying academic backgrounds (an experienced psychiatrist, a psychology graduate, and an experimental psychologist with five years experience in sleep and dream research) attempted to sort randomly selected dreams of twelve college students, as well as the dreams of a group of schizophrenic patients. The dreams were classified according to the dreamer, the night of occurrence, and the sequential order within a night. The results of the study support the assumption that dreams are orderly, nonrandom events. They were able to successfully distinguish among the dreams of different people and those of one person on different nights, with a statistically significant degree of success. However, they were unable to determine the sequential order of any dreamer's dreams within one given night. It was believed that the reactive nature of dreams was reflected by the judges' ability to sort successfully the dreams of one night from those of another night. Although the authors do not state it in psychoanalytic terms, this data could be viewed as good experimental evidence substantiating the importance of the day residue in dreams.

Psychiatric Effects of Prolonged Asian Captivity. A Two-Year Follow-Up. Richard Hall and Patrick Malone. Pp. 786-790.

Six returning Vietnamese veterans had been in captivity for at least five years before their return. The families had been seen by the authors for one year prior

to the return of the subjects in the study. The subjects showed social, work, emotional, and family difficulties, each area following its own course of onset, impact, and resolution. It appears that cognitive difficulties were most pronounced during the first three months after return, but were resolved without specific treatment and were easily dealt with by the families. Social problems were most pronounced from the third to the sixth months and caused considerable difficulty for the wives. These particular problems had to be resolved before family roles were restructured. From the third to the ninth month, self-imposed and overdetermined standards of work were stressed for the men. They were socially uncomfortable in nonprisoner-of-war, nonmilitary social groups. Emotional factors, including mood shifts, paranoid ideation, hoarding behavior, depression, fatigue, guilt, and phobic behavior, predominated from the third month through the end of the first year and were resolved after that gradually. Family difficulties tended to be resolved during the second year after return. Reparative work in social functioning could not begin until cognitive clearing had taken place. Significantly at the end of two years, the authors saw no evidence of a concentration camp syndrome nor any major psychiatric illness. They make comprehensive suggestions for programs involving any future re-entry.

Free Psychotherapy: An Inquiry into Resistance. James L. Nash and Jesse O. Cavenar. Pp. 1066-1069.

Using five case reports in a short but interesting article, the authors review past comments on the importance of setting an appropriate fee. In the five cases presented, the lack of a fee became the focus of an insoluble resistance to therapy. The reasons ranged from overwhelming guilt in a patient with an obsessive character structure through patients with overt sexual identity problems who fantasized nonfinancial demands being made on them by the therapist in lieu of money. In another case, the authors felt that the nonpayment of fee was an unwitting oral gratification which would shield potentially crucial material from therapeutic inspection.

WILLIAM ROSENTHAL

British Journal of Psychiatry. CXXVI, 1975.

Attainment and Adjustment in Two Geographical Areas: I. The Prevalence of Psychiatric Disorder. Michael Rutter; Anthony Cox; Celia Tupling; Michael Berger; William Yule. Pp. 493-509.

This study demonstrates that rates of "behavioral deviance" (conduct disturbance in school) and psychiatric disorder in ten-year-old children were twice as high in an inner London area as on the Isle of Wight. This was consistent for inner London as a whole and was true of both boys and girls. There was also a higher over-all rate of psychiatric disorder for girls and boys in the London area, with a high rate of situation-specific psychiatric disorder shown only in the home.

Attainment and Adjustment in Two Geographical Areas: II. The Prevalence of Specific Reading Retardation. Michael Berger; William Yule; Michael Rutter. Pp. 510-519.

Similar to the previous report, this study shows that the prevalence of reading retardation (underachievement) and reading backwardness was respectively about three times and twice as high in ten-year-old children from the inner London area compared with the same age children on the Isle of Wight. While a definitive comparison between the two populations could not be made, there was a strong tendency for the reading retarded children to have high rates of behavioral difficulties in school.

Attainment and Adjustment in Two Geographical Areas: III. Some Factors Accounting for Area Differences. Michael Rutter; Bridget Yule; David Quinton; Olwen Rowlands; William Yule; Michael Berger. Pp. 520-533.

The third paper in this group is an attempt to analyze factors associated with the findings in the previous papers, within the two specific areas as well as between areas. Marital discord, particularly when severe and when of disruptive, quarrelsome nature, as opposed to apathy and indifference, was significantly higher among parents of children with psychiatric disorders. Maternal psychiatric disorder (not paternal) was strongly associated with child psychiatric disorder on the Isle of Wight. In London this did not hold, as there was a high rate of psychiatric disorder in the mothers of "normal" children. However, the average score of mothers of children with disorders in both populations was considered significantly higher. Antisocial behavior in the fathers was associated with disorder in both groups of children. Disorders were more common, significantly in the London population, when "the father had a laboring or semi-skilled manual job." Large family size was also associated with children with psychiatric disorder and reading retardation. While the schools with the greater percentage of behaviorally deviant children had a higher rate of teacher and pupil turnover, the evidence for these as causal factors is less strong. Four sets of variables—family discord, parental deviance, social disadvantage and certain school characteristics—"were associated with child deviance and disorder within the two areas and in almost all cases these same factors also differentiated between the two communities." They are felt to be causal. The paper concludes with an examination of alternative explanations of a biological nature. There is circumstantial evidence, based on height differentials, that the nutrition of children of the London area was inferior to those of the Isle of Wight.

ROBERT J. BERLIN

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Meetings of the Psychoanalytic Association of New York

Howard L. Schwartz, Charles Tolk, Marion G. Hart & Melvin Stanger

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NOTES

MEETINGS OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

April 21, 1975. FREUD AND THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY. Leonard Shengold, M.D.

Dr. Shengold first spoke of the definition, purpose, and philosophy of the university as it evolved from its beginnings in Italy and France in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. He then cited the relevance of this historical view for an understanding of the parallel modern evolution of psychoanalytic institutes as discussed by Bertram D. Lewin in his 1958 paper, "Education or the Quest for Omniscience." These points served as the background for an examination of the factors and experiences which may have borne on Freud's attitudes and writings touching on the university. His ambivalence toward the university and the medical profession was to some extent derived from the painful rejections he received from Vienna and the medical world. It also sprang from such psychological roots as his omniscient urges, his sibling rivalries, and his well-known oedipal tensions. In addition, it was contributed to by humanist identifications and his self-image as the lonely seeker of truth. He wished (like Faust) to conquer intellectually the paternal figures at the university (especially Brücke), and to gain access to the omniscient mother, *Alma Mater*. These conflicts and experiences were seen by Dr. Shengold as influencing the views expressed in Freud's 1919 paper, "On the Teaching of Psycho-Analysis in Universities," and in the 1926 paper, "The Question of Lay Analysis." Dr. Shengold felt that Freud's ideas could be considered consonant with a specialized psychoanalytic university or a psychoanalytic unit in an established university. To the end of his life he held to the goal of *universitas litterarum*—to discover and stand for the truth.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Jan Frank emphasized the importance of anti-Semitism in Freud's struggle with official academic circles. Dr. Maurice Friend underscored the value and pertinence of a historical orientation in approaching the new developments in psychoanalytic education and practice. He warned that the expectation of omniscience by either student or teacher will always result in anxiety and difficulty. Dr. William Niederland reminded the audience that an analyst's search for truth had to be combined with a commitment to the health of the patient. Dr. Robert Levitt and Dr. George Wiedeman both raised questions bearing on present trends in American psychoanalysis and their relation to Freud's earlier experiences. At the conclusion, Dr. Shengold agreed that Freud's oedipal conflict did not explain all of his conflicts over the university and that the quest for truth was not necessarily a fantasy of omniscience.

HOWARD L. SCHWARTZ

September 29, 1975. SCOPTOPHILIA AND SEPARATION ANXIETY. Renato J. Almansi, M.D.

The coexistence of scoptophilia and separation anxiety in four cases of simple voyeurism previously published by Dr. Almansi pointed strongly toward a genetic relationship between object loss and scoptophilia. In the case under

discussion (a patient with a severe voyeuristic perversion and marked separation anxiety) crucial reconstructions implicated trauma connected with the nursing situation. From the age of nine months through the age of fifteen months, the patient had suffered from an illness with bloody diarrhea, associated with crying fits and periods of semi-stupor, during which he was a source of revulsion for his mother. He reacted with depression and manifest anger, passively watching his parents but missing them when they were not present. Other notable details of the history included the patient's observing his mother masturbating while she listened in on party-line telephone conversations, adolescent spying on his older, seductive and exhibitionistic sister, and primal scene experiences between the ages of twenty-four months and forty months, involving a mirror in his parents' bedroom.

The long analysis with its reconstruction of his early intestinal illness brought out evidence of intense oral cravings, marked oedipal problems, severe castration anxiety, and a feminine identification with well-defended, passive, feminine fantasies. When the primal scene material was reconstructed, there was a recurrence of the voyeurism and increased resistance to the analytic work. These developments and understandings supported the assumption that object loss in early life promoted the visual search for the object, which is at the base of voyeurism. Working through of the separation anxiety was as crucial for the cure of the perversion as was the understanding of the subsequent sexualization of the original impulse in the phallic and oedipal phases.

DISCUSSION: Raising the question of choice of perversion in this case, Dr. Marvin Nierenberg suggested that a disturbed mother-infant relationship which weakened the ego and intensified separation anxiety might contribute to other perversions as well. Dr. Shelley Orgel focused on the patient's stimulus hunger and felt that the visual search was, in fact, related to trauma in the nine-to-fifteen-month period, rather than specifically related to the nursing situation, as Dr. Almansi had suggested. He expressed interest in the nature of the analytic dialogue and transference relationships in a patient whose communication problems were rooted in such early disturbance. Both Dr. Henry Rosner and Dr. Robert Dickes raised the question of the ubiquitousness of separation anxiety and the unusual nature of this patient's symptomatology. The role of superego deficits in voyeurism, expressing the need for omnipotence, was stressed by Dr. Alan Eisnitz. Dr. Roy Lilleskov documented some of the pertinent features of the mother-child interaction with reference to nursery observations and videotape studies.

CHARLES TOLK

January 19, 1976. OBJECT LOSS AND THE WISH FOR A CHILD. Merl M. Jackel, M.D.

Elaborating on his previously described thesis that a preoedipal wish for pregnancy can occur in response to separation from the analyst, Dr. Jackel offered a series of clinical observations which demonstrated that this phenomenon also occurred outside the analytic situation. He felt it was a response

to object loss in general and represented an attempt on the part of patients to re-establish within themselves the mother-child symbiotic unit. Clinical illustrations of the variety of ways in which this wish could be evidenced included fantasies of out-of-wedlock babies, dreams of postpartum phlebitis, interest in creativity, difficulties with contraception and actual pregnancies coinciding with vacations of the analyst, and psychophysiological changes such as paradoxical lactation at the time of termination, or anal abscess in a male patient with anal pregnancy associations.

Dr. Jackel's review of the literature reinforced his view that this phenomenon derived from certain identificatory stages in the course of early separation-individuation developments. The patient (child) identifies with the childbearing omnipotence of the preoedipal mother and thus tries to avoid the helplessness engendered by the threat of separation. Since other transference wishes may overlap with this preoedipal derivative, additional meanings of the wish for a child may include wanting to give mother a child, to bear a child for father, or to have father's penis, for example. Anna O's pseudocyesis after leaving Breuer and Breuer's prompt countertransference impregnation of his wife were also cited.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Judith Kestenberg noted that pregnancy fantasies may derive from a variety of pregenital stages, with many different images of the mother and many different early phallic and prephallic body sensations serving as determining influences. She doubted that regression to the symbiotic phase under discussion would lead to pregnancy wishes. Dr. Muriel Laskin, citing the case of a male patient with negative oedipal wishes, noted that a distinction should be made between the "wish for a child," related to early separation-individuation problems, and the "wish to be a parent," arising after a stable resolution of the oedipal conflict. Dr. William Niederland spoke of the instances of notable creativity (Goya, Schliemann) related to losses or personal malformations, and of the frequency of marriages and childbirth in Holocaust survivors attempting to replace lost relatives. Other reconstitutive functions related to pregnancy fantasies manifest in psychosomatic conditions were cited by Dr. Leonard Barkin, while Dr. Henry Schneer believed that the frequent promiscuity and illegitimate births among juvenile delinquents represented the wish to restore the early mother-child relationship. Dr. Jackel added that in many cases, the out-of-wedlock baby is given to the girl's mother to be cared for.

MARION G. HART

March 5, 1976. PANEL DISCUSSION: ADOLESCENCE AS SEEN IN ADULT ANALYSIS. Jules Glenn, M.D., Chairman; Eugene H. Kaplan. M.D.; Joseph Mayer, M.D.; Maurice R. Friend, M.D.

This Panel Discussion centered around a number of questions that were to be examined in connection with two case reports and the general clinical experience of the discussants. Dr. Jules Glenn, citing Anna Freud's observation that the full intensity of the adolescent experience often fails to appear in the course

of adult analyses, wondered whether this impression was widely shared. He asked whether a successful or optimal analytic result could be achieved without the vivid actuality of adolescence being reconstructed or remembered and its place in development fully understood. He also asked about the technical approaches needed to adequately exploit the therapeutic potential of working through derivatives of adolescent experiences.

Dr. Joseph Mayer described the case of a twenty-six-year-old male who remembered and re-experienced in the analysis his experience at age fifteen of a year of loneliness, depression, feelings of alienation and worthlessness, and marked hostility toward his father. This was followed by a period of homosexual activity with an admired prep school roommate, involving mutual masturbation and anal intercourse. The transference afforded opportunities for the tracing out of wishes for passive gratification and contact with a powerful man, including the wish for anal penetration and rage at the frustration of this wish. Genetic antecedents included early toilet training by his mother, who wiped his anus until he was six, and frequent enemas given by both parents until latency. The infantile and latency experiences and accompanying defenses were significantly altered by the biological and structural changes in the subsequent developmental phase, a fact which posed a particular technical requirement insofar as reconstruction and interpretation were concerned.

Dr. Eugene Kaplan discussed the case of a woman in her mid-thirties whose presenting complaints included two conversion episodes marked by dizziness, diplopia, and lapses of consciousness with screaming and crying on awakening. A mildly retarded, hyperactive, epileptic brother, three years her junior, was a source of guilt and anxiety for her parents, who sought to deny his handicaps and to ascribe responsibility for them to the patient's infecting him with measles when she was five. The mother dressed the children alike, bathed them together, and in many ways sought to erase the distinction between the healthy girl and the damaged boy. The fantasy of being a Siamese twin to her brother, joined at the genitals, as well as several childhood fellatio attempts and other childhood sexual adventures, were combined with an early and persistent intention to become a career woman. In adolescence, this led to behavior problems in school, drinking and dangerous involvements with older boys, all of which was conceived of—with her father's conspiratorial cooperation—as a type of boyish hell-raising and being one of the boys. Her lifelong determination to be "one of the boys" contributed to her eventual escape from the parental household through marriage at age twenty, when she was three months pregnant. Her battle for twinlike equality with the male continued in her marriage and culminated in her admission to a male homosexual coterie, in which she acted out significant relationships with debased or idealized representatives of her past life.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Maurice Friend spoke of the special technical problems involved in analyzing adolescents because of their distrust of parental figures, their ease of regression, the special conflicts concerning their sexual wishes, and the defense of aesthetic preoccupations. One consequence is the likelihood that we are less often able to accomplish an affectively complete reconstruction and

more often able only to reassemble available derivatives. He cited three groups of patients who are likely in adult analysis to restructure their adolescent development most definitively: (1) the ones who, in adolescence (or earlier), suffer parent or sibling loss, or who suffer a severe illness or a significant separation; (2) severely depressed, borderline, narcissistic patients with homosexual conflicts, like Dr. Mayer's patient; and (3) a few hysterical patients, like Dr. Kaplan's, who make continuous active attempts to master familial superego configurations. Dr. Friend was interested in learning how insight from the adolescent material in this second case aided the patient in advancing to later object relations and other changes.

Dr. Peter Neubauer, in responding to Dr. Glenn's original questions, suggested that there were many interrelationships between earlier pathology and adolescent ego ideal formation, as well as with other dimensions of the evolution of the adolescent personality. What had to be analyzed, therefore, depended upon the degree to which the adolescent developments were invaded, distorted, and limited, or upon whether there existed an alternative situation in which there was simply a continuation or replication of the earlier pathology in the later phase. For the latter, an ordinary genetic interpretive effort would suffice, but the more complicated instance posed different technical challenges to actualize blocked or distorted adolescent development. Dr. Charles Sarnoff focused on the cognitive shifts in adolescence necessary for normal development, involving shifting from fantasy objects to real objects as the object of discharge. This included the movement from the fantasies about the parents of the oedipal phase to nonincestuous objects, even into adulthood.

Dr. Kaplan added that his patient's ability at age fifteen to read about the concept of pseudoretardation and to use this newly-acquired knowledge to deal with her conflicts and guilt represented the kind of cognitive advance adolescent development made possible. Other patterns of adjustment that evolved in her early childhood, such as passive-aggressive withholding of urine, gave way to more overt and more complicated conflicts with the parents in adolescence and later.

Dr. Friend expressed pessimism concerning our ability to clearly elucidate the relationship existing between pathology, significant adaptational developmental processes, and the pre-existing preoedipal and narcissistic preverbal contributions. Dr. Glenn felt that these two patients showed adolescent phenomena so vividly because of their inability to resolve the problems of the phase because of pre-existing problems with separation-individuation or with strong preoedipal fixations, resulting in a prolonged adolescence.

MELVIN STANGER

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

January 27, 1976. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COLORS BLACK AND WHITE IN THE DREAMS OF BLACK AND WHITE PATIENTS. Wayne A. Myers, M.D.

Material from the analyses of three black patients and three white patients included examination of approximately three hundred dreams from each

group. Dreams in which the colors black and white were mentioned were of higher-than-average frequency in both groups studied, while the incidence of reports of other colors was lower than average. Dr. Myers, following H. Blum, suggested that color in dreams was an indicator of conflict around self- and object representations and the development of the sense of identity. He felt that the colors black and white in his patients' dreams related to their transference wishes and affects. The use of black to express degradation and white to convey idealization was impressive in a patient of biracial parentage, while in another case it served to express aspects of the prominent transference resistance which, according to Dr. Myers, was based on the color difference between patient and analyst. Other studies of interracial analyses have shown dream material in which conflicts of self- and object differentiation were correlated with skin color. In conclusion, Dr. Myers mentioned the possibility that the frequency of his white patients' color references may have been influenced by their awarness that he also had black patients.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Leo Spiegel noted that both latent and manifest meanings of the colors had to be considered. He expressed the belief that the processes of idealization and of splitting of self- and object representations made the problem of the idealized transference especially important in interracial analysis. Dr. Charles Brenner questioned the weight placed on the two colors, noting that their significance derived from their finding their way into hallucinated images by virtue of their origins in affect-laden aspects of unconscious conflicts. He contended that the relevant aspects of the affective significance of black and white in these patients' dreams did not have to do with the colors per se, but with the current social conventions and prejudices associated with them. Dr. Charles Fisher commented on some of the statistical observations made in regard to this special series. He offered the general observations that color is used to differentiate inside and outside of body image representations and that since black and white are the only color pair with a metaphorical polarity, this metaphorical usage might account for the high incidence in Dr. Myer's material.

ISRAEL ZEIFMAN

February 10, 1976. SOME REMARKS ON THE ANALYSIS OF DREAMS AND OF NEUROTIC SYMPTOMS. Charles Brenner, M.D.

After reviewing Freud's hypotheses concerning the formation of dreams as explicated in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams,* Dr. Brenner offered a revision of the theory, previously described in his book, written with Dr. Jacob Arlow, *Psychoanalytic Concepts and the Structural Theory.* Instead of ascribing the dream's psychological properties to its being formed in the unconscious according to the rules of primary process and secondarily revised and censored by secondary process elaboration in the preconscious, he proposed that the dream be considered a compromise formation, similar to any waking thought, demonstrating the combined compromise among id, ego, and superego influences.

Thus, the relative unintelligibility of a dream to the dreamer is not due to the "foreign language" of the unconscious, but can be ascribed to defense—the need to disguise and distort wishes that would otherwise arouse anxiety, guilt, or depressive affect. The special characteristics of the dream as distinguished from other compromise formations derive from a degree of regression and a suspension of certain ego functions (especially reality testing) that accompany sleep. Such a revised view better explains certain aspects of dreams considered exceptions to the old theory and places dreams in the same general framework as other mental phenomena (such as symptoms, fantasies, slips, jokes, etc.), subject to the same general laws and understandable in the same way. Accordingly, it is not the recapturing of the fullest and clearest description of the dream itself which is technically useful, but attention to the way the patient presents the dream, since that best illuminates what the dream means to and tells us about the dreamer.

Dr. Brenner wondered if the overemphasis on dreams was responsible, in fact, for the neglect of the analysis of symptoms, via associations, as a means of understanding unconscious conflict. Symptoms frequently express childhood wishes, or the guilt over these wishes, in a direct and childlike way. By paying careful attention to what precipitates the emergence of a symptom, and what the patient was thinking, feeling, and doing when he or she became aware of it, we can study symptoms in relation to the rest of the patient's compromise formations or character structure. Citing clinical data from several cases to illustrate these points, Dr. Brenner finally cautioned that neither symptoms nor dreams should be treated as being necessarily more important than whatever else a patient might have to say.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Milton Jucovy expressed agreement with the bulk of the presentation but stressed the impact of symbolism, condensation, displacement, and representation by the opposite as additionally contributing to the unintelligibleness of the dream, beyond defense and resistance. He offered a clinical example which demonstrated, he felt, the dream's special ability to express preverbal experiences. Dr. David Milrod contested many of the details of this revision of the dream theory and in general insisted that there was value in adhering to the topographical theory in understanding dreams and other regressed mental operations. He considered Dr. Brenner to have neglected preoedipal and prestructural phenomena in his ideas of neurosogenesis and in his interpretative approach. In general, he felt it was more correct to distinguish dreams from symptoms and to accord the dream a special position in analytic work.

DAVID M. HURST

The 1977 Fall Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held December 14-18, 1977, at the Waldorf-Astoria, New York.