The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego—A Lifetime Later

Alexander Mitscherlich

To cite this article: Alexander Mitscherlich (1978) Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego—A Lifetime Later, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 1-23, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926826

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926826

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

GROUP PSYCHOLOGY AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE EGO— A LIFETIME LATER

BY ALEXANDER MITSCHERLICH, M.D.

In a retrospective evaluation of Freud's essay, the author discusses the formation of emotionally fused mass movements, the implications of drastically changing social patterns and staggering population increases. He sees the critical faculty of the individual ego as the only safeguard against the pull of mass regressions. However, for people long held in subjection, fusion in a common political purpose can constitute a first step toward individual self-awareness, although their leaders may be terrorists, agents of the accumulated aggression. Only the concept of a death drive fully explains the recurrence of mass regression; only the fear of our enormous destructive power may offset its terrible seduction.

The essay I shall discuss in the following pages was, of course, originally written in German. Its title, "Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse," was rendered in English as "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," the German word, "*Massen*-psychologie," being translated as "*Group* Psychology." This translation tends to gloss over the distinction between "mass" and "group," a distinction which I think is important.

A "group" can be made up of a number of people who come together for any purpose at any time, however small the number. By the word "mass," on the other hand, I mean a multitude of people sufficiently large, durable, and unified to exercise a critical gravitational pull on individuals who may be exposed to it. It is mainly to the formation and characteristics

---

Translated by Beverley R. Placzek.

This is a revised version of the Twenty-Sixth Freud Anniversary Lecture presented at the New York Psychoanalytic Society on April 13, 1976.

of the "mass" in this sense that I address myself, and to the effects of its pull on the individual.

Freud's thoughts on mass psychology and the analysis of the ego may today be considered from either one of two perspectives. First, one can ask whether the world around us has changed in any basic way during the time since he wrote and, if so, to what extent. The second question is this: How has our understanding of the world been affected by our increased understanding of ourselves?

That the *world* in this twentieth century of ours has not stood still needs no further comment. But the crucial question remains: Are we better equipped than were our fathers and grandfathers to cope with our own largely unconscious conflicts? And have we thus succeeded in penetrating the motivations that breed affectively charged mass movements—phenomena of enormous significance—beyond what Freud himself has taught us?

It is by no means a sign of naïve hero-worship that now, more than fifty years after it was written, we still consider Freud's essay expressive of present-day positions. In fact, when we first encountered it in the 1920's, we understood only partially what Freud saw so clearly. Only after having lived through the horrors of the Nazi era—when the very things he had described were acted out before our eyes—did we come to a full understanding of his almost prophetic insight. There are, however, many new factors and subsequent developments that must be taken into account.

In the march of world affairs, the most crucial change is the emergence in the past decades of humanity's almost total hegemony over all natural forces. This expropriation has been accomplished with a complete lack of scruples. Biotopes, as age-old functioning forms of coexistence for animal, plant, and human, have been—and are still being—blindly sacrificed to the steam-roller expansion of technological progress. Meanwhile, the fruits of the civilizing pioneer work, which the nineteenth century hailed so enthusiastically, remain far beyond

the reach of millions of people, whose lives are ruled by the most stringent material want.

Speaking of the enormous discrepancy between the rich and the poor, the Hungarian socialist Georg Lukacs (1923) declared: "Mass psychology is nothing but the wishful thinking of the bourgeoisie, which allows it to perpetuate conditions of disorganization among the working classes that it itself constantly renews. At the same time it is an attempt to instill in the oppressed class the belief that this perpetual disorganization is scientifically based" (pp. 248-249).

Whatever one may think of this explanation, one does in fact often wonder why the hardships imposed by a society on so many of its members do not automatically fuse them into a mass, nor even impel them to common action. Wilhelm Reich early drew attention to this anomaly: "When workers who are starving strike for higher wages," he writes, "their action is the direct result of their economic position. The same is true of the starving man who steals. No further psychological reason is needed to explain either the strike or the robbery." And he adds: "It is not *why* the hungry man steals, nor *why* the man who is exploited strikes that needs explanation, but rather why the majority of those who are hungry do *not* steal, and the majority of those who are exploited do not strike" (*cf.*, Kuehnl, 1975, pp. 39-40).

According to Freud (1927), "the identification of the suppressed classes with the class who rules and exploits them is, however, only part of a larger whole. For . . . the suppressed classes can be emotionally attached to their masters; in spite of their hostility to them they may see in them their own ideals; unless such relations of a fundamentally satisfying kind subsisted, it would be impossible to understand how a number of civilizations have survived so long in spite of the justifiable hostility of larger human masses" (p. 13).

This inevitable conditioning of the ruled by their rulers is surely one of the chief reasons for the fact that, where no mass pull is present, the process of change in society is very slow; it is

a step-by-step recognition and opening of the mind of each individual citizen to the possibility of new social interconnections, new orderings of society. We must never forget that the feeling of helplessness—perhaps only a dull feeling of pain connected with everyday experiences that seem unalterable—can change only when the shape of the possible alternative has been formulated in words; only then does it become thinkable and can so spread as a shared hope. Only when a possibility has been seen and named can it become politically effective. The slogan, "Workers of the world, unite," for instance, formulated the idea of a unification with others of like experience and suffering, a unification that would reach beyond the local to the whole world.

It has been said of Freud that he pictured society as nothing more than the sum of individual psychologies and not at all in terms of economic interdependencies. This is an old reproach, and one that is only partially true. Freud measured civilization by the sufferings and demands it imposes on the individual. Now more than ever we need standards that illuminate suffering of this kind to guide us through the ethical chaos of an almost totally success-oriented society. Mass psychology remains largely unexplored by research, and yet—whether its study be fashionable today or not—it may ultimately affect the very future of mankind. In 1921 Freud wrote, "Although group psychology is only in its infancy, it embraces an immense number of separate issues and offers to investigators countless problems which have hitherto not even been properly distinguished from one another" (p. 70). The situation has changed little in the intervening years.

As a political instrument, the masses may be seen either positively or negatively, according to the circumstances and one's point of view. They may be felt as ominous because of their tendency toward irrational ferment, but they can also be seen as the carriers of world-wide revolutionary change.

Since the concept "the masses" is not sharply defined, it might be useful to examine some of the more specific attributes of

classical mass behavior. Let us start with the regressive style, which is credulous, politically unified, and ideologically integrated. Indeed, it is remarkable how accurate the phenomenological description of the nineteenth century French sociologist Gustave Le Bon still is. As Le Bon (1895) recognized, when the masses become ideologized and politicized, they lose sight of the realities of the situation in which they are involved; they overestimate their strength, are greedy for a share in the anticipated distribution of power, and, ruled as they are by prejudice, project their own antisocial tendencies onto fictitious adversaries. Furthermore, they are liable to gross error in assessing the strength of real enemies. They imagine themselves to be all-powerful and experience a vast inflation of narcissistic feeling.

All this Freud taught us to understand. And all this still holds true. But what sets off the chain of motivations underlying these typical patterns of mass behavior? Why does a mass frenzy, a storming of the Bastille, happen at one particular historic instant and not at another? While this may be analyzed retrospectively, it can scarcely ever be precisely predicted. One thing alone is certain: in this development, no single chain of motivation is ever involved alone—neither the economic, working from outside, nor the psychosocial, working from within. Such historic outbursts are produced by both of these and by still other forces working together in extremely complex ways.

In the exchange of letters between Einstein and Freud, Einstein very accurately noted that, rather than the so-called uncultured masses, it is "the so-called 'Intelligentzia' that is most apt to yield to these disastrous collective suggestions . . ." (Freud, 1932, p. 201). In general, it is true that the basic type of politicized, ideologically fixated mass, prone to exaggerated worship of a leader and to blind enthusiasm, is rather repellent to the educated person. But there are, as we all know, many mass situations in which, without any differentiation, educated and uneducated alike come under the sway of a mass leader and his ideas, altering their habits and values accordingly.

The change in the personality of an individual caught up in the tide of a mass movement demanding unqualified submission may take place with lightning speed. In some cases a person can be converted to the slogans of a political mass movement, to a mass faith, in the course of a single well-staged mass spectacle, such as the Nazi party rallies, the *Parteitage*. No further elaborate brain-washing is needed. What happens is this: to share properly in the worship of the leader, to be able to trust his contradictory, often absurd promises, requires a massive regression to a childish belief in the omnipotence of the father that takes place in conjunction with an intense identification of the members of such a mass movement with one another. If the regression is prolonged, it will constitute a major block to any further development in the personality of the individuals involved. The regression is promoted by the huge mass marches and meetings which demonstrate the subordination of the individual to the rules and rituals of the new religion and at the same time promote his sense of omnipotence and self-idealization.

As we have said, mere intellectual training provides no counterweight to the regressive lure of a mass movement. But now, at least, we are no longer uncomprehending spectators at these dangerous outbreaks of collective regression. Freud's work on mass psychology and the analysis of the ego has taught us that *only the strength of the ego* can prevail against the attraction of such mass excitement; that, in fact, our only hope lies in fostering the development of this "Johnny-come-lately" of evolution, the individual ego. Although this psychic capacity is of crucial importance, its composition is difficult to describe precisely. One thing, however, is certain: the strength of the ego is indissolubly bound up with the critical faculty, with the ability to resist overwhelming emotion and to distinguish clearly between the self and the other.

To search for and discover one's own identity is part of the normal process of growth. But it cannot be said of all the people crowding to join a mass movement that each is striving for a new

identity. Some may be permanently out of work, others may feel exploited and discouraged; many are emotionally frustrated and find fulfillment in the service of a leader who promises libidinal and aggressive gratifications. All surrender to a new creed. But this is not a creed that has been arrived at after soul-searching and struggle, quite the reverse: this new truth has enveloped the individual overnight. The new rules, of permission and prohibition, have been slipped on—like a hood over the head.

Naturally, unconscious processes are also at work. The sense of guilt, for instance, must be warded off; individuals deceive themselves, upheld by the certitude of the mass. And here it should be noted that the earlier in life restrictions are imposed on the development of the critical faculty, the more readily will people accept the dictates of the mass. In confronting the seductions of a mass regression, it is this critical faculty, this ability of the ego to appraise reality, that provides the only safeguard for individual identity and character.

With the mention of the restrictions to which the critical faculty, the critical ego, is subjected in the course of development, we raise the whole issue of insufficiently fostered, oppressive, and often distorting socialization. We must never forget that the individual who faces the transforming pull exercised by a mass movement—who yields to it or withstands it—comes to this conflict already bearing the imprint of socialization. The quality of this socialization will weigh heavily in his susceptibility to, or resistance against, mass patterns and in his appraisal of them as desirable or undesirable.

Here I should like to stress that describing only those patterns of mass behavior that have been declared ethically inferior does not exhaust the issue. The range and complexity of attitudes and conduct in mass psychology are such that the term may also encompass praiseworthy mass movements. Do we not all yearn to fight for causes that demand courage and vigilance, against cruelty and injustice? There must surely be some social situations in which, in the service of the ego, we may allow our-

selves to regress into the womb of the mass with relative unconcern. The crucial question is whether the *scope* of the regression can be successfully kept under control.

The Civil Rights Movement in the United States seems, at least in certain respects, to exemplify such a controlled mass movement, one that stays within the context of rationality while retaining some of the fervor and spirit that infuse highly charged mass movements. The regression here is not so drastic, so totally beyond reflection; people surrender to passion, yet still remain capable of an independent appraisal of the real situation and goals. What is more, the leaders of such movements—a Martin Luther King or a Gandhi—are the very opposite of fanatical destroyers, as witness Gandhi's policy of nonviolence, which King espoused.

In observing and describing mass characteristics, Freud (1921, p. 93) points out that there are certain mass formations which he calls "artificial." "Artificial" masses require a certain external coercion if their cohesion is to last. As examples of such artificial masses, Freud cites the army and the church. The members of such masses are kept in a state of perpetual anxious tension, often by the use of elaborate propaganda techniques. We see this, for instance, in military training, in which there is a comprehensive assault on the individual and on what the drill sergeant would call "the civilian slob" in him. By these means, the psychic glue of shared affects is kept from growing cold and losing its force. Freud also notes that the ideas used to achieve this cohesion are interchangeable. Speaking of religious groupings, he says: "If another group tie takes the place of the religious one—and the socialistic tie seems to be succeeding in doing so—then there will be the same intolerance towards outsiders as in the age of the Wars of Religion; and if differences between scientific opinions could ever attain a similar significance for groups, the same result would again be repeated with this new motivation" (p. 99).

Today, masses and mass movements take shape against the background of an unheard-of growth in world population. They

differ from "artificial" masses in that their purpose is not externally imposed. They are, indeed, a correlate of the population explosion and can ultimately make manifest new concentrations of power. Not infrequently, they succeed in breaking through ossified, anachronistic social arrangements and so open the way to new ideals and new concepts of human association.

In her paper, "Crowds and Crisis," Phyllis Greenacre (1972) writes: "In the studies of crowds during the last 100 years, two points of view emerge most clearly. One holds that although crowds show great irrationality, excessive emotion and volatility, with primitive behavior tending toward violence, still they represent a progressive force. According to this theory their very destructiveness is necessary to provide the dissolution of worn out civilizations and permit a new social order to grow up" (p. 152-153). But the social organization and government of these avalanches of humanity is an almost insoluble task. How can differentiated living conditions be created that leave room for individual human growth and variety? The signs of failure are everywhere.

The mammoth institutions that are supposed to solve the technical problems involved in such great numbers of people living together can do so only by a drastic leveling of individuality. Looking up at the façade of a high-rise building, with its grid of hundreds of identical windows—behind each of which we know *people* are living—we are appalled by the anonymity, the uniformity to which individuals must assent in order to earn their daily bread. Such surroundings, of an extent and bleak monotony fundamentally different from anything Freud knew, breed a depressive alienation. It is essential that we learn to recognize the constant stress to which individuals are subjected by a society that is no longer capable of dealing with them as human beings, that is, humanely, and so treats them as objects. This is one of the main sources of the general frustration of which we spoke earlier. It is the contrast between the actual lack of concern for the needs and aspirations of the individual

and the promises held out by a massive, delusional belief in progress which becomes ever more unbearable and which, to quote Bakunin, excites "the lust to destroy."

A growing sense of the meaninglessness of their existence also assails those millions in the more remote parts of the world who—at least for the present—are still in the grip of impotence. The time may not be far off when, united by common past experience, they will break out of their imposed passivity and will band together to form politico-ideological masses, controlled by leaders. And, at least to begin with, these leaders may well be terrorists.

But even if the leader lifted to power by the mass, the leader who catalyzes the mass fusion, is a true revolutionary and the cause a just one, he too may resort to force when faced with political and socio-economic conditions that are unacceptable, conditions that have become unbearable and cannot be altered without overstepping existing laws. Indeed, it is not always possible to distinguish between those misdeeds that are tragically altruistic and those in which, under the guise of altruism, *homo destruens* is pursuing his destructive passion. Murder is unforgivable, even when committed in a just cause. But the unforgivable may also be unavoidable. A grievous sense of the impotence of reason in the face of this agonizing dilemma scarcely ever leaves us.

Hitherto, however, many of the hero-leaders thrown up by the first attempts of populations at self-definition have been the carriers not of a true revolutionary vision but rather of accumulated hatred and frustration. Let us dwell for a moment on those often lonely agents, the perpetrators of terroristic acts. Although it is true that such terrorists are frequently staking their own lives, nonetheless, it cannot be denied that in recent years they have carried on an increasingly successful practice in bomb-setting and murder as agents of the fanatic masses to which they belong. The cynical ruthlessness of these masses becomes frighteningly apparent when, after a successful massacre—often of chance victims—they generously accept responsibility for the

atrocity committed in their name, as though such atrocities could be redeemed so simply. And yet, even behind such utter contempt for human life, there are ideals. And—following the classical pattern—it is these ideals that are used to justify every crime. No adherent dares question them; everything done in their name must be accepted unconditionally, or the questioner becomes an enemy. In truth, these masses are actually conferring absolution upon themselves; the criminal has also become the judge. Among the members of the mass, such sanctioned crimes can be a powerful element of identification, creating a unity that weakens the guilt the crimes evoke. As yet, we do not fully understand the reciprocal reinforcement of motives that occurs between the masses and their representatives, but we do know that ultimately it is this reciprocal reinforcement that creates the consensus in favor of individual and mass crime, held in check by no manifest feelings of guilt. The events in Northern Ireland and in Lebanon provide terrifying demonstrations of this process.

In the developing countries, the sources of violence are not far to seek. In the nineteenth century our fathers and grandfathers, with unflagging greed, created for themselves a prosperity founded on overlordship and exploitation. To be sure, once they had been set free, the oppressed proceeded to repeat exactly what they had learned from their oppressors. This, incidentally, provides an almost textbook instance of identification with a negative model, the aggressor; furthermore, such an identification, because it remains unconscious, cannot be dispelled by learning. Having themselves been insulted and humiliated, the formerly oppressed groups find the same methods of insult and humiliation ready to hand for use against their opponents—and also against their own dissenting minorities or splinter groups. Nowhere within their range of experience is there any model of peaceful, humane conflict solution.

But the release of horrifying cruelty which always seems to accompany a powerful mass regression is not fully explainable

even by the joint urgings of the repetition compulsion and identification with the aggressor. Daily we hear of the ghastly cruelties inflicted on political "enemies" in the name of political "necessity." In some of us this evokes despair, in some apathy—but we are all affected. We feel helpless to combat the outrages committed, because to do so would allegedly be to "interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state." In addition, we ourselves are too splintered and too selfish to unite in bringing aid to the imprisoned and maltreated.

Earlier, I spoke of the terrorists as "agents of mass aggression." The members of Amnesty International—the only organization I know of that is willing to confront this rising tide of human suffering—have, I believe, become the "agents of our conscience."

Now, as we come face to face with the connection between acts of violence and cruelty on the one hand, and moral responsibility on the other, we can no longer evade the concept of a death drive.[1] Freud (1929) describes civilization as "a process in the service of Eros, whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind." "But," he continues, "man's natural aggressive instinct, the hostility of each against all and of all against each, opposes this programme of civilization." It was to explain this dichotomy that he found himself forced to recognize "this aggressive instinct [as] the derivative and main representative of the death instinct . . ." (p. 122). Freud tells us that he adopted this concept into his metapsychology only after long hesitation: "I remember . . . how long it took before I became receptive to it. That others should have shown, and still show, the same attitude of rejection surprises me less" (p. 120).

Although that was written more than fifty years ago, there are still many people who doubt the validity of the concept of a death drive and many who reject it. I do not share this rejection.

[1] This concept must not be confused with other apparently similar ones, such as the ethological concept of Konrad Lorenz (1966).

Why? Mainly because of the endless, compulsively repeated acts of mass destruction, and particularly because these acts have been and continue to be perpetrated within the most variously organized societies. There may have been periods of relative quiet, but none that endured. In spite of the *Pax Romana*, in spite of the commandment to "love they neighbor as thyself," no human civilization has ever led to a definitively peaceful sociality. To deny this periodic deep human dissatisfaction and unrest—which, I believe, goes far beyond anything that might be caused by economic factors—is to fall prey to self-delusion. In contrast, I hold that a ruthless compulsion to repeat is the inescapable unconscious motivation of this periodic return to destruction. Until now, every human civilization has fallen victim to it. I see no reason to believe that ours will be an exception.

Perhaps the one glimmer of hope lies in the sheer enormity of our destructive power. The clear certainty of total annihilation, were this power to be used, might—just might—reinforce the powers of Eros and deflect the implacability of Thanatos.

This may sound ruthlessly pessimistic. But one thing is certain: we shall never achieve adequate protection of the vital requirements of civilization, overshadowed as they are by aggression, if we entrust ourselves to the notion that this human behavior, this aggressive destructiveness, is imposed on mankind by external forces; that if these forces were only appropriately altered, the "original" image of man would emerge, an image naïvely pictured as free of this ceaseless renewal of aggressive energy.

But even if the destructiveness of mankind were not attributable to an instinctual drive, it must at least be seen as growing out of very durable identifications. Identification, as we know, is the oldest form of human interrelation and is a central factor in the building of individual character in all phases of life. However, as I described earlier, when a person gets caught up in the field of force of a fused mass, this gradual continuous process of "maturation" is disrupted by violent incitements to identify

with and introject new objects. Conflicts between the old and the new are resolved by jettisoning the old identifications and patterns of thought in favor of new mass slogans. This abrupt change of identification puts the person under a control alien to himself and leads to that notorious decline in discriminating intelligence which Le Bon called the *"abaissement du niveau mental."* What has already been accomplished within the individual character, all "individual acquirements" are swept aside in favor of mass aims; the individual is deflected from his own aim—that of developing an independent ego—although only a short while before, this had seemed to him and to his society the highest ideal of human maturity. All would have agreed with Goethe that: *"Hoechstes Glueck der Erdenkinder sei nur die Persoenlichkeit."* (The greatest happiness of the children of this earth is personality alone.)[2] This goal—to have a portion of one's personality that is definitively one's own—is surely what Freud (1921, p. 129) had in mind when he spoke of "a scrap of independence and originality"; and it is this which I still feel we must strive to attain.

An essential element of this ego identity is continuity, which forms the basis for critical loyalty in our relations with our fellow human beings as well as for a responsible relation to ourselves. Although Erikson's concept of ego identity may not be as sharply drawn as many of the classical psychoanalytic concepts, it nevertheless refers to an element of continuous self-awareness and self-discovery that is indispensible, particularly in a society in which the ego-structuring forces of tradition are rapidly decaying and the supportive social units of family and

[2] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: *West-oestlicher Divan.*

Volk und Knecht und Ueberwinder,
Sie gestehn zu jeder Zeit:
Hoechstes Glueck der Erdenkinder
Sei nur die Persoenlichkeit

Jedes Leben sei zu fuehren
Wenn man sich nicht selbst vermisst
Alles koenne man verlieren
Wenn man bleibe was man ist.

neighborhood are giving way more and more to mass formations.

Within our lifetime, we have witnessed unconscionable excesses of violence, including two world wars and attempts to exterminate whole populations. This explains why, in our consideration of mass psychology, we are primarily concerned with charged masses, that is, masses that are fused both libidinally and aggressively, are heavily saturated with affect, and are under the control of a leader. In masses of this sort, "the mental superstructure, the development of which in individuals shows such dissimilarities, is removed, and the unconscious foundations, which are similar in everyone, stand exposed to view" (Freud, 1921, p. 74)—and become operative. Personal traits are forced into the background and everyone is "infected" by behavior patterns that are mass-typical.

In the dynamics of the formation of such masses, we are dealing with processes that run counter to the development of individual personality: in the mass, differentiated single individuals present themselves as uniform. They are impelled to seek this uniformity by drive urgings which had previously been excluded from gratification and to which the multitudes of like-minded people now lend support. Religious or pseudoreligious confessions become the prestructuring groundwork for mass emotions. The catchwords roared in unison by a many-thousand-throated human mass, in which each member tunes his voice to the voice of all, resemble the bellowings of some fabulous monster. Indeed, it was the very ease with which individuals could be transformed into a unified mass that led Le Bon (1895, p. 73) to envision mankind as being "in possession of a sort of collective mind."

It was Freud's view that mass formations come into being and are held together by a common love object, the leader, and by the tie created by the common worship of that leader. This brings us to the question: Is a charismatic leader-figure indeed indispensable to the formation of affectively united mass movements? I hold that he is. A charismatically gifted leader will

exploit the historically favorable situation and initiate the process of mass cohesion by inserting his image, his ideals, into the psychic economy of each of his followers in place of the personal ego ideal. This introjection of the leader inflates the self-confidence of the adherents, making them immune to critical objections, particularly when the leader manages to procure step-by-step gratification of their strong libidinal or aggressive-destructive urges.

One aspect of the relation between mass and leader has received relatively little attention, namely, rhythm. Here, too, we see how the grip of an affective mass movement is determined by the charismatic force of the leader and of the inflammatory ideals he represents. These subject the masses alternately to centripetal and centrifugal currents. Centripetally, the masses are convened to share in the unifying cult of the leader. Huge spectacles and mass demonstrations confirm them in their common adoration of him and reinforce their mutual identification in a shared obedience to his directives. When the cult has run its course, the centrifugal phase takes over. The mass, till then centered on the person of the leader, disperses. But not into complete privacy: their new ego ideal makes demands on them—for instance, to carry out a mission of some sort—and it must be obeyed. Periodically, the dispersion is interrupted by a new centripetal phase: before the signs of slackening enthusiasm become visible, the leader once more calls the masses together, preferably in a place already hallowed by the cult. Again his followers can surrender themselves to the intoxicating sense of omnipotence and are again emotionally replenished. Again, their uncritical dependence on the leader is converted into its opposite, as they envision themselves triumphant, going from victory to victory under his banners. Then again follows the loosening, the phase of home missionary assignments. There may even be a dangerous return to the old lifestyle, the old world-view. Internal objections may make themselves felt, objections which the individual, because of fear—of mass and leader—had never dared express aloud,

which had instead been overlaid by white-washing protestations of devotion. Then, once again, the giant rally—and the cycle repeats itself.

The members making up the mass are in a perpetual alternation between surrender to the mass and its blind emotions and separation—even withdrawal—from that mass. This characteristic experientially-bound phenomenon corresponds, I believe, to a rhythm in which the repetition compulsion may well play a part, a rhythm that is immemorial. Throughout the long course of human history, the development of the reflecting ego has come about through a continuous alternation between the tendency to identify with the mass and the opposite tendency to separate from it, through what I would call the perpetual dialectic between individuation on the one hand and "mass-ification" on the other.

In Western civilization, this process of individuation has proceeded so far that "mass-ification"—of the classical type described by Freud, which we have been discussing here—occurs as a regression from a differentiation already achieved. Elsewhere in the world, however, mass formations of a very different type are appearing as a concomitant of the surging increases in world population. Indeed, it is even questionable whether the word "mass" in our sense is appropriate. Whatever we call them, we may be witnessing in them the very first steps on the long road toward full human self-awareness.

Certainly quite different in its basic patterns from the loud, affect-laden style of the European mass is the pathologically rigid behavior of the as yet unformed masses in Latin America, described by Paul Parin (1972). Of these same unformed masses, the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* writes: "The Indians of the Sierra are usually considered hardly capable of development, as well in Bolivia as in Peru and Ecuador, where, in each case, they constitute roughly half the population. Centuries of oppression and dependence have made them docile and apathetic, but in certain situations and with only a small external impetus, they can change overnight."

In all the instances of which we have knowledge, the apathy of unformed masses is little more than a collective consequence of the common impotent submission to an alien anonymous power that blocks all avenues of progress and freedom. In the classic European mass, the weak individual becomes, as it were, the prey of the prepotent leader. In the apathetic masses of Latin America, however, individuals have for centuries been the victims of exploitation and oppression by various ruling castes, in conditions rapidly growing worse as a result of an appalling, unchecked birth rate. Consequently, the defense mechanism of regression has been drastically reinforced in them. For this reason they are unable to learn and, *because* they are unable to learn, they remain—for all their overwhelming numbers—utterly helpless politically. But beneath the blanket of regressive apathy, some capacity for idealizing identification must exist. It is this which expresses itself, in an apparent parallel to what happens in a European mass, when the "lightning change" takes place.

In spite of the apparent similarity, something radically different has, in fact, occurred. Far from involving a diminution or *loss* of identity (a *regression* such as occurs within the individual in the "classical" pattern), for people breaking out of an age-old apathy into some sense of commonality, there is a *gain* in identity, a *progress* toward self-awareness. Although in Latin America, Che Guevara, for instance, failed to fuse these masses into a political instrument, he nevertheless fulfilled a crucial preliminary function: he gave shape to an ideal. As I said earlier, only things that have been expressed—that have been formulated—can be altered. Now, after Che, the take-over of the land, which for centuries had been only a formless yearning, has suddenly become a real and credible aim, one which can arouse emotion and begin the process of fusion in these hitherto unfused apathetic masses.

Mass apathy in the face of alien rulers is not new, nor is it confined to any particular part of the world; it may exist wherever a people has for generations been held in subjection

by foreign overlords. In Sicily, for instance, the native population has for centuries been under the domination of outsiders. Giuseppe di Lampedusa (1960), in his magnificent novel, *The Leopard,* describes what has happened: "All those rulers who landed by main force from every direction, who were at once obeyed, soon detested, and always misunderstood, their only expressions works of art we couldn't understand and taxes which we understood only too well . . . all these things have formed our character, which is thus conditioned by events outside our control" (p. 208). As Lampedusa makes clear, not only have the Sicilians, like the Indians of Latin America, been controlled for centuries by alien rulers, but what is more to the point, they have been alienated from themselves in the process. In consequence of this alienation, they are incapable of identification with the activism of a charismatic leader; theirs remains, rather, a passive admiration for the Mafia-type hero, who has managed to put himself outside the laws of the state and now acts in that free area.

Comparable conditions of impotence, occurring out of a variety of historical circumstances and in various parts of the world, appear to produce unfused masses with important common features: inhibited or blocked learning capacity, apathy, and a certain sense of collective selfhood that differentiates them from their alien rulers. And such masses may be occurring not only in the so-called "underdeveloped" countries. Within our own Western cultures there are phenomena that foreshadow alarming trends. I think, for instance, of the enormous increase in the urge to regression taking place in our society, a regression that is obviously not aiming in the direction of the classical mass solution. On the contrary, the lapse into passivity, into addiction to drugs that cripple activity and produce states of presocial contentment, can and must be seen as a forerunner of the formation of unfused apathetic masses, willing to submit—by withdrawal—to any government whatsoever. No less clear is a massive tolerance of presocial, often criminal heroism, in the style of the Sicilian Mafia and partaking also of projected

aggression comparable to the projection of aggression by nationalist groups onto their terrorist agents.

An analysis of the similarities and differences in the conditions that bring about these various mass formations—an "ethnopsychoanalysis" such as Parin has called for—might establish for us certain crucial insights which, in turn, might help us to deflect some of the most calamitous effects of mass reactions. While it is undeniable that in the last half century psychoanalysis has made significant progress in the understanding of individual ego psychology, the same cannot be claimed for the manifold forms of collective psychology.

"The strength of the ego rests on the reciprocal interaction of personality and social structure"; so said Weinstein and Platt in 1973. Freud recognized this interaction a lifetime ago, but until recently insufficient attention has been paid to it. Only in the last few years has psychoanalytic social psychology come to recognize the fundamental function of society as the organizing matrix of the qualities of the individual.

And now the question looms: Will individuality remain the lodestar of coming eras, as it has been for so long in our culture, or will it be replaced by some other form of human self-perception?

In a little essay which adopts a historical perspective, Herbert Marcuse (1970) speaks of the "obsolescence of the Freudian concept of man." His argument is not that this concept will lose its validity, but that it is being superseded by processes and events within the society over which it has no influence and which constantly attack the sovereignty of the individual, threatening to render his very individualness obsolete. While Marcuse stresses that "that which is obsolete is not, by this token, false" (p. 60), the question that faces us as psychoanalysts is: Will psychoanalysis succeed in defending the "rightness" of the individual—and his individualness?

Among the processes that threaten the individual with obsolescence is the very profound alteration of certain fundamental social patterns: for instance, the importance attached

to sexuality, and to the role of the father. Sexuality has, to use Marcuse's term, been "desublimated" in our "mass-culture" (p. 57). But this "desublimation," far from being the gateway to new freedom, has simply made room for further regression. The role of the father has also changed almost beyond recognition. In its stead we have "permissive education," with all the nefarious effects on superego development that Yela and Henry Lowenfeld (1970) describe. The respectful distance that was heretofore customary between father and child has, within our lifetime, been so greatly reduced as to have almost disappeared. We seem in fact, to be on the brink of what I have elsewhere called a "society without the father" (1969).

A fatherless society is a society traditionally associated in our minds with a lack of initiative and with apathy, one which is deprived of the active enterprising father-figure who has dominated our civilization and whose decline we are undoubtedly witnessing. Where will this decline lead? To what sort of individual development? Has psychoanalysis any understanding to contribute here? Must our individualism, so closely tied to that father-figure, be sacrificed? And if so, what forms of style-creating object relations will make the bureaucratization of the world bearable?

These are dread questions but they cannot be evaded, particularly now when, behind fatherlessness and the growing rejection of all the father stood for, motherlessness, too, threatens to become our fate. What then will the family look like? A family devoid of *any* authority? What then will be the structuring forces in the development of the individual? Or are our efforts to foster these forces related to what has been called by Marcuse "a disappearing form of human existence"?

Certainly, psychoanalysis by itself is not adequately equipped to cope with the problems of this rapidly changing civilization. But around us many of the natural and social sciences offer their new and significant findings for our consideration. They challenge our exploration and our assessment of what is relevant to analytic metapsychology. Indeed, I believe that psycho-

analysis will survive only if, in the future, it devotes the same intensity to grappling with the problems of *cultural* and *mass* psychology as, in the past, it has dedicated to illuminating the problems of the individual. As the populations of the world grow ever larger, these two areas overlap and merge to form an inseparable unity.

Freud saw this unity. And if—as we said at the outset—it took the hideous convulsions of National Socialism and World War II to bring us to a full understanding of his "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego," we cannot but wonder what other of his prophetic insights we will see fulfilled and so come to understand in the future. Psychoanalysis will indeed survive if we continue to trust Freud's insights and remain true to his most challenging hypotheses. Guided by them, we have reached down into the deepest sources of individual motivation. But now—and still under that same guidance—we psychoanalysts must reach out to these other disciplines. Only in this way can we hope to encompass and in some small measure to alleviate the burdens of human existence and contain the scourge of human aggression.

REFERENCES

FREUD (1921): *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego.* Standard Edition, XVIII, pp. 69-143.

——— (1927): *The Future of an Illusion.* Standard Edition, XXI, pp. 5-56.

——— (1929): *Civilization and Its Discontents.* Standard Edition, XXI, pp. 64-145.

——— (1932): *Why War?* Standard Edition, XXII, pp. 199-215.

GREENACRE, P. (1972): Crowds and Crisis. Psychoanalytic Considerations. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XXVII.* New York: Quadrangle Books, pp. 136-155.

KUEHNL, R., Editor (1975): *Texte zur Faschismus-Diskussion.* rororo aktuell, #1834. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowolt-Verlag.

LAMPEDUSA, G. DI (1960): *The Leopard.* New York: Pantheon Books.

LE BON, G. (1895): *La psychologie des foules.* Paris.

LORENZ, K. (1966): *On Aggression.* New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

LOWENFELD, H. and LOWENFELD, Y. (1970): *Our Permissive Society and the Superego. Some Current Thoughts about Freud's Cultural Concepts.* This QUARTERLY, XXXIX, pp. 590-608.

LUKACS, G. (1923): *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. Studien über Marxistische Dialektik*. Quoted from: *Werke*, Band II (Frühschriften II) Neuwied, 1968.

MARCUSE, H. (1970): The Obsolescence of the Freudian Concept of Man. In: *Five Lectures: Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Utopia*. Boston: Beacon Press.

MITSCHERLICH, A. (1969): *Society without the Father. A Contribution to Social Psychology*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.

PARIN, P. (1972): *A Contribution of Ethno-Psychoanalytic Investigation to the Theory of Aggression*. Int. J. Psa., LIII, pp. 251-257.

WEINSTEIN, F. and PLATT, G. M. (1973): *Psychoanalytic Sociology. An Essay on the Interpretation of Historical Data and the Phenomena of Collective Behavior*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press.

Sigmund Freud Institute
Myliusstrasse 20
6 Frankfurt/Main
Germany

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Pyromania and the Primal Scene: A Psychoanalytic Comment on the Work of Yukio Mishima

Jacob A. Arlow

To cite this article: Jacob A. Arlow (1978) Pyromania and the Primal Scene: A Psychoanalytic Comment on the Work of Yukio Mishima, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 24-51, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926827

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926827

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

PYROMANIA AND THE PRIMAL SCENE: A PSYCHOANALYTIC COMMENT ON THE WORK OF YUKIO MISHIMA

BY JACOB A. ARLOW, M.D.

In the writings of the Japanese novelist, Yukio Mishima, primal scene experiences and derivative expressions of them recur persistently. The element of fire figures prominently in connection with the wish to wreak vengeance on the persons originally observed in the act of intercourse. As a destructive, attention-compelling spectacle, fire is a particularly suitable vehicle for this purpose. In Mishima's works, revenge takes the form of retaliation in kind: parental figures, or their surrogates, are put into the position of having to observe the child, or substitutes for him, in the act of sexual infidelity. These observations as well as clinical reports in the literature suggest some insights into fantasies of pyromania. They also make possible certain speculations concerning Mishima's turbulent life and dramatic suicide.

In 1950 in the ancient capital city of Kyoto, a young Zen priest attached to the Kinkakuji, the Temple of the Golden Pavilion, deliberately set fire to that historic structure and burned it to the ground. Set in a tranquil garden at the edge of a reflecting pool, this masterpiece of Buddhist architecture had been revered as a national treasure for more than five hundred years and admired by visitors from all over the world.

According to the newspaper account, this young acolyte, son of a Zen Buddhist priest, had been obsessed with envy of the beauty of the Golden Temple—an envy that could be understood in terms of his extreme ugliness and lifelong stutter. The student had intended to die in the fire, but, losing courage, he

Presented as the Freud Anniversary Lecture of the Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis, May 20, 1975. A version of this paper was published in the Journal of the Japanese Psychoanalytic Association, Vol. XX, No. 5, 1976.

ran from the burning building to a nearby hill and attempted suicide. Failing at this, he gave himself up to the authorities and asked to be punished as he deserved. At the trial, however, he did not regret having burned the temple. He said that he hated his evil, ugly, stuttering self and that this led him to hate anything beautiful. The psychiatrist diagnosed him as a "psychopath of the schizoid type" (Ross, 1959).

This dramatic event intrigued the imagination of one of the most brilliant of Japan's writers, an author of true genius, Yukio Mishima. Six years after the fire, when he was thirty-one, Mishima presented his artistic apprehension of the character of this priest-turned-arsonist. Using only the essential features of the actual incident in a novel entitled *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion* (1956), Mishima created a character at once consistent and believable. He intuited the young priest's motivation for arson and self-destruction in terms of a primal scene trauma, the consequence of having observed his mother having sexual intercourse with his uncle.

This presentation will trace the connection between the primal scene and the act of pyromania in the novel, *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion*. In addition, it will seek to demonstrate how this theme persists and recurs in other works by Mishima. On the basis of this investigation, some speculations about fantasies of pyromania will be offered. Illuminating the nature and role of this persistent fantasy in the life of Mishima, as revealed in his writings, makes possible some tentative hypotheses concerning some of the events in the turbulent life of this most unusual man.

The pathogenic effect of a child's witnessing adult intercourse was described many times in Freud's writings (1900, 1905, 1914, 1925, 1934-1938). Because Freud found that many events in the lives of certain individuals and some of the symptoms and unusual traits of which they complained represented repetitions or derivatives of having witnessed parental intercourse, he referred to this experience as the primal scene.

He felt that observing parental intercourse is traumatic because it evokes overwhelming sexual excitement, which is transformed into anxiety. In addition, the child misinterprets the act of love as a sadomasochistic interaction, thinking that the father is assaulting the mother. The tendency for the child to identify with both parents during the act—a factor of great influence in subsequent fantasy life and character formation—was also noted. Since Freud could not uncover clear evidence that such an event happened in every case, he assumed that through phylogenetic inheritance, children develop such fantasies anyway, i.e., the concept of primal fantasy. On the validity of this latter point, there is considerable disagreement.

The primal scene concept has been invoked to explain the origin of many different types of behavior, so many and so diverse, in fact, that Esman (1973) in a thoughtful and comprehensive critique of the literature was led to say, "One is moved to wonder whether we are here confronted by one of those situations in which a theory, by explaining everything, succeeds in explaining nothing" (p. 65). Many authors, of whom Fenichel (1945) is typical, connect the perversion of voyeurism and voyeuristic activities in general with the primal scene. To these authors, the compulsive need to witness intercourse again and again represents an actively initiated repetition of the experience for the purpose of achieving belated mastery over the original trauma. This is accomplished through the mechanism of transforming a painful experience, passively endured, into an actively induced event under the control of the individual.

According to Esman (1973), Freud's views on the etiological role of the primal scene have been repeated in the literature without challenge. He adduces clinical, anthropological, and sociological observations to indicate that these views require modification:

> Primal scene content, derived either from observation or fantasy, seems to be a universal element in the mental life of postoedipal humans. Evidence that observation of parental intercourse is *per se* traumatic to the child is not convincing;

> certainly, no specific pathological formation can be ascribed to it. The "sadistic conception" of the primal scene . . . appears to be largely, if not entirely, determined by other elements in the parents' behavior—in particular, by the amount of overt violent aggression they exhibit. . . . The child's response to such observations will be determined in a large measure by the cultural setting and emotional set that surrounds him" (p. 76).

The notion that a single event, like the primal scene, could of itself be traumatic seems simplistic and contrary to the dynamic viewpoint of multiply determined etiology in psychoanalysis. This notion probably reflects the lingering influence of an earlier concept of traumatic hysteria (Breuer and Freud, 1893-1895), in which one crucial event was taken to constitute the pathogenic core of the entire structure of a symptom. In clinical experience, it is striking how often the patient does not recall the primal scene. The event has to be reconstructed from compelling evidence gathered in the psychoanalytic situation. In a study of fantasy, memory, and reality testing, in which the primal scene was used as an example, I suggested that what is recalled as the memory of the specific event represents in reality the fusion of many actual events with fantasies that were operative both before and during the primal scene experience (Arlow, 1969). In their recollections, young children are usually not able to distinguish between what they have perceived and what they have fantasied. Later, when a so-called traumatic event is integrated into the organized structure of memory, subsequent events and fantasies, which are thematically related to the original memory, are retrospectively agglomerated and condensed into the memory of the trauma. The primal scene trauma represents a type of memory schema, around which the material related to the individual's crucial oedipal conflict is organized. Edelheit (1967, 1971, 1974) has discussed these and related issues in several studies of the primal scene.

It is frequently the case in psychoanalysis that many things which are well known and widely current do not find propor-

tionate representation in the literature. I suspect that this is true of many of the so-called sequelae of the primal scene in individuals whose analytic material and life style are organized around primal scene memory schemata. In such patients, a very common and prominent response is a sense of deep narcissistic mortification, a wounding of the self-esteem, often leading to the conviction that they are unloved and unlovable. It is incorporated into an all-pervasive feeling of oedipal defeat. The disappointed child feels betrayed and despairs of ever finding true love and happiness. In boys, this may be one determinant for the need to degrade the love object (Freud, 1912); in girls, for prostitution fantasies. The little boy often ascribes the fact that he had to play the role of observer rather than participant in the primal scene to his phallic inferiority. He feels he was not as successful as his adult rival because he was not as attractive: he was too weak and small. In reaction to this sense of phallic humiliation, the boy may entertain grandiose, phallic, narcissistic aspirations of an exhibitionistic nature. Related to these wishes are various fantasies of stealing the omnipotent phallus, devouring it, and making it his own.

Perhaps insufficient attention has been drawn to the element of narcissistic rage as a consequence of the primal scene experience. Although most of the hostility may be directed against the parent of the same sex, both parents are held accountable, giving rise in the child to a wish to wreak vengeance on both in destructive fantasies that often take on an oral character.

Of the many forms which this wish for vengeance may take, I would like to call attention to one particular kind, because it is very common, often overlooked, and offers an understanding of certain kinds of repetitious behavior growing out of the primal scene. An understanding of this type of vengeance illuminates many of the repetitive patterns of behavior related to the primal scene, without invoking the concept of mastery by active repetition, and makes it possible, instead, to understand these phenomena in terms of motivations observable in the clinical setting. It offers what Waelder (1962) called an explanation at

the level of clinical generalization, rather than at the level of metapsychology.

Some years back, I described what I consider a typical dream, that is, a dream of relatively uniform manifest content with a constant latent meaning (Arlow, 1961). In this type of dream, the patient is in the act of defecating when suddenly this private activity is transformed into a public spectacle. This may happen in many ways: someone may intrude into the bathroom; the door of the cubicle may disappear; a hitherto unnoticed window may materialize in the bathroom and throngs of people pass by and observe the dreamer in the act of defecating—to the surprise of the dreamer; or the dreamer may find himself in some outrageously public situation being observed by all. Associations to this type of dream lead regularly not only to the primal scene, but to a specific set of unconscious wishes as well. Analysis of the structure of such dreams is particularly instructive. These dreams constitute a regressive representation of the primal scene, in which the act of defecation has replaced intercourse. There is, however, an important transposition of roles. In the original experience, the child was the pained and humiliated observer, while his parents engaged in an act of instinctual gratification. In the typical dream, the dreamer is at the center of the stage—engaging in an act of instinctual gratification—while others are cast in the role of the humiliated, defeated observers. The dream fulfills a wish to avenge oneself on the parents by exchanging roles. It inflicts punishment in kind. During the analysis of the transference of such patients, it often happens that they leave the bathroom door unlocked, unconsciously arranging for the analyst or some patient to walk in upon them. In actual life, they frequently arrange to be observed in sexual situations, or leave revealing, telltale information sure to humiliate the discoverer for whom it was intended.

Clinical experience shows that the primal scene does not always come as a surprise to children. Often, they seek it out, either to gratify curiosity about sexual activity or to disturb

the parents during the act. If children cannot be participants themselves, they can at least prevent their parents from having their pleasure. Freud (1914) noted how often the need to defecate appears in connection with the primal scene.

Reference has been made to the intense oral rage aroused in the child against both parents in the primal scene. Lewin (1950, 1968) connected this theme with his concept of the oral triad. In a regressive way, the child interprets the primal scene in oral terms, conceiving the experience as a form of mutual cannibalism or reciprocal suckling. Lewin traced various types of insomnia to the experience of being awakened by parental intercourse. This insomnia, in turn, may be equated with the wakefulness of the unfed baby. In any event, the primal scene, said Lewin, is often the event which is reproduced in adult depression and elation. It disturbs the child's sleep, leading to a wish to return to sleep, to deepen sleep, and to stay asleep—sometimes forever. Anna Freud (1946) noted that regression from oedipal anxiety to earlier pregenital levels leads to the concept of parental intercourse by mouth.

The relevance of these themes in the writings of Yukio Mishima is clear and unmistakable. Let us consider first *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion* (1956). This book is written in an autobiographical style, as if the author were the arsonist. The central figure of the novel is Mizoguchi, a puny, ugly boy who stutters. Taunted by his peers, he feels unattractive and unlovable. He envies a handsome upper classmate who possesses an excellent athletic physique and a handsome sword. At an opportune time, he seeks out the sword and defaces the scabbard. Immediately afterward, in a spirit of free association, he says, "All of a sudden, my memory alights on a tragic incident in our village."

The incident concerns a beautiful neighbor, Uiko, a girl older than himself, with whom he is enamored. One night, during the war, waking from sleep with lustful thoughts of Uiko, Mizoguchi decides to surprise her as she bicycles home from

work. He hides in the dark beneath a tree and springs in front of her as she passes. Frightened and angry, Uiko exclaims, "What an extraordinary thing to do—and you only a stutterer!" Mizoguchi is crushed. He is further enraged when his uncle, having heard of the incident from Uiko, scolds him. "I cursed Uiko and came to wish for her death and, a few months later, my curse was realized."

Once again, Mizoguchi is awakened from sleep; this time by the sounds of commotion in the streets. Uiko has been arrested by the police and charged with concealing her lover, a deserter from the army. Under pressure, she leads the police to a nearby temple where her lover is hiding. Betrayed by Uiko, the soldier—before the horrified eyes of Mizoguchi and the villagers—kills her with his pistol and then commits suicide.

Before his death, Mizoguchi's father entrusts him to the care of Father Dosen at the Golden Temple. The Superior of the temple, Father Dosen accepts Mizoguchi as an acolyte. Mizoguchi has a premonition that the United States air raids will destroy the temple. His secret dream is that all Kyoto will burn. Again, to this thought he associates "an episode that took place in Kyoto toward the end of the war. It was something quite unbelievable." In the company of a friend, he comes upon an astonishingly beautiful young woman, dressed in traditional ceremonial robes. She is preparing tea in a secluded pagoda of the Nansen Temple where she is meeting her soldier-lover to say farewell before he leaves for the front. Hidden from view in this idyllic setting, Mizoguchi observes the lovers' embrace. The young woman then takes her breast from her kimono, squeezes some milk into a cup and offers it to her lover to drink. Watching the woman, Mizoguchi says, "I felt that this woman was no other than Uiko who had been brought back to life."

On the anniversary of his father's death, Mizoguchi is reluctant to return home to say the traditional prayers, because he hates his mother and wants nothing to do with her. "There is a special reason that I have, until now, avoided writing about my mother . . . . Concerning a certain incident, I never addressed

a single word of reproof to mother . . . . Mother probably did not even realize that I knew about it, but ever since that incident occurred, I could not bring myself to forgive her." The incident is a primal scene trauma. Mizoguchi refers to witnessing his mother having intercourse with an uncle who was visiting. He awakens from sleep, noticing an abnormal swelling in the mosquito netting about his mother. The netting seems to shake in the wind. The father, dying of tuberculosis, feigns sleep and tries to shield the boy's eyes from his mother's infidelity. In a hyperbole of denial, Mizoguchi comments, "But as far as mother was concerned, apart from the fact that I could not forgive her that memory, I never once thought of avenging myself on her."

Mother soon adds insult to injury. She sells the father's land, and when Mizoguchi mentions that he might be called into the army, his mother, after the fashion of Uiko, says, "If they start taking stutterers like you into the army, then Japan is really finished."

Immediately following this recollection, Mizoguchi feels that if there were no chance of the Golden Pavilion's being destroyed, he would have lost his purpose in living. Clearly, the impulse to punish his mother had become the center of his life and had assumed the form of wishing to destroy the Golden Pavilion. The identification of the woman and her breasts with the temple is explicit in many places in the book and illuminates the difficulties Mizoguchi encounters when he first attempts intercourse. At the moment when he is about to have relations, a vision of the Golden Temple appears before his eyes and he is unable to continue; he loses his erection. Even when the beautiful girl whom he had seen at the Nansen Temple later offers her breasts to him—as earlier she had done to her soldier-lover—Mizoguchi thinks, "Beauty comes too late for me." The Golden Temple appears before his eyes. It keeps changing back and forth into a vision of the girl's breasts. Mizoguchi leaves her.[1]

[1] This self-defeating form of vengeance is not an uncommon factor in the etiology of certain types of masochism.

While pondering the meaning of the Buddhist *koan*—"When you meet the Buddha, kill the Buddha. When you meet your ancestor, kill him! When you meet your mother and your father, kill them! Only thus will ye attain deliverance"—Mizoguchi's resolve to burn the temple takes definite shape. He attempts intercourse with several other women, but on each occasion a vision of the temple appears and makes it impossible for him to perform sexually. Each woman he associates with the betraying Uiko, a clear substitute for his mother.

The next crisis in the book is a repetition of a derivative of the primal scene. Wandering through the entertainment section of Kyoto, Mizoguchi comes upon the Father Superior of the temple in the company of a notorious geisha. "Unwittingly" he intrudes upon their intimacy and compounds the embarrassment by laughing inappropriately. Some time later, in a provocative, self-destructive gesture, he presents the Father Superior with a newspaper into which he has slipped a large photograph of the geisha. Now Mizoguchi knows that his mother's hope for him to succeed Father Dosen as the Superior of the temple can never be realized. From that point on, his moral decline is precipitous. He neglects his studies and dissipates the tuition money given him by the temple; he runs away, is discovered and returned to the temple where his mother humiliates him once again by slapping him in public.

Once he begins to make definite preparations to set fire to the temple, Mizoguchi feels liberated. Now when he goes to the prostitute, he finds that the vision of the temple no longer plagues him: he is potent and well satisfied. He thinks: "Did he want to lose his virginity so that he could burn the Temple or did he want to burn the Temple so that he could lose his virginity?"

When Mizoguchi finally gets to the burning of the temple, he is temporarily delayed by an aged priest who is using the water-closet. He intends to use his luggage and bundles of straw to start the fire, but somehow the *mosquito netting* seems best for the purpose—it is the most inflammable of all the objects. He stretches the mosquito netting over the rest of the

luggage and as he sets fire to it, he is aware of overwhelming hunger.[2] The *koan* of killing one's ancestors comes to his mind. As the flames spring up, they puff out the mosquito netting (just as the wind had puffed it out in the original primal scene experience); everything about him suddenly seems alive. As he runs away from the fire, the burning timbers sound like the cracking of people's joints. At the end of the book, Mizoguchi is watching the fire from atop a nearby hill. He reaches into his pocket and lights a cigarette, feeling like a man who settles down for a smoke after a job well done.

The connection between primal scene derivatives and fire runs through much of Mishima's work. The sense of shock and betrayal from witnessing a loved one having sexual relations becomes the basic motivation of the characters around whom the plots revolve. Vengeance in the form of unconscious, destructive oral trends predominates. In the illustrations to follow, it will not be possible to present in detail the many elaborations of the central theme and thereby do justice to the richness of the evidence, but even the brief summaries will demonstrate how the primal scene dominates Mishima's fantasy life, as expressed in his writings.

Thirst for Love (1950) was published one year after *Confessions of a Mask,* which was Mishima's first novel, clearly autobiographical in nature. The principal character of *Thirst for Love* is Etsuko. As she approaches the crematorium with the body of her recently deceased husband, Etsuko ponders, "I have not come to cremate my husband, but to cremate my jealousy." Some time earlier, she had found on her husband's desk evidence of his many sexual infidelities. Apparently, he had deliberately placed the evidence there for her to find. During his fatal illness, she had been humiliated by having to sit by and observe a succession of his mistresses come to visit. The rest of the book concerns her obsessive love for a much younger man, who she feels has betrayed her. The book reaches its

[2] For the connection between burning and devouring, see Arlow (1955).

climax in a midnight assignation scene, arranged by Etsuko, in which she accuses the young man in these words:

> I wanted to let you know the pain you are all-knowingly causing me, and felt I had to cause you to experience the same degree of unbearable agony. You can't imagine how much I suffered. I wish I could have taken that pain from my heart and placed it alongside the pain you are feeling now. Then we would know which is worse. I even lost control of myself and deliberately *burned my hand in the fire.* Look. I did this because of you. This burn was for you (p. 165, italics added).

At this point, Etsuko's aged father-in-law, whose mistress she had become, awakens to find that she has left his bed. After checking at the young man's bedroom, he appears on the scene in the garden, as the young man, goaded by Etsuko's accusations, attempts to rape her. The young man makes no effort to flee, nor does the father-in-law do anything to reproach him. At this point, Etsuko seizes a mattock and kills the young man.

The most varied elaboration of primal scene vengeance is to be found in a novel written in two parts during the years 1951 and 1953, published in English translation under the title, *Forbidden Colors.* There are two central figures who actually represent aspects of one character: one is an aging novelist; the other, a young man of ambiguous sexual identity who has been hired by the novelist to serve as his alter ego. The novelist, loathed and betrayed by women, has also been rejected by his mother because he is ugly. His writing habits are identical to those of Mishima: he works throughout the night in his upstairs study, sleeping in the early morning. One night, on sudden impulse, he decides to break off his writing and go to the bedroom to surprise his wife. She is not there. Eventually, in the dim light of the early dawn he finds his way to the kitchen where, unnoticed, he observes his wife and the milkman in conversation. It is clear that they have been lovers for a long time. As he watches, the milkman makes love to his wife, specifically performing cunnilingus.

The novelist finds Yuichi, a young man of surpassing beauty, irresistible to both men and women. He agrees to finance the young man's education, marriage, and subsequent career—if Yuichi will be the willing instrument in his plan for vengeance upon women. He says, "First, you are the most beautiful youth in the world. When I was young, I always wanted to be what you are. Secondly, you do not love women . . . . Please live my youth again in another way. In short, be my son and avenge me."

With almost infinite variations, the rest of the novel represents the realization and partial miscarriage of this plan. Yuichi succeeds in seducing and injuring all the women who had humiliated the novelist, and more. The pattern of injury is almost always the same. The enthralled woman is made to witness Yuichi's infidelity to her; even Yuichi's mother and wife are not spared. To their pain, even they have spread out before them the full revelation of his sexual misconduct with men as well as women. Having been initiated by the novelist into a career of arousing jealousy and betraying his victims, Yuichi becomes increasingly corrupt and dissolute and, in the end, ensnares the novelist himself.

One particular episode of vengeance is so patent and naïve a fulfillment of a typical wish derived from the primal scene that it must be mentioned. Yuichi seduces a haughty young woman who had spurned the novelist. He takes her to a hotel room and gets her drunk. When she falls asleep, he leaves and, according to the plan, the novelist takes Yuichi's place in bed with the woman. The novelist has intercourse with her. In the morning, she is surprised and humbled by the deception.

The principal affair of the novel involves Mrs. Kaburagi, who is more than old enough to be Yuichi's mother. She is explicitly described by Mishima as the mother-prostitute. (Yuichi's identification with the mother-prostitute is also clear throughout the book.) The affair culminates in several primal scene repetitions, all of them humiliating to Mrs. Kaburagi. The novelist intrudes upon her privacy with Yuichi, and Yuichi arranges for Mrs.

Kaburagi to observe him having sexual relations with her husband.

The element of fire recurs throughout the book. Whenever Yuichi feels a surge of sexual excitement, he thinks of fire and sometimes hears the sound of fire sirens. He often dreams of fire sirens. On their honeymoon, Yuichi and his wife use a telescope to watch a young couple embrace. As they move the telescope, they see a large fire in the distance. On five or six different occasions in the book, usually at turning points in one of Yuichi's affairs, he observes a fire. Once, while having intercourse with Mrs. Kaburagi, he is distracted by the sound of fire engines. He leaves her, goes to the fireplace, and idly stirs the coals. It sounds to him as if he were stirring bones. In the next to the last scene in the novel, Yuichi is strolling down the Ginza and is caught up in a crowd watching a fire. The sight of the firemen "gambling against death seems to strike the hearts of the crowd with a pleasure not unlike that lewd one." (Thus, fire is equated with sexual intercourse.) The crowd is carried away by its excitement. A plate-glass window is shattered and, underfoot, Yuichi notices that the crowd has trampled on some balloons. A sandal is sloshed about like a bit of flotsam. "The extraordinary energy of the mob scene . . . has stirred in him an inexplicable excitement. Since he had no place to go, Yuichi walked for a time and finally went into a theater that was showing a movie he did not especially want to see." (The relationship between spectacles on screen and stage and the primal scene is well documented in the literature.) Only one episode remains to complete the book: the novelist commits suicide, having made Yuichi his heir.

More chilling in its stark and brutal simplicity is the story of *The Sailor Who Fell from Grace with the Sea* (1963), a novel several critics have compared with Golding's *Lord of the Flies.* As is customary with Mishima, he indicates the main theme of the novel in the first few pages of the book. Noboru is a young teenager living with his attractive, widowed mother. Because he has been keeping bad company, she puts him to bed early and

locks him in his room. As she does so, she thinks: "What would happen if there were a fire—if the door warped in the heat or paint clogged the keyhole, and the door could not be opened?" Left alone, Noboru discovers that by removing the bottom drawer of a built-in dresser, he can look through the ceiling into his mother's bedroom. He begins to spy on her, watching her undressing and masturbating. When she takes the sailor as her lover, he watches them having intercourse. "They clutched at each other and collided in frenzied, awkward movements like beasts in the forest lunging at a ring of fire."

Noboru resents the sailor and shares his hostility with the members of his gang. They are united in their hatred of fathers. One says that "fathers are filthy, lecherous flies who broadcast to the world that they've screwed with our mothers." Another complains that his father won't buy him an air rifle, and a third says that his father is always coming home drunk and bullying his mother. "When I stood up for her one time, he got white as a sheet and grinned and said, 'Keep out of this. You want to take away your mother's pleasure?' "

In a scene reminiscent of primitive initiation ceremonies, Noboru kills a cat which the gang proceeds to dissect. The act of killing makes him feel powerful—as if he had achieved true manhood. As he watches the glistening viscera emerge from the belly, he thinks of the nakedness of the sailor and his mother in sexual embrace. (Throughout Mishima's writing, intercourse is associated with death, and the postcoital partners are described as corpses.)

Shortly after the mother and the sailor decide to marry, they discover that Noboru has been peeping at them. The mother surprises him and humiliates him by beating him for the first time in his life. The sailor, on the other hand, is conciliatory. But Noboru's pride is hurt, especially now, as the sailor is beginning to call him "son."

The gang now decides to have a sacrifice of human blood—and the sailor is the designated victim. Noboru leads him to the gang's hiding place and serves the sailor tea which has been

drugged. In anticipation of what they intend to do, the boys begin to tease the sailor. They grab his cap and play with it. Mishima describes the cap as having become an "exorbitant firebrand, lighting the way to eternity." The sailor begins to lose consciousness, as the gang begins to put on rubber gloves and prepares the surgical instruments for the ritual murder and dissection.

Similar themes recur in Mishima's (1957) Nō plays and in his short stories. In *Sotoba Komachi,* the Old Woman who is the central figure of the play disturbs several couples who are making love in the park. A young Poet enters and is caught up in the throes of a romantic fantasy of having been in love with the Old Woman a generation earlier. After this brief, romantic interlude, he falls dead at her feet. A Policeman comes upon the scene. The Old Woman says that the Poet was making sexual advances. Suddenly the Policeman calls out to some men, "You there—you're not allowed to make bonfires in the park! Come here! I've got something for you to do." Another Nō play, *Cantan,* deals with the love of a young man for an older woman—his former nurse. He reminds her of the loving care she showed him in a house that burned down. The short story, "The Three Million Yen" (Mishima, 1953), concerns a frugal, affectionate married couple who are saving their money in order to afford a house and a child. In the end, we learn that they make their living by performing sexual intercourse at private parties. In the same collection of short stories, the theme of betrayal is elaborated in "Thermos Bottle" and "Dojoji." In the former, a man betrayed by his mistress comes home and finds he has been betrayed by his wife. In the latter, the lover—caught *in flagrante*—is killed by the irate husband.

The four-volume cycle, *The Sea of Fertility* (1968b, 1969, 1970a, 1970b), was Mishima's literary testament, a retrospective summary of his life, beginning in a mood of lyrical romanticism and culminating in disillusion and despair. The character who serves as the unifying thread of the narrative is Honda, a lawyer—as Mishima had been. By the third volume, entitled

The Temple of Dawn, he is an aging man, a voyeur addicted to peeping at couples having intercourse in the park. In the wall of the library of his summer home, he has arranged a peephole which opens into the guest room. For motives not immediately connected with the theme of this presentation, Honda is interested in a young Thai princess. He arranges with a young man to seduce the princess in the guest room while he watches. The plan, however, fails. The princess repulses the young man and takes refuge with a friend of Honda's, an aging lesbian. Some time later, Honda observes the princess and the lesbian in the guest room, having sexual relations. That night a fire breaks out in the summer house, and it burns to the ground. The princess disappears during the course of the excitement, and for a while one is led to believe that she may have perished in the flames. This turns out to be untrue. But several years later, Honda learns from her twin sister that the princess had died two years after the fire—from a snakebite.

It would be possible to cite additional evidence of the themes we have been considering from other works by Mishima, but I think there is sufficient material to say that the primal scene and derivative representations of it constitute a significant and repetitive element in Mishima's writing and, accordingly, one must conclude in his fantasy life. Three responses to the primal scene seem to be prominent: first, the primal scene is experienced as a humiliating defeat leading to a wish to retaliate in kind; second, one observes the evocation of tremendous destructive rage against one or both parents; and third, the primal scene is symbolically represented by the element of fire or is screened off by memories of fire. The fire is also a vehicle for the oral destructive wishes against one or both parents, expressing primitive unconscious fantasies of devouring, consuming, and incorporating. Because of its great power to destroy, fire lends itself readily as a vehicle to gratify sadistic impulses used to redress grievances from whatever source. The literature on firesetting is full of case reports of fires set for the purpose of

revenge (Karpman, 1954; Lewis and Yarnell, 1951; Macht and Mack, 1968; Podolsky, 1953; Stekel, 1922).

The fact that fire can create a compelling spectacle of mounting intensity and excitement, one that can get out of control, is particularly appealing to some individuals bent on destructive revenge originating in a primal scene trauma. Both sexual and aggressive impulses are projected onto the fire, which comes to serve as a symbol and a screen for the original experience or fantasy. In one of the few well-documented case reports of pyromania treated from the psychoanalytic point of view, Karpman (1954) furnished a striking illustration of some of these dynamic elements. Shortly after receiving a letter from his fiancée announcing that she is going to marry someone else, Karpman's patient, a soldier at the front, saw a village go up in flames. In the smoke he saw a vision of his fiancée. Years later, when frustrated or angry over some disappointment, he would set a fire in order to see once again the image of his fiancée going up in smoke. The report, unfortunately, has no record of the infantile conflicts, except for some references to fears of devouring or being devoured.[3]

In a case reported elsewhere (Arlow, 1977), a memory of a fire in which several people were killed served to screen off a primal scene experience that aroused murderous wishes against both parents, particularly the mother. During childhood, the patient had a recurrent dream in which he saw his home burned to the ground. In the dream, he realized with great sadness that his mother had died. As a child, he set fire to a backyard rubbish heap where he had seen a young boy making sexual advances to a girl.

[3] Axberger (1973), in a paper on arson in literature, called attention to how the themes of fire-setting and incest recur in most of the major works of the American poet, Robinson Jeffers. In almost all the instances he cited, moreover, the fire was set out of vengeance by a humiliated lover who had just witnessed an act of sexual betrayal involving the incestuously loved object. Axberger speculated, as did Lewis and Yarnell (1951), that Jeffers and other authors could have become fire-setters were it not for the sublimation of this trend made possible by creative writing.

Most of the early literature emphasized the element of urethral erotism in relation to fire and fire-setting (Freud, 1931; Michaels, 1954; Simmel, 1949; Stekel, 1922). More recent reports are less definite in this regard. Grinstein (1952) noted that fire may symbolize libidinal impulses from all levels of psychosexual development. From my clinical observations, I have noted how often the element of fire in dreams, fantasies, and memories may represent oral wishes, erotic and aggressive, active and passive (Arlow, 1955).

Almansi (1954) has developed this theme in connection with religious rituals. Because Mishima's imagination was rich in elaborately detailed, exquisitely ritualized fantasies of sacrifice, cannibalism, and drinking blood *(Confessions of a Mask),* I will quote at length a relevant passage from my paper on fire and oral symbolism (1955):

> In religious ritual, consigning the sacrificial animal to the fire on the altar is suggested as representing a communal re-enactment of the elements of the totem feast. Permission to kill and devour the totem animal is granted to the priest and through symbolic identification with him the members of the group unconsciously gratify their parricidal and cannibalistic wishes. In ancient religions the priests had the prerogative of eating the flesh of the animals sacrificed as burnt offerings. By the independent but complementary transformation of the aim and the object . . . the fiery sacrifice of the animal evolves into the sacrament of communion. The flesh and blood of the animal are replaced by more remote representatives of the human body, namely, the wafer and the wine, but the element of devouring, heretofore distorted by the act of burning, re-emerges undisguised in the oral incorporation of the host in the sacrament of communion. In funeral rites, the ritual pyre and cremation may be interpreted, as is burial in the earth, as a re-entry into the immortality of the womb; in the former instance, however, the route of oral ingestion is represented by burning (p. 70).

As we have seen, the equation of burning with oral destruction is indisputable in three of Mishima's novels *(The Temple*

of the Golden Pavilion, Forbidden Colors, and *The Temple of Dawn).* Writing to his mentor, Shimizu, toward the end of World War II, Mishima described in the following terms his pleasure at watching Tokyo burn: "The air raids on the distant metropolis, which I watched from the shelter of the arsenal, were beautiful. The flames seemed to hue to all colors of the rainbow; it was like watching the light of a distant bonfire at a great *banquet* of extravagant death and destruction" (Nathan, 1974, p. 58, italics added).[4]

Edelheit (1967, 1971, 1974) has paid particular attention to how the primal scene is symbolically portrayed in fantasy, literature, art, and mythology. He sees the figure of Christ nailed to the cross as representing the parents superimposed and united during intercourse. Crucifixion fantasies in our culture, he maintains, are the most common, though far from the only, symbolic representation of the primal scene. Edelheit mentioned several alternative expressions of the primal scene, including bullfight fantasies which are particularly suitable because of the marked ambiguity with regard to the roles of victim and aggressor in the classic bullfight. Some additional clinical alternates for crucifixion fantasies include Joan of Arc at the stake, Prometheus, the binding of Isaac by Abraham, and the story of Judith and Holofernes. Mishima's (1953) classic short story, "Patriotism," is especially pertinent. A young bride—and through her, the reader—is placed in the position of having to watch in horror as her husband commits *seppuku.* The act is described in meticulous and gruesome detail, reminiscent of the dissection of the cat in *The Sailor Who Fell from Grace with the Sea.* If we use Edelheit's concept, the ritualized *seppuku* in "Patriotism" can be regarded as a dis-

[4] Stekel (1922) described the masturbation fantasies of two patients who had the impulse to set fires. In the case of a man suffering from impotence, Stekel traced this difficulty to the patient's having observed his parents during intercourse in a room they had shared since the patient was three years old. It is not my intention, however, to suggest that primal scene pathology is involved in all cases of fire-setting.

guised representation of the primal scene that the woman is vengefully forced to observe.

Having established the importance of the primal scene motifs of fire and revenge in the works of Yukio Mishima, let us turn to the dramatic events in the life of this young genius.

Mishima's career was meteoric and dazzling. In approximately twenty-five years, he produced no fewer than twenty-three novels, more than forty plays, almost one hundred short stories, and several volumes of poetry, essays, and travel literature. He had, in fact, been considered for the Nobel Prize in Literature when, apparently in consideration of his youth, the committee passed over him in favor of his countryman and mentor, Kawabata. In addition, he had appeared in several stage productions, had directed and starred in films, was recognized throughout the world as one of Japan's outstanding writers, and was richly rewarded financially.

Kimitake Hiraoka (Mishima is a pen name) was born in 1925. His lineage was mixed. His mother's family were middle-class scholars. On his father's side, the grandfather came from peasant stock, but the grandmother was from a noble family. Mishima's childhood was, to say the least, unusual. He was only a few weeks old when his irascible, domineering, neurotic grandmother took possession of him; she raised him at her bedside in her sickroom until he was twelve years old. The baby's mother was summoned from the upstairs apartment by a bell to nurse her child for a carefully measured number of minutes. She was allowed to walk him and was later given permission to escort him to and from school. The regimen imposed by the grandmother was overprotective and emasculating. Mishima was not allowed to play with boys, run about, or make noise. Even brandishing a ruler in childish imitation of sword-play was prohibited. To make matters worse, he was a puny, sickly, unattractive child. At the age of four, he almost died of an illness diagnosed as "auto-intoxication." For years after, at monthly intervals, the symptoms recurred in attenuated form. In addition, he suffered from anemia and attacks of respiratory illness (Nathan, 1974; Scott-Stokes, 1974).

In *Confessions of a Mask* (1949), an astonishingly revealing autobiographical novel and Mishima's first major success, he described how he envied the beautiful physique of the outstanding athlete at school. His fantasies of attaining his ideal of masculine perfection by murdering and devouring a beautiful youth are described in this book in connection with the struggle against his emerging homosexuality. His fantasy life was indeed bizarre, perverse, and grisly, with detailed descriptions of ritual slaughter, cannibalism, drinking blood, and a wide range of sadomasochistic images.

In these fantasies, Mishima cast himself in both the active and passive roles. These trends had been adumbrated by an earlier preoccupation with the idea of noble, violent death in battle and by fairy tales of sadomasochistic content. He related how he was enamored of the picture of a beautiful youth in armor, only to be shocked when he learned from his nurse that the youth was not a boy but a girl—Joan of Arc.[5] When he was twelve, Mishima came upon a picture of St. Sebastian bound to a tree, his body pierced by two lone arrows. "The arrows have *eaten* into the tense, fragrant youthful flesh and are about to consume his body from within with *flames* of supreme agony and ecstasy" (*Confessions of a Mask*, 1949, pp. 39-40, italics added). The image of the bound martyr aroused within the young Mishima a surge of sexual passion that culminated in his first experience of masturbation and ejaculation. For some time thereafter, the image of St. Sebastian or some alternative expression of the same idea played a central role in his erotic fantasies. He also composed a prose poem about St. Sebastian. Until the age of nine, Mishima indulged in transvestite play. In his adult years, he became fanatically dedicated to body-building through weight lifting and Kendo, the classical form

[5] Bisexual identity, so clear in his own life and in the hero of *Forbidden Colors*, also pervades his final work, *The Sea of Fertility*. In Volume II, *Runaway Horses* (1969), Isao, the leader of an abortive youth rebellion, shortly before he commits *seppuku*, has a dream in which he sees himself as a woman in a sexual situation. It is also noteworthy that in the next volume, Isao is reincarnated as a woman, the Thai princess who has a lesbian relationship which Honda, the hero, observes through a peephole the evening his house burns down.

of Japanese fencing. The florid psychopathology depicted in this autobiographical novel needs much fuller discussion than is possible here.

After a poor start, Mishima turned into a brilliant student, graduating first in his class from the ultra-elitist Peers School in 1944. Receiving the prize from the Emperor on that occasion was one of the high points in Mishima's life. At his father's insistence, he took a degree in law at the Imperial University in Tokyo. His father, a staunch admirer of the Nazis, despised writing, considering it a profession for degenerate, weakling intellectuals. His mother, to whom he was devoted, supported Mishima in his literary ambitions, and he read to her every page of his writings. After one year in government service, Mishima resigned in order to write full time. Within a few years, he was an acknowledged figure in the rising generation of postwar writers. For all his many interests and talents, he was a disciplined worker; no matter what he might be doing earlier in the evening, shortly after midnight he returned to his study and wrote all night, sleeping during the early morning hours. (He had been a poor sleeper as a child. The anticipation of any exciting event made him insomniac.)

To date, two biographies about Mishima have appeared in English. Both begin with his death—and for good reason. Spectacular though the burning of the Golden Temple may have been, it pales to dull grey when compared to the awesome way in which Mishima ended his life in November 1970. On the morning of that fateful day, having completed the final page of the manuscript of his masterpiece, *The Sea of Fertility,* and after leaving detailed instructions for settling his affairs, Mishima—accompanied by four young students from a private and miniscule *opéra bouffe* army he had recruited—drove to the headquarters of the Eastern Army at Ichigaya, gained entrance to the office of the commanding general and, by threatening him with a sword, received permission to address the garrison. He harangued the soldiers to rise up in revolt and to follow him in restoring the Imperial prerogative. The

soldiers jeered and mocked him. Rebuked and humiliated by the crowd, he left the balcony, returned to the general's office where, with the aid of his accomplices, he carried out the plan they had agreed upon in advance. He disemboweled himself in the traditional *seppuku* ritual and was decapitated by his assistants. Like the Golden Temple, his career ended in a spectacle of horror.

Earlier in this paper, I called attention to the fact that Mishima regularly associated intercourse with the idea of dying and being put to death. Almost without fail, he described lovers after intercourse as corpses. If we add to these observations Edelheit's interpretation of crucifixion and binding fantasies, it becomes possible to illuminate certain aspects of Mishima's life and work. Viewed as an expression of a primal scene fantasy, the story of Judith and Holofernes suggests a deeper understanding of the manner of Mishima's death. He elected to be decapitated by Morita, his favorite disciple and—according to one biographer (Scott-Stokes, 1974, pp. 303-305)—his homosexual lover. The act of execution thus became an act of love and, in Tarachow's (1960) terms, Morita was assigned the role of the beloved executioner.[6] Accordingly, the dramatic public *seppuku* and decapitation of November 1970 may be interpreted as a spectacular, grandiose acting out of a sadomasochistically conceived, homosexually elaborated primal scene fantasy.

In this light, it becomes possible to correlate two major trends in the fantasy life of Mishima. The themes of betrayal, revenge, and destruction by fire have already been related to the primal scene. Now Mishima's preoccupation with crucifixion, murder, theater, binding, and ritualized cannibalism can

[6] The situation is a striking, acted out parallel to Tarachow's (1960) interpretation of the relationship between Jesus and Judas. In his paper, "Judas, the Beloved Executioner," Tarachow sees Jesus "as the willing victim, offering himself in love to be killed and eaten by the Jews, and by Judas in particular. Judas is pictured as loving Jesus and as being burdened by Jesus with the load of aggression, by the invitation to be the lover and ritual executioner. . . . Surrender in love is equated with being killed and eaten" (p. 551).

also be included under the same unifying rubric, i.e., the concept of the primal scene.

In the case of Mishima, private fantasy and literary imagination ultimately cross over into real life. He was a man of action par excellence, a showman who delighted in and was, perhaps, compelled to create spectacles, a man who acted out his fantasy life. According to Fenichel (1945), this is a feature characteristic of individuals traumatized by the primal scene. A few examples will illustrate how Mishima tended to act out his fantasies. His fascination with the image of St. Sebastian has already been noted. Four years before his death, he posed for a photograph of himself as St. Sebastian, hands bound, his body pierced with arrows, blood dripping from the wounds. In 1968, he completed *Runaway Horses,* a novel about a futile, immature, right-wing revolutionary group of youngsters under the leadership of an older officer. The hero commits suicide at the end of the book by *seppuku*. That same year, Mishima founded a secret, private, right-wing army of young students; he was its leader and the only adult. In the end, he lived out the main elements of the novel. In *Confessions of a Mask,* he related his fantasy of drinking the blood of a ceremonially sacrificed youth. In 1967, when he inaugurated his private army at a blood-oath ceremony, each member of the group dripped his blood into the cup until it was full. After they signed their names in blood, Mishima suggested that they drink it. "He picked up the glass and asked, 'Is anyone here ill? None of you have VD?' He called for a salt cellar and flavored the cup; then he drank from it" (Scott-Stokes, 1974, p. 242).

How and why the primal scene came to play so important a role in the works and life of Yukio Mishima is hard to know.[7]

[7] Primal scene experiences must be very common in the crowded conditions of Japanese life. This study deals with how the primal scene dominated Mishima's imagination and thought. Discussion of the complex cultural, political, and historical determinants belong to scholars who are more conversant than I in the realities of Japanese life and traditions. The dominant primal scene fantasy in Mishima's life and work would only illuminate how this inner need predisposed him to make use of a specific cultural and historical tradition as a vehicle with

There are many possibilities, but I will refrain from speculating at this time. In summary, however, it seems clear that his literary works are dominated by a primal scene fantasy. Various elaborations of the fundamental fantasy can be inferred. One set of elaborations was the theme of murderous oral revenge against the humiliating parental figures or their surrogates. It would seem that the aggressive oral wishes associated with this type of elaboration were transformed into fantasies of fire-setting and burning. This theme found sublimated expression in his literary creations. The other principal elaboration went in the direction of sadomasochistic trends. For many years, it would seem, they too were constrained more or less by the sublimation made possible by his literary genius.[8]

In the end, however, the compulsion to act out disemboweling fantasies proved uncontrollable, and Mishima shocked the world in what was probably one of the most bizarre suicides of modern times. In his death, he unconsciously achieved the suicide-murder that Mizoguchi had planned when he set fire to the Golden Pavilion. He brought down upon himself the burning oral rage of the retribution he intended for the principals of the primal scene.

REFERENCES

ALMANSI, R. J. (1954): *A Further Contribution to the Psychoanalytic Interpretation of the Menorah.* J. Hillside Hospital, III, pp. 3-18.

ARLOW, J. A. (1955): *Notes on Oral Symbolism.* This QUARTERLY, XXIV, pp. 63-74.

——— (1961): *A Typical Dream.* J. Hillside Hospital, X, pp. 154-158.

——— (1969): *Fantasy, Memory, and Reality Testing.* This QUARTERLY, XXXVIII, pp. 28-51.

——— (1977): *Revenge Motif of the Primal Scene.* Unpublished.

AXBERGER, G. (1973): *Arson and Fiction: A Cross-Disciplinary Study.* Psychiatry, XXXVI, pp. 244-265.

which to express his own inner needs. A parallel study from the historical point of view on how traditional factors contributed to the culmination of Mishima's career in the political act of self-destruction was recently presented by Morris (1975).

[8] According to one biographer (Scott-Stokes, 1974), Mishima was the only major modern Japanese writer to concern himself with *seppuku.*

BREUER, J. and FREUD (1893-1895): *Studies on Hysteria*. Standard Edition, II.

EDELHEIT, H. (1967): Discussion of A. J. Lubin's *The Influence of the Russian Orthodox Church on Freud's Wolf-Man: A Hypothesis*. Psa. Forum, II, pp. 165-166.

——— (1971): Mythopoiesis and the Primal Scene. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society, Vol. V*. Edited by W. Muensterberger and A. Esman. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 212-233.

——— (1974): *Crucifixion Fantasies and Their Relation to the Primal Scene*. Int. J. Psa., LV, 193-199.

ESMAN, A. H. (1973): The Primal Scene: A Review and a Reconsideration. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XXVIII*. New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 49-81.

FENICHEL, O. (1945): *The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

FREUD, A. (1946): The Psychoanalytic Study of Infantile Feeding Disturbances. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. II*. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 119-132.

FREUD (1900): *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Standard Edition, IV/V.

——— (1905): *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*. Standard Edition, VII, pp. 130-243.

——— (1912): *The Universal Tendency to Debasement in the Sphere of Love*. Standard Edition, XI, pp. 179-190.

——— (1914): *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis*. Standard Edition, XVII, pp. 7-122.

——— (1925): *Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes*. Standard Edition, XIX, pp. 248-258.

——— (1931): *The Acquisition and Control of Fire*. Standard Edition, XXII, pp. 187-193.

——— (1934-1938): *Moses and Monotheism*. Standard Edition, XXIII, pp. 7-137.

GRINSTEIN, A. (1952): *Stages in the Development of Control over Fire*. Int. J. Psa., XXXIII, pp. 416-420.

KARPMAN, B. (1954): *A Case of Fulminating Pyromania*. J. Nerv. and Ment. Dis., CXIX, pp. 205-232.

LEWIN, B. D. (1950): *The Psychoanalysis of Elation*. New York: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc., 1961.

——— (1968): *The Image and the Past*. New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

LEWIS, N. D. and YARNELL, H. (1951): *Pathological Firesetting (Pyromania)*. Nervous and Mental Disease Monograph No. 82. New York and Washington D.C.: Nervous and Mental Diseases Publ. Co.

MACHT, L. B., and MACK, J. E. (1968): *Firesetter Syndrome*. Psychiatry, XXXI, pp. 277-288.

MICHAELS, J. J. (1954): *Disorders of Character. Persistent Enuresis, Juvenile Delinquency and Psychopathic Personality*. J. Nerv. and Ment. Dis., CXX, pp. 408-410.

MISHIMA, Y. (1949): *Confessions of a Mask*. Translated by M. Weatherby. New York: New Directions Publ., 1958.

——— (1950): *Thirst for Love*. Translated by A. H. Marks. New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1971.

——— (1951-1953): *Forbidden Colors*. Translated by A. H. Marks. New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1974.

——— (1953): *Death in Midsummer and Other Stories*. Translated by D. Keene, I. Morris, J. Sargent, E. Seidensteiker. New York: New Directions Publ., 1966.

——— (1956): *The Temple of the Golden Pavilion*. Translated by I. Morris. Berkley Publishing Corp., 1971.

——— (1957): *Five Modern Nō Plays*. Translated by D. Keene. New York: Vintage Books.

——— (1963): *The Sailor Who Fell from Grace with the Sea*. Translated by J. Nathan. New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1976.

——— (1968a): *Sun and Steel*. Translated by J. Bester. New York: Grove Press.

——— (1968b): *Spring Snow*. Translated by M. Gallagher. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

——— (1969): *Runaway Horses*. Translated by M. Gallagher. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973.

——— (1970a): *The Temple of Dawn*. Translated by E. D. Saunders and C. S. Segile. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1973.

——— (1970b): *The Decay of the Angel*. Translated by E. Seidensteiker. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1974.

MORRIS, I. (1975): *The Mobility of Failure*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.

NATHAN, J. (1974): *Mishima. A Biography*. Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown, & Co.

PODOLSKY, E. (1953): *The Mind of the Pyromaniac*. Indian Medical Record, LXXIII, pp. 240-243.

ROSS, N. W. (1959): Introduction to *The Temple of The Golden Pavilion*. New York: Berkley Publishing Corp., 1971.

SCOTT-STOKES, H. (1974): *The Life and Death of Yukio Mishima*. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux.

SIMMEL, E. (1949): Incendiarism. In: *Searchlights on Delinquency*. Edited by K. R. Eissler. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 90-101.

STEKEL, W. (1922): *Peculiarities of Behavior: Wandering Mania, Dipsomania, Cleptomania, Pyromania and Allied Impulsive Acts*. New York: Boni & Liveright, 1924.

TARACHOW, S. (1960): *Judas, The Beloved Executioner*. This QUARTERLY, XXIX, pp. 528-554.

WAELDER, R. (1962): Review of *Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method and Philosophy*. Edited by S. Hook. J. Amer. Psa. Assn., X, pp. 617-637.

---

120 West 59th St.
New York, N.Y. 10019

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Ego Function Assessment of the Psychoanalytic Process

Vernon Sharp & Leopold Bellak

To cite this article: Vernon Sharp & Leopold Bellak (1978) Ego Function Assessment of the Psychoanalytic Process, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 52-72, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926828

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926828

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

EGO FUNCTION ASSESSMENT OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS

BY VERNON SHARP, M.D. and LEOPOLD BELLAK, M.D.

Pressing needs for objective and rapid clinical assessment of the psychoanalytic process are emerging in the current climate of social and medical change. The Ego Function Assessment (EFA) method is presented as an available, valid, and reliable quantitative technique which can be used by clinicians for such objective evaluations. EFA formulations are dynamically highly relevant. They are directly derived from psychoanalytic theory and practice.

In the current climate of social, medical, and psychiatric change, objective and rapid clinical assessment of the ongoing psychoanalytic process has become increasingly vital for a variety of pressing reasons. These include analytic education, supervision, research, third party inquiries, and peer review.

At least two factors make psychoanalytic clinical assessment unique. First, more than anyone else in the healing professions, analysts are reluctant to invade the privacy of the patient-doctor relationship, since it is fundamental and crucial to the treatment process. Second, the psychoanalytic appraisal of the patient's progress in treatment involves great difficulties because of the complex variables involved, far beyond manifest symptomatology.

The need for systematic assessment of psychoanalytic patients has been noted and responded to by others. Notably, Greenspan and Cullander described an excellent systematic metapsychological scheme for the assessment of analyzability (1973) and another for the assessment of the course of an analysis (1975). Regrettably, their scheme is not presented in a form to permit quantification readily enough to provide a basis for interrater reliability and validity. Some of their verbal statements could easily be translated into numerical ones in the future, but

whether their scheme can attain statistically desirable characteristics has yet to be demonstrated.

A method described by Endicott et al. (1976) as the Global Assessment Scale attempts to measure over-all severity of psychiatric disturbance. They based their ratings, in essence, on a list of symptoms. In their study, three groups were inpatients and the subjects in the fourth group were seen at an aftercare clinic—that is, they had been inpatients. The reliability of the GAS for this sample appears quite satisfactory. The authors discuss some reasons for technical doubts about the validity of their data. Be that as it may, the nature of their sample involved a symptomatology of inpatients much more severe than psychoanalysts are likely to find in their patients. The more subtle the symptomatology, the more difficult it is to make discriminatory judgments. Even more critical for psychoanalytic assessment is the fact that a scale using only *symptoms* as criterion measures lacks meaning in a psychoanalytic, psychodynamic way.[1]

The strength of the method suggested in this paper, Ego Function Assessment (EFA), lies precisely in the fact that it constitutes a bridge between descriptive psychiatry and the dynamic propositions of psychoanalysis (*cf.*, Strauss, 1975). It not only lends itself to operational definition and statistical study but can in fact now be related to an existing body of data with demonstrable reliability and validity. Independent observers have been shown to achieve high agreement on the status of the ego functions of a patient (Bellak, et al., 1973; Ciompi, et al., 1976; Milkman and Frosch, 1977). Ego functions have been carefully defined in previous research by Bellak, Hurvich and Gediman (1973). From this work, an interview guide and scoring manual have been developed covering basic concepts readily familiar to all psychoanalysts. For experienced

[1] The GAS was used last year by the Assessment Committee of the American Psychoanalytic Association. According to Dr. Robert L. Spitzer and Dr. Daniel Shapiro, head of that committee, the sensitivity of GAS in that study is still being assessed.

clinicians these materials need only serve as a systematic frame of reference.

In reporting ego functions to a committee or any third party, virtually nothing of personal significance or intimate meaning in the life of the patient is revealed. Scores on ego functions are highly impersonal matters, and yet to the expert they relate precisely to the complexities of psychoanalytic theory and practice and to the functioning of a person in treatment. The method is therefore suggested as a rapid, reliable, and global approach to the clinical assessment of the analytic process.

SYSTEMATIC EGO FUNCTION ASSESSMENT

A systematic technique for the evaluation of ego functions was previously developed by Bellak, Hurvich and Gediman (1973) in a different context. A large research study of five years' duration concerned itself with the definition and rating of ego functions in such a way that clinicians serving as independent raters could agree to a statistically acceptable degree on the rating of twelve ego functions on either a seven-point scale or a thirteen-point scale. Superego and drive factors were also rated but were not statistically studied because of practical limitations (such as computer time) at the end of the study. In order to arrive at these ego functions, the research team listened to dozens of recorded interviews. Each clinician then listed ego functions that could be discerned and rated. After arriving independently at a list of functions and their ratings, the researchers had long discussions in which differences and agreements were assessed. It was by this laborious process that we finally arrived at twelve ego functions—and their components—which we felt were both necessary and sufficient to describe a person. The sample included schizophrenics, neurotics, and normals—or as we came to call them, community representatives. After that list was completed (including superego evalu-

ation and drive assessment), we began the laborious process of finding out whether independent raters could achieve the same ratings. With these ratings, it was hoped that they could clearly differentiate people who had been diagnosed independently by others by means of their complaints and their life history. It took considerable time for members of the research team to listen to the same tape and arrive at similar ratings. In this case "similar" means that correlation coefficients should be statistically acceptable—a way of saying that the percentage of agreement was high, with each other and with the diagnoses made independently by clinicians not part of the research team.

This process continues at present. Other researchers are using the scheme, and Bellak, working with a new team, is attempting to broaden the sample and make EFA easier and more practical.

The following table lists the twelve ego functions in our assessment scheme and their components.

EGO FUNCTION	COMPONENTS
1. Reality testing	a. Distinction between inner and outer stimuli b. Accuracy of perception c. Reflective awareness and inner reality testing
2. Judgment	a. Anticipation of consequences b. Manifestation of this anticipation in behavior c. Emotional appropriateness of this anticipation
3. Sense of reality	a. Extent of derealization b. Extent of depersonalization c. Self-identity and self-esteem d. Clarity of boundaries between self and world

EGO FUNCTION	COMPONENTS
4. Regulation and control of drives, affects, and impulses	a. Directness of impulse expression b. Effectiveness of delay mechanisms
5. Object relations	a. Degree and kind of relatedness b. Primitivity (narcissistic attachment or symbiotic object choices) versus maturity c. Degree to which others are perceived independently of oneself d. Object constancy
6. Thought processes	a. Memory, concentration, and attention b. Ability to conceptualize c. Primary-secondary process
7. Adaptive regression in the service of the ego (ARISE)	a. Regressive relaxation of cognitive acuity b. New configurations
8. Defensive functioning	a. Weakness or obtrusiveness of defenses b. Success and failure of defenses
9. Stimulus barrier	a. Threshold for stimuli b. Effectiveness of management of excessive stimulus input
10. Autonomous functioning	a. Degree of freedom from impairment of primary autonomy apparatuses b. Degree of freedom from impairment of secondary autonomy
11. Synthetic-integrative functioning	a. Degree of reconciliation of incongruities b. Degree of active relating together of events

EGO FUNCTION	COMPONENTS
12. Mastery-competence	a. Competence. How well subject actually performs in relation to his capacity to interact with and actively master and affect his environment. b. The subjective role, or subject's feelings of competence with respect to actively mastering and affecting his environment. c. The degree of discrepancy between component a and component b (i.e., between actual competence and sense of competence).

These ego functions and their relationship to the analytic process have been further described by Bellak and Meyers (1975). A broader scope for EFA was described by Bellak & Sheehy (1976).

Figure 1 shows the basic rating form and the approximate range of normality, neuroses (and equivalent character disorders), borderline conditions, and psychoses.[2]

ASSESSMENT OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC PROCESS

In collaborative work, the authors have used the EFA method to continuously monitor the progress of two patients seen simultaneously in supervised analyses. The determination of EFA's at regular intervals has not only introduced a desirable element of precision into the ongoing analytic work, but has also provided a broad overview of specific trends in treatment and a focus for predicting future trends. In addition, this process

[2] The graphs are reproduced by permission of John Wiley & Sons, Inc., from Bellak, Hurvich and Gediman: *Ego Functions in Schizophrenics, Neurotics, and Normals*; copyright © 1973 by C.P.S., Inc.



Figure 1

Ego Function Rating Form

has made possible the planning of future treatment goals in a flexible and methodical way.

In the two case histories below, each patient entered treatment during a developmental crisis: late adolescence in the first and a mid-life crisis in the second *(cf.,* Jaques, 1965). Both were seen four times weekly, using the couch.

Case Histories

Patient A, a twenty-two-year-old, bright, active, single female college graduate, entered analysis complaining of mild depression, problems with interpersonal relationships, and a generalized feeling of loss of purpose in her life. She had done well in college but had maintained a symbiotic tie to her mother through daily phone calls from her college in the mid-West to her parent's home on the East Coast. In her interpersonal relationships she was passive, compliant, and emotionally distant.

Following the death of her mother during her third year of college, the patient took a college-sponsored trip to France where she began to use a variety of drugs and engaged in a series of sexual affairs, all new activities for her. During this time, she experienced no conscious grief over the death of her mother. Following her return to college for her senior year, she experienced a number of troublesome but not disabling symptoms, for which she sought and received group and once-weekly individual therapy. After graduation, although she had planned to be a guidance counselor, she took a job as a trainee in a large advertising agency. At this point she sought analysis, in part because other members of her family had been in analytic treatment.

Patient B is a thirty-nine-year-old, successful attorney. He has been married fourteen years and has two daughters. He sought analysis on the advice of his internist when he complained of moderate depression, generalized feelings of dissatisfaction, and superficiality in his interpersonal relationships, especially with his children and his wife. He had not had sexual relations with his wife for months and was considering divorce. He said that although he had attained all the hallmarks of social and professional success, he felt he was "only going through the motions." A trial period of analysis was begun. It soon emerged that the patient was constantly preoccupied with the details of an incident that had occurred in the course of a long-standing love affair with his secretary: a casual sexual contact the secretary had had with a stranger at a time when the patient

had been out of town and the relationship had deteriorated. During the analysis, it became clear that the patient's painful preoccupations, feelings of rage, deep distrust, and periodic punitive retaliation toward this woman were highly overdetermined and related specifically to childhood abandonments.

The patient had been abandoned by his natural father before his birth, and he had seen this man on only three occasions in early childhood. For the first four years of his life, he was reared by his mother and another woman, a warm, interested person whom the mother had taken into the apartment as a boarder. When the patient was four, however, the mother suddenly remarried, and at the insistence of the new husband, the patient was sent to a distant city to be raised by his maternal grandparents. He saw little of his natural mother thereafter. As with the first patient, there was little evidence of overt grief following parental abandonment.

Both patients were evaluated at the beginning of analysis using the EFA method (see Figures 2 and 3).

Both patients have undergone periods of crisis, depending on vicissitudes in environmental stress and the analytic work. For example, Patient A went through a suicidal period shortly after the third anniversary of her mother's death. During this time, conflicts over dependent needs were in the forefront of the analysis, and her self-esteem was at a profoundly low ebb. On one occasion, she became suicidal following an hour in which her anger over the analyst's fees began to emerge but was not sufficiently worked through because of an intervening weekend. At the same time, her confused relationships with several young men had taken a turn for the worse, and she had recently been promoted to a position of increased responsibility at her job, a change about which she was ambivalent. The regressive movement of her ego functions under the combined pressures of internal conflict and external stress can be seen in Figure 4.

Having the scheme of ego functions clearly in mind was helpful to the supervised therapist in assessing his countertrans-



Figure 2

Patient A. Onset of Analysis



Figure 3

Patient B. Onset of Analysis



Figure 4

Patient A. Rating during a Suicidal Crisis

ference responses during such stormy periods in the course of treatment. In this instance, the trainee was able to correlate the precise changes in the patient's manifest anxiety and altered ego functions with his own perceived anxiety, altered perceptiveness, and therapeutic effectiveness, a process which was

quite valuable in the supervision. The systematic use of EFA's in the training of analysts and other therapists has yet to be explored.

Figure 5 illustrates an increase in the ego functioning capacity of patient B during an episode of especially strong



Figure 5

Patient B. Rating during a Positive Transference Episode

positive transference. This event occurred six months after the analysis had begun. The patient had received a substantial raise in salary and for the first time in his life felt financially secure. However, he was experiencing great pressure to terminate the analysis. He was profoundly doubtful about his work and about his relationships with women and with his male superiors; he wished to withdraw from them all because he felt dangerously overinvolved. Underlying these currents of feeling was an increased sense of comfort and closeness with the therapist, which was being vigorously denied. In spite of his previous accomplishments in the analytic work and his improved financial status, he professed an inability to pay for further treatment, claiming it was an unbearable financial burden. In addition, he felt frustrated in the analysis and was deeply resistant to free associating.

Nevertheless, as work continued over several sessions, he began to perceive his pervasive distancing in all previous relationships, his fears of emotional closeness and terror of abandonment, and finally his sense of never having experienced secure parenting, only a succession of "guardians," from whom he felt no direction or depth of commitment. During a particular hour the following dialogue occurred:

Patient: While my grandparents were bringing me up, I ran away from their apartment several times. I didn't really want to leave; just wanted to get my way, which I always did. They couldn't handle me. I always did what I wanted to do. They were older and I could always persuade or manipulate them. [pause] . . . and yet I guess I really wanted them not to give in so easily. I needed some kind of direction, a commitment from them, like a stamp of approval.

Therapist: Do you want me to tell you not to stop the analysis?

Patient: Yes, I think I do. Yes, I'm sure of it.

Therapist: If I'm really interested in you and care about your well-being, I won't let you run away?

Patient: Yes, that's it. I'd already decided to continue therapy, but I wanted you to affirm my decision, give it a stamp of approval.

Therapist: You wanted me to be a stronger parent and give you directions . . . . not let you do self-defeating things.

Patient: Yes, I wanted you to sense that, without my having to tell you. I couldn't say it outright, but I guess I was testing for some kind of commitment from you. I've been constantly looking for okays all my life.

Therapist: At the same time that you're terrified of getting attached to somebody.

Patient: Yes, I've had just as much trouble with that in here with you as I have with people outside.

Therapist: In quitting the analysis you'd be reliving the same scenario as when you were a little kid . . . by running away.

Patient: Sure.

Therapist: Well, I don't think you should stop now and I strongly recommend that you don't. As you've already said, there still remains a lot to do in our work here.

In the next hours, he began to say that he had hit on something vitally important to him. He had begun to feel quite good and self-confident. He had started to feel a new level of being close to people. At the same time, he felt himself losing the need to be superficially close to too many people at once. He was feeling more in charge of his life at work, at home, and in his other relationships. In relations with his superiors he felt his frustration and anger subsiding and the pressure to withdraw from them diminishing. He experienced an increase of concern and caring for his wife and a renewed closeness to his children. In another area, he reported that for the first time he was not embarrassed by the emotionality of the Italian singing waiters at a night club where he'd taken a client.

Although many ambivalent feelings regarding the continuing

love affair with his secretary remained, he experienced a reduced sense of urgency to either fire her or obtain a divorce from his wife—a prominent feature in his original complaints. Finally, there occurred a renewed commitment to the analysis and a marked reduction in his resistance to free association. These changes are charted in Figure 5.

EXAMPLES OF SCORING EGO FUNCTIONS

In this section the use of the scoring manual for rating individual ego functions will be illustrated. The manual contains extensive descriptions of clinical status for each of the thirteen numerical stops.

For example, at the outset of analysis (Figure 2), Patient B was highly dependent on praise and compliments from clients, employees, and the community. He worked in many ways to obtain this feedback and was quite successful at it. Yet he often felt out of place, undeserving, and "phony." He was overly sensitive to criticism from superiors and often felt demeaned by them. Under stop 7 of Ego Function III (Sense of Reality of The Self and The World) is the following description: ". . . role-playing at identity rather than experiencing it from within. Often feels humiliated. Sometimes [Subject is] dependent on external feedback to maintain identity." During the episode of positive transference, Patient B was rated at stop 9: "More . . . stable identity, self-image, and self-esteem noted here. There are signs of an independent sense of self with a moderately good sense of inner identity continuity, and internalized self-representation."

In contrast was Patient A, who had ingested two hundred milligrams of secobarbital during her suicidal crisis on the anniversary of her mother's death. Her father and step-mother were out of town, and she was alone in her apartment. She felt strangely empty inside herself and began to experience a global floating feeling of being inside her mother's body. At the same time, important living people seemed very distant, like small

statues or dwarfs. Previously, she had gone to her old home searching for a picture of her mother, but had been unable to find one because her step-mother had disposed of them all. She felt everything had been changed in a bizarre way. She returned to her apartment feeling totally alone and enraged at her father and step-mother. As the medication took effect she had a dreamy fantasy that by taking the whole bottle of secobarbital capsules she could blend and merge with her mother, each being inside the other's body. She thought of a male friend who had committed suicide with sleeping pills and envied the clever way he had done it. She repeatedly looked in her mirror and saw her mother's face.

She wanted to die, yet restrained herself by thinking how embarrassed she would be if she failed to kill herself. All of this was related in the next hour in a calm and accepting manner.

This transient episode was rated at stop 1 under Sense of Reality of The Self and The World: "Surrounding people and things feel unreal, changed in appearance, as though they weren't there . . . . Very slight environmental changes may produce strange sensations. There may be oceanic feelings of nothingness, feeling dead, inanimate, selfless. Parts of the body feel unreal . . . . Feeling literally or physically empty inside . . . . May experience states of extreme fusion or merging with others, suggesting near-total loss of boundaries between the self and the outside world. At this stop body boundaries may be extremely fluid and vulnerable." The patient's report of seeing her mother's face in her mirror had a nightmare-like quality about it, yet was quite ego-syntonic to the patient.

Further Clinical Use of EFA

Using simpler definitions of the scale stops of the twelve ego functions, Ciompi, et al. (1976) at the University of Lausanne were able to rate patients in fifteen to twenty minutes, based upon their clinical knowledge of each patient. After further refining their modified EFA method, they tested its reliability,

using two psychoanalysts as independent raters. They achieved very satisfactory coefficients of correlation in a sample of one hundred patients. Finally, they demonstrated their ability to assess strength and weakness of ego functions of a patient in psychoanalysis by presenting two EFA profiles taken a year apart (Figure 6).[3] Their data, showing marked improvement in most of the ego functions, supplement our own assessment of the psychoanalytic process with more extensive statistical material and a wider temporal spread of observation.

DISCUSSION

The evaluation of the psychoanalytic process would greatly benefit from the use of EFAs. In practice, a patient in treatment with one analyst could be interviewed at any time by another analyst and both analysts could make their independent ego function ratings. If there were two peers evaluating a third one's patient, they could "conference" their findings and report agreed-upon ratings, as a basis for comparison with those of the treating analyst. Conferencing of findings is an accepted method among researchers. Utilizing this method of objective evaluation would further protect the treating analyst from arbitrary or poor rating.

In turn, it would be quite feasible, after independent ratings, for the treating analyst and the evaluating analysts to conference their separate assessments. This procedure would bring to the analytic situation the often-missed richness of shared observations which play so constructive a role in other forms of medical practice and progress.

In addition, the EFA approach to clinical assessment would make it possible to report behavioral operational concepts to interested nonanalytic audiences, such as general psychiatrists, county medical societies, insurance companies, etc. Reporting findings to such nonanalytic third parties would have the advantage of protecting the privacy of the patient: quantitative

[3] Figure 6 is reproduced by the permission of the authors.



..... First Evaluation, May 25, 1975
Mean 7.8 points

——— Second Evaluation, June 6, 1976
Mean 9.7 points

Figure 6

Analytic Patient (Ciompi, et al.)

statements about a patient's ego functions do not have the emotional charge of intimate life history data. Furthermore, concepts like reality testing, judgment, and impulse control, as well as the majority of the other functions, are more readily intelligible to nonpsychoanalysts than other subtleties of psychoanalytic conceptualization.

Another advantage consists of the global inclusiveness of EFA's as opposed to the exclusiveness of diagnostic labels, which could be avoided entirely.

The recent establishment of the Research Foundation of the American Psychoanalytic Association strongly relates to the thrust of new interest in clinical analytic research, an area in which Ego Function Assessment holds great promise. Although these assessment procedures might create temporary distracting effects in the treatment, these are likely to be outweighed by the benefits of periodic consultation and sharing of observations.

There are additional unique problems inherent in assessing the analytic process. Informed allowances must be made for the downward fluctuation in ego functions as normal variables in treatment (see Patient A above). Indeed the proper assessment of the normal regression, for example, of autonomous and synthetic ego functions in the course of any successful analysis, poses particular problems in the assessment of all clinical data.

SUMMARY

The current climate of social and medical change has brought about the need for clinical validity, accuracy, and speed in the assessment of psychoanalytic treatment and patient response. Peer review, insurance and other third party inquiries, analytic education and research, all require objective evaluation of the analytic process.

Ego Function Assessment (EFA) is presented as a reliable and easily applied quantitative method of psychoanalytic evaluation. EFA procedures are directly derived from psychoanalytic theory and clinically grounded in psychoanalytic practice. These proce-

dures are described and their uses with patients in analysis are detailed. Two case histories are presented and examples are given of specific changes in ego functions during clinical crises in the treatment.

EFA is a dynamically sophisticated, easily applied approach to psychoanalytic assessment. Its applicability to a variety of current analytic problem areas is discussed.

REFERENCES

BELLAK, L.; CHASSAN, J.; GEDIMAN, H.; HURVICH, M. (1973): *Ego Function Assessment of Analytic Psychotherapy Combined with Drug Therapy*. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis., CLVII, pp. 465-469.

———; HURVICH, M.; GEDIMAN, H. (1973): *Ego Functions in Schizophrenics, Neurotics, and Normals. A Systematic Study of Conceptual, Diagnostic, and Therapeutic Aspects*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

——— and MEYERS, B. (1975): *Ego Function Assessment and Analysability*. Int. Rev. Psa., II, pp. 413-427.

——— and SHEEHY, M. (1976): *The Broad Role of Ego Function Assessment*. Amer. J. Psychiat. CXXXIII, pp. 1259-1264.

CIOMPI, L.; AGUE, C.; DAUWALDER, J. (1976): *L'objectivation de changements psychodynamiques: Expériences avec une version simplifée des "Ego Strength Rating Scales" de Bellak, et al.* Paper read at the Tenth International Congress of Psychotherapy, Paris, October 7.

ENDICOTT, J.; SPITZER, R. L.; FLEISS, F. L.; COHEN, J. (1976): *The Global Assessment Scale: A Procedure for Measuring Overall Severity of Psychiatric Disturbance*. Arch. Gen. Psychiat., XXXIII, pp. 766-771.

GREENSPAN, S. and CULLANDER, C. (1973): *A Systematic Metapsychological Assessment of the Personality—Its Application to the Problem of Analyzability*. J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XXI, pp. 303-327.

——— ——— (1975): *A Systematic Metapsychological Assessment of the Course of an Analysis*. J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XXIII, pp. 107-138.

JAQUES, E. (1965): *Death and the Mid-Life Crisis*. Int. J. Psa., XLVI, pp. 502-514.

MILKMAN, H. and FROSCH, W. A. (1977): *The Drug of Choice*. J. Psychedelic Drugs, IX, pp. 11-24.

STRAUSS, J. (1975): Review of *Ego Functions in Schizophrenics, Neurotics, and Normals*. J. Nerv. Ment. Dis., CLXI, pp. 216-218.

Vernon Sharp, M.D.
45 Popham Road
Scarsdale, N.Y. 10583

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Developmental Prestages of Defenses: Diagnostic and Therapeutic Implications

Robert D. Stolorow & Frank M. Lachmann

To cite this article: Robert D. Stolorow & Frank M. Lachmann (1978) The Developmental Prestages of Defenses: Diagnostic and Therapeutic Implications, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 73-102, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926829

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926829

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

THE DEVELOPMENTAL PRESTAGES OF DEFENSES: DIAGNOSTIC AND THERAPEUTIC IMPLICATIONS

BY ROBERT D. STOLOROW, PH.D. and FRANK M. LACHMANN, PH.D.

In the interest of clarifying the distinction between psychopathology based on structural conflict and psychopathology rooted in an arrest in ego development, the hypothesis is offered that there is a developmental line for each defensive process and that a defense mechanism represents the endpoint of a series of developmental achievements. Clinical material is presented to demonstrate the decisive diagnostic and therapeutic consequences of distinguishing between the defenses of projection, incorporation, and splitting, on the one hand, and their specific developmental prestages, on the other.

The extension of psychoanalytic practice beyond the classical neuroses to borderline conditions has made it necessary to distinguish between psychopathology which results from structural conflict, and psychopathology which is rooted in an arrest in ego development. Structural conflict can only come about after certain prerequisite internalizations have occurred, when self-object differentiation is well under way and preoedipal derivatives are regressively cathected in the service of defense. For ego and superego functions to participate in intrapsychic conflict, some consolidation of these structures must have occurred (Arlow, 1963).

While the term "structural conflict" is generally applied to derivatives of object-instinctual investments, "developmental arrest" is the term usually applied to failures in ego development and in particular to interferences with specific aspects of self-object differentiation and integration. The diagnostic significance of this distinction was alluded to by Freud (1911a) and

Portions of this paper were read at meetings of The National Psychological Association for Psychoanalysis (New York, April 1977) and The Eastern Psychological Association (Boston, April 1977).

Ferenczi (1913) even before the creation of the structural theory (see also, A. Freud, 1965; Zetzel, 1966). A developmental arrest can come about through an unfavorable match between the environment and the developing child, either because the child's unfolding potentialities have not been met by an average expectable environment, or because the child's needs require a particular empathic responsiveness which the environment fails to provide. Consequently, certain internalizations crucial to the development and maturation of specific ego and superego structures are interfered with.

An examination of the history of the concept of defense indicates that while ideas about *what* a defense wards off have evolved, the concept of defense itself has remained static. Before Hartmann's studies of the ego, only instincts were seen to develop autonomously. Thus a defense was a mechanism through which the ego reacted to a phase-specific instinctual threat. A defense was present or would be called into service through the arousal of an id derivative. The study of the vicissitudes of the libido in its development through the psychosexual stages was therefore an appropriate means for understanding conflict, particularly the defensive aspects of it. After Hartmann's (1939) elaboration of the concept of an undifferentiated id-ego matrix, out of which the ego becomes differentiated and unfolds, the ego gained some autonomy but its defensive function remained wedded to and dependent upon psychosexual development. Several writers (for example, A. Freud, 1937; Jacobson, 1957; Kernberg, 1966) have attempted to introduce a temporal scheme by ranking defenses from "archaic" (for example, denial and splitting) to "higher order" (for example, repression). However, Anna Freud (1937), cautioning against the attempt at chronological classification of defenses, stated: "It will probably be best to abandon the attempt so to classify them and, instead, to study in detail the situations which call forth the defensive reactions" (p. 57).

Matching specific ego defenses with substages of libidinal development is a relic of Abraham's ontogenetic table (*cf.*,

Fliess, 1948). This approach relies on an assumption of the correlation between ego and libido development. However, as Ross (1970) and Lachmann (1975) have pointed out, the degree of this correlation has been overestimated, and clinical experience has offered much contradictory data. By keeping the concept of defense so closely tied to instinctual development and, hence, to instinctual conflict, we have failed to give sufficient attention to defense as a function of an autonomously developing ego. Advances in the understanding of ego development and ego pathology have therefore failed to contribute to the understanding of defensive processes. We believe we are now in a position to examine defenses, not only as they ward off the derivatives of instinctual wishes, but also in relation to ego development. We recognize that a defense is a complex ego function which requires a particular level of ego articulation and individuation before it can be called into service.

Our previous work has led us to the hypothesis that there is a developmental line for each defensive process and that a defense mechanism in the usual sense of the term represents the endpoint of a series of developmental achievements (see, Spitz [1961] for a different approach to this issue). Hence the utilization of a particular defense not only has relevance for understanding a specific instinctual conflict but indicates as well that certain prerequisite developmental tasks have been accomplished by the ego.

In earlier contributions (Lachmann and Stolorow, 1976; Stolorow and Lachmann, 1975) we attempted to describe the circumstances under which pathological idealizations, grandiosity and other failures to perceive and acknowledge reality accurately are reflective of a developmental arrest, and to describe as well the circumstances under which they result from defensive processes (such as denial) as part of a structural conflict. We tried to bridge these two explanatory models and to discuss the relevant differences between them. It is our intention in the present paper to extend this examination of developmental prestages to certain other defenses which, like denial,

idealization and grandiosity, radically alter the perception of the self and object world. The mechanisms to be considered are projection, incorporation, and splitting. Specific reference will be made to their *defensive* use, in which they ward off id derivatives as part of a structural conflict, and to the occurrence of their *prestages* as an aspect of an arrest in ego development.

DEFENSES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENTAL PRESTAGES

Our earlier study of denial (Stolorow and Lachmann, 1975) may serve as a prototype for understanding the contribution of ego development to the formation of a defense. We proposed a distinction between the *developmental* inability to register and affirm the reality of an event and the *defensive* denial of an event. The developmental inability, to be regarded as a prestage of denial, is manifested when the internal structures necessary for accurate perception and integration of an event have not yet evolved. For example, in their effort to comprehend a trauma (such as early object loss) for which they are developmentally or structurally unprepared, children will construct explanatory fantasies that derive from their level of psychosexual development at the time of the event and reflect wish fulfillments consonant with the ego's cognitive capacities. In contrast, the concept of denial as a defense should be reserved for those situations in which the requisite ego apparatuses have matured sufficiently for a child to be able to acknowledge a reality, but he or she does not do so because of conflictual meanings, associations or implications linked with the perception. In defensive denial, earlier explanatory fantasies may be retained, but now these function as true denial fantasies. They are consolidated into a static defensive system which aims to ward off those perceptions of reality that evoke anxiety because they stimulate conflicts over instinctual drive derivatives.

In a second article (Lachmann and Stolorow, 1976), we extended this developmental framework to a consideration of

idealizations of the self (grandiosity) and of objects. Idealizations may be viewed as a special category of failure to perceive reality in that, when the self or an object is idealized, its real qualities are not accurately recognized or acknowledged. Analogous to the work on denial, we proposed a distinction between idealizations which are based on a developmental inability to register and affirm the real qualities of the self or of objects (prestages of defense) and idealizations in which there is a defensive denial of the real qualities of the self or objects. We described the former situation in the case of a narcissistically disturbed woman whose ego had remained arrested at the level of primitive, prestructural narcissistic self-object configurations. To demonstrate the latter situation, we presented the case of a patient in whom prestructural idealizations were retained and consolidated into a static defensive system. This patient was a narcissistically disturbed man who reactively idealized himself and objects lest recognition of their real qualities evoke dangerous conflicts over aggressive drive derivatives. On the basis of our findings we argued for the postulation of two distinct types of narcissistic disorders requiring different treatment approaches: narcissistic pathology derived from developmental arrest and narcissistic pathology resulting from defenses against object-instinctual conflicts.

We shall now apply our developmental paradigm to some additional defenses which operate primarily through the distortion of self- and object representations: namely, projection, incorporation and splitting. We have chosen to focus on this group of mechanisms because recent advances in ego psychology are especially germane to the elucidation of the developmental prestages of those defenses which operate by altering aspects of the "representational world" (Sandler and Rosenblatt, 1962).

Projection as a defense may be viewed as a process whereby painful impulses or ideas originating in the self-representation are experienced as originating in one or more object representations in order to alleviate intrapsychic structural conflict (Freud, 1911b, 1922; Waelder, 1951). The projected contents

may have id, ego, and/or superego components. We are defining incorporation here as a complementary process whereby portions of an object representation are relocated in the self-representation. As a defense, incorporation typically functions to ward off intrapsychic conflicts in the context of disappointment by, separation from, or loss of an ambivalently cathected object (Freud, 1915). Projections and incorporations in our view are basically fantasy formations, analogous to denial fantasies, which attempt to eliminate from awareness aspects of the representational world associated with painful affects and instinctual conflict.

The developmental prestages of projection and incorporation as defense mechanisms can be found in the normal symbiotic ego states of earliest infancy, in which self- and object representations are merged, and in the somewhat later infantile states of partial self-object differentiation and partial self-object boundary confusion (*cf.*, Jacobson, 1964; Mahler, et al., 1975; Spitz, 1966). An example of the latter would be toddlers who believe their mothers know their thoughts or have put thoughts into their heads, the normal developmental equivalent of the psychotic "influencing machine" (Tausk, 1919). Indeed, some analysts who have worked with schizophrenic patients have alluded to or specifically noted the crucial role of arrests in ego development at, or regressions to, levels of incomplete self-object differentiation and inadequate self-object boundary maintenance (*cf.*, Federn, 1927; Ferenczi, 1913; Jacobson, 1954; Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971; Searles, 1959; Tausk, 1919).

It should be stressed that projection and incorporation as defenses actively employed by the ego to ward off structural conflict can come into play only after a minimum of self-object differentiation has been achieved. Defensive translocation of psychic contents across self-object boundaries requires that those boundaries have in large part been consolidated. Clearly, one's therapeutic approach to states of self-object confusion will differ radically, depending upon whether they are regarded as stemming from defensive projections and incorporations which

serve to ward off instinctual conflict, or as rooted in an arrest in ego development or regression to an early symbiotic prestage of these defenses characterized by an inability to adequately differentiate self- and object images.

We believe that Kernberg's (1975) discussion of "projective identification," which he regards as a form of projection characteristic of borderline patients, fails to make these distinctions adequately:

> Patients with borderline personality organization tend to present very strong projective trends, but it is not only the quantitative predominance of projection but also the qualitative aspect of it which is characteristic. The *main purpose of projection here is to externalize the all-bad, aggressive self and object images,* and the main consequence of this need is the development of dangerous, retaliatory objects against which the patient has to defend himself. This projection of aggression is rather unsuccessful. While these patients do have sufficient development of ego boundaries to be able to differentiate self and objects in most areas of their lives, the very intensity of the projective needs, plus *the general ego weakness* characterizing these patients, *weakens ego boundaries* in the particular area of the projection of aggression. This leads such patients to feel that they can still identify themselves with the object onto whom aggression has been projected, and their ongoing "empathy" with the now threatening object maintains and increases the fear of their own projected aggression . . . . In summary, projective identification is characterized by the *lack of differentiation* between self and object in that particular area, by *continuing to experience the impulse as well as the fear of that impulse while the projection is active,* and by the need to control the external object (pp. 30-31, italics added).

On the one hand, "projective identification" is described here as a defensive operation actively employed by the ego to ward off conflictual aggressive drive derivatives. On the other hand, it is also seen to reflect general ego weakness and inadequate achievement of self-object differentiation (developmental

arrest). We believe that at particular points in treatment, a diagnostic judgment should be made on whether the self-object confusion in question results primarily from defensive activity or from an arrest at a prestage of defense. Ideally, one's technical approach will be strictly dictated by this assessment. We find it difficult to view "projective identification" primarily as a defense, since the ego-alien impulse continues to be experienced consciously as an aspect of *both* self-representation and object representation. Hence, we would tend to view "projective identification" primarily as a remnant or revival of an arrested prestage of defense and gear our initial therapeutic approach to the developmental deficiency in self-object boundary maintenance.

An ambiguity similar to that found in Kernberg's discussion of projective identification appears in Jacobson's (1954) concept of "psychotic identifications." She explains them alternately as: 1, reflecting a "fixation"[1] at infantile ego states of magic participation, in which self- and object images are incompletely differentiated—that is, a developmental arrest at a prestage of defense; 2, resulting from defensive incorporations which aim at safeguarding an object relationship by turning aggression away from the ambivalently cathected love object onto the self; and 3, stemming from a regressive flight from instinctual conflict to symbiotic ego states—that is, a defensive regression to a prestage of incorporation. As we stated earlier, the utilization of incorporation as a defense requires that self-object boundaries have in large part been consolidated. In Jacobson's first explanation, self-object confusion reflects a developmental arrest at a prestage of defense, in the second it results from defensive incorporations, while in the third it stems from defensive regression (revival of archaic ego states) but *not* from defensive incorporation. We find it difficult to accept that

[1] In our opinion, the term "fixation" should be reserved for the vicissitudes of instinctual development, and the term "developmental arrest" used to refer to interferences with ego development.

these three processes are compatible theoretically; further, we believe that each implies a different therapeutic approach.

Splitting as a defense may be viewed as a process whereby object images (and/or self-images) with opposing affective cathexes are forcibly dissociated or experientially kept apart in order to alleviate intense ambivalence conflicts (*cf.,* Kernberg, 1966, 1975; Mahler, et al., 1975). In our view, such split images are essentially fantasy formations which, like projections, incorporations and denial fantasies, aim to distort aspects of the representational world which are linked to instinctual conflict. The normal prestages of splitting can be found in early infantile states in which the ego is developmentally incapable of integrating object (and self-) images carrying opposing affective cathexes (Atkin, 1975; Kernberg, 1966, 1975; Pruyser, 1975; Spitz, 1966; Zetzel, 1966). As with projection and incorporation, it should be stressed that splitting, as a defense actively employed by the ego to ward off instinctual conflict, can come into play only after a minimum of integration of oppositely cathected object (and self-) images has been accomplished through ego development. A defensive split into parts requires a prior integration of a whole (Atkin, 1975; Pruyser, 1975). Again, one's therapeutic approach to unintegrated representations will depend upon whether they are regarded as resulting from defensive splitting or as reflecting an arrest in ego development at an early prestage of splitting characterized by an inability to integrate contrasting images.

The distinction we are emphasizing here was prefigured historically in early descriptions of hysterical patients, many of whom we would now regard as borderline personalities. Specifically, we are referring to the contrasting views of Janet and Freud with respect to hysterical "splitting of consciousness" (*cf.,* Pruyser, 1975). Janet regarded hysterical dissociations as stemming from a constitutionally determined curtailment of "psychical synthesis," whereas Freud interpreted them as result-

ing from the forces of resistance—that is, repressions instituted by the defensive ego in connection with intrapsychic conflict.

This same dichotomy now appears in current literature on the borderline personality. For instance, Atkin (1975) presents case material which he believes "offers strong evidence of the primary etiological importance of a constitutional defect in the integrative and synthetic functions in the formation of a borderline personality" (p. 31). Kernberg (1975), on the other hand, regards the "lack of synthesis of contradictory self and object images" in borderline personalities as evidence of an active defensive splitting process aimed at warding off severe ambivalence conflicts (p. 28).

With regard to the propositions of Janet and Atkin, we believe that the concept of an arrest in ego development (which Atkin also uses) eliminates both the necessity and advisability of making any a priori assumptions about so-called "constitutional defects" in an effort to explain psychopathology which is not primarily grounded in instinctual conflict. Indeed, this "nature-nurture" antithesis may be viewed as a relic of the stage of psychoanalytic conceptualization that existed before it was recognized that the ego develops autonomously. Ego development proceeds as a result of the complex interplay of constitutional and experiential factors, and in most cases the relative contribution of constitution and experience to a developmental arrest in the integrative function of the ego would be virtually impossible to ascertain. In our opinion, to invoke arbitrarily the concept of constitutional defect as an explanation introduces an unwarranted degree of therapeutic pessimism. What Atkin views as evidence for a constitutional defect in the integrative and synthetic functions, we would see as evidence of no more than an arrest in ego development at a prestage of defensive splitting.

Kernberg (1975) has cogently described the prestages of defensive splitting in early infantile ego states:

> Introjections and identifications established under the influ-

> ence of libidinal drive derivatives are at first built up separately from those established under the influence of aggressive drive derivatives ("good" and "bad" internal objects, or "positive" and "negative" introjections). This division of internalized object relations into "good" and "bad" happens at first simply because of the lack of integrative capacity of the early ego. Later on, what originally was a lack of integrative capacity is used defensively by the emerging ego in order to prevent the generalization of anxiety and to protect the ego core built around positive introjections. . . . *This defensive division of the ego, in which what was at first a simple defect in integration is then used actively for other purposes, is in essence the mechanism of splitting* (p. 25).

Curiously, despite this illuminating developmental formulation, Kernberg appears to assume that whenever unintegrated representations appear in a borderline personality, they stem from defensive splitting which "is maintained as an essential mechanism preventing diffusion of anxiety within the ego and protecting the positive introjections and identifications" (p. 28) against invasion by aggressive drive derivatives. His treatment approach follows directly from this assumption. The need to protect an object relationship from aggressive drive derivatives presupposes a minimal integration of the object image. We do not believe that such a presupposition is warranted *a priori* in every borderline case. As with states of self-object confusion, in any given occurrence of unintegrated representations a diagnostic judgment must be made about whether the lack of integration of object and/or self-images results from defensive splitting or stems from a developmental arrest at a prestage of this defense. One's technical approach will be determined accordingly. We offer a very tentative hypothesis that those instances in which contrasting all-good and all-bad object images are rigidly attached to two or more separate external objects, as in split transferences, are likely to stem from the operation of defensive splitting which aims to ward off intense ambivalence conflicts. On the other hand, the fluid and rapid

alternation of contradictory images in connection with the same external object is more likely to reflect an arrest in ego development at a prestage of splitting characterized by an inability to integrate opposing representations.

CLINICAL ILLUSTRATIONS

In our earlier article on idealization and grandiosity (Lachmann and Stolorow, 1976), we demonstrated that Kohut's (1971) treatment recommendations (aimed at permitting archaic narcissistic configurations to unfold and become subject to transformation into mature forms of self-esteem regulation) are specifically valid for narcissistic pathology which is the remnant of a developmental arrest. In contrast, Kernberg's (1975) treatment recommendations (aimed at exposing narcissistic resistances) are applicable to narcissistic pathology resulting from defenses against object-instinctual conflicts. A schematic comparison of the two suggests that the essence of Kohut's technical suggestions is to focus empathically on the *state which the arrested ego needs to maintain or achieve* (see also, Stolorow, 1975a, 1975b), while Kernberg strongly emphasizes interpreting *what the defending ego needs to ward off*.

As illustrated in the clinical vignettes to follow, we believe that these two distinct treatment approaches offer, respectively, prototypes for treating clinical manifestations of developmental arrests at prestages of defense and for treating those aspects of the patient's psychopathology deriving from defenses against structural conflict. The role of genetic reconstructions will differ in the two treatment paradigms. In the case of pathology rooted in structural conflict, historical reconstructions alert the analyst to the infantile instinctual satisfactions and fantasies that the patient will *wish to repeat* in the transference. This wish to repeat and its attendant anxieties and defenses will then become the focus of analytic exploration. In the case of a developmental arrest, reconstructions of the patient's past alert the analyst to the pathogenic developmental traumata which

the analyst will *strive not to repeat* with the patient. The patient's reactions to the inevitable unwitting repetitions which do occur then become a focus of analysis. With structural conflict, early experiences have been *repressed* or otherwise defended against. These are reanimated and analyzed in the transference. With a developmental arrest, experiences that the patient legitimately *needed but missed* or prematurely lost are understood within the transference in order to assist the patient's ego in its belated development.

Defensive Projection and "Projective Identification"

When Bill, a twenty-five-year-old single man, began his analysis, he was suffering from a severe narcissistic personality disorder with pronounced borderline features. During the early months of his treatment, especially when he discussed his difficulties in relating socially and sexually to women, he would attribute to the analyst attitudes of extreme contempt, disgust and devaluation, a process that frequently reached paranoid intensity. Interpretations to the effect that Bill was experiencing his own self-devaluations as coming from the person of the analyst were met at first with anxiety, anger, resistance and an intensification of persecutory feelings in the transference. But these interpretations eventually enabled the patient to experience and explore his own attitudes of searing self-contempt and self-disgust. Here the patient's self-object confusion within the transference resulted from a defensive projection of sadistic superego forerunners, from an effort to substitute interpersonal for intrapsychic conflicts. Therapeutic movement was fostered by interpreting what was being warded off—Bill's merciless self-hatred.

By the third year of treatment, Bill had established a narcissistic transference which oscillated between "merger," "twinship" and "mirror transference proper" (Kohut, 1971). We view the transference at this time as reflecting a therapeutic regression to an archaic prestage at which the patient's ego develop-

ment had been arrested. During this period of the therapy, Bill was discussing certain of his sadistic sexual fantasies having to do with molesting and mutilating children. Suddenly he became panic-stricken. He exclaimed that the analyst's accepting attitude must mean that the analyst had the same sadistic fantasies. Further, Bill imagined that he and his analyst could become involved in a collusive relationship in which they acted out those fantasies in reality. These thoughts were extremely frightening to the patient.

The state of self-object confusion described above would seem to fit Kernberg's (1975) description of "projective identification," which we have earlier discussed as a prestage of projection. Bill consciously experienced the sadistic fantasies as an aspect both of his self-representation and of his object representation of the analyst, because the distinction between self and object had been weakened by the revival in the transference of an early ego state.

Interpretations of this material in terms of defensive operations might have aimed at uncovering to what extent the fantasies of mutilating children represented identification with the aggressor (parent) and to what extent the patient was attempting to ward off masochistic transference wishes by hypercathecting the sadistic fantasies. Indeed, much later in the analysis, when sufficient structuralization of the patient's ego was present, these defensive aspects of his fantasies became subject to systematic interpretation. However, at this earlier point in treatment, the analyst commented on Bill's need to have it demonstrated that, while the analyst could accept his fantasies, he did not entertain the same fantasies and would not tolerate their being acted out in reality. In contrast to what would be expected when confronting a defensive projection, this intervention, focusing on the patient's developmentally determined self-object confusion and his phase-appropriate need to achieve more adequate self-object differentiation, had the effect of relieving (rather than increasing) his anxiety. It did not evoke resistance, and it quickly enabled Bill to continue to explore

his own fantasies. Therapeutic movement was fostered by empathically focusing on Bill's need to establish a firmer distinction between his self-representation as a person who could not control sexual and aggressive drive derivatives and his object representation of the analyst as a person who could.

Defensive Incorporation and Its Prestages

There are many examples of defensive projection and defensive incorporation in the analytic literature and in analytic practice. Bill's defensive projection of his self-devaluation onto the analyst served to ward off painful superego forerunners. In the case of Anna, whose treatment was described in an earlier communication (Stolorow and Lachmann, 1975), her fully conscious conviction that a small penis protruded from between her vaginal lips illustrates clearly the operation of defensive incorporation.

When Anna began her analysis, she was thirty-one years old and suffered from states of anxiety centering around fantasies that her husband would leave her for another woman. These fantasies were supported by profound feelings of defectiveness linked to the penis fantasy she had maintained since her childhood. It was possible to reconstruct with a good deal of certainty that the rudiments of Anna's fantasy appeared as a direct response to her father's imprisonment and eventual death in a concentration camp when she was four years old.

Two complementary explanations for the illusory penis emerged. According to the first, she imagined that her father had disappeared and stayed away because she was disgusting and valueless to him: her genital was defective, damaged and "castrated"; she had no penis. She developed the fantasy of possessing a penis, then, in order to deny and repair her "defect," as an expression of her wish to make her father value her and return to her now that she was "whole." However, the penis fantasy merely exacerbated her feeling of defectiveness. According to the second explanation, the fantasy was an attempt

to restore her father to her through incorporation, to rescue and enshrine a part of him in her own body image. The illusory penis made up for the loss of the whole object by incorporating a highly valued part-object. Not surprisingly, throughout her life she clung to her illusory penis with great tenacity.

At some point during her latency years when she had become able to comprehend the reality of her father's death, Anna began to construct an elaborate denial-in-fantasy system by which she kept her father alive and warded off a developmentally possible mourning process. The illusory penis functioned as a central ingredient in her denial system. It sustained her conviction that her father was alive and that he stayed away because she was genitally defective and disgusting to him. At this point the illusory penis may be described as a defensive incorporation and denial fantasy which warded off the intense ambivalence conflicts evoked by Anna's growing comprehension of her father's death. She needed to preserve the hope that he would return to shelter and love her; she also felt terribly guilty and magically blamed herself for his death.

Throughout her four-year analysis, Anna was able to maintain a firm therapeutic alliance, and there was no evidence of an arrested development of basic ego functions. Hence, we must assume that her relatively benign preoedipal years had provided her with differentiated self- and object representations and stable self-object boundaries by the time of her father's death. The illusory penis was regarded as a defensive incorporation of the paternal phallus, and the various instinctual conflicts that it served to ward off in the course of Anna's development became the focus of systematic interpretation. Analysis of the functions of the penis fantasy was met with anxiety, resistance, and rage-filled struggles with the analyst. However, when the multiple dangers that it warded off were sufficiently explored and understood (especially within the transference), the illusory penis and associated feelings of defectiveness were completely dissolved.

In the case of Jane, whose treatment we described in an

earlier contribution (Lachmann and Stolorow, 1976), states of self-object confusion occurred as the halo of idealized objects fell upon her self. While in the example involving Bill's sadistic fantasies the self-object confusion reflected a prestage of projection, here it may be described as a prestage of incorporation.

Jane sought analysis at the age of twenty-five because of her inability to complete her doctoral dissertation and because of a number of other complaints which indicated a disturbance in self-esteem regulation. Analysis of her attachment to a group of idealized friends led to an elucidation of the specific vulnerability in her self-esteem. She experienced these friends as concrete embodiments of her parents' ideals and, hence, of her own self-expectations. They were the "attractive, brilliant, artistic, sensitive, slender, graceful people." Nearness to them enhanced her self-representation by making her feel worthy and acceptable—her "gilt by association."

The extent to which her self-esteem fluctuated with her proximity to or distance from these idealized objects, and with every nuance of their reactions to her, indicated the extent to which self- and object images were insufficiently distinguished from each other. A smile or a frown from the object immediately resulted in either a positively or negatively toned self-perception. Although Jane's self-esteem rose in consequence of favorable contact with her friends, the value that she "borrowed" remained the property of the object and was perceived as part of the self only so long as actual contact was maintained.

In the case of Anna, the defensive incorporation of the paternal phallus occurred in the context of very specific instinctual conflicts and warded off equally specific dangers associated with particular objects. In contrast, Jane's frequent manifestations of self-object confusion were neither conflict-specific nor object-specific. They occurred in a wide variety of interpersonal relationships that were used for self-esteem regulation because her self-representation was insufficiently structuralized. We believe Jane's strivings for self-esteem through states of symbiotic-like merger with idealized objects are best conceptual-

ized as reflecting a developmental arrest at a prestructural prestage of incorporation.

The therapeutic approach to Anna's illusory penis was to systematically analyze its defensive functions. To interpret Jane's attempts to acquire the valued aspects of her friends (their "gilt") through literal closeness to them strictly in defensive terms would have placed her in an untenable position. She would have felt pressure to dispense with an essential ingredient needed to sustain her precarious and vulnerable self-representation. In submission to the analyst she might have expressed greater self-assertion with her friends or voiced resentment or envy of them, but in consequence of the self-object confusion she would have paid a high price in lowered self-esteem. The analyst first had to help Jane gradually define self- and object boundaries through conveying an understanding of the function of the bond she was trying to maintain with both her friends and her analyst, and through responding appropriately when the symbiotic-like transference had outlived its usefulness and steps toward separation were becoming possible. Empathic clarifications of the purpose of her merger experiences and, later, of her readiness to accept separateness evoked neither anxiety nor resistance. Instead, Jane appreciated and used such interventions to facilitate increasingly autonomous efforts at self-articulation.

Defensive Splitting and Its Prestages

Rachel employed defensive splitting in the context of very specific intrapsychic conflicts in relation to particular object images. When she began treatment at the age of twenty-seven, she suffered from a morbid dread of becoming trapped in elevators, as well as from wrenching conflicts in her relationships with men. Her mother, with whom she had maintained a very close tie, had slowly deteriorated and died of cancer when Rachel was fifteen. Her father had died a year and a half later, following a period of prolonged psychological deterioration in consequence of his wife's death.

During the fourth year of her analysis, Rachel presented a highly illuminating dream, fragments of which are germane to the subject of splitting:

> I was living in a hotel, a resort in the countryside, with Bernard [her lover, a sixty-five-year-old artist]. It was really strange, because there were two Bernards—a Bernard and another Bernard who was dying. He was lying in bed and dying. I was taking care of him and figured that since he was dying, I'd make him die faster. So I got some arsenic and mixed it with the medicine I was giving him and he died. . . . Something about the resort reminded me of places I went with my parents as a child. I explained to Bernard that I'd killed Bernard because, since he was dying anyway, I wanted to experiment with killing.

In association to the theme of the two Bernards, Rachel recounted that when she and Bernard were doing things together, he seemed like a very vigorous and glamorous figure, and she loved to be with him. However, she recalled that on certain occasions when she saw him lying in bed asleep, he appeared to her to be very old and decrepit, and she felt totally disgusted and repelled by him. Bringing the discrepant images of Bernard into juxtaposition evoked an acute conflict of ambivalence: "One side of me recognizes he's too old for me, and the other side wants to stick with him. When I see how old he is, I want to kill him so I can turn to younger men."

Rachel then became tearful as she began to confront the reality that Bernard would certainly die while she was still a young woman and to anticipate "the terrible pain of separation." She wept as she spoke of her experiences at her mother's bedside and her revulsion at the intolerable sight of her mother's helplessness and deterioration (feelings which were re-experienced in reaction to her father's psychological deterioration). The analyst interpreted that the patient needed to keep separate her images of Bernard as vigorous and glamorous (her perception of him when he was awake) and as aging (her perception of him when he slept), lest bringing them together

would revive her conflicting feelings in the presence of her dying mother. Rachel then remembered her tormenting wishes to speed up her mother's death in order to be free of her, along with her oppressive fears of dire punishment for her guilty wishes.

In Rachel's analysis there was no evidence of a developmental arrest in the integrative function of the ego. She was quite capable (structurally) of experiencing contradictory affects in relation to a whole, ambivalently cathected object, as evidenced in her relationships with younger men (including the analyst) who did *not* reanimate the particular image of a dying parent. The unintegrated images of Bernard had resulted from defensive splitting, and the analyst was able, through interpretation, to promote the uncovering of the specific ambivalence conflict that was being warded off.

Rachel showed no evidence of borderline psychopathology in spite of her use of splitting, often considered pathognomonic of such pathology. It is precisely with the borderline patient that a diagnostic distinction between the defense and its prestages is most germane. The prestages of defensive splitting have been described in terms of an arrest in the ego's ability to synthesize or integrate divergent perceptions of an object (or the self). Developmentally, this would hark back to the period in infancy when alternating states of gratification and frustration completely determine the infant's perceptions of objects. This occurs prior to the establishment of object constancy and, when maintained into adulthood, indicates serious interferences with aspects of reality perception. Clinical examples of the prestages of splitting would thus be more characteristically found in the more severely disturbed borderline patients, prepsychotic or ambulatory psychotic patients whom one might treat on an outpatient basis.

The case presented by Atkin (1975) of a thirty-six-year-old woman with borderline pathology exemplifies both the use of splitting for defensive purposes and the occurrence of prestages

of that defense. Atkin describes in detail this woman's "integrative 'disjunction' manifested by simultaneous but nonconflictual strivings toward contradictory goals" (p. 29). Glaringly contradictory expectations and discrepant evaluations of the same person were voiced by the patient within one analytic session. Unlike Rachel's use of splitting, this failure to integrate psychic contents did not appear to be linked to specific intrapsychic conflicts. Rather, her integrative incapacity pervaded broad areas of her cognitive and conative functioning, so that she lived in an experiential world of unsynthesized "part-universes" and need-satisfying part-objects.

Within the framework of our proposed distinction between prestages of splitting and its function as a defense, we would agree with Atkin's demonstration that there had been a developmental arrest in the synthetic or integrative function of this patient's ego. Hence, in the early phase of treatment, confronting the patient with her inconsistencies evoked neither anxiety nor resistance, but rather noncomprehension. In this phase, according to Atkin, the analyst unwittingly served as a pregenital parent (auxiliary ego), offering his own unified perceptions as models for internalization, which assisted the patient's arrested ego in the task of integration. During a later phase of therapy when sufficient structuralization had been accomplished, the patient used disjunctive phenomena defensively, and their analysis evoked anxiety and resistance.

We must, of course, recognize that such a division of the course of treatment into "prestructural" and "defensive" phases is somewhat schematic and oversimplified. Even in the early period of the therapy Atkin's patient showed some evidence of defensive splitting in the transference. The analyst was maintained as an idealized all-good object, while the patient's parents were hated and experienced as all-bad. Here splitting was used defensively to safeguard the image of the analyst by warding off and deflecting the patient's aggressive wishes toward him. In the prestage of splitting, as exemplified in the alternating contradictory attitudes toward the same object, no id derivative

seemed to be warded off; rather, a developmental inability to integrate discrepant psychic contents was in evidence. In the defensive splitting of the transference, representations of the self, the analyst and the parents were more clearly articulated, so that hostile wishes reserved for the parents could be excluded from the relationship with the analyst.

The prestage of splitting, in which the same object is alternately seen as gratifying and as dangerous—reflective of a developmental arrest in the capacity to synthesize aspects of the self- and object representations—was also seen in the case of Burton. Burton began his fifth attempt at psychotherapeutic treatment[2] at age twenty, with a history of persecutory delusions, alternating acute suicidal and homicidal preoccupations, and fears of "imminent disintegration." In the early months of treatment there were session-to-session oscillations from intense distrust and fear of being influenced against his will and even annihilated by the therapist, to feeling understood and wishing to merge with her. His view of the therapist alternated between seeing her as murderous and depriving or as all-good and giving. These perceptions were associated with recollections of gross inconsistencies in his mother's behavior toward him: he remembered her as overtly sexually seductive and as someone who subjected him to severe daily beatings from the time he was two years old.

Burton's earliest memories were of the daily beatings by his mother and of lying in his crib in the morning, waiting for his father to smack him for crying so early in the day. By the age of three or four, he began to have repetitive nightmares, one of a tick-tock noise which eventually exploded into an atomic bomb and the other of rats that lived in a ditch in the back yard and somehow got into the house. What terrified him in the latter dream was that the rats looked human. Later in his childhood and for many years afterward Burton had a nightmare in which

[2] Burton was being seen by a therapist under the supervision of one of the authors.

someone was locked in a coffin, alive. Sometimes Burton was the one locked inside, with his mother standing on the outside, and sometimes this was reversed.

Burton's inability to synthesize contradictory images of objects rendered him, like Atkin's patient, subject to contradictory and incompatible aims. His early development was characterized by both sexual and aggressive overstimulation. The extent to which his mother was both grossly seductive and sadistic interfered with his ability to synthesize a cohesive image of her. Similarly, the extent to which powerful and incompatible drive derivatives were stimulated within him interfered with the synthesis of a cohesive self-representation. Burton's alternating suicidal and homicidal preoccupations reflected the fluid interchangeability between images of the self and object as killer and victim. This, along with the rapid fluctuations in his perceptions of the therapist, suggested a developmental arrest at a prestage of splitting (with incomplete self-object differentiation as well). The therapist could discern no defensive purpose underlying these shifting unintegrated representations, nor was there inherent in them any protection of a love object by assigning negative qualities to someone else. A correlate of the inadequate integration of self- and object representations was that primitive drive derivatives remained relatively unneutralized (or subject to regressive defusion), since constant moderating internalized objects had been unavailable to aid in their gradual taming.

The treatment interventions with this patient were aimed at stemming the propensity toward decompensation. When the early relationship with the mother was revived in the transference, the therapist, rather than focusing on the content of his adoration of or rage-filled complaints about her, attempted to convey to the patient her empathic understanding of the intense, alternating, contradictory feelings to which he was subject and to help him understand the frightening loss of self-continuity ("imminent disintegration") which he experienced as a result. Specifically, the therapist addressed herself to the

patient's arrested ego's phase-appropriate need to achieve more adequate integration and attempted to provide him with a model for articulating and synthesizing varying self- and object representations and their associated affects.

FURTHER TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS

A number of analysts suggest that certain components of the analytic situation, as well as certain parameters or special techniques, may be useful in promoting the growth and maturation of arrested ego functions, such as self-object differentiation and integration (see, Atkin, 1975; Blanck and Blanck, 1974; Dorpat, 1974; Eissler, 1953; Fleming, 1975; Green, 1975; Grinberg and Grinberg, 1974; Kohut, 1971; Pankow, 1974). We would like to propose that our conceptualization of defenses as the endpoint of a developmental line has direct implications for the course of therapy in the psychoanalytic treatment of patients with arrests in ego development. Especially in the early stages of the analysis of these patients, the analyst will need to be alert to manifestations of arrests at prestages of defense. As illustrated in our clinical vignettes, when such manifestations appear, the analyst's interventions will focus empathically on the states that the patient's arrested ego needs to maintain or achieve. The analyst's aim here is to promote sufficient structuralization of ego functions to make possible a subsequent exploration of the defensive aspects of the patient's psychopathology in terms of the instinctual conflicts which it serves to ward off.

The vignettes and case histories described in this paper were selected because in the clinical material the manifestations of structural conflict and arrests in ego development were fairly clearly distinguishable. More common are those patients for whom diagnostic decisions are difficult to make. As we indicated in our discussions of the therapeutic implications of understanding whether a particular pathology connotes a developmental arrest or whether it should be interpreted as a defense, the diagnostic distinction is crucial for the progress of the treat-

ment. A careful judgment about which of the two predominates—and hence, how one should frame the clinical intervention—is required. These evaluations are often difficult to make and are sometimes more accurately understood after the fact than at the requisite moment in treatment. This raises the question of the consequences of an incorrect assessment in either direction. As an example, we might consider two possible approaches to a patient's silence. To accept a patient's silence "empathically" when it is actually serving as a resistance against revealing a "guilty" secret might be contrasted with erroneously interpreting a silence as resistive when it is serving to recreate for the patient a fantasy of merger with an idealized figure, a legitimate developmental need which originally had been interrupted too often and too early. On balance, the consequences that result from misinterpreting the manifestation of an arrested developmental phase as a resistance appear to us to be far graver than the error of misconstruing a resistance as a developmental step.

The failure to analyze a defense is analogous to an incomplete and incorrect interpretation (Glover, 1955) which serves to strengthen resistance. When an analyst interprets as resistive what the patient accurately senses to be a developmental necessity, the interpretation is often experienced by the patient as a failure of empathy, a breach of trust, a narcissistic injury. It recreates for the patient a trauma similar to those which originally resulted in the developmental arrest (Balint, 1969; Kohut, 1971). To interpret a defense as a developmental arrest may make the analyst appear at least too benign, or at most, pollyannish, but generally this can be corrected when a more accurate understanding of the patient's current dynamics is achieved. It may be referred to as a "technical error," as compared to the less forgivable "error in humanity" (Greenson, 1967; Stone, 1961) which comes about through the analyst's failure to acknowledge the validity of a developmental step by dismissing it solely as an aspect of the patient's pathological defenses.

Having emphasized the analytic stance toward developmental arrest that enables the patient to return to and complete the task of consolidating those aspects of self- and object representations that have remained vulnerable to regressions, we would like to exemplify the clinical criteria which indicate that this "structuralizing" phase of treatment has reached a point where its continuation would undermine the patient's further growth.

The case of Jane was described to illustrate the extent to which archaic self-objects were needed for self-esteem regulation. At one point after a prolonged period of symbiotic-like, idealizing transference, she asked the analyst to say more about himself, to identify himself to her, specifically concerning his views on certain political and social issues. This was seen not primarily as an expression of resistance, but rather as a request for him to assert his existence as a separate object.

Requests like this have been voiced in various forms by numerous similar patients. One young woman reached a comparable point in the third year of her analysis. When she was four her father had left the family, which intensified her attachment to her mother. But this tie was constantly threatened and interrupted by the mother's boyfriend. The separation from the father had revived and exacerbated fears of separation from the mother. The regressively reactivated but prematurely interrupted wishes to merge were covered by a pseudo maturity, but the longings for self-object boundary dissolution remained in the patient's attraction to magical, mystical experiences which provided her with feelings of oneness on a "cosmic" level. In her analysis a symbiotic-like transference with a twofold meaning was eventually established. The transference revived the attachment to the mother, although the bond with the analyst was not traumatically disrupted as the tie to her mother had been. The other transference meaning was, "So long as you and I are one with each other, I need not be afraid of your leaving me as my father did." During one session in the third year of the analysis, the patient described a "new feeling" she had recently experienced during sexual intercourse with her

boyfriend. She had become particularly and pleasurably aware of the pressure of her friend's body in opposition to her own. Her associations led her to describe similar feelings toward the analyst: she wanted him to make his weight felt more in opposition to her. This wish included her wanting him to introduce new ideas, even ones contradictory to hers, rather than exploring and clarifying what she was saying. In this instance, an oedipal wish and a developmental step toward self-object differentiation coexisted, and an analytic response to both was necessary.

At such points in treatment, other patients have described envy of friends who "fight" with their analysts, or they have voiced desires to join a therapy group in order to be subjected to harsher criticism or a wish that the analyst would describe his views on some sociological or psychoanalytic issue. In each case the pathology of the patient had reflected, to a greater or lesser extent, a developmental arrest and was so treated. These moments marked a turning point in the treatment. The requests did not require fulfillment. The fact that they signaled the patient's readiness for increased tolerance of separation, differences and opposition had to be recognized. It was also pointed out in each case that, while a step toward separation and self-object distinction was in evidence, the patient expected the analyst to differentiate himself from the patient, rather than vice versa. This could now be understood in defensive terms.

From the standpoint of the course of treatment, such a request by a patient is a sign that self- and object boundaries have become sufficiently stable so that if the analyst introduces a "new idea"—for example, points out a drive derivative that the patient is unconsciously defending against—it can now be worked with analytically. Rather than responding to such interpretations as though they were obliterating, dedifferentiating intrusions, the patient can now react to their content and meaning.

The correct assessment of an arrest at a prestage of defense and the requisite empathic interpretive responses by the

analyst gradually enable patients to reach a level at which their representational world becomes sufficiently structured for them to signal the analyst that something "new" is now required of him. The "new" in this case is actually the availability of the patients for a more classical analysis of their object-instinctual or structural conflicts and the vicissitudes of their defensive struggles against them.

SUMMARY

A review of the concept of defense reveals that it has remained curiously immune to the impact of recent formulations on autonomous ego development. The hypothesis is offered that there is a developmental line for each defensive process and that a defense mechanism represents the endpoint of a series of developmental achievements. Clinical material is presented to illustrate the distinction between the defenses of projection, incorporation and splitting on the one hand, and their developmental prestages on the other. The distinction between psychopathology stemming from defenses against structural conflict and psychopathology rooted in an arrest in ego development at a prestage of defense has decisive diagnostic and therapeutic consequences. While the analytic approach to the former is to interpret what the defending ego needs to ward off, the approach to the latter is to focus empathically on the state which the arrested ego needs to maintain or to achieve. In the treatment of patients with developmental arrests at prestages of defense, the analyst's aim is to promote sufficient structuralization of ego functions to make possible a subsequent, more classical analysis of defenses against instinctual conflicts.

REFERENCES

ARLOW, J. (1963): *Conflict, Regression and Symptom Formation*. Int. J. Psa., XLIV, pp. 12-22.

ATKIN, S. (1975): *Ego Synthesis and Cognition in a Borderline Case*. This QUARTERLY, XLIV, pp. 29-61.

BALINT, M. (1969): *Trauma and Object Relationship*. Int. J. Psa., L, pp. 429-435.

BLANCK, G. and BLANCK, R. (1974): *Ego Psychology: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press.

DORPAT, T. (1974): *Internalization of the Patient-Analyst Relationship in Patients with Narcissistic Disorders.* Int. J. Psa., LV, pp. 183-188.

EISSLER, K. (1953): *The Effect of the Structure of the Ego on Psychoanalytic Technique.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., I, pp. 104-143.

FEDERN, P. (1927): Narcissism in the Structure of the Ego. In: *Ego Psychology and the Psychoses.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1952, pp. 38-59.

FERENCZI, S. (1913): Stages in the Development of the Sense of Reality. In: *Sex in Psycho-Analysis.* New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1950, pp. 213-239.

FLEMING, J. (1975): *Some Observations on Object Constancy in the Psychoanalysis of Adults.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XXIII, pp. 743-759.

FLIESS, R. (1948): An Ontogenetic Table. In: *The Psychoanalytic Reader.* Edited by R. Fliess. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 254-255.

FREUD, A. (1937): *The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1946.

——— (1965): *Normality and Pathology in Childhood: Assessments of Development.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

FREUD (1911a): *Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning.* Standard Edition, XII, pp. 218-226.

——— (1911b): *Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides).* Standard Edition, XII, pp. 9-82.

——— (1915): *Mourning and Melancholia.* Standard Edition, XIV, pp. 243-258.

——— (1922): *Some Neurotic Mechanisms in Jealousy, Paranoia and Homosexuality.* Standard Edition, XVIII, pp. 223-232.

GLOVER, E. (1955): *The Technique of Psychoanalysis.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

GREEN, A. (1975): *The Analyst, Symbolization and Absence in the Analytic Setting (On Changes in Analytic Practice and Analytic Experience).* Int. J. Psa., LVI, pp. 1-22.

GREENSON, R. (1967): *The Technique and Practice of Psychoanalysis, Vol. I.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

GRINBERG, L. and GRINBERG, R. (1974): *The Problem of Identity and the Psychoanalytical Process.* Int. Rev. Psa., I, pp. 499-507.

HARTMANN, H. (1939): *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958.

JACOBSON, E. (1954): *Contribution to the Metapsychology of Psychotic Identifications.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., II, pp. 239-262.

——— (1957): *Denial and Repression.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., V, pp. 61-92.

——— (1964): *The Self and the Object World.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

KERNBERG, O. (1966): *Structural Derivatives of Object Relationships.* Int. J. Psa., XLVII, pp. 236-253.

——— (1975): *Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism.* New York: Jason Aronson, Inc.

KOHUT, H. (1971): *The Analysis of the Self. A Systematic Approach to the Psychoanalytic Treatment of Narcissistic Personality Disorders.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

LACHMANN, F. (1975): *Homosexuality: Some Diagnostic Perspectives and Dynamic Considerations.* Amer. J. Psychother., XXIX, pp. 254-260.

——— and STOLOROW, R. (1976): *Idealization and Grandiosity: Developmental Considerations and Treatment Implications.* This QUARTERLY, XLV, pp. 565-587.

MAHLER, M., PINE, F., and BERGMAN, A. (1975): *The Psychological Birth of the Human Infant: Symbiosis and Individuation.* New York: Basic Books, Inc.

PANKOW, G. (1974): *The Body Image in Hysterical Psychosis.* Int. J. Psa., LV, pp. 407-414.

PRUYSER, P. (1975): *What Splits in "Splitting"? A Scrutiny of the Concept of Splitting in Psychoanalysis and Psychiatry.* Bull. Menninger Clinic, XXXIX, pp. 1-46.

ROSS, N. (1970): *The Primacy of Genitality in the Light of Ego Psychology: Introductory Remarks.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XVIII, pp. 267-284.

SANDLER, J. and ROSENBLATT, B. (1962): The Concept of the Representational World. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XVII.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 128-145.

SEARLES, H. (1959): *Integration and Differentiation in Schizophrenia: An Over-All View.* Brit. J. Med. Psychol., XXXII, pp. 261-281.

SPITZ, R. (1961): *Some Early Prototypes of Ego Defenses.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., IX, pp. 626-651.

——— (1966): Metapsychology and Direct Infant Observation. In: *Psychoanalysis—A General Psychology: Essays in Honor of Heinz Hartmann.* Edited by R. Loewenstein, L. Newman, M. Schur, A. Solnit. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 123-151.

STOLOROW, R. (1975a): *Toward a Functional Definition of Narcissism.* Int. J. Psa., LVI, pp. 179-185.

——— (1975b): *The Narcissistic Function of Masochism (and Sadism).* Int. J. Psa., LVI, pp. 441-447.

——— and LACHMANN, F. (1975): *Early Object Loss and Denial. Developmental Considerations.* This QUARTERLY, XLIV, pp. 596-611.

STONE, L. (1961): *The Psychoanalytic Situation.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc.

TAUSK, V. (1919): *On the Origin of the "Influencing Machine" in Schizophrenia.* This QUARTERLY, II, 1933, pp. 519-556.

WAELDER, R. (1951): *The Structure of Paranoid Ideas: A Critical Survey of Various Theories.* Int. J. Psa., XXXII, pp. 167-177.

ZETZEL, E. (1966): An Obsessional Neurotic: Freud's Rat Man. In: *The Capacity for Emotional Growth.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1970, pp. 216-228.

Yeshiva University
Department of Psychology
55 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10003

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Conscious Dream Synthesis as a Method of Learning about Dreaming: A Pedagogic Experiment

Alvin Frank & Eugene E. Trunnell

To cite this article: Alvin Frank & Eugene E. Trunnell (1978) Conscious Dream Synthesis as a Method of Learning about Dreaming: A Pedagogic Experiment, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 103-112, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926830

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926830

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

CONSCIOUS DREAM SYNTHESIS AS A METHOD OF LEARNING ABOUT DREAMING: A PEDAGOGIC EXPERIMENT

BY ALVIN FRANK, M.D. and EUGENE E. TRUNNELL, M.D.

Stimulated by Freud's comments on the unique perspectives offered by "building up dreams by synthesis," the authors applied this idea to the St. Louis Psychoanalytic Institute's introductory course on the psychology of dreaming. Each student was assigned the task of purposefully and consciously synthesizing a dream, utilizing certain assigned information and meeting the specified criteria. In the use of this device, it was anticipated that the conscious active effort required to duplicate the usually passively experienced processes of dreaming and the unconscious dream work would lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation of the dream.

"Building up dreams by synthesis" was one of the methods of dream interpretation described by Freud (1900, p. 311). He regarded synthesizing dreams as the easiest way of making "clear" and "defending the trustworthiness" (p. 310) of the processes of the dream work. By "synthesis" he meant the reconstruction of a dream after the interpretation and elucidation of the dream thoughts. In the interest of discretion, he declined to make this synthesis in the discussion of his own dreams, but subsequently published syntheses of two of Dora's (1901) and one of the Wolf Man's (1914b) dreams. Further, the intuitive synthesis of dreams by a creative writer was a major theme in the "Gradiva" paper (1906). Later, he commented several times on the similarities between such artistically inspired dreams and real dreams, including their analyzability (1914a, 1924).

From the St. Louis Psychoanalytic Institute.

Portions of this paper were presented at the Fall Meeting of the American Psychoanalytic Association, New York City, December 1975.

Stimulated by Freud's comments, we developed the idea of using a third variation of dream synthesis as a teaching device. We assigned students the task of purposefully and consciously composing a wholly artificial "dream" that would meet certain prescribed criteria. By the use of this method we anticipated that the conscious active effort required to duplicate the usually passively experienced processes of dreaming would lead to a deeper understanding and appreciation of the dream work, of the dream as a creative product, and of the subtleties and intricacies of the primary process. Because the exercise proved to be a most rewarding one, we wish to share it.

The assignment was made midway in an eighteen-session, first-year course entitled "Introduction to the Psychology of Dreaming," given to two classes at the St. Louis Psychoanalytic Institute. At this point in the course, candidates had already studied the process of dream formation. The following instructions were given to each student:

> Synthesize a manifest dream using the following material. Your unique dream wish is enclosed separately; all others are different. Do not discuss with classmates, but be prepared to respond in class so we can analyze dream and determine the wish (i.e., be prepared to present associations leading to latent dream thoughts and what is related to dream from day before, childhood, etc.). Dream should include:
>
> At least two instances of condensation;
> At least two instances of displacement;
> A reversal or a joke or
> A symbol, neologism, or spoken words;
> An example of calculation and/or absurdity and/or intellectual activity;
> It may include the kitchen sink in addition if you so wish.
>
> Material:
>
> You are a twenty-one-year-old male graduate student living in dorms with a male roommate. Each of you has a girlfriend with whom each of you occasionally also shares the room (by prearrangement with roommate). Your parents visit on Satur-

day, see the sights, and watch your football team upset Ohio State. Parents meet roommate and your girlfriend for the first time. They seem to like them. You go out for dinner.

You are a middle child, conventional background. Sister two years older, brother two years younger. No history psychotherapy. You dream the following Saturday night. We will have to determine whom you tell the dream to Sunday . . . P.S. If we can guess the "infantile wish" from the manifest content, you've not done it.

The condition that the dreamer not be in psychotherapy was included to limit the number of variables confronting the dreamer. As was indicated, each of the students was assigned a different dream wish. A secretary was given a list of different "infantile wishes" with the directions to include one, arbitrarily, with each set of instructions. Hence, no one, including the instructors, could have advance awareness of what "infantile wish" might be "motivating" any of the "dreamers." The identification of the wish was expected to reveal its object, in turn revealed by the identity of the person with whom the "dream" was presumably shared.

Each of the candidates in the two classes participating in this experiment has succeeded in producing a synthetic dream. While the task was not a simple one, it did not prove to be unduly difficult. The students agreed that it was a stimulating, challenging, and profitable assignment. The technique used by most was to create the "dream" piecemeal, at intervals, over an extended period of time, perhaps two or three days. The majority were successful in combining day residue, latent dream thoughts, and an infantile wish, and translating them all into a "manifest dream."

Finished "dreams" were "interpreted" (using the usual psychoanalytic technique) by candidates and instructors together during subsequent class periods. The class atmosphere was one of informal camaraderie and constructive competition. From thirty minutes to an hour was spent on each dream. The "dreamer" was asked for associations to the "events" of the day

preceding the "dream" and to various elements in his "dream." Only after the exercise was finished (i.e., when the "dream wish" had been correctly ascertained by the class as a whole), would the "dreamer" answer questions about why and how he had constructed his "manifest dream" and how he had done his "dream work."

While the synthesized dreams lacked the richness contributed by the overdetermination of genuine dreams, they offered some distinct advantages as a pedagogic device. For candidates to submit their genuine dreams to open examination in a class might be emotionally very difficult. In this exercise, however, it was comfortable to assume the role of the dreamer of an assigned dream and to participate actively in having it analyzed. A synthesized dream is, of course, simpler than a genuine one and can be understood with less material than is usually needed to illustrate dream formation in an actual case. Finally, as previously indicated, the active synthesizing of a dream (in contrast to analyzing) offers a unique way of understanding dreams and an opportunity to apply and juggle the mechanisms of the dream work. The requirement that these principles be applied in a conscious, problem-solving, goal-oriented effort necessitates the use of previously learned abstract knowledge in a concrete, practical way. In addition, it requires the synthesis of previously discretely defined mechanisms in such a way as to lead to an integrated end product.

To further illustrate the technique, here is a "manifest dream" created by one of the participants:

> Dreamer, as a little boy, is with roommate's girl at a table in a restaurant. The only available light is from a candle in the center of the table. The light is so dim that dreamer thinks he is with his own girl or maybe with his mother. The girl stands up, and dreamer sees that she is high in the middle and round on the end like his mother but much taller than either his mother or himself. She is carrying a doll which looks like the dreamer or his baby. The girl sits down and begins to nurse the doll. Dreamer picks up the candle and passes it back and

forth in front of the girl. She reaches for it but he blows out the flame. As he does so, the dreamer begins to grow physically and age at an incredible pace. From a small boy he quickly reaches twenty-one; in a minute more he is thirty-two years older than that. Since he knows this is absurd, he runs to the mirror where he sees his father's face superimposed on his twenty-one-year-old face. The image is perfectly fused at the points where the dreamer and his father actually look alike. The mirror reflection says: "You are my son!"

The "dream work" of this dream was summarized as follows:

Dream Thoughts:

My girl is O.K. but she doesn't hold a candle to my mother. I would like to sleep with my mother but that is forbidden. Of course I'm very young—being born in 1953—so I have time yet to find someone like my mother. I do want to marry and have a baby. If only I were older, I might have met my mother first, married her, and had a baby with her.

Condensation:

1. Girl stands for mother and for his own girl;
2. Image in mirror stands for himself and for his father.

Displacement:

1. Baby to doll and nursing of doll instead of self-nursing;
2. Symbolization of intercourse displaced from mother to girl.

Joke: What is high in the middle—round on ends—Ohio.

Symbol: Candle for penis. Also visual representation of "My girl doesn't hold a candle to my mother."

Spoken word: "You are my son," which dreamer must have heard as a child.

Calculation: 32 years plus 21 years = 53—the year dreamer was born (reversal also).

The wish was to have a child with the mother. The dream was accordingly told to her. On review, we cannot identify the "reversal" cited in the last line.

What are the assumptions which led us to believe we could imitate, however imperfectly, the process and results of dream

formation? First, of course, is a conscious intellectual appreciation of the nature of the mechanisms of the dream work, an understanding which we had imparted in the preceding weeks of study and which we hoped to utilize and test with this exercise. Second is the capacity to use this material in the characteristically illogical manner analogous to dream formation, while still functioning in a logical, purposeful way. This capacity we know as Kris's "regression in the service of the ego." Finally, there is an accessible reservoir of primitive capacities and processes in each of us to draw upon while in the conscious state. We assume such a reservoir as a part of all creativity. Both Kubie (1958) and Kris (1952) have described the broad range of both preconscious content and thought processes which would satisfy this requirement. Kris stated that "they [preconscious mental processes] cover continua reaching from purposeful reflection to fantasy, and from logical formulation to dream-like imagery" (p. 305).

We expected psychoanalytic candidates, well into their personal training analyses, to take advantage of their potentiality for regressed, preconscious imitative expression in a consciously directed creative effort, a synthetic dream. While the products of these efforts would not duplicate unconsciously inspired and constructed dreams, we could reasonably expect some circumscribed approximation of the processes and results of the dream work. Was this a unique psychological exercise for our students? To the contrary, we assume that the degree of personal analysis required for matriculation had already involved repeated similar experiences. To allow one's self to purposefully regress in a controlled fashion in order to sample one's own inner nature, then to withdraw in order to savor, appreciate, and understand what had been experienced is the everyday stuff of psychoanalysis. At a crucial moment in their progress as fledgling analysts our students must substitute another person for themselves; they must learn to apply the capacities described above to the observation, understanding, and treatment of others. These are paradigms of the psychoanalytic educational process: the development of capacities for

the alternations between logical Aristotelian thought and an appreciation of the madness we call the unconscious; and the ability to replace ourselves with another as the object of study. The process of accomplishing these ends consists of many small steps rather than a few giant ones. We regard dream synthesis as an appropriate and specific action in this progression.

We could not, however, consider the dreams submitted as purely synthetic. It was immediately obvious that the influence of uniquely unconscious factors was visible or highly suspect in the students' completed assignments. We were repeatedly able to discern, as if in the clinical situation working with "real" dreams, unacknowledged influences which manifested themselves in such ways as unexplained overpreoccupations with a given theme or detail, the student "dreamers' " seemingly irrelevant tangents, patently obvious omissions which could not be explained on an intellectual basis, and the structure (contrasted with content) of some of the synthetic dreams. The regression involved in the composition of these dreams had obviously not been entirely "in the service of the ego."

No student described completing his assignment in an intellectual, purposeful, single sitting. Rather, they had worked on it at intervals, usually also "sleeping on it." We compared the "directions" or "material" (see pp. 104-105) upon which the assignment was based to Rorschach or TAT cards or the day residue of a naturally occurring dream. We hypothesized that at times during the composition of these "synthesized" dreams—in sleep, through inattention, under "stress," or whatever—unconscious forces had effected "transferences" in exactly the way described by Freud in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. Here we found that we had also followed Kris's (1952) thinking. In an explicit comparison between dreams and wit and caricature, he distinguished between the former "where the ego abandons its supremacy and the primary process obtains control" and wit and caricature soon extended to "the vast domain of aesthetic experience in general. . . . This process remains in the service of the ego. . . . The contrast is between an ego overwhelmed by regression and a regression in the service

of the ego. . . ." The reason for this difference is economic: "It seems that the ego finds its supremacy curtailed whenever it is overwhelmed by affects, irrespective of whether an excess of affect or the ego's own weakness is to be held responsible for the process" (p. 177).

It would seem that at moments in the composition of these synthetic dreams such conditions did exist; that, ironically, at these moments some of their elements approached an authenticity we could not have prescribed. Considering these conditions, we felt some concern about the emergence of uniquely revealing material in these "dreams," however artificial and well defined were the parameters within which they were created and their impact in the classroom. But the preponderance of conscious determinants and the group focus on the primary process from a secondary process viewpoint tended to minimize this inevitable complication. In no case were we aware of anxiety or embarrassment in any candidate regarding his dream's manifest or latent content. In retrospect, we see that because of our concern, we failed to appreciate the positive aspect of this facet of the experience. Realistically, candidates must learn to tolerate and accept others' awareness of the impact of inevitable residual unconscious conflicts on their work. Such self-acceptance is necessary in order to participate productively in, for example, case conferences and supervision. It is one of the steps leading to the recognition of contertransference and the need for continuing self-analysis.

We judged our experiment impressionistically from several perspectives. First, the candidates stated spontaneously and explicitly that they had found it useful in clarifying and facilitating their mastery of the various elements of the dream work. This result was corroborated by the class discussion. There we found areas of deficiency or confusion which had previously escaped both the students' and the instructors' detection. The two most extreme (indeed startling) examples are as follows.

One candidate designed a convincing artificial dream with

an intricate underlying dream work. However, he failed to explicitly link this impressive production with his assigned "infantile wish." Somehow, he understood that the wish should be inferred without a clear, stated connection.

Another created a dream and dream work which were technically correct as far as form and mechanisms were concerned. The content was another matter. The entire latent dream was of contemporary origin; it completely lacked anything of childhood.

Finally, we found this exercise to be of real value in the evaluation of the students' progress and our own teaching efforts. We were assured of the candidates' mastery of previously covered material by their successes, as well as alerted to areas of ambiguity by "rough spots" described or detected in the completed assignments. The appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses demonstrated therein helped direct our continuing efforts in areas of both evaluation and teaching. In contrast to the two extreme examples given above, most of the results were reassuring. In another situation it had been difficult to evaluate a candidate because of his lack of participation in class discussions. It was reassuring that he was able to create a technically correct and rather rich synthetic dream.

We wondered if such a reductive approach to the dream and its processes would tend to distract teachers or students from the complexities and ingenuity of the natural phenomena. It was found, however, that our experiment, with its artificial restriction of variables, its clumsy, self-conscious, frustrating approximations of nature, and its pale imitations of the dreams which we are so prone to take for granted each night did not have this impact. Rather, it resulted in a renewed appreciation of the depth and profundities of the dream as process and experience.

SUMMARY

The assignment of synthesizing an artificial dream was given to analytic candidates in a first-year class in the psychology of

dreams. The object was to provide students with the challenge of using what they had learned didactically about dream formation in an active creative manner. The synthesized "dreams" lacked the richness of the real thing; in this experiment the means justified the end.

We believe this assignment proved very successful in teaching and learning about dream formation and unconscious aspects of creativity as well as some of the vicissitudes of primary processes and unconscious ego, superego, and id influences. In addition, we viewed it as an appropriate step in the students' progress from analysand to analyst.

REFERENCES

FREUD (1900): *The Interpretation of Dreams.* Standard Edition, IV/V.

——— (1901): *Fragments of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria.* Standard Edition, VII, pp. 7-122.

——— (1906): *Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's 'Gradiva.'* Standard Edition, IX, pp. 7-93.

——— (1914a): *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement.* Standard Edition, XIV, pp. 7-66.

——— (1914b): *From the History of an Infantile Neurosis.* Standard Edition, XVII, pp. 7-122.

——— (1924): *An Autobiographical Study.* Standard Edition, XX, pp. 7-74.

KRIS, E. (1952): *Psychoanalytic Explorations in Art.* New York: Schocken Books, 1964.

KUBIE, L. (1958): *Neurotic Distortion of the Creative Process.* Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas Press.

4524 Forest Park Boulevard
St. Louis, Missouri 63108

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Autohypnotic Watchfulness

Leonard Shengold

To cite this article: Leonard Shengold (1978) Autohypnotic Watchfulness, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 113-115, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926831

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926831

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

AUTOHYPNOTIC WATCHFULNESS

BY LEONARD SHENGOLD, M.D.

A young woman who had been seduced by an adult as a child of five showed a typical and repetitive simultaneous shutting off of emotion and perception in a "hypnoid state" and a hypersensitive awareness to certain signals that meant to her the possible reliving of a trauma from childhood.

She reported one day that she had left the previous analytic session feeling sleepy and "out of things." This was a characteristic autohypnotic state: "I didn't even know how to open the door or whether to leave it open; it was as if I wasn't quite there, and I had no awareness of you or of leaving your office. And yet when I went out into the waiting room, I heard the sound of a man urinating from the bathroom. I am sure it was a man—from the sound. And before that, as I was closing the door, you had a phone call and I heard the change in your voice. You weren't talking to a patient, but to someone you didn't want to hear from."

The patient, as usual, was right. As she had done before, she was showing a need both to block out and to anticipate what was going to happen to her. My next patient, a man, had reported that he had urinated before coming in to his session. I had received a telephone call from an insurance salesman, and although the young woman had only heard me say "hello" and "no," I had *not* welcomed the call. Despite the patient's alteration of consciousness, her perceptions had been accurate and had registered almost instantaneously.

As a child of five, she had been seduced to perform fellatio after she had opened a bathroom door on a man who was urinating. His anger at the intruder ("someone you didn't want to hear from") turned to sexual excitement, and he started to masturbate. The girl especially remembered the sound of his

excited breathing. She was "fascinated—as if hypnotized" by his exhibition and was easily induced to suck on his penis. (She had not yet remembered the terrifying overstimulation that ended this initially pleasurable and exciting encounter at the time of the incident that is being reported in this communication.)

In later life her autohypnosis blocked the sexual excitement that could have resulted from perceptions that were unconsciously linked with the memory of the earlier seduction. At the same time the hypnosis permitted a concentrated hypercathexis of perceptory signals: a hypnotic watchfulness. She often listened intently for sounds of the analyst's breathing and was aware of nuances of change. These would evoke a sleepy feeling, or increase it if it were already present, and she would often say something like "I'm even more aware of the breathing, but now it's almost as if *you* aren't even there."

I believe this is an instance of simultaneous hypnotic evasion and hypnotic facilitation. The alteration of consciousness as she left the session served both to ward off and to repeat the past (see Dickes, 1965; Fliess, 1953; Shengold, 1967). The hypercathected listening and watchfulness also functioned both for defense and for discharge, e.g., of voyeuristic excitement. To be seduced while she was hypnotized meant that she was passive and therefore not responsible for what was happening. The excited beginning of the seduction was easier to repeat than was the subsequent terror, overstimulation, and rage. Ultimately, it was the overwhelming fear and rage, which could reach the pitch of wanting to bite and to kill, that was evaded by the hypnosis. The alteration in consciousness also served to keep the incestuous object of the feelings (i.e., the related oedipal fantasy) out of conscious awareness. The expectation of repetition made for a characteristic alertness to signals, especially auditory signals, as part of generalized watchfulness that was compatible with autohypnosis.

REFERENCES

DICKES, R. (1965): *The Defensive Function of an Altered State of Consciousness: Hypnoid State.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XIII, pp. 356-403.

FLIESS, R. (1953): *The Hypnotic Evasion: A Clinical Observation.* This QUARTERLY, XXII, pp. 497-511.

SHENGOLD, L. (1967): *The Effects of Overstimulation: Rat People.* Int. J. Psa., XLVIII, pp. 403-415.

245 East 87th Street
New York, N. Y. 10028

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

The Ceiling Tiles

Samuel Abrams

To cite this article: Samuel Abrams (1978) The Ceiling Tiles, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 116-117, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926832

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926832

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

THE CEILING TILES

BY SAMUEL ABRAMS, M.D.

A young man began his analysis with concern about the use of the couch. He approached it cautiously, complaining a bit about the loss of the face-to-face confrontation. He had imagined a potential value to the analyst's facial expression, as a signal of the directions that he might best pursue. He anticipated difficulties in the absence of such signals.

After a few days he felt more reassured. The setting proved tolerable after all, but a new concern developed about his capacity to control his feelings. He recounted manipulating mathematical formulas or playing mental arithmetical games as a frequent aid to falling asleep or while negotiating some other trying period. An interpretation was made concerning his need to feel in control as a reassurance against intense feelings and the use of his organizing skills as an expression of that control.

His confirmation and elaboration appeared clearly a day or two later when, after a moment of silence, he complained about the ceiling tiles in the office. He remarked with some laughter that they were driving him crazy. From the time he had started with the couch, he explained, he had periodically had his attention drawn above. He partially accounted for his interest by his line of work, which, in fact, was related. Several ideas had occurred to him about those tiles. To begin with, it was possible to develop nearly an infinite series of groupings and patterns; he recalled his childhood interest in the "infinite." Secondly, he had become intrigued with the question of whether the first row of tiles was "complete" or whether the tiles had been slightly trimmed at the edge to fit into the proscribed space. This concern about "intactness" challenged him. At the moment when he finally brought his attention to the ceiling tiles into the analysis, he had been establishing a

central grouping of four tiles arranged in a "hollow" and surrounded by a border of groups of four. All the while, he was trying to distract himself from the remaining tiles and from a developing anxiousness that was ill-defined. Those other tiles, however, appeared to press for recognition constantly, and he could not hold onto the central established image. An attempt to limit and constrict his interest as a buffer against the invasion of the multiple possibilities finally brought him to the idea that the ceiling would drive him crazy, and the laughter gave him distance and relief.

The dynamic possibilities inherent in his different views of the tiles were apparent; at this early point in the analysis, however, attention was drawn to his need for control and to his use of some distracting structure as a protection against intrusive feelings, ideas, and memories. It was because of this that the couch, free association, and analysis itself had been so threatening. That dread had now passed its first encounter.

This vignette illustrates a frequent resistance seen in analysis: the attraction to a focused, limited area, sometimes with obvious dynamic content, as a protection against the engagement of more diffuse, archaic, or less defined anxieties. The analyst must be wary of being lured into the structured, well-defined offering, while overlooking the more dreaded unconscious representations crowded out of the center.

25 East 83rd Street
New York, New York 10028

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Freud: The Fusion of Science and Humanism, The Intellectual History of Psychoanalysis. Edited by John E. Gedo and George H. Pollock. Psychological Issues, Volume IX, Nos. 2/3, Monograph 34/35. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1976. 452 pp.

Mark Kanzer

To cite this article: Mark Kanzer (1978) Freud: The Fusion of Science and Humanism, The Intellectual History of Psychoanalysis. Edited by John E. Gedo and George H. Pollock. Psychological Issues, Volume IX, Nos. 2/3, Monograph 34/35. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1976. 452 pp., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 118-150, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926833

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926833

BOOK REVIEWS

FREUD: THE FUSION OF SCIENCE AND HUMANISM. THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF PSYCHOANALYSIS. Edited by John E. Gedo and George H. Pollock. Psychological Issues, Volume IX, Nos. 2/3, Monograph 34/35. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1976. 452 pp.

This volume undertakes to trace the intellectual history of psychoanalysis back to the humanism of the Renaissance, with vistas beyond that to the "know thyself" of the Greeks. This line of development is also projected forward to a method for extending individual analysis to group behavior and history. An original and daring enterprise, it represents workshop collaboration and individual contributions by members of what may be called the contemporary Chicago School.

Most of the sixteen individual articles have appeared in the literature previously. Already linked by a common viewpoint, they are further integrated by commentaries of the editors and by an inspirational summing up by Heinz Kohut, whose influence has been pervasive throughout. An introductory chapter by Gedo and E. Wolf, "From the History of Introspective Psychology: The Humanist Strain," launches the themes that are to be developed as the work proceeds. Humanists are defined as "particular type(s) of intellectual(s) who, in addition to their classical learning, focused their professional activities within the areas of poetry, history and moral philosophy" in contrast to the more empirical disciplines of natural sciences and behavior (law). Gedo and Wolf find it "the essence of the analyst's activity to engage in self-analytic introspection, to use the tools of poetry and history, and to aim at moral self-improvement" (p. 12). Humanism is seen as reaching its pinnacle with Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), in whose teachings may be found points of comparison with psychoanalysis. Gedo and Wolf discover an antithetical figure in Descartes, whose application of natural sciences to psychology they hold to be disastrous, foreshadowing empiricism, experimental psychology, and behaviorism.

For this reviewer, such sketching of broad lines of development leaves problems that call for further definition. Was Freud really more prone to use poetry and to seek moral self-improvement than

to use guidelines of empirical research and to seek therapy? Lines of descent can be and have been drawn between Descartes, Locke, and John Stuart Mill (whose work Freud translated) to Freud's own differentiation of thing-representations and word-representations in his 1915 work on the unconscious.[1] Some have seen Descartes' *"cogito ergo sum"* as placing introspection and the mind of the observer for the first time at the core of the observing process in science. Indeed, Descartes was so self-analytic that he applied modern techniques to the understanding of his dreams. Lewin considered his *cogito* as equivalent to Freud's observing ego and his philosophy as a creative application of his dreams.[2]

More immediate and detailed scrutiny of "Freud's Cultural Background" in Vienna is provided by H. Trosman. Both the conflicts between romanticism and classicism and the political ascendance of anti-Semitism over a mild liberalism in the Hapsburg empire left their mark on Freud. Young Jews, excluded from political activities, turned to intellectual careers and displayed remarkable talents in the arts and sciences. Trosman examines, not entirely negatively, the influence of the Jewish mystical tradition on Freud and concludes that the total combination disposed the maturing youth "toward an empirical investigation of psychic reality" (p. 70).

A fascinating section of the volume is devoted to chapters by Gedo and Wolf that include the first English translation of a previous review of Freud's "Ich Letters" and the republication of a paper on "Freud's 'Novelas Ejemplares'" (Cervantes). These invoke the notable correspondence extending back to early adolescence with his youthful schoolmates, Eduard Silberstein and Emil Fluss. We obtain a preview of important documents not yet generally available. Important episodes—the "Gisella affair," Freud's youthful visits with his mother *to* his birthplace, Pribor (which may be quite as significant for his travel neurosis as the better known travels *from* Pribor), and, above all, the Tom Sawyerish founding of

[1] *Cf.*, Modell, A.: *Object Love and Reality. An Introduction to a Psychoanalytic Theory of Object Relations.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1968.

[2] Lewin, B. D.: *Dreams and the Uses of Regression. Freud Anniversary Lecture.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1958. Reprinted in *Selected Writings of Bertram D. Lewin.* Edited by J. A. Arlow. New York: The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, Inc., 1973, pp. 329-352.

a secret society, the Academia Castellana, with Eduard Silberstein, to study the works of Cervantes in their original tongue—are definitely within the line of development of his personality and of analytic organizations to come, as the authors point out.

While this material is presented as confirming an impression of young Freud as "an introspective genius," it becomes somewhat self-defining to consider his tranquil reaction to the split-up with Gisella also as a manifestation of such "introspective genius." Other tendencies may be noted that were of the greatest significance for the future of psychoanalysis—his constant hunger for companionship and his indefatigable interest in people (whether literary or real). The exploration of their motives cannot be defined, as the authors do, merely as narcissistic and resulting in identifications. The hunger was for object relations that would lend accuracy to his empathy and intuition. Actually, the Silberstein-Fluss relations seem to continue the games with his nephew, John, which in early adolescence led to their alternately acting the title roles of Schiller's *Caesar and Brutus.* Interest in reviving and enacting the past would prove most significant in the future.

The authors' guideline of the introspective genius stimulated by a faceless double does not prepare us for the observing and empirical genius who so brilliantly learned to understand one patient after another, with whom he had, as he said of the Wolf Man, no special empathy. Neither does it prepare the authors of the book to present convincingly the relationship to Breuer, a veritable giant of intellectual history who showed for the first time that symptoms were meaningful. He further devised a theory and method that disclosed these meanings and resulted in cures, however "primitive" such early models may seem to subsequent generations.

The "facelessness" of Breuer becomes impressed upon us as Anna O becomes the senior partner in devising cathartic treatment: "Freud replaced the cathartic treatment he had inherited from Bertha Pappenheim—Anna O—and Josef Breuer . . ." (p. 4). Breuer's scientific style, especially in the theoretical section of *Studies on Hysteria,* is reproved for its "unsupported speculation" (including as it does the principle of constancy, the primary and secondary processes, and the concepts of free and bound energy) as compared to Freud's more inductive presentation of case material in the same volume. Breuer is ultimately dismissed as leaving be-

hind a heritage which showed that "the internally consistent evolution of psychoanalysis was a process which took place exclusively within Freud's mind" (p. 168). Open-mindedly, the authors report that their discoveries came as "something of a surprise" to Anna Freud and that she thought her father would have been surprised also. Certainly, he was to aver after thirty years that psychoanalysis still contained within its nucleus the cathartic treatment devised by Breuer.

One methodological note occurred to the reviewer. The investigators were particularly distressed by Breuer's theoretical portion of the *Studies*. They overlooked the fact that Freud's theoretical portion was not in the *Studies* themselves but was transferred to the *Project* because of differences of opinion with Breuer. The *Project* has not failed to distress a great many people ever since and shows just about all the faults attributed to Breuer—"faults" which are part of the creative side of thought, as compared to the narrower ways of natural science that had previously led to the favoring of Montaigne over Descartes by the same group.

Gedo comes to grips with a proposition that is recurrent throughout the volume and at times assumes the proportions of a theorem: that Freud's self-analysis became "the basis for all his analytic discoveries" (p. 288). In less dogmatic form, this can prove a fertile field of research. Gedo quite properly points to the fact that "we possess very little historical evidence about the process of self-analysis for the period after 1901, when Freud ceased to announce its results to Fliess" (p. 300). He undertakes to devise methods for extracting analytic ore from such semi-autobiographical "novels" as Freud's studies of Gradiva, Leonardo, and Moses. Disarmingly, he calls on us to read this chapter "with maximal use of one's historical imagination" (p. 286). Still, when we proceed behind inferences about Freud's self-analysis to such concrete suggestions as that "the structural theory of the mental apparatus occurred in response to the mastery of the severe frustrations of his seventh decade of life" (p. 304), we are reminded of the importance of reconstructing not only the presumptive course of biography and self-analysis but also the inherent determination of theories by the observations and problems they are invoked to understand.

Fortunately, the volume is particularly rich in material for such correlations, ranging from an examination of Charcot's influence

on Freud (J. A. Miller and others of the Workshop on the Scientific Methodology of Psychoanalysis of the Chicago Institute), the progress of his hypotheses as apparently affected by self-analysis (L. Sadow, et al.), his metaphors and style in a "turning-point" essay, "The Aetiology of Hysteria" (E. Wolf), and his remarkable affinities for doubles like Boerne (Trosman), the Earl of Oxford as presumptive author of Shakespeare's plays (Trosman), and Popper-Lynkeus (Trosman and Wolf). There are also studies of the relationship of Breuer to Anna O (G. Pollock) and of Ferenczi (Gedo).

In the last chapter, Heinz Kohut steps forward in a specially written and lengthy communication to draw for us the lessons inherent in these studies. As usual, his thinking is original, fertile, and deeply entrenched in the humanistic viewpoint. A list of the outstanding points is only a preliminary to the perusal of the article itself: Kohut approaches Freud's self-analysis not from the point of view of the therapy, but rather in relation to spells of creativity that involved a merger with an idealized, omnipotent "other." It differed from other analyses in that he was able, "on the strength of the unique and special endowment of his ego, to turn each personal insight into a suprapersonal scientifically valid psychological discovery" (p. 392). Kohut suggests further that the transferences established by creative minds during periods of intense creativity resemble those of narcissistic personalities. He notes that the idealization of Freud plays a key role in maintaining the psychic equilibrium of the individual analyst as well as in the maintenance of group cohesion within the analytic community. The self-analysis of this community is suggested as a precondition for the analytic study of history.

The volume is obviously of extraordinary significance; it calls for careful study, especially in relation to several of the major trends in psychoanalysis today.

MARK KANZER (NEW YORK)

PSYCHOTHERAPY AND PSYCHOANALYSIS. THEORY. PRACTICE. RESEARCH. By Robert Wallerstein. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1975. 475 pp.

This is a collection of Wallerstein's essays, written between 1951 and 1973. Generally, the work achieves balance and demonstrates

the range of its author's interests over the past twenty-five years. In four of the papers, Lewis Robbins, Ishak Ramzy, Harold Samson, and Neil Smelser were co-authors.

In "The Role of Prediction in Theory Building in Psychoanalysis," the author reminds us that although it is not usually described as such, prediction does play a significant role in all phases of analytic work from diagnosis to treatment. The role of prediction was studied in the Psychotherapy Research Project of the Menninger Clinic. Predictions were made according to the formula: "If this occurs, then this will happen because of these assumptions in our theory." The study aimed at tracing and examining "the natural history" of the processes and outcomes of psychoanalytic psychotherapies.

In a chapter entitled "Research Training for Psychotherapies," Wallerstein carefully examines the advantages and pitfalls of research training, cautioning the reader that research can be used to advance psychoanalysis only if properly approached. He points out that it can also be used perversely to defy established principles rather than to bring about real progress. He commends the research principle to his reader as generally advantageous, and suggests model programs for research training of the clinician and for clinical training of the researcher.

In "The Futures of Psychoanalytic Education," Wallerstein places psychoanalytic education in the framework of education in general and its difficulties. He cites Bernfeld's proposal that all psychoanalytic education be abolished in favor of a return to the informality of earlier days. He also mentions Kairys's suggestion that the training analysis should be separated as much as possible from the educational progression. He carefully argues that our analytic training centers have used the educational process to gather evidence of resistance and transference. Although these are undoubtedly present at times, such difficulties ought to be dealt with in analysis and in the supervision, not in the classroom. The latter setting should be free to allow issues of knowledge, validation, etc., to be dealt with in their own terms.

Wallerstein urges that psychoanalytic research and education be carried out in full-time institutes where analysts who are able and interested can work under reasonable conditions, rather than at night after a busy day at the office. He also suggests the development

of multiple tracks and multiple career models, such as the Hospital Psychoanalyst, the Social Psychoanalyst, the Experimental Psychoanalyst, etc.

In these examples, among many samples of his work in theory, practice, and research presented in the volume, Wallerstein's continuing efforts to find new paths to ensure the survival and growth of psychoanalysis are clear. We who practice psychoanalysis owe him a great deal, and there is every reason to expect that psychoanalysis as science and profession will continue to be enriched as Robert Wallerstein carries on his important work with the same prodigious energy, sense, and sensitivity he has demonstrated in the past twenty-five years.

BARRY L. SIEGEL (ANN ARBOR, MICH.)

CHILDREN AND PARENTS: PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES IN DEVELOPMENT. By Judith S. Kestenberg, M.D. New York: Jason Aronson, Inc., 1975. 496 pp.

This volume is a collection of Dr. Kestenberg's writings over a span of thirty-five years. The book includes important clinical observations, theoretical formulations, and a highly original and courageous application of basic biological and endocrinological facts to issues of human psychic development. It is also a narrative of the growth of a scientist during an especially exciting "developmental period" of our own discipline, child analysis and child development, from the early 1940's to the present day. Finally, it poses several challenging questions for clinicians and researchers in the coming decade if child analysis is to retain the vitality and fertility of its earlier years.

The papers are presented in three major groupings: Part I, "The Development of Sexuality," comprises five papers originally published from 1941 through 1973; Part II, "Phase Development from Infancy through Latency," comprises four papers published from 1946 through 1971 and two contributions previously unpublished; Part III, "Phase Development in Adolescence," includes four papers published from 1961 through 1968 as well as three previously unpublished papers written with Esther Robbins around 1972. The reader is therefore confronted with a rich panorama of ideas, which are often only slightly related to other papers in a given section,

and at times with concepts and even terminology from a much earlier period in the author's thinking and in the development of our field.

The two earliest published papers in this volume, "Mother Types Encountered in Child Guidance Clinics" (1941) and "Early Fears and Early Defenses" (1946) are examples of "old-fashioned" analytic writing that merit a permanent place in our literature and contain gems of clinical observation faithfully displayed and sensitively understood. These papers exemplify the nuances of intimate resonance and interpretation that have long provided the basic ground structure from which solid child analytic work has emanated. From Dr. Kestenberg's preface as well as from the later papers, it is fascinating to see how these early observations, in addition to her own special attunement to the phenomena of rhythm, led to a determination to acquire a method for recording objectively (and hence permanently) the data of movement of child and mother individually and in interaction. This in turn yielded rich clinical and theoretical insights regarding the role of rhythmicity as a basic psychobiological ingredient in the development of children, particularly in their use of and attunement to object relationships. The author is candid and courageous in her use of modifications of the "effort-shape" movement notation, and she indicates faithfully how the study of movement has influenced her understanding of the phenomena of psychic growth. To be sure, Dr. Kestenberg's movement notation studies *have* been the subject of periodic controversy. Approximately three papers in this volume relate directly to the movement studies. In these, clinical material and theoretical considerations regarding rhythmicity, reciprocal rhythmicity between mother and child, and the importance of biological rhythms in the vicissitudes of object relationships and internal psychic development can be assessed and evaluated independent of rhythm notation techniques themselves.

In terms of the evolution of a science and a scientist it is interesting (and humbling) to note that the current resurgence of attention and research into "biological clocks"—the circadian and other biological rhythms that govern some of the most fundamental physiological processes in living beings—was really anticipated by Dr. Kestenberg's observations and interests over twenty years ago.

Dr. Kestenberg's specific and original approach in the study of

developmental phases is contained in the middle chapters of the book. In her introduction to this material, she notes: "Throughout subsequent chapters phase development will be highlighted by emphasizing insights gained from the study of: 1. motility as prototype and expression of mental functioning and 2. organization of developmental progression from stages of disequilibrium to stabilization of structure" (p. 189). Throughout the subsequent chapters she demonstrates the growth and change within the child and between parent and child, as "the two systems, the nonverbal and the verbal, supplement and reinforce one another." At times the presentation is highly clinical, observational, and descriptive. At other points there is a transition to the metaphorical which, to the reader uninitiated in the specific terminology that she employs, may seem to turn gradually into the allegorical. Discussions of the "flow of shape" and the "Affinity (coordination) of Tensions-flow with the Shape-flow" are terms unfamiliar to most readers (this reviewer included) and their application to the development of object relations is often provocative and sometimes confusing. Dr. Kestenberg possesses the virtue of consistency within her own terminology, and her frequent return to clinical examples helps to hold this material together for the clinician.

Rhythms—physical, psychological, and basically physiological—underlie both concept and organization of presentation in Part III of the book, "Phase Development in Adolescence." Here Dr. Kestenberg and her colleague, Dr. Esther Robbins, represent the phenomena of adolescence in their complex biological and physiological dimensions and in relationship to the concomitant psychological and psychosocial changes to which clinicians are especially attuned. In this section one finds some most provocative suggestions, as well as some which are most difficult to array and relate to the material and arguments presented earlier in the book. The author holds, for example, that the phenomena of biological clocks parallel what we can observe clinically in the *need for withdrawal,* which varies in its intensity and amount at different phases of development. It is more difficult to comprehend, however, except in the most metaphorical sense, how the "community spirit" occurs as an outgrowth of these early and basic physiological rhythms. "Through the reorganization of rhythmic relationships in adolescence a stable structure of adulthood evolves: the *community spirit,* which keeps

rhythmicity in check and safeguards the individual and his community from the excesses of drive-dominated behavior. The social conscience and its successor, the community spirit, become incorporated into the superego, the former in latency and the latter in the last phase of adolescence" (p. 443). The foregoing exemplifies one of Dr. Kestenberg's not altogether satisfactory fusions of biological fact, sociopsychological observations, and psychoanalytic theory.

In her conclusion, Dr. Kestenberg summarizes the thrust of her work over these past three decades: citing "changes in the rhythmic production of certain hormones and the rhythmic changes in motility with specific references to the rhythmicity inherent in the behavior of adolescents," she further states, "We found that there was a developmental trend from repetitive alternations between playing with mother, one's own body and things through periodic repetitions of contact with various people and finally to adulthood, in which there are controlled variations between intimate and more remote objects, groups, and solitude" (p. 459).

Throughout, Dr. Kestenberg approaches her data and ideas with the humility of a true scientist, even to the caveat of her closing footnote: "The data on which our descriptions are based stem—unless otherwise specified—from therapy or observations of middle-class adolescents" (p. 460). In this she reminds us that in addition to dealing with a biological reality which exists for all children (and parents) in a relatively uniform way, there is also a spectrum of social realities from which the final developmental result is never completely free. She considers the varieties of "absent fathers," for example: the father who is absent from the lower-class family either because he was never part of that family circle or has long since abandoned his family responsibilities is an absent father; so too is the middle-class family father described by Dr. Kestenberg, who is "commissioned to overcome new rivalries on an annual basis" and who on this account may be psychologically absent in vital ways from his child's upbringing and developmental experience.

Children and Parents is an exciting and rewarding volume for the clinical and research analyst and for child development professionals.

HERBERT J. GOLDINGS (WEST NEWTON, MASS.)

STUDIES IN CHILD PSYCHOANALYSIS: PURE AND APPLIED. The Scientific Proceedings at the 20th Anniversary Celebrations of the Hampstead Child-Therapy Course and Clinic. (Monograph Series of the Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, No. 5.) New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975. 175 pp.

From one of the most productive of all child psychoanalytic research centers comes this collection of papers. They have been culled from a larger group of presentations which constituted the scientific program of the celebration of the twentieth anniversary of the Hampstead Child-Therapy Course and Clinic. Each contribution is representative of an area of interest under investigation by members of the staff. The stimulating influence of Anna Freud is reflected throughout, beginning with her foreword and continuing in the form of comments included in many of the papers. In her foreword, Miss Freud briefly outlines the history of the clinic from its beginnings as an outgrowth of the Hampstead Nurseries which she and Dorothy Burlingham operated during World War II. Training, therapy, and research became interrelated goals, with special attention devoted to diagnosis, establishment of an index, and the formation of concept study groups. In one of the chapters in the book, Miss Freud describes the present Nursery School of the Hampstead Child-Therapy Clinic. She dates its current orientation from 1967, when it was designed to serve children of underprivileged and disadvantaged families. This clinic, like some in the United States, attempts to make up for deficiencies in parental care, such as physical nurturing, affection, or mental stimulation.

The first part of the monograph opens with Albert J. Solnit's overview of the clinical and therapeutic activities of the Clinic. He describes the scope of those endeavors under three headings: Direct Observation; Research; and Other Applications of Psychoanalytic Theory. As an illustration of the broader application of psychoanalytic knowledge in the Hampstead tradition, he cites the case of a three-and-a-half-year-old girl treated in a pediatric intensive care unit at Yale University Hospital. The Yale Child Study Center staff collaborated in the treatment of this child, who had suffered severe injuries when she was run down by an automobile. Especially important in her recovery was the direct involvement of the parents in helping to undo the repression consequent to the trauma. Solnit

quotes from the mother's intelligent, insightful letters to suggest that the child's mutism was a reaction to the feelings of helplessness and loss of control caused by the injuries. There is little doubt that the participation by the parents and the coordination of the care of the child rendered by different hospital departments were essential elements in restoring the child's health physically and psychologically.

In the second article of this section, Joseph Goldstein discusses the participation by Anna Freud and Dorothy Burlingham as faculty members of the Yale Law School during the past ten years. Their work has served to extend analytic understanding to the court's relation to the child and the family. As an illustration, Goldstein examines the case of a child whose adoption was being challenged by the biological mother. The reasoning of the judges in rendering their opinions clearly reflects the impact of new knowledge in child development derived from centers such as the one at Hampstead. The trend is toward more humanistic and less legalistic thinking and decisions.

The second part of the book consists of contributions from the various study groups of the staff. From the Group for the Study of Technical Problems in Treatment, Agnes Bene writes on "Depressive Phenomena in Childhood." She notes the doubts about the existence of an organized depressive syndrome in childhood and cites Joffe and Sandler's view that childhood depressive phenomena are examples of a specific mode of affective reaction. The child she describes suffered, at the age of three years, the loss of a sister who was two years older than herself. Further deprivation was caused by the illness of the mother following the death of the sister. Beneath the ostensible problems of penis envy and the need to control and possess lay the earlier feelings of disappointment and despair.

Sara Rosenfeld, from the Study Group for Borderline Cases, presents the treatment of a nine-year-old child. The boy had suffered a number of severe physical and psychological traumata between the ages of nine months and seven years. In particular, being scalded by boiling water at nine months had created a heightened response to danger in the child; it had also made the mother suffer from feelings of unworthiness which were transmitted to her son. The analyst discusses the technical approach and the course of an

analysis which yielded greater integration and improvement in a number of ego functions. The discussion utilizes the concepts of Anna Freud, Kohut, Kernberg, and Mahler to explain the pathogenesis, as well as the rationale for and outcome of treatment. Rosenfeld gives special emphasis to the evaluation of the child's self- and object representations in working with borderline children.

Maria Kawenoka Bergen of the Clinical Services staff describes the treatment of an eleven-year-old, partially blind boy. The case reflects the special interest of Hampstead in blind children. The boy's realization of his progressively increasing blindness due to optic atrophy and his awareness of the genetic link with a blind father, who was in the process of leaving the family, led to conflict over masculine identification for the boy, causing a retreat from a positive oedipal orientation. The report of the analysis deals principally with the boy's fear of his aggression, his fear of separation from his mother, and his bisexual tendencies. After two years there was evidence that treatment was releasing phallic exhibitionistic and competitive strivings and was resulting in improved social relationships.

The Group for the Study of Diagnostic Assessment discusses children with obsessional symptomatology. These children differ from the classical picture of obsessional neurosis. Their symptoms include preoccupation with real dirt and with feces. The symptoms are sudden in onset and disappear quickly in some cases. There is also a lack of symbolization and intellectualization.

Thomas Freeman from the Group for the Study of Adult Psychosis demonstrates the value of using the profile schema to obtain more accurate clinical description and the possibility of improved nosology. Comparison of psychotic children and adults by the schema has shown that there are similarities in symptomatology. Disturbances in interpersonal relationships and impairment in the quality of libidinal drives were present in both groups.

The concluding article by Joseph Sandler for the Index Research Group attempts to define and classify sexual fantasies and theories in childhood. The difficulties inherent in all such efforts are demonstrated here. Following a review of Freud's views on fantasy and sexual theories, material from the analysis of a five-year-old girl's pregnancy fantasies is discussed in a most interesting and thought-provoking way.

Despite Anna Freud's statement that this clinic differs so much

from other clinics in the variety of cases and severity of disturbances seen, I believe the essential difference lies more in the caliber of the staff, the greater depth of analytic understanding, and the stimulating guidance by Anna Freud. The book, as the program was intended to be, is representative of the work being done at the Hampstead Clinic and will therefore be of interest to all who wish to keep abreast of ongoing psychoanalytic research by a dedicated team of talented analysts with an inspiring leader.

ISIDOR BERNSTEIN (GREAT NECK, N.Y.)

SCHIZOPHRENIA AND GENETICS: A TWIN STUDY VANTAGE POINT. By Irving I. Gottesman and James Shields with a Contribution by Paul E. Meehl. New York and London: Academic Press, 1972. 433 pp.

This scholarly and innovative study of the etiology of schizophrenia will interest psychoanalysts for two reasons: first, because it supplies evidence of a genetically based predisposition to schizophrenia and thus gives substance to the long felt presence of a "constitutional" factor; second, it makes very clear that schizophrenia cannot occur as a result of the genes alone and that environmental stress plays an equally significant role.

Gottesman and Shields detail the steps taken to arrive at these conclusions. Their study, commenced in 1962 and carried on over a period of seven years, uses a series of all same-sexed twins from sixteen years' consecutive admissions to outpatient and short-stay inpatient psychiatric facilities at the Maudsley Hospital. Fifty-seven twin pairs were found, twenty-four monozygotic (MZ) and thirty-three dizygotic (DZ), approximately evenly divided between the sexes. At least one member, the index case (or proband), of each pair had been registered at the hospital and diagnosed as schizophrenic. Synopses of the individual case histories are presented with all pertinent details, including verbatim excerpts from tape-recorded follow-up interviews, comments concerning the pair, and in some instances, the reasoning underlying the diagnoses.

Prerequisite for any twin-based study is the ability to make an accurate separation between MZ and DZ same-sex pairs. Here this was routinely achieved by the use of fingerprint patterns and the quantification of blood grouping.

An unusual feature of this study was the use of "consensus blind

assessment." The authors sought to avoid experimenter bias which "may lead the investigator to make diagnoses contaminated by his knowledge of the zygosity of the pair and biased in the direction of his expectations" (p. 209). Similarly, the strictness or looseness of the diagnostic standards could influence concordance rates. To prevent such errors, each member of a panel of six experts was asked to apply his personal criteria in using the diagnostic classification of *Schizophrenia, ?Schizophernia, Other Diagnosis,* or *Normal,* and was supplied with all the pertinent data of the one hundred fourteen individual patients, with the exception of the prior diagnosis of the twin and the zygosity.

This method produced a consensus diagnosis showing pair concordance for schizophrenia in MZ pairs as eleven out of twenty-two, in DZ pairs three out of thirty-three. These results clearly indicated the existence of a genetic factor in the etiology of schizophrenia. Whether this was due to the influence of a single gene or polygenes was then discussed. Although the authors favor a polygenic theory, they concluded that insufficient information is available at this time for a decision to be reached.

Among the genetic effects on concordance, it was found that in MZ pairs the co-twin was more likely to be schizophrenic if the illness of the proband was severe and if his or her previous personality was assessed as schizoid. In fact, the MZ co-twin has a risk about fifty times greater of becoming schizophrenic and the DZ co-twin seventeen times greater than a member of the general population of comparable age.

> . . . there was often a very considerable resemblance in the form the psychosis took in a pair of schizophrenic twins. . . .
>
> A personality of a kind which may be described as schizoid is almost certainly largely genetically determined. . . . However, not all schizophrenics develop from a schizoid personality, even in concordant pairs of twins, and not all nonschizophrenic MZ co-twins are diagnosable as schizoid. Some genes may be implicated which only get "switched on" once certain psychosomatic states have been reached. Different though often related genetic and environmental factors may contribute to the etiology of each case (pp. 253-254).

Since the results of their study showed only fifty per cent concordance, Gottesman and Shields re-examined the eleven discordant pairs in an effort to understand why one of the twins became schizo-

phrenic and the co-twin did not. The many environmental or stress-producing situations frequently thought to be responsible for the predisposition to, or the precipitation of, schizophrenia were considered. Among these were biological, nongenetic determinants such as order of birth and birth weight and social factors such as minority group membership, illegitimacy, adoption, broken homes, and the presence of psychiatrically abnormal relatives in the home of rearing. The authors concluded that "none of these variables, singly or in combination, were more frequent in concordant pairs" (p. 292). There was also insufficient evidence that inter-twin identification had any effect; in only three pairs, two MZ and one DZ, did it appear possible that psychosis in one twin had any influence on the other. Nor could support be found for presuming the existence of a "schizophrenogenic" mother. Only one mother "treated the future schizophrenic in an irrational manner" (p. 291). However, small differences in interpair dominance appear to be significant in that the more submissive twin showed a relative failure in socialization and greater susceptibility to any existing predisposition to schizophrenia.

> There is an increasing risk of schizophrenia to the relatives of schizophrenics as a function of the degree of genetic relatedness. The familial distribution cannot entirely be due to environmental differences between families—the MZ concordance rate is higher than the DZ—or to gross differences within families such as sex or birth order. . . .
>
> Paradoxically, it is the data showing that identical twins are as often discordant as concordant for schizophrenia that provide the most impressive evidence for the important role of environmental factors in schizophrenia, whatever they may be (pp. 317-319).

According to this study, neither genetic nor environmental influences alone are sufficient to produce schizophrenia. The authors see their diathesis-stressor theory as filling "the chasm between geneticism and environment" (p. 337) and conclude that they have laid to rest the old nature-nurture controversy.

It should be helpful to clinicians *to know* what could only be surmised up to now: that genetically determined constitutional givens do exist for schizophrenia. This knowledge may not affect the treatment method or the goals, but it does point to a new field of inquiry —the search for those life experiences that may precipitate schizophrenia in genetically endangered individuals. The authors ex-

press the hope that eventually, if such experiences can be reduced to a common denominator, such as anxiety-producing stresses, for example, effective preventive measures will evolve.

MARJORIE R. LEONARD (STAMFORD, CONN.)

THE MYTHIC IMAGE. By Joseph Campbell. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Bollingen Series C, 1975. 552 pp.

This book, as the title indicates, is devoted to the mythic image, as distinct from the problem of mythmaking. It is an impressive volume, of coffee-table dimensions, elegant in format and lavishly illustrated. The accompanying text is related to the illustrations and offers detailed, erudite interpretations of the images depicted, with careful reference to both ancient and recent sources. It is a book to be enjoyed both for its visual stimulation and its scholarly account of the mythologies of the world.

The book covers mythic imagery in many areas: the East and the West; nonliterate and literate cultures; Judaic, Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist religions. The themes include the origins of the earth and humanity; birth, death, and resurrection; the dream; sacrifice; unity with God and release from self.

There are few references to psychoanalysis, and these are mainly quotations from Jung's writings. The author mentions Rank and limits his reference to Freud to a quote from Jung, who says: ". . . anyone who penetrates into the unconscious with purely biological assumptions will become stuck in the instinctual sphere and be unable to advance beyond it, for he will be pulled back again and again into physical existence. It is therefore not possible for Freudian theory to reach anything except an essentially negative valuation of the unconscious. It is 'nothing but' " (p. 410).

To learn Campbell's thoughts on the nature of myth and mythmaking one must turn to his earlier writings. In these, especially in *The Masks of God: Primitive Mythology,* Campbell gives a detailed account of Freud's contribution to the understanding of human psychic development and the similarities of infantile fantasies and the myths of all cultures, but he denigrates the significance of this contribution in language that is more expressive than precise. For example, in this earlier work he accepts the concept that the "universal images" of myths "are developed largely from such

infantile imprints," but "constitute merely the raw material of myth." His emphasis is that myth is "progressive, not regressive." He adds: "However, for the psychoanalyst then to make use of the fantasies of the regressive case as the key to the scientific understanding of the progressive functioning mythology and ceremonialism of the social group in question would be about as appropriate as to mistake a pancake for a soufflé." [1]

Would not a more careful reading of Freud have informed Campbell of the meanings and implications of sublimation, in his writings on the significance of religion and art? And would not a more careful reading of psychoanalytic writings, for example, Arlow's 1961 paper on ego psychology and mythology,[2] have informed Campbell that Freudian psychoanalysts are fully aware of the "progressive," adaptive function of myth?

The evolution of human beings from their hominid state has given them the power of speech, the capacity for conceptualization, and the capacity for symbolization. The fruit of this development is the unique quality of human psychic functioning. The psychoanalytic study of this unique quality considers, among other characteristics, the role of unconscious mentation, the search for causality to explain and codify perceptions of the outer world and inner feelings, and the effort to avoid unpleasure, including the denial of death, so prominent in myths of rebirth.

Claude Levi-Strauss in *The Savage Mind* gives ample evidence of the capacity of the primitive human for logical thought, conceptualization, and abstraction. Primitive humans, too, seek to explain, to codify. In all cultures there are myths that gratify these basic needs. Some myths are archaic, their sources lost in prehistoric times; some are current, the response to events that are ill-understood or too painful to accept. In every instance it is the lack of scientific knowledge which evokes the myth.

What is central to a myth is that it must be consciously believed. Otherwise it is a fable, an allegory, a fairy tale. These also contain truths, but for the most part these truths are maintained unconsciously. Primitive people who fashion a mask know it is made of

[1] Campbell, J.: *The Masks of God: Primitive Mythology*. New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1959, pp. 91, ff.

[2] Arlow, J. A.: *Ego Psychology and the Study of Mythology*. J. Amer. Psa. Assn., IX, 1961, pp. 371-393.

wood or metal, but they worship it as a god. We have here an analogy to the split described by Freud in the case of fetishism—the conscious awareness of the reality of the mythic image or fetish alongside the unconscious significance of the image or the fetish. The myth is the social expression of the individual's need to know the unknown, to gratify the unattainable, and to deny the unacceptable.

As human knowledge of the world, the universe, and the self increases, the need for myth decreases. This does not deny the importance of myth in the development from myth to science, nor its importance even to this day. Myth has a place along with art. Freud has said, "Our knowledge of the historical worth of certain religious doctrines increases our respect for them, but does not invalidate our proposal that they should cease to be put forward as the reasons for the precepts of civilization." [3]

In his essay "Freud and the Future," delivered on the occasion of Freud's eightieth birthday, Thomas Mann said: "The mythical interest is as native to psychoanalysis as the psychological interest is to all creative writing. Its penetration into the childhood of the individual soul is at the same time a penetration into the childhood of mankind, into the primitive and the mythical." [4] So, too, Cassirer says, ". . . before man thinks in terms of logical concepts, he holds his experiences by means of clear, separate, mythical images." [5] Science and myth, he tells us, are different ways of perceiving. Primitive humans created art, myth, and religion. They were limited by not having the scientific knowledge available to us today, although we have reason to question the use to which we are putting that knowledge. Myth is basic in the development of the individual and in the development of mankind. It is a stage in the progression from fantasy to reality, from ignorance to truth.

Although Campbell's book lacks the insight that psychoanalysis has to offer to the understanding of myth and mythmaking, it is useful and deserves the careful attention of the psychoanalyst.

DAVID BERES (NEW YORK)

[3] Freud: *The Future of an Illusion*. Standard Edition, XXI, p. 44.

[4] *Cf.*, Mann, T.: *Freud, Goethe, Wagner*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1937, p. 29, n.

[5] Cassirer, E.: *An Essay on Man*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944.

ART AND ACT. By Peter Gay. New York: Harper & Row, 1976. 256 pp.

Since Freud's controversial venture into Leonardo's iconography (1910), a virtual flood of publications has appeared, attempting or purporting to account for the "creative process" or to explicate the content—seldom the form—of works of art of all ages and in all media.[1]

More recently, application of psychoanalytic ideas to historical events and to the lives of historical figures has led to the emergence of psychohistory, a new interdisciplinary synthesis that seeks to meld the depth perceptions and psychological insights of the psychoanalyst with the rigorous scholarship and long-range perspective of the historian.[2] Now, in Peter Gay's *Art and Act* we have the logical development in this progression—a historian's excursus into the lives and work of three major creative figures whose art, he believes, serves as exemplars of historical processes. Creativity is viewed here as a phenomenon in history, illustrative of causative principles that, Gay proposes, work on all levels of historical explanation.

A new approach to the psychoanalytic psychology of creativity is certainly needed. From Freud's time to our own there have been two basic trends in such studies. The effort to "interpret" works of art or artists' biographies to expose unconscious motivations and/or meanings has been widespread but has rarely demonstrated anything in the personal history or preoccupations of artists that can truly account for a particular and unique mode of resolving conflict or communicating meaning. (Greenacre's work, "The Childhood of the Artist," [3] is a major exception here.)

[1] *Cf.*, Rothenberg, A. and Greenberg, A.: *The Index of Scientific Writings on Creativity*. Hamden, Conn.: Shoestring Press, Inc., 1974, et seq. This comprehensive bibliography, when completed, will contain listings of some nine thousand works on the subject of creativity. Although not all of these are by psychoanalysts, enough of them are to document the intensity and persistence of analytic interest in this enigmatic theme.

[2] *Cf.*, Erikson, E.: *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1958; Erikson, E.: *Gandhi's Truth: On the Origins of Militant Nonviolence*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969; Langer, W.: *The Mind of Adolf Hitler: The Secret Wartime Report*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972; Mazlish, B.: *Psychoanalysis and History*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963.

[3] Greenacre, P.: The Childhood of the Artist. Libidinal Phase Development and

The second body of work has sought to delineate the special psychological capacities that make creative work possible. Such concepts as Ehrenzweig's "unconscious dedifferentiation" and Rothenberg's "Janusian thinking," [4] as well as Kris's "regression in the service of the ego" and, of course, Freud's "sublimation," have been advanced to account for the artist's capacity to create "significant form." [5] Critical examination of these notions shows, however, that all are essentially descriptive in nature; none of them specifies special genetic or dynamic factors responsible for the existence or development of such capacities. We seem here to be in the realm not of psychoanalysis but of cognitive psychology; at least, these matters have little to do with those issues of motive, affect, or meaning that are the central concerns of psychoanalysis. At the same time, there is a

> continuing tendency to deal with "creativity" as a vicissitude of the drives—to treat it, that is, as did Freud with his concept of sublimation. Hartmann's substitution of "neutralization" and his attention to the adaptive aspects of such enterprises have not significantly diminished the focus of most investigators on the libidinal or . . . aggressive transformations that supposedly motivate the artist. Such explanatory attempts do not, I think, serve us or the artist well. They do not promote—they scarcely allow—a distinction between art and vandalism on the one hand or art and coitus on the other; statements about "taming," or "sublimation," or "neutralization" describe, but do not explain, the proposed transformations, or help us to understand the genetic background, dynamic forces, or adaptive aims at play in the artist's experience. At best, they help to explain the *content,* but rarely if at all the *formal* elements that represent the essence of the work of art. They contribute little or nothing to a psychology of *style.*[6]

Peter Gay, Durfee Professor of History at Yale, is concerned with precisely this issue: how can one formulate systems of historical

---

Giftedness. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, Vol. XII.* New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 47-72.

[4] *Cf.,* Ehrenzweig, A.: The Undifferentiated Matrix of Artistic Imagination. In: *The Psychoanalytic Study of Society, Vol. III.* Edited by W. Muensterberger and S. Axelrad. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., pp. 373-398; Rothenberg, A.: *The Process of Janusian Thinking in Creativity.* Arch. Gen. Psychiat., XXIV, 1971, pp. 195-205.

[5] *Cf.,* Langer, S.: *Philosophy in a New Key.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957.

[6] Esman, A. H.: *Richard Huelsenbeck.* Amer. Imago, XXXII, 1975, p. 364.

causes that can account for the specific stylistic qualities that animate the work of artists of widely different styles and temperaments? In a previous work, *Style in History*,[7] he addressed similar questions in the realm of historiography, exploring the styles of such diverse masters as Gibbon, Macaulay, Ranke, and Burckhardt. To this present task, Gay brings an unusually sophisticated grasp of psychoanalytic principles. In his Introduction he spells out what are for him the relevant psychoanalytic ideas; most particularly, he is impressed by Freud's concept of overdetermination as a safeguard against oversimplification and reductionism. "Was it," he asks, "Picasso the political activist, Picasso the anti-Franco Spaniard, Picasso the experimental painter, Picasso the self-conscious autobiographer, or a combination of these Picassos who painted *Guernica*?" (p. 14). Further, he finds Hartmann's concept of the "conflict-free sphere" of the ego valuable as a means of incorporating into the causal network a wide range of goal-determined, effective behaviors and adaptive functions.

As his subjects, Gay chooses Edouard Manet, Walter Gropius, and Piet Mondrian, each an acknowledged master of the modernist movement. Each in turn serves to demonstrate his thesis that "art . . . enjoys no special status in historical analysis: its causal texture is as rich, as variegated and ultimately as unpredictable as the texture of diplomatic or military events" (p. 5). Schematically, the complex of causes can be classified into three broad interacting categories relating to the culture, to the realm of craft or work, and to the personal, or inner, world of private motives. It is the interplay of these classes of causative elements, all represented to some degree in every historical act, that determines the particular features of each specific act or the product of each specific actor on the historical stage. "Psychology," he says, "is not the sole property of the private world . . . it forms an essential part of all the worlds from which historical causes emerge . . . all history must be in significant measure psychohistory" (p. 19).

Gay's success in weaving these strands into a seamless web of causality makes *Art and Act* both a scholarly tour de force and a source of challenging insights about his protagonists and about the multiple roots of artistic work. Indeed, Gay is one of the few

[7] Gay, P.: *Style in History*. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974.

psychoanalytically informed scholars who have dealt with the theme of art as *work*—as the product of craft consciously applied for practical as well as expressive purposes. Psychoanalysts have, by and large, accepted the Romantic view in which the artist is an inspired, tortured, alienated creator. No matter that the "inspiration" comes from the "the unconscious" rather than from God or the muses; the artist is said to work under the pressure of an impulse whose source is alien to his conscious self, and the product is the consequence of his elaboration of that urge. Rarely do we read of artists "creating" in order to earn money with which to pay their rent or feed their children, or to fulfill commissions, or for any of the mundane purposes that govern the labors of the rest of us. No more do we read in psychoanalytic essays of the artist's interest in solving purely esthetic or technical problems; these are generally dealt with as at best secondary motives or even serendipitous consequences of the primary wish to express an unconscious impulse or to resolve an unconscious conflict. Corbin's (1974) discussion of the role of "autonomous ego functions" in creativity is one of the few statements of psychoanalytic interest in such matters.[8]

Gay, however, deals extensively with all these issues. Manet, "a personal painter, a self-aware artist, and a painter of modern life," exemplifies the primacy of culture as a shaping force. Manet was immersed in the bourgeois world, of which he was a comfortable, participant observer, and "represented the 'moral temperature' of his age to perfection." Gropius, dedicated to the fulfillment of the architect's eternal purpose—"to make buildings that one could live in"—imposed upon his political passions and his aesthetic individuality the imperatives of a rigorous craft. Mondrian, finally, utilized his superb craftsmanship in the service of a tortured defensive flight from sensuality, rationalized at times in terms of cosmic philosophy, but ultimately serving his need to impose the most rigorous and compulsive controls over his peremptory drives.

It becomes apparent here that each of these geniuses found his own way to his creative work. The elucidation of elements of style represents a major gain, and Gay's brilliant dissection of Mondrian's work in particular earns him our deep gratitude. Those

[8] Corbin, E. I.: *The Autonomous Ego Functions in Creativity.* J. Amer. Psa. Assn., XXII, 1974, pp. 568-587.

who speak, then, of a unitary "creative process" tend toward precisely the kind of reductionism Gay seeks to avoid. To his credit, Niederland (1976) acknowledges in his most recent work [9] a variety of "creative processes," the precise pattern of which depends in each case on the very group of factors Gay delineates.

But we find ourselves still left with a profound gap in our understanding. Given all the factors so convincingly sketched out for us, we still must ask: What made it possible—indeed, imperative—for these three men, and for the endless parade of others through history, to impose, through the application of their craft within the frame of a particular culture, the magic of significant form on the chaos of their private experience? On this question, Gay, like the rest of us, is forced to take ultimate refuge in Freud's oft-quoted dictum, "Before the problem of the creative artist analysis must, alas, lay down its arms." [10] And it is here, finally, that we touch the boundaries of psychoanalysis as an explanatory science. Rothenberg and Hausman have suggested that, in the end, the creative act is simply inexplicable—that it transcends the possibility of scientific understanding.[11] Maybe so. In any case, it is evident that psychoanalysts, unaided, will never be able to succeed in explaining it as long as they remain wedded to quasi-mystical notions of a unitary "creative process," and to a concept of creativity as a vicissitude of drive discharge. "The bulk of psychoanalytic formulations about 'creativity' is, I believe, distinctly culture- and time-bound. They are most valid for the avant-garde artist of the 19th and 20th centuries, working in a cultural context in which he has lost his essential social role, and in which he operates in a dialectical tension with . . . bourgeois society. . . ." [12] Should the two hundred odd cantatas of Bach, written to serve the ritual needs of the church of which he was a functionary, be understood merely as expressions of unconscious instinctual drives or attempts to resolve

[9] Niederland, W. G.: *Psychoanalytic Approaches to Artistic Creativity*. This QUARTERLY, XLV, 1976, pp. 185-212.

[10] Freud: *Dostoevsky and Parricide*. Standard Edition, XXI, 1927, p. 177.

[11] Rothenberg, A. and Hausman, C. R.: Creativity: A Survey and Critique of Major Investigations. In: *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Science. An Annual of Integrative and Interdisciplinary Studies, Vol. III*. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1974, pp. 70-97.

[12] Esman: *Op. cit.*, p. 362.

conflicts? Are we to deny the laurel of creativity to those anonymous artisan-geniuses of "primitive" cultures who have produced such masterpieces as the Assyrian temple reliefs, Dogon woodcarvings, or Mayan steles in conformity with the abiding cultural needs and traditions of their people?

Gay, at least, would not say so. His scheme of causal processes would, I think, allow us to embrace the creative work, not only of those rare "inspired" geniuses who have ordinarily interested psychoanalysts, but also those journeyman artists—the Lippis, the Dittersdorfs, the Trollopes, the Signacs, the O'Caseys—whose products, conceived within the received tradition, nonetheless represent significant contributions to our artistic heritage. It would certainly require that we consider the vast array of nonconflictual factors that contribute to all those behaviors that can be construed as creative.[13] His effort to enlarge our grasp of historical causation and his perceptive explication of the many-layered texture of artistic work stands, I believe, as a major corrective to careless thinking, simplistic reductionism, and overambitious speculation. For those who are interested in the application of psychoanalysis to the artifacts and processes of culture, his book will be invaluable. Written with grace, clarity and wit—with, may I say, style—it represents a substantial contribution to humane letters and can serve as a model for those—be they historians or psychoanalysts—who seek in the future to explore similar terrain.

AARON H. ESMAN (NEW YORK)

WHITMAN'S JOURNEY INTO CHAOS. A PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF THE POETIC PROCESS. By Stephen A. Black. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975. 255 pp.

As the title suggests, this is a literary explication, using psychoanalysis as a tool, of the major themes in Whitman's poetry. Regrettably, the emphasis is on Whitman's poems rather than on the life of the artist and its relationship to his art. Regrettably—because applying psychoanalytic technique to Whitman's work without giving a coherent personal picture of the writer makes it

[13] Chomsky has suggested that every verbal utterance, insofar as its form is original and unlearned, is the product of a creative act. See his *Language and Mind*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1968.

difficult at best for the reader to reach a fuller understanding of Whitman. Black does provide biographical details and personal vignettes, but they appear more to support interpretations of the poems than to provide the necessary, coherent analytical picture of Whitman. The book reads as if it were written for an inner circle of Whitman scholars already fully acquainted with the esoterica of his life, or like a published doctoral thesis limited by the required format of the academic exercise for which it was prepared. Whatever the reason, it suffers from a lack of psychological sense of Whitman as man and poet.

Psychoanalyzing a poem at some distance from the poet is like analyzing a dream apart from the dreamer. It can be done as an academic exercise but its results are speculative, theoretical. There is a watery thinness to the intellectual soup that results from its preparation without the biographical flesh and bones of the artist. In a sense, a psychoanalytic study of poetry is, by its nature, a contradiction in terms. Psychoanalysis, above all, begins and ends with the person, the personality, and while it makes perfectly good sense to analyze an individual poem as you might a dream or a delusion, it is ultimately a mental event in the life of the author and must be understood as such.

Furthermore, this book is weak at what it does attempt to do: provide an extensive reading and explication of the poems from the psychoanalytic point of view. Too frequently the explications consist of little more than translations of poetic images into clumsy psychoanalytic jargon. For instance, when Whitman writes

> His own parents . . . he that had propelled the fatherstuff at night, and fathered him . . . and she that had conceived him in her womb and birthed him . . . they gave this child more of themselves than that . . .

Black comments that the passage reflects Whitman's moving closer to "unconscious Oedipal conflicts." This belaboring and restating of the obvious in psychoanalytic terminology does nothing to further the reader's understanding of the work.

And at times Black does worse—he misreads the obvious. Much of his approach to Whitman is based on the unconvincing assumption that the poet's homosexual feelings were unconscious, that Whitman was unaware of them. According to Black, Whitman consciously considered the athletic love he celebrated between men

to be asexual friendship. Yet Whitman's poems are filled with robust, physical images of bisexual love. Although we cannot prove that Whitman was, or was not, actively a physical lover of men, a common-sense reading of his images suggests that he was consciously aware of these feelings.

Black's readings of the poems are based on an oversimplified all-or-none psychoanalytic theory of creativity, in which complete repression is required to generate poetic utterances as a symbolic form of sublimation. He would have us think that Whitman was naively unaware of the nature of his feelings and imagery. What Whitman may well have been unaware of was the childhood sources for those feelings, and Black's study offers little in the way of a developmental perspective to elucidate those origins.

Black's readings of the psychological themes in Whitman's poetry are at times sensitive and enriching but he does not go far enough: Whitman was preoccupied with the issue of generativity and lustily identified with the roles of both sexes in his imagery festively celebrating procreation and parenting. While Black does talk about possible patriarchal origins for these images in Whitman's surrogate parenting of his younger siblings, he stops far short of providing an explanation for the extraordinary strength of Whitman's drive toward generativity itself. Black also describes the poet's reckless freedom in fluidly merging with the different elements in his poetic universe so that he moves like a vagabond from element to element in the poetic landscape. He shows us how, in a poem about a ferry crossing, Whitman is the ferry, the river, and the passengers. Here, too, Black is at his best in demonstrating this proneness to symbiotic mergings, but he has less to say about the origins of these needs or the adaptive purpose the poetic expression served for Whitman.

In summary, I found this book lacking in psychoanalytic sophistication, too narrow in its approach to Whitman's work, and rather densely written for the reader who does not bring to it a prior fund of knowledge about the poet. The book is more rich in its summary of the powerful psychological themes that Whitman wrote about, although the tendency toward psychoanalytic jargon is frequently distracting.

STEPHEN A. WEISSMAN (WASHINGTON, D.C.)

HANDBOOK OF RORSCHACH SCALES. Edited by Paul M. Lerner. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1975. 523 pp.

One of the major controversies in contemporary clinical psychology concerns the potential contribution of diagnostic psychological tests (particularly the Rorschach) to clinical and research endeavors. In the past decade there has been a considerable decline in the utilization of these procedures in many clinical settings and a marked reduction in the amount of training offered in these procedures in many graduate training programs. This decline in interest in intensive diagnostic assessment was in part a function of the disenchantment with individual psychotherapy and an increased emphasis on action-oriented, brief, crisis, and group treatment. This shift away from the interpersonal and intrapsychic was also expressed in an emphasis on behavior therapy, psychopharmacological intervention, and possible biological and genetic factors in psychopathology. These shifts have occurred partly because of the doubts about the efficacy of individual psychotherapy and its capacity to meet the mental health needs of our society. In this context, intensive diagnostic psychological assessment often seemed like an unnecessary luxury.

In addition to the social and political issues in mental health which have had consequences for the decline in interest in diagnostic assessment, there has been considerable doubt about the reliability and validity of projective procedures, especially the Rorschach. Many of these doubts are based on research done in the decade from 1945 to 1955 which led to an uncritical acceptance of the myth that diagnostic psychological tests (e.g., the Wechsler Intelligence Test, the Thematic Apperception Test, and the Rorschach) yielded unreliable data with little potential contribution for clinical or research endeavors. The convergence of the sociopolitical issues of the mental health movement with early negative research findings led to a marked decline in interest in diagnostic psychological assessment.

But there are now indications that the current generation of mental health trainees are once again becoming interested in interpersonal and intrapsychic issues and in intensive individual psychotherapy. There has been increasing debate about the possible

manipulative and coercive aspects of some forms of behavior therapy and there is considerable controversy about the specificity of genetic and biological factors as determining predispositions in a wide variety of severe psychological disturbances such as schizophrenia and depression. At the same time there is an increasing number of research findings which indicate that the earlier judgment about diagnostic psychological tests has been quite premature. There are signs of renewed interest in diagnostic psychological assessment in some psychology graduate training programs and in many clinical settings.

The publication of the *Handbook of Rorschach Scales* is only one of a number of recent statements in this area. In this work Paul Lerner presents, and thoughtfully comments upon, some of the more important research statements that indicate that projective procedures can provide meaningful data if they are administered properly, if the responses are considered within appropriate theoretical context, and if the data are related to appropriate and meaningful criteria. Because of the major shifts in the mental health field in the past decade, there was little need for most clinical and research psychologists to reconsider the earlier negative judgment about projective techniques. With the return in interest in individual therapy and intensive psychological assessment, Lerner's *Handbook* and other recent statements in this area may provide some focus and direction for a more judicious and systematic reappraisal of the earlier negative conclusions about the reliability and validity of data gathered with the Rorschach.

While there are important differences between the psychoanalytic context and responses given to projective techniques, the data produced in the response to the ambiguity and the lack of structure of projective stimuli has important similarity with free associations and dreams. Recent findings indicate that responses to projective techniques can provide valuable data for testing clinical hypotheses. Projective tests may provide a partial answer to the perplexing problem of how to establish an adequate data base for the systematic investigation of some hypotheses derived from psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic theory.

SIDNEY J. BLATT (NEW HAVEN, CONN.)

THE CYCLES OF SEX. By Warren J. Gadpaille, M.D. Edited by Lucy Freeman. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1975. 496 pp.

This is a well-written book which uses knowledge of biology, anthropology, and sociology intertwined with a basic psychoanalytic view of individual development. The author, at the present time the Chairman of the Committee on Adolescence, Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry, is quite adept at extracting, summarizing, and utilizing references from these various fields. The style is adapted for interested members of the health, education, and guidance professions. At the same time, this book helps to broaden the sexual education and the framework of the medical student and those in family practice, as well as residents in adult/child psychiatry.

Because of biological studies that indicate androgens are necessary for male differentiation, the author proposes that the young boy's envy of the caretaking maternal figures, especially his envy of their ability to propagate, is as difficult to resolve as penis envy in young girls, perhaps even more difficult. Gender differences are minimized in this book, in spite of the fact that there is no consensus at the present time in research studies.

From the psychoanalytic literature, the author selects strange bedfellows of an uneven caliber, with different frames of reference. He nevertheless uses them indiscriminately as authorities. For these reasons this book cannot be satisfactory to the psychoanalyst, although it may prove helpful to the related disciplines mentioned earlier.

MAURICE R. FRIEND (NEW YORK)

THE DISTORTED IMAGE. GERMAN JEWISH PERCEPTIONS OF GERMANS AND GERMANY, 1918-1935. By Sidney M. Bolkosky. New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Co., Inc., 1975. 247 pp.

In this, the toddler age of psychohistory, it is a pleasure to find a small, but significant study of excellent quality. Bolkosky shows that during the years of the Weimar Republic, German Jews were obsessed with the memories of the German literary and philosophical leaders of the Age of Enlightenment. Their lives were dominated by the myth that the German philosophers and writers of the Age

of Enlightenment, especially Goethe, Schiller, and Lessing, represented the true spirit of the German people. These writers, particularly Lessing in *Nathan the Wise*, symbolized for them the embracing of the biblical spirit and a merging of it with the German "*Geist*." This created the illusion that the more they preserved their Jewish identity, the more German they were, provided they embraced all the "German" virtues such as fervent patriotism.

Taking refuge in this fantasy view of themselves resulted in a paradox for German Jews. The greater the anti-Semitism, the greater the rejection of the Jews by the Germans, the greater was the pressure to take refuge in this mythological construction and to disavow the current reality as merely a temporary aberration held by a minority of misguided people. The extremes to which German Jews went to deny the threat to themselves, is, of course, well documented. Yet the scope of the denial induces disbelief. Professor Bolkosky shows that even after Hitler took over the government of Germany and proclaimed the "Ayran paragraphs," Jews maintained the myth that the Fuehrer only used anti-Semitic rhetoric to gain power and that he would mellow and change his attitudes. The article of faith to which they clung as they were drowning was that Germans could not do anything unfair to the Jews since they were united by the national and cultural identity.

Having established this historical background, Bolkosky goes on to a psychohistorical study of this phenomenon. Using psychoanalytic theories of myth and illusion, he demonstrates that the myth created an Edenic age complete with its heroes. The myth substituted for the unacceptable reality. In dissecting the anatomy of the myth, he uses the theories of Melanie Klein and Paula Heimann to explain how the ideals of the Jews were projected upon the German people. There was a form of projective identification with the "good" self-representation. Bolkosky notes the narcissistic nature of this relationship and uses contemporary psychoanalytic conceptions to explain the nature of the mythopoesis and the consequences of it. The fantasy fusion of the good self-representation with the grandiose-good-object-representation overrode the German Jews' ability to perceive the political changes in Germany realistically. Blinded by a mirror-transference to their heroic archetypes, they were unable to take self-preserving actions.

The study not only carefully analyzes psychological factors in the

tragedy of the German Jews, but has universal application to the interaction of other relations between host nations and ethnic minorities. The narcissistic idealization of a whole nation may not be a unique aberration, but rather a virtually inevitable development under certain circumstances, for instance, in colonial constellations or in one-nation-dominated political states such as the Soviet Union. Under such conditions, the dependent minority may be driven to blindly misperceive the tortured convulsions of the dominant nation as the tournaments of its heroic age and thus become the victims of a holocaust.

HENRY KRYSTAL (SOUTHFIELD, MICH.)

THE ORDEAL OF CIVILITY. Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss, and the Jewish Struggle for Modernity. By John Murray Cuddihy. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974. 272 pp.

This work "examines the 'hidden transformations' of the everyday life problems of assimilating Jewry . . . into the very thought structures of Jewry's intellectual giants: Freud, Marx, and Lévi-Strauss." The process is viewed as a crucial dimension "of the threat posed by modernization to a traditionary subculture . . . the danger that being 'gentled' posed to an 'underdeveloped' subculture indigenous to the West" (p. 14). Freud dominates this provocative but affectionate book by an Irish-American Professor of Sociology at Hunter College. The author was "for a short time in the late nineteen-forties a patient of Dr. Theodore P. Wolfe," who had helped Wilhelm Reich settle in Forest Hills, New York in 1939. Cuddihy forthrightly tells it "like it is" without hiding behind modifying clauses. The effect, on this reader at least, is very much as I imagine the effect might have been for the first readers of Freud's unequivocal, deceptively simple discussion in print of universally guarded secrets: shock waves of defensive denial mixed with admiration and the suspicion that there is too much to think about and decide from a single reading. With time, Cuddihy's fellow sociologists of knowledge will determine whether he has duplicated for the seemingly trivial "Protestant Etiquette" (described here as the subculture's actual experiencing of Weber's Protestant Ethic) Freud's feat of extracting meaning from the seeming trivia of parapraxis (*The Psychopathology of Everyday Life*).

Cuddihy understands "Etiquette" in the "nontrivializing sense of public behavior and civility . . . requiring at a minimum the bifurcation of private affect from public demeanor," a transformation insurmountably alien to "Life-Is-With-People" *Shtetl* Jewry. Adopting Talcott Parsons's view of modernization as "a secularization of Protestant Christianity passing from affectivity to affective neutrality, from particularism to universalism," Cuddihy identifies among the requirements for modernization: 1, the separation of church and state as a Catholic trauma; and 2, the differentiation of ethnicity and religion—of manner and morals—as a Jewish trauma. Marxism, Freudianism, Haskalah, Reform Judaism, ideologies of the post-Emancipation era "have 'designs' on their Jewish audience which they wish to change (wholesale revolutionary economic change in the case of Marx, retail individual psychological change in the case of Freud), enlighten or reform" and at the same time "constitute an elaborate effort at apologetics, addressed to the 'Gentile of good will,' designed to reinterpret, excuse, or explain to him the otherwise questionable public 'look' of emancipating Jewry" (p. 4). Far from being assimilators like Chagall or Malamud, for example, Freud, Marx, Lévi-Strauss and intellectuals like Professor Harry A. Wolfson of Harvard are "proud pariahs" exhibiting "a principled and stubborn resistance to . . . Western civilization as an incognito or secularized form of Christianity" (p. 231).

Cuddihy ranges widely over Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals and artists to reinforce the prototype developed from material by or about Freud, the master of the hidden. He applies his findings from the Jewish subculture to the Irish and black subcultures and to early Christianity. His facility with language adds to the enjoyment, particularly in the chapter titled "A Tale of Two Hoffmans: The Decorum Decision and the Bill of Rites." But in at least one instance Cuddihy should have curbed his verbal exuberance and refrained from reiterating his catchy "id-Yid" phrase in support of a transformation for which he musters better evidence than the happenstance that "id," the English translation of Freud's *"das Es,"* can be found embedded in the word "Yid."

A glossary of Yiddish and sociological terms and a bibliography should have been included. An index and chapter notes at the end have been.

LUCILLE B. RITVO (WOODBRIDGE, CONN.)

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Revue Française de Psychanalyse. XXXVIII, 1974.

Emmett Wilson Jr.

To cite this article: Emmett Wilson Jr. (1978) Revue Française de Psychanalyse. XXXVIII, 1974., The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 151-167, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926834

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926834

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

ABSTRACTS

Revue Française de Psychanalyse. XXXVIII, 1974.

Constructions. Reconstructions. Concerning "The Construction of Analytic Space."

Double issue No. 2/3 of this volume contains the papers read at a colloquium on a work of Serge Viderman, *La construction de l'espace analytique* (*The Construction of Analytic Space*). Viderman is in favor of a relativistic view of the truth value of interpretations in psychoanalysis. He believes that the object of the analytic process is not a specific and accurate reconstruction of the historical past of the analysand. The constructions of analysis are instead created, imagined, or invented by the analyst. The psychic reality of the analysand is brought into existence by the analytic situation and by the development of "analytic space." Viderman emphasizes the metapsychological difference between primal and secondary repression. A "coefficient of incertitude" characterizes constructions made about primally repressed material, although there may be relative accuracy about the historical past of the analysand which is recovered from secondary repression. The archaic experiences of the analysand are without structure and are given a reality by the verbalizations occurring in the course of an analysis. This verbalization gives them a form and a concrete representation and, in effect, creates the past, structuring what was in itself inchoate, fragmented, unformed, and unrecognizable. Verbalization unifies and concretizes these experiences in a totally original manner and in a form which does not exist in any place other than the analytic space and through the language in which they are expressed. Between the instinctual experiences and the verbalizations of the constructions there is a qualitative jump, which Viderman attributes to the creativity of the analyst.

The Recompounded Past. Francis Pasche. Pp. 171-182.

Pasche argues that in the course of an analysis, the compulsion to repeat the past in the transference, together with the external frustrations of the analytic situation, leads to the recovery of actual memories. The analysand is compelled to represent, rather than act out his memories, and in so doing disengages his memories from repression. Since the memory can no longer be taken as a perception, the analysand is forced to move from the analytic "here and now" into the past and to place the images in their historical context, recovering the cathexes and fantasies that were attached to them. In other words, the memory becomes conscious. This is precisely the task of the analyst: to render the unconscious conscious. To do so, one must recover the many fragments and aspects of the remembered but repressed scene. Reconstructions are characterized by the recovery of specific details which are only contingently connected. As these details come into focus a particularly personal and individually significant scene is reconstructed. The patient may show some creative synthesis in this

reconstruction, but only the patient should be the "artist" in aligning the fragments. It should certainly not be the analyst as Viderman claims.

Brief Critical Reflections on Constructions in Psychoanalysis. Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel. Pp. 183-196.

Viderman's apparent denial of the validity and truth value of constructions in analysis is criticized by Chasseguet-Smirgel. Viderman's thesis raises questions for the scientific status of psychoanalysis and leaves little to distinguish the analyst's work from suggestion. Viderman undermines psychoanalysis as an instrument of knowledge. If he is correct, then psychoanalysis becomes a sort of Berkeleyan idealism, in which everything is in the mind of the analyst, while the existence of the reconstructed past becomes problematic. The aim of psychoanalysis is knowledge, and this aim is inconsistent with Viderman's thesis. Viderman would make psychoanalytic theory itself a "construction" on Freud's part. Chasseguet-Smirgel stresses a point also mentioned by Pasche: that the analytic contract is triangular, in that it is not just between the patient and the analyst, but involves submission of both parties to the basic rule. This represents submission to an external law, involving both the superego and external reality. Hence psychoanalysis pursues the actual historical past, and not a fiction about the past.

Concerning the Trauma of Seduction and Construction after the Event in Psychoanalysis. Julien Rouart. Pp. 197-211.

Rouart explores Viderman's thesis for its implications on the nature of unconscious fantasy and primal repression. We are inevitably forced to recognize the difficulties concerning the nature of primal fantasies. Some authors have claimed that these primal fantasies are the specific object of psychoanalysis. If primal fantasies are not given form except through the language of interpretation, how does one explain the occurrence of very primitive defenses such as splitting, projective identification, and primitive introjection? It would seem that there is still some minimal structure, some organization which characterizes primal fantasies, as shown by these primitive defense patterns. The traumatic character of a seduction may be due to the revival of these minimally structured primal fantasies. Viderman's work is stimulating in the development of our thinking about the nature of primal fantasies. The impossibility of knowing these fantasies other than through their derivatives has led to many diverse theories concerning their nature, from phylogenetic explanations to the Kleinian conceptions of their organization.

Notes on the "As If" Construction of Psychoanalytic Space and the Truths of the Transference. S. A. Shentoub. Pp. 233-237.

Earlier discussions of psychoanalysis have attempted to defend its scientific status while acknowledging its attempt to deal with the irrational elements of

human behavior. Now Viderman drops all claim of rationality and, in particular, the postulate that the transference involves a repetition of the past. Shentoub views Viderman's approach as pessimistic and skeptical. Viderman seems to suggest that psychic reality is inaccessible and, like Kant's noumenal world, cannot be known in itself.

Construction, Reconstruction, Creation. Jacqueline Cosnier. Pp. 241-251.

For Cosnier, psychoanalytic interpretation is one system of knowledge among others. It is creative, however, in that it orders and recognizes experiential elements already present in some other system. Many such forms of interpretation are found: children are subject to interpretations from their parents; secondary revision in a dream is a form of interpretation, etc. Hence psychoanalytic interpretation must be situated in a series of structural reorganizations of psychic economy which occur during the course of a life history. This new ordering integrates more reality than the earlier, but risks leaving aside some linkages and a certain quantity of instinctual energy. The best interpretive system would be one which assembles the greatest force and most meaning. If, as Viderman maintains, language is reductive and a betrayal made in the interests of communication, psychoanalytic interpretation is at the very limits of language in its efforts to recapture the multiplicity of lost senses obscured by language. Viderman's emphasis on the creative elements in an analysis is an important counterweight to the view which makes the analyst merely a decoder of what the analysand says. However, the analysand is much more the creator in analytic work. As the past is temporally as well as topographically differentiated, the patient seems to take charge of his or her own history.

Psychic Reality and Common Sense. Jean Bégoin. Pp. 257-266.

Viderman's work and the impassioned responses it has evoked is compared with the discoveries of Melanie Klein who was also concerned with the importance of unconscious fantasies in the psychic apparatus. Viderman emphasizes the role of countertransference and the role which the psychic apparatus of the analyst plays in the analysis. Hence Viderman's thesis places heavy responsibility on the analyst in the formulation of his or her interpretations. Analysts must be in communication with their own unconscious. The creative aspects of analytic space are such that the analyst must permit the development of an ideally functioning psychic apparatus which serves for development, integration, and creation, reminiscent of the early mother-child relationship.

Construction and Reality in Psychoanalysis. Jean Guillaumin. Pp. 271-295.

Guillaumin agrees with two main points that Viderman presents. The first is that the analyst plays an essential role in the analysis through the ordering effect of words used in working out a construction. The second point of agreement

is that the construction never leads to an integral reconstitution that is objectively faithful to what "really happened." For Guillaumin, these points of view are profoundly Freudian and accord with his own clinical experiences. Every analytic discourse has the question of reality in the background, but constructions raise the question of the historical past in a particularly acute way. Freud's 1937 paper "Constructions in Analysis" introduced an important ambiguity in Freud's attitude toward the reality of the recovered memories of his patients. For a while Freud had seemed to be immersed in a methodological skepticism concerning the reality of the recovered past memories, while the important therapeutic aspect of constructions was viewed as resulting from the coherence introduced into the personal psychic history. With the 1937 paper the question of the reality of memory is taken up again in depth, seemingly with a return to the objective realism of some of Freud's earlier views.

Analysts have been divided into two camps by this article. One group holds that the vocabulary of the 1937 paper is largely metaphorical, and hence that constructions are largely subjective elaborations about historical reality. Their functional value is that which is really important for the patient. Other analysts, however, hold that constructions attempt to attain the objective reality of the history of the patient as it actually happened. Guillaumin will join neither camp. He suggests rather that both Freud and Viderman are attempting to acknowledge the intensely subjective character of psychical experience while at the same time taking into account the unalterable nature of reality of the events which play a role in the structuralization of psychical life. This subjective-objective ambiguity is at the basis of all experience.

A New Psychoanalytic Spirit. Christian David. Pp. 305-313.

According to David, Viderman's thesis is an explanation for the development of various schisms in the psychoanalytic movement. The schisms may be due to insufficiencies in psychoanalytic theory and can lead to a relativism in psychoanalytic practice. Viderman's work suggests that the analyst who hopes to imitate the natural science model has not yet fully understood the intellectual import of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is different from other sciences in its approach. It is nevertheless scientific because of its internal coherence, because of the degree of intelligibility that it introduces into psychological phenomena, and because of its capacity to explain observable psychical functioning as seen in the analytic space. Viderman suggests, however, that the unconscious is essentially unknowable. David would settle for the less radical claim that there is a sort of homology between the unconscious fantasy and its reconstruction during the course of analysis.

The Bottle on the Water. Serge Viderman. Pp. 323-384.

Viderman compares writing a book with launching a message in a bottle into the sea, in that one does not know whether it will be found, or whether the

message written will at all resemble the message received. He succinctly reviews and clarifies the main themes of his argument and attempts to answer some of the critical objections raised in the foregoing papers. In particular, he emphasizes analytic space as being uniquely the product of the transference neurosis. He suggests that many of the criticisms fail to recognize that he was talking about the phenomena of the transference neurosis, rather than about the universal disposition for the establishment of transference. Since the transference neurosis is a product of the analytic process, constructions which develop out of the resolution of the transference neurosis must be viewed as having validity only within this field. The transference neurosis constitutes a new psychical formation which is the essential and specific event of the psychoanalytic treatment. His book was an attempt to clarify the difficult theoretical and technical problems which arise from this specific event.

EMMETT WILSON, JR.

Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease. CLXIII, 1976.

Therapists' Physiological Activation and Patient Difficulty. J. Busk; D. H. Naftulin; F. A. Donnelly; G. H. Wolkon. Pp. 73-78.

This article is of interest to psychoanalysts not so much because of the findings, but rather because it deals with an area in which we have little data. It was designed to determine the effects of patient difficulty on measured physiological activation and self-reported behavioral arousal experienced by psychotherapists during sessions with patients. It was based on the premise of arousal theory that the degree of arousal is a function of task difficulty and the physical or symbolic intensity of stimuli. The method utilized actresses trained to simulate either "easy" or "difficult" patients, portraying such "difficult" behavior as passive rejection, tension, withdrawal, and antagonism. "Easy" patient behavior consisted of more solidarity, tension release, joking compliance, offering suggestions, and expressing feelings. Although therapists were more aroused during therapy sessions than during rest periods, there was no significant difference in their responses when dealing with the difficult patients as compared to the easy ones. The authors discuss a variety of factors to account for this finding. It would seem that far more subtle and individually determined factors might account for arousal differences in therapists, but it would be useful to know if there are any generally ascertainable factors that are involved in the creation of the particular state of responsiveness in a psychotherapist.

Fugue States in Sleep and Wakefulness: A Psychophysiological Study. Emanuel Rice and Charles Fisher. Pp. 79-87.

This paper presents considerable detail about a particular patient, as well as the relevant literature and clinical data that are useful in the further under-

standing of fugue states. Fugues are manifestations of altered states of consciousness stemming from a variety of physical and/or psychological causes. They represent intense underlying needs to escape from threatening and painful realities. Previously, Fisher has classified fugues into types of increasing severity and separation from more conscious states of awareness and identity. These are really to be seen as a continuum, rather than as discrete entities.

The work with the patient under study suggests that his sleep-talking episodes are nocturnal equivalents of his daytime fugue episodes; they are similar in mental content and differ only in the factor of motility. The data indicate that the dream, the fugue, and some sleep talk are psychological correlates related to the REMP organismic state. This relationship is viewed as having both a physiological and a psychological basis. A similar continuity is postulated between the three organismic states of wakefulness, NREM, and REM sleep. In this particular patient the relationship of these states to his underlying conflicts is made quite clear, but the particular choice of symptom, as is so often true in psychoanalysis, remains somewhat inexplicable. The introduction of the physiological correlates may prove quite useful along these lines.

Is There a Reciprocal Relationship between Symptoms and Affect in Asthma? Donald I. Davis and William Offenkrantz. Pp. 369-390.

The authors present an interesting case report and an extensive survey of the literature concerning the old belief in a relationship between some physical symptoms and emotions. Davis and Offenkrantz hypothesize a reciprocal relationship between affective expression and physiological discharge. Other studies presented include those of Knapp who has repeatedly observed active and aggressive expression being replaced by helplessness and longing in episodes of asthma. Studied with direct bearing on the reciprocal hypothesis of this paper are those which demonstrate: 1) the presence of inhibition of affect in patients with psychosomatic conditions; 2) indirect support for the hypothesized reciprocal relationship; 3) that disinhibition of affect in a psychosomatic patient, especially an asthmatic, can occur in therapy and can be beneficial.

The case report stresses the psychotherapeutic exchange. Ratings were prepared to attempt to determine correlations between affective clinical reactions and physical clinical reactions during the course of therapy. To a large extent, the reciprocal relationship is demonstrated, although it is clear that the physical symptoms and affective reactions are not mutually exclusive. From a pragmatic point of view, the implications for psychotherapy are considerable. From the theoretical viewpoint, the authors view the asthmatic symptom and the affective experience as two alternative processes rather than as two different forms of energy discharge, interchangeable by conversion using some constant still to be determined.

HAROLD R. GALEF

Psihoterapija: Journal for Psychotherapy and Allied Disciplines (Yugoslavia). II, 1973.

On the Problem of the Transference Neurosis. G. Gero. Pp. 17-22.

Freud used the term, transference neurosis, in two ways. The first referred to a category of psychopathology designating neurotic patients capable of forming transference relationships and therefore treatable by the psychoanalytic method. Clinical work shows us that we cannot exactly correlate transference neurosis, in this sense, with particular symptoms. Phobias and obsessions, for example, occur in persons of widely varying psychopathology. The second use of the term referred to a product of the treatment work which leads to the patient's neurotic conflicts becoming organized around the analyst as the central transference figure. This represents a change in the form of the neurosis, giving information about its history and development, and it may be marked by a shift in manifest symptomatology. The author presents a case illustration in which the onset of a woman's neurosis in adolescence included sudden hemorrhagic cystitis following her first intercourse. The symptom disappeared thereafter, until an interpretation connected her sexual activity with her feelings for the analyst. Immediately following, she developed another episode of hemorrhagic cystitis.

On the Development of the Girl's Wish for a Child. E. Jacobson. Pp. 99-110.

Psychoanalytic work with a young girl, from her third to fifth year, permitted direct observation of the vicissitudes of her wish for a child. In the first phase, observation of her mother's pregnancy led to oral-sadistic fantasies of incorporation arising out of envy of the mother's having a baby in the womb. In the second phase, aided by primal scene exposure, these fantasies were condensed with penis envy toward the father, so that having a baby meant appropriating his genital. In the third phase, she felt as if she had been castrated by her mother. Narcissistic interest in the mother and penis envy of the father from previous phases came together, giving a sadistic cast to her genital oedipal wish to have a child. The wish was regressively expressed in the form of a revived fantasy of a feces-baby. The preoedipal stages of the girl's wish for a child stem basically from ambivalence toward the mother and the wish to appropriate the contents of her body. Therefore, we cannot yet accurately speak of the wish to have a baby "with the mother" or "to give the mother a baby."

Role of Psychodynamics in Amenorrhea. M. Kramar. Pp. 155-166.

The case history of a young woman with severe anorexia nervosa and amenorrhea is used to underline the difficulties in adapting to a feminine role, sometimes reflected in the symptom of cessation of menses. Two aspects are stressed. The first is an adaptation to overwhelming environmental pressure

which de-emphasizes the value of femininity. This may be seen in wartime when utility in the labor force, for example, is the dominant priority establishing personal self-worth. The second is an expression of deep intrapsychic conflict about the meaning of being a woman. Kramar emphasizes the significance of ambivalent ties to important female family figures.

OWEN RENIK

British Journal of Psychiatry. CXXVII, 1975.

The Multifactorial Model of Disease Transmission. I: Description of the Model and Its Use in Psychiatry. II: Sex Differences in the Familial Transmission of Sociopathy (Antisocial Personality). III: Familial Relationship between Sociopathy and Hysteria (Briquet's Syndrome). C. Robert Cloninger; Theodore Reich; Samuel B. Guze. Pp. 1-32.

This issue includes a series of three articles dealing with the multifactorial model of disease transmission. The first describes the model and its use in psychiatry. In the second, which explores sociopathy (antisocial personality), it is noted that more males than females are affected. The greater prevalence of disturbance among relatives of sociopathic women than among relatives of sociopathic men, coupled with the more disturbed parental home situation of the women, "suggests that the sex difference in the prevalence of sociopathy is due to sex-related cultural or biological factors causing the threshold for sociopathy to be more deviant in women than in men." Sociopathy in women would then represent a more deviant manifestation of the same etiological process. The good fit of the multifactorial model of transmission to the data would support a transmission based either on strong genetic influence or on a situation in which the genetic effect is small, relative to environmental factors that include many events whose effects are additive. This finding gives further support to the hypothesis of a similar etiological process, with female sociopathy representing a more deviant manifestation. Additional supportive evidence is offered.

In the third paper, the familial relationship between sociopathy and hysteria (Briquet's Syndrome) is explored. While the former is more common among men, the latter is more common in women. Several clinical and family studies have suggested for some cases a common etiology and pathogenesis, based on the observation that the two disorders often occur in the same family and in the same individual more often than would be expected by chance. Use of the model with three thresholds related to severity and sex can account for the population and family data about these disorders. This is "consistent with the hypothesis that hysteria is a more prevalent and less deviant manifestation of the same process that causes sociopathy in women. Depending on the sex of the individual and its severity, the same process may lead to different, sometimes overlapping, clinical pictures."

The Comparability of Suicide Rates. M. W. Atkinson; W. I. N. Kessel; J. B. Dalgaard. Pp. 247-256.

A comparison of suicide ascertainment procedures in Denmark, a country with a higher suicide rate than the international average, as opposed to England and Wales where the rate is lower than the average, showed marked differences. "In Denmark the official diagnosis of suicide is given by a doctor acting in private, using a balance of probabilities as his criteria," whereas in England and Wales the verdict on presumed unnatural death is given by the coroner (in effect a judge) in public, and a verdict of suicide requires proof of suicidal intention. Further, a study of English coroners and their Danish counterparts, in which each examined samples of the others' case records on a "blind basis," found that "Danes consistently report more suicides than the English coroners on the same material." A second study of deaths by poisoning in districts in England and Wales showed "considerable variation" from one district to another in those cases considered accidental, open, or suicide.

X-Linkage and Manic-Depressive Illness. Armand W. Loranger. Pp. 482-488.

Loranger questions whether the hypothesis that manic-depressive illness is transmitted through X-linked heredity can serve as a general explanation for all bipolar manic-depressive illness. His study shows the presence of father/son pairs to much the same degree as in other parent/child pairs. While the absence of these pairs in previous studies does not constitute the entire support for the hypothesis of X-linked transmission, the "probability values associated with these other findings are many magnitudes smaller than those found in studies of well established X-linked traits." Loranger concludes that the support for X-linkage "should be viewed as tentative and promising rather than definitive" and that while there is increasing evidence for X-linked transmission in "certain family pedigrees," whether they constitute a majority or a minority is yet to be determined.

ROBERT J. BERLIN

Journal of Psycholinguistic Research. IV, 1975.

The following abstracts appeared in the Journal of Psycholinguistic Research and are reprinted with the permission of the publisher.

Mothers' Speech to Children of Four Different Ages. Colin Fraser and Naomi Roberts. Pp. 9-16.

This study reports analyses, in terms of five different measures, of the speech on two standard tasks of thirty-two middle-class mothers to their children aged one and a half, two and a half, four, and six years. Sex and birth order of child were not found to be related to mother's speech. On four of the measures, both

task and age of child had strongly significant effects. In general, with increasing age of child, mothers spoke more, in longer and grammatically more complex utterances, with greater diversity of vocabulary. The differences in speech addressed to one-and-a-half-year-olds and that addressed to two-and-a-half-year-olds were particularly marked.

Is Language Acquired Through Imitation? Grover J. Whitehurst and Ross Vasta. Pp. 37-59.

The role of imitation in language acquisition is examined, including data from the psycholinguistic, operant, and social learning areas. From the psycholinguistic data, four empirical statements have been extracted: (1) there is no evidence that spontaneous imitations of adult speech influence grammatical development; (2) imitation of speech does not appear to occur with frequency beyond age three; (3) speech and hence imitation are not necessary for the comprehension of linguistic structures; and (4) most utterances of a child are novel and therefore could not have been exactly modeled. The first and second propositions are seen to be based on a too restrictive definition of imitation—immediate and exact copying. Selective imitation—a functional relationship involving similarity of a particular form or function of the model's responses—is proposed as an alternative, thus leaving the validity of statements (1) and (2) in question. Concerning assertion (4), certain data from the operant literature are presented as evidence of the compatibility of novel responding and modeling, imitation, and reinforcement. Finally, it is proposed that statement (3) suggests a mechanism by which selective imitation can be understood. A three-stage process is proposed in which comprehension of a grammatical form sets the stage for selective imitation of that structure, which leads in turn to spontaneous production. Thus imitation is a process by which new syntactic structures can be first introduced into the productive mode.

Semantic Organization in Deaf and Hearing Subjects. Ryan D. Tweney; Harry W. Hoemann; Carol E. Andrews. Pp. 61-73.

Hierarchical cluster analysis of data from the sorting of noun words was used to compare semantic structures in sixty-three profoundly deaf and sixty-three hearing adolescents. In the first study, performance differed only for a set of words referring to sounds, where deaf persons have no experience, and not for a set of common noun words and pictures. In the second study, differences between matched sets of high- and low-imagery words were comparable for sixty-three deaf and sixty-three hearing subjects. It is concluded that deaf subjects manifested abstract hierarchical relations and were not dependent on "visual mediators" or hindered by the absence of "acoustic mediators."

Studies in Dialogue and Discourse: II. Types of Discourse Initiated by and Sustained Through Questioning. Elliot G. Mishler. Pp. 99-121.

A sociolinguistic approach to the study of language is described. Three types of discourse are defined empirically, each of them initiated and sustained by ques-

tions. It is proposed that these types are linguistic expressions or "realizations" of authority relationships between speakers. In the first, Chaining, a conversation is extended through successive questions by the initial questioner; in the second, Arching, it is extended by the respondent's questions; in the third, Embedding, there are two responses to the question. The general hypothesis about the relationship of the linguistic structure of discourse to differentials between speakers in power and authority is examined through an analysis of natural conversations in first-grade classrooms. The findings provide consistent support for this hypothesis. When adults initiate a conversation with a question, they retain control over its course by successive questioning, i.e., by Chaining; when children ask an adult a question, the adult regains control by responding with a question, i.e., by Arching. Children question each other through a more balanced use of Chaining and Arching that might be thought of as either more egalitarian or more competitive.

Development of Temporal Patterning and Vocal Hesitations in Spontaneous Narratives. Sabine Kowal; Daniel C. O'Connell; Edward J. Sabin. Pp. 195-207.

Narratives were told aloud by twelve boys and twelve girls at each of seven age levels in response to nine cartoon pictures. Speech rate increased with age, due to corresponding decreases in both length and frequency of unfilled pauses (UPs), although the two measures were themselves uncorrelated. Parenthetical remarks (PRs) increased with age, while repeats (Rs) decreased. Location of UPs (81% before function words) was stable over age levels. Comparisons with other experiments are made. Interrelationships of speaking and thinking are discussed in terms of the cognitive and linguistic functions of length and frequency of UPs, respectively. Theories that neglect multiple psychological determinants of speech behavior and/or concentrate on only one level or unit of encoding are rejected as inadequate.

Personality Organization and Language Behavior: The Imprint of Psychological Differentiation on Language Behavior in Varying Communication Conditions. Irving Steingart; Norbert Freedman; Stanley Grand; Charles Buchwald. Pp. 241-255.

The language behavior of field-independent (F-I) and field-dependent (F-D) clinically normal, verbally resourceful female college students was examined in three different communication conditions: Dialogue, Warm (visually supportive) Monologue, and Cold (visually nonsupportive and stressful) Monologue. F-I and F-D subjects produced similar amounts of the different types of language behavior evaluated in each of the three communicative conditions. However, they differed with respect to verbal output and length of sentence "packaging" unit in Monologue conditions. F-D subjects talked considerably less but at the same time produced different types of grammatically more elaborate language behavior in Warm and Cold Monologue compared to their Dialogue language behavior. F-I subjects talked considerably more but also showed a type of language autonomy. The pattern of language behavior which characterized F-I speech in Dialogue remained the same in both Monologue conditions.

Training in the Use of Double-Function Terms. Harvey Lesser and Carol Drouin. Pp. 285-302.

Twenty first-, second-, and third-grade children were tested, trained, and retested in their use of double-function words (e.g., *hard, deep, bright*). Children first understand such words as they refer to inanimate objects, then to people in a physical sense, and last to people in a psychological sense. Wide variations in initial understanding and trainability of double-function words occurred. It is easier to train children to understand a double-function word as applied to a person in a physical sense than in a psychological sense. Words with tactual referents (*sweet, warm, dry, cold, hard*) are understood earlier than words with visual referents (*bright, crooked, sharp, deep*), but words with visual referents show greater gains after training. Several possible explanations of these results are discussed.

Semantic Components in Children's Errors with Pronouns. Jonathan Baron and Anne Kaiser. Pp. 303-317.

In the presence of the experimenter and two dolls, children were asked to respond to sentences containing pronouns which required distinctions to be made on the basis of person, number, and gender, such as "Point to *my* (*your, his, her, our, their*) feet." Errors tended to maintain distinctions; for example, *we* was treated as if it meant *I* (maintaining first person) or *they* (maintaining plural) more often than could be accounted for by a response-bias model. Furthermore, there were consistent individual differences in the kinds of distinctions that were difficult; some subjects had more trouble with number, others with person. These findings support the notion that errors made during acquisition result from dropping only part of the correct meaning, and they suggest that individuals may differ in the relative strengths of different components.

Analyzing Spoken Language into Words, Syllables, and Phonemes: A Developmental Study. Barbara Fox and Donald K. Routh. Pp. 331-342.

Fifty children aged three to seven years were asked to repeat spoken sentences and then to divide up these sentences into words, the words into syllables, and the syllables into speech sounds. There was a clear developmental progression in the ability to analyze spoken language in this way. The skills of analyzing sentences into words and words into syllables were highly related. Items requiring analysis of syllables into phonemes were highly correlated with each other and somewhat independent of sentence and word analysis items. The results are related to Gibson's model of reading, in which the acquisition of grapheme-phoneme correspondences is a crucial process.

On Differentiating Syntactic and Semantic Features in Emerging Grammars: Evidence from Empty Form Usage. Lawrence B. Leonard. Pp. 357-364.

Recent emphasis on underlying semantic relations in the child's acquisition of grammar has left ignored those cases in which syntactic operations can be observed relatively independent of semantic relations. Such operations may reveal optional processes in the child's transition from single-word utterances to grammatical usage that may be related to specific linguistic rather than general cognitive abilities.

Coherency in Children's Discourse. Elinor Ochs Keenan and Ewan Klein. Pp. 365-380.

We provide evidence that the capacity of young children to engage in social interaction exceeds that suggested by Piaget in 1926. Rather than being collective monologues, the conversations between the subjects of this study (twin boys) were dialogues: the children attended to one another's utterances and provided relevant responses. This was observed for conversations which were referentially based as well as for sound play exchanges. This is not to say that the children experienced no difficulty in sustaining cooperative discourse. It could take a speaker several turns to secure the attention of the co-conversationalist and establish a discourse topic.

Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy. II, 1976.

The following abstracts appeared in the Journal of Sex and Marital Therapy and are printed with the permission of the publisher.

Gender and Sexual Experience as Determinants in a Sexual Behavior Hierarchy. Leonard R. Derogatis; Nick Melisaratos; Margaret M. Clark. Pp. 85-105.

This study sought to assess the influence of gender and previous sexual experience regarding the structure of the basic sexual behavior hierarchy. Results indicated that both gender and previous experience have significant effects. Over-all, gender appeared to have a less substantial effect than previous experience, being more noteworthy for the similarities manifest between males and females than the few differences observed. Previous experience displayed a substantial effect, particularly in the upper portion of the hierarchy, with like-experienced groups showing marked similarity in their hierarchy patterns. Several significant gender-experience interactions were found regarding oral-genital behaviors, and a general trend was observed for females indicating negative *appreciation* from pre- to postexperience. Males revealed positive *appreciation* from pre- to postexperience on all but the most basic sexual behaviors. Conclusions were that while both variables influenced the hierarchy, effects were complex and often mediated by additional factors.

A Preliminary Classification of Human Functional Sexual Disorders. Lawrence Sharpe; Judith B. Kuriansky; John F. O'Connor. Pp. 106-114.

A preliminary classification is presented for functional human sexual disorders. This system is based on objective behavior and reports of distress. Five categories of sexual disorders are proposed, including the behavioral, psychological, and informational components of sexual functioning in the individual and the couple.

Primary Orgasmic Dysfunction: Essential Treatment Components. R. T. Segraves. Pp. 115-123.

In an attempt to determine the essential components of a successful treatment regime for primary orgasmic dysfunction, the principal treatment approaches are reviewed to elucidate the similarities in different programs which have reported similar outcome data. It is concluded that the systematic desensitization studies, the masturbatory training approaches, and the Reproductive Biology Research Foundation series are all effective treatment procedures. It appears that all three approaches employ graduated exposure to sexual stimuli plus some form of directive psychotherapy emphasizing interpersonal skills acquisitions. These may be the essential treatment components.

Assessment of Anomalous Erotic Preferences in Situational Impotence. Kurt Freund. Pp. 173-183.

Sometimes the main reason for situational impotence is a gross anomaly in a patient's erotic preferences. However, those patients who for one reason or other try to adjust in their sexual interactions to the general norm tend to hide or underestimate their true erotic preferences. This makes it necessary sometimes to base our diagnosis on data other than a patient's verbal report. An overview on nonverbal diagnostic methods is presented, and one of them, the phallometric test, is described in more detail, including a discussion of its limitations.

Issues in the Use of Psychophysiology to Assess Female Sexual Dysfunction. Julia R. Heiman. Pp. 197-204.

The viability of psychophysiology as an assessment approach for female sexual function and dysfunction revolves around physiological measurement issues, subjective measurement issues, and the nature of the sexual difficulty. Recent data are presented and discussed as are the potentials and limitations inherent in a psychophysiological study of human sexuality. A case is made for the use of vaginal pressure pulse as a primary measure, vaginal blood volume as a secondary measure, correlations between subjective and objective measures of sexual arousal, and intercorrelations between various subjective affect scales.

Androgens and Male Sexual Function: A Review of Human Studies. Raul C. Schiavi and Daniel White. Pp. 214-228.

This article is a review and brief discussion of recently gathered information on androgens and sexual behavior in men. It includes experimental observations on the covariance between androgens, mainly testosterone, and sexual functioning in normal heterosexual men and studies on sexual dysfunction and homosexual behavior. The effects of castration, hypogonadal conditions, hormonal replacement, and endogenous testosterone variations on sexual behavior are examined. Further psychoendocrine studies are necessary to evaluate the role of gonadal hormone production in impotency. Current pharmacological research does not furnish specific evidence that the administration of androgens or preparations that stimulate the secretion of endogenous androgens have beneficial effects on functional impotence. After reviewing the studies on male homosexuality and androgen levels, the article concludes that it has not been established that homosexual men are characterized by abnormalities in plasma testosterone.

Discrimination of Organic versus Psychogenic Impotence with the DSFI (Derogatis Sexual Functioning Inventory). Leonard R. Derogatis; Jon K. Meyer; Carol N. Dupkin. Pp. 229-240.

The present study is designed to discriminate impotence of biogenic origins from that with a psychogenic etiology on the basis of a psychological inventory—the DSFI. Subjects for the study were fourteen males with impotence clearly related to organic causes and a matched group of fourteen males with impotence of psychogenic origins. Comparisons of scores on the eight subtests of the DSFI revealed psychogenic males to have significantly higher scores on two subscales—*Experience* and *Gender Role Definition*. The latter showed psychogenic males to have hypermasculine role definitions, and a cutting-score analysis revealed an 89% correct etiologic assignment on the basis of the gender role variable. A detailed analysis of the *Symptoms* subtest indicated that psychogenically impotent males also showed markedly reduced scores on the Phobic Anxiety dimension. Results were interpreted in the context of gender role research, and a dynamic hypothesis suggesting that counterphobic mechanisms may be central to psychogenic impotence was postulated. Evaluation of the increase in predictive efficiency associated with use of the DSFI in this context revealed it to be of marked value in the clinical assessment of male potency disorders.

Historical and Theoretical Perspectives: Sex, Love, and Commitment Revisited. Clark E. Vincent. Pp. 265-272.

A "sociology-of-knowledge" perspective is used to examine the interplay among sex, love, and commitment within the context of historical trends and social changes. The implications of qualitative and quantitative differences

among love, sex and commitment are discussed in relation to 1) the concept of "multiple selves," 2) "individual variations in threshold levels," and 3) the misuse of "ideal types." Clinical and research efforts to differentiate among sex, love and commitment need to be balanced by explicit awareness of the tendency to compartmentalize these three areas.

Thoughts on Love, Sex, and Commitment. Henry Grunebaum. Pp. 277-283.

Some of the key issues involved in the interaction of love, sex, and commitment are delineated. Coupling is viewed from an ethological perspective that suggests that, in addition to the developmental contribution of the parent-child experience, peer relationship is a major determinant of adult heterosexual relatedness. Couples are next considered as responding to social and economic forces that influence powerfully what types and duration of relationships have survival value. Finally, the nature of the inner experience of couples, their existential awareness of themselves and the other, and the meaning that they attribute to it is discussed. Being a member of a couple is participating in a story, sometimes a "love story," and whether or not it is seen as a good story depends on one's critical vantage point. Finally, the analysis of relationships is contrasted with the experience of a relationship as a gestalt, a whole; not as the sum of its parts.

Anger, Sexuality, and the Growth of the Ego. Jay Kuten. Pp. 289-296.

The long-term issue of sexual dysfunction in terms of normal psychosexual development is examined. Human sexual development and ego growth originate simultaneously within the symbiotic relationship of the child and the first nurturant caretaker, usually the mother. Infantile sexuality, the pleasure of the total body, is equivalent to love and dependent upon sameness and continuity, tending toward fusion. Adult sexuality depends for its emotional impetus upon separateness and difference between lovers. Once established, adult sexual relationships drift inexorably toward the symbiotic unity implicit in loving. Genital sexuality may be sacrificed in the preference for more global satisfactions reminiscent of the infantile sexual experience. Essential to the adult sexual relationship then is the capacity to bear and express conflict and anger as a means of breaking the symbiotic tie; a continuous restructuring of ego boundaries is necessary for the maintenance of a functioning sexual relationship of long duration.

Journal of Sex & Marital Therapy. III, 1977

Hypoactive Sexual Desire. Helen Singer Kaplan. Pp. 3-9.

The sex therapy literature has concentrated on disorders of the excitement and orgasm phases of the sexual response. However, disorders of sexual desire have been virtually neglected, although low-libido disorders are highly prevalent,

may be extremely distressful to patients and their partners, and influence the course and prognosis of therapy. This paper focuses on this important aspect of human sexuality. Some clinical features of hypoactive sexual desire are described, and some hypotheses about etiology and prognosis are presented.

On the Etiology of Sexual Dysfunction. Bernard Apfelbaum. Pp. 50-62.

Lack of consideration of the sexually functional population has led to misconceptions about the causes of both sexual dysfunction and sexual functioning. Although observation of the dysfunctional population appears to indicate that performance anxiety is the first-order cause of dysfunction, it is proposed that in the functional population, performance anxiety has the opposite effect, generating automatic functioning rather than dysfunction. The first-order cause of dysfunction is, then, whatever causes this differential response to performance anxiety, conceivably an inability or unwillingness to bypass pathogenic influences. Thus automatic functioning can mask the effects of all pathogenic influences on sexuality, making these effects appear random, confounding etiological issues and creating the belief that the causes of both sexual dysfunction and sexual disorder cannot be specified.

Cotherapy: A Review of Current Literature (with Special Reference to Therapeutic Outcome). Melvin Roman and Betty Meltzer. Pp. 63-77.

A review of the current literature on cotherapy with special reference to therapeutic outcome is presented. The review covers the fields of sex therapy, group therapy, and family and marital therapy. It considers both patient variables and cotherapist variables. There are few "research" studies of cotherapy. Most data derive from case illustrations which, however well detailed, are anecdotal in nature. The most widely addressed effect of cotherapy upon patients is presented in terms of treatment process and not treatment outcome.

The Psychoanalytic Quarterly

ISSN: 0033-2828 (Print) 2167-4086 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/upaq20

Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society

Stefan P. Stein

To cite this article: Stefan P. Stein (1978) Meetings of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 47:1, 168-172, DOI: 10.1080/21674086.1978.11926835

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/21674086.1978.11926835

Published online: 20 Nov 2017.

NOTES

With this issue of The Quarterly, we welcome a new member to our Editorial Board, Dr. Warren S. Poland of Washington, D.C.

We also take this opportunity to express our gratitude to colleagues other than our Editors who have reviewed a number of papers submitted to us during the past year. We would like to thank Dr. Sander M. Abend, Dr. William A. Binstock, Dr. Herbert J. Goldings, and Dr. Mayer Subrin for their invaluable help.

MEETINGS OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

November 16, 1976. THE MORNING RUMINATIVE STATE—THE FLASH PHENOMENON. John Frosch, M.D.

Dr. Frosch expanded his examination of the relationship of dreaming, sleeping, and awakening to psychopathology by focusing attention on the morning ruminative state (MRS). This is a period of obsessive-like rumination occurring either during the night in a moment of partial awakening or upon awakening in the morning. Ushered in at times by a sudden "flash" experienced a few moments after waking, the MRS often reflects themes of a dream which has occurred shortly before. Such themes may be related to transference events or to other elements of infantile conflict connected with experiences in the patient's life, both current and past. Dr. Frosch presented two clinical vignettes illustrating the phenomenon in the analytic process. The MRS may be viewed as the persistence of conflict, activated in a dream, into the partially awake state, i.e., a sort of "night residue." In certain individuals with fragile ego organization, these ruminations may become part of a psychotic disorganization, reflecting their excessive instinctual investment in the presence of an ego in which censorship and the capacity to test reality are markedly impaired. In patients with a more intact ego, the morning ruminative state will be corrected by the awakened ego's reality function, and the conflict will then be dealt with in a manner more appropriate to the awake state.

The frequently encountered flash phenomenon may reflect several types of dramatic shifts in the psychic economy, in which the sexual and/or aggressive components in a dream or other impulses are opposed to aspects of ego and/or superego functioning. The consequent thoughts are analogous to the "flash" of sudden revelation in a psychotic experience, such as those connected with a grandiose delusion, e.g., "I am God" or "I am the universe."

In the morning ruminative state, the awakening ego can be said to "process" the nighttime dream, bringing together the highly conflicted id, ego, and superego elements with sudden cathectic shifts manifested by the flash experience. Dr. Frosch cited clinical examples in which the flash signaled the shift from the nighttime attempts at resolving psychic conflict to the MRS in which there is a continuation of these attempts in the more awakened state,

with the introduction of more evident conflict between the psychic agencies. The psychic agencies active in the MRS may be derived from more primitive developmental stages, particularly if the ego functioning is regressed and in an altered state because of partial awakening. An understanding of the mechanisms and conflicts observed in the MRS will enlarge the analytic apprehension of the patient's manner of dealing with instinct-laden material.

DISCUSSION: Dr. David L. Rubinfine questioned the relationship of the content of the clinical vignettes to the formulations in Dr. Frosch's paper. He felt that the ruminations might better be explained on a basis other than that presented by Dr. Frosch. In one of the cases described by Dr. Frosch, Dr. Rubinfine viewed the ruminations as perhaps being partially understandable as the "worrying" of an individual who had been threatened and was correctly frightened. In general, he questioned whether the clinical data were adequate to support the theoretical formulations advanced. He felt that greater attention to formal aspects of the MRS would lead to a better understanding of this altered state of consciousness.

Dr. Harold Blum viewed Dr. Frosch's conceptualizations of the MRS as a useful clinical contribution. He saw the ruminations of the MRS as related to the expression of forbidden wishes and fantasies in a form consistent with psychological phenomena in other altered states of consciousness. The ruminative state occurs in a wide variety of personality types, including the obsessional, the narcissistic, and the depressive. The MRS may be said to be occurring at a time of "sleepy censorship," leading to a new psychic equilibrium. Dr. Blum went on to present excerpts from the Schreber case, to illustrate an instance when the MRS was seen to be just at the frontier between obsessive ruminations and delusional psychosis in a patient with a fragile ego organization. In Schreber's memoirs, obsessive ruminative-like fantasies of being a woman submitting to sexual intercourse were reported as occurring in periods of early morning awakening, just antecedent to Schreber's again falling into his psychosis. Dr. Blum contended that Schreber's MRS recapitulated an earlier altered ego state in both its formal and content aspects.

STEFAN P. STEIN

March 15, 1977. THE CASTRATION COMPLEX IN WOMEN. Charles Brenner, M.D.

In the psychosexual development of girls, the observation of anatomical differences between the sexes causes a profound response, involving wishes, fears, guilt, etc. This conglomerate reaction defines the castration complex in women. Dr. Brenner attempted to correlate this observation with Freud's original insights into feminine development—chiefly, the girl's shift of libidinal attachment, her fear of loss of love rather than castration anxiety, her more gradual relinquishing of oedipal ties, and the development of a relatively less independent superego. To further the understanding of the female castration complex, Dr. Brenner began by reconsidering the interplay between anxiety, defense, and conflict. With various amplifications, Freud's theory still stands—

namely, that in accordance with the pleasure principle, an instinctual drive that threatens re-emergence of an infantile danger situation is warded off by defense in order to prevent anxiety. Dr. Brenner's major theoretical step consisted in stating that anxiety is not the only affect which triggers defense and conflict; that the same is true of "depressive affect." Defining affect as "a complex mental phenomenon that includes sensations of unpleasure, pleasure, or both, on the one hand, and thoughts or ideas, on the other, Dr. Brenner distinguished anxiety (in which unpleasure is linked to the idea that something bad *will* happen) from depressive affect (in which unpleasure is linked to the idea that something bad *has* happened).

This theoretical shift elucidates the female castration complex as follows: after perceiving the anatomical differences, little girls react with unpleasure, plus the idea that "something bad has happened"—in other words, with depressive affect. Defense and conflict follow, typically involving denial and undoing in such fantasies as that of the illusory penis, or as enacted in tomboyish behavior. Tracing the effects on feminine character, Dr. Brenner noted that the girl in the phallic phase reacts with conflicts over aggression. Should rage and the desire for revenge predominate, the woman's character is like that of the "exception," in that she feels discriminated against and thereby entitled to vengeful acts. This in turn causes further anxiety and guilt. The greater frequency of depressive illness in women may be explained by the major role played by depressive affect in this process.

Noting that there were complicating factors—the castration complex is only one source of depressive affect, the typical danger situations of childhood coexist and interrelate, and anxiety may give rise to depressive affect (and vice versa)—he stressed that this was clinically a question of *relative* importance: "On the whole, castration anxiety is more important in the mental lives of most boys and men, and depressive affect . . . in the lives of women and girls." Accordingly, traits formerly considered characteristically "female" can now be understood as reactions to depressive affect—e.g., envy, rage, ambivalence toward men, etc. The clinical application of this theory should result in more correct and complete analyses of the castration complex in women.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Sander Abend concurred in the proposed psychoanalytic theory of affects; he awaits clinical confirmation of Dr. Brenner's views. He suggested that unconscious residues of childhood perceptions of the anatomical genital differences may have led to analytic "clarity" about male psychosexual development and "haziness" about that of the female. Dr. Helen Davidoff-Hirsch disagreed with Dr. Brenner's emphasis on depressive affect as *the* major central issue for females. To correct this perspective, she looked to the pre-genital phases which lie "beneath" the oedipal era, adding richness and predetermining its nature. She particularly referred to primary feminine identification with the mother and the discovery of the emergence of feminine identity during separation-individuation, as observed by Mahler. This developmental view suggested that the castration complex had two phases: a rapprochement phase and a phallic phase. Knowledge of the preoedipal roots of feminine

self-esteem grants the woman's superego a progressive, positive development. Dr. Brenner replied that focusing on preoedipal determinants may also lead to oversimplification. A favorable identification with the mother at one stage may become unfavorable at another; the relationship with the father and real-life experiences during the oedipal period must also be considered. As for the "female" traits, Dr. Brenner reiterated his belief that they are causally related to depressive affect. Dr. Kurt Eissler thought it simplistic to correlate affect with the timing of unpleasure in past or future, and, in addition, he cautioned that tomboyish behavior may reflect an adrenal abnormality. Dr. Brenner responded by noting that tomboyism is common and adrenogenic abnormalities quite rare and that, in any event, the pertinent psychological events remain important in their own right.

ANNA M. BURTON

The 1978 Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION will be held May 3-8, 1978, at the Hyatt-Regency Hotel, Atlanta, Georgia.

The 55th Annual Meeting of THE AMERICAN ORTHOPSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION will be held March 27-31, 1978, in San Francisco.

The 28th LINDAU PSYCHOTHERAPY WEEKS CONGRESS will be held April 17-29, 1978, in Lindau, Germany. For further information, contact: Dr. Helmut Remmler, Lindauer Psychotherapiewochen, Orlandostrasse 8/IV, D-8000 München 2, Germany.

The 2nd WORLD CONGRESS OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY will be held August 21-September 6, 1978, in Barcelona, Spain. For further information, contact: Dr. C. Ballús, II World Congress of Biological Psychiatry, Casanova, 141, Barcelona (11), Spain.

Dr. Bluma Swerdloff of the Columbia University Psychoanalytic Clinic has announced that The Columbia University Oral History Research Project on the Psychoanalytic Movement, which has been in progress for over twelve years, is nearing completion. Interviews with prominent pioneers in the psychoanalytic movement have been tape-recorded for this project. The transcribed interviews, housed in the Columbia University Butler Library, Special Documents Section, are now available to scholars. Restrictions, if present, are noted in the catalogue titled *The Oral History Collection of Columbia University*, edited by Elizabeth B. Mason and Louis M. Starr. Some sections of the inter-

views have been closed for a period of time requested by the psychoanalysts who were interviewed. They will be opened at the expiration of the specified time period.

The FOUNDATIONS' FUND FOR RESEARCH IN PSYCHIATRY announces a limited program of support for scholars on sabbatical leave in order to further their research and contribute to the knowledge of psychiatric diagnosis, treatment, and prevention. The sabbatical must be spent away from the home institution at an internationally recognized institution. Applications must be received no later than May 1st of the year preceding the proposed sabbatical, and applicants must be United States or Canadian citizens or permanent residents of the United States or Canada. For further information, contact: Foundations' Fund for Research in Psychiatry, 100 York Street, New Haven, Conn. 06511.

ERRATUM: We have received a communication from Dr. Ernst Federn pertaining to the letter from Dr. Henry Lowenfeld which was published in The Quarterly, Vol. XLVI, p. 359. While he feels that Dr. Lowenfeld's comments are well taken, Dr. Federn wishes to correct the impression that Dr. Herman Nunberg had not completed the editing of the volumes in question. Dr. Nunberg had finished the editing before his death, and it had been his judgment that Freud's use of Moebius's terminology ("women's physiological imbecility") needed no explanatory annotation when it appeared in Volume III, as specific reference had been made to Moebius's book in Volume I of the *Minutes* (p. 226).