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A PATIENT WHO HAD TROUBLE WITH GEOGRAPHY

BY LEONARD SHENGOLD, M.D.

Aspects of geography are important in relation to the establishment of body ego, since they inevitably supply from the external world the early symbols that represent in the mind the basic elements of infantile experience in regard to body parts, functions, and relationships with primal objects. The accretional intertwining of all subsequent psychic conflicts can therefore be expressed in symbolic geographic terms. These conflicts center on the developmentally evolving meanings of the mother's body as epitomized in the riddle of the Sphinx. Illustration of the concepts includes a brief clinical report and selected literary and mythological examples.

"Geography is destiny," Napoleon is reputed to have said. Freud's transformation of this is familiar. Here is his earliest statement of it:

> The excremental is all too intimately and inseparably bound up with the sexual; the position of the genitals—*inter urinas et faeces*—remains the decisive and unchangeable factor. One might say here, varying a well-known saying of the great Napoleon: 'Anatomy is destiny' (1912, p. 189).

Freud "here" locates the genitals. The full Latin quotation—*we are born* between urine and feces (my emphasis)—not only connects sexuality with the excremental but alludes to the mother, her body, and her private parts. Freud varied a saying of one of his alter egos, the conqueror Napoleon ("I am nothing but by temperament a *conquistador*," Freud wrote to Fliess in 1900 [Jones, 1953, p. 348]), substituting *anatomy* for *geography* (thing

symbolized exchanged for symbol). In his masterpiece, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), the metaphoric ground plan of which is a journey through a landscape (Shengold, 1966), Freud indicated the bodily and sexual meaning of landscape in dream symbolism. He was subject to what he called "travel-anxiety" (1887-1902, p. 285), and from his self-analysis and his work with his patients, he concluded that travel and geographic details had symbolic sexual resonances for everyone. The symbol—an element of the external world—is universally used to represent body parts and body functions, of the self and of the parents. In his paper on the Dora case (published in 1905 but written in 1901) Freud constructed a defloration fantasy of Dora's out of many "geographic" manifest elements of her (second) dream—elements that referred allusively and symbolically to the female genitals. And Freud exclaimed about his interpretation, "Here was a symbolic geography of sex!" (1905, p. 99). The conquistador was leading his followers toward unconscious meanings of exploration and of geography. And, if landscape is the mother's body, exploration signifies the penetration and violation of that body (Niederland, 1971b).

Geography is defined by the *Oxford English Dictionary* as "the science which has for its object the description of the earth's surface, treating of its form and physical features, its natural and political divisions, the climate, productions, population, etc., of the various countries." Geography, then, is the study of the earth and its parts. The word geography is derived from the Greek words for "to write" and "of the earth." The latter word, *Gē,* is linked with the name of the primal goddess and Earthmother, Gē, Gaia, or Gaea. I quote Niederland, our psychoanalytic Strabo and Freud's chief disciple in the psychoanalysis of geography, whose assumptions and conclusions I am underlining in this paper (see Niederland, 1956, 1957, 1971a, 1971b):

> [I start] from the premise that geography, as the name implies, is the study of Gaea, the *Urmutter*, and that the great questions

> of geographic research—'where', 'wherefrom', the relentless investigation and exploration of the earth—resemble and in a sense repeat the libidinal questions of every human . . . (1957, p. 50).

The "great questions" of libidinal research, of childhood sexual curiosity, invoke the riddle of the Sphinx—the meaning of which, according to Freud, is the mystery of where babies come from. The strange composite body of the Sphinx can also represent the child's preoccupation with the enigma of the genitalia: the libidinal questions, "Who has what?" and "What lies within those holes?" The "female" openings are much more unknowable than the visible "male" protruberances which are hidden only by clothing. Children have an innate drive to explore (to see, to touch, to suck, to bite, to penetrate) the mysteries. The price to be paid for the passionate pursuit of knowledge in relation to the terrible Sphinx is anxiety: castration anxiety—"Where is the penis?" and "What will happen (or has happened) to mine?"—and the more primal anxieties inherent in overstimulation and the aggressive drive: fear of loss and of destruction of the parent and the self. The Sphinx is cannibalistic and will slay if not slain. These anxieties of the libidinal explorer frequently result in inhibitions of learning, of retaining knowledge, of achieving understanding. (The word "understanding" alludes to the small child "standing under" and looking at the genitals of the parent [Fliess, 1956, p. 132]).

There is an especial developmental significance that involves and adheres to "geography" derived from its specific incestuous link with the exploration of the mother's body and her genitals. Gē or Gaea is not only *Urmutter*, the primal Great Goddess—she is Mother Earth herself. The Olympian creation myth (Graves, 1951) starts with the Mother and features progression from voyeurism to incest:

> At the beginning of all things Mother Earth emerged from Chaos and bore her son Uranus as she slept. Gazing down fondly at her from the mountains, he showered fertile rain

> upon her secret clefts, and she bore grass, flowers, and trees, with the beasts and birds proper to each. . . . Her first children of semi-human form were the hundred handed giants . . . [and the] one-eyed Cyclopes . . . (p. 31).

A Clinical Example

A young homosexual man was struggling in his analysis with unexpected and frightening feelings of excitement about female genitals. These feelings were connected with fantasies about seeing his mother exhibit her genitals to him when he was a child—fantasies that began to take on more and more qualities of memory. He recalled being beside himself with excitement looking at his mother's naked body. She was seated and, according to his fantasy/memory, had started to masturbate when he came into view. She stared through him as if he were not there. He approached her shaking with excitement. She pressed her thighs around his head and his excitement turned to terror. He fainted. The incident gathered more peripheral detail as the painful analysis proceeded. The patient was experiencing much anxiety and felt a great temptation to run away from the analysis—he usually mentioned going to Scandinavia. The running away was attenuated to sexual acting out—looking for and contacting Uranus rather than Gaea.

The forbidden incestuous involvement with geography is marvelously expressed by the mother-obsessed poet, Baudelaire, in his poem about a primal mother, "*La Géante*" (The Giantess); much of the poem's beauty is lost in the following literal translation (my own—adapted from the Penguin *Baudelaire*):

> In the time when Nature in her potent exuberance
> Each day conceived monstrous children,
> I would have loved to live near a young giantess
> Like a voluptuous cat at the feet of a queen.

Mother Nature, like the mythical Greek and Scandinavian

primal mothers, gives birth to monsters. Baudelaire, unlike my patient, was not an overt homosexual—but both were masochistic submitters. Baudelaire could express an ecstatic passivity. The feminine identification with the "monstrous" mother is expressed in the poet's picturing himself as a cat.

> I would have loved to see her body flowering with her soul,
> And freely expand [*grandir librement*] in its terrible play [*terrible jeux*],
> To guess if her heart was hiding some dark flame
> Whose smoke I could see swimming in her eyes.

My patient had felt that his mother was looking at him with an unseeing stare in *her* "terrible play."

> I would have loved, leisurely, to travel over her magnificent shapes;
> To crawl on the slopes of her enormous knees,
> And, sometimes, when the unhealthy suns of summer
> Have made her wearily stretch out across the fields,
> To sleep nonchalantly in the shadow of her breasts,
> Like a small hamlet at the foot of a mountain (1857, pp. 25-26).

The child-poet, sleeping "nonchalantly" (*nonchalamment*, from the Latin *non calēre*, to be lacking heat or feeling), is an image that represents a defensive wish fulfillment: a reaction formation belying Baudelaire's terrible passion-swept life and my patient's terrible overstimulation and anxiety. In this poem the mother is Mother Earth and, as Freud said of Dora's dream, the poem is "a symbolic geography of sex."

One day my patient said:

> I want to go away—to run off and travel. I'm not sure where to. I've thought about Denmark. But what keeps coming into my mind is to go to the Bosporus. What is funny is that I have no idea what the Bosporus is, or where it is. Is it in Europe, or in Asia? I never know whether places are in Europe or in

> Asia. I know it seems incredible but I just don't retain geographical facts. I never did in school and now, if the travel agent didn't plan for me, and if the airplane didn't take me where I want to go, I wouldn't know how to get there.

In the course of this session the patient expressed a similar looseness of knowledge about the female genitals—what they are and where they are. He had no such difficulty with anatomical peninsulas; he knew where to find the penis and testicles. Similarly, although the fascinating Bosporus mystified him, he knew more about the location of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. He expressed himself only indirectly about the geography of the anus, complaining that he was impotent in his attempts to be the active partner in anal intercourse—his preoccupation with the vagina seemed to be interfering with his feelings about the anus.

This reminded me of a fragment of a story by Lytton Strachey, the biographer-essayist who was homosexual. The story centered on the geography "*inter urinas et faeces*" and demonstrates Strachey's anatomical confusion. The "Curious Manuscript" (the title of the piece) was purportedly written by someone who had to flee for refuge to Morocco because he was prosecuted following an accusation about buggery. (The story was probably written about the time of Oscar Wilde's sensational trial.) The narrator asks:

> Why, I wish to know, is it perfectly moral for me to copulate with a personage whose sexual organs are different from my own, and perfectly immoral for me to copulate with a personage whose sexual organs are not different? The point of penetration, you will remark, is not the same in the two cases. I agree; but is it entirely reasonable that a matter of about eight inches one way or the other should have such an extraordinary effect upon your judgement? Do you really wish never to see me again because a certain part of my body penetrated A's about eight inches from the point where, if it had been B's, it might have penetrated with absolute impunity?

> Are eight inches to send me into solitude for two years, or into exile for ever? (1895, pp. 154-155).

The editor drily noted that the "matter of eight inches reveals a curious conception of female anatomy" (p. 151). Strachey repeated three times that the distance between anus and vagina is "eight inches" (thereby adding a "penis-length" to the interposition). This speculation about the unconscious interposition of a male organ recalls the joke Strachey made, to the delight of his friends, during his interrogation at a tribunal ruling on his claim to be exempted from conscription as a conscientious objector in World War I.

> "I understand, Mr. Strachey, that you have a conscientious objection to all wars?"
>
> "Oh no," came the piercing, high-pitched reply, "not at all. Only this one."
>
> "Then tell me, Mr. Strachey, what would you do if you saw a German attempting to rape your sister?"
>
> Lytton turned and forlornly regarded each of his sisters in turn. Then he confronted the Board once more and answered with gravity: "I should try and interpose my own body" (Holroyd, 1968, p. 179).

The Bosporus is the strait separating European from Asiatic Turkey and joins the Black Sea with the Sea of Marmara. It is the watery gap between Europe and Asia—one of the "clefts" of Mother Earth. The corresponding strait joining the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean is the Hellespont—swum for libidinal reasons by Leander who was later emulated by that bisexual athlete, Lord Byron, who remarked that "the current renders it hazardous, so much so, that I doubt whether Leander's conjugal powers must not have been exhausted in his passage to Paradise" (Marchand, 1970, p. 82). These connections between Europe and Asia would have an especial meaning in relation to sexual curiosity and the primal scene. The literal meaning of Bosporus is "Ox-ford"—it is named after one of Zeus' loves,

Io. Io was a priestess of Hera at Argos. Here is a version of the myth:

> As Zeus loved [Io], she was changed by the jealousy of Hera into a white heifer, and Argus of the hundred eyes was appointed to watch her. When Hermes, at the command of Zeus, had killed Argus, Hera maddened the heifer by sending a gadfly which perpetually pursued her. Io thus wandered through the continents of Europe and Asia, by land and by sea. Each of the different straits she swam across was named after her *Bosporus* or Ox-ford. At last in Egypt she recovered her original shape, and bore Epaphus to Zeus (Seyffert, 1891, pp. 321-322).

Graves (1955) made it clear that it was Zeus and not Hera who turned Io into a white heifer. Graves identified Io as a moon goddess. Io, confusingly, was another name (in Homer) for the "cow-eyed" Hera who, as Zeus' wife, persecuted Io (p. 192). Graves noted that "Io has been equated in the myth with Demeter [and] Demeter's mourning for Persephone is recalled in the Argive festival of mourning for Io" (p. 192). In turn, Demeter, the Goddess of agriculture and of fertility, supposedly the granddaughter of Gaea, was sometimes equated by her worshippers with Gaea. Demeter's "name signifies Mother Earth" (Seyffert, 1891, p. 177).

At any rate, it is clear how many versions of the frightening and potentially castrating Great Mother are condensed in my patient's reference to the (for him) enigmatic Bosporus. "Is it in Europe or in Asia? What is it?" When in his memory he found himself facing his mother's genitals, he—like Oedipus—was confronting the Sphinx and her riddle, and in danger of being castrated and eaten, or having to kill the beloved monster who barred his path. Since he had been forbidden by his conscience to look at his mother, he therefore could not *understand* the geography, and especially the clefts, of Mother Earth. The earth is the symbol for the mother. Truly, and not only in the Creation Myth ["At the beginning of all things Mother Earth

emerged from Chaos . . .], in the beginning was the mother's body. If one retrospectively endows the infant with the power of speech and if (following St. John) "In the beginning was the Word"—that word would not be "God" or even "Goddess," but one that would connote a primal parent like "Sphinx"—an unexplored, mysterious, exciting, dangerous, indeterminately sexed or bisexual creature just separated out of the Chaos of symbiosis. It is of this seductive, bisexual parent that Baudelaire wrote (and my patient, if he had been a poet, might have written):

> For Lesbos of all men on this earth elected me
> To sing the secret of its virgins in bloom
> And from childhood on I was admitted to its dark mystery
> (quoted in Proust, 1921, p. 126).

"Dark mystery" leads to Baudelaire's making his muse a sphinx. Here is the beginning of another of the "*Fleurs du Mal*"—"*La Beauté*" (Beauty):

> I am beautiful, o mortals, as a dream in stone.
> And my breast, where everyone has bruised himself in his turn,
> Is made to inspire in the poet a love as eternal and as mute as matter itself.
> I reign in the Blue like an enigmatic sphinx . . . (1857, pp. 26-27; my modification of literal translation).

Freud is reputed to have said that a cigar is sometimes only a cigar, and we know that potential "Freudian" symbols are not always used to denote "things symbolized" (these stem from the child's body and his earliest environment). If one accepts Fliess's reading of the symbols *sky* (="arse") and *blue* (=anal) (1973, p. 89)—and I have found these equations useful in understanding patients[1]—then the sphinx reigning "in the Blue" ("*je trône dans*

[1] Glover (1938), speaking of perverse patients involved in anal excitement, stated: "In a typical case the anal ring was phantasied as a kind of halo suspended in the sky. It was then contemplated, adored and idealized" (p. 294).

l'azur . . .") is relevant to the confrontation Fliess described as basic to *understanding* (and, it follows, specific to understanding geography):

> Of the word "understand" (lit.: "to stand under," to apprehend the meaning, to grasp the idea, to comprehend) Webster notes: "The development of sense is not clear." Yet it would be if it described the original position of the upright and sexually curious child of the second anal phase relative to the object of his curiosity: the maternal cloaca (Fliess, 1956, p. 132).

From the primal place, the womb, to its modifications, "the cloaca," the vagina; to the mother's body; to the earth; to the Blue of the universe—this centrifugal direction denotes the psychic developmental journey. And the reverse track in the symbolic equations of our mind and in our innate oral and incestuous drive to return to the mother's body and to Mother Earth makes for the geographic round—the psychic orbit in which we are all fixed.

I want to end this paper with another of Freud's references to geography. It is a statement about religious belief—that is, about Gods and Goddesses—and Freud (1927) wrote specifically of Greece in a way that invokes Gaea:

> Religious ideas are teachings and assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality which tell one something one has not *discovered* for oneself and which lay claim to one's belief. Since they give us *information about what is most important and interesting to us in life*, they are particularly prized. . . . There are, of course, many such teachings about the most various things in the world. Every *school lesson* is full of them. Let us *take geography*. We are told that the town of Constance lies on the Bodensee. A *student* song adds: 'if you don't believe it, go and see' (p. 25, italics added).

"What is most important and interesting" to the child bent on *discovering* the answer to the riddle of the Sphinx is the body of

the mother. In "taking" geography, Freud chooses the *city*, Constance. (The proper noun, Constance, is derived from the Latin *cōnstāre*, to stand firm; *cf.*, the similar derivation of "understand" [Partridge, 1958, pp. 661-662].) The city has a woman's name; and Freud's life is full of "geographic" conflicts and inhibitions centered on cities of overdetermined (including oedipal—"the city, our mother," said Sophocles) significance: Rome, Athens, Vienna, London. And Constance lies on the Bodensee—literally the "bottom-sea," a watery equivalent (sea = mother) of my patient's Bosporus and a clear allusion to the cloaca.

At this point in his exposition, Freud (1927) turned away from what must be taken on faith to what can be ascertained by experience. He then came full circle by proceeding to the need to reassume his "geographic" doubts about place, origin, and orientation:

> I happen to have been there [Constance] and can confirm the fact that the lovely town lies on the shore of a wide stretch of water which all those who live around it call the Bodensee; and I am now completely convinced of the correctness of this geographical assertion. In this connection I am reminded of another, very remarkable experience. I was already a man of mature years when I stood for the first time on the hill of the Acropolis in Athens, between the temple ruins, looking out over the blue sea ["*je trône dans l'azur* . . ."]. A feeling of astonishment mingled with my joy. It seemed to say: 'So it really *is* true, just as we learnt it at school!' How shallow and weak must have been the belief I then acquired in the real truth of what I heard, if I could be so astonished now (p. 25).

Freud was trying to contrast the schoolboy's need for belief with the adult's certainty based on the evidence of his own senses. But he brought in an instance in which he doubted the very experience that should supply conviction. Sex is not for schoolboys and is usually not learned "at school." One of Freud's favorite quotations from Goethe—used at least five times in his writings—was:

> Das Beste was du wissen kanst,
> Darfst du den Buben doch nicht sagen (1900, p. 453).
>
> After all, the best of what you can know may not be told to boys (1900, p. 142, n. 1).

As a fifty-year-old at Athens, Freud could not transcend his disbelief. Far from being "completely convinced" on the Parthenon overlooking the sea, he could not credit what he saw. He entitled the open letter to Romain Rolland that he wrote about the experience, "A Disturbance of Memory [*Erinnerungsstörung*] on the Acropolis" but, as Freud himself said, it was not his memory but his sense of reality that was disturbed—he called it *Entfremdungsgefühl,* "a 'feeling of derealization' " (1936, p. 244). Freud connected this disturbance with conflicts about having gone further than his father ever did—not overtly mentioning the exploration and conquest of the mother (on the mountain looking down on the sea, as Uranus looked down on Gaea in the Greek creation myth). Freud had come to the forbidden city (which Oedipus had approached for his reunion with Mother Earth). Both positive and negative oedipal wishes were involved (Kanzer, 1969, Shengold, 1966, pp. 325-326; Stamm, 1969). Freud said that he was dealing with disavowal (1936, p. 245) and that "we should not be in the least astonished if an attempt of this kind were aimed at a piece of reality that threatened to bring unpleasure" (p. 242). Jones (1955, p. 24) quoted Freud as having written that "the amber-colored columns of the Acropolis were the most beautiful things that he had ever seen in his life." I have speculatively connected (Shengold, 1966) this aesthetic judgment with Freud's reaction when at age four he saw his mother's naked body on a train journey from Leipzig to Vienna—a forbidden exciting view (columns = his mother's nude legs colored amber by gaslight?) that he wrote to Fliess about (Freud, 1887-1902, pp. 218-220), but in Latin! Jones (1953, p. 13) correctly linked this early oedipal view with Freud's train phobia—and it is, of course, Freud's per-

sonal, experiential basis for the Freudian explanation for the drives and difficulties that relate to travel and to geography.

Freud used a grand geographic metaphor[2] in a paper written in 1926, that is, shortly before writing about Lake Constance and the Acropolis:

> . . . after all, the sexual life of adult women is a 'dark continent' for psychology (p. 212).

In the original, "dark continent" is in English. By 1926, there was little exploring of Africa left to be done; but the phrase "dark continent" was part of what was exciting news during Freud's boyhood years: the mapping out of the former *terra incognita* of central Africa. This would have been recurrently present in the Viennese newspapers and in a series of popular books (first published *in English*) during Freud's early childhood and adolescence. In the year of Freud's birth, 1856, Burton and Speke were in East Central Africa, looking for the source of the Nile. Here is a partial list of these "dark continent" best sellers:

Richard F. Burton:	(1856) *First Footsteps in East Africa*
	(1860) *The Lake Regions of Central Africa*
	(1863) *Wanderings in West Africa*
	(1864) *The Nile Basin*
	(1872) *Zanzibar: City, Island and Coast*
John H. Speke:	(1863) *Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*
	(1864) *What Led to the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*
David Livingstone:	(1857) *Missionary Travels*
	(1865) *The Zambezi and Its Tributaries*
	(1874) *Last Journals*

[2] I am indebted to Dr. Dale Boesky for pointing this out to me.

Henry M. Stanley: (1872) *How I Found Livingstone*
(1878) *Through the Dark Continent*

These publications occurred from Freud's birth until his age was twenty-two, and I speculate that the quest for the source of the Nile and the search for Livingstone must have had a fascination for Freud the "conquistador."

In the 1926 quotation, Freud linked the "dark continent" with the sexual life of adult women. But for the child, "adult women" means first and foremost the mother—and therein lie the conflicts. The Sphinx, as Oedipus learned to his despair, turned out to be his own mother: the cannibalistic phallic mother who bars the way to power (Shengold, 1963). And, to return to the Sphinx's riddle, it is the sexual life of mother and father (but, with the castration complex, especially of the mother) that is the "dark continent," the *terra incognita* of Central Africa, for the child. The Sphinx of the Oedipus legend, of course, comes from Africa, borrowed by the Greeks "from Egyptian religion and symbolism" (Seyffert, 1891, p. 600). Freud, the *conquistador* of the psyche who consciously identified with Oedipus, the explorer of the oedipus complex and the interpreter of the riddle of the Sphinx, could not—any more than can the rest of us, women and men alike—completely plumb the enticing, dangerous depths of the mystery of the Sphinx. In this sense, my patient's difficulty with geography is an exaggeration of a universal failing.

CONCLUSION

"The ego is first and foremost a bodily ego . . ." (Freud, 1923, p. 26), and with its establishment there begins the awareness of everything—of things, of ideas, of a sense of place, of inner and of outer worlds. The body ego is at first part of and confused with the maternal (really parental—primal parent's) body. After separation and individuation, the striving for re-

union with that earliest "other's" body continues (with correspondent changes) throughout all psychic development. These primal affinities affect all aspects of the individual's interrelated, conflictual evolutionary maturation of instinct, of ego and superego, of the psychic representations of the self and of the other, and of external relations with others. The basic resonance of the body ego's dynamic relation to the body of the parent can be seen (in concentrated form, as it were) in a person's sense of place and of geography at any moment in his psychological journey from the delusional assumption of the womb as the universe to the sad knowledge (if one has the courage to renounce the delusion) that, despite insistent wishes to the contrary, the universe is not the womb. This is exemplified by some of Freud's own symptoms; and by a patient whose difficulty with a sense of, and with the details of, geography expresses an inhibition resulting from conflicts stemming from various developmental levels of wanting and "knowing" his parent's (basically his mother's) body.

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An Example of Disavowal Involving the Menstrual Cycle

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AN EXAMPLE OF DISAVOWAL INVOLVING THE MENSTRUAL CYCLE

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The author presents clinical material that illustrates the confusion between reality and fantasy in disavowal, the tendency of some women in analysis to disavow menstrual events, and some technical considerations pertaining to the analysis of disavowal as a resistance.

I

A woman in analysis was upset to find herself having romantic thoughts about her analyst. At first she tried to dismiss her feelings as being "just transference." She did not like to acknowledge that, while she was undoubtedly influenced by her past, her current feelings arose from actual experiences with her analyst—a man with whom she had a real and intimate, if carefully structured, relationship. Her sexual urges caused her to feel humiliated because she could not allow herself to consider the possibility that they might be reciprocated in any way. She could be attracted to her analyst and curious about his body, but she insisted to herself that she knew her analyst found her boring and unappealing. If he seemed attentive, it was entirely a matter of his clinical interest. Despite the analyst's generally cordial and informal demeanor, she determinedly thought of him as critical and aloof.

When she was a child, her father would go into passionate rages at her. Frequently, these ended with his spanking her bare bottom, a practice in which he persisted through her early teenage years, until her mother intervened. As a girl, the patient told herself that her father merely had strict and definite

ideas about child rearing. She took the attitude that her father had no special interest in her. He must prefer her older brothers, since he did not spank them. As she grew up, she maintained the idea that men whom she respected looked down on her, despite abundant evidence to the contrary. Her husband's love for and attraction to her was impossible to deny, but she explained this by regarding him as more of a boy than a man. The image of herself as an adult, competent, sexually active, and desirable woman was intolerable to her. She felt incapable of having children.

As her analysis proceeded, she gained a clearer picture of her many inhibitions and began to explore the anxieties that motivated them. Long-standing views about her history, including her relationship with her father, came under review. However, each new insight was greeted as an assault—as evidence that she was disturbed and destined for a life of unhappiness. After a time, it became difficult for her to remain unaware that her life was changing for the better. She had to admit her considerable symptomatic improvement, but regarded it as a mysterious development, perhaps unrelated to her analysis. She found myriad ways of denying and disavowing the perception that her relationship with her analyst was not only real, but productive.

One morning's session began with the report of a dream. She was being chased by a man brandishing a long knife. The dream ended as he caught her and stabbed her in the abdomen, and she awoke feeling the pain of being stabbed. In her associations, she recalled that since childhood she had had a recurrent nightmare of being chased by a man with a knife. This was the first time he had actually caught her. She was impressed with how real the dream seemed. This led her to think about the question of reality as she had been discussing it in her analysis. It disturbed her to acknowledge that her analyst was a real man about whom she had real sexual feelings; and even more disturbing was the possibility that he might really have sexual feelings toward her. The analysis could be ruined. Sexual feelings

could get out of control. Her father had often seemed on the verge of losing control.

Typically, she lamented the turn her session had taken. The future seemed dangerous and bleak. Even her dreams portrayed disaster, rather than expressing hopeful wishes. Her analyst questioned this assumption: it was not at all clear that the dream expressed no hopeful wish. If there were such a wish and it aroused anxiety, the wish might well be expressed in disguised form. They had observed a tendency on her part to transform disturbing pleasures into unpleasant assaults. The patient responded that, of course, the dream could be viewed as a symbolization of sexual intercourse. Perhaps it even represented a wish to have sex with her analyst—or her father. But so what? Yes, she sometimes had the thought that she might be able to seduce her analyst if she really tried, that she might have been able to seduce her father, but all that was theory and fantasy and had nothing to do with anything real. She was adamant in this conviction.

On the subject of reality, the analyst asked her what thoughts she had about the real pain she had felt upon awakening. It turned out that she had wondered whether she had a stomach flu. She even thought of appendicitis, but it was on the wrong side. In any event, it had soon gone away. Where was she in her menstrual cycle, the analyst asked. It wasn't cramps, she answered quickly—she was not having her period; in fact, she was right in the middle. Did she ever have physical sensations when she ovulated, the analyst asked. She paused for a moment, greatly embarrassed. Of course that was what it was, she said. She felt mittelschmerz during most of her cycles and knew what it was. She was puzzled and humiliated at having pushed the knowledge that she was ovulating out of her mind.

Subsequent analytic work took up the patient's need to disavow her mittelschmerz. Among the themes that emerged was her attempt to remain naïve and passive, casting her analyst in the role of knowledgeable seducer. Included in the disavowal, it developed, was the fact that she had been having thoughts of

trying to get pregnant and was terrified by punishment fantasies concerning the pain of delivery and the overwhelming responsibilities of motherhood. Similar anxieties were brought up by the idea of terminating her analysis, which would testify to a productive collaboration with her analyst. The sensations of mittelschmerz were proof of her mature sexual capacity, which had to be disavowed. Likewise, she was terrified of feeling the physical sensations of sexual arousal while lying on the couch. She might go out of control, soil, rip her clothes off; or, if she were too seductive, her analyst might lose control of himself. She might observe him with an erection. Eventually, she recalled, with mixed excitement and dread, a memory of sitting playfully on her father's lap and feeling his penis poking her. Apparently this memory, before becoming conscious, had been one of the determinants of the "real"-seeming dream of being stabbed.

From here, the path led to her fantasy of oedipal triumph, currently being relived in the transference relationship. Anxieties attendant on this fantasy and the conflicts which generated them came under investigation. Eventually, too, the defensive functions of the fantasy emerged as the patient, with both disappointment and relief, explored the implications of the fact that even if she really ovulated, she was not really going to bear an oedipal child.

II

The foregoing vignette describes a commonplace clinical sequence in which resistances to the experience of the transference relationship were analyzed. Disavowal is a familiar aspect of resistance: certain affectively loaded perceptions are kept preconscious in order to avoid trains of associations that might jeopardize repression; or, if a threatening perception cannot be kept altogether out of conscious awareness, that element of the perception which claims attention may be discredited as unreal.

The patient's manner of dealing with her mittelschmerz was an instance in point. The pain associated with ovulation insisted itself upon her awareness. She could not avoid being conscious of the pain; but she dismissed her perception as having been merely part of a dream fantasy, thus disavowing its reality and its real meaning. In the course of analytic work, she had done the same thing with perceptions related to the erotic aspect of her relationship with her analyst whenever she was unable to keep them out of consciousness. She became aware that she had sexual feelings about her analyst, that he was a man who was capable of having sexual feelings toward her, that she knew how to tease him into activity; but she found various ways of considering these perceptions part of "analysis," as opposed to "real life."

Realities connected to her experience of an erotic father transference had to be disavowed since events in her childhood had led her to the conclusion that sexual feeling between father and daughter is something dangerous which must not be acknowledged. She believed sexuality could ruin her analysis, just as it might have ruined her family. As her disavowals were addressed, she realized she experienced her analysis as a series of passionate spankings that she played a part in bringing about. The defensive functions of this regressive, sadomasochistic view, and the anxieties it protected her against, could be analyzed. It was then that she was able to recall a real and explicit sexual encounter with her father—a memory which previously she had also disavowed by treating it, in disguised form, as a recurrent dream fantasy.

Psychoanalytic glossaries (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1967; Moore and Fine, 1968) and discussions (Panel, 1963; Stewart, 1970) have tended to equate disavowal with denial, defining it as the complete deletion of a disturbing perception from conscious awareness. To my mind, this leaves aside an important clinical observation which deserves to be conceptualized. I would opt for including within the definition of disavowal those less complete avoidances in which some component of a per-

ception may enter consciousness, but as an "unreality." Such a usage seems to me in keeping with Freud's (1940) description of disavowal as a condition in which incompatible views of reality are simultaneously held within consciousness. The fetishist, as Freud pointed out, cannot avoid seeing that the female genitalia manifestly lack a penis; but he deems his perception illusory, "knowing" that despite appearances a penis is "really" there.

III

It is not surprising when body sensations are disavowed, inasmuch as they are likely to be invested with the kinds of meanings that generate conflict and therefore anxiety. This would appear to be particularly true of mittelschmerz. A considerable proportion of women feel mittelschmerz regularly,[1] yet my own experience is that women patients do not mention it spontaneously. I have the impression that the same holds true, though to a lesser extent, with regard to other events in the menstrual cycle. Women I have analyzed have tended to bring up explicitly the fact that they are having their periods, or that they are experiencing premenstrual changes, less often than might be expected. At the same time, it is often possible to suspect an indirect representation in the patient's associations (themes of cycling, periodicity, ebb and flow, strange mood, blood, red color, etc.). If I feel that there is some reason for me to take the initiative and inquire about menstruation, it usually happens that thereafter spontaneous references appear from time to time.

When menstrual perceptions are not reported explicitly but present themselves in disguised form, it suggests that the perceptions are making some claim upon the patient's attention

[1] Benson, R. (1982) reports a prevalence of 25%, and this figure describes only those instances in which the level of discomfort is such that it reaches the attention of a gynecologist.

and need to be disavowed out of anxiety. I have found that exploration usually reveals this to be so and that investigation of the disavowal contributes to the analytic work, as was the case in the vignette presented. Often, the most superficial aspects of the anxiety center on the concern that I as a man will be disinterested in menstruation, disgusted by it, or unable to understand it; and, if I inquire about menstruation without its having been explicitly mentioned by the patient, related ideas may emerge about why I am especially interested—menstrual events are then sometimes reported out of compliance.

I have not been able to determine whether there is quite the same tendency among women patients to disavow perceptions related to menstruation when the analyst is also a woman. It may be that my observation, insofar as it can be generalized, applies specifically to women analysands with male analysts. Informal survey suggests that the trend toward disavowal is not greatly affected by the sex of the analyst, though the details of what is disavowed and the transference fantasies causing anxiety may take a somewhat different form. However, I believe it is an interesting point of comparison and worth some further study.

I find that when a woman patient does introduce the topic of menstruation of her own accord, it is often under the aegis of complaint. The perception is of being burdened with a symptom—edema, headache, depression, or the like. A woman who would like to be pregnant may speak of her disappointment at getting her period. Pleasurable ideas associated with events of the menstrual cycle are generally more threatening, as illustrated by the clinical material presented, and tend not to come up spontaneously. Women sometimes mention premenstrual distress. They complain of feeling irritable or overwhelmed. Less frequently do they bring up feeling more sexual, although this is a common experience in the premenstruum. Mayer and Cath (1981) showed that the same skewed perception is shared by psychiatric investigators who have studied the premenstrual state. The best known and most commonly used

research instruments are questionnaires which inquire only about dysphoric symptoms. In their controlled experiments, Mayer and Cath found that female subjects reported pleasurable and/or neutral changes occurring premenstrually which were not picked up by research instruments designed solely with premenstrual distress in mind.

Mittelschmerz does not lend itself as readily as do other phases of the menstrual cycle to being depicted in unpleasurable terms. If mittelschmerz tends especially to be disavowed, this may explain why. The "schmerz" is generally not very great, and sensations of ovulation are not connected with antisexual taboos, as is menstrual bleeding, for example. Mittelschmerz is a direct and undeniable indication of fertility; whereas menstrual flow at the end of the cycle can be taken, at least transiently, to confirm infertility.

To my knowledge, mittelschmerz has not been a subject of discussion in the psychoanalytic literature. One intention of this brief report is to suggest the possibility that women in analysis may tend to disavow mittelschmerz as well as perceptions of other events in the menstrual cycle, especially when those perceptions have consciously gratifying associations.

IV

In the clinical example presented, disavowal came to light as a result of direct inquiry on the part of the analyst. Lipton (1977b) has written about situations in which a patient disavows a perception as a resistance to experiencing some aspect of the transference relationship. I agree with him that under these circumstances it is often necessary for the analyst to take the initiative in introducing a topic which the patient has not brought up and that there is little disadvantage in doing so, since fantasies engendered by the analyst's activity—whether or not that activity proves fruitful—will provide the occasion for further analytic investigation.

I also agree with Lipton (1977a) that many aspects of an analyst's conduct toward his patient lie outside the domain of psychoanalytic technique. Inevitably, an analyst's personal style will correspond to one or another of a patient's wishful fantasies. In this case, for example, the patient interpreted her analyst's informality as flirtatious. Of course, if he had been more reserved in his manner, she might well have construed him as being constrained out of a fear of his sexuality. Both were important transference images. We know that the technical procedures of analysis, too, often correspond to fantasy and are regarded accordingly. Again by way of example, the patient experienced her analyst's inquiry about menstruation as a sexual assault which she provoked by challenging him and partially revealing herself.

In my view, the fact that an analyst's behavior may correspond to or gratify his patient's wishful fantasies does not necessarily mean that the behavior should be avoided. Rather, the correspondence, the gratification, is a matter for analysis—the analysis of the patient, on one hand, and the analyst's self-analysis, on the other. Nor is it necessarily useful to confirm or deny to the patient whether the actual situation is as the patient perceives it to be (for example, by personal disclosure on the analyst's part). Often, the analytic task is to examine a patient's reluctance to acknowledge that what she or he perceives could actually be occurring. The clinical vignette presented above describes an instance of this sort in which the patient was all too willing to dismiss as mere fantasy her perceptions that her analyst was responding to her sexually, because the reality that *it could be true* made her very anxious.

Perception is a combination of observation and inference, or fantasy. The patient's observations—e.g., that her analyst's manner was cordial, that he inquired with interest into the details of her sexual life, and that she could elicit this response by teasing him with incomplete information—were accurate. Her fantasy that these behaviors were evidence of her analyst's sexual interest in her might or might not be true; but in any

case it was not unrealistic. In fact, the fantasy was threatening precisely because it was realistic. It corresponded all too closely to her memories of actual childhood encounters with her father—including not only spankings, but the unmistakably sexual experience of feeling his erection. It was necessary to take up the question of why sexual interest in her on her analyst's part—or her father's—need be regarded as dangerous. In order for that question to be considered, it was important that her analyst not join her in disavowal.

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Cognitive Difficulties in Psychoanalysis

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COGNITIVE DIFFICULTIES IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

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The author raises a number of questions about cognitive difficulties in relation to psychoanalysis. He presents the case of an adult patient in whom previously unrecognized childhood cognitive difficulties were discovered during the course of analysis. Their relationship to the patient's problems in adulthood is discussed. Some suggestions and speculations about the questions raised are presented with the hope of stimulating further exploration of what the author considers to be an interesting and important subject for psychoanalysis.

Certain individuals manifest unusual cognitive characteristics in childhood. These include exceptional abilities in one or another area—in musical or mathematical talent, for example—as well as special disabilities. Often they occur in mixtures. Dyslexia, minimal brain dysfunction, learning disorder, and hyperactivity are among the terms that workers in fields other than psychoanalysis have applied to childhood conditions in which particular cognitive difficulties or combinations of them are prominent. In recent times, psychologists, educators, neurophysiologists, and workers in other disciplines have become increasingly interested in aspects of the general subject. Formerly, the cognitive difficulties of individuals went unrecognized more often than they now do. My clinical experience has been that people with such idiosyncrasies appear fairly frequently as patients. Their cognitive difficulties, whether they had been recognized in childhood or not, play a significant part in adult analyses and therapy, both through their effects on development and, if they persist, through their continuing effects in adulthood. With

the exception of some work of Victor Rosen (1955, 1961) and Annemarie Weil (1978), however, little else dealing with the subject has appeared in the psychoanalytic literature.

This paper is presented with the hope of encouraging greater psychoanalytic interest in and discussion of this subject. I wish to raise a number of questions that have occurred to me in the course of working with such patients. For some of these questions I can suggest partial answers, based on my experiences, and for some, I cannot, but I hope that others may become interested in reporting their findings and ideas.

1. What traces of cognitive difficulties that appear in childhood but go unrecognized may persist into adult life, and how can they be discovered in analyses? How can cognitive difficulties that first occurred in childhood and may have persisted into adult life be detected in analyses when the patient is unaware of their presence?

2. What can we learn about the effects of such problems on the development of individuals?

3. How do these problems influence patients as analysands?

4. Do such problems require modifications of analytic technique, or alterations of emphasis or modes of communication, in adult analyses?

5. Can analytic data increase our understanding of the sources of such cognitive idiosyncrasies, or are we limited to achieving understanding of their specific psychological meanings in the childhood conflicts and psychological development of affected persons?

6. Why has the question received so little attention in the psychoanalytic literature?

By way of orientation, I will summarize what the common manifestations of cognitive "deficits" are thought to be by nonanalysts. I will briefly interpolate one view of some characteristic dysfunctions; this is taken from the extensive review of the subject by a child psychiatrist, Paul Wender. In his book, *Minimal Brain Dysfunction in Children*, Wender (1971) writes, "The principal abnormalities of motor function are . . . a high activity

level and impaired coordination" (p. 13). "A few children are hyperactive and listless." A typical history is of a "clumsy, inept child" (p. 14), perhaps with "poor fine motor coordination," and "difficulty in learning to throw and catch a ball. . . . Shortness of attention span and poor concentration ability are common" (p. 14). There is often "an inability to organize hierarchically so that all aspects of a percept or an idea are of equal importance," which may lead to "an obsessive quality." There are associated learning difficulties. The most serious learning difficulty is "learning to read (although problems in writing, generally sloppiness, and problems in comprehension and arithmetic may be present as well)" (p. 16). Wender writes that, "working with Swedish teenage dyslexics of normal intelligence, Frisk [and co-workers] found that approximately one-third to one-half showed current distractibility and restlessness, sleep disturbance, or impaired motor abilities, and that as children they had had an increased prevalence of speech difficulties, clumsiness and enuresis" (pp. 16-17). Such children often have "low frustration tolerance" and "impulsivity, poor planning and judgment," "defective control." They are often "obstinate" and "controlling." Wender does not note that right-left confusion is a frequent concomitant phenomenon.

I will continue by presenting a case report of an analysis of a patient who manifested a number of these characteristics as a child and as an adult, and who did not become aware of some of them or of their consequence until they were described in his treatment.

Mr. R.'s internist referred him to a consultant, a psychoanalyst colleague, for evaluation of a potency disturbance that the internist could not explain. He came thence to me. He had been married three years to a woman five years younger. His sexual symptom, he told me, was an exaggerated version of a life-long difficulty. It consisted of a lack of interest in intercourse and frequent loss of erection or premature ejaculation on those approximately monthly occasions when he and his wife attempted intercourse. This situation had become increasingly severe over

the year preceding his coming to treatment. He had had a lifelong anxiety about performing sexually before meeting his wife. His earlier sexual activity had consisted mainly of masturbation. He had had two affairs of several months each and many "one-night stands," more or less successful, before meeting his wife. During the year of courtship and the first year of his marriage, he felt he "performed"—his word—successfully enough to satisfy himself and, by and large, his wife as well, although she informed him that he was inhibited and less pleasing than any of her previous lovers.

The patient connected his idea that he "performed," when I asked him what he meant in using this term, to a notion he often had that he was a "faker," that there was something "not genuine" about him, as if he "pretended" that he had abilities he really lacked in the sexual sphere and in other areas, but he could not be more specific about what he meant. Despite a certain feeling of anxiety and humiliation, things went fairly well until his wife developed pneumonia. He was fearful about approaching her sexually during and for some months after her recovery and felt somewhat less aroused by her after they resumed more frequent intimacy.

More recently, probably when Mrs. R. began to indicate a wish to have a child, Mr. R. noticed that he had less sexual interest in her than before and that he also began to experience periods of irritability, an increased difficulty in getting his work done, and embarrassing mental lapses. He came late to work appointments, misfiled papers, "forgot" names, and neglected to pay bills. His work situation was at that time a cause of considerable anxiety to Mr. R. He was an executive in a large paternalistic advertising corporation with the responsibility for evaluating future directions in which his company might go, as well as for planning administrative structures. The company was doing badly, his advice was not followed, and he felt he was not well regarded. His "Guru," the man who had hired him, had lost influence and seemed on the verge of being let go. If he lost his "Guru," he would risk being exposed as a "faker";

he would feel "lost" himself because he would be "found out" as one who could not "find his way" by himself. Mr. R. felt fearful about his future prospects, especially so since he had distinguished himself neither in selecting his three previous jobs—two of the companies had gone out of business—nor in his own work accomplishment. He had the tendency to begin jobs with energy and enthusiasm and then to become bored, inefficient, and unproductive. He lost interest. Sometimes, he had "superior" ideas and insights he could not clearly communicate to others. Difficulty organizing his ideas in logical sequence impaired his ability to write, slowed him, and added to his work problems. In addition, he felt guilty about his superiority, but mortified when it was unappreciated.

The past history was as follows. The patient was the elder of two children, with a sister four years younger. The mother had been the youngest of three sisters. Mr. R.'s maternal grandfather had become reasonably successful as an engineer, and his mother admired him greatly. This grandmother died when Mr. R.'s mother was in her early twenties. Her older sisters were married, and she cared for her father, keeping house for him until he died suddenly when she was in her mid-thirties. She received a modest inheritance, and shortly after her father's death, married the patient's father, a man eight years younger, who had separated from his family when he emigrated from Europe. After a period of infatuation, she quickly became disappointed in her husband. His defects, she thought, were that he was uncultured and uninterested in becoming more cultured, and that he was a drinker who preferred to spend his evenings in the local bars with cronies rather than working hard to advance himself intellectually or financially. Mr. R. was born in the second year of this marriage, and by the time his sister was born, he felt he was superior to his father, was destined for great things, was charming and brilliant, and was much like the revered, dead grandfather—or would soon become so. Unlike his father, he could already appreciate and understand poetry, novels, and political and economic problems which he heard

about on the radio, from his mother's readings to him, and in discussions with adults. His sister's birth, he thought, had led to only a minor and transient deflation. He continued to feel preferred and superior and treated her with contempt and condescension, as he thought his mother did.

When he was sent to a local school under religious auspices at age six, he suffered a great blow. Though he thought he was more intelligent than the other children, academically more gifted and generally superior, he was disliked and excluded by them, felt physically large and inept, and was unable to make friends. He had to make do with being a teacher's pet. Throughout his childhood and adolescence, he felt deprived, lonely, and angry because he seemed unable to make friends and felt he was not one of the group. Partly, these feelings were the result of his view of himself as special and imaginative, but unappreciated. He described his behavior at this time as ingratiating and passive with peers, sparkling and brilliant with adults—for example, with teachers with whom he discussed subtle theological points. He was extremely fearful, avoided fights and arguments, and could not stand up for himself. He was a "sissy" and a "mama's boy." However, he did well enough academically to be transferred to a special school for gifted children and later to win a scholarship to a prestigious university. Nevertheless, in adolescence, as in childhood, he lacked self-confidence. He could not approach girls, came to feel he was under the thumb of his mother and the clergy, and began to resent his father for his lack of involvement with him, as well as for the other flaws that he and his mother agreed his father had. He resented the college he attended because he felt it was too strict and too much his mother's choice, but he could not bring himself to transfer. Instead, he cut classes, stayed out at night later than the rules allowed, and was almost expelled. This experience frightened and cowed him. He attended graduate school in New York, lived with his parents, and continued to bask in his mother's approval—which was withdrawn when he showed signs of independent interest, especially in women. He

did not move out of his parents' home until he reached his mid-thirties.

At this time he began to form a more affectionate and understanding relation with his father and to conceive a new view of his mother. Gradually, he came to regard her as manipulative and exploitative and a millstone around his neck. When he moved out of the convenient and comfortable parental home into his own apartment, he began to date more seriously, met his wife to be, and married.

Having given something of an overview of the manner of Mr. R.'s presentation and of his history, I will now proceed to a description of the course of his analysis. Mr. R. was a tall man, six feet three inches in height, but not of impressive appearance. His frame was not broad, his appearance pudgy and soft, and he was perhaps thirty pounds overweight. He was very involved with his dress and owned many clothes, including some dozens of suits. He favored large patterns in expensive and conservative materials but in odd, bright colors. His manner matched his appearance. It was correct, yet incorrect, acquiescent, yet assertive. He would come into the office, lie down on the couch, and speak in a professorial, somewhat arrogant, lecturing manner. For several weeks he spoke in meticulous detail of his history, as though he were reciting a book. He seemed hardly to pay any attention to me, except for polite hellos or goodbyes. There was little hint of the state of his feelings or of more than a scholarly interest in the story he was unfolding.

In the second month I began to make comments to Mr. R. to the effect that there was something official in his manner, that he revealed few feelings, that he seemed to concentrate on historical matters. He was annoyed and responded by telling me that he had thought psychoanalysts were particularly interested in the histories of their patients and that he would be pleased to discuss whatever I might think best. He wished to cooperate as best he could. Perhaps he should talk more about current problems. And so he began to tell me about the office

politics and the difficulties of the projects he was working on. Gradually, I told him he wished to think of me as a guide or as a "Guru," as the boss who had hired him was, someone to please and satisfy in the hope of being led. He agreed with me, noting that he was aware that I was an expert in my field, that he had come to me for help, that he hoped I would be able to explain his problems to him. Again, gradually, repeatedly, I pointed out that he seemed to act as though his observations or ideas about himself were of little account, that he wanted to leave most of the thinking about him to me, and that this seemed inconsistent with the common aim we both had to understand him and his difficulties in being more active. It also seemed inconsistent with his attitude of intellectual superiority.

Slowly, the work became somewhat more spontaneous and immediate. Mr. R. expressed some angry feelings about his years of religious indoctrination. He complained about the narrowness of his mother's and his teachers' views and concluded that his inhibitions had resulted from his "brainwashing" upbringing. He rarely spoke of his own impulses, wishes, or intentions, or indicated that he had any, other than to satisfy the desires of his employer, wife, analyst, and others, and he felt guilty and resentful about being imperfectly able to do so. I was able to convey to him that he had nevertheless told me of his opinions and attitudes about business, of disagreements with others throughout his life, of feelings of disdain for colleagues and superiors, of fears of fighting and of punishment.

Again, over a period of time, and with numerous such interchanges, Mr. R.'s manner gradually changed. He spoke of his anger with his mother and his feelings of ineptness and inadequacy. He never could live up to her expectations and thus felt incompetent or helpless in many instances. He revealed that he masturbated frequently and compulsively even now, two or three times a day, and that he had done so since adolescence. Later, with much shame, he described fantasies of being shown how to do it by an older man, then of arousing himself by fantasies of watching two women arousing each other orally,

then having intercourse with dildos. I pointed out to him his tendency to make himself aloof, distant, an observer, even in his fantasies. Fears of losing control began to come up. Mr. R. remembered having frightening dreams in childhood—dreams of gory automobile crashes related to fear of his drunken father, dreams of robbers and murderers against whom he had to defend his family, especially his mother and sister. I suggested to Mr. R. that in the preceding period of his analysis, he seemed to have behaved toward me as he described his behavior toward adults in his early childhood. That is, he adopted a seemingly ingratiating manner, acting like a "goody-goody," a compliant student. Probably he hid his feelings of rivalry and contempt for the feared rival. His attitude toward superiors at work appeared to parallel his behavior toward me. His repeated infatuation with bosses and jobs, followed invariably by feelings of disappointment and disillusionment, reflected, besides fear over rivalrous wishes, an emulation of his mother's attitude of disappointment with his father and superiority to him, thus revealing his close tie to his mother.

Gradually, the patient became more querulous with me. He responded more and more to my comments with associations that took the form of "yes, but." At the same time he more frequently felt anger toward his work superiors and even openly questioned and opposed them. Rare dreams, dimly remembered, concerned battles and revolutions. His potency problem became worse. He became overtly angry with his mother, refused to see her over long periods of time or even to speak with her on the telephone. He recalled adolescent feelings of resentment toward women in general. Mr. R. came to see his rebellion against religion during his teens, his unproductivity at work, and his sexual negativism toward his wife as expressions and defenses against his underlying hostility toward his mother, whom he wished to torture by depriving her of the satisfaction of her wish to dominate him while living vicariously through him. He also thought he had "seen through" the members of the clergy who deluded themselves, thinking they were

pious, when actually they craved power and domination. His method for concealing arrogance derived from identification with clergy rivals as well as with mother. Mr. R. came to understand that he had a belief that he was dependent on his mother, later on his father, teachers, the "Gurus," on his wife and on the analyst, and that criticisms by them led to the fear of being "lost," unable to fend for himself, and to feelings of extreme anger. He talked about how angry he felt when interpretations indicated that he could not "orient" himself; he then felt like withdrawing and withholding. His submissive attitude and his passive posture toward superiors diminished. He quit his job and began to search for a better position.

During this period of career transition, Mr. R. felt an uncomfortable, variable anxiety, which he blamed on me. I had deprived him of his hope that he would achieve success by attaching himself to a powerful male. I had frustrated him in his wishes to outdo his mother at her own game, to succeed where she had failed. I had caused his potency symptom to worsen. I had pointed out to him his envy of his sister, who had married a wealthy and successful businessman and had thus succeeded where he could not. I was able to expand on earlier interpretations. I explained these angry feelings as reflecting resentment at the messenger who told unwelcome truths. We were able to enlarge Mr. R.'s understanding of his adoption of a feminine attitude in terms of earlier relations within his family, as well as to clarify his fears about his competitive and hostile strivings, especially in relation to feelings of guilt over his superiority. The sexual disturbance continued. Mr. R.'s anxiety and anger focused more on his wife's wish to have a child. He would then be replaced as a favorite by the child as he had been with his father when his sister was born. He would become a "meal ticket" as his father had been. I remained puzzled about the reason for the intensity of his need to conceal his ambitiousness, the intensity of his feelings of vulnerability, the intensity of his anxiety.

In the fourth year of analysis symptomatic acts he had earlier

experienced in other contexts now appeared in relation to me. He arrived late for our appointments, neglected my bills, and misremembered what had been said in preceding sessions. Investigation of his mental lapses proceeded in response to my requests for further details, requests which were influenced by my puzzlement about the intensity of the feelings of mortification and humiliation Mr. R. had when parapraxes occurred. He was unable to give any reasons why he felt so humiliated over his "mistakes" or so reluctant to investigate them. His parapraxes seemed motivated in part by transference fear of me. He wished to appear a harmless, incompetent, childish person. The reasons for the intense anxiety remained obscure. I now became more curious about the form the parapraxes took.

A pattern became evident over a period of months. Mr. R. misfiled my bills. On describing the geography of his home office, he said he had put my bill in the file on the left, not in the appropriate one on the right. After a lateness, he explained that he had turned in the wrong direction in the subway and gotten on a train leading away from my office. The following night he reported remembering a dream. In it, he was interviewing an applicant for a job (he had just recently found one for himself) and rejected him. When he awoke, it was some time before he realized this had been a dream, not a reality. In the interim, he wondered whether he had been "right" in rejecting the applicant. In the session, he suggested that his sense of humiliation with me had to do with the feeling that "I am never right. I want to reverse our relationship and be right." On another occasion, as he was discussing a political office problem in which he was arguing a point with the head of his company, he explained that the "head" had been on his right, and he gestured with his left hand. I pointed out a transference connection I thought was related—Mr. R. had recently seen me driving and envied me my car—as a partial explanation of his underlying anxiety: perhaps he wished to be the "head." Was the gesture with the left hand a gesture toward the driver's seat? He had gestured with his left hand while describing the "head"

who sat on his right. I was also dimly aware that the emphasis on geography—location—might have some significance.

Mr. R. responded with much embarrassment. Again he had made a slip. He felt humiliated, incompetent, like a child. He could not tell right from left. I suggested that the right-left question might be important. I pointed out the spatial confusion in the episodes of the misfiled bills, his taking the wrong direction, the dream question, "who was right?" Mr. R. became angry; I wanted to make him feel small. I had no "right" to suggest that he had a defect. I had not made this suggestion, I replied. Why did he think he had become so angry? He replied that I was mocking him for his left-handedness. His father had mocked him when he had difficulty learning to write. That he was left-handed was news to me, I indicated, as was the fact that he had had difficulty learning to write. It had never occurred to him to mention these two facts, he said. He recalled a painful memory, from the age of about four, of having gone shopping with his mother and having lost her. He had been terrified about being lost, unable to find his way to her.

This new element in the patient's life was explored and defined and its ramifications revealed to some degree. Again, feelings of guilt and fear consequent to his wish to defeat his father, and me, played a part in motivating his inhibitions. In addition, his anxiety was related to his fear that criticism indicated to him that he could not find his own way, lacked an independent ability to orient himself, and had to depend on others. He was a "faker" because he pretended that he did not have to depend on others. His writing problem and his difficulty in orienting himself in childhood had been the source of deeply humiliating feelings to him and had aggravated his anger when he felt neglected by those on whom he depended. He had also had great difficulty in spelling correctly as a child. He had never learned to spell letter by letter as other children did, but had overcome this problem by memorizing how words looked. This was a secret he had never told, because it indicated to him that he had a defect that he had to conceal to avoid being laughed at, and

it contributed to his idea that he was a "faker" who concealed an embarrassing flaw.

A certain characteristic lack of humor, particularly about himself, came to seem connected to his early responses to and persisting tendency toward spatial confusion. He felt he had a defect. Something was missing that others had. Mr. R. soon thought that this "defect" played a part in his feminine identification. He had equated his spatial problem with a lack of masculinity. His physical clumsiness added to his sense of inadequate masculinity and to his sense of dependence and enforced passivity. Childhood fears and memories of being lost continued to come up, as did the relation of these experiences to later interests and characteristics. He had early become extremely interested in travel and maps. He had developed his visual capacity, his preferred visual imagery, and had come to emphasize sexual looking, as, for example, in his peeping masturbatory fantasies. He recalled a persisting difficulty in remembering which was the "x" and which was the "y" axis in high school math. His interest in organizing companies, in ordering administrative structures, in market identification, in futurology, came to seem related partly (there were various determinants) to a need to locate himself spatially, to know where he was in relation to others. His clumsiness in childhood was more closely described, and Mr. R. theorized that his tendency "to find the banana peel in life and slip on it," and the mirth it provoked in others, had added to his angry, defensive negativism, his fear of competition, and his lack of humor and spontaneity. After all, he believed he had a "defect." The banana peel image was unusual for Mr. R., who, as noted, had rarely permitted himself to be comical.

Another aspect of his childhood cognitive difficulty emerged through further memories Mr. R. recovered, relating to how he learned to read in the second and third grades, with the help of a special personage in his life, a teacher who took a special interest in him. As noted, he could not manage the abstraction of letters signifying sounds, but instead learned how words look

and how to reproduce their appearance. In a way he felt a cheat, an impostor who pretended to read and write but could not really do so. He was afraid of being found out and felt guilty about being a pretender. Clearly, this "defect," so strenuously denied, concealed, and compensated for, also served as a defense against phallic aggressive strivings. The defect also made the satisfaction of these strivings seem unlikely to the patient. At the same time, his capacity to visualize supported his sense of being special and superior. He used his defect as a defense—it helped him to appear innocuous—and he defended himself against his profound feelings of defectiveness by emphasizing his superior qualities. At the same time, his pride over his capacity to visualize contributed to his anxious fantasies about impending punishment.

In his new capacity for greater ambition and aggressiveness Mr. R. now determined to have a child but discovered he was sterile. He attempted various medical treatments to remedy his new defect but was unsuccessful. Six months later, he arranged to adopt a baby, was pleased with good success at his new job, and had only a moderate fear mixed with his enjoyment of the political wars at work. Sexual ennui persisted and so did his masturbatory fantasies. He was able to recognize and understand feelings of anger and depression related to the recent blow of discovering his sterility, but claimed adoption would be a satisfactory solution. At this point, he said he was satisfied with the analytic results and was determined to end his treatment. As reasons for a more abrupt termination than I would have regarded as optimal, he cited questions of time and money related to job and child, and an unwillingness to enter into a struggle with his insurance company, which was demanding lengthy reports on his condition. The insurance question was unfortunate, but significant, because it played into his continuing anxiety about his defects and his persisting tendency to defend against feelings of anxiety and depression related to them. It also influenced his decision to take his life "into his own hands" at this time.

I have presented a case report of the treatment of a middle-aged man who came to treatment because of work problems and sexual dysfunction. In the course of the analysis, we came upon what seemed to be hints of a cognitive difficulty. Memories appeared that confirmed the presence of difficulties and of special childhood abilities that had contributed to his problems in adult life and to his character development. In childhood, this left-handed patient had suffered from right-left confusion, impulsiveness, lexical problems respecting the written word, clumsiness, and some difficulty involving abstraction, or perhaps the capacity to categorize the significant and less significant. He also thought he had a special ability to visualize and to remember. In adulthood, he was inhibited, controlled, passive, humorless, fearful about competing, passively aggressive, and sexually dysfunctional. He was also methodical, rigorous, interested in structure, visually gifted, and felt guiltily and fearfully superior. The treatment had clear, positive, but limited results. Mr. R. became more successful at work and in his relationships. He will probably enjoy fatherhood, but he remained relatively constricted and somewhat anxious. He learned a great deal but was unable to work analytically in a termination phase. His departure seemed to reflect a newfound ability to be more active, but it also seemed to suppress his only partly analyzed aggression and his transference fears of punishment, now in relation to fantasies about fatherhood. Certain characteristics were relatively unaffected by the analysis. His responsiveness to interventions in general remained less spontaneous and original than that of many other patients. His dream reports remained rare, and his associations unimaginative, perhaps vaguely concrete. At the same time, he maintained an arrogant sense of superiority which compensated him to some extent for his continuing feelings of defectiveness, but his guilt and fear of retaliation, which he was able to analyze to some degree, persisted and contributed to his decision to terminate.

I return to the original Question 1 about how one can detect

previously unrecognized cognitive difficulties in analysis. In this case, a number of the patient's adult characteristics led to my suspicion that such difficulties might have been present in childhood. These included certain characterologic qualities. They were general qualities: an underlying level of anxiety and a corresponding defensiveness, a narcissistic vulnerability and rigidity of character, a distance and humorlessness, and a constriction of dream and fantasy life that seemed out of keeping, in my clinical judgment, with the historic factors that I knew and with his general competence. The severity of Mr. R.'s separation problems and the intensity of his bisexual conflicts were more specific factors that led me to wonder. Still more specific keys involved his propensity to feel humiliation, almost mortification, in response to seemingly minor parapraxes and, finally, his repeated use of imagery involving location, particularly in relation to right and left in his associations, as well as in many parapraxes. Ultimately, these cues led to the discovery of Mr. R.'s childhood lexical difficulties, writing problems, clumsiness, and spatial uncertainties. This grouping corresponds to Wender's (1971) description of minimal brain dysfunction: Mr. R. had "impaired coordination," "clumsiness," "problems in arithmetic" (including the x-y axis confusion), "short attention span" (which seemed to persist and to influence Mr. R.'s work performance), "impulsivity," and an "obsessive quality."

As to Questions 2 and 3 regarding the effect of these difficulties on development and on the patient as analysand, the effects—e.g., heightened anxiety and defensiveness, and their developmental vicissitudes—became obvious during the course of the work. Mr. R.'s sense of defect had supported his vulnerability to separation at first and his susceptibility to castration fears later. The sense of defect added to his sense of loss at his sister's birth, and later, when he went to school, it contributed to his tendency toward depressive ideas of incompetence and dependence, to his susceptibility to ridicule, to his humorlessness, and to his tendency toward sulking and withholding. It

also spurred him to compensatory development of his visual capacities and to efforts at finding alternative ways of orienting himself spatially and temporally.

Regarding Question 4, about the possibility of needing to modify technique with such patients, I do not believe that this case required technical modification, although it was necessary to repeat interpretations in various words, using a variety of examples, more patiently and tactfully than usual. This seems to be similar to tutorial methods used to aid children with cognitive difficulties, which depend on presenting concepts in alternate forms and using a variety of sensory modalities to aid the child in finding alternative routes around his difficulties. It might be that in a more seriously impaired patient than Mr. R. was, more literal and concrete examples and analogies would have to be given, to convey the meaning intended in an intervention. In some instances, a supportive, encouraging, more psychotherapeutic approach may be required.

As to Question 5, having to do with the issue of etiology, I do not personally think that psychoanalytic data can be used as definitive evidence regarding the question of immanent versus developmental factors. In Mr. R.'s case there is perhaps a piece of negative evidence: none of his cognitive idiosyncrasies could be explained to my satisfaction, in the way that symptoms, dreams, and other psychological phenomena can, simply as the consequence of compromise formation. Nor did his tendency toward right-left confusion or his difficulty in organizing his ideas and in sometimes translating images into words significantly change with analysis. It is possible that Mr. R.'s functioning deteriorated more readily under stress than one might expect on dynamic and developmental grounds. Perhaps, under stress, characteristic forms appeared because of an underlying physiological organization which became mobilized for psychologic reasons. It is clear that Mr. R. used the forms for defensive and wish-gratifying aims, both consciously and automatically.

Finally, I would like to speculate briefly about why this subject

has received little attention from psychoanalysts. First, until recent years, it has received little attention from anyone. The likelihood is that had Mr. R. had his reading difficulty as a child today, a diagnosis of dyslexia would have been made, and remedial efforts would have been instituted. He might have been referred for psychotherapy or analysis as well. Second, such difficulties have received attention in recent years, but mainly as a problem of children, not as a problem of adults. It must occur often that such difficulties in childhood have, as they did for Mr. R., important effects on the development of later pathologic and characterologic formations, just as physical infirmities, illnesses, or such defects as color blindness do. That they may persist and continue to affect cognition may also be so. But this has not been generally recognized. Thus if the difficulty is subtle, it may not be recognized. If severe, such patients may not be considered candidates for analysis.

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AN ESSAY ON METHOD IN APPLIED PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY FRANCIS BAUDRY, M.D.

The author attempts to evaluate critically the application of psychoanalysis to literature by examining problems of method and the assumptions psychoanalysts unwittingly make about texts they are about to interpret. The special advantages of psychoanalysis over other interpretive systems are discussed, and several examples of the possible use of psychoanalysis in the study of literary texts are presented.

Psychoanalysis has been so misused in its application to other fields such as literature that a re-examination of the definition, limitations, and possible contributions of a psychoanalytic approach is in order. Some critics even go so far as to question whether the application of psychoanalysis to a literary text can be valid. There is now a considerable literature on the limitations of applied psychoanalysis (e.g., Kohut, 1960; Skura, 1981; Trilling, 1950; Werman, 1979). Most papers dealing with the issue stress the difference between a live patient and a text—the lack of free association and patient response in the applied field—and urge caution in using psychoanalysis in other than the clinical realm.

In this paper, I will attempt to place the psychoanalytic concept of interpretation within the more general framework of a broad definition of interpretation and meaning. This will be followed by specific consideration of how analysis circumvents the absence of a live patient in its examination of a literary text. I will define four main approaches.

1. In the first approach, the analytic writer treats a novel,

play, or poem as a case history, ignoring the as-if nature of the literary text and performing a type of character analysis.

2. The second approach relates the text to the mental life (both normal and abnormal) of the author. The text is viewed as a modified form of free association.

3. The third approach considers the text in its own right and carries out a thematic analysis identifying traces or derivatives of mental contents.

4. The fourth approach concerns itself with the reaction of the reader and the production of poetic and aesthetic effect.

Using a number of well-known literary texts, I will illustrate each of these approaches and discuss its validity. As an introduction to this, I will examine Freud's thinking on the relationship between psychoanalysis and literature.

Eissler (1968) described a personal bias of Freud's which shaped his attitude toward literature: his awe and admiration for the talents of the greater writers and their capacity to reach psychological insights intuitively. This led Freud to approach literary texts as organic, live, real. Said Eissler, "Shakespeare's creations may have been experienced by him, not as figments of the mind, or as artistic illusions, but rather as sectors of a live world that has to be analyzed in the same way as one analyzes the minds of live and really existing people" (pp. 152-153).

Freud's bias is apparent in his work on *Gradiva* (1907) and in the use he made of *Macbeth* (1916, pp. 318-324) in his attempt to explain the puzzling character type of "those wrecked by success." He searched for the hidden motivations of Lady Macbeth, who falls apart psychologically after achieving an external success. One gets the impression that Freud expected the playwright in his genius to furnish clues to explain the puzzling breakdown. In this case, Freud's attempt failed as he realized that a literary work was never designed for that purpose. In addition to examining literature and works of art as barely modified case studies, Freud was also interested in the psychology of the artist and in understanding the basis for his own reactions to great works. It is instructive for us to examine the sort of

questions which served Freud as points of entry for applying psychoanalysis to other fields. In the "Leonardo" paper (1910), he started his inquiry by noting that something prevented Leonardo's personality from being understood by his contemporaries—particularly his attitude toward his art: Leonardo left many works unfinished and cared little about their ultimate fate. In the "Moses of Michelangelo" paper, Freud (1914) was drawn to analyze the inscrutability of the statue and its particularly powerful effect on him. In his paper on the uncanny (1919), he examined a feeling that is significant to the realm of aesthetic experience yet often neglected by experts in that field. In each case, then, Freud started by focusing on contradictions in the life or work of an artist, or on something unexplained by another discipline, which was of personal interest to him and which he believed could be clarified by using the psychoanalytic approach. The details Freud started with are often quite limited in scope, yet they afforded him an opening to discuss questions of wide interest.

Freud's theorizing about the creative product and its genesis was influenced by his self-analysis and by the exploitation of the richness of the dream. It is not an accident that Freud gave the dream a special position in its role as gatekeeper to the unconscious and as first model, by analogy, of the creative process.

In his early writings Freud overcame some of the obstacles in comparing dream states and waking thought by establishing intermediary way stations. The 1908 paper, "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming," established an analogy: the poet is *like* a child at play. He creates for himself an imaginary world which he takes seriously, i.e., he endows it with considerable amounts of affect, all the while distinguishing it clearly from reality. Play is superseded by daydreams; these are followed by the novel, that is, by works of art with a narrative structure. Certain universal fantasies, such as the family romance or the Oedipus story, structure myths and certain novels. Dreams and poetry are tied together through a common element—the state of man

dissatisfied and unhappy. Unfulfilled wishes are the motive forces of fantasies; all fantasies are wish fulfillments, serving to correct a frustrating reality. A much later work, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), incorporated the skillful analysis of a child's play with a wooden reel, understood by Freud as an attempted mastery of loss. Many examples of works fueled by such a motive come to mind. Proust's *Remembrance of Things Past* is an apt illustration of this dynamic element.

In a little-known passage from the "Michelangelo" paper, Freud (1914) clarified beautifully his view of some of the specific contributions analysis can make to the study of art. He wrote:

> In my opinion, what grips us so powerfully can only be the artist's *intention*, in so far as he has succeeded in expressing it in his work and in getting us to understand it. I realize that this cannot be merely a matter of *intellectual* comprehension; what he aims at is to awaken in us the same emotional attitude, the same mental constellation as that which in him produced the impetus to create. But why should the artist's intention not be capable of being communicated and comprehended in *words*, like any other fact of mental life? Perhaps where great works of art are concerned this would never be possible without the application of psycho-analysis. The product itself after all must admit of such an analysis, if it really is an effective expression of the intentions and emotional activities of the artist. To discover his intention, though, I must first find out the meaning and content of what is represented in his work; I must, in other words, be able to *interpret* it. . . . I even venture to hope that the effect of the work will undergo no diminution after we have succeeded in thus analysing it (p. 212).

There is something very compelling about this succinct statement; it still has hints of the dream theory, with the concept of "identity of perception," which Freud utilized in Chapter VII of *The Interpretation of Dreams*. This passage of Freud's also provides a method for the application of analysis to works of art. Better than any other discipline, analysis can provide an un-

derstanding of the "meaning and content of what is represented" through the observation of small details often considered unimportant when judged by existing aesthetic standards. This is achieved through objective knowledge of symbolism, and through the understanding of fantasies and their means of representation as derived from the study of dreams. Also necessary is the capacity to understand what is represented in the work. This requires a process akin to empathy. Freud separated the intentions and the emotional activities of the artist, thus distinguishing motives from process. Finally, Freud saw a work of art as a particular type of representation of the artist's mental life. It is not a separate entity and is best appreciated by making constructions about the artist's mental life. There are some problems with the above formulation, however. It is by no means proven that the artist aims "to awaken in us the same emotional attribute, the same mental constellation as that which in him produced the impetus to create." A derivative of this theory was later espoused by Hanns Sachs (1942) who viewed the artist as the vehicle through which forbidden, guilt-laden unconscious fantasies may be given some form of expression. There is a resonance, then, between the author's unconscious and that of his audience. A common sharing results, and the audience is in a position to use the work as a vehicle to live out some of its personal fantasies. The successful work will allow a greater range of possibilities through the artistic skill and creative use of ambiguity. By using the word "intention," Freud was stressing the volitional aspect of creativity far more than is generally held to be true. Many artists, if not most, are unaware of what forces drive them to create and what meaning they intend the audience to find in their work. This is especially true in nonverbal art forms. In his writings, Freud was generally more interested in the psychology of the artist than in the nature of the literary text.

Freud's (1916) paper on "those wrecked by success" included a lengthy analysis of the play, *Macbeth.* It illustrates very well the process of Freud's thinking and is worthy of extended com-

mentary. It is a peculiar paper, in that Freud saw fit to resort to a fictional character to help him solve some of the puzzling clinical features of a character type.[1] The first level on which Freud examined the play was that of character, treating the personages as real and explaining their behavior as though they were live people interacting with one another. Such an approach can certainly yield new insights, such as the uncovering of hidden motives to explain behavior. In the case of *Macbeth*, the character approach failed at one critical point well described by Freud. How is one to account for Lady Macbeth's breakdown in view of the strength of that lady in the beginning of the play? If anyone should have shown signs of remorse or guilt, surely Macbeth would have been a more plausible candidate. He seems far less determined than Lady Macbeth to kill Duncan and is more aware of the ignominy of the act itself.

The attempt to understand Lady Macbeth's decompensation and suicide on this level can be pursued in terms of evidence within the play (i.e., the level of so-called observable data). If this fails, as it does in the present instance, the depth psychologist can import explanations from outside of the text and not well supported by it, but still within the limits of plausibility—using the concept of self-directed aggression and reconstructing possible motives. Such formulations include Lady Macbeth's wish for self-punishment for having wanted Duncan dead, or her interpreting her childlessness (whatever its causes) as a punishment. The latter explanation has an interesting structure; it is plausible, as imported from the historical origins of the legend, but it requires a span of time between the accession to the throne and the subsequent breakdown. It even has the unusual quality of being supported by evidence from within the play itself, yet it is unacceptable because of the short span of the action. In the original story ten years elapsed between the murder and the later events. However, Shakespeare's play con-

[1] Arlow (personal communication) has suggested the reverse possibility—that Freud wanted to use his understanding of the character type to try to unravel the mystery of Lady Macbeth.

denses the action for the purposes of dramatic structure to a bit less than a week, thus making it impossible to resort to the historical truth. As Freud (1916) stated, ". . . the contradiction remains that though so many subtle interrelations in the plot, and between it and its occasion, point to a common origin of them in the theme of childlessness, nevertheless the economy of time in the tragedy expressly precludes a development of character from any motives but those inherent in the action itself" (p. 322). Freud wisely wrote: "We must, I think, give up any hope of penetrating the triple layer of obscurity into which the bad preservation of the text, the unknown intention of the dramatist, and the hidden purport of the legend have become condensed" (p. 323).

A third level abandons the search for psychological plausibility and turns to the study of aesthetic and tragic effects, i.e., looking at events not as psychologically motivated but included for other purposes—dramatic action, movement, and the like. In this approach, also pursued by Freud, a new hypothesis was constructed. Lady Macbeth's behavior is "understandable" if we see her conflicts and identity as displaced from Macbeth, that is, if we see the two characters as having been interchanged at least in their psychological reactions. This leads us to an important realization for the depth psychologist. The continuity of character is an illusion created by the playwright. In terms of the process of creation, we know that the author may identify with different characters as a play or novel proceeds. I have studied some aspects of this shift in some scenes of Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* and have shown the shifting identification of the author, sometimes with one character and sometimes with the other (Baudry, 1979). Thus, the shifting evolution of guilt in *Macbeth*, seen first in one character, then made more evident in another, is consistent with what we know about the creative process. Of course, the skill of the playwright lies in combining elements of poetic necessity with those of psychological plausibility, or even of so overwhelming the audience that a question about plausibility is not raised because the affects aroused

deaden the sense of critical judgment or make unnecessary a search for rational explanation. Until I read Freud's study of Lady Macbeth, I had never been troubled by the apparently unexplainable nature of Lady Macbeth's breakdown.

Having been frustrated in his attempt to solve the riddle of Lady Macbeth, Freud suggested one last approach. He looked for underlying themes to unify disparate characters and scenes—in the case of *Macbeth*, "fathers and sons." Although he did not pursue this further, one could attempt to formulate various classes of hypotheses on the basis of this piece of data. One class would remain at the level of the text and bring to it certain psychoanalytic hypotheses about the relationship of fathers and sons to see whether the play illustrates their validity; or one could try to unify scattered bits of data and attempt to sketch out a clearer statement, perhaps an identifying theme of the play as a particular vicissitude of father-son relationships. It would be possible to examine other Shakespearean plays to test such a theme and to look for variations, *Hamlet* being a logical choice. There is a further level of *Macbeth* not addressed by Freud. As analysts, we might be interested in the study of dramatic effects and ask why and how such effects are produced. We are also curious about the nature and determinants of various audience reactions including the sense, "this is implausible."

Interpretation and Meaning

It is not possible to interpret a text without making some systematic, fundamental assumptions on which to base our interpretations. On the simplest level, to interpret is to reveal a new meaning which underlies the text—"a" really means "b." The interpretation can pertain to the structure or another version of "a," or it may demonstrate a new context which clarifies the original text. To interpret also means to take one set of facts and insert them into a more general system of thought. In this manner we might assert that a poem can have a religious, an

allegorical, a historical, a Marxist, or a sociological interpretation. Within each system, different rules of evidence apply. An interpreter espousing a polemic theory might not be very concerned with scientific accuracy. A more encompassing concept of the meaning of a text includes a complex range of possibilities, from the most personal ones related to the author (conscious, preconscious, and unconscious), to those more impersonal sets of ideas related to the historical and cultural epoch and including the genre to which the text belongs. The possible range of meanings of a text is considerable; there is no *one* true meaning.

Some literary critics, notably Hirsch (1967), have argued for a separation of the concepts of meaning and significance. For these theorists, meaning refers to the author's intended meaning (on whatever level). What changes through the ages is not the meaning of a text but its significance—that is, the context in which a particular meaning is seen or understood, depending upon current social and cultural values. The advantage of this point of view is the separation of the "objective" search for meaning from the reader-related concept of significance. Some literary critics, such as Trilling (1950), have disagreed: "There is no single meaning to any work of art. . . . changes in historical context and in personal mood change the meaning of a work and indicate that artistic understanding is not a question of fact but of value. Even if the author's intention were, as it cannot be, precisely determinable, the meaning of a work cannot be in the author's intention alone. It must also lie in its effect" (p. 331).

Speaking as an analyst, I prefer to distinguish, as Hirsch does, the more objective readings of a text, from the more personal, subjective components. Yet, even an objective reading will still be largely a function of the system and assumptions of the interpreter. A college student, a literary critic, a novelist, and a psychoanalyst could start with the same text and arrive at very different readings of varying degrees of sophistication and scholarship. Some authors, notably Holland (1968), have taken

the extreme position that the meaning of a text becomes little more than the projection of an individual's identity themes and conflicts. This view makes of meaning an entirely subjective endeavor and negates the entire field of scholarship. The danger of subjective intrusion is present in any interpretation and can lead to the disregard of other tools available to evaluate an interpretation from the point of view of scholarship and faithfulness to the text.

One of the questions I am raising is whether texts have properties independent of the author which could be called psychological. Language has its own sets of predetermined meanings, implications, and referents, independent of the wishes and purposes of an author. The latter simply borrows them for his own use. The same point was made by a contemporary French critic, Doubrovsky (1966), in a brilliant work on criticism in France: "Though the writer speaks a language, there is also a language speaking through the writer. The real meanings of the written word exceed in every direction the restricted meaning of the work meant. Or, more precisely, the framework of willed significations supports the fabric of the possible significations, of which some, by definition, must escape the author . . ." (p. 104). "Far from its signifying essence being frozen in an eternal present, the work of art is constantly projecting itself, toward an indefinite and open future" (p. 105). The richness of meanings of a work of art is partly intentional, partly preconsciously and unconsciously determined, partly the result of the nature of language, and partly the result of the absence of a clear context which limits the range of possible meanings.

In the case of *Macbeth*, the poor preservation of the text adds its own contribution to obscurity and ambiguity. A simple example will illustrate the problem. In Act I, Scene vii, there is a brief exchange between Macbeth and Lady Macbeth. Macbeth: "If we should fail,—." Lady Macbeth: "We fail!" This "we fail" is open to at least three interpretations because the punctuation in the original text is unclear. 1) We fail? (meaning we, fail—how can you imagine this?). 2) We fail! (meaning what is the

matter with you? We shall have to accept whatever destiny fate has in store for us, and this should not deter us). 3) We fail (implying a more resigned and philosophic stance). Sometimes the author may deliberately resort to ambiguity for purposes of enriching the multiple meanings which reverberate. As analysts, we are interested in the purpose, development, and possible aims of motivational ambiguity. This ambiguity has to be differentiated from obscurity or meaninglessness. In general, great works such as *Macbeth* expose the blind spots of the explanatory devices which open them up to interpretation. The many literary meanings are contained within the text itself and not linked (as is the dream) to another level of discourse of which the text is a distorted symbolic expression.

Having so far examined some general concepts of interpretation and meaning, I will now turn to the arena of psychoanalysis. In contrast to the other systems and theories, what are the specific attributes, methods, and advantages of a psychoanalytic approach to a text and what special skills are required to carry out this task?

The basic approach of psychoanalysis is to look at all human behavior from the vantage point of conflicts, most often unconscious, and to lay bare their structure, their modes of representation, their development, genesis, transformations, and solutions, both adaptive and maladaptive. Psychoanalysis was initially the science of the unconscious, of the hidden. It eventually extended itself to include functions such as memory and cognition, formerly the domain of academic psychology. With the advent of ego psychology and the study of character which focuses on the formal aspects of behavior, starting with surface descriptions, psychoanalysis moved closer to issues at the heart of literature—those of structure and narrative. As a discipline, psychoanalysis possesses certain very distinct advantages over other methods of literary interpretation, a fact that can be forgotten by excessively zealous critics.

Psychoanalysis, when properly applied, is not reductionistic. It combines several points of view. To arrive at a diagnosis of

character, we do not rely on a catalogue of descriptive traits alone, but combine dynamic, structural, genetic, and adaptive approaches. Waelder (1929) described some of the advantages of an analytic approach, which is "characterized by the fact that it is continually divesting our knowledge of the mind of its subjective features and disguises, and which thus indeed conforms to the essence of the development of scientific thought in general, overcoming by an endlessly converging process its basic antimony, i.e. that its means of dealing with its subject are themselves part of this subject . . ." (p. 111). Psychoanalysis has led to the accumulation of vast stores of knowledge about the functioning of the human mind, particularly in the realm of defenses and the multiple, often unexpected transformations of unconscious fantasies in both pathological and nonpathological areas. This allows analysts to pick up clear-cut derivatives which nonanalysts would ignore. They are in a position to focus on certain minute details which might strike the literary critic as irrelevant but which hold important clues to hidden meaning. Freud (1910) demonstrated this in the "Leonardo" paper by examining ledgers for expenses which Leonardo kept and then interpreting such ledgers as mini-obsessional devices that allowed the expression of warded-off affects which Freud reconstructed. In addition, analysts through their training are sensitized to observing clues, often preconsciously, which reinforce impressions derived from other observations. The same message can be conveyed through many channels.

A brief comparison of dreams and literary texts will serve as a useful prelude to discussing the application of psychoanalysis to literary texts. The early approach of analysis to literature was based on making analogies to dreams and symbolism. However, the attempt to extend the understanding of the dream to that of waking mental products immediately raises the question of the difference between the two which an application of method must take into account. 1) We must reconcile the narcissistic regressive aspect of the dream with the process of waking thought consciously constructed. Dreams are automatic phe-

nomena, whereas literary products are at least in part under conscious control. 2) There are certain functions of the dream, such as being the guardian of sleep, which cannot be easily applied to waking products. 3) A fundamental aspect of a successful work of art is the degree to which it is a creation; that is, not simply a projection of the unresolved conflicts of the artist but a new solution. This is the familiar concept of sublimation which implies more than a successful defense. It is possible, in theory, to reduce a dream to, and explain all its elements in terms of, the workings of the unconscious mind, its mechanisms (condensation, displacement), and its contents. A dream is nothing more than the workings of the mind during the condition of sleep. We might admire the elegance of a construction of a manifest dream, but we would not apply the label "creative" to the end product. I am using the word "creative" to refer to a complex synthesis of unconscious, preconscious, and conscious elements through the application of artistic technique resulting in an aesthetic effect.

The development of the theory of dream interpretation and the meaning of the interpretation of a dream can be contrasted with the application of interpretation to a literary text. Until the advent of psychoanalysis, dreams were interpreted, independent of the dreamer, as oracular or as special communications from the gods. Only occasionally would some symbolic meaning coincide with the dreamer's psychology. It was one of Freud's great discoveries that dreams do not have significance except in relation to the dreamer. His method of interpreting dreams required consideration of the dreamer's associations. All previous methods of dream interpretation could then be seen as nonscientific, arbitrary, and subjective. The dream is an authored text. It cannot be understood without the cooperation of its author. A context is necessary. The meaning of a dream as determined by psychoanalysis is not arbitrary and can be discovered only by applying certain well-defined principles. As Freud (1900) defined it in *The Interpretation of Dreams*, ". . . interpreting a dream implies assigning a 'meaning' to it—that is,

replacing it by something which fits into the chain of our mental acts as a link having a validity and importance equal to the rest" (p. 96). Ricoeur (1965) pointed out that dream interpretation leads from a less intelligible to a more intelligible meaning. The same does not hold true for a literary text. It has meanings in its own right, and even though it can be placed in the context of the author's life, this is not its primary value, except for the analyst who is specifically interested in understanding the process of transformation associated with creativity.

In analogy with dream interpretation some analysts refer to a literary text's latent content. This is a dangerous analogy as it suggests that there is a real or true meaning in another register and that the text is a deceptive surface which has to be deciphered. Trilling (1950) was critical of the search for hidden motives in a play such as *Hamlet*, which would imply "that there is a reality to which the play stands in the relation that a dream stands to the wish that generates it and from which it is separable. But *Hamlet* is not merely the product of Shakespeare's thought, it is the very instrument of his thought" (p. 333). The text offers itself for us to see. I prefer the terms "oblique" or "hidden" to indicate the effort and care required to tease out a certain meaning. When we do use the term latent, we are referring to the author and postulating that some hidden unconscious fantasy is acting as an organizer of the plot or story. Doubrovsky (1966) expressed the same idea: "The profundity of a work must therefore be understood in a perceptual sense as one speaks of the depth of a visual field in which the multiplication of viewpoints can never exhaust the material to be perceived . . . so that there are indeed levels of signification, defined by the level of perceptual acuity; there are indeed 'depths' of meaning but not strata" (p. 99).

A text presents a different sort of compromise formation from that of a dream. Considerations of aesthetics or poetics, conscious intent, available models, and cultural factors in the broadest sense determine the end product in a way very different from that applicable to dream work. In contrast to a

dream, a literary text does not require the author's associations to be understood. It is, of course, possible to use the text of a story written by a patient in analysis, much as one would use a dream, and to ask the patient to associate to various elements. In such a case, one would hope to gain an understanding of the personal relevance of the story to its author, and possibly of the ways in which the experience of the author finds its path in the story. Such an approach might also clarify some of the author's intentions. We generally use the term significance rather than meaning when we are interested in the personal ramifications of a text. This does not, however, exhaust the meanings of a literary text. To arrive at them, all we usually need is the manifest content. Our appreciation of the author's private or personal use of symbols is not a prerequisite for the reading of the text, although it may enrich our understanding and enable us to appreciate more subtle effects and ambiguities. It may also rule out certain interpretations as inconsistent with the author's intent. The power of a text often transcends the author's intended purposes. It is important to try to differentiate what an author intends from the full range of meanings which can be derived from a text.

Although I have used the term psychoanalytic interpretation as though it were uniform, there are in reality a number of different models which can be applied. They share certain common assumptions, to be sure (e.g., conflict, determinism, multiple function), but stress different aspects (symptom, dream, transference, fantasy, character) (see Skura [1981] for detailed discussions). Looking at a text as a symptom, for example, would emphasize the pathological aspect of the work either formally (e.g., looking at certain repetitions as obsessions) or by focusing on the conflicts expressed therein. Certain stories of Kafka lend themselves to this approach. As an example, the story entitled "Josephine the Singer, or the Mouse Folk" (Kafka, 1922) endlessly and repeatedly dwells on reasons for the audience's interest in the mouse's quite ordinary piping. Perhaps because of the rather clumsy and bland effect of the

story, it is tempting to view the monotonous repetitions as a failed artistic effect which has in it components of an obsessional need to express some inner fantasy.

Looking at a text as a dream emphasizes the search for the latent content, the altered states of consciousness, and such concepts as condensation, displacement, and the hidden meaning behind a deceptive surface whose organization has to be disregarded in order to reach the true meaning. Certain art forms, such as poetry, lend themselves to this, particularly if the circumstances of their composition are associated with a dream or a dream-like state. An obvious example is "Kubla Khan" by Coleridge. A Keats poem, "La Belle Dame Sans Merci," the subject of a forthcoming paper by me, is another such example. In one instance, at an interdisciplinary colloquium on applied analysis, Dr. Donald Kaplan's conceptualizing a difficult and abstract poem, "Beyond the Alps" by Robert Lowell (1956), as an "association" to a brief autobiographical segment included in the book with the poem appeared to yield considerable meaning. The method he employed was to make an analogy between the poem and a dream, both being the result of condensation and displacement. The autobiographical segment held the key to decoding the poem by enabling him to connect obscure imagery to the personally meaningful details in the poet's life that were included in the same book. It was the factor of this inclusion that made the connection permissible.

Looking at a text from the vantage point of transference will emphasize the object relations aspect of the work, the attempt of the author to reach out to the audience (real or fantasized), and the search for the infantile objects. There is an aspect of object relations as organizer that is particularly applicable to theater and tragedy. Bennett Simon (1984) has examined tragedies from the point of view of the biased interpretation that a particular character makes about another character's motives or actions. For example, for reasons of revenge Iago is bent on poisoning Othello's mind and imposing a warped view of reality by playing on Othello's jealousy and gullibility. Simon has made

use of the Kohutian concept of the unempathic mother and has tried to show how a character's reaction to being chronically misunderstood by another inexorably moves the play to its tragic ending.

Looking at a text as a fantasy would again emphasize certain aspects of unconscious mental functioning, the transformation of the infantile wishes, the defensive modes of operation, the universal themes and their vicissitudes which recur in humankind.

Looking at a text from the point of view of character would emphasize the formal aspects—its narrative structure in relation to the content. The structuralist school has developed this aspect. Character has also been used in another context, that is, the examination of a character of a fictitious personage such as Hamlet and its development throughout a play.

These approaches do not clash; sometimes they can be combined usefully.

Problems of Method in Applied Psychoanalysis

We arrive at meanings by a process of interpretation. Interpretations in the analytic sense are reconstructions of hypothetic mental processes, transformations, and implied meanings which the ambiguity of language allows. Where does the meaning reside? The text evokes hypotheses in the reader who shares certain common assumptions, fantasies, and experiences with the author. How is interpretation in applied psychoanalysis different from that in the clinical situation? In the clinical setting, interpretation refers to a method for revealing hidden meanings in the context of an ongoing process. Psychoanalysis has developed its own system of procedures and rules to uncover the multiple meanings of dreams, symptoms, and attitudes.

Again, using the dream for purposes of comparison, psychoanalysis allows us to reconstruct the latent dream text from the manifest dream by using the patient's free associations in the

course of an ongoing treatment which provides a rich context. Psychoanalysis has both described the various mechanisms by which the manifest dream is created out of the latent content and has discovered a process by which we can recover the "seed" thoughts, so to speak. In practice, we do not exhaustively analyze the text of a dream; we are more interested in what the dream can tell us about the dreamer—his current preoccupations and hidden wishes. It is possible from certain dreams to reconstruct large segments of the determinants of the patient's neurosis. Such a reconstruction might be called the meaning of the dream (for the analyst). However, we would not interpret this to the patient; we would instead focus on the purpose of the dream. This refers to the author of the dream (whether consciously or unconsciously intended is a secondary matter).

We are unable to set up a similar method to reveal the intentions of the author of a piece of creative writing. The determinants (not causes, as the complexities are worked out retrospectively) are so numerous as to defy a dynamic ordering except in very extreme cases. We make the following assumptions about a work of art. It is a mental product, and, like all mental products, it follows certain basic psychological principles, such as the principle of multiple function. That is, we expect it to be a complicated compromise formation that includes drive derivatives, defenses, aspects of the superego, the repetition compulsion, and some adaptation to reality. As previously mentioned, the nature of this compromise formation is different from that of a symptom, dream, or character trait. Included in the art work are such factors as technical skill, talent, and sensitivity, which are not easily reducible to psychoanalytic formulations.

There is a further problem in the application of psychoanalysis to a text, due to the absence of the unconscious, defenses, or conflicts, which are attributes of persons (authors) not of fictional characters. In applying psychoanalysis to a text, we are confined to the descriptive level and must substitute other data for the missing points of view. This is the core problem of

applied analysis; it is met in a variety of ways, none of them truly satisfactory. As mentioned earlier, I will outline four main approaches.

The first approach is for the interpreter to enter the fictional world and attribute to the characters in a novel or play the conflicts, defenses, and attitudes of live people. Once this step is taken, then it becomes easy to use analytic concepts, ignoring the "as if" quality of the enterprise. In its extreme form the first approach, which was also the earliest form of applied analysis, claims to be able to explain a character's behavior through a "discovery" of his unconscious motives, treating the text as a case study. This way of proceeding overlooks the fact that characters are figments of the author's imagination; they have no past, no memory, and they "live" only for the duration of the play. The author of a play is often more concerned with theatrical or poetic effect than with the creation of real human beings. However, if one chooses to enter the fictional realm, cannot analysis "discover" traces consistent with the expression of motives and feelings normally kept out of awareness? Is not the author, who, after all, possesses an unconscious, able to convey some of its elements in his creative work without realizing the accuracy of his observations? If so, analysis is in a position to enrich the understanding of the work by demonstrating the existence of such evidence and its consistency with what we know from the clinical realm. Wangh (1950) did this in the case of *Othello* by demonstrating convincing "evidence" of Iago's hidden homosexual attachment to Othello.

In the second approach one uses the text as a portal of entry into the psychology of the author and sees the work as a form of modified free association. In order to interpret a text in this way, one must possess a set of assumptions and values similar to the author's or be aware in the greatest possible detail of the author's value and assumptions. This may help to avoid one of the pitfalls common to psychoanalytic interpretation—the inappropriate attribution of a personal meaning to an aspect of the work best explained by reference to the more impersonal

elements. This does not negate the possibility of a combination of factors; that is, a cultural factor can also serve as the expression of more personal themes. The role and relevance of "unconscious" factors in explaining a character's behavior is a matter of considerable controversy. It is often not clear whether a given action requires the import of psychological theory or whether it may be "explained" by what is loosely termed poetic license. We are most often dealing not with an "either/or," but with an "and." Such a controversy is apparent in the discussion of Hamlet's procrastination by the literary scholar, G. L. Kittredge. He went out of his way to explain Hamlet's delay as due to doubts about the authenticity of the specter ("The spirit that I have seen may be the devil"). Kittredge (1939) wrote: "This doubt as to the ambiguous apparition accords with ancient doctrine and was perfectly intelligible to any Elizabethan audience. Disregard of Hamlet's dilemma has led to misinterpretation of his character, as if he were a procrastinator, a vain dreamer, an impulsive creature of feeble will. But Shakespeare has done his best to enforce the imperative scruple as to the apparition" (p. xv). Kittredge followed this with a number of specific references to similar reactions on the part of other characters (Horatio, Bernardo). There is the danger that the analyst, when faced with a puzzle in a text, will, as in the clinical situation, resort to various aspects of unconscious motivation, ignoring certain historical considerations relevant to the play. It is also possible, as in *Macbeth*, that the data might not be available to account for a particular bit of behavior. To explain certain senseless aspects of behavior as derived from "an unconscious need for punishment" in the absence of confirmatory evidence can be quite misleading, if not positively false.

Within a play, what are the limits of the explanatory value of unconscious motivation? Is it acceptable to explain certain aspects of the adult behavior of fictional characters by referring to their childhood, as some authors do in their interpretations? In my view, such interpretations stretch the limits of common sense. One can say that certain behaviors or actions of a real

person would suggest certain childhood antecedents, but to refer to a fictional character's past is to add one's own fiction to that of the author. Yet one could make the counterargument that such concepts as the oedipus complex are, after all, based on what we know about childhood experience. Resorting to the oedipus complex as an explanatory hypothesis, however, will be valid only to the degree that the text supports it directly—for example, through the identification of triangular relationships or by the presence of loving statements about the mother in association with hostile attitudes toward the father. A truly enlightened psychoanalytic approach requires a thorough grounding in other disciplines to minimize causes of error. The text itself cannot directly answer questions about the mind of the author. It can, however, provide data which help us to formulate hypotheses. At a certain point it becomes necessary to go to other sources for more evidence (biography, letters, journals). As a brief example, much of Keats's poetry contains images of fusion and orality; much deals with themes of abandonment, and the mood is often depressed. It does not surprise those who are analytically trained to discover in Keats's early history multiple object losses, an inability to mourn, and evidence of considerable depression. It is possible to reconstruct from the imagery and metaphors a number of likely unconscious fantasies and to show how Keats attempted to come to terms with his losses.

In the absence of such information, the general application of "psychoanalysis" to a text is not possible; or it will yield only some trivial aspect, such as the fact that the characters have oedipal conflicts. The most common pitfall is for the unwary interpreter to restate the text using psychoanalytic terminology and substituting general truths of little interest for the specific images and interactions of metaphors of the text. Proust's dread of going to sleep becomes an index of his fear of loss of identity.

A careful reading of a text and some knowledge about its composition may yield a particular point of view or a general organizer which is of heuristic value. For example, the state-

ment made by Virginia Woolf (Bell, 1980, p. 208) to the effect that writing *To the Lighthouse* was a "necessary act" to rid her of her obsession with her dead parents suggests a particular organizer—the work of mourning. It is possible to compare the characters of the mother and the father at the beginning and at the end of the novel and to consider their various representations, the shift in affects, the quality of imagery, various metaphors of incorporation and introjection, and the degree of aggression, to mention but a few possibilities. In this way, the evolution of the novel can be seen as paralleling the author's own mourning; creativity is used in the service of both making possible and undoing the loss of the object. It is important not to "degrade" the text—that is, to use it for some purpose for which it was not "designed." By this, I mean that the questions asked of the text must have some relevance to its inner structure or to the intentions of the author.

Many of the writers in applied analysis fail in this kind of approach by carelessly equating the manifest content of a work with its intrapsychic equivalent, relying mainly on the mechanism of symbolic translation. As an example, if a poem describes a rather transparent oedipal fantasy, the interpreter may all too quickly equate the manifest content of the work with the author's mental life, relying on a mechanical application of analogy, identification, and projection. Kings and queens become fathers and mothers, lances become the masculine attributes of power, and so on. The conflicts inferred as applying to the characters in the work are quickly transferred to the author, with the interpreter ignoring the transformations they may have undergone en route. In this approach the text is seen as a thinly veiled representation of the author's wishes, fears, and conflicts. Terms such as defense or primary process are, in my view, not applicable to a text, although a section may provide an illustration of what a defensive process would be if the text were spoken by a live person. Outside of a dynamic frame of reference, it is not easy to decide to what degree a text reflects its author's primary process mode of functioning, in contrast to a

secondary process mode. We are interested in the influence of the author's defensive processes on the text. Such processes could influence either form or content, or both. How to determine which of the author's defenses are represented in a text has not been spelled out. Should we think of a text as analogous to a character trait—with the author imprisoned within the confines of its limitations? The question of the relationship between defenses and the outer limits of an author's creativity are not clear.

For many practical reasons it is sometimes neither possible nor methodologically sound to attempt to relate text to author. At times the data about the author are not available or not verifiable, or, even if available, they may be hard to assess.

This leads to the third approach of applied analysis. The text is examined as a self-contained structure, and aspects of its form or content are studied in analogy to some mental phenomenon or repetition of a family relationship. One searches for derivatives of typical universal fantasies or examines the metaphors, imagery, and form from a psychoanalytic perspective, with no attempt to infer dynamic relationships. The aim is to describe certain organizers and patterns in the text, using data which a nonanalyst might well overlook. Several works from the same author can be examined to further discover the common elements idiosyncratic to that author. The French structuralist school of Lacan and Derrida has pushed this approach to its limits. Arlow (1978) used this approach in the case of the Japanese writer, Mishima, demonstrating convincingly the role of the primal scene as an organizer of several of his novels. The identification of such an unconscious fantasy does not permit us to draw conclusions about its role in the author's mind without information outside the work itself. This is true of all constructions of a psychological nature drawn from a piece of literature: we are not able to relate our conclusions to the life of the author without further data.

A derivative of the structural approach to a text is the study of function rather than of meaning in the context of narrative

structure. What is stressed here is the analysis of the formal aspects of the narrative. Thus, a particular character behaves in a certain way not because of inner motives, but rather because the author needed this behavior in order to reach a particular ending he had in mind.

When queried about the reasons for including a particular character molded after an acquaintance, a patient who was a creative writer replied that this inclusion best allowed him to develop certain traits and attributes of his main character. This approach is not, strictly speaking, "psychoanalytic," although it can generate interesting questions for the analyst. Robert Fitzgerald's (1981) Introduction to a collection of Flannery O'Connor's short stories illustrates the enrichment of analytic strategy, as details about the timing of the composition of different passages of a work of fiction are taken into consideration. He wrote: "In the summer of 1950, when [O'Connor] had reached an impasse with Haze [a character in a novel] and didn't know how to finish him off, she read for the first time the Oedipus plays. She went on then to end her story with the self-blinding of Motes, and she had to rework the body of the novel to prepare for it" (pp. xv-xvi). This passage can serve as a departure point for demonstrating the multiple factors that are relevant to psychoanalysis.

1) One could simply look at the novel as a text. Do the motivation and the characterization hold together, make sense, add anything to our understanding of the human mind? Are there weaknesses in the description? If so, where? This approach does not try to explain but simply to understand on a plane slightly above that of common sense, investigating the psychology of the characters as though they were real by using the tools of empathy and clinical judgment.

2) The second approach deals with the psychology of the author and her relation to the text. We might ask what kind of a person would write a novel of this sort, or we might be interested in the process of creativity—particularly if we were in possession of earlier versions of the novel. We could be inter-

ested in the nature of the inhibitions of the artist. Was the reading of the *Oedipus* tragedy fortuitous? That is, did O'Connor's revised ending fit with the previous draft? If so, did the author need to shield her own solution behind the cloak of Greek tragedy so as not to bear the psychological burden of the ending? Were the author's own oedipal conflicts involved in the act of writing itself? The list of questions should be limited only by the availability of the data to point the way in some direction.

3) The third approach, although focused on the narrative structure of the text and its various organizers, can also include a consideration of the function of various elements, particularly the above-mentioned facts about the timing of the composition. Within the process of creating the novel, the usual ordering of events in the sequence has to be reversed from that in real life situations. The end comes before the middle and the middle had to be altered to lead to the end. Instead of asking what is the meaning, we look at the function of various segments. This method of dealing with the structure of the novel and issues of poetic license broadens the psychological understanding.

4) The fourth and final approach of applied analysis focuses on reader reactions and examines the text to understand the means by which the author arouses feelings in the audience. This leads to the study of aesthetic and poetic effects. This last approach is congenial to psychoanalysis, as it reintroduces a dynamic system—that of the subject. The clinical analogy is the use of the therapist's reactions and state of mind to yield clues about the patient. Freud (1919) used this last approach in his well-known paper, "The 'Uncanny'." According to Arlow (1969), "The aesthetic effectiveness of metaphor in literature is derived, in large measure, from the ability of metaphorical expression to stimulate the affects associated with widely entertained, communally shared unconscious fantasies" (p. 7). The greater the degree of ambiguity (as differentiated from obscurity or meaninglessness), the greater the possible aesthetic effect and resonance with multiply determined unconscious fantasies.

I will now turn to the difficult problem of validation in applied analysis. If psychoanalytic meanings of a text are not related to the intentions of the author, thus limiting the range of speculations, what avenues are open to the investigator devoted to textual interpretation who wishes to avoid wild analysis? Unfortunately, it is possible to take a great work such as *Hamlet*, apply to it almost any psychoanalytic theory—Kleinian, Kohutian, classical, object relations—and find in the text some "evidence" to support the approach. When we do not possess the biographical data to limit our speculations and rule out certain of the more far-fetched possibilities, we must rely on other criteria for the usefulness and validation of our interpretations. They must bring together assorted types of data (both form and content) hitherto unexplained. They must be parsimonious, possess inner logic, and be consistent with psychoanalytic knowledge. Finally, they should add to our understanding and possibly to our enjoyment of the work.

One of the criteria often used in validation of hypotheses is that of plausibility. Hartmann (1927), quoting Max Weber, reminded us that "no matter how meaningful a self-evident interpretation as such may appear to be, it cannot on this account alone claim to be a causally valid interpretation. In itself it may remain only an especially plausible hypothesis" (p. 388). Understandable connections are neither true nor false; they are a means of expression and description. They have to be the starting point of scientific work—not the goal. Unfortunately, in much of applied analysis such interpretations are the end point and are therefore taken for granted, with only minimal attention paid to the tedious work of validation.

In light of imprecise methodology, various interpretations of a play are best compared by asking how the authors arrived at their conclusions. In the absence of clear-cut guidelines, it is possible that a critic will select certain explanations in accordance with his private theories of motivation. Our erroneous expectation that plays should copy reality leads us to evaluate the work in terms of its plausibility. The stories of Kafka, in

which the boundary of dream and reality are constantly called in question, are a good example of the artistic use of implausibility. Audiences have different expectations of degree of plausibility depending on the art form. We do not expect as much plausibility when it comes to opera as when we see a play. The theater of the absurd has toyed with the limits of implausibility and even with the irrelevance of character. It is useful to recall that analysis is the only system of meaning which, in its method, takes into account the properties of the text it is examining before making an interpretation. That is, it does not blindly translate the patient's manifest text by resorting to mechanical devices such as symbolism; rather it first searches out the proper context in order to determine which elements are dynamically significant. In the clinical situation this context is often the transference relationship to the analyst. In its absence one may end up with a reductive account of the text. It is possible, of course, for a sensitive clinician to take an isolated session from a patient's treatment and to derive from it a wealth of data about the major conflicts, the identity themes, the object relation scenarios which are being re-enacted in the present, the nature of the defenses, and the like. What is more difficult clinically is to derive technical maneuvers from this approach, in the absence of the context of the session. In the clinical setting, we validate our interpretations by noting shifts in affective or defensive reactions to them and the emergence of new material such as dreams and infantile memories.

In contrast, a text will not react to our interpretations. In the most favorable instance, an investigator would examine a novel or series of poems and make certain hypotheses about the biography or life of the author. If he could then turn to the life and retrieve some data previously unknown to him which would confirm his hypothesis, this would provide the most satisfactory type of validation. The purpose of our interpretations is to gather wide arrays of data in the most parsimonious fashion.

One of the best examples of the creative use of psychoanalysis in the study of character is Wangh's (1950) paper on *Othello.* As

in Freud's paper on Leonardo, Wangh justified the introduction of psychoanalysis by noting that critics have been unable to account for Iago's hatred of Desdemona through recourse to apparent motivation. "The magic of the play lies in its hidden content, which speaks directly to the unconscious of every spectator" (p. 203). Wangh suggested that it is Iago, rather than Othello, who is the prime victim of delusional jealousy. In order to prove his point, he amassed an impressive amount of evidence ranging from a careful analysis of the circumstances surrounding the onset of the illness, historical material derived from the original story on which *Othello* was based, and evidence within the play itself, including the analysis of a dream of Cassio. In all the instances, Wangh stayed close to the data of observation and quoted from the play, allowing the reader to judge the evidence. He also moved back and forth from his knowledge of paranoid states derived from clinical work to the evolution of the character of Iago within the play.

Validation of the second approach in applied analysis—that which relates the work to the mental life of its author—is based on the assumption that the work is a *modified* form of free association. If one emphasizes the word modified, then it is possible to identify sensitively certain aspects of the author's mental life in his works. Knowledge of the context, careful attention to many possible transformations, and awareness of literary history are mandatory. The anchoring of the work to the mental life of the author makes this approach the most sympathetic to the basic assumptions of psychoanalysis.

The third approach, which is confined to the analysis of the text and its many themes, is the most difficult to validate (since there is no outside mind to serve as organizer or reference point), yet it is the most likely to probe the nature of the literary (since it deals with the text itself). In addition to analyzing the content, it is possible to enrich the method and increase its plausibility by a study of the form. As an example, one can see that a dream of the English poet, John Keats, which included considerable motion (whirling, floating) in its manifest content,

found its way into a poem in the form of a ballad. The ballad lends itself to dancing. This third approach is a powerful and creative tool which allows the analyst to uncover organizers which a nonanalyst might miss. The knowledge of unconscious fantasies and their transformations in the clinical realm afford a bridge, through analogy, to the literary text. Other organizers in addition to universal fantasies can be various object relation scenarios, drive derivatives, developmental stages, affective states, reactions to trauma (e.g., object loss), various neurotic or psychotic phenomena, or even various normal phenomena (e.g., dream state or altered states of consciousness). The text is treated as if it were a single session or a series of sessions.

I have said the least about the fourth approach of applied analysis—that devoted to the investigation of aesthetic effect or the subjective reaction of the reader. It has been most studied by such writers as Kris (1952), Sachs (1942), and Arlow (1969). It is such a broad topic, particularly in the area of validation, that it deserves a separate paper in itself.

Before closing, I wish to emphasize that psychoanalysis has its limitations which are determined by its strategy—looking at human behavior from the vantage point of conflict and wish fulfillment. These limitations are not a defect but an inherent property of any theoretical system. In the case of psychoanalysis, one cannot criticize it for failing to explain some behavior or a work of art outside the framework it assigns itself. A truly psychoanalytic reading in the best sense is not simply reductionistic but rather a study in meanings, relationships, and transformations. This is an application of its developmental approach to human behavior.

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Lacan and Language. A Reader's Guide to *Écrits*. By John P. Muller and William J. Richardson. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1982. 443 pp.

Stanley A. Leavy

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BOOK REVIEWS

TO OUR READERS: In this issue's Book Section, we are presenting nine reviews of books which either derive from or comment upon psychoanalytic work taking place in France. We believe that as a group they afford a meaningful glimpse into an important dimension of analytic activity and thinking which has been and is being carried out in that part of the world. We are also offering four reviews of books in which the psychoanalytic approach has been applied, in a most interesting manner, to literature and biography. We expect that these, too, will provide a view into an important area of psychoanalytic interest in human affairs.

LACAN AND LANGUAGE. A READER'S GUIDE TO *ÉCRITS*. By John P. Muller and William J. Richardson. New York: International Universities Press, Inc., 1982. 443 pp.

Whoever has tried to teach the writings of Jacques Lacan to psychoanalytic candidates and to psychiatrists has undertaken a tough task. Lacan's ideas run across the grain of traditional theory, and they have been expressed very obscurely, so that everyone has trouble finding a point of entry into them. The translations by Anthony Wilden and Alan Sheridan have helped us to understand Lacan, but Sheridan has provided a very meager glossary and few explanatory notes, and Wilden has appended his extensive notes to only one of Lacan's essays (a most important one, to be sure). Wilden's notes also come from a philosophical rather than a clinical background. It is therefore a matter of moment that Muller and Richardson, clinical psychologists trained at the William Alanson White Institute and engaged in clinical work at the Austen Riggs Center, have made the awesome effort of preparing an exegetical study of the nine *Écrits* of Lacan so far translated by Sheridan.

This sort of scrutiny is probably unprecedented in psychoanalytic writing. It bears a marked resemblance in form to the kind of exegetical analysis that Biblical commentaries provide. Ambi-

guity is at the heart of both; and both call for the hermeneutics of suspicion to evoke and restore latent meaning.

Muller and Richardson traverse the nine chapters of their book by proceeding along three paths. First, in an "overview" of the *Écrits*, they organize Lacan's meaning by synthesizing the contents along more strictly logical lines than Lacan could or would take. Sometimes they piece together related ideas that are confusingly separated in the original, creating a new assembly that often sheds light on old obscurities. They also make reference to hidden subtexts or to the writings of authors on whom Lacan has (sometimes silently) drawn. Naturally, the overall effect at times flattens the brilliance of the original. But that price will strike at least the novice as well worth paying. Indeed, the writers have a colorful and vigorous style of their own.

The second approach is located in what the authors call the "map of the text," a detailed outline of each of the essays. This is a splendid help for readers attempting to maintain a toe-hold on Lacan's sometimes slippery arguments. It might be good to use this section to accompany a first reading of each *Écrit*, since it offers support to the reader without prejudging the meaning of the text. But it necessarily abbreviates the content, and perhaps other "maps" could be made of the excluded elements.

Thirdly, the authors offer a fairly elaborate series of expository notes on many details of the *Écrits*. While less complete than those of Wilden in his study of the "Rome Discourse" (which is given generous acknowledgment by the authors), these notes are more directly pertinent and far less taxing on the reader.

At this point, two questions present themselves: are the authors successful in their effort, and was the effort worthwhile? With respect to the latter, I have indicated in a number of earlier writings[1] that I consider Lacan's contribution to be a major one. It would be out of place in this review to belabor that point. My experience teaches me that those who have found enough of interest in Lacan to study him have done so initially through their acquaintance with his own writings in all their strangeness. This is

[1] E.g., Leavy, S. A. (1973). Psychoanalytic interpretation. *Psychoanal. Study Child*, 28:305-330; (1977). Review of *Ecrits, A Selection* by J. Lacan. *New York Times Book Review*, October 2; (1977). The significance of Jacques Lacan. *Psychoanal. Q.*, 46: 201-219.

likely to remain the case in the future, even with these devoted guides available. It might also be said that Freud's writings are the best introduction to his thought, although this does not diminish the value of his commentators.

As for the success of Muller and Richardson in elucidating Lacan, I believe they deserve high grades. They are, to begin with, paradoxically encouraging in that they confess their bafflement with Lacan on many occasions, thereby showing that their honesty is as great as their assiduity. One of the *Écrits*, "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power," drives them, here and there, to the distraction of the untrained: on pages 275-276 they wonder at Lacan's two unparallel uses of the word "being" in a text that is "particularly obscure." On page 278, they indicate that the transition from a discussion of "being" to one of "desire" calls for "some educated guesswork." A bit later, they are puzzled when Lacan, who ordinarily uses the capitalized word "Other" to mean the "unconscious structured like a language," uses it to refer to a generalized someone. On page 283, they state that "the distinction between demand and desire (and by implication, need) remains difficult to grasp," although this distinction is supposedly basic to the understanding of Lacan. And they conclude the overview of "The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious" with the plaintive comment: ". . . we must be content with what few misty glimmers have been allowed us in the course of this long, foggy night."

For all that, in these passages the commentators have simply been honest about Lacan at his most maddeningly perverse; and elsewhere they have rendered complex tangles into orderly if hardly simple prose. In instances of difficult passages that I have myself worked on at length for the purpose of exposition to classes, I find that Muller and Richardson have accomplished the task, with their overviews and their "maps," concisely but with less attention to ambiguity and detail than might have been possible. This is hardly a criticism, since a fuller exegesis would have led to a book of a most uneconomic length. It merely means that using this book will leave plenty for the reader to do on his or her own.

We have come to learn from the current spate of literary and philosophic works on Freud's texts that no interpretation can be unaffected by the critical perspective from which it proceeds.

Freud as seen by Roustang, by Derrida, or by Lacan will in each instance be somewhat different, and each will differ from Bettelheim's view. The same consideration applies to the book under review: from what position do Muller and Richardson operate? Richardson, of course, has a world reputation as an interpreter of Heidegger, and in general of phenomenological philosophy, and Muller seems to share his stand. This necessarily leads to an affinity for Lacan. What distinguishes them from some of the French interpreters is that they approach Lacan from a tradition of American psychoanalysis and are free of the condescending or even outrightly dismissive attitude of many French commentators toward English-speaking readers. Thus they do a great deal to bridge the gap between "them" and "us," between Paris and—may we say New York? It is fortunate that the work of demystifying Lacan has been in this instance carried out by psychoanalysts capable of comprehending him in his philosophic and aesthetic depth, while maintaining that optimal critical milieu of friendly neutrality.

STANLEY A. LEAVY (NEW HAVEN)

LA BATAILLE DE CENT ANS. HISTOIRE DE LA PSYCHANALYSE EN FRANCE. (The One-Hundred-Year Battle. The History of Psychoanalysis in France.) By Elisabeth Roudinesco. Paris: Ramsay, 1982. 498 pp.

Everyone who has participated in discussions between American and French psychoanalysts will have been struck by the different ways in which psychoanalysts in the two countries refer to Freud's work. For instance, an American refers to the structural theory, whereas the French refer to the second topographical system. The "structural theory" has for the French another meaning that is related to the linguistic and anthropological fields from which some French psychoanalysts have borrowed a conception of diachronic and synchronic views of psychological development. Other differences are related to the different styles of analytic writing. An American paper has for a French reader a medical style of scientific exposition; a French paper has for an American a flavor of philosophical thinking and a literary mode of writing. Nevertheless, this does not mean that psychoanalysis would be considered a science in America and an art in France. The French way

of writing about psychoanalysis would be considered by the French to be just as "scientific" as the American way is considered to be in the United States.

One might conclude, therefore, that there is an American psychoanalysis and a French psychoanalysis. Elisabeth Roudinesco, in her history of psychoanalysis in France, criticizes this idea, however, suggesting instead that psychoanalysis in each country has developed its own specific style. She gives an account of the historical background of psychoanalysis in France, within its cultural, medical, literary, and linguistic contexts.

Elisabeth Roudinesco, like her mother, is a psychoanalyst. This has a certain importance not only because her mother lived through the initial splits in the French psychoanalytic movement, but also because she reviews the history of psychoanalysis in France as interlinked, within a familial background, or, let us say, as a double transmission of the analytical and the historical. To be more accurate, she tries (and succeeds, in my opinion) to give an analytical history of the history of analysis in France. In order to accomplish this, she has carried out a meticulous study of multiple sources as well as conducting interviews with people who have been directly involved in the events to which she gives an analytical reading.

The medical (Charcot's discovery of hysteria and the role that sexuality plays in it; Morel's idea of degeneration in neuroses; Clerambault's "mental automatism"), philosophical (Descartes and Bergson), and psychological (Le Bon's *Psychologie des Foules* and Janet's psychology) backgrounds are explored. She makes clear that there are two themes in French psychoanalysis: one tries to adapt Freudian notions linked with German words to French thought (*l'inconscient à la française*); the other bases itself on exegesis of Freud's texts, using German words without translation or translating them anew without reference to existing translations into French.

Let me give an example. The term *"Verwerfung"* might be translated simply as "rejection" or "repudiation," a term in everyday language, but Lacan has elevated the term to the level of a major concept to which he has given the French name of *"forclusion"* (foreclosure in English) in his theory of psychosis. However, in order to understand the evolution of this concept, one needs to be

aware of the work of one of the early French analysts, E. Pichon, a grammarian who worked on this topic with Jacques Damourette. Without Roudinesco's careful and detailed historical exposition, many French analysts would not be aware of the earlier work upon which Lacan drew.

Roudinesco demonstrates that French either resists the importation of ideas from other languages, or if it adopts them, it always refers them back to the original language. Thus we might say that the original idea gains from translation or, on the contrary, it loses a great deal. For the English reader this notion will be familiar, since recent critics of Strachey have suggested that the standard translation of Freud may distort and rigidify our understanding of his ideas as well as illuminating them.

Roudinesco utilizes the Freudian notion of "resistance" to explain how certain notions inherent in the structure of a language can serve as a filter that both promotes and inhibits the spread of new ideas. In her view, there are two major currents of thought about psychoanalysis in French culture, one tending to situate psychoanalysis within the medical model and the other seeking to situate it within literature and philosophy. I am sure that Lacan, with his constant references to literature, logic, linguistics, and structural anthropology, has been a major influence in the second approach to psychoanalytic theory. This theme will be developed at length in the second volume of Roudinesco's work, which will appear in 1984. It is eagerly awaited by psychoanalytic circles in Paris.

Roudinesco attempts to give a psychoanalytic interpretation to the history of psychoanalysis in France, in order to clarify the way in which the analytic movement has transmitted its theories there. In doing so, she has revealed, in a telling manner, the lack of integration between Freudian thought and the development of psychoanalytic societies within France and in relation to the international movement. Despite Freud's views on religion, the psychoanalytic movement can well be seen as both fanatical and in search of converts. The analysis of myth has in no way prevented psychoanalysis from creating and maintaining a series of legends about its founder and about its own origins. One of the central ideas in the book is that the institutionalization of psychoanalysis is to be understood within a social, political, and historical context.

It is interwoven with the conflicting ideals of its founder and of the originators of its later, major schools of thought.

Roudinesco has given us an excellent history of the first period of psychoanalysis in France. It has the particular merit of illuminating much which was hitherto obscure. She has demonstrated how theory, culture, and the individual have combined to produce a unique school of psychoanalysis in France. We can look forward eagerly to her next book, in which she will describe more recent events in France, which have enriched psychoanalysis not only in France but also in other countries where psychoanalysis is a serious object of study (and desire).

RENÉ MAJOR (PARIS)

THE DAUGHTER'S SEDUCTION. FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS. By Jane Gallop. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982. 164 pp.

This intelligently argued, provocative book is at once a lucid introduction to Lacan's thought and an incisive reading of major French feminist texts. The book consists of a brief, summarizing introduction followed by nine chapters, each of which forms a lively dialogue between Gallop and selected passages from Lacan and the feminist authors. Three of the chapters appeared, in earlier versions, in *Diacritics*, *SubStance*, and *Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought*. The footnotes, bibliography, and index reflect the scholarly care that generally holds the book together.

Gallop's subtitle echoes an important earlier book by the British feminist writer, Juliet Mitchell. Her *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*[1] drew on the work of the French feminists and of analysts strongly influenced by Lacan. Mitchell used the French rereading of Freud to reject a biologistic view of Freud and to undercut the stereotyped negative responses to Freud made by many American feminists. For this, Gallop is grateful. But she contends that Mitchell does not really understand and utilize Lacan and his stress on the importance of language, so that she "fails to come to grips with the feminist's place (her place) as *desirer*" (p. 12). The subject's desire, she indicates, is articulated by an unconscious that is struc-

[1] Mitchell, J. (1974). *Psychoanalysis and Feminism*. New York: Pantheon Books.

tured by language and is not merely a mirror of the dominant (male) culture. She states that no program for liberation should ignore such roots of desire.

Gaining momentum, Gallop then tackles Lacan head on. Reading passages from his essay, "The Significance of the Phallus,"[2] Gallop questions Lacan's insistence on making the phallus the privileged signifier of desire, thereby, Gallop alleges, imputing to women a disproportionate lack from which men do not suffer. But, as she confronts Lacan, she contrasts his overt phallocentrism with what she terms Ernest Jones's denial of it. Such denial, Gallop states, does not benefit women in the least, for phallocentrism pervades language itself, and to deny it is to remain subject to its influence.

She follows this with a close reading of a text of Michèle Montrelay, a French Lacanian analyst, who, according to Gallop, "spins out the clearest and yet most subtle elaboration of Lacanian theory on sexual difference, and specifically on female sexuality, that exists" (p. 27). Feminine sexuality is for Montrelay not "phallocentric" but "concentric"; its pleasure is that of *jouissance*, not simply "orgasm"; its register is contiguity and immediacy, not the visually mediated and displaced, with its primacy of sight over smell. What seems to be at issue here is the idea of feminine sexuality as "the alternative, the rival to (always masculine) desire" (p. 30). The idea of this rivalry shapes the rest of the book, as Gallop prods us to recognize our phallocentric views by concretizing the rivalrous terms in her text. She reads the Greek etymology of "-centric" as "prick"; she suggests that the syllable "con" (as in "contaminate") is to be heard as "cunt-"; she thereby produces a retranscription of the passages from Lacan and Montrelay, which are then read to convey "language with a bodily presence, an evocative 'odor di femina' " (p. 31). The reader will have to decide whether this assertion of a special feminine sexuality at work within the very texts that flaunt phallic privilege is convincing or not.

In the following chapter Gallop continues her textual analysis by focusing on Lacan's 1972-1973 seminar that deals with feminine

[2] Lacan's texts on feminine sexuality (along with excellent introductory chapters) have recently appeared in English in *Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne*, edited by Juliet Mitchell and Jacqueline Rose, translated by Jacqueline Rose. New York: Norton, 1982.

sexuality and Freud's question, "*Was will das Weib?*"[3] She quotes Lacan and responds favorably:

> "Phallic pleasure is the obstacle through which man does not succeed . . . in taking possession of and revelling in the woman's body, precisely because he takes possession of and revels in . . . the organ's pleasure." . . . Feminists could find little to argue with in this statement and its various correlates. Throughout the year's lectures, the phallic order and phallic enjoyment are shown to be a kind of failure. . . . The phallic order fails because, although unable to account for the feminine, it would, nonetheless, operate as a closure, attempting to create a closed universe that is thoroughly phallocentric. The sexual relation as relation between the sexes fails (p. 34).

Pervasive phallocentrism, she indicates, keeps us from understanding what women want; thus Lacan points to a domain "beyond the phallus" as the region of "an enjoyment of the body" in which women want more—both more and different from the phallus (p. 35). This leads Gallop to a statement of the book's major thesis: because Lacan flaunts the phallus-as-privileged-signifier, he is a "prick." She means by this not just that he focuses phallocentrically upon the male sexual organ but that he is "an obnoxious person—an unprincipled and selfish man who high-handedly abuses others, who capriciously exhibits little or no regard for justice," but whom some women and men "find irresistible" (p. 37). Defined in this way (as "a narcissistic tease"), Lacan is seen as exposing his own "desire," which undermines his authority. Gallop, ensnaring Lacan in his own formulation, writes:

> Since the phallic order demands that the law rather than desire issue from the paternal position, an exposure of the father as desiring, a view of the father as prick, a view of the father's prick, feminizes him (p. 38).

Thus Gallop speculates that in his open phallocentrism Lacan "gets pleasure from his cruelty. The evidence of the pleasure undermines the rigid authority of the paternal position" (p. 38). She seems to say that if we follow her example of reading Lacan's texts to lay bare his desire—and thereby lay bare the desire of patriarchs—then we will overthrow the paternal law that masks and protects that desire.

This position is taken by her main discussant, the Lacanian analyst, Luce Irigaray, "who plays the female lead," Gallop tells us,

[3] Lacan, J. (1975). *Le Séminaire de Jacques Lacan.* Livre xx. *Encore, 1972-1973,* ed. J. A. Miller. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.

"opposite Lacan, in this book" (p. xiii).[4] Irigaray uses a striking series of images to counter the way men typically conceptualize sexuality and other matters. In her article, "The Mechanics of Fluids," she elaborates upon the properties of fluids (continuous, dilatable) in contrast to those of solids (consistent, rigid). She relates this to psychosexuality, in which the solid phallus is taken as desirable while the "formless" female sex organ (with its own specific but neglected properties) is ignored. She further relates the fluid/solid distinction to modes of thinking among men and women. Phallocentric thinking has the following characteristics: it is rigid; it relies on representations; it divides differences into polarizations; it speaks from the position of the knowing master; it affirms stable identities; it is ego based. The problem with these characteristics, she states, is that they distort what one is attempting to understand and leave little place for the fluid, the nonrepresentable and nonvisual, the inconsistent. She indicts psychoanalysis (including Lacan) for perpetuating a misunderstanding of "a specific economy of fluids" (p. 41). In the economy of solids, phallic sexuality places an object (the Lacanian object *a*) in the place of the other-as-castrated: this object is a solid (breast, feces), and phallic desire is stirred by this object insofar as it fills the place of the other and provides the illusion of oneness, of wholeness. Thus, in phallic sexuality, Lacan repeats, "there is no sexual relation" and therefore "woman does not exist." That is to say, what is specifically feminine lies beyond both phallic desire and phallocentric discourse, for in that discourse "woman" is given a fantasied role. But why does woman go along with this? Because, Gallop seems to say, she has been seduced by the father.

These themes are taken up more intensively in the book's central chapter, titled "The Father's Seduction," recalling the book's title:

> The role of father and daughter are given to Lacan and Irigaray as well as to Psychoanalysis and Feminism. But because this father-daughter relation is a

[4] Selections from the writings of Irigaray and other feminists discussed by Gallop (Kristeva, Cixous, Clément) have appeared in translation in *New French Feminists: An Anthology,* edited by Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, New York: Schocken Books, 1981. See also, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society:* Special section on French feminist theory. Vol. 7, No. 1, Autumn 1981, for translations of Kristeva, Irigaray and Cixous.

> seduction, the roles become more complicated, more equivocal, more yielding (p. xiv).

The seduction works as follows: the daughter, desperately desiring to be valued by her father, submits to his rule, the law, in order to please him. The law, which interdicts the father's desire, in turn serves to protect him by denying this desire. By denying this desire for what is feminine, the law maintains phallocentrism. Thus the daughter in her compliance is seduced by a law that denies any desire for seduction on the father's part. Irigaray proposes that we "call into question this mantle of the law with which he drapes his desire, and his sex (organ)" (p. 77).

In Chapter 6, titled "Impertinent Questions," Gallop engages in a three-way debate with Lacan, Irigaray and Sade, reading the text to uncover Irigaray's desire regarding Lacan as father figure. Gallop's talent for exposing the author's desire in the very words and letters the author has composed now becomes the overt methodology of the rest of the book. But Gallop is so proficient at this that her talent overshadows her thesis. The discussion ranges from pornography to the phallus to Marxism to motherhood to Dora. While the dialogue is never dull, it does ramble; but perhaps it is meant to, in repudiation of a phallic-fecal consistency and rigidity: ". . . the gesture of paying attention to small details is not simply some external methodological device, but is the very stuff of what I am trying to advance as a psychoanalytic, feminist reading. Lacan would call it attention to the letter. Feminists might call it attention to context, to materiality, which refuses the imperialistic, idealizing reductions that have been solidary with a denigration of the feminine . . ." (p. 93). Her admonition is worth considering, but when "attention to context" includes Gallop's cursory reflections on her own motivation in questioning other feminists, we must wonder how this differs from flaunting one's desire. She herself wonders as she wanders: "Finally (?) I wonder if these self-reflections are not facile and self-indulgent, narcissistic, exhibitionistic and modish" (p. 108).

But such reservations do not prevent her from personalizing Julia Kristeva, a leading semiotician, into the "Phallic Mother" whom she accuses of capitalizing on her status as a foreigner, whose "narcissistic self-reference reveals the specific woman (the vulgar Bulgar), the female self-pleasuring body, behind the

Mother" (p. 120). Acknowledging that marginality may provide for a perspective on heterogeneity, Gallop asserts, regarding Kristeva: "(But how vulgar to flaunt it.)" (p. 119). To this reader, at least, Kristeva does not appear to flaunt, although she writes from an astonishing breadth of learning and experience. Gallop could perhaps have paid more attention to her own earlier remark: "(what is more nervous than a parenthetical remark, a patch-job defence?)" (p. 89). If Kristeva makes her nervous, Gallop could simply say so rather than attack her.

This brings us to a final point, namely, the question of aggressivity. Throughout the book Gallop explores the barriers to and conditions for a relation between masculine and feminine—a relation in which one does not submit to the other nor is one represented as the opposite of the other or, deceptively, as a complement to the other. Whether it be at the level of desire, of sexual interaction, or of modes of thinking and writing, Gallop admonishes us to be sensitive to any tendency to fashion the sexual relation according to some "natural" model. The sexual relation has to be studied in a psychoanalytic context, in which Freud is taken seriously (as she does) and is not dismissed as a Victorian chauvinist. But to take Freud seriously (as Lacan does) is to struggle with a further tension—the relation between desire and aggressivity, to which Gallop pays little attention, limiting it, for the most part, to the political context alone.

In summary, this unusual book enlivens the encounter between feminist thought and psychoanalysis as understood by Lacan—or more specifically, with that large part of Lacanian psychoanalysis that has to do with sexuality. We are informed about how women differ from men, first with regard to sexuality and then, by analogy, in other ways as well. But what about the other huge focus of psychoanalysis, namely aggression? How do women and men differ there?[5] They do, of course, but how would a feminist-psychoanalytic reading take such difference into account? Indeed, since so much of the pain and oppression of women is a direct product of male aggression, might it not be even more valuable to

[5] Frodi, A., Macaulay, J. & Thome, P. R. (1977). Are women always less aggressive than men? A review of the experimental literature. *Psychological Bulletin*, 84: 634-660.

focus on that aspect of psychoanalytic thought? Lacan had much to say about aggressivity, as did Freud, and we must wait for Gallop's further reflections on it.

JOHN P. MULLER (STOCKBRIDGE, MASS.)

DIRE MASTERY. DISCIPLESHIP FROM FREUD TO LACAN. By François Roustang. Translated by Ned Lukacher. Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 162 pp.

PSYCHOANALYSIS NEVER LETS GO. By François Roustang. Translated by Ned Lukacher. Baltimore/London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983. 162 pp.

The French came late to psychoanalysis, and in a way that made what pertinent news did reach America difficult to process. Jacques Lacan's expulsion from the International Psycho-Analytical Association in the early 1950's—he called it an excommunication—served to dramatize his polemical compulsion and his arrogance, and gave the average American colleague ample reason to consider with skepticism that large sector of French psychoanalytic culture for which Lacan was the undisputed and increasingly ascendant master. The skepticism of the American colleague might well have been joined by a degree of outrage if he were sufficiently acquainted with the particulars of the dispute with the International to know that Lacan had structured his offensive around an attack on the ego psychology of Hartmann, Kris, and Loewenstein, rendered for the occasion in aggressive caricature. At any event Lacan was relatively unknown in France as well, except in psychoanalytic circles, until 1968. It was only when the May "revolution" promoted him to the status of culture hero, replacing the likes of Sartre and Lévi-Strauss, that his name acquired sufficient momentum to cross the Atlantic. Then, as his writings began to become available in translation, their abstruseness and apparent contempt not only for the views of the established psychoanalytic eminences, but also for the reader, did little to persuade Americans that Lacan was anything more than the latest Parisian sacred monster. It was perhaps only with the arrival of translations of his former students, such as Laplanche, that the seriousness and distinct character of the psychoanalytic work Lacan had set in motion in France could emerge.

François Roustang's books, *Dire Mastery* and *Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go*, published in France in 1976 and 1980, are representative in a number of ways of the current French psychoanalytic scene. Their methodological cornerstone is *analyse de texte*, the traditional discipline of close reading. Their thematic preoccupation is, following Lacan's directive, primarily with Freud. Yet within their conformity to such expositional formulae, Roustang's books attempt an important deviation. The argument, broadly put, is that institutional transmission of psychoanalysis depends upon unresolved transference relationships and so is fundamentally inimical to the essence of psychoanalytic work. "Here lies the paradox: the transmission of analysis is the greatest threat to analysis itself if it is assumed that transference should be reinforced rather than dissolved" (DM, p. 20). "In this sense, psychoanalysis is basically asocial, and to speak of psychoanalytic societies is a contradiction in terms" (DM, p. 14). Early on, Roustang makes it clear that if, like Erikson's Luther, he is scrupulously attentive to primary texts, it is perhaps only the better to put into question the latter-day master who urged their study: "Nothing is possible any longer for the Lacanians but the assimilation of doctrine and its aftereffects: intransigence, pretension, crass ignorance, and fanaticism. . . . In a group whose only goal is to acknowledge Lacan and to be acknowledged by him, the dissolution of the transference is a theoretical absurdity" (DM, p. 28). This is an important reminder for English-speaking readers: it is psychoanalysis as taught by Lacan that Roustang is criticizing.

Roustang backs off from an excessively static formulation of his opening paradox; while "there are no good psychoanalytic societies" (DM, p. 34), psychoanalytic societies are nonetheless necessary, for analysts need both to be and to have disciples. Why? "This double question can, in my opinion, be given a single answer: in order not to go mad" (DM, p. 33). This remark may strike one as cryptic, and its note of drama is all too typical of Roustang's journalistic style. Yet his way of developing it in the course of the two books—for it is, in a way, his central notion—usefully raises questions about a number of matters central to the concern of any person interested in psychoanalysis. *Dire Mastery* takes up Freud's relations with his disciples and the (related) interdependency of theory-building, influence, and theft. *Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go*

investigates the dynamics of discipleship in the clinical situation, putting in question the clear distinction Freud attempted to draw between transference and suggestion, and arguing that Freud's maintenance of this distinction masked a wish to ignore the most enslaving (for both parties concerned) aspects of the transference.

The two books, one more historical, the other more theoretical, complement one another. *Dire Mastery* works from a careful reading of Freud's correspondence with Abraham, Ferenczi, Jung, Andreas-Salomé (on Tausk), and Groddeck, and depends as well on Jones, Roazen, Schur, Eissler, and the *Standard Edition.* All the sources are standard and available. Roustang's reading, however, is subversive. He lays emphasis upon the dependent, jealous, and self-deprecating strain that seems sooner or later to emerge in each of these disciples. His argument, simply put, is that Freud required submissiveness, frequently deepening it by overtly denying his demand, as in a letter to Abraham: "I see with dismay that you depreciate yourself in relation to me, building me up in the process into a kind of imago instead of describing me objectively" (DM, p. 3). It was not just his position as leader of a movement that Freud was protecting, according to Roustang, but his intactness as a theoretician, and even his sanity. The argument builds to this last point via the case of Tausk, who put Freud in an "uncanny state" (Roustang borrows this idea from Roazen) by following his work too closely, by echoing his words: "Tausk was undermining the creative process itself. . . . Each man was accusing the other of stealing his ideas, but both were in fact afraid of taking the other's ideas while under the belief that they were their own. The fantasy of theft was no more than the reversal or projection of a slight delirium of influence" (DM, p. 92). Here Roustang discusses Freud's fascination with the occult and with "thought transference," and proposes that by warding off Tausk, Freud sought to protect himself from the breakthrough of an awareness of a psychotic, preverbal level of exchange between people. More specifically, Roustang continues, Freud was experiencing with Tausk disconcerting aspects of the preverbal child-mother relation, aspects which Freud found intolerable because of his repression in this area: "It is as though the founder of psychoanalysis, who had done so much to demystify parental ideology, was determined to preserve a small corner in which all small boys could dream of their unchangeable (*unwandelbar*) mother" (DM, p. 101).

Having argued that among Freud and his followers the dynamics of discipleship were inextricable from the dynamics of theory development, Roustang has moved, in an attempt to clinch his point, to gratuitous psychobiography. Be it said that this is not atypical of recent French psychoanalytic writing, in the sense that the French have particularly involved themselves with the history of the psychoanalytic movement and have taken as a given that the evolution of theory cannot be separated from the vicissitudes of relationships among members of the movement. And while one could argue that the tendency toward dissensions and splits is particularly exaggerated in French psychoanalytic culture, it must also be admitted that it is a chronic and endemic tendency in psychoanalytic circles worldwide. The French may, with respect to this problem, occupy a privileged position, especially since, as latecomers, they are perhaps unhampered by some of the constraints that long-standing adherence to Freudian culture may bring with it. All the same, Roustang fails to persuade when he suggests that Freud drove Tausk away in order to defend himself against conscious awareness of primitive ambivalence toward his mother; we have not followed, with any conviction, the displacement of the master-disciple relation from neurosis to psychosis.

If the progression of Roustang's argument falters at this point of attempted deepening, he does at least proceed to make clear what motivated the attempt. The chapter on Tausk is followed by one on Groddeck, whose drift into madness is presented in the context of his failure to work through a maternal transference to the man who maintained all along that the question of fathers and sons was primary. Roustang concludes by asking: "What proves that the insistence on the paternal transference and on the need for filiation in psychoanalysis is not a way to avoid facing up in the analysis to the more dangerous and more archaic relation with the mother and her language, which is in fact a mockery of language?" (DM, p. 129). This introduces the last chapter of the book, "Toward a Theory of Psychosis," in which Roustang expands upon his notion of the archaic mother by discussing the differences between neurotic and psychotic transference. As he admits in a prefatory note, this chapter "might appear to be somewhat out of place in this book, since it does not deal with the question of the disciple in the field of psychoanalysis" (DM, p. 132). The reasons he offers for including it come back to his awareness of his own status as a

disciple both of Freud and of Lacan, for this chapter is "the theoretical work around which the disciple's existence turned" (DM, p. 132). Roustang's very French conclusion is that to theorize is to establish one's individuality: "For both the psychoanalyst and the [psychotic] analysand, the need for theorization is—even though in a different manner—a question of survival" (DM, p. 155).

Psychoanalysis Never Lets Go starts from the gesture of theoretical self-emancipation that concluded *Dire Mastery*; it presents itself as an excursion into the theory of transference relationships. The central hypothesis, put forward in the preface, is that *"psychoanalysis, through its intermediary the transference, has not really disengaged itself from hypnosis and suggestion"* (PNLG, p. viii). Textual analysis as a route of approach is taken as much for granted as clinical anecdote might be in a similar book written by an overseas counterpart. Allowance being made for this difference in intellectual tradition, the book is in good part compelling and authoritative; Roustang moves with ease among a number of Freudian texts and traces convincingly the threads of the master's worry about the problem of suggestion. The threat, he argues, lay for Freud in the two types of transference that were never integrated into analytic (as opposed to hypnotic) technique: the negative transference and the positive transference involving erotic sources. Freud's intended antidote to these potential sumps of suggestion was the neutral, receptive posture of the well-analyzed analyst, so manifestly different from that of the hypnotist; but, says Roustang, this is the most powerful suggestion of all: "If the analyst's position of pure receptivity suggests, in effect, nothing particular, would it not still constitute a formidable suggestion? . . . Is it not simply to adopt a perverse position of all-powerfulness which fixes the patient in his own corresponding state of infantile all-powerfulness?" (PNLG, p. 78). Freud, through hypnosis, had learned to induce in the patient a primitive sort of love which, as it turned out, was difficult to control or resolve. Changing the nature of the doctor's participation, introducing the technique of free association, and calling the love a "transference neurosis" were just so many detours intended to avoid an unanalyzable submission of the patient to the analyst. Yet Freud recognized, argues Roustang, that "the transference is the privileged occasion through which one experiences or reex-

periences a masochistic willingness that alleviates the guilt of the first separation" (PNLG, p. 92). Roustang refers here to Freud's discussion of unconscious guilt in *The Ego and the Id*, and he takes this notion as the point of departure for his chapter entitled "The Game of the Other," which he describes in his preface as "the most original part of the book" (PNLG, p. ix). This is the author's theoretical *prise de position*, his self-consciously highlighted move to resolve his own transference: "In chapter 4 I analyze, as an example, some pages of Jacques Lacan, and I show not only that his demonstration of the separation between transference and hypnosis does not stand up but that it tends to prove the contrary, to what might be a horrible extreme. In this chapter, taking my distance from Freud and relying on clinical practice, I try on the one hand to propose a radical definition of the transference as an ahistorical non-relation and on the other to suggest that if one wishes to escape from alienation, which should be the result of the analysis, one must experience this aberrant fact of the transference" (PNLG, p. ix).

Roustang's argument in Chapter 5 is complex and assumes some acquaintance with Lacan. Viewed from a few steps back, it seems to involve the understandable proposal that Lacan's model of the analytic situation be modified by the introduction of concepts drawn from various models of primitive relatedness, and in particular from Roustang's reading of Searles. The problem of unconscious guilt leads Roustang to the hypothesis that the patient "takes refuge in love for the analyst" after the "appearance of disturbing fantasies or a stream of archaic images" has led him "to the edge of subjective destructuration" (PNLG, p. 93). The burden on the analyst is to find a way to analyze the fantasies of primitive fusion which the inevitable suggestive element of the transference has induced. Roustang develops at length his "initial myth" of the primitive relation and cautions that the analyst "must be able to accept this relation by letting himself be absorbed to the limits of annihilation without rejecting the patient" (PNLG, p. 96). Here he indicts Lacan: through his exclusive attention to language, to "the word," the master ends up enslaving the patient within the initial myth, that is, within Lacanian theoretical discourse. Roustang's proposal on this point, an obviously intended heresy, strikes at the

heart of Lacan's doctrine: "Rehabilitating language in analysis should not lead inevitably to a sort of assimilation of the other factors into language" (PNLG, p. 100). He advocates instead that one stand by "the strict hypothesis of the unconscious as a limit of the knowable and the existent, which is not structured and which in fact marks the limit of language itself . . ." (PNLG, p. 101). The exploration of the state of fusion and the possibility of the patient's emancipation would depend upon the analyst's moving away from a stance of impenetrability and unresponsiveness. Toward what, Roustang is not exactly clear: "The analyst does not have directly to share his personal history, his personality, or his anxiety, with which the patient has nothing to do; nevertheless, those things are precisely what enter into the analysis through the analyst's conscious or unconscious reactions to what the patient says" (PNLG, p. 115). Perhaps this amounts to a repetition of Freud's admonition that the analyst be well analyzed. But in the closing pages of the book Roustang seems to push the idea in a particular direction: "I do not believe that any analysis can be terminated or that any transference can be lifted if the patient has not somehow experienced the underlying incomprehension of the analyst" (PNLG, p. 145). This is immediately followed by a passage which describes Lacan as a paranoiac who "scorns and overwhelms the crowd" and who "must repeatedly be put in the state of being the one who is supposed to know [a Lacanian catchphrase]; to know, obviously, for the other and in his place" (PNLG, p. 146). The master repeatedly, dogmatically, breaks Roustang's fundamental rule that the analyst must be able not to understand.

Roustang's books, at least in translation and in English-speaking countries, will require of the reader that he, like the good analyst, be able not to understand. In part, this results from easily avoidable difficulties. The translation, by Ned Lukacher, is excessively literal and frequently awkward. The editing is poor: there are numerous typographical errors, and in places, crucial, if small, words like "not" are omitted, so that important passages become nonsense. Most of all, there is an apparent assumption on the part of the publisher and translator of considerable familiarity not only with Lacan's writings, but with the French scene generally, as indicated by an absence of translator's prefaces or explanatory notes. This

will constitute the most serious obstacle for the average English-speaking reader, to whom the books risk appearing not simply esoteric, which to a degree they are, but incomprehensibly so. Other difficulties run deeper. Roustang's style is not only journalistic, with use of annoying devices like present-tense historical narration to heighten the drama, but it is also slick and elliptical in its dealings with other authors, whose remarks are often embroidered into the text without any indication of their context or source, except in the footnotes at the back of the book. The organizational principle in both books is unclear; speculative chapters are interspersed among chapters of historical discussion or textual analysis, without any obvious narrative progression. Roustang's primarily nonclinical focus, combined with a tendency toward obsessional murkiness in his own practice of the tradition of *analyse de texte*, together create a problem of obscurity that cannot be laid down to cultural differences.

All this being said, I do find the books interesting, important, and open to various lines of interpretation. For one thing, they might be read as cross-cultural documents which demonstrate the application of a particular method to psychoanalytic texts, and also bear more broadly upon the development of the psychoanalytic movement in France. Still, it is in their delineation of the problem of masters and mastery in psychoanalysis that they are strongest and most original, and if they falter in their quest for a solution, they are, after all, only following Freud.

HUMPHREY MORRIS (CAMBRIDGE, MASS.)

NARCISSISME DE VIE. NARCISSISME DE MORT. (Narcissism of Life. Narcissism of Death.) By André Green. Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1983. 280 pp.

This volume contains a series of articles by André Green, published between 1966 and 1980. The title expresses their common theme. In his introduction, Green outlines the debates which have taken place on the concept of narcissism on the two sides of the Atlantic, following which he justifies his own theoretical position. In his clinically derived point of view he feels that if "there are narcissistic structures and narcissistic transferences . . . neither the first nor

the second can be conceived of or interpreted independently, neglecting the object relations and the general question of the relation between the ego and the erotic or destructive libido" (p. 14). Then, admitting that narcissism has "the right to exist as an independent entity," he does not isolate the narcissistic structures, but states that "as soon as conflictual organization reaches regressive strata situated beyond classical fixations observed in transference neurosis, the part taken by narcissism appears more important, even in the conflicts where it is not in a prevailing position" (p. 15). In the debate between Kohut and Kernberg, the former defends the autonomy of narcissism while the latter is opposed to it, "although admitting the legitimacy of a clinical distinction." Green adopts an intermediate position which consists in "not exaggerating the differences between narcissistic structures and borderline cases" (p. 16).

Then Green asks, especially in the introductions to his papers which he uses to put his ideas into perspective, whether another topography, in which the theoretical poles are self and object, should not also be utilized in psychoanalytic conceptions. He does this out of aspiration for psychoanalysis to use theoretical constructions that are clearly anchored in clinical observations. It seems to him that the use of self-object topography, which reflects clinical aspects other than Freud's essential referents of neurosis and transference neurosis, helps to clarify borderline cases and narcissistic pathology.

Throughout the papers in this volume, the same focus is always maintained: that of a desire in which the object is the self. Starting from the Lacanian definition of desire as a "motion by which the subject is put out of the center," Green presents the idea of narcissism as a solution that permits avoiding the "putting out of the center that obliges investing in the object which retains the keys of access to the center" (p. 22).

A major idea that emerges is that, beyond the "positive narcissism" that means the neutralization of the object, when the "retreat toward unity" (i.e., the confusion of the self with the idealized object) is no longer possible, there starts a research not of the unity but of nothingness. Green states: "Narcissus-Janus is therefore mimetic of life as of death, adopting an illusionary solution to make life and death an indivisible entity. We understand better why

Freud turned away from the concept of narcissism in which he saw a source of possible misunderstanding. But the replacement of a concept by another changes only the word, not the thing" (p. 23).

The itinerary of André Green's interrogations concerning narcissism is above all an incessant questioning of the formation and evolution of Freud's ideas, including their use by his successors. It veers, at times poetically, between clinical and theoretical excursions which reveal a way of thinking more than they lead to new concepts to replace the ones Green questions. Narcissism, from the utopia of the "One" to images of the "Same," belongs less to the universe of aesthetic myth, according to Green, than it does to the realm of religious myth, and this is why it endlessly flourishes and reflourishes.

In the article, "Narcissism and Anxiety," he proposes a theory of "object trauma." The object to which he refers exerts a pressure of uncertainty that forces the ego to a work of adjustment.

The second part of the book, subtitled "Narcissistic Forms," which basically is opposed to a more theoretical first part, contains another memorable article, "The Dead Mother." In it, Green presents a structural point of view of anxiety that contributes to the possibility of classifying different kinds of anxiety around the two poles of "blood colored" and "mourning colored" anxiety. He also expresses, in this article, a very interesting concept of the etiology of a certain type of depression.

HENRI BIANCHI (PARIS)

PSYCHOANALYZING PSYCHOANALYSIS. FREUD AND THE HIDDEN FAULT OF THE FATHER. By Marie Balmary. Translated by Ned Lukacher. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 184 pp.

Within her costume of French intellectualism, tricked out with the passementerie of structuralism and Lacan, Marie Balmary is actually a woman with a mission. In her Introduction, she describes the solitary nature of her path and the lack of support which she has gotten from the psychoanalytic establishment. This is not to be

wondered at, since, if she were to have her way, she would turn that establishment on its head.

At the heart of her enterprise is her appeal for her poor ones: the children, innocent and tortured, who have been dehumanized by the interpersonal impact of the defenses with which their parents have ringed their own acts of moral turpitude. She accuses psychoanalysis of further compounding that crime by insisting on tracing neurosis to a supposed origin in the patient's own illicit desires instead of properly bearing witness to the cruelties which have been inflicted in reality.

She envisions a tragic link between the generations, forged as the child-victim of today grows inevitably into the adult who will in turn victimize other innocents. She feels that Sigmund Freud betrayed his own awareness of this tragic vision when, on the first anniversary of his father's death, he abruptly renounced the seduction theory (i.e., the culpability of the parents) and substituted for it a truncated version of the Oedipus legend which made the development of neurosis an after-product of the child's own initiative. Freud's Oedipus is scotomatized, Balmary insists, because, in individualizing the motives that led Oedipus to his deeds, Freud blatantly ignored the major thrust of the legend, the working out of evil from parent to child.

Since she feels that the whole development of psychoanalysis after 1897 is the result of a moral failure, a need on Freud's part to exculpate his father, she is free to reduce all of Freud's subsequent writings to the level of text, broken fragments to be analyzed as the manifest content of a neurosis. She can thus evade entirely the force of any of Freud's overt arguments and apply herself to unearthing the secret message which she feels they involuntarily reveal. This message centers around the mysterious Rebecca, the unknown second wife of Jacob Freud. According to Balmary's historical reconstruction, this second wife was put aside because she was childless and, either before or after Jacob impregnated the twenty-year-old Amalie out of wedlock (with the child who was to be named Sigmund), she committed suicide, perhaps by jumping from a train (which is why Freud had a train phobia). It was the guilt that Freud took on for this skeleton in the family closet (of which he was not consciously aware) that caused him to identify with both Joseph and Moses, because of the rejected mothers in

their backgrounds, and particularly with his father as Don Juan, which led him to expect punishment from the stone Commander. This is why he brought statues to the dinner table, wrote an essay explaining that the statue of Moses could not move, lived chastely with two women (his wife and his sister-in-law), named his children so that the first letters of their names spelled out Moses, and delighted in hunting for mushrooms whose German names, *Steinpilze* and *Herrenpilze*, yield again the name of the stone *Herr*, the avenging representative of the father who will punish the child for the father's own misdeeds. Most important, he turned his therapy into an exercise for coercing his patients into bearing the responsibility for the sufferings of their childhood and the neuroses that grew out of them, thereby passing on to them the guilt that he had assumed. So goes Balmary's thesis.

Such a thesis reduces everything to one factor and establishes that factor itself on the basis of the most questionable evaluation and tenuous speculation. Is it true that Freud's work after 1897 is merely a defensive production of incoherent fragments which gain meaning only after they have been subjected to analytic scrutiny? Is his therapy really so much an exercise in domination as to require an advocate for the patient? Were anyone's conflicts ever exclusively the result of a father's premarital behavior? This latter assertion requires a triple substrate of ancillary belief: that Freud's mind developed only through the impact of object relations, that only his relations to his father mattered (his mother, among others, not counting for much), and, finally, that his interactions with his father were so dominated by the effects of his father's guilt as to make all other aspects of that relationship trivial.

On other points, Balmary passes from the arguable to the inaccurate: for example, Freud's period of intensive theory building precedes (rather than following, as she contends) his rejection of the seduction hypothesis, and cannot therefore be counted as evidence of the effects of Freud's renunciation. And, most important, the "truth" from which Freud turned away with his espousal of infantile sexuality is not the same as the author's theory of the origin of guilt in the disruption of total transparency between parent and child. Freud no more derived neurosis from the failure of a supporting matrix of fusion before 1897 than he did afterward.

Yet it would be a mistake to discard the book because one is not prepared to be persuaded by its thesis. The author is intelligent and has done her research carefully. No reader of *The Interpretation of Dreams* can miss the evidence of Freud's mid-life struggle with sexuality and his search for a new superego that would help him to cope with his resurgent impulses. The question of what effect these personal struggles had in shaping psychoanalysis is still an open one, and Balmary adroitly marshals much of the evidence relevant to such an inquiry.

MARTIN H. BLUM (NEW YORK)

LA PLUME SUR LE DIVAN. PSYCHANALYSE ET LITTÉRATURE EN FRANCE. (The Pen on the Couch. Psychoanalysis and Literature in France.) By Pamela Tytell. Paris: Aubier Montaigne, 1982. 326 pp.

Pamela Tytell, a Ph.D. scholar from Columbia, now teaching the history of psychoanalysis in Paris after having graduated from one of the French psychoanalytic institutes, has written an interesting book on the relation between psychoanalysis and literature in France.

She adopts a historical perspective, dealing first with the early development of analysis in France and then moving on to the shaping influence of Lacan on analysis and literature. The novel section of her work deals with all aspects of writing by analysts—hence the title *La plume sur de divan* (*The Pen on the Couch*). She is concerned with the journals published by the various analytic societies, the ways analysts write up their cases, and the need to write as an unburdening process. She also is interested in shifts in form, such as in the new psycholiterature, which is a hybrid between a surrealist work and an attempt to convey directly, by "show" rather than "tell," the ambiguities of the unconscious mind.

Tytell is able to capture rather well the flavor of the many French analytic movements, which in contrast to their American counterparts are largely nonmedical and lean heavily on a tripod of philosophy, linguistics, and literature. Such a heavy emphasis on the humanities leads to a blurring of identity among the various disciplines and a loosening of what we would consider the more

scientific aspects of psychoanalysis. The rigorous way Tytell has approached her topic is evidenced by the more than one hundred pages (out of about three hundred) that are devoted to notes and bibliographies about applied analysis in France and the history of the French analytic movements, their splits and their periodicals.

The first two chapters concern themselves with the attitudes and writings of Freud and his followers in France, about literature and the influence of writers on analysts. She reminds us of the climate of the French cultural scene in the 1930's, characterized by anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and the condescending attitude of the French toward foreign imports, as well as the extreme Kraepelinian descriptive model of psychiatry, supported by the traditions of Pinel and Esquirol.

The first translation by a French philosopher, I. Meyerson, of *The Interpretation of Dreams* was not published until 1925. A French psychoanalytic society did not exist until 1926 when it was formed under the sway of Princess Marie Bonaparte (the subject of a recent biography) and then of Rudolph Loewenstein. The fledgling movement was looked upon with derision by the medical and scientific community, but was warmly received by the literary community; Gide, in his 1925 novel *The Counterfeiters*, included a psychiatrist, modeled on Mrs. Sokolnicka, one of the founders of the analytic community. Freud was wary of the enthusiasm with which the surrealists greeted his discoveries, feeling, quite correctly, that they grossly misunderstood him and used him for their own purposes. He refused to write a preface for one of their books that consisted largely of a collection of manifest dreams, replying that without the dreamer's associations one can say very little about the meaning of such productions.

This leads directly to the next section of the book—an extended critique of the works on applied analysis by the early pioneers. It was difficult for them to resist the temptation to consider literary works as thinly disguised case histories, following Freud's lead in his *Gradiva* study but disregarding his cautionary notes. These analysts forgot that Freud was using the literary work as buttress and confirmation of his findings rather than being interested in grappling with the literary text itself. *Gradiva* was translated into French by the indefatigable Marie Bonaparte in 1931. Such was the success of this book that several surrealist painters took up the theme, an

art gallery was named Gradiva, and little plaster cast models of the famous statue were required possessions, like the awful replicas of the Eiffel Tower bought by present-day tourists.

A chapter is devoted to Bonaparte's work on Edgar Allan Poe ("The French Connection"). In it, Tytell convincingly ascribes Bonaparte's fanciful hypotheses to some curious identifications she made with Poe. Bonaparte shared with Poe the experience of many early traumas and sensitivities—early loss of a mother, concern with death, illness, fear of being buried alive, and an obsession with pits, containers, and various sadomasochistic themes.

Tytell contrasts Marie Bonaparte's problematic approach to Poe with Lacan's analysis of the story, "The Purloined Letter." The story lends itself to an illustration of the Lacanian theory of the role of the signifier and of what Lacan defined as the symbolic order. Language assumes central importance. Quite apart from its theoretical aims, Lacan's essay is a welcome relief from the speculative ventures of the early pioneers. Though it is couched in difficult language, it reveals Lacan's talent in examining a text as text.

We now come to the more contemporary scene in France, whose chief concern lies with the construction of the text and its relation to the unconscious, partly through a close examination of the reaction of the reader. Tytell is able to pinpoint the problems with the application of analysis to a text, but unfortunately she does not spell out ways of circumventing its limitations.

The French have set aside the attempt to see the text as some element of the author's biography. Instead, they have focused on the structure of the language, its formal characteristics, and analysis of the reader's reaction. Pontalis (co-author of the highly successful *Vocabulaire de la psychanalyse*), Mannoni, and Green (all three students of Lacan) have each tried their hands at this. They are sensitive to what the author may be trying to do to his reader—for example, trapping him, as James boasted he enjoyed doing. It is of interest that one of Lacan's early writings on applied analysis was his 1932 thesis, "Aimée or the 'Paranoia of Self-Punishment'," a detailed structural analysis of the speech and literary productions of a psychotic patient who had attempted to murder a well-known actress with a knife. The patient had been studied psychiatrically over an eighteen-month period, and Lacan showed great sensitivity

to the development of complex themes. What a pity he did not pursue this promising avenue of research.

The last section of Tytell's book is devoted to the more radical experiments in writing by analysts in France. They are largely of interest as curiosities and as examples of strange ideas carried to extremes. In order to fight what was considered the narcissistic intrusion of the author and his need to publish—what he termed the danger of "*poubellication*," a play on the words publication and *poubelle*, which means garbage can—Lacan created a review whose articles (except his own, by some peculiar quirk) would be published anonymously. Another contemporary current in France is the publication by analysts of so-called analytic novels, half confessional and half case history, with a blurring of autobiography, fantasy, and patient material. In evaluating such works, Tytell departs from the objective attitudes she has displayed so well until then. She fails to realize that the manifest content of such a hybrid work is no closer or clearer a manifestation of the unconscious mind than are the great novels of the preanalytic era.

What emerges from Tytell's study is a solid historical document that allows the interested reader to place the French scene in perspective. It would seem that the special sensitivity of that culture to the vicissitudes of language would give the French studies in applied analysis an advantage over our own efforts in the field, yet with rare exceptions the results are disappointing. They are certainly no better than some of the best efforts of our own literary scholars, such as Shoshana Felman or Meredith Skura.

FRANCIS BAUDRY (NEW YORK)

LETTRE OUVERTE À FREUD. (Open Letter to Freud.) By Lou Andreas-Salomé. Paris: Lieu Commun, 1983. 142 pp.

If I had to select my favorite text by Lou Andreas-Salomé, I would choose this *Lettre ouverte à Freud.* In it, near the end of her life (she was seventy), in a tribute to Freud's thinking upon the event of his seventy-fifth birthday, she unexpectedly developed a veritable conception of limits. It is a conception that should inspire modern psychoanalytic theoreticians, not only by its content but also in its style. Her purity of language brings radiant overtones, subtle shading, and almost palpable texture to what she has to say.

Her conception of limits is situated at the line of demarcation between the strange and the familiar, between the outside and the inside. She uses it to lend force and scope to her reflections on creative outpouring and on the psychoanalytic experience, which are seen as propping each other up. That which separates the poet and the analyst is, for her, similar to the right and wrong sides of a piece of fabric: in one case the eye takes in the overall motif, whereas in the other it focuses on single threads, on the lines they form, and on the way in which they interlace.

For example, one clinical configuration, which displays the confidence of desire, presents expectations as though they are fulfilled by the very reality that denies their existence. It goes so far as to blur the differentiation between reality and illusion if need be. Another, supported by the doubt inherent in the criteria of reality and of the mind, leaves decisions neither to an exterior nor to an interior space, but to some place *beyond* that transcends them both. But from the "ghost" in the works, the most intimate and strange, and from "the sealed coffin of the past," the looming phantom creates the sounds of Eros by clanking its chains, at times offering "the mirage of a surface where the void lies in wait, sometimes undermining the ultimate landmarks themselves" (pp. 63,64).

Analytic activity, like artistic activity, is based, according to Lou Andreas-Salomé, on the feeling "that we are equal within our human condition," which for her entails giving unreservedly of oneself while maintaining a certain degree of objectivity. "What emerges in us is something quite different from a mere intention or decision, different from more comprehension. . . . The explosion of the liberated instinct must be transformed into a new amorous ecstasy" (p. 17). This leads her to state, deliberately, and just as boldly, that analysis is the noblest of crafts and that to heal is an act of love. Here she concurs with an ethics of joy, which Spinoza called the only (kind of) perfection.

"Near you," wrote Lou Andreas-Salomé to Freud, "means, for me, to be there where I know you are always close to the depths, as close as possible" (p. 59). Her position vis-à-vis the master is not established through absolute dependency or through a stormy split. Nor is the relation to the Other to be measured in terms of fidelity to or betrayal of a concept. It is to be measured rather in

that which creates the finite and infinite nature of the relation. This means seeking to be as close as possible to the truth that underlies the relation. This is seen as including a sort of categorical imperative of drives.

Andreas-Salomé has grasped the essential part of the truth that was revealed by Nietzsche: that past or present Man, sharply conscious that he is subject to the danger of abstraction, is only beginning, slowly, to realize what he has done by killing God; the corpse still smells, and Man has not acquired the capacity to take over his act (p. 80). This does not mean, however, that Andreas-Salomé feels obliged to advocate the void in order to cover up the cry of the void. She sees nothing in the intense pleasure that is a part of the religious spirit which would corrupt its purity while it gives it its consistency. Nothing understandable can destroy that which within human conflict takes the form of a desire for redemption.

Indeed, the poet has every reason to complain about the "monkey of the mind" that sits upon his shoulder. The transparent veil that covers a work of art allows the viewer a glimpse of the extreme fragility which has produced it. Andreas-Salomé sees the sacrifice of creative momentum in Rilke as the point at which the foundation of his view gives way, the point from which he ventures far away. Her vision of art, which is different from Freud's, relies on this point. For her, the success of a work stems not only from the fact that the initiatory source has sunk into unobservable oblivion, but also from its exhaustion—from the oblivion of oblivion, so to speak. Repression, leading to the non-fulfillment of desire, acts only indirectly as an incentive to creativity; the most essential part of the creative process lies in something *which does not aspire* to fulfillment in reality.

Likewise, that which is related to the social order is secondary to the creative process, in that the essence of the process is connected to the joyous thrust, the rapture, which the work arouses in its creator. Here the dividing line between artistic creation and bodily experience tends to become blurred, as in Rilke's description of Duino's experience: "Leaning against a fork in the tree, he had the feeling that the tree's essence was literally flowing into him."

RENÉ MAJOR (PARIS)

FREUD ET LE YIDDISH: LE PRÉANALYTIQUE. (Freud and Yiddish: The Preanalytic.) By Max Kohn. Paris: Christian Bourgois Éditeur, 1982. 378 pp.

The title of this book contains a play on words (*préanalytique/pré analytique*—the preanalytic/the analytic field) and thus signals Kohn's interest in words as plastic material, an interest that is common in contemporary French psychoanalytic writings. Yet, while the book appears to be directed to readers interested in the interface between psychoanalysis and linguistics, it will be more satisfying to readers who are curious about Freud's cultural and intellectual history.

The author's central argument takes off from the following premise: "For Freud, who was completely a part of the German language, . . . Yiddish appears as something repressed which he no longer speaks even if he understands it" (p. 11, translations are my own). Before entering into the two main sections of the book—a commentary on various categories of Yiddish jokes followed by one on Freud's earliest writings—the author briefly traces the history and "prehistory" of Yiddish. He then announces that he will not take as his object the presence of Yiddish in Freud's work, but rather "this linguistic structure which he will, unbeknownst to him, put to work in his preanalytic works" (p. 12). The phrase "unbeknownst to him" reveals that this book will be another work attempting to look at the influence of Freud's blind spots on his writings.

The first section of the book proceeds, in a rambling way, to comment on a large number of Yiddish jokes, or *Witz*. Kohn refers only intermittently to the development of his hypothesis that there is something specific about Yiddish, a language related to the mainstream yet alienated from it, which provided a structure for Freud's thought. This part of the book is chiefly a catalogue of *Witz* organized around such themes as "Jews and Goyim," "Disbelievers," "Matchmakers," and so on.

Kohn refers at times to Freud's book on jokes, but his intention of writing a *Beyond the Relation of Jokes to the Unconscious* is not fulfilled. Freud chose to develop a theory of and from jokes by examining different types of them and by elaborating certain underlying principles relating back to his work on dreams, but Kohn's method provides little development of any of the concepts he works with. He tells one joke after another, interpreting each one

by applying a preconceived concept to it. This style of interpretation harks back to the days when psychoanalytic criticism of literature consisted of no more than pointing out that *Hamlet* or *Phèdre* was a disguised illustration of the oedipus complex. In addition, the author's interpretations often make use of improbable associations or leaps of logic to support preconceived, idiosyncratic notions. For example, Kohn recounts the following joke:

> Two friends meet:
> "Where are you coming from?"
> "I'm coming from an exhibition (*Ausstellung*). My landlord threw all my things out in the street" (p. 83).

His interpretation begins:

> Exclusion by the owner [landlord] of the signifier . . . is jokified [*witzisée*] by this story where the intimate exclusion of the subject in relation to its object is ironically played out.

The concepts developed from the jokes tend to stem from the line of French psychoanalytic writings most influenced by linguistics. However, the book, in its very form, strays from those concepts. The organization of chapters by themes of jokes, for example, departs from the notion that themes are a distraction from the deeper organization provided by the structure or by the interplay of signifiers. Also, Kohn's book does not offer the rich polysemy of many of the more interesting recent French psychoanalytic writings. In it, everything becomes a metaphor for sign, word, message, relations between signifier and signified, the "other" versus the "Other," and so on. Kohn does justice neither to the jokes, in his reductionist interpretations of them, nor to the relevant concepts to which he refers. He invokes the latter but does not develop them at any length. The early chapters do, however, leave us with at least one memorable quotation: "The signifier is *meshugge*" (p. 53).

In his introduction to the second part of his book, the author describes his intention as follows: "Starting with insignificant texts or translation notes, we must apply interpretation, and then construction, to the preanalytic" (p. 119). What follows is a series of commentaries on works written by Freud between 1877 and 1897. The commentaries range from extravagantly wild analysis to obsessive attention to detail, with a middle ground of historical comments that are often interesting. Yet the reader's patience is strained. For example, in the chapter on Freud's "Observations on

the Formation and More Delicate Structure of the Lobe-Shaped Organs of the Eel, Described as Testicles," a major argument is that "*Aals*" (eel) rhymes with "*Hals*" (throat), leading to the question: "What's going on in Freud's throat in 1877, since we know that he will die of a cancer in his mouth?" (p. 125).

Despite the far-flung conjectures included in these later chapters, the reader gains a sense of the enjoyment Kohn has had in putting together his reflections on Freud's early writings. There is a certain pleasure in following him along a rambling path which touches on the translations of Mill, the tubercle bacillus, syphilis, neuroanatomy, aphasia, and the two theses which Freud directed.

In general, the book suffers from an excessive effort to tie everything together. The basic organizing principle of the first part of the book—that the historical and internal characteristics of Yiddish played an important part in structuring Freud's thought—is forced, vague, and not well developed. The thrust of the second half of the book—that one can get to know the real Freud better through his preanalytic works—takes the reader on a path that leads to an unexpected turnabout: ". . . the details of this itinerary matter little. It was followed to be forgotten. The main point is that he invented psychoanalysis" (p. 371).

Kohn's taste for the anecdotal is clear throughout both sections of the book, as is his tendency to conjecture in ways that are often imaginative. The book would have been more satisfying if he had allowed himself to pursue his search into certain aspects of Freud's cultural and intellectual development without having felt the need to justify his work by making persistent allusions to complex but not very relevant theoretical issues that are popular in contemporary French analytic writings.

FRANK YEOMANS (NEW YORK)

PSYCHE REBORN: THE EMERGENCE OF H. D. By Susan Stanford Friedman. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981. 332 pp.

H. D.: THE LIFE AND WORK OF AN AMERICAN POET. By Janice S. Robinson. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982. 490 pp.

The literary world has appreciatively anthologized the poetry of H. D. (Hilda Doolittle, 1886-1961) as the supreme example of the

Imagist movement, which (from 1913) flourished for only a brief moment in literary history but nevertheless had a lasting influence on the direction of modern poetry. The scope of H. D.'s contribution to other literary forms has been less well known. Her reputation, too closely linked to "the perfect Imagist poem," has been limited by the often expressed view that her art was too fragile for the harsh modern world (Friedman, p. ix).

Now with the publication of these two studies, both of which make use of previously unavailable letters, memoirs, and manuscripts, H. D. emerges in a new dimension as a woman and as an artist. Her life and her art were an intricately intertwined quest. Self-discoveries infused her art, which evolved through a profound exploration of a woman's experience in a male-dominated world. Culminating in her most mature work, *Helen in Egypt*, which was first published just before her death at age seventy-five, the personal quest was wedded to the mythic quest to achieve a timeless and universal feminine perspective to stand alongside the traditional patriarchal foundations of Western culture.

H. D. and these two books hold special interest for psychoanalyst-readers on several counts: (1) H. D.'s psychoanalysis with Freud, and her later *Tribute to Freud*; (2) H. D.'s contribution to the understanding of female psychology; (3) the unusually close parallel between H. D.'s life experiences and her artistic creations, which sharpens the critical debate over the validity of deriving authorial biography from the fiction; and (4) general questions about the practice of psychobiography raised by these two books.

Both Friedman and Robinson are careful researchers, and their books are extensively annotated. Both portraits of H. D. are sympathetic attempts to elucidate her work in relation to her life. And yet the differing visions of the authors tend to lead us to a more limited view of H. D. from Robinson and to a more expanded view from Friedman. This divergence is equally true from the literary perspective, in that Robinson continues to stress the Imagist influence in H. D.'s later work, while Friedman points to Modernist trends in the earlier work and traces the emergence of a mature, unique achievement. I shall leave further literary analysis to those better qualified and concentrate on the areas of psychoanalytic interest listed above.

H. D. spent several months in analysis with Freud during 1933

and 1934, and a friendly relationship of mutual respect lasted until his death. Some years later H. D. wrote her *Tribute to Freud*,[1] which is a loving and human portrait of "the Professor" as seen through this free-associative reminiscence of her analytic work with him. Ernest Jones called it "the most enchanting ornament of all the Freudian biographical literature,"[2] and for that sentiment alone it is worth reading. However, if the reader pays careful attention to H. D.'s gentle "the Professor was not always right" (*Tribute to Freud*, p. 103) and to further material from H. D.'s diaries and letters during the time of her analysis, there is a far richer picture of the interplay of two creative minds. Though grounded in mutual warmth and respect, their relationship represented a series of polarities: man/woman, science/art, fact/vision, reason/intuition, theory of innate female inferiority/legitimate quest for primary feminine identity. But the *Tribute* is not a false picture so much as a reflection of the fact that "H. D. responded not to the condescending gallantry of the misogynist persona of his writings, but rather to the human being she visited every day for months" (Friedman, p. 153). She found harmony to transcend their differences and portrayed Freud as really an artist whose medium was science (Friedman, p. 117). Would Freud have called this resistance to his interpretations? Apparently, at first he did, but Robinson's study of H. D.'s correspondence about her analysis suggests that Freud did alter some of his views, at least as he applied them to H. D. (p. 331).

Friedman's *Psyche Reborn: The Emergence of H. D.* is the better of the two books on H. D.'s quest for a female psychology that is not derived from a phallocentric point of view. The issue here is whether her search for a woman-centered mythology is a demonstration of resistance to analysis and of the escapist function of her art, based on fantasy and wish fulfillment, or whether her art was the dimension in which she found the freedom to oppose existing realities and the oppression of a male-centered ideology (Friedman, p. 273). Perhaps it is a bit of both; perhaps we shall never know. Friedman emphasizes the oppressing realities, in-

[1] H. D. (1956). *Tribute to Freud.* Oxford, England: Carcanet Press, 1971.
[2] Jones, E. (1957). Review of H. D.: *Tribute to Freud. Int. J. Psychoanal.*, 38:126.

cluding Freud's views on women. Did he really say, as she claims (p. 270), that women contributed nothing but weaving to the development of civilization? Well, yes, he did say almost just that in his lecture on "Femininity."[3] What is important is that H. D. fused an answer for herself out of her lifelong struggle for personal and creative identity, a search that ranged through psychoanalysis and esoteric religion as well as Greek mythology and her art. And she offered an unstrident but bold voice in support of the view of Woman as the life-giver and nourisher, holding the primal position in the unconscious of the individual and the collective unconscious of the race. "H. D.'s development of the Goddess as a symbol of woman's authentic self in *Helen in Egypt*[4] represents the culmination of cultural transformation that began on a small scale in her imagist poems and grew to epic proportions in her later life . . . and thus establish[ed] a valid dimension of women's quest" (Friedman, p. 271).

In contrast to Friedman's focus on the universal and the epic myth, Robinson's *H. D.: The Life and Work of an American Poet* deals with H. D. essentially as a gifted woman who had troubled relationships with the people in her life and wrote about them using disguised names. It is of some interest to know about her intimate friendships with Ezra Pound and D. H. Lawrence—the question of whether H. D. is really Lawrence's Lady Chatterley occupies some space. But Robinson's detailed research gives us more than enough, so that by page 400 one tends to get weary of one more chapter about one more novel, poem, or memoir, complete with the cast of characters for translating the *roman à clef*. Of more concern than excessive repetition, however, is Robinson's assumption that one can move back and forth between the author's life and fiction as though there were no creative artistry interposed. She repeatedly begins with a biographical statement, shifts to a quotation from the fiction to support it or to supply the motivation, and then back again without missing a beat (*cf.*, pp. 40, 136, 147). It is true that H. D. herself encouraged this approach, for she declared her novels to be autobiographical (Robinson, p. xiv) and,

[3] Freud, S. (1933). New introductory lectures on psycho-analysis. *S. E.*, 22:132.
[4] H. D. (1961). *Helen in Egypt.* New York: Grove Press.

in writing to friends, would even interchange the real names with their fictional counterparts. However, H. D. also wrote to her friend Bryher, "These memoirs were written to lessen rather than to reveal to the public all the unhappy incidents of my life" (p. 154). Rather than taking this as caution, Robinson takes it as license: if the memoirs conceal, then the novels must contain the truth. She even tries to devise a logical scheme for deciding whose writing to believe as "truth" when there are inconsistencies between the various versions of the intertwined lives of the real and fictional worlds of H. D., D. H. Lawrence, and their spouses (p. 165). If she is thinking of some literary equivalent to the concept of psychic reality, and she seems to come close when she refers to "fidelity to the spiritual reality" (p. 167), then why all the bother about trying to reconcile the different versions of reality? This seems to be Robinson's approach to fiction, not just to H. D.'s "autobiographical" works, for she applies the same reasoning and fussy detective work to Lawrence's novels.

Robinson is missing something important both about fiction and about biography when she blurs the distinction and when her main concern is finding the "real identity" on which a character in a novel is based. Why does Lady Chatterley have to "be" someone, or be only one someone? Robinson seems to disdain the possibility of imaginative art. It is not a bad book in other respects. Since her book was published a year later than Friedman's book, Robinson apparently was able to incorporate much more of the newly available source material. There are many valuable additions in the form of letters, memoirs, and manuscripts. It is unfortunate that Robinson misused them in this way.

Both of these books come within a broad definition of psychobiography since they attempt to relate the subject's psychological development and inner life to her creative work. Both authors seem at home with psychoanalytic terminology and the analytic process as H. D. made it known in her *Tribute to Freud.* Friedman deals in greater depth with psychological material; hers emerges as a book on adult development in a creative artist. Neither author has given us any excess of psychological reductionism as is so often the case, especially in literary psychobiography, because of the temptation to read from the fictional characters back to the au-

thor's psyche. I have taken Robinson to task for reductive excess, if you will; but in a peculiar way hers are not really psychological reductions, for they are not so much reductions to "how sick" but to "who's who."

One final comment is in order. Given the characters (Freud and H. D.), the subject (the emergence of a woman artist proclaiming a new feminine myth), and the authors (two women), one might have expected that Freud would be more severely chastened for his failure to understand the psychology of women. Instead, I think he got little more than he deserved. Perhaps Robinson and Friedman took their cues from H. D., who responded to Freud, the *mensch*, rather than to Freud, the misunderstanding misogynist.

RALPH E. ROUGHTON (ATLANTA)

LIFE HISTORIES AND PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY. EXPLORATIONS IN THEORY AND METHOD. By William McKinley Runyan. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982. 288 pp.

Psychoanalysts, of course, do not need to be lectured about the importance of life histories, although many of them remain dubious about the possibilities of psychobiography. The life history is not merely an element in a psychoanalysis; the patient's recounting of his history and attendant dreams and free associations is the single most important event in his analysis. The best analysts are skilled interpreters of this event, but, somewhat paradoxically, they are less impressive when they recount a life history in their own version of a psychobiography, namely, a case report. Whether in the form of a written paper or of an oral presentation, the case study is likely to be factually sparse or limited since it necessarily requires the condensation of many hours of work by both analyst and patient into relatively few paragraphs. Frequently, the reporting analyst will confine himself to only those facts and patient memories, dreams, and associations that support his interpretations; ordinarily, we do not receive information that might point in a different direction. But even lengthy case reports are not free from confusions of evidence and inference, observations and speculations, inductions and deductions.

The book under review has much to offer those who have been troubled by these difficulties in reporting their own cases or in reading the reports of others. Runyan, a clinical psychologist who teaches at Berkeley, states at the beginning that his book's "intellectual roots are closest to those of personology in personality psychology, to the concern for individuals in the clinical professions, and to the interpretation of individual lives in psychobiography" (p. 13). Concerned primarily with "clarifying methodological and conceptual issues which arise in the study of lives," Runyan is not an advocate or adversary of any particular approach. He is occupied, rather, with explicating the diverse ways in which individual lives can be studied, and to this end he discusses a number of psychological and psychobiographical case studies, many of them familiar to psychoanalysts. Among them are Freud's accounts of Little Hans and of Schreber, and, in addition, studies of Jesus, Shakespeare, Lincoln, Van Gogh, Woodrow Wilson, Samuel Johnson, and Virginia Woolf, among others. Even Daniel Elsberg and South African Black Consciousness leader Stephen Biko receive attention, the former in connection with the CIA-sponsored psychiatric profile of Elsberg that achieved notoriety during the Watergate investigation, and the latter with reference to the inquiry into Biko's death in prison.

The problems raised by these studies cannot fail to have a sobering effect on the most enthusiastic psychobiographer. In the case of Jesus, the more than sixty thousand biographies that have been written only serve to prove that more is less: the "ironic consequence is that this deluge of scholarship has reduced rather than increased our store of accepted knowledge" (p. 23). Runyan does not mention that "this deluge of scholarship" is also a depressing commentary on the credulity of mankind since, after all, practically nothing is known about Jesus' first thirty years, or almost the entire period of his life.

Not that uncertainty varies in inverse proportion to the known facts. We know more about Shakespeare than about Jesus, but many remain uncertain (Freud was one of them) that Shakespeare could have written those great plays, or, for that matter, *any* play. About Van Gogh we know much more than we know about either Jesus or Shakespeare, but, as Runyan points out, not enough to be

certain why he cut off the lower half of his left ear. The author discusses more than a dozen "explanations" of the self-mutilation in an effort to illuminate one of the most urgent problems in psychobiography, the problem of alternative explanations. In the case of Van Gogh—and one could add many examples taken from the literature of psychoanalysis as well as that of history and biography—the question demanding attention is: "Is one of these explanations uniquely true, are all of them true in some way, or perhaps, are none of them true?" (p. 38). Those who believe an answer can always be found in Van Gogh's case and other cases are advised to read Runyan's discussion of the question (pp. 38-50).

The book's list of references fills thirty pages of small print, and clearly the author is familiar with all of them. For that reason alone, *Life Histories and Psychobiography* is almost required reading for psychobiographers. But, as already indicated, the book can serve as a valuable resource for those analysts struggling to make sense of their own or of other analysts' case reports. Every case report, however clinical, is to some degree a psychobiography and therefore vulnerable to the conceptual and methodological problems discussed at length by Runyan.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW (NEW YORK)

CHILDLIKE ACHILLES. ONTOGENY AND PHYLOGENY IN THE *ILIAD*. By W. Thomas MacCary. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982. 276 pp.

In the 1920's and 1930's, a series of studies by German scholars demonstrated that Homer lacked the vocabulary for designating the body or soul as a whole, but that his vocabulary was rich in words denoting parts of the body and aspects of mental functioning. From this peculiarity of Homeric diction, scholars such as Hermann Fränkel and Bruno Snell developed a theory of "Homeric psychology": "[Homer] lacks the consciousness of a unified organism. . . . There are no indications [that Homer comprehends] the psychic in its full abstraction, in its preeminent distinctiveness from the functioning of bodily organs. . . . Homer does not yet possess knowledge of that capacity of the mind to reflect upon

itself which we, in a special sense, call 'reflection' and 'consciousness.' "[1] Thus, Homeric man lacks a consolidated sense of self; he is a fragmented and uncentered being, a kind of "open 'field' from which forces freely emanate and which is freely permeated by outside forces, factual as well as spiritual. . . ."[2] "*Das Ich ist nicht abgekapselt, sondern ein offenes Kraftfeld.*" ("The I is not encapsulated, but is an open force field.")[3]

During the same period, the American scholars Milman Parry and Albert Lord, carrying forth the preliminary studies of the Slavic scholar Matthias Murko, discovered what amounted to a corollary of these views in the techniques of Homeric verse composition. Like the orally composed Serbo-Croatian epics with which it was compared, Homeric verse is built up out of a large, but limited store of traditional formulae for designating character and action: e.g., "swift-footed Achilles"; "And so, having spoken, he sat down." Thus, Homeric narrative, like the characters which populate it, is a whole no larger than the sum of its individually conceived parts.[4]

The manifold implications and consequences of these theories for Homeric studies are considerable, and Homeric scholarship in the modern epoch has been preoccupied mainly with their refinement, clarification, extension, and, sometimes, refutation. *Childlike Achilles* is the most recent addition to this literature, and the first attempt to consolidate these views within a psychoanalytic framework. It is a work of great originality and boldness, in which MacCary, abjuring what he characterizes as the "humanist" and "structuralist" readings of the *Iliad*, follows Snell in locating the archaic mind as it is manifested within the poem at the origins of European thought, and goes on to inscribe this "phylogenetic" pattern within the framework of Hegelian *Geistesgeschichte*. MacCary

[1] Snell, B. (1931). Review of Joachim Böhme: *Die Seele und das Ich im homerischen epos. Gnomon*, 7:75, 85, 82.

[2] Fränkel, H. (1939). Review of Walter Marg: *Die Charakter in der Sprache der frühgriechischen Dichtung. Amer. J. Philology*, 60:477.

[3] Fränkel, H. (1951). *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums*. Second edition. Munich: C. H. Beck, 1962, p. 89.

[4] For a fuller characterization and critical evaluation of "Homeric Psychology and the Oral Epic Tradition," see the article of that title by Joseph Russo and Bennett Simon (1968). *J. Hist. Ideas*, 29:483-498.

does not focus on the specifics of the Hegelian scheme, but attends primarily to those passages in *The Phenomenology of Mind* in which there is a fascinating (if fortuitous) correspondence of terminology and mode of analysis between Hegel and Freud: the mutual dependence of subject and object, the internalization of the subject-object relationship, the notion of self-consciousness as Desire, etc.

As a complement and parallel to this phylogenetic reading of the poem, MacCary draws on the psychoanalytic theory of narcissism to develop an ontogenetic perspective, and he proposes an interpretation of the character of Achilles on the analogy of the "narcissistic disorder." MacCary employs what he refers to as a "Freudian model corrected by Hegel (i.e., a Lacanian model)" (p. 42), which incorporates certain aspects of the theories of Otto Kernberg, Heinz Kohut, Margaret Mahler, and others.

MacCary postulates an originary state of narcissistic perfection analogous to Mahler's symbiotic stage, which is disrupted by the child's experience of lack and hence desire. However, it is not the lack of or desire for the mother as "object" which is at issue here—it is rather the child's image of himself as complete and perfect, an image which the mother, as mirror of his reality, as Other, has reflected to him, and to which he attempts to assimilate himself. The constitution of this image is itself a function of a world in which the father is absent and the mother, infinitely available, is not herself construed as object of desire: "[D]esire is a function of rivalry" (p. 78). "Without the rivalry of the father, the mother is not constituted as the child's object of desire. Instead, because of her infinite availability, he desires himself and demands from her that image of himself which she alone can provide" (p. 80).

The action of the *Iliad* centers around Achilles' struggle to recapture this image, which is variously designated as "the ideal ego, in a 'corrected' Freudian model" (p. 256), "[the child's] lost authentic self" (p. 80), "the narcissistic image of the self invested as object" (p. 126), etc. This struggle is conceived, in MacCary's interpretation, as internal to Achilles himself, with the other major characters in the poem functioning as "parts" of his incompletely consolidated self-image. Since MacCary is drawing simultaneously on several psychoanalytic paradigms, the terminology for designating the internal mechanisms at work shifts accordingly. Thus, Patroklos, Achilles' dear companion, functions variously as his

"ego-ideal" (pp. 128, 184), "self-object," "partial object" (p. 64), or "libidinally determined self-image" (p. 89). Hektor, the Trojan hero and slayer of Patroklos, whom Achilles sets out to slaughter in a vain and confused attempt to recapture that image of his own narcissistic perfection which the death of Patroklos has disrupted, becomes Achilles' "aggressively invested self-object" (p. 64), or "aggressively determined self-image" (p. 89).

Achilles is only the most extreme and fully developed example of a mentality which pervades the whole poem, as MacCary shows through an interpretation of a number of disparate themes and passages. Thus, women possess no inherent value as human beings and function only as the means through which men consolidate their relations with each other; warriors typically do not fight alone, but alongside a companion who provides the hero with the mirror which completes his partially developed sense of self; the slaughter of the enemy provides the hero with the means to ratify through violence his own existence; the use of the same verb (*mignumi* = "mix") for erotic and aggressive drives is symptomatic of the "originary" character of violence for which "sex [is] only one of its expressive modes" (p. 148); when women are despised as weak and passive, it is because they are associated in the hero's mind with the vision of his own naked and mutilated (castrated) corpse;[5] the glorification of youthful manliness in the poem, and the concomitant contempt for old men (and women and children), is a function of the pervasive nostalgic desire for and struggle toward the early, perfect image of the self; the valorization of the young warrior's death and the glory which attends it signifies a preference for self-obliteration (the death drive) through violence stemming from narcissistic rage over accession into the world of the fully constituted self and other.

The *Iliad*, then, is a "preoedipal drama" played out within the context of desire. At its heart there lies an "Achilles complex" which captures our imagination because "Achilles faces in the narrative progress of the poem the loss of what we have all experi-

[5] This point depends upon a complex and disputable argument which asserts that "castration-anxiety . . . is pre-oedipal," that "women have nothing to do with castration" (p. 80), because the struggle for existence takes place between men who define themselves in terms of their (phallic) weaponry and who atempt in battle to "castrate" one another by stripping the corpse of its armor (pp. 160-162).

enced in the early stages of our own development, namely narcissistic preoccupations in the context of unthreatening maternal support and the almost total absence of paternal intervention" (p. 93). Thus, MacCary's interpretation of the *Iliad* provides us with the means to explain our continuing capacity to respond to a text which embodies, in historical terms, an archaic or primitive period in the development of Western thought. For the unconsolidated sense of self which Achilles manifests, and its fragmentation into part-objects, represents the psychoanalytic correlate to—the symptomatology, as it were, for—Fränkel's "open force field," Snell's "lack of consciousness of a unified organism," and Hegel's interaction between two inchoate self-consciousnesses.

MacCary's reading of the *Iliad* is an undeniably appealing one, and only the stodgiest of readers will be able to resist the captivating ingenuity of, for example, his conjunction of Lacan's figure of *le corps morcelé* (the "fragmented body") in the mirror-stage, with the Hegelian idea that selves reflecting back upon one another collapse in mutual disintegration, and with Snell's observations on the "fragilization" of body parts in the Homeric conception of the organism (p. 85). However, in attempting an assessment of the book as a whole, one is left with the discomfiting feeling that the form of argumentation replicates the major themes of the work: the psychoanalytic paradigm is assembled from the fragments of disparate theories, and while notice is taken of the discrepancy in theoretical perspectives, there is no attempt to reconcile them within a larger scheme. The theory remains a collage, without a clear guiding principle or explanatory mechanism. Thus, Achilles appears now as Kernberg's borderline patient, now as Kohut's "shame-prone individual," now as trapped in Lacan's *stade du miroir*. The stunning interplay of conjunctions captures our attention at the same time that it leaves us confused and unsettled about what dynamic or economic principles actually make the system "work." One misses in particular a consideration of the work of Edith Jacobson, whose theories provide at many points an important "bridge" between Freud and contemporary object relations theory.

MacCary's interpretation of the *Iliad* is similarly disconcerting: individual passages, themes, and word groupings are made to yield up new and interesting meanings under the force of his adroit

intelligence. But an understanding of the dynamics of interplay which drive the narrative forward eludes us. Special pleading must often be invoked to account for characters and events in the poem (in particular, Hektor and his relationship with Andromache) which, in other interpretations, have both complicated the ethics of the heroic world and provided a counterpoint against which to measure Achilles' development within the epic. The interpretation of Achilles' wrath—the announced theme of the poem—as "purely a function of . . . internal conflict" precipitated by a mere "brush with . . . reality" (p. 91) serves to elide rather than to elucidate its astonishing force within the narrative as a whole. Thus, MacCary's reading gives us illuminating moments of insight into the *Iliad*, while at the same time it withholds from us a larger and more comprehensive account of the poem's internal logic. We are left at the end with a dazzling array of interpretive "events," but we lack a clear understanding of how the multiplicity of characters, themes, and actions intersect to form a literary entity. We have, one might say, gained a new Achilles, but we have lost the narrative world which made his existence possible.

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FLAUBERT AND KAFKA. STUDIES IN PSYCHOPOETIC STRUCTURE. By Charles Bernheimer. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982. 261 pp.

Despite its sophisticated scholarship, close reading of the language of fiction, and elegant thesis, this book runs aground on the shoals that have always made psychoanalytic criticism of literature a hazardous undertaking. Yet, sometimes bold sailings that end with a sleek new packet stranded on the same old tricky reefs provide valuable lessons for future sailors—both psychoanalytic and literary. So it is with Bernheimer's book, for it embodies the dilemmas inherent in applying concepts about human psychological development and functioning to literature.

Psychoanalytic literary criticism typically focuses on content, forgetting that innovative literature is unique in *how* it says rather than in *what* it says. In bold contrast, Bernheimer describes his project as follows:

> I have developed a theory of psychopoetic structure that enables me to recu-

> perate a subject primarily in the rhetorical shape of his writing rather than in the obsessive themes of that writing. . . . Relating metonymy to Eros and metaphor to Thanatos, I associate a text's constitutive tensions with a dynamic conception of the writing subject in conflict between opposing impulses (p. xi).

The argument draws primarily on Flaubert's *Correspondence* and on two fictional texts, *The Temptation of St. Anthony* and *Bouvard and Pécuchet.* It states that Flaubert was emotionally deprived in early life by a mother who did not adapt to her infant's needs "so closely . . . that she is felt to be an extension of him, he a part of her" (p. 70). Denied a sense of contiguity and dependent connection in early life, and thus unable to separate and individuate, Flaubert sought in his writing to make himself contiguous—as a part of a whole—with the world. Bernheimer relates this presumed developmental deficit to Flaubert's early preference for metonymy. Citing Fontanier, Bernheimer defines this figure of speech as

> 'the designation of one object by the name of another object which, like the first, is an entirely distinct whole but which owes the first, or to which the first owes . . . its existence. . . .' [M]etonymy is a relation of external dependence and not of arbitrary juxtaposition (p. 14).

Flaubert's wish to transform himself into the world and the world into him was doomed to disappointment. Just as Madame Bovary discovered that romantic fiction and provincial life could not be made one, Flaubert discovered that writing could not recuperate for him the missing union with another. Various disjunctions interrupted that sense of fusion—awareness of sexual difference, fear of castration, the vicissitudes of the oedipus complex. In reaction, Flaubert defensively retreated into the despair of his later works. Eros' binding power succumbed to Thanatos' disintegrating force. The joyful illusion of the transitional object, which blurs the difference between self and other, was replaced by the deathly anxious denial of the fetish, which seeks to permanently eliminate difference. Flaubert's psychic structure, now presumably constituted by the sadism of the repetition compulsion and powered by the death drive, became connected to the central trope of his more mature work, metaphor.

As with metonymy, the author's perspective on metaphor is crucial for his argument:

> Metaphor . . . is a Thanatotic process . . . that gap . . . that fissures any notion of identity or propriety. . . . From the psychoanalytic point of view, this is the

> type of mental functioning that characterizes the unconscious and that operates by . . . condensation and displacement. . . . Considerations of reality are entirely absent (pp. 33, 34).

In the somewhat narrow view of the repetition compulsion the author favors, an individual dominated by Thanatos repeats an earlier trauma, but for defensive purposes is unaware that seemingly different actions are but variations on a more distressing original theme. Repression creates a gap between the original and its copies and generates an endless chain of blind substitutions. Similarly, metaphor substitutes one word for another in an endless chain that denies the loss of the comforting connectedness of metonymy and defensively centers on the gap between word and referent. Metaphor is seen as a kind of repetition compulsion that guards against the traumatic discovery that word and thing are not one and denies the wish that they were.

Bernheimer's argument about Kafka draws on his letters, diaries, and two fictional texts, *The Judgement* and *The Castle.* It proceeds along similar methodological lines, though reaching ultimately a far more sympathetic view of that writer.

Basically, Bernheimer sees ideas from very different areas of human inquiry as analogues of each other. The "structure" of figures of speech echoes the "structure" of the infant mind echoes the "structure" of literary genius echoes the "structure" of psychoanalytic metapsychology. At one pole of psychopoetics, Eros, integration, metonymy, and *St. Anthony* cluster; at the other are gathered Thanatos, disintegration, metaphor, and *Bouvard and Pécuchet.* Literary figuration is seen as the evidence for a reconstruction of psychic structure; conversely, psychic structure is seen as the source of literary figuration. Psychological experience and words are counterparts, metonymically connected, metaphorically interchangeable.

A reassuring enclosure is drawn connecting author and text, experience and art, personality and trope. But should we be reassured? Analogic thinking can help us to see things in new ways, but there are certain dangers. We may mistake our models of the object for the object itself; we may conflate elements from very different levels of reference; we may rely too trustingly on models which themselves deserve scrutiny. Bernheimer succumbs at moments to each of these dangers.

To begin with, Bernheimer is too trusting of the models of psychoanalytic metapsychology. Metapsychology shares with structuralism the view that surface phenomena, whether psychologic, linguistic, or anthropologic, are directed by binary laws that operate below the surface. This intellectual perspective allows us to see—or to imagine that we see—what is below, beyond, and within the flux of experience. We feel in control, no longer subject to the randomness of "one damn thing after another." Yet, an inevitable question arises: Do structures repose in phenomena or do we impose them on the phenomena? Obviously, since all thought is projective in nature, there can be no easy answer. Concepts are products of human mentation. They are not simply given to us by the world, nor do they reside in the world. This is as true of psychoanalytic metapsychology as it is of other human inquiries.

In his eagerness to construct a "psychopoetics," Bernheimer reifies such psychoanalytic concepts as fetishism, life and death instincts, repetition compulsion, and narcissism, by "finding" them in literary texts. Freud's formulation of the death instinct, for example, may have been more a comforting movement into mythology in the face of certain perplexing clinical phenomena than it was a discovery about life. Bernheimer is too easily co-opted by the word *structure*, with its connotations of solidity, visibility, palpability—in short, of "thereness." Psychoanalytic structural concepts are simply a perspective on reality; they do not recuperate reality. Like any perspective, they help us to see some things while they blind us to others. They resuscitate neither texts nor authors. Structures do not a subject make.

Another major problem resides in the connections drawn between figures of speech and presumptions about early infantile life. The contiguity that characterizes metonymy, according to the author's particular view of that trope, originates in the contiguity between mother and infant. Words presumably mirror the physical and emotional union within the mother-infant pair, as posited by Winnicott and Heinz Lichtenstein. In his wish to trace the abstract back to the concrete, Bernheimer conflates elements from very different levels of reference into a false unity. The physical contiguity of infant and mother does not necessarily prove that they are mentally contiguous as well. Moreover, in the connection he draws, Bernheimer ignores what is most crucial about language,

including poetic tropes. Words are essentially arbitrary labels which may *point to* some aspect of physical reality, but they have no necessary or "natural" contiguity with any physical or emotional realm, including that of the nursery.

Once again, the author is not critical enough of the psychoanalytic models he employs. Psychoanalytic reconstructions of the inner mental experience of preverbal infants may themselves be a Romantic fiction we employ in our struggle to grasp that hidden period of life before language. Long before we had such concepts as the breast as undifferentiated part-object, symbiosis, or separation-individuation, Wordsworth wrote as follows about babies in *The Prelude*:

> Rocked on his Mother's breast; who with his soul
> Drinks in the feelings of his Mother's eye!
> For him, in one dear Presence, there exists
> A virtue which irradiates and exalts
> Objects through widest intercourse of sense.
> No outcast he, bewildered and depressed:
> Along his infant veins are interfused
> The gravitation and the filial bond
> Of nature that connect him with the world.

Wordsworth's description of the infant/mother pair reverberates richly with the work of Winnicott, Mahler, Lichtenstein, and others. Psychoanalysis and poetry seem to correspond nicely, and we are tempted to read the poetry as confirmation of our theories. Yet, following Meredith Skura's fine lead in *The Literary Use of the Psychoanalytic Process*,[1] we need to wonder: Did poetry speak a "truth" that psychoanalysis later discovered, or is psychoanalysis repeating the "truth" that poetry first created?

Though highly sophisticated in his analysis of literary texts, Bernheimer at times takes a remarkably unliterary view of his subjects' letters and diaries. For example, he analyzes a famous letter from Kafka to his father in which Kafka describes the "inner harm" inflicted when he was exiled one night to a balcony after annoying his sleeping (love-making?) parents with demands for water. Bernheimer argues that for paternal power to be exercised "with such devastating effect suggests a prior disturbance in the infant-mother relation" (pp. 150-151). But, in interpreting this letter we must be

[1] Reviewed in this *Quarterly*, 1983, 52:469-473.

constantly aware (as the author himself elsewhere points out) that Flaubert and Kafka were particularly self-conscious artists. They *were* writing. Given this, are their letters solely "documents"? Are they not texts, too? Two such consummate craftsmen were no doubt exercising their talents in their letters as well as in their novels. Bernheimer recognizes this possibility when he states that Kafka "*invites* his reader to consider this episode as an explanatory origin" (p. 150, italics added). Writers, like psychoanalysts, weave narratives about beginnings. Bernheimer later puts this aside when he takes Kafka's "intentionality" at face value and regards the letter as transparent self-revelation and reliable evidence for reconstructions of Kafka's actual relationship with his mother.

When dealing with two dreams in Flaubert's early work, *Mémoires d'un fou*, Bernheimer again blurs fiction with findings. Citing the ideas of another critic, he states that these dreams are "the transcription of dreams Flaubert actually had and . . . a key . . . to Flaubert's psychological disposition" (p. 75). However, even dreams reported in the analytic situation (which these are not) never are "transcriptions." Even real dreamers do the editing we know as secondary elaboration. Here, since we have neither an actual dreamer, nor his free associations, speculations about "psychological disposition" are hazardous indeed, and, in fact, return us to a preanalytic reliance on manifest content. But even if there were evidence that Flaubert actually had such dreams, there are other interesting questions to raise about dreams in fiction before concluding that they document the "psychological disposition" of their author. What *literary* purpose do they serve? Is the author persuading us of something, or inviting us to take a particular stance toward a character, by presenting certain material as a dream? How does the dream fit into the overall form of the text? What literary conventions or traditions is he employing in such a technical maneuver?

It is all too easy for psychoanalysts with no formal training in literary studies to see fictional texts only in terms of the unconscious psychological motivations of their authors. Such a stance is not necessarily wrong, though it is incomplete. If we are to appreciate literature in all its multiplicity, we need additional understandings that take other facets of literature, and the process of artistic creation, into account. In our clinical work, we try to remain "equidistant from id, ego, and superego" and attend to the prin-

ciple of "multiple function" so that we can help our analysand develop a self-understanding that is comprehensive as well as "deep." Similarly, our understanding of psychic reality is not confined to unconscious factors alone. It takes into account, in all their subtle interplay, conscious choice as well as unconscious motivation, adaptive as well as regressive function, conflict-free as well as conflictual spheres, reality orientation as well as primary process thrust. If a model that avoids closure and a search for unitary causes is crucial in our clinical work, it is equally so when we seek to understand literature. A literary scholar as highly qualified as Bernheimer might have helped acquaint us with the "multiple function" of the fictional dream but he focuses too much on seeing it in terms of the author's unconscious conflicts, "psychological disposition," and presumed early life experience.

It is not surprising that literature escapes the structure psychopoetics would place around it. Just when we think we have successfully transformed literature into "other terms," we realize that literature has been busy transforming us. Literature alters the very categories of our thought and changes the very critical instruments we use to investigate it. In this sense, books like *Sentimental Education* and *The Castle* are the best criticism of any overarching critical system that seeks to enclose them or their creators.

The author of *Flaubert and Kafka* wants to integrate beginnings and endings, experience and art, trait and trope. Flaubert and Kafka—and Freud in his most radicalizing and liberating mode—have given us texts that challenge such an appealing and synthetic project. The novels Bernheimer would enclose within a metapsychological structure question the very idea of structure. They radically subvert the conventional view of the novel—and of life—as having a clearly discernible beginning and ending or a readily knowable or deducible historical experience. Our views of human character as unified and fully understandable within *any* systematic structure are likewise called into exciting question. This does not mean that we must abandon our desire to understand human character, or to discern the differences between and the connections among origin and end, past and present, personality and artistic creativity. But it does mean that such projects are vastly more complicated—with ourselves the prime complication—than we may have suspected.

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ABSTRACTS

Psyche. XXXVII, 1983.

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The Young and We Psychotherapists. Horst-Eberhard Richter. Pp. 1-15.

What can psychotherapists learn from the new youth protests? While those of the older generation who are locked into occupational roles feel powerless and therefore do not wish to think about the risk of war or the danger to the environment, those young people who are oriented toward "alternatives" express the real social problems which their elders have repressed. Psychotherapists and others of the older generation can learn from the new protest movement that if the majority acted as the alarmed young do, the fate that has been prepared for us might no longer be what it is.

Anti-Semitism—A Male Disorder? Margarete Mitscherlich-Nielsen. Pp. 41-54.

Until now, anti-Semitism, a societal prejudice-sickness, has been viewed as being genetically derived from the psychosexual development of males exclusively. There is no direct correspondence between anti-Semitism and female socialization, in which fear of the loss of love takes the place of castration anxiety. Rather, anti-Semitism arises in women because of their adaptation to the ideologies of the world of men.

Language, Life Practices, and Scene Understanding in Psychoanalytic Therapy. Alfred Lorenzer. Pp. 97-115.

Freud stated that the repressed unconscious results from the separation of object representations from word representations. Lorenzer strips the seeming objectivism from this terminology by invoking other of Freud's texts. The object representations are memory traces of (as yet) nonverbalized interactions; that is, precipitates of experienced actions and models for future actions. By participating in the patient's game, the therapist can employ his scene understanding to deal with all the presented material in analogy to the interpretation of dreams. Scene understanding is, therefore, the royal road to the unconscious.

Relationship and Transference in Freud's Therapies and Writings. Walter Bräutigam. Pp. 116-129.

On the basis of reports by Freud's analysands, the author comes to the conclusion that Freud not only went beyond the rules he laid down in his writings on therapeutic technique, but that there is a contradiction. The concept of transference is supplemented by the notion of relationship between the analyst and the patient as the basis of the therapeutic process. The constitution and the shaping of this re-

lationship is a condition for any interpretive and corrective work on transference in psychotherapy.

Unwanted Pregnancy and Its Termination: An Opportunity for the Unconscious Staging of the Work of Mourning. Andreas E. Benz. Pp. 130-138.

The author proposes that for women who become pregnant without wanting to and then request an abortion, the fetus represents an introject with a separate existence; it is physically, but not psychically, incorporated. An abortion amounts to a developmental step—the separation from a lost narcissistically cathected object.

The Psychoanalytic Approach to Alcoholism. Wolf-Detlef Rost. Pp. 412-439.

M. Klein's psychological theory of object relations opened up new possibilities for the understanding of addiction which have barely been utilized in the treatment of alcoholism until now. Addiction and certain psychosomatic illnesses are two possible interchangeable expressions of a basic self-destructive disturbance derived from a troubled mother-child relationship. A treatment aiming at more than mere symptom change must address this basic disturbance.

Subject and Life History: The Role of Biography in Psychoanalysis and Behavior Therapy. Dieter Gröschke. Pp. 440-453.

A comparison of theories shows that psychoanalysis is defined as historical anthropology while behavior therapy operates with an ahistorical concept of the subject and must therefore be counted as a type of technology. The author reminds us that the intentions of psychoanalytic theory went beyond mere therapy. Psychoanalysis intends a general theory of the subject and of society.

The Scientific Demand for an Objectifiable Psychoanalysis. Gerald Ulrich and Jörg Wiesse. Pp. 454-461.

Recent tendencies to reconstruct psychoanalysis as a nomological science have given new life to the controversy between cultural and natural science methods. The authors demonstrate the limits of such an enterprise and plead for the linking of intersubjectively won evidence with objective data, so as to broaden the methodological basis of psychoanalysis.

Psychoanalysis without the Basic Rule. Henning Graf von Schlieffen. Pp. 481-496.

The author regards the rigid application of the psychoanalytic basic rule of free association as an externalization of the intrapsychic struggle surrounding the patient's and analyst's resistances. The externalization prevents what a recognized rule of psychoanalysis demands: that the resistances against making a content conscious be analyzed before the contents themselves are worked on.

The Evolution of Unconscious Structures. Fritz B. Simon. Pp. 520-554.

The primary union between mother and child requires a certain "analog" communication which, in turn, depends on unconscious objective structures. The ac-

quisition of language brings about the "digital" transformation of such "analogic" communications within the framework of interactional negotiation processes. Depending on the predominance of the paleocortex or the cerebrum, which exchange information with one another, consciousness and the unconscious will be either vertically or horizontally coordinated.

On the Origin of the Id: Freud, Groddeck, Nietzsche—Schopenhauer and E. von Hartmann. Bernd Nitzschke. Pp. 769-804.

Freud supposed that Groddeck borrowed the term "id" from Nietzsche. The author, in his search for the term's source, points out the great significance of Schopenhauer as "precursor" of Freud and also mentions Eduard von Hartmann (as well as Lichtenberg and Feuerbach). Freud's reference to Nietzsche is interpreted as a misattribution (on the basis of a cryptomnesia) which has been retained in the secondary literature.

Two Rediscovered Book Reviews by Sigmund Freud (1895): Scientific Context and Biographical Background. Oswald Kästle. Pp. 805-827.

Two book reviews published by Freud in 1895, but not attributed to him until now, are reprinted and discussed in regard to their scientific-biographic context. One is a review of a book by Hegar entitled *Der Geschlechtstreib* (The Sexual Drive) (1894) which deals with Bebel's *Die Frau und der Sozialismus* (Woman and Socialism). The other review concerns Moebius' treatise, *Die Migräne* (Migraine) (1894).

The Wolf Phobia in the Fairy-Tale, "The Wolf and the Seven Little Kids": The Origin and Meaning of a Type of Anxiety-Neurotic-Phobic Condition. Reinhard Plassmann. Pp. 841-846.

This fairy-tale (in the version of the Grimm brothers) contains the precise representation of the origin and resolution of neurotic (wolf-) anxiety. The defensive process consisting of several phases, which is clinically well known from conditions of anxiety neurosis and phobia, can be discerned in the story as well. In both cases this defensive process serves the re-establishment of the mother-child relationship.

From the Analysis of a Rubber Fetishist. Alexander Mitscherlich. Pp. 867-904.

Psyche herewith publishes for the first time an extensive case history from the estate of the late Alexander Mitscherlich. The patient had entered analysis in the early 1940's and was referred to Mitscherlich in 1948 by the colleague who had conducted the first phase of treatment. The therapy under Mitscherlich took place from 1948 to 1952. Mitscherlich presented the case of this fetishist to the psychoanalytic community several times. He considered publishing it, but did not do so during his lifetime. The present version was probably composed around 1955. Case histories of this sort have become rare in the psychoanalytic literature. Here we see the therapist Mitscherlich at his daily analytic work. Ordinarily only a fraction of this reaches the public.

"The Language of Tenderness and Passion." Reflections on Sandor Ferenczi's 1932 Lecture in Wiesbaden. Johannes Cremerius. Pp. 988-1015.

Unlike any other of Freud's early students, Ferenczi distinguished himself through his readiness for theoretical and technical experimentation. Toward the end of his life, this brought about a break with Freud. Fifty years after Ferenczi's death, Cremerius reconstructs Ferenczi's innovative proposals concerning psychoanalytic treatment technique, especially the broadened criteria for analytic treatment and the reconceptualization of abstinence. He shows the line extending from Ferenczi by way of Michael Balint and Donald Winnicott to the contemporary object relations theorists.

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Abstracted by Emmett Wilson, Jr.

Eurydice or Sublimation. Claude Le Guen. Pp. 823-840.

The precept, "Don't analyze a sublimation," has validity. One learns through experience that even to ask anything about sublimation may cause it to disappear, like Eurydice returning to the underworld. Le Guen reviews three major characteristics of sublimation: its change of aim, its aconflictual nature, and its social value. As a corollary of the change in aim, there is a change in act which nevertheless retains a close relationship with the original act. The new action is a creation, not just a production. Le Guen sees creation as the instrument linking sublimation with society and culture, involving the recognition of others and recognition by others. He suggests that sublimation begins in sexual conflict and ends in conflict, but that there is an interval in which the act is desexualized. This exclusion of conflict is due to the social and collective character of the fantasies involved in sublimation and is necessary in order to situate creation in the socius (the individual as a social unit). The model for sublimation may be found in Winnicott's transitional object. Sublimation would seem to involve this potential space between inner psychic reality and the external world. Deconflictualization is necessary so that this level can be discovered, thus preparing the way for cultural experience and creation. Sublimation, then, is a passage between the individual and society, between the psyche and the socius. It also involves the imposition upon the socius of a dream of infantile megalomania, causing society to recognize this omnipotence. Sublimation represents not only having a child, but also making oneself the child. There is a narcissistic triumph with a fusion with the introjected mother. The father has no place in this birth process, but his role is the important one of looking on and approving.

Notes on Some Problems Posed by Sublimation in the Pictorial Arts. Pierre Luquet. Pp. 901-922.

Freud's certainty that in finding the laws of pathology he had at the same time discovered those of the human psyche remains valid today. However, the more the weight of the past diminishes, the more the individual acquires autonomy, becomes

capable of novelty and creation, and tends to escape these simple laws. Psychoanalysis has unfortunately remained reductionistic with respect to the arts. It is a serious fault of theorizing to confuse the paths of integration with the diverse regressions discovered in psychopathology. This confusion leads us to overlook one of the most important aspects of human psychology, its capacity to evolve. And if we understand anything of the essence of art, it is its integrative function. Luquet proposes a "metaprimary system." In this theory, the preconscious has two poles, one oriented toward the unconscious and the other toward consciousness and language. The first is the metaprimary system. It uses the mechanism of the primary process, organizes symbolic material, and may find expression for itself in language, in music, in pictorial art or in other functions which are more or less autonomous with respect to its own integration. The metaprimary preconscious is an essential part of the ego. Its mode of functioning, however, is centered on mentalization without being clearly conscious. It offers many diverse possibilities of expression and is intuitive, in contrast with the intellectual and verbal functioning of the ego. It is primary in art and love and in experiential rather than intellectual knowledge. The pictorial arts are to be understood at the level of the metaprimary preconscious. Freud wrote of sublimation in terms of the displacement of the instinctual aim. Luquet focuses on the question of what the displacement shifts to. His thesis is that it contributes to the organization of a complex function that involves several distinct underlying instinctual fantasies. Unless there is such a function on the way to being organized, there cannot be a displacement of instinctual aim. With the abandonment of the object, instinctual energy is added to ego energy, and instinctual fantasies find an important discharge in the change of aim. The problem is not what impulses are most easily sublimated: it was once thought that these were pregenital impulses, but in fact sexual and genital impulses are equally capable of sublimation. Luquet's argument is that simplistic explications of art and artistic sublimation as merely perverse and pregenital fixations are not tenable. Analysts are confused sometimes by the presence of preoedipal impulses integrated into a postoedipal structure. This does not constitute a regression of the ego. A strong ego permits all libidinal regressions without fear, without eroding its structure, and without rigidifying its defenses. This is indeed the principal quality of artists, who are ready to run the risks so carefully avoided by those with character neuroses. An impulse integrated into a sublimation by pictorial representation is not a perversion, any more than talking of an act one would like to carry out is an acting out. Using such terms as perversion psychopathologizes art. For the pictorial arts, a preconscious interest in representation and the pleasure of seeing are involved, but the sexual aim is abandoned in favor of the aim of exteriorization of the representation. In the course of this complex and interesting paper, Luquet also discusses the drawings of children, the theme of narcissism, and the importance of self-portraits in almost all artistic productions, as well as the importance of the artist in the sociocultural context and tradition.

For a Resexualization of Sublimation. Florence and Jean Begoin. Pp. 923-941.

The authors review the development of the concept of sublimation in Freud's writings. The concept was introduced in 1905 in the Dora case in *Three Essays on*

Sexuality. The first sketches of a theory of sublimation were energic in orientation. In *The Ego and the Id,* identification was viewed as fundamental in the formation of psychic structure. At this point Freud introduced the concept of desexualization. This, however, would seem to limit "sexual" to the sexual act, which goes against the usual Freudian perspective. Freud's discussion of sublimation here fell back into the hydrodynamic energic view which preceded the introduction of the structural hypothesis. From this theoretical regression or confusion between the economic and structural points of view stems Hartmann's concept of neutralization. In 1923 Melanie Klein, in *The Psychoanalysis of Children,* analyzed the question of Leonardo's sublimation in almost diametrically opposed fashion. She viewed it as a massive and exceptionally precocious movement of narcissistic libido to object libido, in contrast to Freud's view of sublimation as the passage of object libido to narcissistic libido. Klein also saw sublimation as a reparation, while Freud held that it was a matter of using infantile polymorphous perverse impulses and exteriorizing them in a desexualized and socially acceptable fashion. The authors believe the contradiction is only apparent and can be resolved by a new understanding of the concept of narcissism and the two aspects of identification: projective or imitative identification, and introjective identification which assimilates the object into the ego. Klein, in writing of Leonardo and the passage of narcissistic libido to object libido, had in view the abandonment of infantile aims: the imitation of and projective identification with an object being abandoned in favor of an introjective identification, in which the love of the object prevails over the love of the self. This terminological quandary results from using the expression "narcissistic libido," which can stand for either primary or secondary narcissistic libido. But is the concept of desexualization necessary to understand sublimation? Is it metapsychologically justified? Meltzer has argued that work and sublimation only appear desexualized from a purely descriptive point of view, in the sense that the search for satisfaction does not imply sexual satisfaction, properly speaking. But from the structural point of view, adult work appears highly sexual. The authors then develop the Kleinian concept of reparation and symbolization, according to the work of Meltzer, Bion, and Hanna Segal.

Music and the Game of the Bobbin. On the Economic Point of View of Sublimation. André Brousselle. Pp. 943-970.

This article explores music and the genesis of the aesthetics of music from the economic point of view. Brousselle emphasizes the themes of tension and relaxation of tension, repetition and the denial of loss, as exemplified in the "Fort-Da" game Freud observed in his grandchild. He gives some technical analyses of music, ranging from classical and romantic to *Wozzeck,* and makes some suggestions about what he calls "post-Wagnerian metapsychology."

Evolution and Function of a Day-Dream in Treatment: Concerning Erotization. Claude Girard. Pp. 971-1017.

Girard shares in the recent interest in the nature of the personal history as told and discovered in an analysis. There have been different approaches to the past, according to one's theoretical viewpoint. Viderman has argued that a new history

is created in the process of analysis. Construction and reconstruction, history and fantasy, can at times be difficult to differentiate. Much of Freud's early work was concerned with daydreams and their relationship to dreams and symptoms. Girard reviews Freud's writings on this topic and discusses the various categories: daydreams, fantasies, reveries, screen memories, adolescent daydreaming, the family romance, masturbatory fantasies, and infantile sexual theories. The unity of the fantasizing function seems to rest in the latent content, permitting transformations and linkages with the manifest content. The daydream as a locus of exchanges and transformations has a privileged position in an analysis. A patient's proclivity for daydreaming permitted Girard to follow the evolution of the fantasies and the fantasizing function. To be able to tell stories indicates access to the field of illusion and the organization of its forms, and requires a certain maturative evolution. It is also a step in the mastery of ambivalence and of identifications. It indicates the establishment of a sense of reality which can permit this particular play of pleasure and anxiety. Girard reviews the progress of the case in which fantasy life was progressively reintegrated into psychoanalytic process, with greater definition of the personages and roles in the fantasies. This led to a differentiation of parental images and a mobilization of affect.

Aspects of Psychoanalytic Representation. Nicos Nicolaïdis. Pp. 1031-1064.

Nicolaïdis develops several hypotheses concerning the relationship between representation or idea, body image, language, and signifier. Laplanche and Pontalis have suggested that Freud's representation (*Vorstellung*) is similar to the linguistic notion of the signifier. However, the linguistic signifier is different from the psychoanalytic signifier. In psychoanalysis, the signifier does not represent a concept, but rather the impulses. It leads us not to the sign as in linguistics, but to the unconscious, that is, to thing representations. It is diachronic, in contrast to the synchronicity of the linguistic sign. Nicolaïdis suggests that prior to what Freud discussed as hallucinatory wish fulfillment, the infant experiences a sort of hallucination of the referent in which the libidinal impulses are represented by a concrete image of the object, yet signifier and signified are not yet distinct. This is representation prior to the development of signifying representation. The representation becomes a signifier and is incorporated into the psychic apparatus and acquires an autonomy in its protosymbolic function when separation and differentiation from the mother has occurred. Nicolaïdis connects the evolution of the signifier with the evolution of writing and language. He discusses Freud's use of language as well as his ideas about pictographic writing and proposes that writing is a sort of corporal prototype of language. In hieroglyphics the primary process is expressed, and the representation of words and things (signifier and signified) is not sufficiently distinguished. Nicolaïdis claims that language is only a verbalizable inscription of representations of things, a virtual writing, based on mnemic traces which are preeminently corporal. Writers have noted that the body image develops in close linkage with the acquisition of language in the child, between the ages of nine and twelve months. There is a sort of mirroring in pictographic writing, in which there is a primacy of the representation of things. The author finds this relationship between object and representation to be derived from the mimicry and gesticulations exchanged with the mirroring mother.

Organization of Thought by Prime Numbers and Metapsychology. Guy Rosolato. Pp. 1065-1095.

Rosolato's intention is not so much to make evident the use of prime numbers in rational or scientific work, but rather to discuss what he feels are symbolic constants in the usage of the prime number. He recognizes that his work will meet with resistance because prime numbers are also used in mystico-religious or parapsychological contexts. However, Rosolato believes his work is a metapsychological approach, an attempt to show that each numerical configuration is determined by crucial experiences of childhood which psychoanalysis has made evident as a crossroad of psychic development. He then discusses the metapsychological aspects of numbers. He sees one as unity and permanence, the emergence of one's own body and psyche. Zero signifies emptiness, contradiction, and death. Two suggests the conflict or struggle between life and death impulses, and the differences in the sexes. Three would introduce oedipal considerations, and so on.

Some Reflections on the Relationship Which Links Repression with the Capacity To Symbolize. Ilana Schimmel. Pp. 1097-1118.

Schimmel considers symbolization in terms of breaks and linkages. The capacity to symbolize is the capacity to establish a relation, that is, the capacity to accept a break or absence and the possibility of elaborating it through psychic work which produces and destroys symbols. Schimmel's hypothesis is that this function is rendered possible through the process of repression, since this is the mechanism that makes and unmakes such relations. She presents a theory of the development of the sense of separateness and distance between mother and child, based on the work of Melanie Klein, Hanna Segal, Bion, and Winnicott. In her view, the infant must have had the experience of holding and the good container (Bion) in order for a separateness and sense of reality to develop. The infant must develop the possibility of healing this distance through a psychic reality which is reliable and reassuring as well as open to information coming from the exterior. This function must be capable of being enriched by being brought into question. Not only is the good enough mother necessary to promote this mode of functioning, it is also necessary that this mother be repressed so that the mode of functioning may be organized around contents linked to adult sexuality, such as oedipal and castration themes.

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Abstracted by Emmett Wilson, Jr.

The Image of the Father and the Fear of the Tyrant in the 17th Century. Jean-Marie Apostolides. Pp. 5-14.

We have difficulty in understanding the unconscious of the seventeenth century. Each society delineates a field of the unconscious, for the unconscious is not universal any more than the forms of the family or alimentary practices are. We must

evoke other "conceptual tools and instruments" to permit an understanding of the seventeenth century and its *ancien régime*. We cannot equate the paternal imago of nineteenth century Vienna with the seventeenth century view of the king. At the time of the triumph of the absolutism of Louis XIV, the nation utilized the invention of the "king's body" to regard itself as a totality above the traditional categories of the three orders. The king, then, had a double body. He was a private individual, but he was also the symbolic body, who was immortal and through which the nation defined itself. Some playwrights, including Corneille, deal with the personal sacrifices which a king makes as a pact and offering. These constitute a total and irreversible gift which legitimizes the kingship. Sometimes the sacrifice is a symbolic self-mutilation, as in renouncing one love object to marry another for reasons of state. This sacrificial gesture permits the king to leave the universe of men for that of history. When this sacrifice is refused and royal or imperial power is placed in the service of individual and private enjoyment, as in Racine's Nero, we have a tyrant. The father, in order to preserve an uncontested power, destroys the symbolic rapport he has with his children or his subjects. He breaks the pact which permits him to be differentiated from the imaginary; he becomes real, and a tyrant. In Racine, there is a regressive "mutation" in the paternal image, as it changes from the castrating father to the bad mother who may annihilate, destroy, dismember, or devour. A fear becomes manifest: that a woman installed at the heart of the state will set in motion the disorganization of this great machine. Some of the same themes can be seen in seventeenth century comedy. The father may become a tyrant with the express wish to hold on to his daughter for himself or for an alter ego. Thus it is important, in the seventeenth century view of the state and of the nuclear family, that the head of the state or the family be able to control his passions and possess the virtues of self-mastery. There is an appeal made outside the family group with its faulty head. The group invents another father, more distant and powerful, to impose order and security and to complement the political universe.

Feminine Figures in the Work of Gérard de Nerval: Tentative Reconstruction of the Maternal Image. Janine Cophignon. Pp. 15-46.

The author believes we can learn something about Nerval, the genesis of his work, and his tragic end by relying on the writings of Freud, Abraham, and Klein on the psychopathological mechanism of manic-depressive psychosis. The sublimatory mechanism which worked so well at some times in his life did not suffice at other periods. Cophignon views Nerval as a manic-depressive with a rhythm to his illness which was partially determined by biographical circumstances. All through his work was a vain search to recreate the lost object, his mother, from real, imaginary, and literary figures. His biography shows an early and massive affective deficit, linked to the absence of his mother from the eighth month of his life and her death when he was two. He never saw his mother, nor any portrait of her. His mother died in Germany, and Nerval was long fascinated with the German language and culture. The author provides a rich and detailed psychobiographical study of Nerval, tracing the relationship between the creative phases in his life and the real events he experienced. For Nerval, external events always seemed to add to internal conflict, leading to further decompensation, and ultimately, to suicide.

Psychoanalytic Discourse and Abstract Art. Anita Kechickian. Pp. 47-63.

The appearance of abstract art is virtually contemporaneous with Freud's own work. Freud, however, showed a gross misunderstanding of abstract art. In a letter to Abraham in 1922, his response to an abstract portrait of Abraham was to call it "horrible." He caustically suggested that such an artist might confirm Adler's theory that only a person afflicted by a grave perceptual defect would strive to become an artist. Psychoanalysis had certainly been no stranger to art, but art, as understood by Freud, was representational. It was always *of* something. What was interpreted was the content, the meaning which was given through the form. Abstract art, devoid of any such representational content, would seem to invalidate Freud's general approach. Kechickian argues that the problem has indeed changed, but that this does not invalidate the psychoanalytic view of art. Another approach becomes necessary. Abstract art is not a bearer of meaning already there. Rather, abstract art must be thought of as an object plus two subjects, the artist and the spectator. Such art is nonrepresentational. However, it is the product of human activity, an object produced by work. The artistic activity then becomes its own end, something which might be compared to the notion of games. Each work is productive of an original space. The colors and configurations vary from art work to art work. Hence the concepts of Winnicott on transitional space and transitional objects may be applicable. The author also refers to the work of Paul Schilder on body image. Schilder placed emphasis on a continuing process of internal construction and destruction, on the lability of the postural model. The spatializing activities of the artist in the construction of his object are then in a relationship with the variations in the configurations of his own body. For the artists with an abstract product, the goal is the moment the artist's senses work in equilibrium with the establishment of forms and colors which produce a unity. The artist puts outside of himself spatial elements of his own body image, starting from an undifferentiated point (e.g., an empty canvas). The work then becomes a stranger to him and rejoins the things in the world. The spectator encounters the abstract art object which is neither created by himself nor found in the sense of a completely exterior object. For the spectator, the art object is also situated in transitional space. Kechickian concludes that psychoanalysis has the concepts to analyze abstract art when viewed in this manner.

The Paths of Creation in the Work of Stéphane Mallarmé. Henri Vermorel. Pp. 65-97.

One of the fundamental themes in Mallarmé's work, according to Vermorel, is the idealization of the poet's mother, whom he lost when he was five years old, and of his sister, whom he lost when he was fifteen. Though there were other losses, especially the death of his young son, Anatole, in 1879, all of which prompted themes of death, tombs, etc., in his work, the main underlying theme seems to be reunion with his mother whom the omnipotence of ideas brings to life again in a sort of nostalgic return to primary narcissism. Vermorel considers the importance of mourning in grief and in creative activity. Melanie Klein argued that the creative impulse is contemporaneous with the depressive phase and is born of the need to restore the lost object. A psychological critic of Mallarmé, Charles Mauron, catalogued a network of obsessive metaphors which underlie Mallarmé's work. But,

according to Vermorel, it has not been sufficiently noted that this group of metaphors relates exclusively to the mother's body through the intermediary of the voice, a voice which sings alone or with old instruments. There is emphasis on the eyes as well in these metaphors discerned by Mauron. This would link with Spitz's work on the maternal visage. Vermorel argues that for Mallarmé, writing was an incestuous act, an orgasm transmuted into literature. He reviews many aspects of Mallarmé's life in the light of these themes and notes the curious period of Mallarmé's life in which he edited a women's fashion magazine under female pseudonyms. He discusses also the posthumous *Book*, a megalomaniacal sketch of a "new sort of supreme art which would resume all art," and which placed Mallarmé as a fantasy god of autocreation. This return to the mother and to narcissistic origins implies a narcissistic regression which relates literary creation to the dream and to madness.

Oedipus in the Circus. Michel Soule. Pp. 99-125.

Soule offers an amusing and fascinating study of the circus, especially the circus clowns and their effects on latency age children, their parents, and their grandparents. He discerns several unconscious themes. There is the aspect of the development of a transitional space, a space of games, play, and make-believe. The circus performers appear to abolish gravity (jugglers and acrobats). Dwarfs abound, indicating that one's small size does not matter. Fierce and terrifying animals behave docilely. Elephants and horses perform their physiological functions in front of everybody. Domestic animals are made laughable. The duo clown team, in France known as Auguste and the White Clown, articulate many things that the child had long thought about his conflicts. The author examines the pleasure that each of the three generations might seem to find in the clown duo. Auguste is infantile, without repression, and with obvious polymorphous perverse traits. The White Clown represents parental authority, confusions about the parental couple, and the expression of anal sadism as well as narcissistic completeness. The audience to which the clown act appeals is especially the latency age child. Before that age the child is afraid, while after the age of eleven or twelve he is no longer interested. The spectacle is thus especially appealing to the child who sees in it his struggle with his instinctual world and his environment. Each generation experiences and discharges its own conflicts in the humor of the clowns.

Itineraries. Paulette Wilgowicz. Pp. 165-175.

This is a brief consideration of the work of Marguerite Yourcenar from a psychoanalytic point of view, especially the development of her work out of themes, ideas, projects, and sketches from early in her life. Wilgowicz focuses on the character of Zeno in *L'oeuvre au noir* (translated as *The Abyss*).

The Narcissistic Woman: Freud and Girard. Sarah Kofman. Pp. 195-210.

On Things Known Since the Beginning of the Century. René Girard and Psychoanalysis. Gilbert Diatkine. Pp. 211-223.

These two articles deal with the work of the French literary critic, René Girard,

whose theories have been developed in his books, *Violence and the Sacred* (1972) and *On Things Hidden Since the Beginning of the World* (1978). Diatkine provides an excellent summary of Girard's main theses, with which readers may already be familiar. His theory of mimetic desire would place identification in the role of the primary motivational principle of life. Girard links such desire, which takes another as a model, with violence, since there is an implicit rivalry. Religion, ritual, and the scapegoat are various means society has utilized to control the violence inherent in mimetic desire. According to his theory, sexual love is an accessory consequence of identification. Diatkine is impressed with the analyses of myth and tragedy which Girard offers, once the myth or tragedy has been "processed" through Girard's point of view. However, he suspects that Hellenists and students of mythology probably find as many objections to Girard as analysts would when dealing with Girard's analysis of the familiar Freudian texts. He concludes that Girard offers original and productive ideas but turns them into a sterile dogma. Kofman's article is an extract from her forthcoming book on the woman in the texts of Freud. She cites a passage in the article, "An Introduction to Narcissism," in which Freud commented at length on the narcissism of women and the attraction it has for men. This unassailable libidinal position of the woman is comparable to animals of prey, to cats, to the great criminal as presented in literature, and to the humorist. All these have one thing in common: they attract men and are envied by them for having safeguarded their narcissism and their independence. Kofman finds this passage rather atypical for Freud, who was wont to reduce feminine psychology to penis envy. She regards this text of Freud's as rather Nietzschean and wonders whether this is an influence of Lou Andreas-Salomé, with whom Freud was fascinated at the time of writing this passage. The comparisons are, except for the reference to the humorist, rather Nietzschean in character. Moreover, the text is Nietzschean in establishing a differential typology. The author criticizes Girard's discussion of this passage and his conclusions about feminine psychology in general. Girard suggests that narcissism on the woman's part is a strategem, a lure to appear self-sufficient in order to attract men. Kofman feels this point of view is unfair both to women and to Freud's unwonted perspicacity in this passage.

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Meeting of the Psychoanalytic Association of New York

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NOTES

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK

November 15, 1982. THE ANALYST AND THE PATIENT'S OBJECT WORLD; NOTES ON AN ASPECT OF COUNTERTRANSFERENCE. Theodore J. Jacobs, M.D.

Dr. Jacobs focused on an aspect of countertransference that has been given little attention in the literature: the analyst's reaction to objects in the patient's life. The analyst may develop emotional reactions to people in the patient's life that affect the analytic work. Because these reactions are not directed at the patient, they often are not recognized as countertransference phenomena and are not the subject of the analyst's self-analysis. Reactions to the patient may be displaced to the patient's objects and are thus hidden from the analyst's scrutiny. As the analyst develops mental representations of the patient's objects, he may invest them with aspects of self- and object representations from his own present and past. The patient's account of these objects may reawaken in the analyst fantasies, memories, and expectations from his own childhood that unconsciously affect his feelings about the object and the patient either through re-enactment or defense. In the special situation in which the analyst knows someone in the patient's life, he may, in guarding against conscious reactions, neglect the possibility that the object evokes unconscious responses in him with links to his own childhood experiences. Reconstructions may also be invested with the analyst's unconscious associations to the objects of the patient's past.

Dr. Jacobs used Racker's 1968 comprehensive definition of "countertransference," in which the term encompassed all of the emotional responses stirred up in the analyst by his contact with the patient. He elaborated upon Racker's terms, "complementary" and "concordant" identifications and "direct" and "indirect" countertransference. Complementary identifications—identification of the analyst's ego with the patient's internal objects—are the result of the patient's treating the analyst as a projected internal object. This, according to Racker, is what is meant in common usage by countertransference. Concordant identifications refer to the processes whereby the analyst identifies a part of his personality with a corresponding part of the patient's personality. Direct and indirect countertransferences refer to responses in the analyst toward the patient induced directly by the patient or indirectly by others. Thus, indirect countertransference may be stimulated by the analyst's contact with a supervisor or a colleague.

Dr. Jacobs presented several clinical vignettes from his own experience and from that of colleagues to illustrate these points. (1) An analyst presented a case at a clinical conference in which he seemed to join his patient in idealizing the patient's young son. This related to his feelings about his own son, who was the same age as his patient's son. The analyst was critical of himself for having ambivalent feelings

toward his son, who was experiencing some difficulties. (2) At a seminar, an analyst who was otherwise well attuned to his feelings toward a young male patient, described the patient's father, who had failed to help support the patient after a divorce, as a "no-goodnik." When his strong feelings toward the father were pointed out, he easily recognized residues of feelings from his own family circumstances. (3) Dr. Jacobs and members of an ongoing seminar group to which he presented the case of an adolescent girl found themselves reacting negatively to the patient's mother. It was only after his attitude became balanced upon meeting the mother that he realized he had been affected by the patient's intensely positive transference reaction and by his own difficulty in accepting aggressive feelings toward the patient. These feelings were more easily discharged toward the mother. (4) Dr. Jacobs upgraded his diagnosis of a young woman, originally seen as being borderline, after she gave an insightful and appreciative account of a paper presented by a friend and colleague of his. He was aware that his admiration for his friend had influenced his view of the patient. When the reaction lingered, he gave it more attention and was able to trace it to an experience in his own childhood. Forbidden by his parents to attend an after-school sports group because of their disapproval of the group leader, he was saved by a visiting cousin, an eccentric young woman who had sensed the importance to him of the group leader and had persuaded his parents to let him continue in the group. As happened years later with his patient, he had immediately upgraded his view of his cousin, no longer seeing her eccentricities.

Dr. Jacobs pointed out that in the description of his treatment of Dora, Freud had expressed strong feelings about Dora's mother and about her father, whom he had treated for syphilis. These feelings, as well as his reactions to Herr and Frau K, may well have influenced his perceptions of these individuals and compromised his ability to work with the emerging maternal and paternal transferences.

Dr. Jacob's most extensive example involved his analytic treatment of a young executive. He was fascinated by the patient's descriptions of his boss, Mr. B., an unusually talented, powerful business tycoon and a self-made man. When the patient nearly left treatment, Dr. Jacobs found himself saddened at the thought of hearing no more about Mr. B. When Mr. B. was hospitalized with a severe coronary thrombosis and the patient was then given major responsibility in the company, Dr. Jacobs found it difficult to empathize with his patient's reaction of mixed exhilaration and fear. He realized that he had been angry at the patient for concentrating on his own good fortune and forgetting Mr. B. Utilizing his own associations, dreams, fantasies, and emotional reactions within the analytic hours, Dr. Jacobs was able to uncover some determinants of his reaction. His own father had developed an incapacitating illness some time before this patient's analysis began. His conscious reaction had been a mixture of sadness, anger, and loss. Less conscious but detectable in dreams and fantasies was a reaction best described as guilty satisfaction that it was he to whom other family members had turned for advice, guidance, and leadership. It was the unacceptability of this reaction in himself that had caused him to be critical of his patient in a similar situation. Dr. Jacobs then became aware of how his image of Mr. B. had become interwoven with childhood images of his father and residual transferences toward his former analyst, who had died a few months before this patient's treatment began. Dr. Jacobs's father, though not a successful entrepreneur, had been to him "a man of magic, the Cecil B. DeMille of the paint business." This early view of his father had contributed to an

idealized image of his analyst which had been reactivated by the analyst's death and given new life in Mr. B. Also, his fear of his father, whom he had heard raging at an employee, had caused him to join his father in imagination as commander of the troops. Years later he responded to his patient's transference fantasies that made him an authoritarian father by identifying with Mr. B.

In addition, the patient had transferred to Dr. Jacobs the role of a much admired older brother. This was a role which Dr. Jacobs valued in his own family. His wish to accept this role had caused him to join the patient in overlooking the envy and rivalry between them. As Dr. Jacobs gained an understanding of his reactions to Mr. B., he became aware of his own envy and jealousy of the patient, who was being chosen by Mr. B. as the favorite son, a role Dr. Jacobs had long ago wished for with his own father.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Milton Horowitz said that Dr. Jacobs's observations widen the sphere of "countertransference" to encompass the analyst's reactions not only to the patient but to the large population of the mental representations of objects in the patient's mind. The analyst might react to the patient and his objects in the transference setting not only because of the stirring of old fantasies about persons in his own life but also because he is equating parts of his own personality with those objects. Similarly, the patient's presentation of "objects" may be projections of parts of the patient's personality. Dr. Horowitz compared this with the psychology of dreams and with the structure of novels, in which two or more conflicting portions of the personality are represented as separate characters. What the patient depicts as the "object" may have only a limited historical and developmental validity, in that it may represent aspects of the patient's conflicts presented as persons. With such presentations, the patient may be attempting to seduce the analyst to react to the "pictures" of mother, father, etc., and thus to violate the objective stance by reacting against the patient's drives, defenses, or superego contents appearing in the disguise of "persons." Some analysts have a greater capacity than others for visualization. Dr. Jacobs's descriptions imply a special capacity for depicting or "visualizing" the objects in the patient's life. The descriptions "come alive" under certain circumstances by confluence with objects from the analyst's own past. This, too, has a counterpart in dream psychology. Vividness and a sense of reality in a dream most commonly come about via condensation. Dr. Horowitz felt that Dr. Jacobs's work alerts us to the possibility that the analyst's picture of the patient's objects may serve a variety of expressive and defensive needs. Even a description may have a structure similar to a symptom, a compromise formation involving drive, object, and defense. He suggested that knowledge of this phenomenon sometimes gives rise to the technical preference of some analysts for "transference" interpretations which bypass the objects outside the analytic situation. Dr. Melvin A. Scharfman felt that Dr. Jacobs's definition of the term countertransference was overly broad. In the strict sense countertransference refers to a process parallel to transference, implying involvement of early infantile object relationships. He questioned the use of the term in cases in which the analyst displaces affects from his own current situation onto the patient, citing Dr. Jacobs's case of the analyst who accepted his patient's idealization of his son because of conflicts about his own son. This was not countertransference in the usual sense. Dr. Scharfman also questioned Racker's equating countertransference with complementary identification, the analyst's reaction to having been treated as a projected internal object

by the patient. Countertransference reactions could be induced by the patient in this way, but not all countertransference reactions are induced by the patient. Dr. Scharfman addressed the particular problem for the child analyst, who is aware of the danger of forming a "real picture" of the parents, which can interfere with analyzing the patient's subjective experience of the parents. Information about the "reality of an object" makes it more difficult for the analyst to devote himself to the intrapsychic phenomena of the patient. Dr. Scharfman questioned whether the analyst and patient eventually understand the actual qualities of the figures in the patient's childhood and whether we ever really reconstruct external reality. Referring to the case of the adolescent girl described by Dr. Jacobs, Dr. Scharfman emphasized that when one accepts so globally an adolescent girl's description of her mother, there is likely to be an interfering response on the part of the analyst, and self-analysis would be indicated.

HERBERT H. STEIN

MEETING OF THE NEW YORK PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY

November 30, 1982. THE FEAR OF KNOWLEDGE (The 34th A. A. Brill Memorial Lecture). Milton H. Horowitz, M.D.

In a fascinating and illuminating lecture, Dr. Horowitz wove together references to some of the great poets, ancient mythology, religious writings, and clinical psychoanalytic case material to discuss the pervasive human phenomenon, the fear of knowledge. He began by reminding us of Sophocles' and Thomas Gray's writing of ignorance as bliss and of Milton's writing of "the sweetness of Eden and the everlasting sadness of a *Paradise Lost* through man's disobedience." Such wishes to return to the infantile past are not the concerns of poets alone. They are well known to psychoanalysts in the phenomenon of transference and in patients' fantasies of "cure." The wish for a terrestrial paradise in the consulting room, the fear of knowledge expressed in the phenomena of defense and resistance, and the mournful fear of separation and death as part of the process of termination of treatment are regular manifestations of the psychoanalytic situation. Dr. Horowitz reminded us of the wide-ranging myths, legends, and sacred texts warning of the danger of knowledge, such as the Biblical version of the Fall of Man after tasting the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge, and the mythical story of curiosity leading to the opening of Pandora's box. And yet mankind reveres knowledge and honors the learned. Thus, we see how the desire to know and the fear of knowing exist in conflict in cultures as well as in individuals.

For a certain group of patients, elements of the story of the expulsion from Paradise are a part of their personal psychology. They fear knowledge and avoid acquiring it as if to do so were sacrilegious. They fear the loss of the "Paradise" of attachment to parents who loved and nurtured them. They avoid knowledge of their own and their parents' sexuality, as well as other knowledge about their parents and other people, as if knowledge of such matters carried great dangers with it. Each of us has this problem in a lesser way: a perpetual unconscious defensive

battle against the awareness of our inner conflicts and of the external world, so that our capacities to perceive and test reality vary and fluctuate. Dr. Horowitz reminded us that children's acquisition of knowledge proceeds as they progress through the various developmental phases explicated by Piaget, Mahler, and others; that they develop the ability to control or modify their environment in both reality and fantasy; and that they progress through the developmental sequences of anxiety situations first described by Freud, all of which are touched upon in the Biblical story of the expulsion from Paradise.

Then Dr. Horowitz turned to a set of myths and stories about the fear of looking into closed containers, at the peril of mutilation, madness, and death. One such myth is about Pandora, which begins with an episode of parental insult—the slighting of Zeus and the mockery of a trick sacrifice by Prometheus (similar to the story of "the Fall of Man"). Authority is challenged, Man's puniness is revealed to him, and his urges are punished as crimes. This tale includes Pandora's box and the intriguing issue of what lies within and its potential for horror. A patient suffering from an obsessional neurosis described the "closed casket of the mind," into which he was afraid to look because it was like a sewer. He feared losing control of his infantile sadistic impulses and their emergence in the form of insanity as punishment, which to him meant damage to his genitals (by displacement) and being isolated in a hospital (separation).

This fear of learning about one's mind may be matched by a fear of the analyst's curiosity, which is experienced as invasiveness. One patient's fear of this "invasiveness" stemmed from a history of her mother's having given her frequent enemas. Patients often blame their mothers for many problems. The woman as temptress and witch, intruder and troublemaker, is derived from real and fantasied experiences with the mother who not only nurtures her children but also "civilizes" them by frustration and training. She is the model for "beautiful Eve and alluring Pandora, for the horrid Gorgon Medusa and for the Three Fates who are said to govern our lives."

Referring to the syndrome called pseudostupidity, Dr. Horowitz spoke of the patient's fear of curiosity and learning, and how he may be warding off intense voyeuristic impulses in order to avoid anxiety or guilt and may at the same time be obeying and rebelling against his parents who frustrated his curiosity. The pseudostupid patient is often the "wise fool" of fairy-tales. Just as the wise fool gains access to closed places, so the pseudostupid patient gains access to closed places, thus gratifying his voyeuristic impulses.

To be *unknowing* in order to evade guilt can be seen as a social phenomenon as well as a personal symptom. An example of this is the seemingly "unknowing" state of so many Germans about the fate of the Jews. Less dramatic examples can be seen when death or some grievous harm has come to someone and guilt which would be too painful to bear is hidden by means of "not knowing" what has happened. Philosophers since the ancient Greeks have written about man's wishfulness distorting knowledge; Freud added that *fear* also plays an important role in this. What we "know" is limited by the process of defense as well as by the consequences of desire. The wish to avoid knowledge is especially evident in attitudes toward death, the final separation. The ancient Egyptians worshiped Osiris, the god who died and returned to life. Modern people show this inability to believe in the permanence of death in their use of defense mechanisms such as isolation and a

phenomenon described by Freud as the splitting of the ego in the process of defense. Many mythologies and religions refer to an afterlife which varies, depending upon a judgment of the dead person's moral worth. Through the ages, people have developed magical attempts to influence that fantasied journey, such as the Egyptian Book of the Dead, the Eleusinian mysteries, and requiem masses. All require ritual repetition without liturgical deviation. In relation to one of these, Aristotle said of the initiates that they "do not learn anything so much as feel certain emotions. . . . " They were excited, exhilarated, awed, joined with each other in a sacred band. Descriptions like this sound similar to certain transference fantasies in the course of analysis; the patient sees the analysis as a pathway to safety: "the awesome emotion attached to the figure of the analyst, the 'positive' aspects of transference providing an engine of suggestion that creates a situation in which, in Aristotle's words, they 'do not learn anything so much as feel certain emotions'." Many patients fear their curiosity in the transference because of reactions against voyeurism or because it will interfere with their attempts to relive the past. They are unconsciously afraid the analyst will be different from the parent of childhood; they are trying to recreate the world of childhood. Such a need to reconcile wishfulness with current reality has contributed to some of man's greatest creative outbursts, such as Columbus's feelings of having discovered by sailing west a terrestrial paradise thought to be located in the east and medieval man's building of Gothic cathedrals depicting on earth an image of heaven. The fantasy of a safe haven is a common transference fantasy and is often connected with fantasies of confession of "sin" and of forgiveness. For the patient to unmask these is painful and makes termination akin to a period of grief.

The task of psychoanalysis is to face the truth of one's own inner life through the analysis of the transference. Few people can unreservedly pursue that search for truth and show an unwillingness to be deceived by wishfulness or by fears. "To be curious, to search, to *know* oneself, is perhaps the only human freedom, but there could be none more noble."

RICHARD G. KOPFF, JR.

MEETING OF THE PSYCHOANALYTIC INSTITUTE OF NEW ENGLAND, EAST

June 13, 1983. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC NEUTRALITY. Axel Hoffer, M.D.

Briefly touching upon the unclear yet important role of neutrality as a concept in psychoanalysis, Dr. Hoffer called attention to the fact that Freud did not use the word "neutrality" (*Neutralität*) but rather the term "*Indifferenz*," translated as "neutrality" by Strachey. There has been an ongoing debate about whether remaining true to the concept of neutrality is somehow antithetical to the analyst's genuine involvement with the patient. Dr. Hoffer defined the concept of neutrality in terms of specifiable conflicts, suggesting that this would make it operationally useful for a deeper understanding of analytic data. Such a definition includes the patient's

intrapsychic conflict, the interpersonal conflict in the analytic situation, and conflict within the analyst. Dr. Hoffer described two clusters of meaning assigned to neutrality, one having to do with feelings of indifference, unconcern, or detachment, the other with power or influence. He then reviewed the concept of neutrality, beginning with Freud's paper, "On Transference Love," and Anna Freud's classical formulation of psychoanalytic neutrality as a stand equidistant from the id, the ego, and the superego. He noted that her definition focused on intrapsychic conflict and did not explicitly include the analyst's view of reality. In regard to the dyadic aspect of psychoanalysis, Dr. Hoffer cited Warren Poland's recent paper which examined the implication of this omission. Also cited were Fliess's contribution on the "metapsychology of the analyst" and Sandler's description of the analyst's "role responsiveness" as extending beyond cognition and affect to the analyst's actual behavioral responses. More recent papers by Harold Blum, Anton Kris, and Roy Schafer, as well as the one by Poland, focus on the importance of the analyst's neutrality in respecting the patient's individuality.

Dr. Hoffer next presented three clinical vignettes using the definition of neutrality with respect to feelings and power to illustrate how the theoretical orientation can influence the analyst's focus of attention and can lead to a potential shift in his neutrality. He also referred to a vignette from Greenson in which the analyst conveyed his "true" feeling of annoyance with a "nagging patient." Dr. Hoffer felt that it might have been more useful for the analyst to maintain neutrality with respect to his feelings and to remain true to a definition of neutrality with respect to conflict. This would have provided the analyst with an opportunity for exploration of his patient's conflict of ambivalence toward herself. In an illustration of an hour in which a patient repeatedly referred to himself as resistant, Dr. Hoffer showed how, by remaining neutral to this self-definition, he could explore the patient's conflict regarding hostility toward authority figures. The neutral position allowed the analyst to escape being drawn into a sadistic attack upon a masochistic patient.

Neutrality with respect to power was explored by Dr. Hoffer in discussing the analyst's goals, expectations for the patient, decisions regarding termination, etc. He questioned whether the analyst can be neutral with respect to power or influence. For instance, he wondered whether suicide as a choice can be fully explored with a patient. This becomes an ethical dilemma with patients for whom self-destructiveness is self-protective. He discussed the many examples in which the analyst takes a clear stand, e.g., regarding fees, termination, emergency situations, or acting out behaviors such as marriage, pregnancy, and missed analytic hours. This led to a discussion of Paul Gray's views on (a) emphasis on the patient's mind "inside" the hour rather than on his life "outside" and (b) transference versus nontransference interpretation. Commenting on Gray's example of a young female patient contemplating a trip which would interrupt her analysis, thus illustrating a focus within the hour, Dr. Hoffer felt this could be viewed as a prejudgment based on a theory of treatment requiring transference interpretation.

Finally, Dr. Hoffer proposed an expansion of Anna Freud's definition of neutrality to include: (a) interpersonal conflict in the psychoanalytic relationship and (b) conflict within the analyst. This would introduce a fourth point of "equidistance,"—the "external reality" defined as the person of the analyst and his particular way of constructing external reality. Such a view would make the concept of

neutrality more congruent with the current emphasis on the two-person aspects of psychoanalysis while retaining a primary focus on intrapsychic conflict.

DISCUSSION: Dr. Samuel Silverman noted that Fenichel, in his 1941 monograph, *Problems of Psychoanalytic Technique,* made four points relevant to these issues. (1) Fenichel referred to the misunderstanding of the phrase "the analyst as a mirror" and commented on differences between analysts in their influence on the patient's behavior. (2) He mentioned that Grete Bibring had noted that the sex of the analyst could be a decisive factor for some patients and not for others. (3) He commented on the analyst's feelings of countertransference, suggesting that if the countertransference is primarily of a libidinal nature, it is less troublesome than if it is of narcissistic origin or a defense against anxiety. (4) He wondered how the patient could be protected—i.e., how good was the analyst's own analysis?—and stressed the importance of honesty and integrity as well as the humanness of the analyst. Not only did Fenichel speak of the analyst's own conflicts; he also brought in the concept of reality, i.e., the idea of beginning at the surface and working toward more depth. Fenichel felt that the behavior of the analyst should not be stilted, and he advocated using examples from real life. Dr. Sheldon Roth recalled that Fenichel had talked of countertransference in terms of neutrality in several places. Dr. Robert Kenerson mentioned other contributors to the history of the concept of countertransference, e.g., James T. McLaughlin in his papers, "The Sleepy Analyst" and "Transference of the Analyst," in which he suggested a change in the term "countertransference." The problem, Dr. Kenerson felt, lies in the dual role of the analyst as gratifying and frustrating. Dr. Alexandra Rolde raised the question of confusion between the concept of countertransference and neutrality. Dr. Hoffer felt that neutrality includes countertransference but also encompasses the analyst's concept of the goals of psychoanalysis and how they are to be achieved. Dr. Arthur Valenstein commented that the term neutrality arose before 1930, and since that time there have been changes in the goals of psychoanalysis. Its application has been extended from conflict neuroses to developmental neuroses, and the term transference has also been extended to apply to developmental defect. With respect to dealing with outer reality, Dr. Valenstein referred to Robert Waelder's paper, "The Principles of Multiple Function," in which the ego is seen as central to integrating and modulating forces coming from the id, the superego, and the outer world. Dr. Valenstein observed that we must determine whether we are discussing the outer reality of the patient or our own, and whether we are colluding with the resistance of the patient. Everyone prefers to change outer reality and yet in analysis it is the inner reality which must be shifted. Within the framework of some points of view, there is no room for neutrality as such: e.g., those who adhere to the object relations theory are offering the patient a second chance to grow up within the transference, which thereby precludes neutrality.

Dr. Hoffer wondered if Dr. Roth and others use the concept of neutrality equally for those patients suffering from conflict and those suffering from developmental deficit. He felt that patients with deficit disorders can also be understood in terms of conflicts, e.g., the conflict of self-protection. Thus a boring patient may be thought of in terms of "what conflict the patient is bringing into analysis." Dr. Roth felt that with such patients he would focus more on the patient's primary object—

mother—rather than on the patient's intrapsychic conflict. Dr. Valenstein's opinion on this issue was that if the analyst were to listen in terms of conflict, such a patient would associate to his mother anyway. He pointed out how a patient can use success in one area of his life (e.g., in work) while in analysis as resistance to further exploration and change in other areas of neurotic conflict. A difference of opinion arose as to whether a developmentally deprived patient can be seen in terms of conflict, as Dr. Hoffer proposed, or whether, as Dr. Valenstein pointed out, such a patient's defensive maneuvers are conflicts between himself and the outside world. There is a lack of trust as well as many preverbal issues which can be distinguished from defensiveness. Dr. Cornelius Heijn was concerned that the concepts of conflict and neutrality become too global in a way similar to the concepts of Schafer's action language. He appreciated Dr. Hoffer's paper, especially the discussion of Greenson's vignette illustrating the struggle to maintain an analytic position. It stimulated his thinking in relation to supervision of residents where development of the notion of neutrality and how to understand and appreciate it is difficult to teach. It becomes an issue especially when restraint on countertransference is necessary. He pointed out that neutrality grows out of respect for the patient's autonomy and from a conviction that the patient's resolution of the conflict will be more helpful than what our resolution would be, i.e., we must see the patient as an active agent. Residents get into difficulty in terms of not having appropriate respect for the particular solution of the patient. He urged that we develop this aspect of neutrality more thoroughly.

ALEXANDRA K. ROLDE

Dr. Martin Wangh has been awarded the first Walter Briehl Memorial Prize for his essay, "The Implications of the Nuclear Threat for Psychoanalytic Theory." This essay contest is sponsored by the SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA PSYCHOANALYTIC SOCIETY to honor the memory of its member, Dr. Walter Briehl, pioneer psychoanalyst and champion of civil and human rights. The prize is awarded for the best essay utilizing psychoanalytic thinking to deepen the understanding of issues of significance to human rights.

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